BERTRAND RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS

by

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PREFACE

The aim of the present study is to demonstrate the nature of the relation of Russell's political philosophy to the other areas of his work, both popular and professional. The nature of the relation can be demonstrated, however, only if two premises are accepted: (1) that Russell has a political philosophy, and (2) that his political theory is related to the other branches of his philosophy. A problem arises as regards the acceptability of (1), and an attempt is made in the first chapter to justify proceeding with the present study despite Russell's denial that he is a political philosopher. As regards the acceptability of (2), Russell's ethical theory and his epistemology are examined in order to discover the elements common to both. Once these elements are identified, his political philosophy, which is elicited from his non-technical pronouncements on political matters, is studied in order to see whether or not these same elements are found in it. Russell's political philosophy is shown to be related to his ethical theory and to his epistemology; the nature of the relation, however, changes according to his stage of

philosophical development. The attempt to demonstrate the dynamic nature of the relation of Russell's political philosophy to the other branches of his philosophy is, primarily, a philosophical task; the heavy concentration on ethics and epistemology, therefore, is indispensable.

The thesis that is defended in the following pages is that Russell's political views are closely connected with his philosophical presuppositions, methods, and conclusions. His Liberalism in politics varies directly as his cognitivism in ethics. His Internationalism varies directly as his analytic, i.e., piecemeal, method. When Russell supported a cognitive ethical theory, he was a Liberal and believed that there was a close connection between politics and philosophy. He abandoned Liberalism when he adopted a non-cognitive ethical theory and insisted on the division between politics and philosophy. When Russell supported philosophical analysis he was a political Internationalist, whereas he had formerly advocated both synthetic methodology and Imperialism. When he abandoned philosophical synthesis and the epistemological doctrine of internal relations, he adopted the doctrine of external relations in epistemology and Internationalism in politics. A synthetic philosopher is more likely to be a nationalist and an imperialist than his analytic counterpart who, because of his

piecemeal approach to the world, aims at understanding and not at control. Thus, all of the "power-philosophies" described by Russell are cases of synthetic philosophies which mold the facts to fit the theories. The analytic philosopher, on the contrary, seeks clarity in philosophy and politics.

Throughout his life, Russell has always been both a democrat and a progressive. His understanding of "democracy" and "progress" has undergone several changes according to the shifts in his analysis of "power" and "good" respectively. In general, the analogue of his analysis of "power" is his epistemological methodology; the analogue of his analysis of "progress" is his theory regarding ethical knowledge. The kind of Democratic Progressive that Russell is at any given time depends upon the epistemological methodology to which he is committed at that time. As Russell has become more empirical, he has become both more internationalistic and more preoccupied with the foundations of political activity which, he argues, are rooted in human nature. His philosophical anthropology, which is a part of psychology, i.e., that part concerned with the study of human nature, becomes more important in direct proportion to his emphasis on empiricism and internationalism.

Three secondary sources have been of special

assistance: Alan Wood's The Passionate Sceptic, Professor Lillian Aiken's Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, and Lester E. Denonn's "Bibliography of the Writings of Bertrand Russell to 1962." The Passionate Sceptic was used extensively for biographical information. Professor Aiken's book provided guidance for the analysis of Russell's theoretical ethics. Lester Denonn's chronological bibliography of Russell's work was of great use in determining Russell's different stages.

Professors Frank A. MacDonald and James W. Miller deserve special gratitude for their patience and for their guidance. Discussions with Professor MacDonald, Visiting Professor of Philosophy at McGill University, 1964-65, provided both stimulation and clarification as regards the outlining of the project of this thesis. Professor Miller's direction and analysis of concepts that are expressed in this study helped to overcome many obstacles during its writing. To both great men, I express my thanks.

In addition to typing the rough and final copies of the thesis, Gertrude Caplan Hartt has offered many valuable suggestions which are incorporated in the pages that follow.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Bertrand Russell has denied that he is a political philosopher.[1] His denial was made in reply to the essay by V. J. McGill entitled "Russell's Political and Economic Philosophy."[2] In both the title and text of his article, Mr. McGill referred to Russell's political writings as "philosophy." In reply, Russell criticized the application of this term to his writings on politics.

The salient features of Russell's objection are (a) that his political writings cannot be called "philosophy," "because they do not seem . . . to come within the scope of even a very liberal interpretation of the word 'philosophy'," [3] and (b) that philosophic readers, aware that Russell is classified as a "philosopher," extend this classification to his popular books on political

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[1] Bertrand Russell, "Reply to Criticisms," The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. P. A. Schilpp (New York, Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 729-31.

[2] V. J. McGill, "Russell's Political and Economic Philosophy," The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, op. cit., pp. 579-617.

[3] "Reply to Criticisms," op. cit., p. 729.

questions, and, therefore, believe that they are justified in referring to Russell as a "political philosopher." Russell, however, pointed out that his popular books on political matters were written not in his capacity as a "philosopher" but in his capacity as a "human being." The distinction was based on his desire to exclude all value judgements from philosophy. In his "Reply to Criticisms," Russell divided into two groups the critical essays to which he intended to reply: (1) those essays written as critical assessments of his philosophy, and (2) those essays written as critical evaluations of his value judgements. Included in the former group were those critical essays on his logic, scientific method, epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics. Included in the latter group were those critical essays on his ethical, religious, social, political, and historical views.[4] Russell's remark, "Passing over to matters involving judgements of value . . .,"[5] indicates his division between value judgements and philosophy. At the specific point in "Reply to Criticisms" of his passing over from the former group to the latter group, Russell restated his desire to separate value judgements from philosophy, "I should like

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[4] Ibid., p. 681.

[5] Ibid.

to exclude all value judgements from philosophy . . ."[6]

Since Russell included his writings on politics among those matters involving value judgements, and since he excluded value judgements from philosophy, it might seem unwarranted to investigate Russell's philosophy of politics. Since he has denied that he is a political philosopher because his political writings are not philosophical, it might seem inappropriate to extend the use of the term "philosophy of politics" to Russell's political theory. Yet, both the title and the theme of the present study assume that Russell has a philosophy of politics.

There are several reasons why Russell's denial that he is a political philosopher should not prevent an investigation of his political philosophy. In the first place, his denial was limited to one specific stage in his philosophical development. In the second place, an analysis of his ambiguous usage of the term "philosophy" in the very context of the denial casts doubt upon the acceptability of the basis on which the denial was made. In the third place, to be a political philosopher is not the same as to have a political philosophy.

Although Russell maintained the division between value judgements and philosophical arguments for a period

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[6] Ibid., p. 719.

of several years, he did not insist upon it in either his earliest or his most recent works. The exact duration of the stage in which Russell excluded value judgements from philosophy will be determined in the following chapter. Russell's denial, therefore, is not a common characteristic of all his work.

The investigation of the different senses in which Russell used the term "philosophy" will be restricted to his "Reply to Criticisms": i.e., to the context in which he has denied that he is a political philosopher and suggested the reasons for his denial. His division between value judgements and philosophical arguments, which constitutes the basis for his denial, is not as sharp a distinction as it might seem to be. Several of Russell's own remarks make this division less clear. Firstly, he included among those matters involving value judgements "political and social philosophy."[7] Russell used the term "philosophy" to label social and political theories, and yet these theories were to be excluded from philosophy. Secondly, Russell found it necessary to qualify his desire to exclude all value judgements from philosophy. He admitted that to do so would be "too violent a breach with usage."[8] It is possible that

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[7] Ibid., p. 681.

[8] Ibid., p. 719.

Russell realized that the word "philosophy" has been and still is used in a way which often includes value judgements, and that to impose the complete exclusion of value judgements from philosophy is simply incompatible with the way in which the word "philosophy" is used ordinarily. Thirdly, Russell began the paragraph with these words, "I come now to what is, for me, an essentially different department of philosophy . . . ."[9] Whatever else he went on to say, he admitted that matters involving value judgements cannot be excluded totally from philosophy. Value judgements constitute a department of philosophy, although the department to which they belong is quite a different department of philosophy from the one which includes logic, scientific method, epistemology, psychology, and even metaphysics.

In "Reply to Criticisms," Russell was not always careful to distinguish between the two different senses in which he used the term "philosophy." On some occasions he used the term in a broad sense and on other occasions he used it in a narrow sense. The term "philosophy" in the broad sense is the way in which the term is commonly and ordinarily used. It is the sense in which to have excluded all value judgements would have constituted "too violent a breach with usage." When used

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[9] Ibid.

in the broad sense, the term "philosophy" refers to its two constituent departments, namely, technical philosophy and non-technical philosophy. The term "philosophy" when used in the narrow sense refers exclusively to the department of technical philosophy. Technical philosophy excludes all value judgements. It includes logic, scientific method, epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics. It also includes "the argument that ethical propositions should be expressed in the optative mood, not in the indicative."[10] Theoretical or intellectual arguments are possible in the department of technical philosophy. "When two people differ about (say) the nature of matter, it should be possible to prove either that one is right and the other wrong, or that both are wrong, or that there are insufficient grounds to warrant any opinion."[11] Technical philosophy deals with propositions that either indicate facts or analyze the forms of facts. Any difference of opinion about the nature of matter is a problem for the technical philosopher; if it is not merely a difference with regard to the use of words then it is a difference with regard to the interpretation of facts. Non-technical philosophy includes matters involving value judgements. It includes

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., pp. 719-20.

ethics, religion, political philosophy, and social philosophy. In non-technical philosophy, conclusive arguments cannot be produced,[12] nor are theoretical arguments possible.[13] In view of this distinction between technical and non-technical philosophy, Russell's denial may now be interpreted to mean that his value judgements on political matters are to be counted as non-technical philosophy.

Another preliminary distinction should be made, namely, between being a political philosopher and having a political philosophy. Although Russell has denied that he is a political philosopher, he has not denied that he has a political philosophy. Firstly, according to his own usage of the term "philosophy" in the broad sense, Russell has a political philosophy. Secondly, Russell possesses a political philosophy in an entirely different sense even if it is true that he is not a professional political philosopher. In this sense, Russell's non-technical pronouncements on political matters are based on, and reflect, a more or less coherent set of general political principles which may be referred to as his political philosophy. In at least the minimal sense

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[12] Ibid., p. 719.

[13] Ibid., p. 720. Russell referred specifically to ethics, but his remarks apply equally well to the other branches of non-technical philosophy.

of the term "political philosophy," i.e., a more or less coherent set of general political principles which are the presuppositions for his less general political pronouncements, Russell does indeed possess a political philosophy. An attempt will be made in subsequent chapters to demonstrate the nature of the relation of Russell's political philosophy to the other branches of both his technical and non-technical philosophy.

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORETICAL ETHICS

In order to understand Russell's philosophy of politics, an extensive description of the changing periods of his philosophical development is required as a basic frame of reference. The nature of the relation of Russell's philosophy of politics to his technical philosophy seems to differ from one stage of his philosophical development to the next.

"Reply to Criticisms" was written in July, 1943. This essay is representative of a specific stage in Russell's philosophical development. This stage may be referred to as his emotivistic stage.

The term "emotivism" will be used to refer to any "ethical theory which asserts that ethical terms do not have any cognitive meaning and do not designate or refer to anything whatsoever. Such terms are characterized as 'expressions of attitude' or feeling . . . ."[1] Ethical sentences, therefore, fall outside the realm of knowledge and cannot be said to be either true or false.

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[1] Lillian W. Aiken, Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals (New York, The Humanities Press, 1963), p. 21 n. 1.

A crucial distinction between practical and theoretical ethics should be made. "Practical ethics" refers to doing ethics or to making moral value judgements. "Theoretical ethics" refers to analyzing the sentences of practical ethics.[2] When Russell stated that "The only matter concerned with ethics that I can regard as properly belonging to philosophy is the argument that ethical propositions should be expressed in the optative mood, not in the indicative,"[3] he may have had this distinction in mind, although he did not explicitly propose it. The argument that ethical propositions should be expressed in the optative mood is itself an argument in theoretical ethics. Practical ethics consists completely of non-cognitive value judgements.

In July, 1943, Russell was committed to emotivism. Value judgements, he thought, express nothing but desire, and, therefore, should not be classed with statements which can be known to be true or false; the sentences of practical ethics are neither true nor false.

An attempt will now be made to determine the dates of Russell's emotivistic stage. Although Russell supported several varieties of emotivism, his subtle shifts of emphasis during this stage will not be examined

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[2] Ibid., p. xvii.

[3] "Reply to Criticisms," op. cit., p. 719.

because they are irrelevant to the present study.

In his book Religion and Science, Russell asserted that "questions as to 'values' lie wholly outside the domain of knowledge."[4] Thus, in 1935, the date of the original publication of Religion and Science, Russell advocated the emotivistic theory of values, and the dates of his emotivistic stage may now be said to extend from 1935 to 1943 inclusive. The bibliography near the end of The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell indicates those of Russell's writings which were published between 1935 and 1943.[5] Among the volumes is one entitled Power. If the procedure of extending the dates of Russell's emotivistic stage is to continue successfully, it should be tested first by finding corroborating evidence that Power, for example, is properly classed as a volume manifesting Russell's commitment to emotivism. One remark in Power which seems significant is Russell's statement that "The great ethical innovators have not been men who knew more than others; they have been men who desired more . . . ."[6] Russell

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[4]Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science (New York, Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 230.

[5]The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, op. cit., pp. 780-790. The Bibliography was compiled by Lester E. Denonn.

[6]Bertrand Russell, Power (London, Unwin Books, 1960), p. 167.

reaffirmed in Power the emotivism manifested in Religion and Science. Value judgements should be interpreted as expressions of desires, not as assertions; they express a type of wish. "The hearer can gather that I feel this wish but that is the only fact that he can gather, and that is a fact of psychology."[7] Russell concluded the paragraph by saying that "There are no facts of ethics."[8] By "ethics" he probably meant not theoretical ethics but rather practical ethics. The statement, "There are no facts of ethics," is itself a statement in theoretical ethics. It is another way of saying that the sentences of practical ethics are not descriptive. They do not indicate ethical facts but rather express the utterer's wishes or desires. The sentences of practical ethics, therefore, are emotive; they are outside the realm of knowledge and, as expressions of desires, they are neither true nor false.

Russell advocated an early form of emotivism in An Outline of Philosophy, first published in 1927. "There are some among the traditional problems of philosophy that do not seem to me to lend themselves to intellectual treatment, because they transcend our

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

cognitive powers . . . ."[9] Russell went on to develop an elaborate theory "as to what constitutes knowledge."[10] His approach consisted of examining "the relation of man to his environment."[11] Throughout this volume, Russell endeavoured to point out the differences between the "traditional" view of philosophy and his own scientific philosophy. In the chapter on "Emotion, Desire, and Will," Russell began by pointing out that:

> Hitherto, in our investigation of man from within, we have considered only the cognitive aspect, which is, in fact, the most important to philosophy. But now we must turn our attention to the other sides of human nature. If we treat them more briefly than the cognitive side, it is not because they are less important, but because their main importance is practical and our task is theoretical. Let us begin with the emotions.[12]

In the first place, Russell distinguished between "the cognitive aspect" and "the other sides of human nature." It is reasonable to suppose that he was referring to the non-cognitive in general and the emotive in particular with regard to his discussion of emotions. It is on the basis of emotion that we determine the ends

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[9]Bertrand Russell, An Outline of Philosophy (New York, Meridian Books, 1960), p. 1.

[10]Ibid., p. 15.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., p. 226.

or goals we wish to pursue. Knowledge has an instrumental function; it is the means of achieving our ends.[13] "In desire," which Russell discussed next, "we wish to change something in ourselves or in our environment or both."[14] Desires may refer either to means or to ends; the distinction between ends and means is not as clear cut in the case of desires as in the case of emotions. One may desire some end on the basis of an emotional choice. The means by which to achieve a specific end can also come to be desired.[15] Therefore,

> We cannot, in our integral reaction to a situation, separate out one event as knowledge and another as desire; both knowledge and desire are features which characterize the reaction, but do not exist in isolation.[16]

This might seem to cast doubt on any attempt to include An Outline of Philosophy as a volume representative of Russell's emotivism because knowledge and desire seem to be almost indistinguishable features which characterize our reactions. An examination of his chapter on "Ethics"

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[13] Ibid., pp. 228-29.

[14] Ibid., p. 229.

[15] Ibid., p. 230.

[16] Ibid.

will clarify this apparent difficulty.

In his chapter on "Ethics," Russell distinguished between ethics and casuistry. Ethics (practical ethics) consists of "general principles which help to determine rules of conduct."[17] Casuistry "in its old and proper sense . . . represents a perfectly legitimate study."[18] Questions of casuistry are not questions of practical ethics. In attempting to answer the question, "In what circumstances is it right to tell a lie?", one is engaged in casuistry, not in practical ethics. Casuistry is an attempt to deal with "how a person should act in such and such specific circumstances."[19] Russell also distinguished between ethics and morals. "It is not the business of ethics to arrive at actual rules of conduct . . . ."[20] It is within the province of morals to attempt to arrive deductively at actual rules of conduct from the general principles of practical ethics.[21] Russell, still dealing with those problems which relate to the "other sides of human nature . . . from . . . the

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[17] Ibid., p. 233.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid., p. 234.

[21] Ibid.

cognitive aspect . . .,"[22] explained his reasons for discussing ethics. "Ethics is traditionally a department of philosophy . . . ."[23] Now, casuistry does "not belong to ethics in the sense in which this study has been included in philosophy."[24] Russell referred to the inclusion of ethics as a branch of philosophy in the past tense because, as he went on the say about practical ethics, "I hardly think myself that it ought to be included in the domain of philosophy . . . ."[25] This assertion has an obvious similarity to his statement in "Reply to Criticisms": "I should like to exclude all value judgements from philosophy . . . ."[26]

Russell proceeded to analyze the meaning of the sentences of practical ethics.

> Perhaps the best way to approach the subject of ethics is to ask what is meant when a person says: "You ought to do so-and-so" or "I ought to do so-and-so". Primarily, a sentence of this sort has an emotional content; it means "this is the act towards which I feel the emotion of approval".[27]

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[22] Ibid., p. 226.

[23] Ibid., p. 233.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] "Reply to Criticisms," op. cit., p. 719.

[27] An Outline of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 234.

Russell used the words "emotional" and "emotion" to indicate the "primary" or fundamental meaning of the sentences of practical ethics. Fundamentally, the sentences of practical ethics are expressions of a personal emotion. Russell did not leave the matter at this point. He went on to suggest that "we want to find something more objective and systematic and constant than a personal emotion."[28] His next move, in order to find the something that is more objective, was to interpret the secondary meaning of the sentences of practical ethics in terms of desires; " . . . good and bad are derivative from desire."[29] He then placed the sentences of practical ethics on a more or less objective footing:

> Men desire all sorts of things, and in themselves all desires, taken singly, are on a level, i.e., there is no reason to prefer the satisfaction of one to the satisfaction of another. But when we consider not a single desire but a group of desires, there is this difference, that sometimes all the desires in a group can be satisfied, whereas in other cases the satisfaction of some of the desires in the group is incompatible with that of others.[30]

Russell supported the view that practical ethics is "mainly social" insofar as one pair of desires can be said to be "socially preferable" to another pair of

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., p. 238.

[30] Ibid., p. 241.

desires.[31] Education, in the sense in which it includes habit-formation, can change men's desires to more nearly approximate "desires which promote socially harmonious conduct."[32]

Russell's views on the relation of emotion and desire to knowledge can now be examined in the light of the presentation of his views on the relation of practical ethics to philosophy. Emotion is distinct from knowledge in the sense that the sentences which express emotions are non-cognitive. Since the primary function of the sentences of practical ethics is to express a personal emotion, the sentences of practical ethics are emotive at base. Thus Russell advocated a form of emotivism as early as 1927 in An Outline of Philosophy. His suggestion that "we cannot, in our integral reaction to a situation, separate out one event as knowledge and another as desire,"[33] does not imply that desires are cognitive. As Russell pointed out,

> When we reach the level of explicit conscious desire, it seems as if we were being attracted to a goal, but we are really still pushed from behind. The attraction to the goal is a short-hand way of describing the effects of learning together with the fact that our efforts will continue till the goal is

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[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid., p. 230.

> achieved . . . . There are feelings of various kinds connected with desire, and in the case of familiar desires, such as hunger, these feelings become associated with what we know will cause the desire to cease. . . . Only experience, memory and association - so I should say - confer objects upon desire, which are initially blind tendencies to certain kinds of activity.[34]

Thus, knowledge enters into practical ethics as an instrument or a guide for effecting ends or goals. The general principles of practical ethics are not items of knowledge but rather expressions of both basic personal emotions on a primary level and harmonized social goals on a secondary level. Knowledge is used to harmonize conflicting social goals, so that "The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge."[35]

Philosophy, which is part of the pursuit of knowledge, should have as its only purpose the attempt to understand the world, not to change it to conform to this or that ethical principle.[36] Since "in desire, we wish to change something in ourselves or in our environment or both,"[37] desires are emotive. Sentences based upon emotions, which express either individual or collective desires as ends or as means, are not a part of

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[34] Ibid., pp. 230-31.

[35] Ibid., p. 243.

[36] Ibid., p. 310 and p. 228.

[37] Ibid., p. 229.

philosophical knowledge.

In 1927, with the writing of An Outline of Philosophy, Russell was an advocate of emotivism. The dates of his emotivistic stage may now be said to extend from 1927 to 1943. During these years, Russell wrote several volumes of specific interest to the theme of the present study. Sceptical Essays was first published in 1928 and it reflects his emotivism. What I Believe (1929), The Conquest of Happiness (1930), Education and the Social Order (1932), Freedom and Organization (1934), were but a few of the significant volumes published between 1927 and 1935. They may all be taken to reflect Russell's emotivistic commitment.

In his chapter on "Ethics" in An Outline of Philosophy, Russell stated that he used to hold the view, advocated by G. E. Moore, "that 'good' is an indefinable notion, and that we know a priori certain general propositions about the kinds of things that are good on their own account."[38] Russell admitted: "I formerly held this view myself, but I was led to abandon it, partly by Mr. Santayana's Winds of Doctrine. I now think that good and bad are derivative from desire."[39] Thus, Russell did not always hold the view of practical ethics

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[38] Ibid., p. 238.

[39] Ibid.

which he held in 1927. What was the date before which Russell agreed with Moore and after which he adopted emotivism? One clue to the discovery of that date was suggested by Russell. Since it was, at least in part, due to Santayana's Winds of Doctrine that Russell abandoned his earlier agreement with Moore, an attempt might be made to determine the date of Russell's reading of Winds of Doctrine, which was published in 1913. Knowledge of the publication date, however, does not yield knowledge of the date on which Russell shifted to emotivism. Russell could have read Santayana's essay long after its publication or even sometime before it was published. Further evidence is required. In the chapter on "Science and Ethics" in Religion and Science, Russell admitted that his view of practical ethics was quite different in 1935 from what it had been thirty years earlier.[40] This indicates that there had been a change in Russell's position in theoretical ethics. The theory which he advocated in 1905, or thereabouts, was not the same as the theory which he advocated in 1935, or, for that matter, in 1927.

The attempt to discover as precisely as possible the exact year in which Russell abandoned his earlier ethical theory and adopted emotivism will now be approached

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[40] Religion and Science, op. cit., p. 223.

according to the following procedure. Several of Russell's ethical writings published between 1905 and 1927 will be examined because during these years Russell shifted from his agreement with Moore's understanding of "good" to his own emotivistic analysis of "good." Once the turning-point in Russell's developing ethical theory is discovered, a closer examination of his earlier stage will be made. Bearing this intention in mind, several important works published prior to 1905 will, for the moment, be neglected because these works will be examined subsequently.

In 1905, Russell seems to have been preoccupied with his technical philosophy.[41] This was also the case in 1906 and 1907; Russell evidently wrote no significant volume or essay in theoretical ethics. In 1907, Russell wrote "The Study of Mathematics" which he tells us in the Preface to Philosophical Essays should be included with his essays on ethics, "because this essay is concerned rather with the value of mathematics than with an attempt to state what mathematics is."[42] Nevertheless, this essay is not a statement of the kind deemed relevant to the present investigation. In 1908, he wrote

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[41]See Denonn's Bibliography, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, op. cit., pp. 750ff.

[42]Bertrand Russell, Philosophical Essays (London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910), p. v.

"Determinism and Morals" for the Hibbert Journal (October, 1908). This article was "Reprinted: in Philosophical Essays, as 'The Elements of Ethics,' 1910."[43] Nothing else of immediate relevancy to the present investigation was published by Russell in the remaining part of 1908, nor in 1909. Russell's volume, Philosophical Essays, was published in 1910. The particular essay in this volume of interest to the present investigation is entitled "The Elements of Ethics." Section IV of this essay was a reprint of his 1908 article in the Hibbert Journal, "Determinism and Morals." In 1910, the New Quarterly published an essay by Russell entitled "Ethics," which was reprinted in Philosophical Essays as "The Elements of Ethics."[44] The articles of 1908 in the Hibbert Journal and of 1910 in the New Quarterly will both be ignored and "The Elements of Ethics" will be investigated because it would seem that this essay contains both of Russell's articles.

In general, Russell's view of ethics, as stated in "The Elements of Ethics," was almost exactly the same as the view which G. E. Moore expressed in Principia Ethica. Their ethical views were so similar that Russell, in a footnote, referred his readers to Moore's Principia Ethica

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[43] The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, op. cit., p. 752.

[44] Ibid., p. 753.

"for fuller discussions."[45] Russell's ethical views of 1910, prior to his advocacy of emotivism, may be referred to as his intuitionistic stage of development in theoretical ethics.

What is the basis for the distinction between Russell's intuitionism and his emotivism? The reasons were stated above for concluding that there was a change in Russell's theoretical ethics. The nature of this change, however, was not examined. The term "emotivism" was introduced in order to apply to any ethical theory or theory of values in which the meaning of ethical terms, such as "good," "right," "ought," is non-cognitive. The word "emotivism" was intended to be used as a label for ethical theories asserting that the sentences of practical ethics fall outside the realm of knowledge and they cannot be said to be either true or false. The term "intuitionism" will be used to refer to those ethical theories which assert that the sentences of practical (i.e., normative) ethics are true or false, that the adjective "good" cannot be defined, and that goodness, which is a non-natural property of some sort, can be known through intuition, i.e., immediate judgement.[46]

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[45]Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," Philosophical Essays, op. cit., p. 1 n.

[46]Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, op. cit., p. 6.

In "The Elements of Ethics," Russell argued that "the object of ethics . . . is to discover true propositions about virtuous and vicious conduct, and that these are just as much a part of truth as true propositions about oxygen or the multiplication table."[47] He maintained that ethics was one among the sciences, not some study outside science.[48] As in science, so in ethics, propositions are true or false. Knowledge in ethical matters is possible, and theoretical arguments in ethical disputes can be used to settle ethical disagreements. Most, although not all, of the propositions of ethics can be proved. Not all of them can be proved because "a proposition can only be proved by means of other propositions,"[49] and one must "begin by assuming something."[50] In his discussion of the meaning of "good," Russell seems to "begin by assuming something" which committed him still further to intuitionism, namely, that the idea of good is "apparently among those which form the simplest constituents of our more complex ideas, and are therefore incapable of being analysed or built up out

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[47] Philosophical Essays, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

[48] Ibid., p. 2.

[49] Ibid., p. 3.

[50] Ibid.

of other simpler ideas."[51] Russell proceeded to point out that we may be acquainted with redness without being able to offer a clear definition (i.e., analysis) of "red." Similarly, we know what "good" means without being able to offer an analytic definition of good.[52] "Good and bad are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as much as round and square do."[53] Good is simple and indefinable. That which is good or bad cannot be inferred from the existence of things in the natural world.[54] Russell based this view on his belief that "it is false, in theory, to let the actual world dictate our standard of good and evil."[55] Thus, he has satisfied the first two requisites of intuitionism. He has argued that ethical propositions can be known to be true or false, and that "good" cannot be defined. He has also satisfied the first part of the third requisite, namely, that he believed, in 1910, that goodness is a

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[51] Ibid., p. 4.

[52] Russell had not yet come to regard mathematics as tautologies, and so the term "analytic definition" posed no redundancy in 1910. "The Elements of Ethics" was written in roughly the same period of philosophical development as "The Study of Mathematics" in which Russell still regarded "mathematics with reverence."

[53] Philosophical Essays, op. cit., p. 11.

[54] Ibid., p. 14.

[55] Ibid., p. 15.

non-natural property of some sort. Did he also believe that goodness can be known through intuition, i.e., immediate judgement? In Section IV of "The Elements of Ethics," Russell stated that intrinsic goodness is judged as such through an immediate judgement.

> It must be admitted that ultimately the judgement "this thing is good" or "this thing is bad" must be an immediate judgement, which results merely from considering the thing appraised, and cannot be proved by any argument that would appeal to a man who had passed an opposite judgement.
> . . . . . .
> The immediate judgements which are required in ethics concern intrinsic goods and evils, not right and wrong conduct.[56]

Thus, in "The Elements of Ethics," Russell advocated an ethical theory which was quite different from the one which he later adopted during his emotivistic stage. At some point between 1910 and 1927, Russell altered his theory from intuitionism to emotivism. In 1911 Russell was primarily concerned with logic and epistemology. This preoccupation with technical philosophy, with the exception of two articles on (a) religion and (b) the dissolution of marriage, continued until 1914. In 1914, Russell became preoccupied with social and political matters. He mentioned in "My Mental Development" that "psychological and social problems . . . occupied my

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[56] Ibid., pp. 50; 51.

attention during the war of 1914-18."[57] While he published many important technical writings during the war years, he also produced many important non-technical writings. In 1914, he wrote an article entitled "Why Nations Love War," reprinted as Chapter Four of Justice in War-Time. In 1915, he wrote "On Justice in War-Time." This article, for the International Review, was intended as "an appeal to the intellectuals of Europe." It was reprinted, with several additions, in his 1916 volume Justice in War-Time. His 1915 article "The Ethics of War," originally published in the International Journal of Ethics in January of that year, also was reprinted in Justice in War-Time (1916). Several other articles were reprinted in this volume, including: "Is a Permanent Peace Possible" (1915), "The Future of Anglo-German Rivalry" (1915), "War and Non-Resistance" (1915), and "Policy of the Entente" (1916). Another important non-technical volume of Russell's was published in 1916, Principles of Social Reconstruction (published in the United States as Why Men Fight). Principles of Social Reconstruction will be examined later. Because Justice in War-Time contained articles written and published before 1916, it will now be examined to discover whether or not it marked the turning-point at which Russell

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[57] The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, op. cit., p. 18.

converted from intuitionism to emotivism.

The view that Russell's adoption of emotivism occurred as early as 1914 is perfectly compatible with Russell's citation of Santayana's Winds of Doctrine as the opus which led to his conversion. Winds of Doctrine was published in 1913. It is reasonable to suppose that Russell read it, thought about the forcefulness of its argument, re-examined his own views in theoretical ethics, and, in the light of the horrifying circumstances of The Great War, abandoned his intuitionism. In all probability, therefore, there were powerful theoretical and practical grounds for Russell's abandonment of his intuitionistic theory of ethics in 1914. Professor Aiken pointed out that:

> Basically Santayana holds that it is false to separate ethics from the "material ground and relational status of the moral life." If we divorce morality from the animal part of our natures, we tend to become fanatical and narrow. Santayana believes that this narrowness and fanaticism are implicit in any theory such as Russell's anti-naturalistic intuitionistic theory.[58]

Santayana demonstrated that the proposition "Good is unconditioned, and is just found out there as an objective primary (but non-natural) property" does not follow from the proposition "Good is indefinable." "An emotivist

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[58] Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

would certainly not think that this implied that goodness had an objective, independent status."[59] There are many indefinable terms, but this does not entail that these terms are groundless, objective, or unconditioned. While the term "good" may indeed be indefinable, it may nevertheless be conditioned by desire or preference, and as such would serve as a relational term. There is no contradiction in a situation in which one individual may desire X and another individual may not desire X. What does this imply about the goodness of X? It does not imply that because X is thought to be good for one individual and not good for another individual that therefore this is a contradictory situation. On the contrary, the term "good" is a relational term such as "left" and "right." X may be good for one individual and bad for another in precisely the same way as X may be to the left for one individual and to the right for another. Russell had assumed that X could not be both good and bad at the same time without a logical contradiction, and in this assumption, if Santayana's analysis is correct, Russell was mistaken. "There is really no logical contradiction at all. For Russell this criticism is devastating, because it attacks him on logical

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[59] Ibid., p. 22.

grounds . . . ."[60] Santayana went on to bombard Russell's intuitionistic theory with argument after argument in order to point out "the causes which led Russell to accept intuitionism."[61] In short, these were (a) the misunderstanding of contradictions and (b) Russell's mistaken psychology.[62] There were, as well, the practical circumstances of the First World War which were instrumental in Russell's changing his ethical theory in 1914. Alan Wood, in his book Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic, pointed to the First World War as an important turning point in much of Russell's thinking.

> . . . Russell at least recognized, the moment the war broke out in August 1914, that a lot of his previous ideas were wrong, and that men were not so rational as he had believed. He radically altered his way of thinking and his way of life accordingly.[63]

If Wood is correct in this assertion, then both Santayana's Winds of Doctrine and the practical circumstances of the First World War were the causes which led Russell to shift from intuitionism to emotivism. It is, thus, not surprising to find evidence of Russell's emotivism in his volume Justice in War-Time.

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[60] Ibid., p. 24.

[61] Ibid., p. 28.

[62] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[63] Alan Wood, Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic (London, Unwin Books, 1963), p. 83.

In "The Ethics of War," Russell's main concern was to determine whether some wars can be justified. There are, however, many statements in this article about the nature of ethical arguments and moral judgements. Russell began by stating that "The question whether war is ever justified, and if so under what circumstances, is one which has been forcing itself upon the attention of all thoughtful men."[64] He argued that the First World War did not seem to him to be one of those wars in which any of the combatants was justified, although he did not wish to defend the view that all war is a crime. Russell proceeded to establish the ground-rules for this argument, as for any argument in practical ethics. He asserted that:

> The argument used will merely reinforce what comes out of a man's nature. The fundamental facts in this as in all ethical questions are feelings; all that thought can do is to clarify and harmonise the expression of those feelings, and it is such clarifying and harmonising of my own feelings that I wish to attempt in the present article.[65]

Russell abandoned the belief that judgements which express values are either true or false. They express our feelings or attitudes toward something or other, which is neither good nor bad in itself. Russell, in "War and

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[64]Bertrand Russell, "The Ethics of War," Justice in War-Time (Chicago and London, The Open Court Publishing Co., 1916), p. 20.

[65]Ibid.

Non-Resistance," asserted that:

> Tolstoy does not judge conduct by its consequences: he considers actions inherently right or wrong. This makes it possible for him to say that no use of force is ever right. But if we judge conduct, as I think we ought, by its power of promoting what we consider a good life or a good society, we cannot expect such simplicity in our moral precepts, and we must expect all of them to be subject to exceptions. Whatever we may have to say must be regarded as in the nature of practical maxims, to be applied with common sense, not as logically universal rules to be tested by extreme cases.[66]

This passage reflects Russell's shift. Although he had always argued that circumstances and consequences were important, after 1914 they became even more important as theoretical ground-rules by which to determine right conduct. Furthermore, whereas in his intuitionistic theory Russell referred to goodness as a non-natural objective property inherent in that which was immediately judged intrinsically good, in his early emotivistic theory Russell referred to what we consider good. Judgements of good or evil do not reflect the intrinsic goodness of an objective situation but merely reflect human attitudes toward that situation.

Russell adopted an early form of emotivism in 1914. He did not supply his readers with any reasons for his

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[66]Russell, "War and Non-Resistance," Justice in War-Time, op. cit., p. 41.

shift from intuitionism to emotivism in "The Ethics of War"; he merely stated that moral questions are matters of feeling alone. Theoretical arguments supporting emotivism were given later in his emotivistic stage. Thus, Russell's emotivistic stage extends from 1914 to at least July, 1943.

Does Russell still adhere to emotivism in 1966? This question will be discussed after the date of origin of his intuitionistic stage has been decided. As regards procedure, working backward from 1905, evidence will be sought from Russell's writings to indicate that he did not adhere to the indefinability of some non-natural property known to be intrinsically good by intuition. No endeavour will be made to go back much further than 1896, the year in which Russell's first book, German Social Democracy, was published. Russell probably had his own views in theoretical ethics as early as 1894 because in that year he took the Moral Science Tripos at Cambridge. Although there is no necessary logical connection between taking the Moral Science Tripos and having one's own ethical theory, it is reasonable to expect that Russell, who began to inscribe his thoughts on religious problems in a journal as early as 1883, probably examined ethics seriously while preparing for the Moral Science Tripos and possibly formulated his own

ethical theory as early as 1894 or even prior to that date.

In the Preface to Mysticism and Logic, Russell stated that "In theoretical ethics, the position advocated in 'The Free Man's Worship' is not quite identical with that which I hold now . . . ."[67] This essay will now be examined in order to discover whether Russell's theoretical ethics in 1903, the date of the original publication of "The Free Man's Worship," differed significantly from his intuitionistic position of 1910.

The term "good" had the same kind of objective status in "The Free Man's Worship" as it had in "The Elements of Ethics." In both essays, man has knowledge of good and evil because they are objective properties.[68] Good, however, is an ideal which is not to be found "in the realm of matter."[69] Russell also referred to the existence of evil.[70] He suggested that "real goods" which were unattainable "ought not to be fretfully

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[67]Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, n.d.), p. v. The Preface was written in 1917.

[68]Ibid., pp. 46-47.

[69]Ibid., p. 48.

[70]Ibid., p. 49.

desired."[71] The term "unattainable" can be taken to mean not only "cannot be acquired" but also "cannot be analytically defined." Any knowledge of ideals, such as the good, is a matter of a kind of vision. It is precisely this vision of ideals which enables man to assert his "mastery over the thoughtless forces of Nature."[72] In short, in his essay "The Free Man's Worship," Russell supported an ethical theory fundamentally the same as the one which he supported in "The Elements of Ethics" (1910). This is not surprising. The first edition of Moore's Principia Ethica was published in 1903. In 1898 Russell and Moore had rebelled against the Kantian and Hegelian systems. As Russell stated in "My Mental Development," Moore "took the lead in rebellion, and I followed, with a sense of emancipation."[73]

> With a sense of escaping from prison, we allowed ourselves to think that grass is green, that the sun and stars would exist if no one was aware of them, and also that there is a pluralistic timeless world of Platonic ideas.[74]

The good was one of these Platonic ideas or ideals. Both Russell and Moore, in their rebellion against Kantianism

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[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid., p. 51.

[73] The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, op. cit., p. 12.

[74] Ibid.

and Hegelianism, adopted a form of Platonic realism which was manifested in their theoretical ethics as well as in other areas of their philosophical work. Thus, Russell's intuitionistic stage in theoretical ethics extended from 1899 to 1913, and his emotivistic stage extended from 1914 to at least 1943 and possibly beyond.

From 1894 to 1898, Russell's ethical theory was probably a variation of Kantian or Hegelian ethics.

> In the years from 1894 to 1898, I believed in the possibility of proving by metaphysics various things about the universe that religious feeling made me think important. . . . I thought I would also write a series of books on social and political questions, growing gradually more abstract. At last I would achieve a Hegelian synthesis . . . . The scheme was inspired by Hegel . . . .
>
> During 1898, various things caused me to abandon both Kant and Hegel.[75]

Thus, from 1894 to 1898, Russell was an advocate of Hegelianism, including Hegelian ethics. German Social Democracy, published in 1896, exhibited Russell's interest in Hegelianism. Russell's Hegelianism in theoretical ethics will be referred to as his organicistic stage because of what Russell said about Hegel in A History of Western Philosophy.

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[75] Ibid., p. 11.

> From his early interest in mysticism he retained a belief in the unreality of separateness; the world, in his view, was not a collection of hard units, whether atoms or souls, each completely self-subsistent. The apparent self-subsistence of finite things appeared to him to be an illusion; nothing, he held, is ultimately and completely real except the whole. But he differed from Parmenides and Spinoza in conceiving the whole, not as a simple substance, but as a complex system, of the sort that we should call an organism.[76]

The label "organicistic" is, therefore, more or less appropriate.

Russell's organicistic stage extended from 1894 to 1898. His intuitionistic stage extended from 1899 to 1913. His emotivistic stage extended from 1914 to at least 1943. Did Russell's emotivistic stage in theoretical ethics continue beyond 1943?

In her book, Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, Professor Lillian Aiken pointed to at least one more shift in Russell's theoretical ethics.

> Since 1910, Russell has been continually reluctant to include ethics within the sacred sphere of what is ordinarily called "knowledge." Throughout the years, however, he has become more and more dissatisfied with the dim world into which, as he thought, he had relegated the problems of value and morality. In . . . Human Society in Ethics and Politics, there is a decided change of outlook. At long last, he has decided to permit ethics to stand beside - yet with a difference -

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[76]Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 731.

other types of knowledge.[77]

Thus, Human Society in Ethics and Politics will be examined in order to determine the nature, if any, of Russell's shift in theoretical ethics.

Russell entitled Chapter IX: "Is There Ethical Knowledge?". He began the chapter by asserting that all of the previous discussion led up to the problem of ethical knowledge. He raised this fundamental set of questions:

> If we say, "Cruelty is wrong," or "You ought to love your neighbour as yourself," are we saying something which has impersonal truth or falsehood, or are we merely expressing our own preferences? If we say, "Pleasure is good and pain is bad," are we making a statement, or are we merely expressing an emotion which would be more correctly expressed in a different grammatical form, say, "Hurrah for pleasure, and away dull care"? When men dispute or go to war about a political issue, is there any sense in which one side is more in the right than the other, or is there merely a trial of strength? What is meant, if anything, by saying that a world in which human beings are happy is better than one in which they are unhappy?[78]

Russell went on to express his view on these questions, and on the basis of his reply it seems that he has abandoned emotivism. He answered:

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[77] Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, op. cit., p. 155.

[78] Bertrand Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics (New York, Mentor Books, 1962), p. 90.

> I, for one, find it intolerable to suppose that when I say, "Cruelty is bad" I am merely saying, "I dislike cruelty," or something equally subjective. What I want to discuss is whether there is anything in ethics that is not, in the last analysis, subjective.[79]

Earlier in the book, Russell stated that:

> . . . it still remains a question whether there is such a thing as ethical knowledge. "Thou shalt not kill" is imperative, but "murder is wicked" seems to be indicative, and to state something true or false. "Would that all men were happy" is optative, but "happiness is good" has the same grammatical form as "Socrates is mortal." Is this grammatical form misleading, or is there truth and falsehood in ethics as in science?[80]

Russell admitted that the answers to these questions were not easy or simple. He suggested that, as in science, so too in ethics, there may be some way of arriving at objectivity.[81] He proposed that a series of fundamental propositions and definitions be established in ethics.

> We can now set up a series of fundamental propositions and definitions in Ethics.
> (1) Surveying the acts which arouse emotions of approval or disapproval, we find that, as a general rule, the acts which are approved of are those believed likely to have, on the balance, effects of certain kinds, while opposite effects are expected from acts that are disapproved of.
> (2) Effects that lead to approval are defined as

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[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid., p. 20.

[81] Ibid.

> "good," and those leading to disapproval as "bad."
> (3) An act of which, on the available evidence, the effects are likely to be better than those of any other act that is possible in the circumstances, is defined as "right"; any other act is "wrong." What we "ought" to do is, by definition, the act which is right.
> (4) It is right to feel approval of a right act and disapproval of a wrong act.[82]

Then Russell concluded with these words: "These definitions and propositions, if accepted, provide a coherent body of ethical propositions, which are true (or false) in the same sense as if they were propositions of science."[83] Thus, when Russell stated that ethical propositions were objective, he probably used "objective" in the scientific sense of "descriptive."[84] When Russell stated his suggested definition of "good" as "satisfaction of desire,"[85] he did not mean personal desire alone. He rejected the view that "the good" could mean the satisfaction of my desires.

> If "the good" is defined as "the satisfaction of desire," we may define "my good" as "the satisfaction of my desires."[86]

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[82] Ibid., pp. 94-95.

[83] Ibid., p. 95.

[84] Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, op. cit., p. 160.

[85] Human Society, op. cit., p. 44.

[86] Ibid., p. 45.

Professor Aiken suggested that Russell's ethical theory in Human Society differed from the theoretical ethics of his emotivistic stage only insofar as in Human Society, "Value judgements are descriptive in the sense that they refer to or describe certain feelings such as satisfaction."[87] Ethical terms are, therefore, "definable in terms of words referring to desires and satisfactions."[88] As Russell stated, "Ethics contains statements which are true or false, and not merely optative or imperative."[89]

In Human Society, there was a definite shift away from the ethical theory advocated by Russell during his emotivistic stage. The term "good" is used in propositions which describe the satisfaction of desires, and these propositions are empirically verifiable. Professor Aiken referred to this stage of Russell's development in theoretical ethics as his ethical naturalism. In a footnote, she explained her use of the label "naturalistic" as applied to Russell's theoretical

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[87] Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, op. cit., p. 161. Value judgements are also prescriptive in the sense that "their moving appeal stems from desires and feelings to which they refer and the presence of these desires renders moral judgements somewhat different from scientific assertions."

[88] Ibid.

[89] Human Society, op. cit., p. 96.

ethics of 1952.

> By ethical naturalism I mean the belief that ethical terms are definable and designate certain empirical or natural properties. Moral judgements would then be descriptive as well as true or false. This limited use of the word "naturalism" is not to be confused with its more general use in which it means that the ethical theory in question asserts that there can be no value in the universe whatsoever without the presence of sentient creatures. In this more general sense, Russell has been a naturalist since the time he abandoned his intuitionism.[90]

The date which marked the turning-point from emotivism to naturalism in Russell's developing ethical theory will now be determined. In the Preface to Human Society in Ethics and Politics, Russell asserted that:

> The first nine chapters of this book were written in 1945-6, the rest in 1953, except Chapter II of Part II, which was the lecture I gave in Stockholm on the occasion of receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature. I had originally intended to include the discussion of ethics in my book on Human Knowledge, but I decided not to do so because I was uncertain as to the sense in which ethics can be regarded as "knowledge."[91]

Thus, Russell started to re-examine his ethical theory approximately one year after his "Reply to Criticisms" was published. But even three or four years later, in

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[90] Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, op. cit., p. 156 n. 4.

[91] Human Society, op. cit., p. vii.

1948, the date of the publication of Human Knowledge, Russell was still unsure of precisely the sense in which ethical terms were cognitive and not strictly and exclusively emotive. Nevertheless, while his naturalistic theory was not sufficiently developed until, perhaps, 1952, Russell had probably abandoned his emotivism by 1945. It may be no mere coincidence that Russell's History of Western Philosophy, published in 1945, immediately preceded his naturalistic ethical theory. As an emotivist, Russell demonstrated that there was no connection, except a psychological one at best, between philosophy and politics. In the Preface to A History of Western Philosophy, Russell expressed his purpose:

> My purpose is to exhibit philosophy as an integral part of social and political life: not as the isolated speculations of remarkable individuals, but as both an effect and a cause of the character of the various communities in which different systems flourished.[92]

Russell's remarks may be understood to express nothing more than a psychological connection between philosophy (including theoretical ethics) and politics. But, by 1947, the connection had become stronger. In his lecture-essay, "Philosophy and Politics" (1947), Russell stated that his topic was to examine "the connection of

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[92] A History of Western Philosophy, op. cit., p. ix.

philosophy with politics."[93] He demonstrated that in Continental Europe, philosophy is very closely related to politics. In Britain, however, the connection "has been less evident" and Russell proposed to discuss the nature of the connection. The exact nature of the connection of philosophy with politics will be discussed in a later chapter.

An examination of the gradual evolution of Russell's ethical naturalism from his emotivism provides the justification for setting 1945 as the date of Russell's adoption of naturalism. No evidence is available to indicate a subsequent shift in Russell's theoretical ethics since the publication of Human Society in Ethics and Politics. Thus, Russell's ethical naturalism may be considered to extend from 1945 to the present day, 1966.

In conclusion, Russell's developing ethical theory may be divided into four stages according to the shifts in his analysis of key ethical terms such as "good," "right," and "ought":

cognitive organicism - 1894 to 1898,
cognitive intuitionism - 1899 to 1913,
non-cognitive emotivism - 1914 to 1944,
cognitive naturalism - 1945 to 1966. . . .

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[93]Bertrand Russell, "Philosophy and Politics," Unpopular Essays (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1950), p. 1.

CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENTS IN EPISTEMOLOGY

The previous chapter began with the suggestion that it would be necessary to furnish an extensive description of the changing periods of Russell's philosophical development. The chapter ended with an outline summary of the various stages of Russell's developing ethical theory. Although theoretical ethics is an important branch of technical philosophy, other branches have not as yet been discussed. In the present study, Russell's contributions in the field of symbolic logic as such will not be examined. Russell's work in logic will be referred to only insofar as it is relevant to his epistemology. His technical work in symbolic logic will not be examined because the thesis that there is a necessary connection between Russell's technical work in logic and his political pronouncements will not be defended. His epistemology, however, will be examined because the thesis that there is a connection between his epistemology and his political pronouncements may be tenable. This does not mean that there is such a connection but only that there may be a connection;

whether there is or is not will be determined in a later chapter. In this chapter, the stages of development in Russell's epistemology will be described. The term "epistemology" usually refers to "theory of knowledge." In Russell's case, however, "epistemology" has a broader application insofar as it involves psychology, logic, and the physical sciences.[1]

Russell's central philosophical interest throughout his lengthy career has been "to discover how much we can be said to know and with what degree of certainty or doubtfulness."[2] This is the central theme which pervades everything Russell wrote in epistemology. While he was still a student at Cambridge, he was motivated by his desire "to believe that some knowledge is certain,"[3] and he wished to attain certainty. "In almost all philosophy . . . certainty has been the goal."[4] His desire to achieve this goal motivated Russell to become a philosopher rather than a diplomat or politician as his relatives had hoped. He has confessed that the motive

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[1]Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth (Penguin Books, 1962), p. 124.

[2]Bertrand Russell, My Philosophical Development (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959), p. 11.

[3]Bertrand Russell, Portraits from Memory (1953), reprinted in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1961), p. 53.

[4]Ibid., p. 56.

"which operated first and continued longest was the desire to find some knowledge that could be accepted as certainly true."[5] This motive, however, should not be confused with any of Russell's epistemological conclusions; his epistemological endeavours have all reflected the scepticism to which he was forced to adhere because of the impossibility of attaining the kind of certainty which he had set out to achieve.

As in theoretical ethics, so too in epistemology, Russell's development may be divided into stages. "My philosophical development may be divided into various stages according to the problems with which I have been concerned and the men whose work has influenced me."[6] There was one major turning-point in his philosophical development. All other changes were gradual; this one was decisive.

> There is one major division in my philosophical work; in the years 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism and the technique of Peano in mathematical logic. This was so great a revolution as to make my previous work, except such as was purely mathematical, irrelevant to everything that I did later. The change in these years was a revolution; subsequent changes have been of the nature of an evolution.[7]

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[5] Ibid.

[6] My Philosophical Development, op. cit., p. 11.

[7] Ibid.

Thus, Russell's philosophical development may be divided into two distinct periods. The period which lasted until 1898 will be referred to as his nineteenth century period. The period which began in 1899-1900 will be referred to as his twentieth century period. The evolutionary shifts within each period will be investigated in order to determine whether or not the duration of the stages in Russell's epistemological development corresponds with the duration of the stages in Russell's ethical development. No attempt will be made to describe Russell's philosophical development prior to 1894.

As regards epistemology, the last four years of Russell's nineteenth century period will be referred to as his stage of synthetic idealism. It was in 1894 that Russell adopted a synthetic method and an idealistic philosophy.

> McTaggart had Hegelian answers to the rather crude empiricism which had previously satisfied me. . . . I stood out against his influence with gradually diminishing resistance until just before my Moral Sciences Tripos in 1894, when I went over completely to a semi-Kantian, semi-Hegelian metaphysic.[8]

By 1899, Russell had abandoned synthetic idealism and organicism. There is a correspondence in the duration of his stage of organicism in theoretical ethics and his

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[8] Ibid., p. 38.

stage of synthetic idealism in epistemology. In both cases, Russell's theories were Hegelian-oriented. No question will arise in a later chapter concerning the connection between Russell's political views and his technical philosophy during this four year period. The connection was, for Russell, as it was for Hegel, a rigorous one of logical necessity. During the Hegelian phase of his nineteenth century period, Russell's political pronouncements, his political principles, his ethics, and his epistemology, were all logically interconnected. Indeed, there was so great a mutual interdependency that political pronouncements when abstracted from the absolute became unintelligible. The treatment which Russell gave to the political questions in his book on German Social Democracy (1896) was dependent upon his Hegelian interpretation of history. Russell made it quite clear at the start that any attempt to understand Social Democracy was doomed to failure unless examined in its total context as a religion and an ethic and not merely as a political party.

> For Social Democracy is not a mere political party, nor even a mere economic theory; it is a complete self-contained philosophy of the world and of human development; it is, in a word, a religion and an ethic. To judge the work of Marx, or the aims and beliefs of his followers, from a narrow economic standpoint, is to overlook the whole body and spirit

of their greatness.[9]

In My Philosophical Development, Russell described the revolt against Kant and Hegel. Together, Moore and Russell rejected Kant and Hegel. Russell was able to follow Moore in theoretical ethics. In epistemology, however, although both Moore and Russell adopted a form of Platonic realism, there were several significant differences which divided the two rebellious Platonists. These were "differences of emphasis."[10]

> What I think at first chiefly interested Moore was the independence of fact from knowledge and the rejection of the whole Kantian apparatus of a priori intuitions and categories, moulding experience but not the outer world. I agreed enthusiastically with him in this respect, but I was more concerned than he was with certain purely logical matters. The most important of these, and the one which has dominated all my subsequent philosophy, was what I called 'the doctrine of external relations'. Monists had maintained that a relation between two terms is always, in reality, composed of properties of the two separate terms and of the whole which they compose, or, in ultimate strictness, only of this last. This view seemed to me to make mathematics inexplicable. I came to the conclusion that relatedness does not imply any corresponding complexity in the related terms and is, in general, not equivalent to any property of the whole which they compose.[11]

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[9]Bertrand Russell, German Social Democracy (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1965), p. 1.

[10]My Philosophical Development, op. cit., p. 12.

[11]Ibid.

Russell expressed this theory in his book on The Philosophy of Leibniz. Shortly thereafter, when he became aware of the work of Peano in mathematical logic, he was led to adopt a "new technique and a new philosophy of mathematics."[12] Russell reacted to the opposite extreme of Hegel in his rebellion against Hegelianism. Russell "began to believe in the reality of whatever could not be disproved - e.g. points and instants and particulars and Platonic universals."[13] His rebellion against synthetic idealism led him "to believe everything the Hegelians disbelieved."[14] He adopted an analytic (i.e., piecemeal) approach and a realistic (i.e., Platonic) philosophy. Thus, as regards epistemology, the first stage in Russell's twentieth century period will be referred to as his stage of analytic realism.

In Chapter IX of The Problems of Philosophy, Russell admitted the very close similarity between the Platonic "theory of ideas" and his own theory of universals.

> The problem with which we are now concerned is a very old one, since it was brought into philosophy by Plato. Plato's 'theory of ideas' is an attempt to solve this very problem, and in my opinion it is one of the most successful attempts hitherto made.

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., p. 62.

> The theory to be advocated in what follows is largely Plato's, with merely such modifications as time has shown to be necessary.[15]

Examples of Platonic ideas are justice and whiteness. Russell warned his readers not to confuse justice with a particular act which is considered just. Insofar as the term "idea" is ambiguous, Russell proposed to use the term "universal." Russell's universals, such as justice and whiteness, refer to the pure essences which particulars, such as just acts and white things respectively, have in common.[16] He proceeded to demonstrate that "all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals."[17] Indeed, we have intuitive knowledge of self-evident truths.[18]

The Problems of Philosophy was published originally in 1912. In 1912, therefore, Russell held a theory of universals which exhibited his Platonic inclinations. The world of universals was the world of timeless being. In comparing the world of universals with the world of particulars, Russell's own view was that "both are real,

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[15]Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York, A Galaxy Book, 1959), p. 91.

[16]Ibid., pp. 91-92.

[17]Ibid., p. 93.

[18]Ibid., p. 109.

[19]Ibid., p. 100.

and both are important to the metaphysician."[20]

Is there a connection between Russell's intuitionistic stage of development in theoretical ethics and his stage of analytic realism in epistemology? His intuitionistic stage extended from 1899 to approximately 1913. His stage of analytic realism lasted from 1899-1900 to at least 1912. There seems to be more than merely a coincidental correspondence.

Consider the following quotations from The Problems of Philosophy[21]:

(1) A priori knowledge is not all of the logical kind we have been hitherto considering. Perhaps the most important example of non-logical a priori knowledge is knowledge as to ethical value. . . . I am speaking of judgements as to the intrinsic desirability of things. . . .

. . . Such judgements must, in part at least, be immediate and a priori. . . . it is fairly obvious that they cannot be proved by experience; . . . it is only important to realize that knowledge as to what is intrinsically of value is a priori in the same sense in which logic is a priori.[22]

(2) We have now seen that there are propositions known a priori, and that among them are the propositions of logic and pure mathematics, as well as the fundamental propositions of ethics.[23]

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Quoted in Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, op. cit., p. 33.

[22] The Problems of Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

[23] Ibid., pp. 80-81.

(3) Our immediate knowledge of truths may be called intuitive knowledge, and the truths so known may be called self-evident truths. Among such truths are included those which merely state what is given in sense, and also certain abstract logical and arithmetical principles, and (though with less certainty) some ethical propositions.[24]

(4) It would seem, also, though this is more disputable, that there are some self-evident ethical principles, such as 'we ought to pursue what is good'.[25]

(5) Judgements of intrinsic ethical or aesthetic value are apt to have some self-evidence, but not much.[26]

It is clear, from the above quotations, that Russell's intuitionism and his analytic realism are closely connected. The first three quotations illustrate that "Russell believed certain ethical propositions to be a priori, self-evident timeless truths."[27] But his claim that some ethical propositions were self-evident has a provisional tentativeness which seems to thwart charges of dogmatism.[28] As Professor Aiken pointed out, "Toward the end of Problems, Russell seems to become more and more doubtful about our ability to know a priori ethical

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[24] Ibid., p. 109.

[25] Ibid., p. 112.

[26] Ibid., p. 117.

[27] Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Morals, op. cit., p. 37.

[28] Ibid.

truths or to recognize them as such."[29] The hesitancy exhibited by Russell in three of the quotations cited above indicates his growing doubt about the status of ethical sentences. Russell evidently felt that our ability to recognize self-evident ethical propositions was quite limited.[30] Professor Aiken pointed out that Russell's uncertainty regarding the validity of ethical judgements was the result of his "commitment to the Platonic ontology . . . ."[31] Because of this commitment, Russell seemed "obliged to analyze moral principles in terms which are inappropriate to them . . . ."[32] Aiken also suggested that "Russell's ontology and his acceptance of a priori self-evident propositions no doubt had much to do with his ready acceptance of Moore's type of ethical theory."[33]

Between 1899 and 1912, Russell's treatment of ethical judgements was closely related to his epistemology. Between 1914 and 1944, he tended to separate ethics from

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid. Aiken suggested that there does not seem to be much of a practical difference between Russell's non-naturalism and Santayana's naturalism. In practice both would have admitted the difficulties inherent in achieving agreement about what was good.

[31] Ibid., p. 38.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

knowledge. Russell was convinced, during his emotivistic stage, that practical ethics is not a branch of technical philosophy. He abandoned his realism at about the same time as he abandoned his intuitionism. Note the respectful tone in which Russell referred to Plato in The Problems of Philosophy. "Plato's 'theory of ideas' is an attempt to solve this very problem, and in my opinion it is one of the most successful attempts hitherto made."[34] Note the same reverential tone in his reference to Plato in "The Study of Mathematics" (1907):

> Plato, we know, regarded the contemplation of mathematical truths as worthy of the Deity; and Plato realised, more perhaps than any other single man, what those elements are in human life which merit a place in heaven.[35]

"The Study of Mathematics" was written as an expression of Russell's conviction that mathematics held the key to man's higher vision of what was ultimately real. Plato's judgement of mathematics, which had a profound influence on Russell's philosophical method and theories from 1899 to approximately 1913, was in turn influenced by

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[34] The Problems of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 91.

[35] Russell, "The Study of Mathematics," Philosophical Essays, op. cit., p. 73. Reprinted in Mysticism and Logic, op. cit., p. 56.

Pythagoras. Russell later confessed that:

> My philosophical development, since the early years of the present century, may be broadly described as a gradual retreat from Pythagoras. The Pythagoreans had a peculiar form of mysticism which was bound up with mathematics. This form of mysticism greatly affected Plato and had, I think, more influence upon him than is generally acknowledged. I had, for a time, a very similar outlook and found in the nature of mathematical logic, as I then supposed its nature to be, something profoundly satisfying in some important emotional respects.[36]

Russell began to abandon his respectful tone towards Pythagoras and Plato when he began to change his "general outlook upon the world."[37] He came to feel that mathematics was devoid of factual content; it did not contain any truths about the external world. He continued for a short time to derive emotional and aesthetic pleasure "from an elegant piece of mathematical reasoning,"[38] however "this mood began to pass, and was finally dispelled by the First World War."[39] Russell confessed that after the beginning of the First World War, he no longer had the opinion "that only Plato's world of ideas

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[36] My Philosophical Development, op. cit., p. 208.

[37] Ibid., p. 211.

[38] Ibid., p. 212.

[39] Ibid.

gives access to the 'real' world."[40]

It is relatively easy to find written evidence of Russell's changing attitude toward Plato at about the time of the beginning of the First World War. From approximately 1899 to 1912, Russell's remarks reflected his respect for Plato. By 1914, Russell's attitude had altered. Plato was blamed for identifying the good with the really real.

> . . . throughout most of Plato's teaching, there is an identification of the good with the truly real, which became embodied in the philosophical tradition, and is still largely operative in our own day. In thus allowing a legislative function to the good, Plato produced a divorce between philosophy and science, from which, in my opinion, both have suffered ever since and are still suffering.[41]

In a later part of the same essay, Russell pointed out that:

> Physics, as it appears in Plato's Timaeus for example, is full of ethical notions: it is an essential part of its purpose to show that the earth is worthy of admiration. The modern physicist, on the contrary, though he has no wish to deny that the earth is admirable, is not concerned, as physicist, with its ethical attributes: he is merely concerned to find out facts, not to consider whether they are good or bad.[42]

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[40] Ibid., p. 213.

[41] Russell, "Mysticism and Logic," Mysticism and Logic, op. cit., p. 6.

[42] Ibid., p. 28.

These quotations illustrate Russell's dissatisfaction with Platonic philosophy. Russell maintained that ethical knowledge is impossible and, for that reason, wished to purge physics of its ethical content. He adopted a view of the world compatible with that of modern physics and attempted to apply the methods of mathematical-logic to the analysis of physics. He suggested that philosophers should adopt the objectivity of scientists: "The man of science, whatever his hopes may be, must lay them aside while he studies nature; and the philosopher, if he is to achieve truth must do the same."[43] Russell ceased to admire the timeless world of pure mathematics because he was convinced by Wittgenstein, not long before the outbreak of the First World War, that mathematics consists of tautologies.[44] This followed quite closely on the heels of Russell's shift in theoretical ethics resulting from Santayana's arguments in Winds of Doctrine. With characteristic honesty, Russell abandoned his Platonism.

In 1914, Russell wrote "On Scientific Method in Philosophy." This essay began with an account of the two groups of motives which have led men to ask philosophical questions: (a) those which result from interests in

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[43] Ibid., p. 6.

[44] Russell, "My Mental Development," The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, op. cit., p. 19.

ethics and/or religion, and (b) those which result from interest in science. Plato was led to philosophy by the first group of motives; Hume was led to philosophy by the second. Russell maintained, in this essay, that philosophy should adopt the scientific approach to the world. It may appear that Russell has said nothing about methodology that he might not have said in The Problems of Philosophy, for there too he held the view that the proper method by which to philosophize is analysis. However, the term "analysis" was used differently by Russell during the different stages of his twentieth century period. At first, when he and Moore rebelled, analysis was quite compatible with Platonic realism. It was a method based on a mathematical model of reality. When, in 1914 or so, Russell changed his attitude concerning the significance of mathematics, he came to hold a view of analysis which more closely approximated the constructionism of modern physics. In this stage, Russell excluded ethics from technical philosophy and viewed the sentences constituting practical ethics as nothing but emotive utterances. There was no logical connection between his technical and non-technical philosophies.

Russell's epistemological shift marked the inception of his stage of analytic constructionism. The label,

"analytic constructionism," is appropriate because Russell's analytic approach took a slightly different form in 1914 from that which it took in 1912. In the Preface to Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), Russell stated that:

> The central problem by which I have sought to illustrate method is the problem of the relation between the crude data of sense and the space, time, and matter of mathematical physics. I have been made aware of the importance of this problem by my friend and collaborator Dr. Whitehead, to whom are due almost all the differences between the views advocated here and those suggested in The Problems of Philosophy. I owe to him . . . the whole conception of the world of physics as a construction rather than an inference.[45]

Russell's adverse criticism of Plato in Our Knowledge of the External World is another of the differences between the two volumes.

> Plato, moreover, adopted from the Eleatics the device of using logic to defeat common sense, and thus to leave the field clear for mysticism - a device still employed in our own day by the adherents to the classical tradition.[46]

There is a striking similarity between Russell's first chapter, "Current Tendencies," in Our Knowledge of the External World and his essay "On Scientific Method in

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[45] Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (New York, New American Library, 1960), p. v.

[46] Ibid., p. 24.

Philosophy." Once again, Plato is blamed for identifying ethical values with reality.[47] Russell suggested that a distinction should be made between facts and values. He suggested that a sharper division should be made between science (knowledge) and ethics. He proposed that ethics should not be classified as a branch of technical philosophy.

> Driven from the particular sciences, the belief that the notions of good and evil must afford a key to the understanding of the world has sought a refuge in philosophy. But even from this last refuge, if philosophy is not to remain a set of pleasing dreams, this belief must be driven.[48]

In The Problems of Philosophy, a priori intuitive knowledge of self-evident ethical truths is possible. In Our Knowledge of the External World, however, knowledge of ethical ideals is impossible; ethical ideals cannot be known by the scientific method. Facts and values are separated.

In 1948, and possibly a few years earlier, Russell once more shifted his theoretical ethics. He began to compose Human Society in Ethics and Politics as early as 1945, but, although his original intention was to include his naturalistic ethical theory in Human Knowledge (1948),

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[47] Ibid., p. 30.

[48] Ibid.

he did not publish his arguments for shifting to naturalism until 1954. Although Human Knowledge marked a new epistemological stage for Russell, he remained committed to philosophical analysis.

> In my Human Knowledge I have discussed proper names at considerable length and in a number of passages. I do not think that what I say in that book is open to any of Mr. Urmson's criticisms or is an abandonment of the doctrine of philosophical analysis.[49]

Russell has been an advocate of one form or another of philosophical analysis ever since 1899-1900.[50] An example of the application of his method of analysis is "that by analysing physics and perception the problem of the relation of mind and matter can be completely solved."[51] Russell used the term "analysis" to represent the method by means of which knowledge is sought.

> All the advances of modern physics have consisted in a more and more minute analysis of the material world. . . . No man of science would dream of questioning the propriety of analysis. . . . A person without musical training, if he hears a symphony, acquires a vague general impression of a whole, whereas the conductor, as you may see from his gestures, is hearing a total which he minutely analyses into several parts. The merit of analysis

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[49] My Philosophical Development, op. cit., pp. 228-29.

[50] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[51] Ibid., p. 15.

is that it gives knowledge not otherwise obtainable.[52]

In Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, Russell pushed the method of analysis as far as it could be pushed. As a result, he was forced to admit that the kind of certainty for which he had searched is unattainable.

In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell asked the question: "Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?"[53] This question was raised in 1912 at the beginning of one of Russell's first epistemological works. In one of his last epistemological works, dated 1948, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, Russell replied to this question raised over thirty years earlier: " . . . all human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial. To this doctrine we have not found any limitation whatever."[54] This conclusion was reached as the result of his realization that analysis is the most useful method by which to increase empirical knowledge in spite of its impotency as regards the acquisition of certainty. At first, during his stage of analytic realism, analysis

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[52] Ibid., p. 229.

[53] The Problems of Philosophy, op. cit., p. 17.

[54] Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 507.

included mathematical deduction. Shortly thereafter, Russell realized that mathematical deduction would yield little, if any, new knowledge. In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell maintained that deduction may be used to derive new knowledge. In Human Knowledge, he stated that "deduction has turned out to be much less powerful than was formerly supposed; it does not give new knowledge . . . ."[55] He abandoned deductive-analysis when he abandoned Platonism, and subsequently adopted inductive-analysis in his stage of analytic constructionism. During this stage, Russell attempted to show how the knowledge that the chair is really there can be logically constructed from perceptions called "seeing the chair." He abandoned this approach, however, because he came to believe that it was quite impossible to infer the world of science from bits and pieces of data given in "experience."[56] Russell subsequently retained the empirical approach to his subject-matter although he abandoned empiricism as a philosophy. Analysis was Russell's method, not his metaphysics. The empirical method of analysis led Russell to accept the philosophy of empiricism and its untenable model of the world.

In Human Knowledge, Russell argued that empiricism

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[55] Ibid., p. 155.

[56] The Passionate Sceptic, op. cit., p. 194.

is not self-supporting. He suggested five postulates which constitute the foundation of empirical knowledge:

> (a) The postulate of quasi-permanence.
> (b) The postulate of separable causal lines.
> (c) The postulate of spatio-temporal continuity in causal lines.
> (d) The postulate of the common causal origin of similar structures ranged about a center, or, more simply, the structural postulate.
> (e) The postulate of analogy.[57]

His new epistemology was based on criteria other than strictly scientific ones. Postulates were introduced and had to be accepted. If the postulates were rejected, solipsism would result. If these postulates were not in fact believed, "the human race would not have survived."[58] In this way, Russell was appealing to practical considerations and to useful results in order to justify the postulates. These postulates are presupposed independently of experience or else "science is moonshine."[59]

The term "reconstructionist" was not used by Russell to describe his new epistemological stage, but its appropriateness will become apparent after a brief explanation. It is a label which another "logical atomist," Gustav Bergmann, used to apply to what he contended was

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[57] Human Knowledge, op. cit., p. 487.

[58] The Passionate Sceptic, op. cit., p. 195.

[59] Human Knowledge, op. cit., p. 505.

the best method in philosophy.[60] It is a label which indicates Russell's new attempt at the kind of constructionism which he had attempted ever since Our Knowledge of the External World. The method which he used during his constructionistic stage in order to account for the world of science and common-sense on the basis of the data of perception, had to be altered when he came to believe that induction itself was not fundamental as a means for the acquisition of knowledge. Russell introduced his postulates, and induction was not one of them. His new approach to construct the world of science and common-sense out of the data of perception may therefore be referred to as his stage of analytic reconstructionism.

The significant difference between Russell's constructionism and his reconstructionism is based on the different foundations which, in the two stages, he attributed to knowledge. Induction, hence empiricism, had its limits. The epistemological reconstruction of the world was based on postulates, the acceptability of which depended upon practical results.[61] Russell found greater consistency, simplicity, and believability in the

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[60]Thomas English Hill, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (New York, The Ronald Press, 1961), p. 414.

[61]The Passionate Sceptic, op. cit., p. 196.

postulates of the reconstructionistic theory than in the inductive-analysis of the constructionistic theory advanced previously. The author of Bertrand Russell's Construction of the External World, Charles A. Fritz, wrote that, in Human Knowledge, Russell

> . . . finds it desirable for the individual to have knowledge beyond that of his own percepts, but he finds it is only possible to do so on the basis of postulates, or assumptions justified only on the ground that they do make that knowledge possible.[62]

The use of the term "desirable" is significant. The postulates are to be accepted because knowledge beyond percepts is desirable. If this interpretation of Russell's argument in Human Knowledge is tenable, as it seems to be, then the inclusion of a naturalistic ethical theory within the scope of human knowledge is a reasonable consequence.

In Human Society in Ethics and Politics, Russell demonstrated that ethical terms are not egocentric.[63] Just as he had set up his postulates in Human Knowledge, he set up a series of "fundamental propositions and definitions in Ethics."[64] These definitions and

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[62]Charles A. Fritz, Bertrand Russell's Construction of the External World (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), p. 231.

[63]Human Society, op. cit., p. 91ff.

[64]Ibid., p. 94.

propositions are as fundamental to ethics as the postulates are to epistemology. The postulates in epistemology are themselves neither true nor false. Russell pointed out that "in practice, experience leads us to generalizations."[65] The process of generalization occurs in terms of these postulates which "are known in the sense that we generalize in accordance with them when we use experience to persuade us of a universal proposition . . . ."[66] Similarly, the definitions and propositions which are fundamental to ethics are not themselves known to be true or false. These fundamental ethical definitions and propositions are either accepted or not accepted. If accepted, they constitute a sufficient basis on which to "provide a coherent body of ethical propositions, which are true (or false) in the same sense as if they were propositions of science."[67] Russell's naturalistic ethical theory, therefore, remains ultimately dependent upon the initial acceptability of fundamental presuppositions in the same way as his reconstructionistic epistemology remains ultimately dependent upon the initial acceptability of fundamental postulates. This is why Russell asserted that:

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[65] Human Knowledge, op. cit., p. 506.

[66] Ibid., p. 507.

[67] Human Society, op. cit., p. 95.

> Although, on the above theory, ethics contains statements which are true or false, and not merely optative or imperative, its basis is still one of emotion and feeling, the emotion of approval and the feeling of enjoyment or satisfaction, the former being involved in the definition of "right" and "wrong," the latter in that of "intrinsic value." And the appeal upon which we depend for the acceptance of our ethical theory is not the appeal to the facts of perception, but to the emotions and feelings which have given rise to the concepts of "right" and "wrong," "good" and "bad."[68]

Russell's naturalistic stage extends from 1945 to the present date. His reconstructionistic stage in epistemology can be assigned the same dates. During the period from 1945 to the present day, Russell has maintained that knowledge of the truth or falsehood of ethical propositions is possible in the same sense that knowledge of the truth or falsehood of scientific propositions is possible. In his naturalistic stage, Russell has argued that "good" is definable in terms of "the satisfaction of desire." The term "good" refers to some natural property rather than to some non-natural property. The connection, therefore, is apparent between his reconstructionism and ethical naturalism.

In conclusion, Russell's epistemological development may be divided into two distinct periods which, in turn, may be subdivided into various stages:

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[68] Ibid., p. 96.

Nineteenth century period (until 1898):

Stages: unspecified - 1872 to 1893

synthetic idealism - 1894 to 1898

Twentieth century period (from 1899):

Stages: analytic realism - 1899 to 1913

analytic constructionism - 1914 to 1944

analytic reconstructionism - 1945 . . .

The dates of each epistemological stage correspond to dates of a specific stage in theoretical ethics. In each case, Russell altered his epistemology at approximately the same time as he changed his ethical theory. The reason for this correspondence is that epistemology and theoretical ethics are closely related. The nature of the relation, however, changes in conjunction with Russell's shifts.

Russell's stage of cognitive organicism corresponds in duration to his stage of synthetic idealism (1894 to 1898). His ethical theory and his epistemology are internally connected. Political judgements, ethical ideals, epistemological criteria, and metaphysical first principles are unintelligible in isolation. Each branch of philosophy is completely dependent upon all of the other branches. The interconnection between Russell's political pronouncements and his philosophy is of a rigorous logical nature.

Russell's stage of cognitive intuitionism corresponds in duration to his stage of analytic realism (1899 to 1913). His ethical theory and his epistemology are externally connected; i.e., both presuppose the same Platonic ontology and the same method of analysis. The connection between Russell's political pronouncements and his philosophy during these years will be examined in the next chapter.

Russell's stage of non-cognitive emotivism corresponds in duration to his stage of analytic constructionism (1914 to 1944). His ethical theory and epistemology are co-related; i.e., both are branches of "technical philosophy" in which theoretical arguments proceed by the same method of analysis. The relation, if any, of Russell's political pronouncements to his technical philosophy will be examined in the next chapter.

Russell's stage of cognitive naturalism corresponds in duration to his stage of analytic reconstructionism (1945 . . .). His ethical theory and his epistemology are externally connected; i.e., both follow the same structural procedure by appealing to fundamental definitions and postulates in order to justify scientific and ethical knowledge. The connection between Russell's political pronouncements and his philosophy during these years will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS

Russell's political philosophy can be discovered by examining his popular writings on political matters. The term "political philosophy" may be understood to mean "a more or less coherent set of political principles." The term "coherence" may be understood as "consistent interdependence." If Russell's political principles are more or less interdependent and consistent with each other then they may be said to reflect his political philosophy. The political principles expressed in his writings on politics are his political pronouncements of a high degree of generality. The judgement, for example, that "democracy is good" is a political principle whereas the judgement that "the war in Viet Nam is unjustified" is a particular political pronouncement. Russell's writings on politics include both kinds of value judgements. Because the element of coherence is not itself explicit, Russell's political philosophy, unlike his political principles, is implicit.

A distinction has been made between theoretical and practical ethics; a similar distinction can be made as

regards politics. Political philosophy may be taken to correspond, more or less, to practical ethics; both consist of normative value judgements. Philosophy of politics may be taken to correspond, more or less, to theoretical ethics; both consist of theoretical arguments concerning the relation of values to knowledge. Neither theoretical ethics nor philosophy of politics consists of value judgements. The term "philosophy of politics" may be used to indicate the study of political philosophy from the viewpoint of the technical philosopher who investigates the relation of political philosophy to practical ethics, to political pronouncements, and to the department of technical philosophy. To say, for example, that political judgements of any degree of generality should be expressed in the optative mood is to propose a theoretical argument in the philosophy of politics. In order to describe Russell's philosophy of politics, his political writings will be examined with the aim of eliciting the political philosophy implicit in them.

The concepts of power and progress seem to be equally prominent in Russell's political thought. His examination of political power and his analysis of human progress have both undergone several changes, and the development of Russell's political thinking may be divided into stages accordingly. Just as in epistemology

and ethics, so too in politics, Russell's development from 1894 to the present day may be divided into four stages. The judgement that a new stage has begun is based on two criteria: (a) a shift in either Russell's theory of political power, or in its presuppositions, and (b) a shift in Russell's theory of human progress, or in its presuppositions.

Russell's approach to political questions from 1894 to 1900 seems to have been inseparable from his Hegelian approach to philosophy. Russell may be described as an Imperialist Liberal during this stage. He became an imperialist under the influence of Sidney Webb and he supported the Boer War and the use of force in settling disputes among nations. Despite his membership in the Fabian Society, Russell was a British Whig. He urged other progressives to co-operate with the Liberals rather than form an independent Labour Party. He believed that change from the worse to the better was inevitable if progressives co-operated in the struggle for reform; his belief in the inevitability of progress and his optimism about the future of the world were inspired by Hegelianism.[1]

In the Preface to the 1965 edition of German Social Democracy, Russell explained that the book was written

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[1] The Passionate Sceptic, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

from the point of view of an "orthodox Liberal."[2] The book also exhibits his Hegelian-synthetic approach inasmuch as his examination presupposed that Social Democracy could be understood only as a completely "self-contained philosophy of the world and of human development . . . in a word, a religion and an ethic."[3] Thus, an inquiry into a political system had to include an examination of the philosophical presuppositions of that system; politics could not be understood piecemeal. Russell's synthetic approach reflected his attempt to examine political ideals as if they were factual items of knowledge. He praised Marx for attempting to purge politics of its platitudinous content as regards the individualist doctrine of the Rights of Man, and for attempting to establish economic democracy as the necessary result of the desires of the proletariat.[4] Unfortunately, however, in spite of Marx's attempted innovation, the German Social Democrats adopted the principle that all men are equal. Russell argued that the discrepancy between Marx and his followers led to confusion among Social Democrats on whether to advocate the policy of reward according to produce or of reward

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[2] German Social Democracy, op. cit., p. v.

[3] Ibid., p. 1.

[4] Ibid., pp. 166-67.

according to needs.[5] The point on which the Social Democrats and Marx seemed to have been in agreement was that the means of production should be collectively owned. Political democracy and economic collectivism were methods of distributing political and economic power more equally. Russell expressed his qualified approval of German Social Democracy, but he could not applaud their Marxian orthodoxy as regards class warfare:

> Friendliness to the working classes, or rather common justice and common humanity, on the part of rulers, seem, to me at least, the great and pressing necessity for Germany's welfare. I would wish, in conclusion, to emphasise the immense importance, for the internal peace of the nation, of every spark of generosity and emancipation from class-consciousness in the governing and propertied classes. This, more than anything else, is to me the lesson of German Politics.[6]

Russell's liberalism and imperialism, his cognitive organicism and synthetic idealism, his Hegelian method and metaphysics are all interconnected. The inevitability of progress is cause for optimism as regards the desirable democratization of political power.

Russell's approach to political matters from 1901 to 1913 seems to have resulted from his Platonic ontology, his cognitive ethical theory, and his piecemeal approach

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[5] Ibid., p. 169.

[6] Ibid., p. 171.

to philosophy. Russell may be described as an Internationalist Liberal during this stage. He rejected imperialism and supported the British Whigs especially as regards their advocacy of Free Trade. When he abandoned Hegelianism, he also abandoned the doctrine of the inevitability of progress.

Russell has never been anything other than what may be described as a progressive, however, when he adopted philosophical analysis, he had to reject the Hegelian view of inevitable progress because such a doctrine was incompatible with a piecemeal approach to knowledge. Nevertheless, Russell continued to believe that progress was possible given the co-operative efforts of men working towards a common, desirable goal. The term "progress" has always had the same meaning for Russell, i.e., "change from the worse to the better."[7] As a Platonist, Russell claimed that judgements concerning the occurrence of progress were cognitive because goodness could be intuited. He suggested several prerequisites for political progress. First, each individual had to recognize that there was room for improvement, i.e., that "in the world we know, there are many things that would

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[7]"Mysticism and Logic," op. cit., p. 24; p. 101.

be better otherwise . . . ."[8] Secondly, each person had to learn that the world was not made for him alone.[9] Thirdly, each man had to realize that he ought to seek the happiness and well-being of his comrades throughout the world, and not merely his own private welfare.[10] Education, which is the key to progress, diminishes a man's crude instincts and increases his awareness of the outside world so that he becomes a "citizen of the universe, embracing distant countries . . . ."[11] The chief moral aim of education is the enlargement of the scope of desire from the purely personal to the universal. If education is successful with regard to politics, each man will find his true place in society.[12] Russell's Platonism and his analytic methodology were, therefore, the presuppositions of his theory of progress.

Russell's desire for progress was expressed not only in his writings but also by his political activities. Although occupied with the writing of Principia Mathematica, he participated in the struggle for political reforms.

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[8]Russell, "A Free Man's Worship," Mysticism and Logic, op. cit., p. 48.

[9]Ibid., p. 49.

[10]Ibid., p. 53.

[11]Russell, "The Place of Science in a Liberal Education," Mysticism and Logic, op. cit., p. 37.

[12]Ibid., p. 38.

He ran for Parliament in 1907 as the candidate of the National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies. He had the unofficial support of the Whigs because he endorsed their entire platform, to which he added the plank of women's suffrage. In a speech at Wimbledon, he announced that he stood for democracy, liberty, and justice, and that these political principles meant granting the vote to women.[13] He exclaimed that "the question of Votes for Women, if not the most important, is almost the most important question at present before the country."[14] Russell lost the election to his Conservative opponent. In May, 1910, Russell sought the official Liberal candidacy but was rejected by the Selection Committee when they discovered that he was an uncompromising free thinker who refused to attend Church occasionally to placate his potential constituents.

Russell described his rejection of imperialism in a broadcast in 1901.

> 'I had an experience not unlike what religious people call conversion. . . . In the course of a few minutes I changed my mind about the Boer War, about harshness in education and in the Criminal Law, and about combativeness in private relations.'[15]

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[13] The Passionate Sceptic, op. cit., p. 62.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid., p. 65.

He became an internationalist because he disliked the use of force by any State to further its nationalistic interests. Although the use of force in human affairs is sometimes unavoidable, Russell claimed that power is inherently evil and destructive.[16] His internationalism resulted from his Platonic identification of the good for one individual with the good for all mankind.

As an Internationalist Liberal, Russell stood for the general principles of democracy, liberty, and justice. As a logician and a philosopher of mathematics, he sought the generality which marks the great mathematician of the Principles of Mathematics and Principia Mathematica. As a cognitive intuitionist and an analytic realist, he explored the universal world of ideas. Mankind, he thought, is capable of progress in politics, of certainty in epistemology, of knowledge of the good in ethics, and of truth in mathematics and logic. All of these views are connected with the Platonic ontology which Russell adopted after his rejection of Hegelianism. Russell's strong stand in favour of the political equality of women, the general principles of justice and democracy, and the freeman's vision of the good life, all seem to have a common source. Just as with Socrates in The Republic, so too with Russell from 1901 to 1913, there

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[16] "A Free Man's Worship," op. cit., p. 48.

could be no sharp separation of political, ethical, aesthetic, scientific, mathematical, religious, and ontological questions; all were related to Russell's intuitive vision of the good and his Platonic ontology. As an Internationalist Liberal, Russell's approach to political theory was indistinguishable from his approach to ethics and the other branches of philosophy.

Russell's approach to political questions from 1914 to 1944 seemed quite different from what it had been before the First World War. When he became convinced that mathematical and logical statements are all factually vacuous tautologies, he abandoned his Platonic ontology. When he became convinced that ethical and political judgements are factually vacuous expressions of desires, he abandoned his cognitive ethical theory. His theory of power, its uses and distribution, could not, therefore, be justified by appealing to a priori intuitive knowledge of good and evil; his new approach attempted to combine empirical and emotive elements. Whereas his political philosophy had been based previously on Hegelianism and Platonism respectively, his new theories of power and progress were based partly on philosophical anthropology, i.e., the study of human nature, and partly on purely emotive judgements concerning ethically desirable ends. During this stage, Russell may be described as an

Internationalist Guild Socialist. He rejected Liberalism and joined the Labour Party in 1914.

The term "Liberal," as it has been applied to Russell's political theories prior to 1914, indicates not only his affiliation with the British Whigs but also his acceptance of a cognitive ethical theory. Although, in general, liberalism and ethical cognitivism are not necessarily connected, in Russell's case, they seem to be invariably conjoined. As a Liberal progressive, Russell had claimed that a judgement of the occurrence of progress can be known, in principle, to be true or false because men have knowledge of the good. As an emotivist, he could no longer claim that a judgement of the occurrence of progress can be known, even in principle, to be true or false because men do not have knowledge of the good.

> Change is one thing, progress is another. "Change" is scientific, "progress" is ethical; change is indubitable, whereas progress is a matter of controversy.[17]

To judge truly that progress has taken place presupposes knowledge as regards what is worse or what is better. If ethical knowledge as regards ends is impossible, then any judgement that progress has taken place is purely emotive. Russell's adoption of emotivism in ethics led

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[17]"Philosophy and Politics," op. cit., p. 8.

to the abandonment of his Liberalism both as regards Whig affiliation and the ability, albeit tentative, to know the truth of political judgements about desirable ends.

After 1914, Russell no longer believed that politics was conducted rationally. He became convinced that "politics is largely governed by sententious platitudes which are devoid of truth."[18] Knowledge may be acquired regarding the means by which some end can be effected or concerning the probable consequences of political conduct. Judgements concerning the goodness of political ends, however, are based not on reason, but entirely on desire.[19]

The year 1914 was as decisive a turning-point in Russell's political thought as the year 1899 was in his epistemological work. Prior to 1914, Russell was preoccupied with writing about abstract matters and he wrote about politics only occasionally. But once he had banished political judgements from the realm of knowledge, he wrote repeatedly, expressing his political opinions.

> The first world war gave a new direction to my interests. The war, and the problem of preventing future wars absorbed me, and the books that I wrote

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[18]Russell, "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish," Unpopular Essays, op. cit., p. 92.

[19]Bertrand Russell, "What I Believe," Why I Am Not a Christian (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1964), pp. 60-62.

on this and cognate subjects caused me to become known to a wider public.[20]

Russell's pacifism during the First World War was not a matter of principle; he did not oppose all war. Some wars, he argued, were justified although the First World War was not one of these.[21] He admitted that judgements on subjects such as war "are the outcome of feeling rather than of thought."[22] Russell's feelings were that just as the individual "who goes against the law should be considered wrong . . . because of the importance of preventing individuals within the State from resorting to force," so too, in the interrelations of States, the use of force, with a few exceptions, should be considered wrong.[23] Each side regards its victory as desirable, and thus, each side becomes blind to the evil consequences which are inseparable from war and which are likely to result regardless of whichever side is victorious. Some of the evil consequences of war are the death of large numbers of young men, the hates and fears instilled into the hearts of even the non-combatant

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[20]"My Mental Development," op. cit., p. 17.

[21]"The Ethics of War," op. cit., p. 20.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid., p. 21.

population in the region of the war, and the persuasion of men that the way to improve their lot is to injure those in some other country.[24] The worst of all consequences is the hatred which prevents nations from seeing "that there is a real consonance of interest and essential identity of human nature, and every reason to replace hatred by love."[25] If the beneficial consequences of a particular war outweigh all of the harmful by-products, then the war in question is justified.[26] The criterion was utilitarian: i.e., the greatest benefit for the greatest number was judged in terms of desired consequences.

Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916), Political Ideals (1917), and Proposed Roads to Freedom (1918) exhibit Russell's adoption of Socialism. Russell's Socialism may be more precisely described as Guild Socialism; it is not to be confused with State Socialism.

> My own opinion - which I may as well indicate at the outset - is that pure Anarchism, though it should be the ultimate ideal, to which society should continually approximate, is for the present impossible, and would not survive more than a year or two at most if it were adopted. On the other hand, both Marxian Socialism and Syndicalism, in

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[24] Ibid., pp. 24-27.

[25] Ibid., p. 27.

[26] Ibid., p. 28.

> spite of many drawbacks, seem to me calculated to give rise to a happier and better world than that in which we live. I do not, however, regard either of them as the best practicable system. Marxian Socialism, I fear, would give far too much power to the State, while Syndicalism, which aims at abolishing the State, would, I believe, find itself forced to reconstruct a central authority in order to put an end to the rivalries of different groups of producers. The best practicable system, to my mind, is that of Guild Socialism, which concedes what is valid both in the claims of the State Socialists and in the Syndicalist fear of the State, by adopting a system of federalism among trades for reasons similar to those which are recommending federalism among nations.[27]

When Russell wrote Proposed Roads to Freedom, the ideas of Guild Socialism were relatively new. They were first expounded in Cole's World of Labour (1913) and in National Guilds (1914).[28] The policy of Guild Socialism aimed at autonomy in industry and curtailment of the power of the State. The workers in each factory would elect the managers and each factory would control its own method of production. In a given industry, the different factories would federate into a National Guild which would deal with marketing and with the general interests of the whole industry. The State, which would act as a trustee for the community, would own the means of production. Guilds would manage the production and

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[27]Bertrand Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1919), pp. xi-xii.

[28]Ibid., p. 81 n.

distribution of goods and the distribution of income to their members. A Parliament, to represent the community of consumers, and a Guild Congress, to represent the community of producers, would be established. A joint committee of Parliament and the Guild Congress would decide matters which relate to the interests of both producers and consumers.[29]

Russell believed that the advantage of Guild Socialism lay in its attempt to reconcile State Socialism with Syndicalism. Marxian State Socialists were primarily concerned with producers; Syndicalists were primarily concerned with consumers. Russell pointed out that:

> . . . although Guild Socialism represents an attempt at readjustment between two equally legitimate points of view, its impulse and force are derived from what it has taken over from Syndicalism. Like Syndicalism, it desires not primarily to make work better paid, but to secure this result along with others by making it in itself more interesting and more democratic in organization.[30]

Democracy, as it was practiced in several large States, was not, in Russell's judgement, the best possible form of government. Majority rule in a large State is self-defeating. In many questions, only a small minority

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[29] Ibid., pp. 80-83.

[30] Ibid., p. 84.

of citizens may be interested in or have knowledge of the issues involved, yet every voting citizen has an equal say in their settlement. "When people have no direct interest in a question they are very apt to be influenced by irrelevant considerations . . . ."[31] Thus, those most interested in an issue which concerns only themselves ought to be able to settle the matter independently of external interference. This idea was advocated by the Guild Socialists. Industries would be self-governing units as regards internal affairs. In this way, the power of the State would be diminished, an end which was desirable in Russell's estimation, and those most interested in a given question would be left free to settle the matter.

Russell did not accept the entire programme of the Guild Socialists. He adopted, for example, such "more or less Anarchist proposals as the 'vagabond's wage'."[32] He argued that,

> . . . no one should be compelled to work, and those who choose not to work should receive a bare livelihood, and be left completely free . . . . One great advantage of making idleness economically possible is that it would afford a powerful motive for making work not disagreeable . . . .[33]

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[31] Ibid., p. 133.

[32] Ibid., p. 212.

[33] Ibid., p. 193.

The world, as Russell hoped it could be made, would be one which was "based rather upon the impulse to construct than upon the desire to retain what we possess or to seize what is possessed by others."[34] Thus, the basis for Russell's political and social ideals rested in encouraging some human impulses and desires and discouraging others.

In Political Ideals, Russell argued that political events were the result of human impulses and desires; politics was an extension of ethics, and the study of politics presupposed the study of human nature.

> Political ideals must be based upon ideals for the individual life. The aim of politics should be to make the lives of individuals as good as possible. There is nothing for the politician to consider outside or above the various men, women, and children who compose the world. The problem of politics is to adjust the relations of human beings in such a way that each severally may have as much of good in his existence as possible. And this problem requires that we should first consider what it is that we think good in the individual life.[35]

There are two sorts of goods and two corresponding sorts of impulses. There are goods which are private possessions and those which are enjoyed by many individuals;

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[34] Ibid., p. 212.

[35] Bertrand Russell, Political Ideals (London, Unwin Books, 1963), pp. 9-10.

there are the corresponding possessive and creative impulses.[36] Russell suggested that "The best life is the one in which the creative impulses play the largest part and the possessive impulses the smallest."[37] The possessive impulses lead to the use of force; they lead to "competition, envy, domination, cruelty, and almost all the moral evils that infest the world."[38] The abuse of power is unlikely where goods resulting from creative impulses are sought. In human beings, Russell argued, there is a natural impulse of growth and development which "may be helped or hindered by outside influences."[39] Thus, by the term "impulse," Russell probably meant an inherent tendency in individuals towards the realization of a desired end. The use of force to impede the impulses is destructive to both those who use force and those against whom it is used. "Those who realize the harm that can be done to others by any use of force against them, and the worthlessness of the goods that can be acquired by force, will be very full of respect for the liberty of others."[40] A man's life will realize its

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[36] Ibid., p. 11.

[37] Ibid., p. 12.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

best potentialities if he exercises his creative rather than possessive impulses and if he has reverence for others. Russell's criterion for judging the merits of political and social institutions was according to the good or harm that they do to individuals.[41] Because the political institutions in 1917 were far from what Russell imagined was desirable, progress had to be made towards establishing those institutions which would encourage the creative impulses. "At present our institutions rest upon two things: property and power."[42] Both result from possessive impulses and are harmful. The conditions for good political institutions are both negative and positive (or necessary and sufficient). Security and liberty are negative conditions whereas encouragement of creative energy is the positive condition. The first step would be "to render democratic the government of every organization."[43] Consistent with his Guild Socialism, Russell advocated an increase of self-government for subordinate groups, i.e., devolution.[44] He, therefore, opposed a powerful central government. A government should only use force to prevent those who

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[41] Ibid., p. 14.

[42] Ibid., p. 15.

[43] Ibid., p. 20.

[44] Ibid., p. 23.

attempt to use force against others. The aim of reformers, according to Russell, was "to have such institutions as will diminish the need for actual coercion and will be found to have this effect."[45] An international government should be established to prevent anarchy between states.[46] This, however, is merely a necessary condition. Given international peace, personal liberty and security, education is the important positive factor in establishing the type of political institutions which will provide greater scope for the creative impulses. "The more men learn to live creatively rather than possessively, the less their wishes will lead them to thwart others or to attempt violent interference with their liberty."[47]

Russell's aim in the Principles of Social Reconstruction was to suggest a political philosophy "based upon the belief that impulse has more effect than conscious purpose in moulding men's lives."[48] Since all "human activity springs from two sources: impulse and

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[45] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[46] Ibid., p. 22.

[47] Ibid., p. 24.

[48] Bertrand Russell, Principles of Social Reconstruction (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1917), p. 5.

desire,"[49] methods and institutions must be established to control socially undesirable impulses and to stimulate socially desirable ones. Once such political institutions are brought into play, education would be able to bring forth the natural creative impulses latent in human nature. Russell believed that education had been used by the holders of political power to maintain the status quo, and as a result, educators had ignored the children being educated. "If the children themselves were considered, education . . . would aim at making them able to think, not at making them think what their teachers think."[50] The principles of social reconstruction, justice and liberty, were insufficient if unsupported as regards education.[51] The principle of liberty was essentially negative: it condemned interference with freedom, but it was not a positive principle of construction. Yet education required a positive conception of what constituted a good life.[52] The creative principle in human affairs was hope.[53]

Although Russell seems to have been unaware of the

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[49] Ibid., p. 12.

[50] Ibid., p. 144.

[51] Ibid., p. 145.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid., pp. 166-67.

birth of Guild Socialism at the time of the writing of Social Reconstruction, the general political principles which he advocated as early as 1914 seem to be similar to those advocated by the Guild Socialists. Russell's use of the term "socialism" in Social Reconstruction was synonymous with Marxian State Socialism, a political theory of which Russell never wholly approved. He disliked both State Socialism and Liberal Individualism. "The distinction between socialism and individualism turns on the non-essential functions of the State, which the socialist wishes to extend and the individualist to restrict."[54] To Russell, "the essence of the State is that it is the repository of the collective force of its citizens."[55] The State is, therefore, an instrument of power. "The principle source of harm done by the State is the fact that power is its chief end."[56] Therefore, decentralization and democratization, i.e., devolution, would be sought in all political institutions.[57] Reorganization would proceed in terms of "local government by trades as well as by areas."[58] The power

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[54] Ibid., p. 45.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., p. 62.

[57] Ibid., p. 72.

[58] Ibid.

of the State ought to be used only to prevent strife among organizations or to prevent the tyranny which the majority in a community might exercise over a helpless minority.[59] The role of the State ought to be to help settle rival interests for the benefit of the entire community; "its only principle in deciding what is the right settlement would be an attempt to find the measure most acceptable, on the whole, to all the parties concerned."[60] As regards the use of military power, there should be only one State, a world State, the government of which would arbitrate in disputes among rival factions in the world.[61]

Russell argued that the "equalization of wealth without the equalization of power seems . . . a rather small and unstable achievement."[62] Power was to be distributed equally, not only in economics, but especially in politics. The Bolshevik theory failed to focus sufficiently on the inequalities of political power which Russell considered "the greatest of political evils."[63]

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[59] Ibid., pp. 72-73.

[60] Ibid., p. 75.

[61] Ibid., p. 101.

[62] Bertrand Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (London, Unwin Books, 1962), p. 82.

[63] Ibid., pp. 82-83.

The principle of justice implies the equalization of economic wealth and of political power. This was Russell's understanding of "democracy." He did not believe that a community in which power was concentrated in the hands of a minority would refrain from destroying what was most valuable in the individual.[64] Since politics is governed by human desires,[65] and since political institutions in turn control the impulses of individuals,[66] the good society will come about only when political power is distributed equally among the citizens of the State. Then, and only then, will creative impulses be encouraged by desirable political institutions.

Russell related the desire for power both to politics and to philosophy; man's insatiable love of power affected political events and philosophical systems. Men often refuse to recognize their human limitations and this makes social co-operation difficult. "Every man would like to be God . . . ."[67] Since the easiest way for men to acquire glory is to possess power, as motives, power and glory may be regarded as one.[68] The drive for power

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[64] Ibid., p. 81.

[65] Ibid., p. 63.

[66] Ibid., p. 81.

[67] Power, op. cit., p. 8.

[68] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

is more important politically than the drive for wealth because once a moderate degree of comfort is provided, "both individuals and communities will pursue power rather than wealth."[69] Thus, "the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics."[70] Marx was mistaken in supposing that self-interest was the fundamental concept in the social sciences and that the desire for wealth was its chief embodiment. The desire for material goods is finite whereas the desire for power is infinite. The love of power, although it is one of the strongest of human motives, is not distributed evenly; some men love power more than others and in some men the love of power is more obviously manifested than it is in others.[71] Inequalities in the distribution of power are, therefore, partly the result of human nature; those with a more prominent love of power will usually acquire more than those who tend to follow or withdraw.[72] Human nature is not the only reason for the unequal distribution of power. Even in a democracy, power will be distributed unequally for the sake of efficiency. As society grows

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[69] Ibid., p. 9.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid., p. 10.

[72] Ibid., p. 13.

more organic, inequalities in the distribution of power will increase.[73] Yet, as science and technology develop, the concentration of power in the hands of a few becomes more dangerous.

> There is no hope for the world unless power can be tamed and brought into the service, not of this or that group of fanatical tyrants, but of the whole human race . . . for science has made it inevitable that all must live or all must die.[74]

The term "power" was defined by Russell as "the production of intended effect."[75] Power, therefore, is a quantitative concept: "given two men with similar desires, if one achieves all the desires that the other one achieves, and also others, he has more power than the other."[76] As regards political power, its distribution should be as democratic as possible because:

> To anyone who studies history or human nature, it must be evident that democracy, while not a complete solution, is an essential part of the solution.
>
> The merits of democracy are negative: it does not insure good government but it prevents certain evils.[77]

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[73] Ibid., p. 12.

[74] Ibid., p. 24.

[75] Ibid., p. 25.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid., pp. 185-86.

An organization, which may be defined as "a set of people who are combined in virtue of activities directed to common ends,"[78] is democratic "if a fairly large percentage of the population has a share of political power."[79] Since whatever is good or bad is embodied in individuals, not primarily in communities, and since "there can be no valid argument for an undemocratic ethic,"[80] it follows that social, economic, and political democracy must prevail.

> Without democracy, devolution, and immunity from extra-legal punishment, the coalescence of economic and political power is nothing but a new and appalling instrument of tyranny.[81]

Thus, political democracy, which results from human nature and a democratic ethic, is the best known method for the taming of power.

The love of power has led as well to several power-philosophies. Fichte, Hegel, James, Dewey, Bergson, Nietzsche are a few of those who have propounded power-philosophies.[82] While the love of power is a

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[78] Ibid., p. 107.

[79] Ibid., p. 129.

[80] Ibid., p. 183.

[81] Ibid., p. 197.

[82] Ibid., pp. 172-77.

normal part of human nature, "power-philosophies are, in a certain precise sense, insane."[83] The love of power leads the proponents of power-philosophies to a distorted view of the world.

> The success of insanity, in literature, in philosophy, and in politics, is one of the peculiarities of our age, and the successful form of insanity proceeds almost entirely from impulses towards power.[84]

The love of power, therefore, has philosophical as well as political manifestations. Power-philosophies are judged insane because they lead to self-refuting social consequences.[85] But, not all love of power should be condemned. "Power is the means, in ethical contests as in those of politics."[86] Its use should be judged good or bad according to its effects.[87] A criterion is required on the basis of which "good" effects can be distinguished from "bad" effects. Some ethical ends, i.e., objects of desire, "are such as can, logically, be enjoyed by all, while others must, by their very nature,

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[83] Ibid., p. 175.

[84] Ibid., p. 176.

[85] Ibid., p. 177.

[86] Ibid., p. 169.

[87] Ibid., p. 183.

be confined to a portion of the community."[88] Those objects of desire which can be enjoyed by all are socially and politically preferable to those which cannot. Therefore, the ultimate aim of the holders of political power should be "to promote social co-operation, not in one group as against another, but in the whole human race."[89]

Russell's political judgements between the two World Wars seem to have been based on a fairly coherent set of political principles. His advocacy of allied participation in the Second World War was in no way inconsistent with his advocacy of British neutrality in the First; he did not oppose all wars as a matter of principle. Although, in general, war had evil consequences, in exceptional cases the evil might be outweighed by the beneficial effects. Russell's utilitarian criterion was the basis on which his political principles were accepted or rejected. Democracy was good because it had beneficial consequences as regards individuals. In politics, as in ethics, democracy involved a more equitable distribution of wealth, of property, and of power. Democracy also involved individual liberty from the arbitrary use of external

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[88] Ibid., p. 183.

[89] Ibid., p. 184.

coercion. Devolution of political power was desirable if compatible with social order. The common good could only be decided, in the final analysis, by reference to individual desire. Thus, politics is an extension of ethics because political institutions were judged good or bad in terms of their consequences on individuals. Judgements of the goodness or badness of a political end were based on individual desires. The impulses which led to political institutions were judged good or bad in terms of the extent to which they permitted the satisfaction of desire by the greatest number of persons. Creative impulses were, generally, regarded as good while possessive ones were, generally, regarded as bad. Political institutions ought to control possessive impulses and encourage creative ones because possessive goods could not be shared whereas creative goods could be shared. Both the motives and goals of all human activity were derived from the essential identity of human nature. The study of human nature, i.e., philosophical anthropology, was, for Russell, an important part of psychology. Psychology, which was a branch of technical philosophy, was the ground on which he distinguished good institutions from bad ones and good philosophies from bad ones. Power-philosophies had socially undesirable consequences; they were self-refuting.

Creative impulses led to socially useful philosophies and to socially constructive political institutions. Russell's political philosophy and his technical philosophy are, therefore, psychologically related to each other in the sense that his political principles are dependent upon his philosophical anthropology or psychology of human nature. Wood pointed out that:

> Russell sometimes maintained, partly I think out of perverseness, that there was no connection between his philosophical and political opinions. . . . But in fact I think there are perfectly obvious connections between Russell's philosophical and other views.[90]

Russell's attempt to eliminate the *a priori* and concentrate on the empirical is illustrated in his political philosophy as well as in his technical philosophy. His approach to politics was empirical and was based on the evidence of his psychological findings, not on *a priori* principles.[91] Russell's political conclusions were arrived at in the same way as his philosophical conclusions. This is the fundamental link between his technical and popular writings: Russell's principles in both philosophy and politics were empirically determined, not presupposed *a priori*. Although, between the two

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[90] *The Passionate Sceptic*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[91] *Ibid.*

World Wars, Russell excluded value judgements from technical philosophy, his political principles were related methodologically and psychologically to his technical philosophy.

After 1945, Russell seems to have acknowledged that politics was related to philosophy. In his essay on "Philosophy and Politics" (1947), Russell argued that empiricism is "associated with democracy and with a more or less utilitarian ethic."[92] Although during his stage of Internationalist Guild Socialism Russell opposed the traditional Liberalism he had held previously, he became an empiricist Liberal after the Second World War.

> I conclude that, in our own day as in the time of Locke, empiricist Liberalism (which is not incompatible with democratic socialism) is the only philosophy that can be adopted by a man who, on the one hand, demands some scientific evidence for his beliefs, and, on the other hand, desires human happiness more than the prevalence of this or that party or creed.[93]

Russell did not abandon his Socialism. He remained committed to almost all of the same political principles to which he had adhered prior to 1945. Human nature was still the basis for political activities and institutions. The ethical criterion by which political events were

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[92]"Philosophy and Politics," op. cit., p. 5.

[93]Ibid., p. 20.

judged good or bad remained the utilitarian one of judging goodness in terms of an increase in the number of socially desirable consequences. Democracy, as regards the distribution of both goods and political power, continued to involve advocacy of Guild Socialism, world government, and devolution.[94]

> The general principle which, if I am right, should govern the respective spheres of authority and initiative, may be stated broadly in terms of the different kinds of impulses that make up human nature. . . . the regularizing of possessive impulses and their control by the law belong to the essential functions of government, while the creative impulses, though governments may encourage them, should derive their main influence from individual or group autonomy.[95]

The principles of security and justice, if implemented as they ought to be, required centralized government, including world government.[96] The desire for progress, however, required encouragement of individual initiative.[97] The method of devolution is most likely to secure both goals.[98]

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[94]Bertrand Russell, Authority and the Individual (Boston, Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 62-63.

[95]Ibid., p. 65.

[96]Ibid., p. 67.

[97]Ibid.

[98]Ibid.

> The world government must leave national governments free in everything not involved in the prevention of war; national governments, in their turn, must leave as much scope as possible to local authorities. In industry, it must not be thought that all problems are solved when there is nationalization. A large industry - e.g. railways - should have a large measure of self-government . . . .[99]

The individual man is the bearer of good and evil.[100] "The State" is an abstraction;[101] its purpose is to produce conditions compatible with the good life for those who inhabit the State. A good society is merely the means to a good life for the members of the State.[102] Since "all human activity is prompted by desire or impulse,"[103] political theory, if it is to become scientific, must take account of psychology.[104]

> Politics is concerned with herds rather than with individuals, and the passions which are important in politics are, therefore, those in which the various members of a given herd can feel alike.[105]

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[99] Ibid., pp. 67-68.

[100] Ibid., p. 74.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid., p. 73.

[103] Human Society in Ethics and Politics, op. cit., p. 132.

[104] Ibid., p. 131.

[105] Ibid., p. 142.

If politics is to become scientific, "it is imperative that our political thinking should penetrate more deeply into the springs of human action."[106] In this way, Russell has based politics on psychology; scientific political theory, therefore, involves empirical knowledge about political ends. Empirical judgements concerning the occurrence of progress can be known, in principle, to be either true or false. Russell's empiricist Liberalism is not incompatible with his democratic socialism in the sense that the occurrence of ethical knowledge is not incompatible with the expression of desires in ethical judgements. Ethics and psychology are, therefore, closely related.

After 1945, Russell's political theory and his technical philosophy were not divided into two different departments of philosophy. The basis for political judgements was to be found in psychology. The same tendencies in human nature had led to British empiricism and Liberalism. The same creative impulses led to scientific and Liberal tentativeness. Science holds the key to the future both in philosophy and in politics. Psychology and anthropology belie the popular maxim that "human nature cannot be changed."[107]

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[106] Ibid., p. 131.

[107] "An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish," op. cit., p. 92.

The main difference in Russell's political philosophy before and after 1945 was the ultimate foundation of his political judgements. Just as in epistemology and ethics knowing depends upon postulates and definitions, so too in politics, which is grounded in ethics and psychology, there are preconditions. The postulates in epistemology and the fundamental propositions and definitions in ethics have to be accepted if progress is to be made. The acceptance of the postulates and definitions is dependent upon an appeal to common sense. Since politics is an extension of ethics, the fundamental propositions and definitions which make ethical knowledge possible also make knowledge of political ends possible. The appeal in politics, as in ethics and epistemology, is to the fundamental propositions, definitions, and postulates apprehended only by common sense. Common sense replaces intuition as the method of justifying empirical, ethical, and political knowledge. Common sense has only one precondition: survival. Man's survival in the nuclear age requires common sense and common sense perishes if mankind becomes extinct. Russell's 1945 shift in political theory is, therefore, based on both theoretical and practical considerations. Theoretically, Russell adopted a cognitive ethical theory which presupposed that an appeal to common sense was the ultimate justification for

knowledge. This led to both empiricism and Liberalism. Practically, Russell concentrated on the common sense methods by which nuclear annihilation could be prevented. Controls were required over the self-destructive passions which, unless checked, would lead to the universal death of mankind. Russell doubted whether the rulers of the nuclear powers had the sympathy, knowledge, and common sense required to prevent a nuclear holocaust.[108]

In conclusion, Russell's philosophy of politics, i.e., the relation of his political philosophy to the other areas of his work, can now be seen in terms of each of the four stages of development in his political philosophy.

As an Imperialist Liberal, Russell has a political philosophy which is interconnected with his ethics and epistemology. Political judgements, ethical ideals, epistemological criteria and metaphysical first principles are intelligible only as a unit. Each branch of philosophy is completely dependent on every other branch; the interconnection of his Imperialist Liberalism to his cognitive organicism and synthetic idealism is of a rigorous logical nature.

As an Internationalist Liberal, Russell has a political philosophy which is externally connected to his

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[108] Human Society, op. cit., p. 200.

ethics and epistemology in the sense that Platonic ontology is the source of each of the three branches of philosophy. Political pronouncements, ethical judgements, epistemological propositions, and ontological universals are all items of knowledge capable of being true or false. Each branch of philosophy is based on Platonic ideas; the connection of his Liberal internationalism to his cognitive intuitionism and analytic realism is one of mutual dependency.

As an Internationalist Guild Socialist, Russell has a political philosophy which is co-related to his ethics and epistemology in the sense that psychology (or philosophical anthropology), which is a branch of technical philosophy, is the source of his political philosophy. Political pronouncements, ethical value judgements, epistemological propositions, and psychological facts all relate to philosophical anthropology. Both departments of philosophy depend upon empirical knowledge of human nature; the a priori element is abandoned. The relation of his Internationalist Guild Socialism to his non-cognitive emotivism and his analytic constructionism is of a methodological nature.

As an Internationalist Empiricist Liberal (and a Democratic Guild Socialist), Russell has a political philosophy which is externally connected to his ethics

and epistemology in the sense that ethical knowledge is possible; a science of politics is, therefore, possible. Political judgements, ethical propositions, psychological beliefs, and epistemological facts are all items of knowledge capable of being true or false. Each branch of philosophy follows the same structural procedure by appealing to fundamental definitions and postulates in order to justify scientific knowledge. The acceptance of the fundamental definitions and postulates has two preconditions: common sense and human survival. The connection of Russell's Empiricist Liberalism to his cognitive naturalism and analytic reconstructionism is one of mutual dependency and structural uniformity.

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