WILDLIFE CONSERVATION THROUGH THE LENS OF PASTORALISM: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR RANGELAND MANAGEMENT IN THE MAASAI STEPPE, TANZANIA

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Abstract

In Tanzania's Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem (TME), ethnic frictions between Kisongo Maasai pastoralists and Arusha (Maasai) cultivators complicate the politics of conservation areas. These two Maa-speaking groups are drawn together by shared sociocultural institutions, clan-based processes of assimilation, and intermarriage. However, economic differences between the groups are ethnographically visible, with the Arusha preferring a cultivation-based economy supplemented by livestock, and the Kisongo considering themselves 'people of cattle,' despite increasing diversification (including crop cultivation) in recent years. A series of colonial and post-independence policies have facilitated the migration of Arusha from the fertile highland slopes of Mount Meru to the lowlands of Monduli since the 1950s, and the Arusha have seen their control over rangelands increase disproportionately to the Kisongo who inhabited the area in the late precolonial era. The Arusha have since been able to leverage social, cultural, and economic ties with the Kisongo to expand into pastoral areas, and subsequently gain control over village councils, key formal institutions for allocating land at the local level. These trends have led to rapidly increasing smallholder farming in the TME, compounding a long history of land alienation that began with settler farms and protected areas, and continued with commercial agricultural production following independence. Witnessing the fragmentation of their precious pastoral lands around them, the Kisongo ironically accelerated their own property transitions from common pastures to private farms. They did so in response to increasing constraints on herding, but also to lay their own claims to land, realizing that unsettled and uncultivated areas were subject to being grabbed. Community-based conservation areas pose threats, but also opportunities for Kisongo and Arusha communities. Depending on their institutions for governance and management, conservation areas run the risk of dispossessing livestock keepers from accessing key sources of water and pasture or, in more severe cases, physically displacing communities. At the same time, they can formalize resource access and use rights and provide much-needed capacity for managing land. My research is based on a continuous year of multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork (July 2019 – July 2020) carried out across twelve administrative villages surrounding Manyara Ranch and Randilen Wildlife Management Area (WMA), two community-based conservation areas in the central Maasai Steppe that protect vital wildlife habitat. Each is distinct in its legislative and institutional frameworks for governance, thus providing an opportunity for analytical comparison of the effectiveness of two different approaches to managing rangelands. I employed mixed methods to study and analyze these areas through the lenses of community attitudes towards conservation, local livelihood practices, conservation institutions, and human-wildlife conflict. I carried out 240 in-depth qualitative interviews with local community-members, 250 interviews with key conservation stakeholders across governance scales, a large-scale quantitative household survey (n=1076), and participant observation of everyday life at the village level. I ultimately conclude based on this research that Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch represent valuable assets for their local communities, with both Kisongo and Arusha community members appreciating them, but for distinct reasons that are only tangentially related to the central tenets of wildlife conservation.

Résumé

Dans l'écosystème de Tarangire-Manyara (TME) en Tanzanie, les conflits ethniques entre les pasteurs Kisongo Maasai et les cultivateurs d'Arusha (Maasai) compliquent la politique des zones de conservation. Ces deux groupes de langue maa sont réunis par des institutions socioculturelles communes, des processus d'assimilation claniques et des mariages mixtes. Cependant, les différences économiques entre les groupes sont ethnographiquement visibles, les Arusha préférant une économie fondée sur la culture agricole complétée par l'élevage et les Kisongo se considérant comme des "gens du bétail", malgré une diversification croissante (y compris agricole) ces dernières années. Une série de politiques coloniales et de la période de post-indépendance ont facilité la migration des Arusha des pentes fertiles des hautes terres du mont Meru vers les basses terres de Monduli depuis les années 1950 conduisant les Arusha à augmenter leur contrôle sur les parcours de manière disproportionnée par rapport aux Kisongo qui habitaient la région à la fin de l'ère précoloniale. Ces tendances ont conduit à une augmentation rapide des petites exploitations agricoles dans le TME, aggravant une longue histoire d'aliénation des terres qui a commencé avec les fermes des colons et les zones protégées, et qui s'est poursuivie avec la production agricole commerciale après l'indépendance.Témoins de la fragmentation de leurs précieuses terres pastorales autour d'eux, les Kisongo ont ironiquement accéléré leurs propres transitions de propriété des pâturages communs aux fermes privées. Je soutiens qu'ils l'ont fait pour revendiquer leurs propres terres, réalisant que les zones non colonisées et non cultivées étaient sujettes à l'accaparement. Les aires de conservation communautaires dans cette zone représentent des menaces mais aussi des opportunités pour les communautés de Kisongo et d'Arusha. En fonction de leurs institutions de gouvernance et de gestion, les aires de conservation courent le risque de priver les éleveurs de l'accès aux principales sources d'eau et de pâturages ou, dans les cas les plus graves, de déplacer physiquement les communautés. Dans le même temps, ils peuvent formaliser l'accès aux ressources et les droits d'utilisation et fournir une capacité indispensable pour gérer les terres sur le terrain. Ma recherche est basée sur une année continue de travail de terrain ethnographique multi-sites (juillet 2019 - juillet 2020), menée dans douze villages administratifs entourant Manyara Ranch et Randilen Wildlife Management Area (WMA), deux zones de conservation communautaires dans le centre de Maasai Steppe et qui protègent l'habitat vital de la faune. Chacune est distincte dans ses cadres législatifs et institutionnels de gouvernance, offrant ainsi une opportunité de comparaison analytique de l'efficacité de deux approches différentes de la gestion des parcours. J'ai utilisé des méthodes mixtes pour étudier et analyser ces zones à travers le prisme des attitudes communautaires envers la conservation, les pratiques de subsistance locales, les institutions de conservation et les conflits homme-faune. J'ai réalisé 240 entretiens qualitatifs approfondis avec des membres de la communauté locale, 250 entretiens avec des acteurs clés de la conservation à plusieurs échelles de gouvernance, une enquête quantitative à grande échelle auprès des ménages (n = 1076) et une observation participante de la vie quotidienne au niveau du village. Je conclus finalement sur la base de cette recherche que Randilen WMA et Manyara Ranch représentent des atouts précieux pour les communautés locales, les membres des communautés Kisongo et Arusha les appréciant, mais pour des raisons distinctes qui ne sont que tangentiellement liées aux principes centraux de la conservation de la faune.

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List of Acronyms

AA – Authorized Association
AAA – American Anthropological Association
ACC – African Conservation Centre
ADDO – Arusha Diocesan Development Office
APW – African People and Wildlife
ArcGIS – Geographic Information System Software Program
ATCL – Air Tanzania Company Limited
AWF – African Wildlife Foundation
BACI – Before-after-control-impact
BP – Before Present
CAD – Canadian Dollar
CASCA – Canadian Anthropology Society
CBC – Community-based Conservation
CBO – Community-based Organization
CCM – *Chama cha Mapinduzi* or "*Chukua chako mapema*" "Take yours before others do"
CCRO – Communal Customary Right of Occupancy
CCS – Community Conservation Service
CICADA – Centre for Indigenous Conservation and Development Alternatives
CIP – Community Initiated Project
COSTECH – Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology
CRO – Customary Right of Occupancy
CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility
DC – District Council or District Commissioner
DED – District Executive Director
DGO – District Game Officer
EASTCO – East African Safari & Touring Company
ECF – East Coast Fever
GCA – Game Controlled Area
GEF – Global Environment Facility
GIS – Geographic Information System
GMP – General Management Plan
GPS – Global Positioning System
HEC – Human-Elephant Conflict
HWC – Human-Wildlife Conflict
IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAN – Institutional Canopy of Conservation
ICCA – Indigenous and Community Conserved Areas
ICMP – Integrated Conservation Management Plan
IFP – International Finance Corporation
IIED – International Institute for Environment and Development
ISID – McGill Institute for the Study of International Development
JKT – *Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa*; national military area
KEEP – Kwa Kuchinja Environmental Easements Project
KIPOC – Korongoro Integrated People Oriented to Conservation

KPS – Kisongo Pilot Scheme
LBCSP – Lolkisale Biodiversity Conservation Support Project
LCA – Lolkisale Conservation Area
LEAT – Lawyers Environmental Action Team
LED – Light-Emitting Diode
LLWZ – Lolkisale Livestock and Wildlife Zone
LMNP – Lake Manyara National Park
LVC – Lolkisale Village Council
MDC – Monduli District Council
MDGO – Monduli District Game Officer
MDP – Masai Development Project (colonial period)
MEDA – Makuyuni Elephant Dispersal Area
MIC – MIC Executive Lodge in Makuyuni
MLFD – Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development
MNRT – Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism
MODECO – Monduli District Development Corporation
MP – Member of Parliament
MRC – Manyara Ranch Conservancy
MSP – Multiple Stakeholder Partnership
NAFCO – National Farming Corporation
NARCO – National Ranching Corporation
NC – Naitolia Concession
NCA – Ngorongoro Conservation Area
NCAA – Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
NIDA – National Identification Authority
NTRI – Northern Tanzania Rangelands Initiative
OBC – Otterlo Business Corporation
OTC – Ol Tukai Conservancy
PC – Provincial Commissioner (based on colonial administrative divisions)
PCCB – Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
PES – Payment for Ecosystem Services
PESO – The Political Ecology Society
PINGO – Pastoralists Non-Government Organizations Forum
PWC – Pastoral Women's Council
QGIS – Geographic Information System Software Program
RAI – Royal Anthropological Institute
RAS – Regional Administrative Secretary
RTT – Responsible Tourism Tanzania
RWMA – Randilen Wildlife Management Area
RZMP – Resource Zone Management Plan
SAGE – Site-level Assessment of Governance and Equity
SAP – Structural Adjustment Program
SfAA – Society for Applied Anthropology
SFS – School for Field Studies
SME – Small and Medium Enterprises

SPN – Savanna Pastoral Neolithic
SSHRC – Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
STANDD – McGill Centre for Society, Technology, and Development
TAA – Tanganyika African Association
TALIRI – Tanzania Livestock Research Institute
TANAPA – Tanzania National Parks Authority
TANESCO – Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited
TANU – Tanganyika African National Union
TATO – Tanzania Association of Tour Operators
TAWA – Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority
TAWIRI – Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute
TCA – Tarangire Conservation Area
TCAMP – Tarangire Conservation Area Management Plan
TCCL – Tarangire Conservation Co. Ltd.
TCP – Tarangire Conservation Project
TFS – Tanzania Forestry Service
TIN – Taxpayer Identification Number
TLCT – Tanzania Land Conservation Trust
TLMZ – Tourism and Livestock Management Zone
TLU – Tropical Livestock Unit
TME – Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem
TNC – The Nature Conservancy
TNP – Tarangire National Park
TNRF – Tanzania Natural Resources Forum
TPMZ – Tourism and Photographic Management Zone
TPW – Tanzania People and Wildlife
TRA – Tanzania Revenue Authority
TRS – Tanzania Rangelands Society
Tsh – Tanzanian Shilling
UBC – University of British Columbia
UCRT – Ujamaa Community Resource Team
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UPE – Universal Primary Education
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USD – United States Dollar
UTP – United Tanganyika Party
VAT – Value-Added Tax
VEO – Village Executive Officer
VGS – Village Game Scouts
VLUP – Village Land Use Plan
WCA – Wildlife Conservation Act
WD – Wildlife Division
WMA – Wildlife Management Area
WW1 – World War One
WWF – World Wildlife Fund

Glossary of kiSwahili words and phrases

Askari	Security guard
Balozi	A representative of ten households within sub-villages
Baraka za mjini	Blessings from the city
Boda boda	Motorbike taxi
Boma	Maasai Homestead
Chini	Down/below
Dala dala	Minibus
Dawa	Medicine
Funza	Jigger flea
Furaha	Happiness
Jami	Community
Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa	National military area
Jeshi	Military; also used colloquially to refer to military controlled areas
Jumbe	Headman during German colonial period
Juu	Up/above
Kabila	Tribe/ethnic group
Kampuni	Company (sometimes used by community members to refer to WMA or community-based ecotourism ventures)
Kata	Chop or cut; also used with reference to political ward
Katibu Taarafa	Representative of the state / division at the local level; colloquially thought of as 'special agents' for the central government
Kawaida	Usual or normal
Kaya	A way of defining polygamous households used by the government that categorizes each wife of a married man as a household. The Maasai do not use this system.
Kijiji	Village
Kitu kidogo	Something small
Kondoo	Sheep
Konyagi	Tanzanian spirit alcohol
Korongo	Gorge/valley
Ku chinja	To slaughter; "kwa ku chinja" also refers to 'the place of slaughter' near Olasiti village, which later became known as the Kwakuchinja or Kwa Kuchinja Wildlife Corridor
Kuku	Chicken
Kulisha mifugo	To graze livestock

Kuvunja chungu	To break a pot; also used with reference to an Arusha death curse
Kuwa jirani mwema	To be good neighbours
Maendeleo	Development
Maisha kawaida	Normal life
Maisha magumu	Hard life
Maisha mazuri	Good life
Maisha	Life
Maziwa ya tembo	Milk of elephants
Mbuzi	Goat
Mifugo	Livestock
Mji	City
Mjini	In the city
Mkoa	Region
Mtandaji	Village Executive Officer
Mto wa mbu	River of mosquitoes; A village in Monduli District
MwArusha	A person of Arusha ethnicity
Mwenye kiti	Village Chair
Mzungu	White person
Na	And
Napenda	I like
Nashukuru	I appreciate and thank you
Ngoja kidogo	Wait a little; refers to thorny bush plants used to build fences in rangelands
Ng'ombe	Cow
Ni hapo tu	It's just there
Nyama choma	Grilled meat
Piki piki	Motorbike
Pori	Bush
Shamba	Farm
Sipendi	I don't like
Sote ni WaTanzania	We are all Tanzanians
Taarafa	Division (administrative unit in Tanzania)
Tajiri mwenye kiti	Rich village chair
Tajiri	Rich person
Tembo	Elephant
Uhifadhi	Conservation
Ugali	Stiff maize flour porridge
Ujamaa	Extended family; also used with reference to socialist policies/ cooperative economics
Vijiji	Villages
Vijijijini	"in the villages"; also used with reference the to the villagization initiative

Vilima vitatu	Three mountains (three hills in the context of Vilima Vitatu village)
WaArusha	The Arusha people
Wakwavi / kwavi / wakuafi	Colonial terminology for agricultural Maasai, perhaps Arusha or Parakuiyo
Wamachinga	"Marching men" or roadside traders
Wanyama pori	Wildlife
Wazungu	White people
Wilaya	District

Glossary of Maa words and phrases

Aladariak	Place of red water; Maasai placename for dry season wells in Manyara Ranch
Alalili	Reserve pasture
Alchamba	Manyara Ranch; derived from kiSwahili *shamba* "farm"
Ashe	Thanks
Ashe Naleng	Thank you very much
Doroboni / Ndoroboni	Maasai placename for communal grazing area in Makuyuni
Eluaii	*Acacia drepanolobium*; known commonly as 'whistling thorn' acacia
Emanyara inkutot	The territorial sub-grouping of Kisongo Maasai living in Oltukai, Esilalei, and Losirwa
Embarimbali	Maasai place name for a low lying area that catches rainwater and river spill-off in Manyara Ranch
Emparnat / Imparnati	Permanent habitation(s); "operation *imparnati*" refers the sedentarization of pastoralists during villagization initiatives
Emutai	Civil war between Maasai sections
Endito/intoyie (pl.)	Young girl(s)
Engigwana em balbal	Arusha lineage moots
Engishomi	Arusha clan
Engishui e kawaida	Normal life
Engishui sidai	Good life / well-being
Engishui	Life
Engutoto/ inkutot (pl.)	Maasai territorial sub-group(s)
Enkaji	Maasai house / clan
Enkang / Inkang'itie	Maasai homestead
Enkanyit	Respect
Enkiguena	Traditional Maasai meeting
Enkipaata	Maasai circumcision rite of passage ceremony

Enkitoria	Ruling authority
Eramat / eramatare	Customary Maasai philosophy of rangeland management
Esilalei	*Commiphora schimperi* or commonly 'gloss-leaved corkwood tree'
Esimangori / Esimangore	Maasai place name for mountain adjacent to Saburi sub-village of Makuyuni
Eunoto	Maasai rite of passage ceremony whereby junior warriors become seniors/adults
Ilaigwenok / Ilaigwenak	Maasai traditional leaders representing age sets
IlArus	Arusha people (also referred to as *WaArusha* by Maasai)
Ilayiok	Young herder class within the age-set system
Ildorobo	Those without livestock; may also constitute an independent ethnic group of hunter-gatherers
IlKikoin	An ethnic group living in Arusha Chini (Moshi) in the early 19th century, and perhaps ancestors of IlArus
IlKisongo/ Kisongo	Maasai territorial section
Ilkurrman	Maasai farmers
Ilmarieta / Olmarei	Households / Household
Ilmurran	Maasai warrior class
Iloikop	Other non-Maasai pastoralist groups living in the rift valley prior to the 20th century
ILoogolala / Loogalala	A group of non-Maasai pastoralists that inhabited the rift valley prior to the 20th century
Ingishu	Cattle
Inkidong'I / Loonkidongi	A Maasai family dynasty that produced *Iloibonok* prophets; *enkidong'i (ink-idong'i, pl.)* can also refer also to the containers used by *iloibonok* to carry medicine
Inkutot	Maasai territorial sub-grouping
Intaloishi	Maasai Moieties
Kipoc	"We will recover" ; the first Maasai NGO
Koko	Grandmother/ elder woman
Komolonik	Maasai place name for Monduli Mountain
Korianga	Kisongo Maasai age set (Order by age: *Nyangulu, Korianga, Landiis, Makaa, Seuri, Nyangusi*)
Landiis	Kisongo Maasai age set (Order by age: *Nyangulu, Korianga, Landiis, Makaa, Seuri, Nyangusi*)

Lengai / enkai	God
Lolkisale	Maasai place name for mountain east of Tarangire National Park; village name
Loongaik	Extended arms, used as a Maasai placename for a natural dam in Manyara Ranch
Makaa	Maasai age set (Order by age: *Nyangulu, Korianga, Landiis, Makaa, Seuri, Nyangusi*)
Makande	Bean and maize mixture eaten by Arusha people
Mang'ati	Enemy; often used by Maasai with reference to Barabaig people
Manyatta	A type of grass used for grazing livestock and building traditional huts
Ngulat	Maasai sacred place on Mondul Mountain (*Komolonik*) where *Eunoto* ceremony is held
Nyangulu	Kisongo Maasai age set (Order by age: *Nyangulu, Korianga, Landiis, Makaa, Seuri, Nyangusi*)
Nyangusi	Maasai age set (Order by age: *Nyangulu, Korianga, Landiis, Makaa, Seuri, Nyangusi*)
Olaunoni	Selected Maasai age-set executive authority
Ol-ng'esher	Maasai rite of passage ceremony marking transition from warriorhood to junior elderhood
Olaji/ilajijik	Maasai age sets
Olcani	Medicinal plants
Olcorro	Maasai placename for the soda lake, silted dam, and surrounding pastures in Manyara Ranch
Oldonyo	Mountain
Olgarsis	Arusha lineage elders/councilors and spokesmen
Olgilata	Maasai clan; can also refer to Arusha sub-clan
Olkeiju Loorg'abolo	Maasai place name for Makuyuni River
Olkiama	Masai Council during the colonial period (colonial spelling of Maasai)
Olmolog	Maasai sacred place on the slopes of Kilimanjaro (site of the Olngesherr ceremony)
Olnegesherr	Maasai rite of passage ceremony from warriorhood to eldership
Oloiboni / Iloibonok	Maasai prophet(s)
Olosho/Iloshon	Maasai territorial section(s)
Olpurkel	Hot and dry lowland plains with good pasture and salt licks, but less water sources
Oltukai	Date palm tree

Olwashe	Arusha sub-divisions based on age, territory, or lineage;
Oreteti	*Ficus thonningii*; Common name 'Ficus tree'
Orpul	Traditional ritual periods in the bush to build strength and solidarity, and exchange knowledge
Osotua	Friendship bond reinforced through cattle exchange or gift-giving
Pakiteng	Special friend based on cattle exchange
Randileni	Maasai placename for the hill near the Randilen WMA main gate
Ronjo	Temporary seasonal homestead for semi-nomadic herders
Seuri	Maasai age set (Order by age: *Nyangulu, Korianga, Landiis, Makaa, Seuri, Nyangusi*)
Shuka	Maasai blanket and traditional clothing
Sidai	Things are good
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[1] Original source: http://www.tarangireconservation.com/tarang.htm

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Livestock and life

Kilamian rose quietly from his seat and began walking to the front of the room. With each step forward the chatter subsided a little more as the anticipation grew: the meeting was about to start. By the time he had stopped walking, a silence had fallen over the hall as people respectfully awaited his opening remarks. Kilamian paused for a moment to look over the crowd before speaking. At least fifty people had gathered in Mto wa Mbu, Tanzania on a warm Thursday afternoon in late November of 2019. Most of them held key roles in the governance of Randilen Wildlife Management Area (WMA), a community-based conservation area on village land adjacent to Tarangire National Park (TNP). Kilamian, an Arusha agropastoralist from the member village Mswakini Chini, served as the WMA chair. I watched patiently from the back corner of the room, where I was perched with my research assistant Edwine, my wife-to-be Leanne, and Damian, the director of a community-oriented conservation NGO called Honeyguide. Edwine and I had helped Honeyguide organize this workshop on WMA governance and equity by preparing some background reports on community livelihoods in the WMA member villages. We were attending the workshop as participant observers, tasked with facilitating small group discussions and documenting the event as it unfolded. This endeavour would prove especially useful for me as I carried out a year of ethnographic fieldwork in partial fulfilment of my doctoral degree in anthropology at McGill University.

Certain that he had the devoted attention of his onlookers within his grasp, Kilamian swiftly raised his right fist above his head and bellowed in kiSwahili, the national language in Tanzania, "*tembo!*" to which the crowd immediately responded, "*na maendeleo!*" Without pause, he quickly inverted the phrase, shouting back at the crowd: "*Maendeleo!*" to which they instinctively replied "*na tembo!*" Before I had time to fully process the introduction, Kilamian continued on to a second verse, "*Mifugo*" to which the group answered "*na maisha.*" And

finally, "*Maisha,*" followed by "*na mifugo*." For those readers unfamiliar with the kiSwahili language, the chant translates roughly as follows,

Elephants! And development!

Development! And elephants!

Livestock! And life!

Life and livestock!

Kilamian dropped his fist and held his hands out to each side as if to imply, 'is that all you've got?' A cheeky grin appeared on his face as he rose his fist towards the ceiling and began the chant again, this time with even greater enthusiasm. He was met in turn with an equally rousing chant from the crowd as people began to come out of their shells and really let loose. After repeating the chant a third time for good measure, Kilamian began the meeting to loud cheers from the crowd and people laughing in joy as they reveled in the pleasure of making a good old fashioned ruckus.

While the performative elements of the chant were indeed significant, the words themselves hold great resonant meaning. The first segment references a vulnerable and charismatic species of wildlife that is highly valued by the government, but which generally brings considerable costs to rural communities in the forms of crop destruction, property damage, and injuries to people and livestock. Here, elephants are associated with development, a connection that is often assumed by government and conservation actors in a rhetorical fashion, but which rarely translates into practice in East Africa. Kilamian, as a representative of community interests, seemed to be implying that the member villages of Randilen WMA also viewed wildlife as a source of revenue. In the second verse, the core pastoral value of livestock shines through, as livestock is equated with life itself.

These two verses, when taken together, serve as an anthropological window into the current state of community-based conservation in the Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem (TME). They are poetic microcosms for the larger story that I will develop in this dissertation about how

rural communities feel about conservation areas in the TME, and why they feel the way that they do. Based on mixed ethnographic methods (detailed in Chapter 2), and with reference to literature on institutions (as operationalized in Sections 1.6-1.68), I explicate some theoretical nuances of what I interpret to be an ongoing process of social transformation affecting how rural communities think about conservation. Inspired by the works of Hodgson (2001) and Nelson et al. (2007), I take a historically grounded approach in situating current community sentiment in relation to the wider political and economic processes that have come to characterize the wildlife sector in Tanzania throughout its colonial and post-independence eras. The dissertation is attuned in an applied sense to the issue of rangeland management, framing land fragmentation as a central concern for both pastoralists and wildlife (see Hobbs et al. 2008). In addressing this topic, I integrate my study with theoretical literature on the anthropology of development, and social-ecological literature on the anthropology of pastoralism, introduced in Sections 1.5-1.71.

1.2 Research questions

Throughout Tanzania's history, protected areas have been established by the government as strategies for preserving wildlife habitat and creating a financial ecosystem for generating tourism revenue. These dynamics have become complicated over the past forty years as conservation and ecotourism have moved out of national parks onto village land. Various models of community-based conservation have emerged involving networks of actors including international donors, NGOs, investors, and communities, though most models are still shaped in some fashion by state policy. The question of whether local people view community-based conservation areas in the Maasai Steppe as oppressive, inconsequential, or empowering will be explicated in this dissertation.

Specifically, I address two main research questions: 'How do local communities feel about Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA, two community-based conservation areas in the central Maasai Steppe?' And subsequently, '*Why* do they feel the way that they do?' I situate my research in relation to previous social science studies of these areas by Loveless (2014), who

documented village-level resentment towards Randilen WMA's planning processes, and

Goldman (2011:65; 2020), who referred to Manyara Ranch as a "conservation opportunity lost"

owing to local Maasai pastoralists' lived experiences of dispossession. I discuss my central

findings in relation to theirs in Chapters 6-9, revealing in the process new insights of great

significance.

   While it is tempting to essentialize the sentiments of local people in simple terms, the

empirical reality on the ground is unsurprisingly complex. I came to realize over the course of

my research that my specific discoveries about community attitudes symbolized the observable

tip of an iceberg; the majority of historical forces at play only became apparent through deeper

analysis. To paint a more representative picture, this dissertation lays out the wider social,

political, and economic context that frames my study. It conveys a story that began well before I

commenced my fieldwork and which will continue long after I am gone. The dissertation

sketches a political economy of rangeland development in Tanzania's Maasailand, woven

through the works of Kjekshus (1977b), Hodgson (2001), and others to lay out the historical

backdrop that is crucial for contextualizing my findings. In particular, I touch on 1) the deep

history of East Africa and the development of pastoralism, 2) the ethnic makeup of late

precolonial Tanganyika, 3) the colonial policies affecting Tanzania's Maasailand including

large-scale alienation of pastoral lands for settler farms, 4) the lasting effects of the socialist

period on pastoral mobility, including the institutional legacy of villagization and state-

sanctioned sedentarization, 5) the history of displacement of Maasai from national parks and key

sources of water and pasture, 6) the emergence of private investors in the conservation sector

since structural adjustment programs were applied in the mid 1980s, and 7) the decentralization

(and recentralization) of wildlife conservation policy in Tanzania since the 1990s in the context

of community-based conservation.

   One of the key anthropological lenses I peer though in this dissertation in an

intersectional fashion is ethnicity, a concept that has been manipulated through ideology by the

colonial administration and the independent state (through the classifications of "tribe"), and which plays a prominent role in shaping community sentiment towards conservation. Sociocultural and political factors related to ethnicity undergird the encroachment of cultivators onto Maasai territories and the widespread conversion of common pastures to smallholder farms (see Homewood et al. 2004). This dissertation highlights the case of the Arusha who moved from the highlands of Mount Meru onto the rangelands of Monduli during the colonial and socialist periods, where they continue to live in close proximity to Kisongo Maasai pastoralists (see Kuney 1994). A point that I continually return to throughout the dissertation is that there is an ongoing trend of land enclosure in Tanzania and a history of marginalization of pastoralism vis-à-vis crop cultivation by government policy. Village lands in northern Tanzania are becoming increasingly fragmented by land use change, driven in part by in-migration, but also by endogenous changes in the livelihood practices of pastoral communities (cf. McCabe et al. 2010; McCabe et al. 2014; McCabe 2003b; McCabe et al. 1997; Sachedina and Trench 2009; Trench et al. 2009; Homewood et al. 2009a,b; Norton-Griffiths 1995). I will discuss the nuances of these land use changes, which are at times shaped by subsistence concerns in the context of economic diversification, and in other instances by political surroundings (see Chapter 5). But as Kilamian's second verse in my introduction clearly iterates, in this ethnographic setting, "*livestock and life*" are intimately connected. Put differently, cattle remains the centrepiece of the pastoral mode of production in the central TME. While the Arusha have established strongholds in this area, they are very much situated within the social landscape of Maasailand, where the cultural hegemony of Kisongo Maasai pastoralists still endures. Arusha ethnic identity in the lowland plains of Monduli has developed over the past seventy years in a relational fashion to the Kisongo, but cultural and socioeconomic distinctions between the groups of great consequence still remain.

1.3 Central themes

There are three key themes that run through this dissertation. In practice, they are intimately connected, but it is perhaps useful to parse them for a moment to provide emphasis. The first is *land*. Land underlies this study, literally and figuratively. By land, I am to referring here to: material distributions of natural resources, wildlife habitat, and pastoral areas, but also to land rights and tenure, use patterns, agrarian change, rangeland management, and political allocations of land for conservation, development, or other purposes (e.g. land grabbing). The second is *institutions*. By this I am referring to: organizations, stakeholder dynamics, formal and informal governance mechanisms, management practices, social facts, norms, laws, and customs. Together, these phenomena form a layered set of multi-scalar influences that bear on rangelands, including the activities of international conservation foundations, local NGOs, villages, and the everyday practices of pastoralists on the ground. My thinking follows loosely from the work of North (1991) who conceptualizes institutions in cultural terms as 'rules of the game,' and of Ostrom (1990) who focuses on the various forms of social organization that facilitate (or undermine) management of common pool resources. As outlined in Sections 1.6-1.68, I also conceive of institutions broadly for the purposes of my analysis. The third pillar is *wildlife*. I conceptualize wildlife as a key source of tourism revenue in Tanzania, but also in terms of its livelihood costs for rural communities. As an anthropologist, my training and skillset caters more towards an understanding of the human dimensions of wildlife conservation, but less to the direct study of wildlife biology. What I have endeavoured to do in this dissertation is weave a narrative together based on my readings, interviews and engagements with people who generally have far more knowledge of wildlife dynamics than I. In keeping with the interests of the pastoralists with whom I work, I also think of wildlife and livestock in relation to each other, given their competitive yet complementary roles in the ecology of rangelands (Reid 2012). This approach is informed by a growing body of literature on disequilibrium social-ecological dynamics showing that the semi-arid rangelands of East Africa exist in multiple forms of stability given variable

rainfall patterns (Behnke et al. 1993; Scoones and Graham 1994; Scoones 1995). Disequilibrium theory is discussed in Section 1.71.

I approach these three pillars – of land, institutions, and wildlife – through the lenses of pastoralism and conservation, two ways of thinking that have key ideological differences, but which share much common ground. My interest in this dissertation is in highlighting some of these commonalities, though with some diplomatic suggestions in such instances where I think that one way of thinking could perhaps improve the outlook of the other. In reality, a dichotomy does not actually exist and these sources of knowledge are perhaps better thought of as a dialectic rather than a binary opposition. While much has been written about the divergences between these two epistemologies (see Goldman 2020, 2003), some has also been written about their potential marriage (see Homewood et al. 1987; Reid 2012; Godfrey 2018). Few studies in East Africa, however, have empirically shown how the interests of government, conservationists, investors, and pastoralists can be aligned in practice.

1.4 Statement on positionality

My positioned stance is that wildlife conservation in this region is complex and multidimensional. Social science can offer important insights into the perspectives and lived experiences of people who would otherwise be marginalized in conservation discourses. 'Fortress' models of conservation that displace and dispossess local communities in favour of 'pristine' wilderness spaces are an ever-present concern for people living in wildlife-rich areas of Tanzania (see Brockington 2002; Neumann 1998; Igoe 2004). In my view, fortress conservation is both ethically wrong given its human cost, and unproductive in the context of semi-arid rangeland ecosystems where wildlife and pastoralists must move across large areas to access resources that vary across space and time. That said, I have also come to think that exclusively critiquing conservation in theoretical terms ultimately limits collective understanding by failing to offer much in the way of practical solutions. I consider my approach to be applied in its attempt to foster long-term solutions to conservation problems in this area that are mutually

beneficial for people and wildlife, and theoretical in its contribution to the anthropology of conservation and pastoralism. My heart is with the plight of wildlife and my intellectual bias is towards safeguarding pastoral livelihoods. My intention with this dissertation is to offer an anthropological approach to understanding why pastoral communities feel the way they do about community-based conservation, perhaps in so doing contributing to the design and implementation of sustainable and equitable conservation initiatives in the future. I do not consider myself an activist, but what is intriguing about this case is the extent to which the fate of wildlife is bound together with the state of pastoral land tenure and customary institutions for managing rangelands. As I will attempt to show, securing pastoral land and protecting wildlife habitat are not antithetical and accomplishing this joint goal has the potential to rekindle scholarly interest in documenting and contributing to "win-win" models of conservation, rather than in exclusively critiquing those that struggle to achieve these laudable goals. As evidenced by a growing body of literature on the beneficial role of domestic herds in managing semi-arid rangelands (see Reid 2012; Homewood and Rodgers 1991), people, livestock and wildlife can and do coexist. I am convinced that thinking about them together represents the future of conservation in this region.

1.5 Theoretical frame: Political ecology and the anthropology of development

The general frame of my work is political ecology. I follow Bryant and Bailey (1997) in theorizing the environment as a political arena, within which different actors with varying degrees of power are engaged in struggles over access to, and control of, resources (see also Jones 2006; Vaccaro et al. 2013). Literature in political ecology is diverse, ranging from abstract post-structural conceptualizations of 'nature,' (see Escobar 1999; Raffles 1999) to material assessments of measurable ecological processes (see Vayda and Walters 1999). These approaches are often complementary, though the field has also been characterized by divergent views on how political ecology ought to be operationalized. At the risk of essentializing to some extent, I prefer to run with Bryant and Bailey's (1997) general definition, which seems to travel

well and apply most productively to the case at hand. While I am reluctant to refer to this as an analytical lens, I do believe that this basic definition characterizes quite accurately what I have observed to be occurring on the ground in northern Tanzania.

One of the disciplinary subfields of anthropology that informs my analysis is the anthropology of development, a subdiscipline that could perhaps be distilled down to the study of social change. More precisely, development theorists consider the ways in which diverse sets of actors mobilize their own logics, interests, values, and strategies to rationalize the trade-offs of change (see de Sardan 2005:137; Yung and Zaslavsky 1992). Different ways of approaching natural resources can create tensions as distinct ways of knowing come into conflict. Political interventions "from above," whether originating from colonial administrations, NGOs, or the state, often fail to accomplish their objectives irrespective of their "will to improve" as a consequence of these differences (Havnevik 1993; Li 2007; Hodgson 2001; Ferguson 1994). As Scott (1998b) suggests, states "see" by creating an aesthetic of order in an attempt to render populations and resources more "legible." Such processes often overlook the lived experiences and local knowledge of rural communities. While these shortcomings of development are well-documented, I am perhaps more intrigued by the literature that speaks to the potential for conservation to create new forms of institutional pluralism, where groups of actors with seemingly divergent interests come to share emergent objectives about the governance and management of natural resources (see Agrawal 2005). I have found fruitful de Sardan's (2005:144-145) concepts of "sidetracking" and "selective adoption," applied when peasants choose to support some elements of development that align with their own interests, while either excluding or appropriating others to fit their personal goals. These concepts align quite nicely with what I observed during my fieldwork, as community members seemed to interpret conservation in terms of their own livelihood concerns, rather than subscribe to the same set of priorities as conservationists, ecologists, tour operators, or the state. To understand these social dynamics, I attend theoretically to institutions, which I conceptualize in the following section.

1.6 Theorizing institutions

Here, I operationalize the theoretical concepts that inform my scholarly analysis. I draw from some explicitly in later sections, while others inform my thinking in more subtle ways. My central theoretical focus is on institutions, or the mechanisms that allow people to pursue shared goals (see Douglas 1986).

There is a core theoretical approach to institutions that is central to my dissertation, and a broad set of related conceptualizations of secondary importance. The approach taken up in institutional economics is of primary significance here. Within this field, institutions are generally conceived in either societal or cultural terms (North 1991; Ostrom 1990). In accordance with the cultural connotation, institutions refer to rules, expectations, guidelines, and norms that shape how people think. North's (1991:97) definition is particularly compelling in this regard. In his words, "institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)." Informal institutions can be thought of as those that are conceived endogenously by people in culturally-specific terms, while formal ones are generally supported by the state (see Yami et al. 2009). Institutions help to order social realities and minimize uncertainty (North 1991). They shape the choices that individuals are able to make, and subsequently their behaviour. North (1991:97) argues in economic terms that institutions create "the incentive structure of an economy." Using "game theoretic terms," he contends that effectively-implemented institutions make cooperation more economically favourable than individualism (North 1991:97). Institutions lower production and transaction costs of exchange, which would otherwise disincentivize collaboration or trade. In a nutshell, then, North (1991) maintains that institutions provide people with economic incentives to work together towards common goals, rather than act individually to maximize one's own wealth.

While closely related, Ostrom (1990) approaches institutions through the lens of social organizations, with particular attention to how common pool resources are collectively governed (discussed further in Section 1.67). In social terms, institutions can thus also refer to the organizations, groups, and action-oriented processes that structure people's interactions. In this dissertation, I use institutions with reference to formal laws, customs, practices, and organizations that create "norm circles" with some degree of "causal power to produce a tendency" in individuals within a group (Elder-Vass 2010, 2012:23; Archer and Elder-Vass 2012). Institutions bear on people's "processes of classifying and recognizing" environments and shape how they think (Douglas 1986:3). In doing so, they enable groups to work towards common goals without defaulting to the fulfilment of personal desires that may not be in the collective interest. I use institutions with reference to social (e.g. age-set system; intermarriage), cultural (eg. grazing norms; taboos; beliefs; language), economic (e.g. bride price payments; customary trade in livestock and grain), and political (e.g. written laws; traditional political organization of Maasai society; governance and management structures of conservation areas) mechanisms that serve collective functions. Each of these have various parameters that are useful to demarcate for the sake of scholarly analysis. In reality, however, neat boxes separating social, cultural, economic, and political domains do not actually exist, and there is a risk of reifying these distinctions if emphasized too much. Institutions, whether formal or informal, are often layered in reality. Some exist at global, national, and regional levels and emanate down to localities, including networks of social organizations and well-defined administrative units with significant political influence on land governance dynamics. Villages in Tanzania are one such example of formal institutions that often coexist with customary pastoral institutions for governing access to grazing resources (see McCabe et al. 2020). Rather than supersede one another, new institutions often remake and integrate ones that already exist. Cleaver et al. (2013) refer to this as "institutional bricolage." The SSHRC/IDRC-funded 'Institutional Canopy of Conservation' (ICAN) project, with which my study is affiliated, conceives of institutions both

in terms of tacit rules (cultural) and organizations (social) and the myriad ways in which these dynamics are manifest across the rangelands of East Africa. In the following sections, I outline some of the secondary theoretical threads that inform my overall understanding of institutions.

1.61 Social facts and custom

The institutional mechanisms that promote social solidarity have been taken up in various ways by different theorists. According to Durkheim (1890), there are social forces that exist outside individual minds that serve to promote social order. These 'facts' are both abstract in their lack of materiality, and concrete in that they inform observable social behaviours. One could perhaps call them norms, or engrained ways of thinking and doing things that are often taken for granted because they are so infrequently interrogated by ingroup members. To Durkheim (1890), and many of the French thinkers who followed, including Le Bon (1895) in his discussion of crowd psychology, and Mauss (1925) in his theorization of gift-giving and reciprocity, custom entailed a source of coercive power over people that constrained behaviour in line with group norms. Entering into this discourse, Malinowski (1926) took the concept of custom in a slightly different direction, balking at the notion that coercive forces had intrinsic power, suggesting that rather the interdependence of livelihoods, kinship ties, and rituals in small-scale societies all functioned to promote economic cohesion. His take, then, was one that was practically oriented towards the observable sets of relations that were tied to production, and not to a universal notion of the forces that bind people together. Thus, Malinowski attuned the discourse to ethnographic context.

1.62 Cultural and political hegemony

Conceptualizing institutions broadly, as Durkheim and Malinowski did, makes it possible to put disparate theoretical threads related to the exercise of power over behaviour into conversation with one another. Hegemony, for instance, as explicated by Gramsci (1970), refers in a general sense to the control of collective imagination, facilitating the normalization and acceptance of 'the ways things are.' Gramsci meaningfully disaggregates hegemony into political and cultural

forms. Political hegemony operates through the formal apparatus of the state through police and military, which may 'intervene' to continually establish and re-establish the status quo through the use of force. Perhaps more significantly for this dissertation, cultural hegemony works through pathways internal to civil society. Gramsci (1970) held that people become enculturated into accepting the status quo through personal relationships, social networks, and education. Subsequently, a particular vision of reality comes to dominate people's thoughts, rendering the prospect of reifying moral alternatives unlikely. Gramsci (1970) was essentially attempting to explain why the Italian working class did not internalize the programs of the communist party and chose to support the Fascists and perpetuate bourgeois ideology instead. It would seem that proletariats were not revolutionaries, but nationalists with particular economic agendas, suggesting that Gramsci's conceptualizations of class-based thinking may have been reductionistic. It is also important to note that education is not just about assimilating the ideology of the ruling class, but cultivating new skills and ways of seeing the world that make possible alternative visions of the present and future. Nonetheless, the central thrust of Gramsci's (1970) arguments are useful to bear in mind.

1.63 Ideology and identity

Hegemony overlaps to some extent with ideology, which I take to mean the mobilization of one group's set of interests vis-à-vis another's, often through the perpetuation of cultural or political beliefs and the cultivation of identity. While some identities are less ideological than others (see Ehala 2015), implicit in some are a set of sacred or core values (see Tetlock 2003; Smolicz 1981). Nationalism, for instance, involves the production of shared identity of group members irrespective of tangible physical proximity or cultural closeness. Members of the nation come to identify with an "imagined community" of other members who adopt a common identity and set of interests, lessening their social distance (Anderson 1983). Thinking through ideology in this fashion, as an institutional force that bears on the identities of group members, will subtly underlie my entire analysis. It has informed my interpretations of the Kisongo-Arusha interface

in the context of Maasai ethnicity and of the 'community' of Randilen WMA member villages. Perhaps most notably, it has coloured my analysis of the socialist project of the post-independence state, which sought to downplay ethnic differences in the name of creating a national "neighbourhood" or extended family (*ujamaa*). Ideology also underpins my thinking about the conventional protected area model of wildlife conservation in Tanzania, which many have argued is the product of a global effort to protect charismatic animals at the expense of the resource rights of indigenous pastoralists (i.e. it perpetuates a nature/society dualism; see Igoe 2017; Brockington 2002; Goldman 2020).

1.64 Governmentality and environmentality[2]

The indirect ways in which hegemony and ideology influence people's thoughts and behaviours overlap to some extent with Foucauldian studies of power. As Foucault (1977:93) himself concedes, "power is not an institution," in and of itself, but institutions most certainly have power. Foucault (1978) coined the term governmentality with reference to the various tools and techniques that governments utilize to increase the governability of people and resources, generally without having to resort to the top-down use of force (Lemke 2001, 2002). Foucault (1978) describes these practices as the "conduct of conduct," or the general management of peoples' behaviours.[3] Extrapolating from Foucault (1976), Agrawal (2005) developed the concept of environmentality in the context of community-based conservation. Through the

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[2] Section 1.64 was published in the following article: Raycraft, Justin. 2020. The (un)making of marine park subjects: Environmentality and everyday resistance in a coastal Tanzanian village. *World Development* 126(1):1-12.

[3] Governmentality is not a homogenous process of producing subjects, but rather one that can be disaggregated into different types (Fletcher 2010, 2017). Truth governmentality refers to the creation of scientific truths that legitimize the exercise of power. Neoliberal governmentality refers to the production of rational actors who are incentivized to act in particular ways based on basic economic cost-benefit analyses (Fletcher et al. 2018). Disciplinary governmentality, a subtype that is perhaps most widely recognized, refers to the use of surveillance and monitoring techniques that instill in subjects fear of repercussions for transgressing rules. Consequently, people internalize a 'fear of punishment' and 'discipline' themselves, in essence becoming self-regulating subjects. Sovereign governmentality refers to the top-down exercise of power, and the use of direct force in governance. Disaggregating governmentality studies into these (and perhaps other) sub-types can sometimes enable more nuanced ethnographic assessment of the complex ways in which power circulates between governing authorities and subjects in the context of conservation (Fletcher 2017). Bluwstein (2017), for example, applies this theoretical discussion in his analysis of community-based conservation and ecotourism in northern Tanzania, highlighting the fact that multiple forms of governmentality can be present at the same time.

decentralization of governance institutions (further unpacked in Section 1.66), individuals come to participate more 'intimately' in conservation and realize the benefits of conserving resources, leading them to become "environmental subjects" whose interests align with the state (Agrawal 2005:1). As such, Agrawal (2005) argues that community members can participate in the production of their own governability in a Foucauldian sense by self-regulating their environmental practices, eliminating the need for state intervention to directly exercise power over their behaviour. While environmentality studies branch into a number of different directions (see footnote 2), I personally take environmentality to mean an axis of thinking in relation to the environment that can be positive (i.e. the creation of conservationists), negative (i.e. the production of anti-conservationists), or varied mixtures of both (Cortes-Vazquez and Ruiz-Ballesteros 2018).[4] While I have found environmentality to be a productive lens to apply in the past (see Raycraft 2020), I have grown somewhat wary of reducing the interests and practices of rural communities to products of political processes.[5] Indeed political context does seem to play a significant role in shaping people's attitudes towards conservation, so environmentality should not be discounted altogether. But at the same time, pre-existing cultural values of stewardship in some cases seem to run deeper than political subjectivities. In all likelihood, culture and political context likely interact with each other, dynamics which could be interpreted through Fletcher's (2010,2017) theorization of 'multiple' environmentalities.

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[4] The presence of multiple environmentalities in the same ethnographic context can also lead to important contradictions between the various approaches to producing subjects, which can actually pit the interests of conservation and development against each other (Youdelis 2013).

[5] Several scholars have raised critiques and potential limitations to environmentality explanations (Rutherford 2007). Singh (2013), for example, argues that such analyses privilege the power of economic and political rationalities, vis-à-vis affective forms of labour and embodied emotions (see also González-Hidalgo and Zografos 2017). Similarly, Cepek (2011) suggests that environmentality approaches may 'underestimate' the abilities of people to forge their own critical, self-aware, and culturally grounded understandings of collaborative environmental projects. Furthermore, as Scott (1990) shows, through his concept of "hidden transcripts," subjectivities may be formed relative to the public visibility of behaviours. Subordinate groups may engage in "infrapolitics," which occur out of sight of those in power. Thus the explicitly visible interactions between dominators and oppressed form public transcripts of power relations that do not necessarily encapsulate the subjectivities of people across all situations (see also Nations and Monte 1996).

1.65 Territoriality and territorialization[6]

Another related force that bears on people's abilities to live in groups is that of territory, which I take to mean an interwoven set of practices, ideas, and technologies for governing and managing space. Branch (2017:133) refers to these dynamics as the "institution of territory." Rather than a fixed and discrete object, territory is perhaps more accurately conceived of in a processual fashion. One such approach is through the lens of territoriality. In a similar vein to governmentality, the term territoriality has been applied by scholars in diverse ways to refer to indirect forms of social-spatial control (Vaccaro, Dawson and Zanotti 2014). It refers at times to social-ecological adaptations to scarce, abundant, or unpredictable resources (Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978) and to socio-political processes of territorial governance (Sack 1983, 1986). Generally speaking, I take territoriality to mean the utilization of a "bounded space" as a mechanism for "securing a particular outcome" (Taylor 1994:151). This application draws from Sack's (1983:55) definition of the term as "the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions and interactions (of people, things and relationships) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a geographic area." As such, this meaning of territoriality is situated within a stream of governmentality studies that frames territorial control as a political tool for increasing the governability of people and resources (Agnew 2013; Elden 2010; Foucault 1982, 1991; Hannah 2000). Put simply, territoriality entails a process of controlling space, as a means of controlling people or resources.

Territoriality can occur at varying scales (Sack 1986). For the modern nation-state, sovereignty is contingent upon the capacity of the state to 'mould' social relations within its territory (Taylor 1994). Giddens (1985:172) conceptualizes the state as a "power-container," with reference to its tendency to exercise power over delimited space, as a means of controlling the people encapsulated within it. Similarly, Scott (1998) maintains that the demarcation of

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[6] Section 1.65 was published in the following article: Raycraft, Justin. 2019. Circumscribing communities: Marine conservation and territorialization in southeastern Tanzania. *Geoforum* 100(1):128-143.

geographical territory is a tool of statecraft, which allows governments to "read" spaces and the people who inhabit them. This form of 'legibility' of space and people is a prerequisite for governance (Scott 1998b; Braun 2000; Galaty 2016). Vandergeest and Peluso (1995:387) refer to processes of state territoriality that occur within national borders as "internal territorialization," in that they enable modern nation-states to assert direct control over domestic resources, and the people who use them. Similarly, Vandergeest (1996:159) refers to territorialization as "the process by which states attempt to control people and their actions by drawing boundaries around a geographic space." Building from these definitions, Corson (2011:705) outlines "three key components of territorialization." These include "mapping boundaries, establishing and enforcing new rights, and determining acceptable resource uses" (Corson 2011:705). Most recently, Rasmussen and Lund (2018:388) contend "that the territorialization of resource control is a set of processes that precedes legitimacy and authority, fundamentally challenging and replacing existing patterns of spatial control, authority, and institutional orders." Thus, territorialization involves a struggle to reconfigure pre-existing spatial orders.

Protected areas can constitute tools of territoriality and territorialization that serve to strengthen state sovereignty. They are often governed in ways that "define territorial enclosures" and "reclassify the meanings" of spaces, in turn reshaping the relationships between people and natural resources (Akram-Lodhi 2007; Dressler and Guieb 2015:323; Peluso 1990; see also Peluso and Vandergeest 2011). Parks can be interpreted as socially and politically constructed 'governable spaces,' which enable governments to expand territorial control to rural terrains that would otherwise be difficult to directly govern through the state apparatus (Watts 2004:53). They can be considered strategies of territoriality in such cases where they reflect attempts to control people or resources through the control of the geographical areas where they are located' (Elden 2010; Gregory and Vaccaro 2015:345; Offen 2003; Peluso and Lund 2011).

Recent scholarship on the Tanzanian context reveals how territorialization is an ongoing process that occurs through the interplay between top-down interventions and barriers in practice

(Bluwstein and Lund 2018; Raycraft 2019a). In particular, territorialization often faces hurdles in the form of inadequate technical capacity for implementing specialized scientific approaches to environmental management on the ground (see Lund 2015), and bottom-up resistance from communities who may be unsupportive of coercive interventions (Mariki, Svarstad and Benjaminsen 2015; Raycraft 2020). Conflicts between conservation stakeholders can further complicate the picture in empirical reality, a consideration that is especially prevalent in the context of community based conservation interventions (Bluwstein, Moyo, and Kicheleri 2016; Moyo, Ijumba and Lund 2016; Scheba and Rakotonarivo 2016; Wright 2017). The complexities of conservation politics on the ground, however, can serve to legitimize continuous processes of territorialization across broad temporal scales (Bluwstein and Lund 2018).

1.66 Environmental governance and management

In analyzing the perspectives of local pastoralists, I also draw from a body of literature on the human dimensions of conservation that applies an institutional lens to the study of protected areas (Bennett et al. 2017). Bennett and Dearden (2014b:109) provide a particularly productive definition of protected areas in this regard, "[a] protected area can be seen as a social institution that is comprised of a series of laws, policies and processes that are enacted by various levels of government (as well as private sector and civil society actors) through applied governance and management." Following Bennett (2015), I take governance to refer to the mechanisms and pathways through which conservation-related decisions are taken. This involves consideration of who the relevant stakeholders are across scales, what their roles are in decision-making processes, and how power is distributed across these actors (Bennett and Satterfield 2018). Governance processes determine what the particular management priorities of a given conservation area will entail in practice, but they are not synonymous with management. An example of a governance process is holding a steering meeting to discuss future strategic planning. I take environmental management to mean the institutional arrangements that are put into practice on the ground to regulate and enforce the outcomes of governance decisions (Jones

2014; Bennett and Dearden 2014a; Bennett 2015). Examples of management could include carrying out ranger patrols, issuing fines, confiscating livestock, or educating people through rural outreach. In practice, governance and management come hand-in-hand, but for the sake of analytical clarity, it is productive to parse them.

Conservation governance and management have been shown to play crucial roles in determining the extent to which local communities either support or oppose conservation. Participatory governance processes can build trust and respect and ensure that local communities feel that their livelihood concerns are prioritized in the conservation model. Similarly, management institutions that are in line with the traditional values of local communities are more likely to build support for conservation. By contrast, exclusionary processes of decision making taken in a centralized fashion by authorities without adequate involvement of local communities can make people feel marginalized and resentful. These dynamics become particularly impactful when coupled with stronghanded management practices, as people can in some instances come to perceive conservation as a tool for 'policing the community.' Thus governance and management are highly significant lenses for understanding why community members support or contest a particular conservation area.

1.67 Property theory

The final approach to institutions taken up in this dissertation is through the framework of property theory. Following Bromley (1992:2), Galaty (2016) and others, I define property as a "social instrument" that communicates who can access the "benefit streams" associated with a particular resource or set of resources. Rather than a material object, property entails a network of social relations that serve to establish rights in the eyes of prospective users and the state. These rights are often conditional upon group membership or fulfilment of a prescribed set of duties that accompany access rights. Property can be disaggregated into different types, though in practice neat boundaries are not always apparent. State owned property is fairly straightforward in theory, involving the use of formal state institutions to demarcate boundaries,

as is the case with national parks. Rights to use the resources may be allocated to groups and individuals, but governance processes for determining such rights are under the discretion of the state. Private property, often reified through land titling, signifies that the rights holder has the exclusive right to access and use resources vis-à-vis all other individuals in accordance with the law. The third category, common property, refers to resources with shared access and use rights. Anthropological complexities become apparent in conceptualizing how common pool resources should be classified in property terms. Hardin's (1968:1243) now-infamous theorization of "the tragedy of the commons" argued that common pool resources would eventually become degraded if not protected by the formal institutions of private or state property because of a lack of accountability on the parts of resource users. The logic, as applied to the case of livestock keeping, was that people would overstock common pastures to maximize their individual benefits, knowing that the costs incurred from such practices would be diffused across a large set stakeholders. Individuals would thus act in self-interest to increase their benefits, without heed to the costs of their behaviour because it was not 'their' property to begin with. The key element that Hardin failed to take into account, however, was the presence of both formal and informal institutions that serve collective goals, such as villages or locally-based systems of grazing control (McCabe et al. 2020; Ostrom 1990; Yami et al. 2009). Anthropological scholarship has since demonstrated that in situations where people have shared interests in maintaining the material base of their economy, they often implement collective institutions to achieve these ends, irrespective of the formal categories of written law (see Rail 2020). These shared rules are agreed upon through some form of participatory governance and are designed to ensure livelihood security over the long-term. In the context of Maasai pastoralism in East Africa, for instance, customary range management practices include seasonal mobility, the preservation of dry season grazing banks, and processes of ethnic territoriality that are sometimes strict and other times flexible (Galaty 2016b). Under such conditions, common property often does not produce the tragedy of the commons that Hardin predicted, but a sustainable model of resource use that

allocates rights and responsibilities to group members. These institutional arrangements serve to regulate individual behaviour, the actions of other group members, and those of people from outside the group.

While Hardin's (1968) theory failed to recognize the importance of collective institutions, it does still make a useful contribution, though perhaps not the one originally intended. While poorly suited as a framework for understanding why common pool resources are more susceptible to degradation in a universal sense, he did offer some insight into those conditions where degradation is likely to occur: in such cases where there is an absence of property relations governing access to and use of resources (cf. Vaccaro and Beltran 2019). Rather than a tragedy of common property resources, then, Hardin's framework can be applied to 'open access' property, whereby no arrangements are put in place for who can use resources, and under what circumstances (see Hardin 1994).

Adding further complexity to this discussion, formal laws on paper may not actually align with what is occurring on the ground. Informal and formal property rights may coexist or come into conflict in some cases in ways that undermine tenure security (Unruh 2006). For instance, rural land may be designated as state owned, but without the capacity of government to manage remote areas in practice, the resource pool may become open access. Similarly, land that is privately owned on paper could in practice be managed through shared institutions as common property irrespective of how the land is legally classified (see Galaty 2016b). Adding further texture to this discussion, property regimes often change over time in diverse ways, moving from one type to another depending on the political, economic, and environmental constraints within which people operate (Galaty 2016b). Property, then, is a dynamic and nuanced concept that can only truly be understood relative to ethnographic context (see McAllister 2017).

1.68 Institutions in sum

As I have outlined, institutions can be conceptualized in various theoretical ways, though these diverse approaches are not always put into conversation with one another. It is important to note

that my overview is far from comprehensive. In a general sense, I have defined institutions as the sets of relations, practices, and ideas that serve to accomplish shared objectives, allowing individuals to live with others in social groups (for better or for worse). Institutions create spheres of influence over individual behaviour, some through the direct use of force, and others through incentivization, the 'fear of punishment', or domination of the imagination. They enable groups to uphold shared social systems and work towards common goals. While different theorists have emphasized their social, political, and economic aspects, I have sought to think of these various approaches in discourse. The theoretical threads unraveled in this section all refer in some fashion to the sociological mechanisms that allow humans to live together in social groups. These involve the making of rules, and the means through which these rules are enforced, as well as the more subtle 'social facts' of everyday life that bear on the choices of individuals. Institutions can be formalized through the apparatus of the state through laws and legislations, or they can be informally tied to the customary practices of different social groups with specific sets of ingroup/outgroup criteria. These institutions often coexist, overlap, and conflict with each other in the context of legal pluralism and inter-legalities.[7] One of the central theoretical questions that this dissertation considers is 'how do different sets of institutional influences intersect, overlap, and supersede one another in practice?' And furthermore, 'how do formal institutions interact with informal ones?' As I will show, the historical tendency in Tanzania has been towards an unproductive top-down layering of formal institutions over customary ones, undermining the effectiveness of the latter and disrupting the traditional pastoral Maasai social-ecological system of managing semi-arid rangelands. Ideological undercurrents operating at different scales further complicate the reality on the ground by bearing on people's political identities as Tanzanians, as community-members, and as Maasai. There are also some

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[7] By legal pluralism and inter-legalities, I am referring to the coexistence of competing legal orders in the same place at the same time (see Moore 2001; Merry 1988). In the Tanzanian context, Sally-Falk Moore has written about the various ways in which Chagga communities resolve disputes, sometimes through customary means and in other instances via the formal court system of the state (see Moore 1986, 2013). For more recent theorization of inter-legalities see: (Palombella 2021).

contemporary instances where formal and informal institutions overlap in productive manners, as I have observed to be occurring through Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA. I seek to highlight these intersections in this dissertation.

1.7 Applied focus: Rangeland management

Rangelands provide compelling environmental arenas to study institutions. The term 'rangelands' refers broadly to terrestrial ecosystems where livestock is produced and feeds on naturally occurring plants, generally in areas with less than 1000mm in annual precipitation (du Toit, Kock, Deutsch 2010; du Toit 2010). Rangelands can encompass a variety of ground covers and terrains, ranging from arctic tundra to savannah grasslands and dryland deserts. These ecosystems are often shared with wild ungulates and carnivores, and constitute important repositories for biodiversity. Rangelands thus contribute simultaneously to wildlife conservation through habitat protection, and to livestock production through the provision of pasture. In East Africa, human-led livestock grazing regimes, and the use of fire, have likely played significant roles in shaping range ecology over millennia, together with the natural patterns of wild ungulates (see for example Marshall et al. 2018). In the absence of these influences, East African savannas would have probably become much bushier as they moved towards climax states of vegetation. Rangelands, it would seem, are influenced by both social and environmental phenomena.

Rangeland issues are global in scale. At 40%, almost half of the earth's land surface is covered by savannas and grassland biomes (Sinclair and Schaler 2010:xviii). Grasslands prevent soil erosion, promote nutrient cycling, retain water, and provide a crucial source of carbon storage (Wrobel and Redford 2010; Deutsch 2010; Conant et al. 2001). They also provide "gene banks for drought-resistant species" of plants, all of which are centrally important in the face of environmental change (Wrobel and Redford 2010:10). Semi-arid rangelands are vulnerable to climate change, and to a range of social, political, and economic challenges brought about by development trajectories at different scales (Pachauri and Residinger 2007).

Despite their social and environmental importance, rangelands are difficult to address through policy because of their complex and dynamic natures, and the number of different actors who are involved in their governance and management (Wrobel and Redford 2010). Compared to other lands, the productivity of rangelands is often low in agricultural terms, with highly variable distributions of resources across space and time necessitating the maintenance of large connected areas for livestock and wildlife. Their size requirements make them susceptible to fragmentation, the drivers of which are generally complex and multi-scalar. Thus, attempts to conserve rangeland ecosystems, for livestock and wildlife, often involve political interventions that span multiple scales to ensure that ecosystems remain connected. Attempts to create landscape-level governance and management systems, however, can sometimes result in the imposition of strict institutional arrangements that are at variance with ethnographic context (Bluwstein 2018; Goldman 2009; Bluwstein and Lund 2018; Noe and Kangalawe 2015). This highlights the importance of thoroughly understanding the social, political, economic, and environmental contexts in which rangelands are situated before management interventions are put into practice (Behnke, Scoones, and Kerven 1993; Scoones 1995). Due diligence is particularly important in the context of environmental uncertainty (Scoones and Stirling 2020).

1.71 Pastoralism as social-ecological system for managing semi-arid rangelands

Over millennia, pastoralism has developed in intimate connection with rangeland environments (Sinclair and Schaller 2010). Pastoralism allows people to inhabit drylands by grazing livestock, in so doing converting plants that are otherwise indigestible to humans into products that can be consumed, like meat, milk, and blood (Galaty and Johnson 1990; Brown 2001; Wrobel and Redford 2010). In East Africa, this strategy is highly adapted to the dynamic nature of semi-arid rangelands because these areas generally receive limited and unevenly distributed (and sometimes sporadic) bimodal rainfall (Little 1996; Homewood 1994; Homewood et al. 1987; Homewood and Rodgers 1991,1994; McCabe 1997). While agriculture is productive in some areas where precipitation is higher (650-1000mm per year), the lowland plains are generally

marginal agricultural areas with low rainfall (200-250mm per year) and productivity (MDC 1997). Approximately every seven years, moderate droughts occur, and every 20 or so years, there are severe ones (see du Toit 2010:35). Permanent water sources on these landscapes are generally sparse and scattered across large distances, making some areas more productive than others depending on rainfall patterns. It is in the context of these variable environmental conditions that pastoralism has developed, with herders generally moving seasonally with livestock to access water and pasture in accordance with common property mechanisms. Surprisingly, traditional range sciences have largely failed to understand the merits of pastoralism as a social-ecological system for sustainably managing semi-arid rangelands, instead framing livestock keepers as drivers of rangeland degradation through overstocking. Emergent scholarship over the past 30 years, however, has synthesized literature on the anthropology of pastoralism to forge a new vision for range sciences that better appreciates the role of herders in maintaining the variability (and thus stability) of rangeland systems (Scoones and Graham 1994; Behnke et al. 1993; Galvin et al. 2008; Homewood 2008; Scoones 1995, 1999; Homewood 1987).

To effectively understand the particularities of the new range ecology, it is important to first grasp the conventional ecological theory from which it diverges. Traditional ecological theory from the 1950s assumes that ecological systems are inherently stable and exist in a state of equilibrium (McCabe 2003a; Homewood 2004; Neumann 2005).[8] This singular state is preserved by regulating density through population control, which serves to maintain an equilibrium point with a maximum state of vegetation. It was held that if the system was pushed beyond a set carrying capacity by inadequately regulating the population numbers of grazing animals, then losses in biodiversity or potentially permanent declines in productivity would occur (see Homewood 2004; Homewood 2008:4). However, this model was developed in

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[8] This section is drawn largely from Homewood (2004) who offers a particularly compelling and digestible narrative of pastoralism as a sustainable social-ecological system for managing rangelands in Africa. See also Neumann (2005:60-71) for detailed discussion of equilibrium and disequilibrium ecological dynamics.

temperate ecosystems in western countries that were relatively predictable and stable compared to semi-arid environments in eastern Africa. Issues arose with the uncritical manner in which conventional ecological models were applied to semi-arid rangelands. In these contexts variability was generally higher, though fluctuations were initially interpreted by ecologists as disruptions to the state of equilibrium. Thus, they were taken as signs of degradation. Based on empirical longitudinal studies of semi-arid rangelands, however, some anthropologists and rangeland ecologists have since come to the conclusion that these ecosystems are not governed by the same principles (McCabe 1990b). The 'default state' is, in a sense, the absence of a single state. Rather, ecosystems exist in a series of alternative states of stability at any given time based on variable conditions. This consideration led to the emergence of disequilibrium theory, which holds that there was never a fixed equilibrium state to begin with and that semi-arid rangelands are constantly in flux, adapting and changing in response to external stressors like drought, fire, disease, grazing practices, and increases in population density (see Fuhlendorf & Engle 2001).[9]

This led to the emergence of resilience theory, which, in its original application, sets out that ecological systems can be both dynamic and self-organizing (Gunderson 2000; Briske 2017; Briske et al. 2017). Resilience refers to a state of stability of an ecological system at different scales. Resilience theory holds that ecological systems are non-linear and can have multiple types of stability regimes. A lack of resilience occurs when there is a "flip" into a different regime altogether, from which it can be challenging to recover (Walker 2010:15). Within a particular system, if the feedback loops (e.g. nutrient cycling) are intact, then a system remains in a particular regime, but if it crosses a certain threshold, changes to these feedback cycles occur. Resilience theory, then, is concerned primarily with regime shifts, which occur when a threshold is crossed. Thresholds are generally defined at points where the feedback cycles of a system change to such a degree that the overall structure, function, and identity of the system is no

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[9] To be fair, ecologists have been engaging ideas about uncertainty, stochasticity, and dynamic equilibriums for the past forty years, and many have since moved beyond the conventions of the 1950s detailed here (Vaccaro pers. comm. 2022).

longer the same (Walker et al. 2004; Walker 2010; Folke et al. 2010). A regime can refer then to all of the possible states of the system that still retain shared feedback loops.[10]

The key assumption of resilience theory is that ecological systems are dynamic and adaptive across time and space. Thinking about semi-arid rangelands through this lens makes clear the necessity of flexible management strategies, rather than 'command-and-control' approaches aimed at producing a singular 'optimal' result (Walker 2010). Such approaches will likely fail, as semi-arid rangelands can be shepherded along towards a particular trajectory of change, but cannot ever be entirely controlled. Attempts to preserve them in ideal states often overlook the impact of "extreme events," and run the risk of viewing social and ecological rangeland processes as separable (Walker 2010:16). This can lead to "partial solutions" (Walker 2010:16). One practical approach to rangeland management advanced by Walker (2010) is through the triad of resilience, adaptability, and transformability. Resilience refers in this context to the capacity of the system as a whole to withstand external stresses and change form in such a way that the overall structure, function, and feedback cycles are maintained. Adaptability refers to the agency of the involved people to promote resilience by actively managing the system. Transformability connotes the potential to completely change the system into a new one altogether in such cases where the previous system is no longer feasible.

Prior to colonial intervention, pastoralists in East Africa used traditional social institutions to maintain the resilience of their social-ecological systems (see McCabe 1990a). These generally involved nomadic and transhumance pattens of herding to access pasture, water, and alkaline lake salt-licks. In the wet season, pastoralists occupied the lowland plains where rainfall turned drylands into verdant savannahs. In the dry season, they stayed near permanent

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[10] Resilience can occur at different scales: patch scales, landscape scales, regional scales, or cross-scales (Walker 2010). Sometimes, multiple thresholds interact with one another across scales (see Walker 2010:23). Once a system crosses a particular threshold, after which point stability (defined in terms of recurrent feedback loops) can no longer be maintained through any alternate state, the system enters a new regime, which may not be as sustainable in the long term (Walker 2010).

water sources such as swamps and springs, or retreated to the mountainous highlands where tropical forests created their own weather zones, providing consistent rainfall, water catchments and running streams. Pastoralists secured access to the resources necessary for their mode of production through territoriality, including conflict and warfare, but also through cultural hegemony and ethnic flexibility, the latter of which allowed pastoralists like the Maasai to maintain social networks across these varied ecological zones (Galaty 1982, 1993). To manage the material base of the economy (grasslands), pastoral groups implemented strict territorial restrictions on seasonal resource access. They practiced rotational strategies to prevent overgrazing at critical times of grass growth, such as when seeds first dropped and began to take root at the beginning of the rains (see Jandreau & Berkes 2016). Outgroup members were prevented from accessing these resources if the exclusion costs were low relative to the economic costs of allowing intrusions (Galaty 2016b). But in such cases where exclusion costs were high and resources were abundant – in the wet season across the savannah for instance – boundaries were more flexible. At the same time, when resources were scarce, boundaries could also become more permeable as necessity dictated movement across the territories of one pastoral group, or into those of rivals (McCabe 2004). Drought, for instance, required movement to permanent water sources that became more difficult to defend as demand rose. Such situations stressed social-ecological systems and rendered institutional arrangements for pasture management at one territorial scale more challenging to uphold. Generally speaking, however, pastoral resources were managed in communal ways, considering the importance of each to the overall economy and variable distributions by area and season. Rather than Hardin's "open to all" tragedy of the commons, pastures were managed through common property institutions that involved agreed upon duties and responsibilities for group members in relation to each other and non-group members (Bromley 1992; Ostrom 1990). These management institutions were enforced through customary means, giving them power over social behaviour and ensuring sustainable resource use and the continuation of production.

A key benefit of pastoral production was that rather than assert direct pressure on wildlife populations through hunting or clearing land for agriculture, this economic system was relatively compatible with wildlife (Reid 2012). Some level of grazing competition between livestock and wild ungulates occurred, as did disease transmission (wildebeest-cattle), and depredation of livestock by predators and retaliatory killings. In comparison to alternative livelihood systems, however, these impacts were modest (Reid 2012). Furthermore, some degree of conflict between humans and carnivores was likely functional, reminding each set of actors to keep their distance when possible, phenomena that had trickle-down benefits for wild ungulates who could seek temporary security in pastoral-dominated areas (Schuette 2012; Tyrrell et al. 2017). Abandoned pastoral homesteads, where livestock had kralled and defecated in a central location, fertilized the soil for future growth of nutrient-rich *manyatta* grasses to the benefit of both future livestock and wild ungulates (Reid 2012; Augustine 2003). During severe droughts, pastoralists could take to small-scale hunting, and carnivores could increase their cattle offtake, creating a symbiotic form of exchange between pastoralists and wildlife in times of stress (Western 1982).

Pastoralism, it would seem, facilitated human-wildlife coexistence primarily because it kept rangelands open for use by livestock and wildlife (Reid 2012). Contrary to the often-used misnomer "wildlife management," which refers more accurately to the conduct of people, wild ungulates require no direct supervision. Through hundreds of thousands of years, wild ungulates have co-evolved with grasslands, regulating their movements and grazing practices instinctively, in so doing contributing to the dynamism of ecological systems that exist in multiple states of stability (Wrobel and Redford 2010). The great migration, for instance, is one of the most wonderful examples of this in the world. Each year in northern Tanzania, wildebeest sense the coming of rainfall and depart their dry season pastures in the Ngorongoro Crater, passing through Seronera and the Serengeti plains en route to the Masai Mara in Kenya. Livestock in this ecosystem, by contrast, must be managed, which has historically occurred through pastoralism. Over the past 150 years, however, traditional pastoral institutions for range management have

come under fire from political interventions 'from above' through the colonial encounter and the rise of nation-states (see Havnevik 1993; Ndagala 1982; Ndgala 1990). Attempts to make pastoral communities more "legible," that is subjects of political control, through sedentarization and restrictions on mobility, have disrupted the core foundations of the social-ecological system: moving seasonally to access unevenly distributed resources (Salzman 1980; Fratkin et al. 2004; Galvin 2009; Galaty 2016b; Fratkin and Roth 1999; Scott 1998). The wildebeest are still able to maintain their seasonal patterns of movement thanks to the protected status of Serengeti National Park. However, local pastoralists have seen theirs restricted (Gardner 2016; cf. McCabe 1997:59). Political boundaries constraining the movement of people and livestock across space and time threaten to collapse the pastoral mode of production. In Kenya, for instance, recent subdivision of commonly held lands into individual private property through titling has been particularly troubling (see Galaty 1994; Homewood and Thompson 2010:353). In Tanzania, and elsewhere, areas with abundant wildlife have been alienated for conservation, despite their central importance for pastoral productivity. These decisions have been taken for intrinsic reasons (i.e. 'wild animals must be protected from the self-serving interests of humanity') and for economic ones in support of burgeoning tourism sectors in otherwise low-income countries. The ideology underpinning this approach is that people degrade nature, and that nature should be protected from humans, assuming a one-directional and one-dimensional set of influences that fails to take into account the social-ecological feedback loops that have historically characterized rangeland ecosystems. In reality, humans have never been separate from nature, limited as animals are by physiology and environment. Pastoral communities have coexisted with wildlife for millennia, owing in large part to their mutual interest in accessing water and pasture across large connected rangelands. As stewards of these ecosystems they have been held in tow by their own customary institutions, tailored in culturally specific ways to their surroundings.

One fruitful lens for conceptualizing customary pastoral institutions for managing semi-arid rangelands is through the "territories of life" framework put forth by the Indigenous Peoples

and Community Conserved Areas Consortium (ICCA). Territories of life refer to areas that are "governed, managed and conserved by custodian indigenous peoples and local communities" (ICCA 2019:5). They are characterized by three main criteria: 1) a "close and deep connection" between the custodian people and their territory, 2) the presence of a functioning institutional arrangement for governance, and 3) the manifestation of management practices that contribute positively to both "the conservation of nature" and to "community livelihoods and wellbeing" (ICCA 2019:5). Thus, a key aspect of ICCAs is that they are mutually beneficial for ecosystems and the people who steward them. In the context of Maasai pastoralism, I would argue (as do the Maasai and other ICCA members) that their customary forms of territoriality contribute directly to the conservation of key wildlife habitat by promoting productive grasslands and preventing land use change and habitat fragmentation. Healthy grasslands in turn support the pastoral economy and help promote human wellbeing and livelihood security.

A challenge with the ICCA framework in the Tanzanian context stems from the question of how territories of life interact with macropolitical and economic context and, in particular, the state. In this regard, the ICCA Consortium provides a helpful set of sub-classifications for contextualizing ICCAs. The first category ("defined ICCAs") refers to ICCAs that are "self-recognized" in practice, and fulfil the three criteria outlined above. The second category ("disrupted ICCAs") classifies territories that have been "destroyed by 'development'" (ICCA 2019:7).[11] The third category ("desired ICCAs") describes territories that local custodians want to put into practice, but which have not yet come to be. Thus, ICCAs may have once existed, may currently exist, or may exist in the future with concerted action. In my view, all three types of ICCAs are apparent across Maasailand with some nuance: the 'desire' for territories of life is strong and enduring among the Maasai; the extent of past Maasai territories of life that existed prior to colonialism has been severely 'disrupted'; and many are still well-'defined' and involve

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[11] The ICCA provides the example of the Gibe 3 Dam in Ethiopia, which blocked the flooding patterns of the Omo River, "drying up the territories" of communities in the lower Omo Valley (ICCA 2019:7).

a combination of formal and informal governance institutions. A resonating question in this dissertation is whether Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch reflect conservation areas that could be considered territories of life.

In a contemporary context, pastoralists have been systemically oppressed by governments and marginalized by environmental policies that have misunderstood the ecological value of their economic system (see Fratkin and McCabe 1999). The rhetoric that wildlife conservation benefits pastoral communities through tourism revenue, offsetting economic losses from livestock production, has generally not been translated into practice (Homewood and Thompson 2010). Most pastoral communities affected by wildlife conservation in East Africa receive little in the way of economic offsets, which, coupled with the new constraints on their livelihoods, has led to livelihood diversification into other arenas including wage labour and agricultural production, the opportunity costs of which are now generally lower in all but the driest areas for pastoralists who are forced to provide for their growing families on increasingly fragmented lands (Norton-Griffiths 1995; Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995; Norton-Griffiths 1998; Norton-Griffiths et al. 2008; Homewood and Thompson 2010). The current picture, then, is a rather bleak one for the plight of pastoralists who have traditionally been the stewards of semi-arid rangelands for millennia. While some have suggested providing adequate offsets to pastoralists in the form of direct payments to recoup the losses from not cultivating wildlife habitats near core protected areas, the solution that I hope my dissertation contributes to is one that recognizes the importance of the livestock economy of pastoralists and seeks to align the formal institutions of the state with the customary ones that have allowed pastoralism to thrive in rangeland environments alongside wildlife for millennia. While these institutions have in some cases begun to decay in the face of political pressure, there are many pastoral communities who still value above all else access to the rangeland resources that support their way of life. Here, I explore ethnographically two particular community-based conservation areas in the Maasai Steppe that have moved beyond troubled sociopolitical terrains to garner support from local

pastoralists for the resonating reason that the areas secure (rather than dispossess) large areas of communal land, making possible the continuation of the pastoral way of life. The solution, as I see it, is to think about wildlife conservation through the lens of pastoralism, an approach taken by pastoral communities long before colonialism, and one that is likely to endure into the future, provided that it receives adequate political support.

1.8 Outline of dissertation

Chapter 2 details my methodological approach to data collection and analysis, subdivided into a description of the study area, the field sites, and the methods used. Chapter 3 lays out the ethnographic context of the study, including historical discussion of the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial periods, and the effects of government policy on rangeland development in Tanzania's Maasailand. It also gives anthropological background on the cultural lifeways of the Kisongo Maasai and their historical relations with the Arusha. Chapter 4 discusses the institutional arrangements for governing and managing wildlife and rangelands in contemporary Tanzania against the backdrop of the previous chapter. Chapter 5 presents a socioeconomic overview of the study villages through a combination of quantitative and ethnographic data. Chapters 6-9 address the question of whether Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch reflect effective and equitable models of community-based conservation based on mixed data on community attitudes towards conservation. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on Randilen WMA, and Chapters 8 and 9 attend to Manyara Ranch. In Chapter 10, I discuss the theoretical and applied significance of these findings in relation to the scholarly discourse on institutions and Tanzania's political economy of rangeland development and conclude with some thoughts on the future of conservation policy in East Africa.

Chapter 2. Methodology

2.1 Study area

2.11 The rangelands of Maasailand

In total, Maasailand spans approximately 150,000-200,000km^2 of semi-arid rangelands in southern Kenya and northern Tanzania (Homewood and Thompson 2010:341). Its ecological zones are diverse, ranging from fertile highlands with volcanic soil to sandy loam lowlands with marginal agricultural productivity. Maasailand is revered globally for its vast savannas, charismatic species of endangered wildlife and iconic pastoralists. Tanzania's Maasailand spans some 60,000-80,000km^2. Up until 1974, it was governed under one district administration, but has since been divided into five smaller ones: Monduli District, Ngorongoro District, Kiteto District, Simanjiro District, and Longido District (see Hodgson 2001:158). Kiteto and Simanjiro are located within the Manyara Region and the rest are considered part of the Arusha region. The vast area of Tanzania's Maasailand features uneven rainfall patterns, varied geographical terrains, and a great diversity of flora and fauna. It supports an abundance of wildlife, protected through a variety of conservation areas including Serengeti National Park and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA), two of the most renowned (and contentious) protected areas in the world. Conservation-related tourism in Maasailand is a crucial part of the Tanzanian economy.

Significant spatial and temporal "biophysical variability" across Maasailand make it challenging to study holistically (Homewood and Thompson 2010:341-342). While Maasailand is socially and ecologically diverse, there is also much continuity across the region, as similar socioeconomic and environmental patterns are evident across the entire area. Ethnically, Homewood and Thompson (2010:343) suggest that 95% of the population in Maasailand is Maa-speaking, and "self-defines as Maasai." I will perhaps complicate this claim of ethnic homogeneity in this dissertation through discussion of the Kisongo-Arusha interface, but overall there is certainly much continuity. In micro-economic terms, the majority of people in these areas are herders and farmers, and over half of household income in the rural areas of

Maasailand comes from livestock (Homewood et al. 2009a). Maasai have diversified their economies over the past twenty years to include crop cultivation and participation in wage labour (O'Malley 2000; McCabe, Leslie, and DeLuca 2010; McCabe et al. 2014). Cultivation generally serves subsistence purposes and helps to mitigate the risks of drought and reduce environmental uncertainties (see McCabe et al. 1997; McCabe 1997; McCabe 2003a,b). At the same time, commercial production has increased in recent years, and there is also some suggestion that cultivation has become a means for herders to stake their claims to land (see Sachedina 2008). Government policies and power dynamics internal to the Maasai age-set system also play a role (see McCabe et al. 2010:2). Rather than push Maasai away from livestock altogether, some levels of diversification in Maasailand seem to complement the pastoral economy and support its resilience (see McCabe 2003b:109).

2.12 The Maasai Steppe and the Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem

Homewood and Thompson (2010) suggest that the ethnic, micro-economic, and ecological similarities across Maasailand make it suitable for investigating the role of political context in influencing rangeland management outcomes. This dissertation focuses on the central Maasai Steppe in the southern part of Tanzania's Maasailand. The Maasai Steppe is a vast grassland ecosystem that supports a variety of wildlife species of global significance, including numerous species of wild ungulates and large carnivores.[12] The central part of the Steppe, where this study took place, is home to over 2000 elephants, the largest sub-population in northern Tanzania and one of the fastest growing continent-wide (Rodgers et al. 2003:5; Pittigilio et al. 2013; Galanti et

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[12] Some social scientists have been critical of the phrase 'Maasai Steppe Heartland,' which was essentially born from a marketing campaign from the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) that sought to conjure up relatable images of an "American Heartland" for U.S.-based donors (see Sachedina 2008:329; Bluwstein 2018; Sachedina et al. 2010). Scholars have also taken issue with the depiction of the Steppe as an area where Maasai pastoralists and wildlife 'coexist' in harmony, pointing out that multiple ethnic groups inhabit the area and practice an economic mosaic of livelihoods in relation to the constraints of poverty and land alienation (see Igoe 2010:386). There is important basis to these points that should not be overlooked, though the area was referred to as a heartland (see for instance Kjekshus 1977b), and as 'the Masai Steppe' (see Lamprey 1964: Fig. 10) long before AWF arrived on the scene. The Steppe does for the most part overlap the Masai Reserve from the colonial era, where the Maasai historically resided (see Hodgson 2001) (discussed in Chapter 3). The role of AWF in shaping the conservation dynamics of the area is discussed in Chapters 6-9.

al. 2006; Pittigilo et al. 2012; Borner 1985; Galanti et al. 2000; Pittigilio et al. 2014:150; Igoe 2010; Goldman 2020:174; Foley 2002:34; Bluwstein 2018). In total, the Steppe spans approximately 40,000 square kilometres, encompassing both Tarangire National Park (TNP) and Lake Manyara National Park (see Figures 1 and 2), as well as several other community-based conservation areas (Litchenfeld and Kent 2011).[13] The area is home to Kisongo Maasai pastoralists, Arusha cultivators, and several other ethnic groups. The social demographics of the study area are discussed in depth in Chapter 5. When TNP was gazetted in 1970, it caused significant socioeconomic disruption for local pastoralists whose livestock depended on access to the Silalo Swamp and Tarangire River, key permanent water sources in the area (Woodhouse and McCabe 2018; Sachedina 2008; Igoe and Brockington 1999).[14] In a contemporary context, pastoralists are prohibited from entering either park (unless they do so as tourists) and face considerable challenges in securing communal access to grazing resources in adjacent areas in the face of increasing crop cultivation and a lasting legacy of land alienation from settler farming during the colonial era (see Ndagala 1997; Hodgson 2001) (discussed in Chapters 3, 6-9).

Rainfall patterns vary significantly across the Steppe and generally follow a bimodal pattern. The lowland plains receive as little as 250mm of annual rain, while some of the mountains can receive upwards of 1500mm (Ndagala 1994:4). Much of the area receives less than 500mm on average, with vegetation growth limited to the rainy periods (MDC 1994:5). The Steppe undergoes considerable transformation across seasons. In the long dry season, from approximately June-October, wildlife congregates around the Tarangire River in TNP. November-January usually coincide with a short wet season, followed by a short dry season from January-February. During my fieldwork, in 2019-2020, the Steppe received anomalously high

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[13] Accessed from: https://www.nationalgeographic.org/article/case-study-big-cats-maasai-steppe/#:~:text=The%20Maasai%20Steppe%20is%20an,kilometers%20(15%2C444%20square%20miles).&text=The%20Maasai%20Steppe%20includes%20Tarangire,Steppe%20has%20two%20rainy%20seasons
[14] Pursuant to conservation legislations in Tanzania, all human activities, including livestock grazing, hunting, fishing, and harvesting are prohibited inside national parks. It has been suggested, however, that TNP may have been important only for small stock grazing (Miller et al. 2014).

amounts of rainfall for most of this period (see Wainwright et al. 2021) (discussed further in

Chapter 4). In the long wet season, from February-May, the grasslands become verdant and

wildlife disperses out of TNP into the adjacent areas (see Figure 1) (Sachedina and Nelson

2010).

Figure 1 – Sketch of wildlife dispersal routes out of Tarangire National Park during the wet season according to data from Lamprey (1964). The map was redrawn and adapted by the author based on Borner (1985:92).

TNP thus functions primarily as a dry season park (Borner 1985). The dynamic nature of this

ecosystem renders it particularly challenging to protect through conservation initiatives. Seasonal

dispersals outside TNP leave wildlife vulnerable to competing land uses and often lead to

conflicts with local people whose livelihoods depend on farms and livestock (Hariohay and

Røskaft 2015). This issue has generated considerable interest from conservationists hoping to

protect the wildlife habitat areas adjacent to TNP that overlap with village land. Spearheaded by

the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and other organizations, various community-based

conservation initiatives have been implemented over the past thirty years in an effort to prevent

these areas from becoming fragmented. Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch are two such

initiatives, and will be the primary focus of this dissertation (see Figure 2). Chapters 6 and 7

discuss Randilen WMA in detail, and Manyara Ranch is examined in Chapters 8 and 9. The

following section provides a basic overview of the field sites, though detailed discussion of the

ethnographic context features in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

Figure 2 – Map of the study area in the central Tarangire ecosystem. Map produced by author with QGIS software based on data gathered with handheld GPS devices and protected area shapefiles provided by Honeyguide and the Monduli District Council. Villages are represented by their names to show their general locations. In reality, villages are distinct administrative units with defined boundaries, though some are contested.

2.13 Field Sites

When I first arrived in the study area, I commenced emplaced fieldwork in Oltukai village next

to Manyara Ranch (see Figure 2), unsure of how the project would unfold. One of the key

methodological tensions that I wrestled with in the early weeks of my fieldwork was what the

tradeoffs were of residing exclusively in one village to engage in a more classic form of

participant observation versus a multi-sited approach that would allow me to attend to a wider

area, but with greater risk of diffusing observational rigor. My past work at the Master's level,

which was based on emplaced fieldwork in a single village, had left me with some concerns with this approach – I had felt limited in my ability to generalize findings across a larger area. The way I came to determine my approach was by reminding myself that the methods should be dictated by the research questions. In my case, I wanted to assess in a representative fashion how communities felt about Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA. I decided at that point to scale up to a study of Oltukai, Mswakini Juu, Mswakini Chini, and Naitolia (see Figure 2) with regular travel across these villages. Not long after, I met with the Randilen WMA chair at his home in Mswakini Chini and asked him whether he felt that fieldwork in these villages would be sufficient for understanding community attitudes towards the WMA. He replied quite directly that "if you want to understand what is going on, then you must go to all the member villages because each has a different story to tell." I decided to heed his advice and realized over time how crucial this decision was. The ethnographic complexities were quite different across the villages and spending time in all of them gave a much more rounded picture of how people in these communities felt about conservation. The study, then, which began in a single village, eventually evolved to a multi-sited study of twelve villages to ensure that I was not missing important information. I decided that expanding my gaze much further than this would spread me too thin. Beyond this locus, I tried to soak in information in a broader sense as it related to the wider ecosystem, pastoral tenure, Tanzania's wildlife sector, and the history of rangeland development in Maasailand.[15]

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[15] My approach would have been impossible without 'Nex,' my trusty Nissan X-trail vehicle acquired through generous support from my supervisor via the "Institutional Canopy of Conservation" (ICAN) project. Having a capable 4x4 vehicle was a complete 'game changer' that allowed us to cover diverse terrains across seasons and move swiftly between villages as needed. The vehicle was my mobile home, office, storage unit, meeting place and was absolutely crucial for the project, so I am very grateful to the ICAN project for support in this regard. Without the vehicle, the scale of the project would have been necessarily much smaller. Nex has some notable tradeoffs vs. a land cruiser that are worth mentioning for those considering fieldwork in remote areas. A land cruiser has a higher suspension and a significant amount of power to bulldoze through mud. Nex by contrast has a much lower suspension and is powerful pound-for-pound but not to the same extent. Its key advantage, however, is that it is much lighter than a cruiser, so it can skim through the mud fairly efficiently in instances where a cruiser would likely become stuck. Cruisers, however, are more capable in deep rivers requiring a large suspension. We found Nex up to the task on almost all occasions, albeit with our fair share of instances of getting stuck. The only time our vehicle met its match was when it came up against the river near Engaruka/Selela, which was simply not crossable on one occasion in November, 2019, as Leanne and I drove from Lake Natron to Randilen WMA. This meant

In the end, the study involved a year (July 2019-July 2020) of multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork across the twelve administrative villages surrounding Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA (see Figure 2).[16] These villages were: Oltukai, Esilalei, Makuyuni, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, Mswakini Chini, Olasiti, Lemooti, Lengoolwa, Nafco, Lolkisale, and Oldonyo. Together with Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA, these villages constitute an interconnected geographical area in the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem. However, due to the layout of road infrastructure, these villages represent two sets of field sites: the Makuyuni side (Makuyuni, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, Mswakini Chini, Olasiti, Oltukai, Esilalei) and the Lolkisale side (Lemooti, Lengoolwa, Nafco, Lolkisale, Oldonyo). Although Lemooti and Makuyuni are very close in geographic proximity, the paths connecting them are only passable by motorbike and one must navigate through many *korongo* (gorges) and a precarious elephant dispersal area. The options by vehicle are to either drive to Naitolia and pass through Randilen WMA, following the winding paths through the wildlife area until eventually reaching Lemooti. This route is enjoyable for occasional game viewing, but is less practical as it takes longer, is more remote, and requires some navigational dexterity (especially in the wet season). The other option is to drive on the main highway back towards Arusha and take the main dirt road south upon reaching Kisongo town. This road is rough but straight forward in the dry season, allowing travel up to 60km per hour compared to the slower pace at which one must drive in the WMA. In the wet season, however, the main river just a few kilometres from the highway becomes virtually impassable. For those bold enough to brave it, the road becomes much worse forty minutes or so into the drive as the red sandy loam soils give way to black cotton swamps that are highly challenging to traverse. Since we worked in Lolkisale through both wet and dry seasons, my

driving all the way around through backcountry roads towards Monduli town and navigating switch backs up Komolonik mountain near Monduli Juu before connecting up to the A104 highway again.

[16] Standing atop the Esimangore mountain made clear on one afternoon during fieldwork the parameters of the study area I was working in. Essentially, one could draw a line from the top of Esimangore to Lake Manyara, then down south to Boundary Hill on the edge of Tarangire National Park, then over to Lolkisale mountain and back up to Esimangore.

research assistant Edwine (see Section 2.22) and I navigated these challenging terrains with regularity, often getting stuck and requiring tows from tractors and other passers-by.

While I will present descriptive statistics of the village demographics in Chapter 5, I will provide some general social backdrop of the villages here. Oltukai and Esilalei village are located between Lake Manyara and Manyara Ranch (see Figure 2), and comprise almost entirely Kisongo Maasai.[17] On the other side of the A104 highway connecting Arusha town and Babati, the three villages of Mswakini Chini, Mswakini Juu, and Naitolia are almost entirely inhabited by Arusha cultivators. I will lay out their social history in Chapter 3. These three villages are member villages of Randilen WMA, and also neighbouring Manyara Ranch. Olasiti village is located to the southwest of the ranch between Oltukai and Mswakini Chini. Though it is close in geographic proximity, it is technically located in the Babati District of the Manyara Region, which posed particular administrative challenges because fieldwork in this village required a different set of permissions from regional and district authorities. Olasiti comprises a Arusha majority, followed by Kisongo and mixed ethnicities. On the other side of the ranch is Makuyuni, which has a complex political history of land allocation, outlined in Chapter 4. The majority of Makuyuni's rural sub-villages are home to Arusha cultivators. The exception is Saburi, which comprises a Kisongo Maasai majority with some mixed-ethnicity "Swahili" families who had in-migrated to work on a commercial farm in the area (see Chapter 3).[18]

In Makuyuni village, a small town has formed around the highway junction where the A104 Arusha-Babati highway branches off towards Mto wa Mbu.[19] The road was paved in 2005

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[17] Though they may actually comprise a mixture of core/pastoral Maasai sections, they think of themselves as Kisongo Maasai in a contemporary context (see Chapter 3).

[18] In Tanzania, Maasai tend to refer to non-Maa speaking ethnic groups as "Swahili." This has been documented by Hodgson (2001) and Goldman (2020), and may have to do with the nationalization of the kiSwahili language during the socialist period and the association of the kiSwahili language with crop cultivation and government. Here, I am applying the term as it is used by the Kisongo in their everyday discourses, and not with reference to the Swahili people living along the Swahili coast (see Nurse and Spear 1985). Quite interestingly, Arens (1979) documents that people of mixed ethnicities in Mto wa Mbu have come to think of themselves as "Swahili," knowing that the Maasai living in surrounding areas also conceive of them as such.

[19] The junction area near Makuyuni is considered a town in terms of tenure, as individuals can be given GROs (general rights of occupancy) (see Chapter 4 for more detailed discussion of land tenure in Tanzania).

and since that time, urbanization of Makuyuni has accelerated. Landcover maps derived from Landsat data reveal that agricultural expansion has occurred rapidly along the highway over the past fifteen years (Martin et al. 2019; Martin et al. 2020). Much like Minjingju, a 25-minute drive down the A104 from Makuyuni towards Babati, the town comprises mixed ethnicities who have in-migrated to the area to set up shops and participate in the increased economic activity that the highway junction has generated. Swahili-speaking women from Mto wa Mbu regularly catch *dala dalas* (mini-busses) to Makuyuni to sell their vegetable and fruit produce before traveling back home in the evening.[20] The main junction of Makuyuni is always densely packed with *boda bod*a (motorbike taxi) drivers who take people back to the villages from the junction, where the large inter-city busses drop them off. From the junction, one can travel to any of the nearby villages in the area within about forty minutes. Being based near the junction also allows one to hop over to Babati, Mto wa Mbu, Monduli town, Lolkisale (via Kisongo), or Arusha city quite efficiently, which I often did in pursuit of key stakeholders who were challenging to track down.[21] The town centre has a variety of shops selling cooking supplies, household goods, small electronics, food products, and mobile telephone vouchers. On Saturdays, the town transforms to host the weekly cattle market and Maasai men flock to Makuyuni to buy and sell livestock. Maasai women also come to sell handicrafts and milk products, and people from other towns bring clothes, jewellery and household goods to sell. Arusha farmers also participate by selling beans, maize and other crops.[22] Most people living in the surrounding villages do their routine shopping during these market events because it is easier to solicit rides to town, and there is greater selection of products then. Beyond the economic considerations, market days are also fun

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[20] The journey takes about half an hour.

[21] Stakeholders generally refer to people who have a stake in a project, initiative, or set of processes. This includes the entire network of involved actors from community members to government officials. By *key* stakeholders, I am referring in particular to those individuals who hold positions of power and have authority to shape governance dynamics, and to those who have specialized knowledge of relevant issues because of their professional employment or experiences.

[22] On Sundays, the market is held in Minjingu town (technically in Olasiti village), and for those who are willing to travel greater distances to compare prices, there are also market days on Thursdays in Mto wa Mbu (village named after the "river of mosquitoes"), on Wednesdays in Duka Bovu, and on Saturdays in Lolkisale town.

for people. They provide reasons to leave the villages and come together with friends from other places to drink, eat grilled meat, and socialize. Thus, market days are also important for social reproduction.

In town there are a few small restaurants serving beans, meat, chapati, chai and rice and two main guesthouses, MIC Executive Lodge and Tanzanite. I came to establish MIC as my home base on the Makuyuni side, which appealed to me for its lower costs, locked compound for my vehicle, slightly quieter atmosphere and secure room, which I generally rented over the long haul to keep as a mobile base.[23] A few hundred metres away is Tanzanite lodge.[24] Tanzanite is structured like a huge Maasai boma, with a large outdoor seating area where people can eat, drink chai and watch the football games. At the front entrance, facing the Makuyuni-Mto wa Mbu road, is an attached coffee shop with an espresso machine to cater to the tourists who are passing through en route to the Serengeti and Ngorongoro. This made it a lovely place for me to relax and work on my laptop in the shade, with a nice cup of coffee. Tanzanite was also a highly strategic location for engaging with key conservation stakeholders. On one occasion, for instance, the directors of Honeyguide, UCRT, and PWC, and the mangers of Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch, were all in the junction at the same time passing through on their way to a series of unrelated meetings![25] Monduli District Government Officers also often stopped in Makuyuni, as did Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute (TAWIRI) researchers, Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority (TAWA) officers, and Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA)

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[23]The owner, Mushi is a kind-hearted Chagga man from Karatu who worked in the forest service during his career and has established a pair of guesthouses in retirement, one of which is in Makuyuni. The rooms are modest and because of my long-term arrangement with him, I came to pay approximately 10,000 shillings per day (5$ or so). MIC is tucked just off the highway, in a small dirt lot. It is not the most attractive location, but quite practical because it is secure and easy to access.

[24] The original owner, who passed away during my fieldwork, was a Kisongo man who became wealthy through Tanzanite trading and subsequently established Triple A Nightclub in Arusha and Tanzanite Lodge in Makuyuni. Unlike Triple A, Tanzanite itself does not serve liquor, though it can be purchased and brought over from the bar next door, but this is not common practice. The atmosphere in Tanzanite was always much calmer than the bars on the other side of the A104 highway in the town centre of Makuyuni. Most of the regulars were Maasai and there was always a sense that disorderly behaviour would not be tolerated.

[25] UCRT stands for the Ujamaa Community Resource Team, and PWC stands for Pastoral Women's Council. UCRT, Honeyguide, and PWC are NGOs that respectively focus on pastoral land rights, community-based conservation, and gender empowerment in Maasailand. I introduce all three in greater depth in later chapters.

staff heading to the national parks. This made the large open seating areas in Tanzanite very practical for a snowball approach to recruiting key stakeholders for interviews (see Section 2.24), beyond its homely appeal.

On the other side of the study area, Lolkisale is similar to Makuyuni in that it also has a town-like centre, albeit one that receives less traffic because of the unpaved access road. The town itself comprises mixed ethnicities, and there are some farming sub-villages with predominantly Arusha. The Kisongo reside on the outskirts of the village, away from town. While working on the the Lolkisale side, I generally oriented myself in relation to Lolkisale mountain, which looms over the north side of Lolkisale's main road. Oldonyo village is located just to the west and south of the mountain. It comprises mostly Kisongo Maasai with some Arusha dominated sub-villages. Nafco village is situated just to the east of the mountain and is mostly inhabited by Arusha, with a Maasai minority living on the periphery. Lengoolwa is nestled adjacent to the eastern and northern side of the mountain and Lemooti is just north of it. Lengoolwa has a small Arusha minority but is mostly inhabited by Kisongo. Lemooti is home exclusively to Kisongo Maasai. These five villages were originally sub-villages of Lolkisale, but have since subdivided into five separate villages (see Chapter 6).

The landscape across the study area was remarkably diverse. In Saburi, near Esimangore Mountain, the area is covered by acacia trees, punctuated occasionally by large baobabs. Near Lake Manyara, in Oltukai and Esilalei, there are sandy grassland plains (almost beach-like) with palm trees scattered throughout (*Oltukai* trees in Maa). Moving across the A104 highway to Naitolia and Mswakini, there are mostly checkered farmlands. Near Lolkisale, there is dense forest on the mountainside with significant water runoff in the wet season. Farmlands enclose Lolkisale village and some of the best pastures and water sources are located in the remote parts of Lemooti in areas that overlap Randilen WMA.

2.2 Methods for data collection

2.21 A four-pillar mixed-methods ethnography

This dissertation is based on a year of multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork. During this period, I utilized a combination of methods to understand how pastoral communities living in the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem felt about wildlife conservation, and how these feelings could be situated in relation to the wider political and economic histories of rangeland development in Tanzania. What began with open-ended interviews in a single village (Oltukai) about people's thoughts and feelings about wildlife conservation ultimately evolved into a fairly systematic approach to assessing community attitudes towards Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch across twelve villages. After some trial and error, I came to conceptualize the study through four methodological pillars, each of which contributed an important piece, and which together comprised my ethnography.[26]

2.22 Boma-to-boma qualitative interviews

The foundation of the project involved carrying out in-depth interviews with household heads across all the study villages between August 2019-March 2020.[27] The Maasai organize themselves into households (pl. *Ilmareita*; sing. *Olmarei*) that comprise a married man and his multiple wives (and children) living in their own houses within the same overall homestead

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[26] An integral preface to the study involved securing the appropriate clearances and permits from different bureaucratic bodies. This was an ethnographic process in and of itself. This included applying for REB ethical clearance from McGill University, submitting a COSTECH research proposal for review and collecting the permit in Dar es Salaam, applying for a Class C residence permit to legally reside in Tanzania for a year at the Tanzania Immigration Head Office in Kurasini, Dar es Salaam, registering a Tax Identification Number (TIN) with the Tanzania Revenue Authority in order to acquire and insure a field vehicle, applying for a National Identification Authority (NIDA) number and card in Dar es Salaam, registering a local sim number and linking it with the NIDA number in Dar es Salaam, acquiring permission from the Arusha Regional Government offices in Arusha, the Manyara Regional government offices in Babati, the Monduli District Council in Monduli town, and the Babati District Council in Babati town. Permissions were then obtained from the ward level, and finally from the village councils of each study village. At the ground level, interviewees and survey participants were recruited via the ethical principles of informed consent. The entire process was quite painstaking, but passing through these various levels of government gave me full confidence in my decision to pursue my study in a transparent and direct fashion. The process also elucidated some of the everyday challenges that citizens of Tanzania regularly face in navigating government bureaucracies. It was thus an important exercise in empathy.

[27] Respondents were fairly well represented in terms of age, and gender bias was circumvented by selecting an even number of men and women from each village.

(sing. *Enkang*; pl. *Inkang'itie*). The core of their household economy is the shared management of livestock (see Nkedianye et al. 2020:6). Married men are considered the household heads and are responsible for supporting the family.[28] Edwine Maingo Ole was my Maasai research assistant throughout my study and proved to be a wonderfully skilled translator with a warm social disposition and a disarming smile. He was an invaluable friend to me throughout my study and I now consider him part of my extended family. On the Makuyuni side, we were generally joined by our close friend, Soippey Parkipuny from Oltukai village, who helped tremendously in the logistics of carrying out interviews and managing household surveys. Based on consultation with the village leaders of Oltukai, we decided to carry out 20 interviews in each village. We selected bomas purposively, with an intention to select a set that was well distributed geographically and in terms of demographics, considering also the relative population sizes of sub-villages. The recruitment was done in good faith and I was careful to avoid interviewing certain people who were suggested by leaders. Rather, I selected bomas myself in a semi-random fashion until participant quotas (by sex and village) were reached. The interviewees who chose to participate were thus fairly representative of a wide diversity of views. However, the intention was not for these interviews to serve as representative samples on their own, but to generate qualitative themes and help conjure a picture of how people felt about conservation. Interview questions ranged from demographic questions to ones about land use and livelihood practices, and ultimately attitudes towards Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch. After establishing rapport and informed consent, interviews were generally carried out inside people's bomas to reduce wind noise. I posed questions in English and Edwine translated them into Maa for the interviewee (and sometimes kiSwahili) and then back into English for me. When I first began the study, I had been wary of this approach. I was primarily concerned that subtle meanings would be lost in translation, and that Edwine would have too much sway over the interpretive meaning and the content he chose to share (see LaRocque 2006:22). These concerns dissipated after I

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[28] Maasai social organization is discussed in depth in Chapter 3.

spent a considerable amount of time with Edwine and came to realize how bright he is. He has a remarkable short-term memory, a vast vocabulary in three languages, and really understands the content of the work, largely through his close relationship with the director of UCRT. These interviews were audio recorded and later transcribed. Of the twenty interviews carried out in each village, 10 were conducted with men and 10 with women. The male interviewees were heads of households, and the women were either female heads (see next section for operational definition), or the senior wife. Interviews were carried out individually, though in some cases it was more natural for people to answer in groups to triangulate historical information and co-construct collaborative responses. We were cognizant of gender and power dynamics in such instances. When women were being interviewed, we politely asked that the men in their families refrain from expressing their opinions until after to ensure that there was an equitable gender balance in people's responses. Since we were working in twelve villages, we carried out a total of 240 interviews in this fashion (120 men and 120 women). These interviews provided a rich qualitative dataset that was integral to understanding the views of community members, particularly in the context of environmental governance and management (see Bennett 2016).

2.23 Close-ended quantitative survey

While the qualitative interviews across the study villages were essential for helping me to understand community perspectives on the two conservation areas, I was puzzled to some extent by the stark differences I was finding between my interview data and the published literature about these areas (Loveless 2014; Brehony et al. 2018; Goldman 2011 in particular). This dissonance motivated me to think critically about the generalizability of my findings.[29] I became determined to design and implement a survey instrument to assess, in a representative fashion, people's attitudes towards the two areas across all adjacent villages (April – July 2020). Rather

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[29] A few years prior to fieldwork, a reviewer for a conservation-related journal had referred to the methods from my Master's research as 'subjective' because they were based on a small, purposively selected qualitative dataset, so I had perhaps already internalized a concern for generalizability.

than something that stands alone, the survey serves to triangulate my ethnographic findings and qualitative data.

The quantitative survey examined two separate populations. The first was all household heads living in the Randilen WMA member villages. The second was all household heads living around Manyara Ranch. Since these were different populations, they required different sampling procedures. To establish sampling frames, I sought the support of sub-village chairs to travel boma-to-boma on motorbikes to compile a list of all household heads in each sub-village. One notable ethnographic detail of foreground relevance to this methodological approach is that Kisongo families in these different villages had different homestead structures, which initially complicated my process of recruiting survey participants. In Oltukai, one male head often lived with several wives in a series of huts located outside a central kraal, but with no outside fence (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 – Variations in homestead structure among Kisongo Maasai in Oltukai, Esilalei, Nafco and Lemooti. **A** was more apparent in Oltukai and **B** was observed in Esilalei. **C** was more common in Nafco and Lemooti. The diagram was drawn by the author.

In Esilalei, the household structure was the same but sometimes with an outside fence. On the Lolkisale side, there were often multiple married male heads living with their wives within an outer fenced area, but with their livestock kraaled centrally together in the middle. This was the case in Lemooti and Nafco in particular. These differences initially made it challenging to compare Kisongo households across villages, though I eventually took an approach that considered each married male to be a household head regardless of whether he lived in a shared homestead with other married males, and irrespective of physical differences in fencing style.

This made sense since Maasai consider households to be oriented around each married man and his multiple wives and offspring. The household remains intact even if the man dies, with the senior wife in effect assuming the role of household head. As such, I defined the first frame (male household heads) as those males who were married. For the sake of establishing a non-redundant sampling frame, each married male was only listed once.[30] The second sampling frame comprised female household heads, which I defined as women whose husbands had died, women who were divorced or separated, or women who simply lived in their own personal boma for various reasons.[31] I included women as female heads even if they lived with married sons in a shared boma, and I included these married sons in the 'male household head' sampling frame. While the relationships between women and different households were ethnographically complex given inter-generational family ties, I decided that being consistent in sampling approach would garner a fairly accurate picture of gendered views on the conservation areas.

For the Randilen WMA survey, all sub-villages in the WMA's eight member villages were sampled including Lengoolwa C in Nafco and Lolkisale B in Lolkisale, both of which comprise mixed ethnicities and are more like towns. They were included because they are still technically part of the WMA community. Since Manyara Ranch does not have member villages, other than the informal designation of Oltukai and Esilalei as community partners, the towns of Makuyuni Mjini (in Makuyuni) and Kibaoni A (in Olasiti) in the surrounding area were excluded as they comprised mostly people who were not indigenous to the area and who generally did not keep livestock. These sub-villages were sampled during qualitative interviews to ensure that

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[30] The household lists in the village offices were unproductive in this regard because they used *kayas* as units, which defined one married man and each wife together as a separate unit. This form of classification would have created redundant samples if I had used them.

[31] In reality, some women who live in their own bomas retain close social ties with their husbands, but these women were nonetheless considered to be female household heads.

important insights were not overlooked, but their inclusion in the survey would have skewed the survey results, so they were excluded from that portion of the study.[32]

The main objective of the survey was to provide an overview of community sentiment towards each conservation area. The survey instrument was designed midway through a year of ethnographic fieldwork in the study villages based on qualitative themes that had begun to emerge through interviews. The questions were chosen to develop an understanding of community members' perspectives towards the ranch and the WMA, especially in the context of conservation governance, management, tradeoffs, effectiveness, and equity. The survey instrument was close-ended, with coded numerical responses to facilitate data entry and analysis. The survey was designed to be administered in about half an hour. It covered a range of socioeconomic demographic questions (length of residence, ethnicity, education, gender, age, primary source of income, livestock assets, and farming practices). It then examined key metrics as either yes-no responses, three point scales, or 5 point Likert ordinal scales.[33] The survey questions assessed general attitudes toward the area (5 point Likert scale)[34]; support for the area (5 point Likert scale); memory of general attitude towards the area 5-10 years ago (5 point Likert scale); change in attitude over the past 5-10 years (5 point Likert scale); trust in authorities of the area to act in the community's interest (yes or no); perceptions of costs and benefits (more costs; equal number of costs and benefits; more benefits); perceptions of inclusion in conservation governance (yes or no); perceptions of inclusion in conservation management (yes or no); and classification of area as successful or unsuccessful (one or other). Two specific questions were also asked for each area based on the existing literature. Following Brehony et al.'s (2018)

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[32] A large part of Section 2.23 is published in the following book chapter: Raycraft, Justin. 2022. Community attitudes towards Randilen Wildlife Management Area. *In* Tarangire: Human-wildlife coexistence in a fragmented ecosystem. Pp. 109-128. Eds. Christian Kiffner, Derek Lee, and Monica Bond. Springer: New York, NY.
[33] It is perhaps more accurate to state that these were adapted Likert items in that respondents chose from options ranging from 'strongly dislike' to 'strongly like' when asked directly about their attitudes towards the WMA, rather than indicating their degree of agreement with a statement. Furthermore, my use of 'Likert scales' in the text refers to individual 'Likert item' questions, not to combined scores that constitute a larger scale.
[34] A sixth option was included for "I do not know what Randilen WMA is."

classification of Randilen WMA as 'fortress conservation,' respondents were asked about whether they would classify the WMA as fortress conservation or community-based conservation (one or other). Following Goldman's (2011:65) description of the ranch, respondents were asked about their perceptions of the ranch as a "conservation opportunity lost" (yes or no); The survey instrument was translated into written kiSwahili and administered across the study villages with the help of eight field assistants who were fluent in both kiSwahili and Maa. Survey questions were asked in KiSwahili or Maa depending on the linguistic profile of the respondent. Handheld GPS devices were also used to record the locations of bomas, which were used to spatially visualize the data (see Figure 2).

Based on the inclusion criteria for determining household heads, 2037 male heads and 352 female heads were listed across the eight member villages and 26 sub-villages of Randilen WMA (see Table 5 in Chapter 5). For the villages surrounding Manyara Ranch, 1554 male heads and 209 female heads fit the inclusion criteria for the total frames. Appropriate sample sizes from these total frames were calculated using Cochran's (1963) sample size formula for finite populations, with a 95% level of confidence, 5% confidence interval, and a p value of 0.05. Using this formula, it was determined that 323 male heads and 184 female heads were needed for the samples of household heads in Randilen WMA to be representative. Using the same sample size formula for the Manyara Ranch villages, I determined that a minimum of 308 male heads, and 136 female heads would be needed for the sample. Based on these minimums, 326 male heads and 191 female heads were recruited from the Randilen WMA villages. From the Manyara Ranch villages, 308 male heads and 139 female heads were selected. To take into account differences in population sizes across the study villages, I employed a stratified random sampling method involving a proportionately weighted random sample of each sub-village based on their sizes relative to the total frames (using sub-villages as strata). To determine the sample ratios, the total number of household heads in each sub-village was divided by the total number of heads in each sample frame (male and female) and multiplied by 100 to determine the population

distribution across the sub-villages. These ratios were then used to calculate a proportionately-weighted sample from each sub-village. The total number of household heads sampled for each study in relation to sub-village population size is shown in tables 5 and 6 in Chapter 5. To select participants, the lists of household heads from each sub-village were numbered and entered into a spreadsheet. A random number generator was then used to select the numbered household heads from the compiled lists from each sub-village until the designated quota for each stratum was reached.

As a consequence of the cultural context, male household heads outnumbered female household heads by nearly 4:1. To avoid gender bias during data collection, I established a third sampling frame, 'females in male-headed households' to rebalance this gender bias. Within this frame the first wife of every second surveyed male head was also recruited for participation. The total sample of wives sampled was thus 161 for Randilen WMA and 154 for Manyara Ranch. In some cases, the proportionate weighting was not exact due to the real-world practicalities of field research. For the male heads, between 14.8–16.7% of the total household heads were sampled. The exceptions in Randilen WMA were the sub-villages of Lesiday (18.75%) and Lemooti (31.43%), which had small total population sizes and so had higher recruitment percentages. Given the limited number of female household heads across the villages who fit the inclusion criteria, the recruitment percentages for the female head samples were significantly higher and more variable, typically ranging from 40–80% with some exceptions. Loosikitok sub-village, for instance, had 0 female household heads who fit the inclusion criteria, and Lesiday, Kanisani, and Lengijape had 100% recruitment rates owing to their small total numbers of female household heads.

The total sample size for the Randilen WMA villages was 678, and the total for the Manyara Ranch villages was 601. For the overlapping villages (Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini), the survey participants were presented questions about both areas. I selected the higher number of participants from each sub-village based on the Manyara Ranch frames,

which required greater samples from these sub-villages to be representative. The excess respondents were excluded from the Randilen WMA study at random to maintain the proportional weightings of each respective study.

2.24 Key stakeholder interviews

Key stakeholder interviews provided a vital source of knowledge on the multi-scalar governance processes that affect Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA. They were also integral for understanding the historical context of conservation and provided an overview of rangeland management issues in contemporary Tanzania. My general rule of thumb was to reach out to any person of interest I came across in the field for an interview in an attempt to gather as many perspectives as possible. Since I had secured all of my legal permits up front, I was not shy about approaching people, and actively pursued interview leads wherever possible, with some higher-up officials requiring a particular level of patience and persistence. Some of these interviews were carried out in kiSwahili with Edwine's help, though I can follow the content of spoken kiSwahili to some extent and pose clarifying questions as needed. Most key stakeholder interviews, however, were carried out in English. Interviews were audio-recorded for future listening, and later transcribed (see Section 2.26). Sometimes these interviews 'snowballed' into other ones, as some interviewees recommended that I speak to another person, often putting us in touch directly.

In total, I interviewed about 250 key stakeholders in this fashion. These included village leaders, ward-level government officials, district government officials, representatives of the regional commissioner, the Director of Wildlife, the Director of Land, the Director of Research at the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, members of the Tanzania Livestock Research Institute, NARCO range scientists, directors and staff of NGOs like Honeyguide, UCRT, and the Nature Conservancy, ecologists working on the Tarangire Lion Project and Tarangire Elephant Project, Village Game Scouts (VGS), the managers and management staff of Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch, tourist camp staff in both areas, and local Tanzanian scholars at the College

of African Wildlife in Mweka, the School for Field Studies (SFS) in Karatu, Sokoine University

of Agriculture in Morogoro, and the Tanzanian Rangelands Society. I also interviewed the park

wardens of Lake Manyara National Park, Tarangire National Park, TANAPA staff, rangers, and

park guides, the former country director of AWF, the head of TAWA's northern zone protection

unit, the director of TAWIRI, and several other TAWIRI-affiliated researchers working in the

area. I also interviewed a few retired government officials who had great historical knowledge of

the wildlife sector.

2.25 Participant observation

Inspired by the work of Malinowski (1922) and long-term anthropological practice, I was

determined to camp in the rural villages I was studying to carry out participant observation and

develop a more grounded understanding of everyday life. Edwine and I found ourselves rotating

across the villages like Maasai nomads in an attempt to get a sense of the overall lay of the land.

While working in Oltukai we often camped near Soippey's boma.[35] In Oltukai, Naitolia, Saburi,

and Lemooti we camped in and near people's homesteads.[36] After doing the basic groundwork in

each of the villages, we came to establish two bases, one for each side of the project. The first, as

mentioned earlier, was MIC lodge in Makuyuni. Having a home base in Makuyuni with a hot

shower and electricity was a major help to my workflow and overall mental wellbeing. On the

Lolkisale side, Edwine and I had originally taken a pair of rooms at the teacher's quarters of an

elementary school. However, this location made it difficult to access the other villages in the wet

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[35] It was always fun when the three of us were together since we were all part of the same age-set. We often joked that Soippey was my older brother and Edwine was my younger one. Soippey was quite serious for the most part and very responsible when it came to organizing participants, keeping me on track for time, driving through the villages, and commanding people's respect with an air of authority. Edwine by contrast always had a smile on his face and disarmed people with his jokes and charm. He kept things light, something that everyone appreciated.
[36] After several months, camping became challenging for various reasons. The insects, for one thing, started to get the better of me. I was particularly wary of bed bugs, which had infested many of the bomas in the study villages and my eagerness to pitch my tent near livestock kraals had led to me being feasted on by fleas in Lemooti. In Mswakini Juu, a *funza*, known colloquially in English as a jigger flea, actually established a nest inside my toe. This required a minor surgery at the village dispensary of Mswakini Juu, much to the entertainment of the people around. At one point, it was a bit touch and go, and I thought I might lose the toe! Fortunately, the quality of care was quite good considering the remote location, and we wrapped it up and continued on with the project.

season, as it was located at the end of a particularly bad road. On a few occasions, we were quite literally rained-in.[37] We came to find the small rooms on the side of the road in Nafco village more suitable over a long period of time, which were close to a small roadside restaurant and centrally located. While there was no running water, the rooms were secure and clean. From there, it was efficient to return to Kisongo town, or visit any of the other Lolkisale-side villages within about forty minutes. Nafco also proved to be a particularly significant village between April-June 2021. Perhaps due to the heavy rains that year, herds of 40-80 elephants frequented the village on a nightly basis to raid people's maize farms. The elephants necessitated the stationing of one of Randilen WMA's VGS vehicles in Nafco throughout the growing season and also attracted the attention of different scales of government, including the Monduli District Game Officer (DGO) and his team. One some occasions, TAWA officers and representatives of the national anti-poaching task force also visited Nafco to help shepherd the unruly elephants back towards Randilen WMA's reserved area. This made it a fruitful study site for participant observation, and an important hub to meet (and bond with!) with key stakeholders.

I discovered during fieldwork that having concrete and tangible interview and survey goals gave structure and purpose to my time in the field, but some of the most meaningful insights unfolded 'in the cracks' of these methods, while I was 'on the way' to do what I set out to do (see Raycraft 2018d). I tried to remain open to 'distractions' and let life unfold naturally around me as much as possible (see Raycraft 2018b). While the interviews and survey took much dedication, I also spent a significant portion of my time attending governance meetings at different scales (see Table 1), tagging along on ranger patrols, herding livestock, telling stories by the fire, hiking through village land with local guides ("walkabouts"), collecting and photocopying documents from village offices, and observing (and participating in) cattle-

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[37] This was made worse when my hiking boots were stolen from outside my door, right in the midst of the heaviest rains in January 2020. I was subsequently forced to make do with some rubber boots from the local shop for the remainder of my trip. This often resulted in jests from my Kisongo interlocutors, and appreciation from my Arusha ones, as it seemed as though I had become a local farmer!

exchange ceremonies and rituals. Much of this data falls outside the scope of this dissertation (it is a lifetime's worth!), but I have come to find that no knowledge is lost in forming a narrative of how everything fits together – small details and observations have informed my thinking throughout the subsequent chapters and it would be difficult to decipher the genealogies of each of them. The full year on the ground gave me a strong sense of seasonality, and the central role that rainfall plays in transforming bare plains into verdant grasslands and unpaved roads with black cotton soils into swampy terrains that are difficult to traverse. Rivers swell and become impassible and Lake Manyara floods into the villages of Oltukai and Esilalei.[38] While participating in the everyday events of village life, I took detailed field notes, which I later organized into themes during analysis (see next section).

Table 1 –Notable governance meetings attended during fieldwork

Meeting type	Role	Location	Date
Village council meeting	Observer	Mswakini Chini	October 2019
Village council meeting	Observer	Oltukai	September 2019
Randilen WMA governance and equity workshop	Facilitator	Mto wa Mbu	November 2019
Randilen WMA AA meeting	Observer	Makuyuni	June 2020
Randilen WMA AA meeting	Observer	Makuyuni	February 2020
NTRI rangeland governance meeting	Participant and observer	Arusha	November 2020
Regional government-district government-NGO development meeting	Observer	Mto wa Mbu	March 2020
Tanzania Rangelands Society bi-annual meeting	Presenter	Morogoro	March 2020
Maasai traditional leaders rangeland governance meting	Observer	Mto wa Mbu	April 2020
Focus group discussion with Monduli district game officers	Facilitator	Monduli	May 2020

2.26 Approach to data analysis

Following fieldwork, I inputted the quantitative survey data into a spreadsheet and subsequently cleaned them. I then used Microsoft Excel and SPSS 27 to produce tables and figures of these

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[38] As described by one of my local interlocutors in Oltukai, people "become like frogs hopping around."

results in the form of descriptive statistics.[39] Using the GPS data from the surveys, and geographic shape files (.shp) of protected area boundaries from the Monduli District Council, I produced a map of the study area using QGIS software. I also redrew several maps and figures from existing literature to better contextualize the study spatially.

To analyze the village-level interviews, I originally sought the assistance of a transcriber to work through the audio recordings and transcribe the translated portions of the interviews verbatim. I also began transcribing the key stakeholder interviews myself with the use of AI software. I quickly found that both approaches were highly labour intensive and inadvertently narrowed my analytical gaze, making it challenging to grasp the whole of the study. After taking a step back, I took a new approach that involved carefully listening and studying interviews, then writing about the key points that had remained in my mind. I came to find this a productive exercise for constructing an overarching narrative. Following this new approach, I took three months to read through my notes, listen to interviews, and study the quantitative data and take new sets of distilled notes from the original ones. I found this time invaluable to understand the overall themes that were emerging from the data. I then returned to the literature for another three-month period while thinking about how to situate my findings.[40] This enabled me to historicize my study through close reading of Hodgson (2001) and Kjekshus (1977b) and other key texts. I tried to weave my own work through theirs to expand the temporal frame of my ethnographic gaze and better contextualize my research. I then proceeded to produce a much narrower outline of my findings in narrative form. Several presentations via the McGill Centre

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[39] Inferential statistics proved highly complex as a consequence of the nonparametric data I was working with, and the ordinal Likert item responses I was using as outcome variables. After running some preliminary ordinal and binary logistic regressions (with dichotomous yes/no answers), I concluded that there was insufficient variation in the attitudes dataset to model the effects of independent demographic variables on attitude outcomes. I may revisit this data during a postdoctoral position in close collaboration with a skilled statistician, but for the purposes of this dissertation, I present descriptive statistics from these quantitative studies together with the qualitative findings from my interviews and participant observation.

[40] The most foundational text I worked through during this period was Dorothy Hodgson's (2001) 'Once Intrepid Warriors,' which seemed to fit seamlessly as historical backdrop for my study. I draw heavily from her book in describing the ethnographic context of my research in Chapter 3, especially when detailing the lasting effects of the British colonial period on Tanzania's Maasailand.

for Society, Technology, and Development (STANDD), the Canadian Anthropology Society (CASCA), the Society for Applied Anthropology (SfAA), and the Royal Anthropological Institute (RAI) allowed me to refine the parameters of my dissertation further. In the following four-month period, I wrote intensively, mostly from memory, following the particular train of thought from the distilled notes. From there, my committee and I began to revise and fine tune the thesis. The central aim of this dissertation is to represent the study at large and provide a backdrop for my future research in Tanzania.

The breakdown of how these methods inform the remainder of the dissertation is as follows: the key stakeholder interviews feature primarily into Chapters 3 and 4, but are also drawn from in Chapters 6-9. The village-level interviews are used primarily in Chapters 5, 7, and 9, but in some cases in Chapters 3, 4, 6, and 8 as well. The socioeconomic demographic data from the survey is presented in Chapter 5, and the quantitative data on conservation attitudes is presented in Chapters 7 and 9. Participant observation informs all of the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3. Historical ethnographic context

"Where do we begin?" Makko asked me earnestly as we sat across from one another at the Msumbi coffee shop in Arusha, not long after my arrival. Makko Sinandei and I had first met at the Institutional Canopy of Conservation (ICAN) workshop in Nairobi, Kenya a few months prior and had made tentative plans to touch base when I arrived in Tanzania to collaborate on my research.[41] As a Maasai pastoralist and the Founder and Director of the Ujamaa Community Resource Team (UCRT), Makko had considerable expertise on the issues facing pastoral communities in northern Tanzania.[42] Ahead of our meeting, I had told Makko that I wanted to study human-wildlife conflict and community-based conservation in the Kwakuchinja Wildlife Corridor north of Tarangire National Park (TNP), but that my knowledge of the area was abstract. Makko looked at me excitedly. He had a piercing stare with striking blue eyes and naturally dilated pupils that seemed eager to soak in light. I felt energized by his disposition and I pulled out my notebook out in anticipation to take notes, before we both paused to consider the question of where our discussion should start. For a brief moment, neither of us knew how to proceed. The issues that we were interested in discussing were entangled within a web of social, political, and economic connections, and deciding on a precise starting point seemed like a daunting task. We soon dove into our first of many discussions while I was in Tanzania, spring-boarding as we often did from one issue to the next, rounding my understandings in the process, but also making it challenging to establish how everything fit together. The question of 'where to begin' later came to take on different meanings to me over the next few years as I proceeded with my fieldwork and returned to Canada to analyze my findings. I have since come to realize that the story I am interested in telling begins long in the past, where the keys to a sustainable future still remain.

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[41] ICAN is a SSHRC/IDRC-funded research project.

[42] UCRT carries out land use planning in Tanzania's northern rangelands to formalize common property institutions and provide pastoral tenure security.

3.1 Deep history of eastern Africa[43]

Approximately 25-30 million years ago, a tectonic fracture separated the African Tectonic plate into the eastern Somali plate and the western Nubian one.[44] As their division deepened, the continental crust stretched and thinned, creating a low-lying depression. In the south, these low points formed the Great Lakes of Eastern Africa including Lake Turkana, Lake Tanganyika, and Lake Malawi (Nyasa). In the north, the Indian Ocean flowed into the newly formed spaces creating the Red Sea. Beneath the thinning crust of the earth, magma rose along the fault line to create volcanic cones. These included Shira, Mawenzi, and Kibo which together formed, through bursting lava around 750,000 years ago, Mount Kilimanjaro, the tallest free-standing mountain in the world (5895m).[45] Volcanism on the edges of the two divergent plates created mountain ranges that buffered the forming valley from the moist air of the Indian Ocean, transforming the region over time from a wet tropical rainforest into a dry savannah with seasonal rainfall.

The Great Rift Valley, as it is commonly known today, is considered by many to be the birthplace of humanity.[46] While earliest evidence of human evolution can be traced back six million years, during the Pliocene period, to the *Sahelanthropus tchadensis* in Chad, the *Ardipithecus kadabba* in Ethiopia, and the *Orrorin tugenensis* in Kenya, the period of 3.5-6 million years was likely characterized by mosaic evolutionary processes that are not classifiable on a monophyletic tree.[47] Footprints of *Australopithecus afarensis* imprinted 3.6 million years ago into wet volcanic ash in Laetoli, Tanzania are still visible today and are the oldest known footprints of early bipedal hominins. And though there are competing claims as to the exact

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[43] The dates presented in this section are approximations.

[44] The historical information in this section is drawn from my first-hand visit to the Olduvai Gorge museum in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area while carrying out fieldwork on May 25, 2020. The information on the rift valley is from the sign: "Geology of the Great Rift Valley and Formation of the Savannah."

[45] See for reference in layman terms: https://www.thomsontreks.com/blog/kilimanjaro-volcano-history/

[46] Competing theories exist on this, with some pointing to the 'Cradle of Humankind' in South Africa, the Okavango in Botswana, or to mosaic evolutionary origins across the African continent. Some also consider the East African Rift to be separate from the Great Rift Valley.

[47] See the sign entitled: "Human evolution during the Pliocene" at the Olduvai Gorge Museum for further information.

geographic origins of humanity, archaeological evidence confirms that the first species of early humans did for certain inhabit the Olduvai Gorge, a 50km long ravine east of the Serengeti Plains in what is today the Ngorogongoro Conservation Area (NCA). A natural history museum in the truest sense, the Gorge has preserved sediments of Pleistocene period lake beds providing a paleoanthropological window into the deep history of human evolution.[48] Since its first discovery, it has become clear that the first of the early human species, *Homo habilis,* inhabited the Gorge sometime between 1.9-2 million years ago, followed by (among others) *Homo erectus* 1-1.2 million years ago, and finally by our current species, *Homo sapiens*, around 200-300,000 years ago. *Homo sapiens* footprints dating between 5,000-19,000 years old have also been recently found just southeast of the Gorge in Engare Sero on the shores of Lake Natron. It is no stretch then to state with certainty that our current species of humans has been present in the East African Rift Valley for hundreds of thousands of years.

During the Acheulian Age, from 1.5 million years ago until 300,000 years ago, lithic technology was largely homogenous, untailored in meaningful ways to environmental context (McBrearty and Tryon 2006). But sometime between the middle Stone Age and Later Stone Age from 280,000-25,000 years ago, lithic artifacts began to differ in form across areas, suggesting that Homo sapiens had begun to adapt their technologies to the ecological niches in which they lived, ranging from arid desserts and savannah grasslands to dense forested highlands and coastal beaches (Tryon et al. 2005; Ambrose 2001; Tryon and Faith 2013; Shipton et al. 2018; Goodwin 1929). Discoveries of Red ochre cave paintings and ostrich egg beads in the Mumba cave in southwestern Tanzania near Lake Malawi (and the Enkapune Ya Muto rock shelter in the central Rift Valley of Kenya) point to the emergence of modern human behaviour at this time, including developments in abstract thinking, symbolism, planning and strategy, and economic and technological innovation (see McBrearty and Brooks 2000; Ambrose 1998).

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[48] See for example: (Hay 1987; Hay and Leakey 1982; Leakey 1959; Leakey, Tobias, and Napier 1964; Leakey, Clarke, and Leakey 1971; Leakey and Harris 1987; Leakey et al. 1976).

From 25,000-10,000 years ago East Africa was probably inhabited by click-language speaking hunter-gatherers, perhaps early ancestors of Sandawe and Hadza peoples, the latter of whom still reside around Lake Eyasi in north-central Tanzania with little change in their subsistence patterns until the last few hundred years.[49] While the Khosian language family was itself debunked, the Sandawe language does seem to share some features with the click languages of Southern Africa, and in particular the Khoe family (Guldeman 2010, 2014).

Livestock was likely domesticated by hunter-gatherers in the Sahara of North Africa 8,000-9,000 years ago (Galaty 2021; Gifford-Gonzalez 2017; Kuper and Riemer 2013). In the arid phase of the middle Holocene, the Sahara began to dry, and grasslands became marginal desert motivating herders to expand outwards into the Nile Valley, and beyond into East Africa. Unlike the Neolithic period elsewhere in the world, the pastoral Neolithic period in East Africa was characterized by mobile pastoralism. The Savanna Pastoral Neolithic groups likely arrived in East Africa about 5,000 years ago, migrating south out of the Horn of Africa from Ethiopia and the Sudan into northern Kenya, eventually settling in the lowland plains of Kenya between 3,000-5,000 years ago (Mitchell and Lane 2013). From there, they likely expanded up into the Kenyan highlands around 3-3,300 years ago (Ehret and Posnansky 1982; Ambrose 1984). Remnants of Savanna Pastoral Neolithic (SPN) bones excavated in Luxmanda site in Babati district, Tanzania reveal that these pastoralists were likely Cushitic speakers and inhabited the area between 2,900-3,200 years ago (Skoglund et al. 2017; Grillo et al. 2018). These early Cushites perhaps cultivated sorghum and finger millet alongside their livestock keeping practices (see Galaty 2021b:4). It was around this time, during a dry period in the highlands of East Africa, when transitions occurred from hunting and gathering to food production between the Neolithic and Iron Ages (Ambrose 1998). Eburran hunter-gatherers in Kenya, for instance, transitioned to livestock keeping gradually between 4,900-3,300 years ago (Ambrose 1998; Marean 1992;

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[49] I visited the Hadza in March 2013 and joined them on a hunt. The Sandawe have since become agriculturalists, perhaps following the Bantu expansion.

Bower 1991). And largely through their interactions with Neolithic Savana Pastoralists in the western plains of Kenya, Elementeitan hunter-gatherers also began to shift to pastoralism (Prendergast et al. 2019; Robertshaw 1988). Recent isotopic, mineralogical, and micromorphological analyses of grasslands in southern Kenya reveal that nutrients from decomposed animal dung from ancient Neolithic herders have persisted for 3,000 years in the soil (Marshall et al. 2018:387). These results suggest a mutually enhancing relationship between pastoralism and range ecology that has developed over millennia.[50]

Around about 3,000 years ago, Eastern Sudanic Nilotic speakers living near the Upper Nile subdivided into Western, Southern, and Eastern Nilotes. The Western Nilotes remained in the area (Evans-Pritchard 1949), while the Eastern Nilotes established territories in the borderlands of contemporary Uganda, Sudan, Kenya, and Ethiopia (Galaty 2021:5). The Southern Nilotes expanded south into the Great Rift Valley where they came in to interaction with Cushitic-speaking pastoralists near Lake Turkana (Murdock 1959; Ehret 2002; Vossen 1982).[51]

Around 2,000-3,000 years ago Proto-Bantu speakers emerged from their core in central West Africa, migrating east and south in four waves, generally displacing or assimilating the hunter-gatherer and pastoralist groups they encountered along the way (Berniell-Lee et al. 2006; Oliver 1966). Bantu-speakers had inhabited the highland borderlands between Cameroon and Nigeria since about 5,000 bp before traversing around the northern forests of the Congo en route to East Africa (Ehret 2001; Zeitlyn and Connell 2003). They likely had come to develop sophisticated technologies for agricultural production, including iron and ceramic production, enabling them to expand into new ecological niches (see Oliver 1966). The Urewe people, for instance, established strongholds around Lake Victoria around 2,500-2,600 years ago, where

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[50] See also this popular article concerning the origins of herding in Africa, drawing from the scholarly works of Elizabeth Sawchuk and others: https://theconversation.com/ancient-dna-is-revealing-the-origins-of-livestock-herding-in-africa-114387
[51] From there, they further subdivided into northern and southern branches.

they perfected iron smelting, setting the stage for production of carbon steel a century or so later (Clist 1987a,b; Lane et al. 2006; Schmidt and Childs 1985). Small Bantu-speaking groups continued onwards from there and by year zero had settled the coastal areas of Misasa in Tanzania and Kwale in Kenya, interacting with Cushitic speakers, and later Arabs, Indians, and Persians from about 1,000-1,500 years ago leading to the emergence of Swahili culture along the coast of East Africa (Kusimba 1999; Kusimba and Kusimba 2017; Kusimba and Oka 2008).

3.2 Becoming Maasai

About 2,500 years ago, Eastern Nilotes branched into the Teso-Turkana and the Lotuko-Maa, moving west of the Rift Valley and west of Lake Turkana respectively (Galaty 2021). Between 1,000-1,500 years ago, the Lotuko-Maa further subdivided into the Maa and Lotuko, with the former residing in close proximity to the Ongamo in the rangelands between Lake Turkana and Lake Baringo and the latter moving west to southern Sudan (Galaty 2021:5). The Maasai trace their mythical origins to this Maa subgrouping of Eastern Nilotes that branched away from their relatives in southern Sudan over a thousand years ago (cf. Berntsen 1976, 1979a,c, 1980; Sutton 1993; Galaty 1993b, Sommer and Vossen 1993; Jacobs 1965a).[52] By about five hundred years ago, Maa-speaking agropastoralists inhabited the Great Rift Valley of Kenya. Over time, the central Maa group began to fragment into smaller subgroups that moved south and northwards, allowing different dialects of Maa languages to emerge, and in tandem cultural identities.[53] The time was likely characterized by extensive mixing and assimilation, as different groups continually recultivated their senses of identity over time in relation to their sets of interactions (Galaty 1982, Galaty 2021b:6; Vossen 1988; Berntsen 1976). It was perhaps then that some groups, including the Maasai, began to specialize as "pure" pastoralists who sought to control the lowland plains through warfare and territoriality, but also through the development of an ideology as "people of cattle" (Galaty 1982, 1993; Sutton 1993). Several factors likely

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[52] "Maasai are those who say 'maa'" (from Galaty 2021b: footnote 23. See his note for explanation).
[53] The Chamus, Samburu, and Loogalala/Baraguyu, for instance were considered to be part of these processes of ethnic mitosis (Hodgson 2001).

contributed to the dominance of the Maasai in the Great Rift Valley over the past few hundred years: iron-forging and the production of weaponry, the development of the age-set system, and the rise in power of prophets (pl. *Iloibonok;* sing. *Oloiboni*) who assumed roles as spiritual leaders and directed religious life (see Section 3.3).

While the exact timeline is a bit murky, it is likely that the Maasai moved southwards into Tanzania between the 16th-18th centuries.[54] From there, they continued to expand through warfare and assimilation of other ethnic groups into the nineteenth century. By the early nineteenth century, there existed an economic mosaic of Maa-speakers spread across a highly diverse set of ecological zones. These groups likely distinguished themselves by territorial sections, clans, and economic production (Berntsen 1980; Galaty 1993b; Krapf 1860; Thomson 1885; Waller 1985a,b). Some debate and confusion in the literature exists as to how these various groups referred to themselves and each other, as "Maasai" "Iloikop" or "Wakwavi" with various scholars drawing from the accounts of early travelers and colonial officials (see Hodgson 2001 and Sections 3.4 and 3.5 for further discussion).[55] A series of disease outbreaks in the late 1800s, coupled with an emergent conflict between *iloibonok* brothers (see section 3.3), led to a period of civil warfare and instability in Maasailand known as *emutai* (civil war), as Maasai struggled to rebuild their herds (Spencer and Waller 2017:478; Waller 1988). Into the 19th century, the Maasai were connected to the globalized trade networks of the Indian Ocean World

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[54] Hodgson (2001:24) suggests it was during the 15th century. The earlier dates are likely attributable to the presence of Ongamo on the slopes of Kilimanjaro around that time, though their dialect branched away from Maa at a certain point (see Vossen 1982). Oral accounts vary as to when the exact period of Maasai expansion into Tanzania occurred, with some suggesting between the 16th – 18th centuries (see Wright 2019), while other indicate that it may have been towards the end of the 18th century, into the early 19th century (Ole Kuney 2020 pers. comm.). Oral accounts I elicited from elders in Oltukai and Esilalei suggest they have been living in their present area for around 200 years. It is perhaps most likely that the Maasai moved into Tanzania between 150-300 years ago in search of productive rangelands and water sources for their livestock during a season of drought. The Maasai may have occupied first the fertile highlands around Kilimanjaro, where there was plenty of water, before spreading to the savannah steppe southwards and westward and settling in their present locations in Tanzania's Maasailand.
[55] As Fosbrooke (1956b:191) defines them: "the Kwavi, also called Lumbwa, Loigop or Baraguyu, are the less numerous forerunners of the true Masai, who, in adversity took to agriculture and are in consequence called at times "the agricultural Masai."

through the caravan routes that passed through their territories (Johnston 1886; Krapf 1860; Merker 1910; Thomson 1855).[56]

While my historical narrative is far from comprehensive, it should make clear the fact that the genealogy of human presence in East Africa traces back deep into the distant past. Of particular foreground significance for the remainder of the dissertation is that people have coexisted with other animals in East Africa, albeit with appropriate levels of conflict and competition, for several hundred thousand years, for the most part as hunter-gatherers and, for the past five thousand years, as pastoralists who have practiced and refined animal husbandry in response to the environmental constraints of living in semi-arid rangelands. The recent changes to this historical picture are agricultural development in the past two thousand years, colonial intervention over the past 150 years, and the rise of nation-states within the past century. Contextualized on this vast time scale, it is rather remarkable how rapidly the rangelands of Tanzania have changed since colonization. The remainder of this dissertation focuses mostly on the anthropological dynamics between the Kisongo Maasai pastoralists and Arusha agriculturalists who currently inhabit the areas surrounding Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA in the early 21st century. The following sections outline their economies and cultural practices, drawing attention to their overlapping but distinct social histories and the wider political and environmental contexts that frame their interactions.[57]

3.3 Maasai sociopolitical organization and economy in the precolonial era

Cattle are the centrepiece of Maasai society, playing vital roles in rituals, ceremonies, and social life.[58] Economically, cattle serve as a long-term storage of wealth akin to dividend paying stocks. Maasai reap these benefits in the forms of milk and sometimes blood. Cattle are integral to

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[56] Maasai particularly appreciated tobacco products and umbrellas (Hodgson 2001).
[57] In providing an overview the Maasai, I am indebted to Reuben Ole Kuney who patiently participated in a series of interviews on oral traditions at his home in Monduli. Reuben also diligently and graciously prepared hand-written notes between my visits to aid me in writing the dissertation. Much of the historical information in this section is drawn from my interactions with Reuben.
[58] I write in the present tense in this section, as many of these aspects of social and economic life still persist.

economic exchange, serving as gifts, bridal dowries, and compensation to resolve disputes between families. In general, Maasai are somewhat reluctant to bring their cattle to market or slaughter them for meat. On special occasions, cows are sacrificed but this is not a routine occurrence. Cattle are brought to market in times of need, or when market prices are favourable (see Sections 3.9, 3.11 and Chapters 4 and 5 for detailed discussion). Breeds vary by area and herders' risk tolerance, with some breeds fetching higher prices in markets, but with greater risk of succumbing to drought. Herds are often mixed, but there is a general bias towards Zebu cattle which are particularly hardy in trying conditions. Recently, Maasai have begun to diversify their livestock holdings to include goats and sheep, which thrive in the face of declining rainfall and are more liquid than cattle. Market demand for shoat meat is generally high and Maasai have no real qualms about flipping shoats for cash. Cattle remain the most valuable to the Maasai both culturally and as the core of their long-term investment portfolios.

The foundation of the pastoral Maasai mode of production is the triad between land, livestock, and labour.[59] Land refers broadly to water sources, salt-licks, and pastures, which are often scattered across large areas and vary seasonally. Thus the pastoral territories of the Maasai need to be large enough to include these key ecological features, and the terrains must also be traversable on foot with livestock to adapt to changing conditions (Ndagala 1994, 1997). Contrary to the idea that pastures are simply "open to all" (Hardin 1968), the Maasai have historically implemented tightly regulated territorial strategies for managing access to grazing resources (Homewood and Rodgers 1991; Potanski 1994). Territorial boundaries are sometimes defended from encroachers through open conflict, and the Maasai have historically utilized warfare to establish control over rangelands and expand their cattle territories. In general, exclusion costs of maintaining rigid boundaries in the arid drylands are quite high, so territorial boundaries in these areas are more flexible (see Galaty 2016). In times of drought, Maasai

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[59] The following four paragraphs are drawn in large part from a series of interviews with Reuben Ole Kuney at his home in Monduli town in early 2020, and the written notes he prepared in between our visits.

regularly move across vast areas through reciprocal relationships along the lines of kinship and ethnicity. Territorial boundaries are enforced more loosely at these times. Territories are based on detailed understandings of the ecological context in which the Maasai operate, including vegetation quantity, availability of water sources, wildlife dynamics, and distances between places (Homewood and Rodgers 1991; Ndagala 1997). This is often indicated in the place-names that Maasai attribute to aspects of their environment, with reference to soils, temperatures, mountains, water, and so on (Ndagala 1997). *Oltukai* village, for instance, is named after the date palm tree. This intimate ecological knowledge has been foundational for the pastoral system to function sustainably over time.

The Maasai traditionally organize themselves into different territorial sections called *iloshon* (singular *olosho*), each functioning as its own self-contained social-ecological unit, and as a part of a larger whole (Hodgson 2011; Ndagala 1997). Prior to colonialism, these sections determined access to and control of resources within particular geographic areas based on the naturally occurring levels of resource abundance or scarcity (see Dyson-Hudson 1978). Within an *olosho*, grazing rights were allocated to members of the section and key areas were kept aside for dry season use (McCabe, Leslie, Davis 2020). *Iloshon* were thus politically autonomous groups that occupied particular territories, but they were also loosely allied members of the larger Maasai society, united by common language, and similar customs, values, and social institutions.[60]

The Maasai living in my study area are part of the *IlKisongo* (hereafter Kisongo) section, the dominant Maasai group in Tanzania and the largest in Maasailand, excluding the Arusha (see Figure 4).[61] The Kisongo likely arrived in the Enduimet area near Longido from southern Kenya,

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[60] See for comparison Evans-Pritchard's (1940) discussion of the segmentary system of the Nuer of southern Sudan.
[61] *IlKisongo* is sometimes spelled *IlKisonko* (see Hodgson 2001:158; Spencer and Waller 2017:462) depending on whether the southern or northern Maa dialects are referenced. Northerners pronounce a hard 'k' sound, while southerners say a soft 'g.' In this dissertation, I refer to Kisongo Maasai as "the Kisongo" as a means of differentiating them from "the Arusha," who also participate in the Maasai regional economy. I specify if I am referring to Kisongo or Arusha town (or Arusha region).

moving southwards towards Kilimanjaro. After displacing the ILoogalala (discussed below),

they expanded west to Ngorongoro and south to Simanjiro (Wright 2019). In part due to the

influences of colonial and post-independence development policies, the Maasai-proper have to

some extent amalgamated in the southern parts of Tanzania's Maasailand under the banner of

Kisongo.[62] This umbrella title now refers to the largest section of pastoral Maasai in Tanzania,

though Kisongo-proper would refer most specifically to those in the Kisongo area in Monduli

(see Goldman 2011:77).[63] The fact that the pastoral Maasai in my study area identify with a

single section plays an important role in the context of community attitudes towards

conservation. As described by Gardner (2016), in Loliondo, a notable safari company forged a

mutually beneficial relationship with the Laitayok section at the expense of the Purko and Loita

sections, leading to differentiated experiences of conservation along sectional lines (see also

Wright 2019:85). These intersectional divisions between pastoral sections were not present in the

communities I was studying. In this case, the dominant tension was between Kisongo pastoralists

and Arusha cultivators.

Historically, *iloshon* were each affiliated with a particular *Oloiboni,* who was revered as

an omniscient father figure. The *Iloibonok* were part of the *Loonkidongi* (also spelled *Inkidong'i*)

family dynasty and led the Maasai as diviners for two centuries, with power passed down from

father to son through the Ole Supeet family. [64] They played crucial roles in unifying the Maasai

in times of warfare and directing movements into new areas, expanding the overall locus of

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[62] In 1938, for instance, Loita, Laitayok, and Purko Maasai elders living in the Loliondo area lobbied for the establishment of a school in Loliondo (Page-Jones 1948; see Hodgson 2001:128). Instead, the colonial government concentrated resources on the Mondul School in Kisongo, leading to an influx of other pastoral Maasai sections into the Monduli area (see Page-Jones 1948).

[63] Importantly, the Kisongo section was tangible and real prior to colonialism. The Kisongo displaced the Loogalala in the late 19th century around Kilimanjaro and established a stronghold in the area, in so doing becoming the largest Maasai section. But the Kisongo have since come to adopt members from other sections as well, which I was surprised to find during fieldwork. Some of my interlocutors in Oltukai suggested to me that this a was a product of development (*maendeleo*) and that pastoral Maasai sections have come to unite in the southern parts of Tanzania's Maasailand as a product of macro-political context.

[64] Some of the general information on the Loonkidongi dynasty I present in this section is drawn from the following weblink, which provides some useful general background for a layman audience: https://artsandculture.google.com/story/mbatian-the-story-of-the-great-maasai-laibon/dwKi6e02ybc9KA

Maasai control over territory.[65] *Iloibonok* led through charisma, with each *oloiboni* attracting his own set of followers. When sons came of age, they moved away from their fathers to establish their own communities and clientele in different places (Ole Kuney interview 2020).[66] While their position in society was not inherently political, their sphere of influence as prophets was significant given their skillsets as specialized sorcerers (Spencer and Waller 2017). *ILoibonok* led the movements of the Maasai into new territories because they were believed to have the gift of foresight. They lived "semi-outside" Maasai society, sharing cultural institutions with the Maasai but living separately in small communities on the edges of Maasai sections (Spencer and Waller 2017:465).[67] They were strong leaders who advanced their individual ambitions while also making the Maasai into "an unstoppable [military] force" (Spencer and Waller 2017:473).

Two of the most notable *ILoibonok* were Supeet and Mbatian, who united *ilmurran* age-sets (discussed below) across sections in the context of the Maasai expansion southwards (Spencer and Waller 2017:474). In 1866, Mbatian inherited the title from his father Supeet, who passed away in the 1860s. Mbatian came to wield a greater following than his brothers Mako and Neelyang, quarreling with Mako in particular. Mbatian, born in Matapato, Kajiado, held his position from 1866 to 1890 when he passed away (see Spencer 2003:107). During Mbatian's period, the Maasai were largely unified and were able to expand their territory to approximately 80,000 square miles from Lake Turkana in the north to Mount Meru in the south.[68] Mbatian played a central role in uniting and mobilizing Maa speakers who had previously been at odds,

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[65] In Maa, an *enkidong'* (pl. *inkidong'i*) refers to the container that *iloibonok* use to carry medicine, so the *inkidong'i* came to refer to the family dynasty itself (Galaty 2022 pers. comm.). *Iloonkidong'i* is a possessive form of the word, referring essentially to 'things of the *enkidong'*.

[66] Berntsen (1979b,c) and Jacobs (1965b) seem to agree that it was an age-based transition, with sons acquiring power after becoming senior *ilmurran* (warriors; introduced later in this section). Spencer and Waller (2017:467) suggest that it was rather through a son's "ability to cope with sorcery" that determined when a son could develop into an *Oloiboni*.

[67] Of all the 16 Maasai sections in a contemporary context, 13 of them have a *Loonkidongi* prophet (Spencer and Waller 2017).

[68] See: https://artsandculture.google.com/story/mbatian-the-story-of-the-great-maasai-laibon/dwKi6e02ybc9KA

such as the IlKisongo and the IlPurko setions in Narok and Kajiado.[69] Mbatian's legacy was passed down to his sons Olonana and Senteu. Olonana (Talala age group) was born in the 1870s and tried unceremoniously to usurp Senteu's rights to inherit the diviner powers and become the foremost *Oloiboni*. Family tensions between Mako and his brother Mbatian, and then subsequently between Mbatian's sons Olonana and Senteu, created factions that have since led to fragmentation of the *Loonkigong'i* dynasty into different followings. While Olonana remained in Kenya, Senteu's following expanded southwards to Kilimanjaro and Pangani. Due to ongoing conflicts between the brothers, however, the British banished Senteu to the Loita Hills, and Olonana came to settle in Ngong. In a contemporary context, Senteu's family line still live mainly in Loita, while the *Iloibonok* who have settled on the Monduli hills in Tanzania are descendant from Olonana's family. Olonana's son Parit was brought to Tanganyika in 1922 at the request of the Kisongo to assume the role of principal *Oloiboni* of Tanzania's Maasailand (Hodgson 2001) (see Section 3.9).[70] Following the effects of the colonial attempts to 'pacify' their influence, the power of *iloibonok* has been fading, particularly in terms of their abilities to mobilize the Maasai through warfare (Spencer and Waller 2017). In a contemporary context, the influence of Iloibonok has continued to decline due to political constraints on Maasai society implemented by the state. During my fieldwork, I interviewed *Oloiboni* Meshuko Ole Mapi, a descendent of the Olanana family, who resided on the hill in Esilalei village, and who was well respected in the area. He was born in 1914 (Nyangusi age-set), with eight wives and 56 children and 106 grandchildren. He passed away in early 2020, with a funeral on April 15, 2020.

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[69] Waller (2017:478) seems to suggest that the prophets may have opportunistically emerged following the intersectional Maasai civil wars engendered by disease outbreaks (in Spencer and Waller 2017). He points out that there is no evidence that northern sections had *Iloibonok* prior to the wars.
[70] Parit died in 1928 (see Fosbrooke 1948:11-12; Fosbrooke 1956b:193).

Figure 4 – Map of Maasai territorial sections (*iloshon*). The map was redrawn and adapted by the author based on Spencer (2003).

Within *iloshon*, there are smaller group units called *inkutot* (singular *enkutoto*). These smaller "localities" are managed by groups of elder men who determine grazing access and designation of other land uses like settlement and cultivation (see McCabe, Leslie, and Davis 2020:8). Historically, *inkutot* have covered vast rangeland areas, but they have been reduced considerably in the contemporary context. Ndagala (1994:5) estimates that in the 1960s, they covered areas of 500-800 square kilometres, with 12-14 homesteads (*enkang* or *boma* in kiSwahili), 600-700 people, and 8000-9000 head of cattle. Different *inkutot* generally overlapped each other to create interconnected livestock corridors. Rather than hard divisions between *iloshon* and *enkutoto*, there was a significant amount of fluidity between the territories, with some group members living in other areas as needed (Ndagala 1994).

Within sub-sections, there are clans (*Olgilata* sing.) and sub-clans with designated male leaders. Clans act as "mutual aid groups" to support households through redistribution of livestock and fund-raising to help clan members in times of need (McCabe, Leslie, and Davis 2020:8). Clans also hold authority over key water resources, including streams, springs, and dams and reserve the right to permit access of non-clan members at their discretion (McCabe, Leslie, and Davis 2020). Different clans maintain primary access to particular seasonal grazing areas and water sources, with elders responsible for determining who can graze where and when. Other clan and section members are generally permitted to graze, but at the discretion of the in-group, from which permission has to be sought. If other pastoralists from outside the in-group transgress these restrictions, they are sanctioned through the payment of cattle.

Maasai homesteads are traditionally demarcated with sisal plants or thorny bush fences (*ngoja kidogo* in kiSwahili) to prevent wildlife encroachment. Areas just outside these fences are generally kept for family-level grazing in times of need, or in some cases cultivated as small gardens to diversify the livestock economy and buffer against the risks of drought and livestock disease (see McCabe 2003b). Inside the fenced enclosures, livestock is kraaled in the centre and disaggregated into large stock, calves, and small stock. People live in small mud huts with thatched rooves within the outer fence. The Maasai are generally polygamous with one man taking multiple wives to support their household economy in various ways through an organized division of labour. In most cases, each wife's house is autonomous, and all wives carry out similar functions. However, I also observed during fieldwork in Oltukai instances where each wife was in charge of a particular set of tasks (child rearing, cooking, etc.), though this is uncommon across Maasailand. A homestead generally comprises one male head living in his own hut, and multiple wives living in their own houses with their children. Homesteads vary to some extent across areas (see Chapter 2), but generally follow this basic structure. The impermanent nature of household infrastructure facilitates mobility in times of environmental

variability, from as far south as the Simanjiro plains all the way north into Kenya (Ndagala 1997).

The economic system of the Maasai is structured by a Nilo-Hamitic age-set system (Fosbrooke 1956b; Merker 1910). Men formally pass through age-sets (*olaji/ilajijik*), with respect increasing throughout the lifespan (Hodgson 2001:26).[71] At around 14-17 years old, Maasai boys are circumcised and assume their roles as junior warriors (Fosbrooke 1956b). After a period of about 7-8 years, these junior warriors go through an *Eunoto* ceremony and progress to senior status (Fosbrooke 1956b). Traditionally, at this point a new set of junior warriors is initiated who come to be known as the left-hand in relation to the right-hand senior warriors (Fosbrooke 1956b). The left-handed junior warriors ultimately catch up with the right-handed senior warriors after undergoing their own *Eunoto* ceremony, before the combined group of warriors goes through a *Olng'esher* ceremony to transition from warriorhood to junior elderhood (Fosbrooke 1956b:189). In a contemporary context, the IlKisongo section has dropped the hand divisions, employing only a single combined age-set of 14-15 year periods, rather than the 7-8 year periods of handed divisions observable in most of the Kenyan sections (Galaty 2021 pers. comm.). The frequency of divisions is generally determined by the *oloiboni* (Spencer 2003; Spencer and Waller 2017).

Table 2 – Kisongo age-sets in study area based on interviews in 2019-2020[72]

Age-set	Approximate age
Nyangulu	(15-28)
Korianga	(28-44)
Landiis	(45-55)
Makaa	(56-70)
Seuri	(70-85)
Nyangusi	(85-100)

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[71] Women passed through them informally through rituals marking their transitions from young girls *endito/intoyie* through to grandmothers *koko* (see Hodgson 2001:26).

[72] The age ranges depicted in this table are rough approximations based on informal group interviews with Kisongo in Oltuaki and Esilalei. There did not seem to be a consensus on the exact ranges. In reality, there is some overlap in actual ages since some boys are advanced earlier within the system, and others are held back. For general context, Goldman (2020:26) documents *Eunoto* ceremony dates in 2019 for Nyangulu, in 2005 for Korianga, in 1991 for Landiis, in 1978 for Makaa, and in 1965 for Seuri. She does not include *Eunoto* dates for the Nyangusi age set, but lists their circumcision date as 1935, and their *Olng'esher* ceremony date as 1958.

A gender-based division of labour is generally used manage livestock.[73] Adult women milk livestock in the mornings and the evenings, and are responsible for distributing milk to all members of the household. Young girls (*endito/intoyie*) help their mothers with collecting water and supplies, housekeeping, and child care. If there is a surplus of milk, adult women are in charge of its trade to other households or in markets. Women also process the hides of slaughtered animals, using them to produce sleeping pads and clothing and trading them along with milk surpluses. Elder men are responsible for the governance of herding, making key decisions about where to graze and water and when. Young boys herd small stock on their own, and larger herds with the supervision and assistance of *ilmurran,* older boys who are responsible for the majority of herding and defending livestock and people from raids and wildlife. Thus, both the age-set system and a gender-based division of labour contribute to the upkeep of the economic system. Rather than an oppressive system that exploits the labour of youth and women, this traditional system is egalitarian in nature with all members treated with respect (*enkanyit*), though Hodgson (2001) contends that inequality may be increasing since colonialism.[74] Men and women traditionally share overlapping rights to livestock and its products and gender roles are woven together to contribute to household economy. Both men and women gain power with age within the society, with male elders having the most political sway in decision-making processes. Men generally hold key leadership positions as *ilaigwenak*, representing age-sets, clans, and sections.[75] These men are central for taking decisions related to rangeland management, and

[73] This paragraph is largely paraphrased from Hodgson (2001:30-33), who discusses Maasai social organization in precolonial Tanganyika through the lens of gender relations and cultural values of respect (*enkanyit*).

[74] Research by Elliot Fratkin and others suggests that labour between men and women is approximately equal, but age plays a major role in shaping the division of labour. Boys tend to work more as young herders than older men, while older women have greater responsibility for managing households and animals than young girls. Men are typically much older than their wives, which is partly a factor in accounting for differences in labour across genders, though elder men are also actively involved in governance as well, a form of work in and of itself.

[75] In a contemporary context, there are also *Ilaiguen*ok (pl.) who represent age-sets through life and are clan affiliated (see Goldman 2020; McCabe, Leslie and Davis 2020).

resolving disputes.[76] Age-set leaders play key roles in determining grazing areas and advising on when they should be opened up across seasons.

In a contemporary context, these customary Maasai institutions for managing rangelands coexist with formal institutions at the village-level in Tanzania (McCabe et al. 2020; see section 6.3). Wider political and economic pressures bearing on the pastoral mode of production of the Maasai have also led to livelihood diversification, and forays into new economic arenas including cultivation, wage labour, ecotourism, and the Tanzanite trade, as Maasai weigh the opportunity costs of livestock keeping vis-à-vis other strategies for earning an income (Davis 2011; McCabe 2003a,b; McCabe, Leslie, and DeLuca 2010; McCabe, Mollel, and Tumaini 1997; Sachedina and Trench 2009; Sachedina 2008; Norton-Griffiths et al. 2008; Norton-Griffiths 1995, 1998; Norton-Griffiths et al. 1995; Homewood et al. 2009). These trends are discussed in section 3.18.

3.4 Maasai identity, "Ethnic shifting," and the Arusha

The second dominant ethnic group in my study area was the WaArusha (IlArus or IlArusa in Maa, hereafter Arusha), Maa-speaking agriculturalists who share many cultural institutions with the Kisongo, but who have only recently come to occupy the lowlands of rural Monduli. Nowadays, the Arusha seem to point to Arusha Chini south of contemporary Moshi town, where highland rivers from Kilimanjaro and Meru join together as the Pangani River, as their ancestral homeland (Spear and Nurse 1992). The question of how precisely to situate the Arsuha in relation to the Kisongo is a particularly intriguing one, as it demands careful consideration of the 'boundaries' of Maasai culture (see Galaty 1993a; Sommer and Vossen 1993; Little 1998). I will attempt to unfold this dynamic in the following sections.

As Galaty (1982) details, the Maasai established an enduring cultural hegemony in East Africa since the 18th century or so, in part through "ethnic shifting," which allowed them to

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[76] Women, however, were not absent from these processes, as they were able to testify at meetings and advocate through their married sons and husbands (see Hodgson 2001:31; Merker 1910:220). Women also held moral power in the context of their involvement in certain rituals and religious practices (Merker 1910; Hodgson 2001).

retain lasting relations across sections that were dispersed across wide geographical areas. While Maasai-proper were generally considered to be pastoralists, Galaty (1977) suggests that the scholarly distinctions between pastoral and non-pastoral (or semi-pastoral) Maasai groups are not entirely productive because they fail to take into account variability of livelihood practices across different political and economic contexts. While the terms *IlMaasai* and *Iloikop* have also been used in place of Maasai-proper and Maasai-other to refer to these distinctions (by Jacobs 1963 in King 1971; Jacobs 1968; Krapf 1860), the use of such terms has also evoked critique by Galaty and others. Berntsen (1980), for instance, expresses skepticism of Krapf's (1860) depictions of *Iloikop* and the extent to which it reflected a representative title, as both *Ilmaasai and Iloikop* seemed to be referring at times to pastoral societies with similar economies (see also Berntsen 1979a, 1976). At the same time, some have also argued that *Iloikop* is indeed a productive term, used to refer to a broad set of pastoral groups that inhabited different areas in East Africa in the 19th century, one of which was the Maasai (see Jennings 2005a; see also Jennings 2005b). It seems likely that Krapf's initial categorizations of *IlParakiuyo* pastoralists as *Iloikop* were correct, but later associations between *Iloikop* and farming were not. Crop cultivation likely emerged following the *Iloikop* wars, particularly in the Eldama Ravine of Kenya, when defeated pastoral groups took to farming as refugees. This included groups like the Uasin Gishu, fragmented *Iloogolala* and others. These groups were defined as *Iloikop* by early colonial writers like Hollis and Elliot (and promulgated by Jacobs) given their reliance on crop cultivation, though the so-called *Iloikop* farmers had likely transitioned to agriculture following the depletion of their pre-existing herds during the wars. Given the lack of clarity on the subject, I am personally more inclined towards Galaty's (1977, 1982, 1993b) assessment of a core-periphery dynamic of Maasai society, which emanates out from a pastoral mode of production in the plains and is interconnected with more agriculturally-inclined Maa-speaking communities in the highlands. This unified economic system sustained Maasai society over time by contributing in a

complementary fashion to the longevity of the pastoral system (through network relations detailed below).

Prior to colonialism, the pastoral Maasai, while protective of their cultural identities, also actively sought out economic relations with non-Maasai/pastoral peoples to barter for food items and supplies. One of the central elements of Maasai identity, as suggested by Galaty, is the participation in the shared rituals. Galaty (1977:66;1993b) argues that some sections could be considered "core" groups in that they initiate rituals, and in particular age-set rites, as compared to groups which play a more "peripheral" role in these ceremonies. Extending this logic, a core and periphery dialectic across Maa-speaking groups could perhaps be applied to understanding the historical relations between Kisongo and Arusha. However, Spear's (1992, 1993, 1997) work on the Arusha poses an interesting challenge to the notion that Arusha are less central to Maasai identity than Kisongo. Taking up this question through a detailed historiographical account of the Arusha throughout the colonial period on the slopes of Meru, Spear (1997) suggests that the Arusha are no less Maasai than the Kisongo, spring-boarding from this assumption to interrogate the question of whether there exists in practice a resonating pastoral mode of production that underlies Maasai cultural identity. To Spear, the Arusha constitute "Maasai farmers" or *Ilkurrman* (see Galaty 1982:9), who participate actively in the age-sets and rituals of the Kisongo, and in Galaty's (1993b) sense, could be considered part of the "core." But unlike the Kisongo who inhabit the lowland plains, the Arusha generally lived up in the highlands through the 19th century, in close proximity to Bantu-speaking Meru farmers, who Spear and Nurse (1992) note broke away some time ago from the Chagga. The Meru (who refer to themselves as Waro) likely arrived in the early seventeenth century led by Kaaya and Mbise clans before splitting and settling the peak of the mountain near the floor of the crater (Mbise) and Machame on Mount Kilimanjaro (Kaaya) (Spear and Nurse 1992; Luanda 1992; Spear 1997; Neumann 1998:53). As Galaty's (1982) work suggests, there was likely some fluidity at the time both

within and across ethnic groups. Nnko and Pallanjo Meru clans, for instance, are said to have originated from Maasai (Neumann 1998).

3.5 Arusha origins

Competing theories exist as to the ancestral lineages of the Arusha in relation to the wider genealogy of Maa-speakers in eastern African. What is known for sure is that the Arusha took up residence on the fertile southwestern slopes Mount Meru around 1830, where they practiced intensified cultivation. Their ancestral ties, however, are less clear. One theory, raised by some Arusha and Kisongo elders I interviewed, was that the Arusha were themselves originally Maasai-proper (pastoral Maasai) in southern Kenya. A small group of Maasai had come to realize, largely as a product of family and clan-level disputes, that cattle had become a source of conflict that disrupted their abilities to live peaceful lives. According to the story, the group left without livestock (becoming *Ildorobo* in the eyes of the Maasai) in search of a quieter life. They eventually arrived on Mount Meru where they took up farming, perhaps in part through their interactions with Meru people, who had stemmed away from the Bantu-speaking Chagga people of Kilimanjaro. This explanation would certainly account for why the Arusha still speak Maa, uphold the Maasai age-set system, and participate in some of the same cultural rituals, albeit without large herds of cattle, the economic core of the Maasai mode of production. It would not be a stretch, then, to conceive of the Arusha as "Maasai farmers" (Spear and Nurse 1992:481).

While the explanation is appealing in its simplicity, other theories are perhaps more compelling. Another explanation is that Arusha were originally Gweno-speaking refugees from the mountains of North Pare (Cory 1948). After expanding south of Mount Kilimanjaro onto the lowland plains, they came to interact with Maasai and subsequently adopted the Maa language and Maasai institutions before returning to the highlands of Meru (Spear and Nurse 1992:482). Based on this reasoning it would seem that the Arusha may have always been a farming group that resided in the highlands, with only a "superimposed veneer of Maasai culture" (Spear and Nurse, 1992:482). However, this interpretation offers no reason for the lack of linguistic or

cultural ties to Gweno speakers, or to Bantu roots in general (Spear and Nurse 1992). As Vossen's (1988) linguistic work reveals, the Arusha and the Kisongo are very close in their place on the Eastern Nilotic genealogy. They are both part of the Southern Maa group and diverge only at the very tail end (see Figure 5).[77]

Figure 5 – Tree diagram of Eastern Nilotic linguistic groups. Original research and visualization was carried out by Vossen (1988) and this version was redrawn and adapted by the author.

A third theory is that the Arusha were refugees of the Maasai intersectional civil wars of the early 19th century. The Kisongo were known to have won a key battle with the pastoral *Iloogalala* ("Hard teeth" see Hodgson 2001:23; hereafter Loogalala) in the Pangani Valley south of Kilimanjaro, and it is highly plausible that the Arusha descended from this group before being

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[77] One issue that is perhaps worth noting with Spear and Nurse's (1992) linguistic rationale for dismissing the Pare origins of Arusha people is the efficiency with which non-Maasai groups seem to be able to 'become' Maasai (see for example Fox's (2018:4) discussion of Ndigirri hunter gatherers becoming Laikipia Maasai in a relatively short period of time, thereafter distancing themselves completely from their *ndorobo* roots.

pushed to the Meru highlands without stock. The Loogolala (referred to as Baraguyu during the colonial period), were a sub-section of maa-speaking *Iloikop* ("other Maasai" see Galaty 1982) who struggled with *IlMaasai* into the 19th century (King 1971; Jennings 2005a,b). The Loogalala (pejoratively referred to as Lumbwa by the Kisongo) had settled the lowlands of the Pangani valley around Mount Kilimanjaro in the eighteenth century (or earlier) (Spear 1997; Spear and Nurse 1992). The Loogolala practiced pastoralism on the plains until being displaced by the Kisongo in the early nineteenth century (Fosbrooke 1948, 1956a; see Berntsen 1976; Wright 2019:54-55). Another related explanation is that the Arusha were already Maasai agriculturalists (*Ilkurrman* or *kwavi*, though the latter is a contentious term owing to its colonial applications) before being displaced by the Kisongo to the highlands. The question of whether agricultural/pastoral divides were ever reified in a binary fashion, however, has been contentious in the literature (Jacobs 1978; Berntsen 1980; Galaty 1982; Spear and Nurse 1993). Galaty (1982:9), for instance, acknowledges that many of the *Ilkurrman* groups may well have been refugees from intersectional *IlMaasai/Iloikop* civil wars of the 19th century, though he also notes that "there is no reason to believe that such agricultural colonies have not long existed, serving comparable functions." Both theories hinge on the displacement of Arusha ancestors from the Pangani Valley by the Kisongo, but differ in terms of the level of agricultural intensification the Arusha practiced prior to this conflict. Another potential twist to this interpretation is that the Arusha may have arisen from interactions with the *ILoogalala* prior to the conflict with the Kisongo, perhaps as far back as the 17th century (Galaty 2021 pers. comm.). Indeed there is evidence to suggest that early settlements in Arusha Chini were "*wakuafi*" (Luanda 1992:75).

The most widely accepted view seems to be that the Arusha were originally pastoralists, descended (to some degree) "from early Maasai groups," who lost their stock through disease or war and were forced in such times to adopt agriculture (see Luanda 1992:73; Huntingford 1953:110-111; Luanda 1992:72; Waller 1978; Waller 1976; Jacobs 1978; Sutton 1973). They were likely displaced from the lowlands during the core Maasai expansion southwards. Like

other defeated pastoralists, they established small communities in the highlands on the peripheries of Maasai dominated areas and continued to maintain strong cultural and economic relations with the Maasai (Fischer 1885; Myer 1909; Thomson 1855). As Luanda (1992:72) describes, while the Arusha cultivated crops during their early days on Mount Meru, they were "mainly interested in cattle." As he further notes, "their lifestyle and culture were very much tied to pastoralism" (Luanda 1992:73). Luanda's (1992) work offers some interesting nuances to this discussion. He suggests that the first Arusha settlement in Burka had been established under the supervision of *Oloiboni* Supeet, who sought their labour to build a furrow from Engare Ol Motonyi River and to cultivate tobacco and food products for tribute (Luanda 1992:73-74; See also Gulliver 1963).[78] Luanda (1992) asserts that the original settlers near Engare Ol Motonyi and Burka were either *wakuafi* or *Iloikop* refugees (most likely Baraguyu/Parakuiyo/Loogalala). Fosbrooke (1956b), however, suggests that these initial refugees were actually *IlKikoin* people from Arusha Chini. Kuney (1994:97) shares this contention, holding that '*IlKikoine'* (his spelling) comprised a small group of Bantu-speakers that were almost entirely assimilated by the Maasai. Waller (1978) seems to agree, but notes that there were likely several different refugee groups in the area which interacted with each another. Not to be understated, Arusha oral traditions point to Loogalala residents of upper Ngare Ol Motonyi river as their direct ancestors, so the exact origins of the Arusha are difficult to pinpoint (Luanda 1992). While the linguistic evidence that the Arusha were more closely related to the Kisongo than to Gweno-speaking refugees is notable, Fosbrooke (1948:5) firmly asserts that the Arusha were indeed originally Pare from the Moshi area (referred to as Arusha Chini during the colonial period). Fosbrooke (1948:5) maintains that the Maasai encouraged the Arusha to settle Selian to the west of Arusha town, where Arusha both absorbed Maa-speakers there and "became Maasai speakers themselves" (see also Kuney 1994). They subsequently took in significant numbers of Maasai in the 1880s when rinderpest ravaged Maasai herds (Fosbrooke 1948). Similar to the Meru who

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[78] Engare Ol Motonyi is the river one crosses when driving east from Mount Meru back towards Arusha town.

were "skilled agriculturalists" and used the fertile slopes of Mount Meru productively, Fosbrooke (1948:5) notes that the Arusha were also agriculturalists, but that "their mode of life [was] more heavily oriented towards cattle," a characteristic he considers to be "most understandable considering the Maasai elements in their origins." Fosbrooke's (1948) account is perhaps the most reliable given that he served as a government-hired sociologist during the late colonial period and documented oral traditions of Arusha and Kisongo elders at that time.

In a nutshell, then, the Arusha may have always farmed in the mountains, they may have historically farmed in the plains, or they may have kept livestock (and farmed) in the plains prior to their conflict with the Kisongo in the early 19th century (Spear and Nurse 1992). The question of whether the Arusha "stayed Maasai" (see Homewood et al 2009) after their transition from lowland pastoralism to highland farming (or whether they were even Maasai to begin with!) necessitates more textured ethnographic attention. Galaty's (1982) and Spear's (1997) colourful works suggest that there may not be a definitive answer. After living among Arusha and Kisongo for a year, I am inclined towards the interpretation that the Arusha have always been distinct from the Kisongo, but likely share a common lineage as Maa speakers through their interactions with Loogolala ancestors who at one point lived in close proximity to the Samburu in northern Kenya before settling in the central Rift Valley, the Kaputie plains, and the Loita Hills in the 18th century (Sommer and Vossen 1993; Galaty 2021:6). At some point within the past 500 years, these groups likely fragmented further and the Loogalala came to settle the Pangani Valley south of Kilimanjaro, which became the stage for the *Iloikop* war between the Kisongo and Loogolala.

3.6 A (plausible) history of Arusha-Kisongo relations

The defeated Loogolala were faced with a choice to either assimilate into the Kisongo section or maintain their autonomy by traveling to a distant geographical area or transitioning into new ecological niches that did not conflict with the territoriality of the Kisongo in the plains (see also Galaty 1982:9). Assimilation likely unfolded in a few different ways. One route was for Loogalala men to live as dependents in Maasai households in exchange for labour in the form of

herding, or joining a larger homestead as independent heads of households. The process of actually 'becoming' Maasai in such cases likely occurred in the following generation, when sons were then brought into the age-set system. Another possible process was through clan and sub-clan based alliances. Groups like the Loogalala who were interested in assimilating into Maasai society often held that their specific clans were essentially Maasai sub-clans, thus positioning themselves in relation to the major Maasai clans. Such dynamics are explicated by Schlee (1989). While many Loogalala did indeed join the Kisongo at that time, large numbers decided to branch away from the lowlands leading to fragmentation of these Maa speakers into the Parakuiyo and the Arusha (Spear and Nurse 1992). These divisions seem to have been primarily economic ones as each group adapted to the environmental conditions which they came to inhabit. The Parakuiyo moved down south to find areas suitable for pastoralism outside Maasailand, where Bantu-speaking farmers predominantly lived. Perhaps the Parakuiyo became mixed agropastoralists at this time, while the Arusha became more specialized in agriculture as they settled the highlands (see also Fischer 1885). By the early 19th century, the Arusha had established a stronghold in Arusha Chini (Moshi) where they produced a variety of crops and actively traded with Chagga for iron hoes and other tools (Spear and Nurse 1992).[79] The area became an important source of food for the Kisongo and other passing caravans, and the Arusha also assimilated Kisongo in times of extreme drought (Luanda 1992). While most stayed in Arusha Chini (Moshi), in the mid 19th century, some of the Arusha followed the rivers up to Arusha Juu (Arusha town area), southwest of Mount Meru. It was there they came to interact with the Meru who had been present on the southeastern slopes since the mid 18th century after branching off from their Chagga relatives, much like the Arusha did from the Loogalala/Parakuiyo. It was likely at this point that the Arusha came to specialize in settled agriculture that made use of irrigation systems and terracing. They were able to establish markets

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[79] While Arusha Chini was used to refer to the Moshi area during the colonial period, it has since become its own ward. Arusha Juu was used by administrators with reference to present-day Arusha town.

in Sanguwezi for their crops, with Kisongo taking particular interest in their supplies of honey, tobacco and maize.

Initial Arusha settlements on the mountain have been dated between 1820-1845, when the Kidotu Kisongo age-set were warriors (Waller 1978; Jacobs 1978; Gulliver 1963; Spear and Nurse 1992). At first, they were heavily dependent on the Kisongo, and even subservient to them in Arusha Chini, and in the early 19th century on Meru (Fischer 1885). But unlike some other defeated *Iloikop* groups, the Arusha later established themselves as a strong and unified force in the late 19th century (Waller 1978). They became independent of the Kisongo, and their population grew until they became dominant in the Meru area after fighting further battles with the Kisongo and other groups (Luanda 1992). By the late 1880s they established "cultural hegemony over the Meru" through military supremacy before their expansion and settlement patterns were disrupted by German colonization (Luanda 1992:92).

While the Arusha spoke Maa and shared the customary practices of the Kisongo, they cultivated like the Meru, sharing with them a similar diet (Luanda 1992). And while the Arusha no longer upheld a 'purely' pastoral mode of production, they still kept livestock, perhaps stemming from their cultural roots as Loogalala, and knowing that it was a practical form of diversification from their emergent cultivation-based economy. While authority mirrored that of Maasai in terms of political decentralization across the elders and age-set system, they were more concerned with individual property than the Kisongo (Luanda 1992:89).

Originally, the Arusha settled the lower parts of the mountain, but as families expanded, older sons moved higher on the slopes to clear their own farming areas, as inheritance of lower fields was passed down to a father's youngest son (ultimogeniture) (Mair 1974). As the primary heir of the homestead and land, the youngest son was expected to stay home and care for the late father's wives, while the eldest son became the main heir of the herd (Galaty 2022 pers. comm.). Like the Kisongo, traditional leaders of each age-group (*ilaigwena*k) were responsible for governance of these territorial areas that continually expanded up the mountain. Thus, quite

interestingly, the areas on Mount Meru came to constitute territorialized reflections of the age-set system that formed part of a distinctive system of political administration (Mair 1974). By the 20th century, Arusha had settled the majority of the inhabitable southwestern slopes of the mountain (between "4,000 to 5,800 feet" elevation) and established tightly clustered homesteads and permanent irrigation systems for farming (Spear and Nurse 1992:485). As they expanded up the slopes, they cleared forest areas to plant maize, beans, bananas, and millet (Gulliver 1963; Mair 1974:137; Spear 1997). Some in the area now also grow coffee commercially. The Arusha came to interact closely with Meru and Chagga, the former of whom have inhabited the Meru slopes for more than 300 years and whose presence long-predated the arrival of the Arusha (see Fosbrooke 1948; Neumann 1998; Luanda 1992:91). Mair (1974) notes that over half of contemporary Arusha society comprises descendants from intermarriage with Chagga and Meru.

Somewhat similar to the Kisongo, the Arusha in the Meru highlands live in dispersed homesteads, but differ in that each is generally surrounded by a private banana plantation and a fence. Groups of homesteads form territorial parishes (later villages following villagization), separated by streams higher up the mountain (Mair 1974:137). Arusha society is based on patrilineal descent, and young men are encouraged to move away and cultivate new lands to establish their families. They follow the same age-set system of the Kisongo and follow the same *oloiboni* to carry out their age-set ceremonies. Gulliver (1963) suggests that the age-set system of the Arusha was likely born from the Kisongo and modified slightly through interaction with Bantu-speaking Meru and Chagga. The warriors are referred to as *Ilmurran,* but since the Arusha have largely given up herding in Meru, junior *Ilmurran* take up jobs collecting firewood, preparing feasts, and sending messages. They do not yet begin farming, and are not yet allowed to participate in public meetings, rituals or to marry (Mair 1974). Senior *Ilmurran* attend meetings and serve as an executive branch of the elders. At this age, they begin to cultivate land and are permitted to marry.

Like the Kisongo, there is no individual leader, and authority is decentralized across age-set leaders (*ilaigwenak*). But a key difference is that their descent lineages are very important, which they trace back to one of the original pioneering groups of settlers (Mair 1974). These constitute 'maximal' lineages (all descendants). The smallest level of 'inner' lineages consists of brothers and their sons (direct family descendants). The Arusha avoid violence to resolve conflicts, believing that having to resort to force shows weakness, as does attempting to solve problems on their own. They engage rather in open discussions.[80]

Their society is divided into two territorial moieties, each of which consists of two clans, names which the Arusha kept from their ancestral lands. Within a clan (*engishomi*), there is a sub-clan (*Olgilata*), each of which comprises ten maximal lineages (Mair 1974; Luanda 1992). The four main clans and sub-clans are depicted in the following table:

Table 3 – Main Arusha clans (based on Luanda 1992:87)

Clan	Sub-clan
Laiser	Miringo; Kawuanara
Lukumai	Lekiteto; Msaro
Molelian	Masangwa; Bosa; Kusher; Kisarika; Kibesua; Mukuti; Musenge
Kivuyuni	Kereu; Sarisoi

Arusha clans are the same as Kisongo ones, but the sub-clans are different. This suggests that sub-clans were likely drawn from the Arusha's origin group, and then subsequently positioned in relation to the major Maasai clans. Clanship was thus likely a key point of assimilation, with Maasai clans adopting Arusha ones and re-classifying them as sub-clans.

Any of the significant sub-divisions in Arusha society – based on age, territory, or lineage – are referred to as *olwashe*, which Arusha use to find allies in times of conflict (Mair 1974). Disputes are resolved by lineage elders/councilors and spokesmen (*olgarsis*), often at parish

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[80] Arusha governance underwent some changes during the colonial period. During the German regime, two Arusha age-set spokesmen were nominated as colonial headmen (*jumbe*) (Hodgson 2001). Following the Second World War, British administrators appointed an Arusha Lutheran teacher, who had been elected by the Arusha Tribal Council, as Arusha 'chief.' The chief oversaw one *jumbe* from each parish, who carried out tax collection and other duties (Hodgson 2001).

assemblies and lineage moots (*engigwana em balbal*) and *olwashe* are morally obligated to support members of their own division (Mair 1974; Luanda 1992).

The Kisongo were also not absent from the mountains throughout the 19th century, and continued to establish relationships for securing labour with the Arusha. As mentioned earlier, *Oloiboni* Supeet inhabited the areas west of Mount Meru in the 19th century and had hired Arusha to cultivate tobacco and other crops for the Kisongo. Shared participation in rituals and age-set ceremonies also meant close interactions between the age mates of both Kisongo and Arusha. Fosbrooke (1956b:200) suggests that the Arusha adopted the Kisongo system "*in toto*," following the same *Oloiboni*, age set names and ceremonies as the Kisongo. Kisongo men regularly exchanged cattle to marry Arusha wives, creating social conditions where the Kisongo gained increasing household labour through women and children. Waller (1978, 1985b) suggests that at one point, the Kisongo likely experienced a surplus of cattle relative to the number of herders they had to herd them, while the Arusha were scarce on livestock and grazing areas. Reciprocal trading ties allowed Arusha to acquire cattle and contribute herders to the Kisongo in exchange for a place to keep their cattle (as part of Kisongo herds) in the lowlands. But these relations were not one-directional, and in times of severe drought, the plains were particularly affected. In these instances, Arusha would exchange food crops and cattle to the Kisongo for wives (Waller 1978, 1985b). The highlands were less prone to the impacts of drought because of the mountain forests often had their own sources of water. The Kisongo then would be able to recover their depleted herds and improve the ratio of cattle to people, while the Arusha could bolster their labour force to increase agricultural productivity. In the late 19th century, the convergent pressures of drought and disease created a greater reliance of Kisongo on Arusha to provide refuge in times of need. Thus, following Galaty's (1982) logic, the Arusha, in their role as highland cultivators, actually contributed in a supportive fashion to the resilience of the pastoral economy in the lowlands. As Galaty (1982:9) writes, "economic vagaries motivate the creation of anomalous communities at the pastoral margin that, paradoxically, make the pastoral

idea possible in the long run. Ambiguity of identity is just one characteristic of flexibility common to these interstitial groups." By fostering an interdependent social network with the Kisongo (and other pastoral sections), the Arusha, despite their agricultural economies and highland settlements, were continually "seen by themselves and by other Maasai as integral components in the wider construction of Maasai identity" (Spear and Nurse 1992:486).

Extrapolating from this logic, the Arusha can be seen as part of the broader cultural terrains of Maasai identity, which involve "shifting" (Galaty 1982:17) to protect vital relational ties across the sections to cope with environmental stressors and climate-related variability. The Arusha then, perhaps occupying a peripheral role to the core pastoral mode of production upheld by the Kisongo, allow the Maasai to establish dialectical social networks across diverse biogeographical zones to strengthen the overall resilience of Maasai society. This consideration suggests that the Arusha are very much Maasai, even though their agricultural economies reflect a divergence from the pastoral economy of the Kisongo. They have historically played a complementary role to the Kisongo, who prefer to think of themselves as "people of cattle" (Galaty 1982:1). But the ties across the Arusha and Kisongo suggest that these agricultural and pastoral economies were linked through shared social institutions and reciprocal networks that allowed the Arusha and Kisongo to not only coexist in different ecological niches, but to use this diversity to strengthen overall resilience. These economic systems were not only productive, but likely also sustainable. The settled, labour intensive model of agriculture practiced by the Arusha in late precolonial Tanganyika may have actually improved soil productivity (rather than engender declines in fertility). Similarly, the Kisongo practiced a well-adapted model of nomadic pastoralism that involved actively managing rangelands through customary institutions.[81] The question, however, of how these dynamics are playing out in the lowlands of rural Monduli, and in key wildlife dispersal areas in the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem, has not yet been thoroughly

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[81] Gourou (1963) suggested that the introduction of cattle in tropical ecosystems was 'disastrous,' as livestock degraded these environments. Kjekshus (1977b) instead argues that cattle were foundational to the maintenance of social-ecological 'order' in late precolonial Tanganyika.

documented. I will discuss the expansion of the Arusha from the highlands of Meru onto the lowlands of Monduli, and the historical political economy of rangeland development in Tanzania's Maasailand in Sections 3.9-3.12.

3.7 The social landscape of late precolonial Tanganyika[82]

While the focus of this dissertation is on Kisongo-Arusha relations in the context of rangeland management and community-based conservation in Tanzania's Maaasailand, there were many other ethnic groups involved in the regional economy of northern and central Tanganyika prior to colonialism (Kjekshus 1977b). Interactions were characterized in some instances by acute conflict, but also by flexible ethnic networks that allowed different groups to inhabit particular ecological niches and use land productively and sustainably relative to the overall human population (Kjekshus 1977b).[83] Land uses included efficient agricultural settlements and an interconnected regional "cattle complex" that allowed the overall economy to thrive, even in harsh environmental conditions (see Herskovits 1926; Kjekshus 1977b).[84]

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[82] This section is drawn mostly from Kjekshus (1977b), who synthesizes a vast array of German literature from the colonial period in meticulous detail. I have included several of his references to original German works, which are key sources for those with interest in this topic, though I am not proficient in German myself and understand those works through Kjekshus (These include citations for: Baumann, Herrmann, Feirerman, Warburg, Casati, Burton).

[83] Kjekshus (1977b) situated his ideas in relation to Speke (1864) and Roberts (1968) who both suggested that precolonial Tanganyika was in need of strong governance to address 'tribal' warfare and avert the 'crisis of authority' that they alleged had come to characterize the interior of East Africa. Early explorer writers tended to portray African social life in a Hobbesian fashion as 'brutish' (Kjekshus 1977b:10). Krapf (1860:359), for instance, said the Maasai were "dreaded" warriors who regularly pillaged herds from rival ethnic groups. In some cases, the Maasai were even represented as indiscriminate killers (see Krapf 1860:364; Reichard 1892). Kjekshus (1977b), speaking to a "new historiography," suggests that the 19th century in East Africa was characterized by active attempts to master and control natural ecologies through various forms of economic production that lasted until the 20th century, pursuits which he contends were largely successful. Kjekshus' (1977b) work thus brings to the fore African agency. The assumptions of Kjekshus' predecessors were that 1) 'tribal' warfare undermined the ability to establish lasting control over the environment 2) the tsetse fly confined livestock keeping and settlement patterns 3) shifting cultivation patterns were insufficient for establishing lasting control (drawn from Kjekshus 1977b:4). The consequence of these assumptions was that historiographical accounts of precolonial Tanganyika tended to see "the East African" as a "captive of his barbarism and his environment," representations that were generally associated with overgrazing, soil erosion, and other forms of land degradation (Kjekshus 1977b:4). Kjekshus (1977b), however, argues against all three, contending that East Africans managed their environments actively and sustainably on the eve of colonialism. The smaller (but stable and growing) populations of the 19th century were able to control ecological areas that became challenging to manage in the 20th century as populations grew (see Kjekshus 1977b:6). Precolonial innovations in salt and cotton production and iron forging also pointed to industrial developments prior to colonial influence.

[84] The prevalence of the tsetse fly, according to Kjekshus (1977), only increased in the 20th century.

Rather than a 'crisis of authority' described by Speke (1864), there was a "rich variety of traditional [economic and political] systems" in the northern regions of precolonial Tanganyika (Kjekshus 1977b:27). Agriculture was sophisticated in the highlands, involving the application of manure, systematic crop rotation, and attention to soil fertility, with only a small minority practicing shifting cultivation (see Kjekshus 1977b:27). The Sambaa, for instance, adapted to their ecological niche in the highlands where rainfall was plenty.[85] They developed a complex political society long before colonialism and produced large crop surpluses through an irrigated cultivation system (Bauman 1891, 1894). They maintained reciprocal trading relations with the Kisongo and, without adequate long-term crop storage, exported remaining surpluses via caravan to coastal Tanga (Feirerman 1970; Warburg 1894). By the mid 1800s, the Chagga had established their own permanent irrigation systems on the slopes of Kilimanjaro, with banana trees serving as the centrepiece for subsistence, fodder, and infrastructure (Krapf 1860; see also Neumann 1998). Land pressures were already evident at this time and stall-feeding was practiced as well as cultivation (Kjekshus 1977b). Several other groups were present, including the Pare, who had implemented steep terracing on the side of the mountain (Baumann 1891), and the Wahehe, who were skilled agriculturists in the highlands and kept cattle in the lowlands before their economy collapsed with Rinderpest in the 1890s (Kjekshus 1977b:38-39; Winans 1965; Thomson 1885).[86]

Prior to colonial intervention, the Maasai indeed controlled a vast territory from Ngorongoro down to the Simanjiro plains, but the Sukuma and Nyamwezei occupied even larger territories just west.[87] The Sukuma were prosperous cattle herders and agriculturalists who practiced three years of cultivation and three years of fallow (see Kjekshus 1977b:43; Burton 1995 [1860]; Casati 1891). Maasai territories were flanked by the Wagogo in the southwest, Kaguru in the south, and Nguu in the southeast. The southeastern areas were later inhabited by

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[85] I visited Sambaaland in October 2014 as part of a week-long trek through the Usambara mountains.
[86] The Wahehe were known to regularly raid their Wasangu and Wabena neighbours.
[87] *Wanyamwezi* means 'people of the moon,' but is perhaps more accurately understood as 'people of the west.'

the fragmented Parakuiyo following their defeat by the Kisongo. East of Kisongo territory, the Sambaa, Pare, Chagga, Meru, and Arusha lived in the highlands. In the northwest, the Barabaig subgroup of Datoga (or Tatoga) had established a stronghold in Ngorongoro Crater before the Maasai pushed them south to the Hanang plains (Lane 2017). Small pockets of Sonjo cultivators also lived on the escarpment up from Lake Natron (see Gray 1963). To the northeast of Maasai territory, Ngruimi and Ikoma hunter-gatherers lived on the plains of the western Serengeti. The areas near Lake Manyara were part of the Mbugwe expansion northwards (Gray 1955). The Mbugwe likely controlled the whole area up to the northern boundary of present-day Lake Manyara National Park for grazing before being pushed west (or assimilated) by the southward-moving Maasai (Kjekshus 1977b:76; Gray 1955; Illife 1979). West of the lake was highly productive agricultural area settled by the Iraqw. The Iraqw practiced agriculture and animal husbandry across to Lake Eyasi, where Hadzabe hunters also lived. The areas of contemporary Tarangire National Park (TNP) were likely inhabited by the Mbugwe, Gorda, Barabaig, Mrangi, and Sandawi (see Figure 7), and covered by thick, tsetse-infested woodlands.

While Maasai maintained hegemony over the central plains, their dominance was not uncontested by competing ethnic groups. The Maasai struggled constantly with Wahehe and Wagogo to establish superiority over these rangelands (Herrmann 1892; Redmayne 1968). Wagogo considered cattle to be the basic unit of value in their society, and actively accumulated herds whenever possible (Rigby 1969). However, they were likely the weakest of the three militarily and were regularly exploited by Wahehe and Maasai through raids. The Wahehe, by contrast, wielded a strong group of warriors and succeeded in pushing other ethnic groups farther back into the western hinterlands (Redmayne 1968).[88] Contrary to the depictions of Maasai by Krapf and Reichard as savage warriors who regularly resorted to violence, Fischer's (1884) early colonial accounts situated cattle raids in relation to the economic aims of the warriors who

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[88] Unlike the Maasai, the Wahehe enslaved their prisoners, and practiced a class-based system. Those in the ruling class did not work, and labour was carried out by women and slaves (Kjekshus 1977b).

perpetrated them (see Fischer 1884:62; Kjekshus 1977b:18). Raids were functional means of securing cattle and those who had sufficient stock through inheritance or other means generally did not participate (Fischer 1885). The raids were often small in scale, comprising less than 30 warriors (Jacobs 1968:27). As Kjekshus (1977b:19) speculates,

> it is quite possible that our impressions of a warlike past have come about partially through uncritical translation into accepted history of tribal lore and legend despite their well-known tendencies to exaggerate past achievements on the battlefield.

Put differently, there appears to be considerable evidence to suggest that ethnic 'warfare' may have been overstated in the precolonial era (see Bosch 1930; Burton 1860; Kjekshus 1977:20). I have a complementary contention: that some degree of acute ethnic conflict was likely functional, in that it allowed groups to inhabit different ecological niches and make productive use of their environments through tailored modes of production (see Barth 1956).[89] Over the long term, practices of negotiation, cooperation, and reciprocity across these ethnic groups probably played an equally important role in strengthening social-ecological resilience, particularly in times of need.

   Prior to their population being reduced by disease and famine between 1884-1890, there were likely as many as 400,000-500,000 Maasai dispersed across a vast territory, with young warriors living out in the rangelands with their girlfriends, and settling after marrying (Kjekshus 1977b).[90] Given the age-set system, there were probably only 50,000 warriors at any given time, and those who engaged in a particular raid were probably fewer than 500 (Kjekshus 1977b). The suggestion by Kjekshus (1977), then, is that the Maasai were probably not able to establish rigid territorial boundaries through constant warfare. Rather, he maintains that they engaged in timely

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[89] Such a suggestion would be considered taboo in contemporary Tanzania, where ethnic differences are downplayed in favour of egalitarian citizenship.
[90] From the 1890s, their numbers dropped dramatically to 100,000-150,000, and then by the peak of the British administration to as few as 80,000 (see Kuczynski 1945:122; Kjekshus 1977b).

conflicts that served to establish the general parameters of their territory, but were for the most part flexible in adapting to external population pressures (Kjekshus 1977b).

In 1882, the Ngorongoro Crater was densely populated by Maasai, and extensive cattle paths were documented west of the escarpment (Farler 1882:735; Baumann 1894; Kjekshus 1977b).[91] The Maasai were also living in Seronera and the Serengeti plains, which represented the western boundary of Maasailand (Kjekshus 1977b:75; Farler 1882:735-36). There they made use of wells that likely had been dug by Datoga or Watataru before being displaced by the Maasai, who used the area until Rinderpest in the 1890s (Fuchs 1907 in Kjekshus 1977).[92] Just west of there, the Wandorobo had settled, who primarily hunted elephants in the village of Natal, but were also agriculturalists. Washaschi also lived along the Uruti river in Ikoma (see Kjekshus 1977b:75).

The rich evidence presented by Kjekshus (1977b) suggests that the precolonial regional economy of northern Tanganyika was sophisticated and well-integrated. Agriculture was complex and technologically efficient, and likely developed in relation to population pressures on scarce fertile areas. Agriculturalists and pastoralists were likely drawn together into a unified regional "cattle complex" economy involving inter-regional trade and mixtures of agropastoralism depending on environmental conditions (Herskovits 1926). Of further significance, precolonial societies had come to master the manufacturing of cloth, baskets and pottery, as well as the production of salt and iron (Kjekshus 1977b). The livelihoods of different ethnic groups were specialized in functional ways, with some level of interdependence in production to adapt to unpredictable surroundings. Thus, the precolonial economy of northern

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[91] Rinderpest pushed the Maasai out of the Ngorongoro crater in the 1890s, at which point, the German settler Siedentopf established an ostrich and cattle ranch inside the crater (taking up a third of it), expanding by 1905 to 2000 head of cattle (see Fuchs 1907:252). The farm was sold following WW1 to Sir Charles Ross, an American who operated it as a hunting lodge (see Kjekshus 1977b:74-75). It was then turned into a wildlife reserve in 1928. Local Maasai have continually struggled to reclaim their rights to the land (discussed in Section 3.13).

[92] Maasai were later displaced from the plains to create Serengeti National Park (see Shetler 2007; Gardner 2016), and moved into the Masai Reserve (see Section 3.9), which ended at the escarpment of the Rift Valley in the west, and the "fourth parallel" in the south (Kjekshus 1977b). These transitions reduced their total grazing lands from 40,000km to 6,000km (Jäger 1913).

Tanzania had a strong material base until the 1890s when crisis occurred and German colonizers established rule (Kjekshus 1977b:182). It was then that "economic life deteriorated" (Kjekshus 1977b:184).

3.8 German colonial period (1890-1918)

In the late 1800s, the Maasai were ravaged by a series of epidemics that resulted in widespread famine and death. The first in 1883 was an outbreak of bovine pleuropneumonia, followed by rinderpest in 1891, and finally smallpox in 1892 (Waller 1988; Koponen 1996). Large numbers of Maasai people and livestock perished during this time, followed soon after by a series of inter-sectional civil wars, stimulated by fighting over shares of the diminished regional herd but exacerbated in large part by the emergent conflict between the *iLoibonok* brothers, Olonana and Senteu (see Waller 1988; Jacobs 1965b; Iliffe 1979).[93] Early explorer writers thus observed East Africa at a point of peak crisis, likely underrepresenting "African agency" in the process (Kjekshus 1977b:3). To rebuild their herds, cattle raiding increased at the time, as did ethnic intermarriage, with Kisongo men marrying their daughters to Arusha men in exchange for cattle (Waller 1988; Hodgson 2001). During points of particular crisis, some Kisongo even asked for land in exchange with the Arusha on which to settle and take up livelihoods as farmers in the Meru highlands, thus becoming Arusha in the process (Merker 1910; Hodgson 2001).

It was at this time that the Germans began colonial rule of Tanganyika following the Anglo-German agreement of 1890. The arrival of the Germans led to a series of social consequences for local Africans including disease outbreaks, cultural disruption, and political constraint (see Kjekshus 1977b:17; see Kucynski 1949). The period was characterized by uneven governance efforts, concentrated on areas deemed to be 'productive.' On the whole, the German administration lacked sufficient capacity to manage the vast areas of Maasailand effectively.

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[93] It is possible that the tsetse fly epidemic in northern Tanzania emerged following the rapid depopulation of people and livestock in the late 1900s (Kjekshus 1977b). See Neumann (2001) for discussion of how the British colonial administration created vast areas of bush infested with tsetse flies as part of its effort to establish an expansive 'wilderness' area through the formation of the Selous Game Reserve.

Nonetheless, it was during this period that the Maasai were first exposed to macro-processes of top-down government, the foundations of which were expanded upon by the British (Hodgson 2001). The Germans established a particular political apparatus for governing involving the use of headmen (*jumbe*) to translate governance onto the ground. The Germans were concerned with the 'violent' and 'undisciplined' dispositions of the Maasai and sought to restrict their movements and raiding ways through the implementation of strategically located military outposts (Hodgson 2001). Perhaps the most lasting effect for the Maasai was the establishment of the Masai Reserve, an attempt to secure arable areas for European settlers (Koponen 1994; Merker 1910). While initially formulated during the German period, the original reserve was essentially only a 'paper reserve,' in that there was minimal capacity for implementation and enforcement. Perhaps more significantly, however, the reserve symbolized a key tension within the German administration: the Maasai were viewed by German colonial officials as a threat to the administration, but also with a somewhat romanticized appreciation of their cultural distinctiveness as warriors and herders (Hodgson 2001). These conflicting views informed the implementation of geographic restrictions on the movement of the Maasai that would allow *some* autonomy within a particular area, while also facilitating greater top-down control over their lives (Hodgson 2001). The enforcement of these geographical restrictions in practice, however, was not particularly strong at the time.[94] The combination of disease, civil war, famine and colonization led to some acute changes in the social organization of the Maasai, though Hodgson (2001) notes that by the early 20th century, the majority of Maasai in Tanganyika had weathered these storms and returned to their previous way of life.

The German colonial period also marked the beginning of centralized land and wildlife conservation policies in Tanganyika, with initial legislations passed as early as 1891. While the administration employed a number of technically and scientifically competent experts to handle

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[94] The Maasai, for instance, were restricted from living north of the North Road, though many still lived there at that time (Hodgson 2001).

natural resources, their efforts to administer policy were a "fiasco" (Schabel 1990:139). German administrative policies and laws undercut customary tenure and traditional institutions for managing land, as did the introduction of district and regional boundaries.[95] Under the German Imperial Decree (Ordinance) of November 26, 1895, for instance, all land within the jurisdiction of German East Africa was declared to be "unowned" and thus placed under the control of the Reich (Fimbo 1992:156). The formal institutions of the administration were subsequently used to reallocate land for commercial plantations and settler farms, rather than to peasant farmers (Fimbo 1992; Shivji 1998). Formal tenure under the German administration was defined through leaseholds and conveyance (titling) (Fimbo 1992). Between 1902-1905, a small number of Boers fleeing South Africa following the Boer War became the first group of white settlers to be allocated land in Arusha (Illife 1969; Schabel 1990). Approximately 45 Boer families settled near the foothills of Mount Meru at that time between Kisongo and Arusha territory (Schabel 1990). Contrary to the expectations of the administration, however, which wanted the Boers to settle and cultivate, the Boers lived mainly as 'unruly' hunters before eventually leaving for the Uasin Gishu Plateau of Kenya (see Schabel 1990:140; Illife 1969). Fimbo (1992) estimates that by 1912, there were approximately 4,700 Europeans living in Tanganyika, with just over 750 plantation owners and settler farmers. Almost 1.5 million acres of land was alienated for these farms at that time, which produced mainly sisal, rubber, cotton, and coffee (Fimbo 1992). While peasant farming was permitted to continue in areas where it was not directly displaced by the plantations, small-scale farmers were encouraged to cash crop (Fimbo 1992). In the Arusha highlands, coffee was particularly important, as was cotton in the Shinyanga area.

Local Africans who could not convey their customary claims to land lost access and use rights through the German-sanctioned process of land reform. This was particularly challenging for pastoralists who moved frequently and, aside from clan-governed streams and rivers, did not

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[95] Some of the historical information in the next few paragraphs is drawn from hand-written notes from Reuben Ole Kuney based on disparate hardcopy reports and his own recollections. I am uncertain of their exact primary sources, so I am citing them here as (Kuney 2020).

traditionally conceive of common land in terms of property ownership. Several key laws

followed the 1895 Imperial Decree that had lasting consequences for land tenure. The German

Ordinance of May 7th, 1896 enabled the creation of two hunting reserves, one on Kilimanjaro

and one near the Rufiji river in the south. This was followed by the Hunting Ordinance of Nov. 5

1909, which led to more reserves being created, further alienating the peasantry. Forest-

conservation ordinances in 1904 and 1909 led to 750,000 hectares of land being declared as

forest reserves, though German capacity for management was relatively minimal (see Schabel

1990:138). While enforcement of these laws was haphazard, these early land policies led to

significant institutional change by creating an administrative framework of centralized resource

control in Tanganyika. These institutional changes perhaps still underlie the disharmony between

local customary practices and state legislature in contemporary Tanzania.

3.9 British colonial period (1919-1960) [96]

Following the First World War, the British took over governance of Tanganyika in 1919.[97]

Through the League of Nations, Britain was allocated particular protectorates to govern on

behalf of the local populations. The East African Protectorate was thus distinct from the

Protectorate of Tanganyika, the former of which had been controlled by the British since the late

1800s, and which later became known as the Colony of Kenya in 1920.[98] The groundwork of

centralized resource control in the Protectorate of Tanganyika was expanded upon during the

British administrative regime through the Proclamation No. 16 of 1917, the Game Preservation

Proclamation of 1920, and further game laws in 1921 (see Majamba 2001:7). Through these

legislations, game hunting licenses were allocated exclusively to white settlers, with a few

exceptions for dedicated hunter-gatherers like the Wandorobo and Hadzabe (Nelson et al. 2007).

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[96] This section on the British colonial period in Maasailand is drawn primarily from Hodgson (2001) who weaves together an impressive set of materials based on archival and ethnographic research.

[97] In 1916, the British Indian infantry and Royal Naval seized control of Tanganyika from the Germans en route to winning World War 1.

[98] Differences in governing styles across the protectorates later led to interesting alliances with British political parties; the Kenyan Colony resonated with the Conservative Party, while the Labour Party positioned itself with Tanganyika (Galaty 2022 pers. comm.).

These laws facilitated the creation of no-take game reserves that restricted human settlement, hunting, harvesting, cultivation and grazing rights (Neumann 1998). Perhaps the most significant law was the Land Ordinance of 1923, which recentralized resource control by declaring all land in Tanganyika as property of the crown. Customary land rights were only allocated in special circumstances at the discretion of the British Governor (Shivji 1998; Nelson et al. 2007).

When the British commenced colonial rule, they were generally confounded by the dynamic "fluidity" of African notions of culture and ethnicity, which the administrators came to view as a barrier to governance (Hodgson 2001:48). The early British period was thus characterized by an attempt to promote social order through the classification and enclosure of 'tribes' in distinct geographic areas (Hodgson 2001). Once the regional ethnic mosaic had been rendered "legible" (see Scott 1998a), the British then implemented indirect rule to manage local African communities. This involved identifying and working with pre-existing 'tribal' authorities to rule over the population. The British viewed the Maasai as a particular challenge to this process, conceiving of them as 'violent' cattle raiders who "roamed" across the land (Hodgson 2001:49). The Maasai defied the neat territorial and 'tribal' divisions desired by the administration, and thus posed a direct threat to social order. Building from some of the initial groundwork of the Germans, the British regime took a very systematic approach to 'dealing with' the Maasai (Hodgson 2001).[99] In 1922, the administration sanctioned the creation of the Masai Reserve following some of the original boundaries suggested by the Germans.[100]

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[99] There were also several sympathetic government officials throughout the period, particularly at the district level.
[100] In 1917, initial attempts were made to demarcate boundaries for the Masai Reserve, but it was not until the conclusion of the First World War when its boundaries were actually formalized, in 1920, following the Treaty of Versailles and the establishment of the British protectorate of Tanganyika (Hodgson 2001).

Figure 6 – Map of Masai Reserve in Tanzania during the British colonial period. The map was redrawn and adapted by the author based on Hodgson (2001:53). Hodgson's (2001) map was produced by Rutgers Cartography (2000), but I cite her book here.

The main objective of the reserve was certainly to better control a nomadic group that would otherwise roam across the countryside unabated, raiding and pillaging the greater population as it went (or so they thought). But at the same time, there may well have also been some protectionist thought behind the endeavour. As explicated by Hodgson (2001), Provincial Commissioner (PC) Browne's early letters on the matter revealed his genuine desire to create an

interconnected territory where the Maasai could continue to live based on their cultural traditions.[101]

Regardless of the intentionality behind it, the implications of the reserve were quite significant: Maasai people were forced to reside within a fixed area, and those living outside it were expected to relocate into the reserve or surrender their Maasai identity (Hodgson 2001). Other ethnic groups were also prohibited from entering the area which was designated exclusively for Maasai. This involved establishing a pass system in 1924 to restrict those entering into the reserve to secure full control over the area (see Hodgson 2001:55). The reserve thus functioned to inscribe ethnicity onto territory. The colonial distinctions between 'Maasai' and 'not-Maasai' were based on the narrow notion that 'tribe' was a neat category that could be fixed across space and time. While there was some pre-existing material basis to the cultural distinctions between Maasai and other ethnic groups, "being Maasai" was much more complex, and 'flexible' (Galaty 1982). The colonial accounts of the Maasai 'tribe' privileged some aspects of Maasai identity, notably their masculinized depictions of warriors and herders, while downplaying some of their more fluid aspects in the highland areas where cultivation was practiced (Hodgson 2001; Waller 1993). As such, the distinction failed to take into account the dynamic notions of Maasai identity that existed relative to sections, core and peripheral groups, and other ethnicities that were crucial to maintaining an interconnected regional economy. These connections were vital for coping with external stressors to the pastoral system by providing access to highland water catchments and grazing resources, and to food supplies from cultivators in times of famine. Thus, the British colonial administration distilled a complex and fluid set of

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[101] Perhaps Browne's vision was not so different from a 'territory of life' in conceptual terms. In reality, however, the reserve did not include enough permanent water resources. It was made up of largely marginal land, as the most productive areas in Maasailand were reallocated for settler farms. However, the reserve did also provide a buffer against encroachment of smallholder cultivators, so its impacts on pastoral livelihoods were varied. Notably, Browne lobbied on several occasions to expand the reserve to improve the material base of the Maasai pastoral economy. Nonetheless, Hodgson (2001) contends that the reserve was mostly detrimental to the Maasai.

relations between groups (ethnicity) into a rigid object (tribe) that could be bound and circumscribed (see Figure 7).

Figure 7 – A partial "tribal" map of Tanganyika based on Kjekshus' (1977b:11) materials gathered from the British colonial survey division in the 1940s. The colonial administration sought to inscribe ethnicity onto territory to create order and make the disparate ethnic populations more 'legible' (see Scott 1998). The reality, of course, was much more fluid and dynamic (see Galaty 1982). The map was redrawn and adapted by the author. Maasai territory is depicted in red (with the colonial spelling). Other groups with large territories are depicted in shades of grey, and those with smaller territories are displayed in yellow. Arusha areas are represented by orange signaling closer proximity to the Maasai. Fragmented Parakuiyo likely also inhabited the areas southeast of Maasailand, though this group did not feature into the colonial survey division's materials in this case.

While the reserve spanned a large area in northern-central Tanganyika, it was one that was fairly arid. Browne's objectives were practical as well as political, as he recognized that these semi-arid rangelands were best managed by the pastoral Maasai themselves, and were in his view not suitable for agricultural production. However, boundaries were a key concern, as the area lacked enough year-round water sources and productive areas were later annexed for allocation to colonial settlers (Hodgson 2001). There was extensive negotiation at that time to

determine what the exact boundaries of the reserve would be, and local Maasai were very adamant about maintaining the connecting area between northern and southern Maasailand (see Hodgson 2001:285, note 8; see Figure 6; Igoe 2019 pers. comm.). The primary factor in determining the reserve boundaries, however, was settler interests. Over time, key sources of dry-season pastures were alienated in favour of farms for European settlers. The lush highlands of Kilimanjaro, including Olmolog, were all "excised" from the reserve (see Figure 6) so they could be allocated to settlers and Arusha farmers (Hodgson 2001:52).[102] Mondul, Olmolog, and Ngorongoro were reclassified as forest reserves to preserve water catchments, leading to prohibitions on grazing (Page-Jones 1948). In 1930, the upper parts of Mount Meru were also designated as a forest reserve (Neumann 1998). The Arusha were thus restricted from moving up the mountain further, where volcanic soils were particularly fertile, and were forced to move down into areas with variable rainfall and less soil productivity, limiting their crops under cultivation (Gulliver 1963; Neumann 1998). Alienation of the mountain for settler farms increased land scarcity in the area (Neuman 1998). Gulliver (1963) estimates that in the 1950s there were over 1000 people living within a square mile on the mountain. The total Arusha population at the time was 63,000, a number that has since been steadily increasing (Gulliver 1963). Around this time, the Arusha District Officer pushed for the reallocation of 865 acres on the slopes of Mondul Mountain (*Komolonik*) for sale to settlers, as well as advocating for designation of the mountain for relocation of Arusha farmers (Hodgson 2001). The northern Provincial Commissioner at the time, Webster, supported this proposal, but expressed concern that the Maasai would be dispossessed of a mountain that was otherwise sacred to them

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[102] *Olmolog* was a sacred place for the Maasai, as a site of the *Olgn'esher* ceremony, the birthplace of *Oloiboni* Mbatian, and a key source of pasture and water in times of extreme drought. The Maasai had dug a series of wells in Olmolog as well, and despite their requests to the administrators to return the land in 1929, their application was denied (see Hodgson 2001:286, note 16). *Ngulat* on the Mondul Mountain (*Komolonik*) was also alienated despite its significance for the *Eunoto* ceremony. In the 1990s, Daniel Ndagala served as the Commissioner of Culture for the Tanzanian government and helped to recognize *Olmolog* as a National Monument to be set aside for the *Olgn'esher* ceremony (Galaty 2022 pers. comm.).

(Hodgson 2001). However, government-sanctioned alienation of Maasai lands continued despite Webster's warning, and the expansion of Arusha into Monduli began to snowball from there. As Hodgson (2001:58) writes, "evidence suggests that Maasai understandings of land were beginning to shift as they absorbed and reworked the colonial ideas that land was a commodity to be bought, sold, and owned and that ownership meant the right to determine who had control, access to, and use of the "property" (see also Wright 2019:82).

In 1926, the reserve was reclassified as Masai District, and Browne began to show his true colours in 1927-1928 when he sought to expand the Maasai Reserve to include more dry season areas and water sources. This was met with opposition from neighbouring district administrators, who saw the Masai District as an improper allocation of land that would otherwise be fit for agricultural expansion. In 1926, a large portion of land south of Komolonik Mountain was sold to settlers, and in 1928, the Arusha District government proposed to move the "surplus" numbers of Arusha on the slopes of Mount Meru into the area (Hodgson 2001). Intensification of agricultural production on Meru throughout the British period led to increased competition between Arusha, Meru, and colonial settlers for land (Spear 1997).[103] Allocation of productive lands to European settlers contributed to increasing land scarcity as did the emergence of cash cropping in the form of coffee plantations and the establishment of a Forest Reserve and Arusha National Park (Neuman 1998). By 1928, the Arusha had already established three small settlements in Musa and Kitching, and the District Officer of Arusha District anticipated that further Arusha encroachment on the Masai Reserve would continue until the "whole of the Mondul slopes" was occupied by Arusha (cited in Hodgson 2001:286, note 32).

In 1930, an investigation was carried out by the land development commissioner, F.J. Bagshawe, into the boundaries of the Masai District. He recommended that Mbulu and Arusha peoples be allowed to settle in the district, and that Maasai living outside it be relocated back

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[103] Spear (1997) also suggests that Arusha and Meru people were influenced by colonial missionaries, teachers and administrators, and had begun to integrate some external values into their cultures.

inside (see Hodgson 2001:57). Settlement of Maasai outside the district was seen as particularly concerning in Ngorongoro and Embagai craters, where it complicated colonial interests in wildlife conservation (aka preservation of big game for commercial hunting). Presence of Maasai in highland forest areas was also seen as a threat to European settlers (see Hodgson 2001:57). It was Murrels, the Masai District Commissioner, who went to bat for the Maasai in their defense. Murrels recognized that the increasing alienation of Maasailand was building distrust and resentment among the Maasai.

Maasai mainly ignored the colonial policies that they didn't agree with, like restrictions on movement, but welcomed those that fit within their pastoral way of life, like water projects (Hodgson 2001). In the early British colonial period, the administration was constrained by a lack of capacity to manage Maasailand. Decision-making authority was concentrated among a few key officials, but it was challenging to put their policies into practice without adequate administrative support. Hodgson (2001) points out that there was likely considerable disagreement between the governing authorities overseas, central government, and provincial commissioners, as they juggled the conflicting views of district commissioners who generally empathized with the perspectives of their constituents.[104]

Given these constraints on colonial governance, the administration attempted to use the existing political structures of the different 'tribes' to bring government closer to the ground. However, rather than the direct appropriation of traditional political organizations, they created new political institutions for the purpose of governance. To implement 'indirect rule,' an approach formalized as policy in 1926, the British established "Native Authorities." In 1916, this involved the replacement of *jumbes* with three Maasai "agents," and direct collaboration with *ilaigwenak* and notable elders (Hodgson 2001:61). In 1922, the *oloiboni* was included after the

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[104] Murrels (DC) and Browne (PC), for instance, both generally supported the autonomy of the Maasai vis-à-vis the Director of Land Bagshawe, but often disagreed on how the more practically-minded Murrels would be able to put Browne's idealistic ideas into practice, given limited financial and human resources within his district (Hodgson 2001).

Maasai lobbied for Parit, the son of Olonana, to be allowed to move from the East African

Protectorate (renamed the Colony of Kenya) to Tanganyika to serve as the "chief" of all Maasai

in Tanganyika (see Hodgson 2001:61; Spencer 2003:109). Unlike other 'tribes' within colonial

Tanganyika, the Maasai did not have a single hereditary chief which held a monopoly on power.

DC Murrels and others described the Maasai social organization as largely democratic on the eve

of indirect rule (Hodgson 2001).[105] In light of this consideration, a new political institution was

formed, the *Olkiama* (the Masai Council), which included respected elders from different parts

of Masai District and positioned *Oloiboni* Mbeiya at the helm.[106] After his passing, the

subsequent *Oloiboni* was shifted into an advisory role to a council of elders. This political

structure held into the 1950s prior to independence (Page-Jones 1948; see also Hodgson

2001:62,90). The formation of the *Olkiama* shows that some Maasai institutions were integrated

into the formal governance of colonial authorities. The administrators sought to increase control

of elder men over younger men, to reduce what they felt to be the threat of 'unruly' warriors

'roaming' across the land. In a sense, these efforts served to strengthen the pre-existing authority

of the age-set system (Hodgson 2001). Murrels was indeed supportive of a well-respected age-

class system, which he saw as a means of maintaining order over the warriors.

On the heels of the Great Depression of 1929, the British Government passed the

Colonial Development Act to promote economic development in the colonies, marking a shift

from tribal reification to integration of Maasai into the colonial economic machinery (see

Hodgson 2001:73-74). The Maasai came to be seen as important producers and consumers of

exported British goods. But rather than address the core issue of land alienation that constrained

livestock production, the colonial administrators attempted to "convert" wet season pastures into

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[105] *Ilaigwenak* were representatives of each age-set; an *olaunoni* had authority over his own age group, and the *oloiboni* was a spiritual leader named for a specific age set or 'hand' to help with governance processes, provide council, and offer magical protection. In instances where the hands of different Maasai sections named the same *Oloiboni*, he subsequently took on a larger role and reinforced intersectional-ties.
[106] The Olkiama comprised elder *ilaigwenak* from each part of Masai District, who would together gather with district and provincial officers to discuss politics and land affairs (Hodgson 2001).

permanent grazing grounds through water conservation projects (see Hodgson 2001:74). Water

projects were presented as an environmental solution to land pressure, "deflecting attention from

the causes of the structural inequities themselves" (Hodgson 2001:74). The Maasai funded these

projects almost entirely themselves, and most failed over time.[107]

Another approach taken by the administration was to increase provision of veterinary

services. While the Maasai appreciated some of these initiatives, they resented the way that

veterinarians were used to further control their lives. The Veterinary Department sought to

control livestock movement and instituted quarantines to reduce the transmission of diseases.

They implemented "veterinary guards" from the African Native Veterinary Service, whom the

Maasai suspected of being spies for the colonial administration (Hodgson 2001:82). They

resented these actors and often transgressed any directives that had significant impacts on Maasai

social life.

The colonial administration during this period also attempted to monetize the Maasai

economy by changing the way they thought about cattle – from dividend paying stocks to

commodities. The authorities wanted more livestock available to them through sale, but they also

wanted the Maasai to have more available cash to pay head taxes (Hodgson 2001). These taxes

went towards development projects that sought to address the very problems that the

administration had caused through land alienation (Hodgson 2001). From 1927-1948, the Maasai

paid the highest tax rates of any ethnic group in Tanganyika, which the British rationalized

because the Maasai were 'wealthy' in terms of their livestock holdings (Hodgson 2001). Higher

taxes were opposed by many Maasai on the grounds that they did not take into account

disparities in livestock assets, and thus disproportionately affected the poorer members of Maasai

society (Hodgson 2001). Maasai men were also forced to pay a "hut tax" to pay for their multiple

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[107] The most notable one was the Masai Water Loan project of 1928-1935. The project ran into several challenges including a lack of technical capacity to see the project through to completion, an incoherent management plan, and insufficient cash flow (see Hodgson 2001). It also undermined customary Maasai institutions for regulating access to water sources.

wives, as though they were taxable property (Hodgson 2001:69).[108] While the Maasai had also been engaged in a vibrant barter economy with other ethnic groups and passing caravans, largely spearheaded by women, the administration clamped down on these forms of informal trade knowing that it would not be able to extract revenue from them via taxation (Hodgson 2001). They implemented orders in the early 1930s to licence all trading, and implemented official trading centres and formal cattle auctions to facilitate taxation.

From the perspective of the administrators, taxation and livestock sale also addressed the issue of (perceived) land degradation, which some framed in terms of the 'backward' livestock-keeping practices of the Maasai (see Beinart 1984; Anderson 1984). This way of representing the issue ignored the land alienation that constrained pastoral mobility (Hodgson 2001). Promoting livestock sales was seen by the government as less political than implementing destocking policies, and also generated benefits like increased meat for consumption in urban centres, hides for export, and revenue from market licenses and sales tax (see Hodgson 2001:85).[109]

In the 1930s, livestock disease (rinderpest, etc.) and drought reduced the cattle population in Tanganyika by half, and small stock by 80% (see Hodgson 2001:87). Livestock prices dropped dramatically, but livestock was still being sold to purchase food supplies, and widespread famine took hold in Maasailand. Maasai elders wrote letters to the district government requesting permission to make private arrangements with settlers to access their farmland in Moshi and Arusha-Meru, but these requests were declined (Hodgson 2001). Rather,

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[108] In fairness, huts were visible and thus countable, while livestock could be taken into forests and hidden. Property taxes in Europe and America, by comparison, are also taxed based on value and not a fixed rate. Taxes are an important aspect of national societies around the world, which link citizens and state, and (ideally) allow governments to invest in infrastructure and provide services to the benefit of local populations. A key question, however, is whether taxation structures are fair, and subsequently, whether governments are efficient, accountable and transparent in managing central accounts for the betterment of society. Hodgson (2001) suggests that some Maasai viewed the hut, livestock, and market taxes as unfair. This is a valid point, though it is also possible that the transition to formal taxation was resented more because it was a 'first step,' rather than an overly oppressive one.
[109] Murrels, though generally sympathetic to Maasai concerns, also felt that pastoralists were overstocking the rangelands and driving declines in grassland productivity. The idea was widespread at the time, based on assumptions that Maasai valued cattle quantity over quality, and that pastures were simply 'open-to-all' (Hardin 1968).

the approach was to frame these political issues as ecological ones, and the administration intensified their efforts to 'modernize' Maasai animal husbandry practices (Hodgson 2001).

The central goal in Maasailand became about 'improving' the animal husbandry processes of the Maasai to 'enable' them to produce quality cattle for markets, creating both an important meat product and a source of tax revenue (Hodgson 2001). This approach involved attempts to change the (perceived) preferences of the Maasai for cattle quantity over quality. There were several key oversights in this assumption. The Maasai, of course, do certainly value quality of their stock, but a key consideration that came up in my interviews about cattle breeds was risk-reward tradeoffs. The larger "Borana" cattle (and other breeds) were preferred by those individuals with a higher risk tolerance as they fetched higher prices in the markets. Most of my interlocutors, however, generally preferred "the Maasai" breeds (Zebu), which were smaller and had pronounced fat deposits on their backs, making them better equipped to cope with drought (cf. Hodgson 2001). In times of severe drought, the larger 'quality' cows were more likely to perish rendering them more risky choices.

Second, the colonial administrators were conceptualizing cattle solely in terms of their exchange value, framing them essentially as growth stocks that should be 'bought low' and 'sold high' (Hodgson 2001). This logic, of course, also resonates with the Maasai who certainly prefer this approach to the opposite! They are indeed very aware of market prices at any given time across areas, and are often willing to travel great distances to compare prices and patiently wait for the best opportunity to sell. This was rather evident during the implementation of 'closed markets,' which required the Maasai to exclusively sell their cattle at designated locations to facilitate taxation and monitor quotas (Hodgson 2001). The sales in these formal markets were quite low, leading some to suggest that the Maasai were unwilling to sell their cattle. In reality, however, they were simply selling their cattle to Meru, Arusha, and other Maasai through under-the-table markets (see also Jacobs 1978 for similar discussion). In these informal settings, they could sell their stock at much higher prices, without having to report the sales for tax purposes,

an approach that would seem in economic terms to be rather rational. Nonetheless, a key oversight was that the Maasai do not *exclusively* think of their cattle in terms of their exchange value. Rather than growth stocks that can be bought and sold based on share price appreciation, they are in essence stable income dividend stocks that pay a consistent amount over time through milk production and herd growth without herd owners having to compromise their principal investments. In years with good rainfall and healthy forage, the Maasai were not as interested in selling their cattle to secure maize flour because they had adequate supplies of milk, something which ran counter to the colonial logics that these seasons should represent opportunities to 'sell high' (see Hodgson 2001:107-108). Thus, a key oversight of the development process was that the colonial administrators sought to 'modernize' Maasai livestock production with the end goal of producing meat for sale, but the Maasai were more interested in producing milk for consumption. Another key assumption was that the Maasai would welcome new forms of fodder conservation, including the production of hay and ensilage. The Maasai, however, were apprehensive about these types of fodder out of fear of disease, preferring to feed their cattle with naturally occurring grasses (Hodgson 2001).

Between 1948 to 1958, the European population in Tanganyika doubled from just over 10,000 to just over 20,000 and with it came growing need for land for the settler population (see Iliffe 1979:450-451; Hodgson 2001:296). This led first to the reallocation of highly fertile lands to settler farms in the Kilimanjaro and Meru area and, over time, to the key dry season pastures in the Masai District as well (Neumann 1998; Spear 1997). During this ten-year period of European population growth, land alienated for settler farms also doubled, increasing from just over 660,000 hectares to just shy of 1,300,000 hectares (Hodgson 2001).

The majority of land that remained for pastoral use was semi-arid. A census from 1948 suggested that approximately 70% of the 23,000 square miles of Tanzania's Maasailand was marginal in the dry season as a consequence of the tsetse fly or a lack of water (see Hodgson 2001:101). This led to the implementation of the Masai Development Project (MDP) of 1951.

The approach taken through the MDP was on the surface well-intentioned. It attempted to increase livestock production of the Maasai by establishing new permanent water sources in the Masai District like boreholes and dams, clearing substantial areas of tsetse-infested bushlands, and experimenting with fodder production and new types of grazing regimes to increase livestock production (see Hodgson 2001:100). The showcase initiative of the project, the Kisongo Pilot Scheme (KPS), covered 200 square miles in the Monduli area (Hodgson 2001).[110]

Some Maasai were initially supportive of these project goals. But as Hodgson (2001:104) shows, it was the "top heavy" manner in which these projects were implemented that stirred resentment among the Maasai. The projects were largely subsidized by the Maasai themselves, who were forced to pay large sums of money (65,000 pounds initially) through their Native Treasury by sale of livestock to fund particular interventions based on guidance from technical 'experts' (see Hodgson 2001:103). A lack of clear directives on how projects would be maintained over time led to many of them failing on their own terms. One key issue was that of labour. The projects attempted to reconfigure the labour force of the Maasai, which was traditionally based on the age-set system and involved allocating specific types of labour based on one's age category. The *ilmurran*, as discussed earlier, were responsible for herding cattle and defending people and livestock from threats. The Masai Development Project, however, sought to turn the *ilmurran* into a labour force for the colonial administration to 'modernize' the Maasai (Hodgson 2001). The Maasai, however, viewed such work as denigrating and the *ilmurran* resisted attempts to recruit them, save for times of extreme famine in the late 1950s during a period of severe drought, when some participated in food-for-work programs (Hodgson 2001).

As Hodgson (2001) describes, one of the key issues with these projects was that Maasai people felt they were never implemented with the respect (*enkanyit*) that was so central to their culture prior to the colonial encounter. This lack of respect was exemplified during the Second

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[110] The KPS had a complex bureaucratic structure involving Provincial Commissioner, technical experts, field officers and a management committee.

World War, when the Maasai offered in solidarity over 27,000 head of cattle and 20,000 acres of land as a gift to their colonial friends (*osotua*) to support them in their time of need (see Hodgson 2001:138). The idea was that the colonial administrators would help the Maasai in the future in their own time of need, as was traditional in Maasai culture. The gesture of gifting the land, however, was meant as a lease hold, whereby the colonial administrators could cultivate wheat during the wartime period during their time of need, but would return it to the Maasai after the conclusion of the war. Instead, the colonial government refused to return the land, instead alienating much more through the allocation of settler farms which were considered much more "productive uses" of fertile areas (Hodgson 2001). The Olkiama opposed these deals, but they were overruled. Over time, the Maasai came to feel that the aims of development were never actually meant to improve their lives, but to facilitate their economic and political control by the colonial authorities (Hodgson 2001). As Hodgson (2001:101) writes, "despite its claims to merely address technical problems, the MDP was therefore deeply intertwined with colonial imperatives to order, control, and compel the progress of their most unruly subjects." In a sense then, the great irony of these development schemes was that they attempted to 'fix' problems of their own creation (see Ferguson 1994). By framing the problems in terms of improved animal husbandry and intensification through water projects and tstetse removal, the colonial administration 'de-politicized' the problem by distracting away from the fact that real constraints on livestock production in the district had been caused by land alienation through the creation of settler farms (Hodgson 2001).

Given their abilities to demonstrate more 'productive' use of the rangelands, the Arusha continued their expansion into Masai District in the 1950s. By 1956, the Arusha had expanded into Lolkisale, increasing their land under cultivation on a yearly basis (see Hodgson 2001:300, note 144). Arusha were moving into Masai District both officially and unofficially in the 1950s, in part through intermarriage with the Kisongo, and also by forging friendships and economic ties with them (see Kuney 1994). At the policy level, Arusha expansion was sanctioned by the

provincial administrators who sought to resettle the Arusha from Meru where land was scarce to the Masai District where land was abundant (see Hodgson 2001:135). This led to the preparation of the Wilson Report, which outlined this position of the government in writing. Starting in the early 1950s, the administration sanctioned large-scale resettlement of the Arusha to Masai District, and to the Kisongo area in particular (see Gulliver 1957). The Olkiama was also implicated in these processes, as elder Kisongo council members had taken Arusha as "farmer wives" (Hodgson 2001:135). While the Olkiama, based on the earlier directives of the colonial authorities, officially prohibited other 'tribes' from entering the former reserve, key members of the council were unofficially able to solicit bribes from Arusha in the form of daughters for marriage and cattle (Kuney 1994). As Hodgson (2001:58) writes,

> Arusha, who shared a language, certain ceremonies, and other features with Maasai, blurred the neat colonial spatial divisions of territory by ethnicity, which enabled them to permeate boundaries which obstructed other African cultivators from entering Masai District.

While the Arusha and Kisongo had different Native Authorities during the colonial period, they both maintained allegiance to the *Oloiboni*, respected clans and upheld the age-set system. They still maintained their historical ties through intermarriage, trade, stock partnership, and ritual participation. Thus, while *some* Arusha moved into Masai District through government-sanctioned resettlement during the colonial period, it was likely that most entered informally, through intermarriage, gift-giving, or bribes paid to Maasai elders (see Kuney 1994; Hodgson 2001:168). The Olkiama held various meetings in the late colonial period to try to stop the tides of Arusha encroachment, but when the discussions of removing the Arusha implicated the wives of several elder council members, "the matter was dropped" (Hodgson 2001:135). This trend has since complicated the pastoral system in the area by engendering agrarian change (see Homewood et al. 2004; Kuney 1994) (discussed further in Section 5.4-5.6).

Alienation of pastoral land was further exacerbated by the administration's interest in preserving wildlife, which intensified from 1930-1960. In 1930, Major Richard Hingtston, a representative of the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire, was dispatched to Tanganyika to determine whether a network of national parks was a feasible prospect (Hingston 1931; Brockington 2008). Hingston's (1931) vision of Tanganyika entailed a stark contrast between nonprotected and protected lands (Brockington 2008). He suggested that unprotected land should be maximized in terms of agricultural development, while parks should be established to provide pockets of wilderness that were insulated from human influences (Brockington 2008). As such, Hingston's early vision of protected areas in Tanganyika was based on an ideological separation between nature and society. Protected areas were proposed as means of preserving nature in its pristine form, while the tides of development swept around park boundaries (Neumann 1998; Brockington 2002). Similar to the administration's approach to ethnicity, 'wilderness' and 'society' became neatly bound concepts that could be used to make complex realities more legible for governance.

In 1933, Britain signed the London International Convention Relating to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, which included within it a provision for the creation of protected areas that were "free from human interests" (Wanitzek and Sippel 1998:116). Following this, the Game Ordinance No. 20 of 1940 was put in place by the administration to preserve game and wildlife and help put the provisions of the convention into practice. The law instilled in the Governor of Tanganyika the right to declare any crown land as a national park. Initially established as a game reserve in 1937, Seregenti National Park became the first park to be established in Tanganyika in 1951, which at the time also included the Ngorongoro Crater. The park directly displaced the Maasai and other inhabitants of the Serengeti plains and Ngorongoro, further constraining the regional pastoral economy (Garner 2016; Shetler 2007; Wanitzek and Sippel 1998). The Ordinance of 1940 was later followed by the National Parks Ordinance of 1948, and was ultimately replaced by the National Parks Ordinance of 1959, which

fully restricted access, use, and residence rights inside national parks.[111] The National Parks Ordinance essentially "extinguished" all land rights inside parks, with compensations for displacement to be "collected within ten weeks" (Wanitzek and Sippel 1998:117). The consequences of this legislation are still apparent in contemporary Tanzania.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, the colonial administrators scrambled to gazette as many protected areas as possible to protect wildlife from the threats of poaching and the uncertainty of independent African governance (Nelson et al. 2007). Lake Manyara Game Reserve was established in 1957, and redesignated as a national park in 1960.[112] Ngurodoto Crater National Park was also established in Arusha in 1960, on the eve of independence. It was later expanded to include parts of Mount Meru and re-gazetted as Arusha National Park in 1967 (Neumann 1998). Just north of the Usambara Mountains, Mkomazi Game Reserve was established in 1951, dispossessing Parakuiyo and Maasai pastoralists of key pastures (Brockington 1998, 1999, 2002; Homewood and Brockington 1999).[113] Tarangire Game Reserve was established in the 1950s and later became a national park in 1970, in the process restricting Maasai in the Simanjiro plains from accessing permanent water sources in the dry season (Davis 2011; Woodhouse and McCabe 2018). In sum, the British colonial administration severely restricted access to pastoral land in northern Tanzania through the making of the Masai Reserve, the allocation of settler farms, and the establishment of protected areas.

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[111] The ordinance of 1959 also parsed Serengeti National Park and the Ngorongoro Conservation Area.
[112] It was later expanded in 1974.
[113] When Mkomazi Game Reserve was gazetted in 1951, some pastoralists were initially allowed to continue living in the area, and were permitted to access grazing resources as needed. However, in 1988, "all residents were evicted" due to "increasing in-migration" and concern about the conservation status of the area (Homewood and Brockington 1999:302). Mkomazi and Umba were later jointly re-gazetted as Mkomazi National Park in 2006. Together with Maasai and Parakuiyo pastoralists, the area had also been used by Pare, Sambaa, and Kamba hunters, though the land was generally unsuitable for crop cultivation (Brockington 1998; Homewood and Brockington 1999:303).

3.10 Independence and *Ujamaa* socialism (1961-1984)

Leading up to independence, there was a period of severe drought and famine (Hodgson 2001).[114] The drought bankrupted the Native Treasury, which had spent considerable funds in support of the famine relief efforts. The great irony then, explicated by Hodgson (2001), was that after being subjected to half a century of development initiatives, the Maasai were in a much worse condition than before. Much of the fertile and productive lands had been alienated, undermining the viability of the pastoral economy. Furthermore, the administration had instilled distrust and resentment among the Maasai for the government, and development at large (Hodgson 2001).

After independence, President Nyerere was elected in 1962 and forwarded his vision for African socialism. His party, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), was later renamed Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and became the country's sole political party until 1992 when the multi-party system was introduced.[115] President Nyerere sought to cultivate the cultural identity of the nation. Through the formalization of KiSwahili as the national language, and a mantra of togetherness ("*tuko pa moja*"; "we are together"), he endeavoured to unify Tanzania and create what Anderson (1983) refers to as an "imagined community." The rhetoric of *ujamaa* was mobilized to create a sense of "extended family" shared by all Tanzanians regardless of their ethnicity, cultural traditions, economic practices, or geographical areas of residence. Rather than subscribe to the capitalist models of development pushed by the western industrial states, which Nyerere viewed as exploitative, he utilized *ujamaa* to forward his idea of "cooperative economics." He outlined his model of national development through the Arusha Declaration of February 5, 1967. The declaration proposed to draw the nation together through a one-party political system, nationalization of crucial economic sectors, the introduction of compulsory formal education, the collectivization of agricultural production, and an ethos of self-reliance

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[114] This was followed by drought in 1961-62.

[115] Despite introduction of the multi-party system, however, CCM is the only party to have ever held power in Tanzania.

from the influences of imperial powers (see Huizer 1973). *Ujamaa* was intended as an allusion to the precolonial communal property relations of African societies, based on notions of codependence and reciprocity. It is difficult in objective terms to critique the ideals of respect, dignity, and equality. But as put into practice, the *ujamaa* policies had significant consequences for the Maasai. The African elites who took over after independence forwarded their own "modernist narrative" of national development, viewing ethnic differences and cultural practices as primitive (Hodgson 2001:148). The government implemented a dress code for the Maasai, trying to make them 'look modern' in the hopes that it would make them 'act modern' (see Hatfield 1977). This included crackdowns on *ilmurran* ponytails and red ochre hair dressings and attempts to make them adopt trousers rather than wear *shukas* (traditional Maasai blankets) (Hodgson 2001). KiSwahili was promoted as the national language, and school curriculums were standardized. Universal Primary Education (UPE) was also introduced to provide every child free primary school education, the goal of which was to produce standard Tanzanian citizens who spoke kiSwahili and participated in the national society (Hodgson 2001).

Taking an approach that was surprisingly similar to the policies of late colonial Tanganyika, Nyerere sought to increase agricultural production and modernize animal husbandry (see Scott 1998a). This movement was based on initial assessments carried out in 1959-1960 by the World Bank to inform policies for national economic development.[116] In 1961, the World Bank proposed a five-year development plan for Tanganyika, with a series of recommendations about how to improve the efficiency of a primitive peasantry (see Hodgson 2001:231). The World Bank report stressed the importance of cooperation and suggested that increased social services would soften the attitudes of the peasantry towards development policies (Hodgson 2001). At the same time, the report also inferred that coercion might need to be considered if rural communities were particularly obstinate. Part and parcel of the report were proposals for low-interest, long-term loans to increase production and stimulate economic growth. Partly based

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[116] It was formerly called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

on some of these suggestions, Tanzania pursued rural agricultural development policies rather than urban industrialization (see Hodgson 2001:153). For Nyerere, this approach demanded 'hard work' on the part of citizens to contribute to the national economy. On the government's side, this entailed nationalizing key companies and sectors and forming parastatals to regulate the distribution of produce. The government also encouraged the formation of cooperative farms, which introduced new labour arrangements to collective agricultural production. During this first period of the socialist regime, Maasailand was largely excluded from the *ujamaa* program because of the President's view of pastoralists as difficult to manage, as compared to cultivators (see Nyerere 1968:140; Ndagala 1982).

3.11 The rise and fall of ranching associations

As time passed, however, government attention also shifted to pastoralists with the intention of increasing cattle production through collective ranching in an attempt to bolster the beef industry (see Hodgson 2001:203). Based on uninterrogated assumptions, the World Bank assessments asserted that the 'open' nature of Maasai pastures was a barrier to efficient production. This stance failed to take into account the traditional social institutions that shaped access to rangeland resources in Maasailand, as well as the wider political and economic pressures that were increasingly constraining them. The World Bank recommended transforming the livestock sector completely through disease control, improved husbandry, better stock quality, and active pasture management (see Hodgson 2001:204). In particular, they forwarded a model of partnership ranches that would be run by the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation, with Maasai serving as tenant herders. These recommendations became the backdrop of the Range Management and Development Act of 1964 (hereafter the Range Act).

The Range Act aimed once again to forge 'primitive' pastoralists into 'modern' livestock producers through the formation of ranching associations. Hodgson (2001) holds that the spirit of these associations was informed by the *ujamaa* notion of cooperatives involving the design of collaborative land use plans and the implementation of key infrastructure to improve beef

production. Through the Ministry of Agriculture, the government formed the Masai Range Commission, a governmental body for implementing ranching associations in the Masai District. On the commission, there was one representative from each division within the district and six government officials. Through the Masai Commission, a few key areas in Masai District were allocated via 99-year leaseholds and pastoralists were promised water supplies and dips to incentivize participation. The ranching associations were in some cases well received, but a key aspect was that they did not uphold pre-existing forms of Maasai sectional and clan-based territoriality for managing rangelands (Gardner 2007). They also undercut the governing authority of elders and supplanted them with new institutional arrangements for governance through elected authorities of each association (see Hodgson 2001:159). In some instances, these associations led to overgrazing because of the changing distributions of dips and water sources, without adequate institutions to manage them anymore (Hodgson 2001). Komolonik, the first ranching association, was established near the headquarters of Maasai District in Monduli (see Gardner 2007:107).[117] Following a 100,000$ government investment, a pipeline carrying water and two cattle dips were built to the appreciation of local pastoralists (Gardner 2007). However, the added infrastructure brought livestock keepers from afar, and allowed cattle to graze for longer in areas that were previously semi-arid (see Gardner 2007:107). Extending the water projects into other areas to redistribute grazing was prohibitively costly, and Komolonik's members ultimately lost interest in the project given its negative impacts on local pasture management (Parkipuny 1979).

By 1968-1969, Tanzania's centrally managed partnership associations were deemed failures, owing in large part to Maasai feelings of resentment over their exclusion from key decision-making processes relating to the governance and management of the associations (Gardner 2007). The main issue seemed to be that the Maasai did not feel 'ownership' over them

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[117] Gardner (2007) uses the spelling '*Kolomonik,*' but I am reverting to the *Komolonik* spelling used by Hodgson (2001) and suggested to me by Reuben Ole Kuney (2020) in personal communication. The association was named after the Maasai placename (*Komolonik*) for Mondul Mountain (see Hodgson 2001:53).

(Hodgson 2001). With regards to Komolonik's shortcomings more specifically, however, Gardner (2007) points out that many government and technical experts viewed the main issue as a lack of capacity. This set the stage for USAID to take over the funding and management of Komolonik in 1970 with the intention of scaling up the pilot across Maasailand (Gardner 2007; Parkipuny 1979; Hodgson 2001). Despite the inadequacies of the associations, USAID saw promise in them as a means of commercializing pastoral production, with mixed results in the decade that followed (Parkipuny 1979; Gardner 2007; Hoben 1976).

Hodgson (2001) presents a fascinating analysis of the ranching associations in the context of state dynamics and a gendered process of social change in Maasailand. Her account is meticulous and draws together an impressive array of archival materials in support. What also becomes clear in engaging the works of others is the sheer scale of the USAID-led initiatives which were being implemented at the time across Kenya, Botswana, Niger, and Somalia as well as Tanzania (Galaty 1988; Moris and Hatfield 1982). Galaty (1988), for instance, contextualizes Tanzanian ranching associations in relation to group ranches in Kenya and grazing associations elsewhere in northeastern Africa. The post-1970 ranching associations, while certainly important to situate in relation to the socialist period in Tanzania, were thus largely the by-products of a much larger continent-wide initiative driven primarily by western ranchers (Moris 1988). While their proliferation across Africa had varied effects, in Tanzania, the socialist government ultimately refused to grant the associations enduring tenure rights in the 1970s, opting rather for villages as the principal unit of settlement, land use, and development (see Section 3.12). Ranching associations in Tanzania thus seem to have been characterized by two waves. The first was a government-led pilot program in the 1960s based on initial recommendations from the World Bank, and implemented in a way that was congruent with the ruling party's socialist ideology. The second program, in the 1970s, was designed, financed, and led by western ranchers through USAID.

USAID saw great potential in collective ranching, leading to the implementation of the Masai Livestock Development and Range Management Project from 1969-1979, a ten-year project with funding in the vicinity of 10-23 million dollars (see Hodgson 2001:208). The project was ambitious in scope and was primarily designed to support the Tanzanian government in its pursuit of a surplus of beef for export. It encouraged groups of Maasai to register with the government as an association, providing them with occupancy rights and a certain entitlement to water project services. The ranches aimed to develop quality bulls, commercialize livestock keeping practices, and generate economic profits. They were financed by development funds at the regional level, which were used to cover the costs of salaries, dips, water sources, and pens (Hodgson 2001). Ranches tended to cover approximately 300,000 acres and included about 500 families (Hoben 1976; Hodgson 2001).

Once again, the initiative ran into several key issues: First, the Maasai strongly preferred their traditional Zebu cattle, which were particularly drought resistant (Hodgson 2001). The higher quality bulls, including MPwapwa and Borana breeds were less capable of thriving in challenging conditions. These new breeds were less able to endure long treks, limited access to water, and frequent exposure to ECF and other diseases. Over half of the distributed bulls during this process died between 1971-73 (Parkipuny 1979). Second, the projects often led to overgrazing since they lacked customary institutions for regulating livestock numbers in fixed areas (Hodgson 2001). And third, bureaucratic inefficiencies related to limited management capacity, lack of funds, and ongoing maintenance challenges prevented the project from achieving its goal of increasing cattle production for sale (Hodgson 2001). In the end, Maasai sales did not increase, as pastoralists chose to bring their livestock to market in Kenya illegally, rather than through formal markets (Jacobs 1978). Jacobs (1978) suggests that the failure of the associations was largely due to Maasai coming to view the project as government-directed, thus ensuring that they did not feel ownership over its outcomes. The project was also particularly bogged down by disagreements between USAID and the central government as to where

authority would rest in determining project priorities and implementation. Complex bureaucratic structures rendered it difficult to determine who was in charge, until the passing of the National Decentralization Act of 1972, whereby planning and development was decentralized to regions and districts. The Maasai, however, did appreciate some net gains like the increased access to dips and water sources (Hodgson 2001).

In the late 1970s, USAID began to shift their focus towards improving the livelihoods of Maasai, rather than solely focusing on national development. It started attending more to the cultural values and attitudes of Maasai herders, who had mixed feelings about the ranching associations overall (Hodgson 2001). According to Hodgson (2001:217), "as in Kenya, some Maasai perceived the ranching associations as a means to secure land against further encroachment by cultivators. Once the government reneged on its promise to guarantee land rights and allowed further encroachment on Maasai areas, the ranches became less desirable." Thus, the Maasai appreciated the ranching associations when they served their interests in securing pastures, but disliked them when they undermined their land rights. Such a consideration suggests that the Maasai had not internalized the values of commercialization, as desired by USAID, but rather saw the group ranches as a means to an end (see de Sardan 2005). This is an important theme that will resurface in Chapters 6-9 in my analysis of Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch. A key point to keep in mind is that the range practices of Maasai pastoralists were highly rational prior to the Masai Range Management Project, and they have continued to be sensible since the associations collapsed. Maasai, for instance, generally look for the best prices for their livestock, whether these are best found through formal markets, or through informal networks (Jacobs 1978). Throughout the colonial period, the administration essentially tried to force upon pastoralists prices that the Maasai felt to be unreasonably low. Pastoralists generally avoided selling their stock during droughts knowing that prices were low, and appreciation could be generated through breeding. From the perspective of government, a key challenge was that pastoralists were also often unwilling to sell their cattle when the climate

was favourable and thus prices were high. In such instances, however, pastoralists were less likely to require cash, and thus preferred to let their investments ride. Furthermore, western ranchers would also likely consider Maasai practices of mobility as highly rational given the variability and unpredictability of rainfall patterns in Tanzania's semi-arid rangelands. Maasai pastoralism, it would seem, was already 'modern,' and highly adaptive in the face of environmental change.

3.12 Operation *imparnati* or project villagization (*vijijini*)

Based also on the World Bank development assessments carried out on the eve of independence, President Nyerere began an initial Village Settlement Scheme in December 1962, which aimed to reorganize and modernize the labour arrangements of peasant farmers. The objective was to improve agricultural productivity through cooperatives and the use of new technologies like tractors, ploughs, and fertilizers (see Kjekshus 1977a:274; Hyden 1980; Scott 1998). As the government did not have the means to support peasant families in these transitions, the original hope was that the government would be able to rely on some level of foreign aid to support its initiative (Kjekshus 1977a; Scott 1998). While the plan was for one million peasants to participate by 1980, the scheme was abandoned in 1966 after a meagre 23 settlements had been formed covering only 15,000 acres (see Kjekshus 1977a:274).

Following the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere took a different approach that preached self-reliance of the peasantry in its shift to collectivization (Shao 1986). While the former initiative had attempted to 'modernize' the peasantry with costly development plans, the latter was centred upon a notion of self-improvement and came to be known as *ujamaa vijijini (*neighbourhood villagization). Key to this approach was encouragement and guidance from the government in preaching the benefits of reorganizing peasant modes of production into collectives, but without the use of direct force and coercion. *Ujamaa vijijini* was meant to be a democratic process built on trust, whereby peasants chose to participate in the program of their own accord (Shivji 1986). The undertaking involved "a massive ideological campaign" to persuade the peasantry to

participate in the process of their own volition (Kjekshus 1977a:275; Shivji 1986). However, what began with socialist ideas for cooperative economics in 1967, ultimately gave way to a more coercive model of resettlement (Shivji 1986). *Ujamaa* villages took considerable time and resources to establish, and it was difficult and "unnecessarily expensive" for the central government to supply services to scattered human populations (Ndagala 1982:28). Nyerere changed his course in the early 1970s, taking his paternalistic role to heart in laying down the new policy of "planned" villages, diverging from the prior socialist rhetoric on "ujamaa" villages (Kjekshus 1977a; Scott 1998; Shao 1986; Shivji 1986). This new policy was referred to as 'Operation *imparnati*' (sing. *emparnat*) in Maasailand ("permanent habitation" in Maa) or operation *vijini* (villagization) (Ndagala 1982:29).

Contrary to the prior approach, where peasants were encouraged to participate willingly in cooperative *ujamaa* villages, Operation *imparnati* was carried out with the use of force. The *Ujamaa* scheme was characterized by the rhetoric of communal economics, while the latter was more focused on sedentarization. Operation Imparnati involved mobilizing the military to survey and assist with the relocations. Drawing from the rhetoric that every citizen had the right to basic services, the government reasoned that it was more economical and efficient for people to permanently settle into clustered areas to facilitate the provision of services. As Hodgson (2001:153-154) describes, although villagization "claimed to be in part about decentralizing decision-making, control, and funding for economic development to villages, it actually concentrated development interventions in the hands of the state." Scott (1998:235) describes the social dislocation felt across rural Tanzania quite eloquently,

> [Operation Planned villagization] would rip the peasantry from their traditional surroundings and networks and would put them down in entirely new settings where, it was hoped, they could then be more readily remade into modern producers following the instructions of experts. In a larger sense, of course, the purpose of forced settlement is always disorientation and then reorientation.

In 1971, the initial resettlements were carried out in the Dodoma region, and following their swift execution in the face of general resistance, it was determined in 1974 (following the TANU directive of November 1973) that all rural Tanzanians must live in villages (see Kjekshus 1977a; Scott 1998a). This set the stage for the National Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975, which formalized TANU's call. A deadline of 1976 was implemented and the government enforced one of the largest resettlements of people in the history of Africa, with approximately five million people relocated (see Scott 1998a:223). Under the title 'Operation Arusha,' Maasai that had been previously overlooked in the *ujamaa* phase were targeted as people who did not live in permanent or clustered homesteads, and thus resettling them was seen as a pathway to national economic development (see Ndagala 1982:29). Maasai were generally confused about the differences between Ranching Associations and resettlement villages, and many pastoralists were afraid that resettlement entailed handing land (and even wives and children!) over to cultivators (see Ndagala 1982:29). Their confusion was well grounded given the general lack of coherence in policies governing the rangelands in the mid 1970s. In particular, the Range Act of 1964 and the National Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 (hereafter National Villages Act) seemed to put forth conflicting directives (Hodgson 2001). In 1975, it was ultimately determined that the National Villages and Ujamaa Villages Act superseded the legal status of the Range Act, thus requiring pastoralists to live in villages and not ranching associations (see Jacobs 1980:8). After 1975, all customary lands in Tanzania inhabited by the peasantry with deemed rights of occupancy became subject to the National Villages Act. The act established villages with defined boundaries that would be registered and titled by the state.[118]

To garner Maasai support for the process, the government collaboratively surveyed Maasailand to identify key areas for building houses and settlements in places that were not susceptible to flooding (Ndagala 1982). They also carried out seminars at different levels of

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[118] This was later decentralized to District authorities through the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982.

government (district/ward/division) to educate people on the benefits of resettlement (Ndagala 1982). Maasai were involved in choosing settlement sites, in consultation from technical experts. The basic guideline was for each family to be provided with half an acre for their own housing, and action plans were the responsibility of the districts (Ndagala 1982). A central objective was to sedentarize the Maasai as the government viewed nomadism as a considerable constraint on national development (Ndagala 1978, 1982). While Operation *imparnati* did not start the process of sedentarization, which had begun during the colonial era, it accelerated and "completed" it (Ndagala 1982:29). However, the endeavour was not without its challenges. Registering each Maasai person into a single village was difficult. Some ended up being listed in their wet season pastures, and then again when they returned to their long-term dry season grazing areas (Ndagala 1982). It was also difficult for government agents to communicate and collaborate across a large area with varied terrain.

When resettlement of the Maasai began formally in 1975, 'the boma' (*enkang'*) (homestead) was determined to be the basic unit of development (Ndagala 1982). Each boma could house up to ten families within one circular fence, and people were allocated places to establish their bomas by the agents responsible for implementation (Ndagala 1982). Bomas were to be distributed half a kilometre apart in most cases, approximately 50% closer than they were prior to resettlement (Ndagala 1982).[119] The Maasai employed some foot-dragging techniques to slow the process, like frequent requests for transportation assistance, building materials, and food. Overall, however, Ndagala (1982:30) notes that the government found the pastoralists "easier to deal with than the cultivators" both in terms of costs and efficiency. The Maasai, of course, were much more familiar with moving and owned fewer consumer items as a result. The exercise also did not fundamentally change Maasai settlement patterns, as it did for cultivators, other than shrinking the physical distance between bomas. Due in part to the land alienation experienced during the colonial period, the Maasai had already established bases around

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[119] Some of the Kisongo elders in my study area suggested that bomas used to be located about a kilometre apart.

permanent sources of water (cf. Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978), moving as needed based on seasonal variations.

The general result across rural Tanzania, however, was the substitution of "loose" rhythms of everyday work with the "tight-knit" order of a factory (Scott 1998a:235). Villagization disregarded seasonality and cultural adaptations to challenging environments including mobility and improvisation (Scott 1998a:235; see also Shao 1986). While the resettlements were associated with development promises, most of these services failed to materialize. Resistance was met with violence and in some cases people's homes were burned. While one of the objectives of villagization was to streamline production, Scott (1998:224) astutely points out that "the thinly veiled subtext of villagization was also to reorganize human communities in order to make them better objects of political control." The process was meant to eliminate ethnic, social, and class-based differences and enforce a model of egalitarian citizenship. Villages were designed based on aesthetics of "order and efficiency" involving simplification of complex landscapes and miniaturization of state jurisdiction in an attempt to make Tanzania's rural population, an estimated 11-12 million people at the time of independence, more 'legible' (see Scott 1998a:229). Villages were thought to facilitate supervision and taxation, in essence allowing the central government to 'capture' a peasantry that was largely outside its control (see Hyden 1980). Rather ironically, however, the government likely substituted the *appearance* of order for *actual* order (Scott 1998a). By excluding local knowledge in the name of social welfare, millions of people in Tanzania faced social dislocation throughout the villagization period (Scott 1998a). The result was the production of "an alienated, skeptical, demoralized, and uncooperative peasantry," rather than one whose interests were aligned with the state (Scott 1998a:237).

In Maasailand, these changes disrupted the stability of the pastoral system by further reducing the total amount of productive land available to herders and creating new boundaries

limiting access.[120] Based on the social-ecological surveys of Maasailand, different kinds of villages were formed based on their dominant land use system. Some villages were categorized as "pure" pastoralist villages such as Oltukai, Esilalei, and Losirwa in the Manyara area. In pastoral areas, operation *imparnati* established villages in the former ranching association areas, which tended to follow the traditional ecological territories used by the pastoralists. In some areas that were traditionally used by pastoralists for seasonal grazing, however, agriculture was considered to be a more productive use of the land by technical experts. Mswakini, Makuyuni, (Lemiyon), and Naitolia villages, for instance, were reclassified as agropastoralist and put under mixed cultivation and livestock keeping. The wetlands of Mto wa Mbu were reclassified as "pure" agricultural villages and subsequently put under intensified cultivation, utilizing irrigation from the nearby Kirurumu, Mahamoud, and Magadini rivers. Villagization created new divisions between these areas, which came to form autonomous localities with new boundaries, each with separate jurisdictions of authority and land use planning systems. Within these "governable spaces," (see Watts 2004:50), land could be allocated to individuals and families through the formal apparatus of state legislature, irrespective of pre-existing pastoral institutions for managing rangelands. The villagization process thus created favourable macro-political conditions for cultivators to encroach on pastoral areas (Kuney 1994; Homewood et al. 2004).

In spite of the large-scale social disruption they caused, villages have endured in Tanzania as a core development unit. The lasting effects of villagization were not necessarily the physical re-organization of villages in Maasailand, which did not significantly change pastoral settlement patterns (see Homewood and Rodgers 1991), but rather the institutional shift in governing and managing rangelands (see McCabe et al. 2020; see also Gardner 2012, 2016). Legally, they supersede the traditional territorial arrangements of the Maasai for determining acceptable land uses based on customary rules and governing authorities (sections and clans). Villages still exist in Tanzania as *administrative units* that enable village councils to allocate land as they see fit

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[120] The following paragraph is drawn from notes prepared by Reuben Ole Kuney in Monduli town in 2020.

(see LaRocque 2006). The village institution can be used in a contemporary context to prevent (or permit) pastoralists from accessing grazing resources in village land, or to prevent smallholder farmers from encroaching. At the same time, it can also be wielded by the Arusha (and others) to re-allocate land along kinship lines to smallholder cultivators, further destabilizing the pastoral commons. Thus, the enduring outcome of villagization has been the fragmentation of the political landscape of the country. Local-level village councils have since come to hold the authority, in accordance with state law, to govern pastoral land pursuant to the Village Land Act and Land Act (see Section 4.2). While this formal institution has prevailed in Tanzania (see McCabe et al. 2020), the state has been reluctant to afford villages full authority to allocate land, and has on many occasions attempted to trump villages by re-centralizing governing authority and subsequently leasing land out to private companies to generate revenues for central coffers (discussed further in later sections).

3.13 Wildlife policy in the socialist period

The social implications of villagization in Maasailand were further complicated by the continued development of the wildlife sector, as residuals of colonial conservation policies resurfaced during the socialist period. Nelson et al. (2007) point to two reasons for the perpetuation of colonial wildlife policies: 1) there was international interest, stoked by former colonists, in ensuring that wildlife would not suffer in the face of pending indigenous rule. 2) President Nyerere saw great potential in wildlife, not for intrinsic reasons, but as resources that would boost the national economy. The passing of the first Wildlife Conservation Act (WCA) of 1974 mirrored many of the earlier pieces of legislation issued by the colonial administration. Rather than revitalize customary land rights and indigenous stewardship of ecosystems, the policy once again recentralized resource control in the post-independence era and consolidated state power (Nelson et al. 2007:239). Importantly, throughout the post-independence era, the state has retained exclusive ownership of land and wildlife resources (Shivji 1998; Fimbo 1992). Rising human-wildlife conflict and organized poaching in the 1960s and 1970s heightened the need for

wildlife policy reform in Tanzania (Nelson et al. 2007). These trends coincided with economic deterioration at the national level as the state began to see high levels of inflation owing to its socialist agenda, and struggled to cope with the external economic stressor of war with Uganda in the late 1970s (see Bigstein et al. 2001).

The formalization of national parks prohibiting grazing, like Tarangire, in the early 1970s made clear that the state valued wildlife preservation and tourism over local livelihoods (Neuman 1998). Brockington (2002) refers to this trend of local exclusion as "fortress conservation." The situation in Ngorongoro was particularly troubling and complex and began in the early 1950s when Serengeti National Park was planned and implemented at the expense of Maasai inhabitants.[121] Gazetted in 1951, Serengeti National Park projected a conservation hegemony of pristine wilderness onto the landscape, paying little heed to competing visions of nature from local pastoralists (Shetler 2007). Following resistance from local Maasai in the face of displacement, the British colonial administration promised that the Maasai would be allowed to continue occupying land adjacent to Serengeti National Park, including Ngorongoro crater. The NCA's multiple land use model was subsequently established in 1959 and was forwarded as a compromise that would allow the Maasai to continue their pastoral livelihoods within the area and live alongside wildlife. The Maasai continued to live in the NCA alongside wildlife through independence, until the Government of Tanzania took the decision to prohibit Maasai from living directly inside Ngorongoro crater in 1975. Maasai were relocated to the highlands of the outer crater rim, though they were permitted to access pasture and water inside the crater.[122] Most recently, in 2019, the central government proposed to evict 93,000 Maasai pastoralists from the NCA entirely. Adjacent to the NCA, fifteen villages in Loliondo Division were being told at the time of writing to prepare for compulsory resettlements to clear the area for Ortello Business Company (OBC), a United Arab Emirates-owned entity, to use as a 1500km^2 trophy hunting

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[121] The next few paragraphs on the NCA case are published in the Summer 2022 issue of the CICADA newsletter.
[122] The alkaline lake inside the crater serves as a natural salt lick for livestock.

block (discussed further in Chapter 6). Beacons were put in place between June 7-11, 2022 catalyzing violent conflicts between local Maasai and government officials. These clashes culminated in state-sanctioned violence against the protestors including the use of tear gas, gunfire, and beatings.

In total, the Maasai were displaced from Serengeti (grazing areas), Ngorongoro (crater pastures, sacred sites, and salt licks), Tarangire (river and wetlands), Lake Manyara (rivers), and Mkomazi (seasonal pastures), which worsened their alienation from villagization and settler farms. Following the WCA of 1974, governing authority over protected areas in pastoral lands came under the formal jurisdiction of the state, the effects of which are still visible today through TANAPA and the NCAA (see Jacobs 1980); (See Section 4.1). The WCA of 1974 also established laws and regulations for centrally managing wildlife outside national parks, through game controlled areas and reserves, further alienating the Maasai (see Stolla 2005:3).[123] All three of the key acts in the 1970s (the Range Act, the National Village Act, and the WCA) thus constrained Maasai customary institutions for managing rangelands and undermined pastoral mobility.

Other forms of land appropriation continued into the 1970s-1980s, with key pastures being allocated for military training (see Jacobs 1978) (discussed further in Chapter 4), private farms, and parastatals like Tanzania Breweries Limited and Tanzania Cartons (Hodgson 2001). In Loliondo, Tanzania Breweries proposed to establish a barley and wheat farm spanning 100,000 acres of crucial grazing area (see Gardner 2007:114). Lazaro Parkpiuny, the founder of the first pastoral land rights NGO in Tanzania, KIPOC, and the local MP, however, moved swiftly to block the deal by rallying villages in opposition against the grab (Gardner 2007).[124] One of the central arguments put forth by Parkipuny's followers was that villages, and by

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[123] See the Wildlife Conservation (Game Controlled Areas) Order No. 269 of 1974, a regulation stemming from the WCA.

[124] *Kipoc* means "we will recover" in Maa, and the acronym refers to the Korongoro Integrated People Oriented to Conservation. Parkipuny was also the first Maasai individual in Tanzania to complete an advanced degree.

extension, the assemblies of those villages (i.e. the villagers) should have the "ultimate authority to grant land concessions" on village land (Gardner 2007:114). The conflict in Loliondo between Tanzania Breweries and villages was symbolic of a larger tension in Maasailand over rights to allocate and lease land in villages. Parkipuny held that villages should be able to exercise customary rights to land, an implication that was ambiguous in the context of state policy. Titling became of central importance to pastoralists because it provided a potential means of formalizing customary claims to land in the face of alienation. At the time, however, government officials seemed intent on maximizing revenue from land, and viewed customary rights as unnecessary competition (see Homewood and Thompson 2010). Many of these tensions are still present in contemporary Tanzania, though the institutional dynamics have changed considerably since legislative reform in 1998 (discussed further in Chapters 4 and 6).

In the 1980s, the state withdrew its financial services from Maasailand, including maintenance of dips and water sources (Hodgson 2001). There was a "violent resurgence of East Coast fever and heartwater in the mid-1980s," as cattle lost their resistance to ECF from years of dipping that was suddenly withdrawn (Hodgson 2001:220). From 1983-1984, drought again hit Maasailand and famine returned, leading to the rise of development NGOs like KIPOC, aimed at capacitating and supporting pastoral communities (Hodgson 2001).

3.14 Structural adjustments, globalization, and decentralization (1985-1998)

While President Nyerere had been steadfast in his promotion of self-reliance in the face of international influence, his successor, President Mwinyi, adopted a different tone. Following his election in 1985, he signed on to a structural adjustment program (SAP) with the World Bank/IMF that overhauled the Tanzanian economy following the principles of financial and institutional reform to promote stabilization and encourage Tanzania to follow a trajectory of capitalist development. In general, the IMF and World Bank used a series of strategies to boost economic growth in developing countries. Some of the key adjustments included devaluing currencies relative to the US dollar, trimming subsidies, eliminating price controls, privatizing

sectors that were previously public, liberalizing international trade, encouraging foreign investment, and introducing multi-party political systems (Agrawal et al. 1993). In Tanzania, a number of policies were put in place: controls on crop prices were lifted, crop unions were established, the shilling was devalued, the budget was stabilized, government wages were increased, food trade was liberalized, and subsidies were reduced (Agrawal et al. 1993). In a nutshell, the adjustments were meant to encourage the adoption of free-market economic principles that involved competition and privatization, as well as a 'rolled back' state that did not intervene in the face of potential foreign investment, particularly as it concerned the primary sector (natural resources). The implications of these policies have been actively debated by scholars and practitioners (cf. Taube 1993; Kaiser 1996), with some suggesting that the SAPs have exacerbated inequalities and disenabled people from accessing basic health services (see Kamat 2013). At the same time, some strategically positioned (wealthy) entrepreneurs have benefited significantly from the integration of state-private partnerships into the national economy. Retrospective studies by IMF suggest that Tanzania's heightened dependency on foreign capital was not associated with declines in "domestic savings," and the money was on the whole used to boost development investments, rather than bolster consumption (Agrawal et al. 1993:i). Compared to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa with similar programs, Tanzania was largely inefficient in generating returns on its investments as a consequence of a "highly inefficient parastatal sector" (Agrawal et al. 1993:ii). At the same time, economic growth accelerated and investments and exports rose (see Agrawal et al. 1993:26). From 1986-1990 foreign aid from World Bank and IMF led to a steadily increasing GDP (see Agrawal et al. 1993:1). On a domestic level, foreign assistance helped to reduce Tanzania's budget deficit, and also helped to mitigate inflation (Agrawal et al. 1993:26). The SAPs also increased Tanzania's international competitiveness by lowering its exchange rate (see Agrawal et al. 1993:26).

The question of how Tanzania's SAPs affected the peasantry at large, however, is a challenging one. Some in the conservation field have suggested that state-private partnerships

have neglected resource-dependent communities (see Igoe and Croucher 2007; Igoe and Brockington 2007) and alienated a peasantry that has throughout Tanzania's history been largely marginalized. At the same time, I am less convinced that it is the 'neoliberal' component of state-private relationships that is significant, as it seems to me that the state still plays a dominant role in regulating, and even snuffing out entirely, private operations that interfere with its ability to extract revenue from resources. Post SAP Tanzania seems, in my view, to reflect a political and economic dynamic that is better characterized by a blend of socialism and capitalism (see Barkan 1994).

Into the 1980s and beyond, Maasai leaders had to seek out the Arusha Diocesan Development Office (ADDO) to seek NGO assistance in dealing with ongoing land issues at the tail end of this political economy of rangeland development (Hodgson 2001). These included government proposals to eliminate customary tenure, corruption at the level of village government, encroachment of cultivators on pastoral areas, conversion of communal pastures into private farms, and forest clearing for charcoal production (see Hodgson and Schroeder 2002:87; Hodgson 2001).[125] In the late 1980s, amidst the shifts to privatization and liberalization, Tanzania also began to implement reforms to the wildlife sector (Nelson et al. 2007). These changes were allegedly aimed at decentralizing conservation governance with support from international NGOs and foreign donors. This ultimately culminated in the passing of the Wildlife Policy of 1998, a first of its kind, which stipulated that local communities should have the rights to manage wildlife on their own land, for their own benefit (see MNRT 1998:14). Following this policy, a plethora of community-based pilot projects were implemented in an attempt to decipher what the best practice was for including local communities in conservation in such a way that wildlife, communities, private investors and central government authorities would all benefit. However, as Nelson et al. (2007) and several others have suggested, the high expectations associated with this policy reform have not been translated into practice over the past twenty plus

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[125] Village-level government is referred to as local government in Tanzania.

years since the Wildlife Policy was enacted. Some have argued, in fact, that these reforms have simply served to further centralize resource control at the expense of rural communities (Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Goldman 2003; Nelson et al. 2007) (see Section 4.1 for further discussion).

3.15 Makuyuni and Lolkisale areas in focus[126]

Prior to the colonial period, the Manyara area was covered by vast rangelands, which pastoralists used for seasonal livestock grazing.[127] The area was also inhabited by abundant populations of wildlife moving throughout the ecosystem. Some areas had a high prevalence of tsetse flies, in particular from Lolkisale to Naitolia and Mswakini, and from the Tarangire area to Esilalei (the Manyara Ranch area) towards Engaruka. These natural distributions of flies shaped the settlement patterns of the Maasai, who avoided these areas for the most part to safeguard their cattle from sleeping sickness. The area provided a wonderful material base for the pastoral mode of production. Elders recall an interconnected rangeland extending from contemporary Lolkisale through Makuyuni, Oltukai and Esilalei to Mto wa Mbu and north to Selala and Engaruka and eventually Lake Natron. High quality grass was plentiful, as were salt licks from the alkaline waters of Lake Manyara.[128] Large wetlands formed by rivers flowing from the highlands into the lake provided fresh water year-round from Mto wa Mbu to Selela (Yanda and Mohamed 1990). Mto wa Mbu ("river of mosquitoes" in kiSwahili) was initially established by the German administrators as an army cargo site during the war. It came to be used as a resettlement area for refugees, and later became particularly appealing for establishing irrigation infrastructure. During the late colonial period, it began to receive an influx of casual labourers who were recruited to work on the settler farms in the area (Ole Kuney 2020 pers. comm.) The settlement grew steadily following independence and villagization, with an influx of mixed ethnicity

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[126] This section draws mainly from interviews with, and hand written notes from, Reuben Ole Kuney (2020).
[127] Local Maasai refer to the area from about Engaruka/Selela down through Losirwa, Esilalei, Oltukai, Mswakini, Naitolia, and Makuyuni as Manyara. This is related to the *EManyara enkutoto* described by Goldman (2020).
[128] Lake Manyara was also used in times of extreme drought when other water sources dried out.

cultivators moving into the area to produce fruit and vegetables. In a contemporary context, Mto wa Mbu provides a cross-section of Tanzania's ethnic diversity, with all of Tanzania's 120 ethnic groups represented in the village (Arens 1979). Arens (1979) suggests that the settlement constitutes the state's ideal vision of rural development, in that community solidarity and egalitarian rights to place for rural citizens have come to supersede ethnic differences. From the perspectives of local Maasai, the development of Mto wa Mbu has offered a greater range of public services, but less access to permanent water sources for livestock. The wetlands are now under the jurisdictions of Mto wa Mbu, Kigongoni, Migongoni, Jangoni, and Selela and are primarily used for irrigation-based agricultural production of rice, bananas, and vegetables. Mto wa Mbu has continued to develop in recent years, becoming a major business centre for commercial agriculture and the tourism industry. Its economic development has led to further expansion across the most productive wetlands in the area, which were previously used by wildlife and pastoralists to graze their herds. The continued agricultural development in the area has led to land conflicts, as Lake Manyara National Park (LMNP) authorities are concerned that cultivators are encroaching on the reserved area of the park, undermining the park's boundaries and its conservation plan. Kisongo Maasai pastoralists in Selala and Esilalei also feel that the agricultural expansion interferes with their customary grazing schemes, which used to ensure access to these key wetlands. Thus, Mto wa Mbu has become a highly contested area due to its abundance of water across seasons.

During the early British colonial period, Makuyuni was a small maintenance camp for the all-weather road connecting Arusha to Babati to Dodoma ("The great north road"). During the late colonial period, it became a cattle holding ground and veterinary centre. Specified cattle market routes were designated in the area as was a quarantine holding ground for cattle that was en route to primary and secondary markets in Arusha, Tanga, Dar es Salaam and Kenya. In the 1950s (up until independence), the British colonial administration went to great lengths to eradicate Tsetse flies in the Makuyuni area by clearing extensive bush. While some of these

efforts certainly benefited the Maasai to some extent, the efforts were largely aimed at creating favourable conditions for large settler farms, and later set the stage for further agricultural encroachment on the area.

Throughout the colonial period, massive farms and ranches were allocated to white settlers in the greater Makuyuni and Lolkisale areas. George Dam, a European settler, was allocated a 45,000 acre ranch to the west of the Makuyuni-Ngorongoro road. Following his death, the ranch was handed over to the national government via the National Ranching Company Ltd. (NARCO) in 1975. As discussed in detail in Chapter 8, the ranch was subsequently leased to the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) in 2000, which oversaw the area as a conservation area via a Land Conservation Trust. Manyara Ranch is used by community residents for livestock grazing, and also serves as a wildlife dispersal area for wildlife moving out of Tarangire NP.

Large-scale allocation of land continued after independence as part of the socialist regime's attempts to solidify commercial agriculture as the base of the national economy (see Msoffe et al. 2011:271). Many former settler farmers were nationalized or leased out to companies to produce crops for national food reserves and export (see Msoffe et al. 2011:271). Just west and south of Manyara Ranch, Hermanus Steyn was allocated 300,000 acres for crop production and cattle ranching.[129] Steyn's land covered a large area from Esimangore Mountain to Mswakini. His primary enterprise was the production of beans and seeds as part of his Rift Valley Seed Company. However, due to challenging environmental conditions, the farms produced low yields. Steyn's company was subsequently nationalized and his lease was cancelled. Large parts of the area were taken over by NAFCO and later reallocated to "land hungry cultivators" like the Arusha who faced considerable population pressures in the Mount Meru area (interview with former district government official, 2020). During this time, the Arusha established settlements from Lemiyon and Makuyuni Chini to Mswakini Juu and

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[129] Hermanus Steyn is a somewhat notorious figure in Tanzania, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.

Mswakini Chini. The areas west of Makuyuni were allocated by the national government to the Monduli District Development Company (MODECO), a subsidiary of the Monduli District Council. During villagization, the land was then handed over to the new villages of Mswakini and Naitolia. In a contemporary context, these areas are now covered by the four villages of Makuyuni, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini. Other than the Saburi sub-village of Makuyuni (Kisongo) and the junction area of Makuyuni (mixed), these villages are almost exclusively inhabited by Arusha. Through informal arrangements with village governments, some wealthy Arusha elites were able to secure sizeable titles to farmland in Naitolia and Mswakini (discussed in Chapter 6).

Villagization brought many landscape changes to the to Makuyuni area. The establishment of villages led to rises in infrastructural development such as roads, schools, commercial centres, shops and other social amenities. During operation *imparnati*, Losirwa and Esilalei (later subdivided into Oltukai) were established as typical pastoralist villages. These villages had large enough areas (6,000 acres) to support the pastoral Maasai, though some parts (approximately 100 acres) were not ecologically viable for supporting livestock herds. Since the 1980s, large portions of Steyn's former estate have been reallocated as mixed agropastoral village land. As road infrastructure improved, the Makuyuni junction developed into a semi-commercial centre with a variety of shops and services. Makuyuni village now has a school, a police station, a water supply, hotels and restaurants, and a health centre.[130]

There are several other commercial farms and ranches in the Makuyuni area. Saburi Estate, just north of Steyn's bean plantation covers an area of about 5,000 acres (discussed in Chapter 4). Adjacent to Saburi along the Mto wa Mbu road is a JKT military camp occupying an area of about 2,000 acres of pasture. In the 1980s, JKT was closed and reallocated for the establishment of Makuyuni Boys secondary school, but in 2016, the area was handed back to JKT to use as a military training area. Ten kilometres north of Makuyuni town, along the

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[130] The main A104 highway was paved in 2005 (see Martin et al. 2019:3).

Makuyuni-Arusha road, is the Esimangore Ranch of a few thousand acres owned by a private farmer. Near Saburi, there is also Arimeo Ranch, a 1,400-acre area owned by Somali investors.

On the Lolkisale side, a major settler farm was reallocated after independence to the Sluis brothers (discussed in Chapter 4). Several other settler farms were also designated in the area, but many of their leaseholds were canceled in the 1970s-1980s and the land was nationalized (including Steyn's). For this reason, NAFCO managed sizeable farmland in the area during the socialist period, which came to inspire the name for Nafco village, a former sub-village of Lolkisale. The cancelations of colonial-era leaseholds opened up land for elite Arusha and Kisongo investors, many of whom who had made lucrative profits from the commercial coffee industry in Meru and the Tanzanite trade in Simanjiro respectively. This scramble accelerated when Lolkisale subdivided in 2012 (and 2015) into Oldonyo, Lolkisale, Nafco, Lengoolwa, and Lemooti as both Kisongo and Arusha struggled to secure individual farms through social maneuvering in relation to village councils (discussed in Chapter 6).

3.16 Cumulative effects of colonialism and socialism on Maasailand

A key aspect of this wider political economy worth reiterating is the expansion of the Arusha into the Maasai Steppe. Hodgson's (2001:168) work shows that there was an initial 'first wave' towards Lolkisale that took place during the colonial period (1950s), followed by a "second wave" during villagization into the Makuyuni area (1970s). Despite some attempts to push Arusha out of pastoral lands in the 1960s-70s, these areas were ultimately resettled by Arusha again over time (see Jacobs 1980). Since then, the Arusha have used kinship ties and positions of power on village councils to allocate land to new incomers and further penetrate into Kisongo territories (Kuney 1994). While some Arusha moved into Monduli through government-sanctioned resettlements, a large number also entered informally through social relations with Kisongo elders (Kuney 1994). Initial Arusha pioneers began by settling the edges of the former Masai Reserve (see Figure 6), but the Arusha eventually moved further into the heart of the Maasai Steppe (see Igoe 2010:385). The result in a contemporary context is that Arusha and

Kisongo have come to live in a series of neighbouring villages in the Makuyuni and Lolkisale areas. This has greatly complicated the management of these rangelands, which were used primarily as seasonal pastures in support of the livestock economy prior to colonialism.

Other effects of colonial and socialist policies on rangeland development in Maasailand are evident in a contemporary context.[131] Subdivision of traditional territorial social-ecological units into villages has led to new institutional arrangements for managing rangelands that are more susceptible to fragmentation. Administrative boundaries at different scales have hindered pastoralists from moving seasonally to access dry season pasture, permanent water sources, and salt-licks. While Maasai settlement patterns were not entirely restructured by operation *imparnati*, the associated restrictions on mobility have since led to sedentarization of pastoralists. Village settlements have led, on the one hand, to improved infrastructure and social services. These have included schools, dispensaries, access to roads and nearby towns, growing numbers of shops, and markets for livestock, crops, and amenities. On the other hand, however, villagization has facilitated an influx of cultivators onto pastoral territories, especially Arusha who have leveraged their cultural closeness (language, rituals, age-set institutions) with the Kisongo to establish strongholds in the rangelands. As encroachment increased, land that was more suitable for livestock keeping became cleared for agriculture as part of the mixed agropastoral Arusha economy, further alienating pastoralists from rangelands that were previously used solely for livestock. This has exacerbated the colonial processes of allocating productive areas for settler farms, which had already dispossessed the Maasai prior to villagization. Ongoing land use change has reduced pastoral lands to fragments of a once vast frontier. The establishment of large ranches and commercial farms in the Makuyuni and Lolkisale areas, and irrigated banana plantations in Mto wa Mbu, deepened the problem. Increases in peasant farming in the wetlands around the rivers of Mto wa Mbu and Selela following villagization have further enclosed crucial dry season pastures. And while new water

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[131] This section is drawn from interviews with, and hand-written notes from, Reuben Ole Kuney (2020).

sources and dams were provided in some cases within pastoral village boundaries, they have faced great sustainability challenges like a lack of capital for implementation and maintenance, and a particularly low (and receding) ground water table. Dams have also complicated pre-existing territorial and clan-based arrangements for determining access to water resources, further undermining customary institutions. The Maasai experienced some benefits to the livestock economy during the colonial and socialist periods including the provision of veterinary facilities, programs for livestock disease control, and the introduction of improved cattle breeds. However, these were unevenly provided and part of a wider attempt to modernize pastoralists as beef producers. In effect, they distracted away from the real problem facing pastoralists: a trend of rangeland enclosure of the administrators' own making (see Ferguson 1994; Hodgson 2001).

The political economy of rangeland development in Maasailand is further complicated by a centralized wildlife sector that has displaced pastoralists through a network of national parks that protect wildlife at the expense of livestock keepers. Fragmentation has accelerated since the 1980s as urbanization of villages like Makuyuni, Mto wa Mbu, Kigongoni, and Selela have followed growth in tourism, particularly along the main highways leading to the national parks on the northern safari circuit. Far from islands, national parks are unfenced and conservationists have realized the need to promote ecological connectivity in the areas between parks, leading to landscape-level conservation initiatives (Bluwstein 2018a,b). These programs preach the importance of mobility, the very thing that has sustained the pastoral social-ecological system for thousands of years. And yet, conservation that is occurring in village land threatens to further dispossess pastoralists by restricting their land uses and tenure security (Bluwstein 2017). Wildlife corridors, conservation ranches, and wildlife management areas (WMAs) are being pushed under the umbrella title of community-based conservation, but the Maasai are fearful that further alienation will lead to a collapse of the pastoral economy. At the same time, community-based conservation may also provide new institutional models for *securing* pastoral tenure in the face of potential encroachments and thus be a tool for communities to *reduce* alienation. The

question of whether community-based conservation worsens or improves a situation that is becoming increasingly dire for pastoralists is the focus of the Chapters 6-9, which examine Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch from the perspectives of local communities.

3.17 Conclusions about the political economy of rangeland development in Tanzania

The resonating thread throughout much of Tanzania's colonial and post-independence history is its general failure to "capture the peasantry" in Goran Hyden's (1980) sense. Development has been implemented from above, often in a haphazard fashion, and in ways that are misaligned with the lived experiences, cultural values, modes of production, and perspectives of the peasantry. As a result, peasants have not become 'subjects of the state,' who have internalized participatory roles in the governing apparatus (Foucault 1978). Rather, they have remained marginalized ones who might publicly refrain from voicing displeasure with the state, while maintaining their "hidden transcripts" of subjugation, disrespect, and resentment that were written during the colonial and post-colonial periods (Scott 1985, 1998; see Raycraft 2020). However "rational" the various development plans may have seemed at the time, they have largely failed on account of a rigid logic of order that was forced onto the peasantry from above (see Havnevik 1993; Scott 1998a; Hodgson 2001).

The history of development policies in Maasailand also illustrate a consistent disregard for the livelihood concerns of Maasai pastoralists and their finely tuned institutional arrangements for managing semi-arid rangelands. The area was approached in terms of its potential for commercial agriculture, wildlife conservation, tourism, and beef production, but never as an interconnected social-ecological landscape managed through a complex and well-adapted form of ethnic territoriality that was at times well-defined and at other times fluid, depending on uncertain environmental conditions. Prior to colonialism, the Maasai had established a functional economic system and cultural hegemony over the area that was compatible with ecological dynamics and wildlife, and would have likely been far better suited to that context than another system. Colonialism disrupted this by attempting first to create a

tribal map of the landscape, as did socialism by attempting to abolish ethnicity altogether through villagization. It has thus been through political intervention from above that the rangelands face fragmentation.

The central apprehension of the Maasai around topics of conservation owes to this top-down history of development initiatives throughout the colonial and socialist periods that have for the most part dispossessed the Maasai from the grazing resources upon which they are dependent. In a contemporary context, community attitudes towards conservation in Maasailand cannot be understood in a vacuum, as they are intimately connected to these wider political histories. As things currently stand, the initial reaction of the Maasai to conservation and development initiatives seems to be one of skepticism, perhaps for good reason considering this history. As I will explicate in Chapters 6-9, the Maasai were initially opposed to Manyara Ranch and cautious about the creation of Randilen WMA. Over time, however, these areas came to prove useful for them, a story that I will unfold in the latter half of this dissertation.

3.18 Changes in pastoral Maasai livelihoods since the colonial period

In a contemporary context, the Maasai have changed along with the world around them. Modernization has brought with it new sets of influences affecting their cultural values and customary institutions (Galaty 2021a; McCabe 2003a,b; Trench et al. 2009).[132] Since structural adjustments, commercialization of food production has increased and restrictions on livestock mobility have posed threats to pastoralism, with herders seemingly becoming more inclined towards agropastoralism in response to wider constraints (Homewood et al. 2009; Trench et al. 2009). Maasai diets have broadened to include grains, fruit, beans, and other meats like chicken. Stemming from a greater need for cash, some herders have come to prefer rearing higher quality breeds to bring to market, rather than relying on milk products for subsistence. Education and globalization have introduced the Maasai to different standards of middle-class living, in some cases leading to changes in dress and housing. Improved road infrastructure and technological

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[132] This section also draws from interviews with, and notes from, Reuben Ole Kuney (2020).

advances in mobile smartphones have made it easier to travel to towns and communicate with people from afar. Maasai nowadays often send their children to school, and visit health clinics when possible. Some attend churches as well (Hodgson 2005). Decreases in child mortality and increasing birth rates have led to a growing human population relative to cattle numbers, which have remained fairly stable in northern Tanzania in recent years. Fewer stock holdings per capita have affected household economies, and younger generations of Maasai seem to be trending towards smaller families. The relative decrease in family livestock holdings has meant that dietary dependence on traditional pastoral foods has declined, and the importance of crops has increased (see McCabe 2003a:81). While the material impacts on poverty and food insecurity across Maasailand are difficult to assess in the context of diversification, micro-analyses of Ngorongoro Maasai suggest that food insecurity has become more entrenched (see McCabe et al. 1997; McCabe 2003b,a).[133]

In the face of political constraints on pastoral mobility, the Maasai are continually faced with dilemmas about the opportunity costs of keeping livestock in the remaining marginal areas vis-à-vis farming, dynamics that are further complicated by variable rainfall patterns and ecological factors (Norton-Griffith 1995; Norton-Griffith et al. 2008; McCabe et al. 2010). In some cases, restrictions on the pastoral economy have led to shifts away from a livestock-oriented mode of production to new forms of food and income generation (McCabe 2003a). Some Maasai choose to migrate to cities in search of formal employment as *askari* (guardsmen) and other positions, though many of them return at a later date, or send money electronically via MPesa (mobile money transfer) to support households in the villages (O'Malley 2000; McCabe et al. 2014; Smith 2012). These new economic dynamics have led to changing visions of what constitutes a 'good life' for the Maasai (Woodhouse and McCabe 2018). Further compounding the situation, modern administrative structures for local government (i.e. villages) have come to

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[133] The Ngorongoro case is complicated by conservation zoning arrangements including restrictions on agriculture, local trade, and livestock marketing, which together bear on the resilience of the pastoral system (McCabe 1997; McCabe 2003a).

undermine customary models of political leadership and authority in Maasai society (McCabe et al. 2020). Key social institutions like the gender-based division of labour and the age-set system are also under pressure from the influences of education, wage labour, development, and globalization (Hodgson 2001).[134] The increasing diversification of production and consumption, including rural-urban migration, crop cultivation, and reliance on store-bought food are on the one hand reasonable "pastoral responses to rangeland fragmentation" and "enclosure" (Galaty 2021b:41). At the same time, some scholars have even questioned whether the Maasai will be able to "stay" Maasai, in the face of the changes, if their way of life becomes fundamentally altered (Homewood et al. 2009; Trench et al. 2009). While cultural changes across the pastoral areas of East Africa have unfolded over the past century through increased access to education and markets, and exposure to world religions, shifts in livestock keeping practices seem to be occurring in some places and not others, suggesting that ethnographic context matters a great deal. What is clear even in the cases where livelihood transitions have occurred is the enduring importance of livestock in Maasailand, even considering diversification. Somewhat paradoxically, crop cultivation and wage labour are often used to *support* the pastoral economy, rather than undermine it, by allowing families to subsist without selling livestock (Galaty 2022 pers. comm.; McCabe et al. 2010). For these reasons, and others, I am quite reluctant to suggest that the Maasai are in the process of abandoning their livestock economy altogether. As I will discuss in Sections 5.7-5.8, the Kisongo Maasai I worked with still find ways to remain 'people of cattle,' even in the face of outside influences and a political economy of rangeland enclosure.

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[134] Gender-based economic divisions of labour have come unraveled in some cases through the influence of western feminist NGOs seeking to 'empower' women without paying adequate heed to the historical gender relations that underlie the pastoral mode of production (Hodgson 2017). At the same time, local grassroots NGOs have also provided Maasai women with greater self-determination and power, particularly in the contexts of education and land rights (Hodgson 2017).

Chapter 4. Institutions for governing and managing wildlife and rangelands in contemporary Tanzania

4.1 Governance of the wildlife sector[135]

While the colonial and socialist legacies of top-down resource control remain largely intact, the institutional arrangements for governing resources have changed considerably since the turn towards liberalization in the 1980s. A central focus of state policy since these reforms has been on the burgeoning wildlife sector, and, more precisely, on how best to monetize wildlife resources. The key ongoing challenge is that wildlife is not restricted to the boundaries of national parks, and generally requires large, connected rangeland ecosystems to secure seasonal access to resources. This is especially so around Tarangire National Park, where the home ranges of resident ungulates extend well into community (and private) areas adjacent to the park. Elephants, in particular, move across park boundaries fluidly and have large home ranges in nonprotected areas. The driving question beyond the ecological considerations is an economic one with roots in what De Soto (2000) describes as the conversion of natural resources into capital (i.e. 'natural capital'): How can the state efficiently extract revenue from wildlife if they are to exist beyond the boundaries of national parks? Converting mobile wildlife into capital, in the sense of De Soto (2000), requires a particular set of formal institutions to ensure that wildlife that roams through unprotected lands can be moulded into a source of national revenue.

The disaggregation of the central government into different branches within the Ministry of National Resources and Tourism (MNRT), each with their own stake in wildlife revenue, reflects this concern. Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA), of course, deals with all wildlife-related issues that occur inside national park boundaries including enforcing regulations and collecting tourism revenue, but their jurisdiction does not technically extend beyond the

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[135] Historical information on decentralization and reform of the wildlife sector since the 1990s is drawn in part from Nelson et al. (2007).

boundaries of national parks. In practice, this is not totally cut-and-dried, as TANAPA is often

actively involved with adjacent communities, providing services to these communities,

participating in and facilitating funerals, and assisting with mitigating human-wildlife conflict to

build good faith with the communities. But in a formal sense, and in terms of the conversion of

wildlife to capital, TANAPA is not involved. As soon as wildlife leaves park boundaries, it falls

under the administrative authority of the Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority (TAWA).

TAWA is able to extract revenues from wildlife through hunting concessions in game reserves

and game-controlled areas.[136] GCAs allow the central government to extract tourist hunting

revenue through the administration of concessions by TAWA without competition from the

community level. However, they pose significant challenges from the perspective of government

because they do not directly restrict human settlement and activities in the same fashion as game

reserves and national parks, making them vulnerable to encroachment and alternative land uses.

While rife with undesirable social consequences for rural Tanzanians, including disregard of pre-

existing forms of customary tenure, villagization has also offered some benefits to communities

in the form of more stable land rights pursuant to the Village Land Act (see Section 4.2). Since

the late 1970s and 1980s, wildlife dispersal areas outside national parks that were designated as

GCAs in accordance with the WCA often overlap areas that could also be classified as villages

based on the Village Act. This makes it challenging for the central government to establish a

sustainable model of extracting wildlife revenue from GCAs, while also ensuring that rural

communities did not encroach and lay their own claims to land. Upscaling all GCAs to game

reserves, which prohibit *all* human settlement is certainly one option from the perspective of

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[136] The hunting industry had helped buoy the national economy to the tune of 27 million dollars in annual revenue by the early 2000s (see Baldus and Cauldwell 2004; Nelson et al. 2007). Importantly, the Wildlife Conservation Act (WCA) did not provide any resource use exemptions for indigenous hunter-gatherers to use wildlife resources, despite the power of the Director of Wildlife to offer, with discretion, hunting licences. While this power could have been used to empower and support local communities, it has in reality been used to support commercial interests since the 1980s, under the institutional authority of the state (Nelson et al. 2007).

government, but this would come at the expense of physically displacing communities, exacerbating the national park model of 'fortress conservation' (Brockington 2002).

The exception to TAWA's control of wildlife revenues outside national parks (and village land) is the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA), which has its own administrative authority called the Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority (NCAA), which is solely responsible for management inside the NCA including enforcement of regulations and collection of wildlife-related revenue. The distinctions between these bodies within the MNRT is meant in practical terms to allow the central government to consistently secure an unabated benefit stream (mobilizing Bromley's 1992 definition of 'property') from wildlife resources through an apparent process of decentralization to different governing authorities at different scales of operation. My own interviews with figures representing these bodies suggest that collaboration and cooperation do indeed occur in practice, but at the same time, there are often instances of tension and conflict as the bodies can actually compete with one another for access to scarce revenues. One interlocutor shared an anecdote from a recent NCAA steering meeting where they actively, and transparently, discussed strategies for ensuring a consistent revenue stream via the NCAA vis-à-vis TAWA and TANAPA. While these governmental bodies are indeed all under the governing umbrella of the MNRT, they each have their own operating and running costs, including salaries to pay, offices to light, and vehicles to fuel, and so they must look out for their own interests. Such are the politics of centralization and decentralization, as Wright (2017) has discussed, in that the wildlife sector is at once highly centralized and also decentralized in manners that are not always productive.

This is further complicated by dissonance between different ministries at the central level, and in particular the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (MLFD), the Ministry of Lands, and the MNRT. During my fieldwork, I developed a working rapport with the Director of Research for MLFD who kindly welcomed me to their head office in Dodoma and to the nearby Tanzania Livestock Research Institute (TALIRI). After a series of interviews there, I

realized that the MLFD was quite sympathetic to the concerns of pastoralists, recognizing the contributions the livestock sector makes the national economy. Unfortunately, the areas inhabited by the pastoralists are often areas that are considered of great importance to conservation, and so rangeland management falls under the jurisdiction of MNRT, leaving MLFD with little recourse to counteract their policies. The Ministry of Land juggles a range of other priorities like urban planning and development and must also collaborate with the Ministry of Agriculture on matters related to land use planning in the context of commercial farming. Part of the politics of decentralization in Tanzania means that these various ministries hold fragmented perspectives on how best to manage land, based on their own sets of priorities. High up officials in the government are certainly not blind to these complexities. During an interview in early 2020, the Director of the National Land Use Planning Commission for the Ministry of Land, lamented the challenges of creating comprehensive land use plans that were equitable and effective given competing interests across the ministries. Far from a stereotypical image of a pencil-pushing bureaucrat, the Director had a PhD in political ecology from Kyoto University and was highly aware of the politics of land management in Tanzania. He was once again particularly sympathetic to the concerns of pastoralists and had collaborated with UCRT in the past to try and create land use plans that took into account pastoral livelihoods. But like MLFD, the Land Use Planning Committee was also constrained in areas where conservation shifted jurisdictional authority in favour of MNRT.

Within the MNRT, the interests of communities are not high on the agendas of any of its three main arms (NCAA, TAWA, TANAPA). However, having conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the Tarangire-Manyara Ecosystem, my personal experiences with TANAPA officials have been quite encouraging. TANAPA, as represented by the authorities at Lake Manyara National Park and Tarangire National Park during interviews in mid 2020, did strike me as genuinely concerned about the interests of the communities in the surrounding areas. The directors of both national parks were eager to meet with me and discuss my findings and share

their efforts to engage the communities. I was surprised to find that the director of Tarangire National Park had collaborated on a series of studies on the social impacts of conservation areas earlier in his career. The Director of Lake Manyara National Park had a PhD in Peace and Leadership studies contrary to my pre-conceived idea that TANAPA officials would exclusively represent ecological and tourism interests at the expense of communities. In reality, the directors seemed to be kind to people who cared about the wellbeing of rural communities living adjacent to these parks, and who were operating in relation to wider administrative constraints on the role of TANAPA within the wildlife sector.

The state at large retains its central interest in ensuring an efficient system of milking revenues from wildlife resources flowing through TAWA, TANAPA, and the NCAA.[137] The interest of the state in milking wildlife-related tourism revenues is particularly apparent when it is faced with potential threats to central control in the form of private partnerships that emerge outside its administrative ecosystem. If 'neoliberal' assumptions were to hold true in contemporary Tanzania, private tour companies would be able to establish strategic partnerships with fortuitously positioned local communities to establish community-based conservation alternatives to the state-centric model of conservation apparent in national parks, game reserves, GCAs, and the NCA. Indeed, they have done so in the past, but these arrangements have largely been snuffed out in recent years through legal reform aimed at formalizing community-based conservation (see below). As discussed at length in the theoretical and regional literature, neoliberal conservation entails a "rolled back" state in the face of private interests (see Holmes and Cavanagh 2016; Igoe and Brockington 2007). Based on free-market principles, the state (in a neoliberal setting) would not intervene in determining market conditions, and would allow basic

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[137] Though fairly modest considering the access gained, wildlife-related research permit fees could be interpreted as a means of further generating revenue from wildlife. Beyond the routine 300USD that foreign researchers must pay for a research permit via the Tanzanian Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH), and the 650USD fee for a Class C Residence Permit paid to the Tanzanian Immigration authority, researchers carrying out studies related to wildlife must pay an extra fee (500-1000USD) directly to TAWIRI, the Tanzanian Wildlife Research Authority. All wildlife research in Tanzania must include approval from TAWIRI including formal registration and review, as TAWIRI governs research in all protected areas in Tanzania.

principles of supply and demand to regulate the market. Success or failure would be independent

of state interference and business competition would reign supreme.[138] In reality, a neat binary

between state and market does not exist, as cases with some elements of 'neoliberalization' (see

Holmes and Cavanagh 2016) are generally characterized as well by varying degrees of

protectionism, particularly when valuable resources are at stake. Policy landscapes also tend to

shift across time. While much of the social science discourse seems to suggest that neoliberal

logics underpin the conservation landscape of Tanzania (Brockington et al. 2008; Bluwstein

2017). I am more inclined towards an interpretation which returns to the fundamental role of the

state. The socialist ideology forged by President Nyerere on the heels of a colonial legacy of

centralization still permeates the fabric of resource governance in Tanzania. The Tanzanian state

is reluctant to loosen its grip on natural resources by decentralizing governing authority to

private actors, or devolving it to the level of communities. Rather, it strictly regulates the wildlife

sector following a protectionist mindset that undermines the very prospect of neoliberal

conservation. Of course, strategic partnerships can be forged between the government and

private actors, as these also function to secure a revenue stream for government operations. But

given a choice between supporting a good faith community-based conservation arrangement

between a private investor and a community or establishing a new means of grabbing these lost

revenues back into central coffers, the Tanzanian state seems consistently inclined towards the

latter option. This is the case in Ololosokwan village in Ngorongoro District, where the village

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[138] Critics of neoliberal conservation have argued that such an arrangement can lead to exploitation and
marginalization of local communities, as natural resources become commoditized and attributed new forms of
economic value independent of the vital roles that they play as lifelines for local livelihoods (see
Buscher and Davidov 2013; Buscher and Fletcher 2015; Buscher et al. 2012; Fletcher et al 2018). Indeed, the risks
are significant, as in the absence of regulatory mechanisms from the government, private investors could operate in
bad faith by thinking only about their bottom lines without catering to the concerns of local communities. This is
certainly a real danger, and numerous cases like this have been documented in Tanzania and Kenya over the past
thirty years. At the same time, the opposite is also conceivable. A well-intentioned investor could forge a good faith
relationship with a local community and support local livelihoods while generating revenue for the investor (e.g.
Treetops Lodge in Randilen WMA discussed in Chapter 6). Since both outcomes are possible, painting all private
institutional arrangements as negative under the umbrella label of neoliberal conservation is not productive. Cases
vary due to numerous contextual factors like geography, ecology, history, cultural context, and individual-level
differences in investor personality.

council had established a productive community-based conservation operation, but the central government is moving to either expand the NCA to encapsulate this area, or annex it as part of a trophy hunting block for Ortello Business Corporation (OBC). Both options would allow the central government to extract capital from wildlife resources on village land, either through the NCAA or TAWA, and prevent tourism revenue from slipping away to the level of communities. In short, the state retains its interest in grabbing the revenue from wildlife resources, rather than redistributing the benefits of wildlife resources to private interests or communities. Is this explainable under the umbrella of neoliberal conservation? I think not. Rather, the narrative that I am unfolding in this section is that the state is never absent and is involved in every aspect of matters pertaining to wildlife resources in Tanzania. In such instances where the revenues from wildlife begin to fall through their administrative cracks, the central government once again tightens the reins. And this, in a nutshell, is the backdrop of how and why WMAs were established in Tanzania.

Wildlife, as stated earlier, is not fixed inside national park boundaries and generally occupies home ranges in communal lands. As Damian Bell, the Director of Honeyguide, explained to me over a coffee one afternoon in Makuyuni in late 2019, this created a fertile opportunity for community-based conservation in an economic sense because tour operators were not bound by the same restrictions as they were inside national parks. In particular, they had fewer fees and could offer walking safaris and cultural experiences in the communities that could not be offered in the national parks. This created an exciting prospect for investors. Communities mobilizing their rights derived from the Village Land Act, which allowed them to use the resources on village land for their own development, began to take interest in these potential investment opportunities where they could negotiate benefits with investors in exchange for allowing tour companies to operate in their villages. In essence, following neoliberal logics, the basis of potential win-win arrangements began to take shape (of course, they can also be win-lose arrangements depending on the investor at the helm). From the

perspective of tourists, these arrangements were also appealing because they often lowered

overall trip costs by reducing park fees. Tourists could also 'feel good' about supporting local

communities in the process, in a sense creating a 'win-win-win.' But, as has become customary

throughout Tanzania's history, the state once again reared its head. Knowing that they could not

collect the revenue through TANAPA (national parks), NCAA (NCA), or TAWA (Game

reserves and GCAs), the state established a new formal institution to help ensure that wildlife

revenue on village land could once again be directed back to the central government – Wildlife

Management Areas (WMAs).[139]

The initial motivations for the creation of WMAs were not entirely insidious, as there

was also genuine interest in securing wildlife habitat outside national parks in the face of

potential alternative land uses that might otherwise lead to fragmentation. Furthermore, there was

also pressure on the central government from the international community to devolve

conservation governance in a participatory fashion to better represent the interests of

communities.[140] This was reflected in the revised Wildlife Policy of 1998, which stressed the

importance of including local communities in the wildlife sector through the establishment of

WMAs. The policy addressed the historical marginalization of communities in the wildlife sector

and acknowledged their rights to utilize wildlife resources on village land.[141] While the policy

reinforced state control over all wildlife and land in Tanzania, it also formalized an institutional

framework for local communities to extract revenue benefits from wildlife, at least in theoretical

terms. This set the stage for land use plans to be drawn up at the local level outlining the areas in

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[139] To be fair, the central government lacked legislation stipulating how these tour companies would be taxed on village land, and it is certainly appropriate, in my view, that the government tax and regulate private business operations to some extent.

[140] TANAPA and the WD/TAWA were both involved in spearheading several pilot projects in communities around national parks (see Nelson et al. 2007:241). The Director of Wildlife in the 1990s, M.A. Ndolanga, was particularly vocal about the need to devolve the stakes in wildlife resources to the levels of communities (see for instance Ndolganga 1996).

[141] The policy went as far as to say "it is the aim of this policy to allow rural communities and private land holders to manage wildlife on their land for their own benefit" (MNRT 1998:14l; see Nelson et al. 2007 for detailed discussion).

village land that would be set aside for conservation, and the regulations that would be put in place to manage them. Thus, WMAs reflected the culmination of three intersecting interests: First in securing the government's ability to extract revenue from wildlife in village land; second in protecting wildlife outside protected areas from competing land uses, and third in providing greater opportunity for communities to participate in the wildlife sector.

WMAs, then, are microcosms of wider sectoral reform in that they are designed to address key social, economic, and ecological concerns that had arisen in relation to the national park model of conservation. And while some of the initial objectives of WMAs appear laudable, their political subtext is 'thinly veiled,' to borrow from Scott (1998). While framed as a mechanism for decentralizing wildlife conservation, they create a new platform to dictate the "rights and responsibilities" of rural communities for managing wildlife resources (Nelson et al. 2007:246). While areas to be set aside for WMAs are supposed to be determined by village councils, it is in effect the Minister of Natural Resources who has the power to gazette WMAs. Following the Wildlife Policy of 1998, detailed procedures were put in place by the central government outlining how WMAs could be established, often including the need for multiple villages to unite in forming a CBO (community-based organization). CBOs serve as a political body above the level of villages in order to govern member villages. While the CBO is responsible for creating the initial land use plans, these proposals must ultimately be subjected to an environmental impact assessment carried out by technical experts. This is often a point of contention, as the initial conservation interest of communities comes into conflict with the perspectives of outsiders. Technical experts and central government officials may be more concerned with preserving the ecological integrity of the area (or monetizing it for the government), without fully understanding the social-ecological complexity at play (see Brehony et al. 2018). Only after this environmental impact assessment is carried out can communities then apply directly to the Director of Wildlife to secure their own rights to benefit economically from

wildlife in village land. Thus, the basic structure of WMAs is based on a rigid legislative framework that was conceived by the central government.

Communities in a contemporary context are invited to follow a pre-determined set of procedures to establish WMAs. They must navigate various bureaucratic hurdles to do so, without any real guarantees that doing so will secure their resource rights rather than undermine them. Much of the conflict that has been documented in the literature on WMAs in Tanzania likely stems from uncertainty around what the exact implications of WMAs will be for communities. As Wright (2019) documents in his ethnography of Enduimet WMA, communities struggled for a long time to decipher whether the WMA represented a 'friend or foe,' in that they wondered whether it would serve and protect their livelihoods or displace them. Makko has expressed similar concerns to me on several occasions. In his description, WMAs do not fall into the category of community conserved areas because the initial idea to form them, and the governance structures for operating them, originate from the state not local communities. Within WMAs, community members are not able to articulate the fundamental conditions of their user rights without seeking permission from central government authorities. Representatives of UCRT have expressed concern to me that WMAs may simply allow the central government to establish conservation areas on village land that serve to further centralize resource control and siphon wildlife revenue back to the state.

By contrast, Makko has pointed out to me that, according to the Wildlife Policy of 1998, private landowners could theoretically establish their own wildlife sanctuaries and actively manage wildlife on their land for their own benefit based on their own bottom-up governance and management plans. Of course, this model would involve some sort of tax structure so that the government could also benefit, but rather than the government imposing one model on communities, this alternative could represent another model where communities are encouraged to innovate and establish their own approaches to conservation and then share the benefits with the government in an equitable manner. Perhaps the most notable local investor in this regard

was late President Magufuli, who at the time of his passing had secured a large private area near his home in the Bukoba area, where he had relocated a large number of antelope species (and also ordered many of the venomous snakes to be killed!) to begin his own private wildlife sanctuary. The private conservancy model is not without risks, however, considering the politics of similar cases in Kenya, for instance.

While the question of private wildlife sanctuaries to be managed by communities is not without contention, the driving point is that communities often have differing views on how precisely to go about wildlife conservation on their communal lands in order to secure their own benefit stream from wildlife resources. A notable case in this regard is that of Lake Natron, where Alicia Mori and Corey Wright worked as part of the ICAN project. In that context, the local Maasai community is supportive of the idea of conservation and interested in promoting ecotourism. Lake Natron has much to offer tourists who can climb Oldonyo Lengai ("the mountain of god"), visit the migratory flamingos, and marvel at the preserved footprints of human ancestors or the odd petrified animal corpse.[142] Indeed, from the perspective of a tourist, it is a stunning vista, as I came to realize on a trip there with Leanne in late 2019. Driving in from Longido, rolling plains span as far as the eye can see, punctuated by the occasional giraffe, Maasai homestead and small herds of zebra, antelope and wildebeest. Oldonyo Lengai looms in the distance creating a stunning juxtaposition that becomes ever-more striking as one draws closer. It is a breathtaking place, and the fact that the local Maasai community welcomes the prospects of conservation and tourism in their lives seems to me to represent great potential. But the notion of having a WMA in this area dampens local people's enthusiasm for conservation (see Mori 2017:32). Communities are wary of WMAs and other protected areas, which they view as government schemes for monetizing wildlife resources on village land.[143] The entrance gate to

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[142] Lake Natron is alkaline, so the salt serves as a natural preservative.
[143] The proposal for a WMA in Lake Natron has undergone many iterations. The initial proposal was for a WMA extending from Longido town to the eastern shore of the lake (see Mori 2016:30). On the other side of the lake, Engare Sero, Oldonyo Lengai and the escarpment were proposed to be part of Loliondo, with discussion at one point of annexing the area as part of an expanded NCA or a game reserve. While the WMA was registered in 2013, and

Lake Natron exemplifies this concern. To visit the lake area, tourists must pay fees to three separate districts all at once! The ticketing booth is symbolic of what seems to be a scramble within the government to grab onto any potential community-based conservation opportunities and milk them for all they can. Communities living in Engare Sero would much rather forge their own model of conservation that allows them to retain control over the revenue structure and their use of ancestral lands, but they feel handcuffed into accepting a model that has been forced upon them, in their own land, by the government. The current situation is ever-more precarious as there are proposals by the central government to create a large WMA that expands from Longido over to Lake Natron, with the intention of then converting some of the highly productive areas for tourism into full game reserves that prohibit human settlement and activity completely. This is linked up with the larger plan to reconfigure the NCA, in so doing displacing tens of thousands of Maasai pastoralists from inside the area. The proposal would annex village lands in Loliondo, dispossessing pastoral communities living in adjacent areas from accessing forests, seasonal pastures and key sources of water and salt-licks for their livestock. While some highly questionable 'scientific' papers have been put forth in support of the idea that local communities have degraded the ecological productivity of the area, the real thrust of the matter seems to be an economic one. The proposed NCA expansion seems to reflect an attempt by the central government to reconfigure the political landscape of the area to better facilitate its own extraction of revenue from wildlife through the tourism sector, with little genuine heed to the interests of communities.[144]

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finalized its resource management plan in 2014, the WMA technically never became formalized, in part due to overlapping jurisdictions with a game controlled area that generated revenue through trophy hunting (see Wright 2017:162).

[144] There has been ongoing pushback against this issue of late as activists have mobilized with support from CICADA and ICAN through domestic channels in an attempt to lobby to the highest levels of government and bring community perspectives to the fore. In early 2020, I was eager to help as I could with field visits, documentation and report writing, but I was advised against direct participation by local activists for my own safety while living in Monduli. Beyond security considerations, my interlocutors expressed concern that doing so might actually undermine the activities of these activists by angering the very government officials they were trying to persuade. President Magufuli was particularly concerned about his public persona and had a tight grip on the media and its portrayals of him and his political party. Rather than protesting openly or posting on social media, these activists

And this consideration elucidates the dark side of WMAs. Like other strategies employed by the Tanzanian government throughout history, one cannot overlook their potential to be used in ways that are antithetical to the interests of communities. They are not, in and of themselves, community-based models of conservation, but rather a particular form of wildlife conservation conceptualized by the central government to forward its own interest in maintaining centralized control of resources during a period of decentralization (see Wright 2017). The primary purpose of WMAs is not to protect community livelihoods, but to enable the central government to extract revenue from wildlife that moves outside the jurisdictions of TANAPA and TAWA onto village land.

This backdrop is deeply important and validates much of the concern that local communities have with concept of WMAs. In mid 2020, I attended a workshop in Mto wa Mbu led by UCRT that brought Maasai traditional leaders across northern Tanzania together to discuss strategies for revitalizing customary institutions for governing and managing rangelands. One of the key concerns raised by Maasai traditional leaders about WMAs was what will happen in the future if they welcome a WMA in their land and find out that it is not actually in their community's interests. What recourse will communities have if WMAs are used to support private or state interests in land and wildlife while marginalizing pastoral rights? Backing out of a WMA after it has already been established unprecedented, and likely quite challenging due to complex bureaucratic processes associated with such an endeavour. So communities must be as

sought to communicate directly with the President's Office, which appeared to be genuinely sympathetic to listening to their concerns. A special task force from the President's office was sent to Loliondo and other areas to garner community perspectives and decide on whether the proposed changes to the NCA would be put into action or not. I was fairly surprised to learn of the President's interests in listening to the communities, and even more so when my interlocutors in Naitolia, Mswakini, Oltukai, and Esilalei referenced a speech in Makuyuni in 2018 by a representative of the President explaining that no pastoralists would be evicted from wildlife corridors in the areas between Tarangire National Park and Manyara Ranch. The communities emphatically latched onto this speech in support. Whether or not this was a political ploy to garner the pastoral vote, after former head of opposition Lowassa almost won the prior national election, is unknown to me. Despite his polarizing personality and questionable policies, the late-Magufuli did seem to also express concern at times for the interests of his rural citizens, gestures which were appreciated by some. But, his central duty was to the state, the priorities of which did not always align with those of local communities.

certain as they can be that a WMA is truly in their interests. As discussed in Chapter 6, this was a key consideration for the Kisongo in the Lolkisale area in deciding whether or not they wanted a WMA in their land. While the Kisongo of Lolkisale appreciated the benefits of conservation and ecotourism in village land, they were ambivalent about the WMA model, since it was one that had been conceived by the central government. To be sure, one of the first steps they took was to organize a group of Korianga-aged young men (see Table 2 in Section 3.3 for Maasai age grades) from Lengoolwa sub-village to travel to Longido to meet with traditional leaders there to discuss the benefits and costs of Enduimet WMA. After this visit, and hearing first-hand from other Kisongo that WMAs can serve as a mechanism for securing grazing land, the Kisongo in Lolkisale came to support the idea of forming Randilen WMA.

4.2 Land tenure and Customary Rights of Occupancy (CROs)

Following the Wildlife Policy of 1998, the Land Act No. 4 of 1999 strengthened state control over land, but also formalized community tenure through customary occupancy rights. In the same year, the Village Land Act of 1999 decentralized governing authority of community lands to the levels of village councils, which became able to allocate and manage village lands on behalf of their assemblies. Land in Tanzania is divided into three categories: general, reserve and village land. Pursuant to the Land Act, the areas inside WMAs could, in a sense, be classified as 'reserve land' following the establishment of WMAs, though these areas were actually located in village land. Thus, once a WMA is gazetted, the administrative authorities of activities taking place within the reserve area come under the direct control of the Commissioner for Lands, who has the exclusive right to grant occupancy. In accordance with the Village Land Act, land outside reserves was either considered to be 'general land' if it was unoccupied or unused within the auspice of a village. Land that was directly used by villagers was considered village land in accordance with the land act. However, much literature discusses the conceptual conflicts between classifying land as general land or village land in Tanzania, especially in contexts where

pastoralism, fallow agricultural systems, and fisher mobility are practiced as livelihood strategies.

Technically speaking, the Tanzanian state still owns all land and wildlife resources inside its national jurisdiction. The government can provide 'granted right of occupancy' and sub-leases to citizens and foreign investors occupying general land. These occupancy rights are established through the formal institutions of the state through titling, processes that are often facilitated by district level government. Land that is officially registered as village land on the registrar of villages is issued a certificate of Village Land, which bestows upon local-level village councils the power to manage village land. Village councils provide individual villagers with customary rights of occupancy (CROs), documents that articulate their customary occupancy rights. As such, villagers hold 'deemed right of occupancy,' which generally do not involve a formal land title deed. While CROs might seem to be precarious vis-à-vis formal title deeds and ownership over land, they are backed by the formal institutions of the state, and thus can be taken as fairly secure. Of course, the state can always exercise eminent domain in the name of public good to reclaim land regardless of who uses it and to what end. But in terms of property rights, securing CROs are the most secure route available to individuals living in rural communities in Tanzania.

While village councils have significant authority in contemporary Tanzania to allocate land within their jurisdictions (McCabe et al. 2020), tensions between villages and state are historically embedded. Under President Nyerere, villagization was intended to reclassify all land in rural Tanzania and establish villages as the primary unit of local governance, settlement, and land use. When the state underwent structural adjustments in the 1980s, however, the prospect of communities registering their land as villages came into conflict with the ability of the central government to reallocate land to parastatals or lease it out to private investors or foreign companies. As discussed in Chapter 3, Parkipuny's struggle against Tanzania Breweries in Loliondo exemplified these tensions. Realizing that valuable pastoral land was at risk of being alienated for barley production, Parkipuny pushed for registering and titling villages in an

attempt to utilize the legacy of villagization to insulate communities from state-sanctioned land grabbing. Villages thus became tools for negotiating land deals. In response, the government reformed its land laws to ensure that villages only referred to areas where communities could demonstrate that they were using land productively pursuant to their customary rights. In some cases, the government even blocked attempts to register villages if the processes were deemed to be in direct conflict with state interests. Though the Village Land Act of 1999 formalized the rights of village councils to allocate land in their jurisdictions, some conflicts still persist, particularly in areas where villages overlap game controlled areas (discussed in Chapter 6).

One of my pursuits while in the field was trying to understand exactly how these processes of securing land tenure take place. How, for instance, does an ordinary villager in contemporary Tanzania go about securing a CRO or title? There are several routes that people can take to achieve this, each with its own levels of security vis-à-vis different audiences. The first approach taken by some of the people in my study area involved laying claim to land directly, generally by demarcating the boundaries of their homestead with sisal plants, or by cultivation. In Tanzanian law, claims to land are seen as reflections of the extent to which people have "improved the productivity of the land" or "invested labour into it" (see Pedersen and Kweka 2017:219; Kamat et al. 2019:7; Pedersen 2016). So in this sense, cultivation as compared to mobile pastoralism tends to be viewed as a more secure mechanism for claiming land. Thus, farming sometimes comes to take on a political character, beyond a material livelihood strategy. I will detail some particularities of this process in Chapter 5.

The other route is to secure land via CROs administered by village councils pursuant to the Village Land Act. The first step in this procedure involves the village becoming officially registered at the district level. This is often an ongoing process because villages regularly sub-divide as their populations grow. In the context of my study villages, several were recently subdivided: Oltukai subdivided from Esilalei; Mswakini Chini and Juu subdivided from Mswakini; and Lolkisale split into Oldonyo, Nafco, Lengoolwa, and Lemooti. The first step

following subdivision is that the participatory land use committee at the district level must map out the boundaries of the village as a whole, a contentious process considering competing claims from neighbouring villages, commercial farms, and protected areas. Once this process has taken place and the village is formally registered at the district level, then village councils can allocate land to villagers based on their own internal governance processes. Theoretically, this should work well for communities, but like most governance institutions, village councils can be appropriated in various ways depending on the intentions of those with power. In many cases, money does move behind the scenes to mobilize private interests at the expense of others. Some of my interviewees from Naitolia, for instance, were resentful of the ways in which land was allocated by the village government. Several respondents felt that the village council had been rewarding close friends with larger plots of land vs. people who were less popular. Unfortunately, there is little recourse that an ordinary villager can take outside the village government structures if their application for land is denied or deemed less important than another's. But in many other contexts, depending on the governance structures of the village, these processes seemed to work effectively. Generally, villagers apply to the village council, which then holds meetings to decide who would be allocated what land. Food and livelihood security concerns are taken into account in these discussions and the village government has the power to give land to those in need. Thus, one simple route for a villager to gain land is to apply to the village government and be allocated land in this manner. These claims to land are technically reflections of formal law, not informal institutions, as they occur in accordance with the Village Land Act. These rights to land can be passed down through inheritance, and they can also be sold to other villagers or prospective buyers from outside who do not plan to carry out large-scale changes to the land. In such cases, it would likely require a review from the village council. However, complications arise in terms of how these processes are actually documented. In the Maasai cultural context, oral traditions are the repository of historical knowledge, passed down through stories and spoken word. But in the post-villagization era, the village councils are

the primary political mechanism for upholding land rights within the villages. Village councils generally have five-year terms, at which point leaders can be re-elected or others take their place. I was fortunate that my fieldwork coincided with village-level elections in late 2019, which occurred prior to the national elections in 2020. A significant amount of lobbying throughout the villages takes place because of the awareness of how much power is at stake to determine the trajectory of land deals in village land. A key concern for individuals and communities is that new leaders may come into power and not recognize unwritten claims to land by villagers who were either allocated land by prior councils, or who had inherited land from their parents. While these previous claims to land are sometimes documented in writing, they are often based on oral agreements that are more vulnerable to competing claims. As Ole Kuney (1994) has documented, the encroachment of Arusha onto previously Kisongo-dominated rangelands since the 1960s has complicated these matters further because Arusha cultivators were able to gain representation in village councils and allocate land through kinship ties, allowing Arusha to continually move into these lands to commence farming activities. This accelerated rangeland fragmentation in the area as small holding farms increased rapidly in the areas between Manyara Ranch and Tarangire National Park. As a consequence, Kisongo customary rights to communal grazing areas came into conflict with Arusha dominated village-level councils, creating tensions with how claims to land would be reconciled.

Despite the high stakes involved, informal sales of the CROs between agreeing parties may not involve any formal documentation, as one of my Maasai interlocutors proved to me by purchasing a one-acre farm in Loliondo in early 2020 without receiving any supporting paperwork (much to my concern!). This individual had purchased the land for 700,000Tsh (about 400$) from another fellow who had been allocated the land by the village council. In the Saburi sub-village of Makuyuni where I was frequently based, land was selling for between 1.5-2 million Tsh per acre (820-1,100CAD). One of my interlocutors in Saburi was selling a five-acre plot for 4 million Tsh (2,200CAD). Generally, a member of the village council should bear

witness to these transactions, but often they are not documented in writing. This lack of paperwork can prove messy if competing claims to the land are to arise. Another complicating factor is that newly subdivided villages can take time to register at the district level because of unresolved boundary disputes. I was fortunate to collaborate with the Monduli District Council during my fieldwork and the land use and urban planning officer graciously provided me with GIS shapefiles for the villages in my study area to assist me in making maps for my dissertation and publications. Interestingly, he was not able to provide shapefiles for Makuyuni because there were still ongoing land disputes (some examples are discussed further in Section 4.3). Thus, there is a chain of political and bureaucratic connections that come into play that can make it challenging for villagers to secure their own CROs.

Assuming that a villager is successful in receiving a CRO, other issues arise. CROs only recognize individual rights to land and thus can actually undermine customary forms of communal tenure. For the Kisongo, their livelihoods are based on the livestock economy. This is couched within a complex social-ecological system that requires a carefully crafted set of informal institutions to regulate access to and use of rangelands in a communal manner. These collective institutions serve to safeguard the productivity of grasslands, and by extension, the health of their cattle. Individual claims to land can actually be detrimental to the pastoral mode of production by incentivizing people to establish exclusion criteria for their own personal plots of land.[145] This consideration gave rise to the concept of CCROs (Communal Customary Rights of Occupancy), spearheaded by UCRT in an effort bring a communal emphasis to this process of securing land tenure in pastoral areas. Like CROs, CCROs are recognized as formal institutions backed by law, but which are allocated to communities rather than individuals. The aim, taking a common property approach, is to secure the livelihoods of communities whose economies depend on shared institutions for accessing and using resources. Compared to individual CROs,

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[145] I will discuss this process further in Sections 5.7-5.8, as it seems that the political and ethnic context of cultivation plays a significant role.

CCROs reflect an attempt to bring the formal institutions of the state in line with the customary institutions that have historically existed in pastoral communities. For these reasons, UCRT has been particularly involved in helping secure CCROs for hunter-gatherers and pastoralists, notably including around 50,000 acres of village land for the Hadzabe near Lake Eyasi, and over 100,000 acres in the Simanjiro plains for the Maasai.

CCROs offer an appealing strategy for achieving tenure security for pastoral communities that practice seasonal mobility. Such practices have been continually constrained by macro-political forces including large-scale land alienation and policies promoting sedentarization. CCROs provide the legal basis for pastoral communities to manage their land in the way that they see fit, and in a way that best supports their livelihoods. Thus, they create a foundation for endogenous forms of community-based conservation to potentially emerge in a way that safeguards the livelihood priorities of pastoralists. For these reasons, UCRT has historically preferred to help secure CCROs for pastoral communities rather than subscribe uncritically to the WMA model of "community-based conservation" that has been vigorously advanced by the central government. The historical backdrop of fortress conservation is a deeply important reason for pastoralists to be mindful of how conservation can serve outside interests at the expense of their pastoral way of life. Though WMAs reflect multi-use systems that offer communities wildlife user rights, the legislative framework for governing them was devised by the central government. Some of these particularities are discussed in the context of Randilen WMA in Chapters 6 and 7. Compared to its favourable disposition towards CCROs, UCRT has been very apprehensive about the idea of WMAs throughout its history, knowing that they are exogenous creations by the central government that may not support pre-existing customary institutions and thus may undermine the long-term well-being of pastoral communities. Burunge WMA for instance does not allow grazing inside the WMA area, and restricts cultivation in key agricultural lands, which neither the livestock keepers nor cultivators appreciate. The land use plans put forth in those contexts may not reflect the perspectives of communities and, depending

on the manner in which they are enforced, can create conflicts that did not previously exist. As Makko explained to me in one of our more recent exchanges in late 2020, his life project is about formalizing the status of indigenous territories to ensure that they are owned, controlled, and managed by local communities in ways that support their livelihoods and socioeconomic priorities.[146] Makko, of course, acknowledged to me that this is a lofty pursuit given the competing interests in the conservation sector that are still trying to push a model of physical, social, and economic exclusion of pastoralists from conservation areas, as evidenced by the ongoing struggles over the NCA (see Sections 3.13 and 6.9 for further discussion) .

In considering some of the challenges that CCROs are faced with, it is crucial not to ignore the role of the state. High ranking officials within the MNRT are not particularly inclined to support the rapid expansion of CCROs across the rangelands between national parks where wildlife abounds. There is no incentive for the central government to support creating such areas vis-à-vis WMAs, since the latter clearly stipulate how tourism revenue will be shared with the government (usually 35% via TAWA). Put bluntly, 'how will the central government get its bite of the pie if CCROs proliferate across communal lands?' This is perhaps the driving question behind all conservation policy in Tanzania and should never be overlooked. Furthermore, while land rights are essential for pastoralists to maintain their way of life, so too are the collective institutions that enable communities to manage grazing resources. As I will unfold in the next two sections, through cases from my study area, formal land tenure status does not always equate with management in practice. This suggests that tenure security may not be the end all be all for the plight of pastoralists, but rather a means to an end.

4.3 Property on paper and property in practice

One of the most significant cases in rural Monduli follows the story of Sam Murunga, a Maasai politician from the Monduli District who served two terms as Prime Minister from 1977-1980

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[146] In this way, his vision seems to mirror the spirit of CICADA and ICCA territories of life.

and 1983-1984.[147] Around the time of Tanzania's war with Uganda in 1978, Murunga was responsible for repurposing a large portion of land in Monduli for the national military. The large area (or *jeshi* in kiSwahili) is still held by the government in a contemporary context, and is visible from the main A104 highway when passing Kisongo en route towards Babati.[148] Murunga's decision to allocate a large portion of Monduli to the military was seen as contentious in some circles. Some Maasai felt that Murunga had "sold out" for a cushy job at the expense of further land alienation in Maasailand. Technically speaking, the Monduli Jeshi is now categorized as state-owned property and thus all other land uses are prohibited. But rather than develop the land, the state has preferred to keep the landscape largely intact to facilitate military training exercises. Since the area is unfenced, the *jeshi* has remained connected with the wider ecosystem. As I observed while carrying out fieldwork in Nafco village between in March-June of 2021, wildlife from as far as Tarangire National Park and Randilen WMA regularly move into the area in the wet season. Despite the formal tenure status of the land, Kisongo interviewees in Lengoolwa and Nafco reported grazing their livestock inside the *jeshi* without much hassle from the central government. *Jeshi* authorities require that the pastoralists not interfere with military activities and that they only graze their livestock inside when seasonal variations require them to do so. The Kisongo appreciate this arrangement, using it for the most part as a dry season grazing bank. While livestock keepers benefit, the same cannot be said for cultivators like the Arusha who are unable to encroach onto the area to establish farms and settlements. Thus, while Murunga's decision alienated the Maasai from rangelands in a formal sense, it may have actually secured seasonal pastures through shared understandings between military personnel and herders. Unlike farming, herding is not always mutually exclusive with the military's training agendas and so the land can take on multiple uses in practice irrespective of its tenure status.

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[147] Sam Murunga is a pseudonym.
[148] It is hard to miss while driving since the speed limit drops to 50km/hr for a few miles to protect soldiers carrying out roadside training exercises.

Thus, Murunga may well have felt that he was bringing an asset to the region for the benefit of local pastoralists.

The same is also true of Makuyuni JKT, a *jeshi* designated within Makuyuni village as a military training camp. Technically, since it was reclaimed by the central government, JKT is no longer part of village land and thus cannot be governed by the village council. However, the land is rarely occupied and is used only sparingly by the military for occasional training exercises. In practice, the area serves as a wildlife dispersal area adjacent to Manyara Ranch and is managed informally by the Kisongo of Saburi as a communal grazing area. Given its formal status as a military area, cultivation is prohibited once again benefiting the local pastoralists.

While the consequences of Murunga's decisions to repurpose land for the military have had broad implications, other aspects of Murunga's land legacy in Makuyuni are much more personal. Following the Arusha Declaration of 1967, TANU, Tanzania's single political party at the time (later renamed *Chama cha Mapinduzi* in the multi-party era), established a model for socialist development and governance (as discussed in Chapter 3). A key aspect of this political vision was that party leaders were expected to live modest socialist lives, distanced from the tendencies of capitalist accumulation. They were thus prohibited from owning private property, at least in theory. Prime Minister Murunga, however, was a livestock keeper and was interested in securing pasture land for his personal use. To circumvent this restriction on property ownership, he negotiated an under-the-table deal with an Indo-Tanzanian commercial farmer. Since the second World War, the farming family has been involved in producing coffee in the Arusha region, having owned around a thousand acres of farmland on the edge of the Ngorongoro caldera and elsewhere in Arusha. Murunga was interested in establishing a boma and keeping livestock in Makuyuni, but the restrictions on property ownership made it technically illegal for him to do so. The two parties were able to negotiate a deal that involved formally registering the land under the farmer's name as a means of holding the land for the Prime Minister. At first, this arrangement worked without an issue as an informal arrangement

outside the law. However, it has since become quite complicated. To purchase the land, the farmer took a loan from the national bank, leveraging his large-scale farms in other areas. However, he later defaulted on his loan, and the area was turned over to the bank. The farmer eventually passed away, as did Murunga, but the late Prime Minister's wife, Madame Bilaya, still lives in the original homestead.[149] She considers her claim to the land to be legitimate since she has lived there for the past fifty years, irrespective of the way in which it was initially registered. In her mind, it is still her land.

Madame Bilaya is particularly apprehensive about visitors. During my fieldwork, Leanne and I spent many weekends hiking through the backcountry of Saburi. We regularly trekked up into the Esimangore Mountains, where it was easy to encounter a wonderful array of wildlife and enjoy views looking back over Lake Manyara. We were often accompanied by a few *ilmurran* to guide us through the landscape and navigate potential dangers, which was especially important given the high number of elephants and buffalo in the area. On one occasion, after charting a path up into the mountains and then traversing a path towards JKT, we came down near Madame Bilaya's boma. As we approached her area, Madame Bilaya expressed anger with the *ilmurran* for bringing *wazungu* trespassers onto her property. I was quick to apologize to her and explain that there had been a minor misunderstanding about what my intentions were. Unfortunately, one of the *ilmurran* in our group was rather strong-headed and managed to fuel her discontent with a disrespectful tone and we left a bit awkwardly with her threatening to call the police. In reality, her threats to call the police carried little punch since I was already formally registered at the local police station and carried with me a letter from the Village Executive Officer stating that I was free to roam through village land undisturbed. But what was more significant was what the event represented to her. Not long after the incident Madame Bilaya apologized to a mutual friend of ours and relayed her side of the story.

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[149] Bilaya is a pseudonym.

From Madame Bilaya's perspective, the lack of formal paperwork detailing the fact that she is actually the rightful owner of the land has put her in a precarious position, as it leaves her unable to effectively articulate her land rights in the face of external actors who may want to grab her land. Unfortunately, the very documents that would legitimize her claim would also in a sense de-legitimize it by revealing the underhanded nature of the initial deal between the farmer and her late-husband. The presence of such papers would likely implicate the original agreement as a violation of Prime Minister Murunga's socialist obligations. While Madame Bilaya lobbied for her property rights after her husband's passing, she has to the day of writing been unable to reach a resolution. This matter was further complicated in 2019 when a hunting safari company based in Morogoro bought the land from the bank. One of my key informants in the village has suggested to me that there may have been some nefarious aspects of this transaction. Regardless of the ethical terrains of the deal, the investor arrived while I was conducting fieldwork in the area and immediately began ploughing a road straight towards the Esimangore Mountain, with a plan to establish a private conservancy at the top of the hill. He proceeded to put up signs near the main road preventing all trespassers, including local Kisongo who regularly use the land for grazing. This led to conflict with local herders who openly complained and continually transgressed these boundaries as needed, viewing them as illegitimate. Importantly, local Kisongo view Madame Bilaya's rights to the land as the righteous ones pursuant to their customary claims as Maasai, irrespective of the legal tenure status of the land. In response to the investor encroaching on her territory, Madame Bilaya sought the help of the farmer family, which sometimes keeps livestock in the area and maintains good relations with the Madame Bilaya, to persuade the investor to leave. As it turns out, the investor was not aware of this politically charged history and was surprised to find that he had set up shop next to a hornet's nest! Not long after he established his groundwork for a tourist camp on top of the hill, he left with plans unfinished. Though the investor may return again in the future, my interlocutors in the village are confident that he is disinterested in the amount of conflict this investment property

would bring to his life. In May, 2021, one of my key informants in the village passed by the "no-trespassing" signs again and asked Madame Bilaya if she wanted the *ilmurran* to destroy them on her behalf. She replied, "just leave them because they had no power anymore," symbolizing the fact that the formal tenure status no longer matters. The investor is no longer actively involved on the ground and the local herders continue to access pastures as needed, accepting that Madame Bilaya's claims to land is legitimate.

Madame Bilaya's story highlights the political complexity of land rights and property relations in Makuyuni. In many instances, the formal legal status of the land does not match what is actually practiced on the ground. In another case, just a few kilometres southeast, on the other side of Saburi sub-village, is an area that formerly belonged to Hermanus P. Steyn, a South African commercial farmer, and somewhat notorious figure in the land politics scene in East Africa (as introduced in Chapter 3; discussed further in Chapter 6). During the socialist period, Steyn owned and operated the Arusha-based Rift Valley Seed Company Limited, which had sizeable land holdings in Makuyuni and Naitolia. In 1982, the Tanzanian government nationalized the company and Steyn's lease holds were canceled with partial compensation paid in return. Ruins of Steyn's buildings are still visible in Saburi, including a small runway for his bush plane. When the land became available, numerous stakeholders swooped in to try to secure their claim to it, including individual in-migrating Arusha, the village councils, NGOs, and the Monduli District Council through MODECO. Land in Naitolia village was reallocated to the village councils as village land. UCRT was particularly involved in helping to secure the land south of the Makuyuni junction, which served as a crucial communal grazing area (called *Ndoroboni*). Some areas were first allocated to MODECO and then subsequently turned over to the village.

While some of these processes have been resolved, one of Steyn's former farms in Saburi is still contested. Since the land was turned over to the central government after the lease was canceled, it technically remains under state control. The central government thus retains the

exclusive right to determine how the land will be used in the future. Steyn, however, opposes this claim and has not accepted it willingly. He has repeatedly attempted to sue the Tanzanian government on the grounds that their confiscation of his assets was illegitimate. The decades-long dispute escalated in August 2019 when Steyn, since retired and living in South Africa, pushed the South African courts to seize an Air Tanzania Company Limited (ATCL) jetliner in Johannesburg. As documented by the Citizen, the saga has dragged on for 37 years, and it will likely continue into the future.[150] Following the death of President Magufuli on March 17, 2021, whispers have emerged in Makuyuni that Steyn may return to reclaim his land depending on the new President's stance on foreign investment. So as things currently stand, the drama remains unresolved. From the perspective of local Kisongo pastoralists, the area represents a key pasture of crucial significance. At the time of writing, government security guards are stationed in the area and confront incoming livestock keepers for trespassing. According to some of my interlocutors in Saburi, however, the situation is not entirely negative because small under-the-table negotiations can be carried out between herders and the security guards. Herd owners can pay a small fee for guards to look the other way while livestock grazes in the confiscated land. In a sense then, despite its designation as government property, in practice, it is managed through informal agreements between the herders and security guards. The local Kisongo I spoke with about this arrangement were actually generally happy with it because it allowed them consistent access to good grazing areas without outside disturbances. The key point, which I am reiterating again, is that the formal tenure status of the land does not match the institutional arrangements that exist in practice. The Kisongo in Saburi see formal tenure status as a means to an end to secure access to grazing areas, but not as the end all be all solution to their livelihood concerns. The ultimate objective of the local pastoralists is to secure grazing access, and they are not overly concerned if access is provided through informal, word-of-mouth agreements that do not

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[150]See: https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/the-story-behind-atcl-plane-seizure-in-south-africa-2690388

reflect what the legal status of the land. What matters is whether tenure affects their grazing access.

The situation, however, is not always neat and tidy. On one occasion in late 2019, a new security guard was staffed to the area who was unfamiliar with the informal arrangements that had been in place between the local pastoralists and the previous security guards. When a group of *Ilmurran* appeared in the area with a few hundred head of cattle, the guard confronted them as trespassers. He threatened to confiscate their livestock and fine them, hopeful that this would intimidate the *ilmurran* into leaving. The herders were unperturbed and issued their own warning to the guard about not honouring their prior arrangement. The guard did not comply, and in response the *ilmurran* told the guard to hold their cattle for them while they went to 'discuss the matter' with the other *ilmurran*. They told the guard that he should take extra caution to ensure that their cattle remained in good health in the meantime. This, of course, was an obvious threat and one that people in Makuyuni have learned to take seriously. When such conflicts occur, they often result in 30-50 *ilmurran* returning on motorbikes with spears in preparation for an open skirmish that has been sanctioned by the older age-sets.[151] Not long after the warning from the *ilmurran*, the security guard realized the serious danger he had brought upon himself and fled the area entirely, abandoning his post and pursuing other work altogether. The cattle were later secured by the *ilmurran* without loss.

While this particular situation resolved itself organically, it highlights the precarity that can result from the dissonance between tenure and management. In many cases, agreements are contingent upon the social relations of involved parties, so the institutional framework regulating resource access can dissolve when certain individuals are no longer around. It goes without saying that key actors can move away, be re-stationed for work, fall ill, or die. Without informal

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[151] This was the case in *Ndoroboni* in February 2020 when a grazing conflict occurred between an Iraqw encroacher and local Kisongo (discussed in Section 4.4).

gate-keepers to mediate the gap between tenure and management, the resilience of the pastoral-system again may again come under threat.

In this case, the situation is ever-precarious because the government could in theory change the legal status of the land at any time, perhaps catalyzing changes in on-the-ground management practices. One of the suggestions that was raised during focus group discussions at the district level was that of converting the area into a WMA or a private conservancy. These two outcomes could potentially be perilous for local Kisongo. Private conservancies, like the one that was implemented on the other side of Saburi, often implement grazing bans, which would inevitably lead to conflict with herders. Depending on how they are designed and implemented, WMAs can also undermine grazing rights if the land use plans are not produced in an equitable fashion. A WMA in this area might shift the land management priorities in favour of the government's interests in generating revenue from private investments in ecotourism. There is great risk that this agenda may not align with the interests of the Maasai in managing the area as pasture. UCRT is particularly intent on securing the area through CCROs which would provide some tenure security to the local Kisongo and allow them to continue using the area for seasonal grazing, as they have since the precolonial era. But the district government is less inclined towards this approach, as it would mean that the district would not receive a cut of the benefits. A WMA or private conservancy, on the other hand, would generate revenue and would thus be an asset that could be used to bring money into the government coffers. In light of these competing interests, the situation remains precarious.

The Esimangore mountains also provide an example of the ways in which property on paper diverges from property in practice. In the mountains, dense forests make it challenging to pass through on foot, but the Kisongo from Saburi graze their cattle there in the dry season. It can be a dangerous area at times because buffalo and elephants reside in the forest.[152] But

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[152] As I came to learn during fieldwork, buffalo in the forests are far more concerning for pastoralists than those in the plains where both parties can see each other clearly from afar. This became abundantly clear to Edwine and me, while doing fieldwork in Lolkisale around the time of my birthday. I had decided that to celebrate I wanted to climb

nonetheless, the Kisongo in Saburi do graze their livestock in the mountains when need be, but they are reluctant to call it a forest, knowing the power that this term carries. The Kisongo are aware that the top halves of the mountains are technically classified as the Esimangore Forest Reserve, a classification that falls under the central government via the Tanzania Forestry Service (TFS). Much like game reserves and national parks, national forest reserves technically prohibit all human activities inside their boundaries. This unfortunately includes grazing. Prohibitions on mountaintop grazing have roots in the British colonial era, when the heights of mountains were initially demarcated as forest reserves to safeguard water catchments (see Page-Jones 1948; Hodgson 2001). While some colonial administrators recognized the challenges that this form of land classification posed for the Maasai, who relied on the mountain grazing in the dry season, key forest legislations were still passed. This framework for centrally governing forest reserves remains largely intact today through TFS. While the transgression of herders into the Esimangore Forest Reserve is almost impossible to enforce on a consistent basis, the Maasai are still careful to refer to the area as Saburi and not Esimangore, knowing that this title may technically restrict their access. In practice, however, it is hardly enforced as a national forest reserve as the local Kisongo remain its stewards and are the only real visitors to the area on a regular basis.[153] It is simply not practical for government authorities to manage this area, as it is

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Lolkisale mountain which overlooked the villages, and Edwine was happy to accompany me. But in starting our ascent, several villagers approached us and warned us that it was very dangerous due to buffalo on the mountain. Perhaps overconfident, I did not pay them much heed until about an hour and half into our trek up through the dense forest cover, did we come across fresh buffalo droppings. The snap of a twig about a stone's throw from us was enough to seriously worry Edwine and instill in me a caution that I perhaps should have had from the outset. As we continued on with greater care, Edwine told a story of his rite of passage experience when he and a group of *ilmurran* had ventured into the forest near Loliondo in search of a lion to kill to 'become a man.' The practice is highly discouraged nowadays by conservation authorities, and the Maasai generally refrain from participating in these exercises (at least publicly). When they arrived in the forest, however, they were met with an angry buffalo, which in Edwine's description, pierced his brother's lower gut so severely that his intestines were hanging out of his body while they carried him back to the village. Fortunately, they were able to rush the young man to the hospital, and he survived. I could tell from the way that Edwine told the story that he was genuinely traumatized from this experience. Buffalo in the mountain forests are certainly to be heeded!

[153] On the other side of the Esimangore mountains (east and northeast when facing the mountains from Saburi) is a sizeable hunting block, but this was beyond the scope of my study.

challenging to access by vehicle, and offers no revenue in return. The result is that the property is technically state owned, but managed by local herders as seasonal pasture.

Similar cases exist elsewhere as well. In Lolkisale, a sizeable area was allocated for settler farms during the colonial era, then leased out to Sluis Brothers LTD following independence for commercial bean seed production. Given the challenges of growing beans in an area that includes migratory wildlife and infrequent rainfall, much of this farm has since been converted back to pasture for livestock keeping. Some areas are still kept aside for crop production, and the current owners at the time of my fieldwork specialized in bean seed multiplication in these remaining areas. Despite the significant consequences that commercial farms have had for the Maasai in terms of land alienation, my Arusha and Kisongo interviewees in Nafco and Lolkisale reported having good relations with these owners, who have generally taken an interest in supporting the livelihoods of the neighbouring communities. Several interviewees described forging informal agreements with the owners to access pastures for grazing. The arrangements typically involved a fee of one cow in exchange for a season's access to the pastures. Local herders are content with these terms, especially because they fit within a customary mode of economic exchange. Once again, the legal status of the land does not directly translate into practice on the ground, as informal arrangements are negotiated between rights holders and those who seek access to the resources. Conflicts do still occur, as was evident in a publicly accessible court appeal proceeding from August 2020. The case involved a livestock keeper from one of the neighbouring villages allegedly damaging 20,000,000Tsh (~11,000CAD) worth of beans and water sources through negligent livestock keeping (termed "malicious damage to property") sometime in 2009 (see High Court of Tanzania, 2020:2). The livestock keeper was convicted to two months in jail by the Monduli District Court, and his cows were confiscated and sold to compensate the victim in 2010. However, the livestock keeper successfully appealed this decision and the 20,000,000Tsh (8600USD) was returned to him. He then counter-sued the owners for specific and general damages, which he also won. The case

reveals that informal arrangements for managing access to land can sometimes still require involved actors to clarify the legal status of their property rights and utilize the formal institutions of the state to resolve emergent conflicts. Nonetheless, this appears to be a relatively minor case, the details of which are not entirely clear from the public proceedings. In the grander scheme, it is generally apparent that local herders seem to appreciate the mutually agreed upon price of a single head of cattle in exchange for seasonal grazing access.

The ethnographic complexities of land and property in the Makuyuni and Lolkisale areas reveal some limitations with a traditional territorialization framework (operationalized in Chapter 1), which sometimes assume that top-down processes of reconfiguring territory on paper translate into practice. Much of the time, however, they do not. While the consequences of land alienation have been significant for the Kisongo in the area, there is a risk in overemphasizing the theoretical components of these restrictions while understating the ways in which people manage the effects on their everyday lives. That is to say that the tendency to focus on structural constraints should not come at the expense of addressing the *agency* of pastoralists to forge new pathways to secure their livelihoods. If taken at face value, 'fortress' conservation narratives in northern Tanzania imply that changes in land tenure have created literal walls around key areas for grazing, leading to physical enclosures of landscapes at the expense of pastoralists (Bluwstein 2018; Bluwstein et al. 2018; Brockington 2002). The realities on the ground, however, are much more complex and nuanced. As illustrated by these cases in rural Monduli, territorialization in practice is shaped by ongoing negotiations between those who have been formally administered rights to resources, and those who seek access. This renders territorialization an incomplete and inconsistent process that is largely contingent upon management institutions in practice.

4.4 Maasai social institutions for rangeland management in contemporary Tanzania

While the Kisongo seem to have no shortage of customary institutions for managing grasslands, it is important to note that their traditions have come under pressure since colonial times as a consequence of wider political and economic circumstances. LaRocque's (2006) thesis, based on

fieldwork with Kisongo and Arusha communities in rural Monduli, speaks to an alienation-induced transition away from communally-managed rangelands towards smaller areas that are used in more intensive ways.[154] As discussed in the previous chapter, key drivers of this process have been national park formation, settler farming, and villagization, each of which limited pastoral mobility and dispossessed (to some extent) herders of access to water and pasture. Pastoralists have since been faced with a choice to continue grazing their livestock in smaller areas, or diversify. Conversion of pastures to rain-fed farms has become a key alternative (or complement) to a pastoral system that is handcuffed by macro-political context. But in some cases, livestock-keeping persists in fragmented areas without adequate mobility, putting pastures at risk of overgrazing. This is not a product of Hardin's tragedy of the commons, but rather a consequence of institutional constraint, sedentarization, and land alienation. These trends seem to be particularly apparent in Arusha-dominated villages in Monduli, but also in some of the Kisongo ones, depending on whether there are village-level communal grazing plans that are regulated and enforced by community-members. In some instances, traditional range management practices have deteriorated in the face of restricted access to pastures. In Naitolia, for instance, there is a CCRO-protected grazing area, but the grasslands are relatively unproductive compared to those in nearby Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch where grazing plans are tightly enforced by VGS rangers.[155] As discussed in Chapter 1, grasslands that are *actively* managed through livestock-keeping tend to be highly productive, but those areas that have seen breakdowns in customary management practices may become subject to overgrazing.

There are other chains of connections at play as well. An essential prerequisite for the pastoral Kisongo mode of production is the social subscription to the age-set system, which underpins their society. Central to this is the division of labour across the ages, with young men

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[154] As his Maasai interlocutors described, "the land is getting smaller."
[155] These statements are based on interviews with TPW rangeland officers.

playing a vital role as the *ilmurran* warrior class.[156] *Ilmurran* typically herd cattle, as they are

among the physically strongest and fittest members of the society.[157] Herding is the lifeblood of

the pastoral way of life and requires a considerable amount of skill, training and expertise,

acquired through practice. Herders must be able to guide large groups of (at times unruly)

animals away from dangers like highway crossings, large carnivores, cattle rustlers, and other

people's farms. Despite their significance to the economic system, there is a trend in Maasailand

of young men migrating from their rural homes to urban centres to enter the cash economy

through wage labour.[158] Young Maasai men seem drawn to *askari* (security guard) positions,

perhaps owing to their reputations as strong and intimidating warriors. These processes of

labour-related domestic migration are generally not one-way departures from rural life, but often

involve some form of circular mobility where the young men return to their communities from

time to time. Even if they do not physically return, they often send money home via MPesa

(digital money transfer) to support their families or purchase livestock. As Allegretti (2018)

describes, the interface between rural and urban life in Tanzania has become more intimate with

the construction of highways and the emergence of mobile telephone networks and digital money

transfer platforms. Nonetheless, there are labour-related consequences for the pastoral mode of

production as these young men have historically been in charge of herding livestock. For the

young men who decide to leave, urban centres seem to be associated with an "allure" of new

economic possibilities, and an imagined future that is somehow 'better' than rural life. I thought

of this on one occasion in particular as Edwine, Soippey and I sat together near the shop in

Oltukai after finishing our morning segment of interviews in September, 2019. Together we

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[156] Historically, this set was responsible for leading raids on rival groups and defending people and livestock from external threats. In a contemporary context, physical violence is largely prohibited as the modern state retains what Weber (1919:396) refers to as the "monopoly on the legitimate use of force."

[157] While younger boys often herd as well, they generally do so with oversight and protection from *ilmurran*.

[158] I have documented a similar trend in the Makonde community in Mtwara, Tanzania, where I worked previously. Young men in that context often leave for Dar es Salaam "in search of a good life," later taking up jobs as roadside traders. These men are colloquially referred to in the city as "*Wamachinga*," a kiSwahili appropriation of the English phrase "marching men" (see Raycraft 2019c).

drank warm sodas and listened to Diamond Platinumz, a Tanzanian popstar who takes inspiration from mainstream Nigerian music, and whose songs are mastered on a high budget by well-known South African and Dutch producers. In the song, Diamond sings about women, cars, big houses, and fancy jewelry and I could not help but reflect on the juxtaposition to the serenity of rural life in Oltukai. Contrary to '*Bongo flava*,' an unapologetically Tanzanian 'home-grown' sound, brewed in back-alley studios in the slums in Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam, which speaks to the trials and tribulations of everyday life in rural Tanzania, Diamond's song idealized Euro-American values like private property and fancy luxuries. Cities, I believe, come to occupy a place of mind for young Maasai men, representing potential gateways to the exciting life described by Diamond. This vision of a 'good life' is less constrained by the practicalities of rural life and the strict traditions of generations past. But as explained to me by a respected elder in Saburi, there is also irony to this way of thinking. By taking up work as security guards in town, who open and close doors at all hours of the day, the social worlds of these young men can perhaps also become smaller. In some cases, the individual profits gained from work as a security guard, often in the vicinity of 100,000Tsh (50-60USD) per month, pale in comparison to the value of a herd that grows over time and pays consistent dividends in the form of milk. Herds buffer against food insecurity, environmental uncertainty, and economic hardship and reflect a highly productive way of utilizing rangeland resources. Fundamental to the system, however, is the social acceptance of shared institutions that weave the livelihood concerns of kin together, rather than parse them apart; the young men must play their social role as herders.

In a contemporary context, there is no dichotomy between those who stay and herd and those who migrate in search of formal employment. Money earned in town is often reinvested into the livestock economy and used to enhance household food security. The exact economic implications of swapping young labourers for cash in pastoral communities would require a more rigorous economic analysis than I am positioned to make. What is clear ethnographically, however, is that pastoral labour arrangements are undergoing social change.

In broad terms, there does not seem to be a net shortage of young men willing to work within the livestock economy.[159] A herder can be arranged irrespective of kinship ties in exchange for room (his own boma) and board (generally a chai and *ujii*-based diet, with the occasional serving of meat from time to time), and the promise that, when the time comes for the young herder to marry, the owner of the boma will contribute to paying his bride price in the form of cattle. Wealthier pastoralists can generally afford these prices and are thus able to secure herders fairly efficiently. But for some less wealthy families, offering to pay a bride price for a hired herder without kinship ties can represent a greater economic barrier to engaging the herder. In these cases, young men born into their families must play a central role in herding the livestock, and, in such cases when they leave for town to pursue other opportunities, the burden often falls on children who are not experienced enough to manage large herds of livestock. Traditionally, children take on modest roles in managing small stock in grazing areas near the boma, or in fairly safe and secure pastures. But managing large herds of cattle requires far more expertise. Guiding cattle through dangerous terrain like Manyara Ranch, where predators are numerous, is a tall task. Children, after all, are easily bored, distracted, and generally unable to grasp the full implications of the projects they are tasked with. In a few instances, I observed a couple children as young as four or five years old tasked with watching over a herd of a hundred or so cattle in Manyara Ranch and I could not help but wonder how they would defend the herds (and themselves!) from predators. During interviews in Lolkisale, several of the Swahili-speaking cultivators expressed resentment of Arusha livestock keepers for continually grazing their cattle on people's farms. Within a few weeks of arriving in Lolkisale, I witnessed an incident where a middle-aged mother came running outside screaming at a young boy, not much older than four years old, who was standing in the middle of her farm picking his nose while his herd of a dozen cows trampled her one acre farm of maize. She was furious, berating the boy for not paying more attention as he stared blankly back at her. As the boy looked over in my

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[159] Formal education has also complicated the scenario and led to greater reliance on hired labour.

direction, he caught a glimpse of the sub-village chair walking towards him. Realizing the predicament he was in, he turned and bolted, abandoning the cows in the process! At the time, I could not help but laugh as I watched this young fellow panic, but my laughter quickly dissipated as the sub-village chair roared at the neighbours to grab the boy before he could disappear, which they did. Two men accompanied the boy back, each holding one arm as they brought him before the sub-village chair. They looked like bailiffs bringing a prisoner to court. The chair proceeded to call the boy's father to arrange a meeting between families to discuss the issue. What I had initially thought to be a somewhat comical event turned out to be a rather serious conflict requiring intervention and mediation from various parties in the community.

Grazing issues seemed to be a fairly consistent concern across the study villages. On one occasion in Mswakini Juu as we sat in the shade behind our vehicle awaiting the start of our friend's wedding, a Korianga-aged Kisongo man called over two young boys of perhaps six or seven years and proceeded to beat them with his stick. The beating did not appear particularly concerning, and I could tell that he was holding back strength as he tried to frighten the young boys into submission. I asked what they had done to warrant this punishment, and he explained that they had grazed livestock in areas that were supposed to be kept for the extreme dry season. Preserving some pastures for dry season grazing is one of the key traditional institutions for managing rangelands for the Kisongo. By designating dry season gazing areas, the Kisongo are able to buffer against the insecurities of drought, a potentially devastating situation for the livestock economy. Dry season grazing banks should not be utilized when there is still rainfall available, and transgressing this norm is highly punishable. For experienced herders, this social norm has become well entrenched in their minds to the point where it is common knowledge and rarely transgressed. For children, however, who lack the experience and long-term understanding of the challenging environmental conditions in which pastoralism operates, these concerns are not as paramount. Of course, children are likely to remember such beatings through operant conditioning and may subsequently refrain from transgressing these norms in the future. But the

true consequences of their actions are not what guides their behaviours, only the acute punishments they receive.

Grazing norms are intrinsic to the sociocultural fabric of Maasai society. They hold power, not unlike the coercive influences outlined by Durkheim (1895) in his theorization of social facts, but perhaps more similar to Malinowski's (1926) discussion of the economic necessities of livelihood that instill in members of society shared stakes in the maintenance of social order. Custom, according to Malinowski (1926), was not an all-encompassing source of coercive power, but rather a practical set of social relations that functioned within the context of a material economic system. Following an interview at his home in Nanja in June 2020, Alais Morindat, an occasional spokesperson for the Northern Tanzania Rangelands Initiative (NTRI), reiterated the lasting importance of Maasai grazing norms. He described to me in detail the way that each household in his community demarcates reserve grasses near their homesteads for the dry season.[160] In 2018, Alais' community faced an issue when one of his neighbours had refused to conserve the grasses outside his homestead. In Alais' description, this fellow was a recent migrant to the area and "a self-centered drinker" who did not appreciate the significance of collective institutions. To address the issue, village leaders held community meetings, almost mirroring an intervention of sorts, to express concern that the man was squandering the resources that would sustain his livestock in the dry season. The community representatives were genuinely looking out for this fellow by tabling the matter, but he instead interpreted it as a personal attack. The man brushed aside their concerns and maintained that he would use his own grasses how he saw fit and that it was none of their business. Unfortunately, when the dry season inevitably arrived, he was left without a grazing bank to buffer his cattle against starvation. He then returned to these same community members "with his tail between legs" asking for forgiveness and permission to graze his livestock in their reserved areas. The community held

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[160] The NTRI is an initiative headed by the Nature Conservancy that draws together rangeland governance stakeholders in northern Tanzania.

another meeting to discuss the situation again. After some deliberation, they explained to the man that he had been "full of pride" during the wet season, without thinking of the future and the effects that his actions would have on other community members. As a result, when the dry season arrived, he was left with "only his pride." The punishment was fitting of the crime: the man would not be allowed to graze his stock on other people's reserve grass. Rather, he would have to "eat his pride." Many of the man's cattle died that year, as he suffered the consequences of a challenging dry season with no support from other community members. As Alais's story illustrates, the Maasai have no shortage of customary institutions for managing rangeland resources. Like other common property regimes, these institutions outline the "duties" and "responsibilities" of rights holders to themselves, and to each other, for the purposes of managing resources (see Bromley 1992; Galaty 2016b).

While these institutions still thrive in many situations, there are instances where they fall short of accomplishing their goals and (from the perspectives of pastoralists) could potentially benefit from the added strength of formalization. As we walked outside after our interview, Alais directed my attention to the large dam at the foot of the low-lying mountains southwest of his home. I remarked that it must be nice for his livestock to have a consistent water source so close to his home, to which he replied that it was actually a great challenge. The problem with the dam, according to Alais, was that it was difficult to regulate access to it through community-level institutions. While streams, rivers, and pump systems are fairly straightforward to manage at the levels of clans and families, large open water sources are a different story. Herders often come from afar to access these types of water resources, in so doing increase grazing pressure on community lands. Somewhat surprisingly, Alais remarked that his community had been lobbying for the establishment of a WMA in this area so that local pastoralists could harness the institutional support of VGS rangers to help enforce outsiders from entering their community and using local resources. To be clear, the issue from the perspective of the community was not about

blocking outside herders from entering, but in building up institutional capacity to regulate access to resources when herders begin to converge on the area.

One of the key complications with the Maasai pastoral system is that exclusion costs for managing boundaries on grazing resources are generally high (Galaty 2016b). Furthermore, ethnicity, used here to refer to shared ties across Maasai sections, entitles Maasai herders to rather generous reciprocal grazing rights in different geographical areas. This is especially true in times of drought, when mobility becomes a necessity (Galaty 2016b; McCabe 2004).[161] These forms of reciprocity are on the one hand highly adaptive in semi-arid rangeland environments, given the uneven distribution of productive resources across space and time. While one locality may have verdant rangelands at one time, another area may have good grass later in the year, so sharing access to these pastures in a flexible manner is an effective strategy. On the other hand, however, this tradition of reciprocity can create stress in the receiving areas, particularly considering the cumulative effects of alienation, fragmentation, and sedentarization stemming from political context. The customary institution of reciprocal mobility developed prior to colonialism when pastoral frontiers still reigned supreme, but is less adapted to the fragmented political context in which pastoralism is now forced to operate. This can lead to increased pressure on communities if herders converge from elsewhere, while leveraging the social capital of their Maasai ethnicity.

The issue, of course, is far from black and white, and the benefits of these reciprocal movements greatly outweigh the downside from the perspectives of Maasai pastoralists. The key usually seems to be management-in-practice, which from the perspective of the Maasai should involve negotiation, discussion, flexible enforcement of rules and regulations, and above all else respect (*enkanyit*). The tendency within Tanzania, I believe, has been to disregard these nuances in favor of strong-handed restrictions on pastoral mobility altogether. As a consequence, Maasai

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[161] McCabe (2004) refers to Turkana pastoralists, but similar principles apply in Maasailand. See also McCabe (1990a) for discussion of the effects of drought on pastoral institutions.

social institutions for managing rangelands have come under threat from external influences. In a notable example, the Tanzanian government recently restricted the cross-border movement of Maasai herds moving from Kenya into Tanzania. Rather famously, the late President Magufuli confiscated and auctioned over a thousand head of Kenyan cattle, arguing in a nutshell that Tanzanian rangelands were not a 'free for all' for herders from other countries to use. However, his stance misunderstood the historical ethos of reciprocal ethnic ties across Maasai sections. As such, the formal policy from above did not effectively synergize with customary strategies on the ground, and thus this political intervention likely reduced pastoral resilience.[162] Despite the border restrictions, Maasai from other sections do still migrate with their cattle south from Kenya into Longido, across Monduli to Nanja, southwest into Lolkisale and south to the Simanjiro plains, but they do so somewhat surreptitiously. In times of severe drought, however, discretion is thrown to the wind and large herds from Kenya arrive in areas where pastures remain, including the Manyara area, where tensions sometimes rise between government authorities, local communities and herders from afar over access to scarce resources. While scarcity can lead to both conflict and cooperation, in such instances, the stress on local institutions for managing rangelands can be immense, and conflicts have been known to occur if cattle is dying in large numbers. This was the case in the 2005 and 2009 droughts.

The situation is made increasingly difficult by the inflexibility of the central government's stance on national parks. If, for instance, national parks allowed pastoralists access to 50km of grazing area inside park boundaries in times of drought, the number of conflicts would likely be reduced substantially. Rather, the rigid boundaries that are fixed across space and time make it challenging for pastoralists to maintain resilience. Evidently, there are multi-

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[162] Resilience is defined here in terms of pastoralists' abilities to adapt and cope with environmental stressors at a group level without being forced to adopt a different economic system altogether. For recent discussion of pastoral resilience in changing political and environmental contexts see: (Leslie et al. 2013; Konaka and Little 2021; Little 2021; Pollini and Galaty 2021).

scalar issues at play in terms of pastoral institutions, some of which are still practiced and upheld, and others that have come under fire from wider political and economic influences.

In reality, when pastoralists are faced with the choice of letting their cattle die or transgressing grazing restrictions, herders often elect for the lesser of two evils: risking potential fines in spite of the rigid conservation policies. This poses a particular challenge for grasslands inside national parks because these pastures are not subject to institutions for their management, either by the state, NGOs, or community-level customs. Grazing inside national parks is technically considered illegal. As a consequence, the quality of grasslands inside national park boundaries in Tanzania is contingent upon the capacity of TANAPA rangers to enforce universal grazing restrictions across a vast territory. This is not always feasible in practice in the face of limited social and financial resources. According to the Director of Serengeti National Park, this can sometimes create conditions for overgrazing and grassland degradation, as is the case in the western parts of Serengeti National Park where unregulated livestock encroachment has led to decline in the ecological productivity of grasslands. My suspicion is that these instances contribute to entrenched ways of thinking about livestock-keeping across government actors. The prevailing sentiment seems to be that livestock keepers degrade natural environments, when in actuality the key nuance is that *unregulated* livestock keeping in a fixed area can lead to degradation. Put differently, in the absence of property, defined here as a social instrument for regulating access to resources, livestock keeping can lead to declines in rangeland productivity, following Hardin's logic of an open access 'tragedy of the commons.' But for Maasai pastoralists, their grazing patterns have never truly been unregulated, being subjected instead to common property institutions at the group level which serve to maintain the productivity of the material base. The extractable line of thinking from the perspective of government and conservationists seems to be that the simple solution to rangeland issues is to separate people from nature by prohibiting livestock grazing altogether. Rather ironically, their attempts to do so likely dispossess pastoral communities of their traditions of stewardship by changing the

property relations of the area from common to open access, though the title of state (or private) owned property may remain on paper. The more equitable approach of including pastoralists in rangeland conservation policies is likely the most practical way forward, as it recognizes that livestock keeping is not in and of itself a driver of degradation insofar as it is subject to management institutions. This has historically been the case in Maasailand in spite of a century of colonial and post-independence development policies that sought to systematically dismantle the pastoral way of life.

The point I am trying to emphasize, and one that has been reiterated to me by Makko on several occasions, is that securing land tenure is not the 'end all be all' solution to the plight of pastoralists in a contemporary context. Rather, it may well be a crucial first step that sets the stage for traditional management practices to be maintained, and in some cases revitalized. There is an interdigitated chain of social, political, and economic connections that bear on rangeland management within pastoral society in relation to external factors. Returning to the question of CCROs raised in Section 4.2, CCROs are perhaps best thought of as a first step. On one occasion in the lobby of Lodge Tellamande in Arusha, where I sometimes stayed to recoup after a few weeks of remote camping, Makko told a story of a Maasai community in Simanjiro that UCRT had assisted in registering their formal (group-level) CCRO. Community leaders called Makko in the night in distress because artisanal miners had entered their territory and begun mining operations. Mining presents a complicated predicament for property relations, as sub-surface mineral rights can be allocated separately from tenure rights to the land above. Of particular significance here is the question of how these competing rights are enforced in practice. The callers in this case felt that the CCRO legitimized their community's claim and asked UCRT staff to come help them deal with the miners. Makko, however, calmly told them: "better get your sticks," implying that the CCRO did not have any real "power" in this context for keeping out the intruders. It was simply a piece of paper that could not be wielded in physical defence of land! We shared a chuckle at this, but the point is quite a significant one – that land tenure that is

written in formal law does not always mirror what happens on the ground in practice (see Galaty 2016b). In the context of wildlife corridors, for instance, the legislation is fairly clear that human settlement and activities (including livestock grazing and cultivation) are strictly prohibited inside areas demarcated as corridors. But in reality, these laws are very difficult to enforce. Taking the Kwakuchinja Wildlife Corridor as an example, the in-migration of Arusha into the area in the 1960s and beyond coincided with the villagization movement and, consequently, these domestic in-migrants later gained formal rights to these areas through the Village Land Act. The question of which governmental body will actually enforce the corridor laws in practice is challenging, as in a contemporary context these are technically village lands, a title that carries significant weight.

In the case of WMAs and other reserve areas, while the land use plans may be detailed on paper, the question of how these laws are put into practice and actually enforced on the ground is another question altogether (Bluwstein and Lund 2018). Often conservation areas, whether community-based or not, require specialized experts to prepare the management plans through the use of GIS technology and other scientific methodologies that rural communities are not privy to (Lund 2015). So the disconnection between the territorialization of property relations in theory and in practice are frequent (Raycraft 2019a). However, in such cases where they reflect capacity for enforcement on the ground, as is the case in Randilen WMA through training and support received from Honeyguide, the potential impact on local communities and their relationships with resources can be marked. If they are administered in strong-handed ways with little governance input from communities, they can breed discontent and resistance in such cases where communities feel disempowered. But in such cases where communities feel that their interests are represented by the management plans, and those who enforce them, communities may actually be empowered by conservation. This is what I have observed to be occurring in Randilen WMA.

By contrast, communal areas without formalized institutions for management can be appropriated by domestic elites with economic and political capital. This became quite clear in April 2020 in Makuyuni village when a grazing conflict unfolded in *Ndoroboni*. As mentioned earlier, *Ndoroboni* was formerly part of Steyn's bean seed plantation, but after independence, the lease was canceled and the land was redesignated as village land. The Kisongo in Saburi sub-village lobbied for the area to be kept open as communal pasture for local livestock-keepers. UCRT assisted in producing a collaborative land use plan and the community decided that they would not carry out any activities in that area other than grazing. As such, it was not settled by cultivators and continues to be an important pasture for pastoralists in Makuyuni and neighbouring villages. *Ndoroboni* borders Randilen WMA, and, originally, was included inside the proposed WMA area. Makuyuni, however, was later dropped from the WMA proposal due to a lack of community support (see Chapter 6). As a communal pasture in village land, villagers collectively determined how the area would be managed through village government structures. The current management plan at the time of writing permits grazing in some areas during the wet season (from April-May), but restricts access to key areas that are reserved as dry season grazing banks (June-September).

In April 2020, a mixed Iraqw and Barabaig man caused a stir in *ndoroboni* by disregarding its village management plan. Given his mixed ethnicity, the local Maasai refer to him as *mang'ati* ("enemy" in Maa) and point to Karatu as his original homeland, though he actually arrived from the Babati District of the Manyara Region.[163] Through connections with the *Katibu Taarafa*, he was able to establish residence in Makuyuni without following the standard protocols through village government.[164] He brought with him herds of approximately 240 cattle

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[163] *Ilmang'ati* is also used generally by the Maasai to refer to Barabaig people.

[164] *Katibu Taarafa* are colloquially thought of in rural villages as "special agents" who wear plain clothes, but who represent the central government and monitor everyday activities at the village level. *Taarafa* refers to division, an administrative level that is technically above the ward, but below district and region. *Katibu Taarafa* are known to represent President Magufuli's interests. In a sense, the fellow described here represents the "eyes of the state" in Makuyuni Division. His jurisdictional authority supersedes that of the village chair and *Mtandaji* (Village Executive

and 120 shoats, which in my interlocutors' description were "numerous and healthy." Local Maasai consider him to be a "powerful" fellow who is physically strong, wealthy, and, most importantly, well-connected politically. To support his private interests in maintaining a healthy and sizeable herd, he began grazing his livestock inside the reserved area of *Ndoroboni*, and even established a seasonal homestead (*ronjo*) in the pasture. He was quickly confronted by members of the village environmental committee who informed him that he was grazing in a prohibited area and that there would be consequences for such actions. In response, he bribed them, paying each member of the committee 200,000Tsh shilling (100$) to look the other way while he continued to graze his livestock in the area. Local Kisongo and Arusha, however, were irate about this transgression and the corruption that accompanied it. After fielding numerous complaints from villagers, the village chair, a well-liked (and in my view) honest leader who cares about the interests of his community at large, decided to override the village environmental committee, which had become corrupted. He arranged for a group of fifty Nyangulu (youngest warrior Maasai age-set) to travel on motorbikes to Ndoroboni and push the man and his livestock out of the area. When the warriors arrived, they found the man sharpening a spear. He raised it above his shoulder in a gesture of aggression, and yelled that if anyone touched his livestock, he would kill them. While he was indeed a convincingly tough man (Landiis age) with a strong Nyangulu-aged son at his side, the warriors simply laughed. They asked him diplomatically what he thought would happen if he killed one of them. Before awaiting his answer, they calmly informed him that they would respond by killing both him and his son. Realizing the gravity of his situation, the man lowered his spear and beckoned one of his wives from inside his boma to bring him some milk. The warriors waited patiently while he sat there drinking his milk and pondering what to do. After a few minutes, he stood up and conceded, saying to the warriors "okay, take my livestock where you need to and let's go." The warriors yelled that they were

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Officer). Villagers are aware of who these individuals are. Powerful elites sometimes form strategic relationships with *Katibu Taarafa* through bribery to secure special privileges that serve their private interests.

going to bring his livestock "all the way back to Karatu!" Of course, these were empty threats, and the livestock were brought to Makuyuni town and locked inside the central pen at the cattle market.

Though the issue seemed to be coming to a natural end, it was essentially only beginning. Prior to the arrival of the warriors, the man had gotten wind of the village chair's plan to send the *ilmurran* to push him out, so he made a call to the *Katibu Taarafa* who lives in Makuyuni. The *Mang'ati* man paid off the *Katibu Taarafa*, who arranged for the release of his livestock. Taking the matter one step further, the *Katibu Taarafa* also sanctioned the arrest of the village chair, along with one of my friends who was giving him a ride on his motorbike at the time (and who was coincidentally tasked with administering one of my surveys in the village). They were publicly apprehended and put in the local jail on charges of inciting unrest.

Several villagers recall the scene in Tanzanite as the Katibu Taarafa, between swigs of *konyagi*, yelled at the police over the phone to catch the village chair and lock him up until the *Mang'ati* man's livestock had been released.[165] When confronted by other patrons about why he would make such a call, his above-the-table reason was that the village chair had sanctioned violence and the arrest was meant to deter the *Mang'ati* man from suing the village chair for damages. The under-the-table reason was the bribe paid by the *Mang'ati* man.

Villagers were outraged by this act of corruption and tensions immediately began to rise. Within the hour, between 50-100 villagers stormed the police station in defiance. For a few moments, it seemed it might escalate into chaos as a few of my friends were also threatened with potential arrest. One of my key interlocutors in Makuyuni detailed to me why the villagers had taken to open protest:

> By arresting the chair, the police are telling the people that this village has no leader. But the police must follow the rules established by the village government. They cannot throw our leader in jail for defending the community. The village chairman has the authority

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[165] Konyagi is a Tanzanian distilled spirit alcohol similar to gin.

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here, and is nominated and elected by the people. He must fulfil his work to the villagers

by responding to their problems.

When my interlocutor forwarded this rationale to his fellow community members, the police accused him of himself inciting unrest, which is considered by the government to be an offence. In response, he said,

No, I am not mobilizing people. I am just pointing out that you made a mistake. You

arrested our leader improperly. I am not inciting protest, but if you think I am then catch

me as you caught the village leader. See how the villagers respond then.

Realizing that the situation was escalating, the *katibu taarafa* decided to advise the police to release the chair. My interlocutors have suggested to me that this decision was based on self-interest as he was worried that the situation might get out of hand and ultimately "come back to bite him." By most accounts, he had been drinking rather heavily when he made the initial call for the arrests. After he was released, the village chair held a private conversation with the *katibu taarafa* where they resolved their differences, after which he addressed the villagers through the following public speech,

You brought a claim to me as the village chair. What was I supposed to do other than to

solve your problem? I stood up for your problem. And I still stand up for it. These

livestock are not going back to Ndoroboni! They won't go back! I will be with you until

the end of this problem.

The villagers rejoiced at this speech and I regularly heard supportive refrains for a few weeks in people's everyday discourses ("He is a great leader! We really trust him").

Ultimately, the situation was resolved and the *mang'ati* man was prohibited from returning to *ndoroboni* to graze. The issue, however, again highlights a key issue in the context of communal pastures: how precisely will their regulations be enforced in practice? While the foreign herder was ultimately pushed out of the area, it was not without significant conflict and political unrest that threatened to destabilize the entire village. Village-level institutions, like

monitoring by the village environmental committee, were co-opted through bribery.[166] Attempts to enforce community norms through the force of warriors brought the community into conflict with the state's "monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force" (Weber 1919:396), which created further fodder for the wealthy herder to sway the situation in his favor. Thus, despite the presence of shared rules and responsibilities by community members, these institutions were vulnerable to appropriation. As I will unfold in Chapter 7, similar issues that occurred within Randilen WMA were handled by trained VGS rangers with 4x4 vehicles, weapons, and, most importantly, the jurisdictional authority to use force as necessary to enforce grazing regulations. Far from foreign rangers trained to 'police the community,' Randilen WMA VGS are all from member villages and are equipped to guard communal pastures from foreign herders who do not respect collective institutions. Thus, the formalization of grazing plans through the institution of the WMA can directly secure communal pastures that are otherwise difficult to defend.

4.5 Effects of different management strategies on vegetation ecology

While the social differences in formal and informal pasture management institutions were ethnographically visible to me through cases like the one in *ndoroboni*, variations in their environmental impacts on vegetation ecology are perhaps equally important. One of the key questions that I wanted to understand during fieldwork (though it was beyond my individual skillset) was how the quality of grass differed inside Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch, as compared to the community grazing areas in village land. My suspicion based on my observations and interviews with local pastoralists was that the grasslands were generally more productive inside the WMA and ranch. I was able to explore this question through collaboration with Tanzania People and Wildlife (TPW), a Tanzanian NGO that addresses rangeland

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[166] The term bribery can have multiple connotations. In East Africa, bribery is often seen as 'something small' (*kitu kidogo*), as small payments are often paid to those in positions of power to encourage them to carry out their duties as they should. Roadside police officers in Tanzania sometimes refer to these payments as "*baraka za mjini*" or "blessings from the city." In this case, bribery refers to a process of co-opting the usual course of justice for personal gain, and is considered by Tanzanians to be a more serious offence.

management through the lenses of traditional and scientific ecological knowledge.[167] TPW was one of the few NGOs whose teams I encountered regularly during fieldwork, other than Honeyguide and UCRT. Following a mantra to introduce myself to everyone I encountered in the field who seemed to be doing work that was relevant to my own, I quickly became acquainted with Kirerenjo Medukenya, a rangeland management program assistant and Loshiro Alais Morindat, a rangeland management officer, who were often working in the same villages as me at the same time. We became friends and I was impressed with their on-the-ground presence at the village level and their interactions with the communities. I caught up with Kirerenjo for a formal interview in Morogoro during the bi-annual Rangeland Society of Tanzania conference on March 23, 2020 when he explained to me in his own words the work that TPW does:

> TPW works across northern Tanzania, where we train villagers to build capacity on how to communally manage their rangelands. We accomplish this by integrating traditional ecological knowledge and scientific knowledge. We believe that pastoralists know a lot about how to manage rangelands, but due to technological change and globalization, people are forgetting. The pastoralists are forgetting those good ways of managing their rangelands. But we try to advise them on how to recover, or how to revitalize their strategies to manage their rangelands, because their rangelands are at very high risk now. So, we bring a focus on community pasture and rangeland monitoring.

In Kirerenjo's description, TPW recognizes that pastoral communities have traditionally had social institutions in place to manage their rangelands and tries to work collaboratively with them to bring these management techniques back to the fore. These strategies have historically involved rotational grazing practices and the enforcement of restrictions on accessing dry season grazing banks. But beyond these basic practices, which have generally persisted, Maasai pastoralists have historically had nuanced and refined ecological understandings of how to

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[167] They are also known more broadly in the international community as African People and Wildlife.

effectively manage rangelands through livestock keeping. These include knowledge of how cattle pick up and redistribute grass seeds to new areas, till them into the soil with their hooves, and fertilize them with their stool. Rangeland officers at TPW try to revitalize these traditional Maasai ways of knowing to improve rangeland management outcomes. They also assist communities by carrying out longitudinal rangeland monitoring and preparing inventories of invasive plant species to provide communities with scientific data that can be integrated into their pasture management plans. When I first met Kirerenjo, in the fall of 2019, he was working with four Kisongo men in Mswakini Juu to measure bare ground and grass height in a communal grazing area. Kirerenjo held a tablet in his hand as the men from the community gathered measurements of the grasses. I could sense immediately their genuine interest in learning about these scientific methods and working collectively towards improved quality of their communal pasture. After taking their measurements, they reported them to Kirerenjo who inputted them into a survey software program on a handheld tablet for documenting vegetation cover changes. Kirerenjo walked me through the survey, showing the various questions that it asked, such as the village, sub-village, sample site, basil cover, species identification, presence of invasive species, the palatability of each grass species, and the percentage of bare ground, the height of the grass, qualitative assessment of the grass quality, any notable observations and so forth. Emphasis in particular was on the basil cover and identifying species and determining which were palatable.

He acknowledged that there was some level of subjectivity to the process, as the survey enumerator must make interpretations and there can sometimes be variations in how individuals record such information. But it followed a specific methodology, and to me, it demystified an otherwise unknown process as to how environmental scientists can measure changes in vegetation cover. It was a very human process, and one that felt simple enough for a layperson like myself to understand. This, I believe, makes it accessible to the pastoralists with whom TPW works and who can take up the reins of this initiative to bring scientific tools for measurement into conversation with traditional ecological knowledge and cultural practices for managing

rangelands. Notably, TPW works in the communal grazing areas and the community-based

conservation areas, but not on individual private property, or national parks. By studying these

indicators on a monthly basis over a long period of time, TPW is able to track trends in the

quality of grass. This allows them to evaluate whether certain management practices are having

success, or in need of revision based on empirical evidence. After collecting their monthly data,

they process it using ArcGIS online and prepare a report, which they then discuss with the

village environmental committee during feedback meetings. TPW's rangeland management

officers often meet directly with the grazing sub-committee of each village and interpret the data

collaboratively, before proceeding with decision-making from there. In Maasai villages, the

rangeland team often works directly with traditional leaders to connect the scientific data with

the traditional governance structures for determining access to pastures for pastoralists. So in

Kirerenjo's words, the "core values" of the TPW rangeland management team shine through

their attempts to strike "a balance between community, science, and nature."

In such instances where declines in grassland quality are documented, TPW's rangeland

team attempts to understand what the drivers of these changes are. Deciphering the causes of

declines in grassland productivity is a difficult task considering the interwoven influences of

macro-political context, a changing climate, and community-level stocking practices. Attempting

to pinpoint a singular 'cause' of change can not only be challenging, but problematic, as it may

misconstrue a complex social-ecological reality (see discussion of disequilibrium dynamics in

Chapter 1). This is especially true if the period of observation is relatively short. In early 2020,

for example, the Arusha region saw significant levels of rainfall. In fact, climatologists later

concluded that it was one of the heaviest periods of rainfall ever on record in East Africa

(Wainwright et al. 2021). This caught some Tanzanians off guard, as it occurred when the short

rainy season was usually ending. Both large-scale commercial coffee farmers and smallholder

maize farmers complained to me of losing out on harvests, as planted crops were overwatered to

the point of rotting. Maize farmers had not yet had an opportunity to cultivate the land and plant

their crops before the large rains began to flood the landscape. From the perspectives of the pastoralists, however, the rainfall was particularly welcome. As I learned through a conversation with Loshiro at the village office in Naitolia in February 2020, the rainfall had led to significant improvements in the grass quality in TPW's study villages, both inside the communal grazing areas, and inside Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch. Rainfall, it seems, plays a vital role for the productivity of these rangelands, and this should never be overlooked in any discussion of the impact of grazing practices on rangeland quality.

Nonetheless, some comparisons can be drawn between the communal grazing areas in the villages and those inside Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch. Since the ranch and WMA neighbour the villages, rainfall is fairly consistent across these areas. A key point of difference is how these areas are managed. I continually wondered during fieldwork whether there were discernible differences in the quality of pastures across these areas that could be linked to differences in their respective institutions for management. TPW, having worked in both the village areas and reserved areas inside the ranch and WMA, was well positioned document these differences, so I posed this question to Kirerenjo during our interview. Kirerenjo explained that there were indeed variations, but these were perhaps more nuanced than my initial suspicions:

Yes, there are differences between the communal grasslands and the reserved lands. Within the villages, there are some areas that are protected by the communities, and the health and rangeland status is very good for those areas because they get time to rest, allowing the plants time to grow and produce seeds, and drop the seeds. Then once the animals come and graze though, at the beginning of the rainy season, when the rains first come, it's very easy for the grass to start to grow and the invasive species are very low. But for the open communal areas, when those lands are grazed continuously, the bare land is very high. Those areas are invaded by nonpalatable species, and actually, are very degraded. Generally, the reserved lands are good. They have more pastures and less issues with invasive species or bush encroachment, but at the same time, there is also reserved area

with high levels of bush encroachment. For example, Randilen WMA has some areas that

are highly encroached by invasive species, so we have a project going on there to find out

how to reduce the impact of those bush encroachments.

The nutshell message then, according to Kirerenjo, is that the reserved areas generally have good

quality grasslands with minimal degradation, but there are also some reserved areas with

considerable bush encroachment from nonpalatable invasive species.[168] In the communal areas,

direct connections between management and vegetation cover are visible when comparing those

areas that are actively protected by the communities and those which are continuously grazed

("open to all"). While these findings, then, are not dichotomous, they speak to a key

consideration: that management institutions likely play a key role in determining the productivity

of grasslands. The communal grazing areas that are actively managed have good forage, but

those that lack sufficient management generally have low productivity. Randilen WMA and

Manyara Ranch have considerable capacity for enforcing management restrictions. If their

management plans are aimed at protecting the productivity of the grasslands (rather than

exclusively focusing on wildlife conservation or ecotourism), then they may actually serve to

strengthen pastoral livelihoods, rather than undermine them. This, of course, depends upon

governance, and, more specifically, who is involved in setting the priorities for management and

who will retain access and use rights once the plan has been determined.

Detailed grazing plans, it would seem, are a crucial aspect of managing communal

pastures, whether inside conservation areas or outside them. The added benefit of Randilen

WMA and Manyara Ranch is that these plans can be translated into practice through the on-the-

ground enforcement of VGS rangers. VGS have the power to confiscate livestock and issue fines

of several hundred thousand shillings (a few hundred USD), and are particularly well equipped

to deal with livestock keepers who are not from the member villages. In a sense, then, the formal

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[168] Reserved areas in this context are referring to community-based conservation areas (in this case, Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch) and not to national parks or game reserves, which prohibit all livestock grazing activities.

institutional structures of Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch can serve important roles for enforcing rotational grazing restrictions that were once invaluable to the pastoral way of life prior to colonial influence. As discussed further in Chapters 6-9, they may not be fully community-based models of conservation per se, but they may also reflect considerable common ground between the interests of the central government in generating revenue from wildlife outside national parks, and those of pastoral communities in managing rangelands on a seasonal and rotational basis. In my view, one of the key misconceptions that seems to rear its head in the social science literature on wildlife conservation is that local communities are universally opposed to restrictions on their livelihood practices. This could colloquially be referred to as the "fines and fences" model of conservation as opposed to the "carrot" model which involves incentives for behavioural change. Restrictions are often framed as the antithesis of social well-being, serving only conservation objectives with little heed to the impacts on resource-dependent communities, but literature on property theory complicates this discourse. For pastoralists, restrictions on grazing and settlement practices have historically been essential to their economic mode of production, given people's shared reliance on common pool resources. For the Kisongo Maasai, these have included distancing bomas at least half a mile apart, not settling too close to sources of water, keeping dry season grazing banks and so on. The dangerous component of new environmental regulations, when implemented through the framework of conservation areas, is not that they restrict grazing, but that they do so in a way that is fixed across space and time (see Bluwstein 2019). Universal prohibitions on grazing, as is the case inside national parks and game reserves, are obviously highly detrimental to the livelihoods of pastoralists and often instill resentment. But there is also danger in utilizing GIS technologies to map out grazing and land use plans. While maps make clear the spatial aspects of environments, they struggle to encapsulate temporal, seasonal, and climatic variability (Bluwstein 2019). By contrast, however, grazing plans that are implemented through community-based conservation areas, based on an understanding of the varied grazing requirements of local pastoralists across seasons, are directly

in line with the traditional cultural practices of pastoralists. Strong enforcement of grazing plans in such cases is not antithetical to the interests of pastoral communities, but actually of direct benefit to the livestock economy.

The communal areas across the twelve villages where I worked have varied qualities of grasslands depending on the grazing plans that are in place. Lengoolwa has a communal grazing plan, but it has not yet been implemented. Loiborsoit, just southeast of Lolkisale in the Simanjiro District, has a well implemented grazing plan. By contrast, some of the communal areas in Mswakini and Naitolia lack plans and are quite degraded, though some are healthy according to Kirerenjo. Notably, these differences are irrespective of CCRO status. Interviews with villagers in Naitolia and Mswakini revealed that their most productive grazing areas are the grasslands in Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch. For the Kisongo villages of Oltukai and Esilalei, the pastoralists depend heavily on Manyara Ranch to graze their cattle during the dry season. They must rely intensively on village land during the wet season, and some of these areas are degraded according to Kirerenjo because the grass is grazed too early in its growth stage and is not given adequate time to mature. The ranch areas are saved for the dry season and essentially serve as a seasonal grazing bank.[169] As a result, they are in great condition. The grazing constraints faced by the Kisongo in the wet season are considerable, given the lasting effects of villagization and the numerous political boundaries that discourage pastoralists from moving freely across the land. Across the highway from Esilalei, the Kisongo face formal threats against grazing, though they have been able to secure access to pastures informally as discussed in Section 4.3. In particular, potential grazing prohibitions in the private conservancy, the ambiguous legal status

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[169] As discussed in Chapters 6-9, these areas have undergone numerous shifts in political classification and governance since the colonial period. Similar to Tarangire National Park, Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch include within their boundaries permanent water sources and critical drought pastures (see for example Goldman 2020 for discussion of pastoral resources on Manyara Ranch). These areas were generally unsettled by Kisongo and lightly utilized during the wet season due to tsetse fly infestations. Their roles as dry season grazing banks have become even more crucial in a contemporary context given the large-scale alienation of territory in Maasailand and sedentarization of pastoralists.

of Steyn's former commercial farmland in Saburi, the patchwork fragmentation of pastoral lands by in-migrating Arusha cultivators who have established small holding farms, and the two national parks of Lake Manyara and Tarangire contribute to a sense of alienation and being landlocked with livestock. Considering this, the fact that some of the wet season grazing areas in Oltukai and Esilalei are degraded is unsurprising, given the political constraints on grazing in the greater area. As quoted by LaRocque (2006) in his dissertation title, "the land is getting smaller" is a common refrain among the Kisongo in this area who are being forced to adapt to increasing constraints on their pastoral way of life. In reality, the land is not getting smaller, but access to it is becoming increasingly politicized for pastoralists. This is further complicated by emergent conflicts within Oltukai and Esilalei where social transformations have begun to occur as some individuals seem keen on converting pasture to agriculture in response to these challenges. The ethnographic complexities of this trend are discussed in Chapter 5. As Kirerenjo reminded me, cultivating pastures can make rangelands vulnerable to bush encroachment from invasive species.

The increasing limitations on pastoral use of communal grasslands in village land make the tightly regulated pastures inside Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA all the more vital to community livelihoods. When I asked Kirerenjo what the solution was for reducing the declines in productivity of wet season pastures in village lands, he replied that it is crucial to have detailed grazing plans that are protected by village bylaws and enforced with political will to ensure that people abide by the management model. This was echoed by Alais when discussing the issue of herders from afar converging on the pastures near the dam in Nanja. As mentioned in Section 4.4, in Alais' view, a WMA would be a welcomed intervention in that area to formally institutionalize his community's desire to *enforce* restrictions on livestock keepers who were not indigenous to the area and who had interests in using their local resources. His ideal vision of a WMA would not exclude external pastoralists simply because they were from other places, but rather it would require that they negotiate with his community at the discretion of the WMA

members. Clearly, the restrictions on grazing practices formalized by WMAs can be highly appealing to pastoralists as mechanisms for regulating access to, and use of, rangeland resources. Thus, if established equitably, they can become extensions of common property regimes.

4.6 The question of population growth

One of the issues that is consistently brought up by conservationists when discussing rangeland degradation in the communal areas outside protected areas is human and livestock population growth. The logic is that increasing numbers of livestock in a fixed area will ultimately lead to overstocking. This way of thinking is pervasive enough to become entrenched rhetoric and can serve as justification for removing pastoralists from reserves and national parks. The ideological assumption of these displacements is that natural environments must be insulated from the inevitable destruction brought about by human tendencies towards greed, growth, and individual prosperity. I am not convinced by the population growth argument, nor are many of the pastoralists I interviewed. The manager of Randilen WMA, Meshurie Melembuki, and I discussed this issue at length with Sam Shaba, the Program Manager at Honeyguide in October, 2019. At the time, we were taking a lunch break outside the WMA office near the main gate while working together on a background report for the upcoming SAGE IIED Governance and Equity workshop for Randilen. The breeze blew gently from across and above, as rock hyraxes (*Procavia capensis*) scurried across the granite outcropping just a few feet from our chairs. To my surprise, Meshurie asked me if I thought population growth was a problem in the Randilen WMA member villages, a question that I had been accustomed to posing, but not answering myself. Not knowing exactly how to situate my thoughts in that moment, I replied that I did not know and that I was still in the process of trying to understand how everything fit together. I suspect he was testing me to some extent, as conservation researchers often approach their studies through a particular ideological lens, and population growth is a particularly contentious issue. Jane Goodall, for instance, famed for her work with the chimpanzees of Gombe National Park in Western Tanzania, made waves at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in

January 2020 when she suggested that human population growth was to blame for the majority of the world's environmental problems. She implied that if human population had remained steady over the past 500 years, then many of these problems would never have occurred. She further posited that those that still did emerge would likely resolve naturally. Goodall took much backlash for these comments from social scientists in particular, who raised issues of race, class and social justice in response to suggest that her comments could disproportionately affect vulnerable and marginalized peoples around the world. Setting these critiques aside for a moment, the question of whether population growth, in and of itself, is the root of environmental problems is an intriguing one with long theoretical roots. According to 18th century Malthusian (1798) principles, human population will continue to grow exponentially (geometric growth), while food production will eventually be unable to keep pace (arithmetic growth) and crises will result in the form of disease, famine, and violent conflict. Ultimately, his principles were disproved by economists, with the most convincing counter-arguments highlighting human use of sophisticated technology, which allows human society to develop a mastery over natural environments and increase production and distribution, perhaps far beyond Malthus' wildest expectations. A key as well is that humans are not highly specialized in their environmental requirements, unlike other species. As generalists, humans are quite capable of adapting, through the use of technology, to adverse environmental conditions. Rather than diving further into the particularities of this theoretical discourse, my interest is in pointing out that what Malthus failed to take into account was technology, which I define here in general Encyclopedic terms as a set of methods, techniques, skills and processes used to achieve a particular objective.[170]

Management institutions, in my mind, are what disrupts the link between population growth and environmental problems.[171]

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[170] See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology

[171] Importantly, humans are large mammals with a significant ecological footprint that is generally magnified by technology on a global scale, rather than diminished. In the context of semi-arid rangelands used by pastoralists, however, the exact impact of humans on ecosystems is usually challenging to delineate.

Returning to my conversation with Meshurie, I dodged and reflected the question back at him, curious to know his thoughts on the matter. I was interested in his opinion as both a WMA manager who trained at Mweka College of Wildlife, and also as an Arusha community member from Mswakini Juu. Meshurie looked at me thoughtfully and suggested that we take the example of a wildlife corridor, another contentious subject in this area. From a conservation standpoint, ecological connectivity is vital to allow wildlife in the Tarangire ecosystem the opportunity to disperse outside the park seasonally. From the perspectives of local villagers, however, the corridors are a direct threat to their land rights and livelihoods and are vehemently opposed. Meshurie explained that, theoretically, a thousand pastoralists could live sustainably inside a corridor while providing adequate habitat for wildlife. Conversely, an equally possible scenario could exist where one ambitious person blocks an entire corridor with a large-scale commercial farm and high-grade fences around the property. The point that he was making is similar to what Malthus' critics were alluding to: that humans have innovative techniques for achieving certain objectives. In Meshurie's case, it is not population size that is the most important factor. Rather, the crucial detail is the way in which people use land, something that stems from the management plans that are in place for regulating access to, and use of, resources.

Meshurie's case, in actuality, is not entirely hypothetical. According to the maps produced by conservationists, the Kwakuchinja Wildlife Corridor passes through the villages of Minjingu, Olasiti, and Kakoye in the Babati District, and is now limited for the most part to the reserved areas of Burunge WMA. Minjingu, however, can hardly be considered an ecological corridor nowadays because it is blocked by a large-scale phosphate factory used to produce commercial fertilizers. The factory was literally built in the heart of the corridor, obstructing a once important wildlife route. With its establishment came the prospect of jobs and industry, and people began migrating to the area from elsewhere in Tanzania to capitalize on these opportunities. Eventually, this led to the creation of a small town. Urbanization was further exacerbated by the high flow of tourist vehicles heading to Tarangire National Park, which had

to turn off of the A104 highway onto the dirt road in neighbouring Olasiti.[172] The populations of Minjingu and Olasiti did indeed grow following the establishment of the factory, but more significantly than this, human settlements increased and land use change accelerated. These latter processes are what ultimately fragmented of the corridor (see Martin et al. 2019, 2020). Ecological connectivity issues in the area seem to arise from a few precise processes: 1) development-induced land use change, 2) the formation of urban centres in areas that were previously rural, 3) the conversion of common pastures to smallholder farms by in-migrants (depending on fencing and seasonal planting patterns), and 4) increases in unplanned human settlements as encroachers continue to lay claim to land. Contrary to the literature on fortress conservation, which implies that local communities could be displaced at any time in the name of wildlife conservation, this is actually quite difficult to put into practice in a contemporary context pursuant to the Village Land Act. Although arriving in the area relatively recently (in ecological terms), the lasting legacy of villagization entitles these migrants to land rights that are difficult to usurp through conservation legislations. By contrast, local communities with tightly managed land use plans could see their human populations rise while still not enclosing the landscape, as is observable in the Kisongo-dominated areas near Manyara Ranch, where the pastoralists have secured an interconnected livestock (and wildlife corridor) spanning Oltukai, Esilalei, Losirwa, Selala, all the way up to Natron. Up to a point then, population growth is not the source of the problem, but rather the institutional arrangements for governing and managing land.

Logically, one would think that there must be an upper limit to the number of people and livestock a *fixed* area can healthily sustain. The question of "limits" is often considered by conservationists under the umbrella phrase 'carrying capacity' (see Sinclair and Schaller 2010:xxi). Such discourses are often politically charged given what is at stake for pastoral communities. As discussed in Chapter 1, limits are difficult to determine, given environmental variabilities across space and time and the abilities of people to utilize technology and adapt to

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[172] Local Maasai often refer to Olasiti as Minjingu in their everyday discourse.

changing conditions. This is especially true in semi-arid rangeland environments. I am personally

not equipped to comment on where these upper limits might lie in practice for pastoral societies,

but my sense is that pastoralists themselves are acutely aware of how to operate economically in

relation to the environmental constraints around them. Livestock numbers do not rise

interminably, and often reach natural caps relative to the material base that sustains them.[173]

There are also countless examples of people worldwide altering or diversifying their livelihood

practices as needed to allow their mode of production to keep pace with a growing human

population. People are highly adaptable at the scale of communities, families and individuals.

Future generations, for instance, may simply decide to have fewer children leading to population

stabilization. There are plenty of other examples of human diversity that make it difficult to

assess what the actual "limits" of land are. What is sure not to occur as population rises is

Malthusian catastrophe.[174] A concern raised by conservationists that is perhaps more likely,

however, is that wildlife species with more specialized habitat requirements than humans may be

disproportionately affected by these processes of growth and change if they are less adaptable to

different environments. But under what circumstances would this actually occur? I suspect that

rangelands kept open by pastoralists would not marginalize wildlife in this fashion, though the

same cannot be said for large areas alienated by commercial agriculture. My point once again is

that carrying capacity, when applied to humans and their livelihoods, does not seem to be an

overly valuable term in and of itself, since what is really of importance is *how land is used.* A

common assumption sometimes forwarded by ecologists is that growing human populations in

East African rangelands invariably lead to rises in livestock numbers and in turn degradation, as

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[173] Despite the rhetoric that is being forwarded by conservationists concerned about the NCA, for instance, cattle numbers in Tanzania have held relatively stable over the past fifty years (see for example McCabe 2003b). Small stock numbers, however, have continued to rise, posing considerable problems for rangelands. Sheep are of particular concern because they eat grass seedlings that have not yet had adequate time to grow. For these reasons, sheep are prohibited from grazing in the Maasai Mara in Kenya. Goat meat is more commonly brought to market for roadside *nyama choma* ("grilled meat") restaurants than sheep, though the Maasai use sheep fat as *dawa* ("medicine") when sick with various ailments.
[174] Malthus speculated that disease, famine, or war would follow in such instances where human population growth exceeded production.

people are forced to expand into protected areas in the face of land scarcity. Human and livestock numbers in northern Tanzania, however, are generally detethered as each operate under a different set of constraints (see for example McCabe 2003b). Cattle numbers tend to correlate with rainfall, rising and falling around a general mean, while human populations continue to increase. The result of this disarticulation is a decrease in per capita livestock holdings, which has some cases led to increasing poverty and food insecurity, though these effects are confounded by diversification, macroeconomics, and the public policy landscape. What is becoming increasingly clear within the disequilibrium school of thought is that the health and productivity of semi-arid rangelands are shaped mainly by rainfall, rather than grazing pressure in and of itself (Behnke and Scoones 1993; Behnke et al. 1993).

When I posed the question of population growth to the pastoralists I interviewed across the twelve villages, there were only a handful who viewed it as a real concern. Most instead pointed to the benefits they received from having neighbours around to help them in times of need, and to enrich their social lives. While there were some that alluded to conflicts, especially when population growth was associated with in-migration of cultivators and tensions over land allocation in the village, the majority were markedly in support of increasing human populations in their areas. When asked about whether it was a driver of rangeland degradation, very few saw it as such, and I believe there is validity to these views if contextualized historically. Prior to the formation of administrative boundaries, protected areas, and commercial farms, when the land was an open frontier and mobility reigned supreme, the population growth of pastoralists was likely not a significant concern. Livestock numbers, as mentioned above, were curbed naturally by environmental factors like climatic conditions. It is important to remember that long before colonialism, the semi-arid rangelands of East Africa supported massive herds of wildlife. In fact, the grasses actually co-evolved with Pleistocene era herds of megafauna. Allan Savory's (2013) controversial TED Talk suggests that one of the simplest means of revitalizing degraded grasslands is to reintroduce cattle, which till the land, distribute seeds and fertilize the soil

naturally.[175] The key of course, is that the herds must move, as they historically have to ensure that seeds have time to drop, take root and grow before they can be grazed again, something which often happens naturally. "Overstocking" has really only become a problem in a contemporary context in East Africa as a consequence of the large-scale land use changes that surround pastoral lands and constrain herders from practicing the basic aspects of mobility that are so central to effective rangeland management. Considering this, I am once again left thinking that population growth is not actually the core conservation issue at stake in the communal areas around protected areas in Tanzania, but rather the need to implement and enforce land use plans that secure adequate grazing land and ensure the sustainable use of communal pastures in the face of increasing human settlements and land use change.

4.7 Strategic partnerships for governing and managing rangelands

This consideration has led to intriguing partnerships between pastoral communities, conservationists, and the NGOs which represent their interests.[176] The Nature Conservancy of Tanzania (TNC), for instance, does not operate within the boundaries of national parks or game reserves. Rather, it takes as its focal point the community lands that connect these protected areas. Having interviewed Chira Schouten, the National Director of TNC, at her home in Kisongo, I was struck by the nuanced and well-rounded understanding she has of the political, economic, and social complexities of conservation in Tanzania. Contrary to a preconception that I may have held that TNC focuses on wildlife in a myopic fashion without attending to complex social realities (something which seems to be implied in some of the social science literature), I found the opposite was true. Chira had over twenty years of lived experience working to understand the challenges and tradeoffs of conservation in practice. One of the key partnerships

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[175] Savory's ideas have been heavily critiqued and should be taken with a grain of salt. His popular talk is viewable here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpTHi7O66pI

[176] In the context of this dissertation, I focus in particular on the ones that were present in some fashion in the villages and conservation areas where I was working. These were: Honeyguide, UCRT, Tanzania People and Wildlife, and the Nature Conservancy. While this list is not a comprehensive overview of all NGOs carrying out work in this region at any given time, it is certainly encompassing of my experiences on the ground. I am very grateful to have forged meaningful professional relationships with people working for these organizations.

that has arisen over the past decade is between TNC and UCRT, which serves their respective goals in different ways. But the common ground between the organizations, both literal and figurative, is immense. From the perspective of UCRT, pastoral communities face great threats from in-migration, land grabbing, alienation, and dispossession, which must be safeguarded through CCROs and land use plans. From the perspective of TNC, communal lands adjacent to national parks are part of a larger ecosystem for wildlife that must be kept open and saved from fragmentation through land use change. Thus, while their overall aims are different, the two organizations are united in their common goal to keep communal lands open for pastoralists and wildlife through the formation and enforcement of detailed land use plans. While some degrees of conflict are expected between pastoralists, their livestock, and wildlife in these contexts, such frictions are by far the lesser of two evils for TNC as compared to large-scale land use change and habitat fragmentation. Counter to the rhetoric put forward in the media by National Geographic and other conservation platforms, the major threat to wildlife in the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem is not poaching, but habitat loss.[177]

Conservation in contemporary Tanzania is now less about creating 'pristine' wilderness spaces that are unperturbed by people and livestock (see Neumann 1998), than it is about taking a landscape level approach to promoting connectivity between protected areas (see Bluwstein 2019). But while some social scientists have emphasized the conflicts that emerge as conservation practices are extended onto village land (Bluwstein 2017, 2019), I am more interested in the ways in which it can draw people together by aligning their interests. As the partnership between TNC and UCRT illustrates, conservationists and pastoralists have shared interest in preventing rangeland enclosure and fostering productive grasslands.

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[177] At a regional scale, however, poaching does play a significant role. There are also poaching hotspots in East Africa, such as the Selous Game Reserve in southern Tanzania, and the insecure rangelands of northern Kenya. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, organized ivory poaching has been minimal in Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA since 2012.

There are numerous other NGOs involved in what Galaty (2017) calls the "institutional canopy of conservation" in northern Tanzania, each with different agendas and ideological approaches.[178] Honeyguide, with whom I perhaps worked the most closely, plays a central role in the management of Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA and is discussed in greater depth in Chapters 7 and 9. To some extent, these NGOs compete for limited donor funds, but for the most part, the major players collaborate with each other to delegate operations that would otherwise be difficult to carry out on their own. TNC is the most efficient at securing donor funds because of its global reach and reputation. After securing funding from donors like USAID or World Vision, funds can then be allocated to regional partners like UCRT or Honyguide for on-the-ground implementation. Funding for the SAGE IIED Governance and Equity Workshop for Randilen WMA, for instance, was secured by TNC, which then put a call out to its regional partners to see who was interested in organizing such an event.[179] Damian stepped in to answer TNC's call, recognizing that the workshop would likely reflect a useful exercise for Randilen WMA, and could perhaps later serve as a framework for improving governance and equity in other WMAs.[180]

In an effort to further consolidate the sector and increase efficiency of partnerships between NGOs and government actors, Chira spearheads the Northern Tanzania Rangelands Initiative (NTRI). The NTRI draws together conservation actors with shared interests in protecting rangelands and creates a network for them to communicate through regular mailing lists and in-person meetings. I attended several of these congregations while conducting

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[178] Galaty (2017) coined the phrase through his grant application title to SSHRC/IDRC

[179] At the time, the SAGE IIED guidelines were still being piloted around the world, so this event was intended to be beneficial both in terms of its contributions to the governance of Randilen WMA, and also as a feedback exercise for those who had designed the guidelines.

[180] While Makame WMA has garnered much support from local Kisongo, who view the WMA as a mechanism for preventing commercial farmers from encroaching onto their land, Burunge WMA is still riddled with conflict. These tensions are due in part (according to Honeyguide) to an inability to separate their governance and management institutions.

fieldwork, including two large regional ones in Arusha in September 2019 and February 2020.[181] The meetings generally took a macro-level approach to conservation issues from a stakeholder perspective and proved highly productive for me as an anthropologist studying rangeland governance and management institutions. By attending as a participant observer, I was able to forge collaborative ties with Alais, and several of the staff and researchers at TNRF, who later became key interlocutors for me at various points during my fieldwork.[182]

While some events comprised mainly NGO actors, others engaged different scales of government, ranging from national-level meetings in Dodoma and Dar es Salaam, to regional ones in Arusha, and district-level ones in Monduli. I was fortunate to attend several of these. At one district-and-regional-level meeting in Mto wa Mbu in early 2020, it became clear that one of the key interests of the District Government was in determining how NGOs would be involved in the administration of services to communities. This can be particularly complex in the political context of privatization as government bodies have various tasks and duties, which sometimes overlap with the good intentions of NGOs, complicating service delivery.[183] My observations of the workings of district-level government are quite different from my impressions of the role of central government in Tanzania's political landscape. Having collaborated with numerous district officers during my fieldwork, I came to the realization that District Governments are heavily constrained by limited financial resources. At the meeting between district and regional government in Mto wa Mbu, the theme of how donor funds could essentially be re-routed into

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[181] I was never fully in the loop about when the meetings were going to occur, but fortunately Makko usually called me a day in advance of each meeting to share the details of their locations and times.

[182] TNRF stands for Tanzania Natural Resources Forum, a local NGO focused on conservation issues. TNRF is a partner of the ICAN project.

[183] One such instance came to the fore while I was conducting MA fieldwork in the catchment area of a natural gas extraction project in Mtwara, Tanzania in 2014 and 2015. The Canadian company (Artumas Group Inc., later renamed Wentworth Resources Ltd.) involved had genuine interest in fulfilling its corporate social responsibility (CSR) mandate to the communities by providing households with subsidized electricity (see Kamat 2017; Kamat et al. 2019 for further context). However, complications arose because The Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited (TANESCO) wanted to remain the sole provider of electricity in rural Tanzania, and ultimately blocked the company's plans to implement wired electricity in the villages. Coordinating between public and private stakeholders is a key dimension of Tanzania's 'institutional canopy' of governance, and the central government generally seems disinclined to share authority over key sectors (Raycraft 2019a; see also Lugusa 2020 for discussion of these dynamics in the Kenyan context).

the delivery of services that the District Government was struggling to administer became apparent to me. This was further brought to light as I later tried to establish whom to speak to at the district level about land use plans, only to find that many of the district's assessments were actually carried out by UCRT on *behalf* of the district using donor funds.[184] In a few other examples, Pathfinders has been collaborating with the District Game Office to provide training and expertise on how to reduce human-wildlife conflicts throughout Monduli, and Oiykos has been collaborating on a project to deliver fresh water to pastoral communities. NGOs, it would seem have become intertwined with the very fabric of governance at the district level. While the NGOs cannot directly bring in revenue to the district government, they can do so indirectly by contributing services that would otherwise cost the government money to administer. They key, of course, is coordinating how these various services will be provided, making these types of meetings crucial.

4.8 Key ongoing challenges and concluding thoughts

In sum, rangelands in contemporary Tanzania are shaped by a variety of social, political, and economic processes operating at different scales. For the central government, rangelands represent pathways for valuable wildlife resources to move outside the state's financial ecosystem of national parks. This makes it challenging for the state to efficiently convert wildlife resources into capital. To prevent wildlife revenues from slipping through the cracks, the state has decentralized governing authority outside parks across various administrative arms, each with the task of grabbing revenues back into central coffers. Community-based conservation has largely unfolded against this backdrop, with WMAs reflecting clear attempts by the state to re-monetize wildlife that moves onto village land. WMAs are constrained by a rigid legislative framework designed by the central government, with little wiggle room for communities seeking alternative models, including joint ventures with private investors.

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[184] Some were also administered directly by the Monduli Urban Planning Officer.

At the same time, rangelands are not exclusively sites of wildlife conservation and are valued by communities for providing the material base of the pastoral economy. While WMAs emerged as a means of tightening the state's grips on wildlife revenues outside parks, they also constitute new formal institutions that communities can wield to manage rangelands. The question of whether the potential benefits of entering into WMAs for communities outweighs the risks of marginalization vis-à-vis the state (and investors) is of ongoing concern. Alternatives to WMAs include CCROs, which provide communal tenure security for pastoralists, but may not necessarily translate into management outcomes if on-the-ground capacity for enforcement is limited. Formal land tenure does not seem to translate 1:1 into land usage, as communities can gain formal land rights irrespective of management institutions. Conversely, pastoralists can be alienated from land formally, but gain access to it through informal arrangements with key gatekeepers. What seems to be of great significance is how land is managed. Management of rangelands in practice is largely contingent upon the social institutions of pastoralists, many of which endure but some of which have come under pressure in relation to the regional political economy of development. These include traditional labour arrangements associated with the age-set system, which are undergoing social change through rural-urban migration; customary patterns of territoriality, which have been disrupted by administrative boundary-making; and the social norms of grazing, which are complicated by economic diversification.

Land continues to be a fundamental concern for pastoralists. In particular, the struggle is both about securing access to pastoral land and subsequently establishing a set of tools to safeguard and manage it. This is particularly pressing in areas with significant in-migration of cultivators, as is the case in rural Monduli. In a contemporary context, the state monopoly on violence makes it difficult for pastoralists to protect their territories through the use of physical force. Rather, their defence of land must stem from other institutions for governance and management.

Pastoral areas with active management, whether informal, formal, or combinations of both, clearly demonstrate sustainable and productive use of pastures. But areas that lack property relations, as is the case in some of the wet season grazing areas in mixed ethnicity village land or inside national parks where grazing is technically illegal, seem to reflect declines in productivity. These trends likely have little to do with population size, but everything to do with how land is used. Restrictions on pastoral mobility have led to shifting perceptions of the opportunity costs of livestock keeping versus farming, with some pastoralists now considering cultivation to be a more viable livelihood strategy. While small-scale cultivation has long been practiced by pastoralists to mitigate the risks of drought and livestock disease, large-scale conversion of communal pastures to commercial farms is more troubling. Such trends have been associated with further enclosures of pastoral land and increased bush encroachment by invasive species. These factors are likely to affect long-term pastoral resilience in the face of climate change.

To stem the tides of further fragmentation, land use planning has come to be of utmost importance for pastoral communities. This consideration has led to the emergence of strategic partnerships between conservationists and pastoralists who have shared interest in preventing rangeland enclosure. For the pastoralists, rangelands are the foundation of the livestock economy, and for conservationists they provide crucial ecological connectivity for wildlife to disperse outside core protected areas. These complementary interests are represented by a diverse array of NGOs that have come to collaborate with each other and government, the latter retaining a strong interest in capitalizing on wildlife resources and the flows of donor funds and NGO services. Land use planning seems to reflect an effective strategy for balancing the concerns of these different stakeholders, especially given their potential common ground. However, such processes are still not without risks for pastoral communities depending on the governance structures affecting how key decisions are taken. For instance, pastoralists are supportive of demarcating pastures where cultivation and settlement are prohibited, but they do not want land use plans that are *fixed* across space and time. Such maps may be overly rigid and

poorly tailored to the context of semi-arid rangelands where environmental variability is high. Rather, they find that seasonal plans that allow for mobility and rotational grazing are more adapted to social-ecological context.

The overall picture, then, is one characterized by great complexity. What is abundantly clear is that wildlife conservation, state governance, and pastoral institutions for rangeland management are intersecting in this ethnographic context. They are thus perhaps best understood through a relational lens, rather than one that attempts to artificially parse them into the dichotomous categories of nature and society. In practical terms, what seem to be crucially important for rangelands and wildlife are governance approaches that protect large areas of connected land, and management plans that are enforced in equitable ways. This consideration sets the stage for the central applied question of this dissertation: do the two community-based conservation areas of Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch strengthen institutional capacity for managing rangelands and wildlife in equitable ways, or not? I present a combination of interview, survey, and ethnographic data in the context of a historically-grounded analysis to answer this question in Chapters 6-9.

Chapter 5. A tale of twelve villages: Socioeconomic overview of study area[185]

5.1 Quantitative sampling frames and socioeconomic demographics (total study area)

The historical processes outlined in the Chapter 3 have come to shape what is observable on the ground in a contemporary context: Kisongo pastoralists and Arusha cultivators living in neighbouring administrative villages in the rangelands of the Maasai Steppe. The following section provides a quantitative overview of the twelve study villages where I carried out fieldwork, based on household socioeconomic surveys administered in April-July 2020. In total, 1076 surveys were administered across 12 villages (36 sub-villages). Sampling frames by village and sub-village are depicted in Tables 4 and 5.[186]

Table 4 – Total number of households in each village[187]

Village	Total # of households
Oldonyo	271
Lolkisale	455
Nafco	397
Lengoolwa	370
Lemooti	118
Makuyuni	339
Esilalei	211
Oltukai	163
Olasiti	273
Mswakini Chini	220

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[185] All tables and figures in this chapter are based on my survey data (see Chapter 2 for methods).

[186] Given the differing total population sizes of Randilen WMA member villages and those surrounding Manyara Ranch, some surveys from the three overlapping villages of Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini were excluded at random from the Randilen WMA attitudes study to ensure proportionate weighting relative to population size. The samples used for the Randilen WMA portion of the study in these three villages are depicted in Table 6. Descriptive statistics presented in this chapter are based on the sampling frames in Table 5. Data on attitudes towards Manyara Ranch in Chapter 9 are based on samples from Table 5. Data on attitudes towards Randilen WMA (Chapter 7) use the samples from Table 6 for the three overlapping villages of Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini to maintain proportionate weightings of each sampling frame.

[187] My numbers differ from those available in the village offices because those numbers count *kayas,* which consider each wife of a married man to represent a different household. Thus, they do not adequately take into account the cultural context of the Maasai. My numbers assume that one married man and multiple wives constitutes a single household. Households were counted by hand with the assistance of sub-village chairs and *balozi* representatives over an eight-month period in 2019-2020. The town sub-villages of Makuyuni (Makuyuni Mjini) and Olasiti (Kibaoni A) were excluded from this survey, so the total numbers of households in those villages are actually much higher than the ones presented here. Makuyuni would likely be the largest village by household number if the town sub-village was included in the total count.

Mswakini Juu	305	
Naitolia	253	
Total	**3375**	

Table 5 - Total sample frames and respondents sampled by village and sub-village during surveys administered in April–July 2020 across all twelve study villages. Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.

Village	Total # of male heads	# of male heads sampled	% of male heads sampled	Total # of female heads	# of female heads sampled	% of female heads sampled	# of wives sampled
Oldonyo							
Nyorit A	54	8	15	5	4	80	3
Lengijape	44	7	16	3	3	100	3
Oldonyo	90	15	17	12	6	50	7
Loosikitok	63	10	16	0	0	0	4
Lolkisale							
Lolkisale B	113	17	15	37	20	54	9
Makao Mapya	87	13	15	21	12	57	7
Lolkisale A	67	12	18	25	11	44	5
Endarpoi	98	15	15	7	4	57	8
Nafco							
Lengoolwa C	197	31	16	45	21	47	16
Lengoolwa B	66	10	15	21	13	62	4
Osilaley	60	9	15	8	6	75	4
Lengoolwa							
Lengoolwa	57	9	16	6	4	67	6
Engosipa	93	15	16	12	4	33	8
Donyon	109	17	16	22	12	55	8
Orkisima	63	10	16	8	5	63	4
Lemooti							
Olorisyo	54	8	15	5	4	80	5
Lesiday	16	3	19	1	1	100	1
Lemooti	35	11	31	7	4	57	4
Makuyuni							
Lemiyon	127	30	24	10	4	40	12
Saburi	62	13	21	9	5	56	7
Esimangori	4	2	50	1	1	100	0
Makuyuni Juu	103	22	21	23	11	48	10
Esilalei							

Esimiti	40	8	20	2	1	50	4
Kanisani	57	12	21	3	2	67	6
Shuleni	52	11	21	6	4	67	5
Endepesi	29	6	21	0	0	0	3
Makuyuni Masaini	22	5	23	0	0	0	2
Oltukai							
Simbi	22	5	23	8	5	63	1
Engusero	37	8	22	7	5	71	3
Ilera	47	10	21	8	5	63	5
Oltukai	29	7	24	5	3	60	4
Olasiti							
Eluai	120	24	20	2	1	50	12
Oltukai	61	12	20	10	7	70	6
Kibaoni B	71	14	20	9	7	78	6
Mswakini (Chini)							
Shuleni	91	20	22	12	10	83	8
Kanisani	44	9	20	7	7	100	4
Engasiti	51	10	20	15	9	60	5
Mswakini Juu							
Shimamo	68	14	21	18	10	56	10
Randilen	84	17	20	15	13	87	8
Orbukoi	99	21	21	21	13	62	11
Naitolia							
Engusero	127	26	20	10	7	70	11
Ormang'way	107	21	20	9	6	67	10
Total	2920	547		455	270		259

Table 6 – Sampling frames used for attitudes towards Randilen WMA study (see Chapter 7) for the three overlapping villages of Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, Mswakini Chini.

Village	Total # of male heads	# of male heads sampled	% of male heads sampled	Total # of female heads	# of female heads sampled	% of female heads sampled	# of wives sampled
Mswakini (Chini)							
Shuleni	91	14	15	12	6	50	8
Kanisani	44	7	16	7	7	100	4
Engasiti	51	8	16	15	8	53	4
Mswakini Juu							
Shimamo	68	11	16	18	8	44	6
Randilen	84	13	15	15	8	53	6
Orbukoi	99	16	16	21	10	48	8

Naitolia							
Engusero	127	20	16	10	5	50	10
Ormang'way	107	17	16	9	5	56	9
Total	**671**	**106**		**107**	**57**		**55**

Table 7 – Total number of people sampled per village relative to the entire sample.

Village	# of respondents surveyed	% of total sample
Esilalei	69	6.4
Lemooti	41	3.8
Lengoolwa	102	9.5
Lolkisale	133	12.4
Makuyuni	117	10.9
Mswakini Chini	82	7.6
Mswakini Juu	117	10.9
Nafco	114	10.6
Naitolia	81	7.5
Olasiti	89	8.3
Oldonyo	70	6.5
Oltukai	61	5.7
Total	**1076**	**100**

The ethnic landscape of the study area on the whole was dominated by Arusha (58.3%), followed by Kisongo (32%), Iraqw (2.3%), Nyaturu (1.5%), Mrangi (1.3%), Nyiramba (1.1%), and about twelve other ethnic groups forming minorities of less than one percent (see Figure 8).

Figure 8 – Ethnicities of respondents in the study area based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 across all twelve villages.

Figure 9 – Maasai Age-set distributions in the study area based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 across all twelve villages. Approximate age spreads for each set are presented in Table 2 of Section 3.3.

The most common age grouping was Korianga (40.5%), followed by Landiis (30.8%), Makaa (12.2%), Seuri (7.5%), Nyangusi (2.3%), and Nyangulu (6.5%). These distributions are presented in Figure 9. Just over half of the respondents across the whole area had attended primary school (54.3%), while over a third had received no formal education (39.4%). A minority had been to secondary school (5.4%), and a few had been to university (.9%). The vast majority of respondents (83.63%) derived their primary income from livestock keeping and farming. Some depended only on farming (8.8%), followed by exclusive livestock keepers (5.3%). A small number got their primary income from business activities (1.86%) and a few from unspecified means (.37%).

Figure 10 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood in the study area based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 across all twelve villages.

The crops that were most important to livelihood were maize and beans, followed by peas, sunflowers, fruit and a small number of other vegetables (see Figure 10). When asked how respondents acquired land, the most common response was that they had inherited it (46.3%), followed by those who said they were given land by a friend or family (36.5%). Some had purchased land (12.4%), and a minority had acquired land through unspecified means (2.8%). A few respondents did not own land (2.1%). In terms of the tenure status of those who owned land, just under half had been allocated land by the village government, but without written documentation (43.4%). Over a third held their land through informal customary agreements (38.3%), and some had received a formal letter from the village council stipulating rights of occupancy (15.5%). A very small number (2.3%) had received land titles from district government. Mean livestock and land holdings are depicted in Tables 8 and 9.

Table 8 – Livestock assets of respondents across whole study area based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 across all twelve villages.[188]

	Cattle	Donkeys	Goats/Sheep	Chicken	TLU[a]
Mean ± SD	22.7 ± 55.6	1.8 ± 2.6	42.1 ± 60.6	13.2 ± 16.4	21.1 ± 43

[a] *Tropical livestock units (TLU) were calculated following Jahnke (1982:10) and Mkonyi et al. (2017:252). The following TLU conversion factors were used: Cattle = 0.7, sheep and goats = 0.1, donkey =0.5, chicken = 0.01.*

Table 9 – Land holdings across whole study area based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 across all twelve villages.[189]

	# acres total	# acres planted	# acres harvested
Mean ± SD	11.82 ± 14.4	7.9 ± 7.6	6.3 ± 6.9

5.2 Socioeconomic demographics by village

The following sub-sections present descriptive statistics from each of the study villages to provide a basic profile of each area. This is followed by a section with a series of cross-comparative tables and figures to provide a sense of quantitative variations across the study area.[190]

Oldonyo Village

In total 70 people were surveyed in Oldonyo. Of these, the majority were Kisongo Maasai (60%), and the remainder were Arusha (40%) (see Figure 11). Over half of the respondents were from the Korianga age set (57.1%), followed by Landiis (28.6%), Makaa (10%), and Nyangulu (4.3%). There were no Seuri or Nyangusi respondents (see Figure 12). Around half of the

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[188] Livestock assets refer to household head holdings, and thus household holdings. I did not explicate livestock holdings per capita because male household heads had a difficult time off-hand recalling how many children they had during interviews. Respondents often had to call in their wives to discuss the question. While livestock per capita would have been a useful measure, I cut the question about household size from the survey because of the significant time drag it had on survey administration. It was a large survey instrument with many items and I realized during pre-testing that if questions were not instinctive for people to answer, they lost interest quickly. Fortunately, local Maasai consider household stock holdings to be a more significant measure than livestock holdings per capita (see Goldman 2020).

[189] These holdings refer to land that respondents felt belonged to them individually. Formal tenure status varied, and parcels of land were generally allocated by the village government on the basis of customary occupancy rights. Some people possessed title deeds, while others held land through informal customary agreements.

[190] I have thus presented this data in three ways: 1) holistically across the whole study area 2) through individual village profiles 3) via cross-comparative tables and figures displaying key variables. Future researchers may find one approach more useful than others for providing background for their studies. In the context of my analysis, perhaps the most crucial factor to emphasize is the ethnic distribution of each village (see Table 13). Livestock and land holdings by village are presented in Section 5.3.

respondents had no formal education (51.4%), but over a third had primary education (37.1%). Some had attended secondary school (5.7%) and university (5.7%). The vast majority said that mixed livestock keeping and farming was their primary source of income (87.1%). Some relied only on farming (7.1%), and a few only on livestock keeping (4.3%). One person derived income mainly from business activities. A small minority of respondents had a family member who was employed by Randilen WMA (4.3%).

Figure 11 – Ethnicities of respondents in Oldonyo village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

All respondents considered maize to be very important to their livelihood, and most also considered beans to be crucial crops. Peas, sunflowers, fruits, and other vegetables were also considered fairly important (see Figure 13).

Figure 12 – Maasai Age-set distributions in Oldonyo village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 13 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in Oldonyo village in April–July 2020.

Most respondents had acquired land through inheritance (80%), while some stated that they had been given land by a friend or family member (10%). An even smaller number reported having purchased land (8.6%), and one did not own land. In terms of the tenure status of those who owned, the majority had received written letters from the village government stipulating customary rights of occupancy (70%), while just under a third had been allocated land by the village council, but without formal documentation (27.1%). Two respondents held land through informal customary Maasai agreements. Land and livestock holdings are shown in Table 10.

Lolkisale Village

Of the 133 people surveyed, the majority were Arusha (60%), followed by Mrangi (9.7%), Kisongo (8.3%), Nyiramba (6.8%), Chaaga (3.8%), Iraqw (2.3%), Kamba (2.3%), Sandawe (2.3%), Nyaturu (1.5%), Pare (1.5%), Gogo (.8%), and Jaturu (.8%) (see Figure 14). While not all of these ethnic groups followed Maasai age-sets, their approximate relative ages were grouped into the following categories for the purposes of visualizing age distributions. About half were in the Korianga age set (49.6%), followed by Landiis (25.6%), Makaa (12.8%), Nyangulu (6%), Seuri (4.5%), and Nyangusi (1.5%) (see Figure 15).

Figure 14 – Ethnicities of respondents in Lolkisale village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 15 – Maasai Age-set distributions in Lolkisale village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Most respondents had primary school level of education (76.7%), while just less than a fifth had no formal education (18%). A small number had attended secondary school (4.5%) and one had been to university (.8%). The majority said that mixed livestock keeping and farming were their primary source of income (69.2%), followed by exclusively farmers (30.1%). Only one respondent relied only on business activities. Two respondents had family members who had

been employed by Randilen WMA. The crop distributions for the village in terms of perceived

importance to livelihood are depicted in Figure 16.

Figure 16 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in Lolkisale village in April–July 2020.

Most respondents in Lolkisale said that friends or family had given them land (81.2%). Some

had inherited land (9%), and some had purchased it (9%). One respondent had secured land

through unspecified means. Tenure mostly took the form of allocations by the village council

without written documentation (67.7%), with just under a third holding land through informal

customary agreements (29.3%). A few had received formal letters from the village government

specifying occupancy rights, but none had received titles from the district level. Average

livestock assets and land holdings in Lolkisale are shown in Table 10.

Nafco Village

Like Lolkisale, Nafco had mixed ethnicities in some sub-villages. Of the 114 people surveyed in

Nafco, the majority were Arusha (59.3%), followed by Nyaturu (10.6%), Kisongo Maasai (9.7%)

Iraqw (5.3%), Chaaga (4.4%), Kamba (2.7%), and a minority of other ethnic groups (see Figure

17). The age distributions are reflected in Figure 18. About half were in the Korianga grouping

(48.2%), followed by Landiis (32.5%), Makaa (10.5%), Seuri (7%), and Nyangulu (1.8%).

Figure 17 – Ethnicities of respondents in Nafco village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 18 – Maasai Age-set distributions in Nafco village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Most respondents had primary levels of education (71.1%), and about a quarter had no formal education (24.6%). A small minority had been to secondary school (4.4%) and no one had been to university. Most derived their primary source of income from livestock keeping and farming (81.6%), with some getting income only from livestock (10.5%), crop cultivation (4.4%), and business activities (3.5%). A small number had a family member who was employed by

Randilen WMA (8.8%). The crops of importance to livelihood are shown in Figure 19. Just over a third of the respondents had inherited land (36%), while a quarter had been given land by friends or family (25.4%). Just under a quarter had purchased land (23.7%), and some rented only (11%). A few had acquired land through other means (3.5%). Around half of the respondents held land through informal customary agreements (49.5%). Over a quarter were allocated land by the village government without written documentation (28.4%), and just under a quarter had a written letter from the village government stipulating occupancy rights (22%). Livestock and land holdings are depicted in Table 10.

Figure 19 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in Nafco village in April–July 2020.

Lengoolwa Village

In Lengoolwa, 112 people were surveyed. The majority were Kisongo Maasai (57.8%) and the remainder were Arusha (42.2%). Age distributions of these respondents displayed in Figure 21.

Figure 20 – Ethnicities of respondents in Lengoolwa village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

 Figure 21 – Maasai Age-set distributions in Lengoolwa village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Over half of the respondents had no formal education (57.8%), but over a third had been to

primary school (39.2%). A few had attended secondary school (2.9%), and none had been to

university. Almost all respondents depended on mixed livestock keeping and farming (99%),

with only one respondent relying only on livestock keeping. Maize and beans were the most

significant crops (see Figure 22). Some respondents also had a household member employed by Randilen WMA (10.8%).

Figure 22 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in Lengoolwa village in April–July 2020.

Just under half of respondents had been given land by friends or family (43.1%), and almost a third had purchased land (31.4%). About a quarter had inherited land (24.5%) and one person rented only. Three quarters of those who owned land held land through informal customary arrangements (76.5%), and about a fifth had been allocated land by village councils without written documentation. A small number had received written letters from village government specifying occupancy rights, and none had titles from the district level. Land and livestock holdings are displayed in Table 10.

Lemooti Village

Of the 41 people surveyed in Lemooti, all of them were Kisongo Maasai (see Figure 23). About half were Korianga (51.2%), a quarter were Nyangulu (24.4%), a fifth were Landiis (19.5%), and a small number were Makaa (4.9%). There were no Seuri or Nyangusi (see Figure 24).

Figure 23 – Ethnicities of respondents in Lemooti village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 24 – Maasai Age-set distributions in Lemooti village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Most of these respondents had primary education (82.9%). Some had no formal education (14.6%), and one had been to university. Most said they relied on livestock keeping and farming for income (85.4%), and some relied only on livestock keeping (12.2%) and one relied only on farming. Some had a household member employed by Randilen WMA (14.6%). Significant crops for livelihood are shown in Figure 25.

Figure 25 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in Lemooti village in April–July 2020.

Most respondents said that they had inherited land (85.4%), and some said it was given to them by friends or family members (9.8%). A few said they had purchased land (4.9%). In terms of tenure, most held land through agreements with the village government but without formal documentation (70.7%). About a quarter held land through informal customary agreements (26.8%). One had a written letter from village government specifying his occupancy rights. Land and livestock holdings are shown in Table 10.

Makuyuni Village[191]

In Makuyuni village, 117 people were surveyed. Arusha dominated the area, making up well over half of the survey respondents (66.7%), followed by Kisongo (20.5%), Iraqw (6%), and a small number of Datoga (*Mangati*) (2.6%), Nyaturu (1.7%), Somali (1.7%), and one Nyiramba respondent (Figure 26). The most frequent age grade of respondents was Korianga (35%), followed by Landiis (32.5%), Makaa (10.3%), Seuri (10.3%), Nyangulu (8.5%), and Nyangusi (3.4%) (see Figure 27).

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[191] The sub-village of Makuyuni Mjini was excluded from this survey.

**Figure 26** – Ethnicities of respondents in Makuyuni village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 27 – Maasai Age-set distributions based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 in Makuyuni village.

Most respondents had no formal education (55.6%), but over a third had been to primary school (39.3%). A small minority had secondary level education (4.3%), and one had attended university. Most respondents relied on a combination of livestock keeping and farming (85.5%) as their primary source of income, followed by those who were exclusively livestock keepers (10.3%). A small number of respondents depended only on farming (2.6%), and two respondents

got their primary income from other business ventures. The most important crops grown in Makuyuni were maize, beans, and peas with minimal cultivation of other crops (see Figure 28).

Figure 28 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in Makuyuni village in April–July 2020.

About half of the respondents in Makuyuni acquired land via inheritance (51.3%). The next most common response was that the participant was given land from friends or family (40.2%). A few people said that they purchased land (2.6%), or acquired it through non-specified means (4.3%). One person did not own land, but rented the rights to cultivate a farm. The majority of respondents held informal customary tenure (87.2%). A small number of people had been allocated land by the village council without written documentation (12%). One person had a formal letter from village government specifying customary rights to occupancy. Livestock assets and land holdings for respondents in Makuyuni are represented in Table 10.

Esilalei Village

In total, 69 people were surveyed in Esilalei. Almost all of these respondents were Kisongo Maasai (97.1%). There was one Mbulu respondent and one Arusha (see Figure 29). The dominant age group was Landiis (43.5%), followed by Korianga (27.5%), Makaa (20.3%), Nyangulu (5.8%), and Seuri (2.9%) (see Figure 30).

**Figure 29 –** Ethnicities of respondents in Esilalei village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 30 – Maasai Age-set distributions based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 in Esilalei village.

The majority of respondents in Esilalei had no formal education (66.7%). About a third had primary school education (29%), and a small minority had attended secondary school (4.3%). None had attended university. Most respondents suggested that agropastoralism was their primary source of income (65.2%). Just over thirty percent suggested that their income was exclusively from livestock (31.9%), and two respondents said that their primary income was from other business ventures. Just under a third of the respondents noted that someone in their household had been directly employed by Manyara Ranch (29%). Most respondents in Esilalei

considered Maize to be the most important crops to their livelihoods, followed by beans. Some also grew other crops, though this was uncommon (see Figure 31).


Figure 31 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in Esilalei village in April–July 2020.

When asked about how respondents acquired land holdings, just under half of the respondents said that they were given land by friends or family members (47.8%). Over a third said that they had inherited land (37.7%), and a minority (7.2%) had purchased land. A small number also noted that they had secured land through other unspecified means (7.2%). Tenure status of the land varied greatly across the respondents. Just under a third specified informal customary Maasai agreements (29%), followed by a number (26.1%) who had a written letter from village government confirming customary occupancy rights. About a quarter (24.6%) claimed to have official title deeds from district government, and a fifth (20.3%) of the respondents said that they were allocated land by village government, but without a written letter of confirmation. Land holdings and livestock assets for respondents in Esilalei are represented in Table 10.

Oltukai Village

In total, 61 people were surveyed in Oltukai. Almost all of these respondents were Kisongo Maasai (95.1%), with a very small minority of Arusha (4.9%) (see Figure 32).

Figure 32 – Ethnicities of respondents in Oltukai village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Almost half of the respondents in Oltukai were from the Korianga age set (47.5%), followed by Landiis (24.6%), and Makaa (23%) (see Figure 33). There were a few Nyangulu and no elder Seuri or Nyangusi respondents. Over two-thirds of people had no formal education (78.7%), while some had attended primary school (16.4%). Two had been to secondary school (3.3%), and one had been to university. Most respondents derived their primary source of income from a combination of livestock keeping and farming (83.6%), while some depended exclusively on livestock keeping (16.4%). Just over a third of the respondents (34.4%) had a household member who had been employed by Manyara Ranch.

Figure 33 – Maasai Age-set distributions in Oltukai village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Most respondents said that maize was important for livelihood, and just over half thought beans were important to livelihood. Other crops were not considered significant and were infrequently planted (see Figure 34).


Figure 34 – perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in Oltukai village in April–July 2020.

About half of the respondents in Oltukai had been given land by a friend or family member (49.2%). Jut under a third had inherited land (29.5%). Some acquired land through other means (16.4%), and a few had purchased it (4.9%). Over a third held land through informal customary agreements (37.7%), while a similar number had been allocated land by the village council, but

without paperwork (36.1%). About a fifth had been provided written documentation by the village government confirming customary rights of occupancy (19.7%). A small number had secured a land title through the district government (6.6%). Table 10 contains information on land holdings and livestock assets for respondents in Oltukai.

Olasiti Village[192]

Of the 89 people surveyed in Olasiti, the vast majority were Arusha (78.7%), followed by Kisongo Maasai (18%). There were also two Iraqw respondents and one Pare.

Figure 35 – Ethnicities of respondents in Olasiti village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

The most common age set among respondents was Korianga (46.1%), followed by Landiis (22.5%), Nyangulu (15.7%), Makaa (10.1%), Seuri (4.5%), and Nyangusi (1.1%) (see Figure 36). Just over half of the respondents had primary school education (52.8%), and about a third had no formal education (33.7%). A minority (13.5%) had attended secondary school. Most respondents relied on a combination of livestock keeping and farming (80.9%), with some deriving their income primarily from business activities (10.1%). Several depended only on farming (7.9%). One person was exclusively a livestock keeper. Two respondents reported that

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[192] The sub-village of Kibaoni A was excluded from this survey.

someone in their household was employed by Manyara Ranch. The most significant crops for livelihood were maize and beans, followed by peas, sunflowers and some other vegetables (see Figure 37). None of the respondents reported growing fruit.

Figure 36 – Maasai Age-set distributions in Olasiti village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 37 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in Olasiti village in April–July 2020.

About half of the respondents reported inheriting land (49.4%). About a third said that they were given land by a friend or family member (34.8%). Some people admitted that hey acquired land through unspecified means (9%), and a minority had purchased land (5.6%). One respondent rented land. Well over a third of the respondents (42.7%) had a written letter from the village

government stipulating occupancy rights. Just under a third had been allocated land by village councils, but did not have a letter of documentation (29.2%). A similar number held land through informal customary agreements (28.1%). Land holdings and livestock assets for respondents in Olasiti are found in Table 10.

Mswakini (Chini)

Out of the 82 people surveyed in Mswakni Chini, almost all of them were Arusha (93.9%). The remaining respondents were Kisongo (6.1%) (see Figure 38). The majority of respondents were members of the Korianga age set (42.7%), followed by Landiis (24.4%), Makaa (14.6%), Seuri (13.4%), Nyangulu (3.7%), and Nyangusi (1.2%) (see Figure 39). A small minority reported having a household member employed on a temporary basis by Manyara Ranch (7.3%). One person reported employment by Randilen WMA. Most respondents had primary education (59.8%), and just over a third had not attended school (31.7%). A few had secondary education (7.3%) and one person had undertaken post-secondary studies. Most respondents depended on mixed farming and livestock keeping for income (90.2%), and some relied exclusively on farming (9.8%). The most significant crops for livelihood were maize, beans, and peas, though some also considered sunflowers and fruit to be very important (see Figure 40). The majority of respondents inherited land (84.1%), while some were given land by friends or family (12.2%). A few purchased land (2.4%), and one acquired land through unspecified means. Tenure status was relatively evenly divided between those who had informal customary tenure (47.6%), and those who had been allocated land by village councils (42.7%), but without written letters stipulating customary occupancy rights. Some did have letters from village government specifying their customary rights (8.5%), and one respondent had a title from the district level. Average livestock holdings and farm sizes are depicted in Table 10.

Figure 38 – Ethnicities of respondents in Mswakini Chini village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

**Figure 39 –** Maasai Age-set distributions in Mswakini Chini village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 40 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 in Mswakini Chini village.

Mswakini Juu

In total 117 people were surveyed in Mswakini Juu. Almost all of the respondents were Arusha (97.4%), and the remaining few (2.6%) were Kisongo (see fig. x).

Figure 41 – Ethnicities of respondents in Mswakini Juu village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 42 – Maasai age-set distributions in Mswakini Juu village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Korianga was the most frequent age grade of respondents (39.3%), followed by Landiis (31.6%), Seuri (17.9%), Nyangulu (5.1%), Makaa (4.3%), and Nyangusi (1.7%) (see Figure 42). Most respondents reported no direct employment from Randilen WMA (82.1%), though a relatively high number noted that a household member had been employed by the WMA (17.9%). A similar number of respondents noted comparable employment by Manyara Ranch at the family level (17.1%). The majority of respondents had primary level education (65.8%), and a quarter had no formal education (25.6%). A small number had been to secondary school (8.5%) and none of the respondents had attended university. For most respondents, farming and livestock keeping was the primary source of income (82.1%), while some relied exclusively on farming (15.4%). Two respondents depended only on livestock and one derived most income from other business activities. Maize was the most important crop to livelihood, though beans, peas, and other fruits and vegetables were also grown (see Figure 43).

Figure 43 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 in Mswakini Juu village.

Three quarters of respondents in Mswakini Juu acquired land through inheritance (75.2%), while less than a quarter secured land through purchase (14.5%). Some were also given land by friends or family members (9.4%), and one respondent acquired land through other means. The most common tenure status among respondents was via agreed upon allocation by the village government without written documentation (79.5%). A number of respondents held land through informal customary agreements (16.2%), and a small minority had a written letter from village government stipulating customary rights of occupancy. Average livestock holdings and farm sizes in Mswakini Juu are depicted in Table 10.

Naitolia village

Of the 81 people surveyed in Naitolia village, most were Arusha (81.5%) followed by Kisongo (8.6%), Iraqw (8.6%), and one Mrangi respondent. The dominant age set among respondents was Landiis (36.3%), followed by Korianga (32.5%), Seuri (11.3%), Makaa (8.8%), Nyangulu (7.5%), and Nyangusi (3.8%).

Figure 44 – Ethnicities of respondents in Naitolia village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

Figure 45 – Maasai Age-set distributions in Naitolia village based on surveys administered in April–July 2020.

None of the respondents had household members employed by Randilen WMA. One respondents had a family member who was employed temporarily at the tourist camp in Manyara Ranch. In terms of education, most respondents had been to primary school (64.2%) and about a third (32.1%) had no formal education. A small minority (2.5%) had secondary education and one respondent had attended university. For almost all respondents (97.5%), their primary source of income was a combination of livestock keeping and farming. One respondent exclusively

farmed, and one other only kept livestock. Respondents had varied responses about how they had acquired land in the village, with just under a quarter suggesting they had purchased their farm (23.5%). About a third said that they had inherited it (29.6%), and almost half maintained that they were given land by friends or family members (46.9%). Tenure status was mostly based on orally agreed allocation by the village council (91.4%), with a small minority receiving formal letters from village government to certify the process (4.9%). An even smaller number had received formal title deeds by district level government (3.7%). The main crops grown were maize, beans, and peas with some cultivators producing sunflowers and fruit as well (see Figure 46). Livestock and land holdings for respondents in Naitolia village are shown in Table 10.

Figure 46 – Perceived importance of crops to livelihood based on surveys administered in April–July 2020 in Naitolia village.

5.3 Cross-village comparisons

The following section presents key variables by village to provide comparative context across the study area. This data is shown in Tables 10-14 and Figures 47-51.

Table 10 – Livestock assets and land holdings of respondents by village

Village	Cattle	Donkeys	Goats/Sheep	Chicken	TLU[a]	Farm size[b]
Oldonyo	7[c] ± 9.8	1.4 ± 1	28.1 ± 41.5	8.56 ± 6.8	8.5 ± 10.6	7.6 ± 5
Lolkisale	5.4 ± 6.9	.6 ± 1.2	9.8 ± 10.7	6.5 ± 8.6	5.2 ± 6.2	5.8 ± 5.9

Nafco	19.6 ± 25.1	2.2 ± 2.8	44.2 ± 49.1	40 ± 25.1	19.6 ± 23	14.2 ± 14.4
Lengoolwa	13.2 ± 13.4	3.4 ± 2.5	47.2 ± 55	13.2 ± 9.7	15.8± 14.9	10.2 ± 5.8
Lemooti[193]	70.5 ± 39.7	4.6 ± 3.4	95 ± 56.3	12.5 ± 11.5	61.3± 32.8	47.7 ± 45.7
Makuyuni	17.7 ± 17.9	2.5 ± 2.5	64.8 ± 39.9	15.2 ± 15.5	20.3 ± 15.9	5.8 ± 7
Esilalei	81.3 ± 117.6	3.7± 5.1	105.4 ± 146.8	9± 9	69.4 ± 96.2	9.2 ± 7.1
Oltukai	59.5 ± 159.7	1.7 ± 2.4	59.3 ± 88.9	3.8 ± 5.6	48.5 ± 112.1	10 ± 6.9
Olasiti	26.6 ± 30.7	.5 ± 1.1	26.6 ± 16.6	8 ± 7.2	21.6 ± 22.7	14.1 ± 9.5
Mswakini Chini	13.8 ± 14.1	.9 ± 1.3	29.3 ± 28.8	15.4 ± 20.2	13.2 ± 12.6	14.6 ± 8.4
Mswakini Juu	9.4 ± 10.8	.7 ± 1.1	21.2 ± 20.2	8.7 ± 6.2	9.1 ± 9.3	15.4 ± 7.8
Naitolia	9.5 ± 14	1.5 ± 1.7	31.7 ± 41.6	8.9 ± 11.2	10.5 ± 12.7	7.7 ± 7.7

[a] *Tropical livestock units (TLU) were calculated following Jahnke (1982:10) and Mkonyi et al. (2017:252). The following TLU conversion factors were used: Cattle = 0.7, sheep and goats = 0.1, donkey =0.5, chicken = 0.01.*
[b] *In acres*
[c] *Mean ± SD*

Table 11 – Cross-village comparisons of education levels[a]

Village	None	Primary	Secondary	University
Oldonyo	51.4	37.1	5.7	7.7
Lolkisale	18	76.7	4.5	.8
Nafco	24.6	71.1	4.4	0
Lengoolwa	57.8	39.2	2.9	0
Lemooti	14.6	82.9	0	2.4
Makuyuni	55.6	39.3	4.3	.9
Esilalei	66.7	29	4.3	0
Oltukai	78.7	16.4	3.3	1
Olasiti	33.7	52.8	13.5	0
Mswakini Chini	31.7	59.8	7.3	1.2
Mswakini Juu	25.6	65.8	8.5	0
Naitolia	32.1	64.2	2.5	1.2

[a]*based on % of survey respondents*

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[193] While the farm holdings are large in Lemooti (47.7 acres on average), only 16.6 acres on average (mean) are actually planted as farms (SD = 22). Thus, the majority of areas held as private farms in Lemooti are actually kept open as pasture (discussed in Sections 5.7-5.8).

Figure 47 – Visualization of cross-village education distribution

Table 12 – Cross-village comparisons of age-set distributions[a]

Village	Nyangulu	Korianga	Landiis	Makaa	Seuri	Nyangusi
Oldonyo	4.3	57.1	28.6	10	0	0
Lolkisale	6	49.6	25.6	12.8	4.5	1.5
Nafco	1.8	48.2	32.5	10.5	7	0
Lengoolwa	11.8	27.5	29.4	13.7	5.9	11.8
Lemooti	24.4	51.2	19.5	4.9	0	0
Makuyuni	8.5	35	32.5	10.3	10.3	3.4
Esilalei	5.8	27.5	43.5	20.3	2.9	0
Oltukai	4.9	47.5	24.6	23	0	0
Olasiti	15.7	46.1	22.5	10.1	4.5	1.1
Mswakini Chini	3.7	42.7	24.4	14.6	13.4	1.2
Mswakini Juu	5.1	39.3	31.6	4.3	17.9	1.7
Naitolia	7.5	32.5	36.3	8.8	11.3	3.8

[a]*based on % of survey respondents*

Figure 48 – Visualization of cross-village age-set distribution

Table 13 – Cross-village comparisons of ethnicity distributions[a]

Village	Kisongo	Arusha	Other
Oldonyo	60	40	0
Lolkisale	8.3	60	31.7
Nafco	9.7	59.3	69
Lengoolwa	57.8	42.2	0
Lemooti	100	0	0
Makuyuni	20.5	66.7	12.8
Esilalei	97.1	1.4	1.5
Oltukai	95.1	4.9	0
Olasiti	18	78.7	3.3
Mswakini Chini	6.1	93.9	0
Mswakini Juu	2.6	97.4	0
Naitolia	8.6	81.5	9.9

[a]*based on % of survey respondents*

Figure 49 – Visualization of cross-village ethnicity distribution

Figure 50 – Visualization of survey respondents who considered crops to be 'very important' to livelihoods.

Figure 51 – Visualization of primary sources of income by village

Table 14 – Primary sources of income by village[a]

Village	Mixed livestock and crop cultivation	Livestock only	Crops only	Other
Oldonyo	87.1	7.1	4.3	1.4
Lolkisale	69.2	0	30.1	.8
Nafco	81.6	10.5	4.4	3.5
Lengoolwa	99	.9	0	0
Lemooti	85.4	12.2	2.4	0
Makuyuni	85.5	10.3	2.6	1.7
Esilalei	65.2	31.9	0	2.9
Oltukai	83.6	16.4	0	0
Olasiti	80.9	1.12	7.9	10.1
Mswakini Chini	90.2	0	9.8	0
Mswakini Juu	82.1	1.7	15.4	.9
Naitolia	97.5	1.2	1.2	0

[a]*based on % of survey respondents*

5.4 Some ethnographic texture: Kisongo-Arusha cultural dynamics in the area

Cultural differences between Arusha and Kisongo in this contemporary rangeland context are ethnographically visible. The Kisongo generally prefer to live in their traditional homestead enclosures (*enkang*). The homes are generally produced with mud and thatched bark, structures that can be dismantled and rebuilt without too much effort to facilitate mobility. The Arusha, by contrast generally prefer more modern homes with corrugate metal rooves, higher ceilings, sofas and other furniture. The Arusha houses are more permanent and reflect, in my view, a desire to develop one's own private property. Generally speaking, the Kisongo prefer large herds of cattle and small maize and beans farms as diversification to buffer against environmental uncertainty. They tend to rent out these farms to other cultivators (like Mbulu), or pay labourers to cultivate the land on their behalf, still viewing the act of farming as somewhat degrading compared to livestock keeping. By contrast, the Arusha cherish their roles as farmers, taking great pride in their intimate knowledge of soils, and their ability to produce high yields of a variety of crops. This is evident in their dress, as the Arusha often unabashedly wear rubber boots to navigate muddy terrains during planting and harvesting seasons, signifying their dedication to their craft. The Kisongo by contrast have taken to a particular MacGyvered market innovation whereby

motorbike tires are recycled and refashioned into sandals. This footwear is appealing to the Kisongo because it is both durable and comfortable, making it ideal for trekking long distances across varied terrains with cattle. The Arusha wear similar *shukas* as the Kisongo, but with different colour combinations and patterns. The Arusha are much more likely to combine these shukas with western clothes like coats, sweaters, and toques. The elders have similar stretched earlobes, a practice which has declined in the younger age-sets for both the Kisongo and the Arusha, but the Kisongo men and women generally wear colourful beaded jewellery, which only a few Arusha wear to the same extent. Dietary differences are also apparent with the Kisongo relying heavily on *uji* porridge made from maize and milk, while the Arusha prefer *makande*, a mixture of soaked beans and maize. These distinctions are observable on the teeth of the two groups, with the Kisongo having notably white smiles compared to the distinctive red teeth of the Arusha.[194] Subtle differences in their dialects also persist, despite their linguistic similarities within the southern Maa genealogy (see Vossen 1988), which my research assistant Edwine remarked on on several occasions in areas where we moved swiftly from Kisongo interviewees to Arusha ones. Certain words are different across the dialects, and these are continually changing as new slang and jargon is adopted and appropriated over time. Perhaps the most likely explanation for these subtle differences is that they signal to other members of the ingroup one's identity as either Arusha or Kisongo (Galaty 2020 pers. comm.). Each group can easily pick up from language, dress, and appearance who identifies with which group. To this I would add that they also share enough similarities that, to non-Maasai people, the Arusha and Kisongo still appear similar enough to be painted with the broad stroke of Maasai identity. Arguably, this is particularly useful for the Arusha, who can mobilize their "Maasai-ness" strategically when it suits them (see Hodgson 2001). For instance, with the talk in the conservation community of

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[194] The red colour of Arusha people's teeth has also been attributed to the mineral content (likely iron) of drinking water in the mountains. That said, in my study area, Arusha and Kisongo live in close proximity in the lowlands and often drink from the same water sources. There is even a river in Manyara Ranch, described by Goldman (2020), that sometimes run red, and is primarily accessed by Kisongo. Both factors (water and food) likely play a role.

relocating the Arusha who have settled the wildlife corridors north of Tarangire National Park, in Naitolia, Mswakini, and Olasiti, many Arusha in these affected villages are quick to identify as Maasai, a title which conjures up a storied history of political struggle in the face of conservation-induced displacement. Maasai identity carries great social capital and hegemonic power in rights discourses, and so, to borrow from Hodgson (2011), the Arusha can use their cultural closeness to "be Maasai" and "become indigenous" in strategic ways. The Kisongo do not seem to feel the same way, often discussing the Arusha pejoratively in their everyday discourses and preferring to distance themselves from Arusha when possible. At the same time, they regularly engage the Arusha as trading partners, for intermarriage, for labour, for food, rituals, and particularly in times of need. The Arusha are very much part of the cross-sectional Maasai networks, and, over the past hundred years or so, Kisongo and Arusha families have become interwoven through intermarriage. These patterns of intermarriage, shaped in large part by changing environmental and macro-political contexts, might lead one to assume that Kisongo and Arusha societies have become completely mixed in the study area. But, importantly, intermarriage does not seem to have created an assimilative affect between Kisongo and Arusha in this study area. Women married into the other group seem to take on the dominant cultural context of the receiving group. Soippey, my friend and interlocutor in Oltukai, is Kisongo, but his mother is Arusha. Soippey's mother, however, has come to view herself as Kisongo because she was married into that group. Soippey is very adamant that he and his family are Kisongo despite the fact that his mother is Arusha. The reverse is also true, as those Kisongo women who are married into the Arusha group come to assimilate into Arusha society. The result is that both groups retain their key cultural differences and economic complementarity. Thus, the concept of ethnicity in this ethnographic context is a highly flexible one that can be manipulated in accordance with the social networks across groups.

Another example of this ethnic malleability is observable in the areas where some Kisongo live in Arusha-dominated areas or vice versa. One example is the Olutkai sub-village of

Olasiti. The village is technically located in Babati District (Manyara Region) to the west of Manyara Ranch, but it shares a border with Oltukai village (Monduli District, Arusha Region). The Arusha living in this area are noticeably closer to Kisongo in their styles of homestead enclosures and dress than the Arusha living across the A104 highway in the other sub-villages of Olasiti. Similarly, the Kisongo living among the Arusha near the highway in Naitolia and Mswakini seem to take on some of the characteristics of the Arusha. The result of this is that the territoriality of each group is largely preserved.

Ethnic territoriality in this case becomes strikingly clear through my survey data. I quickly realized after inputting the survey data that the landscape was not an inter-mixed mosaic of Arusha/Kisongo, but one characterized by rigid territorial division, generally by villages or sub-villages. The survey data suggests very strong territorial division between these two groups, irrespective of their shared social networks and complementary roles within Maasai society. This was especially true since respondents were *self-identifying* as either Kisongo or Arusha in the survey.

5.5 Implications for rangeland management

The question that resonated in my mind after visualizing the GIS data was what implications does this form of ethnic territoriality have in the context of rangeland management? The ecological context of the area is important in this regard, as the area is embedded within the greater Tarangire ecosystem and constitutes an important wildlife dispersal area adjacent to Tarangire National Park. Bimodal rainfall patterns shape the landscape. In the wet season, wildlife moves out of the park onto village land. Some follow seasonal migratory routes further afield before returning in the dry season to the permanent water source in the park, the Tarangire River. The Kisongo of Olutkai and Esilalei suggested to me during oral history interviews that they first arrived in the area just over 200 years ago, and, prior to colonialism, they had minimal issues with the wild ungulates in their community because they did not farm at that time. There was, of course, some competition for grazing resources, and some concern about cattle-

wildebeest disease transmission. The Kisongo were primarily pastoralists and viewed the areas in contemporary Naitolia and Mswakini villages as seasonal pasture. Thus, the Kisongo had interests in keeping those rangelands open for the sake of their livelihoods, an interest that simultaneously benefited the wildlife (and the conservationists who sought to protect them). However, once the Arusha began settling the area, these rangelands began to fragment (see LaRocque 2006). As Arusha expansion into the area from Monduli and Meru accelerated following independence (see Chapter 3), the trend became marked. Rather quickly, over the span of fifty or so years, these wildlife dispersal areas and seasonal pastures for the Kisongo became fully fledged villages hosting, almost exclusively, Arusha agriculturalists.

The Arusha are very aware of this somewhat underhanded pattern of encroachment into the area, which quickly became apparent in differences in how prospective Kisongo and Arusha interviewees responded to the idea of a foreign researcher with unknown intentions arriving in their village in a private vehicle (as government officials often do) to recruit interviewees. The Kisongo almost always welcomed these prospects, happy to discuss their histories and stories. But the Arusha were noticeably more guarded, particularly around questions of ethnicity, geographic origins, and history of residence in the area. The sense of precarity shared by many of the Arusha in the area has been fuelled in large part by rumblings that the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) will at some point reclaim the wildlife corridors near national parks that have been encroached on by domestic in-migrants. State legislation on wildlife corridors in Tanzania stipulates that all human settlements and activities inside corridors are technically prohibited (see Goldman 2009), though these regulations have thus far been unevenly enforced, if at all. The designation of the areas between Tarangire National Park and Lake Manyara National Park as the Kwakuchinja Willdife Corridor, despite the fact that these areas are also village lands is enough to put the Arusha on edge (see Igoe and Croucher 2007). Enforcement of corridor restrictions would also detrimentally affect the Kisongo, as the restrictions on human activities would also apply to livestock grazing. Unfortunately for the

Maasai, conservation policy in Tanzania has not yet developed to the point that pastoralism is recognized as a sustainable form of rangeland management that fosters human-wildlife coexistence. The question, however, of whether the government would actually implement a corridor in this area, and subsequently enforce the relocations, is unknown. The land rights of the Arusha in this area are secure to some extent pursuant to the Village Land Act, but the state can also exercise eminent domain if it is deemed that the relocation of villagers would serve public good.

But as things currently stand, the Arusha have established strongholds along the southern side of Manyara Ranch and show no signs of relinquishing their claim to land. If one is to conceptualize the Arusha as descendants of the Loogolala (perhaps mixed with Pare), who previously practiced pastoralism in the plains before adapting to the highlands (see Chapter 3), it is logical to assume that they will adapt again following their return to the lowlands. Such agrarian transitions do not occur immediately, and likely unfold over a period of time in response to changing environmental conditions. Based on my fieldwork in 2020-2021, it would seem that the Arusha still very much consider subsistence agriculture to be the economic core of their mode of production and, while they do not grow the same variety of crops that they once did in the highlands, they are still determined to cultivate maize, beans, and peas (as well as sunflowers and some fruits). However, there are two main factors that make this livelihood pursuit challenging in the area: first the bimodal patterns of rainfall, generally averaging less than 500mm annually, make it challenging to grow maize in the absence of sophisticated irrigation systems. The farms in Naitolia and Mswakini are situated on flat lands where terracing is not possible and the fields are rain fed. This makes it difficult to consistently grow maize with high yields because it takes a long time to mature (2-4 months). Consistent rainfall over a longer period of time would better suit this type of production. Secondly, wildlife dynamics play an important role in creating new opportunity costs for farmers in this area that did not exist in the highlands. Elephants in particular, but also zebra and various species of antelope raid maize with

regularity ahead of harvesting, having acquired a palate for "the sweet taste of corn" (Arusha interviewee in Naitolia). The zebra and antelope are "stubborn" (Arusha interviewee in Mswakini) but can be kept at bay with strings tied around the edge of farms, thorny-bushes (*ngoja kidogo* "wait a little" bushes that grab one's garments), and a few guards at night. But the elephants are very difficult to manage, and a small group left unperturbed can destroy an entire several-acre maize field in a single evening. These factors suggest that over an extended period of time, the Arusha might be inclined to adapt their livelihood and land use practices once again in response to the environment that they have come to inhabit. Certainly, when one takes a historical approach to framing agrarian-pastoral transformation in East Africa, this prospect becomes increasingly plausible. Harking back to history, *ILoikoip* pastoralists engaged livestock keeping, farming, and hunting in various ways prior to colonialism before the pastoral *IlMaasai* came to establish their "pure" pastoral ideology (Spear 1993, 1997; Galaty 1982). The Maasai fragmented rival *Loikop* groups after defeating them during the *Loikop* wars of the mid 19th century, pushing these different sub-groups (like Loogalala, Uasin Kishu, Laikipiak, Moitanik among others) to adapt to new social and environmental contexts, as the Parakuyo and Arusha did (Jacobs 1963 in King 1971, 118). It becomes plausible then, and perhaps even likely, to suggest that the Arusha living in the Tarangire ecosystem will once again adapt to the constraints on farming. Indeed, this seems to be the case in parts of Naitolia and Mswakini, as several disgruntled Arusha farmers lamented during interviews that their efforts to defend their crops were no match for the rising numbers of elephants in the area (see Bluwstein 2018b), and they had in some cases converted small holding farms back to pasture. The danger from a rangeland management perspective, however, is that new technologies might emerge that allow people to master their environments in such a way that the elephants and rainfall patterns play a less determining role. Sophisticated irrigation technologies, often subsidized around the world by commercial farming companies, or high-quality elephant-proof fences could mitigate these constraints and allow the Arusha to continue their farming practices in an environmental context

to which they are otherwise unsuited. Thus, the opportunity costs of farming versus livestock keeping are not fixed across time.

A key aspect in this discussion can be distilled down to the ways in which people think about their livelihoods and property relations. Currently, the scramble for land in this area has led to topographical fragmentation through the proliferation of smallholder farms, but these are not "hard boundaries" (Reid 2012; Galvin et al. 2008). As Damian Bell, the Director of Honeyguide, a Tanzanian community-based conservation NGO, shared with me on one occasion, the maize farms and thorny bush fences do not actually stop the elephants from moving through. And for the rest of the wildlife, the farms are only seasonal. But from the perspectives of the Kisongo, the property relations of these farms have shifted to individual private property, and thus the pastoralists are alienated from using them in a communal fashion. As surfaced in several of the interviews, when asked about their aspirations for the future and how to resolve these emergent land conflicts in their villages, a number of Arusha respondents suggested with great detail (and enthusiasm!) that the Kisongo should reduce their cattle holdings, that the government should fence the national parks and keep the wildlife inside, and that the Arusha should be provided with high quality fencing materials to protect their own private property. Inside their own individual enclosures, the Arusha would then ideally keep a small herd of mixed stock for milk, meat, and sale, and a personal farm to grow their own food (and bring the surplus to market). This was a commonly expressed vision for what constituted a "good life" (see Woodhouse and McCabe 2018; Raycraft 2019c). The implication then, as I see it, is if faced with the choice of utilizing new technologies to master their environments (irrigation and fencing), and truly fragmenting the rangelands into private property, the Arusha would jump at this prospect. My sense, after having worked with the Arusha for a year and based on reading the works of Spear, is that the Arusha often take what is given to them in that they pull in a bricolage-like manner (see Levi-Strauss 1962) from the social capital of the pastoral Maasai, the tools of the Chagga, the industriousness of the Meru, the western influences of colonial

administrators and missionaries, and the ecosystems around them. Their expansion into these areas, with this level of efficiency and social organization, is rather remarkable, but poses a very real threat to the prospect of the rangelands adjacent to Tarangire National Park remaining open.

5.6 Ethnicity, politics, and land conflict

Not to be overlooked, the agency of the Kisongo is great as well, and I could not help but wonder why the Kisongo were willing to accept this fate of watching their precious grazing areas fragment around them as they closed in on their now-permanent homes of Oltukai and Esilalei. During interviews with the Kisongo in Oltukai on how this encroachment occurred and why the Kisongo remained idle, some interviewees reminded me that they were not allowed to use physical violence to resolve cultural matters anymore. Violent clashes do still occur between cultivators and pastoralists, in some cases leading to deaths. However, the scale and frequency with which these events occur, and their economic implications, are likely less in a contemporary context than they were in a precolonial era (though this assumption is interrogated by Kjekshus 1977b). Cattle raiding has become prohibited in contemporary Tanzania, and even mentioning the word "*Kabila*" (tribe or ethnicity) in certain political contexts is considered taboo, given the enduring nationalist ideology of shared citizenship championed during the socialist period. *Ujamaa* may well have succeeded in reducing acute instances of ethnic conflict, but the long-term implications still bear on the state of rangelands in Monduli. While the Kisongo are happy to interact with the Arusha in the highlands, where their agricultural society created a buffer against environmental uncertainties and ultimately supported the pastoral economy in the plains, the encroachment of Arusha onto the lowlands now drives rangeland fragmentation and thus does not align with their interests. As several of my interlocutors in Oltukai alluded to, if this encroachment had occurred a hundred years ago, the Kisongo would likely have gone to war, pushing the Arusha back up into the highlands, where they would remain in a peripheral and complementary role in Maasai society. The Kisongo, after all, have a strong warrior class (*Ilmurran)* that enabled them to establish control over the lowlands in the 19th century before

external political intervention. But in a contemporary context, with the macro-level political dampers on ethnic differences, the Kisongo are essentially handcuffed from taking to arms and pushing the Arusha out of the lowlands.[195] Thus, the political interventions of Nyerere through the socialist regime disproportionately weakened the cultural autonomy of the Kisongo while simultaneously strengthening the abilities of the Arusha to expand into the rangelands. The great irony, then, is that the attempt to reduce ethnic conflict through political intervention has ultimately led to greater long-term land conflict over time, the implications of which are great for the pastoralists and wildlife, which both depend on access to pasture in these areas. Despite the critical view that ethnic conflict receives in regional discourses, it likely played a highly functional role in ensuring that cultural practices of one ethnic group were tailored to accomodate the environmental context in which they operated. The Kisongo, with their reign over the lowlands could ensure that these areas were managed through a pastoral mode of production, while the Arusha would settle and cultivate the fertile highlands, assuming a complementary role within the interconnected socioeconomic system of Maasailand. That continued until colonial processes sought first to micromanage the relationships between ethnicity ("tribe") and territory through the formation of the Masai reserve and the subsequent reconfiguration of ethnic relations through socialist policies (see Chapter 3). As a consequence, the rangelands of Monduli (and Babati) have become fragmented as the ethnic territoriality of Arusha agriculturalists and Kisongo pastoralists persists in a stalemate. It is yet to be seen how precisely population growth will factor into this discussion down the road. If it is to continue on its current growth trajectory, it could lead to greater land scarcity over time and catalyze institutional change. Or perhaps population growth will simply stabilize relative to available resources as people tailor their decision-making processes to emergent constraints. The only true certainty is that nothing stays the same for very long, and the current state of ethnic territoriality

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[195] Violent clashes between pastoralists and cultivators do still occur, sometimes resulting in deaths. However, most land struggles in a contemporary context are waged through institutional warfare in the political arena.

might well give way to new types of agrarian and pastoral transformation in the not-so-distant future.

5.7 Livelihood diversification and property transitions among the Kisongo

As things currently stand at the time of writing, the key concern in the context of rangeland management in the greater Makuyuni-Lolkisale area is the conversion of communal pasture to smallholder farms. Indeed, topographical examination of the landscapes around Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA reveals significant land cover change over the past fifty or so years (see for example Martin 2019, 2020). As discussed in the previous section, many of these changes were driven by the in-migration of Arusha cultivators to the area, but one of the particularly intriguing and concerning aspects of this trend has been the endogenous shift within Kisongo society towards cultivation. Looking from above, the checkered smallholding farmlands of Naitolia and Mswakini look quite similar to those of Esilalei and Oltukai. The key distinction, as illustrated by the quantitative data in this chapter is that Esilalei and Oltukai are almost entirely Kisongo Maasai, while Naitolia and Mswakini are mostly Arusha. At first glance, the tendency might be to group these areas together under the umbrella term "agropastoralism." In my experience, ecologists and conservationists in the area generally seem to paint these communities with the same brush as "Maasai" and describe in troubling tones the shifts from "pure" pastoralism to mixed farming and livestock keeping. While it is correct to some extent to suggest that the Arusha are also Maasai, there is more to this story, and the details have significant implications in the context of rangeland management. Importantly, there are underlying anthropological differences in how land use changes in Kisongo villages and Arusha ones are unfolding.

On the observable surface, the study villages have seen a somewhat rapid transition from common pastures to smallholding farms ever since villagization. While the Arusha have long historical precedent of farming as cultural practice over the past century, many of the Kisongo, particularly in Oltukai and Esilalei, began this transition to farming fairly recently; elders point to the 1980s. Elder interviewees in Oltukai and Esilalei explained that their parents and

grandparents either did not farm at all, or kept small maize and bean farms (of a few acres or less) to mitigate the risks of drought and provide food that could be stored for greater security. Beginning in the 1980s, the rapid transition began, with Kisongo in the area citing cross-pollination of ideas from Arusha, drought, increasing sizes of families, state policies promoting sedentarization, and desires to lay personal claim to land vis-à-vis the state (national parks), outside commercial interests (plantations and large farms), and other community-members (individual farms within communities). By the mid 2000s, Maasai pastoralist landscapes had been reconfigured into checkered agropastoralist terrains, with far larger farms than one would have seen a hundred years ago in Maasailand. Beginning within the past decade (about 9 years ago at time of writing), people began to pay for tractors (around 30-50,000Tsh per acre) to cultivate lands as families and farms grew in size and people became further integrated into the cash economy. Large farms are also rented out to people from elsewhere, with some used for commercial production. The scramble for individual title deeds in village land has accentuated the shift in land uses, as farming is considered in the eyes of the state to be a productive use of land (i.e. one that is visible to the naked eye). Allegations of corruption and favouritism in some villages during these processes have been forwarded as a potential explanation for why some individuals have been able to secure large farms (50-100+ acres), while others have been told there is no space left in village land. Fear of protected area expansion within Kisongo communities has also led to the strategic positioning of farms immediately next to protected areas to buffer against conservation expansion into otherwise 'unused' land.

Careful examination of how the Arusha and Kisongo farm, and why, reveals a more enduring set of cultural and economic differences between the groups with great significance for rangeland management. On the one hand, it is too simplistic to suggest that the Arusha are wholly farmers if one is to consider that they may well have undergone economic change over the past few centuries from pastoralism to agriculture. They are certainly not opposed to livestock keeping, and actively acquire stock when possible, which is valuable both

economically but also in terms of social capital and their abilities to trade and practice reciprocity with neighbouring Kisongo. On the other hand, however, when observing their farming practices closely and discussing them during interviews, there do seem to be noticeable differences in the level of attention, care and personal value that the Arusha devote to their farms. This is of course to do with the economic outcomes of investing labour into the activity, as farmers with greater skill and knowledge, and who exercise more attention and care, will likely have higher yields. Farming contributes directly to household food security, both through subsistence and commercial sale of surpluses in local and regional markets. But beyond the economic aspects as well, there is also something intrinsic to labour and livelihood that cannot be reduced to capital alone. People do not work exclusively for money, but also to feel fulfilled and find meaning in their lives. Farmers around the world, in my experience, often take great pride in their work not just for economic reasons but for intrinsic ones because they view farming as a rewarding use of their time. The Arusha I worked with seemed to share this way of thinking about their farms. They viewed their identities as farmers with great pride, and valued in particular the sense of ownership and autonomy it gave them. Subtle details continually surfaced in my observations of Arusha families, as compared to Kisongo ones during our interviews. The Arusha often decorated the walls of their houses with paint and carving, shapes, and posters in artistic ways, and in ways that varied considerably from each house to the next. By contrast, the Kisongo walls inside their mud huts were generally blank. This is not to suggest a broad set of entrenched differences, but a subtle distinction in how the two groups value what is important to them, and what they feel adds meaning to their lives (and what does not). One trivial dissimilarity that Edwine and I found entertaining was the sense of landscape scale that seemed to differ depending on who we were speaking with, and whether we were referring to a farm or grazing area. The Kisongo would consistently remark that anything over 5-10 acres was a big farm, while the Arusha would describe their farms of the same size as small. But for those unwilling to walk great distances, it is perhaps ill-advised to ask a Kisongo how far away

something is if it exists on the other side of a pasture ("it's just here; it's right there only; not far"). This often entailed an hour's walk, sometimes across a river and over a mountain! Again, these were subtle differences that should not be taken to represent entrenched cultural differences, but noticeable particularities how each group thought about land. To the Kisongo, anything larger than a garden-sized farm was thought to be big, but pastures that took less than half an hour to traverse were considered small.

In terms of their specific farming practices, the Arusha are generally meticulous in how they plant and harvest. Arusha interviewees thoughtfully described how they first dig holes, fertilize the holes with animal dung, and plant seeds. They experiment with a variety of crops, considering methodologically which ones will produce adequate yields, and they adjust accordingly over time. They invest their own time and labour into cultivating soil, planting seeds, defending their crops, and harvesting. While these details are also at times apparent among the Kisongo, they are done with far less consistency. The Kisongo generally grow maize and beans exclusively. They sometimes use cattle dung for fertilizer, but not in an organized or systematic fashion. They also generally prefer not to cultivate, plant or harvest their fields themselves. They often hire 'Swahili' labourers to manage their farms, viewing such work as denigrating, albeit somewhat economically productive. In the areas of Oltukai that neighbour Manyara Ranch and Olasiti village, for instance, much of the area is cultivated for maize and bean farms. But there is much more going on there than meets the eye. The Village Council allocated those areas as farming areas strategically to create a visible buffer zone in the event that AWF or the government wanted to expand the protected area of the ranch onto village land (discussed in Chapters 8-9). People from Oltukai were concerned that if the land was left open for seasonal grazing, the conservationists would view it as unoccupied and would grab it in the name of wildlife conservation. In practice, these farms are not managed by Kisongo themselves, but rather, the land is rented out to 'Swahili' cultivators, who either pay the Kisongo 'owner' a flat rate for the season per acre to cultivate the land for their own uses, or they pay in a portion of

their crop yield for the year, which the Kisongo are happy to receive to bolster food supplies. So the farms then serve both a political function (to secure land) and a practical one (to provide food), but the latter in this case is subsidiary to the main priority of preventing protected area expansion into the village. Makko and I discussed this issue at length when I first began working in the area. Makko explained that when AWF first began operating in the area, the strong reaction from the Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei was to block the entire side of the ranch to prevent expansion. As time passed, and the fear of the ranch expanding into the village began to subside, the interest in opening up the area for livestock has started to shine through again. That said, there is still lasting apprehension about future alienation, particularly in the neighbouring areas given the history of displacement that the Kisongo have faced in the name of conservation (Igoe 2010, 2017; Bluwstein 2017; Goldman 2003; 2011).

5.8 When a farm is not a farm

Often times when I asked people about their farming practices in Oltukai and Esialei, people were initially coy. When I asked why they cultivated, they replied simply that they farmed for food. But when I continued to poke and prod a bit, it became clear that the farms were not particularly important to many of the Kisongo respondents in and of themselves. Many did not use fertilizer of any kind, and some did not bother planting the fields at all. One Korianga-aged man in Esilalei explained, rather confidentially, that "we kind of joke with these farms - some people just sprinkle maize and beans, but this is just for show." In these cases, a passing observer might think the farms in the Arusha villages and the Kisongo ones are the same, but they represent very different things. For the Kisongo who expressed little interest in investing labour into the farms and in producing substantial yields, the farms were simply a way to signal to others that this was their property. This speaks to a key definition of property as a social instrument for communicating to other stakeholders who has the right to access the benefit streams associated with those resources (Bromley 1992). By farming, the Kisongo are essentially saying, 'this is my land.' In some pastoral areas of Tanzania like Simanjiro, where conservation

politics are highly contested, some social scientists have referred to this dynamic as 'defensive cultivation' (see Davis 2011; Sachedina and Nelson 2012).

This became quite clear while interviewing the late *Oloiboni* in Esilalei village*,* who unabashedly explained that "all those farms over there" *gestured out in front* were areas where his children would eventually establish their own homesteads. He was just keeping the area for them in the event that outside interests (like Arusha) tried to grab the area away from his family. His 'farms' then, were not really farms in the productive sense, but simply holdings. This was a common theme that surfaced in many of the interviews with the Kisongo. In Oltukai, one man explained that he had acquired sizeable farms. He pointed to them, and explained carefully (in response to my annoyingly persistent farming questions) which crops he planted, how he planted them, when he planted them etc. But as the farming questions persisted and he became increasingly bored with the topic, he eventually conceded that he did not actually plant the farms on a consistent basis at all! He only did so when tensions emerged as to who actually owned the land. Planting was his way of writing his name on the property for others to see. I asked him why he felt the need to do that and he explained that if he did not, others might try to take it. By others, he meant not only outsiders, but also insiders. Within Oltukai, there appears to be a scramble of sorts going on to secure farmland for individual families – essentially *kuchukuo chako mapema* (to take yours early, or 'to get yours before someone else gets theirs').[196] On the one hand, this would seem to represent a shift towards more individualistic ways of thinking that could 'collapse the pastoral platform' (see Galaty 2013), but I realized there was still more to it. People, for instance, would endeavour to secure two farms that were connected to one another to encompass a larger total area. As one Kisongo man (of the Landiis set) explained during an interview, he had negotiated with others to secure two large farms (10-20 acres) next to each other. His rationale was that he would be able to divide the large area up and give each of his

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[196] *Chukuo Chako Mapema* is a kiSwahili phrase used throughout rural Tanzania with pejorative reference to the ruling party CCM and rumours of corruption.

sons some farmland (not a traditional form of inheritance among the Maasai). When I asked the sons how they felt about the area being reduced to smaller individual farms, they explained that the fact that the farms were *connected* made all the difference. The sons could then decide together through their family relations which parts of the farm, if any, they would cultivate, and which parts they would leave open for grazing. They could even actively convert cultivated areas back to pasture by planting grass.[197] Thus, rather than fragment and enclose their rangelands, the farms may actually serve to prevent this fate from occurring by stopping others from grabbing the land. Encroaching cultivators, for instance, may be much less inclined to keep area open for grazing. The farms, then, are not an 'end' (in Li's 2014 sense) but part of an ongoing process of property transitions that are still tied to the social institutions of family and kinship, and which exist relative to a wider political context and underlying economic mode of production.

Of course, there is an aspect of economic pragmatism to the integration of farming into their livelihoods. The Kisongo (and other Maasai-proper/pastoral/core sections) have long integrated some modest amounts of cultivation into their societies as a means of buffering themselves against the insecurities of drought and climate variability and diversifying away from exclusively livestock holdings. Traditionally, this entailed small 'garden' farms of a few acres or less around one's homestead to keep maize or beans or other food supplies that could contribute to household food security through subsistence. But the scale at which the transitions from communal livestock keeping to small holding farms have occurred over the past forty years in northern Tanzania has led some to question whether the Kisongo are "staying Maasai" (Homewood et al. 2009). Diversification across different economic arenas including wage labour, farming, and mining among others have raised questions about the continued role of cattle as the centerpiece of the Kisongo economy (Sachedina 2008).

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[197] Converting cultivated lands back to pasture is sometimes challenging, as turning over the soil disrupts the natural growth cycle of native grasses.

To understand the implications of these property transitions from communal pasture to smallholding farms, it is key to elucidate how the Kisongo think about these processes, what their objectives are, what the shifts represent to them, how their social and cultural values have changed, and where their economic priorities lie. The variety of answers I received when asking the Kisongo why they farmed was particularly telling. Some pointed pragmatically to the need to feed their growing families, as the milk products from their cattle alone could not nourish all of their children. At first glance, this would seem like it is due to inadequacies with the livestock economy in and of itself, or attributable to progressive population growth at the village-level. But I think rather, it is a reflection of the larger processes of land alienation and political constraint that have restricted the Kisongo in continually smaller areas (LaRocque 2006), which make the pastoral mode of production difficult to sustain. Alienated from key water sources through settler farms, national parks, villagization, boundaries on the Masai Reserve, and now Arusha encroachment, the Kisongo must still provide for their families amidst this sea of constraints. The Kisongo of Oltukai and Esilalei are enclosed to the west by Lake Manyara and the surrounding escarpment, to the north by the expansion of Mto wa Mbu, to the east by settler farms and a national forest reserve, to the southeast by the rapidly urbanizing town of Makuyuni, to the south by Arusha encroachers and Tarangire National Park, and to the southwest by the growth of Minjingu town around the recently established phosphorous factory. The Kisongo, it would seem, have their backs against the wall, making it abundantly clear how important the politics of land have become at the village level. Mara Goldman's (2003, 2011) work in Manyara Ranch provides crucial context because it highlights the fear and apprehension that the Kisongo had, for good reason, about the potential for the ranch to be yet another example of land that was alienated from them. The stakes are tremendously high for the Kisongo in this area, as the material base of the pastoral mode of production is being reduced to fragments all around them, with few tools available to stem the tides of these wider political and economic forces.

Considering these wider pressures, the Kisongo carve out niches where they can to exercise their agency and remain in control of their way of life. While some interviewees spoke in practical terms about the benefits of farming vs. keeping livestock, given the limited land that is available to them, and the difficulties this presents for food security, a majority pointed to the Arusha as the main reason for the shift: "We farm because the Arusha farm" was a common answer, presented as though that would be a sufficient reason to justify the transition. I always prodded more to understand why the Kisongo felt the need to follow the practices of the Arusha. Kisongo interviewees were primarily concerned that if they did not lay claim to land though cultivation, the Arusha would be able encroach on the area, as they had in Naitolia and Mswakini. The result of the Arusha in-migration following villagization was a scramble within the Kisongo villages to keep these migrants at bay and prevent them from grabbing more land in Kisongo areas. Village councils in Oltukai and Esilalei are flexible when they receive requests from fellow Kisongo or other pastoral sections to establish homesteads and assimilate to the village, but are steadfast in prohibiting Arusha from doing the same after bearing witness to the rapid in-migration and ensuing fragmentation that occurred in Naitolia, Mswakini, Olasiti, and Minjingu. Once again, the farms signal that the land is occupied, but this time to a different audience – not to government or conservation actors, but to Arusha who may otherwise try to grab it. This trend is particularly noticeable on the southern boundary of Manyara Ranch. Technically, the boundary of the ranch extends to the road, but the Arusha began encroaching on the area by crossing over the highway from Naitolia and Mswakini. When I asked the former village chair of Mswakini Chini (an Arusha man) how he felt about the ranch, he was happy that Arusha from his village were allowed to graze their livestock inside, but resented the fact that the ranch 'encroached' on Mswakini's village land, pointing to those areas on the other side of the highway. In reality, however, the ranch was formed long before their claims to this territory were established, and it was actually the Arusha who began the process of encroachment. A compromise was eventually reached where those who had already established bomas on the

north side of the highway would be allowed to stay, but no further expansion would be tolerated. As will be discussed at length in Chapter 9, The Kisongo are thrilled to have a formal institution in place to prevent the Arusha from further enclosing Oltukai and Esilalei. So when the Kisongo say "we farm because the Arusha farm," what it actually means is "we farm to lay claim to land and prevent the Arusha from encroaching on our territory."

A second reason that the Kisongo mimic the farming practices of the Arusha is an economic one. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Kisongo have maintained reciprocal trading relations with the Arusha since the early 19th century, often exchanging cattle for food supplies and labour and vice versa depending on climatic conditions. While Arusha trading partners are still receptive to receiving cattle (they generally have smaller large stock holdings than the Kisongo) in exchange for crop products, in a contemporary context many prefer to simply sell their crops for cash. This forces the Kisongo to sell their cattle, which they are generally reluctant to do unless economic conditions are favourable and they need cash.[198] Generally speaking, the Kisongo prefer not to sell their cattle when it can be avoided, given the central importance of milk to their diets and herds to their social life (e.g. rituals, bride price etc.) and overall sense of livelihood security in the face of variable environmental conditions.[199] The reluctance of herders to bring their cattle to market has been well documented across sub-Saharan Africa (see Ferguson 1994). This has been framed at times as being a product of differences in 'cattle logics' vs. 'capitalist logics' (Schareika et al. 2021). Indeed, there are values (both use and exchange) of cattle within pastoral societies that extend beyond their market value, as sources of pride and prestige and means to secure wives and household labour, but also a core source of food security through milk products. Aside from these social reasons put forth

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[198] As discussed in Chapter 3, the Kisongo often bring their cattle to market in Kenya informally given greater demand and thus more favourable prices than formal markets in Tanzania. This suggests that they are indeed willing to sell cattle as needed, despite a general hesitancy about commercialization.

[199] Goats, on the other hand, are much more liquid. They generate little in the way of social capital, are effective foragers in a range of conditions, and are easy to bring to market in towns given the high demand for butchered meat.

by some scholars suggesting that pastoralists have a moral economy that operates in a different fashion from the rationalities of markets, the argument could also be made that by not responding to market incentives to sell their cattle, the Kisongo are simply acting as rational economic actors. The Kisongo recognize the long-term economic value that cattle hold, not as cash holdings, but as savings accounts and dividend-paying stocks that provide a long-term source of milk without requiring the herd owner to compromise the principal investment.[200] This investment strategy is highly rational and tailored to semi-arid rangelands. Pastoralists are sometimes criticized by technical experts for not selling stock when prices are high, or low, overlooking the more driving question of whether the herd owners are in need of cash. Pastoralists seem to sell livestock as needed to fulfil their cash requirements, with a general interest in maintaining herds for the purposes of the domestic economy.

A key question that then emerges is 'how do the constraints on pastoralism affect the basic economic analyses that herders make in terms of the most productive use of their remaining communal lands?' Are Kisongo pastoralists undergoing a fundamental change in their underlying economic mode of production? This is a pressing question of great resonance. Converting pasture to agricultural fields might suggest this is occurring, but again if one digs deeper, these surface level assumptions deteriorate. Why? Because the Kisongo still keep and value cattle above all else, and this becomes clear through anthropological attention to ethnographic context and the economics of everyday life (see Malinowski 1926). The Kisongo cultivate maize and beans to feed their families without having to sell their stock to pay Arusha traders for food supplies. Despite their hesitation about bringing cattle to market, the Kisongo do so on various occasions to raise cash, but they much prefer to do so when prices are favourable. The idea that cattle logics are somehow different from capital logics does not quite hold water in this case because what seems to be occurring is very diligent price-checking to time markets and 'sell high' for a sizeable profit, rather than being *forced* to 'sell low' in order to purchase

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[200] For more nuanced discussion see Galaty's (2021) comment on Schareika et al. (2021).

necessary food supplies from Arusha trading partners. The farms also increase the Kisongo's bargaining power and their ability to leverage their own supplies in negotiations with Arusha for maize prices.

Thus, I would argue that livelihood diversification and property transitions among the Kisongo in this area are not driven by a desire to reconfigure the underlying mode of production of the society, but rather to contribute to its longevity in the face of social (encroaching Arusha) and political constraints (land alienation). The Arusha remain resourceful agriculturalists who strategically position themselves close to the Kisongo. They are happy to increase their livestock holdings when possible to complement their cultivation-based economy, and wield the power of village councils to secure agricultural land. At least for now, the core difference between the Arusha and the Kisongo is a socioeconomic one: the Kisongo remain "people of cattle," and the Arusha are agriculturalists. This social backdrop is crucial for understanding why these communities feel the way they do about Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch.

Chapter 6. An anthropological microhistory of Randilen WMA

The following two chapters address the central question of whether Randilen WMA constitutes an effective and equitable model of community-based conservation on village land adjacent to Tarangire National Park (TNP). At stake as well is the question of whether Randilen further alienates pastoral lands or secures local access and use rights, outcomes with great implications for pastoral resilience. With particular attention to the perspectives and lived experiences of local communities, I will thus attempt to explicate whether Randilen WMA reflects an appropriate institutional arrangement for managing semi-arid rangelands. Addressing these research questions demands a historically-grounded approach as the case is nuanced and ethnographically complex. To present a well-rounded picture, Chapter 6 first outlines the historical context of Randilen WMA and Chapter 7 subsequently presents and analyzes the mixed data I collected in the field in 2019-2020. Chapter 6 is organized as follows: First, I introduce background literature on WMAs, provide some general information about Randilen WMA, and acknowledge the current scholarly discourse about the case. The remainder of the chapter lays out a historical narrative of how Randilen WMA came to be. I then segue swiftly into Chapter 7, which continues the story by presenting a contemporary portrait of the WMA. I withhold discussion and conclusion until the end of Chapter 7, at which point I synthesize the information presented in Chapters 6 and 7 in the context of the research questions outlined in this introduction.

6.1 Background literature on WMAs[201]

In northern Tanzania, Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) represent a key strategy for conserving wildlife habitat outside national parks. WMAs are often located adjacent to national parks in seasonal wildlife dispersal areas that overlap village land. The process of establishing a

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[201] Some of this information is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 4, but is re-iterated here in a concise format for contextualizing the analysis. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 are published in the following book chapter: Raycraft, Justin. 2022. Community attitudes towards Randilen Wildlife Management Area. *In* Tarangire: Human-wildlife coexistence in a fragmented ecosystem. Eds. Christian Kiffner, Derek Lee, and Monica Bond. Springer: New York, NY. Pp. 109-128.

WMA involves reclassifying some village land as a reserve area to be managed through land use plans. These management plans generally prohibit some human activities to support conservation objectives, while allowing others for the sake of community livelihoods. WMAs must be contextualized in relation to a political history of centralized resource governance in colonial and post-independence Tanzania (see Chapters 3 and 4). They were established following reformation of the country's wildlife sector in the late 1990s to serve three main aims (Nelson et al. 2007): First, WMAs created a legislative framework for the central government to extract revenue from wildlife-related tourism occurring in village land. Second, they served to protect wildlife habitat outside protected areas that was at risk of fragmentation through land use change. And third, WMAs were meant to reflect a form of decentralization that empowered local communities by allowing them to access the benefit streams associated with wildlife resources through participatory governance and management institutions (Wilfred 2010; Songorwa 1999). WMAs were thus microcosms of wider sectoral reform in that they were conceived to address key social, political, economic, and ecological concerns that had arisen from the national park model of conservation.

While WMAs have been touted by the government as a community-based model of wildlife conservation, this rhetoric often does not translate into practice (Goldman 2003). WMAs have been heavily criticized by social scientists for reconfiguring jurisdictions of authority in favour of the central government and private investors at the expense of village communities (Kicheleri et al. 2018a; Kicheleri 2018; Green and Adams 2015; Moyo et al. 2017). They have been framed as a form of state sanctioned rent seeking to 'grab' tourism revenues from communities, which may otherwise enter into direct agreements with private investors (Benjaminsen et al. 2013; Sulle and Banka 2017). Like other types of conservation areas, WMAs can be implemented in ways that are exclusionary and rife with conflict, depending on the distributions of power across WMA stakeholders, the livelihoods of local communities, and the governance and management mechanisms at play (Francis 2019; Bluwstein et al. 2016; Kicheleri

et al. 2018b, 2021). Rather than contributing to 'sustainable development' at the village level, several studies have suggested the contrary, drawing connections between WMAs and persistent conditions of poverty in local communities (Homewood et al. 2020; Kaswamila 2012; Igoe and Croucher 2007; Keane et al. 2020). Despite these significant criticisms, however, WMAs may also represent opportunities for communities (see Wright 2017, 2019), particularly in such instances where they secure community access to rangeland resources vis-à-vis external actors with competing interests in the land. WMAs create an institution for managing land that is formalized through law, making it difficult for outside actors to encroach onto community areas or grab land for other purposes. As such, WMAs may also directly protect the interests of resource-dependent communities. This consideration highlights the importance of engaging with the perspectives and lived experiences of community members on a case-by-case basis, rather than defaulting to broad-stroked critique of all WMAs in Tanzania.

6.2 Brief overview of Randilen WMA

Randilen is one of the newest WMAs in Tanzania, gazetted in 2012 under Regulation 32(2), and the Sixth Schedule of the Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) Regulations of 2012 (MNRT 2012:9–10, 21; see also schedule 13(1–2) on page 12). It constitutes a key wildlife habitat area adjacent to TNP in the Monduli District (see Figure 2 in Chapter 2). In total, Randilen WMA encompasses 31,201 hectares of land and includes eight member villages: Oldonyo, Lolkisale, Nafco, Lengoolwa, Lemooti, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini. For the most part, Randilen WMA's member villages are inhabited by Arusha cultivators and Kisongo pastoralists. The two exceptions are Nafco and Lolkisale villages, which include town-like sub-villages comprising mixed ethnicities (see Chapter 5). The Kisongo likely arrived in the central Tarangire ecosystem between the late 18th or early 19th century after their southern expansion was disrupted by the Wahehe around 1830 (see King 2009:21) (see Chapter 3). Mixed ethnicity in-migrants to Lolkisale and Nafco have roots in the colonial era and the recruitment of labour to work on the settler farms in the area. Oral life histories carried out in the member

villages suggest that the Arusha began settling the area between the 1950s-1970s, with encouragement from the government to out-migrate from the densely populated Meru area to the "underutilized" rangelands of Monduli (see Chapter 3; Igoe 2010; Bluwstein 2017). There are, however, some reports of Arusha expansion into Monduli as early as the 1920s (see Hodgson 2001).

Pursuant to the legislative framework of WMAs, Randilen comprises a council of elected representatives from each of the member villages, which together form an Authorised Association (AA) that is accountable to the village councils of the member villages. The AA council is authorized to govern the WMA on behalf of its constituents as per the Wildlife Conservation Act (WCA) No. 5 of 2009 and the most recent Wildlife Management Areas Regulations.[202] The AA is made up of 40 members in total, with five representatives from each of the eight member villages, including the WMA chair who is currently (2020/2021) from Mswakini Chini. Within the AA, there are sub-committees including the Finance and Planning Committee, and the Discipline Committee. Unlike other WMAs, Randilen WMA has a professionally trained manager and finance officer, both of whom are from member villages (Mswakini Juu and Lengoolwa, respectively).

The WMA also has a Board of Trustees and a District Advisory Board. The Board of Trustees holds the WMA accountable and addresses any external conflicts that are beyond the capacity of the executives and AA councils. The Board of Trustees currently comprises six individuals from the member villages. Two of the most recently subdivided villages (Lengoolwa and Oldonyo) do not yet have representatives on the board. The WMA constitution directs how the AA obtains its Board of Trustees. The District Advisory Board was established in accordance with Section 33(1) of the Wildlife Conservation Regulations of 2012 for the purpose of advising the AA on matters relating to the coordination and administration of the WMA in collaboration

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[202] The WMA regulations have been amended and updated several times since 2012.

with government and other external stakeholders (see MNRT 2012:27). It currently includes 5–10 members.

At the top of the WMA's management umbrella is the manager, who is guided by the workplan and budgets approved by the AA. The manager oversees four management divisions: the protection unit, the tourism unit, the community unit, and the financial team. WMA regulations are enforced on the ground by Village Game Scouts (VGS), who are disaggregated into a zonal group, a camp group, and an entrance gate group. Zonal VGS fall under the protection unit, and entrance gate VGS are part of the tourism unit. Funding, training, and guidance for VGS are provided by Honeyguide (a Tanzanian NGO focusing on community-based conservation efforts), with support from the Nature Conservancy (a global environmental organization). Currently, there are 26 VGS from the member villages (3–4 from each village). At the head of the community unit is the WMA Chair, who oversees issues relating to the community in collaboration with the AA.

6.3 Existing literature on Randilen WMA and lingering controversies

In recent years, a scholarly discourse has unfolded in the *Journal of Mammology* regarding the social and ecological outcomes of Randilen WMA. The first article that appeared in the journal by Lee and Bond (2018a) compared wildlife and livestock densities in the area before and after the establishment of Randilen WMA, using distance sampling surveys administered six times per year over a period of four years. They documented in their paper higher densities of wildlife (giraffes and dik-diks in particular) relative to cattle in the study area after the implementation of the WMA. They assert that this finding suggests that Randilen WMA is showing short-term signs of ecological success. Brehony et al. (2018) then published a response to this initial article, critiquing it on three grounds: First, they argued that the concept of ecology used by Lee and Bond (2018a) failed to account for the 'social' in social-ecological systems following a logic of disequilibrium theory. Second, they claimed that the methods were insufficient for concluding that the WMA had, in and of itself, brought about ecological change. And third, they asserted

that the article had misrepresented Randilen WMA as community-based, when in reality it was more accurately characterized as "fortress conservation," in that it excludes communities from the benefits of conservation (see Brockington 2002). In support of this claim, Brehony et al. (2018) draw from Loveless' (2014) Master's thesis, which documented conflicts in Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini when the WMA was first established. In Loveless' (2014) view, villagers were discontent with the exclusionary model of WMA planning and decision-making and felt that their village assemblies were inadequately consulted when the WMA was first created. I discuss Loveless' (2014) thesis in relation to my research in Sections 6.16-6.20. Lee and Bond (2018b:1543) responded to Brehony et al.'s (2018) criticisms as follows: First, they clarified their definition of ecological success with reference to their interpretation of Brooks et al.'s (2012) discussion of "improved outcomes for wildlife." Second, they agreed that coexistence between livestock and wildlife is possible and maintained that their "before-after-control-impact (BACI) design" was sufficient to justify their findings relative to their scale of analysis (Lee and Bond 2018b:1543). Third, they pointed out that quantitative anthropological assessments of community perspectives towards the WMA were lacking, and encouraged "the publication of additional evidence from quantitative analyses of anthropocentric and ecological WMA outcomes" (Lee and Bond 2018b:1544). This chapter takes as its point of departure the third point raised by Brehony et al. (2018), concerning the question of whether Randilen WMA is more accurately characterized as community-based or fortress conservation. I present a mixture of historical, ethnographic, and survey data as part of an anthropological analysis of Randilen WMA, in so doing providing further texture to this important discourse.

6.4 The Lolkisale land squeeze

"The focus of local land tenure contests has shifted from the core state protected areas – the National Parks and Game Reserves – which in most cases were removed from local control decades ago, to the village lands themselves. The issue is no longer the black-and-white one of

evicting local people and establishing exclusive parks, but centers around numerous local

contests over degrees of control of access and rights to land and wildlife" – Nelson (2005:2)

The institutional landscape of conservation in Randilen WMA has a complex and convoluted history. Prior to colonialism, the Kisongo were the dominant group in the area having pushed out, or assimilated, the Mbugwe, Barabaig, and Akie who inhabited the area prior to their arrival. While the area was used for seasonal grazing as part of the pastoral mode of production, it had high densities of tsetse flies, which limited human settlement patterns and livestock keeping in the area. For the most part, the Kisongo used the area for dry season grazing, particularly in times of drought. Up until the 1950s, the area was sparsely populated, and the Kisongo kept the area aside for reserve pasture to be used in times of dire need.

A series of land policies during the mid-colonial period began to constrain pastoralists in the Lolkisale area (see Chapter 3). Tarangire NP and Lake Manyara were gazetted as reserves in 1957, and Tarangire was upscaled to a national park in 1970. These changes displaced local pastoralists from accessing key sources of water and pasture, and created an arbitrary political division between 'pristine wilderness' spaces and human society (Igoe 2004; Neumann 1998).[203] The land squeeze was exacerbated by the allocation of large parcels of land in the Lolkisale area for settler farms in the 1950s. Mixed ethnicity labourers migrated to Lolkisale to work on these settler farms, eventually leading to the development of the town-like sub-villages (Lolkisale-proper and Nafco) that are seen today. Following independence, sizeable areas in Lolkisale were set aside by the state for large-scale agricultural production and leased to private companies (Woien and Lama 1999:8). In 1971, commercial bean and flower seed production commenced in the Lolkisale area, expanding to over 6500 hectares by 1976 (Borner 1985:93-94; see also Gardner 2007:114).[204] Commercial seed production for export resulted in large-scale land cover change in the 1970s-1980s (see Figure 52).

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[203] The added livelihood constraints engendered by TNP also changed local perceptions of risk (Baird et al. 2009).
[204] At the time of writing (2021-2022), a large dryland farm in Lolkisale was listed for sale for 1.5 million $USD. While the original listing did not specify the acreage, I inquired with the listing company and was provided with an

Figure 52 – Map of farmlands around TNP in the early 1980s. The original sketch was by Borner (1985), and was redrawn and adapted by the author.

Under the title of his company Rift Valley Seed Ltd., Hermanus Steyn was allocated the entire area bordering the eastern boundary of TNP, an area of around 381,000 acres (Woien and Lama 1999; Homewood 1995:337-338). Steyn had been administered a lease to develop the land for commercial seed production and, though he intended to intensively develop it for agriculture and ranching, he had only cleared small portions of the area for bean farms by the early 1980s when

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updated link which specifies that the farm is 2406.7 acres (974 hectares), including a two bedroom manager house and a four bedroom guest house. The website states that it has been held by the same family business since 1988 when it was issued a 99 year lease hold. Initially, the farm produced bean and flower seeds for export. Since then, it has diversified to include livestock feed, seeds, and a variety of crops (beans, sorghum, maize, cowpeas, sunflowers, flower seeds, bailing hay). They also rears pigs, sheep, and steer. Source 1: https://www.luxuryestate.com/p100351985-farm-for-sale-lolkisale
Source 2: https://www.investabroadproperties.com/propertysearch/international/property/36114_ps_lhs_lf/6-bedroom-farm-for-sale-lolkisale/region-all/country-tanzania/radius-1/

the government abruptly (and unceremoniously) canceled his lease.[205] The incident remained

unresolved through the 1980s and escalated to national controversy in 1994 when Parliament

ultimately voted against him retaking possession of the land (Woien and Lama 1999). While

Steyn was partially compensated for this loss of land, the dispute is technically still unsettled,

much like the ones in Saburi described in Chapter 4. Steyn is still claiming compensation for his

confiscated farms in the vicinity of 33 million dollars from the Tanzanian government. While

commercial agricultural companies like Steyn's Rift Valley Seed Ltd. were the major players

involved, smallholder farmers were also implicated through growing contracts. The Sluis

Brothers Ltd., for instance, provided small producers with "stock seeds" to plant on their farms

(Nshala et al. 1998:71). In exchange, Sluis Brothers held the right to purchase back the harvests

from the small-scale producers (Nshala et al. 1998). One of my Somali interviewees from the

Esimangore sub-village of Makuyuni reported participating in a growing contract of a similar

nature through the 1980s. Including Steyn's farms, which were nationalized in the 1980s, bean

seed plantations in neighbouring Makuyuni covered 25-55% of the entire area (see Borner

1985:94). In the early 1980s, the areas just east and north of Lolkisale Mountain in contemporary

Nafco were 100% covered by national bean seed farms (Borner 1985:94; see Figure 52). Nafco

village (a former sub-village of Lolkisale) took its name from NAFCO, the National Farming

Corporation, which, through nationalization of private holdings, took over in the 1970s-1980s.

Further complicating land issues, villagization in the same period created distinct

administrative units for allocating land at the local level. Though *operation imparnati* had

limited effects on Maasai settlement patterns in the Lolkisale area (see Woodhouse and McCabe

2018:2), villagization spurred in-migration of Arusha from Meru into the area, increasing total

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[205] As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, Steyn had been leased a massive area spanning Makuyuni, Naitolia, Nafco, and Lolkisale. When the leases were cancelled, NAFCO and MODECO took over for a period before turning much of the land over to village councils (other than Saburi sub-village in Makuyuni, discussed in Chapter 4, which remains in the hands of the government). The farms in Nafco, Makuyuni Juu, and Naitolia, were designated as village land. Many Arusha in-migrated both to work on the MODECO farms following the cancelation of the leases, and to lay individual claims to land informally through cultivation. Many did so without paperwork or formal processes of allocation through villages or other channels.

land under cultivation (see Chapters 3 and 4). Arusha leveraged social (intermarriage), cultural (shared language), and political (leadership positions on village councils) influence to gain access to the area (Kuney 1994; Hodgson 2001). This continued into the 1980s when the government carried out land surveys in the Maasai Steppe to enable village registration and titling (see Woien and Lama 1999). Rangeland intensification accelerated in the 1980s as national development policy turned in favour of economic liberalization (see Figure 53). With government encouragement, farms were cleared north of Lolkisale, near the Engorika Hills, and by the 1990s, large areas in Mswakini had also been alienated by commercial farms.[206] In the 1980s-1990s, the government increasingly encouraged foreign investment and mechanization of agriculture through lease contracts with private companies (Woien and Lama 1999:9). Charcoal production also became widespread, with rising demand in urban centres driving deforestation by small-scale producers in the areas adjacent to TNP (Woien and Lama 1999).

Figure 53 – 2022 Google satellite view of land cleared for agriculture east of Tarangire National Park. Lolkisale Mountain is visible on the left of the image for context.

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[206] Mswakini later subdivided into Naitolia.

6.5 Managing wildlife on the periphery of the park: The efforts and limits of TANAPA

Land use change in the areas east of TNP posed a great conservation challenge for the government in the 1980s. While the Maasai Steppe at large spanned an area of approximately 35,000 km^2, only 2,600 km^2 was located inside TNP. As mentioned in Chapter 2, wildlife generally disperses outside the park in the wet season before returning to its permanent water sources, including the Tarangire River and key wetland swamps – Ngusero and Lormakau in the south, Silale in the east and Gursi in the west. In the wet season, the Simanjiro plains to the east of the park serve as crucial calving grounds for zebra and wildebeest, and Lolkisale and Makuyuni are important dispersal areas for the largest sub-population of elephants in northern Tanzania (Rodgers et al. 2003:5; Pittigilio et al. 2013; Galanti et al. 2006; Pittigilio et al. 2012; Borner 1985; Galanti et al. 2000; Pittigilio et al. 2014:150; Foley 2002:34; Igoe 2010; Goldman 2020:174).[207] Evaluating the wildlife dispersal routes outside Tarangire in the early 1980s, Borner (1985) painted a grave picture of the impacts of commercial agriculture on the ecological connectivity of the Maasai Steppe. In his words, "the north-eastern migration [through Lolkisale] is seriously hampered by seed-bean farming north of Lolkisale Mountain and will be blocked completely in the near future" (Borner 1985:92). Thus, from a conservation standpoint, commercial agriculture posed a crisis for Tarangire's wildlife.

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[207] This elephant sub-population may also be the fastest growing across all of Africa. In 2010, there were approximately 2300 elephants in the ecosystem, a number that has since risen (Igoe 2010).

Figure 54 – Map of wildlife dispersal routes out of TNP prior to land use change in the 1970s-80s north of the park via Mswakini, Oltukai, Esilalei, and Manyara Ranch en route to Lake Natron and Mto wa Mbu (#1,2,3); Northeast of the park via Lolkisale and Makuyuni (#4,5), and east of the park onto the Simanjiro plains (#6,7). Original sketch was by Borner (1985) following Lamprey (1964). This version was redrawn and adapted by the author.

While the land squeeze had been caused for the most part by large-scale alienation of settler farms in the colonial period, and commercial seed production in the 1970s-80s, the government focused its attention on the clearing of wildlife habitat by small-holder cultivators. While this was indeed a growing concern, it was perhaps not the root of the problem. Nonetheless, TANAPA went to great lengths in the 1980s to try to convince Maasai communities living east of the park not to farm. In Lolkisale and other villages adjacent to TNP, TANAPA authorities sought in the 1980s and 90s to offset some of the costs of wildlife in village land for communities and help villages harness some of the benefits. TANAPA implemented the Community Conservation Service (CCS) to provide some services to

communities adjacent to Tarangire NP, and generate support for community initiated projects (CIPs).[208] Rural communities refer to this as *kuwa ujirani mwema* ("being good neighbours"), a sentiment that shone through in my interviews about TNP in villages adjacent to the park (see Nshala et al. 1998:24). Through the efforts, TANAPA grasped the fact that strong-handed approaches to enforcing wildlife laws were making rural communities resentful towards conservation (Nshala et al. 1998). Between 2000-2005 in Simanjiro, TANAPA spent $152,363 on community projects aimed at improving local sentiment to wildlife conservation (Nelson et al. 2010:84). Local Maasai were particularly appreciative of TANAPA's assistance in addressing livestock depredation, providing water for livestock, and helping with security issues in the context of potential rustling (see Kipuri and Nangoro 1996). But at the same time, the local village communities also had concerns about TANAPA, which to them represented the central government. As my interviewees in Lolkisale, Mswakini, and Olasiti explained to me, TANAPA staff are very different from Randilen or Manyara Ranch VGS. Villagers perceive them, and the parks they manage, as symbols of the state. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the community of Lolkisale regularly complained that they were being denied grazing access to open areas by TANAPA staff, and that they were being alienated by commercial farms (Nshala et al. 1998:25). While TANAPA staff could not offer much in the way of support for the farming claims, Lolkislae villagers felt that it was government officials who had secured these farms at the expense of village communities, and thus TANAPA should take responsibility on behalf of the government (Nshala et al. 1998:25). Villagers lamented the "empty promises" of *maendeleo* ("development") by the government (with TANAPA serving as the scapegoat) that never came to be (Nshala et al. 1998:25). For these reasons, when asked about the prospect of a WMA in their area in 1998 by Nshala et al. (1998), the community of Lolkisale was in support on the

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[208] Edwine's father worked in this capacity for TANAPA in the 1980s in the village communities around Serengeti National Park.

condition that their community would be in charge of managing wildlife in village land and not the government.

Perhaps the most significant grievance that my interviewees raised about TNP was that they were resentful of the way that TANAPA consistently expanded its boundaries to grab more pastoral land even while claiming to help them (see Sachedina 2008). Lolkisale community was particularly concerned about these transgressions in the late 1990s, and during my interviews in Mswakini Juu, interlocutors mentioned that some of these boundary issues were still ongoing in 2020. When I interviewed the TANAPA directors of TNP and Lake Manyara National Parks in early 2020, they explained that the main issue from their perspective was that national parks are supposed to have a 2km buffer zone around their boundaries where human settlement and cultivation are prohibited, but neighbouring villages had expanded right up to the boundary of the park. These buffer zones created ambiguity as the communities felt that buffer zones were part of village land, while TANAPA authorities were trying to enforce them as an extension of park boundaries. Technically, however, TANAPA could not enforce this legislation or provide services to communities in areas where it did not have legal jurisdiction (as discussed in Chapter 4). TANAPA staff could not work in park buffer zones, so their enforcement of park restrictions in these areas was uneven and inconsistent.

As a consequence of TANAPA's lack of jurisdiction outside TNP, community conservation services had to be carried out through village-level administrative structures, which were constrained by limited capacity and start-up capital (Woien and Lama 1999). As a consequence, neighbouring communities struggled to realize benefits from wildlife in village land. Conservation remained something that they were told to support by the government, but with little in the way of incentives. Pastoralists and smallholder farmers alike associated wildlife with livelihood costs and top-down land grabbing, but not with its potential benefits. Several studies from this period indicate that wildlife in Lolkisale village was having significant negative impacts on people's livelihoods. A study from 1999 indicated that 84% of people surveyed in

Lolkisale had negative attitudes towards wildlife (Woien and Lama 1999). Another study based on field research in the early 2000s revealed widespread discontent with the costs wildlife were having on household economies, without offering much in the way of benefits. As one of Rija's (2009:45) interlocutors in Lolkisale explained during an interview, "the wildlife is causing great damage to our crops and livestock while these resources seem to benefit only a few people in this country."[209] While these sentiments are troubling for human rights reasons, TANAPA and the conservation community were becoming increasingly concerned about what the long-term impacts of human-wildlife conflict would be for the Tarangire ecosystem as a whole. Discontentment with wildlife at the community level was spurring pastoralists east of the park to clear land for agriculture in the 1980s in an attempt to actively steer wildlife away from communities (McCabe pers. comm. 2018). It was also a means of laying claim to land as discussed in Chapter 5, and staking out boundaries of wildlife areas and villages. In practical terms, why would communities want wildlife on village land if they were unable to harness the benefits of these resources and forced only to bear their costs? Cultivation, then, became a tool to defend community land from intruding wildlife, posing a significant concern to conservationists as the land outside the park became increasingly fragmented by expanding human settlements and agriculture. Reflecting on these trends, Borner (1985:91) famously wrote about the "increasing isolation of Tarangire National Park" and conservationists began to realize that the existing institutional arrangements for governance and management were inadequate for dealing with the complex challenge posed by a dynamic ecosystem that extended beyond park boundaries.

While Borner's (1985) article was influential in inspiring the emerging discourse in Tanzania on wildlife corridors, close reading reveals a diplomatic tone that is appreciative of the potential for Maasai pastoralists and wildlife to coexist in the areas east of TNP. As he noted,

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[209] They continued to say, "where is our right? We are losing our wealth to these animals, no compensations and only to be told to humble with this beast!" As another one of his informants explained, "[Poaching] is the only way we can bring back our lost capital" (Rija 2009:45).

although the Maasai in Simanjiro suffer from the occasional attack on their livestock by lions or from elephants damaging their wells, they experience no forage conflict and they still favour the coexistence of game and livestock. There seems to be no serious objection to a dual use of the Simanjiro plains and the Lolkisale GCA for livestock and wildlife (Borner 1985:95).

Building from these sentiments, a proposal was put forth in the early 1980s to establish a multiple land-use authority in the Lolkisale area that was similar in management structure to the Ngorongoro Conservation Area (see Borner 1982). At the time, projects were underway to map out land uses and biodiversity of the areas adjacent to TNP, including one by Oikos called the Tarangire Conservation Project (TCP) (Bluwstein 2018a:159; Ecosystems Ltd. 1980).[210] The multiple land use proposal drew from these insights to propose a hypothetical 6,000 km^2 reserve encompassing Lolkisale and beyond to protect wildlife moving outside TNP. This proposal was supported by TANAPA, but ultimately rejected by the Ministry of Livestock (Woien and Lama 1999). A similar proposal was tabled by Prins (1987) that outlined migratory routes of large mammals outside the park and specified land uses that were compatible with the preservation of wildlife habitat across an area of 35,000 sq km. Namely, these included bans on cultivation and reduced livestock numbers, among other recommendations. Ultimately, neither proposal was put into practice because they required land use planning efforts that were difficult to fashion into the vertical silos of the government's central ministries (see Woien and Lama 1999:7).

For the sake of community members in Lolkisale, it was likely a blessing that these plans were never carried out, as they were designed by wildlife conservationists without input from the local communities. The proposed restrictions would have likely had significant impact on pastoral and agricultural livelihoods, further constraining an already marginalized peasantry. But at the same time, the idea of a multiple land use plan in the Lolkisale area was not necessarily antithetical to the interests of the Maasai community. As described to me during interviews in

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[210] Oikos is an Italian NGO that focuses on natural resource management and sustainable development in Tanzania.

Lolkisale, many of the Kisongo (and in particular, well-respected elders) greatly resented the encroachment of Arusha cultivators onto their territory and the blockage of livestock corridors in the area, which affected pastoralists and wildlife alike. Harking back to days of the Masai Reserve (described in Chapter 3), the Kisongo were very concerned about maintaining the livestock corridor connecting northern and southern Maasailand, and which was becoming squeezed by commercial and subsistence agriculture on either side (see Figure 52). The last remaining corridor connecting Simanjiro up to the north was via Lolkisale. As outside interests in pastoral lands from farmers, development organizations, and the central government continued to increase, the Maasai lamented the lack of formal structures to defend their pastoral land from being grabbed and converted into other uses. The interests of the Maasai in Lolkisale in protecting pastoral livelihoods thus reflected clear common ground with the wildlife conservationists who were keen on preventing further agricultural enclosure of TNP. For various reasons, however, the government failed to nurture these shared objectives leaving a promising and underexploited niche for private companies to explore.

6.6 Conservation outside Tarangire National Park: A new tourism frontier

While the ecosystem was becoming increasingly fragmented in the unprotected areas outside TNP, tourism inside the park was growing rapidly. Between 1992-2006, TNP and LMNP logged a combined 1.9 million tourists, generating revenue from $913,000USD per annum in 1992 to more than $7 million in 2006 (Sachedina and Trench 2009:284). TNP specifically saw its number of tourists rise from 15,716 in 1989-1990 to 63,031 in 2002-2003, with total revenues rising 3,650% over the same period (Nelson et al. 2004:5; Rodgers et al. 2003:4). From the perspective of tourists and tour operators, however, the park experience was limited. Game drives took place on fixed circuits and in some ways paled in comparison to the vast and diverse tourism opportunities that existed in community lands adjacent to the park (Nelson 2003; Nelson 2004:6). Unrestricted by park regulations, tour operators outside the park could engage cultural experiences, horseback riding, walking safaris, night drives, fly camping and even drive off road

in rangelands under the supervision of the local Maasai communities. Given the vast and dynamic nature of the Tarangire ecosystem, many of the villages hosted as much (and sometimes more) wildlife on a seasonal basis than the park itself (Goldman 2018). They also offer the added appeal of fewer tourists and infrastructure, less "congested" game viewing and a more "exclusive" experience (Nelson 2004:6).[211]

These appeals were strong enough for several investors to approach villages east of Tarangire with proposals about establishing private tourism arrangements on village land. Some anthropologists have referred to this as the "neoliberalization" of tourism in Tanzania (Wright 2019). Prior to the reformed Village Land Act, investors would negotiate with the state to establish a lease hold over high-potential general land for commercial cultivation or mining (Homewood and Thompson 2010). The central state has historically been inclined to support external land investments that potentially generate revenue, even if they come at the expense of local livelihoods (Homewood and Thompson 2010). The formalization of the Village Land Act, however, meant that villages had the right to negotiate terms of foreign investment in village land. This created the potential for a range of partnerships between private investors and villages. Joint ventures could be structured in a variety of ways, with some paying communities a piece of the revenue streams, while others renting village land on a short or long-term basis. Some scholars have referred to this dynamic as 'payment for ecosystem services' (PES), which Nelson et al. (2010:78) propose as viable model of "community-based conservation in northern Tanzania." Private arrangements between villages and companies tended to involve an agreed upon set of conditions. Companies often requested labour in the form of guides and security guards for camps, and, most significantly, land use restrictions governing how community members could use land (Woien and Lama 1999:11). Usually, negotiations were carried out as to whether the company would retain exclusive rights to tourism in the area, and generally the

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[211] When Leanne visited in late 2019, I offered to take her on safari in Tarangire National Park, but sitting in a car for four hours simply did not appeal to her as compared to hiking up into the Esimangore mountains of Saburi with a local Kisongo guide. We saw more wildlife on these expeditions than I often do inside the park!

arrangements were made without formal titling, though this was requested in some cases (Woien and Lama 1999). In return, villages sought cash payments or infrastructure investments to help build schools, dams, and pipelines, or to purchase milling machines. The specific demands varied on a case by case basis, but usually involved setting aside a concession (or easement) where land would not be cleared for agriculture. These processes of negotiation were far from straightforward, and often took several years to complete. Ultimately, contracts were signed implicating the involved parties (the investor and the village council), which were then ratified by the government (often at district, regional, and national scales).

In Lolkisale, there were three main factors that led to the emergence of partnerships between investors and the village. First, there was shared interest among the Kisongo and tour operators in preventing agricultural conversion. For the Kisongo, concessions protected pasture for livestock, and for the tour operators, they preserved habitat for wildlife. Second, both parties had interests in capitalizing on the abundant wildlife that was dispersing onto village land. For community members, this would offset some of the costs of wildlife for household economies and community livelihoods; for investors, community-based ecotourism offered a potentially lucrative opportunity to diversify the tourist experience away from game drives in the park. And third, TANAPA was unable to effectively address this emergent market. These three factors set the stage for an opportunistic investor to forge new ground in Lolkisale village in the late 1980s and early 1990s by developing a private concession in village land in collaboration with Lolkisale Village Council. The area, which sought to address the dual aims of protecting wildlife habitat and pastures outside the park, later became called the Lolkisale Conservation Area (LCA).

6.7 Drinking the milk of elephants: the origins of community-based conservation in Lolkisale

The original impetus behind the LCA traces back to a partnership between an Australian investor (and his brother) and the village of Lolkisale in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The investor came to establish the East African Safari & Touring Company (EASTCO), a family-run business based out of Arusha that today (2021-2022) runs and manages lodges and safari camps in Tanzania for wholesalers overseas (LBCSP 2003:9). EASTCO's selling points are its 'off the beaten track' 'wilderness' experiences in the greater Tarangire ecosystem. These often involve walking safaris and fly camping in village land. When the investor first approached Lolkisale village, his company was just a one man, one car operation before blossoming in the late 90s. In 1997, EASTCO launched its online website and has since developed into a major tour operator throughout East Africa, scaling up from two initial lodges in Tarangire to over fifteen.[212]

In the late 1980s, the Australian investor brothers became increasingly concerned that the migratory pathways for wildlife moving outside TNP were becoming blocked by commercial farms. Coupled with this, they recognized the potential for developing an ecotourism enterprise outside TNP that offered something creative and new. While visiting a friend's farm in Lolkisale in 1993, they developed the idea to establish a joint conservation venture with the local Kisongo and set their sights on Boundary Hill, a stunning viewpoint in Lolkisale village overlooking TNP. They negotiated with Lolkisale Village Council for about 2,000 acres (8km sq) of land on Boundary Hill where they wanted to establish a luxury tourist camp overlooking TNP. They also established a small 4-bed bush camp in Lolkisale called *Sidai* camp (Maa word for "things are good"). The brothers planned to carry out walking safaris, fly camping and night game drives in Lolkisale as part of the agreement, and sought permission from the village council to build the lodge on the hill and secure exclusive tourism rights to the area. Part of the agreement involved

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[212] In Serengeti National Park and the adjacent game reserves, EASTCO upsized from three initial lodges to over twenty. Source: https://www.eastafricansafari.net/why-us/

setting aside a concession area that would not be farmed by the local community. In exchange, Lolkisale was to receive a share of the tourism revenues. In 1998, the Lolkisale village council signed a ten year lease agreement with Boundary Hill Lodge Ltd. which entitled it to exclusive photographic tourism rights over the area, including the rights to tented camping and walking safaris (see LBCSP 2003:18).

A key part of this proposal was that it was legally structured as a joint venture between Lolkisale Village Council (LVC) and the Tarangire Conservation Co. Ltd. (TCCL), a subsidiary company wholly owned and operated by EASTCO (see LBCSP 2003:9). LVC and EASTCO (via TCCL) were registered as equal 50:50 shareholders in the new company. The two parties thus formed their own private company, which they subsequently named Boundary Hill Lodge Co. Ltd. This form of community-based conservation contract was ground-breaking at the time, as it meant that profits were to be split evenly between EASTCO and LVC. The joint venture was formalized in 1995 and the community of Lolkisale put local restrictions on farming in the designated concession area. At the time, Lolkisale had not yet subdivided and included the sub-villages of Lemooti, Lengoolwa, Nafco, and Oldonyo. At the time, it was predominantly a Kisongo village with a population of around 6000 people, though as my demographic survey research in this area suggests (see Chapter 5), the Arusha were likely already established in Lolkisale at that time as well (LBCSP 2003:9).

While Lolkisale village agreed to the terms set forth by EASTCO, the investor lacked the start-up capital necessary to actually build the lodge. To raise funds, Boundary Hill Lodge Co. Ltd. applied for a Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) loan from the International Finance Corporation (IFP), a division of the World Bank Group. EASTCO framed the proposal as a community-based conservation venture that would benefit the environment by preventing biodiversity loss, while simultaneously contributing to sustainable development at the village level. They were awarded $200,000USD in support of their plans to build the Boundary Hill Lodge (LBCSP 2003:2). The community of Lolkisale was supportive of this plan, hoping to

benefit from the revenue stream of the subsequent lodge. The limited funds, however, put a drag on lodge construction, which progressed slowly into the early 2000s.

Not long after establishing the initial joint venture with Lolkisale village, EASTCO strengthened its presence in the area by diversifying into other neighbouring villages. In 1996, EASTCO entered into another agreement with the villages of Makuyuni and Mswakini Juu (prior to sub-dividing into Naitolia village) to establish the Naitolia Concession (NC), an exclusive tourism zone adjacent to Lolkisale (PINGO 2013:5). Based on the agreement, the two villages set aside 13,590 acres (55 km2) for photographic tourism and walking safaris. The NC covered parts of the migratory routes of wildlife moving from TNP towards Lake Manyara and Natron (see Figure 54). Located within the NC were the Lemiyon plains and the Naitolia floodplains, which were ecologically significant for wildlife. The concession demarcated an exclusive-use zone for a small eight-bed bush camp called Naitolia camp, though EASTCO held the rights to establish another tented camp in the area if desired. Two potential camp sites were selected by EASTCO through consultation with the communities to ensure that their grazing and farming rights were maintained, but only one was ultimately developed into Naitolia Camp. An area of 2000 acres (8.1km sq) was demarcated around the camp sites where grazing would be prohibited. EASTCO agreed to pay a flat rate of $1000USD per year for exclusive use of the area, split between Makuyuni and Mswakini ($500 each). The initial contract was for five years, with the possibility of renewal if the villages and EASTCO agreed.

Eager to get the luxury lodge at Boundary Hill up and running, and perhaps recognizing that 200,000$ was a fairly modest amount for an initial investment in the area, EASTCO applied for further funding from IFC (World Bank) via the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 2003. They were subsequently awarded 35,000$USD in technical assistance funding and 450,000$USD via a Multiple Stakeholder Partnership (MSP) platform loan. As stipulated in the proposal, the funding was meant to establish and implement an Integrated Conservation Management Plan (ICMP) for a scaled-up Lolkisale Conservation Area. While the technical

assistance funding was meant to finance the design of a management plan for 40,000-60,000 acres (164km sq - 242km sq) around Boundary Hill Lodge, the MSP loan was provided for *implementing* an integrated conservation management plan across 145,000 acres (587km sq) adjacent to TNP. The loan was intended to finance a multiple stakeholder approach to streamlining tenure policies in the area and establish a sustainable revenue stream that was to be equitably shared between investor and communities. From the perspective of GEF, the loan proposal was appealing because the funds would be used to support the protection of a key wildlife dispersal area and contribute to institutional harmonization of conservation governance and management outside TNP.

The Lolkisale village council did not take the prospect of an expanded conservation area lightly. Prior to the submission of the MSP loan proposal in 2003, Lolkisale village systematically weighed the benefits and risks of the LCA in 2001-2002. It was democratically decided, through the governance structures of the village council, and with the support of the assembly, that the community of Lolkisale would support the LCA. Numerous meetings were held in Lolkisale village to discuss the concept of a community-based conservation area and the benefits of establishing the LCA (see King 2009:17). These meetings were diligently documented, and minutes were taken to ensure due process was upheld. By June 2001, a detailed management plan for the conservation area had been drafted that clarified the potential economic benefits that the community of Lolkisale would accrue, and the improved conservation and environmental outcomes for the ecosystem at large. On December 20, 2001, a key meeting with the Ward Development Council was held that formalized the overall LCA area, including the zoning scheme outlined in the tentative management plan. It was considered a very significant occasion for all involved stakeholders, as it represented an exciting new (community-sanctioned) direction for conservation outside national parks, on village land (King 2009). By February of 2002, the Environmental Committee and Finance Committee of the Monduli District Council formally gave the go-ahead to commence management activities on the ground in the LCA

pursuant to the management plans that had been designed collaboratively between the communities, private investors, government stakeholders, and international donors. A key point for Randilen WMA critics to keep in mind, then, is that the initial planning stages for a community-based conservation area in the Lolkisale area unfolded a decade and a half before Loveless' (2014) study of Randilen WMA. Many of Randilen WMA's key management principles in a contemporary context arose organically from the early planning stages of the LCA.

One of the key aspects of the expanded LCA was the creation of a large buffer zone adjacent to the initial conservation area called the Lolkisale Livestock and Wildlife Zone (LLWZ), encompassing 99,000 acres (400km sq). The Kisongo saw it as a means of defending the land from encroaching cultivators, and EASTCO saw it as a way to secure wildlife habitat in a key dispersal area. It was managed by local pastoralists through the integrated conservation management plan (ICMP), which essentially meant maintaining it as common pasture. A comparison of the map in Figure 55 and the one adapted from Borner (1985) in Figure 52 reveals that the LLWZ covered the key remaining areas of the livestock corridor connecting northern and southern Maasailand via Lolkislae. Further to the LLWZ, the Makuyuni Elephant Dispersal Area (MEDA) was added to the LCA management plan in 2001. MEDA overlapped the communal grazing area of *ndoroboni* in Makuyuni village (discussed in Chapter 4) and was added in the wake of the Tarangire Elephant Project, which was kickstarted in 1993 by Charles Foley with financial support from the Wildlife Conservation Society (Bluwstein 2018a). The Elephant Project is still ongoing and has since become the world's longest elephant research project (see Bluwstein 2018a:159). Realizing the importance of elephant migratory routes outside TNP, the Elephant Project lobbied for a key elephant habitat area in Makuyuni to be included in the LCA. The area was identified as an important wet season dispersal area for Tarangire's northern sub-population of elephants**.** Makuyuni agreed to set aside 11,000 acres (44.5km) for MEDA (near *ndoroboni*). In exchange, Makuyuni village council was interested in

partnering with another prospective investor in the future, as the village had already been receiving some modest revenue from the Naitolia Concession. Together, the LCA, LLWZ, MEDA, and NC formed the Tarangire Conservation Area, an area that would be managed holistically as part of the integrated management plan funded by GEF (King 2009). By 2000, the Tarangire Conservation Area spanned just over 144,000 acres (585km sq), including four distinct zones that had been demarcated by the villages and EASTCO for community-based conservation and ecotourism: the LCA (40,500 acres/164km sq), the LLWZ (99,000 acres/400km sq), the MEDA (11,000acres/44.5km), and the NC (13,590 acres /55 km2) (see Figure 55). Together the four zones protected key ecological features and wildlife habitat including the northern watershed for the Tarangire River and Gosuewa swamp (LCA), the Lemiyon Plains and Naitolia floodplains (NC), as well as key dispersal areas for elephants (MEDA), wildebeest and zebra (LLWZ). The TCA was officially endorsed by the Office of the Vice President of Tanzania on August 30, 2000. In June of 2001, the Environmental and Finance Committees of the Monduli District Council approved the TCA management and zoning plan and authorized the commencement of management activities on the ground.

Figure 55 – Sketch map of the Tarangire Conservation Area (TCA) adjacent to TNP in the early 2000s including the four zones (LCA, NC, MEDA, LLWZ) and the locations of Naitolia Camp and Boundary Hill Lodge. Randilen Hill was proposed as the initial boundary gate to the TCA. Lolkisale Mountain is included for spatial reference. Map drawn by author based on King (2009).

While the LCA was an exciting prospect on paper, in practice, Boundary Hill Lodge struggled to get off its feet. Though EASTCO's website stated that Boundary Hill Lodge was ready for guests by 2002, it was actually still in the throes of construction. Building the lodge was challenging, due in part to Boundary Hill's remote location. Things turned for the worse in 2005 when the lodge burned down, delaying construction further.[213] Lolkisale village was

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[213] While the origins of the fire are unconfirmed, the Australian investor alleged that the lodge was burnt down by hunters who resented the photographic concession around the lodge (discussed further in Section 6.10). According to an account relayed to me by a district government official who was knowledgeable of the situation as it unfolded, however, the investor's brother burnt down the lodge ahead of a visit from World Bank representatives, knowing that the investor had only used a portion of the money to build the lodge and had spent the rest on other ventures overseas. I am unable to confirm whether the allegations hold merit.

disappointed in their Boundary Hill joint venture because it was not offsetting the opportunity costs of setting their land aside for the concession. People in Lolkisale began calling Boundary Hill "*tasa*," which translated roughly as "unproductive" (PINGO 2013:4). While Lolkisale village and EASTCO were technically 50% stakeholders in the project, Lolkisale village felt that the investor had leveraged his relationship with the community to secure the World Bank loan only to use it unsystematically to build Boundary Hill Lodge and establish Naitolia Camp without adequately compensating the community in return. Beyond what I have been told by community members and district officials, I have not personally seen evidence that the investor used the money in ways other than what he had initially proposed to do (build a lodge and implement a management plan for the TCA). What is perhaps likely is that community resentment stemmed from a lack of effective communication, and frustrated expectations of tourism revenues that took a long time to materialize. Lolkisale Village Council was keen on receiving a head fee from visiting tourists to contribute to village services and infrastructure development projects, but these payments could not be made until the lodge was built and ready to host visitors.

While EASTCO may well have used the money honestly to accomplish the plan they originally set out to, from the perspective of Lolkisale villagers, there was a lack of transparency in how the money was used, and this led to distrust with the Boundary Hill Lodge venture. Prospective tourists also expressed dismay at the state of Boundary Hill, as evidenced by a heated discussion on an online travel forum from 2004-2006. As one tourist wrote on Feb. 4, 2006 after having booked a trip to the lodge via the EASTCO website,

> Their lodges/camps are a mystery to myself and everyone I talk to (especially when compared to the other camps in the vicinity) [...] I merely think Simon should update his web sites and provide factual information about the status of his camps/lodges Naitolia, Boundary Hill and Sidai. This is not too much to ask! For example the website currently states that Boundary Hill will open in 2002! This is misleading as the lodge has never been

completely constructed! Why is everything so secretive? Myself and many on this board will strongly support his efforts but he needs to do his part as well! The local villages (most certainly with high hopes) deserve better.[214]

Distrust reached the point of widespread worry when Lolkisale village got wind of the fact that EASTCO had defaulted on its loan to the World Bank, potentially leaving the community on the hook to pay back the difference (~700,000$USD) as 50% partners in the initial proposal. This led to considerable fear within Lolkisale that community land would be taken away by the World Bank as compensation to pay back the loan. Despite a period of worry, the World Bank was ultimately made aware of the community's concerns and decided to turn over the loan to Lolkisale village. Thus, rather than pay back the loan to the World Bank, EASTCO became legally obligated to pay it back to Lolkisale village, though at the time of my fieldwork (2019-2020), Lolkisale village had still not received the money. The village took EASTCO to court over money owed and the case is still ongoing. Further complicating matters, Boundary Hill Lodge has allegedly been taking guests as recently as December, 2021 through under the table arrangements that circumvent their bed night fee requirements.

In the early 2000s, frictions also emerged at Naitolia Camp. As a bush camp, Naitolia camp did not require as much start-up capital, and was quick to get off the ground. However, there was no agreement in place for sharing tourism revenues with the villages, as the concession had been negotiated based on a flat rate (PINGO 2013). Concession funds were used to finance community development projects, which villagers appreciated. These included the installation of pump in Makuyuni River to supply Naitolia and Makuyuni with water, the construction of a dispensary in Naitolia, and the purchase of a tractor. But since the rate was low, and the villages had sub-divided into Makuyuni, Naitolia, and Mswakini Juu, the funds were minimal from the perspective of villagers. Village councils wanted a share of the revenue streams, but in all fairness, the camp only hosted eight guests and did not generate much profit at the best of times.

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[214] Source: https://www.fodors.com/community/africa-and-the-middle-east/eastco-trip-574514/

As part of the revised Tarangire Conservation Area Management Plan of 2009, additional tourist camps were proposed in the NC and MEDA to diversify the revenue streams for these villages. Makuyuni wanted to partner with Kikoti Lodge, which was already operating in Loiborsoit near the Arusha-Manyara regional border, but this never came to fruition. Ultimately, the Naitolia bush camp struggled to sustain itself and by the time Randilen WMA was formalized, it had been abandoned.

Although EASTCO had not delivered on the promise of a 'win-win' joint venture for the communities or investor, it indirectly contributed to one of the most successful private-community partnerships in all of Tanzania. While Lolkisale villagers patiently waited for Boundary Hill Lodge to be constructed in the late 1990s, the investor's brother raised the idea of establishing another lodge within the LCA with the permission of the Lolkisale Village Council. The lodge was proposed as means of providing more immediate revenue to the community from a company that had the capital on hand to build the lodge. This would help to offset the opportunity costs of not clearing land for agriculture in the concession zone while Boundary Hill was being built (a 'stop-gap' so to speak).[215] After negotiating the terms of this arrangement with the Lolkisale Village Council, Boundary Hill Lodge Ltd. (the joint venture) sold a short-term lease concession for 100 acres to Halcyon Tanzania Ltd. to build Treetops Lodge (LBCSP 2003:18). Halcyon Tanzania Ltd. partnered with Boundary Hill Lodge Ltd. to build the lodge in 1999 and the original investor's brother negotiated the terms of the benefit sharing structure with Lolkisale. Since Treetops was meant to be a short-term solution to benefit the community while Boundary Hill got on its feet, it was determined that the 15$ bed night fees from Treetrops Lodge be paid directly to Lolkisale village. By contrast, the bed night fees of other tented camps in the LCA were kept by Boundary Hill Ltd., with the plan of eventually reinvesting them into the management of the LCA. While Treetops generally hosted guests for a few nights at a time, it was hoped that Boundary Hill would later fill out the market for longer stays. Tarangire Treetops

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[215] An exit strategy for Treetops was even proposed in the GEF loan application of 2003 (see LBCSP 2003:38).

was subsequently built in 1999 and its five year lease was renewed in 2003. The uniqueness of the lodge, perched up in the canopy of large baobab trees overlooking the savannah, appealed to adventurous safari-goers, and the 40-bed lodge attracted a large number of guests in the early 2000s. Much to the appreciation of community members, Lolkisale accrued approximately 50,000$USD annually directly to its Community Development Fund (51,000$ in 2002; and 54,000$ in 2003) from its partnership with Treetops, a figure that would rise to almost 100,000$USD by 2008.[216]

Revenue from Treetops had a major impact on people's well-being in Lolkisale village. A key reason for this was good governance at the local level. Lolkisale has always had the same chair (*mwenye kiti*) since the village was first established following villagization. He is a humble man, whom the community holds in high esteem because of his steadfast dedication to ensuring that democracy prevails. My interlocutors in Lolkisale describe him as a well-respected leader who tries in earnest to do right by the people and ensure that the community decides how tourism revenues are put to use for the benefit of the community at large. As Sulle (2008:20) writes,

> Ololosokwan in Ngorongoro District and Lolkisale in Monduli District are examples of villages where the Village Authorities have shown high levels of transparency in revenue collection and spending as well as commitment to the supervision of development project funded by tourism receipts.

The returns from their strategic partnership with Treetops allowed Lolkisale village to invest in its own development (*maendeleo*) in a grass-roots fashion, based on the needs of the community. Given Lolkisale's remote location, one of the key concerns voiced by community-members in the context of *maendeleo* was the difficulty in accessing health services. Road infrastructure in Lolkisale is very poor and is made particularly challenging by black cotton soils, the intensive

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[216] By that point, Treetops had been sold to Elewana Afrika Ltd. Elewana maintained the pre-existing positive relationship with Lolkisale village and continued to share the pre-negotiated bed night fees with the community.

water runoff from Lolkisale mountain, and the multiple rivers that one must cross to reach Kisongo town on the main A104 Arusha-Babati highway. While the road is relatively straightforward to traverse in the dry season, it is treacherous in the wet season and is almost impassible without four-wheel drive. Public busses are unfortunately unable to travel there in some instances, and this can make life in Lolkisale dangerous when medical emergencies arise and people must travel to hospitals. During my interviews in Lolkisale, women were particularly concerned about the difficulties this posed for reproductive health during pregnancy and child birth. Based on these concerns, the village council in Lolkisale decided, with support from the village, to invest some of the initial profits from the partnership with Treetops into a community 4x4 ambulance that could be used to shuttle people to the hospital during emergencies and in the case of complicated child births. Petrol and maintenance fees were paid directly from the tourism revenue and the ambulance became a key fixture in Lolkisale village. Importantly, it was funded by conservation-related tourism, and not the government. Villagers in Lolkisale were very aware of this fact, and quickly came to realize the tangible benefits that conservation could have for their community and individual well-being. In a show of enthusiasm, the community painted on the back of the vehicle "*maziwa ya tembo,*" which translates into English as "the milk of elephants." In the same fashion that the Kisongo live off the milk of their cattle, the community of Lolkisale had come to realize that conservation could pay a regular dividend and allow them to flourish. It could take care of them in times of emergency, and contribute directly to the economic prosperity of their community. Since then, tourism-related revenue has been used to build a dispensary, a school, and several other developments in the village, which community-members not only appreciate but depend on as essential services. A water tank was installed at Lemooti school and desks and school supplies were purchased for students (King 2009). While the cash itself does not trickle down to the household economies of families, it was used to create economic safety nets for community members to support them. In thinking of the conservation revenue as the milk of elephants, Lolkisale had come to realize that conservation-related tourism

could sustain their communal life. This was a deeply important sentiment because wildlife in the area, and in particular elephants, caused significant problems for individual livelihoods and household economies. As one interviewee in Lolkisale explained, "Elephants raid maize farms and limit our crop yields, but they also bring ambulances, and schools. Perhaps one day, they will also build roads." In short, people in Lolkisale had come to realize that wildlife could be a sustainable resource pool for the village that would support the community and help it prosper. Lolkisale had tasted the milk of elephants, and had developed a thirst for wildlife-related tourism in village land.

The good governance practices of Lolkisale village council in negotiating a fair deal with EASTCO and Halcyon on behalf of villagers, and in exercising transparency and fairness in determining how the funds would be applied at the village level for the betterment of the community, led to widespread support in Lolkisale for community-based conservation. These sentiments developed despite the shortcomings of the Boundary Hill Ltd. joint venture, and inspired the community of Lolkisale to conserve the LCA "on their own initiative" (Sulle 2008:20). Sulle (2008) estimates that Lolkisale village earned between TZS 150 million to TZS 180 million per year (approximately 65,000-78,000USD per year) between 2006-2008, as ecotourism and conservation in village land were flourishing. Lolkisale had become a bright spot for conservationists who were concerned about fragmentation outside TNP. As Rogers et al. (2003) optimistically note, while the Tarangire ecosystem at large was "under increasing threat" of agricultural intensification, "Lolkisale [was] an important exception where conservation incentives created by wildlife-based tourism at the village level [were] reversing some of these land use changes." (Rodgers et al. 2003:11). The joint venture in Lolkisale village (and the one in Emboreet) served as a model for the establishment of the Simanjiro Payments for Ecosystem Services initiative in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which involved a consortium of tour

operators and NGOs who came together to create a conservation easement in Terrat village (Nelson et al. 2010:82; see also Sachedina and Nelson 2010).[217]

6.8 "Drive/Spot/Stalk": Lolkisale as trophy hunting block

While community-based conservation was showing promise in Lolkisale through the village's partnership with Treetops, there were other political dynamics that complicated the situation. Following the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974, many of the wildlife dispersal areas adjacent to core national parks and game reserves were technically classified as Game Controlled Areas (GCA). Identified as a key wildlife area near TNP by the state, Lolkisale was declared a GCA in 1974 to be managed by TAWA in collaboration with Monduli District Council. The GCA covered just over a thousand kilometres (1,087.26 km^2), and essentially spanned the entire eastern boundary of the park. [218] Rather confusingly, the GCA overlapped Steyn's lease, which had been administered for ranching and commercial seed production. As mentioned earlier, Steyn's lease was cancelled abruptly in the early 1980s due in large part to this complicated dual classification of land; the state may have recognized the "disastrous effects" that commercial seed production along the edge of the park would have had on Tarangire's wildlife (Borner 1985:94). From the perspective of the state, land leases were distributed to private investors as a means of maximizing productivity and generating profits for the central government. While commercial seed production had proved viable northeast of TNP, the abundance of wildlife in Lolkisale posed the dilemma of how best to generate capital in this area. One option was to re-allocate the land for trophy hunting. From the perspective of the central government, trophy hunting represented big money and was generally favoured over other wildlife and land uses when the opportunity presented itself. Between 1989 to 2001, centrally collected revenues from trophy hunting increased from 1.5 million $USD to 10.5 million $USD per year (see Nelson et

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[217] While Simanjiro District was beyond the scope of my fieldwork, it is worth noting that there were a series of private tourism concessions and easements there next to TNP, some of which were on village land and were technically in the disputed areas of Steyn's old lease (see Nelson et al. 2010).
[218] Source: https://dopa-explorer.jrc.ec.europa.eu/wdpa/32781

al. 2007:250; Baldus and Cauldwell 2004).[219] Trophy hunters revered Lolkisale for its plentiful and approachable game and numerous cats (particularly leopards) and elephants. These sentiments have been fairly easy to garner online, since many trophy hunters like to brag about their kills and hunting experiences. As one trophy hunter wrote in 2005 on a tell-all public-facing personal website:

> There are a lot of leopard in the area, as well as lion. However, unlike Lolkisale where the park lions tend to follow the game out, due to the number of Masai in Loborsoit they are harder to bring to bait, rarely seen in the day time and do not call as much, making them harder to locate. Although one sees more plains game in Lolkisale, Loborsoit is visually interesting and provides the opportunity to track game thanks to the soft soil, versus strictly spot/stalk from the vehicle. The game was a bit more wary in Loborsoit versus the animals in Lolkisale, but nothing like what I had seen previously in the Selous where they gave you 400 yards and that was it.[220]

Trophy hunting dates back to the colonial era, with some of the contemporary hunting blocks remaining relatively unchanged since the 1950s. Following the WCA of 1974, trophy hunting became centrally managed by TAWA (formerly the Wildlife Division) via Game Controlled Areas (partially protected through TAWA) and Open Areas (unprotected dispersal areas) (see Wilfred 2019). As discussed in Chapter 4, the practical purpose of GCAs was to siphon wildlife revenues back into central coffers, particularly when they offered lucrative opportunities for

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[219] The process for acquiring a lease to a hunting block in Tanzania involves a centrally managed application system with various fees and requirements. The application fee for the Lolkisale GCA hunting block, as of 2022, is 5,000USD and annual fees are determined by anonymous bidding via an online portal. The bidder with the highest offer is awarded the exclusive right to trophy hunt in the area. Successful bidders are provided a Hunting Block Allocation Certificate issued by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. As things currently stand, TAWA gets most of the auction prices for blocks, with some returning to the district level. Hunting companies are eligible to receive up to five different hunting blocks from different categories. Importantly, for a company to qualify for the auction, it must be registered with the national Registrar of Hunting Companies, the company director must have at least five years of experience in the wildlife and conservation industry, and it must meet other specific requirements outlined in the Wildlife Conservation Act (Section 39(3)(a) (TAWA 2022:1). These requirements make it challenging for villagers to gain rights to access these hunting blocks adjacent to village land.
[220] Source: http://www.accuratereloading.com/bchr2.html

hunting concessions. Unlike Game Reserves, which prohibited all human activities, GCAs (prior to 2009) allowed grazing, residence, and cultivation, but prohibited hunting without an official licence. GCAs created a legislative framework for the central government to monetize wildlife resources that would otherwise remain outside the reaches of TANAPA (see Wright 2016). But the framework was poorly conceived and conflicts arose between land laws and the original Wildlife Conservation Act. On the one hand, Lolkisale GCA offered TAWA the benefit of not having to share hunting revenue with local villages, but, on the other, it was subject to encroachment, expansion of human settlements and other activities that resulted in competing claims from the communities and declines in hunting productivity. Rural communities, some of which expanded into GCAs and laid claim to land through cultivation following villagization, could claim customary land rights, posing a governance challenge for the state.

In Lolkisale, Steyn had been slow to develop his leased land for agriculture, other than some modest bean farms on the northeastern edge of TNP (Borner 1985). Steyn had apparently been weighing the opportunity costs of ranching vs. seed production in the area. When the government cancelled his lease in favour of supporting trophy hunting in the area in the early 1980s, it catalyzed a scramble for land as smallholder cultivators, particularly Arusha, continued to expand into the area. Villages that were primarily demarcated during villagization, based on pre-existing Kisongo settlement patterns and the input from technical experts, began to expand both in population and geographic sprawl. Eventually, the Lolkisale GCA overlapped the rapidly expanding human settlements. This once again created friction, this time between rural communities and state policy. While the southern parts of Lolkisale GCA remained open with no settlements or agriculture (between Emboreet and TNP), smallholder cultivation was rapidly expanding in the portion of Lolkisale GCA in Monduli District (see Sachedina 2008; Sachedina and Trench 2009:27).

Between 1984 and 2000, Lolkisale GCA's landscape was largely transformed from pasture and small scattered farms of an average size of 3.4km to extensive crop cover with farms

averaging five times larger (15km) (Msoffe et al. 2011). This posed challenges for the conservation of the Tarangire ecosystem, given the wildlife dispersal patterns outside TNP, but also to the government, which wanted to monetize the hunting blocks. The Land Act of 1992 took aim at snuffing out these conflicting customary rights to land altogether (see Homewood et al. 2004; Homewood and Thompson 2010). Theoretically, this would have simplified things from the perspective of the state. In practice, however, people had already established residence in Lolkisale GCA and were difficult to move. When the Village Land Act and Land Act were reformed a few years later, these inhabitants gained rights to remain and use the land. The Village Land Act provided village councils with the formal governance authority to manage and allocate land inside the administrative unit of the village, but the ambiguity with the GCA status was still unresolved. Lolkisale GCA came to directly overlap Lolkisale village in Monduli District (Arusha Region), and Loiborsoit, Emboret, and Loibor Siret in Simanjiro District (Manyara Region) (Woien and Lama 1999:13). Conflicts between villages and the GCA abounded. Emboreet village, for instance, held that their village extended to the edge of TNP, but the central government considered it to only extend to the edge of Lolkisale GCA (Sachedina and Trench 2009:267). Sachedina (2006:27) even notes that Lolkisale GCA boundaries were contested between district (Monduli vs. Simanjiro) and Region (Arusha vs. Manyara).

The LCA was originally proposed inside the Lolkisale GCA, which was technically legal albeit confusing. According to the second grant proposal for the Lolkisale Biodiversity Conservation Support Project to GEF in 2003, "the establishment of a Natural Resource Management Area within the Lolkisale Game Controlled Area and outside TNP is in accordance with the Wildlife Policy of Tanzania (MNRT, 1998) and the Forestry Policy of Tanzania (MNRT, 1998), which promote the conservation of wildlife, forest and associated habitats outside of core protected areas." (LBCSP 2003:5). Notably, included in the proposal is a letter of endorsement written by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Natural Resources and

Tourism with attention to the Director of Wildlife, clearly demonstrating that the central government was on board with the plan, at least in theory.

A key conflict in the context of GCAs that overlap village land is what happens when hunting companies have a concession within a GCA that has been issued by TAWA, but the village wants to use their land for other purposes, and perhaps enter into a photographic or other joint venture with another investor (see Nelson 2005). This was the case with Lolkisale, which had entered into private arrangements for photographic tourism with Boundary Hill and TreeTops, but was technically at odds with a state-sanctioned trophy hunting block. Both claims were legitimate to some extent, as hunters had leases to the prior hunting blocks and tour operators had permission from the villagers who were the customary owners of the land (see PINGO 2013).[221] Rungwa Safari Ltd., for instance, in 2021 had a hunting concession of 2400km^2 that included the Lolkisale GCA and extended to Simanjiro.[222] At the time of writing, this issue has becoming increasingly pressing in the Ngorongoro District, where the Loliondo GCA has historically overlapped village land. From the perspectives of local Maasai, they view the land as part of their village, having developed mutually-beneficial, community-based photographic tourism partnerships in Ololosokwan (see Kileli 2017). Under pressure from Ortello Business Corporation (OBC), a United Arab Emirates Company, which has long held the trophy hunting lease for Loliondo GCA, the state has been inclined to side with the trophy hunters (see Weldemichel 2020). This ultimately led to the burning of bomas in Ololosokwan by SENAPA rangers in 2017 and open conflict, which subsided in 2019 when OBC director Isack Mollel was arrested for employing foreign nationals without work permits.[223] The conflict, however, has resurfaced in full force following the passing of President Magufuli. Fifteen villages in Loliondo Division across a 1500km^2 area face potential eviction at the time of writing in February 2022 to

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[221] See also this series of anonymous blogposts by 'noexpert' on Tripadvisor, which reveal an uncanny grasp of some of these political complexities: https://www.tripadvisor.ca/ShowTopic-g293747-i9226-k6900443-What_s_in_a_name_when_it_comes_to_land_use-Tanzania.html

[222] Source: https://www.rungwasafaris.com/areas/map.html

[223] https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/minister-orders-arrest-of-obc-director-2670694

clear the hunting concession for the Arab company. At the time of final dissertation revisions, in June 2022, violent conflicts over the demarcation of the newly annexed area were ongoing.

The question of whose rights should prevail in this type of situation has been an enduring one. While less heated than the Loliondo case, Lolkisale faced similar land tenure issues because of the ambiguity between village land and Lolkisale GCA. As a consequence of the haphazard GCA legislation of 1974, the formal institutions of the state (governing land and wildlife) were not effectively harmonized and this created tensions on the ground. As Nelson (2005:8) describes,

> the overlap of GCAs and village lands is consequently a widespread source of conflict between local community interests and external government and private sector interests in accessing these areas to utilize wildlife and lands between various parties involved.

The driving issue behind conflicts over GCAs is that the state is never absent when it comes to governing natural resources. In such cases where private and community enterprises begin to thrive, the government is quick to demand its bite of the pie. In 2000, the MNRT passed legislation that prohibited photographic and walking safaris and game viewing in hunting blocks and game controlled areas (Rodgers et al. 2003; see also Nelson 2004:223). Exceptions would only be made with explicit permission from the Director of Wildlife, since wildlife remained property of the state. As a consequence, the creation of a fruitful relationship between Lolkisale and private tour operators on its land essentially became illegal because Lolkisale was technically a Game Controlled Area with a lucrative hunting block (Rodgers et al. 2003:12). Community-based conservation, it would seem, had unfolded organically in Lolkisale through capitalist partnerships between investors and villages that became possible in the period of structural adjustment and the advent of neoliberal policies, but rather than nurture these types of mutually-beneficial relationships, the state since sought to stamp them out completely through legislative reform. While the village of Lolkisale appreciated drinking the milk of elephants, it was also hard not to conceive of wildlife conservation as a "significant land tenure threat"

(Rodgers et al. 2003:12; ESRF 2002). While MNRT's written letter of endorsement meant that the Treetops' partnership with Lolkisale in the LCA could continue on an exceptional basis, it offered little in the way of political reassurance, since it was technically an anomalous case outside formal law. It also further entrenched the contradictory nature of land and wildlife policies, thus adding to precarity on the ground.

While the state preferred to prioritize the GCA to generate capital for the central government, this was not a straightforward proposition. Though trophy hunting had existed since the 1950s, hunting blocks like Lolkisale became more challenging to manage following villagization as large stretches of land were cleared for agriculture and patches of forests were burned for charcoal by opportunistic cultivators who had moved into the area. As Lolkisale became more densely populated, this put strain on managing the GCA as a hunting block and it became particularly confusing to administer. Technically, GCAs are administered by TAWA in collaboration with the District Council (Sulle 2008). Prior to the revised WCA, and in accordance with the Wildlife Policy of 1998, hunting fees in Lolkisale GCA were collected by TAWA and 25% was then returned to the Monduli District Council. Of this 25%, 40% was supposed to be allocated to the natural resources department of the district, and the remaining 60% to the villages in the area. However, in practice, funds never reached the village level (Sulle 2008). TAWA retained the lion's share of these revenues and there was little to no transparency in the transfer of funds to the district level. Sulle (2008) notes that the 25% figure was essentially an arbitrary number that was not based on trophy quotas or the number of animals killed. As he wrote, "there is a lack of clarity in Districts about how the figure of 25% of revenues is calculated. The formula used seems to be a mystery to everybody outside the Wildlife Division (WD) and the Treasury" (Sulle 2008:3-4). While TAWA released a management plan explaining how revenue should be distributed across government stakeholders in 1995, it was never actually put into formal legislation. Hunting revenue, it would seem, was never actually meant to trickle all the way down to villages (Sulle 2008:4).

As a consequence of this lack of transparency around hunting revenue collection within the central government, the Monduli District Council began to develop resentment towards TAWA. MDC had seen its revenues decrease in the early 2000s, and suspected that the central government was taking more than its fair share (Sulle 2008). TAWA had responded by saying that inadequate district reporting of received funds were to blame, as well as "poor quality animals" hunted as part of the quotas (Sulle 2008:6). The Monduli DGO, however, pointed out in Sulle's (2008:6) report that the wildlife killed was of high quality, and in some cases even facing extinction. The Monduli DGO further alleged that TAWA had issued "licences without conducting proper surveys of existing animal numbers in the area" (Sulle 2008:6). While these accusations cannot be substantiated from afar, it is clear that the lack of institutional clarity around Lolkisale GCA, and in particular the revenue-sharing structure, was causing confusion and even distrust among government stakeholders operating at different scales. The Monduli DGO was particularly resentful because, although hunting revenue from Lolkisale GCA was collected centrally by TAWA, much of the management on the ground was carried out by the Monduli DGO and his support staff. While TAWA game officers did patrol the GCA, they did so haphazardly, given the numerous other game controlled areas across northern Tanzania that also needed to be managed. From the Monduli DGO's perspective, TAWA used GCAs to grab wildlife revenue, without offering adequate support to the district level to actually administer them. The Monduli DGO had limited funding to pay staff and fuel the vehicles, as compared to TAWA and the MNRT (see Sulle 2008:8). I realized while observing the Monduli DGO and other District Government officials during fieldwork, that their abilities to carry out management tasks were significantly constrained by limited resources.

GCAs across Tanzania provide the government lucrative hunting blocks, but they are difficult to manage. Boundaries are challenging to enforce, the environmental impacts of offtakes are difficult to measure, and permits are issued manually (see Baldus and Cauldwell 2004). The central government has consistently shown little transparency in revealing how GCAs are

actually governed and what the rationale behind various policies has been (Sulle 2008). Communities have little to no say in these processes, whether in terms of allocating hunting blocks or setting quotas, and this is made all the more difficult by conflicting laws on how GCAs should be administered (Sulle 2008).

The Lolkisale GCA hunting concession spans about 725km square, and runs north-south along 80km of the Eastern border of TNP (just beyond TNP's 2km buffer zone). Bundu Safaris Ltd. held the block in the early 2000s.[224] Bundu Safaris Ltd. was affiliated with the African Professional Hunters Association (APHA), a continent-wide organization, which outlines ethical responsibilities of trophy hunters to ensure environmental sustainability.[225] Bundu hosted tourist hunters in a small lodge called Lolkisale Camp located just outside TNP's buffer zone, in an area overlapping the LCA and Treetops' village-level concession. Almost all wildlife species were considered fair game except pregnant or nursing females and young animals of either sex, elephants of less than 20kg in weight or 1.7 metres in length (later changed to 25kg and 1.75 metres), and Nile crocodiles that were smaller than two metres (Baldus 2004:49). Four species were universally prohibited: giraffe, black and white colobus monkeys (though not present in the Tarangire ecosystem), black rhinos (no longer present in TNP), and African wild dogs. Quotas specified the minimum rifle calibre required to shoot each species, and the minimum trip duration needed to shoot a particular animal. An olive baboon, for instance cost 90$ in trophy fees, no minimum rifle calibre, and three trophies could be taken on a 21 day trip. On the higher end, an elephant cost 4000$ in trophy fees and .375 calibre was required as a minimum (Baldus 2004). Only one could be taken and the hunter had to be participating in a minimum 21-day safari (Baldus 2004:47-48). In 2012, Lolkisale GCA's hunting concession was again allocated to Bundu safaris, together with the Masai Open Access (W), and Mkugunero Game Reserve, while HSK Safaris C. Ltd. had been allocated the Simanjiro GCA (W).[226]

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[224] Tandala Expeditions held the western block of the Simanjiro GCA in 2003.
[225] See: https://africanpha.org/ ; http://www.sos-africa.org/
[226] See: http://forums.nitroexpress.com/showflat.php?Cat=0&Number=313760&Main=202174

The discontinuities in the formal status of the land in Lolkisale Village and Lolkisale GCA created significant tenure complications and competing claims, making it difficult to capitalize on wildlife resources in the area: TAWA and trophy hunting operators wanted the GCA hunting block to be prioritized, while Lolkisale Village and Treetops wanted the LCA and photographic concession to be honoured. Though the Treetops agreement was more recent, it was layered on the pre-existing GCA framework. Jackson (2021:505) refers to this type of dynamic as the "palimpsestic" nature of rural development microhistories in Tanzania.

6.9 Grievances with resident hunters and concerns about poaching

While ambiguities between the territories of trophy hunters, villages, and photographic operators were paramount in the early 2000s, resident hunting was also contributing to the struggle over wildlife resources. Resident hunting was established in the 1970s in Tanzania, but banned between 2015-2018 following widespread allegations of corruption and abuse. It was introduced to allow local consumptive wildlife uses in areas outside reserves and parks, in either Open Areas (unprotected dispersal areas) or Game Controlled Areas that have partial protection (see Wilfred 2019:86). In Open Areas, wildlife still disperses outside core protected areas, but is not under any level of protection. Resident hunting is overseen by the District government, under the directives of TAWA, and district authorities have the power to issue licences after fees are paid (see Wilfred 2019). The resident hunting system faces many challenges that are well-documented in the literature, including non-compliance with regulations, the illegal photocopying and sharing of permits, violation of quotas, under-reporting kills, re-using licences, and killing prohibited animals (females or young ones) (see Wilfred 2019:86; Baldus and Cauldwell 2004). Resident hunters are supposed to be escorted by game rangers, but this is often not the case. Local communities are usually unable to access resident permits due to high licencing fees and centralized control of permit processing, meaning resident hunting is often financed by wealthier individuals from afar (Leader-Williams 2000). Open areas are also

difficult to enforce in practice because of TAWA's limited capacity, and thus poaching is often a concern (Caro and Davenport 2015).

A key hunting issue in Tanzania centres on enforcement of regulations on the ground and conflicts between resident hunters and trophy hunters (Wilfred 2019). Technically, resident hunters are prohibited from accessing GCA blocks that are allocated for trophy hunters. TAWA favours trophy hunting because of the lucrative profits it generates compared to all other forms of wildlife-related activities. But the enforcement of these boundaries across large areas like Lolkisale is very difficult. While resident hunters were not allowed to use the Lolkisale GCA blocks designated for trophy hunters, they could access Open Areas nearby, but boundaries were often not clearly demarcated on the ground. Resident hunters around the Lolkisale area and trophy hunters and photographic tour operators alike alleged that there was widespread abuse of resident hunter permits east of TNP. Trophy hunters felt that resident hunters encroached on their designated blocks and disrespected local hunting regulations. Drawing from cases elsewhere in Tanzania, Wilfred (2019) suggests that these are common allegations raised against resident hunters, who are sometimes beaten and harassed by trophy hunters, and accordingly feel that trophy hunters are favored by the state. Resident hunters commonly complain in response that trophy hunters encroach on Open Areas in order to bait carnivores and hunt, and often treat open areas as part of their hunting blocks (Wilfred 2019). A lack of consistent monitoring and enforcement on the ground by either district government or TAWA means that conflicts between resident and trophy hunters sometimes arise.

Trophy hunting operators and photographic tour operators alike agreed that resident hunting east of TNP was poorly regulated and this was leading to unabated poaching. In the 1980s, there was a poacher's camp in Lolkisale village, near Boundary Hill, though poaching dropped off considerably after 1989 following the international ban on ivory trade (Pittigilo et al. 2013:829). Despite the declines, it was evident that conflicts in Lolkisale over access to and use of wildlife resources were multi-dimensional: between resident hunters, trophy hunters,

photographic tour operators, and Lolkisale village. These conflicts were to a large extent attributable to unclear and poorly conceived national policies, which created unnecessary ambiguity, grey areas and overlapping jurisdictions of formal rights. Enforcement of these policies on the ground was complicated by decentralization of the state into different arms of MNRT (TAWA and TANAPA), District Councils, and Local-level governments at the village level, all of which were constrained by a lack of managerial capacity in practice.

6.10 Contestations over Lolkisale Game Controlled Area / Lolkisale Conservation Area

Conflicts in Lolkisale GCA/LCA abounded throughout the early 2000s and, in an attempt to resolve them, a series of multistakeholder meetings was held in 2008. During one meeting on May 21, 2008, meeting minutes were taken and subsequently published publicly online by the Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF), providing key insights into the nature of these tensions.[227] The meeting was held between representatives of tour and hunting operators in Lolkisale, Simanjiro, and the wildlife division. It also included representatives from the Wildlife Division (Elias B. Muzee), TNRF (Vijay Aggarwal), Boundary Hill Lodge (Hartley King), Treetops Elewana (Kieran Day and Glen Dennis), Dorobo (Daudi Peterson), and Kikoti Safari Camp (Pratik Patel). Notably, Bundu Safaris and Tandala Hunting Safaris were not in attendance, much to the frustration of other attendees. While several members (including the representative of the Wildlife Division) had gone to great efforts to recruit a representative from Bundu safaris to the table, it had proved difficult. Daudi Peterson of Dorobo made clear that Bundu Safaris had "been consecutively invited" but would not attend (TNRF 2008:1).

A key topic of discussion in the meeting was a proposal to add "no-hunting buffer loops around Naitolia and Treetops campsites" and "a 1km no-hunting radius around mobile camp sites with operators" (TNRF 2008:1). To accommodate the latter, mobile photographic camp operators would have to notify the trophy hunters in advance of their camping schedules. The meeting minutes make clear building tensions between trophy hunting and community-based

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[227] Since the document is public, I include names of these key stakeholders here for reference.

ecotourism, conflicts that were largely a product of unclear and poorly streamlined wildlife and land legislation. As King put it, according to the minutes, "photographic and hunting operators have a conflict no doubt" (TNRF 2008:3). These two stakeholder groups had respectively negotiated access to the area, and thus came into conflict on the ground. For trophy hunters, their access was legitimized through the hunting blocks in Lolkisale GCA administered by TAWA, and for photographic operators, their access rights were provided by individual contracts with Lolkisale village. Though both claims were legitimate in some way, the two groups could not operate in the same areas at the same time for safety reasons, as trophy hunting is dangerous if there are photographic safari-goers around. In Lolkisale, hunting on foot is generally not feasible because the concession is large. Generally hunters must drive, spot, and stalk, often taking shots from about 75-250 yards away. The question of whose access and use rights should take precedence in Lolkisale had led to growing hostility between stakeholders.

This particular meeting, in May 2008, was held to resolve conflicts that had escalated between the trophy hunters, ecotourism lodges and communities in Lolkisale GCA/LCA. As mentioned earlier, Boundary Hill Lodge burned down in 2005. While unconfirmed, the Australian investor alleged that the lodge had been burnt down by hunters.[228] The fact that no representative from Bundu Safaris was in attendance was significant. It is certainly possible that the owner of Bundu Safaris was unaware of the meeting or preoccupied by other matters. Or perhaps he felt his company had much to lose economically by revisiting the terms of his hunting concession, and was not interested in engaging the topic with photographic tour operators who might compromise his allocated hunting block. The other meeting attendees suspected the latter explanation to be the case.

The key proposal of the meeting was that the mandatory 2km buffer zone around TNP, should be supplemented with an additional 2km radius and that no hunting should be allowed

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[228] As previously mentioned, the Australian investor's brother was also accused of burning down the lodge to cover-up misuse of World Bank money. I am not well positioned to evaluate the validity of these allegations.

near Naitolia Camp and Treetops Lodge (TNRF 2008:2). According to the minutes, Hartley King explained that the Monduli District Council had agreed to increase TNP's buffer to 5km, but they could not codify it into law because the district council did not have the authority to do so unless it was approved by the Wildlife Division. While the 2km buffer zone was already in place, and most ecotourism camps were upholding a 3-4km buffer, Treetops was located between 2-4km from the boundary of the park, in the same area as Bundu's hunting concession. King's central proposal, then, was that the buffer outside TNP should be expanded to 4km "with loops drawn around the lodges of Treetops and Naitolia" (TNRF 2008:2). Thus, he was calling for an expanded buffer zone for trophy hunting of 4km from TNP, while maintaining the 2km buffer zone for photographic tour operators. King pushed for a universally expanded buffer zone around the entire park. His own interests notwithstanding, King expressed that the issue at stake was not just about the current conflict but about "all the village land adjacent to the park," which needed to be insulated from hunting for the "health of the ecosystem" and to generate "money for communities" (TNRF 2008:4). Other stakeholders expressed skepticism that the central government would agree to such a bold proposal, so King resigned himself to supporting a 2km buffer zone for the most part, with an added 2km radius around the LCA's tourist camps outside the buffer zone. The problem, however, was that the proposed Naitolia and Treetops loops would cut into Bundu's Block B within Lolkisale GCA, so Bundu would stand to lose from this proposal. Notably Boundary Hill was excluded from the proposal "as per the current situation" (TNRF 2008:2).

Kieran Day of Treetops appreciated the proposal, but was skeptical about how the added loops would be enforced. As he pointed out, the agreement was meant to reduce conflict in the interim while there were competing claims to the area. Practically speaking, however, nothing could actually be put into law prior to the expiration of the current lease contracts. While King wanted the Wildlife Division to formally implement the expanded buffer through legislative reform, other attendees recognized that this could take years. This consideration raised the

question of how these conflicts would be resolved in the interim. To quell Day's concerns, Roger Corfield of Foxtrot Charlie Ltd. explained rather sagely that "the proposals and agreements we are making here today *will be the law* for two years," implying that since the meeting attendees were the resource users in practice, if they agreed for the proposal to be binding, then it would be (TNRF 2008:3).[229] Interestingly, then, the meeting signified the creation of an informal institutional arrangement for governing access to wildlife resources in the LCA/GCA dispersal areas outside TNP that unfolded in the cracks of formal state legislation, much in the same fashion that common property mechanisms operate at the community level through custom.

Day expressed further concern that because Bundu was not represented at the meeting, the proposal would not be fully respected, but Corfield responded that it was a "consensus-based solution" by the majority of group members operating in the area (TNRF 2008:4). Peterson of Dorobo, however, agreed with Day suggesting that "we need political support and backing" (TNRF 2008:4). According to Pratik Patel of Kikoti lodge, the Wildlife Division was looking for an "amicable solution" to these emergent conflicts and was prepared to mandate different zoning arrangements in 2009-2010 to formalize a compromise between hunters and photographic tour operators, but they needed to agree on a short-term solution until then (TNRF 2008:3). Ultimately, the group voted on the size of the buffer zone and agreed to extend it an extra 2km all the way around the park (4km in total). The expanded buffer was never formalized as law, but was still put into practice on the ground.

To alleviate potential conflicts between Bundu and Treetops, Peterson of Dorobo suggested allowing Bundu to continue hunting between 2-4km of the park because its hunting block was fairly small. Day pushed back, knowing that Treetop's lodge, walking safaris, and fly camping operations were at stake, though his counter proposal was framed in terms of ecological reasons. Peterson agreed that the expanded buffer zone would likely benefit the environment,

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[229] The italicized emphasis is my own.

and could also be combined with photographic concessions to further benefit communities.[230] The question of how TAWA would get its cut of these arrangements, however, was raised as a potential issue, and the group suggested a "wildlife activity fee" that should not be a "double payment" for the concession, but a "flat fee" paid to TAWA on top of the agreed amount paid to the contracted village (TNRF 2008:6). The group also decided through verbal agreements that photographic operators would inform hunters of their mobile camping schedules in advance and while in the area to ensure the safety of campers. Hunters would then have to refrain from hunting within 1km of the mobile camps, even if the blocks overlapped the mobile photographic camps.

The inter-stakeholder governance meetings between tour companies operating east of TNP reveal that there was an institutional scramble underway to harness the capital generated by wildlife resources on village land. This involved a combination of formal and informal governance and management arrangements coexisting at different scales. The lack of formal harmonization in state policies had resulted in competing claims that were supported by law, and this made it challenging for all involved stakeholders to ensure consistent access to the benefit streams of wildlife resources. From the perspective of the central government, wildlife was state property and was a key source of revenue through TANAPA inside TNP, and TAWA in Lolkisale GCA. From the perspective of Lolkisale village, wildlife was passing through village land over which village councils had formal authority. While wildlife disrupted local livelihoods, the Kisongo of Lolkisale had also realized they could drink the milk of elephants and, for a variety of reasons, disliked hunting on their land. Thus, the lack of clarity over governance of wildlife resources led not only to conflict but strategic alliances: the central government sided with trophy hunters and Lolkisale village positioned itself with the photographic tour operators.

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[230] See Gardner (2016) for a thoughtful discussion of Peterson's genuine interest in establishing mutually-beneficial community-based joint ventures with villages.

6.11 Legislative reform and the prospect of a WMA

Indeed, as Patel of Kikoti Lodge had voiced during the inter-stakeholder meeting, legislative reform was just around the corner. The revised Wildlife Conservation Act (WCA) No. 5 of 2009 addressed many of the ongoing grievances that had developed in overlapping GCAs and villages. The passing of the revised WCA ultimately clarified that village land could not overlap GCAs, and in such instances where it did, these areas would be considered villages pursuant to the Village Land Act (PINGO 2013). The act also prohibited grazing, cultivation and settlement inside GCAs eliminating some of the prior confusion: villages were for communities and GCAs were for centrally managed trophy hunting concessions (see Wright 2016:46; MNRT 2009). Loveless (2014:47) notes that the revised WCA of 2009 avoided "the costly eviction conundrum the government would otherwise face" for communities living in villages that previously overlapped GCAs. This greatly clarified the situation, as large parts of Lolkisale GCA became superseded by village land. But while villages gained clearer rights to manage village *land* through their councils, pursuant to the WCA of 2009, they still lacked rights to manage *wildlife* itself, even if it was on village land, since all wildlife remained property of the state. The Revised WCA of 2009 built on the legislation of 2000 by further clarifying prohibitions on private contracts between villages and tour operators without state approval, whether in GCAs or village land. The resonating reason why the state did not support these private agreements was that there was no legislative framework in place for centrally taxing the wildlife-related revenue streams that accrued from them. Besides clarifying pre-existing ambiguities in land and wildlife policies, legislative reform also demonstrated a clear attempt by the state to consolidate central control over wildlife revenues. Neoliberal partnerships between villages and private investors that had emerged in the context of community-based ecotourism in the 1990s and early 2000s (see Gardner 2016) were thus short lived, as by 2009 the state once again intervened in the market by implementing policies that recentralized institutions for wildlife governance. As discussed in Chapter 4, this was the invisible hand behind the concept of WMAs in Tanzania, which

represented a formal institution for extracting taxes from wildlife-related tourism occurring on village land. The WCA of 2009 clarified that all contracts with tour operators on village land had to be implemented within the framework of a WMA. As a consequence, Lolkisale had to decide whether to establish a WMA or forgo the prospects of photographic tourism partnerships and a community-based livestock and wildlife area altogether.

In forwarding WMAs as the *de jure* model of community-based conservation in village land, the state was not acting in isolation from other influences. The African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), USAID and other conservation NGOs and international donors had begun to pressure the central government in the early 2000s to push the WMA model as a way to conserve wildlife on village land. AWF touted WMAs as part of its "heartland" initiative, which sought to conserve key ecosystems outside national parks across Tanzania's Maasailand (see Wright 2019:4, 102; Bluwstein 2018a; Igoe 2010, 2017). In the northern parts of Maasailand, AWF referred to its program as the "Kilimajaro Heartland," which extended from Enduimet across to Lake Natron and covered most of the Longido District (see Wright 2019:108). In the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem, the area was referred to as the "Maasai Steppe Heartland."

Figure 56 - Map of AWF's Maasai Steppe Heartland, encompassing the greater Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem. Map redrawn and adapted by author based on Bluwstein (2018a:46), who borrowed from AWF.

AWF strategically fashioned its regional program in relation to the emergent global interest in landscape-level conservation, and the emotional appeal of American heartlands (Sachedina 2008). To attract donor funds from USAID and WWF, it carefully crafted a marketable image of conservation in the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem (Igoe 2017).[231] AWF's websites and brochures highlighted pastoral Maasai living harmoniously together with wildlife, while downplaying the presence of Arusha cultivators, and other social complexities that

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[231] See also Gardner (2016:55-56) for discussion of AWF in the Loliondo context.

disrupted its aesthetic narrative of wildlife conservation in Maasailand (see Igoe 2010:386). In so

doing, AWF was able to establish itself as the dominant NGO in the regional conservation arena

in the 2000s, vacuuming up much of the global donor funding in the process (Bluwstein

2018a,b). At the suggestion of AWF, the central government commenced a WMA "pilot period"

from 2003-2006, where WMAs were implemented on an experimental basis throughout

Tanzania (Wright 2019; Kimario et al. 2020:127). With AWF's technical and financial

assistance, Enduimet WMA was started in 2003 and gazetted in 2007; Makame WMA was

introduced in 2003 and formalized in 2009; and Burunge WMA was initiated in 2003 and

formally established in 2006 (WWF 2014:7). AWF's efforts were driven by an enduring wildlife

preservation ethos. My own interviews with George Sanford in 2020, who served as AWF's

Maasai Steppe Landscape Director during its heartland initiative, revealed a genuine interest in

protecting wildlife from poaching and safeguarding the habitats upon which they depended.[232]

Lolkisale had been identified by AWF as an important corridor out of TNP and a potential

poaching hotspot, and was thus high on its agenda for a WMA (see Bluwstein 2018b:160).

Notably, AWF was generally opposed to trophy hunting, and viewed Lolkisale's interests in

photographic tourism more favourably than the GCA hunting block. As described by a statement

on AWF's (2017:1) website, "while the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) acknowledges that

well-managed hunting can play a role in financing conservation, we are opposed to the hunting

of elephants, lions, and rhinos due to the ongoing poaching crisis and plummeting population

numbers."[233]

From Sanford's perspective, AWF was doing well-intentioned work in Maasailand to

protect vulnerable and endangered species of wildlife. The organization inspired a large

collective of African practitioners and researchers who cared about the well-being of wildlife,

largely through the Mweka College of African Wildlife, which was founded in part by a

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[232] George Sanford is a pseudonym.
[233] Source: https://www.awf.org/news/awf-statement-about-us-governments-recent-decision-trophy-hunting

41,000$USD grant from AWF in 1963 (AWF 2012:30). As Sanford described to me, central to the heartland scheme was a focus on protecting wildlife that moved onto village land and would otherwise be unmonitored by national park rangers. AWF was certainly not blind to the concerns of communities, but its ultimate priority was conserving wildlife. According to Sanford, AWF latched onto WMAs as the best tool available for wildlife conservation on village land because the heartlands program still had to operate within the framework of national policies for governing land and wildlife resources. WMAs were one of the only viable options available for an organization that had secured considerable donor funding and was eager to contribute to wildlife conservation outside national parks; WMAs could hypothetically appeal to government, community, and investor interests while achieving AWF's ultimate goal of conserving wildlife in village land. Thus, AWF likely meant well by trying to rapidly establish WMAs in wildlife dispersal areas throughout Maasailand. At the same time, it is difficult to overlook AWF's impacts on the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem from a social perspective. In the mid 1990s, the AWF resettled 60 people living to the northwest of TNP to make way for a wildlife corridor, which would ultimately become Burunge WMA (Igoe and Croucher 2007; Bluwstein 2018b:160). Sachedina (2008) suggests that AWF's conservation efforts tended to benefit select elites, while stoking resentment in communities. Thus, despite the good intentions of AWF actors in wanting to safeguard endangered wildlife, AWF's overarching "vision" of African landscapes did not neatly align with those of rural communities (Bluwstein 2018a:28).

While the Wildlife Policy of 1998 explained that WMAs could be established on village land in key wildlife habitat areas adjacent to national parks and GCAs, it offered little insight into how specifically they would be "organised and run" (Nshala et al. 1998:14). The policy introduced the WMA concept as a means for communities to own and manage conservation areas on community land, and the initial Wildlife Management Area regulations of 2002 outlined how WMAs would be legally formed (Rodgers et al. 2003:12). From the perspective of communities, WMAs were perceived with distrust during the initial pilot phase. Burunge WMA,

for instance, was met with considerable local resistance (Bluwstein et al. 2016:220). WMAs were poorly understood and the procedural processes for establishing them were convoluted and unclear (Kallonga et al. 2003). They also tended to drag out over several years (Rodgers et al. 2003). In Lolkisale, the community was mindful of the history of dispossession from TNP and Lolkisale GCA, and the Kisongo were wary of a prospective WMA, which they initially viewed as a government scheme. There was concern that Lolkisale village might lose its rights to manage the area, and its authority to oversee wildlife-related tourism and authorize investments on village land. The initial WMA legislation also failed to stipulate exactly how much revenue local communities would receive from tourism vis-à-vis TAWA. Lolkisale village was worried that high taxation would eat significantly into its revenue streams. Sulle (2008:20) expressed concern that this type of institutional shift in Lolkisale might make the community reconsider the opportunity costs of using land for photographic tourism.

Distrust and confusion about what a WMA would entail were not specific to Lolkisale village and have been recurrent themes across rural communities in northern Tanzania (Wright 2017; Gardner 2016). In the late 1990s, a team of land lawyers and anthropologists called the "Lawyers Environmental Action Team" (LEAT) assessed the potential receptiveness of communities to WMAs in the Tarangire ecosystem prior to the initial WMA pilot period. The team carried out its study under the auspices of AWF and TANAPA, with funding from USAID. As one of their interviewees from an unspecified village in the Tarangire ecosystem said, "we fear that the WMA is a way for TANAPA to control the village land use plan. We have already lost 2000 acres of forest to the corridor with no discussion, no agreement, no benefit. We were just informed by a notice from the District Administrator" (Nshala et al. 1998:27). Communities living adjacent to TNP were wise to the history of state-led dispossession through national parks, game reserves, and settler and commercial farms. On the whole, they thought of WMAs with great skepticism and cynicism. There were also legal complexities related to the formalization process of WMAs that communities were ill-equipped to navigate, and rumours about the

process abounded. Communities like Lolkisale were concerned that for WMAs to be established, village boundaries would first have be registered to secure a title deed, though technically speaking, customary titles were equal in "status and effect" to "granted titles" (Nshala et al. 1998:2). Boundaries between villages, general land, and reserves were often still unresolved in areas where WMAs were being planned. In some cases these boundary disputes were fraught with conflict, even after the revised Village Land Act (see Shivji 1999:3). While the GCA issue had been largely resolved in Lolkisale, and Steyn's lease had been cancelled, Lolkisale village had not been fully mapped and did not yet have formal titles. This was further complicated by an ongoing process of subdivision that took place from 2012 onwards (see Section 6.14). From a legal standpoint, Nshala et al. (1998) argue that villages did not technically need to be mapped and registered as a prerequisite for establishing a WMA because customary rights of villages were legitimate claims to land even prior to the revised Village Land Act.[234] Nonetheless, both communities and government stakeholders alike prioritized land surveys and the demarcation of village boundaries before the WMA could be seriously considered, and this gave Lolkisale village an opportunity to consider whether a WMA was actually what they wanted.

6.12 "Friend or foe"? Factors affecting Lolkisale's decision on whether to establish a WMA[235]

Following the revised WCA of 2009, Lolkisale village was faced with the question of how to proceed, knowing that technically their arrangement with Treetops was on village land and should be reclassified as a WMA. In 2010, Lolkisale village entered into discussions with AWF and the Monduli District Government about the possibility of registering a WMA in Lolkisale village, at which point the district government explained that the WMA would have to include other neighbouring villages as well. This point became one of many for Lolkisale village to

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[234] As they maintain, the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974, together with the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982 and the Wildlife Policy of 1998 stipulate that village councils suffice as corporate bodies with the legal capacities to establish contractual agreements and "own property" (Nshala et al. 1998:3). "Customary titles" were thus on par with "formal title deeds" (Nshala et al. 1998:3).
[235] "Friend or foe" borrows from Wright (2019:22).

consider. On the one hand, the WMA was an unknown entity that was devised by the central government and thus posed significant risks to the village, both in terms of potential revenue losses and land dispossession. Bringing other villages into the mix could also give rise to new political complexities and potentially jeopardize Lolkisale's authority over its tourism arrangements. On the other hand, the LCA was constrained by a lack of management capacity and political backing, making it difficult to enforce their livestock area and photographic tourism concession. Thus, the proposition of a WMA in Lolkisale village had potential tradeoffs and at first the community was unsure of how to proceed. There were a few key factors that affected the community's decision to proceed with the WMA. One of the primary ones was that Lolkisale was receiving significant revenue from Treetops and the community did not want to lose the money from this arrangement if the government decided to illegalize their contract on the grounds that it did not exist through a WMA. Further to this, the Kisongo of Lolkisale wanted to stop hunting and commercial farming on their land and saw the WMA as a potential platform to accomplish this.

While the Kisongo of Lolkisale supported the LCA, it was difficult to enforce the integrated management plan on the ground in the face of wider competing interests in the area from hunters and commercial farmers. The Kisongo were not interested in hunting ventures and wanted trophy hunting gone from their land, a sentiment shared by AWF and the conservation-oriented photographic tour operators. The Australian investor was a naturalist after all, who had been working on a comprehensive field guide to moths in Tanzania up until his death in 2018 (he was 57 years old when he passed).[236] The Kisongo greatly supported the LCA and wanted the area to be used for photographic tourism, wildlife habitat, and pastoralism. They were well aware that it could be used to defend the land from agricultural encroachment, either from large-scale commercial companies or smallholder Arusha moving into the area. It also provided a consistent

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[236] Source: https://www.theage.com.au/national/visionary-and-conservationist-20190514-h1edru.html

and growing revenue stream for funding community development projects. To the Kisongo, hunting represented a threat to the material base of the LCA, and thus they had a strong aversion to it. While I will not venture to generalize too much as to how enduring Maasai disapproval for hunting is across different social, political, and economic contexts, it is worth noting that this sentiment is not specific to the Kisongo of Lolkisale. Wright (2019:236-237) documented similar sentiments among those in Enduimet WMA, who viewed trophy hunting in their territory as an unsustainable use of resources as compared to photographic tourism. As discussed earlier, the Maasai of Loliondo want trophy hunters (OBC) banished from the Loliondo GCA knowing that their presence threatens Maasai customary rights of occupancy in overlapping villages. And, as Damian Bell, the Director of Honeyguide, explained to me in late 2019, he has had a similar experience working with the VGS anti-poaching unit in Makame WMA in Simanjiro. In his words, "for whatever reason, the Maasai really do not like poaching in their territory and they immediately call the VGS rangers when they think it to be occurring." Some of my Maasai interlocutors also pointed out that one of the issues that bothered the Maasai in Ngorongoro about the Barabaig (*Mangati*), prior to going to war with them and pushing them down south onto the Hanang Plains, was that the Barabaig were hunting in the plains, which the Maasai resented. Of course, there are some Maasai groups that hunt and the Maasai at large can and do kill carnivores, but generally only if they feel the predators pose a direct threat to their livestock. Otherwise, the Maasai seem rather content in my experience to let wildlife be. In Lolkisale, trophy hunters still patrolled the areas deemed to be part of Lolkisale GCA, as did resident hunters and poachers, and the community of Lolkisale resented the fact that hunters were entering their territory and undermining their livelihoods and the resource base of their lucrative arrangement with Treetops. Though the revised WCA had made clear the distinctions between village land and the GCA in terms of formal tenure, in practice, there was driving concern as to who would enforce these laws on the ground. TAWA and the Monduli DGO had limited capacity for monitoring the 700-1000km^2 area and the local Kisongo were not equipped to

confront hunters. They complained as well that trophy hunters and illegal poachers beat and harassed herders if they interfered with their hunting activities, even if it was on village land (Nshala 1998:25). By rezoning the area as a WMA, it would officially be endorsed by TAWA, and a team of Village Game Scouts (VGS) could be established to patrol the area with a vehicle and prevent hunters from entering their territory and depleting their valuable wildlife resources.

Further to hunting, the Kisongo were becoming increasingly concerned with the commercial farmers that had moved into the Lolkisale area after the cancellation of Steyn's lease. The LCA's integrated management plan offered little guidance on how these farmers could be pushed out of the area. Due in part to the historically overlapping jurisdictions of the GCA and village, many of these large farms were leased directly by the central government, not the local village council, though they were technically located in village land. This was particularly a concern in Lolkisale's Lemooti sub-village which was a key area for grazing and was becoming enclosed by several large commercial farms. Importantly, the farms were located inside the LLWZ area, which the Kisongo resented. These farmers were Arusha, Meru, and Chaaga and lived in Arusha town and Moshi, not the village. In the mid 2000s, the issue of absentee landholders had become a major problem in the Lolkisale area and was putting further land pressure on the pastoral Kisongo. While fraught with risks, the Kisongo reasoned that formalizing their community-based conservation area through the WMA might be a means of destabilizing these farmer's claims to land, especially since a WMA would have the support of the central government.

6.13 Learning from the Kisongo of Enduimet: The ripple effect of WMAs in Maasailand

The growing concerns among the Kisongo of Lolkisale about hunters depleting their profitable resource pool (wildlife), and Arusha farmers grabbing pastoral land, were strong incentives for Lolkisale to entertain the idea of upscaling to a WMA, despite their worries about the risks involved. While the Kisongo recognized the potential benefits that the WMA could have, they were wary of potentially committing to something that could have significant consequences for

the community in the long-term. As Makko thoughtfully explained to me at a Maasai traditional leader meeting in Mto wa Mbu in 2020, it might be straightforward to establish a WMA, but if the community decides that they want to leave it, there is no legal precedent for such an occurrence.[237] WMAs are thus sometimes perceived by pastoral communities as a one-way street towards formalization, with no potential exit strategies in the event that the WMA does not turn out to be in their interest. In Lolkisale, the Kisongo were very cognizant of these risks and to determine whether they wanted a WMA in their village, the *korianga* age-set of Lengoolwa sub-village organized themselves to make a visit to the Kisongo of Longido, where Enduimet WMA had been established in 2007. I interviewed members of this original party in late 2019 and early 2020, and they explained with great pride how they had held a series of meetings in Lengoolwa in 2010 to discuss the idea of the WMA before traveling. After selecting a key group from Lengoolwa, they raised money on their own through village contributions to fund a trip to Longido in 2011 together with representatives of other prospective neighbouring villages who might be interested in joining the WMA. Delegates from the neighbouring villages of Makuyuni, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini were invited to attend since these villages had been selected by Lolkisale as other potential member villages based on the District Government's suggestion to band villages together. Five representatives were selected from each of those villages to visit Enduimet WMA to observe its mechanisms in practice and decide whether a WMA would benefit their communities. Also accompanying them on this trip were ward councillors, chairmen and district representatives. The group was led by several *ilaigwanek* who sought out respected elders in Longido to discuss their experiences with Enduimet WMA. They were tasked with a mission to deliver the messages of these elders back to the community of Lolkisale. As Wright (2019) discusses, the Kisongo of Longido had also wrestled with the question of whether a WMA would be in their community's interests or not. At first, they were opposed to the WMA, worried that it would displace their land rights, but over time, they came

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[237] At the time, we were discussing the idea of a WMA in the Lake Natron area in Engare Sero village.

to view it as an "opportunity" to strengthen sovereignty over their traditional territory in the face of trophy hunting and foreign investors they did not care for (Wright 2017:157).

To effectively understand what was garnered from the meeting with traditional leaders in Enduimet, it is crucial to understand the ethnographic context of Enduimet WMA, which as mentioned earlier, was one of the initial pilot WMAs in the country. Like Lolkisale, Enduimet comprised a Kisongo majority spanning nine villages in Longido District. After it was established in 2007, Wright (2017) describes three main events that galvanized the community around the WMA: First, in an eerily similar fashion to the political dynamics in Lolkisale village (and Loliondo), Sinya, the largest village by area in the WMA, had been struggling to establish photographic tourism on land that overlapped a trophy hunting block in Longido GCA. Sinya village was located just across the border from Amboseli National Park in Kenya and thus constituted an important dispersal area for wildlife moving outside the park (much like Lolkisale and TNP). Like Lolkisale, the area was dual classified by TAWA as the Longido GCA and leased to a trophy hunting company named Northern Hunting Company (Wright 2019; Wright 2017; Wright 2016; Trench et al. 2009). In the late 1990s, Sinya village began to welcome photographic tourism on village land, but ran into a similar conflict as Lolkisale because their concession overlapped the one that had been leased by the central government to Northern Hunting (Wright 2017). The community took Northern Hunting to court and the central government unsurprisingly sided with the trophy hunters. While Sinya village had initially been opposed to the notion of a WMA in their land knowing that it represented a tool for centrally managing wildlife revenues, they abruptly changed course when the WCA was revised in 2009 and decided to join the WMA (Wright 2017). They realized that the WMA gave them the "authority" to evict Northern Hunting (Wright 2017:161). Through the WMA, Sinya was able to rezone the area for photographic tourism and push out the hunting concession. With Sinya's interests represented, the AA of Enduimet WMA revised its management plan for the period of

2011-2016, and on Jan. 11, 2012, the Director of Wildlife approved the new RZMP of Enduimet WMA and the trophy hunting block had effectively been zoned out (Wright 2017).

Sinya village also ran into issues with a photographic tour operator, not unlike the controversies that had arisen in Lolkisale with Boundary Hill Lodge. In 2007, Shu'mata Camp established itself in Sinya through an arrangement with former village leaders who received personal "financial benefits" in exchange (Wright 2017:161). The investor received a written letter of endorsement from the villager chair, which pursuant to the Village Land Act sufficed as proof of formal allocation of land. Villagers in Sinya felt that the deal was done in bad faith, and the majority wanted the tour investor gone. Despite attempts from the subsequent village council to create a new contract, the investor was not receptive. Shu'mata abused its position in the community, offering no compensation for wildlife impacts on livelihoods, no employment opportunities, and no access to the tourism revenue streams (Wright 2017). Through the AA meetings of the WMA, the community decided that Shu'mata had to leave, and the community went as far blocking roads, "commandeering its vehicles" and occupying the lodge (Wright 2017:161). The investor sought support from politicians and other elites to crack down on the community, but was eventually hit with an eviction notice in 2014 from the District government. Shu'mata took the village to court later that year and after a two ear saga, the High Court ultimately sided with the community. The investor appealed the court decision and the case was still ongoing as of 2020.[238]

This backdrop of conflict between the Kisongo of Sinya and foreign investors (and trophy hunters in particular) was crucial context for understanding what lessons were learned from the trip to Enduimet. Since the party had traveled to Longido two years after the Sinya community had changed course, from opposition of the WMA, to support of it, they took away from the visit an appreciation of the benefits that could be gained from having a WMA in their village. Sinya was in the midst of ousting the trophy hunters through their revised management

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[238] The community has since dropped the case for reasons not entirely clear (Wright 2022 pers. comm.).

plan, and thus the message that they delivered to the Kisongo of Lolkisale was very clear: WMAs were political tools that could be used to harness the power of the central government to push out unwanted outside interests in pastoral land and the wildlife it supported. The community of Lolkisale was particularly pleased with the idea of zoning out trophy hunting altogether. Quite significantly, then, the lived experiences of the Kisongo of Enduimet WMA had a ripple effect on the perspectives of the Kisongo in Lolkisale towards the prospect of a WMA.

The travel party returned to their respective villages to report their findings, at which point local governance at the village level came to play a crucial role in determining the trajectory of community sentiment towards the prospective WMA. In Lolkisale, open village assembly meetings were held and the findings were discussed in a transparent way with the communities. The greater Lolkisale community (including all five sub-villages) contemplated the potential benefits of joining the WMA in the context of their previously fruitful arrangement with Treetops, and their tensions with Bundu Safaris and the central government over the hunting block in the Lolkisale GCA. The experience of the Sinya community in successfully pushing out hunters was highly reassuring, as were its plans to push out the problematic photographic tour operator that was doing business in bad faith. The Lolkisale community viewed these as important reassurances that the WMA could be used to serve their interests, but one point of concern raised by key council members in these meetings was what would happen to Lolkisale's revenue from Treetops? Would it become spattered across all the villages, or be slurped up by the central government? How much 'milk' would be left for the community of Lolkisale? This proved to be a resonating concern that was difficult to address in the planning stages because the exact revenue structure of the WMA was not yet known to the community. The village ultimately reasoned that the milk of elephants was something that would support their community indefinitely as long as the wildlife populations remained healthy. Furthermore, pastoral livelihoods would be secure as long as the rangelands were not enclosed by commercial

farms. Even if the revenue from their private arrangement with Treetops declined, it would perhaps become a more reliable and secure long-term income stream through the WMA. Formalization offered a political instrument for defending community land from the hunters who threatened the wildlife and the commercial farmers who fragmented habitat and reduced available pastures. Thus, the potential losses in revenue were seen as secondary to the long-term benefits to sustainably managing the two resources that were central to the community's well-being – land and wildlife.

6.14 From one village to many: WMA pre-planning and the politics of subdivision

As the political leadership of Lolkisale contemplated the process of upscaling the LCA to a WMA, another important social dimension featured into the politics of WMA pre-planning – ethnic frictions and inter-village politics. The prospect of forming a coalition of neighbouring villages through the proposed WMA (as required by government), had potential benefits and costs for Lolkisale. On the one hand, it allowed the community to safeguard a larger area, but on the other, it meant that they would also have to share governance authority with other villages. This had the potential to put Lolkisale's private contract with Treetops at risk, and undermine the core pastoral values that underlay the assembly's interest in securing a community-based livestock area. The logical villages to include in the WMA, other than Lolkisale, were Makuyuni, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini.[239] These villages shared borders with the LCA, and had contributed land to the TCA through the elephant dispersal area in Makuyuni and the Naitolia Concession. Together, they geographically surrounded the conservation area in question, and had each expressed interest in cultivating community-based ecotourism in village land. But Lolkisale was wary of these villages, largely because they comprised strong Arusha majorities. Ethnic tension between the Kisongo and Arusha, though they are both Maa speakers, was a key factor that Loveless (2014:20) largely overlooked in her broad-stroked categorization of the Maasai as "the dominant tribe" in Naitolia and Mswakini. While she cites Homewood

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[239] Naitolia had previously subdivided from Mswakini Juu, which had subdivided from Mswakini.

(2008) in maintaining that cultural differences between the groups are largely "superficial," my ethnographic research suggests otherwise (see Chapters 3-5). As discussed earlier, the Arusha had been rapidly expanding into the area and their political and economic concerns differed from those of the Kisongo. On the Lolkisale side, the Kisongo still held cultural hegemony over the area, with Arusha establishing small (but growing) hamlets in Lengoolwa, Nafco, and Lolkisale-proper, and Kisongo still holding sub-village chair positions in Lemooti, Lengoolwa, and Oldonyo. Nafco, however, was developing into an emergent Arusha-dominated breakaway sub-village, with Kisongo only inhabiting the peripheral areas away from the clustered farms. The Kisongo were the primary inhabitants of the Lolkisale area at the outset of the colonial period and they were the ones who had come to appreciate the benefits of community-based photographic tourism as a strategy for keeping farmers and hunters at bay and converting wildlife into capital. The villages on the other side of the proposed WMA were a different story. While the sub-villages of Makuyuni were split between Arusha and Kisongo, Naitolia, Mswakini Chini, and Mswakini Juu were almost entirely inhabited by Arusha, with only a very small minority of Kisongo living in these villages. Those villages thus had different livelihood priorities than Lolkisale: their primary concerns were their smallholder farms, with livestock a secondary consideration. Since they were relatively recent migrants to the area, from the 1950s onwards, the Arusha were also worried that their 'indigenous' rights to the area would be called into question by the proposed WMA. While Lolkisale's village chair was himself a Nyaturu, he recognized that the interests of the Kisongo in securing a livestock area and promoting photographic tourism served the community as a whole irrespective of ethnicity. The village councils of the other four prospective villages, however, were held by Arusha, and there was significant concern within Lolkisale that including those other villages would sway the balance of power over the area in favor of a cultivation-based regional economy and increasing in-migration of Arusha onto pastoral land.

While the Lolkisale assembly did not yet understand all of the nuances of what a WMA would entail, they were quick to key in on the potential for other villages to eat into their income stream from their partnership with Treetops. More importantly, they were concerned that the material base of their entire economy was at stake if the institutions for governance were to fall into the hands of other villages who did not share their concerns. As one of my interlocutors in Lolkisale explained to me, this was a discreet factor underlying Lolkisale's process of subdivision. After discussions with AWF and the Monduli District Government about what the WMA would involve, there was an awareness within Lolkisale that each member village of a WMA would have a seat at the table. As things stood in 2010, this would mean that Lolkisale, Makuyuni, Naitolia, Mswakini Chini, and Mswakini Juu would be on equal footing in governing the area, and thus, Lolkisale would be greatly outnumbered. Of particular concern, Arusha would control 75% of the governance authority of the WMA, and would also take the same amount of whatever tourism income was returned to the member villages. This consideration concerned the Lolkisale community greatly about the prospective WMA and a plan was devised to subdivide Lolkisale village into several smaller villages to increase its representation in the proposed WMA. Lolkisale was aware that Naitolia and Mswakini Juu had both subdivided from Mswakini, and considered subdivision a useful strategy for increasing their political representation and economic stake. While it is common for villages in rural Tanzania to sub-divide as their populations grow, the swiftness with which Lolkisale sub-divided not only into two villages, but into *five* was notable. In 2012, Lolkisale split into Lemooti and Nafco, and later, in 2015, Lengoolwa and Oldonyo followed suit. These processes took some time to complete as they required mapping out village boundaries and formally registering them with the district, but all things considered, were formalized quite quickly. The plan to subdivide Lolkisale into separate villages gave the assembly more confidence in the idea of establishing a shared WMA with Makuyuni, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu and Mswakini Chini because Lolkisale would increase its political representation from 25% to 56%, allowing them to retain a governance majority. It

would also bring three Kisongo-led villages to the governance table in Lemooti, Lengoolwa, and Oldonyo to balance the Arusha-led ones on the other side. While the exact revenue structure of the WMA would not become clear until the revised WMA guidelines of 2012 were passed by TAWA, the math for calculating how this would affect income-sharing between villages was simple enough for the Lolkisale community to grasp. Rather than Lolkisale village receiving a combined quarter of the total income that would then be divided across its sub-villages, each sub-village would directly receive a ninth of the total income. Hypothetically, if 40,000$ was returned to the communities from the WMA, this would initially have been divided four ways meaning 10,000$ for Lolkisale to divide among its sub-villages (2,000$ per sub-village). Comparatively, if Lolkisale sub-divided into five villages, the 40,000$ would be divided across all nine villages, meaning $4,444 each and $22,222 total for the Lolkisale community at large. While not the only factors influencing the decision to subdivide, the political and economic dimensions were clear as Lolkisale considered how to maneuver in relation to the WMA framework to defend its interests.

6.15 In or out? Makuyuni as prospective WMA village

In the end, the community of Lolkisale decided to move forward with the WMA and proceed with formalization. The question then became, which villages would join in their proposal to the district? While the Lolkisale community had reasoned through uncertainty, in light of their own history of engagement with photographic tour operators, trophy hunters, and commercial farmers, to support creating the WMA, villages on the Makuyuni side arrived at different conclusions after the trip to Enduimet. Makuyuni village was directly adjacent to Lolkisale (Lemooti) and was a logical village to include in the WMA proposal because the Makuyuni Elephant Dispersal Area was connected to the Lolkisale Conservation Area and Lolkisale Livestock and Wildlife Zone within the unified Tarangire Conservation Area. While the Makuyuni Village Council had expressed interest in joining the WMA, their engagement with the proposed WMA took a turn when the representatives returned from Enduimet. Following a

series of community meetings, the Makuyuni assembly decided that it did not want to participate in the WMA, despite the continued interest of the village council in being included. Consequently, Makuyuni was dropped from the proposal and was subsequently excluded from the WMA.

There were several reasons why the community of Makuyuni decided not to be part of the WMA, some of which were sociocultural and others that were political and economic. The primary one was that Makuyuni comprised an Arusha majority. Excluding the town, the sub-villages south of the A104 highway were inhabited mostly by Arusha (Lemiyon; Makuyuni Juu; etc.) who had in-migrated to the area during the socialist period. The village council was also held by an Arusha. The Arusha of Makuyuni were concerned that the WMA might be used as a way for the pastoral Kisongo to prioritize livestock grazing at the expense of farming, or worse yet, to push the Arusha out of the area completely. They were aware that the Kisongo resented Arusha in-migration, so saw the WMA as a threat to their village and farms. Arusha elders were particularly wary of the WMA. Once a general consensus was reached around the risks that the WMA posed, a well-respected group of Arusha elders advised the community that if anyone decided to support the WMA against their community's interests, there would be consequences. Some of the elders placed a curse, which translates roughly into English as a "broken pot curse" (*kuvunja chungu* - "to break a pot"). The broken pot curse is a traditional form of Arusha sorcery used to convince people to follow someone's orders.[240] As part of the curse, pots are imbued with social life. If someone violates the terms of the curse, the elder breaks a pot, symbolizing the shattering of the cursed individual's life. When the pot is broken in this fashion, the individual and his or her family are destined to die abruptly. The curse extends to kinship ties and all descent lines from the individual that come after. It is considered one of the gravest forms

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[240] I classify this curse as a form of sorcery, in that it was placed by a skilled individual through a focused action. By contrast, witchcraft in the field of anthropology generally refers to inborn powers, often used as cultural justification for scapegoating impoverished women in sub-saharan Africa. Curses are normally cast along family or age-set lines in the Maasai context and require specialized knowledge to carry out (Galaty 2022 pers. comm.).

of sorcery at hand for the Arusha, so when faced with the prospect of being cursed to death or opposing the WMA, the remainder of the community followed suit. One of the key elders had said "if you support the WMA, the pot will follow you and you will break. Your family will die as this pot dies." The Arusha in Makuyuni took this curse very seriously, and to ensure that they would not be subjected to such an extreme fate, withheld their support for the proposed WMA.

Another reason that Makuyuni decided not to join the WMA was that Makko, the founder and director of UCRT, lived in Saburi sub-village, which was a Kisongo-dominated area. UCRT until that point had been wary of WMAs because it viewed them as an extension of the central government that could be used to grab pastures away from pastoralists in village land. UCRT had worked diligently to ensure that when Steyn's lease was canceled in Makuyuni, the land was turned over to the village to be managed as communal pasture. As discussed earlier, *doroboni*, the communal grazing area adjacent to the Makuyuni Elephant Dispersal Area, was a crucial lifeline for the livestock-keepers of Makuyuni, who were being squeezed on all sides by changing land governance arrangements (see Chapter 4). The proposed WMA area was planned to overlap *Ndoroboni*, and the Kisongo of Makuyuni, upon suggestion from UCRT, were worried that this would mean losing control over their key grazing area. While the Kisongo of Saburi and Lolkisale both prioritized grazing areas, they thus had different views on whether the WMA would help to secure communal grazing areas or undermine them. In the end, the Kisongo of Makuyuni also felt that the WMA posed too great a risk to their village's grazing area, and opposed the proposal to join the WMA.

The final reason that Makuyuni decided against joining the WMA was ward-level politics. The Makuyuni Ward Councillor at the time been an advocate for the WMA, knowing that it could be a way to generate revenue for the district. While the hunting block in the GCA generated considerable profits, those were mostly taken by TAWA. The WMA was seen as a way to potentially tap into the profitable agreement between Treetops and Lolkisale and ensure that some money was also coming back to the district. The community of Makuyuni was well

aware that the Makuyuni Ward Councillor supported the WMA, and in fact came to associate the WMA with the councillor, believing the proposal to be part of his personal development vision for the Makuyuni area. This association was manipulated by other political hopefuls who opposed the councillor and were hoping to succeed him and assume his position in the subsequent election. Several candidates had made visits to Makuyuni as part of their personal campaigning efforts, where they used polemical arguments to invalidate the planned initiatives of the councillor. Many community members in Makuyuni were swayed by these visits and began to perceive the former councillour with skepticism. Consequently, they also began to view the proposed WMA with distrust because of their conflation of the political standing of the councillor and the prospects of the WMA. In actuality, these sentiments were entirely political and had little to do with the material aspects of the WMA proposal.

The combination of these three ethnographic factors led the community of Makuyuni to withdraw from the proposed WMA, and they were subsequently excluded from the formal proposal. During interviews with community members in Makuyuni in 2019-2020, some people alleged that because Makuyuni had dropped out of the plan late, a portion of its land had already been included in the WMA's reserved area. The WMA indeed came to include the Makuyuni Elephant Dispersal Area, and Makuyuni was never compensated for this contribution.

6.16 Participation and governance issues during WMA planning

Following Makuyuni's decision to withdraw from the WMA in 2011, the proposal was reduced to four villages, though Lolkisale was preparing to subdivide. Unlike Makuyuni, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini ended up joining the WMA, but their processes for taking this decision were highly contentious.[241] After their representatives returned from Enduimet,

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[241] Loveless' (2014) work focuses on the experiences of villagers in Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini during the initial planning and establishment phases of the WMA. In the following sections, I work systematically through the central findings of her thesis. The governance issues that Loveless (2014) documents should be contextualized as reflections of the experiences of people in these three villages during the WMA's initial stages (2011-2014), as they do not reflect governance processes on the Lolkisale side of the WMA. Loveless' (2014) work provides an important backdrop of conflict and community-level opposition to the WMA planning process that should not be overlooked in any contemporary analysis of community attitudes towards the WMA. However, it is

Naitolia and Mswakini came under significant pressure from AWF and different levels of government to accept the WMA.[242] Unlike Makuyuni and Lolkisale, there was a lack of governance transparency in these villages at the local level and the decision to move forward with the WMA was taken without input from the majority of the village assemblies. These gaps in participation led to the corrosion of community support for the WMA in the early stages of its establishment.

Though the idea for a community-based conservation area had developed organically in Lolkisale village, part of the motivation for reforming the LCA into a WMA had come from the central government. Around the same time that the Kisongo-led party from Lengoolwa carried out its scoping mission to Enduimet WMA, the central government called a meeting in the country's capital, Dodoma to articulate MNRT's commitment to the WMA model of community-based conservation following the revised WCA of 2009. During the meeting, ward councillors from Mswakini, Makuyuni and Lolkisale were directed by representatives from the MNRT to facilitate the implementation of a WMA in their jurisdictions (Loveless 2014).[243] The councillors were asked to persuade village leaders (chairs and VEOs) to join the WMA (see Loveless 2014:48). As discussed in the previous section, the assembly of Makuyuni was wary of the Makuyuni Ward Councillor, and, due to the village's strong governance institutions, made a collective decision to withdraw from the WMA. By contrast, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini bent under the influence of the central government, as intended by MNRT. The ministry had hoped, however, that the village leaders would internalize the suggestions of ward

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important to note that her study was based on 31 qualitative interviews and a survey of 63 respondents, conducted in the context of approximately a month and a half of fieldwork in Mswakini Chini, Mswakini Juu, and Naitolia (see Loveless 2014:34-36). Fieldwork was not conducted on the Lolkisale side of the WMA, where the inspiration for community-based conservation first began. By acknowledging these methodological limitations (as she does on pages 43-44), my intention is not to be critical, but to point out that her study may not have been representative of the views of all community members (these past few sentences appear in the Raycraft (2022) book chapter referenced throughout this dissertation).

[242] For the sake of reducing redundancy, I refer to these three villages as Naitolia and Mswakini. Mswakini Juu, Mswakini Chini, and Naitolia are specified if I am referring to one village in particular.

[243] At the time, Makuyuni village was located in Makuyuni Ward; Lolkisale was within Lolkisale Ward; and Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini were part of Mswakini Ward.

councillors and subsequently "educate" their councils and development committees about the benefits of establishing the WMA. The central government expected that knowledge about the WMA would then trickle down from the level of the village council and development committees to the general assembly, thus "engineering" community support from the top down (Loveless 2014:55). Monduli District Government and AWF, the latter of whom served as an 'NGO facilitator' throughout the process, were tasked with helping to fast track this "downward" spiral of WMA planning from the central government down to the level of communities (Loveless 2014:75).

6.17 'Sensitizing' communities to the WMA[244]

The official WMA regulations required that communities first be introduced to the WMA concept before being asked about whether they supported the establishment of one. In 2011, the central government, with support from AWF, undertook a process of "sensitization" that involved education and outreach work at the village level intended to soften the communities of Naitolia and Mswakini to the idea of establishing a WMA (Loveless 2014:45). An important aspect of the sensitization process was that all outreach teams were ultimately accountable "upwardly" to the MNRT (Loveless 2014:75). Sensitization activities had to be implemented in accordance with MNRT regulations, and all decisions pertaining to the WMA had to be approved by the Director of Wildlife (see Loveless 2014:50). Members of the village government were supposed to go both ways (up and down), acting as a liaison between the district and central governments (upwards) and the villagers (down). This meant helping both to educate villagers on behalf of the central government, and also to advocate for the concerns of the village assembly (see Loveless 2014:50).[245] In practice, however, they were only accountable

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[244] See Loveless (2014:61).
[245] The WMA guidelines suggested educating the community through a series of "audio-visual, drama, songs, poster, fliers," to make communities aware of the benefits of the WMA (Loveless 2014:50). A cynical critic might refer to these processes as tools of propaganda used to convince communities to support an initiative that might not be in their best interest. At the same time, the communities may not have been literate or otherwise able to follow along with jargonistic reports and legal documents, highlighting the potential value of these educational tools.

in an upward fashion, and the village-level education initiatives were ineffective and poorly distributed across the communities. Thus sensitization did not take hold.

While consultation with communities technically featured in MNRT's officially prescribed WMA procedures, little effort was made to engage villagers in Mswakini and Naitolia. Unlike the democratic assembly meetings in Lolkisale and Makuyuni, the majority of villagers in Naitolia and Mswakini were not represented in the WMA-related meetings where consultation was meant to take place. Less than 10% of the total village populations in Naitolia and Mswakini attended the initial meetings to discuss the prospective WMA and, thus, most villagers were not adequately represented by the planning processes (see Loveless 2014:50). This was a far cry from the "50% of active community members" that were expected to be represented according to the official WMA protocols (Loveless 2014:50).[246] For those who did attend, the meetings were structured in such a way that members of the assembly were not offered opportunities "to influence how the WMA process was made or implemented" (Loveless 2014:50). Thus, participation of villagers in Naitolia and Mswakini were 'tokenistic,' in that the formal process of establishing the WMA had already been determined by the Ministry and could not be changed (Loveless 2014).

Two main WMA planning meetings were held in each of these villages in 2011. According to the meeting minutes, around a hundred people attended each of these meetings (97 and 91 for Mswakini Chini; 138 for Mswakini Juu; and 115 and 80 for Naitolia).[247] While these numbers seem decent for village assembly meetings, Loveless (2014) notes that the village leaders had in some cases exaggerated villager attendance. There were accusations that the village council of Naitola had "forged the list" of the WMA meeting by recycling the one from the "annual general assembly meeting" (Loveless 2014:62). Villagers alleged that key committee

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[246] As I observed during my fieldwork in these three villages, low attendance rates in village assembly meetings are a general occurrence. During one village assembly meeting in Mswakini Chini in late 2019, I counted about 40 people in attendance as key issues related to the WMA, food security, and public health were discussed.
[247] For context, the village populations at the time were approximately 2000 in Mswakini Chini, 1674 in Mswakini Juu, and 4000 in Naitolia (see Loveless 2014:51).

members also hid details of WMA meetings from the assembly to concentrate decision-making power in the hands of a select few. In the words of one of Loveless' (2014:52) interlocutors, "leaders do not like us to know the details of the WMA," implying that leaders were actively withholding information from villagers to capitalize on their unawareness. This was seen as an intentional political strategy for consolidating power.

As a consequence of poor governance at the village level, WMA meetings were carried out without adequate participation from the assembly. Those who did attend were generally passive observers rather than engaged participants who "actively" deliberated "the idea of the WMA" (Loveless 2014:51). In the meetings, the sensitization teams gave cookie-cutter responses to general questions about whether WMAs were based on technical knowledge, but did not engage the communities in meaningful discourse. The meetings followed official WMA procedures but lacked thoughtful discussion and genuine participation. Importantly, this was very different from what had transpired in Makuyuni and Lolkisale, where there was considerable discussion and debate within the communities about the benefits and drawbacks of establishing a WMA. Low attendance rates at the WMA meetings meant that most people in these villages only heard about the WMA 'through the grapevine,' during their everyday conversations with friends and family members. Very few people in these villages were "properly informed" about the WMA and had a "keen awareness" of how it would work.[248] These cracks in communication between village government and the assembly meant that misinformation about the WMA and distrust were rampant. Villagers suspected that their local governments had "ulterior motivates" for "engaging with the WMA scheme," undermining the government's attempts to sensitize the communities to the benefits of the WMA (Loveless 2014:52-53).

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[248] Though information sometimes traveled through formal channels, including letters and posters that were provided to children at school to bring home to their parents, most villagers heard about the WMA via "word of mouth" from other community members (Loveless 2014:53). As Loveless (2014:53) writes, "the majority of information about RWMA [was] received through informal or non-governmental channels rather than through the sensitization team or government."

Exclusionary local governance meant that very few people in Naitolia and Mswakini were able to track the WMA planning processes and follow how the initiative was progressing. As Loveless (2014) found in her surveys, approximately half of her respondents across these three villages reported being unaware of the WMA.[249] Her surveys were carried out two years after the WMA had been officially gazetted, indicating that community outreach was still minimal. Disturbingly, she also found that the majority of people she surveyed had concerns about the WMA, but had not expressed them (see Loveless 2014:54). This was particularly so for women and youth (*nyangulu* age and below), whose voices were given less authority in governance processes (see Loveless 2014:55). Some of these gaps in awareness have persisted. I found during my fieldwork in Naitolia and Mswakini that some people only had general ideas of what the WMA entailed (enough to answer basic survey questions about them), but when they were prodded on the more complex characteristics of WMA governance and management, they did not fully grasp what it actually involved. This was not the case in the villages on the Lolkisale side of the WMA, where most people I interviewed had a solid understanding of what the WMA was and how it operated. This trend was particularly apparent among female respondents in Mswakini and Naitolia, who on the whole expressed less nuanced opinions on the WMA during interviews than male heads of houses. This was perhaps related to the traditional gender-based divisions of labour and governance in Maasai society, as outlined in Chapter 3. Men generally participate in key governance meetings where land and grazing issues are discussed, while women tend to the households and rear the children (though they are involved in such meetings indirectly through their husbands and sons, as explicated by Hodgson 2001). What is certainly clear is that the entire sensitization process in Mswakini and Naitolia was lacking due to poor local governance. As a result, many villagers, and especially women, were unaware of what the central aims of the WMA actually were. The lack of education about the

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[249] It is important to note that Loveless (2014) only spoke to 65 people in total across the three villages, and her survey only included 20 people. Thus, her findings may not be fully representative.

WMA created a barrier to genuine participation in the planning processes and foregrounded growing discontent within these villages about the WMA's establishment.

6.18 Decision to 'accept' the WMA in Naitolia and Mswakini

As a product of the poor education and consultation efforts, Mswakini and Naitolia never reached a genuine consensus on whether the communities wanted the WMA or not. Loveless' (2014:61) interviewees felt that "village leaders reinforced the potential benefits of WMAs" and underreported the potential risks, while keeping "the door closed to villager input" throughout the planning stages. Ultimately, the local governments of these villages agreed to having the WMA in their villages without adequate input from their constituents. Loveless (2014:61) thus contends that these "villages were *made* WMA-ready."

While the local governments in these villages were guilty of poor governance practices that limited participation from their assemblies, they likely also faced coercion from above. Some village committee members felt that opposing the WMA would be futile because there were larger forces at play behind the scenes. When the village chair of Naitolia vocalized opposition to the WMA, he was excluded from further WMA planning and governance meetings from then on. Indeed, there were big players behind the scenes pushing the WMA through, some of whom Loveless' (2014:64) interlocutors did not "care to mention." The major politician was James Baraka, who at the time served as the Member of Parliament (MP) of Monduli before leaving that position to become the Prime Minister of Tanzania under the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM).[250] Baraka would later defect to Chadema, the leading opposition party after he was not selected as CCM's presidential candidate. He ran in the 2015 presidential campaign, and narrowly missed winning the presidency over the late President Magufuli.[251] I had a chance to chat informally with the former Prime Minister at the home of a mutual friend in Monduli town in mid 2020, though I did not formally interview him about Randilen WMA. In

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[250] James Baraka is a pseudonym.
[251] Baraka also served as the Minister of Lands from 1990-1995 (see Kelsall 2004:5).

Tanzania, MPs have the authority to debate bills and pass laws, and consequently have much power in the policy-making arena. Baraka was supplanted by Julius Kalanga as the MP of Monduli from 2015-2020, and I was able to interview Mr. Kalanga about the WMA in mid 2020. While Baraka served as the MP of Monduli, he went to considerable lengths to push Randilen WMA through to formalization as quickly as possible. I have heard several different perspectives on why Baraka was so interested in fast-tracking the WMA. The first was that he appreciated keeping livestock as a way of storing and accumulating wealth outside central banks, and viewed the rangelands of Monduli as an appropriate place for managing herds. This aspect of his policy was certainly favoured by the Kisongo pastoralists living in rural Monduli. Some of my key informants from district government suggested to me during interviews that Baraka was genuinely interested in contributing positively to pastoral development. These same interlocutors relayed to me that Baraka had been troubled by the alienation of pastoral land for commercial farms, agricultural expansion, and national parks, and saw the WMA as a means of defending the land rights of local pastoralists. At the same time, some of my local Kisongo interviewees resented him because they felt that he was looking for areas to privately manage his own large herds without heed to the customary Maasai institutions for rangeland management. Several of my interlocutors suggested to me that Baraka's plan was to keep his own herds in the Randilen WMA area, and this was the main reason for his interest in encouraging its establishment. Other key informants at the district level, however, pointed out that there was no evidence to suggest that those allegations were anything more than rumours. Another explanation raised by some members of district government was that Baraka saw the WMA as a legitimate strategy for ensuring that revenue from community-based conservation in Lolkisale would make it back to the Monduli District Council, rather than remaining in the villages or being 'eaten' by TAWA.

Another key government figure who supported the formalization of the WMA was the Monduli District Game Officer Seraphino Mawanja. I was able to formally interview Mr. Mawanja in 2020 to garner his views on the WMA. I later crossed paths with him several times

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in Nafco village, and at a number of governance meetings in Makuyuni, Mto wa Mbu, and Monduli town. Mr. Mawanja was not acting out of personal interest in helping to establish the WMA, though he was certainly not opposed to generating more money for his branch at the district government, which was generally constrained by a lack of funds. Mawanja is a dedicated conservationist who genuinely cares about the well-being of wildlife and the equitable distribution of conservation benefits to communities. Prior to being placed in Monduli District, he worked in Morogoro and advocated to TAWA that a major trophy hunting block should be closed because he felt it was having a too significant impact on the wildlife populations. TAWA abruptly relocated him to Monduli District where he has since been working for many years. Mawanja's interests were closely aligned with the Kisongo of Lolkisale: he wanted the GCA to be reclassified as a photographic tourism area because he felt that would be of greater benefit to wildlife and local communities. When I first met him at a WMA governance meeting in 2020, he was advocating for the resolution of the ongoing Boundary Hill court case and felt that Boundary Hill Lodge should pay Lolkisale village back what it was owed. In May 2020, when I was staying in Nafco village, Mr. Mawanja appeared on his day off with a district vehicle to help villagers push elephants back into the WMA, which the community very much appreciated. Mawanja prides himself on having boots on the ground and considers himself to be a rogue actor who follows his heart irrespective of what the central government expects of him. He is an endearing character and I think highly of him. When I explained the nature of my research and my interest in evaluating community perspectives on the WMA, he very thoughtfully explained that I must make sure to attend to issues of class, education, gender, and geography because the opinions of people might vary significantly and that I "should make sure to get all the opinions of people to really understand what is going on." Mawanja is also a strong-minded and charismatic fellow, and I suspect that he was fairly direct in his suggestions to members of local government that they should support the WMA, though I believe his reasons for advocating for the WMA were well-intentioned.

Regardless of the intentions of Baraka, Mawanja, and the various ward councillors who supported establishing the WMA, Loveless (2014) notes that several members of local government in these villages felt forced into accepting the WMA. Some reported being convinced through threats of displacement, which motivated the village committees to take acceptance decisions prematurely. On the Lolkisale side, there were indeed concerns that if the WMA was not established, the land would be reclassified as part of the GCA, potentially undermining people's rights to graze and collect firewood, as well as the village's partnership with Treetops. In Mswakini Juu, where conflicts over the boundaries of TNP and village land were ongoing, one member of village government was told that if they did not accept the WMA in their village "Tarangire would extend its borders and they would remain with no land at all" (Loveless 2014:56).[252] The concept of a wildlife corridor was also floated as an alternative possibility in Naitolia and Mswakini that would undermine local land rights entirely (see Goldman 2009). According to one member of the Naitolia council, MP Baraka had advised him directly that the WMA was the only option available to prevent the government or foreign investors from grabbing the land (see Loveless 2014:62). If he did not accept the WMA then the area would be converted into a corridor. As a consequence, the members of local government that Loveless spoke to in Naitolia felt "forced to agree" to the WMA (Loveless 2014:62). Local governments were thus motivated to join the WMA in spite of "admissions of its flaws" because it allowed "villages self-determination in securing land rights and access to natural resources for the present and future" (Loveless 2014:56). Makuyuni was the exception that remained skeptical about these threats, as compared to the risks of joining. An important aspect of these discussions that does not feature substantially in Loveless' (2014) work is that the Arusha were particularly cognizant of being evicted, knowing that they were relatively recent in-migrants, and that they had moved into an ecologically significant wildlife dispersal area. The Arusha-led village councils and committees in Mswakini and Naitolia were told by ward councilors that the WMA

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[252] Some of these boundary disputes were still ongoing at the time of writing.

would prevent village land from being grabbed by TAWA or TANAPA, and that it would ensure that the land rights of their villages would be upheld. Money was also used as an incentive to get village governments on board with the WMA. MP Baraka advised ward councilors and village committees to "act quickly to tap into the money being made from conservation" (Loveless 2014:56). There were also promises of infrastructure development in the villages including proposals to build schools and dispensaries.

As a local government member in Mswakini Juu explained to Loveless (2014:61), some people in his village had significant "fears and concerns about the WMA" because they were "enclosed on almost every path" by land use policies that favoured wildlife more than people. The local government committees also held this fear, but channeled it into support for the WMA, which they viewed as a means of securing land. By contrast, villagers worried that their local governments had signed off on the very thing that they were afraid of, a wildlife conservation area that would displace them from their village. Villagers were concerned that, given all the other protected areas around, this would turn into yet another situation where the government wanted to extract tourism revenue from wildlife at the expense of community livelihoods. Some feared that the government was playing a "political trick" on villagers by making them think it was a community-based idea, when in reality it would be used as a precursor for displacement (Loveless 2014:62). Villagers had seen conflicts arising in Burunge WMA over grazing rights, and they were also concerned that the WMA might implement a multiple land use model like the NCA, which prohibited cultivation (Loveless 2014). This was a major concern for these communities, since the Arusha were mainly farmers.

In Naitolia, some members of the council said "the WMA was made behind closed doors through small village committees" (Loveless 2014:63). These environmental and development committees were at times at odds with the village councils, as they had been directly influenced by ward councillors and district government officials. The former village chair of Mswakini Chini explained to Loveless (2014) that when the district government officials communicated the

costs and benefits of the WMA to the village committees, they overemphasized the benefits (income gains, employment opportunities), and underemphasized costs (increasing human-wildlife conflict, loss of land). As a result, some of the village committees had come to expect high "income from tourism", which was unrealistic relative to the operational costs and benefit-sharing structure of the future WMA (Loveless 2014:58). Furthermore, the district underreported the livelihood impacts that increasing wildlife numbers would have on agropastoral livelihoods.[253] Men in Naitolia and Mswakini were particularly concerned about their farms and livestock, while women were worried about restrictions on collecting firewood and building materials (Loveless 2014). These concerns, however, were neglected in the decision to establish the WMA and in the process of devising its initial management plan.

6.19 Establishing Randilen WMA

The process of formally establishing the WMA followed national guidelines and a 2011 handbook from AWF. The WMA was named Randilen (formerly *Randileni*), the Maasai place-name given to the hill near the proposed WMA's entrance gate, which marked the border between the pre-existing LCA and the Naitolia Concession (King 2009:14-15). Randilen had been proposed as an entrance gate and visitor centre as part of the original Tarangire Conservation Area (King 2009:8). The first step in the formalization process in 2011 was establishing a Community Based Organization (CBO), a body of representatives from each member village that would later become an Associated Assembly (AA) once the WMA had been made official by the central government. Selection of CBO candidates was supposed to be based on transparent elections, but in the case of Mswakini and Naitolia, voting members of the CBO were "hand-picked" individuals who already had other personal leadership positions (Loveless 2014:65). The pre-selection of CBO candidates was partially about consolidating power within the leadership groups of these villages, but it was also necessary because there were simply not

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[253] One of Loveless' (2014) interlocutors estimated losing about 10-20 sacks of maize (120kg per bag) per eight acre farm. At the time, each bag sold for about 200-250,000Tsh.

enough nominations received from the general assembly (Loveless 2014). Mswakini Juu, for instance, only received two applications for the position, and the rest were hand-picked by the environmental and development committees (Loveless 2014). As such, there was never full devolution of power to the level of the assembly, as governance processes were only devolved to pre-selected villagers.

Once the CBO from the member villages had been selected, the CBO became tasked with preparing the WMA's constitution, strategic vision, and resource zoning management plan (RZMP) (Loveless 2014:66; see also MNRT 2013).[254] These documents had to be filled out using official MNRT templates, and many of the community members did not have the technical expertise to know exactly how to work on them (Loveless 2014). AWF played a significant role at this point, assisting with filling out data sheets about monitoring and helping the CBO fill out land use agreements and make the management and resource use plans. Once the documents were finalized, the CBO then applied to MNRT for AA status and formally became an official governance body in the eyes of the state in 2012. This meant that the AA superseded the governance authority of each individual village in the context of administering WMA resources. The WMA was gazetted at that time in accordance with TAWA's new set of official WMA regulations that were updated that same year. Loveless (2014:66) suggests that Randilen WMA at this stage shifted from "direct democracy" to "representative democracy" as ordinary villagers only had a say in WMA governance through the AA. Following the establishment of the AA, the Director of Wildlife granted the AA wildlife user rights. The AA then gained authority to make governance decisions about the WMA and negotiate contracts with investors (as demonstrated in

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[254] Within WMAs, each village must produce its own land use plan, or contribute to a Joint Village Land Use Agreement (USAID 2013; see also MNRT 2013:67) that fits in relation to the larger resource zoning management plan. The CBO is meant to convene to discuss how the area will be zoned, including factors like settlements, livestock grazing, photographic tourism (and in some cases hunting). These management plans are meant to dictate the terms of management, but there is a considerable body of literature on community-based conservation in Tanzania suggesting that management plans do not always translate into practice for a variety of reasons (Lund 2015; Raycraft 2019a, 2018c; Bluwstein and Lund 2018). Once these plans are completed, the CBO then applies for approval from the central government.

Enduimet by Wright 2017). A "bid and tender committee" was made up, including members of MNRT, Monduli District and the AA to "finalize and approve contracts" with investors, though final authority for approving deals rested with TAWA (Loveless 2014:73). Importantly, the pre-existing village-private photographic partnerships like those seen in Lolkisale were no longer permissible under state law, so all future negotiations had to be carried out with the AA, rather than village councils (see also Kimario et al. 2020).

Unique to Randilen WMA compared to other WMAs was that the LCA/TCA already had a fairly comprehensive eighty-page management plan that had been revised in 2009, thanks to the Australian investor and his World Bank loans and strategic partnerships with Lolkisale village. Thus, devising Randilen's management plan was not as difficult as had been the case with some other WMAs because the planners did not have to start from scratch. Some of the initial proposals for the WMA entrance gate and ranger posts remained from previous plans. Other features were erased, though some residuals remained in a 'palimpsestic' fashion (borrowing again from Jackson 2021).

As far as timelines for establishing WMAs go, Randilen WMA was the one of the fastest WMAs ever formalized in Tanzania. From the time of the initial sensitization and decision-making meetings in 2011 to when it was officially gazetted in 2012, it took around a year. Its rapid establishment was due in large part to the political support from above, as MP Baraka was intent on pushing the WMA through. It also would not have been possible without the technical assistance of AWF, particularly in the preparation of the initial RZMP. Village governments in Mswakini and Naitolia reported feeling considerable pressure from AWF to finalize the necessary documents and paperwork (Loveless 2014). On the Lolkisale side of the WMA, however, the village council and AWF collaborated closely. Making the RZMP required the use of GIS technology to map out the area and its boundaries. Villagers did not have these technical skills, nor the equipment to gather GPS points, analyze them on a computer and prepare maps. So AWF assisted with preparing the maps for the initial RZMP in collaboration with the District

Government. However, key issues emerged during this process. From the perspectives of community members, AWF had been in such a rush to carry out the mapping that they did not do a thorough job of assessing where the boundaries should be. They relied on the directives of a few individuals, rather than the community at large. Consequently, the initial maps were not representative of the community's livelihoods concerns. In Lemooti, for instance, the Kisongo were angry about the way the map of their village had included a key permanent water source inside the reserved area (Damian Bell 2019 pers. comm.; see Section 7.4). From the perspective of the mappers, the difference was miniscule as it was only a matter of a few hundred metres, but from the perspectives of the Kisongo, it was a crucial difference. In response, representatives of Honeyguide visited the District Government offices to ask why the water source had been included in the reserve area if the community had not wanted it to be. The official at the District Government who was in charge of mapping explained that the boundaries on the ground were likely not exact because he had been under pressure from AWF to formalize the maps as quickly as he could. AWF at the time was working towards achieving key deliverables for their donors, measured in terms of how many WMAs they had established across the heartland of Maasailand. They were thus driven to establish as many as they could in a short period of time. In practice, this led to mapping issues that were very significant from the perspectives of community members.

Some of the boundary disputes were between villages, which would have been an issue irrespective of the WMA. Mswakini Chini and Olasiti Village (in Babati District), for instance, had an ongoing dispute over village boundaries, made even more complicated by the fact that they were located in different administrative regions (Arusha vs. Manyara) (RWMA 2018). Makuyuni also had a conflict over its village boundaries that remained unresolved at the time of writing. Makuyuni's issues have been due in part to political complexities stemming from the cancellation of Steyn's lease and the limbo status of some of the pastoral areas in Saburi. As described to me by the urban planner of the Monduli Government, Makuyuni's boundaries have

still not been formally mapped due to the unresolved disputes. Some of the villagers I spoke with in Makuyuni in 2019 felt that the lack of resolution of the formal boundaries of Makuyuni allowed Randilen WMA to include a portion of land in its reserved area that would have otherwise technically been in Makuyuni. Naitolia and Mswakini Juu were also concerned about how far the WMA's reserve area extended onto village land, and where the exact divisions between the villages were on the ground. Some people, including the WMA Chair believed that the WMA's boundary between Lemooti and Naitolia passed through the Santilen hills and across ("to old Lekooya Camp"), but the RZMP indicated that the boundary moved in a different direction near the hills, before later linking up with Lekooya Camp (RWMA 2018:17). Villagers in Mswakini Chini argued that the visual landmarks they were accustomed to using to demarcate boundaries ("trees, campsites or rivers") were not represented by the management plan (RWMA 2018:17). Some of these boundary conflicts had led to increasing tensions, particularly in Mswakini Juu and Naitolia, over the WMA boundaries. These conflicts were exacerbated by significant ambiguity on the ground, as the beacons were not clearly defined, and, in some cases, it was difficult to decipher the exact boundary lines between the beacons. The revised management plan indicates that this ambiguity was used strategically by some individual villagers to interpret the boundaries as they saw fit. On the whole, the community felt that the initial round of GIS mapping "was wrong" (RWMA 2018:17).

While committees were formed to discuss and prepare the initial zoning and land use plans, the groups were led by technical experts, and there were only a few community representatives involved through the CBO. These groups prepared the zoning and land use plans before returning with them to the villages (see Loveless 2014:70).[255] Villagers thus did not have adequate opportunities to contribute to formulating the plans. As such, the initial WMA zoning management plan did not represent the voices of the villagers in Mswakini and Naitolia. As

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[255] The AA had attended "a seminar on boundary-making and proceeded to make [the management plans] before villager inclusion in the process" (Loveless 2014:70).

Loveless (2014:65) writes, the communities felt that they were "being planned for." The women she spoke to in those villages were worried about having to request permission to harvest firewood and medicinal plants and to access sacred areas (see Loveless 2014:69). Despite these livelihood concerns, technical knowledge was prioritized through the influence of AWF, and the "local knowledge" that villagers valued was underrepresented (Loveless 2014:69-70). This led to disillusionment when the initial management plan was put into practice in 2014.

6.20 Implementation of the initial management plan and community protest

Though the WMA was technically gazetted in 2012, it was not yet operational until April 2014 when VGS began to patrol the area and enforce the management plans. It was at this point that villagers in Naitolia and Mswakini were finally informed by AA members and District government officials about boundary beacons and land use restrictions during village assembly meetings in 2014. Most villagers did not attend those meetings, and were still unaware of the WMA and how it functioned. They also did not know who the AA members were and what exactly they represented (see Loveless 2014:72). Villagers were "surprised" when they encountered VGS and beacons in their villages and in some cases had no idea why they were even there (see Loveless 2014:72). These discoveries of beacons in village land and emergent fears that the WMA was going to be used to 'police the community' led to growing resentment in Naitolia and Mswakini over the "top-down" way in which the WMA had been designed and implemented (Loveless 2014:73). Though they had little say in the determination of the WMA's management priorities, villagers worried that they would be the ones who had to "abide by WMA restrictions and regulations," and thus bear the costs (Loveless 2014:73). Most villagers still did not fully understand what the WMA was, let alone its specific bylaws and boundaries, because they had been excluded from the planning processes. Villagers were thus afraid, confused, and distrustful of the changing political landscapes of their communities. They became fearful that their local governments had sold their land without them knowing and that they had lost their land rights in the process. Tensions began to rise when one man was caught in the

reserved area of the WMA on a motorbike and was reportedly beaten by VGS, though he was apparently unaware that he had transgressed any boundaries (Loveless 2014). Some community members alleged that seasonal *ronjo* (short-term settlements for mobile herders) bomas in key grazing areas had been destroyed in accordance with the new zoning plan. This greatly angered local livestock keepers and in 2014, villagers from Naitolia and Mswakini stormed the newly built WMA offices at Randilen hill and threatened the WMA management staff with violence. Administrative staff locked themselves inside the office until the angry mob passed. As expressed to me during interviews in 2020, staff members maintain that if they had not done so, they might have been killed. As discontent built up, residents of Naitolia and Mswakini began to rise in opposition to the WMA and the protest escalated to a full-scale blockade of the A104 (Arusha-Babati) highway around May 2014. People carried signs, yelled and stopped cars by marching across the highway in protest. They were led by the village chairs from Naitolia and Mswakini who had expressed concerns throughout the planning processes, but whose voices had been overruled, first by the development committees, and later by the AA (Loveless 2014).

Arusha villagers were, of course, concerned that they would be subjected to new rules affecting their livelihoods, which they had never agreed to in the first place. These included restrictions on firewood collection, charcoal production, grazing, and farming. As a substantial and growing body of literature shows, communities often do not roll over and accept the fates that are prescribed for them by governments in the context of conservation, and often exercise their agency by resisting these political forces (see Bluwstein and Lund 2018; Raycraft 2019a, 2020). Residents of Naitolia and Mswakini were not passive victims, but engaged agents who rose up in defence of their land and livelihoods. To Loveless (2014:77), the acts of protest were "obvious reflections of exclusionary [governance] practices" and top-down disregard of "villagers' needs in [WMA] planning and implementation." As Brockington and Igoe (2006:2) point out, protest "is likely to be loud where people are highly dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods and risk facing impoverishment because of those regulations."

In response, the state swiftly intervened by sending in paramilitary forces and police officers to break up the protests and arrest the village chairs, who they targeted for mobilizing the communities. The village chairs were subsequently imprisoned for two weeks and the village offices in Naitolia and Mswakini were closed while the dust settled and the situation de-escalated. The WMA, however, had already been formally gazetted and the boundaries remained on the ground. As described to me during an interview with the WMA chair in 2020, people in these villages had still opposed the WMA through 2014, but were afraid of voicing their discontent after the state's demonstration of power and authority. People instead resorted to everyday resistance in the form of curses that were cast with the intention of destabilizing the WMA, while simultaneously avoiding open conflict with authorities (see Scott 1985; Hoffman 2014; Holmes 2007; Raycraft 2020).

6.21 Commercial farmers, cattle barons, and other political forces at play

Loveless' (2014) work shows the effects that poor local governance and inadequate community participation in WMA planning had on the attitudes of villagers in Naitolia and Mswakini towards the WMA when it was first established. While the protests were certainly a reflection of villager's concerns about land tenure and livelihoods, my interviews with government officials, WMA management, and several NGO representatives also point to another set of political factors at play that does not feature in her work – the role of a minority of powerful elites who viewed the WMA as a threat to their private interests. While Loveless (2014:58) rightfully suggests that villagers were "duped into accepting" the WMA, here I would add that they were also subsequently duped into opposing it. As Brockington and Igoe (2006:2) also recognize, "protest is likely to be loud when those affected are wealthy and powerful and not able to become richer and more powerful as a result of the restrictions of conservation." Behind the scenes, open opposition was driven by a strong and vocal minority of domestic elites who were able to manipulate Arusha villagers through fear mongering. While there were valid reasons for the Arusha in Naitolia and Mswakini to oppose the WMA, stemming from top-down planning

processes, influential elites also played a significant role in swaying these communities towards protest.

As mentioned previously, there were commercial farmers with large farms in these villages, though they themselves resided elsewhere (see Figure 57). These farmers from outside the villages saw the WMA as a direct threat to their operations, and had no interest in having their farms repurposed as a reserve area. While the commercial farmers on the Lemooti side had been leased land directly by the central government following the cancelation of Steyn's lease, those on the Naitolia side had secured land through their dealings with the village councils, which constituted formal process under state law pursuant to the Village Land Act.

Figure 57 – Satellite image showing the checkered farmlands of Mswakini Chini and Mswakini Juu. The faded residuals of former farms just right of the Google logo are the area that has been re-demarcated as the WMA's livestock management zone. Tarangire National Park is on the right of the image.

Outside farmers were prominent in Naitolia and Mswakini where wealthy Meru, Arusha, and Chaaga who had made significant profits from the commercial coffee trade in Meru, sought to re-invest in commercial farms in rural Monduli. They picked areas where farmland was

affordable (away from the major city), where kinship ties could be leveraged, and where village councils were 'agreeable' to allocating village land to wealthy individuals from outside the villages. Outside farmers secured land through the village councils, but also by buying villagers' customary occupancy rights, which were usually signified by word of mouth agreements or a letter from the village government (see Chapter 5). One of the key strategies employed in these villages was accumulating and trading small parcels of farmland allocated to individuals to consolidate a large area that could be cleared for a commercial farm. One Chagga commercial farmer I interviewed in Makuyuni town in 2019, for instance, described to me how he had purchased ten acres here, and another five there and bought and traded his way to a 200 acre farm in Naitolia. During interviews with villagers in Naitolia, suspicion of corruption at the level of the village council was frequently voiced as a concern, as many villagers felt that the former village chair could be convinced with gifts (alcohol) and money to allocate farmland to outsiders and favour their claims over local Arusha residents who had inherited farms from their fathers. A key issue, as discussed in Chapter 5, was that land acquisitions within villages often took place without formal paperwork, making it more challenging for those with less political power to stake their claims, and far easier for those with "money power" to bully their way into the villages.

Further to commercial farmers, elite livestock keepers were also involved. A regional politician had allegedly paid local herders to take care of his large herds and negotiated access to communal grazing areas through the village council of Naitolia. The former chair of Naitolia, who Loveless notes was opposed to the WMA, had made private arrangements with this politician to allow him grazing access in Naitolia village. The issue was made even more complex by class differences among Kisongo livestock keepers, some of whom had accumulated herds of more than a thousand cattle. The emergence of Kisongo elites over the past thirty years in the Lolkisale area is attributable in part to the commodification and globalization of the Tanzanite industry. Not far from Lolkisale are the Mererani Mines, which constitute the

only place in the world where one can find Tanzanite, a precious gemstone of global significance. While Merarani is technically located in the Simanjiro District of the Manyara Region, the Kisongo of Lolkisale are related through kinship ties to the Kisongo of Simanjiro, which makes up Tanzania's southern Maasailand. Tanzanite, named by Tiffany & Co. in the 1960s after the country where it was found, is a vibrant blue-violet zoisite that ranges in colour from blue to purple after it is treated with heat to remove its brown veil. Prior to its emergence as a commercially sought after gemstone, it was ubiquitous in the areas around Mererani and the Kisongo integrated it into traditional jewelry. With its global emergence, it became a ticket for many artisanal Kisongo miners to a life of wealth. In rural Tanzania, this is often referred to as the good life (*Maisha mazuri* in kiSwahili or *engishui sidai* in Maa), a contrasting idiom with the hard life (*Maisha magumu* in kiSwahili), and the "normal life" (*engishui e kawaida* in Maa, borrowing from kiSwahili) (see Woodhouse and McCabe 2018:5; Raycraft 2019c).[256]

Despite the tightening grips of state and corporate interests over the mines through privately-leased commercial blocks, the artisanal mining blocks in Mererani still offer significant opportunities for lucrative payouts for skilled, dedicated, and downright lucky artisanal Kisongo miners. In June 2020, for instance, Saniniu Laizer, an artisanal miner set the record for the largest stones ever mined (21.4 lbs. and 11 lbs.). He sold the stones to the central government for approximately 3.35 million $USD (Dausen 2020). While Laizer's case was exceptional, there are numerous other examples of individual Kisongo men striking it big in the mines. A general

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[256] Tanzanite was formally discovered in 1967 and the mines in Mererani were nationalized in 1971. In the 1970s and 80s, mining regulations were not effectively streamlined and much of the circulating Tanzanite was sold under the table where it was out of the reach of state taxes (Huggins and Kinyondo 2019). In 1990, the central government disaggregated the mines into four blocks: A, B, C, and D. Blocks A and C were leased by the government to large-scale commercial miners and Blocks B and D were kept for local Kisongo artisanal miners. While this policy helped the central government ensure a consistent revenue stream from the stones, there was further concern that gemstones were being exported in their raw form, either via Kenya or directly to India for processing and cutting (Huggins and Kinyondo 2019). In 2010, the central government illegalized raw exports of stones over a gram in size without local processing (Times of India 2013). Despite these regulations, intended to ensure state control over the mines, the informal economy persisted, leading to considerable slippage in taxation (Huggins and Kinyondo 2019). Miners were underreporting their discoveries and smuggling them out of the mines. To curb this trend, the central government sanctioned the construction of a 24km wall around the mines in 2018. The state also cracked down on informal trade by requiring that all Tanzanite be bought and sold in the formal market in Arusha town.

distrust for central banks, and an awareness that cash faces a losing battle against inflation in the long haul, has led many of these new elites to reinvest the profits into business ventures like luxury lodges and tented camps, guest houses, or nightclubs. One such fellow established the well-renowned Triple A Nightclub in Arusha and the Tanzanite Guest House and coffee shop in Makuyuni, the latter of which was named directly after the source of his spoils, and which I frequented during my fieldwork. The fellow unfortunately passed away suddenly in May 2020 following a bad bout of pneumonia after which management was turned over to his bereaved wife and brother.

The other common strategy for Kisongo who have made considerable profits from the Tanzanite industry is to reinvest the profits in livestock. This was the approach taken up by one young man from Lemooti who managed to amass a sizeable fortune from mining and trading Tanzanite. Though he was from Lemooti sub-village, he lived primarily in Arusha town and traveled back and forth from the mines to trade in stones. He had managed to amass a herd of around 2000 cattle thanks to his continual re-investments, which he divided across Simanjiro and Lolkisale. When the prospect of the WMA was raised, he was particularly opposed to it, knowing that it might jeopardize his private interests in the area. Realizing that he was outnumbered on the Lolkisale side by those who supported the idea of establishing the WMA, he allegedly began spreading rumours about the WMA to generate community resistance.

During several of my interviews with key stakeholders with knowledge of the initial implementation phase of the WMA, it was brought up that some of the "cattle barons" (as the rich herders were referred to by some interviewees) and commercial farmers had taken measures to destabilize the process of formalizing the WMA. The village chairs that Loveless (2014) points out were opposed to the WMA, for instance, were being lobbied by the politician and commercial farmers who had made private arrangements to access farmland and pasture in their villages. When the village chairs were thrown in jail during the protest, the police were aware of their connections to these figures and advised the chairs to cut ties with them. The outside elites

were well aware that the WMA would undermine their access to these areas, and used their money and political influence to sway the general populations of Naitolia and Mswakini to revolt against the WMA. As George Sanford (AWF) explained to me in an interview in 2020, some of the politicians involved even hired journalists and news reporters to spread fear in the communities and stoke the flames of discontent by broadcasting the rumour that the local villages in the area were going to be displaced to make way for a national park-like protected area and wildlife corridor.[257] While the Lolkisale community was generally aware of what the WMA would entail, the Arusha villages of Naitolia, Mswakini Chini, and Mswakini Juu had largely been kept in the dark and were very fearful that they were going to be evicted. The politician and commercial farmers who had existing stakes in these villages manipulated and stoked these fears by encouraging the village chairs to incite opposition at the level of their assemblies. During an interview with one Makaa-aged woman in Naitolia in 2019, I asked if she remembered a time when people opposed the WMA. She replied,

> Yes, there was a big protest. I went with my sister and someone gave us a sign. We were screaming and yelling and marching and then police came and started arresting people. My sister and I looked at each other and we said 'why are we even here? What's this protest even about anyway?' So we dropped the sign and ran back to our houses and hid inside!
> *starts laughing*

As her narrative segment reveals, in the same fashion that villagers were uninformed about what the WMA actually was and some were also unaware of what the exact reasons were for opposing it in such a heated way. On the surface level, it might have seemed like the entire villages of Naitolia and Mswakini were opposed to the WMA, but there was much misinformation going around and there were only a few key players who were fully informed about the WMA and the protests against it. Ordinary villagers in Naitolia, Mswakini Chini, and Juu were caught up in the crossfire of a larger conflict between powerful political actors. On the one side of the struggle,

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[257] George Sanford is a pseudonym.

MP Baraka, MDGO Mawanja, and the Mswakini ward councilour, in collaboration with AWF staff, were pushing swiftly for villagers to accept the WMA without adequate deliberation and discourse; And in the other corner, the cattle barons and commercial farmers who already used the area for their own personal gains, and who had much to lose by the prospect of tighter environmental regulations, stoked the flames of discontent. The villagers were subject to manipulation largely because of the lack of awareness and participation that Loveless (2014) documented during the initial stages of WMA planning. Villagers did not have concrete facts about what the WMA actually was and what it would entail in practice, and this lack of knowledge allowed rumours to flourish. The villagers were largely disregarded by the powerful actors who wanted to establish the WMA, and used as pawns by the elites who opposed it. All the while, villagers felt genuine and well-grounded apprehension about what the future would hold for their land tenure rights and livelihoods. In the next chapter, the story of Randilen WMA continues with my own ethnographic findings from 2019-2020, which reveal the extent to which the situation has changed over the past five to seven years.

Chapter 7. Cultivating Randilen's rough political terrains

This chapter presents a combination of ethnographic, interview, and survey data to convey the current state of community attitudes towards the WMA, and the reasons why people feel the way that they do. I discuss social, political, and economic complexities, some of which are specific to this case, and others which likely apply to other WMAs as well. The chapter concludes with discussion of my findings in relation to the central research questions presented in the introduction of Chapter 6.

7.1 "Discursive shifts": The emergence of community support for the WMA[258]

When I commenced fieldwork in Naitolia and Mswakini in July 2019, I initially expected to find widespread community-level opposition to the WMA, as had been documented by Loveless (2014).[259] What I found in practice, however, was far from fulfilling this expectation. Residents of these villages cherished 'their' WMA and its crucial role in securing their livelihoods and protecting their land. Through interviews and informal conversations across the member villages, this sentiment continually shone through. I became determined to assess the generalizability of my findings across the whole community, which led to me to the design and implementation of a survey instrument to assess, in a representative fashion, people's general sentiment toward the WMA across the entire area. Rather than standing alone, the survey serves to triangulate my ethnographic findings and qualitative data. The results should be taken as a "quantitative snapshot" of community sentiment towards Randilen WMA. I can assert with confidence that the findings of this survey do indeed mirror my qualitative findings, elicited through hundreds of in-depth interviews and participant observation of everyday life while residing in the member villages. The take-home message is clear: the local communities support Randilen WMA.

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[258] Wright (2019:226) documented a similar change in community sentiment towards Enduimet WMA in 2010.
[259] My Master's research with fishing communities in southeastern Tanzania who were affected by the implementation of a marine park had also contributed to this expectation, as community members in that context strongly opposed the marine park at the time of my fieldwork (see Raycraft 2016, 2018a, 2019a,b,c, 2020). Unfortunately, community-level discontent with top-down conservation projects has historically been the norm in Tanzania, rather than the exception.

That said, the survey results should also be interpreted with a grain of salt, and there are a few disclaimers that are worth mentioning as a preface. Firstly, while respondents were assured of anonymity during the conduct of the surveys, names were randomly selected from lists of households (see Chapter 2) and used to follow up with respondents if there were inputting errors or missing responses. Respondents may have had some fear that voicing opposition to the WMA could be construed as critique of government, which communities were apprehensive about during Magufuli's second term as president. Secondly, there seemed to be some "research fatigue" to survey methods in some of these villages, and it is possible that people felt inclined to simply answer in the way they viewed as the path of least resistance. Some of these constraints on survey research are inevitable, but the results are still of great value as pieces of a whole, so I present them here as part of a larger picture of social dynamics in Randilen WMA. Bearing in mind the potential limitations of the survey method, there are also some factors that speak to its validity: respondents were randomly selected, and the samples were representative and proportionately weighted across sub-villages relative to population sizes of each village (see Chapter 2). Seven different field assistants assisted with administering the surveys across each village, each of whom documented similar findings independently. The survey results also aligned with my observations, informal conversations, and interviews with villagers giving me greater confidence in interpreting the results.

7.2 A quantitative snapshot of community sentiment towards Randilen (2020-2021)[260]

7.21 General attitudes toward the WMA[261]

Findings from the first two questions served as a barometer of general community sentiment towards the WMA. These questions revealed that the majority of respondents had positive attitudes towards the WMA (see Figure 58). In total, 36.4% of respondents liked the WMA, and

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[260] Section 7.2 is published in the following book chapter: "Community attitudes towards Randilen Wildlife Management Area. *In* Tarangire: Human-wildlife coexistence in a fragmented ecosystem. Eds. Christian Kiffner, Derek Lee, and Monica Bond. Springer: New York, NY.

[261] Survey questions and sampling procedures are outlined in Chapter 2.

38.5% strongly liked it (74.9% with positive attitudes). This finding is encouraging, as it suggests that, from the perspectives of local communities, the WMA is well received. This was further elucidated with respondents' expressed levels of support for the WMA: 64.7% of respondents supported the WMA and 10.9% strongly supported it. This finding suggests that local communities are no longer opposed to Randilen WMA, and are instead generally appreciative of its presence in their lives.

Figure 58 – Attitudes towards Randilen WMA based on surveys administered in April – July 2020 to a proportionately weighted sample of 678 respondents from all 8 member villages, using sub-villages as sampling strata (26 sub-villages). **A** = General sentiment towards the WMA; **B** = Level of support for WMA; **C** = General sentiment towards WMA five years ago; **D** = General sentiment now compared to five years ago.

7.22 Change in attitudes over the past five years

People's memories of the past are sometimes unreliable, as people generally reconstruct narratives of past events in ways that are congruent with current understandings, and in ways that help derive meaning from experience (see Garro and Mattingly 2000). Nonetheless, respondents were asked to recall their feelings towards the WMA five years ago, and the extent to which their attitude had changed since then (see Figure 58C,D). Most people reported feeling neutral towards the WMA five years ago (52.2%), and that their attitude had become more positive towards the WMA over the past five years (58.6%). Forty percent reported liking the WMA more now, while 18.6% reported liking it *much* more now than then. While these self-reported recollections of change in general sentiment towards the WMA are not particularly marked, they nonetheless do show a modest trend characterized by increasing positivity towards the WMA.

7.23 Lived experiences of WMA governance and management

As a dimension of governance, respondents were asked the degree to which they trusted WMA authorities to act in their community's interests (see Figure 59). Rather strikingly, 87.6% reported that they trusted WMA authorities to act in their interests. When asked about conservation tradeoffs, and people's perceptions of the distributions of costs and benefits associated with the WMA, the majority of respondents reported that Randilen WMA had more benefits than costs (75.4%) (see Figure 59). Perhaps most significantly, 92% of respondents felt that their community was included in WMA governance, and 91.4% thought that their community was included in WMA management.

Figure 59 – Community perceptions of WMA governance and management measures based on surveys administered in April – July 2020 to a proportionately weighted sample of 678 respondents from all 8 member villages, using sub-villages as sampling strata (26 sub-villages). A = Trust in WMA authorities to act in community's interests; B = Perceptions of WMA costs and benefits; C = Perception of community participation in WMA governance; D = Perception of community participation in WMA management.

7.24 Interpretations of the WMA as a success or failure

Respondents were asked to report whether they viewed the WMA as a success or a failure, and whether they felt that the WMA represented a top-down strategy for securing resource control at the expense of local communities, or whether it constituted a community-based conservation area that distributed benefits to community members (see Figure 60). Results showed that 89.5% of respondents felt that Randilen WMA represents a community-based conservation area, rather than a fortress model, and 93.5% viewed it as a success, rather than a failure.

Figure 60 – Community evaluations of Randilen WMA as socially successful or exclusionary based on surveys administered in April – July 2020 to a proportionately weighted sample of 678 respondents from all 8 member villages, using sub-villages as sampling strata (26 sub-villages); A = Community interpretations of WMA as fortress or community-based conservation; B = Community classifications of WMA as a success or failure.

7.3 Homogeneity of responses and nuance in interpretation

I have a few explanations for the homogeneity of the results in terms of positive attitudes towards the WMA. I suspect that it was partly a result of the governance structure of Maasai society, which is built upon respect for traditional leaders and elders and deep appreciation for collective values.[262] During my fieldwork I noticed that within villages, there was less interest in my attempts to document individual differences than there was about conveying shared household and community concerns. Women, for instance, were unlikely to disagree with their husbands, particularly in instances where they were surveyed in the same space as their husbands. Interviewees often considered my attempted distinctions between individual and group interviews arbitrary and often saw me as a vessel to communicate issues that affected the community as a whole.[263]

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[262] One fair point that is worth considering here is that the interests of women and men are generally not wholly divergent in this ethnographic context, as the livelihood concerns of both genders are tied together through household economy. If men are happy with grazing arrangements, for instance, their wives are often happy about them as well, though they may have other concerns like harvesting firewood and access to medicinal plants.

[263] In a sense like a therapist who would listen to the community, but one who could offer little in the way of tangible treatment options.

The quantitative results do not tell the whole story, but with a grasp of the ethnographic context, they tell a fair amount. There are a few culturally-specific details worth noting. The neutral category was translated on the written survey as *kawaida*. Though *kawaida* is a kiSwahili word meaning normal or usual, it is also used by the Maasai. *Engishui e kawaida*, for instance, means "normal life" (see Woodhouse and McCabe 2018:5). While the relative place of neutral on the ordinal scale was made clear to respondents, this option can signify multiple things when given as a response. It can literally mean that the individual has neutral sentiments about the WMA, or it can mean that someone is choosing to withhold their honest or impulsive answers. This could be out of respect for leaders, because of an aversion to disagreements and potential conflict, or to avoid potential repercussions. In some instances, it is also used interchangeably with "I do not know," if the respondent wants to avoid the embarrassment of admitting that they do not know about something they feel they should. I suspect in reality there were many more people than zero who disliked the WMA, but chose to withhold their true feelings for various reasons. Something that is also worth noting, however, is that Loveless' (2014) surveys generated similar homogeneity in responses, but at the opposite end of the spectrum. Her respondents generally opposed the WMA and very few supported, indicating both a change in people's attitudes towards the WMA, but also continuity in the tendency towards homogeneity. Based on my observations, it seems to me that rumours, fears, worries, and feelings of trust and appreciation spread like wildfire through Maasai communities, making it possible to track discursive shifts relative to pre-existing baselines like Loveless' (2014) study.

While the quantitative results on the whole reveal much consistency across all member villages, there are a few telling details from each village's responses that are relevant to my analysis. People's general attitudes towards the WMA by village are presented in Table 15. Arusha-dominated villages on the Naitolia side of the WMA were generally more 'neutral' than Kisongo ones on the Lolkisale side, with the exception of Oldonyo. This finding suggests to me that there are still some lingering mixed feelings in the villages where Loveless (2014)

documented discontent and protest. Though negative attitudes were not vocalized through the survey, the higher percentages of 'neutral' responses relative to villages on the other side of the WMA is likely of anthropological significance. Overall levels of awareness about the WMA also seemed to be lower in these villages. Furthermore, Nafco had higher percentages of respondents with negative responses, and Lemooti had a majority who strongly liked the WMA, but a vocal minority that disliked it. Some ethnographic reasons for these key differences across these two villages are discussed in Sections 7.8 and 7.12.

Table 15 – Breakdown of community attitudes towards Randilen WMA based on surveys administered in 2020. The numbers represent percentages of responses.

	Strongly dislike	**Dislike**	**Neutral**	**Like**	**Strongly Like**	**Does not know**	**Total**
Mswakini Chini	0	0	32.9	45.1	14.6	7.3	100
Mswakini Juu	1.7	0	35	57.3	5.1	0.9	100
Naitolia	0	0	23.5	40.7	33.3	2.5	100
Lemooti	4.9	7.3	4.9	2.4	75.6	4.9	100
Lengoolwa	2.9	2	10.8	9.8	71.6	2.9	100
Nafco	0.9	8.8	14	38.6	22.8	14.9	100
Lolkisale	0	0	0	35.3	63.2	1.5	100
Oldonyo	0	0	30	54.3	15.7	0	100

7.4 Putting the community first: The arrival of Honeyguide[264]

The survey made clear my suspicions that support for the WMA was widespread across the member villages, albeit with some variations. One of the primary research questions that shaped my fieldwork in Randilen was *why* do communities support the WMA? Were there social, political, and economic factors specific to this case that had led to the emergence of positive attitudes towards the WMA in a fashion that Agrawal (2005) would refer to as environmentality? My ethnographic observations made clear that since Loveless' (2014) fieldwork, the WMA had developed into a livelihood-oriented conservation area that communities viewed as centrally important to their wellbeing. These changes must be contextualized in relation to the changing

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[264] This section draws largely from a series of interviews carried out with Honeyguide's Founder and Executive Director, Damian Bell, at the Honeyguide office in Arusha town and his home in Kisongo in 2020.

institutional dynamics of the WMA, and in particular, the changing roles of NGOs in Randilen's governance and management.

In 2014, AWF's contract with USAID ended. As they were "closing up shop in Randilen," they reached out to Honeyguide, a grass-roots Tanzanian NGO, with an "invitation" to facilitate anti-poaching activities in Randilen WMA. Honeyguide had developed an experienced anti-poaching track record in Enduimet WMA, and was contracted by AWF to carry out anti-poaching operations in Manyara Ranch. At the time (2012-2013), Manyara Ranch was having a difficult time curbing elephant poaching. Honeyguide successfully stopped the surge in elephant poaching in the ranch in part due to their canine anti-poaching unit, which helped track poachers all the way back to their homes. AWF had suggested that Honeyguide extend its operations into Randilen WMA to create a larger presence in the area and streamline management activities across the ranch and the WMA. Unlike their contract with AWF in Manyara Ranch, however, Honeyguide established its contract directly with Randilen's AA and subsequently applied for donor funds from WWF and USAID directly to carry out its anti-poaching operations in the WMA. This gave it some degree of liberty to devise a management plan on its own terms in collaboration with the AA. With the arrival of Honeyguide in Randilen WMA, the sociopolitical dynamics of the WMA began to change markedly for the better. As I have since explicated through my own ethnographic fieldwork across the member villages, these changes have largely been a product of Honeyguide's concerted efforts to put community livelihoods on equal footing with wildlife conservation.

Honeyguide is led by Executive Director Damian Bell who began in the conservation sector as a photographic tour operator. In 1990, he co-founded Sokwe Limited, an operator that established luxury camps in Ololosokwan and Piyaya villages in Ngorongoro District and cultivated mutually beneficial community-based ecotourism ventures with the local Maasai

communities.[265] Sokwe developed a well-respected reputation for negotiating with the Maasai in good faith to establish photographic concessions in village land in exchange for fair returns and guaranteed grazing rights. In 2000, Damian established the Karibu Travel and Tourism Fair, a trade fair that brought together all tourism stakeholders in Tanzania on an annual basis to share knowledge and experiences in the industry. He also served two terms as the chairman of the Tanzanian Association of Tour Operators, which helped build a strong social network in Tanzania. In the spirit of collaboration, Damian spearheaded a joint venture between Sokwe and Asilia, another tour company in 2005-2006. Damian oversaw the merger and pivoted into a new role as the Director of Corporate and Social Responsibilities for Asilia's Lodges and Camps, managing a team of over 50 tourism vehicles and 350 staff.[266] While Asilia has since blossomed into one of the most dominant tourism companies in East Africa, Damian switched gears away from profit-oriented work towards a pursuit that he finds more intrinsically meaningful – building up the capacity of rural communities to benefit from wildlife conservation.

Damian founded Honeyguide in 2007 to build bridges between tourism and community development that were mutually beneficial for communities and wildlife. While 'win-win' models of conservation in Tanzania have been elusive, Damian's experiences in Ololosokwan instilled in him an appreciation for what was possible. Damian was aware that tourism had the potential to greatly benefit communities if it was organized in a responsible way. This ultimately led to the development of a non-profit association called Responsible Tourism Tanzania (RTT), which issues ethical guidelines and provides accreditation for tour operators to work equitably and sustainably in Tanzania. Honeyguide sits on the Board of Trustees along with the Tanzania Association of Tour Operators (TATO) and MNRT.[267] While Damian's interest in applying social business principles in the context of community-based conservation held constant in

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[265] See Chapter 3 of Gardner (2016) for an excellent discussion of Dorobo Safaris and its mutually-beneficial community-based conservation relationships with villages in Loliondo.
[266] Source: https://tz.linkedin.com/in/damian-bell-01756710
[267] Source: https://www.rttz.org/who-we-are/

Honeyguide's early days, their projects were diverse and innovative. Honeyguide experimented with a food production project in the western Serengeti to help bushmeat-dependent communities sell their produce to tourists through a community-based market and business centre.[268] In the eastern Serengeti, they helped create Tourism Management Plans for the local Maasai communities in Lake Natron and Loliondo. In Longido, Honeyguide collaborated with the Big Life Foundation, which was focused on reducing elephant poaching in the Amboseli-Tsavo-Kilimanjaro ecosystem with funding support from AWF.

Figure 61 – Map showing Big Life's anti-elephant-poaching presence in the Amboseli Ecosystem. Many of these ranger posts were funded by AWF. Enduimet WMA villages are depicted to the west of Mount Kilimanjaro National Park on the Tanzanian side of the border, and were administered by Honeyguide. Sinya village is labelled for reference. Map redrawn and adapted by author based on an earlier version from Big Life (Original source: https://biglife.org/who-we-are/about-big-life).

While international donors coveted anti-poaching initiatives as the holy grail of wildlife conservation projects in East Africa, Damian's interests were broader and more tailored towards

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[268] Source: https://biglife.org/archive/big-life-tanzania/the-team/damian-bell

enhancing the sustainability of community-based conservation. Big Life Foundation, like many NGOs in East Africa, was keen on branding itself as the leading anti-poaching organization in the Amboseli ecosystem and coveted a militarized and heavy-handed approach to conservation. They had secured significant funding in support of their activities and believed unwaveringly in "pumping money" into anti-poaching efforts in Enduimet. Damian's views on anti-poaching, however, were beginning to diverge. As he described in an interview,

> We didn't have much poaching [in Enduimet] after a short while, it was more human-wildlife conflict. The incidents were mostly around lions where some Maasai would go and kill a lion because it killed a cow or something. And [Big Life] would come in and say, right, arrest those people; arrest anyone! They literally came in and wanted me to just go arrest people and throw them in jail. Right, that'll stop them! *laughs* Like, that's not my job. But they were really serious about it […] So there was a bit of [tension]; they weren't happy with our approach. They were also not happy with the fact that when there were problems with the community rangers, that we didn't come in and just fire the ranger. Well, I'm not employing the ranger, the community is! And there were issues when they wanted us to move rangers from one place to another because they wanted more control, but I was trying to build the capacity of the communities. So there was a difference in management styles.

As Damian's narrative segment reveals, Honeyguide was wary of anti-poaching efforts that hinged on policing the community in a top-down fashion. Honeyguide was interested in forging a new direction that built up the capacities of communities to manage wildlife themselves. These values are exemplified in the organization's name, which takes after the Honeyguide savanna bird. The Honeyguide bird is known for leading indigenous peoples to beehives where they can find honey, providing the birds with wax and larvae to enjoy in exchange. The symbiotic relationship between people and honeybirds is a metaphor for Honeyguide's collaborative rapport with communities. While Honeyguide and Big Life found themselves moving in

different directions, Honeyguide's experiences working in Enduimet proved to be of great value in helping the organization refine its vision of community-based conservation through a practical set of experiences. One of the key lessons that Honeyguide learned was that traditional anti-poaching efforts not only instilled resentment in local communities; they were also expensive. These issues became clear when Damian started to dig into the economics of ranger posts. As he describes,

Once a ranger post is constructed, you need a minimum of three people to guard a post, because you've got rotations. It's three because you always need two people at a time in a ranger post. You're not allowed just one, so it's two on and one on rotation. So you have to have three people guard a ranger post, then you've got the ranger post sorted. Now you have to make it useful. So then you have to have another seven people based at the ranger posts to do activities around and go on patrols - walking around or driving around or whatever they do. So now you've got 10 people per ranger post, and Enduimet had five ranger posts. Well, that's 50 people in just the ranger posts! Then you've got your drivers on top of that. So suddenly you've got up to 60 people on the anti-poaching team. And suddenly you're talking about money [and realizing this adds up fast]. So that's when I started thinking, okay, we've got to rethink this model. There is absolutely no way we can carry on. And that's when I started thinking, well, what's actually successful out there? Why are we doing all this ranger posting stuff? And that's when I thought, we need to rethink the whole model. This is ridiculous. We're building an anti-poaching unit not on the threat of poaching, but on a concept whereby you have to have put rangers in a space just because that space has wildlife. We need to protect this area, so bang a ranger post in there. That was the attitude! Rather than say, is there a threat of poaching? Do we need to throw money in there?

Honeyguide's experiences overseeing the anti-poaching units in Enduimet led the organization to develop some degree of cynicism about the practicality of the classic anti-poaching model of

conservation that was based on monitoring a vast area through ranger patrols. The anti-poaching model of conservation had taken its inspiration from national parks, but was missing a key factor in the context of WMAs – community interest and buy-in. In Damian's description,

> If you think about how patrols got set up, I mean, what's the basis of patrols? I guess it comes from, National Parks with no people in them where you've got rangers who need to go on patrol because there's nobody there. They're looking out for footprints, and if they find footprints, it means a person's been there on foot thus it must have been a poacher (because in national parks you're not allowed on foot inside them). And then obviously when conservation went outside of national parks, they picked up that same concept and threw it on them. This is the way: you wear green, you put black boots on, you salute, you carry a gun. Okay, and you go around and arrest people who shouldn't be there. *laughs* And you suddenly tell communities to do exactly the same thing. That's the way it's done! And obviously, some of them kind of like to do that. It's kind of fun. You know, everyone's got their thing. You get a sense of pride. But if you bury that and say, Well, what am I trying to achieve? Well, fundamentally, there are other interested parties like national parks, NGOs, and investors who want community land to remain as natural habitat for wildlife. So you are asking communities to stop converting it primarily. That's the biggest threat. Stopping poaching is what everyone thinks you have to do. But actually, the main issue is stopping habitat from being converted into farmland. So you want them to protect that habitat and the wildlife within it. Well, if you just focus on that, then you've got to rethink things. What do you need to do in order to get there? Well, the biggest thing is to make sure that everybody in that community wants [the WMA] to be there! Focus on that!

As time passed in Enduimet, Damian thought deeply about the issues affecting community-based conservation and Honeyguide's focus began to shift away from classic anti-poaching efforts towards things that were important from the perspectives of communities. It was becoming clear

that bringing an external body into communities to police them was far less productive than helping communities realize the value of wildlife on their own terms. As Damian thought reflexively about the merits of traditional anti-poaching efforts, Honeyguide began to come into its own and evolve as an organization. In 2013, it commissioned a series of surveys in Enduimet to understand what communities cared most about in the context of conservation. They found that communities considered their agropastoral livelihoods to be of the greatest importance, particularly in the context of human-wildlife conflicts. Given the abundance of wildlife in the Amboseli ecosystem, people were concerned mainly about crop raiding elephants and livestock depredation from lions and other carnivores. Interestingly, Honeyguide found in their survey that the money coming in from tourism did not feature as high on the community's list of priorities as expected. The main concern from the perspective of local communities was reducing the livelihood costs of increasing conflict with wildlife. This suggested to Honeyguide that communities might be willing to re-invest a significant portion of their tourism revenues into the operational costs of a WMA if it assisted in reducing their burdens of living with wildlife.

After carrying out the community surveys in Enduimet in 2013, Honeyguide commenced work on human-wildlife conflict in Burunge WMA, which the participating villages supported. Honeyguide rallied a small team of 30 volunteers to work together in people's smallholder farms to help defend them from crop-raiding wildlife. But in Damian's description, Burunge had already become accustomed to large international NGOs coming in, carrying out projects, and leaving, with no real plans for how projects would be continued after the NGO left. Honeyguide, by contrast, was interested in building an initiative that communities could manage on their own into the future through the WMA's conservation model. Burunge WMA's leadership team, however, immediately discontinued the project after Honeyguide left because they were "more interested in making money" than in delivering services to the communities that local people actually valued. Although the project in Burunge was not continued by the WMA after Honeyguide left, it had shown great promise in terms of community attitudes because the

participating villagers viewed it as directly valuable to their livelihoods. The community buy-in was there, but the sustainability was not, and some of these lessons were once again internalized by Honeyguide as it started to transition into work in Randilen in 2014.

When Honeyguide arrived in Randilen, the WMA was essentially a "paper reserve" that existed in law, but had no real infrastructure on the ground ("Randilen at that stage had absolutely nothing in place, except for space on a map!"). While AWF had assisted in hurriedly setting up the initial boundaries of the WMA and in preparing the initial zoning plans, there was no main office, entrance gates or anything of that nature. In some ways, this was a blessing for Honeyguide, as it meant that there was a blank slate to work with. Unlike Burunge and Enduimet, where numerous international NGOs had existing stakes, Honeyguide could start fresh in Randilen.[269] Thus, while AWF had been involved in Randilen's set up on paper, management in practice had yet to unfold. As a consequence of this, the community had not been indoctrinated by what Damian calls "overgenerous NGOs," which are inclined to carry out top-down projects to fit their deliverables without thinking critically enough about the community's long-term interests. In Enduimet, for instance, WWF had funded the construction of four entrance gates, but had not taken into account the long-term running costs of "securing those investments from looting," let alone the money it would take to systematically manage their operations. Damian estimates it would take 20 people for instance to manage those gates alone, which is just shy of Makame WMA's entire anti-poaching unit![270] Considering this, when Honeyguide entered Randilen, it was very cautious to ensure that it did not invest anything that would leave the community burdened with long-term costs when it left. This dovetailed with Honeyguide's interests in ultimately leaving the community in a more empowered state than when it first began. In 2016, Honeyguide refined this ethos in its organizational strategy, which articulated the need for carefully planned exit strategies to promote long-term sustainability.

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[269] AWF, Big Life, UCRT, Nature Conservancy had all partnered with Honeyguide in various ways, but at that point, Honeyguide was the only one actually working on the ground in Randilen WMA.
[270] Makame's anti-poaching unit comprises 27 people.

Rather than parachuting in and formalizing WMAs across a vast area as quickly as possible (as AWF had), this type of approach entailed thinking thoughtfully about how Honeyguide could help shepherd a community-based area to a point where it was financially sustainable and appreciated by the local community. The key to reaching this goal was leaving something behind that was able to stand on its own for the benefit of communities.

In Randilen in 2014, there was no real political leadership of the WMA, though an AA existed on paper. They had not yet had a proper governance meeting to decide the management priorities of the WMA nor the future directions that the WMA would take. There were no ranger posts, no employees, and only a few volunteer VGS from the member villages. Because there were no other NGOs that had been involved in influencing local thinking in the same way as in Burunge, the AA was very receptive to Honeyguide's proposal to build up the WMA into a sustainable enterprise. Drawing from Damian's past experience as a tour operator, Honeyguide focused on helping the community realize the financial viability of their business. It wanted the community to take hold of all aspects of the WMA's governance and management, including the management of money. This meant revising the entire governance and management structures of the WMA "so that it was run more like a business." This was a key aspect of Honeyguide's approach that is often lacking in the context of WMAs – detailed attention to how the business can be run in an efficient and sustainable way. Honeyguide began to experiment with different ideas, including increasing management capacity and separating the board and management teams. This meant hiring a professional manager, not just a secretary, to the board. Meshurie Melembuki was hired as the first professional manager of a WMA in Tanzania and he has done an excellent job of spearheading Randilen's renewed management efforts. A professional accountant from Lengoolwa was then hired in support to balance the books. In Damian's view, one of the key issues in Burunge was that they did not effectively parse governance and management. Separating the two meant that everyone had clearer roles and could carry out their duties effectively in relation to others. This is especially important because "conservation areas

are complex businesses." As Damian pointed out to me, "even external organizations like African Parks" struggle to manage these areas efficiently, so how can we expect communities to navigate the challenges of operating a multi-dimensional conservation business in collaboration with investors, governments and NGOs without adequate support and training? In most cases, human resource policies, and finance and administrative policies are entirely lacking and it is difficult for people who have not been trained in these fields to develop these skills on the fly. So Honeyguide focused on capacity-building to help the Randilen community cultivate these skills through coaching, workshops and trainings with an awareness that good "management is crucial, as is governance for "holding management accountable."

7.5 From anti-poaching to crop protection

Another strategy that Honeyguide employed was ensuring that the conservation model improved the everyday lives of its community-members. Wildlife, while rewarding to observe in the context of safari visits, becomes far less attractive when it prevents children from attending school, kills livestock, raids crops, and even kills loved ones. Expecting communities living with wildlife to value them in the same way as safari-goers is unreasonable given these costs. Honeyguide prioritized distributing the benefits of the WMA to individual households by considering what was important in the context of people's livelihoods. In Randilen, Honeyguide keyed in on two main issues that community-members were concerned about: farming and grazing. While the Arusha care more about their farms than the Kisongo, they also value their livestock. Conversely, while the Kisongo still consider themselves 'people of cattle,' they have diversified their economies to include farming in the face of constraints on the pastoral mode of production. Honeyguide was able to establish, in what I would call an anthropological fashion, that what mattered most to livestock-keepers was *grass*. In terms of cultivation, people wanted secure tenure rights and assistance in keeping elephants and other wild ungulates out of their farms. Through concerted efforts, Honeyguide was able to reduce crop damage in member villages considerably. This involved recruiting 200-300 volunteer members of village

communities to assist in monitoring the expansive farm areas in Nafco, Naitolia, and Mswakini. While Honeyguide could not offer salaries for all these people, they were happy to be involved and take ownership over an issue that directly affected their livelihoods. In essence, these efforts reflected a form of management decentralization that allowed people to feel included in the institutions of the WMA, factors which have been shown in critical political ecology literature to directly affect local support for conservation areas.

To further help with these efforts, Honeyguide subsidized Human-elephant conflict (HEC) toolkits comprising defensive equipment to help farmers protect their crops. These included LED lights, air horns, roman candles and chilli bombs (held together by condoms), which were not meant to be used as weapons against the elephants, but as deterrents to prevent the elephants from dwelling in people's farms. As I witnessed during fieldwork, when farmers do not have these tools, they usually yell and bang on buckets until the elephants leave. While the elephant sympathizer in me wonders whether aggravating the animals in this way is the most effective way to promote coexistence, as an anthropologist, I cannot help but empathize with the plight of smallholder farmers in the Randilen WMA member villages who are otherwise ill-equipped to safeguard their crops from herds of the largest land animal on earth. Over the course of my fieldwork, dozens of people were injured by elephants, some severely so. A few were even killed. As mentioned in Chapter 4, many of the Kisongo I interviewed in Lemooti had abandoned planting their farms knowing that they were fighting a losing battle with elephants. Nafco, Naitolia, and Mswakini Juu were also heavily impacted by elephants, but the Arusha in these villages were determined to remain farmers, which they viewed as central to their economy and way of life. Rather than devising a business model for Randilen that was purely about generating economic returns for communities, Honeyguide realized that the business should be catered towards addressing these livelihood and well-being concerns and generating enough money to sustain itself in the process. Money to build schools and dispensaries were very much

appreciated by the communities, but these constituted "the icing on the cake" compared to people's tangible agropastoral livelihood concerns. As described by one Arusha man in Naitolia,

> There was a time when we hated the WMA because we thought it might reach a time that the WMA would take the whole land. We have come to understand that the WMA is ours because it is still the land of our village and we are allowed to graze there, so we have come to like the place […] now we benefit from it a lot. Money from conservation has even helped us build a school and a dispensary.

Rethinking the business model was an exercise in empathy, and one that allowed Honeyguide to address the things that community members felt mattered to them. It meant revising the business plan in terms of what the community was investing into the WMA and what it was getting in return. In Randilen, communities give up land, and in the case of Lolkisale, a significant share of their income from Treetops. In return, they expect well-managed grazing banks, dedicated crop protection teams, and a share of the tourism profits. From Honeyguide's perspective these were reasonable and attainable expectations and it has worked to ensure that communities, as the shareholders, reap these returns from their community-based enterprise (Randilen WMA).

While Honeyguide recognized the value of prioritizing community livelihoods, both in terms of social outcomes and the ecological imperative to preserve wildlife habitat outside TNP, convincing donors of this is more challenging. WWF and large international wildlife donors are still largely convinced that heavy-handed anti-poaching strategies are the best way to protect wildlife in community land, meaning that this is generally what gets funded. Honeyguide was able to secure donor funds to commence anti-poaching operations in Randilen WMA drawing from its growing track record in Enduimet, Burunge, and Manyara Ranch, but realized quite quickly that if the community did not want poaching in their land, then it did not occur. Innovative strategies for tracking poaching activities including canine units, undercover informants in communities, and a modest squad of VGS were sufficient for essentially eliminating elephant poaching in Randilen. While ivory poaching had been a concern in 2012-

2013 when Honeyguide first started working in the area, I was surprised to find that zero elephants had been killed in Randilen or Manyara Ranch over the past five years (at the time my fieldwork). Honeyguide's innovative thinking in devising its anti-poaching strategy was partially to thank for this, but it was also largely a reflection of communities buying into conservation through a give and take reciprocal relationship with the WMA. Through discussions with communities, Honeyguide realized very early on that carrying out anti-poaching patrols in the wet season was a non-negotiable topic across the Arusha villages, as this was the season when maize was grown. Communities had no interest in being policed in those months when they were so desperately concerned about herds of elephants in farms on a nightly basis. Honeyguide listened, and in a gesture of good faith, stationed one of the VGS vehicles on the Nafco side of the WMA and the other in Naitolia to help communities push elephants back into the reserve area at night. Unlike other NGOs and tour companies that brand their vehicles with their logos, Damian was adamant that he wanted the vehicles to bear no logos in Randilen (unlike in Burunge) so that the communities associated them directly with the WMA. It was *their* WMA that was carrying out activities that community members valued and viewed as centrally important to their livelihoods. Communities very much appreciate these efforts. As one interviewee from Naitolia explained,

> There was a time when we didn't like the WMA because we thought that they were the ones that were bringing these wild animals inside the village. But we like it now because when the elephants enter to eat our crops, they come to help.[271]

I carried out emplaced fieldwork in Nafco village in April-June 2020 during the harvest season and participated in some of these evening expeditions into people's maize fields to wrangle elephants back into the WMA. If one thinks herding cattle is challenging, shepherding wild savannah elephants while driving through maize fields is sheer madness. On some evenings, I counted herds of 60 or 70 in people's farms, which I was shocked to find can easily destroy an

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[271] The literal translation was "when the elephants enter to eat our whole farm."

entire farm of a few acres in a single night. What I was perhaps most struck by was the amount of damage that the vehicles themselves do to people's farms in pursuit of the elephants. Each night, we would have a few Arusha or Kisongo passengers together with our team as we screamed and yelled and fought what felt to be a never-ending battle to steer the elephants back into the WMA. When I asked the VGS about the impacts of vehicles on people's crops vis-à-vis the elephants, they replied that if the elephants were left undisturbed, the damage would be far greater, an assessment which I agreed with. But what was more telling was the response given to me by one of the farmers who hopped on board: "We are just happy that they are here to help." I realized quite clearly at that point that what was significant to those farmers was not, in and of itself, the economic impacts of the crop-reduction efforts, but the *gesture* that symbolized to people the fact that conservation was not just about protecting wildlife at the expense of people. It was also about protecting the things that mattered to communities. In this case, it was about protecting their crops. When we returned to the small roadside restaurant in Nafco each night after hours of exhausting efforts chasing elephants from fields, ordinary villagers took turns buying the dinners of the VGS – small gestures in return to show them how much the community cared about the work they were doing.

In Damian's view, communication between the WMA and the community is "probably the most important part of the work" that Honeyguide is doing, and is "probably the most important part of community-based conservation" in general. Damian likens the WMA to a public liability company that is trying to attract its shareholders to continually invest in it. Essentially, its business model is based on communities continuing to invest their land and natural resources. To win their continued investments, the potential returns must constantly be communicated to them. In the same fashion that NGOs must convey to their donors, through visually-appealing annual reports, the impact of their funds, Damian contends the WMA should prioritize articulating to communities the benefits of investing village resources. International NGOs regularly spend thousands of dollars on graphic design to publish aesthetically pleasing

pamphlets and brochures because they know that it is crucial for their ability to secure donor funding. And yet, as Damian points out, conservationists often assume that communities will willingly invest in WMAs without any effort taken to communicate back to them the returns on their investments. Despite its importance for community-based conservation, donors have little interest in funding communication efforts between WMAs and communities. They would rather invest money to "catch poachers," without recognition of the fact that by building community support for conservation, the need for anti-poaching efforts declines in tandem.

7.6 Supporting the community to build community support

Honeyguide focused its efforts in Randilen on building community support for the WMA, which it viewed as centrally important to Randilen's long-term success. These attempts were informed by Honeyguide's 'theory of change.' As described in Honeyguide's 2017-2021 strategic plan, "Honeyguide works to bring about behavioural changes at the community level that result in communities protecting wildlife and rangeland habitats, based on their own social, economic, and cultural interests and values." Put in different terms, Honeyguide was working to achieve what Agrawal (2005) refers to as environmentality, whereby communities come to develop positive attitudes towards the WMA in part due to its changing institutional dynamics.[272] My research shows this to be occurring.

A key aspect of Honeyguide's attempts to foster attitudinal and behavioural changes was about building up villagers' trust in the WMA as a friend, rather than a foe (see Wright 2019). Honeyguide provided much-needed management capacity for the WMA and tailored Randilen towards protecting, rather than policing, local agropastoral livelihoods. One management strategy that worked well in this regard was the enforcement of the elite outsiders who had gained access to village land. Keeping out the cattle of powerful politicians was no simple task. In the early days of WMA enforcement, VGS would confiscate trespassing herds led by local

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[272] Rather than frame this process in terms of government and subjectivity in a Foucauldian fashion, however, I am inclined to interpret this case in terms of the community's growing appreciation for Randilen's contribution to local livelihoods and well-being.

herdsmen on behalf of absentee herdowners in Arusha town, only to receive phone calls from regional police officers a few hours later asking for the herds to be released without fine ("So, we hear you have some cattle…"). The cattle barons, of course, were well-connected politically, making the enforcement of restrictions at their expense challenging. Nonetheless, through the dedicated support from Honeyguide, VGS and WMA staff learned to hold their ground in these instances by continuing to subject the encroachers to standard fines prior to releasing the cattle. On one occasion, a wealthy herdsman drove in from Arusha town and led his sizeable herd into the centre of the WMA's reserve area in a belligerent act of protest. He was swiftly confronted by armed VGS in green uniforms, escorted out of the area, and fined for his transgression. With time, these types of altercations began to dwindle, likely because the heightened management presence in the WMA made incursions not worth the hassle relative to other areas with less enforcement on the ground. Whereas in the past, the village chair of Naitolia could be incentivized with money to allow these politicians to graze their cattle in the area, the Honeyguide-trained VGS were paid fair salaries and enforced the WMA's management plan irrespective of how wealthy or politically well-connected the cattle owners were. Kisongo elites from Lemooti, by contrast, were entitled to graze their cattle in the area because they were part of the Randilen community.

Commercial farmers were also not exempt from the crackdown on outsiders utilizing village land for private gain. The areas occupied by large commercial farms in Mswakini that extended significantly into the WMA were re-allocated as communal grazing areas and reserve land. These farms had been held by outsiders who had negotiated with village councils, or purchased CROs from villagers. As to be expected, these farmers were angry that their productive assets had been confiscated without adequate compensation and proceeded to sue the WMA in the High Court of Tanzania. Quite interestingly, the courts sided with the WMA over the farmers and all the cases on the Mswakini and Naitolia side that I am aware of were dropped. When I discussed this development with Meshurie (WMA manager), we reasoned together that

the state may have had an incentive to side with the WMA because it generated revenue for the central government via TAWA as compared to the commercial farms, which mainly produced beans and sunflowers with varying degrees of productivity. Several court cases regarding commercial farms in Lemooti, however, were still ongoing at the time of fieldwork. Some of those farms had been leased directly from the central government, rather than via the village council. The ones that were being formally handled in the courts were: Richard's farm (2000 acres), Steve's farm (1000 acres), Roni's farm (900 acres), and Mollel's (2000 acres).

Residents of Randilen's member villages began to realize during this period that the WMA was restricting access to village land by outsiders without infringing significantly on the tenure rights and livelihoods of people who actually resided in the villages. This realization was particularly significant in the Arusha-inhabited villages of Naitolia and Mswakini, where people had been fearful of eviction at the time of Loveless' (2014) fieldwork. Rather than a multiple land use model like the NCA that restricted subsistence cultivation, a national park that displaced them, or a wildlife corridor that undermined their tenure rights, the Arusha in Naitolia and Mswakini began to see the WMA as an institution that actually served their long-term interests by helping them solidify their own claims to land.

In helping to sway communities to support the WMA, Honeyguide and the newly hired WMA management team specifically targeted the village chairs who had been initially opposed to the WMA due to the influence of outside elites. Honeyguide helped foster direct dialogue with those village chairs and WMA staff, and integrated pastoralist chairs and agricultural committees into important governance discussions. These committees generally comprised nine representatives from each member village. Some village chairs, however, were still opposed to the WMA in Honeyguide's early days. The village chair in Naitolia, for instance, was so opposed to the WMA that Honeyguide simply replied in kind by withdrawing its crop protection services from Naitolia, while offering continued support for the other member villages. A short time later, residents of Naitolia began to plead with their chair to rectify his relationship with the WMA so

that they could also receive crop protection services. Eventually, the chair had to reconcile his relationship with the WMA as the complaints from villagers piled up. Honeyguide re-commenced crop protection services in that village shortly thereafter, which the Arusha in Naitolia greatly appreciated. While there was a vocal minority that still attempted to "stir the pot" to destabilize the WMA in the first few years after Honeyguide's arrival, public opinion had already started shifting by 2016. Damian described to me one particularly significant event that occurred during a village assembly meeting in Mswakini around that time. In the meeting, the village chair openly preached to the villagers about the costs of the WMA. In response one Arusha woman stood up and yelled, "you have a car. I don't see you out at night protecting us from the elephants! The WMA helps us. You do not!" The village chair proceeded to sit down quietly "with tail between his legs." In Damian's view, the woman's statement was a clear sign that community attitudes had swung in support of the WMA, and that the village chairs needed to change course or lose villagers' favour entirely. Through ongoing targeted efforts, the village chairs in Naitolia and Mswakini began to realize that the WMA could bring considerable benefit to their communities through ecotourism revenue, construction of schools, and crop protection. As time passed, the same people who had previously attempted to incite opposition to the WMA on behalf of their elite financiers instead began to preach support for the WMA within the community. When I interviewed the former village chairs of Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini in 2019, all of them voiced appreciation for the WMA and its many benefits for their assemblies.

Honeyguide's goals in Randilen were thus threefold: First, it sought to build up the WMA to a point where it did not require an external donor to support its operations, ideally within five years. Second, it wanted to cultivate community support for the WMA to the point where local people genuinely valued it. Third, it worked to establish a business framework that ensured that wildlife habitat remained stable, or was improved. Poaching was a minor threat to this third goal compared to the conversion of rangelands to farms, and constraints on the exercise

of customary institutions for rangeland management. In working towards those three interrelated goals, Honeyguide came to find that what mattered most to communities was self-determination and livelihood security. As Damian phrases the question from the perspective communities, "are we the captain of our ship?" Communities wanted to know that they were ultimately in control and could ensure that the WMA delivered things that they valued. By way of comparison with Burunge, where Chem Chem Lodge has dictated terms of the WMA, in Randilen, the communities have been able to continually orient the WMA towards the things that matter most to them. Unlike the international NGOs that tend to project their predetermined standards onto WMAs and communities, Honeyguide has been flexible in "observing the standards that the community wanted" and in helping to nurture the community's relationship with the WMA.

7.7 From customary to formal: The revised Management Zone Plan as a reflection of traditional Maasai techniques for managing semi-arid rangelands

Since the initial zoning plan (2012-2017) had been carried out hurriedly by AWF together the District Government, and had caused disagreements on the ground, the WMA's second resource management plan was designed carefully under the thoughtful supervision of Honeyguide (and with technical assistance from UCRT and the Nature Conservancy). The revised management plan (2018-2022) is much more reflective of the concerns of the community, and the people I interviewed across all eight member villages who were familiar with it all voiced appreciation. As one Arusha man from the Korianga age-set from Mswakini Chini explained to me during an interview, the members of the facilitator team had made a strong effort to take stock of community livelihood priorities across all the member villages before formalizing the plan. In his words,

> They did a survey, as you are doing now with this interview. But they used survey forms. They went to all the villages and collected people's opinions and views. Then they made a report. Then they took the report to each village office, and in the village assembly meetings, the villagers came and read out the rules and said these are the rules that we

came up with ourselves. Is there anything to add? Is there anything to remove? And so we

were the ones who agreed in such a way […] so in my view, it is a successful project

because we are benefiting from the grazing plans.

Another Arusha interviewee in Naitolia also explained that the facilitator team had carried out

assessments across the area to ensure that the community was happy with the revised plan. One

interviewee in Mswakini Juu, however, expressed concerns about ongoing boundary disputes

between the WMA, TNP, and the village, as he felt that both areas encroached on village land.

The revised Management Zone Plan establishes two primary zones in the WMA based on

areas that were resurveyed in April 2018 (RWMA 2018:27). The two zone categories are a

central Tourism and Photographic Management Zone (as depicted in green in Figure 62), which

covers 215.53km^2 and three peripheral Tourism and Livestock Management Zones that together

cover 96.66km^2 (as shown in yellow in Figure 62).

Figure 62 – Map of revised Management Zones for Randilen WMA. Map redrawn and adapted by author based on RWMA (2018:28).

Within each area, there are lists of acceptable uses that are agreed upon by the AA and enforced by VGS. As shown in the map, the core TPMZ overlaps to a large extent with the previous LCA area. While the map on paper appears highly legible, it is in actuality a representation of key landmarks on the ground that are (for the most part) agreed upon and used by the local communities. In some places, its boundaries run along rivers and, in other areas, identifiable trees and hills serve as reference markers that were agreed upon by the communities. Inside the TPMZ, hunting, mining, off-road driving, tree cutting, capturing wild animals, cultivation, charcoal burning and "unauthorized livestock grazing" are prohibited (RWMA 2018:30). Local herders were very particular to specify that "unauthorized" grazing was prohibited (see RWMA 2018:28-29). The purpose of this provision was to ensure that the AA retained authority to decide whether grazing would be allowed on a flexible basis depending on season and variable environmental conditions. As discussed in Chapter 4, the idea that herders are universally opposed to restrictions on grazing is not true, as there have historically been numerous customary institutions and normative practices for regulating access to pastures at particular times. Pastoralists, however, take issue when restrictions are imposed on them from outsiders in top-down ways that are fixed across space and time, and based on a different way of conceptualizing and managing rangelands. In the context of RWMA the vast majority of people I interviewed, both Arusha and Kisongo, across all eight member villages, took no issue with the general restriction on grazing inside the core photographic and tourism zone, because they were happy to keep it as a buffer for times of dire need.[273] As one Korianga-aged Arusha man from Mswakini Chini described during an interview,

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[273] In 2022, for instance, ongoing droughts in northern Tanzania necessitated that the TPMZ be opened to local pastoralists as needed for livestock grazing.

Before the WMA, we didn't have grazing plans. The WMA helped implement the grazing plans. Since it started, there have been some areas where livestock are not allowed to reach. But we like these restrictions on grazing. Because we are the ones who made the rules. And we are following them. Of course some people occasionally break the rules and try to graze in the places where livestock are not allowed to reach. But if we are the ones breaking those rules, we are caught, and we are fined. But we are the ones who made the laws, so if we break the laws, we pay the fines.

According to the official management plan, grazing is permitted inside the photographic zone, "only in extreme weather conditions and subjected to permits by the AA" (RWMA 2018:30). Essentially, then, the core photographic zone serves as a "drought reserve," which is a traditional Maasai technique for managing pastures in semi-arid rangelands (Goldman 2011:73; Homewood et al. 2004). Traditionally, elders were in charge of enforcing the restrictions on accessing these extreme dry season grazing areas, but in Randilen, it takes place through the formal institution of the WMA. This is a very significant development because, as McCabe et al. (2020) point out, traditional customary institutions among the Maasai for managing rangelands (through territory *olosho,* clans (*olgilata*), and the age-set system; see Chapter 3) are being superseded in contemporary Tanzania by the formal institution of the village. The emergence of the village as an institution for regulating access to pastures can undermine the management of semi-arid rangelands because it can parcel environments with unevenly distributed sources of water and productive grasses into small areas that are managed by independent parties. While the WMA is also a formal institution that has the potential to undermine traditional grazing patterns, in Randilen, it is being wielded by the Maasai as a strategy for ensuring a collectively managed dry season grazing bank that cannot be governed by individual villages, but through shared institutions. If I were to distill my entire dissertation down into the single most significant detail, I believe it to be this: the WMA fits within a traditional cultural framework for managing semi-arid rangelands and promotes resilience in the face of uncertain and variable environmental

conditions. From the perspectives of local herders, this is the most significant reason why they have come to appreciate the area, and this is where I see much common ground with conservationists. From a conservation perspective, the photographic zone protects wildlife habitat in an important elephant dispersal area from competing land uses. From a pastoral perspective, the photographic zone protects reserve grass from cultivators, green grabbers, and livestock keepers who do not respect collective institutions.

When I posed the question of how people feel about the WMA during interviews across Randilen's member villages, the most frequent response put forth was, "I like the WMA because we use it for grazing and it has good grass." As one interviewee in Naitolia explained, we know that, if there is a major drought, we will be able to graze our livestock in the whole area, so we are happy to have this." As another interviewee pointed out, "The WMA is our grazing bank. And we are grateful that it keeps our livestock healthy in times of drought and now there are no livestock coming from outside into our area." Some interviewees were also particularly appreciative of the fact that politicians can no longer graze their livestock inside the WMA area by negotiating in nefarious ways with village councils. VGS have vehicles and weapons and are able to patrol and enforce the area on behalf of communities. While the Maasai have traditionally valued reciprocity across regions, the current management model of the WMA stipulates that the AA retains the authority to negotiate grazing access and provide permits to people as needed. The AA is thus able to permit such requests in exceptional circumstances if it is determined by the representative democracy as an appropriate decision. On the whole, however, livestock from outside these communities are not permitted inside the WMA's community grazing area. This insulates communities from the rich politicians who have historically gained access to the area through the Naitolia village council.

A key aspect of the revised resource management zone plan is that some villages also have areas that are classified as Tourism and Livestock Management Zones. In these areas, community livestock grazing is permitted, while livestock from outside the communities are

prohibited without permission. Livestock keepers are also allowed to establish *ronjo* bomas in these areas. Part of the reason for the initial protests in 2014 was that local communities had heard that VGS were in the process of burning unauthorized *ronjo* bomas, which caused a very strong visceral reaction in community members who had livestock at stake. While the revised management zoning plan includes upper limits on the number of livestock allowed in the TLMZ areas, these limits were determined by the community and are much higher than the villages are able to reach. Cattle are limited to 100,000 head, goats are limited to 80,000 at a time, and sheep to 50,000 (RWMA 2018:32). For context, Lemooti had approximately 20,500 cattle total in 2018, the highest of any member village despite its small human population size (RWMA 2018:17). Naitolia had the second highest number at approximately 5,500, with the remaining villages having less than 5,000. This means that the maximum number of cattle in the entire WMA was approximately 50-55,000, keeping it well under the upper cap. The communities intentionally selected upper limits that were great enough that they would not lead to conflicts in practice because the sociocultural and economic value of accumulating livestock still endures in these communities. As discussed in Chapter 4, livestock numbers tend to reach natural caps relative to changing environmental conditions, and community members are not worried about exceeding these upper caps.

Other resource uses in the mixed livestock zones are regulated in various ways. Harvesting plants for traditional medicines must be authorized by the AA, but trees cannot be ring-debarked or up-rooted. Collection of dead firewood is permitted, but live tree felling is prohibited, as is charcoal burning. The restrictions on charcoal production are not specific to the WMA, and are illegal throughout Monduli District. During interviews with District Forest Officers, it was revealed that charcoal burning is an ongoing problem in the area, particularly in the Arusha dominated villages. On several occasions, I encountered people burning charcoal openly in their homesteads, and others doing so more discreetly at night. District Forest Officers

take charcoal production quite seriously and generally issue stern fines to those they catch, as they view it as a primary driver of deforestation in the village areas around Randilen WMA. Within the Tourism and Livestock Zone, other land uses like hunting, cultivation, and mining are also prohibited. Beekeeping is also permitted in both zones, with an upper limit of 10,000 bee hives in both areas, which communities are also unlikely to reach.

The restrictions on cultivation were welcomed on the Lemooti side of the WMA by the pastoral Kisongo in the area, but were a topic of significant concern for the Arusha on the Naitolia and Mswakini side. Given the importance of farming to the Arusha mode of production and way of life, Arusha villagers were concerned that the initial zoning plan restricted their abilities to cultivate too significantly. The revised zoning plan demarcated a modest zone that would be kept aside for livestock keeping and tourism, while leaving the majority of the villages open for cultivation. The mixed livestock and tourism zones in Mswakini Chini and Juu are thus quite small compared to the Lemooti area. Though they consider themselves to be farmers, the Arusha have come to very much appreciate the grazing banks in their villages. Their move from the Meru highlands into the lowlands of Monduli has meant that livestock keeping has become a viable and productive way to use the land. Livestock holdings are of great value to the Arusha, even for those who live exclusively in the Meru highlands. This is especially so since their economy and social life is entangled with the Kisongo, with whom they participate in shared rituals, exchanges, and marriages, and with whom they trade in grain, livestock, and labour. As discussed in Chapters 3-4, small stock essentially serves as cash account (that beats inflation), as shoats are highly liquid and can be brought to market at any given time. Cattle hold great exchange value with the Kisongo and are still the de facto currency of Maasai social life. So while the Arusha favour their farms much more than the Kisongo in terms of investing labour and physically tilling the land, they also greatly value their livestock and thus appreciate the grazing banks that the revised resource management plan provides them.

7.8 King of the Hill: 'Villagism' and the WMA

The mixed livestock and tourism area in Lemooti provides a crucial grazing bank for pastoralists on the Lolkisale-side of the WMA. As discussed earlier, Lolkisale is squeezed by farms and most of the pastoralists in this area, across all five villages, rely on the grazing areas in Lemooti. While access to this area is now technically governed by the AA and enforced by VGS, an issue developed in 2019-2020 due to overlapping jurisdictions of the village and that of the WMA. Both are formal institutions for managing land that are supported by state law (see McCabe et al. 2020), but the question of which should supersede the other is sometimes contested. Prior to the 2019 elections, there was no real issue as pastoralists from the Lolkiale side entered the area as needed, established temporary *ronjo* bomas to tend to their stock, and abided by the generous upper limits for livestock. In 2019, however, the young man who had struck it rich in the Tanzanite trade, and who was initially opposed to the WMA (see Section 6.21), decided to run for office. I stayed in Lemooti and carried out interviews across all the sub-villages in the months leading up to the election and I was hard pressed to find many people who supported his claim to the village chair position (at least openly). Most were instead wary of what would happen if someone with so much "money power" were to take up the position, knowing that village councils have great authority in accordance with state law to allocate land within their territories. At the time, I had developed a sense on the ground that the WMA actually served community interests, rather than undermined them, and I was concerned about how this individual, who did not seem to care much for collective institutions, would affect the sociopolitical landscape of the area. Unlike all the other bomas in Lemooti, the *tajiri* ("rich person" as he is referred to locally) lives atop a large hill overlooking the WMA. He has built a remarkably large house with a high tower atop, not unlike a castle. It looks rather out of place in the village, but I could not help but think enviously that the view from his tower must be stunning. When I interviewed some of his neighbours about how they felt about him building a castle atop the hill, and what he was like as

a person, one man angrily explained, "This man has no respect. He brings thousands of cattle through here whenever he wants. They trample my maize farms and he does not even apologize." I had thought at the time that there was no way the *tajiri* would succeed in his bid for office with that much dislike from other community members. Evidently, there was more going on. A few months later, I was staying in Lolkisale-proper carrying out interviews and I heard a group of people in the street worriedly discussing the election result in Lemooti*:* the *tajiri* had won the election.

I was shocked at first and when I returned to Lemooti to carry out follow up interviews with people, some still insisted that they had not supported his bid, but a notable number had shifted their views. When I poked to find out way, it became evident that there was money involved in swaying votes. As one interviewee explained, "he used his money power to become the chair," implying that he had bought the votes. Knowing that he was one of the vocal minority who was opposed to establishing the WMA in the first place, and that Lemooti had given the largest portion of land to the WMA, there was a sense in the greater Lolkisale community that the *tajiri mwenye kiti* (rich village chair) might be scheming about something. Sure enough, immediately after taking power, he began to re-allocate the temporary *ronjo* bomas of livestock keepers from outside Lemooti to ones from within it. While he did not have the physical means to 'block' pastoralists from elsewhere from entering the area, he signaled to the incoming herders that they must first register with the village office before entering the area. Preventing them from setting up their own temporary *ronjo* bomas in the mixed livestock area made it difficult for livestock keepers from the greater Lolkisale area to graze their livestock there.

The *tajiri mwenye kiti* was operating under the assumption that the Village Land Act trumped the revised WMA regulations in terms of land tenure and rights. Technically, the areas overlap, as the grazing area in question was within the WMA *and* on village land. Much like the GCA controversies of the past, the crucial question in this context is 'when there are conflicting laws governing WMAs and villages, which one takes priority?' Since there are three types of

land in Tanzania (general, village, and reserved land), WMAs make it somewhat unclear which category these overlapping areas fall under. Technically, Lemooti is still village land, but it is also a reserved area within the framework of the WMA. While some lawyers have suggested that the Village Land Act could potentially trump the WMA regulations in court, my own interviews with government officials have suggested that the WMA as a formal institution now supersedes the village. This means that the AA has the ultimate authority over access to, and use of, land in the mixed livestock and tourism area, and not the Lemooti village council. The *tajiri mwenye kiti* of Lemooti is someone who I would call a 'villagist,' that is a pastoralist who supports and values the formal institution of the village for governing access to land, rather than communal forms of tenure that involve reciprocal access rights across semi-arid rangelands (see McCabe et al. 2020). During interviews in Lengoolwa, Nafco, Oldonyo, and Lolkisale-proper following the elections, the new *tajiri mwenye kiti* in Lemooti was consistently raised as a concern for pastoral livelihoods. As one Maaka-aged Kisongo man from the outskirts of Nafco said during an interview, "The rich village chair has already started blocking our livestock from grazing there. But where else can we go? That is our only grazing area." Pastoralists from the Lolkisale area were worried about being prevented from accessing pastures as a consequence of this change in political leadership at the village level, with some feeling the effects already. As another Landiis-aged Kisongo pastoralist from Oldonyo explained, "he does not care about us, he wants only to control access to the grazing area in that territory." My interviewees were aware that the *tajiri* had a large herd of cattle and viewed his new position as a means of consolidating power. Interviewees interpreted his actions as attempts to secure his own private grazing area at the expense of pastoralists from other villages who had smaller herds and less political clout.

Concerned about the potential for this fellow to undermine community support for the WMA across Lolkisale, I raised the issue with the WMA chair. Meshurie explained to me that with someone like *the tajiri mwenye kiti*, one has to be diplomatic. Meshurie's philosophy was that it was best to try to carefully bring the *tajiri* into WMA governance meetings to make him

realize that there was much to be gained from building solidarity and acting in good faith. This, however, proved challenging in the early days of the *tajiri*'s tenure. During a governance and equity workshop for Randilen WMA in Mto wa Mbu in 2019 (mentioned in Chapter 1), not long after the local elections, the *tajiri* was notably absent. I asked Damian of Honeyguide at that meeting what he thought about the *tajiri*'s rise to power, and whether it jeopardized the collective institutions of the WMA. Damian's response was that since the WMA had already been formalized, it would be difficult for a single village chair to oppose it at this stage ("it's like a machine that's already in motion"). Indeed, the WMA institutions are supported by state law making them difficult to overrule once they are established. But, resistance is always a possibility if people do not view laws as legitimate. On one occasion, in early 2020, the *tajiri* was reluctant to sign off on the amount that would be paid to the Lemooti bank as part of the WMA's distributions to the member villages. The *tajiri* argued that Lemooti had given more land to the WMA, and thus it should receive a larger piece of the revenue. These issues have been documented by Sulle and Banka (2017), and are also discussed in Chapter 4. I provide a breakdown of the changing financial structures for WMA benefit sharing in the next section.

To avoid speculating about the *tajiri* based only on second hand information, I thought it prudent to interview him myself to develop a sense of what his thoughts were on collective solidarity and the WMA as an institution. Unfortunately, he proved very challenging to track down. He was rarely in Lemooti, and was often at the mines in Mererani, or the Tanzanite market in Arusha town. Finally, in May 2020, we both attended a Randilen WMA AA meeting together in Makuyuni, and I had a chance to observe the nature of his participation closely.[274] As the AA members and government officials emphatically clapped their hands in support of the WMA and chanted "*tembo maendelo, maendeleo, tembo*," I watched him hesitantly begin to join in. He was surrounded by unanimous support for the WMA, and I am sure he began to feel part of the Randilen community. By the end of the meeting, he was making constructive suggestions

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[274] Makuyuni serves as the most convenient meeting point for villagers coming from both sides of the WMA.

as Meshurie took extra efforts to engage him with questions and thoughtfully made notes on a flipboard based on his suggestions in order to ensure that he felt listened to. I could sense that some of the *tajiri's* grievances with the WMA were starting to dissipate now that he had a seat at the table and felt included in the WMA's governance dynamics. While it was far too soon to ascertain whether his constructive engagement with the WMA would be enduring, I could not help but wonder whether the *tajiri* symbolized the last chip to fall in place in terms of community support for the WMA. He may well have been holding some of his cards close to his chest, but he appeared to be earnestly engaged. I suspect that he was surprised by how appreciative everyone else was of the WMA, and how welcoming and supportive his peers were to him, even knowing that he had opposed the WMA openly in the past.

After touching base and exchanging numbers at the meeting, I finally tracked the *tajiri* down for a formal interview in June 2020. We met in the backseat of an all-black BMW with tinted windows, in the parking lot of the Tanzanite market in Arusha. When I asked him directly about the WMA, he explained that he had come to appreciate its value for the larger Maasai community in the area because of its potential benefits, but he still felt that that the village institution should trump the WMA. He explained diplomatically that the village need not entail universal prohibitions on incoming pastoralists, but it should be respected enough that pastoralists from elsewhere register at the office "and follow the correct procedures." In his mind, the village was still the dominant land management institution that should be upheld. While it was difficult to disaggregate the *tajiri's* personal stake in the matter from his philosophical stance on rangeland management institutions, his interest in preserving the political self-determination of villages was a fair one; institutional interplays between land and wildlife management policies in villages must be thoughtfully considered if WMAs are to be considered socially successful models of conservation.

7.9 Changing financial structures for benefit sharing and implications for investors and Lolkisale villlage

Tradeoffs between village-level institutions and WMA-level ones are particularly important to consider in the context of economic benefit sharing. Prior to the WMA era of community-based conservation, private investors could negotiate the terms of their contracts directly with villages. An investor operating a private business had to register with the central government and pay a certain percentage of their company's earnings in taxes submitted through the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA). There are numerous bureaucratic steps involved in registering a business of this nature in Tanzania, but it generally involves applying for a tax clearance certificate, a business licence, a Value-Added Tax (VAT) certificate, and a Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN). There are also several processes specific to tour operators, including vehicle inspection reports, tourism control numbers and several others. In terms of the tax structure, companies paid their licencing fees and taxes on their earnings directly to the government. Concession payments to villages came directly out of an operator's earnings, paid as a fixed amount for the concession, or a percentage share (see Gardner 2016:126-150). Typically, operators and villages negotiated a "bed night fee" that would go directly to the partnering village bank. Bed night payments were paid per guest, per night, based on a negotiated amount between investors and villages. In Lolkisale, Treetops had been paying Lolkisale village a 15$USD bed night fee. Following the legislative reforms and the emergence of the WMA framework for conservation on village land, the basic business model of the photographic tour operators in the Lolkisale area did not fundamentally change. They still operated as private businesses and paid licensing fees and taxes directly to the government based on their earnings. What changed, however, was the system for managing bed night fees. Rather than being paid directly to a single village on a case by case basis, the "bed night fee" became a formalized tax that was centrally collected by TAWA (see Sulle and Banka 2017).

The WMA regulations of 2012 stipulate the revenue sharing model to be applied across all WMAs in Tanzania, which are disaggregated into ones supporting photographic activities and trophy hunting. In WMAs where hunting is administered, TAWA takes 25% of the block fee and 65% of the game fee. Since the Kisongo of Lolkisale, in collaboration with AWF, had zoned out trophy hunting, Randilen WMA was categorized as a photographic area. As things currently stand at the time of writing, TAWA takes 30% of bed night revenue, Monduli District Government takes 5% and the remaining 65% is returned to Randilen WMA. Of this remaining 65% of the gross revenues, 50% goes back into the operational costs of the WMA and 50% is distributed to member villages. In some cases, the funds that remain with the WMA are administered directly by the AA in the context of WMA administration, but, in the case of Randilen, a professional finance team was put in place to manage them. The formal bed night fee in Randilen remained at 15$ per night after the WMA was established.

On top of the formalization of the bed night taxation structure, WMA entrance permits were introduced. These mimicked entrance fees for national parks, which were based on single entries of up to 24 hours. Generally speaking, the burden of these costs falls to the consumer (tourist) and not the operator, though lodges can assist in organizing permits. In such instances, paying tourists are made aware of the added fees, which increase the total price of their stay slightly, but directly support the community and WMA's operations. These WMA-level fees follow the same formal tax structure as the bed night fees from the lodges. The entrance fee of Randilen, as of 2021, is 10$ for a resident and 10,000Tsh(4.3$) for a citizen (5$ and 5,000Tsh/2.15$ for children).[275] Camping fees are 15,000Tsh (6.50$) for a citizen and 20$ for a resident (5,000Tsh/2.15$ and 20$ for children). Tanzanian registered vehicles are charged 10,000Tsh (4.3$) per day. Walking safaris can also be arranged for a price of 10$ per person and night drives cost $20 per person.[276] VGS can also be hired for 10$ per day. A VAT tax that goes

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[275] For WMAs, the general entrance fees are 10$ for a non-citizen, 5$ for a non-citizen child, and 1$ for a citizen adult. Tanzanian children are free (Spenceley et al. 2017:4).
[276] See: https://www.randilen.org/camping/

directly to TRA is additional to these amounts. Randilen WMA thus generates revenue, for itself and member villages, through bed night fees, entrance permits and WMA activity fees. Accommodation fees for staying at the lodges and tented camps inside the WMA are paid by tourists directly to the lodge operator. The owner must subsequently pay a 15$ bed night fee directly to the WMA, since the village is no longer responsible for negotiating concessions or payments. Earnings generated by investors from tourist accommodation payments are taxed by the central government in the same fashion that they would be outside WMAs and, in this sense, their business operations carry on largely independently. However, the formalization of bed night fees can be a major source of conflict in WMAs both from the perspective of villages and investors, potentially undermining community support for WMAs. One such well-documented conflict has unfolded in Burunge WMA since 2006 (see footnote for details).[277] From the perspective of investors, the pricing of accommodation offerings is crucial for determining economic margins, as tourist payments must cover the running costs of their lodges or camps, including salaries for staff, maintenance fees, food, supplies, equipment, and vehicles, while still offering suitable returns on their investments. As of March 1, 2022, the current prices per night for the lodges in Randilen, according to TripAdvisor, range from 360$USD per night for

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[277] Minjingu village has been opposed to Burunge WMA since it was established in 2006 (Sulle 2008). The village had a pre-existing fruitful relationship with Kibo Tours, which had implemented Maramboi Tented Lodge in the village prior to the WMA (Nelson et al. 2006; see Sulle and Banka 2017:468). The pre-existing agreement provided Maramboi with a 40-acre concession in exchange for a bed night fee of 5$USD per guest per night to be paid to the village. Minjingu used the bed night payments to build secondary schools and even the village office (Sulle 2008). The village opposed the WMA on the grounds that its joint venture would be threatened by the new benefit-sharing structure. Though Minjingu became part of the WMA, it joined under accusations of poor local governance (i.e. forged meeting lists and top-down pressure from AWF), similar to the experiences of Naitolia and Mswakini in Randilen (Sulle and Banka 2017). As a consequence, the village assembly held an open meeting in an attempt to withdraw their land from the WMA in 2006 (see Igoe and Croucher 2007:549; Bluwstein et al. 2016; Sulle and Banka 2017:468). Their attempts to exit the WMA were still ongoing in 2016 (see Moyo et al. 2016:235). In 2008, Maramboi ceased its direct payments of 5$USD to Mingingu because it had been ordered to pay 15$ USD directly to the WMA (Sulle and Banka 2017). From the perspective of the investor, paying both Burunge WMA and Minjingu village would constitute a double payment and bring their bed night fee up to 20$. But since Minjingu had refused to accept the formation of the WMA, it was not entitled to its share as a member village. Consequently, it was left in a situation where the lodge was operating in its village and only other villages were benefiting. In response, Minjingu Village Council sued Maramboi and Burunge WMA in a case that went to the Higher Court of Tanzania, claiming that the WMA had not followed due process and had been trespassing in village land. While Maramboi was found not guilty, Burunge WMA was deemed guilty of trespassing and was ordered to pay 746,115 $USD to Minjingu village (see Sulle and Banka 2017:469).

Boundary Hill to 1,240$USD per night for Treetops, with the other lodges in a similar

ballpark.[278] From the perspective of the WMA and member villages, these prices are irrelevant,

as the only aspect that affects WMA revenue is the number of beds that the lodge has, and the

frequency with which it attracts guests; the bed night fee is tied only to the number of guests, so

the lodge could charge 2000$ a night or 20$ a night. Regardless, they would pay 15$ per guest,

per night to the WMA as a bed night fee.

While Treetops was not directly affected by the changing WMA legislation in terms of its

core operations (bed night payments remained stable at 15$USD per head after formalization),

the revised financial structure of bed night collection severely affected Lolkisale's share. In

2010, following the passing of the revised WCA of 2009, bed night fees could no longer be paid

directly to Lolkisale village because these arrangements were technically illegalized, so bed

night fees were paid directly to the Wildlife Division. Sulle and Banka (2017:469) note that the

revenue Lolkisale received dropped off a cliff from 95,003$ USD per year in 2009 to 5,304$

USD from 2010 onwards. Data from Treetop's bed night payments between 2004-2014 reveal

that the total revenue generated from bed night fees had actually been increasing over this period

(NTRI 2017), but due to the new processes for central collection and taxation, the total payments

received by the WMA declined after Randilen was formalized in 2012. From the perspective of

Lolkisale village, formalization of the WMA directly reduced their stake in Treetop's business

by splintering their consistent revenue stream into a small fragment of its once sizeable whole.

After TAWA (30%) and MDC (5%) took their share, the WMA took half of what remained. The

other half was then divided *equally* among the member villages. For the first few years after the

WMA was established, from 2012-2015, the community payments were divided among

Lolkisale, Nafco, Lemooti, Naitolia, Mswakini Juu, and Mswakini Chini. From 2015 onwards,

Lengoolwa and Oldonyo were included in the WMA and the community income was split eight

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[278] Ecoscience, discussed in the following pages, is at the upper end and charges around 1500$ USD per night. Nimali and Kirurumu fall somewhere in the middle.

ways. As Sulle and Banka (2017:469) point out, villagers in Lolkisale became increasingly aware of these drops in revenue after formalization because the village council had to ask for greater contributions from people to pay for the construction of schools and other community development project that were previously fully subsidized by bed night income. During my interviews in Oldonyo in late 2019, one Kisongo man from the Landiis age-set voiced similar concerns. As he asked,

> What is wrong with our WMA (*kampuni*) now? Can you tell me? Because in the past we never had to worry about paying for these kind of development projects, but now our council is always raising the issue of contributions to pay for things. I have no money to pay for these things myself, so this is why I am asking you, what is wrong with our WMA?

As this man's questions reveal, the history of high returns from Lolkisale's partnership with Treetops was leading to expectations that were no longer in line with the practical realities of the WMA's model of revenue distribution. The 'milk of elephants' had begun to run dry, and Sulle and Banka (2017) express concerns that these changes might lead to declines in community support for conservation in Lolkisale. The issue of decreasing benefits relative to costs is exacerbated by the fact that Lolkisale (via Lemooti) had given up significant portions of its land, and was thus disproportionately affected by the costs of the WMA vis-à-vis other villages. This kind of inequitable distribution of costs and benefits to member villages of WMAs is well documented in the literature and poses a particular governance challenge that is difficult to address through the current legal framework (see Sulle et al. 2011; Homewood et al. 2015:2; Sulle and Banka 2017:470).

7.10 Emergence of other lodges and tented camps in the WMA

In the TCA management plan (prior to the WMA), five tourist accommodation areas were demarcated. Three of them were permanent facilities (Treetops, Boundary Hill Lodge, and Naitolia Camp), one was a permanent camp (Sidai Camp), and one was a special campsite (Sand River Campsite) (King 2009). In total, these areas could host up to 90 guests. When the WMA

was formalized in 2012, the tourist facilities changed shape. Naitolia Camp and Sidai Camp were discontinued, and, while the short-term lease for Treetops expired in 2008, it was continually renewed every five years. Since the days of the TCA, however, Treetops has been sold to Elewana Afrika Ltd. (Elewana translates as "Harmony" in kiSwahili). Elewana owns and runs a chain of five luxury properties in mainland Tanzania (including the Arusha Coffee Lodge), one in Zanzibar, and eight in Kenya. These are collectively called the Elewana Collection. Since Elewana is a tour company that helps international tourists book their safari packages from start to finish, they are able to route visitors to Treetops with relative ease.

A few other lodges and tented camps have developed in the area since formalization, including Nimali Lodge at the former Sand River campsite in Lolkisale/Lemooti, Kirurumu Tarangire Lodge (which partners with Hoopoe Safaris) at the former Tamarind Campsite in Mswakini Chini, and Ecoscience in Mswakini Juu. These lodges are considered part of Randilen WMA, and each offers a slightly different product. Nimali provides a relaxing experience for tourists, as it is nestled into the side of the river and guests are lulled to sleep by the calming sounds of the babbling water at night. Kirurumu's ten tented cottages are set in a wetland area adjacent to TNP, in Mswakini Juu, with numerous buffalo around. Kirurumu, however, is challenging to access from the main parts of the WMA due to poor road infrastructure. Ecoscience comprises a tented conference centre and luxury lodge established by a volcanologist (and talented pianist) who studies the geology of the rift valley volcanoes. Other than the ongoing dispute with Boundary Hill, the communities appreciate these lodges for generating revenue for their WMA, and there are no other outstanding conflicts that I am aware of. Villagers in Mswakini Chini, for instance, very much appreciated Ecoscience's well-intentioned gesture to directly fund the construction of a dispensary and dining hall for its primary school. Community members I spoke with who were aware of the WMA and how it functioned economically greatly appreciated the value of having quality lodges in their WMA and often encouraged me to help

search for more investors and advertise the area to prospective tourists. As one young man from Mswakini Chini expressed during an interview,

> The WMA has many benefits. The village office was one of the benefits of the WMA because we built it with WMA funds. We get benefits because of those investors inside the WMA who support us. The WMA staff wait at the main entrance gates and collect all the money from the tourists and investors staying in the WMA, and then they share it with the villages. The other benefit we get is employment. The people working there are from the villages.

Villagers have come to directly associate the investors and tourists with village development projects, even if not all of them are fully aware of the precise economic processes at play in governing and managing the WMA. They very much appreciate the WMA revenue that is returned to member villages and can subsequently be put towards meaningful community initiatives, particularly if their village was not receiving bed night payments prior to the WMA. One concern that was raised by the WMA chair and several other interviewees, however, was that villagers are not fully represented through employment at the lodges and camps. As per the revised management plan, "residents of member villages" are entitled to "priority on any employment opportunity" within the WMA, "provided they hold the required qualifications" (RWMA 2018:16). Based on my observations and informal conversations with the staff at the lodges and camps, the *askari* (security guards) are generally hired from member villages (usually Kisongo). Kitchen and service staff, however, are almost always from outside the community. When I raised this issue with the lodge manager of Boundary Hill Lodge during an interview, he made a valid counterpoint: the luxury lodges must cater to wealthy tourists who expect five-star service. This makes it difficult to hire local villagers as chefs and servers in these lodges without adequate professional training. On the whole, residents of member villages end up taking up positions as security guards.

During interviews with the Financial Staff of Randilen WMA in 2020, they explained that Treetops still does the majority of heavy lifting in terms of tourism revenue for the WMA, though Nimali and Kirurumu also make decent contributions. Boundary Hill has also been providing growing revenue since being rebuilt, though its court case with Lolkisale village is still ongoing. Ecoscience, however, is struggling to bring in tourists and researchers, and one of my interlocutors suggested to me in 2020 that the owner has been looking to sell the lodge.[279] Investors also face the challenge of a never-absent central state that can decide to 'shake the tree' at any given time. During my own visit to Randilen's lodges and camps in mid 2020 to carry out interviews with the managers, a white TRA vehicle was just ahead of me on the road visiting each facility in the same order as me. When I asked the manager at Ecoscience what the TRA representatives wanted, he replied jokingly that "sometimes they want to tell you your furniture is out of place, so you must pay a fine," implying with some sarcasm that TRA frequently hassled the lodges with unnecessary fines even if bookkeeping was in order. The macropolitical environment of private business in Tanzania is thus highly challenging because of the strong presence of the state in all aspects of private enterprises.

From the perspectives of lodge managers, garnered during interviews in 2020, the WMA structure has benefits and drawbacks. Changing bed night fees can detrimentally affect the bottom line of lodges. If an investor, for instance, had a pre-arranged agreement to pay a village a bed night fee of 5$ prior to a WMA being established, and was subsequently contracted to pay a 15$ bed night fee to the AA after the WMA was formalized, the investor has an incentive to oppose the WMA structure. This is what seems to be occurring in Burunge WMA, where one lodge owner in Minjingu has expressed a preference to have the village withdraw from the WMA to allow the lodge owner to negotiate a more affordable contract directly with Minjingu's village council. Minjingu village has incentive to support the withdrawal scheme knowing that

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[279] The formalization of the WMA around the lodge in 2012 likely meant that it became increasingly challenging to host science conferences with researchers, given the added WMA entrance fees. Ecoscience is also at the highest end of accommodation costs in Randilen, with a price tag that only attracts very wealthy clients.

their own bed night fees would likely increase dramatically. Another drawback is that the added permit fees can deter some tourists who are looking to reduce trip costs wherever possible. Based on my own informal conversations with tourists, however, some seem content to pay a little more if they are assured that their money will go towards supporting local communities and the prospect of community-based conservation outside national parks. At the same time, tourists can also be deterred by the bureaucratic process for acquiring WMA permits, which from the perspective of investors and tourists, adds unnecessary red tape. Though it is under revision, the current system, is rather convoluted (at the time of writing). To enter Randilen WMA, a prospective tourist can either have their tour operator or lodge arrange the permitting fees on their behalf. More adventurous tourists can request a permit on Randilen's online portal by filling out their vehicle registration numbers, names of visitors, and passport (or residence permit) details. Randilen's administrative staff then produce an invoice that includes a Control Number that will be linked to a subsequent payment. The permit fees can then be paid either with MPesa (mobile money transactions) or at an NMB bank in Arusha town where central payments are accepted. Once the WMA is provided with the proof of payment, Randilen administrative staff will email the tourist the permit. This arduous process, inhibited by an overly bureaucratic central state, creates unnecessary hindrances for tourists who might otherwise want to simply purchase their permit at the entrance gate. Despite rumblings of reform, purchasing WMA permits at the entrance gate was still impossible at the time of my fieldwork. Communication between entrance gates and lodges are also sometimes strained by poor mobile networks and a lack of coordination, which in some cases results in tourists getting stuck at the gate without a permit in hand because the lodge was expecting them, but the gate staff were not made aware. The lodges are also challenging to operate due to their remoteness, which would be an issue irrespective of the WMA. Poor road infrastructure and black cotton soils currently make wet season travels into the heart of the WMA rather daring.

At the same time, lodge and camp managers also voiced appreciation for some aspects of the WMA structure. The WMA provides lodges and camps with greater security, as some of these accommodations were plagued by petty thievery prior to the WMA. Of appeal to investors (and anti-poaching donors), Randilen has two well-staffed ranger posts which serve as deterrents for prospective thieves.[280] Wildlife populations have also been on the rise (see Lee and Bond 2018a), enriching the product that lodges and camps can offer to clients. This has been further enhanced by the development of tourism infrastructure, like the marvellous elephant water hole hide near Sunset Hill, and the newly built airstrip for bush planes. These features could serve to attract more tourists in the future, so long as the WMA is able to sustain itself economically.

7.11 Economic viability of Randilen WMA in macropolitical context

The formal benefit sharing model of WMAs complicates the political and economic landscape of community-based conservation by undermining pre-existing relationships between private investors and villages. It also poses a threat to the notion of sustainability because it demonstrates little awareness of the administrative costs necessary for operating a WMA. When Honeyguide commenced work in Randilen, it brought with it a clear focus on making Randilen economically viable, a pursuit that has been severely constrained by legislative context. Having worked as a photographic tour operator in Ololosokwan in the 1990s, Damian was very familiar with the economics of community-based conservation prior to the legal reforms of 2002, 2009 and 2012. He was determined to help develop Randilen into a community owned and operated business that was financially independent, and which provided opportunities for community livelihoods, wildlife conservation, and tourism to thrive. This meant ensuring that Randilen's gross tourism revenues covered its operational costs on a consistent basis without external donor support. One of the most challenging issues in realizing these objectives, as voiced to me by Randilen's finance team during interviews, is that TAWA collects 30% of the WMA's gross

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[280] See: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=531351454099084

revenues without contributing anything back on the ground in terms of service.[281] Put differently, TAWA takes unsustainably without helping to defray the management and governance costs of operating the WMA. This makes Honeyguide's goal of helping the WMA achieve financial independence extremely challenging. The money designated for WMA operational costs must cover "all management, resource protection and governance functions," which is no small task (NTRI 2017:2). As a financial breakdown, in 2014-2015, Randilen WMA earned $163,387.69USD in total gross revenues (NTRI 2017). From this total, 49,016.31$ was first taken by TAWA and $8,169.38 was taken by Monduli District Council. From the remaining $106,202, half went to the AA to cover Randilen's operational costs ($53,110) and the other half was divided between the member villages, which amounted to roughly $6,640USD per village per year (NTRI 2017:2). Based on a financial assessment of the WMA by Acacia Natural Resource Consultants in 2016, it was determined that about $176,000USD was needed to operate the WMA.[282] Thus, Randilen WMA was only able to cover about 30% of its own expenses, leaving a deficit of around $124,198 between its earnings and running costs (NTRI 2017). As a rough breakdown of Randilen's operational costs, financial and administrative management expenses take up about 20% of its budget. Protection costs, including VGS salaries, patrol vehicles, fuel, training and equipment run about 60% of this budget.[283] Governance expenses, including venue rentals for AA meetings, transportation for AA members, and per diems (sitting allowances) make up about 20%. It is easy to overlook the fact that with all of these running costs, money coming in to the WMA must be enough to cover money being spent, and this

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[281] In 2016, new non-consumptive tourism regulations were also introduced for WMAs, which reduced centrally collected revenues in WMAs marginally from 30% to 25% for TAWA (while maintaining the 5% for district). Accordingly, Randilen WMA should keep 70% of its own revenues, though it was only receiving 65% at the time of fieldwork.

[282] Honeyguide developed their own "WMA Financial Viability Tool" based on this initial dataset. Damian has since suggested to me that with inflation, Randilen would need to generate around 350,000$ to achieve financial independence.

[283] Honeyguide and Big Life estimate, for instance, that elephant anti-poaching efforts in Enduimet WMA cost around $250,000 a year ($175 per km) (NTRI 2017). A more conservative estimate of protection costs is 200$ /km to effectively patrol an area from "poaching, charcoal burning, agricultural encroachment, and other prohibited activities" (NTRI 2017:4).

makes it a challenging business to operate, even for a professional financial management team. As a consequence of Randilen's financial deficits, its governance and management activities must to be supported by Honeyguide with money from the Nature Conservancy and international donors to help it fulfill its operational tasks.

This consideration highlights the fact that the current level of government taxation is neither fair nor appropriate and is jeopardizing the long-term viability of Randilen WMA. As one member of Randilen's financial team told me during an interview, "the central government does not realize that Randilen WMA is a fruit-bearing tree. Rather than eating the fruit over a long period of time, the central government wants to cut off its branches for a quick profit." This sentiment was vocalized by WMA staff and community members, many of whom view the central government as "greedy" and short-sighted in its attempts to maximize short-term profits at the expense of long-term sustainability. While the Acacia consultants noted that WMAs in northern Tanzania were more economically viable than those in the south because there were more opportunities for photographic tourism near the northern safari circuit, those "in the Tarangire ecosystem still do not earn enough revenue to make them economically viable for communities to protect wildlife" (NTRI 2017:4).[284]

While the government's unsupportive approach to WMAs was perhaps unintentional, some of my key informants also speculated that the government may not have a genuine interest in supporting community-based conservation. WMAs may be tools for snuffing out previously productive partnerships on village land, with the added bonus of bringing in further revenue to TAWA in the process. A key question raised by one of my informants from the Pastoral Women's Council during one of our conversations was, "why is the government so intent on pushing a new formal institution that supersedes individual villages and undermines their governance?"[285] Some of my interlocutors suspect, as do I, that villages were becoming

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[284] WMAs in the north also had more wildlife by comparison (see Burgess et al. 2015).
[285] Pastoral Women's Council is a grass-roots Tanzanian NGO focused on empowering Maasai women through education.

increasingly powerful in the context of neoliberal partnerships with private investors, and the central government felt like it was losing authority over valuable wildlife resources (see Gardner 2016). In response, the Tanzania Wildlife Management "Authority" was formed to take over tasks previously administered by the Wildlife Division, and land laws that posed threats to state control were overruled by WMA regulations that weakened the authority of villages pursuant to the Village Land Act. Why, for instance, would the government require villages like Lolkisale to band together with other villages to form a WMA to manage wildlife resources, rather than allowing Lolkisale to establish a WMA within its own village? In a classic colonial/post-colonial strategy, "divide and conquer," the central government may well have been aware that some level of conflict between villages within a WMA might allow the state to capitalize on the ensuing disorder. If Lolkisale had, for example, been able to establish a WMA on its own village land and manage it through its own village council, conflicts in Naitolia and Mswakini would not have occurred in the first place. This would in some ways have been fairer considering the costs that Lolkisale must bear, though it would have also meant protecting a smaller area for wildlife habitat and grazing.

It is very much possible that state wildlife policy approaches community-based conservation as a threat, and WMAs as a way of reducing that threat. There seem to be clear instances of both TAWA and TANAPA competing with communities in the arena of WMAs. In the context of Randilen, TANAPA did not allow multiple-entry visitors into TNP at the time of my fieldwork, as it wanted to encourage tourists to stay inside the park. In 2013-2014, TNP was generating more than 4 million USD$ per year (NTRI 2017). Single-entry permits make it highly inconvenient for guests staying at lodges in Randilen to visit TNP as part of their safari because each time they leave the park to return to their lodge, they have to pay for a new 24-hour single entry permit. Making matters worse, TANAPA has refused to build a ticketing booth at the Boundary Hill Gate connecting Randilen WMA to Tarangire. Tourists who would otherwise be able to drive for a few minutes from Boundary Hill directly into the park must instead drive

all the way out of the WMA, along the main highway and back through the main gate of Tarangire to purchase their single entry ticket. They can then drive back to their lodge in Randilen via the Boundary Hill Gate, which does not restrict movement out, but will not allow tourists to enter without purchasing a ticket at the main gate.[286] The commitment it would take for TANAPA to implement a ticketing booth at the Boundary Hill Gate is fairly modest compared to the massive inconvenience it causes for prospective tourists, who are largely drawn to Randilen WMA because of its proximity to Tarangire. As described to me by several of my key informants, however, TANAPA's reluctance to implement the booth is simply because it views Randilen as a competitor and it wants to disincentivize tourists from staying there. TAWA is also to blame for making life difficult for prospective Randilen tourists. Its insistence on maintaining a tight grip on wildlife-related revenue collection outside national parks has translated into an overly bureaucratic system that prevents tourists from purchasing entrance permits at the WMA gate (as mentioned earlier in this section). Rather, tourists or tour operators have to arrange for permits via TAWA either online or in Arusha town as part of a pre-arranged package. This makes it very challenging for tourists to either visit Randilen WMA on a whim, or combine it with a trip to Tarangire in the context of a flexible itinerary trip. During my fieldwork, in 2020, Randilen was in the process of trying to change the system to allow for WMA permits to be processed at the gate.

International NGOs and donors are highly aware of the constraints posed by macropolitical context. But the shortcomings of the central government in supporting community-based conservation also create opportunistic gaps that must be filled by strategically positioned NGOs, meaning that the status quo finds a way to sustain itself in a way that benefits the government and the NGOs who fill in the gaps in capacity. But the question that Honeyguide is determined to answer is, can a WMA achieve true sustainability on behalf of its community

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[286] Recently, tourists in Randilen WMA have been able to drive from Boundary Hill back to the airstrip at sunset hill to purchase a TANAPA ticket, making for a slightly shorter 2-hour drive detour.

despite the current sea of constraints? The NTRI (2017) suggests a few ways in which the government could help (if it is actually interested in supporting WMAs, which it may not be). First, TAWA must consider reducing its revenue collection from WMAs in order to improve their long-term "performance and viability" (NTRI 2017:2). For WMAs to become sustainable, it will likely become necessary that they "retain more of the revenue they generate from tourism" (NTRI 2017:4). The fact that TAWA takes 30% of photographic tourism and 50% of hunting revenues is an unsustainably high level of taxation for a model of conservation that claims to be community-based. Communities are not receiving enough of the revenue "to be incentivized to conserve" (NTRI 2017:4). NTRI (2017) also recommends streamlining the framework for investing in WMAs to establish more lodges and tented camps, and improve roads and accessibility. Of course, they also advocate for the continuation of outside donor support to supplement WMA revenues. WMAs are, after all, currently unviable without this support. Almost all WMAs rely on "donors and investors" to provide "patrol equipment, communication devices and VGS salaries" (Kimario et al. 2020:131).

Under the guidance of Honeyguide, Randilen had been working admirably towards the goal of financial independence, despite all of these constraints, when the COVID-19 pandemic hit in March 2020, derailed its growing tourism revenue (see Shoo et al. 2021). Fortunately, this has begun to recover again at the time of writing. Thinking critically, there are some serious issues that make it very challenging for Randilen to reach complete sustainability. Treetops lodge currently generates the majority of the WMA's revenue, though it can only host a maximum of 40 people per night. This means that in an absolute best case scenario, with a full house every night of the year, and considering the 15$ bed night fee, the maximum revenue it can generate through bed night payments is 219,000$.[287] This figure will then be reduced by 35% by the government, and half of what remains will be distributed to member villages. In reality, of course, expecting a full house every night is absolutely unattainable. Assuming even an overly

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[287] (40 people x 15$ a head x 365 days a year) = 219,000$

modest estimate of 200,000$ (176,000$ in 2016) a year in WMA running costs, Treetops alone simply cannot carry the entire WMA on its shoulders. For Randilen to become economically viable without donor support, it needs the central government to entirely revise its revenue sharing structure. It also needs more investors.

Importantly, it is not just the *number* of investors that matters. The *quality* of the investors, measured in terms of Randilen's economic and environmental sustainability goals, is also of great significance. In Burunge WMA, for instance, one lodge in Mwada village sleeps 65 tourists per night and generated approximately 268,9000$ USD per year in 2016, while holding a small concession, compared to another lodge in Vilima Vitatu village with a large no-use (including grazing) concession zone that only generated about $50,400USD for the WMA per year (Moyo et al. 2016:238, 240, note 11). The point, then, is that it is not just about increasing the total number of lodges, but growing the number of tourist accommodations that bring in significant bed night fees without unsustainably using available land.[288] Spearheaded by Honeyguide, the Nature Conservancy, and the Land & Life Foundation, tourism occupancy rates in Randilen WMA increased by 48% between 2017 to 2019.[289] At the time of fieldwork, Randilen had two sites open for potential future investors (sunset site and *korongo la Dume* site) that could each sleep an additional 20-40 guests per night.[290] Prospective investors who wish to establish a lodge or tented camp in these sites must negotiate with the WMA's bid and tender committee comprising the AA, WMA management team, and representatives from central and district government. The contract would include an initial and recurring fee to the WMA to

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[288] To invest now that the WMA has been established, prospective investors must own a legally registered company and they must have an established "Memorandum of Articles of Associations" for the company, including CVs of Company Directors. Investors must also present a detailed business plan outlining ongoing and future plans. The application should include a proposal for conducting tourism activities in the WMA. Source: https://www.tanzaniatourism.go.tz/en/investment-opportunities/randileni-wma-opportunities
[289] See: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=531351454099084
[290] See: https://www.tanzaniatourism.go.tz/en/investment-opportunities/category/wma-opportunities

operate within its boundaries, which could be a drag on the investor's margins, but a boon for the WMA's revenue.[291]

For Randilen to become financially independent, a few more quality lodges or tented camps would help a great deal. Building a consistent revenue stream for the WMA that exceeds its basic operational costs would create opportunities for reinvesting capital into roads and other aspects of the WMA that would improve its overall efficiency and in turn attract more tourists and operators (until saturation and sustainability are reached). The revised management plan of 2018 included an ambitious goal to generate 2.5 million $USD by 2020, which Randilen was admirably trending towards prior to being disrupted by the global pandemic (RWMA 2018:35). Even with the return of tourism, Randilen has a very long way to go to reach that lofty target.

7.12 Corruption and the 'New Nafco': The importance of local governance in managing village income

Another important consideration in the current benefit sharing structure is the role of local governance at the village level in ensuring that income from the WMA is distributed equitably to the community. Local governance played a significant role in the era of private contracts between villages and operators prior to the WMA. Despite the centralized reforms, it has remained crucial for ensuring that the tourism income that is returned to villages is managed transparently and in a way that is reflective of assembly interests. This is particularly critical if there are limited funds available for each member village, which necessitates careful budgeting and accountability practices. As some studies have shown, WMAs generally do not directly increase the income of individual households (Keane et al. 2020), however, they do in some cases provide community-level benefits in the form of improved infrastructure and the construction of health dispensaries and schools (see Homewood et al. 2020). Distinguishing between WMA impacts on household economy vs. community-level development is important

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[291] Economic analyses of investor margins would deepen this discussion, though I do not have access to this data. It would be particularly fruitful to assess sunk costs, capital costs, running costs, cash flows, and the effects that WMAs have on these fundamental aspects of business operations.

because, from the perspectives of local resource users, conservation restrictions often have individual and livelihood-level economic costs. Thinking logically, for WMAs to work, communities must be satisfied that the community-level benefits they receive from the WMA are worth the individual livelihood costs that they must endure. But one aspect that I believe these studies overlook to some extent is the way in which individual household economy and community-level infrastructure developments are entangled. As I have observed in Oldonyo village, and as Sulle's work in Lolkisale also suggests, if wildlife-related income does not cover the costs of community development projects, then village governments will go door-to-door to the assembly to request payments to cover these costs. Thus, while WMAs may not *directly* improve household wealth, they may do so indirectly by covering costs that villagers would otherwise have to pay their local governments to cover development projects in the form of "contributions" (*michango*).

As discussed earlier, Lolkisale village has been fortunate to have good governance at the local level since its establishment and this has meant that wildlife-related income from its Treetops partnership has funded meaningful community development project at the village level. Even after its income declined drastically following the legislative reforms, the village council has continued to act democratically in allocating these funds for community initiatives. While Lolkisale village illustrates the positive impacts that transparent governance at the local level can have on the relationships between Randilen WMA and community development, the experience of Nafco village paints a very different picture. Having subdivided from Lolkisale in 2012, Nafco comprised a rapidly growing Arusha majority that had been expanding land under cultivation, primarily for maize, beans, and peas. The original WMA chair from 2012-2017 was from Nafco village and, though he believed in the values of fairness and equity that were being upheld in Lolkisale-proper, the village council that established itself in Nafco did not. Unlike Lolkisale, Nafco did not have a history of managing money from wildlife-related tourism, and the village council that immediately came into power was tasked with managing these funds after

they were distributed from the WMA to the village bank. Although the annual funds were quite small (~5000 $USD), the community was aware that this money had been allocated to the village bank. At first, Nafco trusted their elected leaders and thought that the money would be used to benefit the community at large through the construction of schools and dispensaries, which are always high on the list of infrastructure priorities that communities put forward in assembly meetings. The Nafco council explained that the money they had received was not enough to fund these kinds of projects so villagers would have to continually supplement the money with their own contributions. Villagers obliged to this form of taxation as they were confident that it would improve quality of life of their community. As time passed, however, the village council continually asked for contributions on top of the WMA money and villagers did not see returns on their investments in the form of community development projects. They began to grow resentful and felt that the village council may have been embezzling money. As one angry Korianga-aged Arusha man explained to me in Nafco, "the village chair asked us all for our contributions with a smile on his face and promised that the money would be used together with the WMA funds to build a school, but then he ate the money!" As told by another interviewee, the village chair had been seen driving around in a new 4 x 4 vehicle that he had allegedly purchased with village contributions and WMA income. Unlike the ambulance in Lolkisale that the community had voted upon as an appropriate use of funds, the Nafco leader had decided undemocratically to use the money to buy the vehicle. Furthermore, villagers alleged that he used the vehicle for his own private needs and not as a public service to the community. As I continued to garner further perspectives on local governance in Nafco, one young Arusha woman who had attended secondary school reasoned (Nyangulu age-set) that she was not sure whether the chair had explicitly taken the money and spent it on himself, or whether he was simply bad at managing it. The consensus that I seemed to gather was that the village council had acted in a matter that was secretive and non-transparent, and with little accountability to the assembly that it represented. This caused significant levels of distrust to build in Nafco, not just towards the

village council, but also the WMA, which people began to see as something that benefited those in power and not the general village assembly. Negativity was apparent in the survey responses from Nafco, as presented in Sections 7.2-7.3. The fact that the village chair had asked for continued contribution payments from villagers made their experiences of resentment so much deeper. Many of the people I spoke to about it in Nafco were not just bitter, but hurt. They had trusted this leader to act in their community's interests and he had abused his position of power for his own benefit. By betraying their trust in this fashion, the village council was not just undermining local governance but the efficacy of the WMA, as communities were prevented from reaping its economic benefits. When villagers saw the village chair driving around in a new car, it was the straw that broke the camel's back. The assembly rose up in revolt and stormed the offices and the homes of the entire council and chased them out of town. Not a single member of any of the village's committees or sub-committees were spared. They physically forced an entire cleaning of house and would not entertain anyone from the former leadership group being involved in village governance in anyway. When I carried out fieldwork in Nafco in late 2019 prior to the elections, Nafco had no council or chair! The only member of government there was the *mtandaji* (VEO) who was assigned to the village from the district to carry out administrative tasks on its behalf. She informed me that just prior to my arrival, officials from PCCB (Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau), Tanzania's national body for investigating government corruption, had visited her to gather information about the case and the potential whereabouts of the former leaders. Knowing that elections were a particularly significant topic in Nafco, I stayed in the village while elections were ongoing around November 2019 and there were massive crowds and much political fanfare. Villagers made it very clear that they would not tolerate another similar travesty in the future.

The contrasting cases of Lolkisale-proper and Nafco demonstrate the importance of local-level village governance in shaping the social outcomes of WMAs. In Lolkisale, the transparent supervision of funds and democratic processes for determining how they would be used led

communities to trust their leaders and realize community-level benefits from the WMA. By contrast, the Nafco leadership managed WMA funds secretively and used them undemocratically for personal gain. As a consequence, the community developed distrust for their leaders and for the WMA institution, which they came to view as a tool for further enriching those in power at the expense of those who were already impoverished. The repercussions of poor leadership in terms of community attitudes towards the WMA are still observable, though people have softened to the WMA considerably in recent years thanks to Honeyguide's efforts to help reduce the impacts of elephants on crop production (see Section 7.5). These initiatives have helped to rebuild community trust in the WMA and remedy the damage done by the selfish former leaders. During interviews with the new village chair of Nafco in 2020, he pledged to help cultivate "a new Nafco" that respects the values of democracy and community well-being. As voiced by other members of the newly elected council during interviews, Nafco's political leaders have come to see the WMA as an institution that can support their community, as it had Lolkisale. They expressed a moral obligation to do right by their assembly "and succeed where the past leaders had failed."

7.13 Complexities in assessing the socioeconomic impacts of Randilen WMA

During interviews across the member villages, there were only a few individuals who did not like the WMA, and they usually referenced fines for grazing livestock in the protected photographic and tourism area. Interestingly, when I prodded more in these instances, the individuals did not personally graze their livestock in the WMA area, and had only heard stories from others about having livestock confiscated in the WMA. These second-hand stories were enough to colour their attitudes in a negative way. Importantly, they did not actually consider themselves to be WMA resource users. Of all the interviewees who grazed their livestock inside the WMA, all of them liked it. This finding complicates to some extent the idea that WMAs generally produce individual livelihood costs and community-level benefits. In fact, I would argue based on my ethnographic data that the WMA in practice has significant individual and community-level

livelihood benefits for local livestock keepers through a locally governed and flexibly enforced management model that keeps as its primary focus the pastoral mode of production. Quantifying these impacts on individual household wealth, as Keane et al. (2020) attempt to across Tanzania at large, would in my view be exceptionally challenging and is certainly beyond the scope of my capabilities. My suspicion, however, is that the household wealth indicators they used would not tell the whole story here.

In my view, certain types of economic analyses run into issues when applied in cross-cultural contexts. For instance, during a collaborative study with a wildlife ecologist based at the School for Field Studies in Karatu, we employed a standard set of material indicators of household wealth to determine if these were correlated with people's attitudes towards wildlife. The survey included items like (cars, motorbikes, sofas, chairs, TVs, radios, tin roofs, cement walls etc.). However, a concern I expressed based on my own interviews and participant observation was that in in some cases, there were elite Kisongo families living in our study villages with thousands of cattle, who are considered by themselves and their communities to be very wealthy, but who had virtually none of these things because they do not value them in the same way as other ethnic groups. What matters most to the Kisongo in the context of the WMA is the management of grass, which sustains their cattle. Grass is the material base of their economy and cattle is the currency. If there is good grass, and their livestock are healthy then people consider themselves to be wealthy (*engishui sidai* – "a good life"; see Woodhouse and McCabe 2018:5). For the Arusha, large farms are valued greatly, as are livestock, but to a lesser extent than the Kisongo (see Chapter 5). But the Arusha are much more inclined towards the material indicators of wealth that feature into these types of surveys because they prefer permanent housing structures, while the Kisongo still think of themselves as being semi-nomadic. Thus, focusing too narrowly on traditional measures of household and material wealth might not tell the full story of how WMAs fit in relation to the economies of local communities. Certainly, there are numerous other factors that are relevant, but would also be challenging to

quantify, such as the impacts of increasing wildlife numbers on stock depredation and crop raiding. Perhaps ethnographic attention to the lived experiences of local communities should be considered on equal footing to meta-level quantitative analyses across cases. During my fieldwork, people were eager to articulate both the costs and benefits of the Randilen WMA in terms that were meaningful to them. Based on my qualitative interviews, I found disaggregating these socioeconomic impacts of the WMA into individual and group-level costs and benefits fruitful, though as mentioned earlier, some of these overlap. Table 16 provides an overview of some of the most significant ones that arose during interviews.

Table 16 – Socioeconomic impacts of Randilen WMA

Household Benefits	Household Costs	Community Benefits	Community Costs
Formalization of communal grazing plans	Fines for transgressing WMA grazing restrictions	"Foreign currency" (tourism revenue for community bank)	Some village land reallocated as reserved area
Crop protection from wildlife (Honeyguide toolkits etc.)	Livestock depredation by carnivores	Protection of community land (from commercial farmers, external grabbers, and smallholder encroachment on pastoral areas)	Governance authority over village land (and investor contracts) shared with other villages via AA
Employment (VGS, lodge staff)[292]	Crop raiding by wild ungulates	Healthcare (building clinics, dispensaries, and ambulances from WMA revenue)	Village council cannot negotiate directly with private investors in village land
Smaller contributions from households to pay for community development projects	Permits required by AA to collect medicinal plants from reserve area	Education (building primary and secondary schools, furniture, and school supplies from WMA revenue)	Large amount of wildlife income taken by TAWA, District, WMA, and other member villages
		Formalization of communal grazing plans	Potentially increasing wildlife in village land

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[292] Some respondents in Lemooti and Mswakini Chini were concerned that the lodges were not living up to their responsibility to hire the correct quota of local people from the member villages.

7.14 Discussion and conclusion: From fear to trust

In their critiques of Randilen WMA, Loveless (2014) and Brehony et al. (2018) respectively forward "partial truths" (see Clifford 1986) that obscure nuance and flatten a textured social reality. While Loveless (2014) was correct in asserting that there was protest on the Naitolia and Mswakini side of the WMA at the time of her research in 2013-2014, she takes these conflicts at face value to mean that the communities universally opposed the WMA. She reaches this conclusion without visiting the Lolkisale side, where the initial idea for a community-based conservation area was born through a good faith relationship between Treetops and Lolkisale Village Council that was highly profitable for the community. If she had dug a little further, she would have realized that there was an underlying ethnic friction that was not visible to the naked eye, but which has unfolded between the Kisongo and the Arusha in subtle ways through the formal institutions of the post-independence state. After realizing the benefits of conservation through their private joint venture, the leaders of Lolkisale village approached the Monduli District Council to establish a community-based conservation area, at which point they were advised that the only option available to them given the current political landscape of conservation in Tanzania was a WMA. The leaders had to negotiate with other villages and put forth a proposal that stipulated which villages should be included in the WMA. Unsure of whether this would benefit or hurt their access to grazing resources, Korianga-aged Kisongo *iaigwanok* from Lengoolwa set out to visit the Kisongo of Longido, who had recently become part of Enduimet WMA. They wanted to be sure that the WMA would be a 'friend' rather than a 'foe' (see Wright 2019). After discussing the issue with Kisongo traditional leaders in Longido, the Kisongo of Lolkisale came to realize that the WMA could serve as an important means of pushing out trophy hunters, and preventing encroaching cultivators (including Arusha) from expanding into the area. Lolkisale-proper, though comprising mixed ethnicities, was supportive of conservation and ecotourism in village land. An ambulance with the words '*maziwa ya tembo*' ("milk of elephants") written on the back had been solely paid for by tourism revenue generated

by the Treetops arrangement. People in Lolkisale had thus experienced tangible benefits from conservation prior to the WMA being established. This was in large part due to the skilled and kind leadership of their long-serving village chair, who my interlocutors in Lolkisale feel acts selflessly in ensuring that the conservation revenues reaching the village bank are used effectively and democratically to address the needs of the community. WMA payments have been used to build schools, dispensaries, and ambulances, facilitating the provision of services that villagers desperately wanted.

By contrast, in Naitolia and Mswakini, the lack of transparency in governance meant that most villagers were not made aware of what the WMA actually was, let alone its potential implications on people's livelihoods. Villagers did not have adequate opportunities to voice their concerns and participate in the decision around whether they wanted to be included in the WMA in the first place (Loveless 2014). As Loveless (2014:52) writes, "the call for inclusion of the community was not met in reality." Importantly, the villages where Loveless (2014) was working (Naitolia and Mswakini) were almost exclusively inhabited by Arusha cultivators. They migrated into the area during the socialist period following villagization. Since then, they have used their kinship ties with members of village councils to strengthen their presence in the area. They are cognizant of their encroachment on a wildlife corridor, and on the lowland plains used by the Kisongo, knowing that history has seen the Kisongo push them out of these areas, and conservation displace rural communities in favour of wildlife habitat. The Arusha in these areas are thus apprehensive about whether they might at some point be evicted from the area, knowing that their 'indigenous' claims to land are somewhat precarious. This was the backdrop that several local elites were highly aware of when the WMA was initially proposed. Prior to the WMA, these elites had been distributed large plots of land in Mswakini and Naitolia for commercial agriculture through private arrangements with village leaders, including the former chair of Naitolia. The important legal context here is that the Village Land Act provides village councils with the legal authority to allocate land within their jurisdictions. These processes,

however, can be co-opted (see Thompson and Homewood 2002). Elites paid these councils to secure thousands of acres of farmland for their own private bean farms. Several of these arrangements existed in Mswakini and Naitolia prior to the WMA, creating significant land pressure. While leaders of Naitolia and Mswakini initially signed off on the WMA, they did so under significant pressure from the MP, MDGO, and ward councillors, and the promise that they too would benefit from the 'milk of elephants.' Around this time, the local elites who resided in Arusha town entered the picture to voice their opposition. Those individuals wanted the area to remain an open access free for all where they could pay to acquire sizeable farmlands. A local Kisongo cattle baron in Lemooti also opposed the WMA and wanted it to remain his private grazing pasture, without interference from collective institutions. When the WMA gained momentum, the commercial farmers immediately advised the village councils to rally the communities against the WMA to incite protest on the grounds that the villagers were going to be physically displaced and that this area would become a national park. The elites thus exploited Arusha feelings of insecurity through fear mongering. Some even paid local radio stations and newspapers to stoke fears and further embolden people to resist. This eventually culminated in the visible conflict that Loveless (2014) alluded to that spilled over onto the highway and necessitated the closures of village offices. The underlying reality, however, was that this conflict was largely incited intentionally by a powerful minority, and villagers were following suit from a place of misunderstanding. The political leaders of these villages, who were nefariously involved with these outside elites, were eventually thrown in jail for inciting conflict and were strongly advised by police and district authorities to cut ties with the outside actors who had stirred the politics of their villages.

Over time, however, the communities came to realize that the WMA actually did the opposite of what they feared: it secured their access to land in the face of dispossession from outside forces, rather than undermine it. For the Arusha, it also provided them with the added tenure security of being 'member villages' of the WMA, making it even harder to question their

claims to the land. Rather than a case of the government implementing this in a top-down fashion and exploiting villagers, governance of Randilen WMA is devolved to the communities via the AA, albeit in the context of a restrictive legislative framework dictating how WMAs are meant to function. On key measures of governance, like how decisions are taken, communities are directly involved through AA meetings. I have participated in several of these gatherings and was struck by the extent to which Randilen WMA authorities listened to, and collaborated with, representatives from each village to take their concerns into consideration. It became strikingly clear through my fieldwork that despite its complex beginnings, Randilen WMA has very much become a community-based conservation area. The head manager, accountant, WMA chair, and VGS rangers are all from the member villages. The WMA provides community members with a valuable dry season grazing bank, revenue for building schools and dispensaries, and a vehicle to push elephants out of their farms in the wet season. My central point is that painting the WMA with a broad-stroked brush as fortress conservation is not only unproductive, it is misrepresentative. Despite the concerns of social scientists about the nature of WMAs in general, Randilen WMA has become a community-based conservation area that serves the interests of its members. The communities still have some concerns, mainly to do with the livelihood impacts of increasing human-wildlife conflict, and the centralized nature in which WMA revenue is collected by TAWA before being dispersed back to the WMA (the communities would rather see this order of operations reversed), but overall, the communities have come to support the WMA and view it as their own. While the partiality of Loveless' (2014) thesis is understandable given the constraints of carrying out a Master's project, the social critique of Randilen WMA by Brehony et al. (2018), on the basis of no new empirical fieldwork, is less productive (despite good intentions). With the help of Honeyguide, Randilen WMA has blossomed into a livelihood-oriented model of conservation that communities are able to steer towards the things that matter to them: managing rangelands on a seasonal basis, and defending farms from crop-raiding elephants. The result is a community-based conservation area that protects a key wildlife

dispersal area adjacent to Tarangire National Park, while also providing a crucial grazing area for livestock, an effective crop-protection team for local farmers, and a share of tourism revenue to put towards building schools and dispensaries. The next step is helping Randilen WMA reach financial independence, a task that Honeyguide has identified as a central component of its new strategic plan for the next five years.

It is still important to bear in mind the fact that WMAs are not always synonymous with community-based conservation (Igoe and Croucher 2007).[293] Indeed, existing literature on community relations with WMAs in Tanzania speaks to this important consideration (Francis 2019; Bluwstein et al. 2016; Kicheleri et al. 2018a,b; Kicheleri et al. 2021). In many cases, there does appear to be valid reason for social scientists to be critical of WMAs, which may undermine the resource rights of local communities. From a conservation standpoint, exclusionary models of governance coupled with strong-handed management can breed discontent from local communities and incite resistance (Bennett and Dearden 2014). This may take the form of noncompliance (and even disregard) for regulations, potentially undermining the central aims of conservation (Holmes 2007; Hoffman 2014). The story that I have unfolded in this chapter, however, is that communities can also embrace the institution of WMAs and come to view them as centrally important to their livelihoods. Ethnographic factors specific to each case likely play a crucial role including, but not limited to, ethnicity, history, livelihoods, cultural practices, land use practices, inter-village dynamics, community-investor relations, ecology, seasonality, and so on. In short, WMAs should not be implemented uncritically as 'community-based' conservation interventions given their troubled histories and potential to generate conflict among local stakeholders (Kicheleri et al. 2018a; Kicheleri 2018; Green and Adams 2015; Moyo et al. 2017). At the same time, it is equally important to note that WMAs can also come to represent

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[293] These final two paragraphs are published in the following book chapter: Raycraft, Justin. 2022. Community attitudes towards Randilen Wildlife Management Area. *In* Tarangire: Human-wildlife coexistence in a fragmented ecosystem. Eds. Christian Kiffner, Derek Lee, and Monica Bond. Springer: New York, NY. Pp. 109-128.

community-based forms of conservation if the communities view them as valuable. When asked specifically about Brehony et al. (2018)'s description of Randilen WMA as fortress conservation (*Uhifadhi wa ngome / haijumuishi jamii*), the vast majority of respondents disagreed with this label, preferring to classify it as a community-based conservation area (*uhifadhi wa msingi wa jamii ambao unajumuisha jamii*) that is implemented in a way that benefits local communities. Looking to the future, equity must continue to be a central component of any community-based conservation initiative in the Tarangire ecosystem, where the migratory routes of wildlife intersect village land. In the case of Randilen WMA, positive attitudes towards the WMA at the community level suggest that conservation is being implemented in an equitable fashion. Based on this core finding, I have forwarded an alternative anthropological perspective on WMAs in Chapters 6 and 7, suggesting that while they are often characterized by conflict and marginalization, they can also show promise as institutional mechanisms for securing wildlife habitat outside national parks and garnering support for conservation from resource-dependent rural communities. In Chapters 8 and 9, I examine Manyara Ranch, another of model of conservation in the Tarangire ecosystem that has produced distinct yet similar social outcomes.

Chapter 8. Revisiting Manyara Ranch[294]

"If the villages managed Manyara Ranch, and wildlife were bringing in benefits they could see, then they would regulate grazing in the ranch better, and would even think about giving up their farms to better protect wildlife, because the ranch would be theirs, they would own it" (Goldman 2020:3).

The following two chapters examine Manyara Ranch in terms of the research questions outlined in Chapter 1 and reiterated in Chapter 6. Namely, the question of whether the ranch reflects an equitable and effective model of community-based conservation is at stake. Chapter 8 sketches the social history of the ranch up until 2011. This background is crucial for contextualizing the findings of my 2019-2020 study of the ranch, which I present in Chapter 9. I then discuss the case as a whole at the end of Chapter 9. I use the term "revisiting" in the title of Chapter 8 because Manyara Ranch has been the subject of many ethnographic studies in the past, most notably by Mara Goldman (see also Igoe 2007, 2010; Sachedina 2008). Goldman carried out emplaced ethnographic fieldwork in Oltukai in 2002-2004, with follow ups in 2005, 2007, 2009. The majority of historical information in Chapter 8 is drawn from Goldman (2011, 2020), publications that were based mainly on her emplaced fieldwork in Oltukai in 2002-2003. Goldman's work provides vital historical backdrop by detailing the early stages of ranch implementation from the perspectives of local Kisongo, and in the context of Maasai ways of knowing. I endeavour to situate my own work in relation to hers to broaden the temporal scale of my fieldwork.

8.1 Brief background on the ranch

Manyara Ranch covers 17,807 hectares just north of the A104 highway between TNP and LMNP (see Figure 2 in Chapter 2). In ecological terms, the ranch overlaps the northern migratory route for wildlife moving out of TNP (see Borner 1985). It is currently held through a 99 year lease

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[294] In terms of methods, she interviewed household heads (n=43) and elders (n=20) and carried out participant observation of Manyara Ranch steering committee meetings (from 2002-2004) (see Goldman 2020:69).

hold by AWF for the protection of wildlife habitat, and in support of local pastoral livelihoods. Its two community partner villages are Oltukai and Esilalei, which are inhabited almost entirely by Kisongo Maasai (see Chapter 5). Oltukai and Esilalei were formerly one village, together with Losirwa. In 1975, during the villagization period, Losirwa and Esilalei subdivided (Goldman 2020). Oltukai later broke off from Esilalei in 1999, and a boundary was "drawn along the seasonal Makuyuni River (*olkeiju Loorg'abolo* in Maa)" (Goldman 2020:83). Esilalei is larger and wealthier in terms of cattle holdings, though the two villages are closely related through kinship, clanship, and ethnicity. The ranch is surrounded to the east, south, and west by five other villages: Makuyuni, Naitolia, Mswkini Chini, Mswakini Juu, and Olasiti. All of these villages are in the Monduli District with the exception of Olasiti, which is in the Babati District of Manyara Region. These five villages are inhabited mostly by Arusha, other than the Saburi sub-village of Makuyuni, which borders the ranch to the east and is home to Kisongo and some mixed ethnicity families (see Chapter 5). There are also town-like sub-villages in Olasiti and Makuyuni, which formed around highway junctions.

The ranch is governed through an administrative board comprising AWF staff, village representatives, and district government officials and management is contracted by AWF to Honeyguide to oversee a team of VGS. The nature of this management contract is different from Randilen WMA, where Honeyguide is contracted directly by the AA; in Manyara Ranch, Honeyguide is funded and employed by AWF. The ranch is operated by a head manager and a team of support staff comprising a veterinarian and finance team who are paid by AWF. As its name suggests, the area is also managed as a ranch, with a central herd reared to generate income in support the running costs of the conservancy. Within the ranch, there is a significant array of pastoral resources. This includes a network of rivers, wells, and dams and key pastures that have historically been used by the Kisongo for dry season grazing.[295] The ranch also holds several

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[295] Goldman (2020:76,81) documents these areas meticulously using Maasai placenames. Significant areas in the ranch are *Olpurkel* ("a hot/dry place" in Maa) and *Olcorro* (Maa placename for a soda lake, silted dam and adjacent pastures). *Losemendoni* and *Embarimbali* were historically key sources of water near *Olcorro* (Goldman 2020:76).

sacred sites and areas significant for rituals, including a large *oreteti* (*Ficus thonningii*) tree, which women visit "to pray for rain and fertility" (Goldman 2020:70).

8.2 Manyara Ranch during the precolonial, colonial, and socialist periods

Sometime in the late precolonial period, the Kisongo settled the plains along the eastern shores of Lake Manyara, in contemporary Esilalei, pushing out or assimilating the Mbugwe who had expanded northwards to present day LMNP (see Kjekshus 1977b; Gray 1955). Through the German colonial period, the area that later became Manyara Ranch was used by the Kisongo for dry season grazing. Goldman's (2011) oral histories reveal that, at the time, Esilalei comprised two founding families, and the ranch was used for *orpul* (traditional ritual periods spent by *Ilmurran* in the bush to build strength and solidarity, and exchange knowledge) (see Goldman 2011:77). There were a few Kisongo homesteads near the current head office of the ranch at that time, but these were abandoned after 1930 over concerns about increasing tsetse flies in the area. In the mid-colonial period, an outsider named Farab requested access to the land from elders in Esilalei (Goldman 2011).[296] Farab was himself a livestock keeper and was interested in rearing cattle. Having already moved their homesteads out of the area due to tsetse flies, the elders agreed to allow Farab access to the area, but were not aware that in doing so they were foreclosing their formal rights to the land in the future (see Goldman 2011:70). Part of the incentive for the Kisongo to agree in this fashion was that they had hoped that Farab would address the growing tsetse fly problem by clearing and managing the bush. Over time, Farab began to bring in more people (likely staff) and established a perimeter around an area that he considered his own (Goldman 2011). The Kisongo in Esilalei, however, viewed the boundary as

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Embarimbali (Maa place name for a low lying area that catches rainwater and river spill-off in Manyara Ranch) was a crucial source of water in the dry season, though it disappeared in 2018 after an elephant carcass clogged it, causing water to spillover across the land (see Goldman 2020:234-235). *Eluaii* is frequented by residents of Esilalei for pasture, firewood, and *olcani* ("medicinal plants") (Goldman 2020). *Eluaii* is Maa for *Acacia drepanolobium* ("whistling thorn"), which Maasai women use as a medicine "to clean out the uterus after childbirth" (Goldman 2020:81). Endepesi residents access a natural dam in Manyara Ranch that they call *Loongaik* ("arms"), as it resembles two widespread arms (Goldman 2020:76).

[296] Goldman (2011) notes that Farab was a '*mzungu*' ("white person"), though his name may have been Arabic.

illegitimate and continued to access resources inside the area as needed including wells they had dug at *Aladariak* in the *Long'abolo River* (see Goldman 2011:70; Goldman 2020:76).[297] Farab was not well-liked by the Kisongo of Esilalei, who alleged that he apprehended and sometimes beat children for grazing livestock inside 'his' area (and even stole their clothing) (Goldman 2011). Conflicts began to emerge at that time over different conceptions of property, with the Kisongo conceiving of the area in terms of shared access, and Farab thinking in terms of private property (Goldman 2011).

In the late colonial period, the ranch was turned over to a white settler named George Dam, a fellow who the Kisongo liked by contrast to Farab. The Kisongo continued to graze their livestock in the area and access resources as needed, but found Dam more respectful than Farab and accommodating as needed. They particularly appreciated his efforts to manage pastures through controlled burns (Goldman 2011). Dam set up fire breaks and alternated years burning each side of the ranch to help reduce ticks and tsetse flies and help encourage new grass growth (see Goldman 2011:74-75). During my interviews in Oltukai and Esilalei (and Olasiti), some elders recalled Dam fondly as a fellow who took no issue with local Kisongo grazing their livestock in the area as needed. The elders felt there was respect (*enkanyit*), which Farab had lacked. Interestingly, some of the elders in Oltukai also recalled the colonial period nostalgically as "a time when life was good," as compared to the periods after independence that followed (cf. Hodgson 2001).

Distinctions between how the land was registered on paper, and how the Kisongo used it in practice, however, created issues in the years that followed. Though the Kisongo had a respectful relationship with Dam involving shared access, from the view of the colonial administrators, the land belonged legally to Dam. When Dam passed away following independence, the ranch was nationalized by the socialist government under the National

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[297] *Aladariak* means "the place of red water" in Maa (Goldman 2020:76). There, water is "salty" and rich with minerals, likely iron, which make it red (Goldman 2020:76).

Ranching Corporation (NARCO) (Goldman 2011:70). NARCO ranches, though separate from the Ranching Associations described in Chapter 3, were managed by the central government with a similar intention of producing beef commercially (mainly Borana cattle) for export. Both NARCO ranches and associations were informed by conventional American approaches to range management and aimed to modernize animal husbandry practices to boost the national economy (see LaRocque 2006:77; Hodgson 2001). The emphasis of NARCO ranches and ranching associations on producing beef for market thus diverged from pastoral interests in rearing cattle for milk (and social life). Unlike the ranching associations, NARCO ranches were not jointly operated with local Maasai.[298] During the NARCO era, pasture management in Manyara Ranch "was abysmal" (LaRocque 2006:77). The Kisongo of Esilalei were technically prohibited from accessing the ranch, though some local herders were hired to manage the national herds. Local Kisongo, however, continued to use the area as needed "to meet their livelihood and cultural needs" (Goldman 2011:68). Local herders snuck onto the ranch as needed to "steal grass" (see Goldman 2011:73), and sometimes bribed their way into accessing pastures (LaRocque 2006). Without adequate institutions for managing these haphazard grazing patterns, vegetation cover in the ranch became "denuded" during the NARCO era (LaRocque 2006:77). Due in part to bureaucratic and management challenges, and difficulties in bringing cattle to market, many of the NARCO ranches in Tanzania started to privatize in the late 1990s in an attempt to make them more economically viable (see Goldman 2011:70). NARCO ranches had vacuumed up much of the state funding for the livestock sector, and yet never became profitable. Ironically, pastoralists and small-scale livestock keepers remained the primary livestock producers throughout the socialist period despite the minimal investments they received as compared to the state ranches. Though some NARCO ranches have endured in Tanzania, most still struggle to run a profit. Manyara Ranch, like several others, was put up for sale in 1999 (see Goldman 2020:89).

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[298] A ranching association did exist in Manyara during this period (headed by Reuben Ole Kuney) that extended from Engaruka down through Selela, though it was ended in 1979 (source: 2020 interview with Reuben Ole Kuney).

8.3 The arrival of AWF and the formation of the Tanzania Land Conservation Trust

After learning that the NARCO ranch was being listed for sale by the government, the Kisongo of Oltukai and Esilalei made a formal request to president Mkapa for the land to be returned to them (see Goldman 2011:69; Goldman 2020:89; see also Igoe 2007:249). They argued that the land had been theirs prior to the colonial period and that they had shared access rights to it in good faith, only to see it put under exclusive use and control. The village councils of Oltukai and Esilalei proposed to manage the ranch as their own, and had gathered that President Mkapa might be sympathetic to their pleas. After some lobbying, the communities received word that the land was indeed going to be returned to them, which residents of Oltukai and Esilalei celebrated. However, a misunderstanding had taken place around the exact legal status of the land, as the central government had in reality allocated the land to AWF (Goldman 2011). Realizing its potential as a key wildlife habitat, AWF had purchased a 99-year lease hold over the ranch with a proposed plan to manage the ranch *on behalf* of the communities (Goldman 2011). The central government turned over the ranch to AWF on April 19, 2001 to manage through a privately held land trust (see AWF 2003:1). The trust was the first of its kind in Tanzania and became known as the Tanzania Land Conservation Trust (TLCT). At the time of purchase, the land itself was valued at around 233,000USD$ (see Goldman 2011:78, note 26) and with funding from USAID, AWF invested a further 2.5 million USD$ in the ranch between 2001-2007 (Sachedina 2008:347). As part of the legal process, the TLCT was registered as a "non-profit institution that [sought] to acquire critical wildlife areas" (AWF 2003:1). This structure was based on a model used by the Nature Conservancy to purchase and manage land for conservation goals (see Goldman 2011:77; note 7).[299]

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[299] See LaRocque (2017) for discussion of a Nature Conservancy easement program in southwestern Alberta that involved purchasing a series of ranches on the eastern edge of Waterton National Park and subsequently leasing the land back to ranchers, under prohibitions against hunting or practicing agriculture, in order to preserve wildlife habitat.

Lands acquired by the TLCT, including Manyara Ranch, were to be managed as community-based conservation areas "to protect the needs of local pastoral communities and to preserve the integrity of the landscape for wildlife conservation" (AWF 2003:1).[300] While these dual aims were laudable on paper, the two objectives were not valued on equal footing in practice. AWF's main goal in securing Manyara Ranch, as it had been in assisting to formalize Randilen WMA a decade later, was to protect a key wildlife dispersal area outside TNP. The ranch was seen as particularly important because AWF considered it to be part of the "Kwa Kuchinja Wildlife Corridor," which encompassed the northern migratory routes out of TNP (see Figure 54 in Chapter 6; Goldman 2009; Goldman 2020; Igoe and Croucher 2007; Igoe 2007). The ranch was identified as a key link in this pathway that could serve to connect TNP to LMNP and beyond, if it was secured from habitat conversion (Goldman 2020). One possible option that was considered was annexing the entire area as part of LMNP, but AWF and government officials were aware that local resistance in Oltukai and Esilalei would be heated (see Igoe 2007:248). At the same time, smallholder farming was expanding rapidly in the area. By the late 1990s, TNP's northern migratory wildlife routes had already become highly fragmented as Arusha continued to in-migrate to Naitolia and Mswakini (with the Kisongo moving out in tandem and consolidating in Oltukai and Esilalei; see Goldman 2020:84). While AWF was cognizant of the dependence of Oltukai and Esilalei on the ranch, they thus considered the ranch too crucially important to be entrusted directly to local villages "unconditionally" out of fear that it would be put under cultivation (Goldman 2020:69). The TLCT was seen as a compromise that would allow AWF to retain control over the governance and management of the ranch, while still catering to the interests of local communities. By acquiring the ranch through the TLCT, AWF was able to achieve its main goal of acquiring a sizeable portion of wildlife habitat outside TNP and preventing it from being converted to smallholder farms.[301] It was an exciting new model of

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[300] Source: https://www.awf.org/news/manyara-ranch-corridor-and-more (March 22, 2022)

[301] Some ecologists suggest that the areas adjacent to Tarangire National Park are better thought of as dispersal areas rather than corridors.

conservation, and AWF hailed Manyara Ranch as its "flagship conservancy" (Sachedina 2008).[302] In fact, the majority of AWF's approximately 1.5 million $USD annual budget in the early 2000s was "concentrated in Manyara Ranch" (Sachedina 2008:393).

8.4 Community confusion over the AWF lease

Around the time that the lease agreement was being formalized, AWF approached Oltukai and Esilalei with plans to carry out land use planning in the area and raised the idea of managing the ranch in terms of wildlife conservation and pastoral livelihoods. The Kisongo were receptive to working with AWF to manage wildlife in the ranch, having no major quarrel with wildlife themselves, and thinking that the ranch had been returned to them by the president (Goldman 2011). Goldman carried out her core doctoral fieldwork in Oltukai just after the ranch had been allocated to AWF (2002-2003), and she notes that, in 2002, residents of Esilalei and Oltukai were confused about who actually owned the ranch (Goldman 2006; Goldman 2011:70). People felt that the ranch was *theirs*. Many of the people Goldman spoke to were not actually aware that the AWF had purchased the leasehold for the area. When the AWF lease was formalized, communities were operating under the assumption that the ranch was being returned to the villages of Oltukai and Esilalei, and that AWF was only offering an assisting role in managing wildlife inside the ranch (see Goldman 2011:70). It was not until one member of ranch staff translated the transfer paperwork into kiSwahili and distributed it to the communities that people in these villages became aware of the lease agreement (see Goldman 2011:70). Community members realized thereafter that a "series of meetings" had been carried out without community representatives during which the ranch had actually been turned over to the TLCT (Igoe 2007:249). Feeling blindsided by the news, the communities began to feel distrustful of the ranch

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[302] The idea was not ominous in and of itself – a collaborative trust to manage an important area for wildlife, while providing local pastoralists with resource access. However, the way in which it disregarded local rights was problematic (Igoe 2007). Igoe contends that the local Kisongo were relegated to "junior stakeholders," rather than "rights bearing citizens," as they were considered by conservationists to be threats to the protected status of the area (Igoe 2007:249).

and began to fear that their land had been sold to make way for an exclusive protected area. Misunderstandings about who owned the ranch were fueled by then MP Baraka, who held the position from 1995-2015 (discussed in Chapter 6).[303] Goldman's (2011:78) interlocutors in Esilalei and Oltukai told her stories of Baraka visiting the villages and calling a meeting where he "held up a piece of paper and declared that" it was "proof that the area had been returned to them" (see Note 27). But since no one in the villages had actually *read* the piece of paper he was holding, people in Esilalei and Oltukai began to speculate that the paper had just been a ruse used to placate them while the deal was being formalized (see Goldman 2011:78; note 27).

Further stoking distrust, Mkapa was named as a member of AWF's board of trustees after finishing his second term as President, and Baraka was given a key position on the board of the TLCT (see Igoe 2007:249). Residents of Oltukai and Esilalei interpreted these appointments to mean that the central government had lied to them, and quickly came to see the TLCT as a scheme that benefited the central government and AWF, at the expense of local communities. People in Oltukai and Esilalei felt "robbed" of their land and some were afraid that they were going to be evicted (Igoe 2007:249).[304] AWF representatives had allegedly floated the idea of relocating people to the Hanang Plains in the southwest (see Igoe 2007:250), where conflicts between Barabaig and a Canadian-funded commercial wheat farm were already abound (Lane 2018). With funding from the Brown Foundation, AWF relocated a primary school from the centre of the ranch to a safer location on the periphery as part of its efforts to clear the area for wildlife habitat (Igoe 2010:386).[305] AWF also lobbied the government to evict people from the neighbouring Saburi Estate that had been settled by former labourers who allegedly had not been paid in many years (see Sachedina 2008:363). They also encouraged the government to relocate

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[303] As a reminder, Baraka is a pseudonym.

[304] While there were a few evictions of homesteads when AWF took over, these were because people had settled on the ranch illegally (see Goldman 2011).

[305] In defence of this move, the ranch manger at the time, Clive Jones, had been genuinely worried about student safety, since there had been a "rogue lioness" killing cattle on the ranch (AWF 2003:1). This prompted his recommendation to move the school to a safer location. The new location was also more accessible to students.

a district secondary school in the 9,000 acre Makuyuni JKT around the same period, with intentions of expanding their efforts across the wider landscape (see Sachedina 2008:363).[306]

Part of the confusion and fear at the community level surrounded the TLCT institution and what it meant for ranch ownership. The newly hired expatriate ranch manager tried to explain to communities in 2002 the details of the TLCT, and why the deal had taken place, but Goldman (2011) notes that this generated further confusion. Communities felt that they had "*invited*" AWF to "help manage wildlife" and not to "*own*" the ranch (Goldman 2020:89). They were unclear about why this new manager had been hired and why people in Oltukai and Esilalei had no say in hiring him. Technically, AWF (with donor support) had fronted the money for the TCLT to hold the land, but villagers had taken this to mean that the land had been sold, and thus that the ranch had been "lost again" (Goldman 2011:71). Almost all of the people that Goldman spoke to about the ranch in Oltukai and Esilalei in 2003 said that the ranch was no longer theirs. Her interlocutors felt that AWF had abused the community's good faith invitation to help manage the area by dealing directly with the government to purchase the land (see Goldman 2020:89).

8.5 Changing institutional arrangements for ranch governance

AWF and the TLCT were in conception the same entity, but were parsed for "legal and accountability reasons" (Goldman 2011:77). Residents of Oltukai and Esilalei, however, associated the Trust with AWF. The TLCT was formally registered as a legal entity and, in terms of governance, was jointly run by a steering committee and a board of trustees (see Goldman 2011:69). As mentioned in the previous section, the chairman of the board was MP Baraka who also served at the time as the Minister of Livestock and Water. The remainder of the board comprised a range of representatives from Big NGOs, donors, government bodies (AWF, WWF, TANAPA, UNDP), and private investors. To 'represent' community interests, the *Oloiboni* of Esilalei was named to the board, though he could not fully participate due to language barriers

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[306] JKT stands for "*Jeshi la Kujenga Taifa*" ("National Military Area").

(Goldman 2011).[307] His inclusion was thus largely tokenistic, and there was a significant "participation gap" between the board and the communities it claimed to represent (Goldman 2011:72).

The steering committee by contrast comprised representatives from village government, including the chairs from both villages. According to the initial Trust deed, the board and steering committee were supposed to work collaboratively to govern the ranch. In practice, however, the board of trustees had the power to make decisions regarding management priorities, and the steering committee was relegated to an advisory role (Goldman 2011). Steering committee members, for instance, were invited to board meetings, but could not actually vote on board-related matters (see Goldman 2011:77). Monthly steering committee meetings were run by the ranch manager, and participants were generally picked up in the ranch vehicle and brought to headquarters where the meetings were held. However, due in part to cultural differences in how the meetings were structured, community members did not feel that they had "space to speak" (Goldman 2020:194). Steering committee meetings were led by the manger in a western format, so community representatives could not participate on their own terms, based on their "own social norms" (Goldman 2020; Goldman 2011:72). Participants were also inadequately educated, further limiting their participation (Goldman 2011). As a result, local Maasai knowledge was generally marginalized in ranch governance decisions, particularly in the context of "ecological planning" and strategies for "herd management" (Goldman 2011:72). Making matters worse, AWF hired an Arusha community liaison representative, which the Kisongo very much resented (Goldman 2011).

As a result of the gaps in participation, key ranch governance decisions were generally taken by the board with little to no input from the communities (see Goldman 2011:71). Community members were essentially bystanders who were along for the ride (i.e. not "captains

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[307] Meshuki could not speak or read kiSwahili or English and thus could not follow along with the governance discussions that took place around him.

of their ship" to quote Damian). People in Oltukai and Esilalei, for instance, wanted to rename the ranch *ramat* to signify its central role in rangeland management (see Godfrey 2018 for discussion of *eramatare*), but AWF vetoed it for sounding "too Arabic" (Goldman 2011:70). Of greater consequence, communities had little clout for negotiating contracts with prospective investors in the ranch, deciding which NGOs would be involved in ranch management, and determining the general orientation of ranch objectives. Ultimate authority over these decisions was vested in the board, and the steering committee came to see themselves as "puppets" who were pulled in different directions by more powerful conservationists and politicians (see Goldman 2011:72). Power asymmetries between the board of trustees and the steering committee allowed the board to co-opt ranch governance and even undermine the abilities of village chairs to manage resources in their respective villages (Goldman 2011). While it does not surface explicitly in Goldman's work, several of my key informants claimed that Baraka had manipulated his position as chairman of the board in an attempt to keep his own private herd of cattle on the ranch. Baraka, who had also been embroiled in a national corruption controversy, allegedly "saw the ranch as his own private backyard" (key informant interview 2019). However, when I raised these allegations with a few of my key informants at the district level, they asserted that these rumours were false and had been perpetuated by Baraka's political opposition to undermine his reputation. I am not well positioned to comment on the validity of the allegations, but what is clear is that some local Kisongo did not fully trust Baraka. Though Baraka was raised in Monduli and claimed to be Maasai, he was actually born to a Meru mother and a Chagga father. In reality, however, few Maasai actually "recognized him as such" (Hodgson 2011:170).

Similar to the experiences of Naitolia and Mswakini in the context of Randilen WMA planning, the communities of Oltukai and Esilalei were caught up in wider political dynamics that made it challenging for them to articulate their interests. To address this concern, Goldman proposed in 2005 that Manyara Ranch adopt an *enkiguena* ("traditional Maasai meeting") style for its steering committee meetings to allow for greater community participation (Goldman

2020:209). While this show of good faith in decolonizing the governance processes of the ranch was appreciated by the communities, the core issue that concerned them – ownership of the ranch – remained unaddressed. This was the primary factor that continued to upset the Kisongo throughout the period of Goldman's studies. Questions around ranch ownership were structurally tied to the legal contract between AWF and the state and were complicated by the meddling of Baraka as chairman of the board. A key issue, then, was titling. Due to word of mouth arrangements between the Kisongo of Esilalei and the original colonial settlers, a series of processes were set in motion that would ultimately see the area registered as a national ranch. If the area had been titled as village land, then Esilalei (or Oltukai) would have been able to negotiate contracts with potential investors, or manage the area as they saw fit (Goldman 2020). However, since it was not registered as village land, Manyara Ranch was able to secure a leasehold through the TLCT. Thus, communities did not legally have any formal rights to the ranch, regardless of the participatory structure of the steering committee meetings (Goldman 2020). Titling is thus a key strategy in Tanzania for securing pastoral rights to land when there are competing interests in rangeland resources (Goldman, Davis and Little 2016; see Goldman 2020:150-151). It provides tenure security and though it does not, in and of itself, translate into management in practice (see Chapter 4), the absence of tenure security creates conditions of precarity for pastoralists. Goldman (2020) contrasts the case of the ranch with AWF's efforts to implement KEEP ("Kwa Kuchinja Environmental Easements Project) in village land, which proposed to pay villagers a fee to relocate their bomas out of a key wildlife corridor in Oltukai, along the edge of Lake Manyara (see also Igoe 2007). KEEP was part of AWF's effort to "transform" the Maasai Steppe heartland into a unified "conservation landscape," and also included a proposed easement south of the ranch in Mswakini to protect a narrow wildlife corridor north of Tarangire (Igoe 2010:386). AWF was also instrumental in establishing Burunge WMA to the southwest of the ranch, and Randilen WMA to its southeast (see Chapter 6). The logic of the easements was that villagers could be incentivized to stop farming and relocate their

homesteads through one-time payments. Due in large part to growing distrust and feelings of resentment towards AWF over the ranch, Oltukai (and Mswakini) refused the KEEP project (see Davis and Goldman 2019). They were able to do so because the areas in question were titled as villages, as compared to the adjacent ranch, where AWF dictated the terms of the arrangement as the lease holder.

8.6 Complexities around negotiating investor contracts

One of the key implications of these differences in titling between the ranch and the village was the manner in which contracts with investors were negotiated. By way of comparison, in Oltukai village in the early 2000s, Corbett Bishop entered into a contract with the village council involving an annual commission for a private concession and tented camp, agreements to hire local community members, and a bed night fee (see Goldman 2020:9, 109, 236). Corbett mainly focused on cultural tourism and brought visitors to purchase local handicrafts and stay in the village overnight (Goldman 2020:9). The concession was modest, and included a 50-acre area where no grazing was allowed (see Goldman 2020:114).[308] Together, Corbett and Oltukai village then established the Ol Tukai Conservancy (OTC), a grassroots NGO that carried out anti-poaching monitoring in village land and raised private funds for village development projects (see Sachedina 2008:347). Corbett and AWF came into conflict with each other over these initiatives, with each accusing the other of manipulating communities, competing for scarce donor funds, and implementing ineffective conservation strategies (see Sachedina 2008:347). These frictions were exemplified by AWF's attempts to block OTC's formal registration with the

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[308] One tension around the investment was that Corbett wanted to build a dam to attract wildlife (and to benefit livestock keepers), but some community members were concerned about increasing grazing competition in village land between wildlife and livestock. The communities tried to leverage this potential cost to negotiate for increased access to ranch pastures, which they were still largely excluded from at the time (see Goldman 2020:117-125).

Monduli District Council in December 2005 (Sachedina 2008).[309] Conflicts between Corbett and AWF were ongoing until Corbett passed away in 2009 and the company left (Goldman 2020).[310]

Since their arrangement had been on village land prior to the revised WCA of 2009, Corbett and Oltukai had negotiated the terms of their partnership directly and appeared to be engaging in a mutually beneficial community-based conservation venture, though Goldman (2020) expresses some suspicions that the arrangement may have benefited certain individuals in the village more than others. By contrast, in the ranch, AWF via the TLCT retained full authority to negotiate with prospective investors. As the centrepiece of its heartland initiative, AWF sought to woo investors by marketing the area as "an attractive location for a luxury lodge." (Igoe 2010:386). Local communities resented that AWF leveraged its ties to Oltukai and Esilalei to market itself as a community-based conservancy in Maasailand, even though its governance institutions were essentially top-down (Goldman 2020). Despite community concerns, AWF was successful in attracting both donor support and an investor. The TLCT negotiated a contract with Mantis Limited for a 35,000 acre concession inside the ranch, to be managed under the name Manyara Ranch Conservancy. It was negotiated as an exclusive rights contract, meaning that other investors were not allowed to establish tented camps or lodges in the ranch unless a new contract was negotiated. Livestock grazing was only permitted inside the concession in accordance with official ranch policies (see Section 8.8).

The problem from the perspective of community members was that residents of Oltukai and Esilalei were not sufficiently included in these negotiations. Rather than a joint venture agreement between a village council and an investor (as Lolkisale VC had with Treetops), or a

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[309] Tensions continued to escalate when a large trench for holding water was dug by AWF in Oltukai village in 2006 without the village's permission (see Sachedina 2008:348). The trenches posed a serious risk to livestock and people, and several children were injured after falling in. Soon after the trenches were constructed, former President Mkapa was hosting billionaire Ted Turner on the ranch in an attempt to persuade him to donate a sizeable sum (Sachedina 2008). Corbett sent a small team of anti-poaching staff to Mkapa's tent to report that several zebra had fallen into the trenches and died (Sachedina 2008). AWF responded by reporting Corbett to the police and alleging that he mobilized villagers to 'intrude' on the ranch during an important visit from the former President (Sachedina 2008).
[310] Goldman (2020:9) notes that another investor "came and left" between this period.

WMA that would provide the opportunity for the AA (a representative democracy) to negotiate the terms of the contract, the Manyara Ranch Conservancy was governed by the TLCT. Thus, its board of trustees had the exclusive authority to negotiate the terms of the contract. Since village governments were only represented on the steering committee, which served an advisory role, they did not have a direct say in the terms of the benefit sharing agreement, meaning there was no framework in place for sharing tourism revenues directly with the villages. The consequence was that Mantis Limited never actually had to negotiate with the community, and thus there was no obligation for it to pay a share of the revenue back to the villages, other than good will. From the perspectives of people in Oltukai and Esilalei, the deal had thus been negotiated in bad faith, and the concession further symbolized the land being "lost" (see Goldman 2011:76).

8.7 A commercial cattle ranch *and* a wildlife conservancy

Throughout the early 2000s, AWF was generally more interested in wildlife conservation than ranching, but after floating the idea of an exclusive wildlife conservancy to the communities of Esilalei and Oltukai, and receiving significant pushback, AWF decided to maintain the commercial ranch (Goldman 2020). First and foremost, keeping the ranch signified to the communities that cattle would continue to be prioritized in the area over wildlife. It was thus of great symbolic importance to the Kisongo of Oltukai and Esilalei. Furthermore, the ranch also offered numerous practical benefits for local pastoralists as well. The resident veterinarian officer at the ranch assisted local herders deal with emergent livestock diseases by providing medicines and vaccines, and helping oversee the tick dips and other key services. For the Kisongo, their cattle were their most central concern, and having the ranch nearby provided them services that were useful for their livelihoods. Bearing in mind these benefits, Goldman (2020) notes that residents of Esilalei and Oltukai would have been fine with reducing the ranch's large herd in favour of a much smaller one used only for breeding. In simple terms, this would have meant more available pasture for village herds. AWF likely figured that if the area was going to be managed for livestock on behalf of the communities anyway, then it may as well have some

skin in the game with a herd of its own. The commercial ranch was thus sustained, with cattle and sheep brought to market to support overall running costs of the conservancy. In fact, most of AWF's subsequent investments in Manyara Ranch were put towards "ranch infrastructure" (see Sachedina 2008:394).

In an attempt to increase cattle marketing, AWF built a cattle slaughtering station (abattoir – from French *Abattre* "to slaughter") near the Makuyuni junction in 2010, but it never became operational. AWF rationalized the project in a few ways. First, it assumed that with improved local processing infrastructure, a greater market could be generated in Makuyuni than already existed. A vibrant local market would benefit the ranch economically, as it would create a more stable and convenient revenue stream. The slaughtering house was thus thought of as a long-term investment that would provide Manyara Ranch returns in the future. A second rationale behind the project, and one taken up by the colonial and socialist regimes of the past, was that the slaughtering station would help incentivize the local Kisongo to stop accumulating cattle. This would lead to destocking in the villages surrounding the ranch to the benefit of competing wildlife. As discussed at length throughout this dissertation, however, the Kisongo preferred to think of their cattle as their long-term investment portfolios, and were not particularly interested in compromising their principals that paid rich dividends in the form of milk (see Ferguson 1990; Hodgson 2001). They also tended to disagree with the overly simplistic narrative that livestock and wildlife were direct competitors in a zero sum game (Goldman 2020). In the end, the slaughter house was abandoned as a failed project. Irrespective of this, cattle numbers per household in Oltukai and Esilalei have declined modestly over the past twenty years (see Chapter 5), with Goldman (2020) documenting an average of 73 head per household in Oltukai and 138 in Esilalei in 2002, as compared to the 60 head per household in Oltukai and 81 head per household in Esilalei that I recorded in 2020. Droughts in 2003, 2005, 2009, and 2011 likely played a significant role in these declines. Prior to the major drought of 2009, for instance, Esilalei had an average of around 209 head per household, which

subsequently declined to 32 following the drought (Goldman Riosmena 2013; Goldman 2020). Disarticulation between rising human population and relatively stable overall cattle numbers is likely also a factor (see for example McCabe 2003:105 for discussion in the Ngorongoro context).

8.8 Conflicts over the initial grazing policy

In taking over the governance and management of Manyara Ranch, AWF brought with it a different way of conceptualizing rangelands from local Kisongo pastoralists (Goldman 2020). This way of envisioning landscapes largely neglected local ecological knowledge and Maasai ways of knowing. Goldman (2020) provides a remarkably fine-tuned assessment of Maasai understandings of ranch resources in terms of their sociocultural significance and economic functions as part of the pastoral mode of production. While AWF focused on mapping boundaries, the local Kisongo knew their landscapes intimately through place names and oriented themselves in a "spherical" fashion (drawing from Ingold 2000) through lived experience on the ground. Goldman (2020) documents ontological differences in terms of how the Kisongo conceived of place, and the ways in which AWF thought about wildlife habitat: each construal was couched within a different way of ordering the environment.

From the perspectives of people in Oltukai and Esilalei, the dams, rivers, wells, and dry season pastures in the ranch were lifelines for their pastoral livelihoods. Residents of these villages employed a series of flexible customary institutions for regulating access to ranch resources as needed, though many of them had been disrupted by the formal status of the land since the socialist period. AWF saw local pastoralists as a threat to the integrity of the wildlife habitat, and sought to limit them through fixed boundaries, permits, and quotas (Goldman 2020). These different approaches to rangeland management were evident in the ranch's initial grazing policy, which was implemented in 2003 and became an immediate source of contention (Goldman 2011). Though village chairs were represented on the steering committee, the communities were not directly involved in negotiating the terms of the grazing plan. The ranch

manager devised the policy before subsequently approaching the steering committee to discuss it. In fairness, Goldman (2020) does note that the manager was interested in garnering community input from the committee. However, due to the paternalistic governance structure, committee members felt uncomfortable voicing their concerns on behalf of their communities despite their disagreements (Goldman 2020).

Goldman (2020:117) argues that AWF's grazing policy was informed by conventional wisdom about the carrying capacity of the land relative to stocking rates, and this led to the implementation of a rigid permit system for local herders (Goldman 2011; Igoe 2010). Management was afraid that if village cattle entered the ranch from one place, it would lead to the formation of a *korongo* (gorge) (see Goldman 2020:118).[311] The initial grazing plan required pastoralists to make "individual requests" to graze inside the ranch during the dry season (Goldman 2011:73). To be awarded access, the prospective herders first had to demonstrate that there was no remaining grass near their bomas (Goldman 2011).[312] Strict regulations on herd sizes were put in place, and ranch security took photographs of cattle and recorded names of herders to enforce them (Goldman 2011). Only a certain percentage of a milking herd was allowed onto the ranch, and initially there was a limit of "50 head of cattle" per request, though this was eliminated by the end of 2003 (Goldman 2011:78). In Goldman's (2011:73) view, the grazing plan was essentially designed to deter village cattle from accessing Manyara Ranch, unless local herders were in "severe need." The second manager of the ranch even explicitly tried to prevent residents of Oltukai and Esilalei from grazing their livestock in the ranch at all, and encouraged them to plant grass in the villages instead (Goldman 2020).

8.9 Social implications of ranch politics

The rise in AWF's power over land, and its direct partnerships with government and investors, were concerning to social scientists because the changes in sovereignty seemed to be

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[311] For context, Esilalei had around 11,000 cattle at the time of Goldman's fieldwork.

[312] This is a reference to the personal reserve grass near the homestead described by Alais Morindat in Chapter 4.

accompanied by declining rights of rural communities (Igoe 2007; Igoe and Croucher 2007; Sachedina 2008; Brockington et al. 2008). From the perspectives of the local Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei, they resented the fact that AWF selected an expatriate ranch manager without their input, who brought with him a different way of conceptualizing rangelands. They felt marginalized by ranch policies that ignored Maasai social memories and cultural histories of resource use in their areas, and threatened their livelihoods (Goldman 2020). They particularly resented the way the ranch prioritized wildlife habitat at the expense of grazing, especially since wildlife also "circulated" on village land, for which villagers received no compensation (Goldman 2018; Goldman 2020:130).

These multilayered politics shaped community sentiment towards the ranch in a significant way. By 2003, Goldman noted that most of her interlocutors in these villages resented the ranch and viewed its conservation status as illegitimate. The Kisongo felt that their traditional knowledge of pastures, cattle, and wildlife were neglected by ranch management practices.[313] Furthermore, they felt that AWF and the implicated politicians treated them with disrespect, which greatly undermined community support.[314] The feelings of disillusionment that Goldman documented were largely about herders feeling dispossessed by overly strict grazing restrictions that had been implemented in a top-down way by outsiders. While local Kisongo herders were formally outmatched in the political arena that encircled the ranch, they were not helpless victims of top-down processes. They protested subtly by continuing to graze their livestock on the ranch as needed, irrespective of the restrictions (Goldman 2011). These types of transgressive acts, while seemingly small, have been shown to destabilize power structures by lessening the impact of formal rules (see Scott 1985). Goldman (2011:70) documents local herders grazing

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[313] Goldman (2020) gives numerous examples throughout her book. One interesting one relates to divergent views on the management of cattle disease (see Goldman 2020:102-103).

[314] Goldman (2020:106) highlights an instance when the manager wanted herders from Oltukai and Esilalei to bring ranch cattle to Arusha town by foot for a percentage share of the sales. Community members viewed this request as disrespectful because of the labour dynamics it signified; wealthy Kisongo generally pay poorer herders to transport their cattle in this way. In the end, the communities refused the request on the grounds that it was disrespectful.

their livestock on the ranch at night out of sight of ranch guards. I would interpret these acts as 'everyday forms of resistance,' following Holmes (2007) and Hoffman (2014) (see also Raycraft 2020). Herders were regularly issued fines, though they continued to resist being excluded in order to fulfill their material needs (see Goldman 2011:73). While people did not have the governance authority to devise the official management plan, they retained agency in their abilities to disregard it in practice. The irony, then, was that by restricting people in a top-down way, Goldman (2011:75) suggests that the ranch became the very 'free-for all' that AWF sought prevent.

The end result of these convergent political processes was that people in Oltukai felt disappointed, confused, and betrayed by AWF, having experienced dispossession of resources that were centrally important to them. People responded by grazing illegally, and even by pursuing lion hunts with greater frequency, which Goldman (2020) also interprets as a form of protest. Uncertain of what the future would hold for the ranch and the pastoral communities that depended on it, Goldman (2011:66) characterized the ranch as " a conservation opportunity lost." In the next chapter, I present my findings from 2019-2020, which reveal some notable changes in how local communities have since come to think of the ranch and its role in their everyday lives.

Chapter 9. Lost and Found: The rise in community support for Manyara Ranch

Goldman's (2006, 2011, 2020) studies provide key historical context on community-ranch relations, though much has changed since her core doctoral research in 2002-2003. Similar to my experiences working in the Randilen WMA member villages, I was surprised to find during my fieldwork in Oltukai in 2020 that the people I spoke with had positive things to say about the ranch and considered it a valuable asset in their everyday lives. These sentiments immediately came to the fore when I carried out interviews with household heads across Oltukai's sub-villages. I subsequently quantified the generalizability of these qualitative findings across the communities of Oltukai and Esilalei through the design and implementation of a survey. People's views about the ranch at the community-level were notably more nuanced than community attitudes towards Randilen WMA and several expressed lingering concerns. Nonetheless, the overall trend was highly positive. Since I was interested in conservation dynamics throughout the central Tarangire ecosystem, I studied attitudes towards the ranch across all seven villages that share a border with Manyara Ranch (see Chapter 2 for detailed discussion of sampling procedures, and Chapter 5 for total sample sizes). For the sake of comparison to Goldman's work, I first present results from the two official partner villages of Manyara Ranch, Oltukai and Esilalei, with discussion of the "peripheral villages" to follow after. By my count, there were 211 households in Esilalei and 163 in Oltukai that fit my inclusion criteria. Figures 63-73 are based on responses of 61 people in Oltukai and 69 in Esilalei. These study participants were recruited via stratified random sampling using sub-villages as strata. Recruitment numbers by sub-village are listed in Chapter 5.

Figure 63 – What do you think of Manyara Ranch? (*Unaifikiriaje kuhusu Ranchi ya Manyara?*)

Figure 64 – Do you support Manyara Ranch? (*Je! Unaunga mkono au unapinga Ranchi ya Manyara?*)

Figure 65 – What did you think of Manyara Ranch ten years ago? (*Je! Ulifikiriaje kuhusu Ranchi ya Manyara miaka 10 iliyopita?*)

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
Figure 66 – How do you feel about Manyara Ranch now compared to ten years ago? (*Je! Unapenda Ranchi ya Manyara kidogo au zaidi sasa kuliko vile ulivyofanya miaka 10 iliyopita?*)

Figure 67 – Do you trust Manyara Ranch authorities to act in your community's interests? (*Je! Unaamini mamlaka ya Ranchi ya Manyara kuchukua hatua kwa maslahi ya jamii yako?*)

Figure 68 – Do you think Manyara Ranch has more costs or benefits? (*Ranchi ya Manyara ina hasara zaidi au faida kwa jamii yako?*)

Figure 69 – Do you think your community is included in Manyara Ranch governance? (*Je! Unafikiri watu kutoka kwenye jamii yako wamejumuishwa vyema katika utawala wa Ranchi ya Manyara? (kufanya maamuzi*)

Figure 70 – Do you think your community is included in Manyara Ranch management? (*Je! Unafikiri watu katika jamii yako wamejumuishwa vyema katika usimamizi wa Ranchi ya Manyara? (kusimamia taratibu/sheria*)

Figure 71 – Do you think Manyara Ranch is a fortress conservation area that excludes communities, or a community-based conservation areas that includes communities for their benefit? (*Je! Unahisi kuwa Ranchi ya Manyara imewekwa kwa usawa zaidi kama uhifadhi wa 'ngome' (haijumuishi jamii) au uhifadhi wa misingi ya jamii (inajumuisha jamii kwa faida yao*)?

Figure 72 – Do you think Manyara Ranch is a success or a failure? (*Je! Uanona Ranchi ya Manyara kama mafanikio?*)

Figure 73 – Do you think Manyara Ranch is a conservation opportunity lost? (*Je! Unachukulia Ranchi ya Manyara kuwa 'nafasi ya uhifadhi iliyopotea'?*)

The survey results show high levels of support for Manyara Ranch across the two official partner villages of Oltukai and Esilalei. Furthermore, they reflect clear acknowledgement of the fact that community attitudes towards Manyara Ranch have changed for the better over the past ten years, with the vast majority of respondents stating that they like the ranch more now (or much more) than they did ten years ago. In stark contrast to Goldman's observations, most respondents reported trusting ranch authorities to act in their community interests, and felt that Manyara Ranch had more benefits than costs. Most people reported that their community was included in ranch governance and management and viewed the ranch as a community-based conservation area rather than an example of fortress conservation. Almost all respondents considered the ranch a success, and almost none considered it to be "a conservation opportunity lost." The resonating question that I will attempt to address in the remainder of this chapter is 'why have these communities shifted their views in such a marked way since Goldman documented entrenched resentment towards the ranch?'[315]

9.1 "The ranch is ours again": Feelings of ownership and changes in governance

One of the major factors behind the positive sentiments towards the ranch explicated through the surveys relates to notions of ranch ownership and governance. After Baraka lost the national election in 2015, the new Prime Minster (Kassim Majaliwa), canceled the TLCT's lease contract with Manyara Ranch. In December 2016, he delivered a speech explaining that the ranch would be given back to the communities of Oltukai and Esilalei, and acknowledged the TLCT's misdealings in taking advantage of local communities. Many people I spoke with during my fieldwork in Oltukai and Esilalei referenced this speech and took it to mean that the ranch was once again theirs. The speech was important both as a symbolic gesture of reconciliation, but also in terms of tangible impacts on ranch governance. The former board of trustees was dissolved with the intention of forming a new board that better represented the local

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[315] The caveats about interpreting the survey data outlined in Chapter 6 should be also be considered here.

communities. At the time of my fieldwork in Oltukai and Esilalei in late 2019, a new board was being formulated and put into place that was pending the results of the local elections. The newly elected village chairs of both villages were appointed to the ranch board, together with an elected representative from the villages, the DED (District Executive Director), the Monduli MP, and the ranch manager. The MP in 2019, Julius Kalanga Laizer, was a Maasai whom the communities respected. The assemblies of Oltukai and Esilalei were also very strategic in electing their village chairs. Rather than selecting respected elders for these positions, the villages chose young men who were educated and who could speak and read kiSwahili. The reason for this was the communities wanted to ensure that when the chairs participated in Manyara Ranch governance meetings, they could follow everything that was going on, voice community concerns, and relay all information learned back to their villages. These changes were significant given the previous governance structure, which inadequately represented local interests due to the steering committee's lack of authority, and the language barriers affecting the *Oloiboni's* participation in board meetings. By contrast, the new governance structure gives local communities meaningful seats at the table, and includes voting rights on key issues during board meetings.

These changes were highly significant from the perspectives of communities because they represented the culmination of many years of fighting for their resource rights. People in Oltukai and Esilalei finally felt like they were getting the recognition they deserved as the rightful 'owners' of the land. As I observed during fieldwork, people expressed a lot of happiness that the TLCT had been dismantled and that the land had been proven to be theirs. As several people said to me during interviews and informal conversations, "we are happy because the ranch is ours again." As further described by one respected elder in Oltukai during an interview,

> you know why people here like Manyara Ranch? Because this was the land that was given
> to an outsider in a previous time by the elders. But later on we fought for our rights and the
> land was returned to the villages, so our villages are very happy to have it back.

As this explanation reveals, the communities feel proud that they have persevered in their efforts to regain their rights over the land, a struggle that has been ongoing across generations since the socialist period. While local herders faced significant insecurities as a result of the changing formal status of the ranch, the pursuit of earning back their community rights galvanized these villages and gave meaning to their lives. They worked hard for this achievement and view the change in ownership and governance with great pride. The ranch was something that had 'been lost,' and yet it was something they never gave up on, fought for, and earned back. For these reasons, the villages of Oltukai and Esilalei have come to cherish the ranch as 'their' area.

While most of the people I spoke in these villages were appreciative of these changes and viewed them with great hope, Goldman (2020) expresses lingering concerns about the ownership of the ranch, especially since the communities were once again never shown title deed specifying that they actually *owned* the ranch. This is a fair and justified concern. Indeed, during the first stakeholder meeting after the former board was dissolved on Jan. 17, 2017, the DC stated that the ranch constituted an important wildlife corridor that had been entrusted to the District to maintain as "government property," on behalf of the beneficiary villages of Oltukai and Esilalei. According to the DC, the prime minister had given the District Council clear directives on the need to maintain the corridor, and Goldman (2020:217) points out that the local communities may still not technically constitute "owners" of the ranch. The Manyara Ranch Conservancy website reaffirmed these concerns in 2022. As written on the webpage: "Monduli District Council is the owner of the land (Title Deeds were transferred to the Council from Tanzania Land Conservation Trust at the end of 2016) representing the local communities, conservation groups, National Parks, the Wildlife Department and local authorities."[316] Evidently, the communities do not technically 'own' the ranch, as Goldman (2020) warned.

My emergent view having worked with these communities is that what is centrally important to local pastoralists is whether they are able to access ranch resources as necessary in

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[316] Source: https://manyararanch.com/projects-and-partners/

support of their livelihoods and social life. The idea of private land ownership was not inherent in these societies in the precolonial era, and emerged only following colonialism and interactions with the state. Ownership became about communicating to the state and other outside interests that land belonged to an individual or group, and thus owners had the rights to access the "benefit streams" associated with land (see Bromley 1992:2). The local Kisongo were never in a sense the 'original owners' of the land, having moved into the area fairly recently in historical terms, but they were certainly its stewards. They used the land in an efficient way through a form of pastoral production that also benefited wildlife by keeping the rangelands open. The need for ownership became an issue when unsettled and uncultivated areas were subject to being grabbed by outside actors, as occurred with Manyara Ranch. When this happened, the Kisongo saw their access to the area decline, and they came to realize that 'owning' the land was a key aspect of ensuring they could continue to access it as needed. While clans and families historically played significant roles in securing water sources, the purpose was always about controlling regimes of access to both scarce and abundant resources, rather than something intrinsic about being an 'owner' (see Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978). It is worth noting as well that in Tanzania, the state technically owns all land, with use and occupancy rights leased out to different actors (including villages) in various ways. My point, then, is that I am not convinced that it is land ownership, in and of itself, that is the most significant standalone factor in the context of Manyara Ranch. Rather, I think communities view ownership as a prerequisite for ensuring a consistent access to the benefit streams of resources that are valuable to them, and this is what ultimately matters most to them. As non-owners, the Kisongo realized that they were easily excluded from key decision-making processes about how land should be used (governance), and subsequently from the steps taken to enforce those decisions (management). What seems to underlie community interest in owning the ranch is a concern about being represented by governance and management institutions. Thus, while the ranch may not technically be titled as village land, if the communities feel that they have a consequential voice in ranch governance,

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and they feel confident that they will be able to steer ranch policies towards things that matter to them, then they are likely to be supportive of the ranch regardless of formal titling. As discussed at length throughout this dissertation, the Kisongo greatly value their pastoral livelihoods (i.e. their cattle), perhaps above all else.

Figure 74 – What seems to matter most to local pastoralists is how land is used on the ground (management), dynamics that are downstream to institutions for governance, and often (but not always) ownership.

People in Oltukai and Esilalei certainly feel proud of their well-fought battle to regain their rights to the ranch, but the downstream factor of greater significance for communities is the reconfigured governance structure. Put differently, even though the ranch was formally registered as government property, the people I spoke to were still happy to consider the ranch 'theirs' as long as they retained the authority to make decisions about the land. As indicated by the survey results, most respondents from these villages felt that their community was included in ranch governance processes through the revised board. The inclusion of village chairs and representatives on the board provided Oltukai and Esilalei with the power to voice their livelihood concerns and make key decisions about the management of ranch resources.

While the majority of survey respondents were pleased with the revised ranch board, and hopeful about its long-term implications, some members of local government expressed concerns

during interviews that should not be overlooked. As described by the former village chair of Oltukai during an interview,

Things are better now with Manyara Ranch, but some issues have not yet been fully resolved. Now we have a new board, which is great progress because it shows that Oltukai and Esilalei are the owners of the ranch, but the situation is not yet ideal. We still have some concerns that need to be addressed. Things are much better now compared to the past, but there is still work to be done.

When I asked the former chair to clarify his comments on how the ranch could be improved, he continued,

We were given back the land for the ranch and now it is ours again. So we made a constitution that should be followed by the new board in running the ranch. This constitution was brought to the district, and they returned it to us with many changes, so that's why I say the situation is not yet ideal.

As the village chair's explanation shows, the revised governance structure of the board is still not functioning perfectly from the perspectives of Oltukai and Esilalei given the power imbalances between the village and district representatives on the board. As he describes, the villages of Oltukai and Esilalei came together to create a new constitution that represented their interests, but the district government intervened and changed the terms of the constitution in ways that the communities did not agree with. Local government was especially concerned by the continued emphasis on the corridor aspect of the ranch. The reason that the district was able to edit the constitution in this way was that the DED (District Executive Director) had been named the chairman of the board. The former village chair worried that the DED's appointment meant that the district government would have too much authority over the governance decisions affecting the ranch, harnessing fears from the time of Baraka's tenure. But more so than worries about the DED's ability to manipulate governance processes, the chair was concerned that the DED was often preoccupied with other political matters and was unable to participate directly in ranch

governance processes. Generally, ranch board meetings are held with voting members present to discuss issues and take decisions, but since the DED was quite busy with other administrative duties, he is often not able to attend the meetings in person. In the village chair's words,

> I like the ranch, and I am happy to have the new board. But we will appreciate the ranch more if they change this constitution, as they did the board. We are content with having the DED on the board, but since he is very busy, he can never attend the meetings and observe what is going on in the ranch. So we need someone who we the villagers choose to be the chair to run the board. Even though the changes have been good, we are still being dragged by the government because instead of us deciding these things, they are deciding for us. We know that the ranch has a lot of wildlife, and good trees, and we want to maintain the environment. We don't want people cutting down trees and damaging it, but we want to take care of it on our own, rather than being made to. We, as Oltukai, should stand and support the place.

As described by the village chair, communities do not take issue with the DED being on the board, but are concerned about his central role as the chairman. They would much prefer a democratic process of selecting a chair that they were confident would be involved in the day-to-day administration of the ranch and would be a voice for community priorities. Later in the interview, the village chair explained that even if they could not fully replace the DED as the chairman of the board, the communities would be content with an elected vice chair from the villages to advise the DED when he was not able to participate in the board meetings. While local government members are happy that there is now a secretary on the board to represent community interests, the secretary's role is not to explicitly work with the DED, who has ultimate authority as the chairman.

The village chair's narrative segment reveals both a genuine interest in the ethos of conservation, and enduring concerns about the nature of ranch governance. Residents of Oltukai and Esilalei are very grateful that the central government gave the ranch back to the villages, as

evidenced in the survey responses, but key members of local government are still rightfully worried that the district continues to hold the reins. These concerns are not about being owners per se, but about regimes of authority for making decisions affecting how the ranch is used. The changes in the board are a step in the right direction that the community views positively. That said, some concerns still remain, and the former chair was direct in his message to me about what was important to communicate through my research,

> We are still fighting this struggle because we are not yet fully responsible for the ranch. The central government gave it back to us, but now the district government is holding it and not giving it completely to the villages. So in your research, how will you help with that?

Thus, despite the positive changes in governance that have occurred over the past five years, the villages are still struggling for sovereignty over the ranch and these ongoing concerns should not be swept under the rug. Although the TLCT's contract with Manyara Ranch was cancelled and the board was revised, AWF continues to play a role in operating the ranch. AWF still pays the staff salaries and participates in ranch governance, but their dominance in the conservation sector in Tanzania has receded over the past decade. AWF has no country office in Tanzania, but continues to provide overarching support for Manyara Ranch, and maintains a presence on the ground through its hired manager and team. When I asked the village chair of Oltukai about AWF in 2019, he explained that the communities had softened their views towards AWF in recent years and had no direct quarrel with them, as their main issue was with the District Council ("We do not blame AWF, because our main issue now is with the district council"). Some of the reasons for this shift are to do with the positive associations communities now have with the current manager (see section 9.6). However, one of my key informants in Oltukai recently carried out a survey on behalf of AWF in May 2021. The survey aimed to gauge the attitudes of local communities towards AWF to help determine whether AWF should renew its contract and continue overseeing the ranch. Though I have not personally seen the results, my

interlocutor suggested to me that it showed that the communities wanted AWF to leave. While some of the people I personally spoke with in the villages were fine with the ongoing role of AWF, others felt that the villages should not have to answer to NGO actors in making ranch governance decisions.

9.2 Impacts on tourism benefit sharing

One of the implications of the reconfigured governance structure has been its impact on the economic dynamics of the conservancy. From the perspectives of the communities, the revised board should be responsible for negotiating investor contracts and establishing the terms of revenue sharing. In practice, however, this is not currently occurring. Part of this has to do with the exclusive contract previously negotiated by Mantis Limited, which must be broken before new investors can establish lodges or camps in the ranch. But some community members also point to the district council as a reason why money is not trickling down the communities. As the village chair in Oltukai said,

> We came to understand that AWF is giving the money to the ranch to help operate it, which we appreciate, but the district is the one taking the money and not giving any back to the village. Money from the conservancy is now not coming to the board account; it goes to the district's account instead. The board is the one that can distribute the money to the villages, but right now it is going straight to the district and it is not being returned to the villages.

The revised board, then, has had direct effects on the benefit sharing model of the conservancy, as returns from tourism in the ranch are being held by the district without trickling down to the villages. Some community members maintain that the situation has actually gotten worse since the revised board was installed. As described by Oltukai's village chair,

> In 2014, we had a model that was similar to a WMA. TAWA collected the revenue and then some of it was distributed back to our board and then down to the villages. But

nowadays, it's quite different. For the past five years, there has been no money coming into

the villages and we do not understand where the money is going.

The chair's statement suggests that transparency around revenue sharing has decreased since the
revised board was formed and the communities are unsure where the money is going and why.
Speculation is abound that the district government has been grabbing revenue away from
communities as part of its tightening grip over the ranch. Residents of Oltukai and Esilalei are
not just worried about how government intervention is affecting current returns, but how it might
continue to affect them in the future. The village chair of Oltukai was cognizant of the
detrimental effects that regulatory overhang can have on the prospect of attracting investors to
build tented camps and lodges in the ranch,

If the government is still holding the ranch, there are not going to be any investors who are

interested in investing there. But if we villagers hold it and take full control of the area,

then we might attract a lot more investors through the villages. Things are very hard

because the government grabs the opportunities.

This statement provides an insightful take on the role of the state in the context of community-
based conservation and mirrors some of my own thoughts on 'neoliberal' conservation. Why
would an investor want to take on the risk of investing in an area where the state can shake the
tree at any given time? This question is of significant concern to communities because attracting
good quality investors is seen as a viable strategy for building a consistent and sustainable
income stream for the villages.

The communities are also resentful about the current investor contract, which in their
view provides inadequate returns relative to its concession size. As one Korianga-aged man in
Oltukai explained to me in 2019, the communities have a few sites in mind for where future
lodges could be situated in the ranch, but the exclusive contract means that the board cannot
negotiate with other investors. Currently, there is only a single eight-bed tented camp within this
sizeable concession (35,000 acres), which is open throughout the year, except from April 1-May

31 during the long rains.[317] There is no cement or hard timber used in the campsite, though the canvas tents have handcrafted furniture, lighting and hot running water.[318] According to the conservancy webpage, "Esilalei and Oltukai villages are recipients of financial benefits derived from visitors to the conservancy."[319] However, as previously mentioned, neither village was receiving money in return from the tourism arrangements in the ranch at the time of my fieldwork. Since there is only one tented camp in Manyara Ranch, it takes bookings on behalf of the conservancy as a whole. The conservancy offers a range of activities including game drives, night drives, walking safaris, and Maasai village visits. Stays can be booked either as a full board package or a game package (which includes food and board), with various extras. As of 2019, the rates were 500 USD per person during low season (January – March 31 / September 1 – October 31) and 690USD during high season (June 1 – August 31/ December 16 – December 30) with additional costs for further beds.[320] The cost for the full package is 615USD per person during low season and 840USD per person during high season. Fees also include an additional bed night concession fee for the conservancy of 60$ USD per person per night (30$USD for children). There is also an additional $40 dollar concession fee to be paid during the holiday months (December 23 – January 3).

Perhaps in a telling fashion, very few people I spoke with in the villages or at the district game office were able to explain the financial mechanisms of the ranch in terms of precisely how revenue sharing worked. Unlike in Randilen WMA, there are major concerns within the community, particularly by the members of village governments, about the financial transparency and accountability of the ranch. Goldman (2020) notes on one occasion, there was a proposal to purchase an ambulance for the villages from tourism revenue (like the one purchased in Lolkisale), but the funds were never made available. Communities also have little say in

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[317] It is also sometimes closed during the short rains (from November 1 – December 15).
[318] Source: https://manyararanch.com/accommodation/
[319] Source: https://manyararanch.com/maasai-village-visit/
[320] Source: https://manyararanch.com/accommodation/

negotiating the terms of employment opportunities with Mantis' tented camp. One young man I interviewed in Oltukai worked at the camp for a short period of time as a security guard, but quit shortly thereafter because he felt the owner did not treat him with enough respect. When the camp struggled to attract guests, there were issues around the payment of salaries, and expectations that hired staff would stay on site to guard the camp at all times, even when there were no guests. The man I interviewed, however, preferred to spend his time with his family in the village unless he was needed for work at the camp, so quit with a bitter taste in his mouth about the investor. During another interview, the new ranch secretary mentioned that the owner of Mantis had recently shown some interest in engaging the villages in meaningful discourse. The secretary was hopeful that the community-investor dynamics would change in the future, but was mainly concerned about the bad contract, which the communities wanted to break to make way for new investors. As things stand at the time of writing, the camp does not generate enough revenue to make a meaningful contribution to the communities or the conservancy considering its large exclusive-use concession.

9.3 What matters most: Managing the ranch as part of the pastoral way of life

Despite ongoing governance issues, community sentiment towards the ranch was for the most part positive in Oltukai and Esilalei during my fieldwork. The feelings of ownership and the steps taken to reform the ranch board are part of the story, but the fact that significant governance issues remain in spite of these positive attitudes points to other factors. Harking back to my diagram of downstream concerns, I contend that what is most significant for community members is management in practice. Lack of ownership and poor governance threaten the orientation of management priorities from the perspectives of communities, but what ultimately matters most to local pastoralists is how environmental policies are implemented on the ground.

Much of the discontent within the communities that Goldman (2011) documented was about the initial grazing policies of the ranch. While the strict, top-down nature of the grazing plan was apparent in 2002-2003, it has continued to evolve since then. As Goldman (2011) notes,

the grazing policy was already beginning to change during the timeframe of her studies. It transitioned from a rigid, individualized, permit-based system to one based on seasonal requests from village governments to open the ranch to village cattle once the wet season pastures on village land had been exhausted (Goldman 2011). Goldman skims over this point, but it is a crucial one because it marked the beginning of the ranch coming to serve a reliable role as a dry season grazing bank for the communities. While the use of fire is still not permitted in the ranch, it did not come up organically in my interviews and conversations with villagers as a topic of concern. What did matter tremendously, however, was managing the ranch through a seasonal grazing plan. As Goldman (2011) points out, the chairman of the steering committee during her fieldwork recognized the value of having a rotational grazing plan for the area, and felt that the communities of Oltukai and Esilalei could implement grazing restrictions more effectively than the government as long as they were the ones in charge of making and enforcing them. Local herders at the time of Goldman's studies were unhappy that the ranch had become a free for all where people disregarded the formal designation of the land and grazed surreptitiously to avoid getting caught. Rather, they wanted to remake the grazing plan into something that they supported and which served to protect their vital *alalili* (reserve pasture; see Goldman 2011:73). As discussed in Chapter 4, *alalili* restrictions are strictly enforced and are only accessible in times of dire need, as permitted by elders.

Goldman (2011) notes that when the communities thought that the ranch was being returned to them the first time, in 2001, they planned to manage it as a drought reserve to be used in the dry season and during the early rains, with access regulated by traditional leaders and elders. They expressed genuine interest during Goldman's fieldwork in managing the area *both* as a conservation area and as pasture.[321] Despite the governance challenges noted in the previous sections, these wishes are largely reflected in the ranch's management model, and have been for

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[321] Some of Goldman's (2011) interviewees wanted to settle on the ranch and farm it, but the majority wanted to keep it aside for wildlife habitat and grazing.

some time. The ranch is currently managed through a seasonal plan that provides local herders from Oltuaki and Esilalei access to the ranch during the dry season. The ranch is then closed to village herds in the wet season to allow the grass to recover. The exact months will vary from year to year depending on rainfall, but dry season grazing usually occurs on the ranch between June-September, though this period is often longer. While the management institutions for enforcing these restrictions are not customary in the sense that they are not overseen by elders and traditional leaders nor enforced through culturally-specific sanctions, they are implemented in ways that are nonetheless effective. In fact, as I argue in Chapters 4 and 6, the presence of armed VGS who are able to enforce seasonal restrictions on grazing by confiscating the herds of transgressors and issuing fines might well be *more* effective in the face of outside elites or private actors who do not respect collective institutions. The key, as always, is whether management enforcement is at the expense of local pastoral livelihoods ("policing the community"), or in support of them ("defending community pastures").

9.4 Was the ranch all that bad? The lasting effects of AWF's model of pasture management

While it is tempting to identify a specific point in time when the shifts in management occurred in Manyara Ranch, it seems to me that positive aspects of ranch management have persisted for some time, and likely existed during Goldman's fieldwork as well. Communities, for instance, benefited from ranch employment as VGS and enjoyed receiving "superior" bulls for breeding at fair prices (LaRocque 2006:47). They also received vaccinations, treatments and general assistance in dealing with livestock diseases through the ranch veterinarian. AWF also helped set up a cultural boma in Esilalei, which provided women with a market for their handicrafts and beadwork (Igoe 2010). During my interviews with rangeland officers from Tanzania People and Wildlife (TPW), who have been documenting grass quality inside Manyara Ranch and in the villages of Oltukai and Esilalei on a monthly basis for many years, I learned that the quality of grass inside Manyara Ranch is excellent compared to many of the adjacent pastures in village land (see Chapter 4). These trends seem to follow on the initial grazing plans that were first

implemented by the past ranch manager, Clive Owen. According to LaRocque (2006), Owen had genuine interest in engaging the perspectives of the local Kisongo and in fact greatly appreciated their local knowledge in managing ranch cattle. Larocque (2006) notes that from July to December, pastoralists from Oltukai and Esilalei were allowed to graze inside the ranch, a policy that is quite similar to the seasonal grazing plan currently in place, though the timing fluctuates based on the coming of the rains. Furthermore, LaRocque (2006:76) maintains, based on his own interviews with Owen, that the ranch showed "remarkable" vegetation recovery when AWF took over as compared to the days of NARCO, though "comprehensive assessments" were lacking at the time.

LaRocque (2006) points to several important factors at play to explain why the pastures on the ranch improved. First, the ranch's central herd was small relative to the available grazing resources on the ranch. Second, the restrictions on outside livestock from entering during the wet season meant that forage accumulated and carried over to the next year. While dams were often subject to flooding, particularly in cultivated and bare areas, surface water was not overflowing into dams. Rather, it seeped into the ground because of the covering litter and filled the dams slowly rather than overpowering them (LaRocue 2006). Soil erosion was low and cover built up because there was no mechanical clearing or fire burning. Wet season grazing restrictions on outside livestock meant that stocking was very low during the growth season, allowing the ranch to blossom into a very productive dry season grazing bank as well as a "safe haven for migrating wild herds" (LaRocque 2006:77). Pastoral grazing patterns were part of this, as dry season grazing helped convert dry season forage into manure, thus allowing cycling of nutrients and preventing "senescent plants" from accumulating (LaRocque 2006:77). Dead vegetation was subsequently trampled down into litter and thus dry season pastures that were "severely grazed by Maasai herds during the dry season" generally "rebounded remarkably after the next rains" (LaRocque 2006:76). Jones attributed these recoveries to the important role that the Maasai played in managing the pastures on a seasonal basis.

The ranch's model of intensive grazing followed by a long period of recovery and rest during the wet season appears to be scientifically sound, and contributes to revitalized growth each year. As Goldman (2020) astutely points out, as does LaRocque (2006), the seasonal drought reserves managed by the Kisongo independently of the ranch bounce back each year in a similar fashion, with high productivity. Unlike the village pastures, which are constrained by resident grazing and sedentarized pastoralists, cattle from the communities leave the ranch during the wet season. LaRocque (2006:78) contends then, based on his background as a rancher (and a skeptic of 'modern' range practices) himself, that "Manyara Ranch reflects wise watershed and forage management." Rather than a model entrenched in western range management conventions, as is implied by Goldman (2020), LaRocque (2006) maintains that Jones grasped the value of the hired Maasai herders who managed the herds flexibly based on their local ecological knowledge. Thus, it would seem that ranch management may have shown promising signs some time ago as part of a wider pastoral system of dry season use. The improvements in grass quality throughout AWF's tenure as ranch administrators were likely because the ranch benefited from grazing during the "most beneficial season" (dry season), and was insulated from it while grass recovered and grew (LaRocque 2006). LaRocque contends that it was not the conventional ranching approach that was important here, but the willingness of the ranch manager to engage local Maasai herders in grazing decisions in managing the pastures.

What is perhaps most plausible is that this case is a textured one. When the ranch was turned over to AWF in 2001, Goldman (2020:3) notes that herders grazed "as they could, whenever they could, against the rules that some of them were involved in creating." A large part of this inherent contradiction was that herders felt they had lost autonomy over the area, though some had indeed been involved in contributing to the rotational grazing plan. They resented the fact that the ranch was not considered *their* land, in that they did not have sovereignty over it to govern it as they saw fit. People likely perceived the restrictions on grazing as tools intended to benefit wild ungulates at the expense of cattle, and thus resented the restrictions. Consequently,

they disrespected the ranch's conservation status as a form of protest. Thus, the transgressions were not about universal dislike for restricted access to grazing areas, but a product of the political status of the ranch, and people's feelings of being excluded from governance. The result of these exclusions was that the local Kisongo interpreted the grazing restrictions to be *at the expense* of their livelihoods in order to protect wildlife habitat, rather than *in support* of their local economy and way of life. The material impacts of the grazing policy were perhaps less important to the Kisongo than what they felt to be the intentionality behind the restrictions. They felt like the land was being managed in a way that benefited wildlife over people and livestock and this, I believe, contributed to growing resentment. These interpretations were likely exacerbated by rising wildlife populations on the ranch (see Kiffner et al. 2020) and in adjacent villages (see Goldman 2018), which meant increasing costs from carnivores on livestock production and from wild ungulates on crop cultivation. Increasing wildlife numbers likely contributed to the entrenched perception that the ranch was being used to protect wildlife at the expense of local pastoral livelihoods (Goldman 2020).

As discussed throughout this dissertation, the Kisongo very much respect grazing restrictions if they are implemented endogenously in support of the pastoral mode of production through the designation of reserve pastures that buffer against variability in rainfall. Goldman (2011) noted that, at the time of her fieldwork, "most drought reserves [had] been lost to conservation areas," referring as well to the ranch. I hold that what has occurred in the ranch is that, while the material dynamics of the seasonal grazing policy may not have changed substantially, the communities have come to re-interpret the ranch as a drought reserve that is managed on their behalf, *in support* of their livelihoods, rather than *at their expense* in favour of wildlife habitat.[322] The reasons for these shifts in thinking are less about the material aspects of the management in practice than they are about trust and respect. Communities have come to

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[322] Reversible figures in cognitive psychology may offer some metaphorical insight in this case, as a single image can generate multiple, stable perceptions. While the material particularities of the seasonal grazing policy may not have changed substantially, the ways in which communities interpret them certainly have.

trust that grazing restrictions are in their interests, and that management respects their pastoral way of life. As the herders began to build trust in ranch management, they came to respect the restrictions on grazing in return. When I interviewed local Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei about the grazing regulations in the ranch, and whether they felt that they were overly restrictive, almost all of my interviewees suggested rather that they valued the rotational grazing plan, which "kept good grass for their cattle to eat in the dry season."

9.5 Many helping hands make for a well-monitored ranch: The role of Honeyguide

Much like in Randilen WMA, Honeyguide's entrance likely played a crucial role in helping to build trust at the community level. Irrespective of the exact grazing regulations inside the ranch, the VGS under Honeyguide's management were flexible in enforcing restrictions in the first few years after Honeyguide's arrival (around 2012). In Damian's view, local herders were still bitter at that time because they felt that outsiders had taken control of the ranch. VGS were trained to deal with local herders respectfully as part of Honeyguide's evolving philosophy of community-oriented work (see Chapter 6). Sine the VGS were themselves Kisongo from Oltukai and Esilalei, they were able to explain to local herders that the ranch was being managed as a dry season reserve pasture for the benefit of their villages. With time, some of the resentment that communities felt about the grazing restrictions began to subside because local herders came to realize that, although management had been outsourced by AWF to another NGO, Honeyguide was not the classic anti-poaching organization that they were expecting. Rather VGS seemed to care about managing pastures for the benefit of community livelihoods, and this realization started to build trust with management.

Honeyguide took this further by engaging local herders as valuable members of ranch management, rather than as 'trespassers.' Herders exchanged phone numbers with VGS and Honeyguide staff and called them whenever they saw people from outside the communities inside the ranch to help prevent poaching. Relative to the size of the area, the ranch had a small number of VGS patrolling it, so, by engaging local herders in this fashion, Honeyguide was

better able to monitor the ranch. Though they did not wear green uniforms and black boots, local herders essentially became part of the management team who were responsible for monitoring transgressions and reporting them to VGS. Most residents of Oltukai and Esilalei I spoke with expressed a strong dislike for poaching for both material and intrinsic reasons, as discussed in Chapter 6. Local herders were particularly cognizant of the fact that, since they did not have control over ranch governance and management, the presence of poachers might result in stronger anti-poaching measures and 'policing the community.' People in Oltukai and Esilalei had, for the most part, come to like the more herder-friendly model of conservation enforcement brought by Honeyguide and thus wanted to ensure that poaching did not increase. A key point that does not appear in Goldman's work is that organized ivory poaching had become a concern on the ranch around 2010-2012, making ranch politics all the more complex. George Sanford (AWF) described to me during an interview in 2020 that the ranch was having a significant problem eliminating elephant poaching until they finally realized that it was the head security guard of the ranch who was facilitating poachers by telling them when the coast was clear (for a cut of the spoils).[323] Soon after arriving, Honeyguide utilized their canine unit and informant approach (see Chapter 6) to identify the perpetrators and elephant poaching subsided after 2012. Ranch VGS told me proudly during interviews in 2019-2020 that there had not been a single elephant killed on the ranch for the past five years. Locally-led lion hunts have also declined significantly over the same period, trends that, in metaphorical terms, are barometric indicators of improving relations with the communities.

While Honeyguide's positive impacts on Manyara Ranch have been marked, complex politics have constrained its ability to carry out its strategic vision in the same fashion as in Randilen WMA. Some of the community members associate Honeyguide with ranch governance, and view it as part of the apparatus of external organizations that have taken control of their land. While some interviewees in Oltukai were appreciative of Honeyguide's work, a

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[323] As a reminder, George Sanford is a pseudonym.

few of the more outspoken elders were critical of the ranch's institutional dynamics, within which Honeyguide is embedded. As one elder explained during an interview,

> I don't like Honeyguide because they were brought here and the villages were not involved in this decision. We were just complaining about Honeyguide a few days ago in the board meeting because we always call the ranch to ask for help and support because our livestock are being attacked by a lion, or there are elephants going into the farms. But they say they don't have a car for us. They say we don't have motorcycles to help with that, and yet Honeyguide is being paid by AWF to carry out the protection activities. But protection just means anti-poaching activities inside the ranch, not in the villages. Why don't they have enough cars or motorbikes for the rangers so that they can come help us when we have trouble with wildlife?

This man's explanation makes clear that he interprets Honeyguide as part of a wider governance apparatus of NGOs that are operating in the ranch without direct input from the communities. From his perspective, Honeyguide is focused on anti-poaching inside the ranch without catering to the livelihood concerns of the communities in the partner villages. This means that money from AWF is being put towards protecting wildlife at the expense of allocating resources to safeguard local livelihoods. This is a valid concern that should not be discounted. In Honeyguide's defence, the nature of their contract in Manyara Ranch is different from their one with Randilen WMA. In the case of the ranch, they are sub-contracted by AWF to carry out anti-poaching operations on the ranch. This means that they are more restricted in the types of services they can provide to communities, as compared to Randilen WMA, where they are contracted directly by the AA. By way of comparison, in Randilen WMA, Honeyguide vehicles are stationed in Nafco and Naitolia in the harvest season (see Chapter 6) to steer elephants back into the WMA because this is what communities want. In Oltukai and Esilalei, people want similar services, but Honeyguide is not able to offer them to the same extent because of the nature of their contractual constraints. Unfortunately for Honeyguide, a history of entrenched and

complex politics in Manyara Ranch make it difficult for communities to see the organization in separation from their struggle to regain autonomy over their land, and this dampens Honeyguide's reception in the ranch to some degree. Nonetheless, some of the community-members I spoke with were also very appreciative of being provided with O-lights and HEC toolkits and recognized that VGS do help when they can. As evidenced by the strong community support for Randilen WMA in the previous chapter, Honeyguide has successfully applied some of the lessons learned from navigating the political complexities of Manyara Ranch (and Burunge WMA) in its move over to Randilen WMA.

9.6 From one Maasai to another: The hiring of Fidelis Ole Kashe as ranch manager

"Look at this great lawn," Fidelis said proudly, hands on his hips, piece of grass sticking out unapologetically from the corner of his mouth. "You know when I first started here, this was all dirt" *gestures his arms around in a circle,* "But when I started I said no, let's have this area be covered in grass. You know we Maasai like grass. *Takes the piece of grass out of his mouth, looks up at me and smiles.*

A key reason for the discursive shifts I observed in Manyara Ranch as compared to Goldman's studies was the hiring of a Maasai ranch manager, Fidelis Ole Kashe, who greatly helped build trust and respect with the communities of Oltukai and Esilalei. Fidelis was brought in by George Sanford (AWF), who had advocated on Fidelis' behalf.[324] Sanford proudly explained his thought process for nominating Fidelis for the position during an interview in 2020. In his description, Sanford first met Fidelis at a small conservation area in Kilmanjiro, where Fidelis was working. Sanford admired Fidelis' management style and confidence, and most of all he regarded the fact that Fidelis had held a key political position as Ngorongoro District Council Chairman in the past. Fidelis was also a former military man, which Sanford also respected. Manyara Ranch was highly politicized around 2010-2012 with much at stake, not unlike the politics in Ngorongoro. Goldman (2011) draws connections between the cases for good reason. In Ngorongoro, Fidelis

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[324] As a reminder, George Sanford is a pseudonym.

had been outspoken about conflicts between Maasai communities and OBC over trophy hunting in village/GCA land, and had won the support of local pastoralists in their fight against dispossession. In Manyara Ranch, community pushback was becoming heated and the entire situation was complicated by ivory poaching and the different politicians with their hands in the pie. In Sanford's words, the ranch manager needed to be someone "strong" and diplomatic, with excellent communication skills, values, and respect for the community. Sanford respected Fidelis' military background and saw him as a strong figure who could help to ensure that organized ivory poaching did not continue in the ranch. Elephant poaching troubled Sanford deeply, not just as a wildlife professional, but on a personal and intrinsic level. When he raised Fidelis as a candidate for manager, AWF's hiring committee immediately asked about Fidelis' academic credentials, which Fidelis did not have. AWF was initially unconvinced, but Sanford insisted, telling them firmly, "this is your man." Perhaps related to Goldman's (2011) open access article in *Conservation & Society*, AWF was likely aware that bringing in a Maasai voice to ranch management might help to improve relations with the community. In the end, AWF decided to take Sanford up on his suggestion by hiring Fidelis.

People in Oltukai and Esilalei think very highly of Fidelis. While he is not a Kisongo from the *Emanyara Inkutot*, he is a (core) Maasai who understands and lives the pastoral life himself.[325] My interviewees in both villages explained happily that Fidelis communicates with them in Maa and listens to their concerns. My interlocutors explained that when community members reach out to him in times of dire need, Fidelis obliges them. Sometimes people request access to water sources, dams, and pastures inside the ranch during the wet season, and Fidelis handles these requests thoughtfully and diplomatically. The communities feel that Fidelis treats them with respect (*enkanyit*), something which Goldman (2011) maintains had been 'lost' in the early days of AWF's tenure with the ranch.

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[325] Fidelis is from Loliondo, though I did not ask which Maasai section he is part of.

On one afternoon, when I was carrying out interviews in Esilalei in late 2019, Fidelis was driving a truck to the community to deliver water tanks, which people in Esilalei were grateful for. Rather than putting money earned from the conservancy towards ranch infrastructure, Fidelis was showing communities that he was bringing them returns and that he cared about their well-being. In my view, these types of demonstrations are worth much more than their economic impact. They are gestures of respect and reciprocity that help build community support.[326] Fidelis also makes the communities feel like knowledge is being shared "from one Maasai to another," as one interviewee in Esilalei put it, rather than from "Swahili" or "*Wazungu*" outsiders. This distinction seems to matter greatly to the communities. As Goldman's (2020) work shows, language is tied to Maasai ways of knowing the landscape and being able to communicate about issues in terms that are meaningful to people in Oltukai and Esilalei is significant. It also means greater recognition of social norms and customary practices for holding meetings, raising ideas, and sharing knowledge that were previously more challenging to address in a cross-cultural context.

The accumulation of small gestures over a long period of time contributed to the building of trust. In 2016, there was an extreme drought and Ole Kashe was accommodating in allowing the communities to graze in the ranch for a longer period of time, and in areas that were usually subject to tighter restrictions. He also sent the ranch veterinarian through the villages to help herders take care of their livestock during this critical period. In 2019, the borehole that supplied water for both Oltukai and Esilalei burst, and they appealed to Ole Kashe for the ranch to assist

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[326] Fidelis also helped oversee a revamped breeding program to help communities diversify their herds if they wanted. Local herders I interviewed spoke favourably about the ranch-led breeding program. Those interested in bringing cattle to market valued the "big red ones" (Borana) in Fidelis's description, though most herders still prefer their sturdy Zebu breeds, which are reliable in the face of drought, and produce dependable supplies of milk. One such Zebu breed is the Sahiwal, originally from India, and brought to the Kenyan Colony by the British administration in the 1930s. Breed choice seems to be at the personal discretion of the herd owner based on individual risk-reward assessments. Importantly, Borana breeds also have some of the same qualities as Maasai Zebu including resilience in the face of drought and heat resistance, though many Borana nowadays are mixed breed. In western Tanzania, Zebu breeds are increasing in prevalence over native long-horned Ankole breeds of Sanga cattle, which seem to produce less milk in hot environments than Zebu cattle by comparison.

the communities with accessing water. He allowed them to stake out a new area a few kilometres inside the ranch to access water as required. Empathic responses such as these from management have gone a long way in helping to rebuild the trust that had been lost throughout the early 2000s.

When I mentioned to Fidelis during an interview in 2020 that numerous community members had communicated to me their support for the ranch, he was thrilled. He explained that when he first took up his position, there was much conflict between stakeholders and one of his personal missions was to help foster community support by treating people with respect. Fidelis is optimistic about the ranch's future considering the restructured board, but he did note that he is thinking of retiring soon. While I told him that the communities would be very sad to see him go, he explained that he wanted their growing support for the ranch to be his lasting legacy. Fidelis is confident that he has put the groundwork in place for the next ranch manager to continue to nurture a respectful relationship with the communities, but cautioned that the next manager will need great social skills to work with all the different stakeholders involved in ranch operations. The real art of Fidelis' role is that he must work with conservationists, AWF, researchers, communities, and politicians, and this makes it easy to get pushed in different directions if one cannot "stand well." One of the challenges he faces in working with local communities is individuals asking for favours. This is a common issue across sectors in rural Tanzania and becomes particularly challenging to negotiate in the context of shared Maasai kinship, clanship, age-sets, or family ties. But Ole Kashe is firm when necessary in explaining repeatedly to community members that his role is to serve the community as a whole and not individuals. Ole Kashe has been strong and sure-footed as the manager, and has negotiated a challenging political terrain with confidence and dignity. The communities will need someone with a similar disposition to continue in this role in the future.

9.7 Shared stakeholder interest in stopping Arusha encroachment

Another aspect of community support for the ranch is that significant common ground exists between the Kisongo and AWF in terms of their joint interests in securing pastoral land. While the local Kisongo had grievances with AWF in the early 2000s, they were becoming increasingly concerned by the rapidly expanding Arusha settlements in Naitolia and Mswakini. Goldman (2020:84) notes that technically it is against the law in Tanzania for villages to be "defined along ethnic lines," but, in practice, it is well-known that Oltukai and Esilalei are Kisongo Maasai villages, with most inhabitants able to trace their ancestries through a few founding families. While the Kisongo had some settlements in Naitolia, Mswakini, and Olasiti prior to the arrival of the Arusha, the areas were used mostly for seasonal grazing with core settlements concentrated in Esilalei, Oltukai, and Losirwa. As discussed in Chapters 3,5, and 6, the Arusha began moving to Makuyuni and Lolkisale in the 1950s due to land scarcity in the Meru area, and a series of colonial and post-independence development policies (Hodgson 2001; Igoe 2010; Bluwstein 2017). After Steyn's lease for his Rift Valley Seed Company was cancelled in the early 1980s, much of the land was turned over to the Monduli District Development Corporation (MODECO). The District Council divided large areas into small cultivation plots to generate money for the district and many more Arusha moved to the area to work for MODECO. When the MODECO project was discontinued in the 1980s, the Arusha were quick to lay their own claims to land through cultivation allowing them to gain control over a fairly large area in a relatively short period of time. Reuben Ole Kuney, the former director of the Manyara Ranching Association and a former District Commissioner, explained this to me during an interview,

> When you ask the Arusha elders how they arrived in this place, they will tell you that they were disbanding near Makuyuni in the area that was previously part of Steyn's farm. Mswakini and Naitolia villages were made into cultivation plots by the Monduli District Development Corporation (MODECO) after Steyn. MODECO was a corporation within the council, which was trying to make money for the district through agricultural

production. When it ended, the Arusha infiltrated immediately. They infiltrated into Steyn's former farm without formal property arrangements – they were not relocated there because it is an open area. They made their own individual efforts to go there and utilize the area. So lots of Arusha people started moving in there. That's when it really started to accelerate. Esilalei and Oltukai are safe because first of all they have got serious boundaries. They have the ranch and they can graze their livestock there. Although they do not have full control of the wildlife management there, because it is a corridor area, the Arusha cannot move into that area to cultivate.

As Reuben describes, Arusha in-migration to the villages surrounding Manyara Ranch accelerated after the cancelation of Steyn's lease, in part due to the MODECO farming projects, which encouraged Arusha labourers to move into the area. As Arusha continued to expand into Naitolia, Mswakini Chini, and Olasiti, the Kisongo moved out, consolidating in Oltukai and Esilalei, which were core Maasai villages (see Goldman 2020:84). The Kisongo established an "unspoken rule" with the Arusha that families living in "bordering Minjingu Village" would not be allowed to "cross the Oltukai River to access resources (pasture, water)" or establish homesteads (Goldman 2020:84). UCRT also assisted by producing participatory land use plans and formalizing village boundaries (see Goldman 2020:83). Within Oltuaki and Esilalei, non-Maasai residents either "[became] Maasai through marriage or assimilation," or were temporary labourers who "did not participate in village politics" (Goldman 2020:84). Goldman (2020:235) notes that one Barabaig resident lived in Oltukai during her fieldwork but that his "presence was hotly contested." The tacit understanding between Kisongo and Arusha about Arusha expansion patterns, however, only carried so much weight. As I have discussed at length, the Arusha established themselves as the dominant ethnic group across the central Maasai Steppe with remarkable efficiency, seemingly backing the Kisongo into small pockets, rather than a dispersed pastoral presence. These processes were no doubt exacerbated, and perhaps even caused, by villagization and sedentarization. As Reuben alludes to, the only factors that seem to disrupt

Arusha expansion are hard boundaries that are strictly enforced. The Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei will not tolerate Arusha moving onto their village land, but the ranch was never technically part of their villages. Examination of topographical land use maps in this area seem to suggest that Manyara Ranch is one of the final frontiers in an ongoing standoff between the pre-existing pastoral Kisongo and the recently in-migrated Arusha cultivators. Grievances with AWF notwithstanding, the Kisongo value the ranch as a buffer between Arusha villages and Kisongo ones that serves to protect pastoral land. As LaRocque (2006:48) states, "although the village councillors resent the power exercised by Manyara Ranch and its overseer AWF, whom they consider illegitimate owners in Maasailand, they would in effect emulate its exclusive regime if their interests were better served" (LaRocque 2006:48). LaRocque (2006) is alluding here to the benefits of the ranch for keeping out encroachers.

During my interviews with Arusha in Mswakini and Naitolia, several complained that the ranch actually extended into their village, and yet they were not considered owners of the ranch in the same way as Oltukai and Esilalei. As described by the former chair of Mswakini Chini (an Arusha man), "If you look at the map, you will see that Mswakini Chini actually extends on that side of the highway. They consider that area to be part of the ranch, but that is actually our territory." This was a common complaint voiced by Arusha living just south of the A104 highway in these three villages. The reality, however, is that the ranch preceded the Arusha, though they are quick to argue otherwise. To reiterate the history, after pushing out or assimilating the Mbugwe, the Kisongo were the primary inhabitants of the area adjacent to Lake Manyara and used the villages of Naitolia and Mswakini for seasonal grazing. The ranch was established in the colonial era, and has since changed ownership several times. But the Arusha began intensively settling the area only later. The ranch extended all the way to the main A104 road, but as the Arusha tend to do, they expanded north of the road onto the ranch. When AWF took over, they made it clear that the ranch was part of a wildlife corridor and the Arusha would no longer be allowed to expand in that area, which the Arusha resented. After some negotiation,

it was determined that those who had already established their homesteads on the north side of the highway could remain, but no further expansion would be allowed. At the time of writing, those few homesteads are still visible from the highway. Technically, they are located inside the ranch, but are considered part of the villages of Mswakini and Naitolia. The Arusha use this fact strategically to argue that their village boundaries actually extend onto the ranch, which has grabbed their village land, but the truth is that they were actually the ones who encroached onto the ranch. In fact, the original ranch may have actually extended just south of the highway.

AWF's primary objective is to keep wildlife habitat intact in the ranch and prevent the area from being converted by the Arusha into smallholder farms. Despite their concerns about the ranch governance structure, the Kisongo are quietly quite pleased that the ranch accomplishes this feat, feeling much resentment themselves about Arusha encroachment onto pastoral land. While the Kisongo were rightfully worried at the time of Goldman's fieldwork that the ranch could pose an even larger threat to pastoral livelihoods if implemented in a top-down manner with legislations akin to a national park (i.e. no human activities allowed, including livestock grazing), they were also very concerned about the rapid encroachment of Arusha cultivators on their pastoral territory, which had essentially backed them into a corner on the edge of Lake Manyara. This dimension of ethnic friction between the Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei, and the Arusha in Naitolia and Mswakini, is a major factor that underlies Kisongo support for the ranch. When the more significant threat of 'fortress conservation' and displacement subsided, the slower and perhaps more insidious threat (from the perspectives of the Kisongo) of Arusha expansion remained. Several of my interviewees in Oltukai and Esilalei expressed very strong sentiments about the Arusha in those villages. As one *Olmurrani,* son of the late *Oloiboni* Meshuki, said dismissively when I explained that I was interviewing people from all villages around Manyara Ranch, "Why do you want to interview those people? They have no history! You should interview us [the Kisongo] instead! We are the real Maasai!" As another interlocutor in Saburi explained, "those people are intruders in our land and they will chop (*kata*) the whole

area into little pieces if they can." Of course, these opinions are only part of a complex social reality, as intermarriage and assimilation through moieties and clans also weave the two groups together. But as discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 5, the distinct economic priorities of the groups endure and the *EManyara Kisongo* have realized that the ranch buffers against Arusha from continuing to expand north of the A104 highway.

9.8 Community attitudes across non-partner "periphery villages"[327]

From the perspectives of local Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei, the ranch keeps the Arusha at bay, highlighting one of the key benefits of its management plan. Given the wider scope of my research on institutions for rangeland management and conservation across the central Tarangire ecosystem, I was also particularly interested in understanding how the Arusha in these non-partner villages felt about the ranch. As mentioned earlier, while Oltukai and Esilalei are the two official partner villages of Manyara Ranch, the ranch is also surrounded by five other villages, inhabited primarily by Arusha. Though these partner villages were at first prohibited from entering the ranch, they have since been allowed to graze their livestock inside during the dry season as part of ranch manager Fidelis' attempts to 'be a good neighbour' (*kuwa jirani mwema*).[328] The results from the larger survey across all of the seven villages surrounding Manyara Ranch are listed in Tables 17-27. Figures represent percentages of responses. Each question is disaggregated by village for the purposes of cross comparisons, and Oltukai and Esilalei are included as references. The town sub-villages in Olasiti and Makyuni were excluded from the study because most of these residents were not local livestock keepers and did not access ranch resources.

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[327] By "periphery villages," I am drawing from Goldman (2011) to reference the five other villages surrounding Manyara Ranch. Since these villages are inhabited mostly by Arusha, I am also referring in a deeper sense to the core-periphery Maasai dynamics outlined by Galaty (1982).

[328] Goldman (2020:235) notes that the restrictions on periphery villages also affected Kisongo living in Olasiti and other neighbouring villages at the time of her fieldwork. The changes began in the early 2000s after AWF decided to allow neighbouring villagers to access a dam on the ranch for watering their livestock (Goldman 2011). Preventing the Arusha living just across the road in Naitolia and Mswakini from otherwise entering the ranch was very challenging, and the more inclusive approach has proved more manageable.

Table 17 – What do you think of Manyara Ranch? (*Unaifikiriaje kuhusu Ranchi ya Manyara?*)

Village	Strongly dislike	Dislike	Neutral	Like	Strongly like	Does not know	Total
Oltukai	0	0	1.6	14.8	83.6	0	100
Esilalei	0	0	2.9	27.5	63.8	5.8	100
Makuyuni	1.7	4.3	29.1	33.3	2.6	29.1	100
Naitolia	4.9	4.9	50.6	29.6	3.7	6.2	100
Mswakini Juu	0	.9	36.8	51.3	0	11.1	100
Mswakini Chini	0	0	65.9	30.5	2.4	1.2	100
Olasiti	1.1	0	23.6	24.7	7.9	42.7	100

Table 18 – Do you support Manyara Ranch? (*Je! Unaunga mkono au unapinga Ranchi ya Manyara?*)

Village	Strongly oppose	Oppose	Neutral	Support	Strongly Support	Total
Oltukai	0	0	16.4	41	42.6	100
Esilalei	0	0	23.2	66.7	10.1	100
Makuyuni	3.4	6	51.3	34.2	5.1	100
Naitolia	6.2	2.5	61.7	29.6	0	100
Mswakini Juu	2.6	.9	35.9	60.7	0	100
Mswakini Chini	1.2	0	36.6	61	1.2	100
Olasiti	1.1	9	66.3	23.6	0	100

Table 19 – What did you think of Manyara Ranch ten years ago? (*Je! Ulifikiriaje kuhusu Ranchi ya Manyara miaka 10 iliyopita?*)

Village	Strongly disliked	Disliked	Neutral	Liked	Strongly liked	Total
Oltukai	0	11.5	39.3	49.2	0	100
Esilalei	0	15.9	69.6	14.5	0	100
Makuyuni	6.8	3.4	65.8	17.1	6.8	100
Naitolia	6.2	2.5	70.4	16	4.9	100
Mswakini Juu	2.6	0	93.2	3.4	.9	100
Mswakini Chini	1.2	4.9	84.1	7.3	2.4	100
Olasiti	7.9	21.3	58.4	12.4	0	100

Table 20 – How do you feel about Manyara ranch now compared to ten years ago? (*Je! Unapenda Ranchi ya Manyara kidogo au zaidi sasa kuliko vile ulivyofanya miaka 10 iliyopita?*)

Village	Dislikes it much more now	Dislikes it more now	No change	Likes it more now	Likes it much more now	Total
Oltukai	0	0	11.5	45.9	42.6	100
Esilalei	0	0	4.3	44.9	50.7	100
Makuyuni	3.4	1.7	87.2	4.3	3.4	100
Naitolia	3.7	4.9	81.5	9.9	0	100
Mswakini Juu	1.7	1.7	21.3	65	10.3	100
Mswakini Chini	2.4	3.7	28	40.2	25.6	100
Olasiti	0	13.5	64	22.5	0	100

Table 21 – Do you trust Manyara Ranch authorities to act in your community's interests? (*Je! Unaamini mamlaka ya Ranchi ya Manyara kuchukua hatua kwa maslahi ya jamii yako?*)

Village	Yes	No	Total
Oltukai	72.1	27.9	100
Esilalei	97.1	2.9	100
Makuyuni	14.5	85.5	100
Naitolia	9.9	90.1	100
Mswakini Juu	82.9	17.1	100
Mswakini Chini	81.7	18.3	100
Olasiti	1.1	98.9	100

Table 22 – Do you think Manyara Ranch has more costs or benefits? (*Ranchi ya Manyara ina hasara zaidi au faida kwa jamii yako?*)

Village	More costs	More benefits	Equal distribution	Total
Oltukai	1.6	60.7	37.7	100
Esilalei	0	88.4	11.6	100
Makuyuni	31.6	21.4	47	100
Naitolia	25.9	6.2	67.9	100
Mswakini Juu	5.1	89.7	5.1	100
Mswakini Chini	4.9	75.6	19.5	100
Olasiti	24.7	3.4	71.9	100

Table 23 – Do you think your community is included in Manyara Ranch governance? (*Je! Unafikiri watu kutoka kwenye jamii yako wamejumuishwa vyema katika utawala wa Ranchi ya Manyara? (kufanya maamuzi*)

Village	Yes	No	Total
Oltukai	83.6	16.4	100
Esilalei	95.7	4.3	100
Makuyuni	2.6	97.4	100
Naitolia	4.9	95.1	100
Mswakini Juu	7.7	92.3	100
Mswakini Chini	12.2	87.8	100
Olasiti	0	100	100

Table 24 – Do you think your community is included in Manyara Ranch management? (*Je! Unafikiri watu katika jamii yako wamejumuishwa vyema katika usimamizi wa Ranchi ya Manyara? (kusimamia taratibu/sheria*)

Village	Yes	No	Total
Oltukai	72.1	27.9	100
Esilalei	76.8	23.2	100
Makuyuni	1.7	98.3	100
Naitolia	2.5	97.5	100
Mswakini Juu	6	94	100
Mswakini Chini	11	89	100
Olasiti	0	100	100

Table 25 – Do you think Manyara Ranch is a conservation opportunity lost? (*Je! Unachukulia Ranchi ya Manyara kuwa 'nafasi ya uhifadhi iliyopotea'?*)

Village	Yes	No	Total
Oltukai	11.5	88.5	100
Esilalei	5.8	94.2	100
Makuyuni	20.5	79.5	100
Naitolia	44.4	55.6	100
Mswakini Juu	9.4	90.6	100
Mswakini Chini	5.1	94.9	100
Olasiti	29.2	70.8	100

Table 26 – Do you think Manyara Ranch is a fortress conservation area that excludes communities, or a community-based conservation areas that includes communities for their benefit? (*Je! Unahisi kuwa Ranchi ya Manyara imewekwa kwa usawa zaidi kama uhifadhi wa 'ngome' (haijumuishi jamii) au uhifadhi wa misingi ya jamii (inajumuisha jamii kwa faida yao*)?

Village	Fortress	Community-based	Total
Oltukai	21.3	78.7	100
Esilalei	11.6	88.4	100

Table 27 – Do you think Manyara Ranch is a success or a failure? (*Je! Uanona Ranchi ya Manyara kama mafanikio?*)

Village	Success	Failure	Total
Oltukai	90.2	9.8	100
Esilalei	92.8	7.2	100
Makuyuni	32.5	67.5	100
Naitolia	48.1	51.9	100
Mswakini Juu	88	12	100
Mswakini Chini	92.7	7.3	100
Olasiti	30.3	69.7	100

9.9 "The plate that carries my food": Qualitative perspectives across non-partner villages

Since the surrounding non-partner villages are not directly involved in ranch governance and management, people living in these villages had notably more mixed sentiments as compared to respondents from Oltukai and Esilalei. These villages, as mentioned earlier, are dominated by the Arusha, with pockets of Kisongo distributed throughout (like the Saburi sub-village of Makuyuni and the Oltukai sub-village of Olasiti). Interestingly, however, most of the respondents from peripheral villages still considered the ranch successful and acknowledged its benefits versus costs. Once again, I believe this relates to the downstream diagram of priorities described previously in this chapter. Though they do not 'own' the ranch, nor participate in its governance, the neighbouring villages very much appreciate being allowed to graze their livestock on the ranch in the dry season. Seasonal grazing access contributes directly to people's livelihoods, household food security, and well-being. As shown in Table 28, the vast majority of respondents in Mswakini Juu and Mswkini Chini graze their livestock inside the ranch, with a small majority doing so in Naitolia and Makuyuni. Olasiti village, notably located in a different district and

region, and perhaps subjected to stricter restrictions, had a minority who grazed their livestock inside.

Table 28 – Do you graze your livestock in the ranch? (*Je! Unalisha mifugo yako ndani ya Ranchi ya Manyara?*)

Village	Yes	No	Total
Makuyuni	61.5	38.5	100
Naitolia	54.3	45.7	100
Mswakini Juu	87.2	12.8	100
Mswakini Chini	89	11	100
Olasiti	38.2	61.8	100

As one Maasai woman who lives in Saburi, Makuyuni said, "our cows are so healthy and fat now thanks to the ranch." A few others living in Olasiti, on the other side of the ranch, said they also enjoyed being able to graze their livestock inside Manyara Ranch on a seasonal basis. Some, however, were resentful of the ways in which Oltukai and Esilalei villages were given priority access to ranch benefits as designated "stakeholder villages" (see Goldman 2020:235). This trend was especially so in Arusha-dominated villages, where some interviewees complained that they should be entitled to a share of the tourism revenues as well because "they had also given land to the ranch." In reality, those claims were not actually true, but the rhetoric is important nonetheless. When the politics heated up around who the question of ranch ownership following Goldman's (2011) influential article, the Arusha in periphery villages also became more vocal in an attempt to stake their claim. Bearing in mind what was happening in Randilen WMA in 2012-2014 (see Loveless 2014; Chapter 6), the Arusha in Naitolia and Mswakini suddenly felt that they were being squeezed on both sides and would soon be evicted if the area was to be demarcated as a unified wildlife corridor by linking Randilen, Tarangire, and Manyara Ranch (cf. Igoe 2010). After the prime minister's decision to return the ranch to the villages of Oltukai and Esilalei in 2016, the Arusha no longer saw benefit in advocating for their cut of the ranch, knowing that the resolution had already been taken. The question became, would they get

anything at all? Since 'ownership' was attributed to the Kisongo villages of Oltukai and Esilalei, the Arusha wondered if their access rights would remain.

Fortunately for them, ranch manger Fidelis treated peripheral Arusha with respect and decided in the spirit of being *ujirani mwema*, that Arusha livestock keepers from the surrounding villages would be considered part of the local community and allowed to graze inside the ranch in the dry season. The Arusha from peripheral villages were grateful for this gesture of generosity. At the time of my fieldwork, the grazing plan was applied uniformly across all surrounding villages, though some interviewees in the peripheral villages complained that VGS favoured Kisongo from Oltukai and Esilalei in enforcing restrictions. The VGS were, of course, from Oltukai and Esilalei themselves and considered their villages to be core ranch villages.

When asked how they felt about Manyara Ranch, some interviewees shared stories of people being fined for transgressing grazing restrictions, leading them to have knee-jerk negative reactions. Most who accessed ranch resources themselves, however, seemed to like it. When asked about the ranch during an interview, one Makaa-aged Arusha woman in Mswakini Chini was dismissive of it at first, ("Ah, *sipendi*" "I don't like it"). Jokingly, our local guide who was present with us that day asked in response, "but Mama, where did you just come from with that firewood?" The woman replied, "just over there" *points towards the ranch* "But that's the ranch!" exclaimed the guide. *Mama puts her hand on her forehead and smiles* "Ohh, then I like it." We all laughed. As the woman's response revealed, she had only abstract ideas about the ranch and she explained later that one of her neighbours had been fined for a grazing violation, but she herself only collected firewood from just beyond the highway, which she considered to be a routine part of her everyday life.

For the most part, the Arusha in Naitolia and Mswakini seemed to (more or less) conceive of their categorization as peripheral villages to the ranch as fair. When I asked one Arusha woman in Naitolia how she felt about the ranch during an interview, she shrugged and replied, "I cannot dislike the plate that carries my food," implying gratitude that she was able to

graze her livestock inside the ranch during the dry season. Of course, the Arusha would prefer more access rights, a stake in tourism revenue, and a seat at the governance table, but realizing that the ranch is not actually their area, they are fairly content with the status quo. One well-respected Arusha man who lives on the hill in Makuyuni Juu explained his perspective on the ranch very diplomatically (and eloquently) when asked about it during an interview. In his words,

> when your neighbour brings you leftovers from dinner, you cannot complain about this. But at the same time, of course it would have been nicer to have been invited to dinner in the first place!

As this man's narrative segment reveals, he has mixed feelings about the ranch. He is both grateful for the role it plays in keeping his livestock healthy, but also harbours some resentment that his community is not involved in the governance and management of the ranch. Some of the Arusha I spoke to about the ranch explained that the VGS still favour Kisongo over Arusha in their interactions with them, irrespective of village. They pointed to the Kisongo living in Saburi, who also benefit from the pastures in the ranch. Many of the Kisongo in Saburi, however, are related through kinship to the Kisongo in Esilalei and so are considered by VGS to be part of the extended Esilalei community, even though they are technically from another village. This is also true for the Kisongo living in Olasiti on the other side of Oltukai.

When asked about whether ethnicity plays a role in shaping rights to ranch resources, a Somali pastoralist in Saburi, who had long served as the sub-village chair before being supplanted in the 2019 elections, noted that he thought it did to some extent, but the issue at stake was more about pastoral values than ethnicity per se. In his words, "the ranch belongs to the Maasai to take care of, and that is the way it should be because they are good pastoralists. They manage it in a way that maintains it as pasture. If the Arusha and other groups are put in charge of its management, it might become fragmented into farms." As this fellow's explanation revealed, he was content with the current situation as he felt the ranch was in good hands with

the Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei who would ensure that the area was managed as pasture. The Kisongo in Saburi consider the Somali man to be an honorary Maasai because they recognize that he generally values pastoralism in a similar way, though the Kisongo themselves are still not inclined towards keeping camels, as he does.

The insights gained from my surveys and interviews across the non-partner periphery villages were perhaps the most revealing aspect of this study because they helped pinpoint the factor that is most important to rural communities living near conservation areas in this context – dry season grazing access. I believe this to be the single most important factor that underlies community sentiment towards conservation areas in the central Maasai Steppe, and one that has great implications for conservation in semi-arid rangelands where pastoralism is practiced.

9.10 Discussion and conclusion: Finding common ground

The governance structure of Manyara Ranch is characterized by a state-private-community partnership. It was originally overseen by AWF on behalf of the Kisongo villages of Oltukai and Esilalei through the TLCT. Local confusion about the implications of the trust model on community rights came on the heels of a history of changing ranch access regimes, including periods of exclusion throughout the colonial and socialist periods (Goldman 2011). While local herders were willing to collaborate with AWF to manage wildlife, they had not realized that AWF had actually secured the lease to the ranch, undermining the tenure security of the villages (Goldman 2011; Goldman 2020). Local Kisongo worried that the land had been sold by the government to AWF and would be used exclusively for the preservation of wildlife habitat. There was precedent for this in the Tarangire ecosystem, including resettlements during the formation of Burunge WMA (see Igoe and Croucher 2007; Bluwstein 2018a,b), and dispossession of water sources in TNP (Woodhouse and McCabe 2018). Residents of Oltukai and Esilalei were not fully versed in the intricacies of this new type of protected area as compared to those that had displaced people in the past. As illustrated by the NCA case, which was ongoing at the time of writing in March, 2022, local pastoralists had genuine grounds to be

fearful that the ranch might evict them, grab vital pastures, or dispossess them of access to water and other essential resources. People were particularly concerned that the ranch would expand into villages and thus residents of Oltukai and Esilalei farmed up its border as a defensive strategy to signify 'ownership' and productive use. Goldman's emplaced fieldwork in Oltukai came at a key time (2002-2003), just after the ranch had been turned over to AWF in 2001 so there was widespread concern in Oltukai and Esilalei about how the changes would affect local resource access and use rights.

An overlapping theme between Goldman's (2011) work on Manyara Ranch and Loveless' (2014) study of Randilen WMA is the issue of participation. Both documented "participation gaps" during the initial implementation phases of these areas, oversights that led to local resentment towards conservation (Goldman 2011:68). I also garner from their works that when governance is poor and communication is weak, distrust and fear tend to metastasize at the community level. These sentiments are dangerous from a conservation standpoint because they spread quickly and can evoke opposition either in the form of open protest or subtle disregard for changing environmental authorities. I believe that the entire fabric of community support for conservation in rural Tanzania can unravel more or less through rumors transmitted via everyday conversations at the village level. Residents of Oltukai and Esilalei felt disappointed, confused, and betrayed and they were afraid that their land had been taken away. The material realities of ranch operations were likely more nuanced than people's fears. As some people have suggested to me, for instance, the original AWF manager seemed to have interest in listening to the perspectives of local Kisongo herders. The primary interest of AWF, after all, was in preventing the conversion of wildlife habitat to smallholder farms, an initiative with significant common ground with pastoralists.

While the TLCT likely seemed to conservationists be a promising way to simultaneously safeguard wildlife habitat and secure pastoral livelihoods, in practice it struggled to deliver on these shared objectives. The trust model afforded authority to AWF to negotiate the terms of

investor contracts without requiring direct participation from communities. While the partner villages were supposed to be represented on the ranch board, they were relegated to less consequential roles on the steering committee and lacked voting rights (Goldman 2011). As a token, the *Oloiboni* in Esilalei was included on the board, but he did not speak English or kiSwahili and thus could not genuinely participate in ranch governance (Goldman 2011). Matters were further complicated by then-MP Baraka's position as chairman of the board, which some of my interlocutors allege allowed him to co-opt the trust for his own private interests (though some of my key informants suggested that these were false rumours). As things progressed, the Kisongo of Oltukai and Esilalei were not evicted, but Goldman (2011:61) argues they experienced other forms of "exclusion" as their traditional ecological knowledge was marginalized by the ranch. One of the key areas of contention was the grazing policy, which herders felt was overly restrictive in the way it prioritized the preservation of wildlife habitat over pastoral livelihoods. The end result of these politics was that the communities of Oltukai and Esilalei came to resent the ranch.

After Baraka was defeated in the national presidential election of 2015, the Prime Minister who succeeded him canceled the TLCT's lease to the ranch. The new Prime Minister delivered a speech in 2016 asserting that the ranch should be returned to the communities of Oltukai and Esilalei. The communities rejoiced when the old trust was dissolved and a new board was formed with village chairs from both villages represented. Through village council elections, both villages selected young chairs who were fluent in kiSwahili to ensure that they were meaningfully involved in key ranch governance decisions. These changes are viewed by the communities as a victory but some local political leaders are not entirely satisfied with the reforms. While the communities have indeed been reinstated as partner villages, formal ownership of the ranch has been allocated to the Monduli District Government, with the DED holding a key position as chairman of the board. Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei are concerned about these arrangements, in part for intrinsic reasons about their status as 'owners' (following

Goldman 2011), but more so because of the downstream implications that ownership has on governance (how decisions about the ranch are taken), and ultimately management (how these decisions are put into practice) (see Bennett 2015; Bennett and Dearden 2014a,b; Bennett and Satterfield 2018). Some community members also continue to resent the dominant role of AWF in ranch governance.

The main issue with Manyara Ranch as compared to Randilen WMA is an ongoing lack of governance transparency. Despite my best efforts to garner a well-rounded picture of how exactly the ranch functions, very few stakeholders could describe to me in detail how it worked as a unified whole. From the perspectives of my interviewees in Oltukai and Esilalei, the conservancy was not returning tourism revenue directly to the communities, and people were unsure why this was the case. When I asked ranch management, they explained that they were having a difficult time dealing with the investor who had thus far not demonstrated much interest in contributing back to the communities. Some elders and political leaders in Oltukai and Esilalei pointed to the District Government, which they alleged was holding a tight grip on the ranch. But when I interviewed people at the Monduli District Game Office about the ranch, it became clear that district government officials were also unsure of how the ranch worked. The District Game Office was not receiving a share of the ranch's tourism revenue at the time of my fieldwork.

Confusion over the ranch's precise governance structure translates into ambiguities around how tourism revenues are shared with the communities, and how much sway District-level government and investors have over conservation and tourism operations. Some community members were also less enchanted with Honeyguide as compared to those in Randilen WMA, but these sentiments must be understood in the context of ranch governance. In Randilen WMA, Honeyguide is contracted directly by the CBO. This means that it is employed by the Randilen community and is able to adopt a supportive role in providing training and guidance, while allowing the community to manage the area on its own terms. On the ranch, Honeyguide is sub-contracted by AWF so it is constrained in the services it can provide. Some

residents of Oltukai and Esilalei expressed exasperation with the institutional apparatus of ranch governance and stated that they would prefer to run the ranch themselves without NGO involvement. However, numerous interviewees also recognized that the communities likely do not have the capacity to enforce their management plan without Honeyguide's anti-poaching units. On the whole, most local herders I spoke with were appreciative of Honeyguide's work.

While some people in Oltukai and Esilalei are not pleased with the ranch's governance complexities, general community support for the ranch itself is ethnographically apparent. While the Kisongo of Oltukai and Esilalei would very much like to have full governance control over the ranch to orient it towards things they care about, their main interest for wanting this autonomy is not to maximize profits from the conservancy but to ensure the area continues to be managed as a grazing reserve and not an exclusive-use concession. Negotiating with investors on their own terms is of course appealing to village councils but the economic returns from the conservancy are secondary to their primary interest in maintaining access to water and pasture. These resources directly affect household economies and livelihoods, and are vital to the continuation of the pastoral way of life.

Despite the critiques, the ranch has numerous characteristics that point to its status as a community-based conservation area. Ranch VGS are from Oltukai and Esilalei, and the most recent manager is a Maasai who validates the concerns of community members. With assistance from the resident veterinarian, the ranch has helped introduce productive cattle breeds in the communities, and offered assistance in the form of water tanks, and access to restricted pastures in times of need. The Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei have also come to view the ranch as an essential tool for stopping Arusha from Naitolia and Mswakini from encroaching on their village land. While the Kisongo are concerned about the potential for the ranch to annex their village, they are generally pleased with the role that the ranch plays in *securing* pastoral land from agricultural conversion. What seems to matter most to local Kisongo is maintaining the ranch as a dry season grazing reserve for the benefit of their pastoral economy (rather than for wildlife, at

the expense of their livelihoods). While the initial framework for a seasonal grazing plan was put in place by earlier ranch managers, local herders have come to develop a deeper appreciation for it since the hiring of Fidelis Ole Kashe who has treated local herders with respect and helped to rebuild the community's trust.

As local herders began to trust ranch management, they came to respect the restrictions on grazing that had been implemented. When I interviewed local Kisongo in Oltukai and Esilalei about the ranch grazing policy, almost all of my interviewees suggested that they appreciated the rotational grazing regulations, which "kept grass for their cattle to eat in the dry season." Perhaps the most interesting component of this case, as I see it, is that when one disaggregates governance from management, local Kisongo are quite content with the status quo given that the ranch provides a crucial dry season grazing bank and keeps the Arusha at bay. If there existed an unconditional guarantee that the Kisongo would have the right to graze their livestock on the ranch as needed, they would likely support the ranch indefinitely. But they have grown wary of the changing macropolitical environment around them and the importance of gaining authority that is recognized through the formal institutions of the state. They realize in a contemporary context that outsiders like wildlife conservationists and government officials do not respect informal agreements and customary institutions in the same way as the Kisongo and this has necessitated a form of transformation whereby pastoralists are increasingly seeking out formal governance authority over their land. The village councils of Esilalei and Oltukai are significant in this regard. As Goldman (2020) points out, the Kisongo in both villages will not tolerate Arusha (or other ethnic groups) moving into their administrative unit. They are aware of how efficiently the Arusha have penetrated into other nearby areas and taken over the village councils. While ethnicity is taboo in contemporary Tanzania and village boundaries are not supposed to be drawn along ethnic lines (see Goldman 2020), villages are nonetheless key institutions shaping the ethnic struggles between Kisongo and Arusha over control of Monduli's rangelands. Mindful of the rapid pace of Arusha in-migration all around, the Kisongo in Oltukai

and Esilalei are very adamant about maintaining a dominant position at the governance table of the ranch.

Arusha living in the peripheral villages of Olasiti, Mswakini, Naitolia, and Makuyuni have mixed feelings about the ranch. Some are dissatisfied with not receiving tourism revenue and resentful of boundary disputes between the ranch and village land. These feelings were more pronounced prior to the Prime Minister's speech in 2016, which confirmed that only Oltukai and Esilalei were officially considered partner villages of the ranch. At the time of my study, most Arusha interviewees living around the ranch were grateful for being allowed to participate in the ranch's seasonal grazing regime, though some expressed concern that they were discriminated against in the form of harsher punishments for grazing transgressions vis-à-vis their Kisongo neighbours. For the most part, however, the Arusha living in surrounding villages were thankful that they were receiving benefits from the ranch in the form of continued grazing access.

The most significant factor in the case of Manyara Ranch seems to be how land is managed in practice. Local Kisongo have come to realize that there are a series of processes that affect rangeland management, including ownership and governance. Without ownership, pastoralists are at risk of being excluded from governance processes; without representative and participatory governance institutions, management priorities may not be reflective of community interests. I argue, however, that what *actually* matters on a fundamental level to pastoralists is how land is used. As I alluded to in Chapter 4, management without tenure security is indeed possible. What seems to be occurring in this case is that ownership remains in question and governance processes are opaque. However, local herders appreciate how the area is being managed as a dry season grazing bank in support of the pastoral economy.

Chapter 10. Discussion and Conclusion

There are multiple ethnographic layers to the current state of community-based conservation in the Maasai Steppe. For the Kisongo Maasai, their pastoral mode of production depends on rotational access to water, salt-licks and dry season grazing areas. Kisongo range management practices reflect processes of territoriality that secure access to these grazing resources as necessary to sustain the livestock economy. They also involve common property mechanisms that outline the duties and responsibilities of group members to regulate resource use. The Kisongo manage pastures through an interconnected set of social institutions, some of which have come under pressure in a contemporary context, but many of which have persisted. These 'social facts' have coercive power over individual group members in a Durkheimian (1895) sense, but they are also linked in a practical fashion to shared livelihoods and the material base of the economy in a Malinowskian (1926) one (i.e. custom).

Maasai notions of ethnicity in the precolonial era were at once flexible to help forge social networks across vast and varied ecological areas, and also enduring as the pastoral Maasai used their reputations as warriors to establish political hegemony over the lowland plains and spearhead an interconnected regional cattle economy. Since colonialism, the pastoral Maasai have seen their hegemony over the rangelands diminish disproportionately to other ethnic groups through a series of development policies that undermined their autonomy. Marginalization of the Maasai was in some cases purposeful, and in others, an unintentional by-product of failures to understand the validity of the pastoral social-ecological system for managing semi-arid rangelands. The colonial administration sought through territorialization to bound the Maasai into the Masai Reserve, a spatial unit that was fixed across time, in an attempt to make pastoralists better subjects of political control. Boundary-making disrupted pre-existing patterns of mobility and social relations with other ethnic groups, including the Arusha who had taken to intensive agriculture in the Meru highlands since the 19th century. The Maasai were restricted by administrative boundaries, but also by settler farms and wildlife reserves, which prohibited

access to seasonal pastures and permanent water sources. Of particular significance to this study, Maasai were dispossessed by the Tarangire Reserve (later TNP), and from the upstream rivers flowing into Lake Manyara in the Manyara Reserve (later LMNP).

Following independence, TANU mobilized an ideology of *ujamaa* to create an "imagined" (see Anderson 1983) national community that sought, through the production of shared symbols and institutions, to erase the connection between 'tribe' and territory and promote national self-reliance and shared citizenship. Through villagization and the collectivization of production, the state attempted to sedentarize pastoralists and eliminate the concept of ethnicity altogether in the name of nationalism. However, the Tanzanian peasantry at large remained relatively "uncaptured" in the sense that they retained their own 'exit strategies' and preference for their traditional livelihoods that were independent of other social classes (Hyden 1980). This prevented an entrenched cultural hegemony from taking hold. The villagization movement re-territorialized pastoral property relations through the formation of new administrative boundaries and institutional arrangements for land governance. The result was the in-migration of mixed ethnicity cultivators who irrigated the fertile soils around Mto wa Mbu, alienating pastoralists from yet another permanent water source. It was around this time that the Arusha began to encroach on the previously Kisongo-dominated rangelands and establish farms.

In the context of the conservation sector, the state has attempted to configure its institutional apparatus for governing to efficiently extract revenue from wildlife resources at the expense of the rural communities who have been systemically excluded from the benefits of wildlife. These processes of conservation governmentality throughout history have led to the perpetuation of an ideological separation between nature and society that has informed conservation practices through the national park model of fortress conservation. With the move to decentralization against the backdrop of structural adjustment and partnerships with global conservation NGOs, new institutions for conservation governance have emerged. On the one

hand, these new models of decentralized conservation seem to allow the state to monetize wildlife that moves outside national parks. At the same time, they also create new formal institutions for pastoral communities to manage rangelands in the face of land alienation. Manyara Ranch involves a state-private partnership with AWF and a board of trustees comprising district and village-level government. Randilen WMA includes an elected body of representatives from the member villages that must operate in collaboration with district government and within the constraints put forth by the central government. Both utilize village game scouts (VGS) in their on-the-ground management practices with social and financial support from Honeyguide. The perspectives of local Arusha and Kisongo communities speak to inclusion in governance and management, despite the different histories, ongoing issues, and institutional arrangements that apply in their home areas. These lived experiences have led to rises in community support for conservation, seemingly reflecting a process of environmentality that has succeeded in bringing the interests of rural communities in line with the state in the arena of conservation. Careful examination of people's views, however, reveals that the central tenets of wildlife conservation do not resonate with communities, who are more interested in securing land. Thus an environmentality framework, in and of itself, does not fully represent the resonating value of pastoralists in maintaining their ongoing way of life. More precisely, it seems that there is common ground between the interests of the central government, which views wildlife as a key source of revenue, conservationists who want to protect wildlife for intrinsic reasons, and rural communities who seek to secure access to land in the face of alienation and derive new livelihood sources.

The result, then, is the emergence of a new synthetic 'canopy' of institutions that involves a combination of formal state legislations, techniques for wildlife conservation, strategic partnerships with NGOs and private donors, district and local governments, and traditional pastoral technologies for managing rangelands. The interests of these stakeholders are all slightly different, but the key is that the protection of wildlife habitat overlaps with the provision of dry

season pasture for pastoralists. On paper, and in practice, these areas reflect blends of state, common, and private property that are governed and managed by different actors with diverse but intersecting goals. I propose using the phrase 'pluralistic property' to describe the overlapping set of governance and management institutions that co-exist either on paper or in practice (or both), which involve different groups of actors with diverse goals, each with stake in determining access to and control of resources and the allocation of the duties and rights that accompany their use. Pluralistic property, whereby resources mean different things to different stakeholders at the same time, may or may not be an effective approach to reconciling conflicts between actors operating at different scales. Cooperation is perhaps most likely when the objectives of different stakeholders overlap in a meaningful way. In this case, institutions for securing pastoral land and protecting wildlife (for both intrinsic and economic reasons) seem to co-exist, given shared interests in reducing land fragmentation that would destroy wildlife habitat and reduce rangeland productivity. It is my emergent view that, in this particular case, the middle ground between stakeholders is greater than the sum of differences, and this has led to social-ecological conservation outcomes that I feel duty bound to characterize as successful.

I have endeavoured in this dissertation to situate Manyara Ranch and Randilen WMA in relation to the intersecting social histories of Kisongo pastoralists and Arusha cultivators. These two ethnic groups have overlapping identities and complementary economies and have historically vied over 'access to and control of' rangeland resources (see Bryant and Bailey 1997; Vaccaro et al. 2013; Jones 2006) through warfare in the precolonial era and more recently through precise political negotiation of the administrative institutions of the post-socialist state (see Kuney 1994). The conservation areas, then, have become "arenas for struggles" between pastoral Kisongo and agricultural Arusha (Neuman 1998:5). With the increasing encroachment of Arusha on the lowlands, the Kisongo view both the ranch and the WMA as ways to secure pastoral land from agricultural development. The Arusha were originally afraid that the WMA would displace their precarious 'indigenous' claims to land, fears that were stoked by elites from

outside the community via nefarious relations with the village councils. Once the dust settled after open protests, the Arusha eventually realized that the WMA in actuality further reinforced their claim to land on the shoulders of their status as member villages of a conservation area. As likely (or possible) descendants of Loogalala pastoralists themselves, prior to their displacement to the Meru highlands by the Kisongo in the 19th century, the Arusha are happy to keep livestock and reap the benefits of the grazing banks of each area.

While both groups have, for the most part, come to support these areas for different overlapping reasons, there is still considerable apprehension about the future. Communities are always cautious about the potential for the state or private actors to prioritize wildlife conservation over local livelihoods owing to the lasting legacy of centralized resource control, and the history of dispossession that rural communities have endured. While the communities themselves view these areas as centrally important to their livelihoods, the institutional arrangements for governing them are not fully decentralized. In the case of WMAs, state policy dictates the legislative framework within which WMAs operate. Relevant Acts are continually revised every few years and representatives of the state (e.g. the Director of Wildlife) must sign off on key processes prior to formalization. Tourism revenue is also centrally collected by the Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority (TAWA) before subsequently being distributed to the district level, then to the WMA, and finally to the member villages. In a similar vein, but through different governance pathways, Manyara Ranch is privately leased by AWF, which subcontracts Honeyguide to oversee management on the ground. While Honeyguide also supervises management in the WMA, there they are directly contracted by the CBO, and thus work directly for the communities in helping to provide management capacity. At first glance, these arrangements might lead particularly skeptical social scientists to conclude that these areas are being run in top-down manners constitutive of fortress conservation. However, my central contention is that much more nuance is needed in both cases. In the case of Randilen WMA, while it is constrained to some extent by the legislation governing all WMAs in the country, the

actual institutions for governance are very much devolved to the community via their Associated Assembly. Thus, despite what has been published about Randilen WMA by some social scientists (see Loveless 2014; Brehony et al. 2018), I stand by its title as a community-based conservation area. In the case of Manyara Ranch, the initial community trust model was designed in a top-down way, allowing the Baraka-led board of trustees to dominate ranch governance.[329] The governance structures have since been reformed to include greater community representation and prioritization of local livelihoods, though some controversies and ambiguities persist. But what is strikingly clear is how supportive the surrounding pastoral communities are of the way the ranch is managed as a vital grazing bank and buffer against agricultural expansion. Thus, while the ranch may have appeared at one point to be a "conservation opportunity lost," it would seem that it has since been found (Goldman 2011:65).

The resonating overlap that draws the two cases together is the way in which they formalize seasonal grazing plans for the local pastoral communities that previously existed through customary institutions. Thus, the reality in this case is that the formal institutions of the state have melded with pre-existing customary ones and, although they have transformed and adapted to a new political environment, they retain the same function, albeit in a slightly different form. While not a direct application of the concept of 'resilience' in ecological terms, I am spring-boarding from this concept to suggest that this synthesis between political policies from above and the underlying institutions of the pastoral communities on the ground seems to reflect a somewhat resilient model of pasture management that achieves its own particular form of stability. The key challenge that will test the resilience of these arrangements will come when extreme events like drought are imposed on the scenario, and pastoralists from afar converge on these resources in times of stress (cf. McCabe 1990a). The WMA has a stipulation that, in such cases, the entire wildlife area can be used for livestock grazing, something which national parks do not formally have. Thus, while it is not a perfect solution that mirrors exactly the pastoral

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[329] As a reminder, Baraka is a pseudonym.

system of mobility from precolonial times, it could be an effective one even in the face of extreme events. The mettle of pastoral institutions is not measured in terms of productive maximization (see Galaty and Johnson 1990), but by the capabilities of these arrangements to mitigate risk in the face of environmental uncertainty (see McCabe 1997:58).

My conclusion, then, is that although these areas are not fully devolved to communities, they seem to reflect equitable and effective approaches to wildlife conservation in semi-arid rangelands. They have succeeded in garnering community-level support, albeit for diverse and complex reasons that are only tangentially related to the central objectives of conservation. Through the eyes of local Kisongo pastoralists, conservation is less about wildlife than it is about *eramatare,* or the overall form of rangeland management that operates through collective institutions (see Godfrey 2018). The key from an applied conservation perspective is ensuring that these primary concerns of local pastoralists align with those of central government and conservationists. Randilen WMA and Manyara Ranch appear to accomplish this task by simultaneously securing large areas of wildlife habitat and formalizing institutions for rotational management of pasture, including the ever-essential grazing banks that provide lifelines for local herders in the dry season. Recent ecological studies speak to the high abundance and densities of wild mammals in these areas that are on par with, and in some cases actually greater than, those of national parks (Lee and Bond 2018a; Kiffner et al. 2020). These findings are highly encouraging and suggest that the ever-elusive goal of designing and implementing 'win-win' conservation areas that simultaneously benefit people and wildlife is finally showing signs of attainability in Tanzania. The communities have come to trust that conservation represents a set of practices that can support their livelihood goals rather than undermine them. While the tourism-related benefits to communities are not yet apparent in Manyara Ranch, member villages of Randilen WMA have come to reap the benefits from WMA revenue distributed to the village level. Villagers in the greater Lolkisale area refer to these funds as the 'the milk of elephants,' a phrase signifying the integration of wildlife conservation into the pastoral way of life – milk of

livestock being the economic dividends of the pastoral mode of production. These benefits, while secondary to pasture access and range productivity, further reinforce community support for the WMA.

The result of these convergent social, political, and economic processes is that a significant transformation in community attitudes towards conservation has taken place in this part of Tanzania, as the rhetoric of community-based conservation is finally translating into practice. Through particular institutional arrangements for governance and management involving some degree of decentralization, the communities have embraced conservation as an important aspect of their lives. These findings suggest that conservation does not have to protect wildlife at the expense of excluding people. By including communities in conservation governance and management, common ground can be reached between state, private, and community actors whose interests are diverse, but not always in direct competition with one another. The key take home message from my research is that integrating pastoral institutions into the management of wildlife conservation areas in semi-arid rangelands makes sound practical sense given uneven and variable distributions of rainfall across space and time. Doing so creates a resilient system that is adaptable to external disturbances and sustainable over the long term. While pastoralism has come under significant pressure over the past 150 years in Tanzania, largely through the interventions of colonialism, socialism and conservation itself, wildlife conservation can change course into the 21st century by revitalizing customary institutions for rangeland management through political support from above. The keys to a sustainable future lie in the pastoral institutions that developed in the semi-arid rangelands of East Africa over millennia, and the time has come for wildlife conservation to bring this way of life back to the fore.

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