

Democratic pedagogical authority in large music ensembles: A participatory philosophical inquiry

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This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my mom, Heather Pyrcz (1951-2022), who was a fierce advocate for the promise of education and who inspired me every day in the pursuit of knowledge, beauty, and love.

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Abstract

This dissertation examines ethical complexities that arise when music teachers pursue multiple, sometimes competing, democratic educational aims, particularly in the context of large music ensembles such as school wind bands and orchestras. The analysis focuses specifically on normative tensions involving the exercise of teachers' pedagogical authority in music classroom contexts.

In order to illuminate these ethical complexities, I develop a conceptual framework that incorporates a series of philosophical distinctions regarding educational, democratic authority. This conceptual framework serves two related purposes. First, it complicates and contrasts with a widely held perspective in contemporary music education theory, which implies that band conductors' pedagogical authority inevitably reflects and reinforces larger anti-democratic patterns of social hierarchy and inequality reproduction. Second, the framework provides a theoretical foundation for a qualitative study of music teachers' efforts to exercise their pedagogical authority in the service of democratic aims.

The design of this study broadly follows the methodological principles of normative case studies. Normative case studies present complex ethical dilemmas, where there is no obviously correct course of action to take. These dilemmas are analyzed to clarify the principle values at stake. Echoing these aims, through interviews with expert music educators, I sought to generate data that captures the ethical complexities music teachers face in practice. However, I expand normative case study methodology in this dissertation through a participatory philosophical inquiry approach, whereby teacher participants deliberate together in a focus group modelled on the Community of Inquiry. The purpose of this participatory approach was to co-construct and collaboratively analyze normative case studies that relate directly to the dilemmas music teachers face in relationship to their pedagogical authority. I then offer a systematic philosophical analysis of the findings of the multi-

stage participatory inquiry. This weaving of teachers' experiences, beliefs, and normative intentions, with traditional philosophical concepts of democratic authority aims at grounded reflective equilibrium between theory and practice.

The analysis of my qualitative study yielded several important conclusions that advanced my initial research goal, which was to describe, analyze and evaluate the ethically complex nature of music teachers' deliberation and exercise of their pedagogical authority in the service of democratic aims. First, I show how the complex ways teachers described employing various pedagogical moves toward their democratic goals, and the dilemmas they faced in this pursuit, presents a serious challenge to common scholarly metanarratives that narrowly consider directive teaching approaches as repressive of students' democratic agency. Second, investigating notions of student voice that arose in discussions with teachers, I suggest that realizing fully the democratic values of student voice requires clarifying the democratic ends to which voice aims, and how those ends might conflict in practice. This proposition implies a responsibility on the part of teachers to structure student learning in ways that identify and protect their democratic goals. Finally, I discuss how teachers' perspectives urged a reconsideration and expansion of my initial framework of authority to include a relational view, where teachers and students hold the capacity to shape one another's normative environments in pursuit of the best possible outcomes. The nuanced views of pedagogical authority presented in this dissertation open clearer pathways to employ our authority as conductors in ways that can promote the development of students' musical and democratic capacities.

Résumé

Cette thèse examine les complexités éthiques qui apparaissent lorsque les professeurs de musique poursuivent des objectifs éducatifs démocratiques multiples, parfois concurrents, en particulier dans le contexte des grands ensembles musicaux tels que les harmonies scolaires. L'analyse se concentre spécifiquement sur les tensions normatives impliquant l'exercice de l'autorité pédagogique des enseignants dans les contextes de classe.

Afin d'éclairer ces complexités éthiques, je développe un cadre conceptuel qui incorpore une série de distinctions philosophiques concernant l'autorité pédagogique et démocratique. Ce cadre conceptuel a deux objectifs connexes. Premièrement, il complique et contraste avec une perspective largement répandue dans la théorie de l'éducation musicale contemporaine, qui implique que l'autorité pédagogique des chefs d'orchestre reflète et renforce inévitablement des modèles antidémocratiques plus larges de hiérarchie sociale et de reproduction de l'inégalité. Deuxièmement, il fournit une base théorique pour une étude qualitative des efforts des professeurs de musique pour exercer leur autorité pédagogique au service d'objectifs démocratiques.

La conception de cette étude suit largement les principes méthodologiques des études de cas normatives. Les études de cas normatives présentent des dilemmes éthiques complexes, pour lesquels il n'existe pas de ligne de conduite manifestement correcte pour les enseignants. Ces dilemmes sont ensuite analysés pour clarifier les valeurs éducatives en jeu. Faisant écho à ces objectifs, j'ai cherché, par le biais d'entretiens avec des enseignants de musique, à générer des données qui rendent compte des complexités éthiques auxquelles les enseignants de musique sont confrontés dans la pratique. Cependant, j'ai élargi la méthodologie dans cette thèse en adoptant une approche d'enquête philosophique participative, dans laquelle les enseignants participants prennent part à un groupe de discussion modelé sur l'idée de la 'communauté d'enquête.' L'objectif de cette

approche participative était de co-construire et d'analyser en collaboration des études de cas normatives qui se rapportent directement aux dilemmes auxquels les professeurs de musique sont confrontés en relation avec leur autorité pédagogique. Je propose ensuite une analyse des résultats de l'enquête participative. Ce tissage d'expériences, de croyances et d'intentions normatives des enseignants, avec les concepts philosophiques traditionnels de l'autorité démocratique, vise à établir un équilibre réflexif entre la théorie et la pratique.

L'analyse de mon étude qualitative a permis de tirer plusieurs conclusions importantes qui ont fait avancer mon objectif de recherche initial. Tout d'abord, je montre comment les façons complexes dont les enseignants décrivent l'utilisation de diverses mesures pédagogiques pour atteindre leurs objectifs démocratiques, et les dilemmes auxquels ils sont confrontés dans cette quête, représentent un sérieux défi pour les métarécits courants. Deuxièmement, en étudiant les notions de voix des élèves qui sont apparues lors des discussions avec les enseignants, je suggère que pour réaliser pleinement les valeurs démocratiques de la voix des élèves, il faut clarifier les objectifs démocratiques visés par la voix et la façon dont ces objectifs peuvent entrer en conflit dans la pratique. Cette proposition implique la responsabilité des enseignants de structurer l'apprentissage des élèves de manière à identifier et à protéger leurs objectifs démocratiques. Enfin, je discute de la façon dont les perspectives des enseignants m'ont incité à reconsidérer et à élargir mon cadre initial de l'autorité pour y inclure une vision relationnelle. Les vues nuancées de l'autorité pédagogique présentées dans cette thèse ouvrent des voies plus claires pour utiliser notre autorité en tant que chefs d'orchestre de manière à promouvoir le développement des capacités musicales et démocratiques des élèves.

Contributions

I am the sole researcher and author of this work. In addition to the editorial support of my committee, I would also like to acknowledge that Chapter 3 has evolved from a co-authored manuscript with Dr. Kevin McDonough, an early draft of which was presented at the International Society for the Philosophy of Music Education symposium in 2022 in Oslo, Norway. Secondly, the normative case study which is presented in Chapter 1 was co-created with Krista Bryson. I would like to offer my sincere gratitude to Krista, and all participating teachers, whose collaborations were central to the development of this dissertation.

Chapter 1: Dilemmas of authority in band: An introduction

You want to dance the masque, you must service the composer. You gotta sublimate yourself, your ego, and yes, your identity. You must, in fact, stand in front of the public and God and obliterate yourself.
 -Lydia Tár (Field, 2022)

This dissertation investigates the complex interactions between teachers' pedagogical authority and democratic education as it pertains to instrumental music education. Secondary school music education in Canada and the United States has traditionally been synonymous with participation in wind band.¹ Within North American high schools in particular, a central role of music teaching is conducting large music ensembles (LME) such as wind bands and orchestras, leading student musicians toward a unified interpretative vision of musical works. However, the value of LMEs in secondary school music education has become increasingly contentious within music education scholarship over the past several decades. Of primary concern is the potential stifling of students' democratic capacities through traditionally directive, often authoritarian, instructional practices and the pervasively Western musical traditions associated with wind band pedagogy.

In this dissertation, I will suggest that while current theoretical narratives of democratic music education offer several important critiques to the traditional practices of conductor-led ensembles, they are theoretically insufficient to capture the complex ways authority and democracy interact in educational practice. This lack of clarity, I will show, leaves teachers without adequate conceptual resources to consider how they might employ their pedagogical authority toward democratic ends within their individual teaching situations, and particularly in light of conflicting democratic educational values. To consider these complex interactions of theory and practice

¹ Wind bands are often referred to interchangeably as wind ensembles or concert bands, despite slight variations in the composition of these distinct ensembles, historically speaking. Pedagogical wind bands, to which I refer here, typically consist of 30-60 musicians performing on woodwind, brass, and percussion instruments. For an interesting discussion of the distinctions between pedagogical wind bands and American wind bands in the tradition of Sousa and Gilmore, see: Mantie, R. (2012).

regarding democratic pedagogical authority, I begin with normative case study.² This case, drawn from my study's research data, casts light on the sorts of difficult normative and ethical tensions music teachers encounter when they seek to enact their authority toward democratic educational goals.

Krista's dilemma

The music department at Krista's school, as she describes it, was a 'band place'. Band education *was* music education at Three Oaks Senior High (TOSH), as it was throughout Prince Edward Island, the Canadian province in which Krista's school was located. As Krista described, when she started teaching, there were very few high school music programs on PEI that offered alternatives to band (for example, orchestral strings, choral, piano, or composition-based programs). The high school concert band scene in the province, however, was flourishing, with strong enrollments and the attainment of high standards at regional and national music competitions such as MusicFest Canada.

Krista had graduated from TOSH's band program herself and she had gone on to study at prestigious university music programs, performing in high calibre wind bands across North America. She was, as she put it, "all in with band." When Krista returned to her hometown as the new music teacher, she strove to uphold and enrich the successful and well-established band program at TOSH for the first twelve years of her career. Krista valued deeply the skill sets her students were gaining through band: the ability to work with and listen to others, the long-lasting friendships nurtured through collaboration toward a shared goal, and a shared sense of time and musicality.

However, Krista wrestled with concerns about some of the "old school" teaching methods associated with band, and the heavy reliance on band-as-music education at TOSH and throughout

² Normative case studies as a qualitative-philosophical hybrid methodology are introduced later in this chapter, and explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.

PEI³ at the expense of other forms of music making. Her concerns were wide ranging, from the reverence of conductors and composers that commanded a singular view of music, which she felt limited, at times, students' authentic musical expression and creative potential, to concerns about the degree of competition involved in music learning through regional and national music festivals and the authoritarian teaching practices it encouraged. She also held strong concerns that wind band repertoire and practices were "literally drowning in colonialism," and the fact that the students represented in her band room were primarily middle-upper class and white. Finally, Krista worried about the significant disconnect between learning through band and 'real world' music making.

For the early years of her career, Krista strove to address these concerns within the band program, teaching with care and open-mindedness, regularly stepping off the podium and sitting with an instrument in the ensemble while a student conducted, exposing her students to music from composers of diverse backgrounds, discussing the socio-political context of the music they were performing, and including students' ideas whenever possible. Despite these concerted efforts, however, her concerns were not greatly assuaged.

After several years of abstaining from entering her ensembles in the regional music festival in hopes of deemphasizing the competitive, teacher-driven nature of traditional band education, Krista decided, against what she felt was her better judgement, to take her senior band once again to the regional music festival. She did this primarily in hopes of gaining recognition and funding from her principal at the time, who seemed all together uninterested by the active and successful music program at his school. In order to prepare for this competition, the senior concert band devoted the entire semester, every day from February to June, to perfecting the three pieces they were to perform. The music learning that term was almost entirely conductor-led, with criteria for musical excellence and efficiency at the forefront. While she continued to teach with care and openness in

³ Educational curriculum in Canada is provincial/territorial jurisdiction.

preparing for festival, Krista felt she was having to fight hard against acting as the “sage on the stage,” which had always felt somewhat inauthentic to her as an educator. When it came to festival time, the senior concert band performed at an extremely high level, receiving a gold standing⁴ with an invitation to the national music festival, where they similarly received gold.

Though Krista had become deeply skeptical about the competitive performance aspects of band education, she was surprised by the impact this experience had on her group of students: “We really felt like it was a life changing experience and we felt very empowered. We worked really hard and like dug into these three pieces, you know, and like, did this really amazing thing. And they'll never forget that feeling. So that was a philosophical crisis of like oh, that's not a bad thing, like that was a positive experience.”

Soon after, Krista was offered a position as curriculum consultant in her province, and she responded to her feelings of ethical unease about the ubiquity and authority-driven nature of band education by developing a curriculum for an additional stream of music courses in the province called popular music performance (PMP). This course offers the ability for students to decide upon the musical genres and styles they wish to explore, from traditional, to folk, to pop, either on their own or in small groups. The curriculum is open ended and almost entirely student-directed. Upon the inclusion of PMP in the curriculum, Krista ran her school music program with two distinct streams – popular music and instrumental music (band) in an effort to offer greater options for students to engage musically at school. She saw these two streams as complementary to each other, and many band kids (typically high achieving students, many of whom studied music outside of school) also joined the PMP classes. However, the new offerings additionally drew from a wider

⁴ Music Fest Canada, and associated regional music festivals, employ a rating system based upon “standards of performance” (musicfest.ca), rather than on a ranking of participating ensembles.

school population, making music appealing and accessible to a greater diversity of students and increasing the overall enrollment in the music department.

In her PMP classes, Krista adopted a different approach to teaching, stepping far back from the centre of the learning process to allow her students to explore on their own or in groups, providing suggestions and guidance only when necessary:

My instruction is ridiculously hands off, it's so crazy. One of my favourite quotes from the feedback I've gotten from students is that 'it's hard to believe that the class you learn the most is when the teacher does the least,' and I was like, damn, I nailed it.

Indeed, the new program was thriving, with several of the popular music ensembles performing regularly at local music venues in the city. After the first semester of PMP, Krista's teaching philosophy was deeply transformed. Her experience was jarring, as she, up until this point, had identified so strongly as a band director:

I am forever changed by seeing the impact of giving students space to make their own music. Students in my pop music classes transform into whole other human beings all of the time, not just like once every 10 years. It is infectious excitement and it's completely intrinsic...like I never have to motivate them...ever.

In contrast to her hands-off instruction in PMP, Krista felt more strongly still that the nature of the band stream confined the ways in which she taught music, forcing a didactic, 'teaching from command' approach which felt increasingly problematic to her as an educator. She worried that her band students didn't experience the kinds of transformative experiences that seemed so naturally flowing in the PMP class. Band took more motivation on her part as a teacher, despite the feelings her students emerged with after music festival, and she questioned the values she had so long held about instrumental music education.

Krista was, as she expressed, in a “philosophical crisis.” Despite these concerns about the teacher-driven band program, the experience she and her students had through their deeply engaged preparation for music festival was undeniable and, she explains, was not easily captured by other performance events at the school. Even large-scale concerts that were designed and produced by students and that wove the band stream and the PMP stream together at the school, she explains, did not capture the collective empowerment that their success at nationals had provided. What was this sense of empowerment that was so strongly felt by her senior band, despite the high degree of control exerted in the learning process?

Moreover, notwithstanding their new “rockstar” status in PMP, most of Krista’s band students remained committed to the band program. Krista was surprised that her students kept signing up for band, after having the opportunity for more freedom in PMP. Why weren’t they turned off by the authority-driven teaching approach now that there was an alternative? In an effort to avoid any negative feelings about moving from semester 1 PMP to semester 2 band, Krista asked her students to write down what they love about band. Many students, she explained, responded that they love how they are “all in it together.” These sentiments reflected Krista’s own views about the LME as offering “a deep sense of belonging.” Upon reflection, she wondered, then, how should she approach teaching her band classes now, as her role as band director, which led to the empowering music festival experience, seemed counterintuitive in light of the sorts of self-transformation her students experience in PMP through the withdrawal of her authority? How hard should she push to force the sorts of transformations within the band program that she has seen take place in the PMP class? What about the students who only enrolled in the band program who seem happy to sit, unassuming, in the back of the clarinet section, being instructed in how to improve their technique and musicality, without having to step into the spotlight of a class which

requires a significant degree of vulnerability? Is it in their best interest to have the primary aim of transformation thrust upon them?

On top of questions about how to shape and lead the band program, the PMP was growing, but the band program was also retaining its numbers and its high performance expectations from students and their families. Trying to keep both streams running as they were, Krista was verging on burn-out. Should she reduce or eliminate the offerings of one of the programs? Should she abandon band altogether, given her concerns about the normative foundations of LMEs, even though students remained strongly committed to the band program? Is one class more likely to support her students' flourishing as musicians or as democratic citizens? Sitting down with the program structure planning charts for the upcoming school year, these thoughts swirl around Krista's head and she wonders what, if any, place there is for teacher-driven pedagogy in her music classroom.

Background

Krista's dilemma highlights ethical tensions that are likely familiar to many Canadian music educators. On a personal note, like Krista, as a student musician I felt a significant degree of community, comradeship, and belonging in working through complex musical pieces with my peers. While there were more and less positive experiences depending upon the attitude and musical aptitude of the conductor, my experience in these ensembles was a positive one and led to a strong desire to become a high school band conductor. However, when I took to the podium as a music teacher in secondary schools in the Canadian province of Ontario, I found myself struggling to reconcile how to employ my authority as a pedagogical and musical expert in the classroom with my deep personal commitments to democratic education. I believed that there was space for students' perspectives and creations within my band room and that these contributions would support a richer musical and democratic experience as well as a stronger musical product. Yet, these values, which seemed so mutually supportive in my educational philosophy, continually conflicted in practice.

Krista and I, like many music educators, seek not only to produce high calibre and life-long musicians, but also nurture an array of educational goods that will support students' overall flourishing. Flourishing, according to Brighouse et al. (2018) requires cultivating the knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions for a number of capacities, including: the capacity for critical thinking, cultivating meaningful relationships with their peers, personal fulfilment, and the skills to become productive members of society. The philosophical unrest Krista describes in the case above arises when one or more of these values comes into conflict, and teachers are forced to make trade-offs, particularly without adequate normative resources to support their decision making. As Brighouse et al. (2018) explain, "However keen they may be to do the right thing, decision makers are often not well equipped with the conceptual resources they need" (p. 1).

Moreover, Krista's conflict is complicated and deepened by all sorts of external pressures exerted upon music educators: the complexity of simultaneously teaching 30-60 students the techniques to perform on a dozen different instruments, expectations from the school community to stage a diverse array of concerts and competitions each year, and the substantial lack of funding, resources, and support from administration resulting in educators leading their own fundraising and promotional campaigns to sustain their programs. In face of these pressures, music teachers often do not have the time or means to consider deeply the way in which their teaching approach serves the goals of democratic education, even if they hold those commitments as central to their teaching philosophy. This thesis responds to these philosophical tensions by exploring the theoretical and practical nuances in the relationship between teachers' pedagogical authority as exercised in traditional wind band settings, and the development of students' democratic capacities.

Reflective of Krista's experience, the bands-*as*-music-education paradigm (Mantie, 2012) has drawn considerable criticism over the past two decades, particularly from those who seek to promote social justice and democracy through music education. Indeed, current theories of

democratic music education propose that music education should nurture: critical reflection toward music's social and political contexts, diversity in the repertoire performed as well as in the student body that constitutes school music programs, space for students to explore and voice their musical subjectivities, and opportunities for musical decision making (Allsup, 2003, 2016; Allsup & Benedict, 2008; Bladh & Heimonen, 2007; DeLorenzo, 2016; Elliott, 2016; Tan, 2014; Vakeva & Westerlund, 2007; Woodford, 2005, 2019).

The relevance of large music ensembles within such democratic music curricula is a source of contention amongst music education philosophers and practitioners (Perrine, 2021). A central, yet philosophically neglected, concern within this debate relates to the nature of authority held by conductors of LMEs. Randall Allsup (2016), for instance, argues that the master-apprentice model of musical learning, which relies on the cultivation of musical expertise over a long period of time through a hierarchical learning structure, perpetuates 'closed' forms that are often "at odds with the values of a democratic society" (p. 11). Conductors' cultivated musical expertise is seen to demand students' submission and deference to authoritarian teachers: "The learner is placed in a looping deficit to the form she is studying and the Master she obeys. Ironically, the better she gets, the further away she feels—the more the light recedes" (Allsup, 2016, p. 10).

Popular cultural references to the 'tyrannical conductor' abound—from J.K. Simmons's portrayal of Terence Fletcher, the verbally and physically abusive conductor of the fictional Schaffer Conservatory Studio band in *Whiplash* (Chazelle, 2014) to Cate Blanchett's heartbreaking portrayal of Lydia Tár, a fictional conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic who grooms her female musicians, and whose conduct on the podium exposes layers of controversy regarding elitism, class, and cancel culture tied to the authority of the conductor and composer (Field, 2022). These dramatizations aside, there is certainly some historical truth to the authoritarian, militaristic traditions of educational leadership in LMEs (Battisti, 2002; Small, 1998). However, the relationship between authority,

power, and democratic learning in LMEs is often presented in the scholarship in overly simplistic narratives. Rather than engaging in normative discussions regarding the complex, plural, and often competing philosophical understandings of democratic authority, current music education scholars tend to adopt one of two sweeping pictures of authority in LMEs. On one hand, in Randall Allsup and Cathy Benedict's (2008) frequently cited critique of school bands, the authors argue that conductors' authority is inherently oppressive and anti-democratic due to the hierarchical, Western musical structures that govern musical knowledge transmission in formal educational settings. This criticism, explored in depth in Chapter 1, has tended to lead to the assumption that the nature of the LME structure, with the teacher directing the learning, is inherently un- (if not anti-) democratic. Responding to these concerns, scholars have increasingly turned to informal approaches of music learning that remove or diminish teachers' authority in order to promote more democratic, student-driven learning. On the other hand, Paul Woodford draws attention to a contrary assumption in music education literature that claims that LMEs are *implicitly* examples of "democracy in action...treated as *if* compartmentalized from society and politically neutral" (Woodford, 2021, p. 352, emphasis in original). Woodford criticizes this claim, arguing that it is based on "voluntary and serving efforts to develop in students social values such as obedience, loyalty, and a commitment to personal excellence" rather than in terms of "preparing students as democratic musical citizens who understand how music and music education relate to the wider world and its problems" (2021, p. 352).

In this dissertation, I propose that both these commonly expressed views lack critical engagement with the possible values and limitations of authority in education, and within democratic society more broadly, thereby obscuring how music teacher authority may be enacted as a potential vehicle for democratic education in LMEs. Creating a binary between the authoritarianism of traditional conducting and the progressive, democratic nature of an informal, hands-off teaching

approach, I will contend, does not provide the necessary conceptual resources to support teachers' decision making about their programs, and limits (or even impedes) their students' democratic learning.

This dissertation, therefore, seeks to understand better the limits and potentialities for music teachers to employ their authority as conductors of large music ensembles toward democratic ends.

To do so, I address the following research questions:

1. How are the narratives of authority as presented in current music education research ruptured by teachers' real life experiences and concerns?
2. How do secondary school music educators who express a concern for democratic aims consider and employ their authority in the classroom?
3. What role can philosophical reflection play in music teachers' reflective practice?
 - a. What are the possibilities and limitations of teachers' authority as expressed in the philosophical literature on democratic authority?
 - b. How do music teachers' experiences of authority rupture or nuance the philosophical conceptions?
4. How can a participatory and reiterative research approach impact the heuristic, generative, and pedagogical aims of normative case study methodology in a way that is mutually beneficial for addressing questions of pedagogical authority within democratic music education?

Methodology

The above questions consider democratic pedagogical authority in LMEs through both theoretical and practical lenses. Indeed, clarifying the justifiable limits and opening potentialities for music teachers to utilize their authority in service of democratic ideals, I contend, requires considerable understanding of the sorts of tensions teachers face in their day-to-day lives as educators. As Clinton

Golding (2015) argues, “The philosophical analysis needs to be situated in actual practice...we cannot decide better conceptions for particular educators in particular circumstances at a particular time, unless we grapple with their current problems and conceptions” (p. 209).

To address this interaction between theory and practice, in this dissertation I bring into dialogue notions of democratic authority from political theory and the philosophy of education with philosophically-oriented qualitative research. To do so, I draw on recent methodological trends in the philosophy of education that seek to bring philosophical and empirical research together in a rich dialogue (Levinson & Fay, 2016, 2019; Morton, 2019a; Santoro, 2018). Thus, the methodology for this dissertation is neither top-down philosophy, where philosophical theories are imposed upon empirical data, nor is it bottom-up in the style of ethnography. Rather, I seek *grounded reflective equilibrium* (Levinson, 2014) by weaving together and working within the contrasts and tensions that arise between philosophical and teacher perspectives of democratic pedagogical authority. Expanding upon Meira Levinson and Jacob Fay’s (2016, 2019) work in normative case studies, I employed qualitative interviews and a participatory, Community of Inquiry (Golding, 2015) to develop and reflect upon ethical dilemmas that arise for teachers in enacting democratic music practices in LMEs.

Normative Case Studies are a relatively new but increasingly popular methodology in educational philosophy, driven by the work of Meira Levinson and the Justice in Schools Project (Levinson & Fay, 2016, 2019). As Levinson and Fay (2016) describe, normative case studies are “richly described, realistic account[s] of complex ethical dilemmas that arise within practice or policy contexts, in which protagonists must decide among courses of action, none of which is self-evident as the right one to take” (p. 3). These cases do not aim to solve ethical dilemmas, necessarily, or to create universal educational theories. Instead, they serve to illuminate competing values in

educational decision making, and provide teachers with conceptual tools to work through ethical dilemmas that arise in their teaching practices.

Within the emerging research on normative case studies, there is little written about the effects of various methods for gathering case study data. Though Levinson and Fay allude to employing a mix of ethnographic studies, interviews, and personal experience to craft their case studies, there is much left to be discovered regarding the effects and values of various methods for gathering data. Normative case studies must present a complex ethical dilemma, where there is no obviously correct course of action for teachers to take. To create such cases, Levinson and Fay combine qualitative data in creative ways, sometimes merging stories, personal experiences, with some fictional elements.

Toward these ends, this dissertation explored the value of participatory research with in-service teachers, to both craft cases and deliberate on philosophical concepts and ethical dilemmas arising in the cases. My methodology began with qualitative, semi-structured interviews to collect data on teachers' understandings about their authority and the dilemmas they face in their music classrooms, analyzing those perspectives in light of philosophical concepts of authority and democratic education to highlight common threads and ruptures. In a second research phase, my participants came together in a Community of Inquiry to consider more deeply the philosophical and practical concepts and dilemmas that arose in the initial research phase. According to Golding (2015), a Community of Inquiry is a small group of expert practitioners with experience in the topic being discussed—in this case, democratic music education and conducting of LMEs. In a Community of Inquiry, the group of participants engages in “collaborative, dialogical philosophical inquiry about this issue, guided by a philosophical moderator or facilitator” (Golding, 2015, p. 208). The Community of Inquiry is typically used in educational settings, particularly prominent in the Philosophy for Children movement (Gregory, Haynes, & Murriss, 2017; Gregory & Laverty, 2018;

Lipman, 1976; Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980). However, I echo Golding's (2015) view that it is a mode of inquiry that is readily translatable to research because "the inquiry process needed for learning is similar to the inquiry process for research" (p. 208). The Community of Inquiry offered a concrete and bounded way for participants to engage actively in the process of philosophical inquiry. It also offered the opportunity for participants to revisit their thinking on the concepts of authority and democracy, subsequent to the interviews, through engaged philosophical dialogue, and to reflect upon Krista's case together.

Employing this multi-stage methodological process, blending together several empirical-philosophical hybrid methodologies, this dissertation sought to enrich and refine conceptions of music teacher authority through ongoing collaboration between philosophical researcher and practicing music teachers, creating a more participatory approach to the research process. The methodological process provided many points to revisit my own philosophical assumptions and refine the initial conceptual framework in a way that reflects deeply teachers' lived experiences. As Golding (2015) describes the Community of Inquiry: "The moderator brings their philosophical inquiry skills, and the participants bring their expert empirical knowledge, so together they can engage in collaborative philosophical inquiry that would otherwise be out of their reach" (p. 201).

Dissertation structure

Seeking grounded reflective equilibrium, I weave together empirical and philosophical considerations throughout the structure of this dissertation. Chapter 2 provides a critical literature review of contemporary scholarship on democracy and music education. In this literature review, I explore how certain theories of power, expertise, and democracy have led to the implication, pervasive in the field, that conductor-led ensembles are inherently a vehicle for oppressive, authoritarian command, fundamentally adverse to ideals of democracy and democratic education. Drawing on literature from music education and educational philosophy, as well as highlighting the

complexities that arise in Krista's dilemma, I argue that the growing body of scholarship on democracy and music education provides an inadequate basis for examining normative questions related to music teachers' democratic educational authority within large music ensembles. Given these shortcomings, I suggest the need for a more nuanced conceptual framework for examining questions of appropriate scope and limits of teachers' democratic educational authority.

Responding to scholarly concerns about conductors' authority, in Chapter 3 I offer an initial set of conceptual frameworks that clarify several key distinctions regarding democratic pedagogical authority. Namely, distinctions between coercive and non-coercive authority, deferential and dialogical authority, and hierarchical and non-hierarchical conceptions of childhood. In doing so, the chapter provides a repertoire of concepts for a broader and more nuanced way of thinking about the relationship between authority and democracy in music education.

In chapter 4, I outline the multi-stage, participatory philosophical methodology employed in the research process of this dissertation to consider teachers' phenomenological experiences and normative understandings of their pedagogical authority. Considering the conceptual frameworks from the previous chapter, I explore the primary heuristic question of the philosophical inquiry; that is, how do practicing teachers perceive their authority in relationship to democratic educational aims? I show how this methodological approach foregrounded the complex ways teachers employ various pedagogical moves toward their democratic goals, and the dilemmas they face in determining which democratic values are most salient at any given time. The perspectives offered by participants in this chapter present serious challenges to the assumption that a reduction of teacher-directiveness will necessarily yield greater democratic outcomes.

In chapters 5 and 6, I examine two generative findings arising from my participatory philosophical research process. The first, explored in chapter 5, considers the democratic goods associated with student voice in context of LMEs, and the limitations to student voice expressed as

democratically or ethically justifiable by teachers in my study. In chapter 6, I attend to the relationality of pedagogical authority, which discussions with participant teachers identified as insufficiently captured in my initial conceptual frameworks. Braiding together teachers' perspectives with Anthony Laden's (2012) concept of the "authority of connection," I offer an expansion to the conceptual framework of authority outlined in Chapter 3 with the addition of a more social and responsive notion of authority. Taken together, the two generative findings explored in Chapters 5 and 6 suggest how normative case studies can illuminate the complex relationships between democratic education and pedagogical authority in ways often obscured by, on one hand, those who justify band education on 'naturalistic' democratic grounds, and on the other, those who too hastily equate authority with oppression and coercion. Rather, the dilemmas teachers face arise most often from the strenuous normative difficulties in reconciling, balancing, and prioritizing democratic goods of students' freedom and autonomy with the collective goods gained through high stakes, epistemically-oriented endeavours unique to the large ensemble experience. Normative case studies, with their heuristic, generative, and pedagogical goods, I argue, can thus open a wider horizon of understandings of democratic pedagogical authority.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I offer a catalogue of the central theoretical questions raised in this dissertation, framed in practical terms that relate to music teachers' everyday pedagogical tasks. Reflection on these questions, in the context of one's own teaching circumstances, I argue, can support teachers in their deliberations on how best to employ their authority in particular teaching circumstances. Moreover, engagement with these questions in situations that are distinct from those explored in this dissertation invites openings for novel thinking about democratic pedagogical authority in music.

Chapter 2: Concerns of power and mastery: Literature review of democratic authority in music education

I try, you know, the R. Murray Schaeffer thing: be the guide by the side, not the sage on the stage. There's a lot of sages and a lot of stages in the School Board, and I try not to be one of them.

-Susan (Interview)⁵

In this chapter, I argue that the growing body of scholarship on democracy and music education provides an inadequate basis for examining normative questions related to music teachers' democratic educational authority, particularly in context of large music ensembles (LMEs). The chapter serves as a critical literature review focusing on contemporary scholarship on democracy and music education, highlighting the need for a new theoretical approach for examining questions of appropriate scope and limits of teachers' democratic educational authority. These questions of scope and limits bear also on questions about the ethics of promoting or constraining students' political agency and other normative issues. When is it appropriate for teachers to assert their authority in ways that suppress or limit student dissent? Under what circumstances should democratic aims of providing students with room to challenge teachers, and perhaps even school authority, take priority – for example, regarding decisions that have been made or proposed regarding repertoire, part selection, ensemble offerings, or program structure? In what circumstances is it democratically preferable for teachers to enforce regulatory epistemic norms? I show that these and other questions cannot be adequately addressed by certain metanarratives that dominate contemporary scholarly literature, and I begin to highlight ruptures in the current metanarratives by drawing upon the nuanced ethical dilemmas Krista faces in the case outlined in the introduction of the dissertation.

⁵ For the purpose of confidentiality, the names of all participants in this study, other than Krista, are pseudonyms.

There is a growing body of literature in music education scholarship on concepts related to democracy and music education, music education and social justice, popular music studies, and music teacher agency that attend to questions of power in learning relationships. However, surprisingly little research has been developed on the role of teachers' pedagogical authority in promoting students' democratic skills. Despite this lack of concrete conceptual analysis regarding pedagogical authority, there are several metanarratives embedded in contemporary scholarship on school wind bands that have created broadly held assumptions about music teachers' authority. As I will show, much of the current literature implies (some more overtly than others) that a commitment to democratic values requires teachers to significantly abrogate their pedagogical authority and to allow students wide latitude to assert, explore and develop their musical judgments free from external interference by the teacher. Several assumptions are embedded within this claim:

1. Top-down transmission of musical expertise from teacher to student (i.e., master-apprentice) is an enactment of coercive authority as it limits students' voices, demanding conformity to established epistemic norms, and silences multiple modalities of music making. Thus, it is a fundamentally undemocratic teaching and learning approach.
2. Student-led, experiential learning is aligned better with democratic goals and outcomes. Thus, informal learning is democratically preferable to formal learning.
3. The issues described in the previous two points are embedded within broader conditions of neoliberal education. These structures, which rely heavily on competition and notions of excellence, are argued to limit teachers' agency and fundamentally shape their identities, and, in the process, stifle both teachers' and students' capacities for democratic engagement.

I paint purposefully here with broad brushstrokes. Certainly, there are counter narratives regarding democratic music education. As I discuss in chapter 4, within performance circles it is commonly believed that the collective act of pursuing musical excellence in a large group is a naturally

democratic endeavour (Peltz, 2021). This narrative is rife with its own theoretical inconsistencies. However, the analysis offered in this chapter suggests that when considering current philosophical critiques of band education, the claim that conductors' authority is akin to anti-democratic, authoritarian teaching is pervasive and normatively problematic.

Democratic education and educational goods

Before unpacking each of the assumptions highlighted above, I wish to attend to two points that frame the discussion of this chapter: the place of democratic education amongst the plurality of educational goods, and what is meant by democracy itself. First, I wish to clarify from the outset that democratic citizenship is but one among many educational aims. Echoing Brighouse et al. (2018), I understand the role of public education as promoting human flourishing. In this view, education ought to develop educational goods, or the “knowledge, skills, attitudes, and dispositions” required for flourishing (p. 9). By *goods*, Brighouse et al. do not refer to material commodities, but rather they invoke the term to contrast educational *bads*. Educational goods include the capacities for: economic productivity, personal autonomy, democratic competence, healthy personal relationships, treating others as equals, and personal fulfillment (Brighouse et al., 2018). Moreover, in decisions of education policy and practice, educational goods are necessarily balanced with other, independent values such as parental interests and childhood goods.⁶

However, the cultivation of skills for democratic citizenship is often presented by proponents of democratically-oriented music pedagogy to be the only, or at least the most important, educational good. Paul Woodford (2021), for instance, argues that teachers have to make a fundamental choice between democratic or non-democratic teaching:

⁶ Brighouse et al. (2018) describe childhood goods as independent from educational goods insofar as childhood goods recognize the developmental importance of goods *only* available in childhood, while educational goods are described as primarily focused on investing in students' future adult lives. The most obvious examples of childhood goods, according to Brighouse et al. (2018) include “purposeless play, naïve curiosity, unreserved joy, and carefreeness,” (p. 37).

Wind band and other music teachers, thus, also have a choice: they can either continue teaching music as an ostensibly neutral subject, thereby contributing to the maintenance of the status quo, existing in almost willful denial of the non-democratic foundations and history of their profession, or they can reconceptualize their programs as actively fostering critical and moral agency in defense of democracy, no longer incapacitated and politically disfranchised by the naïve belief in music and music education as apolitical and beyond critique. (p. 353)

Certainly, my dissertation echoes much of Woodford's belief in the value of the arts for the development of democracy. However, I situate this belief within a more pluralistic understanding of the values and goods that comprise the appropriate aims of education in democratic societies.

Therefore, while this dissertation focuses on the complex relationship between authority and democratic learning, it does so with the full acknowledgement that teachers' every day decisions involve a delicate balancing of diverse educational goods. Teachers, even those who are inclined toward a democratically-oriented teaching style, may not always make decisions that most greatly enhance students' democratic capacities, even if promoting such capacities is acknowledged as an intrinsically valuable goal. The reason for this is that in any given situation, multiple intrinsically valuable and realizable educational goods may be non-compossible. That is, it may be impossible to actualize all desirable values or goods simultaneously. When this happens, teachers are faced with difficult choices regarding what goods should be prioritized and on what grounds to prioritize them. In many such cases, democratic values could take priority over other goods. But this is not always the case, and it is often impossible to determine whether they do or do not, prior to some processes of intellectually and morally difficult deliberation. In some cases it might be that a decision to prioritize democratic values will come at the costs of denying students with access to other values

such as the childhood goods of play.⁷ In other cases, it may be that students' interests in developing skills necessary to evaluate career and job opportunities are most important and require teachers to act in ways that are sub-optimal with respect to some goal or value associated with democratic citizenship. The point here is not that when such conflicts arise, democratic considerations always take a back seat to other considerations. Nor does it imply that conflicting goals are always incompatible in practice. Sometimes it is possible for creative and innovative teachers to combine or reconcile several apparently conflicting values in particular situations. The point, however, is that, at least occasionally, multiple goals *are* non-compossible. Even in cases where a synthetic solution that reconciles initially conflicting values can be found, such points of possible reconciliation may not be apparent until after teachers have undertaken serious moral reflection.

The usual non-compossibility of educational values, including democratic educational values, carries two implications especially pertinent to the analysis of this dissertation. The first is that teachers' decisions about whether to exercise their pedagogical authority in classroom situations are common. Here the question is not whether they should assert their authority, but rather to attend to the means and ends of the exercise of authority. A second implication is that democratic principles and values are but one of several important sets of ethical considerations at play in teachers' ethical decision-making. At times, then, the question may not be how to exercise authority in ways that appropriately realize democratic educational values, but whether democratic values are, in fact, the most ethically salient educational goods to be prioritized in teachers' decision-making.

These two implications of educational goods are important for my analysis as they highlight how ethical complexity and uncertainty operate as important conditions of teachers' exercise of democratic authority. It is precisely by engaging with moments of ethical uncertainty—when various

⁷ For a thoughtful discussion on music education aimed toward childhood goods of play and leisure, see: Mantie, R. (2022).

educational values come head to head—that, I argue, the complexities of the interaction between authority and democracy are cracked open. In this way I follow, to some extent, Estelle Jorgensen’s (2003) conception of “this-with-that”—holding in tension opposing conceptual perspectives in order to tease out the conceptual middle ground and open space for more complex and nuanced perspectives. Within the broad field of educational goods described by Brighouse et al. (2018), in this dissertation, I focus primarily on students’ cultivation of democratic competencies, and the tensions that arise due to the complex, multi-faceted, and contested nature of such democratic aims. However, I do so while also acknowledging the complex ways in which democratic aims give way to tensions with other fundamental educational goods.

Understanding the tensions that arise between democratic values in the classroom necessarily begins with the acknowledgment that “democracy” is not defined in terms of a single, coherent, or simple value or principle, but is plural and widely contested. The particular democratic values prioritized by teachers—freedom, autonomy, equality, or justice, for instance—will impact many aspects of classroom life. Thus, before further analysis of current theories of democratic music education, is important to attend to the definition of democracy itself. The current literature on democratic music education tends to adopt an overly homogenistic and monolithic stance on LMEs as anti-democratic, while, at the same time, failing to specify what exactly is meant by ‘democracy.’ Many scholars employ overly thick notions of “inclusion” and “participation” to denote democratic learning (DeLorenzo, 2016). Indeed, Paul Woodford (2019) has long called for scholars in the field to concretize their meanings of democracy and democratic citizenship. As he states, “It strikes me as somewhat disingenuous of teachers and academics to claim a democratic purpose for their programs without acknowledging that democracy is an open and hotly contested concept...warranting considerable discussion and debate” (p. 29). I agree with Woodford that this lack of deliberation regarding the aims and purposes of democracy within music education is highly problematic, as

criticisms of anti-democratic teaching practices may be manipulated to serve a variety of secondary purposes, rather than being morally objectionable on clear democratic grounds. Moreover, these blurred notions of democracy, I argue, do little to provide support to teachers like Krista, who struggle to navigate complex decisions about how and what to teach in their classrooms to promote citizenship. What is rarely acknowledged in the literature is that various pedagogical actions, even when aimed at promoting ‘democratic’ skills, can promote different, even competing democratic values. Without knowledge of these various forms of democratic engagement, teachers may, unknowingly, create spaces that in fact undermine the very sorts of skills which they seek to promote. Therefore, it is critical that we acknowledge the particular democratic goods to which our pedagogies aim.

The goal of this dissertation, however, is not to present a theorization of pedagogical authority within one particular view of democracy or democratic citizenship. For this reason, I do not begin with a singular definition of democracy to guide the subsequent discussion of pedagogical authority. Rather, I highlight the need for normative tools to consider *competing* notions and goods of democracy within particular instances of educational decision making, thus centralizing empirical circumstances within normative theorizing. This ground-up search for conceptual clarity requires a framework for authority that is sharply attuned to various democratic conceptions and the goods yielding from those distinctions. Thus, before considering possible limits and scope of democratic authority in music education, I first wish to consider several central distinctions in democratic theory to highlight the ways in which democratic ideals might conflict in educational practice.

A key distinction in democratic theory that relates to music education practice is that between aggregative and deliberative democracy. A common practice often labelled as ‘democratic music teaching’ is asking students to vote on the repertoire they wish to perform as a group. While casting a vote might provide some buy-in from students, it is arguably limited in the breadth and

depth of democratic learning taking place without attending to the moral and epistemic considerations related to the students' votes. Indeed, in a purely aggregative approach, where democratic legitimacy rests on the fairness of the procedure of aggregation, there is no inherent requirement for deliberation or consensus building. Students might be provided with a choice of repertoire from a preselected list, for instance, without discussion about the structures that impact the creation of the list, who is represented and whom the list ignores, and so forth. Pure aggregation also does not inherently account for experiences of loss through aggregation, and whether certain groups experience such loss more than others. Thus, while in this situation students are provided a degree of choice to shape their learning experience, and the process of decision making might be said to follow a fair procedure in that every student was provided the opportunity to vote, that choice could serve to reinscribe potentially undemocratic educational structures.

Elizabeth Gould (2008) argues that many democratic acts in music classrooms are reduced to symbolic gestures or rhetoric that “do not change or even challenge power relations inhered in modern classrooms” as they are “accepted unproblematically with little or no consideration of ways in which consensus depends on coercion” (p. 30).⁸ In other words, in a aggregative approach, there is little inherent requirement that students engage with epistemic questions such as: ‘what counts as musical knowledge?’ ‘what constitutes an excellent composition?’ or ‘what is of musical value?’ Indeed, David Estlund (2008, 2015) argues that the goals of a fair proceduralist approach to

⁸ Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne (2004) have similarly addressed the feeble and apolitical nature of the most common forms of citizenship education practiced in schools. Westheimer and Kahne distinguish between three sorts of citizens: the personally responsible citizen, the participatory citizen, and the social-justice oriented citizen. Critiquing the merits of personally responsible citizenship education, they state that “a focus on loyalty or obedience (common components of character education as well) works against the kind of critical reflection and action that many assume are essential in a democratic society (p. 244). The distinctions between these forms of citizenship holds several common threads with the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3. However, the frameworks I will present also complicate notions of deference to authority in democratic education in a way that is not explored in Westheimer and Kahne’s work.

democracy might be similarly attained by a coin flip, where all parties have equal chance to affect the outcome. And yet, as Estlund makes clear, a coin flip certainly does not suffice for a liberal view of a morally justified democratic decision.

Seeking democratic practices that better serve the aims of social justice education, music education scholars have more recently tended toward a broadly deliberative conception of democracy. Woodford (2019) suggests that “There can be little hope of educational progress in fostering democratic citizenship in and through music or other educational subjects in the absence of controversy and debate over sometimes conflicting social values” (p. 23). However, often overlooked in music education scholarship is the fact that there are also different values prioritized within deliberative approaches to democracy. One central division lies between procedural and epistemic views of democracy. Very broadly understood, deliberative proceduralists understand a decision to be democratically legitimate if the procedure of the decision followed fair and discursive procedure, regardless of the outcome. As will be shown later in this chapter with the discussion of informal learning approaches, much of the work on democratic music education, drawing upon Deweyan or Habermasian ideals of deliberative democracy, supports such a proceduralist view of democracy.⁹ Yet, even within a proceduralist view there are distinctions present. One might prioritize a fairness-recognizing procedure or a reason-recognizing procedure (Estlund, 2015), thereby prioritizing either students’ expressive voice over the giving of good reasons (evaluated by some outside standard) or vice versa. What connects the proceduralist views, however, is that neither requires a particular outcome to justify their moral, democratic value; the authority of the decision is justified by the procedure in which the decision took place.

⁹ In Chapter 2, I highlight several scholars who interpret Dewey’s view of democracy (as an associated mode of living) as supporting an epistemically oriented notion of democracy, rather than a purely deliberative democratic procedure. However, I argue that, within music education literature, the democratic ideals drawn from Dewey’s work tend to emphasize the *process* of critical thinking and deliberation, rather than any epistemic judgement of democratic outcomes.

To account for the epistemic element that seems woven into the fabric of democratic deliberations, an alternative approach to procedural deliberative democracy is epistemic democracy. In epistemic democracy, democratic decisions are judged in relation to procedure independent standards. “Broadly speaking, they advocate deliberation based on its ability to communicate and utilize knowledge in order to arrive at rational, good or correct decisions, where rational, good and correct are defined by some non-procedural standard” (Benson, 2019, p. 81). In contrast to the proceduralist view, epistemic conceptions of democratic deliberation hold that fair deliberation procedures can result in illegitimate decisions – i.e., when those decisions are epistemically deficient in some way. As such, a condition of democratic legitimacy is that democratic decisions – that is, decisions that result from fair deliberative procedures – are ultimately subject to epistemic evaluation, critique and correction by participants in the deliberative process. The normative force of this form of democracy in music education goes beyond students’ sense of authenticity, inclusion, individual freedom, or happiness. It requires discussions about musical quality, where some students’ opinions may be deemed more or less qualified than others in the decision-making process.

Many of the critiques of large music ensembles, discussed in the remainder of the chapter, would likely object to an epistemic notion of democracy on several grounds. First, that epistemic democracy reinforces hegemonic and hierarchical thinking by ascribing to an *a priori* view of a rational, good, or correct decision. In contrast, what renders a democratic decision legitimate in the procedural view is that the democratic process has taken place in such a way as to maximize equal participation without coercion or oppression. Second, that epistemically-oriented modes of music teaching—i.e., pedagogical traditions that rely on “codified standards”—are exclusionary (Allsup, 2016; Green, 2008; Wright, 2016). Regulatory epistemic criteria such as musical excellence are seen to interfere with inclusive, fair, and just democratic (musical) participation. The argument regarding exclusion is closely tied to a third objection, which is that epistemic democracy marginalizes

alternative or non-rationalistic modes of communication or ways of knowing and musicking.

These tensions between epistemic and procedural goals of democratic music education, which are examined from several theoretical perspectives in the remainder of the chapter, highlight the substantial need for a more nuanced theoretical approach to considering the ways in which pedagogical authority interacts with various democratic priorities. Indeed, whether we legitimize our educational practices on notions of procedural fairness, the process of rational deliberation, or the tendency of achieving epistemically legitimate outcomes, holds significant implications for what sorts of constraints ought to be placed on teachers' authority within the classroom. Thus, discussion of democratic pedagogical authority must take into close consideration these nuanced distinctions in democratic theory.

In addition to this conceptual clarification on normative elements of democracy, I argue throughout the dissertation that empirical circumstances are a critical aspect of such normative theorizing in the context of education. As Brighouse et al. (2018) put it, "Individuals can make better policy choices if they are systematic in their consideration both of the relevant empirical evidence and of the relevant moral values" (p. 5). In short, in this dissertation, empirical and normative considerations will work towards a systematic schematization of the ways in which authority impacts the democratic educational goods nurtured in and through music education, rather than offering an enunciation of one particular political or moral theory of democracy placed upon the context of music education.

The master-apprentice relationship

Critics of traditional music education pedagogy often argue that conductor-led ensembles have typically displayed a hierarchical model of musical tutorship and hegemonic musical authority that impedes the development of democratic capacities such as student voice (Allsup & Benedict, 2008; Philpott & Wright, 2012; Schmidt, 2005; Wright, 2016). One of the central claims proffered against

the traditional large ensemble format is that it relies on a master-apprentice model of learning, or the ‘cult of the expert,’ that prioritizes mastery in technical skill (Chomsky, 1987). Critics argue that the conductor’s authority, traditionally justified by their musical mastery and epistemic expertise, stifles student voice, teaching patterns of acquiescence and passivity. The authority of musical experts, grounded in Western notions of musical excellence, is argued to have been arbitrarily imposed by a cultural elite who have delineated what counts as art and what does not (Gaztambide-Fernandez, 2013; Gould & Countryman, 2009). Patrick Schmidt (2005), for instance, provides a critique of music teachers’ reliance on the authority of musical experts and the “positivist tradition...that sensitizes students to beauty, formally analyzing art-music, and developing aesthetic sensibilities” (p. 5). He argues that “Music teachers continue to view themselves largely as technicians, trusting in the research and opinions of the experts in the field, and shying away from developing their own inquiries, inside their own classrooms” (Schmidt, 2005, p. 5).

The strong emphasis on mastery of a set of technical skills (evaluated through auditions to elite ensembles, band competitions, university entrance requirements, and so forth) is said to generate a significant power imbalance between students and their teachers; the latter determining whether or not students hold sufficient talent to succeed within the prescribed musical structures. Knowledge and expertise are thus imposed in a way that precludes engagement with students’ critical capacities and agency. Describing the harms of music education’s disciplinary norms, Allsup (2016) states:

The Law is abetted by institutions in which deferred entry through an endless series of doors and doorkeepers is an accepted norm, each door more difficult to get through and each doorkeeper more powerful than the last. This is the Master-apprentice model. (p. 9)

Moreover, it is not *solely* the strong emphasis on teaching technical mastery at the expense of other musical and educational goods that is argued to create elitist and exclusionary learning environments,

but that the technical skills being taught authorize and reinscribe the value of particular musics and ways of musicking—that is, those of Western art music. By perpetuating (often unwittingly) such structures of Western elitism through technocratic instruction that places primary value upon the practices and musics of the established canon, teachers are argued to become stewards of antidemocratic oppression. Power to determine what counts as quality music, quality techniques, and valuable music ability, is described as not only antidemocratic, but as an act of symbolic violence (Gould, 2008, p. 36).

I wish to suggest that these accounts, while beneficial in bringing attention to certain problematic traditions in LME pedagogy, insufficiently consider the complex relationship between authority, power, and democracy. Jorgensen (2021) highlights how such ambiguity in understanding the ways in which authority operates can, itself, lead to oppressive practices: “What once may have been authoritative, in the sense of constituting a valuable reference point and exemplar for musicians, may come to command the acquiescence and obedience of all musicians and thereby constitute a source of their disempowerment (p. 178). I want to suggest that when education abandons authority as a means of enabling student agency and interprets authority as equivalent to coercion and force, they are thereby depriving themselves and educators of the conceptual resource they need to understand how education can distinguish between practices that promote genuine agency and those that simply encourage directionless, haphazard, or arbitrary choice making.

The article “The Problem of Bands,” by Randall Allsup and Cathy Benedict (2008) was instrumental in generating critical discussion of coercive authority and structural oppression in the tradition band education pedagogy. I quote their critique here at length, as their argument has significantly shaped contemporary music education scholarship:

The oppressor refers to what counts as legitimate ways of knowing in society and therefore universities and schools, and consequently, amongst ourselves. In the case of wind band

directors, one way hegemony is often made manifest is through the careful maintenance of the orchestral classical repertoire celebrated and revered by a cultured audience, the careful maintenance of the venerated wind band conductor, and the accompanying normative practices for transmitting this repertoire...as we give up the right to control and determine our own destiny in favor of transmission of skills and representation of expertise, we may want to contemplate that in our quest to be considered a basic or a legitimate course of study, we reproduce systems in which responsibility is not just dissuaded, but abdicated...Hence, both conductors and students are oppressed in this search for perfection; conductors as the tool of the repertoire and students as the handmaiden of the sound...a master's tool. (p. 161-162)

The central premise of Allsup and Benedict's argument is that traditional education, of which the band is suggested above as a quintessential exemplar, reproduces problematic relationships of social domination. Allsup and Benedict point to the ways in which the authority of the Western classical canon,¹⁰ as well as the treatment of the conductor as all-knowing expert and the students as mere vessels (or worse, as tools to the improve the conductor's ego and status) dehumanizes both the learner and the teacher, stripping both parties of their agency. In so doing, the authors contend that such teaching is fundamentally un- (or even anti-) democratic.

These concerns about the relationship between authority, power, and democracy as it pertains to the role of the conductor in LMEs have their roots in the intellectual traditions of several

¹⁰ It is worth noting that the wind band as an entity has evolved from two musical traditions: American military concert bands in the style of the Sousa and Gilmore bands, and smaller European wind ensembles from the Classical and Romantic periods with compositions from the symphonic traditions of Mozart, Berlioz, and Strauss. While contemporary wind band compositions are often still grounded, to some degree, in these musical traditions, other genres such as popular music are increasingly pervasive in public school band rooms. Moreover, advanced university and community bands are impressively breaking from traditional compositional styles with compositions that incorporate improvisatory and technological effects. Thus, it is reductive to refer to large ensembles as merely performing western Classical music. However, the criticism that the pedagogical models continue to rely heavily on western notational standards, expectations of western norms of performance excellence, and driven by competition at the expense of critical dialogue, stands.

scholars, including Foucault and Bourdieu (as well as critical pedagogues, whose theories I explore in the next chapter). In the following section, I briefly highlight several key ideas from these theoretical traditions to show how music education scholarship has often adapted these views in ways that produce two problematic dichotomies. The first is the view that power is inherently dominating, thereby interfering with democratic practice and growth. The second is the notion that the enactment of expertise through the authority of the teacher is necessarily at odds with democratic education, and thus democracy is rendered an anti-epistemic process.

Intellectual roots of the ‘coercive master’

Concerns about the coercive nature of master-apprentice learning, and the degree to which it is seen as an inherent product of the LME structure, reside in part with Michel Foucault’s power/knowledge thesis. Simply stated, Foucault understood power and knowledge as inextricably linked, “in knowing we control and in controlling we know” (Gutting & Oksala, 2022). Foucault’s post-structuralist account of power suggests violence can occur when order and control is exercised through institutional knowledge and disciplines:

All knowledge rests upon injustice, that there is no right, not even in the act of knowing, to truth or a foundation for truth, and that the instinct for knowledge is malicious (something murderous, opposed to the happiness of mankind). (Foucault, 1998, p. 378)

Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power helps to illuminate how scholars might view the legitimacy of educational authority based upon cultural norms and disciplinary expertise with wind band pedagogy as inherently coercive and oppressive. Mantie (2012), for instance, drawing on Foucault’s notion of “pastoral power,” argues that:

The wind band conductor of today is ‘authorized’ by the music and the educational expectations of art to *govern*; through the legitimating function of expertise, the conductor is

granted license to do whatever necessary to achieve the composer's intent, as so doing is unequivocally assumed to be good for the student. (p. 75-76)¹¹

This view of the relationship between authority and power in the context of the LME is further influenced by the Bourdieusian concept of pedagogic authority as the *reproduction* of social domination. Current music education theory has been strongly influenced by Bourdieu's writing (Wright, 2010; Benedict, Schmidt, Spruce, and Woodford, 2015; Burnard, Trulsson, and Söderman, 2015). Bourdieu and Passeron (1990, pp. 11-12) view pedagogic authority as a "power of symbolic violence" that bolsters the very 'arbitrary' and hidden power of broader social systems:

Insofar as it is an arbitrary power to impose which, by the mere fact of being misrecognized as such, is objectively recognized as a legitimate authority, [pedagogic authority], a power to exert symbolic violence which manifests itself in the form of a right to impose legitimately, reinforces the arbitrary power which establishes it and which it conceals. (p. 11-12)

Elizabeth Gould (2008) extends this criticism of arbitrary power to collegiate music education systems which, she argues, thrive on embedded coercive structures of power:

Virtually all students entering university music programs become complicit in this as they quite willingly give up control of their bodies to their omniscient music teachers and conductors, convinced that by relinquishing all technical and musical performance decisions, they will gain requisite skills and knowledge to become successful professional concert musicians (p. 36).

Gould suggests here that adhering to the musical directives of conductors or private studio teachers on the basis of their music knowledge and skill is a deferential act through which students

¹¹ Through a Foucauldian lens, Mantie (2012) draws an important and generative distinction between how power and legitimacy are enacted in historical community bands and contemporary school band settings.

experience loss of agency and, as she argues, constitutes a form of symbolic violence (Gould, 2008, p. 36).

For Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), this symbolic violence often exists in educational institutions as the authority of “magisterial language” which “derives its full significance from the situation in which the relation of pedagogic communication is accomplished, with its social space, its ritual, its temporal rhythms” (p. 108). They argue that the form of university lectures, for instance, “governs teachers' and students' behaviour so rigorously that efforts to set up a dialogue immediately turn into fiction or farce” (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p. 109). Allsup and Benedict similarly critique the temporality and ritual of several commonly held pedagogic language acts in band education. For example, the ‘10 second rule’ suggests that when the conductor stops the band in rehearsal, they ought to provide instruction in very short, 10-20 second bursts before raising their arms again to continue conducting. Direct and efficient instruction is a skill that is widely encouraged in conducting manuals and practiced in university conducting courses (Battisti, 2007; Labuta & Matthews, 2022). Such a commitment to efficiency, it is argued, leaves no room for explication or discussion: “The ‘10- or 20-second rule’ method of teaching or any other ‘method’ that is predominantly teacher-centered, teacher transmitted, and content/repertoire driven” strips students of learning and creativity; thus, students “internalize obedience to the director, alienated from the process of musicking” (Allsup & Benedict, 2008, p. 169). Similar arguments are levelled against music programs that teach exclusively notational based practices, rather than learning music by ear, which is seen more commonly in community based music making (Green, 2001). The “magisterial language” of notation is said to render the music learning process elitist and exclusionary. As previously noted, Gould (2008) describes the use of such temporal language control as a form of symbolic violence: “While both the master and the Other participate in the

asymmetrical power relations of symbolic violence, neither generally recognize it as anything but ‘natural’ or at least inevitable” (p. 35).

While similarly drawing attention to the way power operates through institutional structures and the ways in which authority is legitimized within those structures, Bourdieu’s understanding of pedagogic authority is importantly distinct from Foucault’s. Certain readings of Foucault suggest that he viewed power as not merely repressive and reproductive but as potentially productive. He states, “The individual, that is, is not the *vis-à-vis* of power; it is, I believe one of its prime effects,” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98; original italics). Foucault (2012) suggests that “we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms; it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it conceals’. In fact power produces” (p. 386). On the other hand, Megan Watkins (2018) argues that “From Bourdieu and Passeron’s perspective, framed as imposition, its only utility is to reproduce existing class divisions, to maintain the positions of dominant and dominated. Their notion of power, therefore, is simply one of repression” (p. 52). Watkins effectively connects this view of power to the withdrawal of authority that has been suggested within educational discourse.¹² Because, as Watkins claims, applications of Foucault’s work in education tend to default to the position that dominates Bourdieu and Passeron’s theory, where “power is simply repressive,” Watkins (2018) argues that we are lead to the conclusion that “the only viable response in terms of a pedagogic approach seems to be the removal of the source of this imposition, or at least to limit its effects, hence justifying the reduced role of the teacher within pedagogic practice” (p. 53).

Rancière similarly criticized Bourdieu’s theory of social reproduction for having no room for agency or social action. Summarizing Bourdieu’s sociological view, Rancière (1984) describes the

¹² Watkins (2018) discusses the issues of this theoretical move from Bourdieu’s notion of power to a withdrawal of educational authority in reference to general educational practices, not from the field of music specifically.

eternal loop whereby the working class are excluded because they don't know why they're excluded; and they don't know why they're excluded because they're excluded. This places the sociologist into a position of hierarchy—the eternal denouncer of a system endowed with the capacity to conceal itself from its agents. Rancière (2004) argued that “This violence therefore must be even more irremediable than that of domination; it must be the irreducibility of the law that leaves the agents producing it or subjected to it no means to recognize it” (p. 177). Pelletier (2009) suggests that Bourdieu’s view “can consequently be neither productive, in the sense of enabling reform, nor enable ‘radical’ critique, since it is impossible to imagine, within this vision of the social, that the social order could produce anything else than its own misrecognition” (p. 140).

Despite these criticisms of the theory of social reproduction, several strands of Bourdieu’s thesis continue to impact the ways in which music educators understand the role of the teacher as musical expert. Bourdieu and Rancière held similar concerns regarding the concealment of knowledge by the expert teacher. As Lambert (2012) describes, “Rancière is critical of the hegemonic temporal mode of learning whereby an (endless) journey of progression from ignorance to knowing becomes institutionalised and regarded as endemic to the human condition” (p. 212). These temporal concerns raised by Bourdieu and Rancière resonate strongly with the critiques levelled against the controlled epistemic structure of the instrumental education. In traditional wind band pedagogy, it is common for conductors to delay knowledge temporally (‘you will learn that piece/that technique later, when you are ready’) as well as concealing musical tools such as the full instrumental score (musicians only having access to their individual parts). The conductor, in their position of authority, holds the key to students’ knowledge and growth, and thus the unilateral power to shape their educational progression. These are important critiques. Nonetheless, assuming that pedagogical authority is inherently a coercive and oppressive act, an act of symbolic violence,

lacks critical nuanced perspectives about how teachers might employ their expert musical and pedagogical knowledge in ways that counter such repressive possibilities.

In summary, the concerns about social reproduction of hegemonic systems of control and the coercive authority of specialist knowledge provided the intellectual roots for critiques levelled against the role of the conductor in school band settings. While critiques of school bands that draw upon the theoretical traditions explored above bring critical awareness to the ways in which power might be exercised within traditional band teaching, I remain wary of how contemporary music education literature often employs these theoretical frames in such a way as to limit teachers' agency to enact their authority toward their educational values and goals. As Burbules and Rice (1992) contend, "Power is systematized to the point where no one controls it, no one can escape it, and we can conceive of progressive practice only in terms of self-conscious struggle within and against that system" (p. 34).

Democratic connections

Allsup (2016) has recently doubled down on the fundamentally undemocratic nature of epistemic judgement and expert authority. In his book, *Remixing the Classroom*, he states:

When induction takes place over years, or decades, the expert is naturally averse to democratic participation... Where notions of good and bad have consensus, where what counts as quality is in general accord, where expectations of mastery are connected to words like "perfection," "excellence," and "virtuosity" (more than "experimentation," "subjectivity," and "amateurism"), one finds a closed form waiting to be evaluated and ranked (p. 54-55).

Epistemic considerations are, in Allsup's writing over several decades, counter to democratic endeavours, and thus the teacher interferes with the cultivation of democratic educational goods if they exhibit musical mastery or employ their expert pedagogical authority to shape curricular ends.

That said, it remains rather unclear in Allsup's descriptions whether, or to what degree, justifying authority in the classroom based upon "excellence" or "mastery" in pedagogical skills might be concluded to be undemocratic.

Despite the clear skepticism regarding epistemically oriented teaching expounded in much of Allsup's work, he has likewise acknowledged several problematic over-simplifications in the literature regarding the value of teachers' expertise. In a critique of some of the tenets of Lucy Green's informal learning approach to popular music (this approach will be discussed in greater detail in the next section), Allsup and Olsen (2012) express some concerns about the overly anti-epistemic turn towards informal, student-centered learning situations. In response to Green's (2008) suggestion that "learners in the informal realm seem to experience a qualitative difference between being taught by someone who is designed as a teacher and being taught by someone who is a peer, regardless of the particular teaching method," (p. 121), Allsup and Olsen (2012) contend that:

The music teachers in Green's book could easily be outsourced in favour of cheaper, less experienced, and under-educated labor. If the tenets of informal musical learning are to be adapted, second-wave research needs to provide broad and self-critical illustrations of what constitutes a qualified, indeed *highly* qualified, music teacher. (p. 14)

They go on to argue that through a greater awareness of contextual elements of schooling, teachers might place their "skill at the service of student needs, rather than personal expertise. But neither should teacher expertise be hard to locate, only redirected or refocused to a common good" (Allsup & Olsen, 2012, p. 16).

These last claims seem to conflict with his argument that musical or pedagogical mastery is necessarily oppressive and anti-democratic. Allsup's call for a second-wave of research in informal learning regarding normative conceptions of teacher quality has gone, I contend, largely unanswered. If we assume that the greater control a teacher exercises in directing classroom activities—what

Philpott and Wright (2012) describe as strongly framed and transmitted curriculum—the more students’ democratic voice is limited, we risk eliding conceptions of authoritarianism with legitimate democratic authority. Authoritarian teaching practices that rely upon a conception of the teacher or conductor as all-knowing and infallible, where decisions are made at the sole discretion of the teacher-expert, and dominance, coercion, or fear are tactics seen fit to realize the teacher’s goals, no doubt engender the sort of dominant-acquiescent power imbalances of which critical music pedagogues are rightly wary.

Certainly, an uncritical overreliance on traditions of technical expertise as a teaching tool can have many problematic effects such as disregarding students’ voices and discouraging participation and criticism in musical decision making, thus effecting the democratic value of the learning experience. It goes without saying that “when it cultivates authoritarianism, mastery may undermine democracy” (Jorgensen, 2021, p. 179). However, this view rests on the *contingency* that mastery is exerted in ways that are coercive and authoritarian, rather than through legitimate, non-coercive authority. I contend that authoritative teaching, justified to some extent by a teacher’s epistemic expertise and necessarily implying some degree of power, does not *necessarily* stifle students’ capacity for democratic growth. Indeed, in the next chapter, I consider views from Hannah Arendt and Sigal Ben-Porath who view authority as being justified on adherence to certain independent standards, aimed at the protection of children’s vulnerabilities and developing capacities for autonomous reasoning and agency. In these views, it is the *responsibility* of educators to ensure the legitimate exercise of authority. As Arendt (1961a) argues:

Children cannot throw off educational authority, as though they were in a position of oppression by an adult majority— though even this absurdity of treating children as an oppressed minority in need of liberation has actually been tried out in modern educational practice. Authority has been discarded by the adults, and this can mean only one thing: that

the adults refuse to assume responsibility for the world into which they have brought the children. (p. 190)

This sort of ‘casting-off’ of the responsibility for authority, as Arendt describes, could deprive children of the means to understand its potential value and resist its misuse. Therefore, rather than creating dichotomies between power and democracy, or expertise and democracy, the structural criticisms of Foucault and Bourdieu presented above ought to be viewed as potential *constraints* on authority that enter into ethical deliberation regarding educational policy and practice, without negating teachers’ or students’ democratic agency. Recognizing the nuanced differences in forms of authority is an epistemic task that is necessary both for philosophical and practical clarity about the justifications of educational authority. While attunement to the social power structures within which we teach is critical for reflective teaching practices, I agree with Miranda Fricker (2007) who states that “While social power is *unavoidable*, engagement in epistemic judgements is critical to illuminating when power and authority is legitimate, and when it is coercive” (p. 3, emphasis mine). Failure to engage with epistemic questions of quality and value, she argues, can lead to serious epistemic injustices (Fricker, 1998, 2007). Thus, in the remainder of this chapter, I examine two concrete ways in which views of power and authority in contemporary music education theory have become linked to democratic music education. The first is an association between democratic pedagogy and student-directed, informal learning. The second explores questions of power and authority within competitive music structures.

Democracy in informal learning

The dualism of coercive and non-coercive pedagogical authority outlined above frequently manifests in music education as a division between formal and informal approaches to music instruction. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, one assumption that is embedded in the metanarrative about band education is that student-led, informal learning is aligned better with democratic goals

and outcomes. Notions of informal learning in music education often draw upon the work of Lucy Green, a chief proponent of integrating informal modes of learning into formal music education settings. In her highly cited books, *How Popular Musicians Learn: A Way Ahead for Music Education* (2001) and *Music, Informal Learning and the School: A New Classroom Pedagogy* (2008), Green proposes a methodology that emphasizes the importance of student-directed learning. Students' autonomy to choose their curriculum, a focus on the musical styles with which students identify, and peer learning in friendship groups are at the heart of her informal model. The merits of Green's conception of informal education within the context of the music classroom is certainly debatable, and is further investigated below. However, it is important to note first that scholars who suggest a move toward such informal learning approaches often evoke democracy as a central justification for the shift away from traditional learning structures such as the LME. They highlight informal processes that include dialogue between peers on musical ideas, creating original compositions, or a general focus on music as play or leisure (Allsup, 2003; Green, 2008; Mantie, 2022; Philpott & Wright, 2012). In other words, for many contemporary music education scholars, pursuing democratic capacities of collaboration and dialogue in their classrooms *necessitates* a shift from propositional knowledge or educational products (such as concerts and competitions) to student-led learning without predetermined ends being established by the teacher. I suggest, however, that assuming informal learning necessarily renders learning democratic treats democracy as if it is uncontroversial, representing a clear, undisputed (and often unarticulated) conception of what goals democratic education should seek to cultivate. This is problematic because it occludes reflection and deliberation on the normative complexity of promoting democratic goods within various musical activities as well as the way goods conflict in practice.

Proponents of the democratic value of informal approaches to music education often turn to John Dewey's progressive education. Comparing traditional education with his progressive

approach, Dewey (1986) places student-led, experiential learning in stark contrast to formal, directive teaching approaches:

To imposition from above is opposed expression and cultivation of individuality; to external discipline is opposed free activity; to learning from texts and teachers, learning through experience; to acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by drill, is opposed acquisition of them as means of attaining ends which make direct vital appeal; to preparation for a more or less remote future is opposed making the most of the opportunities of present life; to static aims and materials is opposed acquaintance with a changing world. (p. 243)

Dewey relates these dualisms of authority, espoused in the distinction between procedural and ends-oriented pedagogy, directly to the value of democracy:

One may safely assume, I suppose, that one thing which has recommended the progressive movement is that it seems more in accord with the democratic ideal to which our people is committed than do the procedures of the traditional school, since the latter have so much of the autocratic about them. (Dewey, 1986)

Responding to Dewey's concerns about the product orientation of traditional schooling, which are inextricably woven with concerns regarding the 'cult of the expert' described in the previous section, many music education scholars have proposed thinking about music as a process, rather than as an object (the latter of which occurs when there is a significant focus on the authority of the musical score or the performance outcomes). David Elliott (1995, 2003) was one of the first scholars to push back against product driven music education, highlighting the view that "Musical products—performances, improvisations, compositions, and arrangements— are enmeshed in and derive their nature and significance from their contexts of creation and use" (p. 8). For Elliott (2003), a praxial music education requires both product and process, grounded in the experience of music making: "Praxial" is meant to convey the idea that music pivots on specific kinds of human doing and

making...that are purposeful, contextual, and socially embedded” (p. 14). Elliott’s conception requires that teachers hold significant musical and pedagogical experience to facilitate such processes. In this way, praxial music education reflects quite closely a Deweyan perspective. In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey (2018) argues that “one of the weightiest problems with which the philosophy of education has to cope is the method of keeping a proper balance between the informal and the formal, the incidental and the intentional, modes of education” (p. 9). However, recent calls for democratic music education lean more heavily toward the side of informal approaches as a way to combat the issues of coercive power and technocratic instruction described in the previous section.

Informal music education is argued to promote student-led experiential learning, reducing the direction and control from music teachers in students’ learning process. Though not necessarily correlative, the emphasis in informal approaches tends towards popular styles of music and music learning. In Green’s (2008) informal practice, students choose a small group of friends who have like-minded musical taste and employ learning practices common to the field of popular music such as peer-directed learning and copying parts by ear. Skills and knowledge are acquired haphazardly; the teacher steps back and observes students, eventually providing limited mentorship, as students learn from one another through an exploratory music making process. Green explains that a key difference in how musicians learn popular music outside of formal settings is that such learning:

tends to be a community of peers rather than ‘master-musicians’ or adults with greater skills.

The significance of this is profound, as it affects the entire way in which skills and knowledge are transmitted in the popular music field, taking the onus of transmission away from an authority figure, expert or older member of the family or community, and putting it in large measure into the hands of groups of young learners themselves. (Green, 2008, p. 6)

Through student-led learning, where students begin with shared musical interests and can pursue music with which they personally identify, without top-down instruction from an expert musician, some scholars argue that informal learning can nurture democratic goods such as student voice and subvert issues of power described in the previous section (Allsup, 2003, 2016; Allsup & Benedict, 2008; Karlsen & Vakeva, 2012). These informal approaches, however, obscure the notion that democracy depends on opportunities to speak and act across difference.

The goal of the student-directed, informal approach in Green's formulation is depicted primarily in terms of emotional or affective value. Students are said to experience greater self-esteem in their capacities as musical knowers, there is an increase in student buy-in and motivation regarding music learning, and an overall sense of enjoyment through the music learning process. Moreover, Green (2008) briefly proposes that the informal model holds certain epistemic value as it strives to nurture greater purposive listening, creativity, and critical musicality as students learn to understand the musical styles with which they identify through exploration and experimentation. While each of these claims deserves serious critical analysis, some of which has been undertaken by other scholars in the field (Karlsen & Vakeva, 2012), I focus on a more recent assertion by some music education scholars regarding the democratic benefits of Green's model (Karlsen & Vakeva, 2012). By reducing music teachers' epistemic authority to direct student learning, proponents of informal learning argue that student voices are highlighted, leading to more democratic collaboration and discussion amongst a community of peers (Allsup, 2003).

There is substantial murkiness regarding the relationship between authority and voice in Green's approach, which carries over to subsequent discussions about the democratic implications of informal learning. Indeed, the notion of student 'voice' invites definitional mayhem. What virtues do we seek to nurture in terms of student voice? Are we striving to encourage students' expressive capacities through artistic self-expression? In absence of a clear definition of student voice, Green's

informal approach does not sufficiently acknowledge that democratic citizenship in a plural society involves deep diversity and disagreement. Rather, Green's conception of informal learning—that is, learning based on small, segregated friendship groups—lacks the deep diversity, disagreement, and provisional authority necessary for the cultivation of voice as a communicative virtue within a plural democratic society, potentially exacerbating the very difficulties proponents are attempting to overcome. As I elaborate in Chapter 5, teacher authority and student voice are not as opposed as critical music pedagogues sometimes suggest and, therefore, we must consider the potentials of non-authoritarian notions of democratic authority that can nurture the cultivation of student voice.

The pluralistic goals of democratic education are further subdued by common rhetoric about the unifying power of music (Froehlich, 2009; Kertz-Welzel, 2016). A focus on unification, or “oneness” (Allen, 2004), through the ensemble experience, where the act of performing together brings players together toward a common good, is seen in certain views as naturally employing democratic collaboration. However, As Young (1996) argues, we cannot assume a unity of views amongst a diverse, pluralist society, either as a starting point or end goal of deliberation:

If we are all really looking for what we have in common—whether as a prior condition or as a result—then we are not transforming our point of view. We only come to see ourselves mirrored in others. If we assume, on the other hand, that communicative interaction means encountering differences of meaning, social position, or need that I do not share and identify with, then we can better describe how that interaction transforms my preferences. (p. 127)

Working within this more pluralist perspective of deliberative democratic engagement, democratic voice might then be understood as the capacity and inclination to communicate one's views in public settings characterized by deep diversity and disagreement.

In Chapter 5, I offer a more expansive consideration of the connections between student voice, authority, and democratic education in the context of LMEs. However, I wish to draw

attention here to three fundamental issues that arise from a hasty labelling of Green's informal peer-learning model as inherently cultivating democratic voice. These issues problematize assumptions about democratic education requiring a withdrawal of teacher influence, and are thus important to note at this stage:

1. Green's model of informal learning falsely assumes that small group learning, once the teacher's authority is removed or subdued, is free from dominance or coercion.
2. The criteria for pre-established shared musical sensibilities in small friendship groups deprives students of sufficient diversity to cultivate democratic voice. Shared musical preferences are inoculated, to some degree, from critical democratic deliberation or evaluation. Like-mindedness and easy agreement are celebrated.
3. Potentially most troubling is that the fact that the informal model relies on self-segregating dynamics that may, under certain conditions, reaffirm ingrained, and possibly undemocratic or parochial tastes and attitudes.

In other words, informal learning based on small, like-minded groups misses the opportunity to work through diverse and potentially competing musical sensitivities. Such practices in turn limit the critical skills required of democratic citizenship. In fact, Green's model emphasizes that:

The response was invariably that co-operation had been 'easy', or 'very easy'...In groups, it is necessary to be with friends in order for [repertoire] selection to take place, since it relies on being able to reach some kind of a consensus over what music to choose...Informal learning in the popular music sphere is fundamentally tied up with learning to reproduce and create music which affirms and celebrates, rather than contradicts or threatens, one's individual and group identity. (Green, 2008, p. 121)

Green maintains that groups need to share musical sensitivities and achieve easy agreement to foster learning and safeguard against the dissolution of the groups. However, the price of such easy

agreement appears to be a significant diminishment of viewpoint diversity and disagreement among participants. This has potentially serious costs for educators who might seek to foster skills of democratic deliberation among students. The democratic and pedagogical value in easy decision making and the affirmation of group attitudes is unclear. While forbiddingly onerous collaboration could potentially stifle productive discussion and collaboration, it is difficult to see the pedagogical or democratic lessons to be learned when decision making is meant to be as seamless as possible. Certainly, recent research in the philosophy of education emphasizes the importance of discussing controversial issues in order to promote students' deliberative capacities (Ben-Porath, 2023; Callan, 2016; Hess & McAvoy, 2014; Stitzlein, 2024; Yacek, 2018). Moreover, the suppression of voices by dominant personalities within the groups, peer pressure to acquiesce, or staying silent to avoid prolonging negative interactions are all entirely possible within the informal model as articulated by Green. While jamming with one's friends may seemingly yield easy consensus, equal inclusion of democratic voice is not an inherent condition of the model.

Secondly, if students remain entrenched within like-minded groups of peers who share similar musical proclivities before entering the music room, student collaboration arguably misses a valuable opportunity for developing capacities to negotiate difference in a large, diverse group of people. Eamonn Callan (1994) explains the broader political significance of niche politics, which is reflected in the educational contexts proposed by Green:

The public ends with which individuals identify are so often sharply distinguished from the good of the polity as a whole: it is the flourishing of some specific community or the aims of some special interest group that matter, rather than the good of the republic and all its citizens (p. 191).

In 'democratizing' the music classroom through collaboration within like-minded groups, one ignores the difficulty of democratic pluralism and the educative potential of negotiating difference.

Distrust or misunderstanding between the various friendship groups is likely to remain unresolved or possibly even re-enforced.

Finally, the reliance of Green's model on personally identifying friendship groups is supported by the notion that musical expression can only succeed if musicians hold in common a close musical sensitivity:

Friendship, co-operation and the ability to be sensitive to other people also affect the precise nature and 'feel' of the music being produced, in ways that relate to musical communication in performance, and particularly to group composition and improvisation...without such co-operation, a band will eventually disintegrate. (Green, 2008, p. 9)

Shared taste and musical sensitivities are important, Green contends, to safeguard against dissent or difference that could disintegrate the learning experience. This approach minimizes the presence of substantial disagreement, which is problematic if the goal of democratic music education is to provide students with meaningful opportunities to engage in genuinely democratic deliberation. Moreover, building deliberative spaces on *a priori* unity can too easily uphold the status quo. Indeed, musicians in the Vienna Philharmonic employed a similar motivation for the exclusion of women and visible minorities in their orchestra. Helmut Zehetner, second violinist for the Philharmonic upheld musical and cultural uniformity of the ensemble, stating:

From the beginning we have spoken of the special qualities, of the way music is made here.

The way we make music here is not only a technical ability, but also something that has a lot to do with the soul. The soul does not let itself be separated from the cultural roots that we have here in central Europe. And it also doesn't allow itself to be separated from gender.

(Osborne, 1996, p. 6)

Grouping students with similar sensitivities may encourage more students into music programs and may give them greater air time to verbally express their musical ideas. However, sequestering

students into niches that share cultural sensitivities glosses over musical difference in a way not unfamiliar to culturally monistic professional orchestras.

More recent adaptations of Green's model by proponents of the democratic potential of informal learning tend to offer a more nuanced and communicative picture of student voice. Allsup (2003), for example, offers a conception of student voice through informal pedagogy that is oriented toward communication in diverse educational settings. He argues that small group composition such as the 'garage band' provides a more democratic learning environment and culturally meaningful experience than the traditional, conductor-led ensemble, as students and teacher learn from each other in a dialogical relationship. Central to Allsup's conception of democracy is negotiating power through dialogue and collaboration: "At the heart of democratic learning is dialogue, where power is negotiated through shared decision making" (Allsup, 2003, p. 27). This sort of collaboration, Allsup (2003) argues, lays the "groundwork for unheard voices" (p. 31).

Despite his advocacy for the democratic benefits of informal learning inspired by Green's work, Allsup does not subscribe completely to Green's model, identifying several major shortcomings. Allsup and Olsen (2012), for instance, argue that organizations like Musical Futures,¹³ a music teacher training program in the United Kingdom that was studied by Green and that employs a similar conception of informal popular music learning, are problematic on several fronts. Musical Futures, Allsup and Olsen (2012) contend, continues to perpetuate narrow cultural norms—in particular, Anglo-American, guitar-based music practices—insufficiently representing the pluralism of our classrooms. Moreover, Allsup and Olsen (2012) are skeptical that this student-centered program overly devalues teachers' expertise, thereby "sowing the seeds of our own demise" (p. 14). Finally, they criticize the reproduction of popular music in Green's model for easily falling prey to predatory capitalism. These are all serious concerns regarding Green's informal pedagogical

¹³ For more information, see: <https://www.musicalfutures.org>

model. Allsup and Olsen (2012) argue that informal learning should instead nurture diversity-affirming learning communities, where “teachers, in their role in these communities, will invite students to engage with one another, to wrestle with difference, and with musical practices to which they may not be initially drawn” (p. 16).

Despite the attention to democratic learning in settings of diversity and difference, the values toward which Allsup strives, i.e., collaboration, discussion, or creativity, on their own, do not necessarily imply democratic interactions. While Allsup places the teacher in a “dialogical relationship” with the students, there remains in his work, as discussed in the previous section of this chapter, a deep skepticism toward the authority of expertise, without sufficient discussion about the democratic legitimacy of authority. What counts as legitimate democratic authority in Allsup’s view? What is the democratic goal of collaboration and discussion in garage band pedagogy? Such ambiguity in the aims of democratic music teaching risk perpetuating undemocratic habits and attitudes. For instance, within Allsup’s (2003) description of democratic garage bands, unequal gendered power relationships were subtly perpetuated. His interview data with students in a garage band composition project revealed that the only female member of the rock band (other girls were apparently intimidated by the group’s maleness and associations of maleness with the activity of composition) viewed working with the boys as requiring compromise in the way she conducted herself. She needed to “loosen up a little to fit in with the guys” (Allsup, 2003, p. 33). The boys, on the other hand, “made little to no concessions to gender because they were unaware that this was an issue to consider” (Allsup, 2003, p. 33). Despite the boys describing everyone’s contributions as equal within the group, when they expressed the value of the project, how they built friendships, and how they learned from and relied upon each other, they failed to mention the young woman’s contributions to their group. Therefore, although everyone had opportunity to collaborate and share their ideas for the composition, this student-centered learning was not free from problematic

epistemic power relationships, nor did it provide students with the democratic skills to critically evaluate the democratic process with which they were engaged. Indeed, had there been greater direction from a pedagogical expert, such power imbalances in the democratic process may have been acknowledged and mitigated.

Returning to Dewey's commitment to experiential learning, it should be noted that overly procedural and informal interpretations of progressive education, such as I have argued is sought through Green's educational approach, obscure the place of epistemological goals in Dewey's progressive education. In fact, certain readings of Dewey's democracy are analytically coherent with epistemically oriented notions of democracy. Hilary Putnam (1992) argues, for instance, that "democracy is not just one form of social life among other workable forms of social life; it is the precondition for the full application of intelligence to the solution of social problems" (p. 180). Paul Woodford's (2005, 2019) views about the dire need for intelligent, critical, and rational deliberation on matters pertaining to music education certainly offers a reading of Dewey that supports a somewhat epistemically oriented notion of democratic music education. However, I have attempted to highlight in this section the ways in which many contemporary music education scholars draw on Dewey's general ideas to provide accounts of democracy in music education that misguidedly de-emphasize epistemic issues and judgements, thus obscuring the role of teachers' epistemic authority in the teaching and learning process.

I am not arguing that informal music learning is without valuable pedagogical merits. Such work can allow a focus on non-notational practices that appeals to students who may otherwise eschew music altogether, or provide formally trained musicians with a different and complementary musical skillset, or, importantly, work toward a decolonial practice of music education. However, whatever the existing merits of this focus, the justification of democratic voice, indicated by improved opportunities for dialogue and collaboration, falls short. Jamming with one's friends may

easily render musical judgements, whether it be how to play a lick or the style of music performed. This kind of consensus may be agreeable, but it reduces the development of democratic voice to a minimal, easy subjectivist exercise, or worse, may exacerbate the very conditions proponents are rightfully trying to avoid. Therefore, as the argument that authority based upon expertise necessarily limits democratic voice appears untenable, then it holds that there must be a non-authoritarian conception of authority that can foster democratic skills necessary for the development of voice as a communicative virtue within a diverse, plural society. Non-authoritarian conceptions of democratic authority, as they relate to LMEs is the focus of Chapter 3.

The determinacy of competitive structures

In the previous sections, I have problematized the assumptions that authoritative teaching practices based in musical or pedagogical expertise are inherently anti-democratic, and that, subsequently, informal, ‘student-centred’ music practices better nurture the development of deep democratic skills, free from coercion and oppression. The picture, as I have attempted to illustrate, is significantly more complex than these oversimplified dualisms suggest. Krista’s case, described in the introduction to this dissertation, exemplifies the complexities experienced by teachers when balancing their expertise and formal music training with their students’ musical and democratic knowledge and development. Krista experiences the normative impact of teaching in different modalities (as conductor, as mentor) in complex, multilayered ways. She values the collective “empowerment” that arose from performing successfully as a large ensemble in a high stakes setting, even at the same time as she was increasingly uncomfortable with the position of authority she felt was imposed by the structure of the wind band, and cognisant of the normative appeal in prioritizing her students’ individual autonomy and expression through the student-led music making in her PMP course.

Krista's ethical conflict turns, at least in large part, on a collective experience that emerged out of the high stakes performance setting of the national music festival. She wonders whether her authority to steer her wind ensemble is justified by the goods of empowerment produced through the collective effort of preparing for music festival, or whether her ethical concerns about the hierarchical and colonial nature of band education means she should abandon band education completely in favour of the new, student-led popular music learning course. According to Krista's description, it was the high stakes nature of the setting (a performance where an adjudicator provides a rating based upon pre-established criteria of technical and musical mastery) that shaped her students' experience. Krista describes how other large concert events they showcased at school, concerts which were more student-driven and diverse in forms of musical expression, could not replicate the impact of the festival experience. Comparing such a music night at the school to the national music festival experience, she describes:

We put on a beautiful band concert [and] played gorgeous music that was really well programmed [and] they did really well. It was absolutely gorgeous. It was epic. It was a night to remember. But I still don't think it had the same impact. (Krista, interview)

This was a surprising outcome for Krista, as she held strong philosophical concerns about the competition-driven environment, often avoiding entering her ensembles in competitive performance opportunities. She explains that her students' reaction following the festival was "fascinating because we're trying to get away from the culture of like prizes [and] competition. So that's why I rebelled against it. But then it keeps coming back to us, into that conversation" (Krista, interview). Both Krista's unease with competitive band culture and her feelings of inescapability of these educational structures echo the increasing criticism in philosophical scholarship regarding the structural forces exerted on teachers through the careful maintenance of competitive, neo-liberal structures of music competition, particularly in the U.S. setting. Several scholars (Gould, 2008;

Natale-Abramo, 2014; Powell, 2023; Tucker, 2023; Tucker & Powell, 2021) have recently argued that competitive, or high stakes music performance, particularly when competition is “used to evaluate the quality of music education,” (Powell, 2023, p. 5), constricts music teachers’ agency and frames the ways in which teachers are able to develop their professional identities.¹⁴ Several assumptions within this argument are necessary to unpack in order to assist Krista in weighing the goods nurtured by employing her authority either to run her ensembles in traditional modalities, or moving more fully toward informal learning approaches.

It could be argued that Krista’s dilemma about how best to exert her pedagogical authority within an environment that is driven increasingly by neo-liberal, competitive forces, is primarily a question of her agency to enact change to the system itself. Melissa Natale-Abramo (2014), in her research on teacher identity, found that her research participants experienced conflicts similar to Krista’s. As she explains, her participants all felt that:

The pedagogical discourse modeled after the conductor was in conflict with the student-centered creative approach they had experienced in graduate school. Each participant grappled with the seemingly opposite pedagogical discourses, borrowing from each, as they attempted to create their teaching identity. (Natale-Abramo, 2014, p. 58)

But, as Natale-Abramo (2014) argues, despite this discomfort felt by her participants, and “while they rejected the role of ‘conductor’ as the archetype of the ensemble educator, they still were required to borrow from its gestures, unable to fully escape its influence upon conceptions of ensemble teaching” (p. 64).

Natale-Abramo’s account of teachers’ identity being shaped and constricted by the traditional structures of LME is further developed in recent work by Olivia Powell and Sean Tucker.

¹⁴ Powell describes how there is an increasing practice of utilizing scores in music competitions to evaluate music students’ learning and competencies.

Tucker's (2023) research on music teacher agency suggests that high-stakes music performance was the core from which her participant music teachers' identities arose, but that this system also constrained their practices, and continued to reinforce the "emphasis on performance above other strands of music-making" (p. 400). For Tucker, teachers' agency is deeply connected to their professional identity and it "emerged from their interactions with music education organizations that perpetuated a high-stakes performance environment" (Tucker, 2023, p. 400). Powell (2023) concurs with Tucker's concerns about the impact of competition on music education, going so far as to suggest that "it's easier to imagine the end of music education than the end of competition" (p. 93). Elizabeth Gould (2008) similarly criticizes the structures of evaluation, equating normativity with oppression in relation to the wind band. She writes, "the logical basis for both ranking (valuing) and dominating (controlling) is the construct dualism, which *necessarily* enables hegemony (assimilation) on the one hand and inferiorization (domination) on the other" (p. 31-32, emphasis mine). The conductor thus becomes a vessel for this domination, their authority to direct learning legitimized by the norms of ranking and evaluation. In this view, authority, particularly when related to normative decision making, implicates the loss of student agency.

The implications of these critiques levelled against band education could work to deflate the epistemic substance of questions related to the legitimacy of pedagogical authority. If musical and pedagogical expertise is fundamentally linked to hegemonic, oppressive, neo-liberal structures that do not provide opportunity to employ authority for the benefit of her students, Krista seemingly has no agency in the process of making pedagogical decisions. However Krista, unlike many of the American case studies provided in the current literature, had *significant* agency to change the system within which she taught. Her administration was open to reshaping the program, she was not compelled by the community to attend the music festivals and often freely opted to avoid them, and she was invited to rewrite the provincial curriculum to reflect the values to which she felt

increasingly connected. In this way, Krista met Powell's (2023) description of agency as "an ability to exercise judgment, reflect upon past actions, act on behalf of students' best interests, and imagine change in the future" (p. 98). This substantial agency, however, did not dissolve the dilemmas she experienced in navigating her authority in the music classroom. Thus, while discussions of teacher agency and identity, particularly within American contexts, are vitally important, my focus on authority in this dissertation is quite distinct from the literature of agency. While I fully acknowledge the presence and impact of systems of competition and economic control that shape school music programs in countries such as Canada, Sweden, and the UK, as well as (though to an arguably lesser degree than) in the United States, I contend that there is an overly hasty connection established between a teacher's agency and how they choose to exert their pedagogical authority to the benefit of their students' democratic capacities, particularly when faced with weighing competing educational goods.

In the development of his argument about competition in music education, Powell (2023) reflects some of my view, in so far as he argues that the structures that compel us to see competition as a necessary of music education are, in fact, *contingent* and thus "open to our influence" (p. 93). I agree with Powell that "by seeing these authority figures as 'creatures of contingent circumstance,' we place them in space and time as historical contingencies rather than universal, eternal forces," thus demystifying the systems of authority (Powell, 2023, p. 97). Powell links this notion of contingency to a democratic turn for music education:

A truly open, fair, and democratic music education system would be one in which its contingency is continually made visible—one in which a space is always maintained between particular practices and a universalization of a particular. But, rather than substituting one particular mode for another, we should shift our focus to the *singular*. In other words, each *singular* way of musicking in the classroom would be allowed to thrive on its own terms

without being constantly judged against an external standard—a process that necessarily distorts that practice to meet the needs of comparison and assessment. (p. 97)

There is no doubt that overly competitive structures constrain music teachers' ability to exert their authority in ways that uphold many ideals of democratic education. Moreover, a view of music education that embraces a praxiological stance might suggest that we move between the particular musical and cultural practices of the school and more universal normative, educational ideals. Still, the point I wish to make here is that external standards do not necessarily undermine democratic achievement. In fact, as I will return to in Chapter 6, and as is clear in Krista's case, high stakes performance environments might, under certain circumstances, increase both the demandingness of the democratic goals and create "empowering" collective experiences. The question remains what normative limits are required of teachers' authority to safeguard those communal benefits without undermining other fundamental democratic requirements.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have highlighted and problematized three commonly held assumptions that are implied within the metanarrative of LMEs as an anti-democratic educational structure. I have argued that there are false dichotomies drawn between power and coercive, anti-democratic oppression as well as equating epistemic expertise with anti-democratic elitism and exclusion. These dualisms strip teachers of legitimately employing their authority toward democratic educational goals, mistakenly suggesting the need to significantly abrogate their pedagogical authority in order to attain democratic educational goals. Second, I suggested that certain claims that democratic participation and inclusion are best served in student-led, informal learning are strongly overstated in the literature I have reviewed. Such strong claims about the tight connection between informal, student-led pedagogical approaches and democratic outcomes obscure the normative complexity of weighing competing democratic goods, and risk perpetuating the sort of undemocratic relationships proponents of

informal music education seek to avoid. Third, I have highlighted some of the ways in which Krista's case illustrates how teachers' democratic authority may be obscured by an overly dualistic theoretical understanding of the relationship between educational authority and democratic educational goals and outcomes.

The criticisms of traditional formal music training through the LME highlighted in this chapter raise critically important points, particularly regarding the structural forces that shape the ways in which we approach thinking about pedagogical authority. At the same time, it is clear that these criticisms tend toward grand metanarratives and stark dualisms that do not capture the nuanced dilemmas experienced by practicing teachers, nor do they provide tools for teachers to consider the ways in which the exertion of their authority might promote or limit particular democratic (or other educational) goods. What is required, then, is a philosophical framework for thinking about the democratic potential of conductors' authority within current educational structures. In the next chapter, I provide several conceptual schemata regarding teachers' authority and students' agency. The conceptual frameworks offered provide a way by which to consider the ruptures between teachers' experienced dilemmas related to their authority and the current literature on democratic education, providing concrete conceptual tools for teachers to weigh the ethical trade-offs that arise in their pedagogical decision making.

Chapter 3: Democratic pedagogical authority: A conceptual framework for large music ensembles

What kind of world came to an end after the modern age not only challenged one or another form of authority in different spheres of life but caused the whole concept of authority to lose its validity altogether?
(Arendt, 1961b, p. 104)

In Randall Allsup's (2016) book, *Remixing the Classroom: Toward an Open Philosophy of Music Education*, he begins with plea for a more “venturesome vision of music education,” arguing that, “tired of closed forms of life and living, we want to break free—we are longing for openings” (p. 1). At the centre of Allsup's definition of ‘closed forms’ in music education is a problem of authority—the authority held in the grip of the musical form and authorship, congealing criteria of music excellence and social value, and of the Master who reproduces that authority through their pupils. In this view, the authority of the musical expert reproduces oppressive power relationships that demand students’ submission and deference to unshakeable standards (a process of induction though an “endless series of doors and doorkeepers” (Allsup, 2018, p. 10)). Indeed, Allsup moves quickly from the notion of hierarchical educational relationships to relationships of oppression in his descriptions of the closed system:

Defenders of hierarchical relationships have a special burden of proof if they wish to justify their method and approach. They may point to efficiencies in the learning process or lay claim to cultural authenticity of some kind or other, but no justification can be made to defend actions that are oppressive. (Allsup, 2016, p. 11).

Herein lies the problem with the dualism of open/closed educational structures that are linked to conservatory-style training (both individual, and in large music ensembles such as wind bands and orchestras); a slippery slope is manufactured which implies that hierarchy in the classroom, in which normative and epistemic evaluations are entangled, perpetuates oppressive tendencies, thereby

suffocating democratic potential. As I have suggested in Chapter 2, Allsup argues that through systems of induction, experts are “naturally averse to democratic participation” (p. 54). “A culture of closed forms,” he contends, “is one of perfection, not uncertainty; submission, not play; elitism, not access; merit, not democracy; Law, not innovation” (p. 55). These views are not solely attributed to Allsup’s work, but are characteristic of contemporary scholarly discussions of LMEs, which are viewed as grounded, perhaps irredeemably, in hierarchical Western musical traditions and, as such, as inflexibly structured, unresponsive to students’ perspectives, exclusionary, and discriminatory. Following this logic, the question of teacher authority in LMEs as a potential vehicle of democratic education is often a non-starter.

While Allsup (2016) and I share a common goal, to “make a case for the concerted and conscious circulation of power and control” (p. 12), I suggest that beginning with the binary between open and closed, or, said another way, between relativistic and foundational justifications of authority, isn’t sufficient to evaluate the ethical merits of a learning environment on democratic grounds. I do not wish to imply that Allsup devalues all teacher-directed learning, as at times throughout the book and his other work, he softens his view by looking to balance the foundational and the relative, “a closed form can be made open, and an open form can be closed,” arguing that a quality teacher is “a flexible expert who moves comfortably within closed and open arenas” (Allsup, 2016, pp. 11-12). However, he evidently prioritizes open approaches which aspire to ‘transcend the given,’ and resists notions of expertise gained through long processes of specialization, and he does so, often, on claims of democratic education. It is the claims to democracy where the dualism falls particularly short. Distinctions between authority, expertise, power, and democracy remain hazy in Allsup’s depictions of open and closed educational structures. Paul Woodford (2019) similarly critiques Allsup’s picture of democracy, stating that “The model of democracy to which he subscribes is not explicitly identified, and so it is not clear how teachers might judge their own

competence” (29). Allsup (2016) attempts to draw connections between the open conception and the development of certain democratic capacities, stating:

The aim of school and university music education is not performance expertise in closed or open forms; it should be openness. This concerns straying and muddling, the disposition to search and wander, and the pleasure of problem posing. It can be characterized by Deweyan notions like independence of mind and ability; the enlargement and enrichment of individual capacity, loyalty, and thinking; and understanding of self and others. (p. 109)

However, I agree with Woodford that democracy in this light is a catch-all of ideals which may or may not yield democratic results, let alone specify a particular conception of democratic citizenship. Even if the capacities Allsup names were all aimed toward democratic ends, they cannot always exist in synchronicity, and would inevitably conflict in particular moments of daily teaching. Thus, this ideal of democratic, open teaching leaves little for teachers, faced with dilemmas of balancing goods, with which to grasp onto.

Thus, rather than keeping our eye transfixed upon ‘openness,’ ‘transcendence’ or even what Woodford describes as a “challenging of the status-quo,” I suggest we reinforce and make more robust the guardrails to ensure the ongoing viability of the foundations of democratic cooperation and deliberation. Woodford (2019) suggests that to do this:

Teachers must screw up their courage to think and act boldly as public intellectuals in contributing to sometimes difficult discussions and debates in academia and the public realm about the nature and value of education in democratic society and the important roles of music and other arts therein. (p. 41)

But Woodford places a great deal of onus on teachers, already spread thin, and with few conceptual resources to evaluate the democratic merits of their actions as musical and pedagogic authorities. In absence of foundational grounds for democratic legitimacy of educational authority teachers are left

“without guidelines for exercising their residual authority,” creating a “chilling effect on educators” (Gutmann, 1999, p. 99).

In short, while there is widespread recognition of the existential threats to democracy (polarization, colonialism, authoritarian leadership), the conceptual tools that are being used to address democracy in music education are insufficient. As a field, we lack concrete conceptual tools to consider the validity of authority on foundational democratic grounds, and ways to consider how different manifestations of authority, in different settings, might prioritize certain democratic goods at the expense of others. Thus, it is incumbent upon us to consider the values that are foundational to democracy, rather than beginning with values that presuppose a secure democratic context such as ‘transcendence.’

To do so, in this chapter I develop a series of distinctions related to pedagogical authority that draw upon political philosophy and philosophy of education, but that keep the theoretical gaze cast upon the particular context of conductors’ authority that is unique to instrumental music education. The distinctions provide interpretive and analytical frames within which music teachers can coherently articulate more complex and varied conceptions of practical democratic teacher authority than the rigid and one-dimensional portrait often implied by critics of LMEs. To do so, I highlight several crucial distinctions in philosophical accounts of political and educational authority. First, I draw on the work of Hannah Arendt (1961b) and Amy Gutmann (1999) to distinguish between coercive and non-coercive authority. Second, I contrast deferential and dialogic conceptions of authority (Cunliffe & Reeve, 1999; Raz, 2009; Zagzebski, 2013). Finally, I engage with contemporary debates about democratic authority in educational contexts, highlighting a range of distinctions between hierarchical and non-hierarchical views of childhood (Ben-Porath, 2010).

The conceptual distinctions upon which I focus are usually treated by philosophers as universalistic and prescriptive normative principles. For example, political philosophers examine the

role of citizen consent as an ethical and epistemic constraint on political authority—a constraint that has broad implications for determining the legitimacy of state authority and for evaluating the justice of laws imposed on citizens. On this view, conceptual analysis of concepts like ‘authority’ are designed to illuminate and justify normative standards to which teachers and schools are ethically accountable (Galston, 1991; Gutmann, 1999; McDonough & Feinberg, 2003). For the purposes of this dissertation, I repurpose these distinctions as interpretive and analytic tools for examining teacher perspectives on their pedagogical authority. Do music teachers seek to exercise authority in ways that align with the proposed philosophical framework, or do they think about authority in different terms? In other words, the goal of the framework is not to produce an ideal vision of music teacher authority. Rather, this framework is meant to suggest certain ethical limits to authority—limits that are specifically constrained by values of democratic citizenship—which provide a constructive critical framework to begin to consider teachers’ phenomenological experiences of democratic music teaching through the participatory philosophical methodology in Chapter 4.

Non-authoritarian pedagogical authority

As previously described, there is a tendency in current music education theory to equate conductors’ musical and educational authority with domination or authoritarianism (Allsup & Benedict, 2008; Green, 2001, 2008). Insofar as this equation is assumed and accepted, there seems to be little room within which to appreciate the democratic potential of educational authority. By contrast, the philosophical framework developed below seeks to exploit the interpretive potential of distinctions between non-authoritarian conceptions, which can be aligned with democratic principles, and authoritarian conceptions, which are averse to such principles. By ‘interpretive potential,’ I mean that the distinctions can be understood not as absolute and binary, but as delineating the conceptual boundaries between which a wide range or spectrum of practical conceptions of teacher authority

may be enacted by teachers with diverse backgrounds, ethical commitments, and in diverse circumstances.

The first distinction concerns a contrast between power and legitimate authority. According to Hannah Arendt (1961b), “Since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of coercion where force is used, authority itself has failed!” (p. 93). Simply stated, democratic authority cannot be unconditional authority. Unchecked authority permits tyranny, and is hence incompatible with democracy. One of the ways in which Arendt distinguishes power from authority, as well as from strength, force, and violence—all of which carry deliberate and distinctive meanings in Arendt’s work—is that power is not individually held, but sustained by a group:

Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. When we say of somebody that he is “in power” we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name. (Arendt, 1970, p. 44)

Where there is a political community, Arendt (1970) argues that power is necessarily inherent and ubiquitous; thus, power does not require justification, only legitimacy through the process in which it was established: “Power springs up whenever people get together and act in concert, but it derives its legitimacy from the initial getting together rather than from any action that then may follow” (p. 52).

Arendt’s distinction between violence and legitimate power implies that authority seems necessarily conditional on certain independent, ethical requirements. In educational settings, this would imply that students learn why authority is legitimate, which, Arendt argues, necessitates first learning to obey authority and participating practices of obedience to authority. However, on her

account ‘submission’ to authority cannot imply totally passive obedience. This is unlike authoritarianism. Authority in the ‘new’ sense of authoritarian (i.e., in the modern world Arendt describes in which claims to authority have lost their validity) is ‘whatever makes people obey.’ But, Arendt claims that this is clearly *not* true—it cannot be true—of genuine authority in the older sense that derives from the authority of tradition, and which Arendt wishes to valorize. Arendt (1961b) argues that this mistaken view of authority is most starkly experienced in educational spaces: “The fact that even this prepolitical authority which ruled the relations between adults and children, teachers and pupils, is no longer secure signifies that all the old time-honoured metaphors and models for authoritarian relations have lost their plausibility” (p. 92). Because genuine authority derives its legitimacy from standards that are independent of any particular exercise of authority, for Arendt, authority can command obedience only in light of reasoned arguments about its legitimacy. In this sense, authority derives its legitimacy from the fact that it requires neither force nor persuasion to command obedience. In educational settings, such requirements demand educators be responsible for the development of students as separate and autonomous individuals. As Arendt (1961a) describes:

At this stage of education adults, to be sure, once more assume a responsibility for the child, but by now it is not so much responsibility for the vital welfare of a growing thing as for what we generally call the free development of characteristic qualities and talents. (p. 189)

The foundational distinctions Arendt draws illuminate the vital importance in questioning whether conductor-led ensembles are *unavoidably* coercive or if they can be conceived and organized in practice in ways that embody a non-coercive form of authority and that are productive of individual agency and autonomy.

However, Arendt’s distinction between coercive and non-coercive authority does not, by itself, address how authority can respect democratic freedoms within schools and advance

democratic, educational aims without losing the meaning of authority by slipping into equal relations of persuasion. Indeed, schools are not in-and-of-themselves wholly democratic spaces, and some degree of coercion may be necessary to prepare young people to appreciate and consensually participate in social and political relationships that require legitimate authority. Extending conceptions of non-coercive authority in educational settings, I turn to Amy Gutmann's (1999) principles of *nonrepression*¹⁵ and *nondiscrimination*¹⁶ (pp. 44-45). Gutmann (1999) contends that these two constraints are "necessary and sufficient for establishing an ideal of democratic education" (p. 95). This argument is based on two assumptions: the first being that neither majoritarian decision making, nor correct results are, in and of themselves, "all that we valued about democracy," and second, that it is necessary to acknowledge the temporal dimension of democracy, which takes into consideration whether the results will yield conditions for democratic deliberation in the future (Gutmann, 1999, p. 95). In the context of the music classroom, Gutmann's principles would constrain educational authority such that tactics of fear, humiliation, or domination employed by conductors, or members of the ensemble, are unacceptable and illegitimate exercises of power. Indeed, the ethical constraints of nonrepression and nondiscrimination would require teachers strongly resist and counteract such tactics as profoundly anti-democratic tendencies. "The principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination limit democratic authority in the name of democracy itself" (Gutmann, 1999, p. 95).

However, Gutmann's principles do not imply that authority derived from expertise is inherently oppressive, coercive, or authoritarian. The presence of a hierarchy is not what

¹⁵ "The principle of nonrepression prevents the state, and any group within it, from using education to restrict rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and the good society" (Gutmann, 1987, p. 44).

¹⁶ "In its most general application to education, nondiscrimination prevents the state, and all groups within it, from denying anyone an educational good on grounds irrelevant to the legitimate social purpose of that good" (Gutmann, 1987, p. 45).

delegitimizes the democratic goods of the endeavour, but rather democratic legitimacy is contingent upon practices that do not perpetuate unreflective, repressive social tendencies. Teachers' epistemic judgements about musical quality, in this sense, are not incompatible with democratic education; their judgements are simply subject to these ethical constraints. Thus, extending Gutmann's argument, critics of the LME would be legitimate in arguing that conductor-led ensembles reproduce antidemocratic tendencies in particular instances if they "restrict rational deliberation among competing ways of life" by not providing opportunities to discuss, for instance, whether a piece of music or musical practice promotes sexist, racist, or homophobic assumptions or beliefs (Gutmann, 1999, p. 104). However, this criticism is *contingent* on localized factors. Claiming a correlation between teachers' decision making power or professional expertise and repression, coercion, or violence misunderstands legitimate grounds for democratic authority as well as the temporal nature of democratic schooling.

While Gutmann's principled limits constrain democratic authority, broadly speaking, to ground non-coercive approaches and support democratically oriented policy making in *education*, the constraints of nonrepression and nondiscrimination are still, I contend, insufficient from the perspective of teachers' enactments of their authority in localized classroom settings. If we consider Krista's dilemma, presented in the introduction, it would be rational to argue that her conscientious approach to band teaching, which breaks down barriers to access, presents opportunities to deliberate on social structures and histories of music, and is one of several musical offerings which provide students with alternate views of musical quality and practice, upholds Gutmann's principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination. And yet, these constraints do not capture her ongoing ethical anxiety with her own authority on the podium, which requires a significant degree of deference from her students in order to coordinate ensemble playing.

A distinction drawn by John Cunliffe and Andrew Reeve (1999) between ‘deference’ and ‘dialogic’ authority further extends and delineates understandings of non-coercive authority, helping to address Krista’s concerns about the hierarchical nature of directive band teaching. According to Cunliffe and Reeve (1999), dialogic authority, unlike exercises of hierarchical power that demand unqualified deference from its subjects, remains always accountable to the autonomy of those subject to the exercise of authority. Dialogic authority is relational, demanding that citizens be responsible for continually questioning and authorizing those whose authority they have provisionally accepted (Cunliffe & Reeve, 1999, p. 459). A dialogic conception of authority challenges the view of conductors as requiring deference from their student musicians. Cunliffe and Reeve (1999) suggest that authority, if provisionally held, can simultaneously uphold students’ agency and autonomy. “Acceptance of her authority—as expertise—is entirely compatible with asking questions about her proposals, and expecting answers in relation to my objectives, which I can understand” (Cunliffe & Reeve, 1999, p. 456).

Dialogic authority, when compared to authoritarianism, deferential authority, or even to the egalitarian practice of persuasion, seems uniquely positioned to provide opportunities for young people to practice deliberating in non-deferential ways, and to engage in democratic practices of holding political power to account. For example, exercising reasoned dissent or demanding justifications for legislation that appear to conflict with constitutional principles. If structured through a lens of dialogic authority, there seems to be at least some, if not significant, potential for LMEs to provide opportunities for students to learn to distinguish democratically justified forms of authority and dissent from undemocratic forms. In Cunliffe and Reeve’s (1999) conception of dialogic authority, offering reasons for pedagogical decisions would not undermine teachers’ authority in the classroom, but rather utilize that authority in order to provide opportunities to teach the democratic capacities necessary to hold authority accountable. It’s a delicate balance to strike and

involves educational risks and challenges that I contend are not present in the other forms of educational authority. The forms of authority outlined thus far move progressively from more to less coercive and hierarchical. A schema of this progression can be viewed below in Figure 1.

Figure 1

Authoritarianism	Deference Authority	Dialogic Authority	Persuasion
•Coercive power •No accountability to reason •Oppresses student agency	•Asymmetrical relationship - students defer to teachers' expertise •Accountable to reasons – no justifications required •Lack of student agency	•Provisional/ conditional asymmetrical relationship •Accountable to reasons – justifications required •Compatible with autonomy and agency	•Symmetrical relationship – authority absent •Equal sharing of reasons

This series of distinctions regarding the nature of educational authority complicates the picture of authority represented by Gould (2008), Allsup (2016), and Green (2008). While this framework is by no means fully comprehensive in scope, it provides a way of locating one's practice as a conductor in the broader conceptual field of democratic authority. Dialogic authority seems to present a more compelling way to approach teacher-student relationships in the band room, and as we will see in the subsequent chapters, is captured in several ways in my participants' leadership techniques.

However, there are still several important questions related to dialogic authority particularly within an education setting, including a lack of clarity regarding epistemic accountability and the normative placement of musical excellence in the learning process. In order to learn the capacities for distinguishing between, and consenting to, educational authority, students require opportunities to *practice* questioning and exercising dissent, including dissent to teachers' authority, albeit in limited ways. To teach the skills required for the development of these democratic capacities, students would need to be let in to the process of decision making—providing the score, working through

repertoire or pedagogical choices, encouraging student conductors, and so forth. While these skills might result from a dialogic interaction, the educational development of such capacities are not inherent in Cunliffe and Reeve's picture of dialogic authority. A conductor who provides rational and understandable reasoning for decisions (rather than reasoning based on their musical pedigree), does not ensure that students will, themselves, gain the ability to dissent against such authority if necessary, nor does it develop particularly deep or demanding capacities for political deliberation. Thus, while it does tend to offer an orientation to authority that adheres to Gutmann's foundational liberal democratic values in such a way that upholds students' autonomy, it is not inherently an educationally driven approach to democratic *growth*.

Put another way, dialogic authority seeks to preserve autonomy to the greatest extent possible by way of accountability from the person holding authority (Cunliffe & Reeve, 1999, p. 459). What remains unclear in the account of dialogic authority provided by Cunliffe and Reeve is whether accountability requires a) simply giving comprehensible reasons without requirement that the authority-figure demonstrates willingness to be moved by the reasons of those under their provisional authority through deep deliberation; and b) whether the reasons provided are accountable under any objective, or epistemic, criteria. These two questions are complex and significant in the context of performance-based music ensembles, particularly those with educational objectives. Moreover, answering these questions has a significant impact upon the version of democracy (liberal participatory, deliberative, or epistemic) that would be encouraged through teachers' enactments of their authority.

Rather than pursue these questions first from a theoretical perspective, subsequent chapters examine them from the ground up, through discussions with teachers regarding their justification for, and enactments of, their pedagogical decisions as well as the limitations they place on their own authority in pursuit of students' educational autonomy and agency.

Student agency and autonomy

A key element when considering ethical limits to democratic authority is to ensure that students develop their agency in ways that align with general democratic principles. Certainly, Gutmann's (1987) principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination suggest that student agency is a central educational value, at least insofar as "conscious social reproduction must educate all educable children to be capable of participating in collectively shaping their society" (p.39). Conscious social reproduction implies that "It would be an illegitimate pretension to educational authority on anyone's part to deprive any child of the capacities necessary for choice among good lives" (Gutmann, 1987, p. 40). It is important to note here that I view childhood not as an ontologically 'fixed' category; rather, as holding socially and politically constructed meaning. Different ways of understanding and socially constructing childhood imply different and potentially conflicting ways of viewing the political status of children, and hence how they are properly regarded as subjects of educational authority. My goal here, is to examine the educational significance of children's agency in detail, problematizing certain conceptions of student agency employed in current music education literature, and expounding how respect for children's agency might shape and direct the appropriate exercise of music teachers' educational authority.

The question of why and how young people can reasonably be regarded as appropriate subjects of authority in contexts that are widely viewed as morally inapplicable to adults is of course fundamental to the very idea of compulsory education. But it is also applicable to questions of educational practice and children's status as (equal or otherwise) epistemic agents within those practices. One common view holds that childhood is a temporary phase, such that education implies the need to regard children primarily as the adults they will and should become. On this liberal paternalistic view, children are viewed as 'incomplete' or 'unfinished' adults, whose (temporary) deficient and inferior status renders them appropriate subjects of domination (Ben-Porath, 2010, p.

74). Accordingly, children are viewed as incapable of making reasonable or justified choices, and thus they must be indoctrinated into adult capacities and roles. The liberal paternalism view is distinct from ‘banking models’ of education whereby, as Freire (2018) explains, “knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. ... The teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence” (p. 72). Liberal paternalism, rather, sees the authority as a stop-gap in order to secure student’s open future. This view, and the banking model of pedagogy, at least on the surface seem to correlate to what Allsup refers to as “closed” education systems, where education is understood as a process of induction. As will be explored in Chapter 5, discussion with expert practitioners highlighted that a significant problem with this correlation occurs when the ends of increasing student agency become blurred with means of employing authority in the classroom.

Indeed, to avoid the systemic inequalities and repression of student agency that are argued to arise from authoritarian teaching, ‘banking’ education, or liberal paternalism, current music education scholars frequently draw from child-centred approaches such as critical pedagogy (Benedict, Schmidt, Spruce, & Woodford, 2015; Gould & Countryman, 2009; Green, 2008; Hess, 2019). As Hess (2017) explains, “a significant body of literature in music education in the 1990s centred on tenets of Freirean pedagogy. The analytic turn, in many ways, was led by feminists, and joined later by the critical race theorists in the discipline” (p. 173). Critical pedagogy suggests that liberation through education arises from a process of ‘conscientization.’ Students come to such a state through naming their world and problem solving-based education, where teachers and students are engaged in reciprocal partnerships:

The students—no longer docile listeners—are now critical co-investigators in dialogue with the teacher. The teacher presents the material to the students for their consideration, and re-

considers her earlier considerations as the students express their own. The role of the problem-posing educator is to create, together with the students, the conditions under which knowledge at the level of the *doxa* is superseded by true knowledge, at the level of the *logos*. (Freire, 2018, p. 81).

bell hooks (1994) develops Freire's goals of critical pedagogy by re-drawing our attention to the intersectionality of race, class, and gender in education. hooks suggests that students and teachers together can transgress boundaries to create classroom spaces that are inclusive, multicultural, and emancipatory.

Certain applications of critical pedagogy in music education interpret Freire and hook's theories to suggest a decentering of the teacher. As Juliet Hess (2017) describes, "Such music education decenters the teacher as it fosters a polyphony of voices and a politically-engaged music education" (p. 174). As I discussed in the previous chapter, Lucy Green's (2008) work in informal popular music including her study of David Price's *Musical Futures* program in the UK, prioritize students' personal musical preferences and 'authentic'¹⁷ means of knowledge transmission in an effort to allow students to develop their personal autonomy. To do so, Green (2008) calls for an equal partnership between teacher and student, essentially flattening the hierarchical nature of traditional teacher/student relationships and providing students with significant control of educational decision making.¹⁸ The interpretation of the work of Freire and critical pedagogy as requiring the dissolution of educational hierarchy in order to secure student agency and autonomy echoes the tendency in some postmodern and post-structuralist scholarship to view autonomy as negative freedom (McGowan, 1991). However, I contend that this assumption oversimplifies and

¹⁷ In Lucy Green's work in informal music education, so-called 'authentic' means of knowledge transmission is situated primarily in student preferences. For a thoughtful discussion on the value and meaning of this claim to authenticity, see: Vakeva (2009).

¹⁸ Teaching democratic citizenship by providing students with significant control over their educational environments can similarly be seen in projects such as the Brooklyn Free School (<https://www.brooklynfreeschool.org>).

misunderstands the complex ethical relationship between respect for children's agency and teacher authority, within which some exercises of teacher authority promote, and in some cases are necessary to promote, students' voices, deliberation, and epistemic growth, all of which are important ingredients of democratic citizenship education. Henry Giroux (2004), a leading proponent of critical pedagogy resists, to some degree, the slide into post-modern interpretations of critical pedagogy, student autonomy, and authority. He writes:

Authority in this perspective is not simply on the side of oppression, but is used to intervene and shape the space of teaching and learning to provide students with a range of possibilities for challenging a society's common-sense assumptions, and for analyzing the interface between their own everyday lives and those broader social formations that bear down on them. (Giroux, 2004, p. 43)

Thus, the problem with the view of student agency employed by proponents of Green's informal music learning approach is that it seems to require educators to refrain from exercising, or to condemn the exercise of, educational authority even when such exercise is an important vehicle for promoting children's long-term agency. This view loses sight of the temporal dimension of democracy and democratic education, as discussed above.

An alternative conception of childhood assigns children's epistemic agency much more robust status, but one that is still compatible with a view of educational authority that respects democratic ethical constraints on authority (e.g. nonrepression and nondiscrimination), and which facilitates the epistemic goals and values associated with dialogic authority. On this conception, childhood need not imply a status of moral and epistemic inferiority. To elaborate this view, I draw on Miranda Fricker's (2007) work on epistemic justice and Sigal Ben-Porath's (2010) conception of structured paternalism. Fricker's (2007) description of testimonial injustice, whereby there is an unjust deficit of credibility owing to the hearer's prejudice, illustrates how children can often

experience a credibility gap in virtue of their status as children. Indeed, testimonial injustice provides a powerful example of the sort of normative limits on democratic, educational authority. Fricker (2007) demonstrates convincingly that while social power is unavoidable, engagement in epistemic judgements is critical to illuminating when power and authority is legitimate, and when it is coercive (p. 3). Failure to do so, she argues, can lead to serious epistemic injustices. Accordingly, extending Fricker's concept of testimonial injustice to discussions of student agency, it follows that respect for children's agency and its development would require that educational environments be structured to resist actively epistemic injustices, which necessarily involves teachers and administrators making authoritative, educational judgements.

In a similar light, Sigal Ben-Porath (2010) argues that non-hierarchical views of childhood risk "obscuring children's vulnerability and erroneously characterizing them as fully capable of independent decision making and self-guidance" (p. 73). She further contends that:


Adults' obligations toward children are not derivative of the latter's supposed innate incapability to reason or efficiently practice a right to self-determination. Adults' obligations toward children are derived from two sources: first, from the acknowledgment of children as deserving the basic rights ascribed to them in Western theory and social practices, including respect of their agency; and second, from children's greater physical, emotional, and economic vulnerability and dependence. (Ben-Porath, 2010, p. 71)

Ben-Porath (2010) proposes that developing student agency and opportunity through 'structured paternalism,' whereby authority's power is used to provide a structured landscape of choice, both protects children from harm while "enhancing their wellbeing and their standing as civic equals by properly constructing their landscape of choice" (p. 17). Structured paternalism balances respect for student rights, agency, and autonomy with protection that acknowledges that childhood holds increased vulnerability. As Ben-Porath (2010) describes, "Society should learn to allow children to

experience and enjoy their youth, and protect them from what they cannot contain, decide, or be responsible for” (p. 81). While it may be hard to see any path forward for conductor-led LMEs in educational models that seek to decenter teachers from the learning process, structured paternalism offers greater democratic potential and possibilities for conductor-led ensembles to uphold student agency.

By highlighting Fricker and Ben-Porath’s arguments regarding appropriate boundaries of teacher authority, I seek to clarify the complex relationship between educationally appropriate respect for children’s agency and teachers’ legitimate educational authority in a way that fills in the gaps left by the oversimplified and dichotimized view of educational authority in some child-centred models of music education. Figure 2 schematizes the distinct accounts of the relationship between children’s agency and educational authority discussed in this section.

Figure 2



By offering this conceptual framework, I do not mean to flatten the vast theoretical nuances and variations within each category. Rather, by schematizing various views of student agency, I seek to

open further ways to consider legitimate pedagogical authority while supporting the development of student agency.

Conclusion

Three central ideas have governed the creation of these conceptual frameworks related to music teachers' democratic authority. The first addresses educational aims: simply stated, there are many competing educational aims at play in mass compulsory schooling that shape how educational decisions are made (Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb, & Swift, 2018). These competing goods hold implications for how democratic citizenship is learned and how teachers should enact their educational authority to promote the development of certain goods over others. Second, educational authority need not be seen inherently as uni-directional. Rather, viewing teacher authority as relational broadens how we might approach our role as conductors of LMEs. Finally, I suggest that a more nuanced view of student agency that balances the development of students' autonomy with the protection of their growth and vulnerability might situate students within structured choice contexts. Understanding and evaluating the practice of music teachers' authority involves the complex interaction of these three dimensions. Prevailing philosophical discussions regarding LMEs and the related issues with music teacher authority, seem to neglect this complexity.

Broadening the conceptual scope of democratic authority in music education contexts opens a host of further questions and considerations for music teachers' practices. For instance, how do teachers view the relationship between democracy and student agency, and in what ways do they exert or limit their authority in service of their ideals of student agency? Moreover, if democracy implies a plural set of goods, learning to negotiate discontinuities between goods arguably becomes a central civic skill (Brighouse, 2005). Thus, what role do music teachers, and LMEs, hold in nurturing discontinuity in a plural democracy and on what criteria do teachers prioritize competing goods in order to model democratic practices? In the context of music education, discontinuity suggests that

to develop autonomy we need exposure to different music and ways of musicking. What might enabling discontinuity mean in the context of the LME and what are the limitations? What sort of educational contexts might require directive versus non-directive teaching strategies (Hand, 2014) to nurture a ‘landscape of choice’ as described by Ben-Porath (2010)? Furthermore, how might the role of the teacher in structuring choice and discontinuity be justified differently for young children and adolescents (Franklin-Hall, 2013)? These questions provide a backdrop for discussions with current music educators through the empirical phase of my research project.

The conceptual framework presented here is both interpretive and evaluative. It is interpretive in the sense that it provides a conceptual background against which to understand better how teachers view the basis of their educational authority. I do not impose an analytic structure or understanding of authority onto teachers’ lived experiences. Rather, having a spectrum of views will help to interpret, together in discussion with participants, their experiences. Additionally, the framework is evaluative in the sense that it provides a set of normative principles by which teachers’ deliberations about when and how to exercise their authority in the classroom may align with and/or conflict with democratic values and principles. Finally, the conceptual distinctions offered in this chapter remain open to amendment from the knowledge and experiences gained through the qualitative study.

Chapter 4: Participatory philosophical inquiry methodology

*There would be a pause and then the bassoon player would go ‘well, the problem with this section is this,’
and I was like, oh my God, it is possible!*

-Susan (Interview)

In the previous chapters, I briefly described Krista’s ethical dilemma in order to illuminate how the concept of democratic authority in school music teaching is significantly more complex than is typically described in current music education scholarship. In Chapter 2, I explored a common metanarrative in music education that equates authority, particularly authority derived from the cultivation of expertise, with coercive, oppressive, and undemocratic educational tendencies. I argued that this metanarrative is normatively insufficient to capture the complexity and nuance of music teachers’ experiences. In particular, I suggested that the metanarrative presents an overly binary picture that does not account for the ways in which teachers might justifiably exert their authority toward democratic aims. In response to the insufficiency of normative tools to describe and evaluate the democratic value of teacher’s authority, in Chapter 3 I developed two conceptual frameworks. These frameworks highlighted a series of distinctions between coercive and non-coercive authority, as well as between hierarchical and non-hierarchical views of childhood, in order to emphasize the multiplicity of perspectives missing from, or obscured by, the common metanarratives of democratic authority in music education scholarship. In so doing, these frameworks provide interpretive and analytical scaffolds within which music teachers might coherently articulate more complex and varied conceptions of practical democratic teacher authority than the rigid and one-dimensional portrait often provided by critics of LMEs. The distinctions I outlined in Chapter 3 provide an analytical and interpretive repertoire for addressing a crucial question that is raised, yet which remains largely unaddressed, by existing critical accounts: how

might music teachers in LMEs coherently seek to mobilize their authority in the classroom on behalf of democratic ideals?

In this chapter, I outline the methodology employed in this research project to engage with teachers' phenomenological experiences and normative understandings of their pedagogic authority and the relationship of these perspectives with the frameworks offered in the previous chapter. This methodological approach, which I term 'participatory philosophical inquiry' has four primary aims. The first is to generate first-hand descriptions of teachers' experiences and perspectives as musical and pedagogical authorities. The second is to evaluate how teachers' experiences align with, or occur in tension with, the initial conceptual frameworks. This evaluative process, as I describe below, is done interactively and recursively with a group of expert teachers. The third is to generate, with participants, a normative case study that clarifies the sorts of tensions teachers experience in enacting their authority in particular contexts. And finally, to return to the case study, analyzing it as a group in order to reconsider theoretical views of authority initially presented in both the conceptual frameworks and teachers' original descriptions.

Such a weaving of teachers' experiences, beliefs, and normative intentions, with traditional philosophical concepts of democratic authority, reflects the philosophical process of 'reflective equilibrium.' Reflective equilibrium is a philosophical mode of inquiry established by John Rawls (1971). As Harry Brighouse (2004) describes reflective equilibrium, "We list our considered judgments about particular cases, and look at whether they fit together consistently. Where we find inconsistencies, we reject those judgments in which we have least reason to be confident" (p. 12-13). In this dissertation, I draw on a particular development that engages in this process by beginning from experience, rather than from stylized or hypothetical philosophical cases. Meira Levinson (2023) describes this as *grounded* reflective equilibrium. Grounded reflective equilibrium, as Levinson (2023) explains, begins not with an "analytic concept or from a hypothesized original position, but

instead from phenomenological experience” (p. 115).¹⁹ The goal, as I take Levinson’s meaning, is still to place our judgements and values under a stress test of a particular case in order to find and reject inconsistencies. However, the process she describes is distinct from the Rawlsian version, in that grounded reflective equilibrium engages in *non-ideal* theorizing about education by beginning with the complexities of teachers’ everyday experiences. In the quotations above, Levinson connects these non-ideal, grounded beginnings with phenomenology. She does so, however, without discussion about what, in particular, the philosophical discipline of phenomenology might bring to the process of grounded reflective equilibrium.

There is much debate about the application of phenomenology, particularly within non-philosophical contexts (Stolz, 2023). Indeed, the philosophical discipline of phenomenology itself has several theoretical strands, whether you follow Hegelian or Husserlian thinking, for instance. At its core, though, the process of phenomenology as a philosophical methodology is interested in how “we come to know mind as it is in itself through the study of the ways in which it appears to us” (Schmitt, 1972, p. 135). Central to Husserl’s conception of phenomenology is the ‘eidetic reduction,’ or bracketing of one’s own experiences in order to grasp the essence of particular phenomena (Husserl, 2013). As Husserl (2013) explains, “The corresponding Reduction which leads from the psychological phenomenon to the pure “essence,” or, in respect of judging thought, from factual (“empirical”) to “essential” universality, is the *eidetic Reduction*” (p. 44). An exemplary of the eidetic reduction, as Katsuki Sekida (2005) describes, is the Zen practice of meditation:

¹⁹ This quotation refers to non-ideal theorizing through normative case studies. As Levinson (2023) states, “I also think that phenomenological approaches may be warranted by the intrinsically “non-ideal” features of theorizing about education; if nothing else, it is helpful to confront head-on what it means to theorize about children and not just presumptively free and equal adults” (p. 115). For Levinson’s connection between non-ideal theorizing such as normative case studies and grounded reflective equilibrium, see: Levinson (2014).

If you want to experience any form of realization with the book on the desk, whether it be phenomenological reduction, or intuitive cognition, or seeing Dasein, or Zen experience, you must first put the book aside and start to eliminate your own topsy-turvy delusive way of thinking. After you have done this, you may return to the book. And see! What a different world you find there! The book radiates essence, idea, and universal quality. You have accomplished an epistemological revolution. (p. 191)

In contrast to Sekida's description of eidetic reduction as the lengthy practice of bracketing to achieve the full release of intentionality, it seems as though Levinson's description of grounded reflective equilibrium does not demand such rigorous bracketing. On the other hand, grounding the study of educational ethics in the non-ideal situations that are experienced by teachers goes beyond merely describing at face value teachers' first hand experiences. As I take Levinson's meaning, such non-ideal theorizing engages with descriptive accounts to illuminate the ethical tensions and contradictions in theory and practice, subjecting both to ethical analysis in order to gain a clearer view of the phenomenon. Thus, I wish to posit that there *is* something quasi-phenomenological occurring, which I suggest is perhaps not a full bracketing of experience, but rather the process of free imagination, which requires at least a moderate bracketing of one's own views and experiences.

Describing Husserl's free imagination, Schmitt (1972) states, "when I vary examples freely in imagination, I reflect about the criteria implicit in my ability to recognize examples of the given sort of object; I now put into words the criteria that previously were merely implicit in my performances" (p. 142). Levinson (2015) similarly suggests that a grounded approach to philosophical research that is built upon teachers' phenomenological experiences strengthens moral theories "by inclusive attempts to understand, and, if appropriate, integrate novel perspectives, as well as attune to forms of justification that aren't immediately familiar but can be understood over time" (p. 7). The participatory philosophical methodology expounded in this chapter offers several

opportunities to imagine variations and negations about the essence of pedagogical authority, through the embodied experiences of teachers. Indeed, through collaborative deliberation between educational philosopher and expert practitioners over several interactions, this participatory philosophical methodology, which I describe in detail below, provided significant space to reflect together upon the multiplicity of values that interact when striving for democratically oriented, pedagogical authority. In so doing, I suggest that, while this methodology doesn't go 'all the way down' phenomenologically speaking, there is, as Levinson suggested, a quasi-phenomenological element to grounded reflective equilibrium, particularly when explored through participatory practices.

The next section of this chapter outlines in detail the methods that comprised the participatory philosophical methodology of this dissertation. I then consider the primary *heuristic* question posed by this reiterative philosophical research methodology; that is, how do teachers perceive their authority in relationship to democratic educational aims? In the final section of this chapter, I show how the participatory philosophical methodology foregrounded the complex ways teachers employ various pedagogical moves toward their democratic goals, and the dilemmas they face in determining which democratic values are most salient at any given time. The perspectives offered by participants in this chapter present serious challenges to the assumption that a reduction of teacher-directiveness will necessarily yield greater democratic outcomes.

Participatory philosophical inquiry

Krista's case, with which I began this dissertation, is an empirically researched and marginally fictionalized dilemma that highlights how it is often "impossible to realize all important values and principles (or all reasonable interpretations of a single value or principle) at once" in classroom teaching (Reid & Levinson, 2023, p. 129). Krista experienced a significant "transformation" in her thinking about her role as a teacher when she designed and began teaching the Popular Music

Performance (PMP) course, stepping far back from the learning process and allowing students to explore music composition and performance with greater independence and space for personal expression. She described this capacity for transformation as connected to notions of authentic and autonomous creative expression, as well as through forms of music making that are directly connected to ‘real-life’ music making practices. In this way, Krista’s conception transformative education echoes the body of scholarship on democratic education that evolved from the work of Lucy Green, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, this is not the entire picture, as, at the same time, Krista found it impossible to reproduce the collective “empowerment” that traditional, competitive musical experiences garnered, and which she connected to certain traits of democratic citizenship. She struggled to let go of the band model of teaching, despite her deep ethical concerns about band’s hegemonic, hierarchical, and competitive traditions—traditions she viewed as anti-democratic: “I keep asking myself questions like, why am I working so hard to make this vehicle [concert band] diverse and accepted and creative and like, why am I working so hard in this vehicle when all of the things I’m striving to do in this vehicle just happened in another setting?” (Krista, interview).

Understanding the ethical limits and potentialities for music teachers to utilize their authority in service of democratic educational ideals requires considerable appreciation of the sorts of tensions teachers face in their day-to-day lives as educators (Golding, 2015). Increasingly, philosophy of education is pushing boundaries between philosophical and empirical research, in pursuit of reflective equilibrium between the philosophical and empirical (Levinson & Fay, 2016, 2019; Morton, 2019a, 2019b; Santoro, 2018). The search for methods that strive for grounded reflective equilibrium, in conjunction with the development of a new field of educational ethics, has led to the popularization of utilizing normative case studies to promote deep ethical thinking in education.

This work has been driven primarily by scholar Meira Levinson²⁰ and the Justice in Schools Project (*Justice in Schools* 2024; Levinson & Fay, 2016, 2019). As Levinson and Fay (2016) describe, normative case studies are “richly described, realistic account[s] of complex ethical dilemmas that arise within practice or policy contexts, in which protagonists must decide among courses of action, none of which is self-evident as the right one to take” (p. 3). These cases do not aim to solve ethical dilemmas, necessarily, nor to create universal educational theories. Instead, they serve to illuminate competing values in educational decision making and provide teachers with conceptual tools to work through ethical dilemmas that arise in their teaching practices.

Levinson and Reid (2023) argue that normative case studies serve three primary roles in educational ethics. The first, they describe, is heuristic insofar as the cases provide “philosophers, educators, and policymakers an opportunity to test normative principles and theories in authentic contexts” (p. 130). Second, normative case studies play a generative role “by identifying contexts or phenomena for which extant theories provide insufficient guidance or conceptual clarity, spurring development of new principles, concepts, or other theoretical resources” (p. 130). Finally, Levinson and Reid argue that there is a pedagogical role that emerges from the creation of normative case studies: “Normative case studies enable interaction among democratic citizens confronted by a common problem and are oriented toward supporting professionals to develop key democratic skills” (p. 131). Through collaborating on the creation of normative case studies, Reid and Levinson (2023) contend that participants can develop “ethical sensitivity” and “moral agency” (p. 131).

Within this emerging research on normative case studies, there is a lack of consideration for the effects of various methods for the creation of normative case studies. Though Levinson and Fay (2019) allude to employing a mix of ethnographic studies, interviews, and personal experiences to craft their case studies, no connection is drawn between the ways in which these cases are developed

²⁰ This work has been done in close partnership with several scholars including Jacob Fay and Ellis Reid.

and the benefits (i.e., heuristic, generative, and pedagogical) that are said to be produced through engagement with normative cases. Moreover, while normative case studies, such as those on the Justice in Schools (2024) website, often emerge from real life situations and are frequently employed in collaborative spaces (classrooms, policy groups, etc.), the benefits of utilizing normative case studies within a broader participatory philosophical endeavour has not yet been explored. Therefore, I employed a methodological approach that broadens the normative case methodology through a multi-stage research process that included: one-on-one, semi structured interviews with expert teachers on their views of authority and democracy through teaching large musical ensembles in secondary schools, a co-creation of a normative case study that was generated through discussions with teachers about their ethical uncertainty regarding the normative implications of their authority, and a Community of Inquiry discussion group to reflect upon and analyze the tensions teachers initially raised.

Such a process of philosophical introspection required a significant depth of reflective practice, thus I sought expert teachers who held at least eight years teaching experience at the secondary level (grades 9-12), and who conducted at least one LME on a regular basis (either concert band, orchestra, or jazz band) to be participants in the study.²¹ I initially contacted, via e-mail, the band associations and music educators' associations in the following Canadian provinces: Nova Scotia, Quebec, New Brunswick and Newfoundland and Labrador. The reasons for recruiting participants from Eastern and Central Canada was not for any sort of representative sampling from which to draw correlative or causal claims, but rather due to my own familiarity with these educational systems and to include some regional diversity in order to enrich group discussions with a variety of perspectives and experiences. To these associations, I sent a recruitment letter (see

²¹ Choirs are not included in this list as there are some differences in approaches to choral conducting that may decentre the focus of my research.

Appendix A), from which only the Quebec Music Educators' Association and the Newfoundland and Labrador Band Association advertised the opportunity through social media and e-mail lists, respectively. As no participants arose from the initial recruitment phase, I then began snowball recruitment, first contacting teachers with whom I had a personal connection who then reached out to other colleagues they identified as likely interested in the research topic (Appendix B). This snowball technique resulted in 5 participants from the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and Prince Edward Island.²²

While all participants were experienced Canadian instrumental educators, their teaching backgrounds and situations were diverse. Jonathan teaches at a subsidized private high school in an urban setting in the province of Quebec, where they offer both a regular and a concentration instrumental music program. The concentration program, in which students can choose between a concert band or stage band stream, offers a multitude of performance and competition opportunities, as well as instruction in small groups (sectionals) with professional musicians on a regular basis. The school also offers extra-curricular music options such as chamber music. Jonathan described the school as a “high achiever school” where the expectations of performance excellence from students and the local community are of a high order. Susan is a veteran music educator in an urban setting in Ontario. While she has taught at several schools during her career, she is currently the department head at a public high school in a “privileged area” with a lively music program which provides music instruction to over 300 students. Her school offers a concert band and a wind ensemble (and prior to COVID, a 3rd concert band), a choir and a jazz choir, an “enormous” jazz orchestra that includes non-traditional jazz instruments, as well as small chamber groups such as

²² Though I had a collegial connection to a few of the participants, I contend that in this particular form of research, this limited familiarity was an asset, rather than a limitation. Leading interviews and focus groups on questions of ethics, beginning from a place of familiarity provided a degree of comfort which thus allowed for freer flowing discussion of ideas.

percussion, saxophone, and brass ensembles. Susan describes the school as once a “very traditional program,” but since her arrival, the school is shifting toward more varied teaching approaches through the ensembles and music courses offered. Michael teaches in the same city as Susan, but in more diverse neighbourhood, though with the recent addition of a magnet program and intermediate grades (7 and 8) to the high school. Michael described how the demographics have shifted and enrollment grew exponentially over a short period of time given these rapid changes. Michael’s school offers multiple sections of music from grades 7-12, and offers many extra-curricular ensembles such as concert bands, jazz bands, choir, and steel pans ensemble. Karen also teaches in the same city as Michael and Susan. Her school resides in the urban centre and offers an International Advanced Placement Program, Specialized Gifted Program, and several Specialist High Skills Major programs. The school offers 18 sections of music, with three wind bands (which they label concert band, wind ensemble, and symphonic winds), a full string program with 3 orchestras, as well as 2 jazz bands, and several small ensembles.²³ My final research participant, Krista, teaches in a more rural setting in Prince Edward Island. Her teaching situation is described in detail in the case study presented in the introduction of the dissertation.

I met with participants individually for approximately one hour, in a semi-structured interview format. Interview questions (Appendix C) were broken into 4 categories: basic information about participants’ music programs, including what they believed to be the core aims of their programs; their teaching approach; ethical dilemmas faced in their teaching careers; and questions related to their views on democratic education in music classrooms. Data from these interviews were coded with both inductive and deductive analysis techniques. I began with 4 high level deductive codes to ground the analysis as it pertains to my research topic: authority, democracy/democratic education, ethical dilemmas, and directive/non-directive teaching. All other codes were emergent, in

²³ These offerings went down slightly during and post-COVID, which was similarly experienced by all participants

other words, the codes were created and organized utilizing language and conceptions from the participants' contributions. These codes included terms such as: mentorship, facilitator, steering, framing, modelling, moral agency, student voice, belonging, flexibility, listening, resilience, empowerment, transformation, critical thinking, and autonomy. Once all interviews were coded emergently, they were organized into a code book that wove together the deductive and inductive codes. From this code book, I returned once again to the interview transcripts and employed the code book in a thematic analysis of the data.

Codes, once created, were not set in stone, and critical thinking about the organization of the data was vital to effective analytic interpretation (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). As Coffey and Atkinson (1996) describe the goal of data coding, "the general analytic approach here is not to simplify the data but to open them up in order to interrogate them further, to try to identify and speculate about further features" (p. 30). Thus, each stage of the research provided space to revisit the codes I employed and helped determine not only teachers' conceptual understandings of these terms, but also if the codes themselves reflect the teachers' experiences and perspectives.

Through this ongoing merging of inductive and deductive analysis, I coded recurring themes under four subheadings: democratic education, teacher authority, pedagogic moves, and democratic capacities in students. Interestingly, none of my participants invoked the term 'democracy' without prompting when describing the goals and values of their programs. However, when asked to reflect upon the meaning of democracy and how they promote democracy in their classrooms, a general commitment to democratic education was clear, though a range of understandings of democracy arose. While some participants described democracy as living together in society, holding collective responsibility to work with people of various backgrounds and ability levels whom they may not know well toward a common goal, others described democracy in terms of individual moral agency, transformation, or equal opportunity. Within these conceptions, participants offered a wealth of

goods they viewed as democratically beneficial arising from their programs: learning to listen to others, resilience, empowerment, critical thinking, open mindedness, and the capacity to deliberate with others.

Unsurprisingly, during the interviews there was some degree of “sales pitch” occurring in the multiplicity of these goods claimed to arise from their individual music programs. To unveil the central democratic goals behind the promotion of their programs’ goods, throughout the coding process I searched for moments where the messiness of real life teaching situations presented ethical dilemmas for the teachers in my study, where they described feeling uncertain about how they should have proceeded when faced with competing goods. Looking for moments of tension through non-ideal theorizing grounded in teachers’ experiences, I was particularly struck with the profundity of ethical uncertainty and unrest Krista experienced, and the ways in which she described her students’ reactions to widely divergent forms of authority. The tensions Krista experienced were wrapped up in questions of structure, student agency, and competing views of democratic education. Drawing from her descriptions in the interview, I collaborated with Krista on the creation of a normative case study prompt. I employ the term “prompt” here to signify an incomplete version of a normative case study. The draft purposively did not yet present a fully defined dilemma, but rather shared Krista’s feelings of ethical uncertainty, and a description of her situation. Creating a prompt was an offering, an invitation, to the group of participants to engage with, clarify, and expand the potential goods at stake in Krista’s dilemma. After completing an initial draft of the prompt, Krista made amendments and suggestions that she felt better reflected her actual experiences. While some of these amendments we incorporated to reflect better her lived experience, we agreed to lightly fictionalize a few details to suggest more pronounced ethical tensions for deliberative purposes.

Rather than creating an open prompt, we could have written a complete case to reflect upon the philosophical conceptions presented in the early chapters of the dissertation, making alterations

to philosophical assumptions based upon the tensions raised in Krista's dilemma. Such an approach would have closely reflected the ways in which Levinson often engages others with the normative cases on the website Justice in Schools (2024). In Levinson's work, educational stakeholders and philosophers are invited to offer their personal insights on the case, and the cases are published with responses. Or, the cases are used for purposes of enhancing ethical decision making in teacher education programs. However, grounded reflective equilibrium, I contend, was deepened in this project through a participatory philosophical methodology that required teachers first engage with the concept of democratic authority itself as they see it in their classrooms, and consider their own moments of ethical uncertainty. From there we examined Krista's case and deliberated together; not only about what ought to be done, but how this commonly experienced conflict might play out in their own school contexts.

As this sort of reflection required a philosophical lens, a Community of Inquiry discussion group provided the ideal approach to engage in a collaboration between theory and practice.²⁴ According to Golding (2015), a Community of Inquiry is a small group of expert practitioners with experience in the topic being discussed—in this case, democratic music education and conducting LMEs. In a Community of Inquiry, the group of participants engages in “collaborative, dialogical philosophical inquiry about this issue, guided by a philosophical moderator or facilitator” (Golding, 2015, p. 208). The Community of Inquiry is typically used in educational settings, particularly prominent in the Philosophy for Children movement (Gregory et al., 2017; Gregory & Laverty, 2018; Lipman, 1976; Lipman et al., 1980). However, I echo Golding's (2015) view that it is a mode of inquiry that is readily translatable to research because “the inquiry process needed for learning is similar to the inquiry process for research” (p. 208). Similarly, Juliet Hess (2017) argues that

²⁴ Note, one participant (Jonathan) was unable to attend the Community of Inquiry as he was out of the country for a prolonged time period.

“teachers have unique perspectives on classroom triumphs and challenges; centering their perspectives in philosophical inquiry of practice creates the possibility for research and practice perspectives to merge, to speak powerfully to pedagogical issues” (p. 175).

Golding (2015) suggests that a Community of Inquiry is guided by a philosophical question or problem, and led by a moderator who “brings their philosophical inquiry skills” while “the participants bring their expert empirical knowledge, so together they can engage in collaborative philosophical inquiry that would otherwise be out of their reach” (p. 201). Golding contends that the role of the researcher in the Community of Inquiry is to ensure deliberations are “philosophically rigorous but without imposing the researcher’s conclusions”(p. 209). However, not “imposing the researcher’s conclusions,” I posit, is not synonymous with a stance of neutrality that requires a full bracketing of one’s own epistemic orientations. Indeed, in the quotation above, Golding suggests some degree of philosophical skills that are brought together with teachers’ experiences and knowledges. Recent research in phenomenology has suggested, moreover, that personal connections between researchers and research participants can, in fact, create “shared experiences [that] have the potential to promote collective engagement, provide access to difficult research fields and be a productive learning resource in critical practice research” (Skovlund et al., 2023, p. 377). Thus, I sought to reduce epistemic hierarchies through an openness about my own experiences as a band teacher similarly struggling with balancing educational goods, as well as providing philosophical guidance to deepen the connective tissues between teachers’ experiences and philosophical concepts at several points throughout the research process. This personal approach to philosophical research with practicing teachers was done with careful attunement to keeping open all epistemic possibilities, and not closing discussion by providing personal, normative assumptions. I strove to achieve this balance of participatory relationship building research without an imposition of values through the following strategies:

- I made it clear to participants, before they began, the nature of the research. That is, that I was interested in knowing more about democratic authority within the context of the LME. While this naturally skews the folks that would be interested to share in a participatory philosophical methodology, it is precisely engagement with a theoretical ideal that grounds the research process. As Garrison (2016) suggests, “participants in a community of inquiry identify first with the academic purpose of the groups. As such, social presence must be developed in an environment that goes beyond social interactions and personal relationships” (pp. 70-71). While I had some collegial connection to participants, the commonality was grounded on a shared interest in considering the ethics of conducting LMEs.
- During the initial interviews, I began with a general approach of researcher neutrality to the extent that I sought to minimize my own positionality as philosopher of education so as to allow teachers to express their views and experiences with the greatest freedom possible, within the framework of my interview questions.
- At the end of interviews, I purposefully allowed space, if participants inquired, for more unstructured conversation regarding my philosophical questions about democratic authority in LMEs and how I came to these questions through my own practice as an educator. This sharing process was primarily aimed at equalizing relationships between researcher and participants by being open with my own motivations for interrogating this question.
- Between the interviews and the Community of Inquiry, I employed conceptual frameworks (presented in Chapter 3) to organize emergent data in two distinct ways. The first was by utilizing participants’ language of various pedagogical moves to create a schema that reflects and expands work in philosophy of education on directive and non-directive teaching; and, second, by co-creating the case study with Krista. Thus, the conceptual frameworks

informed the Community of Inquiry process, as well themselves being expanded by the initial interview data.

- During the Community of Inquiry, I worked primarily as a moderator, posing questions, probing participants to dig more deeply into their conceptions, and encouraging them to define the terms they used. To do so, I drew upon philosophical methodologies and understandings of alternate conceptions of terms commonly expressed in the group discussion. Thus, my epistemic perspectives necessarily impacted the contours of the discussion.

These reiterative steps sought to put into practice the braiding of philosophical thinking with empirical, quasi-phenomenological experiences throughout the entirety of the research process.

During the Community of Inquiry, I followed Golding's suggested discussion structure (Appendix D) to present, consider, and test participants' understandings of the "pedagogical authority moves" they described in their interviews. Given that all the participants conceived of their authority through various pedagogical moves, and these moves they directly related to the ways in which they might limit or promote democratic education, it seemed this was a critical starting point. As mentioned above, I provided a schema of pedagogical moves that I developed directly from the interview data (described in the next section below), and focused the discussion on the following question: To what degree or in what circumstances should music teachers command or steer students to particular musical interpretations/understandings? Thus, the Community of Inquiry (see Appendix E) encouraged a shift from the experiential, which grounded the interview process, to the normative. Participants were asked what *ought* to be done, but drawn from the experiences they had previously described. The ethical question was first left open for responses, and then was 'tested' through the posing of particular sorts of decisions typically required of music educators (repertoire

choice, instrument selection, technical skills, musical interpretation, performance opportunities, as well as discussing controversial issues related to music).

The second element of the Community of Inquiry kept the schema of pedagogical moves in the background while we shifted to discussing Krista's case. Reflecting upon Krista's case, we identified and clarified the goods at stake in the case, and brainstormed ways that the case might play out in the music classroom, based upon the expert practitioners' individual experiences and teaching situations. Thus the goal was to put teachers' conceptions of their authority under the "stress test" of Krista's dilemma, while generating potentially novel ways this case could manifest in their own teaching experiences, reshaping the case itself. In other words, the Community of Inquiry held both an evaluative and a generative role.

Employing this three-stage process, (interviews, analysis and normative case study creation, and Community of Inquiry), blending together several empirical-philosophical hybrid methodologies, I sought to enrich and refine conceptions of music teacher authority through *ongoing* collaboration between philosophical researcher and practicing music teachers, creating a more participatory approach to the research process. Although it does not follow ethnographic methods, this methodological process arguably echoes to some degree Snow, Morrill, and Anderson's (2003) notion of 'theoretical refinement,' in analytic ethnography. As they describe, theoretical refinement "refers to the modification of existing theoretical perspectives through extension or through close inspection of a particular proposition with new case material" (Snow et al., 2003, p. 191). Theoretical refinement, according to Snow et al., requires four criteria, all of which I argue were attended to in this project's methodology. First, they state that one comes to the field with a 'repertoire' of formal theories, but that these theories are not viewed as blueprints. I have attempted to capture such a repertoire in the distinctions outlined in the theoretical framework. Such distinctions are not to be mapped onto teachers' experiences, but provide a repertoire of concepts to understand and analyze

the qualitative data. Second, they state that one becomes as immersed as possible in the situation, while keeping an open mind to “the possible generality of what’s being observed” (Snow et al., 2003, p. 193). Although ethnographic observation is not an element of this research project, ongoing discussions with and amongst teachers provided an engaged approach to data retrieval. Third, they argue that data “speak as loudly as theories, so that they mutually inform each other” (Snow et al., 2003, p. 193). And finally, that it is imperative for the researcher to return to their notes and the field to “further substantiate the evolving refinements” (Snow et al., 2003, p. 193).

The braiding of conceptual frameworks of democratic educational authority with teachers’ experience through the process of grounded reflective equilibrium helped to develop what Sara Ahmed (2014) terms an “archive” of pedagogical authority in music education. Moreover, as I argued in the introduction to this chapter, peer-to-peer discussion of complex ethical cases, guided through a process of philosophical inquiry, arguably revealed and deepened teachers’ phenomenological perspectives, providing a pedagogical experience for their own practices as well as more reflective qualitative data. In this way, the participatory philosophical methodology offered a deeply grounded reflective equilibrium.

Heuristic findings: Locating the ruptures

Several findings arose from the heuristic question with which this chapter began; that is, how do practicing teachers perceive their authority in relationship to democratic educational aims? I investigate teachers’ conceptions of democratic education and the ways those views are expressed in terms of the pedagogical moves teachers prioritize. Upon analysis of the interview data, teachers who described democratic education particularly in terms of collective responsibility and participation, also tended to describe teaching through “steering” or “framing” students’ thinking and decision-making. Conversely, teachers describing democracy in terms of moral agency, empowerment, and deliberative capacities tended toward less directive teaching methods such as

“guiding” and “facilitating.” While I draw parallels between these views and current narratives about democratic education, I will show how discussions of Krista’s case in the Community of Inquiry raised critical challenges and complications to these assumptions, particularly the ways in which they are played out in distinctions between formal and informal approaches.

Participants’ understandings of democratic education

In this section, I show that an initial analysis of the interview data suggests that participants’ understandings of democratic education align broadly with the two primary metanarratives of pedagogical authority in current music education literature. One of these narratives, common within performance circles, is that democracy arises naturally from the process of playing together toward a common goal. In this view, (which I refer to as the ‘naturalist narrative’) participation in a large ensemble provides context-independent democratic capacities that arise from a shared search for musical excellence. As Charles Peltz (2021) describes, music is not just the means to a democratic end, but democracy and music occur in simultaneity as both means and ends, “democracy only works through compromise toward mutual benefit. Compromise demands the parties know the ‘other’ gained through listening to the other. The large ensemble is the only place in education where vigilant listening to many, many others *is* the curriculum,” (p. 390, emphasis in original). Peltz argues that to teach collaborative listening not only demands an authority to guide the process, but the process itself equates to the teaching of and for democracy, “to teach this extensive collaborative listening is to teach democracy,” (Peltz, 2021, p. 390).

This notion of individual responsibility and active engagement through preparation and listening, aimed toward the contribution to the general will, was echoed by several of my research participants in the initial interviews. Jonathan, for instance, considered the democratic potential of his instrumental music program in very particular terms, which he distinguishes as such:

I think democratic means living in society. So when we when we think of it that way...school is democratic, you know that's the whole name of the game. You have rules to follow. You have authority, you have your own roles and responsibilities...and this is really citizenship, right? But then, if you're talking about democracy as in empowerment and decision making, and that's oftentimes what we're hearing now, you know, there are going to be situations that are better for that. (Jonathan, interview)

Here, Jonathan delineates different conceptions of democracy, stating that the large ensemble provides democratic goods aimed at participation in and responsibility for a collective endeavour. Like Peltz, Jonathan experiences a sense of belonging in this process, which he attributes to democratic citizenship. He also describes a sense of “empowerment” that arises in band settings when “you're facing your limitations, but you're overcoming them and you're doing it in a group setting.” Jonathan characterizes this empowerment as growing from a sense of belonging that is felt when “we do it together, we participate, we're all in it together and we know our strengths, we know [our] weaknesses and we have to present it.” Beyond these benefits that Jonathan views arising from collective participation and responsibility, he also suggests a more embodied democratic experience from performing in synchronicity with others:

You know it's funny because there's science behind this. When you play music, you're synchronized, you know, within milliseconds of each other. And I think there's something biological about all this too. And I mean the most important thing about it all is that it's a source of pleasure, you know, playing music together and having that synchrony. The kids are smiling. (Jonathan, interview)

Such an affective and synchronous democratic experience, Jonathan argues, requires strong leadership to coordinate. Band, he says, “is not an environment for total freedom. It's just doesn't work like that.”

Michael similarly drew connections between democracy and collective responsibility, arguing that active participation and accountability are required in service of the greater good so that we can “all elevate ourselves together” (Michael, interview). Karen expressed this notion of collective responsibility as requiring significant trust between members which, she describes in her interview, sometimes requires individual sacrifice, placing limits on the value of individual freedom in her ideal of democratic education. “I think you need to be able to trust each other and to take chances together...Not every kid’s going to love a piece of music we’re going to play all the time and that’s OK.” Here, she distinguishes flourishing from happiness and argues that the ensemble’s shared musical goals require, at times, limiting one’s own preferences or happiness in order to participate fully in the collective challenges:

My job is to make sure that students are exposed to lots of diverse music, that they’re challenged in lots of ways, and sometimes that challenge might be: you have to play this piece of music that you hate and pretend that you like it. (Karen, interview)

These descriptions of the ways in which LMEs offer a space for the development of democratic capacities tend to echo the ‘naturalist narrative.’ In these descriptions, democracy did not require particularly deliberative capacities, nor did they seek to prioritize personal autonomy or transformation of the self or society. Rather, democratic learning arose through engagement as a participatory, responsible citizen, described as requiring trust and personal sacrifice. Students are obligated to perform their part to the best of their ability not only to pursue their own educational outcomes, but because in failing to do so, they would be undermining the experience of music making for the entire group. In this view, the democratic value of the LME, with its structures of collective responsibility, participation, and embodied synchronicity is distinct from many other educational relations. These views are evocative of a Rousseauian (2004) view of democracy, where in order to pursue a common goal, we necessarily limit some of our own freedoms, and in doing so,

participate freely in the general will.

Critics of this view of democratic music education, however, contend that it offers, at best, a superficial view of democracy, as it ignores crucial social, political, and economic influences upon the structure of band education itself. Woodford (2021), for instance, argues that “music and its performance in schools is treated as if compartmentalized from society and politically neutral, and in no way problematical, when such is not always the case” (p. 352). Woodford’s suggestion here is that in viewing democracy as flowing naturally from the ensemble experience, we miss the political and social contexts of the ensemble form and history. Woodford argues that this blind spot is deeply connected to neo-liberal educational structures that “reduce music education to supply-side economics as children are conceived as either future professional musicians or consumers, and *not* as citizens to be prepared in schools to participate intelligently in the political life of society” (Woodford, 2019, p. 21). For Woodford, democratic education ought to be grounded in critical thinking about the socio-political structures within which learning occurs, and an orientation toward challenging the status quo.

With this critique in mind, one might seek to unveil the structural forces that are exerted on these teachers’ democratic views. Indeed, though I do not suggest any generalizable claims arising from my data set, it is interesting to note that there are some tendencies to suggest that the teachers who expressed ‘naturalist’ conceptions of democratic education were impacted by external forces, as they teach within private school settings or schools with international certification programs, whose programs were described as “highly academic” and aimed at excellence in performance outcomes. In participants’ descriptions, these performance outcomes tended to justify, *a priori*, the exertions of authority. This authority, as several teachers described, was a temporary constriction of students’ individual freedoms in order to secure their individual musical growth and collective success. Michael, for instance, suggested that the justification for pedagogical authority is stronger when

children were younger and less experienced. He admitted that while teachers struggle with the problems of teaching from command and more easily locate student-centred approaches within regular classroom settings, “we haven't really ever moved away from that teaching from command concept when it comes to running on ensemble” in part because it is really “effective” and in part because “we're trying to articulate what our expectations are as an ensemble. Those need to be modeled as best practices” (Michael, interview). Michael described that when he teaches older adults (even if they are musical beginners such as in New Horizons band programs) or senior level musicians, he can step back from the teaching from command role to “be a little bit more collaborative” in comparison to teaching beginner grade nine students. When considered in relationship to the framework of student agency presented in Chapter 3, Michael’s justifications of authority seem to align with notions of liberal paternalism, where authority is viewed as a temporary measure aimed toward securing students’ personal growth and future flourishing.

On the other hand, teachers whose beliefs, desires, intentions, as well as the educational structures were aligned such that they held significant agency to “imagine change in the future” (Powell, 2023, p. 98), often withdraw themselves to a greater degree from the learning process, acting as facilitators to promote students’ transformation and moral agency. For instance, Susan explained how she was entrusted by her principal to develop a new approach to the grade 11 and 12 music curriculum, designed from the “bottom up.” She suggested to her principal that when students “come to class on the first day, we're going to have a blue sky discussion, and I’m going to say, what do you want to learn this year?” From there, she explained how, together with the students, they would “walk it back into units,” deliberating about what they are “going to learn this semester and how [they] are going to show me [they] learned it?” (Susan, interview). She held the trust of her administration to rewrite the traditional music programming, and as long as she could prove attainment of the curriculum, it was up to Susan and her students how to get there. Similar to

this bottom-up planning approach, as we saw in the case study that opened the dissertation, Krista was given the opportunity to change not only her own program, but to rethink the entire provincial music curriculum.

While Krista and Susan echoed some of the same democratic capacities as resulting from ensemble participation as the other participants, they favoured a view of democratic education focused on goals of “empowerment,” “moral agency,” “transformation,” and connecting educational practice to students’ “real life” experiences. They were also more explicit in the limitations of the naturalist narrative, emphasizing the cultural and social situations within which these values played out. Susan and Krista, in other words, held more ‘ecological’ views toward the development of their students’ democratic capacities. As Jacob Fay (2018) describes, “through an ecological lens, human development [is conceived] as the study of human interactions with their social and material environments, with an eye toward how human beings both shape and are shaped by the social, political, cultural, and, even, environmental settings they inhabit” (p. 64).

Krista described one of her concerns about claims of inclusion in band education, given the typical membership of school concert bands:

Because I think that music teachers really love to say anybody could be in the band, anybody can! And I'm like, *can* anybody be in the band?...Does everybody have access to a place to practice? Or have a parent that's going to get them to band practice? It's not as inclusive as we think it is, folks.

Krista and Susan both greatly struggled with the traditions of the LME that perpetuate barriers to inclusive access and culturally oppressive practices. Krista describes band education as “literally drowning in colonialism.” Indeed, the ethical uncertainty clearly expressed by Krista and Susan seemed to be cultivated by the high degree of agency they held. In response to these ethical tensions, both Krista and Susan sought ways to diminish the authoritarian traditions of LMEs. In the next


section, I explore the ways participants' democratic commitments were expressed in terms of the pedagogical moves they make in their ensembles.

Pedagogical moves

In the initial interviews, teachers described an array of 'pedagogical moves' to employ their authority within their classrooms. These moves, drawn from participants' own language, included:

"commanding," "steering" (also referred to as "framing"), "guiding," and "facilitating." Drawing from Hand's (2014) distinction between directive and non-directive teaching, I placed the pedagogical actions on a scale from more to less directive, as they were described by teachers in the interviews.

Figure 3



The notion within the "naturalist" narrative of democratic music teaching tended to be expressed as requiring teachers "steer" or "frame" the learning experience. As mentioned above, directive teaching was viewed as a *temporary* suppression of student agency in order to secure their open future. Michael, for instance, described employing "gentle steering" to decision making in his classroom, whereby through a "gentle nudging along," students feel that they have "really contribute[d] something meaningful, which it is." Yet, he describes how these decisions made by students typically "correlate[ed] perfectly with the set of rules that I already had in mind to begin with" (Michael, interview). In a similar vein, Jonathan describes a steered approach to deliberation in rehearsals, "you have to frame it in a way that they get freedom, but not so much. Within your own parameters so that they're satisfied there's some sort of democracy there, but it has to be on your

terms” (Michael, interview). Jonathan describes how even though decisions typically achieve his desired and pre-determined goals, students provide valuable contributions which offer new perspectives, even within these controlled frames:

‘Though sometimes I’m surprised. Honestly, sometimes students will surprise you and it’s great. And I learned a lot from them too. But most of the time... it’s that framing I told you; you know the end result, but they don’t know that you know, and then you give them this, this sort of freedom to make decisions. (Jonathan, interview)

Karen also felt that students’ growth depended on substantial direction from the conductor. She suggested that when there is a mismatch in interpretation, she approaches these differences by recording the ensemble and having students listen to their performance. This framed listening process, she argued, typically results in students adopting her original interpretation: “You press record and then you plug it in the speaker and you’re like, so that’s what you guys did. Do you think that that worked and they’re like, oh, no, let’s try it again” (Karen, interview).

These views suggest that students’ growth is best served by a certain degree of paternalism through steering learning toward (usually) predetermined ends. Critics of the potential for democratic education through LMEs, however, suggest that employing moves on the directive end of the spectrum closes opportunities for the development of student agency, thus undermining the democratic goods suggested above. In so doing, teachers would be seen to be reinscribing authority-driven practices aimed primarily musical, not democratic goods, through notions of liberal paternalism in education, where decisions are rendered by one person who has been trained in Western practices through the master-apprentice training. A steered approach might only serve to conceal from view the authority-driven nature of the process to a greater extent than a more overtly authoritarian teaching from command. Following from these potential critiques (which are described in detail in Chapter 2), the LME is perceived to be naturally inclined to nurture passivity in students

through authoritarian, hegemonic educational structures and thus democracy can be only indirect or superficial at best.

If we follow this line of logic, it might follow that in order to cultivate greater democratic skills, teachers need greater agency to pull away from Western band practices and diminish the amount of teacher-directed learning that occurs in the classroom. Krista describes undergoing a shift to less-directive teaching, portraying her role as helping to “facilitate personal growth and well-being and like confidence building of teenagers during this fragile and tumultuous time in their lives...I am a teenager whisperer, a guider of teenagers, and I do it through music” (Krista, interview). As we see in Krista’s case, her struggle to enact less directive pedagogical moves within the structure of the LME led her to the creation of the PMP course, where she could more easily remove herself from the learning process and allow students the freedom to explore genres and styles of music in ways that were more authentic to real life music making contexts and their personal lives.

Bringing together these observations from the initial interview data, there seems to be a correlation between a view of democracy as collective responsibility and participation with more directive teaching approaches, and, on the other hand, a view of democracy as aimed toward the development of moral agency and social justice as necessitating less-directive teaching approaches. However, while this analysis seems initially to support the current metanarratives in music education scholarship, these connections were complicated through the Community of Inquiry process. Upon reflection of the schema of pedagogical moves as I presented them at the beginning of the Community of Inquiry, teachers identified significant issues in considering the justification of their authority on the *degree* of teacher-directiveness to steer learning outcomes. In Chapter 5, I explore several ethical commitments that teachers expressed as requiring more directive modes of teaching, even at the expense of limiting student voice. In the following section, I describe how the discussion of Krista’s case in the Community of Inquiry challenged assumptions linking teacher directiveness

with distinctions between formal/informal teaching as they are often presented in current scholarship of democratic music education.

Rupturing connections between form and teacher directiveness

In the Community of Inquiry, teachers problematized the premise that particular ensembles or pedagogical forms necessarily require, or ought to be constrained by, particular degrees of authority. Reflecting on how Krista's case is encapsulated in the division between formal/informal music learning, Susan, for instance, rejected the dichotomy between wind band and popular music learning as relating to the democratic value of the learning experience. Approaches that try and link issues of equity and colonialism directly to a particular ensemble or genre of musical performance, Susan suggested, are inherently flawed. It's insufficient to think, as she states her school board does, that "Well, if we take out the band instruments, we put in steel pans, equity solved right?" Rather, Susan argued that:

An instrument cannot...it can have context, but an instrument can't be racist. So for me, it's about the house. If you're going to buy steel pans and you're just going to teach Hot Cross Buns, how is that different? Right? You've just changed what they're playing on, not the content and the delivery. So, for me, it's not about what the instruments are in front of the children, it's about the instructional practice and how that can be applied to any type of instrument. (Susan, Community of Inquiry)

Just as Susan argues that the ethical value of instrumental education has less to do with the form of the ensemble or instrumentation, discussion on Krista's case challenged the validity of the ensemble structure itself. Is it, as some of the literature strongly implies (though is often hesitant to outright claim), that the band is inherently authoritarian in its history and relationality between conductor and musicians? Krista described her own concerns about the vehicle of the wind band as requiring, inherently, a high degree to teacher control, despite the conducting approach:

The vehicle was designed for a leader, you know, like a professional orchestra, like a Gustavo Dudamel. Doesn't matter if it's me or him. That's the nature of that vehicle: leader has a vision, leader helps us all create the vision, whether it's explicitly, you know, very bossy and [a] dictatorship, or whether it's like a collaborative process. That's the deal. (Krista, interview)

In deliberating on this view in light of the case study, however, participants complicated the proposition, highlighting how the *vener* of authority is menacing to seeing the more subtle relational aspects of their pedagogy and thus to make evaluative decisions about their ethical value. Susan suggests that the appearance of authority through the view of an audience member watching a conductor lead an ensemble, directing the musical experience, obscures the kinds of relationships occurring in the ensemble:

You know that there's a mutual respect that's been built that allows people to feel comfortable expressing themselves. So what might appear from a short term or an audience perspective to be teaching from command...can actually have a much different back story than what it does. (Susan, Community of Inquiry)

Though Susan held deep concerns about the colonial nature of traditional band education, cultivating a more inclusive, democratic environment did not, for her, necessitate a shift in form, instrumentation, or a withdrawal of teacher influence. Rather, it required cultivating deliberative skills in students in order to nurture their moral agency. "We have discussions, I don't know how else grow the capacity for what you call democracy, [or] I call or self-directed or moral agency" (Susan, interview). Susan's comment echoes Levinson and Reid's (2023) argument that moral agency is "a democratic commitment to deliberation with differently situated others" (p. 131). To nurture such moral agency, Susan continually creates space within her band program for deliberation. For instance, prior to learning a piece of music, "everybody pulls out whatever technology they have or they share or they grab a Chromebook and we're like, what's this song about? Where is it from?

Should we perform it? And we decided as a class, yes, we should perform this or, no, no, this is terrible” (Susan, interview). She goes further to contend that a deliberative approach is possible not only within the music classroom through research into socio-political music histories, but also within the frame of the rehearsal itself. She describes sitting in on a rehearsal with Chineke!, which is a “majority black and otherwise racially diverse orchestra from the UK,” where, she describes:

It wasn't the conductor going, ‘what do you think or what do you think?’ It would just be like, there would be a pause and then the bassoon player would go ‘well, the problem with this section is this,’ and I was like, oh my God, it is possible. (Susan, interview)

The rehearsal process, in Susan’s view, was not beholden to teaching through command. By encouraging deliberation throughout each stage of the rehearsal cycle, Susan seeks to structure learning toward the development of students’ moral agency. This might be what Allsup (2016) refers to as an opening of a closed system; however, I want to suggest that teachers’ reflections on their shared experiences suggest that it was not an inherently closed system to begin with, and that focusing attention primarily on the degree of teacher-directiveness obscures a view of the educational relationships occurring within the LME. What this section has sought to illustrate is that despite what seems like echoes of the metanarratives in the initial interview data, the process of reiterative, participatory philosophical inquiry complicated the assumptions about the degree of teacher influence and students’ democratic learning embedded in those metanarratives.

Conclusion

Responding to increasing critiques of the standard liberal ideals of the democratic educational community, Douglas Yacek (2021) argues:

The agonistic perspective on civic life seems to force us into an either/or situation that constrains the universe of options available to us for grappling with political polarization.

From the agonistic view, it seems that we either give up on the social virtues of democratic

community and embrace a politics of adversarial struggle, or consign ourselves to the unjust status quo. (p. 176)

The metanarratives regarding band education similarly constrict the “universe of options” for teachers to employ their authority in myriad ways to help students develop a variety of democratic capacities. Without better normative tools to understand the limits both to teacher authority to stay within democratic bounds, as well as the limits to the democratic values of student agency and voice, teachers are easily left feeling demoralized (Santoro, 2018). Indeed, Susan explains the strife she experiences through the struggle:

The arts is doing the heavy lifting for the world right now; like, we are the social emotional learning component... We're not building virtuoso musicians, we're building virtuoso people. We're trying to do it all, but without any funding, any time, and coming out of the pandemic where it's easy to cancel us. (Susan, Community of Inquiry)

Thus, teachers require normative tools to evaluate the prioritizations of certain democratic values, at certain times, with certain students, and against other educational goods. While the participatory philosophical process shared by myself and the participants in this study amplified the ruptures to binary thinking about authoritarian/democratic teaching and open/closed structures, it also underscored the value of working through real life, ethically complex cases. Indeed, as Chapter 5 and 6 will demonstrate, these discussions resulted in the generation of several questions that not only challenge the current metanarratives, as illustrated in this chapter, but also expand the conceptual framework offered in Chapter 3. Braiding together teachers' perspectives on Krista's case with literature from the philosophy of education, in Chapter 5 I expand upon the heuristic findings from this chapter to consider a variety of perspectives on the democratic potentials and limitations of the notion of student voice. In Chapter 6, I present an offering to expand the conceptual framework of authority proposed in Chapter 3 to include a more relational, social picture of

pedagogical authority that is potentially congruent both with the authority of expertise, as well as the development of students' democratic autonomy and agency.

Chapter 5: Democratic student voice in band

*I was coming from a place of watching them like change into freaking unicorns.
And I was like, oh my God, how do I do this [in band]?
(Krista, Community of Inquiry)*

Thus far, I have sought to complicate normative assumptions about large music ensembles (LME) which suggest that employing expert, pedagogical authority to steer a group of student musicians toward regulatory musical ideals is inherently an oppressive act of authoritarian command, fundamentally adverse to ideals of democracy and democratic education. In the previous chapter, I suggested how engaging in reiterative, ethical deliberation with expert music practitioners casts light on the heuristic ruptures that exist between popular metanarratives of teachers' classroom authority in contemporary music education theory and teachers' experiences navigating difficult decisions about when and how to enact their authority. In the following two chapters, I further that claim by revisiting the Community of Inquiry discussion to highlight two significant *generative*²⁵ findings. The first finding, explored in this chapter, offers a focusing of the 'conceptual optometry' of student voice. I borrow the notion of the process of philosophy as "conceptual optometry" from Tony Laden's (2018) presentation at the Centre for Ethics and Education Graduate Student Institute at the University of Madison-Wisconsin. Conceptual optometry, as Laden conceives it, requires identifying when we are looking at a concept through multiple lenses, leading to a vision of the world that is conceptually fuzzy. The goal of this approach to philosophy, which I share and attempt to similarly capture in this dissertation through the process of grounded reflective equilibrium, is not the creation of theories, but of clarifying conceptual vision.

²⁵ Reid and Levinson (2023) argue that normative case studies are designed with three key functions in mind: heuristic, generative, and pedagogical. These functions are defined in Chapter 4.

Thus, while the notion of student voice is not generative in and of itself, deliberating with teachers on the normative case study laid bare how “extant theories provide insufficient guidance or conceptual clarity” for teachers to determine the scope, goods, and methods of student voice in their classrooms (Reid & Levinson, 2023, p. 31). Teachers in my study, interestingly, read Krista’s case as foundationally a question of student voice, showing how deeply the concept of voice permeates educational thinking about authority and democratic education. Bringing their own teaching experiences to bear on Krista’s case, participating teachers exposed significant complexities and the urgent necessity in extracting *means* from *ends* in midst of the conceptual cacophony of ‘student voice’ to begin to consider the democratically justifiable limits on student expression within the context of the music room.

Weaving participants’ experiences and perspectives in striving to promote student voice in their own classrooms, in dialogue with literature from the philosophy of education, generated three notions of student voice: voice as transformation, voice as communicative virtues, and voice as consent. In this chapter, I begin by examining each of these conceptions, considering their distinctiveness and the possible implications each holds on notions of pedagogical authority in order to broaden and refocus the conceptual lenses through which we look at the notion of authority as music educators. I then turn to the sorts of limitations teachers described as justifiable in their classrooms, considering these limitations in light of the different conceptions of voice and their links to possible democratic goods. Finally, I draw from one teacher’s ethical uncertainty about the notion of student consent, and how their consent interacts with notions of student voice in a democratic classroom. This exploration, moving reiteratively between teachers’ phenomenological experiences and extant theories from the philosophy of education, suggests alternative ways of thinking about student voice that were previously invisible within current discourse about the role of student voice in democratic music education.

Three lenses of student voice: Transformation, self-expression & receptivity

In order to express the ethical justifications of their pedagogical authority in service of students' flourishing as democratic citizens, teachers in my project frequently turned to the notion of 'student voice' to anchor their educational philosophies. Indeed, in interviews and Community of Inquiry discussions, 'student voice' was employed frequently by participants in myriad ways. The lack of conceptual unanimity is of little surprise, given that the term is often conceptually fuzzy within educational theory—an example of “looking through too many lenses” as Anthony Laden (2018) describes. Fredriksen et al. (2023) similarly critique the lackadaisical use of student voice in contemporary scholarship: “scholarly works sometimes offer ‘under-theorized, unproblematic accounts of student voice’ in educational research, thus adding to the lack of clarity about the nature and purposes of student voice” (p. 255). While student voice is pervasive within music education theory, discussions with participants about Krista's case underscore the significant work required to clarify the relationship between voice, pedagogical authority, and democratic education, particularly within an educational setting such as the LME that is deeply reliant on direction from the teacher to coordinate the musical process.

At the heart of Krista's dilemma is a concern that students in her band classes do not experience a sense of self-transformation in the same way, or to the same degree, as she perceives her students experiencing in the more freeform, student-led popular music performance class (PMP). In the PMP class, Krista explains:

[We had] almost weekly experiences of somebody rolling in and doing something you've never heard them do before, and everybody like cheering and yelling and crying and hugging. That's the vibe in terms of transformative experiences. And so then it made me think, like, existential crisis! How can I make that happen in my instrumental band class? How could they transform? They gotta transform. They all need to transform! And a lot of them take

my band class, so they do this ridiculous thing, like, 'I wrote this song about my mother, who has cancer' and [its] beautiful. And we're all crying. And then, the next period, they pick up their trumpet and play third trumpet. No offense to the third trumpet. I was just coming from a place of watching them like change into freaking unicorns. And I was like, oh my God, how do I do this [in band]? (Krista, Community of Inquiry)

Krista viewed the diminishment of top-down instruction from the teacher as key to enabling the sort of self-transformation she describes. Students were provided with the freedom to draw upon their personal experiences and musical preferences in order to engage in musical creation with a small group of their peers—whether an original composition or cover piece—that led to finding new modes of personal expression and a process of coming to realize the inner realities of their classmates. “The more I release control,” Krista described, “the more they impressed me by problem solving on their own. Things became incredibly organic.” The more time she spent releasing control to her students in PMP, the greater frustration Krista experienced in feeling unable to attain equivalent transformational experiences in her band classes, despite her concerted efforts.

This transformational view of student voice holds important considerations for democratic music education. I do not mean to claim that there is a logical or necessary connection between self-transformation and democracy. However, the following discussions of student voice aimed at transformative educational experiences provide a conceptual lens through which to understand, reflect upon, and evaluate certain ethical tensions Krista experiences, including tensions that pertain to democratic aims or goods of education. Transformation of self and society are often evoked as an indication of democratic learning in music education scholarship. For instance, terms such as “transcending the given,” (p. 48) “and destabilizing the Master” are illustrative of Allsup’s (2016) vision of the ‘open’ classroom, which he “recognize[s] as democratic” (p. 5). My purpose in this section is to provide a more thorough investigation of the concept of voice for transformation in

context of Krista's case, highlighting possible ambiguities in the relationship between voice, transformation, and democratic educational aims. I emphasize how transformation may align or diverge from democratic outcomes, and correspondingly, teachers can (and no doubt do) stimulate transformational processes that are correspondingly ethically ambiguous from a democratic perspective. Clarifying this relationship is critical to evaluate the democratic merits of student voice: are the *ends* toward which student transformation strive coherent with democratic ideals?²⁶ If so, which ideals might such a notion of voice promote or obscure? And is *how* students undergo transformation necessarily predicated on non-interference by the teacher? Without answers to these questions, the relationship between the enactment of teachers' authority and the democratic value of the transformative outcomes remains unclear.

At the outset of his book *The Transformative Classroom*, Douglas Yacek (2021) posits the following question: "should we think of transformations as autonomously chosen and self-caused, as instances of influence from without, or as something in between" (p. 3)? To answer this question requires an understanding of the ends toward which transformation strives. Under the larger umbrella of transformative education, Yacek (2021) refers to the particular notion of transformation expressed by Krista as 'transformation as conversion.' In a conversion view, he suggests we understand voice as the activation to reorient students' structured view of the world and uncover the structural forces exerted upon them, heretofore unseen—what Freire (2018) refers to as "conscientization." Indeed, in music education theory, the notion of student voice as transformation expressed by Krista is deeply rooted in the theoretical work of critical pedagogy and social justice education (Benedict et al., 2015; Gould & Countryman, 2009). In this view, "Students come to appreciate the power of a comprehensive new ideal and to radically reorient their lives according to

²⁶ Increasingly, social justice advocates are eschewing the pursuit of democracy as the goal of transformative education, seeing it as a structural impediment to justice. See: Yacek, (2021, pp. 175-178) and Gould (2008).

its dictates” (Yacek, 2021, p. 21). Music is thus instrumentalized as a tool to lead students towards “a new realm of experience” (Yacek, 2021, p. 24) where “life is fuller, richer, deeper, more worthwhile [sic], more admirable, more what it should be” (Taylor, 2007, p. 5). Susan O’Neill (2015), for instance, describes a “transformative vision” of education, whereby “young people are encouraged to *see things differently*. They are encouraged to *speak back* to the realities of their world and discover that they are capable and ready to effect positive change” (p. 389, emphasis in original). For many social justice advocates, such conversion is viewed as necessary in order to escape and combat oppressive social inequities: “Students emerge with an agenda—to fight against the oppression of marginalized peoples and to pursue nothing less than the democratic reconstruction of society” (Yacek, 2021, p. 31).

In order to grapple with these questions arising out of Krista’s expression of transformative education, I turn briefly to a distinction offered by Nicholas Burbules and Suzanne Rice (1992) between voice as self-expression and voice as receptivity. At first glance, achieving a transformative experience through student voice within Krista’s PMP class appears to require substantial opportunity for students’ self-expression. Withdrawing from directive teaching, Krista describes, opened space for students to explore the themes and genres of music of their choosing, and to create a musical representation that expresses their thoughts, feelings, and artistic values. Certainly, such self-expression, as Burbules and Rice (1992) argue, is an important element in the development of students’ communicative capacities. For instance, they point to Dewey’s valuing of self-expression, drawn from students’ personal experiences, as fundamental to the democratic educational process:

We are beginning to learn that learning which develops intelligence and character does not come about when only the textbook and the teacher have a say; that every individual becomes educated only as he [sic] has an opportunity to contribute something from his [sic]

own experience, no matter how meager or slender that background of experience may be at a given time; and finally that enlightenment comes from the give and take, from the exchange of experiences and ideas. (Dewey, 1946, p. 36)

While Dewey here begins by stating the educational goods yielded from voice as personal expression, it is worth noting how he quickly shifts to the notion that a fully realized view of student voice requires nurturing communicative virtues that demand a level of receptivity to others. Here, we can see the conceptual lenses of authority overlapping, leaving us with a fuzzy view of the means and ends of student voice. Can self-expression or self-transformation be extracted from interactions in Dewey's view? Does self-expression hold particular democratic values that are separate from voice that is engaged dialogically with others in a process of joined reasoning? When describing the goods resulting from relinquishing her authority, Krista similarly emphasized not only students' individual transformations through self-expression, but the ways in which students became organically more collaborative in problem-solving musical challenges together.

We can already see the difficulties teachers might face when considering the role they ought to play, when transformation, self-expression, and receptivity float in a conceptual deep space of 'student voice.' Of course, delineating between voice as self-expression or receptivity does not imply that we ought to nurture one without the other. Burbules and Rice (1992) argue that both voice as self-expression and voice as a dialogic encounter ought to be considered as a constellation of communication. Without developing various modes of communication, they contend, voice can slip into problematic social categorizations:

The human practice of open and equitable communication — especially when it entails gender- or culture-related differences — requires that participants be animated by this whole range of virtues. When any of the virtues are lacking, there is a danger that certain partners will dominate, and that others will be silenced or acquiesce. (para. 11)

However, it is critical to consider these means of voice separately, as these modes of communication will inevitably conflict at times in practice. A musical assignment where students are asked to share their personal musical histories, for example, does not require—in fact, could be negatively impacted by—discussion with others. So, rather than consider either notion of voice as the *end* of a pedagogical process, Burbules and Rice (1992) argue that these different sorts of communicative interactions be guided by a set of first-order communicative virtues: “patience, tolerance for alternative points of view, respect for differences, the willingness and ability to listen thoughtfully and attentively, an openness to giving and receiving criticism, and honest and sincere self-expression” (para. 5).

The virtue ethics argument put forth by Burbules and Rice regarding student voice establishes a set of virtues *a priori* to distinctions in means—i.e., student voice as self-expression or receptivity (or, perhaps as transformation). Whether one agrees necessarily about which virtues student voice ought to reach toward, or whether there is justification for establishing regulatory communicative values in the first place, what I find appealing in Burbules and Rice’s argument is that it establishes student voice as a *means* to attaining other character shaping educational goods, rather than an end in and of itself. If voice is the end rather than the means of democratic education, one can see how it has led to calls for the “Master’s demise” (Allsup, 2016). Democracy would seem to be best realized through an informal approach that removes teacher influence, increasing opportunity for individual student expression. However, I agree with Burbules and Rice (1992) in that communication must strive toward some values and those values require a certain degree of educational influence to be nurtured:

More classroom conversation alone, however, is not sufficient to encourage the acquisition of the communicative virtues where they may be lacking, or to nurture their consistent exercise among students who already possess them. Such conversation must be attentive to

factors that impede certain students' participation, and must be animated by a spirit of patience and good will. (para. 22)

Considering student voice as a means to some set of established virtues, rather than an end in and of itself can, however, easily fall back into the trap of authoritarianism. For instance, Yacek (2021) questions certain approaches to transformative education on such grounds: "Is dialogue that intentionally steers students to such strong convictions about social life truly different from the 'authoritarian' forms of pedagogy that it was supposed to avoid?" (p. 35). A hyper focus on transformation through student-led learning, then, risks instrumentalizing music for broader purposes of social justice, potentially at the expense of students' democratic development and even, Yacek argues, fully realized transformation itself:

Student-centered approaches risk closing students off from the external sources of value that can provide them impetus to expand their existential horizons. Teachers and their disciplines can be seen as the very resources students need to become the selves they want to be. On the other hand, overly teacher-centered approaches can overlook the importance of activating students' imaginative agency to support meaningful learning. (Yacek, 2021, p. 7)

Rather than turning consideration to an ideal theory of democratic education, with a firm set of regulatory ideals to guide teachers in how to employ student voice in some distant future, we might consider, instead, democratic communicative ideals as a set of constraints in the here and now, in the messy classrooms interactions in which teachers work to balance competing pressures.

Clearly, the concept of voice as transformation in Krista's case opens a host of complications to the assumption that a withdrawal of teacher influence towards an open classroom environment necessarily improves the democratic learning taking place in her classroom. Neither conceptualizing student voice as self-expression, nor as directed dialogue aimed at transformation, nor as non-directive, open-ended dialogue wholly determines the scope of democratic outcomes

experienced by students in the classroom. Moreover, an emphasis on self-expression or receptivity as a central communicative virtue might well prioritize either a more liberal conception of democracy that places primary value on self-governance, or a more deliberative approach that values the process of extended deliberation towards consensus (Carmichael et al., 2000). These separate lenses of student voice and their potential links to the development of particular democratic ideologies and capacities are obscured by the assumption that greater speaking time in open classrooms, where students lead the learning, are squarely correlated with democratic education.

Rather, I posit that teachers ought to *engage* their authority towards safeguarding democratic constraints on educational processes, even at the expense, at times, of limiting one or more modes of student voice. These constraints become even more critical as we recognize and seek to ameliorate structural issues of power within music education, “The stronger the plea for tolerance and non-domination across cultural, racial, or gender diversity, the *greater* the need for some normative conception of how we ought to maintain such relations — especially communicative relations” (Burbules and Rice, 1992, para. 27, emphasis in original). Though the participants in the Community of Inquiry all spoke to the importance of promoting student voice, most participants followed such proclamations with a list of caveats. Thus, I shift back to teachers’ descriptions of the sorts of constraints they placed on student voice to consider potential justifications for teachers exerting their authority, whether through commanding, steering, or facilitating, in ways that might, in fact, strengthen students’ communicative possibilities.

Limiting student voice

“When should we use more or less direct teaching methods in instrumental music classes?” This was the central normative question posed to participants during the first part of the Community of Inquiry. The question drew from the ways in which teachers described, in their initial interviews, the pedagogical authority moves they make in their classrooms. Moreover, by looking at *specific* sorts of

decisions teachers make in their classrooms (decisions of repertoire choice, instrument parts distribution, interpretive musical decisions, classroom discussions of controversial issues, and so forth), teachers suggested several moral and legal commitments that guided their decisions about which pedagogical move to employ.

At the most fundamental, teachers described employing unilateral teaching from command to uphold principles of physical and dignity safety in their classrooms. As Susan explains:

There is a legal hierarchy that is established, and...if there is a conflict between two kids because of something that's happening in the world right now and they're coming from two different world perspectives, you have to make sure that your classroom is a safe place. And unfortunately, sometimes that bizarrely involves that sort of command portion of, you know, like, this will not be allowed. This is not open for discussion...We're not going to put it on an anchor chart. No, you may not use homophobic slurs. You may not use racial slurs...So like for me, the teaching from command part is the safety and security of the people in the room. (Susan, Community of Inquiry)

While there is considerable debate about the notion of safe spaces in education (Callan, 2016), Susan seems to refer here to the very fundamental legal and moral obligation held by teachers to protect their students from harm. To fulfill this obligation, Susan saw no requirement to deliberate with students—even if this felt “bizarre” to her—but rather, that basic standards of care and respect could be commanded and deference required from her students. Indeed, without such protections, teachers could negate their legitimate authority, and students would be justified in (proportionally) defending the rights to not experience harm or oppression (Parkin, 2024).

In a similar attempt to protect students from structural harms, Susan described two specific instances where she opted to steer students toward particular ethical stances, despite experiencing some uncertainty about whether this was the best approach to adopt. The first is a concern she

holds about method books used for band instruction. Method books are levelled instructional tools that include short musical excerpts to teach musical skills in a sequenced manner, and which can be played by the full ensemble or by individual instruments for private instruction, playing tests, and so forth. While nearly every beginner and intermediate band program in Canada and the United States rely on method books for basic instructional purposes, Susan argues that they are in no way as innocuous as they are often perceived:

I did an equity audit of method books during the pandemic...When I looked through, every single piece of the method book was wrong. Like, it would either be like, colonial, like hot crossed buns, or all white classical composers, or if there was something from a racially diverse composer, or even [music from] a different culture, it would say 'traditional.' No information about the piece, so I just I stopped using it. (Susan, interview)

In lieu of using a method book, Susan writes her own band exercises, an extremely time-consuming task. However, she did not remove method books completely from her band room, still offering the books as possible resources, amongst others. She permits her students to choose musical excerpts from these books for playing tests, and encourages students to use the practical tools, such as fingering charts, in the books. The choice for students to use the books, however, is certainly influenced by the disclosure of her reasoning for not using the standard books with the group:

I'm very clear with the kids about why I don't use the method book. The material is not well sourced. I have a little slideshow we go through like, this is my reasoning....I'm never a 'because I said so' kind of a person. It's like just so you know, this is why I'm not comfortable using the method [book]. (Susan, interview)

Susan discloses the reasons for which she feels the method books exert problematic educational power that uphold colonialist traditions, Othering and silencing racially diverse and female composers, and non-Western musical traditions. Though Susan strives to nurture students' decision-

making capacities by insisting they choose their own music to demonstrate their attainment of musical competencies in monthly playing tests, certainly this disclosure of the potential ethical harms of the method books purposively steers students' decision making about their repertoire choice.

In a similar pedagogical move, Susan also avoids programming Christmas music or music with religious associations from any culture for her bands, despite urging from students and parents to include such music on winter concert programs.²⁷ As with the method books, she explains to students why she doesn't believe school music should include religious affiliations, and suggests that students work on Christmas songs in small groups during their independent time if they so choose. In both these instances, Susan's commitment to anti-colonial education placed certain limitations on student voice that led to her adopting a steered teaching approach, though without the sort of unilateral teaching from command that teachers suggested as necessary when safeguarding the physical and dignity safety of her students.

Susan's full and open disclosure of her beliefs and her steering of students' views toward anti-colonial, social justice-oriented perspectives, might seem to some as a rejection of a stance of neutrality, which some argue is critical to the development of students' autonomy and a free and open public education. As Hess and McAvoy (2014) note, it is "often assumed that teachers should not discuss their own views with their students. This is typically motivated by a fear that teachers over-share and violate the public's trust and student autonomy" (p. 190). However, as Hess and McAvoy (2014) remind us, "the classroom is not 'neutral'" (p. 191). Just as critics of the "naturalist" metanarrative of democratic band education argue that we need to recognize the socio-cultural contexts of the musical forms in which we engage rather than assuming music is inherently apolitical (Woodford, 2019, 2021), a *laissez-faire*, hands-off approach to teaching similarly adopts a troublesome stance of neutrality that is not necessarily productive of democratic student voice. Hess

²⁷ For an excellent discussion of potential anti-democratic consequences of religion-blind policies, see: Benedict (2021).

and McAvoy (2014) describe how “it became clear to us that to expect teachers never to share a personal view was an unrealistic and occasionally undesirable standard, but to take the position that teachers should *always* share their views also was problematic. That left us with the murky answer ‘it depends’” (p. 193).

Placing some constraint on Susan’s students’ voice of self-expression, and even, at times, of dialogic interactions, was done as a pedagogical manoeuvre within a classroom environment that generally promoted political tolerance and discourse. As described in Chapter 4, Susan shared her belief that the development of her students’ moral agency, a key goal in her educational philosophy, must be accomplished through classroom dialogue. Certainly, she achieves significant critical dialogue through her general teaching approach. Susan carves space to research and evaluate together with her students the histories and cultural settings of every piece of music the band performs, encouraging students to determine collaboratively the validity of the music they perform. Furthermore, together as a class, her students research, discuss, and nominate a Canadian musician for the Governor General Awards, considering the historical norms established by these sorts of artistic awards. Yet, these critical and deliberative approaches to band instruction are performed within a strongly structured and steered environment, where her moral commitments, as we saw above, sometimes lead to a limiting or stifling of particular forms of student voice in particular contexts. In short, Susan’s teaching approach can be seen to require teachers’ influence—sometimes exerted more strongly than others—for the full realization of student voice within the educational system: “I don’t speak for children,” Susan states, “but I will help them speak for themselves if they need it.”

The legitimacy of teachers’ authority to speak for children suggests some degree of paternalism present within the teacher-student relationship in order to protect students’ educational growth and the development of their moral agency within educational systems that too often distort

their voices. Too much paternalism, however, risks overriding students' autonomy and educational growth. Considering this delicate balancing during the Community of Inquiry discussions lead to the question of students' consent to educational authority.

Student consent

Considering the limitations to student voice during the Community of Inquiry, one participant expressed substantial ethical concerns regarding the scope of his students' consent to teacher-driven practices found in traditional LMEs. Before turning to Michael's dilemma, briefly, I wish to establish the importance of considering consent within discussions of democratic student voice and teachers' pedagogical authority. Consent within liberal democratic theories is broadly understood as the act of providing permission to an authority figure to make decisions that affect one's life and wellbeing. John Rawls (1971) famously proposed the notion of hypothetical consent, whereby political authority is deemed legitimate if citizens would consent to the laws under certain ideal conditions (the original position). In Rawls's account, there is an obligation to obey political authority that meets such ideal criteria—an obligation that stems from the natural duty to do what is morally right (Rawls, 1971). David Estlund (2008), on the other hand, argues that political authority does not actually derive from our consent, because most citizens “have never consented to the political authority of the government that rules over us” (p. 3). This certainly rings true for students in compulsory education. In absence of consent as a satisfactory justification for authority, Estlund explains how expertise has often been tempting as a justificatory ideal. Yet, he argues, expertise similarly does not hold in a democratic setting because we are very unlikely to agree on who the moral or political experts are, deflating the obligation to obey. Therefore, Estlund proposes a conception of ‘normative consent.’ He argues that a democratic procedure that “involves many citizens thinking together, potentially reaping the epistemic benefits this can bring, and promoting substantively just decisions better than a random procedure” would require moral (aka normative)

consent from citizens:

Political equality depends on, and finds its limits in, what sorts of arrangements will allow the promotion of justice and common good in a way that can be justified to the broad range of points of view that are owed acceptable justifications for the coercive political arrangements under which they live. (Estlund, 2015, p. 20)

If these conditions are met, then citizens are morally required to give their consent to the authority of the decisions reached.

Whether one adopts a Rawlsian conception of consent, or a normative view such as proposed by Estlund, many philosophers of education argue that a primary role of civic education should be to prepare young people to be capable to provide or deny political consent (Brighouse, 1998; Tanchuk et al., 2018). Indeed, authority is oppressive if the state compels citizens to submit to its authority but does not ensure that citizens are able to consent to the decisions that affect them. Being capable of consent, therefore, is a valuable educational and democratic good. Moreover, it seems unlikely that we can fulfill that obligation without the exercise some sort of provisional authority.

In discussions of Krista's case during the Community of Inquiry, Michael expressed that while he wishes to provide greater space and opportunity for students to become engaged in shaping their educational environment, he struggles to balance that goal with students' direct requests for stronger teacher direction. Michael described how, particularly since the pandemic, his students have shown keen desire for strong teacher authority in the classroom. When he asks them what they need to support their learning in the classroom, Michael's students, more often than not, request that he take charge of the teaching and allow them to improve on their instruments by following his direction. As Michael explains, the students ask him to "just tell me exactly what I need to do. I don't really want to, you know, I'm not here to offer my opinions. I'm simply here to improve and I

just want to play my instrument. I just want to be here playing third clarinet.” But Michael struggles to understand the implications of this sort of uncritical consent to his pedagogical authority:

I found that it's a funny balance to strike...if they're receiving something positive out of that, if that is what they need in the moment, then of course I can be that person for that... but you know at the same time...it feels to me at times like there's a level of creativity that's been removed out of that equation along the way. (Michael, Community of Inquiry)

Michael wonders how much legitimacy there exists in students not only consenting to his authority, but expressing their significant need for greater teacher direction. On one hand, some participants suggested that this situation exemplifies students’ learned deference to authority, a trait deeply ingrained in students throughout elementary school. Susan, for instance, contended that responding to these requests requires employing her pedagogical authority to encourage the gradual growth in students’ capacity to pull away from practices of deference:

Like you have a rehearsal at 7:30 in the morning. The kids don't come in going, ‘I really hope the teacher asks me what I think this morning.’ They're like, ‘please don't notice that I haven't practiced. And I really need to eat breakfast in middle of rehearsal.’ So you have to you have to build an environment, or when you try and have those discussions, you get silence. So it's a building process. (Susan, Community of Inquiry)

Susan suggests that student consent to teacher authority cannot be understood as freely given in Michael’s case, because the educational structure has taught students to view deference to authority as integral to their school experience. As Harry Brighouse (1998) explains:

If the state helps form the political loyalties of future citizens by inculcating belief in its own legitimacy, it will be unsurprising when citizens consent to the social institutions they inhabit, but it will be difficult to be confident that their consent is freely given, or would have been freely given. (p. 719)

Thus, Susan argues for a paternalistic approach to pedagogical authority aimed at student's growth towards becoming independent thinkers and musicians who are able to evaluate the normative validity of the authority to which they are subject. In this view (which is akin to the "liberal paternalism" account outlined in Chapter 3), limiting the student's voice (as a request for directiveness) in the moment is justified on the grounds that it develops in her a more freely given consent in the future. However, Michael's observations about the increase in consent for teacher-driven instruction in his classroom post-pandemic suggests other ecological factors that would be crucial to weigh when considering how such a request might present not as merely learned deference to pedagogical authority, but as an act of dissention against educational structures that have created unmanageable pressures during and post COVID. In light of the circumstances of COVID, perhaps students were, in fact, exerting their voice in defence of their rights to cope with external forces weighed upon them. Evaluating the scope of student consent, then, requires a critical perspective in weighing the development of students' rights and autonomy with the protection of their vulnerability, particularly in times of strong external influences.

Like Michael, Krista also was surprised by a notion of student consent that arose in her program. As previously mentioned, Krista was struck by the fact that band students did not drop out of band after their experiences in the PMP program. The fact that music is an elective course, and her students continued to remain loyal to the band program, shapes the contours of student consent to the teacher-directed LME experience. In other words, in what way might the teacher-student relationship have shifted by the fact that students' views about music learning were ruptured and expanded by the freeform music making opportunities in PMP? Should the fact that students had choice in musical opportunities assuage Krista's concerns about employing her musical expertise through more teacher-directed methods in band?

The fact that Krista's students had opportunities to decide what music class they preferred, I contend, is insufficient to legitimize Krista's authority on grounds of free consent. For example, many music departments provide a wide array of musical offerings from which students may choose: band, orchestra, choir, jazz bands, small ensembles, pit bands, etc. Yet, these choices would not sufficiently assuage Brighouse's concern about students' uncritical consent to authoritarian or deferential authority. Indeed, the criticisms of band education, outlined in Chapter 2, might well emphasize the ways in which these students are lacking the conscientization necessary to take action against oppressive educational structures. However, there is a different ethos in Krista's case, I argue, that shifts the legitimizing effect of student consent and destabilizes the force of the critique. By providing a form of music making that is based upon a fundamentally contrary ontology of the means and ends of music education, students experience significant discontinuity from the traditional norms and practices of music education.

Brighouse (2005) contends that discontinuity is central to achieving autonomy-facilitation within plural educational spaces. He states, "Autonomy-facilitation requires a modicum of discontinuity between the child's home experience and her school experience, so that the opportunities provided by the home (and the public culture) are supplemented, rather than replicated, in the school" (p. 22). His description of discontinuity between home life and school life pulls in two directions in Krista's case. The first, as I mentioned, is that the PMP course required that students become aware of the ways in which they were subject to conductor's authority in band, and engage more actively in shaping their music learning experiences. On the other hand, in the PMP class, as with most versions of informal music education, students are encouraged to study music with which they identify, listen to at home, and so forth.²⁸ Band and orchestra, however, offer

²⁸ It should be noted, though, that Krista does structure certain PMP assignments around particular genres/forms of music. She might set a class assignment, for example, to study the forms and history of rock and roll, traditional folk, etc.

a different sort of discontinuity towards music appreciation, that can open new realms of music for students, previously unknown. Thus, in Krista's department, students are provided opportunities to experience discontinuity from both traditional structures of compulsory education, as well as from the norms of their home and social lives.

My argument here is that the fact that Krista's students continued to register for the band program provides a more compelling activation of consent, not merely because they have options to opt out of band without giving up participation of music in school, but because the discontinuity between band and PMP widened their views of music making, thus rendering their consent freer and more informed. This informed consent was deepened by, if not predicated on, the fact that Krista engaged students in conversations about the different modes of music learning, asking students what they value about band, particularly in relationship to PMP. While freely given student consent 'all the way down' in compulsory education seems an unattainable educational goal (Edmundson, 2018, p. 375), Krista employs her pedagogical authority to direct dialogue towards the development of student consent to her pedagogical authority in the band room.

In summary, the reiterative and philosophical nature of discussions with expert practitioners in my study generated more nuanced and complex views of student voice. The development of student's democratic voice requires a delicate balancing of student-led learning that allows space to foster students' moral and imaginative agency through a range of communicative encounters, but done within carefully structured learning environments that are established by teachers, on the grounds of teachers' moral democratic principles. The existence of those democratic principles, I contend, are not universal or static, but contingent on local, ecological factors. Though the realization of student voice is subject to such contingencies and professional judgement from

However, generally, students are afforded more choice that aligns with their preferences and the types of music Krista chooses are generally more strongly connected to those listened to by students.

teachers, this chapter has sought to underscore that it is insufficient to suggest that *more* classroom discussion, providing space for self-expression, or particular approaches to music making in schools are fundamentally more productively democratic than others. Woodford (2019) suggests that it is incumbent upon teachers to engage in rigorous critical thinking about the democratic goods toward which their teaching should strive. In a way, I strongly agree with him. However, without normative tools to do this, Woodford's call seems a particularly onerous one for music educators, as many of my participants described being stretched too thin, constantly feeling "exhausted" and "unsupported." The participatory philosophical inquiry offered space and time for participating teachers to explore the dilemmas they face together. Drawing connections from and to their own teaching experiences, engagement with normative case studies like Krista's case can begin to lift the many conceptual lenses that obscure a clarity of vision, thereby supporting teachers in their pedagogical decision making.

Chapter 6: Aspiring to the authority of connection

*When someone's offering you an art work, that's coming from their heart,
you need to listen and accept
(Susan, Community of Inquiry)*

I explored in the previous chapter how teachers in my study frequently returned to notions of student voice to ground their interpretations of Krista's case and think through implications of their classroom authority. They turned to student voice, I contend, in part out of a dissatisfaction with the ways in which current conceptual frameworks of pedagogical authority actually captured the relational reality of their classrooms. Teachers in the Community of Inquiry emphasized how my questions regarding the validity of particular pedagogical moves in their decision-making lacked attention to the ways in which they establish and maintain authority through building relationships of trust with their students. One participant, Susan, thoughtfully argued that the veneer of conductor's authority, as appears particularly in performance, is menacing to a full realization of the authority relations occurring in her classroom. The problem of authority, Susan contended, is not captured simply in the act of coordinating and authorizing musical efforts, nor is it limited to particular groupings of instruments. Rather, Susan, like many participants in the group deliberation, spoke to an ethos of relationality between teacher and students that she felt better determined the legitimacy of their authority. This notion carried into discussions about the ethical merits of the pedagogical moves they described in their interviews—commanding, steering, guiding, facilitating. When asked to consider these actions in various teaching scenarios, participants argued these actions, on their own, similarly obscured the foundational question of relationality between teachers and students. Thus, in this chapter, I turn attention away from questions of student voice and agency, back inwards toward teachers' phenomenological perspectives of their authority in relation to their students.

The generative finding that teachers lacked the normative tools to express the relational authority they understand occurring in their classrooms, led me to return to the philosophical literature and reconsider the framework of authority presented in Chapter 3 by drawing on the work of Anthony Laden. Laden (2012) proposes an alternative theory of authority, where authority is generated in the social act of reasoning together in a reciprocal and responsive relationship of shared authority. I suggest that Laden's "authority of connection" is potentially more expansive and attuned to teachers' experiences than Cunliffe and Reeve's notion of dialogic authority, as it requires responses that not only justify the authority to make decisions on behalf of the group, but that teachers are open to being moved by students' views in such a way as to contribute to students' growth and understanding of democratic engagements. Moreover, I discuss how Laden's conception of social authority does not preclude or limit the value of expertise or the collaborative pursuit of truth and excellence. The notion of "responsiveness" in authority, however, holds its own democratic limitations, to which I attend at the end of the chapter.

It is not my goal here to provide a universal answer to Krista's dilemma. As I have previously mentioned, the goal of normative case studies is not to provide a cut-and-paste answer to ethical problems. Rather, similarly to the previous chapter, I seek to broaden and refocus the conceptual lenses through which we look at the notion of authority as music educators by suggesting alternative ways of thinking about pedagogical authority that were previously invisible within current discourse. Indeed, the generative findings described in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 5, stress the significant complexities of teachers' daily experiences as expert teachers and musicians. I contend that what is critical for students' democratic development is not whether teachers lean toward formal or informal methods, though those two settings would likely nurture different sorts of democratic capacities. Rather, these findings underscore how engagement with practicing teachers' beliefs, concerns, and experiences, in reiterative dialogue with philosophies of education, and placed

under the stress test of a normative case study, have shown that the overly dichotomous view of authority presented in current scholarship misreads the complexities of teacher-student interactions. In doing so, these metanarratives limit teachers' ability to make decisions that fully align with their philosophical beliefs and commitments and wrongly implies that LMEs are inherently anti-democratic pedagogical structures.

The limits of dialogic authority

In the previous chapters, I shared several interactions of authority described by participants: Krista engaging students in discussions about the values of the band program when compared to the new PMP approach to music teaching and learning; Susan disclosing her reasons for avoiding the use of method books in band class due to their issues of colonialism and essentialism; and Michael offering reasons to his students about why their contributions are important even if they would prefer to follow a conductor's dictates. I contend that these interactions, even if final decisions are still remaining in the teachers' hands, shift the classroom ethos. Looking back to the schema of authority presented in Chapter 3, we might say that the teachers in these scenarios are authorizing their decisions by providing students with reasons in ways in which they can understand. Cunliffe and Reeve (1999) would argue that such an approach would uphold legitimate authority while also being consistent with students' agency.

However, there are some internal logic issues with this concept of dialogic authority when placed in educational contexts. Laden (2012) points to one of these inconsistencies in traditional notions of the authority of reasons:

If the authority of reason consists in its right to command or rule us, then reasoning with someone is, in the end, similar to commanding him. But one who has the right to command is thereby freed of the need to offer reasons, and offering reasons to someone is doing something other than merely commanding them. (p. 52)

If a teacher provides reasons for their decisions, it does shift the normative environment within which the students exist, but it does not require a response from students, and thus is not a reciprocal endeavour. Because no response is required, other than to obey or rebel against the reasons, the engagement does not offer much in the way of democratic practice for students. Thus, the improvement to students' democratic development in terms of deliberative capacities and the skills to challenge authority are, arguably, still minimal in a dialogic approach. However, Krista, Susan, and Michael's interactions mentioned above are also not well captured by a fully student-led classroom environment, where epistemic and moral status are equalized, thus rendering reasoning a process of persuasion (Arendt, 1961b), and where teachers' expert contributions to the reasoning process are seen as interference in the development of students' autonomous moral agency. As the teachers in my study noted, something still appears missing in the framework.

Authority of connection

Attuning to teachers' frustration with the insufficiency of the available normative tools, and the sorts of ethical dilemmas they raised in our discussions, I consider a view of authority that is more foundationally social in nature. Anthony Laden (2012) refers to this picture of authority as the "authority of connection." Unlike the authority of command, in which the authority figure unilaterally determines an aspect of the normative environment of those subject to their authority, "When we converse with each other on the basis of our connections, on the other hand, our capacity is a capacity to try and shape a normative environment we share, that we inhabit together," (Laden, 2012, p. 65). The authority of connection, Laden (2012) argues, is akin to the relationship that democratic citizens engage in, not when they vote, but when they "deliberate politically and reasonably" together (p. 67). Unlike the authority of command, which leaves open only the actions of rebellion or obedience, in Laden's picture of communicative authority, "when someone suggests a course of action, there is nothing to obey and nothing to rebel against" (Laden, 2012, p. 63). It is an

invitation to speak for the other, rather than a command. This picture, however, is not void of authority, as Arendt contends is the case in the act of persuasion. Here, authority rests in the shared capacity to shape another's normative environment.

Several elements further distinguish the authority of connection from the authority of command. In addition to requiring reciprocity (i.e., if one ignores one's interlocutor's offering of reasons, or one accepts, unreflectively, the invitations of the other, then the authority of connection fails to be achieved), the credentials of authority rest on the uptake from others, and thus are forward looking, rather than backward looking to an independent set of previously established credentials. As such, the locus of authority does not rest solely with the speaker, but is distributed in part to the listener as well. And finally, "whereas the authority of command serves to end our conversations, the authority of connection leaves room for them to keep going" (Laden, 2012, p. 73).

Considering participant experiences through the lens of the authority of connection affords several perspectives that were closed off in binary distinctions between 'open' and 'closed' classrooms.²⁹ First, the authority of connection proposes concrete norms of student-teacher relationships that are possible to apply in a variety of informal and formal settings. Let us consider a conductor who, during a band rehearsal, begins a piece of music at a tempo that is too fast for the capacities of the players or that musicians simply feel does not properly capture the best musical expression of the piece. If the conductor adopts a stance of commanding the tempo, players can either accept the decision, despite their concerns, or rebel against the command by playing slower than the conductor initiated. Certainly, such rebellion could be seen as an act of collective,

²⁹ These perspectives are similarly closed off, I argue, by the "both-and" narrative which has arisen in a great deal of recent philosophy of music education (Allsup, 2015). Varkøy (2023) suggests that though it "might sound very wise," a 'both-and' approach has the tendency to "blur meaning-making differences" (p. 64). Varkøy argues that "distinctions and even dichotomies are highly important to a multifaceted understanding of music and music education" (p. 65).

democratic defiance, and such acts can and do occur in professional orchestras. But the likelihood and impact of this sort of rebellion is muted within compulsory education systems, where students are a captive audience and the overall structures limit the scope of possibilities for rebellion. Moreover, the choice to obey or rebel holds little hope of educational promise for deliberative democratic capacities.

On the other hand, this same conductor might utilize the opportunity of discord about the appropriate tempo to inquire with students about the benefits and limitations of performing at different tempi, the historical traditions that rendered those tempi and whether they ought to be continued or modified, the educational progression the band will make towards the faster tempo, and so forth. They might be open to trying students' suggestions, perhaps, as my participant Karen suggested, recording the band performing at different tempi and discussing what effects they heard upon the playback. They could be open to being moved by students' viewpoints, despite traditions of performance practice or how their conducting teachers instructed them to perform the piece. The conductor may carry this discussion forward to other genres of music, considering the impact tempo has on our enjoyment of particular genres, and utilize students' perspectives in pieces later in the year. In this way, teachers could put to work their musical and pedagogical expertise in favour of developing responsive deliberative relationships with their students.

This notion of dialogue, aimed at constructing an authority based upon reciprocal uptake within a shared space of reasons, would similarly shift how we consider teachers' role within informal settings. Requirements to be moved by one's interlocutors would also place constraints on small group composition such that power moves by particular members of the ensemble would extinguish the authority of connection existing between the members. These constraints require more active involvement from teachers, I contend, than Amy Gutmann's (1999) constraints of nonrepression and nondomination discussed in Chapter 3. Teachers would be required to exert their

authority to ensure classroom deliberations, whether in large or small groups, adopt a stance of reciprocity where students and teachers are able to shape the normative environment of others in the group. The benefit here is that a responsive, relational view of authority pulls away from the assumptions that informal teaching is necessarily more democratic in its lack of authority and that music educators' expertise limits possibilities for building democratic relationships.

I don't mean to imply that music teachers must always adopt the views of their students if, after sincere deliberation, they believe the students might be making decisions that are not in the best interest of the group as a whole. Indeed, Laden would suggest that a teacher, given their expertise in education, holds the "right to pass judgement over her field of expertise" (p. 56). However, the fact that the reciprocal conversation has taken place, in good faith, and that it remains open to further deliberations in the future, alters the normative environment. Therefore, the conductor who upholds the initial tempo marking, does so on authority established through the shared, reciprocal activity of deliberation, rather than upon the authority of command.

Indeed, being moved by another's invitations to reason does not require a change of position. Warnick, Yacek, and Robinson (2018) develop Laden's view of responsiveness to contain multiple modalities. For instance, while one might certainly change one's own position after engaging responsively with another, being moved, they contend, might also present as a changing of the reasons why one holds a particular opinion, might soften one's opinion, or might change one's view of the other person (2018). All these modes of being moved change the normative environment, even if they don't change the decision at the surface level. In this way, the four modes of being moved, the authors argues, are civically productive, even when engaging with citizens who one might deem to hold "unjust or morally problematic views" (Warnick et al., 2018, p. 39).

The second way that the authority of connection is distinct from, for example, Allsup's description of the 'open' classroom, is that it leaves space open for end-based pursuits. Though

Laden argues that a central distinction between the authority of command and the authority of connection is that the former aims toward a final decision, where the latter keeps open various possible futures, reasoning as a social act is not, he argues, totally adverse to reasoning that aims at ends. Laden distinguishes between more conversational acts of reasoning and “engagements” to account for the need for making decisions in some circumstances. “Engagements,” Laden argues, “are characterized not by their ends, but by their demanding a further level of responsiveness from their participants” (p. 169). As opposed to informal, conversational forms of reasoning, the need to find common ground toward a joint endeavour, say, a high-stakes musical performance of a LME, requires that we be “*more* responsive to our conversation partners than when we are reasoning with them more generally, both in the kinds of invitations we offer and how we go on if they are declined” (p. 171, emphasis added). Engagement requires more than being answerable to each other, but to be moved by what others say. Thus, rather than considering the experience of Krista’s students to work together toward a shared goal of performing at MusicFest Canada as a closing off the learning experience, the authority of connection offers a way to grapple with the feelings of empowerment Krista describes her students experiencing in their collective efforts to achieving a joint end. This is not to say that the presence of high stakes will *naturally* lead to such engagements, but that if formulated on norms of reasoning grounded in a notion of the authority of connection, one might consider that high stakes situations might in fact require a more robust, demanding democratic engagement.

The democratic value in aspiring

There are potential limitations to Laden’s view of authority in the context of LMEs. Logistically, there isn’t the time, in every circumstance, for every student in a 60-person band to provide their considerations on a particular marking in the score. Thus, critics might well argue that the authority of connection is better realized within small group endeavours where the primary task is to find joint

solutions to musical problems. However, this would still miss what Krista's students were trying to capture in their descriptions of the value of the band program, in which they were "all in this together." Indeed, there is something particular, as Jonathan noted in Chapter 4, about the experience of performing in synchrony with a large group that is distinct from the previous descriptions of verbal discussions. Carolyn Barber (2021) offers a powerful metaphor of a flock of birds to capture the creative acts within a large ensemble, whereby "a multitude of one-to-one relationships occur throughout the flock simultaneously and perpetually, resulting from spontaneous interactions that in turn spark new interactions unpredictably," (p. 205). In her description of the musical and creative interactions that can occur between members of the ensemble, she echoes some of Laden's distinctions, suggesting that sympoietic collaboration is neither compromise nor an amalgamation of viewpoints, but a conversation. However, sympoietic collaboration would disintegrate if there was no response from fellow musicians, if they played only what they saw the conductor indicating and not what they hear, if they are more concerned about out-performing their stand partners than inviting them into a shared musical space, and so forth. A band or orchestra that has been cultivated through an experience of shaping each other's normative environments reciprocally would be better situated to experience the "flow" (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) of a sympoietic experience than one that where musicians live in fear of and deference to an authoritarian commander.

Another potential criticism of Laden's picture of responsive authority is that, within the structure of compulsory education, it is not fully realizable, given the degree of hierarchy that is built into the teacher-student relationship *a priori* to the learning process. Laden acknowledges how pre-existing hierarchies might be antithetical to the authority of connection:

If I have social power and status over you that allows me, without recourse, to decide what each of us will do and why, then even if I choose to forgo such power, my doing so is a gift to you, and we are not in the position of two people reasoning with one another. (p. 158)


However, these limitations to a fully realized picture of relational, responsive authority does not dismiss the educational goods of aspiring toward it: “To suggest that social practices and institutions can place barriers in the way of genuine reasoning together is not to claim that there is no point in trying to reason together before we reach a state of full justice” (Laden, 2012, p. 159). If we suggest that a fully non-hierarchical relationship between teacher and student is necessary to nurture students’ capacities as democratic citizens with flourishing moral agency, the impossibility of this claim would likely foreclose the goods of striving toward it. What I mean to suggest, is that the goods of aspiring toward engaging students in authority relationships based on reciprocity holds significant value in students’ democratic development. Yacek (2021) similarly argues that, “civic education can be thought of as an awakening of students’ *aspirations* towards the virtues of democratic community, rather than demanding their immediate realization” (p. 177).

While the authority of connection holds significant educational promise, I do not mean to argue that it is normatively the best approach to pedagogical authority in every circumstance. This would, in fact, be impossible and undesirable. As I argued previously, there are times when teachers are not only justified, but legally required to exert their credentials and expertise to unilaterally shape students’ normative environments in order to protect their students’ physical safety and democratic rights. However, Laden’s picture of authority offers a way to consider how we might reconcile embracing teachers’ distinctive authority as musical and pedagogical experts and seek to aspire to plural ideals of musical excellence, while upholding open and ongoing deliberative spaces.

Deliberations of Krista’s case with teacher participants resulted in a partial rejection of my initial conceptual framework of authority, as well as significant unease with the framework of

pedagogical moves that was crafted from their initial interviews. Teachers could not put these frameworks to work in such a way as to capture sufficiently their phenomenological experiences. Aspiring to an authority of connection provides one perspective to account for this gap between teachers' experiences and normative understandings of pedagogical authority in music education. As such, it expands the conceptual framework of authority for music educators. Figure 3 illustrates this broadened framework:

Figure 3



The addition of the authority of connection to the spectrum of pedagogical, democratic authority, insofar as it is distinct both from dialogic authority based upon interactivity rather than responsiveness, as well as from fully egalitarian and ends-based forms of reasoning such as persuasion, offers a way to view Krista's case through a more nuanced lens. Krista's particular situation, in which students have increased informed consent through discontinuity of music-making perspectives, and through which dialogue about the fundamental structure of their program Krista shares with her students, has shaped the normative environment through responsiveness and reciprocity. The democratic potential of her situation, I argue, is thus not limited to, nor fully captured by, a question of transformation or voice. Certainly, whether she decides to offer fewer sections of band or PMP might well shape the particular civic and communicative capacities

students gain. For instance, students might experience greater self-expression and autonomy if she prioritizes the PMP classes, but more pluralistic civic friendship³⁰ if she prioritizes band. These decisions would certainly shape her students' views of democratic life and the weighing of these options requires thoughtful deliberation within the local context. However, what this chapter has shown is that approaching Krista's case through a collaborative inquiry, emphasized that the normative environment of the large ensemble, within which authority is exerted, is shaped by more than the presence or removal of teacher influence, or the educational structures in which deliberations are occurring. The relational nature of deliberations is crucial in considering the potentials and limits of teachers' democratic authority in the music classroom.

³⁰ For discussion of the democratic educational values of civic friendship see: Allen (2004). Also, see: MacLean (2019) for a discussion of civic friendship in New Horizons Band programs.

Chapter 7: Considering questions of democratic pedagogical authority in practice

I wonder sometimes if we just embrace it for what it is...
-Krista (Interview)

In this dissertation, I have shown that the ways in which music teachers conceive of and enact their authority toward democratic goals is insufficiently captured in contemporary music education scholarship. It is clear from my discussions with music educators in the process of researching this dissertation, that all my participants regularly experience ethical dilemmas arising from tensions between their role as musical and pedagogical authority and the desire to create spaces in which to nurture students' agency and voice. I have witnessed similar concerns manifested in my undergraduate music education methods classes, where students wrestle to reconcile their traditional musical educations and their love of instrumental music—experiences that led them to want to teach music—with their urgent commitment to greater educational justice through anti-colonial, culturally sensitive, and inclusive teaching. The anxiety many students in my classes have expressed feeling about reconciling these educational goals through their teaching is palpable. In the midst of this ethical melee, teaching for democracy through band might seem increasingly like an archaic afterthought, or perhaps, as some scholars argue, even an impediment to the achievement of educational justice. It might indeed seem that the answer is to eschew the “old-school” ways, refusing to engage in teacher-directed activities such as wind bands and orchestras in the name of social justice, student agency, and structural change. This sort of disciplinary transformation has certainly gained traction in recent years. At the 2019 symposium of the International Society for the Philosophy of Music Education, keynote speaker Rubén Gaztambide-Fernández suggested that “if music education was really willing to be moved by others, symphonic orchestras would be dead.”

This statement was received with significant applause from the audience of music education philosophers. While there are many critical issues entangled in this movement of change, this dissertation has argued that pedagogical authority and expertise are not fundamentally antithetical to democracy and democratic education. Indeed, the implications of this binary limits potential democratic openings, risking un- or even anti-democratic tendencies going unnoticed. In so doing, it can also deepen teachers' already profound ethical uncertainties.

Most high school music educators, as was emphasized in my discussions with participants, teach full course loads, often in multiple subject areas, while keeping a full slate of traditional extra-curricular ensembles running. At the same time, they are looking to break free of a myopic focus on traditional modes of music instruction to invite a diversity of music making experiences and perspectives into their classrooms. They do all this with minimal support and resources from administrative bodies, and the near decimation of their programs during the COVID-19 pandemic. Already stretched from all sides, setting authority in stark opposition to democracy and justice only places further obstacles in front of teachers who seek to employ their expertise in service of their ideals, thus deepening the risk of demoralization and burnout for music educators (Santoro, 2018).

So what are music teachers to do in face of such complexities? How do they decide when, how, and to what ends to exert their musical and pedagogical authority in service of democratic or other educational goods? Throughout this dissertation, I have sought to emphasize that this process of grappling with the democratic justifications of pedagogical authority is profoundly complex, requiring better normative tools than are currently on offer in the field. Normative case studies, I have suggested, provide a valuable tool for pre- and in-service teachers, as well as music education scholars, to identify and clarify the goods to which they aspire, the means to get there, and the potential losses accrued in the process. Moreover, the benefits of normative case studies are further strengthened, I have argued, through reiterative, participatory engagement with teachers in the

creation of the cases themselves. Such a process allows for connections to be made across teaching situations, creating cases that not only promote democratic deliberation amongst educators, but reflect, at their core, the plurality of teachers' experiences.

The participatory philosophical methodology employed in this dissertation challenged current thinking about democratic authority in several distinct ways. From a heuristic perspective, by revisiting the ethical basis for the pedagogical moves teachers make in their classrooms, participants resisted the suggestion that democracy is best served in informal classrooms that are non-directive, detached from teachers' expertise and the disciplinary traditions of large music ensembles. The complex ways teachers described employing various pedagogical moves toward particular democratic goals, and the dilemmas they faced in determining which democratic values were most salient at any given time, presented a serious challenge to scholarly metanarratives in music education that narrowly focus on the degree of teacher directiveness in the learning process. These initial heuristic ruptures were then expanded through group deliberations on the democratic value of student voice, which resided at the heart of participants' perspectives on Krista's case. I suggest that to realize fully the democratic values of student voice, we should consider voice as a means to specific democratic ends, rather than an end in and of itself. This proposition would require that teachers employ their expertise to structure students' learning in ways that identify and protect the democratic goals, nurturing a range of communicative encounters. Doing so requires not only that teachers "screw up their courage to think and act boldly as public intellectuals" (Woodford, 2019, p. 41), but that they have conceptual resources to consider the competing values that arise in the process. Finally, the process of philosophical inquiry with teachers offered an opening to view conductors' authority in the LME as relational. In the picture offered in Chapter 6, authority and expertise are not flattened or removed, but exist in a relational space where teachers and students hold the capacity to shape one another's normative environments in pursuit of the best possible

outcomes. Such openings, I have argued, were obscured by current binary thinking about the role of authority in democratic music education.

In addition to the heuristic and generative research benefits I have suggested arising from this participatory philosophical inquiry of the concept of democratic pedagogical authority, Levinson and Reid (2023) argue that the practice of deliberating on ethically complex cases provides pedagogical benefits for participants. “Participants develop their ethical sensitivity and moral agency, learn to deliberate with others in the face of moral disagreement, and grow in their capacity to work as part of a collective to tackle common problems” (Levinson and Reid, 2023, p. 131). In so doing, the cases, Levinson and Reid argue, provide a strengthening of teachers’ democratic capacities: “In engaging in discussions of normative case studies, participants are offered structured opportunities to engage with differently situated peers in relations of democratic equality in the service of broadening their moral sensitivity” (p. 134). These capacities are essential for structuring democratically responsive classroom environments. Therefore, it is my suggestion that further development of normative case studies, like Krista’s, with a particular focus on the questions and dilemmas of democratic music pedagogy, would surely strengthen the democratic potential of our classrooms, providing teachers with greater normative resources with which to pursue their democratic goals.

Revisiting Krista’s case

Reflecting on her situation through the research process, Krista wondered if perhaps the sorts of goods that her students expressed experiencing through her band program—collective participation, belonging, civic friendship—were, on their own, sufficiently legitimate justifications of a more directive teaching approach, despite her concerns about the centrality of her role as a conductor and the historical traditions of LMEs. Near the end of our initial interview, and reiterated in the Community of Inquiry, Krista considered the potential faults in trying to contort band into

something that promotes a *different* set of capacities, such as those offered by her popular music performances courses, or by losing the traditions of large music ensembles themselves:

Maybe we're trying too hard to transform this vehicle that, actually they just want to play third clarinet. And they just want you to rehearse. And not to say that you don't have to do anything creative, but like, sometimes I think that we're trying a little too hard to morph [it into] something. I wonder sometimes if we just embrace it for what it is. Taught the old school way, but with new age philosophies and perspectives, you know what I mean? Keeping the mindset of a diverse, accepting, loving educator, but with a little bit of old school, like, this is what band is. (Krista, interview)

Certainly, Krista is not alone in searching for a way to retain the benefits of teacher-led ensembles, despite the many concerns that have been discussed in this dissertation. Considering the particular nature of music teachers' pedagogical authority through the process of a participatory philosophical inquiry with expert practitioners, this dissertation generated important openings for, and constraints on, teachers' democratic pedagogical authority. These constraints do not require an abandonment of the large, conductor-led format. What is critical, rather, is the process of clarifying the sorts of democratic considerations that might require or limit our authority when on the podium. Thus, the central task for music educators is to focus our conceptual lenses to the means and ends of our exertions of authority.

I have suggested that future work in this regard would benefit greatly from the creation of normative case studies. Additionally, I offer below a catalogue of the central theoretical questions raised in this dissertation, framed in practical terms that relate to the daily logistics of teaching in the large ensemble format. In repackaging the findings of this study into guiding questions for practice, I am aware of the potential of oversimplifying or reducing the complexity of the analysis. However, I contend that reflection on these questions, in the context of one's own teaching circumstances,

supports critical reflection of the ways in which authority and democracy interact in LMEs.

Moreover, engagement with these questions in situations that are distinct from those explored in this research project invites opportunities for novel thinking about democratic pedagogical authority in music.

Guiding questions

One of the conclusions of this dissertation, explored primarily in Chapters 2 and 4, is that certain criticisms of formal instrumental music teaching mistakenly imply that the structure of the LME is foundationally ‘closed.’ One implication of this claim is that those particular democratic capacities that might be gained from group music performance—values such as a “deep sense of belonging,” synchronicity, and civic friendship through high stakes engagements—are devalued in comparison to those democratic values that may be more readily attainable in informal settings—autonomy and verbal deliberation, for instance. In Table 1, I offer several questions that teachers might consider when structuring their ensemble programs. These questions present possible ways of employing pedagogical authority in LMEs that are aimed at nurturing students’ democratic agency.

Table 1

Student engagements within formal musical structures

When curriculum and program planning	In what facets of my programming are students involved? Do students have a say in classroom expectations, curriculum programming, repertoire selection, or performance opportunities? If they make decisions that I do not agree with, in what ways might I be moved by their ideas?
	What knowledge is being hidden from students' view (i.e., access to the score, my uncertainties about how to interpret a particular element of the music, or advanced techniques)? Is this concealment in service of their development, or in service of merely preserving my authority as the infallible expert?
	How do I create opportunities for students to problem solve musical issues together they hear in our performance? How and to what degree am I moved by their proposed solutions?
	Do I make space for discussions of controversial topics in the music industry within my daily teaching that situate music in socio-cultural and historical contexts?
	Am I satisfied that democratic learning will have been served by student input through aggregative decisions? By the process of their participation in collective deliberations? When those deliberations result in the best possible outcome, all things considered?

In Chapters 3 and 6, I explored distinctions between several notions of authority, including: deferential, dialogic, and the authority of connection. The questions in Table 2 provide considerations of how these distinctions might look in practice. No one teaching moment can adequately capture the general approach to authority a teacher nurtures over the time a student participates in her classes and ensembles. As my participants often emphasized, there are pedagogically appropriate times to enact each of these modes of authority. This set of questions aims, simply, to clarify the type of authority one might be enacting when they respond in particular ways to students' contributions.

Table 2

Deferential/dialogic/responsive authority

When responding to students' questions and contributions:	When should I expect deference from my students, given my musical or pedagogical expertise? Do I require this deference due to my legal role as a teacher or based on the prestige of my diploma or performance background?
	When should I respond dialogically, offering factual reasoning, perhaps from music history, agreement within the expert community, or disciplinary norms as a way to justify my reasoning? In doing so, have I evoked a finality that closes future discussions?
	When should I open questions to multiple perspectives, inviting ongoing exploration and problem solving to occur within the ensemble?
	In times of high stakes performance preparation, do I limit discussions, or do class deliberations become more highly engaged and responsive?
When leading rehearsals:	In what ways do I model modes of responsiveness (changing my own views based upon student contributions, changing the reasons for my own views, or changing my view of my students themselves)? Are these responsive moves made clear to students?
	What educational or democratic goals benefit from a steered approach? In what ways might I increase the responsiveness in my steering of student learning?
	Do I employ rehearsal techniques that actively teach not only listening to fellow ensemble members, but that explore ways of responding musically to others' contributions, without first being instructed by the conductor?
	Do I respond through my gesture to what I hear, allowing my score study to be influenced by students' music making in the moment?

Finally, in Chapter 5, I suggested that the development of students' democratic voice requires substantial space for the development of deliberative capacities. However, these deliberations require structural constraints that protect students' vulnerability to un- or anti-democratic influences. Moreover, I argued that discontinuity is central to achieving autonomy-facilitation within plural educational spaces. Questions in Table 3 offers perspectives for considering how to structure the development of student voice as a means to the democratic goals teachers seek.

Table 3

Classroom deliberation for the cultivation of student voice

In classroom discussions:	What goal(s) do I seek to achieve by offering space for students to share their views?
	Whose voice (i.e. particular students, social, racial, or cultural groups, and so forth) is missing from our discussions and performances?
	Do all questions go first through the conductor, or is there a classroom culture of discussion that moves from student to student?
	Is small group work (i.e. composition and chamber performances) subject to deliberative constraints? How are these constraints formulated and enforced? Are these the same as deliberative constraints in large group settings?
When curriculum and program planning:	Are aggregative decisions made in class (i.e., voting on repertoire selection, performance opportunities, or classroom decorum) subject to pre- or post- deliberation, particularly regarding the views that might not have been acknowledged or taken seriously?
	Do I offer students opportunities to experience discontinuity from their pre-established notions of music, either from home, or from previous schooling?
	Do I offer ways for students to consent or dissent from musical engagements or classroom policies?

These questions do not aim to offer a fully comprehensive inventory of considerations regarding teachers' pedagogical authority. However, it is my hope that they provide an entry point to engage in normative reflection about the nature of our authority in our ensembles, each with our own unique context and set of ethical dilemmas. Such practices of grounded reflective equilibrium, moving from our practices, to conceptual frameworks such as are offered in this dissertation, and back again to our practices, supports a clearer vision of the ways in which music teachers' authority might promote or limit particular democratic capacities. Through this engagement, we can open clearer pathways to employ our pedagogical and musical expertise in ways that nurture students' musical and democratic capacities—capacities that can lead to a more deliberative and responsive democratic citizenry.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Call for Research Participants

Department of Integrated Studies in Education
McGill University

PARTICIPANTS NEEDED FOR RESEARCH IN DEMOCRATIC MUSIC EDUCATION PRACTICES

My name is Tessa MacLean and I am a PhD Candidate in Educational Studies at McGill University. I am looking for volunteers to take part in a study that investigates music teachers' understandings of democratic education and their educational authority as conductors of bands and/or orchestras.

To participate in this study, you must currently **conduct a band or orchestra in grades 9-12**, have at least **8 years teaching experience** in the field of instrumental music, and be interested in discussing your role as an ensemble conductor.

Your participation would involve two sessions: a one-on-one interview and a focus group discussion. The process will take approximately **3-4 hours** of your time (inclusive), with the potential for further involvement in the research process between sessions.

For more information about this study, or to sign up to participate, please contact:

Tessa MacLean (PhD Candidate, DISE, McGill University)

at

E-mail: tessa.maclea@mail.mcgill.ca

This project is supervised by Dr. Kevin McDonough and has been approved by the McGill Research Ethics Board

APPENDIX B

Correspondence

E-mail to Teacher Associations

Subject: Invitation to a research study on democratic music education

[Name of Association contact]:

I am a PhD candidate at McGill University in the Department of Integrated Studies in Education, and a former high school music teacher. I am looking to invite teachers from the [Quebec/Nova Scotia] Music Educators' Association to participate in my doctoral research project. My research investigates the potentials and limitations of secondary school band and orchestra programs to nurture students' skills for democratic citizenship. Specifically I am looking at teachers' perspectives regarding the nature of their educational authority as ensemble conductors and the sorts of dilemmas they might face when balancing their role as conductors with commitments to nurturing students' democratic capacities and political agency.

Would it be possible for you to disseminate my recruitment letter to your members? I have included the recruitment letter and my McGill ethics approval, as well the informed consent form which I will personally send to folks once they contact me with their interest to participate. I am also happy to share further information about my project with you if you have questions or concerns.

Thank you in advance for your support of this research project!

Sincerely,
Tessa MacLean

.....

Personal E-mail/Facebook message to colleagues

Hi _____,

I hope this finds you well and that the school year is wrapping up on a high note! I am gearing up for the final stage of my PhD and I am looking for volunteer music teachers to be a part of my research project on the role of band and orchestra conductors in helping students develop skills of democratic citizenship. If you are willing, and interested in the topic, I would love to talk to you about how you understand your educational authority as a wind ensemble conductor and the sorts of dilemmas you might face when balancing your work as conductor with commitments to nurturing students' democratic capacities and political agency.

I know this is a very busy time of year, so to contextualize it, your participation would consist of an hour-long interview on Teams, preferably in June, followed by a focus group conversation with 6-8 other music teachers from Eastern and Central Canada to work through some of the dilemmas we face, likely held in August. I am hoping that this process might be beneficial to you as an

opportunity to share some ideas with other music teachers about how to navigate difficult ethical dilemmas that arise in our teaching practices!

If you are interested, or know other teachers that might be interested in participating in this project, please let me know and I will send you the informed consent form. However, I want to make clear **that there is in no way pressure to participate in my study!** Finally, in case you are interested in sharing this opportunity with colleagues, please note that in order to participate, teachers must have at least 8 years teaching experience, currently conduct a band or orchestra in grade 9-12, and be generally interested in democratic teaching practices.

Thanks so much,
Tessa

APPENDIX C

Interview Questions – MacLean Dissertation

**Numbered questions will be provided to participants one day prior to their interview. Follow up questions (indicated by lower case letters) are not provided to participants, but rather are used as prompts for the researcher.*

Part 1: The music program at your school

1. Please tell me a little bit about your school's music program. What kind of ensembles and courses do you offer (credit and extracurricular)? Approximately how many students are enrolled in music at your school? How many teachers are in the music program?
2. In your view, what are the core aims of your music program?

Part 2: Your teaching approach

3. How would you describe your teaching approach?
 - a. *How does your own approach compare/contrast with the approaches of your colleagues?*
4. What are some key words that describe your ideal of student-teacher relationships?
 - a. *Can you describe some examples that illustrate when you meet those ideals and when you don't?*
5. Can you tell me a little bit about your instructional decisions? For example, can you give me examples of how you select repertoire or a theme for a concert, decide what musical styles to study in class, make choices regarding musical interpretation when score studying or during a rehearsal, or decide upon classroom rules?
 - a. *Do you alter your approach to decision making between the various courses/ensembles you teach? How so?*
 - b. *How big a role do your students play in decision making about their musical learning? (Ex. Student – teacher ratio= 0/ 100; 25/ 75; 50/ 50; 75/ 25).*
6. What are your goals for public performances (either within the school, the broader community, or at music festivals)?
 - a. *What educational value do performances hold in your view?*
 - b. *What pressures or frustrations do performances pose to your work as a music educator?*

- c. *If your band participates in music festivals, how do you feel about adjudication at these festivals?*
 - d. *How, if at all, does performance pressure influence your teaching practice?*
- 7. Would you describe your teaching approach as 'directive' or 'non-directive'? Can you describe times when do you tend to teach more directly or non-directly? Why?
 - a. *Do you see student involvement in educational decision making as important? Why or why not?*

Part 3: Educational dilemmas

- 8. Can you describe situations in which you experienced high degrees of stress as a music educator in terms of your teaching practices? What were the circumstances that caused these stressful situations?
- 9. Can you describe a situation in which you had to make a tough ethical choice regarding your students? For example, one that led you to think especially hard about what to do or one that nagged at you for a long time afterward?
 - a. *How did you finally come to a decision?*
 - b. *How did you feel after the decision was made?*
- 10. Can you think of a time when your rehearsal style as a conductor of a band or orchestra felt at odds with your educational or personal values? Please describe.

Part 4: Democratic education in the classroom

- 11. Compared to other educational goals, how important is cultivating skills of democratic citizenship to you as a music educator?
 - a. *(Other goods such as such as teaching musical or literacy skills, preparing students for the work force, or helping students develop healthy personal relationships)*
 - b. *What sort of skills do you believe students should learn through democratic education, generally speaking?*
- 12. In what ways do you attempt, consciously, to implement rehearsal strategies that you believe are 'democratic'?

- a. *How do you understand your role in this democratic teaching strategy?*
- b. *Did you feel that democratic pedagogy in your rehearsals was successful? How so?*
- c. *What factors might encourage or discourage you from implementing such a democratic strategy in the future?*

13. Is there anything else you would like to share about your experience as an instrumental music educator?

APPENDIX D

Discussion framework: Community of Inquiry

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C. Golding

Table 1 A simple framework for a process of philosophical inquiry (based on Golding 2009)

Stage of philosophical inquiry	Inquiry prompts the mediator might use	Milestones that result
1. Pre-inquiry	What do you think about the inquiry topic?	Initial, unrefined formulation of conception
2. Initiate	What is problematic about this conception? What questions does this raise?	Articulated the philosophical problem as a philosophical question
3. Suggest	What resolutions could we offer? What answers could we suggest?	Offered suggested resolutions, positions or answers
4. Reasoning and analysing	What are the implications of these potential resolutions and answers? Please elaborate	Elaborated the resolutions Drew a reasonable implication of the suggested resolutions
5. Testing and evaluating	What are the reasons for and against these resolutions and answers? What are possible examples and counter-examples? Which criteria should we employ to evaluate?	Identified reasons for and against, and examples and counter-examples Identified criteria for judging the best resolution
6. Resolving and concluding	What is the best resolution or answer? What is now problematic?	Made a reasoned judgement about which is the best resolution Identified new problems Refined formulation of initial conception

Golding, C. (2015). The Community of Inquiry: Blending philosophical and empirical research.

Studies in Philosophy and Education, 34(2), 205-216.

APPENDIX E

Normative Case Study Discussion Group Protocol

Borrowed from: <https://www.justiceinschools.org/protocols> (*Justice in Schools* 2024)

1. **What are the dilemmas in this case, and for whom?**
2. **Why are these dilemmas?**
 - A. What values or principles are at stake? Do people disagree about which values matter, which should take precedence, or how they apply in this case?
 - B. What practical and/or policy considerations are at stake? Do people disagree about which considerations are relevant, which should take precedence, or how they should be addressed in this case?
3. **What do you think should be done in this case, by whom? Why?**
4. **What have you learned from talking about this case that might apply to other ethical dilemmas in education?**
 - A. What principles or values are you thinking about for the first time, or thinking about in a new way?
 - B. What policies or practices are you thinking about for the first time or in a new way?
5. **What value is there, if any, to talking through a case like this with others?**
 - A. What did you learn about yourself?
 - B. What did you learn about others?
 - C. What did you learn about your institution, organization, or broader context?
 - D. What did you learn about the process itself?
6. **Is there anything else you want to bring up or discuss?**

APPENDIX F

Community of Inquiry Discussion Plan

Intro (5 min)

- *Thanks*
- *Describe the purpose of a Community of Inquiry and how it is different from a focus group: In a focus group we interview participants to find out what they actually think. In a Community of Inquiry we inquire together, as expert practitioners, about what we should think.*
- *Highlight the drawbacks of group think, and encourage differences in perspectives/opinions.*
- *Explain generative/ collaborative nature of the day's discussion*
- *Have participants introduce themselves. Reminder that knowledge gained here is not to be shared outside this group.*

Part 1: Data checking (15 minutes)

When we spoke in our interviews I was interested in the various ways you all described putting your pedagogical authority into action in the classroom. I gathered 4 concepts that I saw reappear across our discussions, and I have drawn, with your permission, some quotations from our interviews that I think do a great job of describing these distinctions.

I am curious to know whether you think these categories match with your understanding of the ways you use your authority in the classroom. Of course, as educators, we move in and through more or less directive modes of teaching, though some situations or leadership styles may pull more strongly from one category or another.

Do you feel that this table captures some of these distinctions, or is anything missing, misplaced, or problematic given your experiences teaching music? In cases where there are multiple understandings of the concept, does the term in fact capture these various meanings effectively or are there inherent contradictions present? (See Powerpoint for categories)

Part 2: Testing/evaluating conceptual distinctions (45 min)

As I mentioned at the beginning, we are looking to tackle a particular philosophical issue through a CoFI, rather than a more free ranging discussion typical to most focus groups. Roughly, I have formulated a philosophical question based on these notions of pedagogical authority that you described in the interviews. It reads something like the following:

When should we use more or less direct teaching methods in instrumental music classes?
How do particular educational outcomes influence our reasoning?

To tackle this rather broad question, I thought we could look at each category and discuss when you think it is best to employ this sort of authority and the educational goals you seek to achieve by using one sort of authority or another.

Go through them 1 by 1: Can you think of situations in your own practice where you adopt this approach? Why? What motivates you? What kind of situation? How does it work? What works well? Does anything go wrong?

Request clarifications of terms employed and specific examples from their own practices whenever possible.

a. Possible prompts:

- i. Repertoire choice*
- ii. Instrument selection/parts distribution*
- iii. Technical skill: hand position, embouchure, etc.*
- iv. Interpretive decisions: tempo, balance, phrasing, etc.*
- v. Classroom discussions about controversial issues in music (socio-political contexts of music)*
- vi. Decisions about where to perform as an ensemble (competitive or not).*

Of the reasons we discussed for various moves of pedagogical authority, which, if any, do you think might align with goals of democratic education?

Part 3: Case Study (1 hour)

For the last bit of our discussion, I would like to share a situation that Krista described and has allowed us to discuss together. I am going to present you the beginnings of a case study drawn as closely as possible from Krista's experience. Then, I'd like to go through a series of discussion questions that have 2 primary aims: 1. To tease out the values at stake in the case and reason about these values together 2. To consider how the philosophical unease about teacher authority described in this case might play out in different ways in music classrooms, based on your own experiences (co-creation of normative case study).

(This case does not present a clearly defined dilemma, but rather expresses a feeling of philosophical uncertainty. The goal of the CofI is to identify and clarify the goods at stake and brainstorm ways that the case might play out in the music classroom, based upon the expert practitioners' experiences. The goal is both to clarify the values present in the case, as well as potentially generate a richer NCS)

Case Prompt

The music department at Krista's school, as she describes it, was a 'band place'. Band education had historically comprised the entirety of music education. However, when Krista arrived to take over the music department, her perspectives on teaching music began to shift the music education landscape. Krista had attended this school as a student herself, and upon graduation went on to complete several performance degrees at prestigious university music programs. Moreover, she performed with highly respected bands and orchestras throughout North America. However, during her graduate degree, Krista had begun to wrestle with concerns about some of the 'old school' practices that were associated with teaching band. Concerns about authoritarian teaching methods that commanded a singular view of music, which she felt limited students' authentic musical expression and creative potential; concerns about the degree of competition involved in music learning through regional and national music festivals and the authoritarian teacher practices it encouraged; concerns about the colonial nature of large music ensemble repertoire and practices, and the fact that the students represented in her band room were always primarily middle-upper class and white; and concerns about the significant disconnect between school bands and 'real world' music making.

For the first number of years of her teaching career, Krista worked hard to transform the band program, teaching with care and open-mindedness, regularly stepping off the podium and sitting with an instrument in the ensemble, exposing her students to music from composers of diverse backgrounds, discussing the socio-political context of the music they were performing, and including

students' ideas whenever possible. All the while, she worked hard to maintain a culture of 'excellence,' preparing polished performances for local and national music festivals, as is expected in running a 'successful band program'. In fact, just prior to COVID shutdowns, after several years of abstaining from entering her ensembles in the regional music festival for philosophical reasons, Krista decided to take her senior band to the national music festival, in hopes of offering the students an experience of bonding together to refine three pieces to the absolute best of their ability, and ideally, gain recognition from her principal, who seemed all together uninterested by the active music program at his school.

In order to prepare for this competition, the senior concert band devoted nearly the entire semester to perfecting the three pieces they were to perform. The music learning that term was almost entirely conductor-led, with criteria for musical excellence and efficiency at the forefront. While she continued to teach with care and openness in preparing for festival, she felt she was having to fight hard against the role of the "sage on the stage." When it came to festival time, the senior concert band performed at an extremely high level, receiving a Gold standing.

Upon return to school, the principal gave little recognition of the success of the ensemble—not a huge shock to Krista. However, what *was* surprising was the effect the experience had on her band students: "We really felt like it was a life-changing experience and we felt very empowered. We worked really hard and dug into these three pieces, you know, and did this really amazing thing. And they'll never forget that feeling. So that was a philosophical crisis of like ohh, that's not a bad thing, like that was a positive experience."

Despite her efforts and the success of the band program, Krista's concerns regarding the authoritarian nature of concert band education were not greatly assuaged. Thus, when Krista was offered a position of curriculum consultant in her province, she responded to these feelings of philosophical unease about band education by developing a curriculum for a popular music stream within the province. Upon the inclusion of the popular music performance curriculum (PMP), she ran her school music program with two distinct streams – popular music and instrumental music (band). She did this with significant hesitation though, as she feared that the addition of the new stream may negatively impact the enrollment in the band program. However, while many band kids (typically high achieving students, many of whom studied music outside of school) also joined the PMP classes, the new classes additionally drew from a wider school population, making music appealing and accessible to a greater diversity of students and increasing the overall enrollment in the music department.

In PMP, Krista adopted a different approach to teaching, stepping far back from the centre of the learning process to allow her students to explore on their own or in groups, providing suggestions and guidance only when necessary. The new program thrived, with several of the popular music ensembles performing regularly at local music venues in the city. Krista's teaching philosophy was further influenced by this new teaching environment: "I am forever changed by seeing the impact of giving students space to make their own music. Students in my pop music classes transform into whole other human beings all of the time, not just like once every 10 years. It is infectious excitement and it's completely intrinsic...like I never have to motivate them...ever."

In contrast to her hands-off instruction in her popular music classes, Krista felt increasingly that the teacher directed nature of the instrumental music stream undermined the possibility of students realizing their authentic musical expression and confined the ways in which she taught music, forcing a didactic, 'teaching from command' approach which felt inauthentic to her as an educator. Moreover, though the music festival repertoire lists were improving, she felt strongly that band education was "literally drowning in colonialism."

However, Krista was still conflicted. The experience she and her students had through their deeply engaged preparation for music festival was undeniable and was not easily captured by other

events she has held since then. What was this sense of empowerment that was so strongly felt by her senior band, despite the high degree of control exerted in the learning process? As she considers this, she wonders...“Maybe that is what that is. Like, maybe that's what band is like. Maybe we're trying too hard to transform this vehicle when actually they just wanna play...they just want to be the third clarinet. They just want you to rehearse and that's not to say that you don't have to do anything creative, but sometimes I think that we're trying a little too hard to morph it into something. I wonder sometimes if we just embrace band for what it is...”

Questions: (Adapted from Levinson's discussion protocol).

- What values or principles are at stake in this case so far? For Krista? For her students?
- Which values ought to take precedence?
- What practical and/or policy considerations are at stake? Which should take precedence?
- From your own experience, what sorts of difficult decisions might Krista now face given her uncertainty about the ways in which she might exert her authority?
- What have you learned from talking about this case that might apply to other ethical dilemmas in education?
 - What principles or values are you thinking about for the first time, or thinking about in a new way?
 - What policies or practices are you thinking about for the first time or in a new way?
- What value is there, if any, to talking through a case like this with others?
- Is there anything else you would like to bring up or discuss?