From Origin to Destination:
Family Dynamics of Immigrants and Their Children in Western Europe

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June 2023

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Sociology at McGill University

Abstract

This dissertation consists of four articles that contribute to the sociology of migration and demographic research on families and fertility. It examines family-related attitudes across immigrant generations, focusing on gender roles and fertility ideals. It finds that attitudes toward gender roles are more influenced by acculturation, while attitudes toward ideal family size are less susceptible to such pressures. Second, it distinguishes between attitudes and behavior, showing that fertility norms in the parental country of origin have little effect on fertility behavior in the second generation.

The first empirical chapter uses the European Social Survey to examine gender role attitudes among Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants and their children. It finds that Muslim immigrants hold more traditional gender roles, but are not more influenced by the norms of the country of origin. Second-generation Muslims have more liberal attitudes. The second chapter, based on the EURISLAM survey, examines the impact of social contacts on attitudes towards women's employment and men's domestic roles in Muslim immigrant families. It suggests that private social interactions with natives play a key role in the acculturation of gender role ideologies. The third chapter uses the TeO survey to examine the influence of fertility norms in the country of origin on family attitudes and fertility behavior among immigrant children in France. Fertility behavior converges with that of the majority population, but fertility ideals remain influenced by parental origin-country norms. The fourth chapter, also using TeO, examines how religion and

language practices in immigrant families affect second-generation fertility socialization. Religion influences ideal family size, while language moderates the influence of the country of origin.

The final chapter discusses the contributions and limitations of the research, highlighting the contrast in dissimilation between gender role ideology and second-generation fertility attitudes. It suggests future directions to address the challenges of studying cultural norms and potential biases related to migrant selection.

Résumé

Cette thèse, composée de quatre articles, contribue significativement à la sociologie de la migration et aux études démographiques sur la famille et la fécondité. Elle aborde deux principales contributions. Tout d'abord, elle examine les évolutions intergénérationnelles dans le contexte de l'immigration, en analysant les attitudes et comportements liés à l'idéologie de genre et aux normes de fécondité, en distinguant l'influence des facteurs pré-migratoires, des pratiques culturelles (comme la langue et la religion) et des interactions avec la société d'accueil. Les résultats révèlent que les attitudes envers les rôles de genre, un sujet central du débat public sur l'intégration des migrants en Europe, sont sensibles à l'acculturation, tandis que les attitudes envers la taille idéale de la famille, considérées comme des questions privées, le sont moins. Deuxièmement, l'étude démontre que les normes de fécondité du pays d'origine des parents influencent les idéaux de fécondité de la deuxième génération, mais ont peu d'impact sur leur comportement en matière de fécondité.

Le premier chapitre, basé sur l'enquête sociale européenne (ESS), explore l'influence des normes de genre dans le pays d'origine et de destination sur les attitudes des immigrants et de leurs enfants, en distinguant entre familles musulmanes et non musulmanes. Il confirme que les immigrants d'origine musulmane adoptent davantage de rôles de genre traditionnels, mais sans être davantage influencés par les normes du pays d'origine. En fait, les attitudes des immigrants musulmans sont plus similaires à celles de la société d'accueil que celles des immigrants non musulmans. Les attitudes des musulmans de deuxième génération sont aussi libérales que celles des non-musulmans.

Le deuxième chapitre, basé sur l'enquête EURISLAM, analyse comment les contacts sociaux dans les sphères publique et privée influencent les attitudes envers le travail des femmes et des hommes dans les familles musulmanes immigrées. Les résultats montrent que des liens sociaux plus forts dans la sphère privée, en particulier avec des amis et des membres de la famille de la société d'accueil, sont associés à des attitudes plus égalitaires, tandis que les contacts sociaux dans la sphère publique ne le sont pas.

Le troisième chapitre, utilisant l'enquête Trajectoires et Origines (TeO), examine l'impact des normes de fécondité du pays d'origine sur les attitudes familiales et le comportement de fécondité des enfants d'immigrés en France. Les résultats indiquent que le comportement de fécondité converge avec la population majoritaire, mais les idéaux de fécondité restent influencés par les normes du pays d'origine des parents.

Le quatrième chapitre, également basé sur l'enquête TeO, explore comment la religion et la langue influencent différemment la socialisation de la deuxième génération en matière de fécondité. La religion influence directement la taille idéale de la famille, tandis que la langue modère l'influence du pays d'origine.

Le dernier chapitre résume les contributions et les limites de la recherche, mettant en évidence la différence de dissimilation entre l'idéologie des rôles de genre et les attitudes en matière de fécondité au sein de la deuxième génération. Il suggère également des orientations futures pour surmonter les défis liés à la mesure des normes culturelles dominantes et aux biais potentiels liés à la sélection des immigrants.

Acknowledgments

This dissertation stands as a remarkable achievement in my extensive and sometimes convoluted academic journey. Beyond its scholarly significance, this dissertation is of great personal importance not only to me, but also to my family. Considering that neither of my parents had the opportunity to complete elementary school, I feel fortunate to be the first in my generation to successfully complete a dissertation. While my parents may not have the resources to help me overcome educational and academic obstacles, they provide unwavering support, both financially and emotionally, that allows me to pursue my goals and complete this dissertation. Without their invaluable help, it would have been impossible to overcome the myriad of challenges along this lonely path. Also, I am grateful that this dissertation can be supported by one of the most prestigious funding projects for Ph.D. candidates from the Taiwanese government - 2022 National Science and Technology Council Taiwanese Overseas Pioneers Grants (TOP Grants).

I consider myself incredibly fortunate to have been supported by an exceptional group of mentors who have played a pivotal role in fostering my passion for this field. Among them, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Thomas Soehl, whose guidance and expertise have had a profound impact on shaping my research skills. Thomas embodies a diverse set of intellectual skills, an insatiable curiosity, and an unwavering determination that have made my journey through graduate school more enlightening than I could have ever anticipated. It brings to mind his own acknowledgment in his dissertation at UCLA, where he humbly stated, “I cannot repay the personal and intellectual debt I owe him [his advisor], but can only do my best to pay it forward to the next generation.” Well, I want to say that directly to you, Thomas - you have done that and more! You are an extraordinary advisor, and I am eternally grateful for your guidance and support.

I would like to highlight two instances where I am particularly grateful for Thomas' help. During his vacation in Germany, while he was spending time with his family, I was in the midst of developing the chapters for my dissertation, wrestling with over a hundred different ideas. Despite the significant time difference, I had several Zoom meetings with him, discussing my ideas and initial findings, even when it was late at night in Germany. I could sense his fatigue, but he remained enthusiastic about engaging in academic discussions with me. When he returned to Montreal last summer, I could tell he was still adjusting to jet lag, but he eagerly arranged to meet me in person in a park near his home. As we talked about research, he encouraged me to consider applying for a tenure-track assistant professor position while our daughters played together. These are just two examples of the wonderful moments we shared, and there are countless more that I have trouble putting into words here.

Thomas is not the only McGill faculty member to whom I am indebted. Working with Sarah Brauner-Otto has been a privilege, as her unwavering commitment to precision and meticulousness has greatly helped me untangle crucial complexities in my research. It is truly remarkable that I had the opportunity to take three of Sarah's courses during my Ph.D. program: Sociology of Population, Demographic Method, and Sociology of Fertility. When I first arrived at McGill, my English writing skills were below par. However, Sarah kindly read my memo and provided me with invaluable suggestions. I cannot imagine completing this dissertation without her help. In addition, she has played an important role as one of the most influential mentors in my life. Throughout the pandemic, she has guided me in conducting demographic research and encouraged me to focus on low-income settings such as Nepal. While Thomas taught me the ways of a migration scholar, Sarah mentored me to become a true demographer.

Since my early days at McGill, I have had the privilege of being mentored by Céline Le Bourdais, widely recognized as the foremost family scholar in Canada. Céline has generously shared her wealth of experience with me, imparting valuable knowledge on various aspects of being a family scholar, including methodologies and theories. Along with Sarah and Thomas, Céline provided me with many useful suggestions for my dissertation proposal. Significantly, despite her retirement last summer, Céline remained enthusiastic about writing letters of recommendation on my behalf and inspiring me to follow in her footsteps as a family scholar. It has been a pleasure to have her support throughout my academic journey at McGill.

I owe much of my success in completing this dissertation to the people and institutions at McGill. However, my academic journey did not begin in Montréal. Many years ago, I was an undergraduate student at National Taiwan University. I often took a back seat and rarely engaged with my professors. It was during this time that I met the first advisor who had a profound impact on my life: Jay Chih-Jou Chen. He became not only my mentor, but also a dear friend. Jay played a pivotal role in shaping my path by strongly encouraging me to pursue my doctoral studies in North America. Under his guidance, I not only gained knowledge in my academic field, but also learned how to be a compassionate and responsible individual. The debt I owe him, both intellectually and personally, is immeasurable. Although I cannot fully repay him, I am committed to following in his footsteps and striving to inspire future generations to the best of my ability. Thung-Hong Lin, Ming-Chi Chen, Kuo-Hsien Su, and Janet Chen-Lan Kuo were instrumental in my education, teaching me invaluable lessons in social statistics and guiding me through the field of social research. To this day, we maintain our relationship and continue to collaborate on our research efforts. They are the main reasons why I had the opportunity to study at McGill, and I am deeply grateful for their support. I would also like to thank Kate Choi at Western University and

Renee Luthra at the University of Essex. Their invaluable and insightful suggestions were instrumental in helping me overcome numerous obstacles during the writing of my dissertation.

During my time in Taipei and Montréal, I received tremendous support from many people. Kin Man Wan, Louis Chao, BW Hu, Sakeef Karim, Ian Van Haren, Zachary Marshall, Winnie Yang, Yvonne Chang, Alicia Poole, Maike Issac, Lysandre Champagne, Ana Canedo, Julia Descamps, Ken Hsieh, and members of the NTU Sociology Research Group all played an important role in my journey. Kin Man, Sakeef and Ian, your wisdom, encouragement, and advice were indispensable, and I truly believe that I would not have been able to complete this dissertation without your guidance. I am especially grateful to Lysandre and Julia, as their help was crucial in preparing my French abstract. I am sure there are others whose names have been inadvertently omitted from this list. Their friendship has provided unwavering support through the ups and downs of the past five years. I extend my heartfelt gratitude to every one of you.

Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family. It is difficult to find the right words to begin to express my gratitude. My parents, Un Chan and Wai, have been unwavering in their support throughout this long educational journey that has taken me to a place halfway around the world. Their support and understanding mean the world to me and I am deeply grateful for their presence in my life. To Amber, my love and partner through these years, I would also like to express my sincere gratitude. Without her, none of this would have been possible or would have made sense. She is the driving force behind my perseverance for our family, especially during the most difficult times. Amber, you are the reason I keep going. To my daughter Eva, you are simply the best. I know that the path we have chosen, filled with different places, cultures and schools, has not been easy for you. Despite the challenges, you have excelled both academically and as a person. Your strength and resilience inspire me, and I am so proud to be your parent. And to my

little one, Bruno, who entered the world as I began writing this dissertation. Your presence has been a source of focus and motivation. I cannot imagine navigating this research journey without you. To my entire family, your unwavering support, understanding, and love have been the pillars that have sustained me. I am forever grateful to each one of you.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

How does the existing literature study examine the integration of migrants? Proponents of assimilation theory – whether neo-assimilation or segmented assimilation – have consistently taken migrants' arrival in the destination country as the analytic starting point, focusing on the role of the context of *immigration* in the assimilation processes. This line of literature has made valuable contributions to understanding the role of ethnic difference and the context of immigration in immigrants' assimilation outcomes (e.g., Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). However, this literature overlooks the cross-border nature of migration, in which all *immigrants* are also *emigrants*. All migrants come from specific places with specific cultural and social conditions and have been socialized by the context of emigration before leaving their country of birth and arriving in their new country. As a result, while assimilation theories have paid much attention to the conditions of immigrants and their children in the destination

country, they have neglected the long shadow of the context of origin (for an exception, see Luthra, Waldinger, and Soehl 2018).

But how can we better conceptualize and understand the context of emigration? Recent literature on migration offers two complementary conceptual and empirical approaches that contribute to the study of migration. The first approach focuses on the influence of origin countries and examines how this influence shapes the outcomes of migrants and their children, such as education and labor force performance (see Luthra, Soehl, and Waldinger 2018; Luthra, Waldinger, et al. 2018). Whereas the traditional approach treats origin country membership as a categorical characteristic (e.g., represented by a dummy variable indicating Mexican or Turkish), this new approach directly measures the origin country context (e.g., using a continuous measure of political environment or cultural norms) as a single indicator. This direct measurement of the "culture" of origin allows us to examine how this cultural context shapes *assimilation* trajectories.

The second approach is known as the *dissimilation* perspective. This perspective offers an alternative way of looking at the outcomes of immigrants and their children. Its main argument is that as immigrants and their children become more similar to other members of the destination country, they also become dissimilar to the non-immigrants they left behind (as discussed by FitzGerald 2012). However, this process of becoming different has long been overlooked by migration scholars. The dissimilation perspective can provide a better understanding of how immigrants and their children become different from non-migrants in their countries of origin and shed light on the mechanisms that may influence the dissimilation process. This perspective captures an important aspect of migrants' reality that is often overlooked when adopting the exclusive perspective of the destination country (FitzGerald 2014).

1.1 Context of Emigration in Family Studies

Why is it important to consider the context of emigration and the dissimilation perspective within the literature on migration and families? The existing literature on migration and families focuses primarily on understanding the influence of destination and origin cultures and social norms on migrants' family attitudes and behaviors, including union formation, transition to adulthood, fertility behavior, and attitudes toward women's employment (as reviewed by Kleinepier and de Valk 2016; Pailhé 2015; Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014; Milewski 2009; Pailhé 2017; Pessin and Arpino 2018; Röder and Muhlau 2014). This extensive body of research has offered three main cultural explanations for the convergence and divergence of family attitudes and behaviors.

Acculturation theory posits that over time and across generations, immigrants' cultural attitudes and values become more similar to the dominant culture and norms of the destination country through exposure to media and social interactions outside of their origin group. The *socialization* hypothesis, on the other hand, emphasizes the impact of early childhood exposure to specific norms, values, and preferences, whether from the destination or origin culture, in shaping long-term family attitudes and behaviors over the course of an individual’s life. Finally, the *cultural maintenance* hypothesis suggests that assimilation may not apply to certain immigrant groups because their norms and values remain deeply rooted in their ethnic-origin culture. In general, these theories consider *culture* to be a central explanation for the variation observed in family attitudes and behaviors across research contexts. However, our understanding of how to conceptualize and measure culture remains limited.

Moreover, focusing solely on assimilation, comparing differences between migrant groups and the native population in the destination country, is insufficient to understand whether the distinctive patterns of family attitudes and behaviors among immigrants and their children are the

result of "imported norms and behaviors" shaped by the context of origin or are related to the context of destination and the specific migration situation (as discussed by Baykara-Krumme and Milewski 2017; Glick 2010; Impicciatore, Gabrielli, and Paterno 2020). For example, when examining the high fertility rates of Turkish descendants, is this due to their "strong culture of family origin" (Milewski 2009), or is it influenced by the hindered assimilation in their disadvantaged destination context (Coleman and Dubuc 2010)? Similarly, are the traditional gender attitudes of Muslim immigrants and their children attributed to their traditional gender norms from the country of origin (Norris and Inglehart 2012), or are they a response to social closure and inequality in the destination context? These questions cannot be adequately answered by simply comparing differences between migrant groups and the native population in the destination country. The dissimilation approach, comparing differences between migrant groups in the destination country and non-migrants in the country of origin, allows for a direct examination of the cultural links between ethnic-origin norms and the family attitudes and behaviors among immigrants and their children because this approach helps to isolate and examine the unique dynamics of change in the context of international migration (FitzGerald 2012).

Additionally, the existing literature primarily examines the influence of origin-country cultural norms on family behaviors, such as the timing of union formation and completed fertility, while paying less attention to family attitudes, with few exceptions (e.g., Mussino and Ortensi 2018). In this dissertation, I address this gap by considering both attitudes and behaviors, and by comparing the influence of the origin-country cultural norms on family attitudes and behaviors. This approach offers two important advantages from a migration studies perspective. First, by focusing on family attitudes, this analysis provides a deeper understanding of the cultural transmission between destination migrant groups and their country of origin in terms of family

norms. Attitudes are considered a more reliable indicator of individual values and norms than behaviors (Milewski and Mussino 2019; Testa and Grilli 2006), making them particularly valuable for studying cultural dynamics within migrant families. Second, by comparing the impact of parental origin-country fertility norms on both fertility attitudes and behaviors, this analysis offers a more systematic understanding of whether cultural assimilation or structural constraints better explain the recent convergence of family behaviors among the children of immigrants. This comparison allows for an examination of the factors driving changes in family dynamics within migrant populations.

1.2 Mechanisms Shaping Assimilation Trajectories in Family Dynamics

What are the underlying mechanisms that influence the outcomes of immigrants and their children with respect to emigration and their assimilation/dissimilation trajectories? In the context of migrant cooperation studies, I examine two commonly discussed individual- and family-level mechanisms that potentially shape dissimilation and assimilation trajectories in family attitudes and behaviors: religion and language.

1.2.1 Religion: Muslims vs. non-Muslims

Numerous empirical studies have highlighted the fundamental differences between Muslims and non-Muslims with respect to gender and fertility norms, suggesting that Muslims tend to have more traditional attitudes toward family values than non-Muslims, as Islamic doctrines and practices are perceived to encourage early, simultaneous parental departure and marriage, followed by rapid childbearing (Michael and Tuma 1985; Régnier-Loilier and Prioux

2008). For example, a cross-national study by Morgan et al. (2002) found that Muslim women tend to have more children and want more children than their non-Muslim counterparts. Muslim women also tend to enter marriage and parenthood at an earlier age and have larger ideal family sizes than non-Muslim women (Michael and Tuma 1985). Similarly, many studies have argued that Muslims tend to hold more traditional attitudes toward women's roles than non-Muslims because Islamic doctrine and practice are perceived as promoting inherently non-egalitarian gender relations, such as in the case of the division of household labor. For example, a cross-national study by Inglehart and Norris (2003, 47) argues that Muslims hold more traditional gender attitudes than non-Muslims. Some studies have also shown that immigrants with Islamic backgrounds have more traditional gender ideologies than those from non-Islamic countries (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2018).

Religion may also be a salient social boundary feature that produces effects independent of religious doctrine or practice. In the European context, the clear “bright boundary” between natives and Muslim immigrants exacerbates and reinforces public perceptions that Muslim immigrants pose challenges and may even resist assimilation into Western society (Alba 2005; Brubaker 2013; Zolberg and Long 1999). From a rational choice perspective, Muslim immigrants may perceive fewer benefits than non-Muslims, leading to reduced incentives to engage in assimilative behaviors, limited opportunities to interact with native populations, and slower progress along the acculturation trajectory. As a result, Muslims may adopt an ethnic boundary strategy that actively resists integration into the host society while maintaining the values of their country of origin. Alternatively, they may develop an oppositional culture in response to experiences of social exclusion and inequality in the host context (Wimmer 2008; Wimmer and Soehl 2014). Given the different levels of prejudice and discrimination experienced by Muslims

and non-Muslims in Europe, as well as the different degrees of ethnic communities and societal ties to their countries of origin, it is likely that Muslim immigrants will show limited convergence with family attitudes in their destination society, while retaining relatively stronger ties to attitudes prevalent in their society of origin.

1.2.2 Language: The Uses of Origin-country Language at Home

Similar to religion, language practice plays an important role in shaping immigrant dissimilation. The use of one's native language is crucial for intra- and intergenerational communication, connecting immigrants to those who remain in their countries of origin (Gutierrez 2020; Soehl and Waldinger 2012). While most second-generation immigrants and their highly educated parents are fluent in the language of the host country in public settings such as schools and workplaces, some continue to use their mother tongue for communication in private settings (Soehl 2016, p. 1521). The language spoken at home is important for cultural transmission between migrants and their homeland, as well as across generations. For the children of immigrants, the ability to speak their native language is essential for maintaining a strong bond with their parents (Lutz and Crist 2009; Portes and Hao 2002; Portes and Rumbaut 2001), as well as for fostering connections with their ethnic community, relatives, and friends in their home country. Consequently, the loss of native language proficiency may weaken both the motivation and the ability to maintain a transnational cultural identity and connection. Conversely, immigrant children who continue to use their mother tongue are more likely to maintain a strong connection to the cultural norms of their country of origin, including family values such as gender role attitudes and fertility ideals.

1.3 Methodology: Variable-Based Approach rather than Nominal Approach

As noted above, my approach in this study is to conceptualize and model the process of dissimilation and assimilation in attitudes as a transition from the emigration context to the immigration context. Methodologically, I build on a growing body of research that directly measures the emigration context, such as the cultural background of emigration (Luthra, Waldinger & Soehl 2018), attitudes toward homosexuality in the country of origin (Soehl 2017), and gender role attitudes in the country of origin (Pessin & Arpino 2018). Instead of using a dummy variable for nationality/ethnic group as a proxy for cultural heritage (e.g., Turkey), I directly measure the cultural norms of both the emigration and immigration contexts (e.g., fertility norms in the origin and destination countries) in my multivariate analyses.

Furthermore, this approach allows me to distinguish the influence of socialization in the countries of origin and destination from the influence of individual- and family-level characteristics, such as religion, langauge, and class background. For example, in the second chapter, I distinguish the effects of religion (e.g., Islam), gender norms of the country of origin (e.g., gender norms in Islamic countries), and gender norms of the country of destination (e.g., gender norms in European countries) on immigrants' gender attitudes. In addition, this framework allows for the examination of individual- and family-level characteristics that may moderate the process and explain variation in cultural dissimilation and assimilation. Specifically, I examine whether the gender norms of the country of origin and the country of destination have different effects on Muslim and non-Muslim immigrant populations. To accomplish this, I use interaction terms between Islam and gender norms of origin and destination countries to examine whether

Muslim immigrants exhibit stronger or weaker adherence to the gender norms of their origin and destination countries compared to non-Muslim immigrants.

1.4 The Four Empirical Chapters

1.4.1 Chapter 2

I use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to examine the impact of gender norms in both the country of origin and the country of destination on the gender role attitudes of immigrants and their children, focusing on differences between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants. Consistent with previous research, my findings indicate that Muslim immigrants tend to hold more traditional gender role attitudes than non-Muslim immigrants, even after controlling for the influences of the country of origin. However, there is no evidence that Muslims are more influenced by the gender norms of their country of origin than non-Muslims. In fact, the gender role attitudes of Muslim immigrants are more in line with those of the host society than those of non-Muslim immigrants. Moreover, the gender attitudes of second-generation Muslims show a similar level of liberalism as those of non-Muslims.

1.4.2 Chapter 3

In this chapter, I use a unique survey EURISLAM, which focuses on Muslim immigrants and their children in six Western European countries. The aim is to examine whether social contacts with natives in both the public and private spheres are associated with attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic roles. The results show that immigrants and their children who have stronger social ties in the private sphere, especially with native friends and family members,

are more likely to hold egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic roles. However, social contacts in the public sphere, such as work and neighborhood interactions, do not significantly influence these gender role attitudes. These findings support theories that emphasize the significant role of private social interactions with natives in the process of acculturating gender role ideologies within Muslim families.

1.4.3 Chapter 4

In the forth chapter, I analyze data from the Trajectoires et Origines (TeO) survey to examine the influence of origin-country fertility norms on family attitudes (ideal number of children) and fertility behavior (timing of births) among the children of immigrants in France. In line with previous studies, the results indicate that the fertility behavior of the second generation is converging towards the patterns observed in the majority population. However, their fertility ideals are still strongly influenced by the fertility norms and patterns of their parental countries of origin. Children of immigrants whose parents come from countries with high fertility rates express a desire for larger families compared to those whose parents come from countries with low fertility rates, even though there are no significant differences in the timing of births. These findings suggest that structural constraints, rather than acculturation alone, play a crucial role in shaping the convergence of fertility patterns to those observed in the destination society.

1.4.4 Chapter 5

Finally, this chapter again draws on the TeO survey to examine how two cultural practices within migrant families, namely religion and language, influence the socialization of fertility attitudes

among the second generation in different ways. Religion directly shapes the ideal family size desired by immigrant children, as those from Muslim and highly religious families express a desire for more children. Conversely, the use of the language of the country of origin does not directly influence the ideal family size, but rather moderates the influence of the country of origin. Those who spoke the mother language during childhood show a stronger alignment with the fertility ideals of their country of origin than those who grew up speaking French.

1.5 Contributions to Original Knowledge

This dissertation makes significant contributions to the fields of migration and family studies in several key respects. First, by examining and comparing two types of attitudes, it uncovers intriguing findings. Specifically, it shows that attitudes toward gender roles, which are highly salient in the public discourse surrounding the assimilation of migrants in Europe, are strongly influenced by acculturation pressures. As migrants and their children interact with the host society, their beliefs and attitudes about gender roles change significantly, becoming more aligned with the prevailing norms of the host society over time and across generations. Conversely, attitudes toward ideal family size, which are more personal and private in nature, are less susceptible to such acculturation pressures. Even after a single generation, the fertility norms inherited from the parents' country of origin continue to strongly influence the ideal family size of the second generation.

The second major contribution of this dissertation is to distinguish between attitudes and behaviors. It shows that while fertility norms from the parents' country of origin shape ideal family size among the second generation, their influence on actual fertility behavior is limited. In other

words, individuals may have preferences or ideals regarding family size that reflect their cultural heritage, but these preferences do not necessarily translate into corresponding fertility behaviors.

Third, this dissertation examines the influence of two crucial cultural practices within migrant families: religion and language, and their differential effects on second-generation fertility attitudes. Religion, which often plays a regulatory role in family life and sexuality, directly shapes the desired family size of immigrant children. Among immigrant children, those raised in Muslim or highly religious families express a stronger desire for larger families. On the other hand, the use of the language of the parents' country of origin does not directly affect ideal family size, but rather acts as a moderator of the influence of the country of origin. Those who spoke the language of their country of origin (either completely or partially) at home during childhood show a stronger alignment with the fertility ideals of their country of origin than those who grew up speaking the language of the destination country.

1.6 Contributions to Authors

Ka U Ng is the sole author of all four manuscripts comprising this dissertation.

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Chapter 2

Are Muslim Immigrants Assimilating? Cultural Assimilation Trajectories in Immigrants' Attitudes toward Gender Roles in Europe

Published in the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*; 06 Feb 2022; Volume 48 – Issue 15

Abstract

As public attitudes toward gender roles in Western societies become increasingly liberal, Muslim immigrants and their children in Europe are regarded as conservative and unassimilated. This study treats acculturation as a process by which immigrants and their children shift from the attitude distribution in their origin country to that of their settlement country, and distinguishes the influence of Islam and origin-country gender norms on Muslim immigrants' and their children's gender role attitudes. Using data on gender role attitudes from 32 European settlement countries and 98 origin countries, the study models the relative influence of origin and settlement contexts on 25,220 first- and second-generation immigrants in Europe. Similar to previous studies, this study finds that Muslim immigrants have more traditional gender role attitudes than non-Muslim immigrants when controlling for the effect of origin-country gender norms. However, there is no evidence that Muslims are more attached to their origin country's gender norms than non-Muslims. Instead, Muslim immigrants' attitudes about gender norms are more similar to those in the settlement society than those of non-Muslim immigrants: Unlike their foreign-born parents, second-generation Muslims are as liberal as non-Muslim populations. Taken together, these results suggest that second-generation Muslims are adopting mainstream European gender norms.

Introduction

Immigrant acculturation of gender attitudes has become an increasingly important topic in academic research and public policy in European societies. While gender norms in Northern and Western Europe have become increasingly liberal in recent decades, Muslim immigrants and immigrants from Muslim-majority countries are considered to hold more traditional attitudes than natives regarding gender issues. The gender norm differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in Western European countries have received much attention as the rich and wide-ranging literature has provided comprehensive accounts linking the gender traditionalism of Muslims to levels of religiousness (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009; Khoudja and Fleischmann 2015), intergenerational transmission (Kretschmer 2018; Maliepaard and Alba 2016; Spierings 2015), and religious doctrine and practices (Norris and Inglehart 2011). However, the existing literature has paid little attention to distinguishing the effects of Islamic religious and origin-country gender norms on immigrants' and their children's gender role attitudes (for a partial exception, see Röder 2014). By using multiple-origin data drawn from pooled waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) in 32 countries of settlement and the World Value Survey (WVS) dataset containing information on the distribution of gender role attitudes in 98 countries of origin, this study goes beyond the existing research by clearly distinguishing the influence of religion and country of origin on immigrants' and their children's gender role attitudes in Europe.

Building on previous literature that has explained the gender traditionalism of Muslim immigrants and their children in Western Europe, this study summarizes three mechanisms that help us understand the conservative gender ideology of these individuals. Although these mechanisms have previously been proposed separately in the literature, no empirical study has organized them together and systematically examined their predicted outcomes. The first

mechanism outlines that religious doctrines and practices have a prolonged influence on immigrants' attitudes regarding gender roles; specifically, Islamic doctrine has been regarded as inherently entailing non-egalitarian gender relations (*Islamic doctrine and practices*). The second mechanism posits that as most Muslim immigrants came from countries with lower levels of gender equality, gender traditionalism among Muslim immigrants and their children is the outcome of origin-country socialization rather than solely religious doctrine and practices (*origin-country socialization*); thus, this conservative gender role ideology that is linked to the culture of the origin country may fade over time and across generations. The final mechanism posits that religion is a salient characteristic of social boundaries that produces effects independent of religious doctrines and practices. The social closure and inequality Muslims face in their European settlement countries encourages them to maintain the cultural values of their (parental) origin countries and distances them from the settlement-society's gender norms (*blocked acculturation*). To evaluate these hypotheses, this study aims to address three empirical questions. First, do both first-and second-generation Muslim immigrants hold more traditional gender ideologies than non-Muslim immigrants and their children (*Islamic doctrine and practices*)? Second, are the traditional gender attitudes among Muslim immigrants explained by the level of origin country gender role ideology (*origin country socialization)*? Third, are Muslim immigrants more anchored to their origin country's gender norms and less influenced by their settlement country's gender ideology than non-Muslim immigrants (*blocked acculturation)*?

Conceptually and methodologically, this study builds on an emerging research program in migration and family studies that treats acculturation as an assimilation and dissimilation trajectory. This process is modeled as a shift in attitudes from one distribution (the origin country) to another (the settlement society) (Pessin and Arpino 2018; Soehl 2017). This study separately examines the

three hypotheses that explain Muslim immigrants' traditional gender ideologies. To do this empirically, first, the influence of origin- and settlement-country socialization on immigrants' gender attitudes is distinguished from the influence of individual-level characteristics, such as time in the settlement country and religious domination. Specifically, the effect between religion (e.g., Islam), origin country (e.g., the Islamic country's gender norms), and settlement country (e.g., the European country's gender norms) on immigrants' gender attitudes can be distinguished. Second, besides estimating the main effect of religion and origin-country and settlement-country gender norms, this approach can demonstrate whether origin-country and settlement-country gender norms have different effects on Muslim and non-Muslim immigrant populations. To do so, the interaction terms between Islam and the gender norms of origin and settlement countries are used to investigate whether Muslim immigrants are more or less attached to their origin- and settlement-country gender norms than non-Muslim immigrants.

Employing this approach to Muslim immigrants' acculturation, this study is the first to systematically analyze the dissimilation and assimilation of gender role attitudes among Muslim immigrants and their children. While previous research on this topic has stated that Muslim immigrants and their children hold more traditional attitudes toward women's employment than non-Muslims immigrants (Norris and Inglehart 2012; Röder 2014), this study finds a different conclusion. Although first-generation Muslim immigrants tend to hold more conservative views on women's employment than non-Muslim immigrants, and this religious effect is independent of the origin-country effect, there is no evidence that Muslim immigrants are more attached to their origin-country gender norms than non-Muslim immigrants. Surprisingly, they are not less but *more* acculturated to the gender attitudes of the settlement country than non-Muslim immigrants. In addition, the effects of religion and origin country fade after one generation as second-generation

Muslims are no more traditional than their non-Muslim counterparts. Additionally, the second generation is no longer influenced by their parental origin-country culture. Altogether, Islamic doctrine is not always a barrier that prevents Muslims from acculturation to mainstream social and cultural values, nor necessarily a bridge linking origin-society norms and their values. Furthermore, second-generation Muslims are also adopting mainstream European gender norms.

2.1 Religion and Gender Role Attitudes in the Context of Migration

Global societies, and particularly Western societies, have become more liberal in gender ideology than in previous decades (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015). However, while mainstream societies today hold more liberal gender equity attitudes, Muslim immigrants are often considered a threat to liberal gender norms. Based on the previous literature, three perspectives explain why Muslims tend to be more conservative in their gender attitudes than non-Muslim populations.

2.1.1 Islamic doctrine and practices

Many empirical studies have posited the argument that Muslims tend to hold more traditional attitudes regarding women's roles than non-Muslims because Islamic doctrine and practices are perceived to encourage inherently non-egalitarian gender relations, such as in the case of the division of household labor. For example, a cross-national study by Inglehart and Norris (2003 p. 47) argued that Muslims have more traditional gender attitudes than non-Muslims. Some studies have also demonstrated that immigrants with Islamic-origin backgrounds hold more traditional gender ideologies than those from non-Islamic countries (Diehl, Koenig, and

Ruckdeschel 2009; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2018). For instance, in Germany, immigrants from Turkey were found to be substantially more religious and more likely to have traditional attitudes toward working women than native Germans (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009). Similarly, a study found that immigrants in the Netherlands with Muslim-origin-country backgrounds have considerably more conservative values about marriage and sexuality than Dutch natives (Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2018).

As second-generation Muslims have grown up and been exposed to more secular environments, they are expected to be more liberal regarding gender ideology than their foreign-born Muslim parents (Maliepaard and Alba 2016). However, some of these second-generation Muslims may still be more traditional than the settlement-country natives and non-Muslim children of immigrants because their Muslim parents transmitted their traditional gender ideologies to their children (Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2018; Kretschmer 2018; Röder 2014). While second-generation Muslims have higher levels of exposure to mainstream ideologies than their foreign-born parents, these parents retain a significant influence on the religious socialization of their children. Inside this religious socialization within the family, parents may also transmit traditional gender ideology to their children. For instance, Kretschmer (2018) found that second-generation individuals with Turkish and former Yugoslavian backgrounds have more traditional gender role attitudes than their native German counterparts. One might argue that the negative association between the Muslim population and the gender-egalitarian view is mainly due to the high level of religiosity within Islam (Kretschmer 2018). However, another study observed that Islamic affiliation is particularly closely linked to gender traditionalism, even when the level of religiosity is controlled for (Alexander and Welzel 2011). The present study, therefore, posits the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Islamic doctrine and practices: Muslim immigrants and their Muslim children hold more traditional gender role attitudes than non-Muslim immigrants and their children, and this association is independent of the influence of the country of origin and individual religiosity.

2.1.2 Gender norms in the country of origin

The second perspective is linked to the socialization and assimilation theories that focus on the role of origin-country cultural norms in the gender attitudes of immigrants and their children. It is widely believed that the origin countries of many Muslim immigrants in Europe have lower levels of gender equity than many European countries (Norris and Inglehart 2012). This perspective views that gender traditionalism among Muslims is not solely due to Islamic doctrines and practices but also to the gender norms of their countries of origin. Socialization theory considers that exposure to certain preferences, values, and norms during childhood has long-lasting effects and continues to shape immigrants' attitudes after migration. This, therefore, may explain why immigrants from Islamic countries of origin hold more traditional gender role attitudes than immigrants from other regions, although previous studies have not distinguished the effects of Islam and origin-country gender norms.

From the perspective of migration theory, scholars working within transnationalism have found that origin-country cultural norms have a long-lasting influence on immigrants' attitudes and behavior (Levitt 1998). Likewise, ethnic communities may be able to re-enforce immigrants to maintain their cultural attitudes and practices in the country of settlement (Dasgupta 1998; Stuart et al. 2010). Previous literature has examined the lasting influence of origin-country socialization in domains related to gender and family issues, including attitudes toward homosexuality (Soehl

2017a), female labor force participation (Frank and Hou 2015), ideal ages for family formation (Holland and De Valk 2013), and gender role attitudes (Pessin and Arpino 2018). Families are the main agents of socialization, particularly in the sphere of family and gender attitudes (Axinn and Thornton 1993; Moen, Erickson, and Dempster-Mcclain 1997), and foreign-born parents may transmit their origin-country gender norms and practices to their children (Helga A.G. De Valk and Liefbroer 2007; Liefbroer and Elzinga 2012).

However, according to assimilation theory, the differences between immigrants and natives disappear over time and across generations (Alba and Nee 2003). For example, the gender and family attitudes of immigrants will be gradually influenced by the norms and values of the settlement society through the media, the labor market, and social contact with the mainstream society in daily life (Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014). The influence of settlement countries on gender attitudes may be more significant for the second generation because these children of immigrants are exposed to the settlement country's gender norms during childhood through schooling and peer groups. This exposure has long-lasting effects in shaping gender role attitudes among the second generation. As the influence of the settlement society becomes increasingly important in immigrants' gender role attitudes, conversely, the influence of the origin country may continue to decrease over time and across generations. Therefore, this study posits the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: Origin country socialization: The differences in gender role attitudes between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants can be explained by the gender norms of their countries of origin.

Hypothesis 2b: However, the influence of country of origin on an individual's gender role attitude will decrease over time and across generations.

2.1.3 Symbolic boundary and blocked acculturation

However, this dissimilation and assimilation process may not apply to all immigrants' ideologies of equality as Muslim immigrants may adopt settlement-country cultural norms less than non-Muslim immigrants. As such, the process may apply to immigrants unequally depending on the conditions of their settlement country, such as possible discrimination and hostile institutional environments (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993).

In the European context, the "bright boundary" between natives and Muslim immigrants exacerbates the public opinion that Muslim immigrants are problematic and even unassimilated in Western society (Alba 2005; Brubaker 2013; Zolberg and Long 1999). As Muslim immigrants perceive that they will receive fewer returns than non-Muslims, they may have fewer incentives to invest in assimilative behaviors, limiting their opportunities to have contact with natives and proceeding more slowly along the path of acculturation. Consequently, Muslims may develop an ethnic boundary strategy that actively opposes the settlement societies and maintains their origin-country values or develop an oppositional culture to respond to social closure and inequality in the context of reception (Wimmer 2008; Wimmer and Soehl 2014). Muslim immigrants and their children hold social and cultural values distinct from the mainstream, not because they are culturally unassimilated but because the mainstream of the settlement country has blocked their acculturation.

In addition, religion has played an important role in maintaining continuity in values and attitudes across borders and generations (Soehl 2017b; Wuthnow and Offutt 2008). For Muslim

immigrants, religion can be an important way for parents to maintain social and cultural capital that protects their children from discrimination and the undesirable aspects of the settlement society (Bankston and Zhou 1995; Soehl 2020). The maintenance of high religiosity levels among second-generation Muslims can be explained by blocked acculturation due to stratification and social closure in the context of settlement countries (Drouhot 2021). Similarly, Muslim immigrants and their children may also reinforce their conservative gender attitudes in response to social closure in European societies. While non-Muslim immigrants may partly internalize their lifestyles (e.g., women participating in the public sphere, such as in education and labor markets) and adopt the gender norms of the settlement society (e.g., consuming local media), Muslim immigrants may maintain their origin-country gender norms to respond to the stratification and inequality in the context of reception. Given the different levels of experience of prejudice and discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe, as well as the different degrees of ethnic communities and origin societies in which they are embedded, we can expect that Muslim immigrants may experience limited convergence toward the gender role attitudes in their settlement society and a relatively higher persistence of origin-society attitudes. Therefore, the final hypothesis follows:

Hypothesis 3: Blocked acculturation: As an excluded population in Europe, when compared to non-Muslims, Muslim immigrants' and their children's gender norms are more anchored in those of their origin countries and less influenced by the settlement societies' attitude contexts.

2.2 Data and Methods

2.2.1 Sample and Dataset

A multilevel dataset that included information on attitudes toward gender roles in 98 countries of origin across the world and 32 immigrant-receiving countries in Europe was assembled for this study. For the individual-level analyses, data from the ESS, which includes all European Union (EU) member countries that are part of the ESS as well as Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland, on a total of 32 countries were used. Pooling four waves (Rounds 2, 4, 5, and 8 between 2002 and 2016) resulted in a dataset of 13,636 respondents born outside of their country of residence and 11,584 respondents who were children of immigrants with origins in 98 countries worldwide. The WVS was used to capture the origin-country-level gender norms in this dataset. The distribution of origin-country gender norms is shown in Figure 1. The percentages of missing values for all variables used in the models are summarized in Table A1.1.

2.2.2 Dependent Variable

The current study focuses on whether individuals believe that men and women should have equal access to the labor market. The survey question regarding the dependent variable, *gender role attitudes*, was posed through the following statement: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women." This is one of the few available statements that is widely used to measure gender role attitudes (Arpino et al., 2015; Pessin and Arpino 2018; Röder and Muhlau 2014). Additionally, it is the only statement used in both the ESS and WVS surveys. The respondents were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with this statement, and their answers were recorded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree." To make the interpretation of coefficients and their directions more straightforward, the categories were reversed-coded so that higher values indicated more liberal attitudes. Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables.



Figure 2.1: Gender attitudes toward women's employment in origin countries.

Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of variables

	Overall	1st Gen.	2nd Gen.
Dependent Variable			
Gender role attitudes			
Men should be prioritized over women professionally when jobs are scarce			
Strongly agree	0.07	0.08	0.07
Agree	0.16	0.18	0.14
Neither agree nor disagree	0.15	0.15	0.15
Disagree	0.33	0.32	0.33
Strongly disagree	0.29	0.27	0.31
Independent variables (discrete)			
Married	0.46	0.49	0.42
Citizen	0.77	0.62	0.95
Female	0.54	0.55	0.54
Religion			
None	0.33	0.3	0.37
Catholic	0.2	0.21	0.19
Protestant	0.07	0.07	0.07
Orthodox	0.13	0.15	0.11
Muslim	0.07	0.09	0.04
Other	0.2	0.18	0.22
Linguistic assimilation/using settlement-country language			
Exclusively	0.51	0.36	0.67
First	0.17	0.2	0.19
Second	0.22	0.44	0.14
Parents' country of birth			
Both foreign-born	0.65	0.91	0.37
Foreign-born mother	0.16	0.04	0.29
Foreign-born father	0.19	0.05	0.34
Years lived in the country of settlement			
Less than a year		0.02	
1–5 years		0.1	
6–10 years		0.11	
11–20 years		0.22	
20+ years		0.55	
Independent variables (continuous)			
Age			
Mean	47	49	46
Std. dev.	17	18	17
Min	18	18	18
Max	80	80	79

European Social Survey, waves 2, 4, 5 and 8, World Value Survey (Waves 1–7).

Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of variables (continued)

	Overall	1st Gen.	2nd Gen.
The level of religiosity			
Mean	4.83	5.08	4.57
Std. dev.	3.15	3.14	3.14
Min	0	0	0
Max	10	10	10
Education (1–5)			
Mean	3.3	3.3	3.4
Std. dev.	1.31	1.37	1.24
Min	1	1	1
Max	5	5	5
Gender norms in origin country			
Mean	2.78	2.77	2.78
Std. dev.	0.96	0.95	0.99
Min	0.22	0.22	0.22
Max	4.82	4.82	4.82
Gender norms in settlement country			
Mean	3.6	3.6	3.6
Std. dev.	0.39	0.39	0.39
Min	2.17	2.17	2.17
Max	4.74	4.74	4.74
Gender norm distance between origin and settlement country			
Mean	0.99	1.03	0.98
Std. dev.	0.84	0.83	0.84
Min	0.01	0.01	0.01
Max	4.1	4.1	4.1

European Social Survey, waves 2, 4, 5 and 8, World Value Survey (Waves 1–7).

2.2.3 Independent Variables

Gender values in countries of settlement and origin

The variable of *settlement-country gender norms* was based on the ESS and matched to each respondent based on their country of residence and the survey year. This variable was measured as the mean of the 5-point Likert scale (from 0 to 5) answers that ranged from "Strongly

Agree" to "Strongly Disagree" regarding the statement "When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women" among native respondents[1] in the settlement country.

The variable of *origin-country gender norms* relied on the WVS, which covers 104 countries with a sample size of approximately 700 to 2,000 individuals in each country. Following previous research (Arpino, Esping-Andersen, and Pessin 2015), this variable was matched to each respondent based on their country of origin and the survey year, and was measured as the portion of respondents in the origin country who disagreed with the item measuring the dependent variable. While the statement was used in both the ESS and WVS, the scale was different between these two datasets: In the WVS, the respondents were able to choose the following answers: "Agree," "Disagree," and "Neither." Therefore, the share of native respondents in the country of origin who disagreed with this statement was used to measure origin-country gender norms in the present study. This percentage was standardized to a scale ranging from 0 to 5 in order to harmonize the settlement-country gender norms.

Higher scores indicated more liberal gender norms. Settlement countries were, on average, more liberal (mean = 3.6) than origin countries (mean = 2.8). In addition, the variation among origin countries (standard deviation = 0.96) was larger than that among settlement countries (standard deviation = 0.39). Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of the average gender norms of each country in the sample.

Immigrant settlements and generational status

The ESS provides a five-category variable to distinguish a new arrival (less than one year) from those who have lived for 1–5 years, 6–10 years, 11–20 years, and more than 20 years in the

[1] Natives were respondents who were born in the country of residence and whose parents were also born there.

settlement country. Second-generation immigrants are those who were born and raised in the settlement country.

Religion

The ESS provides information on whether or not the respondents belonged to different religions. In the present study, this variable was recoded to distinguish between those with no religious domination, Protestants, Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, Muslims, and all others. The "others" category included Jewish respondents and those from Eastern religions and other Christian denominations. These six categories were included in the main effect model (Model 1, reference group: the non-religious), while the dummy variable indicating Muslim respondents was included in the interaction models (Models 2, 3A, and 3B, reference group: non-Muslims) for two reasons. First, the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims (including the non-religious and other religious individuals) is the most theoretically important (Brubaker 2013; Zolberg and Long 1999). Second, adding random effects for all religions would have introduced too many variance components for a reliable estimation.

Parents' Migration Background

A second-generation respondent whose parents are both foreign-born may have more traditional family attitudes than a second-generation individual with only one foreign-born parent (Goldscheider et al. 2011). In addition, the intergenerational transmission of gender role attitudes may differ between father and mother (Idema and Phalet 2007). Foreign-born fathers and foreign-born mothers may have different influences on their children's gender role attitudes. Therefore, this variable was coded into a three-categorical variable: both parents are foreign-born, foreign-born mother, and foreign-born father.

2.2.4 Control Variables

The following control variables were also included in this study:

The everyday use of language: Language may influence the dissimilation and assimilation process among immigrants and their children (Gutierrez 2020; Soehl and Waldinger 2012). The ESS asked respondents which languages they spoke in their settlement country, and recorded up to two. This information was recoded into three groups: those who mentioned using the settlement country language only, those who mentioned the settlement-country language as a first language and the language of their origin country or parents' origin country as a second language, and those who mentioned the settlement-country language as second to their origin-country language. *Age*: Because older respondents might tend to hold more traditional gender attitudes, age was included in the model. *Level of Education*: As more highly educated people are likely to have more exposure to liberal and modern ideas and, therefore, have more liberal gender norms (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004), the five levels of education (lower than secondary education, lower secondary education, upper secondary education, post-secondary education, and tertiary education) were included as a continuous variable in the model. *Marital Status*: As those who are or have been married might express more conservative attitudes toward gender issues (Fan and Marini 2000), a dummy variable that distinguished those who were/had ever been married and those who have never been married was constructed. *Citizenship*: Respondents who hold citizenship in the settlement country may have a deeper sense of receiving society membership than those who are not citizens in the settlement country (Soehl and Waldinger 2012); therefore, they may express more liberal gender role attitudes than non-citizens. *The Level of Religiosity*: The level of religiosity may influence people's gender role attitudes (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009). In addition to religious

affiliation, the ESS also provides a self-assessed measure of the level of religiosity, scaled from 0 (least religious) to 10 (most religious). In the present study, this was regarded as a linear predictor. *Gender*: Previous studies have shown that acculturation patterns differ between male and female immigrants and their children (Dasgupta 1998). One might argue that female immigrants, especially second-generation female immigrants, hold less conservative gender role attitudes than male immigrants. A dummy variable for gender was included in the model in this study. *Distance between gender norms in the origin and settlement countries*: the ideological distance between the gender norms in the settlement and origin countries may influence immigrants' assimilation process. To tackle this issue, the absolute value of the gender norm difference between the settlement and origin countries was included in the models.

2.2.5 Method

To test the hypotheses, I used a cross-classified multilevel regression model whereby immigrants have simultaneously nested in origin- and settlement-country attitude distributions. A cross-classified multilevel regression model captures the influence of the origin and settlement contexts on respondents' attitudes and the factors that shape the relative weight of origin and settlement distributions (Pessin and Arpino 2018; Soehl 2017). This model simultaneously captured four different effects that this study was interested in, including the effect of the settlement country, the effect of the origin society, the effect of individual characteristics, and the interactive effect between individual country-level variables (for example, interaction terms between Muslim immigrants and their origin country's gender norms). The interpretation of the coefficients was similar to that of the simple multilevel regression model: A coefficient shows how different the

average respondents of the two groups are, while in the cross-nested approach, coefficients measure how well a set of respondents fit into two distributions (Soehl 2017a).

The following equation summarizes the cross-classified multilevel regression model used in this study. In this equation, y_i denotes the gender attitude of immigrants, and 0 represents the model intercept. The magnitude of a set of individual-level variable X is indicated by a vector of coefficient β. Origin and settlement gender norm variables are identified with o and d, respectively; both of which interact with a subset of individual-level variables X_i^*. The mean in the origin country ao and settlement country ad are included in the model on the second level, which predicts the magnitude of these cross-level interactions, o and d, respectively.

$$y_i = \beta_o + \beta X_i + \gamma_{o(i)} X_i^* + \delta_{d(i)} X_i^* + e_i$$

$$\gamma_o \sim N(\theta_o \alpha_o, \omega_\theta),$$

$$\delta_o \sim N(\theta_d \alpha_d, \omega_\theta).$$

The indicators for settlement country, generation, language spoken, religious affiliation, and parents' migration background were used in the regression models as both main effects and interaction terms with the country of origin and country of settlement value measures. To address potential concerns about the robustness of the findings, I replicate the analysis using multilevel ordered logistic regression models in Table A2.2.

Table 2.2: Cross-classified mixed model of attitudes toward gender roles

	Model 1 Baseline	Model 2	Model 3A Interaction	Model 3B
	Overall	Overall	1st Gen.	2nd Gen.
(Intercept)	0.12	-0.05	-0.43	0.97*
	(0.24)	(0.90)	(0.96)	(0.44)
Religion: (No religion)				
Catholic	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Protestant	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Orthodox	0.11***	0.10***	0.10*	0.09
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Muslim	-0.33***	-1.08**	-1.41***	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.33)	(0.39)	(0.63)
Others	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
The level of religiosity	-0.04***	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.06
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Language use: (settlement language only)				
Settlement language first	-0.13***	-0.52*	-0.30	-0.87*
	(0.02)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.34)
Settlement language second	-0.23***	-0.61**	-0.68*	-0.41
	(0.02)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.33)
Settlement/generation (Arrived less than a year)				
Arrived 1–5 years ago	-0.04	0.71	0.78	
	(0.08)	(0.90)	(0.91)	
6–10 years ago	0.04	0.06	0.09	
	(0.08)	(0.88)	(0.89)	
11–20 years ago	0.15	0.72	0.80	
	(0.08)	(0.86)	(0.87)	
20+ years ago	0.21**	1.48	1.54	
	(0.08)	(0.85)	(0.86)	
Second generation	0.21	1.04		
	(0.14)	(0.85)		
Foreign-born parents				
Foreign-born mother	0.01	-0.24	-0.78	-0.25
	(0.02)	(0.21)	(0.43)	(0.26)
Foreign-born father	0.01	-0.28	-0.62	-0.22
	(0.02)	(0.21)	(0.40)	(0.25)

Table 2.2: A cross-classified mixed model of respondents' attitudes toward gender roles (continued)

	Model 1 Baseline	Model 2	Model 3A Interaction	Model 3B
	Overall	Overall	1st Gen.	2nd Gen.
Gender norms in country of origin	0.07**	0.43***	0.47***	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.05)
x Arrived 1–5 years ago		-0.17*	-0.17	
		(0.09)	(0.09)	
x 6–10 years ago		-0.21*	-0.19*	
		(0.09)	(0.09)	
x 11–20 years ago		-0.24**	-0.23**	
		(0.08)	(0.08)	
x 20+ years ago		-0.32***	-0.29***	
		(0.08)	(0.08)	
x Second generation		-0.37***		
		(0.08)		
x Muslim (non-Muslim)		-0.04	0.02	-0.18
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)
x Settlement language first		0.01	-0.01	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
x Settlement language second		0.05*	0.06*	0.03
		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
x Foreign-born mother		-0.03	-0.06	-0.03
		(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)
x Foreign-born father		-0.03	0.02	-0.04
		(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Gender norms in country of settlement	0.77***	0.51*	0.60*	0.59***
	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.13)
x Arrived 1–5 years ago		-0.06	-0.08	
		(0.24)	(0.24)	
x 6–10 years ago		0.17	0.15	
		(0.23)	(0.24)	
x 11–20 years ago		0.04	0.02	
		(0.23)	(0.23)	
x 20+ years ago		-0.09	-0.12	
		(0.22)	(0.23)	
x Second generation		0.08		
		(0.23)		
x Muslim (non-Muslim)		0.24**	0.29**	0.04
		(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.14)

2.3 Results

Table 2.2 presents the detailed results of the four cross-classified linear regression models. Model 1 was the baseline model, including both first- and second-generation respondents. Model 2 used the same sample but introduced a series of cross-level interactions between the origin and the settlement country's gender norms, on the one hand, and immigrants' time in the settlement country and generation, whether they were Muslim, the language they spoke daily, and their parent's migration background, on the other. Models 3A and 3B split the sample by generational status: Model 3A showed the results for the first generation, while Model 3B showed those for the second generation.

Model 1 showed that being Orthodox Christian was significantly positively related to the liberal gender role attitudes (coef. = 0.11, $p<0.001$), while being Muslim was significantly negatively associated with liberal gender role attitudes (coef. = -0.33, $p<0.001$). Orthodox Christians were also found to be more liberal than people with no religious background, while, conversely, Muslims were more traditional than atheists and other religious groups.[2] In additional analysis not shown herein, I estimated a similar model using a Muslim/non-Muslim dummy variable instead of the six-categorical variable and found results substantively similar to Model 1: Muslims were significantly more traditional in terms of their gender role attitudes than non-Muslims. As expected, those who had higher levels of religiosity had more traditional attitudes toward gender roles than those with lower levels of religiosity.

[2] The author also ran several regression models without including the variable of the level of religiosity and with different religious reference groups. The results in this model demonstrated that Orthodox Christians were no more liberal than people with no religious background when religiosity was not controlled for, and Muslims were consistently significantly more traditional than other religious groups and atheists across the models.

For other individual-level measures, individuals who spoke the origin-country language, including those who regarded their origin-country language as a first or second language, tended to have more conservative gender role attitudes than those who exclusively spoke the settlement-country language. Furthermore, those who had lived over 20 years in their settlement country held a more liberal attitude than recent arrivals. No significant association was observed between parents' migration background and gender role attitudes. For the country-level variables, both gender norms in the origin country and those in the settlement country were positively associated with liberal gender role attitudes.

The interaction model (Model 2) shows the influence of origin- and settlement-country gender norms on gender role attitudes by individual characteristics. The results of the main effects were similar to those in Model 1. The first part of interaction terms showed the influence of origin-country gender norms on individual gender role attitudes. In terms of time spent in the settlement country and generation, immigrants who had lived longer in their settlement country were less influenced by their origin-country gender norms than recent arrivals, supporting Hypothesis 2. Similarly, the second generation was less influenced by their origin country's gender norms than those who had arrived less than a year earlier. There was no evidence to suggest that Muslims were more attached to their origin-country gender norms than non-Muslims (coef. = -0.04, not significant, not supporting Hypothesis 3). Meanwhile, the language respondents used daily varied the influence of origin-country gender norms on their individual gender role attitudes: Those who spoke the settlement-country language less than that of the origin-country were more influenced by their origin country's gender norms.

Turning to the second part of the interaction terms detailing the association between the settlement-country norms and gender role attitudes, settlement-country gender norms were

positively associated with liberal gender role attitudes. However, no evidence demonstrated that the second generation and those who had lived longer in their settlement country were more influenced by their settlement-country gender norms than those who had recently arrived. Muslims were surprisingly more influenced by their settlement-country gender norms than non-Muslims (coef. = 0.24, $p<0.01$), which contradicted the prediction of Hypothesis 3. There was no difference between the everyday languages used in terms of the influence of settlement-country gender norms on individual gender role attitudes. Similarly, parental migration background did not vary the influence of settlement-country gender norms on individual gender role attitudes.

To examine the generational differences in gender norm acculturation, Model 3 was separated into Model 3A and 3B for the first and second generations, respectively. The main effect in Model 3A showed that the first-generation Muslim immigrants were more traditional (coef. = -1.41, $p<0.001$) than atheists and other religious groups. Moreover, people with higher self-assessed levels of religiosity were more traditional than those with lower levels of religiosity.

The first part of the interaction terms in Model 3A showed the influence of origin-country and settlement-country gender norms on gender role attitudes according to individual characteristics. Origin-country gender norms were positively associated with liberal gender role attitudes (coef. = 0.47, $p<0.001$); however, this influence was much stronger for those who had recently arrived than for those who had lived in their settlement country for more than 20 years (coef. = -0.29, $p<0.001$). The next row of the model, which was one of the main foci of this study, did not suggest that Muslim immigrants were more attached to their origin-country gender norms than non-Muslim immigrants, including those with other religious backgrounds and atheists (coef. = 0.02, not significant). In the next two rows, the results showed that the first-generation immigrants who mostly spoke their origin-country language were more influenced by their origin-

country gender norms. In terms of parents' migration background, there were no significant differences between respondents who had one foreign-born parent and those who had two foreign-born parents in terms of the influence of their origin-country gender norms on their individual gender role attitudes.

Turning to the second part of the interactions in Model 3A, which show the influence of the settlement country, we can see that immigrants were influenced by their settlement country's gender norms (coef. = 0.6, $p<0.05$) and that those who migrated to their settlement country more than 20 years previously were equally as influenced by their settlement country's gender norms as the recent arrivals (coef. -0.12, not significant). The results also showed that Muslim immigrants were more influenced by their settlement-country gender norms than non-Muslim immigrants (coef . = 0.29, $p<0.01$). Similar to the results in Model 2, no evidence showed that the acculturation process varied according to the everyday language used or parental migration background.

Model 3B showed the differences in gender attitude acculturation among the second generation. In the main effects section, the results revealed there were no religious differences in gender role attitudes. Unlike the first-generation Muslims, the second-generation Muslims were no more traditional than their counterparts with no specific religious affiliation (coef. = -0.02, not significant, Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the evidence). We may, thus, say that being Muslim is not inherently associated with gender traditionalism. In addition, the level of religiosity was not associated with gender role attitudes among the second generation.

In the section of the interaction terms, the results demonstrated that there was no significant association between origin-country gender norms and gender role attitudes among the second generation. Moreover, no evidence suggested that the influence of origin-country gender norms varied according to respondents' religion, everyday language, or parental migration background.

In contrast to origin-country gender norms, the second generation was, as expected, strongly influenced by their country of birth. The influence of the settlement country's gender norms on individual gender role attitudes was even stronger for those who spoke both the origin- and settlement-country languages than those who exclusively spoke the settlement-country language. This may imply that speaking the origin-country language does not necessarily prevent the second generation from socializing in their country of birth. For the control variables, the results broadly showed that women, younger individuals, and the highly educated were more liberal in gender role attitudes across the models, while citizenship status and the distance between the gender norms in the origin and settlement countries were not significantly related to individual gender role attitudes.

To demonstrate whether Muslim immigrants are more influenced by their origin society than non-Muslim immigrants, Figure 2.2 demonstrates the interaction between the origin country, settlement country, and being Muslim on gender role attitudes. These plots are based on the coefficients of the regression models (Model 3A for the first panel and Model 3B for the second panel) to examine the generational differences in Muslim gender cultural dissimilation and assimilation. In Panel A, the orange bar shows the coefficient of the interaction term between the origin-country gender norms and non-Muslim immigrants, while the blue bar indicates the coefficient of the interaction between origin-country gender norms and Muslim immigrants. As the results show, there was no significant difference in the influence of origin-country norms between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants. In other words, the evidence failed to support Hypothesis 3, which predicted that Muslim immigrants are more strongly anchored in their origin country distributions. Surprisingly, the right-hand side of the panel shows that Muslim immigrants were significantly ($p < 0.01$) more influenced by their settlement society than non-Muslim

Panel A. First generation



Panel B. Second generation



Figure 2.2: Effects of origin- and settlement-country norms on Muslims and non-Muslims.

immigrants. However, Panel B shows a different pattern and demonstrates that second-generation Muslims and non-Muslims were equally influenced by their origin and settlement societies.

Overall, the acculturation process occurs not only in the second generation but also in the first generation Muslim. Although first-generation Muslim immigrants held more traditional gender attitudes than the non-religious, they were more influenced by their settlement country than non-Muslim immigrants. In contrast, second-generation Muslims shared a similar socialization process to their second-generation counterparts with other religious or non-religious backgrounds; however, it should be noted that no evidence showed that the second-generation Muslims held more traditional gender role attitudes than their non-religious counterparts. In contrast to previous studies, these results do not support the notion that Muslim immigrants are more influenced by their country of origin and less influenced by their settlement country than non-Muslim immigrants. In addition, the results do not support that second-generation Muslims still hold more conservative gender role attitudes than their non-religious counterparts.

2.4 Discussion and Conclusion

Before discussing the implications of this study's findings, it is important to note some alternative interpretations and limitations. First, one might think that Muslim immigrants who hold more liberal gender attitudes may have had higher incentives to leave their origin country and move to a society with a more liberal gender ideology. This may explain why Muslim immigrants are found to be more influenced by European values than other immigrants in this study. If this selection process produced a significant bias in this study, we might not be able to see the subsequent result for three reasons. First, if this selection matters, we may see that Muslim immigrants who arrived more recently in the settlement country may hold similar attitudes or even more liberal attitudes

than non-Muslim immigrants. However, the main effect of religion shows that, by contrast, first-generation immigrants are still significantly more conservative than other immigrants. Second, additional descriptive statistics suggest that the Muslim immigrant subsample was not particularly selective. It is widely known that highly educated people are more likely to hold liberal gender attitudes; therefore, if Muslim immigrants were strongly selective in this study, we might have expected that first-generation Muslim immigrants would be mostly highly educated. However, the descriptive statistics failed to support this argument: Among the first-generation immigrants, more than 47% of Muslim immigrants had an educational attainment below secondary education, while only 25% of non-Muslim immigrants had levels of education lower than secondary school. Overall, the level of education among Muslim immigrants was lower than that among non-Muslim immigrants in this sample. Third, one may argue that Muslim immigrants with liberal gender role attitudes (more highly educated) may be more likely to move to a more liberal country, such as Sweden, than a more conservative country like Spain. This may be the case. However, if we closely examine education among Muslim immigrants across countries, there is no significant difference in educational attainment among Muslim immigrants across Europe.

Additionally, the ESS data were cross-sectional rather than longitudinal. Cross-sectional data only provide a snapshot of respondents who have spent varying periods of time in their settlement society, whereas the theories supporting this study imply that individuals change over time. However, although longitudinal data can capture individuals' attitude changes over time, it fails to provide sufficient numbers from the settlement countries to test the present study's theories and distinguish the effects between religion and origin-country gender norms. The ESS data are the only available data that let us consider how a country of origin and country of settlement shape immigrants' attitudes simultaneously because the data provide variations in both the sending and

receiving contexts. Not surprisingly, many well-established migration studies have also relied on cohort data, especially the ESS data, to examine changes in immigrants' assimilation processes and settlements (Pessin and Arpino 2018; Röder and Muhlau 2014; Soehl 2017a).

Another potential limitation of this study is that it overlooks how cross-border ties and transnational activities influence immigrants' assimilation and dissimilation. Recent studies have noted that immigrants' cross-border activities might have an important effect on their adaptation, for example, their educational attainment and political attitudes (Luthra and Soehl 2018; Waldinger and Soehl 2013). However, the ESS data does not provide this kind of measure to allow us to study cross-border activities' associations with acculturation. To alleviate this potential problem, this study relief on language use and time spent in the settlement country since previous studies have supported a positive association between cross-border activity and language use and time spent in the settlement country (Gutierrez 2020; Soehl and Waldinger 2010).

The final limitation is that the ESS survey was conducted in the official and dominant language of each country, which might have excluded immigrants who were not proficient in their settlement-country language. These immigrants are likely to be those who are less educated and are recent arrivals. Without these immigrants in the study's sample, the present analysis may have underestimated the association between gender role attitudes and education, as well as the length of settlement. This potential limitation may explain the slight effect of length of residence on gender-norm acculturation in the first generation in Model 3A in Table 2.2. It is possible that most of the recent arrivals can fluently speak the settlement-country language and are the most acculturated. In other words, the less acculturated may not be included in the ESS sample.

Despite these limitations, this is the first study that directly disentangles a variety of assimilation and dissimilation processes between the sending and receiving societies on the gender

role ideologies of Muslim immigrants. Previous research on this topic has pointed out that Muslim immigrants and immigrants from Muslim-majority countries hold more traditional gender attitudes (Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 2018; Röder 2014). However, as these studies did not distinguish the effects of religion, the context of emigration, and the context of immigration on immigrants' attitudes toward gender roles, it is still unclear whether gender traditionalism among Muslim immigrants and their children is due to Islamic doctrine and practices, the socialization of origin country gender norms, and/or blocked acculturation in the settlement society.

Overall, the findings of this study do not fully support the proposed hypotheses. First, the Islamic doctrine and practices hypothesis suggested that Muslim immigrants and their Muslim children hold more traditional gender role attitudes than non-Muslim immigrants and their children, and this association is independent of the influence of the origin country and the individual level of religiosity (H1). Although the results show that first-generation Muslim immigrants hold more traditional gender roles than non-Muslim immigrants when controlling for the level of religiosity, no evidence suggests that second-generation Muslims are more conservative than their non-Muslim counterparts. These results imply that Islamic doctrine and practices are not inherently linked to non-egalitarian gender relations. Second, the origin country socialization hypothesis (H2a) suggested that the differences in gender role attitudes between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants are explained by the level of gender equity in the country of origin. The findings demonstrate that gender norms in the country of origin only partly explain these gender role differences: Muslim immigrants have still been found to hold more conservative gender attitudes than non-Muslim immigrants when controlling for the effects of origin-country gender norms. Finally, and most remarkably, the analysis did not find evidence to support the blocked acculturation hypothesis that Islam supposedly constitutes in Europe, which impedes assimilation.

If we follow the logic of the blocked acculturation hypothesis (H3), we should see that both Muslim immigrants and their children are more attached to their origin-country gender ideology and less influenced by their settlement-society gender norms. However, the empirical evidence not only fails to support this hypothesis but also points to the opposite direction: Muslim immigrants are more influenced by their settlement-society gender norms than non-Muslim immigrants.

While the current political climate continues to stigmatize Muslim immigrants, how can they and their children adapt to mainstream gender norms even more than other immigrant groups? As British sociologist Ryan (2011) noted: While Muslims are labeled and stigmatized as "abnormal" in the European mainstream, Muslim immigrants, especially women, have more substantial incentives to become "normal." For most Muslim immigrants in Europe, being normal means being a good Muslim, and being a good Muslim means adapting to particular types of attitudes, beliefs, and lifestyles. They expect that this adaptation can differentiate them from immigrants who are "not assimilated" and "abnormal." Adopting a more liberal gender role attitude may be a strong signal that Muslims are not necessarily unassimilated. This study supports this perspective and shows that the bright boundary between Muslim immigrants and mainstream gender issues is not that solid. One might think that Muslim immigrants might strongly retain their culture and beliefs when they face significant social closure. However, it is also possible that Muslim immigrants may be more eager to adapt to mainstream cultural values to prove that they are members of the European mainstream society. Future research should continue to focus on how Muslim immigrants react when experiencing extensive social discrimination.

More broadly, this study contributes to the comparative analysis of the role of religions in the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion and the process of assimilation and dissimilation in Europe and the United States. While sociologists tend to interpret religion's role in immigrant

families as a bridge that helps immigrants cross the boundary between minority groups and mainstream society in the United States, European public opinion and literature certainly suggest that religion, especially Islam, is a barrier to their adaptation and integration (Brubaker 2013; Foner and Alba 2008; Zolberg and Long 1999). The empirical evidence in this study suggests that despite the discrimination and prejudice Muslims face in their daily lives, Muslim immigrants and their children are not only not rejecting but also adopting settlement-society gender ideologies. It is true that the bright boundary between Muslims and the European mainstream is a wall blocking Muslim immigrants and their children from assimilating into mainstream society; however, it does not necessarily mean that Muslims have no choice but to maintain their origin-society identity and distance themselves from the settlement society's mainstream values.

In conclusion, this study highlights that the acculturation process of Muslim immigrants in Europe remains poorly understood. When Muslim immigrants move from their origin society with more traditional cultural values to a settlement country with liberal values natives, how do these social contexts shape their gender norms? Which assimilation pathway will they follow when they face significant social closure and discrimination in the settlement country? This study answers these questions but covers only a small part of acculturation. I suggest that future research should continue to investigate the strategies employed by Muslim immigrants when they face a bright structural boundary between themselves and mainstream society.

2.5 References

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2.6 Appendix

Table 2.A1: Missing percentages for all variables of interest

Variable	Missing	Total	Percent Missing
Dependent variable			
Gender role attitudes	567	33,751	1.68%
Country-level variables			
Gender norms in country of origin	6,048	33,751	17.92%
Gender norms in country of settlement	0	33,751	0.00%
Individual-level variables			
Religion	1024	33,751	3.03%
Settlement and generation	504	33,751	1.49%
Language	6	33,751	0.02%
Parents' country of birth	1718	33,751	5.09%
Control variables			
Female	26	33,751	0.08%
Married	106	33,751	0.31%
Education	245	33,751	0.73%
Age	1229	33,751	3.64%
The level of religiosity	373	33,751	1.11%
Gender norm distance between origin and settlement country	6,048	33,751	17.92%

Table 2.A2: Multilevel ordered logistic regression models of attitudes toward gender roles

	Model 1 Baseline	Model 2	Model 3A Interaction	Model 3B
	Overall	Overall	1st Gen.	2nd Gen.
Religion: (No religion)				
Catholic	-0.03	-0.02	0.05	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Protestant	-0.09	-0.07	-0.06	-0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Orthodox	0.10	0.14*	0.16**	0.14
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)
Muslim	-0.51***	-1.33*	-2.08**	0.37
	(0.08)	(0.61)	(0.69)	(1.23)
Others	-0.05	-0.04	-0.08	0.14
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.07)
The level of religiosity	-0.07***	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Language use: (settlement language only)				
Settlement language first	-0.17***	-0.69	-0.21	-1.41*
	(0.04)	(0.37)	(0.43)	(0.66)
Settlement language second	-0.27***	-0.88*	-0.61	-1.08
	(0.05)	(0.43)	(0.48)	(0.93)
Settlement/generation				
Arrived 1–5 years ago	-0.06	1.03	1.11	
	(0.15)	(1.68)	(1.66)	
6–10 years ago	0.08	0.09	0.12	
	(0.16)	(1.61)	(1.58)	
11–20 years ago	0.24	1.00	1.10	
	(0.15)	(1.59)	(1.55)	
20+ years ago	0.29	1.69	1.91	
	(0.16)	(1.59)	(1.55)	
Second generation	0.38*	1.39		
	(0.17)	(1.68)		
Foreign-born parents				
Foreign-born mother	0.03	-1.04*	-1.79	-0.65
	(0.05)	(0.49)	(1.21)	(0.50)
Foreign-born father	0.02	-1.28**	-1.37	-1.05**
	(0.04)	(0.41)	(0.86)	(0.37)

Table 2.A2: Multilevel ordered logistic regression models of respondents' attitudes toward gender roles (continued)

	Model 1 Baseline	Model 2	Model 3A Interaction	Model 3B
	Overall	Overall	1st Gen.	2nd Gen.
Gender norms in country of origin	0.20**	0.82***	0.88***	0.08
	(0.06)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.07)
x Arrived 1–5 years ago		-0.35*	-0.34*	
		(0.15)	(0.15)	
x 6–10 years ago		-0.39*	-0.38*	
		(0.16)	(0.16)	
x 11–20 years ago		-0.44**	-0.43**	
		(0.14)	(0.14)	
x 20+ years ago		-0.56***	-0.53***	
		(0.15)	(0.15)	
x Second generation		-0.68***		
		(0.14)		
x Muslim (Ref: non-Muslim)		-0.08	-0.01	-0.28
		(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.19)
x Settlement language first		-0.01	-0.02	0.01
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
x Settlement language second		0.11**	0.12*	0.07
		(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
x Foreign-born mother		-0.09*	-0.16	-0.07
		(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.05)
x Foreign-born father		-0.06	0.02	-0.08
		(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Gender norms in country of settlement	1.18***	0.81	0.79	1.17***
	(0.08)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.17)
x Arrived 1–5 years ago		-0.00	-0.03	
		(0.44)	(0.43)	
x 6–10 years ago		0.32	0.31	
		(0.43)	(0.42)	
x 11–20 years ago		0.15	0.13	
		(0.42)	(0.41)	
x 20+ years ago		0.05	0.00	
		(0.42)	(0.42)	
x Second generation		0.26		
		(0.44)		
x Muslim (Ref: non-Muslim)		0.37*	0.44*	-0.06
		(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.27)
x Settlement language first		0.15	0.02	0.33
		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.20)
x Settlement language second		0.08	-0.01	0.18
		(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.26)

Table 2.A2: Multilevel ordered logistic regression models of respondents' attitudes toward gender roles (continued)

	Model 1 Baseline	Model 2	Model 3A Interaction	Model 3B
	Overall	Overall	1st Gen.	2nd Gen.
x Foreign-born mother		0.37	0.60	0.20
		(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.13)
x Foreign-born father		0.42	0.35	0.37
		(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Female	0.56***	0.55***	0.59***	0.50***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Gender norm distance between	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.01
origin and settlement country	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***	-0.01***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married	-0.03	-0.03	-0.08**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	0.17***	0.18***	0.19***	0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Citizen	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Cutpoint 1	2.7	3.05	3.03	2.19
	(0.33)	(1.59)	(1.55)	(0.7)
Cutpoint 2	4.24	4.59	4.65	2.62
	(0.33)	(1.59)	(1.55)	(0.7)
Cutpoint 3	5.1	5.43	5.48	4.48
	(0.33)	(1.59)	(1.55)	(0.7)
Cutpoint 4	6.76	7.07	7.13	6.12
	(0.34)	(1.59)	(1.55)	(0.72)
Waves	Fixed	Fixed	Fixed	Fixed
Observations	25220	25220	13636	11584
Number of origin countries	98	98	98	98
Number of settlement countries	32	32	32	32

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Interlude I

The second chapter focuses on the impact of gender norms in both the country of origin and the country of destination on the gender role attitudes of immigrants and their children. In particular, the study examines the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim families. Consistent with previous studies, the results show that Muslim immigrants tend to adhere more strongly to traditional gender roles than non-Muslim immigrants, even after controlling for the influences of the country of origin. However, there is no evidence that Muslims are more influenced by the gender norms of their country of origin than non-Muslims. Surprisingly, the gender attitudes of Muslim immigrants tend to be more in line with those of the host society than those of non-Muslim immigrants. Moreover, the gender attitudes of second-generation Muslims show a similar degree of liberalism as those of non-Muslims.

However, the specific mechanism that brings about changes in the gender role attitudes of Muslim immigrants and their children remains unclear. Chapter 3 examines one of the best-known mechanisms, but one that has rarely been studied empirically in the context of gender role attitudes: social contacts. The forthcoming analysis aims to examine the relationship between social contact with native individuals, both in the public and private spheres, and various aspects of gender role ideologies.

Chapter 3

Which Social Contacts with Natives Matter? Attitudes toward Gender Roles of Muslim Immigrants and Their Children in Western Europe

Published in *International Migration*; 22 Nov 2022; Online first

Abstract

Social contacts with mainstream individuals play a central role in acculturation. Yet, research has paid little attention to examining whether social contact with natives is linked to egalitarian gender role attitudes among Muslim immigrants and their children. Using a unique data set including 4584 Muslim immigrants and the second generation in six western European countries (EURISLAM), the study investigates whether public- and private-sphere social contacts with natives are associated with attitudes towards women's employment and men's domestic roles. The findings show that immigrants and their children who report stronger private-sphere social ties, that is native friends and family members, hold more egalitarian attitudes towards women's employment and men's domestic roles. However, public-sphere social contacts (at the workplace and in the neighbourhood) are not associated with these attitudes. These results support theories stating that private-sphere social contact with natives is important in gender role ideology acculturation among Muslim families.

Introduction

In Western Europe, the public policy and academic research debate on the cultural integration of immigrants and their children have firmly established religion as the most influential factor in assimilation (Foner and Alba 2008; Zolberg and Long 1999). While values and norms in Western Europe have become considerably more liberal over the past decades, many non-Western migrants with Muslim backgrounds and their children are considered to hold more traditional attitudes than natives and Western migrants, especially on gender and family issues. A growing body of sociological literature points to the possible role of religion in explaining the maintenance of traditional gender role attitudes among Muslim immigrants and their children, including the influence of the origin- and host-country gender norms (Ng 2022), the religious doctrine and practices of Islam (Norris and Inglehart 2012), and the high levels of Muslims' religiousness (Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel 2009).

Besides the influence of origin-country gender norms and Islamic doctrine, the acculturation process may also be shaped by the socio-cultural context of the destination countries, such as hostile institutional environments and discrimination (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993). Particularly in the Western European context, the 'bright boundary' between natives and Muslim immigrants and their children exacerbates public opinion that Muslims are unassimilated in Western society (Alba 2005; Zolberg and Long 1999). This social closure may, in turn, encourage Muslims to develop an ethnic boundary strategy that actively opposes the destination societies, and limits social contact with natives (Wimmer 2008; Wimmer and Soehl 2014). From this perspective, gender traditionalism among Muslim immigrants and their children does not exist primarily because they are not culturally assimilated, but rather because the social closure and lack of social contact with natives has blocked the acculturation process. While the

role of social contact with the mainstream in Muslim assimilation has been discussed as a possible mechanism in explaining acculturation in gender-related attitudes in previous empirical studies (see Ng 2022; Soehl 2017), these have paid little attention to directly examine the link between social contact with the mainstream and traditional gender role ideologies (for a partial exception, see Maliepaard and Alba 2016).

In the present article, I address this research gap by investigating the association between different dimensions of social contact with natives and gender attitudes. While existing research examines the influence of social contact with the natives in a single dimension (Maliepaard and Alba 2016), such as the group-level neighbourhood composition, I measure social contact with the natives in multiple dimensions, including in the workplace, neighbourhood, friends, and families. In fact, existing studies on generational populations suggest that different levels and types of social exposure, such as schools and workplaces, shape individual gender attitudes differently (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009). The first contribution of this paper, therefore, is to extend our understanding of what dimensions of social contact with natives shape Muslim families' gender attitudes in the migration context.

Second, while previous studies primarily focus on one dimension of gender attitudes (e.g., Maliepaard and Alba 2016; Ng 2022), current research analyses attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic work. Recent studies on the general population suggested that these two dimensions of gender attitudes may change at different paces and under different mechanisms (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015; Lappegård, Neyer, and Vignoli 2021). These studies broadly suggest that the change in attitudes toward women's employment is closely linked to broader socio-economic changes, such as economic incentives for women's labour force participation, while the change in attitudes toward men's domestic roles is more linked

to the diffusion of values and norms in the private sphere, such as within family and between friends. Engaging this debate, this paper provides the first quantitative empirical evaluation on whether different dimensions of social contact with natives are associated with different attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic roles among Muslim immigrants and their children.

I draw on a dataset that contains a large sample size of Muslim immigrants and their children in six western European countries (EURISLAM). The EURISLAM provides measures of social contacts with natives and gender attitudes in various private and public settings. Models used logistic regression to investigate the association between gender role attitudes (attitudes toward women's employment and men doing domestic chores), and four dimensions of social contact with natives (workplace, neighbours, friends, and family members) in Muslim migrant families. The results show that social contacts with native friends and family members are positively associated with egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic roles. However, social contacts with natives in the workplace and neighbourhood are not associated with gender role attitudes.

3.1 Blocked Acculturation: Social Contacts with Natives and Gender Role Attitudes

While Islamic doctrine may shape the gender role ideologies of Muslim immigrants and their children (Norris and Inglehart 2012), religion can also be a salient social boundary characteristic that produces effects apart from religious doctrine or practice. Islamic marks have been seen as an unambiguous 'bright boundary' between the Muslim minority and the mainstream (see Foner and Alba 2008; Zolberg and Long 1999). As members of the excluded population in Western Europe,

Muslim immigrants and their children may be less inclined or find it challenging to access mainstream institutions and social circles, including the labour market and native neighbourhoods, perceiving that they will receive fewer benefits than by staying in their ethnic economy and communities (see the discussion of 'blocked acculturation' in Alba and Nee 2003). As a result, the lack of social contact and long-lasting social relationships between Muslims and natives make it challenging to coordinate around shared norms and behavioural expectations. This social segregation may, therefore, lead Muslim minorities to maintain origin-country attitudes as a part of the excluded minority's own boundary-making strategy (see Wimmer 2008). Consequently, a lack of social contact with natives is likely to increase differences in cultural norms, such as gender role ideologies. From this perspective, the gender traditionalism of Muslim immigrants and their children may be associated with a lack of native social contact at an individual level. Existing research, however, has paid surprisingly little attention to directly examining the link between social contact with natives and traditional gender role ideologies among Muslim immigrants and their children at the individual level (for a partial exception, see Maliepaard and Alba 2016). The following sections discuss how different dimensions of social contact may be associated with gender ideology acculturation in Muslim immigrants and their children, building on previous literature on the general population.

3.2 Public-sphere Social Contacts with Natives: Neighbourhood and Workplace

Empirical research on the general population supports this perspective and finds that people with higher exposure levels to egalitarian gender values hold more liberal gender attitudes in different contexts (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009). For example, a study finds

that living in a state with a lower proportion of fundamentalists is positively associated with egalitarian gender attitudes (Moore and Vanneman 2003). A recent study also finds that women who moved to urban areas spend less time on housework than those who remain in rural areas (Luo and Chui 2019). In the context of international migration, some have linked the neighbourhood effect to the gender attitudes of immigrants and their children, but the findings are mixed. For instance, a qualitative case study focusing on the children and grandchildren of Turkish immigrants in Belgian urban areas found that those who grew up and lived in neighbourhoods with more co-ethnicities and limited contact with natives continue to be influenced by their (grand-)parents, and hold traditional gender roles attitudes (Van Kerckem, Van De Putte, and Stevens 2013). By contrast, a recent quantitative study focusing on Muslim immigrants and their children in the Netherlands found that the ethnic composition of neighbours is not significantly associated with gender roles ideology (Maliepaard and Alba 2016).

Labour force participation also exposes egalitarian ideas, especially for those who had limited exposure to egalitarian gender beliefs before entering the labour market. A few decades ago, women were still expected to manage the housework rather than work outside the home. A wide range of literature has shown that participating in the labour force is associated with holding more gender-egalitarian beliefs among women (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Moore and Vanneman 2003). In a similar vein, given the significant difference in gender ideology between Muslim minorities and native Western Europeans, Muslim immigrants and their children participating in the mainstream labour market may adopt more egalitarian gender attitudes and more likely make the shift to the mainstream. From the perspective of assimilation theory, the entry of ethnic minorities into a relationship with the mainstream labour market represents an important form of assimilation (Gordon 1964). Besides this, social contact with natives in the

workplace also shortens the social distance between ethnic minorities and the mainstream, such as interethnic relationships, friendship, and union formation (Eisnecker 2019; Rahnu et al. 2020). Similarly, when Muslim immigrants and their children have sustained contact with native colleagues and customers at work, they are exposed to the values and norms prevalent in the settlement society. Therefore, they may be more likely to shift toward the mainstream gender ideology. By contrast, those who consistently work in businesses run by similar ethnic groups may maintain more traditional gender attitudes.

3.3 Private-sphere Social Contacts with Natives: Family Members and Friends

Family influences are the main force of socialization on individuals' attitudes and values (Davis 2007). Certainly, parents play the most important role in shaping children's family attitudes and behaviours (Axinn and Thornton 1993). Besides parents, recent studies suggest that other family members also shape an individual's outcome (Goodman 2007; Sun and Li 2014). For example, a study finds that parents as well as grandparents, aunts, and uncles can influence an individual's educational attainment (Loury 2006). Similarly, other family members may shape an individual's gender attitudes, especially since Muslims usually have a close relationship with joint or extended family. In this case, in transmission processes similar to those discussed above for parents, having one or more native family members may influence an individual's gender attitudes. Since egalitarian gender ideologies prevail in western countries, the interaction with native family members is likely to shorten the cultural distance in gender attitudes between Muslim immigrants (and their children) and mainstream society.

Besides family, friends play an important role in shaping individuals' values and ideologies (Biddle, Bank, and Marlin 1980), particularly in helping teens and young adults develop identities and gain autonomy from their parents. Also, friends provide a new social network different from the individual parental family, and this network may provide exposure to new cultural norms (Brown, Clasen, and Eicher 1986). Previous research found that friends' characteristics shape individuals' attitudes and behaviours (Little and Rankin 2001; Maxwell 2002). Specifically, a growing body of work found that friends' religiosity shapes people's sexual attitudes and behaviours (Adamczyk and Felson 2006). For example, teens with more religious friends tend to have their first sexual encounter later than those with less religious friends (Adamczyk 2009). Similarly, friends may also shape an individual's gender values and attitudes.

3.4 Social Contacts with Natives, Attitudes toward Women's Employment and Men Doing Domestic Works

The previous section discusses how public- and private-sphere social contacts are associated with the gender role attitudes (mainly measured by attitudes toward women's employment) of the general population and immigrants. However, recent demographic research has shown that gender ideologies should be understood as multiple dimensions. For example, the gender revolution framework (Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015) provides a two-part gender revolution perspective on understanding the recent change in gender role ideologies: the changes in women's roles in the public sphere (women's employment), and men's roles in the private sphere (men's domestic work). This subset of the literature suggests that compared to the change in attitudes toward women's employment, it will taike a very long time to change people's attitude toward men domestic role.

The core difference between the change in attitudes toward women's employment and men doing domestic work is that people have had much more preparation for women participating in the labour market. For instance, the increase in women's education in the past century combined with the post-World War II labour shortage provided an excellent opportunity for women to participate in the labour market. Due to these structural changes, people are exposed to working women throughout society, and hence increasingly perceive that women should not be excluded from the labour market(Bolzendahl and Myers 2004).

By contrast, men have had very little preparation for domestic roles. Although working women have become socially accepted, women are still regarded as family caretakers, and men are still seen as primary breadwinners (Baxter 1997). In recent years, women began to expect their male partners to have involvement in the family, including childcare and housecleaning (Gerson 2009; Lynn 2006), but the social climate still expects men to be more responsible for employment than housework. The social pressure pushing the change in attitudes toward men's domestic roles is much weaker than attitudes toward women's employment. Individual-level socialization agents, such as family and peers, have a much stronger influence on attitudes toward men's domestic roles than social pressure (Goldscheider et al. 2015; Lappegård et al. 2021).

Based on this discussion, we can expect that the public- and private-sphere social contacts with natives may be differently associated with attitudes toward women's employment and men doing domestic work. *Public-sphere social contacts*, such as at the workplace and in the neighbourhood, give Muslim immigrants and their children a higher exposure to egalitarian values and ideologies regarding women's employment. However, this public-sphere exposure may not translate to adopting egalitarian attitudes toward men's domestic roles, since the social environment does not have a strong expectation of men being responsible for domestic work

compared to women's employment. In contrast, not only can the *private-sphere social contact* with natives, such as native friends and family members, provide a more profound and long-lasting social connection between Muslim minorities and the mainstream than the public-sphere social contact, but it is alsoassociated with both the public-sphere aspect of gender role attitudes, i.e., women's employment, and also the private-sphere aspect of attitudes, i.e., men's domestic work. Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Public-sphere social contacts with natives, such as at the workplace and the neighbourhood, are positively associated with egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment, but not men's domestic roles.

Hypothesis 2: Private-sphere social contacts with natives, such as native friends and family members, are positively associated with both egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic roles.

3.5 Data and Methods

This paper draws on data from the EURISLAM dataset conducted between 2009 and 2012 (Hoksbergen and Tillie 2015; Tillie et al. 2013) because it provides multiple measures on the public- and private- social contacts with the natives and attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic work, allowing us to investigate the mechanism of the liberalization of Muslim gender ideology in recent years. EURISLAM provides a systematic analysis of cross-national differences in Muslim immigrants' cultural integration, and has recently been used in investigating gender roles and sexual attitudes (e.g., Glas 2022). The dataset sampled the four largest Muslim groups, including immigrants and children of immigrants (not in the same household) of Moroccan,

Turkish, Pakistani, and Ex-Yugoslavian origins[3], in Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom[4]. To collect a representative sample of Muslim immigrants and their children, the EURISLAM uses surname-based sampling that draws on telephone directories as its source. Surname-based sampling from phone directories has proven to be an efficient and representative method for studying the immigrant population (Schnell et al. 2012). The survey questionnaire was available in both the language of the destination society, and those of the countries of origin. The interviewers were bilingual, speaking both the destination society's language, and the interviewee's origin-country language. The initial sample consisted of 5,397 Muslims across six host countries. After dropping the missing values of the dependent and independent variables, 4,532 respondents remained (see Table 3.1).

3.5.1 Dependent variables

An egalitarian attitude toward women's employment was measured using the following question: Who should earn money in a household? Respondents can select the following three answers, "mostly the mother," "mostly the father," and "both equally." Then, I recoded this three-categorical outcome into a binary variable ("mostly the father" coded as 0; "both equally" and "mostly the mother" coded as 1). I pooled the "both equally" and "mostly the mother" into one category for two reasons. First, theoretically, according to the gender revolution framework, the first part of the gender revolution is about women participating in the labour market; pooling "both

[3] One of the limitation of this dataset is that EURISLAM focuses on these four largest Muslim groups in Europe, and may not be representative for all Muslim migrants in Europe. However, given that EURISLAM contains multidimensional measures of social contact with natives and gender role attitudes, it is still one of the most appropriate datasets for the current study to investigate the association between multi-dimension of social contacts and gender role attitudes.

[4] EURISLAM focuses on these four ethnic-origin groups because they are the largest Muslim groups in Western Europe. Similarly, the dataset emphasizes these six destination countries because until the 1980s, these countries had the largest populations of people originating from predominantly Muslim countries. More detailed information is available in the EURISLAM codebook (Hoksbergen and Tillie 2015).

equally" and "mostly the mother" together allows a better fit of the theory. Second, fewer than 0.01% of respondents chose the answer "mostly the mother."

An egalitarian attitude toward men's domestic roles was constructed based on respondents' view on "who should do the routine household chores in a household?" Same as the last question, respondents can select the following three answers, "mostly the mother," "mostly the father," and "both equally." Since the second part of the gender revolution refers to the increased involvement of men in home and family, I combined "both equally" and "mostly father (< 0.01 of respondents chose this answer)" as 1, and "mostly the mother" as 0. The summary of all the variables is listed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of the sample

	Mean/percent	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Miss. per.
Dependent variable					
Attitude toward women's employment					0.77
Traditional (Mostly father)	36				
Egalitarian (Both equally or mostly mother)	64				
Attitude toward men's doing domestic chores					0.54
Traditional (Mostly mother)	30				
Egalitarian (Both equally or mostly father)	70				
Independent variables: continuous					
Contacts with natives at workplace	4.09	1.22	1	5	0
Contacts with natives at neighborhood	3.67	1.11	1	5	2.12
Contacts with native friends	3.00	1.27	1	5	3.47
Contacts with native family members	1.66	0.82	1	3	0.96
Frequency of worship	2.02	0.84	1	4	1.56
Frequency of prayer	3.15	1.61	1	5	1.91
Muslim identity	3.78	1.04	1	5	2.6
Religiosity (factor score)	0.01	0.45	-0.87	0.83	2.78
Independent variables: discrete					
Gender					0
Male	48				
Female	52				
Level of education					5.51
Primary or lower	19				
Secondary	55				
Tertiary	26				
Generation					0
1st generation	63				
1.5th generation*	13				
2nd generation	24				
Destination country					0
Belgium	14				
Switzerland	16				
Germany	21				
France	15				
United Kingdom	21				
The Netherlands	13				
Ethnic group					0.08
Yugoslavian	22				
Turkish	33				
Moroccan	24				
Pakistani	21				
N	4567				

Source: EURISLAM; *1.5th generation refers to those who moved to their destination country before age 9

3.5.2 Independent variables

The first variable of public-sphere social contact with natives is *social contact with natives in the workplace*. Two questions related to social contacts with the natives in the workplace construct this variable. Respondents were asked, "How many employees and colleagues were natives of the host country? Then, respondents can choose the following answers: "I don't have any," "Almost none," "A minority," "Approximately half," "The majority," and "Nearly all." Then I combined "I don't have any" and "Almost none" and recoded it as a 5-point scale. Higher scores mean having more social contact with the mainstream in the workplace. The second variable measuring public-sphere social contact is *social contact with natives in the neighbourhood*. Respondents were asked, "How many people were natives of the host country in your neighbourhood?" Respondents can choose the same answers as the previous question. Then, based on the answers, I constructed a 5-point scale measuring social contacts with natives in the neighbourhood.

The first variable measuring private-sphere social contact is *social contact with natives with native friends.* Respondents were asked, "How many of your good friends that you can trust are natives?" Respondents can choose the same answers as the previous questions. Then, based on the answers, I construct a 5-point scale that measures social contact with native friends. The second variable that measures private-sphere social contact is *social contact with native family members.* Respondents were asked, "Are there any people in your family who are married to or cohabitating with natives, if yes, how many?" Respondents can choose the following answers: "*No, none*," "*Yes, one*," "*Yes, several*." Based on the answers, I created a 3-point scale to measure the levels of interethnic contact with native family members. I also estimated additional models that see these social contact variables as categorical variables. The results are consistent with the origin models (that see these variables as continuous variables).

3.5.3 Control variables

The models also control for the following variables. Religiosity is controlled because it may be associated with both social contacts and gender role attitudes. I follow the previous literature (Glas 2022) and use the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) technique to create a continuous measure latent variable that measures individuals' religiosity by considering the following three questions (see Appendix Table A3.1). Respondents were asked: "How often do you go to a place of worship (4-point scale)?"; "How often do you pray (5-point scale)?" and "To what extent do you see yourself as Muslim? (5-point scale)." *Gender* is controlled because research on this topic suggests that female Muslims may hold more egalitarian gender attitudes than male Muslims (Maliepaard and Alba 2016), and the opportunities for social contact may vary by gender. Migration generation is also included as a control (in Model 1 and 2) and moderated variable (in Model 3) because the association between social contact with natives and gender role ideologies may vary by migration generation. This three-categorical variable differentiates between first-generation migrants (who moved to their destination country after the age of 9), the 1.5 generation (those who moved to their destination country before the age of 9), and the second generation (who were born in the destination country). The three-categorical *educational attainment* variable, primary or lower, secondary, and tertiary degree, has been controlled in the model because education may be associated with social contact and gender role attitudes simultaneously. The ethnic groups of respondents, including Yugoslavian, Turkish, Moroccan, and Pakistani, have also been controlled. Finally, the survey wave is controlled in the models because the United Kingdom includes a second wave.

3.5.4 Analytic strategy

As the dependent variables are binary outcomes, I estimated logistic regression models that control for both settlement countries and ethnic-origin groups. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the averaged marginal effects of the logistic regression model results that take attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic roles as the dependent variable, respectively. Model 1 is the baseline model that includes socio-demographic variables and the potential confounding variables that may be associated with social contact with the natives and gender role attitudes simultaneously, such as migrant generation and religiosity. Model 2 adds indicators of the current analysis' primary focus, i.e., the public- and private-sphere social contacts with the natives[5]. Finally, Model 3 replicates Model 2 but includes the interaction between the migrant generation and four types of social contact with natives to see whether the migrant generation moderates the association between social contact and gender role attitudes.

[5] Statistically, these four indicators of social contact with natives may be highly related to each other. Conceptually, social contact with native friends and family members may be the mediated variables between social contact workplace and neighbourhood and gender role attitudes. Therefore, I ran a series of models to include these four indicators separately (available upon request). The results are consistent with the main-text results. Also, I have checked the VIF of all the independent variables in these models. The VIF of all variables are lower than 1.1, and the mean VIF is 1.06. Both items show that there is no severe collinear problem.

Table 3.2: Averaged marginal effects of logistic regression model on social contacts with natives predicting attitude toward women's employment

	(1) Baseline	(2) Contact	(3) Interaction
Generation (1st)			
1.5th generation	-0.020	-0.027	-0.007
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.111)
2nd generation	-0.007	-0.012	0.022
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.078)
Religiosity	-0.167***	-0.151***	-0.150***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Female	0.065***	0.065***	0.064***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education (primary or lower)			
Secondary	0.016	0.015	0.015
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Tertiary	0.068**	0.066**	0.067**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Social contacts with natives X Generation			
Workplace contact		0.001	0.004
		(0.006)	(0.007)
Workplace contact X 1.5 gen.			-0.019
			(0.018)
Workplace contact X 2nd gen.			-0.009
			(0.013)
Neighbor contact		0.003	0.001
		(0.006)	(0.008)
Neighbor contact X 1.5 gen.			-0.001
			(0.019)
Neighbor contact X 2nd gen.			0.012
			(0.014)
Friend contact		0.017**	0.020**
		(0.006)	(0.007)
Friend contact X 1.5 gen.			0.013
			(0.018)
Friend contact X 2nd gen.			-0.018
			(0.013)
Family member contact		0.037***	0.033**
		(0.009)	(0.011)
Family contact X 1.5 gen.			0.014
			(0.025)
Family contact X 2nd gen.			0.007
			(0.020)

Table 3.2: Averaged marginal effects of logistic regression model on social contacts with natives predicting attitude toward women's employment (continued)

	(1) Baseline	(2) Contact	(3) Interaction
Country of settlement (ref: Belgium)			
Switzerland	0.064**	0.070**	0.069**
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Germany	-0.042	-0.041	-0.042
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
France	0.079**	0.083***	0.084***
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
United Kingdom	-0.160***	-0.144***	-0.143***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
The Netherlands	-0.001	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Ethnic group (ref: Yugoslavian)			
Turkish	-0.017	-0.012	-0.012
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Moroccan	0.014	0.006	0.006
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Pakistani	-0.216***	-0.206***	-0.207***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Interval	-0.014	-0.007	-0.007
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Wave	Fixed	Fixed	Fixed
Pseudo R-Square	0.087	0.092	0.093
Observations	4,584	4,584	4,584

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; Wave is controlled because the UK has conducted two waves of the cross-sectional survey

3.6 Results

In Table 3.2, the coefficient in Model 1 shows no generational differences in attitudes toward women's employment. As expected, religiosity was negatively associated with an egalitarian attitude toward women's employment. Compared to those with a primary degree or lower, those with a tertiary degree were more likely to hold egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment. Model 2 included the variables that measure public- and private-sphere social contacts with natives. The public-sphere social contacts, including contacts in the workplace and neighbourhood, were not significantly associated with attitudes toward women's employment. By contrast, private-sphere social contacts, including friends and family members, were positively associated with attitudes toward women's employment. In Model 3, none of the interactions between social contact and the migrant generation were significant, suggesting that the migrant generation does not moderate the association between social contact and attitudes toward women's employment.

Across models, we can see some destination country and ethnic group differences in attitudes toward women's employment. For example, compared to those living in Belgium (the reference group), respondents in Switzerland and France are more likely to hold a more liberal attitude toward women's employment; by contrast, those in the United Kingdom are more likely to hold a more traditional attitude toward women's employment. Regarding the differences between ethnic groups, respondents with Pakistani backgrounds tend to hold a more traditional attitude toward women's employment compared to those with Yugoslavian backgrounds (the reference group).

Table 3.3: Averaged marginal effects of logistic regression model on social contacts with natives predicting attitude toward men doing domestic chores

	(1) Baseline	(2) Contact	(3) Interaction
Generation (1st)			
1.5th generation	-0.021	-0.030	0.167*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.074)
2nd generation	-0.030	-0.037*	0.015
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.077)
Religiosity	-0.098***	-0.078***	-0.078***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Female	0.010	0.011	0.010
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Education (primary or lower)			
Secondary	0.018	0.017	0.018
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Tertiary	0.058**	0.054**	0.055**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Social contacts with natives X Generation			
Workplace contact		-0.001	0.006
		(0.006)	(0.007)
Workplace contact X 1.5 gen.			-0.018
			(0.017)
Workplace contact X 2nd gen.			-0.016
			(0.012)
Neighbor contact		0.002	0.006
		(0.006)	(0.008)
Neighbor contact X 1.5 gen.			-0.034
			(0.019)
Neighbor contact X 2nd gen.			0.001
			(0.013)
Friend contact		0.025***	0.026***
		(0.005)	(0.007)
Friend contact X 1.5 gen.			-0.015
			(0.017)
Friend contact X 2nd gen.			0.001
			(0.012)
Family member contact		0.047***	0.044***
		(0.008)	(0.011)
Family contact X 1.5 gen.			0.013
			(0.025)
Family contact X 2nd gen.			0.005
			(0.019)

Table 3.3: Averaged marginal effects of logistic regression model on social contacts with natives predicting attitude toward men doing domestic chores (continued)

	(1) Baseline	(2) Contact	(3) Interaction
Country of settlement (ref: Belgium)			
Switzerland	0.080***	0.087***	0.088***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Germany	-0.026	-0.024	-0.025
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
France	0.057*	0.062*	0.064**
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)
United Kingdom	-0.199***	-0.174***	-0.175***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
The Netherlands	0.063*	0.053*	0.057*
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Ethnic group (ref: Yugoslavian)			
Turkish	0.003	0.010	0.011
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Moroccan	0.061**	0.051*	0.051*
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Pakistani	-0.064**	-0.052*	-0.052*
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Interval	0.536***	-0.237	-0.438
	(0.160)	(0.241)	(0.278)
Wave	Fixed	Fixed	Fixed
Pseudo R-Square	0.070	0.080	0.080
Observations	4,584	4,584	4,584

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 3.3 summarizes the logistic regression model predicting attitudes toward men's domestic roles. As expected, religiosity was negatively associated with an egalitarian attitude toward men's domestic roles. Similar to the results in Table 3.2, Muslims with a tertiary degree are more likely to hold a more egalitarian attitude toward men's domestic roles than those with a primary degree or lower. Model 2 included the variables that measure public- and private-sphere social contacts with natives. Similar to those in Table 3.2, the public-sphere social contacts with

natives, including contacts in the workplace and neighbourhood, were not significantly associated with attitudes toward women's employment. In contrast, private-sphere social contacts with natives, including friends and family members, were positively associated with attitudes toward women's employment. The coefficient surprisingly shows that the second generations hold more traditional attitudes toward men's domestic roles than the first generation. However, the association between migrant generation and attitudes toward men's domestic roles is not significant in bivariate logistic regression[6]. In Model 3, no interactions between social contact and the migrant generation were significant, implying that the migrant generation does not moderate the association between social contact and attitudes toward men's domestic roles.

Some destination countries and ethnic groups differ in attitudes toward men doing domestic chores. Similar to the results of attitudes toward women's employment (Table 3.2), compared to respondents in Belgium (the reference group), those in Switzerland, France, and the Netherlands are more likely to hold a more liberal attitude toward men's domestic roles, while those in the United Kingdom are more likely to hold a more traditional attitude toward men's domestic roles. In terms of the differences between ethnic groups, respondents with Pakistani backgrounds tend to hold a more traditional attitude toward men's domestic roles compared to those with Yugoslavian backgrounds (the reference group). By contrast, those with Moroccan backgrounds are more likely to hold a liberal attitude toward men's domestic roles than those with Yugoslavian backgrounds.

[6] Since most individuals in the second generations have a higher level of education than the first generation, education may have mediated the positive association between the second generations and egalitarian attitudes toward men's domestic role in this model. In this case, we see a negative association between the 1.5 and second generations, and egalitarian attitudes toward men's domestic role after controlling respondent's education. Based on assimilation theory, there is a strong expectation that the second generations should hold more egalitarian gender role attitudes than the first generation, but a recent study also found that the second-generation report more traditional gender roles attitudes than their foreign-born parents. An alternative explanation is that the foreign-born population tends to under-report their traditional gender role attitudes (see Kretschmer 2018).



Figure 3.1: Predicted probabilities of social contacts with natives on attitudes toward women's employment

Since regression coefficients are difficult to interpret and cannot be meaningfully compared to the coefficient size, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the marginal predicted probabilities for each social contact with the natives at either 1 (the lowest value in social contacts with the natives) and 5 (the highest value in social contacts with the natives in the workplace, neighbour, and with friends) and 3 (the highest value in social contacts with native family members) on attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic roles, based on Model 2 in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. In addition, the grey area is the 95% confident interval of the estimation. These probabilities also provide a sense of the magnitude of the associations as the logistic regression coefficients do not have an intuitive interpretation.

Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities of attitudes toward women's employment based on the four types of social contact with natives. The two panels on the left-hand side illustrate that there is not much variation in social contact with natives at the workplace and neighbours in attitudes toward women's employment. For example, I predict that roughly 64% of the respondents who have a social contact with the natives at the workplace (red line) score of 1 hold an egalitarian attitude toward women's employment, while this attitude will exist for only slightly more than 64% of those who reported 5. Similarly, I predict that 63.2% of the respondents who have a score of 1 in social contact with natives in the neighbourhood (orange line) will hold an egalitarian attitude toward women's employment, while 64.5% of respondent who scored 5 will hold an egalitarian attitude.

Turning to the two panels on the right-hand side of Figure 1, the plots show higher levels of social contact with native friends (green line) and family members (blue line), which are associated with a higher share of respondents reporting egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment. For instance, I predict that 61% of respondents whose social contact with native friends (green line) scores is 1, i.e., they have no or almost no native friends, will hold an egalitarian attitude toward women's employment; 67% of respondents who report that almost all of their friends are natives will hold an egalitarian attitude. Likewise, in the 'family' model, I predict 62% of respondents who have a social contact with a native family member(s) (blue line) score of 1, i.e., no or almost no family member married or cohabited with native, will hold an egalitarian attitude toward women's employment, and the percentage of respondents with several family members married or cohabited with natives would be about 7 percent higher (69%).



Figure 3.2: Predicted probabilities of social contacts with natives on attitudes toward men's domestic work

Similarly, Figure 3.2 demonstrates the predicted probabilities of four types of social contact with natives on attitudes toward women's employment. Similar to the results in Figure 3.1, the two panels on the left-hand side show a very slight variation in social contact with natives at the workplace and neighbours in attitudes toward men's domestic roles. For instance, the red plot shows that for respondents who have a social contact with natives at the workplace score of 1 (almost no natives), roughly 70% of them will hold an egalitarian attitude toward men's domestic roles, whereas only slightly over 70% of those who reported 5 (almost all are natives) hold an egalitarian attitude. Similarly, I predict that for respondents with a score of 1 (orange line) in social contact with natives in the neighbour (orange line) score of 1, 70% hold an egalitarian attitude toward men's domestic roles, whereas slightly over 70% of those who reported 5 hold an egalitarian attitude.

Looking at the two panels on the right-hand side of Figure 3.2, the plots show that predictive margins of holding egalitarian attitudes toward men's domestic roles diminish with increasing scores of social contact with native friends (green line) and family members (blue line). For example, in the 'friend' model, I predict that around 66% of respondents with a social contact with native friends (green line) score of 1, i.e., no or almost no native friends, holds an egalitarian attitude toward men's domestic roles. About 75% of respondents who stated that almost all their friends are natives hold an egalitarian attitude. Likewise, in the 'family' model, I predict that 67.5% of respondents with a social contact with a native family member(s) (blue line) score of 1, i.e., no or almost no family member married or cohabited with native, holds an egalitarian attitude toward men's domestic roles, whereas 77% of respondents (a 10% increase) with several family members married or cohabited with natives would hold an egalitarian attitude.

The study findings supported Hypothesis 2 but not Hypothesis 1. The public-sphere social contacts with the natives are not associated with the attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic roles. In contrast, only private-sphere social contacts with the natives are associated with attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic roles.

3.7 Discussion and Conclusion

In recent decades, Muslim immigrants and their children have been regarded as conservative and even unassimilated regarding gender ideologies in Western Europe. However, recent works on gender attitude acculturation in Muslim immigrants and their children show a new conclusion: traditional Muslim gender attitudes appear to change over time and across generations (Maliepaard and Alba 2016; Ng 2022). Furthermore, recent studies have linked acculturation to several possible mechanisms, such as the reducing role of religiosity (Glas 2022) and the educational effect

(Maliepaard and Alba 2016) among second-generation Muslims. However, the micro-level mechanisms of the acculturation of Muslim immigrants and their children are still unclear.

Building on assimilation theory, which focuses on the bright boundary between Muslim immigrants and natives (Foner and Alba 2008; Zolberg and Long 1999), this study adds to the literature by examining whether individual-level social contact with natives is associated with gender role acculturation. Taking advantage of the unique dataset that provides multiple measures on social contact with natives and gender role attitudes, I go beyond previous literature that primarily focused on the role of migrant generation and religiosity on gender ideology acculturation by investigating what dimensions of social contact with natives are associated with women's employment and men's domestic role. Previous classic assimilation theories have suggested that contact between immigrant and native groups may not lead to acculturation in norms and values (Nee and Alba 2013; Shibutani, Kwan, and Billigmeier 1965), especially for minority groups that are discriminated against, such as Muslim immigrants. I indeed found that public-sphere social contacts with natives are not associated with egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic role. However, the current analysis shows that *private-sphere* social contacts with the natives, friends, and family members, are associated with egalitarian views on women's employment and men's domestic role. The current finding highlights the importance of types of social contacts: while public-sphere social contacts with natives are not associated with cultural integration, gender role attitudes in this case, private-sphere social contacts play a critical role in this acculturation.

The analysis also contributes to the current debate on the gender revolution framework. Previous demographic literature has shown that people's norms and values about women's employment and men's domestic role develop at a different pace with different mechanisms

(Goldscheider et al. 2015; Lappegård et al. 2021). While the change in attitudes toward women's employment is closely linked to broader socio-economic changes, such as economic incentives for women's labour force participation, the change of attitudes toward men's domestic roles is more linked to the diffusion of values and norms in the private social network, such as within family and between friends. However, I found that while private-sphere social contacts with the natives are positively associated with both egalitarian attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic role, public-sphere social contacts with the natives are not related to any dimension of gender role attitudes. These findings may broadly suggest that, for the social groups with traditional gender cultural backgrounds, such as Muslim minorities in Europe, private-sphere social network may still be a more important tool than public-sphere exposure in increasing gender-egalitarian ideologies.

With the comparative breadth of the data come several limitations. The most significant limitation is that this research stems from the cross-sectional nature of the EURISLAM dataset. Therefore, the causality between gender attitudes and social contact with the natives cannot be clearly identified. Muslim immigrants and their children with a more traditional gender ideology may have social contact with co-ethnic ties rather than mainstream individuals because they perceive gender ideology as profoundly different from the mainstream population. Although a wide range of the literature shows individual characteristics shape people's choice of friends (Hartmann and Steinmann 2021; Martinović 2013), homophily, borrowing the term from social network research, people's attitudes and behaviours can also change due to social exposure and contacts (Adamczyk and Felson 2006; Davis and Greenstein 2009).

Also, I cannot offer a more dynamic analysis of the household-level process underlying the micro mechanisms of gender ideology socialization. Since cultural values may change over time,

an ideal research design would be a panel study tracking immigrants and their children's value orientations over their life course. However, as this study's primary goal is to evaluate whether different types of social contacts with natives shape different dimensions of gender attitudes differently, the EURISLAM dataset is the only one that provides multiple-dimensional measures on social contacts with natives and gender attitudes. This advantage fits the research goal of this paper, and allows it to go beyond previous literature.

Furthermore, the measurements of social contact with natives in the current study may not capture the actual social contact between Muslim immigrants (and their children) and natives because the questionnaires ask respondents about the share or number of natives in four dimensions of social environment: workplace, neighbour, friend, and family members, but not the actual contact. For example, workplaces may be highly segregated by job types and working groups. Respondents reported that most of their colleagues are natives, but it is still possible that they only have stronger social ties with people from the same ethnicity or religious group. A similar situation can also apply to social contact in the neighbourhood. Muslim immigrants may live in a slightly segregated neighbourhood but may have a stronger relationship with other Muslims than natives. More detailed measures of social contact with natives will be an important and fruitful avenue for future research.

Another avenue for future work might be to develop a more micro-level measure of gender role ideologies. Simply questioning respondents about their attitudes toward women's employment and men's domestic role may overlook howthe type of paid and unpaid work may have different gendered meanings for Muslim immigrants and natives. For example, a majority of Muslim immigrants and natives may both support women having equal opportunities to have a paid job outside the family, but they may still have different opinions on whether some jobs are

not allowed (i.e., ‘haram’ jobs, such as bartending) for women. Like their non-Muslim counterparts, some Muslim immigrants and their children may also think that men should be responsible for routine housework, but Muslim men may be more likely to do more ‘male’ work such as washing cars, and less ‘female’ work such as cooking and parenting than non-Muslims. Given the data’s limitations and our argument’s focus, this study did not systematically explore these possibilities. However, this may be an important avenue for future quantitative and qualitative research.

Despite these limitations, this paper points to the micro-level mechanisms explaining the variation of acculturation in gender attitudes that remain poorly understood. While most previous literature investigates what shapes the social contact with the natives of Muslim immigrants and their children, the outcomes of social contact with the natives are still unclear. The paper covers only a small part of a sizeable multidimensional field of attitudes, values, and ideologies. Examining whether the same dynamics apply in this much broader field will be a task for future research.

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3.8 Appendix

Table 3.A1: Standardized confirmatory factor analyses of religiosity

	Religiosity
Factor loadings	
Frequency of going to a place of worship (1-4)	0.62
Frequency of prayer (1-5)	0.82
Extent seeing self as Muslim (1-5)	0.58
Fit statistics	
Eigenvalue	1.87
Cronbach's alpha	0.69
RMSEA	0.02

Interlude II

Chapters 2 and 3 examine the trajectories of assimilation regarding gender role attitudes and explore the micro-level mechanisms behind them. The findings suggest that immigrants and their children, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, tend to hold more progressive views on gender roles overall after migration. These findings support assimilation theory, which posits that migrants and native populations become increasingly similar over time and across generations. However, it is important to recognize that gender role ideology is only one aspect of family attitudes and is particularly politicized compared to other facets. In the European context, gender roles have been central to discussions about immigration, assimilation, and cultural diversity in both academic discourse and public opinion. In such a scenario, migrants and their children from non-Western backgrounds may experience acculturation pressures to gradually adjust their cultural beliefs about gender roles. But what about family values that are less politicized and considered more personal, such as fertility ideals?

Chapter 4 builds on the emerging literature on migration and family studies to examine the influence of fertility norms in the country of origin on the desired family size and actual fertility behavior of the second generation in France. This research question not only contributes to our understanding of acculturation in family norms, but also sheds light on the ongoing debate about fertility postponement in high-income countries in recent years.

Chapter 4

Inheriting the Homeland? The Influence of Parental Origin-Country Fertility Norms on Ideal Family Size and the Timing of Birth(s) among the Children of Immigrants in France

R&R in *Population Research and Policy Review*

Abstract

While fertility behaviors are converging among the children of immigrants in Western Europe, existing literature has paid little attention to whether their fertility ideals are still diverse and linked to their parental origin-country fertility norms. This paper develops a country-of-origin perspective to investigate whether parental origin-country fertility norms continue to shape childbirth attitudes and behaviors among the children of immigrants. The analysis draws on data on the ideal family size and the timing of birth(s) of the children of immigrants in France (Trajectories and Origins survey, TeO), which I link to data on parental origin-country fertility norms. Findings show that the origin-country fertility norms shape the ideal family size of immigrants' children; however, they do not shape their timing of childbirth(s). Consistent with previous studies, these findings suggest that fertility behavior among immigrants' children is converging. However, their fertility ideals are still diverged and strongly influenced by their parental origin-country fertility norms. Immigrants' children with higher parental origin-country fertility norm backgrounds desire a larger ideal family size but do not have children earlier than those with lower fertility norm backgrounds. This study provides a new perspective on understanding fertility dissimilation/assimilation and

highlights the importance of emphasizing the gap between fertility ideals and behaviors among the children of immigrants.

Introduction

Migration and population studies have recently highlighted that most second-generation fertility behaviors are converging across groups of origin in Western Europe (Kulu et al. 2017; Pailhé 2017; Wilson 2019). Empirical studies in this field have long been using native populations in destination countries as a reference group to compare the extent to which the immigrants' (and their children's) fertility patterns are similar/different from the native population (Adsera and Ferrer 2014; Kulu and Hannemann 2016; Pailhé 2017). This approach contributes to the literature by drawing a clear picture of whether migrants' fertility behaviors become similar to the natives' across generations.

However, recent literature argues that solely comparing the group means of fertility behaviors between migration groups and the destination natives is insufficient to distinguish whether the distinct fertility patterns of migration groups are 'imported attitudes and behaviors' from the origin countries or linked to the destination contexts and specific migration situations (Baykara-Krumme and Milewski 2017; Impicciatore et al. 2020). Therefore, to understand whether the fertility patterns of migration groups are linked to the fertility context of their origin country, recent studies have developed a dissimilation perspective to investigate the fertility behaviors' difference (or similarity) between immigrants and the 'stayers' in their origin country (Baykara-Krumme and Milewski 2017; Behrman and Weitzman 2022; Glick 2010; Impicciatore et al. 2020; Kraus and González-Ferrer 2021; Milewski and Baykara-Krumme 2021; Puur et al. 2017).

Nevertheless, comparing the *fertility behaviors* between migrant groups and non-migrants in the country of origin may also be inadequate to understand whether the distinct fertility patterns of migration groups are linked to their origin-country culture. It is because fertility behavior is not directly influenced by individual cultural norms and ideologies but also embedded in the destination's institutional context and socio-structural conditions (Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014). Precisely because of this reason, recent literature has called for researchers to focus on *fertility ideals* when studying fertility assimilation; fertility ideals are considered a more appropriate indicator of acculturation than behaviors because they are more representative of underlying values, norms, and ideologies (Milewski and Mussino 2019). As a result, various studies have stressed the need to investigate the fertility ideals of immigrants and their children (Milewski and Mussino 2019). However, it has rarely been applied in empirical research in the migration context (for partial exceptions focusing on the female immigrants, Afulani and Asunka 2015; Mussino and Ortensi 2018), and even less research has investigated whether (parental) origin-country fertility norm shape the fertility attitudes of immigrants and their children (Mussino and Ortensi 2018 on fertility ideals; Puur et al. 2019 on fertility intention).

In this study, I advance this topic by investigating the association between parental origin-country fertility norms, fertility ideals, and fertility behaviors among the immigrants' children using migrant-focused survey data in France. To do this, this study engages explicitly with the perspective emphasizing the influence of the emigration context on the attitudes and behaviors of immigrants children in migration studies (Luthra et al. 2018). Methodologically, it followed a growing body of work in migration studies treating immigrants as emigrants from different origin countries rather than ethnic minority groups (a dummy variable) in the destination country and directly measured the cultural values of the origin country (Holland and De Valk 2013; Luthra,

Waldinger, et al. 2018; Ng 2022; Pessin and Arpino 2018; Soehl 2017a). It applied this concept to the fertility norm, constructing an attitudinal and behavior indicator on the origin-country fertility norm by directly measuring the mean of the ideal number of children and total fertility rates (TFR) in the country of origin. This approach allows me to directly investigate the cultural link in fertility norms between immigrants' children and their parents' origin countries: To what extent are the fertility ideals and behaviors of immigrants' children shaped by their parental origin-country fertility norms?

This paper addresses these questions and uses immigrant survey data in France - Trajectories and Origins survey (TeO), containing information on fertility ideals and behavior questions. The TeO allows this study to identify 45 immigrant groups from different countries of origin worldwide and evaluate the influence of origin-country fertility norms on migrants and their children's fertility ideals and behavior. Findings show that the origin-country fertility norms shape the ideal family size of immigrants children; however, they do not shape their timing of childbirth(s). Although the immigrants' children with higher fertility origin-country background desire larger family sizes than those with lower fertility origin-country background, they do not have children earlier than those with lower fertility origin-country background. These findings broadly suggest that fertility assimilation is not simply triggered by acculturation in fertility ideals but is more likely a structural integration process linked to destination structural contexts that limit the fertility behaviors of the immigrants' children.

4.1 Classic migrant's fertility theories: explaining fertility ideals and behaviors among immigrants' children

The assimilation theory or *adaptation hypothesis* predicts that immigrants and natives will eventually become more alike over time and across generations (Alba and Nee 2003). The direct application of the assimilation framework to the realm of fertility would anticipate that over time and generation, fertility ideals will converge with that of the mainstream population, which, in a strong 'two-children norms' environment such as in France and broadly in Europe, would mean that fertility declines between immigrants and their children (Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014). These studies have assumed that the current destination social context shapes immigrants' fertility ideals and behaviors through social contact and media consumption outside the origin group (e.g., Kulu et al. 2019; Pailhé 2017; Wilson 2019). Specifically, the immigrants' children spending their formative years in the destination-society context have extensive exposure to its institution, such as schools. Therefore, the immigrants' children will desire a smaller ideal family size than their parents and hold a similar ideal family size to the natives. Moreover, the parental origin country may have much less influence on the immigrants' children than on their foreign-born parents. Although some transnationalism studies have suggested that immigrants may maintain their ties with their origin country and society over time and even over a generation (Levitt and Schiller 2004; Levitt 1998), these ties inevitably decrease gradually (Soehl and Waldinger 2010). Accordingly, only a small number of immigrants' children still have a solid connection to parental origin countries (Soehl and Waldinger 2012). In this case, the origin-country fertility norms may also fade over time and across generations. The second-generation, thus, have children later (Milewski 2007; Pailhé 2017) and fewer than their foreign-born parents (Stichnoth and Yeter 2013; Wilson 2019; Woldemicael and Beaujot 2012). Taken together, one can expect that the *fertility*

ideals and behaviors among immigrants' children are not influenced by their parental origin-country fertility norms.

The *cultural maintenance hypothesis* provides a competing explanation for fertility ideals and behaviors of immigrants' descendants. Although the immigrants' children are socialized in the host country, their parents may also transmit their origin-country norms and values to them simultaneously. The transmission of parental fertility behaviors has been well established in family studies on the non-migrant population. Previous studies have shown an intergenerational transmission of the number of children (Axinn et al. 1994; Murphy and Knudsen 2002) and the timing of first births (Barber 2001; Steenhof and Liefbroer 2008). In the migration context, a few studies have also pointed out the importance of intergenerational transmission of fertility patterns in children's childbirths' timing of birth(s) (Baykara-Krumme and Milewski 2017; De Valk and Liefbroer 2007). Specifically, the Muslim minority is the most salient case in the European context. Muslim immigrants have been found to hold more traditional gender and family values (Norris and Inglehart 2012) and be more successful in transmitting their values (De Valk and Liefbroer 2007) to their native-born children than non-Muslim immigrants. Empirically, studies find that the second generations of Muslim origin backgrounds have more children than non-Muslim immigrants' children and natives (Kulu et al. 2017; Pailhé 2017; Wilson 2019). For instance, recent studies suggest that ethnic-cultural values have a massive influence on the fertility patterns of Turkish and South Asian descendants in European destination countries (Pailhé 2017; Wilson and Kuha 2018; Wilson 2019). Turkish immigrants and their children consistently have a higher risk of entering parenthood than other immigrant groups in Germany (Ezdi and Baş 2020) and France (Pailhé 2017). Similarly, women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin in the United Kingdom demonstrated consistently high fertility levels (Kulu et al. 2017; Wilson 2019). These studies

broadly assumed that origin-country norms and behaviors continue after migration and are transmitted to the second generation in European migration contexts (Milewski 2007). Altogether, we can expect that *fertility ideals and behaviors of the immigrants' children are shaped by their parental origin-country fertility norms: those with a higher origin-country fertility background desire a larger family size and have their birth(s) earlier than those with a lower origin-country fertility background.*

However, fertility ideals are considered soft predictors of actual childbirth behaviors because people may have a different number of children they desire (Beaujouan and Berghammer 2019; Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014). Underachieving fertility has become more common in high-income countries in recent decades. Childbirth postponement has been suggested as one of the most significant pathways to underachieving fertility ideals because it leads women to run out of time to have more children during their reproductive life. (Lutz et al. 2006; Régnier-Loilier and Vignoli 2011). Structural constraints are one of the driving forces of childbirth postponement (Morgan and Rackin 2010). Given the considerable variability across societies, there is widespread agreement that structural factors, such as the labor market, the housing market, and economic uncertainty, play significant roles in childbirth postponement (Rindfuss and Brauner-Otto 2008). These structural constraints influence actual fertility through multiple mechanisms. For example, young adults today face an increasingly uncertain economic situation and non-standard employment; hence, they are increasingly characterised by displacement from career jobs and less job tenure and security (Sullivan 1999). Meanwhile, the increasing cost of housing also leads young people to find it more challenging to own an apartment, especially in metropolis cities. Therefore, young people nowadays may be more likely to stay at their parental homes longer and delay their union formation and childbirth (Mulder and Billari 2010; Mulder 2013).

In the migration context, these structural constraints may be more complicated to explain in minority groups' fertility. In the French context, the children of immigrants from some specific minority groups have limited opportunities in the labor market and suffer from high unemployment levels due to discrimination from mainstream society (Meurs et al. 2006). These labor market uncertainties may negatively impact the timing of union formation and of first birth, especially for the immigrants' children (Pailhé and Solaz 2012). For example, the descendants of immigrants from the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa—the discriminated-against minority groups with stronger family and fertility ideals—have a lower transition risk of union formation than the native in France (Pailhé 2015), and tend to postpone their first and second births (Pailhé 2017). Therefore, we expect that the immigrants children from these minority groups may desire more children than their actual number of births and have a child earlier than their actual timing of birth due to institutional constraints and social discrimination. In this case, we may see that *parental origin-country fertility norms shape the fertility ideal but do not influence the timing of birth(s) of the immigrants' children: Those with a higher parental origin-country fertility background desire a larger family size but do not enter childbirth(s) earlier than those a lower parental origin-country fertility background.*

4.2 Data, Variables, and Methods

To evaluate the arguments outlined above, this study drew on data from a nationally representative study of immigrants in France – TeO – conducted by the French national demographic institute (INED) in 2008/2009. The survey drew on confidential government data to construct a sampling frame of immigrants and their children, and the interviews were conducted face-to-face. This survey asked a long list of questions about immigrant's (and their children's parental) country of

origin and socio-economic characteristics, including school trajectories and year of migration, as well as information on family formation, such as the timing of marriage and birth, spouse's migration background, and the ideal number of children.

4.2.1 Sample

The analyses were restricted to the second generation and immigrants who arrived in France before they were nine years old (the one-point-five generation), with 11,779 respondents. Following previous research on the ideal family size (Ruckdeschel et al. 2018; Testa and Grilli 2006), this study restricted the analysis to individuals aged 18-45, resulting in a subsample of 8,932 for two reasons. First, they are the group most involved in the reproductive process. Second, limiting the sample to the younger cohort better matches the measure's timing of the average origin-country ideal. Considering the following analysis aimed to link the origin-society ideal family size from multiple datasets by identifying the details of the origin country among immigrants, the study included only the respondents whose country of origin was detailed and identified in the survey[7]. After dropping the respondents (n = 919) from the regions where I could not identify the countries (such as 'Other Asia' and 'Other Europe'), there was a total of 45 countries of origin in the data's sub-sample, resulting in a subsample of 8,013. After dropping the missing values of each independent variable (N = 445; 5.8% missing), there were 7,568 respondents in the sample (see Table 4.1).

The analysis had the following two components. First, the study investigated whether the parental origin-country norms shaped the ideal number of children among the immigrants' children.

[7] For example, immigrants from most Asian countries are grouped as 'other Asian countries' in the TeO survey. Consequently, I needed to exclude observations from these countries because I could not link them to the datasets that record the ideal number of children in these countries.

Second, it examined the impact of parental origin-country fertility norms on the timing of first, second, and third birth among immigrants' children.

4.2.2 Dependent Variables

Ideal family size: The TeO asked respondents to assess their personal ideal family size[8] in the following way, 'In your opinion, what is the ideal number of children in a family (personal ideal number of children)?' Respondents who answered "don't know" and refused to answer are coded as missing.

Fertility behavior was measured by *the actual timing of the first, second, and third birth*, contrasted by the year and month of respondents' childbirth(s) and respondents' birth.

[8] The TeO asked respondents to assess their general ideal family size. Respondents were asked their thoughts on the general ideal family size, 'And when you think in particular of people from the same background as you and with the same income, what is the ideal number of children in a family' Considering two of the datasets I employed to measure respondents' origin-country fertility ideals used the personal ideal number of children, I adapted the personal ideal number of children as a dependent variable in this study. Additionally, I ran the same models using the general ideal number of children as a dependent variable; the results are consistent with the main-text models (using the personal ideal number of children).

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of immigrant sample in the TeO

	Mean/freq.	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Missing
Dependent variable					
The ideal number of children	2.77	1.29	0	23	4.8%
Age of first birth	26.48	4.66	17	45	2.3%
Age of second birth	29.32	4.49	17.93	45	1.8%
Age of third birth	31.42	4.81	19.02	45	1.6%
Independent variables: continuous					
Parental origin-country fertility ideal	3.27	1.66	2.02	7.87	10.3%
Parental origin-country TFR at age 15	3.38	1.79	1.13	7.76	10.3%
Number of siblings	3.26	1.89	0	6	0.1%
Importance of religion during childhood	2.52	1.13	1	4	1.2%
Age	30.39	7.91	17	45	0.1%
Independent variables: discrete					
Migration generation					0.1%
1.5th	0.14				
2nd	0.86				
Religion					1.5%
None	0.32				
Catholic	0.21				
Other Christian	0.05				
Muslim	0.38				
Other religions	0.04				
Marital status					0%
Unmarried	0.4				
France-born spouse	0.48				
Foreign-born spouse	0.12				
Level of education					1.2%
Primary or lower	0.14				
Lower Secondary	0.28				
Higher Secondary	0.26				
2-year college	0.13				
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.19				
Language at home					0.1%
French	0.35				
Bilingual	0.44				
Other than French	0.21				

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of immigrant sample in the TeO (continued)

	Mean/freq.	Std. dev.	Min	Max	Missing
Gender					0%
Male	0.46				
Female	0.54				
Parents'migration background					0.3%
Both parents are foreign-born	0.65				
Native mother	0.21				
Native father	0.14				
Number of children					0.1%
None	0.51				
One	0.16				
Two	0.2				
Three	0.13				
Employment status					2%
Not working	0.34				
Working	0.66				
Education status					1.8%
At school	0.05				
Finished schooling	0.95				
N	7,568				

4.2.3 Independent Variables

Parental Origin-country Fertility Norm

I use two indicators to measure parental origin-country fertility norms: *parental origin-country averaged ideal family size* and *total fertility rates*. Two different measures are used because both have different advantages and disadvantages. Parental origin-country averaged ideal family size can clearly measure the attitudinal dimension of the fertility norm in origin countries; however, it is challenging to capture the change of origin-country fertility norm since this measure relies on survey data, which is not conducted every year. By contrast, total fertility rates (TFR) of parental origin country can more precisely measure the fertility norm since it is yearly data, but the TFR measures fertility behaviors rather than fertility attitudes.

To construct a variable of the ideal family size in the country of origin, this study followed a previous study on measuring country-level ideal family size (Mussino and Ortensi 2018; Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014) and drew data from female respondents between 15 and 49 years old and male respondents between 15 and 60 years old in the following three datasets. Subsequently, it calculated each origin country's average ideal family size as the origin-country fertility ideal. *The Eurobarometer (2001)* covers 11 European countries in this analysis sample. Respondents were asked, 'for you, what would be the ideal number of children you would like to have or would have liked to have had?' *The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS),* conducted between 1990 and 2005, covers 18 African and one Asian country. Respondents were asked, 'if you could go back to the time when you did not have any children, how many children would you like to have in your whole life?' *The World Values Survey (WVS),* conducted between 1981 and 2008, covers the rest of the 19 countries[9] worldwide in the TeO sample. Respondents were asked, 'What do you think is the ideal size of the family? How many children, if any?' Figure 1 visualizes the origin-country fertility ideals, while Figure A1 in appendix shows the data sources of these 45 countries.

For the parental origin-country TFR, I used average total fertility rates (TFR) in the parental origin country when the respondent was aged 15. I chose age 15 as the time point because the childbirth ideal is more likely to be shaped during adolescence than adulthood.

[9] Four European countries, including Czech, Bulgaria, Austria, Germany, were also available in the WVS dataset. The average ideal family size of these countreis is very close to the measure from Eurobarometer dataset. I also ran a series of robustness tests using data from WVS on these four countries, the results are consistent with the in-text results.



Figure 4.1: Origin-country fertility norms
Note: Origin-country fertility norms are the average ideal family size within each country of origin.
Source: DHS, WVS, Eurobarometer.

The number of siblings: This variable was used as a proxy of parents' completed fertility. This variable can be used to investigate whether parents' fertility behaviors mediate the cross-border transmission of fertility norms between the parental origin country and the immigrants' children. Respondents were asked how many siblings they had. For those who answer more than six siblings, I treat them as six or more. Therefor, this variable was coded into seven categories: (0) no siblings, (1) one, (2) two, (3) three, (4) four, (5) five, and (6) six or more.

4.2.4 Control Variables

In addition to the independent variables, the study included the following control variables in some models that may shape the association between independent and dependent variables.

Parents' migration background: This variable was coded as a three-categorical variable: (1) Both foreign-born, (2) Native-born mother and foreign-born father, and (3) Native-born father and foreign-born mother. *Generation*: From the information on the respondents' and their parents' country of birth and arrival age, this study recorded these two variables into a dummy variable ordered in increasing generations: (1) the 1.5 generation, immigrants who moved to France at or under nine years old and at least one of their parents are foreign-born[10] and (2) the second generation, children of foreign-born parent(s) who were born in France. *Marital status and spouse/partner's migration background*[11]: To construct this variable, the study used the information from two variables: the current marital status of the respondent and the migration background of the respondent's current married or cohabited spouse. It combined these two variables into a three-categorical variable: (1) single (including those who have been divorced, separated, or widowed), (2) native spouse (married or cohabited), and (3) foreign-born spouse (married or cohabited). *Gender:* Considering men may have a larger ideal family size than women, especially those from higher fertility ideal countries, a binary variable indicates whether respondents are male or female. *Language spoken at home* may influence fertility choices (Adsera and Ferrer 2014). Respondents were asked about what language they spoke to their parents during childhood. The study re-coded these answers into three categories: French only, both French and other language(s), and other language(s). *Religious affiliation* may influence respondents' fertility ideals and behaviors (Behrman et al. 2022). For example, Muslims may desire more children and have children earlier than non-Muslims. The variable was coded as follows: no religion, Catholic, other Christian, Muslim, or other religions. The importance of religion during childhood (a four

[10] I also ran all models using a standard that regards immigrants who arrived in France before and at 12 and 6 years old as cut points for distinguishing the 1st and the 1.5th generation. The results are consistent with the results of the in-text models.

[11] This variable was measured as timing-varying in the hazard models.

points scale) is also controlled in the model. Individuals' *educational attainment* may shape fertility patterns (Kravdal 2002; Trimarchi and Van Bavel 2018). The categorical educational variable was also coded as follows: Primary or lower, lower secondary, higher secondary, 2-year college, or Bachelor or higher. Life course variables: age, age square, and the current number of children have been controlled in the ideal family size model since people may have different ideal family sizes over the life course. *Employment status:* Working respondents may desire a small family size. Therefore, a dummy variable measuring employment status was controlled in the models. *Finished schooling*[12]*:* Whether respondents are still at school may influence the timing of birth(s).

4.2.5 Methods

The Fertility Ideals of the Immigrants' Children: The Ideal Number of Children

The study examined the influence of origin-country fertility ideal and individual characteristics on the ideal family size among immigrants' children using Poisson regression models with clustered standard errors at the country of origin level[13].

The Fertility Behaviors of the Immigrants' Children: The Timing of First, Second, and Third Birth

Considering the second group of dependent variables was the age of first, second, and third births, the study used Cox proportional hazard models with origin-country level clustering to adjust standard errors to assess the effect of origin-country fertility ideals simultaneously, a series of

[12] This variable was only included in and measured as timing-varying in the hazard models.

[13] For testing the robustness of the results (available upon request), I also ran the models using negative binomial regression, multilevel ordered logistic regression (ordinal outcome variable: from none to more than six), and hierarchical linear regression models (treating the ideal number of children as a continuous variable) with clustering country-level standard error. The results of these models are consistent with those of the Poisson regression models.

time-constant and time-varying control variables on the hazard of giving birth(s) to a child. Cox regression analysis demonstrates the hazard ratios as the ratio of the hazard rates, which is the relative risk of an event occurring in one group compared to the reference group. For the first birth analysis, all individuals were followed from age 16, and cases were censored at 45 when no birth was reported or at the interview date. For the second (third) birth, only a parent who reported a first (second) birth is at risk. They were followed from the year of the first (second) birth and censored at 15 years after the first (second) birth or the interview date. Finally, these models were estimated separately for women and men to determine the potential gender differences in the association between origin-country fertility ideal and timing of birth(s).

The data were organized into a person-period format. The study created the episodes considering respondents' timing of birth(s) and a series of time-varying covariates, including whether the respondents were still at school and their union formation status. There were 14,729 person-periods for women's first birth (N = 4,087), 12,931 person-periods for men's first birth (N = 3,481), and 4,918 person-periods for women's second birth (N =2,723), 3,851 person-periods for men's second birth (N = 1,974), and finally 3,219 person-periods for women's third birth (N=1,823) and 2,145 person-periods for men's third birth (N=1,216).

4.3 Results

4.3.1 The Ideal Number of Children

Table 4.2 summarises the result of the Poisson regression model on the association between parental origin-country fertility ideal and the ideal number of children. While models 1 and 2 demonstrate the results of origin-country fertility ideals, models 3 and 4 show that of origin-country TFR at age 15. Across the models, either origin-country fertility ideals and TFR at age 15

are positively associated with the ideal number of children of the immigrants' children. Immigrant children with higher fertility norm origin-country backgrounds desire a larger family size than those with lower fertility ideal backgrounds (e.g., Nigerian immigrants' children desire more kids than Italian immigrants' children in France). However, do foreign-born parents' fertility behaviors mediate this origin-country effect on the fertility ideals of immigrant children? Models 2 and 4 show that parental fertility behaviors mediate only 16% and 19% of the origin-country effect[14], respectively; the effect of parental origin-country fertility norm on fertility ideals of immigrant children is still substantially significant ($p < 0.001$), controlling for other important factors, such as religion, religiosity, and educational attainment. This result implies that parents' fertility behaviors play a part in explaining the fertility ideals of the immigrants' children. More specifically, the parental origin-country fertility norm directly affects the ideal family size of the immigrants' children, independent of their parents' fertility behaviors.

[14] I ran the Poisson regression of Model 2 and used a package "maczic" in R designed to discompose the direct and indirect effect of covariates on the count variable outcome to estimate the mediated effect.

Table 4.2: Poisson regression on the personal ideal number of children

	M1	M2	M3	M4
	fertility ideal		TFR	
	Base.	Siblings	Base.	Siblings
Origin-country fertility ideal	0.065***	0.057***		
	(0.007)	(0.006)		
Origin-country TFR at Age 15			0.055***	0.044***
			(0.011)	(0.009)
Number of siblings		0.024***		0.024***
		(0.005)		(0.005)
Generation (1st generation)				
2nd	0.025	0.024	0.025	0.025
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
No religious affiliation				
Catholic	-0.021	-0.006	-0.002	0.009
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)
Other Christian	0.044*	0.052*	0.060**	0.066**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)
Muslims	0.126***	0.111***	0.113***	0.100***
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.017)
Others	0.120**	0.121**	0.102*	0.106**
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Importance of religion	0.031***	0.027***	0.033***	0.029***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education (primary)				
Lower Sec	-0.038*	-0.034*	-0.037*	-0.034*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Higher Sec	-0.024	-0.015	-0.023	-0.014
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
2-year college	-0.039*	-0.026	-0.041**	-0.028*
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.006	0.023	0.004	0.022
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Language at home (French)				
Bilingual	0.028*	0.020	0.027	0.019
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Other than French	0.016	0.007	0.011	0.001
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.025)

Table 4.2: Poisson regression on the ideal number of children (continued)

	M1	M2	M3	M4
	Norm		TFR	
	Base.	Siblings	Base.	Siblings
Marital status (unmarried)				
Native spouse	0.013	0.014*	0.014*	0.013
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Foreign spouse	0.018	0.017	0.019	0.018
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Female	-0.051**	-0.055***	-0.051**	-0.055***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Foreign-born parents				
Native mother	-0.008	0.006	-0.007	0.006
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Native father	-0.010	0.007	-0.007	0.008
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Age	-0.022**	-0.023**	-0.024***	-0.025***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age square	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*	0.001*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Current numbers of children (No child)				
One	0.020	0.016	0.022	0.018
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Two	0.047***	0.041**	0.047***	0.041**
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Three or more	0.259***	0.252***	0.256***	0.250***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Employed	-0.010	-0.009	-0.008	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Interval	1.237***	1.200***	1.301***	1.256***
	(0.111)	(0.123)	(0.107)	(0.121)
Country of origin		45		45
Cluster S.E. (country of origin)		Yes		Yes
Observations		7568		7568

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

4.3.2 The Actual Timing of Birth(s)

Do the parental origin-country fertility norms shape the fertility behaviors of the immigrants' children? Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the association between parental origin-country fertility ideal, TFR at age 15, and the actual timing of first, second, and third births among the female and male children of immigrants. The results in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are shown from Models 1 to 6 separately by birth order and two measures of origin-country fertility norms (the detailed model shown in Models 3 and 6 in Tables A4.1 to A4.6 in appendix[15]). These hazard models display the relative risks, also called the hazard ratio, of having a first, second, and third child.

For daughters of immigrants, Table 4.3 shows a positive relationship between parental origin-country fertility norms, including averaged fertility ideals and TFR, and the actual timing of births across models was not determined. These non-significant results do not change when controlling respondents' number of siblings across models. In contrast, a negative association between parental origin-country TFR and timing of second births in the female second birth model was found (Models 9 and 10 in Table 3). The hazard ratio shows that, while holding all other variables constant, the TFR in a parental origin country increases by one, and the rate of having a second birth decreases by 5%. This result suggests that the immigrants' daughters with higher fertility ideal origin-country backgrounds are more likely to delay their second birth than those from countries with lower fertility ideals. Furthermore, the number of siblings is positively associated with the timing of second and third births but not the first. For example, by having one more sibling, the rate of having a second birth increased by 6% (Model 4).

[15] Other models in Table A1-6 in Appendix show the sequence of models with and without controlling the number of siblings and time-vary variables.

Table 4.3: Cox hazard models on the first, second, and third birth among immigrants' daughters

	Origin-country fertility ideals						Origin-country TFR at age 15					
	First	First	Second	Second	Third	Third	First	First	Second	Second	Third	Third
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.99	0.98	0.96	0.96	1.05	1.05						
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)						
Origin-country TFR at age 15							0.99	0.98	0.95*	0.95*	1.04	1.05
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Number of siblings		0.99		1.06*		1.05*		1.01		1.07*		1.05*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Country of origin	43		39		36		43		39		36	
# of respondents	4087		2723		1823		4087		2723		1823	

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The detailed results are shown in Table A1-A3.

Table 4.4: Cox hazard models on the first, second, and third birth among immigrants sons

	Origin-country fertility ideals						Origin-country TFR at age 15					
	First	First	Second	Second	Third	Third	First	First	Second	Second	Third	Third
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.99	0.99	1.02	1.02	1.04	1.04						
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)						
Origin-country TFR at age 15							1.00	1.00	1.01	1.01	1.01	0.98
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Number of siblings		1.01		1.14***		1.16***		1.01		1.15***		1.16***
		(0.01)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.01)		(0.05)		(0.04)
Country of origin	43		38		35		43		38		35	
# of respondents	3481		1974		1216		3481		1974		1216	

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The detailed results are shown in Table A4-A6.

Table 4.4 shows the results of immigrants' sons. Similar to the results for immigrants' daughters (in Table 4.3), no significant association has been observed between parental origin-country fertility norms, including averaged fertility ideals and TFR, and the actual timing of births across models. These non-significant results do not change whether controlling respondents' number of siblings. The association between the number of siblings and the timing of birth(s) also shows a similar pattern during the results in Table 4.3: the number of siblings is positively related only to the timing of second and third births.

To sum up, I found that the parental origin-country fertility norms continue to influence the fertility ideals among the immigrants' children, but they do not influence the fertility behaviors measured by the actual timing of the first, second, and third birth. The immigrants' children with higher fertility norm origin-country backgrounds desire a larger family size than those with lower fertility ideal backgrounds; however, they do not enter childbirth(s) earlier than those with lower fertility ideal backgrounds.

4.4 Discussion and Conclusion

In Europe, recent research has shown that most immigrants' children converge with the natives in *fertility behaviors,* including quantum and tempo (Kulu et al. 2019; Milewski 2009; Pailhé 2015; Wilson 2019). However, we know little about whether the immigrants' children have similar *fertility ideals*. It is worth emphasizing that this is not simply an empirical question but also a theoretical contribution. In the migration context, fertility ideals are considered a better indicator of cultural integration than fertility behaviors because fertility ideals measure migrant's and their children's fertility values, norms, and ideologies. Meanwhile, we know little about whether the fertility ideals are linked to their (parental) origin-country culture. The cultural heritage of the

origin country has long been a central theme in explaining group differences in fertility patterns. However, this concept is seldom operationalized but instead measured by the proxy of nationality/ethnic group, thus relying on names when generalizable theory demands variables. As a result, we still know little about whether fertility ideals and behaviors of immigrants' children are still influenced by their parents origin country. Although this is an important theoretical question, we rarely have the empirical tools to investigate it. Considering the TeO includes measures of ideal family size and the actual timing of birth(s), as well as the information on parental origin countries, I can respond to that challenge precisely to measure parental origin-country fertility norms and investigate whether these norms continue to shape the ideal family size, and the actual timing of birth(s) among the immigrants' children.

The findings show that the origin-country fertility norms have a substantial, enduring influence on fertility ideals among the immigrants' children. However, the origin-country fertility ideal does not influence the timing of first, second, and third birth, which aligns with previous empirical studies that most second-generation have a similar timing of childbirth(s) to their native counterparts in France (see Afulani and Asunka 2015; Pailhé 2017). Similarly, parental origin-country fertility does not shape the completed fertility among the immigrants' children. Overall, these findings suggest that the parental origin-country ideal shapes the ideal number of children of immigrant children but does not influence their actual timing of birth(s). More broadly, these findings highlight that fertility integration is not simply triggered by *acculturation in fertility ideals* but is more likely a process of integration linked to *destination structural contexts* that limit the fertility behaviors of the immigrants' children.

This study provides evidence that fertility behaviors' convergence among the immigrants' children may not be solely driven by acculturation in fertility ideals since we can still see a

significant group difference between migration groups. However, it is challenging to assert that structural factors in destinations play more predominant roles than cultural factors in fertility convergence among immigrants' children. Conceptually, structural factors alone can not reasonably account for the postponement and decline in fertility among the children of immigrants. Suppose structural constraints can solely delay people's childbirth and reduce the fertility rate. In that case, we may expect that the non-migrants in lower-income origin countries may have their children later and fewer than the migrants and their children living in higher-income destination countries. This is because the economic conditions in these lower-income origin countries are much worse than those in the higher-income host countries. As we know, assimilation is an interrelated and multi-dimensional convergence process occurring at the cultural and socio-economic levels (e.g., structural factors) (Alba and Nee 2003; Drouhot and Nee 2019). Specifically, immigrants and their children may not adopt the fertility ideals of their settlement country. Rather, either before or after migration, they may have adopted a different valuation of children, namely a cultural value that views childhood as a period of investment rather than exploitation for the family's benefit (Caldwell 1980; Zelizer 1985). In destination countries, regardless of being native or migrant, parents are expected to have sufficient economic resources to provide this appropriate family environment before building their families. This value, along with the structural constraints in recent decades, makes entering parenthood and reaching their desired number of children more challenging for immigrants' children. To summarize, the immigrants' children have similar fertility patterns to the natives, not because they desire fewer children, but because the socio-economic condition prevents them from achieving their ideal family size. However, like most, maybe all, immigrant surveys, the TeO does not ask questions about the cultural values of children. As a result, the current analysis did not directly examine the second part of the argument – the

dynamics of acculturation in the values of children and structural factors in explaining the fertility convergence of the immigrants children. This is an important and fruitful avenue for future research.

Another avenue for future work is to examine the mechanism of fertility assimilation more broadly by investigating the role of union formation/marriage in the underachieving fertility among the children of immigrants. Specifically, underachieved fertility may be closely linked to the postponement of union formation (Nitsche and Hayford 2020). In the French context, most second-generations have adopted more open and modern family values, including the cultural values of children and gender equity; however, marriage institutions remain important among the second generation from outside Europe (Pailhé 2015). Particularly, marriage is still more closely tied to childbirth among the immigrants' children than in the native population in France (Delaporte and Kulu 2022). However, given that marriage is considered a more committed union (Wiik et al. 2009) that requires added financial resources than cohabitation (Cherlin 2004; Kuo and Raley 2016), the immigrants' children with a more traditional origin-country cultural background may need additional time to allocate resources to enter a union and parenthood than those with a more liberal family cultural backgrounds. Moreover, most second-generation—with a more traditional and higher fertility ideal origin-background—are the most discriminated-against group in France, such as children of sub-Saharan African and North African immigrants. For example, previous studies have found that immigrants and their children from these regions are severely disadvantaged in the labor market (Meurs et al. 2006). In such a situation, family formation and childbirth may be delayed for these migrant groups. This expectation is consistent with previous empirical research on the second generation union formation and fertility in France:

sub-Saharan African and North African children have been found to enter marriage and childbirth later than the natives and other migration groups (Delaporte and Kulu 2022; Pailhé 2015, 2017).

It is also worth emphasizing the role of family socialization in fertility. Consistent with previous literature, parents' fertility behaviors play key roles in children's fertility (Barber 2001; Liefbroer and Elzinga 2012; Murphy and Knudsen 2002). While origin-country fertility norms do not shape the timing of birth(s) of the immigrants' children, the number of siblings is associated with the timing of birth(s). Meanwhile, the number of siblings of the immigrants' children may not be closely linked to the fertility ideals of their immigrant parents because migration and settlement may disrupt migrants' fertility (disruption hypothesis). Therefore, I can not provide a more systematic analysis of how family- and group-level fertility norms shape the fertility ideals and behaviors of the children of immigrants.

More broadly, the present study contributes important insights into emerging literature in the sociology of migration. It focuses on the gap between attitudes and behaviors and the differences between different dimensions of assimilation/dissimilation. It highlighted a broader set of cultural transmission between the destination migration groups and the country of origin that remains poorly understood. When the immigrants' children grow up and get exposure from the destination context in the public sphere, simultaneously adopting and practicing their parental origin-country culture with their parents in the private sphere, how do these contradicting atmospheres affect their worldview? What values and norms of the destination area do they adopt? Do these attitudes and norms influence their behaviors? This study covered only a tiny part of a large, multi-dimensional field of values and behaviors. Examining whether the same dynamics apply to other family attitudes and behaviors is a task for future research.

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4.6 Appendix



Figure 4.A1: The data sources of origin-country fertility ideal

Table 4.A1: Cox hazard models on the first birth among immigrants daughters

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.96	0.99	0.98			
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)			
Origin-country TFR at age 15				0.97	0.99	0.98
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of siblings			0.99			1.01
			(0.02)			(0.02)
Generation: 1.5th generation						
2nd generation	0.85*	0.91	0.92	0.83*	0.93	0.93
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Language at home (French)						
Bilingual	0.93	0.97	0.95	0.90	0.95	0.93
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Other than French	1.15*	1.06	1.03	1.11	1.06	1.02
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)
No religious affiliation						
Other Christian	1.04	1.03	1.09	1.01	1.03	1.08
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Catholic	1.02	1.00	1.05	1.03	1.01	1.05
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Muslims	1.14*	1.15*	1.12*	1.15*	1.17**	1.14*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Others	1.18	1.21	1.26	1.21	1.26	1.28*
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Importance of religion	1.02	1.04**	1.02	1.03*	1.04*	1.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education (primary)						
Lower Sec	0.79***	0.76***	0.77***	0.78***	0.75***	0.75***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Higher Sec	0.55***	0.53***	0.55***	0.51***	0.50***	0.51***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
2-year college	0.42***	0.45***	0.47***	0.40***	0.43***	0.46***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.35***	0.40***	0.43***	0.34***	0.39***	0.42***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Foreign-born parents						
Native mother	1.31***	1.18**	1.24**	1.28***	1.17*	1.23**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Native father	1.06	1.02	1.08	1.02	1.00	1.06
	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)

Table 4.A1: Cox hazard models on the first birth among immigrants daughters (continued)

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Time-varying variables						
Marital status (Native-born married spouse)						
Single		0.22***	0.22***		0.22***	0.22***
		(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)
Native cohabited spouse		0.69***	0.70***		0.71***	0.71***
		(0.06)	(0.05)		(0.06)	(0.06)
Foreign-born cohabited spouse		0.92	0.93		0.92	0.93
		(0.16)	(0.15)		(0.17)	(0.15)
Foreign-born married spouse		0.89	0.89		0.90	0.89
		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.15)	(0.15)
End school		1.42***	1.44***		1.45***	1.46***
		(0.13)	(0.13)		(0.13)	(0.13)
Country of origin			43			
Cluster S.E. (country of origin)			Yes			
# of respondents			4087			

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table 4.A2: Cox hazard models on the second birth among immigrants daughters

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.96	0.96	0.96			
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)			
Origin-country TFR at age 15				0.95*	0.95*	0.95*
				(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of siblings			1.06*			1.07*
			(0.02)			(0.02)
Generation: 1.5th generation						
2nd generation	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.93	0.94	0.94
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Language at home (French)						
Bilingual	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.87*	0.87*	0.87*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Other than French	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.92	0.92	0.92
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
No religious affiliation						
Other Christian	1.10	1.09	1.08	1.00	0.99	0.99
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Catholic	0.97	0.97	0.97	1.00	0.99	1.00
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Muslims	1.34***	1.32***	1.32***	1.40***	1.37***	1.37***
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Others	0.79*	0.78*	0.78*	0.94	0.94	0.94
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Importance of religion	1.02	1.03	1.03	1.05*	1.05*	1.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education (primary)						
Lower Sec	0.95	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.92	0.92
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Higher Sec	1.02	0.98	0.98	1.00	0.97	0.97
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
2-year college	1.00	0.96	0.95	1.03	0.99	0.99
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Bachelor's degree or higher	1.15*	1.10	1.09	1.18*	1.13	1.13
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Foreign-born parents						
Native mother	0.87	0.86	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.86
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Native father	0.85*	0.84*	0.83*	0.86*	0.86*	0.86*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)

Table 4.A2: Cox hazard models on the second birth among immigrants daughters (continued)

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Time-varying variables						
Marital status (Native-born married spouse)						
Single		0.96	0.96		0.93	0.93
		(0.14)	(0.15)		(0.16)	(0.16)
Native cohabited spouse		1.20	1.20		1.03	1.03
		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.19)	(0.19)
Foreign-born cohabited spouse		1.37	1.36		1.04	1.04
		(0.26)	(0.26)		(0.42)	(0.43)
Foreign-born married spouse		1.23	1.22		1.17	1.17
		(0.22)	(0.21)		(0.24)	(0.24)
End school		0.90	0.91		0.92	0.92
		(0.08)	(0.08)		(0.08)	(0.08)
Country of origin			39			
Cluster S.E. (country of origin)			Yes			
# of respondents			2723			

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table 4.A3: Cox hazard models on the third birth among immigrants daughters

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Origin-country fertility ideals	1.02	1.05	1.05			
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)			
Origin-country TFR at age 15				1.03	1.04	1.05
				(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Number of siblings			1.05*			1.05*
			(0.02)			(0.02)
Generation: 1.5th generation						
2nd generation	0.77**	0.78**	0.77**	0.79**	0.80*	0.79*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Language at home (French)						
Bilingual	0.99	1.00	0.98	0.86	0.87	0.85
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Other than French	1.11	1.11	1.10	0.98	0.98	0.95
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
No religious affiliation						
Other Christian	0.75	0.76	0.76	1.01	1.01	1.00
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Catholic	0.98	0.99	1.00	0.87	0.88	0.89
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Muslims	2.02***	1.99***	1.92***	2.00***	1.94***	1.87***
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Others	1.06	1.09	1.10	1.49*	1.51**	1.51**
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Importance of religion	0.97	0.97	0.96	1.00	1.00	1.00
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education (primary)						
Lower Sec	0.90	0.89	0.90	0.85	0.83	0.83
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Higher Sec	0.80	0.76	0.78	0.71	0.66	0.67
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
2-year college	0.72	0.66	0.69	0.79	0.71	0.74
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.77	0.70	0.70	0.62*	0.55**	0.56**
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Foreign-born parents						
Native mother	1.51***	1.53***	1.59***	1.40***	1.42***	1.46***
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Native father	1.08	1.08	1.17	1.10	1.10	1.17
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)

Table 4.A3: Cox hazard models on the third birth among immigrants daughters (continued)

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Time-varying variables						
Marital status (Native-born married spouse)						
Single		1.16	1.14		1.01	1.01
		(0.34)	(0.32)		(0.28)	(0.26)
Native cohabited spouse		1.49	1.43		1.07	1.04
		(0.32)	(0.29)		(0.30)	(0.28)
Foreign-born cohabited spouse		0.49	0.49		0.58	0.59
		(0.31)	(0.32)		(0.23)	(0.24)
Foreign-born married spouse		1.64*	1.67*		1.40	1.44
		(0.41)	(0.42)		(0.39)	(0.39)
End school		0.95	0.94		0.93	0.93
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Country of origin			36			
Cluster S.E. (country of origin)			Yes			
# of respondents			1823			

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table 4.A4: Cox hazard models on the first birth among immigrants sons

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.96	0.99	0.99			
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)			
Origin-country TFR at age 15				0.96	1.00	1.00
				(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of siblings			1.01			1.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)
Generation: 1.5th generation						
2nd generation	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.93	0.95	0.94
	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Language at home (French)						
Bilingual	0.87***	0.90*	0.89**	0.88**	0.91	0.90*
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Other than French	1.15	1.18*	1.17*	1.14	1.19*	1.18*
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
No religious affiliation						
Other Christian	1.28	1.29	1.30	1.34*	1.31	1.32
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Catholic	1.10	1.05	1.06	1.03	1.01	1.02
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Muslims	1.23	1.25*	1.24	1.20	1.18	1.18
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Others	0.68*	0.68*	0.72	0.68	0.66*	0.70
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Importance of religion	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.04	1.02	1.02
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education (primary)						
Lower Sec	1.18	1.10	1.10	1.12	1.06	1.06
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Higher Sec	0.82	0.85	0.85	0.80*	0.85	0.85
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
2-year college	0.69**	0.69***	0.69***	0.66**	0.68***	0.68***
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.69**	0.80*	0.80*	0.66**	0.79*	0.80*
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Foreign-born parents						
Native mother	0.99	0.88***	0.88***	0.97	0.87***	0.87***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Native father	1.00	0.90	0.90	0.96	0.90	0.90
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)

Table 4.A4: Cox hazard models on the first birth among immigrants sons (continued)

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Time-varying variables						
Marital status (Native-born married spouse)						
Single		0.16***	0.16***		0.16***	0.16***
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Native cohabited spouse		0.62***	0.62***		0.61***	0.61***
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Foreign-born cohabited spouse		0.46***	0.46***		0.45***	0.44***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
Foreign-born married spouse		0.68***	0.68***		0.67***	0.67***
		(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.07)	(0.07)
End school		1.80***	1.79***		1.89***	1.89***
		(0.27)	(0.27)		(0.29)	(0.29)
Country of origin			43			
Cluster S.E. (country of origin)			Yes			
# of respondents			3481			

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table 4.A5: Cox hazard models on the second birth among immigrants sons

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Origin-country fertility ideals	1.05	1.02	1.02			
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)			
Origin-country TFR at age 15				1.01	1.01	1.01
				(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Number of siblings			1.14***			1.15***
			(0.05)			(0.05)
Generation: 1.5th generation						
2nd generation	1.11	1.12	1.13	1.11	1.13	1.12
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Language at home (French)						
Bilingual	1.30**	1.30**	1.29**	1.30*	1.31*	1.31*
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Other than French	1.60***	1.56***	1.56***	1.64***	1.62***	1.61***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
No religious affiliation						
Other Christian	0.80*	0.78*	0.79*	1.05	1.04	1.04
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Catholic	0.97	0.97	0.98	1.05	1.05	1.05
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Muslims	1.08	1.04	1.03	1.07	1.04	1.04
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Others	1.09	1.07	1.07	1.06	1.05	1.06
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Importance of religion	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.01	1.01	1.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education (primary)						
Lower Sec	0.95	0.92	0.92	0.98	0.95	0.95
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Higher Sec	0.94	0.87	0.88	0.99	0.95	0.95
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)
2-year college	1.30*	1.18	1.19	1.24	1.17	1.17
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Bachelor's degree or higher	1.26	1.13	1.13	1.22	1.14	1.14
	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Foreign-born parents						
Native mother	1.23*	1.22	1.22*	1.17	1.16	1.16
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Native father	1.18	1.18	1.19	1.18	1.18	1.17
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)

Table 4.A5: Cox hazard models on the second birth among immigrants' sons (continued)

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Time-varying variables						
Marital status (Native-born married spouse)						
Single		0.96	0.94		0.98	0.97
		(0.77)	(0.77)		(0.51)	(0.51)
Native cohabited spouse		2.18	2.19		1.47	1.47
		(1.03)	(1.03)		(0.70)	(0.69)
Foreign-born cohabited spouse		1.33	1.34		0.52	0.52
		(0.92)	(0.92)		(0.41)	(0.41)
Foreign-born married spouse		4.12***	4.17***		2.57**	2.58**
		(1.52)	(1.56)		(0.90)	(0.90)
End school		0.94	0.93		0.89	0.89
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Country of origin	38					
Cluster S.E. (country of origin)	Yes					
# of respondents	1974					

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table 4.A6: Cox hazard models on the third birth among immigrants sons

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Origin-country fertility ideals	1.04	1.04	1.04			
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)			
Origin-country TFR at age 15				1.00	1.01	0.98
				(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Number of siblings			1.16***			1.16***
			(0.04)			(0.04)
Generation: 1.5th generation						
2nd generation	0.93	0.91	0.93	0.94	0.91	0.94
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Language at home (French)						
Bilingual	1.16	1.17	1.11	1.16	1.17	1.13
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Other than French	1.26	1.27	1.25	1.24	1.26	1.24
	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)
No religious affiliation						
Other Christian	1.28	1.30	1.26	1.30	1.32	1.25
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.31)
Catholic	0.94	0.95	0.98	0.95	0.96	0.97
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Muslims	2.40***	2.49***	2.28***	2.40***	2.48***	2.32***
	(0.38)	(0.44)	(0.48)	(0.40)	(0.47)	(0.42)
Others	2.07*	2.13*	2.36*	2.01*	2.09*	2.23*
	(0.68)	(0.70)	(0.88)	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.77)
Importance of religion	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education (primary)						
Lower Sec	0.65***	0.66***	0.69***	0.65***	0.66***	0.69***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Higher Sec	0.63**	0.65	0.70	0.64**	0.65	0.70
	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.18)
2-year college	0.65	0.71	0.76	0.65	0.71	0.75
	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.66*	0.71	0.78	0.66*	0.71	0.79
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Foreign-born parents						
Native mother	0.97	0.97	1.02	0.96	0.97	1.02
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.28)
Native father	1.64**	1.60**	1.83**	1.63**	1.59**	1.87***
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.36)

Table 4.A6: Cox hazard models on the third birth among immigrant sons (continued)

	Origin-country fertility ideals			Origin-country TFR at age 15		
	Base.	T.V.	Full	Base.	T.V.	Full
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Time-varying variables						
Marital status (Native-born married spouse)						
Single		0.66	0.74		0.66	0.73
		(0.23)	(0.28)		(0.23)	(0.27)
Native cohabited spouse		1.20	1.25		1.20	1.25
		(0.32)	(0.35)		(0.32)	(0.34)
Foreign-born cohabited spouse		0.88	0.89		0.86	0.86
		(0.44)	(0.49)		(0.43)	(0.46)
Foreign-born married spouse		0.54	0.76		0.54	0.75
		(0.19)	(0.32)		(0.19)	(0.32)
End school		1.12	1.08		1.13	1.07
		(0.19)	(0.18)		(0.19)	(0.17)
Country of origin			35			
Cluster S.E. (country of origin)			Yes			
# of respondents			1216			

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Interlude III

Chapter 4 explores whether parental origin-country fertility norms influence the ideal family size of the second generation in France. However, the specific mechanisms behind this influence remain unclear. To address this puzzle, the following chapter focuses on the role of parents and examines how parent-child socialization shapes the ideal family size of the second generation, taking into account the influence of the country of origin.

The next chapter focuses on two important cultural practices within migrant families: religion and language. Drawing on the emerging literature on family and migration, it examines the long-term effects of childhood religious and linguistic practices on fertility ideals. As argued in the following chapter, while religion and language share certain characteristics, they play distinct roles in parent-child transmission. In particular, religion directly influences the desired family size of immigrant children. Among immigrant children, those raised in Muslim families or in highly religious families express a greater desire for a larger number of children. On the other hand, the use of the language of the parent's country of origin does not directly influence the ideal family size. Instead, it moderates the influence of the country of origin. Individuals who spoke the mother language at home during childhood tend to adhere more closely to the fertility ideals of their country of origin than those who grew up speaking French.

Chapter 5

Religion or language? How family socialization shapes the influence of parental origin-country fertility norms on the ideal family size among children of immigrants in France

Published in the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*; 15 May 2023; Online first

Abstract

How do immigrant parents transmit their origin-country fertility ideals to their children? Drawing on a national sample of immigrants and their children in France (the 'Trajectories et Origins' survey), this study argues that the two main aspects of cultural practices in migrant families, religion and language, influence the fertility socialisation of immigrant children in different ways. Religion, often regulating family life and sexuality, directly shapes the ideal family size of immigrant children. Among children of immigrants, those growing up in Muslim families and those in highly religious families desire more children. By contrast, the use of parental origin-country language does not directly affect ideal family size but instead moderates country-of-origin influence. Those who (solely or partly) spoke their parental origin-country language at home during childhood conform more closely to parental origin-country fertility ideals than those who grew up speaking French. These findings highlight that religion and language play different roles in fertility socialisation in migrant families.

Introduction

The fertility behaviors in migrant families have received much scholarly attention. In Europe, demographers have found that fertility patterns among the second generation are converging with those of the mainstream population due to exposure to and socialization with host-country institutions and norms (Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014; Milewski 2009; Pailhé 2017; Wilson 2019). In addition to social institutions, such as schools and the workplace, demographers have noticed that the *family* is also a critical socialization agent that shapes adolescents' and young adults' long-term family behaviors, such as union formation and childbirth attitudes and behaviors, especially in migrant families (Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014; Milewski 2009). However, due to a lack of effective measurement methods, existing studies have paid little attention to *how* family socialization during childhood shapes the influence of parental origin-country fertility ideals on fertility ideals among children of immigrants.

What, then, are the key aspects of family socialization in migrant families? In the field of migration and ethnic studies, *language* and *religion* have been identified as two central cultural practices and intergenerational socialization in families (Brubaker 2013, p. 3). Many studies have focused on the intergenerational maintenance of parental origin-country language and religion in migrant families. Researchers have highlighted family as a critical locus for transmitting origin-country language and religion (Jacob and Kalter 2013; Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013; Portes and Hao 1998; Soehl 2016; Van De Pol and Van Tubergen 2014). Further, religious and linguistic socialization during childhood has a long-lasting effect on the attitudes and behaviors of children of immigrants. These practices not only provide crucial resources for developing a positive ethnic identity and creating a symbolic distinction between native and ethnic groups, but also facilitate the maintenance of family cohesion, enable access to ethnic networks, and reinforce cultural and

social connections to the parental origin country (Brubaker 2013; Giles and Coupland 1991; Gutierrez 2021; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Language practices during childhood also have many critical long-term consequences for adulthood, particularly in the parent-child relationship (Portes and Hao 2002) but also in education and work trajectories (Lutz and Crist 2009; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) and the connection to the parental origin-country (Gutierrez 2021; Soehl and Waldinger 2012). Likewise, childhood religious environments also have a long-term influence on the second generation: children of immigrants who grew up in more religious families than average tend to have stronger emotional ties with their foreign-born parents and are more protected from negative and hostile environments in mainstream society (Bankston and Zhou 1995; Soehl 2020).

In this study, I link these two research areas and investigate how intergenerational linguistic and religious socialization shape the transmission of fertility ideals between parental origin country and the children of immigrants. This analysis thus adds to the literature on migrant families by explicitly exploring the mechanisms of cross-border connection between sending and destination communities regarding family norms and values (Van Hook and Glick 2020, p. 234). Further, this study also precisely responds to recent studies that have called for investigating fertility attitudes rather than behaviors in migrant families (Milewski and Mussino 2019). This line of research has argued that individual ideals and host-country context shape fertility behavior. Also, solely focusing on behaviors may overlook individual reproductive and marital/cohabited conditions. Still, various concepts have been developed to measure fertility attitudes, such as fertility intentions and ideals. Fertility intentions have been recognized as concepts in the middle of fertility ideals and behaviors that are subject to change over time because they are shaped not only by fertility ideals but also by individual characteristics, partner's intention, and structural contexts such as the economic environment and the change of "parenting schemas" (Bachrach and Morgan

2013; Hagewen and Morgan 2005; Testa and Grilli 2006). Fertility ideals, on the other hand, are most often set for the population as a whole and, as such, represent a social and cultural norm that is more stable over time and less influenced by individual constraints and circumstances.[16] Given these characteristics, fertility ideals have been seen as a more appropriate measure to study fertility transmission in the migration context (Milewski and Mussino 2019; Mussino and Ortensi 2018).

This study also adds to the debate on the social integration of immigrants and their children in Europe. The current study argues that although language and religion have similar roles in social life, they function differently in regard to acculturation and assimilation in migrant and minority families (Brubaker 2013). Language is an important medium of communication that connects the second generation to their parental origin country, but it does not contain any intrinsic normative content. By contrast, religion is not a communication tool but often comes with a set of cultural norms and practices (Brubaker 2013, p. 14) that regulate an individual's family life and sexuality. This analysis expands the scope of this debate by including fertility ideals, and the conceptual framework is demonstrated in the following path diagram (Figure 5.1).

[16] Besides fertility ideals and intentions, demographers also developed fertility desires and expectation to measure people's fertility attitudes. The meaning of fertility desires is closed to personal fertility ideals, especially in a situation where there were no childbearing constraints and perfect fertility control (Thomson 2015). Generally, it is conceptualized as the demand for children. On the other hand, fertility expectations, like intentions, include both desires/ideals regarding the size of the family and the perception of the likelihood that the preferences can be translated into outcomes. However, expectations contain a greater degree of uncertainty because expectations include both intentions and external factors (Bachrach and Morgan 2013), and empirically, scholars often use intentions as a general term that includes both (Hayford 2009). As this study specifically examines how family socialization shapes the cultural dissimilation process, an examination of the relationship between fertility ideals, desires, intentions, and realistic expectations is beyond the scope of this article.



Note: (a) The path diagram shows the direct effect of individual-level "Religion" on the individual-level outcome "Ideal family size" and the direct effect of group-level "Origin-country fertility ideals" on the individual-level outcome "Ideal family size." (b) It also shows a moderate effect of individual-level "language use" on the effect of group-level "Origin-country fertility ideals" on the individual-level outcome "Ideal family size."

Figure 5.1: Path diagram

Methodologically, I follow a growing body of work in migration studies that directly measures the origin-country context rather than using nationality as a proxy variable (Luthra, Waldinger, et al. 2018; Ng 2022; Soehl 2017a). Taking advantage of the "Trajectories et Origins" (TeO) survey, which contains information on respondents' ideal family size as well as detailed data on childhood religious and language practices and (parental) countries of origin, I directly measure origin-country fertility ideals by calculating the mean ideal number of children in the country of origin from multiple data sources (see Mussino and Ortensi 2018). This methodological approach clearly distinguishes the influence of origin-country cultural norms and individual-level characteristics. More importantly, it allows me to investigate whether language moderates parental

origin-country's influence on fertility ideals among children of immigrants through interaction terms between origin-country ideals and religious and linguistic variables.

Findings suggest that for the socialization process of fertility ideals, migrant generation is not the decisive variable: neither influence of origin-country ideals on individuals nor absolute ideal family size decreases across generations. Instead, *family socialization* plays a decisive role in transmitting and shaping fertility ideals within migrant families. Among the children of immigrants, those who (solely or partly) spoke their origin-country language at home during childhood tend to adhere more closely to their origin-country fertility ideals than those who exclusively spoke French at home. By contrast, those growing up in Muslim and highly religious families desire a larger family size than non-religious families. These findings highlight that the two primary cultural practices, religion and language, play different roles in fertility socialization in migrant families.

5.1 Fertility Socialization in the Context of Migration

5.1.1 Fertility Dissimilation in Fertility Ideals

The direct application of the assimilation framework to the realm of fertility posits that the differences in fertility ideals between migrant families and the mainstream population will decrease over time and across generations. For the first generation, the incentive of assimilation is usually economical, but assimilation may unintentionally translate into cultural and attitudinal change. Immigrants' attitudinal shifts follow what Gordon (1964) called "structural assimilation": developing widespread primary relationships with majority members and gaining acceptance into mainstream social spaces. Indeed, changes in social relations can follow from other aspects of assimilation. For instance, as immigrants increase their financial resources, they can leave their

ethnic neighborhoods to move to middle-class suburbs (Alba, Logan, and Crowder 1997). Exposure to the native population may also enhance the opportunity to enter mainstream social spaces. Following this logic, immigrants may eventually adopt the mainstream norms and values and increasingly become similar to the natives and dissimilar from those in their country of origin (FitzGerald 2014, p.178), regardless of whether they notice them (Alba and Nee 2003).

The dissimilation process is usually more evident in the second generation. As foreign-born parents may adopt a certain level of fertility values and norms from mainstream society, they may become less attached to their origin-country fertility norms and therefore have fewer incentives than non-migrants in their origin country to transmit their origin-country culture to their children. Further, as the children of immigrants spend their formative years in the settlement-society context and have extensive exposure to institutions such as schools, the parental origin-country attitude context will have little influence on their cultural norms and values. Some transnationalism studies have suggested that immigrants may maintain ties with their origin country and society over time and even a generation (Levitt and Schiller 2004; Levitt 1998). However, the ties to their origin country tend to diminish over time and across generations (Soehl and Waldinger 2010), and only a small number of immigrants' children will still be strongly connected to parental origin countries (Soehl and Waldinger 2012).

A recent study on Turkish migrants and their children in Europe demonstrated a significant generational difference in most transnational behaviors (Klok et al. 2020). While not all transnational activities develop over time and generations, certain activities such as transnational economic activities and circular, chain, and marriage migration behaviors may persist across generations. However, the sociocultural aspect of transnationalism, including visits, media consumption, language, and sense of belonging, tends to decline significantly across generations

(Safi 2018 and Trieu, Vargas, and Gonzales 2016). This reduction in sociocultural connections may lead to a dissimilation of values and attitudes.Empirical studies on attitudes toward gender roles and homosexuality also demonstrate that the origin-country culture has less influence on the children of immigrants than on their foreign-born parents (Ng 2022; Soehl 2017a). Similarly, studies on migrant fertility behavior align with this view and have found that most second-generation immigrants share similar fertility patterns with native individuals (Pailhé 2017; Wilson 2019; Woldemicael and Beaujot 2012). However, these studies focused on migrants' actual fertility rather than fertility ideals or attitudes. Nevertheless, the basic assumption of these studies is that migrants' fertility assimilation is primarily due to fertility ideal acculturation. Taken together, I posit the following hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 1:* Dissimilation in fertility ideals: The influence of origin-country fertility norms on ideal family size in migrant families decreases across generations.

5.1.2 Religious Doctrine and the Importance of Religion during Childhood

Numerous empirical studies have suggested that Muslims tend to hold more traditional attitudes toward family values than non-Muslims because Islamic doctrines and practices are perceived to encourage early simultaneous parental home-leaving and marriage, followed quickly by childbirth (Michael and Tuma 1985; Régnier-Loilier and Prioux 2008). For example, a cross-national study by Morgan et al. (2002) suggested that Muslim women tend to have more children and desire additional children than their non-Muslim counterparts. Muslims women also tend to enter marriage and parenthood at earlier ages and have larger ideal family sizes than non-Muslim women (Michael and Tuma 1985). In the context of migration, previous research on fertility behaviors has demonstrated that immigrants from Muslim-majority countries tend to enter

parenthood earlier and have more children (Kulu et al. 2017; Milewski 2009; Pailhé 2017; Wilson 2019). Although the fertility of the second generation usually decreases across generations, there are some exceptions to this trend for those whose parents are from Muslim-majority countries. For example, children of immigrants from Turkey have higher first- and second-birth transition rates than native women in France (Pailhé 2017); similarly, second-generation Pakistanis and Bangladeshis have a higher level of completed fertility than the natives in the United Kingdom (Wilson 2019). Subsequently, I posit the following hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 2a:* Islamic Doctrine: Muslim immigrants and their children have a higher ideal number of children than their non-Muslim counterparts.

However, high fertility may not be inherent due to Islamic doctrine. In fact, there is no centralized view within Islam regarding the acceptability of contraceptive use, and many Muslim-majority countries actively support making contraceptives available. The high fertility among Muslims may not be due to the Islamic doctrine and practices but because of differences in sociocultural factors between Muslims and non-Muslims, such as higher religiosity and corresponding attitudes, norms, and aspirations prioritizing large family sizes. On average, Muslim immigrants and their children have higher religiosity than their non-Muslim counterparts in Western Europe (van Tubergen 2006), and France is certainly not an exception (Drouhot 2021; Soehl 2017b). Religious people often espouse family norms that emphasize large families and traditional gender roles, with childbearing central to women's self-concepts (Hayford and Morgan 2008). The association between religiosity and fertility can be found in different contexts. For example, a recent study in Canada demonstrated that women with high religiosity have higher fertility rates than those less religious women (Dilmaghani 2019). In addition, another recent study further suggests that the differences in ideal family size between Muslim and non-Muslim women

can largely be explained by the high religiosity of Muslims (Behrman and Erman 2019). These studies have provided a fruitful understanding of how religiosity is linked to fertility ideals. However, like religion, fertility ideals are primarily shaped during childhood and more stable over the life course than other fertility attitudes and behaviors (Miller 2011; Thomson 2015). Still, few studies have investigated whether the importance of religion during childhood influences the ideal family size after the transition to adulthood. Therefore, I expect the following:

> *Hypothesis 2b:* The high level of religiosity during childhood explains the difference in ideal family size between Muslims and non-Muslims (non-religious and Christian).

5.1.3 The cultural bridge between here and there: Origin-country language

Like religion, linguistic practice is also a primary factor shaping immigrants' connection to their origin country, as using one's mother language, especially at home, is central for communication across generations and with those left behind in countries of origin (Gutierrez 2021). As posited by the concept of selective acculturation in the segmented assimilation framework, for children of immigrants, the ability to speak their mother language is essential for maintaining a more coherent relationship with their parents (Lutz and Crist 2009; Portes and Hao 2002; Portes and Rumbaut 2001), their ethnic community, and their parent's relatives and friends in the home country (Gutierrez 2021; Soehl and Waldinger 2012). Language is not simply a *tool* for communication but also has a powerful *emotional attachment* to the origin country. For the first generation, speaking "one's own" language is often associated with feeling at home (Brubaker, Feischmidt, and Fox 2006, p. 264). Precisely for this reason, immigrants who insist on speaking their origin-country language at home to their children likely tend to have a strong emotional attachment to their origin country. They, therefore, may have stronger incentives and cultural resources to

transmit their origin-country cultural norms to their children.

In both cases, for the children of immigrants, speaking their parental origin-country language at home is expected to have more substantial exposure and attachment to their parental origin country, including fertility ideals. Empirically, despite focusing on different aspects of family and gender attitudes, recent studies have found that origin-country gender and sexual norms influence people using origin-country language more than those exclusively using settlement-country language (Ng 2022; Soehl 2017a). In fact, recent literature on the link between language and fertility among immigrants (and their children) also suggests that speaking a non-destination language is associated with a larger actual family size (Adsera and Ferrer 2014). However, I argue that language does not influence fertility by itself since language does not contain any cultural norms on fertility. In the current study, instead of regarding language as an independent decisive variable, I treat language as a moderator that shapes the influence of origin-country fertility ideals on an individual's ideal family size among the children of immigrants. Thus, I posit:

> *Hypothesis 3:* Linguistic socialization: Children of immigrants who spoke their origin-country language at home during childhood will resemble origin-country fertility ideals more than those who used French.

5.2 The French Context

In France, as in other high-income countries, the start of parenthood has been postponed in recent decades. However, in contrast to the other high-income countries, this postponement does not seem to affect the completed fertility rate much. Since 1975, France's total fertility rate (TFR) has remained almost stable at around 1.8 children per woman. It fell slightly at the beginning of the 1990s and has risen narrowly since 1996 (Revillard 2006). After that, the TFR remained stable at

around 1.9. Although, similar to other European countries, the mean ideal family size in France has decreased slightly in the past few decades, France stands at the upper end of the range of ideal family sizes in Europe (with an average of 2.34). The predominant ideal of having two children coexists with a high proportion of women who express an ideal of having three children, and having one or no children is still rare (Testa and Grilli 2006). In combination with generous and multiple family policies, such as family allowances, tax credits, and childcare services, which enable people, especially women, to reconcile family and work, the gap between ideal family size and completed fertility is smaller than in most European countries (Toulemon, Pailhé, and Rossier 2008). The overall fertility is higher in France than in other European countries. However, within France, fertility still differs across migrant groups (Pailhé 2017). Most immigrant women, especially those born in high-fertility countries such as North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and Turkey, have more children than the native French (Toulemon et al. 2008, p.523).

5.3 Data, Variables, and Method

To evaluate the arguments outlined above, this study drew on data from a nationally representative study of immigrants in France—the TeO—carried out by the French Institute for Demographic Studies (INED in French) in 2008/2009. The survey used confidential government data to construct a sampling frame of immigrants and their children, and the interviews were conducted face-to-face. The TeO asked the respondents who were of working age (aged 18–60) in metropolitan areas in France. In this survey, the respondents were asked a long list of questions about immigrants' country of origin and socioeconomic characteristics, such as the ideal number of children, year of migration, and timing of childbirth.

For the current analysis, I limited the sample to immigrants and their children (*n*=16,550). Because the data collection involved matching information on the origin-country ideal family size from multiple datasets by identifying origin countries among immigrants, I included only respondents whose country of origin was identified in the survey. After excluding observations from the countries I could not identify (*n*=1,657; five regions) and no information on ideal family size (*n*=978; six countries),[17] 49 countries of origin and 13,915 respondents remained. After further excluding respondents with missing dependent and independent variables (*n*=1,106; 7.9% missing), the final sample included 12,809 respondents (4,977 immigrants and 7,832 children of immigrants). I then examined the influence of origin-country fertility ideals and individual characteristics on the ideal number of children using Poisson regression models with clustered standard errors at the country of origin level.[18]

5.3.1 Dependent variable

Following recent studies, I used the ideal number of children to measure fertility-related acculturation (Mussino and Ortensi 2018) because ideals regarding fertility directly reflect cultural aspects of people's values and norms (Milewski and Mussino 2019). The TeO asked respondents

[17] For example, the TeO categorizes immigrants from most Asian countries as "other Asian countries." As a result, I must remove data from these countries since there is no available linkage to datasets that record the average ideal number of children in these countries. Therefore, I had to drop data from 11 origin countries and regions (2,635 respondents) due to their unidentified area, which includes Other Europe, Other Africa, Other Asia, North America, South America, and insufficient information on ideal number of children in the origin country (978 respondents), such as Tunisia, Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Portugal, and Cyprus.

[18] To test the robustness of the results (available upon request), I also ran all models using hierarchical ordered logistic regression (ordinal outcome variable: from none to more than six; individual and origin-country level) and hierarchical linear regression models (treating the ideal number of children as a continuous variable) with clustered country-level standard errors. The results of these models were consistent with those of the Poisson regression models.

to assess their ideal family size in the following way: “In your opinion, what is the ideal number of children in a family?”[19] The descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables can be found in Table 5.1.

[19] The TeO asked about the ideal family size of respondents using an alternate approach, by asking, “And when you think in particular of people from the same background as you and with the same income, what is the ideal number of children in a family.” However, I opted to use the primary questionnaire in the main text to measure the ideal family size, as it maintains consistency with the questionnaires utilized in the datasets employed to assess the respondents’ origin-country fertility ideals. Furthermore, I conducted the same analyses using the alternative measure of the ideal number of children as the dependent variable, and the results were consistent with the models utilizing the main-text measure. Previous literature has also established that these two measures are similar (Testa 2012, Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014), and have been used interchangeably in previous empirical research on migrant fertility (Mussino and Ortensi 2018).

Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of immigrant sample in the TeO

	Overall	Immigrants	Child. of im.	Missing
Dependent variable				
The ideal number of children				5.9%
Mean	2.85	3.01	2.75	
Std. dev.	1.50	1.73	1.33	
Min	0	0	0	
Max	23	23	22	
Independent variables: continuous				
Average of origin-country ideal number of children				0%
Mean	3.45	3.83	3.2	
Std. dev.	1.87	2.12	1.65	
Min	2.02	2.02	2.02	
Max	7.89	7.89	7.89	
Origin country total fertility rate at age 15				0%
Mean	3.88	4.79	3.32	
Std. dev.	2.02	1.97	1.83	
Min	1.13	1.13	1.13	
Max	7.94	7.94	7.76	
Number of siblings				0.6%
Mean	3.57	4.15	3.2	
Std. dev.	1.96	1.92	1.89	
Min	0	0	0	
Max	6	6	6	
Age				0.1%
Mean	35.29	40.73	31.86	
Std. dev.	11.15	10.58	10.08	
Min	18	18	18	
Max	60	60	60	
Independent variables: categorical				
Religious affiliation				2.0%
Non-religious	0.26	0.17	0.33	
Christian	0.3	0.3	0.3	
Muslim	0.39	0.47	0.34	
Other religions	0.05	0.06	0.03	
The imp. of religion during childhood				1.8%
No importance at all	0.2	0.14	0.25	
A little bit of importance	0.25	0.2	0.27	
A fair amount of importance	0.23	0.23	0.22	
A lot of importance	0.32	0.43	0.26	
Language at home during childhood				0.2%
French	0.25	0.04	0.38	
Bilingual	0.38	0.26	0.46	
Other than French	0.37	0.7	0.16	

Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of immigrant sample in the TeO (continued)

	Overall	Immigrants	Child. of im.	Missing
Level of education				1.2%
Primary or lower	0.21	0.32	0.14	
Lower secondary	0.29	0.23	0.33	
Higher secondary	0.2	0.16	0.23	
2-year college	0.11	0.08	0.12	
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.19	0.21	0.18	
Gender				0%
Male	0.46	0.47	0.46	
Female	0.54	0.53	0.54	
Parents migration background				0.3%
Both parents are foreign-born			0.62	
Native mother			0.23	
Native father			0.15	
Marital status				0%
Unmarried	0.4	0.37	0.41	
France-born spouse	0.42	0.32	0.5	
Foreign-born spouse	0.18	0.31	0.09	
The actual number of children				0%
None	0.39	0.2	0.52	
One	0.16	0.18	0.15	
Two	0.23	0.25	0.21	
Three	0.22	0.37	0.12	
Origin-country official language				0%
Non-French	0.72	0.67	0.74	
French	0.28	0.33	0.26	
# of origin country	49	45	43	
# of respondent	12809	4977	7832	

Source: TeO survey, children of immigrants are those who moved to France at or under 6 years old and those who were born in France with at least one of the parents is foreign-born.

5.3.2 Independent variables

Origin-country fertility ideals

I measured this variable by calculating the mean ideal family size of the country of origin. Data were from respondents between 15 and 60 years old from the following three datasets conducted around 2000. The "Demographic and Health Survey" covers one Asian and 18 African countries included in this study's sample. Respondents were asked, "If you could go back to the time when you did not have any children and could choose exactly the number of children to have in your whole life, what would it be?" The "Eurobarometer" covers 11 European countries, and respondents were asked, "What would be the ideal number of children you would like to have or would have liked to have had?" The "World Values Survey" covers the rest of the 19 countries in the TeO sample. Respondents were asked, "What do you think is the ideal size of a family? How many children, if any?" Figure 5.2 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the mean origin-country ideal family size.



Figure 5.2: Parental origin-country fertility ideal
(average ideal number of children in parental origin country)

Generation

The data on arrival age, country of birth, and generational status were used to create a dummy variable: (0) immigrants who moved to France after age six, (1) Immigrants who moved to France at or under age six with their foreign-born parent(s), or those who were born in France and at least one parent is foreign-born.

Language spoken at home during childhood

Respondents were asked what language they spoke to their parents during childhood. I sorted responses into three categories: (1) French only, (2) both French and another language, and (3) another language only.

Religious denomination

The TeO asked respondents whether they have religion, and if so, the respondents would be asked which religion (an open-end question). According to the respondents' answers, the TeO organized a detailed religion list. Then, I re-coded them into four major categories: (1) Not religious, (2) Christian, (3) Muslim, and a fourth category capturing "other religious," which includes small numbers of Buddhists, Jews, and Hindus, as well as religions that were not further classified in the survey.[20]

Importance of religion during childhood

Respondents were asked about the importance of religion during childhood in their family using a four-point scale: (1) No importance at all, (2) a little bit of importance, (3) a fair amount of importance, and (4) a lot of importance.

[20] For those who are religious, less than 1 percent of respondents belong to a religion different from the one in which they were raised, and less than 2 percent of them grew up in households where parents were of different religions.

5.3.3 Control variables

Number of siblings

A wide range of literature has indicated that parental fertility behaviors may influence children's fertility (Jennifer S Barber 2001; Murphy and Knudsen 2002). I, therefore, included the number of siblings as a proxy indicator of respondents' completed parental fertility to measure parental fertility behaviors. This variable was divided into seven categories: (0) No siblings, (1) one, (2) two, (3) three, (4) four, (5) five, (6) six, or more.

Gender and age

Because men and women may differ in their ideal number of children, a binary variable indicated whether respondents were male or female. Age is also included in the models.

Marital status and spouse/partner's migration background

Married/partnered individuals may desire a larger family, and the migration background of spouses/partners may also be relevant. To construct this variable, I used information regarding respondents' current marital status and the migration background of respondents' current spouse or cohabitating partner. This information was combined into a three-categorical variable: (1) Single (including those who were divorced, separated, or widowed), (2) native-born spouse or cohabitating partner, and (3) foreign-born spouse or cohabitating partner.

Education

Education may increase exposure to liberal, modern ideas regarding smaller ideal family sizes. The education variable was categorized into five levels: (1) Primary school or lower, (2) lower secondary school, (3) upper secondary school, (4) two-year college, and (5) bachelor's degree or higher.

The current number of children

How many children respondents currently may influence the ideal family size. For example, more children may mean a desire for a larger family.

Parents' migration background

Children with one native-born parent may desire a smaller family than those with two foreign-born parents.

Whether French is the parental country of origin's official language

Immigrants and their children from countries where French is the official language may have different fertility acculturation processes than those from non-French countries. A dummy variable indicating whether French is the parental country of origin's official language was included in the models.

5.4 Results

5.4.1 Language use in migrant families: French and non-French official language origin countries

As this study aims to investigate whether the use of origin-country language at home during childhood shapes the influence of origin-country fertility ideals on the ideal family size among the children of immigrants, it is important to consider the case where a significant group of migrants originates from countries where French is the official language, such as Niger, Cameroon, and the Ivory Coast. The analyses might be biased if French had been the only language spoken at home during childhood in these migrant families. However, given that French is not usually the majority native language in the official French-speaking countries, it is still very common that migrants

from these countries continue to speak their native language to their children at home after their arrival.

The TeO contains detailed information on the language(s) spoken at home during childhood and (parental) origin country. Table 5.2 illustrates the language use of (a) immigrants and (b) children of immigrants by two groups of origin countries (non-French and French official language). In the upper part of the table, as expected, immigrants from French official language countries are more likely to report they exclusively spoke French or were bilingual at home than those from non-French official language countries, but the difference is small. For example, there was only a 7% difference regarding exclusively speaking French at home between immigrants from French- and non-French-speaking countries (8% vs. 1%, respectively). However, the gap widens for bilingualism between immigrants from French-speaking and non-French-speaking countries (39% vs. 16%). Finally, 83% of immigrants from non-French-speaking countries and 53% from French-speaking countries reported they did not speak French at home. In other words, over half of the immigrants from French official language countries reported they did not speak French at home. These results are not surprising since French usually is not usually the majority native language in countries where French is the official language (mainly in Africa).

Differences between language use at home during childhood disappear among children of immigrants. For instance, 39% of children of immigrants from non-French-speaking countries and 38% from French-speaking countries spoke French at home during childhood. Furthermore, 46% of children of immigrants from non-French-speaking countries and 51% from French-speaking countries reported they were bilingual at home while growing up. Finally, 15% of children of immigrants from non-French-speaking countries and 11% from French-speaking countries reported they did not speak French at home during childhood. In summary, the descriptive statistics

show that children whose parents come from a French official language country or a non-French official language country show almost no difference in the distribution of language use at home during childhood.

Table 5.2: Summary statistics for language use during childhood (Non-French/French official language)

Origin Country	French as a non-official language	French as an official language
(a) Immigrants		
Language at home during childhood		
French	0.01	0.08
Bilingual	0.16	0.39
Other	0.83	0.53
# of origin countries	30	15
# of respondents	3335	1642
(b) Children of immigrants		
Language at home during childhood		
French	0.39	0.38
Bilingual	0.46	0.51
Other	0.15	0.11
# of parental origin countries	28	15
# of respondents	5840	1992

Source: TeO, after excluding the missing value of variables in this analysis

5.4.2 Generational differences: dissimilation from the origin country?

Do origin-country fertility norms shape the ideal family size of immigrants and their children? In Table 5.3, Model 1 is a baseline model that only includes the main effect of the independent variables. Model 2 illustrates the interaction terms between origin-country fertility ideals and migrant generation (the detailed results of other variables are shown in Table A5.1 in the appendix). In both models, origin-country fertility norms are positively associated with the ideal number of children among immigrants and their children, which suggests that origin-country fertility norms shape both immigrants and their children's ideal family size. Focusing on Model 2, the non-significant results of interaction terms between migrant generation and origin-country fertility ideals show that the effect of origin-country fertility norms on an individual's ideal family size does not decrease across generations. Taken together, these results do not support the straight-line dissimilation theory (hypothesis 1) regarding the decreased influence of origin-country fertility norms on ideal family size across generations.

Table 5.3: Poisson regression on fertility ideals, generational differences

	Overall	
	(1)	(2)
	Baseline	Generation
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms		
Generation × origin ideals		
Children of immigrants X origin fertility ideals		0.01
		(0.01)
Main effects		
Generation (Immigrants)		
Children of immigrants	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Interval	0.87***	0.87***
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Country of origin	49	49
Observations	12809	12809

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; the detailed results of the control variables are shown in Table A1 in the appendix.

Table 5.4: Poisson regression on fertility ideals among children of immigrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Main effect	Interaction		
		Combined	Non-French	French
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.03***	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms				
Language × origin ideals				
Bilingual × origin ideals		0.03***	0.02*	0.03***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Other than French × origin ideals		0.02*	0.04*	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Main effects				
No religious affiliation				
Christian	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Muslims	0.12***	0.11***	0.12***	0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Others	0.13**	0.13**	0.11*	0.24***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
The imp. of religion during childhood (*not important at all*)				
A bit important	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Important	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Very important	0.08***	0.08***	0.06***	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Language at home during childhood (French)				
Bilingual	0.02**	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Other than French	0.02	-0.06	-0.11	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Interval	0.93***	0.99***	0.93***	1.09***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Country of origin	43	43	28	15
Observations	7832	7832	5840	1992

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; the detailed results of the control variables are shown in Table A2 in the appendix.

5.4.3 Family socialization: Religion and language

I further investigated whether two main aspects of family socialization in migrant families moderate the effect of origin-country fertility norms on ideal family size among children of immigrants (see Table 5.4; detailed results are presented in Table A5.2 in the appendix).[21] Again, the first model is the baseline model, while the rest of the models add interactions of origin-country fertility ideals with variables measuring *linguistic* socialization during childhood.

In Model 1, controlling for other variables, the results show that parental origin-country fertility norms are significantly associated with ideal family size among children of immigrants (coef.=0.03, $p<0.001$). This result is consistent with that in Model 2 in Table 5.3, suggesting parental origin-country fertility norms continue to influence ideal family size among children of immigrants. The result also demonstrates that Muslim children of immigrants desire a larger ideal family size than their non-Muslim counterparts (including the non-religious and Christians)[22]. Meanwhile, the importance of religion during childhood is also significantly associated with a larger family size: those who reported religion was very important in their family during childhood hold a larger ideal family size than those who reported religion was not important. These finding overall support hypothesis 2a rather than 2b. Muslim immigrants and their children have a higher ideal number of children than their non-Muslim counterparts, and this effect is independent of the importance of religion during childhood.

What about linguistic socialization at home during childhood? Model 2 adds the interaction between language use at home during childhood and parental origin-country fertility ideals. Both

[21] I also ran these models using only the second generation, excluding the 1.5 generation (those who arrived in France before age six). The results are consistent with those in the models of the in-text table, which included both the second and 1.5 generations (see Table A5.3 in the appendix).

[22] I replicate the model by treating Christian as reference group, the result still demonstrates that Muslims is significantly associated with larger ideal family size.

interaction coefficients are statistically significant. These results indicate that children of immigrants who reported they spoke both French and the origin-country language (coef.=0.03, $p<0.001$) and those who exclusively spoke the origin-country language (coef.=0.02, $p<0.05$) at home during childhood are more attached to parental origin-country fertility ideals than those who exclusively spoke French (see Figure 3). Models 3 and 4 replicated Model 2 but divided the sample according to those from French and non-French official language origin countries. The results are consistent with Model 2.



Figure 5.3: The influence of parental origin-country fertility ideal on the ideal family size among the children of immigrants by language use at home during childhood

The results of Models 3 and 4 are illustrated in Figures 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. Figure 5.4 shows origin-country effects from non-French official language countries, while Figure 5.5 illustrates those from French official language countries. As Figure 5.4 illustrates, among children with parents from non-French official language countries, those who used both French and the origin-country language at home during childhood appear to be more attached to parental origin-country fertility ideals than those who exclusively spoke French (coef=0.02, $p<0.05$). Additionally, those who exclusively spoke the origin-country language at home during childhood are more influenced by parental origin-country fertility ideals than those who exclusively spoke French at home (coef=0.04, $p<0.05$).



Figure 5.4. The influence of parental origin-country fertility ideal on the ideal family size among the children of immigrants by language use at home during childhood
(non-French official language origin country)

The models for children with parents from French official language countries show similar patterns. Figure 5.5 illustrates that those who used French and the origin-country language at home during childhood are more attached to parental origin-country fertility ideals than those who exclusively spoke French (coef.=0.03, p<0.001). However, no evidence demonstrates that those who exclusively spoke the origin-country language at home during childhood are more influenced by parental origin-country fertility ideals than those who exclusively spoke French at home; but this is likely due to the smaller sample size (90% confidence interval that does not include zero; coef.=0.02, equivalent to p<0.1). In summary, the findings support hypothesis 3.



Figure 5.5 The influence of parental origin-country fertility ideal on the ideal family size among the children of immigrants by language use at home during childhood
(French official language origin country)

5.5 Discussion and Conclusion

Research on fertility patterns of immigrants and their children in Europe has extensively documented that the second generation's fertility behaviors are converging with those of the native-born population (e.g., Kulu et al. 2017; Milewski 2009; Pailhé 2017; Wilson 2019). However, no research has systematically examined how family socialization, language and religion, shape the influence of parental origin-country fertility ideals on the ideal family size of immigrant children. Accordingly, this study makes two key contributions. First, it utilizes the unique TeO dataset, which contains a wide range of information related to linguistic and religious socialization during childhood, to underscore the importance of *family socialization* in this cross-border transmission process. Second, it highlights the different roles of *language* and *religion* in fertility socialization in migrant families.

Like all empirical studies, this study is not without limitations. First, as most data sources for most countries only cover short periods, origin-country fertility ideals cannot be analyzed as a time-varying variable. Because most countries' coverage periods did not completely overlap, I used one data point (the year 2000) that allowed most available countries to be covered. I also ran additional analyses that replicated all the regression models using the origin-country TFR when respondents were 15 years old to proxy origin-country fertility ideals for the robustness check. These results are consistent with those from the original models (see Tables A5 and A6 in the appendix). In addition, although TFR and origin-country fertility ideals are conceptually different,[23] the overall pattern of TFR and origin-country fertility ideals are close. Overall, the

[23] The use of origin-country fertility ideals and TFR has its own set of benefits and drawbacks. Origin-country fertility ideals, which represent the average ideal family size in a particular country, can provide a clear indication of the attitudinal aspect of the fertility norm in that country. However, this measure may not be able to accurately capture changes in the origin-country fertility norm over time, as survey data is not conducted annually. On the other hand, TFR of the origin country can provide a more precise measure of origin-country fertility, as it is based on yearly data. However, it measures fertility behaviors rather than fertility ideals, which can be a disadvantage since there may be a gap between people's ideals and their actual behavior.

findings suggest that TFR could be a reasonable proxy to origin-country fertility ideals for future studies.

The second limitation of this study stems from the TeO dataset's cross-sectional nature, which hindered a more dynamic analysis of the household-level process underpinning the micro-processes of fertility norm intergenerational transmission. Considering that cultural values may change, conducting a longitudinal study tracking immigrants' and their children's value orientations over their life course would be ideal. However, as the primary objective of this study was to determine whether parental origin-country fertility ideals affect the ideal family size of immigrants and their children, the TeO dataset remains the most appropriate source of information on parental origin-country norms. I also included the number of siblings, a proxy for parents' completed fertility, to capture the potential mediation effect of parental fertility behavior between parental origin-country fertility ideals and ideal family size for children of immigrants.

Another challenge is that migrants are selected by migration policy and the origin-country context in the migration process. It is conceivable that liberal, "Westernized" people are more likely to choose and be selected to start their new life in France. If this selection process produced a bias, it might undermine the association between origin-country fertility norms and migrants' fertility ideals. However, the effect of origin-country fertility ideals remains strong across all the models.[24] Also, the analysis strongly relies on interaction terms to examine how migration generation and language practices at home during childhood shape the influence of origin-country fertility ideals on the ideal family size among the children of immigrants. However, a discrepancy

[24] To examine this issue further, I conducted additional analyses that incorporated the type of migration upon arrival (available upon request). These models did not indicate any indication that economic migrants hold smaller preferred family sizes or have a weaker attachment to origin-country fertility ideals compared to those who arrived as refugees or family reunification migrants.

in fertility rates between the destination and origin countries is necessary to observe any discernible contrast.

With these caveats in mind, the study makes several contributions to the current debate. First, the analysis suggests that fertility ideals do not neatly correspond to the dissimilation assumption that the origin-country effect will decrease over generations as exposure to destination-country context and institutions, such as schools and workplaces, grows. Rather, the current findings show that origin-country fertility norms have a significant, enduring association with the ideal number of children among immigrants and their children. In contrast to previous empirical studies on fertility behaviors (e.g., Pailhé 2017; Wilson 2019), this study demonstrates that migrant generation is not relevant to the dissimilation process of fertility ideals: the influence of origin-country fertility ideals does not decrease across generations within migrant families in France.

The puzzle, then, is why are the current study's findings inconsistent with those from previous research on fertility behaviors? One possibility is that fertility behaviors may not solely reflect fertility preferences but may also be shaped by actual socioeconomic conditions and institutional context in the destination country (Milewski and Mussino 2019). That is, the convergence of fertility behaviors among children of immigrants may be mostly driven by destination socioeconomic context rather than the change in fertility ideal (Pailhé 2017, p. 1386). However, why do fertility ideals not change across generations while the origin-country effect decreases across generations for most public-sphere family and gender aspects, such as attitudes toward women's employment and homosexuality (e.g., Ng 2022; Pessin and Arpino 2018; Röder and Muhlau 2014; Soehl 2017)? It is likely closely related to how European mainstream society perceives these two different dimensions of family attitudes. Gender role ideology and homosexual attitudes have long been politicalized as marks of differences between migrants and natives and

focal points in debates about immigration, assimilation and cultural diversity in Western Europe (Maliepaard and Alba 2016; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2009; Soehl 2017a). However, the fertility ideal is still regarded as a relatively personal aspect that governments and societies refrain from intervening in European democratic countries. Undoubtedly, social institutions, such as schools, influence people's fertility attitudes; children of immigrants are certainly not an exception. Adolescents are taught about responsible parenthood, with the expectation that parents will devote sufficient time and financial resources to raising their children.However, these concepts are more likely to influence fertility intentions than ideals (Bachrach and Morgan 2013).

Furthermore, general-population studies have demonstrated that these two dimensions of family attitudes change at different paces and through distinct mechanisms (Goldscheider et al. 2015; Lappegård et al. 2021). Specifically, while public-sphere family attitudes may be easier to change with greater exposure to public institutions, private-sphere family attitudes may be more influenced by family socialization. This may imply that, in the context of international migration, parental socialization may have a greater power to shape children's values and preferences regarding private-sphere attitudes, such as fertility ideals.

Accordingly, what aspect of cultural practices shapes the fertility socialization process in migrant families: language, religion, or both? This study's findings support the argument that language and religion have different functions and roles in shaping social norms and values among children of immigrants. I found that religious socialization *directly* shapes the ideal family size for children of immigrants. Those who grew up in a more religious environment and Muslim families desired a larger family size than those who grew up in less religious and Christian families, which is consistent with the findings from the same setting by Behrman and Erman (2019). Conversely, language does not shape the ideal family size by itself but *indirectly* shapes the influence of

parental origin-country fertility ideals on the ideal family size of immigrant children. That is, the children of immigrants who (solely or partly) spoke their origin-country language at home during childhood were more influenced by origin-country fertility ideals than those who did not. As recent studies have demonstrated, the use of origin-country language plays an essential role in emotional bonds and interpersonal contact between children of immigrants and their non-migrant counterparts in origin communities, which helps maintain, or even strengthen, the cultural attachment between origin and destination (Gutierrez 2021; Soehl and Waldinger 2012). Empirically, recent studies have also demonstrated that origin-country language is key for transmitting origin-country family and sexual norms to immigrants and their children (Ng 2022; Soehl 2017a). Certainly, as the current study demonstrates, fertility ideals are not an exception.

More generally, this study also highlights a broader set of demographic transformations of migrants that remain poorly understood. When migrants move from a traditional society to a more liberal one and simultaneously move from one socioeconomic context to another, how does family socialization shape origin-country cultural norms' influence on family attitudes and behaviors? This study focused on only a small part of a board and a multidimensional range of attitudes, values, and norms. Thus, future research could examine whether the same dynamics apply to a broader range of topics in family studies, such as the ideal timing of marriage, types of union formation, and trajectories of transition to adulthood.

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5.7 Appendix

Table 5.A1: Poisson regression on fertility ideals, generational differences

	Overall	
	(1)	(2)
	Baseline	Generation
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms		
Generation × origin ideals		
Children of immigrants × origin fertility ideals		0.01
		(0.01)
Main effects		
Generation (Immigrants)		
Children of immigrants	0.03	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)
No religious affiliation		
Christians	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Muslims	0.13***	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Others	0.08*	0.08*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Language at home (French)		
Bilingual	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Other than French	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of siblings	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education (primary)		
Lower Sec	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Higher Sec	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
2-year college	-0.05*	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Bachelor or higher	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)

Table 5.A1: Poisson regression on fertility ideals, generational differences (continued)

	Overall	
	(1)	(2)
	Baseline	Generation
Marital status (unmarried)		
Native spouse	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Foreign spouse	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Current numbers of children (No child)		
One	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Two	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Three or more	0.24***	0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Interval	0.87***	0.87***
	(0.05)	(0.04)
Country of origin	49	49
Observations	12809	12809

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 5.A2: Poisson regression on fertility ideals among children of immigrants

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Main effect	Interaction		
		Combined	Non-French	French
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.03***	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms				
Language × origin ideals				
Bilingual × origin ideals		0.03***	0.02*	0.03***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Other than French × origin ideals		0.02*	0.04*	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Main effects				
No religious affiliation				
Christian	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Muslims	0.12***	0.11***	0.12***	0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Others	0.13**	0.13**	0.11*	0.24***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
The imp. of religion during childhood				
A bit important	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Important	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Very important	0.08***	0.08***	0.06***	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Language at home during childhood (French)				
Bilingual	0.02**	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Other than French	0.02	-0.06	-0.11	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Education (primary)				
Lower Sec	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02**	-0.06
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Higher Sec	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
2-year college	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.03**	-0.09**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Bachelor or higher	0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)

Table 5.A2: Poisson regression on fertility ideals among children of immigrants (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Main effect	Interaction		
		Combined	Non-French	French
Marital status (unmarried)				
Native spouse	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Foreign spouse	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Foreign-born parents				
Native mother	0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Native father	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Number of siblings	0.02***	0.02***	0.02**	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Current numbers of children (No child)				
One	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Two	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Three or more	0.23***	0.23***	0.24***	0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
French official language origin country	0.03*	0.03*		
	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Interval	0.93***	0.99***	0.93***	1.09***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Country of origin	43	43	28	15
Observations	7832	7832	5840	1992

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 5.A3: Poisson regression on fertility ideals among the second generation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Main effect	Interaction		
		Combined	Non-French	French
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.03***	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms				
Language × origin ideals				
Bilingual × origin ideals		0.03***	0.02*	0.03***
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Other than French × origin ideals		0.03**	0.03**	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Main effects				
No religious affiliation				
Christian	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Muslims	0.13***	0.12***	0.13***	0.08
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Others	0.13***	0.13***	0.11**	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)
The imp. of religion during childhood				
A bit important	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Important	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.10**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Very important	0.07***	0.07***	0.06**	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Language at home during childhood (French)				
Bilingual	0.03**	-0.06**	-0.02	-0.05
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Other than French	0.01	-0.08*	-0.09	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education (primary)				
Lower Sec	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.03*	-0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Higher Sec	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
2-year college	-0.06***	-0.06***	-0.05**	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Bachelor or higher	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)

Table 5.A3: Poisson regression on fertility ideals among the second generation (continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Main effect	Interaction		
		Combined	Non-French	French
Marital status (unmarried)				
Native spouse	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Foreign spouse	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Foreign-born parents				
Native mother	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Native father	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Number of siblings	0.02***	0.02***	0.02**	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Current numbers of children (No child)				
One	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Two	0.03*	0.03*	0.03	0.06*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Three or more	0.24***	0.24***	0.26***	0.22***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
French official language origin country	0.03*	0.03*		
	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Interval	0.94***	1.01***	0.96***	1.09***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.06)
Country of origin	43	43	28	15
Observations	6873	6873	5086	1787

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 5.A4: Poisson regression on fertility ideals in generational differences (origin-country TFR)

	Overall	
	(1)	(2)
	Baseline	Generation
TFR at age 15	0.03***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms		
Generation × TFR at age 15		-0.01
Children of immigrants × TFR at age 15		(0.01)
Main effects		
Generation (Immigrants)		
Children of immigrants	0.02	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.06)
No religious affiliation		
Christians	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Muslims	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Others	0.05	0.05
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Language at home (French)		
Bilingual	0.03**	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Other than French	0.03	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Number of siblings	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education (primary)		
Lower Sec	-0.05***	-0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Higher Sec	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
2-year college	-0.05*	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Bachelor or higher	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)

Table 5.A4: Poisson regression on fertility ideals, generational differences (origin-country TFR, continued)

	Overall	
	(1)	(2)
	Baseline	Generation
Marital status (unmarried)		
Native spouse	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Foreign spouse	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Current numbers of children (No child)		
One	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Two	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Three or more	0.24***	0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Interval	0.99***	0.96***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Country of origin	49	49
Observations	12809	12809

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 5.A5: Poisson regression on fertility ideals among children of immigrants (origin-country TFR)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Main effect	Interaction		
		Combined	Non-French	French
Origin-country fertility ideals	0.02**	0.01	0.02*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Interaction terms				
Language × TFR at age 15				
Bilingual × TFR at age 15		0.03***	0.02*	0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Other than French × TFR at age 15		0.02*	0.02*	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Main effects				
No religious affiliation				
Christian	0.04**	0.04**	0.03	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Muslims	0.12***	0.12***	0.13***	0.09*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Others	0.12**	0.12**	0.11*	0.22***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
The imp. of religion during childhood				
A bit important	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Important	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Very important	0.08***	0.08***	0.07***	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Language at home during childhood (French)				
Bilingual	0.02**	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.06
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Other than French	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.10)

Table 5.A5. Poisson regression on fertility ideals among children of immigrants (origin-country TFR, continued)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Main effect	Interaction		
		Combined	Non-French	French
Education (primary)				
Lower Sec	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.02**	-0.06
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Higher Sec	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
2-year college	-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.03**	-0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Bachelor or higher	0.01	0.01	0.04	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Marital status (unmarried)				
Native spouse	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Foreign spouse	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Female	-0.05*	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Foreign-born parents				
Native mother	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Native father	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Number of siblings	0.02***	0.02***	0.02**	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*	-0.01*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Current numbers of children (No child)				
One	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Two	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Three or more	0.22***	0.22***	0.24***	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
French official language origin country	0.05*	0.05*		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Interval	1.01***	1.04***	0.99***	1.17***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Country of origin	43	43	28	15
Observations	7832	7832	5840	1992

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Chapter 6

Discussion and Conclusion

This dissertation consists of four article-length manuscripts that make significant contributions to the fields of sociology of migration and demographic research on families and fertility. The main contribution involves a comprehensive examination of continuity and change within the immigrant context and across generations, focusing specifically on various aspects of family-related attitudes, such as gender role ideology and fertility ideals. The aim is to disentangle the various influences that shape these attitudes, including pre-migration factors, cultural practices such as language and religion, and interactions with the host society.

Conceptually, I present a framework that shifts the focus from examining the assimilation processes of immigrants and their children in the immigration context to understanding how the context of emigration and cultural practices in migrant families shape family attitudes and behaviors. Methodologically, I build upon a growing body of research that directly measures the context of emigration (Luthra, Waldinger & Soehl 2018; Soehl 2017; Pessin & Arpino 2018), rather than relying on dummy variables of nationality or ethnicity as a proxy for cultural heritage. By measuring gender and fertility norms within both the emigration context and immigration

context, this dissertation investigates the dissimilation and assimilation trajectories in family attitudes and behaviors of migrant families.

Overall, this dissertation contributes significantly to the fields of migration and family studies in three key ways. First, by comparing these two types of attitudes, the study reveals intriguing findings. It shows that attitudes towards gender roles, which play a crucial role in the public discourse on the "assimilability" of migrants in Europe, are highly susceptible to acculturation pressures. In other words, as migrants and their children interact with the host society, their beliefs and attitudes about gender roles are significantly influenced and tend to align more closely with the prevailing norms of the host society over time and across generation. On the other hand, attitudes toward ideal family size, while also influenced to some extent by acculturation, are considered more private matters and are, therefore, less susceptible to these pressures. Even after one generation, origin-country fertility norms still have a strong influence on the ideal family size among the second generation.

The second major contribution of this dissertation is to distinguish between attitudes and behaviors. It shows that while fertility norms inherited from the country of parental origin shape ideal family size in the second generation, they have limited influence on actual fertility behavior. In other words, individuals may hold certain preferences or ideals regarding family size that reflect their cultural heritage, but these do not necessarily translate into corresponding actual fertility behavior. The third major contribution of this dissertation is to distinguish between attitudes and behaviors. It shows that while fertility norms inherited from the country of parental origin shape ideal family size in the second generation, they have limited influence on actual fertility behavior. In other words, individuals may hold certain preferences or ideals regarding family size that reflect

their cultural heritage, but these do not necessarily translate into corresponding actual fertility behavior.

Third, I explore how two main aspects of cultural practices in migrant families, religion and language, influence fertility attitudes of the second generation in different ways. Religion, which often regulates family life and sexuality, directly shapes the ideal family size of immigrant children. Among the children of immigrants, those raised in Muslim families and those in highly religious families desire more children. In contrast, the use of the language of the parent's country of origin does not directly affect ideal family size, but rather moderates the influence of the country of origin. Those who spoke (all or part of) their home country's language at home during childhood conform more closely to their home country's fertility ideals than those who grew up speaking the destination language.

6.1 Limitations and Future Directions

Although each empirical chapter contributes to advancing discussions on various research topics, they exhibit certain shared limitations.

6.1.1 Selection Bias and Measures of Origin-country Cultural Norms

Selection bias is a common problem in social science, and migration studies are no exception. Usually, there are at least two selection biases, particularly in migration studies, selection before and after migration.

Selection before migration

The importance of considering pre-migration characteristics and immigrant selectivity has been widely acknowledged by scholars, particularly economists. It is well understood that migrants are not a random sample of the population in their country of origin. While this fundamental observation has been recognized in studies exploring immigrants' socioeconomic and educational attainment (Feliciano 2020; Ichou 2014; Luthra, Nandi, and Benzeval 2020), it has received less attention in relation to the acculturation of attitudes and values. Within the scope of my dissertation, I have identified that gender and fertility norms from the origin country have an influence on the gender role attitudes and fertility ideals of immigrants. This influence also extends to the fertility ideals of their children.

However, it is essential to recognize that these findings may not provide a precise estimation of the influence of the origin country. This is mainly because migrants are chosen through migration policies and self-selection based on values, and they are also influenced by the circumstances in their home country during the migration journey. It is possible that individuals with more liberal or "Westernized" values are more likely to migrate to Western European countries. If this selection process introduces some bias, it could weaken the link between home country norms and migrants' attitudes.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that in this study, I used averaged measures of origin-country fertility ideals and gender role attitudes to represent the culture of the origin country. However, it is important to acknowledge that the mean may not be the most appropriate measure in this context. This is because there is no distinct 'mainstream' society in either the origin or destination countries which immigrants can fully assimilate or disassociate themselves from when it comes to values and ideologies. Both destination and origin societies are inherently diverse, and

individuals, whether migrants or non-migrants, embrace a range of beliefs and values. While it is indeed a limitation to use means to characterize the cultures of origin and destination, this approach goes beyond previous literature that relies solely on a dummy variable to compare the group mean of different ethnic or immigrant groups without measuring their "ethnic culture". It is important to emphasize that measuring the mean of countries of origin and destination can at least overcome the pitfalls of cultural essentialism, which assumes that certain ethnic or migrant groups inherently possess particular cultures and values without any quantifiable measure.

In addition to the above concerns, it is imperative that future studies develop improved strategies to address the issues of pre-migration selection and over-representation. One possible approach could be to compare the attitudes and values of migrants and natives with similar socio-economic backgrounds. This can be done by using individual-level survey data from both destination and origin countries, such as the European Social Survey and the World Value Survey. To implement this strategy, latent models can be used to predict an individual's cultural values and attitudes in the country of origin, taking into account various socio-economic factors such as education level, urban/rural residence, gender, and birth cohort. These predicted values can then be matched to migrants based on their socioeconomic background in the destination country, thereby assessing the differences between the destination and origin cultures (i.e., cultural distance).

However, it is important to recognize that this approach does not completely eliminate the problem of selection bias, as there may still be unobserved characteristics that differ between migrants and non-migrants. Nevertheless, it can serve as a valuable tool to gain more insight into the relationship between migrants' attitudes and their country of origin, and it can help mitigate the challenges posed by the selection problem.

Selection after migration

Estimates of the influence of origin-country cultural norms on migrants and their children may also be subject to bias due to post-migration selection. In this dissertation, I find that the influence of origin-country gender norms on migrants' gender role attitudes diminishes over time and across generations. However, this does not necessarily mean that the majority of migrants have fully adopted the "mainstream" values of their destination countries. It is plausible that migrants who encounter difficulties or choose not to adopt the gender norms of the destination country may have returned to their countries of origin. Consequently, those who remain in their destination countries may be individuals who are more receptive to adopting the mainstream values of the destination society.

To address this potential problem, the use of longitudinal data, such as the CILS4EU-Germany dataset, could prove valuable. Longitudinal data allow researchers to examine the evolution of cultural values over time. By taking advantage of these long-term data, we can closely examine the post-migration selection hypothesis and assess whether migrants' attitudes tend to align with mainstream values over time and across generations. This approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how attitudes evolve and whether they converge with the prevailing values of the destination society.

6.1.2 Intergenerational Transmission

In this dissertation, a significant contrast arises in terms of the influence of parental origin countries on fertility ideals and gender role ideology in the second generation. While fertility ideals are still

influenced by the parental origin country, the gender role ideology is not. However, the exact mechanism linking parental origin countries to individual cultural values and attitudes remains unclear. Are their values and attitudes shaped by their foreign-born parents, or are they more influenced by other social institutions like ethnic and religious communities, rather than directly by their parents? Unfortunately, the ESS and TeO surveys do not collect information about the attitudes of respondents' parents, so it is not possible to determine the extent to which the second generation's attitudes resemble those of their parents. One possible approach is to examine whether family socialization in religion and language during childhood plays a role in shaping the influence of parental origin countries on the second generation. However, this approach assumes a strong continuity between parents and children regarding gender and fertility norms, which may not always be the case.

To address this limitation, the CILS4EU dataset can be used, as it is a dyadic dataset that collects information from both parents (either mother or father) and children regarding gender role attitudes. This setting allows researchers to investigate the similarity between children's attitudes and those of their foreign-born parents, as well as how other aspects of family socialization, such as language, religion, and parent-child relationships, contribute to the intergenerational transmission process in migrant families. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the CILS4EU dataset specifically targets certain ethnic groups. As a result, the number of origin countries represented may be insufficient for researchers to conduct a multilevel analysis, which directly examines the influence of gender norms of the origin countries on parents and children.

6.1.3 Gendered Acculturation

Throughout the four empirical chapters of this dissertation, my focus has been on exploring how the context of origin and destination influences family attitudes among immigrants and their children. However, there is one important aspect that has been overlooked: gender. Previous research has shown that assimilation and acculturation processes are gendered, especially for the second generation (Maliepaard and Alba, 2016; Nawyn and Park, 2019; Valdez and Tran, 2020). However, the mechanism behind these gender differences in acculturation remains unclear.

As these studies suggest, one possible explanation could be the traditional gender norms prevalent in countries of origin, where immigrant families may discourage second-generation males from adopting more progressive views on gender roles and instead expect them to prioritize larger families. In addition, young men may face educational challenges, live in predominantly immigrant neighborhoods, interact primarily within their ethnic communities, and attend mosques frequently, limiting their social integration into the broader society. These gender differences may also be influenced by rational choice theory, which suggests that the female second generation may have greater incentives to desire smaller family sizes and hold more liberal gender role attitudes than their male counterparts.

To investigate these hypotheses, future studies could use the analytical framework employed in this dissertation to examine gender differences in fertility ideals and gender role ideologies among different religious groups.

6.2 Summary

This dissertation makes significant contributions to migration sociology and demographic research on families and fertility. It explores how the origin and destination contexts shape the family attitudes of immigrants and their children, focusing on gender role ideology and fertility ideals. The study considers various factors, including pre-migration influences, cultural practices, and interactions with the host society, to understand the formation of these attitudes.

I introduce a framework that shifts the focus from assimilation to examining how the emigration context and cultural practices within migrant families influence family attitudes. By directly measuring the emigration context and comparing gender role attitudes and ideal family size, the study reveals that gender role attitudes align with the host society's norms through acculturation, while ideal family size remains influenced by the fertility norms of the country of origin.

Furthermore, the dissertation distinguishes between attitudes and behaviors, finding that while fertility norms shape ideal family size, they have limited impact on actual fertility behavior. It also investigates the effects of religion and language within migrant families on fertility attitudes. Religious influences are linked to desired family size, with Muslim and highly religious families expressing a desire for more children. Language use moderates the influence of the country of origin, as those who speak their home country's language are more likely to conform to its fertility ideals.

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