MAWLĀNĀ ABŪ-L-KALĀM ĀZĀD'S CONCEPT OF RELIGION AND RELIGIONS ACCORDING TO HIS TARJUMĀNU-L-QUR'ĀN: A CRITIQUE

by

Ernest Norman Hahn

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Sacred Theology

McGill University March 1965

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

> Which heaven will shade me and which earth will bear me if I speak about the book of God what I do not know?[1]

After the death of Sri Jawaharlal Nehru, it was reported that the Secretary of the Congress Parliament Party suggested that Nehru's portrait be placed in the only vacant panel in the Central Hall of Parliament along side the eleven portraits which had already been installed. It is not coincidental that one of these eleven panels bears the portrait of a Muslim, and it is even less coincidental that this portrait is of Abū-l-Kalām Āzād. As long as people remember the independence of India and the dramatic struggle to attain this independence, just that long will the memory of Āzād, who was so intimately associated with the Indian independence movement, burn bright in the minds and the hearts of people who study this movement.

In one respect at least the memory of Āzād holds even greater significance for the forty-seven million Muslims who now live in India after independence. He is remembered for his efforts to win a place for Muslims in secular India. This is not to suggest that all Muslims in India revere the name of Āzād; nor, for that matter, that all of them even have heard his name. Nor is this to

suggest that all Muslims in India who knew him are ready to follow along the path which he trod as a Muslim in India. Yet those who knew Āzād acknowledge him to be not only a genuine Indian patriot and a political figure of outstanding importance, but also a Muslim who was involved with the concerns of Muslims everywhere, (especially the concerns of that large remnant who remained in India after independence) and an Indian Muslim who lived as an Indian and as a Muslim in secular India. Voices of lesser Muslim figures in India even now arise and probably will continue to arise, pleading for a Muslim leader in India of the stature of Mawlānā Abū-l-Kalām Āzād.

In devoting his life to the independence of India, Āzād sought to motivate the Muslim community to strive for political independence. He attempted to offer an Islamic rationale for maintaining the unity of the nation and to create in them a spirit of brotherhood and cooperation with their fellow citizens who did not confess the faith of Islām. Few, if any, could foresee so clearly the catastrophe which awaited a divided India and could predict so accurately the plight of those millions of Muslims who remained in India after the partition of the country.

To avert the disaster of partition Āzād laboured in vain. As he foresaw, India after partition continues to suffer from this tragic division, and the plight of the

Muslims hardly has eased on this (or even the other side?) of the border because of communal struggles. Though, obviously, the problem is manifold, Āzād's concern was Islamic. He saw that the root of Muslim communal problems was basically an issue of Islamic theology. Yet even when the die was cast, Āzād continued to live optimistically as a Muslim and as an Indian in a country which was shorn of several of its limbs.

Not only Indian Muslims but all Indians who know Āzād have recognized him as a Muslim. Even more, however, Āzād is recognized by the Indian ʿulamāʾ as an ʿālim of the ʿulamāʾ. Few voices among them would dissent from this verdict. And though there be these voices, they conflict with the competent opinion of many a Muslim ʿālim in various parts of the Muslim world. Be it true or not that Āzād's Islamic theology was coloured by Gandhian principles or eclectic tendencies (but who can really prove this?), surely Āzād would assure us that his theology was Islamic and firmly rooted in the Qurʾān, that his theology moulded his political outlook, and that his politics served as only an handmaid to his Islamic theology. And this assurance he could probably defend.[2]

By virtue of his commentary, Tarjumānu-l-Qurʾān,[3] Āzād has gained the reputation of being one of the leading Muslim theologians on the sub-continent during the past

two centuries. His thesis in this commentary runs as follows: there is only one true religion; all religions are one in origin; therefore all religions are originally the true religion. Religions err insofar as they deviate from this true religion. The Qur'ān has come as a final revelation to confirm the truth of all previously-revealed religions and to summon men who have deviated from the truth to return to this original truth of their religions.

Āzād's thesis, of course, is by no means unique. Other Muslim scholars, especially on the sub-continent, have advanced a similar thesis, though perhaps with less emphasis on the corollary which Āzād derives from this thesis that the cardinal sin is to deviate from this truth. Positively speaking, however, Āzād has sought to support this thesis by an appeal to the modern science of comparative religions. In his effort to prove this thesis Āzād has penetrated beyond the thesis itself by venturing into the depths of this discipline's vast ocean. The tremendous expenditure of effort involved in this pursuit and the rich treasure of knowledge with which Āzād has emerged are open on the pages of his commentary for all to read. This venture itself as well as the product, if not unique, are nevertheless most unusual phenomena in learned Muslim circles. The value of Āzād's work is further enhanced when one recalls how deeply he immersed himself in the traditional disciplines of Islām also.

There is another reason of a more general, yet more critical, nature, which validates almost any attempt to write a thesis of this kind. As an Indian Muslim Āzād represents some two-fifths of the world's Muslim population, who dwell on the sub-continent, whose language is not Arabic, and whose culture, however religiously akin to the culture of the Arab Muslim Near East, is yet a different culture. Near-eastern and western scholars of Islām have paid proportionately little attention to this fact, though there are some notable exceptions. As evidence to this one might point to the quantitatively limited source materials on India in Gibb's small but classical Modern Trends in Islam.[4] Though it may be less convincing, it is still significant that one looks in vain for an article on Abū-l-Kalām Āzād in the new Encyclopaedia of Islam,[5] which, it may be hoped, will still be an improvement on its older edition in this respect also.[6]

One may concede the centrality of the Arab world in Muslim history and the continued need to study the past and present history of the Arab world. However, to state the matter succinctly if somewhat crudely by way of example, could not some of the scholars divert some of their attention from the Arabic works of Al-Ghazzālī to concentrate a while on lesser known areas of the Muslim

world: parts of Africa, Indonesia, the Urdū and Bengali speaking Muslim world, not to speak of the Muslims in South India who speak the Dravidian languages, about whom virtually no scientific studies have been made? And if it behooves scholars who study the Muslim world for primarily academic purposes to pursue more studies of the Muslim world east of the Persian Gulf, how much more is it incumbent upon Christians to study these living peoples and their cultures for reasons of their Lord!

As a justification for this thesis topic it may be said in sum:

1. Islamic scholars of the Arab and western worlds have not given enough attention to the non-Arab Muslim world.

2. As a Muslim and as an outstanding political and religious figure in Indian history, Āzād may be considered a good representative of a large segment of this non-Arab Muslim world.

3. As a Muslim theologian whose qualifications are recognized by Muslim theologians throughout the Muslim world, his thesis on religion and the unusual methodology which he has used to support his thesis demand a hearing among a larger number of Islamic scholars.

4. As far as I know, little has been published in the west on Āzād and his commentary.[7]

In dealing with the thought of Āzād in my thesis, I have limited myself primarily to Āzād's Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān. This does not suggest that his other works are void of theological references; nor does it suggest that there is no growth in Āzād's personal theology. Competent Muslim opinion indicates that his Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān is his opus magnum on theology and by far his most important theological legacy. Thus, it would seem Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān reflects most clearly the flowering of Āzād's theology, in spite of remarks in his other works which may indicate that Āzād has deviated from the thesis of his commentary. Otherwise how could Āzād have encouraged the translation of his work and have approved without qualification what had been prepared for publication in English just prior to his death?[8]

Though the heart of Āzād's thesis in Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān beats most fervently and perceptibly in his commentary on Sūratu-l-Fātiḥah, copious but frustratingly scattered references exist in the rest of the commentary which confirm, augment, clarify, and at times modify or even seem, at points, to contradict segments of his thesis. These references are indispensable for any proper evaluation of his thesis. Much of this extra commentary is based by necessity on the verses of the Qur'ān, and, at least insofar as the thesis is

related to genuine Quranic interpretation, is therefore more susceptible to critical test. In trying to consolidate and systematize the scattered threads of reference which seem to form the pattern of Āzād's thesis, I have tried to present Āzād's thesis as completely as possible in order to do him justice. This has involved the relatively easy task of setting forth Āzād's idea of what religion really is, as well as the more laborious task of spelling out what it is not. Thus, by necessity, the presentation of Āzād's thesis forms the main body of this thesis, a presentation which obviously calls for more patience than mental acumen, especially when one whose mother tongue is not Urdū attempts to decipher Āzād's fine kitābat and to overcome the occasional difficulties of defective lithography.

Nevertheless, to endorse the need to study Āzād's thesis is not to endorse everything that he says in support of his thesis. In this thesis I shall attempt to show that:

1. Āzād has established his Quranic thesis on the basis of the Qur'ān.

2. His doctrine of the God of religion, however, is not a complete reflection of either nature or the Qur'ān.

3. The science of comparative religions does not

lend conclusive proof to his theory of the devolution of man's original concept of God or to his theory of the evolution of man's concept of the attributes of God; nor does the Qur'ān offer solid evidence to support these theories.

4. Āzād has not demonstrated that all religions are one in origin.

5. Especially in his interpretations of other religions, Āzād operates with Quranic premises which do not accord with an objective study of these religions.

Having said this, however, I still am keenly aware of the far-flung areas into which Āzād has penetrated and the effort he has expended in developing his thesis. His research is worthy of emulation by others as well as by his fellow Muslims. I am still more keenly aware of my own incompetence to keep pace with him in his pursuit of knowledge. By reason of this incompetence, my critique is incomplete. It is governed by the trite, yet useful, saying that "discretion is the better part of valour," and in this instance by the even more applicable Arab maxim which cautions against "interpreting the unknown by the unknown."

Though this thesis hardly purports to fill in one of those gaping lacunae in our knowledge of the non-Arab Muslim world of which mention has been made, its

attempt at an initial systematization and critique of this important phase of Āzād's theological thought may serve as a stepping stone for a deeper, wider, and more scholarly presentation on this subject by someone who has access to the theses' files at the Institute of Islamic Studies in Montreal. With Laṭīf's translation of Āzād's commentary on Sūratu-l-Fātihah at hand and the promise of the rest of the commentary in the future, the task should be easier for those who do not know Urdū.

S. D. G.

INTRODUCTION

> My eleven companions in Ahmadnagar Fort were an interesting cross-section of India... Though I am grateful to all my companions, I should like to mention especially Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, whose erudition invariably delighted me but sometimes also rather overwhelmed me...[1]

Āzād's notorious reservation regarding his person has left us with little detail about his life.[2] Yet the facts available enable us to construct an outline of his life and offer us a rationale for his greatness as a superb Indian politician and as a scholar of Islamics.[3] Though for many Āzād is best known as a politician of upright character, it is the contention of many Muslims that he was and considered himself to be first and foremost a student of Islām and religion. With justice many Muslims would contend that Āzād's religious attitude shaped the destiny of his political outlook. His sincerity and purity of intention in the realm of politics can scarcely be questioned more than that of Islām's prophet, whose genuineness shines through the pages of the Qur'ān, the spirit of which Āzād continually imbibed throughout his life.[4]

Āzād (1888-1958) was born in Makkah of an Indian father of noble ancestry who had left India after the Mutiny.[5] About two years later, when the family moved to Calcutta, Āzād received instruction in traditional

Islamic learning at the feet of his father, a pīr, and other teachers. Though he did not study at al-Azhar, as is sometimes thought, his phenomenal progress in Islamic theology became proverbial.[6] Even in his early youth he attained proficiency as a writer and a lecturer. On one occasion he was described by Ḥālī as "an old head on young shoulders."[7] Through the Aligarh movement Āzād came to realize the need to broaden his intellectual horizons, but he rejected Sir Sayyid's path of cooperation with the British in favour of the nationalist movement which had as its immediate goal the expulsion of the British. Through his attacks against foreign rule which he published in al-Hilāl, he contributed greatly to the Lucknow Pact, which united the Congress and Muslim League parties for a time. Meanwhile, he announced his intention to publish his studies on the Qur'ān which were to comprise a simple translation of the Qur'ān, a commentary, and a prologemena. The first fruits of these studies appeared in his publication, al-Balāgh. His reputation as an ʿālim later precipitated the request issued by some one thousand of the ʿulamāʾ, including orthodox leaders from Dēōband and Lucknow gathered in Lahore from all parts of India, that he become the Imāmu-l-Hind.[8] Contending that this appointment would do the Muslim community more harm than good, Āzād rejected this request.[9]

In 1915 Āzād announced his intention to publish his Qur'anic studies in al-Balāgh. Only fifteen years later Volume I of the Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān appeared. There is little need here to detail the cause of the delay: his imprisonments, several confiscations of his papers and his manuscripts, his efforts at re-writing parts after his repeated requests for the return of his papers, which, when they finally were returned, were in a state of confusion, some being torn and others even lost. After fifteen months of jail following his arrest in 1921 and after viewing his ruined papers, Āzād could say:

> Never in my life was my patience so tried... This was the bitterest drop which the cup of events pressed to my lips, yet without complaint I drank it. Nevertheless I cannot deny that its bitterness clutches my throat to the present day.[10]

In spite of political pressures and physical weakness Āzād resumed the task. Volume I, which appeared in July, 1930, included the translation and notes of Chapters two to six of the Qur'ān preceded by a lengthy commentary on Sūratu-l-Fātiḥah which served as a natural prolegomena for the Qur'ān. Six years later Volume II appeared. Both volumes were revised during Āzād's incarceration in Ahmadnager in 1945.[11] The second volume includes a translation of chapters seven to twenty-three, fuller marginal notes, and a series of appendices

on various theological and historical subjects. According to a report a new Indian edition has now appeared in type. Several other editions are reported to have been issued in Pakistan also. Thus some three-fifths of Āzād's translation and exposition of the Qur'ān have appeared. In spite of Laṭīf's indication that the whole work has been completed, it is doubtful whether the matter not already printed will ever see the light of day.[12] Nevertheless, we may rest assured that in the two volumes available Āzād gives us an adequate expression of his understanding of the Qur'ān.[13] As indicated in the Preface, it would seem that Āzād espoused the opinion he held in his commentary as long as he lived.[14]

Āzād's Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān ranks as his greatest work. An Indian professor of Urdū has written:

> It will live for ever, both because of its new, humanistic interpretation of the Quran and of its graceful and vivid style. By any standards, it is a masterpiece and a monument amid the works of Urdu literature. It is the product of a mind which has come to maturity through many stages of development.[15]

True, some Muslims have deprecated its value by referring to it as the Congress commentary, just as others, through excess eulogy, may have exaggerated its uniqueness and excellence. Yet, on the basis of his commentary also, which has been influential in countries other than Pakistan and India, an Egyptian with justification has

said that "Abul Kalam was of the calibre of our own Mohamed Abdo."[16] A press tribute from Lahore says:

> Apart from his other works, his commentary on the Holy Quran is generally accepted, despite the fact that some do not agree with all his views, as a towering monument to its author's erudition and originality of thought, and it undoubtedly stands among the foremost interpretations of Islamic philosophy.[17]

Āzād harbours no doubt regarding his spiritual and academic qualifications for undertaking his commentary and offering his pearl of great price:

> For the past twenty-seven years I have been constantly concerned with the study of the Qur'ān. ... I can say that I have read most of the commentaries and books, published and unpublished. To the best of my ability I have covered all aspects of the Quranic sciences. In our present day, men distinguish between traditional and modern knowledge. I do not consider this distinction valid. Traditional knowledge I have received as an inheritance. Modern knowledge I have discovered through my own efforts. ...[18]
>
> From the beginning I have refused to be content with the legacy bequeathed to me through family, society, and education. The bonds of <u>taqlīd</u> have never fettered me and the thirst for knowledge has never forsaken me. ...
>
> Never have I been possessed with an assurance of heart which the thorns of doubt would not have pricked, nor with a confidence of spirit which all denial's temptations would not have penetrated. I have drunk the drop of poison also from every cup. ... When thirsty my thirst was not the thirst of others. When my thirst was satisfied, it derived its satisfaction from no common source. ...
>
> Distant the source from the road which <u>Khizar</u> trod
> We have quenched our thirst along a different path.
>
> After such extensive research, I have set forth in the pages of this book the manner in which I have

> understood the Qur'ān, and what I have understood from it.[19]

In Ghubār-i-Khātir Āzād details the struggles of his spiritual growth with greater clarity.[20] With a whole series of imprisonments forming the background, - involving about one-seventh of his life and which he compares with a sabbatical leave - Āzād discovered that philosophy's solutions to life's problems are negative. "Philosophy opens the door of doubt and cannot close it again."[21] The merciless determination of the physical world offers no comfort among the wares of its bazaar. "Science offers proof but cannot give faith."[22] If one wishes to repair the broken heart, he must repair to the way of religion and there find support for the back racked in pain.

> Religion (madhhab) offers us faith although it offers no proof. In order to live, not only proven facts are necessary; faith is also necessary.[23]

But what kind of religion?

> Without doubt faith based on the supernatural activities found in the old world of religion which hovered over our hearts and minds no longer suffices for us.[24]

Āzād clearly attests his dissatisfaction with and departure from the religious treasure which he inherited, as well as his venture along new paths even from his early youth. Significant especially is the course of Āzād's unrest:

> Initially I noted the diversity of schools within Islām. Their contradictory claims and clashing (conclusions) confused and confounded me. As I proceeded a little further, I noted wide-spread disputations within the soul of religion itself which added doubt to confusion and denial to doubt. Later when I viewed the field where flew the mutual banners of religion and science, what remaining faith I had I lost. Fundamental questions of life, which in ordinary circumstances we hardly remember, emerged one after another to confront my mind and heart. What is truth? Where is it? Does it exist? If it exists and it is one only (for there cannot be many truths) why are there diverse ways? Not only are there diverse ways, but why are they conflicting and clashing? Again, how is it that, in confronting all of these ways engaged in a war of strife and conflict among themselves, science stands holding its light of inflexible judgments and firm truths, and in its merciless light all the obscure shadows of tradition and antiquity, which men were accustomed to view as glorious and sanctified, disappeared one after another?
>
> This path always begins with doubt and ends in denial. Should one's pursuit of this path be blocked, nothing remains in one's hand except despair. ...[25] I too had to pass through these various stages, but I did not stop. My thirst did not wish to be content with despair. Finally after traversing many stages of confusion and bewilderment, I arrived at a place which revealed another world. Within these same deep shadows of superstition and fallacious ideas, I discovered a firm and illuminated path also which leads to the goal of faith and assurance and which, if there is to be found any trace of a source of rest and peace, precisely there it is to be found. The faith which I lost in the search of truth, I regained from this search itself. The reason of my malady finally proved itself to be a healing remedy.
>
> Through Laila I cured my passion for Laila
> As a wine-bibber cures himself with wine.[26]

The common thoroughfare which Khiḍar had forsaken was the path of <u>taqlīd</u>. He had discovered the true

faith.[27] True religion is not inherited religion, a geographical religion, a religion which finds a column in census papers (where, says Āzād at this point, Islām also should be included), nor a religion cast in the mould of ritual. Indeed, to distinguish religion from the religions, he calls religion "true religion" (haqīqī madhhab).[28]

Between true religion and true science there is no struggle. If both travel along different paths, they ultimately arrive at the same goal.[29] Only this religion leads positive support to the moral values of men's activities. It teaches men that "life is a duty to be fulfilled, a burden to be borne."[30]

If indeed true religion involves men in a restless struggle, it is because only within this restless struggle is rest to be found. Āzād considers that a couplet of a Persian poet exhausts the whole philosophy of life:

> We are waves, our rest is our death.
> We live by avoiding relaxation.[31]

Āzād himself encouraged the translation of his Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān. After several scholars undertook translations (which, however, did not satisfy Āzād), Āzād suggested through Dr. Sayyid Maḥmūd that ʿAbdu-l-Laṭīf undertake this task. Āzād lived to approve of Laṭīf's

translation of his commentary of the Sūratu-l-Fātihah which was later published in 1962.[32] Laṭīf also indicates that the remaining matter in the first two volumes awaits publication in English.[33]

Laṭīf correctly notes the difficulties involved and the liberties he has taken with the consent of Āzād in translating this work. To be sure, it is easy for one who has only compared the Urdū and English texts to suggest that Laṭīf perhaps has under-estimated the liberties he has taken. For a second edition parts of the translation could bear revision. Some transliterations and spellings of foreign vocabulary and proper nouns, with which neither the translator nor the publisher seem familiar, need correcting.[34] Yet these observations should not detract from the general value of his translation and a recognition of the difficulty involved in rendering Āzād's "arabized-persianized" Urdū into English.

CHAPTER I

RELIGION

> Everywhere in the world the way of the divine nature is one. It cannot be more than one, nor can it differ from itself. It was therefore necessary that from the very beginning this guidance be one, and address all men in a uniform manner. Accordingly the Qur'ān says: Regardless of their time or place, the way of all the prophets was one and all taught the one universal law of happiness of God.[1]

1. The Sources: The Qur'ān and the Traditions

Āzād bases his whole approach to religion on the Qur'ān. He assumes and maintains the traditional Muslim doctrine of the inspiration of the Qur'ān, notes that Muḥammad received the Qur'ān within a period of twenty-three years, appears to accept the finality of the text of the Qur'ān as it stands, the unity of each sūrah, the total unity of the Qur'ān, and to maintain little sympathy for any form of "higher" or "lower" criticism, Muslim or otherwise, regarding the text of the Qur'ān.[2] His exposition of religion and of men's deviation from the true religion is found primarily in his extended commentary on Sūratu-l-Fātihah, the mother of the Qur'ān, which he considers to be the essence of true religion.[3]

For Āzād the Qur'ān is the primary source of true religion. Yet to bolster his argument he frequently intersperses his commentary with Muslim traditions which he considers to be authentic.[4] In recognizing their

validity he observes, however, that they do not possess the authority of the Qur'ān which God has channeled through a prophet who, like all the prophets who have preceded him, is guileless (maʿsūm). While strongly defending the guilelessness of Abraham in opposition to the tradition which alleges that Abraham told three lies, Āzād says:[5]

> Doubtless, the tradition is in the ṣaḥīḥayn. Nevertheless, for thirteen hundred years no Musulmān has claimed that the traditionists are guileless. No one has considered that either Imām Bukhārī or Muslim is guileless. The best that can be said for any tradition is that it is sound. And by "soundness" is meant "soundness" in the technical sense of the word, not the absolute and infallible (qaṭʿī-o yaqīnī) "soundness" like the "soundness" of the Qur'ān. Hence no matter how well attested a tradition may be, its attestation in any case rests on the evidence of fallible (ghayr maʿsūm) men and the decision of fallible critics...
>
> ...The veracity and guilelessness of the noble prophets areamong religious and revelational certainties... Not for a moment can a fallible witness be allowed to be set in opposition to religious certainties. We will have to concede that this is not the saying of a prophet. Hence the traditionists definitely erred; and because of this admission, the heavens will not be split nor will the earth be torn asunder...
>
> ...Among all books after the Qur'ān which have been ordered for men, the best are the ṣaḥīḥayn, the collection of Bukhārī and the collection of Muslim...
>
> ...In every case the foundation is the Qur'ān. Its transmission is certain and its decisiveness beyond all doubt. Every human witness must be tested by it...[6]

2. The Abuse of the Sources

Generally Āzād has little to say positively about previous commentaries.[7] Quranic exegesis throughout the centuries is like a chain in which each succeeding link has become weaker. Various factors, like thick veils, have been imposed upon the Qur'ān to hide its truth: the tendency toward artificiality through confrontation with the civilizations of Iran and Rome, and the arts, sciences, and philosophy of Greece; the attempts to square it with modern science; the appeal to the Khalaf rather than to the Salaf and, at times, an inability to distinguish between them; the infiltration of Jewish legends and superstitions; deviation from the simplicity of the Qur'ān, its analogy of faith, or its simple theme, purpose, and logic; its non-technical and non-scientific vocabulary, language, style, and rhetoric; a reverence for taqlīd ("this murderous disease completely pervaded the body of tafsīr");[8] the general intellectual degeneracy of the people; and the attempt to compel the Qur'ān to conform to one's own idea, a danger which the Ashāb and Salaf, whom Āzād always respects, so strongly feared.

To arrive at the truth, Āzād finds himself compelled to penetrate a labyrinth of obstacles. Just how successful he has been, he adds, he cannot decide.

> Nevertheless I dare say that a new path of contemplative study of the Qur'ān has been revealed and intelligent men will find this path different from other paths which they hitherto have trod.[9]

3. The Proper Use and Logic of the Qur'ān

Āzād recalls that when the Qur'ān was delivered it addressed in a natural way men of simple nature who were unaffected by artificiality and the complexities of philosophy and science.[10] If men wish to understand the Qur'ān they must remember its original context and endeavor to grasp its simple logic (istidlāl) and vocabulary as the companions of Muḥammad so easily did.

Basic to the logic of the Qur'ān is its appeal to human nature, to man's instinct, senses, conscience, and reason.[11] The Qur'ān summons men to reason, to reflect, and to meditate upon creation in order that they may understand themselves and their surroundings aright.[12]

4. The Attributes of God

(a) Their presence in the physical world. As men reason and reflect, what conclusions do they draw? Within the confines of his commentary on Sūratu-l-Fātiḥah Āzād suggests that through reflection men discover the order, the beauty, and the balance of nature.[13] The order, the beauty and the balance of nature, which are manifestations of the creator's attributes point men to God, who is Lord,

merciful, and just; and direct men to praise him.[14] In this way the Qur'ān "created a rational conception of the worship of God."[15]

(i) Rubūbīyat. As men ponder the creation, they note that provision exists to meet every need of every creature at every time and at every place according to the fixed laws of nature.[16] Not only is everything provided with concern and love; every creature possesses the ability to utilize the goods of this world to satisfy its needs. This unity of law and order in creation and this presence of a perfect and flawless rubūbīyat indicates to man the presence of a perfect and flawless provider who is alone creator and Lord of all.[17]

(ii) Rahmat. As men continue to reflect and as their knowledge advances, they also take cognizance of the beauty and harmony which pervade the totality of the creation.[18] True, life is a struggle, yet a struggle relished by men.

> If the life of men were free from all these difficulties, he would feel deprived of all life's delicacies, and to remain alive (would be) an unbearable burden.[19]

Similarly, to break the monotony, life offers variety and change. Everything has its counterpart: night and day, man and woman, life and death, etc.[20]

What men normally call the survival of the fittest, the Qur'ān designates as the survival of the

useful.[21] All the various elements within nature strive for perfection in such a manner that the good survives and the evil is erased. Even the delay in the process of removing evil is a gracious offer to allow evil to be rectified and good to become better.[22] The destruction involved in this constructive process is itself constructive.[23]

Though philosophy recognizes the presence and need of the beautiful and balanced creation, philosophy fails to answer why the need of this law has been imposed upon creation.[24] But, says the Qur'ān, inherent within men is an ability to understand that such beautiful and harmonious perfection in nature operates as a manifestation of God's rahmat, of which, Āzād adds, rubūbīyat is a part.[25] Again the order and harmony of creation, like a factory whose production serves the interests of men, direct men to recognize God, his unity, and his mercy. Of all God's attributes, none is so emphasized and so pronounced as his attribute of mercy. Thus, Āzād says:

> It can be said that the Qur'ān, from the beginning to the end, is nothing but the message of divine mercy.[26]
>
> The Qur'ān's conception of all religious beliefs and practices appointed for men rests solely on mercy and love.[27]

(iii) ʿAdālat. Less explicit, at least in Āzād's exposition, is the justice apparent in creation.[28]

As various aspects of nature possess certain qualities, so they must produce results in accordance with these qualities.[29] The law of justice maintains order and beauty in creation, and serves to eliminate deficiencies therein according to its own nature, not because of an arbitrary divine displeasure. Thus it complements the qualities of rubūbīyat and rahmat, and operates for the good of man according to the demand of mercy, and regulates the balanced relationship between the heavenly spheres to preserve the universe from chaos.[30]

(b) Their indication of the unity of God. For Āzād, it is extremely important for men to realize that all these manifestations of the divine attributes in the physical world point to the existence of one God, Allāh, in whom dwell these attributes of rubūbīyat, rahmat, and ʿadālat.[31] Herein is to be found the distinctive logic of the Qurʾān and its natural appeal to men. According to Āzād, these three attributes comprehend the totality of God's attributes or his beautiful names.[32]

(c) Their indication of revelation. These attributes which are visible in the physical world are apparent in the spiritual world also.[33] For those who reflect and reason, the purpose, provision, order, mercy, beauty, and justice which govern the physical world govern the spiritual world also. He who provides rain for the parched earth and light to expel darkness, provides water

for spiritual thirst and light for spiritual darkness so that, as the useful survives in the physical order, truth triumphs over error in the spiritual order.[34]

Within this context of God's concern for man, Āzād deduces from the Qur'ān the need for spiritual revelation as the highest form of God's guidance for man.[35] This guidance acts as a corrective to the limitations of man's reason, as man's reason corrects his sense perception and his instincts.[36] More specifically, God precipitates this mercy of revelation by sending prophets who, though they be different from one another and though they channel the message in different languages at different times and under different circumstances, yet channel a message whose essence is one and is for all.[37] In this way the message channeled through a prophet is always a confirmation of the preceding message.[38]

(d) Their indication of life after death. Within this same context, the Qur'ān in its natural manner deduces the obvious necessity of life after death.[39] Since survival of the useful also encompasses the spiritual realm, this total purpose in creation indicates the necessity of life after death for man.

> For it cannot be that the supreme creation of this temporal universe be created only to be created and after living a short period of time become extinct.[40]

To buttress his argument, Āzād draws a similar conclusion from the language of science and the evolutionary process of nature engaged for millions of years in preparing the noblest creation of this temporal universe, a conclusion which for Āzād is logical.

> It is as if the totality of being and events which adorned the earth from its creation to the perfection of human development is an account of the growth and perfection of man.
>
> ...If, in the past, life has continued to progress through a perpetual series of changes, why should not this change and evolution continue in the future also? If we are not surprised that in the past all forms of life have been obliterated and new forms of life have appeared, why should we be surprised that the obliteration of our present life too is not a complete obliteration and is superseded also by a higher life?[41]

5. The Nature of Revelation

(a) Al-dīn. Our prime concern here centers around Āzād's understanding of God's revelation for men. If, as he says on the basis of the Qur'ān, God through a multitude of prophets who appeared at various times and places has conveyed one and the same revelation to all people, regardless of their nationality, race, or colour, what then is the nature of this revelation? According to Āzād, the very foundation of the Quranic summons upon which all other Quranic doctrine rests, and apart from which its entire structure collapses, is "the universal guidance of revelation called al-dīn, that is, the true

religion for mankind."[42] It is also called al-Islām, because "Islām means to acknowledge and to obey."[43]

Āzād first discusses this critical concept of dīn in some detail in his exposition of maliki yawmu-d-dīn.[44] After briefly surveying its significance in Arabic and several cognate languages, he derives from al-dīn the basic meaning of "requital and recompense" (badlah-o mukāfāt) in the sense that reward is the lawful recompense of works, not an imposition which God lays upon man according to his arbitrary wrath or pleasure. Hence,

> The word al-dīn is used for religion and law (madhhab-ō qānūn) because the basic belief of religion is belief in the recompense of works, and the basis of law rests on retribution.[45]

> What is the universal law of happiness? It is the law of faith and good works: Devotion to the Lord of the universe and a life of good works. Any so-called religion other than this or in conflict with this is not the teaching of the true religion.[46]

In support of this contention, Āzād quotes the following Quranic verse:

> Righteousness is not that you turn your faces (in prayer) towards the east or the west; but righteousness is this, that one believeth in God, in the Last Day, in the angels, in the Books and in the Prophets, and for the love of God giveth of his wealth to his kindred and to the orphans and to the needy and to the way-farer, and to those who ask and to effect the freedom of the slave, and observeth prayer and payeth the poor-one and is of those who are faithful to their engagements when they have engaged in them, and endureth with fortitude poverty, distress, and moments of peril--these are they who are true in their faith and these are they who are truly righteous.[47]

To this Āzād, perhaps with slight agitation and disgust, adds:

> For thirteen hundred years, this verse has been in the Qur'ān. If the world cannot understand the basic objective of its summons, what then can it understand?[48]

Elsewhere the Qur'ān designates al-dīn as the truth of God, the straight path (sirātu-l-mustaqīm), the dīn-i hanīf, the way to which Abraham summoned, the natural religion, the straight path in which there is no crookedness or deviation, the way which demands obedience to the laws ordained by God, the religion which Jacob inherited and bequeathed to his sons upon his death bed, the religion which all prophets have instructed mankind to uphold, the way of salvation and happiness for all who heed its message, and the religion which knows no change nor variation and is the common heritage of all.[49]

While discussing the significance of maʿrūf and munkar, Āzād appeals to the common factors in all religions which are acknowledged as good and evil, no matter what variations may exist otherwise among these religions.[50]

> All agree that it is good to tell the truth and that to lie is evil. All agree that piety is good and that impiety is evil. No religion disputes that honouring father and mother, proper treatment of one's neighbour, concern for the poor, and justice for the oppressed are good deeds... All of the world's religions, ethics, wisdom, and communities, however they may vary in other matters, are of one accord concerning these works.

> According to the Qur'ān the works which men have recognized as good are these which dīn-i ilāhī enjoins upon men. Similarly dīn-i ilāhī prohibits those works which generally are rejected and which all religions agree are evil. Since this fact is a basic truth of religions, there can be no dispute about this matter...[51]

Thus Āzād appears to reduce the ethics of religion to a religious lowest common denominator. As clarity characterizes all laws of God, similarly religion, if it is for the guidance of man, will be necessarily easy to believe and to practise, free from mystery and complexity.

> The whole body of beliefs and practices can be summarized in these words: Faith and good works. Its night too is as bright as its day.[52]

(b) Variations in religion. Āzād recognizes, however, that variations in religions do exist.[53] These variations he divides into two categories: 1. Variations which are in fact not characteristic of the religions themselves, but which the erring devotees of religions have fabricated by deviating from the true teaching of religion within their religions. 2. Variations which actually are present in the religions as ordinances and rites, of which form of worship is an example. Such variations do not affect the religion (dīn) of all religions as they were originally manifested.

For the moment we are concerned with the second category. Āzād states that there are two types of teaching

in the Qur'ān: the first, which constitutes the essence or the spirit of the Qur'ān and which is therefore of primary importance, is dīn; the second, which constitutes externals and which is therefore of secondary importance, is shar^{c} or minhāj and nusk. Since dīn pervades all religions, the variations which exist in the various religions by virtue of shar^{c} and minhāj should not evoke strife among the devotees of these religions.

In fact, such variations are necessary. They accord with the variations of environment in which men of various climes and ages have lived and with the variations in the stages of men's development in history.

> For every age and country God has ordained a special form (of worship) which suitably conformed to man's situation and need. ...Had God willed, he would have made a unified nation and community of all mankind, and no variation of thought or practice would have appeared; but we know that God did not so wish. His wisdom demanded that various states of thought and practice be created...[54]

This in part serves as Āzād's exegesis of the following verses in the Qur'ān:

> For every one of you (that is, for the followers of every call) we have appointed a special sharī^{c}at and way. Had God willed (there would have been no variation of 'laws'), he would have made you all one community. But there is a variation in order that (according to every time and circumstance) you may be tested through the ordinances which have been given to you. Therefore, (do not fall a prey to this variation) try to emulate each other on the paths of righteousness. (5:48)[55]

(c) The tolerance and unity of religion. Since, then, all religions in origin contain the truth and are pervaded with the same spirit, and since the existing variations in religions do not affect the essentials of religion, the Qur'ān enjoins tolerance towards the followers of other faiths and forbids forceful and coercive techniques in summoning others to its religion.[56]

> And had your Lord wished, all men on earth would have believed (but you see that it was the decision of his wisdom that every man walk according to his own understanding and on his own way). Then do you wish to compel people that they would become believers? (10:99)[57]

On several occasions the Qur'ān even praises adherents of other religions who, because of their firm faith and righteous deeds, have preserved the true spirit of their religion. It encourages others who have deviated to return to their own religion.[58] For as God is one, so God in the Qur'ān invites scattered mankind into the unity of religion to become as a united brotherhood, as "one family of the Lord of the universe," and as a people who hate sin yet not the sinner.[59] In this unity of religion and holy relationship with God, men can discover the corrective for all human divisiveness and the true source of their salvation, contentment, and happiness.[60]

CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION

> The conception of God is always the axis of the spiritual and moral life of man.[1]

1. Introduction

Āzād has deemed it necessary to offer us a brief history of religion in order that we may understand religion aright and grasp more fully the purpose of the Qur'ān as the culmination of religious revelation.[2] His discussion centers around man's conception of the divine unity and the attributes of God in relation to the law of evolution, the consequences thereof, and finally the Quranic corrective. In the preface to the second edition he notes the vast expenditure of thought devoted to the subject of God's attributes in philosophical and religious circles, the complexity of the subject, the delicacy of mind required for penetrating its intricacies, and the severe doubt and distress which he suffered as a student at the hands of this subject until he ultimately uncovered the futility of scholastic disquisitions and discovered the way of the Qur'ān from which its early expositors refused to deviate.[3]

2. The Origin of Man's Concept of God

Āzād recognizes the common principle of causation as the source of change and progress.[4] "The

law of evolution operates throughout creation including the mind and body of man."[5] With the theory of material evolution as their premise for the law of spiritual evolution, the nineteenth century scholars of the History of Religions propounded a series of theories which attempted to demonstrate the evolution of religion from its primitive stages to its more modern manifestations. Whatever their theories were and however they differed, all seemed to agree that monotheistic religion is the outcome of a long course of human development.[6]

But things changed in the twentieth century. With Professor W. Schmidt and his book, The Origin and Growth of Religion, Facts and Theories as his chief authority, Āzād, tolling the bell as post-World War I scholarship dealt the death blow to these nineteenth century theories, attempts to show that primitive man's original concept of religion centered in the recognition of one supreme God and that only later was this concept beset by aberrations.[7]

> With respect to the existence of God it appears that the situation is completely reversed. Instead of evolution, a kind of law of devolution and retrogression operates. As we trace the history of earliest man he appears to retreat rather than to advance.[8]

Man originally conceived of God as an invisible supreme being and creator of all. Only gradually did man

construct and worship idols.[9]

To confirm this contention Āzād selects the primitive tribes of Australia and the Pacific Islands which have preserved the concept of the supreme being and creator of all; the ancient Egyptians, who worshipped the invisible God, Osiris, who according to the ancient Book of the Dead is called the good, the gloriously worshipped, the original king, and the lord of the after-life; the Sumerians and the Akkadians who worshipped the invisible creator of the sun and the moon rather than these created objects themselves; the pre-Aryans of Mohenjadaro who worshipped one god called Ūn, the ruler of all, the eternally awake, under whose fixed laws all powers operate; and the Semitic tribes, who, as soon as they emerged from Arabia, discovered within themselves a belief in a unique being, an invisible god.[10] Āzād further appeals to some writings of Plato and to the Genesis account of Adam in which, he says, Adam is portrayed as originally living a "paradisiacal life of guidance." He slips and then loses this life.[11] In Āzād's own words:

> The results of modern scholarly research completely agree with the interpretations of the holy writings of the world's religions. All religious traditions--of Egypt, Greece, Chaldea, India, China, and Iran--speak of an age in the beginning when mankind was not acquainted with error and grief and lived a life of natural guidance.[12]

And this is exactly what the Qur'ān says:

> In the beginning all men were of one group (that is, they had not gone astray on various paths). Then they fell into variation. (10:19)
>
> In the beginning all men were of one group (that is, they were on the one path of natural guidance. Then afterwards variations were created). Then Allāh sent prophets one after another. They gave the good news of the results of good works. They warned of the evil results of evil works. With them he sent the scriptures also so that they might decide the matters concerning which the people differed. (2:213)[13]

Thus Āzād concludes:

> Belief in the existence of God was not a product of man's intellect so that it should change in conformity with the changes of (his) intellect. It was an intuitive perception of his nature, and with intuitive perceptions neither the influences of the intellect can interfere nor can changes arise within them through external influences.[14]

3. Man's Concept of the Attributes of God: A General Survey

Yet through evolution we may perceive the development in the human conception of God's attributes, since such development is not divorced from the evolutionary process. To be sure, man has an innate belief in God, "but the human intellect is powerless in comprehending the Absolute."[15] And here the tragedy begins.

Nature has instilled within man a compulsion to confess God.[16] Then man through his intellect seeks to comprehend God in his essence. Little does he realize his

state of self delusion or the obstacles in the way of understanding: His intellect is bounded by his senses, and his senses are bounded by their natural and environmental limitations, difficulties which are further aggravated in the life of primitive man, whose mental concepts are correspondingly primitive. Thus, in his effort to comprehend God in his essence, he comprehends only God's attributes and, of God's attributes, only those which he can imagine within his limitations. He believes that his image of God is God, yet it is always a reflection only of his own restricted ideas. In this way man's intellect interferes with his natural propensity to worship God. Out of his distorted concept of God emerge the gods whom he makes in his own image and whom he associates with God. This concept, to be sure, in time matures and is purified, yet is in need of divine guidance.

To save men from this tragedy, God has given man, through a series of prophets, the guidance of divine revelation conforming to the capacity of those addressed.

> The method of teaching man the attributes of God which the prophets chose operated within the confines of this chain of development; indeed it provided its various links.[17]

It is possible, says Āzād, to examine all the intellectual elements involved in this process and to determine their innumerable characteristics. In sum, however, the following three characteristics comprehend

the total evolutionistic process from beginning to end, from the imperfect to the perfect:

> There is a development from (1) tajassum to tanzīh,[18] (2) polytheism to monotheism, (3) the attributes of qahr and jalāl to rahmat and jamāl.[19]

Because of the immaturity of man's mind in the early period of his life, man conceived of God in an anthropomorphic manner and initially assigned to him the attribute of anger.[20] Why? Simply because in this world the veil of destruction conceals the constructive nature of the world. Beset by the limitations of infancy and confronted by violent and easily perceptible eruptions in nature, such as the storm, hail, volcano, earthquake, floods, etc.; unarmed and impotent, unable to subdue a hostile environment of vicious insects and wild animals; confronted by this veil of strife, man responded by attributing to God the qualities of terror and vengeance, qualities which he thought to be the source of punishment inflicted upon him. Man failed to pierce the veil of qahr and jalāl to view the less perceptible attribute of justice which permeates the world and lends a positive significance to the attributes of qahr and jalāl. As man developed, he discovered the elements of hope and mercy in the universe which correspondingly altered his concept of God. Yet, as he worshipped God, he continued to

associate with God his images of terror, manifestations of which are so evident in ancient Greece and India.

4. Man's Concept of the Attributes of God in the Various Religions

After broadly depicting the problem and the sad results of man's intellectual efforts to comprehend God and his attributes, Āzād briefly summarizes the attitudes of the various world religions relevant to God and his attributes, and their empirical manifestations just prior to the time of the Qur'ān.

(a) The Chinese concept. For a long period of time the Chinese preserved their original "simple and unambiguous" concept of the divinity from intellectual intrusion.[21] Gradually, however, their concept attained the form of a colourful picture. From antiquity, along with the local gods the Chinese believed in a celestial being whose glory and supremacy they indicated by pointing to the sky. For the Chinese the sky served as a symbol of beauty and grace, anger and terror. Hence, these attributes characterized the celestial being. A Chinese poet expresses the confusion arising from the paradoxical (mutadadd) acts of the deity:

> How is it that your acts lack uniformity and harmony?
> You grant life and yours the lightning flashes of destruction.[22]

In addition, every Chinese family practised ancestor worship. Religious codes established about 500 B.C. proclaiming the way of happiness and the rights and duties of man did not alter the current theology. In fact, ancestral worship developed into a belief in the ability of ancestors to intercede with God and the ultimate establishment of a multiplicity of deities.[23]

Āzād also notes the prevalence of sacrifice in the forms of offering and atonement presented to gain one's object, and to seek the favour of God and protection from his anger; a trend of mysticism which, though it deepened religious and moral concepts and heightened intellectual refinement, scarcely affected the general populace; and the eventual spread of Mahayana Buddhism, which accommodated itself to its new environment and which filled the temples of China, Korea and Japan with idols of the Buddha.[24]

(b) The Indian Concept. Within the complex context of contradictory Indian conceptions of the divinity, two main trends are discernible: a philosophy of tawhīd and religion in practice.[25] The former, cultivated by the elite, attained intellectual heights which are found in no other ancient concepts of the divine. The latter, practised by the hoi polloi, involved the worship of all aspects of nature and sank into the lowest depths of degradation.

The hymns of the Rig Veda evidenced the gradual spread of anthropomorphism and nature worship and the gradual emergence of a concept of one supreme being who is creator of all. Whether this latter concept be a remnant of antiquity or a product of evolution, it is nevertheless possible to detect a concept of tawhīd in ancient times.

Time was when the number of gods ran into "three hundred and thirty-five or some such three-digit figure."[26] Then faith concentrated on three aspects of nature: earth, atmosphere, and heaven; then on the lord of lords (henotheism); then on one supreme ruler. Finally, out of all this crystallized a concept of the creator of the whole universe who, though one and though called by various names, cannot be identified with any particular aspect of nature.

> He is 'Eikam Sat', the unique reality, the truth. It is this unity which appears within the total multiplicity of the universe.[27]

Upon these foundations Indian thought formulated the pantheism of the Upanishads and erected the massive structure of Vedantic metaphysics.[28] Pantheistic belief, founded on inspired visions of the Absolute, either completely avoided speculation on the divine attributes or restricted it to negative attributes, since, it held, all positive attributions are derived out of our finite minds, and are, therefore, personal and relative and

cannot be attributed to the Absolute without losing the Absolute in the process. A poet summarizes the matter thus:

> A difficult task it is, for every atom is he
> It is difficult to indicate him.[29]

Only when the Upanishads clothed the Absolute (Brahma) in the veil of personality (Īshwar) did they ascribe attributes to this being.[30] Yet, however many and beautiful these attributes and however great this concept of God and the later heights to which Vedantic philosophy attained, polytheism, so deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, continued to contaminate the concept of tawhīd. Nor was there a pure belief in God "in the unity of attributes" corresponding to belief in God "in the unity of essence." The firm religious compromise which evolved out of this situation Āzād describes as "monotheistic polytheism," a compromise encouraged by the gnostic elite themselves who considered the worship of the gods as an initial step in their approach to truth.[31]

Āzād also compares the relative rôles played by these inferior powers in Aryan and Semitic theology. While Semitic religions considered them as created and ministering beings, the Aryans considered them as gods possessing an independent authority to plan and to act. Even when the concept of tawhīd deprived them of their independence and divinity, they continued to operate as mediators, since direct access to God was impossible. And

though the devotee's worship be directed to God, it was directed to the divine through them and from their sanctuaries.

> In truth it is this doctrine of mediation and intercession which everywhere has vitiated true confidence in the one God. Yet no one denied the uniqueness and supremacy of God.[32] The Qur'ān has noted the identical doctrine, which the Arab idolators in the age of jāhilīyat espoused. 'They say: 'We serve them only that they may bring us near to God.'[33]

Because shirk in its various forms contributed to a belief in so many gods and the worship of idols, it became almost impossible for the honest seeker to discover the concept of unity or to remain unaffected by the idolatrous worship of the general populace. It was this complex situation, so involved in paradox and contradiction, which perplexed the minds of foreign scholars who visited India and which Hindu scholars and others have explained by appealing to the varying aptitudes in man.

(c) The Buddhist concept. Buddhism, which succeeded Brahmanism, was the common religion in India when Islām first made its appearance.[34] There are various interpretations of Buddhist doctrine including a nineteenth century view deriving it from the Upanishads and centering it in the teaching that man's spirit returns to Nirvana (perfect salvation) from where it came. Contemporary scholarship, however, generally acknowledges

the absence of any concept of God or of the spirit and limits it to doctrinal considerations regarding the problems of happiness and salvation, the obliteration of the ego (Nirvana) and escape from life's cycle.

Though doubtless later Buddhist thinkers were agnostics and even atheists, it cannot be proved from the Buddha's silent reservations and their interpretations that the Buddha shared these views.

> If we examine all the statements directly attributed to him, we feel that he did not negate the essence of God; he negated God's attributes. To negate (God's) attributes, however, is to paralyze all human intellectual and verbal expression (of God) and leaves one with no alternative other than silence.[35]

To support this thesis, Āzād recalls the Buddha's great efforts to uproot the evils of a deeply entrenched idolatry and to direct men away from Brahmanism to "the knowledge and practice of truth, that is, Ashtang Marg."[36] Later a complete denial (of God?) emerged out of the movement which rejected idolatry.[37]

> In any case, whatever may be the Buddha's own attitude and teaching or his expositors' explanations of his teaching, the fact remains that his followers quickly filled the vacated throne of the divine concept. On the throne which they saw vacant they enthroned the Buddha himself and initiated the worship of this new deity so vigorously that his idols occupy more than half the world.[38]

In spite of the Buddha's final testament, which indicated only his humanity, a series of councils distorted

the simplicity of his message and initiated a belief in his superhuman personality which Āzād compares with the doctrine of the Christian Trinity. His followers claimed that within his personality there are three beings: his being as a teacher, his being in the world, and his true being, which resides in heaven and of which his worldly manifestations are reflections. To be saved is to be with the Buddha in heaven.

Āzād also notes the two great divisions existing among the Buddhists and adds:

> At present, apart from Ceylon, where a disfigured remnant of Hinayana Buddhisn, called Tharavada, exists, the religion of all the Buddha's disciples is Mahayana.39

(d) The Iranian concept. Prior to Zoroaster, the religion of the Medes and the Persians, resembling in certain aspects the Vedic religion of India, divided the world's spiritual forces into two divisions: those spirits of light who dispensed blessing to man and those dark spirits of evil who plagued the world with trouble and destruction.[40] Fire was worshipped on altars which were served by devotees called "magōsh."[41]

Zoroaster delivered Iran from the bondage of these old beliefs.[42] He supplanted polytheism with the worship of one god, Ahura Mazda, who is unique, incomparable,

light, holy, wise, good, the creator of the universe, this world and the afterworld. According to his teaching, the holy perishes, the spirit remains, and man is rewarded according to his works. He considered those powers formerly classified as gods to be angels who acted according to Ahura Mazda's will and the power of evil and darkness to be Angrāme Nīyūsh (Satan), called Ahriman in the Zend language.

According to Āzād, Cyrus, who was a younger contemporary of Zoroaster, first promulgated and established Zoroastrianism in Iran.[43] Yet he served in an even greater capacity. For, according to Āzād, he was called to be a prophet, a conclusion which Āzād arrives at on the basis of Greek historians, several of the prophetic books of the Old Testament, and primarily the Qur'ān through his identification of Dhū-l-Qarnain with Cyrus.[44]

After some centuries, however, ancient influences began to corrupt the pure religion, so much so that at the time of the Sassanids the religion was compounded of Magian, Greek, and Zoroastrian elements, which especially manifested themselves in ritual, dualistic teaching, and the worship of the sun and fire. It is this religion which Islām encountered in Iran and which the Parsis brought with them to India.[45]

> As the Christianity of Rome could not be safe-guarded from the reaction of ancient Roman

> idolatry, so Zoroaster's pure teaching of devotion to God could not withstand the ancient Magian religion. Especially in the Sassanid era, when it was re-edited, the resultant product differed radically from the original teaching.[46]

(e) The Judaic concept. Though the Judaic concept of God progressed to the point where II Isaiah is able to refer to God as the God of all nations, nevertheless from the beginning the Judaic representation of God has been national or family (naslī) in character.[47] This trait it has always preserved, and in this form it was confronted by Islām.

The Jewish concept of God, which hovered between tajassum and tanzīh, emphasized the attributes of wrath and vengeance. The Tawrāt in its primitive style constantly portrays God as assuming some shape or as possessing the same characteristics and passions as those whom he addresses, or as a jealous husband who can forgive all except the faithless character of his wife, Israel, whom he severely punishes for her immoral behaviour.[48]

> No matter how effective and poetic this parabolic language may appear externally, there is no doubt that in relation to God it is a static concept of a primitive stage.[49]

Elsewhere in contrasting the Quranic and Old Testament concepts of God's attributes, Āzād cites samples of Old Testament anthropomorphisms: Abraham sees God at

the oak of Mamre; Jacob wrestles with God; God is angered, acts hastily, and then regrets it; God mourns and is pained; God assumes a form and descends; all these and other analogies are used in spite of the fact that Judaism opposed idolatry.

(f) The Christian concept. II Isaiah, however, did introduce new elements into the Judaic concept of God which set the stage for Christianity with its message of mercy, love, and forgiveness.[50] The concept of God as a loving and tender father displaced the old concepts which portrayed God as a tyrannical king or an angry and jealous husband.

> Among all human relationships, the relationship of mother and father is the most exalted. Such a relationship, so completely permeated by mercy, kindness, and loving care, is not obstructed by lustful and passionate concerns which mark the husband and wife relationship. Though the children will commit faults, the mother will never turn her back and the father will still forgive. If, then, when conceiving of God there is no escape from the analogy of human relationships...[51]

According to Āzād, Christ was compelled to use such anthropomorphic language. Out of this language men constructed the doctrine of Christ's sonship.[52]

Elsewhere Āzād discusses at some length the relative New Testament and Quranic teaching about mercy within the context of God's attribute of mercy.[53] Though

the Qur'ān, according to Āzād, does not teach man to love his enemy and though the Injīl does teach man to love his enemy, the message of both is still the same.

The message of Christ, says Āzād, has its setting in and serves as an antidote to the moral depravity and ritual extravagance so prevalent among the Jews and their neighbouring nations. Christ therefore emphasized "the moral sacrifices of love and forgiveness" as we find this message in the Sermon on the Mount.[54]

But at this point we are faced with another tragedy. Both the unsympathetic critics and the naive followers of Christ's message have done Christ a great injustice by considering this message as legislation and hence impracticable. The message is even completely contrary to the character and capacity of human nature, others would add.

The Qur'ān, however, cannot admit that the message of Christ is impracticable and contrary to human nature. Such an admission entails rejecting the truth of the teaching of Christ which, the Qur'ān insists, it confirms, as it confirms the teachings of all prophets. To acknowledge the validity of these objections is also to distinguish between the prophets, a distinction which the Qur'ān strongly rejects.[55]

By interpreting the message of Christ literally, the followers of Christ thereby lost the total figurative significance of his message and engulfed themselves in a series of critical misunderstandings.

> Wherever Jesus told men to love their enemies, he certainly did not mean that every man must become a devoted lover of his enemies. His meaning was simply this: within your heart there must be flowing passions of love and mercy rather than anger, hate and revenge...
>
> Or, for example, if he said: 'If someone slaps your cheek, then turn the other,' certainly he did not mean that one literally should turn the other cheek. Obviously this means that one should cultivate forgiveness rather than revenge... If we interpret this manner of figurative speech in a literal manner, we will not only pervert all inspired doctrine; we will distort totally all literary and rhetorical expression which is found in every language of the world.[56]
>
> Thus, if Christ emphasized total mercy and forgiveness rather than punishment, he did not do this in order to introduce new legislation against the idea of punishment. He sought to save men from the grave error into which they had fallen through their techniques of meting out excess punishment. He sought to teach the world that the foundation of all human activity rests on mercy and love, not punishment and revenge. If punishment is permitted, it can only be practiced because there is no other remedy, not because your hearts have become nests of hatred and revenge rather than of mercy and love.
>
> The disciples of the Mosaic law fashioned the law into an instrument of punishment only. Christ explained that the law comes not to punish but to show the way of salvation, and the way of salvation is purely the way of mercy and love.[57]

All the religions have taught men to distinguish between the deed and the doer. Though they have taught men to detest sin, they have never taught men to detest the sinner. To illustrate that Christ proclaimed this same teaching, Āzād recalls several incidents in the Gospels. And to show that the teaching of the Qur'ān harmonizes with the New Testament concept of a loving father and son, Āzād, in citing the following Quranic verses, calls special attention to the force of the "my":

> O, my servants, who have transgressed to your own hurt! (39:54)[58]

> Was it ye who led them, my servants, astray! (25:18)

Perhaps Āzād in quoting a tradition is more successful in his attempt at a harmonization:

> God prefers the humility of the sinner to the audacity of the pious.[59]

In quoting a poem, he is still more successful:

> Beggars are unaware of this fact
> That the king of the world is with us today.[60]

Āzād climaxes this discussion with an observation relevant to his theory of progress. The fundamental teaching of the Messiah and the Qur'ān is the same, he claims, though occasions and styles differ.

> Christ only emphasized morals and purity of heart because of the existence of the Mosaic law which he did not wish to change in the least. It was incumbent upon the Qur'ān, however, to proclaim simultaneously both moral and legal injunctions. Hence, it naturally shows a style which avoided metaphor and ambiguity and presented its laws and precepts in a clear and well-balanced fashion.[61]

Thus all religions recognize the need for forgiveness and retaliation governed by justice. Though retaliation, in itself, is an evil, yet it remains an indispensable procedure in certain situations as a preventative against greater evil. According to the Qur'ān it can be practised only against those who violently oppose the believers.[62]

Yet for Āzād the Christian concept of God hovers between tajassum and tanzīh, as in Judaism.[63] Later, Christianity, confronted by Roman idolatry, developed the doctrines of the Trinity, the atonement, and the deity of Christ. Orthodox Christians, who rejected the worship of idols, practiced Christolatry and Mariolatry. This form of monotheistic polytheism confronted Islām at its advent.

(g) The Concept of Philosophy. Though Āzād recognizes the limited spread of philosophy among the common people, he also recognizes its importance in the growth of human thought.[64] He briefly traces its growth among various Greek philosophers, a growth similar to that in the Rig Veda: its initial refusal to disturb the status quo and its culmination in Socrates and Plato. Socrates maintained a pure concept of the unity and transcendence of God which was free from anthropomorphism and which rejected any bargaining with the gods. For

Socrates, God is good and beautiful,[65] since he possesses these attributes, he cannot be the cause of evil and cannot appear as an actor in various guises.[66] Because of his resolute stand in upholding the truth, a trait "which builds its house in prophets and martyrs only," Socrates drank the hemlock, stating as his parting words that he was departing from an inferior world to a better world.[67]

While noting that Neo-Platonism differs from Platonism and that its principles have infiltrated into Aristotelianism, Āzād describes the analogies which exist between this philosophy and the Upanishads. Both uphold the negation of God's attributes. Plotinus said that the Absolute can be described as "goodness" and "being" (though, in fact, he transcends these characteristics) only to avoid that he be nothing. Otherwise, he can be described only by what he is not.

> It is a secret; the tongue of speech is dumb concerning it.[68]

During the Middle Ages, Maimonides, echoing the voice of the Alexandrian School, questioned the fallacy of describing God at all since descriptives apply only to the creation. He even avoids stating that God exists and that he is one without associate because all of these descriptives are not sanctified from relative connections.

(h) The Quranic concept. When the fullness of time had come, God sent forth the Qur'ān.[69] Āzād contends that prior to the Qur'ān man's limited intellect had risen only high enough to reject the worship of idols and espouse the worship of the unseen God. No concept of attributes was free from the veil of anthropomorphism so that men could view the attributes as they are. The Qur'ān, however, removes all veils of anthropomorphism and presents a purely transcendental concept of God.

> Nought is there like Him. (42.11)
>
> No vision taketh Him in,
> but He taketh in all vision. (6:103)
>
> Say: He is God, the one only:
> God, on whom all depend!
> He begetteth not, nor is He begotten;
> And there is none like Him. (112:1-4)

The contrast is especially glaring when one reads the Old Testament and Quranic accounts of the same incident.[70]

> If a veil is over the face of truth
> It is the sin of our eye which worships the picture.[71]

In offering the perfect concept of tanzīh, the Qur'ān offers no support for the doctrine of taʿṭīl, the teaching of the Upanishads through which all the attributes are negated and, because of this negation, the essence itself is in danger of being negated. Nor, as we have seen, does it support anthropomorphism, which is an exaggerated affirmation of the attributes. The Quranic doctrine of tanzīh offers a via media between taʿṭīl and

tajassum which satisfies the demand of the human heart and intellect. By avoiding tashabbuh, it preserves the truth of the unity of attributes; by rejecting taʿtīl, it avoids the personification of the Absolute.

It ill befits to speak of wine apart from the cup.[72]

Without hesitation, the Qur'ān affirms all the beautiful attributes and activities of God on which man's mind ponders. It even speaks of his outstretched hands (5:64) and his throne, which encompasses heaven and earth (2:255).[73] At the same time, it states in unambiguous terms that nothing can be compared with God (42:11; 16:74). Hence, his knowing, seeing, power, hand, etc., are not like our knowing, seeing, power, hands, etc. This, then, is the simple solution to this complex problem.

If to meet you is not easy, it is simple
The difficulty is that there is no difficulty.[74]

In regard to the negation of attributes, Āzād also recalls the excesses of later Muslim thinkers. Though Ashʿarī's view on the subject was more balanced than the tendencies of the other dialecticians, all of them failed to untie this Gordian knot. After their extensive researches, Imām Jūwaynī and Imām Fakhru-d-Dīn Rāzī, in resorting finally to the beliefs they had learned from their mothers, conceded the need to emulate the attitude of simple submission which the Ashāb and

Salaf practiced.[75] When the dialecticians accused their opponents of anthorpomorphism, the opponents retorted by insisting that they, at least, maintained a positive concept of the attributes. Āzād notes the distinction which the Qur'ān draws between muhkamāt and mutashābihāt (ambiguities) defined by Āzād as "things whose reality man cannot discover."[76] He then adds:

> The reality of the divine attributes is included in mutashābihāt. Hence, according to the Qur'ān, intellectual effort in this matter is of no avail. It only opens the door for all manner of perverted speculations. Other than submission, no alternative exists.[77]

Similarly, the Quranic concept of the divine attributes of mercy and beauty (rahmat-ōjamāl) is perfect and transcends all previous conceptions of God's attributes.

> At the time of the Qur'ān's advent, the elements of anger and terror prevailed within the Jewish concept of God. The Magian concept postulated two equal but separately contending forces of light and darkness. In stressing the attributes of love and mercy, the Christian concept concealed the reality of recompense. Likewise Buddhism, in emphasizing the attributes of mercy and love, submerged the attribute of justice.[78]

In short, all of these religions operated with a defective concept of justice which the balanced outlook of the Qur'ān corrects. On the one side, the Qur'ān upholds a

perfect concept of mercy and beauty completely devoid of anger and terror. On the other hand, it upholds a proper concept of justice which serves as the firm foundation for the doctrine of recompense.

The Qur'ān refers to all attributes as the beautiful names of God and describes them in detail.

> Among them, there are attributes which externally sound of anger and terror, e.g., jabbār, qahhār. Yet, according to the Qur'ān, these are also "beautiful names" because they reflect the attributes of power and justice which themselves are beautiful names. ...[79]

Hence, concludes Āzād:

> For this reason only three attributes are mentioned in Sūratu-l Fātiḥah: rubūbīyat, rahmat and ᶜadālat. There is no place for any attribute of anger or terror.[80]

Āzād recognizes that all religions prior to the Qur'ān proclaimed the unity of God's essence. However, in neglecting the proclamation of its converse, that there is none like him, they revealed their incompetence to grasp a belief in the unity of attributes. Because of this failure, essentially a failure of human ability to comprehend the intricacies of the unity of attributes prior to the Quranic dispensation, men made the gods in their own image, glorified their spiritual leaders, and tacitly divided themselves into exclusive groups.

The Qur'ān, however, presents an inimitable and inflexible concept of the unity of attributes which finds

no parallel in previous concepts. It blocks all paths of idolatry; it summons men to worship, to supplicate and to trust in God alone; its basic confession proclaims the servitude of the prophet and with him, all creation; and it offers a common and simple concept of God and his attributes to all men regardless of external distinctions.[81]

Though the Qur'ān maintains a healthy attitude of tolerance towards all religions, it rejects a negative tolerance which breeds a weak and shallow faith and intellect and which thrives on ignorance and superstition. In closing all doors of confessional compromise, the Qur'ān champions an unwavering concept of God's transcendence and unity.[82]

CHAPTER III

OTHER RELIGIONS

> If we ask history which powers apart from war have been most instrumental in causing human desolation, certainly history will point its finger at those tribunals established in the name of religion and law which have always meted out their destructive sentences upon their fellow-men in such a totally terrifying and barbaric manner.[1]

1. Introduction

Hitherto we have seen that Āzād used the word "religions" in a double sense. Positively speaking, all religions are one in origin; they proclaim the same message, which is proper worship of God and good works (dīn), and differ from each other only in shar^{c}, a product of circumstances which in no wise affects the unity of all religions nor creates cause for strife among the religions. But when we compare the empirical nature of all other religions contemporary with the appearance of the Qur'ān, of all these religions, negatively speaking, naught is like unto it - if we may paraphrase Āzād. Presumably the same is true of all these religions in their present guise in so far as they continue to reflect their respective natures at the time of the Qur'ān.

How do these variations (other than those of shar^{c}) arise? As we saw in the previous chapter, these

variations arise from man's false conception of God; more precisely, from a false conception of his attributes.[2] Even though the culmination of revelation in respect to the attributes of God is found only in the Qur'ān and even though revelation prior to the Qur'ān in respect to the attributes is incomplete, since it adjusts itself in accordance with the evolution and growth of man's capacities to understand, nevertheless it is man who creates other religions, who deviates from the path of his original religion which is the true religion, who elevates shar^{c} above dīn, who fashions gods in the likeness of men and worships the images he fashions and who, having done all this, exults in the religion he considers to be the true religion, a religion superior to all other religions and on which he holds exclusive rights.[3]

2. Doctrine of Man

"What then is man that thou are mindful of him...?" Obviously Āzād shares traditional Muslim opinion that God's revelation is for man. But if it is correct to say that orthodox Islām in emphasizing theology has tended to submerge anthropology, it would be incorrect to say that Āzād shares this tendency.[4] On the basis of the Qur'ān, Āzād shows God's purpose in the whole of his

creation and the centrality of man within this world of purpose.[5] Even though in his commentary Āzād does not oblige us with any systematic anthropology, it is evident, from one aspect at least, that he considers man to be the center of God's religion.[6] If man, therefore, wishes to understand religion, he must understand himself. Conversely, apart from a central anthropology, Āzād's conception of the various religions, too, loses its vital significance.

Though Āzād operates within the context of evolution, for Āzād God's will is the cause of everything.[7] All men owe their origin to one man who, according to Āzād, is not necessarily Adam. Through its relation to him society, which expresses itself in the form of clan, tribe, and town, is a unified society and upholds the special sanctity of the family and the individual.[8]

> First the being of man was created. Then he assumed form. Then came the time when Adam appeared. He attained such a dignity that the angels were ordered to prostrate before him.[9]

Out of something despicable which men crush under their feet God created man and gave him authority over all the powers of the world.[10] In him the world finds the culmination of its development.[11] The whole earth is subjected to his lordship.[12] For Āzād, it would seem that God does what is best for his creation.[13]

From the provision of raiment for man (7:26), Āzād understands the initial awakening of man's intellectual life and the emergence of his moral perception. He learned the arts and crafts, forsook his animal existence, and attained that level of life which characterizes man.[14]

The spirit of tawhīd is indelibly imprinted within every man.[15] The natural man intuitively believes in one God, the creator and the sustainer.[16] The internal voice, so evident in his cry to God in time of distress, cannot be silenced unless man himself closes his ears.[17] The heart of man demands that man believe in God; it were better to doubt everything else in all creation, including himself, than to doubt God and his message.[18]

By breathing into Adam of his spirit, God endowed man with intellect and perception so that man acquired the essence of humanity. By virtue of this act God has distinguished man above all beasts, he has marked man as the consummation of his creation, and he has offered him limitless opportunity to pursue the path of progress.[19] As we have seen, the logic of the Qur'ān appeals to the intellect of man to ponder the order of nature and through it to perceive the creator and sustainer who is merciful and just.[20]

Because of his humanity man also reflects the attributes of God.

> For this reason, wherever the Qur'an has mentioned humanity's exclusive attributes, it has related them directly to God.[21]

By more perfectly reflecting the semblance (tashabbuh) and qualities of the divine attributes, man strives toward the perfection of humanity. In cultivating this attitude, he finds his firm foundation for his devotion to God; for the fact that man reflects the attributes of God is the basis of worship.[22]

Uniting God and man is the bond of love; hence, God is not merely to be worshipped but to be worshipped as the beloved.[23] God's attributes are constantly reiterated before man in order to inspire in him the quality of these attributes that "all the divine attributes might be manifested in us."[24] Man is to love, to be merciful, "to adorn his ethical countenance with rubūbīyat," to forgive even his enemy.[25]

> The heart of him who learns to forgive his enemy becomes clean automatically from the filth of human malice and hatred.[26]

As we have seen, though man is to forgive his enemy, he need not love his enemy, because, says Āzād, such language is metaphorical.[27]

"To find guidance is the right of every man."[28] Yet Āzād constantly points out that there are two ways which lead to two separate destinations: the way of good

and the way of evil, of belief and unbelief, of Adam and Iblīs. Thus, men are separated into two groups according to the ways they follow.[29] Indeed, if God had willed, he could have guided all. But, says Āzād, he did not so will.

> And (O prophet) if the peoples' disaffection grieves you, then (do whatever you can, they will never cease).... If God willed, he could gather all to the true religion (and all would tread one path, but you see that this is not the case). But watch, do not become one of those who had no knowledge (of the truth). (6:35)[30]

Man has a free will to choose good or bad. The choice is in his power, and all depends upon his individual choice. Guidance cannot be compelled.[31] Hence, man must also strive after belief in Allāh and the realities which God has revealed to him, cultivate the values of mind and body which are indispensable for human development, and preserve an awareness of the presence of demonic powers which seek to direct him from the straight path.[32] Āzād constantly reiterates the need of obedience to the laws of truth, abstention from evil, religious austerity, and the exercise of worship for moral strength and a pure life, which <u>namāz</u> and <u>zakāt</u> can foster.[33] However, man does not pursue the good by abandoning the worth, though "the world is transient like the dew;" true religion teaches him to preserve the balance which exists between <u>dīn</u> and <u>dunyā</u>, to avoid excess, and to use the good things of this world as opportunities for progress.[34] Though man must struggle in

his pursuit of progress, he should strive with hope and avoid despair.[35]

Guidance is ever available to man. Basic for the possibility of making amends for a dubious past history is muhlat, that period of respite or grace which the law of requital, whose mills grind slowly, allows to man as an opportunity for repentance and for rediscovery of the path of guidance.[36] Seldom does Āzād wax more eloquent than when he reminds man of religion's call to repentance, to a true repentance, whereby man receives complete forgiveness of sins.[37]

> Whatever may be the evil deed, the sin, the transgression, the wickedness, and however violent its nature and however extensive its spread, the very moment that man experiences a sense of repentance and conversion within his inner being, that very same moment divine mercy flings open the door to receive him. A single tear of contrition so can cleanse the countless stains of sins and evil deeds as if his moral apparel has never been stained. 'He who has sinned is as he who has never sinned.'[38]

Since man has a free will to choose good or evil, he is therefore responsible for his actions. Though the prophet is a warner, he, like his fellow men, is responsible only for himself and not for other fellow men.[39] Whether or not man sees the fruits of his actions, he is to fulfill his responsibility, ever aware that the faithful are always successful and the rebellious always fail, that the promises of God are always valid and

his labours are not in vain.[40] Whatever good or evil one does, he does it to himself; accordingly, he enjoys or suffers the result of his own actions, reaping as he sows. For a pleasant reward he can thank God; for an evil reward he has himself to blame. Yet, though "the result is the shadow of the act," he can appeal to mercy if he ceases from his evil deeds.[41]

Within this context, Āzād repeatedly points out that on the day of judgment no man can bear another's burden. Though to spend on the way of Allāh is a meritorious work, and though apart from a readiness to sacrifice even those things which man most prizes one cannot really tread the path of good, yet all the wealth in the world cannot atone for one's own evil works; nor can forgetfulness, genealogy or any similar plea serve as his excuse.[42] Presumed, however, is the message of an apostle, apart from which he will not be punished.

Though history reveals the excision of nations and individuals which serves as a prelude to the final judgment, only at the resurrection is the ultimate recompense of man's action clearly manifested.[43] On the day of judgment, which is sure to come and which involves all people, "all veils will be removed so that all will know the decision of God whose scale weighs the minutest work with the finest accuracy."[44]

Since God alone knows, man, even the prophet, should not presume to know the final end of any group or individual, as if he could read the register of God. How fewer the struggles among men now and in the past if this and similar matters hidden from men's sight were committed to the care of God![45] For man's ignorance regarding the final judgment is really only symptomatic of his general lack of knowledge which, sub specie aeternitatis, is as a few drops in the ocean.[46]

What men need to know they have received through revelation. And revelation, Āzād notes, does not distinguish between persons.[47] In fact, when revelation comes, the despised receive and the elite reject the message.[48]

3. The Doctrine of Sin

In the beginning, men lived together as members of one community. They were satisfied with the simplicity of their natural life which was free from all mutual enmity and rivalry.[49] They trusted in God, followed his guidance, and shunned the path of error. To this state of natural simplicity the Tawrāt and Plato also bear witness.

Only at a subsequent stage did the multiplication of men, social and economic pressures, the conflict of

interests, and an absorption in natural phenomena of this world divide men into exclusive communities and various religions professing belief in a multitude of gods.[50] As we have seen, man, himself, is essentially responsible for these divisions, since he disregards the message of the prophets.[51] Men find themselves divided into various races, nations, colours, and languages over different areas of the earth, and out of all these variations men create among themselves hatred, strife, exclusivism, and the various categories of rich and poor, master and slave, noble and humble, strong and weak, touchables and untouchables, etc.

As far as the origin and growth of sin is concerned, the history of Adam holds little significance for Āzād. As commentary on 2:35,36, Āzād merely says:

> The Sin (laghzish!) of Adam, confession of sin (qusūr) his repentance accepted and the beginning of a new life.[52]

Elsewhere Āzād notes the slip (laghzish) of Adam but adds that he did not rebel. Though both man and woman were driven out of the garden and though now two roads, the straight and the crooked, are open to man, the road to choose is the road of Adam, who with contrite heart obeyed the commands of God.[53] Eve is neither more nor less culpable than Adam. The Qur'ān does not support the

account in the Taurāt which states that Eve was first disobedient and then tempted her husband, and the conclusion which Jews and Christians derive from this that woman is more evil and disobedient than man.[54]

Though Adam and Eve sinned, and though through their sin men were confronted with the possibility of two paths, and though Āzād clearly traces the devolution of descent theologically and ethically which resulted in the need of prophets and guidance, Adam and Eve hardly can be associated with this descent. Whatever be his stature in the eyes of Āzād, he does not seem to fulfill the rôle of a prophet who is sent to warn his contemporaries, since they appear to have no need of such warning.[55] Prophets appear only later with the primary intention of removing divisions among men. However, as far as I can see, Āzād leaves us grasping for possible clues regarding a documented history of man's actual descent. Perhaps the following comment does offer us at least some insight:

> ...In this connection, first of all (calls?) the call of Noah came. Noah appeared in the area between the Tigris and the Euphrates which is the oldest cradle of human civilization and where, in all probability, idolatry first appeared. It would appear that there human society first lost its original and natural guidance.[56]

Similarly, we are left groping over the "somewhat anomalous place" of Satan.[57] Unless I have missed

references, there is little comment on his refusal to bow before Adam and on his temptation of Adam and Eve. However, his great temptation is to make many promises, to raise false hopes, and to create proud desires within man to divert him from the truth.[58] If man refuses to follow the path of Adam, he can follow as the only alternative the path of Iblīs, which is the path of disobedience, rebellion and pride, though for all who do there is a period of muhlat.[59]

Be the history of man's descent what it may, Āzād leaves us with no doubt regarding the nature of that descent. When one gathers the number of the references in his commentary, they tell a sorry tale.

Basic, I think, to Āzād's contention that the fundamental sin of man is the creation of divisions in society are Āzād's allusions to man's character, most of which are related to his shorter commentaries on relevant Quranic verses. Though it rightfully may be claimed that many of the following references are divorced from their context and are not applicable to all men in all situations, yet as generalities such descriptions can validly apply to men under certain circumstances.[60]

Man does not care for righteousness and worship of God. The tragedy of man is that he becomes so absorbed

in the pride of the world and the worship of created things that he loses the vision of the creator.[61] He substitutes the worship of self for obedience to God.[62]

Man always doubts and ridicules the call of the prophets. He always seeks signs and wonders to confirm the message brought to him. He is forgetful and rebellious, unjust and ungrateful, which "is the source of all man's depravity."[63] He is hasty and therefore cannot distinguish between good and evil.[64] In every community there are hypocrites, though some men lack only the proper vision.[65]

Man becomes a servant to his passions.[66] The weakness of human nature drives him to submit himself to this world's goods and renders him insensitive to their value.[67] Because of this weakness, man surrounds himself with silly superstitions: the fallacies of astrology and the worship of the heavenly bodies; the false refuge of flight from the world; rules regarding food and drink and the elevation of other externals of the law which he judges to be the true criteria of salvation.[68] When he attains power and authority, he rules as a tyrant and is greedy for wealth.[69]

Thus, ignorance, strife, prejudice and <u>tāqlīd</u> so blind man and paralyze his intellect and insight that he no longer is able to perceive the truth. So degenerate

do the heart and morals of man become that every capacity to heed a warning or to take an example is totally obliterated. According to the law of God, man loses all light which God has provided and becomes as a creature who is blind and dumb. In this state of total corruption man is pleased to dwell.[70] For Āzād, kufr is just another name for such blindness.[71]

As commentary on 10:57, Āzād says:

> For all the illnesses of the heart there is a prescription. The individual as well as the group who uses this prescription will find healing for their hearts from every kind of rebellion and wickedness.
>
> It should be remembered that in Arabic when the words qalb, fawād and ṣadr are spoken on such occasions as this they refer to the spiritual condition of men; that is, the power of the mind, intellectual perception, emotions and passions, morals and customs, the inner life.... Thus the healing of the heart signifies that for all men's mental and moral disease this is the prescription.[72]

For Āzād, no sin is so vicious and destructive as the sin of tashayyuᶜ or taḥazzub, which arises from a false emphasis of sharᶜ.[73]

> In this connection, it (the Qur'ān) has enumerated all the errors of the devotees of the (various) religions. They are errors of both creed and practice. It (the Qur'ān) repeatedly emphasizes that their greatest error is what the Qur'ān designates as tashayyuᶜ and taḥazzub. In Arabic tashayyuᶜ and taḥazzub mean to form separate parties. The spirit which fills them can be called in Urdū the spirit of gurōh parastī.[74]
>
> As to those who split up their religion and become sects, have thou nothing to do with them: their affair is with God. Hereafter shall He tell them what they have been. (6:160).[75]

> But men have rent their great concern (the one religion that was meant for all mankind), one among another, into sects every party rejoicing in that which is their own (23:53).
>
> God-given religion has opened the way to mankind for devotion to God and good works... But the people neglected this fact and fractured religion into races, nations, countries, and various practices and customs. Accordingly, the manner of creed and good works no longer was considered as the criterion of salvation and happiness; on the contrary, the group to which one belonged became the totally determining factor (for salvation).... The rest of mankind were deprived (of salvation).... As a result, the members of one religion inculcated hate and prejudice (within their own group) against other religions. The way of true devotion to God and piety in this world became a way saturated with hatred, envy, fear, bloodshed, and murder.[76]
>
> Man is so constituted that every community considers its way the best. He cannot see the matter through the eyes of others. As you from your viewpoint consider your way the best, in exactly the same way others from their viewpoint consider their way the best...[77]

For Āzād, it would thus seem that the most comprehensive definition of the evil way is sectarianism or groupism (communalism). Sectarianism, seen in all its narrowness, sharply contrasts with the universal nature of the true religion to which the Qur'ān and Āzād after it, summons men.[78]

Closely related to sectarianism is the fundamental error of <u>taqlīd</u>. Even though we would expect frequent references to this concept in a semi-modernist

interpretation of the Qur'ān such as Āzād's and, therefore, might like to pass it by, we can scarcely escape discussing it because it appears so often in the pages of his commentary. Taqlīd centers in reverence for the forefathers, kings or princes, and their religion. According to Āzād, man becomes ensnared in the worship of antiquity from which there is no release, absorbs himself in the stories of the past, and considers all ancient patterns to be sanctified.[79] Because of taqlīd man elevates his leaders into supermen, worships them, and thus creates sects.[80] Through taqlīd man loses his understanding, and God sets a seal on man's heart through his law of punishment, which is a fruit of man's own evil actions.[81] It is a characteristic of kufr and a great obstacle to the path of truth.[82]

Also closely connected with the errors of sectarianism and taqlīd is the error of denying the prophet. All prophets summon men away from strife and sectarianism to the common path of true religion.[83] To deny one or several or all but one is to commit the error of distinguishing between the prophets.[84] To deny one and to accept the other is to deny the truth which one accepts.[85]

> It is the duty of every righteous man who wishes to follow the true religion of God to believe in all the apostles, all the books, and all religious

> .proclamations without making any distinction among them or denying any one of them. He should cultivate an attitude which leads him to say: 'Wherever and in whatever language truth is revealed, it is the truth and I believe in it.'[86]

Thus, because men establish their sects through their genealogies, various customs, cultic practices, sacrifices, food, dress, etc. as the criteria of truth, they not only deny each other's religion, but they hate and fight against one another in the name of the same God.[87] When the Qur'ān appeared, sectarianism characterized the religious thinking of all people.[88] And, wonder of wonders, adds Āzād:

> The more the Qur'ān asserted this fundamental truth (that religion is one and universal) the more the eyes of the world have turned away, so that it can be said that nothing is so hidden from the world's view as this glorious truth.[89]

4. The Nature of Other Religions

As a supplement references already cited from Āzād's commentary on Sūratu-l-Fātihah regarding his attitude to other religions and the conception of God held by them at the time of the Qur'ān, we may add other comments found elsewhere. These are derived from his discussion of the conception of God as well as other aberrations in specific religions, both those existing at the coming of the Qur'ān and contemporary ones. It is

natural that most of these comments relate to the flourishing manifestations of Arab idolatry, to Judaism and to Christianity, and to the devotees of these religions since, at its advent, the Qur'ān confronted these religions. At the same time, we will recall that what characterizes the false path in general often characterizes the various individual religions; and what characterizes the various individual religions also characterizes the false path.

(a) Buddhism. Āzād is more definite now than previously in his contention that the nineteenth century orientalists have erred in stating that the Buddha's creed was void of any belief in God.[90] He claims that the Buddha did have a conception of God analogous to that of the Upanishads. While refusing to assert anything definite about God's attributes, he did not deny the essence of God.

Nor did the Buddha view this life only as a life of grief and punishment which is to be abandoned in order to attain salvation. He chose the path which lay between absorption in human passions and flight from the world as the way of salvation which he sought. Āzād finally notes that he himself laboured under these misapprehensions regarding Buddhism for some time.

(b) Hinduism. Āzād also refers to the Vedantic philosophers who sought to uphold the denial of God's

attributes and to obliterate tashakhkhus. As a result, the common people not only followed the way of tashakhkhus but also the way of tajassum. The graven image served as the alternative to a conception of God's attributes.[91]

On the basis of plain Quranic doctrine and reward of works, Āzād denies the theosophist contention that the Qur'ān teaches transmigration (tanāsukh), a doctrine which Hinduism shares with Buddhism, Jainism, and with certain phases of ancient Egyptian and Greek thought. In contrast to this conception, the Qur'ān speaks of return (rujū^{c}).[92]

As an example of undue veneration of the past, Āzād cites the Hindus who "have become enmeshed in tales of the Mahabharata and the Puranas."[93]

(c) Zoroastrianism. Regarding Zoroastrianism, there is virtually nothing to add to the previous discussion.[94] As far as I know, Āzād does not relate other passages in the Qur'ān to religious aberrations in Iran other than those passages noted. Just who are the other People of the Book besides the Christians and the Jews?

(d) Religions which the Qur'ān confronts. As a part of an appendix to Sūrah 2, Āzād divides the people in and surrounding Arabia into three categories according to their qualifications for responding to the truth:[95]

(1) Those who were truly devoted to God and sought the truth. They were composed of some Arab monotheists, some Jews, and some Christians. When they heard the summons of truth, they responded favourably immediately. (2) Arab polytheists who had no faith and did not worship God. They were absorbed in taqlīd and veneration for their customs and the path of their ancestors. Error and wickedness had so ripened in their hearts that they were incapable of heeding the truth. (3) The People of the Book, composed especially of Jews and Christians. Though they claimed to have faith and to worship God, to follow the law, to observe the Tawrāt and Injīl and to be in sole possession of the truth, they had lost the spirit of worship, faith, and good works. The Qur'ān exposes them as being hypocrites of a type.

(i) Arab polytheism. We may first note some of Āzād's remarks about the Arab polytheists. He compares this age with the age of Abraham, in which all were bereft of the truth and devoid of any capacity to receive it.[96] This age is called jāhilīyat, since it is immersed in ignorant superstition and folly. The people believe in neither the revealed books, God, nor the resurrection; they can not distinguish between light and darkness; they associate other gods with God, falsifying all his signs,

and learn no lessons from the past history of other nations; in upholding taqlīd, they scorn the obvious logic of guidance.[97]

For the Arabs the recital of the Qur'ān resembles the recital of stories from the Tawrāt.[98] Encouraged by prejudiced leaders of the People of the Book, they reject the claim of Muhammad and the method of revelation.[99] They accuse him of being only a man, a dreamer, a magician, a poet, and of fabricating the message; they demand of him that he send a treasure and another Qur'ān which supports their beliefs and that an angel confirm the message. To climax the matter, they rejoice at the thought of his death.[100]

The Arab leaders especially always seek miracles as verification of the Quranic message. By this strategy they evade the truth, though their evasion is really based on envy, rebellion, and other false excuses.[101]

> They do not search for the truth in truth itself. They continue to look for miracles and wonders and consider that the man who reveals the greatest marvels is the greatest revealer of truth, as if truth is not truth because it is truth but because it is supported by all kinds of strange wonders.[102]

To this Muhammad replies:

> I did not say that I can turn heaven into earth or earth into heaven and that all the powers of heaven are in my authority and at my disposal. Whatever

> my claim be, it is this that I am a man, one who dispenses the message of truth. Then why do you make such requests of me? Why is it necessary for me to reveal a palace of gold and erect a ladder to climb to heaven?[103]

If they do not seek the truth for truth's sake, they will never accept it regardless of how many miraculous signs appear.[104]

Āzād does note that the Arabs believe in God but laments their associating of other gods with God. In times of trouble, they call upon God to deliver them but immediately resume the worship of their gods when they are free from their difficulties.[105] Though they recognize the upright character of Muhammad, know the truth, and are aware of tawhīd-i rubūbīyat, they refuse to accept the message of the truth and prefer worship of subordinate beings.[106] Just as people are divided into men and women, so are the gods for the Arabs.[107] They revere the spirits and consider the angels to be sons and daughters of God.[108] Instead of forming one ummah under God, they follow their various groups and continue their strife.[109]

Since the Arabs are blind to the signs of God, they live only to experience the joy of this world; they reject the resurrection, and ridicule the message of future punishment.[110] Hence, in times of trouble they despair and in times of peace they are careless.[111] The world, which has no purpose and which passes away, is like

a play.[112]

The conclusion is that bad theology breeds bad morals and evil superstitions. The Arab maltreatment of women is only symptomatic of the inferior position which women held everywhere before the Qur'ān gave them equal rights.[113] The Arabs marry and seize the wealth of beautiful orphan girls; if the girls are not beautiful, they marry them to someone else and in the process arrange to appropriate a part of their wealth.[114] They consider having daughters a shame; some of them they slay at the order of their priests and leaders, boast that this act is noble, and yet attribute daughters to Allāh.[115]

The part of their animals and crops which they dedicate to God is given to the poor; the other part, dedicated to the idols, they save for their neighbours.[116] It does not matter if they reduce God's share; yet they scrupulously give the idols their full share. When slaughtering animals on behalf of the gods, they do not take the name of God. When they remove a live calf from a slaughtered animal, only the men eat it; it it is dead, the women also can participate.

Like the Jews, the Arabs designate many things, including foods, as <u>harām</u> according to their superstitions.[117] But, adds Āzād, only that can be declared <u>harām</u> which is opposed to truth and righteousness and which all the

prophets have prohibited. Neither qiyās nor any opinion of man can make such declarations. Everything is permitted except that which God's sharīʿat, based on wahī, specifically prohibits.[118] Āzād also notes that the Arabs were alcoholics.[119]

Āzād laments especially the hardness of heart and the violent opposition which erupted out of Arab hearts against Muḥammad and his followers. They have become so stubborn, prejudiced, and involved in evil works that their hearts are sealed. They are not ready to understand the truth, they cannot understand it, and they remove all possibilities for repentance and correction.[120]

Submerged in doubt and reproducing the errors of past history, the Arabs blindly ask why God permitted the errors of their forefathers if they were in error; and if they themselves are in error, why does God not punish them? Since everything is according to God's will, how could the situation be otherwise?[121] Without doubt, Āzād replies, God could have guided all, but he has given man the intelligence, will, and power to differentiate between light and darkness. It is not within the province of the prophet to negate man's power of free choice, since it is the will of Allāh that man shall not be compelled to follow the path of truth.[122]

The Arabs despise the impoverished company of believers and Muḥammad.[123] But worse still they attempt to deprive the believers of their religious freedom by compelling them to apostasize.[124] They flee from the Qur'ān and prevent others from hearing it.[125] They exclude others from worshipping in the sanctuary, a sanctuary which Abraham constructed for the worship of God and which the sons of Abraham have filled with idols.[126] Because of the tyranny of the Arabs, the faithful had to flee; those who remain are deprived of religious freedom and suffer persecution.[127] The polytheists are warned that if they do not cease violence they will be destroyed; and so they were, adds Āzād.[128]

Since the Meccans wish to settle religious controversy through tyranny and terror, and since they break their covenants, the Qur'ān calls upon the faithful to fight, for the sedition of the Meccans is worse than fighting.[129] Āzād operates with the premise that if there is no defense of religion against violent opposition, religion will disappear.[130] And supporting his premise is his proclivity to depict the opposition in darkest colours and the faithful in fairest.[131]

> Compelled by the tyranny of the inhabitants of Makkah, the prophet of Islām emigrated and lived in Madīnah. But the Quraysh did not let him

> live in peace here either. In the second year of the Hijrah, the Meccans prepared an army and attacked Madīnah. The Muslims also left Madīnah and a fight ensued near a well named Badr...[132]

As an introductory commentary to Sūrah 9, Āzād says:

> There are some events in the history of Islām which are so certain and so clear that it is impossible to reject them, even though one study them with a strongly hostile intent. In short, from the beginning to the end, the actions of those groups who opposed the prophet of Islām were motivated by tyranny and violence, treachery and deceit, barbarity and bloodthirstiness. Whatever the prophet of Islām and his companions did, their every act was the supreme manifestation of patience and endurance, righteousness and piety, forbearance and forgiveness...[133]

(ii) <u>The Jews</u>. Even though in the opinion of Āzād, as we have seen, the Jewish concept of God's attributes had slightly progressed, and even though it betrayed flashes of universalism, nevertheless, for the Jews God was a family despot, whimsical in character, disposed to vengeance, and desirous of sacrifice to soothe his hot anger.[134] After an early stage of error, the Jews never worshipped idols of stone; nevertheless, they built temples on the graves of the prophets and sanctified them into places of worship.[135]

The basic error of the Jews was Judaism, which is a creation of man.[136] By virtue of their descent from Abraham and of their possession of the Tawrāt, which they believed to be only for themselves, they considered themselves to be an exclusive nation in sole possession of the

truth, enjoying the privileges which God had bestowed upon them and which he had bestowed upon no other nation.[137]

> The Jews said that after the Tawrāt no other book can come, and after the children of Israel to no other nation can there be blessing and happiness. Indeed the treasure house of God is full, but his hands are closed. Henceforth, he can grant no other nation blessing and happiness....[138]

Rather than true worship and good works, the need of which God had revealed to them, group affiliation determined one's salvation.[139] Be a man ever so pious, his fate was sealed if he was not a Jew. They, alone, were the sons of God.[140] Whatever evil they might do, they would be saved; and even though they be thrown into Hell, they soon would be released after they had been purified from their sins.[141]

Because of this pride and exclusiveness, the Jews closed their eyes to the truth and even boasted that they rejected another message because of their firmness of faith.[142] They had offered sufficient precedent for their action. Hitherto, they had killed the prophets whom God sent to them.[143] Among the Jews, only the disciples had accepted the message of Jesus. Others slandered the name of Mary and claimed that they had crucified Jesus who, they said, was a sorcerer and a magician.[144]

> The coming of Jesus offered the Jews a final opportunity for correction and happiness. Because of their wickedness they lost this opportunity so that it is as if their fate had been forever sealed...[145]

It is thus not surprising that they later rejected the message of the Qur'ān.

At the time of the Qur'ān, this traditional Jewish hardness of heart is especially nourished by the leaders of the Jews who deprive the people of spiritual guidance and deceive them into thinking that all authority is in the hands of their leaders.[146] So blind have the people become and so easily do they succumb to the deception of their scribes that they even hallow their scribes as associates with God.[147] By abandoning all reason and following all base passions, they have embraced shirk, the only sin beyond forgiveness, since this error centers guidance in man himself and destroys the essential purpose of sharī'at.[148] They who claim to oppose idolatry themselves have established it and even have asserted that it is better than the way of the Qur'ān.[149] With few exceptions, they have been deprived of the capacity to believe, for their hearts are sealed and closed to the truth.[150] As in the time of Moses they feared to enter Canaan and, nostalgically recalling the fleshpots of Egypt, they wished to return whence they came, now also, empty of all impetus to live a better life, they have become as slaves enjoying the peace of servitude.[151]

The Jews have lost all knowledge of their Book and do not follow the precepts therein.[152] Their

religious leaders read the Book and explain it; but, because they are proud, they consciously conceal the truth by altering the meaning of the Book.[153]

> And (behold), among the People of the Book, there is a group (of their religious leaders and guides) who, when they read the Book, twist and alter it (and change its meaning into something else) so that you may think that what they are telling is from the Book of God, though it is certainly not (among the commands) of the Book of God. They tell the people that 'whatever is explained to you' is from Allāh, though it is not from Allāh. They lie in the name of Allāh and they know that they speak lies. (3:78).[154]

In this way, the Jews ignored the commandments of God and substituted their own commandments for the commandments of God.[155] They fabricated excuses for breaking the Sabbath and other laws of <u>sharī'at</u>.[156] When bribed, they explained away the punishment for adultery and saved the guilty rich from death. They considered women to be their property, to be of a status inferior to men, and gave them no domestic freedom.[157] In addition, Āzād states that some facts regarding events mentioned in the Tawrāt have been changed or forgotten with the result that the People of the Book did not know the truth of these matters.[158]

> Teaching and recollecting the Book of Allāh is a duty of a holy community. Those who from fear of the world or covetousness conceal the commandments of truth are worthy to be punished by Allāh's curse.[159]

Because the People of the Book have forsaken the true knowledge and practice of God's Book, other

restrictions have been imposed upon them.[160] But now just to release them from the shackles of these regulations as well as from their superstitions, confused beliefs, and slavery to their leaders, Islām has come. For, says Āzād, Islām is a burden neither to the mind nor to the heart.[161] The Qur'ān has come to correct the changes which have been made in the Tawrāt and to remind the Jews of other facts which they have forgotten.[162]

Only a small minority of Jews, however, responded favourably to the call. Many others pretended to accept Islām but were really hypocrites; in fact, the majority of hypocrites were Jews.[163] The rest openly opposed Islām, the Qur'ān and the faithful. They kindled the flame of skepticism in the hearts of the idolators, and they themselves made similar demands upon Muhammad: that he bring down a written book from heaven which they could see; that he do miracles to confirm his call as a prophet, etc.[164] Though they were forbidden to take usury, they continued to exploit the faithful; while doing business among themselves they were honest with each other but cheated those who did not belong to their community.[165] The religious activities of the pious, they ridiculed.[166] Like the idolators, they were enemies of the Muslims even though they knew the Qur'ān to be true.[167] Though they themselves did not follow their own commandments, they rejected the

Qur'ān because the things forbidden in the Tawrāt were not forbidden in the Qur'ān, meanwhile forgetting also that before Moses their laws did not exist.[168] Forgetting also that the kaʿbah was built by Abraham before the temple in Jerusalem and that they could not even agree with the Christians with whom they shared the Tawrāt about the proper qiblah, they insisted on a special place and direction for proper worship of God.[169] Yet they asked how Muḥammad can be a prophet when all the other prophets, unlike Muḥammad, uphold the rite of burnt offerings.[170] Especially in Madīnah they revealed their hypocritical colours by treacherously breaking treaties and covenants and even seeking to kill Muḥammad.[171]

Āzād offers a short summary of past opportunities as well as the present opportunity which the Jews have rejected and concludes:

> Twice you were destroyed and now a third opportunity has come. The revelation of the truth has opened the door of blessing through divine mercy. If you cease to reject and rebel, you will find prosperity and happiness. If you do not, then just as the law of retribution took its toll of punishment twice before, it will take its toll a third time.
>
> And so it was. Just as the Jews failed to profit from the opportunity given them at the time of Christ, they also failed to profit from the call of Islām. Their fate was sealed with the seal of depravity and misfortune forever.[172]

Thus, according to Āzād, contrary to the claims of the Jews, they did not follow the path of Abraham because

he was not the father of their sect nor, indeed, of any sect. In rejecting the Qur'ān, the Jews actually rejected the religion they call their own by failing to practise it and by failing to recognize that the Qur'ān had come to confirm their Book and the message of their prophets.[173]

Āzād completes the tale of this sorry spectacle of Jewish history by adding:

> Among those who oppose the call to truth, the Jews play the most prominent part. But because of their evil deeds and rebellion, their state is such that upon them has fallen the wrath of the Divine. There is no place in the world where they may really live. Wherever they have found refuge, they dwell in shame and under adversity...[174]

(iii) The Christians. It is, of course, impossible always to distinguish with certainty whether the passages in the Qur'ān regarding the People of the Book have reference to the Jews or the Christians.[175] In any case it is often not necessary to make any distinction since many references appear to govern both Jews and Christians. Thus, what we have seen characterizes the errors of the Jews often also characterizes the errors of the Christians. Though Quranic allegations against the Christians may be quantitatively less, it is to Āzād's credit that he deals with both theological and moral aberrations of the Christians as he understands the Qur'ān to represent them

without glossing them over.[176]

Fundamental to Āzād's understanding of the Quranic representation of the Christians is his thesis that prior to the Qur'ān the Christians also had gone astray in their concept of God and his attributes. The Christian concept fared no better than its Jewish counterpart.[177]

> The true teaching of Christianity is throughout a teaching of tawhīd; yet after its coming not even a century elapsed before the belief in the divinity of Christ emerged.[178]

> The Christians believed that because of Adam's son, all of his descendants became objects of anger. As long as God did not sacrifice his attribute of sonship in the form of the Messiah there could be no atonement for original sin and (God's) wrath.[179]

The basic error of the Christians is Christianity which, like Judaism, is a creation of man.[180] This sect they follow and consider themselves to be the sole possessors of the truth, since they are alone the sons of God. Because God is their father and because of the atonement, He will never close the door of salvation on them.[181] They also falsely claim to follow the way of Abraham in opposition to the Jews, but they name their sect after Christ, who lived centuries after Abraham, and adhere to beliefs and practices which are foreign to Abraham.[182] Though they share the Tawrāt with the Jews, neither they nor the Jews can agree about it.[183] Not

only do they fight with the Jews; like the Jews they are also sharply divided among themselves.[184]

> The Christians also forgot the covenant of faith and works and strayed from the path of truth. They divided into many groups and each group zealously opposed the other. This mutual hostility has extended to such a degree that it will endure until doomsday.
>
> Accordingly, religious sectarianism has remained established among Christians for centuries. That sect which has prospered has demolished another sect. The political and economic divisions (firqah) which now have been created even excel the previous divisions in violent hatred and animosity.[185]

As usual, Āzād treats Christian sectarianism and its differences of creed and practice as the result of pride, ignorance and prejudice.

Again the burden of guilt for establishing sectarianism falls upon the leaders. The people have elevated their popes, priests, and monks as their spiritual guides in place of the Book and thus commit shirk. By keeping the people ignorant, the religious leaders exercise a firm control over the people and allow themselves every liberty to fulfill their worldly lusts. Yet those who are guilty of shirk after the time of Jesus and the apostles will be answerable for it on the Day of Judgment.[186]

Christians have established an "ecclesiastical sectarianism" because they have deviated from the divine

Book.[187] They have exchanged the Book as the measure of their faith and belief for the authority of men. The most conspicuous manifestation of this vanity is their exaltation of the person of Christ, who is only a man and a prophet.[188]

> Whatever else the Christians have fabricated (about him) is ignorance and error.[189]

The Qur'ān strongly opposes this vain belief that Jesus is the son of God, has successfully contradicted it because it is against the truth, and calls it blasphemy (kufr) in spite of the fact that it has been an established doctrine in the Christian church for centuries and has spread throughout the whole world.[190] For no one is worthy of worship other than God and no one should be considered so holy or innocent to be associated with God.[191]

For initiating this heresy, St. Paul plays the role of villain as he does so often in Muslim theological circles:

> The whole foundation of the doctrine of sonship, which is attributed to St. Paul, rests on the idea that man is constituted in sin from his creation. Hence, for his salvation it is necessary that there be an atonement. This atonement could be effected by God's attribute of mercy descending in the form of the son of God. By the blood of his sacrifice, he cleansed the children of Adam from their sins. In rejecting this idolatrous idea, the Qur'ān affirms the power and independence of God.

> It says: 'Why do you consider God so weak and impoverished that unless he makes a man his son and puts him on the cross, he is not able to find a way to save his servants? One who is in need of others to accomplish his work may act this way. But you yourselves concede that God cannot be wanting. By his very will alone his works are accomplished.'[192]

Āzād also points out how Christians worship Mary, a custom which prevailed among Christians before Luther's reformation and which continues among Roman Catholics to the present day.[193] Though the Qur'ān strongly refutes any attribution of divinity to Jesus and Mary, it "utters not a syllable" in rejection of the virgin birth of Jesus, nor, however, does it conclusively support it.[194] In the dispute which ensued among the Jews and the Christians about the character of Mary, the Qur'ān has been obliged to function as an arbiter. Regarding the purity of Mary, the Qur'ān supports Luke's account. But it also rejects the presumptuous conclusion which Christians consider an indispensable support to their doctrine of Christ's divinity, that Christ must be the son of God because he was born of a virgin. How does the Qur'ān do this? By merely stating that Joseph is the father of Christ it could tear in shreds the whole fabric of Christian rationale regarding Christ's divinity. However, its method of argument and protest requires it simply to ask how a slave, a man who was human

in every respect and in need of a mother's womb, could be considered to be God or the son of God. In the midst of the discussion, Āzād says:

> The origin of the Trinity is derived from Serapis, a philosophically saturated, idolatrous idea of Alexandria; Mary is substituted for Isis, and Christ for Horus.[195]

The Qur'ān also rejects the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which Āzād, as we have seen, believes to be derived from philosophical paganism.[196]

> They have so exaggerated their love and esteem for Jesus that they have made him the son of God and have created in the place of one God a doctrine of three gods: father, son, and holy spirit.[197]

We have already seen indications of Āzād's rejection of the Jewish slander that they crucified Jesus and his attitude toward the atonement, a doctrine which clashes with his oft-repeated assertion that salvation is founded on faith in God and on good works.[198]

> And (also) their saying: 'We (crucified and) killed Jesus, the son of Mary who (according to his claim) was an apostle of God.' Nevertheless, (the truth is that) neither did they kill nor destroy by crucifixion [sic]. But the reality of the situation was concealed from them (that is, what really happened is that they thought: 'We crucified the Messiah, nevertheless, they were not able to do so). Without doubt those people also who have differed regarding this (that is, the Christians who say that the Messiah was crucified but afterwards rose again) have fallen into doubt. They have no knowledge and merely conjecture. The Jews certainly did not kill Jesus, but Allāh took him to himself. And Allāh is mighty over all and (in all his works) wise (4:157-158).[199]

As further commentary, Āzād adds:

> The meaning of 'doubt' in this passage can also signify that the personality of the Messiah became concealed and in his place another was put on the cross, and it can also signify that the death of the Messiah became concealed. He was alive but they considered him dead.[200]

On the day of judgment, says Āzād, there will be no recommendations. He wonders whether any idea could be more totally perverse than the Christian notion of atonement for men's sins and their picture of Jesus as saviour and mediator.[201]

But the punishment which falls upon Christians because of these vain beliefs does not await the judgment day only. According to Āzād, the Qur'ān predicted an imminent judgment upon them which was fulfilled some twenty-five years after the coming of Sūratu-l-Mariam. Amazement fell upon the whole Christian world at the report that Jerusalem had fallen into foreign hands.[202] A similar fate soon confronted all of Christian Asia and Africa.

Āzād also notes several other errors current among Christians at the time of the Qur'ān, many of them analogous to the errors of the Jews: the inferiority of women in Christian society, the opposition to the change of the qiblah, the rejection of the Qur'ān by the people,

even though they knew it to be true.[203] In addition, he singles out the extravagance of monastic life and its flight from the world, though he is in accord with the Qur'ān in his praise for the tenderness and humility of the monks.[204] Āzād loses no sympathy with the Christian doctrine of baptism. He translates as follows:

> (The way of guidance and salvation has no need of any ceremonial baptism, that is, colouring, as the Christians practise it). It is of Allāh to colour and, pray tell, can there be any colouring better than that of Allāh.... 2:138.[205]

For Āzād, this ceremony is no substitute for God's baptism by which men's hearts are coloured in the colour of devotion to God.[206]

Perhaps what is most significant of all are Āzād's brief comments regarding the New Testament and its development. After noting the similarity between the Qur'ān and the four Gospels concerning certain events in the lives of Zechariah and John the Baptist, he points out that the four Gospels contain nothing about Mary's birth and her early upbringing in the temple.[207]

> But in the nineteenth century, the manuscript of the rejected gospels which was recovered from the Vatican library provided this lost portion of Mary's birth. From this it is evident that at least until the beginning of the fourth century, A.D., this portion of the account also was believed to be inspired in the same way as the remaining portions are so believed.
>
> By the 'abandoned gospels' are meant the more than twenty-one gospels which were current and common among Christians from the first century to the

> beginning of the fourth. In 325 A.D., the Council of Nicaea selected four and the rest were considered as rejected. This selection was not made on any historical or rational basis, but a kind of omen was observed and its indication was considered as final.[208]

Perhaps we can best summarize the state of the people of the Book in Āzād's own words by reference to a tradition of Tirmidhī attributed to Muḥammad regarding the conclusion of Sūratu-l-Fātiḥah:

> 'The angered upon' are the Jews and 'the astray' are the Christians. But certainly in the commentary 'the angered upon' cannot refer to the Jews alone, and 'the astray' cannot refer to the Christians alone. Rather reference to these two groups serves as an example for illuminating the state of 'being astray' and 'being angered upon'. Accordingly, the history of these two groups affords us a perfect example of these two states of depravity. For 'being angered upon' the national history of the Jews, and for 'being astray' the history of the Christians offer a supreme source of exhortation and admonition.[209]

5. Islām

> After relating the depravity of the former peoples, it became necessary to clarify that now the grace of God had selected the followers of the Quranic summons for the service of the truth, and that the thread of world guidance had been entrusted into their hands.[210]

Abraham had prayed for the appearance of this firm community; the previous books had prophesied the coming of Muḥammad.[211] No geographical or national limitations govern the message which comes through Muḥammad; he has been sent for all.[212] The true believer is he who truly repents and turns to God, who worships at the appointed times as well as leading a life

of worship, who praises God, who walks the path of God, including the hajj, who bows before God, who promotes good and discourages evil in himself and in others, and who preserves the limitations ordained by God.[213]

> History has preserved the evidence of that test of faithful love which the noble companions underwent, and it needs no clarification. Without the least exaggeration, it may be said that no community of men in the world has ever loved any man with such wholeness of heart and spirit as the companions loved the prophet of Allāh on the way of truth. They sacrificed everything that man can sacrifice on this way of truth; yet on the same way they found everything which any community of men can find.[214]

Surrounding this eulogy of the Muslim community, however, are Āzād's frequent allusions to the fact that the central assertion of the Qur'ān rests in its proclamation of an universal guidance for men in every age.[215] To lose sight of this fact is to invite chaos. Only biased opinion which has failed to examine the facts, says Āzād, will charge the Qur'ān with establishing sectarianism.

Though all religions are true in a sense, and though the Qur'ān praises that minority of people who cling to their true religion, the majority of the followers of these earlier religions have deviated from the path of their religions; and the Qur'ān has come to summon them back to the truth.[216] In confirming previous

revelations, the Qur'ān clearly does not claim to be the sole repository of truth, nor to introduce a new religion, nor to condemn the old religions.[217] Since it merely refers men, who are divided, back to their own religions and assumes its objective to be attained if they return to their original religions, why then do men quarrel with the Qur'ān?[218] If they accept their religions as they originally were, they automatically embrace the Qur'ān also.[219]

Yet, however much Āzād eulogizes the message of the Qur'ān and Muslim society in early infancy, he is well aware that moths have eaten holes into the fabric of Muslim society during the past thirteen centuries. As he wistfully recalls the golden age of infant Islām when Muslims cultivated a spirit of mutual brotherhood and love, he turns to the reality of the vast contemporary Muslim community in India and in the world, a community marked only by weakness and strife.[220] Muslims have become ensnared in the very same traps from which the Qur'ān sought to release the people of the Book.[221] They now resemble the Arabs who lived in the age of ignorance.[222]

To the Muslim community, God had given the religious name of "Muslim" only.[223] But the community

divided itself into many sects, each fighting against the other.[224] Later generations who have been caught in the net of taqlīd blindly venerate the errors of their forefathers by giving allegiance to various schools and religious teachers.[225] After thirteen hundred years they continue to dispute the original selection of the khalīfah.[226] They can no longer distinguish between tadhkīr and tawkīl.[227] Thus Muslims have invited chaos and disaster into their midst.[228]

As a possible clue for their current degradation, Āzād suggests that the Muslim community ponder the words which the Qur'ān directed to the hypocrites:

> They say: 'We believe in Allāh and the last day, but they do not believe.'[229]

They are prepared to hear the Qur'ān and consider that hearing it apart from practising it suffices.[230] Like the Jews, they are confident that God has mercy on them and are indifferent to good works. When they fall a prey to sin, they assure themselves that they can resort to a pīr, or to a special namāz, or to a festival as a means of escaping punishment for their evil.[231]

> ...It is evident how far the present Muslim mentality has drifted from Islām. Like the Arabs in the days of ignorance, they begin to prefer conventional virtues to the virtues of Islam.... It must be remembered that God does not consider conventional virtues to be virtues.[232]

Some of the doctrinal aberrations of Muslims regarding the attributes of God have already been

considered.[233] Āzād also notes some Muslim misconceptions regarding the signs of the day of judgment.[234] But, though the Salaf, as well as a few others like Ibn Taymīyah are exceptions, in general the more popular Quranic expositors, though occasionally commended, are subject to sharp criticism and sometimes caustic ridicule. Regarding Pharoah's question and Moses' answer in 20:49, Āzād says:

> If this question were asked Imām Fakhru-l-Dīn Rāzī, he would spend the whole night in discussing it and the whole matter would be confused. But Moses was one who summons, not one who debates and argues...[235]

And again on Surah 21:

> Verse sixteen is among the most important proof texts of the Qur'ān, but as usual our commentators had no opportunity to consider it...[236]

CHAPTER IV

A CRITIQUE

> You are not endowed with sight, else negligence is vision You are not endowed with understanding of speech, else silence is discourse.[1]

1. Introduction

In the foot notes we already have noted some comments and criticisms with reference to Āzād's thesis and his exposition of his thesis. Because of the tremendous breadth of his subject matter, it is impossible to comment in detail on all aspects of his analysis of religion and religions, even if one were competent to do so. This fact, however, need not deter us from attempting an evaluation of the theories which are at the foundation of his thesis and from examining briefly his presentation of the various religions. In general it appears that Āzād has demonstrated the validity of this thesis on Quranic grounds. On the other hand his appeal to the science of comparative religions and to the history of the various religions to support his thesis is not convincing.

2. Āzād's Thesis and the Qur'ān

On the basis of the Qur'ān it is possible for Āzād to deduce strong evidence to show the following: man's need of divine guidance and the availability of this

guidance;[2] that this guidance is from God;[3] the original unity of men in one community and their later divisions into separate communities;[4] the universal scope of the message;[5] the uniform nature of the message;[6] that the message of the Qur'ān is the same as the message delivered to previous prophets;[7] that men should make no distinction among the prophets;[8] that there is an established and inflexible religion of God;[9] that this religion is called al-Islām;[10] and that no other religion is acceptable before God.[11]

The Qur'ān also indicates that: there is variation in ritual;[12] such ritual does not form the core of righteousness;[13] that men have split their religion and created sectarianism;[14] that the Jews and Christians consider themselves exclusive communities.[15]

The evidence of the Qur'ān thus supports Āzād's thesis that there is only one true religion which Āzād calls dīn, that all religions revealed to men prior to the Quranic dispensation were one in essence with the message of the Qur'ān, and that therefore all revealed religions are in origin the true religion.[16] Though the Qur'ān maintains a discreet silence regarding the spread of religion to most communities, ample Quranic evidence shows that even from the time of Adam, God has enjoined a

religion upon man based on the worship of one God and on good works which has devolved through revelation to men in the form of guidance and covenant.[17]

By his attempt to indicate the common denominator between Islām and other religions, Āzād has evoked the common Muslim criticism that he has degraded Islām to the level of other religions.[18] It remains with the critics to disprove Āzād's thesis on Quranic grounds. The currently common Muslim interpretation of abrogation is hardly the solution; nor is the exaltation of the Qur'ān, the prophet, and the early Muslim community;[19] nor the appeal to the Quranic statement that there is a people who has not been warned.[20] In reply to such criticism, Āzād probably would insist that he is not degrading Islām but elevating the other religions as they originally were to the level of Islām. Here also the witness of the Qur'ān would not forsake him.

Less convincing is Āzād's evidence for <u>shar</u>^{c} and <u>minhāj</u>, though evidence there is. The only specific Quranic example of <u>shar</u>^{c} which Āzād cites refers to the direction of worship, and this example he envelops in a cloud of verbosity. Elsewhere in the commentary he frequently alludes to the pillars of Islām. His many references to <u>namāz</u> especially and its intimate link with worship would suggest that it belonged to the category of <u>dīn</u>.[21] But does it? And do the others? If any or all

belong to this category, then they must be found in all religions as these religions originally existed. If they are found in all religions, are they found in their Islamic form? If not, in just which form are they found, if the form may be distinguished from the content?

Or do any or all of the pillars belong to the category of <u>shar^{c}</u>? Again must we distinguish between the content or the activity, and the form in which it manifests itself? If they belong to the category of <u>shar^{c}</u>, even though they be found in other religions, they must be considered to be of secondary importance and not of the essence of religion in any religious community.

In all probability, Āzād would not subscribe to this latter alternative. Nevertheless he has left us without conclusive elucidation on the subject. Whether or not he or his followers would consider these questions important, his supporters are obliged to answer such questions which arise from more orthodox circles if his theology is to maintain any vitality within the Muslim community as well as other religious communities. The answers to these questions will shape a Muslim's attitude not only to his own religion and community; they will also shape his attitude to other religions. That there are difficulties here it is hard to deny. Deeply embedded within all these difficulties, however, is the inherent

difficulty which confronts any theology which is essentially based on law. And Āzād's theology seems to be no exception to this rule.

Yet, our orthodox friend may add, granted that there is a common religion, and granted that there is some Quranic evidence to call it dīn: etymologically and Quranically, however, is dīn the most appropriate designation for expressing what Āzād wishes this category of religion to express?

It would seem that dīn has several distinct meanings in the Qur'ān. His limited exposition of the word, especially falling as it does under his discussion of yawmu-d-dīn, leaves something to be desired. Nor does he always seem to be consistent in his use of it. Even though he does show a preference for it, why does he prefer it to "Islām" when he is able to equate it with "Islām"? Is it possible that he is actually operating with a double definition of Islām: the Islām which is dīn or the essence of religion which all religions share; and the Islām composed of both dīn and shar^{c}, which the Muslim community has received from God? If shar^{c} does not belong to the Islām of the Muslim community, what distinguishes the Muslim community from other communities? It may be admitted that Āzād or his supporters could answer these questions. In his commentary, however, Āzād does seem to operate with this double definition. But, to repeat, all

this hardly affects his thesis. What is lacking is an elucidation of the functional details. Could Āzād or his supporters provide an elucidation on the basis of the Qur'ān? Without this elucidation could his thesis be acceptable to the Muslim community?

3. Creation, God and His Attributes

At times Āzād's harsh criticism of previous Quranic commentaries may disturb us. His concern and the concern of other like-minded expositors, however, to divest Quranic exposition of Greek categories and premises and to return to the original simplicity of Quranic logic and the context in which it was delivered augur well for saner Quranic exegesis and a healthier approach to theological and historical realities. As Āzād indicates, the Qur'ān appeals through nature to the existence of one God. Though in the process he discourses little on the crude idolatry against which the Qur'ān warns, seldom is he more edifying than when he reminds us of God's purpose and handiwork in creation, the order and beauty of nature, and the witness which the creation bears to its creator, a salutary reminder of which all of us who belong to an industrial and "civilized" society are normally in dire need.

Whether or not, however, what Āzād extracts as commentary from the Sūratu-l-Fātiḥah is really there is

another question. The basic Quranic proclamation that there is no god but God and that God is creator is hardly explicit in this surah. Nor does Āzād in his whole exposition of the attributes of God in nature really grapple with those elements of nature which are "red in tooth and claw."[22]

It may be more than merely dramatic to ask how often the expositors of the holy books (or the critics of these expositors) visit the other side of the tracks where dwell the masses who are more aware of that distorted face of nature. It is more than intellectual immaturity which brings the poor and the suffering to mould Kali or her likeness out of their environmental clay. No doubt, "the heavens are telling the glory of God; and the firmament proclaims his handiwork."[23] Alongside this glorious affirmation, however, "we know that the whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now...."[24]

To reveal God as merciful, as just, and as al-Rabb (as Āzād explains it) requires more than natural revelation, or for that matter, legislation.[25] In addition, Āzād's effort to redeem God's attribute of wrath scarcely does justice to natural revelation, to the Qur'ān, or even to Sūratu-l-Fātihah. One would suspect that with this the Salaf would agree.[26]

4. Devolution and Evolution

Āzād needs no justification for his research into the science of comparative religions. Though his studies of this science probably form the most original and interesting development of his thesis, in some respects the conclusions which he draws from these studies are disappointing. Nevertheless, however unsatisfactory the results and whatever be said in criticism of his labours in this field, the fact still remains that Āzād has studied extensively, and in some instances, intensively, the Scriptures and dogma of other religions as well as those of Islām. He has sought knowledge in China, if we may paraphrase the Muslim tradition, which is much more than his present critic has done. Still a few comments relevant especially to the theories may be in place.

(a) Man's original concept of God Āzād's appeal to the conclusions of the study of primitive religions to support the theory that primitive man originally worshipped one God appear to rest solely on the conclusions of W. Schmidt. It may be granted that nineteenth century comparative religionists operated with the defective premise of material evolution in reconstructing the history of religion. On the other hand, is the twentieth century study of comparative religions so far advanced that

on the basis of this study one can conclude without hesitation and without qualification that the original religious concept of men everywhere is a concept of the unity of God? And is there such unanimity among qualified scholars of the ancient civilizations that all the earliest traditions of all these civilizations indicate that man originally worshipped one God only? These are amazing assertions. Regarding history as well as almost any phase of human knowledge, it is still judicious to preserve a spirit of humble agnosticism. It has been well said that our knowledge of ancient history resembles the man who periodically throws the beam of his flashlight on small areas of a large, dark room.

Moreover, in attempting to show that the Qur'ān supports man's original worship of one God only, Āzād cites only two passages.[27] Though the possibility of more Quranic support need not be denied, it must be said that the passages cited are not very convincing. Again one wonders if Āzād has not made his own study of comparative religions a basic premise of his work and then laboured hard to adjust the findings of comparative religions to fit his premise.

In any case, to assert that all primitive societies and civilizations espoused the original worship

of one God and that man's concept of the unity of God has undergone a devolutionary change is probably more than the Qur'ān intends to say. The Qur'ān only says that originally mankind was one, that they fell into variance, and that God sent messengers to announce glad tidings and to warn all communities.[28] It would seem, therefore, that Āzād scarcely undergirds his Quranic thesis with his argument from comparative religions; nor, though he does not explicitly attempt this, can he really confirm his thesis from the tentative conclusions of comparative religions.

(b) Man's concept of the attributes of God

Āzād has detected a weak link in his chain of evidence in nature by which he arrives at the gracious attributes of God. The weakness becomes apparent in his attempt to interpret the evolution of man's concept of the divine attributes. According to Āzād, a thick veil of convulsion overshadows the beauteous face of nature, a veil which primitive man with his primitive intellect cannot penetrate as he attempts to comprehend God.[29] A superficially inimical nature and man's immature intellect combine to obstruct man's understanding of God. For when man conceives of God, he conceives of his attributes only; in conceiving of his attributes only, he attributes to God

the attribute of anger by virtue of the veil of disorder which rests over the face of nature; thus he begins to fashion gods who accord with the conclusions of his limited intellect. Only gradually does the slowly maturing mind of man penetrate this thick veil to behold the order and beauty of nature.

With man's original concept of one God and the devolution of this concept, Āzād couples the evolution of man's concept of the divine attributes. As a response and corrective to the devolution of man's concept of God and as an impetus to the evolution of man's concept of the divine attributes, God sends the prophets at various times to deliver to men the uniform message of religion in a manner which conforms with the capacity of man at these various stages.

Perhaps here more than anywhere, one would like to ask Āzād questions. Even granted for the moment the Quranic thesis that man originally worshipped one God; granted also that there is an evolution in man's understanding of God, be it coupled with devolution, or a series of devolutions and evolutions: if man intuitively grasps the unity of God, does this mean that he grasps only that God is one? And whether Islamically so defined or not, is not the unity of God really an attribute of God?

And if it is an attribute which man can understand, why cannot men who live in innocence and the unity of one community intellectually grasp other attributes of God as they really are?

Moreover, if the correct concept of the attributes of God plays such a vital role in man's conception of God and his unity, and yet primitive man cannot understand the attributes of God, what significance does his concept of God, even the concept of the unity of God, have for him? Why does God, who, according to Āzād, provides so graciously and in so orderly a manner, and with the provision the capacity to appropriate the provision, not also provide man with the intellectual capacity to grasp the attributes of God?

Is there in fact solid Quranic support for the evolution of man's concept of God's attributes? If so, where? If, in reply, Āzād would say that he needs no Quranic support for this fact of history, has Āzād really established the evolution of man's concept of God's attributes as an indisputable historical and religious fact? Does not this matter, as Āzād says about many other matters, belong to ʿ<u>ālam-i-ghayb</u>? To build the history of religion on such a theory of evolution and to pose this theory as historical and religious fact is to build on sand. In view of the nature of the problem and

the evidence which he does present Āzād could have indicated that the theory is only a theory. Though one should be very circumspect before accusing others of operating with dubious premises, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Āzād's theory of the evolution of man's concept of God's attributes is premised, consciously or unconsciously, on the need to show the finality and superiority of the Qur'ān. Be this suggestion of an Azadian premise right or wrong, Āzād virtually tells us that prior to the Qur'ān all men (with few exceptions?) had gone astray regarding God's attributes and that a vital function of the Qur'ān was to correct man's false concept of God's attributes.[30] He also states that prior to the Qur'ān, man's intellect had not attained an ability to grasp the proper concept of God's attributes. Only the Qur'ān offers a perfect concept of God's attributes. Presumably, therefore, man's intellectual capacity had reached at this moment the point where the proper concept of God's attributes could be grasped.

Elsewhere, however, Āzād seems to support the normal Muslim interpretation of jāhiliyah. The unlettered prophet lived as a simple Bedouin among simple Bedouins. Even operating with the order of laws with which Āzād operated, and even granted a law of inspiration which

endowed Muḥammad with the capacity to channel the final and perfect message to mankind, just what law endows these simple and idolatrous Bedouins (or, for that matter, the Jews and Christians of these areas whose concept of the attributes of God the Qur'ān is supposed to correct) with the intellectual capacity to grasp this perfect concept of God's attributes?

It is difficult to reconcile any normal Muslim doctrine of evolution with normal Muslim interpretation of jāhilīyah. Little if any genuine Quranic evidence exists to show the finality of the Quranic message. None whatsoever exists to show its superiority.[31] Whatever evidence does exist in the Qur'ān regarding the message of other religions points precisely to Āzād's thesis: that religion is one, that all religions as they were revealed are one, and that therefore all religions are true. By this theory of evolution, Āzād seems to do more of a disservice than a service to his own thesis.

It is relevant here to repeat Āzād's own statement regarding the attributes of God:

> The purpose of the proclamation of all the noble prophets was to save the world from this error and to create a pure concept of the divine attributes.[32]

(c) Anthropomorphism Obviously underlying Āzād's whole discussion of the evolution of man's concept of God's

attributes is the problem of anthropomorphism. According to Āzād, the uniqueness of the Quranic presentation of God's attributes rests in its perfectly transcendental expression of these attributes. The Quranic doctrine of tanzīh strikes a happy medium between the exaggerated affirmation of taʿṭīl and tajassum. In addition, the Qur'ān is unique in its statement of what God and his attributes are not.

Again one is compelled to ask if Āzād's basically Asharite definition of the attributes is really Quranic. In affirming that "nothing is like unto him" is the Qur'ān affirming this of God's attributes? Does the Qur'ān anywhere explicitly refer to any conception of God's essence and attributes in precisely these terms or even draw a distinction between them?

Though it may be argued that Rahbar overstates his case in drawing a sharp distinction between Greek and Semitic theologies, he correctly indicates that in its original delivery, the Qur'ān and the theology of seventh century Makkah and Madīnah have little or nothing in common with Athens.[33] Only later was Quranic theology packaged in a Hellenistic wrapper, and this wrapper is essentially foreign to the content of the Qur'ān itself.

But why appeal to Rahbar when Āzād affirms the

same thing? He also has sought to purge Islām of this foreign import. Has he, however, been able to sever completely his own connections from it? Though his understanding of the attributes may differ from the understanding of the scholastic theologians, his categories and formulae are essentially the same. Nor does his logic really differ. Is this then, to ask Āzād his own question, the logic of the Qur'ān? Did the Salaf understand God as essence and as a totality of attributes which are not he nor other than he? For that matter, did Muhammad or any of the companions have a vocabulary for or corresponding conceptions of these Greek subtleties? And if they did, were such subtleties really their primary concern?

Certainly Muhammad and the companions were mentally alert men. Certainly the Qur'ān within the context of idolatry is interested in correcting false conceptions of God. But neither Muhammad, nor the Salaf, nor the multitude of pagan Arabs, Jews, and Christians whom the Qur'ān addresses were philosophers or systematic theologians. As Rahbar correctly says, the Qur'ān was engaged in a struggle against the current forms of crude idolatry, against shirk and kufr, not against anthropomorphism, or in any case, anthropomorphic language.[34] Once more it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Āzād is attempting to establish the finality and the superiority

of the Qur'ān in an un-Quranic manner. And this he does, through his allusions to the maturity of the human intellect at this time, in a gnostic context!

In comparing identical events which are cited in the Old Testament and the Qur'ān, Āzād notes instances of anthropomorphic language in the Old Testament which the Qur'ān avoids. Similarly, Jesus is compelled to use the anthropomorphic father and son image, presumably because of his hearers' limited intellectual capacity, though Āzād also observes that this image is preferable to the still cruder image of husband and wife as portrayed in the pages of the Old Testament. Elsewhere, however, Āzād accepts the legitimacy of any figurative language in the Qur'ān. Such language is legitimate, says Āzād, because it is qualified by the fact that even when this language is used, God remains incomparable. How Āzād can assert the uniqueness of the Qur'ān in this matter in the face of Isaiah with which he has shown at least some familiarity is amazing:

> To whom will you compare me
> that I should be like him?
> says the Holy One (Is. 40:25).
>
> For thus says the Lord...
> 'I am the Lord, and there is no other...
> And there is no other god besides me
> a righteous God and a Savior;
> there is none besides me...
> For I am God, and there is no other.' (Is. 45:18-22)[35]

For twenty-three hundred years or more, to paraphrase Āzād again, this passage has stood in the Old Testament. If the world still does not understand....

No doubt the whole Bible is filled with anthropomorphic imagery. Almost a thousand years before the Qur'ān many Jews who came under the influence of Hellenism were very conscious of this fact. Efforts to divest the Old Testament of this imagery are especially evident in the Septuagint translation.[36] Thus, for example, instead of Moses climbing up to God, he climbs up the mountain of God (Ex. 19:3). Direct visions of God are changed in the LXX to a view of the place where God stands. The LXX alters "the hand of the Lord" to "the power of the Lord." (Josh. 4:24). In Jewish apocalyptic literature, numerous hypostases such as logos, sophia, and doxa serve as substitutes for direct designations of God. Philo and other radically Hellenized Jews frequently appeal to philosophical argument and to abstract and allegorical language in their interpretations of the Old Testament. It is doubtful if they or Maimonides would tolerate idolatry among the common folk. If Jeremias is correct in suggesting that various New Testament expressions are circumlocutions of the divine name, this same element of "de-anthropomorphizing" is probably involved in such circumlocutions also.[37]

It is interesting to note that Āzād acknowledges the presence of the Fatherhood of God in the New Testament. But why does he seem to consider the father-son relationship meet for an inferior intellectual capacity only? And why does he seem to have even a contempt for the Old Testament picture of God's relationship with Isarel as the relationship of man and wife? Moreover, is Āzād aware that the father-son relationship of the New Testament is rooted deeply in the pages of the Old Testament? Apart from a Freudian response to the relationships themselves or to Āzād's response to these relationships, suffice it to say that today as well as in ancient days many Jews and Christians, whose intellects are quite sound, have found in this imagery the means of expressing the deep and intimate relationship between God and men.[38] When Āzād indicates the deep personal relationship which exists between God and his servants and the need for men to reflect in their character the personal attributes of God, he himself draws high to those expressions which he otherwise considers inferior. His response seems stranger still when we recall his obvious love for poetry and his amazing facility in quoting it.

Behind the anthropomorphic language of the Bible rests, of course, the Biblical conviction that God is personal.

> The meaning of the many human descriptions of God in the Old Testament is not to bring God from afar to a level like that of man. The human likeness is not a humanization. And these descriptions were never thought of that way except in unfair polemic. Rather they are to make God accessible to man... They present God as person. They avoid the error of making God a static, unconcerned, abstract idea, or an inflexible principle. God is person, full of will, to be found in active discussion, prepared for his communication, open to the impact of human sin and supplication of human prayer and the weeping over human guilt; in a word, God is a living God.[39]

> The anthropomorphism of the Hebrew scriptures, which is so disturbing to the more delicate-minded, is no more than a determination to keep all thought of God, and all talk about God, on this personal level, and to use neither sub-personal symbols nor abstract notions. Hebrew faith will not place God among the particularities of existence, which are accessible to observation; but equally, it refuses to speak of God in universals or generalities, which are the fruit of speculation. It will worship neither the idols fashioned of wood and stone, nor the idols fashioned of reflection, which it calls frankly 'imagination'.[40]

We need not deny that theoretical difficulties exist in ascribing personality to God and that crude anthropomorphic language can lead to crude and immature conceptions of God which bring God to the level of man. The Bible, however, offers no scope for creating God in the image of man. It affirms that man was made in the image of God. Behind the personality of man is the personality of God as <u>datum</u>, not merely as theoretical possibility or as an object of speculation.[41]

Is not this ascription of personality to God a <u>datum</u> of the Qur'ān also: God who lives, wills, speaks,

acts, reveals, sees, hears and knows; who judges and is merciful; who sits on his throne; who has hands; and who comes?[42] To affirm that nothing can be compared with God does not establish the corollary that God is therefore not personal.[43] Quranically as well as Biblically, to divest God of his personality is to fashion God out of abstract intellectual clay into an impersonal image of an Hellenistic philosophy. Would the Salaf have done this? This would be truly devolution.

5. Other religions

(a) The Qur'ān and other religions To what extent, if at all, Āzād visualized the possibility of non-Muslims reading his commentary is a question which is difficult to answer. It would seem, however, that his commentary is written primarily for Muslims. This would explain, in part at least, why Āzād seems to operate within the Quranic framework and with Quranic premises in interpreting not only the history of religions but the various religions of the world as they existed at the time of the Qur'ān or as they exist today. That his methodology under any circumstances cannot be divorced from his Islamic faith is understandable; on the other hand the possibility of seeing another religion in the light of its own self-interpretation must be envisaged also. This he hardly does.

Āzād has noticed the limitation which the Qur'ān has imposed upon itself regarding comprehensive detail about many of the prophets and the areas in which they laboured. If his interpretations are correct, the Qur'ān generally confines its references to Arab, Persian, and especially Jewish prophets, with little or no reference to the prophets of other nations. These same Quranic limitations he imposes upon himself.[44]

(b) Other prophets not mentioned in the Qur'ān

The sole exception is Zoroaster, whom Āzād identifies with no one in the Qur'ān. Though he nowhere specifically calls Zoroaster a prophet, he leaves us in no doubt about Zoroaster's prophetic ministry. The attribution of prophethood to Cyrus is no exception, since he is identified with Dhū-l-Qarnayn. Though he is firm in his conclusion regarding the prophetic ministries of Zoroaster and Cyrus, he is also aware of some historical and theological difficulties involved in arriving at his conclusion. His affirmations regarding the Buddha and Socrates, though couched in eulogistic language reserved for the prophets, are less decisive and more guarded. Here he leaves us to intuite his personal feelings, which he refuses to commit to the care of his pen and the pages of his commentary.

(c) The religions of China, India, Iran

Āzād has achieved perhaps a more objective approach to the religions of China, India, and Iran than to those of the Jews, Christians, and pagan Arabs. We need not discuss the reasons for this. Even here, however, he imports Quranic categories into the discussion of the religions where such categories are not relevant. Do Hinduism, Buddhism, and the religions of China speak about revelation, prophets, revealed books, resurrection, judgment, etc., in a Quranic manner and with a Quranic content? Or, for that matter, did they ever speak this way? It may be agreed that there is a common deposit of ethical standards to which Āzād refers and which, in the language of the Bible, is the law of God written on the hearts of men.[45] But is this all that Āzād means by religion? How radically different the actual theology, the cultic practices, and, in some instances, the specific legislation (of which hardly all belongs to shari^{c}) of Islām from these religions as they have manifested themselves in the past and present. These variations may help to explain why Āzād appears to avoid the technical names of these various religions. He fails, however, to give any concrete historical evidence of a sustained movement in China or India which is truly analogous to Islām.

(d) The People of the Book In his interpretation of the People of the Book, Āzād deviates little from the theological and ethical portrayal of the Jews and Christians which is found in the Qur'ān. The question does arise, however, whether Āzād really continues to preserve the category of "People of the Book". How does he distinguish them from those who, Quranically speaking, are not of the People of the Book? Does it suffice to answer that parts of the Books which the Jews and Christians originally received have been preserved whereas the written revelations which were formerly in the possession of others have disappeared? Or does this Quranic category actually create a weak link in the thesis of Āzād? The whole matter is too complex to be considered here. Any discussion regarding Āzād's response to the matter, however, should give weight to his contention that Zoroaster received a written revelation which later was corrupted beyond recognition.

Seldom is Āzād more painfully correct than when he points to the sin of sectarianism. Though, according to Āzād, all religious communities, including the present Muslim community, share the burden of this guilt, his strictures, following the Quranic pattern, are directed especially against Judaism and Christianity as well as Arab paganism. The current Christian œcumenical movements

serve as an eloquent confirmation of Āzād's criticism of a fragmented Christianity. The New Testament also agrees with a part of the Quranic criticism of Judaism;[46] in fact, it strongly censures sectarianism among Christians.[47]

But is sectarianism always, if ever, the sin of sins, the purest manifestation of kufr, and the sharpest antithesis to religion, as Āzād seems to suggest? Is it the cause or the result of wrong belief in God? And is it always associated with pride and prejudice? Āzād's repeatedly unqualified and comprehensive judgments regarding such an association evoke the thought that he may suffer from the same maladies in their subtler intellectual forms. Whatever else may be said on the subject, it must be born in mind that Āzād himself is the one who establishes the criteria for measuring sectarianism.

Since the Old and New Testaments are so closely interrelated, it is appropriate at this point to consider briefly some of Āzād's comments regarding the Sermon on the Mount.[48] This is one of the few portions of the whole Bible to which Āzād pays some attention. To serve his purpose he has managed to sever it neatly from the rest of the Gospel context. We may agree with Āzād that some of its expositors have interpreted it as mere legislation and have considered it as totally impracticable. If we

accept Āzād's comments at their face value, however, it follows that both unsympathetic critics and naive followers of Christ (Āzād indicates no third category) have misinterpreted this message for nineteen hundred years until Āzād happened upon the scene, discovered that Jesus was using figurative language, and after all these years bequeathed to the world the true significance of Jesus' message.

Seldom have Christians interpreted all aspects of the Sermon on the Mount literally or considered the teaching of Jesus as impracticable. For cutting off the limb or turning the other cheek is no prescription for nor guarantee of a pure heart. On the other hand, who can deny that a pure heart has driven a Cranmer or an Origen (who was a master of allegorical interpretation) to interpret the words of Jesus in a painfully literal manner?

Āzād could have recalled also that loving one's neighbour is an Old Testament command and that all the injunctions of Jesus as ethical injunctions in the Sermon on the Mount find their parallels in ancient Jewish literature. Inherent in the Sermon, however, are the demands which Jesus makes upon the disciples of the Kingdom of God in relation to his own person and his estimate of human nature. His teaching is inseparably linked with the

Old Testament, with the acts and the promises of God which precede the demands, and with himself.[49] The sermon is for disciples. In it he shows the way in which men who have tasted the grace of God will respond to the commands of God. In it we may also see the pattern of Jesus' personal islām.

(i) Judaism Āzād has little favourable to say about the Jews. The principal exception centers in his discussion of Cyrus as a prophet, where he notes the reasonable response of the Jews in accepting Cyrus as messiah and prophet.

Āzād notes that only the Jews in Yathrib err in calling Ezra the son of God. Otherwise it appears that the perversions of the small Jewish community in Yathrib are merely symptomatic of the perversions of Jewry everywhere. According to Āzād, the message of Jesus offers the Jews a final opportunity for correction; later he tells us that Islām offers them another opportunity. Both times their fate was sealed for ever!

Though the Jews err in considering themselves a special people by virtue of their descent from Abraham, it would seem, however, that Āzād consigns the children of those Jews unto the third and fourth generation and more to a bitter fate of shame and adversity because they are

Jews. Jewish fathers in Yathrib eat sour grapes and the teeth of Jewish children everywhere are set on edge.[50]

We may appreciate the difficulties which Āzād encounters in a theology which singles out a chosen nation. Nevertheless Āzād shows no attempt to understand the Biblical claim that God did choose the Jews and the reason why he chose them as a special nation. Nor does he reckon with the Quranic testimony to their exalted role in history. Similarly we may agree with many of the criticisms which Āzād has levelled against Jewish behaviour towards the Muslim community. Āzād, however, makes no attempt to understand any possible Biblical or theological difficulties which may have confronted a sincere and pious Jew in accepting the message of Islām. Without doubt, no matter how perverted the Jewish conception of the Messiah may have been, the hope of the Messiah, so deeply inscribed in Jewish Scriptures, was involved within these difficulties. It may be said frankly that the ministry of Muḥammad hardly could serve as the fulfillment of these Jewish aspirations. Nor is the Jewish rejection of Jesus as the Messiah a perfect parallel to the Jewish rejection of Muḥammad.

(ii) Christianity The pages of Āzād's commentary show little understanding of and no sympathy for the proclamation and doctrines of the Christian Church.

He casually dismisses the doctrines of Jesus' sonship and the Trinity as later accretions to the original Christian faith. The former he attributes to an exaggerated reverence for a human personality; the latter he considers to be derived from Alexandrian Hellenism. The picture of Jesus as saviour and mediator and the doctrine of the atonement are products of a perverse imagination which hinge upon the Christian teaching of original sin. The question whether the Qur'ān represents any or all of these doctrines as they are rooted in the Bible or expounded in the classical Christian creeds does not arise.[51] In most, if not all cases, his actual commentary on Quranic verses with reference to cardinal Christian doctrines and the underlying theology is disappointingly abrupt. Even with regard to the historicity of Christ's death, which the Qur'ān denies, Āzād offers no adequate Quranic or Biblical exposition. Nor, apart from the mere mention of the fact that Christians believe in the resurrection of Christ, is there any effort to plumb the depths of the significance of Jesus' resurrection as God's vindication of his servant's perfect islām unto death. For Āzād, the Messiah simply teaches devotion to God and good works as the way of salvation.

That there are doctrinal differences among Christians cannot be denied. Āzād's attempt to reconcile

these differences, however, is hardly the solution to the unity of the faith.[52] For common to all Christians with few exceptions is the confession that God himself has come into this world in Christ Jesus. And common to all Christians is the confession that the death of Christ is of central importance in the life of Christ: the proclamation of the gospel in contrast with the law. For men and for their salvation God himself has torn the veil which conceals him in order to reveal himself as Lord, as merciful, and as just. This is a message of incarnation, not idolatrous apotheosis, an absolutely vital distinction which Āzād fails to draw in his commentary.[53]

In affirming that Jesus is Immanuel, the New Testament affirms that God is one in action and demonstration.

> Der urchristliche Monotheismus wird durch die Christologie des NT nicht erschuettert, sondern sichergestellt; denn Christus nimmt durch sein Kommen dem Fuersten der Welt die Macht.[54]

Nor is the doctrine of the Trinity a denial of this affirmation. Trinitarian theology as it was formulated in the early church did not serve as a subtle concession to polytheism; it stood as a bulwark of defense on behalf of the unity of God. Its roots are deeply entrenched in the New Testament.[55]

If then the message of Jesus centres in his life, and his life in his death on the cross, Āzād's contention that all religions are one in origin is incorrect.[56]

6. Conclusion

In summary it may be said:

1. According to Āzād there is only one true religion. All religions in origin are one. Therefore all religions are originally true. Within the Qur'ān Āzād can find evidence to substantiate this thesis.

There is also Qur'anic evidence to substantiate the presence of the categories of dīn and shar^{c} and the relative values which Āzād assigns to them, though in the case of the latter the evidence is less. His description of both categories, however, is deficient in detail. This deficiency is bound to arouse a reaction within the Muslim community in regard to its attitude to Islām and to other religions. This difficulty may be further accentuated by Āzād's choice of vocabulary which he uses to designate religions.

2. Āzād's efforts to return to an interpretation of the Qur'ān which is natural to the Qur'ān and which the Qur'ān itself demands is commendable. By heeding the Quranic appeal to nature, Āzād attempts to reconstruct the Quranic doctrines of God's unity and his attributes. However edifying his exposition at points, his one-sided

approach to nature and his efforts to distill the substance of the Quranic doctrine of God from Sūratu-l-Fātiḥah hardly do justice to the revelation of nature or the revelation of the Qur'ān. His doctrine of the God of religion accordingly suffers. In his exposition on the evolution of man's concept of God's attributes, he exposes a part of this weakness.

3. However greatly we may appreciate Āzād's research into the science of comparative religions, we are compelled to note the limited source materials which he uses to establish that man's original religious concept everywhere was a concept of the unity of God and that this concept has undergone a devolution. Comparative religions cannot claim that Āzād's assertions on behalf of this science are final and beyond dispute. In resorting to such evidence, Āzād hardly supports his thesis. The theory itself as Āzād has presented it finds little Quranic sanction.

4. Āzād's idea of the evolution of man's concept of the attributes of God is also essentially theory. Posed side by side with his theory of devolution and his claim for the vital role which the proper concept of the attributes of God plays in religion, his theory of evolution accentuates the difficulties inherent in the

theory itself. Again there is little or no Quranic evidence to support this theory; in fact, the Quranic revelation and the circumstances in which it was revealed tend to contradict this theory. Nor is there any conclusive evidence from history or the other religions to support this theory. Āzād uses his theory as a means of validating his belief that the Qur'ān is the culmination of revelation and alone offers the perfect concept of God's attributes, a belief which itself is theory and is devoid of convincing Quranic witness. In one instance at least his exposition seems to contradict his theory.

5. Involved in his discussion of the evolution of man's concept of God's attributes is anthropomorphism. In posing anthropomorphism as a major problem, it would seem that Āzād slips into those subtle nets of Hellenism from which he would release others. He diverts the Qur'ān from its battle against Arab idolatry and disobedience to do battle against anthropomorphism on alien territory. His affirmation that there is nothing like God assumes the Qur'ān, in spite of its anthropomorphic language, to be uniquely equipped to do battle against anthropomorphism. Āzād has neglected the parallel passage of the Old Testament when he speaks of the uniqueness of the Qur'an in this respect.

6. Āzād's discussion of other religions offers no concrete evidence to show that all religions are one in origin. Though he can speak in glowing terms about other religious personalities, he ventures to attribute a prophetic ministry to only one man who is not already designated as a prophet in the Qur'ān. His attempts at objective studies of other religions which are not mentioned in the Qur'ān operate with a series of a priori categories which may be foreign to these religions. With the possible exception of Zoroastrainism his argument is not convincing. Here also his argument for the original oneness of all religions is historically defective.

In his discussion of Judaism and Christianity, his Quranic premises are even more glaring. His analysis of their basic aberrations is incorrect. He offers no proof to show that these religions originally conformed to "religion" as he has defined it. While discussing these religions, he makes use only of those portions of the Bible which support his thesis. Other portions he reinterprets, overlooks, or dismisses.

For Āzād, the Qur'ān not only interprets the Qur'ān; the Qur'ān also interprets the Bible or any other source materials which are vital to an understanding of the various religions. In fact, it appears that the Qur'ān

is the final interpreter of all religions and of the history of these religions.

But these conclusions are for others to judge.

Ask not what my defective pen has written
This dust of my mind is a portrayal of my own dust.[57]

APPENDIX I

AZAD'S USE OF "LAW"

It is difficult to discuss fully Āzād's use of "law" in relation to God and the whole universe. He has offered us no detailed exposition of its use and significance. Since, however, he continually resorts to it within his translation of the Qur'ān as well as the commentary, some general observations should be noted.

According to Āzād, Allāh's will is the cause of everything; everything is within his knowledge and control, free from change.[1] We may presume that his will is also the cause of law and the various laws. There is really only one law which is dressed in various forms.[2] As there are laws which govern the natural world, there are laws which govern the spiritual world.[3] Everything is regulated for all things and all creatures.[4] As there are laws for individuals, there are laws for societies.[5] According to law, revelation appears at various times and every nation has a prophet.[6] The events of the prophets are recited to make clear the law and its unchangeable nature.[7] There is a law of the victory of truth over error;[8] a law of the survival of the beneficial;[9] a law of destruction;[10] a law of the rise and fall of nations, of life and death;[11] a law of mercy;[12] a law of recompense;[13]

a law of punishment;[14] a law of God which seals the hearts of sinners;[15] a law of leading astray;[16] a law for the day of decision;[17] a law which demands the resurrection;[18] a law against compulsion.[19]

These indications of Āzād's attitude towards law by no means exhaust his references on the subject. Again one wonders, however, how much of his presentation is fact or only theory. Does he posit this law or series of laws under the influence of modern science? Does God operate in the universe solely through the mediation of law? Is everything subsumed under a mechanical operation of cause and effect? Is there ever a conflict of laws, or a suspension of one law so that another may operate? More specifically, what about miracle? What law operates in the choice of a prophet? Why is one prophet more successful than another on earth? What law operates so that John is beheaded but Jesus escapes death on the cross? However trite these and similar questions may be, they do arise when one posits a law or a series of laws of unchangeable nature, operating everywhere at every time.

It may be relevant here to recall that science is now less dogmatic than in a previous age about the existence of firm laws of nature and its ability to discover them. Scientific laws are scientific hypotheses which are subject to change and, in one respect at least,

are the product of human observation and experience.[20] If man is a product of nature and is subject to nature's laws (whatever they may be), scientific laws are, as mental constructs, the inventions of men.[21] These laws cannot be absolutely proved under all circumstances nor can they serve as an infallible means for predicting what will happen.[22]

In his effort to infiltrate the whole universe with law, does Āzād, to use Quranic imagery, barter the signs of a personal God in purchasing his system of law? And if so, Quranically speaking, does he not pay a heavy price for a dubious commodity? For his system of law is only theory, and at points, dubious theory. One who reads newspapers or weekly news magazines or, for that matter, one who reads the Qur'ān may find it difficult to detect the law of man's spiritual progress.

APPENDIX II

ĀZĀD'S COMMENTARY ON SŪRAH 2:105

> One sharīᶜat has appeared after another sharīᶜat because either the former was abrogated or it was forgotten. Naskh means that something which previously existed has ceased to exist. In its place something else has come. Nisyān means to forget. Thus in some situations it has happened that the former sharīᶜat was present in some form or other, but circumstances changed; or else its followers had lost its spirit in practice. It was therefore necessary that a new sharīᶜat appear. In some situations it has happened that after a prolonged period of time the former teaching was forgotten completely and nothing remained of the original. The renewal of guidance was therefore naturally inevitable.
>
> Be the code of laws abrogated or forgotten, it is the divine way that the new teaching will be better than the previous teaching or will resemble it. It will not be inferior. For the principle is progress and perfection, not decline and degeneration.[1]

Is Āzād's commentary in reference to previous religious dispensations, or to the Islamic dispensation, or to both?

APPENDIX III

ĀZĀD'S COMMENTARY ON SŪRAH 3:7

...Two basic types of teaching always are included in the Book of God; muḥkam and mutashābih. By muḥkam are meant those propositions which are of a fundamental nature and which are therefore clear and self-evident decrees to the human mind: for examples, the unity of God and the apostolic office, commands and prohibitions, the legal and the illegal. By mutashābih are meant those propositions which are related to the realities beyond comprehension and which cannot be grasped by human knowledge and sense perception: for examples, the being of God, life after death, the state of the afterworld and the reality of pumishment and reward. Hence it is unavoidable that they be described in a manner which is not unbearable to human understanding. For this reason the description will not be free from simile and metaphor. If someone out of perversity is given to disputation, he can create presuppositions which will lead to all kinds of arguments and a variety of meanings.

Therefore people whose knowledge is sound and who think aright recognize muḥkamāt as fundamental and as sufficient for guidance and action. They will not pursue after mutashābihāt, since this venture is an unprofitable activity. By virtue of a profound understanding and the perfection of knowledge, they realize the fact that the perception of the reality of mutashabihāt is beyond the reach of human reason. They are not contra-rational but ultra-rational. Man can believe in them but he cannot discover them. Therefore they say: 'Whatever is in the Word of God we believe; beyond this we do not wish to venture.'

But those whose minds are perverse engage in a pursuit after mutashābihāt and corrupt (men's) faith and belief.

APPENDIX IV

GOD AS FATHER AND HUSBAND IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

The portrayals of God as Husband and as Father are two of the richest and most profound concepts of God in the Old Testament. Fundamental to these concepts is the covenant relation which God has established with his people, a personal relationship by no means foreign to the Qur'ān. That both concepts are sharply echoed in the New Testament is further witness to the close connection between both Testaments.

God is portrayed as a Bridegroom to his people.[1] The God who is the creator of the whole earth is Husband to his people.[2] He is the Father who created and gave birth to his people, the Father of the fatherless and protector of widows.[3]

> Have we not all one father? Has not one God created us? Why then are we faithless to one another, profaning the covenant of our fathers?[4]

So Israel can be portrayed as a faithless wife, or as a rebellious harlot, or as sons (and daughters), or as a son.[5]

Fundamental to this covenant relationship is the mercy of God:

> As a father pities his children, so the Lord pities those who fear him. For he knows our frame; he remembers that we are dust.[6]

He is ever faithful and his love is stronger than the love of mother or father: "For my father and my mother have forsaken me, but the Lord will take me up."[7]

The Fatherhood of God, may we say, is the culmination of God's beautiful names, the all-encompassing descriptive of his covenant relationship with men, the mark of his words, his actions, and his being, especially as we find the consummation of his revelation in Jesus.

APPENDIX V

THE SCRIPTURES

As Āzād praises all religions in origin and proclaims the worth of every prophet, so he upholds all written Scriptures as receptacles of the true message of God. On the basis of the Qur'ān he speaks in glowing terms about the Scriptures which are mentioned in the Qur'ān. He also quotes copiously from them.[1]

These Scriptures, however, he surrounds with certain reservations. For Āzād some of the facts regarding the events described in the Tawrāt which have been changed or forgotten are corrected by the Qur'ān.[2] He considers the first part of Genesis especially to be untrustworthy.[3] He considers the ethnology of the Tawrāt and the universality of the flood at the time of Noah.[4] The Qur'ān corrects "the existing manuscript of the Tawrāt" which attributes shirk to Aaron.[5] While appealing to the later prophets to substantiate the prophetic ministry of Cyrus, Āzād says:

> ...The later books of the Tawrāt, which were written during the conquest of Jerusalem or at the time of the Babylonian Captivity, are considered to be preserved historically because at this time they were constantly circulating among the Jews and no such accident occured so that their pages became extinct.[6]

In general, the Qur'ān, which is the repository of all truth, serves as the measure for the veracity of the

Biblical records. Whenever there is an historical clash between the Qur'ān and the Bible, Āzād operates with the hypothesis that the former is correct and the latter is wrong. Nowhere does he impartially weigh the conflicting evidence. On the other hand, Āzād's allusions to textual corruption of the Bible never seem to be based on the Qur'ān itself. He neglects, however, the positive witness of the Qur'ān to the integrity of the Bible as it stood at the time of the Qur'ān.[7] In the light of this evidence it is difficult to understand how Āzād can establish the Qur'ān as arbiter over those disputes which exist among the People of the Book in a manner which also involves Quranic arbitration over the Books themselves.

This is not intended as a call to resume the battle of the Books which in the past has centred so often in debates over the authenticity, the inspiration, or any other external evaluation of these Books. It does suggest, however, the need to ponder reverently and to evaluate honestly the content of these Books and the witness they give. Apart from a readiness to consider this critical matter, religious dialogue between Muslims and the People of the Book will prove ultimately to be a fruitless venture. After all, the Book, which is the repository of the truth, is more important than the prophet who, at least according to orthodox Islām, is only a channel of revelation.

APPENDIX VI

THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN

We have already noted that Āzād rejects the Christian doctrine of original sin. It is difficult to indicate precisely, however, what Āzād rejects in this doctrine since he gives little detail regarding his understanding of it. We may sympathize with Āzād if he rejects those formulations of the doctrine which without qualification describe all creation as totally corrupt, which view the new born child as only "odious and abominable" before God, and which refuse to consider anything in this world as good or beautiful, including, presumably, the formulation of the doctrine itself.[1] The question does arise, however, whether Āzād in his analysis of man and sin tacitly supports the doctrine of original sin which he rejects and even scorns.[2]

In the midst of his eloquent dissertations on God's providence, his mercy, and his justice, the wonder and purpose of creation, the exalted nature of man, the unity of the human community, and the great heights to which it is soaring under the uniform guidance provided by God for all men, Āzād confronts us with the tragedy of human perversion and rebellion, the supreme creature's failure to understand God and to obey his commandments.[3] If the initial stage in human history shines brightly with

light and hope for a glorious future, this early light soon flickers away and the world is enveloped in darkness. What reconstruction of history Āzād does offer us reveals few bright flashes which are brief in duration to break the monotony of human transgression, if not human degradation.

We may not agree completely with Āzād's analysis of the human situation and his description of the nature of human depravity. Yet in his own way his analysis of the world of men prior to the Qur'ān and the presuppositions of the darkness which for centuries has hovered over the Muslim community (and even its Quranic expositors?) with which he writes his commentary lend vivid testimony to the fact of human depravity. If the Qur'ān is a bright light which shines in the midst of darkness, human perversity has managed to conceal its brightness with a thick veil. And if religion is to be judged by man's response to it, Āzād, if pressed for a conclusion, scarcely could deny that with few exceptions the history of religion relates a sad story of human failure and indicates the inadequacy of religion to meet the needs of human perversity. That this history is generally the history of men, at least prior to the Qur'ān, the Qur'ān also would support.

All this, it may be suggested, is within the

range of communication with those vital Biblical indications of what Biblical theologians have called original sin. If it is true, is then "This do and thou shalt be saved" the final chapter of God's message for men and for their salvation?

FOOTNOTES TO PREFACE

[1]An Arab poet.

[2]However, for the contention that Āzād's political outlook changed during his career, the trnasition especially evident at the time of the khilāfat movement and the ultimate abolition of the khilāfat, see Hafeez Malik, "Abu'l Kalām Āzād's Theory of Nationalism" in The Muslim World, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, vol.LIII, no.1 (Jan. 1963), pp.33-40.

[3]Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, vol. I, Zamzam Co. Ltd., Lahore, 1947; vol. II, Maktabah-i Mustafā'ī, Lahore, n.d.

[4]H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Third Impression, 1954.

[5]The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, ed. Gibb, Kramers, Levi-Provencal, Schacht, E.J. Brill, Leiden, vol. 1, 1960. It is to appear in the Supplement.

[6]The Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. Houtsma, et. al., E.J. Brill, Leiden, vols. I-IV plus Supplement, 1908-1938.

[7]For exceptions, see the Bibliography.

[8]Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, The Tarjumān al-Qur'ān trans. by Syed Abdul Latif, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962, Vol. I, pp.x-xi, xix-xxi.

FOOTNOTES TO INTRODUCTION

[1]Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, Meridian Books Ltd., London, 1956, Fourth Impression, p.IX.

[2]Maulana Azad, The Publication Division, Delhi, 1958, p.22.

[3]For some estimates of Āzād in addition to the standard works, see Ibid.; Arnold Toynbee, One World and India, Orient Longman's Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1960, p.14, where, in his Azad Memorial Lectures, he applies the words of the second century B.C. poet to Āzād: "Homo sum, humanum nihil a me alienum puto"; Asaf A.A. Fyzee, A Modern Approach to Islam, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963, pp.2-3; Nehru, op. cit., pp.349-352, regarding his early ventures in politics; Imprint, Bombay, vol. I, no.3, June, 1961, which indicates the stature of Āzād through a little anecdote: "Azad (we used to call him 'Maulana Sahib', as Gandhi did) was the only person I ever heard of who dared to smoke cigarettes in the Mahatma's presence" (p.15); Zākir Husayn has said: "The first wick of my lamp I lit from Maulana's lamp" (Maulana Azad, op. cit., p.33).

[4]W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammed at Medina, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1956, pp.325-326; Rudi Paret, Mohammed und der Koran, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1957, pp.136-137, a most significant yet belated recognition in the western world. See also Mahadev Desai, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Shiva Lal Agarwala & Co. Ltd., Agra, 1946, where, in the Foreword, he quotes Gandhiji regarding Āzād: "His nationalism is as robust as his faith in Islam." Somewhere I have heard that Āzād was called "Nehru's conscience keeper."

[5]For this and the following biographical details, see Desai, op. cit., pp.7-48; J.M.S. Baljon, "A Modern Urdu Tafsīr," in Die Welt des Islams, E.J. Brill, Leiden, N/S. vol. II, no.2, 1952, p.95; J.M.S. Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960), Brill, Leiden, 1961, p.7; Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longmans, Bombay, 1959, pp.2-9.

[6]For this error, which Nehru also makes, regarding Āzād's education, see Nehru, op. cit., p.349. Though I forget the reference and do not have access to the book, I recall that Desai, op. cit., makes the same error. It has been corrected by Āzād himself in his autobiography (Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longmans Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1959, p.6).

[7]Desai, op. cit., p.15.

[8]Ibid., p.44; Subh-i-Umayd, Selections from the Works of Abū-l-Kalām Āzād, vol. I, Singh Kitāb Ghar, New Delhi, p.4.

[9]Desai, op. cit., p.44.

[10]Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, vol. I, op. cit., p.7. Āzād outlines the tragic course of events in this paragraph in Ibid., vol. I, pp.3-8.

[11]Ibid. and Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, vol. II, op. cit., Preface, for the variations in the two editions, and, it might be said fairly, his growing attachment to humility during this period of maturity. A brief summary of these variations is also found in the Preface to the translation (Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, The Tarjuman al-Qur'ān, trans. by Syed Abdul Latif, op. cit., vol. I, p.xvi).

[12]Ibid., pp.xv-xvi footnote.

[13]S.A. Kamali, Azad's Tafsīr, a term paper, Institute of Islamic Studies, Montreal, 1954, p.1.

[14]See p.vii supra. Otherwise how could Āzād have encouraged the translation of his work and have approved without qualification what had been prepared for publication in English just prior to his death?

[15]Maulana Azad, op. cit., p.16.

[16]Ibid., p.43.

[17]Ibid., p.66.

[18]Yet others would suggest that Āzād has been influenced by Sir Sayyid, Shiblī Nu'mānī, ʿUbaydullāh Sindhī, Shāh Walīyullāh, etc. In an article on ʿUbaydullāh who was influenced by Shāh Walīyullāh, Mazheru-d-Din Siddiqi writes: "The Qur'ān, according to him (ʿUbaydullāh), represents the basic trend of human thought which is eternally unvarying. The Qur'ān incorporates the essence of all religious and intellectual philosophies. Its outer garment is no doubt Arabic and bears the marks of its temporal and local surroundings, but stripped of all its relativities, it stands forth as the hard core of eternal truth. This core is the real Din (sic)...

Law, according to ʿObaid-ullah [sic], arises from the special circumstances of time and place. As these change, law follows suit. The outstanding achievement of

Shah Waliy-ullah [sic], in ʿObaid-ullah's opinion, was that he disentangled the eternal wisdom (Hikmat [sic]) of the Qur'ān from its legal precepts which were conditioned by the special circumstances of the age and society in which the Qur'ānic [sic] was delivered..." Āzād does sound a similar note.

Mazheru-d-Din Siddiqi, ʿObaid-ullah Sindhi, A term paper, Institute of Islamic Studies, Montreal, 1954, p.6. (Total pages in paper - pp.8).

[19]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, pp.18-19.

[20]Abū-l-Kalām Āzād, Ghubār-i Khāṭir, Kitābī Dunyā, Lahore, n.d., pp.53-66.

[21]Ibid., p.58. As Āzād wrote his commentary on Joseph, one wonders whether he could help comparing himself with Joseph, the trials that he underwent, and the witness he gave while in prison (see under Sūrah 12).

[22]Ibid.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid., p.57.

[25]At this point Baljon's translation of the Urdū text which I have is incorrect. (Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960), op. cit., p.9).

[26]Abū-l-Kalām Āzād, Ghubār-i Khāṭir, op. cit., pp.58-59.

[27]Ibid., pp.59-61 for this paragraph.

[28]Ibid., p.60.

[29]Ibid., p.61.

[30]Ibid., p.61.

[31]Ibid., p.65.

[32]See Preface, p.vii.

[33]Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.xi.

[34]Even the jacket is marred by a wrong transliteration of Fātihah.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, vol. I, p.183.

[2]Ibid., vol. I, p.12. Āzād did express the hope of delineating the principles with which he operates in his exposition (Ibid., vol. I, p.9). As the present commentary stands, his attitude towards the Qur'ān is more implicit than explicit.

[3]Ibid., vol. I, p.26.

[4]But how does Āzād defend the authenticity of the tradition he cites in vol. I, p.100 (Ibid.), which is obviously based on Matt. 25:31-46?

[5]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op.cit., vol. II, pp.494-501 for a full defense of Abraham based on 21:57-67 and the fallacies of those who overestimate and underestimate the value of the traditions.

[6]Ibid., vol. II, pp.500-501.

[7]Ibid., vol. I, pp.9-16 for a list of fourteen obstacles found in previous exegesis of the Qur'ān which militate against the proper interpretation of the Qur'ān. This paragraph is a summary of these obstacles. Compare these with the fourteen methods of interpretation cited by Daud Rahbar, "Reflections on The Tradition of Qur'anic Exegesis," in The Muslim World, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, vol. LII, no. 4 (Oct. 1962), pp.302-303. For another example of principles governing a modern interpretation of the Qur'ān, see Muhammad D. Rahbar, "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Principles of Exegesis," in The Muslim World, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, vol. XLVI, no. 2 (April 1956), pp.104-112. See also Daud Rahbar, God of Justice, Brill, Leiden, 1960, Preface, pp.13-18. Cf. also Iqbal who says: "Yet a careful study of the Quran and the various schools of scholastic theology that arose under the inspiration of Greek thought disclose the remarkable fact that while Greek philosophy very much broadened the outlook of Muslim thinkers, it, on the whole, obscured their vision of the Quran (Sir Mohammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, Reprinted 1962, p.3).

[8]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjamānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.14.

[9]Ibid., vol. I, p.16.

[10]Ibid., vol. I, p.10 for this paragraph.

[11]Ibid., vol. I, p.47; vol. I, pp.50-51. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.264; vol. II, p.59.

[12]Ibid., vol. I, p.31. See also 51:20-21; 12:105; 29:44; 44:38-39, etc.

[13]Ibid., vol. I, p.53. On takhlīq bi-l haqq, see vol. I, pp.47-50 (Ibid.). See also Ibid., vol. II, pp.309-310; vol. II, p.471 for the purpose of God in the world.

[14] Ibid., vol. I, p.32. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.460; vol. II, p.335.

[15]Ibid., vol. I, p.50. Elsewhere Āzād says: "Before the coming of the Qur'ān, the religious mentality of the world totally conflicted with all human intellectual aspirations. Not only did the Qur'ān inspire intellectual aspiration; it charted a magnificent course for intellectual daring and for the pursuit of knowledge which today cannot be equalled..." (Ibid., vol. I, p.65, footnote).

[16]Ibid., vol. I, pp.35-61 for Āzād's full discussion on rubūbiyat and his use of technical terms which he sometimes fills with a healthy, though perhaps "non-traditional", content. After Āzād has said all this, however, it may be questioned whether Āzād's exposition of rubūbiyat harmonizes with God as al-Rabb. Perhaps this exposition is more homiletically than exegetically edifying. See also Ibid., vol. II, p.291; vol. II, p.302; vol. II, pp.324-325.

[17]Ibid., vol. I, p.55. See also numerous Quranic references in vol. I, pp.52-55; vol. II, p.472. (Ibid.).

[18]Ibid., vol. I, pp.62-63. For this whole section, see vol. I, pp.62-113 (Ibid.). See also Ibid. vol. II, p.357. But that which looks good can also be bad (Ibid., vol. II, p.386).

[19]Ibid., vol. I, p.79. Even economic differences are cause for rest and joy! (Ibid., vol. I, p.85).

[20]Ibid., vol. I, pp.82-85. See also Ibid., vol. II, pp.538-539.

[21]Ibid., vol. I, p.75. See also Ibid., vol. II, p.277; vol. II, p.282.

[22]Ibid., vol. I, pp.76-79.

[23]Ibid., vol. I, pp.69-70.

[24]Ibid., vol. I, p.64.

[25]Though Āzād obviously does distinguish between rubūbīyat and rahmat through specific examples, much of the content of both expositions is repetitious and overlapping so that at points the distinction becomes blurred or even artificial.

[26]Ibid., vol. I, p.101.

[27]Ibid., vol. I, p.99. With these passages and what follows on ʿadālat, it is interesting to compare the following: "The present work for the first time attempts to bring out that the idea of God's justice is the central theme of the Qur'ān, and consistently dominates in the Book" (Rahbar, God of Justice, op. cit., p.224). Cf. the same author's comments on the meaning and conditional nature of God's love in the Qur'ān and his statement: "In the short chapter on Divine Love we have shown that there is not a single verse in the Qur'ān that speaks of God's unconditional love for mankind." (Ibid., p.225). He seems to indicate that God is not "a lenient sovereign." (Ibid.).

[28]Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, pp.114-122.

[29]Ibid., vol. I, pp.116-117 for Āzād's use of kasb (earning).

[30]Again much of this has been said under rubūbīyat and rahmat.

[31]Ibid., vol. I, p.47; vol. I, p.50; vol. I, p.55; vol. I, p.85; vol. I, p.123; vol. I, pp.441-442; vol. II, p.13, footnote; vol. II, p.147; vol. II, p.156; vol. II, p.269; vol. II, p.277. On the etymology and significance of the name, "Allāh", see Ibid., vol. I, pp.32-34.

In responding to the indications of God's attributes by believing in God, man is only confirming the belief in God inherent in his own nature (Ibid., vol. II, p.43).

On the Muslim theological trend to see the revelation of God through the laws of nature, see J.M.S. Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation, (1880-1960), op. cit., pp.54-55. See also Appendix I.

[32]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, pp.163-164. See also Ibid., vol. II, pp.45-46; vol. II, pp.373-374.

[33]Ibid., vol. I, pp.55-58.

[34]For more detail see Ibid., vol. I, pp.89-97. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.459.

[35]Ibid., vol. I, pp.56-58; vol. I, pp.88-89; vol. I, pp.174-186. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.312.

[36]Āzād speaks of the various stages of guidance: 1) takhliq; 2) taswīyah; 3) taqdīr; 4) hidāyat, the latter which is also evident in the lower forms of instinct, sense perception, and reason, and in these lower forms as well as its highest form can also be called wahī (Ibid., vol. I, p.174). See also Ibid., vol. I, pp.44-46; vol. II, pp.15-16. Cf. these four stages of guidance according to Muḥammad ʿAbduh (J.M.S. Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960), op. cit., p.62).

[37]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, pp.182-184 for some Quranic texts on the unity and universality of the message. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.402; vol. I, p.426; vol. I, p.437; vol. I, p.467; vol. I, p.473; vol. II, p.8; vol. II, pp.315-316; vol. II, p.438; vol. II, pp.536-537.

Regarding some characteristics of all prophets, Āzād says: 1) The prophets witnessed to their own people. 2) All were dependent on God and none of them was rich. 3) The message of all was the same regarding the worship of God and good works. 4) All were opposed by the leaders and were supported by the poor. 5) Their opponents always ridiculed them and used force against them in spite of the prophets' appeal for tolerance. 6) They always appealed to men's reason. 7) Their opponents finally perished (Ibid., vol. II, pp.22-23). See also the lengthy exposition in Ibid., vol. II, pp.212-215. But how do Abraham, Moses, Jonah, etc. completely fit into these categories? And Cyrus? (Ibid., vol. II, pp.399-420). On the limitation of Quranic references to the prophets, see Ibid., vol. II, p.216. If the Arabs had learned some of the events of the prophets

from the People of the Book, did Muhammad also learn from this source? One some prophets who are exalted above others, see Āzād's comments in his translation of 2:253. See also 17:54.

[38]Ibid., vol. I, p.185. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.256; vol. I, p.322; vol. I, p.329. See also Āzād's translation of 2:285.

[39]Ibid., vol. I, pp.58-61; vol. I, pp.87-88 for this section. See also Ibid., vol. II, p.148; vol. II, pp.177-179; vol. II, p.272; vol. II, p.302; vol. II, p.373. Elsewhere Āzād says that all religions teach the resurrection and that the resurrection is a promise of God (Ibid., vol. II, pp.316-317).

[40]Ibid., vol. I, p.49.

[41]Ibid., vol. I, p.59. For another extended discussion see Ibid., vol. II, pp.519-524. Iqbāl uses the identical argument (Iqbāl, op. cit., p.119).

[42]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, pp.180-181. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.237; vol. I, p.244; vol. I, p.249; vol. II, pp.471-472. For the modern Muslim exegetical trend which views Islām as the universal as well as the natural religion, see J.M.S. Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960), op. cit., pp.74-75. Is Āzād's contention here, however, factually correct? Though it may be a dominant theme of the Qur'ān, is it the dominant theme?

[43]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.180; vol. I, p.208; vol. I, p.214.

[44]Ibid., vol. I, pp.114-122. However he does summarize the essence and importance of dīn in his preface to Sūratu-l-Fātiḥah, noting also the need for a proper concept of God's attributes and man's proneness to stumble at this point (Ibid., vol. I, pp.27-30). See also Ibid., vol. II, p.6.

[45]Ibid., vol. I, p.118.

[46]Ibid., vol. I, p.183. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.189; vol. I, p.193; vol. I, p.199; vol. I, p.200; vol. I, p.208; vol. I, p.213 etc. Āzād also states that "the basis of dīn is tawhīd, the direct worship of the Lord of the universe" (Ibid., vol. I, p.192). See also Mawlana

Abul Kalam Azad, The Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. by Syed Abdul Latif, op. cit., vol. I, p.xvii.

[47]This is Laṭīf's translation (Ibid., vol. I, p.159).

[48]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.188.

[49]Ibid., vol. I, p.203; vol. I, p.216; vol. I, p.207; vol. I, pp.197-198; vol. I, p.184; vol. I, pp.193-194; vol. I, p.189; vol. I, pp.254-256; vol. II, pp.518-519. The teaching of the true religion leads to salvation (Ibid., vol. II, p.153). Pure religion, which from the first day is Islām, saves from all strife and narrowness (Ibid., vol. II, p.519). "To find guidance is the natural right of every man." (Ibid., vol. II, p.258).

[50]Ibid., vol. I, pp.206-207.

[51]Ibid., vol. I, p.207. See also Ibid., vol. I, pp.197-198 and vol. I, p.185 where Āzād adds that men ought to be good to all apart from group considerations.

[52]Ibid., vol. I, p.218. This is reminiscent of Luther's comment that even a seven year old child can understand the doctrine of the Church. Meanwhile a host of publications describing the nature of the Church continues to roll off the presses.

[53]Ibid., vol. I, pp.186-191. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.266; vol. I, pp.421-422.

[54]Ibid., vol. I, p.189. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.181, vol. II, pp.516-517; 22:67.

[55]Ibid., vol. I, p.189. Since the translation does not include Āzād's explanations which he adds within the Urdū text, the translation is mine. To preserve anything of the sense of the Arabic, it is difficult to punctuate.

[56]Ibid., vol. I, pp.190-191. See also Ibid., vol. II, p.21; vol. II, p.166; vol. II, pp.172-175; vol. II, p.315.

[57]Ibid., vol. I, pp.190-191. Again the translation is mine. See also 6:108; 2:255.

[58]Ibid., vol. I, pp.205-206; vol. I, p.210; vol. I, p.214.

[59]Ibid., vol. I, p.185; vol. I, p.107. See also Ibid., vol. II, pp.145-146.

[60]Ibid., vol. I, pp.184-185; vol. I, p.187; vol. I, pp.193-194; vol. I, p.199; vol. I, p.213.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.123.

[2]See Ibid., vol. I, pp.123-173, for this whole section, which Āzād entitles "The Qur'ān and the Conception of the Divine Attributes" and which Laṭīf in his English translation entitles "The Quranic Concept of God: A Comparative Study" (Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, The Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Syed Abdul Latif, op. cit., vol. I, p.99).

[3]Ibid., vol. I, pp.20-21.

[4]Ibid., vol. I, pp.123-127, for this and the rest of the paragraph.

[5]Ibid., vol. I, p.123.

[6]Ibid., vol. I, pp.124-127, where Āzād briefly details the trend, expounds some of these theories, and cites the names of some of the expositors, names with which Latif shows little familiarity.

[7]Ibid., vol. I, p.128, which Āzād quotes and notes in his footnotes, a custom which he too infrequently cultivates. However, Laṭīf, op. cit., (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif), p.102 seems to correct the Urdu footnote and in English footnotes as follows: "W. Schmidt: The Origin and Growth of Religion, Facts and Theories, London, 1931, p.8" to which Āzād also adds p.262. (Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., p.128). I do not have access to this book.

[8]Ibid., vol. I, p.123.

[9]Ibid., vol. I, pp.123-124.

[10]Ibid., vol. I, pp.128-131. Is Āzād confused concerning the racial nature of the Akkadians? The Akkadians were Semites. Did the Semites have their origin in Arabia? Though the question may be more than academic for Āzād, and though there are reputable scholars supporting this theory, the theory is still not proven fact. Perhaps one may be excused for suspecting that in holding this theory Āzād advances the antiquity of the Arabic language, and hence for him its long evolution,

high development, and qualification as the medium of the final revelation. For the antiquity of the Arabic language see Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, vol. II, op. cit., pp.486-487.

[11] Ibid., vol. I, p.131.

[12] Ibid., vol. I, p.131. Is the "all of the religious traditions" broader than those of the six nations cited? I have assumed this possibility and hence this translation.

[13] Ibid., vol. I, p.131. For the defective style of the translation of these two verses I take the blame. Yet I think that it incorporates the meaning of Āzād's Urdū translation from the Arabic and preserves Āzād's explanations as well as the liberty which he takes with the Arabic text--a liberty, I think, which he often takes too seriously at the expense of the Qur'ān.

[14] Ibid., vol. I, p.132.

[15] Ibid., vol. I, p.132. Though what is said here may not be too clear, I think this is what Āzād is saying. Even though unwarranted as well as warranted conclusions could be drawn from it, the general implication at least seems to be clear: The concept of God's attributes is not divorced from the human intellect, which, in turn, is not divorced from evolution; hence, the link between God's attributes and evolution--and the hope that this conclusion does not fit into the category of the unwarranted. Do we also conclude the absence of a link between intuitive perception and evolution?

Though Āzād is normally a disciple of clarity (and occasionally distressingly so), he often has deviated from the path of clarity in his expositions of more critical matters and was probably quite aware of it. It is hardly an injustice to him to say that he considered himself forced by circumstances to tread the middle way, which must have caused him much anguish of mind and heart. In any case, some mature Muslim opinion supports this point.

[16] Ibid., vol. I, pp.132-133 for this paragraph. In vol. II, p.335, Āzād also says: "In any case the affirmation of the attributes is a reality which man by virtue of his human nature intuitively seeks" (Ibid.).

[17]Ibid., vol. I, p.133.

[18]Ibid. In a footnote, Āzād defines tajassum: "to conceive of God as having body and form like the creature"; and tashabbuh; "to assign such attributes which resemble the attributes of creatures..."; the technical term in English for tajassum is "anthropomorphism"; for "tashabbuh", "anthropophysism". Tanzīh is free from all such similitude.

[19]Ibid. These last two words Laṭīf translates as "love". (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.105) Further below on the same page of the Urdū text, five lines from the bottom jamāl instead of jalāl is obviously intended. Jalāl, of course, is glory pervaded by awe. Platts trnaslates jamāl as "beauty, comeliness, pleasingness (syn. husn); elegance, prettiness," and jamālī as "amiable, lovable (as an attribute of the deity, in opp. to jalālī)." John T. Platts, A Dictionary of Urdū, Classical Hindī, and English, Oxford University Press, London, 1930, p.388. In the noun form, at least, perhaps this is another case where Urdū has lost some of the Arabic significance. In Arabic, jamāl has the significance of "glory in condescension" and may be a useful vehicle to convey the meaning of the glory of Christ and his cross.

[20]Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, pp.134-135 for this and the following paragraphs. See also Ibid., pp.29, 118-119.

[21]Ibid., vol. I, pp.135-137 for this section on China. In dealing with such texts, one must be prepared to do something of a textual critic, however amateurish the product may be. Should the Urdū read ghayr mubham? I have followed this possibility, though Laṭīf has followed the text as it stands (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.107), and the following paragraph may contradict it. Be the suggestion correct or otherwise, the matter is hardly simplified by Āzād's colourful language, which he uses to portray the growing complexity of an originally simple and colourless concept of God through the addition of colour to this concept. At least this is how I understand it.

[22]Ibid., vol. I, p.135.

[23]Are these the same as the local gods cited above? Or what is their relationship?

[24]In a lengthy footnote in vol. I, p.137, Āzād notes the failure of nineteenth century and some twentieth century European historians to understand Buddhism and Shamanism as synonyms (Ibid.).

[25]Ibid., vol. I, pp.137-143 for this section. In a footnote on vol. I, p.138, Āzād cites his sources (Ibid.).

[26]Ibid., vol. I, p.138.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Āzād repeats and elaborates much of this material in vol. I, pp.162-163 (Ibid.).

[29]Ibid., vol. I, p.139.

[30]In a footnote in vol. I, p.139, (Ibid.) Āzād briefly formulates an interesting Muslim expression of this idea which is even more worthy of translation since Laṭīf omits it: "Our worthy Sūfī (expositors) have described the situation thus: Aḥadīyat descended into the condition of wāḥidīyat. Aḥadīyat means 'to be unique.' Wāḥidīyat means 'to be first.' We cannot describe a unique being as 'first', for where there is a first there will be a second, a third, a fourth. Into the pure condition of uniqueness the second and the third cannot enter. But when aḥadīyat descended into the condition of wāḥidīyat, then the condition of 'he is the first' appeared; then the designation of the second, the third, and the fourth began to appear." See also Ibid., vol. I, p.162.

[31]Ibid., vol. I, p.141.

[32]See Laṭīf's translation of this sentence on p.114 (Abul Kalam Āzad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit.) for one of several examples of dubious English in his whole translation.

[33]Ibid., vol. I, p.142.

[34]Ibid., vol. I, pp.143-146, for this section.

[35]Ibid., vol. I, p.144.

[36]Ibid. In a footnote on the same page, Āzād describes Ashtang Marg in Buddhist terms.

[37]Ibid. The meaning of this sentence, which is a paraphrase of the Urdū, is not clear to me. Probably, however, it indicates complete denial of the true concept of unity.

To Āzād's credit, he admits that his deductions are personal and tentative, though he feels his extensive studies have compelled him to arrive at such conclusions (Ibid., vol. I, p.144, footnote).

[38]Ibid., vol. I, pp.144-145. According to Āzād, in vol. I, p.146, (Ibid.), some scholars claim that idolatry was not prevalent in Buddhism up to the time of Ashoka which, if correct, says Āzād, indicates that the Buddha was worshipped only after Ashoka. However tempting it may be, it is probably not justified to find this comment politically motivated.

[39]Ibid., vol. I, p.145.

[40]Ibid., vol. I, pp.146-147 for the first, second and fourth paragraphs of this section.

[41]For more information on religion in Persia prior to Zoroaster, see Ibid., vol. II, p.417.

[42]Regarding Zoroaster, the following passage is worth quoting: "But if Dhū-l-Qarnain practiced the religion of Zoroaster (the Qur'ān affirms that Dhū-l-Qarnain professes faith in God and in the afterlife, yet even more it designates him as one who receives revelation from Allāh), does it not necessarily follow that the doctrine of Zoroaster is the doctrine of the true religion? Indeed it does. But there is no reason for us to attempt to escape this necessity because now full light has been thrown on this fact that the doctrine of Zoroaster is the pure doctrine of devotion to God and good works..." (Ibid., vol. II, p.416).

[43]Ibid., vol. II, p.414.

[44]Ibid., vol. II, p.420. For the whole of his interesting discussion on Zoroaster and Cyrus, see Ibid., vol. II, pp.399-420.

[45]Ibid., vol. II, p.418, for more information on the decline of Zoroastrianism.

[46]Ibid., vol. II, p.416.

[47]Ibid., vol. I, pp.147-148 for this section. For nasli, "racial" seems too broad. (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.119) The translation has "Joshua" for II Isaiah! (Ibid.)

Āzād's footnote on the same page is worthy of translation, since it indicates that he has at least a preliminary familiarity with Biblical higher criticism: "In the Old Testament the book which is attributed to Isaiah has a special style in language and purpose until the fifty-first verse (ayat [sic]), after which it completely changes. The first part reveals the language of someone who lived before the Babylonian captivity; the second part shows clearly the effects of this period of captivity. For this reason critics of the nineteenth century have divided it into the message of two men whom they call I Isaiah and II Isaiah." Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.147). See, however, Abū-l-Kalām Āzād, Ghubār-i Khātir, op. cit., p.143, footnote.

[48]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.148. By the Tawrāt Āzād normally means the Old Testament, which, though in common enough usage among the Muslims, is hardly an appropriate designation for it. The Exodus reference on this page should be Exodus 20.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Ibid., vol. I, pp.148-149 for this paragraph.

[51]Ibid., though in a footnote in vol. I, p.149 (Ibid.), Āzād prefers the analogy of the mother's love, since a father's love can fail, but there are no limitations to a mother's love. Hence, the Hindu use of the mother analogy. On Christ's use of "father" for God, see vol. I, p.413. See also Appendix IV.

[52]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.156.

[53]Ibid., vol. I, pp.103-111 for the rest of this section unless otherwise noted.

[54]Ibid., vol. I, p.103.

[55]See Āzād's Quranic references in vol. I, pp.104-105 (Ibid.).

[56]Ibid., vol. I, p.106.

[57]Ibid., vol. I, p.107.

[58]Ibid., vol. I, p.109 for these verses. The translations are by Laṭīf. The verse reference in the translation is incorrect. (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.82).

[59]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.108.

[60]Ibid., vol. I, p.109.

[61]Ibid., vol. I, pp.109-110.

[62]Meanwhile, throughout this commentary, Āzād, while emphasizing the virtue of forgiving men their trespasses, scrupulously avoids the need to love one's enemy, as if presumably there is a clear distinction between forgiveness and love. In a New Testament context, at least, it is valid to ask what forgiveness literally is apart from love's motivation; or even more, after his dissertation, what is love for Āzād.

In passing, Āzād also notes that Christ called "the rebellious a brood of vipers and a den of thieves" (Ibid., vol. I, p.111).

[63]Ibid., vol. I, p.149 for this paragraph.

[64]Ibid., vol. I, pp.149-155 for this section.

[65]Āzād notes that for Aristotle God is "intelligence" (Ibid., vol. I, p.152).

[66]At this point, Laṭīf appears to be carried away somewhat by the argument (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.125).

[67]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.151.

[68]Ibid., vol. I, p.155.

[69]Ibid., vol. I, pp.155-179 for this section.

[70]Ibid., vol. I, p.157, where Āzād compares Exodus 33:21-23 and Numbers 12:5-8 with Qur'ān 7:139. The references in Urdū are incorrect.

[71]Ibid., vol. I, p.160.

[72]Ibid., vol. I, p.157.

[73]It is strange that Latif translates kursīyun (which Azad translates as "throne of rule and majesty",

Ibid., vol. I, p.159) as "knowledge" (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.130). The mystery thickens when on p.131, in reference to "throne" (of God) he preserves a transliteration of the Urdū (ᶜarsh), though in fairness to him he does speak of the throne of God on p.132 (Ibid.). Even granting the validity of Āzād's basically Asharite formula for saving or redeeming the concept of God from tashabbuh, does Laṭīf also find greater difficulty in saving God's throne from the same fate?

[74]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.159.

[75]Jūwaynī is transliterated "Juinī" and Muᶜtazilah by "Mūtizilā" in the translation. (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.131).

[76]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qurān, op. cit., vol. I, p.161. See also 3:7 and Appendix III.

[77]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qurān, op. cit., vol. I, p.161.

[78]Ibid., vol. I, p.163.

[79]Ibid., see also 59:23, 24; 7:180.

[80]Ibid., vol. I, p.164, a genuine example of non sequitur.

[81]Though Āzād does recognize a variation of aptitudes among men and on the basis of Bukhārī and Muslim speaks of three stages: Islām, Īmān and Iḥsān. (Ibid., vol. I, pp.171-172) "Faith's tavern is the same for all. But the cups differ" (Ibid., vol. I, p.172).

[82]Āzād agrees with Shāh Walīyullāh that the Quranic doctrine of unity offers scope for a pantheistic conception. Every unitary concept can find accommodation in the Quranic concept, says Āzād. But, he warns, texts used for this purpose should not be divorced from their contexts and should be understood as the Salaf understood them (Ibid., vol. I, pp.172-173). He also suggests that those who aspire to greater intellectual heights follow the path of Sūratu-l-Fātihah and its three stages: the attributes of rubūbīyat, raḥmat and ᶜadālat.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1]Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.107, which Āzād documents on the same page with a footnote pointing to Christians who, espousing Christ's teaching on non-retaliation, have perpetrated such merciless and inconceivable acts for centuries "in the name of the Injil and their holy teachers." This is "perhaps the supreme example of the strangeness of human perversity." Latif has omitted this footnote also (Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Syed Abdul Latif, op. cit., vol. I). See also vol. I, p.213 (Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit.)

[2]For another protracted discussion on the matter of this sentence and the conditional clause of the following sentence, see Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, pp.332-335. Worthy of note is his statement: "The purpose of the proclamation of all the noble prophets was to save the world from this error (i.e., a false conception of God's attributes) and to create a pure concept of the divine attributes" (Ibid., vol. II, p.334).

[3]The logic in this sentence, I think, is Āzād's own logic and is critical for any appraisal of Āzād's commentary. With this the previous footnote may be compared, a comparison to which we shall return later.

[4]With this condition many orthodox Muslims may disagree, but Āzād would probably support it.

[5]See 21:16, also Ibid., vol. II, p.471: "What is this purpose? It is this, that the world would continually progress from lowliness to greatness until it reaches that highest peak which the Almighty has assigned to it. What force operates to fulfill this purpose? It is the law of struggle between truth and error. In other words, whatever happens here, it happens so that truth would prevail and error be vanquished..." See also Ibid., vol. II, pp.291-292: "... It seems that everything in the world was made to fulfill your need... Is it then possible that all this has come into existence without purpose...?"

[6]He does promise an exegesis on all the passages relevant to the creation of man to be presented later (Ibid., vol. II, p.304).

[7]Ibid., vol. I, p.317. Yet man's concept of the unity is devolutionary. See p.٨٥, supra.

[8]Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.358. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.416, on the

corporate relationship of man which, though present, Āzād's harmatology and soteriology which focus on the individual seem to relegate to the background.

[9]Ibid., vol. II, p.2. See 7:11. Would the Salaf support Āzād's exegesis here? According to Āzād's comment in vol. II, p.3, the manner of man's initial creation and growth is confined to ʿālam-i ghaib (Ibid.).

Āzād also noted the archaeological discoveries which show the parallel accounts of the creation of man existing in Egypt and Babylonia long before the account in the Tawrāt. (Ibid., vol. II, pp.3-4).

For a lengthy discussion on the stages of human creation, the excusable errors of past commentators on this topic, the errors of early modern scientists and Muslim interpreters who follow their false theories (Sayyid Aḥmad Khān, ʿAbduh, etc.), and the more recent scientific confirmation of the facts which the Qur'ān presented some thirteen hundred years ago, see vol. II, pp.526-527; vol. II, pp.540-544 based on 23:12-14 (Ibid.). Within this section Āzād notes: "From whose tongue did this voice of revelation emanate? From the voice of a seventh century A.D. illiterate who was born among the Bedouins of the Arabian desert and whose whole life was spent among the Bedouins" (Ibid., vol. II, p.542).

Though Āzād judiciously warns against conforming Quranic interpretation to all the winds of modern scientific theories, one wonders if he also does not succumb occasionally to this same tendency which he severely criticizes in others.

[10]Ibid., vol. II, pp.303-304.

[11]Ibid., vol. I, p.58, for Āzād's scientific expression of man's nobility. See also the previous reference here in relation to man's natural progress into the afterlife, p. 18 , supra.

[12]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.65, footnote. See also the previous reference to this interesting passage on p. 14 , supra,

[13]Āzād notes that whatever good or evil, honour or shame comes from God, it is always good even though we may fail to recognize its goodness. We are to blame for any evil that assails us.

[14]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, p.6. Is this another exhibition of Āzād's exegetical acrobatics, plus shades of Iqbal?

[15]Ibid., vol. II, p.353.

[16]Ibid., vol. II, p.43; vol. II, p.333.

[17]Ibid., vol. II, p.43; vol. II, p.150.

[18]Ibid., vol. II, p.287.

[19]Ibid., vol. I, pp.101-102; vol. I, p.176.

[20]Ibid., vol. I, p.47. See also p. 16, supra.

[21]Ibid., vol. I, p.102. So all men by virtue of their humanity are equal (Ibid., vol. I, p.267).

[22]Ibid., vol. I, pp.101-102, all of which, being interpreted, means that God created man in his own image? Whether or not Āzād would agree with this interpretation, it is not, of course, totally foreign to Muslim thought.

[23]Ibid., vol. I, p.99.

[24]Ibid., vol. I, p.102.

[25]Ibid., vol. I, p.99; vol. I, p.102.

[26]Ibid., vol. I, p.102.

[27]Ibid. See also previous discussion on p. 41, supra. Āzād asks how retaliation can be prohibited since it is a "natural characteristic of the animal constitution and self preservation depends upon it" (Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.103). If God is the beloved, is he not the lover? And if he is the lover, is he not the lover of all men? And, if so, should not all men be lovers of all men? However, Āzād rarely calls God "the beloved" in his commentary.

[28]Ibid., vol. II, p.258.

[29]Ibid., vol. II, p.204; vol. II, p.3; vol. II, p.307; vol. II, p.508; vol. II, p.514.

[30]Ibid., vol. I, p.445. This partial translation of the verse preserves Āzād's additions.

[31]Ibid., vol. I, p.294; vol. II, p.166; vol. II, pp.172-173; vol. II, p.189; see also Ibid., vol. II, p.34; vol. II, p.315. Nor, Āzād would say, can unbelief. The situation is essentially the same with nations: "Every nation itself constructs its own cradle of life and then with its own hands digs its grave also" (Ibid., vol. II, p.66).

Āzād thoroughly repudiates all predeterminism of Islamic theology and reinterprets (?) in the context of man's free will and the corresponding divine laws the series of Quranic passages upon which orthodoxy bases its doctrine of predeterminism.

[32]Ibid., vol. II, p.353; vol. I, p.291; vol. II, p.514.

[33]Ibid., vol. II, p.519; vol. I, pp.288-289; vol. I, p.117, vol. II, p.76; vol. II, p.80; 2:83; 4:77.

[34]Ibid., vol. II, pp.154-155; vol. I, p.274; vol. II, p.7.

[35]Ibid., vol. II, p.108; vol. II, p.504.

[36]Ibid., vol. I, p.95; vol. I, p.98; vol. I, pp.78-79; Vol. I, p.92.

[37]Ibid., vol. I, p.98; vol. I, p.330.

[38]Ibid., vol. I, p.98. Whether or not this promise is modified by the sin of shirk, in any case it should be considered in this context. See Ibid., vol. I, p.373; vol. I, p.391. But see also 4:153. In any case, Āzād also says that a few moments of faith can erase a life of kufr (Ibid., vol. II, p.454).

[39]Ibid., vol. I, p.434.

[40]Ibid., vol. II, p.281; vol. II, p.286; vol. I, p.95.

[41]Ibid., vol. II, p.348; vol. I, pp.117-118; see also 17:13,14.

[42]Ibid., vol. I, p.330; vol. II, p.43; see also Psalm 49:7-9!

[43]Ibid., vol. I, p.96; vol. I, p.98.

[44]Ibid., vol. II, p.507; vol. II, pp.475-476.

[45]Ibid., vol. II, pp.359-361; vol. II, pp.463-464; vol. II, p.516.

[46]Ibid., vol. II, p.371; vol. II, p.379. In connection with this limitation, see Āzād's interesting discussion on "rūḥ" (Ibid., vol. II, pp.370-371).

[47]Ibid., vol. II, p.379; vol. I, p.267, which Āzād derives from his doubtful exegesis of 2:177. Here, too, we may note that Āzād is a champion of women's rights, their equality with men, and their innocence, the latter especially demonstrated in an attack on the past exegesis of 12:28, which, be it correct or otherwise, is at points ludicrous. See also Ibid., vol. II, pp.265-266.

[48]Ibid., vol. II, p.18.

[49]Ibid., vol. I, p.181; vol. I, p.184; vol. I, p.278; vol. I, pp.130-131 for this paragraph. We have already noted Āzād's Quranic and extra-Quranic evidence for this contention. It should also be noted that Āzād considers this pristine purity and unity of man as a gift of God (Ibid., vol. I, p.184). Elsewhere Āzād says: "The foundation of divine religion is the brotherhood and unity of man, not division and hatred. All the prophets have taught that all men are fundamentally of one community." (Ibid., vol. I, p.199).

[50]Ibid., vol. I, pp.180-181; vol. I, pp.130-131; vol. I, p.214; vol. I, p.199; vol. I, p.174; vol. I, p.278.

[51]See page 57, supra; Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.214; vol. I, p.199; vol. I, p.174.

[52]Ibid., vol. I, p.232.

[53]Ibid., vol. II, p.3; vol. II, p.266. But see also the story of Cain and Abel and the availability of two roads from this time (Ibid., vol. I, p.416).

[54]Ibid., vol. II, p.266, which forms a part of Āzād's defense of women and which is preceded by this previous paragraph: "No woman in the world would be evil if man did not compel her to be evil. No matter how frightful and shameful the evil of woman may be, if the

matter, however, be investigated thoroughly, the hand of man will always appear; if the hand of man is not evident, certainly then the hand of those evils will appear which in one form or another are of his doing."

[55]This would support the conclusion of the previous sentence. Though I cannot prove it, I have heard that the rôle of Adam as a prophet is debated by Muslims. But what about the need of Cain?

[56]Ibid., vol. II, pp.14-15.

[57]H. Spencer, Islam and the Gospel of God,, S.P.C.K., Delhi, 1956, p.31.

[58]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.391, in which reference it is the mushrikūn who are deceived. Āzād's translation of 4:117 preserves the curse (laʿnat) on Satan, a form of expression which he often manages to modify in translation of other passages.

[59]Ibid., vol. II, p.3.

[60]Ibid., vol. I, pp.121-122 for a discussion on some vocabulary about evil works.

[61]Ibid., vol. I, pp.276; vol. I, pp.31-32; vol. II, pp.154-155, especially for Āzād's balanced commentary on the blessing and the vanity of the world and its goods which is a source of all individual and social evils and the extensive and intensive depravity of man. Is Āzād cautioning men who are in the world not to be of the world?

[62]Ibid., vol. I, p.278; vol. I, p.288.

[63]Ibid., vol. II, p.287; vol. II, p.308; vol. II, p.150; vol. II, pp.369-370; vol. II, p.441; vol. II, p.292; vol. II, pp.512-513; vol. I, p.448.

[64]Ibid., vol. II, p.350. But see also vol. II, pp.387-389 for the haste of Moses in conversation with a companion whom Āzād considers to be a "bearer of revelation". Here and elsewhere, Āzād strives hard to defend the impeccability of the prophets on the premise that they must be sinless to be prophets. Still, he is not very convincing.

[65]Ibid., vol. I, p.378.

[66]Ibid., vol. I, p.288.

[67]Ibid., vol. II, p.83; vol. I, p.73.

[68]Ibid., vol. I, p.264; vol. II, p.163; vol. I, p.271; vol. II, p.7; vol. I, p.274; vol. I, p.176.

[69]Ibid., vol. I, p.276; vol. II, pp.154-155.

[70]Ibid., vol. II, p.158; vol. I, p.239, though it should be said that this "ultimate descent" is with reference to the Jews.

[71]Ibid., vol. II, p.66.

[72]Ibid., vol. II, p.161. But see also 15:47.

[73]Rather than Laṭīf's transliterations (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.162).

[74]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.191; see also vol. I, p.186.

[75]At the end of the English translation of this verse, "doing" is probably omitted by mistake. The translation of these Quranic verses is by Laṭīf (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.162).

[76]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.192. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.180, where true religion is not inherited. See also Ibid., vol. I, p.199; vol. I, p.374; vol. I, p.427; vol. I, p.474. Though 3:19 is directed towards the People of the Book, it is generally indicative of Āzād's method of Quranic interpretation to support his thesis. Hence his Urdū translation which is worthy of translation into English: "Without doubt 'religion' (that is, true religion) with Allāh is 'Islām', and the People of the Book differed among themselves (and by creating groups they made separate religions), indeed (not because the way of another religion other than this religion had been shown to them, nor because the way of religion can vary but) because after they found knowledge, they did not remain established in it and divided through mutual opposition and jealousy. And remember whoever denies the signs of Allāh (and prefers error to guidance) indeed (the law of recompense of) Allāh is quick in reckoning."

[77]Ibid., vol. I, p.191, which is based on 6:108 following which Āzād calls for tolerance.

[78]See J.M.S. Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960), op. cit., pp.74-75 for current Muslim expositions on the universal nature of religion.

[79]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.255; vol. II, p.289; vol. II, p.264.

[80]Ibid., vol. II, p.6; vol. I, p.448; vol. II, p.47, where Āzād notes the universal error of elevating great men to the position of gods. For Āzād the modest claims in the Qur'ān regarding Muḥammad are proof of his veracity. Though it is true that these modest claims can disarm the critic of Muḥammad (and have disarmed some of his critics), Āzād's conclusion hardly follows.

[81]Ibid., vol. II, p.34. See also Ibid., vol. II, p.45.

[82]Ibid., vol. I, p.264; vol. II, p.66, where one who is guilty of kufr descends from the human to the sub-human level.

[83]Ibid., vol. I, p.201; 42:13; 4:163 to which Laṭīf adds several Quranic references in his translation (Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., p.171).

[84]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.202; vol. I, p.399; vol. II, p.196; vol. I, p.376 as commentary on 4:61, which in partial translation of Āzād's Urdū translation runs: "And, O prophet, when these people are summoned to the command of Allāh which he has revealed and to the prophet (and order has been given to obey him), then you see the hypocrites turn away from you..." See also the commentary on 3:81 and Āzād's extended commentary within his translation of this verse, Ibid., vol. I, p.329.

[85]Ibid., vol. I, p.203.

[86]Ibid., vol. I, p.202.

[87]Ibid., vol. I, p.204; vol. I, pp.212-213; vol. I, p.214.

[88]Ibid., vol. I, p.212.

[89]Ibid., vol. I, p.181.

[90]For this and the following paragraph, see Ibid., vol. II, p.335.

[91]Ibid., vol. II, pp.335-336, where he reiterates also the similar error found among Muslims. In affirming and in the same breath denying the attributes of God, Bāṭanīyah asserted the reality of the attributes and negated tashabbuh. (Ibid., II, p.336).

[92]Ibid., vol. II, p.179.

[93]Ibid., vol. I, p.255.

[94]In regard to the three above-mentioned religions, it may be said that though Āzād recognizes that the message of the Qur'ān is common for all people, he recognizes also that the Qur'ān is concerned with only certain prophets and geographical areas. These limitations, Āzād ingeniously suggests, are imposed on the Qur'ān because of the people whom it addresses, who would find such references to other prophets and distant countries meaningless. Besides, they could consult with the People of the Book. More significantly, Āzād notes, the Qur'ān reveals the significance of known events, corrects misunderstandings and false facts, and most significantly, (and this is surely to Āzād's credit) it serves essentially as a preachment, not a history (Ibid., vol. II, pp.215-217).

If one may paraphrase Āzād, it might be said that if this fact were recognized, the world would experience much less argument, quarrelling, dissension, anguish, etc. - and a healthier economy of paper and ink.

[95]Ibid., vol. I, pp.308-309.

[96]Ibid., vol. I, p.298; vol. I, p.454, where Āzād notes that the ancients worshipped heavenly bodies and were immersed in taqlīd.

[97]Ibid., vol. I, p.422. See also 5:50; vol. I, p.439. On taqlīd, see also Ibid., vol. II, p.6. For taqlid in more ancient times among the Arabs, see Ibid., vol. II, p.16.

[98]Ibid., vol. I, p.443.

[99]Ibid., vol. I, p.457.

[100]Ibid., vol. II, p.46; vol. II, p.147; vol. II, pp.186-188; vol. II, p.151; vol. II, p.468; vol. II, pp.371-372; vol. II, p.473.

[101]Ibid., vol. I, p.440; vol. I, p.464; vol. I, p.465; vol. II, p.147; vol. II, p.371. See also vol. II, p.307.

[102]Ibid., vol. II, p.371.

[103]Ibid.

[104]Ibid., vol. II, p.373; vol. I, p.440. All of these references hardly exhaust the various Arab accusations and demands. Yet Āzād does discuss the matter at some length in vol. II, pp.371-373, which acts as a supplementary interpretation to 17:89-96 (Ibid.).

Here it may be noted also that though Āzād does not seem to attribute miracles to Muhammad, he repeatedly mentions the "miraculous rhetoric" of the Qur'ān (its style, brevity, logic, etc.) in a sense which is hardly "natural". See Ibid., vol. II, p.263; vol. II, p.286; vol. II, p.348; vol. II, p.371; vol. II, p.484, etc. The matter is naturally closely allied to his idea of wahī, a word which he occasionally seems to translate strangely. Why does he translate wahī which the disciples of Jesus received as ilhām? Or does he not distinguish between the two? (5:111).

[105]Ibid., vol. I, p.452; vol. II, p.48.

[106]Ibid., vol. II, p.151; vol. II, p.195; vol. II, p.475.

[107]Ibid., vol. II, p.321.

[108]Ibid., vol. I, pp.460-461; vol. II, p.321; vol. II, p.354.

[109]Ibid., vol. I, p.452.

[110]Ibid., vol. II, p.43; vol. II, p.148; vol. II, p.186; vol. II, p.316.

[111]Ibid., vol. II, p.185.

[112]Ibid., vol. I, p.444.

[113]Ibid., vol. I, p.311; vol. I, p.368-369.

[114]Ibid., vol. I, p.393.

[115]Ibid., vol. I, p.321; vol. I, p.468.

[116]Ibid., vol. I, p.468, for this, the rest of the paragraph, and still other abuses.

[117]Ibid., vol. I, p.472; vol. II, p.162; vol. II, p.341.

[118]Ibid., vol. I, p.472; vol. II, p.162. Āzād would probably have difficulty squaring this with the New Testament, assuming, of course, that he took the New Testament as it is seriously. Perhaps on the basis of his exegesis of 2:106, he would find the matter somewhat simpler with the Old Testament. In any case, for these and other reasons and even assuming the validity of his exegesis of 2:106, one could perhaps appreciate arguments even on the basis of Āzād's own thesis which other Muslims might bring forward.

[119]Ibid., vol. I, p.431, though Āzād notes that alcohol was only gradually forbidden. The final order was given in 5:91, and previous abuse can be forgiven. See also Ibid., vol. I, pp.371-372.

[120]Ibid., vol. I, p.444; vol. I, p.447.

[121]Ibid., vol. I, pp.450-451; vol. I, p.471; vol. II, p.315; hence, they also attribute their errors to Abraham (2:340).

[122]Ibid., vol. I, p.471; vol. II, p.315; vol. I, p.446; see 6:149: "... If Allāh willed, he would have guided all (because nothing is beyond his power, but he did not so will and this was the decision of his wisdom)." Here also Āzād turns the tables neatly but unconvincingly on orthodox theology, presumably in order to preserve the centrality of God's mercy and the free will of man.

[123]Ibid., vol. I, pp.450-451; vol. II, p.440.

[124]Ibid., vol. I, p.272; vol. I, p.295; vol. I, p.464; vol. II, p.511; vol. II, pp.508-509 where the people not only commit kufr but tyrannize.

[125]Ibid., vol. I, p.444.

[126]Ibid., vol. II, p.511; vol. II, pp.292-293. Āzād strongly supports the thesis that Abraham built the kaʿbah.

[127]Ibid., vol. II, p.62; vol. I, p.314; vol. I, p.386. On the state of those believers who remained in Mecca, Cragg says: "It should be noted that some of Muhammad's allegiance and circle, remaining in Mecca after his departure, were unmolested" (Kenneth Cragg, The Call of the Minaret, Oxford University Press, New York, 1956, p.85).

[128]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.467; vol. II, p.78.

[129]Ibid., vol. I, p.295; vol. II, p.74.

[130]Ibid., vol. I, p.511; vol. II, p.78. See also Cragg, op. cit., p.85. Yet again Āzād draws his significant distinction among the mushrikūn: "It must be remembered that the order given here to fight concerns only those idolatrous groups in Arabia who were fighting to destroy the call of Islām; it does not concern all the idolators of the whole world. Therefore, from beginning to end, the address concerns special groups..." Abū-l-Kalam Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, pp.75-76. Unlike some of his predecessors, Āzād does not suggest that India is populated with the People of the Book, but, as far as I know, he does not specifically deny it either. In any case, the limitations he sets on the command he would probably defend Quranically rather than according to mere expediency.

[131]Āzād also has copious references to the munāfiqūn, their refusal to fight, their breaking of treaties, covenants, etc. See Ibid., vol. II, p.340; vol. II, pp.91-92; vol. II, p.95; vol. II, p.98; vol. II, p.104, vol. I, p.380; vol. I, pp.395-396, etc.

[132]Ibid., vol. I, p.312, footnote.

[133]Ibid., vol. II, p.84. One would wish to refrain from reviving the decrepit query as to whether or not in depicting the total innocence of the faithful and the total guilt of the Meccans, Āzād really pays historical heed to the earliest Muslim sources of these early battles.

More pertinently, however, we may ask whether these same Meccans who were so blind, so perverse, and so absorbed in shirk, and whose hearts were sealed, became followers of the message of truth some years later? And, if so, how? Āzād might appeal to the law of muhlat; if so, just how could they repent in such a depraved state according to the law which Āzād would see operating on this level also, especially if they were beyond repentance? (See Ibid., vol. I, p.373; vol. I, p.391). Though Āzād still might attempt to reconcile such depravity and repentance (see 4:153 and Ibid., vol. II, p.76), one still wonders whether Sūrah 9, which by its nature calls forth the need of a most eloquent defense, has also evoked exaggerations and generalizations from Āzād's facile pen which easily match those of an Amīr ʿAlī.

[134]See page 38, supra.

[135]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.165. This is just another instance in which one would wish for better documentation from Āzād.

[136]Ibid., vol. I, p.193; vol. I, p.373; vol. I, p.251.

[137]Ibid., vol. I, p.193; vol. I, p.195; vol. I, p.240; vol. I, p.243; vol. I, p.251; vol. I, p.373; vol. II, p.42; vol. I, p.253, where Āzād recalls that Ishmael was also descended from Abraham. Yet, on the basis of 2:122, Āzād hardly shows how the Jews are distinguished above all nations.

[138]Ibid., vol. I, p.425. See also Āzād's translation of 5:64.

[139]Ibid., vol. I, p.249; vol. I, p.277; vol. I, p.317.

[140]Ibid., vol. I, p.413. In 10:30, the Qur'ān states that the Jews also err in calling Exra the son of God, obviously in a special sense. Āzād qualifies this by adding that this was not a common Jewish belief. It was current among the Jews in Yathrib only. He supports this contention by the tradition which reports the Jews as saying: "How can we follow you when you have forsaken our qiblah and do not believe Ezra to be the son of Allāh?" (Ibid., vol. II, p.123) Yet the question does arise whether the Jews really believed this or whether this was another Jewish idea of a practical joke. In any case, there is no need to doubt that the claim was made in spite of Rodwell's comment (The Koran, trans. J.M. Rodwell, J.M. Dent & Sons, London, 1950, pp.473-474, footnote 8).

[141]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.196; vol. I, p.240; vol. I, p.392; vol. I, p.413; vol. I, p.424; vol. II, p.42. See also 4:449 and Āzād's translation of this.

[142]Ibid., vol. I, p.243.

[143]Ibid., vol. I, pp.352-353; vol. I, p.416.

[144]Ibid., vol. I, p.322; vol. I, pp.400-401; vol. II, pp.444-445, for a more detailed exposition of Jewish allegations against Mary and Jesus.

[145]Ibid., vol. I, p.401. Elsewhere Āzād offers more details on Jewish history, their rebellions, punishments, etc. On the destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians and the Romans, and the Babylonian captivity, see Ibid., vol. II, pp.326-328. Āzād compares the Jews at the time of David and Solomon with a man who diligently sows his fields and regularly looses his goats to graze on the fields at night.

[146]Ibid., vol. I, p.328.

[147]Ibid., vol. I, p.372. See also Āzād's translation of 4:48.

[148]Ibid., vol. I, pp.372-373; vol. I, p.391; but see also 4:153.

[149]Ibid., vol. I, p.374.

[150]Ibid., vol. I, p.317; vol. I, p.335; vol. I, p.400, footnote.

[151]Ibid., vol. I, p.414.

[152]Ibid., vol. I, p.240.

[153]Ibid., vol. I, p.257; vol. I, p.265; vol. I, p.317; vol. I, p.328; vol. I, p.411; vol. I, p.418.

[154]See also Āzād's footnote in Ibid., vol. I, p.328.

[155]Ibid., vol. I, p.240; vol. I, p.328.

[156]Ibid., vol. I, p.312; vol. I, p.373, footnote; vol. II, p.342.

[157]Ibid., vol. I, pp.419-420; vol. I, p.310; vol. II, p.266.

[158]Ibid., vol. II, p.216.

[159]Ibid., vol. I, pp.261-262. But compare Āzād's translation of "Allāh's curse" on 2:88 with the Arabic; here he exercises an amazing and unnecessary liberty in bypassing Allāh as the subject of the sentence. See also 2:96.

[160]Ibid., vol. I, p.265; vol. I, p.331; vol. I, p.470; vol. II, p.342.

[161]Ibid., vol. II, pp.37-38.

[162]Ibid., vol. II, p.116.

[163]Ibid., vol. I, p.352; vol. I, p.399; vol. II, p.44.

[164]Ibid., vol. I, p.399; vol. I, p.403.

[165]Ibid., vol. I, p.197; vol. I, p.402; vol. I, p.327.

[166]Ibid., vol. I, p.424.

[167]Ibid., vol. I, p.463; vol. I, p.423.

[168]Ibid., vol. I, p.331.

[169]Ibid., vol. I, pp.194-195; vol. I, p.250; vol. I, pp.259-260; vol. I, p.331; vol. I, p.425.

[170]Ibid., vol. I, p.352.

[171]Ibid., vol. II, pp.66-67; whence is derived also the justification for fighting the Jews, a typical Azadian comment on the high morals which the Qur'ān orders the faithful to maintain during combat, and the logical conclusion: "Has any nation in the world until the present day kept the rules of war on such a high moral level? In reply to this, every page of the history of Europe's World War will say 'No'." (Ibid., vol. II, p.67).

[172]Ibid., vol. II, pp.348-349. Cf. the quotation from Ibid., vol. I, p.401 (p. 76, supra).

[173]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, pp.198-199; vol. I, pp.252-253; vol. I, p.244; vol. I, p.424; vol. I, p.474. See also Āzād's translation of 5:59.

[174]Ibid., vol. I, p.335.

[175]Though it is obvious that the category of "People of the Book" is still more inclusive.

[176]Which, of course, any honest exegete of the Qur'ān is compelled to do in a verse-by-verse exposition. However, there is a tendency among Muslims and non-Muslims to forget the apologetic nature of large portions of the Qur'ān, a tendency which does injustice to the Qur'ān and which arises probably because of ignorance of the text. A similar tendency exists among Christians who forget the apologetic nature of extensive portions of the New Testament (not to speak of the Old Testament) including the Gospels.

[177]Ibid., vol. I, p.115.

[178]Ibid., vol. I, p.166.

[179]Ibid., vol. I, p.115.

[180]Ibid., vol. I, p.193.

[181]Ibid., vol. I, p.336 (?); vol. I, p.413. See 5:18 and the commentary within this verse.

[182]Ibid., vol. I, p.325; vol. I, p.199.

[183]Ibid., vol. I, p.

[184]Ibid., vol. I, p.425.

[185]Ibid., vol. I, p.412. Cf. Āzād's translation of 5:14.

[186]Ibid., vol. I, p.437. Jesus, himself, and his apostles, of course, are free from this sin. See also Ibid., vol. II, p.156.

[187]Ibid., vol. I, p.250; vol. I, p.427; vol. II, p.59.

[188]See 19:30-33 to which Āzād points.

[189]Ibid., vol. II, p.435.

[190]Ibid., vol. I, p.324; vol. I, p.404; vol. I, p.14; vol. I, p.427; vol. II, p.431; vol. II, p.442; vol. II, p.444. See also 9:29. As histrocial documentation in Ibid., vol. I, p.324, Āzād surprisingly refers to Muhammad's invitation to the Christian leaders in Najrān to decide the matter of Jesus' sonship by calling the

curse of God upon the losers. (Cui bono?) The Christians "did not dare to accept the challenge, and having pledged obedience, they went their way." Āzād offers no other details about the circumstances, and he can hardly presume that his readers will know them. Since there is no indication that the people have come to Muhammad with a warlike intention, just how does this fit in with Āzād's eulogy on the tolerance of the seventh century faithful? But be that as it may, the incident sufficiently illuminates the fact that Āzād has not loosed himself completely from his seventh-century moorings in this matter. The whole incident is hardly a lesson on seeking the welfare of one's neighbour, which Āzād otherwise can teach so eloquently. See also Rodwell, op. cit., p.392, footnote 1.

[191]Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.325.

[192]Ibid., vol. II, p.435. See also Āzād's translation of 19:35.

[193]Ibid., vol. I, p.437.

[194]Ibid., vol. II, pp444-445, for this and the rest of the paragraph. Azad is less reserved here in his opinion of those expositors, including Sayyid Ahmad Khān, who deny the virgin birth on the strength of the Qur'ān and thereby disturb the conscience of a pious expositor.

[195]Ibid., vol. II, p.445.

[196]See immediately above.

[197]Ibid., vol. I, p.404. While translating 4:171, after kalimah, Āzād adds in brackets bishārat. Again the Quranic rationale is presented in the following verse, the first half of which has provided text for an interesting "sermonette" by Cragg (Kenneth Cragg, "The Servant and the Son," in The Muslim World, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, Vol. xlvii, No. 1, (Jan. 1957), pp.1-4. See also Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumanu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.427. As a part of 5:73, Āzād translates "thālithu thalathatin" by "Khudā tin men kā ēk hai," and in brackets adds, "father, son and holy spirit." In 5:116, is Khudā kō chhōr kar mujhe aur mērī mān kō khudā banā lō an accurate translation of the relative Arabic? It is perhaps worthy of note that Āzād does not

mention the Trinity in reference to this verse since, perhaps, he does not consider this verse as a refutation of the Trinity. Presumably such an explanation enables him to insert "father, son, and holy spirit" as commentary within his translation of other "trinitarian" passages. Nevertheless, this would hardly accord with his comments in Ibid., Vol. II, p.445. Or does he believe that the Qur'ān is dealing with more than one doctrine of the Trinity? If so, as far as I know, Āzād gives no hint of this, though, as all know the argument from silence is really no argument. See also Ibid., vol. II, pp.308-309 for a discussion on the spirit. Note also the obvious error in the translation of 5:114.

[198]Ibid., vol. II, p.444; vol. I, pp.400-401; vol. I, p.392. See also the insertions in his translation of 2:123. It may be recalled here that the idea of kaffārah is by no means foreign to Islam. See 5:89; 5:95.

[199]Ibid., vol. I, p.401. Is it just a chance error that Āzād's translation omits translating "Messiah" in the Arabic but inserts it in the commentary within the verse? In any case, unless the Jews were in a ridiculing mood, which is highly improbable here, they would hardly call Jesus "the Messiah," nor would they slander themselves by stating that they had crucified the Messiah. That the Jews would kill the Messiah is precisely what Jesus told the Jews, a statement which cut them to the quick and drove them to plot his death.

[200]Ibid.

[201]Ibid., vol. II, p.442.

[202]For this paragraph, for the way in which Āzād derives this conclusion, and for the failure of previous expositors in understanding the meaning of the texts regarding an imminent judgment, see Ibid., vol. II, pp.435-436; 19:37-39. See also Ibid., vol. II, pp.447-448, on "the hour".

[203]Ibid., vol. I, p.310; vol. I, p.259; vol. I, p.463; vol. I, pp.192-193.

[204]Ibid., vol. I, p.404; vol. I, p.430. This, of course, is one of several references in the Qur'ān which eulogizes the Christians.

[205]See Ibid., vol. I, p.256.

[206]Ibid., vol. I, p.200.

[207]Ibid., vol. II, p.443.

[208]Ibid., vol. II, pp.443-444. Surely Āzād wishes to point out more than the mere fact that the account of Mary's birth is well attested in early Christian history. Again, we would wish for more commentary here.

[209]Ibid., vol. I, p.220. See also Āzād's translation of 5:65 (Ibid.) Latīf graciously omits the passage in vol. I, p.220 from his translation. (Abul Kalam Azad, Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit.).

[210]Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.253.

[211]Ibid., vol. I, pp.253-254; vol. I, p.407; vol. I, p.457; vol. II, p.39; Āzād cites the following passages referring to Muhammad in the Bible: Deut. 18:17; 32:21; 33:2; Psalm 45:1; Matt. 20:1; John 1:21; 14:15 (Ibid.). Exegesis is conspicuous by its absence.

Āzād follows the normal Muslim interpretation of Muhammad as ummī: "Everything he was is by the grace of wahī" (Ibid., vol. II, p.39). Throughout his commentary, Āzād is unsparing in his praise of Muhammad, though it is modified by the previous remark; on his character and veracity, see Ibid., vol. II, p.151.

[212]Ibid., vol. II, p.38.

[213]Ibid., vol. II, pp.110-113. See also Ibid., vol. I, pp.260-261; vol. I, p.267; vol. I, p.318 (which might cause a rise in Pakistani eyebrows); vol. I, p.319; vol. I, p.333; vol. I, p.334 (the better community); vol. I, p.346; vol. I, p.375; vol. I, p.386 (jihād); vol. I, p.389; vol. I, p.392; vol. I, p.410; vol. II, p.59; vol. II, pp.67-69; vol. II, pp.71-72; vol. II, p.97; vol. II, pp.102-103. In his glorification of the early Muslim community, at least the question arises whether Āzād deviates from his own thesis. Is Islām, which is the common message of the prophets, really manifested only in Arabia with the coming of Muhammad and the Qur'ān? Perhaps there are two other possibilities: Āzād has not explained the "successful" manifestations of Islām at the time of the other prophets, or is Islām "less successful" at the time of the other prophets? The former alternative, however, could be modified in the case of Iran and Zoroaster.

[214]Ibid., p.283.

[215]Ibid., vol. I, pp.180-181 for this paragraph.

[216]Ibid., vol. I, p.206; see also 3:113-115.

[217]Ibid., vol. I, p.210; 2:38; vol. I, p.206; vol. I, p.211; vol. I, p.426. Elsewhere Āzād does say that it is the preserver of their truths: "By nigahbān is meant that it is the preserver of their purposes. If it would not have come, all previous truths would have been shrouded in the darkness of error and change." See 5:43-45.

[218]Ibid., vol. I, p.206; vol. I, p.210.

[219]Ibid., bol. I, p.210. See also vol. I, p.214; vol. II, p.157. Āzād makes it clear that the Qur'ān is not endorsing the conflicting empirical religions, else all religions would be equally false, including the religion which endorses the other religions.

[220]Ibid., vol. II, pp.68-73.

[221]Ibid., vol. II, p.38; vol. I, p.309.

[222]Ibid., vol. II, p.81; vol. I, p.10.

[223]Ibid., vol. II, p.519.

[224]Ibid., vol. I, p.452.

[225]Ibid., vol. II, p.16.

[226]Ibid., vol. I, p.255.

[227]Ibid., vol. II, pp.173-175.

[228]Ibid., vol. II, pp.463-454. See also Ibid., vol. II, p.79.

[229]Ibid., vol. I, p.309.

[230]Ibid., vol. II, p.59.

[231]Ibid., vol. II, p.42.

[232]Ibid., vol. II, p.47.

[233]Ibid., vol. II, p.336.

[234]Ibid., vol. II, p.47.

[235]Ibid., vol. II, p.463.

[236]Ibid., vol. II, p.470. For some of Āzād's references positive and negative, in vol. II to the previous commentators, see Ibid., vol. II, p.33; vol. II, p.40; vol. II, p.46; vol. II, p.55 (angels); vol. II, p.67; vol. II, p.90; vol. II, p.151 (prophet); vol. II, p.156 (hajj); vol. II, p.163 (giyās); vol. II, p.169 (Pharoah's body); vol. II, p.175 (creation); vol. II, p.178; vol. II, p.209 (Qur'ān); vol. II, p.217; vol. II, p.218 (flood); vol. II, p.254; vol. II, pp.257-258; vol. II, p.263; vol. II, p.267; vol. II, p.287; vol. II, p.289; vol. II, pp.297-298; vol. II, p.299; vol. II, p.305; vol. II, p.318 (creation); vol. II, p.378 (resurrection); vol. II, pp.393-398; vol. II, p.399; vol. II, p.436 (judgment); vol. II, p.445; vol. II, pp.447-448; vol. II, p.451; vol. II, p.455; vol. II, p.458; vol. II, p.471; vol. II, p.480.

These references, which are at times sufficiently interesting in themselves, as a totality show us Āzad's independence of thought and at the same time at least give indications of his broad knowledge of the commentaries. A Muslim who was aware of these studies once suggested that someone should study the comments which Āzad has made in the commentaries which were in his possession.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.173. Though it is a sign of poor taste to comment on an oriental poem, the meaning of which should be obvious, it may be stated that the poem is intended as a description of the writer of this thesis, not of Āzād.

[2]76:2-3; 90:8-10; 92:13-14. All these quotations relevant to this and the following paragraph are taken from Āzād's commentary (Ibid.). They do not exhaust the list which he cites.

[3]6:71; 2:120.

[4]10:19; 2:213.

[5]35:23; 13:9; 10:48.

[6]16:38; 21:24; 19:36; 2:139; 42:13. See also the doubtful parenthetical comment on this verse. Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, The Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Syed Abdul Latif, op. cit., vol. I, p.156). How does he arrive at his translation of 23:52? (Ibid., p.155).

[7]42:13; 4:163; 6:90; 3:78; 5:68-69; 2:4-5; 5:59.

[8]2:285; 4:149-151.

[9]30:29-30; 35:43; 17:77.

[10]3:18-19; 3:82.

[11]3:85; 6:155.

[12]22:16; 5:48.

[13]2:148; 2:177.

[14]6:160; 23:53; cf.21:92.

[15]2:106; 2:113; 3:74; 2:129; 5:68-69.

[16]For the Qur'ān the question of a religious dispensation which is other than revelation does not arise.

[17]2:35-38; 20:115-124, Āzād, however, does not note these passages.

[18]For an example of such criticism, see Mazheruddin Siddiqi, "Muslim Culture in Pakistan and India" in Islam - The Straight Path, ed. Kenneth W. Morgan, The Ronald Press Co., New York, 1958, pp.320-321.

[19]Though Āzād's own eloquence at times serves to sow seeds of doubt, it really does not suffice as an anti-thesis to his thesis.

[20]See 32:3. Probably the Arabs are meant. But if force be given to this statement, then the Quranic statement that every community has received the message is qualified, if not contradicted. Actually Āzād speaks of prophets proclaiming the message to the Arabs before Muḥammad, a statement which, though it may create difficulties in itself, hardly affects the core of Āzād's thesis. The obvious retort: the message was forgotten. For the ministry of Hūd and Sālih among the Arabs, see Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, p.197. See also vol. II, p.16. He also considers Job to have been an Arab.

[21]Ibid., vol. II, p.76; vol. II, p.80; vol. II, p.207; vol. II, p.280; vol. II, p.438 (= ʿibādat); vol. II, p.512 (here again it is closely linked with zakāt); vol. II, p.519; vol. I, p.371. See also Āzād's parenthetical remarks on 2:83 and 4:77. It seems quite clear that both namāz and zakāt (the activity, if not the form) belong to dīn.

[22]It almost seems that Āzād consciously treads lightly on this aspect of nature in order that his thesis may not be disturbed.

[23]Ps. 19:1.

[24]Rom. 8:22.

[25]See Herbert H. Farmer, God and Men, Abingdon Press, New York, 1947, p.184 where he shows the difficulty of demonstrating the love of God from the facts of nature and of history.

[26]In brief, Āzād throughout his commentary attempts to "depersonalize" the anger, the wrath and the revenge of God. The law of recompense serves as an "impersonal intercessor". Such exegesis is hardly Quranicly sound or convincing.

[27]10:19; 2:213. Should ummah be translated by "religion" as Laṭīf translates? (Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, The Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Latif, op. cit., p.104).

[28]For the formation of a variety of communities, Āzād places the blame on man. By his lengthy interpolations in his translations of Quranic verses, Āzād attempts to remove determinist elements of these verses (See 10:99). On this trend cf. J.M.S. Baljon, Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960), op. cit., pp.60-61. See also Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.294 and his paranthetical comments on 2:213; 10:19; 16:92. Men cause these divisions; since God does not compel men to believe, he permits them; yet he wills that all men would not be of one community. It is difficult to catch Āzād's logic here. See also 10:99.

[29]In his discussion of nature, Āzād does note the convulsive aspect of nature. There it plays an insignificant rôle. Here its rôle is significant.

[30]Did man have any alternative? Is this a form of taqdīr?

[31]On some indications of the Quranic witness to the Qur'ān and other Scriptures, see Appendix V.

[32]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, p.334.

[33]Daud Rahbar, God of Justice, op. cit., pp.222-223.

[34]Ibid., p.223. All this should be compared with Chapter I, pp. 12 , supra.

[35]See also Is. 40:18; 45:5-6; 46:5,9.

[36]For the following reference, see E. Stauffer, "Theos", in Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. Gerbard Kittel, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgard, 1938, vol. III, pp.110-111.

[37]Joachim Jeremias, The Parables of Jesus, trans. by S.H. Hooke, Revised Edition, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1963, pp.15, 17, 35, et passim. "The anthropomorphic ascription of emotions to God was felt to be inadmissible." (p.39, footnote 55). "The anthropomorphic ascription of an act of will to God was avoided." (p.39, footnote 58).

[38]cf. H.H. Farmer, The World and God, The Fontana Library, London, 1963, p.186. See Appendix IV.

[39]Gerhard Von Rad, Genesis, trans. John H. Marks, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1961, p.114, footnote, quoting L. Koehler, Theologie des A.T., 6 [sic].

[40]Alexander Miller, The Renewal of Man, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1955, p.49. The Arabic and Quranic equivalent of 'imagination' is, of course, bātil.

[41]Cf. H.H. Farmer, God and Men, op. cit., pp.121-123.

[42]Although Āzād does ascribe personality to God's attributes, does he ascribe it to God? At times he seems to screen God with a veil of law. Yet he also notes the sovereignty of God's will. See also Abū-l-Kalām Āzād, Ghubār-i Khātir, op. cit., p.161, for some of his doubts regarding the personality of God. On one instance of his rejection of the same, see Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, p.333.

[43]What language is more anthropomorphic than the language of cursing, taking revenge, etc., which is often found on the pages of the Qur'ān? Does anthropomorphic language, however, necessarily indicate anthropomorphism? If God is not personal, what is the meaning of Muhammad's encouragement to Abū Bakr in the cave: "What care is there for two men for whom God is the third?" (Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, p.90).

[44]For the bolder affirmations of some Indian Muslim expositors of the Qur'ān on the subject, see Baljon, op. cit., p.74. The questions arise whether the message of any prophet (other than Muhammad) has a significance for a people whose nationality is different from the prophet. Is the message of Jesus for the Jews only? Did not Moses preach to the Egyptians, etc.?

[45]Rom. 2:15.

[46]e.g., Matt. 3:7-10. See Julius Schniewind, Das Evangelium nach Matthaeus, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Goettinger, 4. durchgesehene Auflage, 1950, pp.22-23.

[47]See especially I Cor. 13, et passim. Obviously the whole matter of sectarianism is also complex. Suffice it to say that the New Testament does point to a

personality as the source and object of faith, in whom there is neither Jew nor Greek... (Gal. 3:28-29; Rom. 3: 29-30); but this centrality of the person Āzād rejects, and understandably so, on Quranic grounds. And suffice it to ask whether a religion which is based on law and salvation by good works can be non-sectarian, even in Āzād's sense of the word.

[48]Though a Jew may demur at the idea of this interrelationship, a Muslim will concur with it at least in theory.

[49]Cf. Norman Perrin, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1963, pp.202-205.

[50]Jer. 31:29-30. What law would Āzād say is involved here? Why does he not suspend judgment here as he does elsewhere?

[51]One may suspect that they do not, and also may suspect that in places Āzād suspects the same. It may be added that St. Paul's theology is not alien to the theology of the Gospels or Acts; it is normally only an amplification. The Sonship of Jesus is rooted in the pre-existence of the Son, not in the virgin birth. Luke 2:35 and a few other Biblical passages need not serve as a contradiction to the abundant evidence of the eternal sonship. On Mark 10:45, see Friedrich Buechsel, "lytron", in Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. Kittel, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1942, vol. IV, pp.343-351. On the primitive Christian kerygma, see C.H. Dood, The Apostolic Preaching, Harper and Brothers, New York, n.d. pp.7-35. On "original sin," see Appendix VI.

[52]Obviously he is more sympathetic with Protestantism than with Roman Catholicism. Not all Roman Catholics, however, revere Mary to the degree that Āzād suggests. Somewhere Hans Kueng of Vatican oecumenical fame has stated to the effect that the difference between Jesus and Mary is the difference between heaven and earth. I do not have the reference.

[53]Cf. T.W. Manson, The Servant-Messiah, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, First paperback edition, 1961, p.57. But Āzād is correct in stating that Jesus also taught justice. In the words of a recent writer: "...the concept of justice is the heart of the

prophetic concept of God, the central element in the gospel of Jesus, and the ultimate clue to his mission and message" (J. Arthur Baird, The Justice of God in the Teaching of Jesus, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1963, p.14). He also says: "...that Jesus saw his death as a revelation of the justice of God in all its major dimensions" (Ibid., p.251).

[54]Stauffer, op. cit., vol. III, p.103.

[55]On a possible relationship between the Muslim doctrine of the attributes of God and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, see H.A. Wolfson, "The Muslim Attributes and the Christian Trinity," in The Harvard Theological Review, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Vol. XLIX, No. 1 (Jan. 1956), pp.1-18.

[56]For a sober presentation by fine historians of the New Testament regarding the value of the New Testament documents and the centrality of the person of Jesus in the Christian faith, see Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and Noel Davey, The Riddle of the New Testament, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1958. As a part of the Conclusion (pp.179-182) they write:

"The historian can outline the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth. He can, moreover, demonstrate that his life and death did become the occasion of a quite remarkable outburst of faith in the power of the living God. But he can also demonstrate that it occasioned an almost equally passionate hatred and scorn. Upon the ultimate question of truth and falsehood he is unable, as an historian, to decide. And even if he had authority to make such decisions, his own results forbid him to detach portions of the New Testament as good and true, and to discard the rest as of little or of no value. The critical method has itself revealed most clearly the living unity of the documents...

"Yet it is none the less the historian's duty to hand over certain definite conclusions to those who are now concerned with his results. In the first place, therefore, it must be quite definitely affirmed that neither the Jesus of history nor the primitive church fits into the characteristic nexus of modern popular humanitarian or humanistic ideas. The primitive Christians found the revelation of God in an historical figure so desparately human that there emerged within the early Church a faith in men and women so deeply rooted as to make modern humanitarianism seem doctrinaire and trivial.

The New Testament does not present a complex chaos of conceptions about God and man from which one or another may be picked out and proclaimed as ultimate and true because it satisfies the highest idealism of this or of all ages; it presents a concrete and definite solution of the problems of life and death... The New Testament presents the solution in an unique event, in a particular history of human flesh and blood."

See also Dodd, op. cit., pp.24, 56. On the demands of Jesus upon his disciples and the disciples' confession of Christ, see Schniewind, op. cit., pp.134-135.

[57]Abū-l-Kalām Āzād, Ghubar-i Khātir, op. cit., p.21.

FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX I

[1]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, p.317; vol. II, p.164, where law is equal to "it is written".

[2]Ibid., vol. II, pp.210-211.

[3]Ibid., vol. II, pp.210-211; vol. II, p.108.

[4]Ibid., vol. II, p.303; vol. II, p.446; vol. II, p.184.

[5]Ibid., vol. II, p.8. See also Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.255.

[6]Ibid., vol. II, p.467; vol. II, p.6.

[7]Ibid., vol. II, pp.208-209.

[8]Ibid., vol. II, p.159; vol. II, p.268; vol. II, p.277; vol. II, p.470.

[9]Ibid., vol. II, p.87; vol. II, pp.278-279; vol. II, p.282; vol. II, p.515.

[10]Ibid., vol. I, p.440.

[11]Ibid., vol. II, p.66.

[12]Ibid., vol. I, p.441; vol. II, p.304 (For those who do not take advantage of it, it is also a severe punishment.); vol. II, p.461.

[13]Ibid., vol. I, p.330; vol. I, p.336; vol. II, p.31; vol. II, p.41; vol. II, p.2; vol. II, p.184; vol. II, p.187; vol. II, p.205; vol. II, p.275; vol. II, p.348; vol. II, pp.440-441; vol. I, p.115. Does Āzād leave room for "disinterested" love?

[14]Ibid., vol. II, p.23; vol. II, p.46; vol. II, p.508; vol. II, p.513.

[15]Ibid., vol. I, p.400; vol. II, p.34; vol. II, p.385.

[16]Ibid., vol. I, p.466, footnote.

[17]Ibid., vol. II, p.214.

[18]Ibid., vol. II, p.148.

[19]Ibid., vol. II, p.158.

[20]Roger Pilkington, World Without End, Fontana Books, London, 1961, p.30.

[21]C.A. Coulson, Science and Christian Belief, Fontana Books, London, 1958, pp.114-116.

[22]C.A. Coulson, "Science Tells Us" - How Much? S.P.C.K., London, 1961, pp.6-9.

FOOTNOTE TO APPENDIX II

[1]Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, pp.247-248. Āzād gives no comments on 16:101. (Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit.).

In 2:105, does Āzād prepare the stage for his commentary by translating ayah by ḥukm?

FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX IV

[1]Is. 61:10; 62:5.

[2]Is. 54:5; Jer. 31:32; Hos. 2:16.

[3]Deut. 32:6, 18; Ps. 68:5. See also Is. 63:16; 64:8; Jer. 3:19; 31:9.

[4]Mal. 2:10.

[5]Jer. 3:20; Hos. 4:12,15; Ex. 4:22; Deut. 14:1; 32:19; Hos. 1:10; 11:1; Jer. 3:22; 31:18-20 (which may be the source of Jesus' parable of the two sons).

[6]Ps. 103:13.

[7]Ps. 27:10. In the light of such passages, how can Āzād repeatedly state without qualification that in the Old Testament God is portrayed as a capricious monarch? For further references, see Gottfried Quell, "pater", in Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. Kittel, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1954, vol. V, pp.969-974.

FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX V

[1]In connection with the destruction and reconstruction of the temple, Āzād mentions: Daniel, Haggai and Ezra as prophets (Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.297); Moses, the ten commandments, and references from Exodus (Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, pp.30, 32, 36); that Muḥammad is mentioned in the Tawrāt and in the Injīl (Ibid., vol. II, p.39); Jonah and his Book (Ibid., vol. II, p.170); Noah and Genesis (Ibid., vol. II, p.192); David and the Psalms: "The Book of Psalms is in fact a collection of the songs which Hazrat Dā'ūd composed by divine inspiration (ilhām)" (Ibid., vol. II, p.480); Job and his Book, noting that all that is in the fifty pages of Job is in the brief Quranic presentation (Ibid., vol. II, p.483). But why then the many references to Job? His discussion on Cyrus is filled with references to the Biblical prophets and some quotations from their books (Ibid., vol. II, pp.399-420). He also quotes frequently from Luke, comparing and contrasting this account with the Qur'ān (Ibid., vol. II, pp.431-433). These are only a few of Āzād's Biblical references.

[2]Ibid., vol. II, p.216.

[3]Ibid., vol. II, p.218.

[4]Ibid. But compare his notes on the famine at the time of Joseph (Ibid., vol. II, p.236).

[5]Ibid., vol. II, p.464.

[6]Ibid., vol. II, p.404.

[7]For all the Books, the mode of revelation is the same (3:3-4; 21:7; 42:3; 16:43; 4:163; all of the references in this footnote are taken from Mohammed Marmeduke Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, The New American Library, New York, Second Printing, 1954); the content of revelation is the same (26:192-197); they possess the same excellencies (5:44; 2:101; 3:23; 2:75; 40:53-54; 11:17; 46:12; 6:155; 21:48; 2:53; 2:87; 61:6; 5:46); they preserve the same universal significance (6:92; 28:43; 3:187; 3:3-4); the Qur'ān confirms the previous Scriptures which are with the People of the Book (2:40-44); the Qur'ān indicates the continued existence of previous revelations (32:23-26; 40:53; 42:14; 17:2; 57:26; 29:27; 45:16; 17:4; 3:65-66; 19:12; 66:12; 3:48; 62:5-6);

the Jews and Christians read the Scriptures (2:44; 2:113; 7:169-170; 5:65-69; 10:95); belief in the other Scriptures is enjoined upon all (2:136; 2:285; 4:136; 3:119; 5:59; 29:46; 2:2-5; 4:136; 3:3-4; 40:69-70; 28:48); those who doubt the Qur'ān are to seek confirmation for the validity of its message from the People of the Book (35:6; 26:196-197; 46:10-12; 21:7; 43:45; 6:20-21; 28:48-53; 17:101; 2:101; 2:111; 17:107; 16:43; 13:36; 3:99); if Muḥammad doubts the Qur'ān, he is to appeal to the People of the Book (10:95; 6:115). However the Qur'ān reprimands the Jews and the Christians, these reprimands hardly can involve the textual corruption or abrogation of their Scriptures. From the above evidence there are only three reasonably possible conclusions: 1. The evidence of the Qur'ān is unreliable; 2. the Qur'ān invites men to read, study, and believe in corrupted and abrogated Scriptures; 3. the Qur'ān summons men to believe in previous Scriptures which it considers to be textually genuine at the time of the Qur'ān. These possibilities, which are vital to Āzād's thesis, Āzād does not entertain seriously. He neglects this evidence from the same Book which is the source and foundation of his theology.

FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX VI

[1]H.H. Farmer, God and Men, op. cit., p.95.

[2]Nevertheless it is true that Āzād via strange exegesis judges all the prophets qua prophets to be sinless. Do they alone, however, escape what the Qur'ān frequently calls "diseased hearts"?

[3]Cf. Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. I, p.191 (6:108); vol. I, p.194; vol. I, pp.199-200; vol. I, p.214; vol. I, p.220; see also Abū-l-Kalām Ahmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, op. cit., vol. II, pp.170-171; vol. II, p.173; vol. II, p.213. Cf. 4:28; 4:128; 14:9; 16:4; 16:61; 17:67; 17:89; 18:54; 21:24; 22:42-45. See also pp.58-66, supra.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

List of Works Consulted:

Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, Zamzam Co. Ltd., Lahore, vol. I, 1947; Abū-l-Kalām Aḥmad, Tarjumānu-l-Qur'ān, Maktabah-i Muṣṭafā'i, Lahore, vol. II, n.d.

Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, The Tarjumān al-Qur'ān, trans. Dr. Syed Abdul Latif, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, vol. I, 1962.

Abu-l-Kalām Azad, Ghubār-i Khāṭir, Kitābī Dunyā, Lahore, n.d.

Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, Basic Concepts of the Quran, prepared by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif, The Academy of Islamic Studies, Hyderabad, 1958.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, Orient Longmans Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1959.

Maulana Azad, The Publications Division, Delhi, 1958.

Subh-i Umayd, Selections from the Works of Abū-l-Kalām Āzād, vol. I, Singh Kitāb Ghar, New Delhi, n.d.

Baird, J. Arthur, The Justice of God in the Teaching of Jesus, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1963.

Baljon, J.M.S., "A Modern Urdu Tafsīr", in Die Welt des Islams, E.J. Brill, Leiden, N.S., vol. II, no. 2, 1952, pp.95-107.

Baljon, J.M.S., Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation (1880-1960), E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1961.

The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version, Thomas Nelson & Sons, New York, 1952.

Buechsel, Friedrich, "lytron", in Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, vol. IV, 1942, pp.341-352.

Cragg, Keneth, The Call of the Minaret, Oxford University Press, New York, 1956.

Cragg, Kenneth, "The Servant and the Son", in The Muslim World, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, vol. XLVII, no. 1 (January 1957), pp.1-4.

Coulson, C.A., Science and Christian Belief, Fontana Books, London, 1958.

Coulson, C.A., "Science Tells Us" - How Much? S.P.C.K., London, 1961.

Desai, Mahadev, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Shiva Lal Agarwala & Co., Ltd., Agra, Second Indian Edition, 1946.

Dodd, C.H., The Apostolic Preaching, Harper and Brothers, New York, n.d.

The Encyclopaedia of Islam, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, et al., E.J. Brill, Leiden, vol. I-IV plus Supplement, 1908-1938.

The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, ed. H.A.R. Gibb, J.H. Kramers, E. Levi-Provencal, J. Schacht, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1960.

Farmer, Herbert H., The World and God, The Fontana Library, London, 1963.

Farmer, Herbert H., God and Men, Abingdon Press, New York, 1947.

Fyzee, Asaf A.A., A Modern Approach to Islam, Asia Publishing House, Calcutta, 1963.

Gibb, H.A.R., Modern Trends in Islam, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Third Impression, 1954.

Koskyns, Sir Edwyn and Davey, Noel, The Riddle of the New Testament, Faber and Faber, Ltd., London, 1958.

Husain, Ashfaque, The Spirit of Islam, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1958.

Imprint, Bombay, vol. I, no. 3, June 1961.

Iqbal, Sir Muhammad, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, Reprinted 1962.

Jeremias, Joachim, The Parables of Jesus, trans. S.H. Hooke, Revised Edition, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1963.

Kamali, S.A., Azad's Tafsīr, a term paper, Institute of Islamic Studies, Montreal, 1954.

The Koran, trans. N.J. Dawood, Penguin Books, Middlesex, Revised Edition, 1959.

The Koran, trans. J.M. Rodwell, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London, Reprinted, 1950.

Malik, Hafeez, "Abu-l Kalām Āzād's Theory of Nationalism", in The Muslim World, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, vol. LIII, no. 1 (Jan. 1963), pp.33-40.

Manson, T.W., The Servant-Messiah, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, First Paperback Edition, 1961.

Miller, Alexander, The Renewal of Man, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1955.

Nehru, Jawaharlal, The Discovery of India, Meridian Books Ltd., London, Fourth Impression, 1956.

Paret, Rudi, Mohammed und der Koran, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1957.

Perrin, Norman, The Kingdom of God in the Teaching of Jesus, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1963.

Pickthall, Mohammed Marmaduke, trans., The Meaning of the Glorious Koran, The New American Library, New York, Second Printing, 1954.

Pilkington, Roger, World Without End, Fontana Books, London, 1961.

Platts, John T., A Dictionary or Urdū, Classical Hindī, and English, Oxford University Press, London, Fifth Impression, 1930.

Quell, Gottfried, "pater", in Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, vol. V, 1954, pp.959-974.

Von Rad, Gerhard, Genesis, trans. John H. Marks, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1961.

Rahbar, Daud, God of Justice, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1960.

Rahbar, Daud, "Reflections on the Tradition of Qur'anic Exegesis", in The Muslim World, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, vol. LII, no. 4 (October 1962), pp.296-307.

Rahbar, Muhammad D., "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān's Principles of Exegesis", in The Muslim World, Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford, vol. XLVI, no. 2 (April 1956), pp.104-112.

Schniewind, Julius, Das Evangelium nach Matthaeus, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Goettingen, 4, durchgesehene Auflage, 1950.

Siddiqi, Mazheruddin, "Muslim Culture in Pakistan and India", in Islam - The Straight Path, ed. Kenneth W. Morgan, The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1958, pp.296-343.

Siddiqi, Mazheru-d-Din, Obaid-ullah Sindhi, a term paper, Institute of Islamic Studies, Montreal, 1954.

Spencer, Harold, Islam and the Gospel of God, S.P.C.K., Delhi, 1956.

Stauffer, Ethelbert, "Theos", in Theologisches Woerterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, vol. III, 1938, pp.95-120.

Toynbee, Arnold, One World and India, Orient Longman's Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1960.

Watt, W. Montgomery, Muhammad at Medina, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1956.

Wolfson, H.A., "The Muslim Attributes and the Christian Trinity", in The Harvard Theological Review, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, vol. XLIX, no. 1 (January 1956), pp.1-18.