



THE IMAGE OF GOD:

A STUDY IN THE THEOLOGY OF SAINT AUGUSTINE

by

Alexander Blair McPherson, B.A., B.D.

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of  
Graduate Studies and Research in partial  
fulfilment of the requirements for the  
degree of Master of Sacred Theology.

Faculty of Divinity,  
McGill University,  
Montreal.

April 1961

## PREFACE

This thesis is a study of reason and faith as they meet in St. Augustine's writings on the subject of the image of God. Augustine pioneered in a field of study which still remains the most fruitful ground of theological research. A study of the concept of man as the image of God involves the Christian thinker in a two-sided search for truth. On the one side, the philosophic mind raises the question: what is the nature of man as he is in himself? In answering this question it is necessary to apply every insight of psychology and philosophy at our command. The study of the nature of man leads to the ultimate questions of metaphysics, or as it is better named, ontology.<sup>1</sup> As Paul Tillich puts it, "this word 'is' hides the riddle of all riddles, the mystery that there is anything at all."<sup>2</sup>

On the other side, for the Christian philosopher there arises the question: how is the personal being of man related to the ground of all being? In coming to grips with the concept of man as the image of God, it is necessary to relate all the insights of reason with the Biblical revelation of God as personal being. The categories of reason, therefore, meet the truths of Biblical revelation at the point where the Christian thinker takes seriously the Scriptural teaching that man is made in the image of God. In Augustine we find the first significant attempt at a synthesis between

reason and the Christian faith, as they meet on the ground of human nature. This thesis deals with the issues involved in a study of the idea of the image of God and estimates the extent to which Augustine contributed to the solution of these problems.



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## SUMMARY

At his conversion, Augustine accepted a system of rational categories with which he believed himself capable of gaining insight into the true nature of reality. At the same time, he considered that God had enabled him to transfer his affections from the inferior things, which are desired through the senses, to those spiritual things which are loved with the pure rational mind.

Our first chapter examines the philosophical system which almost leads Augustine to teach that the image of God can be found in man apart from his relationship to God. In De Trinitate the categories of his reason require him to discover the image in that part of the human personality which is pure spiritual substance. Augustine's observation of the process of sense perception provides the analogy which enables him to conceive of a self-contained thought activity within the pure intellectual substance of the individual mind. In this thought activity he finds a trinity of memory, understanding and love, which is the image of the divine Trinity.

At the same time, we see how Augustine teaches that the image of God cannot exist in man apart from his contact with God. He argues that the image of God exists in man only because God is always present to, and impressing his form upon, the human mind. God's image in man, then, turns out to be a

capacity for remembering, understanding and loving God. It is a capacity, however, which is given by God, and the image is restored in man only insofar as God gives man the capacity to love pure spiritual things.

In the second chapter we consider how Augustine comes to the image of God passages in the Bible with the categories of his thought already established. Augustine distinguishes the individual from his social unit, to arrive at his concept of the image of God in the individual man. He differentiates between body and mind on the basis of substance and function, to come to his doctrine of the image of God in the intellectual soul. Augustine's most basic theological-philosophical concept - which distinguishes God from man, Creator from creature, in the belief that Divinity means changelessness - brings him to teach that the image of God in man is entirely dependent upon the gift of love which God gives through the Holy Spirit. Finally, his philosophical use of the idea of substance and relation brings him to define love as a substance.

In conclusion, it is seen that the Biblical doctrine of the image of God impresses itself sufficiently on Augustine to keep him from losing sight of its central purpose. His rational categories, however, often lead him away from the original meaning of the concept of the image of God. In particular, his failure to see the personal-impersonal category limits his ability to appreciate fully the truths of Biblical religion.

## INTRODUCTION

The important place Saint Augustine holds in the development of Christian thought needs little proof. He is considered the dominating influence in the development of piety and dogma from the fifth century to the Reformation.<sup>3</sup> More important for us, however, is the fact that he is considered to be the first great Christian teacher to deal with the nature of man according to the thought forms of the Western world.<sup>4</sup> In Augustine, a heritage of Greek philosophical thought comes to grips with the Christian religion. Augustine's great mind and unified personality make his works of lasting influence and power. There is virtually no problem of theology or philosophy which was outside the scope of his mental vision.

Aurelius Augustine<sup>5</sup> came into the stream of Christian history in a most remarkable way. Born in Tagaste, Roman North Africa, in 354, he was the son of a Christian mother and a pagan Roman father. Early in life he showed an aptitude for learning, although he rebelled against the study of Greek. At seventeen he was sent to Carthage for education in a school of rhetoric. While in Carthage he made his way into the world of pleasures and dissipation he found there. It was also during this time that he entered into a relationship with the mistress to whom he remained faithful for some fourteen years. She was the mother of his son Adeodatus. During this period,

at age nineteen Augustine read Cicero's Hortensius and set out thereafter on his search for a satisfying philosophy of life. His pilgrimage led through Manichaeism, scepticism and finally he discovered Platonism during his late twenties while he was making his final movement toward Christianity.

Any attempt to understand the theology of Augustine has to begin with his interpretation of his own experience. The period of his conversion during his thirty-first and thirty-second years is related to us in The Confessions.<sup>6</sup> Looking back upon his experience, Augustine was aware of two main developments in his personal life. One constant theme in The Confessions tells how Augustine was guided in an intellectual pursuit of truth. His intellectual conversion is described for us as an awakening or discovery in which he began to see everything clearly for the first time. He tells how insight came as the culmination of a long quest for a satisfying explanation of reality. Augustine was certain that he had seen a vision of pure truth which left behind an intellectual certainty that he never lost.<sup>7</sup> Soon after his intellectual conversion, there came an emotional transformation in which the moral conflict of his rebellious and passionate inner life was resolved. Following his own analysis we shall deal with the intellectual and religious conversions separately.

The experience of intellectual certainty which came at the climax of his years of searching, is described by Augustine

as a vision of truth. "And I entered (into the inward self), and with the eye of my soul (such as it was) saw above the same eye of my soul, above my mind, the Unchangeable Light."<sup>8</sup> The eye of the soul in Augustinian thought is the intellectual understanding by which man perceives truths which are not available through the senses. The unchangeable light spoken of here is truth in its ultimate philosophical sense. Augustine conceived of truth as the eternal ground of all things. Truth sheds its light upon the minds of men in order that they may understand. Here, however, Augustine believes that he has seen a glimpse of the truth itself and not merely a reflection of its light.

Having once seen this glimpse of true reality, Augustine never again doubted that such a direct vision of truth was possible. In our study of De Trinitate we shall find that this hope of seeing pure eternal and spiritual reality with the eye of the mind remains the constant certainty and goal of his life. In anticipation of this discovery we may note that at one moment he seems to consider that the vision of truth is a latent possibility for all minds.<sup>9</sup> At other times, however, he admits that such visions of truth are the lot of only a few people.<sup>10</sup>

Augustine was under no illusion that he, or any other mortal, could remain long in this high experience of discovery. After having seen a glimpse of God he soon found

himself being turned away from the vision by the impurities which cluttered up his mind. He describes how he was not able to enjoy his vision of God for long because, as he puts it, he was, "presently torn away from Thee by mine own weight, sinking with grief into these inferior things."<sup>11</sup> To the end of his days Augustine believed that it was possible for the human mind to behold God by direct vision of the truth. However, the perversion of the will, by which the mind is cluttered up with inferior things, always prevents us from having more than a glimpse of God in this life. Nevertheless, once man has had a glimpse of truth there is an impression which remains indelibly impressed upon the mind. Having once seen truth the certainty that intellectual vision is possible always remains.<sup>12</sup>

In confessing his religious experience it seemed to Augustine that his conversion had been mainly a change of the direction in which his affections now drew him. His powerful feelings ceased to move him toward material and temporal things which are loved through the senses. Instead he found, after his conversion, that he loved spiritual and eternal things and was now drawn toward them as he had not been before. He describes the climax of his conversion as the discovery that, having seen the truth, he had also seen God. At the same time as he had seen God, Augustine believed that he now loved the true God. "And I marvelled that I now loved Thee, and no phantasm instead of Thee."<sup>13</sup>



Augustine's religious conversion was also a movement into the Church and an acceptance of its authority. It is generally agreed that from childhood he had been emotionally conditioned in favor of Christianity. His early contact with Christianity as a way of thought had disappointed him at a time when he was greatly concerned to be intellectually respectable. The search for a satisfying theistic explanation of reality which followed his first approach to the Bible was in some measure an attempt to find an alternative to the Christian faith. At the same time, however, it seems evident that none of the philosophies he investigated during his period of intellectual searching were satisfying, except as they contributed to his search for an emotionally fulfilling philosophy of life. Christianity had always been available as a solution to his problems but his natural rebelliousness and honest intellectual concern for truth held him from it.<sup>14</sup>

One thing seems certain, the persons who represented Christianity to the searching young man were among the most attractive influences in his early life. After the intellectual obstacles had been removed, Augustine found himself moving quickly into an acceptance of the Christian faith.

The extent to which the Church authority, which Augustine accepted, restricted or distorted the power of his reason is a matter of dispute. Many commentators decry the influence of Catholicism upon his thought. There is no doubt that, in order to support the existing dogmas of the

Church, Augustine moved into many logical inconsistencies.<sup>15</sup>  
 There is little doubt, too, that his desire to be orthodox colored his thinking as he interpreted his own religious experiences.<sup>16</sup> It must be admitted that these are the judgments of those who do not accept the authority of the ecclesiastical system on which such dogmas stood. Augustine, himself, considered that each doctrine he accepted from the Church was necessary to purify his reason.

It is, also, a valid judgment to say that Augustine never did overcome the conflict between faith and reason.<sup>17</sup> However, no one was more aware of the dilemma in which the searcher for truth finds himself than Augustine. The characteristic Augustinian attitude is expressed in the well known conclusion, "Ergo intellige, ut credas: crede, ut intelligas."<sup>18</sup> It is doubtful if Augustine believed it possible, in this life, to get beyond this paradox in which faith and reason are in constant tension while man seeks for ultimate truth. His only solution to the problem was an attempt to prove that reason is free and able to exercise its full powers only when it stands on the foundation of insight which faith brings.<sup>19</sup> Faith, on the other hand, must be constantly demonstrated by reason in order that it may be understood and accepted by rational men.

Augustine himself did not consider that in accepting the authority of the Church he gave up his power and freedom to reason.<sup>20</sup> It is readily admitted that Augustine was often

unsatisfied with the synthesis he had made between faith and reason. However, it is also agreed that the important consideration for the interpreter of Augustine is to recognize that the tension between faith and reason is always found to be contained within his unified and purposeful personality.<sup>21</sup> Augustine accepted doctrines from his heritage of philosophy as well as from Christianity. These philosophic concepts became the fundamental certainties of his life. Augustine's philosophy can be seen making its impression upon his faith just as surely as the dogmas of the Church influenced his reasoning.

It is true that the interpreter of Augustine can trace out two systems of thought in Augustine's writings.<sup>22</sup> One stream of his thought develops a complete ecclesiastical system in which the authority and institution of the Church are supported and justified. The other stream of thought deals with man's personal relationships with God. We shall find ourselves moving almost entirely within this second system of thought during this study. These are not, however, mutually exclusive systems. The two streams of thought are constantly converging at vital points. It is not possible, as we shall see, to move entirely within one system of Augustinian thought without acknowledging the essential unity of his mind at the points where the two systems meet.

The significance of Augustine today, then, does not lie so much in the solutions he has given to the problems of

theology as it does in the fact that he saw the problems so clearly. His greatest service to Christian theology was his ability to recognize the problems which the philosophic Western mind raised for the Christian thinker. Moreover, his willingness and determination to grapple with the intellectual problems which stood between him and the truth makes his work of inestimable value to Christian theology. Augustine was too personally involved in the search for truth to accept solutions merely for the sake of being consistent. His value lies as much in the inconsistencies he uncovered as the syntheses he has made. The most helpful attitude with which we can approach a study of Augustine is expressed by one commentator thus: "What was a burning personal problem for Augustine was at the same time a prime intellectual problem of the Christian religion."<sup>23</sup>

Whatever the explanation, the religious conversion of Augustine had some very practical consequences. After a period of adjustment, he entered into a chaste, celibate and moral life accepting and supporting fully the claims which the Church made upon him. While we cannot consider that Augustine's withdrawal from the worldly obligations he owed to his mistress and his son was morally right, there is no doubt he himself found that his movement out of the world had resolved the emotional conflicts of his inner life. The great sense of relief with which Augustine found himself able at last to accept the faith his mother had urged upon him is never

better expressed than in his famous words: "Thou hast formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee."<sup>24</sup>

Augustine, then, was certain that he had found in Christian faith the means whereby to purify his mind in order that by his intellectual vision he might one day see God face to face. After his conversion, the quest of his life was not only a search for pure intellectual truth and the ground of all reality; but Augustine also desired to behold and contemplate the personal God who is the ultimate truth.<sup>25</sup> In the meantime he applied all the power of his reason to convince others of the value of faith.

Returning now to his intellectual quest, we shall outline briefly the philosophical development of Augustine's mind. Augustine himself traces his desire for a satisfying vision of reality to the Hortensius of Cicero. In this book, which was to be read merely as an exercise in rhetoric, he found a concept of philosophy which struck a responsive chord within him. The Hortensius, he says, "inflamed" him with the love of wisdom.<sup>26</sup> The word inflamed (Latin accendebant) here is an indication of the passion with which he sought after an intellectually and emotionally satisfying scheme of thought. Cicero's teaching that all desire blessedness became one of the certainties of Augustine's philosophy.<sup>27</sup> The belief that there is a desire for blessedness implanted in every human being was self-evident so far as Augustine was concerned since

it was so true to his own experience.

Augustine's quest for a satisfying explanation of life led him from the Hortensius to the Scriptures. At that time, however, they repelled him by their seeming crudity and lowliness of style.<sup>28</sup> As he later saw it, he was still too proud to accept the humble teachings of Scripture. It happened that the Manichaeian system of thought was available to him as an alternative to the Bible. At first it seemed to offer him a full theistic explanation of the universe. Using the eternal contrast between light and darkness, the Manichaeians were able to develop a comprehensive system of thought.<sup>29</sup> However, the materialistic concepts of the system failed to answer many difficult problems. In particular, its failure to give an adequate explanation of evil disappointed Augustine. Between 383 and 386 he was already in the process of freeing himself from the Manichaeian teaching.<sup>30</sup>

From Manichaeism Augustine moved toward scepticism since, as he relates, "For I was half inclined to believe that those philosophers whom they call 'Academics' were more sagacious than the rest, in that they held that we ought to doubt everything, and ruled that man had not the power of comprehending any truth."<sup>31</sup> Two influences overcame his scepticism. One was the preaching of Ambrose in Milan who gave Augustine a new insight into Scripture with his allegorical interpretation. At the same time, Ambrose convinced the young searcher that Christianity could be intellectually

respectable.<sup>32</sup> The other influence was Augustine's discovery of Platonic philosophy.

Platonic thought came to Augustine in Latin translations. He tells us that he read, "certain books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin."<sup>33</sup> Although he does not name the works, it seems relatively certain that they were the works of Plotinus and/or some of the works of Porphyry.<sup>34</sup> In any case, Plotinus is generally credited with bringing Augustine to the way of introspection. These interpreters of Platonic thought turned Augustine's attention inward upon himself. Augustine's brilliant analytical mind soon saw introspection as a way to truth and it led him to his most important philosophic concept. The idea of pure spiritual substance shed a new light upon the whole world of thought and experience for him.

Once having grasped the concept of pure immaterial substance, Augustine had a new approach to reality. The idea of spiritual substance was the weapon he needed in order to refute the Manichaeans.<sup>35</sup> The problem of evil had beset him ever since his Manichaean days. Even after he had rejected the Manichaean system as a whole, he still retained the concept that evil was some kind of "eternal, infinite, and material substance, standing in contraposition to God."<sup>36</sup> The breakthrough came when he began to see the distinction between physical substance and spiritual substance. He describes the light he saw as, "Not this common light, which all flesh may

look upon, nor, as it were, a greater one of the same kind." That is to say, the nature of the truth which gave him insight could not be described as material in any sense. The light which Augustine saw is not the kind of light which is seen with the physical eyes or mediated through the senses. It is the light of intellectual insight.

Augustine goes on to distinguish intellectual light from physical light further by describing its relation to his mind. He says, "Nor was it above my mind as oil is above water, nor as heaven above earth; but above it was, because it made me, and I below it, because I was made by it." Augustine is describing a relationship with eternal things which cannot be explained by an analogy found in anything material. The relation of the supreme light to the mind is the relation of the Creator to his creation. The above and below are not the above and below of physical height and depth. They are the above of the Creator and the below of the creature.

Nor can the spiritual substance which Augustine discovered be measured according to the categories of space. He found himself asking, "Is Truth, therefore, nothing because it is neither diffused through space, finite, nor infinite?" The answer which came to him finally was that God defies the descriptions and categories by which we judge material things in space. God cried to him and said, "Yea, verily, I AM THAT I AM."



The great certainty which remained with him as he turned from his vision of truth, then, was that God was spiritual substance and that he himself had seen God. Augustine was sure that he had met God in his innermost self. God had come to him where physical sense experience is not only unnecessary but is a hindrance to true communication. He concludes the passage on the vision with these words: "And I heard this, as things are heard in the heart, nor was there room for doubt; and I should more readily doubt that I live than that Truth is not, which is 'clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.'<sup>37</sup>"

In modern terms we would say that for a little while Augustine had known full communion with God. He had known high fidelity communication without the distortion which sense experience causes.

Already we have come upon the most important category in Augustinian thought. Augustine sees two worlds of experience and two levels of communication with those worlds. The world of the spirit is to be judged and measured by categories of thought which are distinctly different from those we use for material things. The world of corporeal things is to be considered according to the categories of space, time, weight and number. Communication in the spiritual world is the direct and intuitive experience of pure spiritual substance. Communication with the material world is through the eyes and ears of the body, that is, through sensory perception.

Besides the concept of pure spiritual substance, there are at least four other ideas running through De Trinitate which reveal Augustine's agreement with Platonic philosophy. We mention first his concept of reason as a judge of values. Reason, Augustine believes, sees reality as consisting of various levels of substance. Without hesitation, and with a sense of certainty, reason classifies these substances one above the other. Substances on the higher level are not necessarily morally better but they are superior and "to be preferred." The method which Augustine follows as he searches for ultimate truth is what has been called the Neo-Platonic ascent. By following the reason as it moves upward from the lowest to the highest substance, the mind arrives finally at pure spiritual substance.<sup>38</sup>

Secondly, and closely related to the first concept of reason, is the idea of forms. Augustine's use of the concept of form is definitely related to the Platonic teaching about universal ideas. Augustine believed that the system of values which he found in his mind was a reflection of the universal scheme of values.<sup>39</sup> While Augustine uses the terms form and nature, rather than idea, there is evidence all through his work that he accepts the Platonic system as a description of reality.<sup>40</sup>

Thirdly, Augustine's concept of good and evil follows from his acceptance of the Platonic teaching about the

relation between the universal and the particular. As in Platonic philosophy, the universal in Augustinian thought is more real than the particular. The particular is real and has being insofar as it participates in the universal from which it has been made. It is this understanding of reality that enabled Augustine to solve the problem of evil. For him things are good according as they participate in the good itself. Evil, on the other hand, is non-being. A thing ceases to exist when it loses the participation of God. Things are good, then, insofar as they share in God's being and evil insofar as they cease to participate in God.<sup>41</sup>

Fourthly, Augustine accepted the way of introspection as the means to discover the true reality above the mind.<sup>42</sup> The followers of Plato, Plotinus in particular, had gone far in emphasizing the superiority of the world of ideas and in disdaining the world of sense experience. Augustine came to accept this distinction between that which is received through the senses and that which is received through the intellect as the fundamental difference between the lower and the higher way to the good life. Moreover he fully agreed with the Platonists that the knowledge of self is the surest way to truth.<sup>43</sup>

A final word on his relationship with the Greek philosophers shows his own attitude toward them. He was most grateful for having read the Platonists before he returned to the Bible after his first disappointing encounter

with it.<sup>44</sup> As we shall see, the philosophic categories by which he interpreted the Bible were very much Platonic. Throughout his writings many references can be found to show his high regard for Platonic thought, although he did not have the same regard for all philosophers. One of the most explicit references is this: "If those who are called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, have said aught that is true and in harmony with our faith, we are not only not to shrink from it, but to claim it for our own use from those who have unlawful possession of it."<sup>45</sup> This attitude is true to Augustine's thought in general. In De Trinitate he goes out of his way to condemn the suspended judgments of the Academics.<sup>46</sup> Moreover he constantly teaches that the philosophers are in danger of the ultimate sin which is becoming puffed up with the importance of their own intellectual accomplishments.<sup>47</sup>

The heritage on which Augustine builds his religious teaching is more difficult to estimate than is the source of his philosophy. Much of what he tells us in his Confessions is to be understood against the background of the Manichaeic system of thought. While he is harsh in his rejection of the Manichees, there is little doubt that they had greatly stimulated him. There was sufficient truth in their thought to send Augustine in search of a weapon with which to refute them. As we have already seen, his great concept of pure spirit can only be well understood as a better solution to the problem

of evil than that which the Manichees had offered.

In a positive sense, the main religious influences during his early life were the persons who mediated Christianity to him. Most important among them were his mother Monnica,<sup>48</sup> Ambrose the Bishop of Milan, Simplicianus the Priest and an unknown child.<sup>49</sup>

Augustine's relationship to the other early teachers of the Church is, on the whole, remote. So far as his main theological treatise De Trinitate is concerned, even the Catholic writer Bourke sees almost no direct influence from either Greek or Latin fathers.<sup>50</sup> The main lines of the doctrine of the Trinity had, however, already been settled at the Council of Constantinople in 381 A.D.<sup>51</sup> Consequently, we find Augustine accepting the doctrine of the Trinity without question and bending all his efforts to support it.

In most other matters, on the other hand, Augustine is making theological history. He is sometimes considered to be the first Christian philosopher.<sup>52</sup> He is also thought to be the first teacher of Christian anthropology.<sup>53</sup> His influence on the religious life of the whole Western Church was very great and Harnack calls him the reformer of Western piety.<sup>54</sup> Augustine himself was much too great a personality to be greatly influenced by tradition and Harnack's estimate is this: "We do not require to prove that, for a man with such a personality, all that tradition offered him could only serve as material and means, that he only accepted in order

to work it into the shape that suited him."<sup>55</sup>

The first reactions Augustine had to Scripture seem to have been entirely negative.<sup>56</sup> When he returned to the Bible the second time, however, he became a most ardent expounder of Scripture. Armed with the allegorical methods of Ambrose and the categories of Platonic philosophy, Augustine found that the Bible opened out before him. We shall not attempt to understand Augustine's use of the Bible here since our whole second chapter will be devoted to that purpose. We must note, though, that his use of Scripture is one of the most important aspects of his teaching. Again we quote Harnack who estimates that "no Western theologian before him had lived so much in Scripture, or taken so much from it as he."<sup>57</sup> Constantly Augustine quotes from and points to the Bible as one of the sure foundations on which his theology stands.

NOTES ON PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION

- 1 Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, p.8. Our indebtedness to this book will be obvious throughout this preface.
- 2 Tillich, p.6.
- 3 Adolph Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. James Millar, from the third German Edition, London: Williams and Norgate, 1898, Vol. V, p.3.
- 4 cf. J. F. Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine, London: Methuen, Third Edition 1923, p.308.
- 5 Traditionally this has been his name. However, Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine's Quest of Wisdom, Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1945, p.3 (n.6) proves there is no evidence that he was given any other name than Augustine. We shall refer to him simply as Augustine.
- 6 See the seventh and eighth books of The Confessions. Whether or not his conversion took place as it is described in The Confessions is quite irrelevant to us in this chapter. His own interpretation of his experience is, in any case, the best guide to understanding the workings of his mind.  
cf. Arthur Cushman McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933, Vol. II, p.71 who criticizes the Confessions for being a misleading presentation of Augustine's experience.  
cf. John Burnaby, Amor Dei, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938, p.29 who argues that all such criticism is "not proven."
- 7 Burnaby, p.31; A.D. Nock, Conversion, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933, p.266; Bourke has entitled his book Augustine's Quest of Wisdom to indicate the importance of the intellectual search in the life of Augustine.

8

The Confessions VII,x,16. We quote regularly from The Confessions of St. Augustine, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, trans. J.G. Pilkington, Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1876. The Confessions hereafter will be abbreviated Conf. (Latin Confessionum).

9

On the Trinity VIII,ii,3. Except where indicated otherwise we quote from On the Trinity, The Works of Aurelius Augustine, ed. Marcus Dods, trans. A.W. Hadden, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1873, Vol.VII. We shall refer to this volume so frequently that we shall give only the book, chapter and section, thus: VIII,ii,3.  
See also Letter IV,2.

10

XII, xiv,23, "to attain these visions of truth with the eye of the mind is the lot of few."

11

Conf. VII, xvii,23.

12

XII, xiv,23 "yet this transient thought of a thing not transitory is committed to memory through the instruction by which the mind is taught."

13

Conf. VII, xvii,23.

14

Nock, p.262 "He moved from it (Christianity) or towards it, with as it were a subconscious conviction that he would end in it if and when he could find it intellectually adequate." Bourke, p.6; and Roy W. Battenhouse, A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, art. "The Life of St. Augustine" ed. Roy W. Battenhouse, New York: Oxford University Press, 1955 p.24-25 both agree that Augustine was held from Christianity by his intellectual difficulties.

15

cf. Martin Werner, The Formation of Christian Dogma, trans. S.G.F. Brandon, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957, p.306f "It is evident from Augustine's inner development that his conception of Christianity, when seen as a whole, ruined its inner unity by burdening it beyond measure with contradictions." and Harnack, p.101.



- 16 McGiffert, p.71 and Harnack, p.4. "He remained burdened by the rubbish of ecclesiastical tradition."
- 17 Werner, p.306.
- 18 Sermon XLIII,vii,9; cf. Daniel D. Williams, A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, art. "The Significance of St. Augustine Today."
- 19 II,xvii,28. Here Augustine is teaching that the rock of the Church is the foundation on which men must stand to see the real form of God in Christ. Enchiridion V; "We begin by faith, and are made perfect by sight. This also is the sum of the whole body of doctrine."
- 20 M. C. D'Arcy, A Monument to Saint Augustine, London: Sheed and Ward, 1930, p.161. This Catholic writer concludes after presenting several quotations from various Augustinian works, "These quotations show that it is false to think that Augustine means to impoverish philosophy at the expense of faith." Williams, p.6. A non-Catholic writer explains, "This priority of faith does not mean that all questions are answered dogmatically before we reason about them. Rather, faith means that we lay hold upon the positive reality of our existence and our relationship to God."
- 21 Williams, p.7.  
Harnack, p.102.
- 22 Harnack, p.101.
- 23 Robert E. Cushman, art. "Faith and Reason" in A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, p.288.
- 24 Conf. I,i,I.
- 25 I,viii,17; II,xvii,28; IV,xviii,24.
- 26 Conf. III,iv,8; cf. VIII,vii,17.

- 27 XIII,iv,7 & 8; cf. XIV, xix,25.
- 28 Conf. III,v,9.
- 29 See A. B. Bevan, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, VIII, art. "Manichaeism", p.397b.
- 30 Conf. V,x,19; cf. Bourke, p.48.
- 31 Conf. V,x,19.
- 32 Conf. V,xiv,24; cf. Nock, p.264; Bourke, p.50f; Battenhouse, p.29.
- 33 Conf. VII,ix,13.
- 34 Bourke, p.54 believes these works were translated by the priest Victorinus.  
cf. pp.29-31.
- 35 Conf. V,xiv,25.
- 36 This is Bourke's description p.48.
- 37 Conf. VII,x,16; cf. De. Trin. I,i,2.  
All quotations in this paragraph are from the same passage.
- 38 This process of discovery is followed by Augustine in the eleventh and twelfth books of the De Trinitate.  
cf. also Conf. VII and Burnaby, p.31.
- 39 See esp. Conf. VII, xvii,23.
- 40 e.g.XII,ii,2.  
cf. Cushman, p.293; Bourke, 54.

- 41 Conf. VII,xi,17; cf. Burnaby, p.37.
- 42 Conf. VII,x,16; Conf. VII,xx,26.
- 43 X,ix,12. Here Augustine quotes the proverb "know thyself" with approval; Bourke, p.55f.; Burnaby, p.31.
- 44 Conf. VII,xx,26.
- 45 On Christian Doctrine II,xi,61.  
cf. Cushman, p.291.
- 46 XV,xii,21.
- 47 I,i,1.
- 48 A.D. Nock, p.266 considers that the religious atmosphere of his childhood was the most important influence in bringing about his conversion.
- 49 Conf. VIII,i,1.
- 50 p.206.
- 51 A book on the Trinity had also been written by Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 356-360).
- 52 So Bourke, Pref. viii.  
cf. McGiffert, p.72, "philosophical thinker of high rank and he made important contributions to psychology."
- 53 Bethune-Baker, p.308, "the first Christian teacher who dealt with anthropology."
- 54 E. Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947, pp.84,121 traces the classical doctrine of the Primitive State and the Fall to Augustine.

- 54 Harnack, p.4.
- 55 p.66.
- 56 See above p.10.
- 57 p.98; cf. p. 103.

# I

## THE IMAGE OF GOD IN AUGUSTINE'S DE TRINITATE

Turning now to an examination of Augustine's own thought, our method of research will be as follows: We shall be analyzing in detail his major theological work, De Trinitate. It is possible to confine our attention almost entirely to this treatise for two reasons. The main justification for using De Trinitate in this study is that it is the only one of Augustine's writings where he considers the image of God idea in any detail. Several of his other works have reference to the image which, of course, will be considered. Nevertheless, almost all the pertinent information can be found only in De Trinitate. Our second reason for turning to this treatise is that it is a work of his maturity.<sup>1</sup> We find in De Trinitate the consistency of a settled thinker and it is possible, for the most part, to interpret his words according to their meaning in various other references within the work itself.<sup>2</sup>

The nature and importance of De Trinitate has been much misunderstood. Some have considered it a mere statement of doctrine and found in it simply an attempt to clarify the doctrine of the Trinity.<sup>3</sup> Harnack barely mentions the treatise among the important works of Augustine. Even though he is fully aware of the great importance of Augustine's piety, he does not apparently see that De Trinitate is one of the

richest sources for the study of Augustine's religion.<sup>4</sup>

Harnack does not even consider it necessary<sup>5</sup> to go very deeply into Augustine's trinitarian speculations. Such an interpretation, of course, is possible since ostensibly De Trinitate is a theological treatise on the nature of the Trinity.

Actually, however, the doctrine of the Trinity is considered<sup>6</sup> by Augustine to be an already established doctrine. His intention in De Trinitate is to prove to those of philosophic mind that the doctrine of the Trinity is a necessary guide to their reason.

The unique contribution of De Trinitate follows from the fact that Augustine turned toward his inner self in order to find the purest analogy to the Trinity. As he proceeds toward his goal, the treatise becomes an intensely personal expression of his own religion. Scripture taught Augustine that man was made after the image of God. The Platonists taught him that the way to truth was by searching within. The doctrine of the Trinity taught that God was three persons in one substance, therefore Augustine went searching for a trinity within the highest substance of his innermost being. The trinity of the inner man, which Augustine found, did not satisfy his longing to see God face to face.<sup>7</sup> He was satisfied, however, that insofar as it is possible to do so, he had found the place where the image of God in man resides.

In actual practice, then, Augustine deals with the

ultimate questions which are raised by the idea that man is made in the image of God. He attempted to discover not only what man is in himself but what man is in his relationship to God. He asked, and attempted to answer, the question of how man is related to the ground of all being. At the same time, he had to deal with the question of how man, as a person, is related to God.

Augustine's own search for ultimate truth made it necessary for him to make a synthesis between his reason and his faith. His intention in De Trinitate is stated as a matter of proving to the sceptics that he is not making excuses for his faith. He intends to lead the philosophers to "find by actual trial, both that the highest good (summum bonum) is that which is discerned by the most purified minds, and that for this reason it cannot be discerned or understood by themselves, because the eye of the human mind, being weak, is dazzled in that so transcendent light, unless it be invigorated by the nourishment of the righteousness of faith."<sup>8</sup>

In short, Augustine means to prove that the faith which he professes is essential to reason, in order that truth may be seen. This face to face encounter with reason has led one interpreter to estimate that De Trinitate is the "settlement of his account with Platonist anthropology and ethics as well as with Platonist theology."<sup>9</sup> Certainly this estimate is valid. However, De Trinitate is much more

than an intellectual approach to the faith of the Church. We agree with E. Brunner that the more basic question in the treatise is this: How is the personal being of God related to the personal being of man?<sup>10</sup>

The deeply personal nature of De Trinitate, then, is the note on which we begin. In many ways Augustine was the first Christian explorer of the inner self<sup>11</sup> and its relation to God. While he never was satisfied with De Trinitate as a finished product, in his Retractions he does not change any of its major teachings.<sup>12</sup> We shall consider our study now a search for the mind of Augustine as he sees the relationship between man and God.

#### 1. The Nature of Reason

We must first understand what reason means to Augustine. Above all, we must understand what he considers it possible for reason to do. We begin with this analysis of his concept of reason, since according to his own account in the Confessions the intellectual awakening preceded his rediscovery of faith.<sup>13</sup> Our method of approaching his thought, therefore, will be to trace his philosophical process as far as we are able and then to see how faith bears upon it. While it is true that he begins with authority and proceeds to reason in De Trinitate, we are convinced that to understand him we must move in the other direction. We shall see that in actual practice faith becomes a purifying guide to reason. At the point where man meets God face to face,



reason and faith blend into a kind of mysticism.<sup>14</sup>

There is no doubt that in Augustine's thought the ability to reason is the unique human capacity. At first glance it is tempting to accept the definition that the image of God is the rational and intellectual capacity of the human being.<sup>15</sup> In several places it would seem that this was his own definition. A typical statement is this: "God, then, made man in His own image. For He created for him a soul endowed with reason and intelligence, so that he might excel all the creatures of earth, air, and sea which were not so gifted."<sup>16</sup> However, to accept this definition too readily is to over-simplify the situation. In almost every situation where such a definition is given, the image of God is being spoken of in most general terms. Each time he uses the term image of God, Augustine wants to be sure that his reader does not assume that he is referring to any physical part of man's nature. Therefore, in describing it as rational and intellectual, he is merely making sure he is not laying himself open to the accusation of being anthropo-<sup>17</sup>morphic in his thinking.

Having said that the image of God in man is, for Augustine, related to the rational and intellectual qualities of the human being, we must now go further and see what it is in the nature of reason that is considered to be like God.<sup>18</sup> First of all, Augustine found that reason is the power by which the mind perceives the real value of things.

In the final stage of his pilgrimage toward intellectual certainty, there came to him a conviction that certain things are unquestionably more valuable than others. Here is his description: "not knowing whence or how, yet most plainly did I see and feel sure that that which may be corrupted must be worse than that which cannot, and that which cannot be violated did I without hesitation prefer before that which can."<sup>19</sup> We shall see how this judgment of values influenced his understanding of both Scripture and human nature.

When he inquired why it was he was so certain about the relative value of things, Augustine discovered that through his own reason he had become aware of the eternal scheme of things. "Inquiring, then, whence I so judged, seeing I did so judge, I had found the unchangeable and true eternity of Truth above my unchangeable mind."<sup>20</sup> Ever after Augustine considered that the human mind, through the higher function of its reason, is or can be aware of an eternal and spiritual world of ideas by which all the things of this world are to be measured.<sup>21</sup> Reason's first function within the mind is to judge what is being received into the mind through the senses.

Reason, then, is the spiritual vision of the mind as it is able to perceive what the human senses by themselves cannot see. The impressions which are mediated to the mind through the senses are in themselves quite neutral. Physical

sense organs are neither good nor bad except insofar as they may be impaired in their functions. When impressions are received into the mind through the senses, then, it is the power of reason which enables the person to distinguish the well formed from the deformed and the good from the bad.

Augustine's description of the process is this: "And we see without that they are, and within that they are good."<sup>22</sup>

Reason finds that some of the impressions which enter the mind are to be greatly preferred to others. Man's system of values is determined through the judgments of his reason.

However, reason is not unaided in its judgments. Man's ability to perceive the relative value of things follows from the certainty that his higher reason is aware of an eternal scheme of things. Augustine is sure that mind, when it is using reason in its highest form, is aware of the unchanging form from which all things have been made. An eternal system of ideas is to be seen directly above the mind.<sup>23</sup> Augustine describes the eternal scheme as "the form of eternal truth"<sup>24</sup> which is discerned by the "intuition of the rational mind."<sup>25</sup> He teaches that "we behold in God the unchangeable form of righteousness, according to which we judge that men ought to live."<sup>26</sup> Once in De Trinitate he describes how we could not judge that one thing is better than another "unless a conception of the good itself had been impressed upon us."<sup>27</sup> Sometimes Augustine calls it the "form according to which we are, and according to which we

do anything by true and right reason."<sup>28</sup> At other times he describes it as "most true reason,"<sup>29</sup> or "incorporeal and eternal reasons."<sup>30</sup> Whatever it is called, Augustine is satisfied that there is an eternal form of things which the rational mind knows intuitively. All things received into the mind through the senses are judged according to the mind's knowledge of the eternal forms from which all things were made.

Not only does reason have the function of judging the data of sense perception in order to estimate the relative value of things, but it is the reason which relates each particular object with the universal species according to which it was made. Augustine teaches a theory in which the particular is seen to be real or unreal according to how well it corresponds to the universal idea of what such an object should be like. One example used in De Trinitate is that of the arch which he saw at Carthage. This arch is either good or bad according as it approaches the universal idea of a perfect arch which he finds in his mind.<sup>31</sup>

Reason, in Augustinian thought, is also the power of the mind by which a person moves in thought from one object to another in search of truth.<sup>32</sup> It is the reason that perceives distinctions among the various objects of study which the senses cannot see. An illustration he uses is that of the ring which impresses its form upon wax.<sup>33</sup> When the ring is removed the senses can perceive that there are two forms which are obviously related. The original figure still

remains on the ring while a new pattern has been impressed upon the wax. Both of these forms can be seen with the eyes of flesh.

However, when the same ring is placed in fluid, the impression which is made on the fluid comes into being at the same instant as the ring enters the liquid. Later, when the ring is taken from the fluid, at that moment the outline of the ring which had been impressed upon the liquid ceases to be. It is impossible for the human senses to see that, while the ring is in the fluid substance, there are two related forms. Nor can the eyes know, after the ring leaves the liquid, that there ever had been an impression made upon the liquid. Reason, however, perceives what the eyes do not see. Through reason the mind understands that there are two forms, when the ring is in the fluid, which are related to each other as the outline of the ring is related to the impression in the wax. It is reason that distinguishes the original from the copy when the senses cannot perceive the distinction.

When we come to consider how Augustine is able to develop a concept of pure spiritual substance in the soul, we shall see the importance of this teaching about reason. In his theory of knowledge, Augustine considers that the will has an exceptionally great power to impress images of physical things upon the mind. His whole religious teaching is built upon his belief that the mind is changed by the very nature of the objects upon which the affections are allowed to rest.

The human mind, therefore, is constantly being changed by the images which are impressed upon it through attention to objects which are seen through the senses. Man's mind is generally considered to be pure spiritual substance, plus images, which are the remnants of all the sense experiences a man has ever had.

As we come now to consider his teaching about human nature, we can see how Augustine's understanding of the power of reason influenced his conclusions. When he applies the test of value to the various kinds of substance which can be seen in man, he has no hesitation in labelling some superior and others inferior. In his intellectual search for the image of God, Augustine moves upward from the inferior substances to the superior substances, until he finds the highest created substance in the human mind. Once having located the finest substance in man, reason is employed to distinguish between the mind itself and all that has been added to it by the impressions of sense experience. However, we are moving ahead of the argument.

## 2. Reason and Scripture

As soon as we turn to Augustine's teaching on man, we find that reason and faith begin to meet. Scripture tells Augustine that man is made "after the image of God."<sup>35</sup> As has been noted, the doctrine of the Trinity, as a description of God's nature, is fully accepted by Augustine in De Trinitate.<sup>36</sup> Reason, then, must seek not only an image of God in human

nature but the image must be a trinity. Actually, Augustine puts it the other way. In De Trinitate he is seeking a trinity which is a true analogy of the divine. Since man is the image of God, he must find a trinity in man which is also the image of God in man. The important question in De Trinitate then, is this: "from what likeness (similitudine) or comparison of known things can we believe (credamus), in order that we may love God, whom we do not yet know?"<sup>37</sup>

Augustine's religious attitudes begin to show through in the above quotation. The goal of all faith and reason is that we may know God or, as he often expresses it, that we may see God face to face. Since, however, we do not know God, we are enjoined to love as much as we know of him in order that we may become like him.

It is a basic tenet of Augustinian thought that we cannot love what we do not know. What we actually know of God is mainly, though dimly, seen through our faith. Faith tells us, as we have seen, that God is the supreme Trinity. Moreover, it tells us that man is made after the image of God. With our reason guided and directed by faith, then, we are led to search diligently in human nature for a likeness or comparison by which we can believe, in order that we may love God. The word love is most significant here, for it indicates that De Trinitate is no mere academic search for psychological trinities. Augustine is searching for an inner certainty on which to build his lifetime quest for knowledge

of the reality which is God.

### 3. Augustine's Platonism

Before following through on this search one other fundamental part of Augustinian thought must be explored. It is generally agreed that Augustine found the Platonic concept of universal ideas to be a most satisfactory method of describing the nature of reality.<sup>38</sup> It is better to call it the concept of form, however, since the word form (Latin forma) becomes central in Augustine's terminology. Moreover, forma or species is generally accepted as the best Latin translation of the Greek word ἰδέα.<sup>39</sup>

It is not difficult to prove that the concept of form underlies all of his thinking about the nature of the universe. Augustine's doctrine of creation is, too simply, somewhat as follows: On the first day, God created out of nothing an invisible, formless, shapeless, disorganized something. "For Thou, O Lord, hast made the world of a formless matter (materia informi), which matter, out of nothing, Thou hast made almost nothing." On the second day God created an intellectual heaven. That is to say, God created a place, distinct from himself, in which created spiritual beings see and understand fully without the limitation of the senses.<sup>40</sup> On the third day of creation, God gave visible outline and shape to this formless something in order to bring the land and sea into being. Speaking of the land and sea he says, "which Thou madest on the third day, by giving



visible shape (speciem visibilem) to the formless matter which thou madest before all days."<sup>41</sup>

The use of matter and form, as a description of created things, is basic in De Trinitate. Physical objects in general are described in terms of matter and form.<sup>42</sup> In the mental processes, Augustine considers that the mind is constantly aware of the forms of eternal truth which it knows by intuition. Specific objects are judged according as they are related to these eternal forms.<sup>43</sup> Perhaps the most complete expression of this concept of reality is this: "We behold, then, by the sight of the mind, in that eternal truth from which all things temporal are made, the form according to which we are, and according to which we do anything by true and right reason."<sup>44</sup> We see in this quotation a suggestion of what to look for in Augustine's concept of the image of God. Logically, since God is the universal form of eternal truth, then the image of God in man must be a form of God impressed upon man. However, we are anticipating a conclusion which will be examined more carefully later.

The term forma is seldom used as a description of the visible human body. When speaking of the outline of a material thing, Augustine seems to prefer the word species. When, for example, a specie corporis is removed from the line of human vision a likeness still remains impressed upon the memory.<sup>45</sup> Species is what was given to formless matter when it became visible in the process of creation.<sup>46</sup> To have no species is to

have no distinctive outline or appearance which distinguishes one object from another.<sup>47</sup> We do not entirely disagree with É. Gilson that on the whole species, and forma and even ratio, may all be synonyms for the original Greek term ἰδέα.<sup>48</sup> There is, however, a distinct tendency to use species when outward visible appearance is indicated.<sup>49</sup>

The term forma is also used in the same way as species to describe the distinctive nature by which things are what they are. Forma is used to describe the qualities which the world of things has after creation.<sup>50</sup> It is used more often, however, of the images which are created in the mind when the mind observes corporeal things. All created things are found by the mind to have form in themselves. But they are also found to be related in form to an eternal form which is in itself uncreated. Describing his own approach to reality, Augustine tells how he looked more deeply (inspexi) into the changeable nature (mutabilitatem) of bodies. He found there a sense of movement from one form to another which indicated to him that these changeable bodies were related to an unchanging form.<sup>51</sup>

On the human level, then, forma is used mostly to describe the images which the human mind develops in relation to the objects with which it deals. In the Augustinian theory of knowledge, with which we will deal later, a form or likeness is impressed upon the mind whenever an object is perceived.<sup>52</sup> These are called corporeal forms and they are partly physical,

because they originate from a physical object. They are partly spiritual also, however, since the mind gives them something of itself.<sup>53</sup> Augustine conceives, therefore, of quasi-physical images which are neither pure spirit or real body.<sup>54</sup> The mind easily creates such images when it thinks of human beings that it has never seen.<sup>55</sup> It may also come to love such images, to its own detriment.<sup>56</sup> Or it may develop images to such an extent that the body is influenced by them, as if they were real.<sup>57</sup>

The development of corporeal images which do not correspond to any original observation is, of course, the imagination at work.

This concept of forms greatly influences Augustine's Christology. Particularly is this true when he deals with the nature of Jesus Christ. The problem of the two natures of the Son is solved by teaching that he has two forms. In one form, the Son is equal to the Father in all respects. In the other, he is in the form of a servant.<sup>58</sup> In the form of God, he is the same substance (esse) as the Father. But in the form of the servant Christ is made in the likeness of man (in similitudinem hominum factus).<sup>59</sup> In nature he is equal to God (natura aequalis), but in fashion the Son is less than the Father (habitu minor). During his earthly life, both forms existed within him; the human form in no sense making the divine form less divine. At his crucifixion he died to the human form, the form of God remaining unchanged.<sup>60</sup> The death of Christ is described as a mystery (sacramentum) according to the inner man, and a type (exemplum) as regards the outer man. The mortal

flesh alone was changed at the crucifixion.

Christ is, for Augustine, the Mediator in which man can see the true form of God. The form of God in Christ is variously described as light;<sup>62</sup> as a pattern for those who have no pattern;<sup>63</sup> an example in the form of God which intellectual spirits imitate;<sup>64</sup> or an image of God after whom we may be refashioned.<sup>65</sup> The chief difference between the image, example, or pattern in Christ and the form of God in man, is that in Christ it is the original. That is to say, Christ imitates no one for he is by nature the same substance as God. Men, on the other hand, are created and have a likeness to God only by imitation of that which is above.<sup>66</sup> The form of God in Christ does not change, but in man the form of God increases and decreases according to the distance he is from God.<sup>67</sup>

One of the most consistent conceptions of the nature of God as Augustine sees him, then, is that God is eternal and unchanging form.<sup>68</sup> As we have already seen, the mind of man beholds in God "the unchangeable form of righteousness."<sup>69</sup> More often, however, the nature of God as form is implicit rather than explicit. God, for example, is good itself, whereas that which is impressed upon us is the conception of good.<sup>70</sup> Various descriptions are used which are related to the same concept of God. There is the form of eternal truth by which we judge particular objects.<sup>71</sup> We behold in that "eternal truth" the form according to which we are made.<sup>72</sup>

The will, when it is good, is said to refer the objects of the mind's affections to be judged beside a "better and truer life."<sup>73</sup> Once the higher order is described as righteous law which is, as it were, impressed upon the mind, as the impression from a ring is made upon wax.<sup>74</sup> Whatever the terms used, there is every reason to believe that behind them is a picture of God as the eternal, unchanging and immutable form of all things that are.<sup>75</sup>

Closely related to the concept of forms, and perhaps synonymous with it, is the idea of nature. The word natura is often used in a way similar to forma. As we have seen, Christ is said to be equal to God in natura but not in fashion (habitu). Blessed souls are said to be blessed in "the contemplation of nature, than which nothing is better."<sup>76</sup> God is described in terms of nature, there is a "nature not made, which made all other natures, great and small. And that nature, more excellent than the rest is God."<sup>77</sup> When man becomes like God by partaking of him, the relationship is described in terms of nature. Man's nature becomes like God's nature when a man loves God for a period of time.<sup>78</sup>

In each of the above examples God is unchanging and uncreated nature just as God is unchanging and uncreated form. Man and his soul also have a nature which is measured according to its relationship to God himself. When the human will is turned toward that which is good, then it is said that the will is in harmony with nature, just as we might say that the will is

in harmony with God.<sup>79</sup> In its search for truth the soul of man is instructed to look at itself until it discovers its own true nature.<sup>80</sup> The soul is at its best when it is living according to the nature it discovers in itself. That is to say, when the soul accepts its position under God and yet above all else in the world then it is living according to its nature. It is evident, then, that Augustine's use of the term natura is almost identical with his use of forma and is not at all like our concept of Nature.

#### 4. Augustine's Psychology

We turn now to examine human personality as Augustine describes it. Let us review briefly the major concepts of his thought which are to be kept in mind. First, there is his concept of pure spiritual substance which requires him to find the image of God in the purest spirit of the personality. Secondly, there is the nature of reason as a judge of values with an ability to perceive the relationships between the various parts of the personality. Thirdly, there is the concept of form and nature which is present whenever Augustine describes the nature of reality. Fourthly, although this has been only briefly mentioned, there is his acceptance of the way of introspection as the method through which he finds the ultimate truth, which is God. Fifthly, there is his concept of the nature of being itself. According to Augustine, all things exist insofar as they participate in the ground of all being.

### The Body

Let us begin with the body as the lowest unit of personality. The nearest thing to a definition, in De Trinitate, describes the body as that which has "a certain bulk of flesh (carnis), and an outward form (formae species),<sup>81</sup> and an arrangement and distinction of limbs." In itself, the body is morally neither good nor evil, although in Augustine's theology everything has a certain good of its own.<sup>82</sup> The body's main drawback is that it is corruptible, changeable and finally perishes.<sup>83</sup> It is inferior to the soul which governs it and gives it life.<sup>84</sup> Following his basic conviction that there is an absolute distinction between the spiritual and the corporeal, Augustine considers the body to be separable from the part of man that is spiritual.<sup>85</sup> We must not conclude at this moment that the soul does not have its own kind of death, or that the body has no resurrection.

While his estimate of the body relegates it to an inferior position in the human personality, Augustine certainly did not share the Greek attitude which led to the conclusion that embodiment is entombment.<sup>86</sup> Nor did he retain any of his Manichaeism which taught that men are the offspring of devils.<sup>87</sup> If Augustine had considered matter to be evil, he would not have taught that the body is the temple of the Holy Spirit,<sup>88</sup> or that the Word became flesh.<sup>89</sup> There are times, though, when he considers that the body is

a hindrance to the achievement of the blessed life. Several times he quotes Wisdom 9:15 which speaks of the body as "subject to corruption and presseth down the soul."<sup>90</sup> It is the weight of the body with the "bird-lime of the stains of appetite" that keeps the soul from remaining long in the blessed vision of truth.<sup>91</sup> However, it is the appetites which are misdirected and not the body itself which is the source of evil. Perhaps the best expression of his attitude to the body, then, is that it is heavy, cumbersome and awkward in the attainment of spiritual things.<sup>92</sup>

Even in all its weakness and awkwardness, the body has an important function in the spiritual life. In one passage Paul is described as still bearing the burden of the body which presses down the soul. At the same time, however, it is said that Paul was able to preach the Lord Jesus Christ significantly through his tongue and pen. In the last analysis Augustine is sure that everything a religious man does in his body is at the bidding of God.<sup>93</sup> Furthermore, when men are made new by the blood of Christ, according to Augustine's theology, they remain in their bodies for a significant purpose. Men continue to live in their bodies in order to be made "ready among the evils of this world for a new world, by bearing wisely the misery which this condemned life deserved, and by rejoicing soberly because it will be finished."<sup>94</sup>

The final proof of the value of the body, in Augustine's thought, lies in the fact that it is fully included in his



doctrine of salvation. "But that faith promises, not by human reasoning, but by divine authority, that the whole man, who certainly consists of soul and body; shall be immortal and on that account be blessed."<sup>95</sup> Augustine teaches that, through his faith in the Mediator and his growth in the capacity for God, man is to receive an incorruptible body at the end of the world.<sup>96</sup> Between death and the final judgment man is to have a spiritual body, but at the final judgment the resurrection of the believer will be complete and the body itself will rise.<sup>97</sup> It must be remembered, however, that it is only through the miracle of the resurrection that the body is glorified; the natural body remains weak, corruptible and perishable.<sup>98</sup>

#### The Soul

Above the body, as we have seen, there is the whole realm of the human personality which can be described generally as the soul. Our quickest entry into Augustine's thought about the higher nature of man is to begin with his description of his own experience. The intellectual process by which he came to his highest concept of truth is described as follows: "by degrees, I passed from bodies to the soul (animam) which makes use of the senses of the body to perceive."<sup>99</sup> Here we have an indication that soul (anima)<sup>100</sup> is the general description of the whole area of personality which is above, and of a more spiritual nature than, the body.

The next degree of inward thought he describes thus:

"and thence to its (the soul's) inward faculty, to which the bodily senses represent outward things, and up to which reach the capabilities of beasts."<sup>99</sup> It is significant here to note that the soul (anima) shares a common nature with the beasts up to a certain point. Augustine includes in the nature of the soul all sensory experience by which the living animal perceives the world about him. Even the lasting inward impression, which these sense experiences make upon the nervous system of the organism, he considers to be part of man's common animal nature. Indeed, the only significant difference between man and beast, in this sphere of sensory experience, is that man has an upright body.<sup>101</sup> All this lower activity of the soul is included with the body in the area of human nature known as the outer man.<sup>102</sup>

#### The Rational Soul

The second stage of his upward journey within the soul brings Augustine to a distinctively human level of existence. Having gone a full circle now, we find Augustine using reason to discover the place where reason itself is found. Here is his description: "and thence, again, I passed on to the reasoning faculty (ratiocinantem potentiam) unto which whatever is received from the senses of the body is referred to be judged."<sup>99</sup> It is here, where the soul of man becomes a reasoning entity, that Augustine believes he finds that element of human nature which is distinctively human. Perhaps it is the other way: when he discovers that which is distinct-

ively human, Augustine finds that it has the power of reason for one of its main attributes. "As we ascend, then, by certain steps of thought within, along the succession of the parts of the mind (animae); there where something first meets us, which is not common to ourselves with the beasts, reason (ratio) begins, so that here the inner man (homo interior) can now be recognized."<sup>103</sup>

In this last quotation we meet the classification inner man, which Augustine accepts from Paul and interprets according to his own understanding of reason.<sup>104</sup> There are three relatively equal terms used to describe this more intelligent part of the soul. The first is rational soul (anima rationali), which describes that part of the general territory of soul which is rational or intellectual.<sup>105</sup> While we have described the rational soul as part of the soul, we must remember that the soul has no parts as, for example, the body has parts.<sup>106</sup> It means, rather, that the soul is acting in a higher capacity when it is using the power of reason.

The reasoning soul, however, is also animus, a term which may be briefly defined as the thinking activity of the soul. It describes the soul as the principle of thinking.<sup>107</sup> Augustine's own definition of animus is: "a certain kind of substance, sharing in reason, fitted to rule the body."<sup>108</sup>

Animus is used to describe the soul in its image-forming activity. In this sense animus describes the power of the imagination to develop concepts of things which the eyes

have never seen; for example, the body of St. Paul. At the same time, however, it also judges these images against reality and tests what can be known against what must be believed. Paul's own personal existence in the body is described as animus.<sup>109</sup> When the animus comes to know something, it becomes like the thing known. That is to say, there is an impression made upon the animus which changes it into a likeness of the original object. When the original object of sight is God, then the animus becomes like God.<sup>110</sup> We shall find that the relationship between the animus and God is an important aspect of Augustine's teaching on the nature of the image of God in man.

Animus is, consequently, most often translated as mind, since English has no term which corresponds to it. A comment by É. Gilson is particularly relevant here: Animus, he says, "est employé de préférence par Augustin pour désigner l'âme de l'homme, c'est-à-dire un principe vital qu'est en même temps une substance raisonnable. En ce sens, animus est le 'summus gradus animae' et semble parfois se confondre avec mens."<sup>111</sup> There is still another term which more specifically indicates the mind as the reasoning and understanding aspect of human nature. It is the word mens which we now consider.

Mens is explicitly distinguished from the soul in general because it has the power of understanding (intelligentia). "It cannot at once be a mind, and not live, while it has also something over and above, viz. that it understands

(intelligat): for the souls (animae) of beasts also live, but do not understand."<sup>112</sup> Many of the qualities of animus are, therefore, also found in mens. Unlike animus, however, there is never any ambiguity about mens; it is always used of the rational soul. Most often mens is the noun which describes the rational soul in its highest spiritual nature. Mens is that part of the soul which contemplates incorporeal things. Although we have distinguished animus from mens in order to understand Augustine's concept of the soul, it will not be necessary when dealing with the highest aspect of the soul to draw constant distinction between the terms used. Indeed,<sup>113</sup> Augustine uses them side by side, apparently synonymously.

We have followed the intellectual ascent of Augustine up through the various levels of substance which he finds in human nature. What he actually does in De Trinitate is to eliminate from the field of consideration every part of the human being which depends upon the senses for its knowledge of reality. The body, and all the soul which deals with the phenomena mediated through the senses, is set aside as part of the outer man. In all these parts of the human being it is considered impossible to find a pure spiritual substance in which there is a trinity which is also an image.<sup>114</sup>

#### The Mind

Having eliminated, then, all the obviously corporeal aspects of human nature from the field of study, Augustine proceeds to consider the mind alone. Beginning in the ninth

book he says, "let us put aside from the inquiry all the other many things of which a man consists; . . . (and) as far as in such a subject is possible, let us treat of the mind (mens) alone."<sup>115</sup> From here on we, too, shall be considering only the mind, according to Augustinian categories of thought.

The next discovery we make is that the mind itself,<sup>116</sup> which is the highest grade of human spirit, also has a higher and lower function. While reason is not the only function of the mind it is, nevertheless, the chief power of the mind. Reason, within the mind, moves in two separate directions. On the one hand, it has to deal with corporeal and temporal things. On the other hand, reason, or intellect as it is more often called, contemplates eternal reality. In the first sense, Augustine considers reason to be the practical activity of the mind as it deals with sensory perceptions. Once again, it is not as if in dealing with corporeal and temporal things the soul is becoming evil. The matter of evil is explained in another way. It does mean, however, that a part of the reason is "deputed" for handling inferior things; "a certain part of our reason, not separated so as to sever unity, but, as it were, diverted . . . is parted off for the performing of its proper work."<sup>117</sup>

#### Inferior Reason

Reason, in its dealing with outer physical objects through the senses, is considered to be inferior reason. Even

though such reasoning is of a lower kind, Augustine's analysis of the way in which knowledge comes into the mind through the senses provides his theory of knowledge. This theory of knowledge becomes an analogy by which we also gain insight into the way man knows God. In any act of seeing,<sup>118</sup> three things can be distinguished. There is the object seen; there is the sense organ itself, or seeing itself, as he describes it; and there is the attention of the mind toward the object.<sup>119</sup> This attention of the mind corresponds to the will, which is the dominant affection of the mind.

The contribution of this theory of knowledge toward our appreciation of the image of God lies in the fact that certain likenesses are considered to form in the mind. As a result of the mind's attention directed toward an object through the eye, the form of the physical substance is, in some measure, impressed upon the mind. In the process of seeing, the mind and that which it sees are united by the power of the will. The mind adds some of its own substance to the image which it receives, while at the same time it preserves the species or outline of the object itself.<sup>120</sup>

None of the images in the mind, therefore, is precisely like the object which first impressed itself on the mind yet every object which the mind sees leaves its impression.<sup>121</sup> Images of temporal and corporeal objects contained in the mind are, in actuality, a blending of mind and matter which might be considered a kind of quasi-physical substance. The important

thing about them is that they exist quite apart from the physical substance itself. When the form of the body (specie) is removed, the likeness (similitudo) still remains impressed upon the mind.<sup>122</sup>

Mental images impressed upon the mind through attention to corporeal things are sometimes described as fantasies (phantasmate).<sup>123</sup> At other times Augustine calls them likenesses (similitudi).<sup>124</sup> At least once they are called "footprints" (vestigia)<sup>125</sup> and sometimes they are called images. Whatever the name, these remnants of sense experience are handled within the mind. When the mind holds these images before it and combines newly received images with those received before, the activity is called thought (cogitatio).<sup>126</sup> When the mind combines images in a way that they are never seen in the objective world, or when an image is so formed by the mind that it is unlike anything the senses have ever known, then we have the mental activity which is imagination.<sup>127</sup>

Augustine's teaching about memory is also in terms of the way in which the mind handles the images of sense experience. Each object on which the attention of the mind has been focused leaves an impression of itself in the intellect.

These remnants of sense experience do not leave the mind but are put away in its storehouse of images. Naturally most of the images in the mental storehouse are not in the center of the mind's attention at one time. In other words, the mind is never conscious of everything it has experienced.



The will, however, is the power which can turn the eye of the mind toward the storehouse of images. Vestiges of past experience which had been hidden from consciousness can be recalled and the images which were originally impressed upon the mind are re-formed. Memory, then, is the activity of the mind as it calls into being the images of sense experience which it desires to have before it. Memory differs from imagination in that it is limited to the range of sense experience. Imagination, on the other hand, can create images which have no counterpart in the physical world.<sup>128</sup>

We must note here that memory (memoria), in the Augustinian use of the term, does not describe what the mind does with past experience only. Present experiences which are called before the eye of the mind by the will are also considered to be within the range of the mental activity which is called memory.<sup>129</sup> This part of the mental activity, which is called memory, corresponds very closely to what has been called thought. However, the important reason for noting that memory also includes present experience is this: when Augustine comes to describe the trinity of the mind he speaks of that moment when the mind is completely and vividly aware of itself, and only itself. At this moment, then, when the mind has been recalled entirely to itself as a present reality memoria indicates that which is part of the mind and yet it is the same substance as the whole mind.<sup>130</sup> We shall see presently how the idea of memory as the consciousness of present experience is

included in the doctrine of the image.

All that we have seen thus far has been a description of the activity in which the human mind deals with those experiences which are mediated to it through the senses of the body. We conclude this treatment of practical reason by remarking that all such mental activity belongs to what Augustine describes generally as the outer man. Because reason which is diverted to the handling of lower things is in contact with things which are material, temporal and corruptible, it is thereby less than spiritual. Lower reason tends to take into itself some of the properties of change and decay that belong to lower substances.

Augustine does not teach that the lower reason has no relationship with God. On the contrary, everything which exists is like God simply because it has been made by God.<sup>131</sup> However, the trinitities and likeness which can be found in the outer man are not, and cannot be, the true image of God. Since there are in the outer man the qualities of temporality, changeability, and corruptibility, the outer man can never be considered as the image of God. Only that part of man which is pure spirit and which deals directly with spiritual things can<sup>132</sup> be considered to be the image of God.

#### Superior Reason

Turning now to the higher function of reason as it represents the movement of the mind, we find that Augustine is able to make a distinction between higher and lower reason

according to the words wisdom and knowledge. When the mind uses reason to know those things which can be perceived through the senses, then it gains knowledge. When, on the higher level, the mind uses reason to know those things which are eternal, spiritual and incorruptible, then it participates in wisdom. In other words, mental experience, gained through the senses is knowledge, while anything seen through the intellectual vision of spiritual things is wisdom.

Augustine is not sure that the words knowledge and wisdom will bear such a complete distinction as he has made. Here is what he says: "If therefore this is the right distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that the intellectual cognizance of eternal things belongs to wisdom (sapientia), but the rational cognizance of temporal things belongs to knowledge (scientia) . . ." <sup>133</sup> If, as he says, this is the right distinction, then the intellectual cognizance of eternal things is undoubtedly the kind of mental experience which is most important to us. Augustine has no hesitation in estimating that wisdom is to be preferred to knowledge. Moreover, Augustine believes that he has Biblical support for distinguishing between wisdom and knowledge. We shall deal with his exegesis later, but for now we note that he refers to Job 28:28 and I Corinthians 12:8. <sup>134</sup>

Whether or not the words wisdom and knowledge are the right terms, Augustine is certain that the image of God is not to be found in that part of the mind which deals with

temporal things. At the end of the twelfth book of De Trinitate he turns to search for a trinity which may be found in the intellectual cognizance of eternal things. From then on he deals only with the mind as it is turned upward toward that which is eternal, spiritual and unchanging. We shall return to the concept of wisdom as it is seen to relate the spiritual part of man to the pure spiritual God.

#### Pure Mind

In this chapter we shall follow Augustine in his search for mind in its purest form and reason performing its highest function. Augustine is sure the only thing in human nature that can be considered as an image of God is a pure spiritual substance which is gazing upon or can gaze upon God.<sup>135</sup> Before proceeding further, however, we note that Augustine explicitly denies any suggestion that there are two distinct parts or faculties in the mind. While he admits the difficulty of conceiving a whole mind in two separate functions, he teaches that the mind must always be considered as a unity. Moreover, it must be seen that the part of the mind diverted for the purpose of dealing with inferior things in no sense takes away from the general conclusion that the image of God is to be found in the whole mind. "As we said of the nature of the human mind, that both in the case when as a whole it contemplates the truth it is the image of God, and in the case where anything is divided from it, and diverted in purpose to dealing with temporal things."<sup>136</sup>

If an analogy of how Augustine pictures the mind is possible, it must be something like this: imagine a round glass container, open at both the top and the bottom, standing on a base of dark soluble material. Within the container is water. This means that the substance of the water is in contact above and below with two entirely different kinds of substance. On the lower side it touches a dark, opaque, partly-soluble solid. On its upper surface the water meets the clear gaseous substance of the whole atmosphere. Air, of course, is a different substance than water, yet many of its properties, such as translucence and mobility, are much more like water than are the properties of the dark solid beneath.

Now, as is actually the case, the water has a certain affinity for both the air and the dark solid substance. On the lower side some of the soluble matter is drawn into the water. On the higher level some of the air becomes commingled with the water. The water, in meeting with the lower substance, tends to become darker and heavier while its meeting with the higher substance makes it lighter and more transparent. If, then, water were conscious substance, as mind is, its vision of higher things would be very much affected by its relationship to lower things. When the affinity of the water for the dark substance drew in many impurities, then its vision would become clouded and murky. When, on the other hand, the affinities of the water were turned entirely upward,

the impurities would tend to settle to the bottom and the vision of the atmosphere above would be clear.

Again let us attempt to see how Augustine's reason approaches the nature of the mind in relation to God. Then we shall trace the influence of his faith on the final conclusions. The way of introspection which Augustine describes in the tenth book of De Trinitate is an attempt, according to our analogy, to think of the pure substance apart from its impurities. By using our reason, he believes, we may separate the water from the impurities, not in actual practice, but for the sake of discovering the true nature of the water. Augustine, then, bids us to conceive of the pure substance of the mind apart from all the impurities that have been added to it. "When, therefore, it [the mind] is bidden to become acquainted with itself, let it not seek itself as though it were withdrawn from itself; but let it withdraw that which it has added to itself."<sup>137</sup>

The process of thought by which Augustine considers the mind can withdraw everything from itself is not an attempt, in any materialistic sense, to filter out the "footprints", "bird lime" or fantasies. Nor is it as if the mind can move outside the human being leaving its impurities where the mind once was. Rather, Augustine is describing a process of inner reasoning in which, by introspection, the mind distinguishes itself from all the images which have been added to it through sense experience. It is this process of thought which Augustine

has in mind when he says, "therefore let the mind become acquainted with itself, and not seek itself as if it were absent; but fix upon itself the act of attention of the will, by which it was wandering among other things, and let it think of itself."<sup>138</sup>

Having distinguished itself from all that has been added to it, the mind can become conscious of itself and of itself alone. According to our analogy, it is as if water were living substance and could distinguish in its own consciousness between water and all that is not water. Even when the impurities remain within it, the water can become conscious of itself and only of itself. So is it possible, in Augustinian thought, for mind to become completely aware of itself as spiritual substance.

Having found now the pure spirit of the mind, we have found that substance in human nature which is most like the substance of God. Now at last any evidence of God which can be found in this pure spiritual substance of the mind, will be the image of God. Moreover, anything which this pure spiritual substance can know of God will be known by intuition and will impress itself upon the mind without the limiting mediation of the senses. Here is Augustine's own reasoning: "No doubt everything in the creatures which is in any way like God, is not also to be called His image; but that alone than which He Himself alone is higher. For that only is in all points copied from Him, between which and Himself no nature is interposed."<sup>139</sup>

### 5. The Image of the Trinity in Man

Now that we know what Augustine means by mind, let us sketch the Scripture sources by which he came to find the image there. The first reason for looking for the image of God in man is, of course, because the Bible says he is made after the image and likeness of God. (Gen. 1:26, 27). For Augustine this means three things. First, it means he (man) is made in the image of the Trinity since the plural "our" indicates that more than one of the persons of the Trinity were active in the creation of man.<sup>140</sup> Augustine emphatically rejects the idea that man is made in the image of the Son only since, if this were so, God would have said "Let us make man after thy image."<sup>141</sup> The validity of this exegesis will be considered in our second chapter.

Secondly, Augustine finds Scripture indicates that the image of God is to be found in the individual man. His reasoning is that since the God who created man is one God, then the image of God must be found in a unified personality. Augustine guards the monotheistic principle very carefully for he is dealing with those who have accused the Christians of teaching that there are three gods. In his exegesis he leans heavily upon a literal interpretation of the word forms in his version of Genesis. According to Augustine's Bible, Genesis 1:27 says that God created man, "in the image of God." The word God in this passage is in the singular, (Et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei). These words indicated to Augustine



that, while all three persons of the Trinity were active in the creation of man, it was only one God who created man.

Augustine finds support for this interpretation in Paul's passage concerning the wearing of hats in Church (1 Cor. 11:7). Augustine points out that it is only the man who is called the image of God and rejects the suggestion that it is the man and his wife together who are made in the image. He admits that the image resides in the spirit of man where there is no sex distinction. Nevertheless, his final conclusion is that the image is to be found in the individual male.<sup>142</sup>

Thirdly, Augustine believes that the image of God is to be found in the mind according to Scripture. "For as not only most true reason but also the authority of the apostle himself [Paul] declares, man was not made in the image of God according to the shape of his body, but according to his rational mind."<sup>143</sup> Augustine found the language of Paul most agreeable to this teaching. Romans 12:2 speaks of being "transformed in the renewing of your mind." Colossians 3:10 considers the renewal of salvation to be "in the knowledge of God after the image." Ephesians 4:23, 24 also is most explicit that man should be "renewed in the spirit of your mind" according to the image.<sup>144</sup> Here we note only that this is Augustine's exegesis of Paul. The validity of this interpretation we shall discuss later.

## Theology and The Image

It is the testimony of both reason and Scripture, then, that convinces Augustine he must find the image of God in the human mind. His theology, however, shows through at this point, since he is certain he must find not only the mind but the pure spiritual substance of the mind. It is basic to his theology to presuppose that God is pure immaterial spirit.<sup>145</sup> Logically, therefore, anything which can be called an image or analogy of God must also be the purest spirit which can be found in creation. Here we see that process taking place which inevitably comes in a study of the idea of the image. A person's concept of God determines the nature of the image he will find in human nature as much as his concept of human nature will determine his theology concerning God. Here reason and revelation have to meet.

Another of the criteria, by which Augustine judges what is to be considered the nature of the image of God in man, is that the image must be in something which is immortal and unchangeable. Here is what he says: "we must find in the soul of man (anima hominis) i. e. the rational or intellectual soul, that image of the Creator which is immortally planted in its [the soul's] immortality."<sup>146</sup> This requires of Augustine that he attempt to discover some way in which the soul of man is unchanging and immortal. As we have noted, he considers that the soul is created substance and the mark of creature is changeability. Moreover Augustine teaches that the soul has

its own kind of death, just as everything dies as it moves away from its participation in God. The death of the soul, however, is never complete, since God never entirely ceases to participate in the soul. Augustine decides finally that God never allows the soul to become entirely separated from him. Therefore, there is in the soul a measure of immortality and unchangeability simply because it is the image of God, and because God himself is always present in the soul.<sup>147</sup>

Another theological doctrine which has a direct relationship to the idea of the image of God is the doctrine of the Fall. Augustine's teaching on the Fall is outlined in detail in the thirteenth book of De Trinitate.<sup>148</sup> The main significance of his doctrine of the Fall in relation to the image is that the whole man was changed for the worse. God did not, however, entirely abandon man at the Fall. It is only because man is still in relation to God that he can be considered to have God's image.<sup>149</sup> When we deal with unredeemed man, therefore, we must be prepared to find an inadequate or impaired image (impari imagine). Nevertheless, the certainty remains that there is an image to be found.<sup>150</sup>

Even the mind, the highest created substance, is described by Augustine as an inadequate image. At the same time, the mind is the best image we have.<sup>151</sup> Even at his worst, man excels all the other created beings in reason and intelligence.<sup>152</sup> The image of God in natural man, then, is seriously damaged from the Fall. Man used his own free will

to destroy the relationship with God in which the image first existed and that image cannot be restored except as God himself restores it. In the meantime, however, we must look in the mind of man for the highest analogy of God that it is possible for us to find in created things.

Augustine finds Scriptural support for his teaching about the impaired image in Psalm 39:6. In his translation of the Bible the psalmist teaches that although man lives in vain and his anxiety about life has no purpose, he is nevertheless the image, (Quaquam in imagine ambulat homo, tamen vane conturbatur.)<sup>153</sup> To Augustine these words indicate that Scripture teaches the image is defaced but "such defacing does not extend to the taking away of its being an image."<sup>154</sup>

For the sake of rational analysis we shall attempt to follow Augustine as he studies this greatly impaired image of God as it is to be found in the natural man. At one point Augustine sets this task for himself: "the mind must first be considered as it is in itself, before it becomes partaker of God; and His image must be found in it."<sup>155</sup> Evidently he believes that it is possible for us to find something, which is an image of God, in the pure spiritual substance of the mind which we have isolated and now come to consider through the way of introspection.

#### The Image in the Mind of Man

Considering the mind and the mind alone, Augustine attempts to discover the true nature of the substance he finds

there. He rejects all the suggestions of earlier philosophers which had any material connotations whatsoever. The old philosophers had suggested air, fire, the brain itself and so on, but Augustine is doubtful if any of these substances is the substance of the mind. Augustine finds, however, that there are some things about the mind which no one can doubt. He asks the rhetorical question, "who ever doubts that he himself lives, and remembers and understands, and wills, and thinks, and knows, and judges?" After some discussion his own answer to the question is this: "Whosoever therefore doubts about anything else, ought not to doubt of all these things; which if they were not, he would not be able to doubt of anything."<sup>156</sup>

From these seven basic certainties of our existence Augustine chooses three. The three elements of the trinity in the mind become memory (memoria), understanding (intelligentia) and will (voluntas). The intricate argument by which he relates them to each other and to the mind as a whole is not relevant here. His conclusion is this: "therefore, while all are mutually comprehended by each, and as wholes, each as a whole is equal to each as a whole, and each as a whole at the same time to all as wholes; and these are one, one life, one mind, one essence."<sup>157</sup> This remarkably complex concept of a trinity in the spiritual substance of the mind is Augustine's highest analogy to the divine Trinity. After a great deal more discussion following the above quotation, the end of

his great search for the image is marked as follows: "Well, then, the mind remembers, understands, loves itself; if we discern this, we discern a trinity, not yet indeed God, but now at last an image of God."<sup>158</sup>

Whether by intention or unconscious design, the three aspects of the mind chosen to represent the Trinity are the exact counterpart, in the pure spirit of the mind, of what has been seen in the lower reason. Memory, within the pure intellectual spirit, is the mind itself recalled to complete consciousness of itself. Once having distinguished the mind from all sense-mediated impressions added to it, the mind can remember only mind. Understanding in the mind is compared, by analogy, with the eye as the sense organ through which sense impressions are mediated. Understanding is actually the eye of the mind which sees only the mind when the mind is focused entirely upon itself.<sup>159</sup> Will, as we shall see more fully presently, is the power within the mind which turns the eye of the mind (intelligentia) upon itself. Will is also the power which draws together and unites the knower and what is known. In this case the knower and what is known are one and the same, since all that takes place happens within the mind.<sup>160</sup>

The foregoing outline of the way in which the highest trinity in man is analogous to the process of knowing leads us to a conclusion. One major truth about the image of God in the mind of Augustine is this: it is a kind of mental activity which is analogous to God. The image of God in man is a move-

ment which takes place within the spiritual substance of the mind itself. <sup>161</sup> It is a trinity since there are three distinct operations which can be identified. It is a unity because all parts of the trinity are completely contained and comprehended by the mind. This trinity, therefore, is also the image of God because like God it is pure spiritual substance. At the same time, however, it is not God, since even the highest human substance is created substance.

The picture which is in the mind of Augustine becomes clear to us finally as he gives an exposition of I Corinthians 13:12 in the fifteenth book of De Trinitate. According to his Bible it is translated "we see through a glass in an enigma but then face to face." Apparently what Augustine sees is something like this: within man there is a mirror which is his mind. When a man gazes into his mind he sees an image which is the outline or form of God. However, what he sees is also an enigma (aenigmate) which indicates that it is a likeness of God but one that is very difficult to see clearly. "As far as my judgment goes, as by the word glass he [Paul] meant to signify an image, so by that of enigma any likeness you will, but yet one obscure and difficult to see through." He later <sup>162</sup> identifies the likeness in the mind as a likeness of God.

It soon becomes evident that the image, which is here called both a reflection and an enigma, is something which man may see in his own thought. It is an enigma for the very reason that it is most difficult to see. At the same time no

one can help but see his own thought. Consequently, we have the strange paradox, "For who does not see his own thought? And yet who does see his own thought?"<sup>163</sup> The image of God in human thought, then, is in the final analysis something which everyone sees because in some sense they see their own thought. On the other hand, it is something nobody sees because nobody really sees his own thought. Here is more proof that the image of God in man, difficult as it is to see, is really, for Augustine, a quality of human thought.

The last book of De Trinitate is outwardly a humble admission of the tremendous distance between the best trinity in a man and the Trinity itself. Even while he is outlining the limitation of his analogy, however, Augustine goes deeper into the nature of thought in order to explain what he means. The final word to be said about the image of God in the human mind is that it is so deep within the consciousness of the personality that any attempt to express it in words limits its meaning. In other words, we must go within ourselves until we can feel the moment when our knowledge is completely the same as the word which will be spoken to express it. It is not a thought but a feeling which can be known only before the word or idea has been shaped into a form that can be expressed. "We must go on, then, to that word of man, to that word of the rational animal, to the word of that image of God; . . . which is neither utterable in sound nor capable of being thought under the likeness of sound. . . but which precedes all



the signs by which it is signified, and is begotten from the knowledge that continues in the mind, when that same knowledge is spoken inwardly according as it really is."<sup>164</sup>

"When that knowledge which is spoken inwardly according as it really is" indicates that here before the moment of formation in sound or symbol there is an instant when man's thought is like God's. That is to say, here in the deeper inner self the word which is formed is precisely the same as the knowledge it is to express later in sound or symbol. As soon, however, as it must be spoken, the word is distorted from the original by the limitations of the human being. Before the human limitations distort the word it is, as the Word of God is, exactly co-equal in all respects to the spiritual knowledge from which it springs. "And so this likeness of the image that is made, approaches as nearly as is possible to that likeness of the image that is born [i.e. Christ] by which God the Son is declared to be in all things like in substance to the Father."<sup>165</sup>

It will be noted that when he comes, as he does here, to the most inward kind of thought, he uses the term Word. Actually, in these closing passages of the treatise, Augustine is treating the relationship between God the Father and his Son, who is the Word. We have reason to speculate that were it not for his acceptance of the doctrine of the Trinity, Augustine would have considered the image of God by analogy to the relationship between Christ and God. Earlier he did

accept this idea. However, the main point here is that through his examination of the most inward moment during the formation of the word, he sees a place in which the word of man "approaches as nearly as is possible to that likeness which is born." The word of man in the pure spirit of his mind, then, is like God as an image which is made. Christ, on the other hand, is like God as an image or word which is born rather than made.

The phrase "as nearly as is possible," in the last quotation, expresses the kind of humble feeling with which the De Trinitate closes. Having delved as deeply as it was possible for him to go within his own self by pure introspection, Augustine believed he had found the best possible human analogy of God. In the end, however, simply because it is in the creature, it can never be fully like the Creator himself. Augustine's final conclusions on the subject are true to his own dictum, "Let us therefore so seek as if we should find and so find as if we were about to seek."<sup>166</sup>

We believe here that sufficient evidence has been given to prove that for Augustine the nature of the mental processes were certain evidence that man is like God. The simple conclusion that the image of God in man is his rationality is, however, misleading to say the least. Augustine distinguishes reasoning (ratiocinatio) from reason itself (ratio). Reasoning or ratiocination is the process by which the mind moves from one thing to another in search of truth. Reason, on the other hand, is the sight by which the mind looks upon what it sees.

As such it is very closely related to understanding. Augustine concludes elsewhere, "Hence by reasoning we search, by reason we see."<sup>167</sup>

Actually, therefore, it has been by the process of ratiocination that we have been led by Augustine in search of the image. It is by the power of reason that the mind enters into itself until it has found pure mind. Once having found pure mind, reason then proceeds to discover those elements within the life of the mind which are most like God. In the final analysis, the image of God in man is that within the spiritual substance of the mind which is like God. The image of God is, in this sense, a kind of mental activity complete and self-contained within the mind. Reason, which is the sight of the mind, looks in upon these mental processes which have been found after the long process of ratiocination.

The image of God in man cannot, then, be described simply as rationality. It would be much better to describe it as self-contained thought by which the mind gives evidence that it is alive, in the same way that God is alive. Once having sought the pure spirit of the mind by reason, there is little else that can be said of the mind except to describe the life within it according to our understanding of conscious thought processes. This is what Augustine has done and he finds that thought within takes place by analogy with the knowing process in sense perception. At the most inward point his discoveries become almost, but not quite, a kind of

mysticism in which the knowledge and the word are felt to be completely united but not yet formed into sound or symbol.<sup>168</sup>

There is no doubt, then, that Augustine is sure the most fruitful approach to the image of God in man is to search out the true nature of mind itself.<sup>169</sup> Indeed, to discover the true nature of mind is for Augustine a theological necessity since God is within.<sup>170</sup> He does not at this point, however, consider that the image of God in man is in any sense the same substance or essence as God himself. The image of God in man is like God only as a creature can be like his Creator.<sup>171</sup> His own description is relevant here. "There is, then, a nature not made, which made all other natures, great and small . . . [which is, therefore, greater than] the rational and intellectual nature, which is the mind of man, made after the image of Him who made it."<sup>172</sup> The mind of man is that "than which our nature also has nothing better."<sup>173</sup> There is nothing above the mind except God. Consequently it is in discovering the true nature of the mind that man comes as near to an analogy of God as a creature can come.

This part of Augustine's concept of the image of God in man, which finds the image in the mind alone, describes a relatively static and unchanging aspect of human personality. Theoretically, the mind itself can be discovered by any human being endowed with reason, and the image of God can be found there. The search of De Trinitate has been for something unchangeable in the soul which is immortally planted in its

immortality. Admittedly the amount of reason or intellect is at one time great and at another time small. In other words, rationality is not a static quality.<sup>174</sup> Nevertheless somehow it is possible to consider the mind in itself quite apart from God. So the final estimate concerning the image in the mind is this: "although worn out and defaced by losing the participation of God, yet the image of God still remains."<sup>175</sup> Two certainties are always present in Augustine's thought about the soul. Even at its worst, the soul is always in some measure a rational substance, and secondly, the soul never entirely ceases to exist. Anything which exists does so through the presence of God within it. Therefore, there is in the spirit of the mind an image which is like God.

#### 6. The Image as Man's Relation to God

Having drawn these conclusions about the static nature of the image of God in man, however, we cannot leave the matter there. There is another stream of thought which keeps breaking into this attempt to finalize a definition of the image. Here is his own statement of the situation: "this trinity [memoria, intelligentia voluntas] is not therefore the image of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made."<sup>176</sup>

This last quotation brings us face to face with the logical dilemma in which all study of human nature finally involves us. The dilemma is this: on the one hand, human

nature is nothing apart from its relationships. In the study of the image of God, therefore, it is not a valid criticism of Augustine merely to point out that at this point he becomes illogical.<sup>177</sup> Rather, it is necessary to see how he handles the dilemma which is there in the very nature of man. The essence of his solution is to consider the image to be a power or capacity. Even so, the dilemma still remains. Is it a capacity for God because God has made man after his own image? Or, is man the image of God because he has a capacity for his Creator? Augustine cannot avoid double talk "For it is His image in this very point, that it is capable (capax) of Him and can be partaker of Him (esse potest); which so great good is only made possible by its being in His image."<sup>178</sup>

Beside the concept of the image as being something in itself, therefore, we have in De Trinitate a dynamic concept of an image constantly changed according to its relationship with God. Not only is the image an analogy to God in the pure spirit of the soul; but the image is also something which is vitally affected by the relationship between man and God.

Before we proceed to consider the dynamics of this relationship there are three concepts which are the key to our understanding of Augustine's teachings about the dynamic image. The first is the concept of the will which some consider to be the truly revolutionary idea in his thinking.<sup>179</sup> The second, closely related, is his concept of love. The third is his doctrine of the nature of being itself.

## The Will

We have purposely left the consideration of Augustine's teaching about the will until now. The concept of will is instrumental here in bringing us to understand the dynamic quality of the image of God in man. For Augustine the will is the moving force within the human personality. As we have seen, the body, the soul and the mind are in themselves morally neutral. Everything which exists, of course, has a kind of goodness simply because it exists. However, it is the will, as the dominant direction in which the affections move the person, which determines whether the rest of the personality will be formed according to higher or lower things. Even the mind itself, in which the image of God resides, is considered to be shapeless and unformed until it is directed by the will toward other things. The good mind, therefore, is the mind which is directed toward the good itself. Through the affections of the will the mind becomes good by participating in goodness.<sup>180</sup> On the other hand, as we have seen, the mind is corrupted when it comes to have its affections fixed upon lower things through the perversion of the will.

In Augustinian thought the mind is at its best when it maintains the position which belongs to its own nature. That is to say, by nature the soul is made to hold a position under God "to whom it ought to be subject and above those things to which it is to be preferred, [and] which it ought to rule."<sup>181</sup> The soul loses this position in one of two ways. First, it

looks upward and sees by intuition those things which are intrinsically excellent in God. Seeing these to be desirable, the mind then wishes to have them for itself. In other words, the person proudly desires to be like God. Secondly, in actual practice, this desire or will to be like God amounts to turning the affections upon corporeal and temporal things. Through the power of the affections all kinds of things are drawn into the mind from below until it is so burdened that it can no longer see God.<sup>182</sup> The end result of this grasping for power is that the power of the soul is finally lost and the "vision of eternal things is withdrawn."<sup>183</sup>

The will, then, is the real cause of the deformity found in the soul. "The rational soul, however, lives in a degenerate fashion, when it lives according to a trinity of the outer man; that is, when it applies to those things which form the bodily sense from without, not a praiseworthy will . . . but a base desire, by which to cleave to them."<sup>184</sup> In Augustine's attitude to ethics, it is clear that it is not the mind itself which ultimately produces evil actions. Rather it is the will which is to be held responsible for evil. The mind is not evil "unless also that intention of the mind (mentis intentio) yields, and serves the bad action, with which [the intention] rests the chief power of applying the members to an outward act or of restraining them from one."<sup>185</sup> Covetousness (avaritia), therefore, is the root of all evil and it is the desire (cupiditas) for inferior things by which



the soul is brought down. The end result of the fallen soul is described as arriving "at the likeness of beasts." Spelled out, this means two possibilities: either the soul "affects with swelling arrogance to be more excellent than all other souls that are given up to corporeal senses, or it is plunged into a foul whirlpool of carnal pleasure [and] wallows in a morass of inferior things."<sup>186</sup>

The will, then, may be well and briefly defined as the "dominant affection of the mind."<sup>187</sup> The place of the will in Augustine's theory of knowledge has already been noted. When a person sees, it is the will, or intention of the mind, which fixes the eye upon the outward object. Through the power of the will, the mind is united with the object of sense experience in such a way that a form of it is impressed upon the mind.<sup>188</sup> Moreover, once these impressions have been formed in the mind, the will is still instrumental in the handling of them. When the will turns the eye of the mind upon the most recently formed vestiges of sense experience then it is called thought.<sup>189</sup> When, on the other hand, the will turns the eye of the mind upon its storehouse of mental images in order to recall some to the level of consciousness, it is called memory.<sup>190</sup> One of the fundamental certainties about the mind, therefore, is that it has a power which determines the direction in which the affections of the mind shall be turned and this is called will.<sup>191</sup>

## Love

Closely related to the idea of the will as the dominant affection of the mind, is the concept of love. Augustine has three Latin words, all of which English translates love. He does not distinguish them from each other with careful consistency but, briefly, the main distinctions are these. Amor is the primary power of affection and feeling by which the human being is drawn out in search for the satisfaction of its inner needs. As a description of the mind's activity, amor indicates the power of affection by which the mind is united with the objects on which its attention is focused. It is through the power of love that the images of outer things are drawn into and impressed upon the mind.<sup>192</sup>

In a moral sense, the term amor is neutral for there can be a desire for God just as surely as there is a desire for lower things. The desire for God (amor Dei) is the same as charity (charitas), which is love that is guided in all its actions by reference to God. When, on the other hand, amor is allowed to seek its satisfactions in lower things it is called covetousness (verb concupisco) or desire (cupiditas). Amor therefore is always desire for that without which the soul is unfulfilled. "What, then, is love (amor), except a certain life which seeks to couple together (copulare appetans) some two things, namely him that loves and that which is loved."<sup>193</sup> Good and evil follow from the way in which amor is directed and not from amor itself.

Amor therefore is related to the will in this sense: whereas voluntas directs the attention of the mind toward an object, amor is the power of affection which unites the mind with the thing or image on which the attention falls. In actual practice the two words often denote the same thing. As we shall see, they merge into each other in the final analysis when used of man's relation to God. Generally speaking, voluntas fixes the attention upon the conative element in human activity while amor always denotes the feeling of desire. <sup>194</sup>

Dilectio in many ways is synonymous with amor. However, it is distinguished from amor because it often indicates a sense of conscious preference. Dilectio is more like our English diligence, assiduousness or attentiveness. <sup>195</sup> The term is used regularly in Augustine's Bible to translate <sup>196</sup> ἀγάπη. Diligere is used of God's love for men as also are the terms amor and amare. <sup>197</sup> Augustine enjoins his readers, while using the term dilectio, to love the good itself <sup>198</sup> and he quotes the commandment that man should love God, in which the Latin term is dilectio. <sup>199</sup> Man's higher affections are described by the term, for it is the word used when man is told he must love the "form of righteousness." <sup>200</sup> At the same time, brotherly love is also dilectio since it is the term by which the Bible tells us we must love our neighbour. <sup>201</sup>

In describing dilectio itself Augustine once says, "But this is true love, that cleaving to the truth we may live righteously." <sup>202</sup> In this definition there appears something

of the sense of will-power and determination that belongs to the word. In describing love as a matter of cleaving to the truth, Augustine indicates one of the basic principles of his teaching about love. For Augustine, love does not cease when it has come upon the object of its desire. Satisfaction of the need is not the end of love. Instead, having found the object of its affections, love remains to enjoy the beholding of that which it loves.

The most significant discovery for our understanding of the relationship between man and God, however, is that voluntas, dilectio and amor all meet in synthesis when Augustine estimates how man loves God. It will be remembered that the highest trinity discovered in the pure spirit of the mind was memory, intelligence and will (voluntas).<sup>203</sup> However, as this trinity is more and more related to God himself, the need for a synthesis of will and dilectio becomes apparent.

In the fourteenth book there comes this statement in a discussion on the nature of mind as a trinity: begetter and begotten, which in this case are the mind and knowledge of itself, he says "are coupled together by love (dilectione tertia copulanter), as by a third, which is nothing else than will (voluntas), seeking (appetans), or holding fast to the enjoyment of something."<sup>204</sup> Here we see that love is said to be a description of will that remains fixed on the object of its affections for a sustained period of time. It may be will

that has caused the affections to be focused upon the object. However, when the will remains fastened upon the object then it is seen as love.

### Worship

The final coming together of all three terms, voluntas, amor and dilectio, takes place under the concept of worship in which Augustine includes all that man does toward God. Here is the climactic passage: "This trinity, then, of the mind is not therefore the image of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself (diligit se); but because it can also remember, understand, and love (amare) Him by whom it was made." After discussing again the meaning of this remembering, understanding and loving God, he attempts to sum it all up by saying, "Let it worship God, who is not made, by whom because itself was made, it is capable and can be partaker of Him."<sup>205</sup>

Here, in this last quotation, we come upon Augustine's description of worship as the comprehensive term for everything that man does in moving toward God. Worship includes recalling the presence of God; it includes understanding God; it includes the love which moves men toward God. The importance of love, as the moving affection by which man is drawn to God, is noted elsewhere as he defines worship thus: "And what is the worship (cultus) of Him except the love (amor) of him by which we now desire to see him."<sup>206</sup> It is possible, then, to study the whole of Augustine's religion under the concept of

the love of God (amor Dei).

### The Nature of Being

The third important concept describing the relationship between man and God is the idea of being or essence. There is no such thing in Augustinian thought as existence which is not related to God. Whatever is has its being because in some way it shares or participates in God who is the only one in whom essence and existence are the same thing. Moreover, everything that exists has its own measure of goodness simply because it is God's handwork. "All things that exist, therefore, seeing that the Creator of them all is supremely good, are themselves good. But because they are not, like their Creator, supremely and unchangeably good, their good may be diminished and increased."<sup>207</sup> The great difference between creature and Creator is seen to be changeability and corruptibility. The Creator remains timeless, incorruptible and immutable (changelessly good). The creature moves from greater to less and back, according to how it shares in God's changelessness. It is because there is a basic goodness in all things that man can be said to be created after the image of God.

Augustine's ontology meets his theology at the place where he describes the position of man as a fallen creature. His conclusion, after a discussion of the relationship between God and man in the fallen state is this: "And so it is the especial wretchedness of man not to be with Him, without whom

he cannot be."<sup>208</sup> It might seem at first that Augustine is recognizing at this point two kinds of existence. Since man exists, then he is related to the ground of all being. Such a relationship, we would say, is simple dependence upon a ground of being and it is not necessarily personal or moral existence. Above this level of existence, however, there is the moral, personal and responsible existence before God, who is personal. One would think this was in Augustine's mind when he defines "not to be with him." When man does not remember, understand and love God, Augustine teaches, then man is not with God. In our terms, in such a case man has no fellowship with God.<sup>209</sup>

#### Good and Evil

When we come to define what Augustine means by will there is some evidence that he distinguishes between mere existence and responsible personal existence. Body, soul and even mind in itself, are not considered to be morally responsible in Augustinian thought. On the other hand, when man uses his will, as a person, to turn toward or away from God,<sup>210</sup> he is counted responsible. Such evidence could lead us to conclude that there is a good which belongs to things merely because they exist. Moral goodness, on the other hand, depends upon the personal relationship with God. Such a conclusion, however, is far from justified as a general description of Augustine's thought. Actually his general principle is this: "Insofar, therefore, as anything that is, is good, insofar plainly it still has some likeness of the supreme good (summi

boni) at however great a distance."<sup>211</sup>

Within the above statement we can find no grounds for distinguishing mere existence from personal existence. Nor can we find grounds for distinguishing between a good which belongs to things and the moral goodness of men. Man therefore, like everything else, is good insofar as he exists in God. He is evil insofar as he loses the participation of God and ceases to be in God. Evil is the privation of good and the loss of being. With John Burnaby we conclude that the best we can say is this: "His whole conception of moral good and evil is dynamic: man's soul is in the making and cannot stand still."<sup>212</sup>

Augustine did not apparently recognize the problems raised by the modern theologian when he attempts to relate the changeless ground of being to the concept of a personal God.<sup>213</sup>

The relevance of Augustine's ontology for his teaching about the image of God is this: since man exists or ceases to be, according to his participation in God, the image of God in man is greatly affected by this relationship. The whole structure of the image changes as man approaches God or withdraws from Him.<sup>214</sup> Augustine, of course, would hasten to explain that we do not mean distance in any material sense. "For approach to God is not by intervals of place, but by likeness, and withdrawal from Him is by unlikeness."<sup>215</sup>

#### Participation

Very closely related to this concept of being is the



idea of participation (particeps). As a philosophic concept it almost certainly had its origin in the teachings of Plato. Sharing, or participation, was the way in which Platonic philosophers had expressed the immanence of changeless reality in the changing world.<sup>216</sup> As a concept of the person to person relation between man and God, Augustine finds it a most useful description of religious experience. He describes his own discovery of God in this way "and Thou didst beat back the infirmity of my sight, pouring forth upon me most strongly Thy beams of light . . . as if I heard this voice of Thine from on high: 'I am the food of strong men; grow, and thou shalt be fed upon me; nor shalt thou convert me like the food of thy flesh, into thee, but thou shalt be converted into me.'<sup>217</sup>"

The central theme in the idea of participation revealed in this last statement is this: when man participates in God he is changed into the likeness of God. Never, under any circumstances, does Augustine allow that God can change or be changed. Participation is, therefore, not in any sense a matter of man taking a part of God into himself. Nor is there ever any sense in which God becomes less when man becomes greater. Rather, every growth in man makes him more like the ground of his being, while every movement away from God makes man less like the true form according to which he was created in the likeness of God.

#### Understanding

In terms of man's relationship with God, participation

is very much the same as understanding and knowing God. We shall consider understanding (intelligentia) first. Understanding can be simply defined "to 'see with the mind,' to 'apprehend' rather than 'comprehend.'" <sup>218</sup> Augustine's own definition of thought is "a kind of sight of the mind." <sup>219</sup>

To behold God with the eye of the mind, then, is to look by intuition upon eternal things. Not only are sense organs unnecessary, they are very much a hindrance to clear vision. Understanding, however, does not mean that the viewer is able to take in fully what he sees with the mind. The splendour of the light is always too great for his eyes. <sup>220</sup> It does mean that the mind apprehends, or is aware of, a great deal more of eternal reality than it is able to comprehend. Such understanding as man has, or can have, brings him into contact with God. As in the above quotation, Augustine considers that when the mind sees God something overpowering happens and the mind is changed by what it sees.

#### Contemplation

When the mind beholds God for any extended period of time it is called contemplation. Contemplation is related to participation since both contemplation of and participation in God are the result of a clearer vision. When a man reaches the highest level of relationship to God his vision will be clear and he shall see God as he is. This lasting gaze, or contemplation, is described as "that for which we long." <sup>221</sup> So far as Augustine is concerned, contemplation is the goal

of all life. When man can contemplate God, the need for all analogies, similitudes and even the need for faith will disappear.<sup>222</sup>

Christ's purpose is described in terms of contemplation. He became man in order that we might see the form of God in him and be led to the contemplation of God himself.<sup>223</sup> The overwhelming greatness of contemplation is seen finally in this: "This contemplation is held forth to us as the end of all actions, and the everlasting fulness of joy."<sup>224</sup> Hence, we see how profoundly important and lasting was the influence of the Hortensius upon Augustine.

#### Knowledge of God

There is good reason to conclude that the understanding, which is described by the words intelligentia and intellectus, is the highest function of the mind. We have noted that the words rational and intellectual are often used as complementary adjectives describing the highest part of man. However, when we come to the final stages of De Trinitate, Augustine evidently considers the understanding to be a higher function than reasoning. Here is one of his statements: "the intellectual cognizance of eternal things belongs to wisdom; but the rational cognizance of temporal things to knowledge."<sup>225</sup> There is no doubt that wisdom, which is knowledge of eternal things, is the very form or impression of God upon the mind. Understanding, through which the mind sees God, is, therefore,<sup>226</sup> the most noble part of the human mind.

So much, then, for understanding. Knowledge, the product of understanding, is also related to participation. Knowledge is participation in God. As we have seen, Augustine teaches that there can be no knowledge unless there is a kind of union between the mind and that which the mind sees. The power of love is seen to act in such a way that in all knowledge the knower becomes like that which he knows. When a man knows God, then, let Augustine draw the conclusion "insofar as we know God, we are like Him, but not like to the point of equality, since we do not know Him to the extent of His own being."<sup>227</sup> The nature of the image of God in man is seen here to be the same as his knowledge of God. Indeed, one of the reasons man is called the image of God is that the knowledge of God can exist in his rational mind.<sup>228</sup> The noblest part of the mind is described as that "by which it knows or can know God."<sup>229</sup>

Under the concept of wisdom (which is the knowledge of eternal things) this relation of knowledge to participation is fully developed. We shall only note the relationship here, since we shall deal with it more completely in a later chapter. God, according to Augustine, is Wisdom. Wisdom is God, since nothing can be said of God except as it is God. When man becomes wise, then, he participates in God. As Augustine puts it, he becomes wise "by participation of that supreme Light."<sup>230</sup> Elsewhere it is made clear that this in no sense changes God's wisdom. It simply means that man has a wisdom which makes him

more like God. To know God, therefore, is to have wisdom.<sup>231</sup>  
 To have wisdom is to participate in God.

Participation, finally, is a relationship to God in which man is changed into the likeness of God. At the same time God remains unchanged. Man moves to and from God according to the measure of his participation in God. God remains the one unchanging, immortal and immutable spiritual reality. Partaking of God is receiving "that life which is the light of men" by which in Christ we are made "partakers of His divinity."<sup>232</sup> Participation is gaining wisdom by sharing or apprehending that supreme light.<sup>233</sup> Things are good by the participation of good.<sup>234</sup> Such greatness as the soul has belongs to it because it can be a partaker of the highest nature.<sup>235</sup> We shall consider later the relationship between the likeness of God and the image of God.

#### 7. The Image of God in Fallen Man

Holding in mind these concepts of will, love, the nature of existence and participation, let us attempt a final estimate of the image of God in man as Augustine conceives it. The present natural state of the image is a deformed and disfigured condition which man has brought about by the wrong use of his own free will. "[Man] defaced in himself the image of His Creator by stubbornly turning away from His light, [and] by an evil use of his free-will broke away from his wholesome bondage to the Creator's laws."<sup>236</sup> The state of sin, in which

man finds himself now, is considered by Augustine to follow from the wrong use of the freedom God had given him. As already noted, the result of this rebellion against God is that man has lost his freedom and the image of God has been seriously impaired.<sup>237</sup> Man, for his part, has lost his ability to participate in God and consequently the image in his mind is worn out and defaced like an old coin.<sup>238</sup>

Moreover, man has no power in himself to restore the image to its original form. The fellowship between man and God has been broken. Man has turned his back on God and can no longer see Him. Consequently man simply does not know how to go about restoring the fellowship which he once had with God. Man desires blessedness but he does not have the faith whereby to choose those things which lead to blessedness. The true image of God in man, then, can be restored only by "Him by whom it had been formed at first."<sup>239</sup>

In this unredeemed state, salvation cannot come to man apart from the gracious action of God. Traced to its origin in the sin of Adam, man's sorry state is seen to follow from the fact that Adam proudly attempted to seize God's power for himself. Seeing him proudly grasping for power caused God to abandon man and leave him at the mercy of the Devil. "When He [God] abandoned the sinner the author of sin immediately entered."<sup>240</sup> Before the intervention and mediation of Christ, man was in a state of hopeless bondage and despair without fellowship with God.

What has actually happened, according to Augustine, is that man no longer participates in God. That is to say, from man's side the relationship between God and man has been entirely broken and man is no longer consciously or willingly accepting into himself those qualities of life which make him like God. From the other side of the relationship, however, the matter is different. While it is true that man no longer participates in God, it is not true that God no longer participates in man. Even while man has turned his back upon God and has become unable to see God, God is nevertheless active in man's life. If it were not for the fact that God still gives man his being man would have no existence at all.

Cosmologically this is explained in terms of the Devil. At the beginning of human history, when man rebelled against God, God did not put man in bondage to the Devil. Rather it was man himself, by ceasing to participate in God, who laid himself open to the wiles of the Devil. Man, who had grasped for the power of God, found himself very weak and unable to resist the entrance of the Devil into his life. Man, therefore, became enslaved by the Devil. Even though he is enslaved to the Devil, God has not entirely abandoned man to the Devil. In other words even in his lowest state of degradation God still retains a claim upon man's life and in his most religious moments man can be recalled to the remembrance that he still has a relationship with God. In his natural state the relationship with God in which the image

exists is a limited and shaky relationship. The image of God is damaged and impaired but not destroyed.

#### What The Image Is Not

Just what this deformed and impaired image of God really is for Augustine is a little difficult to estimate with accuracy. We have already concluded that it is almost certainly related to the nature of human thought. However, there is certainly more to it than that. One conclusion which would be most logical, according to the pattern of Augustinian thought, is this: the image must be a form of God impressed upon the mind at some former time. When Augustine speaks of the renewal of the image, he speaks in terms of memory. The image is renewed in those who "by being reminded, are turned to the Lord."<sup>241</sup> This seems to indicate that there must have been an image of God impressed upon the mind, perhaps when it was first formed by God. We are tempted to conclude with John Burnaby: "For the mind at birth is more than a tabula rasa dependent entirely upon impressions from the external world. Being the creation of God and bearing the image of God, the mind must always retain a knowledge of its own nature as God's created image; and thus it must possess a 'memory of God' which is indelible, however deeply hidden away."<sup>242</sup>

Such a conclusion is emphatically rejected by Augustine in De Trinitate. Augustine teaches that it is not because the mind recalls some past experience of God that it can remember him. Rather, the mind can be recalled to God because man "both



lives and moves and is in Him." The mind, he says, can remember God, "Not because it recollects the having known Him in Adam, or anywhere else before the life of this present body, or when it was first made in order to be implanted in this body; for it remembers nothing of this at all."<sup>243</sup> Accordingly Augustine does not accept the teaching of Plato and Pythagoras that the mind recalls experiences from a previous life. At the same time he rejects the logical conclusion that the image of God must be an impression made upon the mind at some earlier time.

#### The Image as God's Participation in Man

What Augustine does teach is that there is an ever present glimmer of light in the mind of man that will enable him to see God if he will allow himself to be lighted by it. "We ought rather to believe, that the intellectual mind is so formed in its nature as to see those things, which by the disposition of the Creator are subjoined to things intelligible in a natural order, by a sort of incorporeal light of a unique kind."<sup>244</sup> Even though man has turned his back upon God, there is still some light from God which enters into his mind by a kind of indirect process of infusion. Man is never so depraved that he is completely incapable of becoming aware of the order of things above the sensory world. Nor is man ever so fallen that he is not at times aware by intuition that God himself is present in his life. When a man is recalled to a memory of God, then, he is not turned back upon some experience of God

which left an image in his mind. Rather, when man remembers God he turns his attention inward until he becomes aware of the presence of God himself. Were it not for the participation of God in his life, man would not be able to see or understand anything at all.

#### The Image as Awareness of Moral Law

The "incorporeal light of a unique kind" evidently is related to the moral consciousness that remains even in depraved men. Augustine states that, "Even the ungodly think of eternity, and rightly blame and rightly praise many things in the morals of men." When he goes on to ask, why this moral sense? Augustine answers that man must somehow feel the laws which are written in that "book of light which is called Truth." When a man is righteous, these laws are impressed upon his heart, "as the impression from a ring passes into the wax, yet does not leave the ring." On the other hand, the unrighteous man with a conscience is described as "he who worketh not, and yet sees how he ought to work, he is the man that is turned away from that light, which yet touches him."<sup>245</sup>

Augustine admits that some men seem to be completely unaware of the moral law. Yet he still thinks that a man who seems to have no moral sense "is just touched sometimes by the splendour of the everywhere present truth, when upon admonition he confesses." So it is not as if some remnant of former experience remains in the mind. The sense of God is a present reality of which the mind "is reminded that it be turned to

God, as though to that light by which it was in some way touched even when turned away from Him."<sup>246</sup>

There is other evidence that the image of God must, in some sense at least, be related to a "form of righteousness" in the mind. At the very beginning we noted how it was through a sense of values that Augustine came to believe he was in relation to the eternal scheme of things.<sup>247</sup> These values, it is true, were not moral values and yet, as we have seen, he does not distinguish between moral and ontological values. In De Trinitate he takes it as self-evident that we could not judge as we do "unless a conception of the good itself had been impressed upon us."<sup>248</sup> There is, he believes, a form of righteousness in the mind which we should love in order to become righteous.<sup>249</sup> The very nature of the mind, when we see it as it really is, brings us to an awareness of a higher existence toward which we are called.<sup>250</sup>

We are justified in concluding that Augustine was greatly impressed by the moral sense he found in himself. Certainly the nature of thought itself was evidence to him that man is made in the image of God. But the sense of moral responsibility, with which this very thought is charged when it looks upward, also impressed him as evidence of God within. As noted, Augustine rejected the conclusion that this sense of values was impressed upon the mind by a former experience. The only way, then, that it can be impressed upon the mind must be that God is always present, impressing himself upon human

personality. This is, we believe, Augustine's conclusion. Because man "lives and moves and has his being in Him" the form of righteousness is always being impressed upon the heart by God Himself. Hence we see at last Augustine's reason for teaching that memory recalls present experiences as well as those of the past.<sup>251</sup>

#### The Image as a Desire For Blessedness

Not only is there a sense of values by which man is reminded of God, however, but there is in the fallen soul of man a desire to be blessed. Here again Augustine is certain that man never falls so low that he loses the drive to satisfy his need for God. Even in the most perverted of sinful men he is certain that it is a desire to be like God which is moving them to sin. The tragedy of sin is that it has perverted man's desire to be like God, until he has been led into slavery to lower things. The present state of man, then, is described as follows: "It belongs to all men to will to be blessed; yet all men have not the faith, whereby the heart is cleansed, and so blessedness is reached."<sup>252</sup>

Among the descriptions of what remains in the natural man that is worthy to be called the image of God, Augustine retains this concept of the will for blessedness. "Even souls in their very sins strive after nothing else but some kind of likeness for God."<sup>253</sup> In his fallen state man has gone searching after blessedness by desiring almost everything except God. The essence of sin, as has been noted, is that

man comes to place his affections upon corporeal and temporal things as if they were ends in themselves. When men have come finally to love lower things in the way that only God should be loved, then Augustine describes their sin with the strong and Biblical word fornication.<sup>254</sup> The only hope for man is to accept the faith that will enable him to see what things he must love in order to be blessed.

Our conclusions about the image of God in the mind of Augustine have now broadened. We believe they include three basic experiences common to man which Augustine took to be certainties of our existence. The nature of thought itself, in its most inward and purest nature, is one element which is, in effect, the image of God in man. Alongside thought, however, there is also a sense of values, both ontological and personal, which causes man to be aware of the abiding presence of God. Thirdly, there is a constant desire - weak, misguided, or corrupted though it may be - which sends man in search of a fulfilment which can be satisfied fully only in communion with God.

#### 8. The Nature of Faith

We must now consider the place of faith in Augustine's description of the restoration of the image. Faith, according to the simile expressed previously, is a cleansing of the heart in order that man may see what he should desire in order to be blessed. In terms of the mind, this means that the sight of the mind must be purified in order that the will

may turn the mind toward higher things. The question has been raised by the interpreters of Augustine: did he consider the image of God in the rational and intellectual mind to be capable of re-forming itself? In other words, is there a way of salvation apart from Christ and the Church?<sup>255</sup>

Augustine deals directly with this question in De Trinitate. There are some, he says, "who think themselves capable of being cleansed by their own righteousness so as to contemplate God and dwell in God." He admits that some of these intellectuals have gone a great distance toward finding the truth. Some of them "have been able to penetrate with the eye of the mind beyond the whole creature, and to touch, though it be ever so small a part, the Light of unchangeable truth." Many Christians, on the other hand, have not been able to reach the same level of intellectual insight.<sup>256</sup>

Thus, there is no doubt for Augustine that some minds are capable of approaching the vision of eternal truth with reason alone. However, he is also certain that those who are proud of their intellectual achievements are, above all people, stained by the most dangerous of sins. There is no sin to which the divine law is more opposed, he says, than to this spiritual pride in which men think they can cleanse themselves by their own righteousness.

According to Augustine, even the greatest of minds need the humility of faith to protect them from falling into the worst of all sins. In any case, such glimpses of truth

are possible for a few people only. All other men have to embark upon the ship of faith (which is the Church) and they will arrive at the same state of blessedness as the intellectuals. Augustine's purpose in De Trinitate is the answer to our question, for he intended by it to prove that all men need faith. The common man can find salvation if he has nothing more than faith, while the one who is capable of loving and understanding truth with his mind needs the Mediator just as much, in order to direct and purify his reason.<sup>257</sup>

Augustine seems at times to set forth a way of salvation that is only for those men whose minds are capable of penetrating into the truths of philosophy. However, in the final analysis he does not believe that there is such a thing as reason which is unaided or free from the direction of God. All truth is measured and judged by men according to the form of truth which has been impressed on them from above.<sup>258</sup> Much of The Confessions is a description of how God had guided and directed Augustine's own reason until he had come to the truth. Within De Trinitate, also, it is clear that there can be no restoration of the image of God in man except as it is given to man through faith. It must be readily admitted that Augustine never did come near to solving the paradox of grace and free will. His famous solution is well known but it is very doubtful if he himself ever was really satisfied with his solution.<sup>259</sup>

### The Necessity for Faith

Thus it becomes clear that faith is necessary for salvation. Reason, according to Augustine, needs the insight that comes only through faith which accepts the reality of our dependence upon God and our relationship with him. It is only the mind which has been purified from the stains of pride, the purgatissimis mentibus, that can rise to a vision of God. The piety of Christianity, then, has the purpose of "healing the feebleness of the mind in order that it may be able to perceive the unchangeable truth."<sup>260</sup>

Earlier we saw how Augustine never did resolve the paradox that one must believe in order to understand and understand in order to believe. The positive side of faith, however, is expressed in this way: "except He is loved by faith, it will not be possible for the heart to be cleansed, in order that it may be apt and meet to see Him."<sup>261</sup> Let us turn now to estimate what Augustine means by faith in relation to the restoration of the image of God in man.

Faith is, first of all, a pre-requisite before the mind can begin to have the image restored. The mind must believe that certain things have already been done. It must believe that the Devil has been conquered by the righteousness and blood of Christ. Moreover, the mind should believe that the Devil remains an adversary only insofar as man is fleshly and mortal. Man's spirit is no longer under the dominion of his power.<sup>262</sup> Faith, then, centers its attention



upon the work of Christ. Indeed faith must be limited to Christ alone, who rose from the dead in the flesh. Faith in any other means of salvation is infidelity, since Christ and no other has freed us from the dominion of the Devil.<sup>263</sup>

The sacrament of baptism is also necessary for salvation. Baptism was, by his acceptance of the authority of the Church, considered by Augustine to be the absolute prerequisite of salvation.<sup>264</sup> It appears regularly, although not prominently, when he comes to discuss the process of renewal in salvation. He describes its effectiveness according to the analogy of sickness. In baptism the fever is cured. The forgiveness and cleansing of baptism is complete, sudden and effective. The true restoration of the image, however, is like the process of growing strong again bit by bit, day by day, and is described as "making progress in the knowledge of God."<sup>265</sup>

Faith remains a constant necessity throughout the whole long process of renewal. We shall never in this life reach the state in which we have any sustained vision of God. Faith in the Mediator is necessary to keep the mind turned toward God in the hope of finally seeing Him "face to face." "And when the last day of life shall have found anyone holding fast faith in the Mediator in such progress and growth as this, he will be welcomed by the holy angels, to be led to God, whom he has worshipped, and to be made perfect by Him."<sup>266</sup> Such is the importance of faith, that it is

essential not only before the renewal of the image can begin but it is necessary as long as we remain in this life.

Before leaving the matter, it should be noted that Harnack is not entirely justified in his conclusion that Augustine's faith is "merely something preliminary."<sup>267</sup> According to De Trinitate the need for faith never ceases until man has come to see God face to face. As long as we are in this life, we cannot see God as he sees us. But when full vision comes,<sup>268</sup> then the need for faith shall pass away. Faith is something, then, which keeps us moving in the right direction throughout all our earthly existence.

Before we proceed to examine how Augustine considers the image is restored, let us attempt one final word about the image as it is in man before restoration. We have now eliminated all suggestion that it is a form or impression made upon the mind from past experience. The form of God in the mind is, then, the very nature of the mind as it reveals how God still participates in man. Should God withdraw his participation, the image would disappear from man. God, however, does not withdraw his participation and is ever present, impressing his form upon the human mind. In man's most fallen condition the light still surrounds him,<sup>269</sup> and his blindness is never complete while he has life.<sup>270</sup> Some trace of God's presence remains, otherwise man could not know God at all. In other words, man can never entirely forget God because God's impression is always being made upon him.<sup>271</sup>

The truth about the image of God becomes clearer still when we realize that it is impossible to consider man as he is in himself without also considering his relationship with God. It may be that Augustine believes it is possible for us to consider man before he consciously turns toward God and, through love, begins to share in his nature. However, it is also abundantly evident that Augustine does not believe that there is such a thing as an image of God in man which exists apart from his relationship to God. The most obvious statement of this principle is this: "For the true honor of man is the image and likeness of God, which is not preserved except it be in relation to Him by whom it is impressed."<sup>272</sup>

It is, then, impossible for Augustine to consider that there is ever a time when God does not participate in the mind of man. According to his ontology there is no existence which is not existence in God. Hence, even at the time when we were attempting to define the image of God as a kind of thought which is analogous to God, we were dealing with something which only exists because God is participating in it. We now see why it was that Augustine said, "For that only is in all points copied from Him, between which and Himself no nature is interposed."<sup>273</sup> It is the mind which is actually in the presence of God that is the image of God in man.

Much of the language of De Trinitate reflects this belief that it is while the mind is in action before God that it is most like God. Augustine speaks of how it is "said of

the nature of mind . . . when as a whole it contemplates the truth [that] it is the image of God."<sup>274</sup> The noblest part of the mind was described as that "by which it knows or can know God."<sup>275</sup> We have seen how blessed souls are truly blessed only when they are in the presence of God, which means, "only in learning and knowing, i.e., in the contemplation of nature, than which nothing is better and more lovable."<sup>276</sup> And finally, it has been noted that the soul is most truly the image of God when it is worshipping God. That is to say, the soul is growing in the image when it remembers, understands and, above all, when it is desiring to see God as he is.<sup>277</sup>

#### 9. The Image as a Capacity For God

From God's side, the image of God is seen to be a relationship with man which God will not allow to be entirely broken. From man's side, the image of God is seen to be a capacity for God. At this point it is almost impossible to sort out which comes first. Is man made after the image of God because he has a capacity for God? Or is it because man is the image of God that he has a capacity for God? Evidently it is both ways. Man is like God because the knowledge of God can exist in his rational mind.<sup>278</sup> The mind is said to be made after the image of God because it is "able (potest) to use reason and intellect in order to understand and behold God."<sup>279</sup> "For it [the mind] is His image in this very point, that it is capable of Him, and can be partaker of Him."<sup>280</sup>

The climax of this discussion comes at the point where

the highest trinity in the mind is found. No sooner has he found it than Augustine goes on to say "This trinity, then, of the mind is not therefore the image of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself; but because it can (potest) also remember, understand and love Him by whom it was made."<sup>281</sup> The fact that the soul has some power to know God ranks very high in Augustine's estimate of why man may be called the image of God.<sup>282</sup> On the other hand, it often seems that it is because man is made in the image of God that he has power to know God.<sup>283</sup> The argument, of course, becomes circular here and simply signifies that Augustine did not solve the problem of grace and free will. When driven to make a choice Augustine would never conclude that man has any power except that given to him by God.

In its natural state the image of God in man is, therefore, a potential. Such power as man has, however, more often than not leads him into sin. Within man is a kind of power which is the will to be blessed, but by himself he cannot see clearly enough to desire those things which will bring him to fulfilment in the blessed life.<sup>284</sup> Something must happen to something in man that will relate this potential with the original source of power. Man's capacities for God must be redirected and developed until he regains his lost position.

At the conclusion of this investigation of Augustine's thought in De Trinitate, then, we come to attempt some estimate

of what Augustine believes about the image of God in man. In the first place, Augustine has found the image of God in the substance of the mind. Just as the Trinity which is God is a substance, so the trinity which is man is the highest created spiritual substance. However, the mind of man is not the image of God merely because it is mind. There is an image of God in the mind of man because that mind has been given a capacity for participating in God.

As something in itself, apart from its relationship with God, the image of God in man is seen to be a movement of the memory, understanding and love which are entirely self-contained and entirely focused upon the mind itself. However, it also appears that Augustine can conceive of no such thing as an image of God which exists without the participation of God. Hence, he teaches that the thought within the human mind, in which God can be seen, is really an image of God only because it is able to remember, understand and love God himself. This capacity for God is not something that belongs to the mind itself but it is finally seen to be a power that the mind has because God never ceases to participate in man's being.

#### 10. The Image Restored

It remains now to follow Augustine as he teaches his doctrine of salvation in which the image of God is restored to its original form. The beginning of the restoration is described as a matter of remembering God. There is no salvation

for man until he is recalled to the awareness of God's presence. The renewal of the image of God in man, then, begins when man "by being reminded" is turned to the Lord. For Augustine this does not mean that man finds God in the objective study of the outside world. It means, rather, that man is recalled to the consciousness that God is ever present in his life, impressing himself upon the inner mind. Man can find God in the nature of his own innermost thoughts; in the world of values that he finds impressing itself upon his mind; in the realization that he desires blessedness, yet does not know where to find it. 285

Apparently the most difficult of all the steps in salvation is the first. Once a man is reminded of God he then turns towards the Lord, or perhaps better, he is converted to the Lord (convertuntur ad Dominum). The idea of turning toward God is meaningless until we come to understand that Augustine considers it a movement of the affections away from lesser things until they are fixed upon God himself. It is the will within man that turns. The desires move from corporeal things to spiritual things. Man himself does not turn toward the Lord in any physical sense.

By the power that love has to unite the mind with that which it sees, then, man begins to be formed anew (reformatio). 286

While it is true that at first the process of renewal has to do with the mind only, there is, according to Augustine's theory of ethics, a moral transformation which follows. For

Augustine the concept of intellectual contemplation includes a great deal more than it does for the modern thinker. When the mind is turned toward God, Augustine considers that man's most dominant desires are then employed in uniting man with the God he beholds.

Again Augustine finds Scripture to support his teaching that the process of renewal takes place in the mind. The language of Romans 12:2 is most agreeable to Augustine's doctrine. Paul writes, "be not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed (reformamini) by the renewing of your mind."<sup>287</sup> The same idea is present in Ephesians 4:23, where the writer says, "be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind." The phrase "spiritu mentis vestrae, spirit of your mind," is carefully examined by Augustine, who interprets it according to his theory of the nature of all reality. He finds that in the Bible there are various kinds of substance which are all called spirit. The highest quality of spirit is the pure uncreated substance which is God. The lowest grade of spirit is the movement of air known as wind. Even within man himself there is both an inferior kind of spirit which is less than mind and there is the rational spirit of the mind. Speaking of human nature, Augustine says that all mind is spirit but not all spirit is mind. Therefore, he concludes, what Ephesians 4:23 really teaches is that the renewal of the image is not a renewal of the whole soul but primarily a renewal of "that spirit which is called mind."<sup>288</sup>



### The Power of Love

The transformation of the inner man is seen to take place through a process of transferring the desires and affections from things which are lower than man to things which are above man. In conversion, the will turns from things which are loved through the senses to things which are desired through the intellect. Augustine does not consider that it is a sudden change but rather, like the process of convalescence in which health is slowly regained, little by little, man grows in the love for and the knowledge of God. "He, then, who is day by day renewed by making progress in the knowledge of God . . . transfers his love from things temporal to things eternal, from things visible to things intelligible . . . and diligently perseveres in bridling and lessening his desire for the former, and binding himself by love to the latter." Lest anyone should think that this process takes place entirely through the human will Augustine adds, "And he does this in proportion as he is helped by God."<sup>289</sup>

Love directed by the will, then, is the greatest single concept in the religion of Augustine. Love is the power of the affections by which the very nature of man is changed in direct relation to the nature of the things upon which the affections are allowed to rest. Man's soul, according to Augustine, is an exceptionally impressionable entity, which is deformed or reformed according as it is allowed to love inferior or superior things.<sup>290</sup> Salvation comes to the

human being when the mind is turned away from those things which are corporeal, changeable and temporal. Salvation begins when man ceases to have great affection for those things which he loves through the sense organs of his body.

When, on the other hand, man begins to love those things which are above, he finds that he is changed into the likeness of those things. The desire which he once had for material and earthly things he now expresses through the intellect. Intellectual love, however, is the love of things which are eternal, immutable and unchanging. Intellectual love is love for God himself and through his love for God man grows slowly into the likeness of God. While man's love for corporeal things does not entirely cease, it does become a love which refers all things to God. Temporal things are no longer loved as ends in themselves but they are loved as means to an end. The end of all things for the believer, is the worship of God. All love then becomes charity and even  
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the love of temporal things is good.

#### The Ethics of De Trinitate

Such ethics as Augustine teaches in De Trinitate are considered to follow from the religious experience by which the mind is transformed through the love of spiritual things. Augustine admits that in this life man does not see clearly enough ever to have a pure love of eternal things. Through faith, however, man is able to transfer his affections from the outer man in order that he may begin to live according to

the form of God which is implanted in the inner man. The place of faith in the life of the Christian is to purify the believer's vision until he can see those things which ought to be loved, in order that he may live a virtuous life.

The process by which virtue follows from faith is outlined as follows. First, we admonish the just to live by faith. Secondly, faith reveals to the believer those things that should be loved. "When those things [the outline of Christ's work] are believed to be true, and those things which therein ought to be loved are loved (diliguntur), then at last the man does live according to the trinity of the inner man." After the vision of the mind is purified by faith, then, the believer comes to see those things on which his affections should be allowed to rest.

Thirdly, when the believer comes to allow his affections to rest upon the right things then he is moved to do what is virtuous. It is possible that some may do good things for other reasons than because they love the good things which faith causes them to desire. If such is the case, then the actions are not really virtuous actions. In order to live the good life a man must be led to do the right things by the love of the true faith, "for not otherwise can they be virtues."<sup>292</sup>

Throughout the earthly life of the believer the image of God will continue to be restored, day by day, bit by bit, so long as he continues in the true faith. As we have noted, the hope of the believer in this life is not that he will have

the full and lasting vision of God but only that when he comes to die he may be found still growing in the knowledge of God. The limitations of Augustine's concept of faith are most evident at this point, where he relates faith to the moral growth of the believer. Faith, according to Augustine, offers man mainly a description of what God has already done through the Son, Jesus Christ.

Augustine knows little about faith which is a present reality in which God and man deal constantly with the sense of guilt and failure which the Christian is certain to have in this life. One of Augustine's few comments on the subject of forgiveness in De Trinitate follows his discussion of the way in which virtues follow from the true faith. In concluding, he says this, "And yet these [virtues] in this life are not of so great worth, as that the remission of sins, of some kind or other, is not sometimes necessary here; and this remission comes not to pass except through Him, who by his own blood conquered the prince of sinners."<sup>293</sup>

#### The Image and Immortality

Augustine's constant hope that he may behold God with the purified vision of his mind is, then, not actually a hope for this life. Indeed, Augustine's theology finally led to an attitude of despair so far as this life is concerned. When he comes to deal with the nature of the image of God in man in the future life Augustine has to do some careful teaching. The first thing to keep before us is Augustine's certainty that the image

of God in man is an image of the Trinity and that it is to be completely like God in the life beyond. His final summary of his long search is this: "we believe, - and, after the utmost search we have been able to make, understand - that man was made after the image of the Trinity, because it was not said, After my or after thy image."<sup>294</sup> Here we see finally how completely Augustine depended upon a close verbal exegesis of his Latin version for the proof of his doctrine. We shall consider the correctness of this exegesis in the next chapter.

Moreover, it is the image of the Trinity which is to be made complete when the limitations of the body have been removed and man sees God face to face. Faith will be no longer necessary when the believer has entered into the life beyond, because he will then behold God with the pure intellectual vision of the mind. The characteristic expression of the Christian hope is this: "For the likeness of God (similitudo Dei) will then be perfected in this image, when the sight of God shall be perfected."<sup>295</sup> That is to say, the image of the Trinity which is found in man's spiritual substance, and which has been growing in the likeness of God during this earthly life, will be completely like God when man's spirit meets the pure spiritual God in the life beyond.

Augustine describes according to another figure the way in which the image will be completely developed. Interpreting Scripture, he teaches that in the future life the

faithful will be one spirit with God. He is careful, however, to distinguish his teaching from that of those who taught that man becomes divine in the after life. Nor does he allow us to understand that man's spirit is to be added to God's in the same way that a cup of water added to the ocean would make the ocean greater. Instead, Augustine uses the concept of participation to teach how man and God become one spirit. When we see God as he is, he teaches, we shall be one spirit with him "by drawing near to partake of His nature, truth and blessedness, yet not by His increasing in His nature, truth and blessedness."<sup>296</sup> In the future life, as in this life, man changes into the likeness of God but God is never changed.

So far Augustine has no problem. His teaching is perfectly consistent with all that has gone before. The image of God in man is the image of the Trinity in this life and it will be completely the image of the Trinity in the life after death. However, Augustine is sure that the Bible teaches a doctrine of the resurrection of the body. When the apostle John writes "we shall be like Him for we shall see Him as He is" (I John 3:2), Augustine interprets this to mean that the body also is to be immortal. He offers two solutions to this problem, since it is impossible for him to believe that the image of God can ever be in the body.

His first solution is to teach that it is only in the final judgment that the bodies of men are to rise and become immortal. Between the time when this earthly body

dies and the time of the final judgment, men will live in the spiritual body which is to be given to them as Paul says, "in the twinkling of an eye" (1 Cor. 15:52). "For in that very twinkling of an eye, before the judgment, the spiritual body shall rise again in power, in incorruption, in glory." During the period between the death of the flesh and the final judgment, then, the image of God in man will be an image in the spiritual body which is as completely like the Trinity as it is possible for any created image to be. Augustine's conclusions are these: "But the image which is renewed in the spirit of the mind in the knowledge of God, not outwardly but inwardly, from day to day, shall be perfected by that sight itself; which then after the judgment will be face to face, but now makes progress as through an enigma. And we must understand it to be on account of the perfection that 'we shall be like Him for we shall see Him as He is.'<sup>297</sup>"

In this last statement we see an inkling of the second solution which Augustine offers to the problem raised by the resurrection of the body. Between death and the final judgment the spiritual body will have in it the image of the Trinity. After the judgment, when the physical body also rises to live eternally, then man will also have an image which is like the Son. Insofar as the body is to be included in the resurrection, man is to become like the risen Christ. When he is like Christ he will have an image like that of Christ.

In his spiritual body man will remain an image of the Trinity. In his risen corporeal body the believer will become an image of the Son, who was the only person in the Trinity to have a body. Speaking of the resurrection body, Augustine says this: "For we shall be like God in this too, but only to the Son, because He only in the Trinity took a body in which he died and rose again, and which He carried with Him to heaven<sup>298</sup> above."

#### 11. The Image of God in Christ

In this last paragraph we find that a problem arises which must be dealt with. How does Augustine consider that the image of God in Christ is related to the image of God in man? The general answer is that the image of God in Christ is something which is born of God, while the image of God in man is something which has been made by God. Augustine accepted the teaching of Hilary as he attempted to outline the special attributes of each member of the Trinity. He taught, "Eternity<sup>299</sup> is in the Father, form in the Image, use in the Gift." Christ, then, is the Image in a way that the Holy Spirit is not. The image in Christ, however, must be an image of the Father. Moreover, the image of the Father which is in Christ is fully equal to the original from which it was born. "But the Son is from the Father, so as to be, and so as to be co-eternal with Him. For if an image perfectly fills the measure of that of which it is the image, then the image is made equal



to that of which it is the image."

The image of the Father in Christ is not, however, the same as the form of God in Christ. That is to say, when Christ is said to be the Image it does not mean that the image of God in Christ is of the same substance as God himself. Christ's image is something which was given to him when he was born and he is, therefore, called the Image relatively and not essentially. Just as the Word of God in Christ is the wisdom of God which was born; so the image of God in Christ is the form of God which was born. We shall consider this matter further in our conclusions.

Augustine teaches that the word born contains some very important theological meanings when it is applied to Christ. In the word born he considers that these things are intended: "both word, and image, and Son are understood [in the word born], and in all these names essence is not expressed, since they are spoken of relatively."<sup>300</sup>

Some of the early theologians, according to De Trinitate, had made a distinction between the image of God in Christ and the image of God in man on the basis of likeness. Whereas Christ is the image of God, they said, man is made "after the image of God." Augustine admits that man is made after the image of God "on account . . . of the inequality of likeness." That is, man is the image of God but he is not like God except at a great distance, whereas the image in Christ is completely like God.

Augustine turns to Scripture again and finds that Paul teaches, "For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, foras-<sup>301</sup> much as he is the image and glory of God." Augustine takes this statement of Paul's to be a refutation of the doctrine that man is made after the image of God. Man, says Augustine, is the image of God, but in a different way from that in which Christ is the image. Man is made in the image of the whole Trinity, whereas Christ the Son is born the image of the Father only. Man is the image of the Trinity but his likeness to God is very distant and incomplete. At best man is only like God as the creature is like its Creator. Christ, on the other hand, is the image of the Father to the extent of being like him in all respects. The great difference between the image of God in Christ and the original form of God is that the image has been born. "And by the example of Him who is the image, let us also not depart from God, since we also are the image of God, not indeed that which is equal to Him, since we are made so by the Father through the Son, and not born of the Father as that [the image in the Son] <sup>302</sup> is."

## 12. The Likeness of God and the Image of God

One final question remains to be answered as it arises from this last discussion. Did Augustine follow the earlier Church Fathers in making a theological distinction between the term image and the term likeness? Our answer is that he did

not make such a distinction and the evidence is as follows:

Concerning the term likeness (similitudo), it can be said that in De Trinitate it is used generally to indicate any kind of similarity between two objects. As a description of Christ it expresses his complete equality with God but it also describes how in the form of a servant he is made like men.<sup>303</sup> This likeness of men amounts to full identification with them in flesh as well as in the sentient and reasoning elements of the soul.

In other cases, however, the meaning of likeness is more akin to our word, analogy. For one thing, until we are able to see God for ourselves through direct vision of him, Augustine teaches that it is necessary for us to speak in similitudes.<sup>304</sup> Moreover, the search for a trinity in the human being is, in the end, a search for "a likeness or comparison" in known things, in which we can "believe in order to love God."<sup>305</sup>

Evidence that being like God does not mean being God himself is clear when Augustine explains that "everything in the creatures which is in any way like God, is not also to be called His image; but that alone than which He Himself alone is higher."<sup>306</sup> There is some sense, according to this passage, in which every created thing has a likeness to God but it certainly is not a part of God. This distinction is made clearly when it is said that the outer man has some likeness to the inner man.<sup>307</sup> We have no doubt after our

study of Augustine's attitude to human nature that this can only mean that the outer man is like the inner in a way that something physical can illustrate something spiritual. At the point of being analogous, therefore, the likeness of man to God ceases.

In all the above passages there is no possibility of theological significance in the term similitudo apart from the fact that all things are in some measure like God. There are at least three passages where there might be a theological distinction between the words image and likeness. In the exposition of Genesis 1:26 Augustine teaches that "man is said to be 'after the image' on account, . . . of the inequality of the likeness."<sup>308</sup> In another passage, speaking of sin, it is said that when man begins with a perverse desire for the "likeness of God" he arrives in the end at the state where he has the likeness of the beasts.<sup>309</sup> It would seem at times like this, when Augustine teaches about sin, that he believes there is always an image of God in man but that the likeness of God can completely disappear from human nature.

The passages in which Augustine is nearest to teaching that there is a significant distinction between the likeness and the image of God in man, appear when he describes the final state of the image in the after life. Here is a typical statement: "Hence it appears, that the full likeness of God is to take place in that image of God at that time when it shall

receive the full sight of God."<sup>310</sup> There is a strong indication in such quotations as these that while the image of God always remains, that which man lost in the Fall was his likeness to God. Man's restoration to fellowship with God, therefore, is the renewed likeness which he gains through the process of salvation.

It is fully evident in De Trinitate, however, that Augustine is not following the teaching of Irenaeus who is credited with establishing the doctrine in which the image and likeness of God are distinguished.<sup>311</sup> There is every evidence that Augustine's use of the terms imago and similitudo follows largely from his own understanding of the Biblical reference in his version of the Old Testament. We support these statements with the following reasons.

In the first place, there is no evidence in De Trinitate that Augustine has read, or has been impressed by, any of the early fathers, except Hilary of Poitiers. As already noted, Augustine himself claims no ability to read or understand the Greek writings of those who taught before him. In the second place, we can be sure that if Augustine had any intention of making a significant theological distinction between imago and similitudo, he would have based his discussion upon an interpretation of Genesis 1:26, 27. In all other matters of doctrine Augustine depends heavily upon a close verbal treatment of these verses. It is inconceivable that he would fail to use the words of Genesis, if he intended to

make any significant distinction between the terms image and likeness.

Thirdly, Augustine does not relate his teaching on the nature of likeness to his teaching about the fall of man, as he outlines it in De Trinitate. We are certain that Augustine taught a doctrine in which the image of God in man was damaged and impaired as a result of the Fall. There is, however, no reason to conclude that this means anything more than that man lost his conscious participation in God and his whole nature was changed for the worse. He makes no suggestion, as did some of the early fathers, that man lost his supra-natural gifts and retained only his natural human qualities after the Fall.

It must be admitted that there are some parallels which can be drawn between the doctrine of Irenaeus and the doctrine of Augustine on the subject of the image of God in man. For one thing, both Irenaeus and Augustine taught that it is man's reason which distinguishes him from all the rest of created beings. Irenaeus considered that the result of the Fall was the corruption of man's reason. Whereas man was created with a free will in order that he might live rationally, man now lives irrationally and in opposition to God.<sup>312</sup> Augustine would have agreed with Irenaeus that the direction of man's reason is now perverted and causes man to seek after things which are less than God.

Irenaeus and Augustine also agreed in teaching that man

in his present state is no longer like God. Irenaeus taught that man lost his likeness to God at the Fall but that the image of God still remains in man.<sup>313</sup> However, Irenaeus considered it was because the spirit of God no longer acted upon man that he had ceased to have the likeness of God. Without the Spirit man is only body and soul and has come to have an animal nature. The likeness of God is restored when the Spirit of God again becomes active in man and restores his true rationality.<sup>314</sup>

Since Irenaeus was writing in opposition to the Gnostics he took pains to prove that the whole man, body, soul and spirit is included in God's plan of salvation. Consequently Irenaeus taught that the image of God is to be found in the whole of natural man. He did not hesitate to teach that man's fleshly nature was molded after the image of God. More specifically, he taught that man's fleshly nature is made after the image of the Son.<sup>315</sup> At this point, of course, the divergence of Irenaeus from Augustine is obvious. Augustine simply could not consider that the image of God was to be found in any of the fleshly nature of man. Nor did Augustine accept the teaching that the image of God in man is an image of the Son only. Augustine was greatly concerned to prove that the image of God in man is an image of the Trinity.

Concerning the nature of likeness, Augustine taught that man never ceased to have some likeness to God. Man is never like God to the point of equality but, on the other hand,

he never ceases to have some likeness to God as long as he exists. Augustine did not consider that the Fall had taken away man's supernatural gifts. He taught, rather, that man's whole nature had been changed for the worse and that the image of God in the spirit of the human mind is impaired.

The best proof that Augustine does not teach a doctrine in which the natural and supernatural qualities in human nature are distinguished according to the terms imago and similitudo, is his own doctrine at the end of De Trinitate. As he comes to consider what Paul means by being transformed into the same image, Augustine says this: By "'we are transformed into the same image' . . . he assuredly means to speak of the image of God; and by calling it 'the same', he means that very image which we see in the glass [i.e. in the thought of the mind] because that same image is also the glory of God." Then Augustine goes on to expand this statement by saying, "we are changed from one form to another, and we pass from a form that is obscure to a form that is bright; since the obscure form too is the image of God; and if an image, then assuredly also the 'glory', in which we are created as men better than the other animals."<sup>316</sup>

It is clear in these last quotations that Augustine does not consider that the renewal of the image of God in man is the restoration of a supernatural element which he has lost. Just as the whole man was changed for the worse at the time of the Fall; so the whole man is changed for the better



while the image is being renewed.

In other words, the changes which take place in the image of God are changes within man's own nature. Man's nature is changed as a result of his closer relationship with God. It is not as if the image is destroyed or renewed when some supernatural element is lost or added to human nature. It is rather that as man moves away from God or toward God he loses or regains that participation in God which makes his nature like God's nature. Hence, it is man himself who changes into the likeness of God when the image is moving from that which is defaced to that which is beautiful. Man's inner being is transformed from the glory that belongs to the creature to the glory that belongs to the Creator. Man himself is said to move from faith to sight and the more he sees God the more he is like God. When the full likeness of God appears in the image, then the process of restoration will be complete.<sup>317</sup>

We conclude then, that Augustine uses the word likeness merely to indicate the similarities between things that are created and the Creator himself. It is not man's spiritual endowments only that make him like God. There are likenesses to God in every part of man. The image, on the other hand, is to be found only in that part of man which is the highest created substance in its purest form.

What, then, does Augustine mean when he says, concerning the future life, "for the likeness of God will then be perfected in this image?" The answer to this question is best

found in considering the way Augustine thinks of the mind in general. Earlier, during the discussion in which Augustine was leading the reader toward a discovery of the mind as something in itself, Augustine had taught that the mind never knows only a part of itself. Rather, when the mind is just beginning to find itself, it knows the whole mind but it knows it incom-  
 318  
 pletely.

Augustine's description of looking into the mind may be compared to looking into a mirror which is heavily fogged. It is possible to see a complete image in the mirror and yet the vision is incomplete because the color, form and delineation of features are indistinct. What a person sees in the mirror is not part of an image but a whole image which he sees incompletely. According to the same figure, when Augustine looked into the mirror of his own thought, he saw the whole God but he had to search diligently to see the outline of the Trinity. The very analogy by which we see God in the mind is also an enigma which is difficult to see through.

We are on solid ground, therefore, when we conclude that, when Augustine teaches the likeness of God is to be perfected in the image, he means that the full vision of God is to be made clear in man's mind. The image in the mind of man is to become clear in detail, form and delineation of feature in the future life. The likeness of God is the developing similarity between the true God and the vision in man's mind. It is nothing more.

### 13. Conclusions

Let us now recapitulate the conclusions which we have drawn. Our first conclusion about the image of God in man as we find it in Augustine's De Trinitate was this: Augustine has nearly described the image of God in man as a kind of self-contained mental activity which is to be found in the rational mental substance of the individual human being. Such mental activity was seen to be a kind of inner movement in which the mind remembers and understands itself because the love of the mind is focused entirely upon the mind itself. Thus the image of God in the spiritual substance of the mind was seen to be analogous to God since the relationship between memory, understanding and love can be described according to the categories which prevail in spiritual substance. The trinity in the human mind was seen to be an image in created spiritual substance which is the nearest analogy to the divine Trinity that it is possible for us to find.

Our second conclusion was that Augustine could not rest content with this description of the image of God as something static. At the same time as he was drawing near to the conclusion that there is such a thing as an image in the mind of man, he was teaching that the image of God cannot exist except through its relationship with God. The solution to the dilemma which presented itself to Augustine was seen to be his teaching that, while man no longer participates in God, God nevertheless still participates in the being of man. The image

of God in natural man, then appeared to be a capacity for God which exists in the human mind. Because God never ceases to sprinkle the human mind with the light by which man sees the truth, man can always be recalled to God. Because God himself is actively impressing his form upon the mind of man then man who turns toward his innermost self can always find the form of God there.

Moreover, we concluded that three experiences common to man were present in Augustine's mind as he taught that the image of God is a capacity for God. First, he considered that the ability to see the spiritual form of true reality with the thought processes of the rational mind was evidence that man has a capacity for God. It is within these thought processes, indeed, that the image of God is to be found. Secondly, we concluded that the presence of values in the human mind from which there arise a sense of obligation impressed Augustine as an evidence that the image of God exists in all men. Thirdly, we concluded that the desire for blessedness, which Augustine believed to be in the hearts of every man, led him to believe that a capacity for God is always present in the human soul.

Finally, we concluded that the image of God is, for Augustine, the same as the knowledge of God. We saw how the image of God in man develops according to the amount of wisdom in the human mind. As man comes to know God he becomes like God and the likeness of God in man is wisdom. The more man participates in the wisdom of God the more he is like God. As

the likeness of God in man develops more and more the image of God is slowly restored to its original form. During this life man needs faith that he may know what things are to be loved in order to see God. The man who cleaves to God in faith during this life will see God face to face in the life to come when the limitations of this earthly body have been removed.

NOTES ON CHAPTER I

- 1 De Trinitate was written between 400 and 416 A.D. Cyril C. Richardson, A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, ed. Roy W. Battenhouse, art. "The Enigma of the Trinity," p.236 considers De Trinitate to be "the fruit of his maturity." cf. Bourke, p.304.
- 2 Étienne Gilson, Introduction a L'Étude de Saint Augustin, Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin., 1943. In the chapter on the image of God in this major resource Gilson is almost entirely dependent upon De Trinitate for his references.
- 3 So Bethune-Baker, pp.225ff.
- 4 p.4; cf.p.122 (n.2).
- 5 p.122.
- 6 See I,ii,4ff.
- 7 The whole fifteenth book is devoted to pointing out the limitations of the analogy he has discovered since the distance between the created trinity and the real Trinity is so great. See Gilson, p.297; esp. Bourke, p.221.
- 8 I,ii,4.
- 9 Burnaby, p.144.
- 10 Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947, p.219 (n.1). cf. Bourke, p.203 "His mature thought may be appropriately considered under the following three titles: God and My Soul; God and the Created World; and God and Society." God and My Soul refers to his treatment of De Trinitate.

- 11 cf. M. C. D'Arcy, p.156.
- 12 Retractions II, xv, 1,2,3 deals with:  
 i. Love of outward appearances.  
 ii. One of his illustrations re. four footed birds.  
 iii. The nature of sin.
- 13 Conf. VI,i,1.
- 14 E.T. Watkin, A Monument to Saint Augustine, art. "The Mysticism of Saint Augustine", p.112 teaches that Augustine approaches mysticism but the theology of mysticism had not yet begun.  
cf. Bourke, p.221; Burnaby, p.33.
- 15 The adjectives rational and intellectual are regularly used as they are here to describe the attributes which make man superior to the animals. Both terms will be examined more carefully later.
- 16 De Civ. Dei XII,23; Conf. XIII,viii,22.
- 17 IV,i,3; IX,xii,17; XII,vii,12; ". . . man was not made in the image of God according to the shape of his body, but according to his rational mind."
- 18 David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, London: S.C.M., 1953 p.100, is misleading when he concludes that the "image is defined by St. Augustine as rationality."
- 19 Conf. VII,i,1.
- 20 Conf. VII,xvii,23; cf. in the same passage, "I passed on to the reasoning faculty, unto which whatever is received from the senses of the body is referred to be judged."
- 21 XII,ii,2.
- 22 Conf. XIII,xxxvii,53.

- 23 Conf. VII,xvii,23.
- 24 IX,vi,11 "form of eternal truth" here is found to be a translation of a note which is added to the Latin text.
- 25 rationalis mentis intuitu.
- 26 VIII,ix,13.
- 27 VIII,iii,4.
- 28 IX,vii,12.
- 29 XII,vii,12.
- 30 XII,ii,2.
- 31 IX,vi,11.
- 32 This is considered by Gilson to be the main work of reason. P.56(n.lc) "La raison (ratio) est le mouvement par lequel la pensée (mens) passe de l'une de ses connaissances à une autre pour les associer ou les dissocier."
- 33 XI,ii,3.
- 34 He accepts, for example, the account of Gen. 30:37-41 where the offspring are affected by what the parents have seen. III,x,15.
- 35 I,vii,14; VII,vi,12; XII,vi,6; XIV,xvi,22.
- 36 cf. II,i,2.
- 37 VIII,v,8.



- 38 Cushman p.293.  
Gilson, p.259 who traces the idea further back than Plato.  
Bourke, p.75.
- 39 Gilson, p.260. "On le traduit souvent par ratio: mais ratio correspond exactement à λόγος, et non à ἰδέα; c'est donc par 'forme' que l'on doit traduire leur nom."
- 40 Augustine guards carefully against the Manichaeen concept of how a part of God entered into his creatures.
- 41 Conf. XII,viii,8.
- 42 VII,i,2.
- 43 IX,vi,11.
- 44 IX,vii,12.
- 45 XI,iii,6.
- 46 Conf. XII,iii,3 "nulla species" is translated "no visible appearance."
- 47 Conf. XII,xiii,16. No species here means no "this and that"  
cf. XII,viii,8.
- 48 Gilson, p.260.
- 49 The term lineamentum is also used to describe the outline of a human body. e.g. VIII,iv,7; VIII,v.7.
- 50 Conf. XII,iii,3. Here the verb is formare and it expresses God's action on the formless material.

- 51 Conf. XII,vi,6 and vii,7. His discussion here is related to his theory of time. He seems to find in the changing form of things an evolution toward the universal uncreated Form.  
cf. Gilson, p.260.
- 52 e.g. XI,ii,3.
- 53 X,v,7.
- 54 II,vi,11. Such-are the appearances of the Holy Spirit when it appears as fire and as a dove. Such appearances are not real incarnations in the sense that Jesus was real flesh. Such appearances are described as "Modes", II,vii,12.
- 55 VIII,iv,7; such images are corporum lineamentis formisque.
- 56 XII,ix,14.
- 57 XI,iv,7.
- 58 I,vii,14; and see esp. I,xi,22 the whole chapter.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 XIII,xv,17 "they who belong to the grace of Christ, foreknown, and predestined and elected before the foundation of the world, should only so far die as Christ Himself died for them, i.e. only by the death of the flesh, not of the spirit."  
cf. I,xi,21.
- 61 IV,iii,6.
- 62 VII,iii,5; IV,i,3.
- 63 VII,iii,5.

- 64 Ibid. cf. VII,xi,12.
- 65 VII,iii,5.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 VII,vi,12. The distance from God is the same as likeness or unlikeness to God. The further man is from God the less he is like God. "For approach to God is not by intervals of place, but by likeness, and withdrawal from Him is by unlikeness."
- 68 Whatever can be said of God, according to Augustine, must be said essentially i.e. God is what he has. God is Wisdom, God is Truth and God is Form.
- 69 VIII,ix,13.
- 70 VIII,iii,5.
- 71 IX,vi,11.
- 72 IX,vii,12.
- 73 XI,v,8.
- 74 XIV,xv,21.  
See Bourke, p.75 for a discussion of God as the supreme Modus or standard of truth.
- 75 cf. XII,ii,2 which is related to this whole paragraph.
- 76 XIV,ix,12.
- 77 XIV,xii,16.
- 78 XIV,xiv,20.

- 79 VIII,iii,5.
- 80 XIV,vi,8.
- 81 III,ii,8.
- 82 Enchiridion XII, "All things that exist, therefore, seeing that the Creator of them all is supremely good, are themselves good. But because they are not, like the Creator, supremely and unchangeably good, their good may be diminished and increased."
- 83 IV,iii,5. Death of the body is attributed to the punishment for sin. cf. XIII,xii,16.
- 84 III,iii,8. cf. VIII,iii,5 where he teaches that the mind is better than the body. See also XIV,xii,16.
- 85 VIII,vi,9; IX,ii,2. "if then we withdraw the body, the mind and spirit remain."
- 86 Burnaby, p.27.
- 87 cf. E.R.E. art. Manichaeism, p.397d.
- 88 I,vi,13.
- 89 I,vii,14; esp. II,vi,11.
- 90 e.g. III,iv,10; IV,iii,5; VIII,ii,3.
- 91 VIII,ii,3.
- 92 IV,xi,14.
- 93 III,iv,10.

- 94 XIII,xvi,20.
- 95 XIII,ix,12.
- 96 XIV,xvii,23.
- 97 XIV,xviii,24; see also IV,iii,6; and XIII,xx,25 where "all good things of human nature" means both the soul and the body.
- 98 cf. Burnaby, p.27.  
 Note on flesh (carnis):- Flesh is used regularly by Augustine to strengthen the impression of outward form and substance as it is indicated by the word body (corporis). There is no regular distinction, however, between body and flesh. See e.g. VIII,viii,12 where Paul in the flesh means Paul during his earthly life.
- 99 Conf. VII,xvii,23. We shall quote several times from this passage in this discussion.  
 Note:- ratiocinatem potentiam would be better translated "reasoning power." Augustine would not allow the term faculty, if by faculty we mean that it is possible to distinguish the parts of the soul according to position or movement.
- 100 anima is the Latin term for the vital principle as it is common to both men and beasts. Anima governs the body III,iii,8; it gives life(vita) to the body IV,ii,8. In this last reference anima corresponds to nepesh in Gen. 2:7.  
cf. D'Arcy, p.171.
- 101 XII,i,1; X,v,7. "For we feel that we have those parts of the soul (anima) which are shaped by the likenesses of corporeal things, in common also with the beasts."
- 102 The main feature of the outer man, according to Augustine, is its dependence on sensory experience. XI,i,1; XII,i,1.
- 103 XII,viii,13; cf. XII,i,1.

- 104 IV,iii,6; Augustine refers us to 2 Cor. 4:16 and Eph. 4:22-25 for the source of this idea.
- 105 II,xvii,28; XV,i,1; here as elsewhere the words rational and intellectual are used together in describing the higher aspect of the anima.
- 106 cf. e.g. VI,vi,8.
- 107 cf. D'Arcy, p.171; it must be remembered that Augustine does not use a consistent technical language and animus can also be used to describe the whole soul. e.g. XII,i,1.
- 108 The Magnitude of the Soul, trans. J. J. McMahon, in "The Fathers of the Early Church," New York: CIMA, 1947, Vol. II,XIII,22.
- 109 VIII,iv,7 - v,8; cf. XI,iv,7, where the power of the imagination is described.
- 110 IX,ix,16; it must be noted here that this does not mean becoming God or having a part of God within. We shall examine this concept further under "participation." Here Augustine is describing what some modern theologians call "ontological reason." cf. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 72-73.
- 111 p. 57 (n. 1a).
- 112 X,iv,6; X,viii,11; cf. X,vii,9; X,x,13; II,xvii,28.
- 113 e.g. X,xi,17; see esp. XV,i,1.
- 114 This is not to say that there are not trinities in these parts. Such trinities, however, cannot be the image of God who is pure spirit.
- 115 IX,ii,2.

- 116 In practice Augustine does not teach a trichotomy of body, soul and spirit. His teaching is, rather, that there are grades of spirit which range all the way from something so material as wind up through the human mind to God. See II,ii,12 where anima is spiritual substance; in VII,iii,5 it is said that only pure intellectual spirits can see God; I,i,2 here God is pure spirit; and in XIV,xvi,22 there is a full discussion of spirit. H. W. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark, 1913, p.160 is misleading on trichotomy in Augustine.
- 117 XII,iii,3.
- 118 Augustine believes the other senses could illustrate the same theory of knowledge but he singles out sight.
- 119 XI,ii,2.
- 120 X,v,7.
- 121 Ibid.
- 122 XI,iii,6; X,viii,11.
- 123 IX,vi,10; VIII,vi,9; IX,xi,16.
- 124 XI,iii,6.
- 125 X,viii,11.
- 126 XI,iii,6.
- 127 XI,v,8.
- 128 XI,x,17.
- 129 XIV,xi,14.

- 130 of. Gilson, p.293 "La mémoire n'est autre chose que la connaissance [consciousness] de la pensée par elle même."
- 131 XI,i,1.
- 132 XII,iv,4; see esp. XI,v,8.
- 133 XII,xv,25.
- 134 XIV,i,1; and XIV,i,3.
- 135 VII,iii,5; here Augustine speaks of pure intellectual spirits who have not fallen through pride. It is such who can see God. This, however, is a form of spirit which does not actually occur in this world.
- 136 XII,vii,10; underlining ours.
- 137 X,viii,11.
- 138 Ibid.
- 139 XI,v,8; underlining ours.
- 140 I,vii,14; VII,vi,12; esp. XII,vi,6.
- 141 XII,vi,7; earlier he had understood the image of God to be the likeness of a son to his father.  
cf. Burnaby, p.144.
- 142 XII,vii,9; VII,vi,12.
- 143 XII,vii,12.
- 144 VII,vi,12 contains Rom. 12:2 and Col. 3:10.  
XII,vii,12 refers to Col. 3:9,10 and Eph.4:23,24.



- 145 I,i,2; II,ix,16; V,ii,3.
- 146 XIV,iv,6.
- 147 cf. I,i,2; II,ix,15; XIII,xx,25.
- 148 cf. also The Enchiridion, XII.
- 149 XIII,xii,16.
- 150 cf. also IX,ii,2.
- 151 X,xii,19.
- 152 XV,i,1; cf. The City of God, XIII,24.
- 153 XIV,xiv,19 and XIV,iv,6.
- 154 XIV,iv,6.
- 155 XIV,viii,11.
- 156 X,x,14.
- 157 X,xi,18.
- 158 XIV,viii,11.
- 159 X,i,1; in the inner man intelligentia corresponds to the eye in the outer man. cf. XIV,xix,25; XV,ix,15.
- 160 XI,viii,15.
- 161 Brunner, p.128 (n.1) traces this way of thought back to Aristotle.

- 162 XV,ix,16.
- 163 Ibid.
- 164 XV,xi,20.
- 165 Ibid. cf. XV,xii,22.
- 166 XI,i,1.
- 167 On the Magnitude of the Soul, XXVII,23.
- 168 cf. Gilson, p.296.
- 169 X,v,7.
- 170 VIII,vii,11; "Behold, 'God is Love:' why do we go forth and run to the heights of the heavens and the lowest parts of the earth, seeking Him who is within us, if we wish to be with Him."
- 171 VII,vi,12.
- 172 XIV,xii,16.
- 173 XIV,viii,11.
- 174 XIV,iv,6.
- 175 XIV,viii,11.
- 176 XIV,xii,15.
- 177 Cairns, p.97 and others consider that when Augustine turns to teach that the image is a capacity this is a way out of a logical dilemma.

- 178 XIV,viii,11.
- 179 H. W. Robinson, p.160.
- 180 VIII,iii,4 & 5.
- 181 X,v,7.
- 182 Ibid.
- 183 XII,viii,13.
- 184 XI,iii,6 underlining ours.
- 185 XII,xii,17.
- 186 XII,ix,14.  
cf. Conf. VII,xvi,22 where he describes his own state  
of sin as being "bent aside from Thee, O God, the  
Supreme Substance, towards these lower things."
- 187 Cushman, p.290.
- 188 XI,ii,2.
- 189 XI,iii,6.
- 190 XI,viii,15.
- 191 X,x,14.
- 192 X,v,7.
- 193 VIII,x,14.
- 194 cf. Burnaby, p.96ff.

- 195 cf. John T. White: Latin-English Dictionary,  
London: Longmans, Green, 1880.  
Burnaby, p.95.
- 196 e.g. 1 Cor. 13:4; 1 Jn. 4:6,7,8; 1 Jn. 2:10.
- 197 IV,i,2.
- 198 VIII,iii,5.
- 199 II,xvii,28.
- 200 VIII,vi,9.
- 201 VIII,vi,9; VIII,viii,12.
- 202 VIII,vii,10.
- 203 X,xi,17.
- 204 XIV,vi,8.
- 205 XIV,xii,15.
- 206 XII,xiv,22 Burnaby's book Amor Dei is a full treatment  
of love as the total religion of Augustine.
- 207 Enchiridion XII  
cf. Burnaby, pp.36-40.
- 208 XIV,xii,16.
- 209 cf. Gilson, p.296.
- 210 see above p.71.

- 211 XI,v,8.
- 212 p.37.
- 213 cf. Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, esp. pp. 43ff.
- 214 XV,viii,14.
- 215 VII,vi,12.
- 216 cf. Burnaby, p.40. "Sharing, participation, was the logical thought-form in which Plato had expressed the immanence of the changeless Reality in the changing world."
- 217 Conf. VII,x,16.
- 218 John Burnaby, The Library of Christian Classics, Augustine: Later Works, London: SCM, Vol. VIII, p.34 (n.2).  
cf. Gilson, p.57 (n.1d) "intelligence est une vue intérieure par laquelle la pensée perçoit la vérité que la lumière divine lui découvre."
- 219 XV,ix,16; cf. Conf. VII,x,16.
- 220 II, pref. Conf. VII,x,16.
- 221 I,x,21.
- 222 I,viii,17 the several times that I Cor. 13:12 is quoted are noted above. I,x,21.
- 223 II,xvii,28; IV,ii,4.
- 224 I,viii,17.

- 225 XII,xv,25.
- 226 cf. Gilson, p.57 (n.1e) in speaking of intellectus and intelligentia he says, "tous deux signifient un faculté supérieure à la raison."
- 227 IX,xi,16.
- 228 XII,vii,12.
- 229 XIV,vii,11.
- 230 XIV,xii,15.
- 231 Ibid.
- 232 IV,ii,4.
- 233 VII,i,2; XIV,xii,15.
- 234 VIII,iii,5.
- 235 XIV,iv,6.
- 236 Enchiridion XXVII;  
cf. XIV,xvi,22.
- 237 IX,ii,2; X,xii,19.
- 238 XIV,iii,5; XIV,viii,11.
- 239 XIV,xvi,22.
- 240 XIII,xii,16.

- 241 XIV,xvi,22.
- 242 The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. VIII,  
p.35 (n.3).
- 243 XIV,xv,21.
- 244 XII,xv,24.
- 245 XIV,xv,21.
- 246 Ibid.
- 247 Conf. VII,xvii,23.
- 248 VIII,iii,4.
- 249 VIII,vi,9.
- 250 XIV,vi,8.
- 251 XIV,xi,14.
- 252 XIII,xx,25.
- 253 XI,v,i.
- 254 XII,x,15.
- 255 Cairns, p.93f; Brunner, p.128 (n.1).
- 256 IV,xv,20.
- 257 XIV,xix,26; cf. XII,xiv,23 "And to attain these  
[visions of truth] with the eye of the mind is the  
lot of few."

- 258 Conf. XIII,xxxviii,53.
- 259 cf. Bethune-Baker, p.309-311.  
Retractions II,i,1 "To solve this question we laboured  
in the cause of freedom of the human will, but the  
grace of God won the day."
- 260 I,ii,4.
- 261 VIII,iv,6. In this passage Augustine uses the word  
heart as a general description of the whole inner  
nature of man.
- 262 XIII,xvi,20.
- 263 XIII,xx,25.
- 264 On Forgiveness of Sins and Baptism, I,65 (xxxv),  
the only exception is the martyr who dies confessing  
Christ and is baptized in his own blood.
- 265 XIV,xvii,23; cf. XII,vii,12.
- 266 XIV,xvii,23.
- 267 p.89 Harnack is, however, right in teaching that  
Augustine does not understand the nature of faith  
as a continuing means of dealing with sin.
- 268 XIV,ii,4.
- 269 cf. On the Gospel of St. John. III,5 "The light is  
not absent but you are absent from the light."
- 270 cf. Ennarr, in Psalm. VI,8.
- 271 Conf. VII,ix,14; X,xvii,26.



- 272 XII,xii,16; the underlining is ours.
- 273 XI,v,8.
- 274 XII,vii,9.
- 275 XIV,viii,11.
- 276 XIV,ix,12.
- 277 XIV,xii,15.
- 278 XII,vii,12.
- 279 XIV,iv,6.
- 280 XIV,viii,11.
- 281 XIV,xii,15; cf. Conf. XIII,32,47.
- 282 cf. De Civ. Dei XIII,13,32.
- 283 XIV,xiv,20.
- 284 XIII,xx,25.
- 285 XIV,xvi,22. cf. Gilson, p.139 on being recalled to the consciousness of God's presence within.
- 286 Ibid.
- 287 The Vulgate here is sensus.
- 288 XIV,xvi,22.

- 289 XIV,xvii,23.
- 290 cf. Burnaby, p.37.  
Brunner, p.506.
- 291 XII,xiv,22.
- 292 XIII,xx,26.
- 293 Ibid.
- 294 XIV,xix,25.
- 295 XIV,xvii,23.
- 296 XIV,xiv,20.
- 297 XIV,xix,25.
- 298 XIV,xviii,24.
- 299 VI,x,11.
- 300 VII,ii,3; see the whole of book VII and the beginning  
of book VIII for the meaning of the terms relatively  
and essentially.
- 301 VII,xi,12.
- 302 VII,iii,5.
- 303 I,vii,14.
- 304 I,x,21.
- 305 VIII,v,8.

- 306 XI,v,8.
- 307 XI,i,1.
- 308 VII,vi,12.
- 309 XII,xi,16.
- 310 XIV,xviii,24; XIV,xvii,23.
- 311 Brunner, p.506 has no support in De Trinitate for his statement, "Since, however, he took over the distinction of Irenaeus between the Imago and the Similitudo, he was obliged to introduce the idea of a vulneratio in naturabilis which . . . plays a very uncertain part."
- 312 cf. Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV,iv,3.
- 313 Ibid. V,6,1.
- 314 Against Heresies, V,viii,2; V,xvi,1.
- 315 Against Heresies, V,vi,1; cf. esp. IV,xxxiii,4.
- 316 XV,viii,14.
- 317 Ibid.
- 318 X,vi,6.

## II

### HOW AUGUSTINE IMPRESSED THE CATEGORIES OF HIS REASON UPON THE BIBLICAL CONCEPT OF THE IMAGE OF GOD

During the first chapter we have come to see how the doctrine of the image of God became important, indeed central, in the theology of Augustine. In De Trinitate Augustine leads the reader in search of the one thing in creation that is most worthy to be used as an analogy by which men may think of the inner life of God. He follows the procedure of accepting certain authoritative sources as the foundation of faith on which to build his teaching. Building on these foundations of faith Augustine then proceeds to demonstrate by reason how the faith is to be understood.

Augustine accepted as authoritative the Biblical teaching that man was created in the image and likeness of God. Then he proceeded to demonstrate how the image of God is to be found in man. By the processes of reason he was finally able to discover a concept of the image of God which he believed was the most satisfactory analogy of God that it is possible to find in created things. It is our purpose in this chapter to see how the categories which are evident in Augustine's thought impressed themselves upon the teaching of Scripture. We shall attempt to see how, and in what way, Augustine's reason transformed the teaching of the Bible on the subject of the image of God.

When Augustine lays out his plan of procedure in De Trinitate, he indicates that there are mainly two reasons for using Scripture. In the first place he teaches that the doctrines of the Church must be supported by the authority of the Bible. Augustine ranks the authority of the Bible alongside the authority of the Church, for he teaches that the faith of the Church must be demonstrable. Before he examines the doctrine of the Trinity in Scripture, he expresses his purpose in this way: "First, however, we must demonstrate, according to the authority of Holy Scriptures, whether the faith be so."<sup>1</sup> The faith of which Augustine speaks at this point is, of course, the doctrine of the Trinity. His dependence upon the authority of the Church is demonstrated in the same passage when he remarks, "this also is my faith since it is the Catholic faith."<sup>2</sup>

The first purpose of Scripture is to give the doctrines of the Church a secure foundation. The second is to convince others who accept the authority of Scripture. After declaring the need to demonstrate the Biblical foundations of Church doctrine he goes on to say, "then, if God be willing and aid us, we may perhaps at least so far serve these talkative arguers - more puffed up than capable . . . as to enable them to find something which they are not able to doubt."<sup>3</sup> The most invincible of all arguments, according to Augustine, is a doctrine of faith supported by Scriptural evidence and inter-

preted according to the accepted categories of reason.

De Trinitate, then, is firmly rooted and grounded in the Bible. As a Catholic, Augustine's first duty is to find every possible Scriptural support for the doctrine of the Trinity. As a theologian, he considers himself primarily a teacher of Christian doctrine which he supports by the interpretation of Scripture. Augustine is careful to teach that in matters of Christian doctrine the authority of the Bible is to be accepted above his own teaching.<sup>4</sup> His respect for the Bible as an authoritative source of truth led Adolf Harnack to say, "no Western theologian before him had lived so much in Scripture, or taken so much from it as he."<sup>5</sup>

There is considerable uncertainty about the source of many of Augustine's Biblical quotations. A large number of his Scriptural references do not correspond to any of the versions of the Bible which are extant.<sup>6</sup> It is generally agreed that there were various versions available to Augustine which are not at our disposal. In his book On Christian Doctrine he deals with these various translations, of which there are many, and expresses a strong preference for one he calls the Itala.<sup>7</sup> It is usually concluded that this reference is to the Old Latin version, which was a Latin translation of the Septuagint.<sup>8</sup> There is no way of telling which recension of the Old Latin the Itala may have been, and there is evidence that he had access to several Latin versions or recensions.<sup>9</sup> One of these may have been Jerome's Vulgate.<sup>10</sup>

Concerning the Greek Scriptures which were available to Augustine, it is safe to say that the Septuagint, in one of its forms, was the most important. Augustine accepted the Septuagint as an inspired translation of the Hebrew.<sup>11</sup> There is also evidence that he had other Greek texts which he compared with the Septuagint wordings.<sup>12</sup> At times throughout De Trinitate Augustine refers back to the Greek Bible to clarify his argument.<sup>13</sup> At other times he uses Greek terms to compare with the Latin language he is using.<sup>14</sup> His ability as a Greek scholar, however, is doubtful. Augustine denies any real competency in reading the Greek language.<sup>15</sup> Such references as we find in De Trinitate could be made by someone with the most elementary knowledge of Greek.

When we examine Augustine's use of the key passages in Genesis, it is evident that he is quoting a source very close to the Septuagint. The first part of Genesis 1:26 is always "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram."<sup>16</sup> Since it is doubtful if the Vulgate translation of this part of the Old Testament was in existence when Augustine was writing De Trinitate, it is unlikely that these words are from that source. The language, however, shows a significant dependence upon that of the Septuagint, since the addition of the copula kai in the Greek had suggested a distinction between the image of God and the likeness of God. The Hebrew, originally lacking the copula, does not sustain either the Vulgate or the Septuagint.<sup>18</sup> Augustine, as noted earlier was unaware of any significant distinction between the concept of

the imago and the concept of the similitudo.<sup>19</sup> At the present writing it is impossible for us to compare these words of Genesis with any of the extant versions of the Old-Latin.<sup>20</sup>

Further evidence that Augustine has a source unknown to us comes when he quotes from the 27th verse of the same passage in Genesis. One of his fundamental arguments concerning the place of the image of God in man is supported by this quotation, "Et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei."<sup>21</sup> Here his language is quite at variance with the Vulgate, although it could conceivably be a literal rendering of the Septuagint.<sup>22</sup> We shall consider the validity of his exegesis later. At this moment we can confirm only that it is quite impossible to be sure about the source of Augustine's Old Testament quotations on the subject of the image of God.

There are some possible explanations of Augustine's independence in the use of Biblical material. One possibility is that he himself attempted translations of the Greek resources which were available to him. This explanation, however, seems to be denied by the passages just quoted, where there is a significant variation between the Greek and Latin renderings.<sup>23</sup> Moreover Augustine's own admission of incompetency in Greek would make it seem that he would hesitate to assume the role of translator. Another possible explanation of his independence is that, being such a prolific writer and thinker, memory often served as the source of his quotations. Since, as it seems certain, Augustine was making the transition from the older



Latin versions to the Vulgate during the period when De Trinitate was being written, it would not be at all surprising if his memory failed to reproduce literally any of the versions at hand.<sup>24</sup>

As we come now to examine Augustine's treatment of the Biblical passages which deal with the image of God, we should keep in mind that his main purpose in De Trinitate is not exegesis. Augustine's chief concern in this treatise is to demonstrate, from the Scriptures, that the doctrine of the Trinity is authoritative. In actual practice he begins on the ground of the doctrine of the Trinity and goes to the Bible to find passages which he believes will enable him to demonstrate the nature of the doctrine.

Augustine finds that the most fruitful passages in the Bible for a study of the doctrine of the Trinity are those which deal with the concept of the image of God. From the two verses of the first chapter of Genesis. (1:26,27), where man is said to be created in the image and likeness of God, he moves out in both directions. On the one side he finds that the concept of God as a Trinity is present in the plural language of these verses. On the other side he concludes that the image of God, which is to be found in the individual human being, is the highest analogy of God that it is possible to discover. He applies the categories of his reason to the concept of the image of God in man in order to make it acceptable to the philosophic mind for which he is writing.

### 1. The Individual-Social Distinction

#### Augustine's Interpretation of Genesis 1:26,27

Augustine came to a consideration of Genesis 1:26 and 1:27 with a category of thought which clearly distinguishes the individual man from his society. The world of thought which influenced him most tended generally to keep the individual in the center of attention, and consider society to be a mass of individuals. In his use of language, then, Augustine could not conceive of a way of thinking which moves without difficulty from the singular to the plural.

Because he takes literally the language of these verses, the first major conclusion which Augustine draws from Genesis 1:26 is that the plural faciamus and the plural nostram indicate that the writer of Genesis had in mind the doctrine of the Trinity as he wrote. Here, in the creation story, Augustine finds evidence that the concept of the Trinity was in existence at the beginning of time. His main concern in using the passage in this way is to prove that all three members of the Trinity were active in the creation of man. One characteristic statement is this: "Certainly, in that it is of the plural number, the word 'our' would not be rightly used if man were made in the image of one person . . . but because he was made in the image of the Trinity."<sup>25</sup>

Augustine points to the plural of Genesis 1:26, then, as support for the doctrine of the Trinity. Since the God who made man speaks of himself in the plural, it is evident,

according to Augustine, that all three persons of the Trinity were active in the creation of man. If the writers of Genesis had intended to teach that it was the Father alone, or the Son alone, who created man in his own image, they would have used the singular. As it is, however, Augustine is certain that the writers of Genesis already held a doctrine of the tri-une God and chose to express his diversity of inner nature by the use of the plural.

If the God who created man is the Trinity, then it follows that the image of God in man is a trinity. Augustine accepts this corollary to his interpretation of the plural faciamus and nostram. He goes further, however, and teaches that the plural God, who is also described by the Latin Deus, is a unified being whose image must be found in the individual human person. Augustine guards the principle of monotheism jealously, even to the point of what appears to be a misquotation. Genesis 1:27, according to Augustine, says, "Et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei." Interpreting these words literally he comments, "lest we should think that three Gods were to be believed in the Trinity, whereas the same Trinity is one God, 'So God created man', he says, 'in the image of God' as though instead of saying, 'In His own image.'" <sup>26</sup>

Augustine, then, is concerned to destroy the argument of those accusing the Christians of polytheism. At the same time he is more concerned in De Trinitate to refute the teaching of those who would find the image of the Trinity in

more than one person. Some had suggested that the image of the Trinity is best seen in the social unit comprised of male, female and the offspring resulting from their marriage. Concerning this social analogy to the Trinity Augustine argues, "divine Scripture evidently shows it to be false." Using the words "Et fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem Dei", he teaches that, while God made man in the image of the Trinity, he also made the individual man in the image of the one divine being. The singular language of this particular way of quoting Genesis 1:27 leads Augustine to find the image of God in the individual.

Augustine offers other Scriptural support for his individualism by quoting the words of 1 Cor. 11:7.<sup>27</sup> This is the passage in which Paul declares that a man should not cover his head, "forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God." Because of his emphasis upon the nature of the individual, Augustine has to deal with the question of whether or not women as well as men are made in the image of God. He admits that Genesis 1:27 includes both male and female within the concept of the image of God. "For this text says that human nature itself, which is complete in both sexes, was made in the image of God." It does not follow, according to Augustine, that the woman, considered apart from the man, is made in God's image. "The woman," he says, "together with her own husband is the image of God, so that the whole substance may be one image; but when she is referred separately to her

quality of helpmeet, which regards the woman herself alone, then she is not the image of God."<sup>28</sup> In practice, Augustine considers that the human male is the only worthy subject of research in the quest for the purest analogy to the Trinity.

It is universally agreed that the Greek mind asks questions and poses problems of which the Hebrew mind is not generally aware.<sup>29</sup> Augustine exhibits his Western attitude when he asks: is the image of God to be found in humanity; in a fellowship of three persons; or in the individual human being? His conclusion that the image of God exists in the individual man, therefore, is not drawn from an exegesis of Scripture. We shall examine later the concept of corporate personality which opposes such an interpretation of Scripture as Augustine has made. Here we note that it is more than likely that it never occurred to the Priestly writers of Genesis that it should ever be necessary to define whether the image of God is in the individual or in a social unit.

#### An Exegesis of the Image of God Passages

What the plural language of Genesis 1:26 actually meant to the Priestly writers of the Old Testament is difficult to estimate. The one certainty, according to the context of the passage, is that there was a great sense of ponderous deliberation in the being of God as he approached the final act of creation. The writers of the Genesis creation story intended to impress their readers with the importance of what

was being done.

But why did the Priestly writers use plural language? Some possible answers are suggested by examination of other Jewish literature. There is evidence that Hebrew thought, at least in earlier times, was familiar with the idea that God sometimes held consultation with other heavenly beings.<sup>30</sup> Such an interpretation was acceptable to a Hebrew commentator of the early Christian centuries who taught that God must have consulted with the angels before he created man.<sup>31</sup> Other Hebrew tradition, however, interpreted the same passage to mean that God considered within himself the possibilities of good and evil which were latent in the man he was about to create.<sup>32</sup> This latter commentator probably represents a Hebrew tradition that was under the influence of the Greco-Roman world where thought is seen to be an inward activity. It is doubtful if Hebrew thought at the time of the P document had such a concept of inward thought.

There is probably some significance in the fact that in the story of creation the P writers use the divine name Elohim. The word itself is plural in form, and several times in the Old Testament it indicates a number of heavenly beings.<sup>33</sup> Since the Priestly document is remarkable for its freedom from anthropomorphism, it is conceivable that the plural Elohim was used purposely. There is something less anthropomorphic in saying that humanity as a whole was created in the image of Elohim, than there is in saying that the individual man is the

image of the singular God.<sup>34</sup> The picture in the mind of the P writers may well have been that the host of heaven, moving as a unified creative force, brought humanity into being.

In their desire to impress the reader with the momentous importance of man's creation, it is quite conceivable that the Priestly writers used what is called the plural of majesty.<sup>35</sup> The Hebrews of the Old Testament were obviously fairly well acquainted with a form of expression which used the plural to indicate men in the most exalted of positions.<sup>36</sup> If, as it seems likely, there was a plural of majesty known to the Priestly writers, then it is more than probable that they would use it in the creation story. Since the one clear purpose of the statements surrounding the creation of man is to exalt the majesty and power of the Creator, it is more than possible that the plurals are the plural of majesty.

On Augustine's behalf it should be said that by the time the language of Genesis had reached him it had been translated first into Greek and then into Latin. The Elohim of Genesis 1:26 had become the Latin Deus, which translated the Greek Theos. Any suggestion that there were a host of beings in the creative power known as God had long since disappeared from the language of Augustine's Bible. If, as has been suggested, he had access to a Latin version which was a direct translation of the Hebrew, the plural of the Elohim did not impress itself on this translation.

Augustine's Bible named God in the singular and yet

spoke of his deliberations in the plural. It seemed quite obvious to him, then, that the God of Genesis 1:26 was unified and diversified at the same time. The singular Deus indicated absolute monotheism, while the Latin faciamus and nostram indicated that God's nature was diversified. The diversity within the unity Augustine took to indicate the doctrine of the Trinity, and he concluded that Father, Son and Holy Spirit were active in the creation of man.

Augustine was quite right in recognizing the roots of the doctrine of the Trinity in Genesis 1:26. It is clear, however, that the Priestly writers had no intention of limiting the plurality in God's being to the number of three. If the plural expressions in Genesis 1:26 are anything more than the language of majesty, they indicate that humanity as a whole was created in the image of Elohim. At the same time, Elohim is most certainly a unified and creative power and while it may indicate a host of heavenly beings, it also indicates a spiritual power which moves with purpose and simplicity. While the concept of the Trinity has become a necessary Christian doctrine, Augustine was quite unjustified in implying that it was present in the minds of the writers of Genesis 1:26, 27.

Let us turn now to a more thorough examination of the language of the Bible as it relates to the doctrine of the image of God. There are only three passages in the Old Testament where it is specifically stated that man was created in the image of God. They are Gen. 1:26, 27; 5:1-3; 9:6. In each of these cases it is the Hebrew word ( אֱלֹהִים ) which is translated



man. The genealogy passage of Genesis 5:1-3 requires the translator to render adham both as a collective term for humanity and as a proper name. Even when adham is rendered Adam, however, the probability still remains that it is a generation of people, rather than one human being, that is indicated. In both of the other passages there is little doubt that it is man, as humanity, which is said to be created in the image and likeness of God.

Since the Hebrew word adham is the usual word for man-kind in general,<sup>37</sup> it is impossible to say whether the Priestly writers intended to say whether it was humanity or the individual who was made in the image of God. The Hebrew attitude to man and his society supports our contention that they simply did not intend to answer the individual-social problem.

While it is true that the Old Testament writers are fully aware<sup>38</sup> of the distinctive attributes of individual personalities, they tended more often to speak of individuals as representatives of the social unit to which they belong. Instead of beginning with the individual and describing society as a mass of individual units, the Hebrew began with the totality known as adham. The individual man is a representative of this humanity insofar as he embodies the characteristics of all men.<sup>39</sup> It is quite possible, then, for the Hebrew to speak of all kinds of social units - family, tribe and nation - in the same language that he uses for the single personality.

Because the ancient Hebrew began with the total group

and considered the individual as its representative, he had a most flexible vocabulary. Johs. Pedersen uses the example of the word for tree which expresses the characteristic nature of one tree while describing all trees. Correspondingly, adham has the character of an individual man while at the same time adham is the essential humanity of all men. Adham, therefore, is the essential character of all men as seen in one particular human being.

This easy movement between the individual and his social grouping is more than what we would call personification. The Hebrew moves from the group to the individual rather than from the individual to the group. Often it is impossible to know whether it is the individual or the social unit which is to be understood by the words which are used.<sup>40</sup> Rather than simply personifying the social group as an individual, the Hebrew actually treats the family, clan, or nation as if it were an individual. Such identification has sometimes been called "corporate personality"<sup>41</sup> to indicate how completely the Hebrew identified the one with the many.

When Augustine finds it necessary to determine whether the image of God is in the individual or in a social unit, he is applying a category of thought which was evidently unknown to the Priestly writers. The answer to the question: did God create humanity in his own image, or did he create one man according to his image, is not to be found in an exegesis of the words of Genesis. The most the Hebrew writers of Genesis

would have said is that humanity can be treated in the same way as you speak of one man in his relation to God. Augustine, however, was teaching a people for whom thought began with an analysis of the individual and moved out to society. The answer Augustine gives is not the result of exegesis but the consequence of applying his distinction between the individual and his society to the plural and singular language of Genesis 1:26, 27.

In his interpretation of the Old Testament concept of the image, Augustine is quite correct in turning to St. Paul. The only New Testament writer to deal with the concept of the image of God to any extent<sup>42</sup> uses the idea mainly for two reasons. First, he describes the nature of Christ according to the concept of the image of God and secondly, he uses the image of God to describe the transformation which takes place in the life of the man who believes through Jesus Christ.<sup>43</sup>

Augustine took notice of the only passage where Paul seems to be echoing the familiar religious assumption that man is made in the image of God (1 Cor. 11:7). Paul's language here is in the singular. It is a man (ἀνὴρ) who is said to be the image and glory of God. Moreover, it is a passage in which man is being contrasted to woman in the matter of appropriate religious dress. Paul's language here supports Augustine in his contention that the image of God is to be found in the individual male.

Paul's teaching, in general, does not bear out Augustine's conclusion that Paul considered the individual, alone, to have the image of God. The attitude of Paul is that individual men and women grow into the likeness of God insofar as they are related to him through faith in Jesus Christ. Never does Paul see the individual Christian believer apart from the context of the society which is also redeemed by Christ.

The subtle changes which have come into Paul's doctrine of man through the Rabbinic atmosphere on the one hand and the Greco-Roman world on the other, are beyond the scope of this study to examine.<sup>44</sup> However, it can be said that most New Testament scholars today are agreed that Paul thought of human nature very largely in the same terms as are found in the Hebrew Old Testament.<sup>45</sup> It is impossible, therefore, that Paul could ever have intended to teach that the image of God is to be found by searching within the nature of the individual man, considered apart from his relationships.

Except for this one reference in 1 Corinthians 11:7, Paul always describes the believer in terms of his membership in the community of believers. In 2 Corinthians it is "we all" who are being changed into the image of Christ (3:18). In Romans it is "those whom he foreknew" who are predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son (8:29). To the Ephesians the author says put off the old man and put on the new man (τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον) created after God (4:22,24).

In the same manner, Paul is speaking to the Colossian church when he says, "Do not lie to one another, seeing that you have put off the old nature with its practices and have put on the new nature, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator" (Col. 3:9,10).

Paul obviously believes that a change is to take place in the nature of the individual believer, but it is a change which transforms the relationships between the believer, his society and his God. Through faith in Christ a person becomes more like Christ, who is the true image of God. However, it is not only the believer, but also the believing community, which is being transformed into the likeness of Christ. In Paul's teaching about the body of Christ, for example, he is concerned to explain how the corporate fellowship is to be like Christ's body.<sup>46</sup> One modern writer concludes, "In all the New Testament passages the image renewed in believers is spoken of as existing, not in the solitary individual, but in the person as a member of the redeemed community."<sup>47</sup>

For Paul, then, as well as for the Old Testament writers in general, there is no consciousness of the question whether the image of God is to be found in the individual or in a social unit. In keeping with his Hebrew background, Paul tends to consider the individual believer, in whom the image of God is being restored, as a representative of the whole believing community in which the image of Christ is developing. In Paul's thought there is only one true image

of God and that is the person of Jesus Christ. Otherwise, the image of God in man is to be found mainly in the individual believer, who is always a member of the redeemed community. Insofar as the believing fellowship is like Christ it is the risen body of Christ, and its members are being transformed into the likeness of God, as seen in the face of Christ.

It cannot be argued that Paul is unaware of the linguistic distinction between singular and plural. He also uses a literal interpretation of Genesis 12:7, about which he comments: οὐ λέγει καὶ τοῖς σπέρμασιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολλῶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐφ' ἐνὸς καὶ τῷ σπέρματί σου, ὅς ἐστι Χριστός, to prove that God's promise was not made to many offspring but to one offspring only (Gal. 3:17). Paul is taking liberty with the Hebrew language to support his doctrine that Christ is the one true descendent of Abraham according to the promise of God. It does not follow, however, that Paul considered all men to be related to God in the same way as Christ is related to God. Indeed, this is precisely his point. Only Christ is related to God as a unique individual. All others, in whom the image of God is being renewed, are related to God through Christ, not only by the response of personal faith, but also through the fellowship of the believing society.

Augustine's interpretation of Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 11:7 led him to conclude that he had the Apostle's support for directing his attention toward the individual man.

Even though he did not entirely overlook the importance of the religious community Augustine, in his search for the image of God in man, moved into extreme individualism. His thought is much more in keeping with the Western mind where the individual is the primary center of attention,<sup>48</sup> than it is with the thought of Paul.

Actually Augustine has no support in the letters of Paul for his denial of the possibility that the image of God is to be found in a social unit. According to Paul, Christ is the only individual in whom the glory of God is revealed to the extent that the image is fully like the original. For Paul the image of God in man is to be seen as much in the community which is the body of Christ as it is to be seen in the individual believer.

In conclusion, then, we see how Augustine came to the Bible with an individual-social category of thought which he impressed upon the language of his Latin Bible wherever it refers to the image of God in man. Whereas the Biblical writers see man as being totally involved in his relationships with man and God, Augustine isolated the individual and went searching there for the image of God. Whereas the image of God in man is the image of the Creator in his whole human creation, according to the Old Testament, Augustine found the image of God primarily in the individual man and his intellectual relationship with God. Only secondarily is the image of God to be seen in man's relations with his fellow believers,

according to Augustinian doctrine. Whereas Paul teaches that Christ alone is the true image of God and believers are like God according to their growth in faith within the religious community, Augustine distinguished between the image of God in the individual believer and the image of God in Christ according to the nature of the image's substance.

## 2. The Corporeal-Spiritual Category

Once having concluded that he must search for the image of the Trinity within the individual male, Augustine went on to apply the categories of his philosophic system to the language of the Bible. In particular, he interpreted all references to the nature of man according to the strict distinction between that which is physical and that which is spiritual. Augustine freely admits his debt to the Platonists in this regard. He considered that Plotinus and other Platonic philosophers had given him a key with which to open Scriptures which had been closed to him before.<sup>49</sup>

Before examining Augustine's treatment of the image of God passages, it is worth while to note that he estimates that all reality is composed of three kinds of substance. First, there is God who is pure, uncreated spiritual substance. God is the only substance which is both pure and free from all the qualities of physical matter and at the same time is uncreated. Moreover, the substance of God is immutable or unchangeably good and, therefore, all other things in the world are good insofar



as they approach the same unchanging nature that is found in God. Concerning the substance of God, the only thing that can be said about it is that it is. It is God; it is the good; it is the truth; it is wisdom. It can never be said that God has any of these qualities. There are no adjectives which apply to God; there are only nouns which describe his spiritual substance. God, then, is known as the only absolutely simple being in the highest philosophical sense.<sup>50</sup>

Second, beneath the pure uncreated spiritual substance of God there is created spiritual substance. Created spirit differs from God's substance mainly in that it has the marks of the creature upon it. All created things are subject to change and corruption in the course of time. The spirit of man as the highest form of created spiritual substance is constantly changing according to its nearness to, or distance from, God. The created spirit of man lives more abundantly as it approaches God and has its own kind of death, which comes as a result of being separated from God. Augustine, at the same time, affirms that there is an inherent immortality in the human soul. Created spirit, then, is like God's spirit when it participates in his being and it is immortal because it never ceases entirely to have some share in the being of God. Created spirit, however, is always a different substance from God's substance, since even at its best it is still creature.

Third, there is created corporeal substance. All the marks of the creature are found in material substance. It is

corruptible, both in space and in time, and ultimately all corporeal substance ceases to exist. Since physical objects can be handled by the outward senses of man, they are described according to the categories of number, bulk and time. Whereas, for example, more spirit does not require more space, more corporeal substance has a greater bulk and requires more room. Corporeal substance is distinguished from spiritual substance mainly because it is available to man and can be handled through the physical senses. Spiritual substance, on the other hand, can be seen and handled only through the intellectual processes of the mind.

Augustine is consistent with this scheme of thought in his interpretation of the Scripture passages which describe man in terms of the image of God. He draws a strict line between God the Creator and man his creature, and makes a complete distinction between the spiritual and corporeal substance in human personality. About the image of God in man he says, "For as not only most true reason but also the authority of the apostle [Paul] himself declares, man was not made in the image of God according to the shape of his body, but according to his rational mind."<sup>51</sup>

We have already dealt with his philosophical reason for rejecting the possibility that the image of God in man could include any of his physical nature. Here we see that his Scriptural proof of this contention rests heavily upon the literal interpretation of the language of Paul. The question arises whether or not he was justified in assuming that Paul

supported his doctrine about the image of God residing only in the rational mind of the individual man.

#### The Meaning of tselem and demuth

Before we proceed to Augustine's interpretation of Paul, we must first consider the original source of both interpretations. Did the Hebrew writers of the Old Testament intend to make any distinction between the psychical and physical natures of man as they presented the concept of the image of God? The overwhelming testimony of Old Testament scholarship today is to the effect that the Hebrew mind saw human nature as a totality of psycho-physical qualities. Man, according to the Old Testament generally, is an organism unified by forces at work within and without. When a man is moved to action it is a movement of his whole being.

The words  $\text{צֶלֶם}$  and  $\text{דְּמוּת}$ , which are the original source of the idea of the image of God, do not suggest or allow us to conclude that the Old Testament found the image of God in any particular part of man's nature. <sup>52</sup> The evidence is as follows: apart from its use as a description of human nature in the passages cited previously (Gen. 1:26,27; 5:3; 9:6), <sup>53</sup> the word tselem has two meanings in the Old Testament. One group of references uses tselem to describe an object which is a material representation of an original. The images of tumors and mice, which the Philistines are commanded to make and send back to the Israelites are tselem (I Sam. 6:5,11). When

the people of Israel went in to desecrate the house of Ba'al they broke in pieces his altars and his images (tselem) (2 K. 11:18; 2 Chron. 23:17). The abominable images which Ezekiel decries (7:20) and the images of men which have led the Israelites to commit whoredom (16:17) are tselem. When Moses commands the Israelites to destroy the figured stones and molten images in Canaan the word tselem indicates the moulded metal objects (Num. 33:52).<sup>54</sup>

In the above list of references there is no doubt that tselem indicates something which is both visible and physical. In each case tselem indicates something material which is fashioned to represent an original object or god. The root meaning of tselem is not entirely clear.<sup>55</sup> Most commentators conclude, however, that it means "something cut out."<sup>56</sup> In one case (Ezek. 23:14) where it speaks of "images of the Chaldeans portrayed with vermillion," it seems to be something chiselled out in stone as in a bas-relief.<sup>57</sup> One of the most common meanings of tselem, therefore, is to indicate a physical representation cut out, or shaped, to resemble an original.

The second meaning of tselem, apart from its use as a description of man, is something that has form and appearance but no solid body of substance. Both Old Testament occurrences of the word, used in this way, are in the Psalms. While the psalmist is describing how insecure and impermanent life is, he says, "verily every man at his best state is altogether

vanity" (RSV a mere breath). Then he expands the statement further saying, "Surely every man (adham) walketh in a vain shew (RSV shadow)" (Ps. 39:5,6).<sup>58</sup> It is noteworthy that here the psalmist is portraying as vividly as possible how inconsequential human life is. In order to make the contrast as great as possible, he compares man at his best with this word tselem, which implies mere shadowy existence. It is mankind (adham) "standing up tall" that is a mere tselem. The parallel expression follows the same pattern. It is man (ish)<sup>59</sup> at his most powerful that is tselem.

The insecure and unsubstantial quality of human life, just described, is even more evident in the expression of the psalmist who uses tselem to describe the wicked. The wicked greatly disturbed the psalmist, until he observed how God had set them in "slippery places". Now the psalmist knows that the wicked are "destroyed in a moment" and are "utterly consumed with terrors." "They are like a dream when one awakes, on awaking you despise their phantoms" (Ps. 73:20 RSV). The word tselem, in this last sentence, is rendered phantoms and describes something that has been present in the mind of a sleeping person. Tselem here means the most fleeting and inconsequential substance that the psalmist can conceive and yet it has an outline and substance which can be seen.

In both of these last cases from the Psalms, the meaning of tselem corresponds to the suggested root meaning "shade" or "shadow". The Biblical Aramaic of Daniel uses the word in a

way which is very similar to these uses. All five of the cases where it is used in Daniel describe something which was seen in a dream.<sup>60</sup> In other words, tselem is always something which is visible, but it does not necessarily have a solid body of substance.<sup>61</sup> Since the Hebrew of the Old Testament makes no distinction between that which is seen by the eye and that which is seen by the intellect, we must assume that tselem is always apparent to the outward eye.

Let us turn now to consider the term demuth. Apart from its use, three times, as a description of man's nature, demuth is used almost exclusively by Second Isaiah and Ezekiel. Demuth is, therefore, quite possibly a late arrival in the vocabulary of the Old Testament. The verb form, however, is used in earlier literature and is usually translated "liken". Generally, the verb damah indicates that one thing is being set alongside another for the purpose of pointing up similarities. The psalmist says he is "like" a vulture of the wilderness (102:6). The lover tells his loved one that she is "like" a roe (Song 2:9). Israel would have been "like" Gomorrah if the Lord had not left some survivors (Is. 1:9).

Two other references are good illustrations of how damah is used to compare things. Ezekiel uses this verb to "liken" Pharaoh to a cedar of Lebanon and he declares that "no tree in the garden of God was like it [this tree] in beauty" (Ezek. 31:1,8). Second Isaiah asks the rhetorical question, "to whom will ye liken God? or what likeness will

ye compare unto him?" (Is. 40:18, 25; 46:5). In all these cases damah indicates how something is being laid figuratively alongside an original subject in order to point up similarities. Damah, then, usually shows similarities, although it may indicate differences also (e.g. Ps. 58:4).

There are some uses of the verb damah which indicate what we would call mental activity. Damah describes the activity of a man who "planned" to destroy Israel (2 Sam. 21:5). It describes what God had "thought" to do for the Canaanites, but did not do (Num. 33:56). Damah describes what the men of Gibeah had intended to do to a Levite (Ju. 20:5). With this verb, God describes a mistaken notion that men have had in their minds. Men "thought" that God was like themselves, i.e. men likened God to themselves (Ps. 50:21). In each of these cases, damah describes the kind of reckoning (that could be considered plan-forming activity) which takes place before the action. It would seem at first that this word is used to represent a relatively abstract kind of thought. However, it is doubtful if the Old Testament generally has a concept of thought which takes place apart from the overt action which follows.<sup>62</sup> In any case, this is not the usual Old Testament description of mental activity.

Demuth, when used as a noun, always describes an outward appearance that is the likeness of some original.<sup>63</sup> We have noted its use by Second Isaiah for the purpose of denoting all manner of images or idols which are not to be

compared with God. Ezekiel uses the term regularly to describe the appearances which he sees in his visions. Out of the midst of fire there comes the demuth of four living creatures (Ezek. 1:5). These living creatures have the appearance (mareh) of burning coals of fire (1:13). In the same vision, there is the demuth of a firmament and the demuth of a throne (1:22,26; cf. 10:1). Later on, Ezekiel sees a "form that had the appearance of a man" rising out of the fire below (8:2; cf. 10:22). In each of these cases Ezekiel's subject is the vision which he has seen. In every instance there is something which has shape and a delineation of features. The substance of these likenesses or appearances has no bodily consequence, yet it is something which can be seen.<sup>64</sup>

Once Ezekiel uses the word demuth to describe the same pictures as were described as tselem. These images of the Chaldeans, he says, look "like officers" (Ezek. 23:15). Here, also, demuth indicates something both visible and of solid substance. One other passage is to be related here. In First Isaiah, the poet is describing the hosts of God who are being mustered as if for battle. His description speaks of the "noise of a multitude in the mountains, like as of a great people" (Is. 13:4). The picture he describes is almost certainly a description of the thunder clouds rolling in upon the mountain tops. The demuth must be the vague outline of the clouds, in which the imagination adds to what the eyes see



and the hosts of God can be felt to be there.

Finally, demuth is used (along with mareh, temunah and tabnith) to describe the outward appearance of things. Demuth can indicate that which is most obviously physical and solid. It is so used when it describes the similarity between Seth and his father Adam (Gen. 5:3). On the other hand, demuth is more often used for that which is, at the most, only quasi-physical. If there can be a distinction made between demuth and tselem it can be made only on the basis that demuth is mostly used to describe the content of visions, whereas tselem usually indicates the form of solid physical objects.<sup>65</sup> Such a distinction, however, cannot be made to support an exegesis which distinguishes the image of God in man from the likeness of God in man. Demuth, like tselem, is a term which indicates mainly the similarities which make an object a representation of another, and it always "denotes something that can be seen, however dimly."<sup>66</sup>

Insofar as it is possible to know the mind of the Priestly writers through an interpretation of these two Hebrew terms, we conclude as follows: the relationship between man and God which is described by the phrase, "in our image, after our likeness," indicates a correspondence between the original who is God, and man who is created as a visible representation of the original. God is seen to be the prototype or original from which man was made.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, God and man remain totally distinct from each other because the one who made the

image is also the original in whose likeness the image was made. Creator and creation are not confused one with the other.

Moreover, we conclude that neither tselem or demuth, when defined, give us any encouragement to search for the likeness of God in any particular part of man. There can be little doubt that both terms indicate man's outward appearance to be, in the mind of the P writers, a concrete representation of God. It is even possible that the concept of the image, which we find in Genesis, indicates that it is primarily man's outward form in which the likeness of God can be seen.<sup>68</sup> Within the meaning of both terms, however, there is the probability that the Hebrews saw in both man and God a quality of personal existence which is quasi-physical. The inner nature of both man and God remains something which is available to human senses, yet it is far from being grossly physical.

The descriptions of this quasi-physical nature in such phrases as "vain show" and the vague outline in the clouds "like as of a great people," indicate that the Hebrews were able to think in terms that are far from gross anthropomorphism. At the same time, the most spiritual expressions of the Old Testament are still far removed from Augustine's concept of a pure spiritual substance which can be seen only by the rational mind. The relationship described in the phrase image of God, therefore, is neither spiritual, or physical, in the modern sense of the terms. Man and God are like each other

in a way that is dimly sensed rather than clearly defined.

On the whole, the Priestly writers display great freedom from anthropomorphism.<sup>69</sup> It is more than likely that the concept of the image was chosen as a description of the relationship between man and God in contradistinction from more anthropomorphic forms of description.<sup>70</sup> The God of the P writers is a God who deals powerfully and directly with the whole of material creation. God speaks and the world is created (Gen. 1:1ff). God speaks and man hears his voice (e.g. Num.16:20). The God of the Priestly creation story, then, did not merely create some spiritual part of man in his own image. Nor is it as if some spiritual part of man is related to a God who is only spirit. On the other hand, Elohim is not physical to the extent that man is physical. It is finally impossible to go beyond the vague statement that, in the eyes of the Priestly writers, man in his total personality is somehow like God who is conceived in totally personal terms.

#### Body and Spirit in Hebrew Psychology

Students of Hebrew psychology today find little evidence that the Semitic mind was aware of any clear distinction between material and spiritual substance. Johs. Pedersen describes the Old Testament attitude to human nature by saying, "That which the Israelite understands by soul is, first and foremost, a totality with a peculiar stamp."<sup>71</sup> Pedersen points out this totality is considered by the Hebrews to be both visible and

invisible. He finds that the Jewish mind was entirely unconcerned to analyze the various elements which go to make up a human being. Under the broad concept of "soul" he examines the Hebrew term nephesh and then adds, "The Israelites had other words denoting the soul; the ones most frequently in use being ruach, spirit, and lebh, heart. The three expressions are not identical, but the likeness is greater than the difference." While other scholars attempt to analyze these terms more completely than Pedersen, his attitude to Old Testament psychology is generally shared.<sup>72</sup>

There is, moreover, little evidence that the ancient mind was analytical or introspective. Generally the Old Testament accepts man as a psycho-physical organism which can be called a nephesh or a soul. When nephesh is used in this sense, it is very different from any modern concept which distinguishes soul from body. Soul, as the person of man, is both seen and unseen; it is physical as well as spiritual. It is impossible to find a Hebrew conception of soul or spirit which can exist without what we would call a body.

The most remarkable thing about the psychological language of the Old Testament is that there is no separate term for body.<sup>73</sup> In the absence of a word which describes the complex of physical organs which we call body, it is legitimate to conclude that the Hebrew did not see any need to contrast the whole with its various parts.<sup>74</sup> More important,

however, it is evidence that the Old Testament has no real awareness of a conflict, or even a contrast, between the soul and the complex of organs known later under the concept of body.<sup>75</sup> When the Hebrew writers do come to think of man as something in himself, apart from his involvement with God and neighbour, it is in terms of a psycho-physical organism in which the physical is the natural and evident expression of the spiritual. This human totality can be described either in terms of the quasi-physical soul<sup>76</sup> or in terms of any part of the body acting as the whole.<sup>77</sup>

There is a dualism to be found in the thought of the Old Testament. On the human level there is some sense of the contrast between the spirit and the flesh. It can be said that the Hebrew view of man, in general, is that he is flesh or dust, plus ruach or spirit.<sup>78</sup> At the creation God breathes the breath of life into the dust of the earth and man becomes a living nephesh (Gen.2:7). This concept of man remains consistent throughout the Old Testament period. The Priestly writers regularly refer to God as "the God of the spirits of all flesh" (Num. 16:22P, 27:16P). By the time of Ecclesiastes it can be said that the flesh returns to dust and the spirit returns to the God who gave it (12:7). This is by no means, however, a doctrine of personal immortality.

Modern scholarship is consistent in its testimony that the spirit-flesh contrast in the Old Testament is an entirely different dualism from the dichotomy which Greek thought made

between body and soul. In the first place, there is no attempt to distinguish between flesh and spirit as two different forms of existence.<sup>79</sup> The Hebrew has no concept of a soul which can exist apart from the flesh which it animates.<sup>80</sup> In the second place, the dualism of the Old Testament is a contrast between that which is weak and that which is powerful. Hence, it is the weakness of men which Isaiah contrasts with the power of God (Is. 31:3), when he compares horses and men with God and spirit. Nowhere in the Old Testament is flesh considered to be evil,<sup>81</sup> the source of evil,<sup>82</sup> or in opposition to God.<sup>83</sup>

It should be noted, too, that the flesh-spirit dualism is not seen to be a conflict within the human personality itself. It is rather a contrast between the fleshly nature of all that is created and the spiritual power of all that is superhuman and God.<sup>84</sup> Insofar as there is any sense of dualism within man himself, it is a vague realization that the purposes of the inner man do not always correlate with the movements of the outer man. Even the contrast between sacramental and personal worship is not great.<sup>85</sup> The prophets, however, were very much aware of the distance between profession and action, even though they did not express it in psychological language. The vagueness of this dualism is summed up by one writer as follows: "On a review of the whole Hebrew account of the unit called 'a man' it may perhaps be said that neshamah, nephesh and ruach stand on one side and everything else on the other - but this is not Greek dichotomy."<sup>86</sup>

We have seen, then, that the Hebrew thought atmosphere, in which the Priestly writers were working, was almost entirely unaware of a spiritual-corporeal conflict or contrast. The P writers, with apparent deliberation, chose to define man's position in history and in the world of nature according to the figure of an image and likeness of God. In so doing they were quite unaware of any necessity to explain whether they meant the reader to understand it to be a spiritual or a physical likeness. There is little doubt that the Priestly writers intended to teach that man alone of all creatures can represent God physically.<sup>87</sup> At the same time, there is no reason to conclude that they conceived of God in grossly anthropomorphic terms. The Hebrews of the Old Testament were quite capable of thinking about man and God in terms which are at the same time both individual and social, physical and spiritual. In these terms they conceived of a full personal correspondence between God who is Elohim and the humanity which he created.<sup>88</sup>

#### Mind and Body According to Paul

As has been noted, Augustine does not teach a dichotomy of human nature in which the soul is distinguished from the body on moral grounds. For Augustine the body is not inherently evil nor is the soul essentially good. The soul, however, is by nature closer to God than the body because it is spiritual substance, while the body is physical substance. Augustine seemed to feel that the power which pulls man away from God

has more of a hold on the body than it has on the soul, simply because the body is inferior substance. The major difference between soul and body according to Augustine, then, is the quality of substance contained in each. He found his main Scriptural support for this teaching in Wisdom 9:15 which he quotes regularly as, "the corruptible body presseth down the soul."<sup>89</sup>

Moreover, Augustine taught that the image of God in man is to be found, not in the soul of man generally, but in the rational soul only. He rested his argument heavily upon a literal interpretation of the language of Paul. In the twelfth book of De Trinitate Augustine is proving that "man was not made in the image of God according to the shape of his body, but according to his rational mind (rationalem mentem)."<sup>90</sup> In support of this argument he marshals two passages from Paul. First, he attributes Ephesians 4:23,24 to Paul and quotes him, saying, "be renewed in the spirit of your mind (spiritu mentis vestrae), and put on the new man, which is created after God."<sup>91</sup> Second, he quotes Colossians 3:9,10 where Paul writes, "Putting off the old man with his deeds; put on the new man, which is renewed to the knowledge of God (in agnitionem Dei) after the image of Him that created him."<sup>92</sup>

Elsewhere, Augustine uses Paul's letter to the Romans to indicate that the image of God is a trinity in the human mind,<sup>93</sup> and that when a believer is changed it is primarily a renewal of the mind.<sup>94</sup> He quotes Romans 12:2 as: "Reformamini



in novitate mentis vestrae, be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind." In all the cases quoted he concludes that Paul can mean nothing except the "rational mind wherein the knowledge of God can exist."<sup>95</sup>

In the fourteenth book of De Trinitate Augustine does a thorough examination of the concept of spirit in the Bible. He concludes that Paul's reference to "the spirit of your minds" (Eph. 4:23) is an indication that Paul was speaking of that spiritual substance which is called mind. Therefore, Augustine believes that all of Paul's teaching about the image of God in man supports his own contention that the image is to be found only in the pure substance of the rational mind.<sup>96</sup>

How far was Augustine justified in his interpretation of Paul? Did Paul intend his readers to think of the image of God as being only in that part of man which is pure spiritual substance? How far had Paul moved away from the Hebrew heritage of the Old Testament? Was Paul not writing for the Gentiles of the Greco-Roman world of thought and in the Greek language? The whole answer to these questions would require a most exhaustive discussion. Here, however, we must attempt some answer to the question of whether or not Paul applied a spiritual-corporeal category of thought to his description of the relationship between man and God.

The surest way to answer the question before us is to attempt an exegesis of the passage which Augustine uses to

support most strongly his conclusions. Ephesians 4:23,24 seemed to Augustine to be proof first, that Paul considered the mind to be pure spiritual substance and second, that when the image of God is renewed in man after baptism, the change takes place primarily in the rational mind. Most scholars today consider that Ephesians was written by someone who lived a generation after Paul.<sup>97</sup> Since, however, Augustine considered it to be a true expression of Paul's thought, we too shall have to consider this passage in the light of Pauline thought generally. In any case, the terms used in this passage are comparable to those used in the letters which are universally acknowledged to be the work of Paul.

Augustine was quite right in seeing the statement, "renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae" as an exhortation to develop the conscious and reasonable relationship with God. In both of the other cases where this type of expression is used, Paul is calling for a human controlled effort on the part of the believer. Once he says be transformed (reformamini) by the renewing of the mind (Rom. 12:2). Once he calls the believer to "put on the new man (induite novum) which is renewed . . . after the image of Him that created him" (Col. 3:9,10). In both of these cases it is evident that Paul had moved beyond the Old Testament, as he used the Greek nous to indicate the "knowing, understanding and judging" capacity of man.<sup>98</sup>

Paul regularly uses the term nous to describe the

conscious activities of thought, judgment and choice, insofar as they are under human control. Nous is the activity which man initiates and directs, as distinct from the activities which are the result of outside influences. On the one hand, nous is involved in conscious and controlled worship as it is contrasted with the speaking of tongues (1 Cor. 14:14,15,19, 20). Paul attributes the phenomenon of tongues to the action of spirit (pneuma), rather than to the action of nous. The peace of God which passes all understanding keeps both heart and nous in Christ Jesus (Phil. 4:7). Here heart and nous are complementary terms indicating the wholeness of personal peace. In this case, heart would tend to indicate more of the feeling nature of peace, while nous has intellectual and rational connotations.

Just as the activity of nous is distinguished from the movements of the spirit, it is also contrasted with the activities and attitudes which are controlled by the power of sin in the flesh. Paul sees in his members a law at war with the law of his nous (Rom. 7:23-25). The law of the nous is the conscious and rational recognition of the superiority of God's law. However, nous alone is not sufficient to enable a man to serve God until the "Spirit of life in Christ" sets him free from the law of sin and death (Rom. 8:2).

Nous, then, is a word Paul uses to indicate the natural human capacity to know God and consciously respond to him. Man is a responsible being because he has the power to know God and

yet he has refused to acknowledge him as God (Rom. 1:19-28). Gentiles, as a group, are living without conscious hope or purpose, because their hearts are hard and they do not know God (Eph. 4:17f). Jews, on the other hand, live in hopelessness because the law of Moses has put a veil over their nous, which makes it impossible for them to see God. Paul attributes the blindness of the Jews to the god of this world, who has taken advantage of the law to make them incapable of seeing the light of the glory of Christ, who is the likeness (eikon) of God (2 Cor. 3:14-4:4).

Augustine was in accord with Paul so long as he taught that the mind is involved in the process of renewal which takes place in Christian experience. In his analysis of the nature of this Christian experience, however, Augustine applies two categories of thought which are not evident in Paul. In the first place, Augustine distinguishes the mind from the body on the basis of the quality of its substance. The mind is pure spiritual substance, according to Augustine, and is therefore set apart from everything corporeal and fleshly. Secondly, Augustine distinguishes mind from everything else on the basis of function. Pure mind beholds, contemplates and loves spiritual things directly, without the mediation of the senses. The chief function of the mind is to understand and see what the human senses cannot see. By contrast, all other human experience has to come through the senses and the resulting knowledge is a lower kind of knowledge than that which the pure mind has.

Augustine was following Paul when he spoke of the "inner man" as contrasted with the "outer man".<sup>99</sup> However, he goes beyond Paul to make the distinction between the inner man and the outer man on the basis of the rational power of the inner man. The chief characteristic of the inner man, according to Augustine, is that it has understanding (intelligentia). Inner man, therefore, is capable of seeing and knowing ultimate truth and the spiritual reality of God himself. The outer man remains dependent upon the limited mediation of sense experience and consequently is excluded from a direct relationship with pure spiritual reality. Even that part of the mind which deals with temporal and changeable things through the senses of the body,<sup>100</sup> is classified by Augustine as part of the outer man.

We shall indicate here sufficient evidence to prove only that the mind and body are not distinguished in Paul on the same basis as they are in Augustine. The clearest proof that Paul does not draw any clear line of demarcation between mind and body in religious matters is in his doctrine of the renewal of the inner man. In 2 Corinthians Paul begins a passage on the nature of the religious transformation by saying, "we have this treasure in earthen vessels" (4:7). Then he goes on to add that the Christian bears about in the body (soma) the death of Jesus, in order that the "life of Jesus" may be made manifest in the body (4:10). This manifestation of Christ is to be seen in the mortal flesh (sarx) of the believer. (4:11).

It is after Paul has argued that the influence of Christ is evident even in the mortal flesh that he goes on to conclude that there is to be a kind of metamorphosis in the believer. The old form of natural man is to pass away, while a new form which has been developing within becomes the real man. Paul says, "Though our outer nature (ὁ ἔξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος) is wasting away, our inner nature (ὁ ἔσω) is being renewed every day" (4:16 RSV). Here in 2 Corinthians, then, Paul simply uses the outer anthropos and the inner anthropos as a graphic way of describing the change which takes place in the believer.<sup>101</sup> Paul finds himself under no necessity to define his terms according to substance or function. Moreover, it is evident in the rest of the passage that the new form of the inner man is to be evident in the body as well as the mind and is to be seen by the outward eye.

The same simple contrast is made between the "old" and the "new" in the passage, "if any one is in Christ, he is a new creation; the old (ta achata) has passed away, behold, the new (kaina) has come" (2 Cor. 5:17,18). In Romans, the religion of the Jews is described according to the outward appearances (ἐν τῷ φανερωθῆ), in contrast to the real religion which is within (ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Rom. 2:25-29). At this point, Paul is following in the tradition of the prophets of the Old Testament who saw the need for more inwardness in religion. In Romans 7:23-25 we saw how the law of God is said to be in the inmost self (τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον) and how the inner man and the nous are

very closely identified. Even so, Paul is not contrasting the mind with the body. The conflict which Paul sees in the human being is between the law of God, which gains entrance through the mind and the law of sin, which gets hold of man through his members.<sup>102</sup>

Augustine, as noted, quotes Ephesians 4:23,24 as proof of his doctrine that the image of God is to be found only in the spirit of the mind. The author's real intention in this passage is to contrast the old (τὸν παλαιόν), which man is to put off, with the new nature (τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον), which the believer puts on from within. Certainly Augustine is right in teaching that man is to be renewed in the spirit of the mind, but there is no indication that the author of Ephesians teaches that the mind is the whole, or even the primary phase, of the new creature. The writer of Ephesians is evidently exhorting the believers to use everything which is under their conscious control for the purpose of facilitating the change which is taking place. It is not evident that the transformation of the mind is the same as the renewal of the image of God in man.

In the one passage remaining to be considered, the believer is urged to a life of honesty on the grounds that he has already put off the old nature with its practices (Col. 3:9,10). Honesty is here presented as a mark of the new nature which is "renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator." Augustine interpreted this to mean that virtues

such as honesty followed as a consequence of the renewed image in the mind of the believer. In Colossians, however, it would seem that it is the practice of honesty itself which is evidence that man is being renewed in the likeness of God, whom he sees in the face of Christ.

The general atmosphere of the New Testament lends weight to our conclusion that Paul does not make the mind-body distinction. Modern students of Paul are agreed that he conceives of no such thing as human personal existence which is not existence in the body.<sup>103</sup> Indeed, it is doubtful if the New Testament at any point expresses a concept of man or God in which a distinction is made between that which can be seen with the eyes of the flesh and that which is seen through the intellect.<sup>104</sup> Since Paul conceives of no human life apart from the body, he teaches that the renewal which takes place in the believer is a transformation of the body. This is not to say that Paul does not recognize that part of the body which is corruptible and which passes away in death.<sup>105</sup> It means, rather, that Paul considers the body to be of permanent worth and an essential part of the human life in whatever form it is found.

Paul's teaching about the body is found in 1 Corinthians, where he describes its ultimate purpose thus: "The body is not meant for immorality, but for the Lord" (6:13). Paul makes it clear in the rest of the passage that the body is corrupted by immoral relationships with other human beings.



On the other hand, the body is to be redeemed through its relationship to the Lord. The body is the temple of the Holy Spirit and it is, therefore, the Holy Spirit which sanctifies and redeems the earthly body (1 Cor. 3:16-20).

Ultimately, Paul sees that the body of the believer is to be raised in the resurrection from the dead. It is, however, not the natural body with which man is born, but his transformed body which is to be raised. There is that in the body which dies just as all flesh dies but there is also that which is raised to everlasting life at the resurrection (1 Cor. 15:35-44; see also Phil. 3:21; cf. Rom. 6:6-13, 8:23).

Augustine accepted Paul's doctrine of the resurrection of the body but as we have seen it caused him difficulty. For Augustine a spiritual body is a contradiction in terms, while for Paul it simply meant a body which is transformed by the power of the Holy Spirit.<sup>106</sup> It is not necessary for Paul to explain that first the mind must be transformed and then the body. So far as we can read the mind of Paul, it is evident that he considers the whole person to be changed.

There is considerable variance among modern scholars when they come to explain what Paul had in mind as he spoke of the two natures of the body.<sup>107</sup> It can be said with certainty only that Paul did not distinguish the two natures of man on the basis of spiritual and corporeal substance, as Augustine did. Paul thinks much more in the terms of the Old Testament as he conceives the relationship of man and God in a manner which involves the whole personality. The distinction between

mind and body is not a part of the religious teaching of  
<sup>108</sup>  
 Paul.

Paul is certain that the new relationship between man and God, which is effected by Christ, causes a transformation in the whole personality of the believer. "It is a new creating of the whole man - spirit and 'form' and  
<sup>109</sup>  
 body." It could not possibly have been Paul's intention to teach that the image of God is primarily in the mind or primarily in the body. His attitude is that Christ is the "image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15) and those whom God has chosen are "predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren" (Rom. 8:29).

Our final conclusion, then, is that Augustine was adding to the meaning of Paul's words a category of thought that is not evident in the writings of Paul. Even if Paul had written Ephesians, he would not have intended the phrase, "spirit of the mind" to indicate anything so limited in meaning as Augustine's "spirit called mind". Nor, on the other hand, would he have meant to teach that the image of God in man is not to be found in the body. The spiritual-corporeal distinction is simply not present in the thinking of Paul. The conflict which Paul sees within man is not a matter of wrong relationships between parts of his personality. The conflict within man comes, rather, as a result of wrong relationships between the whole man and the personal God above.

Right relationships are restored by the personal contact with Christ. Through faith in Christ the whole life of the believer is transformed and he has new fellowship with both God and his neighbour.<sup>110</sup>

### 3. The Changeable and the Unchangeable

The most influential category of thought in Augustine's theological system is that which distinguishes the creature from the Creator on the grounds of changeability.<sup>111</sup> The central doctrine in Augustinian theology is that God is absolutely simple and therefore unchanging in every sense of the word. Everything which can be said about God is the same as God himself. There are no adjectives which describe what God has. There are only nouns which are what God is. God, therefore, is the good, the true and the light. God does not have wisdom; he is wisdom. God does not have love; he is love.

Augustine finds that the language of the Bible must be carefully analyzed when it applies to God. Just as there are three main classes of substance - uncreated spirit, created spirit and created matter - there are three corresponding classes of words. On the one level, Scripture uses words taken from the world of corporeal things and applies them to God. For example, says Augustine, the psalmist speaks of God's wings (Ps. 17:8) but he does not mean that God has physical wings. "Wings", then, are a sign of something else or, as we would more probably say, they are symbolic wings.<sup>112</sup>

On another level, there are words originating in the

world of created spirit which are applied to God. God, for example, is said to be jealous (Ex. 20:5) and God is said to repent (Gen. 6:7). Once again, Augustine is sure that God does not have the feelings that men have. Such words as jealousy, anger, wrath and love must also be considered to be symbolic expressions of the nature of God.<sup>113</sup>

On the highest level, Augustine teaches that there are Biblical words which are true descriptions of the pure uncreated spiritual nature of God. The only example he finds in the Old Testament, however, is Exodus 3:14 which he quotes as "Ego sum qui sum, I am that I am."<sup>114</sup> There is little doubt here that Augustine is following the pattern of the Septuagint. This passage is now considered to be one of the outstanding examples of how the Septuagint translators came to their task with a conviction that God is unchanging.<sup>115</sup> What is virtually impossible to translate from the Hebrew<sup>116</sup> became the foundation stone of a theology which could conceive of no change in the being of God.

Augustine found Scriptural support for the concept of an unchanging God in two other passages. Psalm 102:26,27 is quoted as, "Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed; but Thou art the same."<sup>117</sup> He also quotes James 1:17 which says, in speaking of God, "with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning."

Apart from these direct quotations, Augustine tends to force the idea of changelessness on the passages with which he

deals in De Trinitate. Interpreting 1 Corinthians 6:17 he comments on the idea that the man who is joined to the Lord becomes one spirit. For Augustine this means that the human mind is raised to participation in God's "being truth and bliss." However, he carefully adds concerning God, that in becoming one spirit with God man does not change God. We must always keep in mind, he says, that "nothing thereby [is] added to the being truth and bliss which is His [God's] own."<sup>118</sup> Such an interpretation is obviously Augustine's, for it is not evident in either the language or the context at this point in Paul's letter.

The same method of interpretation is to be seen when Augustine interprets 1 Timothy 6:16 on the subject of immortality. He finds that the words, "who only hath immortality," prove that immortality means changelessness. The real argument rests upon Augustine's own previous statement that "the soul also both is said to be, and is, in a certain measure immortal." This being the presupposition with which he starts, Augustine goes on to say, "Scripture would not say 'only hath' unless because true immortality is unchangeableness."<sup>119</sup> On the whole, Augustine finds that the quality of changelessness in God is a logical necessity, rather than a principle that he finds in the Bible.

Augustine's Concept of Wisdom  
As The Knowledge of God

The result of this strict distinction between the creature and the Creator on the grounds of changeability is most evident in Augustine's understanding of the relationship between man and God. There are two terms in De Trinitate which afford us the best insight into the contrast between Augustine's doctrine of the divine-human relationship and the teaching of the Bible. The first term is wisdom, under which Augustine describes everything which man knows or can know about God. The concept of wisdom bears directly upon the doctrine of the image of God at the point where it is the knowledge of God, or the possibility of such knowledge, which makes it possible to describe man in terms of the image of God. The second term to be considered is the group of words that can be generally discussed under the concept of love. For Augustine, love is the power which unites the knower with the known, and in the divine-human relationship it is the power which restores the image of God to its original form.

Augustine drew a clear distinction between that knowledge which comes to man through sense experience and that knowledge which comes by intuition through the intellect. Knowledge which comes into the mind through the senses is knowledge of things which are changeable, corruptible and mortal. All such knowledge is classified generally as scientia, or plain knowledge. Knowledge which comes to man through the intuition of the rational mind, on the other hand, is knowledge

of things which are spiritual, unchangeable, incorruptible and eternal. Such knowledge, which is the result of the vision of the rational mind, is classified by Augustine as wisdom (sapientia). Wisdom, therefore, is really the knowledge of ultimate truth; the reality of God himself. In his theology, wisdom is the contemplation of truth itself; wisdom is the vision of God himself as he really is and not merely as he comes to us in his revelation.

Augustine supported his distinction between knowledge and wisdom by his peculiar interpretation of Job 28:28. According to his translation, Job declares "Behold piety that is wisdom and to depart from evil that is knowledge."<sup>120</sup> Piety, which is pietas in the Latin, he finds to be a translation of the Greek theosebeia. The best translation of this one Greek word, he thinks, is really Dei cultus, the worship of God. Therefore, he concludes, wisdom, the goal of all life, is really the worship of God.

Earlier, we saw how Augustine defined worship as remembering, understanding and loving God. It is in this relationship of worship that the image of God in man is seen to be maintained. Augustine concludes his discussion on the nature of wisdom by saying, "Therefore God himself is the chiefest wisdom; but the worship of God is the wisdom of man."<sup>121</sup> Elsewhere we find that God is not only the "chiefest wisdom" but he is wisdom.

When we want to know what God is, according to

Augustine, we must attempt to see the very substance of God with the vision of our rational minds. When he speaks of the knowledge of God, Augustine means that vision of God which impresses itself upon the mind when man beholds God intuitively. The knowledge of God, therefore, is wisdom. This means that the knowledge of God is not something that man learns about God, but wisdom is the vision of God as he is. God, then, is wisdom and wisdom is participation in God. Man becomes wise when he sees God himself, for in so doing he is made like God. The truly wise man is the person in whom there is always a consciousness of God himself impressed upon the pure substance of the rational mind.

122

According to the distinction Augustine makes between words that apply to God essentially and words that apply to him relatively, the word wisdom is a description of the essence of God. One of the persons of the Trinity is also called the wisdom of God. Augustine finds that 1 Corinthians 1:24 speaks of "Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God". He finds it necessary to relate this passage with the teaching that God himself is wisdom.

In relating Christ, the wisdom of God, to God who is wisdom, Augustine uses the doctrine of two forms by which the nature of Christ can be interpreted. There is, in Christ the Son, a form which is the form of God himself and which is equal to him in all respects. The form of God in Christ is of the same substance as God and it is in this form that Christ is



seen to be essentially a member of the Trinity. Christ, then, can be said to be the wisdom of God according to the form in which he is of the same essence and nature as the two other members of the Trinity. Insofar as Christ is God and in all points equal to the Father, he is to be called the wisdom of God.<sup>123</sup>

However, there is another form in Christ which is the form of the servant, in which Christ is like men. When Christ is called the Son, it is because he has been born of the Father. The word Son signifies his relationship with the Father but it does not describe the substance in which he is the same as God. When Christ is called the wisdom of God, according to this human form, the word wisdom is being used in a relative sense.

Augustine employs the concept of logos in his teaching in order to make the distinction between that wisdom which is the same as God and the wisdom which was born into flesh. The wisdom of God which was born into the flesh of Christ became the word of God. In the form of God, then, the wisdom of Christ is the same essence as God the Father and the Holy Spirit. In the form of man, however, Christ the Son is the wisdom of God which was born into human flesh and is, therefore, the word which became flesh and dwelt among us. "For He is understood to be the Word relatively, but wisdom essentially: let us understand, that when He is called the Word, it is as much as to say, wisdom that is born, so as to be both the Son

and the image." <sup>124</sup> Wisdom, therefore, is the essence of God.

Augustine maintains the lines of his thought clearly. Wisdom remains that which is unchanged and unchanging even when it is found in the person of Christ. When wisdom enters into the human form of Christ and becomes active in the world of time and change, then it is no longer the wisdom of God but the Word of God. Christ, in the form of a servant, is the wisdom which appears to men. All language which applies to the earthly life of Christ is therefore knowledge. Hence, Augustine describes the earthly life of Christ as the "back parts" of God, for he was someone who could be seen through the eyes of the flesh. True wisdom, however, remains hidden from the senses and man can see the face of God only by faith, until such time as his rational vision has cleared sufficiently for him to behold the true form of God. <sup>125</sup>

As we have seen, when man becomes wise there is action and change in the life of man, but there is no action or change in the life of God. Man's wisdom is always participation in God's wisdom, which means that the spirit of man has some of the nature of God impressed upon it. The true goal of man's spirit, then, is seen to be a matter of becoming unchanging and eternal in the same sense that God is unchanging and eternal. Immortality, for Augustine, means that the spirit of man becomes incorruptible as it participates more and more in the being and wisdom of God. Man becomes wise when the form of God's wisdom is present to his rational mind. The

actions of a wise man are a revelation of his wisdom, because he refers all his judgments and choices to the form of wisdom which he sees to be the very presence of God above his mind. If wise men governed the world, then the world would be controlled by God, since all of men's actions would be referred to him.<sup>126</sup>

We have seen here, in Augustine's teaching about wisdom or the knowledge of God, how firmly he held to the belief in a God who does not and cannot move or change. Even Christ the Son, who is the most active member of the Trinity, is not considered to be in the form of God according to that part of his life that was seen by the eyes of the flesh and understood according to the observations of men who live in the changing world. All the movement which takes place between God and man is seen by Augustine to take place on man's side. Man moves toward God and away from God, but God does not move toward men in any sense except that which we shall examine presently.

#### The Biblical Concept of the Knowledge of God

Augustine's emphasis on the unchanging nature of God bears upon the doctrine of the image of God most when he interprets the Biblical concept of knowledge. The Scripture passage which is the focal point of his doctrine here is Colossians 3:9,10 where he quotes, "put on the new man, which is renewed to the knowledge of God (agnitionem Dei) after the

image (secundem imaginem) of Him that created him." To Augustine, these words are proof that the renewal of the image is to take place in the rational mind, according to the measure in which it knows God. "If, then, we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and he is the new man who is renewed to the knowledge of God . . . no one can doubt, that man was made after the image of Him that created him, not according to the body, nor indiscriminately according to any part of the mind (animi), but according to the rational mind wherein the knowledge of God can exist."<sup>127</sup>

It is evident here that the knowledge of God means something quite different for Augustine than it does in the Bible. The greatest contrast between Augustine's concept of wisdom (the knowledge of God) and the Biblical teaching about wisdom comes in his interpretation of Job 28:28. According to Augustine's Bible Job says, "Behold piety that is wisdom and to depart from evil that is knowledge."<sup>128</sup> Augustine finds that wisdom and knowledge are distinguishable on the basis of action. Wisdom pertains mainly, he thinks, to the contemplation and beholding of God with the rational vision of the mind. Knowledge, on the other hand, implies the ability to act correctly in practical matters. Knowledge deals with things human and changeable, while wisdom has to do with things divine and unchanging.<sup>129</sup>

According to the Old Testament generally, wisdom is that activity in which the results of man's experience can be

seen. Wise men are those in whom others recognize the qualities of virtue and prudence (Gen. 41:8,39; Dt. 34:9; 1 Sam. 18:30; Pr. 15:7; Ezek. 28:3). The wisdom of the Old Testament is practical advice about how to live well. Wisdom is religion applied to the affairs of every day life. The wise man does all things - plowing (Pr. 20:4), marketing (Pr. 11:26), eating in company (Pr. 23:1) - according to his greater experience of God and man.

The center and source of all wisdom begins with man's attitude toward God, according to the Wisdom literature. "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge" (Pr. 1:7; cf. Ps. 25:12; 51:6; 90:12 etc.) It can almost always be said that in the Old Testament a man is considered to be wise when he is seen to act after the pattern of God. Man is wise when he displays a wisdom like God's wisdom. <sup>130</sup>

The correspondence between God's wisdom and man's wisdom is nowhere more apparent than in the book of Job. God is said to be "wise in heart, and mighty in strength" (9:4). "With God are wisdom and might," both of which attributes are to be seen in the natural phenomena of wind, drought, floods and other events of nature (12:13-15). Old men, then, are usually wiser than young men because they have had more experience of natural events and of life itself (12:12; 32:7). Nevertheless, the true source of wisdom is not mere human experience. Wisdom is the knowledge of God's ways. Man, says Job, does not know the way to wisdom, nor

does any living thing. Only God, by whose power the winds and waters move, can see clearly enough into the nature of things to have real wisdom. Man, he concludes, is wise insofar as he respects and reveres God. Hence Job's words: "Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding" (28:28RSV).

Augustine took a simple case of Hebrew parallelism and based a philosophic distinction upon it which was not in the mind of the original author. For Augustine, knowledge of God means the contemplation of God himself, the pure, uncreated spiritual being.<sup>131</sup> In the Old Testament, the knowledge of God is communion with God. Old Testament wisdom is the product of the personal respect for God that has been gained through religious experience and the observation of God's dealings with men in nature and history. Whereas Augustine thinks of worship as an inner movement of the intellectual faculties, the Old Testament thinks of the fear of God in terms of reverence, which issues in obedience. Augustine's knowledge of God, then, is ontological, while the Hebrew concept of religious knowledge is existential.<sup>132</sup>

Augustine was careful to guard the principle that when man comes to know God there can be no change in God's being. The Old Testament, on the other hand, thinks generally of a relationship between man and God in which both are affected by the quality of the fellowship. Despite Augustine's belief to the contrary, the God of the Old Testament is credited

with jealousy and anger, as well as steadfast love and forgiveness. The very nature of the covenant between God and Israel is one in which the future course of God's actions is seen to be determined in part by the present lives of the Israelites. In the Old Testament God is seen to be genuinely affected by the worship and the morality of mortal men.<sup>133</sup>

Turning now to Paul: when Paul speaks of "being renewed in knowledge after the image of its creator" (Col. 3:9,10), does he justify Augustine's contention that such knowledge is largely the result of contemplating God? The answer to this query is within the letter to the Colossians itself. "See to it that no one makes prey of you by philosophy" (Col. 2:8). In place of this philosophy, Paul exhorts the Christians to look upon Christ, "For in him the whole fulness of deity dwells bodily" (Col. 2:9). While it is true that Augustine does not teach precisely the doctrine that is being condemned here,<sup>134</sup> the point remains: the truth which Paul is presenting is that the whole realm of heavenly beings is not to be seen in speculation, but rather by looking on Christ.

The main body of evidence indicates that Paul is very near to the Old Testament in his use of the concept of knowledge. Natural man, he says, can know God by seeing what God has done in creation (Rom. 1:9). When man comes to know God, Paul does not consider that something happens in man alone. God comes to man just as surely as man comes to God.

To the Galatians he says, "now that you have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, how can you turn back again to the weak and beggarly elemental spirits . . . ?" (Gal. 4:9). To the Corinthians he writes, "if one loves God, one is known by him" (1 Cor. 8:3). In other words, God reveals himself to man in such a way that he takes hold of man and makes a claim upon him. Man's knowledge of God, for Paul, is the human response to God's revelation of himself.

Almost always the knowledge of which Paul speaks is the knowledge of God in Christ. In such cases it is always certain that Paul means far more than mere contemplation of the "form of God" in Christ. The God of creation, he says, "has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ" (2 Cor. 4:6). Both the phrase "glory of God," which is God in his outer appearance, and the phrase "face of Christ," make it impossible to say that Paul was thinking of intellectual contemplation. The same pattern of thought is present in Philippians 3:10 and Colossians 2:2, where the knowledge of God's mystery is the revelation of God in Christ.

In his teaching about the knowledge of God, then, Paul remains essentially Jewish. God, for Paul, is always the God who comes in his revelation to the believer. The knowledge of God, according to Paul, has been greatly increased in the believer, not because the believer sees God himself more clearly, but because God has revealed himself more fully



in Jesus Christ. The relationship between man and God is transformed by Christ, and in this relationship knowledge is the experience of fellowship with God. Man is reconciled to God not only because he repents, but also because he believes that God himself has changed the situation and no longer holds his sin against him.<sup>135</sup> In Paul's writings, as in the Old Testament, knowledge is the product of communion and fellowship with God. The growth in knowledge, of which Paul speaks in Colossians 3:10 and elsewhere, is the result of a developing relationship between man and God.

#### 4. Substance and Relationship

Just as wisdom is the most important concept in the philosophic vocabulary of Augustine, love is the most important word in his psychological and religious terminology. Love, generally speaking, is for Augustine the power of affection with which the human mind reaches out and draws images of external things into itself. The love of God, therefore, is of exceptional importance, since it describes the power by which the pure human mind reaches out toward God and impresses the form of God upon the human mind.

As we have seen, it is the power of love which Augustine considers to be instrumental in re-forming the image of God in man after the likeness of the Trinity. It must always be kept clearly in mind, however, that in reaching out toward the deity, love never has any power to change God. God remains

imperturbably the same, while man develops into the likeness of the unchanging Trinity through his love for God.

Human love is a description of man's unfulfilled desire for that which he needs to complete his nature. What, then, is God's love? According to Scripture, Augustine finds that God is love. In his Latin Bible the Greek agape is translated by both dilectio and charitas, consequently God is, for Augustine, both dilectio and charitas (see e.g. dilectio in 1 Jn. 4:8 and charitas in 1 Jn. 4:16), and he uses these words interchangeably as he teaches his doctrine of God. The words dilectio and charitas, then, are the words most commonly used to indicate that love which is God.

The Latin amor, on the other hand, is reserved mainly for the designation of human love, in Augustine's vocabulary. When amor becomes amor Dei, it becomes a description of human love which has God as the object of its affections. In all cases where man's love for God is indicated, amor Dei, charitas Dei and dilectio Dei are all essentially synonymous expressions for that love which draws man toward God in search of spiritual fulfilment. These expressions always describe man's love for  
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God and not God's love for man.

Whereas man has love that draws him toward God, God himself is said to be love. Conversely, since love is a word which applies to God essentially, love is said to be God. God, then, is love and love is God.  
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Logically, if God is spiritual substance, love also is spiritual substance. Augustine at this

point is entirely logical, for he goes on to teach that love is a substance. He spends some time on the suggestion that love is really a substance which belongs to man, but because of its nature it is worthy to be called God. The conclusion of Augustine's argument is that love is a substance which is God, and he points out that Scripture says, "God is charity,"<sup>138</sup> just as it says, "God is Spirit."

Augustine, in defining love as a substance,<sup>139</sup> indeed the same substance as God, finds himself teaching a doctrine in which God's love is not an emotion or a feeling in any ordinary human sense. True to his doctrine that God is unchangeable and unchanging, Augustine is concerned that his readers do not consider that God has any emotions comparable to those of man. For example, he explicitly denies that God becomes angry in the same sense that men become angry. God's wrath, he argues, is not "a perturbation of the mind."<sup>140</sup> Accordingly, Augustine considers it unfitting that the love which is God should be described in the same manner as the love which men know, for human love always indicates that the lover is unfulfilled and incomplete. The love God has for a man, then, is not a desire for fellowship with him, because the Creator has no need for fellowship with his creatures.<sup>141</sup>

God is sufficient in himself and consequently his being can in no way be affected by what men do. Since God does not depend on men, he cannot be injured when they fail him. Since God is omnipotent, he does not need the services which men have

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to offer.

The main movement of that love which is God is not outward toward men. God's love is primarily a mutual attraction between the members of the Trinity. In particular, it is the bond of affection which binds the Son to the Father. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that it is the Holy Spirit which is mainly to be described as love. Added to this main movement of love within the substance of the Trinity, but apparently secondary to it, there is also a kind of love in God which binds man to God from below.<sup>143</sup> This love which unites man to God from below is seen to be the work of the Holy Spirit, as it goes out from God, to become active in the minds of men. Love, then, like wisdom, is not only one of the nouns which is the same substance as God himself; it is also an adjective which describes the particular relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Father and to the Son.

While the Scriptures do not actually say that the Holy Spirit is love, Augustine finds that it is implied in the Bible that the main work of the Holy Spirit is in uniting the Father and the Son. Concerning the Holy Spirit, he says of the Bible that it "so intimates to us a mutual love, wherewith the Father and the Son reciprocally love one another."<sup>144</sup> Augustine does not teach that the Holy Spirit is love, for it is actually the substance of the Trinity itself that is love. He does conclude, however, that there is more purpose in calling the Holy Spirit love than there is in calling either of the other persons of the

Trinity by that name.

Thus far Augustine's doctrine of God is entirely in keeping with the analogy to the Trinity which he found in human thought. As we have seen, the human mind was considered to be a true image of God only when it was entirely turned in upon itself in remembering, understanding and loving itself. When it is necessary to describe God in his relation to man, this conception of complete self-involvement no longer suffices. The question arises: how does God, then, reveal or express his love toward man?

One of the answers to this question is found in Augustine's doctrine of the work of Christ. Christ, he teaches, was born into the world in order that men might know how much God loved them. In order to find God, "first we have had to be persuaded how much God loved us, lest from despair we should not dare to be lifted up to Him."<sup>146</sup> In this passage, God's love is described in these terms, "quantum nos diligereit Deus". The love of God, in Augustine's theology, is not in any sense a kind of affection that God has for mankind. Augustine apparently could not understand the feeling of the Gospel of St. John as it describes God's love in terms of the father who gives his only begotten son (John 3:16). Consequently, the work of Christ is often described simply as a matter of providing men with an example or a pattern to follow, in order that they may be led ultimately to the contemplation of the true being of God himself.<sup>147</sup>

The second part of Augustine's answer to the question of how God expresses his love toward men is found in his doctrine of the Holy Spirit. In the final analysis, it is not the word love, but the word gift, which best describes the person of the Holy Spirit in its relation to the rest of the Trinity. As we have seen, Christ is the wisdom of God essentially and he is the word of God relatively. In the same manner, the Holy Spirit is the love of God essentially and it is the gift of God relatively. In other words, the work of the Holy Spirit is seen to be chiefly a matter of giving the love of God to men. It is the Holy Spirit, then, which gives to men the love by which they are united to God from beneath (subjungens).

The love which the Holy Spirit gives to men, however, in no way endangers Augustine's doctrine of the passionless nature of God. God's gift to man through the Holy Spirit is not a portion of that love which is God. The gift of the Holy Spirit is, rather, the power by which man is able to cleave to God through his own human affections. In giving the gift of love to man, God does not move toward man, nor do his affections draw God toward man. Instead, God gives to man the love by which man's own desires cause him to be drawn toward God. Unlike the God of the Old Testament, Augustine's God never expresses his feelings toward men, either by bestowing special favors upon them or by turning away from them. God remains forever imperturbably the same, but he gives to man the gift of love by which man may come to know him and hence to become

like his Creator.

Man's love is always considered by Augustine to be essentially desire. Because man is incomplete and unsatisfied, he always desires something. Augustine taught that the root and source of all man's religious life was a will, or desire, to reach the state of true blessedness in which he beholds and contemplates God. The human predicament is described by Augustine as a state in which man has the will to be blessed, but he does not have the clarity of vision to know what he ought to love in order to reach the state of blessedness. "For even souls in their very sins strive after nothing else but some kind of likeness of God, in a proud and preposterous, and, so to say, slavish liberty."<sup>148</sup> Man in his fallen sinful state, then, has freedom, but it is only the freedom to seek after those things which lead him into sin and slavery. Man has no freedom or power to turn away from those things to which he has become enslaved.

We now begin to see how it was that Augustine moved into a doctrine which denied the power and freedom of the human will. Underlying all of his teaching in De Trinitate there is the assumption that when the truth of reality is known, then God will be seen as the source and cause of all that is. God, who is himself unchanging, is actually the underlying cause of all change, since all change is movement toward the being of God or away from him. Everything in the created world is either becoming or ceasing to be; created things are never static.

Among created things, man alone is considered to have a will. After long consideration, Augustine came to find that man's will is free in one direction only. Man is able to use his will in order to move away from God. Once having moved away from God, however, man has no power to move back again and restore the fellowship which he once enjoyed. Only God is able to restore the broken relationship between man and God.

It was this principle which we saw at work in Augustine's description of how the image of God in man is to be restored to its original form. Man, by his own free will, caused the image to become deformed and impaired, but man is incapable of re-creating the image of God within himself. "The self which it was able to deform," says Augustine, "it cannot of itself re-form." In other words, "the image's re-forming must come from him who first formed it."<sup>149</sup>

Augustine also teaches that man's salvation is so completely dependent upon the design of God that man can earn no merit for himself. In order to be blessed there are two things that the soul must have. First, the soul must have some merit of its own and second, it needs to receive the reward of God for such merit. However, even that merit which the soul considers to be its own has been given to it by God. The very righteousness that God must find in the soul before the rewards can be given, is righteousness which God himself has given to the soul. "It [the soul] cannot give itself the righteousness it has lost, and so has not."<sup>150</sup>



Even the process by which the soul turns from things of the world to things of God is under the control and influence of God. As we noted in passing, Augustine would not allow that the growth which takes place in the soul, while the image of God is being restored, is a result of man's own will. When the process of salvation has begun and man is constantly transferring his affections from created things toward the Creator himself, man is dependent upon God for the power to continue in the knowledge of God. There is no doubt that the desires and affections which cause man to become like God are man's own desires. Nevertheless, man is dependent upon the gift of God in order that he may continue to have the power to fix his affections upon eternal things. Hence, Augustine concludes his description of the growing Christian with these words, "And he does this in proportion as he is helped by God. For it is the sentence of God himself, 'without<sup>151</sup> me ye can do nothing.'"

The most explicit statement of Augustine's complete and unbending predestination doctrine in De Trinitate comes in the passage where the work of the Holy Spirit is being set forth. According to Augustine, the most excellent gift which is ever given by the Holy Spirit is the gift of love (charitas). Love, then, soon appears to be that which those who are being saved have, and which those who are predestined for perdition do not have. Using the picture of the last judgment to make his teaching vivid, Augustine tells of how only those who have

been given the gift of love are to be set on the right hand side. "Unless, therefore, the Holy Spirit is so far imparted to each, as to make him one who loves God and his neighbour, he is not removed from the left hand to the right."<sup>152</sup>

Here, in this final statement, we see how entirely dependent man is upon the gift of the substance of love, which can be imparted to man only according to the plan and purposes of God. God, who cannot change and does not move, will not be shaken from his plans for the salvation of men by anything that man is able to do for himself. The doctrine of predestination which Augustine teaches is too well known to require further illustration. It may seem at first that such a doctrine is in conflict with the high regard that Augustine has for the power of human reason.

Actually, however, it is the power of Augustine's own reason that has brought him to teach a doctrine of predestination. Having made up his mind that God was self-sufficient and entirely non-dependent upon his creatures, Augustine finally had to follow through to the conclusion that there is nothing that man, the creature, can do which will make any difference to the plans and purposes of God. The only kind of love such a God could give to man is divine self love. That is to say, God can give to man a love which causes man to love God, but God himself does not love man. The love of an unchanging and emotionless God can only be a passionless and unfeeling substance.

It is unnecessary to offer more evidence than has already been given that the God of the Bible is not an unfeeling and unchanging being. The Biblical concept of God is constantly expressed in terms of the highest personal relationships of men. God's love, according to the Bible, is above all things a relationship with men in which God himself is outgoing and searching for fellowship with men. Here in this last passage, on the concept of love according to Augustine, we have seen the most disastrous consequences of his doctrines. Augustine's complete and unbending determinism is the end result of his assumption that the ultimate distinction between man and God must be made on the basis of God's unchangeableness. Moreover, in order to maintain the lines of his thought clearly, he defined the love of God as a substance, rather than as a particular kind of relationship with men. Whereas the Biblical concept of God's love is primarily the description of God's attitude toward and relationship with men, Augustine's conception of God's love, in De Trinitate, is that it is something which God infuses into men in order to give them the power to love God.

Finally, and this will be considered in the conclusions, the greatest limitation in Augustine's interpretation of the concept of the image of God is his failure to distinguish between personal and impersonal being. It is questionable whether, in the last analysis, Augustine considers God to be personal in the truest sense of the term. Having chosen to

define the nature of God as pure spiritual substance, Augustine could not fully appreciate the Biblical teaching on the image of God. He did not understand the unique relationship between God, who reveals himself as personal being, and man, who gives content and meaning to the idea of person. Augustine was not able to solve the problem of how man, who is related to the ground of all being in the same way as all creatures are, is at the same time in fellowship with a divine being who is personal. Having failed to distinguish personal being from mere existence, Augustine ended with a doctrine of determinism which denies all human freedom, power of choice and initiative. His concept of faith is a mere shadow of the New Testament doctrine of Christ and consequently his ethics lack both emotional depth and a feeling for personal values.

Looking back across this second chapter, we see clearly how Augustine was attempting to present the doctrine of the Trinity to the Western mind of his day. By consistently impressing his categories of thought upon the language of the Scriptures, he was trying to make the authority of the Bible impressive to Western thinkers. He distinguished the singular from the plural, the spiritual from the corporeal, the mind from the body, the changeless from the changing and substance from relationship. In so doing, he sometimes followed the developing thought of the Scriptures to its logical conclusion. More often, however, he interpreted Biblical language as having meaning that the Hebrew writers would not have intended.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER II

1. I,ii,4.
2. I,iv,7.
3. I,ii,4.
4. III, Pref., 2, "Do not be willing to yield to my writings as to canonical Scriptures, but in these, when thou hast discovered even what thou didst not previously believe, believe it unhesitatingly."
5. p. 98. Harnack also estimates that Augustine's *Biblicism* prepared the way for the so-called pre-reformation movement.
6. C.H. Milne, A Reconstruction of the Old-Latin Text or Texts of the Gospels, Used by St. Augustine, Cambridge: University Press, 1926, has done a study comparing Augustine's New Testament quotations with the extant Old-Latin and the Vulgate. He finds that, "he was more often independent of both than dependent on either." p. xv.  
  
See Bleddyn J. Roberts, The Old Testament Texts and Versions, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1951, p. 238.
7. On Christian Doctrine, trans. J.F. Shaw, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1877, II, xv, 22. "Now among translations themselves the Italian (Itala) is to be preferred to the others, for it keeps closer to the words without prejudice to clearness of expression."  
See also II,xi,16.
8. A.W. Hadden, On the Trinity, "Translator's Preface," p. vii. However, he admits that Augustine's quotations are "frequently not borne out by the original text."  
  
See also J.F. Shaw, On Christian Doctrine, note on II,xv,22. "The translation here referred to is the Vetus Latina, as revised by the Church of Northern Italy in the fourth century prior to the final recension of Jerome, commonly called the Vulgate."

cf. F.C. Burkitt in Texts and Studies, ed. J. Armitage Robinson, Cambridge: University Press, 1896, Vol. IV, art. "The Old-Latin and the Itala," p. 55ff., attempts unconvincingly to prove that the Itala referred to by Augustine is really not the Old-Latin, but the Vulgate itself.

See also Bleddyn J. Roberts, p. 243, who refutes the above.

9. I,vi,13.
10. According to C.H. Milne, Pref. ix, Augustine began to accept Jerome's translation of the Gospels during the period 394-400 A.D.
11. On Christian Doctrine, II,xv,22, "For it is reported through all the more learned Churches that the seventy translators enjoyed so much the presence and power of the Holy Spirit in their work of translation that among that number of men there was but one voice."
12. I,vi,13.
13. Ibid.; XII,xiv,22.
14. V,ii,3; VII,iv,7; XII,xiv,22; XIV,i,1.
15. III, Pref., "We are not so familiar with the Greek tongue as to be found in any way competent to read and understand therein the books that treat of such topics [i.e. the doctrine of the Trinity] ."
16. VII,vi,12; XII,vi,6; see also I,vii,14; XIV,xiv,25.
17. F.C. Burkitt, p.63.
18. The Septuagint here is ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν.  
The Hebrew reads (מִן) הַיָּמִינִים וְהַיָּמִינִים וְהַיָּמִינִים וְהַיָּמִינִים
19. See Chap. I, pp. 118-126 for the full discussion of this matter.  
Bleddyn J. Roberts, p. 238f., gives evidence that possibly there were Latin translations originating in Africa which were translated directly from the Hebrew. Augustine's version was evidently not one of them.
20. Sir Frederick Kenyon, Our Bible and the Ancient Manuscripts, rev. A.W. Adams, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1958, p. 139 states that "No entire manuscript survives of the Old Testament in this version." However, he lists Codex

Vindobonensis 17, now at Naples, as having fragments of Genesis, and a fifth century manuscript at Lyons with portions of Genesis.

21. XII,vi,6.

22. The Vulgate reads, Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam: ad imaginem Dei creavit illum.

The Septuagint reads, καὶ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα θεοῦ ἐποίησεν αὐτοῦ. ἄρσεν καὶ θήλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς.

23. cf. C.H. Milne, p. xv. De Trinitate offers no support for Milne's statement, "he had an ample knowledge of Greek and the curiosity of the scholar to interpret the Greek for himself."

24. Ibid. p. xv, "his thought and composition were too rapid to admit of his being confined within the rigid limits of any text."

cf. Burkitt, p. 57, on Augustine's use of memory.

25. XII, vi, 6; I, vii, 14; "For if the Father alone had made man without the Son, it would not have been written, 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.'" See also VII, vi, 12; XIV, xix, 25.

26. XII, vi, 6, underlining ours. The Vulgate here reads Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam: ad imaginem Dei creavit illum.

The difference here could mean:- 1. That the Vulgate of Genesis was not available to him. 2. That he was translating or using an Old-Latin translation of the Septuagint. 3. That he was quoting from memory a passage that suited his argument.

27. XII,vii,9.

28. XII,vii,10.

29. See e.g. John A.T. Robinson, The Body, London: S.C.M., 1952, pp. 13-15, for an outline of the contrasts which Greek thought finds in reality-form and matter, the one and the many, body and soul, and the concept of boundary.

30. Gen. 3:22J, 11:7J; 1 K. 22:19-22; Is. 6:8.

31. See e.g. Raschi, The Pentateuch with Targum Onkelos Jerusalem and Jonathan, Amsterdam, 1766, on Genesis 1:26.

32. Midrash Rabbah, trans. H. Freedman, London: Soncino Press, 1939, Vol. I, p. 56f.
33. e.g. Ps. 8:5; Gen. 3:5; Ex. 12:12.
34. John Skinner, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis, I.C.C., Vol. I, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917, p. 17.  
This is one of three reasons listed by Skinner as a probable explanation of the plural.
35. S.R. Driver, The Book of Genesis, London: Methuen, 1911, p. 14. Gives wide evidence that the Hebrews were familiar with a plural of majesty.
36. e.g. Gen. 39:20; Ex. 21:29,34; Is. 19:4.
37. Brown, Driver, Briggs gives 1. a man. 2. mankind. 3. first man.
- See also R.B. Girdlestone, Synonyms of the Old Testament, Michigan: Eardman's, 1953, p. 45.
- Edmond Jacob, Theology of the Old Testament, trans. Arthur W. Heathcote and Philip J. Allcock, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1955, p. 157.
38. Aubrey R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1949, p. 83.
39. Johs. Pedersen, Israel I-II, London: Oxford University Press, 1926, p. 110. "The individual is only a form of the predominant type."
40. e.g. Ps. 53; Is. 53:4ff.
41. H. Wheeler Robinson, The People and the Book, ed. A.S. Peake, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925, art. "Hebrew Psychology," pp. 375-6.
42. Apart from Paul's letters, the only possible reference to the idea that man, as humanity, is made in the image of God, (i.e. in the New Testament) comes in the passage where Jesus calls on the Pharisees to show him a coin (Matt. 22:20; Mark 12:16; Luke 20:24). Here, by inference, the stamp of God is to be found on man.

See David Cairns, p. 32.



43. The most explicit statements concerning Christ as the eikon of God are Col. 1:15 and 2 Cor. 4:4. The same idea is present in Hebrews 1:3, where the word used is ἰσακτῆρ.

In most other cases Paul is speaking of the way in which believers are transformed into the likeness of Christ (Rom. 8:29; 1 Cor. 15:49; 2 Cor. 3:18). Once the idea is used to indicate how the believer becomes like his Creator (Col. 3:10).

44. For a full discussion of this subject see W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, London: S.P.C.K., 1948. Davies concludes that Paul's writing is a complex product of both Rabbinic and Greek influences. See esp. p. 320.

45. H. Wheeler Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913, p. 104, "in spite of the use of some Greek terms (inner man, mind, conscience) [Paul] remains psychologically what he calls himself, a Hebrew of the Hebrews." See also p. 110.

John A.T. Robinson, p. 11.

Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. Kendrick Grobel, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951, Vol. I. See esp. pp. 187-189 and p. 191.

46. John A.T. Robinson, pp. 61-69. "The hope of Christians is nothing less than that the complete fulness of God which already resides in Christ should in Him become theirs. This can never be true of isolated Christians, but in the 'fulgrown man,' in the new corporeity which is His body, 'the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ' is theirs to attain (Eph. 4:18) - for the Father's decree is that the Divine fulness should dwell in Him, not simply as an individual, but σωματικός ."

L.S. Thornton, The Common Life in the Body of Christ, Westminster: Dacre Press, 1946, p. 298f.

C. Ryder Smith, The Bible Doctrine of Man, London: Epworth Press, 1951, p. 151.

47. David Cairns, p. 43.

48. S. Vernon McCasland, The Interpreter's Bible, Vol. VII, art. "The Greco-Roman World," p. 76. "The most striking characteristic of Hellenistic culture was its emphasis on the importance of individual persons."

49. Conf. VII,xx,26. The method of allegory which Augustine learned from Ambrose (see Conf. V,xiv,25) was also instrumental in opening the Scriptures for Augustine. However, this aspect of his Biblicism is not noticeable in the passages with which we shall be dealing.
50. Bourke, p. 238.
51. XII,vii,12.
52. We shall follow Young's Concordance in transliterating.
53. Following B.D.B.
54. Amos 5:26 also uses tselem to indicate the appearance of images, but the text is doubtful.
55. B.D.B. gives the root meaning as "something cut out" from tsalam, "cut off."  
Lexicon In Veteris Testamenti, ed. Ludwig Koehler Vol. II, gives the root meanings as 1. "cut off (nose, ear) which develops to 'chisel'." 2. "grow black; grow dark; darkness."
56. See e.g. C. Ryder Smith, p. 30.  
G. Ernest Wright, Interpreter's Bible, Vol. I, art. "The Faith of Israel," p. 376b.
57. The Aramaic form of tselem is used nine times in Daniel to describe the image made by Nebuchadnezzar.
58. This is the psalm quoted by Augustine (XIV,xiv,19) to support his teaching that the image of God remains in fallen men.
59. cf. Ps. 49:2 where the sons of adham are contrasted with the sons of ish as the low and the high.
60. Daniel 2:31 etc.
61. mareh however is the word regularly used for the appearance of visions. Ezekiel regularly; Num. 9:15; Dan. 8:15; 10:6,18; Joel 2:4.
62. Johs. Pedersen, p. 114ff.
63. 2 K. 16:10 demuth describes the fashion or pattern of the altar.  
2 Chr. 4:3 the altar bears the likeness of oxen.

64. Dan. 10:16 where demuth is "one like the similitude of the sons of men."
65. This distinction is suggested by Driver, p. 15 but he adds, "the distinction cannot be pressed."  
See also Jacob, p. 167 who feels that the use of demuth "in effect curbs and tempers the excessively material and plastic meaning that the first word might first suggest."
66. Ryder Smith, p. 30.
67. These terms were suggested by Friedrich Horst, Interpretation, Vol. IV, No. 3 July 1950, art. "Face To Face, the Biblical Doctrine of the Image of God," p. 260.
68. Skinner, p. 32 concludes, "it might be truer to say that it denotes primarily the bodily form, but includes those spiritual attributes of which the former is the natural and self-evident symbol."
- Jacob, p. 167 quotes Paul Humbert with approval, "The semantic verdict is perfectly definite: man, according to P, has the same 'outward' appearance as the deity of whom he is the tangible effigy, and the noun tselem refers to no spiritual likeness in this case more than in the others."
- cf. J.Y. Campbell, in A Theological Word Book of the Bible, ed. Alan Richardson, New York: Macmillan, 1951, art. "Image", p. 110, "there is therefore no objection to taking this statement to refer primarily to man's bodily form."
69. J. Estlin Carpenter and George Harford, The Composition of the Hexateuch, London: Longman's Green, 1902, p. 246. "Mankind are, indeed, made in his 'image' Gen. 1:27; and Elohim rests on the seventh day 2:2. . . But they [anthropomorphisms] are reduced to the lowest practicable amount."
70. Th. C. Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, p. 145 discusses this probability.
71. p. 100.
72. p. 102. Later writers have analyzed these terms much more thoroughly but generally conclude that they have an overlapping area of meaning.

H.W. Robinson, The People and the Book, see esp. pp. 354-366. "For the Hebrew, man is a unity, and that unity is the body as a complex of parts, drawing their life and activity from a breath-soul, which has no existence apart from the body."

See also his earlier work The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919, pp. 79-83.

Aubrey R. Johnson, p. 12, criticizes Robinson's classification of the meanings of the term nepesh, and finds the term "far too fluid to accept so definite a classification."

Norman H. Snaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament, London: The Epworth Press, 1945, p. 148, describes the terms as having circles of meaning whose circumferences intersect but which do have separate centers of meaning.

73. There are at least 14 different Hebrew terms which the AV translates as body.
74. John A.T. Robinson, p. 11f.  
esp. H.W. Robinson, The People and the Book, p. 366.  
"Hebrew has no proper word for that body; it never needed one so long as the body was the man."
75. H.W. Robinson, The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament, p. 83.
76. Jacob, p. 157. "The fundamental idea of Israelite psychology is that of an animated body."  
  
Pedersen, p. 171. "The body is the soul in its outward form."
77. H.W. Robinson, The People and the Book, p. 354, "man's consciousness, with its ethical qualities, was thought to be so diffused through the whole body that the flesh and bones [and many other parts] ... had a quasi-consciousness of their own."  
  
See also Pedersen, p. 176.  
  
cf. Aubrey R. Johnson, p. 83, who criticizes the concept of "diffused consciousness," and explains most Hebrew expressions as synecdoche.
78. Th. C. Vriezen, p. 201f.; See also Pedersen p. 171f.
79. Pedersen, pp. 146, 176.

80. Even Eccles. 12:7, where the spirit returns to God, is not teaching a doctrine of personal immortality. cf. Eccles. 8:8, 11:5.
- H.W. Robinson, Religious Ideas, p. 99. "The intensity with which the Israelite clings to the present life corresponds to his belief that personality is a unity, demanding both soul and body, and that there is no life, worthy of the name, beyond death."
81. e.g. Th. C. Vriezen, p. 201, considers flesh to be quite neutral.
82. Jacob, p. 158, states that flesh, as a principle of sin, is foreign to the Old Testament.
83. e.g. Edmond Jacob, in Vocabulary of the Bible, ed. J-J. Von Allmen, art. "Man," p. 248b where he teaches that the idea of flesh in opposition to God does not arise in Biblical literature until Wisdom of Solomon 9:15.
84. Pedersen, p. 176.
85. H.W. Robinson, Religious Ideas, p. 150f.
86. Ryder Smith, p. 25; David Cairns, p. 27.
87. See e.g. G.A.F. Knight, A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity, Scottish Journal of Theology Occasional Papers No. 1, Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1953, p. 36 for a discussion of this subject.
88. Most Old Testament scholars agree that the Old Testament did not get beyond thinking of God as a presence who can be seen. See e.g. Skinner, p. 31; Ryder Smith, p. 30 where he concludes that the Hebrews thought of "form" or "shape" which is somehow separable from body.
89. At least three times in De Trinitate; III,iv,10; IV,iii,5; VIII,ii,3.
90. XII,vii,12.
91. Renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae, et induite novum hominem, eum qui secundum Deum creatus est.
92. Exuentes vos veterem hominem cum actibus ejus induite novum qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei secundem imaginem ejus qui creavit eum.

93. VII,vi,12.
94. XIV,xvi,22.
95. XII,vii,12.
96. XIV,xvi,22.
97. e.g. Bultmann, I, p. 190; William H.P. Hatch, Interpreter's Bible, Vol. VII, art. "The Life of Paul," p. 187.
98. Bultmann, I, p. 211 defines nous as, "The knowing, understanding, and judging which belong to man as man and determines what attitude he adopts - except in the case that the human self is replaced by divine Spirit in the state of ecstasy."

In the Septuagint nous was often used to render the Hebrew concept of heart into Greek. It is generally accepted that lebh in the Old Testament was used to indicate mostly what we would call intellectual and wilful activity. For a full treatment of the Hebrew concept of heart, see especially Aubrey R. Johnson, pp. 76ff.; Pedersen, pp. 104ff.; H.W. Robinson, The People and the Book, pp. 362ff. Paul, however, also uses the word kardia in much the same way as the Old Testament writers used lebh. See H.W. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 106, where he finds that the only change in Paul's 52 uses of the term is some increase in the volitional sense of the word and some decrease in the intellectual propensity. cf. Bultmann, I, pp. 220-226.

W. David Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, London: Macmillan, 1956, p. 198, "Paul took this wholly Greek term [nous] and, paying little conscious heed to its original Greek meaning, continued to use it in the same way as the Hebrews of the Greek Empire had used it."

99. See e.g. H.W. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 111. Commenting on Paul's psychology he says, "The one marked advance on Old Testament psychology lies in the contrast of the inner and outer man."

W. David Stacey, p. 211, commenting on the inner man idea says, "it is, in fact, not a new category, but a new conception that found its way into Paul's writing beside the old."

100. XI,i,1; and esp. XII,i,1f.; cf. IV,iii,6.

101. W. David Stacey, p. 211, commenting on the concept of inner man he says, "One cannot resist the idea that here. . . is a term for the essential self, apart from any particular aspect."
102. Ibid. p. 212, "The inward man is the true self, yearning for the life of the Spirit."
103. Bultmann, I, p. 192; H. Mehl-Koehnlein, Vocabulary of the Bible, p. 253; J.A.T. Robinson, p. 27ff; H.W. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 131.
104. e.g. Ryder Smith, p. 184, concludes that the first Christians generally had the idea that God has a form which can be seen even though they may never have seen it.  
cf. Bultmann, I, p. 192, who argues that a concept of "form" is un-Pauline. It would seem that he means something by the term form other than that which Ryder Smith has in mind.
105. Ryder Smith, p. 165; J.A.T. Robinson, p. 30, where he sees a complete identification between the flesh which dies and the body which dies.
106. H.W. Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man, p. 129. "Paul's doctrine of the Spirit, as active in the regeneration and sanctification of the believer united with Christ through faith and baptism is his most important and characteristic contribution to Christian anthropology." p. 131, "a true Jew, he shrinks from the idea of a disembodied spirit; yet as a Christian Jew, he looks forward to a body no longer of flesh, and no longer therefore open to the invasion of sin."
107. Ryder Smith, p. 227ff., uses the concept of two forms to clarify the way in which Paul conceives of the inner transformation of man's nature.  
  
Bultmann, I, p. 192 explains that Paul believes there is a change in the whole nature of man and he finds that the idea of form or shape is un-Pauline; p. 197f., Bultmann describes the body according to its objectivity. i.e. man is called soma in respect to his being able to make himself the object of his own action.  
  
cf. however, J.A.T. Robinson, p.12(n1), who criticizes Bultmann's description of the body according to its objectivity.
108. E.H. Best, One Body in Christ, London: S.P.C.K., 1955, p. 221. "It can thus be seen that neither the Greek conception of body as form, nor the gnostic dualism between body and soul is normative for Paul."

W.D. Davies, p. 17, "It is our contention . . . that the Pauline distinction between  $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}\varsigma$  and  $\pi\upsilon\epsilon\acute{\nu}\omicron\mu\alpha$  is not a replica of Hellenistic dualism, nor again simply to be explained from the Old Testament. It is rather the complex product of Paul's Old Testament background and his Rabbinic training."

J.A.T. Robinson, p. 76, "There is no contrast in these passages [Paul's doctrine of renewal] between the renewal of the 'body,' on the one hand, and of the 'mind' or 'inner man' on the other."

W.D. Stacey, p. 212, "Paul is not a dichotomist but on rare occasions the language of dichotomy creeps into his letters."

109. Ryder Smith, p. 229; See esp. J.A.T. Robinson, p. 75f.
110. J.A.T. Robinson, p. 24; cf. Bultmann I, pp. 245-6.
111. John Burnaby, Amor Dei, p. 179, "Where the Greeks had thought of mortality and immortality, where the scholastics were to think of nature and super-nature, Augustine thinks of change and the changeless."
112. On Christian Doctrine, I,ii,2.  
Elsewhere Augustine explains how words are used in two distinct ways, "All instruction is either about things or signs." A word either means literally what it says, as when wood indicates a piece of tree. Or a word may be a "sign" of something else, as when Moses casts wood into water (Ex. 15:25) and it signifies the purifying power of the Church. This is Augustine's justification of the allegorical method of interpretation. e.g. De Trin. II,xvii,28.
113. See e.g. XIII,xvi,20, where he says, "For the wrath of God is not, as is that of man, a perturbation of the mind."
114. I,i,2.
115. See e.g. G.A.F. Knight, A Biblical Approach to the Doctrine of the Trinity, pp.4-8.
116. Morton Smith, The Image of God, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958, p. 473f.
117. I,i,2, Mutabis ea, et mutabuntur; tu vero idem ipse es.
118. XIV,xiv,20. (Burnaby's Translation)



119. I,i,2.
120. XII,xiv,22, Ecce pietas est sapientia; abstinere autem a malis est scientia.
121. XIV,i,1; cf. XIV,xii,15.
122. VII,i,2.
123. Ibid.; VII,iii,5.
124. VII,ii,3.
125. II,xvii,28.
126. III,iii,8.
127. XII,vii,12; VII,vi,12; XIV,xvi,22.
128. XII,xiv,21.
129. XIV,i,3; Here Augustine quotes 1 Cor. 12:8 in support of the distinction between wisdom and knowledge.  
Alii datur sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae.
130. Ryder Smith, pp.51-54 concludes, "It will now be clear that the Old Testament doctrine that the true kind of man is like God does not depend upon a verse or two in the first chapter of Genesis. . . a man is called to be righteous, holy, and wise, after the fashion in which God is righteous, holy, and wise."
131. Augustine here is very much in accord with the attitude of Greek philosophy when it considers that knowing is a kind of intellectual seeing. See Rudolf Bultmann, Gnosis, in series "Bible Key Words from Gerhard Kittel's 'Theologisches Wörterbuch Zum Neuen Testament'," London: Adam and Charles Black, 1959, pp. 4-5.
132. Th. C. Vriezen, p. 129, "The knowledge of God does not imply a theory about the nature of God, it is not ontological, but existential: it is life in the true relationship to God."
133. Ryder Smith, p. 40, on how the Holy God comes to men. Pedersen, p. 107f, how forgiveness affects God. G.A.F. Knight, pp.66,74.
134. E.F. Scott, in E.R.E., art. "Gnosticism." p. 240b, says that the false teachers condemned here probably belonged to a variety of Jewish Gnosticism.

135. Bultmann, I, pp. 277-286.
136. Burnaby, Amor Dei, p. 92 has an excellent treatment of the nature of love in Augustine's writings.
137. VIII,vii,12.
138. XV,xvii,27.
139. IX,ii,2. Here human love is substance.
140. XIII,xvi,20.
141. This teaching is clear in Conf. XIII,iv,5.
142. Conf. XIII,i,1; Burnaby, p. 161 supports this teaching with references from other writings of Augustine.
143. VII,iii,6.
144. XV,xvii,27.
145. XV,xvii,28 & 29.
146. IV,i,2.
147. e.g. IV,iii,6; VII,iii,5.
148. XI,v,8.
149. XIV,xvi,22 (Burnaby's translation).
150. XIV,xv,21.
151. XIV,xvii,23.
152. XV,xviii,32.

### III

#### CONCLUSIONS

##### THE GREATNESS AND THE FAILURE OF AUGUSTINE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE IMAGE OF GOD

Seen in the light of his own thought world, Augustine's doctrine of the image of God is remarkable for its correspondence with the Biblical concept. In spite of all the misconceptions we have noted in his interpretation of the Scriptures, Augustine's teaching about the image of God is a contribution to Christian truth. Augustine avoided, or was able to free himself from, many of the limitations which are evident in many other writings on the subject, both before and after the time in which he was writing. Augustine gave a direction to the Christian interpretation of the concept of the image of God which was to be influential until centuries later.

Augustine's greatness on the subject of the image of God is mainly in his use of the human being as the truest analogy by which man may come to understand the nature of God. The idea that man was created in the image of God had, on the whole, caused Christians and Jews alike a great deal of difficulty and embarrassment in the Greco-Roman world. Rabbinic thought had, on the one hand, gone to extreme anthropomorphism, in which God was conceived in gross physical terms.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, some Jewish tradition had attempted to meet the

objections of the Greek mind by teaching that only perfect men and the saints in heaven are worthy to be called images of God.<sup>2</sup> Even in the later years of the Old Testament period there is evidence of great resistance to the concept of the image of God on the grounds that it was anthropomorphic.<sup>3</sup> In the early Christian centuries, then, it is not surprising that symbols other than man seem to have been generally more acceptable, even to the Jews, when men attempted to represent the nature and presence of God.<sup>4</sup>

The central concept in Greek philosophy, as it approached the inner nature of the divine being, was the cosmos. The order and perfection of the celestial spheres impressed many Western thinkers as being the best analogy by which to think of God's inner nature.<sup>5</sup> It has been estimated that it was the idea of the cosmos and not the concept of man which was the main, indeed almost the only, analogy which was accepted by theological thinkers before Augustine.<sup>6</sup> Since Augustine found so much truth in Platonic philosophy, it is all the more remarkable that he turned to the Bible in order to find the true ground in which to search for the image of God.

Actually, it would seem that it was Augustine's respect for the authority of the Bible that led him to study the nature of man, in order to see more deeply into the being of God. It is true that Plotinus led Augustine to search within himself for truth and to look above his inner self for God. It was the Scripture, however, that taught him to believe that he

himself was made in the image of God and to search within his own mind to discover what the nature of the image of God could be. Augustine, then, was instrumental in leading Christian thought back to the Biblical realization that there is no type of creation which is nearer to God than man himself.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, Augustine was true to the Biblical doctrine of the image of God when he taught that man in his natural human state is the bearer of God's image. As we have seen, Augustine did not accept the unreal distinction which other theologians made between the human and the superhuman nature of man. Neither his interpretation of the language of Genesis, nor his explanation of sin, required Augustine to teach that natural sinful man is unworthy to be called the image and likeness of God. Augustine considered that the whole human personality was corrupted because of sin but man is always the image of God, whether in perfection or corruption. When the image of God is restored in man, it is a re-formation of that true humanity which he once had and not an addition of some super-nature which is added to his own nature.

It is generally agreed today that the Biblical concept of the image of God in man is not an attempt to describe some primitive state.<sup>8</sup> The doctrine of the image of God which has its roots in the Old Testament is an attempt by the Priestly writers to conceptualize the nature of man's actual present relationship with God and God's creatures.<sup>9</sup> Augustine was

saved from the mistake of many others by his realization that the image of God does not really exist in man apart from his relationship with God. He knew from personal experience that God never entirely abandons man. Therefore, he taught that the image of God is to be found even in the man most distant from God, since some relationship with the Creator always remains.

This brings us to what is usually considered to be Augustine's greatest contribution to Christian thought. In spite of the rigidity of his philosophical concepts and the fact that they often led him far from Biblical truth, Augustine founded his doctrine of the image of God firmly upon the relationship of love. While his doctrine of the love of God is disastrously limited, his concept of man's love for God is the most dynamic part of his theology. As E. Brunner says, in recounting the history of the image doctrine, "we now see, under the influence of his new ideas on Grace, a new conception of the Imago being formed . . . which was bound finally to explode the old traditional dual schema."<sup>10</sup> It was Augustine's concept of love as the power which restores the image of God in man; which was to break through all of his purely rational attempts to define the nature of the image of God in man.

Augustine's doctrine of love as the power which unites the image with the original from which it is made, then, is the most significant aspect of his doctrine of the image of God. Love, for Augustine, is the power which creates a right

relationship between man and God. Insofar as man loves God he becomes like God and the image of God which was corrupted by sin is restored again to its original form. Man, in his present state, is not merely someone who is evil, but he is someone who was good and has been corrupted by sin. Through the power of love the relationship which man once had with God can begin to be re-established in this life. Through the power of love the very form of God is impressed upon the human mind and ultimately issues forth in virtuous human living.

Finally, Augustine's contribution to Christian thought came as the result of his willingness to grapple honestly with the fundamental problems of ontology. Ultimate questions are raised the moment we ask: what does it mean to say that man is the image of God? Augustine's respect for Scriptural authority would not allow him to reject the concept of the image of God as mere anthropomorphism. At the same time, he was much too interested in the nature of being itself to accept the Biblical concept without interpretation. It became necessary for Augustine to make the first significant attempt to interpret the concept of the image of God in such a way that it would become acceptable and convincing to those who measured truth according to the categories of Western thought.

It is true that Augustine's interest in ontology often led him to misconstrue the original meaning of Biblical passages. Often his interpretations of the Bible are unsound

because he is attempting to answer questions that were evidently not present to the minds of the Biblical authors. The fact that he did not always recognize the meaning of the Scriptural passages, however, does not indicate that he was always moving away from the truth. It means, rather, that the categories by which the Western mind measures truth are sometimes not capable of comprehending the truths of the Bible.

In dealing with the question of how man knows any truth at all, Augustine was investigating the area of human experience which is still the proving ground on which all theological doctrines must be tested. According to the standards of his time, he made a remarkable synthesis between the truths of Western thought and the truths of Biblical revelation. As Paul Tillich says of the early Church generally, "This [dealing with ontology] was inescapable not only because of the necessity of introducing the gospel into the Hellenistic world but also because the discovery of the ontological question by the Greek mind is universally relevant."<sup>11</sup>

Today the attempt to unite revelation and reason, faith and knowledge, still goes on.

Augustine, therefore, performed a service for the Christian Church which is still being recognized.<sup>12</sup> In particular, Augustine's recognition that the problems of both theology and ontology ultimately must be solved on the ground of human nature, set the pattern for later thinkers. If we now have better solutions to these problems it is because we



have more information about the nature of man and the limits of his mind. Any realistic theology today still requires that we bring all the measurements of psychology, philosophy and science into relation with the Biblical revelation. While we may regret the limitations in Augustine's categories of thought, we still must recognize the validity of his attempt to measure the truths of revelation against the truths of reason.

Augustine's synthesis between reason and revelation, as they bear upon the doctrine of the image of God, had the effect of turning Christian thought from some of its grosser expressions.<sup>13</sup> The influence of his religious teaching was, for centuries, a spiritualizing influence. The very fact that Augustine came to a conception of a God who is pure spiritual substance led him to attempt the removal of all suggestions of anthropomorphism from his writings. As we have seen, this took him far from the Biblical doctrine of the image of God. However, it did have the effect of keeping Christian thought from an easy acceptance of anthropomorphisms which would have been unacceptable to the thoughtful Western mind.

In his treatment of the doctrine of the image of God, then, Augustine dealt with the central problem of theology: how is the being of man related to the ground of all being? As he searched for a conception of the true nature of God, he was led in De Trinitate to attempt a definition of what the image of God in man is. Augustine's interest in ontology

almost led him to teach that the image of God is a particular quality of substance which can be found in man apart from God. His own religious experience and his respect for the authority of the Bible had the effect of keeping him in sight of the central truth of the Biblical doctrine of the image. In the last analysis, Augustine breaks through the rigid structure of his own philosophy by teaching that the image of God exists in man only through his dynamic personal relationship with God. In actual practice, the truth of Biblical revelation, supported by his own Christian experience, proved to be too great to be confined within the limits of his own categories of thought.

Augustine's failure is found in the extent to which the categories of his thought made him incapable of seeing, or unwilling to admit, the truths of Biblical revelation. His shortcoming on the subject of the image of God is seen in the extent to which his interpretation of the Scriptural passages failed to reveal the true nature of the divine-human relationship. Augustine's contribution to the doctrine of the image of God is only as good as the philosophic categories he has impressed on the Biblical teaching. When categories of thought which are foreign to, or opposed to, the truth of the Bible are used, then it is necessary to examine the validity of those categories. As E. Brunner says, "they affect, like the sign before an algebraic parenthesis or the constant factors in a physics formula, every single concept of faith."<sup>14</sup>

The major failure in Augustine's doctrine of the image of God is, as we have noted, his inability to recognize the distinction between the nature of being as such and the particular quality of personal being. Augustine did not recognize a distinction between mere existence and responsible human existence. In De Trinitate he fails to see any real difference between the goodness which is inherent in man simply because he exists and the moral goodness which is the mark of responsible being.<sup>15</sup> It was this failure which led Augustine first, to a religious determinism which apparently denies all human freedom and second, to a limited and unrealistic concept of ethics.

In the light of today's Biblical theology, Augustine's limitations on the subject of the image of God are seen in the extent to which the "I-It" concepts of his ontological study prevent him from recognizing the truth in the "I-Thou"<sup>16</sup> relationship which is the theme of Biblical revelation. Evidence of this failure is to be seen in De Trinitate in the following ways: First, the impersonal is present in Augustine's doctrine of grace where the love of God is defined as substance, rather than as a relationship. Second, the "I-It" relationship predominates in Augustine's doctrine of salvation where he considers that man is saved by turning his love from the lower kinds of substance toward the pure spiritual substance of God. Third, in his quest for an analogy to the inner being of God, Augustine limits the relationship between

man and God to a correspondence between that which is spiritual substance in man and the spiritual substance which is God. Finally, Augustine's doctrine of the image of God, as a whole, is so completely confined within the limits of his rational categories that he has no place for the holy, the unconscious and the irrational aspects of religious experience.

First, concerning Augustine's doctrine of grace, in the last analysis he teaches that the love of God is a substance which, like God, is unchanging and unchangeable. God's love for man is not an unselfish outgoing concern for men, nor is it a positive approach by the personal God seeking to win the love of his created son who is free in some measure to respond. The image of God in man is seen by Augustine to be the purest part of man's spiritual nature and it is only restored to its original form in such measure as God allows it to be re-formed. The image of God in man, according to Augustine, belongs to man only in such measure as God gives him the power to love God.<sup>17</sup>

Augustine's determinism, then, is partly the result of his failure to recognize that the Biblical doctrine of the image of God obviously indicates that there is in man some inherent freedom and responsibility. In his determination to exalt the authority of God, and especially in his certainty that unchangeability is the one true mark of divinity, Augustine was finally unable to conceive that God would allow any-

thing to be finally beyond his control. Instead of teaching that God's love is so great that men in their freedom are won to God, Augustine teaches that God's love is an infusion of power which enters into man through the workings of the Holy Spirit, without reference to the will of man.

The picture of a self-contained divine being who needs nothing outside of himself is predominant in Augustine's religious thought. Consequently, he came at last to teach that the Holy Spirit was God's agency for infusing the power to love God into the spirit of man. God's love is the power by which an unfeeling and unchanging God binds man to the divine substance according to his own unchanging purposes.

It is safe to say that any form of unbending determinism in Christian thought is a distortion of the Biblical doctrine of the relationship between God and man.<sup>18</sup> It is evident from our study of De Trinitate that Augustine's doctrine of grace does not come from the Biblical doctrine of the image of God. His denial of human freedom follows rather as the consequence of his adherence to the principle that unchangeability is the main characteristic of divinity. Augustine's great respect for the human reason and intelligence leads him to accept a principle of thought which ultimately denies him the freedom of choice. His reason becomes a controlling power which drives him at times, in his thought, toward conclusions that his religious experience makes him hesitate to accept. The fact that he can define love as

substance, rather than as a quality of relationship, is evidence that this concept of unchangeability becomes the determining factor in his thought.<sup>19</sup>

Second, and closely related to his concept of the love of God, Augustine's doctrine of salvation is limited to an "I-It" relationship in many of its aspects. When Augustine comes to illustrate the process through which the image of God is restored in man, he describes how the human affections must move from lower things, until they are fixed upon the highest spiritual substance, which is God. The relationship between man and God which Augustine conceives in this particular illustration is not really personal. The values which Augustine describes in De Trinitate are always ontological values and they indicate the quality of substances rather than the nature of personal good.<sup>20</sup>

The result of Augustine's teaching about value is that he has an extremely limited concept of faith and a relatively secondary place for Christ in his doctrine of salvation. Whereas faith, in the Biblical sense of the word, means total commitment to, or involvement in, the life of another person, Augustine tends to consider it mainly a matter of accepting certain presuppositions which cannot be discovered by reason alone. His certainty that man is made in the image of God would be considered by Augustine to be a matter of faith. Once having accepted that presupposition, however, Augustine interprets the meaning of the concept of the image according

to the principles of his reason, rather than in the spirit of the rest of Biblical teaching.

There is some truth in the judgment that Augustine, in his doctrine of the image, offers a way of salvation apart from Christ.<sup>21</sup> Augustine claims for Christ the only authority by which the faith of men should be directed during this earthly life.<sup>22</sup> But in actual practice, the whole quest of De Trinitate is to see God as he is in himself and not in his revelation of himself. Faith, for Augustine, does not mean what it does for Paul, to whom faith is a matter of entrusting the whole direction of human life to the person of Christ, who brings man into communion with God the Father. Augustine's doctrine of Christ tends to make Christ merely an example who keeps man looking in the right direction until at last he can see God for himself. The revelation of God in Jesus Christ is more often considered by Augustine to be an example and a guide, rather than as the Saviour who brings man into full communion with the heavenly Father.<sup>23</sup>

Third, in his desire to find a trinity in man which is an analogy to the inner being of God, Augustine limited the relationship between man and God to a correspondence between that which is pure spiritual substance in man and the pure spiritual substance which is God. We consider that, in fact, the concept of the Trinity is a doctrine of God as we find him in his revelation. Augustine, however, was looking for an image in man which is not an image of God in his revelation,

but an image of God as he is in himself. It was impossible for Augustine, therefore, to accept anything in the outward form of man's personality as the image of God. Augustine's strict categorical distinction between the spiritual and the corporeal, and between the intuitional and the sensual, caused him to deny that the outer person is related to God, except in a secondary manner.

As we have noted, in De Trinitate the analogy that Augustine really wanted was the analogy of the idea and the word, before the idea had been limited by forming it into anything sensuous.<sup>24</sup> Augustine was prevented from accepting this analogy by the fact that he had to find a trinity of inner substance which could reveal the inner nature of God. If Augustine could have accepted the concept of the idea and the word as an analogy to the inner being of God, he might then have admitted that there is something in human personality, as it reveals itself outwardly, which is analogous to God, as he reveals himself through the Trinity. As it is, the image of God which Augustine finds in human nature is actually less than personal, in the modern sense of the word, and is related to a Trinity which is also something less than personal.

Theologians today generally recognize that most Biblical teaching is about a God who deals with men after the manner of interpersonal relations.<sup>25</sup> No realistic theology can overlook the ontological problem and go on to speak of



God as if the ground of all being is not impersonal as well as personal. The truths of Biblical doctrine, however, can only be understood when we accept the dynamics of interpersonal relationships as the analogical ground from which to develop the higher concepts of religion. The restoration of Christ to a place of central importance in the doctrine of salvation effectively puts the personal back into the center of the Christian theological thought world. 26

Augustine, therefore, was not wrong in attempting to deal with the problems of ontology. He failed, however, to appreciate the value of Biblical revelation by thinking too much in terms of the "I-It" of philosophy and too little in terms of the "I-Thou" of the Bible. We cannot say that the problems of ontology have been solved. Men of science, in particular, have tested religious thinkers severely, because science does not discover a personal God in Nature. The doctrine of the image of God, then, remains in the forefront of Christian thought, for it continues to require us to answer the question: how is the personal being of man related to the ground of all being, which must be personal as well as impersonal, or there can be no religion?

Finally, Augustine remained so completely confined within the limits of his own rational categories that he was unable to include any real appreciation of the emotional, the unconscious, or the irrational within his doctrine of man's relationship with God. Modern Biblical interpreters and

students of comparative religion have effectively presented the place of the concept of holiness as being central in a study of religious experience. Depth psychologists, such as Carl Jung, require the modern theologian to comprehend the whole realm of the unconscious in his study of man's relationship with divinity. While Augustine approached a kind of mysticism in his attempt to see ultimate reality, De Trinitate shows little evidence of appreciation for the realm of religious experience which is beyond the rational. Augustine is more aware of the God within, than he is of the God who is wholly other than himself.

It would be untrue to suggest that Biblical writers were aware of any distinction between the impersonal and the personal in their religious expressions. Primitive religious experience is always expressed in the personal, but seems to remain aware of that which is more than a person.<sup>27</sup> The writers of the Old Testament made their unique contribution in describing a holy God who comes to men.<sup>28</sup> In criticizing Augustine for his failure to recognize the personal-impersonal problem, therefore, we are not merely saying that he failed to see a category of thought which is present in the Bible. Rather, Augustine, as the most self-conscious of all the early Christian thinkers, apparently failed to discover the one category which would have saved Christian thought from the centuries of rationalism during which official religious thought often did not appreciate the more personal truths of

religious experience.

In surveying all that Augustine has written in De Trinitate, we cannot fail to appreciate the tremendous ability of his mind and the depth of his religious insight. He, more than any other thinker of his day, rescued the Christian religion from a possible complete rejection by the Western world. At the same time, we cannot avoid the conclusion that, in his desire to be intellectually respectable and rationally convincing, Augustine was rendered incapable of accepting many of the truths of the Bible on the subject of man's relationship with God. The limitations of Augustine's doctrine of the image of God are still being felt in that stream of Christian thought which can only allow the spiritual part of man to be accepted as worthy of the name "image of God."

### NOTES ON CHAPTER III

1. Morton Smith, p. 478, lists the evidence from early literature which supports the belief that an important school of interpreters believed in a God who accompanied man in human shape and form.
2. Ibid, pp. 477ff.,505.
3. Ibid. p. 477f.
4. Ibid. p. 497ff. The burden of his argument is that there is much evidence supporting the belief that the Menorah was a popular representation of God in many Jewish circles.
5. Ibid. pp. 502,508.
6. Paul Henry, S.J., Saint Augustine on Personality, "The Saint Augustine Lecture Series," New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960, p. 13. "Before Augustine's time, the principal and in fact, practically the only analogy known for God's inner life, was the procession of the world or cosmos from God."
7. Ibid. p. 3, "he was instrumental in substituting man for the world - Psyche for Kosmos - as the fundamental analogy whereby to understand and express...the inner life of God. . ."  
Also p. 15f., "This [Genesis 1:26,27] was Augustine's justification ... for taking anthropos, man, rather than Kosmos, the world, as the least inadequate analogy for understanding God's inner life and richness."
8. E. Brunner, Man in Revolt, p. 532f., however, believes that this concept of an original state must be retained as a "formal image." That is to say, the form of the original, which is responsibility, still remains in man and although there was no historical state of perfect responsibility, we must speak as if there were. See pp. 96-98 for the explanation of the imago.

John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, London: Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 29-31, examines this concept of Brunner's.

9. E. Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, trans. Amandus W. Loos, London: S.C.M., 1944, p. 31, "That man, even in his natural being, is always the man who comes from God is the meaning of the doctrine of the image of God and original sin."
- John Baillie, p. 22, "But the truth is surely that the doctrine of the imago dei, far from being a doctrine derived from any direct knowledge of what happened at creation, is a doctrine suggested to us by, and derived by us from, our knowledge of present human nature."
- David Cairns, p. 28f.; also p. 180, where he criticizes Barth on the ground that he implies that man has no real existence apart from his relationship to Christ.
10. E. Brunner, Man In Revolt, p. 506. While Brunner is not justified according to De Trinitate in thinking that Augustine accepted the traditional distinction between the image and the likeness, he is very right that Augustine's dynamic concepts were destined to explode any purely rational doctrine of the image of God in man.
11. Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, p. 60.
12. e.g. E. Brunner, Man In Revolt, p. 506; Paul Henry, S.J., p. 18.
13. Martin Werner, p. 305.
14. The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 12.
15. See Chap. I, pp. 83-4.
16. Martin Buber seems to have been the one to set the tone of much modern theology in this regard. See e.g. Eclipse of God, London: Victor Gollancz, 1953.
17. See Chap. II, pp. 218-222.
18. E. Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, p. 36, "Every form of Determinism . . . is wholly foreign to the Old and New Testaments; . . . Determinism, through Augustine having found its way into Reformation theology, has Stoic and not a Biblical origin."
- Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, pp. 29, 33, 45.
- cf. John Baillie, pp. 232-236.

19. See Chap. II, p. 214f.
20. See Chap. I, pp. 109-10.
21. David Cairns, p. 93.
22. See Chap. I, p. 101.
23. See Chap. II, p.217. Also Chap. I, p. 39f.cf. 99f.
24. See Chap. I, p. 68f.
25. See e.g. Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, p. 26ff.
26. This process has gone so far in Barth, for example, that he is accused of implying that man is not real apart from his relationship to God through Christ. David Cairns, p. 180.
27. Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, trans. Rosemary Sheed, London & New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958, p. 24.
28. See Norman Snaith, pp.41-47; Ryder Smith, pp.40-49.

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