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**Islam, Islamic Leadership and Community  
Development in Tanga, Tanzania**

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty  
of Graduate Studies and Research  
in Partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree  
of Doctor of Philosophy

Institute of Islamic Studies  
McGill University  
Montreal

October 1991



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## **ABSTRACT**

This study which focusses on a coastal Swahili society, examines the economic, political and social evolution of the Tanganyika Muslim community through the various phases of its history. The study pays specific attention to the role played by religious leaders, whether as competitors, or simply as madrasa teachers in a community with a tradition of Islamic scholarship. At the macro-level, the relationship between various Muslim organizations and the state also receives our scrutiny. This is done through analysis of the educational system and its structuring of the social order. Finally, we assess the views of the Tanganyika religious leadership regarding religion and society against a general discussion of intra-religious issues and political developments in the country, thereby achieving a better understanding of Islam in contemporary Tanzania.



## **RESUME**

Cette étude concerne l'évolution économique, politique et sociale, à travers les différentes époques de son histoire, de la communauté musulmane de Tanga, dans la région côtière de la Tanzanie. L'attention est spécifiquement portée sur le rôle joué par les chefs religieux, qu'ils soient en compétition, ou qu'ils soient simplement des enseignants aux madrasas dans une communauté à forte tradition de scolarité Islamique. Sur le plan général, la relation entre les diverses organisations musulmanes et l'Etat est également examinée. Cette étude est basée sur l'analyse du système éducatif et les effets de celui-ci sur la structuration de l'ordre social. Enfin, les opinions de la direction religieuse de Tanga sur la religion et la société sont évaluées par rapport aux questions intra-religieuses et aux développements politiques de la Tanzanie, permettant ainsi une compréhension plus approfondie de la place de l'Islam dans ce pays.

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
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


**Map I: An Ethnic Map of Tanzania**


Source: J.S. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa* (Oxford, 1964), 199.

# Map II: The Coast Before 1500 A.D.

Source: N. Chittick in Zamaní ed.  
B.A. Ogot (London, 1968), 169.



**Map III: Sketch Map of Tanga Coastline**




Source: Adapted from: L.B. Nhwani, "The Dagaa Fishery in Tanga", **TNR** 86 & 87 (1981), 33.



# Map IV: The Site of Tanga Town


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Source: B.S. Hoyle, *The Seaports of East Africa* (Nairobi, 1967), 19; J.M. Pritchard, *A Geography of East Africa* (London, 1962), 169.



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## ABBREVIATIONS

AA	African Affairs
AC	Africa Confidential
AAS	Asian and African Studies
AHS	African Historical Studies
ALS	African Language Studies
AQ	African Quarterly
AR	Africa Report
AS	African Studies
ASQ	Arab Studies Quarterly
ASR	African Studies Review
BJS	British Journal of Sociology
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CA	Current Anthropology
CD	Cultures et Développement
CDA	Cahier D'Etudes Africaines
CJAS	Canadian Journal of African studies
CPR	Comparative Political Studies
CR	Country Report (Tanzania)
CSSH	Comparative Studies in Society and History
EAJ	East African Journal
HA	History in Africa
IA	International Affairs
IC	Islamic Culture
II	Impact International
IJAHS	International Journal of African Historical Studies
IJMAS	International Journal of Modern African Studies
IJMES	International Journal of Middle East Studies
IMA	Islam and the Modern Age
IS	Islamic Studies
JAA	Journal of African Administration
JAH	Journal of African History
JAL	Journal of African Law
JAS	Journal of African Studies
JASo	Journal of African Society
JCCP	Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics
JCE	Journal of Comparative Education
JCS	Journal of Church and State
JEASC	Journal of the East African Swahili Committee
JIMMA	Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs
JMAS	Journal of Modern African Studies
JRA	Journal of Religion in Africa
JRAI	Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute
JRAS	Journal of Royal Asiatic Society
KUAS	Kyoto University African Studies
MES	Middle East Studies

MW	Muslim World
NA	New African
QER	Quarterly Economic Review (Tanzania)
SI	Studia Islamica
SJA	Southwestern Journal of Anthropology
TNA TDB	Tanzania National Archives Tanga District Book
TNR	Tanganyika/Tanzania Notes and Records
UJ	Uganda Journal

## TRANSLITERATION

In this study, Swahili names, words and phrases whether or not of Arabic origin will be written according to Swahili spelling. Arabic words will be recognized in their Swahili form without the apparatus of diacritical marks used in the standard works. Occasionally where appropriate some words will be transliterated. I have preserved the Swahili form of Arabic words such as maulid, dua, baraka, kadhi, khatibu, ulamaa (written with a single or double "a" at the end), tafsiri, imam, Sunni, Shia, Ismaili, Ibadhi, mwalimu, and Shehe/shaykh. Most of the Muslim proper names and also place names have been left in the form in which they appear in the textbooks or the way they have been adopted by the local people. Muslim personal names (which are of Arabic origin) have been modified or Swahilized. These names appear in any of several forms. A name such as Muḥammad becomes Muhammad/i, Mohamed or Mwamadi; Ṣāliḥ becomes Saleh; ʿAbd Allāh becomes Abdalla/Abdulla/Abdulah; and Saʿīd becomes Said or Saidi. A number of Arabic names are changed with the addition of a vowel, "a", "i" or "u", at the end or occasionally at the beginning. For instance, names such as Ahmadi, Omari/Umari and Selemani or Sulaimani. Sometimes Swahili and Arabic names are combined to form new names. For instance, names such as Mwinyifakii/Mwinyifaqih (from Mwinyi and Faqih) and Mwinyikhamisi. It is clear that a large number of Arabic words were modified and now form an integral part of the Swahili language. In this study Swahili words are given in their singular as well as plural forms, where appropriate. In certain instances English plurals (which may be identical with Swahili plurals) have been followed (for example, waqfu, not awqāf). Words or terms which are in common usage in English such as Koran, caliph or Mecca will be spelled in their accepted anglicized forms and will not be italicized. Foreign words and phrases are italicized generally only the first time they appear in the text. In general Swahili and, to some extent, English spellings will be used throughout this study, except when sources are quoted.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The material for this dissertation was collected mainly during my field research in Tanzania from November 1984 to May 1985. I have relied on McGill and Concordia Universities for secondary material. For financial assistance enabling me to carry out my research in Tanzania, I am indebted to the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University and to the Fellowship Office at McGill for providing me a grant for travel expenses.

I am indebted to many people for their assistance and encouragement in my research. First of all I would like to thank my two supervisors, professor Uner Turgay, presently the Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, and Professor Dan Aronson of the department of Anthropology, for reading and commenting on various parts of my dissertation and for assisting me in other ways. Dr. Turgay has been consistently supportive of my research interests on modern developments in Muslim countries and has guided my academic career at the Institute. He had earlier supervised my M.A. thesis which dealt with Islam in West Africa (nineteenth-century Gambia to be precise). Professor Aronson kindly agreed to lend his help/expertise to this thesis/research project which required the supervision of an Africanist. In fact, the choice of the present topic has been brought into fulfillment through the opportunity to pursue two directed studies courses on Africa with professors John Galaty and Dan Aronson of the department of Anthropology. Dr. Aronson gave me his valuable time and assistance at all stages of my work. I am particularly thankful to him for reading my thesis with encouraging attentiveness and for making valuable suggestions which have resulted in improvements. Dr. Aronson has also been helpful in easing my financial difficulties during a critical phase of my thesis work. I am thankful to him and to Dr. Domingue (Director of the Linguistics department) for providing me with the opportunity to teach Kiswahili in the program of African Studies at McGill during the academic year September 1990 to April 1991.

I would like to thank the office of Utafiti (and particularly the help of Mr. Daniel Ndagala in securing a research permit) for giving me permission to carry out this research and Idara ya Kumbukumbu za Taifa (the Tanzania National Archives) for allowing me to use the archival material. I would like to thank the staff of the University of Dar es Salaam library, the district office (municipal council and office ya Utamaduni, Tanga) and representatives of BAKWATA, Warsha, MSAUD, BAMITA and Uvikita/Ansaar Sunna youth. I am grateful to many people in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Tanga for their advice, hospitality and assistance which made my stay in Tanzania pleasant (the fact that I fell sick and laboured in pain during my field research notwithstanding). I would like to thank Shaykh Jumbe Taajir and other shaykhs and individuals in Tanga and Dar es Salaam (the list is endless) who answered my questions and provided me with information, Hassan Mnjeja, Mwalimu Lumwe, Muhammad Husein and his brother Kiyasibu, Qaasim Muhammad (his maternal uncle, Muhammad Qaasim Maharuma who lives in Toronto influenced my choice of Tanga as the subject of my case study) and others who conducted me around town. It is not possible to mention the names of all the people who helped me or kept communicating with me about developments in Tanga and Dar es Salaam long after I had left the country. I would like to make special mention of Ahmad Diwan who has been very generous with his time and has helped me reconstruct map V (which is a rough approximation of the layout of Tanga town).

For the write-up period I would like to thank the staff of the Institute of Islamic Studies and particularly Professor Donald Little for his continued support and for his concern for a smooth completion of my work (in between writing my thesis I took several years off to study Arabic in the Middle East and also availed myself of the opportunity for a "time-out" to recuperate from the lingering effects of an earlier illness). My thanks are also due to the staff of the Institute of Islamic Studies library at McGill (Salwa Ferahian and Steve Millier) for all their assistance. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for help rendered by all the consultants and Shamas Nanji in



particular who set up the (Macintosh) computer program for me and was available each step of the way to answer my questions and to assist me in whichever way he could during the days, weeks and months that I slaved away in the computer room typing my dissertation.

## INTRODUCTION

In the present stage of the various studies of Islam in Africa, the question of the role of Muslim leaders in a changing socio-economic environment is a crucial one. Thus the issue is not merely the role of the leaders, but, by extension, the evolution of a community through the various phases of its socio-economic and political history.

Since we are concerned about the Islamic community, and since one of the major components of the Muslim society is the *ulamaa* (religious leaders), our inquiry necessarily has to do with Islam, Islamic leadership and community development in Tanga town in northeastern Tanzania. Moreover, despite our treatment of aspects of socio-economic and political life in the Tanga community, the national context is kept in view. This means that, in addition to its local focus, this study is also concerned with Islam in Tanzania in general.

### The Setting

Tanga, the town we have selected for study, is situated between the two important port cities of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Mombasa (Kenya). Our purpose for selecting Tanga for study is the following: 1) we wanted to examine a Muslim society that has not yet attracted the attention of modern research scholars; 2) we wanted to study a society where Islamic scholarship was marked, and where conflict or competitive religious struggles were most acutely expressed; and 3) we wanted to study a society which is at the centre of Islamic issues or concerns of national importance. Tanga is an important Islamic religious centre which has produced religious scholars who have a reputation in the local and national community. The town has shared in the strong tradition of high Islamic learning for which the coastal region is well known in East Africa. One of the outstanding

representatives of this tradition is Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, the late *kadhi* of Tanga, a noted scholar of Islamic law in Tanganyika.

Originally this study was designed to investigate religious and socio-political attitudes of Muslim religious leaders. However, during the course of our field research we discovered that such a study required intensive questionnaire method to be administered to religious leaders in Tanga and also in Dar es Salaam. Our analysis of archival material and other relevant literature at the University of Dar es Salaam and also interviews in Tanga opened our perception to a broader analysis that would take into consideration the establishment of the Tanga settlement, clan cleavage in Tanga and how it relates to religious leadership and competition, religious trends in the community and efforts by Tanzanian Muslims to forge ahead in the educational field. Therefore, it would be difficult to comprehend Tanga as it exists without presenting its historical background, both for its own sake and as a context for understanding religious issues of today. Our investigation focuses on religious leaders who constitute our unit of analysis for studying religious trends in the town. The town has experienced religious factionalism, which has led to a significant number of Muslims to identify with one group or the other.

### **Nature of the study and sources used**

Little scholarly attention has been devoted to Tanga town. Apart from Oscar Baumann's nineteenth-century work, *Usambara and its Neighbouring Regions*, which contains very useful notes on the early history of Tanga town, nothing has yet been written about this town and its community by modern scholars. E. C. Baker and Phillip Gulliver each wrote a general article on Tanga province, not Tanga town as such.<sup>1</sup> Literature on the town exists mainly in scattered fragmentary references in studies which present a general history of the East African coast. Studies of coastal towns have

concentrated on Lamu, Mombasa, Zanzibar, Kilwa and, to a lesser extent, Bagamoyo and Pangani.<sup>2</sup> We hope that our study will fill the gap in part and will stimulate further research on Tanga town.

Given the dearth of written materials, we have relied on archival data, oral data (including our field notes) and published accounts. Information gathered during field research was cross-checked with archival data and material from written sources. Printed and manuscript accounts and also reports by district officials have enabled us to elaborate on developments in Tanga in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

One of the main concerns of this study, which examines some of the religious trends in a Tanzanian Muslim society, is to investigate the process of religious competition and how it relates to religious factionalism in the Tanga Sunni Muslim community. The phenomenon of religious factionalism has not been the subject of many analyses.<sup>3</sup> In fact, factionalism has been studied mainly in the context of politics.<sup>4</sup> In this study it will be argued that factionalism, a key feature in the madrasa rivalry in Tanga, has been the overriding factor which has shaped and defined group loyalties. A "faction" (taken to denote a group of people joined together to further some goal in opposition to some other group) emerges out of conflict or disagreement which is its justification and involves groups which dispute over the share of religious power or leadership in society. There is no recruitment of members (Tanga's factions not having achieved the status of a corporate group, for instance, a party). Clan affiliation and educational ties to a particular madrasa are two of the principles relating to winning supporters. Other principles include propaganda against opposing factions.

This dissertation, which is divided into two major sections, consists of six chapters which are liberally footnoted, often with long explanatory notes. The first chapter will provide a general sketch of the history of Tanga town from its foundation to its

contemporary setting. We shall relate our study of the town to both the wider coastal/Tanzanian society and the historical processes that have acted on it. We shall analyze the changes in the socio-economic and political spheres in the town over the period.

Chapter two is devoted to analyzing the social construction of Tanga. In the first section, the various ethnic and social groups are discussed; in the second section, the socio-economic conditions and the demographic growth of Tanga are treated. This chapter was conceived as an examination of communal segments and competition. In order to elucidate the process of factional competition between the two Segeju clans, we analyze the history of the Segeju in order to locate the origins of this conflict which forms the backdrop of the following chapter. We have also provided a brief history of the other ethnic groups of Tanga.

Chapter three, which is central to this study, begins with a short presentation of the leading religious scholars in Tanga in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Factionalism is the analytic perspective which informs this part of our study. It will be shown that religious leadership is a matter of struggles among individuals who compete for influence and ritual power. The conflicting factions are based on clan rivalry between two Segeju clans. There are two main factions which are composed of supporters of TAMTA and Zahrau madrasas. The Digo have also utilized the ethnic constellation to create a new, but still smaller, faction.

It will be seen in chapter four, when we examine the Supreme Council for Tanzanian Muslims (BAKWATA), that its formation during a Muslim crisis which pitted pan-Islamists against national-oriented Muslims, provided the government with an opportunity to bring Muslims under control in the new pro-government association. This is one of the reasons why BAKWATA received a cool reception in Tanga. This was despite the fact that two leading Tanzanian scholars, first, Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy,

and later, Shaykh Hemed bin Juma, both men are from Tanga and are related, came to occupy high positions in the organization. Another reason is the fact that BAKWATA (which consists of only a handful of employees and is not organized as a madrasa centre with a large group of followers) could not constitute itself as a faction which was the basis of support and religious competition in Tanga. The final section of this chapter will examine Uvikita (now known as Ansaar Sunna youth), a reformist Muslim youth association modelled after Warsha (a Muslim writers' workshop based in Dar es Salaam), which has on a number of occasions mobilized Tangan Muslims against BAKWATA.

Chapter five moves from a narrower study of Islam and Muslim groups in Tanga to a broader investigation of Muslim groups which play a role at the national level. This will be a general discussion of the progress (in the educational sphere) of the Tanzanian Muslim community from the nineteenth century to the present time taking into consideration developments in Tanga. Our purpose here will be to understand the significance of Islam and of Muslim groups in contemporary Tanzania. Since part two of this thesis deals with micro and macro issues in Tangan Muslim life, we need first to make a few introductory remarks to set the setting for this discussion and the study in general in their proper context.

In order to present the Tanzanian Muslim community in general and the Swahili coastal community of Tanga town in particular as a type, it is worth considering in passing Muslim communities in heterogeneous societies such as those in Malaysia, Phillipines and Nigeria.<sup>5</sup> The latter societies are all characterized by ethnic or religious cleavages of one form or another. Nigeria is a country where a little over half the population are Muslims many of whom are concentrated in the northern region. Towns, therefore, such as Kano, an important trading and cultural centre which came under the influence of the nineteenth century Fulani reformers, stand for Muslim religio-political predominance. Nigerian governmental federalism operates to help keep religious and ethnic interests at bay by decentralizing the foci of political competition. On the other hand, Muslim communities

among the Tausug of Phillipines and Malays of Malaysia display deep cleavages in populations that are at odds with their neighbours. In Malaysia ethnic factionalism has been the style of politics at all levels of society while in Phillipines armed struggle has been one form in which Muslim grievance has expressed itself.

In contrast, the Tanzanian Muslim population has been less characterized by friction in its relations with its neighbours. The Muslim population is dispersed throughout the country although the largest concentrations are to be found in towns and on the coast. The fact that Muslims are represented among the major ethnic groups (indicating that religious and ethnic identity cross-cut one another) probably functions to promote or foster a spirit of tolerance among different groups. It is education (which promotes social mobility and assures entry in the elite ranks of society)<sup>6</sup> which has been the main source of Muslim grievance in Tanzania, as indeed in many parts of Africa.<sup>7</sup>

Therefore, chapter five examines the origins of Western education and the educational policies pursued by the German and the British colonial administrations in Tanzania. Our discussion will highlight factors which contributed to the emergence of educational inequalities between the Muslim and Christian communities. The lagging position of the Muslims (whose community has not fared well in terms of educational advancement) has been a factor which has motivated them to organize and pressure successive governments to create opportunities for Muslims in education. The government in post-colonial Tanzania has attempted to diffuse the educational issue which can easily become politicized. In fact, religion is considered to be enough of a potential problem that the official publication of statistical information on the religious affiliation of Tanzanians is avoided. Education is a burning issue with Muslims given that although they probably constitute the largest religious community in the country (40 percent at the very least although Muslims claim an unreasonably higher figure)<sup>8</sup>, they are disproportionately

represented in the higher institutions of learning. Christians number close to one-third of the total population but form the bulk of the student body in these institutions.

The final chapter surveys the views of religious leaders on a number of issues. For instance, we examine whether the Tanga Muslim leaders have adopted themselves to changes in society and whether these changes are reflected in their views on education, women, popular religion and politics. Modern developments, beginning with the colonial era, have brought about certain transformations in the socio-economic and political spheres. The outcome is that the traditional universe is now one among quite a few competing for acceptance by the traditional and modernist forces. This is the more reason why it is necessary to understand the views of Muslim religious leaders in the light of the societal transformations.

It is important to conclude this introduction with a note on the data of the study. At the initial stage of this investigation we knew very little about Tanga town. We had to rely on secondary materials which provided us with various insights on the inquiry of Islam in the coastal Swahili communities of East Africa. Our original thesis outline was of limited usefulness as a guide in directing the focus of our data gathering. It became clear upon commencement of field research that several issues in the Tanga community that we had not anticipated, for instance, the Segeju factional conflict, required extensive examination. Accordingly, our primary concern in data gathering became to collect material and sort it out later according to a new organizational scheme. The final form that this thesis has taken, including the arrangement of the chapters, is, therefore, as much a function of the available sources as it is a fulfillment of our main research objectives. Each chapter makes a discreet essay which treats one aspect or theme of our investigation. Thus the various themes together establish the basic foundations of this inquiry.



The present work, while integrating material from various sources (archival sources, printed and manuscript accounts, reports by district officials, newspapers and pamphlets and fieldnotes), has encountered some difficulties in elaborating certain aspects of the Tangan community. This is evident in instances where our information was too sparse and fragmented to allow us to make exact connections between local and national issues or to elaborate at some length on certain aspects of Tangan society. In such cases the information we have permits the construction of only incomplete and tentative connections. In chapter four and five, for instance, our discussion is more national than local in focus. This is partly a problem of sources and partly a result of the very nature of this study, which seeks to elaborate a subject, specific and local, on one hand, and national, on the other. In the light of the above, it is hoped that if this study succeeds in generating further interest in the study of Tanga and manages to clarify some themes, and to stimulate discussion on some issues, it will have fulfilled its purpose.

### Notes to the Introduction

- 1 E. C. Baker, **Report on Social and Economic Conditions in the Tanga Province** (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1934); and Phillip H. Gulliver, "Alien Africans in the Tanga Region" (Sociological Research, Provincial Administration Tanganyika, August 1956).
- 2 See, for instance, Abdul Hamid El Zein, **The Sacred Meadows** (Evanston, Illinois: Northern Western University Press, 1974); Marguerite Ylvisaker, **Lamu in the Nineteenth Century; Land, Trade and Politics** (Boston: African Studies Centre, Boston University, 1979); A. I. Salim, **Swahili-Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast 1895-1965** (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973); Abdul M. Hussein Sheriff, "The Rise of a Commercial Empire: An Aspect of the Economic History of Zanzibar, 1770-1873" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1971); Randall L. Pouwels, "Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1979); August Harrison Nimtz, "The Role of the Muslim Sufi Order in Political Change: An Overview and Micro-Analysis from Tanzania" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1973); and Walter Brown, "A Pre-Colonial History of Bagamoyo: Aspects of the Growth of An East African Coastal Town" (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1961).
- 3 Among the few studies that have dealt with this subject is Mart Bax's article entitled "'Us' Catholics and 'Them' Catholics in Dutch Brabant: The Dialectics of a Religious Factional Process," **Anthropology Quarterly** 56: 4 (1983): 167-178.
- 4 For discussions on factionalism, consult Janet Bujra, "The Dynamics of Political Action: A New Look at Factionalism," **American Anthropologist** 75: 1 (1973): 132-152; R. W. Firth, "Introduction: Factions in Indian and Overseas Societies," **BJS** 8 (1957): 291-295; Richard Sandbrook, "Patrons, Clients, and Factions; New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa," **Canadian Journal of Political Science** 5 (1972): 104-119; R. F. Salisbury and Marilyn Silverman, eds., **A House Divided? Anthropological Studies of Factionalism** (St. Johns, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1977); A. F. Ricciardelli, "Factionalism at Oneida, An Iroquois Indian Community" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1961); Norman K. Nicholson, "The Factional Model and the Study of Politics," **CPS** 5:3 (October, 1972): 291-314; J. Siegel, "Pervasive Factionalism," **American Anthropologist** 62 (1960): 394-417; idem and A. Beals, "Conflict and Factionalist Dispute," **JRAI** 90 (1960): 107-117; R. W. Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis," in **Political Systems and the Distribution of Power**, ed. M. Banton (London, Tavistock, 1965); Deward E. Walker, Jr., **Conflict and Schism in Nez Perce Acculturation: A Study of Religion and Politics** (Washington: Washington University Press, 1968); and Paul R. Brass, **Factional Politics in an Indian State** (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).

- 5 K. J. Ratnam, **Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya** (Kuala Lumpur: The University of Malaya Press, 1965); Alvin Rabushka, **Race and Politics in Urban Malaya** (Stanford, California: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1973); Hussin Mutalib, **Islam and Ethnicity in Malay Politics** (Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Thomas M. Kiefer, **The Tausug** (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1972); Charles R. Nixon, "Nigeria and Biafra," in **Conflict in World Politics**, eds. Steven L. Spiegel and K. N. Waltz (Cambridge: Mass.: Winthrop, 1971): 281-300; and Ugbana Okpu, "Conflicts in Agitations for More States in the Nigerian Second Republic," **AAS** 20 (1986): 329-356.
- 6 See, for example, P. Bolland and P. J. McGowan, **The Political and Social Elite of Tanzania: An Analysis of Social Background Factors** (Syracuse: Program of African Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1971).
- 7 For a start, see L. Proudfoot and H. S. Wilson, "Muslim Attitudes to Education in Sierra Leone," **MW** 50 (1960): 86-98; David S. Bone, "The Muslim Minority in Malawi and Western Education," **JIMMA** 6: 2 (1985): 412-419; David E. Skinner, "Islam and Education in the Colony and Hinterland of Sierra Leone," **CJAS** 10: 3 (1976): 499-520; B. A. R. Braimah, "Islamic Education in Ghana," in **Religion in A Pluralist Society**, ed. J. S. Pobee (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976): 201-216; and Felice Carter, "The Education of African Muslims in Uganda," **UJ** 29: 2 (1965): 193-199.
- 8 No authoritative data are available on the number of Muslims in Tanzania. The 1978 National Census contains no information on religion and ethnicity. The view voiced by Muslim groups is that they make up 65-70 percent of the total population in the country. This figure is carried in **Muslim News International** (July 1963) and other more recent Muslim reviews such as the **World Muslim Gazette** published by the Karachi-based World Muslim Congress. See also the Mombasa-based Muslim newsletter **The Message** (January-August 1983; and December-February 1984-85) which alleges that according to the white paper released by the (Tanzanian) Ministry of Information and Culture (1980) Muslims constitute 70 percent of the total population in the country. In contrast, one Christian missionary has claimed that the Tanzanian population is made up of 26 percent Muslim, 45 percent Christian and 28.6 percent Traditionalist (followers of African Religions). David B. Barrett, **Frontier Situations for Evangelisation and Religion in Tanzania** (Madras: The Christian Literature Society, 1972), 4, as cited in Jan Pvan Bergen, **Development and Religion in Tanzania** (Madras: The Christian Literature Society, 1981), 23. The above estimates are a clear distortion of the demographic situation in the country. Data from the 1948 Census shows that in Tanganyika out of a population of 7, 4 10, 269 Africans, there were 24.9 percent Muslim, 17.6 percent Christian and 57.5 percent Traditionalist. The Census for 1957 shows that out of a total population of 8, 665, 336 Africans, there were 30.9 percent Muslim, 24.9 percent Christian and 44.2 percent Traditionalist. See **African Census Report 1957** (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1963), Table 37, 67. In 1957 Zanzibar, which is a mainly Muslim island, had a population of 299, 111 people. Therefore, the total Muslim

population for Tanzania (Zanzibar included) in 1957 was 34 percent. This compares with the figure of 34.08 percent which is given in Joseph M. Cuoq, **Les Musulmans en Afrique** (Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1975), 456. If one takes the Muslim rate of population growth between 1948 and 1957 and project it over a period of about three decades (1957-1987) the Muslim population should approximate, at the very least, about 40 percent of the total population. This conservative estimate takes into account the low fertility rates of some of the coastal regions such as Lindi and Mtwara. Barrett's estimates of the Muslim population in Tanzania are applicable to the demographic situation in 1948. Even then, the Muslim population in Tanzania (Zanzibar included) in 1948 stood at 27.8 percent and not 26 percent. See Cuoq, **Les Musulmans**, 456. Based on the evidence we have presented, Barrett's estimates (and also the claims by Muslim groups in Tanzania) are highly questionable. Barrett assumes that during a period of over a quarter of a century the Muslim proportion of the population has remained static, and has not grown whether through natural increase or conversion. This assumption is not borne out by the census reports and ignores the numerical growth of the Muslims between 1948 and 1957. The 1967 Census (which shows that in Tanzania there were 31.7 percent Muslim, 31.2 percent Christian, 36 percent followers of Traditional Beliefs and 1.1 percent others) is generally considered unreliable and reflects the official approach in Tanzania to conveniently assign equal percentages for all the three major religions. The figure of 31.7 percent for Muslims shows a much more static situation. On the other hand, **Africa Confidential** 26: 24 (27 November 1985), 5 indicates that 60 percent of the Tanzanian population was made up of Muslims. An accurate estimate of the Muslim population in Tanzania, surely, must lie somewhere between these two figures.

## **Part One: AN INTRODUCTION TO TANGA**

### **Chapter One**

#### **LOCALITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

##### **The Setting: Tanga town**

Tanga town is located on the southern shore of Tanga bay, a considerable indentation along a coast which is otherwise characterized by mangrove swamps and sandy soil (see map IV). The town lies in a low-lying area (it rises to only about 50 feet above sea level), being built upon a low plateau above an almost completely landlocked harbour. It has hot and humid weather between November and April and hot and less humid or relatively more pleasant weather between May and September when the tropical heat is tempered by cool sea breezes. The town receives heavy rains in April and May and short rains in October and November.

There is very little information available on Tanga's early history. Yet the early history of the town needs to be explored, as thus far the town has not attracted the attention of scholars. It will not be out of place, therefore, if we begin our discussion by tracing the origins of the word Tanga.

At the outset, it should be mentioned that the name Tanga does not belong to the present town, but to a smaller town which is now in ruins on the harbour island that became known in the period of German colonial rule as Toten island.<sup>1</sup> The island is probably two miles in circumference and lies at a distance of about half a mile from the mainland. It contains ruins of two mosques and tombs which indicate an earlier settlement at least four centuries ago.<sup>2</sup> At the western end (where the settlement was located) it is flat

and rises steadily towards the east, where its coastline drops sharply in steep coralline chalk cliffs.<sup>3</sup> In 1824 the island town was visited by members of a British naval expedition who found the town to be in decline. Around the mid-1840s the inhabitants of the old town moved to the mainland, that is, to the present site of Tanga town where the villages of Mkwakwani and Chumbageni had previously been (see maps IV and V).<sup>4</sup> Eventually the name Tanga was transferred from the old town, which by the mid-1880s was no longer inhabited. Oscar Baumann, a German explorer who visited the town in 1890, reported that the local people had no explanation for the name "Tanga." Richard Burton, on the other hand, claimed that the word meant or suggested a sail, which was the shape of the inlet.<sup>5</sup> This assumption, however, was not accepted by Baumann who advanced the view that since the oldest inhabitants of the mainland were Wabondei, the word Tanga, which is a Kibondei word meaning "outside," was used by them to refer to the island only. A more frequent explanation that one hears in Tanga even today<sup>6</sup> is given by Petro R. H. Mbahula.<sup>7</sup> According to him, the word Tanga refers not to the island but to the mainland itself. In other words, when the inhabitants of the old town crossed the island to go to the mainland coast to look after their farms or cultivated fields, they would say: "Naita Tanga" (I am going to the farm).<sup>8</sup> Henceforth Mkwakwani was called Tanga. This view, however, is not without problems since as Baumann reports during his visit, the hinterland people still called the new town Mkwakwani while the Swahili retained the old name of Tanga, the name of the island town. The story gets more complicated: some of our informants, for example, identify the old town as Changa, although for Petro Mbahula this name is derived from Wachanga, the name of that group of Wabondei who settled in Mkwakwani and were thereafter known by that name.<sup>9</sup>

It is clear that evidence points to Tanga being an old settlement, but one that did not come into its own at an early stage due to its proximity to more economically important or more politically powerful neighbours. Although it is mentioned in the context of events of

the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Tanga does not figure prominently in the early records. Indeed, it is only in 1631 that the name Tanga appears in a historical record.<sup>10</sup> This does not necessarily mean that the town had no name before it gained a certain importance as Baumann seems to suggest, but rather that before such time, the town was less frequented by traders or travellers who did not find it important enough to mention.

### **Trade and the Formation of Urban Coastal Communities**

The early development or emergence of Tanga town cannot be understood independent of the establishment of other coastal communities in East Africa. From present Somalia to Mozambique, the coastal communities developed a common civilization and, to a large extent, evolved similar state structures, forms of economic organization and systems of social stratification.

For centuries, even before the advent of Islam, there had always been contact between the East African coast and Western Asia. Traders from South Arabia, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and Western India took advantage of the monsoon winds to visit East Africa in pursuit of commercial opportunities.

The advent of Islam in Arabia in the seventh century marked the turning point in the commercial and trading relations between the two regions. Most importantly, the growing commerce between Arabia and East Africa led to an increased migration to the area. The migrants appeared to have come from a number of areas, but mainly from southern and, to a lesser extent, eastern Arabia. They first settled on the Benadir (Somali) coast in the ninth and tenth centuries, setting up settlements in Merca, Moghdishu and Barawa. In later centuries, most notably the twelfth, traders from this region (descendants of migrants, that is, Afro-Arabs and Africans/proto-Swahili speakers) also moved southwards along the coast as far as Kilwa and established their settlements there. This is the period of the

Shirazi myths (that is, Swahili claims to being descended from immigrants from Shiraz, Persia) as found in a number of chronicles.<sup>11</sup> It is believed that around the thirteenth century East Africa experienced a further influx of immigrants from Hadhramawt and Yemen.<sup>12</sup> This period constitutes the era of a second set of myths or traditions especially as relates to the northern Swahili coast.<sup>13</sup> The cumulative result of the gradual changes brought about by the interaction between the immigrants and the dominant local African groups was the creation of a new urban ethos, in effect, "new, enduring coastal traditions and culture patterns in which Islamic ideas occupied a central position."<sup>14</sup> Although the coastal area had not become fully Islamized by this time, by 1332 when Ibn Batuta visited East Africa for the second time he indicated that there were many Muslims to be found in the coastal town of Kilwa.<sup>15</sup> The period between the fourteenth and the early sixteenth centuries was marked by a general prosperity resulting from the expansion in the volume of commercial activities in this area as indeed in other areas of the Muslim world.<sup>16</sup> This period also witnessed the intensification of the migration patterns which began earlier whereby migrants from the Benadir or northern Swahili towns near the Kenya-Somali border moved to coastal areas to the south. Thus it was these northern traders (Swahili-speaking Africans who included descendants of Arab migrants), identified by local tradition as "Shirazi," who established Tongoni (Mtangata) in the fourteenth century<sup>17</sup> and Tanga around the same period or before the end of the fifteenth century.<sup>18</sup> Since Tanga was already in existence in the early seventeenth century as Portuguese records show, Oscar Baumann assumed, quite correctly, that the town was founded no later than the end of the sixteenth century. This means that it is possible that the town came into existence at an earlier age, for instance, the fourteenth or the fifteenth century. If so, it must have been a very minor settlement. However, there is no archeological evidence for this early dating which in itself does not tell us the whole story as many towns began as villages of mud or wood houses.<sup>19</sup> Also, since the immigrant Shirazi became the rulers of Tanga probably before the end of the sixteenth century, it has to be explained how they devised to seize



power unless we assume that they had arrived much earlier. It is also worth noting that local tradition mentions the settling of Tanga and Mtangata by the same group of migrants. This means that the migrants may have settled in the two areas around the same time (that is, the fourteenth century) or they may have settled in Mtangata first before some of them later moved to Tanga. At any rate, the early history, including the foundation, of Tanga is associated with the "Shirazi" (Wahadishashi) and Wakiongwe (considered to be Bondei).<sup>20</sup> For his part Baumann identified the "Shirazi" who founded Tanga and Mtangata as Swahili migrants from Lamu who were called Wajomba.<sup>21</sup> However, as A. H. J. Prins has noted, these Wajomba could not have been the "Shirazi", the Wajomba being the converted Digo of the Tanga-Vanga area.<sup>22</sup> This would explain why, as Baumann tells us, they preferred to call themselves Shirazi and not Wajomba, which was considered a term of ridicule.

### **Tanga Settlement: The Earliest Phase**

One can speculate about the early history of Tanga town.<sup>23</sup> The town began as a small fishing village but due to its location came to serve as a centre for trade. This coincided with the period of the expansion in trade in the whole coastal area and was also the period of the arrival of immigrants to Tanga island. These migrants found Wabondei living in a loose non-centralized political organization. As was usually the case, the newcomers presented gifts, mainly beads, to local African headmen in order to be allowed to trade. Ivory from the immediate hinterland was the main item sought in trade even during this early period. We can assume that the newcomers settled among the Bondei and established an alliance with them. Since the migrants were few in number and had brought even fewer women with them, they forged marriage alliances with the local people from which they gained rights to society. As they became assimilated into local society, the "Shirazi" (who brought literacy with them), by virtue of their preeminence in trade and

their services in the medical field, assumed an active role in the community.

As the community grew and gained some level of prosperity a number of Shirazi families began to assume political power which they attempted to retain in certain lineages. These were the Muslim rulers who built communal mosques and endowed them. They also sponsored local festivals and developed a network of allies. By then the population had become steadily "Shirazicized"/Swahilized in cultural terms and spoke the Tanga dialect of Kiswahili.

With respect to physical site factors, the offshore island had been preferred over the mainland for obvious reasons. According to Neville Chittick,

These trading towns [such as Kilwa, Mombasa, Lamu and Pate] not only in the earliest period, but until quite recent times, were sited for preference on islands; failing this the favourite position was on a spit of land almost encircled by creeks and mangrove swamps. This was for security; with a stretch of water protecting their wealthy towns from the poorer inhabitants of the hinterland, they had no need of defensive walls, which in the earliest period are seldom found. They would cultivate on the mainland if it was close, crossing to their shambas in boats, but did not venture into the interior.<sup>24</sup>

Thus as a security measure the immigrants built their trading settlement on Totten island rather than on the mainland.<sup>25</sup> The settlement was located at the western end of the island. There is evidence that some cultivation was carried out as indicated by Oscar Baumann who visited the island and reported seeing some mango and orange trees and a few date palms in the eastern part of the island.<sup>26</sup> It is also clear as local tradition has it that the island dwellers maintained some cultivated plots on mainland. In addition, there was fishing, which contributed a significant part of the coastal people's diet then as it does now. However, the town was not self-sufficient in food and had to depend on the hinterland for the supply of grains.

As regards East African island towns, it is important to note one suggestion that there may have existed a contemporary non-Islamic town culture on the mainland coast with which immigrant island settlements traded.<sup>27</sup> Evidence is mounting to support this view (first postulated by Gervase Mathew) that Swahili towns or cities began as coastal settlements of Africans (who traded on a small scale with Middle Easterners) but due to expansion in trade were later joined by Arab immigrants.<sup>28</sup> James de Vere Allen's research in the Lamu region supported this view,<sup>29</sup> but of course it is not clear that his conclusions can be extended to the entire coastal zone.<sup>30</sup>

### **The Portuguese Interlude**

Clearly Tanga was still a small settlement in the sixteenth century when the Portuguese assumed control, nominal or otherwise, over the coastal region. Prior to that time Kilwa may have exercised a vague hegemony along this coast. By the early thirteenth century Kilwa was so important in the Indian ocean mercantile system that as a power perhaps only Moghdisho surpassed it. Kilwa emerged as an important or major medieval seaport, controlling the trade along the coast chiefly owing to three factors: "a defensive island site, the convergence upon the port of major inland trade routes, and the control exerted over supplies of gold reaching the tributary port of Sofala from what are now Rhodesia [Zimbabwe] and South Africa."<sup>31</sup> By the fifteenth century Mombasa rose to prosperity and began to assert itself. Thus the Tanga coast came under the control, if not the rule of Mombasa and fell with it to the Portuguese.<sup>32</sup> For a time the people of the Tanga coast were supporters of the Portuguese, for we hear that in 1528 a ruler of Mtangata aided the Portuguese in their battles against Mombasa.<sup>33</sup> In general, many coastal towns experienced a period of decline in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was due to the fact that when the Portuguese controlled East Africa, apart from

looting and exacting tribute<sup>34</sup>, they did not encourage trade.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, the coming of the Portuguese disrupted the Indian Ocean trade, the mainstay of coastal prosperity.<sup>36</sup>

The brutal rule of the Portuguese provoked rebellions from time to time. In 1631, for instance, Mombasa rose in rebellion and its ruler Yusuf bin Hassan appealed to other coastal towns to do the same. The rulers of Mtangata and Tanga (Mwana Chandi Ivor of Vanga did not join them) responded and soon there were uprisings also in these two towns. It is in relation to this event that the name Tanga first appears in a written record. The rising by Mombasa was not successfully put down for many years. Severe punishment was, however, meted out to Mtangata and Tanga (which followed Mombasa's example) for the killing of Portuguese settlers. Following this rising, rebellion became more common as coastal towns sought help wherever they could find it.<sup>37</sup> For instance, representatives from Mombasa, Wasin, Tanga and Mtangata sought the protection of the ruler of Muscat.<sup>38</sup> Although we don't hear much about Tanga after its rebellion against the Portuguese, from around the middle of the seventeenth century on the Tanga coast is mentioned with Mombasa and as its district.<sup>39</sup> This was the period when the Omanis began seriously to challenge Portuguese control over East Africa. This process took many years and control of the coast switched hands several times between the Portuguese and the Omanis. In 1696 the Omanis began a siege of Fort Jesus in Mombasa which lasted 33 months. Friendly rulers tried to supply the beleaguered town with food; one of these (if Portuguese reports are to be believed) was the ruler of Tanga, referred to in Portuguese sources by the strange name of Guaba de Muizabo, whose vessels were intercepted by the Omanis.<sup>40</sup> When Mombasa fell other towns also submitted to the ruler of Oman. In 1728 the Portuguese staged a short-lived come-back. During this episode of Portuguese control of Mombasa a number of local rulers tendered their submission to them. Among these were the rulers of Mtangata (Makame Rumba), Tanga (Ben Sultan Alauya or Ibn Sultan Alawi), Vumba (Mwana Chama, probably Mwana Chambi) and Pangani (Mwinyi

Makuma).<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, in 1729 the Portuguese were expelled again, this time permanently.

### **The Omani Period**

The second quarter of the eighteenth century marked the beginning of a new epoch in the history of the coastal region. This epoch may be said to have begun in 1741 when the Yarubi dynasty in Oman was supplanted by that of the Busaid. The internal squabbles or dissensions that brought about this palace coup in Oman gave local rulers or governors who had been appointed during the rule of the Yarubi dynasty the opportunity to rebel. The Mazrui of Mombasa seceded and began to rule autonomously. They asserted their claim to overlordship to a large area north and south of Mombasa, including Tanga. They attempted to establish some form of diplomatic suzerainty over Tanga and kept representatives in the town. That Tanga valued its independence is indicated by the fact that during Ahmad b. Muhammad's governorship of Mombasa (1728-1814) the ruler of Tanga rebelled against his agent.<sup>42</sup> According to Shaykh Umar bin Stanbul, during the period when the Mazrui controlled Mombasa, Stanbul b. Bwanakombo was appointed as their agent in Tanga.<sup>43</sup> He later resigned and was succeeded by Qaasim b. Gharib. Akida Chuma was their last representative in Tanga when the Mazrui were finally defeated by the Sultan of Zanzibar.<sup>44</sup> The Sultan of Zanzibar, Sayyid Said (1791-1856), was able to assert his sovereignty over much of the East African coast but not over Mombasa which held out until 1837. Nevertheless, with the exception of towns such as Zanzibar, Mafia and later Kilwa and a few others, the Imam of Oman had no real power over the coastal towns. Thus like the Portuguese before them, the Omanis did not enjoy undisputed control over their domains.

Unlike Mombasa, Zanzibar had always remained loyal to Oman. By the eighteenth century the island was under the control of Omani settlers, although the local ruler of the Hadimu retained some powers. This meant that the local African population, the Hadimu and Tumbatu, had their own rulers while only Omani Arabs were direct subjects of the imam.<sup>45</sup> By the 1830s Sayyid Said had shifted his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar.

Throughout the period of her independence Mombasa had to struggle against her political and economic rival Zanzibar to retain control over an adequate hinterland in an all-important trade.<sup>46</sup> This trade involved ivory and rhinoceros hides which the northern Mrima (the Tanzanian mainland coast opposite the islands) towns of Wasin and Tanga supplied exclusively to the people of Mombasa in exchange for coarse cloth and iron wire.<sup>47</sup> Mombasa's hinterland (the "Nyika" territory) posed problems, with increasing Kwavi, Masai and Galla incursions into the area, Swahili advance was along a corridor (the Pangani River and the adjoining series of mountains from Usambara to Kilimanjaro and Meru) which bisected the "Nyika" belt.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, Oman tried to wrestle the control of Mrima from Mombasa. This they did in 1825 and thereafter barred Swahili (Mombasa) merchants from trading there. A year earlier we hear that part of the British navy's expedition led by Captain Owen passed the Pangani coast and reported the entire area to be little frequented. Some members of the expedition visited Tanga town and saw that:

The population does not exceed three hundred; but some time back it was considerably more, for, previously to the harassing attacks of the Imamn's [Imam's] forces, Tanga was a greater mart for ivory than Mombasa or any other vicinity. It is now reduced to the utmost poverty, the inhabitants living solely on fish and a sparing supply of Kaffer corn, or millet, from the interior.<sup>49</sup>

What the above indicates is that Tangan society was in a state of flux depending on whether the town experienced progress or economic setback. Times of prosperity attracted new

members from the countryside whereas with hard times some of the townspeople with strong rural roots returned to the countryside.

Despite the raids on Wasin and Tanga Sayyid Said of Zanzibar made no attempt to appoint *maliwali* (governors or administrative officers) to the two towns as his attention was devoted to asserting his power over coastal areas and especially Mombasa. In the meantime the two towns retained their traditional administrative system and apparently continued their connection with Mombasa.<sup>50</sup> In 1839, two years after the Mazrui of Mombasa had been defeated,<sup>51</sup> the Mazrui of Gazi attacked Tanga and the Sultan of Zanzibar sent Sulaiman b. Hamid and Muhyiddin with a small force to deal with them.<sup>52</sup> After the invaders had been repulsed fifteen soldiers were left in Tanga and a fort was constructed. Ahmad b. Shaykh was appointed the first liwali of Tanga under the Busaid control.<sup>53</sup> Thus although Tanga and Pangani were in decline in the first quarter of the nineteenth century by the 1840s the towns had recovered. By then the Mrima towns had become economic or trading dependencies of Zanzibar.

### **The Shirazi Confederacies of the Mrima, 17th to 19th Centuries**

The Mrima towns such as Tanga, Mtangata and Pangani shared a similar system of authority. It will be appropriate to present the traditional structure of authority in these towns before we discuss some of the developments which took place after the Sultan of Zanzibar established liwaliship in the Mrima towns.

The "Shirazi" of the Mrima coast formed three or four federations (sometimes Tanga and Mtangata were considered as constituting the wider Tanga federation) which were loose unions comprising Tanga (10 settlements), Mtangata (5 settlements), Pangani (5 settlements) and Bagamoyo (12 settlements).<sup>54</sup> These petty settlements or *jumbeates* were clan units, each under a *jumbe* (chief), who were one another's distant relatives.<sup>55</sup>

Due to lineage and marriage ties and also presumably for purposes of defence against attacks from the hinterland people, these little states (federations), which had become political entities by the seventeenth century, cooperated among themselves and with their neighbours. The Swahili lived as middlemen and, therefore, had to maintain good relations with the hinterland people. The latter brought to the coastal towns goods which entered into external exchanges. Thus the Tanga rulers attempted to cooperate with the neighbouring Digo.<sup>56</sup> There was also a *utani* (joking) relationship between, for instance, the ruler of Vumba and the (Kamadhi) Segeju as well as the Mohindzano clan of Digo.<sup>57</sup>

### **Social and Political Structure in Tanga Town**

Tanga town was divided into a number of clan areas or quarters (*mitaa*) each of which had its own representative or chieftain (*jumbe*) who was responsible for the affairs of the community.<sup>58</sup> Later on these chiefs were known as *madiwani* (title accorded to Shirazi-Swahili chiefs), of whom there was one leading *diwan* or community head. Before one became a diwani, he had to distribute goods to the more important of his followers and leading townsmen. The position of diwani was kept within patrilineal groupings. On announcing his candidature, an aspiring diwan, who had accumulated enough wealth, would convey his intentions to other chiefs, lesser officials and young men of the warrior age-group. The candidate had then to distribute goods (cloth) and money to them.<sup>59</sup> A diwani, however, was not a monarch or absolute ruler. He exercised authority along with subordinate officials, all drawn from particular clans.<sup>60</sup> He was often advised by local merchants. Kaima Muhammad asserts that the jumbe/diwan system of the coast was established only for the purpose of dancing and not for the purpose of ruling. This was probably true with respect to the *akida* system which was more linked to ceremonial activities.<sup>61</sup> According to him, madiwani were "merely leaders of society living in their own homes with their slaves."<sup>62</sup> This was certainly true in later times



especially during the German colonial administration which reduced majumbe to little more than village headmen; but this was not the case in the early period.<sup>63</sup> The diwan exercised authority in a number of areas. To obtain a plot of land in the town an immigrant, an Arab or Swahili, had to negotiate with the relevant jumbe of a mtaa to lease or purchase it.<sup>64</sup> Also, the permission of the diwan was needed before trade could take place. This applied to traders or, for that matter, foreigners whose dhows called at the port and who wished to buy merchandise, for instance, ivory which was brought into the town from upcountry. This permission amounted to a tax on foreign traders and travellers. These traders were mainly Arabs who brought foreign products on their trading dhows which came from Moghdisho to Tanga and other coastal towns.<sup>65</sup> The diwan also received gifts at harvest times, on ceremonial occasions such as weddings or funerals, from dance-groups or from hunting parties. The diwan needed these revenues to buy and distribute presents. The distribution of these gifts was especially important as a way of obtaining and retaining office.

The diwan had a number of tasks, including the settling of disputes. He could levy fines and impose imprisonment if necessary. In his judgements he was influenced by both Islamic and customary traditions.<sup>66</sup> It would appear that for the most part a diwan's rulings were binding except in such cases as murder. From Mtoro Bakari's information on Bagamoyo, it is clear that in the case of homicide if the plaintiff's representatives were dissatisfied with the jumbe's verdict, they could resort to a fight with the defendant's representatives in the jumbe's presence.<sup>67</sup>

For symbols of office, the diwan possessed the traditional horn (*siwa*) and wooden drums. Also, special sandals and the turban formed part of the emblems of the state.<sup>68</sup> People greeted him by taking off their hats. A number of privileges were enjoyed by the diwan: when a cow was slaughtered for purposes of sale or on the occasion of a festivity he received its hump; if a large fish such as a shark was caught he obtained part of it;

finally, he was entitled to a portion of the salvage of wrecked ships and to a fee for the return of a runaway slave.<sup>69</sup>

Tanga and the other confederacies had a lot in common with the Vumba Sultanate (which though not Shirazi probably rose as a Shirazi colony and adopted Shirazi institutions)<sup>70</sup> both in terms of their ceremonies, for instance, funerary and installation or investiture rites, and titular nomenclature. Thus at one time the local rulers of Tanga took on the title of Mwinyi Chambi<sup>71</sup> (Vumba's rulers used the title of Mwana Chambi until 1544 when the title was changed to Mwana Chambi Chandi) the title by which Vumba's rulers were known. It is possible, even if for a short period of time, that the ruler of Tanga was a tributary ruler to Vumba, for there was an important subdivision/family of the Mwinyi Chandi (Chandi signifying in Kiswahili messenger/ambassador) at Tanga.<sup>72</sup> By the opening of the eighteenth century a Sharifian (those who claim descent from the Prophet) immigrant house of the Ba-Alawi from the Comoros arrived in Vumba and four decades later was elected or assumed office changing the ruler's title to diwan, a title borrowed from Pate.<sup>73</sup> This title later gained currency and was often used interchangeably with the old title of Jumbe. The ruler of Tanga in 1729 is referred to in Portuguese sources as Ben Sultan Alauya (Ibn Sultan Alawi). It is probable that this ruler was related to the Ba-Alawi family of Vumba. Intermarriages between members of prominent families from the Shirazi towns was quite common.

Tanga society was not as highly stratified as, for instance, Lamu society which had more elaborate cultural and ideological supports for social differentiation.<sup>74</sup> It is true, however, that in Tanga as in other coastal settlements the great divide was between the *waungwana* (the long established families) and *watumwa* (the slaves). Madiwan owned slaves and were more likely the biggest owners of slaves in town. We can therefore speak of madiwan and their officials as the sector of society that wielded economic power. Nevertheless, as a group they were not too socially differentiated from the rest of the old

families of the town or its new members who had been absorbed into the community and who engaged in different types of jobs as traders, artisans, fishermen or labourers. Since Tanga was not a rich settlement it did not develop a rigid social structure. Moreover, as James de Vere Allen points out, "excessive class differentiation was also more difficult in the smaller settlements, where everybody not only knew everyone else but was well informed about neighbour's origins, financial circumstances, and personal frailties as well."<sup>75</sup> In Tanga's social system the slaves occupied the bottom of the social ladder. They were known by the way they dressed.<sup>76</sup> They did not wear *kofia* (skull cap) or shoes. Female slaves did not cover their heads. Slaves addressed all *waungwana* as *wamwinyi* (singular, *mwinyi*, which is a title of respect) and during ceremonies they sat separate from them. Despite these limitations, the lot of the slaves was not as bad and their treatment was milder compared to that of the (plantation) slaves of the slave trade era in, for instance, the Mauritius.<sup>77</sup> We know, for instance, by way of comparison that among ethnic groups inhabiting Tanga's countryside in the nineteenth century Digo slaves could marry free women and own farms.<sup>78</sup> The egalitarian Bondei were known to treat their slaves as part of their household.<sup>79</sup> Baumann, in his description of the Tanga area, mentions that the slaves born in the country differed only to a small extent from free men and socially occupied almost the same position. Moreover, even those slaves who worked on farms enjoyed a tolerable existence as the laborious work of clove plantations was unknown.<sup>80</sup>

### **Tanga's Integration into the Zanzibari Economic System**

Major economic changes took place after the arrival of Omani Arabs (more specifically, Sayyid Said) as the new bosses in the coastal region particularly during the nineteenth century. These changes were reflected in a form of social relations dominated by a cash nexus, for although money was known before that time it had not been in wide

circulation. East Africa experienced what can be termed as a commercial revival which was brought about by a number of factors ranging from the personal involvement and the initiative of Sayyid Said himself to the availability of the skills and capital of the Asians (Indians) and also the commercial treaties the Sultan entered into with other nations. In other words, first, Sayyid Said, by himself directly getting involved in trading and other agricultural ventures, set an example for others; second, his arrival and eventual settlement in Zanzibar brought in its wake a good number of Omani merchants and aristocratic estate holders -- these, along with Indian traders and brokers whom Sayyid Said welcomed to his new capital played an important role in the economy of Zanzibar; third, Said's reforms in currency and customs administration had a positive economic effect; and finally, the commercial treaties which he entered into with American and European trading nations went a long way in furthering trade.<sup>81</sup>

As a result of such treaties, American and English ships began to call at Zanzibar bringing with them trade goods (cotton, rice, Venetian beads for the interior trade, and some quantities of brass wire, gunpowder, muskets and provisions), sterling and dollars, and taking with them gum-copal, hides and ivory.<sup>82</sup> Thus Sayyid Said's pursuit of an aggressive economic policy contributed to the expansion of trade and also broadened the commercial horizons of the island.<sup>83</sup>

Apart from encouraging clove production in Zanzibar on large plantations for commercial purposes, Said also organized customs and revenue services and staffed them with Indians.<sup>84</sup> The tax revenues collected on every exportable item along with a five percent import tax were used for the army and Sayyid Said's large and powerful navy.<sup>85</sup>

The Mrima ports such as Tanga were central to Zanzibar's economic system. They were the outlets for products such as ivory and slaves from the interior. For this reason the Sultan quite early had to consolidate his power over the coastal towns and their immediate

hinterland. He offered presents to local chiefs and many recognized his sovereignty. The exception was Kimweri, the Kilindi ruler of the Usambara who forged a kingdom centred on Vuga extending from the slopes of Kilimanjaro to the Vanga-Pangani sea coast, where he appears to have succeeded in supplanting the Mazrui of Mombasa in the early nineteenth century, when their fortunes were at a low ebb.<sup>86</sup> Sayyid Said and Kimweri reached a compromise whereby a dual system of government was established. Tanga and its environs remained under the Sultan while elsewhere along the coast Kimweri appointed officials. These appointments had to be confirmed by the Sultan "who makes the candidate a present so that he may not lose sight of Sultan's interests should they run counter to those of the king of Usambara."<sup>87</sup> This sort of condominium came to an end after Kimweri's death in 1870, after which, due to anarchy over succession, the Sultans of Zanzibar acquired sole control over this coastal strip.<sup>88</sup>

Like other coastal towns, when Tanga became a trading dependency of Zanzibar in the nineteenth century it had an Arab liwali appointed for it by the Sultan. He was supposed to be no more than a headman of the alien community and the representative of the Sultan. He was supported by a garrison of mercenary soldiers. The garrison was headed by a Baluchi *jemadar* (commander).<sup>89</sup> These mercenaries maintained order and made sure the Sultan's economic interests were protected. There was also an Indian customs collector. All these officials along with the trading class which included the old (long established) Swahilis, and, more importantly, Omani Arabs and Indians who began to arrive in Tanga, benefitted from trade. These newcomers did not settle on the island town but on the mainland coast. The island, as we have mentioned before, is only about two miles in circumference. As such, the Arabs found sufficient land for their coconut plantations on the mainland coast while Indians set up business to tap the trade from the interior. Indians first settled in Zanzibar but later a few crossed over to the mainland to exploit trade opportunities. The first to arrive were Hindus. They were later outnumbered

by Bohoras and Ismaili Khojas (followers of the Aga Khan), the Bohoras being the most numerous of all Asians of Tanga. There were about 80 Asians in Tanga in 1871.<sup>90</sup> In 1875 Sir John Kirk, the British Consul General at Zanzibar, speaks of twenty-two Bohora families and six Hindus in Tanga.<sup>91</sup> The trade of Tanga, as he noted, was "wholly in the hands of British Indians. It consisted of exports of native millet, oilseed, ivory and butter. The total amount was £ 12, 000 for the year 1875."<sup>92</sup>

Alongside liwaliship was the traditional diwan organization. The liwali was the Sultan's appointee whereas the diwan owed his position to African custom. Since the Sultan's main concern was in the economic sphere, he allowed this loose system of administration to continue so long as his authority and economic interests were not challenged. For their part, madiwan accepted the Sultan's authority in the hope that it might afford them some protection against the hinterland people. However, very gradually the traditional system of authority was eroded. While madiwan continued to lead their wards/quarters and enjoyed ceremonial respect, their external affairs gradually passed into the hands of Arabs. They became a subordinate propertied group. There is evidence that madiwan, for instance, in the case of Bagamoyo slowly began to lose some of their power and were perceived by their people not as rulers but as the Sultan's officials. They acted on the Sultan's behalf by stamping ivory with his official seal and then exacting the customs dues, probably a small portion of which they kept for themselves.<sup>93</sup>

### **Caravan Trade in the Nineteenth Century**

During the early phases of caravan trade, Arab and Swahili traders remained on the coast and relied on African middlemen to bring in products from the interior.<sup>94</sup> By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, coastal traders themselves began to lead caravans into the interior.<sup>95</sup> As for the Indians, very few ventured into the hinterland;<sup>96</sup>

most acted as financiers based principally in Zanzibar or, as was the case later on, in one of the coastal towns. A number of them financed Arab, Baluchi and Swahili caravans which penetrated as far as the central lakes.<sup>97</sup> Ismailis provided service as money-lenders, bankers and financiers.<sup>98</sup> There were also some Hindu traders who in the beginning were temporary residents and unlike Ismailis had not brought their families with them.

### **The Growth of Tanga on the Mainland Coast**

At this time the old island town of Tanga began to decline. In 1854 Ludwig Krapf found the town to be still thickly populated and covered with buildings, but a few years later in 1857 Richard Burton found only a few huts and a square fort (*gereza*) with an old cannon and in 1890 Baumann could report only ruins.<sup>99</sup>

The transfer of the town to the coast in the 1840s ushered in a period of prosperity. The hardcore of Tanga's population were the old Swahili families who were descended from the early settlers. They liked to style themselves as Shirazi although they had absorbed Bondei, Digo and Segeju elements. To this group were added Wadigo, Wasegeju and Wabondei from the neighbouring hinterland who began to trickle into Tanga town and make it their new home. Their number, particularly that of Wadigo, became significant with the passage of time. Around the same time a number of Wagunya (Lamuan) families arrived and spread to all parts of the coast.<sup>100</sup> A few came to Tanga but by far the largest number settled in the Segeju settlement of Mnyanjani, a few miles from Tanga. According to the estimate given by Richard Burton who visited the settlement in 1857, Tanga's population rose to about 4,000 to 5,000 people.<sup>101</sup> The town's population included 15 Baluchis and 20 Banyans (Indian merchants). The town had an Arab *liwali*, Muhammad b. Ali, a Swahili headman, Kibaya Mchanga, and sundry *madiwan*, a Baluchi *jemadar* and an Indian customs collector, Miyan Sahib.<sup>102</sup> Twice a year (May to

June and October to November) the town sent caravans or trading parties of 400 to 500 people to Usambara, Pare, Kilimanjaro (Chagga) and Masai areas.<sup>103</sup> American and British cottons, beads, iron and brass wire were traded for an annual ivory turnover of about 70,000 lbs.<sup>104</sup> Apart from the interior trade, Tangans also traded with the Digo and Segeju with whom they had developed alliances. The Digo brought grain to sell at Tanga in exchange for imported goods. Tanga, therefore, had close ties with its neighbouring villages and also the hinterland for which it served as an outlet for goods which filtered to its port from Pare and Usambara areas and even beyond.

Trade during the second half of the nineteenth century was dominated by ivory which was in high demand in the international market. The major importer was India which served as a market for the production of ivory bangles considered as part of bridal jewelry.<sup>105</sup> Previously this demand had been met by Mozambique. Nevertheless, it appears that by the end of the eighteenth century the Portuguese had imposed high taxes aimed at maximizing revenues from both exports of ivory and imports of cloth and beads.<sup>106</sup> This policy had adversely affected the exports of ivory which in turn meant that customers had to pay a higher price for a limited supply of ivory. The ensuing decline in Yao trade to Mozambique island had created both a demand and an incentive for the exploitation of ivory from the Mrima hinterland.<sup>107</sup> By the second decade of the nineteenth century a new demand arose among the well off in the industrialized world for "soft" (not hard) ivory which was needed for the manufacture of luxury items such as ivory combs, billiard balls and piano keys.<sup>108</sup> Again India was the main importer of this ivory, which was re-exported to Western Europe. The price of ivory rose from about 20 British pounds per frasila (34-36 lbs) in 1825 to 90 British pounds in 1874, a three-and-a-half-fold increase.<sup>109</sup> In 1852 Krapf was told that ivory traders had to pay to the Sultan of Zanzibar a duty of two dollars on every frasila from the Digo area; four dollars if it came from Tanga's hinterland (Usambara and Chagga areas); and twelve dollars if it came from deep



in the interior of the country (Unyamwezi area).<sup>110</sup> Bagamoyo was the major terminus for the central caravan route while Tanga and Pangani served as exits for the northern Mrima trade route. Zanzibar depended on the Mrima hinterland as a source for ivory, gum-copal and slaves which were exchanged for cloth and beads. Therefore, Sayyid Said encouraged Arabs, Indians and Swahilis to trade in the interior. The end result was the expansion of both trade and trading population in the coastal towns.

We have already noted that Tanga's population in 1857 reached a level of 4, 000 to 5, 000 people. The town probably increased in importance as we hear that at the beginning of the 1870s the "Africa Pilot" of the Admiralty names Tanga after Bagamoyo as the largest town on the Mrima and as the embarkation point of the caravans to Masailand and Lake Victoria.<sup>111</sup> Therefore, it was an important caravan centre which grew and prospered during the height of the slave and ivory trade. With a relatively good harbour and a rich hinterland, Tanga had the potential to grow even further in importance because it could supply ships with a convenient source of provisions. Nevertheless, the very reasons which contributed to the rise of Tanga town along the mainland coast led to its later decline as well.

### **Decline in Caravan Trade and its Consequences for Tanga**

Apart from the commerce in ivory, the most lucrative trade was in slaves. The main slave-trading centres were Zanzibar, Kilwa, Mauritius and Mombasa (which, although a distribution centre, obtained only a few slaves from its hinterland in the early part of the nineteenth century).<sup>112</sup> Initially, a good number of slaves could be found near the coast, but with the increased demand, slave traders had to venture deeper into the interior as far as the area of the central lakes. There was a high demand for slaves in French-controlled Mauritius and Reunion for the sugar plantations. The French obtained

their slaves from the Kilwa region, the slave-trading centre of the East African coast.<sup>113</sup> The high death rates of labourers on the sugar plantations ensured that there was always a demand for more manpower. Similarly, the economic system built by the Omanis with its capital in Zanzibar was largely based on slave labour. These slaves were needed in the Arab-owned clove and coconut plantations to work as labourers. There were also foreign markets for East African slaves.

The abolition of slave trade in East Africa took place in a number of steps beginning with the 1822 Moresby Treaty and the 1845 treaty between Sayyid Said and Britain. By 1856, the year of Said's death, slave trade was much restricted but by no means ended.<sup>114</sup> In 1873 Sultan Barghash, knuckling to British pressure, signed a treaty forbidding slave trade. This action was accompanied by closing the slave markets. The treaty signalled the beginning of the end for the slave traffic especially along the coast. The British navy (which had to make do with the ships placed at its disposal for the purpose) patrolled the Indian Ocean coastline in search of slave-ships. Tanga's large safe harbour lay open to the British warships, which showed a special preference for visiting the town and soon made the slave trade, which had become closely connected with the caravan traffic, a very difficult one.<sup>115</sup> Plantation owners who needed more slaves had to look elsewhere, to towns such as Vanga and especially Pangani, with its poor harbour that did not allow entry of larger warships.<sup>116</sup> The anti-slavery campaign diverted the slave-traffic and with it the caravan trade which needed slaves both as beasts of burden to transport ivory to the coast and as exportable commodity. Thus another period of decline began for Tanga. In the late 1870s the last of the larger caravans from Tanga was annihilated in Kavirondo (the northeastern corner of Lake Victoria) and many of the young men were killed.<sup>117</sup> This event in a sense signalled the end of an era and the beginning of a new one.

## **The Colonial Era and After**

### **Conquest and Resistance: The End of the Omari Phase**

Following the 1884 Berlin Conference which provided a forum for the discussion of the partition of Africa, the "Scramble for Africa" began in earnest. Earlier the Germans had established a business house in Zanzibar; now they formed a colonization society headed by Carl Peters, a twenty-eight year old German adventurer or "conquistador." The society began to enter into so-called "treaties" with local chiefs and placed their territories under German "protection." However, the Sultan of Zanzibar had troops and agents in many of these areas.<sup>118</sup> His protestations were silenced on two occasions when the Germans made a show of force and the Sultan had to acquiesce to their demands.<sup>119</sup>

In order to define or look into the claims of the Sultan to sovereignty over certain areas of East Africa, a tripartite delimitation commission of the British, the French and the Germans was set up in 1886. The outcome of this commission was to reduce or limit the Sultan's possessions to the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia plus a ten mile coastal strip. Again the Sultan had to submit to this new demand which was presented in the form of the "unanimous" report or Agreement.<sup>120</sup> Also, the ailing Sultan Barghash (r. 1870-1888) leased to the Germans two narrow footholds at Pangani and Dar es Salaam. In 1888 Barghash's successor, Sultan Sayyid Khalifa b. Said (r. 1888-1890), concluded a new agreement making over to the German East Africa Company for a term of fifty years "all the power that he possessed on the mrima (mainland) and in all his territories and dependencies south of the Vumba River".<sup>121</sup>

These two concessions, involving first Dar es Salaam and Pangani and now the entire Mrima coast, proved to be very unpopular with his subjects. The Tanga poet Hemed b. Abdalla Said al-Buhriy (who was highly respected because he combined knowledge of

Islamic scripture with the occult science and poetic skills) captured the mood of the times in the following words:

Kilwa na Dar-Salaam  
kuna Wazungu nakama  
mtu hapati kusema  
nti wamezizuiya

At Kilwa and Dar es Salaam  
There was a plague of Europeans  
There was no free speech  
They had throttled the country.<sup>122</sup>

There was strong resentment against the Germans in Tanga, Pangani, Bagamoyo and Kilwa. Following the 1888 agreement, the Germans moved rapidly and often tactlessly to establish their presence. The entry of German dogs into the Tanga Friday mosque during the month of fasting did not speak well of German intentions to secure peace in a non-belligerent manner.<sup>123</sup> The liwali and the people protested to the Sultan, but there was not much he could do. In Pangani the German flag could be hoisted only after the arrival of the German gunboat of the Mowe. In Tanga two officials of the German East Africa society took over the customs post without incident. Later, however, when the German gunboat left Pangani, irregular troops of the Sultan began to fire shots at the Society's representatives in both Pangani and Tanga.<sup>124</sup> Also, on the fifth of September 1888 in Tanga town a boat of the Mowe was attacked and the Company's flag could only be hoisted a day later after a landing party from the vessel had driven the hostile elements out of the town.<sup>125</sup> By then there was an uprising in Pangani which soon spread up and down the coast and even beyond that to the immediate hinterland.<sup>126</sup> General Lloyd Mathews wrote to Sir John Kirk that "the feeling was against all Europeans. The whole coast and interior is in a ferment."<sup>127</sup> Nevertheless, as Freeman-Grenville points out, the feeling was not against all Europeans but rather against both the Germans and subsequently the British, for throughout the period, according to Swahili tradition, there were friendly relations between Abushiri b. Salim and the French mission of the Holy Ghost Fathers at Bagamoyo.<sup>128</sup>

It soon became clear that since the German Company (which had lost control of all the coastal towns except Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam) could not put down the uprising, the German government had to intervene. This they did (after finding a pretext for doing so)<sup>129</sup> and the explorer Herman von Wissman was appointed military commissioner and provided with a small army consisting of German officers and noncommissioned officers, 600 Sudanese from Egypt (apparently soldiers who had fought in the Egyptian army against the Sudanese Mahdi), 50 Somalis and 350 Zulus from Mozambique.<sup>130</sup> Against this hastily recruited army, Abushiri's forces resorted to the tactics of guerrilla warfare by withdrawing into the interior and striking at coastal towns.<sup>131</sup> Twice Abushiri's forces were routed on their march to Bagamoyo, first in May 1889 and again in October of the same year. Although he fled to Usagara in December he was discovered and captured at Kwa Mkoro, half naked and starving, and taken to Pangani, where he was hanged on 15 December 1889.<sup>132</sup>

Throughout the period of fighting Tanga's sympathies were with Abushiri. The chief diwan of Tanga at the time was Mwinyi Chambi Ibrahim. He along with sundry madiwan and Swahili notables received news of Pangani from the liwali of Tanga. These notables decided to put up resistance against the Germans. On 12 July 1889, shortly after Wissman had recovered Pangani, the German squadron arrived in Tanga to re-take it and to occupy the customs house. The waungwana were waiting for them in Mkwakwani and Chumbageni. A few shots were fired in the air which the landing troops took as the signal for attack and they in turn fired their cannon in the air at which point the army of the Kina Mwinyi or waungwana fled.<sup>133</sup> The Germans then called for peace negotiations. Diwan Mwinyi Chambi chose Rashid Hassan Bimani who was of Arab and African ancestry as his chief delegate in the ensuing discussions. It was then that the Germans entered the town. They immediately set to work to construct a fort. A visitor to the town several years later observed that "almost every other person in Tanga wears a uniform of some

sort."<sup>134</sup> This description is obviously an exaggerated one although it does indicate the military presence (evidenced by the construction of forts) that the Germans kept in this town as well as in other centres which they viewed as strategic points.<sup>135</sup> By the following year the Sultan's remaining coastal possessions between the Umba and the Ruvuma were ceded to Germany for 4 million marks (£ 200, 000).<sup>136</sup> This marked the beginning of the era of colonialism but not the end of resistance or military activity which continued in various parts of the country for 14 years.<sup>137</sup> One of the factors which sparked this resistance was a decree in 1889 requiring registration of land and property within a period of six months. This created a problem for Africans who could not produce written proof of ownership because land was held customarily. This amounted to German seizure of land. Africans resented the fact that they had to register their land and pay a host of taxes such as head tax, burial tax, inheritance tax, tolls and so on.

### **The Political Set-up during the Colonial Period**

The Germans established a new system of government which in some respects was a development of the previous one which had began with the Sultan of Zanzibar. Baron Von Soden was appointed as the first governor of the territory known as German East Africa. The colony was divided into fourteen stations (by 1914 there were 22) which consisted of 3 provinces, a few military districts (their number fluctuated depending on the security needs of the colonial government) and the rest were civil districts, of which Tanga was one.<sup>138</sup> Each station was under a semi-military commissioner (*Bezirksamtmann*). Under him and responsible to him was a liwali (who was based in the town). The commissioners (who ruled with an iron fist) had considerable power especially over the African population which, along with the Asian population, was classified as "native."<sup>139</sup> He had legal and administrative functions and he delegated judicial authority to the liwali who was considered to be the native governor.

The first liwali of Tanga under the German administration (which incorporated local notables of coastal society into government service) was an Arab by the name of Shaykh Salim b. Msellem al-Husni (d. 1905). He was inherited from the previous Busaid administration. The Germans found him as liwali and retained him at that post. Under a group of palm trees, "government" took place every morning in his presence and with the attendance of Captain Krenzler, the commander-in-chief of the town's garrison.<sup>140</sup> It was here that matters of dispute were decided, judgement was passed and decisions were made on matters relating to politics.<sup>141</sup> Offenders were either placed in detention or given a thrashing. The liwali also held a "baraza" (an hour of receiving guests) every afternoon for the more important Arabs at which Arabic (black, sugarless) coffee was served.<sup>142</sup> Subordinate to liwaliship, the Germans introduced the *akida* system (during the Busaid period the larger garrisons were placed under the command of an officer known as an *akida* who previously in the *jumbe* system had been chosen as a war leader) in Tanga district on the plea that the area did not have important chiefs worth describing. The *akida*'s duties included collecting taxes and trying cases. It is not clear whether Muhammad b. Ulenge was the first *akida* of Tanga under the German administration, but he was still the *akida* at the time of the British occupation of the town. Below the *akida* were *majumbe* who formed the lowest stratum of local authority. The *jumbe* during the German period received no cash payment as his was an honorary office. The paid members of the civil service hierarchy included the school teacher (lowest paid), the *akida* (middle-level official responsible for maintaining order) and liwali (highest paid). *Majumbe* had little power compared to former times. In fact, the local inhabitants considered them as "government *majumbe*" as they were appointed by the colonial government and had made no previous customary disbursements.<sup>143</sup> The local government (in effect, the commissioner to whom were directly responsible, the liwali, the *akida* and *majumbe*) was responsible for the maintenance of law and order with the assistance of a small force of Sudanese<sup>144</sup> and Swahili soldiers also under the commissioner, for the provision of labour for public

works, and, after 1896, for the collection of the hut tax.<sup>145</sup> Later on a bright young scholar, Shaykh Umar b. Stanbul, who belonged to the Swahili aristocracy, was appointed as kadhi (Islamic judge) of Tanga. His task was mainly related to matters involving Islamic law. The kadhi along with the liwali, the akida, majumbe, clerks and messengers (including the town-crier) were all part of the new administrative structure. At the death of Liwali al-Husni in 1905, Abdalla b. Hemed al-Ajemi, a local historian, was appointed as his successor.<sup>146</sup> He served as liwali until his death in 1912.

Under the British administration, maliwali continued to perform the same functions as before. In 1916 when the British occupied Tanga, Ali b. Diwan was acting as liwali. He was pensioned by the colonial office and he was succeeded in 1920 by al-Khidhri b. al-Khidhri.<sup>147</sup> He did not stay in office for long as he was convicted of embezzlement, and in 1922 Sharif Sadiq b. Mansur replaced him. As for the position of akida, the British did not retain Muhammad b. Ulenge. No explanation is given in the colonial files as to why he was arrested and interned in Nairobi. Abdul Rahaman b. Ali, son of the former liwali Ali b. Diwan, was appointed as the new akida. The British also appointed Shaykh Ali b. Hemed al-Buhriy as the kadhi of Tanga in 1920. His judicial functions included court duties and work related to the estates of deceased persons and matters involving Islamic law. In 1927 the post of liwali was abolished and the kadhi was given the power to hold a First Class Native Subordinate court. The executive powers of the liwali passed on to the akida. This policy did not last long and came to an end in 1936 when the kadhi was briefly imprisoned for misuse or loss of some funds and his post abolished.<sup>148</sup> Another person described to be of high standing (probably Shaykh Abdul Rahman b. Ali) was appointed to the revised post of liwali although his functions were purely magisterial and did include the administration of the native estates. Also, the liwali no longer retained his previous executive duties, such functions having devolved on the akida.



Although the British introduced "indirect rule" in Tanganyika in the mid-1920s, towns such as Tanga remained under direct administration. This was based on Governor Cameron's (1925-1931) assertion that there was no "Native Authority" who would be acceptable to the different residents of the town. Tanga was administered by a senior officer or administrator who was charged with the task of implementing the Township Rules (which dealt with the physical upkeep of the towns and covered matters such as sanitation, buildings, roads and so on) which had been enacted in 1923.<sup>149</sup> This administrative officer had the same duties as the previous German commissioner; his chief responsibilities were the maintenance of law and order and the collection of revenue, particularly the supervision and collection of the hut and poll tax.<sup>150</sup> There was not much innovation in the administrative structure and the local government continued as before. During the period of terminal colonialism (1940s and 1950s), however, developments in the administration of justice reinforced the tendency to separate judicial from administrative functions. Holders of purely judicial offices were called *mahakimu* (magistrates). In the end *liwaliship* was abolished altogether not long after the achievement of independence. The judicial functions were taken over by *mahakimu* while the administrative functions were to be exercised by the regional and district commissioners.

In this chapter we have given a synoptic history of the development of Tanga town from the time of its inception to the modern era, highlighting its role in the various phases of its political development as contact point for Tangan hinterland with the external world and its integration in the various economic and political systems. We have examined the importance of trade in the formation of urban East African coastal communities in general and Tangan society in particular. The sea played a crucial role in early Swahili society, determining their mode of economic activity and defining their distinctive development as a community. It is from this perspective that we have discussed how the Shirazi/Swahili settlement was established in Tanga in the fourteenth or fifteenth century and how the

community evolved economically and politically. The next chapter will examine the social construction of Tanga town.

### Notes to Chapter One

- 1 Oscar Baumann, **Usambara und Seine Nachbargebiete** [Usambara and Its Neighbouring Regions] (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer, 1891). Throughout this study reference is made to an unpublished translated version (mimeo 1968) by M. A. Godfredsen which was done for the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM) Pangani Valley Project. This work contains very useful material on Tanga town. Baumann's historical notes are based on M. Guillain's **Documents sur L'Histoire, la Geographie et le Commerce de L'Afrique Oriental I** (Paris: Librairie de la Societé de Géographie, 1856). Guillain summarizes the account given by the Portuguese Pedro Baretto de Rezende of East Africa in the first half of the seventeenth century. This offers glimpses of East African society during the early period of historical witness. See sir John Gray, "Rezende's Description of East Africa in 1634," **TNR** 23 (June 1947): 2-28.
- 2 Baumann, 64. Richard F. Burton, **Zanzibar; City, Island and Coast II** (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1872): 104-138; G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, **The Medieval History of the Coast of Tanganyika** (London: Oxford University Press, 1962): 157-165; James S. Kirkman, **Men and Monuments on the East African Coast** (London: Lutterworth Press, 1964): 185-202; and A. A. Mturi, **A Guide to Tongoni Ruins** (Dar es Salaam, 1975): 9.
- 3 Baumann, 64.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 55.
- 5 Burton, **Zanzibar II**, 115.
- 6 Interviews with the following: Mwinyikhamisi Mnyamanzi, Tanga, 22 February 1985; Mwalimu Pera Ridhwan, Tanga, 4 March 1985; Shaykh Jumbe Taajir, Tanga, 7 February 1985; and Abdalla Salim Seif al-Habsi, Tanga, 17 February 1985.
- 7 Petro Richard H. Mbahula, "History of Wabondei," Swahili Manuscript Collection, University of Dar es Salaam, MS, 35, 30 June 1929. The title is misleading as the manuscript is in Kiswahili.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 4.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 3. Interestingly enough, in **Handbook of Tanganyika**, ed. J.P. Moffett (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1958), 259, n. 3, two possible origins for the word "Tanga" are suggested: that it was a word for "mainland" in several local vernaculars; or that it is an Arabic corruption (there being no "ch" in Arabic) of Wachanga, the name of the "tribe" living in the vicinity. With respect to the latter suggestion, if this were the case, one would have thought the word "Shanga" and not Tanga would be more preferable since it is closer to Changa. Indeed, there was a town or settlement by the name of Shanga in the Lamu region. Besides, people who are familiar with first generation Arabs in East Africa are aware of their harsh guttarals when speaking

Kiswahili. A good many of them have a tendency of substituting "sh" for "ch" as in *shai* for *chai* (tea), *shakula* for *chakula* (food) and so on. The above explanation is, therefore, not convincing.

- 10 Baumann, 56. Baumann gives the date of 1630 although it is generally thought to have been 1631. It was in 1631 that Tanga rebelled against the Portuguese in response to the earlier uprising in Mombasa, also against the Portuguese, in August of that year. See Justus Strands, *The Portuguese Period in East Africa*, ed. J. S. Kirkman (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1961), 173.
- 11 An Arabic version of the Kilwa chronicle fell into the hands of the Portuguese in 1505 when Kilwa was taken. The story relates how seven brothers from al-Hasa on the Persian Gulf founded Moghdisho and Barawa. Another version narrates the story of seven people (a father and his six sons from Shiraz, Persia) in seven ships who founded Kilwa and six other coastal settlements. One of these settlements was at Yanbuu which Spencer Trimingham conjectured to be Yambe island opposite Tanga (J.S. Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1964, 11). Yambe is not exactly opposite Tanga town (Toten island is) but lies several kilometers to the south of it opposite the Segeju settlement of Mnyanjani (See Freeman-Grenville, *The Medieval History*, map II). See also Freeman-Grenville, *The Medieval History*, 45-210 for an English translation of the Kilwa chronicle. Because the number seven occurs frequently, this has led some scholars to seek for an answer to the Shirazi puzzle in Asian cosmologies. For instance, it is suggested that the founders of Kilwa may have been Sevener Shias. See, for example, Randall L. Pouwels, "Tenth Century Settlement of the East African Coast: The Case of Qarmatian/Isma'ili Connections," *Azania* IX (1974): 65-74. However, T. C. Wilkinson points out that Randall Pouwel's thesis regarding Qarmatian/Isma'ili connections rests on the presumption that the Qarmatian dominated the Gulf trade in the tenth and early part of the eleventh century. This, according to him, is an exaggerated reading of the sources and can hardly have been the case since the Qarmatian expansion was short-lived. According to him, the sect with which Kilwa's foundation should be associated is Ibadhi. See J. C. Wilkinson, "Oman and East Africa: New Light on early Kilwan History from the Omani Sources," *IJAH* 14:2 (1981): 285-297, especially 283-4. It has even been suggested that these were Sunni refugees from the struggle of the 'Abbāsid caliphate against the Qarmatians. One scholar (J. de Vere Allen, "The 'Shirazi' Problem in East African History," in *From Zinj to Zanzibar*, eds. J. de V. Allen and Thomas H. Wilson (Frankfurt: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1982), 14) once went so far as to suggest that Shirazi had more connotations of status (it reflects Swahili cosmopolitan affectation stemming from the glories of the court of Shiraz during the Buyid period, 932-1055) than race. The reason why scholars have come up with different interpretations regarding the origins of the Kilwa settlement is because there are different versions, both written and oral, of the legendary history of this town. The problem with the Kilwa chronicle, as indeed with the Lamu and Pate chronicles, is that history and legend have merged. In fact, no scholar today takes seriously the claim that Kilwa culture was of direct Persian origin. While a number of scholars are agreed about the initial emigration to the Benadir (Somali) coast from whence remigration took place later to Kenya and Tanzanian coasts, it is far from clear and the riddle remains as to the exact origin of this settlement or emigration. What is clear is that there is no archeological evidence that these settlers or the civilization they created was Persian.

Also, according to Kirkman, no evidence has been uncovered thus far of "the use of Persian speech and Persian customs which have not been adopted by the Arabs." Certainly East Africa felt the influence of the Persian Gulf area especially in the Middle Ages (Thomas M. Ricks, "Persian Gulf Seafaring and East Africa: Ninth-Twelfth Centuries," *IJAHS* 3: 2 (1970): 339-357; but, as Kirkman points out, "the Persian Gulf is no more Persian than the German ocean (an old name for the North Sea) is German." J. S. Kirkman in Justus Strandes, **The Portuguese Period**, 356. Naturally, one does not rule out the possibility that at most a few individuals among the settlers may have been Persians (the mosque of Arba' Rukn in Moghdisho has an inscription dated 667/A.D. 1268-9 to a certain Khisarwā (Khusraw) b. Muhammad ash-Shirāzī who built it. Another inscription of the early thirteenth century records the settlement in Moghdisho town of a person from Nisapur in Khurasan. Trimingham, **Islam in East Africa**, 10 with references to Enrico Cerulli. In general, however, it is more probable that the provenance of this emigration was South Arabian. See Randall Pouwels, "The Medieval Foundations of East African Islam," *IJAHS* 11: 2 & 3 (1978): 201-26 and 393-409, respectively; idem, "Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1979) -- an edited version of this thesis appears under the title **Horn and Crescent: Cultural Change and Traditional Islam on the East African Coast, 800-1900** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); E. Cerulli, **Somalia, Scritti Vari Editi ed Inediti** I (Rome, 1957); and B. G. Martin, "Arab Migrations to Eastern Africa in Medieval Times," *IJAHS* 7: 3 (1974): 367-90. In this context, it is important to point out that sections of the people of Hadhramawt due to their adverse environmental conditions (they were cut off by the desert from the interior of Arabia; on the other hand, the Red Sea provided them with access to Somalia, the land of aromatics and incense) had long turned to the sea for their livelihood. Factors of overpopulation, famine, drought, political oppression and economic anarchy have occurred repeatedly in the history of the area and have triggered migrations to East Africa, India and even the Philippines. See, B. G. Martin, "Notes on Some Members of the Learned Classes in Zanzibar and East Africa in the Nineteenth Century," *AHS* 4: 3 (1971): 529. It was for trade purposes that these South Arabians established a series of settlements along the East African Coast. Consult Trimingham, **Islam in East Africa**, 2-3 and 5-6, n. 6. The traders were soon followed by a number of Yemeni sharifs belonging to the clan of Qahtani al-Wa'il who, because of their tradition of scholarship, were made kadhis of Moghdisho. Another group of sharifs were the Mahdali who settled in Barawa. E. Cerulli, **Somalia**, I, 18 as cited in Pouwels, "Islam," 14. As far as East Africa is concerned, the earliest known Islamic structure south of the Benadir (Somalia) coast is the Kizimkazi mosque at Zanzibar which has a Kufic inscription dated 500/A.D. 1107. See S. Flury, "The Kufic Inscription of the Kizimkazi Mosque," *JRAS* (1922): 257-64. Apart from the Kilwa chronicle whose critical appraisal can be found in Neville Chittick, "The 'Shirazi' Colonization of East Africa," *JAH* 6 (1965): 275-294, there exists other chronicles as well. For the Lamu chronicle, see **Bantu Studies** 6: 3 (1938) while for the Pate chronicle consult C. H. Stigand, **The Land of Zinj** (London: Cass, 1913): 29-102, and Neville Chittick, "A New Look at the History of Pate," *JAH* 10: 13 (1969): 375-392. For further study on the Shirazi, see Arthur E. Robinson, "The Shirazi Colonizations of East Africa," *TNR* 3 (1937): 40-81; idem, "The Shirazi Colonization of East Africa: Vumba," *TNR* 7 (1939): 92-112; Neville

- Chittick, "The Peopling of the East African Coast," in **East Africa and the Orient**, eds. Neville Chittick and R. I. Rotberg (New York and London: African Publishing Co., 1975); and E. C. Baker, "Notes on the Shirazi of East Africa," **TNR** 11 (1941): 1-10.
- 12 B.G. Martin, "Arab Migrations," 370. Thus came into being two sets of myths suggesting conflict between the older houses which claimed Shirazi ancestry and later newcomers or Arab settlers from the Benadir and the Arabian peninsula.
  - 13 For a discussion of these two sets of traditions, Shirazi vs Arab, consult Pouwels, "The Medieval Foundations," 201-26.
  - 14 Pouwels, "Islam," 181.
  - 15 Zoe Marsh and G. W. Kingsnorth, **An Introduction to the History of East Africa**, 3d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965): 4. For Ibn Batuta's travels to Africa, see H. A. R. Gibb, tr. and ed. **The travels of Ibn Batuta in Asia and Africa** (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963); Said Hamdun and Noel King, **Ibn Batuta in Black Africa** (London: Rex Collings, 1975); and G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, **The East African Coast: Select Documents from the First to the Earlier Nineteenth Century** (Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1962): 9-13. Ibn Batuta described these coastal town dwellers as being pious Sunni Muslims who adhered to the Sharia law. Also, by this time the Shafi school of law had been established.
  - 16 Egypt had a thriving trade with Venice. Muslim traders, especially Persians, were quite active in the Far East. Indian pepper was in high demand in Europe as were African products such as ivory and gold in India, and Malay tin in the Middle East. With the demise of the overland routes from the Far East to the West consequent upon the disintegration of the Mongol empire, a new route was developed which linked the Persian Gulf with the Black Sea. This stimulated trade in this region. Also, the revival of an older route joining the mediterranean and the Persian Gulf through the market at Aleppo expanded trading activity along this traffic. This trading expansion in the above mentioned areas of the Muslim world was felt in East Africa and led to increased trade with India and, to a lesser extent, with the Far East. Gervase Mathew, "The East African Coast Until the Coming of the Portuguese," in **History of East Africa**, Vol. I, eds. Gervase Mathew and R. Oliver (London: Oxford University Press, 1963): 120-25. By the end of the fifteenth century there were no less than 37 East African coastal towns. This is considered the Golden age of the Swahili world as evidenced by the burgeoning of city states. It is also possible, as G. Mathew suggests, that the Shirazi and Dabuli myths may be based largely on fifteenth-century memories.
  - 17 James S. Kirkman, **Men and Monuments**, 187. It is interesting to note that the sixteenth century was the period when the Bajuni and the Mijikenda, including the Pokomo, were moving southwards due to pressure from the neighbouring Oromo. Some Muslim families in the Benadir and northern Swahili coastal areas were also compelled to migrate southwards. These migrants may have included some individuals, part of movements of people of Arab lineages from the Hadhramawt, who arrived in the area. These population movements of people of Arab lineages occurred between the

thirteenth and seventeenth centuries. See B. G. Martin, "Arab Migrations," 367-90. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the "Shirazi," locally known as Barawi (the Khatimi Barawi clan), who had migrated from the Benadir (Somali) or northern Swahili coastal towns to coastal areas in the south, were able to consolidate their power as *madiwan* of many settlements between Pangani (south of Tanga) and Rufiji and in the process became Africanized (*sic*). See, John Iliffe, **A Modern History of Tanganyika** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979): 36. See also H. Neville Chittick, "The Peopling of the East African Coast," in Chittick and R. I. Rotberg eds. **East Africa and the Orient** (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1975): 41.

- 18 Baumann, 57. Quite interestingly, one reads in Laura S. Kurtz, **Historical Dictionary of Tanzania** (London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1978): 207, that Tanga was established by the Persian traders in the fourteenth century. Considering that this dictionary was written in the 1970s, one is astonished to find that its author has not benefitted from recent material which exists on Swahili/Shirazi. It is clear as we have pointed out that careful scholarship has raised doubts about this "phantom" group or band of Persian traders as being founders of East African coastal towns. Quite recently James de Vere Allen has strongly challenged previously accepted views on the Shirazi and has attempted to reconstruct their history in the East African coastal region. Nevertheless, his analysis is tentative and conjectural due to the fact that he has chosen to disregard the existing oral tradition on the plea that it is contaminated by colonial myths. Students of African history and society, be they historians, anthropologists or sociologists have long since come to accept the oral tradition and to use it both critically and analytically to interpret Africa's past. They have attempted to sift the historical wheat from the mythical chaff (Thomas T. Spear, "Traditional Myths and Historian's Myth: Variations on the Shungwaya Theme of Mijikenda," **HA** 1 (1974): 67-84) even given the probable manipulation of traditions through time. On the importance of oral history, see Jan Vansina, **Oral Tradition as History** (London: James Currey, 1985); and *idem*, "Comment: Traditions of Genesis," **JAH** 15: 2 (1974): 317-322. Both Thomas Spear ("The Shirazi in Swahili Traditions, Culture, and History," **HA** 11 (1984): 291-305) and Randall L. Pouwels ("Oral Historiography and the Shirazi of the East African Coast," **HA** 11 (1984): 237-267) have attempted to benefit from the functional and structural modes of analysis as methods of decoding the Shirazi oral traditions in terms of their symbolic and historical meanings. In any case, having rejected the existing oral tradition, Allen goes on to argue that the Shirazi as a people should be considered as having had a homeland or at least a "heartland" reducible to an area lying between Kifundi/Shirazi to the north of the Kenya-Tanzania border and Tanga to the south of this border. Allen's purpose is, of course, to deny that the Shirazi were migrants from some far off region. Hence the reason for postulating a central homeland for them on the East African coast. It is argued that the Shirazi of the eight towns or settlements in the so-called Shirazi heartland were conquered by the Wavumba (an immigrant group from the northern Swahili world) in the early decades of the seventeenth century. As a result, the Shirazi were dispersed from this heartland and a good number migrated as exiles to different areas but principally to the region between Tanga and Bagamoyo or what Allen calls the "extended Shirazi heartland," where they set up four Shirazi confederacies. See James de Vere Allen in Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari, **The Customs of the Swahili People** ed. and tr. J. W. F. Allen

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981): 211-230. Since Allen places the arrival of the Wavumba at a late date of between 1600 and 1630, he is forced to admit (given that there were eight or nine pre-1630 stone-built settlements between Tanga and Bagamoyo): either that some or all these settlements were of Shirazi-Swahili foundation in the period prior to the arrival of the Wavumba and, therefore, before Shirazi dispersion from their heartland (an admission of the untenability of his proposed Shirazi homeland), or that they had been founded by some other group of Swahili but were in decline or had so decayed that the incoming Shirazi exiles were able to take over their government with little trouble. J. de Vere Allen in Mtoro, *The Customs*, 306, n. 28. In another earlier article entitled "Swahili Culture and the Nature of East Coast Settlement," Allen seeks to reinterpret the history and society of Swahili coast. Basically, what Allen attempts to do is to redress the balance (thus far scholars, notably colonialist historians, following the diffusionist perspective, have emphasized the foreign elements in Swahili culture and its history, especially as relates to initial "colonization" of coastal towns (see, for instance, F.B. Pearce, *Zanzibar, the Island Metropolis of East Africa* (London: Cass, 1967; repr. of the 1920 ed.), 399; W. H. Ingrams, *Zanzibar, its History and its People* (London: H.F. & G. Witherby, 1931), 153; and L. W. Hollingsworth, *A short History of the East Coast of Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1929; rev. ed. 1974), 39) and assert the dominance or paramount importance of African indigenous culture. In so doing, Allen, following a certain intellectual fashion (which as is pointed out, has been influenced by the politics of African nationalism and events in post-independence Africa), seems to Randall Pouwels to have overstated his case. As a result, his radical approach is applied rather too rashly based (at least at the time he was writing this article) on insufficient evidence. See Pouwels, "Islam," 1-11. It is clear that coastal culture evolved in circumstances which involved "ocean looking" and "inland looking" (African) elements. The trend at one time was to emphasize "ocean looking" elements as it is now in certain quarters to emphasize "inland looking" elements. Seen from this perspective, Allen's pioneering and provocative work (albeit with growing evidence, especially in the Lamu region and in a number of places on the coast, to support his views) is reflective of the latter tradition. In a later review article entitled "Shungwaya, the Mijikenda, and the Traditions," *IJAH* 16: 3 (1983): 455-485, J. de Vere Allen abandoned the above theory which postulates a central homeland or heartland for the Shirazi in favour of the view which identifies the Shirazi-Swahili origin in a northern coastal setting (the mainland opposite Pate and its vicinity). In putting forward a theory which he later rejects, Allen has fallen into the very error which he points out that Kirkman has shown, that of constructing elaborate hypothetical superstructures upon insecure factual foundations.

- 19 We are not suggesting here that wood cannot be used for dating purposes. We are only pointing out the fact that thick impenetrable bush covers the island which has been completely deserted and uninhabited since the late nineteenth century. The mud huts had disappeared from the island by 1890. Some of the ruins of stone structures have themselves escaped preservation owing to the fact that they were used as building material. For instance, Baumann mentions that he found no trace left of the fortress mentioned by Burton which had been partly demolished during the construction of stone houses on the mainland. Baumann, 65.



- 20 Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, Tanga, 11 May 1985. Petro Mbahula considers Wakiongwe to be Bondei who had earlier settled in Kiongwe and thereafter came to be known by that name. Mbahula, "History," 3.
- 21 A. H. J. Prins, *The Swahili-Speaking Peoples of Zanzibar and the East African Coast* (London: International African Institute, 1961), 17.
- 22 Baumann, 6.
- 23 Tanga did not preserve much by way of traditions or local chronicles of its own; nor did it attract much outside attention. The town was founded, existed for some time, and then emerged out of obscurity by the mere fact that it was involved in an uprising for which it received mention in a written record. Today very few people in Tanga are familiar with the early history of the town. This is partly due to the fact that most people of the older generation who would profess to know something of this history have either died or are rapidly passing away. The other reason is that there are very few "Shirazi" left, most of them having been absorbed into the larger ethnic groups such as the Digo. The older people are slightly more familiar with Tanga's later history. In particular, Mzee Mwinyikhamis Mnyamanzi born in 1897 and of Shirazi-Digo extraction, remembers well the period of German rule. He speaks German which he learned in the early German schools. There is, however, one local Arab cloth dealer by the name of Abdalla Salim Seif al-Habsi, something of a self-made historian, who has attempted to write a history of Tanga town. He is looking for somebody to edit and publish his work, a labour of many years. The manuscript is in Kiswahili. I have not read the typescript (the author's reticence to permit me to do so stems from a personal grievance that he has against a department at the University of Dar es Salaam which had not returned a copy of the manuscript he had sent them to read and comment on the possibility of publication until he had to seek the mediation of a lawyer to recover it) which, if my memory serves me correct, runs to considerable length, and therefore cannot offer any opinion on the record. Nevertheless, I am familiar with some of the author's views having interviewed him and chatted with him on several occasions. He is literate in Arabic and Kiswahili; this means that he has not been able to avail himself of the material, some in Kiswahili but most of which is in English, at libraries and particularly Dar es Salaam University library and Tanzania national archives in Dar es Salaam. His work is probably more or less an oral history. In any case, the interest of the author is to have the manuscript published rather than be kept as a personal record to be used by others who may not give credit where credit is due.
- 24 Neville Chittick, "The Coast Before the Arrival of the Portuguese," in *Zamani: A Survey of East African History*, eds. B. A. Ogot and J. A. Kieran (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), 108.
- 25 This is the opinion of some of the people interviewed in Tanga town. Nevertheless, it is quite inaccurate to suggest as one informer did that the strategic or defensive sighting of Tanga settlement on the island was motivated by fears of Masai raids. The Masai incursions did not reach as far as this part of the coast until the nineteenth century. This is attested to by the fact that the *ngome* or stone walls surrounding Segeju villages such as Ndumi and Chongoliani were built as defensive measures in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries and not before that. See G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, **The Medieval History**, 57-58; R. Burton, **Zanzibar**, II, 104-138; and H. A. Fosbrooke, "The 'Masai Walls' of Mao: Walled Towns of the Segeju," **TNR** 54 (1960): 31-37. In 1882 the Masai carried out raids in the Tanga area including Tanga town where they drove away the cattle and young men fled to Toten island or into the bush. Baumann, 63.

- 26 Baumann, 64.
- 27 Al-Idrisi who wrote in the twelfth century refers to one of them, El Banes, perhaps near the Kenya-Tanzania border, south of which lay the wealthy and populous town of Tuhna (Tohnet). Tohnet was probably the predecessor of Tongoni, and ultimately, therefore, of Tanga. See Moffett, **Handbook**, 25. It is difficult, however, to take seriously al-Idrisi's information since he never travelled to East Africa and he relied on secondhand information. Freeman-Grenville, **The Medieval History**, 41; and idem, **The East African Coast: Select Documents from the First to the Earlier Nineteenth Century** (London: Rex Collings, 1975), 19-20. For a discussion of an ancient trading centre, see J. W. T. Allen, "Rhapta," **TNR** 27 (1949): 52-59. See also H. C. Baxter, "Pangani: The trade Centre of Ancient History," **TNR** 17 (1944): 15-25.
- 28 Gervase Mathew, "The East African Coast," 115-116. Whatever the origins of these towns they were characteristically African in the fourteenth century. Thus Ibn Batuta describes the inhabitants of Kilwa as being Black while the king of Moghdisho spoke a language other than Arabic as his first language. Also, there is a local tradition, admittedly a belated one, according to which the Shirazi on arrival to Tongoni area found the town in existence but completely deserted. See R. F. Stowel, "Notes on Some Ruins at Tongoni, near Tanga," **TNR** 4 (1937): 75-76.
- 29 James de Vere Allen, "Swahili Culture Reconsidered: Some Historical Implications of the Material Culture of the Northern Kenyan Coast in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," **Azania** IX (1974): 131. The process of local development is further revealed by the excavations at Shanga in the Lamu area by Mark Horton. See Mark Horton, **Shanga 1980: An Interim Report** (Cambridge, 1980). See also, D. W. Phillipson, "Some Iron Age Sites in the Lower Tana Valley," **Azania** 14 (1979): 155-162. Early Swahili were iron-workers who later began to trade. They also did some fishing and farming. With expansion in trade they began to construct coral buildings although some of the mud and wattle huts did survive. Construction techniques went from mud and wattle to coral foundations, coral rag and mortar in addition to later on lime water and plaster with the lay out of the town remaining unchanged. Shanga, which began as a ninth-century centre for iron-working, pottery-making, agriculture and livestock, experienced an expansion in trade with the Middle East between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries and also an evolution in local style reflected in the addition to mud and wattle architecture of coral rag and mud (later lime) mortar in the construction of mosques and, in later centuries, of houses as well. Archeological excavations at Kilwa (N. Chittick, **Kilwa: An Islamic Trading City on the East African Coast** (Nairobi: British Institute in Eastern Africa, 1974) have also revealed that the town began as a fishing community which also conducted trade in the ninth and tenth centuries. Material artifacts during this period are of African origin, for instance,

pottery which was unglazed, iron slag and locally manufactured shell beads. The next level (which covers the period between eleventh and twelfth centuries) reveals postholes, red earth and sorghum seeds indicating that people lived in rectangular mud and wattle houses and also farmed. After the thirteenth century increasing prosperity led to masonry houses and a mosque using coral blocks and lime mortar being built. Imported glass beads and glazed pottery belong to this (Islamic) period. By the fourteenth century Kilwa enjoyed high prosperity evidenced by extensive stone structures. Derek Nurse and Thomas Spear, *The Swahili* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 17, 19 and 21. In an article entitled "Asiatic Colonization of the East African Coast: The Manda Evidence," *JRAS* 2 (1986): 201-213, Mark Horton challenges Neville Chittick's findings (Neville Chittick, "Discoveries in the Lamu Archipelago," *Azania* 2 (1967): 37-68) that Manda was probably a primary Asiatic settlement of the ninth century. The reason advanced to support the case for Asiatic colonization is the emergence of stone towns. According to Horton, however, there is no evidence that these stone buildings were constructed by foreigners. Rather, it was more likely the outcome of social and economic influences within the Indian ocean than ethnic (Asiatic) movements. There is no evidence of direct settlement by these traders who more likely established local trading partners instead. The Lamu region (and also Comoro islands and Zanzibar) provide evidence of towns or trading communities which began as coastal settlements of Africans which later became Islamic. At both Pate and Shanga and even Manda the earliest buildings of the ninth century were of timber and mud construction. Stone buildings date to the tenth century. In the light of modern studies on East African coastal society, a number of scholars have begun to cover ground that until recently was untrodden. As a result, the view that Swahili culture is an imported culture or Arab culture grafted on a mixed coastal population has come in for criticism from several quarters (see the article by J. de Vere Allen just cited; see also Abdalla Khalid, *The Liberation of Swahili from European Appropriation* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1977), 38-39 and 60). It was the view popularized by colonialist historians and the one accepted by the old established families of the coast in places such as Lamu where, with the coming of Omani Arabs, people began to style themselves as "Arabs" (to be "cultured" now meant more than sharing in the qualities of *uungwana*; it also meant *uustaarabu* or being like an Arab) and to refer to their social inferiors as "Swahili." M. H. Abdulaziz points out that "Early historians writing about the East African coast often underplayed, and in some cases even denied, the African initiative in the formation of this literate urban culture." M. H. Abdulaziz, "Tanzania's National Language Policy and the Rise of Swahili Political Culture," in *Language Use and Social Change*, ed. W. H. Whiteley (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 73. Swahili culture is not an imported culture, but an urban culture molded by the African environment and stimulated by external currents. With respect to the development of the Swahili language whose origin is traced to Lamu archipelago and lower Tana (the area around the Kenya-Somali border), the following is thought to have been the pattern of its earlier development: the language is derived from an ancestor/proto-(Northeast coast Bantu)-language which began to diversify internally (as the number of speakers increased) and eventually split into a number of different related languages one of which (proto-Sabaki) was the parent language from which various (genetically related) dialects eventually emerged (Elwana, Pokomo, Mijikenda, Comorian and Proto-Swahili). This was followed by a Swahili diaspora which took the form of successive

waves of migration, mostly moving south in the direction of Mombasa, Kilwa and Comoro, and a few moving north to Barawa and Moghdisho (the older section of Moghdisho has a Swahili name, Shangani) in the succeeding centuries. The speech of these Swahili-speakers evolved into different dialects and even languages as they absorbed new material through contact with other linguistic groups. The word Swahili itself is probably derived from the Arabic word "Sawāḥil" (the coasts). There are probably anywhere from 15 to 20 main dialects of Kiswahili spoken as far north as Mwiini (Barawa) in southern Somalia and as far south as Mwani in the Kerimba island in northern Mozambique about one thousand miles apart. See Nurse and Spear, *The Swahili*, 8, 9-14; and idem, "The Origins of the Development of Swahili: Reconstructing the History of an African Language and People," *The Mankind Quarterly* 25: 4 (1985): 353-370. Kiswahili (or variants of a language akin to it) has been in existence probably as early as the ninth century and by the twelfth century, judging from nicknames which appear in the local chronicles, became more than likely the common speech along the coast. Gervase Mathew, "The East African Coast," 116-117 (with references to G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, "Medieval Evidences for Swahili," *JEASC* 29: 1 (1959): 4-8 and 9-11). Al-Mas'ūd who visited East Africa in the tenth century noted that "The Zanj have an elegant language and men who preach in it" (Freeman-Grenville, *East African Coast: Select Documents*, 16). Continuous interaction between the two regions (East Africa and the Middle East) and the two cultures led to the absorption of Arabic loanwords into Swahili language. Before the spread of modern education which was brought by the Europeans, Swahili literature was written in the Arabic script; now it is written in the Roman script. The Swahili language possesses a modern written literature of the Swahili coast which is influenced by Arabic forms and Islamic themes. See Carol Eastman, "The Emergence of an African Regional Literature: Swahili" *ASR* XX: 2 (September 1972): 53-61; and Marina Tolmacheva, "The Arabic Influence on Swahili Literature: A Historian's view," *JAS* 5 (1978): 223-243. For a very useful bibliography on Swahili literature, see J. W. T. Allen, *The Swahili and Arabic Manuscripts in the Library of the University of Dar es Salaam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970). Mwalimu Pera Ridhwan of Tanga has been working for the last several years for the Institute of Swahili Research, University of Dar es Salaam, collecting traditional Swahili poetry or transcribing some of the material in its collection from the Arabic to the Roman script. His writings include "Ripoti ya utafiti (Research Report): Hesabu za Miongo," *Kiswahili* 51: 1 & 2 (1984): 128-155; and his commentary: "Utenzi wa Zamani: Manuscript Number 234," *Kiswahili* 52: 1 & 2 (1985): 187-192.

- <sup>30</sup> See James de Vere Allen, "Swahili Culture and the Nature of East Coast Settlement," *IJAH* 14: 2 (1981): 306-334. We have already indicated that the view is gaining ground which holds that coastal trading communities which date to the ninth/tenth century were indigenous in origin, but were later converted to Islam. This has led to the old hypothesis to be challenged by a number of scholars. In the light of his research in the Lamu area Mark Horton holds that "Asiatic colonization of the East African Coast remains, an unlikely and unproven hypothesis." Horton, "Asiatic Colonization," 211. See also, H. T. Wright, "Early Seafarers of the Comoro Islands," *Azania* 19 (1984): 13-60.
- <sup>31</sup> B. S. Hoyle, "The Emergence of Major Seaports in a Developing Economy: The Case of East Africa," in *Seaports and Development in Tropical Africa*, eds. B. S.

Hoyle and D. Hilling (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 232. Gold from Zimbabwe was carried by head or canoe down the Zambezi to Sofala.

- 32 Baumann, 56.
- 33 Ibid. Mombasa had become the most powerful city state on the coast during this period. Therefore, Mtangata's hostility to Mombasa was an expression of rivalry or competition, a feature of inter-coastal state relations. It was generally the case that local rulers did not accept being dominated by local rivals. This was why they turned to outsiders although they hoped that their authority would be minimal. Except for a few towns, the Portuguese hold on the coast was quite tenuous. Thus although there were a few Portuguese settlers in Tanga and Mtangata, this part of the coast was not important to them.
- 34 In their trail of destruction, the Portuguese looted and burnt Kilwa, Mombasa, Oja, Barawa and Zanzibar. See Keneth Ingham, **A History of East Africa** (London: Longmans, 1965), 8. See also Justus Strands, **The Portuguese Period in East Africa**, tr. J. Wallwork (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1961), esp. 52 and 71 --The German edition of this book was first published in 1899; and C.R. Boxer and Carlos de Azevedo, **Fort Jesus and the Portuguese in Mombasa** (London: Hollis and Carter, 1960), 17. In Barawa Portuguese looting was on a grand scale. There are even reports, if one can believe them, that more than 800 women had their hands and ears cut from their bodies in order to hasten the snatching of bracelets and earrings from them. See Strands, p. 77.
- 35 Zoe Marsh, **An Introduction**, 16.
- 36 There was a second contributing factor in the decline of trade in East Africa; this was the Galla incursions which spelled the demise of many city states in the seventeenth century. A. H. J. Prins, **The Swahili-Speaking Peoples**, 45-46. The Portuguese, the Galla and the Zimba are considered responsible for the destruction of many coastal settlements. The nomadic Galla destroyed a number of coastal settlements including: the Ozi kingdom and Luziwa, Malindi, Kilifi, Kilepwa, Mnarani, Gedi and Ungwana. On the last named settlement, see J. S. Kirkman, **Ungwana on the Tana** (The Hague: Houton, 1970). However, the excavation of Gedi suggests that there may have been natural difficulties (the water table was falling) also. See G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, "The Coast, 1498-1840," in **History of East Africa**, Vol. I, eds. G. Mathew and R. Oliver (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 44. As for the mysterious Zimba, these seem to have been a war-like group originating in the southern region who in their migrations or wanderings northwards wrought much destruction on the local populations. They attacked Kilwa (1587) and Mombasa but in Malindi they found their equal in Wasegeju who defended Malindi and thus halted the Zimba march northwards. The stories about the Zimba which appear in Portuguese sources are much exaggerated and should be treated with caution.
- 37 Prior to this period (i.e. between 1585/87-1589) a Turkish *Ameer*, Ali Bey, claiming the authority of Murad III, sailed down to the East African coast preaching *Jihād* against the Portuguese. His message was well received. However, he did not achieve much except promote the cause of independence. Also, in 1631 when Mombasa rose

in rebellion, her ruler, Yusuf b. Hassan (who was taken to Portugal in his youth and grew up there as a Christian) had reverted to Islam and preached *Jihād* against the Portuguese. Finally, the Omanis who had expelled the Portuguese from Muscat in 1650, began to view themselves as the defenders of the Muslim cause in Africa. See Prins, *The Swahili-Speaking Peoples*, 47. This point is clear when one bears in mind the fact that the Portuguese had a twin motive in controlling East Africa: secure supply bases for their ships on their voyages back and forth to the East; and, as crusaders against Islam, win converts to Christianity.

- 38 Baumann, 57.
- 39 Ibid. Cited from Guillain, *Documents*, I, 533.
- 40 Moffett, *Handbook*, 32. No reference is cited where this information appears. The king of Tanga is alleged to have written a letter declaring his loyalty to the king of Portugal. Strands, *The Portuguese Period*, 270.
- 41 Strands, *The Portuguese Period*, 285.
- 42 C. S. Nicholls, *The Swahili Coast* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), 59.
- 43 Omari bin Stanbul, "An Early History of Mombasa and Tanga," *TNR* 31 (July 1951): 35. The name "Istanbul" or "Stanbul" owes its origin to the Turkish presence on the coast during the latter part of the sixteenth century. See n. 37 above. Apparently, a Turkish dynasty known as Istanbul was established in the small sultanate of Faza. See Strands, *The Portuguese Period*, 151; and Freeman-Grenville, "Historiography of the East African Coast," *TNR* 55 (1960), 285. An alternative explanation holds that the name "Stanbul" or "Sitambuli" (the name of the ruler of Faza) is derived from the Kiswahili word meaning "I do not recognize." See Ian Knappert, *Four Centuries of Swahili Verse*, (London: Henemann, 1979), 11. With respect to Umar b. Stanbul, he had his roots in Magunyani (Lamu area) and was of Arab descent. Interview with Shaykh Jumbe Taajir, Tanga, 7 February 1985 and personal communication from him.
- 44 Stanbul, 35.
- 45 Prins, *The Swahili-Speaking Peoples*, 48.
- 46 Abdul Muhamed Hussein Sheriff, "The Rise of a commercial Empire: An Aspect of the Economic History of Zanzibar, 1770-1873" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1971), 145.
- 47 Ibid. Mrima refers to the entire coastal stretch of the Tanganyika mainland coast opposite the islands.
- 48 Ibid., 141. Nyika, literally "wilderness," is the bushy steppe behind the coastal belt of Kenya. (The name "Tanganyika," which was adopted after World War II when the German East Africa territory came under British rule, refers to the "Nyika"/"hinterland of Tanga). The Pangani River and the adjoining series of mountains from Usambara to

Kilimanjaro and Meru form a natural corridor into the interior. Kwavi incursions were not limited to Mombasa; they were also directed at Tanga and the other northern Mrima towns. By 1840s, however, Kwavi raids had become only a memory. John Lamphear, "The Kamba and the Northern Mrima Coast" in *Pre-Colonial African Trade*, eds. R. Gray and D. Birmingham (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 95.

- 49 Captain W. F. W. Owen, *Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar*, 2 vols. (London: Richard Bentley, 1833), 142. See also Thomas Boteler, *Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery to Africa and Arabia*, 2 vols. (London: Bentley, 1835), 178 and 179. (What this harassment amounted to was the disruption of contact or trade relations between Tanga and the Digo hinterland. When this happened difficult times set in as the town depended on the hinterland for the supply of food. Tanga produced mainly coconuts and fish by way of food). From about 1824 Sayyid Said, the imam of Muscat, attempted to re-establish his authority over the coastal towns of East Africa by harassing the Mazrui of Mombasa. The latter called to their aid a British warship which happened to be in the East African waters at the time and whose captain Owen hoisted the British flag in Mombasa on February 7, 1824 and placed the town along with its districts which included Pemba and the coast between Malindi and the Pangani River under British protection. In 1826, however, the British government annulled this seizure. Baumann, 57.
- 50 C.S. Nicholls, *The Swahili Coast*, 313.
- 51 In 1822 Salim b. Sulaiman, acting on behalf of the Sultan, landed in Pemba to attempt to capture Chwaka, the Mazrui stronghold on the island. The Mazrui forces, led by Riziki b. Mbaruk b. Raashid, were defeated and many Mazrui fled to Mombasa although some of them surrendered and were the ancestors of the few remaining Mazrui in Pemba. With respect to the Mazrui of Mombasa, after several attempts between the period of 1828 and 1837 they were also finally defeated on the occasion of a succession dispute. The Sultan then had many of the leading Mazrui (about 25 of them), including the last ruler Rashid b. Salim, sent in chains to Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf never to be heard of again. He did, however, leave unmolested two Mazrui families which established liwaliship at Takaungu and Gazi, north and south of Mombasa. From their base at Gazi some members of the clan, most notably Mbaruk b. Rashid (See T. H. R. Cashmore, "Shaykh Mbaruk bin Rashid bin Salim el Mazrui," in *Leadership in Eastern Africa*, ed. Norman R. Bennett (Boston: Boston University Press, 1968), 109-138), created trouble for the Sultans of Zanzibar.
- 52 According to Shaykh Stanbul, trouble started when Akida Reza of Hoho (probably sent by Khasa bint Ahmed, the high-spirited Mazrui woman of Gazi) left with a force from Gazi and attacked Tanga. He then cooperated with the last Mazrui agent in Tanga, Akida Chuma, to set up military defences in the town. However, Sulaiman b. Hamid was able to recapture the town and the inhabitants fled to the neighbouring Digo country. A few weeks later peace was declared and the inhabitants returned to their homes. A fort was then constructed (Richard Burton saw it when he visited the island town in 1857). A succession of maliwali were appointed for the town; among them, Ahmad b. Shehe/Shaykh, Ali b. Mansuri, Abedi Hathwareni, Sulaiman Baluchi,

Jemedar Abdalla Baluchi, Muhammad b. Abedi and Sulaiman b. Abedi. The least includes two Baluchis, at least one of whom had the dual position of Commander and liwali. *Stanbul*, p. 35. See also other documentary sources which are cited in Nicholls, *The Swahili Coast*, 313. Sulaiman b. Hamid was the man who was entrusted by the Sultan of Zanzibar with the task of establishing control or obtaining in a peaceful manner (which he did by and large in the southern settlements of the Mrima, especially south of Pangani) a firm foothold at many points along the Tanganyika coast (Moffett, *Handbook*, 34). It is reported in R. Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1934), 254, that at one point Mbaruk Mazrui threatened Tanga and the British had to despatch Mathews with 300 of his men to Tanga. This was after Mbaruk had made a raid on Vanga in 1882. Tanga at the time had a population of 2-3, 000 and a garrison of 60 soldiers (*Ibid.*, 459).

- 53 *Stanbul*, 35.
- 54 Prins, *The Swahili Speaking Peoples*, 96.
- 55 *Ibid.*
- 56 In the mid-1850s Tanga may have experienced trouble with the Digo. Burton, *Zanzibar II*, 124.
- 57 See E. C. Baker, "Notes on the History of the Wasegeju," *TNR* 27 (1949): 31; and Sir A. C. Hollis, "Notes on the History of Vumba," *JRAI* 30 (1900): 279. *Utani* develops and facilitates hospitality and mutual dealings between ethnic groups that were previously at odds (for instance, at war) with each other. *Utani* is, therefore, a consequence of peacemaking. To relieve potential conflict in situations of ethnic cleavage it was the case in the past for ethnic groups to conclude an armistice between them. This allowed them to joke and to have mutual dealings with each other. The basic assumptions of joking relations are found in A. R. Radcliffe-Brown's seminal work on the subject (Radcliffe-Brown, "On Joking Relationships," *Africa* 13 (1940): 195-210). For further discussion on the subject see, Peter Rigby, "Joking Relationships, Kin Categories and Clanship among the Gogo," *Africa* 38: 2 (1968): 133-155; R. E. Moreau, "The Joking Relationship (*utani*) in Tanganyika," *TNR* 12 (1941): 1-10; T. V. Scrivenor, "Some Notes on the *Utani* or the Vituperative Alliance Existing between the Clans in the Masai District," *TNR* 4 (1937): 72-74; F. S. Pedler, "Joking Relationship in East Africa," *Africa* 13 (1940): 170-173; and Jim Freedman, "Joking Affinity and the Exchange of Ritual Services among the Kiga of Northern Rwanda: An Essay on Joking Relationship Theory," *Man* 12 (1977): 154-165.
- 58 The book which was compiled by Carl Velten, *Desturi za Wasuaheli* (Gottingen: Dandenhoed and Ruprecht, 1903), has guided my research in this area. This book was written by Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari in collaboration with a number of other Swahili persons of Bagamoyo. The selections dealing with law were written by Mwalimu Baraka bin Shomari of Kunduchi. The material for the book was collected in the 1890s at the request of Dr Velten, a linguist, who was interested in seeing the traditions and customs of the Swahili committed to writing. The entire book (except for a few chapters which have been left out) has been edited and translated into English by J. W. T. Allen as *The Customs of the Swahili People*. This translated version



has very useful notes prepared by Noel Q. King. The notes are supplemented or interwoven with material written by different contributors. Although the material for this book was written by Swahili persons of Bagamoyo who, in their descriptions of the customs of the Swahili give instances drawn mainly from the Bagamoyo area, their observations are generally relevant for Tanga which was also under the Shirazi. It has already been indicated that these towns had similar customs and a similar system of authority.

- 99 Velten, Desturi, 222. There was a general interest in linguistic studies in the second half of the nineteenth century. Dr Steere was carrying out such studies in Tanga in 1890 with the help of a local notable, old Munyi (Mwinyi) Hatibu, the uncle of Shaykh Umar b. Stanbul. See Baumann, 64. Bishop Edward Steere (not to be confused with Dr Steere) of the Universities Mission to Central Africa published in 1865 in Zanzibar **A Handbook of the Swahili Language as Spoken at Zanzibar**. He also wrote **Swahili Tales** and a translation of the Bible. These missionaries or, more properly, missionary-scholars stimulated interest in the study of Kiswahili, a language that possessed a written literature (in Arabic characters) which goes back to two or three centuries ago (earlier Swahili chroniclers of the sixteenth century, for instance, had used Arabic for their writings) and epic poems transmitted orally since the pre-Portuguese period in East Africa. "Standard" Kiswahili was created by these missionary scholars (Steere, Madan, Saccleux and Krapf) on the model of the local Kiswahili spoken in Zanzibar town; this Kiswahili was codified by European colonial administrators following the creation of the language committee (all of whose members were Europeans) which determined what was to be the official "standard" Kiswahili. The language of Zanzibar is more Arabized and less rich in poetry than the Ki-Mvita (Mombasa) and Ki-Amu (Lamu) dialects of Kiswahili. Lamu island was the cultural centre of the entire coastal area where people produced didactic and homiletic poems such as *Utendi wa Mwana Kuponu*, *Utendi wa Liyongo* and *Utendi wa Inkishafi*. Thus Swahili's literary past has been preserved in the northern dialects. It is quite unfortunate, therefore, that the colonial administrators saw fit to adopt the Zanzibar dialect as the "standard" Kiswahili when a northern dialect should have been selected since the literary heritage as well as the origins of the language are traceable to the northern part of the Swahili world. As Ian Knappert has observed, "The fact that 'standard' forms [in the early part of this century Kimvita/Mombasan Swahili was used in Kenya as the standard language before it lost ground or official status to Zanzibari Kiswahili] differ from 'literary' forms is the result of the Europeans' efforts to impose their own form of Kiswahili as a standard, instead of accepting the existing language, as was advocated by some. The fact that, unlike European languages, Swahili has two standard forms, has seriously prevented European and other students from learning it properly" (Ian Knappert, **A Choice of Flowers** (London: Heinmann, 1972), 13). It was due to reservations such as these that during the colonial period standard Kiswahili was also known as *Kiserikali*, the language of government. Abdalla Khalid in his book (**The Liberation of Swahili**) makes a strong case for the rejection of Zanzibar Kiswahili (a spoken language not based on literary speech) as the basis for standard Kiswahili. According to him, a northern dialect should be selected as the standard form which must be given official status in Kenya. To facilitate this process, his colleagues, Abedi Sheperdson and Shaykh Yahya Ali Omar, have written a book which they hope will be the basis for

teaching standard Kiswahili. They have selected Kimvita which is a central dialect (Mombasa being a melting-pot of other Swahili, especially the northern Swahili) to be their choice of standard Kiswahili.

- 60 These officials included the *shaha* (the diwan's double), *waziri*, *mwenyi mkuu* (chief elder), *mwenyi mkubwa* (crier) and *amiri* (who organized men for battle). Velten, *Desturi*, 124 and 225-226.
- 61 Prins, *The Swahili-Speaking Peoples*, 96. *Akida* was a title accorded to functionaries chosen for military and police duties.
- 62 Tanzania National Archives, Tanga Regional Book Mf 5 (hereafter TNA TRB). Kaima Muhammad was the liwali of Pangani in 1928.
- 63 It is true, however, that madiwan (compared, for instance, to the monarchs of Uganda) had limited power.
- 64 Velten, *Desturi*, 227.
- 65 Baumann, 57.
- 66 There is some indication that Islamic law was known on the Mrima coast probably since the seventeenth century. Velten, *Desturi*, 303. During the colonial period the liwali's court, which replaced the court of the kadhi of Tanga, was specifically concerned with both the Islamic and customary law (customary law refers to local African practices). The liwali's court sorted out questions of conflict; for instance, where a de-tribalized Swahili Muslim died, Islamic law was to be applied in the distribution of his estate, provided while alive the deceased had not intended by his statements or way of life that customary law be followed. On the other hand, should an African (presumably of upcountry origin) Muslim die, customary law was to be applied, unless he intended Islamic law to be followed. In general, Islamic law was applied, although in a somewhat modified form, only to questions of marriage, divorce, guardianship, bequests, maintenance, inheritance, gifts and so on. See the discussion in J. N. D. Anderson, "Relationship between Islamic and Customary Law in Africa," *JAA* 12:4 (October 1960): 228-234; and idem, *Islamic Law in Africa* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1954): 122-147. See also I. M. Lewis, "Islamic Law and Customary Practice," in *Islam in Tropical Africa*, ed. I. M. Lewis (London: International African Institute, Oxford University Press, 1966): 45-57.
- 67 Velten, *Desturi*, 306.
- 68 Burton, *Zanzibar*, II, 124.
- 69 Velten, *Desturi*, 227-228.
- 70 Prins, *The Swahili-Speaking Peoples*, 94.

- 71 Arthur Robinson, "The Shirazi Colonization of East Africa: Vumba," **TNR** 7 (1939): 94; and Hollis, "Notes," 277.
- 72 Ibid.
- 73 Prins, **The Swahili-Speaking Peoples**, 95. The high veneration among Wadigo and Wasegeju for sharifs and their putative healing and spiritual powers has its origin in this period. A. I. Salim, **The Swahili-Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast, 1895-1965** (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1973), 29.
- 74 See Abdul Hamid M. El Zein, **The Sacred Meadows** (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1974). This is an anthropological study which develops rich material on Lamu society. See also Marguerite Ylvisaker, **Lamu in the Nineteenth Century** (Boston: African Studies Center, Boston University, 1979).
- 75 James de Vere Allen in Mtoro Bakari, **The Customs**, 213.
- 76 Velten, **Desturi**, 259.
- 77 Ibid., 318. See also the discussion in A. H. Nimtz, "The Role of the Muslim Sufi Order in Political Change: An Overview and Micro-Analysis from Tanzania" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1973), 165-167; J. de V. Allen in Mtoro Bakari, **The Customs**, 298, n. 1; Baumann, p. 34; Allen G. B. Fisher and Humphrey J. Fisher, **Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa** (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1971); and George Shepperson, "The African Abroad or the African Diaspora," in **Emerging Themes of African History**, ed. T. O. Ranger (London: Heinmann Ltd., 1965), 156.
- 78 Iliffe, **A Modern History**, 74.
- 79 Godfrey Dale, "An Account of the Principle Customs and Habits of the Natives Inhabiting the Bondei Counrty," **JRAI** (1895): 230.
- 80 Baumann, 34.
- 81 Forbes Munroe, **Africa and the International Economy 1800-1960** (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1976), 60-62ff. This period of prosperity was referred to by Kirkman as the "Indian summer" of the Arabs of East Africa. Kirkman, **Men and Monuments**, 186. Sayyid Said facilitated exchange by importing pice (paisa) from India as a small denomination currency. Burton, **Zanzibar**, II, 405-6. The chief coins in use in the region were the Maria Theresa dollar (riale) and the Indian rupee (rupia) which was worth half a riale. The rupee was divided into 60 pesa. Allen in Mtoro, **The Customs**, 231.
- 82 Hamilton, **Princess**, 62.
- 83 For instance, in 1859 trade between Zanzibar and India was worth £ 333, 000, and with America £ 245, 000 (Zoe Marsh, **An Introduction**, 30) while the total trade of

Zanzibar for the same year was £ 1, 664, 577 according to Consul Rugby. Zanzibar's revenue before 1834 was about £ 10, 000 per annum; in 1834 this figure had almost doubled while in 1859 total revenue had increased to £ 50, 000 per annum. Sir John Gray, "Zanzibar and the Coastal Belt, 1840-84," in *History of Africa*, Vol. I, eds. R. Oliver and G. Mathew (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 219. The increase not only reflected the expansion in the export sector, but also the growing importance of the clove crop which depended on slave labour. Just as Sayyid Said is credited with the promotion of cloves for plantation cultivation, he is also blamed for the escalation of the slave trade in East Africa. Also, Zanzibar grew into a very stratified society where there was a tendency for race and economic class to coincide. Michael Lofchie, *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), 14. Saleh Haramil al-Abray, an Omani merchant, is credited with introducing clove production in Zanzibar in 1812. Burton, *Zanzibar*, I, 294-5 and 361.

- 84 John Gray, "Zanzibar," 219.
- 85 C. S. Nicholls, *The Swahili Coast*, 361-363. Between 1834 and 1853 Jairam Sewji of Kutch ran the customs collection at Zanzibar. He bought it in 1834 and continued to run it until 1853 when he was succeeded by Ladha Damji. *Ibid.*, 292.
- 86 Moffett, *Handbook*, 37. These towns, (Tanga included) paid tribute to the Shambala ruler. Abdalla bin Hemed L'Ajemy, *The Kilindi*, eds. J. W. T. Allen and William Kimweri Mbago (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1963), 78-79. *The Habari za Wakilindi* is the original title of the book which is available in Kiswahili. Shebuge, Kimweri's father, may have had commercial interests in mind in his efforts to extend the boundaries of his kingdom. Thus quite early in the nineteenth century he was making visits to a certain area near the coast where he struck business deals with traders from Tanga, Pangani and other northern Mrima towns and obtained "goods, beads and bars of iron" from them. Hemedi, *The Kilindi*, 79. See also G. O. Ekemode, "The Economic Basis of the Kilindi Kingdom in the 18th and 19th centuries," *AQ* XIV: 1 & 2 (1974): 20-31.
- 87 Hemedi, *The Kilindi*, 79. Kimweri's officials and soldiers collected tribute in the coastal towns while the Sultan's officials or representatives collected duty on the ivory passing through the Mrima ports.
- 88 For further study on Kimweri, see Steven Feierman, *The Shambaa Kingdom: A History* (Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1974); Hemedi, *The Kilindi*; R. Coupland, *East Africa and its Invaders* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938): 345-60; and Ludwig Krapf, *Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours during an Eighteen Years' Residence in Eastern Africa* (London: Trubner, 1860) which contains material on Kimweri's kingdom.
- 89 The number of these soldiers varied depending on the size of the town. A garrison could have anywhere from half a dozen to several dozen men. Of the 400 "Baluchis" stationed in East Africa in 1846, 30 were at Lamu, 25 at Pate, 6 at Kilwa and 150 at Fort Jesus (Mombasa). John Gray, "Zanzibar," 223-4. The title of *jemadar* is Indian

in origin. See K. K. Virmani, "Marks of India on Swahili Culture," *AQ* (New Delhi) 22: 1 (1983): 54-61.

- 90 Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 43.
- 91 Hatim Amiji, "The Bohras of East Africa," *JRA* 7 (1975): 39. A Bohora quarterly publication *Zahabiyah* (January 1967), 4 and (April 1966) gives a brief historical survey of the Daudi Bohora community in East Africa.
- 92 Amiji, "The Bohras," 39.
- 93 Velten, *Desturi*, 230-31.
- 94 Thus the Yao were responsible for the area between Kilwa and Lake Malawi, the Nyamwezi for long-distance trade between Bagamoyo and Lake Tanganyika and the Kamba for Mombasa's hinterland. This third route of penetration involved not just Mombasa, but also the ports of Pangani and Tanga and on occasions stretched beyond the Kilimanjaro area to the Kavirondo Gulf (eastern shores of Lake Victoria). The Kamba had virtual monopoly of the ivory trade and to retain this monopoly they exaggerated the dangers of the Masai. Krapf, *Travels*, 172.
- 95 By the 1840s the first Arab had reached Uganda. In their expeditions in the interior the Arabs were mainly interested in ivory and slaves and not iron, salt or copper, the three most important items in the indigenous or regional trade of western and central Tanzania. Edward A. Alpers, "The Coast and the Development of the Caravan Trade," in *A History of Tanzania*, eds. I. N. Kimambo and A. J. Temu (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), 51. Iron was used for making iron hoes, an important item of trade in the area.
- 96 Among the exceptions was one Ismaili from Surat by the name of Musa Mazuri who was a very active and well established slave trader. He met and spoke to Richard Burton (Moffett, *Handbook*, 35).
- 97 *Ibid.* By the end of Sayyid Said's reign the saying was: "when they whistle in Zanzibar, the people dance on the shores of the lakes." Zoe Marsh, *An Introduction*, 27.
- 98 Ismailis acted as agents for big financial houses in Kutch, Bombay, Surat and other trading centres along the Gulf of Canbay. See Shirin Remtulla Walji, "A History of the Ismaili Community in Tanzania" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1974).
- 99 Baumann, 57-8 and 60.
- 100 *Ibid.*, 7. Apparently, these Wagunya arrived on the Tanga coast due to famine in the Lamu region. It is also possible that the insecurity in the area (perhaps raids from Lamu's neighbours) may have indirectly contributed to this migration.
- 101 Burton, *Zanzibar*, II, 116.

- 102 Ibid., 121.
- 103 Ibid., 117. The caravan included Arab and Swahili traders, *pagazi* (non-slave or free porters, mostly Wadigo and Wasegeju) who carry 15 pounds each and slaves. We have an idea about how much load these porters carried from Sir Geoffrey Archer who described a typical caravan in Kenya before 1900. The caravan-porter carried ivory which was from time to time swung from one shoulder to the other to ease weight. He also carried a rifle slung over his shoulder, his blanket and water-bottle, and one month's ration of rice. Over and above that, he often carried 15 yards of cloth wrapped around his waist, and a couple of coil of brass wire suspended from his belt to use as personal trade goods to buy himself extra food. Sir Geoffrey Archer, **Personal and Historical Memoirs of an East African Administrator** (London: Oliver and Boyd Ltd., 1963), 2.
- 104 Burton, **Zanzibar**, II, 117.
- 105 Abdul M. Hussein Sheriff, "Tanzanian Societies at the Time of the Partition," in **Tanzania under Colonial Rule**, ed. M. Y. H. Kaniki, Papers presented to the History Teachers Conference, Morogoro, Tanzania, 1974, 28.
- 106 Ibid. By supplying Mozambican ivory to India, the Portuguese robbed Mombasa of its entrepot role. For further study on the ivory trade, see A. M. H. Sheriff, "The Rise," esp. 85-101; J. Lamphear, "The Kamba"; and R. W. Beachey, "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century," **JAH** 8: 2 (1967): 269-90. Throughout much of the nineteenth century East Africa was the most important source of ivory in the world. Ivory exceeded even slaves in export value. Soft ivory was found more frequently in East Africa than hard ivory which was obtained in Central Africa (the Congo region). Beachey, "The East African Ivory Trade."
- 107 Sheriff, "Tanzanian Societies," 28.
- 108 Ibid.
- 109 Ibid., 29.
- 110 Krapf, **Travels**, 277. Cited in Isaria N. Kimambo, **A Political History of the Pare of Tanzania 1500-1900** (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969), 126.
- 111 Baumann, 58. During much of the nineteenth century Bagamoyo seems to have been the most reputable coastal town. This is indicated, for instance, by the 1872-3 figures of Bagamoyo's exports to Zanzibar which amounted to \$ 200, 000 worth gum copal and \$ 400, 000 worth ivory as compared to Pangani and Tanga's exports which together amounted to a corresponding figure of \$ 400 and \$ 140, 000 respectively. Thus Bagamoyo was not only Zanzibar's gateway to the interior of East Africa, it was also her largest single coastal contributor to its coffers. For a discussion on Bagamoyo, see Walter T. Brown, "The Politics of Business Relations between Zanzibar and Bagamoyo in the Late Nineteenth Century," **AHS** 4: 3 (1971): 631-44; idem, "A Pre-

Colonial History of Bagamoyo: Aspects of the Growth of an East African Coastal Town" (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1971); and Nimitz, "The Role."

- 112 J. M. Gray, "Zanzibar," 226. This trade was a very difficult one as caravans had to march into the interior amidst the dangers of wild animals and the fierce Masai who often had to be bribed with loaves of beads and wire in return for safe passage through their territories (Hamilton, *Land of Zanj*, 84). However, we have already noted that this danger of the Masai was often exaggerated.
- 113 In 1776 the French came to an agreement with the ruler of Kilwa whereby the latter would supply them with one thousand slaves annually. This arrangement continued even after the Omanis had re-established control over the town in 1784 (Moffett, *Handbook*, 33). The trade had to be profitable as Kilwa was an unhealthy place. Cholera struck the region in 1857, and Burton witnessed its terrible effects (Burton, *Zanzibar*, II, 344-7), and again in 1870 when a slave could not be sold at a dollar a head for fear they were infected (J. M. Gray, "Zanzibar," 227). Even during the period of my field research (1984-85) there were a few reported cases of people infected with cholera in Kilwa.
- 114 A number of reasons contributed to the abolition of slave trade: by the end of the eighteenth century Britain had lost America and so it was not to her advantage anymore to indulge in slave trade (G. T. Sride and C. Ifeka, *Peoples and Empires of West Africa* (London: Nelson, 1971), 224); slavery was becoming less important and the role of Africa in the emerging international system was changing to that of a supplier of primary products (Munroe, *Africa*, 13); and finally, the process of industrialization or rather the momentum of industrial revolution in the West had transformed the methods of production, thereby undermining the slave trade or making slavery obsolete sooner in the West than happened in parts of the Middle East (Ali A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations* (London: Heinemann, 1977), 132). For further study on the Transatlantic slave trade, consult Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969). In a carefully documented study entitled *Britain and Slavery in East Africa* (Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1975), Moses D. E. Nwulia argues that Britain's interest in eradicating slavery was more "the humanitarianism of self-interest than of anything else."
- 115 Baumann, 58. In Tanga 64 slaves were freed before the end of 1875. R. Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890*, 219.
- 116 Baumann, 58.
- 117 Ibid.
- 118 The Sultan's domains included the whole coastal area with the exception for a short time only of the stretch between Vanga and Pangani. Also, his authority was increasingly marked along the trade routes that ran up to the great lakes and beyond. Kirkman, *Men and Monuments*, 187. Unlike the Germans, the British did not seek to displace the Sultan from his mainland domains in an abrupt manner; instead

they concocted a plan whereby they would lease from him his mainland territories and thereby obtain control over the points of access to the interior. Munroe, *Africa*, 76.

- 119 In 1885 five German warships anchored at Zanzibar harbour and threatened to shell the town unless the Sultan withdrew his protest against the "treaties" and also that the Sultan recall his troops and agents from these areas. The Sultan submitted to these demands and thus allowed the Germans to acquire territories in the hinterland. Since these territories lacked a suitable port, the Germans made another demand and again the Sultan submitted. Moffett, *Handbook*, 52. Cited in Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere, 1884-98," in *History of East Africa*, Vol. I, eds. R. Oliver and G. Mathew (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 438. Hemedi's story of the German conquest is a poetic dramatization of events leading to the loss of territory. It echoes the concerns and lamentations of a conquered people. Allen wonders whether it was meant to keep alive the flame of revolt; if so, it must have been a secret document, for its language (by colonial standards) is seditious and the Germans would not have tolerated what they considered to be propagandistic material. See n. 122 below. See also the discussion in Charles Pike, "History and Imagination: Swahili Literature and Resistance to German Language Imperialism in Tanzania, 1885-1910," *AHS* 19: 2 (1986): 201-234.
- 120 It was far from a unanimous report since it was the views of the German commissioner or representative which were in the end adopted in the interests of European policy. His colleagues, the British and French commissioners, thought the Sultan should have a 40-mile coastal strip, an area of 25 miles radius of Tabora and Ujiji, areas along the well established caravan routes and the Kilimanjaro region. Moffett, *Handbook*, 54.
- 121 Ibid., 57. Sulaiman b. Nasi al-Lemki who later became liwali of Dar es Salaam, was sent to all chief ports such as Tanga, Pangani, Dar es Salaam, Bagamoyo and Kilwa with the Sultan's instructions to his officials to hand the customs post to the German authorities. A year earlier a German captain had received a cold reception in Dar es Salaam. The Sultan had to recall his Arab governor for refusing to hand over his quarters to the captain. Eventually the Germans moved in and were closely followed by a party of Lutheran missionaries.
- 122 Hemedi b. Abdalla b. Said al-Buhriy, *Utenzi wa Vita vya Wadachi Kutamalaki Mrima* (The German Conquest of the Swahili Coast) ed. and tr. J. W. T. Allen (Dar es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1971), 32.
- 123 Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere," 438.
- 124 Moffett, *Handbook*, 57. On the eighth of September the two German officials in Tanga were taken by the "Leipzig" to Zanzibar for their own safety.
- 125 Ibid; Baumann, 59. Tanga put up resistance which was crashed when the Germans brought in their warship and bombarded the town.
- 126 The leader of the uprising was Abushiri b. Salim al-Harhi. Sultan Khalifa b. Said secretly did whatever he could to aid Abushiri at Pangani in 1888 and 1889. For



instance, "secret instructions" were passed to Abushiri and his men from the Sultan. See J. A. Kieran, "Abushiri and the Germans," *Hadith II* (1970): 168 & 178.

- 127 Moffett, *Handbook*, 57.
- 128 Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere," 439. In November of 1888 the Sultan sent a party of Arab soldiers to escort British missionaries from Usambara to the coast. The insurrectionists refused to allow the troops to land. At Magila, near Tanga, it was Abushiri who rescued Bishop Smythies and a number of missionaries of the University's Mission to Central Africa from his men.
- 129 Germany got the excuse she needed for intervention by introducing a law against the slave traffic in East Africa. It was then that a force was dispatched ostensibly to suppress slavery. See Albert F. Calvert, *German East Africa* (London: T. W. Laurie, 1917), 6-7.
- 130 Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere," 440. In the meantime the Germans had entered into an armistice with Abushiri to cease hostilities. When Wissman arrived he repudiated the armistice and hostilities flared up again.
- 131 Abushiri was running short of men, arms, money and supplies. To make matters worse, in his despair he had sent for the Tanga astrologer-poet Abdalla al-Buhriy and the result was that the news was not good from the astrology books, either. Hemedi al-Buhriy, *Vita vya Wadachi*, 54 sqq as cited in Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere," 440. There are conflicting figures as to the size of Wissman's force. See William H. Friedland, "The Evolution of Tanganyika's Political System," in *The Transformation of East Africa*, eds. S. Diamond and Fred G. Burke (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1966), 251, n. 25.
- 132 Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere," 44. As usually happens in such cases, by hanging Abushiri the Germans inadvertently assured him of hero status. Like Mbaruk Ma'ui, Abushiri has become the hero of epic songs. Regarding Abushiri uprising, it was more than a reaction against the fear of the loss of caravan trade. The movement expressed a popular sentiment by coastal people who throughout their history had resisted foreign rule. It certainly had religious overtones; this was the subject of Jonathan Glassman's doctoral research (Department of History, University of Wisconsin, Madison) which was being carried out in Pangani in 1985. It was not necessarily an "Arab revolt" as it has been labelled although it is true that the movement was led by an Arab inhabitant of Pangani. Abushiri's forces were commanded by Jahazi who was a Comoron; also, on the southern coast the uprising was led by Bwana Heri who was a Zigua.
- 133 This account is given by Khalid Kirama. See Khalid Kirama, "Hadith ya Deutsch Ostafrika, Leo Tanganyika Territory," Swahili Manuscript Collection, University of Dar es Salaam, MS 180 (n.d.). It seems Tanga had a ruler by the same name during the Mazrui rule of Mombasa, for we hear that Mwinyi Chambi Ibrahim was killed by the Mazrui. Arthur E. Robinson, "The Shirazi Colonization of East Africa: Vumba," *TNR* 7 (1939): 94. According to Baumann's account the entire population fled so that when Wissman arrived on 13th September he found the town to be quiet and deserted.

Baumann, 59. Although Baumann was a keen political observer, he detested Arabs, Comorons, Somalis and other coastal groups and his descriptions of them were rather unflattering. Arabs and Comorons are presented as the most bitter enemies of the Germans due to the part they played in the Abushiri uprising. Also, he reported unfavourably of the Kilindi leader Semboja understandably to justify German presence or colonization. As Steven Feierman put it, "Baumann, because he was encouraging German colonization, argued with more subtlety than truth that Shambani was underpopulated" ("The Shambala Kingdom: A History," Ph.D. dissertation, Evanston, Illinois, 1970, 232). It is also important to note that the Swahili people (urbanized and "detrribalized" Africans) have often been described by colonial writers and explorers in uncomplementary terms because they do not fit into a neat "tribal" category.

<sup>134</sup> Norma Lorimer, *By the Waters of Africa* (London: R. Scott, 1917), 29.

<sup>135</sup> In 1896 the Germans had a total military establishment in their East African colony of 2,700 people (2,500 African soldiers, 152 officers and sub-officers and 108 German Red Cross personnel). Heinrich Schnee, *German Colonization Past and Future* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1926), 79. The company at Tanga may have had about 162 African soldiers and several White officers. A. F. Calvert, *German East Africa*, 11. The soldier's salary ranged from 20 to 30 rupees.

<sup>136</sup> By 1902 the German government had paid to Sultan Sayyid Ali b. Said 4 million marks. Moffett, *Handbook*, 67.

<sup>137</sup> After suppressing the "Abushiri rebellion," the Germans had to deal with a number of local responses to their imperialism: Hehe resistance led by Mkwawa (1894-98); Meli, chief of the Chagga (1892) and Kalmera, chief at Usambiro (1890) created trouble for the Germans as did Machembo the Yao chief who refused to pay hut tax (1885-89); Ngoni defiance at Unyanyembe and Urambo (1890-98); Gogo raids in Tabora area (1890); Nyamwezi resistance led by Siki who closed the caravan routes at Tabora; and the Maji Maji war of 1905-6 -- a revitalization movement (in the east the Ngindo were led by the elephant hunter Abdalla Mapanda, who conducted a long guerilla war before he was caught and shot in 1907) by people who were increasingly being subjected to forced labour. See W. H. Friedland, "The Evolution," 252. The German response to these uprisings was often brutal, unrestrained and excessive. Thus in the case of the Maji Maji war, the ethnic groups involved were punished by having their foodcrops burned. The death toll from the war and the ensuing famine is estimated at between 75,000 and 120,000 people. The Germans exploited famine situations by instituting forced labour. Cruel and humiliating forms of punishment were inflicted on African chiefs. For instance, for merely pulling down a German so-called jumbe flag, the Pare jumbe Sebonde of kihurio was sentenced to one year of servitude in chains and to 300 strokes without a stout stick to be laid on during his imprisonment, less 60 lashes which had been inflicted at the time of his capture. TNA Tanga District Book MF 5. Owing to his cruelty, Karl Peters had been known to Africans as *mkono-wa-damu* (the man with the blood stained hands). See Zoe Marsh and G. W. Kingsnorth, *An Introduction to the History of East Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 221.

- <sup>138</sup> The stations included: Moshi, Kilwa Kivinje, Marangu, Iringa, Kilimatinde, Mpwapwa, Perondo, Pangani, Lindi, Ujiji, Tabora, Kilosa and others. (Freeman-Granville, "The German Sphere," 448). The three provinces consisted of Rwanda, Burundi and Bukoba while Mwanza was one of the military stations. See F. Sayers, **The Handbook of Tanganyika** (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1930), 76.
- <sup>139</sup> There was a tendency during the colonial administration for "natives" (Swahili groups including the self-styled Shirazi) to claim non-native status as a way of escaping certain disadvantages which accrued to being a member of the "native" group. E. C. Baker, **Report on the Social and Economic Conditions in the Tanga Province** (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1934), 14. Since there was a shortage of administrative personnel, the Germans recruited native officials from among people of Arab or Swahili extraction. Some of these officials had served under the previous Busaid administration. Those officials who had participated in the Abushiri war were not retained in their posts as maliwali. Maakida were appointed and used most effectively especially upcountry for policing duties which included enforcing planting of crops or recruiting labour for European plantations. See Gerald Sayers, **The Handbook**. During the period of German rule Asians, whether rich or poor, were classified as "native," not being governed by German civil law. With the onset of British rule, however, Asians benefitted as they were no longer classified as "natives."
- <sup>140</sup> Baumann, 60.
- <sup>141</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>142</sup> Ibid., 64.
- <sup>143</sup> Baker, **Report**, 10.
- <sup>144</sup> The reputation of the Baluchis as mercenary soldiers was inherited by the Sudanese (people from the area of the Nuba mountains in central Sudan and also people from southern Sudan who should not be confused with the Hamitic Nubians who live on either side of the Sudanese-Egyptian border). These Sudanese soldiers of fortune were recruited by both the British (Lugard incorporated a group of them into his own forces from what originally constituted Emin Pasha's force of mercenaries) and the Germans (although not on the same scale) in their colonial armies. In Uganda they are known by the misnomer of "Nubis" or "Nubians" (they include Nilotic Muslims among the northern ethnic groups of Uganda such as Kakwa, Lugbara, Madi, Alur and others who for prestige reasons adopted this label). To be a "Nubi," therefore, is not identical to being a member of a particular ethnic group. Rather, it relates to membership in a community; it means adopting Islamic practices, the language of Kinubi (a language that developed among uprooted Sudanese who were exposed to Islam and eventually accepted it, and picked up some colloquial Arabic in emergent towns associated with military and administrative centres), a particular dress style (for women), and other cultural habits. Apart from being agents of Islamization, the Nubi, though numerically insignificant, have played an important role in Ugandan society as soldiers and men of influence. The most recent period of their influence was during the rule of Idi Amin,

himself a Nubi. On Sudanese soldiers, see O. W. Furley, "Sudanese Troops in Uganda," *AA* 58: 233 (October 1959): 311-29. On the Nubi in Uganda, consult Aidan Southall, "General Amin and the Coup: Great Man or Historical Inevitability," *JMAS* 13:1 (1975): 85-105. The "Nubi" factor provides the general backdrop to Ali A. Mazrui's "Religious Strangers in Uganda: From Emin Pasha to Amin Dada," *AA* 76: 302 (January 1977): 21-38. For a recent study on the Nubi, see Omari H. Kokole, "The "Nubians" of East Africa: Muslim Club or African "Tribe"? The View from Within," *JIMMA* 6: 2 (1985): 420-48.

- 145 Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere," 448. Taxation of African population was first introduced in 1897 with the purpose of obliging Africans to accept paid labour and accustom themselves to European administrative discipline (Kurtz, **Historical Dictionary**, 73). At first unpaid labour on public works could be offered instead of paying the hut tax; the need to generate revenues, however, led to the cancellation of this arrangement. Africans were taxed 3 rupies per hut or rural dwelling. The rate of tax became 6 Shillings in 1922. Migrations during this period were partly stimulated by the need to pay taxes. In some areas of the territory, for instance, Mwanza in 1906, force had to be used to collect taxes. Paying taxes was considered alien interference. Moreover, the manner in which it was collected left a lot to be desired and may have contributed in part to the Maji Maji war. The "Native" Hut and Poll tax (after 1936 substituted house for hut) levy on every household included a plural wives rate.
- 146 Abdalla Hemed was the author of **The Kilindi** already cited above. He was of African and Baluchi ancestry. He was born in 1840 in Zanzibar but moved to the mainland where not long afterwards he rose to fame as Kimweri's (ruler of Kilindi) scribe and political trouble-shooter. He died in 1912 and was buried in Chumbageni, Tanga. His funeral was attended by hundreds of people. He was famous among the people of Mrima and the Wakilindi of Vuga. Ali b. Diwan succeeded him as the liwali of Tanga. He was the last liwali under the German administration
- 147 The following material on maliwali and maakida has been obtained from the TNA TDB MF 9 Vol. III. On the British capture of Tanga in 1916, see Brian Gardner, **German East: The Story of the First World War in East Africa** (London: Cassel and Co., Ltd., 1963), 100. The first attempt to capture the town in 1914 ended in failure.
- 148 According to Shaykh Said b. Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, his father received a small salary of a little over 200 Shillings a month. Official records confirm this. His salary in 1935 was 220 Shillings and that of the akida 210 Shillings; their salaries were increased to 260 Shillings and 240 Shillings respectively. It was proposed that an allowance of 20 Shillings be added to their salaries. (Liwali and Kadhi of Tanga, Appointments, TNA TDB 14A Accession 45). Shaykh Said says that the British recalled his father in order to restore his respect. After six months he was retired. Interview with Shaykh Said Ali al-Buhriy, Tanga, 12 March 1985. Another version of the story (obtained from conversation with a Tangan, Muhammad Qasim Manaruma, at McGill University, Montreal, 22 November 1980) is that since the kadhi was a salaried civil servant and not an official who administered cash resources, there was no way he could have directly expropriated cash funds himself. Therefore, what may have happened (as it is believed by some Tangans) is that the kadhi signed a

form or, alternatively, a form was signed on his behalf endorsing the use of some funds for which approval had not been sought. In this context, it is interesting to note that a number of religious leaders in Mombasa were quite mistakenly accused of bribery by the British administrators who seem to have misunderstood the local custom of gift-giving to elders and religious men in exchange for rendering justice. Thus in 1896 the kadhi of Mombasa Shaykh Sulaiman b. Ali Mazrui was sentenced to three months in prison while Shaykh Muhammad Qaasim Maamiri, accused of sanctioning or helping in the wrongdoing, received one month and a fine of 200 Rupees. **The Gazette for Zanzibar and East Africa**, 2-9-96, 6. Cited in Pouwels, "Islam," 540. With respect to the abolition of kadhiship in Tanga, some of our informants believe that it was the Segeju who agitated for this as they were in favour of the liwaliship only. There may be something to this belief as there were some Segeju who resented the position and scholarly influence of the then kadhi of Tanga, Shaykh Ali b. Hemed al-Buhriy.

<sup>149</sup> See, Tanganyika, **Gazette** (1923), 133.

<sup>150</sup> G. F. Sayers, **The Handbook**, 116. "Natives" (Africans) paid the hut or poll tax while "Non-Natives" paid a house tax. Before the imposition of colonial rule Africans had not known such taxes and a good many evaded paying them during the period of both the German and the British colonial administrations. Hence at the end of the tax year the authorities resorted to "round-ups" of tax evaders.

## Chapter Two

### SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TANGA

#### Inter-Ethnic Relationships

Tanga, like other smaller coastal towns, began as a village which was dominated by one ethnic group, in this case the Shirazi-Swahili with strong ties to the Bondei, the autochthonous group. The town was divided into wards, reflecting ethnic or kin affiliations. Since wards were settled by lineage segments, the earlier settlers had a special mtaa (ward) while newcomers were assigned to a special area. Each mtaa (ward) had a representative or ward leader responsible for the affairs of the community. The wards recognized an overall leader or jumbe (later known as diwan). Madiwani came from the old settlers (wamwinyi) or the earlier groups to arrive in the area. This reveals a network of linkages involving tradition and kinship pattern. Wamwinyi were involved in trade and may have had some plots of land on the mainland coast where they did some cultivation. Nevertheless, the town obtained most of its foodstuffs from the immediate hinterland.

As the community grew and prospered in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as a result of trading activities, Tanga constructed more elaborate dwellings, mosques in particular, which were built of coral blocks and coral lime. One of these mosques, whose roof had caved in by the late nineteenth century, was built of coralline stone and comprised three rooms and the prayer-niche.<sup>1</sup> Next to the prayer-niche were some pieces of fine imported porcelain which had been set into the wall. In addition to mosques, Koranic schools were also built for Muslim children, and itinerant *imams* from the northern Swahili towns were to be found in Tanga. The growth of the town stimulated competition between the town's wards, a noted feature of urban Swahili life.<sup>2</sup> This rivalry was reflected in

*ngoma* (dance) and poetry competition. Inter-mitaa tensions, however, were less acute (the town's population being relatively more homogeneous at this time) given that the community was relatively small and social differentiation was less articulated.

The large tide of commerce in the nineteenth century (especially after the transfer of the town to the mainland coast in the 1840s) brought in a large number of settlers. In this situation the Shirazi who faced a growing number of newcomers from the Tanga countryside legitimized their position by invoking the claims of Shirazi origins. The tension between the long established town dwellers and the newcomers created ethnic rivalry, especially in the late nineteenth century. As a result people of the same ethnic affiliations settled together in separate little quarters (*mitaa*) for material and moral support. Townsmen tended to exclude strangers and new immigrants who did not share their culture, although not for long (as we shall see below). The new groups were eventually assimilated into the Swahili community and came to share its culture. An essential part of this Swahili culture was *uungwana* ("cultured" behaviour) which meant (apart from allegiance to Islam and mastery of the Swahili language) behaving properly, greeting in a certain way, visiting when invited, displaying *hishima* (respect), behaving in a certain way among social equals and so on.

Many of the newcomers settled in Chumbageni which, as the name suggests (dwelling unit for guests), must originally have been the visitors quarters. Nevertheless, in 1890 the Shirazi could also be found in Chumbageni.<sup>3</sup> In Mkwakwani (named after a large Mkwakwa tree, a type of climbing plant bearing edible fruit), especially in the area of Kiomboni, where many of the Shirazi from the old island town had settled, there was considerable mixing of Shirazi with Digo elements. In fact, many Swahili of Tanga, including the Wajomba living north of the town, were Wadigo. This is why (as reported by Baumann) the Tanga dialect of Kiswahili is heavily interspersed with Digo elements. Most of the Digo of Tanga lived in Mkwakwani which was divided into Mikamboni and

Mbuyukenda districts.<sup>4</sup> Bondei influence was also to be found in Tanga and particularly in Chumbageni where (according to Baumann) some of the Shirazi who had preserved their racial "purity" fairly well were to be found.<sup>5</sup> At this time Tanga's *madiwani* included Ndemi (Mkwakwani), Mwinyi Chambi Ibrahim (Mkwakwani), Mtondo (Chumbageni) and Jumbe Kaogombo (Chumbageni).<sup>6</sup>

Tangan society was more homogeneous in the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth century when the town played a commercial intermediary role between the hinterland and the Indian ocean. Up-country inhabitants supplied food and other commodities for trade at the various market centres. For instance, the Digo (who had been for a long time involved in the role of middlemen in the ivory trade before losing this position to the Kamba in the nineteenth century) had weekly markets in Gombero and Bombuera, some distance from Tanga town. Often these markets would be held jointly with the Bondei.<sup>7</sup> The Digo bought from Swahili, Arab and Indian merchants (based in Tanga and Vanga) commodities such as salt, fish, beads, pottery, cotton cloth, sometimes guns and powder, which they paid for in copper *pesas* or in exchange for milk and copra.<sup>8</sup> The Digo and Segeju once had a lot of cattle but Masai raids in the nineteenth century depleted their stocks. Middlemen from these two ethnic groups bought clothes from Indian stores and sold it in Bondei and Digo countryside.<sup>9</sup> Also, not far from Tanga town was Amboni market which in the nineteenth century contained one thousand people exchanging food, mats, wooden articles, tobacco and other goods.<sup>10</sup> This market was frequented by traders from Tanga. The hinterland ethnic groups (Digo, Bondei and Sambaa) carried tobacco, beans, millet, maize and other commodities to Tanga to exchange for European goods.<sup>11</sup> Digo millet was exported to Arabia, while rice from Bondei went to Zanzibar. These inland peoples traded with Zanzibar through coastal (for instance, Tangan) middlemen. More particularly, increased demand for ivory boosted ivory prices and



stimulated long-distance/regional trade. For instance, there was long-distance trade from Tanga and Pangani to Kilimanjaro and Masailand.

The outcome of this regional trade was that people who lived in the villages in the surrounding region began to migrate to Tanga town. Trade was the main but not the only reason which induced people to move to Tanga. Earlier in 1839-40 there had been a disagreement between the Segeju of Chongoliani and Wakiongwe (identified as Wabondei) which led the latter to leave for Tanga town.<sup>12</sup> Also, in 1894 and for the next few years Bondei country experienced locusts which destroyed crops and created famine. Many Bondei left their villages to seek work in Tanga.<sup>13</sup> As these groups of people moved from villages to Tanga the town became increasingly heterogeneous. The influx of slaves and up-country Africans in the nineteenth century changed the town's social composition:

The old rivalry between wards apparently gave place to antagonism between established residents and newcomers. In late nineteenth century Tanga and Pangani, for example, interward dancing competitions appear to have taken second place to rivalry between Darisudi and Darigubi societies, representing established townsmen and up-country immigrants.<sup>14</sup>

Increasingly, however, since coastal people shared a common relationship to the inland peoples, these antagonisms gradually disappeared. This is the more so as Tanga had developed strong links between the coast and a number of hinterland ethnic groups proving the capacity of Swahili society to absorb new groups. The longer these people stayed on the coast the more they perceived themselves as being members of the Swahili community.

The nineteenth century conditions (following the transfer of the town to the mainland coast) favoured the new groups, especially the Indians, who were the linchpin of Sultan Sayyid Said's economic policy. It was they who benefitted most from trade as did the Arabs although to a lesser extent given a shift from a slave mode of production in the late nineteenth century. The Africans, especially the wamwinyi, also benefitted from trade

but in a moderate way as they could not compete effectively with the Indians who came to dominate wholesale and distributive trade. The Digo were heavily involved in the copra trade. The profits from trade went into *shamba* (farm ownership). They sold copra and foodstuffs to consumers in the coastal markets. Some worked full-time as fishermen. Tanga in the late nineteenth century had a population of 4,000 people who, apart from the Shirazi, included Digo, Bondei, Segeju, Sambaa and other Africans, Arabs (including Afro-Arabs) and Indians, mainly Bohoras. By the turn of the century Indian shopkeepers were providing stiff competition to Africans who lacked capital. Indians were even encroaching on the African residential area, much to the alarm of the Africans, who complained to the colonial authorities.

The late nineteenth century was also the period that saw many Digo and Segeju embrace Islam. The Digo became heavily Islamized partly because of coastal trading and marketing they became increasingly influenced by Swahili culture. The more they came into contact with coastal traders and coastal culture the more their adherence to coastal culture deepened. The Segeju lived on the coastal belt and may have been assimilated earlier. There were already Muslim villages among the Segeju where mosques and schools could be found. Segeju settlements, for instance, Mnyanjani, which became the home of a number of families which arrived from Lamu in the first half of the nineteenth century, produced an important Muslim scholar-preacher, Shaykh Sero, who lived in the latter part of the century. The Segeju settlement of Ndumi also produced a scholar by the name of Kimanga wa Mwamadi Adi Makame who lived probably in the eighteenth or early nineteenth century.<sup>15</sup> Baumann mentions in 1890 when commenting on Islam among Swahili groups of the Tanga area that the Segeju were the most devoted Muslims while the Digo were superficially Islamized.<sup>16</sup> The first few decades of the twentieth century were periods of Islamic expansion. Muslim officials, school teachers, soldiers and others carried out missionary work among the hinterland Digo and Bondei who were becoming

increasingly assimilated into the Swahili culture. In Bagamoyo's hinterland the Zigua became greatly influenced by Islam as did the Sambaa and many parts of Bonde (with the exception of areas of long mission experience).<sup>17</sup> Eventually the Digo and Segeju became wholly Islamized.

Among the factors which aided the spread of Islam from the coast to inland areas, were Sufi practices, maulid festivities and *Beni* (competitive dance associations), which were processes by which Islam became established in a number of areas in Tanganyika.<sup>18</sup> For our purposes, ngoma societies and particularly Beni (a continuation of Swahili intermitaa competition), which represent an important cultural feature of Swahili society, require a closer examination. This is due to the fact that dance societies (which generated rivalry between partisan groups) exemplify the type of competition (madrassa-based) which is today taking place in Tanga.

Dance societies, which have existed in Tanga and other Mrima/coastal towns for a long time, have functioned mainly as entertainment and mutual aid societies. The way a new society (*chama cha ngoma*) was formed was that people of a ward or wards would get together and establish a dance society of their part of the town to challenge another.<sup>19</sup> The new society chose its leader, his deputy, a counsellor and a messenger (*kijumbe*).<sup>20</sup> If any matter connected with death, marriage or bereavement arose in that quarter of the town where the society was based it was the duty of the deputy to notify the leader. The leader would then consult with his counsellor before reaching a decision. Once a decision has been reached, it was the duty of the messenger to summon the rest of the members to attend, for instance, a funeral, or to appear at a certain place for a meeting if that was necessary.<sup>21</sup>

Competition was a key feature of interward dancing rivalry. The dance societies competed on feast days and on other days when the occasion gave rise to celebrations.

This rivalry set one quarter of the town in competition with another.<sup>22</sup> Some of the ngoma competition could last as long as a week with a lot of money being spent on the occasion.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, ngoma became less important in the late nineteenth century partly due to the decline in caravan trade (there was less money to lavish on ngoma societies) and partly due to a new rivalry which emerged between Darisudi (townsmen) and Darigubi (up-country migrants). That the dance societies regained their earlier importance sometime in the twentieth century is borne out by the fact that one colonial officer wrote to another: "Even now 'ngoma' societies are formed, and there are bickerings between this ngoma and that. A clever and unscrupulous person could use these societies for his own political purposes if he wished...".<sup>24</sup> Since there was an absence of a tribal basis of authority in Tanga district, at least as far as Tanga town was concerned, the same official recommended that the town be divided into mitaa (wards), and one or two representatives from each ward or even dance society be chosen to sit on a *baraza* (council) which would be chaired by the akida. Although the recommendation was not implemented, that they considered setting up a council with representatives from dance societies is a clear indication of the significance of these organizations. Some dance societies got out of hand as we learn that at the beginning of 1923 at the request of the *wazee* (elders) ngomas in Tanga were stopped on account of an increase in drunkenness. This ban was a temporary one as more stringent restrictions were imposed and ngomas were allowed only on certain days and until midnight. More specifically, in order to have a ngoma, one had to obtain a permit, including paying a small fee, from the Native Authority; the person who received the permit would be responsible for the behaviour of those attending; no ngoma would be held between midnight and six in the morning; and failure to observe these stipulations would lead to a fine.<sup>25</sup>

While ngoma groups were quite old, a form of dance society called *Beni* (from English "band") arose during the First World War in Tanganyika.<sup>26</sup> Increased commercial

agriculture meant that some people had money which they decided to lavish on ngomas.<sup>27</sup> These sponsors or patrons along with ordinary members went to great lengths to meet their subscription and other expenses and in the process some incurred debts. There are stories that some Wadigo lost their coconut plantations through mortgage. The most competitive Beni were Marine (which symbolized sea power) and Arnot (which stood for land forces) which were found in many of the major centres of Tanganyika where they had branches. The office bearers of each dance society were given military rank, each rank commensurate with spending appropriate to that rank. Given the colonial context, it has been asserted, that dance associations, quite apart from functioning as entertainment and mutual aid societies, served to mask the desire of colonized people to assume leadership roles.<sup>28</sup> This whole line of argument and its assumptions, however, have been challenged.<sup>29</sup> At any rate, the Beni did provide a social bridge between ordinary townsfolk and the elite modernizers in the African civil service, particularly members of the Tanga-based TTACSA (Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association) and its successor, TAA (Tanganyika African Association).<sup>30</sup> When ngoma was staged it was sometimes the case for invitations to be extended to other towns to join their host in the ceremonies. Thus "visits by the Tanga dancers to Vanga, for instance, were important social occasions in the latter town and probably had some share in the development of the local language commonly spoken in a sphere where formerly Kivumba was the dialect in vogue."<sup>31</sup> It is reported that Tanga's port manager, a European by the name of Pen, had good public relations with the employees of the port, who were strong partisans of ngoma.<sup>32</sup> Ngomas were staged mainly on weekends or on feast days. The subject of the songs was often one section of the town praising itself while heaping ridicule on one of the other sections.<sup>33</sup> The songs were cast in verse form and demonstrated *ufundi wa ushairi* (expertise in versification). The tunes were so attractive that some were incorporated in the repertoire of the elite regimental band of the Battalion of the King's African Rifles then stationed in Nairobi.<sup>34</sup> The dancers formed an arc or semi-circle which moved slowly around a circle

to the tempo of the music or singing. During the dances there was a master of ceremonies who moved inside a circle urging his dancers to sing with enthusiasm and to put on a splendid performance. The element of competition entered into the dance with each group aiming to outdo its competitors in terms of apparel worn for the occasion, how many cows are slaughtered, how many guests are invited and how often the dances are staged.<sup>35</sup> In short, there was competition in extravagance with each group trying to stage a bigger show to eclipse the dance performance of its rivals. This is not unlike what happens today between Tanga's rival madrasas, TAMTA and Zahrau, when they hold their mauid performances.

There was ngoma competition both between and within each of the two important Segeju settlements of Mnyanjani and Ndumi (a few miles from Tanga town) in the years before TAMTA was formed. In the case of Mnyanjani, rivalry reached a point where competing ngoma groups attended different mosques. In other words, the cleavage between two dance societies one of which was called Macho Tumbo was reflected in a pattern of mosque attendance which was based on ngoma association.<sup>36</sup> Competition was most stiff among ngomas of women and sometimes fights would break out.<sup>37</sup> However, by the late 1940s or early 1950s ngomas, particularly Beni, were in many areas in a state of decline. Thus in the case of Bagamoyo bitter rivalry between the *Lelemama* (female ngoma) groups was ended when shaykhs from Dar es Salaam and Mbweni were called to reconcile the leaders.<sup>38</sup> Since that time there is very little competition left between ngoma societies whether in Tanga (which today has a few ngoma groups such as Chela and Gita) or Bagamoyo. In the case of Tanga this competition, as the next chapter will attempt to show, has been replaced by a form of religious rivalry.

## **Ethnic Migrations, Communal Segments and Segeju Clan Feud**

### **The Ethnic Map of Tanga**

Because the Segeju play an important role in the religious affairs of Tanga society, it will be instructive to examine their migration history and inter-clan relations which have shaped the religious situation in Tanga. What we are alluding to here is the fact that there has existed a long-standing friction between the Wakamadhi and Waboma Segeju based in the villages of Ndumi and Mnyanjani, several miles from Tanga town. A brief ethnic history of the Tanga area taking into account Segeju inter-clan relations is necessary in order to understand the present clan-based religious rivalry. In addition to the Segeju (ethnic) history we will also present a Digo history. The Digo are the main Swahili group of Tanga town. They have joined in the religious competition and are beginning to assert themselves in the struggles for religious leadership positions in the community. The Bondei and Sambaa are not involved in religious disputes or competition.

The ethnic history of Tanga deals mainly with the period when a series of migrations to the area were taking place. These migrations affected the ethnic configuration of the region. More specifically, the period during and prior to the seventeenth century was characterized by migrations from Kenya-Somali border or southern Somalia southwards. The Galla had been pushing southwards and many ethnic groups felt their pressure. Successive waves of migrations took place in response to this pressure. These newcomers arrived in the Tanga area and spread in village settlements extending from the coast to the hinterland. The seventeenth century witnessed the burgeoning of Tanga into a Mrima confederacy with close ties to the Bondei, the Digo and the Segeju. The Digo and Segeju were also allies of the Vumba state.

The Segeju, like the Mijikenda (people of the "Nine Towns"--the Giriama, Rabai, Duruma, Digo, Kauma, Chonyi, Jibana, Kambe, and Ribe), claim as their ancestral home a geographical region identified as Shungwaya (southern Somali coast).<sup>39</sup> The Segeju also make a dubious claim that prior to arriving at Shungwaya their original home was in the Middle East.<sup>40</sup> Due to increasing pressure from the Galla (more properly, the Oromo), the Segeju left Shungwaya at the end of the fifteenth or the beginning of the sixteenth century and appeared at Malindi before 1542.<sup>41</sup> The Portuguese author Diogo do Couto mentions them in the defence of Malindi against the Zimba invaders from the southern region of Africa.<sup>42</sup> As allies of Malindi and the Portuguese, they also fought against Kilifi and Mombasa. The first few decades of the seventeenth century found them still living in the area of Malindi where the Portuguese bought their friendship by giving them a yearly tribute.<sup>43</sup> They were pastoralists and had a vocabulary for cattle and other stock.<sup>44</sup> Continued pressure from the Galla led them to migrate, as tradition has it, from Malindi up the Sabaki and south making a long inward sweep through the Kamba speaking area (where one section of the Segeju got lost and was incorporated with the Kamba) to the coast near the Tanganyika border (the region of Vanga). When Tanga and Mtangata rebelled against the Portuguese in 1631 the Segeju had either just arrived or were on their way to the Tanga area. The Digo, on the other hand, arrived earlier than the Segeju (also driven from their primeval homeland) and settled on the coastal strip between Mombasa and Tanga, driving out Wabondei who had occupied the coast from Tanga to near the Kenyan border and inland to the Usambara foothills.<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, the Digo and later the Segeju took over the coastal belt from the Bondei who moved further inland. The Segeju eventually occupied the northeastern corner of the Tanga district. In their migrations southwards, "the original [Segeju] immigrants consisted of a war party who, cut off from their fellows by the flooding of the Uмба River, decided to settle in what was Digo country."<sup>46</sup> Apparently, they lost their women (the only female in the party having been killed, so the story goes, to avoid the possibility of dispute as to who should possess



her) and had no choice but to take women from the local Digo.<sup>47</sup> Thus the Kibirini clan of the Wadigo fought with and later became the *watani* (joking partners) of Wasegeju.<sup>48</sup> One section of the Segeju travelled inland to the area of Buiti and settled among the Shambala-Bondei. These are the Daisu speakers. Another section, the larger of the two, followed the coast and eventually spread out to the Boma peninsula and, later, to the south of Tanga to Mnyanjani, Ndumi and mwambani.<sup>49</sup> The Shirazi were then in power in towns such as Tanga and Tongoni while the Shirazi of the eight towns in the area between Kifundi-Shirazi and Tanga had become subjects of the Vumba state (near Kenya-Tanganyika border). The Shirazi had power and prestige because of the trade involving ivory and also because they acted as medicinemen.<sup>50</sup> However, sometime during the first half of the seventeenth century the diwan of Vumba Mwana Chambi Chandi Ivor entered into an alliance with the Segeju and their allied Kibirini clan of the Digo with the understanding that each new diwan of Vumba would give these *watani* an installation fee in return for their allegiance and assistance in war time.<sup>51</sup> This is how diwan Ivor was able to subdue the Shirazi of the eight towns by calling on his Segeju allies. Also for aiding diwan Ivor, the Segeju were given some land near what is now the Tanganyika border. Later, however, according to local tradition, the two largest and important Segeju clans, the Mwakamadhi (founded by Mwamuryamburi Kamadhi) and Boma (founded by Mwakala Soketa), began to overstep their southern boundary and spread south of Tanga as far as Mwambani as we have already indicated.<sup>52</sup> This led to friction with the neighbouring ethnic groups such as the Digo. Lumwe the Segeju chief of Chongoliani was attacked by the Digo Mwakilirau or Mwakilumu and in the ensuing fight both sides suffered losses.<sup>53</sup>

It is important to note that the Segeju migration to the Tanga coast was that of loose groups of people who were absorbed into earlier politically unorganized populations. According to Freeman-Grenville, "such a view is supported by the absence of political organization of a dynastic kind amongst tribes claiming Shungwaya origin: rather, these are

characterized by loose, informal assemblies of elders, gathered as local convenience ... might dictate ...".<sup>54</sup> The Segeju form a loose non-centralized ethnic system, with no important or powerful chiefs. In the nineteenth century Abdalla Mwaketa, the son of Lumwe, sought to change this and make himself into a powerful chief. He was not satisfied with being a Boma (Segeju) headman or chief of Chongoliani; he had political ambitions to establish himself as Sultan to dominate all Segeju living south of this village.<sup>55</sup> The Boma had settlements at Boma, Manza, Kichalikani, Chongoliani and Mnyanjani while the Kamadhi had their settlements at Gomani, Moa, Mwambani and Ndumi.<sup>56</sup> Prior to Abdalla Mwaketa's rise, the two Segeju clans (the Wakamadhi lived in Ndumi and Waboma in nearby Mnyanjani) seemed to have gotten along quite well as is illustrated by the fact that there were Wakamadhi living in the Boma village of Mnyanjani. This peaceful co-existence was endangered when Abdalla Mwaketa decided to expand his territory at the expense of the Kamadhi Segeju.<sup>57</sup> His manouvres antagonized Akida Mwakombo the Kamadhi headman and caused friction between the two clans. As a result, the Wakamadhi who had been living in Mnyanjani left for Ndumi. Ndumi began to fortify itself and a year later war broke out between the two clans.<sup>58</sup> The Waboma were not able to take Ndumi which was well-defended. The outcome was that the two clans became bitter enemies. Abdalla Mwaketa's intrigues soon embroiled him in a dispute with a Swahili notable of Arab descent, Stanbul b. Abu Bakr, the father of Shaykh Umar b. Stanbul. Mwaketa made claim to Stanbul's cattle, half of which he seized and took off with them.<sup>59</sup> Stanbul's efforts to claim his cattle led to fighting and Stanbul was killed in 1858 at Mvuuni near Chongoliani.<sup>60</sup> It was then that local chiefs, for instance, chief Bori of Saadani were called on to check Mwaketa.<sup>61</sup> So divisive were the squabbles between Wakamadhi and Waboma (who sought to control the parochial administration) that Sultan Sayyid Majid (r. 1856-1870), responding to representation made to him as the overlord of the Mrima coast, sent a dhow-load of his men who arrested leaders of both the Boma (Abdalla Mwaketa and Mwabohera) and Kamadhi clans (Mwinyi Makame Mdudu and Akida

Mwakombo).<sup>62</sup> Abdalla Mwaketa never made it to Zanzibar as he was thrown overboard and drowned. Mwabohera died in prison while the two Kamadhi leaders were released later although Mwakombo died before repatriation.<sup>63</sup>

As the nineteenth century progressed and the Mrima coast quietened down, more and more Segeju embraced Islam (the acquisition of coastal culture led to the acceptance of Islam among the coastal hinterland peoples) and they brought into it not only their beliefs and customs, but also their feuds.<sup>64</sup> Thus Baumann noted that the two clans were bitter enemies and opposed each other with hostility.<sup>65</sup> They had been continuously at war with each other for along time. At the time of Baumann's visit the leader of the Boma Segeju was Mwalimu Faqih.<sup>66</sup> At the turn of the century the chief elder of the Segeju of Pongwe was Buhuri b. Nyale b. Mwalimu al-Bajun.<sup>67</sup>

The Boma-Kamadhi feud surfaced again during the colonial rule among the Segeju of Chongoliani and Bagamoyo (see map III). The British found it difficult to have indirect administration among the Segeju. In 1926, for instance, despite the fact that a Kamadhi headman Juma Athmani was elected by a large majority and the colonial administration wanted him to be the akida, the area had to be administered directly to avoid opposition from the Boma clan which did not recognize him.<sup>68</sup> In October 1926 new divisional boundaries were created which saw the Chongoliani and Bagamoyo people placed under the akida of Moa, a move that was not opposed by the Shirazi-Swahili or members of other ethnic groups but by the Boma Segeju who objected strongly. The spokesman and leader of the Boma Segeju was Muhammad b. Abdalla who became the jumbe of Chongoliani when his father retired in 1926.<sup>69</sup> The administration even considered deposing him in the interests of maintaining the authority of the new akida. In order to solve the Segeju question, the administration proposed to set up a council with members who would include Rashid Muhammad (Manza), Ruga Abdalla (Chongoliani), Ishaq Mbwana (Mnyanjani), the jumbe of Sigaya and several wazee who would represent Chongoliani and Bagamoyo;

Manza, Sigaya and Boma Ndani; and Mnyanjani, Ndumi, Mwambani and Machui.<sup>70</sup> Nevertheless, according to a British official by the name of Harrington, members of other ethnic groups objected to setting up of a council whose purpose was to check or solve Segeju inter-clan conflict and not the treatment of wider issues which were of interest to them.

The foregoing discussion serves as a background for understanding the interconnection between clan tensions which have existed for a long time and, as we shall see in the next chapter, the subsequent development of religious rivalry among members of the two Segeju clans. This rivalry revolves around support for TAMTA or Zahrau madrasas whose core supporters are Segeju. The bitter conflict between the two Segeju clans is not limited to Tanga and its neighbouring settlements of Ndumi and Mnyanjani, but has spread to other areas of Segeju concentration. This is, for instance, the case in Chongoliani which is a village settlement inhabited by Segeju and descendants of Bajuni immigrants.

As for the ethnic history of the other groups of Tanga area, the Bondei and Sambaa, we may start by mentioning one tradition according to which Wazigua, Wanguu, Wasambaa and Wabondei at the beginning were one tribe known as "Wazigua."<sup>71</sup> They lived in amity with the Oromo, their neighbours. There was a conflict at the watering place which led to a fight. Wazigua fled although they fought and resisted while retreating at the same time.<sup>72</sup> They moved southwards until they reached Kondoa-Irangi. In their wanderings Wazigua who spread far and wide (*waliosambaa*) were called Wasambaa; those who settled in the mountains were called Wanguu; and those who moved about and eventually settled in the valley (*Bonde*) were called Wabondei.<sup>73</sup> The Bondei initially settled in the area of Tanga which is presently occupied by the Digo. In the course of a war with a Mkilindi named Mwere they left the area and split up into 15 clans.<sup>74</sup> The Bondei were

eventually driven from the coastal belt by the incoming Digo and were forced to settle at the foot of Usambara mountains.

With respect to the Digo about one-fourth of whom live in Tanzania, it is believed that they migrated from Shungwaya between the fifteenth and the end of the sixteenth century. Legend describes how they fought and were defeated by the Oromo in battle after which they were forced to leave. According to Martin Kayamba, Wadigo, Wagirama, Wachonyi, Waribe and Waduruma were once a single ethnic group known as Wabokumu who were defeated in the Galla war and dispersed south of Lamu where they split into the above groups.<sup>75</sup> The Oromo themselves must have been under pressure from raiding parties from the north which factor, coupled with years of poor rain, must have induced them to move southwards.<sup>76</sup> The Digo and other Nyika groups (who were probably pastoral themselves as they migrated easily) in turn were forced to move further south to escape the Oromo.<sup>77</sup> The overall factor which may have influenced these migrations or population movements was probably the military activities of Ahmad Gran, king of Adal. Gran's military activities were in the sixteenth century (1528-29) during which Muslim states were established by 1535.<sup>78</sup> The whole of Ethiopia might have been overrun by Muslims had it not been for the Portuguese intervention in 1541. These military activities produced pressure on the pastoral peoples who began to move southwards. The Digo were among the groups of people who left Shungwaya to escape Oromo raiders. They halted on their way at Kirao in northeastern Kenya. Here they were joined by the Segeju who fled for similar reasons. Friction between them led the Digo to move southwards and eventually split up into three sections: one part marched to the slopes of Kilimanjaro; one part stayed in the Tana area; and a third one which was able to cross river Kiruruma moved towards the coastal area in and around Mombasa and along the coast towards Tanga.<sup>79</sup> According to one version, the Digo found the Tanga area occupied by the Wamvioni whom they forced into the valleys or *Bonde* after which they came to be known as

Wabondei (people of the valleys).<sup>80</sup> The Digo arrived along the coast most likely in the sixteenth century and were settled in Vanga-Tanga area by the seventeenth century. They were there when the first Sultan of Vumba Kuu was chosen.<sup>81</sup> The Mohindzano clan of the Digo developed utani (joking) relationship with the rulers of Vumba. The Digo of Tanga, said to be descendants of the Jombo clan (hence the name Wajomba), were also on good relations with Swahili-Shirazi and became their allies.<sup>82</sup> The Digo did not occupy the coastal area alone for long; soon afterwards the Segeju arrived and drove out the Wajomba (Digo) and founded the town of Boma after which they were called Waboma.<sup>83</sup> Waboma Segeju were therefore on bad terms with Wadigo. In contrast, the Wakamadhi Segeju were received politely by the Digo and became their allies. Thus whereas the Digo were on bad terms with the Sambaa, Bondei and Waboma Segeju, they developed good relations with the Kamadhi Segeju.<sup>84</sup>

### **Socio-Economic Factors and their Impact on Tanga**

In the preceding section we have presented a brief ethnic history of Tanga highlighting the Segeju inter-clan relations and also exposing the composition of different ethnic groups that make up the population of the Tanga area. We need now to examine the consequences of colonial socio-economic developments on Tanga and its various ethnic groups.

For Tanga the colonial era was one which witnessed the construction of railway and the introduction of cash crops. Both factors wrought a profound economic and social structuring of urban life. Tanga became the administrative headquarters of both the Tanga district and Tanga province. The railway opened up the town to a wealthy hinterland and developed the sisal industry. The town therefore prospered as an administrative and commercial centre.

In economic terms, the decade of the 1890s (which was the beginning of the colonial era) was generally a period of crisis in the plantations on the coast which meant that the Arabs lost their economic base. The crisis was due to depressed commodity prices and colonial proscription of slavery.<sup>85</sup> A number of factors, including European and Indian traders moving up-country with the railway, led to the break-up of older systems of externally oriented production and exchange and contributed to the emergence of a new pattern.<sup>86</sup> The new pattern hinged on the establishment of monocultural plantations, individually or corporately owned, which produced coffee and sisal for export. In time cash-cropping also developed as a peasant or small landholder phenomenon. Sisal was first introduced into the Tanga area in 1893 by Richard Hindorf, an agronomist with the German East Africa Company.<sup>87</sup> By 1905 it was the main cash crop in German East Africa. It gained importance and reached its peak during British rule of the territory.<sup>88</sup> There was a high demand for sisal (which is used to make various forms of cordage, or string, twine and rope) particularly during the World War II period because of the war efforts.<sup>89</sup> Over half the production of sisal in Tanzania comes from the Tanga region. Not surprisingly, therefore, one-third of the total agricultural wage employment in the country, for instance, in 1966 was accounted for by the Tanga region.<sup>90</sup> Sisal was the leading source of revenue in Tanzania from the 1920s to the mid-1960s.<sup>91</sup>

The early colonial focus on railways served to highlight the need to establish control and to stimulate commerce in the colony. Since Tanga's port was one of the main centres of the colonial regime, it was selected to be the terminus of the projected Tanga railway. Construction work on this railway began within a few years of the German conquest in 1893 (a year earlier a small jetty had been built at the Tanga harbour to receive imported railway materials) and in 1912 the line reached Moshi and eventually Arusha. Sisal estates sprang up along the Tanga railway and later the Tanganyika central line. Because it is a very bulky crop, sisal was grown near the exporting port and close to the railway line

where decortication factories were built so that the product could be exported more economically.

Along with railway construction, the Germans began work on the Tanga harbour in 1892. By 1912 construction was undertaken to expand the old harbour (a lighterage quay was completed in 1914) to keep up with the increasing traffic. Although the Tanga port is thought to be the largest sisal port in the world,<sup>92</sup> it is claimed that physical site factors (shallow water conditions) limit its continued growth.<sup>93</sup> More importantly, the failure to establish a direct railway link between Tanga and Lake Victoria has meant that the eventual growth of the port has been overshadowed by that of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, which have deep water conditions. Also, both Mombasa and Dar es Salaam have more extensive rail feeder lines inland.<sup>94</sup> The main commodities handled at this port are sisal, and to a lesser extent, coffee, tea, canned meat and timber, but the cargo traffic levels are rather low because these commodities can easily be handled by the port facilities at Mombasa. However, in 1954 certain major improvements to lighterage facilities were made at the Tanga port which then was able to absorb Mombasa's overflow traffic, which at the time was quite severe.<sup>95</sup>

Tanga was one of the few Tanzanian towns that has experienced relatively rapid urban development. In 1890 Baumann reported that the town had a population of between 2,500 to 3,000 people, of whom 25 to 30 were Europeans.<sup>96</sup> The town consisted of neat *makuti* (coconut palm frond) houses nicely laid out especially along *njia kuu ya Wahindi* (the main Indian street),<sup>97</sup> clearly signifying the importance of the then growing economic position of the small Indian community. There were a few stone houses left, though many had been destroyed during the German bombardment of the town in 1888.<sup>98</sup> The centrepiece of the town at the time was the busy, noisy market at Mwembeni (named after a large shady mango tree).<sup>99</sup> In the twentieth century the town began to play its role as the centre of the surrounding sisal core area. In 1905 Tanga had a population of 5,600



people.<sup>100</sup> This figure more than tripled by 1948 when the population reached 20, 619.<sup>101</sup> The population of Tanga town in 1952 was made up of 14, 635 Africans, 6, 943 Asians (including over 1, 000 Arabs), and 538 Europeans for a total of 22, 136 people.<sup>102</sup> In 1970 the population stood at 65, 000,<sup>103</sup> while in the 1978 Census Tanga urban had a population of 103, 399 people. Assuming an annual population growth rate of about five percent (including migrations to the town) Tanga's population for 1985 was estimated at 172, 000 and has by now reached 200, 000.<sup>104</sup> Much of the population increase in Tanga was drawn from rural areas within Tanga district and province, but part of it represented immigration from other areas of Tanganyika.

Tanga owes its development in the twentieth century to the sisal industry. Sisal is a plantation crop which was established during the expansion of (European) settler agriculture. Requiring expensive machinery to process its leaves before it can be marketed, it naturally evolved as an estate crop, the profits being too low and the work of cutting and transporting too hard to attract African peasant producers.<sup>105</sup> There was also difficulty right from the beginning in attracting sufficient labour from the local population.<sup>106</sup> Owing to demand for labour many migrant wage-earners began to arrive from distant areas of Tanzania and even neighbouring countries. In addition, freed slaves especially from places such as Tabora were brought to Tanga and Pangani districts as wage-labourers.<sup>107</sup> The influx of slaves began in the slave trade era when slaves were needed on the coconut plantations of the coast. With their emancipation during the early part of the German colonial rule, some chose to stay and work in the old places while others offered their much needed labour at the rubber (whose market collapsed after peak years between 1908 and 1912) and sisal industries.<sup>108</sup> There was also labour migration to the coast of people such as the Nyamwezi, Sukuma, Ngoni and others who were either persuaded or forced by Germans.<sup>109</sup> Other factor which may have contributed to this process were: 1) colonial taxation (the need to pay taxes); 2) the absence of opportunities for commercial agriculture

in some areas; 3) and a different seasonal cycle in agriculture which released labour at a time when it could be employed elsewhere.<sup>110</sup> In 1910 there were 14,000 workers on the plantations in the Tanga district; of these, 1,200 were local people while the rest were long-distance migrants.<sup>111</sup> Local workers tended to be more Bondei than Segeju and Digo. Nevertheless, even the Bondei attempted to escape wage labour at the plantation by supplying grain. It is possible that the Digo area also supplied some grain. At any rate, the sisal estates obtained maize and fruit from Bondei country; vegetables and tobacco came from Usambara and meat came from other areas such as Masailand and Usukuma.<sup>112</sup> With respect to sisal workers, there were three divisions or classes among them: 1) the elite (clerks, dressers and school teachers) were mainly Bondei from the early educational centres; 2) influential manual workers (headmen, overseers and factory workers); and 3) low-status manual workers (cutters) were mainly from up-country.<sup>113</sup> According to the 1931 Census for Tanga province (Tanga district had 104,450 people) there were 32,000 "alien" (non-indigenous) Africans in the Tanga area.<sup>114</sup> Quite clearly the sisal industry was the main factor behind the migration to the Tanga region. This migration reached its peak in the 1940s. At its zenith the sisal industry in Tanzania as a whole employed 127,000 people or about one-third of the people in the wage earning segment of the economy.<sup>115</sup> Workers on the plantations lived in frugal dwellings which formed a nucleated settlement on the plantation. Some of these dwellings can still be seen, for example, in Kisosora which is a suburb of Tanga town.

Sisal industry added to the ethnic diversity of Tanga town by attracting members of different ethnic groups from the coastal hinterland and up-country who came to work or to trade in Tanga. Thus sisal facilitated the mobility of labour. The East African Census shows that the population of Tanga in 1948 was made up of over 14,000 Africans, 4,480 Indians (including 408 Goans), 1,120 Arabs and 383 Europeans. The Census also showed that Tanga district had a population of 142,000 Africans (37,550 more people

than in 1931), of whom 22 percent were Wadigo, 16.5 percent Wabondei, and the remainder comprised members of almost every ethnic group in Tanzania, including Wasambaa, Wasegeju, Wazigua, Wamanyema, Wakilindi, Shirazi-Swahili, Wapare, Wakamba, Wamasai and others.<sup>116</sup>

Some of these groups of newcomers to Tanga district formed associations as a means of ensuring their social identity. People's loyalty in the beginning were both to their own communities and to the wider Swahili community. In time, however, they developed very strong ties to the Swahili Muslim community and became part of it. In other words, length of residence in the area was an important factor in bringing about the Islamization of Tanga labour. Most migrant workers did not return home but chose to remain in the coastal area for economic or other reasons. Nevertheless, since salaries were low, there was no inducement for them to stay on the sisal estates. Some chose to become subsistence farmers, others tried their hands at trading while still others offered their labour outside the plantations as a means for periodic wage earning. The longer these migrants stayed on the coast the weaker their ties became with home. Eventually many of them became Muslims since "conversion to Islam is both a symbol of the acceptance of the coastal way of life and a means of participation in local events and values."<sup>117</sup> As Phillip Gulliver noted,

The attraction of Islam to the up-country African has been and continues to be powerful since it appears to offer him a religion, a way of life and a personal dignity which he desires without the many essential doubts and feelings of inferiority brought to the African so often by Christianity. A common religion and a common attitude in life has therefore been a very significant factor in the fairly easy integration of locals and aliens.<sup>118</sup>

To an African, becoming Muslim accomplished several things at once: it facilitated integration into local society, allowed intermarriage with members of the local community and led to involvement with the local kinship network. Thus as Muslims, migrant Africans were able to participate in local customs or rituals and ceremonies such as the annual

monthly fast, the two annual Muslim festivals and *maulid* (the Prophet's birthday) celebrations and also shared in the factors which shaped the attitudes of local society.<sup>119</sup> This also meant the observance of Muslim dietary rules, participation in the transitional rites of naming, marriage and death, involvement in the calenderical rites of the community and acceptance of some aspects of Muslim Law "in matters of marriage, property etc. and there is every inducement to accept the *sharia* altogether (as it is locally applied)."<sup>120</sup>

Tanga town, being the centre of the main sisal-growing area in the country, benefitted both directly and indirectly from the sisal industry. The development of infrastructure (construction of tarmac roads, electrification and the expansion of services ancillary to sisal in general) was particularly marked during the boom years of sisal when real development took place. The seaport (still the second most important in the country though before the First World War its export trade was double that of Dar es Salaam)<sup>121</sup> also employed more people during such times. In addition there was an expansion in the housing sector as people employed in the sisal industry built houses in the town. The water supply was improved (drinking water comes from eight boreholes or more by now) to cope with a growing population. In 1936 a hydro-electric power station was established at the lower rapids of Pangani river immediately above the central belt some 35 miles from Tanga. This has since been expanded to 17, 500 kilowatts installed capacity. Amboni estates built community centres and dispensaries while Galanos built wards at Bombo hospital. Schools such as Karimjee and Galanos were established by these sisal estate owners. Industries which sprang up include rope making, oil milling, vehicle repair and food processing. Today there are in Tanga three soap factories, six sawmills which make plywood and hardboard, a steel rolling mill, a shirt and cotton wool factory, a cement factory (Pongwe), a factory for making sandals, a fertilizer company and Amboni plastics. In good years these industries employed several thousand people.<sup>122</sup>

Owing to the above developments Tanga grew and became the second largest town in mainland Tanzania by 1957. In the late nineteenth century Tanga was a small town and in a state of decline. It consisted of a few stone houses and a fishing village of mud and wattle houses. Somewhat more than a half a century later it had become a relatively large town, with a distinct central business district, an industrial zone which was first laid out in 1947, and residential areas (see map V). The central business district is located not far from the harbour and in fact includes the port itself and the railway station. Government offices, business firms, banks, the main post office, many of the larger hotels, two cinema houses, a market place and a few large shops are located in this area. The residential areas lie to the east, west and south of the core business district. Ras Kazoni, formerly European suburbia, and the generally well-to-do, is today associated with the well placed party functionaries or people in government service. A good many of these party functionaries live in the spacious houses that were previously privately owned but which have since been affected by the Tanzanian government policy to nationalize certain types of houses. The prestigious Mkonge (sisal) hotel and Bombo hospital (formerly European hospital) are located in this area. However, while generally it is true that residence corresponds to some form of social differentiation, not all the wealthy people reside in this area of town. There are also rich people who live in other parts of the town and most notably Chumbageni. In recent years some of the rich people, for instance, businessmen of Arab and other ethnic backgrounds, have begun to build their houses in this section of the town. One finds here as in many other areas of the town nice attractive modern houses lying next to modest houses built of mud bricks covered with stucco and makuti or corrugated iron sheets serving as roofs. The largest concentration of people is to be found in the area which lies to the south of centre town and is demarcated from it by the railway crossing. This area is known as Uswahilini (it has recently been officially given the name of Ngamiani) and its streets are well laid out and are numbered from the first to the twenty first (see map V). It is both a residential area (Indians, Africans and Arabs live here) and a

centre of trade. It forms the hub of the town. Several dispensaries, many shops restaurants, tearooms and a large central market are located here. The centrepiece of Uswahilini is the bustling Tanga market at Ngamiani on the eleventh and twelfth streets. Males play a prominent position in the activities in and around the market.

The town has an active local economy, particularly its informal sector, made up of petty traders or street hawkers who provide valuable service at reasonable prices.<sup>123</sup> In Tanga a number of traders in farm products bring small quantities of maize cobs from their farms for sale in the town. Many peddle their wares around busy centres where they sell roasted peanuts, cashew nuts, maize, cassava, oranges and sugar cane. These street hawkers represent a category of traders with fairly low turnover. Examples of street hawkers include the shoe polisher, kerosene trader and market women referred to as *mama nitilie* or "mother serve me" (*mama* is a Swahili term of polite address used for older women or women in authority). People with little income buy from these trading women who sell fried fish, boiled beans mixed with maize (*pure*), *vitumbua* (fritters) and *mandazi* (pancakes) and other types of food. Some of these women find their way to the harbour or industrial sites to sell food. Many market women each with a basket of food take up a lot of pavement space on Pangani road around sunset. As the night wears on the women find it necessary (due to poor street lighting) to light uncased kerosene lamps. There is a special group of male street hawkers who sell coffee. They trot from one area of the town to another to sell sugarless coffee which is served in small cups. This is in addition to a number of informal *mikahawa* (coffee places) which are to be found in the town.. The Swahili derive great pleasure sitting for long periods of time in the late afternoons sipping bitter Arabic coffee and chatting with friends. In these circles where some men sit on a bench or on the verandah of a house to play, if they are so inclined, a game of draft or *dumna* (dominoes) or sometimes a local game (*baola kete*) in which black fruit-stones are placed in the hollows of a board according to definite rules, strong Arabic coffee is served

and card playing is a form of entertainment. One group of street hawkers, Sambaa boys who sell roasted maize and Digo who sell young coconuts which provide a refreshing drink, are constantly on the look out for inspectors who carry out raids against these hawkers who have not been issued licenses.

### **Economic Status of the different Communities in Tanga**

With respect to the different ethnic groups in Tanga, the Indians (also known as Asians) have been most affected by socialist developments in the country. Tanga has a population of about three to five thousand Asians most of whom belong to the Daudi Bohora community.<sup>124</sup> Other members of the Asian community include the Twelver Shias, some Ismailis and very few Hindus.<sup>125</sup> Asians exist as a social and racial enclave within a predominantly Swahili community. Their separate social, organizational and religious life set them outside the main stream of community affairs. They have experienced a slow and gradual decline in their class position. Many run general stores known to this day as *duka* from the Indian word *dukan*. They work with kinsmen whom they help to open their own shops. They remain a distinct linguistically and racially defined community. They marry within their own communities which are each endogamous.<sup>126</sup> Sometimes their business relationships are cemented by marriage. The young receive exposure to business methods at an early age. They learn thriftiness and discipline. Asian traders cooperate among themselves to the extent that some traders from small towns move to big towns to take over the businesses of departing Asians. Not all Indians are wealthy. Some of them lead very modest lives, compared to the standard of living of Kenyan Indians.

Bohoras arrived in East Africa in the nineteenth century from Gujarat, via Zanzibar. They were organized into an exclusive endogamous group or community with separate housing areas, mosques or *jamaat khanas* (assembly houses), and cemeteries. They

worked as shopkeepers, landlords, craftsmen, artisans and traders. Among pioneer Bohora settlers was Pirbhai Jivanjee who became a progenitor of the two well-known business houses of East Africa, Karimjee Jivanjee and Ismailjee Jivanjee.<sup>127</sup> Successful businessmen such as these began after the 1930s to venture into agriculture and industry (cotton ginning, milling, soap manufacture, car repairs and so on).<sup>128</sup> Those who got involved in agriculture such as the Karimjee Jivanjee family in Tanga became owners of small and medium-sized sisal and coffee plantations. In 1934, of 105 sisal estates, Asians owned 22. In 1940 Karimjee Jivanjee was the largest sisal producer (10,966 tons).<sup>129</sup>

Bohoras are descendants of converted Hindus. This accounts for their tendency towards social exclusiveness due to the caste system of their country of origin. Colonial policy, especially under British rule, further strengthened this attitude (its categorization of people into "Native" and "Non-Native" favoured groups) because societies were divided in terms of racial communities.

The Bohoras, like the Twelver Shias, believe in a concealed *Imam* except that his representative, the visible spiritual head, the *dā'i* (summoner) continues to guide the community.<sup>130</sup> He has religious and legal authority. He has attempted in modern times to assert a tighter control over his East African followers but not without generating dissent from elements within the community.<sup>131</sup> The Bohoras of Tanga have two jamaat khanas (assembly houses) which lack a *mimbar* (pulpit). As such, they do not perform the Muslim Friday Prayer since the *khutba* (sermon) can be said only under the Imam (the twenty first Imam is in occultation). They hold their gatherings in their jamaat khanas run and maintained by community contributions. They also have a *musafirkhana* (lodging house for Bohora visitors or travellers). Prayers in the jamaat khana are usually led by a person called an *amil* (educated in Bohora studies in Surat, India, he is an appointee of the spiritual leader) or his deputy. In addition to the amil, the Bohoras of Tanga have also a president of the community, a local businessman with an independent income.



As for the history of the Ismailis, they began to arrive along the coast in the early part of the nineteenth century. Ismailis were exclusively traders and controlled business. Import of European goods was in their hands as was the export of agricultural produce to Zanzibar.<sup>132</sup> They also controlled the trading caravans by making loans to Swahilis. Some of these Indian traders amassed great wealth. In the twentieth century they diversified into industry, real estate and professional work in education and medicine.

Like the Bohoras, the Ismailis also had a tight community organization. Some of the members of the community resented the growing authority of their Imam (the Aga Khan), especially the annual community levy of one-eighth of income. The Ismailis of Tanganyika challenged the Aga Khan in the nineteenth century and again in 1927. About one-third seceded to the Ithnaashari sect in the 1890s.<sup>133</sup>

Ismailis have an efficient organization and financial arrangement. Their leader (the Aga Khan) has attempted in modern times to change their beliefs (still an endogamous caste) from Hindu customs (Indian Ismailis were mainly converted Hindus) and orient them to the British way of life.<sup>134</sup> They have been the pace-setters for other Indian groups in East Africa. Tanga does not have many Ismailis, a good number of whom have already left the country. Their headquarters in Tanzania is in Dar es Salaam. The affairs of the Ismaili jamaat khana are under the jurisdiction of a *mukhi* (treasurer) who officiates at all religious ceremonies. He is responsible for collecting dues, including voluntary contributions. The person responsible for the affairs of the jamaat khana in Tanga is a businessman who supplies meat and fruits to a Tanzanian army barracks.

As for the Ithnaasharis, their community is quite small. In 1909 there were only three Ithnaashari families in Tanga. They had a mosque in centre town to which was attached a madrasa, a musafirkhana (visitors' lodge for Ithnaasharis only) and other facilities. Today the community (which is entirely Indian except for a few individual

Africans, probably themselves Ithnaasharis, who are in the employment of the community) continues to have the same facilities as before. Prayers in the mosque are led by a religious scholar from India who does not speak Kiswahili.

The economic position of the Asian communities has been weakened by a series of nationalization policies. It is important to point out first that these policies in themselves do not indicate that there is intense hostility against Asians as was the case in Uganda.<sup>135</sup> There is, of course, pressure for assimilation since the days of exclusive schools, medical facilities and separate residential areas have long passed. The government (which is committed to desegregating residential quarters) nationalized houses making it possible for Africans to move into Asian neighbourhoods. Also, since the educational emphasis in the country is on Kiswahili, it is hoped that Asians will be brought into the mainstream of national life. In 1970 Tanzania stopped granting foreign exchange for education of residents of Tanzania abroad and this policy change has affected Asians strongly. This is a consequence of ujamaa policies which came into effect after the Arusha declaration in 1967. In other words, the gradual take-over of commerce by the state has contributed to the gradual decline of the Indian commercial class. Before the Arusha declaration Indians were involved in many spheres of the economy. They were the importers as well as the distributors of goods. By 1970 the state announced taking over the entire wholesale trade. This affected Asian traders who controlled much of the wholesale and retail trade. The government also placed the marketing of cash crops in the hands of co-operatives. The Arusha declaration nationalized private banking, insurance and leading commercial and industrial enterprises. These were placed under the State Trading Corporation (STC) which later extended control to include distribution. The STC (which was later replaced by the RTC/the Regional Trading Corporation) took over wholesale distribution of manufactured goods and essential commodities from Asian distributors (Asians were often accused of hoarding and price-gouging) except at subwholesale level. The government lacked the

necessary expertise to run the nationalized businesses and recruited Asians to run some of their former businesses. Retail trade was not affected by the nationalization policy and continues to be largely in private hands. The government's long term goal at the time, however, was to replace private retail shops by cooperatives and state enterprises. This goal is a long way off (if it hasn't been abandoned altogether) considering that, for instance, only a few cooperative enterprises have risen up in Tanga most of which have not been successful. The parastatals for their part, due to lack of expertise, including distribution personnel, have faced problems which are reflected in the recurrent shortages at the retail level. This has led some Asians (perhaps this is less true now with imports being allowed into the country with fewer restrictions) to scale down their businesses due to uncertainty or lack of inventories. To limit capitalist accumulation and distribute income, the state in 1971 nationalized medium and large size rented buildings valued at more than Tanzanian Shillings 100, 000 with compensation being paid to the former owners for all houses less than ten years old. These houses were placed under the Registrar of Houses. In Tanga one can see the nationalized houses especially in the downtown area and along Mkwakwani street. These are the areas where Indians have most of their shops.

The net result of socialist developments in Tanzania has been the erosion of the privileged position of the Asian community, a factor which has led a significant number of them, most notably the Ismailis, to migrate abroad. Among Asians who have remained behind, those belonging to the middle and upper classes, due to uncertainty about their future, have devised a number of ways to repatriate money abroad where they have relatives. Asians are under pressure to adapt to the political realities of Tanzania. For instance, in its efforts to promote ujamaa the government used the 1968 Muslim crisis within the non-sectarian East Africa Muslim Welfare Society (this crisis will be examined in chapter four) to bring Asians in line with its policies. Also, in November 1968 the government ordered the visiting Bohora spiritual leader, Sayyidna M. B. Saheeb, to leave

the country within twenty-four hours on the charge of having contravened the Tanzanian foreign exchange regulations.<sup>136</sup> In 1970 the ban was lifted against his visit to Tanzania and he revisited the country in December 1984.<sup>137</sup> This time he made special effort to mend his relations with the government as evidenced by his speeches which were tailored to suit the political demands of the Tanzanian situation. He made complimentary remarks about ujamaa and contributed funds to a number of development projects.<sup>138</sup>

Arabs in Tanga have not been as drastically affected by the nationalization policies as Indians have been who, by virtue of their control of the financial sector, had more to lose from ujamaa policies. Tanga has a population of probably between 1, 000 and 1, 500 Arabs, many of whom are the product of intermarriage with Africans. The Arabs are either of Omani or South Arabian descent. The South Arabians (Hadhramis) are Sunnis whereas Omani Arabs are Ibadhis. Omanis are the earlier of the two groups to arrive in Tanga. They began to migrate from Oman to Zanzibar in large numbers at the end of the seventeenth century. Some struggled as shopkeepers, others engaged in trade and still others, especially in the nineteenth century, were farmowners with a workforce of slaves.<sup>139</sup> Although Omani Arabs (with the shift in the mode of production) lost the economic base afforded by the plantations, some of the more prominent families were recruited to fill positions in the colonial administration. Once people of nobility (they enjoyed high prestige in Tanga and other Mrima towns prior to the twentieth century) their status changed or declined when they lost political influence in the region first to European colonial powers and later to African nationalist movements which took over the reigns of political power. In their heyday Arabs were considered as people worthy of emulation.<sup>140</sup> Important affairs of the Mrima people were referred to them. Even in matters of dress, as Baumann noted, "from clothing to the hair-style, [were] decided by fashion for which Zanzibar [their capital] was the centre."<sup>141</sup> The very image of a respected Swahili town dweller (muungwana) in the nineteenth century was that of a man who dressed in Kanzu

(flowing gown) and kofia (skull-cap). He walked with a stick in his hand and might wear a turban. He also participated in the ritual functions of religion and gave generously to dance clubs.

South Arabians in Tanga belonged to a new wave of immigrants to arrive in the area in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. They were part of a steady though trickle flow of Hadhramis to the East African coastal area throughout the centuries. They came to Tanga as simple, poor shopkeepers. They struggled as traders and shopkeepers because of the stiff competition from the Indians. They sold sesame oil squeezed in simple mills and had brought camels as draught animals and used them for the sesame oil trade.<sup>142</sup> In fact, the area in Tanga between the eleventh and the twelfth street known as Ngamiani (camel area) takes its name after a camel/camels which belonged to these Hadhrami sesame oil traders. During the colonial era some leading South Arabians concerned about fellow Hadhramis met to form the Arab Association of Tanga in 1939 with the objective of, among other things, bringing together Arabs to help those who had problems such as taking care of orphans, and to raise funds to help those who could not afford to travel to the Arabian peninsula to visit relatives.<sup>143</sup> They were also responsible for running a madrasa for children, with Mwalimu Abdalla Umar in charge, which was located on the thirteenth street.<sup>144</sup>

Today South Arabians own shops, restaurants and a number of them are cloth dealers. The Omani Arabs are still the more numerous and more prosperous of the two communities. Some of the wealthiest Tangans are Omani Arabs who are involved in the lucrative business of transportation (they own motor buses and other entrepreneurial businesses) and commerce. Among Omanis who were affected by nationalization policies was Salim Sultan al-Harthi who lost his fleet of lorries to the newly created National Road Haulage. While Tangani Arabs are merchants or shopkeepers, there are a few who own farms not very far from the town. Some of the Arabs who were shopkeepers in a number

of sisal centres outside Tanga moved to the town to relocate their shops or take up new businesses there in the aftermath of the disasters that have hit the sisal industry in the last few decades. Although Omani Arabs are Ibadhis, a good many of their offspring (who have lost the sense of religious differentiation) are Sunnis. This is in part due to the fact that Arabs (whether of Omani or South Arabian origin) are part of the wider Swahili community. Unlike Indians, they speak Kiswahili as their first language and have close ties to the Swahilis. Their community does not function as a distinct identity group and is well integrated into the Swahili identity. In this instance, we may include in this group the well-known Buhriy family of poets and religious scholars, part of the old families of the coast, who are referred to in this study as Swahili of Arab ancestry.<sup>145</sup> This is an influential family of Sunni scholars of Ibadhi origin whose role in Tanga society will be examined in the next chapter.

Among Africans in Tanga, the Chagga form the most ascendant segment of the business class. The Chagga (who are predominantly Christian although there are Chagga Muslims to be found in the Kilimanjaro region) are known for their economic assertiveness. They have developed an attitude of acquiring money similar to that of the Kikuyu in Kenya. They recognize opportunity for lucrative enterprise. People accuse them of lacking scruples in working for maximum profit. The Chagga have been more successful in business than other Africans owing probably to their having been exposed to a cash economy for a long time. They had a system of markets for exchange of surplus products and had learned the importance of money in their earlier trade dealings with Arabs in the pre-colonial era.<sup>146</sup> Later the presence of the commercially-minded Asians in Moshi, not to mention the European settlers and plantation agriculture in the area, must have helped develop their economic resourcefulness. The introduction of coffee and its marketing through Kilimanjaro Co-operative Union provided the Chagga with experience in managing large-scale financial transactions.<sup>147</sup> In recent decades Chagga migrations to

the major urban centre such as Dar es Salaam and Tanga have been in response to overpopulation in the Kilimanjaro area which has prompted people to leave in search of economic opportunities elsewhere. The Chagga work as shopkeepers through an extensive network which involves cooperating with family members. Supported by families and patrons back home, they have come to specialize in some lower branches of the urban economy. A number of Chagga are successful businessmen who own hotels and lodging or guest houses. Owing to their involvement in business, the Chagga are not enthusiastic about ujamaa policies although they have indirectly benefitted from those policies which have weakened the economic position of the Asians.

With respect to Africans, the most economically advanced groups tend to be among members of ethnic groups which are not from the immediate Tanga district/coastal area. These are the people from inland areas with long contact with Christian missions. Thus the Chagga, Pare and Sambaa are doing well economically compared to the main Swahili groups of the Tanga district, the Digo and Segeju. The Bondei were once known for their preeminence in the educational field. They were among the earliest clerks and school teachers in the country. In 1930, 10 out of the first 33 Tanzanians to be accepted at Makerere (which was then a senior secondary school) were from the Bondei area. The "stateless" Bondei, who were the first to welcome mission education, benefitted from their early contact with missionaries. The Bondei were later superceded by groups such as the Chagga and Haya who, as major cash crop growers, benefitted in many ways and have come to enjoy the educational lead in the country. Even to this day many responsible administrative or managerial positions in Tanga are in the hands of Christians or up-country Africans.

In terms of business activities, the Sambaa are doing much better than the Digo and Segeju. The Sambaa are known to be very hardworking people. They are involved in agriculture, marketing and some business. A number of them own hotels and guest

houses. The Sambaa have developed sizeable network of agricultural products which are sold in Tanga's two large markets. The Digo and Segeju are heavily involved in the coconut and copra industries. They are generally not well educated and lag behind other groups of Tanga. They are attempting to rebuild their status. The Digo were once long-distance traders and benefitted from regional trade. Today the Digo and Segeju have not seized the opportunity to go into business. In fact, Chondo was among the very few Digos who had attained some level of success in business (he owned Faniza transport company) although even he is not doing well now. The Digo have not opened retail shops as some of the other ethnic groups have done. Some survive by opening a small stall where they sell ripe coconuts. Others earn their living by fishing although, due to lack of capital, they have not modernized their fishing methods. It is said that the Digo (more so than other ethnic groups) are often subject to frequent demands by kinsmen for financial and other material aid. Therefore, they are not able to compete with, for instance, the thrifty Chagga. (A few Chagga traders have attained a scale of operation that is comparable to Indians). Also, some Tangans feel that in the past the Digo and the Segeju elders (especially after the advantages of education at the non-denominational German-established Tanga school were superceded by the widespread mission-based education during the British rule) did not feel strongly about the education of their children. It is further pointed out that the Digo's economic success has been hampered by their lack of extensive participation in commercial agriculture. The Digo occupy the coastal belt and its immediate hinterland. This land is suitable for the cultivation of coconuts, cassava and cereals such as millet and maize, which the Digo grow mainly, but not exclusively, for subsistence purposes. There are, however, also tracts of land in the coastal area where the soil is sandy and not very productive. This is in contrast to the deeper hinterland of Tanga (Bondei and Sambaa areas) where the land is relatively more fertile and more suitable for the production of a variety of crops, including cash crops such as coffee and tea. In fact, Tanga's supply of food crops, vegetables and fruits comes mostly from these areas.



In this chapter, we have examined the socio-economic conditions that have contributed to the growth of Tanga as a modern town. We have also attempted to describe the social construction of Tanga by discussing the various ethnic and social groups that make up the town's population. This chapter was conceived partly as an examination of communal segments and competition. Thus the Segeju clan rivalry receives close attention. This rivalry has important implications on the religious situation in the town. Having presented Tanga's socio-economic and ethnic history, the task of the following chapters will be to bring into sharper focus religious developments in the town.

## Notes to Chapter Two

- 1     Baumann, 64.
- 2     As Mtoro b. Mwinyi Bakari noted in his nineteenth-century work, the whole of Mrima experienced inter-ward ngoma rivalries which go back to quite early times. Velten, 122.
- 3     Baumann, 6.
- 4     Ibid., 59.
- 5     Ibid., 6.
- 6     Interview with Shaykh Jumbe Taajir, Tanga, 15 March 1985. Baumann met old Jumbe Kaogombo and describes him as a man of comic dignity. Baumann, 64.
- 7     Baumann, 97.
- 8     Ibid; and Prins, **The Swahili-Speaking Peoples**, 57.
- 9     Baumann, 18.
- 10    Iliffe, **A Modern History**, 68. The limestone area of Amboni is famous for its magnificent system of caves inside of which are curtain-like formations.
- 11    Ibid., 71.
- 12    Istanbul, 35.
- 13    Iliffe, **A Modern History**, 125.
- 14    Ibid., 24.
- 15    Baumann, 68. The name of this scholar is inscribed in the ruins of a mosque which Burton visited in 1857.
- 16    Ibid., 31.
- 17    Iliffe, **A Modern History**, 256.
- 18    According to T. O. Ranger, there was a definite correlation between the spread of Beni and the expansion of Islam in rural Tanzania. This is confirmed by the fact that it was missionary fears which led to the ban of Beni in Bukoba. See, T. O. Ranger, **Dance and Society in Eastern Africa 1890-1970** (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), 170.
- 19    Velten, **Desturi**, 124.

- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid. These dance societies were quite old and predated the onset of colonial rule.
- 23 Ibid., 125.
- 24 F. Longland to D. C. Tanga, 1933, TNA TDB File No. 14B #45, 1926-37.
- 25 R. E. Seymour, D. C. to P. C. Tanga, 4-8-1933, TNA TDB Ref. No. 758/1. Ngoma fees in the rural area were Shilling 2 per ngoma. Similar regulatory restrictions were placed on ngomas in Mombasa (those labelled "immoral" were banned outright) in order to curb drunkenness, extravagance and generally what was considered by concerned Muslims as degeneration of the community. See Margaret Strobel, **Muslim Women in Mombasa, 1890-1975** (New Haven and London: Yale university Press, 1979), 168. Some of the educated youngmen in Tanga began to turn to the *dansi* (the international, individualistic ballroom dancing which shocked the elderly) which seems to have originated in Mombasa and was popularized by the Tanga Young Comrades Club. See Iliffe, **A History of Tanganyika**, 392.
- 26 H. E. Lambert, "The Beni Dance Songs," **Swahili** 33: 1 (1962/3): 18. Beni associations first developed in the Kenyan coastal towns of Lamu and Mombasa in the late 1890s. See Ranger, **Dance** and Strobel, **Muslim Women**, 156-181. Lelemama associations probably predate Beni. For further discussion on Beni, see the anonymous article, "The Beni Society of Tanganyika Territory," **Primitive Man** 11: 3 & 4 (1938): 74-81. Lelemama, a type of dance which involves swaying movements, was played at weddings or for amusement. It is different from Msondo which is performed in private and in utmost secrecy for the benefit of girls ready to be married. Msondo is part of the sexual education for girls.
- 27 See S. T. Shemhili, "The Economic History of Bagamoyo, 1885-1950" (M.A. thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1977).
- 28 The point about the relationship between Beni and colonialism, especially as relates to Kenya, has been articulated by T. O. Ranger in his study of the Beni ngoma. Ranger, **Dance**, 9.
- 29 Bernard Magubane, "A Critical Look at Indices Used in the Study of Social Change in Colonial Africa," **CA** 12 (October-December 1971): 419-431 and 439-445. In this article, a summary of which is provided here, Magubane takes issue with two British Social Anthropologists--see J. Clyde Mitchell, **The Kalela Dance** (Rhodes-Livingstone Papers no. 27, 1956) which discusses the kalela (a tribal dance) in Zambia, and A. P. Epstein, "The networks and Urban Social Organization," **Rhodes-Livingstone Journal** 29 (1961): 29-62 which is a treatment of aspects of social relationships among urban Africans in Zambia. Magubane uses these two works to launch a critique of "colonial anthropology." He argues that their ideological analysis of social changes or acculturation using indices of westernization

such as "European" clothes, occupational ranking and education (considered as indices of prestige) is biased by the authors' values and their use of the colonial order as a frame of reference. By using "cultural" factors to study human behaviour they fail to overcome their European perspective. Instead of looking at class and thereby come to grips with "class consciousness" and "false consciousness" they focus on status which does not reveal factors embedded in the social system. By concentrating on the African's "aspirations" they did not consider his discrimination. This approach ignores colonialism and imperialism which robbed Africans of their freedom and land. The African, whose "native" society and values came under attack, was taught to reject his past and seek to emulate the European. Yet sociological analysis which is fixated with providing minutely detailed descriptions about how the African seeks to acquire "European" goods, a European way of life, smart European wear, a tribal dance whose idiom and dress of dancers was drawn from an urban existence, serves ideological distortions by covering up the problem of alienation or cultural dislocation. Colonialism was economic, political and cultural and resistance to it which went through the phases of conquest, adoption of European values, and national consciousness leading to independence has to be understood from this perspective. Africans were not merely status seeking when they aspired to "European culture," but were seeking through technology release from the brutalizing effects of colonial exploitation. Such transformations as were taking place during the colonial era must be conceived in historic terms using historically rooted conceptions such as, for instance, Weber's "status" and "class," and the like. To attempt to understand the changes that have taken place in Africa in a psychological, not socio-historical, framework as Mitchell and Epstein have done is to leave oneself open to value-judgements. This leads one to conceptualize White settlers merely as "a reference group" and not as an exploitative group. It is through social analyses that we can evaluate the alienative aspect of domination and not by simply looking at "assimilation through aspirations." Although Magubane's critique is not central to our discussion, it has been useful to elaborate it somewhat as it indicates some of the pitfalls which lie in the way of cultural analyses.

- 30 See Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa," *JAH* 9: 1 (1968): 132-1
- 31 Lambert, "The Beni," 18-19.
- 32 Interview with Ali Hemed, Headmaster of Jumuiya, Tanga, 14 May 1985. There was competition between Pwani and Loco Shed (railway workers).
- 33 The two examples below illustrate the type of Beni songs heard or recorded in Nairobi at the end of 1918:

Dar es Salaam tumekuja Arinoti wa Tanga

Hawa Wamarini wanauza Kanga

Wamarini tuwafunge kamba

Wamarini, kwetu Unyiramba.

We Arnot of Tanga have come to  
Dar es-Salaam

These Marines are selling women's  
clothing.

Let us bind the Marine with rope

You Marine, our country is Nyiramba

Sisi Wamarini watu wa Peponi  
Twafikiri sana kwenda kwetu pwani

Hawa Arinoti watu wa Motoni .

We Marine are people of Paradise.  
We long to go to our home on the  
coast  
These Arnot are people of Hell.

Although the Beni dance gained great popularity in the Tanga-Vanga area, it did not lead to the disappearance of (and one could still hear) Nyamwezi traditional songs which were attractive as marching songs for safari (caravan) porters. Lambert, "The Beni," 19-21.

- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Shemhili, "Bagamoyo," 134-5. In Bagamoyo Lelemama competitions were extremely divisive. Members of different dance clubs did not cooperate socially. The worst example of this is that one sister would not attend the burial of another who belonged to a rival dance club. Before the First World War (according to Shemhili) the two Lelemama associations in Bagamoyo were Salihina and Maji Maji; these were succeeded prior to the Second World War (not after as Shemhili writes) by Mahiwa and Ashrafu. Membership in Ashrafu entailed annual contributions of Shillings 100 for office bearers and Shilling 15 for young girls or dancers; the corresponding amounts for membership in Mahiwa were Shillings 200 and Shillings 35 respectively. This meant that some people had to sell their property, including personal effects, in order to pay their contributions. It is no wonder that Shaykh al-Amin Mazrui of Mombasa attacked Beni as a useless indulgence.
- 36 Interview with Ali Hemed, headmaster of Jumuiya, Tanga, 14 May 1985.
- 37 The situation was much worse in Bagamoyo where in 1936 the government had to intervene and bring in measures which severely restricted women's ngoma associations in the interests of reducing mounting tensions between the factious groups (Mahiwa and Ashrafu). The tensions related to social cleavages in the community. Nimtz, "The Role of the Muslim Sufi order," 304-5. Through the mediation of Shaykh Muhammad Ramiya and other local leaders, the bitter rivalry between the two ngoma societies was reduced from around the time the government issued the above order. This is according to Nimtz. Yet Shemhili points out that the climax of rivalry was actually reached after World War Two when Ashrafu ordered clothes from Dar es Salaam and Europe and their opponents (Mahiwa) in turn ordered a prefabricated *banda* worth Shillings 12, 000 from Zanzibar which bore the name of the group. The D. C. Mr. Pike was forced to intervene and prohibit the show in order to "prevent loss of shambas, houses, and other property through mortgages because the husbands made sure that their wives and daughters paid whatever contribution was required of them as members of ngoma groups." Shemhili, "Bagamoyo," 135.
- 38 Shemhili, "Bagamoyo," 135. In the major Tanzanian centres, notably Dar es Salaam, one encounters at least five forms of music: 1) Ngoma (traditional music); 2) *Taarab* (an Arabic-Swahili song style or concert); 3) *Kwaya* (church or choral

music) and, we may add, music associated with Muslim ceremonies/festivals; 4) Music of the street minstrels; 5) and Urban or Afro Jazz (modern popular music ensembles). See Stephen H. Martin, "Music in Urban East Africa: Five Genres in Dar es Salaam," *AR* 9: 3 (1982): 155-163. See also Hugh Tracey, "Recording Tour in Tanganyika by a Team of the African music Society," *TNR* 32 (1952): 43-9; R. Skene, "Arab and Swahili Dances and Ceremonies," *JRAI* XIVII (1917): 413-34; A. A. Suleiman, "The Swahili Singing Star Siti Bint Saad and the Taarab Tradition in Zanzibar," *Swahili* 39 (1969): 87-90; Shaban Robert, *Wasifu wa Siti Binti Saad, Mwimbaji wa Unguja* (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1958); and Carol Ann Campbell, "Sauti za Lamu: An Exploratory Study of Swahili Music" (M.A. thesis, University of Washington, 1974). There are today five Taarab groups in Tanga: The Black Star, The Lucky Star, the Golden Star, The White Star and Young Novelty. The first two groups have produced nationally known singers who are known by the stage names of Shakila, Sharmila and Asha. These are names of famous Indian singers. Shakila's haunting poetic love songs have entertained many lovers of Taarab music all over East Africa.

- 39 The view that the Segeju (who speak a central Bantu language) come from Shungwaya has been challenged by at least two scholars. See T. J. Hinnebusch, "The Shungwaya Hypothesis: A Linguistic Appraisal," in *East African Culture History*, ed. T. J. Gallagher (Syracuse, New York: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1976); and Thomas T. Spear, "Traditional Myths and Historian's Myths: Variations on the Shungwaya Theme of Mijikenda Origins," *HA* 1 (1974): 67-84. On the other hand, whereas many scholars, including T. T. Spear, identify Shungwaya (Southern Somalia) as the home of the Mijikenda, R. F. Morton has raised doubts about the Mijikenda being from Somalia. His view is that the Shungwaya myth may be legitimately associated only with the Kilindi and Segeju. R. F. Morton, "The Shungwaya Myth of Miji Kenda Origins: a Problem of Late Nineteenth Century Kenya Coastal History" and "New Evidence Regarding the Shungwaya Myth of Mijikenda Origins," *IJAHS* 5: 3 (1972): 397-423 and 10: 4 (1977): 628-643 respectively. See also the discussion in E. R. Turton, "Bantu, Galla and Somali Migrations in the Horn of Africa: A Reassessment of the Juba/Tana Area," *JAH* 16:4 (1975): 519-38; and Jim de V. Allen, "Siyu in the 18th and 19th Centuries," *TransAfrican Journal* 8: 1 (1979): 16-17.
- 40 Thomas Spear, *The Kaya Complex* (Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau, 1978); E. C. Baker, "Notes on the History of the Wasegeju," *TNR* 27 (1949): 16-41; and interview, Tanga: Mwalimu Pera Ridhwan (15-4-85). I am not aware whether Mwalimu Pera's work on *Kale ya Wasegeju* (The Segeju Past) has been published. The Segeju claim (this is, for instance, the view of Mwalimu Pera) that they are of Middle Eastern origin is not shared by any scholar. There is, in fact, no linguistic evidence, for instance, loan material from Arabic to suggest this. Derek Nurse believes that the Segeju arose by convergence (that is, absorption into Digo of speakers of another language). See Derek Nurse, "Segeju and Daisu: A Case Study of Evidence from Oral Tradition and Comparative Linguistics," *HA* 9 (1982): 175-208; and idem, "History from Linguistics: The Case of the Tana River," *HA* 10 (1983): 207-38. For an earlier study of the Segeju, see A. C. Hollis, "Notes on the Segeju of the Vumba," *JRAI* 30 (1900): 275-98.

- 41 Freeman-Grenville, "The Coast 1498-1840," in **History of East Africa**, eds. G. Mathew and R. Oliver (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 136. The name "Oromo" means "free men" while the appellation Galla is of uncertain origin and has been used by the ruling Amhara-Tigrean groups in Ethiopia. See Cornelius J. Jaenen, "The Galla or Oromo of East Africa," **SJA** 12 (1956): 171-190.
- 42 Guillain, **Documents I**, 402 in Baumann, 8. Consult also Sir John Milner Gray, "Portuguese Records Relating to the Wasegeju," **TNR** 29 (1950): 85-97.
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 James Kirkman described the Segeju as a mixed Somali-Nyika ethnic group of pastoral habits. J. Kirkman in J. Strandes, **The Portuguese Period**, 349.
- 45 Moffett, **Handbook**, 252; H. Martin Kayamba, "Notes on the Wadigo," **TNR** 23 (1947): 80-96; and TNA TDB Mf 9 vol. III. Other ethnic groups in the area include Wasambaa (who are closely allied to the Zigua) whose home is the Usambara mountains.
- 46 Moffett, **Handbook**, 252. Hence the name Wasegeju which is derived from "wenye kusega juu," i.e. those who tucked up their clothes or loins (to give themselves greater freedom of movement when crossing the Uмба River). Baker, "Notes," 19. See also Shaykh Ali b. Hemed al-Buhriy, "Habari za Mrima," part I **Mambo Leo** (January 1935).
- 47 Moffett, **Handbook**, 252; and Petro R. Hadji Mbahula, "History," 15. The tradition of sparing the single woman is common to a number of ethnic groups, including North American Indians.
- 48 Baumann reported that Wakamadhi were on good terms with Wadigo (Baumann, 9). This did not preclude occasional raids and skirmishes between Wasegeju and Wadigo both of whom in order to procure gunpowder had to provide slaves. Baker, "Notes," 27.
- 49 Baker, "Notes," 26. Those who settled in the village of Boma (which eventually served as chiefs' burial place) became known as Waboma. For the Kamadhi, Gomani served as the burial place for their chiefs. Baumann, 9.
- 50 Baker, "Notes," 26.
- 51 Prins, **The Swahili-Speaking Peoples**, 95. According to local tradition, it was the Wakina Ganji clan of the Segeju who led the Segeju force against the Shirazi settlements led by Mmanjaule. Baker, "Notes," 30.
- 52 Baker, "Notes," 33.
- 53 Shaykh Hemedi b. Abdalla (al-Buhriy), "A History of Africa," tr. E. C. Baker, **TNR** 32 (1952): 78.

- 54 Freeman-Grenville, "The Coast 1498-1840," 130.
- 55 Shaykh Hemed b. Abdalla, "A History of Africa," 78.
- 56 Baumann, 7.
- 57 Baker, "Notes," 33.
- 58 Ibid., 34.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Burton, *Zanzibar*, I, 272 in Baker, "Notes," 34.
- 62 Baker, "Notes," 34.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 Ibid., 35. See, for instance, Robert F. Gray, "The Shetani Cult among the Segeju of Tanzania," in *Spirit Mediumship and Society in Africa*, eds. John Beattie and John Middleton (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1969), 171-187. The Segeju are Swahili-speaking and have become wholly Muslim as have their neighbours, the Digo, although one can still meet a few non-Muslim Digo in the countryside. The Segeju live in about two dozen villages strung along the coast between Mwambani, south of Tanga town, and the Kenyan border. In 1956 their total population was estimated at 8,000.
- 65 Baumann, 9. Baumann conjectured that the Segeju clan feud was a number of centuries old. On the face of it this assertion would seem plausible given that the Segeju were pastoralists and the different clans may have competed for grazing land and for power. However, the argument he puts forward to substantiate this view contradicts oral tradition and what we know of the Segeju from the Portuguese sources. (See Baker, "Notes," and J. M. Gray, "Portuguese Records Relating to the Wasegeju," esp. 86 and 90. Baumann claims that upon living their ancestral home in Shungwaya, the Segeju divided into two groups, the Wakamadhi occupying villages around the Tanga coast, while the ancestors of Waboma moved near Malindi. To support this contention, he argues that since the Tanga coast was always an ally or dependent of Mombasa, it is conceivable that the Kamadhi gave military support to Mombasa against the rival clan of Waboma who lived near Malindi (Baumann, 8-9). Baumann's theory assumes that the pattern of Segeju feud so evident from the mid-nineteenth century onwards had prevailed for centuries rather than for a century and a half as appears to have been the case. One need only point out that the clashes between Mombasa and Malindi in which the Segeju figure took place in the sixteenth century and the Segeju had probably not arrived on the Tanga coast by then. Therefore, Baumann's explanation while raising the possibility of the clan feud being three or four centuries old, needs to be better elaborated and supported with concrete



evidence. Failing that we have no basis for assuming that the clan feud rather than beginning during the early or mid-nineteenth century when the events described took place (this period would represent the critical phase of the conflict), has its origin in the sixteenth century during the Malindi or Shungwaya phase of the Segeju history.

- 66 Ibid., 67.
- 67 Hollis, "Notes," 276.
- 68 D. O. to P. C., Tanga, 16-9-27, Native Administration, TNA TDB Mf 9 vol. III.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 Ibid. The following list of tax payers as prepared by D. C. Harrington is more than a presentation of areas of Segeju concentration. It includes villages where the Segeju clan feud was most felt.

Table 1

Population of Segeju Villages by Ethnicity

Ethnic groups	Bagamoyo and Chongoliani	Manza, Sigaya, and Boma Ndani	Mnyanjani, Ndumi, Mwambani and Machui	Total
Wasegeju	91	276	475	842
Wadigo	135	69	174	378
Shirazi	35	35	79	149
Wageni (others)	63	61	56	180
Total	324	441	784	1549

- 71 Selemani Kiro, "The History of the Zigua Tribe," tr. Petro Mntambo, TNR 34 (1953): 70.
- 72 Ibid., 71.
- 73 Ibid., 73.
- 74 Godfrey Dale, "An Account of the Principle Customs and Habits of the Natives Inhabiting the Bondei Country," JRAI (1895): 182.
- 75 Martin Kayamba, "Notes on the Wadigo," TNR 23 (1947): 80.
- 76 T. H. R. Cashmore, "A Note on the Chronology of the Wanyika of the Kenya Coast," TNR 57 (1961): 158.

- 77 Ibid.
- 78 Ibid.
- 79 A. H. J. Prins, "The Shungwaya Problem: Traditional History and Cultural Likeness in Bantu North-East Africa," *Anthropos* 67 : 1/2 (1972): 13.
- 80 Baker, "Notes," 27.
- 81 See A. Werner, "The Bantu Coast Tribes of the East African Protectorate," *JRAI* 45 (1915): 326-354; and Hollis, "Notes," 275.
- 82 See Prins, "Shungwaya," 9-35; and idem, *The Coastal Tribes of North-Eastern Bantu* (London: International African Institute, 1952), 45.
- 83 Baumann, 9.
- 84 Ibid.
- 85 Munroe, *Africa*, 115. The caravan traffic ceased to be important by the 1880s. A number of German companies such as the German East African Society, the Trading Society of Magdeburg and the Hofmann Transport Company, which had set up offices in Tanga, attempted to re-establish and promote trading activities with the hinterland areas. Baumann, 61-62.
- 86 Ibid. It is important to bear in mind that whereas the West African maritime trade was dominated by Europeans since the beginning of the TransAtlantic trade in the fifteenth or sixteenth century, East Africa on the other hand, except for an interrupted period of Portuguese rule (1498-1698), was less tied to the Western economies and more locked into an ancient network of exchanges linking it with the Middle East and northwestern India. This pattern changed as East Africa gradually became integrated into the international economy.
- 87 J. J. Oloya, *Coffee, Cotton, Sisal and Tea in the East African Economies, 1945-1962* (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1969), 24-25. Sisal is a fibre whose major characteristic is its hardness and its capacity to resist drought. For this reason it can be grown in both the hot and humid climatic conditions of the coast and in the drier and cooler conditions of the Kenyan highlands. Thus the crop requirements of sisal are minimal and are fulfilled over a wide area of Tanzania, including the central region which receives low rainfall. However, prolonged drought adversely affects the yield. The hot dry country behind Tanga with its red earths is said to be favourable for sisal cultivation. For further information on the sisal crop, see A. C. Mascarenhas, "Resistance and Change in the Sisal Plantation System of Tanzania" (Ph.D. dissertation, U.C.L.A., 1970); Eldred Hitchcock, "The Sisal Industry of East Africa," *TNR* 52 (1959): 4-17; A. C. Coulson, "Crop Priorities for the Lowlands of Tanga Region," *TNR* 82 (1977): 43-54; J. Acland, *East African Crops* (London: FAO and Longman, 1971); and P. Lawrence, "Sisal: The Case for Ujamaa Production" and "Plantation Sisal: The

Inherited Mode of Production," in **Towards Rural Cooperation in Tanzania**, eds. L. Cliffe et al (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1975), 103-130 and 480-504.

- 88 After the First World War Tanganyika became a trust territory of the League of Nations and was placed under the administration of Britain. The British and the Germans extended the war zone from its theatre of operation in Europe to their colonies in Africa. See Francis Brett Young, **Marching on Tanga** (with General Smuts in East Africa) (London: W. Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1917). On July 7, 1916 Tanga town fell to the allies (apart from British soldiers, the forces consisted of men from the British colonies within Africa and from places such as India).
- 89 Sisal is used mainly for manufacturing agricultural twines, for instance, binder twine and baler twine. The hard fibre is also used for making rope, cordage (all forms of rope, packing cord, lines and twine), twines for tying large parcels and so on. See G. W. Lock, **Sisal: Twenty-Five Years' Research** (London: Longmans, 1962), 283.
- 90 S. Jensen, "Regional Economic Atlas Mainland Tanzania," Dar es Salaam, Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, Research Paper No. 1, June 1968, 33.
- 91 Sisal accounted for a third of all export earnings from the 1920s to the mid-1960s. The price crash began by the middle of 1964 and by the late 1960s the value of sisal had fallen to third place amongst export commodities. In 1969, for instance, it accounted for a mere 11 percent of total export earnings compared to 35.6 percent in 1963. There have been further reductions since then. See Diane Balton, **Nationalization- A Road to Socialism?** (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1985), 47. see also Claude William Guillebaud, **An Economic Survey of the Sisal Industry in Tanganyika** (Welwyn [Herts.]: Nisbet, 1966)
- 92 This information is given in a small guide book entitled **Tanga: The Central Port for East Africa** (Nairobi: University Press of Africa, 1968), 27.
- 93 See B. S. Hoyle, "The Emergence of Major Seaports in a Developing Economy: The Case of East Africa," in **Seaports and Development in Tropical Africa**, eds. B. S. Hoyle and D. Hilling (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 225-45; and idem, **The Seaports of East Africa** (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967). Cf. J. M. Pritchard, **A Geography of East Africa** (London, 1962), 170 indicates that Tanga has a natural harbour which is deeper and well protected. The Tanga port has seen a number of improvements, including the export shed on the wharf which was extended in 1943; a new engine shed capable of allowing twelve engines to operate was completed in 1946; and a new goods transit shed with an area of 7, 000 square feet was built in 1950. The port in 1951 handled 246, 695 tons; of which, 97, 474 tons valued at £ 3, 039, 527 were imports and 149, 221 tons valued at £ 13, 923, 762 were exports. J. P. Moffett, ed. **Tanganyika: A Review of its Resources and their Development** (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1955), 824. In the 1960s over 200, 000 harbour tons a year of sisal (over two-thirds of the total volume of exports at the Tanga port) passed through this port which is

exclusively of lighterage. The port has 1,200 feet of lighterage and a crane capacity of 74 tons. A total of 37 lighters give service to about 500 ships a year which anchor at the harbour. There are five anchorages for ocean-going vessels in the inner harbour. The Germans built a poorly designed lighterage quay and part of its wall collapsed and was washed away. In the more recent period the Tanga port handled 490,000 and 170,000 tons of freight in 1980 and 1982 respectively.

- 94 Hoyle, "The Emergence," 237.
- 95 Hoyle, *The Seaports*, 39.
- 96 The only European inhabitants of Chumbageni at the time were Dr. Kaeger (the author of *Brasilianischen Wirthschaftsbilder*) and his wife and two officials. Baumann, 62.
- 97 Ibid., 59. Coconut plantations were an important source of income in the coastal region. Apart from coconut serving as food, milk (drink) and *tembo* (toddy), it is also used for a number of purposes including cooking (as firewood and cooking oil), construction (coconut products such as *makuti*/palm leaves are used for thatching), light and lubrication, scenting clothes (*tunda la kufukizia nguo*), and making *vipepeo* (fans), *pakacha* (baskets), and fish traps. In 1891 the Digo became alarmed at a government order that a count be made of their coconut trees. They were afraid that they might be deprived of their wealth. To supervise the count, therefore, it was found necessary to despatch a small force under Captain Krenzler to different areas of Tanga district (TNA TDB Mf 7 vol. III).
- 98 Baumann, 59-60. Among the few stone houses were the community Friday mosque, the house of a Swahili notable Mwinyi Hatibu and two smaller houses in the possession of Europeans.
- 99 Ibid., 60.
- 100 O. F. Raum, "German East Africa: Changes in African Tribal Life under German Administration, 1892-1914," in *History of East Africa II* eds. Vincent Harlow et al (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 207. Tanga was then smaller than Kigoma and Tabora. By 1957 it had become the second largest town in Tanganyika with a population of 38,000 people.
- 101 Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika: Changes in African Life, 1918-45," in *History of East Africa, II*, eds. V. Harlow et al (Oxford, 1965), 632, n. 2.
- 102 Moffett, *Tanganyika: A Review*, 824.
- 103 Joseph M. Cuoq, *Les Musulmans en Afrique* (Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1975), 451.
- 104 CR (1988-89) and (1985) gives the following population estimates for the main Tanzanian towns such as Dar es Salaam (1.1 million), Mwanza (252,000), Tabora (214,000), Mbeya (194,000), Tanga (172,000) and Dodoma (85,000). The

population of Tanga proper is 172,000; but the greater Tanga area has probably a population of well over 200, 000.

- 105 Nicholas Westcott, "The East African Sisal Industry, 1929-1949: The Marketing of a Colonial Commodity During Depression and War," *JAH* 25 (1984): 446.
- 106 Injury can be easily received from handling the sharp-pointed leaves of the sisal plant. At the end of 1958 sisal processing in Tanganyika employed 27, 210 people on 236 estates. See Report of a mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the governments of Tanganyika and United Kingdom, *The Economic Development of Tanganyika* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1961).
- 107 Phillip H. Gulliver, "Alien Africans in the Tanga Region" (Sociological Research, Provincial Administration of Tanganyika, 1956), 1.
- 108 Gulliver, "Alien," 1. It should be pointed out, however, that the status of slavery continued in some form throughout most of the German colonial rule and that it was during the first decade of the twentieth century that the Germans took a drastic step by passing a decree which made sure that slaves born after 1905 would be free (Sayers, *Handbook*, 102). The irony of the situation was that colonial governments ended slavery only to replace it with forced labour.
- 109 *Ibid.*
- 110 Munroe, 141.
- 111 Iliffe, *A History of Tanganyika*, 152.
- 112 *Ibid.*, 312.
- 113 *Ibid.*, 309.
- 114 *Baker, Report*, 60.
- 115 Mascarenhas, "Resistance," 2. Employment in sisal as a percentage of paid employment in agriculture in Tanzania stood at: 59.1 (1958), 33.7 (1967), and 25.6 (1970). With respect to employment in sisal as a percentage of total paid employment in Tanzania, these figures translate into 32.1 (1958), 12.1 (1967), and 7.3 (1970). In 1961 110, 0000 people were employed in agriculture compared to 41, 800 in 1967 and 27, 500 in 1970. See Enzo R. Grilli, *The Future for Hard Fibres and Competition from Synthetics* (World Bank Staff Occasional Papers, no. 19) (Baltimore: Distributed by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 100-101.
- 116 The Tanganyika Census of 1948 showed 14, 050 called themselves Shirazi. In Tanga district the Shirazi were mainly to be found in Mtangata and Mkwaja.
- 117 Gulliver, "Alien", ii. On the question of how Islam provides migrants with the instrumental means by which to facilitate their adjustment to urban life, see Bruce T.

Grindal, "Islamic Affiliations and Urban Adaptation: The Sisala Migrant in Accra, Ghana," *Africa* XLIII: 4 (1973): 333-46.

- 118 Gulliver, "Alien", ii. J. A. K. Leslie made similar observations in his 1957 survey of Dar es Salaam:

Undoubtedly the greatest attraction even today is that it [Islam] is the religion of the majority; by donning a kanzu and skull-cap the veriest up-country bumpkin is automatically received within the family of coastal people...

Secondly Islam, as practised on the coast was in complete sympathy with the conservative sentiment of so much of Bantu society, with its accent on superior wisdom and, therefore, prior claim to power, of the elders, of the virtue of old customs and old ways, of tradition and continuity, of the importance of the extended family and clan rather than the individual...; it puts its weight behind order and stability in society and in customs and enabled the man without modern education or income or property to be notwithstanding a man of substance and dignity...

J. A. K. Leslie, *A Survey of Dar es Salaam* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 215. In this context it may also be pointed out that, as Frank Schildknecht has argued, Islamic supra-tribal character provided Africans with an answer to the destabilization and a level of detribalization that took place most notably in the coastal areas particularly after the European impact in the decade between 1910 and 1920. The crisis witnessed group conversion among the Digo, Zaramo and Yao. See Frank Schildknecht, "Tanzania," in *Islam in Africa*, eds. W. H. Lewis and J. Kritecek (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold Company, 1969), 235.

- 119 Gulliver, "Alien", 23.
- 120 Ibid.
- 121 Gerald F. Sayers, gen. ed., *The Handbook of Tanganyika* (London: MacMillan and Company, 1930), 15.
- 122 Interview with Maugo, Municipality Planning Officer, Tanga Municipal Council, Tanga, 11 March 1985.
- 123 For a discussion of the informal sector as part of the urban economy, consult Walter Elkan, T. C. I. Ryan and J. T. Mukui, "The Economics of Shoe Shining in Nairobi," *AA* 81 : 323 (April 1982): 247-256; and K. Hart, "Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana," *Third World Employment: Problems and Strategy*, eds. Richard Jolly et al (Harmondsworth, Baltimore: Penguin Education, 1973).
- 124 In 1948 Tanga had a population of 4,480 Indians/Asians while the Asian population in Tanganyika as a whole stood at 46, 254. The Asian population in Tanganyika

increased to 105,000 in 1967, the year of the Arusha Declaration. On Asians in Tanzania, see Hatim Amiji, "The Bohras of East Africa," *JRA* 7 (1975): 27-61; idem, "Some Notes on Religious Dissent in Nineteenth Century East Africa," *IJAHS* 4 (1971): 603-616; T. Lokhandwalla, "The Bohras, A Muslim Community of Gujarat," *SI* 3 (1975): 117-135; S. S. Akhtar Rizvi and Noel King, "Some East African Ithna-Asheri Jamaats (1840-1967)," *JRA* 5 (1973): 12-22; Azim Nanji, "Modernization and Change in the Nizari Ismaili Community in East Africa--A Perspective," *JRA* 6 (1974): 123-139; Robert J. Bocock, "The Ismailis in Tanzania: A Weberian Analysis," *BJS* 22: 4 (1971): 365-380; P. K. Balachandran, "An Embattled Community: Asians in East Africa Today," *AA* 80: 320 (July 1981): 317-326; and Shirin R. Walji, "A History of the Ismaili Community in Tanzania" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1974).

- 125 TNA TDB File no. 988, Accession no. 45, 1930-52, has information on the Indian Association of Tanga which consisted of the following communities: Ismaili, Bohora, Ithnaashari, Hindi-Sunni, Hindu and Sikh. Today there are only a handful of Indian Sunni families left, mostly Memons and Punjabis. The small Ahmadiyya Association had only a few Asian members. Today the association does not have even a single Asian member and it has not made any inroads at all in Tanga society. It maintains a mosque which is exclusively for Ahmadis and is located away from other mosques. This fact plus their fringe position in Islam has meant that they have little influence. The community is very small and lacks resources to establish its own institutions. The sect made its presence known in Tanga in the early 1940s. In 1942 S. N. A. Shah and M. A. Ayaz served as the president and secretary of the association respectively. Shaykh Mbarak Ahmad, an Indian Ahmadi missionary, made a brief visit to Tanga in 1943. He brought with him Shaykh Abdalla Mwafrika from southern Tanzania and appointed him to act as prayer leader. Although the association had only a few members, their presence was enough to provoke bitter feelings and opposition from the majority Sunni Muslims. Their most notable opponent was Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy who, according to the Ahmadis I met in Tanga, wrote a pamphlet against them entitled **Makadiani na vipi Wawadanganyavyo Waislamu** (Qadianis and how they Deceive Muslims). Ahmadis (who are based in Rabwa, Pakistan, and are referred to as the Qadiani group to distinguish them from the much tinier Lahore group) consider their community to embody the only true form of Islam. They regard other Muslims, who do not accept their claim that Ghulam Ahmad (1839-1908) who lived in Qadian, Punjab, India was a prophet and the Masih (Jesus returned to earth) and Mahdi, to be disbelievers. Ahmadis, in turn, are shunned by the major body of Islam which considers them to be non-Muslims for these very beliefs or claims. (see *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. I. "Ahmadiyya," by W. C. Smith, 301-303). For a long time the few Ahmadis of Tanga offered their prayers in the home of a fellow Ahmadi. Later when they decided to establish a mosque of their own they found that people were not willing to sell them land on which to build the mosque. This situation continued until the time of independence when, as luck would have it, the first Regional Commissioner appointed for Tanga, Jumanne Abdalla, happened to be an Ahmadi. It was through his influence that the Ahmadiyya Association acquired a plot of land on which to build a mosque. Interview with the only non-African Ahmadi, Abdalla Seif al-Habsi (an Omani Ibadhi convert), Tanga, 16 May 1985.

On Ahmadiyya in East Africa, see Earl Richard Martin, "Certain Aspects of the Ahmadiyya Movement in East Africa with Particular Reference to its Religious Practice and the Development of its History and Theology in the East African Environment" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nairobi, 1974).

- 126 There are, of course, a few individual Bohoras who have married African women. Their number, however, is quite insignificant.
- 127 See Amiji, "The Bohras," 37.
- 128 Iliffe, *A History of Tanganyika*, 264.
- 129 Ibid., 304.
- 130 See the discussion in Lokhandwala, "The Bohras," 117-135; and Amiji, "The Bohras," 43-44.
- 131 In 1970 in the interests of communal solidarity, Bohora dissenters who had held out their support or approval of the new constitution of 1967 (which centralized power by giving the spiritual head who lives in India greater authority over local corporations) over the popular constitution of 1951 (which was democratic and emphasized community control, apart from repudiating the Hindu custom which does not permit remarriage for widows). See Amiji, "The Bohras," 52-55.
- 132 Baumann, 40.
- 133 See Amiji, "Some Notes on Religious Dissent," 603-616.
- 134 Pocock, "The Ismailis," 366-68; and Nanji, "Modernization," 123-139. Indians who migrated to East Africa belonged to the castes of Bhattia, Lohana (traditionally involved in maritime trade), Bania (traders) and Patidar (traditionally farmers), with some members of the servant castes also being represented. Only a few of these migrants belonged to the Brahmin class. The Brahmins tended to prefer salaried jobs. A caste hierarchy as such has not emerged among East African Indians due to the fact that the castes brought to East Africa had been torn out of their social contexts and were deprived of the higher-lower caste matrix in relation to which Indians could gauge their own status. In other words, the fact that many Indians in East Africa became involved in trade meant that there was no generalized hereditary specialization which could be the basis of a strict caste hierarchy. Nevertheless, particular judgements that Indians made of one another where knowledge of one another in India was known were made in the language of the caste hierarchy. Also, Indians (who lived in exclusivist communities) tended to observe caste endogamy in marriage. See for details the discussion in David F. Pocock, "'Difference' in East Africa: A Study of Caste and Religion in Modern Indian Society," *SJA* 13: 14 (1957): 289-300.
- 135 There is also some pent-up feeling of resentment against Indo-pakistanis by Africans who refer to Kenyan Indians as "paper-citizens" by virtue of living their separate existence and their refusal to adopt (Kiswahili) the host people's language. They



speaking a form of pidgin Kiswahili referred to as "Kihindi". According to Abdalla Khalid, a Kenyan African, Indo-pakistanis continue to be foreigners by culture and language in Kenya because of their failure to integrate into the local community and their unwillingness to assimilate into the local culture as genuine immigrants would do. He is particularly critical of Indo-pakistani Muslims whom he faults for failing to practise Islamic brotherhood. He points out that "in Africa they integrated with the colonial order rather than with their African Muslim brothers." He notes with disappointment the fact that there are mosques in Kenya which were built by Indians where the Friday sermon is given in Urdu, though the majority of the worshippers are Africans who do not understand a word of Urdu. He also laments the fact that an Islamic organization in Nairobi (this may be a reference to the Islamic Foundation)--he refers to it as being a closed Pakistani club with one African member for window-dressing--was propagating Islam (through its literature) by means of English when the majority of Kenyans are Swahili-speakers. See Abdalla Khalid, *The Liberation of Swahili*, 159-161 and 174.

- 136 *Nationalist*, 15 and 17 November 1968. *Standard*, 16 November 1968 shows Dar es Salaam Bohoras wailing as they bid good bye to their leader at the Dar es Salaam airport. He was expelled because he was accused of exploiting the poor when his community collected money to be given to him who is not a resident of Tanzania.
- 137 *Standard*, 27 February 1970.
- 138 *Daily News*, 14 December 1984 reports the arrival on December 12 of the Bohora spiritual leader, Sayyidna Burhanuddin Saheeb, for a one-month tour of the country. Saheeb had taken over as the leader of the Bohoras in 1965. In his 1984 visit he announced in Tanzania the inauguration of a trust fund to finance education, health and agricultural programs.
- 139 Baumann, 39.
- 140 *Ibid.*, 11.
- 141 *Ibid.*
- 142 *Ibid.*, 39.
- 143 Interview with Mbarak Asle, Tanga, 11 March 1985.
- 144 *Ibid.*
- 145 Swahilis are not considered as a separate ethnic group. They derive from several ethnic groups and incorporate significant elements of diverse racial backgrounds. The Buhariy, as we have already indicated, part of the old Swahili families of the coast, are referred to in this study as Swahili of Arab ancestry. This label is used only for the purpose of distinguishing them from other Swahilis. The term Swahili in its restrictive sense refers to the old families of the coast with whom the East African coastal history is connected, while in its general sense it refers to people of diverse ethnic backgrounds who have been absorbed into the Swahili community. Thus the

Shirazi are in a sense the old Swahili as opposed to the new Swahili (who include not only up-country Africans who were attracted by job opportunities to settle on the coast, but others such as slaves who were forcibly settled in this area during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). All the diverse ethnic groups of Tanga (Segeju, Digo, Bondei, Sambaa, Nyamwezi, Afro-Arabs and others) are all classified as Swahili. The Segeju of Tanga are preeminently Swahili as they speak Kiswahili as their first and only language. They have intermarried with Digo and other Swahili.

<sup>146</sup> J. Gus Liebenow, "Tribalism, Traditionalism, and Modernism in Chagga Local Government," *JAA* X (April 1958): 72-73.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

### **Chapter Three**

#### **Religious Scholars and Competitors: The Nature of Factionalism in Tanga**

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of intra-communal structure and competition. Underlying this analysis will be the need to understand forces that have shaped the religious situation in Tanga. In the previous chapter we have elaborated on the Segeju clan rivalry. In this chapter we shall attempt to show that leadership conflict continues to be a persistent problem among the Segeju. We have seen how this conflict has surfaced from time to time whenever there is a leadership position to be filled.

For our purposes, factionalism will be the analytic concept or principle which underlies this discussion. It is factionalism which has bred animosities among people of the same ethnic group. Therefore, it would be impossible to comprehend the flavour and essence of religious competition in Tanga without some understanding of the important role played by clan factionalism in the town's religious life.

The first section of this chapter will attempt to draw a brief profile of the leading scholars in Tanga in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We will outline the salient features of this *ulamaa* and provide a background to their study. Some of these scholars, whose educational accomplishments will be commented upon, have a reputation in the local and the national community and play a significant role in the religious affairs of the Muslim society.

## **The scholarly Foundations of Islam in East Africa**

### **The Early Phase of Islam in Tanga**

It can be determined on the basis of our previous discussion that Islam reached the Tanga coast in the fourteenth century with the arrival of the Muslim Shirazi-Swahili. They opened madrasas for training the young in the teachings of Islam. Their madrasas were few, and were likely in the beginning very rudimentary in structure and teaching methods. One can assume that orthodox Islam existed side by side with popular religion and its emphasis on spirits. Later, as the community grew and prospered, religious affairs became more organized. Thus by the seventeenth century stone mosques began to appear. Tanga was then a Muslim town and had a Muslim ruler. Thus there are ruins of at least two mosques probably of late seventeenth or early eighteenth century.<sup>1</sup> There was a third mosque which is shown in German maps but whose remains have not been located. The mosques were built from coralline stone and have transverse arches.<sup>2</sup> The larger of the two mosques probably served as a Friday mosque. There were also small mosques which were mud-walled, makuti-thatched huts. Both types of mosques have existed everywhere in the coastal region at one time or another.

Muslim religious leaders (*walimu*) played an important role in the establishment of Islam in the town. Some of these walimu arrived quite early and followed in the footsteps of the initial immigration to the area. It is more than likely that some of them came from Mombasa which exercised influence on Tanga.<sup>3</sup> However, their number was too few for them to have an impact on the type and level of religious education. At any rate, higher religious education was either difficult to come by or was the preserve of a few; the common education involved learning by rote the Koran and committing to memory a few of its verses for purposes of prayers. This type of education was and still is offered in a mosque or a ward attached to it or the verandah of a house, and it does not produce many literate people.

The nineteenth century witnessed the growth of higher Islamic education in the whole coastal region. The Busaid (Omani) Arabs (whose capital was at Zanzibar) contributed to literacy and to the intellectual life of the community.<sup>4</sup> Before this time books were rare and were the possession of a privileged few, but by the second half of the nineteenth century they became more readily available. The availability of this written text led to greater knowledge and adherence to the written orthodox tradition which the Busaid presence stimulated. Religious scholars from Arabia, mainly Hadhramawt and Oman, the Comoros and the Benadir coast began to arrive in the coastal towns. Later some of the leading scholars in East Africa travelled to the Middle East where they received their education. Zanzibar sultans employed religious scholars, of both Shafi and Ibadhi rites, as *makadhi*. Nevertheless, Ibadhi influence was very superficial on the mainland. This was due to the fact that Omanis made very little attempt to proselytize among Africans.<sup>5</sup> There was free association of ideas between Sunnis and Ibadhis, many Ibadhis not being in touch with the scholarly tradition of their country of origin. Also, for non-educated Ibadhis they saw very few distinguishable rituals between themselves and the majority Sunnis. Finally, the Ibadhis as a community lost Arabic as their first language. The net result was that some of the leading Ibadhi families such as the Busaid, Mazrui, Hinawy and Barwani ended up following Shafi rites.

Literacy affected both the well-to-do and, to a lesser extent, the general population. There was a number of personal libraries which belonged to shaykhs. We know about some of these libraries because some shaykhs clashed with the German colonial government and all of their books were confiscated.<sup>6</sup> These books dealt on different subjects such as *fiqh* (jurisprudence-- and there was a preoccupation with Islamic law in Tanga), the doctrine of religious duties, Koranic exegesis (*tafsir jalalayn*), certain panegyrics of the Prophet, for instance, *maulid* and *Burda*, mysticism and magic.<sup>7</sup> The learned literature came from Cairo while a few of the popular handbooks on devotional

matters were printed in Bombay.<sup>8</sup> The magical literature was based on the Arabic alphabet (the Abajud books dealt with numbers and speculation) and Hellenic astrology and geomancy.<sup>9</sup> Casting of horoscopes was done to determine the success and fates of people: when to marry, travel, wage war and so on. Before the introduction of these new magico-religious skills from Oman,<sup>10</sup> the coastal people were in the habit of visiting local *waganga* (herbalists or doctors) for protective amulets to guard against attacks from lions during travel up-country, or to speed up trade in one's shop,<sup>11</sup> but with the new literacy people began to use both wild-tree amulets and increasingly Koranic amulets especially in towns.<sup>12</sup>

This occult science (which is an expression of traditional or popular Islam) was frowned upon by coastal Muslims, who regarded Omanis as *wachawi* (sorcerers) but in time this science was absorbed by coastal walimu, particularly in Pemba which emerged as the centre of the new magical skills.<sup>13</sup> These medicine men or *falak* experts (in contrast to herbalists who based their skills on oral tradition) came to be feared by the Swahili people because of their alleged magical powers.<sup>14</sup> This esoteric erudition was transmitted through families and involved secret formula and bookish knowledge. It became the province of the walimu who made it part of their medicinal repertoire. It should be pointed out, however, that the leading scholars of East Africa condemned these practices and argued that they were unIslamic. Among these scholars were Shaykh Ali Abdalla Mazrui (1825-1894) and the Mazrui shaykhs who followed him, Sayyid Ahmad b. Sumait (1861-1925) and Shaykh Abdalla Bakathir (1864-1925).<sup>15</sup> Shaykh Muhyiddin (1794-1869) criticized what he regarded as excesses of sufism such as saint worship or veneration; he also attacked all forms of magical practice.

## **Religious Scholars in Tanga in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries**

A study of religious scholars in the Tanga area begins with Shaykh Khidhri b. Qaasim ar-Riyamy of Tambarani (a settlement south of Tanga which attracted a number of Arabs) and Shaykh Shehe b. Sero (d. 1909), a learned Segeju shaykh of Mnyanjani.<sup>16</sup> Both men studied under the famous Mazrui scholar of Mombasa, Shaykh Ali Abdalla Mazrui. Shaykh Ali Abdalla Mazrui was representative of a new breed of shaykhs who were well versed in the written tradition and consequently developed a more universal outlook on Islam.<sup>17</sup> Although Shaykh Sero studied under the strict and puritan-minded Mazrui shaykh, he was also exposed to the Qadiriyya order (which had been introduced from Somalia)<sup>18</sup> and popularized its teachings in the Tanga area.<sup>19</sup> He taught a number of scholars including Shaykh Ayub b. Khamis (d. 1933) and Shaykh Dhikri b. Said ash-Shirazi both of Mnyanjani.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, Shaykh Khidhri trained a number of students, the most well known being Shaykh Umar b. Stanbul b. Abu Bakr as-Saady whose name has already been mentioned in a number of places.

### **Shaykh Umar b. Stanbul and Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy**

The two most prominent shaykhs of the Tanga area were Shaykh Umar b. Stanbul and his student Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy. Among the religious sciences, Shaykh Stanbul was especially noted for his excellent knowledge of Islamic law in recognition of which he was appointed kadhi of Tanga during the German administration.

With respect to kadhiship being established in Tanga and a few other coastal towns, this may have been a colonial policy of placating the Muslims of these towns. More importantly, however, it is clear that in the coastal towns such as Tanga, Pangani, Dar es-Salaam and Lindi and, to a lesser extent, in the inland centres such as Tabora and Ujiji where Islamic influence had been felt "the Arabs had succeeded, partially at least, in

ousting the indigenous African law and custom and virtually replacing it by the shari'a at least in so far as the general principles of marriage, divorce and inheritance are concerned."<sup>21</sup> In the pre-European period, many of the coastal towns had maliwali who applied Islamic law with respect to personal status of Muslims. In 1886, for instance, Lindi and Kilwa had in addition to the liwali, a kadhi to administer justice.<sup>22</sup> Under the German administration maliwali in the Muslim centres continued to apply this aspect of Islamic law as before.

Shaykh Stanbul was born in Tambarani, Tanga around the mid-1850s.<sup>23</sup> He received most of his religious training in the Tanga area, mainly from Shaykh Khidhri b. Qasim of Pangani. Later he travelled to the Kenya coast where he studied for a brief period under shaykh Ali Abdalla Mazrui of Mombasa and Shaykh Zubayr b. Ali of Lamu.<sup>24</sup> Owing to his skills he was employed in some clerical capacity by a number of maliwali of Tanga before being appointed to the post of kadhi in the 1890s. He never gave up teaching and continued to hold private study sessions with a number of students. Among the students he trained two names stand out: Shaykh Khamis b. ar-Riyamy and the renowned Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy. Shaykh Stanbul is reported to have been a very clever man and on good terms with the German government. This helped him amass considerable wealth; when he died, he had a net worth of about £ 10, 000.<sup>25</sup> Apparently, he was able to accumulate a large part of this wealth through opportunities created when the German administration introduced the idea of individual ownership of land. Shaykh Stanbul claimed as freehold land which he cultivated and which thereafter was registered under his name.<sup>26</sup> Previously, part of this land remained unused while another part was used for his extensive coconut plantations. Shaykh Stanbul served as kadhi until he retired in 1910.<sup>27</sup> He died of an illness in 1916 shortly after the British occupation of Tanga.

Tanga was a Muslim centre on the Mrima noted for its religious scholarship and especially the study of Islamic law. The chief exponents of Islamic law were Shaykh



Stanbul and later Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, who served as makadhi under the German and the British administrations respectively. Both men belonged to a class of religious scholars who had received intensive training in one or more of the traditional written sciences such as law, exegesis, hadith, rhetoric and logic. These types of scholars were and still are referred to in the coastal area as *wanachuoni wakubwa* (great or eminent scholars).

The Buhriy, like the Mazrui, are an originally Arab Ibadhi clan from Oman who adopted the Shafi school of law some time in the nineteenth century. The Buhriy of Tanga (a subgroup of the larger al-Hinawi ethnic group) are far fewer than the Mazrui of Mombasa; also, they have been absorbed into the local community through intermarriage to such an extent that members of the Buhriy family are indistinguishable from the local Swahili.

The literary life of Tanga, by far the most important literary centre in Tanganyika, was dominated by one family, that of the al-Buhriy, a long line of scholar-poets.<sup>28</sup> A brief outline of this family's history and its scholarly achievements is, therefore, in order.

The Buhriy family first settled in Mombasa before migrating to Kundawuwa, Pemba, some time in the eighteenth century. Masudi al-Buhriy (who probably died some time in the early part of the nineteenth century) was the oldest known member of the family who was a poet.<sup>29</sup> He wrote several poems some of which have come down to us through his descendants, distinguished poets themselves. Poetry was considered to be a family possession and was passed on from generation to generation.<sup>30</sup> In the 1820s Masudi's grandson, Said b. Abdalla (d. 1875) migrated with his family to Mtangata (Tanga) which became the new home of the Buhriy.<sup>31</sup> He was made the governor of Mtangata by the Mazrui leader of Mombasa, Abdalla II b. Ahmad (r. 1814-1823).<sup>32</sup> Like his grandfather, Said b. Abdalla was also a great poet and his poems include the story of the monk of

Barasisi, and the epic story known as **Utenzi wa Mikidadi**.<sup>33</sup> His son, Abdalla II (d. 1900) and Abdalla's son, Hemed b. Abdalla established names for themselves as great poets.<sup>34</sup> Since Pemba had something of a reputation regarding the occult sciences, it is probable that Said b. Abdalla may have acquired some familiarity with this esoteric erudition, as did his grandson Hemed b. Abdalla (d. 1922), who, in fact, delved into the occult sciences. Hemed b. Abdalla gained a reputation both as a poet (he was probably the greatest poet of his time in Tanganyika) and as the foremost astrologer on the Mrima. He was extremely well liked and respected by the Wadigo who nicknamed him *Chibao* or *Kibao* (derived from *ubao wa ramli* --divining board). His grandchildren are still referred to as Mwachibao. He had also been nicknamed as *Mgalla* (a reference to the nomadic Galla of Ethiopia) as he was a well travelled person.<sup>35</sup> He was an expert on *falak* (astrology, with a little bit of astronomy), *ramli* (geomancy), and *uganga* (traditional medicine). He was also said to have had jinns under his control.<sup>36</sup> In addition, he was a good poet as evidenced by the quality of his writings exemplified by a number of his great epics, including **Utenzi wa Abdirrahman na Sufyani**, the tragic story of Kadhi Qaasim, and **Utenzi wa Vita vya Wadachi Kutamalaki Mrima**, the latter being a poetic dramatization of events leading to the German conquest of the Swahili coast.<sup>37</sup> His poetic skills made him a propagandist for the local cause which sought to resist German occupation of the country. Finally, Hemed was a scholar in his own right and bequeathed the Buhriy scholarly tradition to his son, Ali Hemed al-Buhriy (1891-1957). This is a clear indication that the religious leaders tended to reproduce their own group.

Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy was born in Mtangata, Tanga. He received his earliest religious education from his father. He delved in the various Islamic sciences studying exegesis and law mainly from Shaykh Stanbul. He also studied for some time under Shaykh Khamis b. Riyamy who was also the teacher of Shaykh Tuba b. Maalim ash-Shirazi of Tongoni. Among his other teachers was Shaykh Abdu as-Sadiq Bawaziri who

was a Hadhrami Shaykh. In his thirst for knowledge, Shaykh Ali Hemed, following the custom of seeking masters, travelled to Zanzibar where he studied for a brief period under the venerated scholar, Sayyid Ahmad b. Sumait. Sayyid Sumait was considered to be the most learned person in East Africa. With a certificate from him or his colleague, the erudite Shaykh Abdalla Bakathir, one was on his way to establishing himself as a respected scholar and could begin to teach his own students. A scholar validated his learning by placing himself in this chain (*silsila*). Those who were unable to travel to Zanzibar, the major centre of Islamic learning in East Africa at the turn of the century, studied from one of their renowned former students. Shaykh Ali Hemed, although he began to teach what he knew, continued to avail himself of every opportunity that presented itself to study or acquire knowledge from visiting shaykhs to Tanga area from Lamu, Siu or Hadhramawt.<sup>38</sup> The shaykh is even reported to have travelled to Mombasa where he studied (or, more properly, read) for a month a certain text dealing with the science of calculating correct times of prayer, fasting and direction of prayer (*qibla*) under a colleague and lifelong friend, Shaykh al-Amin b. Ali Mazrui (1890-1947).<sup>39</sup> This demonstrates the existing geographical mobility or inter-city contacts between scholars which reinforced the regional association of East African scholars. They exchanged literary information and also religious knowledge when they met. By going to Mombasa what Shaykh Ali Hemed did was not unusual as a scholar's reputation was enhanced by studying from as many shaykhs as possible even if for a short period of time (the Swahili word for it is *kutabaruku*) or by obtaining *ijaza* (license to teach) from as many of them as one could. One's learning was given legitimacy by certificates of competence indicating a student had completed the study of a set of texts or a body of knowledge. The scholar read a text aloud while his student or students took notes and stopped him for illustration and lecture on certain difficult points. On completion of reading a text a certificate, signed by the teacher, was handed out. The master received a small fee in cash or kind for his services.

Through this method of study, Shaykh Ali Hemed emerged as the most learned Islamic scholar in Tanganyika.<sup>40</sup> He distinguished himself enough to be appointed the kadhi of Tanga in 1920. He held that post until his retirement, and the post was abolished in 1936. Nevertheless, he continued as a legal consultant and was also consulted by Muslims to give *fatwas* (religious rulings) or to verify texts attributed to Sayyid Ahmad Sumait. He was a man of great erudition who travelled as far south as Lindi to adjust disputes.<sup>41</sup> In a dispute in Bukoba between one group of rural Qadiris who supported the use of *dufu* (tambourines) and admitted women to their sufi *dhikri* ceremonies and their rivals, mainly townsmen of coastal origin, who opposed these practices, Shaykh Ali Hemed was consulted.<sup>42</sup> It was due to the shaykh's efforts that the Shafi rules regarding inheritance became widely known. His book in Kiswahili which deals with this subject was referred to in courts.<sup>43</sup> Shaykh Ali Hemed was a man of great influence partly because of both his scholarship and the prestige of his position as kadhi. He had considerable influence owing to the fact that experts on law who served as kadhīs (for instance, Sayyid Ahmad Sumait in Zanzibar, Shaykh al-Amin Mazrui in Mombasa and Shaykh Istanbul in Tanga) tended to exercise more authority than other types of scholars. It is obvious, of course, that Islamic education where it was deep, for instance, the case of Shaykh Bakathir of Zanzibar who never became a kadhi, conferred prestige. Nevertheless, it remains true to point out that in Tanga as in other coastal towns kadhīs were often selected from prominent influential families of Arab descent or lineages. These families were recognized for their deep learning. This practice of scholarly inbreeding aided the process of learned men often producing learned sons. Thus Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, an Islamic legal expert, and local historian, came from a long line of religious scholar-poets. His son, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, another Islamic legal expert and an authority on the Kiswahili language and a poet, and Buhriy's grandson, Ali Hemed (who has not been trained as a religious scholar like his uncle Shaykh Muhammad Ali), are both

University of Dar es Salaam graduates, something that is unusual among children of shaykhs except in the case of noted scholarly families.

Having developed close ties with other established shaykhs and having built a reputation for himself as a pious and learned scholar, Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy was sought by many students and was responsible for training many shaykhs. In fact, most of the Wasegeju, Wadigo and a number of Wabondei shaykhs of the Tanga area studied either under him or from one of his former students. (Even Shaaban Robert (1909-1962) who became the leading poet of modern Tanganyika spent some years studying Islam at the feet of Shaykh Ali Hemed).<sup>44</sup> The more students a scholar taught the more his scholarly reputation was enhanced. Shaykh Ali Hemed has produced his own crop of students, the leading one being Shaykh Ameer b. Juma al-Bimani who is described as having been an active worker for Islam. Shaykh Ameer b. Juma is credited with establishing in the 1930s an important madrasa (madrasa Shuuban) on the eleventh street. A sample of his students who received their training at Ngazija mosque, includes Shaykh Muhammad Ali Mkanga, the BAKWATA/(the Supreme Council for Tanzanian Muslims) shaykh for Tanga, Shaykh Abdalla Jambia (the founder of BAKWATA in Tanga), Shaykh Muhammad Umar Chuo, Shaykh Qaasim Saleh, Shaykh Zubayr b. Juma Bwembera, Shaykh Ibrahim Hudayta (of Handeni) and Shaykh Qaasim Bangwe. At any rate, higher religious education was often conducted in private study groups or involved a student attaching himself to a well-known shaykh from whom he sought to gain knowledge. Shaykh Ameer b. Juma was very close to his teacher, Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, and his relationship with him was further cemented by marrying the Shaykh's daughter. The list of Shaykh Ali Hemed's students includes his own son Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy (the first general secretary of BAKWATA), his nephew Shaykh Hemed b. Juma al-Buhriy (a very learned man who became the first shaykh mkuu or grand shaykh of BAKWATA), Shaykh Umar b. Juma ash-Shirazi, Shaykh Mshirazi b. Abu Bakr, Shaykh Abu Bakr Sulaiman Semtoronto

(known locally as Shaykh Jumbe Taajir) and also Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana and Shaykh Muhammad Ayub. The latter two joined him later after receiving their initial education from other teachers. Shaykh Muhammad Ayub was first educated by his father Shaykh Ayub b. Khamis<sup>45</sup> while Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana, Shaykh Mwinyifakii Mkuu and Shaykh Muhammad Dhikri studied under the latter's father, Shaykh Dhikri b. Said al-Kaveri.<sup>46</sup> Even the two senior Segeju scholars, Shaykh Dhikri b. Said and Shaykh Ayub Khamis, out of respect for Shaykh Buhriy had appeared briefly (*walitabaruku*) at his lecture sessions on Koranic exegesis.

Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy was extremely concerned about Muslim unity and took great pains to impress upon his students to avoid religious controversies or forming opposing factions. He was successful at least once in organizing Muslims to perform the *Idi* (religious festival) prayer in an open field or playground instead of praying in different mosques. He was quite aware (given the persistence of the clan feud among the Segeju) that once he was gone a few of his more contentious students would vie with one another to wear "a bigger turban" (claim religious eminence over others).<sup>47</sup> As a kadhi of Tanga for one and a half decades he had witnessed British attempts to check Segeju inter-clan conflicts in places such as Chongoliani where if an akida was elected from one Segeju clan members of the other clan would not accept him. This was the extent of the hostility and distrust between the two clans. Each group wanted the leader to come from its own clan. Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, who was of Shirazi/Swahili and Arab ancestry, had married (as have a number of Arabs of Tanga) among the Segeju of Mnyanjani. He was aware of the continuous disputes between Mnyanjani and Ndumi Segeju. Out of respect for him, Segeju shaykhs did not oppose one another in the open when he was alive. In fact, TAMTA (Tanganyika African Muslim Teachers' Association) was founded in Tanga in 1957, the year he died. During his lifetime he had been recognized by all, albeit grudgingly by some section of the Segeju, as the religious spokesman of the community.<sup>48</sup>

As far as his scholarship was concerned, nobody could challenge him as he belonged to the lofty company of scholars of the calibre of Shaykh al-Amin Mazrui. The Digo, the largest sub-community of Muslims in Tanga, respected him and held the Buhriy family in high regard. Shaykh Ali Hemed was a central figure not only of the Muslim community of Tanga in particular, but also of the Tanganyika Muslim society in general. His reputation superseded that of scholars based in a number of coastal centres such as Bagamoyo and Lindi. He was regarded as a religious authority competent to give legal opinion on the basis of his reputation for learning, and based on his wisdom, his integrity and his position of influence in the community.<sup>49</sup> His death created a vacuum in the community which set forces in motion that still shape the religious situation in Tanga.

Within his immediate family, Shaykh Hemed's scholarly tradition is being carried on by his son, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy who, as an expert in Islamic law, is employed in the Attorney General's office. This makes him an employee of the government as his father, a former kadhi, had been. This indicates that it is ulamaa with a legalistic background who have interacted with the state at the highest level. Like his father, Shaykh Muhammad Ali is also well known in the country because of the types of positions he has held. Shaykh Muhammad Ali was born in Tanga in 1927. He was educated at Tanga school (1939-40), Mwanza Town school (1940-43) and Tabora secondary school (1943-48). He pursued the study of Islamic law and religion from 1949 to 1951 and was awarded a certificate as an Islamic shaykh. He combined religious education (he received his religious training mainly from his father and Shaykh Ameer b. Juma) with the opportunities for secular education. Consequently, he worked as a clerk in the liwali's court (1951-52) and for Amboni estate (1952-53). He was employed as assistant liwali/akida (1954-59) and as liwali of Tanga (1960-62). He served once as secretary of the Tanga Muslim Association. In 1963 he became a legal translator in the Attorney General's chambers in Dar es Salaam.<sup>50</sup> In the late 1960s he became the secretary general of the Supreme Council

for Tanzanian Muslims with headquarters in Dar es Salaam. In the late 1970s he completed work on his law degree from Dar es Salaam University. He is a Swahili poet and was for a time a member of the East African Swahili Committee. His role in BAKWATA will be discussed in the following chapters.

It is clear that Tanga has had a reputation as an important scholarly centre in Tanganyika. Unlike Tanga, Dar es Salaam, for instance, never developed scholarly families such as the Buhriy family whose fame has spread throughout the country. The town's reputation has attracted a number of students who have come from different parts of the country to study Islam under Tanga scholars. Among the best known of these students was Shaykh Juma Mwindadi from Dar es Salaam who was appointed in 1948 as a member of the Legislative Council by the Governor and also served as liwali. Shaykh Mwindadi had received his scholarly training mainly from Shaykh Dhikri b. Said.

### **The Origins of Factional Conflict: Shaykh Ayub and Shaykh Mbwana**

The death of Shaykh Ali Hemed in 1957 did not trigger immediate competition between various elements, especially among Wasegeju, who desired to assume religious leadership of the community. This situation was brought about by the forging of a temporary alliance when TAMTA was formed. TAMTA (which was officially opened by the Zanzibari scholar, Sayyid Umar b. Ahmed Sumait) was founded for the purposes of disseminating Islamic religious teachings, training religious teachers and carrying out missionary activities.<sup>51</sup> The original founders were Shaykh Muhammad Ayub (a Boma who had many supporters and was more well known), Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana (a Kamadhi who also had some supporters), Shaykh Muhammad Dhikri (a Boma) and Shaykh Mwinyifakii Mkuu (a Kamadhi), all members of the Segeju ethnic group. The first two scholars who belonged to the two rival Segeju clans of Kamadhi and Boma, were



clearly the most influential members of TAMTA. While it is true that the association attempted to bring together most of the shaykhs of the Tanga area of all ethnic groups,<sup>52</sup> there is no escaping the fact that it became identified with Wasegeju. It was they who dominated the leadership positions within the association just as it was they who formed the bulk of the teachers. Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana was the first chairman of TAMTA while Shaykh Muhammad Ayub was and still is the head of Madrasat Shamsiyya (also known simply as TAMTA). For a while the two men worked together well. Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana did not teach for quite some time but went around collecting funds which were needed for on-going construction projects at TAMTA headquarters. TAMTA was built mainly from donations received from Muslims of different economic and ethnic backgrounds. Contributing to religious causes whether for the purpose of constructing a madrasa or a mosque (TAMTA established its own mosque in the 1960s which later began to offer Friday prayers) is considered a pious act by Muslims. Thus Suriyya Khamis, a rich Kokni Indian who owned a bakery, was one of the benefactors of TAMTA. Complementing Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana, Shaykh Muhammad Ayub devoted his time to teaching at the madrasa.

Very little is known about TAMTA during the period between 1957 and 1962 which would enable us to see the organization forming and to observe which direction it was taking. All we know is that by the beginning of the 1960s, the first cracks appeared in this organization. The question of broadening membership composition created the conditions for the declining power of Shaykh Mbwana. It is significant to note in this context that, as in the past, it was the Boma Segeju who began intrigues to dominate their rival, the Kamadhi Segeju.

At a general meeting of TAMTA which was held in 1962 that the view was expressed that Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana should concern himself more with teaching than with other activities. What was at stake at this meeting was the matter of bargaining for

personal advantages. Quite understandably, therefore, misunderstanding arose when it was decided to broaden TAMTA's membership (TAMTA was exclusively a religious teachers' association) to include Muslims who were not religious teachers.<sup>53</sup> These Muslims could now assume administrative functions which had been the preserve of religious scholars only. Yet when Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana was stripped of his duties as chairman and asked to teach in the madrasa like the other religious teachers, he was replaced by another mwalimu, Shaykh Abdalla Mwaketa. Shaykh Mbwana was suspicious of the objectives of these new changes which happened at a time when he felt that Shaykh Muhammad Ayub was assuming more responsibilities at his expense. What made matters worse was the fact that Shaykh Mbwana was not given his share of the money allotted as salary for teachers and was required to teach like other shaykhs in order to earn a living. Being a Kamadhi Segeju, Shaykh Mbwana and his supporters became ever more convinced of the ploy of the Boma faction, a rival Segeju clan, to undermine his position in the organization.<sup>54</sup> Clan factionalism was clearly a major ingredient in the power struggle. In other words, the struggle for assumption of leadership in the Tanga community was mirrored in the tensions within TAMTA, especially between supporters of Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana and Shaykh Muhammad Ayub. Supporters of Shaykh Mbwana resented the fact that he was being eased out of leadership position and they were furious. Rather than submit to the Mnyanzani group, Shaykh Mbwana left the association, and decided to compete with it. His withdrawal was an act of clan assertion and made him the protagonist in the clan conflict. The clan feud was now in the open with the difference that this time a religious frame had been imposed on it. In fact, since the death of Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy some elements of the Segeju people felt that the leadership of the community belonged to them, not to Mtangata people (a reference to Buhriy's family which, in any case, was not involved with TAMTA). When the loose association was dismantled, all but one of the four founding members (Shaykh Mbwana, Shaykh

Mwinyifakii and Shaykh Muhammad Dhikri) left and Shaykh Muhammad Ayub stayed on and continued as head of TAMTA.

Urged by his supporters, Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana, who was seeking a leadership position in the community, began to devise plans to establish a separate madrasa system. But first he had to secure his home base; he had to make sure he had no rival in the village settlement of Ndumi six kilometers from Tanga town. Ndumi and Mnyanjani villages lie adjacent to each other and are important centres of the two Segeju clans, Wakamadhi and Waboma. Shaykh Mbwana secured his position as the leader of the Kamadhi faction by getting rid of his former teacher, Shaykh Dhikri b. Said (who was a Boma Segeju), with whom he had a quarrel and the latter was forced to leave Ndumi to go and live in Mnyanjani.<sup>55</sup> Shaykh Dhikri b. Said, a respected teacher, who prior to the emergence of religious struggles had lived in Ndumi without opposition from anyone, was now seen by Shaykh Mbwana as standing in the way of his becoming the main scholar in Ndumi. With this objective realized, Shaykh Mbwana, a Kamadhi, became the undisputed leader of the Kamadhi group in the same way that Shaykh Ayub, a Boma Segeju, was the head of the Boma faction. The following chart will help identify the two factions and their leaders.

<u>Community Segment</u>	<u>Leader</u>
Kamadhi (based in Ndumi)	Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana
Boma (based in Mnyanjani)	Shaykh Muhammad Ayub

With the full backing of his Ndumi supporters Shaykh Mbwana was able to realize his plans of establishing a rival madrasa. The madrasa is located in Msambweni and is about a stone's throw from TAMTA (see map V). It was opened on 1 April 1966 and was registered (received legal certification) on 17 May 1973.<sup>56</sup> The madrasa was originally known as madrasa Rif'a before its name was changed to madrasa Zahrau. The effect of

Kamadhi action to establish a rival madrasa was to intensify the boundaries between the two groups which became increasingly polarized into two camps. Feelings became particularly embittered, and both factions assumed aggressive attitudes toward one another. This conflict has forced some Muslims to group themselves around one or the other of the two focal "big men" and the madrasas they represent. Other Muslims, however, have remained neutral and have refused to be drawn into this struggle which has polarized Muslims. Among supporters of TAMTA, quite apart from the Boma Segeju, are some elders (wazee) and wamwinyi of the town, including a few people who belong to the old Swahili families of Arab ancestry who have ties of consanguinity or affinity to the Boma Segeju of Mnyanjani. There are also some Digo who identify with TAMTA owing to the fact that their children study at this madrasa. In fact, one of the senior teachers at TAMTA is the Digo Mwalimu Muhammad Bakari Doda. Zahrau supporters are mainly Kamadhi Segeju but also include some of the townspeople particularly up-country Africans who have settled in Tanga such as Warangi from Kondoa. This is evident from the fact that there are a number of Warangi children studying at Zahrau. This would tend to suggest that opposition factions recruit slightly more support than their rivals from peripheral groups. There are also some Digo who identify with Zahrau, the madrasa where their children receive their religious education. In fact, the imam of the mosque on the ninth street which is controlled by Zahrau, is a Digo. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the religious rivalries between the two madrasas stem from the century-old Segeju clan conflict in matters of leadership. The lack of religious issues in the conflict reveals the nature of this competition in the community. Competition or rivalry, as we have shown in the previous chapter, is the hallmark of Segeju inter-clan relationships. Part of this competition revolves around the control of mosques.

There are close to forty mosques in Tanga town and its suburbs, which with the exception of a few, belong to the majority Sunni Muslims; of these, there are about ten

(including the Ibadhi one which previously did not do so) where Friday prayers are offered. Most of these mosques are smaller in comparison to the community Friday mosque which is also known as the Haidar mosque. It has a tall minaret which is visible from a distance and draws attention to itself. Being a community mosque, it symbolizes the wider Muslim identity over and above other types of identities. As a large, spacious and well-ventilated mosque, it is a place which tempts people to stay on either reading the Koran, taking a brief afternoon nap or talking to friends and watching people pass by. The mosque, which cost about Shillings 150, 000, was built in 1949 over land which was donated by the Yemeni Sharif Haidar. Contributions to the construction of the mosque came from different Muslim groups and individuals including the Ismaili community (their leader, the Aga Khan donated Shillings 75, 000) and the wealthy Bohora estate owner, Karimjee who donated Shillings 10, 000. When the mosque was completed in 1950 (it was officially opened by Prince Badru Kakungulu, a Muslim religious leader from Buganda with connections to the deposed royal family of Buganda), Mbarak Asle, a Hadhrami, formerly the president of the Arab Association of Tanga and one of the rich patrons of the new mosque, was appointed as the caretaker or supervisor (*mwangalizi*) of the Haidar mosque; Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy and his family were made its trustees. The mosque is well-run and has a number of trustees and a *waqfu* supervisor, Mbarak Asle, who until his death a few years back, looked after properties of trust (*waqfu*) from which payment is made to the imam (in the form of salary) and for the upkeep of the mosque. Some of the leading Arabs and Swahilis, for instance, the late Mzee Ali Mazrui, a resident of Tanga, played an important part in the affairs of this mosque and they still do. The Buhriy, in particular, enjoy the honour of offering *darasas* (public lecture sessions) on Koranic exegesis in this mosque during the month of *Ramadan* (the month of fasting). These types of *darasas* are given after the afternoon prayer in a number of mosques. During the Ramadan of 1985 (part of which fell during the period of our field research) the community Friday mosque attracted large crowds who came to listen to Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-

Buhriy.<sup>57</sup> Shaykh Muhammad Ali is probably the only religious scholar in mainland Tanzania who has pursued modern studies up to university level. This makes his approach to his subject very appealing to an audience which includes educated Muslims especially secondary school students. His cousin, Shaykh Hemed b. Juma al-Buhriy, the grand shaykh of BAKWATA who has taken turns with him to give these lectures, had little, if any, opportunity to pursue secular education and as such underwent the greatest exposure to Islamic training. It is because of these learned men that the Buhriy's role as teachers and respected scholars has been maintained.

Owing to the fact that the Buhriy family plays an important role in the affairs of the Haidar mosque, some Segeju complained that the largest mosque in town was controlled by Arabs (the first two Imams that Mbarak Asle installed were Arabs) in league with Mtangata (meaning the Buhriys, people of Arab descent). Here, too, the politics of ethnicity came to play their part. More specifically, when Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, the imam of the Haidar mosque, moved to Dar es Salaam in 1963 to work in the Attorney General's office, the Segeju shaykhs of TAMTA and Zahrau vied with each other for the honour of giving *tafsir jalalayn* (public lectures on the Koranic exegesis) in the community Friday mosque *Ramadan*.. The first night Shaykh Mbwana and Shaykh Ayub showed up and accepted Shaykh Hemed b. Juma al-Buhriy to conduct the *darasas*. Nevertheless, they were not satisfied and each wanted to be the one to give the lectures. Shaykh Ayub's supporters began to circulate a story that all groups had agreed on Shaykh Ayub as being their choice. This created more misunderstandings since Mbwana's supporters had done no such thing. Mbarak Asle attempted to pacify both groups as he did not want to be accused of favouring one group at the expense of the other.<sup>58</sup> The community Friday mosque was important to the whole issue of the place of religious leadership in the Muslim community. To the extent that this is true, the Segeju struggle over control of the Haidar mosque should be seen as a claim to leadership. This is the more

so as some segment of the Segeju resented the preeminence of the Buhriy family which has a high reputation in the local and the national community. Unlike Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy who comes from a prominent family (which has control of the prestigious Friday mosque) and, in addition, had opportunities for secular education (he worked as liwali of Tanga, secretary general of BAKWATA and, until recently, has been a legal translator in the Attorney General's office), Shaykh Mbwana and Shaykh Ayub did not have modern education, and therefore must feel excluded from new socio-economic systems in an era of modernization. Since the Segeju shaykhs wanted to assume leadership (imamship) of the Haidar mosque, as a compromise a system of rotation was devised in which *khatibship* (delivering the Friday sermon) and not imamship (which had been entrusted to the Buhriy family) would alternate between four groups: 1) Buhriy's family; 2) The Boma Segeju (Mnyanjani); 3) The Kamadhi Segeju (Ndumi); and 4) the Digo.<sup>59</sup> The first person to serve as khatib was Shaykh Muhammad Salim, a Digo; he was followed by Shaykh Muhammad Ayub (head of TAMTA) who in turn was succeeded by Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana. Things went on smoothly until the end of Shaykh Mbwana's khatibship (probably four or five years) and that is when problems began. Shaykh Mbwana refused to quit and wanted to continue as khatib. He did stay on for some years amid attempts by the trustees of the mosque (people such as Mbarak Asle and Shaykh Hemed b. Juma) and other concerned Muslims to persuade him to leave voluntarily failed. In the end it took the intervention of the Area Commissioner's office to have him removed. Shaykh Mbwana was placed in a dilemma: he could not attend the communal Friday prayers in the Haidar mosque where he had lost face; on the other hand, he could not pray in the nearest mosque that of TAMTA because this would be venturing into the territory of his bitter rivals. Therefore, he built his own mosque (first of Makuti before the present one of stone) which was also intended to serve as a Friday mosque. In a sense, hostility between the two Segeju factions reached a peak during this period (the early or mid-1970s) when Zahrau set up a mosque next door to TAMTA which had its own mosque. This

further exemplified the nature of the conflict which had no basis on doctrinal grounds. In other words, competitive struggles between the two factions do not in any way reflect doctrinal differences. As we shall see in chapter six when we examine religious orientations of Muslim shaykhs in Tanga, it is only the reform-minded Uvikita/Ansaar Sunna youth whose emphasis on scriptural model of religion sets them apart from all the other religious groups of Tanga.

Attempts to mediate between the two men by Sharif Said Hassan Ahmad Badawi of Lamu (who is respected by both Shaykh Ayub and Shaykh Mbwana) have not been successful. The Lamuan scholar is in the habit of visiting the Tanga coast particularly during the maulid season. He reasoned with Shaykh Mbwana pointing out to him that it was not in keeping with the spirit of Islam and its teachings to set up two Friday mosques next to each other. However, the latter would not budge an inch and stuck firm to his position. Finally, as it turned out Shaykh Mbwana was struck by a serious illness, probably a stroke, and almost died (one side of his body has been left paralyzed and he has to be helped around). Given the existence of factional conflict and the religious susceptibilities of the people, it is probable that some people saw in this misfortune or disease a presumed supernatural displeasure. In any case, when he recovered slightly and was feeling a little better, to the surprise of everyone including his followers, he announced that from that day on there would be no more offering of the communal Friday prayers at Zahrau; instead, the Haidar mosque would serve this purpose. Shaykh Mbwana had realized his mistake and had made amends. Yet by opting for the Haidar instead of the nearby TAMTA mosque (the two Segeju groups wanted control and autonomy and their own leadership) he reached the easier of the two decisions. After all, why should he pray in the TAMTA mosque when leaders of TAMTA never showed up at the Zahrau mosque, the fact that the former was the earlier of the two mosques notwithstanding. Thus during



the daily prayers, supporters of TAMTA and Zahrau continue to pray separately in the two rival mosques.

As for the imamship of the Haidar mosque, it is held by Shaykh Hemed b. Juma al-Buhriy who as the grand shaykh of BAKWATA spends much of his time in Dar es-Salaam and has had to appoint his former student Mwalimu Juma Heka to act as imam on his behalf. Mwalimu Juma Heka (a salaried imam) is a neutral or non-partisan Segeju and is not involved in the factional conflict. In the absence of both Shaykh Muhammad Ali and Shaykh Hemed b. Juma, he is both the acting imam and the khatib of the mosque. He is aided in his duties as khatib by the Digo Shaykh Muhammad Ali Mkanga, the BAKWATA shaykh for Tanga, who delivers a sermon in Kiswahili before the Friday services (conducted by Mwalimu Heka) begin. The person who had been next in line for khatibship was the Digo Shaykh Umar Musa. The Digos, however, have not laid any claims to leadership of the Friday mosque whose imamship had been entrusted to the Buhriy family. Shaykh Musa for one was not interested in advancing ethnic interests and had declined the opportunity to be the khatib of the community Friday mosque. This, in effect, resulted in the system of alternating khatibship among the four groups being abandoned altogether.

There is a general sense of neutrality on the part of many Bondei and Sambaa Muslims with respect to religious disputes in the community. This neutrality also extends to religious leaders from these ethnic groups (although their number is very small) and includes religious leaders associated with BAKWATA and, in particular, members of the Buhriy family. The Sunni mosque (whose imam is a Bondei scholar), the community Friday mosque and a few other mosques which are not controlled by TAMTA and Zahrau, do not serve as centres for advancing the interests of particular groups. The major feature of the community Friday mosque, for instance, has been the transethnic nature of its congregation. Muslims belonging to all groups, including TAMTA and Zahrau, show up

for prayers at this mosque. In fact, on a few separate occasions TAMTA and Zahrau have been allowed to hold their maulid recitations at this mosque.

Although one cannot characterize all Tangans as being involved in the factional conflict, generally, however, it is true that in so far as many of them patronize certain mosques which are controlled by partisans of the big madrasas, they indicate their tacit support for a particular madrasa. This is also the case with respect to their choice of which madrasa to send their children to for their religious instruction. A significant sector of the community being Segeju who are the most active religiously in Tanga, their activities are felt in the whole community. In other words, the two large madrasas incorporate significant sections of the town's population in madrasa competition which serves to intensify the commonality of approach on important religious matters in the community. Consider, for instance, the fact that as many as half (if not more) of the mosques in Tanga and its suburbs are under the control of TAMTA or TAMTA sympathizers. There are also several other mosques which are controlled by Zahrau or Zahrau supporters. This is in addition to the fact that there are a number of mosques, although not controlled by TAMTA or Zahrau, are, nevertheless, frequented by supporters of these madrasas. It should also be noted that while TAMTA and Zahrau have their headquarters in Tanga town, the rapid spread of branch madrasas to the suburbs and rural settlements in the Tanga area is due to the pattern of Segeju clan loyalties which are replicated in urban as well as rural areas. This means that the influence of the Segeju is strongly felt in the Muslim community of Tanga.

Segeju factionalism (which centers on TAMTA and Zahrau) in Tanga has expressed itself in terms of competition for followers and for prestige and power. Each faction seeks to maximize ritual power (such power resides with religious leaders whose basis of authority is religion, not economic power) and prestige in the community. The inner core of each faction (consisting of organizers, advisers and spokesmen for the group)

is bound to the leader by something resembling a teacher-disciple relationship -- a relationship which is cemented by warm affection and loyalty between the leader and his followers.<sup>60</sup> This loyalty was reinforced by other links forged from the mosque and the central madrasa where some of them serve as teachers. The supporters, like the previous partisans of *ngoma* (dance) groups, agitate or encourage their side to excel their rivals in performance. Therefore, they influence a faction's stand or perceptions of an issue by swaying its collective opinion one way or the other. This is the reason why many of the shaykhs that we interviewed were of the opinion that the followers were a bigger problem than the leaders. Every move from one madrasa causes the core of the other camp to react, for instance, by taking the opposite stand. Consequently, the supporters close ranks when a contentious issue arises in the community. Members of each faction believe that their leader is more knowledgeable (that is, has assimilated more fields of Islamic knowledge) than the leader of the rival faction.<sup>61</sup> This is the justification for accepting his decisions. For their part one cannot help but observe that the leaders are motivated more by considerations of prestige and personal esteem than by the desire to bring about Muslim unity. Yet each one of them claims to be responding to the Koranic call [Then strive together (as in a race) towards all that is good-- Koran 2: 148]. Shaykh Mbwana of Zahrau is known to be short-tempered and suffers from high blood pressure. He is, however, described as being a more down-to-earth person than his rival, Shaykh Ayub of TAMTA who gives the impression of being haughty. As mentioned earlier, the two factional leaders compete not just for followers but also for personal prestige. There is also rivalry and competition to control various mosques in the town. At the time of our field research Zahrau was interested in taking over control of the mosque on the fourth street. In addition to having a mosque at their headquarters, each of the two madrasas, TAMTA and Zahrau, controls a mosque on the ninth street. This is the more significant since lying between the two mosques is the community Friday mosque (the largest mosque in Tanga) which seeks to bring together Muslims to interact and to pray under one roof.

Competition between the two rival madrasas is more evident and is enacted on certain occasions such as the maulid festivals which are affairs which redound to the credit of the sponsoring madrasa. In Tanga town and in almost every village in Tanga's surrounding region where Segejus are found the two rival factions of TAMTA and Zahrau organize separate maulids and convert every occasion into an opportunity for competition. Festivals are in a sense a way of accumulating a fund of prestige by outdoing one's rival in terms of how many people participate, how many goats or cows are slaughtered and so on. The ceremony in a sense combines ritual and secular features of status seeking. It brings out the element of joyous festivity just as symbolically it expresses the solidarity of the madrasa and its supporters. The maulid season extends to five months and begins on the day said to be the actual day of the Prophet's birth. Maulid celebrations are inaugurated by the holding of joint maulid by all groups in an open field. These are quite colourful events and provide a forum for bringing Muslims together, preaching Islam and participating in communal values which include the sharing of the ceremonial food, *pilao* (a spiced dish of boiled rice with meat). The first maulid is celebrated by all the groups; after that maulids are sponsored by the two rival madrasas (and also the Digo madrasa, Maawa, of which more will be said shortly) or their supporters or any group of people. Maulid Barzanj is the most commonly read panegyric of the Prophet in Tanga. Its recitation is not limited to the maulid season, although the larger festivals take place during this period. It is also recited during other times of the year in a variety of different contexts, including the joyful life-cycle ceremonies of marriage, acceptance to a high school, following a successful business venture or entering a new house. It is common for groups of people to meet weekly in order to read the maulid together. For instance, every Thursday evening after the sunset prayer maulid is recited in some mosques by the teacher and the students of his madrasa. Refreshments that follow are less elaborate and consist of coffee or ginger tea with slices of bread or biscuits.

Religious festivals provide the occasion for the rival groups to compete with each other. Many Tangans attend readings sponsored by the large madrasas, their supporters or private sponsors. Maulids are generally well-attended and people participate in them with great enthusiasm. TAMTA and Zahrau begin their maulid celebrations by holding processions (singing and "drumming on the streets") called *zaafa*. Processions serve to sanctify the participants and their madrasa. In other words, they display status competition and affirmation of loyalty to the madrasa. On one occasion during the anniversary of TAMTA known as TAMTA Day (buses bring in students from the branch madrasas to TAMTA headquarters in Tanga) the celebrations got out of control when the more enthusiastic students, who had been joined by supporters, began to throw stones as the procession passed by the headquarters of Zahrau. Religious processions are, therefore, occasions for *mashindano* (competition) as are the maulid recitals themselves. Maulid celebrations become converted to propaganda forums where speakers from one faction take the opportunity to either directly or indirectly (by innuendo) attack the opposing faction. It is also an opportunity for each faction to display to its audience its fine religious scholars, the fruits of its madrasa. During the maulid recital (whose sitting arrangement partly reflects social structuring in terms of status) particular guests are honoured by being asked to read a section/chapter (*mlango*) from the maulid book. At the end of each chapter a *qasida* (religious song/hymn) is sung (which catches and deepens the mood of the gathering) to the accompaniment of tambourines, which are played quietly or softly increasing in intensity as the chorus is picked up by the entire group. At the same time that this is going on the participants rise to their knees and sway sideways in coordinated movements to the rhythm of the tambourines. The whole atmosphere surrounding the celebrations is charged with musical performance.<sup>62</sup> The celebrations are entertaining from the standpoint of music; they are also spiritually uplifting in the sense of creating a feeling of euphoria and, as is believed, increasing *baraka* (blessings) for each participant (praising the Prophet is supposed to be spiritually rewarded). The Prophet being the model for

salvation, the maulid traces the salient events in his life which the congregation has gathered to commemorate. The moment of climax of the maulid is marked by the congregation standing up at the moment when the birth of the Prophet is mentioned and together everyone invokes blessings to the Prophet. The reciting of the last section of the maulid is followed by the serving of the ceremonial *pilao*, a fitting way to end the ceremonies since pilao is a choice food or delicacy all over urban-influenced East Africa.

The popularity of maulid in Tanga illustrates the importance in this society of what has been called "the cult of Muhammad." This preoccupation with the figure of the Prophet goes back to at least the late nineteenth century when various East African coastal communities experienced European political and cultural pressure on the one hand and sufi influence on the other. There was a marked interest in Islam after the collapse of the Maji Maji war (C. H. Becker remarked about the "living relationship which people felt to Muhammad") when new converts and also ex-slaves identified so strongly with the Prophet that in a conflict in Bagamoyo in the mid or late 1930s a Qadiriyya leader claimed the Prophet was in fact an African.<sup>63</sup> Although the Qadiriyya order is not strong in Tanga (a *khalifa* of the Barawan Shaykh Uways b. Muhammad introduced the order in Tanga in the 1880s), its practices and rituals are known. This means that the tendency to attribute "superhuman" qualities (unwarranted from reading the text of the Koran) to the Prophet exemplified in the panegyric poems of legendary character which are read during the maulid festivals throughout the Muslim world is indicative of a possible link between the rituals of maulid and sufi traditions.<sup>64</sup> There was a renewed interest in Tanga in the figure of the Prophet as evidenced by a heated exchange or disagreement some years back between Shaykh Hemed b. Juma, the grand shaykh of BAKWATA, and Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana, the head of Zahrau. Zahrau put out a pamphlet entitled *Fimbo ya Musa* (the rod/staff of Moses) in which it was asserted that the Prophet had been created out of the *nuru* (divine light) of God.<sup>65</sup> This idea is rejected by Muslim reformers and most notably

the late Shaykh Abdalla Saleh al-Farsy (1912-1982) the former kadhi of Zanzibar and later the chief kadhi of Kenya who was the foremost Muslim scholar of his age in East Africa.<sup>66</sup>

Before the emergence of religious rivalry in the Tanga area, competition expressed itself around the dance societies (*vyama vya ngoma*) which competed on feast days and on other days when the occasion gave rise to celebrations. This rivalry set one section of the town against another. Each group (within the town or the nearby village settlements) tried to stage a bigger show to eclipse the show of its rivals. Particularly most stiff was ngoma competition both within and between Mnyanjani and Ndumi and sometimes fights would break out. With the decline of ngoma, however, dance competition was replaced by a form of religious rivalry. It is not suggested here that there is a direct connection between dance associations and madrasa groups; rather, that dance societies exemplify the type of factionalism or competition which changed its bases of support. Also, we should note that competition between the two Segeju factions has not been replicated in the political and other fields.

### **Shaykh Shaaban: a Digo Challenger in Quest of a Leadership Position**

In the mid-1970s a new competitor emerged in the person of Shaykh Abu Hamid Shaaban who attempted to carve out a sphere of ritual influence for himself in Tanga, presenting a challenge to Shaykh Ayub of TAMTA and Shaykh Mbwana of Zahrau. Shaykh Shaaban was a young up-start Digo scholar who struggled to gain a foothold in the religious power structure of the town. He challenged the Segeju religious establishment symbolized by the madrasas of TAMTA and Zahrau. Some of the Wadigo think that they are dominated by the Segeju who have a monopoly in the religious field or Islamic educational structure. Wasegeju have produced more shaykhs than Wadigo owing to the fact that they were exposed to Islamic education earlier than the Digo. This is confirmed by

the fact that important shaykhs who opened madrasas among the Swahili of Tanga have been Wasegeju. Wadigo, on the other hand, have been mainly followers and their shaykhs have not set up large madrasas and trained many future scholars as their Segeju counterpart have done. In fact, this applies even to important Digo shaykhs such as Muhammad Twaha, Kinero and Husein Buda. It is an undisputable fact that among the Swahili the Segeju have formed the religious elite while the Digo (the largest ethnic group in Tanga) have produced far fewer scholars in proportion to their numbers. The Segeju have produced more learned men than their demography would legitimate. Consequently, many mosque imams, not to mention teaching scholars who have built a reputation for themselves (whether in the past or at present), have tended to be Segeju. It is against this background that we can understand Shaykh Shaaban's efforts to establish a madrasa which is on a par with TAMTA and Zahrau.

Shaykh Shaaban was first educated at Chakachani (now Mkinga district of Tanga province) before travelling to Lamu where he studied under Sharif Said Hassan Ahmad Badawi. His study in Lamu lasted a number of years before he returned to Tanga in the mid-1970s. His former teacher Sharif Badawi on one of his visits to Tanga during the maulid season took advantage of the communal maulid which were held in Mwakizaro to give Shaykh Shaaban a formal introduction to other shaykhs who included Shaykh Ayub and Shaykh Mbwana. Soon afterwards Shaykh Ayub began to court the Digo shaykh and invited him to teach at TAMTA, an offer which Shaykh Shaaban declined. Shaykh Shaaban was interested in setting up his own madrasa to impart religious education and train future scholars among the Digo. He established his madrasa known as Maawa al-Islam which is located near Jumuiya secondary school (see map V). Maawa is short of funds and is still struggling to complete the construction of a mosque at its headquarters. The madrasa itself is a mud-walled structure covered with stucco. There are plans to expand the facilities if and when funds become available. At the present time the only



mosque that Maawa controls is in Mwakizaro, a squalid area in the periphery of the town. Mwakizaro gives the appearance of a village that has crept up to the edge of the town. It has no road and access to it is by a footpath. The houses, including the mosque, in this Tanga suburb, are mud-walled, makuti-thatched dwellings. The area is inhabited mainly by Wadigo.

Shaykh Shaaban lacked extensive support due to the fact that people were already affiliated with the two large madrasas which have supporters among a significant portion of the town's population. His support base was mainly among the Gombero Digo and not necessarily among all the Digo. He had, therefore, began to seek support among the Digo of the surrounding areas. Quite significantly, Muhammad Rashid, a member of Maawa's executive board, was a member of the Digo Youth League which was part of the Digo Association in Tanga during the colonial period. Shaykh Shaaban also had some support among the Lamuans of Tanga who, because of their veneration of sharifs (these are the most influential religious families in Lamu which claim descent from the Prophet) supported him as a former student of Sharif Badawi of Lamu. Shaykh Shaaban was a serious competitor and did not waste time to make his presence known. Already a charitable dispensary has been named after his madrasa as was the case earlier with the madrasas of his two rivals.

The degree to which he has succeeded in appealing to some section of the Digo population suggests that his message has touched a responsive chord; that is to say, he addressed the need to create educational opportunities for the Digo to acquire Islamic education and join the ranks of religious scholars in ever-increasing numbers, something the Digo wanted earnestly instead of being content as followers. While there are Digo shaykhs in Tanga none has established a madrasa comparable to TAMTA or Zahrau. An ethnic cleavage as such does not exist between the Digo and the Segeju, the two main Swahili groups of the Tanga district.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, the ethnic factor has come to colour

the course or conduct of religious competition. Ethnicity is a response to internal needs to acquire status and social position. Shaykh Shaaban wanted the Digo to be organized as a corporate group on the basis of ethnicity designed to advance Digo interests in the religious-educational sphere. For instance, he once declared in a sermon on the occasion of a maulid festival that he had come to "liberate" the Digo, a vague reference to Moses' mission in Egypt.<sup>68</sup> The point the shaykh was attempting to put across was that unless the Digo were "liberated" from the state of lacking sufficient Islamic education, they would continue to be dominated by the Segeju who have constituted the religious leadership among the Swahili. As we have already indicated not all the Digo share his views and some believe that he was attempting to create an ethnic issue where none existed.

With competition already a two-way race between TAMTA and Zahrau, the presence of a new madrasa, headed by one who regards himself as the champion of the Digo cause, was not welcomed by the established ones. In fact, cold shoulders have characterized the reception which TAMTA and Zahrau have exhibited toward the newest madrasa. Quite interestingly, the basis of opposition to Shaykh Shaaban and his Maawa is to some extent "territorial," not to mention the fact of first "occupancy" by the other madrasas. This is seen in the attempts of each madrasa to spread its reputation within and outwards across the town to the surrounding villages. This is done by opening branches there. Maawa, for instance, despite its lack of funds and qualified teachers, has spread itself thin by opening fifteen madrasas in the villages surrounding Tanga. By doing so, they have challenged TAMTA (which calls itself an Islamic College) and Zahrau (which has countered by naming itself an Islamic University)<sup>69</sup> which have madrasas in some of these areas.

It is important to comment briefly on the structure and organization of these large madrasas. Maawa, according to a claim by a member of its executive committee, has close to 300 students enrolled in its central madrasa and its various branches. Unfortunately, the

only qualified teacher at the madrasa was Shaykh Shaaban himself. The rest of the teaching staff consists of the older or senior students of the madrasa who, on the basis of a system of rotation which has been worked out by the madrasa's executive committee, study for one week under Shaykh Shaaban and the following week teach at one of the branches.<sup>70</sup> This arrangement was devised to make sure the madrasa was fully functioning instead of waiting until such time when qualified teachers become available. This set up does not constitute a problem for the beginners' classes since the older and abler students, under whose care and supervision the smaller children are placed, can easily provide elementary religious education for them. At the higher level there was only one teacher for higher studies (which include Koranic exegesis, *fiqhi* (jurisprudence), *hadithi* (traditions relating to the Prophet), *lugha* (Arabic language and grammar), *siira* (the life of the Prophet) and a little of *tarehe* (history) which are offered for the teacher-students. One wonders whether sufficient time and attention were given to the detailed treatment of these various subjects. Since higher education had not been introduced very long ago, Maawa had yet to produce a single graduate from its madrasa.

According to our most recent information on Tanga, Maawa has experienced a serious setback when Shaykh Shaaban suffered a stroke and died during the occasion of a maulid ceremony in 1989. Prior to his death he had been involved in a dispute with the leader of TAMTA, Shaykh Muhammad Ayub, over the question of whether or not the Muslims in the Digo village of Mtimbwani should offer their Friday prayers in one mosque or in the village's two mosques. Shaykh Muhammad Ayub had given a religious ruling in favour of allowing two *jumaas* (Friday prayers) to take place whereas Shaykh Shaaban (whose mediation had also been sought) had disagreed with this ruling pointing out that the mosques would be half empty if both were used as Friday mosques. In his judgement, one of the two mosques should be designated as a Friday mosque in order that all the Muslims should congregate and offer their prayers in one place which would be filled to

capacity. The leaders of TAMTA and Zahrau, despite the usual posturing of antagonism between them, were united in their deprecation of the young Digo scholar's judgement. They saw him to be undermining the position of a senior (Segeju) scholar. Supporters of TAMTA were extremely annoyed with Shaykh Shaaban and considered him to have insulted their shaykh. When Shaykh Shaaban suddenly died soon after this incident the leaders of TAMTA and Zahrau did not bother to show up at his public funeral at Maawa headquarters in Ngamiani. His funeral, which was attended by a large gathering, among whom were party officials such as the Digo mayor of the town, witnessed an outpouring of feeling among Muslims, and particularly the Digo Muslims. The sharifs of Lamu, his former teachers, also showed up and it was they who conducted the funeral rites.

The death of Shaykh Shaaban has weakened Maawa which has lost some ground in the intra-parochial competition for supporters. The shaykh had not completed the training of a scholar to succeed him. He had also been unable to raise funds to complete the construction work at Maawa headquarters. Muhammad Hariri, a junior clerk at Tanzania Harbours Authority and the most senior student at Maawa, was chosen to succeed him. His critics do not consider him to be sufficiently instructed to be a shaykh. He is still continuing with his studies and the last we heard about him was that he was preparing to leave for Lamu for a period of one year to pursue further studies there under the tutelage of the same Lamu sharifs who had taught Shaykh Shaaban. Muhammad Hariri is Shaykh Shaaban's nephew which means that the leadership of Maawa has been retained in the same family. This reinforces the primacy of family links in perpetuating personal animosities among the leaders of the three madrasas and therefore ensures the continuation of religious competition.

TAMTA is the largest and best organized of the three madrasas. It is the centre of a network of Muslim schools and mosques in Tanga and the surrounding villages. It has 25 qualified teachers and 700 students. The madrasa has 30 branches, all but three (one in

Moshi, one in Mombasa and one in Zanzibar) located in Tanga, its suburbs and beyond that the Tanga region. In 1977 the foundation stone was laid for the construction of a single-storeyed building which once completed will provide space for classrooms for higher studies, a library and a dormitory.<sup>71</sup> Up to now only the dormitory has been built. The student population is drawn primarily from groups which occupy the coastal areas (mainly Wasegeju but also includes Wadigo, Wabondei, Wazigua and Wasambaa) although there is also a sprinkling from the interior (Kigoma) and previously there were a few from Burundi. The madrasa has both full-time and part-time students, the latter being students enrolled in regular/secular schools who attend madrasa classes on the weekends and during school holidays. Each student is supposed to pay a nominal tuition fee of Shillings 20 (in 1985). The madrasa considers itself lucky if even half this amount is paid by the students' parents.<sup>72</sup> As private institutions, madrasas are not eligible for government funding or assistance and have to depend on donations. It is clear that to be a madrasa teacher one is in a sense a volunteer as he cannot rely on the irregular tuition fee payments as a steady source of monthly income. Some walimu find ways to supplement their income. For instance, in addition to teaching at TAMTA, Sharif Husein Hashim offers Islamic lessons at Jumuiya secondary school while his younger brother, who has since quit as a teacher at TAMTA, looks after a farm (the property of TAMTA) from which he draws his subsistence. The madrasa, however, has no income from any properties or estates. A teacher may be invited for maulid or *dua* (prayer) reading in a mosque or somebody's house as the occasion may require and is provided with a meal and sometimes some money. If he is the imam of a mosque he may receive part of the alms that come into or are collected in the mosque. This is one of the reasons why disputes arise regarding the control of mosques.

Because of its size, TAMTA is a graded school. This means that teaching is through the classroom system. The students attend classes regularly and attain a certificate

on graduation, that is upon completion of the twelfth grade. Examinations are both written and oral. There are no set number of courses or years of study that one has to complete before he graduates. Each grade or level of study does not correspond to a calendar year of study but represents the completion of a book or books that have been assigned to a student at that level. When a student has been examined in a written or oral test and the teacher is satisfied that he has understood a book/books (this does not preclude memorizing parts of it given that the traditional method of teaching and its emphasis on rote learning have not been dislodged) he is allowed to proceed to the next grade. The introduction of devices such as examinations and grades has been in reaction to the pressure/threat of modern-style institutions. Nevertheless, no modern/secular subjects are included in the curriculum. The sole purpose of the madrasa system of education is to impart religious knowledge. This has certain implications as is seen in the fact that there are fewer students at the higher level, a clear reflection of the students' job expectations. In other words, madrasa education does not prepare its students for any remunerative post. Therefore, due to the difficulty in finding jobs, it is not unknown for a grade eleven student to quit the madrasa to seek employment. The student who completes his studies has to search for a job for himself and cannot depend on his former madrasa, which can only help if there is an opening for a teaching position at one of its branches. A few students from Tanga (we know currently of four former TAMTA students, one of whom is a nephew of Shaykh Muhammad Ayub and another a Zairean from Burundi, who are studying at the University of Medina) have been fortunate to procure scholarships to go for further studies in Saudi Arabia. There are also a few former Zahrau students who are studying in Saudi Arabia and Syria. A former TAMTA student informed us that before he could begin his university studies in Medina he was required to complete a few years in a qualifying program.<sup>73</sup> The curriculum at TAMTA (which does not correspond in detail with the highly specialized religious curriculum in Saudi Arabian secondary schools) does not qualify a student to enter the Islamic University of Medina. A few preparatory years are required at the Arabic

Language Institute and, if necessary, at the University-run secondary school for those who do not hold a grade Twelve Ordinary Level Certificate or the equivalent from a properly constituted Islamic secondary school before admission into the university program can be secured. TAMTA does not teach modern subjects such as History and Geography which are taught in Saudi secondary schools which are affiliated to Islamic universities such as the University of Medina. Also, there is no proper syllabus and modern textbooks are not included. It is these Saudi-educated students, as we shall see later, who have been associated with religious reformism or puritanism in Tanga. As for those students who complete their studies at TAMTA and join its teaching staff, their education does not end there. They receive further training or special tutelage in specialized branches of Islamic sciences from Shaykh Muhammad Ayub. Some of them have been receiving such training for a number of years and yet they are still referred to as walimu. As long as Shaykh Ayub is there nobody at the madrasa can be called a shaykh. This is part of the exercise of maintaining an aura around the person of the leader. He is treated with high respect. They greet him by kissing his hand. The label of shaykh is used as an honorific title for the revered elderly head of the madrasa who is worthy of respect by reason of age, learning and position. This partly explains why a few unkind or partisan critics of Shaykh Shaaban of Maawa referred to his age (he was in his early or mid-forties in 1985), implying that he lacked deep knowledge and still had a lot to learn. To these critics, extensive learning and age (seniority) go hand in hand. In other words, for a scholar to be taken seriously advancing age was considered a source of experience of scholarship. This was in keeping with the hierarchical notions of learning corresponding to seniority. This is one of the reasons why the same criticism is sometimes also levelled against Saudi-trained students who complete their qualifying years (2-3 years) and university degree programs within six to seven years.<sup>74</sup> The process of religious learning is a continuing one and the older a scholar is the more learned he is presumed to be. The above viewpoint notwithstanding, the most notable of East Africa's religious scholars, Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy for one,

attained a reputation as scholars quite early in their religious careers. Therefore, the claims of these critics should be taken as partisan or at least, as mutable.

The organization of Zahrau is similar to that of TAMTA. Zahrau is a twelve-level graded school and has a total student body of 500.<sup>75</sup> It has 20 branches in and around the Tanga region. Each branch has a single teacher who is appointed by the central madrasa. Zahrau has full-time as well as part-time students. The madrasa is a day school although there are plans to provide partial or full boarding for the out of town students in the future. While coeducation is provided, the tendency is for female students to leave school at the age of puberty. The percentage of female students at both Zahrau and TAMTA is small. Zahrau's central madrasa in Tanga town has a teaching staff of ten, all graduates of the madrasa. They include Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana's three sons, Muhammad Mbwana, Mnyaminsini Mbwana and Hamadi Mbwana. Zahrau teachers teach as volunteers since the tuition fee of Shillings 10 per student is seldom paid by the parents. This situation has sometimes resulted in a teacher quitting the madrasa here also. As far as the classroom facilities at Zahrau are concerned, not all classrooms have been furnished or supplied with desks and benches for students to sit on as is the case at TAMTA. Some are bare rooms in a two-storeyed building where one can see children of the elementary school level sit cross-legged on plaited floor matting and chant in sing-song fashion Arabic alphabet or the short chapters of the Koran. A student has to complete the primary, middle, secondary and high school levels before he can graduate and be awarded a certificate. Graduates who join the teaching staff continue to pursue higher studies from Shaykh Mbwana. He confers the title of shaykh to those who have taken further studies with him for a number of years. In 1985 twelve such graduates, including the shaykh's forty-year old son Muhammad Sulaiman Mbwana, were "turbaned," that is, were made shaykhs. This shows quite clearly that for Shaykh Mbwana the label was not reserved for himself only and was applied to the senior



most students of Zahrau who had attained a certain level of learning. Shaykh Mbwana is partially paralyzed and has left the responsibilities of running the madrasa to his son.

Thus it may be said that owing to a combination of factors, including the religious leadership vacuum created by the death of the towering figure of Tanga's religious scene Shaykh Ali Herned al-Buhriy, Segeju attempts at first to work together in a religious teachers' association, the original TAMTA, gave way to deep-seated Segeju clan rivalry which eventuated in the formation of two rival madrasas. In other words, the competition for a single authoritative leader set the factional process in motion and led to the rupture of TAMTA. At the local level, this clan factionalism has incorporated a significant section of the town's population into the game of clan competition and linked the town and village supporters to the central leaders. When ngoma competition declined in the 1940s/1950s, clan competition persisted, primarily in the form of clan factionalism among rival leaders jockeying for control over the local Muslim community. We have indicated that clan factionalism is highly personalized and revolves around the prestige of the leader and his ability to reward followers with reflected glory. Clearly the madrasa leaders are vying for power within their own community. The establishment of a third madrasa by some element of the Digo who desire to see members of their ethnic group forge ahead in the religious educational field has added a new competitor to the religious scene. Although Shaykh Shaaban attracted a considerable share of Digo sympathy to his cause, he failed in his efforts to carve out a major sphere of influence. Throughout the period of the on-going Segeju factional competition the Buhriy have remained outside of the dispute; instead, they have played a prominent part in a national society (BAKWATA) with headquarters in Dar es Salaam which, given the pervasive influence of TAMTA and Zahrau, has received guarded, if not outright hostile, reception in Tanga for a number of reasons. The next two chapters will discuss BAKWATA within the larger context of Muslim educational backwardness in Tanzania and relations between Muslim organizations and the state. For

now it is sufficient to mention that BAKWATA in Tanga has been led by the Buhriys (who are in charge of the largest and most prestigious mosque in Tanga) or former students of Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy.

## Notes to Chapter Three

- 1 Mturi, *A Guide*, 9.
- 2 Baumann, 64.
- 3 There is no way of substantiating the claim although the date given seems reasonable enough that the earliest important figure responsible for the dissemination of Islam in the Tanga-Mtangata area was a Hadhrami Shaykh Muhammad b. Uthman Qaidil Ghauth (1390-1460). Abdalla Salim Seif al-Habsi, "Historia ya Dini ya Kiislamu na Uimarishaji wake katika Mwambao wa Tanga" (The History of the Islamic Religion and its Establishment on the Tanga Coast), unpublished paper (n.d.), 4. According to one tradition, the Sunni al-Harthi were the first Muslims to preach on the Mrima coast (TNA TRB Mf 5).
- 4 See, for instance, the discussion in Pouwels, "Islam," 437-441.
- 5 Burton, *Zanzibar*, I, 403.
- 6 The Germans seized Hemedi b. Abdalla al-Buhriy's books some of which were later given to Becker. See C. H. Becker, "Materials for the Understanding of Islam in German East Africa," ed. and tr. B. G. Martin TNR 68 (1968): 44.
- 7 Ibid., 44-52. Books on jurisprudence included *Minhāj at-Ṭālibīn* of Nawāwī and commentaries such as Ibn Hajar's *Tuhfa* and al-Ramli's *Nihāya*.
- 8 Ibid., 52.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 See Pouwels, "Islam," 400-404.
- 11 Among the highly prized amulets was the Book of the people of Badr which was sewn up in cloth and tied around the neck so that the book hung around one's ribs. This type of amulet was worn on journeys or in time of war. Velten, *Desturi*, 88-91.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 According to W. H. Ingrams, Pemba had the reputation all over East Africa as being the home of instruction for budding wizards. The magic of Pemba was based on the guild system, that is, organized secret societies. Initiates were allowed entry into the outer or inner circle of the guilds after certain requirements had been met. W. H. Ingrams, *Zanzibar: Its History*, 434, 438 and 466.
- 14 Burton, *Zanzibar*, I, 422. Not all magic was evil; some was medicinal magic. Ingrams mentions four books of magic written in Arabic and Kiswahili which had various recipes. One of these books (thought to have been written between 1800 and 1830) is full of diagrams and magic squares. The most used numbers in magic were 3, 4 and 7 followed by 3, 6 and 9 and the most popular magic square was the 15 square. He also mentions that a printed book of magic much in use in the area at the time of his research (late 1920s or 1930) was called *Shams al-Ma'arifa al-Kubra* probably written at the end of the nineteenth century. Ingrams, *Zanzibar: Its History*, 476-477.

- 15 For a list of these scholars, see Shaykh Abdalla Saleh al-Farsy, **Tarehe ya Imam Shafi na Wanavyuoni Wakubwa wa Mashariki ya Africa** (Zanzibar: Education Department, Zanzibar, 1944).
- 16 Information on the religious scholars of Tanga is based on interviews with a number of shaykhs and most notably Shaykh Jumbe Taajir. I have also used Abdalla al-Habsi's "Historia ya Dini" which has been further checked by Mwalimu Pera Ridhwan who met with Shaykh Muhammad Ayub to ascertain or clarify some points and add any missing information. Additional information on the kadhis of Tanga has been either gleaned from TNA TDB or obtained from the kadhi's (Buhriy) sons.
- 17 When the Mazrui power over Mombasa was broken in 1837, Shaykh Abdalla b. Nafu Mazrui and his sons Ali b. Abdalla and Ahmad b. Abdalla fled to Mecca where eventually they gave up Ibadhi beliefs and embraced the Shafi school of law. Ali b. Abdalla returned to East Africa in 1846 and became one of the leading religious scholars in East Africa. See Farsy, **Tarehe**. Consult also the discussion in R. L. Pouwels, "Sh. Al-Amin b Ali Mazrui and Islamic Modernism in East Africa, 1875-1947," **IJMES** 13 (1981): esp. 9; and A. I. Salim, **Swahili-Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast**, 143.
- 18 On sufism in East Africa, see Bradford G. Martin, **Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth Century Africa** (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); idem, "Muslim Politics and Resistance to Colonial Rule: Shaykh Uways b. Muhammad al-Barāwī and the Qadiriyya brotherhood in East Africa," **JAH** 4: 3 (1971): 471-486; and Nimtz, "The Role of the Muslim Sufi Order."
- 19 Pouwels, "Islam," 504-5.
- 20 One should note the shift towards "Arabization" among the Segeju who began to take on names with Arab-style *nisbas*. For instance, names such as al-Kavery, al-Kamadhi, ash-Shirazi and others. Other students of Shaykh Sero included: Azizi b. Yunus (Moa), Sulaiman b. Amin (Petukiza), Kinero b. Muhammad (Kigirini), Athman Mwasimba (Mnyanjani), Nguli b. Shaykh (Mnyanjani) and Ridhwan Mkumba (Mnyanjani). After the death of Shaykh Sero some of his students continued with their studies either under Shaykh Abdalla Bakathir in Zanzibar or under other shaykhs in Mombasa. Thus Shaykh Ayub b. Khamis and Shaykh Dhikri b. Said travelled to Zanzibar while Shaykh Kinero and Shaykh Azizi went to Mombasa to further their religious education.
- 21 Anderson, **Islamic Law**, 123.
- 22 R. Coupland, **The Exploitation of East Africa**, 452.
- 23 Abdalla al-Habsi, "Historia," 5. Seif gives the date of 1854 which is probably not far from being accurate given the fact that Baumann met Stanbul in 1890 and referred to him as a young man.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Kadhi of Tanga, TNA TDB mf 9 Vol. III.
- 26 Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, Dar es Salaam, 11 May 1985. This kind of situation began to get out of control as chiefs in Tanganyika provided land for sale as freehold whereas in reality they had no title to convey to individual buyers. Accordingly, the German colonial government introduced an Imperial Decree in 1895

whereby they took over all land not actually claimed by anyone at that date. See J. N. D. Anderson, *Islamic Law in Africa* (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1954), 132. As Anderson points out, African customary law does not recognize private property in land although tribal lands are distributed by chiefs to individuals whose right to the land is conditional or limited to their full use of it. On the other hand, lands occupied by Arabs (i.e. land granted to them by the Sultan of Zanzibar) was regarded as privately owned under Islamic law.

- 27 Sharif Umar became the next kadhi of Tanga for a very brief period. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, Dar es Salaam, 11 May 1985. Abdalla al-Habsi names a different person, Shaykh Khamis ar-Riyami, Shaykh Stanbul's older student as the person who became kadhi. Abdalla al-Habsi, "Historia," 5. Official records, however, are silent as to whether there was a kadhi in Tanga in the intervening period between the retirement of Shaykh Stanbul and the later appointment to the post of Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy.
- 28 Ian Knappert, *Four Centuries of Swahili Verse* (London: Heinmann, 1979), 209, ch. 8 entitled "Tanga, the Genius of a Dynasty." The information that follows on names and dates of the Buhriy family was supplied to Ian Knappert by J. W. T. Allen. See Ian Knappert, "Al-Husain ibn Ali in Epic Tradition of Swahili," *IMA* 7: 3 (1976): 87-88. Further information on the subject has been obtained from Buhriy's sons.
- 29 Ibid; also interview with Shaykh Said Ali al-Buhriy, Tanga, 12 March 1985.
- 30 It is possible that some of the poetical works of the family that have survived may have been edited slightly.
- 31 Ibid. With respect to Omani tribes, they are (broadly speaking) divided into two main factions: Ghafiris or al-Ghāfiriyya (predominantly Sunni) claimed to be related to the northern 'Adnānī Arabs; and Hinawis or al-Hināwiyya (overwhelmingly Ibadhi) claimed descent from the southern Qaṭṭānī Arabs. The lingering factionalism (between the Hinawis and the Ghafiris) which had been going on since the early eighteenth century in Oman had been imported into East Africa by the Mazruis (Ghafiris) and Busaids (Hinawis). In Zanzibar, for instance, Barghash was supported by Hinawis while Said Majid was supported by Ghafiris (who include Harthis and Barwanis). See Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods*, 166. According to Shaykh Said Ali al-Buhriy, despite the fact that the Mazruis (Ghafiris) and the Buhriys (Hinawis) belonged to the two different tribal factions, relations between them have always been cordial and friendly since the Buhriy were connected by marriage to the Mazrui of Mombasa and refer to them as their *wajomba* (maternal uncles). The close alliance between them is indicated by the Mazrui appointment of a Buhriy to the governorship of Mtangata.
- 32 Knappert, *Four Centuries*, 209.
- 33 J. W. T. Allen, *Tendi* (London: Heinemann, 1972).
- 34 Knappert, *Four Centuries*, 209.
- 35 Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, Dar es Salaam, 11 May 1985. Hemed b. Abdalla, like the people of Mtangata in general (as Baumann had noted) were fond of travelling. In 1890, for instance, Baumann met some Mtangatans who had accompanied Stanley in his travels in the upper Congo. Baumann, 70.

- 36 Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, Dar es Salaam, 11 May 1985. According to Shaykh Muhammad Ali his grandfather wrote a book entitled **Buhriyya** which dealt with the science of *falak*, *uganga*, for instance, how to cure sterility and so on. It is doubtful whether the manuscript has survived. There is also "A History of Africa" (TNR No. 32, 1952) which was recorded in 1914 by Hemed b. Abdalla al-Buhriy and translated by E. C. Baker. In this history, jinns are represented and they figure in the initial stages (in the prehistoric era) of the peopling of the continent with sentient/conscious beings.
- 37 This work has already been cited in Chapter One. Hemedi's other (religious) poetic writings include: **Utenzi wa Kutawafu Nabi**; and **Utenzi wa Seyyidna Huseni b. Ali**.
- 38 Interview with Shaykh Said Ali al-Buhriy, Tanga, 12 March 1985. This was confirmed by Mbarak Asle, formerly head of the Arab Association of Tanga, who informed us that one of the visiting shaykhs with whom Shaykh Hemed had a few sessions turned out to be his former teacher in Hadhramawt. Mbarak Asle was probably in his late 70s or 80s when we met him in Tanga in 1985. He has since passed away.
- 39 Interview with Shaykh Said Ali al-Buhriy, Tanga, 12 March 1985. Shaykh Hemedi's study in Mombasa lasted for a short time due mainly to the fact that he was familiar with the subject of his study having absorbed this material from his father. Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy and Shaykh al-Amin Mazrui were great friends and admirers of each other. Shaykh Hemed held Shaykh al-Amin in such veneration (one is reminded of the respect that Shaykh Abdalla Bakathir had for Sayyid Ahmad Sumait) that when Shaykh al-Amin was in Tanga visiting him he would check on him several times to make sure he was comfortable and he would not retire for the night until his revered guest had done so. Each of these two men was a scholar in his own right and each one was considered as the leading scholar in his country. The main difference between the two men was that whereas Shaykh Hemed had not been exposed to, or, if he had been, had not embraced, reformist ideas emanating from Egypt, Shaykh al-Amin became the chief exponent or popularizer of some of the modernist ideas associated with Muhammad Abduh and his follower, Rashid Rida. Shaykh al-Amin kept abreast of new trends in the Muslim world. He received magazines from the Middle East and particularly Egyptian reform papers and was aware of the developments in that part of the Muslim world. Also, he had much sympathy with the strict teachings of Ibn Taymiyya, whose teachings nurtured the doctrinal thrust of Wahhabism. Al-Amin's father had lived and studied in Mecca for close to a decade and had communicated these strict tenets to a relative, Shaykh Sulaiman b. Mazrui who in turn passed them on to al-Amin. Islamic reform which is traceable to the last quarter of the nineteenth century did not gain much ground until the 1930s when Shaykh al-Amin popularized reformist ideas. He conducted crusades against popular religion and blind imitation of the West or Westerners in their mode of dress, behaviour and entertainment. See Pouwels, "Sh. Al-Amin"; A. I. Salim, **Swahili-Speaking Peoples**, 159-165; F. H. Elmasri, "Sheikh al-Amin bin Ali al-Mazrui and the Islamic Intellectual Tradition in East Africa", **JIMMA** 8: 2 (1987): 229-237; and Swaha Salim (who relies heavily on Pouwels' research), "A Modern Reformist Movement among the Sunni 'Ulamā' in East Africa" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, Montreal, 1985). Relative to Mombasa which was more cosmopolitan and, therefore, more open to ideas filtering from North Africa and

the Middle East, Tanga was hemmed in by the legacy of traditionalism and an understanding of Islam as taught by Lamuan and Hadhrami shaykhs. We had a number of discussions on this subject with Shaykh Hemed's grandson, Ali Hemed, headmaster of Jumuiya secondary school, whose father had been brought up in Mombasa in the Mazrui household. This reveals the extent of the close alliance between Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy and Shaykh al-Amin Mazrui.

- 40 Anderson considered him as the most learnt Sharia lawyer in Tanganyika while Joseph Schacht described him as the most learnt Shafi scholar he had ever met. Schacht also observed that Shaykh Ali Hemed had an excellent library of printed books and also of some manuscripts mostly Shafi works and as well works of the three other Sunni schools of law and of the Ibadhis. Joseph Schacht, "Notes on Islam in East Africa," *SI* vol. 23, 109.
- 41 Liwali and Kadhi of Tanga (Appointments) TNA TDB 14A/45.
- 42 Ali bin Hemed, "Hukumu ya Duffu katika Sharia ya Islamu," 21 July 1943, TNA 285/155/15. Cited in John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 369.
- 43 Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, *Mirathi: A Handbook of the Mohamedan Law of Inheritance*, tr. P. E. Mitchell (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1923; repr. 1949). He is also the author of a treatise entitled *Nikahi: A Handbook of the Law of Marriage in Islam*, tr. J. W. T. Allen (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1959).
- 44 In Shaaban Robert, Tanga produced yet another great poet, who was born in the village of Vibambani, six miles south of Tanga. He had limited secular education which he had acquired through the medium of Kiswahili at Tanga school. Later, however, he went to Dar es Salaam where he completed his secondary school education in 1926. He returned to Tanga where he was employed as a clerk. This was the period when he began to write. He wrote in what has come to be known as standard Kiswahili. Shaaban Robert is considered to be one of the greatest authors ever to write in Kiswahili. He was an essayist, although apparently not an impressive one, his genius being in his poetic skills and powers. See Ali A. Jahadhmy, *Anthology of Swahili Poetry* (London and Nairobi: Heinemann, 1975), ix the section entitled "dedication to an old friend." Cf. Knappert, *Four Centuries*, chap. 10 "The Modern Poets," 264-275. Shaaban Robert's works include *Pambo la Lugha* (The Adornment of Language), *Kusadikika Inchi Iliyo Angani* (Confirmation/Faith for the Country of the Sun/outer space), *Siku ya Watenzi wote* (The Day of all Epic Poets) and his autobiography *Maisha yangu na Baada ya Miaka Hamsini*. The most well known of his epic works is *Vita vya Uhuru* (The War [World War II] of Freedom).
- 45 Shaykh Ayub b. Khamis also taught Mzee b. Lelo, Ali b. Sozi, Ahmad Mwangalo and Salim b. Mwinyimatano.
- 46 Shaykh Dhikri b. Said also trained Said Dhikri, Juma Mwindadi and Hemed b. Dai.
- 47 Interview with Mwinshehe Husein, Tanga, 12 March 1985.
- 48 While the Arabs, the Shirazi-Swahili and the Digo loved Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, some element of the Segeju resented him. According to the Shaykh's sons, some

Segeju hated his father to the point of wanting him killed. Also, apparently the children of the late kadhi of Tanga Shaykh Stanbul went to Pemba to have him bewitched.

- 49 He was a scholar in institutional terms not in terms of inherited holiness. Had he belonged to an entrenched or privileged holy lineage as did some shaykhs in the Lamu area, for instance, he would have inherited significant power, not because of his Islamic education, but in spite of it.
- 50 **Who's Who in East Africa 1967-1968** (Nairobi: Marco Publishers, Ltd., 1968), 3.
- 51 **Katiba ya TAMTA** (The Constitution of TAMTA) (30-6-77), 1. Among the invited guests at the opening ceremony of TAMTA were a Zanzibari, Shaykh Hassan b. Ameer, two Lamuans, Sayyid Husein Ahmad Badawi and Sayyid Ahmad Badawi (also known as Mwenye Baba) and Anwar Karimjee (from the wealthy Tangan Bohora family).
- 52 The Shaykhs in Tanga region who became members of the association were the following: Shaykh Azizi b. Yunus, Shaykh Husein Buda, Shaykh Muhammad Salim, Shaykh Twaha b. Muhammad, Shaykh Ali b. Ngoa and Shaykh Abdalla b. Sulaiman. Ibid., 13. This list does not include the names of scholars such as Shaykh Ameer b. Juma, Shaykh Hemed b. Juma al-Buhriy and Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy. These were the scholars who a little over a decade later got involved with BAKWATA. The fact that TAMTA was too closely associated with the Segeju (some of whom resented the prominence of the Buhriy family in the local community) may have discouraged them from joining it.
- 53 Interviews with Shaykh Muhammad Dhikri, Tanga, 10 March 1985 and Mwalimu Pera Ridhwan, Tanga, 4 March 1985. In 1964 Mwalimu Pera took over as the chairman replacing Shaykh Abdalla Mwaketa.
- 54 Interviews with Ali Hemed, Headmaster of Jumuiya, Tanga, 14 April 1985 and Abdalla al-Habsi, Tanga, 18 April 1985. According to one TAMTA supporter Shaykh Mbwana had also been required to account for some of the funds he had collected.
- 55 Interview with Mwinshehe Husein, Tanga, 12 March 1985.
- 56 Abdalla al-Habsi, "Historia," 8.
- 57 In Dar es Salaam Shaykh Muhammad Ali offers his darasas on Koranic exegesis at Tambaza mosque.
- 58 Interview with Mbarak Asle, Tanga, 11 March 1985.
- 59 Interview with Mwalimu Juma Heka, Tanga, 22 February 1985.
- 60 With respect to teacher-student relations, Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana's behaviour/action towards his former teacher, Shaykh Dhikri, whom he deposed, was more the exception rather than the rule.
- 61 Interview with Ali Hemed, Headmaster Jumuiya, Tanga, 14 April 1985.
- 62 See Alan W. Boyd, "To Praise the Prophet: A Processual Symbolic Analysis of Maulidi, A Muslim Ritual in Lamu, Kenya" (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1980); and El-Zein, **The Sacred Meadows**.



- <sup>63</sup> Nimtz, "The Role of the Muslim Sufi Order," 446-8. The Qadiriyya (considered to be the first sufi order in Islam) was founded by Sayyid al-Jilānī who died in Baghdad in 1166 and whose name is celebrated in many parts of the Muslim world. The main thrust of his teaching was an attack on worldliness and a strong emphasis on cultivating the love of God (which entails pursuit of the mystical path) through charity, prayer and so on. All sufi brotherhoods developed into social structures through which a master's charisma or holiness was transmitted to posterity.
- <sup>64</sup> See the discussion in Boyd, "To Praise the Prophet," 51-52. There is a stronger element of Sufism in the Habshi than in the Barzanj mauid. Consult Peter Lienhardt, "The Mosque College of Lamu and its Social Background," *TNR* 53 (October 1959), 234.
- <sup>65</sup> Interview with Abdalla al-Habsi, Tanga, 9 May 1985. There were also disagreements between Shaykh Ameer b. Juma and Shaykh Muhammad Ayub. According to Shaykh Muhammad Ayub, a Muslim who neglected the daily ritual prayers (*swala*) was considered a disbeliever (*kafir*) whereas for Shaykh Ameer b. Juma such a person was not a disbeliever but a disobedient Muslim. Interview with Twaha Merei, Tanga, 23 February 1985.
- <sup>66</sup> Shaykh al-Farsy was the first Sunni scholar to prepare a complete Kiswahili translation of the Koran. This translation was preceded by two earlier ones by a Christian missionary who had a specific purpose in mind (i.e. to attack Islam) and an Ahmadi who, apart from offering a rebuttal to the missionary accusations, also wanted to advance Ahmadiyya claims. Apart from Shaykh Al-Farsy, there have been a number of Sunni scholars who have attempted to translate parts of the Koran, for instance, Shaykh Hassan Ameer ash-Shirazi, who had been the foremost Muslim scholar in Dar es Salaam, and Shaykh Muhammad Qaasim Mazrui, who preceded Shaykh al-Farsy as the chief kadhi of Kenya, whose translation covers most of the Koran, if not the whole Koran. With respect to the cult of the Prophet, it is evident that Muslim poets through the ages (including Muhammad's own time) eulogized the Prophet's personality, his character, and most important of all, his religion. The ideal of Muhammad is the bridge through time which links Muslims wherever they are with their past. Panegyric literature reveals the nature of the spiritual love and praise of the Prophet which takes place throughout the year, with a significant increase on his birthday. Creating prose writings which centre on the ideal of Muhammad, his characteristics and principle is in a sense a continuation of the art of biography (*sīra*) which started with Ibn Ishāq (d. 768 A.D.). It is clear that it was the eighth-century theologian Muqātil whose mystical interpretation of the Light verse of the Koran gave impetus to the theorizing by the ninth-century Iraqi sufi Sahl at-Tustāri regarding the luminous character of Muhammad (i.e. *nuru* Muhammad as the primal creation of God). These speculations influenced a large currency of sufi thought and eventually found their way in the panegyrics of the Prophet. See Annemarie Schimmel, *And Muhammad is His Messenger: The Veneration of the Prophet in Islamic Piety* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 123-143. There is a tradition, a fabricated one (it is reproduced in Lienhardt, "The Mosque College," 234), to the effect that the Prophet informed Jābir ibn 'Abdalla al-Anṣārī that God created before all things the light of the Prophet from His light. On Muhammad in Swahili legendary literature, see Lyndon Harries, *Swahili Poetry* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) and Ian Knappert, *Swahili Islamic Poetry* (Leiden: E. J.

Brill, 1971) which contains the most recent translation of al-Barzanji's (1690-1766) maulid. A nineteenth-century Lamu scholar Sharif Mansab prepared a Kiswahili adaptation of al-Barzanji's maulid. Shaykh Said Musa of Moshi (Tanzania), a former student of the puritan-minded Shaykh Abdalla al-Farsy, is the leading writer or author of Islamic books in Tanzania and a strong critic of what he regards as unIslamic practices such as the maulid celebrations. Yet this has not prevented him from preparing his own Kiswahili translation of the maulid entitled **Tafsiri ya Maulidi Barzanji kwa Tenzi na Qasida** (Dar es Salaam: Lillahi Islamic Publication Centre, 1982). For one of the earliest maulids written at the beginning of the fifteenth century by an Ottoman poet, see Suleyman Chelebi, **The Mevlid Sherif** tr. F. Lyman MacCallum (London: Murray, 1943; repr. 1957). Consult also the article on maulid by Fuchs which appears in the **Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam**. A. B. K. Kasozi's "The mawlid an-Nabbi in Uganda," **Dini na Mila** 5: 3 (1971) 1-11 dwells on the importance of maulid celebrations in Ugandan Muslim society. Maulid festivals have performed a missionary function particularly in Uganda. This aspect of the maulid has not yet received scholarly attention as far as we are aware.

- 67 There is, of course, good-natured competition between the Digo and Segeju which centers around the two soccer clubs of Tanga, Coast and Sports. Many of the players for the Sports club tend to be Digo whereas the Coast club players include people from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Originally the Digo had been members of the Coast Club, but due to some misunderstanding with other groups, they had left to found Mkwakwani Sports club, the predecessor of the Sports club. Among some of the staunch Digo supporters of Sports are Alhaji Makalo, formerly an executive member of CCM and currently the manager of Tanzania Breweries, and Balazi Majid who was formerly a member of parliament. Alhaji Makalo also happens to be a TAMTA supporter.
- 68 Interview with Ali Hemed, Tanga, 14 April 1985. This was confirmed by Muhammad Rashid, one of the executive members of Maawa.
- 69 TAMTA and Zahrau are not comparable (in terms of facilities and standard of education) to the Muslim Academy in Zanzibar and Ribāt ar-Riyāda in Lamu. The Muslim Academy established in 1951 and supported by government runs five-year courses and a number of short courses. Lamu is the centre of traditional Islamic scholarship in Kenya. It is the home of the renowned Islamic institute (ar-Riyāda) which was founded by Sharif Habib Saleh. This is the most reputable religious institution in East Africa. It is also the bulwark of tradition and religious conservatism in East Africa. There are also in Lamu another mosque college (Swaffa) and a more recently established institute (the Islamic Academy built and paid for by a Muslim benefactor from the Middle East) which offer Islamic education
- 70 Interview with Shaykh Abu Shaaban, Tanga, 18 February 1985.
- 71 Abdalla al-Habsi, "Historia," 8.
- 72 Interview with Sharif Husein, Tanga, 12 February 1985. Shaykh Shaaban made similar observations regarding non-payment of tuition fee of a mere Shillings 5 charged by his madrasa. This shows just how much the situation has not changed since the nineteenth century when Mtoro bin Mwinyi Bakari in his description of Bagamoyo noted that: "Regarding teaching children, it is difficult work for little reward because when children qualify, the teacher does not receive full pay. Thus more are taught for

free than those who pay, and despite the teacher-parent understanding about tuition payment, when a child qualifies they cheat the teacher and give him nothing." See Velten, Desturi, 51.

- <sup>73</sup> We met and conversed briefly with the student who was in Tanga to spend his school holidays. We also had the opportunity in 1989 of meeting in Riyadh and in Medina a former Zahrau student employed as a migrant/contract worker in Saudi Arabia and two former TAMTA students studying at the University of Medina. Selemani Kilimile, a graduate of the Umm al-Qurā University in Makka and currently an imam of a mosque in Dar es Salaam (his religious sermons can be heard on the Swahili network of Radio Tanzania), is perhaps the most well known of the former students of TAMTA.
- <sup>74</sup> Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Dhikri, Tanga, 13 February 1985.
- <sup>75</sup> Interview with Muhammad Sulaiman Mbwana, Tanga, 27 February 1985.

## **Part Two: ISSUES IN TANGAN MUSLIM LIFE**

### **Chapter Four**

#### **PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES: RELATIONS BETWEEN MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE**

##### **The Muslim Crisis of 1968**

The following two chapters (chapters five and six) will discuss communal and educational issues in the context of the national community. Dar es Salaam is both the capital and the centre of Islamic activities in the country. It is also the headquarters of the Supreme Council for Tanzanian Muslims. As will be shown, we cannot discuss the status of BAKWATA in Tanga without first understanding developments within the EAMWS (East African Muslim Welfare Society) in Bukoba and Dar es Salaam which led to the demise of this society and the establishment of a new one (BAKWATA). Chapter four is very brief and serves as a transitional and introductory section to chapters five and six.

The first section of this chapter will examine a communal crisis in the Muslim community. The crisis was far more serious than any before it and had much wider political implications. It developed into a larger crisis because the logic of events giving rise to it (not to mention extraneous factors which came to bear on the situation) transformed what was originally a mere theological argument into a serious ideological dispute and leadership contest. Nevertheless, the events leading to the crisis should be viewed within the larger context of Muslim efforts to organize themselves for educational

betterment and socio-economic advancement during a period when there was a general unrest in the Muslim community.

When the one-party state, first announced in January 1963, became a reality in Tanzania in 1965, all parties were banned. In Tanga the small parties (UTP or United Tanganyika Party and ANC or African National Congress) had disappeared, being no match for TANU (Tanganyika African National Union). UTP, as we shall see in chapter six, was supported by some of the Muslim notables of Tanga but lacked support among the general population. Being backed by European settlers and a number of wealthy Indians, it was identified as the party of immigrants and those who wanted to preserve the status quo. ANC was a small splinter party from TANU which stood for an exclusive African system of government. It had little support from any group in Tanga. The EAMWS/East African Muslim Welfare Society was founded in 1945 by the Aga Khan (spiritual leader of the Ismailis or Sevener Shias) in collaboration with a number of Asian and African Muslims of East Africa. Given communal and sectarian interests of various groups of Muslims, for instance, Indians who belonged to several sects, the EAMWS served as a vehicle to promote and foster a feeling of Islamic solidarity among Muslims of all racial backgrounds. Indeed, the Aga Khan stated in 1955: "I appeal to the Muslims of all sections to look upon this society as a pan-Islamic Brotherhood, working especially for the uplift of African Muslims, and the encouragement of mission efforts for the expansion of Islam to the African population."<sup>1</sup> The establishment of this society was in response to a number of needs, the most important of which was the educational backwardness of African Muslims. This educational backwardness was the outcome of colonial developments, the Christian mission-control of the educational system in particular. African Muslims were also not efficiently organized and lacked extensive organizational facilities comparable to the Indian (Shia) Jamaat Khanas. The society, therefore, hoped to create opportunities for Muslims in education and in the areas of health and social services.

The banning of political parties in 1963 did not affect the EAMWS which, not being a political party, continued to function as before. The organization was, however, too closely associated with Asian Shia Muslims, its financial backers and guiding force. This association proved to be a liability to the Muslim community at the time when the Ujamaa regime was seeking to co-opt different groups to its socialist course and wanted to subordinate religious values to the exigencies of socio-economic development. In other words, Asian Muslims, successful businessmen in commerce and industry, represented a capitalist group whose values and interests conflicted with those of President Julius Nyerere who was attempting to build a society based on socialist principles as spelled out in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The organization was involved in a Muslim crisis in 1968 which, at one level, pitted Pan-Islamic African Muslims and their Asian financial backers against national-oriented Muslims, and at another level, set in competition pro-TANU Muslims (supporters of Ujamaa) against Muslims, especially Indian Shia elements and others, of capitalist orientation.<sup>2</sup> At the time of the crisis the organization (whose headquarters were located in Dar es Salaam since 1961 when chief Abdalla Fundikira became its first President in Tanzania) had among its territorial leaders two prominent African Muslims, President Said Tewa and Vice-President Bibi Titi Muhammad, both former ministers in the government. Both had lost their strong position in the party and by 1965 they were no longer even MPs.<sup>3</sup> They had fallen out of favour with the party.

### **Conflict within the EAMWS**

The EAMWS was originally involved in a minor conflict in Bukoba (between two factions, the Jumaa-Dhuhuri and Jumaa groups, which were locked in an on-going divisive, sterile theological controversy over the necessity of offering the ordinary early afternoon/Dhuhuri prayer over and above the communal Friday prayer),<sup>4</sup> which later developed into a crisis of national proportions. It is important to note here that disputes

over ritual practice may sometimes be motivated by social concerns about the nature of the community. This controversy was therefore shaped by issues of leadership in Bukoban society. The extra-prayers supplied the idiom or shaped the language of the dispute by turning it into a wider conflict. More specifically, the furore over the extra-prayers entered a critical phase when the Jumaa-Dhuhuri section, alleging that the society was controlled by the Jumaa faction, left the EAMWS in 1965, and set up a branch of a tiny organization called Tanzania Muslim Education Union (TMEU). The dispute continued to simmer and entered a new phase in 1967 when the regional leadership of the EAMWS (the Jumaa group) was accused of embezzlement of society funds and (in contrast to the territorial office) for its anti-Indian and anti-Arab propaganda. According to a source close to BAKWATA, when Adam Nasibu, the regional secretary of the society, learnt that the territorial or head office was sending auditors to check the finances of the regional society, he began to make unfavourable reports against the (territorial) EAMWS to the party and government. The Jumaa faction (with which Adam Nasibu was associated) put up a fight to ward off challenges or pressures from the head office, which was cooperating with TMEU (Jumaa-Dhuhuri faction) leadership. What complicated matters was that the Jumaa-Dhuhuri faction was strongly backed by Indian Muslims of Bukoba; their opponents, the Jumaa faction, on the other hand, were accused of being more inclined to TANU than to Islam.<sup>5</sup> For instance, Adam Nasibu, a pro-TANU Muslim, was one of the organizers, if not the main one, of a mass demonstration in Bukoba in June 1967 in support of the Arusha Declaration (Ujamaa) which was said to be in keeping with the spirit of Islam (the Koran). For its part the Jumaa faction cultivated an alliance with anti-EAMWS forces in Dar es Salaam led by Shaykh Abdalla Chaurembo, a TANU central committee member. This illustrates the fact that the party or people with party connections were heavily involved in the conflict. Thus it was the mauid committee under the leadership of Shaykh Chaurembo rather the territorial EAMWS (which had weak political patronage) which was allowed access to the State Radio to carry out mauid functions.<sup>6</sup> As the crisis developed,

among the issues which emerged was the fact that the EAMWS had not been quick to respond to the call for Tanzanization of the society.<sup>7</sup> For instance, the offices of secretary-general and education secretary-general were jointly held by Aziz Khaki, an Indian Ismaili Muslim.<sup>8</sup> This led to Bukoba meeting organized by pro-TANU elements in June 1968 at which the following resolutions were passed: that a new society be formed which was in line with the political set up (that is, TANU ideology); that its chief patron (until then the Aga Khan), secretary-general, and education secretary-general must be elected Tanzanian Muslims (appointed in the case of the education secretary-general); and that since one of the EAMWS's objective is "to build our nation, and endeavor to cooperate with our leaders of both TANU and Government," then all EAMWS leaders must be "those who believe in the party's goals and aspirations, and that those who are against the party and the government must not be leaders of Tanzania Muslims."<sup>9</sup> When a resolution prepared by these Muslims was presented to the territorial leadership, it was turned down. It was then that Adam Nasibu announced Bukoba's decision to sever ties with the EAMWS. Within a few months nine more regions had pulled out of the society.<sup>10</sup> A number of allegations involving administrative irregularities and embezzlement of Muslim funds were levelled against the society which responded by setting up a seven-man commission. The commission conceded in its report the point that the EAMWS's constitution was outdated and that there was no need for a chief patron; nevertheless, it dismissed the charges of embezzlement of funds, a finding which triggered even more bitter feelings.<sup>11</sup> The commission attempted to preserve the society from total collapse. This proved difficult as the state-controlled media (state radio and party press) was taking an interest in publicizing the crisis. The first Vice-President of Tanzania, Shaykh Abeid Karume (who harboured bitter feelings against Asians) exploited the situation to make political statements. At a mass rally in Zanzibar he stated that the EAMWS was an instrument of the capitalists who used it to exploit the common people.<sup>12</sup>



### **Politics, the Demise of EAMWS and the Birth of BAKWATA**

The final deathblow to the society was delivered, with the involvement and blessings of the ruling party, at the Iringa conference which was organized by the regions (including Tanga) which had seceded from the society. The conference was attended by 200 delegates from all regions and also Muslim political leaders such as government ministers, regional commissioners and party regional chairmen. The first Vice-President, Karume opened the conference by accusing the EAMWS of colluding with foreigners and pursuing policies opposed to TANU and ASP (Afro-Shirazi Party) of Zanzibar. He also declared, contrary to the stated policy of TANU to keep religion and politics separate, that "Religion cannot be divorced from politics because politics was the lifeblood of society... the people have risen to shake off the remnants of the colonial era, including religious domination... From now on the leadership of the Muslim religion must be in the hands of the people themselves, without any attachment to pretenders from the outside."<sup>13</sup> The Second Vice-President, Rashid Kawawa, in a closing speech spoke of the need to remain loyal to TANU as Muslims had done by refusing to be a party to oppression. At the conclusion of the conference a new society called BAKWATA (Baraza Kuu la Waislamu wa Tanzania or the Supreme Council for Tanzanian Muslims) was established. Saleh Masasi, a party central committee member, was elected as the national Chairman. Shaykh Abdalla Chaurembo, another party faithful, was elected as the Deputy Chairman. Adam Nasibu was confirmed as acting secretary-general pending the appointment by the society's central committee of a person to fill that position.

From the foregoing the role of the party in deciding what type of society Muslims should have should be evident. This is clear judging from the way the dispute was handled by TANU and the Ujamaa regime which banned the EAMWS and gave speedy recognition to BAKWATA. The EAMWS had been Pan-Islamic and non-sectarian, with its activities being felt all over East Africa. For this reason it was capable of unifying Muslims,

especially coastal elements, into a bloc that could pose as a threat to TANU.<sup>14</sup> It is, therefore, not unreasonable to suggest, as David Westerlund does, that "an originally minor split was used by TANU and the government to engineer great changes in order to bring all Muslims under firm control in the new organization."<sup>15</sup> This fact has left a legacy of mistrust concerning the new society. Indeed, the circumstances around the formation of BAKWATA have given it the image of being "a branch of TANU" or an organ of the government precisely because, first, the destruction of the EAMWS had been on political, not religious grounds, second, the heavy involvement of political leaders even though they were Muslims was and has been a cause for suspicion, and third, BAKWATA's opposition of some shaykhs who previously had been active in promoting Islam has been a factor which has caused some disaffection.<sup>16</sup> Not long after BAKWATA was established a number of religious leaders who were not regarded as friendly to the regime were secretly arrested or fell out of favour with the government.<sup>17</sup> Unlike previous Muslim organizations, BAKWATA right from the beginning tended to be more pro-government. This explains why it has received a cool reception in a number of Muslim centres such as Tanga. In fact, the very structure of this council reflects the organizational structure of TANU itself; moreover, some of its representatives or leaders are TANU leaders. Also, whereas the EAMWS had included Muslims of all sects (Asian Shia Muslims played an important part in it), BAKWATA has been accused of being a sectarian society organized for mainland African Sunni Muslims.<sup>18</sup>

### **BAKWATA's Cool Reception in Tanga**

During the time of the crisis Shaykh Abdalla Jambia had been in charge of running the Tanga branch of the EAMWS, which had been in existence since the end of the 1940s. He is a Digo shaykh (he doesn't have much of a following in Tanga) who was a close ally of his former teacher Shaykh Ameer b. Juma (a son-in-law and leading student of

the late Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy). Shaykh Jambia was also a member of TANU and was among the people, mainly Digo, who were active in the youth wing of the Tanga branch of TANU in the late 1950s. He later got involved with the Tanga branch of the EAMWS whose main objective was to mobilize Muslims for educational opportunities. It was through the fund-raising efforts of this society and particularly the generous contribution from the wealthy Indian Bohora family of Karimjee which made the establishment of Jumuiya secondary school (formerly Tanga Muslim school) possible. The activities of the society in Tanga, however, were limited mainly to running this school which was supported by the Muslim community. The Segeju shaykhs had not opposed the establishment of this Muslim primary school which was concerned mainly with imparting secular education to Muslim children.

Tanga had been the second region to secede from the EAMWS during the struggles between Bukoba regional branch and the territorial head office of the society. Nevertheless, Said Tewa, the President of the society, had dismissed Tanga's withdrawal as being simply a three-man decision, an observation which was rejected by Shaykh Abdalla Jambia and Abdi Mtinga in their press release of 26 October 1968.<sup>19</sup> It was then that Shaykh Jambia started BAKWATA in Tanga. The manner in which he introduced the society, however, provoked opposition from different Muslim groups and created a lot of ill-will against the society among local shaykhs. He was often tactless and intimidated people by making threats about what BAKWATA stood for and intended to do. He announced, for instance, that BAKWATA would intervene in religious activities such as maulid festivals and would assume control over *waqfu* (mosque endowments) and *sadaqa* (voluntary contributions). The local shaykhs felt threatened that their power would be undermined if BAKWATA took over these activities. Local religious leaders, notably Shaykh Muhammad Ayub of TAMTA and Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana of Zahrau, did not welcome this encroachment in the religious domain and were not happy to hear such news,

whether or not Shaykh Jambia was bluffing. They resented the superimposition of what they regarded as unwarranted interference. They saw this as a government plot to interfere in Muslim religious affairs. Therefore, BAKWATA began on a wrong footing by antagonizing the leaders of TAMTA and Zahrau who had a substantial following in the town. Some people in the town pointed out that if religion and politics are separate as the government keeps on insisting, why is there a need for an organization such as BAKWATA? Thus the perception in some circles that BAKWATA was an organ of the government created to keep an eye over the Muslims continued to haunt the society. For some BAKWATA was perceived to be similar to mass organizations affiliated to the party, including Juwata (labour), Mashirika (cooperatives), Vijana (youth), UWT (women) and Wazazi (parents). In other words, BAKWATA was seen to be TANU disguised as a religious society. Some people even thought BAKWATA to be, if not a Christian organization, a new Muslim sect. This was due to the fact that they misunderstood a clause (in one of BAKWATA's writings) which called for inter-faith dialogue to foster relations with other religious groups and denominations.<sup>20</sup>

Since BAKWATA faced opposition and the question of legitimacy a high profile shaykh was needed to improve its image. It was precisely for this reason that BAKWATA's head office in Dar es Salaam (as the Iringa conference had stipulated) searched for a qualified Muslim to fill the position of secretary-general of the council. BAKWATA's choice fell on Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy (a leading authority on Islamic law in Tanzania who also has modern (secular) training). The government agreed to BAKWATA's request to have Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy (who was then employed in Dar es Salaam in the Attorney General's chambers) work for the council on a part-time basis. Shaykh Muhammad Ali as the secretary-general of BAKWATA also attempted but without success to convince the leading shaykhs of Tanga about the objectives of the new council which intended to work for Muslims. Suspensions against

BAKWATA were too deep to be dispelled even by the appointment of such a respected scholar as Shaykh Muhammad al-Buhriy. On one occasion when he was in Tanga to speak to Muslims he was accompanied by a party or government official who was a Christian.<sup>21</sup> This did little to dispel mistrust and suspicions about the council. They associated BAKWATA with politicians who were telling them that the government had no religion and yet took an interest in meddling in Muslim affairs.

Another shaykh in Tanga who became involved with BAKWATA right from the beginning was Shaykh Ameer b. Juma, a leading scholar in Tanga who was linked by marriage and scholarly training to the Buhriy family. He paid a high price for his association with BAKWATA. In Pangani, a coastal town south of Tanga where emotions run high, shopkeepers would not sell to him. Some people showed their disgust for him by throwing stones at him while they jeered and mockingly referred to him as a BAKWATA shaykh. In both Tanga and Pangani people reacted negatively to Shaykh Ameer b. Juma's association with BAKWATA. Shaykh Abdalla Jambia's involvement with BAKWATA people could understand; he is regarded as being opportunistic and will join any organization if there is anything to be gained by it. It is clear that his behaviour and personality have not earned him much respect in the community. But a leading scholar such as Shaykh Ameer b. Juma who was well known and respected they thought he should have known better than join the new society. Opposition against him did not let up and he became an isolated and beaten man who showed symptoms of senility.<sup>22</sup> Shaykh Said b. Ali al-Buhriy, Shaykh Muhammad Ali's older brother, relying on his family background to keep potential detractors at bay, also joined BAKWATA on the request of his brother. The final member of the wider Buhriy family to join BAKWATA was Shaykh Hemed b. Juma al-Buhriy, a cousin of Shaykh Muhammad Ali. The opportunity for him to do so presented itself in 1975 when the position of grand shaykh of BAKWATA was created and a conference was organized to be held in Dar es Salaam. Shaykh Muhammad Ali

encouraged Shaykh Hemed b. Juma, who is known for his deep religious learning, to run for the position. The conference was attended by religious scholars from different parts of the country. When the meeting was in progress, a delegate from Mwanza, Shaykh Amin Muhammad, reminded the gathered shaykhs that the job of selecting a Muslim leader was made easier by the fact that the learned student of the renowned Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy was present in their company. This paved the way for the selection of Shaykh Hemed b. Juma as the grand shaykh, a position he has held to this day. Before that time Tanzania did not have a grand shaykh, although the late Shaykh Hassan b. Ameer Shirazi acted informally as one. The late Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy was the only person in mainland Tanzania whose position approached that of a chief kadhi.

Due to strong opposition to BAKWATA in Tanga not many people in the beginning wanted to risk being associated with it. It was people connected to the community Friday mosque, especially after Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy became the national secretary-general, who came to fill up positions in the local council. These are the people who are neutral and are not involved in Tanga's competitive religious struggles. Apart from the Buhriys (who enjoy high prestige in Tanga), the leading roles in BAKWATA were assumed by a number of Muslims who became the focus of local opposition. In this group the most notable person was the son-in-law of Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, Shaykh Ameer b. Juma and his former student Shaykh Abdalla Jambia. These two shaykhs were associated with BAKWATA in Tanga right from the beginning. Shaykh Jambia has since been replaced by another Digo, Shaykh Muhammad Ali Mkanga, also a former student of the now deceased Shaykh Ameer b. Juma. Later some Segeju, specifically Shaykh Dhikri and Shaykh Mwinyifakii, who have little following (much of Segeju loyalty or support being divided between the two Segeju madrasa leaders, Shaykh Ayub and Shaykh Mbwana) also decided to seek positions within BAKWATA. This was made possible by the fact that since BAKWATA not being a faction or mass

organization (it does not control any madrasa in Tanga apart from Jumuiya secondary school) one could work for it as a way of earning a living or as a way supplementing one's income without even supporting it. The teachers at Jumuiya secondary school (and at least one employee at the BAKWATA office which is attached to this school) fall into this category. There is also, for instance, one TAMTA teacher who spends a few hours a week at Jumuiya secondary school where he teaches a course on Islam. With respect to the two Segeju shaykhs mentioned above, Shaykh Dhikri (who had been the treasurer of TAMTA) and Shaykh Mwinyifakii (who had been its secretary), they had left to build their own madrasas after the break up of the original TAMTA. Shaykh Dhikri is still running the fledgling madrasa Dandarawiy. He got involved with BAKWATA for a time but his failure to secure a position with the council (he wanted to be the BAKWATA shaykh for the Tanga district) led him to quit. The top position in the local branch of the council in Tanga is occupied by Shaykh Muhammad Ali Mkanga, who is the BAKWATA shaykh for the Tanga region. For his part Shaykh Mwinyifakii, who had been with the Ndumi (Zahrau) group for some time before he had some misunderstanding with the Zahrau leader, left to teach at his own small madrasa. He is now employed by BAKWATA.

### **BAKWATA and the Sungu Sungu Affair**

Apart from TAMTA, Zahrau and Maawa madrasas all of which have uneasy relations with BAKWATA, there is also a Muslim youth organization called Uvikita or Ansaar Sunna Youth which has emerged as a strong opponent of BAKWATA. Uvikita activists (whose ideas and doctrines will be examined in chapter six) are "puritanical" reformers whose interest centres on the regeneration of society along strict Islamic lines. As doctrinal or issue-oriented Muslims, they are not involved in Tanga's religious rivalry which has ethnic overtones. Despite their failure to win widespread support for the

reformist cause, at least in the area of public perceptions and attitude formation, these youth have acted as a successful pressure group on a couple of occasions in mobilizing Muslim opinion or sympathy on issues affecting Muslims and thus creating religious excitement in the town. They are articulate and are able to connect Koranic verses with the issues of the day. While a good number of Muslims admire and praise them for their outspokenness, others consider them to be rash and headstrong. We will examine the role they played in marshalling Muslim opinion in an attempt to forge a united Muslim front during an incident in Tanga in March of 1985. This incident, more than anything else, demonstrates their inclination to religious activism.

In 1985 Uvikita activists consisted of youths from diverse ethnic backgrounds with no ethnic group exercising a dominant role. The person who conducted Uvikita's religious classes was from the old Swahili families of the coast, which included people of African-Arab extraction. He is a nephew of the grand shaykh of BAKWATA. One of the most active members of the group, the secretary, was not from the indigenous coastal groups of Tanga. This shows that Uvikita had attracted members of different ethnic groups from within Tanga and outside Tanga, among whom were a Pemban and a Somali. The group, however, did not include any influential member of the community or a person with ties to the two largest madrasas. In fact, TAMTA and Zahrau have emerged as the strongest opponents of Uvikita on the issue of reform (as we shall see later). It was partly in response to its lack of a strong position in the community that Uvikita had appointed as its chairman Muhammad Hariri (at the time a student completing his studies at Maawa) hoping thereby to have representation from a Digo with links to Maawa. Before they opened their centre quite recently (a Uvikita member who had been studying in Saudi Arabia helped raise some of the funds which went into constructing this mosque centre), Uvikita youths held their Sunday public meetings and religious classes at BAKWATA-owned Jumuiya secondary school.



When the incident involving Kigoma missionaries first surfaced, the grand shaykh of BAKWATA, Shaykh Hemed b. Juma, was in Tanga to spend a few days before an impending trip to Mombasa.<sup>23</sup> He kept a low profile and did not seek to mediate in the dispute. One can understand why he kept his distance, as a few months earlier he had clashed with Uvikita over the Sungu Sungu affair. This affair had contributed to a further cleavage between BAKWATA and its opponents. For this reason we shall examine the Sungu Sungu affair first before we discuss the Kigoma mission incident.

The affair first surfaced when it was learned that members of the traditional defence or vigilant group (a frontier tribal policing unit known as Sungu Sungu) who were celebrating, had entered a mosque in Buzuruga, Mwanza district, and tore up five religious books some of which contained several chapters of the Koran.<sup>24</sup> They also beat up Daudi Saleh, the *muezzin* (one who calls people to prayer), who attempted to persuade them to desist from their act. The Sungu Sungu then prevented Muslims from praying in the mosque. It is also alleged that they afterwards forced Muslims to worship the sun. When news of these events first came out the grand shaykh of BAKWATA was in Tanga to spend a few weeks in his home town after his return from pilgrimage to Mecca. He was quite unaware of what had happened in the Lake Victoria district of Mwanza until several weeks later when a relative informed him of what had happened. Had the shaykh bothered to check with his office in Dar es Salaam he would have found that a letter addressed to him by the Muslims of Buzuruga had been lying on his desk for many weeks. The secretary general of BAKWATA, Adam Nasibu, had not taken the trouble to inform him of the letter and, moreover, was understandably reluctant to deal with the situation himself preferring to play it safe by leaving the matter to be handled by the grand shaykh when he returned to Dar es Salaam.

The strongly-worded letter, dated September 5, 1984, was written by Uvikita of Mwanza, otherwise known as Muslim Youth in the Path of Allah. The letter, which

contains a call for *Jihād* (striving to establish good and suppress evil, by peaceful means if possible and by arms if necessary) in defence of Islam, urges the grand shaykh to resign from his post if he remained silent and did not speak out against a grave injustice committed by unruly members of Sungu Sungu.

Eventually a BAKWATA delegation headed by the grand shaykh left for Mwanza to look into the matter. The grand shaykh met with Daudi Saleh who attested to the tearing up of books which contained chapters of the Koran. Yet at the maulid celebrations in Mbeya his speech, which was broadcast on radio and received coverage in the national paper **Daily News** of December 6, failed to make mention of the five religious texts, four of which contained chapters of the Koran while the fifth one was a book of *hadithi* (traditions of the Prophet) in Kiswahili by Shaykh Said Musa. Apart from criticizing the youth for writing a letter which he considered provocative and liable to create religious disturbance, the shaykh did not help clear up the difficulty and, in fact, created some ill-feeling against himself by confusing the issue when he denied that Sungu Sungu tore up five copies of the Koran. This was taken by his critics to mean that the shaykh saw a distinction between a chapter or chapters of the Koran and a complete text of the Koran. In other words, he was seen as attempting to make Sungu Sungu misdeed seem less offensive to Muslims by suggesting that they had not committed a more serious evil of destroying copies of the Koran.

His speech prompted more angry protests or criticism and public letters from Uvikita of Tanga (December 8, 1984) and Mwanza (December 19, 1984) which accused him of indulging in semantics. These letters, which were widely circulated especially in Dar es Salaam and Tanga, were distributed to Muslims around the main Friday mosques. The youth rejected the grand shaykh's advice that Muslims leave the Sungu Sungu affair to be dealt with by the party and the government. They urged him not to listen to the counsel of those in his office who did not possess religious knowledge (a clear reference to Adam

Nasibu) and whose advice was motivated by considerations of political expediency. They wanted him to come out openly and condemn Sungu Sungu. They were suspicious of his mediation efforts and saw him to be acting on the behest of the party and government which wanted to diffuse the volatile situation.

It is the belief of some Muslims that the grand shaykh (a prominent religious scholar with little or hardly any secular training which would stand him in good stead in the intricate game of diplomacy and mediation in difficult situations) mishandled the situation and alienated Muslims on the Sungu Sungu affair. One can therefore understand why he was not anxious to get involved in the dispute (which is discussed below) relating to the two missionaries from Kigoma.

#### **Uvikita's Clash with BAKWATA**

Two Muslim missionaries from Kigoma, Western Tanzania, arrived in Tanga around the second week of March 1985. They had been touring different parts of the country to hold religious discussions on the teachings of the Bible. The Muslim youth of Uvikita acted as their hosts in Tanga and were responsible for organizing their meetings and conducting them around town to give talks in mosques, school buildings and a few times outdoor in the open air. These meetings attracted many people and generated a lot of interest among Tangans. Twice the meetings were held at Uwanja wa Tangamano or Union Grounds and attracted many listeners and curious on-lookers. These public discussions were not intended for Muslims only but were also meant for Christians with whom the missionaries wanted to enter into a dialogue on what the Bible teaches or says as opposed to what Christians believe on subjects such as the divinity of Christ, monotheism versus trinity, monkery, the Prophet as Paraclete, fasting, dietary regulations (prohibition of pork and alcohol consumption) and ritual purification. A few times during the question

period there were lively exchanges between the missionaries and a few Christians, including a priest. On these occasions the missionaries displayed their skills in polemics. It is obvious that they had taken the trouble to study Christianity and were very familiar with the Kiswahili Bible from which, for the benefit of their listeners, they quoted extensively from memory verses which they considered as supporting their viewpoint. Their aggressive style enchanted the ordinary Tanga but annoyed some Christian representatives who reacted negatively to being challenged in public.<sup>25</sup> It was probably due to a complaint lodged with the authorities by one of these representatives which led to the joint decision by both organs of the party and the government for the province of Tanga to take the unusual step of ordering two Tanzanian nationals to leave Tanga the same day.<sup>26</sup> Muslims raised money quickly and the missionaries were able to leave Tanga for Dar es Salaam as ordered.

The authorities thought this would be the end of the matter. However, this was not to be, as Muslim protests and agitation followed. Uvikita was at the forefront of this agitation. The Muslim youth well knew the weaknesses of the community as exemplified by the factional competition which made it difficult for Muslims to present a united front. Also, it was clear to them that the religious leaders were not up to the task of speaking out on behalf of Muslims, as they were afraid to get involved. The authorities had acted the way they did because they did not expect trouble from the traditional Muslim leaders. It was left to the youth to exercise leadership in a matter which became a burning issue in the town. Supported by some Muslim elders, they spearheaded Muslim efforts (mostly organizing meetings) to discuss and suggest ways to solve the problem.

Following these efforts, a Muslim delegation was sent to the Regional Commissioner's office to seek an explanation for the expulsion order. No satisfactory explanation was offered, however. What the delegation was able to learn was that the missionaries could not be allowed to hold religious discussions because they did not have a

duly recognized local sponsor or host. This was a reasonable excuse considering Uvikita, which acted as host to the missionaries, was at the time a non-registered association. Uvikita responded by informing the authorities that it had notified the BAKWATA office in Tanga of the coming of the Kigoma missionaries several days before they were expected to arrive in Tanga. This was denied by the person who holds the top position in the local branch of the council, Shaykh Muhammad Mkanga, the BAKWATA shaykh for the Tanga region. He did not wish to face a public confrontation with the youth and so he decided not to show up at the community Friday mosque during the Friday of that week. Since he is responsible for delivering a sermon in Kiswahili before the Friday religious services begin, his absence at the mosque was noticed and commented upon by Muslims. On this occasion the youth understood well what could be achieved if the mosque was used to appeal to religious emotion. They were aware that, in crisis, Muslims have been known to gather in the mosque to discuss a problem and seek a remedy for it.<sup>27</sup> This was a way of influencing public opinion. In Tanga the huge Friday mosque provided a forum to appeal to a large Muslim audience as it attracts hundreds of worshippers who flock to it to attend the Friday prayers. The mosque is filled to capacity and worshippers have to use every available space including the mosque verandah and mosque street which is blocked to traffic. On this Friday Uvikita was able to use the mosque to stir public emotion and to express a feeling of outrage against the provincial authorities. Permission to speak in the mosque (and particularly the community Friday mosque which attempts to accommodate all groups) is not usually denied to any Muslim who has an announcement to make or has a few words to say about upcoming events in the community. After the performance of the ritual prayer the outspoken secretary of Uvikita was given permission to speak. He addressed the gathered Muslims and did his utmost to impress them on the rash and arbitrary act by the authorities. He demanded that they explain to Muslims why their guests, two Tanzanian nationals who had not broken the law, had been expelled from Tanga as if they were foreigners from another country. In "deporting" the two Kigoma

Muslims, the authorities had ignored the issue of freedom of movement for nationals of Tanzania. He also demanded that Muslims be allowed to hold their religious meetings or discussions when and wherever they wished. He castigated BAKWATA for not speaking out on behalf of Muslims and for abdicating its responsibilities to Muslims.

In the days that followed the community Friday mosque witnessed more meetings and continued agitation. Continued Muslim pressure finally succeeded in inducing the authorities to react by declaring that the Kigoma missionaries could be reinvited provided this was done by one of the duly constituted religious centres such as TAMTA, Zahrau or Maawa and, more importantly and the real bone of contention, provided they agreed to hold their religious discussions in mosques and not outdoors in public places. A meeting was held by Muslims the same day at the community Friday mosque to discuss the terms under which the missionaries could be reinvited. Many speakers were unhappy about the second condition and raised doubts about the party and the government being neutral with respect to their treatment of followers of different religions. They pointed out that Christians had never been subjected to such restrictions and could carry out their missionary work unhindered. After much discussion, however, the prevailing opinion was for acceptance of the compromise solution as it was realized that with a proper sound system to broadcast the talks from the back of the mosque or mosque courtyard, this would effectively make the religious talks public and open to whoever cared to listen. The missionaries were reinvited to Tanga and a few months later they were back in town, although for a short period of time. They conducted their religious talks perhaps with less enthusiasm, the whole incident involving their expulsion from Tanga not having been forgotten and having left a bitter memory.

In concluding this chapter we would like to note that while opposition to BAKWATA has not ended it has somehow subsided owing to the fact that followers of TAMTA and Zahrau have chosen to ignore the council and the announcements it makes

with respect to Muslim calendrical rites and festivities such as the feast to mark the end of the month of fasting. In 1990, for instance, while BAKWATA announced the date of April 25 as the day to commemorate the end of Ramadhan which is a religious as well as a national holiday, the followers of TAMTA, Zahrau and Maawa celebrated *idil Fitri* the day after as announced by their leaders. Section two of the next chapter will take up further discussion on BAKWATA when we examine the seminary dispute and Shaykh Muhammad Ali's forced exit from the council.

### Notes to Chapter Four

- 1 Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*, 172.
- 2 Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 103.
- 3 Said Tewa was among the 17 people who founded TANU in July of 1954 while Bibi Titi was the first leader of the TANU Women's organization (UWT). She was long-time nationalist die-hard in Rufiji-Utete before being defeated in the 1965 elections. She was detained in 1969, faced charges in 1970 involving accusations of having conspired with Oscar Kambona to topple Nyerere's government. She was sent to prison, but was later pardoned by Nyerere.
- 4 This debate has its origins in the southern region of Uganda (Buganda) where the controversy first surfaced in the mid-1920s. There have been several attempts, for instance, in the late 1920s and again in the late 1940s to solve it. This has been a recurring problem for a long time. The conflict was originally over the issue of leadership following the death of Shaykh Nuhu Mbogo. His son, prince Badiru Kakungulu, became the leader of the community, a position to which he was confirmed by the Kabaka against the wishes or over objections of some of the leading Muslims who thought that the leadership of the community should be assumed by the most learned person, not the most "royal" person. Prince Kakungulu who was then only 20 years old, was not considered the most religiously learned person in the community. With time the conflict found theological expression in the religious issue of whether or not to offer extra-prayers (the daily noon prayer) on Friday. Offering the extra-prayers became the position of the Kibuli group led by Kakungulu. In the late 1940s there were attempts to bring about a reconciliation. Prince Kakungulu and Shaykh Swaibu Semakula (1875-1973), the latter was regarded as the most learned shaykh in Uganda, gave up the extra-prayers, but a section of Kibuli continued to offer the extra-prayer under Shaykh Mivule. The Kibuli group, identified with feudalist forces in Buganda, controlled the Uganda branch of the EAMWS (East African Muslim Welfare Society) while their opponents established NAAM (National Association for the Advancement of Muslims) which was strongly backed by the ruling party, the Uganda People's Congress/UPC. This type of cleavage suited President Obote's purposes which was to exploit or rally support against feudalist forces. When Idi Amin came to power he decided to put an end to Muslim factionalism in Uganda. His initiative resulted in the creation of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council with Shaykh Abdalla Matovu as Uganda's first chief kadhi. For a time it seemed as if Muslim religious factionalism had been ended. In 1985 when we visited Uganda the country had two rival Muslim leaders, each one recognized by his supporters. It is significant that the return of Obote to power on the back of rigged elections in 1980 resulted in the old realignments between UPC and its Muslim supporters, chief of whom is Shaykh Kamulegeya who at the time was one of the rival Muslim leaders. By choosing to support Shaykh Kamulegeya while his Vice-President Paul Muwanga supported Shaykh Kamulegeya's rival, Shaykh Mulumba, Obote was back at his policy of divide and rule. In 1985 Obote's government was toppled from power for the second time in fifteen years. Uganda now has an acting chief Kadhi by



the name of Shaykh Kakoza. In recent years there has emerged in some parts of Uganda as, indeed, in a number of areas of sub-Saharan Africa, a new religious cleavage, in effect, a form of religious polarization along the lines of scripturalism versus traditionalism. (See, for instance, R. W. Niezen, "The 'Community of Helpers of the Sunna': Islamic Reform among the Songhai of Gao (Mali)," *Africa* 60: 3 (1990): 399-424). It is Saudi-trained shaykhs who have been promoting rather aggressively the cause of a return to a stricter form of Islam. While the controversy regarding offering extra-prayers on Friday is now something of the past in Buganda, in Tanzania matters got out of hand over this issue in 1977 and the government was forced to intervene and close the mosques of one faction. During the period of our field research in 1984-85 we heard about the controversy although it was probably less serious.

- 5 Kiwanuka, "The Politics," 43-54.
- 6 Ibid., 76.
- 7 Ibid., 75.
- 8 According to Shaaban K. Msuya, the constitution contained clauses which declared that "the Secretary General must be from the Ismaili community" and that "to become a patron or leader one must be rich so as to be able to contribute 20,000 Shs and Vice-President 10,000 Shs." S. K. Msuya, "A Study of BAKWATA and Muslim Adult Education in Tanzania," Unpublished paper, University of Dar es Salaam, Institute of Adult Education, 1971, 6. We obtained a copy of this paper from the author himself as the copy at the University of Dar es Salaam library was missing. As for Aziz Khaki he now lives in Vancouver, Canada.
- 9 Kiwanuka, "The Politics," 77-78 with reference to the minutes of the regional conference 27/6/68, EAMWS, Bukoba.
- 10 A four-man team led by Saleh Masasi (Iringa) and included Adam Nasibu (West Lake), Juma Sued (West lake) and Shaykh Abdalla Jambia (Tanga) toured different regions of the country to explain to Muslims what had precipitated the withdrawals.
- 11 Kiwanuka, "The Politics," 83.
- 12 **The Standard**, 9/11/68 cited in Kiwanuka.
- 13 **The Standard**, 13/12/68 cited in Kiwanuka.
- 14 Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 103-104.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 This is according to a prominent shaykh, a mosque preacher in Dar es Salaam who followed the events closely and knows the people involved personally. In keeping with his wish he shall remain anonymous.

- 17 Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 103.
- 18 Hussain Lweno, "BAKWATA Needs Overhauling," *Daily News*, 23 August 1976. Also interview with Dr Lweno, Dar es Salaam, 10 December 1984, who was a member of the seven-man commission which had been set up to investigate charges against the EAMWS.
- 19 Kiwanuka, "The Politics," 77-78.
- 20 Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Ali, Dar es Salaam, 11 May 1985.
- 21 Interview with Twaha Merei, Tanga, 23 February 1985.
- 22 Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Ali, Dar es Salaam, 11 May 1985. Also, conversations with a former student of Shaykh Ameer b. Juma in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 1988.
- 23 The purpose of his trip to Mombasa was to attend a short private study session with Shaykh Breki. He wanted to study the branch of Islamic science dealing with calculation of correct times of prayer, fasting and direction of qibla. His uncle, Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, had taken a similar trip to Mombasa some decades earlier to study under a colleague, Shaykh al-Amin Mazrui. It was his wish that his nephew should do the same. Shaykh Hemed b. Juma left for Mombasa where he studied under Sharif Badawi, the aging Shaykh Breki (who passed away recently) not having been able to conduct the study himself.
- 24 Sungu Sungu (a frontier phenomenon) are vigilante groups which are found throughout the Nyamwezi-Sukuma area, that is, in the Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora regions. They have arisen in response to state failure to meet local needs with respect to levels of security, policing and punishment which people want. The Sungu Sungu system began in 1982 as a defence against theft, particularly cattle theft, and other forms of theft, including highway robbery. The system is based at the village level. Each village has its leadership and organization and there is collaboration between villages. Each village has a chief and his deputy who are often diviners and medical experts. Under them are six commanders who organize a body of ordinary men. Every member is equipped with bow and arrows and in addition has a gourd-stem whistle which is blown to alert villagers if a theft has been committed. Sungu Sungu groups have dealt with armed cattle rustlers, sometimes killing them or being killed themselves in the confrontations with them. There have been allegations that in some cases Sungu Sungu torture captured suspected criminals, the ones whom they fail to hand over to the police. Sometimes Sungu Sungu have been involved in witch hunting, some of the suspected witches apparently being killed. Given their tendency to sometimes act in ways which are illegal, the party and the government have been anxious to develop some control over them. There are on-going attempts to incorporate them within the party by encouraging them to adhere to discipline and attitudes consistent with the party ideals and programs. Julius Nyerere has been a staunch defender of Sungu Sungu which he considers as a revolutionary force within the villages. The bureaucracy and the law enforcement agencies, however, have not been as supportive of them as has

the party. See Ray Abrahams, "Sungusungu: Village Vigilante Groups in Tanzania," AA 86: 343 (April 1987): 179-196.

- 25 This aggressive style of conducting missionary activity is generally associated with the Ahmadis and Christian missionary groups. Among Sunnis, the person best known for this style of preaching is the well known Indo-South African missionary, Ahmad Deedat. As an astute student of the Christian scripture, he has held public debates with leading Christian personalities, such as the charismatic television preacher Jimmy Swaggart, on the teachings of the Bible.
- 26 Similarly, in 1987 when these Tanzanian missionaries travelled to Mombasa, Kenya, to address public rallies, they caused quite a stir. Eventually the Provincial Commissioner Simeon Mungala cancelled a religious rally which was supposed to be held at Tononoka football ground although a licence for the meeting had been issued earlier. This was done to appease objections from some local church leaders. The police also deported the Tanzanian preachers along with 11 other people who had come with them to Kenya. The cancellation of the rally provoked a protest demonstration by Muslim youth on 30th October and the police had to use tear gas to disperse the demonstrators. See, "Provoking Muslim Agitation," II 17: 2 (27 November-10 December 1987), 5.
- 27 Asghar Fathi, "The Social and Political Functions of the Mosque in the Muslim Community," IC LVIII: 3 (July 1984): 189-199.

## Chapter Five

### EDUCATIONAL ISSUES IN THE TANZANIAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY WITH REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN TANGA

#### **Modern Education and Muslim Society**

This chapter will examine modern education, a central issue among Tanzanian Muslims, and its role in structuring the existing social relations in society. It is in this sphere that relations between Muslim groups and the Tanzanian government have been marked by pronounced uneasiness, especially during the period of Nyerere's presidency.

Traditional Islamic education in Tanzania, that is, in the coastal area where Islam first reached, was introduced by the Arabs centuries before Western style schooling made its appearance. Generations of *walimu* appeared, some trained more than others, whose purpose it was to impart religious education to the young. This education was offered in what have come to be referred to as Koranic schools (kindergarten) or *vyuo* in Kiswahili. The term *chuo*, however, is used interchangeably with the word *madrassa* which, depending on the context in which it is used, could mean either a kindergarten school or a school of higher learning. These schools are to be found in just about every place where a Muslim society is established and seek to ensure its identity. *Madrassas*, therefore, form an important part in the socialization process of Muslim children. In fact, *madrassa* or mosque education has occupied a central position in Muslim society right from the beginning.<sup>1</sup> Lower education was given in a courtyard, verandah of a house or a one-room elementary school. Higher education, which developed later, was for a select few and was offered in private study sessions given by an independent *shaykh* or through a system of seeking masters, learning language from one, exegesis from another and so on.

The lower madrasas teach children elementary knowledge of Arabic based upon the recitation and copying of the Koran without providing an exegetical study of the text; they teach Islamic values and etiquette or decorum (in short, the Islamic way of life and its social and religious concomitants) with a view to shaping the character of the students; and finally they teach the children Islamic folklore, for instance, eulogies of the Prophet as contained in maulid which become part of the local cultural lore.

Koranic education, while limited in scope, was the only avenue to literacy. Walimu who became healers in addition to teaching provided health services to their communities. The value of the Islamic system of education has often been missed by later writers, especially non-Muslims, who have deplored its mode of instruction as being of little pedagogical value.<sup>2</sup> What they overlook is that a talented and well-taught student will rapidly rise through this system of education and acquire at a higher level command of Arabic and later on study grammar and syntax which will enable him to read the basic works of Islamic law, exegesis and theology with one of the shaykhs who offers higher religious training.<sup>3</sup> At any rate, in the nineteenth century, as we have already noted in chapter three, there was an expansion in higher Islamic education in the coastal region due to a readier availability of religious texts after the opening up of East African society by the Busaids. Later their replacement by the Germans marked the beginning of a period of decline for the Koranic schools which lost their old footing. In Tanganyika as elsewhere,<sup>4</sup> the establishment and expansion of Western-type schools eclipsed the traditional system of education. This decline was most dramatic in Bagamoyo where it is reported that by 1900 the number of Koranic schools had dropped from 30 to 4.<sup>5</sup>

In Tanganyika the missionaries who arrived before the administrators and settlers were the first to establish Western-type schools. The UMCA (Universities Mission to Central Africa) had begun work to build a mission school as early as 1875 in Muheza in the hinterland of Tanga. A French Roman Catholic order started a school at Bagamoyo

over a decade before the German colonization of the area. Other mission societies such as the Church Missionary Society, the Lutheran mission of Berlin and a few other Roman Catholic orders followed suit.<sup>6</sup> The students of these schools were eventually absorbed into the missionary system or its services. This was one of the reasons why Governor Von Soden was in favour of a secular state school system which would train Africans for lower civil service positions. From the Muslim point of view, however, mission education was unacceptable, since the essential feature of this education was, as Ahmed Abdulla has pointed out,

the fact that it coincided almost exactly with the traditional Muslim view of what the aims of education should be. The early missionaries taught literacy, primarily in order to enable African converts to read the Bible. This is also the purpose of the Islamic madarasah or Koran school whose function is to develop to the full the religious side of the Muslim peoples.<sup>7</sup>

### **The German Period: The Establishment of the Tanga Central School**

The German educational policy in Tanganyika right from the beginning was governed by the need to provide an obedient or disciplined African lower civil service class at low cost. Since this demand could not be met by the missions, the administration had no choice but to establish its own training system.<sup>8</sup> The schools that Governor Von Soden envisioned would be free from Christian influences. The first state school was established in Tanga in 1892 with the objective of producing clerks, custom officials, translators and tax-collectors for government employment.<sup>9</sup> Kiswahili was introduced quite early as the medium of instruction in the school. Initially there was a shortage of this subordinate personnel and the Germans had to rely on Arabs and even Indians to provide *maakida*, clerks and tax-collectors. In other words, during the early years of the colonial era, despite the fact that the Arabs had lost political and economic power to Europeans, it was the educated Muslim coast (given its literacy in Kiswahili written in the Arabic script) which supplied the Germans with soldiers (local as well as mercenary ones (Nubians)),

teachers and minor officials who were needed in the hinterland areas. Muslims were at first better adapted to the needs of a developing colonialism and a personnel-starved administration.<sup>10</sup> It was also the coastal population which provided the Germans with interpreters, foremen, artisans and personal servants, all of whom were agents of Islamization and for this reason were distrusted by the missionaries. Therefore, by establishing the first government school in Tanga to be followed by two more a few years later in Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam, Von Soden was partly operating under the assumption that the Swahili-speaking population represented a culturally advanced element.<sup>11</sup> The money for the Tanga school had been raised privately since the imperial government did not want to shoulder the responsibility of education in the early years of the regime.<sup>12</sup> By setting up a secular state school, the Germans attempted to appease the feelings of the Muslim population from whom power (which previously had resided with their titular head, the sultan of Zanzibar) had recently been won. The Germans wanted to reassure Muslims that education would not be a vehicle for proselytization. This policy of religious neutrality was designed to secure political and administrative ends (memories of the Abushiri uprising still lingered) and allay Muslim fears of the threat of conversion. Because the first schools were established in the coastal area, the majority of the students were Muslims. This led the Roman Catholics to complain that the government had a pro-Muslim policy.<sup>13</sup> This protest revealed the goals of the Christian missionaries who set up schools to get converts.<sup>14</sup> The colonial officials denied the charge that by opening schools in the coastal area they encouraged Islam. Apologists for the official position defended themselves by pointing out that coastal Islam was politically relatively safe, a view not shared by all, and, in any case, the bulk of the coastal people were lost to Christianity.<sup>15</sup> Von Soden had been willing to go as far as hiring paid Muslim religious teachers who would visit government schools to give religious instruction. Nevertheless, the Protestant lobby mounted pressure and the resulting opposition within the colonial council succeeded in defeating the salary provision for walimu of the three coastal government schools.<sup>16</sup>

What can be said here is that the relations between the missionaries and government officials were often strained over the issue of secular education and the attitude or policy to be taken with regard to Muslims and their religion.<sup>17</sup> The Germans wanted to win the confidence of coastal Muslims by creating an atmosphere, for instance, appointing a Koranic teacher to visit the Tanga central school, which was conducive to good relations with them. On the other hand, the Christian missionaries were hostile to Islam and were quick to attack any government action which was construed to favour Muslims.<sup>18</sup> The attempt to link Koranic teachers to government schools having failed, the relationship between the German administration and Muslims in education became slightly strained from that time onwards.<sup>19</sup>

Education was a very sensitive issue with Muslims and the substitution of the old Islamic system of education by a new secular one reinforced the wish on the part of some parents to keep their children away from the new educational system. Nowhere was this more true than in the case of Kilwa. When forced by the Germans to send their children to school (compulsory education was first initiated at Tanga in 1899), the waungwana of Kilwa sent the children of their slaves while their own were sent to Koranic schools.<sup>20</sup> Koranic lessons were not provided (even if they were, a non-salaried Koranic teacher would have had no incentive to teach as he could expect to receive no payment in kind or gift as would be the case in the traditional system of education) and the children had to acquire religious instruction outside school hours. Although Muslim students were in the majority at the central government schools, there were still some doubts (suspicions rooted in the distrust for the first mission-established schools) on the part of some Muslim parents regarding Western education. More specifically, the influence of mission schools, particularly that of UMCA Kiungani school in Zanzibar, could still be felt and a sense of resistance was there.<sup>21</sup> This attitude was spread in the Rufiji through Arab maliwali whose influence succeeded in keeping Christian missions out of the place.<sup>22</sup>



The above notwithstanding, the fact remains that the Germans succeeded in winning a certain degree of confidence and goodwill of the coastal Muslims. By 1902 there were three central schools, at Tanga, Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam, each with feeder or out-schools in addition to three communal schools supported by the local people at Kilwa, Pangani and Lindi.<sup>23</sup> The schools at Kilwa, Pangani and Lindi also became government institutions four years later bringing the total number of government schools to six. The Tanga school was the oldest and the most prominent of these central schools. Dr. Karl Weule who visited Tanga around this period described the town as being a scholastic centre where hundreds of African children were instructed in the elements of European knowledge and initiated into the mysteries of the German tongue which he claimed the children could speak after a fashion.<sup>24</sup> One of the reasons why the number of official schools increased was because of the endowment of schools in Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam by Sewa Haji (d. 1897), a wealthy Indian trader<sup>25</sup> who did so on the understanding that they would be run as Swahili-speaking government schools open to members of all races.<sup>26</sup> Due to shortage of funds German educational effort was concentrated on producing a limited African clerical class at the lowest cost possible and only a minimum of education was provided for Indians. A primary school was established in Dar es Salaam for the children of officials and European traders and two schools were begun in the northern farming or European settlement area to attempt to make Boer children loyal to Germany.<sup>27</sup> In pursuit of its objective to provide education for Africans, albeit limited, the Germans established four inland schools at various district headquarters or military stations. Four years later in 1906 the number of these schools rose to nine, the same year that the very first high school in Tanganyika was set up in Tanga.<sup>28</sup> The beneficiaries of these inland schools tended to be members of the Swahili (Muslim) community that surrounded military administrators as staff and dependents of the administration. The teaching staff consisted of Tanga-trained teachers who were mainly Muslims. This was a matter of concern for the missionaries who were not in favour of

education being provided for Africans by the government. This was considered to undermine missionary efforts to evangelize the non-Muslim Africans, for the local African now "knew that they could have civilization without Christianity for they saw educated but polygamous Muslims at every station."<sup>29</sup> The period ending in 1906 marked the peak in German educational efforts as very little expansion took place after that year.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, the total number of students (about 4,000) in official schools compared very poorly with student enrollments in just a few of the larger mission schools.

Beginning around the turn of the century pressure originating in Germany began to mount to involve the local African leadership, among whom missionaries were bidding for power, in administration by spreading the benefits of education to their children. The idea had merit from the colonial administration's standpoint (chapter one touched briefly on the subject of local resistance to German rule in various parts of the country):<sup>31</sup> it held out promise of winning the traditional elite to colonial ideas and loyalties. More importantly, however, there was a felt need to train the children of chiefs to assist in the lower administrative functions and especially in the area of tax collection. Christian missions lobbied the government that Christians be substituted for Muslims for these jobs. The government which had a short supply of minor officials expressed a willingness to do so provided the Christian missions cooperated in training such qualified people. As further encouragement to them, the Germans had agreed since 1898 to make modest subsidies to mission education on the condition that they adopt an official Swahili curriculum. Missionaries showed a preference for vernacular over Kiswahili which was thought to facilitate the spread of Islam.<sup>32</sup> Accordingly, they favoured teaching in local languages as a way of training catechists who would continue with evangelical work among their people. Missionaries also established schools as a means to combat Islam.<sup>33</sup> Because the first government schools were built in the mainly Muslim coastal area, Christian missions, especially after they had won the monopoly to establish new schools in the interior, set up

many of their bush schools in the inland areas. Also, they built schools in the northern farming region of Kilimanjaro, following European settlement in the area in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The mission point of view with regard to Kiswahili gradually began to change and many mission schools started to widen their syllabus. Thus in 1907 they decided to embark on a policy of education for government positions. This coincided with the period when Islam was making gains in the interior of the country. This became a point of concern even in government circles, particularly after 1912 when a number of provisions were introduced to deal with this situation.<sup>34</sup> Mission education, however, was far from outgrowing its evangelical beginnings. The CMS's (Church Missionary Society) educational emphasis, even when subjects such as geography and history were taught, continued to be religious.<sup>35</sup> Schools for sons of chiefs were eventually established in Tabora (in 1910 all chiefs and their heirs were required to receive instruction to be able to read and write)<sup>36</sup> and Catholic and Lutheran missions among the Chagga. Graduates of these schools were employed in government schools, and missions insisted that they be used as agents to facilitate the evangelical cause. This created friction with the government which was committed to secular education in its school system. Meanwhile the demand for the spread of education in rural areas gained momentum. For instance, Captain Fonck encouraged local people in Kilosa district to take advantage of mission schools. The connection between education and employment in government was not lost on the people. Education was seen as opening up new avenues for social mobility.

In 1911 the government owned 78 elementary schools (Catholics and Protestants had 363 and 512 respectively for a total of 875) and 2 high schools (Catholics had 11 and Protestants 8 for a total of 19).<sup>37</sup> Mission schools, therefore, had several times as many pupils as government ones. The study program in government schools was organized as follows: elementary or village primary schools gave a three years' course in reading,

writing and Arithmetic; the nine central schools including the one at Tanga gave a two years' course with emphasis on vocational training; while the high school in Tanga offered clerical, industrial and some academic studies. By 1911 the Tanga school had 24 hinterland schools with two to three European teachers, two to three handicraft teachers and 41 auxiliary teachers.<sup>38</sup> By the following year the school had 556 pupils. At its peak in 1913 the Tanga central school had four German teachers on its teaching staff and a student body of 506 boys in Tanga and 1,073 in the feeder schools. Some of the earliest students at the school (a good number of whom were Bondei) included Abbasi Jumbe, Mwabondo and Muhammad Kara. In 1912-13 the school produced graduates among whom was Mdachi Sharifu, a Segeju from Tanga who later became the president of TTACSA (Tanganyika Teachers' African Civil Servant Association).<sup>39</sup> The famous Swahili poet in Tanzania, Shaaban Robert, was a pupil at the school at the outbreak of the First World War. In these schools Kiswahili was used as the medium of instruction while German was taught as a subject. The Germans made no attempt to provide education for girls; this awaited the British period when a girls' school was started in Tanga in 1930 with 10 students.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, girls received education at mission stations; it was of the type, for instance, in the case of CMS, which prepared women to perform tasks related to domestic life ("mothercraft") although reading and writing were encouraged for the purpose of reading scripture.<sup>41</sup> The decision of the German administration not to educate girls was governed by the fact that education had been streamlined to prepare a limited number of male students for certain lower administrative positions. By 1914 the government had a total of about 6,200 students in its schools while mission schools had 110,000.<sup>42</sup> This meant that over 95 percent of the pupils in Tanganyika were taught in Christian missions.<sup>43</sup> The implications of these figures regarding the education of Muslims and educational opportunities for them from that period on will be clear in the course of our discussion. Here, it is sufficient to point out that in avoiding mission schools, Muslims paid a high price.<sup>44</sup> The First World War, however, disrupted the educational system and whatever

educational plans there might have been. German teachers were withdrawn and both government and most of the mission schools were closed.

### **The British Period: The Entrenchment of Christian Mission Education**

With the British colonial administration firmly established after the War, attempts were made to reopen the schools following the appointment in 1920 of Rivers-Smith as the Director of Education. The confusion caused by the war had led German-trained African teachers to give up work and scatter abroad. Rivers-Smith attempted to relocate them (the Tanga school was restarted under Mwalimu Petro Richard Mbahula) to build up a new educational system. A new educational system was set up to cater for the education of Africans, Europeans and Indians along racial lines.<sup>45</sup> Once the government had agreed to assist missionary voluntary agencies (mission schools were eventually reopened) the same had to be done for all voluntary agencies. The Germans had been less interested in providing education for Indians.<sup>46</sup> This resulted in financing Indian and European education. By 1945 there were 79 Indian assisted schools and 3 government ones; and 4 European assisted schools and two government ones. A three-tier system of education developed which saw education being used as a means for structuring the colonial pecking order. Government net expenditure per student in 1946 was as follows: European £ 38; Asian £ 4.4; and African £ 1.9.<sup>47</sup> This meant that the school system for Europeans and (to a lesser extent) Indians was more developed, European education being rooted in the metropolitan system while that of Indians (Asians) was consistent with their middlemen role in society (they were the wholesalers and the petty bourgeois class--i.e. middle-level civil servants, teachers, clerks, retail traders and self employed craftsmen).<sup>48</sup> European children received literary education on the basis of which they were sent overseas for post-secondary education. The same was true for children of wealthy Asian families who attended private schools which were run on the same lines as European schools. African

education, on the other hand, was geared towards producing wage labour (colonial officials and missionaries extolled the dignity of labour) as can be judged from the fact that their education was more vocational in emphasis although later village handicrafts were encouraged. This type of education was mainly elementary and non-academic in content and, therefore, would not have enabled the African, who was less exposed to utilitarian subjects, to move into the European economy.

By 1924-5 there were 72 government primary schools in rural areas, two central schools in Tanga, two in Dar es Salaam (these were the old German schools which focused on "industrial" courses such as carpentry, tailoring, masonry, blacksmithing and bootmaking in addition to teaching reading, writing and arithmetic), and schools for sons of chiefs in Tabora, Bukoba and Mwanza.<sup>49</sup> The government also encouraged Native Authorities through the Native Authority Ordinance of 1926 to set up elementary schools of their own. As a result of government educational policy, a pyramidal educational structure developed which saw primary education being provided to a substantial number of rural pupils while post-elementary education became the preserve of a small group, for instance, sons of chiefs who were groomed for local administrative positions (their education included learning bookkeeping, typing and office routine), or others who were trained for government employment as clerks, semi-skilled labourers and craftsmen.<sup>50</sup>

Education contributed to further social differentiation among Africans. The Tanga school was illustrative of the type of post-elementary education Africans received during this period: with 304 day pupils in 1924 and a European headmaster and a teaching staff of 10 African teachers and 8 industrial instructors, the school was divided into an industrial and an English literary stream which offered 6 elementary classes (3 years), 2 advanced classes (3 years) and one night class for apprentices in the workshops.<sup>51</sup> By the beginning of the 1930s the school (which offered a four-year program) had 392 students and a teaching staff of 13 African teachers and a number of European teachers. Of these

students, 205 were pursuing the Elementary Course and 108 were taking the English Course.<sup>52</sup> These students (destined for teaching and clerical positions) were sent for further training to Mpwapwa, where at the time the sole Government Teachers' Training Centre was located. The remaining 79 students were taking the Industrial Course which included carpentry, tailoring, masonry, blacksmithing, bootmaker or dresser.<sup>53</sup> Agriculture was not included.

The Tanga province (the territory had 11 provinces at the time) had a population of 350, 000 people. There were 942 pupils who studied in 15 village schools with government support. These schools employed 26 African teachers and 15 industrial instructors. There were in addition 67 assisted mission schools and hundreds of non-assisted mission schools. The Tanga government central school drew its pupils from the 15 village schools and the town of Tanga itself.<sup>54</sup>

As far as mission education was concerned, it continued to be biased in favour of religious instruction and did not place enough emphasis on (secular) education. The government was very critical of the missions on this matter and attempted to develop closer relations or cooperation with them in the area of education over which relations between them were often strained. The groundwork for this cooperation, which implied government supervision over mission education, was laid out in the Phelps-Stokes Commission Report and also in the document on the Education Policy in British Tropical Africa of 1925. The two parties held a conference in Dar es Salaam in 1925 and agreed to establish a partnership in education. This led to the missions becoming increasingly subsidized by the government and coming more under its control. This was not regarded as desirable by the missions which wanted to maintain their autonomy. Nevertheless, the missions realized that in order to qualify for government subsidy or grants-in-aid they had to meet its standards. The government insisted that the missions widen the scope of their education on the basis of a common education code: they had to use Kiswahili, include secular

courses in their curriculum and hire qualified teachers.<sup>55</sup> Also, later on the government wanted the mission to provide education that went beyond the primary school, the main focus of the mission bush schools. By the early 1930s missionary expansion of schools was reflected in student enrollment. In 1931, for instance, the government spent £ 43, 000 for 7, 651 African children while the missionary contribution amounted to £ 100, 000 for 160, 000 students.<sup>56</sup> Thus (as during the German period) the proportion of total student enrollment in missionary schools far exceeded that in government ones.

### **The Impact of Western Education on Koran Schools**

We noted that with the onset of colonial rule Islamic traditional schools declined in the face of the competition from the state system. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that there was a recovery and even an expansion in the madrasa system in the period between 1920 and 1930. In 1924 there were in Tanganyika no fewer than 70 Koranic schools, 80 percent of which were located in the coastal areas, with a total enrollment of 8, 000 pupils,<sup>57</sup> more pupils than were in government schools in 1931. Yet in the report of the Central Education Committee of 1939 a decade later, E. C. Baker (one of the superintendents of the Tanga school and of education in the Tanga province) stated regarding the education of the Muslims of the coast, particularly those of the Tanga province, that over the years the Koranic education Muslim children received

has grown more and more haphazard and unorganized and since these schools, besides teaching religion, educate the pupil in all matters relating to his tribal culture, the framework on which the instruction provided in government schools should be superimposed has grown weaker and weaker and there is no doubt that coastal culture has degenerated in recent years.<sup>58</sup>

It is difficult to imagine that this condition or situation held uniformly for all areas. The quality of madrasa education varied from place to place with the well taught students



being those who attended the relatively better organized madrasas located in urban centres or their surrounding areas.<sup>59</sup>

Baker attributed the "degeneracy" in coastal culture to a number of factors, one of which was the declining economic condition of the common people, particularly those of Tanga district, who were dependant on coconut and copra industries.<sup>60</sup> The existence of madrasas was and still is dependent on the spirit of charity which Islam inculcates among its followers. It is, therefore, understandable that the economic difficulties associated with falling revenues for coconut and copra should have a depressive effect on Koranic education. This resulted in a drop in the number of Koranic schools which were poorly supported partly because "in the absence of a titular head [such as previously the Sultan of Zanzibar], there [was] no one to organize them and ensure a reasonable degree of efficiency on the part of the mwalims."<sup>61</sup> By not attending these schools many children were deprived of cultural education, including ethical and moral instruction, and discipline which these schools provided in ever lessening degree.<sup>62</sup> According to Baker, Muslims lost faith in the utility of these schools as parents (who preferred a school system that provided secular and religious subjects) saw many of the clerical posts in the township being filled by up-country Africans (the reverse of what happened during the early German period).<sup>63</sup> This is an indication that mission graduates (who outnumbered many times over the graduates of the public school system) had begun to assert themselves with the onset of British rule. Many had been educated by the UMCA at Kiungani school in Zanzibar, where they received a literary education in English before 1918. After 1918, this secured them the best jobs in the new civil service. The outstanding member of this group was Martin Kayamba (1891-1939) who was appointed the chief clerk of Tanga District Service.

Baker further states:

At present many of the young men who are above school age merely loaf; they get food from their parents when they want it, and when they require

luxuries they either work for a few days on a sisal plantation or steal coconuts from the village plantations to sell to Indian petty traders in order to obtain the wherewithal to buy cigarettes and soap.<sup>64</sup>

In the previous decade the drop in the price of sisal not only drove many producers out of business, but also led to a reduction in wages and to the trimming of the labour force.<sup>65</sup> Rennie Smith made the following comments on the effects of the drop in the price of sisal:

The vagaries and anarchy of modern industrialism are to be seen in East Africa as in Britain. The fall in the prices of primary products leads to cuts in native as well as in European wages. Thousands of natives are turned to their original occupations for livelihood, or they drift into Dar es Salaam and the larger towns to swell the ranks of criminals. It is probable not only in Tanga but wherever large industrial and agricultural undertakings are developed special efforts require to be made for the care of the children and the limitation of child labour.<sup>66</sup>

Furthermore, the 1929 official report dealing with education in the Tanga province stated that: "It would seem that the chief obstacle to the spread of juvenile education will be found in the large sisal estates, which are already attracting numbers of children."<sup>67</sup> This situation accounted for a decrease in the number of students in the village schools especially in 1928.

The behaviour and attitude of the youth as reported by Baker in the 1930s suggest that we have here a case of far more than the economic effects (the post-war economic recession explanation alone cannot account for the whole situation) of what Baker was describing. The youth were influenced by new trends-- attitudes, fashions, consumption patterns and practices of Europeans, and some deviated from set moral standards in their desire to acquire certain luxurious objects. Baker did not address himself to the question of the cultural impact of colonial rule on coastal society and culture. Coastal communities experienced European cultural pressure and the re-orientation of their societies to European standards. There is reason to believe that cultural penetration, how ever feeble it was-- and the evidence we have here is incomplete, was a factor in the above situation. Indeed,

as Randall Pouwels points out with respect to coastal community in general and Zanzibar society in particular, "a cultural void had been created by the successive military defeats experienced by coastal peoples during the 'pacification' phase of colonial rule, the decline of the nineteenth century economy, and the virtual disenfranchisement of waungwana."<sup>68</sup> The youth from among the lower classes in Zanzibar during the post-World War I period took to imitating those who had status (Europeans), borrowed from Asians to buy alcohol or to indulge in imported entertainments, and, according to one official, "wasted their substance on riotous living"-- which all point to what the reports referred to at the time as a "falling standard of morality."<sup>69</sup> Surely, this is what Baker was implying in his statement about the "decay" in coastal culture? For whereas young men of his time led a life of idleness, late in the nineteenth century Baumann reported that half-grown boys of 13 and 14 were already engaged in all the pursuits of adults.<sup>70</sup> Furthermore, whereas Baker noted that young men "merely loafed," earlier in the decade he had complained that "the children have insufficient leisure and often study the Koran from morning to sunset or, if they attend a Government school, from early afternoon until dusk."<sup>71</sup> Also of note is the fact that while he reports a decrease in the number of Koranic schools the expansion in the madrasa system in the coastal areas during the previous period receives no mention from him.

Baker concluded his statements by suggesting that the government incorporate Koranic schools into its educational system. Through implementation of this measure, the children would be able to acquire spiritual and cultural values based on Islam, and at the same time absorb certain job skills associated with government schools. The suggestion never got off the ground as the government was interested in creating a new system of education and was not about to support Muslim education in a significant or meaningful way. There were, however, two Muslim schools which were government assisted: the school established by al-Jamaat al-Islamiyya or the Muslim Association of Tanganyika at

Dar es Salaam and the Ahmadiyya Muslim school at Tabora.<sup>72</sup> One assumes that they taught secular subjects in addition to religious subjects, for otherwise they would not have been funded. The school of Shaykh Husein at Kilwa, to which Arab children were sent from various parts of the country, was not government assisted.<sup>73</sup>

### **Colonial Policy and Educational Inequality**

As far as the matter of awarding subsidies to mission schools was concerned, the British administration had quite early made it possible for many of their schools run by the voluntary agencies to receive financial assistance. By providing them such assistance, the British were seen by the Muslims to be subsidizing Christianity, particularly in view of the fact that they refused to grant aid to Koranic schools on the ground that these were exclusively religious institutions.<sup>74</sup> Moreover, Koranic teachers who had access to government and native authority schools received no remuneration on the justification that they were not properly qualified in accordance with grant-in-aid regulations.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, just as the Christians had accused the German administration earlier in its policies of being pro-Islam, Muslims made similar accusations against the British administration being pro-Christian. For instance, the Makonde complained that when the majority of the tax-payers in their area (southeastern Tanzania) were Muslims it stood to reason that the government would cater to their educational needs; instead, the government favoured the Christian minority by providing subsidies to mission schools to facilitate their education.<sup>76</sup> Muslim belief in a pro-Christian government bias was reinforced by the fact that in refusing to extend special educational assistance to them, the British, who insisted on maintaining parity of treatment between the two religious groups, perpetuated the status quo. For whereas mission schools were subsidized from abroad and on the basis of this assistance became well organized which, in turn, qualified them for further subsidies from the government, Muslim schools not being properly organized were denied subsidies for this

very reason. Muslim lack of adequate funds to raise their standard of instruction resulted in the denial of funds from the government.

How did the above situation reflect on educational opportunities for Muslims? The answer to this question will be clear after we have examined the following information. In 1945 there were over 200 government and native authority primary schools; the missionary voluntary agency had 300 government assisted primary schools and over 500 registered unassisted ones; the government had 8 secondary schools and 8 teacher training colleges; the missions had 10 secondary schools and 16 teacher training colleges, all assisted.<sup>77</sup> In 1956 there were 711 government and native authority and 27 Muslim agency institutions with a total enrollment of 97, 917 children compared to 1, 846 mission schools with 237,669 students, a small fraction of whom were Muslims.<sup>78</sup> Thus there were 335, 586 primary school students in 1956. Government assistance to Muslim Association Agencies amounted to a very low figure of £ 6, 848 out of a budget of £ 1, 338, 925 which the government spent as educational grants-in-aid in 1957.<sup>79</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that "secular" education became increasingly associated with people who had the longest and closest contacts with missionaries. Of the 41 Tanganyikans at Makerere in 1951 (their number reached 155 four years later) among whom were now Chagga, Zigua, or Sukuma, plus the Bondei, Haya and Nyakyusa who had hitherto predominated, the majority were Christians.<sup>80</sup> The colonial administration perpetuated the system of educational inequality by opening more schools in privileged areas, thus showing preferential treatment to the Chagga of Kilimanjaro and the Haya of Bukoba and, to a lesser extent, the Pare and other inland groups of the Tanga province, and the Nyakyusa of Rungwe.<sup>81</sup> In the race for education Muslims were being outpaced by Catholics and Protestants. African Muslims had limited resources and, more importantly, lacked a centralized church-like organization which is empowered to receive a portion of the income of every Sunni Muslim for the purpose of addressing a wide range of community needs. Under these circumstances,

there was little African Muslims could do with no central figure (unlike Indian Muslims who formed exclusivist communities with each sect having its own separate organizational facilities) to organize their education on the same footing as that of Christian missions. Also, whereas Indian Muslims made great gains in the educational field, thanks to the government policy of favouring Asians over Africans (with the onset of British rule Asians were no longer classified as "Natives"), African Muslims had been neglected. Indians, moreover, were better organized and enjoyed a favoured economic conspicuousness. Their community was more prosperous and opened its own schools. Before 1928 Asian schools were established privately by the Asians themselves. After 1928, however, the government took some of the responsibility for this. In the 1940s Asians who could afford it sent their children abroad to pursue further education in engineering, law, medicine, teaching and so on. Their leaders, particularly the Aga Khan who pursued Westernizing policies and attempted to bring his community closer to European models, encouraged young men to seek education in India.<sup>82</sup>

### **EAMWS: Muslim Response to Educational Backwardness**

It was in response to the educational backwardness of Muslims that the leader of the Ismailis, the Aga Khan (Sultan Muhammad Shah), collaborating with like-minded Asian and African Muslims, despite their sectarian differences, took the initiative to establish the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS). A conference was convened in Mombasa in 1937 at which the goals of the proposed society were declared to be:

- a. to promote Islam in East Africa; and
- b. to render assistance in the advancement and the betterment of such Muslims and in particular African Muslims who in the opinion of the society, stand in need of such assistance in the fields of education, both secular and religious, and in the spheres of health and social services.<sup>83</sup>

It was also resolved that non-African Muslims who were financially well off help raise money to promote the welfare of African Muslims.<sup>84</sup> The actual date of the founding of the society is generally given as 1945, the year marking the end of World War II, when the society began to function. The society made a modest beginning when the Indian Muslims who had their own efficient education systems gradually admitted to schools selected African Muslims, although their number never rose above the five percent mark.<sup>85</sup> The society made a slow start in Tanzania compared to Uganda where its activities, mainly constructing mosques and schools, were strongly felt.<sup>86</sup> Even there, the activities of the society notwithstanding, the developments during the colonial era were such that Ugandan Muslims "have developed as simple traders, as butchers, taxi drivers, and petty shopkeepers."<sup>87</sup>

In Tanzania the Tanga Muslim school represented one instance of local community initiative to establish schools to rectify the educational "backwardness" of the Muslim community with respect to the new forms of education that had developed under colonial rule. The credit for such efforts goes to the EAMWS, which mobilized Muslims for educational opportunities. The Tanga Muslim school was set up in 1946 and began holding classes in a private house located on the sixth street. The school was run by the Tanganyika Muslim Association, Tanga branch, and offered Arabic/Islamic and English lessons. It was both a madrasa and a secular school. For this reason it received the approval of Muslim parents. A medical officer of health reported that the condition of the building where classes were held was such that it had to be used only for residential purposes, not cramming 166 pupils (some of the girls used the kitchen as classroom) in a small building.<sup>88</sup> In September 1947 the school moved to a new site on the fifteenth street where land belonging to the late Shaykh Umar Stanbul had been donated. Quite appropriately, the school became known as the Muslim Union Temporary school because *mabanda* (old sheds) were used as classrooms. The new location was not suitable as a

school site as it was continually inundated with water. Local Muslims tried to raise funds to build the school on a permanent site. The EAMWS donated Shillings 40, 000 for this purpose. Also, the wealthy Karimjee family offered to finance and build the school provided the government made a maximum total grant of £ 6, 000, which was half of the estimated cost.<sup>89</sup> Already the Tanga Indian school had been built through government assistance.<sup>90</sup> In 1951 the Tanga Muslim primary school finally moved to its present site just across the Pangani road on land overlooking the Ngamiani market. The school was later converted into a secondary school and named Jumuiya secondary school in the 1970s.

During the period of terminal colonialism the Muslims of East Africa, and particularly those of Tanganyika, stepped up pressure for equitable opportunities in education for their communities. With independence looming large on the political horizon, they were apprehensive, given that Christian missions were near monopolizing the education systems of their respective countries, about the perpetuation of educational inequalities in post-colonial society.<sup>91</sup> At the Cambridge Conference held in the early 1950s the Muslim members presented their case and complained about the lack of schools of their own and the absence of a provision for religious training.<sup>92</sup> They requested proper training for Muslim teachers, financial assistance to Koran schools and also that

it should be accepted by all governments that it is their special responsibility to ensure that Muslim boys and girls received adequate instruction in Arabic and religion at all levels of school life and that the two should be included in the curriculum.<sup>93</sup>

Muslims were expressing the view that they wanted secular education but not of the type that would undermine their religious and cultural values. The Kenyan case is a good example which illustrates this point: when in the mid-1950s, first Egypt, and thereafter other Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco and Jordan offered some scholarship to local Muslims even the most conservative parents were eager and willing to send their children.<sup>94</sup> It was in reaction to this enthusiasm for education in the Middle East



that the colonial administration set up in 1957 a Fact-Finding Mission consisting of R. B. Sergeant, professor of Arabic at London University and V. L. Griffiths, an ex-Sudan civil servant. Its recommendations, which came out in 1958, included extending special educational help to what it described as the economically and educationally backward Muslim communities. This, however, was never implemented.<sup>95</sup> A follow-up conference was held in 1958 in Dar es Salaam to consider the problem.<sup>96</sup> Again no substantive action followed its findings.<sup>97</sup>

The debates in the Kenyan and Tanganyikan legislative councils (Legcos) reflected similar concerns which were expressed by Muslim members. In Tanganyika Muslim members of the legislative assembly called for the integration of schools as a way of ending the threat of conversion.<sup>98</sup> Although Muslims in Tanganyika outnumbered Christians by a ratio of 3: 2 (this is according to the 1957 census)<sup>99</sup> they were as a community much more backward in education than the Christians. Also, the Census Report showed that the proportions of Christians who had received schooling, that is, "education ever" (71.3 percent for males and 39.2 percent for females) were four times higher than the corresponding proportions for Muslims (18 percent for males and 4 percent for females).<sup>100</sup> In a speech in the Legco in 1956, V. M. Nezerali, a wealthy Ismaili retailer, attacked the government for not acting fairly toward its Muslim subjects in Tanzania. He accused the colonial government of dividing the population into two groups, one of which was ignored (the Muslims) while the other was promoted in the educational and economic spheres. In the same year Dr. S. G. Hassan was making similar statements in the Kenyan assembly.<sup>101</sup> The leader of TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) and later the head of government, Julius Nyerere, was quite sympathetic to Muslim concerns and expressed the view that they were not getting a fair deal in the educational field. Nevertheless, being a product of the mission school (he was particularly influenced by the Maryknoll missionaries), he defended them for the work they had done in providing education.<sup>102</sup>

The debate on the Education Ordinance of 1961 set in motion the process to open up mission schools to children of all faiths.<sup>103</sup> Part six, section 30 (1) and (2) of the Ordinance declared the right of Muslim parents to withdraw their children from religious instruction, and also pointed to the necessity of making arrangements, as far as was possible, to provide children religious instruction and worship of the type desired by the parents.<sup>104</sup> This regulation was welcomed by Muslims although what a half dozen Muslim speakers in the legislative assembly had been calling for was state control (nationalization) of the schools.

The matter of education was such a burning issue with Muslims that in 1959 in Dar es Salaam elderly former TAA (Tanganyika African Association which had been supported by coastal, including Tangan, townsmen) activists (TAA had been succeeded by TANU) wanted Tanganyikan independence to be delayed until Muslims achieved educational parity with Christians.<sup>105</sup> Muslims were concerned about education which opens up the avenue for administrative, political and economic participation in society. Nevertheless, TANU was able to rally enough shaykhs to the nationalist position and to overrule these elders.<sup>106</sup> Thus the independence struggle witnessed the disparity between Muslims and Christians as an issue which could have serious implications. This episode reveals the seriousness of the educational issue which could easily become transformed into a political one. The late 1950s was a period noted for the rise in the political importance of Islam, particularly in Africa, and coincidentally Muslim leaders, most notably Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣir of Egypt, became leaders of anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist campaigns or policies.<sup>107</sup> President al-Nāṣir was a vocal critic of imperialism particularly after the ill-fated attack on Suez in 1957, an issue which won him sympathy among Muslims worldwide.<sup>108</sup> With independence looming large on the political horizons of many African countries, Muslim expectations began to rise about the need to improve their lot, especially in the all-important

area of education. Thus the anti-imperialist propaganda of Radio Cairo in its Kiswahili broadcasts to Tanganyika informed the Muslims that they had a raw deal in education.<sup>109</sup>

### **AMNUT and Daawa al-Islamiyya: Muslim Political Pressure for Equal Educational Opportunities**

It was concern for Muslim advancement in education and government jobs that the All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT) was formed in 1957. AMNUT was based in Dar es Salaam (it was not active in Tanga) where it had attracted some conservative coastal leaders, elderly TAA activists, who were its founders. It tended to act as a Muslim pressure group in the nation's capital.<sup>110</sup> In 1959 its Arab vice-president, H. S. al-'Alawī, urged the British government to delay independence until Muslims acquired sufficient education to be able to share equitably in the fruits of independence.<sup>111</sup> The organization was roundly denounced by Muslim leaders who were strong supporters of TANU. Nevertheless, the situation became more serious when elements within TANU itself put forward "Muslim" demands; it was then that the party reacted quickly by providing an Elders Section within TANU.<sup>112</sup> The Elders wing of the party was dominated by the coastal and Islamic branches of TANU based in Dar es Salaam and Tanga.<sup>113</sup> In Tanga TANU had attracted Muslims such as Mwalimu Kihere and Tuwa Abdalla, who had previously been active in the Digo Association of Tanga. The party's head office in Dar es Salaam, however, was careful not to have on its central committee or the Elders Section of the party a *mzee* (elder) like Shaykh Sulaiman Taqdiri who in 1958 had to be expelled because he made religiously-based demands.<sup>114</sup> At a maulid festival which was attended by Nyerere, Taqdiri pointed out that Muslims were not getting a fair deal. More seriously, he complained that there were not enough Muslims on the TANU election slate. Nyerere took action by having him expelled from the party because he had mixed religion with politics.

Muslim pressures did not let up after independence in October 1961. In fact, AMNUT continued to lobby TANU to support Muslim education. The president of AMNUT even made complaints that Muslims were underrepresented among students sent to study overseas. AMNUT also challenged TANU to hold elections when it became obvious that the government's intention was to introduce a one-party state. In 1963 TANU threatened to ban it as it had done other political parties. Vice-president Rashid Kawawa, a staunch nationalist and a die-hard supporter of Nyerere, was particularly critical of AMNUT which he saw as promoting disunity.<sup>115</sup> The leaders of AMNUT and TANU did not share the same view regarding using the political arena as a forum for interest articulation. Nyerere's government wanted to keep the "church" and the state separate although, as Ali Mazrui has pointed out, while this was possible, not even in the United States has the separation of religion from politics always been possible in practice.<sup>116</sup> This policy has affected Muslims most as it is they who have been very active in pressuring the government to redress the imbalance between the different communities in education. Generally, however, Muslim activity stems from the fact that there is a strong tendency among Muslim communities to see the religious and political spheres as being inseparable.<sup>117</sup> At any rate, a number of AMNUT leaders were arrested because the government was afraid they might mobilize Muslim opinion in opposition to its policies. The more immediate concern for these Muslims was the fact that although independence had been won and Africans had begun to assume administrative roles, the distribution of rewards favoured colonial educated Christians who were consolidating their hold of civil service and technocratic positions.

Among opponents of TANU were two prominent Pan-Islamists: Chief Said Abdalla Fundikira, an important chief in Tanzania and formerly a minister of justice and the president of the EAMWS in Tanzania and his brother-in-law, the Zanzibar-born Shaykh Husein, president of AMNUT and the representative of the Saudi Arabian-based

World Muslim League in East Africa, a congress which stood for the promotion of Muslim educational advancement.<sup>118</sup> Fundikira was among those who opposed the idea of a one-party state. He was potentially a rallying figure for the traditional elite whose position weakened because the supra-tribal (national) forces had created a new leadership which challenged it.<sup>119</sup> The TANU leadership was shrewd when dealing with such opposition. For instance, when chief Fundikira in his capacity as chairman of the National Agricultural Products Board was arrested in 1963 on some dubious and politically motivated charge of corruption and released later the same year, there was an outpouring of Muslim feeling as expressed in a large demonstration in Dar es Salaam.<sup>120</sup> He resigned from TANU shortly afterwards and became an outspoken critic of the one-party state. Shaykh Husein who founded a party, the Nationalist Enterprise Party, wanted to Fundikira to lead it. However, by 1964, whether by choice or owing to political pressure, Fundikira had rejoined TANU.

A new Muslim society was formed in October of 1963 to promote unification and advancement of Muslims, for instance, by expanding the number of Muslim schools. The society known as Daawa al-Islamiyya, sent a letter to all bishops and religious leaders complaining about the lack of parity in educational matters between Muslims and Christians and also about the indifference of the government towards Muslim attempts to set up schools.<sup>121</sup> What the society was arguing was that Muslims needed special help from the government as they did not have any institutions on a par with church mission to direct and fund their educational programs. Their point was that the non-Muslims had benefitted from both (government-assisted) mission and government schools, the latter being more numerous in certain areas than in others. Shortly after the release of the letter which censured the government for frustrating Muslim plans to set up their own schools, Khamis J. Abedi, president of the society, and Abdillahi S. Plantan were sent to detention camps in Mnulu and Chunya "in the interests of security."<sup>122</sup>

What the above discussion reveals is a nationalist TANU strongly reacting to pressure from Muslim groups. More specifically, there was apprehension on the part of Nyerere that the highly emotional subject of Muslim educational backwardness might create dissension and disunity in the country. Therefore, in order to keep Muslim demands at bay, he kept on insisting that Tanzania's politics knows no religion. Religious issues, particularly involving Islam and Muslims, are considered too sensitive for public discussion in Tanzania. The regime wanted the Muslims, rather than be alarmed at the slow pace of their community's educational progress, to be patient and trust the government to change conditions which promoted inequality in the country. While the government was aware that inequalities, including those in the educational sphere, existed (around the mid-1960s as many as 90 percent of the students in Tanzanian secondary schools were Christians)<sup>123</sup> its attitude was to downplay their importance in the interests of the larger equalities envisioned in the new political culture.<sup>124</sup> Accordingly, in keeping with its policy first announced in 1961 to provide free education for all, the government took over a few selected church mission and other private schools, including Muslim ones. However, secondary schools and seminaries were not affected. In 1969/70, following the Education Act of 1969, TANU assumed control of the primary school system as a way of ending differential access to education by virtue of religion, geographical origin, class or ethnicity and also as a way of promoting education for social development. While this was welcome news to Muslims it also meant that their schools (with the exception of four all of which had become secondary schools in the 1970s) were made public institutions. Their number was not inconsiderable for according to Mayanja Kiwanuka by 1966 the EAMWS was running over 86 schools, including 2 secondary schools of Kinondoni in Dar es Salaam and Kibohehe in Moshi.<sup>125</sup> It was still a small number compared to the national total of 4,508 primary schools with 797,000 pupils and 102 secondary schools with 32,000 pupils.<sup>126</sup>

The above measures notwithstanding, the regional advantage in education that certain areas, notably the Kilimanjaro region, enjoyed over others continued. Despite government attempts to close the gap by either not expanding primary education or issuing directives to block further construction of primary schools in the area, by 1970 the Kilimanjaro region continued to enrol twice as many pupils per 1, 000 residents as the national average.<sup>127</sup> Some of these students were studying in unregistered schools which later became registered when policies were relaxed. Thus the Chagga were enjoying a disproportionate share of educational opportunities, and the Chagga, the Haya, and the Nyakyusa were overrepresented in administrative and other important positions in society. Nyerere denied that there was any evidence of tribalism. In a speech in which he addressed the issue, he pointed out that

It so happened the Tanzanians who had the opportunity for higher education under the colonialists were mostly Wahaya, Wachagga, and Wanyakyusa. And because most of the education was provided by Missionaries, most of these people are also Christians. That was our inheritance. These conditions will change, but they have not changed yet. And for these reasons, when we get rid of the Europeans who were doing responsible jobs, and give these jobs to Tanzanians, the people who get them come mostly from one or the other of these three tribes.<sup>128</sup>

The persistence of regional disparities led the government to take over control of primary schools from voluntary agencies; to attempt to allocate educational resources in favour of certain regions; and to introduce as a goal the achievement of universal primary education by 1989 as a way of eliminating inter-regional differences.<sup>129</sup> The inequalities which existed at post-primary school level would be reduced by: secondary school selection being done on regional basis as far as practicable; and adding non-academic criteria (in 1974 the government decided to include vocational and political experience) to selection for university entry.<sup>130</sup> At the primary school level, these policies have had some limited success although they have not closed the gap altogether. As David Court has pointed out, introduction of universal primary education broadens the base of subsequent

selections and gives the semblance of mobility and opportunity which serves as a safety valve against popular discontent.<sup>131</sup> The churches once again started to open new although poorly equipped unregistered schools. More importantly, parents in the Kilimanjaro area, with church support, began to open private secondary schools, conceding the firmer control of government over primary education, and by 1973-74 a quarter of all secondary schools in the country were located in this region.<sup>132</sup> Thus the measures introduced by the government can be manipulated up to a point as academic requirements are still necessary and certain regions have a large number of educated secondary school pupils. Secondly, the expansion in the number of private secondary schools in the educationally advantaged areas with a high ratio of primary schools has created more opportunities for students from these regions to be selected to institutes of higher learning since public and private secondary school leavers compete on an equal footing for admission.<sup>133</sup> Among the private schools, there exists several dozen exclusively Christian secondary schools, called seminaries, which provide additional educational opportunities for the Christians. This is one of the reasons why Christians are overrepresented at higher levels of study. Nevertheless, according to the 1978 report based on a Commission set up by the Christian Council of Churches, there was evidence that Muslims and the poorer classes did not fare well under the rural vocational educational system which has tended to perpetuate class divisions.<sup>134</sup>

### **The Persistence of Educational Inequalities in Socialist Tanzania**

How have Muslims benefitted from government attempts to eliminate educational inequalities? At primary school level, Muslims have benefitted since Muslim children form a substantial number of pupils enrolled in schools located predominantly in Muslim areas. At secondary school level, however, the Muslim percentage is considerably reduced. This is true of Tanga as it is of other Muslim areas. Apart from BAKWATA-run Jumuiya



(Muslim) secondary school and the mainly Indian Popatlal Secondary school, the other secondary schools of Tanga such as Usagara, Tanga, Galanos and St. Joseph have a larger intake of students who are either from up-country Tanzania or from areas of Tanga's hinterland with deepest contact with Christian missions. In the case of Dar es Salaam (which is 67 percent Muslim), for instance, the city council's education department has figures which show that the percentage of Muslim primary school pupils selected to join form one (grade nine) stood at between 21 and 25 percent for the period 1978 to 1981.<sup>135</sup> Muslim representation in high schools, form five and six (grade thirteen and fourteen), and institutions of higher learning is extremely low indicating that only a small percentage of Muslims make it to higher levels of study. The tables presented here show Muslim enrollment figures in the period indicated.

**Table II**  
**The Percentage of Muslim and Non-Muslim Students**  
**Selected for Form Five, 1978-81, in Tanzania**

Year	Muslims Selected	Non-Muslims Selected	Total
1978	12	88	100
1979	13	87	100
1980	14	86	100
1981	12	88	100
Average	13	87	100

Source: Ministry of National Education, Secondary/Technical Division, 1978-1981.  
Cited in Mohamed al-Hajj R. Kassim, "The Impact of Madrasa Education on Primary School Performance" (Unpubl. post-graduate diploma thesis, Dar es Salaam University, 1983), 8-9.

Table III

The Percentage of Muslim and Non-Muslim Candidates Selected to Join Various Training Institutions in 1980

Training Institutions	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
The Institute of Finance Management (IFM)	8	92	100
Institute of Development Management (IDM)	11	89	100
Dar es Salaam and Arusha Technical College	15	85	100
Ardhi Institute	13	87	100
Institute of Water Resources	10	90	100
Dar es Salaam School of Accountancy	15	85	100
Average	12	88	100

Source: **Daily News**, May/June, 1980. Cited in Mohamed al-Hajj R. Kassim, "The Impact of Madrasa Education on Primary School Performance," 8-9.

Table IV

The Percentage of Muslim and Non-Muslim Students Selected for First Degree Courses in the University of Dar es Salaam

Year	Muslim	Non-Muslim	Total
1978-79	14	86	100
1979-80	14	86	100
1980-81	11	89	100
1981-82	16	84	100
Average	14	86	100

Source: **Daily News**, June 1978-1981. Cited in Mohamed al-Hajj R. Kassim, "The Impact of Madrasa Education on Primary School Performance," 8-9.

**Table V**  
**University Students by Regional Origin (1972-73)**

North & Northeast	South	Northwestern	Western & Central	Eastern
33.3 %	31.6 %	17.5 %	12.3 %	5.3 %
76	72	40	28	12
Kilimanjaro 48	Mbeya 28	West Lake 34	Mwanza 11	Morogoro 12
Tanga 16	Ruvuma 20	Kigoma 6	Tabora 6	Coast 0
Mara 8	Iringa 16		Dodoma 4	
Arusha 4	Lindi 4		Singida 4	
	Mtwara 4		Shinyanga 3	

Source: Abel G. M. Ishumi, "The Educated Elite: A Survey of East African Students at a Higher Institution of Learning," *Access to Education in East Africa* 25 (Michigan: Michigan State University, 1974), 68.

Table V brings out clearly the overall educational imbalance between regions.<sup>136</sup> Data for this study was obtained through interviews of a random sample of students, one-third of the student body, at Dar es Salaam University. In terms of sex, male students were greatly overrepresented (80 percent). Table V shows that about half the students were from the regions of Kilimanjaro, West Lake and Mbeya. Many of the rest came from Ruvuma, Tanga, Iringa, Morogoro and Mwanza. The Coastal region did not have even a single representative. When the geographical patterns are translated into ethnic terms one expects to find a preponderance of ethnic groups such as the Chagga and the Haya who have enjoyed a lead in university entrance. In terms of religion, the study shows that 9.1 percent were Muslim, 87 percent Christian and 3.9 percent others. Over the period the 1970s and the 1980s Muslim enrollment has averaged around 14 percent.

The enrollment statistics in Tables 2, 3 and 4 indicate the educational imbalance in favour of the Christians will continue in the foreseeable future unless special measures are taken to bridge the gap in higher education. So long as Muslims constitute a mere 14

percent of the student population at Dar es Salaam University and 12 per of the students at various training institutions, they will not fill in higher skilled and decision-making positions in society in proportion to their numbers.<sup>137</sup> These jobs will fall mainly to Christians, the privileged of Tanzanian society, whose education has enabled them to dominate or to be overrepresented in government ministries, administrations, the parastatals and the banks.<sup>138</sup> Education is a key factor which, combined with bureaucratic employment and political involvement, is the pattern which determines elite recruitment in Tanzania.<sup>139</sup> A comparative analysis of religious affiliation among Tanzanian elites (the influential who get the most of what is available) in the late 1960s shows that 28.6 percent were Muslims, 25.7 percent Catholic, 36.2 percent Protestants and 9.5 percent "Christian."<sup>140</sup> The commitment to egalitarianism notwithstanding, the Christian elite has been able to maintain its privileged position in society. Indeed, a careful observer of East African affairs, Ali Mazrui, has noted that

Most observers do not even realize that there are more Muslims than Christians in Tanzania... but the risk that Muslims might become increasingly discontented as they witness a disproportionate share of privilege enjoyed by Christians continues to hang over Tanzania, especially in years which would follow the departure of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.<sup>141</sup>

It is the belief of Muslim youths that Christians have succeeded in maintaining the existing educational disparity due to favouritism made possible by the monopoly enjoyed by Christians at the highest echelons of the Ministry of Education.<sup>142</sup> It was partly in response to this imbalance that Nyerere's successor, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi appointed four new Muslim directors in the Ministry of Education.<sup>143</sup> This is the dilemma that Nyerere's successors will continue to face in the foreseeable future until genuine equality between religious groups in all aspects of national life can be achieved. The above notwithstanding, it is quite ironic that in November 1985 when Nyerere (who did not retire from politics until 1990) handed over power to Mwinyi, he claimed that he had corrected the imbalance between Muslims and Christians with the result that Christians no longer

commanded any advantage over Muslims.<sup>144</sup> The facts, however, belie this claim. Glaring inequalities between Christians and Muslims continue to persist to the present time, especially if one considers that Muslims continue to account for a small percentage of total student intake (between 10 to 15 percent) at Dar es Salaam University and Muslims form about five percent of the academic staff.<sup>145</sup> Therefore, as long as Muslims (given their educational background) are employed in lower clerical and other subordinate jobs while managerial or white-collar positions fall to Christians it means that efforts to end inequalities have not succeeded. In addition to having access to government schools, Christians have their own private schools, including seminaries. These private schools account for about one-third of total secondary school enrollment. Also, as has been pointed out, the policy of education for social development or *ujamaa* which, among other things, aims at enhancing education of less-privileged groups, "has not had the desired effects when applied to selection for secondary schools, an area where there was considerable scope for patronage and nepotism."<sup>146</sup>

### **The Seminary Dispute of 1981-82**

In this section we shall examine two conflicting religious tendencies between accommodationist elements within BAKWATA and Muslim activists belonging to Warsha, a Muslim writers' workshop. In imitation of Warsha (which has devoted a great amount of energy to organizing Muslim youths) a number of Muslim youth study groups have sprung up in various parts of the country such as Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tanga with names such as Uvikita. These groups have been established for the purpose of mobilizing Muslim youths to educate themselves about Islam and to raise their awareness about what needs to be done to uplift the condition of Muslims. The dispute we describe here is more related to Dar es Salaam (more specifically, the Dar es Salaam-based Warsha) although Tanga was also affected and a leading Tangan scholar was deeply involved. While the dispute is

related to Muslim efforts to better themselves educationally, issues related to Islam and nationalism also emerge. The connections between local and national issues will be made where our information allows us to do so. This section, like the rest of this chapter, deals with the macro-context.

## **The Origin of Seminaries**

### **On-going Muslim Efforts to Establish Muslim schools**

Since the early 1960s Muslims had been pressing for more modern Muslim schools where secular subjects would be taught alongside Koranic religious instruction. The tendency in the country, however, was in the direction of secular schools where religious lessons were offered twice a week by both Muslims and Christians. Muslims began to do this in some places although at the lower primary level only.<sup>147</sup> Even then because of lack of permanently employed Islamic teachers not all primary schools offered religious lessons to Muslim students. The situation was much worse at the secondary school level where enough qualified teachers were not available. There was, therefore, a felt need, toward the end of the 1960s, among Muslims not just to train qualified teachers or religious personnel to teach religious courses, but also to work out a religious education syllabus for primary and secondary schools. This was not an easy task and progress was very slow. The Ministry of Education extended assistance to BAKWATA by loaning it a specialist in education from Morogoro College of National Education.<sup>148</sup> The specialist spent three months working with the council to prepare a syllabus for primary and secondary schools. Some Muslims even at this early stage felt that the two religious periods per week were not enough and that Muslim schools which offered more religious courses should be established.

Muslim plans to start schools known as "seminaries" (private schools intended to bring together Islamic and secular sciences/subjects) first surfaced in the early 1970s although the matter did not receive serious consideration until the mid-1970s. The Tanganyika scholar, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, the secretary general of BAKWATA raised the issue in the meetings of the council in 1975 and again in 1977 and each time the matter died on paper. The idea of establishing seminaries had its origin in Muslim plans to have the Ministry of National Education allow Muslim students to appear for an examination on a subject dealing with Islam just as Christian students had the option to sit for a paper entitled Bible Knowledge as part of the ordinary level (grade twelve) examinations. The matter was brought to the attention of the Minister of education and it was not long before the proposal to introduce an examination paper on Islam was approved. Subsequently, at the suggestion of Muhammad H. Malik, then a teacher at Tambaza government public school, who discussed the idea with Burhan Mtengwa and Mavura, a seminar was planned to which Muslim parents would be invited to discuss how to go about preparing a religious education syllabus for "O" level students. The seminar, which was opened by Shaaban Tuli, a government minister, took place in December 1975, and was attended by a number of BAKWATA leaders such as Saleh Masasi, Adam Nasibu, and also Shaykh Qasim b. Juma who is associated with the council. The seminar discussed the objective of working out a religious education syllabus and ended up passing a resolution calling for the establishment of a committee to write books on Islam for secondary school students. This was the birth of Warsha ya Waandishi wa Kiislamu or simply Warsha (Workshop of Muslim Writers), which was conceived earlier by a group of young energetic Muslim teachers at Kinondoni secondary school in Dar es Salaam. The group consisted of about eight people who met every Sunday to hold workshops. These young Muslims had formed study circles to learn more about Islam. Their teacher was Muhammad Malik, a secular teacher (originally from Pakistan) who taught during his own free time young people who wanted to learn more about Islam. As a Warsha member, Malik was involved

in the efforts to write and edit books even before the government had given its approval to the Muslim curriculum project. He had taken the first step by publishing at his own expense a book entitled **Islamiat Book 1**. The fact that he was not a Tanzanian did not create any problems with the old guard of BAKWATA. He did not hold a position within the council, and so they could have dismissed him any time. Besides, those who had opposed non-Tanzanians on nationalistic grounds had done so over the sensitive matter of handling the finances of the association. Malik offered his services as a volunteer.

Muhammad Malik played such a key role in the evolution of a broader Islamic outlook among young Tanzanian students (the Muslim youth in Warsha being foremost) that it will not be out of place to say a few words about him.

Malik is originally from Pakistan but moved to Tanzania in 1965 to work as a teacher. His qualifications include an M.A. degree in Philosophy from a British University. He had connections with Maudūdī's Jamaat-i Islāmī which had shaped his understanding of Islam as a religion and code of conduct in life. He had also been exposed to the writings of other Muslim activists such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood scholar, Sayyid Quṭb. Both Maudūdī and Sayyid Quṭb had produced literature aimed at raising the religious consciousness of Muslims to make them active and live according to the religious requirement of Islam. Their mission, as they saw it, was to rouse Muslims from their apathy and inactivity, that is, transform them from being passive Muslims to being active believers working for the cause of Islam. Their view, according to Malik, was that to work for Islam (which is different and is opposed to ideologies such as nationalism which is addressed to a particular people) is to serve all of humanity.<sup>149</sup> The writings of scholars such as these promoted a religious resurgence in different parts of the Muslim world.

In Tanzania Malik concentrated his efforts on the Muslim youth since this group was a fertile ground with which he could work to create a new Muslim awareness. His



technique was to teach his students not so much about fiqh (legal matters), but about the basic principles or philosophy of Islam. He inspired in his students an understanding of Islam that went beyond mere religious dogma, that is, Islam as a complete way of life. This type of teaching moulded the thinking of the Muslim youth in Warsha in an activist direction. Yet this activism by Warsha which is strongly for an Islamic system is often alarming to secular governments which fear the influence of Islamic groups.

The main task of Warsha, as we have already mentioned, was to prepare a syllabus and write books for Kinondoni secondary school and ultimately other schools as well.<sup>150</sup> Warsha, however, given its religious orientation, wanted to educate (Muslims) for the purpose of implementing the Islamic order. This was particularly so when later Warsha decided to reach out to the masses by broadening the scope of its educational efforts to include writing and translating books into Kiswahili for the benefit of the larger Muslim public. Kinondoni emerged as a centre for writing and translating Islamic books, the bulk of which were in English, into Kiswahili. These books had been donated by the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but BAKWATA had not made much use of them until then.<sup>151</sup> This was one reason why Warsha was not happy with the way BAKWATA was running things.

From the mid-1970s onwards Muslim efforts to establish seminaries intensified. The young Muslims, for whom seminaries was part of their programmatic orientation, pushed hard for the setting up of Muslim seminaries (schools which teach modern subjects in addition to religion) since they were aware that Christians had many exclusively Christian seminaries. For instance, at a seminar organized by MSAUD (Muslim Student Association of University of Dar es Salaam) delegates passed a resolution calling on BAKWATA to convert Kinondoni secondary school in Dar es Salaam and Jumuiya secondary school in Tanga into Muslim seminaries.<sup>152</sup> Within BAKWATA Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy was successful in getting the seminary idea off the planning

stage when a Muslim delegation met with the Minister of Education to discuss plans to change the status of Muslim schools. BAKWATA eventually received permission to convert three of its four private secondary schools into seminaries. Nothing was lost when the private schools were converted into seminaries, except that (as in the case of Jumuiya secondary school, for instance) an afternoon session was created in order to provide sufficient time for the teaching of secular as well as religious subjects. The permission to convert these school into seminaries represented a triumph of some sort for Shaykh Muhammad Ali who until then, in the eyes of his critics, had nothing to show for his long association with BAKWATA.<sup>153</sup>

Another triumph for Shaykh Muhammad Ali was the fact that at the end of the 1970s he had survived an internal power struggle within BAKWATA of which he had been the main target. The central committee of BAKWATA headed by the chairman, Saleh Masasi, attempted to have him expelled from the society or removed from his position as the secretary general to be replaced by Masasi's colleague, Juma Mlimdoka. Shaykh Muhammad Ali, being a lawyer, decided to make a stand and challenge his expulsion as being unconstitutional. The final outcome of the power struggle was that Masasi's scheme having failed, he was forced to leave BAKWATA. Shortly afterwards, Shaykh Idi Chaurembo, the deputy chairman, also left the council. Thereafter a new caretaker central committee was set up under the chairmanship of the grand shaykh of BAKWATA, Shaykh Hemed b. Juma, who is Shaykh Muhammad Ali's cousin.

By this time some of the youth had already entered BAKWATA and established a foothold there for Warsha. Previous attempts by these youth to have Umoja wa Vijana wa Kiislamu Tanzania or Uvikita (Tanzania Muslim Youth Union) registered having failed (though this did not stop some youth in Tanga from starting an association later by this name which was modelled after Warsha), they decided to join BAKWATA and seek to promote their goals from within the council.<sup>154</sup> This strategy had its merits given that

Warsha (whose support base was mainly among young people, especially students) had and still has limited resources in material and personnel. The youth were more than happy to see Shaykh Muhammad Ali reinstated and, in fact, had played a part in the efforts to restore him. He is a learned and honest person and they hoped to be able to work with him to promote their goals. This was more than they could hope for in the case of some of the other BAKWATA leaders, for instance, Adam Nasibu, who (during the seminary dispute which is examined below) despatched letters to government leaders informing them which Muslim groups should be watched closely. Shaykh Muhammad Ali is described as being a moderate person who attempts to be on good terms with everyone although he is said to be rather cautious where politicians are concerned.

Having secured government permission to convert Muslim schools into seminaries, Shaykh Muhammad Ali announced that the two schools, Kinondoni and Jumuiya, would begin to function as seminaries immediately. In 1981 conversion took effect. Since the two schools operated Forms I to IV this meant that there would be a transitional period of a few years during which non-Muslim students already studying in these schools would be phased out as each succession of students completed their last grade. A number of changes were introduced in the schools with respect to the syllabus, school uniform (which had to reflect the Islamic dress code) and the school or classroom environment. The Jumuiya seminary required that boys wear white shirts and long white pants while girls had to dress in long loose Punjabi-style trousers over which gowns reaching knee level were to be worn. Students were expected to observe the Muslim ritual prayer. Every attempt was made by the school authorities to encourage the Islamic pattern of behaviour. The environment of the seminary was kept Islamic in order that pupils acquire modern education and Islamic religious teachings. Religious education was seen as a means of fostering the moral values of the youth. For this purpose, a number of religious textbooks were produced by Kinondoni seminary to be used for the teaching of the new subjects,

Koranic Studies, Arabic, Islamic history, and fiqh which had been added to the syllabus.<sup>155</sup> Jumuiya being a morning school the new subjects could not be taught within the available time period and so an afternoon session had to be introduced. This led the school to start providing meals for the pupils. Despite the added responsibilities the seminaries were off to a good start.

Muhammad Malik became closely associated with Kinondoni Muslim seminary. In fact, once the school became a seminary, Malik's son was installed as the new headmaster to help shape the character of the new school. The Muslim youth also recruited the services of Malik to conduct several classes on Islam. He spoke on a wide variety of topics such as Islamic economics, Islamic system, Islamic personality and so on. He gave public lectures at Dar es Salaam University, presented papers at conferences and taught Islam on radio every Friday morning in a fifteen-minute radio program aired by Radio Tanzania, Dar es Salaam. These radio talks (for instance, one which was titled "Islam versus Marxism") generated much interest among educated Muslims. On another front, in an effort to disseminate information on Islam and Muslims BAKWATA, which had entertained the idea of establishing a newsletter for over a decade, began the publication in May, 1981 of a Muslim monthly newsletter called *Muislamu*. The young elements in BAKWATA contributed articles of high quality which Muslims read with interest.<sup>156</sup>

### **Reaction to Muslim Seminaries**

Almost from the beginning, the seminaries, owing to the fact that they were strictly for Muslims, came under criticism of Christians.<sup>157</sup> Christian complaints began to grow in intensity and pressure mounted to deal with the situation. In April 1981 the Ministry of National Education issued a guideline regarding government educational policy with respect to seminaries.<sup>158</sup> The guideline was based on the Education Law No. 25 of 1978 which

defined a seminary as being a religious institution and not a school. The guideline declared that seminaries not being schools they would not be entitled to the privileges of regular schools. This meant that while seminary students would be considered as form IV candidates, yet as private candidates starting in 1982 they would have to pay a fee in order to appear for the national examinations. These students would suffer the disadvantage of not being eligible for selection to form V in government schools and they would have to attend forms V and VI in private schools. Moreover, these students not having filled out form IV and form VI selection forms the government would not be responsible to seek jobs for them. Muslim parents were worried about the consequences of these regulations on the education and job prospects for their children. BAKWATA leaders had not foreseen this development as Muslim schools had been converted to seminaries at the beginning of 1981, a few months before the guideline came out. They had assumed that private secondary school leavers would compete on an equal footing (as had been the case all along) with their public school counterparts for admission to form V in government schools. BAKWATA attempted to seek clarification from the Ministry of Education with respect to the new regulations only to be told that the guideline could not be changed as it constituted government policy.

The seminaries continued to attract so much criticism from Christians that soon the matter reached the attention of the highest political authorities. The subject of Islam and Muslims being a highly controversial and emotional one in Tanzania, Nyerere wanted the matter to be looked into carefully. When dealing with sensitive issues involving Muslims, Nyerere very often left the execution of the political decision reached by his government to highly placed Muslim members of his government. In this case, Aboud Jumbe, the Vice-President, and Rashid Kawawa, the chairman of the ruling party and a member of the legislative assembly, were instructed by him to deal with the situation. A meeting was held on November 29, 1981 to advise or persuade Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy to

change the status of Kinondoni seminary. The meeting was chaired by Aboud Jumbe and was attended by Rashid Kawawa, Adam Nasibu, the deputy secretary general of BAKWATA (who took the minutes), Shaykh Abbas Mustafa, a religious scholar from Sudan who was at the time the director of al-Haramayn Islamic Centre in Dar es Salaam, and Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy.<sup>159</sup>

Aboud Jumbe explained that the purpose of the meeting was to tackle a problem for which the politicians had found no solution. He wanted to know why Kinondoni, a regular secondary school, had been converted into a seminary; if the intention was to provide religious education for Muslim pupils, he didn't see why this desire could not be met by using already existing religious institutions to achieve this goal. Shaykh Muhammad Ali responded by informing him that the objective behind establishing Muslim seminaries was two-fold: to impart religious education to Muslim secondary school students who did not have a proper or sound grounding in the basics of their religion; and, to promote and continue to foster secular education which was lacking among Muslims. He pointed out that a large number of the Muslim youth did not benefit from the opportunities for higher education; those who did, moreover, did not display sufficient understanding of Islam and had little exposure to the teachings of their religion in the schools. This was unlike the situation for Christian students who benefitted on both counts; that is, from opportunities for higher education and from exposure to religious training in twenty Christian seminaries. It was under these circumstances that Muslims decided to set up seminaries for Muslims to which they could look for educating their children in both secular and religious subjects. Since BAKWATA lacked funds to establish new institutions, the council considered as a more practical solution the option of converting into seminaries schools already under its control. This plan was immediately implemented once approval was obtained from the Ministry of Education.

The next person to speak at the meeting was Shaykh Mustafa. When asked to offer his views on the seminary dispute he was shrewd enough to decline to comment on the issue saying that a problem of a purely religious nature had become entangled with politics. He did, however, seek clarification on one point: since Kinondoni became a seminary it had attracted the attention of many foreign (Muslim) visitors to Tanzania; should its status be changed, wouldn't these people be left with the impression that Tanzanian Muslims were being unjustly treated?<sup>160</sup> Rashid Kawawa responded by pointing out that what was being discussed was a domestic issue involving Tanzanian Muslims and reflecting the Tanzanian Muslim religious situation. He was quite aware that Muslims suffered educational handicaps in the past due to the policies of the Christian missions. Nevertheless, he asserted that the independent government of Tanzania had since attempted to rectify the situation by assuming control of the school system. He emphasized the fact that the party and the government were committed to a policy of making education open to all Tanzanians irrespective of their colour, creed or religious background. Given this understanding, the issue they were addressing was not whether or not Muslims should have seminaries, but whether a regular secondary school such as Kinondoni should have been converted into a seminary. He thought that the school should be returned to its former status. If Muslims wanted to set up a seminary he suggested that they could use the 30 acres of land available at Changombe Islamic Centre to erect a school building. Both Kawawa and Jumbe attempted to impress on Shaykh Muhammad Ali the need to do the following: to seek an alternative site to locate the present seminary in order that Kinondoni school return to its former status; to find ways to finance the establishment of such a seminary, including seeking contributions from abroad; and to plan to build more seminaries. With respect to seeking funds from Muslim countries, Shaykh Mustafa advised that it would be necessary to send a delegation headed by government ministers in order to demonstrate to the potential donor countries that the Tanzanian government was supportive or appreciative of religious efforts.

It may be necessary to ask at this juncture why the establishment of just two Muslim seminaries created panic and so much intense opposition from a number of quarters? If it is argued that the government wanted to uphold a principle of equality of educational opportunity to all which had been violated, this does not square off with the fact that there existed ten times as many Christian seminaries as Muslim ones and yet Christians were not called upon to account or justify the exclusive nature of their schools. The irony of the situation was that it was the government in the first place which had granted permission to Muslims to change the status of their schools.

It is possible, as has been suggested by a number of people interviewed, that the government was afraid that the seminaries may become a potential seedbed for the development of Islamic activism. The Muslim youth were arousing public interest in Islam through their seminaries, the newsletter publication, the radio talks and other activities in which they were involved. Their dynamism captured the attention of Muslims as they sought to expand the role of religious institutions and scope of religious practice. Their influence was greater than their number suggests as they set the pattern of religious activism in the country. The Islamic subjects taught in the seminaries such as the course on Islamic history, which was a sympathetic portrayal of Islam and its early heroes who forged an empire and a civilization, emphasized the strong identity which exists in Islam between the religious and political communities. This was a much broader understanding of Islam than hitherto the students had been exposed to from listening to the sermons of some of the local walimu who are preoccupied mainly with Islamic ceremonies and rituals. There is no doubt that the seminaries raised the level of Islamic religious consciousness among the students. This could lead to mixing of religion with politics. This is a charge which has been levelled against Muslim individuals and groups on several occasions.<sup>161</sup>

When the meeting ended it was understood that Shaykh Muhammad Ali would take immediate action. Although reluctant at first, in the end, however, he did resist the



political pressure and allow the seminaries to continue in their second year. He could not take seriously the suggestion that he seek an alternative site to locate Kinondoni seminary. How could he do so when BAKWATA's lack of funds to build new institutions was the reason why Kinondoni had been converted in the first place. If the politicians wanted to break up the Muslim seminaries they would have to do it themselves. He could not bring himself to do so as establishing of seminaries was something he had fought for for a long time. He was afraid of losing credibility if he was seen by Muslims to be abandoning a major commitment of BAKWATA.<sup>162</sup> He was not alone in his stand on the issue; the youth shared his view and wholeheartedly supported him and even saw it fit to write papers to defend the need to maintain seminaries. By coincidence 1981 was also the same year that Aboud Jumbe upon his return from pilgrimage to Mecca had initiated BAMITA or Baraza la Misikiti Tanzania (Council of Tanzanian Mosques) with headquarters in Zanzibar.<sup>163</sup> The establishment of a new council which BAKWATA leaders saw as a rival created misunderstanding between Jumbe and some of these leaders, particularly Shaykh Muhammad Ali, who could not understand why Jumbe, on the one hand, said he wanted to help Muslims and had taken it upon himself to found BAMITA and yet, on the other hand, later got involved in efforts to break up Muslim seminaries.<sup>164</sup>

### **The Resignation of Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy and the Expulsion of Warsha from BAKWATA**

Once it became clear that Shaykh Muhammad Ali had no intention of dissolving the seminaries, intrigues began within BAKWATA to have him (along with the young Muslims whom BAKWATA's leaders and shaykhs found too radical for their liking) removed from the council. Some of these leaders who were competing for power, influence and authority saw in the seminary dispute an opportunity to secure positions for themselves within BAKWATA and win favour with the politicians by being instruments

for defeating seminaries.<sup>165</sup> The strategy chosen to accomplish this was to dig up material which reflected badly on the youth and, by implication, on Shaykh Muhammad Ali himself. It was hoped that this material would show the dangerous plans of the youth. For instance, a small Warsha booklet entitled *Uchumi* (inspired by ideas derived from Maudūdi's writings), which had been published before and virtually forgotten, was now on close scrutiny found to contain the following words: "siasa yoyote isiokuwa ya Kiislamu ni ya Kijahiliya" (any ideology/political system which is not based on Islam is one of *jahiliya*, jahiliya society being the opposite of the good society based on Islam). This information was passed on to the authorities. The statement was considered dangerous in its implications and suggested that Islam as an ideology might challenge ujamaa. It implied that Islam could not be implemented without political involvement. There was also a paper which discusses the educational imbalance in Tanzania and government educational efforts which thus far had succeeded in advancing one community at the expense of another, which was viewed as propaganda material.

Intrigues against Shaykh Muhammad Ali reached a peak on June 14, 1982 when a high-level meeting was held at the Ardhi Institute in Dar es Salaam to explain, not the seminary dispute, but what wrong the youth and the secretary general of BAKWATA had committed. The meeting heard several charges covering the period between 1980 and 1982 which were read against Shaykh Muhammad Ali by BAKWATA's investigation committee. Basically he was accused of having brought Warsha into BAKWATA for a purpose. He had welcomed the Muslim youth in the council and allowed them to write what was labelled as anti-government propaganda material which was then passed off as Islamic literature.<sup>166</sup> What this allegation reflected was the concern that a growing Islamic awareness which was not tailored to the party and nationalism might lead to mixing religion with politics. It was to avoid this that politicians had got involved in the establishment of BAKWATA in the first place. Mixing religion with politics was the charge levelled

against Warsha, which had not concerned itself with merely disseminating information on the ritual aspects of Islam but had taught about Islam as a complete way of life.<sup>167</sup> Shaykh Muhammad Ali was quite aware of what went on in the meeting particularly when, according to one source, allegations of a "Khomeini type" plan were brought against him.<sup>168</sup> He had read the political writing on the wall and decided it was time for him to step down.<sup>169</sup> The pressure tactic had succeeded in making him resign as the secretary general of BAKWATA. Subsequently, Warsha was expelled from BAKWATA and denied access to its facilities, as well as to the school, the newsletter publication and the radio programs. News of Warsha's expulsion from the council was reported on the radio and in the newspapers, *Uhuru* and *Daily News* of June 19, 1982. One youth whose picture appeared in the newspaper during this period was arrested by the police and detained for three days without charges being laid against him. Also, Muhammad Malik, regarded by BAKWATA to be a negative influence on the youth, was not granted a work permit by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to continue his stay in Tanzania. When they turned down his application to have his work permit renewed or extended he was left with no choice but to leave the country. The process of "weeding out" activists or "undesirable" elements from within BAKWATA having been concluded, from this period onwards relations between BAKWATA and Warsha became, at best, non-existent and, at worst, ridden with tension and suspicion.<sup>170</sup>

### **Muslim Reaction to the Breakup of the Seminaries in Dar es Salaam and Tanga**

With proponents of the seminaries out of the way, BAKWATA leaders were ready to break up the seminaries and return the two schools to their former status. Therefore, while in Tanga to attend a board meeting of the Jumuiya school, Adam Nasibu announced that the two seminaries would revert to their old status effective the following year, 1983.

He explained that the program to start seminaries had not been planned properly with respect to teachers, the future of the students and the overall objective of the schools. He also said that these students would have sat for the national examinations as private candidates and would not have qualified for admission to form V just as they would not have been eligible for selection for jobs. These statements were reported in **Mfanyakazi** of November 6, 1982. Adam Nasibu made reference to the Ministry of National Education guideline according to which graduates of seminaries would not have qualified for admission to form V in government schools. Nevertheless, he forgot to mention that in 1982, the year when the new regulations were supposed to come into effect, Christian private secondary school leavers from Christian seminaries competed as usual on an equal footing with public school students for admission to form V in government schools. This information is available in the Ministry of National Education booklet which contains the names of students who have been admitted to technical institutes and to form V in government schools. Had this guideline been applied from 1983 to students of Muslim seminaries only, this would have been a clear case of the government favouring Christian students. This raised suspicions among some Muslims that the guideline was really intended to function as a pressure tactic to induce them to accept the suggestion to break up the seminaries.

After hearing the announcement made by Adam Nasibu, concerned Muslim parents in Dar es Salaam held a meeting and asked for clarification from BAKWATA regarding the statements which appeared in **Mfanyakazi**. They wanted to know whether the statements made by Adam Nasibu constituted the official position of the council or whether they were the editorial opinion of a newspaper. Shaykh Juma Mikidadi, the educational secretary of BAKWATA, did not give a definitive response. Adam Nasibu himself was very evasive when questioned on the matter. Since the parents were not getting straight answers from BAKWATA leaders, they decided to set up a parents'

committee to follow up the question of dissolution of seminaries and to investigate and report on the matter. They held a number of meetings, one on the 13th and another one on the 20th of November, to keep the issue of the continuation of seminaries alive. The committee attempted to get BAKWATA leaders to appear at a meeting and explain to Muslims why they were being denied the only two seminaries when Christians had so many. Adam Nasibu did not show up at the meeting which was scheduled to take place at Kinondoni secondary school on December 4, 1982. Instead, it was the police that showed up to break up the meeting on the grounds that no prior authorization had been granted for it. Also, a few people were taken to the police station for further questioning. Subsequently, the committee despatched a letter to the Prime Minister (the letter is dated January 31, 1983) protesting against the use of law enforcement agencies to disrupt a religious meeting, particularly given the understanding that the state does not interfere in purely religious affairs.<sup>171</sup> The letter pointed out that the seminary issue had to be resolved by Muslims themselves as the matter concerned them and the leadership of the Muslim council. BAKWATA leaders had taken an important decision without consulting them. The least they could do was to meet with them to discuss the issue; instead, BAKWATA leaders had chosen to get the police involved hoping thereby to prevent Muslims from speaking out against their action. It is clear that the educational issue had political repercussions. More specifically, the fact that the police got involved confirms that the issue of the two seminaries was viewed as a political concern by the authorities.

In Tanga there was less vocal reaction to the dissolution of seminaries than was the case in Dar es Salaam. The religious situation in the two towns accounted for this difference in community reaction. Dar es Salaam was not plagued with the type of factionalism that Tanga was known for, and so it was easier to organize parents to act as a pressure group. In Tanga, as we have already seen, a good many of the parents were and still are supporters of one or the other of the large madrasas and until the leadership got

involved in the dispute the followers were less likely to mobilize or organize to make their feelings known. More importantly, the leader of the largest madrasa was not too keen on the seminaries, because the seminaries by offering Islamic subjects challenged the traditional domain of the madrasa system. In other words, there was fear of competitive pressure being asserted by Jumuiya on the large madrasas. Yet in the late 1940s, before the establishment of TAMTA when this school (then known as Tanga Muslim school) began to offer secular and religious courses, no fear or concern was expressed by any Muslim shaykh.

Parental pressure in Dar es Salaam in favour of maintaining the Muslim schools continued. No final solution in this matter, however, was reached and to this day the issue of the dissolution of seminaries has not been explained to the satisfaction of Muslims. In the sequel BAKWATA made no attempts to locate Kinondoni seminary at an alternative site and no fund raising efforts were undertaken (oil-rich Muslim countries have not provided substantial aid to BAKWATA) to build more seminaries. The council did nothing beyond returning Kinondoni and Jumuiya secondary schools to their former status. In 1983 the two schools began to operate as regular schools where the amount of time devoted to teaching of religion (Islamic Knowledge) was reduced to two forty-minute periods per week. The most visible remainder that Jumuiya was once a seminary can be detected in the school uniform for boys, a number of whom still prefer to wear the long white pants. The uniform as well as the old character of the school have not survived at Kinondoni.

Because BAKWATA was thwarting Muslim efforts to maintain Muslim schools and was generally not doing much in the area of education, some Muslims began to consider setting up schools of their own through the support of Muslim parents. One such school was started in Dar es Salaam in 1983 by the young Muslims. Muslim parents hoped the school would train and educate Muslims in an Islamic milieu. Owing to lack of

funds and facilities the school was set up on a rented premise in the Temeke area of Dar es Salaam. In 1984, however, Muslim parents agreed to allocate some old buildings at Sinza, a suburb of Dar es Salaam, to serve as the new school site. The school, which is a seminary and has a mosque attached to it, is known as Masjid Qubaa secondary school. Unfortunately, because the school is not sufficiently funded and lacks laboratory facilities, it does not offer science subjects. Apart from religious courses, only subjects in arts and mathematics are taught. Due to the system of adding an additional grade each year the school offers classes from form I to form VI. It is not clear whether graduates from this school (for those who qualify) can pursue further studies in government institutes of higher learning. BAKWATA did not react favourably to the opening of Masjid Qubaa secondary school. In fact, the secretary general of the council attempted to cast doubt about the motives for opening this new school.<sup>172</sup> Apart from Masjid Qubaa, there is also a school in Morogoro known as Jabal al-Hiraa secondary school which was established through the efforts of local Muslims themselves without any support or input from BAKWATA. Later two more Muslim schools appeared, one in Tabora, Nujumi Muslim seminary, and the other in Tandika, Dar es Salaam, Thaqaaafat Muslim seminary secondary school which is run by the Saudi-educated Sulaiman Amrani Kilimile.

In a separate development in 1983, in an effort to help formulate policies, a Muslim Economic and Development Committee was set up under the auspices of BAKWATA to discuss economic development, *waqfu* (pious endowment) and *haji* affairs, and financial and international issues. The committee was more of an advisory body than anything else. It was supposed to meet quarterly under the chairmanship of Hamza Azizi, a former Inspector General of Police and now a businessman. Its first meeting was held at the Ministry of Defence on March 4, 1983. The committee consisted of 25 members one of whom, M. M. Songambe, was the executive chairman of BAKWATA. In 1985 the committee was attempting to attract more individuals into its ranks, including

representatives from the different Asian Muslim communities. Members of the committee included a religious personality, Shaykh Abbas Mustafa (he has since left the country), politicians such as Muhiddin Kimario and Mustafa Nyang'anyi (who was closely involved with BAKWATA), and an individual with a high profile in business, Idi Simba. The committee (it is surprising that it bothered to make these efforts) submitted its recommendations to BAKWATA which was slow to react and did not implement the policy recommendations. Considering its past record BAKWATA was not in a position to start new projects. It should be remembered that the council had previously prepared a number of Three-Year Development plans which outlined ambitious projects.<sup>173</sup> These plans, however, remain unfulfilled. BAKWATA's proposal at the time of our field research included establishing an investment house and an Islamic faculty at the University of Dar es Salaam (the University has a department of Philosophy and Religious Studies). The latter proposal cannot be taken seriously given that the council has not succeeded in establishing schools at the lower educational level. The idea, however, if any thing at all shows their future hopes and ambitions.

### **The Failure of BAKWATA**

In an interview with the secretary general of BAKWATA we learned that BAKWATA has nine committees.<sup>174</sup> What exactly they do nobody seems to know. Some, for instance, the youth (which has since been established) and the women's committees exist only on paper. Besides, even if all these committees really existed, they would not be able to hold their meetings at the national headquarters of BAKWATA, which is housed in a small old building and lacks space to accommodate its own staff. The council owns a two-storeyed building (three more floors are scheduled to be added to the present structure) which it rents out instead of occupying. Adam Nasibu explained that a



number of people contributed money for the construction of the building on the understanding that once it was completed they would be allowed to move in as tenants.<sup>175</sup>

Apart from a few housing units, BAKWATA used to have a transpo-wing with many lorries to transport material to various places. There is only lorry left.<sup>176</sup> They also have one bus which runs between Dar es Salaam and Morogoro. BAKWATA has not established any new dispensaries and orphanages which were among its stated objectives.

In terms of publications, the council has produced very little by way of Islamic literature. The secretary general of BAKWATA (Adam Nasibu) was able to produce only two books which provide elementary religious teachings for children. The office had no back issues of the newsletter Muislamu which has had a tenuous existence since the expulsion of Warsha from BAKWATA. BAKWATA's bookstall is empty of books save for limited copies of a few works by the outspoken religious reformer, Shaykh Abdalla Saleh al-Farsy.

In the area of education, the council has not built a single secondary school in the two decades of its existence. Muslims on their own initiative have built a few schools some of which for administrative convenience have been registered under BAKWATA in order to facilitate their recognition. Also, the council has not constructed a major religious institute in the country.<sup>177</sup> The two religious institutes in Dar es Salaam, the Islamic Centre of Changombe (the equivalent of a Muslim junior senior secondary school whose graduates receive further education at al-Azhar University) which was established by the Egyptian government in 1966 and the more recently built al-Haramayn Islamic College (the equivalent of an Islamic senior secondary school) funded by the Saudi Arabian government, are products of direct outside aid to Muslims of Tanzania.<sup>178</sup> BAKWATA has recently assumed control of al-Haramayn Islamic College.

Today BAKWATA does not embody Muslim unity. It has created more dissensions than it has resolved. It is known to have more detractors than supporters. There are squabbles between the head office of the council and a number of branches. The council faces an intensifying opposition from different Muslim groups and individuals. Masjid Qubaa secondary school (which is run by Warsha) instituted legal proceedings against BAKWATA which lost in its bid to have the school registered under its name although the school does not belong to the council. Similarly, Shaykh Yahya Husein sued BAKWATA on behalf of Tanzanian Muslims for BAKWATA's peculation and malversation of Muslim funds. These funds are made up of income (as profit or rental money) from BAKWATA-owned buildings, schools, transport business, and also include contributions received by BAKWATA from Muslims through collection schemes on the occasion of religious festivals, and some small donations received in the form of gifts from Muslim countries. Shaykh Yahya Husein, a well-known astrologer in Kenya and Tanzania, was previously involved with the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS), the predecessor of BAKWATA, and is reported to have once been jailed himself for a brief period for embezzling Muslim funds. He served as a member of the executive committee of BAKWATA and as a supervisor of its financial affairs between 1985-86, but was forced to leave because of some misunderstanding between him and Adam Nasibu, the secretary general of BAKWATA. Shaykh Yahya Husein did not limit himself to instituting legal proceedings against BAKWATA; he made it a point to reveal in public embarrassing information about the council's financial dealings and its gross mismanagement of Muslim funds, including donations received from external sources. This was followed by accusations and counter accusations between the newly-formed BALUCTA (the Council for the Promotion of the Koran which is headed by Shaykh Yahya Husein) and BAKWATA which began to appear in newspapers. It was then the political authorities intervened to mediate an end to this wrangling. The public revelations, however, had done little to improve BAKWATA's already tarnished public image. The

belief that BAKWATA misuses Muslim funds and also gifts donated by Muslim governments is quite widespread, particularly in Dar es Salaam. For instance, several years back the council received boxes of dates and copies of the Koran for free distribution to Muslims. BAKWATA chose to sell these items to Muslims without, in the case of copies of the Koran, giving out receipts. There are also irregularities concerning BAKWATA's selection of would-be pilgrims. The council requires every person intending to make pilgrimage to Mecca pay Shillings 10 for the application form and an additional Shillings 600 as the fee for processing the form. The problem is that those who are not selected lose the Shillings 600, an amount which at the time was equivalent to three-quarters of the minimum salary in Tanzania in 1985. Although only a few hundred people are selected more forms than are necessary are handed out. There is also the charge that people are induced to pay bribe money to be selected. The pilgrimage remains too expensive and only about 500 people perform the pilgrimage every year. In 1988 due to dissatisfaction with the hajj services provided by BAKWATA Tanzanians living in Saudi Arabia established hajj committees based in Riyadh and Jeddah to receive and assist Tanzanian pilgrims in various matters connected with the pilgrimage.

From what we have been describing above it is clear that BAKWATA has been unable to contribute significantly to the social and economic advancement of Muslims. What the council has accomplished so far stands out as a poor contrast to what Christian organizations have achieved. This is partly a reflection of BAKWATA's lack of resources and partly a reflection of the weakness and ineffectiveness of its leadership. The leaders have not been up to the task of innovating or proposing practical programs and following through with their implementation. One of the problems facing BAKWATA is the fact that it is run by people with very little formal education; that is, people who lack organizational skills and administrative know-how. Educated Muslims, both Africans and Asians, who have skills in a number of areas, including running organizations and

carrying out fund-raising schemes, have not been given an opportunity to participate directly in the affairs of the council. We have also seen that in the past, despite BAKWATA's best intentions (the establishment of the two seminaries and the opposition it created is a case in point), there are certain limitations that are imposed on the council (although this is less true now since the retirement of Nyerere from politics) by the political climate in the country as to what the council can or cannot do. That being said, it should be noted that BAKWATA's impotence derives more from its ineffective leadership than it does from the severe constriction of its possibilities by the government.

Mwinyi's regime, while remaining secular, has been relatively more tolerant towards the development of religious organizations which seek to promote the advancement of their communities. This has meant that BAKWATA's leaders who have enjoyed the political patronage of the politicians, cannot rely indefinitely on their political connections to avoid being accountable to Muslims. As an indication of what may be happening, recently the central committee of BAKWATA set up a committee under the leadership of Alhaji Sulaiman Hegga, a long-time adviser to Adam Nasibu (the secretary general of the council), to look into the council's finances with respect to its earnings and expenditures. That a committee was established at all to investigate what was already common knowledge about the affairs of the council, lends credence to the belief that the Mwinyi government had given the approval for the removal of Adam Nasibu from office for his embezzlement of Muslim funds and for his destruction of whatever little trust and confidence Muslims had in their supreme council. This is indicated by the fact that not only did BAKWATA's investigating committee present a report of its findings to the President, but the subsequent removal of Adam Nasibu and his colleague, Mustafa Songambele, from the council's leadership was reported on the state-controlled radio and in the newspapers. The two men were accused of financial mismanagement, diverting the council's funds to personal use (for instance, Adam Nasibu had been keeping for himself rental money collected from

BAKWATA-owned buildings and also helped himself to hajj funds, while Songambele had sold a Landrover belonging to the council and pocketed the money) and failing to advance or realize the goals of the council. At a meeting held in Dodoma by the central committee of BAKWATA to explain the nature of the charges that had been brought against the two men, Adam Nasibu, (a strong nationalist and pro-government supporter who had been at the center of the developments leading to the creation of BAKWATA) confessed to his wrongdoing and asked to be forgiven on account of his long service with the council. The committee then chose Alhaj Rajab Kunya and Alhaj Sulaiman Hegga, part of the old guard, to replace the outgoing leaders to the positions of secretary general and deputy chairman. An ad hoc committee was also set up to continue with the investigations and in two years' time elections are expected to take place.

These changes, however, have not translated into support for BAKWATA. Until fair elections are held and honest and competent Muslims with financial and administrative skills are brought into the organization, BAKWATA's problems will continue as before.

Given BAKWATA's failure to provide effective leadership in the Muslim community in its socio-economic and educational affairs, a number of Muslims who want to work for the cause of Islam have begun to assume this role in a limited way. For instance, in 1984 Abudi Maalim, formerly a minister in the Tanzanian union government and presently the general manager of the Tanzanian Insurance Company, established the Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF). This was a fund-raising project which was set up to help Muslims by creating opportunities for them in the educational and other fields. Among its objectives will be to finance the construction of mosques and madrasas and to help provide salaries for Muslim teachers and mosque imams. The ISF hoped to raise 10 million Tanzanian Shillings. Up to 1985 the fund-raising project was limited to the Dar es Salaam area although the intention was to extend the scheme to other areas of the country. The ISF has also attempted to secure some scholarships for Muslim students to study Engineering

and Medicine in Turkey through funds provided by the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank. Locally, the ISF has sponsored students for shorter courses within Tanzania. A major concern that is being expressed by Muslims thus far about this project, is the decision by Abudi Maalim to place the funds in a fixed account in the bank. This means that very little of the funds are available for use to benefit Muslims until after a certain period of time. Apart from the Islamic Solidarity Fund, other smaller organizations have sprung up in Tanzania for religious study, for the promotion of Islamic education, for social services, for youth affairs and for the distribution of Islamic literature. There are less obstacles placed in the way of religious organizations that seek legal status. These organizations or religious groups include Uvikita (Tanzania Muslim Youth Association) which has finally received registration under the name of Ansaar Sunna Youth and has established a centre (which includes a mosque) in Tanga; BALUCTA (Baraza la Kwendeleza Kuran Tanzania) or Council for the Promotion of the Koran in Tanzania (it is reported to be backed by Iran but is a weak, one-man show) which sponsors recital competitions among young people and students and operates separately from, and often in competition with BAKWATA;<sup>179</sup> Warsha is still active in Dar es Salaam and runs Masjid Qubaa secondary school; MSAUD (Muslim Student Association of University of Dar es Salaam), which is closely linked to Warsha, has been offering an Islamic Correspondence Course since 1986 and continues to sponsor annual Islamic seminars; a new organization has recently been established at Dar es Salaam University known as Dar es Salaam University Muslim Trusteeship, of which MSAUD is a member; except perhaps in Zanzibar, Aboud Jumbe's BAMITA (Council of Tanzanian Mosques) is weak since his fall from political grace in 1984; and Baraza la Walimu wa Kiislamu Tanzania (Council of Tanzanian Muslim/Islamic Teachers) which was established in November 1988. The Council of Tanzanian Muslim teachers was founded by Tanzanian students studying at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia. Their objectives are to propagate Islam by opening a library, producing religious material, and setting up schools, clinics and bookshops.

They also hope to solicit external assistance including book donations from religious organizations in Saudi Arabia. They have yet to establish their centre in Dar es Salaam. They have resolved not to get embroiled in doctrinal issues (this will be difficult as the religious training they received in Medina is geared towards producing "puritanical" reformers) which may attract negative attention and thus distract from the work they hope to do to promote their objectives. How successful all these organizations will be in advancing their goals which tend to be similar, is yet to be seen. They will have to do better than BAKWATA to inspire Muslim support and confidence in their activities. This will depend on whether they will be broadminded enough to pool their resources and coordinate efforts to achieve similar objectives.

### Notes to Chapter Five

- 1 In the development of the classical Islamic system the primary school was called Kuttāb. For information on the development of Muslim education, see George Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-Century Baghdad," *BSOAS* 21 (1961): 1-56; idem, *The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West* (Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 1981); Arthur Tritton, *Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages* (London: Luzac, 1957); Bayard Dodge, *Muslim Education in Medieval Times* (Washington, D.C.: Middle Eastern Institute, 1962); A. L. Tibawi, "Muslim Education in the Golden Age of the Caliphate," *IC* (July 1954): 418-438; and Ahmad Shalabi, *History of Muslim Education* (Beirut: Dar al-Kachshaf, 1954). The madrasa developed as an institution devoted to the cultivation and transmission of knowledge in Islamic sciences. Other institutions of science and learning in Islam were the academies, libraries, observatories and hospitals.
  
- 2 See, for instance, E. C. Baker, *Report*, 79. Alumni of the Koranic school system are divided between those who question its educational psychology, especially the rigorous discipline involving corporal punishment (A. B. K. Kasozi, "The Impact of Koran Schools on the Education of African Muslims in Uganda, 1900-1968," *Dini na Mila* (Makerere University) 4: 2 (1970): 1-21) and others who while sharing similar concerns, for instance, one Gambian who has, by way of reminiscing on his school days, dwelt in a lighter vein on the Koranic teacher's sternness, have gone beyond mere negative criticism to express an understanding of what these schools stand for and seek to do (L. O. Sanneh, "The Islamic Education of an African Child: Stresses and Tensions" in *Conflict and Harmony in Education in Tropical Africa* eds. G. N. Brown and M. Hiskett (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975), 168-186). On elementary Islamic schools as alternatives to Western-style schools and as units of agricultural production in some rural areas, see Mahir Saul, "The Quranic School Farm and Child Labour in Upper Volta," *Africa* 54: 2 (1984): 71-86.
  
- 3 Ivor Wilks, "The Transmission of Islamic Learning in the Western Sudan," in *Literacy in Traditional Societies*, ed. J. R. Goody (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 166. See also the interesting study by Dale F. Eickelman, "The Art of Memory and its Social Production," *CSSH* 20 (1978): 485-516.
  
- 4 For instance, in Morocco and Algeria there was a decline in mosque universities. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Dr. E. W. Blyden, the champion of Muslim rights, did propaganda work for Muslim education in Sierra Leone with positive results at the end of the nineteenth century. See H. R. Lynch, *Edward Wilmot Blyden: Pan-Negro Patriot* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). This was the period when the British took a more positive approach to Islam in Sierra Leone. They were supportive of Muslim education and even made attempts to incorporate Islam in the education system. They also recognized the importance of teaching Arabic. On Islamic education in Sierra Leone, see David E. Skinner, "Islamic Education in the Colony and Hinterland of Sierra Leone (1750-1914)," *CJAS* 10: 3 (1976): 499-520. In Ghana the British assisted Christian missionaries to set up schools in which only the Christian



religion was taught. This undermined the progress made earlier by Islamic education in the country. The policy adversely affected Muslim education by depriving it of official recognition and financial assistance or patronage. B. A. R. Braimah, "Islamic Education in Ghana," in *Religion in a Pluralist Society*, ed. J. S. Pobee (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 201-16.

- 5 Marcia Wright, "Local Roots of Policy in German East Africa," *JAH* 9: 4 (1968): 626 citing official records (TNA).
- 6 Roland Oliver, *The Missionary Factor in East Africa* (London: Longmans, 1952).
- 7 Ahmad Abdulla, "Ambivalence of African Muslim Education," *EAJ* (February 1965): 7.
- 8 George Hornsby, "German Educational Achievement in East Africa," *TNR* 62 (1964): 84. On German educational policy in Africa, see Martin Schlunk, "German Educational Policy: The School System in the German Colonies," in *Traditions of African Education*, ed. David G. Scanlon (New York: Teachers College Press, 1964), 27-50; Arie Van der Ploeg, "Education in Colonial Africa: The German Experience," *JCE* 21: 1 (1977); Z. E. Lawuo, "The Beginnings and Development of Western Education in Tanganyika-- the German Period," in *The Educational Process: Theory and Practice, with a Focus on Tanzania and other countries*, eds. A. G. M. Ishumi and G. R. V. Mmari (Dar es Salaam: Department of Education, University of Dar es Salaam, 1978), 42-64; and J. Cameron and W. A. Dodd, *Society, Schools and Progress in Tanzania* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1970), 47-57.
- 9 Subjects taught at the school included German, reading and writing. In October 1896 the school had 70 students. A year later it had 86 students and had become a boarding school. In 1899 the school had 110 students, some trained as teachers and craftsmen, and by the end of the year there were a total of 407 pupils and Standard I-VI. Training of craftsmen began in 1899 and by 1904 carpentry, printing, book-keeping, tailoring, bricklaying and blacksmithing were taught. In 1905 buildings were added for the first secondary school. Two years later the trade school was separated from the secondary school. Further reorganization of the curriculum took place to include subjects such as German, Kiswahili, History, Civics, Geography, Nature-Study, Arithmetic and Drawing. See George Hornsby, "A Brief History of Tanga Up to 1914," *TNR* LVIII (1962): 148-150.
- 10 T. O. Beidelman, *Colonial Evangelism: A Socio-Historical Study of an East African Mission at Grassroots* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 84. One of the earliest German appointees for the post of a taxcollector for Bagamoyo was Mtoro b. Mwinyi Bakari. He was, as we have already pointed out, the principal author of *Desturi* which was originally written in the Arabic script. He was a literate Swahili before the Tanga school was established.
- 11 Wright, "Local Roots," 625. Whatever the validity of their assumption, the Germans at the time were not well-established in the interior.

- 12 Ibid; Hornsby, "German Achievement," 84. See also R. F. Eberlie, "German Achievement in East Africa," *TNR* 55 (September 1960): 181-214.
- 13 Hornsby, "German Achievement," 84.
- 14 Allen J. Gottnaid, ed. *Church and Education in Tanzania* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1976).
- 15 Wrights, "Local Roots," 625-626.
- 16 Hornsby, "German Achievement," 84.
- 17 Beidelman, *Colonial Evangelism*, esp. ch. 6 entitled "The Mission and Its Sacred and Secular Competitors: Islam, Competing Christian Missions and Secular Colonial Society." See also Hornsby, "German Achievement," 85, n. 11: he mentions that Bishop Cassian Spiss (a Maji Maji war victim) argued that Muslims had no morals, were deceitful and to educate them was useless.
- 18 Hornsby, "German Achievement," 84.
- 19 Something similar happened in northern Nigeria where chiefs sent slaves to Western schools rather than their children. See Joseph Schacht, "Islam in Northern Nigeria," *SI* 8 (1957): 123-146. Soden's proposal that Muslim teachers be paid for giving religious instruction in these central schools was defeated. Yet Christian missions later began to receive grant-in-aid by teaching not only religious but secular subjects as well. This did not please Muslims, whose Koranic schools were not assisted. See M. Singleton, "Muslims, Missionaries and the Millennium in Upcountry Tanzania," *CD* 9: 2 (1977), 286.
- 20 Cameron and Dodd, *Society*, 56.
- 21 Marja-Liisa Swantz, *Orientation Towards Education in the Coast Region of Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of Dar es Salaam, 1973), 2. The UMCA college of St. Andrew established in 1869 at Kiungani, Zanzibar, as a theological teacher training college, moved to a new site at Minaki near Dar es Salaam in 1925. Many Tanganyikan students were trained in English and Kiswahili at this school.
- 22 Ibid. For obvious reasons Muslim religious teachers stood to lose their leadership in the educational domain and were influential in opposing secular schools. One also should not forget that the waungwana were not completely reconciled to being ruled by Europeans. In a number of areas some Muslims entertained the idea, evidenced by the Meccan letters episode in 1908, that the Europeans would eventually be expelled. See Singleton, "Muslims," 251-305. European ethnocentrism was certainly not unrelated to the emergence of such ideas or attitudes. Africans were considered as the "Black peril" in their own country (see Ida Pipping-Van, *An Episode of Colonial History: The German Press in Tanzania 1901-1904* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974), 24). See also B. G. Martin,

- "Muslim Politics and Resistance to Colonial Rule: Shaykh Uways b. Muhammad al-Barāwī and the Qādiriya Brotherhood in East Africa," *JAH* 10: 3 (1969): 471-486.
- 23 Hornsby, "German Achievement," 86.
- 24 Karle Weule, *Native Life in East Africa: The Results of an Ethnological Expedition* tr. Alice Werner (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1909), 412.
- 25 See A. T. Matson, "Sewa Haji: A Note," *TNR* 65 (1966): 92-94. Being a supplier of goods to European outposts in the interior, this philanthropist had also commercial interests in mind.
- 26 Wrights, "Local Roots," 626.
- 27 Hornsby, "German Achievement," 88. World War I proved German suspicions to be correct.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 86-87.
- 29 Oliver, *The Missionary Factor*, 206.
- 30 Hornsby, "German Achievement," 88.
- 31 See chapter one, n. 137 which lists a number of these local uprisings.
- 32 L. H. Gann and P. Duignan, *German East Africa 1884-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 211.
- 33 Beidelman, *Colonial Evangelism*, ch. 6; Oliver, *The Missionary Factor*, 205-207 *passim*; and Edward H. Berman, "African Responses to Christian Mission Education," *ASR* 17: 3 (December 1974): 527-40. Consult also the discussion in Marcia Wright, *German Missions in Tanganyika, 1891-1914: Lutherans and Monroviens in the Southern Highlands* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); and Carl-J. Hellberg, *Missions on a Colonial Frontier West of Lake Victoria* (Lund: Gleerups, 1965), esp. the section entitled "The trade Mission: a Weapon in the Struggle with Islam," 103-105.
- 34 Muslims in government service were forbidden from taking part in Muslim feasts; Christians were to be given preference in jobs and encouraged to build schools; and Traditionalists enrolled as porters were to be dissuaded from adopting Muslim names. These measures pleased the missionaries in Tabora. Singleton, "Muslims," 286. That there was a certain amount of resentment against Europeans in Tabora should come as no surprise when one considers incidents such as the one in 1902 when Swahili whose devotions were too loud for the liking of European residents received 25 lashes and a few days of forced labour. *Ibid.*, 272. It was the alarmist missionary attitude which was responsible for creating misunderstanding about Islam and Muslims. To combat Islam, missionaries deemed it necessary to understand Muslim activities and agents of Islamization or Islamic acculturation: *walimu*, *madrassa*, Muslim festivals and rites de passage, soldiers and Muslims in government employment, and the influence of

Muslim traders in urban/trading centres. The missionaries saw Arabs and Islam as two evils, and to combat one was to combat the other. Arabs, who are closely associated with Islam, were blamed for their part in the East African slave trade; yet the missionaries conveniently forgot to teach in their schools the role their religious compatriots (Western nations) played in the even larger Atlantic (West African) slave trade. It is also revealing that they did not direct their propaganda against other groups, for instance, the Indians who participated in the slave trade as financiers of trading expeditions precisely because Indians as a non-proselytizing group were not seen as competitors in the race to win converts. This point is admitted by a missionary scholar, Lyndon Harries. See Lyndon Harries, *Islam in East Africa* (London: Universities' Mission to Central Africa, 1954), 14. See also Beidelman, *Colonial Evangelism*, ch. 6.

- 35 Beidelman, *Colonial Evangelism*, 115.
- 36 Ibid., 96.
- 37 A. F. Calvert, "German East Africa," T. Werner Laurie, London, 1911 cited in Hornsby, "German Achievement," 87. Cf. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 219 indicates that there were 83 Swahili-Speaking government schools with 4,312 pupils.
- 38 Hornsby, "A Brief History," 149.
- 39 He was employed in Tanga as a teacher and then in Songea as acting liwali before making his way to Germany to teach Kiswahili during the World War I period. He later became president of TTACSA (Tanganyika Territory African Civil Servant Association). The first headmaster of the school was Paul Blanc (1895-1910). He was succeeded by Brandt (1910) and Lorenz (1914). See Hornsby, "A Brief History," 148-150.
- 40 Even the British colonial administration did not take much interest in opening girls' schools. The Education Conference of 1925 at Dar es Salaam left girls' education, for the time being, to be developed by the missionaries. The government, therefore, did not establish a girls' school in Tanga until 1930. In 1931 the school had 19 students, nine more than the previous year. The missionaries, on the other hand, had five missionary girls' schools in the Tanga province with 284 students. Some girls were attending boy schools. See Rennie Smith, "Education in British Africa," *JASo* 31 (1932), 136-7. The wife of the industrial teacher at government school in Tanga reports how she was able to dispel the fears of Muslim parents when the school was opened that Muslim girls would not be converted. For the instruction of their girls, Muslim parents expressed a preference for Muslim teachers, particularly female ones, of whom there was a short supply. Tanganyika Territory, Education Department, *Annual Report, 1923*, 15-16. See also the reports for the period between 1923-1930 where information pertaining to the central schools of Tanga and Dar es Salaam can be gleaned from the reports of the teachers or headmasters of those schools.
- 41 E. G. Hodgshon, "Settling on Kongwa," *Eastward Ho?* 38 (1928): 40-42 quoted in Beidelman, *Colonial Evangelism*, 116.

- <sup>42</sup> David R. Morrison, *Education and Politics in Africa: The Tanzanian Case* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976), 44. In the article entitled "The Missionary Contribution to Education in (Tanganyika) to 1914," *TNR* 60 (March 1963): 99-109, Anthony Smith gives the figure of 100, 000 for the year 1912. Hornsby ("German Achievement," 88), on the other hand, believes the effective school population was probably nearer 60, 000 than 100, 000. See n. 47 below.
- <sup>43</sup> See D. Swatman, "Missionary Education and the Modernization of Tanzania," *TNR* 88 and 89 (1982), 83. In contrast to this, the combined pressure of metropolitan secularization laws in France which found expression in the anti-church or, to be more precise, anti-clericalism in the Educational Inspectorate at the turn of the century, and the growing need for France to pacify its colonial/Muslim subjects through non-military means, led the colonial administration to assume a more active role in the education of its subjects, thereby promoting and encouraging secular non-mission (i.e. confessionally neutral) education at the expense of mission education whose priests were no longer financed by the state. See Christopher Harrison, *France and Islam in West Africa, 1860-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 57-67.
- <sup>44</sup> Many a future political leader went to this type of school which was set up partly as a way of separating pupils from their non-Christian backgrounds and thus prepare them as good Christian leaders. This practice was by no means limited to Tanzania only, but became the norm in many parts of Africa. Like the school, the hospital was also used as a means to further proselytization efforts. A patient who refused to listen to the Christian message would be told to go elsewhere for treatment. See Aiah Abu, "Islam versus Christianity in Sierra Leone," in *African Reactions to Missionary Education*, ed. Edward H. Berman (New York and London: Teachers College Press, 1975), 92-115. In the 1892 and 1909 smallpox epidemics in the Ukaguru area of Tanzania the CMS was afforded with excellent opportunity to combine preaching with treatment (vaccination). Beidelmen, *Colonial Evangelism*, 110-111. According to one Tangan elder, missionaries came at a time of epidemics and droughts. This meant that for an African to get the new medicine brought by the Europeans he had to go to church where, in addition to medicine, food and clothes were distributed free of charge. Often people were baptized before they received medicine. Eventually these people became Christians. Interview with Abdalla Sembe, Tanga, 15 February 1985.
- <sup>45</sup> See, for instance, Tanganyika Territory, Education Department, *Annual Report 1924*.
- <sup>46</sup> The government had not encouraged Indians to attend the Tanga school since in its opinion they attended school (in this instance, the Bagamoyo school) without being useful to the government. Hence they were held back in education and also segregated until 1912 when they were once more integrated in some government schools and taught together with Africans. Hornsby, "German Achievement," 86.
- <sup>47</sup> Marjorie J. Mbilinyi, "The Problem of Unequal Access to Education in Tanzania," in *Access to Education in East Africa* No. 25 (Michigan: Michigan State University, 1974), 35.

- 48 Ibid., 1.
- 49 Ibid., 14. Tanganyika had central schools located at Dar es Salaam, Tanga and boarding schools at Mpwapwa, Tabora, Mwanza, Bukoba and Moshi. These were the principal government institutions providing post-elementary education. Total school enrollment in Tanzania in 1929 was as follows: attendance for boys-- 76, 476 in primary schools, 651 in training schools, 715 in other schools and 6, 817 in non-controlled institutions; attendance for girls-- 52, 469 in primary schools and 305 in co-educational primary schools. Total student enrollment in 1929 was 137, 433. See Rennie Smith, "Education," 57-61. In the mid-1930s the number of children at schools of any kind was 214, 375. At the time Tanganyika had a population of 5, 000, 160. Government expenditure on education stood at 6.1 (1930), 6.1 (1931), 4.1 (1932) 5.02 (1933) and 4.5 (1934) percent of total revenues. See W. B. Mumford and B. N. Parker, "Education in British African Dependencies," *JOSo* 36: CXLII (January 1937), 20 Table 1.
- 50 Mbilinyi, "The Problem," 15. Consult Tanganyika Territory, Education Department, **Annual Report 1923**. The objective of these schools was to produce men who could read, write and do simple rithmetic. Attention was also given to simple crafts and industries. Craftsmen were needed to build houses, sew mosquito nets, mend machines and so on. Rennie Smith, "Education," 61.
- 51 Mbilinyi, "The Problem," 17.
- 52 Rennie Smith, "Education," 133-134.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Ibid.
- 55 Mbilinyi, "The Problem," 21.
- 56 D. N. Sifuna's review of Allen J. Gottneid, ed., "Church and Education in Tanzania," *Utafiti* 2: 1 (1977): 127.
- 57 Tanganyika Territory, Education Department, **Annual Report 1924** (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1925) chap. 13 entitled "Koran Schools." See subsequent reports for further information bearing on the subject. Consult also J. Cameron and Dodd, **Society**, 51.
- 58 Tanganyika Territory, **Report of the Central Education Committee** (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1943) chap. 8, "The Education of the Mohammedan People of the Coast," 34-35. Braimah also noted that although the Koranic system in Ghana was efficient and useful in the past, it began to degenerate in later times (Braimah, "Islamic Education," 207).
- 59 One such madrasa (madrasa Shuuban) was opened in Tanga around this time by Shaykh Ameer b. Juma, Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy's former student.

- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Ibid.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 Ibid.
- 65 Rennie Smith, "Education," 135-136.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 Pouwels, "Islam," 571-2. The effect of post-war economic recession on coastal society notwithstanding, the impact of European culture on local society has also to be accounted for. Evidence for this is indicated by the fact that some of the educated youngmen in Tanga, for instance, had began to turn to the *dansi* (the international, individualistic ballroom dancing which shocked the elderly) which seems to have originated in Mombasa and was popularized by the Tanga Young Comrades Club. See Iliffe, *A History of Tanganyika*, 392.
- 69 Ibid. Consult F. B. Pearce, *Zanzibar, The Island Metropolis of Eastern Africa* 2nd ed. (London: Cass, 1967), esp. 219-222; and W. H. Ingrams, *Zanzibar, Its History*, 221-222.
- 70 Baumann, p. 22.
- 71 Baker, *Report*, 79.
- 72 *Report of the Central Education Committee*, 35. By this period Ahmadiyya had established its own school system in southwestern Nigeria (which provided religious and regular subjects) and was attempting to do for Muslims what Christian missions were doing for Christians. Ahmadiyya presence in Nigeria was more by accident than by design. It so happened that at the beginning of this century a few Nigerian Sunni Muslims who were studying in England met some Ahmadi students from India whom they mistook for Sunnis. They asked these Ahmadi students whether they were in a position to provide assistance to Nigerian Muslims with regard to establishing the type of schools (where religious and secular subjects were taught) that Christian missions were setting up for African Christians. This was how the Ahmadiyya eventually managed to gain a foothold in southwestern Nigeria from whence they made their presence known in some of the neighbouring countries, although their numbers remain quite small. Ahmadis arrived in East Africa much later and they have been less active there.

- 73 Ibid. In an age of segregational school system one reads in the Report of the Education Committee its recommendation that the government establish in Dar es Salaam two separate Swahili-Speaking primary schools for Arab boys and girls which would provide education up to primary/grade four. The pupils who completed primary four could either join the African or Indian schools.
- 74 Cameron and Dodd, **Society**, 68-69.
- 75 Ibid.
- 76 J. G. Liebenow, **The Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde** (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 213.
- 77 Cameron and Dodd, **Society**, 71. Makerere College (opened in 1923) received its first contingent of Tanganyikan students in 1934. By 1945 it had 27 Tanganyikan students and was developing from a college into a university.
- 78 David Morrison, **Education**, 53. Muslim enrollment in missionary schools grew from as low as 5 percent to perhaps as high as 20 percent.
- 79 Cameron and Dodd, **Society**, 113.
- 80 In 1955 there were 155 Tanganyikans (including four women) studying at Makerere. Makerere's degree courses were established by the early 1950s. Iliffe, **A History**, 444.
- 81 Morrison, **Education**, 53.
- 82 Iliffe, **A History**, 449.
- 83 EAMWS Newsletter, No. 1/66, January, 1966. Cited in K. Mayanja Kiwanuka, "The Politics of Islam in Bukoba District" (Unpubl. B.A. Thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, 1973), 49.
- 84 Ibid. The Aga Khan supported the aim of promoting Islam in East Africa with contributions matching local donations which by 1957 had reached £ 200,000. Martin Lowenkopf, "Uganda," in **Islam in Tropical Africa**, eds. J. Kritzack and W. H. Lewis (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold Co., 1969), 225.
- 85 East African High Commission, **Report by the Fact Finding Mission to Study Muslim Education in East Africa** (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1958), 1.
- 86 Between 1945 and 1957 the society established in Uganda 63 mosques, 75 schools, 1 training college, 1 technical school and 1 boarding house. Lowenkopf, "Uganda," 225.
- 87 Ali A. Mazrui, "Islam and the English Language," in **Language Use and Social Change**, ed. W. H. Whiteley (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 184. On



Muslim education in Uganda, see M. L. Fitzgerald, "Religious Education Among Muslims in Uganda," in **Conflict and Harmony in Education in Tropical Africa**, eds. G.N. Brown and M. Hiskett (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1975), 200-211; Felice Carter, "The Education of African Muslims in Uganda," **UJ** 29: 2 (1965): 193-199; Abasi Kiyimba, "The Problem of Muslim Education in Uganda: Some Reflections," **JIMMA** 7: 1 (January 1986): 247-258; and Ibrahim El Zein Soghayroun, "Educational Status of Ugandan Muslims: A Historical Note," **JIMMA** 2: 1 (1980): 115-124.

- 88 Tanga Town Council, Tanga Union Muslim School, File No. 191 (1946-54).
- 89 See the correspondences of the Provincial Commissioner of Tanga, Director of Education, Dar es Salaam, and Abdalla Karimjee. Muslim African School Tanga, TNA TDB ref. 38837 req. No. 752 (1949). The funds for construction of the school came from a number of sources including the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the Ismailis.
- 90 In 1932 Tanga had a central school plus a small government school; a mission school which received a grant; a school for Indians, and two schools for Indians which did not receive grants. Rennie Smith, "Education," 133.
- 91 Anthony Smith, "The Contribution of the Missions to Educational Structure and Administrative Policy in Tanganyika, 1918 to 1961" (Unpubl. M.A. thesis, Sheffield University, 1962), 234.
- 92 Ibid.
- 93 Ibid.
- 94 Abdulla, "African Muslim Education," 8. This disposes of the propagandistic view of the missionaries and some colonial officials that Muslims were against education because of their conservatism. Muslim conservatism in part is derived from parents who had received no formal schooling and in part was a reaction to or against the vestiges of Christian domination of the school system. Muslim conservatism or defensiveness, especially in relation to Christians or the Western world, on the other hand, is a totally different matter. Ali Mazrui has argued that Islam has a deep-seated defensiveness in relation to Christianity. This defensiveness is rooted in confrontation, for instance, the crusades, and in competitive proselytism. Ali A. Mazrui, "Islam, Political Leadership and Economic Radicalism," **CSSH** 9 (1966-67): 276-78. At any rate, as far as the education of Muslims was concerned, the policy of a secular state school which the Germans pursued in Tanganyika had reassured Muslims of the fear of conversion. Nothing of the sort happened in Kenya and Uganda where the British encouraged the missionaries to take a lead in the educational field with the result that as Kenyan mainland Africans sent their children to mission schools, Muslim sent theirs to Koran schools. Naturally, non-Muslims got a head start in the area of education, as a result of which they continue to dominate in the economic, technical and administrative fields. Even when non-denominational government schools were later set up, Kenyan Muslims continued to resist Western education. This was due to the fact that as far as they were concerned, there was no difference between the mission and government

schools as both had the same syllabus and both were run by people of similar racial and cultural background. See Abdulla, "African Muslim Education," 7. Joseph Schacht observed in his study of Islam in East Africa ("Notes on Islam," 108) "the general complaint of the Muslims that they did not receive their fair share of higher education, for which there existed a real thirst among them." The situation did not differ much in other parts of Africa. Thus in the case of Malawi as David Bone points out, as late as the 1950s, although such incidents were not typical, there were instances where Muslim pupils studying at mission schools were required to demonstrate that they had renounced their religion by partaking of pork in order to be allowed to continue their schooling. David S. Bone, "The Muslim Minority in Malawi and Western Education," *JIMMA* 6: 2 (1985), 414. See also by the same author, "Islam in Malawi," *JRA* 13: 2 (1982): 138 n 42. Writing in a similar vein on Islam in Yorubaland (Nigeria), Van den Berghe observed that "When a Muslim child goes to a Christian institution, social pressures and fear of ridicule or ostracism often incite him to convert and, thus, the stereotype of backward, uneducated Muslim becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy"; or again when contrasting the tolerant attitude of ordinary farmers and townsmen, both Muslim and Christian, with the less tolerant attitude of the educated Christians he noted that "The 'modern' elite, being nearly entirely Christian, on the other hand, tends to equate Islam with lower social status, and therefore, to look down on Muslims." Pierre L. Van den Berghe, *Power and Privilege at an African University* (Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Pub. Co., 1973), 206, 212, and 221.

- 95 Abdulla, "African Muslim Education," 9.
- 96 East Africa High Commission, **Proceedings of the Conference on Muslim Education held in Dar es Salaam on 20th-22nd November 1958** (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1959), 40. The papers presented at the conference covered topics such as "The Need for Higher Islamic Studies," "The Education of Muslim Women," and "Accounts of Modern Developments in the Teaching of Religion and Arabic in Sudan, Nigeria and Somaliland."
- 97 Abdulla, "African Muslim Education," 9. Cf. Lloyd W. Swantz, **Church, Mission and State Relations in Pre and Post Independent Tanzania (1955-64)**, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, The Program of East African Studies, Occasional Paper No. 19, 1965, 32-33: Swantz writes that following the conferences in Nairobi in 1958 and in Dar es Salaam in 1959 "more Government or Native Authority schools were established in areas of the country which were strongly populated by Muslims." Even so, it is doubtful that these few schools could have had any appreciable effect on Muslim educational advancement. In any case, Swantz mentions that in places such as Dar es Salaam apparently (perhaps because the efforts were too little too late) Muslims did not show enthusiasm for these schools.
- 98 Anthony Smith, "The Contribution to 1961," 257-60.
- 99 The 1957 Census shows: 30.9 % Muslim, 24.9 % Christian, 43.2 % Traditionalist and 1 % Unknown. Tanganyika, **African Census Report 1957** (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1963), 61.

- 100 Ibid., 67 table 37.
- 101 Hemed F. Mbyana (sic), **Mwana Aliyehidiwa** (The Promised Son), n.d., 60.
- 102 Anthony Smith, "Contribution to 1961," 257.
- 103 Ibid., 259
- 104 Ibid.
- 105 Iliffe, **A Modern History**, 551-552.
- 106 Ibid.
- 107 Anthony Smith, "Contribution to 1961," 236.
- 108 Ibid. President Sukarno, Tunku Abdul Rahman and Ayub Khan were all leaders of newly independent Muslim states.
- 109 Ibid. This was also the period of the struggle for independence in Algeria and the Voice of the Arabs from Cairo gave its fullest support to Muslims there.
- 110 Henry Bienen, **Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 64.
- 111 H. S. El-Alawy, "AMNUT hits back at Critics," **Tanganyika Standard** 20 August 1959. At independence there were 206 Tanganyikans studying in university and 1, 002 studying overseas. Hadley E. Smith, ed. **Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania** (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 61.
- 112 Bienen, **Tanzania**, 64.
- 113 Ibid.
- 114 Ibid., 187. Although about half of the 17 founders of TANU were Muslim, Muslims did not acquire the reigns of party control which fell to Christians. Julius Nyerere and John Rupia were then president and vice-president respectively of the party.
- 115 Ibid., 69.
- 116 Mazrui, "Islam, Political Leadership and Economic Radicalism," 284. Mazrui has in mind the election campaigns, and in particular, the candidacy of John F. Kennedy, a Catholic, for American presidency. Among the number of works which treat the subject of Islam and politics in Africa or East Africa for our purposes, see Mazrui, "Islam"; Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic Factor in African Politics," **Orbis** 8 (Summer 1964): 425-444; James Ritchie, "Islam and Politics: A Muslim Symposium:

East Africa," **MW** LVI (October 1966): 233-248; J. S. Trimingham, **Islam in East Africa** chap. 7; and W. M. Watt, "The Political Relevance of Islam in East Africa," **IA** XLII: 1 (January 1966): 35-44. All these studies belong to the period of the 1960s. Abu-Lughod and Watt were mainly concerned with examining the prevailing trends in order to predict or consider the future prospects for Islam in the region. They both ended on a positive note regarding the prospects of Islam in the region. On the other hand, James Ritchie considered ethnic affiliations to be more important than religious allegiances so that in the final analysis the Islamic community in East Africa did not influence the pattern of events as a distinct political force. Ethnicity as well as religion played a key role in the Muslim "Nubi" rule of Uganda in the 1970s. On Islam and politics in Tanzania, see Kiwanuka, "The Politics of Islam in Bukoba"; Westerlund, **Ujamaa na Dini**; Nancy Gallagher, "Some Observations of the Role of Muslims in Tanzanian Politics," **Ufahamu** 4: 2 (1973): 10-15; Nimtz, **Islam and Politics in East Africa: The Sufi Order in Tanzania** (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980); and Imtiyaz Yusuf, "Islam and African Socialism: A Study of the Interactions between Islam and **Ujamaa** Socialism" (Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1990). See also Westerlund, **From Socialism to Islam? Notes on Islam as a Political Factor in Contemporary Africa** (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982).

- 117 As Hamilton Gibb has pointed out with respect to Islam's worldly concerns, the Prophet of Islam had placed his religious community from the very beginning "squarely in the midst of the world... so that all activities were to be included within its purview and to be penetrated by its spirit." H. A. R. Gibb, **Mohammedanism** (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 33.
- 118 See the discussion in Westerlund, **Ujamaa na Dini**, 94.
- 119 Harvey Glickman, **Traditional Pluralism and Democratic Processes in Mainland Tanzania** (Asian and African Studies, Annual Meeting of the Israeli Oriental Society 5, 1969), 187.
- 120 *Ibid.*, 188; and Bienen, **Tanzania**, 60.
- 121 Swantz, **Church**, 34.
- 122 **Tanganyika Standard**, October 12, 14, 15, 1963. See also **Reporter**, Nairobi, November 2, 1964 as cited in Swantz, **Church**, 34.
- 123 Knud Ochsner, "Church, School and the Clash of Cultures: Examples from North-West Tanzania," **JRA** 4 (1971): 99.
- 124 David Court, "The Education System as a Response to Inequality in Tanzania and Kenya," **JMAS** 14: 4 (1976): 662. The larger equalities envisioned were to be realized through a policy of social transformation with the objective of **Ujamaa** (socialism), rural development and self-reliance as spelled out in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. On education for social equality, see Abel G. M. Ishumi, "The Educated Elite"; and M. J. Mbilinyi, "The Problem," 5-28.

- 125 Kiwanuka, "The Politics," 49.
- 126 S. Jensen, "Regional Economic Atlas Mainland Tanzania," Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, No. 1, June 1968, 57. On the other hand, O. B. Mapunda, "Educational Progress in the First Ten Years of Independence," *TNR* 76 (1975), 119 indicates that in 1961 (the year Tanganyika attained independence) the country had 486,470 students in primary schools, 4,196 in secondary schools and 236 in high schools compared to 1971 when there were 827,933 students in primary schools, 7,570 in secondary schools and 1,608 in high schools.
- 127 Joel Samoff, "Education in Tanzania: Class Formation and Reproduction," *JMAS* 17: 1 (1979): 48-49.
- 128 President's broadcast to the nation on the 7th anniversary of independence December 9, 1968. Colin Legum and John Drysdale, *Africa Contemporary Record* Annual Survey and Documents 1968-69 (London: Africa Research Ltd., 1969), 217.
- 129 Samoff, "Education," 50.
- 130 Court, "Education," 672. Potential graduates needed several years working experience in national service in order to gain vocational and political experience. Therefore, in addition to academic requirements they had to have working experience plus strong recommendations from employers, co-workers and TANU branch leaders, all testifying to one's commitment to Tanzania's national goals. These are the qualifications for admission to university.
- 131 Ibid., 664.
- 132 Samoff, "Education," 52.
- 133 Court, "Education," 673.
- 134 A. E. Baalawi [Bā 'Alawī], *Nyerere and Muslim Tanzania* (Portsmouth: The Zanzibar Organization, 1982/83?), 7-8. See the magazine *Africa Now* (December 1981) from which Baalawi cites the findings of the church-sponsored commission. Baalawi is a Zanzibari exile who lives in England. He harbours bitter feelings against both Nyerere and the post-1964 rulers of Zanzibar. On further evidence of favouritism and corruption in the selection process in the schools, see E. Gesase Saguge, "Struggle Over the School in a Tanzanian village," in "Papers in Education and Development," No. 2, Department of Education, University of Dar es Salaam, May 1976, 84 and 95. Cited in Zaki Ergas, "Can Education be Used as a Tool to Build a Socialist Society in Africa? The Tanzanian Case," *JMAS* 20: 4 (1982): 571-594. This survey in North Mara showed that for Standard VIII the head teacher admitted an extra 30 pupils, children of the elite.

- 135 Mohamed Al-Hajj R. Kassim, "The Impact of Madrasa Education on Primary School Performance" (Unpubl. post-graduate/M.A. diploma thesis, Dar es Salaam University, 1983), 5-7.
- 136 The southern region accounted for 31.6 percent (and not 30.6 percent which is an error in computation by Ishumi) of student representation by regional origin.
- 137 Students Directory, Dar es Salaam University; and **Daily News** 1979-1981. See Warsha, "Umuhimu wa Kuwa na Seminari za Kiislamu," typed paper dated 24 December 1981, 7. In an article entitled "Tanzania: A Question of Numbers" which was carried in the magazine **Africa Event** November 1984 unofficial figures are cited which show that out of 33 students accepted at the medical school, only 1 was a Muslim; and out of 14 who qualified as dentists, only 1 was a Muslim.
- 138 See Jan Pvan Bergen, **Development and Religion in Tanzania: Sociological Soundings of Christian Participation in Rural Transformation** (Madras: The Christian Literature Society, 1981), 255. In 1976 the Tanzanian legislative assembly had 172 members: 70 Christians, 63 Muslims (35 Zanzibaris and 28 Mainlanders) and 39 Unknown. During the same period among ministers (including junior ministers) 11 were Muslims, 20 Christians and 2 Unknown. In the mid-1985 out of a total of 34 ministers 10 were Muslims. Muslim representation in parliament is much lower if one considers the figure for mainland Tanzania only. Owing to her special status in the union, Zanzibar (with a population of 640, 000 compared to the mainland which has a population of 23.4 million ) sends more MPs (over 40 of the 233 seats) to the Tanzanian parliament than is legitimated by its demography. In a sense, therefore, Zanzibaris constitute a form of buffer between the Christian and Muslim communities of mainland Tanzania. To the extent this is true, it is significant that the current president of Tanzania is from Zanzibar. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that Zanzibaris are happy about their membership in the union as the 1984 anti-union feelings (which ended with the resignation of Aboud Jumbe, the former Vice-President of Tanzania) and recent developments indicate. On earlier problems in the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union, see Colin Legum, "Zanzibar: Another Papa Doc?," **Venture** XXIII No. 6 (June 1971): 21-25; **Africa Contemporary Record**, ed. Colin Legum (London: R. Collings, 1971): 167-186; and Alan Hutchison, "Exorcising the Ghost of Karume," **Africa Report** (March-April 1974): 40-45. Zanzibar's first leader after the 1964 revolution, Abeid Karume (who had ruled the island with an iron fist), was assassinated in 1972. Thereafter Abdurahman Babu and 12 other people were detained. In 1978 4 of these people were released including Babu who had been detained on the mainland and had not been handed over to Zanzibar authorities for fear that he might be executed. Karume when he was alive had executed political opponents such as Qaasim Hanga, much to the embarrassment of Nyerere. These executions reflected badly on Nyerere who, as the president of Tanzania, has to assume responsibility for the excesses committed by his vice president. Karume had earlier attracted international attention in the episode involving a number of young Zanzibari women of Asian origin (Arabs and others) who were forcibly married to some leading Afro-Shirazi Party members. Zanzibar's union with mainland Tanzania was once more an issue in the country in 1984. The prolonged economic crisis was partly at the root of this disaffection by Zanzibaris. The CCM party

proposals for constitutional change which were discussed at a meeting in January 1984 met with unexpected rejection of both closer ties with the mainland and a demand in some quarters for loosening these ties. A former Attorney General, a Goan Indian by the name of Wolf Dourado, called for a referendum on the issue of union, and complained that mainland Tanzania had always dominated it. Zanzibaris complained of discrimination in civil service and military promotions. Some of them put forward counter-proposals calling for separate governments for the mainland and Zanzibar, with a union government handling only defence and certain aspects of foreign affairs. They also proposed that the union President should be alternately a Zanzibari and a mainland. Furthermore, they called for the restoration of human rights, the abolition of preventive detention and an independent judiciary. See QER 1 (1984), 7. By the end of January 1984 Aboud Jumbe (who was unpopular in Zanzibar and the mainland) was forced to resign at a CCM National Executive meeting chaired by Nyerere following allegations that he had worked against the union and had failed to discourage separatists from opposing the union. His resignation reflected the political instabilities and social cleavages in Zanzibar that go back to the period before the 1964 revolution (i.e. the rivalry between the "wasisi", the Afro-Shirazi Party/ASP founders and their opponents, members of the Zanzibar People's Party/ZPP). Wolfgang Durado, ex-Attorney General of Zanzibar, and Abu Twalib, Zanzibar's minister for Lands were arrested. Zanzibar's Attorney General at the time, a Ghanaian (probably he had become a naturalized citizen) was deported, and Chief Minister, Ramadhani Haji Faki, resigned. Troops were sent to Zanzibar to discourage more open expression of discontent. Thereafter measures were taken to improve the economic situation in Zanzibar such as increasing minimum wage to bring it to parity level with mainland Tanzania. QER 2 (1984), 6. Also, Salim A. Salim (his high qualifications notwithstanding--he had almost been elected the Secretary General of the United Nations had it not been for the opposition from the United States) was probably appointed Prime Minister to placate Muslim opinion in Zanzibar. In 1985 Nyerere stepped aside as the President (although he maintained the leadership of the ruling party until 1990) and a Zanzibari, Ali Hassan Mwinyi (who had replaced Aboud Jumbe as the Vice-President) succeeded him. Before Nyerere retired from politics he had consolidated the kuria (Nyerere's regional tribal group) position in the government (Joseph Warioba, a Kuria, appointed as the P.M. at the last minute, was regarded at the time as president-in-waiting), party, civil service, and, more importantly, in the army (which is headed by a Kuria) hoping thereby to ensure military stability through tribal loyalty. Throughout the party, government, civil service and the army, key positions have been handed to "watoto wa nyumbani" (the home boys)--a euphemism for Kuria group. The Kuria's dominance in the army (which is comparable to the Nubi factor in the Ugandan army and the Kamba factor in the Kenyan army during the colonial period) is partly a matter of historical coincidence. Nyerere did not end this tribal element in the army but continued to make use of it in the interests of the stability of his regime. See *Africa Confidential* 26 : 24 (November 1985): 5, and 28: 22 (4 November 1987): 2-4. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi was re-elected in October 1990 to serve his second and last five-year term in office unless he decides to amend the leadership provision in the constitution, drafted during Nyerere's presidency, to allow himself to stay in office for a third term. Soon after succeeding Nyerere as the chairman of the ruling party President Mwinyi undertook a major government reshuffle in November 1990 in which he demoted P.M. Warioba, a Nyerere protégé, to the post

of minister of regional administration and local government and replaced him with John Malecela, former Tanzanian High Commissioner in London. John Malecela had previously served as the minister of agriculture before he was defeated in the parliamentary elections. Zanzibar also has a new leader, Dr Salmin Amour, who has replaced Idris Abdul Wakil as the President of Zanzibar.

- 139 Patrick J. McGowan and Patrick Bollard, **The Political and Social Elite of Tanzania: An Analysis of Social Background Factors**, Program of East African Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, August 1971, 38. On elite formation, see Samoff, "Education," 47-69; Robert Miller, "Elite Formation in Africa: Class, Culture and Coherence," *JMAS* 12: 4 (1974): 521-42; and Paul Beckett and James O'Connell, **Education and Power in Nigeria: A Study of University Students** (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1977).
- 140 McGowan, **The Political and Social Elite**, 59. The category of "Christian" refers to those who appeared by name to have had some exposure to Christianity but who did not evidence any commitment to the Christian religion. This group formed probably 9.5 percent (and not 9.6 percent, the figure given in the book, which would bring the total to 100.1 percent!) of the Tanzanian elite.
- 141 Ali A. Mazrui and Michael Tidy, **Nationalism and New States in Africa** (London: Heinemann, 1984), 377-78.
- 142 Mohamed Said, "Tanzania's Religious Politics," *NA* (November 1989): 35.
- 143 *Ibid.* In this article Mohamed Said takes issue with *New African* correspondent (See *NA* (June 1989): 20-21) who criticized president Mwinyi for strengthening the number of Muslims in his entourage. According to Said, this is redressing a long-standing imbalance in which Christians have enjoyed privileged positions in government since independence. Besides, Ali Mwinyi, for fear of antagonizing Christians has not gone far enough in his measures to rectify the situation. His cabinet as of mid-1990 consisted of 6 Muslims and 20 non-Muslims.
- 144 *Ibid.*
- 145 *Ibid.*
- 146 Mazrui, **Nationalism**, 307 with reference to David Court, "The Education System as a Response to Inequality," in **Politics and Public Policy in Kenya and Tanzania**, eds. Joel D Barkan and J. J. Okumu (New York, 1979), 217. A survey carried out by the magazine *Africa Now* (December 1981) made a similar indictment against the system. In Tanzania's school system emphasis is on primary and adult education (that is, mass education) rather than higher education which the government has attempted to restructure to fit planned manpower needs. At primary school level the emphasis is on agriculture. Secondary schools, on the other hand, have been classified according to a number of vocational biases such as technical, commercial, craft and agriculture. Tanzanian schools lay particular stress on collective agriculture and on political education geared towards promoting socialist values. The



country's education for self-reliance seeks to prepare students for a type of society that does not yet exist. In other words, socialist values are not yet reflected in the structures of the wider society. While the Tanzanian elite through the leadership code has minimized the excesses of conspicuous consumption, nevertheless, it remains a separate ruling and bureaucratic elite by virtue of its privileges and a life style different from that of the masses. See the discussion in David Court in the source just cited above, esp. 217, 219, 222-225. While in theory the Musoma Resolutions opened doors of university to workers and peasants, in practice, however, professionals such as teachers, technicians and bureaucrats have benefited. It is clear that the regional imbalance in the numbers admitted to higher institutions of learning had not been reversed by these policies. The corrective approach of mixing ideology and education could breed favouritism, nepotism and corruption. See Zaki Ergas, "Can Education be Used as a Tool to Build a Socialist Society in Africa? The Tanzanian Case," *JMAS* 20: 4 (1982), 580-582. See also E O'Connor, "Contrast in Educational Developments in Kenya and Tanzania," *AA* 290 (January 1974), 71. In 1974 there were 35 private secondary schools in Tanzania. The practice of transferring from private to government schools after one or two years (thus subverting the District Quota Scheme by pupils transferring at Standard 7 to districts where primary schools are weaker in order to emerge on top the following year) was curtailed by the government which took measures to close this loophole.

147 Swantz, Church, 58.

148 Msuya, "A Study of BAKWATA," 8.

149 Interview with M. H. Malik, Nairobi, 9 August 1985. Maudūdī has been a prolific writer whose writings outline a program for the establishment of an Islamic state. Similarly, Qutb (a leading ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood) who considered Islam as a complete *manhaj* (program) for life, also called for the creation of an Islamic state. Maudūdī's movement in Pakistan has fared better than that of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Maudūdī's works include: *The Birth of the Prophet and the Leader of the World*, tr. Abdul Jaleel (Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Jamaat Islami Hind, 1970); *Come Let Us Change This World*, tr. Kaukab Siddique (Karachi: Salma Siddique, 1971); *Towards Understanding Islam*, tr. Abdul Ghani (Lahore: Islamic Publication, 1960); and his Urdu commentary on the Koran which has been translated into English. Among Sayyid Qutb's translated works in English are: *Social Justice in Islam*, tr. John B. Hardie (New York: Octagon Books, 1970); *Milestones* (Beirut and Damascus: Holy Koran Publishing House (International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations/I.I.F.S.O.), 1978); *Islam, The Religion of the Future* (Beirut and Damascus: The Holy Koran Publishing House, n.d.); *This Religion of Islam* (Salimiah, Kuwait: I.I.F.S.O., 1982); and the last section (the thirtieth part) of the Koran has been translated into English from Qutb's commentary on the Koran. On the impact of Qutb's thinking on Islamic activism, see Emmanuel Sivan, "Sunni Radicalism in the Middle East and the Iranian Revolution," *IJMES* 21: 1 (February 1989): 1-30. See also R. P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and Yvonne Haddad, "Sayyid Qutb: Ideology of Islamic Revival," chap. 4 in John Esposito, ed. *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 68-78. A Muslim critic has described the type of Islamic scholarship which is

associated with names such as Maudūdī and Quṭb as being conservative and preservative; while it has performed a useful role in inspiring an entire generation, it has not generated intellectual boldness nor has it motivated Muslims to think beyond the reacting syndrome against Western colonialism and domination and against neo-colonialism and imperialism. See Ziauddin Sardar, *Islamic Futures* (London and New York: Mansell Publishing House Ltd., 1985).

- 150 This was a slow process and by 1977 only a few textbooks had been produced.
- 151 Interview with M. H. Malik, Nairobi, 9 August 1985.
- 152 MSAUD organizes bi-annual seminars with each seminar being devoted to the treatment of a particular subject or theme. The delegates discussed the subject of *zakaat* at the seminar which was held in 1981. In May 1984 an international seminar was jointly organized by MSAUD and BAMITA (the Mosque Organization of Zanzibar) on the subject of "Challenge to Muslim Youth in Tanzania." The seminar took place in Zanzibar, and was opened by Ali Hassan Mwinyi, at the time the Vice-President of Tanzania. In 1988 the annual seminar was held in Dodoma, the projected new capital. MSAUD is also involved in efforts to disseminate information on Islam and issues a quarterly called *al-Islam*. The association lacks sufficient manpower and financial/material resources to carry out its programs, that is, to reach out effectively to the larger public. In 1986 MSAUD began to offer an Islamic Correspondence Course. See Omar Juma Msangi, "Education of Muslim Minorities," *JIMMA* 8: 2 (July 1987): 403-411.
- 153 Among the foremost critics of BAKWATA are two ultra-conservative Muslim leaders, Shaykh Muhammad Nasoro al-Qadiri and his associate and former student, Shaykh Khamisi M. Magora. In their writings both men have denounced just about every activity that BAKWATA is involved in. They challenge BAKWATA to account for its revenues and expenditure, to reveal the size of its budget, to indicate which schools and mosques it has established, not inherited from the East African Muslim Welfare Society (EAMWS) and other defunct Muslim societies, and to explain how it has used funds inherited from the EAMWS. See Shaykh M. H. al-Qadiri, *Barua ya Wazi kwa BAKWATA* (Open Letter to BAKWATA) and K. M. Magora, *BAKWATA ni Adui Mkubwa wa Uislamu* (BAKWATA is the Archenemy of Islam) (1981). In another book entitled *Tablighi ni Ukadiani* (BAKWATA is Qadianism) Shaykh Nasoro makes a farfetched allegation that the *Tabligh* movement was a front for Ahmadi sectarianism. This is a charge without foundation. The *Tabligh* movement (a conservative spiritual revitalization movement) was started by Sunni religious scholars in Delhi, India. Their purpose was to help create a spiritual awareness among Muslims by boosting their confidence spiritually. The movement is confined mainly to Indo-Pakistani communities although they do also appeal to Muslims of all national backgrounds. The *Tablighis* (this is how Muslims refer to them) are highly missionary-oriented and spread their message among Muslims not only within their own community, but also from community to community across local, regional, national and international boundaries. Thus the movement's activities are felt world-wide. When the *Tablighis* visit a community they invite local Muslims to come to the mosque and listen to their sermons. They preach to them on the virtues of firm/true faith, observance of daily prayers, remembrance of Allah, sincerity of

intention and so on. Their sermons (which have become standardized and are characterized by repetitiousness) are drawn from their book **The Teachings of Islam** which is available in Urdu and also in English. The book calls for a renewal of faith at the individual level and urges every Muslim to observe Islam in his personal life. In Tanzania the leader of the Tabligh movement was the late Abu Bakr Darwesh, an Indian Muslim. Since members of the Tabligh movement seek permits from BAKWATA (the Supreme Council for Tanzanian Muslims) to facilitate their travel to different parts of the country and also to neighbouring countries to attend Tabligh gatherings, this led Shaykh Nasoro to allege that BAKWATA is involved with Tabligh. As for Tabligh's alleged links with Qadianism, he provides no proof. He merely cites certain Tabligh practices such as weeping when listening to an impassioned speech or sermon by their leaders, or the habit among leaders to wear turbans with the tail end sticking out instead of being tucked in. He says these are Qadiani practices. His shallow criticism reflects the suspicion that because the leaders of the Tablighi movement and Qadianism are people of Indo-Pakistani origin who dress alike and share the same zeal for missionary work, they must all be Qadianis. This may be an indication that the Indo-Pakistani element of Tabligh is a cause for resentment. In fact, the Tabligh movement in Dar es-Salaam has experienced internal divisions which have resulted in the fission as one group of African Muslims (who resent the central role of Indo-Pakistanis in the Tabligh movement whose orientation is towards the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent) have left to establish their own African Tabligh centre. This centre known as Markaz Da'wa is based in Gongo la Mboto, Dar es Salaam. The original Tabligh movement (which still has African Muslim activists) is based in Kiwalani, Dar es Salaam, although previously the Indian-controlled Sunni mosque and later the Madina mosque which is associated with the Nyamwezi had served as centres for Tabligh activities before the Tablighis became unwelcome guests. (There a few Muslims in Tanga who have started meeting to hold Tabligh programs every Thursday at Masjid Noor on the fourteenth street. These programs, which include spending the night at the mosque, are organized by a Segeju Muslim, Ibrahim Hassan)

A more serious criticism against Tabligh that one hears among educated Muslims whether in Africa, Western Europe or here in North America is that members of the Tabligh movement preach an escapist personal religion. That is, they invite Muslims to mosques to put them to sleep. Another criticism levelled against them is that they are not concerned about injustices in society or about getting involved in local communities to promote social welfare programs to help the poor, the needy, the homeless, and the orphans. In short, they are accused of reducing Islam to pure ritualism without any social, economic or political context. They emphasize minor things (the spread of symbols) such as growing a long beard, wearing a turban, using toothstick instead of toothbrush and eating with fingers instead of using knife and fork. Because members of the Tabligh movement speak about spiritual matters to the exclusion of worldly affairs (this reflects their lack of any political ideology), they come across as being unconcerned about politics and about oppressed people (Muslims or otherwise) whether in Afghanistan or South Africa. This explains why the movement tends to attract politically passive Muslims. In their meetings or religious gatherings Tablighis avoid controversies of any kind. They listen quietly and passively to speeches or religious sermons by revered bearded leaders/Ameers (mainly Indo-Pakistanis) who emphasize a literal interpretation of Islam. In these gatherings the structures of authority are much too rigid to allow for open discussion. Tabligh supporters are quick

to point out that members of the Tabligh movement cannot do everything and the least they try to do is to get Muslims to be regular about observing the five daily prayers and to frequent the mosque as much as possible. This is a good start for creating a spiritual awareness, particularly among Muslims (living in secular pluralist societies) who have to struggle to preserve their Islamic identities. The movement encourages religious retreats overnight or a few days in the mosque, with a strong sense of brotherhood and solidarity fostered through the sharing of food, accommodation in one place and listening to pious stories of the early heroes of Islam. At these meetings every attempt is made to encourage those who attend into becoming missionaries for the Tabligh cause.

At any rate, Shaykh Nasoro was not justified in accusing BAKWATA of having connections with Qadianism. Shaykh Nasoro did also create a religious division in the Tanzanian coastal town of Kilwa over the issue of whether or not women were allowed to pray in mosques. His view was that they were not. He raised such a furor over this issue that the local authorities intervened to mediate a solution. The District Office agreed to supervise a public debate between five Qadiriyya shaykhs led by Shaykh Nasoro and five Shadhiliyya shaykhs led by the head of the order, Shaykh Muhammad Abdurahman Shadhili who disputed Nasoro's claims. The outcome of the debate was that both groups agreed that partition in the mosque for the purposes of separating male from female worshippers constituted a religious innovation. Nevertheless, there was no agreement over the contentious issue of whether or not women were allowed to pray in mosques, and both parties agreed to refer the matter to religious authorities in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Shaykh Nasoro has written two books one of which discusses what he considers as the unIslamic practice of erecting partitions in mosques, *Vishubaka/Vyumba vya Wanawake na Mapazia Misikitini ni Haramu*, and the other one which reports the debate of November 26, 1980 over the issue of whether or not women were permitted to pray in mosques where men congregate, *Mjadala Kuhusu Uharamu wa Wanawake Kuswali Pamoja na Wanaume Misikitini*. In May 1981 Shaykh Nasoro travelled to Same (Pare) district to attend a maulid festival to which he had been invited. The maulid was sponsored by disgruntled Muslims who were unhappy with BAKWATA which had assumed control over a number of their mosques. These Muslims, according to Shaykh Nasoro, wanted him to visit them and see some of the mosques that BAKWATA had confiscated. The day after the maulid celebration Shaykh Nasoro was arrested by the police and detained for a week. As he explains in his book *BAKWATA na Uislamu Same* (BAKWATA and Islam in Same) he believes that he was arrested by the police at the instigation of BAKWATA which claimed that he had attended a maulid which had not been authorized by the council. A few years after this incident Shaykh Nasoro was in Dar es Salaam where he stirred up trouble again over the controversy of women praying in mosques. This time, however, the Muslims of Temeke created so much trouble for him (it is believed there was also pressure from the authorities) that in the end he left Dar es Salaam for Zanzibar. This was a welcome relief for BAKWATA as he had been a thorn in BAKWATA's side for a long time.

154 At a seminar organized by MSAUD a resolution was passed to form Uvikita. A committee was established which consisted of 25 members, many from Warsha and MSAUD, but also included a few individuals from outside these two associations. The

committee wanted Uvikita to be registered outside rather than within BAKWATA. Nevertheless, the youth experienced problems when they approached the authorities to seek certification for their student movement.

- 155 For instance, **Mafunzo ya Elimu ya Dini ya Kiislamu kwa Shule za Sekondari** (Islamic Religious Lessons for Secondary Schools) numbers I to IV which came out in 1982. I have also seen a textbook on Islamic teaching for "A" (Advanced) level which is entitled "Reason and Implications for Believing in Allah" prepared by panel on Muslim education. The seminary had also material such as "Islamic Religious Education" "O" (Ordinary) level teachers' guide prepared by the Islamic religious education, Secondary panel, Kenya Institute of Education. Due to the efforts of Muslims, there is now a paper called "Islam" which is offered at "o" (Ordinary) and "A" (Advanced) levels.
- 156 The range of topics covered in the newsletter include teachings on various chapters of the Koran, purpose of hajj, Muslim dietary rules and why Muslims don't eat pork, the revolution brought by the Prophet and the Prophet's farewell message. The grand shaykh of BAKWATA Shaykh Hemed b. Juma has a column which is devoted to answering questions posed by Muslims. The newsletter also reports maulid celebrations, Muslim conferences such as the one organized by MSAUD in June 1981, the establishment of BAMITA (Mosque Organization) in Zanzibar in mid-1981, names of pilgrims, and general news relating to Muslims living in other parts of the Muslim world.
- 157 The number of Christian pupils studying at Jumuiya seminary was estimated to be between a quarter and less than a half of the total student body at the school. A number of these students under the misunderstanding that the phase out process meant that they would be kicked out of the school began to take on assumed Muslim names. The school authorities reassured these students to use their real names as no action would be taken against them.
- 158 Ministry of National Education, guideline governing education in seminaries, reference no. EDC6/50/151, 4 April 1981. The names of 20 Christian seminaries are listed as are the names of 3 Muslim schools which had been granted permission to convert to seminaries. The document bears the signature of Tabita Siwale, the Minister of National Education at the time.
- 159 We were able to procure and make a photocopy of this official record of what was said at the meeting. The record is dated December 12, 1981.
- 160 The view or perception that Tanzanian Muslims are in some way oppressed finds expression in an anonymously written article entitled "Tanzania: A Cause of Concern for Muslim World," **The Muslim World League Journal** No. 6 (March-April 1983): 20-22; the Mombasa-based Muslim monthly newsletter **The Message** (January-August 1983) which has a section with the title "Nyerere Keeps A Largely Muslim Population"; and Baalawy in his booklet **Nyerere and Muslim Tanzania** alleges that at one time among 140 Tanzanian government scholars in Canada only 3 were Muslims.

- <sup>161</sup> The frequency of this charge viewed within the context of the governmental espousal of a policy of secularism and equality of treatment of different religious communities, has led Baalawy to claim that: in Tanzania some people (Christians) are more equal than others; that the state is more "secular" towards some (Muslims) than others; and that the Big Brother is ever watchful over them. Baalawy, *Nyerere*, 13.
- <sup>162</sup> Two booklets prepared by BAKWATA, *Facts on Tanzanian Muslims* (December 1977) and *The Three Year Development Plan*, lay out in detail proposed plans to set up in different parts of the country Islamic schools which offer courses or training at the kindergarten, primary and secondary levels with the graduates of the latter schools being expected to attend a Muslim college. The plan as outlined in the booklet *Facts on Tanzanian Muslims* includes the following items on its list of what is required: health centres, mosques, a new national headquarters, motor vehicles (lorries, landrovers and a truck), 3 film projectors for mobile film units, a printing press, typewriters with Arabic characters, teachers, instructors and books. The plan covers a period of 10 years and would be realized at an estimated cost of close to 250 million Tanzanian Shillings. It is obvious that this booklet was prepared partly with a view to impressing or demonstrating to Muslim governments of the Middle East from whom BAKWATA was seeking financial aid (a BAKWATA delegation was touring Saudi Arabia at the time) that it had concrete programs to help Tanzanian Muslims. The material was supposed to demonstrate BAKWATA's self-initiative in developing programs of its own to promote Muslim advancement. It is important to point out that BAKWATA, as its booklet *The Three Year Development Plan* indicates, had been forced right from the beginning to resort to "self-reliance." This was due to the fact that the Asian Muslims who had been the benefactors of the defunct all-inclusive EAMWS ceased to make their contributions available when the society was banned and a new one created. In the late 1970s BAKWATA was engaged in a few business ventures mainly involving 14 lorries which were used as transporters to earn income for the council. A former employee of BAKWATA informed us that most of these lorries did not belong to the council but to individuals such as Saleh Masasi, the chairman of BAKWATA and also the chairman of the Tanzania Licensing Authority, who used the name of the council to run their businesses. When Masasi's removal from BAKWATA became imminent he sold off about 10 or 11 of these lorries before he left. Interview, Dar es Salaam, 7 January 1985, with a former BAKWATA employee who did not want his identity revealed.
- <sup>163</sup> When Jumbe went for pilgrimage he met a number of Muslim leaders at Minna. He consulted with them about the possibility of securing aid for Zanzibar Muslims. He also explored avenues to make Tanzania a recipient of Saudi aid. Jumbe's motives were political (one, of course, does not rule out religious motives as well) as he had ambitions of being the next president of Tanzania after Nyerere. He attempted to use his religious credentials to shop for aid in the Middle East. He was advised in Saudi Arabia to form BAMITA and seek membership in the World Council of Mosques which was under the World Muslim League with headquarters in Mecca. Upon his return to Tanzania he convened a conference in Zanzibar which was attended by religious delegates from different parts of the country (including Tanga) at which BAMITA was launched. The head office of BAMITA was to be in the office of the chief kadhi of Zanzibar. BAMITA has very specific objectives relating to the mosque

which it sees as the centre of the Muslim community. These objectives include providing religious teachers, maintaining and taking care of mosques and attending to mosque affairs. The mosque committees function at the mosque, area, district and regional levels. BAMITA's objectives are laid out in its constitution *Katiba ya Muda ya Baraza la Misikiti ya Tanzania* (Zanzibar, 1982). According to Omar Zahran whom I met in Zanzibar on January 20, 1985, the World Council of Mosques has not lived up to its promises and so far BAMITA has received only two landrovers, some office equipment and stationary. Omar Zahran, a former diplomat at a number of Tanzanian overseas missions, devotes most of his time working for BAMITA.

<sup>164</sup> Jumbe did not show any interest to have BAMITA registered under BAKWATA. For this reason BAKWATA in the beginning felt threatened that BAMITA might replace it or that the two councils might duplicate functions, in which case they would be competitors. This did not happen given that the Mosque Organization had limited objectives. In any case, BAMITA was strong in Zanzibar where its head office is based and where its presence is felt but remained weak in mainland Tanzania. BAKWATA has since attempted to undermine the presence of BAMITA in mainland Tanzania by making a provision in its constitution for mosque committees. See BAKWATA's *Marekebisho ya Katiba za BAKWATA* (1983) which is the amended version of the earlier constitution *Katiba ya Maongozo ya BAKWATA* (1973). In 1981 the year in which BAMITA was founded Jumbe toured different parts of the country (he flew in a government jet) to promote the new council. He insisted that he was touring as Aboud Jumbe and not as the Vice-President. Nevertheless, the fact that he was travelling at government expense did not go unnoticed. In one of his speeches at the time President Nyerere said that the party and the government had no religion. This remark or rebuke was aimed at Jumbe who was mixing religion with politics. A few Tanzanians that we met in Saudi Arabia who sympathize with Jumbe believe that he became a better Muslim after his pilgrimage to Mecca and the founding of BAMITA. According to them, he became a sober Muslim by giving up consumption of alcohol. Also, they point out that every year he travels to Mecca during the month of fasting to perform 'Umra (the lesser pilgrimage). He is accompanied by two bodyguards provided by the Tanzanian government. He is still a member of CCM, the ruling party, although he has not yet been rehabilitated to political life since his fall from political grace in 1984. As to his participation in efforts to break up Muslim seminaries, they believe that he was acting under instructions from the President's office.

<sup>165</sup> Adam Nasibu was the central figure in the scheming that followed. For evidence of this, see n 167 below. The University of Medina-educated Juma Mikidadi was also involved in the intrigues. Nevertheless, he was also later forced to leave the council as he had underestimated Nasibu's shrewdness. Subsequently, Nasibu became the secretary general of BAKWATA.

<sup>166</sup> This can hardly have been the case judging from the titles of the following Kiswahili books which were written by Warsha: *Shahada* (Declaration of Faith); *Tafsiri ya Sura Fatiha na Asri* (Translation of the chapters "The Opening" and "The Flight of Time"); *Uchumi Katika Uislamu* (Islamic Economics); *Uislamu Njia Sahihi ya Maisha* (Islam, the Sound Path in Life); *Funga Ramadhani na Falsafa ya Qur'ani* (Keeping the Fast and the Philosophy of the Koran); *Hajj*

(Pilgrimage); **Hakuna Utume baada ya Muhammad S.A.W.** (There is no Prophethood after Muhammad); **Mungu Wetu ni Mungu wa Haki** (Our God is the God of Truth); **Lailatul Qadri** (The Night of Power); and **Zaka** (Welfare/Purification Tax). These booklets were circulating in the 1970s.

167 Adam Nasibu's confidential letter to the P.M. of 16/September/1983 reference no. MK/D. 10/29/7 which bears the title "Mahusiano na Ushirikiano" (Consultative Relationship and Cooperation) reveals what he and his associates had been up to all along during the course of the developments we have described. He kept the party and the government informed of the activities of Warsha. The letter makes reference to BAKWATA's role in exposing and eventually expelling Warsha from the council because Warsha had written books which "mix religion with politics." As its title indicates, the letter was written to seek "consultation and cooperation" with the government regarding Muslim groups in different parts of the country that BAKWATA thought or recommended that the government should keep an eye on "for the benefit of the Muslims and the government." The interesting thing to note is that all the six groups mentioned which include a section within the local branch of BAKWATA in Iringa happen to be groups which have either challenged the council or criticized it for some reason. Any individual who disagrees or opposes the council is labelled as a trouble-maker. The letter indicates that this was not the only time that Nasibu had written to the politicians to report to them the activities of Muslim groups. Several more letters had been written and reference is made to one of them (reference no. MK/D. 10/29/1).

168 In the letter we have just mentioned above Nasibu brings to the attention of the P.M. the names of the Muslim youth who were among the 13 people to receive tickets from the government of Iran to enable them to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca. There was nothing unusual about this as BAKWATA leaders themselves had performed pilgrimage or visited the Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, under similar arrangement or sponsorship from one or the other of these governments. Nevertheless, Nasibu imputed political motives to the decision of the Iranian government to award tickets to the youth instead of making these tickets available to BAKWATA leaders. What he was suggesting was that since the Iranian government believed in the merger of religion and politics and was seeking for sympathy for its viewpoint and also support for its war efforts against Iraq at the time, the youth (given their tendency to "mix religion with politics") could be their allies. He wanted the Muslim youth to be denied permission to go far hajj. In 1987 again several Tanzanian Muslims received paid-for tickets from Iran to enable them to perform pilgrimage to Mecca. During the mass demonstrations that year in Mecca by unarmed Iranian pilgrims brandishing effigies of Reagan and shouting slogans the Saudi security forces opened fire leaving several hundred people dead and many many more wounded. See Roger Garaudi, "Reflections on A Massacre," (*Afkār Inquiry* 4: 10 (October 1987), 11. See also, "Saudi Arabia and Iran: Towards High Noon in Mecca," *The Economist* (30 April 1988), 41. Tanzanian Muslims who had performed pilgrimage under the sponsorship of Iran on their return home to Tanzania attempted to dissociate themselves from the unfortunate incident of the bloodbath in Mecca. For once BAKWATA leaders were relieved that the tickets had not been given to them.



- <sup>169</sup> Shaykh Muhammad Ali no longer works for the Attorney General's office but has his own private law practice. He offers *darasas* (public lecture sessions) on Koranic exegesis at Tambaza mosque in Dar es Salaam during his free time. Nevertheless, sometimes he is not seen at the mosque for quite sometime due to the condition of his health (he suffers from high blood pressure).
- <sup>170</sup> BAKWATA used the radio and other media or public forums to launch attacks on Warsha which responded by producing typewritten papers which were distributed to Muslims after the Friday prayers. For instance, the paper/leaflet of July 6, 1982 castigates BAKWATA for convening a meeting to press charges against the young Muslims without at the same time allowing the youth to attend and defend themselves. The paper of December 13, 1982 attacks BAKWATA for its double talk and its decision to break up the seminaries without first consulting Muslims. Finally, the paper of March 4, 1983 accuses BAKWATA of attempting to silence its critics by being ever quick to call on the government to ask for police assistance. The letter also accuses BAKWATA of reducing Islam to a set of rituals so that any Muslim who preaches or teaches about Islam as a whole way of life is criticized by Nasibu as mixing religion with politics. See, for instance, the paper by Warsha entitled "Shughuli za Warsha Kutotambuliwa na Viongozi wa Sasa wa BAKWATA" (Warsha's Activities Regarding its Lack of Recognition by the Current BAKWATA Leadership) 6 July 1982.
- <sup>171</sup> In a speech delivered in Tabora on the occasion of opening a seminar of leaders of different religious communities, Nyerere declared that the party was politically neutral with respect to religion. This, in effect, meant that the party and the government had no religion. He also pointed out that the government would not tolerate religious groups which created discord or disturbance. Such groups include sects which deny the legality of earthly governments (this was thought to be a reference to Jehovah's Witnesses whose members have been known to get into trouble with a number of African governments on account of what they preach) or which teach that it is against religion to wear clothes. See Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa wa Tanzania na Dini* (Dar es Salaam: KIUTA, 1970), 2-6 esp. 5. Extrapolating from the above statements in the light of the Muslim experience in Tanzania, one prominent religious scholar and preacher in Dar es Salaam remarked that no Muslim leader worthy of leading Muslims can become a leader in Tanzania, particularly given the climate of political opinion which places strong emphasis on allegiance to the party and fidelity to ujamaa as being above everything else. A politically-conscious Muslim leader would not be tolerated. In retrospect, this seems to have been an extremely pessimistic view considering that a moderate politician Ali Hassan Mwinyi, and not the doctrinaire Rashid Kawawa, assumed the mantle of leadership in the country. That being said the impression should not be given that Nyerere was anti-religious. In fact, as a devout Catholic he was concerned that the Christian church leaders did not misinterpret his efforts to build a society based on Ujamaa principles as attempts to create an atheistic communist society. In a confidential conversation with father Robert Rweyamamu, general secretary of the Tanzanian Episcopal Conference on August 3, 1970, Nyerere informed the clergyman that he had established in TANU a department of political education and put a Lutheran minister in charge to make sure that political education tending to extremism did not arise. The transcript of this conversation appears in appendix 15 of Pvan Bergen's *Development and Religion in Tanzania*, 335. With respect to Jehovah's

Witnesses getting into trouble with African governments, this is mainly due to the fact that they are taught not to salute the national flag or sing the national anthem of the country where they reside. The sect was banned in Tanzania in April 1965 and in Malawi in 1967. Also, several non-Zambian Witnesses were expelled from Zambia in 1968. See *East African Standard* 6 and 8 April 1965 and 22 January 1968 as cited in Bryan R. Wilson, "Jehovah's Witnesses in Kenya," *JRA* 5 (1973): 128-149.

- 172 In Adam Nasibu's confidential letter to the P.M. of 16/9/83 reference no. MK/D. 10/29/7, one of the persons responsible for running Masjid Qubaa secondary school is targeted for criticism.
- 173 See, for instance, n. 162 above.
- 174 These departments or committees are: *dini* (religious affairs), *ilimu* (education), *ustawi wa jamii* (social welfare), *uchumi* (economy), *fedha* (finance), *habari* (information), *kinamama* (women's affairs), *vijana* (youth), and *utawala* (administration). Interview with Adam Nasibu, Dar es Salaam, 26 December 1984. A few years ago a former Warsha member who had been expelled from BAKWATA made his peace with Adam Nasibu (who has himself been removed from BAKWATA leadership recently) and rejoined the council, much to the consternation of other Muslim youths in Dar es Salaam. He has established the Tanzania Youth Muslim Organization. He has also been appointed the head of al-Haramayn school which is now run by BAKWATA. The Sudanese scholar who was the head of the school no longer lives in Tanzania.
- 175 Interview with Adam Nasibu, Dar es Salaam, 26 December 1984.
- 176 Interview with Adam Nasibu, Dar es Salaam, 26 December 1984.
- 177 Msuya reports that BAKWATA aided the construction of mosques in the Kilimanjaro and Pare area. Msuya, "A Study of BAKWATA," 8-9. Some of these mosques were built through the efforts of Muslim themselves. This explains why BAKWATA and some of these Muslims were contesting for control of some of these mosques. See n. 153 above. Also, as Msuya himself points out most of the Muslim primary schools in the Moshi and Pare areas which were eventually taken over by the government were inherited from defunct associations such as the Moshi and Pare Muslim Association which later affiliated with the EAMWS.
- 178 Iran has also established a school for Shias in Dar es Salaam known as al-Muntadhiri secondary school. Among the religious activities associated with Iranians, particularly their efforts to promote their religious viewpoint in East Africa, is the distribution of the Kiswahili magazine *Sauti ya Umma* which is published from Iran.
- 179 The leadership of BALUCTA includes people such as Shaykh Yahya Husein (chairman), Idi Sungura (secretary), Shaykh Qaasim Juma (delegate), Shaykh Nuruddin Husein (delegate) and Tewa Saidi Tewa (delegate). Among a number of Muslim organizations that opened offices in Tanzania at the end of the 1980s were: Africa Muslims Agency (Kuwait), Islamic African Relief Agency (Sudan), Islamic

Relief Agency (Sudan), munaddama al-da'wa al-Islamiyya (Sudan), Islamic Call Society (Libya) and International Islamic Relief Agency (Saudi Arabia). Munaddama al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya (Sudan) planned to build an Islamic cultural centre in Magomeni, Dar es Salaam and a high school in Tegata, Dar es Salaam. It is doubtful whether these Sudanese-based organizations command sufficient financial resources to be able to realize their objectives. For one thing, Sudan itself is in the grip of a severe famine of catastrophic proportions and is in need of every assistance it can get to stave off mass starvation; for another, the stand of the Sudanese government and that of Muslim groups in Sudan which disapproved and condemned the Saudi government role in the recent U.S.-led Gulf war against Iraq, has resulted in Saudi funds being withheld from Muslim organizations in Sudan which previously had been the beneficiaries of Saudi aid. With respect to Islamic activities in Tanzania, the Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), as reported by the Nairobi-based *Gazeti la Lengo* 198 (July 1989) met in Dodoma with the then Christian P.M. of Tanzania Joseph Warioba and asked him to ensure that religious peace/harmony in Tanzania is not endangered by some Muslim groups. As a case in point, it is alleged that a Muslim group called *Jihadi* received aid from outside the country to conduct "holy war." This is a reference to Iran whose religious activities (which is the crux of the matter) are sometimes conducted alongside technical aid schemes. In southern Tanzania, for instance, religious meetings are held and literature distributed in association with an agricultural aid project in the Ikwiriri district run by the Iranian government's *Jehad-e-Sazandagi* (construction Jihād). (In Iran *Jehad-e-Sazandagi* is part of the Ministry of agriculture). See NA (June 1990): 19. *Jehad-e-Sazandagi* is a six-million dollar agricultural construction project/effort to boost agricultural production using modern techniques and has nothing to do with "holy war" as the Christian lobbyists allege. It is known that some of the Christian groups in Tanzania have been unhappy since a Muslim took over as the president after the country had been ruled by a Christian for two and a half decades. In fact, after Ali Mwinyi's nomination for the presidency had been announced in 1985, a delegation of the country's bishops had an audience with Nyerere and unsuccessfully attempted to persuade him to reconsider his nomination. The Catholics were displeased that a Muslim and a Zanzibari had been nominated. AC 26: 24 (November 1985), 5. To make matters worse, Muslims have in the last several years stepped up missionary activities among different ethnic groups in the country, much to the alarm of Christian groups. Some of the concerns of the Christian Council of Tanzania are summarized in two papers written by Warsha ("Fitina Inayotukabili Waislamu," (Conspiracy/Obstacle Confronting Us Muslims) July 1989, and "Kanisa na Utulivu wa Dini Tanzania?," (Church and Religious Calm in Tanzania?) 22 August 1989) and are as follows: Muslim statements about Jesus, the Christian god-saviour; Muslim intent to convert everyone to Islam (as if Christians had no missionary aims); the need to know where the money was coming from to finance mosque construction projects; the enthusiasm of Muslim political leaders could lead to the introduction of the strict *Sharia* laws; the conditions should be known which govern Iran's extension of aid to Muslim groups; and the government should respect the rights of Christians. Reverend Christopher Mtikila had raised some of these concerns in a letter to Nyerere in 1987. There were allegations, believed to be unfounded, that Nyerere himself had been disturbed by the circulating news (these rumours had spread as far as Saudi Arabia and we remember reading about them in a Saudi newspaper in 1988) that some members of his family had become Muslims. In any case, to pacify Christian groups

Nyerere declared that "any member of the party proved to have used religious fundamentalism and tribalism to disturb peace and good order within the country and the party will be expelled from the party membership." See (Afkār) Inquiry (October 1987), 62. Nyerere's statement was probably aimed at Professor Malima, a former minister of education, believed to favour the appointment of Muslims in different positions in the administration, civil service and other sectors of the economy as a first step in efforts to promote genuine equality between Muslims and Christians in the country.

## **Chapter Six**

### **INTRA-RELIGIOUS ISSUES: THEOLOGY, DOCTRINE AND POLITICS: A GENERAL SURVEY OF RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP VIEWS AND ROLE STRUCTURES IN THE TANGAN MUSLIM COMMUNITY**

This chapter examines some of the religious trends in the Tangan Muslim community viewed within the larger context of a socialist, secular Tanzania. Tangan society will be discussed in the light of socio-economic and political developments which have taken place in the region in the last few decades. This will serve as a background for understanding the views and attitudes of the religious leaders. Throughout this chapter we use the term religious leader rather loosely to include Islamic legal experts, theologians, madrasa teachers irrespective of their level of Islamic education, and religious functionaries such as imams of mosques.

#### **Religious Leaders in Muslim Society**

By way of introduction we may begin by observing that in the Muslim world religious leaders have played and do play an important role in their societies. They are the guardians of Islamic institutions, the interpreters of its laws, the upholders of its moral code and the defenders of its cultural heritage. As formulators of Islamic doctrines, it is they who define Islamic belief and practice. They are heirs to traditions of the Prophet in that they teach, explain and execute the ideal he taught. Their behaviour and teachings are supposed to set the moral tone of the community. Given their role as transmitters of Islamic values in society, religious leaders have been quite influential in the formation of public opinion. On a number of occasions, the most vivid in modern times being the case

of the Iranian revolution, they have led popular uprisings against unpopular or oppressive regimes. For this reason, governments both past and present, including non-Muslim ones in modern times in countries where Muslims form a substantial minority, have attempted to court them insofar as they command popular loyalties. There are, of course, instances where this norm is contradicted and examples can be cited of repressive regimes which have resorted to the use of force to silence critics. In Somalia, for instance, where the previous military dictatorship of Siad Barre attempted to undermine the *sharia* principles, the religious leaders challenged the secular order and were alternately coopted or suppressed by the regime. In the modern context, religious leaders can facilitate or block social programs. Nevertheless, their power and influence has been somewhat eroded by secular developments, not the least of which, the emergence of a secular, Western-oriented ruling elite. This elite regards them as challengers or competitors in the exercise of political authority. Hence, now as in the past, the ruling elite have sought to co-opt them in the interests of providing ideological support and legitimation for their regimes. The religious leaders, for their part, have given this support hoping in return to obtain certain privileges with respect to, for instance, semi-independent control over judicial and educational institutions, pious endowments and so on.<sup>1</sup> It is through involvement in the administration of the law and community affairs as judges, administrators and madrasa teachers that religious leaders exercise social and religious leadership.

In general the status of Muslim religious leaders in many Muslim communities has suffered in modern times. The far-reaching and on-going transformations in these societies since the onset of colonial rule, and particularly the introduction and adoption of Western institutions and systems of thought have contributed directly to the erosion of the religious leaders' base of operation. In the educational field, for instance, the introduction of Western schools which have not incorporated any significant religious curriculum has meant that secular education has undermined pure religious science and the madrasa system

on which it is based. One need only remember that in the pre-modern society there was a financial dependence on the part of the religious leaders on madrasa schools and the existing socio-economic order. Changes in the educational, social, economic and political fields, once begun continued well into the post-colonial period and their impact is still being felt. It is, of course, possible that in the foreseeable future religious instruction schools will find ways to co-exist and thrive with secular curricula.

The general picture we have painted above with regard to the decline in the status of religious leaders does not apply equally or to the same degree to all Muslim societies. There is a great deal of variation. For instance, as one would expect, it is mainly in societies where Islam is the official religion or, more importantly, where Islamic law is applied, that religious leaders have achieved rank and status and have derived their influence from holding positions of importance. In societies where Islam permeates all or most aspects of life, the functioning of religious leaders is particularly important. Their services become necessary not only for teaching and conducting religious ritual, but also for administering justice as *makadhi* or legal experts and for providing legitimation for existing regimes. In the latter case, the religious leaders function as a support group that allies itself with the ruling elites. This is, for instance, the case in Saudi Arabia where religious leaders can be considered as a component of the ruling class.<sup>2</sup> In some Muslim societies there exist privileged holy families or lineages which claim descent from the Prophet and on that basis are accorded certain privileges (even King Hassan II of Morocco invokes sharifian claims to legitimize his rule), while in others one finds powerful and influential maraboutic figures who have inherited significant socio-economic and religious roles, as is the case of the sufi brotherhoods in Senegal.<sup>3</sup>

## The Status of Religious Leaders in Tanga

Tanga is one of the Muslim societies where changes in a number of areas have led to the erosion of the role of religious leaders in modern times. In the pre-colonial era when Zanzibar controlled the East African coast, religious leaders enjoyed high prestige and influence. During the colonial period the prestigious office of kadhi was occupied by two prominent scholars, first Shaykh Umar Stanbul and later Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, under the Germans and the British respectively. Shaykh Stanbul became a very wealthy man as we have already shown in chapter two. Shaykh Buhriy did not gain material wealth, but attained more prominence, his position approaching that of chief kadhi of Tanganyika although no such official post was ever created. In 1936 Shaykh Buhriy retired when kadhisip was abolished and a revised post of *liwali* was established which absorbed the duties of the former post. This was a step in the direction of integrating Islamic courts with secular courts. Maliwali, especially in Muslim areas of Tanganyika, followed more or less modified Islamic law in matters of personal status and family law. Some of Shaykh Buhriy's former students, including two of his sons, later served as maliwali or assistant maliwali in Tanga and Mwanza. The office of liwali was eventually abolished not long after Tanzania attained independence. In 1971 the government introduced new legal regulations which modified the existing system of "legal pluralism" by attempting to standardize or establish some uniformity in law as it relates to the various communal groupings.<sup>4</sup>

It is important to note that in Tanga the Muslim community does not have an entrenched or privileged holy lineage or a leadership that exersizes power by virtue of its economic power. The religious leaders do not have extensive *waqfu* property, a source of income which could confer on them a degree of power. Also, they lack state-supported institutions on which they could base their socio-economic status. Their madrasa schools, apart from the fact that they cannot and have not been able to compete with the well



established secular schools, do not generate adequate income for them. The religious leaders and the majority Sunni Muslims whom they serve lack an extensive organization such as the Indian Shia jamaat which is effectively organized and addresses a wide range of community needs. The lack of an association or local council which seeks to promote even very limited objectives reveals the weaknesses in the community. The original TAMTA (Tanganyika African Muslim Teachers' Association) was so plagued with factional conflict that it could not function for long as an association with competing groups which vied with each other for religious leadership in the community. There is no religious leader in Tanga, such as the late Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, who commands the respect of all groups and who can speak on their behalf. The community does not have a structured hierarchy among its religious leaders although degrees of learning are recognized. The number of religious leaders, in the wider sense, is between fifty and a hundred, if not more; of these, anywhere from six to ten are considered to be the most learned. These scholars, most of whom studied directly or indirectly (that is, from one of his former students) with Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, constitute the upper layer of the category of people we have identified as religious leaders. Among them, one holds the position of grand shaykh of BAKWATA, another is a former secretary-general of BAKWATA and a specialist in Islamic law (the two shaykhs belong to the well-known Buhriy family), two are teachers and imams of mosques and two others are the factional leaders of TAMTA and Zahrau. Compared to these scholars, Shaykh Shaaban of Maawa was considered to be a learned but junior scholar.

Regardless of the decline of their power, religious leaders still play a rather important role in society. They have no independent base other than in the religious needs of the Muslim people. This means that their power derives from the attitude of the people to accept them as their religious guides. They have absorbed Islamic teachings and are supposed to embody its morals. They are respected as members of the community and

their advice is sought in doctrinal matters. Their services are engaged in religious rites performed on occasions of joy, illness and misfortune. These ritual actions are important since they reinforce social and communal values and thereby confirm the religious leaders' ritual power. The role of the religious leaders is to teach, to guide and to provide religious opinion about matters relating to daily practices. As imams they lead the daily congregational prayers, *idi* prayers and, if they are also the *khatibs*, either themselves or one of their senior students, give the Friday sermon in the mosque. The Friday sermon is delivered in Arabic although the local practice in a number of mosques is to summarize or read out the whole *khutba* in Kiswahili before religious services begin. In their role as *walimu*, the religious leaders teach in a madrasa for children or, if they are well trained, conduct classes for more advanced students. They also preach in the mosques and hold public lecture sessions.

Most of the fifty or so religious leaders in Tanga lack modern education. Only one has a university degree (Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy) and a few others have studied up to form IV (grade 12). The rest have been trained mainly as religious teachers. This has a certain consequence on their awareness of global issues and matters that go beyond the ken of religion. Many followed the careers of their fathers and were trained as religious teachers, while others joined the profession either because their parents encouraged them to do so or because they themselves developed a keen interest in becoming religious teachers. There is social openness and anyone can become a religious teacher so long as he undergoes religious training. The fact that no steady income is to be made teaching has not deterred certain individuals from pursuing a religious career. One should not forget that religious learning itself is considered an act of merit and religious leaders are respected for their faith, dedication and willingness to work for small returns. Nevertheless, religious leaders are aware of the tough economic life they have to lead and they have attempted to cope as well as they can. They know that it is not enough to wait until they are invited to

some function such as a wedding where they may receive gifts or a meal. A few depend on some patron for help, or grown up sons, or a little property they may have. A few others make some money by tutoring the children of a merchant or shopkeepers. There is, however, none with one or two key political or merchant patrons. Some teach part-time and do some other work to earn a living. We know of one who secured for himself a position in trade and was doing extremely well. Another who is involved with BAKWATA was doing moderately well and his house in Tanga was nearing completion in 1985.

### **Background of Religious Leaders**

In terms of ethnic background, all the ethnic groups of Tanga and its surrounding areas, for instance, Arabs, Segeju, Digo, Bondei and Sambaa, are represented in the ranks of religious leaders. A few of the religious leaders come from different areas of Tanzania. The Segeju are clearly the most dominant of all the African groups, followed by the Digo. This is in part a reflection of Segeju interest in religious pursuits and in part probably a reflection of their having had a headstart over other ethnic groups of Tanga in the field of religious education. Islamization of the Segeju was much more sustained throughout the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. A number of Segeju settlements such as Mnyanjani and Chongoliani, apart from producing local scholars, had attracted immigrants (who most likely included Islamic teachers) from the Lamu region. Among the Swahili of Tanga important shaykhs who opened madrasas and trained many future scholars have been Wasegeju. Even today the two largest madrasas in Tanga are headed by two rival Segeju shaykhs. These have taken over the task of training religious teachers and, as competitors, have built up followings among their supporters or partisans of their madrasas. This was one of the reasons why the young energetic Digo scholar, Shaykh Shaaban, opened his madrasa with the purpose of achieving the same results

among the Digo. With respect to religious leadership in Tanga, a special role is played by Arabs, particularly Swahili families of Arab descent such as the Mtangata people (Buhriy's family) who have been the torchbearers of the tradition of higher Islamic learning in Tanga. It is their higher Islamic education that has enabled them to play a prominent part at the national level in BAKWATA/the Supreme Council for Tanzanian Muslims. At the local level their religious activities centre around the town's community Friday mosque where during the month of fasting they offer public lectures on Koranic exegesis. This is a family with a high profile both locally and nationally because of its scholarly reputation.

Although religious leaders are for the most part men, there are at least five female Koranic teachers (one is an Arab, one is a Segeju and one is a Digo) that we know of in Tanga. A number of them have studied at TAMTA and one is a member of a sufi brotherhood. One female mwalimu in addition to teaching women, runs a madrasa for children with the help of her son. We visited one madrasa for women while classes were in progress and observed that there were no more than fifteen women present (all of whom were dressed in sedate clothes). Most of the students are housewives although there have been attempts to get female secondary school students and working women to join these madrasas. Two female teachers complained that attendance at women's madrasas was quite poor. They pointed out that women have to attend to domestic chores, including taking care of their infants and looking after the sick in the family, and therefore have legitimate reasons for not attending madrasa classes regularly. Other students did not show up for what were deemed flimsier reasons. It was suggested that such women were more involved in the ceremonious aspects of religion and participated more in local customs and rituals. The female walimu insisted on the need to instruct women about the basic tenets of their religion. They considered it a duty that every Muslim be taught to recite parts of the Koran for purposes of prayer. This is the reason why both male and female children have to attend madrasa. As far as girls are concerned, very few attend madrasa after the onset of

puberty. Those who continue with their studies may do so at home through the services of a private tutor or a member of the family. The only other avenue for further religious studies (this is how female walimu get their training) is through special classes offered for women by a few of the established walimu. The female walimu are attempting to meet this need by setting up special madrasas for women.

### **Religious Leadership Views in Tanga, 1985**

To assess religious trends in Tanga, we decided to investigate the opinion of religious leaders with respect to secular trends, changes in the educational sphere, the role of women in society, religious orthodoxy, and socio-political issues. First we met as many religious leaders as was possible and through interaction with them attempted to determine their values and their position and role in society. More specifically, we attempted to identify their concerns and study their views of religious trends in the community. To aid this process, we asked non-structured questions dealing with issues outlined above. Information was also gathered through observations and conversations with ordinary Muslims with whom we interacted in different settings, for instance, the mosque, the workplace and the home.

We can begin our discussion by noting that in Tanga mosque attendance is observed daily by a hard core of pious minded men among whom are older people, walimu, students of madrasas and individuals of different backgrounds who had been exposed to Islam in a number of settings. It is probably safe to say that Muslims who belong to the coastal ethnic groups (for instance, the Segeju) are relatively more careful in their observance of the religious requirements than Muslims from the hinterland areas. There is a deep commitment to Islam among coastal people whose community possesses a tradition of Islamic scholarship and a long tradition of contact with the Islamic heartlands.

Nevertheless, the fact that mosque attendance varies from low to moderate (the religious leaders say that attendance was once higher) is interpreted by them to mean that there is increasing laxity, reflecting the effect of secularizing forces. Many local Muslims appear to be more concerned with the ceremonious aspects of religion such as involvement in birth, marriage and funeral rites, the celebrations of the two feasts (*idi*) and the festivals during the maulid season. Outside of special occasions, only once a week are the mosques (including the huge central Friday mosque) filled to capacity with worshippers, and that is during the Friday congregational prayers. The only other period when there is improved mosque attendance is during the month of fasting when people observe religious ceremonies and practices more closely. For instance, many people attend public lectures on Koranic exegesis which are held in the afternoons and *taraweh* (supererogatory) prayers which are offered in the evenings.

The religious leaders complained that young people performed the ritual prayers less often than they should. They pointed out that part of the reason for this was the lack of religious awareness among Muslims who had received very little religious education. They faulted society for placing too much emphasis on Western education and not enough on madrasa education. Religious leaders, however, are not opposed to Western education as they were in the past; they are just critical of its results and demanded a more balanced curriculum. They were aware that Western education opened up avenues to economic and social advancement. They were not even opposed to female education as long as children, both male and female, receive both secular and religious education. They felt that secular education alone was harmful as it perverts faith. It does not inculcate religious values and fosters a secular attitude among the young. In short, secular education is value-drenched and erodes traditional Islamic culture. Religious education was seen as the antidote to the harmful effect of secular education and the attendant problems of secularization. They insisted that children have to be indoctrinated with the teachings of Islam, its values and

practices. This was not happening in the secular schools. Hence the constant appeal during the occasion of maulid celebration by religious leaders to Muslims to send their children to madrasa schools and not just to secular schools. A number of religious leaders pointed out that because the majority of the young people study in secular schools their model for behaviour was not the shaykh but the Western educated elite, Muslim or otherwise. This is an implicit criticism of Muslim role models. It was the worldly figures who influenced the non-religious aspects of their lives. This was unlike the case of the madrasa educated youth who respected and listened more to the shaykhs. The existence of a dual system of education is mentioned as the cause of this situation. It was to be expected that as the madrasas were surpassed by secular schools, the associated respect of Koranic education diminished since madrasa education had no employment skills to offer to the job-conscious youth. The fact that higher education was made dependent on graduation from secular schools placed madrasas at a disadvantage. Given this situation, the impression many young people had (according to religious leaders) was that for a person whose main concern or hope was to receive felicity in the hereafter a religious career was regarded as being highly desirable, whereas for a person who expected to reap immediate monetary reward or success in this world secular education was the main avenue to achieve this. To correct this bifurcated view of the aims of education, the shaykhs suggested that in the absence of a unified system of education both secular and religious education be made available to Muslim youth as a way of satisfying their spiritual and temporal needs.

### **Female Education and Dress Code**

The value of women's education is today widely acknowledged. This fact explains why many more girls attend secular schools than was the case in the past. Young girls are keen to go to school because they know the value of modern education. Education is important for success in today's society. It opens many doors for a woman and liberates

her from being restricted to reproductive (domestic) roles only. The two female walimu we interviewed were equally appreciative of the value of female education. One of them pointed out that education develops a woman's mind and allows her to use her intellect. She did not oppose female education or women working in offices so long as they dress and behave in accordance with the tenets of Islam. She believed that a girl can pursue her studies up to university level, although she preferred her own daughters to study up to grade twelve. She did not consider all occupations to be proper for women; for instance, a woman should not become a truck driver. The old belief which holds that women are not mentally equal to men and, therefore, should not enter politics, has still a few defenders. The two female walimu were not among them. They did not consider it to be out of place for a woman to pursue a political career. According to them, if a woman is virtuous, it does not matter what job she chooses, as she will be able to preserve her honour. What was of particular concern to them was the fact that Muslim parents did not show sufficient enthusiasm for madrasa education for their daughters and were more keen to send them to secular schools. They considered this to be undesirable as the products of secular schools only displayed little respect for madrasas, their system of education and the walimu who teach in them. The walimu encouraged secular education although they hoped that the secular school system would provide more extensive religious instruction.

The "puritanical" Muslims who belong to Uvikita or Ansaar Sunna Youth (more will be said about them shortly) believe in the separation of men and women in the school, the workplace and any other social context which allows for free mixing of the sexes. This means that female students should attend girls' schools and girls' training centres and when they graduate they should work in places (whether at the office, hospital or school) where they cater to women only. Since the separate facilities that they call for are not available in Tanga they seem to be recommending that women stay at home and be content as homemakers. In practice, however, they are willing to concede co-education in



government schools for Muslim girls but not their employment in a mixed work environment.

The above views notwithstanding, the habit of confining women to their homes is generally not observed in Tanga.<sup>5</sup> There is no strict supervision of women and they are not excluded from public life. They can go out to make social calls or attend local ceremonies. They interact freely with men, although in the case of the strict Muslim families this is done within certain limits. While the coastal Swahili women have not adopted the austere Arab dress code (such as hooded, full-length dark robes which cover the wrists and ankles, and a veil that covers the head and face as is the case in Saudi Arabia), it is customary for the more religious or tradition-conscious among them to don the *bui bui* (the less austere Swahili veil) before venturing out of the house. The *hijaab*, however, has undergone considerable modification and relaxation in recent times. For instance, for some young women the *bui bui*, whether this consists of a thin head scarf or a transparent veil, that are some of the chic women's fashions that have been introduced from the Middle Eastern Gulf states, is perhaps worn more for adornment than as a statement or expression of Islamic culture. The number of women who observe the strict *hijaab* is decreasing and only occasionally does one notice in Tanga women who are sedately dressed. Some women still dress in the traditional Swahili attire; this consists of a *kanga* (cotton cloth with several designs) which is wrapped round the breast area and hangs half-way between the knees and the ankles, while another *kanga* is flung loosely over the shoulders. Others wear a simple dress with or without a *kanga* which is wrapped around the lower part of the body. Sometimes a *lesu* (shawl) is draped over the shoulders or spread over the head. The traditional Swahili garb is worn mainly but not exclusively by non-educated women while modern styles (for instance, skirt and blouse) are popular among those with a secondary school education. Modern styles, however, do not include miniskirts or very thin revealing dresses which are referred to as *mavazi ya uchi* ("clothing of nudity") and are the

target of criticism by both religious-minded Muslims and cultural nationalists who prefer to see the hemline stay down instead of going up. The religious leaders are particularly concerned that young Muslims do not fall prey to new trends and fads. During interviews and conversations they pointed out that the youth are attracted to modern ways and do not listen to walimu in matters of dress and fashion. Many of the young women, especially those who attend school, do not cover their heads. According to the shaykhs, it used to be unthinkable for a coastal Swahili Muslim girl to appear in the street without a bui bui or shawl spread over her head. There was nothing unusual about this anymore as this had become the norm. One shaykh suggested that not many women wear the bui bui because of shortage of cloth. This suggestion was (at the time it was made) more a criticism of the government which was blamed for scarcity of goods in shops than a statement of fact.

There is overall inequality between the sexes in education, social status and family position. Women have less access to career opportunities and generally lag behind men in education and employment. Women who are educated tend to work as nurses, teachers, typists or secretaries which are some of the traditional (Western) female positions in employment. Few are employed in more responsible positions. Some of the more ambitious women have turned to politics and are active in CCM (the single party institution). The quest for equal status is led by these women who are involved in a CCM-affiliated association, Umoja wa Maendeleo ya Wanawake Tanzania (Union/Association for the Advancement of Tanzanian Women). Its leadership, mainly Christian, is held by active CCM members. It voices support for the rights of women and is attempting to encourage them to seize the opportunity to carve out a niche for themselves in Ujamaa society. It is rather doubtful that this association has had a major impact on the average woman in Tanga, who lives in a society where man is still the recognized head of the family. More women have to occupy responsible positions in employment before the principle of man's authority can be undermined. Both male and female walimu believe in

male guardianship of women, polygamy, payment of dowry and other issues which leaders of the women's association do not wish to accept or have reservations about. It is obvious that walimu operate within the traditional criteria. While they may concede the need to provide women with the opportunities for education and employment, they oppose very strongly the type of equality advocated by the women's association. For them the question of equality between the sexes does not arise, as man has priority over the woman as the head of the family. Therefore, according to them, it is *hishima* (a word which signifies respect, honour, dignity and good breeding) for a woman to listen to her husband since a woman's first duty is to be a wife and a mother.

### **Uvikita and Salafiyya Islamic Reform**

Muslim scholars in Tanga do not present a variety of religious orientations. The simple dichotomy of reformists versus traditionalists does not hold. Traditionalism is the norm for almost all the religious leaders who exhibited an attitude or spirit of tolerance toward local customary practices. The religious leaders' understanding of Islam embraced both the Islamic legal tradition and popular Islam as it has developed locally. This does not mean that every practice that goes in the name of Islam is necessarily sanctioned by them. By and large religious leaders have not embraced reformist ideas which have been advocated and popularized in East Africa in recent times by two eminent scholars, Shaykh Abdalla Saleh al-Farsy and his colleague Shaykh Qaasim Mazrui and their former students and supporters in Mombasa and other towns. Their crusade is being championed today in Mombasa by a number of scholars, including the Medina-trained Shaykh Khamisi Nasoro whose main opponents are the sharifs of Lamu. In Dar es Salaam Shaykh Said Musa, Shaykh al-Farsy's former student, through his writings is without doubt the main champion of the reformist cause in Tanzania. That being said, it should be noted that there is lack of widespread sympathy for reform. Also, where there is some support for reform

it is generally limited to the young. This means that religious reformism is still a minor element in the evolving ideology and identity of religious groups.

For definitional purposes, we identify as "puritan" reformers (*salafis*), that is, those who favour reform and are against local customs which are not sanctioned by Islamic teachings or scripture.<sup>6</sup> Their reformism does not imply that they are opposed to modern institutions; it is an impetus for change. Their programs are designed to instill correct Islamic teachings and to control excesses in religion. They subscribe to the dictum that "all innovation in religion is forbidden." They provide a critique of certain religious practices found among the Swahili. Thus they oppose maulid celebrations, particularly the dancing and playing of musical instruments, and saint veneration which are regarded as being unworthy of people who claim to follow the Prophet but in reality follow rituals that were developed at a later period of Islamic history. They oppose the practice of seeking to solve problems by theurgical means; for instance, wearing of amulets or seeking mediation in prayer by offering sacrifices at tombs of saints. They regard such rituals as being connected to superstition and magic. In their fervour for devotional assiduity, some attack the use of *tasbehi* (prayer beads) and the burning of frankincense (*ubani*) as practices borrowed from followers of other religions.

The genealogy of reformism in Tanga does not reach back to any scholar or group of scholars but is the result of recent contact with the outside Muslim world. Reformism in the town is associated with a small group of young Muslims who are members of Umoja wa Vijana wa Kiislamu Tanzania (Association of Tanzanian Muslim Youth) or Uvikita for short. Uvikita's association with reformism is more by accident than by design. It so happened that when Uvikita was in the process of being established two of its earliest members (whose presence in Tanga during school holidays meant increased religious activity by the group) were at the time students who were receiving religious training at Imam Muhammad University in Riyadh and the Islamic University of Medina, well-

known bastions of Wahhabist thinking.<sup>7</sup> These students were strongly influenced by the strict Wahhabist (unitarian) teachings. As puritanical reformers, they call for a return to pristine Islam and seek to revitalize Islamic piety. They are mainly responsible for organizing and supplying books for the Sunday study group at BAKWATA-run Jumuiya secondary school. A third student who never completed his studies in Saudi Arabia was in charge of conducting the study group during the period of our research. It was due to the influence of these students that Uvikita has become strongly identified with religious reformism.

Uvikita (until 1988 it was a non-registered association which started its activities in Tanga in the late 1970s) was directly inspired by the Dar es Salaam-based Warsha. One of the objectives of Warsha (which has nothing to do with religious puritanism) is to seek to create religious awareness among young Muslims by organizing them and setting up for them study groups to learn more about their religion. Uvikita did not have many members when it began to hold its meetings for religious training and discussion at Jumuiya secondary school. Membership was quite low and there were no more than twenty five active members in 1985. This explains why Uvikita's long-term commitment was to set up Muslim study groups in all the local secondary schools. This was considered the most effective way to reach young people and get them religiously involved. Uvikita did, however, generate some interest and a lot of good will on the part of some Muslims who sympathized with their activities in the beginning. Some of these Muslims donated to Uvikita office facilities such as office stationery and a typewriter. Uvikita's activities at the time included organizing annual weekly camps at which speakers from Dar es Salaam, for instance, representatives of Warsha and Msaud, were invited to address the group. They attracted youth from Tanga's secondary schools. They also organized weekly religious instruction for an hour for Muslim students attending these schools. BAKWATA had been responsible for this previously but when their efforts faltered Uvikita took over this

responsibility. They also occasionally hired a *kibanda* (stall) at Uwanja wa Maonyesho in Gofu, a suburb of Tanga, to show, for instance, a film on hajj (pilgrimage) and to distribute pamphlets on Islam. Gradually, however, Uvikita took up the cause of religious reformism due to the influence of Tanga students studying in Saudi Arabia. These students want to preserve the principles of pristine Islam intact and appeal to Muslims to free themselves from the shackles or trappings of traditionalism. This was the beginning of the controversy over true Islam by the youth who emphasize *tauhiid* (monotheism and its theology) and the strict tenets of Wahhabism.<sup>8</sup> They oppose mauid celebrations and particularly the beating of *matari* (tambourines); *khitma* (a religious service involving recitation from the Koran followed by a large feast which marks the end of post-burial ceremonies); *talqini* (a book of prayer for the dead which includes instructions or advice to the deceased as to how to respond to the questioning in the grave); *halubadiri* (the book of the people of Badr, used for religio-magical purposes, refers to Koranic verses which mention the battle of Badr in which by the power of prayer the Prophet overcame a foe that vastly outnumbered his own army); and seeking mediation in prayer by invoking the name of a great shaykh or sharif (descendant of the Prophet) or even the Prophet himself (considered superhuman in popular Islam).<sup>9</sup> All these popular Islamic practices are held to be heretical "innovations."

The reformist critique directly hit the bases of some of the established religious leaders' practices and hence provoked a hostile response. In other words, response to this doctrinal assault has not been positive. The shaykhs are puzzled as to what needs reforming and point out that the youth are mixing up *madhehebu*. Saudi Muslims (Hanbalis) and Tanzanian Muslims (Shafis) do not belong to the same school of law. Also, they emphasize the fact that Tanzanian Muslims are not Wahhabis. Quite expectably, it is shaykhs associated with TAMTA and Zahrau who have been at the forefront of attacks on Uvikita. The youth are dismissed as a group of sectarians and Wahhabis.<sup>10</sup> They do not

accept their claims to represent true Islam. They regard them as insufficiently trained and too lacking in wisdom to dispense advice. How can they after a limited exposure to *fiqhi* and *tauhid*, so argue the shaykhs, presume to instruct those who have spent a lifetime studying Islam. Deference and obedience to one's elders (some of these students had received their initial religious training at TAMTA or Zahrau) are inherent features expected of a student towards his former teachers. Thus the reformist debate has tended to reflect doctrinal and generational factors. While some of the walimu associated with the community Friday mosque, for instance, Arabs such as Ali Mbarak and Mwalimu Awadh have not entered this debate, it is clear that their sympathies are not with the youth who have alienated the local ulamaa on the issue of religious "innovation." A number of walimu who are affiliated to TAMTA and Zahrau make it a point to include in their speeches or sermons on the occasion of maulid celebrations an attack on the young reformers. Shaykh Shaaban of Maawa, however, had been less direct in his criticism of them. Being a young scholar, he understood and sympathized with the young people regarding their zeal and impatience to establish an Islamic moral order. His friendly relations with them may also have been part of his distancing himself from the Segeju shaykhs of TAMTA and Zahrau. Nevertheless, he did not share their reformist ideas and considered them to be posturing as reformers when they actually sought to spread Wahhabism. Opposition to Uvikita has come from the very quarters one would expect it: religious leaders affiliated with TAMTA and Zahrau whose practices (for instance, most of the maulid celebrations in Tanga are sponsored by partisans of these madrasas) took the brunt of salafi's criticism. The leaders of these two madrasas regard the young reformers as being misguided. It is reported, for instance, that Shaykh Muhammad Ayub of TAMTA did not take too kindly to the observations made by visiting Saudi shaykhs to Tanga who were shocked when they witnessed maulid celebrations which they regard as being unIslamic. The youth were blamed for being of the same mind as these visiting shaykhs.

Within Uvikita, however, a few of its more silent members, including the chairman at the time (the current leader of Maawa, who was appointed in order to have strong representation from a Digo with links to Maawa) were not opposed to popular Islamic practices. The chairman, Muhammad Hariri, a student at Maawa at the time, attended maulid celebrations organized by Maawa. He does not believe that religious reform should be made into an issue in the community and prefers that Uvikita deal with other questions which affect Muslims. This view is shared by another former chairman of Uvikita (a student of the BAKWATA Shaykh Muhammad Mkanga) who believes that if the youth within Uvikita are to have an appreciable effect or influence in the Tanganyika community they have to work together with the older shaykhs whom they have antagonized. This is not likely to happen since the young reformers will not accept any compromise with popular Islam and will continue their attack on a whole range of influences labelled unIslamic. It is clear that their goal is to make themselves a significant voice within Tanganyika Islam. To achieve this goal, they planned to build a madrasa of their own.

We have noted that they began to meet once a week on an informal basis at BAKWATA-owned Jumuiya secondary school. After their conflict with BAKWATA (as we have seen in chapter four) relations between them became strained. It was not long before BAKWATA asked them to vacate their premises and seek some other place where they could hold their studies and religious discussions. They were given permission to hold their religious classes at the Ibadhi madrasa, although not for long. Soon afterwards, however, Ibadhi leaders, who were under pressure from BAKWATA which accused the youth of spreading corrupt ideas, asked them to move their classes somewhere else. This time they moved to the sixth street where a sympathizer had offered them space to hold their meetings and religious studies. It was at this time that they began seriously to look for a permanent place to establish their own centre.



Despite a number of problems, including opposition from TAMTA and complications with property registration, they succeeded in obtaining land on the eighteenth street and through local efforts and most especially the fund-raising efforts carried out by a Uvikita member then living in Saudi Arabia, they were able to realize their objective of establishing a mosque centre. Construction work is already under way to build a two-storeyed structure. The first storey has been completed and serves as a mosque. It can accommodate a few hundred people. The second floor once completed will provide space for a madrasa, library, office and guest rooms. It is evident that Uvikita's Saudi Arabian connections have paid off in a brief period of time. The centre runs a madrasa for about forty children who are under the age of fifteen. The madrasa is located on the eighteenth street. For older boys and adults, studies (which include Arabic language, the Koran, the Prophetic traditions and so on) are conducted at the mosque. The centre also provides religious lessons for secondary school girls at Jumuiya secondary school. The girls have established a committee which, among other things, makes arrangements for Muslim girls to attend Islamic seminars in the urban centres of Tanzania and Kenya. This reflects Uvikita's emphasis (following Warsha and Msaud's example) on combining modern education with education in the traditional Islamic sciences. In fact, one of their future plans, if they are able to raise sufficient funds, is to build a secondary school in the area of Msambweni. They have also started issuing serialized type-written papers entitled "Fikira za Kiislamu" which aim at teaching people about Islam. This confirms their role as the champions of orthodoxy against religious "innovation." Owing to financial constraints, however, only a limited number of copies of these papers are available for distribution.

With respect to the management of the affairs of the centre, Uvikita's activities are undertaken on a voluntary or shared basis. There is nobody at the centre who is a salaried employee and everybody works on a voluntary basis, including the two current imams,

Abushiri Jinyevu (a Digo who is a former student of Shaykh Abdalla Ayub, the younger brother of the leader of TAMTA) and Mzee Adam Ali (he and two of his colleagues had been expelled from the TAMTA-controlled mosque known as Sharif's mosque). Mzee Adam Ali's expulsion was probably related to his having accepted or at least sympathized with the views of his son (Ali Adam, one of the founders and leading activist of Uvikita). The two imams are assisted by Husein Abdalla, the nephew of the grand shaykh of BAKWATA. Husein Abdalla began his religious studies at Zahrau before going to Saudi Arabia where he never completed his studies at the University of Medina. People who are associated with Ansaar Sunna youth (Uvikita has recently been registered under this name) include Abbasi Makao, Mzamilu (of Lamuan extraction, formerly the caretaker of the mosque on the nineteenth street), the Riyadh-educated Salim Abdurahman (a Swahili of African-Yemeni extraction, currently completing his graduate studies in Pakistan), the Medina-educated Ali Adam (he is employed by the Arab League to teach Islam in Mozambique) and Muhammad Zuberi, another graduate from a Saudi university.

It is clear that the youth movement (which is characterized by egalitarianism with respect to structures of authority) is not led by a single leader. As such, the distinctions between leaders and followers are less manifest as they have no local position to defend (at least for now). This is unlike the case of the other established groups which are marked by a highly respected or venerated religious leadership.

The Ansaar Sunna youth have attempted to portray themselves and their centre as being non-partisan. Their emphasis on reformism represents a shift from ethnic identity to doctrinal issues. They are not involved in personality conflicts or factional competition and stand outside local rivalries. The community, however, is not yet ready to accept their views and their influence is still limited to a small group. They are attempting to spread their ideas to an ever widening circle of people although they have first to overcome the stigma of being outside the mainstream. In fact, the campaign against them has escalated in

recent years since they opened their centre and have a forum to propagate their ideas unhindered. The mosque (known as msikiti wa vijana or youth mosque) which is located on the ninth street and is controlled by TAMTA is often used by some young TAMTA teachers on behalf of the TAMTA leader both to attack and to counter any influence the Ansaar youth may have. The controversy over true Islam has burst out into the open. This means that there are a number of youth who have joined the Ansaar Sunna youth and face opposition from their parents or a few parents who have done so without their children following their example. There are also some people, for instance, a number of Swahili Ibadhi of Omani ancestry, who (due to their strong desire to learn Arabic)<sup>11</sup> attend Arabic classes at the Ansaar Sunna centre without necessarily supporting its religious stand. Among the people who have dropped in at the centre to offer prayers were Shaykh Abdalla Ayub, the younger brother of the leader of TAMTA (who soon afterwards made up for this mistake, in the eyes of TAMTA, by attacking the youth in his sermon) and Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy. The latter is a noted Muslim scholar (known as being a moderate person) who attempts to be on good terms with everyone. The fact that he does not fit into any faction makes it possible for him to visit or pray in any mosque. Besides, one should recall that Shaykh Muhammad Ali had gotten along well with Warsha when he was the national secretary general of BAKWATA. The most bitter enemies of Ansaar Sunna youth are the shaykhs of TAMTA and Zahrau who have local positions to defend. Given this situation, it is difficult to say (since support has been slow to come) whether the youth's doctrinal assault will be successful. More time is needed before the effect of their propaganda will be felt. They have been successful to the extent that through their efforts they have contributed to the development in embryonic stage of the tension between a stricter form of Islam and Islam as mediated through local practice. That this tension is not greater is due to lack of a strong proponent of a stricter form of Islam among the established religious leaders.

## Religious Leaders and Politics

Among the religious leaders interviewed the prevalent view is that shaykhs, whose primary occupation is to teach religion, should not involve themselves in (party) politics. Many spoke of politics as being a dishonest pursuit.<sup>12</sup> One shaykh pointed out that given the nature of (party) politics which tends to be propagandistic he would be hard pressed to participate in politics as a shaykh whose obligation is to speak the truth all the time. Another explained that it is the duty of the shaykh to defend the sharia and to concern himself with the application of Islamic values. Tanzania being a secular state, according to him, a shaykh cannot in good conscience support secular laws which glorify the state. Reservations such as these have made shaykhs in Tanga keep their distance from politics. The exception has been Shaykh Abdalla Jambia who has been active with the party and was among the people responsible for organizing the TANU youth brigade in Tanga in 1956. He is not highly respected by fellow shaykhs, not because he is an accommodationist religious leader (he is by no means the only one), but because his behaviour is not considered proper for a shaykh. For instance, he enjoys card games and spends a lot of time with *vikundi vya bao* (card-playing groups). The ulamaa are supposed to enhance their status by remaining aloof from mundane activities such as card playing, involvement with sports, entertainment and so on. Some shaykhs in Tanga, as we shall see, supported a particular party or became card-carrying members of that party in the 1950s. Today the situation has changed and most religious leaders are wary about getting involved in politics partly out of fear that if they don't stay in step they may get into trouble with the authorities. Under these circumstances, participation in politics amounts to collaboration with authorities, particularly given the absence of the institution of the multi-party system. As long as a shaykh cooperated with authorities and avoided confrontation with them he had nothing to fear; however, should he oppose government policy, or worse still, put forward what could be labelled as "Muslim" demands, this will not be tolerated. Generally,

therefore, the shaykhs cannot provide political leadership and very few are active in the political process. They do not assert themselves as a political lobby for the protection and promotion of Muslim interests. They are well aware of the risk involved should they express their demands as some of the Dar es Salaam Muslim leaders had done during the period of Nyerere's presidency and leadership of the party. In other words, they have not forgotten the case of a number of outspoken Muslim leaders in Dar es Salaam among whom were Shaykh Sulaiman Taqdiri and Mwenye Baba. Mwenye Baba was the head of the Tanganyika Islamic Centre (TIC) whose activities were associated with the Badawi mosque in Dar es Salaam in the early 1960s. Chief Abdalla Fundikira, a well known politician, was for a time involved with the centre. Shaykh Husein Badawi was a vocal member of TIC and had a small following. He used the pulpit to disseminate Islamic ideas. The centre articulated Muslim grievances and was seen by the authorities as a threat. In the end, Shaykh Badawi was deported while Mwenye Baba was arrested and charged with bribery although he was later released. This effectively brought to an end the activities of the centre.<sup>13</sup>

The extent to which religious leaders in Tanga keep their distance from politics is illustrated by the following example. On one occasion imams of mosques and leaders of other religions were summoned to the area commissioners' office to be briefed on "operation nguvukazi" (what later became the Deployment Act). The theme of the talk was that everyone should work hard. Before the passage of this bill in the national assembly the area commissioner of Tanga took the opportunity to explain to religious leaders the purpose of "operation nguvukazi" so that they could explain it to their followers. According to one Muslim religious leader, no shaykh bothered to explain government policy in the mosque. As far as the shaykhs were concerned, the government policy was that religion would not be mixed with politics. What seemed puzzling to them was that on one hand they were supposed to stay out of politics and on the other hand they were expected to endorse or

support government policies in their religious forums. Muslim religious leaders are concerned with guiding their community in its religious affairs and are reluctant to take on the role of middlemen on behalf of politicians. As one of them explained, they believe in God and the party forbids discussions about God at party meetings.

The above discussion has broached the subject of the relationship between religion and politics particularly given the widely held view by Muslim groups (against which the idea of "not mixing religion with politics" in Tanzania was intended) that these two spheres of life cannot be separated. Nyerere warned religious groups to keep out of politics; and yet he fostered a form of civil "religion" which seeks to subordinate religious values to the exigencies of socio-economic development. The Tanzanian government wants religion to be a private affair and insists, at least in theory, that religion and politics should be kept separate. In practice, however, the government has been promoting a form of civil religion which is connected with political life and has been attempting to coopt religious groups into supporting its programs. More specifically, Ujamaa has been presented as a secular theology which pertains to earthly life in contrast to religious theology which is in the main relegated to the realm of metaphysical concerns.<sup>14</sup>

It is interesting to note that there are areas of contact and areas of possible friction between "church" religion and civil or political "religion" which impinge on each other. According to David Apter, both have the same goal in that their aim is to create a better society. They appeal to norms of egalitarianism and mass participation in social life, values which are held to be universal.<sup>15</sup> Church religion, however, has both worldly or societal and extra-societal concerns whereas civil religion is this-worldly and considers loyalty to the state and the primacy of ideology (Ujamaa in the case of Tanzania) as undergirding national life and overarching national society. This is a problematic area given that religious-minded people place all their daily activities in a context of transcendental reference. Similarly, ujamaa, in so far as it is a civil "religion," also aims at creating a

society where individuals, like believers, would act out its values. One major problem which besets civil "religions" is that their fortunes are tied to the vicissitudes of socio-economical and political life. As David Apter so aptly put it, "political religions are subject to even more severe and cynical disenchantment by their adherents than church religions. For the latter, in addition to their more transcendental concerns, are also codes for expressing individual terrors and moralities."<sup>16</sup>

To provide a perspective within which we can understand and discuss religious leadership views on ujamaa, we need first to present a history of political developments in Tanzania with particular reference to Tanga. This survey of political developments is intended to serve as an introductory background to subsequent discussion which attempts to relate religious views to the socio-economical conditions in the country in the last one and a half decades.

### **TTACSA and TAA: The Birth of Modern Politics**

The beginnings of territorial politics in Tanganyika was among African civil servants who responded to the British colonial plan in 1918 to make Tanganyika an Indian colony. African leaders in Tanga, which was then the main educational centre in the territory, organized themselves to oppose the plan.<sup>17</sup> The signatories included the pro-British liwali of Tanga, Ali b. Diwani, and the civil servants headed by Martin Kayamba, great grandson of Kimweri and a product of Kiungani British mission school in Zanzibar.<sup>18</sup> This opposition became the basis of subsequent political organization in Tanga.

The civil servants also wanted to fight for privileges for African civil servants. They demanded parity with Asians with regard to salaries, housing allowances and other benefits.<sup>19</sup> Their efforts led to the founding of the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Service Association (TTACSA) in March of 1922 with Martin Kayamba, head clerk in the

Tanga District Office, as the president.<sup>20</sup> TTACSA (whose founders were Bondei) did not espouse any radical views and was to all intents and purposes a mutual self-improvement society which sought change through cooperation with Europeans. It was an elitist association, led by a Christian anglophile, which brought together Christians working in Tanga district and Swahili-speaking Muslims (including some Arabs) employed in the local administration to fight for privileges for African civil servants. By the late 1920s the association (which had newspapers and a football team) had grown weak and moved to Dar es Salaam where in 1928/29 some of its members founded the Tanganyika African Association (TAA). TTACSA was revived for a brief period in the mid-1940s and renamed the Tanganyika African Government Services Association (TAGSA). Membership was limited to clerks and skilled workers.

In imitation of TTACSA a few organizations began to spring up in other towns in Tanganyika. The most important of these was TAA which was founded in Dar es Salaam in 1929 by unemployed African secondary school leavers. In effect, TAA, which later developed relatively more broad-based support and had wider membership, replaced TTACSA and became its successor. In the beginning TAA had no political ambition and was content to address itself to the needs of a small Westernized group whose interests it represented. It appealed mainly to clerks and teachers and was particularly attractive to Muslim townsmen who became prominent in it. TAA did not develop into a mass association as it failed to make common cause with the African masses. Therefore, it could not speak effectively on behalf of all Africans and, in fact, its attempts in the interwar period to find local solutions proved only too well the ineffectiveness of politics of local focus.<sup>21</sup> After World War II, however, TAA became increasingly political and began to develop into a national movement. By 1948 it had opened 39 branches in different parts of the country and was beginning to attract traders and farmers. The Tanga branch of TAA was taken over by impatient Makerere men such as Godfrey Kayamba and Steven Mhando



who in 1951 agitated for complete freedom with a document presented to a U.N. visiting mission.<sup>22</sup> In the previous year TAA's head office in Dar es Salaam had recruited as advisors six old Muslim shaykhs to act as intermediaries with the colonial authorities. TAA (and later its successor TANU) courted elders of communities whose intermediary role with the government would dispel the view that it was a party of extremism.

In 1952 Julius Nyerere (who was just back from Britain) was elected as president of TAA, replacing Vedast Kyaruzi. He and other TAA activists contemplated the establishment of a new party which would champion the nationalist cause for independence. On July 7, 1954, seventeen persons, people who could afford to take up politics as a full time activity since civil servants were prohibited from participation in political organizations, founded the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). More precisely, TAA acquired a new name and transformed itself from a social organization into a political union or party. This meant that TANU inherited the legitimacy of a central organization. Within a few years it had nearly two hundred thousand card-carrying members.

### **Populist TANU, Elitist UTP and the Struggle for Independence**

From its inception in 1952 to independence in 1961, TANU was the main nationalist political movement. The party was extremely popular in coastal towns and later gained support in the rural areas as well. The coastal people, in particular, found it easy to transfer their support from TAA to TANU, its successor. Various groups, including followers of the Qadiriyya order in Bagamoyo, supported the nationalist movement and got involved with TANU.<sup>23</sup> Muslim trader-politicians in many urban centres of the country were active in TANU and their strong association with the party helped diffuse a political culture that has been associated with Kiswahili, a language which gave the TANU

ideology, so it is claimed, "many Islamic overtones to balance those which its Western-educated leaders derived from Christianity."<sup>24</sup> Muslims joined TANU in great numbers and participated in the struggle for independence. They hoped to gain political influence and to be able to contribute to policies aimed at redressing existing imbalances in society. Many Muslims (and other groups too) expected African rule to open opportunities for mobility and affluence. This made the opponents of TANU ineffectual and unpopular.

From 1954 to 1961, Tanga was a stronghold of TANU, which was seen as the party which represented the interests of Africans. The leading figures responsible for organizing the Tanga branch were ordinary people such as Mwalimu Kihere, a self-educated Muslim firewood dealer (TAA's committee in 1945 had been run by him), Amisi Here (Khamisi Kheri) and Tuwa Abdalla. These were Wadigo who formed TANU's local nucleus in Tanga. These men, apart from the fact that they had been active in the Digo Association of Tanga,<sup>25</sup> were people who saw the party as an avenue for self-improvement for the Digo. The women's section of the party before it was merged with the men's section was led by a Digo woman, Mwanamema bint Sultan. Bibi Titi Mohammed, a Matumbi townswoman, who had established TANU's women section at the national level in Dar es Salaam in 1955, visited Tanga to help enrol female members. TANU in Tanga was led by ordinary people who had very little formal education. These people were free to join any political party, whereas educated government employees were specifically barred from doing so. In fact, in Tanga TAA, TANU's predecessor, had been weakened by this ban.<sup>26</sup> This means that both TAA and TANU were initially not led by educated Africans. TANU's leadership later passed into the hands of Makerere-educated teachers and civil servants. The Digo played an important role in the party alongside educated Bondei such as Godfrey Kayamba and Steven Mhando. Religion did not seem to play a part in the choice of candidates. Nevertheless, there was friction when these Makerere-educated men took over the leadership of the party from the less educated previous leadership. Godfrey

Kayamba (the third generation of his family to have visited England) was particularly impatient about the tempo of political developments leading to independence.<sup>27</sup>

In its original manifesto, TANU declared itself to be a party for Africans only. In opposition, a new rival party known as the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) was established in February 1956 at the initiative of Sir Edward Twining, Governor of Tanganyika from 1949 to 1958. Governor Twining chose Ivor Bayldon, a member of the legislative council, to lead the new party which was based in Tanga and had its offices on the fourteenth street. Tanga was probably chosen as UTP's headquarters because a number of influential White settlers or estate owners were based in this region. The party's founders consisted of 28 of the 30 unofficial legislative councillors who were appointees of the governor. The legislative council had been set up in 1926 and by 1948 included among its members Shaykh Juma Mwindadi, a Tanga-educated Muslim teacher (a former student of the Segeju Shaykh Dhikri Said) from Dar es Salaam. He had worked as a *hakimu* (magistrate) in Tanga and later served as liwali. Given UTP's association with White settlers and pro-British legislative councillors, it is not surprising that it came to be known as "chama cha serikali" (the government party) among the people. This impression was reinforced by UTP itself which was paternalistic (it considered Africans not to be ready for responsible government owing to lack of an educated electorate in the country) and did not take a stand on ending colonial rule. The party was established in order to check the growth of African nationalism and to promote and maintain European and Asian businessmen and African traditional leaders who were favoured by the British instead of the educated rising African civil service group. The party, which had a liberal budget, wanted to promote free enterprise and to safeguard the influence of Europeans. The party's platform called for multiracialism, a communal roll, and parity of representation in opposition to TANU's common franchise and "one man one vote" principle.<sup>28</sup>

UTP's main backers, apart from wealthy individual Europeans and Asians, included a number of companies which threw their weight behind the party. People in high positions, for instance, bank managers joined UTP committees. Among the leading Asians who joined UTP were people such as Abdul Karim Y. A. Karimjee, the influential sisal estate owner and head of a number of successful commercial firms who became the treasurer of the party, V. M. Nazerali, a leading Dar es Salaam-based Ismaili retailer and sisal estate owner, and Dr. Kuka, a Parsee whose loyalties had been divided after the partition of India.<sup>29</sup> These conservative Asians, members of the defunct Indian Association, were seen as collaborators by members of the progressive Asian Association which was influenced by nationalist developments in India. There were also rumours that the Aga Khan had donated money to UTP.<sup>30</sup> It is doubtful, however, that his contribution made a dent in the political direction of the party. Despite Asian membership in the party, UTP did not acquire a sectarian colouring. The party stood for the status quo of the established groups.

Although UTP was a party of immigrants, a number of Africans, most notably legislative councillors, were among its supporters. Chief David Kidaha Makwaia (who had spent a year at Oxford) and chief Harun M. Lugasha were among the Africans who had signed its manifesto, a move that lost them respect among Africans. A number of Muslims joined the party including Shaykh Husein Juma who later replaced Brian Lewis as the director general of the party. UTP was able to gain some support in different areas of the Tanga province, Handeni and Pangani in particular, and in other parts of the country. By 1957 it had opened 19 branches in places such as Bukoba, Kilimanjaro and Mafia. In the Tanga region UTP was able to gain some measure of support among the Zigua of Handeni and among the traditional elite in Pangani.<sup>31</sup> Local elites had their own ambitions, for instance, the Tambarara Citizens' Union which embodied Zigua irredentism.<sup>32</sup> More specifically, when TANU declined Tambarara's request to affiliate with TANU, UTP

branches appeared in Mombo and Handeni, led by Michael Kikurwe, a Zigua traditionalist, and Petro Mntambo, a former TAA activist and legislative councillor, one of the signatories to UTP manifesto.<sup>33</sup> Tambarara split, most militants allying themselves with UTP which gained strength among the Zigua. In contrast, dissident school teachers (Christian modernizers) and traders who had established the Bondei Central Union (BCU) in 1948, partly to campaign for a paramount chief, succeeded in 1958 after having allied themselves with the nationalist movement (TANU).<sup>34</sup>

In Pangani very bitter rivalry developed between supporters of UTP and TANU. The conflict was severe and grew to serious proportions due to the fact that the Shomvi notables joined UTP to preserve their status when it became clear to them that TANU leaders were mainly Manyema, people (Zairean by origin) of servile ancestry.<sup>35</sup> In other words, the elite joined UTP because they feared that their status would suffer under a TANU-led government which was pitted against forces of privilege. A UTP organizer in Pangani complained that "if a UTP member goes into a bar, all the other people leave. If a UTP member gets on a bus, everyone else gets off, and then the conductor forces the UTP member to leave.... If relatives of UTP members die (Muslims) no one will go to the funeral."<sup>36</sup>

Similarly, in Tanga town there was strong resentment against people who joined UTP even though it included some of the town's elite of Muslim notables, including Shaykh Muhammad Salim Msellem and Muhammad Barwani (who belonged to old coastal Swahili families of Omani ancestry), Khalid Kirama (a former akida), and a number of educated Christians.<sup>37</sup> These people were ostracized by ordinary Tangans, including unskilled (African) immigrants to the town. Most wage earners, then exploited and potentially radical, were strong opponents of UTP and staunch supporters of TANU.

In terms of union activity which translated into support for TANU, the sisal section, based in Tanga, was reputed to be the most militant union in the country. In 1958, for instance, the sisal union organized strikes demanding higher wages.<sup>38</sup> Particularly crucial for the success of TANU were African traders many of whom held party offices and had pioneered many branches in the country. They were strong supporters of TANU which they hoped would create conditions in which African commerce would flourish, particularly in competition with Asians.<sup>39</sup> This was one of the reasons why opponents of TANU were extremely unpopular. In Mtangata, which is not far from Tanga town, people refused to eat with individuals known or suspected to be members of UTP.<sup>40</sup> There were also allegations that the leading scholar in Tanga, Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, was himself a member of UTP, a charge that is denied by his sons, Shaykh Muhammad Ali and Shaykh Said Ali. According to them, the only person in the family who had joined UTP and had been a card-carrying member of the party was Hemed Ali, the shaykh's oldest son. Hemed Ali worked as a secretary for Sir Eldred Hitchcock, a sisal planter and resident director of Bird and Company, who had been one of the founders of UTP. As for the shaykh himself, according to his sons, he had turned down an invitation from a Greek estate owner to join the party. He was not involved in politics (it is more than likely, nevertheless, that as a kadhi he had been a member of TTACSA, a Tanga-based civil servants' association just as he was later to become a member of TAA although for a brief period only) and refused to be associated with any political party. A few of his former students, however, did join the UTP. Shaykh Muhammad Ali insists that he was not among those who did so. Yet, like his father, he says that he was also accused of being a UTP member despite the fact that he was a civil servant (he worked in the Provincial Commissioner's Office at first as assistant liwali (1954-59) and later as liwali (1960-62)) and was not at liberty to join any political party.<sup>41</sup> He recalls that once in 1957 (he had become the khatib of the community Friday mosque following the death of his father during that year) when he was delivering the Friday sermon people walked out of the

mosque because he (being a member of a notable family) was suspected of being a UTP shaykh. It was people who had European connections (that is, were employed or had been employed by the colonial administration) who were obvious supporters of UTP. People of high standing in the community such as Shaykh Salim Msellem (the liwali of Tanga during the Busaid and the German administrations had come from this family), Muhammad Barwani and, as some Tangans allege, Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy, the leading scholar in Tanga, had joined UTP.<sup>42</sup>

### **TANU's Triumph over UTP at the Polls**

Governorship of Sir Richard Turnbull was committed to Tanganyika's attainment of self-government and organized its first election. A two-part general election which guaranteed racial representation to Africans, Europeans and Asians was held in September 1958 and February 1959 to contest 30 seats in the legislative council. For electoral purposes, the territory was divided into 10 large constituencies, each constituency electing one representative from each of the three racial groups. Whereas TANU members in Sukumaland opposed participation in the elections, Abdalla Rashid from Tanga urged electoral participation. Nyerere who was then a member of the legislative council resigned from the council. In the 1958 elections TANU and candidates supported by it from the other racial groups took 13 out of 15 seats, the other two going to unopposed Europeans. TANU endorsed Asian candidates put forward by the Asian Association. In the elections UTP lost badly everywhere and its leader, Ivor Bayldon, was among those who suffered electoral defeat. TANU's support enabled the Asian Association's young professional men such as Ameer Jamaal (a businessman educated in India who was a bitter critic of British rule) to seize leadership positions.<sup>43</sup> His European counterpart was Derek Bryceson, a farmer (and later Minister of Agriculture) who aligned himself with nationalism and did not join UTP. Among Africans, TANU supported the popular Chief Abdalla Fundikira as the

candidate for the Western Province. He won easily. In the Tanga province the TANU candidate, John Keto, won handily against opposition from Petro Mntambo (UTP) of Tambarare Citizens' Union and Zuberi Mtenvu, the leader and the only candidate of a small splinter party from TANU called the African National Congress (ANC) which advocated an exclusive African system of government.

UTP's disastrous defeat at the polls led to the disappearance of most of its branches in different parts of the country. The conservative Asians subsequently rejoined the Asian Association and worked for TANU.<sup>44</sup> Support for TANU increased as its objectives became clear. TANU wanted Africans to be responsible for their future and to govern themselves in an African state. Support for TANU was so widespread that UTP did not bother to contest the 1959 elections, and the party died. In the elections there was a dispute in Tanga over legislative council candidates, urban notables complaining that TANU's provincial leaders were people originating from outside the town. At any rate, under a new constitution which envisaged a new legislative council with 71 elected and 9 nominated members, TANU won almost all the contested seats in the election of August-September 1960. The small parties were able to garner limited votes and succeeded in electing only one member. Nyerere appointed his cabinet which included non-African supporters of TANU, four Europeans and one Asian (Ameer Jamaal) in it. On 9 December, 1961 Tanganyika attained independence. Two years later membership of the party was opened to Tanzanian citizens of all races.

TANU had developed strong support among Tanga Muslims because of its commitment to equalize the level of development throughout the country. The local branch of the party had attracted Muslim activists such as Mwalimu Kihere, Khamisi Kheri, Tuwa Abdalla, Saleh Kibwana, Dhili Mgunya, Abdalla Makata, Abdalla Rashid Sembe, Shaykh Abdalla Jambia and others.<sup>45</sup> TANU's support base in Tanga was among the Digo as well as other ethnic groups of Tanga. These groups had participated actively in the



struggle for independence. Like Muslims everywhere they had high expectations and hoped to be able to improve their position in post-colonial society. Hence their wholehearted support for TANU and Nyerere.<sup>46</sup> There is a story that is told in Tanga that long before Nyerere emerged into the political limelight one shaykh had predicted the coming of independence and the ascendancy to power of a man with a name which starts with the letter N. Nyerere was loved by many people some of whom fasted to pray for his success. This is how popular Nyerere was in Tanga. A big maulid celebration was planned by the Tangan Muslims when self-government became imminent. Even before the British flag was lowered, the maulid had begun as Muslims celebrated and prayed for Nyerere and the party.

### **Religious Leaders' Attitude to Ujamaa Ideology**

We have established the extent to which TANU was popular among all groups in Tanga in the 1950s and early 1960s. We now want to explore whether in 1984-85 (two and a half decades later) this strong enthusiasm for TANU or CCM/Chama Cha Mapinduzi as it is now known,<sup>47</sup> at least as far as religious leaders are concerned, has translated into support for ujamaa.

It is claimed, not without justification, that Tanzanian Muslims, many of whom supported TANU right from the beginning as we have seen, are by and large strong supporters of the main policies of ujamaa socialism.<sup>48</sup> There is no doubt that African Muslims joined TANU in large numbers, hoping to benefit from its policies, especially with respect to education. Later when the ideology of ujamaa was proclaimed many may have been attracted to its programs which held out the promise of justice to all. Ujamaa promised not only to eliminate the disadvantages in society, but also to create equitable distribution of opportunities for all groups. The extreme poverty of the country and most

of the people the overwhelming majority of whom live in the rural areas (the annual income level was estimated at £ 60 per person in 1961 at the time of independence) must have made ujamaa attractive.

In our interviews with religious leaders in Tanga we found that a small group among them was noncommittal on the question of ujamaa. This reflected a suspicion that if their views were known they might get into trouble with the authorities. For one reason or another the majority of religious leaders were not too keen on ujamaa and doubted that creating a scarcity of commodities, hyper-inflation and other problems which they blame on the policies of ujamaa was the best way to help the people. Among religious leaders a preference for ujamaa seems to correlate with the degree of involvement in politics or political activity. For instance, one shaykh who was a strong supporter of ujamaa had been a member of TANU and it is likely that he benefitted in some way from strong association with the party. So long as the question was phrased in general terms, a few of the older shaykhs were a bit more sympathetic. Nevertheless, when confronted with specific cases, for instance, nationalization of houses, they were quick to point out that no matter how popular this policy may have been when it was introduced, it could not be justified on purely religious grounds. When informed that Nyerere claimed that ujamaa socialism was compatible with Islam,<sup>49</sup> that is, it was in accordance with the spirit of the Koran, since both systems aimed at socio-economic justice, their reply was that the Islamic system is not a socialist system although it may contain elements of socialism; ujamaa stands for equality, self-reliance, cooperation and living together in communal villages. According to them, Islam, while it is not opposed to some of these norms, is a system (with its own laws) which is based on its own vision of the good society which addresses the spiritual needs of man. They were sceptical of the alleged compatibility of Islam with ujamaa and saw this to be an attempt on the part of the government to use religion to endorse its policies.

When we cited such views to one Muslim elder in Tanga who had been active with TANU right from the beginning and was a strong supporter of ujamaa, his response was that Muslims don't deny the politics or ideology of ujamaa. The problem, according to him, is that ujamaa has not been implemented properly by the leaders. Also, people in the towns being more individualistic and property-minded (this, however, was also true of rural people in parts of Tanga and Kilimanjaro regions)<sup>50</sup> are not as enthusiastic about ujamaa as people in the rural areas. He was, however, puzzled by the opinion of religious leaders on the question of nationalization of houses. According to him, nationalization of houses has its victims (big landlords) and its beneficiaries (individual Africans who benefitted). This was a good policy which was motivated by the principle of redistributive justice. He admitted that nationalized houses which have been placed under *msajili wa majumba* (Registrar of houses) are not looked after properly and have faulty pipes and leaky roofs.

Another Tangan, an educated Muslim who works as a court registrar and was a supporter of ujamaa, echoed the same criticisms and admitted that ujamaa was not popular in the town. He pointed out that wazee (elders) do not understand ujamaa. They are sceptical of it and think it interferes with religion. That they distrust ujamaa is indicated by some of their sermons during the maulid festivals. They use some of these occasions to preach against equality as advocated by ujamaa. He believes that shaykhs have not understood the type of equality preached by ujamaa supporters. For instance, ujamaa teaches that men and women are equal. Shaykhs do not think this is so. For them men and women are complementary members of society in its entirety and in its microcosm (the family unit) with the man's status being slightly higher than that of the woman as the breadwinner and head of the family. The shaykhs also have problems incorporating in their understanding the statement that the party and government have no religion. His general impression is that the meaning and purpose of ujamaa have not been explained clearly to

them. According to him, Muslim leaders in the party have not addressed shaykhs on this subject. There may be something to this criticism, since our interview with the shaykh who was a supporter of ujamaa revealed that he was not clear on some of the policies of ujamaa.<sup>51</sup> He pointed out that some of the goals of ujamaa are quite good while others are not sound or are opposed to the spirit of the Koran. For instance, he considered as violating the Islamic law of inheritance and, therefore, the right to private property the fact that in a ujamaa village property (meaning the house and the land on which it is built) is to be owned communally and cannot be transferred to one's heirs.<sup>52</sup> On inquiring on this point we were made aware by a Tanganyika politician that each villager, apart from participating in collective farming on the communal land on which may be planted crops such as cotton, maize or wheat, also cultivates his own private plot which adjoins to other plots of land. While he is required to work a number of days on the communal land (he is a shareholder) in a ujamaa village (which may include a village shop or a chicken cooperative), he is allowed to spend the rest of the week looking after his farm. Indeed, the tendency in a number of areas has been for villagers to spend more time on their private farms and neglected the communal farms. The private plot of land and whatever is on it, including a person's house and belongings, can be passed on to one's heirs.

One does not have to look very far to find out why the religious leaders are disenchanted with the policies of ujamaa. It is clear that the economic problems in the country have played a major part in shaping their attitudes and reactions to this ideology. Tanzania has been facing a severe economic crisis and has been desperately attempting a recovery program. Therefore, religious leaders are not the only group that takes a dismal view of ujamaa. It is now clear that the high optimism and once strong support for ujamaa has been seriously eroded by recent developments in the country. While ujamaa is lauded (by those whom Ali Mazrui has described as "Tanzanophiles") as an interesting social experiment (although even this is not certain now), economic performance is the final

arbiter as to whether the system is supported as a practical possibility. It is undeniable that ujamaa as a fight against poverty is given approval by popular culture; yet, it is also clear that ujamaa as implemented by bureaucrats, supposedly the equalizers of society, has left a general cynicism in the minds of people about ujamaa policies in practice.<sup>53</sup> More specifically, the severe economic hardships typified by recurrent shortages of basic commodities in the face of corruption at all levels has created a general cynicism based on the gap between official rhetoric and practice.<sup>54</sup> Ironically, the average Tanzanian who is supposed to benefit from ujamaa policies is the one who has been the hardest hit by the economic difficulties which, not justifiably in all cases, are blamed on ujamaa.

Tanzania's economic crisis (which is examined in detail in the footnote section) has been precipitated by a number of factors, both internal and external.<sup>55</sup> The failure of the country's collective farming program (ujamaa) to expand agricultural production<sup>56</sup> and the dismal performance of the nationalized industries<sup>57</sup> which did not produce goods efficiently led to widespread appearance of corruption and black market operations.<sup>58</sup> To combat corruption and illegal economic activities, the government instituted a major crackdown against economic saboteurs in the early 1980s which was not fully successful.<sup>59</sup> The country's economic difficulties made it increasingly dependent on foreign aid and the government had to reach some accommodation with IMF with respect to conditions for credit granting. This was followed by a major speech by Nyerere in September 1986 in which he called for the full participation by the private sector in the country's development strategy. He made it clear that the state must continue to dominate the economic sector, but accepted the reality that the country's economic crisis had forced it into an "unplanned retreat from socialism."<sup>60</sup>

The impact of Tanzania's economic problems on Tanga, a town which experienced economic growth with the influx of sisal earnings during the first half of the twentieth century up to the 1960s, has not been markedly different from other towns. With the case

of Tanga, however, the sisal boom (which in the past contributed to the growth of the town) has since levelled out and a decline has set in during the last couple of decades, and discounting minor fluctuations in price in recent years, it will not produce a local building spree and development as before.<sup>61</sup> Little new sisal is being grown and the government is attempting to return some of the nationalized estates to their former owners. Tanga which was once the second largest town in mainland Tanzania is now (by some estimates) the fifth largest town after Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Tabora and Mbeya.<sup>62</sup>

The overriding concern of this chapter has been to analyze the views of the religious leaders in the performance of social and religious functions. In studying this leadership, the chapter has brought issues related to religion and society in Tanga into sharp focus. More specifically, the discussion has attempted to show that the status of religious leaders has undergone some modification over time and that changes in the educational, socio-economic and political spheres which began during the colonial period and continued well into the post-colonial era have contributed to the erosion of the religious leaders' base of operation. We assessed some of the religious trends in the Tangan Muslim community using religious leaders as our sample and unit of analysis. We investigated their opinion with respect to secular values, changes in the educational sphere, the role of women in society, religious orthodoxy and socio-political values. Since Tanzania has undergone socio-economic and political changes, we attempted to relate these changes to religious leadership views on politics in general and ujamaa ideology in particular.

We have not offered our observations or analysis of some of the issues raised in this chapter. This has been left to the concluding section, which will be devoted to formulating our conclusions based on the study as a whole.

### Notes to Chapter Six

- <sup>1</sup> See the discussion in Gabriel Baer, ed., *The 'Ulamā' in Modern History* (Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1971); Nikkie R. Keddie, ed., *Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East Since 1500* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Arnold H. Green, "The Tunisian Ulama: Social Structure and Responses to Ideological Currents, 1873-1914" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1973); idem, "Political Attitudes and Activities of the Ulama in the Liberal Age: Tunisia as an Exceptional Example," *IJMES* 7 (1976): 209-241; and Michael Gilsenan, *Recognizing Islam: An Anthropologist's Introduction* (London: Croom Helm, 1982).
  
- <sup>2</sup> Joseph A. Kechichian, "The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia," *IJMES* 18: 1 (February 1986): 53-71; A. Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom," *IJMES* 17: 1 (February 1985): 37-50; A. Layish, "Ulama and Politics in Saudi Arabia," in *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, eds. M. Heper and R. Israeli (New York; London: Croom Helm, 1984); Mordechai Abir, "The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia," *MES* 23: 2 (April 1987): 151-171; Ghassan Salame, "Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia," *ASQ* 9: 3 (1987): 306-326; and Ayman al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985). In the political domain the double-edged character of Islam manifests itself either in the direction of preserving an existing political, social and economic order (legitimizing regimes in power and defending the socio-economic structure over which the regimes are based as is the case in Saudi Arabia) or in opposition to the status quo (revolutionary forces draw upon the example of the Prophet and the political activities of his successors). See the discussion in Mohammed Ayoob, ed. *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion* (London: Croom Helm, 1985), esp. the concluding chapter. Islamic scholars over the course of Islamic history have been of four types: those who seek to harmonize the demands of the ideal with practical necessity; those who act as mediator between government and the people; those who are neutral by withdrawing from the affairs of the world; and those who have opted for outright rebellion. On the last type, see Joseph A. Kechichian, "Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhaymān al-'Utaibi's 'Letters' to the Saudi People," *MW* Lxxx: 1 (January 1990): 1-16; and Nikki R. Keddie, ed. *Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
  
- <sup>3</sup> See, for instance, El Zein, *The Sacred Meadows*; and Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, "Sufi Politics in Senegal," in *Islam in the Political Process*, ed. James P. Piscatori (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 123-37.
  
- <sup>4</sup> At the time when this marriage law was being enacted there was opposition from Muslims. BAKWATA put out a pamphlet explaining the new marriage law. In addition, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, who was the secretary general of the council at the time, toured the country to explain to Muslims what the new law entailed. He attempted to calm their fears about the consequences of the law for them. In

essence, the law recognized both monogamous and polygamous marriages. In the latter case, however, the consent of the first wife was needed for any subsequent marriage by the husband. In practice, however, it is doubtful that husbands seek permission from the first wives before they take on an additional wife. Only an educated wife is assertive of her rights. Child marriages were prohibited and a minimum age was set, 18 for boys and 15 for girls, for marriage to take place. The law did not consider dowry to be a condition which validates marriage. The law also stipulated that a husband or wife could not inflict corporal punishment to his or her spouse. With respect to divorce, the law stated that a marriage could not be dissolved until first it went through a marriage conciliation board. This was aimed at reducing the number of unnecessary divorces. The law allowed divorce to be initiated by either partner in marriage. For a fuller discussion of this law, see Y. P. Ghai, "The New Marriage Law in Tanzania," *AQ* 11: 2 (July-September 1971): 101-109. See also, M. Muro, "The Controversy over Bride Price and Polygamy-New Laws on Marriage and Maternity Leave," *TNR* 83 (1978): 133-137.

- 5 See for comparative purposes, Jerome H. Barkow, "Hausa Women and Islam," *CJAS* 6: 2 (1972): 317-328.
- 6 The Salafiyya movement has a conservative (such as Wahhabism which is mainly concerned with "purification" of religion) and modernist (such as the modernist school of thought associated with Muḥammad Abduh and others like him-- which goes beyond that and is taken up with issues of reformation of Muslim education and reinterpretation of doctrine in the light of modern scientific thought) wings.
- 7 On similar influence in Egypt, see L. Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic Thought and Politics in French West Africa* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1974), ch. 3, "Al-Azhar and the West African Students," 73-94.
- 8 Pious elements in Saudi Arabia (defenders of the Wahhabi tradition) popularly referred to as *muṭawwa'* (sing.) also provide a model of scriptural observance that many foreign students have incorporated in their understanding of Islam. Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1787) was strongly influenced or inspired by the teachings of Aḥmad ibn Taimiyya, a Hanbali theologian of the fourteenth century. Hanbali's judicial school is the most strict among the four Sunni schools of law and stresses the superiority of the scriptural text (the Koran and the Prophetic traditions) over independent reason. For the strict teachings of Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, see *Kitāb al-Tawhīd* tr. Ismā'īl R. Fārūqī (Salimiah, Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1986). This book has also been translated into Kiswahili and a number of other languages.
- 9 In support of their stand, Salafis point to many verses of the Koran which emphasize the doctrine of personal responsibility and reject the idea of human intercession; that is, one human being, whether priest, saint or Prophet (the saint or Prophet being in any case dead), being able to forgive or wash away another's sins as is implied in the Christian doctrine of vicarious atonement and the Catholic practice of confession in particular. In the traditions of the Prophet, however, it is mentioned (in relation to the events of the Day of Judgement when humanity will be assembled before God) that the



Prophet will be given permission to intercede (that is, to ask for forgiveness for members of the Muslim community).

- 10 Wahhabism is not a sect but a Sunni movement based on the Hanbali school of law. It is therefore described as being a reaffirmation of the Sunni creed in its most orthodox form. The word "Wahhabi" is a derogatory term and is often used by adversaries. For instance, Shaykh al-Amin Mazrui and (after him) Shaykh Qasim Mazrui and Shaykh Abdalla Saleh al-Farsy had been accused of being Wahhabis by their opponents, mainly sharifs whose headquarters in Kenya is Lamu. Even Saudi Muslims never refer to themselves as being Wahhabis; they like to be known as 'people of Sunna' (that is, people who follow strictly the spirit and the letter of the Koran and Sunna/traditions of the Prophet).
- 11 Knowing Arabic is an asset for some of the Tangans, particularly those of Arab ancestry, who are fortunate either to migrate to oil-rich Oman (although such opportunities, quite important in the past for Tanzanians of Omani ancestry, are drying up) or to find jobs as migrant workers in one of the oil-rich Gulf states.
- 12 This criticism echoes a long-standing concern among Muslim religious leaders who view the political system as being "contaminated" by infractions of the sharia. This factor has determined right from the early period of Islamic history the existence of two general categories of religious leaders in Muslim societies: those who become involved in government and those who refuse or are reluctant to serve the state. Consult the discussion in H. A. R. Gibb, "The Heritage of Islam in the Modern World (III)," *IJMES* 2 (1971): 129-147. On the principle of neutrality and non-involvement in politics by religious leaders in Africa, particularly in West Africa, see Lamin O. Sanneh, "The History of the People of the Senegambia: A Study of a Clerical Tradition in West African Islam" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1974); Nehemia Levtzion, "Islam in West African Politics: Accommodation and Tension between 'Ulamā' and the Political Authorities," *CDA* 18: 3 (1978): 333-345; and J. N. Paden, *Religion and Political Culture in Kano* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973): 56-72.
- 13 This information was obtained through interviews with a number of Muslim leaders in Tanga and Dar es Salaam.
- 14 Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 63-77; idem, "Freedom of Religion under Socialist Rule in Tanzania, 1961-1977," *JCS* 24: 1 (Winter 1982): 87-103; idem, "Christianity and Socialism in Tanzania, 1967-1977," *JRA* XI (1980): 30-55; G. Shepherd, "Socialism as Religion," *Transition* 5: 6 (1965): 11; and Stewart D. Govig, "Religion and the Search for Socialism in Tanzania," *JAS* 14: 3 (1987): 110-117. Consult also the discussion in David Apter, *Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization* (Engelwood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968); P. Gleason, "Blurring the Line of Separation: Education, Civil Religion, and Teaching about Religion," *JCS* 19: 3 (1977): 526; and R. D. Linder, "Civil Religion in Historical Perspective: The Reality that Underlies the Concept," *JCS* 17: 3 (1975): 401.

- 15 Apter, **Conceptual Approaches**, 99. For a summary and critical analysis of Apter's views on political religion, see L. A. Jinadu, "Ideology, Political Religion and Modernization: Some Theoretical and Empirical Explorations," **ASR** 19: 1 (1976): 123-126.
- 16 Apter, **Conceptual Approaches**, 102. Also, of relevance to this discussion, see David Westerlund, **From Socialism to Islam? Notes on Islam as a Political Factor in Contemporary Africa** (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982).
- 17 Iliffe, **A Modern History**, 266.
- 18 Ibid., 267.
- 19 Asians themselves in the beginning were poor and had to struggle as shopkeepers. They were ambitious to improve their lot and secure a higher legal status than either the Arabs or Africans. "Their complaints culminated in 1914 when the Asians of Tanga explicitly, but unsuccessfully, demanded a separate legal status and formed a professedly non-political body called the Tanga Indian association." Iliffe, **A Modern History**, 140. With the defeat of the Germans during the First World War and the establishment of the British colonial administration in Tanganyika Asians came to enjoy a higher status than Africans. Although Arabs were classified as Asians, they complained that they were not granted full status as other Asians with respect to initial salary in certain jobs. In a letter addressed to the District Commissioner of Tanga the Arab Government Employees Association of Tanga complained that Arabs who worked as clerks, fitters and train drivers were not paid the same initial salary as Indians employed in these jobs, their similar educational backgrounds notwithstanding. The association also demanded that the government hire more Arabs in public service. Arab Association of Tanga, 1947, File no. 1009, Accession no. 45, TNA TDB, Dar es Salaam.
- 20 **Mambo Leo** (March-April 1923).
- 21 J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa," **JAH** 9: 1 (1968): 119-146. Saadani Kandoro, a Manyema from Ujiji, who had been a school teacher and clerk before turning to trade, became secretary of TAA in Lake Province when Munanka resigned in 1952. The triumvirate (Kandoro, Bhoke Munanke, a Kuria, and Paul Bomani, a Sukuma) sought to revitalize TAA. Mwanza was at the time the centre of radical politics in Tanganyika. Iliffe, **A Modern History**, 504.
- 22 Students of Makerere in the 1940s included: Vedast Kyaruzi, a Haya doctor, Hamza Mwapachu, a British-trained social welfare worker, Steven Mhando, an articulate Bondei teacher, and Luciano Tsere, an Iraqw doctor. Marealle, Nyerere, Hamza Mwapachu and Dunstan Omari had established ties with the Fabian wing of the Labour Party while in England. They were concerned with Fabian issues of race, development and constitutional development. Among educated townsmen who had fought in Burma were Dossa Azizi, James Mkande, Abdulwahidi and Ali Sykes. Iliffe, **A Modern History**, 503 and 507.

- 23 Nimtz, "The Role of Sufi Order," chapter 8.
- 24 Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 551. Kiswahili is a language which is connected with Islam and Swahili culture. In fact, Kiswahili, though an African language, has been stimulated by Arabs to the extent that it betrays strong Islamic influence at the explicit and suggestive levels. Ali A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations* (London: Heinemann, 1977), 130; idem and Pio Zirimu, "The Secularization of an Afro-Islamic Language: Church, State, and Market-Place in the Spread of Kiswahili," *IS* 1 (1990), 324. See also M. H. Abdulaziz, "Tanzania's National Language Policy and the Rise of the Swahili Political Culture," in *Language Use and Social Change*, ed. W. H. Whiteley (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 173. Since many Arabs and Swahilis were involved in trade, there has been a tendency to apply the appellation Swahili to Muslims, coastal peoples and also to urbanites even when they are not Muslims. For this reason Bienen contended that one can speak of a Swahili way of life which, in the final analysis, defines who is a Swahili. This may be manifested in a preference to speak Kiswahili instead of, for instance, Kihehe; donning a certain type of dress; involvement in the affairs of one's community; and association with TANU as many Muslim traders did. See Bienen, *Tanzania*, 45-46. Swahilis (as we have already indicated in chapter two) are not considered as a separate ethnic group. They derive from several ethnic groups and incorporate significant elements of diverse racial backgrounds. The term Swahili in its restrictive sense refers to the old families of the coast with whom the East African coastal history is connected, while in its general sense it refers to people of diverse ethnic backgrounds who have been absorbed into the Swahili community. Thus the Shirazi are in a sense the old Swahili as opposed to the new Swahili (who include not only up-country Africans who were attracted by job opportunities to settle on the coast, but others such as slaves who were forcibly settled in this area during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). All the diverse ethnic groups of Tanga (Segeju, Digo, Bondei, Sambia, Nyamwezi, Afro-Arabs and others) are all classified as Swahili. The Segeju of Tanga are preeminently Swahili as they speak Kiswahili as their first and only language. They have intermarried with Digo and other Swahili. It should be mentioned that the term Swahili is today used by many people, politicians in particular, to refer to all Tanzanians, irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds.
- 25 The Digo Association was established in 1943. Its purpose was to promote the advancement of what it called the Digo Swahili community. Africans, who were not sufficiently experienced and lacked financial resources, were struggling to establish themselves in trade against Indian and Arab traders. Some of these traders were buying coconut plantations, the mainstay of the Digo economy. The Digo (who lacked capital) had little scope in competing with Indians and lobbied the government not to allow Indians and Arabs to enter villages for trade. They also pressured the government to change its policy of favouring Indians over Africans. The Digo Association of Tanga, 1944-1961, A6/22, 45, TNA TDB, Dar es Salaam.
- 26 J. J. Mbuli, "The TAA in Tanga," Seminar Paper, University of Dar es Salaam, 1970.
- 27 Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 446.

- 28 Robert G. Gregory, "Cooperation and Collaboration in Colonial East Africa: The Asians' Political Role," *AA* 80: 319 (April 1981): 265-266; and Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 521-529. There were 76, 536 Asians and 20, 598 Europeans in the late 1950s (see Tanganyika, *Report on the Census of the non-African Population*, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1958, 6). For the Asians identification with Tanganyika was easiest for the educated and mobile and more difficult for uneducated shopkeepers and traders who probably had little future elsewhere and experienced localized boycott and harassment (Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 567). TANU at the time did not admit non-Africans to the party. Uncertain about their future, Asians (and also Europeans) had wanted special constitutional safeguards such as provisions in the electoral system for proportional representation by race. TANU leaders, however, offered them the choice to apply for Tanganyikan citizenship, British citizenship or to leave the country.
- 29 Gregory, "Cooperation," 266.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 TANU was perceived in some quarters as being a party which attracted "backward-looking people." See Mbuli, "The TAA in Tanga."
- 32 Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 527.
- 33 Ibid., 528.
- 34 Ibid., 489.
- 35 Ibid., 528.
- 36 Willis to Pangani, 4 November 1957, 31/A/6/13/5 TNA, Dar es Salaam, as cited in Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 528.
- 37 Ibid., 529.
- 38 Gilbert L. Rutman, *The Economy of Tanganyika* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 84. Earlier in 1939 dockworkers (who demanded pre-depression wages) went on a strike and sought support among sisal workers in Amboni. The cutters responded and marched to Tanga although halfway there their enthusiasm waned mainly due to lack of leadership. Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 310-311.
- 39 Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 539, 542 and 559.
- 40 G. E. T. Wijeyewardane, "Administration and Politics in Two Swahili Communities," EAISR conference paper, 1959, cited in Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 529.
- 41 Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Ali, Dar es Salaam, 11 May 1985.
- 42 One prominent shaykh in Tanga who was a supporter of UTP and has preserved his UTP party card as a memento of the political excitement and high expectations of the

1950s maintains that Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy was a member of UTP. A descendant of the first liwali of Tanga during the European colonial administration (Msellem Husni) lives opposite the Ibadhi mosque where his house is located. He leads a modest life and has volunteered part of his time to taking care of the only Ibadhi mosque in Tanga.

- 43 Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 560.
- 44 For instance, A. Y. A. Karimjee who later became the speaker of parliament in independent Tanganyika.
- 45 Other activists of the Tanga branch of TANU included Mustafa Shauri, Omari Saleh, Ali Muhammad Taajir, Zubayr Rashid Sembe, Bakari Fumba, Kizungu Mbaringo and Omari Mbaringo. Interview with Shaykh Abdalla Jambia, Tanga, March 1985.
- 46 It has been noted with respect to the struggle for independence in Tanganyika that Muslim reactions to TANU were more positive than those of Christians. See Iliffe, *A Modern History*, 551.
- 47 CCM or Chama cha Mapinduzi/the Revolutionary Party was established in 1977 when TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party of Zanzibar merged to form a single party.
- 48 Westerlund, *Ujamaa na Dini*, 82-90 and the references cited in there; Kiwanuka, "The Politics"; and Nimtz, "The Role of Sufi Order," 99. In a private conversation with Father Robert Rweyamamu in 1970 Nyerere expressed his unhappiness that all the religious leaders who attended the seminar in Tabora, only the Catholic priests were not convinced of ujamaa program. Bergen, *Development*, 333-336.
- 49 Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa: A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1965-1967* (Dar es Salaam; New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 12. "Islamic Socialism" is considered to be one of the sources of inspiration for ujamaa. The term "Islamic Socialism" came into general use in the Muslim world around the beginning of the 1960s. Proponents of Islamic socialism argue that Islam in support of social justice holds that wealth should not be hoarded among the rich and should be allowed to circulate among the people. To this end, Islamic prohibitions of interest, gambling, controlled right to private property and the necessity of the welfare tax are teachings which seek to promote social justice. See Fazlur Rahman, "The Sources and Meaning of Islamic Socialism," in *Religion and Political Modernization*, ed. D. E. Smith (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974): 243-258.
- 50 In areas of relative prosperity, higher educational achievement and established individual land tenure such as parts of Kilimanjaro and Tanga regions, ujamaa participation did not generally spread. See P. S. Maro and W. I. F. Mlay, "People, Population Distribution and Employment," *TNR* 80 (1978): 12. In Handeni district, Tanga region, income per member from communal activities did not generate a reasonable amount of monetary income in 1973-74. There were times when this monetary income was invested in a shop that sometimes had to close down after less than a year's operation because of managerial incompetence or corruption. There were

also anti-communal attitudes, of neglect of communally held goods. See Zaki Ergas, "Why did the Ujamaa Village Policy Fail?-Towards a Global Analysis," *JMAS* 18: 3 (1980), 397. Also as has been noted, peasants, both the poor and the wealthier ones, being property-minded did not fully support collectivization which was carried out in the country in the 1970s. Consult Michael Lofchie, "Agrarian Crisis and Economic liberalization in Tanzania," *JMAS* 16: 3 (1978): 472-473. See also Imtiyaz Yusuf, "Islam and African Socialism: A Study of the Interactions between Islam and Ujamaa Socialism" (Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1990).

- 51 Ujamaa is not generally understood by common people. For instance, many among the Mbugwe of Arusha region did not grasp the essence of ujamaa as understood in economic terms. For them ujamaa meant cooperation and little else. The Mbugwe belong to some of the communities whose enthusiasm for ujamaa seems to wax and wane with the rains. J. V. Guilotte, "Attitudes Toward Ujamaa in a Multi-Ethnic Community in Tanzania," Paper presented at the 16th Annual Meeting of African Studies Association, Syracuse, October 31-November 3 1973.
- 52 Islam recognizes private property and the right to dispose of it. In theory, all land belongs to God, but in practice man enjoys stewardship or guardianship over this property. This guardianship, for all practical purposes ownership of property, carries with it the obligation to use or dispose of property in the right way. See Sayed Kotb (sic), *Social Justice in Islam* tr. J. B. Hardie (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 110. Islam recognizes not only private property, but also public ownership. While the right to private property is recognized, this right does not extend to water, fire and herbage (which stand for common utility resources) and by analogy all other things that fall in the category of necessities (as Sayyid Qiṭb points out) are by definition communal wealth.
- 53 The government policy to reduce the privileges of the elite through the leadership code notwithstanding, the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" live far better off than ordinary peasants and workers. On this subject, see W. M. Freund, "Class Conflict, Political Economy and the Struggle for Socialism in Tanzania," *AA* 80: 321 (October 1981): 483-500. Consult also references cited below. Cf. R. S. Mukandala, "Bureaucracy and Socialism in Tanzania: The Case of the Civil Service," *The African Review* 10: 2 (1983): 1-21. The country's widespread corruption led to endless controls and regulations of a nationalized economy which many officials used to extract bribes. For instance, one needed a permit to drive on Sunday, buy a plot of land, import essential pieces of machinery and so on. As a general rule each permit risked a demand for a bribe. *AC* 28: 6 (18 March 1987), 4.

There has been much debate about the nature of the Tanzanian state and its relations to international capital. Shivji attacks those in power as being agents of international capital. He blames the bureaucratic governing class for the failure of socialist policies. Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggles in Tanzania* (London and Dar es Salaam: Heinemann, 1976). Shivji's book prompted a refutation from those who defend the ujamaa regime. See the articles which appear in Mwansasu and Pratt, *Towards Socialism*. See also the reviews of Shivji's book by Goran Hyden, "Issues beyond the Theory of Class Struggle" (*A Critique of Shivji's Class Struggles in Tanzania*) *Utafiti* 2: 1 (1977): 57-62; and D. Wadada Nabudere, "Imperialism, State,

Class and Race" (A Critique of Shivji's **Class Struggles in Tanzania**) *Utafiti* 2: 1 (1977): 63-79. For a critical study of the ujamaa regime, consult Andrew Coulson, ed., **African Socialism in Practice**. For a background study of the Tanzanian elite, see Susanne D. Mueller, "The Historical Origins of Tanzania's Ruling Class," *CJAS* 15: 3 (1981): 459-498.

- 54 Freund, "Class Conflict," 488. Tanzania's problems have been noted at length in Cranford Pratt, "Tanzania's Transition to Socialism: Reflections of A Democratic Socialist," in **Towards Socialism in Tanzania**, eds. B. Mwansasu and Cranford Pratt (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 229 ff.
- 55 The main reasons for Tanzania's economic problems in the last couple of decades may be summarized as follows: a balance of payment crisis due to increased prices for imported oil; severe drought conditions which affected food production during the period 1973-75; poorly planned villagization programs; an unproductive state bureaucracy, a bureaucracy which is insensitive to village needs and whose commitment to socialism has been brought into question; lack of expertise, including experienced distribution personnel, to run state-owned enterprises (in the mid-1980s the country was estimated to have about 380 parastatals) which were inefficient and were running at a loss (nascent industries were operating at only 20-30 percent capacity, when they operated at all); a fall in the commodity prices which adversely affected the living standards of Tanzanian peasants; the collapse of the sisal markets which affected sisal revenues (that is, the level of foreign exchange and the capacity to import); high domestic inflation; cost of supporting the FRELIMO struggle in Mozambique; the military intervention into Uganda (estimated to have cost about half a billion American dollars) and the costly expenditure needed to maintain for some time a large standing army in Uganda; and the drought conditions again in 1979-80 resulting in shortage of food staples such as maize, rice, wheat and cooking oils which led to queues, hoarding and widespread corruption (Freund, "Class Conflict," 488-489). At the same time workers were not happy that their wages were not keeping up with the high rate of inflation. On government's intervention to control workers demanding higher wages, see M.A. Bienefeld, "Trade Unions, the Labour Process, and the Tanzanian State," *IJMAS* 17: 4 (November 1974): 553-593. In 1981 the government set up what it called the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) to suggest ways to alleviate its massive economic difficulties. **Structural Adjustment Programme for Tanzania** (Dar es Salaam: Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, June 1982). The cumulative result of these factors has been to increase Tanzania's dependence on foreign aid which has made the country's goal of achieving self-reliance to be an elusive one. In 1974, for instance, food shortages led to massive food imports financed through external assistance totalling \$ 300 million American (Joel Samoff, "Crisis and Socialism in Tanzania," *JMAS* 19: 2 (1981): 292). While foreign aid to Tanzania amounted to an insignificant figure, well below \$ 100 million annually in 1966 and 1967 (the year of the Arusha Declaration), and \$ 100 million in 1973, it averaged annually about \$ 324 million in 1975 and 1976; it was \$ 800 million in 1978, \$ 765 million in 1981 and \$ 624 million by 1984 (*Ibid.*, 292 and *AR* (May-June 1986), 82). On the villagization program which involved several millions of people being forcibly re-settled, see Deborah Bryceson, "Peasant Commodity Production in Post-Colonial Tanzania," *AA* 81: 325 (October 1982): 547-568; Goran Hyden, **Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and An**

**Uncaptured Peasantry** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Jannik Boesak et al., **Ujamaa- Socialism from above** (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977); and Michael Von Freyhold, **Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of A Social Experiment** (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1979). One of the questions being asked now is: would, for instance, food shortages have been acute without villagization and nationalizations?

Poor producer prices and forced cultivation measures were factors which discouraged peasants from being enthusiastic about the production of certain cash crops. There is one instance where peasants put up resistance by resorting to non-production of the desired cashew nuts. Instead, they concentrated on the production of subsistence crops. See Frank Ellis, "A Preliminary Analysis of the Decline of the Tanzanian Cashew Nut Production 1974-79; Causes, Possible Remedies and Lessons for Rural Development," Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, Unpublished Seminar Paper, 1979. Cited in Freund, "Class Conflict," 495. Some analysts from the right consider the socialist problems in Tanzania as reflecting a failure of socialist strategy. Michael Lofchie, "Agrarian Crisis," 451-474 and the references cited there; and John Briggs, "Villagization and the 1974-76 Economic Crisis in Tanzania," *JMAS* 17: 4 (December 1979): 695-702. For a sympathetic treatment of socialist developments in Tanzania, see Reginald H. Green, **Toward Socialism and Self-Reliance: Tanzania's Striving for Sustained Transition Projected** (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1977). Some leftist analysts, for instance, Joel Samoff, consider Tanzania's agrarian crisis not as reflecting a "failure" of socialism, but rather the lack of it. According to Samoff, Tanzania has been pursuing a transformationist strategy, not a socialist strategy. Samoff, "Crisis," 303.

- <sup>56</sup> To alleviate its food shortages and other economic problems Tanzania received in 1980-81 foreign aid and loans totalling \$ 625 million which amounted to about seventy percent of the country's development budget (Linda Freeman, "CIDA, Wheat and Rural Development in Tanzania," *CJAS* 16: 3 (1982): 48. In 1987 Tanzania owed about \$ 3.2 billion (its debt has probably reached \$ 5 billion by now) and in 1986 was forced to reach some accommodation with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the question of conditions for granting further credit ("In the Stealth of the Night," *Africa Events*, January-February 1987). The Tanzanian currency has already been devalued several times in the last six years. Officially, the American dollar was worth 17 Tanzanian Shillings in 1985. On the black market the dollar was worth 80 to 110 Shillings. In 1987 the exchange rate did not show much improvement, with one dollar equal to 55-60 Shillings at the official rate and over 175 Shillings at the black market rate. At the beginning of 1991 the American dollar was worth 195 Tanzanian Shillings at the official rate and 340 Tanzanian Shillings at the black market rate.

The launching of the economic recovery program (ERP) in 1986 has resulted in resources flowing out of unproductive activities such as black market and speculation. Depreciating the official rate has encouraged the flow of hard currency out of the black market into the official exchange rate channels. Since the mid-1980s trade with illegal funds outside the country was permitted (although Nyerere disliked this practice as it represented a divergence from the basic policies of Arusha). The relaxation of import controls has accounted for the return for as much as one billion dollars a year in foreign exchange held illegally overseas (*AC* 30: 7 (March 1989), 6). Also, since 1989 the



government had been preparing a new investment code which seeks to open up the economy to foreign investment in all sectors. Nevertheless, the investment code drafted by the government was sent back by the National Executive Committee of the party because it favoured foreign, at the expense of local investors.

- 57 One of the factors behind the recent shift to a liberalized economy has been the inability of Tanzanian industries to produce goods efficiently. Production levels have been too low to meet the consumption needs of people. This has been partly due to lack of raw materials and partly due to lack of foreign exchange to acquire capital inputs. The result has been an unusually high demand which has been partly satisfied by the black market. Cooperative shops have been ridiculously understocked with essential commodities. Without ration cards one could not buy commodities such as rice, sugar and soap except on the growing black market. Some factory managers were making deals with certain businessmen whom they supplied with essential commodities (*Daily News*, 5, 7, 10, 19, 20 and 26 November 1979 makes reference to factory hoarding garments, maldistribution of essential commodities and police raids on stores and shops in a number of centres for hoarding. See Freund, "Class Conflict," 488-489). Because of low productivity in all sectors of the economy the government had estimated that 27, 000 people would be laid off from public employment. In 1975 probably as many as one-fifth of government employees lost their jobs. Also, in 1977 about 9, 500 civil servants were dismissed; yet the Tanzanian bureaucracy almost doubled (92 percent increase) between 1972 and 1979 (Ergas, "The State," 304, n. 29). The number of civil service posts increased from 65, 708 in 1966 to 295, 352 in 1980, a fourfold increase (Mukandala, "Bureaucracy," 10). In 1983 government employment (excluding defence and parastatal institutions) was 272, 000 (the majority being accounted for by regional authorities), representing a growth of 38 percent since 1979 (of this figure, 27 percent is accounted for by the ministries, 7.5 percent by the town councils and 63.5 percent by the regional authorities. Tanga region ranked second to Dar es Salaam (179, 000) with 78, 000 jobs concentrated there. CR (1987-88): 10-12 and (1988-89): 10. The decentralization program of 1972 gave the civil service additional responsibilities as the 18 (now 20) regions were treated as ministries. This created more responsibilities for civil servants. The Arusha Declaration of 1967 had ushered in a period of civil service involvement in the private sector. These factors stimulated the growth of the civil service).
- 58 Black market operations in Tanzania especially during the period between the late 1970s and early or mid-1980s were the product of severe shortages of basic commodities such as soap and tooth paste and general consumer goods which the Tanzanian industries were not providing. There was even a shortage of such commodities as soap in Tanga, with a few factories which produce this item! The irony is that some of this locally produced soap, which was destined for co-operative shops was finding its way on the black market. This was possible because black market, as one Tanga racketeer explained, existed and operated at three levels which involved the supplier, the middleman and the seller. The supplier's job was to provide goods according to the buyer's specifications. The buyer or middleman was the real businessman who made the deals to procure the goods. He made the purchases and set about to distribute the goods to his agents. The seller or street peddler was employed by the middleman to sell essential goods such as tooth paste, soap or cigarettes. The middleman might hoard the commodity if necessary and when the time was right sell it at the highest possible

price. A lot of street peddlers that we saw in Tanga were young men who were unemployed, and if they were arrested, as the police sometimes did by hounding them or rounding them up, more were hired to do the same job.

High inflation has been and continues to be a big problem in Tanga as in other parts of the country. It has eroded the incomes of salaried people, a good many of whom devised ways to make money over and above their incomes. It was obvious that public employees had found certain means whereby they could satisfy their material expectations. Special funds which existed such as political contributions or funds for certain projects, were being channeled or diverted to private use (This information was gathered from a number of people, including politicians, whose names shall remain anonymous. In any case, the *Daily News*, 5, 12 and 16 October 1979 mentions some of these corrupt practices; for instance, the private use of state-owned vehicles by government employees (Freund, "Class Conflict," 489). There were reports of pilferage of office property. For the self-employed poor and casual labourers, some of them had turned to racketeering. Many rural people, especially the young, quit villages and head for towns despite repeated government attempts to force vagrants back to rural areas. These people come to town because they expect life to be easier there than in the countryside. Rural life is tough and going to town is one way to escape it. Urbanites provide domiciles for their rural kinsmen who come to towns in search of work. These kinsmen are mainly young unmarried males. The department of cultural and youth affairs in Tanga was concerned about controlling this internal migration to town by the youths. It is feared that these young men who lack educational resources will make worse the already serious situation of high unemployment and disguised unemployment among townspeople including secondary school leavers and labourers from surrounding areas.

- 59 A major crackdown on corruption and illegal economic activities was introduced by the government in the period between 1981 and 1983 to deal with the situation. This was due to the fact that economic hardships in the country had reached a peak at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Black market operations were at their worst and corruption existed at all levels. Economic hardship was accompanied by criminality and social disruption. Crime had reached intolerable proportions and people were not safe in their homes or in the streets in the evenings. Opportunities for corrupt behaviour were quite rampant. Some people with positions in the government or who worked in government-owned companies and also people employed in the private sector, for example, owners of retail shops, exploited the situation to make money through unscrupulous or questionable business practices. For instance, by hoarding goods, they created artificial shortages in order to jerk up prices and reap large profits. Some of these people used their good connections to bring about deals. Some, on the other hand, kept hundreds of thousands of shillings in their homes and did not deposit this money in the bank for fear of attracting attention. It was in reaction to this situation that in March 1983 the late Prime Minister of Tanzania, Edward Sokoine, known as a tough administrator, instituted a nation-wide campaign to apprehend *wahujumu uchumi* (economic saboteurs). This operation, launched to stamp out smuggling, bribery and other forms of economic sabotage, was much larger in scale than the earlier "operation ufagio" (the broom) of 1981 which saw the Minister of Communication, Augustine Mwingira, dismissed and two Dar es Salaam businessmen detained by Presidential order (QER 2 (1981), 4). The 1983 operation was so ambitious in its attempt to

remove corrupt elements from positions of responsibility that it made Sokoine enemies in high places. The campaign involved road blocks being set up at the borders and police patrol being instituted along the coast at night to enforce the crackdown on racketeers and economic saboteurs (QER 3 (1983), 6-7). The police or anti-corruption squad raided stores and shops in Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Morogoro and other towns. These raids on stores had begun as early as 1979 as we have indicated. (It is interesting to note by way of comparison that magendo in Uganda is a vast black market, accounting in 1980 for as much as two-thirds of monetary GDP. See Nelson Kasfir, "State, Magendo, and Class Formation in Uganda," JCCP 21: 3 (November 1983): 84-103). The Tanzanian anti-corruption squad also made house to house searches. They found sacks of rice, maize meal, flour, boxes of cigarettes, garments, bicycles, radios and cassette-recorders which some people had stocked in their garages or basements. The commodities seized included large quantities of imported goods (not available at official prices), cash crops (which smugglers bartered for imports) and foreign exchange (the dollar on the black market was worth five times the official rate). Among those arrested were very big dealers and many small traders, including peddlers. Among government officials, three high ranking officials lost their jobs, a regional commissioner was arrested and three party politicians were suspended from the central committee of the party for currency dealing (QER 3 (1983), 6-7). A nine-member tribunal, chaired by a judge, was set up to try those detained under the Economic Anti-sabotage (Special Provisions) Act which made "hoarding" illegal. The tribunal had the power to sentence those it convicted to up to 15 years in farm camps and to seize their property. Those detained were not allowed bail. The defendants were prosecuted by police prosecutors and could not themselves be represented, although they could call witnesses (Ibid). About 2,000 people (including many Asians) were arrested within several months, frequently on the denunciation of their neighbours. Private shops which closed were ordered to re-open if they did not want to lose their licenses (Ibid). As the campaign continued it began to accelerate into a witch hunt with the police so intent on arresting people that if anyone was found with anything new he had to account for it. If he could not produce a receipt he would be arrested. This created a lot of panic and people threw away essential goods, including new clothes and a lot of expensive things and some times even bags of money. Realizing that scarce goods were being destroyed, President Nyerere announced that no action would be taken against anyone who voluntarily handed them in, and admitted that "innocent people may be netted, for which we shall apologize" (Ibid). Some policemen were not themselves always beyond corrupt behaviour. About fifty of them were arrested for demanding bribes in the course of the campaign. There were also a few cases where some criminals dressed as policemen visited some houses to seize property. The large scale crackdown resulted in the detention of hundreds of people from all racial groups. Some were convicted while many others were left to languish in jail for many months awaiting charges to be brought against them.

The nation-wide campaign instituted by Sokoine was not successful in reversing the economic situation although it did check crime and reduced the level of economic sabotage. According to a number of politicians in Tanga, the crackdown was not completely successful because high ranking government or party officials who were involved were not apprehended. Also, some of the wealthy businessmen paid off large sums of money to avoid being prosecuted. Public disillusionment with the campaign had set in in June when the junior minister for agriculture, Edward Barongo, was

released on Presidential orders without having to face trial (QER 4 (1983), 7). In August the minister was rearrested, with the State House explaining that the President had not been informed about the large sum of money found by the police in Barongo's house (Ibid). It is clear that while economic sabotage was reduced *ulanguzi* (black market operations) also referred to as *kuruka kichura* (leap frog-like) continued as a means of survival for unemployed people as well as for people who were employed but could not cope with the substantial price inflation. As long as essential commodities were not available in shops, black market would continue to flourish. With respect to the huge public sector, the government has sought to impose a rigid salary structure of extremely low rates which make it difficult for public workers to survive on their official salaries alone. It is not surprising, therefore, that many workers resort to corrupt behaviour to maintain their standard of living. In response to the economic difficulties some of the town dwellers supplement low cash incomes with food from kinsmen from outlying villages. The former maintain farming plots in their home villages as a contingency against periods of unemployment in the town and as a security. This means that in order to secure additional incomes some people began to get involved in different economic activities such as small household farms, including poultry farms, business run by family members or simply from corruption. When Sokoine died in April 1984 in a car accident (rumours spread that his death was more than just an accident), the enthusiasm for the campaign against economic saboteurs died with him. The courts could not handle the heavy backlog of cases and in the end many of them were dismissed. Some of the people who were released had been in jail for quite some time without charges being brought against them.

The fight against corruption has not let up as Nyerere's successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, continues to battle (albeit unsuccessfully thus far) to find a cure for the economic mismanagement in the country. In 1986 the government of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi fired 28 regional chairmen of the ruling party and the Director General of the National Provident Fund (NPF) in a fresh crackdown on corruption. Also, a group of army officers were arrested for embezzling several million dollars from the defence forces (CR 4 (1986), 7). In 1988 reports surfaced that the National Bank of Commerce was losing a lot of money (NA 248 (May 1988), 18). During the same year in its attempts to boost revenues during a time of economic crisis, the government carried out undercover operations such as installing agents at ports and at the borders with neighbouring countries to apprehend tax dodgers (NA 254 (November 1988), 45). In March 1990 President Mwinyi sacked the whole cabinet of 26 ministers citing as his reason for doing so its failure to check widespread corruption and lack of responsibility. In the shake-up that followed he dismissed seven ministers and demoted others (NA 272 (May 1990), 19-20). In efforts to clamp down on black marketeers, the government announced it would create a nine-member CCM corruption commission to investigate those in public life. The announcement caused widespread panic (reminiscent of the 1983 national campaign against economic sabotage) as politicians were observed to be getting rid of equipment and assets, the acquisition of which they would not be able to account for in relation to their official salaries or other legitimate income (CR 2 (1990), 12; and AR (March-April 1989), 44).

<sup>60</sup> While a wholesale privatization of public enterprises was out of the question, nevertheless, Nyerere thought there should be a reassessment of the role of the state's economic activities. CR 4 (1986), 7. President Mwinyi was pursuing pragmatic

economic policies with IMF-supported austerity program. In defence of his economic policies, Mwinyi pointed out in an interview that Tanzania, being a mixed economy and is not yet a socialist country, its agriculture is about 80-90 percent in the private sector as cash crops such as tea, coffee, tobacco, cashew nuts are undertaken by private people. Furthermore, its food crops, for instance, rice and maize, are produced by private people while sixty percent of its transport sector is in the hands of private people. He also noted that Tanzanians have been allowed to help in the distribution of goods, before the preserve of parastatal organizations only. Finally, he admitted that the government was thinking of doing away with (i.e. privatizing) some of the parastatals which were inefficient. See AR (January-February 1988): 27-28. Since 1986 liberalizing reforms (as part of the Economic Recovery Program) were introduced with regard to the privatization of the economy (this includes negotiations to sell off some of the sisal estates in Tanga) as a remedy for Tanzania's economic crisis (CR 3 (1988), 14. Among IMF's multilateral prescriptions are the following: closure of loss making enterprises; reduction of the public sector personnel; encouraging foreign investment in the country; devaluing the currency; cutting federal spending; lifting price controls on many items to encourage production; and easing restrictions on imports. The government has already begun to move in this direction. For instance, on 23 February 1991 the government announced relaxing the leadership code thus allowing greater freedom for business activity to CCM leaders, including the right to earn more than one salary, the right to own property for rent, and freedom to engage in private enterprise. AC 32: 6 (1991), 3. This has resulted in a readier availability of basic commodities. The country is now moving from a situation of shortages and scarcities at high prices to plenty (mainly imported goods) at high prices. Output, however, has not risen markedly to take advantage of a lowered exchange rate which was supposed to stimulate exports (Professor Haidari Amani, head of the Economics Department at the University of Dar es Salaam, has criticized the economic reform program arguing that adjustment measures have produced few beneficial effects in the countries in which they have been applied. CR 2 (1990), 14. It has also been pointed out by Obichere that the history of IMF in Africa has been one of economic stagnation and failure. According to him, 23 African states signed agreements with IMF with no example of unqualified success anywhere. See Boniface I. Obichere, "Introduction-Tanzania at the Crossroads: From Nyerere to Mwinyi," JAS 14: 3 (1987) 84-88. For a defence of Nyerere's record in office in the wake of criticisms on his ujamaa policies, see David L. Horne, "Passing the Baton: The Presidential Legacy of Julius K. Nyerere," JAS 14: 3 (1987): 89-94). The liberalization of trade has hurt and continues to hurt several industries, particularly the textiles, which are hardest hit due to the importation of *mitumbi* (second-hand clothes) (Obichere, "Introduction," 86). Also, of particular concern to many ordinary Tanzanians is the fact that the devaluations have simply formalized the high black market prices they were previously paying for imported goods. Therefore, while the liberalization policies have brought relief to the rich (who now find it easier to import non-essential luxury goods such as radios, videos, and expensive cars much to the alarm of Nyerere), they have created jealousy and envy from the majority who cannot afford to indulge themselves ("Tanzania: Nyerere's Crusade," NA (February 1988), 22). Nyerere has attacked the new capitalists, who include retired or former political and civil leaders who, taking advantage of the liberalizing policies, were enriching themselves by being engaged in capitalist activities (Ibid).

So far the reforms in Tanzania have been limited to the economic sphere although calls are being heard for the liberalization of the political system as well. There has been a lively press debate in progress on the issue of the multi-party system in Tanzania. In February 1990 Nyerere for the second time questioned the appropriateness of the one-party state. Mwinyi, on the other hand, thinks Tanzania is not ready yet for a multi-party system which would tend to encourage tribal loyalties. See CR 2 (1990), 13. Events in Eastern Europe (the move to a multi-party system and democratic elections) are adding to pressure for political changes in a number of African countries, including Zambia (where President Kaunda was recently defeated in multi-party elections) and Kenya (President Moi will probably suffer the same fate as Kaunda). There have been demonstrations in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi calling for a return to a multi-party system. As Abdurrahman Babu (a former cabinet minister in Tanzania and once an outspoken proponent of Marxism) has pointed out (see "Babu Warns Nyerere," NA 269, February 1990, 13) the one-party system breeds corruption, favouritism, inefficiency, top-heavy bureaucracy and one-man rule. One Tanzanian has taken exception to Babu's criticism (see Balinagwe Mwambungu, "No, No, Mr Babu," NA April 1990, 48). Isa Shivji, head of the department of Legal Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam, is also now involved in fighting for a multi-party system and human rights. He is, however, calling for a protracted discussion and debate on the subject as he does not believe that Western models are necessarily suitable for Africa. Similarly, Tumbo, Tanzania's first High Commissioner in London is calling on the government to free all political prisoners, most of whom are Zanzibaris. Another significant development has been the appearance of an independent newspaper *Business Times* which has begun to circulate in the country. Chief Abdalla Fundikira, nominally the head of the recently established Steering Committee (to "steer" the country to multi-party democracy), has politically resurfaced during the debates on the multi-party system. The Mwinyi government could not stay silent indefinitely on this debate. Therefore, in order to test the mood of the country, the government has set up a presidential commission on multi-party democracy which is expected to make its report in 1992. The multi-party debate in Kenya (until the recent introduction of the multi-party system) has been more serious (that is, more confrontational) and has connotations of class conflict.

- 61 One source of Tanzania's on-going difficulties (although the problem is not just the decline of one crop but the lack of planning for alternatives) has been its once number one export, sisal, which accounted for 55 percent and 35.7 percent of total value of exports in 1948 and 1963 respectively (Tanganyika, *Blue Book* (Dar es Salaam, 1948), 220). Since the 1960s, however, sisal has been facing declining world market prices in the face of competition from synthetic fibres (See Justinian F. Rweyamamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania* (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973), 44). As a consequence of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, 50 sisal plantations and about half or more of the sisal producing companies were nationalized by the government and placed under the Tanzania Sisal Corporation. Many of these estates are located in the Tanga region. Sisal processing is done in Tanga where there are factories which produce twine for export. In 1973 the government nationalized 22 estates located in Morogoro. In 1977 the Tanzania Sisal Authority (TSA) took over the activities of the Tanzania Sisal Corporation. Hatim Karimjee was made the manager of TSA which controlled 60 percent of the sisal estates

in the country. It soon became clear that nationalization was not necessarily the most effective way to transform production and welfare. By the 1980s the nationalized estates were increasingly being subsidized by the government. Housing and welfare did not improve on these estates in contrast to some of the private estates which were efficiently run (Dianne Bolton, **Nationalization: The Road to Socialism** (London: Zed Press, 1985). There was lack of technical expertise to run these estates. Nyerere had admitted earlier the mistake of nationalizing sisal estates and wanted some of them to be handed back to former owners (**Uhuru**, 19 May 1985). These estates were not being maintained properly and some of them had reverted to bush. Tanzania produced 220, 000 tons of sisal in 1970 compared to 42, 000 tons in 1983/4, 30, 000 tons in 1986/7, 11, 604 tons in 1987 and 8, 000 tons in 1990 (**CR** 3 (1988), 14 and (1988-89), 13; and **CR** 1 (1991), 2. Ibrahim Kaduna is currently the director general of the beleaguered Tanzania Sisal Authority (TSA)). In 1953, 151, 800 people were employed in the sisal industry compared to 128, 928 in 1961, 117, 898 (both regular and casual workers) in 1962 and 36, 727 in 1972 with further reductions since then (Maro and Mlay, "People," 12; and Gilbert L. Rutman, **The Economy of Tanganyika** (New York: Praeger, 1968), 85). This was still a high figure compared to tea which employed 16, 407 people, coffee 18, 345 people and sugar 10, 938 people in 1972 (Maro and Mlay, "People," 12).

For this reason Western-based organization such as IMF and World Bank urged Nyerere to sell off state-owned enterprises that were operating under losses. For instance, the National Milling Corporation (NMC), a marketing parastatal for food crops, accumulated a deficit of about \$ 300 million in less than a decade (Zaki Ergas, "The State and Economic Deterioration: The Tanzanian Case," **JCCP** 20: 3 (November 1982): 294. The Tanzanian Audit Commission (TAC) revealed that up to mid-1987 some 50 percent of the parastatals audited were making losses. **CR** 4 (1988), 9).

The decline in agricultural production has not been limited to sisal alone. Between 1970 and 1979 the volume of export crop produced in Tanzania went down by 27 percent, the largest losses being incurred by pyrethrum (64 percent), cashew nuts (61 percent), sisal (56 percent) and cotton (26 percent) (Ergas, "The State," 295). Some of these would make interesting case studies than sisal, since they were not challenged by synthetics so directly. Coffee and cotton are currently Tanzania's main crops accounting for about half or more of Tanzania's export earnings. In 1986, for instance, among the main commodities traded coffee earned \$ 167.1 million, cotton \$ 30.8 million, cashew nuts \$ 13.2, cloves \$ 11.3 and sisal \$ 5.2 million (**CR** (1988-89): 22-23).

<sup>62</sup> **CR** (1988-89) and 1985 indicates the following population estimates for Dar es Salaam (1.1 million), Mwanza (252, 000), Tabora (214, 000), Mbeya (194, 000) and Tanga (172, 200).

## CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis, which has focused on Islam, Islamic leadership and community development in Tanga, has been to examine some of the religious trends in a Tanzanian Muslim community. We have traced how the Shirazi-Swahili settlement was established in Tanga and how the community evolved economically, politically and socially. We have presented an ethnic history of the Tanga area and have examined the inter-religious competition which has incorporated significant sections of the town's population. The study has, therefore, shed some light on religious competition and how it relates to factionalism in Tanga society. We have shown that religious competition among the Segeju is primarily factional competition. This competition is rooted in deep-seated clan rivalry between the Boma and Kamadhi Segeju. Clan feud has existed for almost one and a half centuries, if not longer, and has been the basis of factional alignments between the two Segeju groups in matters of dispute, particularly disputes over leadership and distribution of power. Any attempt by one group to dominate the other is strongly resisted. Abdalla Mwaketa's attempts in the mid-nineteenth century to establish himself as a ruler over all the Segeju laid the basis for the subsequent factional conflict. This is the more so as factions emerge out of a conflict and are often constituted for political reasons.

There are three analytic concepts which are useful for understanding factions in Tanga.<sup>1</sup> We can consider TAMTA as the core faction which enjoys recognition by the largest group. Zahrau is the active opposition faction which is engaged in attempts to counter the core faction it opposes. The emergence of a factional struggle takes place when due to a decisive cleavage in the community fission occurs in which one group withdraws or moves away (as the Kamadhi Segeju did in 1962) to form a new faction. Maawa is the emerging faction which is struggling to establish itself against the core and active



opposition factions which have already carved out a niche for themselves in the Tanga Muslim community. Factions are social conflict groups and it is possible that more than two factions can exist simultaneously. Nevertheless, emerging factions have to struggle to establish themselves given the barrier (that is, stiff opposition by entrenched groups) to entry of third groups.

This system of religious factionalism arose in Tanga as a result of the religious leadership vacuum created by the death of the towering figure of Tanga's religious scene, Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy. At first all the Segeju groups worked together in TAMTA. Within a few years, however, the competition for a single authoritative leader set the factional process in motion and led to the rupture of TAMTA. In other words, rivalry for leadership within TAMTA allowed the Segeju clan conflict to find religious expression. After the break up of the original TAMTA a period of competitive struggle began between Shaykh Muhammad Ayub and his supporters (partisans of TAMTA, the core faction) and Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana and his supporters (partisans of Zahrau, the active opposition faction). Members of the other ethnic groups did not get involved in the conflict although a good number identified with one madrasa or the other depending on their kinship affiliations (those with marital or family ties to the Boma Segeju of Mnyanjani supported TAMTA) and their choice of which madrasa to send their children to. TAMTA and Zahrau, the two main symbols of religious learning in Tanga, have competed with each other for power, prestige and followers. Later a new madrasa was established, Maawa, which seeks support among the Digo. The leader of Maawa (Shaykh Shaaban) attempted to challenge Segeju leadership on ethnic grounds. This resulted, not so much in conflict between the Digo and the Segeju, but rather in rivalry between TAMTA and Zahrau supporters on the one hand and between supporters of these two groups and Maawa supporters on the other. It was the clannish distinction between the Segeju which opened the door to subsequent invocation of ethnicity as an organizing principle for mobilizing the

Digo. While competition among these madrasas has promoted the spread and expansion of madrasa education, it has also (quite apart from dissipating energy in petty strife) seriously affected the unity of the Tanga Muslim community.

If one examines membership in Tanga's factions in the context of social structure, it becomes apparent that the Segeju and Digo comprise groups that are attempting to rebuild their status. Before the nineteenth century the Shirazi-Swahili and their allies the Digo and the Segeju were actively involved in the lucrative ivory trade. The coming of the Indians, who became the linchpin of Sayyid Said's economic policy in East Africa, ushered in an era which saw the Indians control trade as financiers and as traders based in the coastal towns. Later the construction of the railway and a modern port (the basic infrastructure for a plantation or export-based economy) during the colonial era wrought a profound economic and social structuring of urban life. Indians, who began as poor shopkeepers, benefitted most from the new developments (certainly they were aided by the British colonial policy of favouring Asians over Africans), while the major losers were the coastal Swahilis and, to a lesser extent, the Arabs. The Africans, particularly the Digos, lacked financial resources and struggled to establish themselves in trade against Indians and Arabs. There was, in addition to this, a decline in the relative importance of the coastal Swahili Muslims (the Digo and Segeju included) compared to up-country mission-trained African Christians. One should recall that at the end of the nineteenth century the Germans had employed Swahili coastal people (given their literacy in Kiswahili written in the Arabic script), whom they regarded as being more enlightened through their contact with the Arabs.<sup>2</sup> Today Swahili groups, particularly the Digo and Segeju who are exclusively concentrated in the Tanga district, have taken a back seat to hinterland ethnic groups in the economic field. Much of their energies have been channelled into competitive struggles. These competitive struggles may, in fact, be an expression of tensions of modernization and deprivation (relative backwardness in secular affairs, particularly in education) which

affected their status seriously during the colonial period. Therefore, just as the Digo Association of Tanga had campaigned for the economic betterment of the Digo during the colonial period Maawa seeks to do the same, although in the religious realm. Among the Boma and Kamadhi Segeju, the sense of belonging to a clan has persisted for such a long time perhaps in compensation for the less effective Segeju participation in the modern culture of bureaucracy and technology which depend on modern education. In other words, the inter-clan rivalry represents the continuing Segeju affirmation of belonging in the absence of significant progress economically. In economic terms, the Digo and Segeju are lagging behind other ethnic groups of the Tanga region such as the Sambaa, Bondei and Pare and up-country Africans such as the Chagga and others from areas of long contact with missionaries. It is quite significant that most of the students in Tanga's secondary schools (with the exception of BAKWATA-owned Jumuiya secondary school and the mainly Indian Popatlal secondary school) are students who are either from Tanga's hinterland (Sambaa and Bondei areas of long contact with Christian missionaries) or from up-country (Pare, Chagga and members of other ethnic groups). Also, it is important to note that the uneducated Digos who had occupied leadership positions in TANU during the period of terminal colonialism eventually were forced to make way for Makerere-educated Bondei activists. In today's context the assertion that one sometimes hears in Tanga that the Digo place more emphasis on Koranic education and less emphasis on secular education (while it may have been true in the past because of the widespread Christian mission control of the education system) is less applicable in post-independent Tanzania. Today many Digo children attend primary schools because of the government's objective to promote universal primary education in the country although (and this is the problem) far less Digo and Segeju make it to the secondary and high school levels.

Very few of the shaykhs of Tanga have been exposed to secular education beyond the primary school level. This is particularly true with respect to the two Segeju leaders of

TAMTA and Zahrau. In contrast, Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy, a Swahili of Arab ancestry, benefitted from new secular institutions. He held a salaried post and entered the thin ranks of secular educated ulama when new secular institutions which were already beginning to outstrip religious posts as sources of prestige and wealth. Shaykh Muhammad Ali came from a renowned family that had attained local as well as national reputation. Being a scion of a high ulama family he served as imam of the prestigious community Friday mosque, and (as an Islamic legal expert) later moved to Dar es Salaam where he took up employment in the Attorney General's chambers. By doing so he continued the pattern began by his father who had been employed by the government as the kadhi of Tanga. Shaykh Muhammad Ali's involvement with BAKWATA (the government had agreed to BAKWATA's request to have him work for the Muslim council on a part time basis) brought him into public limelight and he attempted to use his influence to change BAKWATA's public image, particularly in Tanga. Due to strong opposition to BAKWATA in Tanga he had to rely on his relatives and former students of his brother-in-law (Shaykh Ameer Juma) such as Shaykh Muhammad Mkanga to take charge of the local branch. These are also the people who are associated with the community Friday mosque. People involved in running this mosque and, most notably, the Sunni mosque (located in the downtown area) are known for their neutrality and non-involvement in inter-tribal religious competition. The Sunni mosque was built by Indian Sunni Muslims most of whom have left the country. The imam of this mosque is a respected Bondei scholar, Shaykh Jumbe Taajir, a former student of Shaykh Ali Hemed al-Buhriy. He wants no leadership position (he is so self-effacing that he prefers to be called a mwalimu rather than a shaykh) and is content to conduct private study sessions at the mosque for advanced and non-advanced students without invoking ethnicity as the organizing principle. He is aware only too well how a number of religious leaders have used madrasas to create followings of their own. Given the existence of neutral groups in the community, it can be said that a discussion of the factional conflict in Tanga is, ultimately, a discussion of scholarly

competition. This competition (which centers around the madrasa groups and their control of many of the town's mosques) affects the Tanga society, some of whose members are not bound up in this conflict.

With respect to the factional conflict in Tanga, a number of possibilities can be envisioned for the future. For instance, it is possible that the claims of factional loyalty may weaken with the death of one of the two main factional leaders. If the primacy of factional interest is stronger than personal antagonisms then factionalism will continue. Since factional units tend to be impermanent, it is also possible that alternative channels of factional rivalry may develop. In other words, while the conflict may not be healed hostilities may be transferred to a non-religious sphere of competition. At any rate, it is also clear given that leadership of these madrasas will be retained within the same family groups that the interpersonal character of the conflict may be confirmed. Shaykh Sulaiman Mbwana for one has groomed his son to be the future leader of Zahrau. In the case of Maawa the recent death of Shaykh Shaaban has resulted in the leadership passing on to his relative Muhammad Hariri. Also, with respect to TAMTA, it is most likely that Shaykh Muhammad Ayub, the head of the madrasa, will be succeeded by his younger brother, Shaykh Abdalla Ayub. Certainly the Boma Segeju will prefer Shaykh Ayub's younger brother to assume the leadership of TAMTA instead of the Digo Mwalimu Muhammad Bakari, a senior teacher at TAMTA. Shaykh Abdalla Ayub does not teach at TAMTA although he is affiliated to it.

Among some Tangans there is the belief that the conflict between TAMTA and Zahrau will continue even if Shaykh Abdalla Ayub takes over the leadership of Tanga's largest madrasa. This is due to the fact that partisans of the two madrasas, especially some of the elders, instigate their leaders to act in rash and uncompromising ways. It is quite revealing, for instance, that when on one occasion Shaykh Abdalla Ayub dropped in at the Uvikita centre and offered prayers at the mosque of the Ansaar Islamic youth, he was

blamed by TAMTA people for daring to go and pray in the mosque of the controversial reformers. Thereafter, Shaykh Abdalla Ayub made amends by making sure that he attacked the Ansaar Muslim youth in his public sermon.

Despite what we have said above, it is difficult to say whether the future Segeju leaders will get trapped into the factional feud and whether they will be able to inspire the confidence of their supporters. They may learn to accept or tolerate each other particularly now that hostility between supporters of the two madrasas is becoming less overt. There is diminishing verbal aggression against each other. This is unlike the case in the past when the two groups harboured very bitter feelings against each other. In the past there have been instances such as on one occasion of TAMTA Day when members of this madrasa while marching in a procession during ceremonial activities hurled stones at supporters of Zahrau. Today this type of aggressive behaviour has been replaced by withdrawal and avoidance rather direct confrontation although attacks on each other in public sermons (some of which are recorded on cassettes) still continue. This is part of the process of exalting in-group sentiments and ridiculing out-group views.

It is important to point out, however, that hostility between the two groups is sometimes ameliorated by joint deprecation for Maawa and Uvikita. This raises the possibility that the Segeju factional conflict may decline in intensity as external competition from the Digo increases. In this case the intra-Segeju competition will be displaced or at the very least diminished by transferring hostility onto other groups, such as Maawa, thus reducing competition among themselves. This is rather unlikely as Maawa has been weakened by the death of Shaykh Shaaban. The new leader needs time to complete his studies and time to reorganize the madrasa and raise funds to complete the construction of the mosque at Maawa headquarters (the construction project has stagnated since 1984-85).

Yet another possibility is that religious polarization over issues may open up the factional process and perhaps encourage pluralism. It is clear that the lack of significant doctrinal differences relates to the absence of divergent religious trends in the community. This may slowly change with the establishment of contact with Saudi Arabia. Tanga is no longer encapsulated from direct external religious influence. It has finally come within the orbit of the Islamic revival emanating from the Middle East. As external contacts grow so will religious awareness; yet these wider contacts often bring tension between scripturalists/reformists and traditionalists. It is possible that this may be creative tension if it stimulates intellectual activity or if it succeeds in deflecting attention away from the ethnically-based religious rivalry. The activities of the Muslim youth (whose leadership is more open and seeks multi-ethnic support) reflect a trend among groups of young Muslims in different parts of Africa to propagate "puritanical" reformist ideas in their societies as a result of their education in Saudi Arabia, mainly at the Islamic University of Medina which caters largely but not exclusively to foreign students. The Ansaar Muslim youth in Tanga seek to transform their society on the basis of Islamic teachings. They do not emphasize kinship or ethnic affiliations unlike their opponents who are involved in advancing ethnic interests. Nevertheless, no important scholar has embraced the reformist cause, which is still in a state of gestation.

This study has also focussed on education which has been a major issue of concern to Muslims in Tanga and the rest of the country. While coastal Muslims benefitted initially from the German policy of making education religiously neutral, nevertheless, by the onset of British rule the mission school graduates gained ascendance in the educational sphere. By the 1930s and 1940s the educational system had structured the social order creating a system which rewarded some groups at the expense of others. This in turn led Muslims to establish organizations to pressure successive governments to create equitable opportunities for the different religious communities in education. Educational disparities

between the Muslim and the Christian communities have resulted in the creation of a privileged class of Christians who occupy the upper reaches of the administrative bureaucracies, state corporations, banks and other financial institutions. Despite the efforts of the Tanzanian government to make primary education accessible to all groups, wide differences still exist between Christians and Muslims in higher education. Unless special measures are taken to bridge the gap in education between regions and between different communities, the pattern of educational inequality will persist in the foreseeable future. As long as this is the case, education will continue to be a source of Muslim grievance in Tanzania. This is due to the fact that it is the educational structure which has perpetuated the existing class relations in society. Since the 1940s the Muslim community of Tanzania has been engaged in fervent efforts to make up for lost time in the race for education. In the past the community was led by the EAMWS which mobilized Muslim for educational opportunities. In 1968 the society became involved in a minor religious dispute which had far-reaching consequences. The conflict, however, was confused by ideology or power dynamics which encouraged the intrusion of politics. As a result, the government got involved in the Muslim crisis and exploited the conflict to bring Muslims under control in the new pro-government Muslim council known as BAKWATA. BAKWATA became the sole Muslim council in the country and Muslim efforts had to be channelled through it.

It is important to note that there is a growing assertiveness which has been noted as a general trend in a number of Muslim societies in recent times. This trend is one of heightened awareness of Islam particularly since the rise in religious activism and the fact of the Iranian revolution, which boosted Muslim self-confidence. In Tanzania tensions between Muslim activists and BAKWATA leaders are indicative of this growing assertiveness in the 1980s and 1990s. While BAKWATA leaders operate within the system and are accommodating to the political elite, Warsha and other Muslim youth



groups want the council to be used as a vehicle for religious mobilization or lobby operations on behalf of Muslim interests, especially in the area of education. The political realities quite apart, BAKWATA has little equipment to deal with problems and does not command much in terms of resources, having forfeited Asian contributions with the banning of the all-inclusive EAMWS. The council, which has been ineffective in promoting Muslim interests, has over time become a focal point of attack by a number of Muslim groups, even including local branches of the council. More seriously, BAKWATA is challenged by groups that want to see the council reconstituted or its personnel changed. We have discussed the struggles within BAKWATA and factors leading to the resignation of Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Buhriy (a factor which further reduced the credibility of BAKWATA) and the expulsion of Warsha from BAKWATA during the seminary dispute. The struggles between Warsha (anti-status quo) and BAKWATA (pro-status quo) represent two divergent trends in Muslim religiosity in conflict and competition with each other. We have discussed the sources of opposition to BAKWATA in Tanga and examined Uvikita's clashes with the national and local branch of the society over the Sungu Sungu affair and the incident involving the Kigoma missionaries. Finally, we have noted that since the retirement of Nyerere from politics in 1990 the relationship between BAKWATA and the government has slowly been changing. In an important development recently, for instance, the strong nationalist, pro-government secretary general of the council, Adam Nasibu, was expelled from the council (at the initiative of the government) for embezzlement of Muslim funds and for lack of realization of the council's objectives.

This study has not focussed very much on Zanzibar, and yet no where in Tanzania is Islamic assertiveness more evident than in the case of Zanzibar. It is in Zanzibar, which is a mainly Muslim society with a special status in the Tanzanian union, that the youth is increasingly and openly identifying with an Islamic trend. The Tanzanian government was

worried about this upsurge in Islamic activism on the island. This led the government leaders (Nyerere and President Ali Hassan Mwinyi) in the latter part of 1987 to make a number of speeches on national unity in which the secular nature of Tanzanian society was emphasized. This, however, did not stop the unrest which continued to simmer (there was deep resentment at the control exercised by the mainland over affairs in the islands and the economic decline in Zanzibar) and finally erupted in the May 1988 demonstrations in which two people died and eight others were injured.<sup>3</sup> The demonstrations had been sparked by the remarks made by Sophia Kawawa, the wife of Rashid Kawawa, the CCM national Secretary General, and the head of a CCM-affiliated association for Tanzanian women (UWT).

We have noted in Chapter Six that traditional institutions and structures have been undergoing erosion as a result of the modernization and secularization processes. Despite the secular influences on Tanga's society, there is a continuing allegiance to Islam in the community. Islam is still a potent social force and its influence operates at the social and personal levels. Religious faith continues to influence people's lives and can arouse their emotions as the affair involving the Kigoma missionaries indicates. Islamic influence is still felt despite modern and Western influences. If this were not the case mosques and madrasas would have fallen into decay because of lack of support by Muslims. Religious competition in Tanga, despite its negative implications, is itself a testimony of the continued vibrancy of Islam in Tanga. Although their status has suffered in modern times as they have been subjected to powerful influences for change, religious leaders remain influential in the religious affairs of the Muslim community. They are carriers of socio-religious norms and continue to provide solid basis for faith in the future of Muslims.

The final section of this study which has examined religious leadership views has shown that religious leaders tend to be traditional in their outlook and are conservative in their approach to social affairs. Their disenchantment with ujamaa is not totally unrelated to

Tanzania's economic difficulties which, as we have indicated, have seriously affected the living standards of ordinary Tanzanians. Our analysis has attempted to situate their views on ujamaa in the economic and political contexts which are informed by the recent developments in the country.

### Notes to Conclusion

- 1 For discussions on factionalism, consult Janet Bujra, "The Dynamics of Political Action: A New Look at Factionalism," *American Anthropologist* 75: 1 (1973): 132-152; R. W. Firth, "Introduction: Factions in Indian and Overseas Societies," *BJS* 8 (1957): 291-295; Richard Sandbrook, "Patrons, Clients, and Factions; New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 5 (1972): 104-119; R.F. Salisbury and Marilyn Silverman, eds., *A House Divided? Anthropological Studies of Factionalism* (St. Johns, Newfoundland: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1977); A. F. Ricciardelli, "Factionalism at Oneida, An Iroquois Indian Community" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1961); Norman K. Nicholson, "The Factional Model and the Study of Politics," *CPS* 5:3 (October, 1972): 291-314; J. Siegel, "Pervasive Factionalism," *American Anthropologist* 62 (1960): 394-417; idem and A. Beals, "Conflict and Factionalist Dispute," *JRAI* 90 (1960): 107-117; R. W. Nicholas, "Factions: A Comparative Analysis," in *Political Systems and the Distribution of Power*, ed. M. Banton (London, Tavistock, 1965); Deward E. Walker, Jr., *Conflict and Schism in Nez Perce Acculturation: A Study of Religion and Politics* (Washington: Washington University Press, 1968); and Paul R. Brass, *Factional Politics in an Indian State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).
- 2 See, for instance, F. S. Joelson, *The Tanganyika Territory* (London: Adelphi Terrace, 1920), 182-3.
- 3 Sophia Kawawa had suggested at a seminar in Tabora that the party consider changing the inheritance laws and abolishing polygamy as a means of promoting equality between the sexes. In the demonstration that followed in Zanzibar on May 13, 1988, demonstrators carried placards attacking the party and Sophia Kawawa. Around 30 people were arrested, some of whom were later released because of lack of evidence. In the trial that followed 15 youth were each sentenced on June 12 1989 to 18 months' imprisonment. See *CR* 4 (1987), 2 (1989): 4 and 3 (1989): 9. Recent events in Zanzibar such as the sacking of senior members from the party; the arrest and imprisonment of several leaders including the popular Pemban, the former chief minister Seif Sharif Hamad (of pre-1964 Zanzibar People's Party background) who is resented by some of the old guard of the Afro-Shirazi party with strong loyalty to the mainland such as Omar Ali Juma the current chief minister; and political demonstrations against the party in Pemba and Zanzibar reveal a general dissatisfaction by the islanders with the ruling party. It was believed at the time that the party saw Sharif Hamad as an obstacle to the envisaged changes in Zanzibar (its full economic and political integration so that it becomes merely a region). This was believed to have been Nyerere's objective until his retirement from politics in 1990. See *AC* 3 (1988), 7. The London-based newsletter, *Africa Analysis*, while reporting that Nyerere (when he was still the chairman of the ruling party) had indicated in private that calls for a referendum over the union of Zanzibar with the mainland would be hard to resist given his position on the self-determination of peoples, yet his fear and cautious warning of the possible return of the former Sultan, Seyyid b. Abdalla (this is just

rhetoric), resulted in the call for a sum of \$ 210, 000 to be allocated to the anti-referendum campaign. CR 3 (1989), 8. Again as reported by the same newsletter, Issa Shivji, a senior academic at the University of Dar es Salaam, has raised doubts about the legality of the mainland's erosion of Zanzibar's independent powers over the past two and a half decades. This has amounted to undermining the basic scheme of the union. CR 2 (1990), 12-13. Due to Zanzibar's dissatisfaction with the mainland, which they see as being dominated by a Christian elite (despite the fact that the current President of Tanzania is a Zanzibari and a Muslim), an undercurrent of rebellion is gaining ground in Zanzibar and Pemba and it is taking on religious overtones. The Zanzibar Democratic Alliance (Zada or Hamaki) which has a largely secular stance was announced in Sweden in 1988 and calls for democratic rule and wants a referendum to be held on the matter of union with the mainland. The "Free Voice of Zanzibar" printed in London (probably originated in Oman where thousands of Zanzibari's of Omani ancestry live) and "Expectations of the Zanzibaris" published in Stockholm have been banned in Zanzibar. They call for an end to the union and for the establishment of an Islamic republic. There is also a covert opposition party (Bismillah) which is based in Zanzibar and calls for an Islamic government. Various organizations have sprung up based in the Gulf countries, U.K. and the Scandinavian countries all of which question the control exercised by the mainland over affairs in the islands. It is of interest to note here that in the final weeks of 1990 as the Gulf crisis was unfolding a number of Tanzanians, mainly Zanzibaris responding to the Iraqi recruitment drive, lined up in Dar es Salaam to join Saddam Husein (presumably for non-military activities for which up to \$ 600 was promised). CR 1 (1991), 15.

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