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The Philosophical Theology of William Temple.

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Note to Examiners
(re Help)

No help has been obtained from any other person,
nor has any other person been consulted with regard to any
point in this Thesis, with the exception of DR. J.S.Thomson,
Dean of the Faculty of Divinity, McGill University.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY OF WILLIAM TEMPLE.

A consideration of the place of Reason in determining the Truth
of Religion, based on the writings of William Temple.

by

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Bibliography.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY OF WILLIAM TEMPLE.

A consideration of the place of Reason in determining the Truth of Religion, based on the writings of William Temple.

1. Introductory.

We are living in a world of perplexity. Professor E.G.Conklin in *Man, Real and Ideal* says "mankind is now in the midst of one of the greatest crises in its long history". Dr. F.S.C.Northrop in *The Meaning of East and West* tells us that "ideological conflicts are present everywhere. Ours is a paradoxical world. The achievements which are its glory threaten to destroy it. It would seem that the more civilized we become the more incapable of maintaining civilization we are". In *The Conduct of Life*, Lewis Mumford speaks of "the erosion of values, and the dissipation of humane purposes, the denial of any distinction between good or bad, right or wrong, the reversion to sub-human levels of conduct". George W. Kisler in *World Tension-The Psychopathology of International Relations* writes of a "deterioration of personal, political, and social morals" and declares that "the melancholy truth about the course of world history is that we are well along the road to dissipation". We have reached, says John H. Hallowell in *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought*, "a spiritual crisis within the soul of man".(1). It is not to be wondered, in the face of so much evidence, that we see man engaged in a frantic search for the solution of his problems, while at the same time he succumbs to the temptation to throw his

hands up in utter despair of finding it. Perhaps he will heed, perhaps not, but at least it is incumbent upon those who claim to have found the answer to formulate and present it in the hope that he will accept it. He can at least be offered help to lift his feet out of the mire, and be offered an appeal to direct his search along other lines. In recent times man has unduly exalted both himself and the material world in which he exists. There may be justification for singing "glory to man in the highest" as Swinburne did, but when the "Super-Man" of Nietzsche rises up to defeat and destroy himself, what then? Shall we find a place of refuge and obtain the salvation and peace we seek by a recourse to the world of nature? And what, then, if the very phenomena which we have exalted and to which we bow and obey in our materialistic worship, upon which we rely to protect and hide us, threaten to engulf and destroy us?

Enough has been said to indicate the struggle which is being waged today for the mind of man. Enough, too, to indicate that he may have to look, in the midst of his perplexities, elsewhere or in addition to, himself and the phenomenal world about him. It was a mark of the prophetic conscience of William Temple, who was called so suddenly from this earthly field of endeavour just over ten years ago, that he should have given so large a hint for the guidance of men in this decade. It would well repay us to give heed to his voice as he bids us in the cogent presentation of a rationalistic realism which is uniquely Temple to do what he himself had done - to "look unto the rock whence we are hewn", and not only to seek but to find, in Christ,

that unification which alone satisfies and saves us in the midst of all our perplexities and diversities.

It is true of William Temple, as it is true of all great thinkers, that he has to be interpreted and evaluated in relation to his place in the development of thought and social conditions of the period in which he made his contribution. His was not the type of mind which cared to be occupied with vague and speculative musings, but rather one which grappled with problems, whether his own or others, and sought to find a satisfactory solution to them,- and in the end, if not a solution, then at least a satisfying explanation. And it is largely due to this characteristic manner of thinking, that he grappled with the problems presented to him in his day and has left us such a heritage of his fruitful inquiry. We may rightly leave our estimate of this great man for consideration in our second chapter. We may also justly postpone our estimate of his contribution to the end of this thesis, when we shall have discovered by way of discussion how immense that contribution is.

But, manifest need of contribution there was; and more, William Temple had to start where he was. Theological discussion at the end of the nineteenth century had taken on a definite form. Theology, the queen of the sciences, unable to boast any longer of her royal state, was having to fight for her own existence and to maintain her position in the face of opposition as a science at all. The rationalists, on the one hand, were seated in the saddle and had things pretty much their own way. Moreover, they were in a position to be able to dogmatise, and dogmatic they were in expounding their "absolute". On the other hand, the nineteenth century had produced its scientists of a different sort. Investigation and enquiry was leading to a closer examination of the "material", and there was "evolving" along this line that great development which was to

become so predominantly characterized as the "biological" sciences. Obviously, in between these trends, there was the need of a reconciling voice and this fell to the lot of the Theologian. To add to the difficulties, the voice had to be shouted very loudly in the teeth of much flaunting opposition. On the Continent (in Europe) the voice of the "radicals" had been heard "crying down" many of the precepts of orthodoxy and tearing to shreds with unholy hands many of the pages of its book. Strauss had launched his virulent attack against "priests" and the churches in his "Life of Christ" (1833) in which he advocated his mythical theory of the Gospels. Shortly after the publication of Darwin's "Origin of the Species", Renan had published his more attractive, but hardly less destructive, "Life of Jesus" (1863). Ferdinand Baur, contemporary with Strauss, had developed his critical view of the New Testament which, as constructed by the "school of Tubingen", became a main source of theological controversy for years. That, added to the former contrivances of De Wette (1780-1843) and Ewald (1803-1875) to present the Old Testament as a figment of the imagination, mere "myth", left theologians far from being in a position to cast anything like a decisive vote. Although the advice to "take the priests out of the church, and the miracles out of the Gospels" had not been put into actual practice, yet it proved startling to men's "consciousness" and a shock to established religious beliefs.

Along with the above-mentioned "trends" we must bear in mind the views and warnings of Darwin and Huxley and the "enlightenment" consequent upon the school of thought represented by Herbert Spencer. Men felt that a whole new world was being opened up to

them, in which they could take their full share and reap the benefits of "modern science" and "progress". Nor must we forget the importance of the "new learning" in presenting to people a new knowledge and interpretation of other "religions". The study of Comparative Religions, represented in England by Max Muller, had tended to bring up for discussion and reorientation the place of the "religious instinct" of mankind. What must be said, in the light of the new knowledge, of revealed religion, or again, of just to what extent religion was natural to man? Moreover, "empiricism" was the order of the day, and the consequent emphasis upon the individual as such, when applied to the race or nation, was bound to lead in the end to the inevitable conflagration which took place in the new century as World War I. It's useless for men to say now, as they said then, that such calamity and wholesale destruction of life should not happen, and need never to have happened- the fact is that it did happen. It became a fact as all the foregoing trends and events outlined above became facts; and William Temple, the philosopher-theologian was to play a part, to have something to say and do about this, as he had also his contribution to make in the larger field.

Meanwhile, there was developing contemporaneously with William Temple another school of thought known as "existentialism". The name is taken from the existentialist philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard and included in the school are such thinkers as Barth, Brunner and Berdyaev. They present us with a "theology of crisis" and preach a new "supernaturalism". They disparage the role of reason and emphasise the limitations of scientific method and its incompetence to deal with all the aspects of our universe. They

emphasise the importance of the individual "feelings", but maintain that revelation is all of God,- we bring nothing to it. Barth and Brunner especially deny any possibility of man understanding or knowing God by means of Reason. God speaks; God has revealed Himself,- but so far is man in his limitations from forming concepts about God, that we can only know and feel the "impact", the "revelation", and leave it at that. What right has science to speak of "progress"? What right have the scientists intervening and interfering as they do when they enter the field of revealed truth? They are wrong to do so, and are advised by Barth and Brunner to keep their hands off and cease from intruding,- they have no right setting their unholy feet upon the sacred confines of the "revealed truth".(2).

Must the Barthian word be taken as final? Does it mean that the way of the scientist and the way of the theologian must be by paths which remain exclusive? Have the scientist and the theologian "nothing" in common, and therefore nothing to contribute to each other? And, within the field of theology itself, does it mean that there could be no such thing as "natural religion"?- at least, as over against "revealed religion"? And, what are we to say about Reason,- must it be reduced to a minimum, or excluded altogether?

With these questions William Temple was much concerned and had a great deal of importance to say about them. It was only natural that he should have been influenced by such great theologians as Bishop Charles Gore, with whom he himself tells us he agrees and differs.(3). Yet it appears that Bishop Gore in his strict "Catholicity" and emphatic "dogmatism" was to have the effect of inclining him toward the school of thought which emphasised "feeling". In fact within his own country and Church, William Temple was to make

up his own mind between the positions held by the extreme (Protestant) "Evangelicals" on the one hand, and the extreme (High Church) "Catholics" on the other.(4). In the stream of English theological thought another great 'divine', Bishop Butler (1692-1752), had taken his stand when confronted with situations not entirely unlike those in which William Temple himself was situated. Although his masterpiece "Nature, Man and God" contains no direct reference to Butler's "Sermons" or "Analogy", yet it is important for the student of philosophical theism to bear in mind the contribution which Butler had made, and the fact that his great and masterly treatment was to mould the thinking of English theologians for centuries. When Dr. Joseph Angus edited "Butler's Analogy and Sermons", he began with quotations taken from various scientists, philosophers and theologians, which all go to show the greatness of Butler and the uniqueness as well as the lasting consequence of his immense contribution.(5). Bishop Butler was attempting to answer the hedonistic philosophy of Hobbes. His "Sermons" for the most part deal with subjects chiefly Ethical, while his "Analogy" seeks to present a systematised and irrefutable argument for theism. He does so by setting up the two "citadels" of "Natural Religion" and "Revealed Religion". With the soundness of Bishop Butler's argument or any appraisal of its method we need not now concern ourselves. But the distinction, as well as the distinctive contribution, had now been made; the "citadels" had been set up; henceforth the exponent of the theistic position was to be "coloured" by the fruit of Butler's rationalism.

Enough has been said to indicate a sharp "tension" inevitably arising within such trends of thought as we have considered, and more particularly as an outcome of them: first of all within

theological circles with regard to "natural" and "revealed" religion; and, secondly, with regard to the philosophical method of their treatment from the point of view of the mind perceiving the data given, or vice versa. We shall see that William Temple, with the type of mind which accustomed itself to grapple with problems and always eager to form a "synthesis", takes account of both. In all fairness, we should add here, however much it reveals the conclusion of this enquiry, that he also did full and creditable justice to both. But his treatment and contribution will be best seen and the more fully appreciated, the more we understand the man Temple in his environment.

Annotation:-

- (1) **Living Issues in Philosophy** by Harold H. Titus, 2nd. Edit., Chap. 1.
- (2) **Bartt: Types of Religious Philosophy**, p. 433f.
- (3) **Nature, Man and God**, pp. 225, 231, 332, 339.
- (4) Cf. **F.A. Iremonger: William Temple**- chapters on the Archbishop's "choice", life and work.
Cf. also **William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation**, p. 96.
- (5) **Dr. Angus** quotes **R. Baxter, Dr. Thomas Reid, Sir J. Macintosh, Lord Brougham, Dr. M'Crice, Dr. Chalmers, Dr. Kaye, Cecil, Bishop Daniel Wilson, and Professor Huxley.**

II. The Man in His Environment.

It is very difficult to write a treatise on William Temple without eulogizing him. The influence which he exerted, and the impact which he made, was so immense, that testimonials were forthcoming from all corners of the earth, from men of all creeds and some with none- from philosopher, journalist, statesman, theologian, socialist, warrior, pacifist, churchman and atheist.(1). Endowed with an enormous appetite for knowledge and a corresponding capacity for acquiring and assimilating his discoveries, he was at the same time able to make the truth as he so clearly perceived it equally intelligible and acceptable to the man of letters and the man in the street. This was no doubt due to his willingness at all times to be ready to understand and appreciate and to "enter sympathetically", as he himself would say, into the personalities of all with whom he came in contact. Not only did this characteristic enable him thus to understand and appreciate the other fellow's point of view, but at the same time it elicited from others a consideration of his own point of view even when they differed from him. It was this great gift of being able to place himself thus humbly along side of others that won for him the epithet "humility of greatness"; and his contribution to the intellectual, ecclesiastical and social realms was so immense, not only in the local and national but international fields, that when he died expressions of condolence and regrets poured into Lambeth Palace from all quarters of the globe, including one from the President of the United States of America, at so great a loss to the world.(2).

Sidney Dark has truly said that William Temple was a man of the

moment.(3). He was born at the Palace, Exeter, England, on October 15, 1881 while his father, Frederick, was Bishop of Exeter, Thus he was destined to grow up in a period of great upheaval and turmoil in history. England was very nearly at the height of the great Victorian era of territorial expansion and the boy Temple would grow up in an England governed by such statesmen as Gladstone and Lord Salisbury. It was the period when Sir John Seeley, professor of history at Cambridge University, was proclaiming that "politics are vulgar when they are not liberalized by history, and history fades into mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to practical politics".(4). It was a period of change and development in the method, meaning, and scope of "history" itself. Lord Acton succeeded Sir John Seeley at Cambridge and had a tremendous influence over the young Temple.(5). England, at the turn of the century, was indeed sitting "on top of the world" and there was a kind of smugness consequent upon the sense of greatness and achievement; yet it was at the same time sitting on the top of a volcano, and there was a vast disturbance, a sense of misgiving and insecurity in the mind of the nation. History, with its new concepts, was taking on a new role. History was not the mere record of events, nor the sum total of these events. Lord Acton declared in his inaugural lecture that it was the function of history "to keep in view and to command the movement of ideas, which are not the effect but the cause of public events". He further argued that "if we are to account mind not matter, ideas not force, the spiritual property that gives dignity and grace and intellectual value to history, and its action on the ascending life of man then we shall not be prone to explain the universal by the national, and civilization by custom".(6). It is

impossible to read Lord Acton, or merely his "inaugural lecture", setting out as it does his view of History as it deals with morals, education, politics, religion, philosophy, culture and custom, without seeing how immensely it influenced William Temple and his claim that "Lord Acton knew more of history than any other Englishman of his generation".(7). Despite history's claim to guiding principles, however, the study and knowledge of history even "with added remorse for the past and assured hope for the future", did not save England or the world. Early in the new century came World War 1 and 'Armageddon' was let loose. This in itself may be a hint at something that William Temple realised, even before the War came, that "principles" themselves are not enough. They form no sure and safe guide to history itself, nor to man on the stage of history.

The foregoing is not meant to convey the idea that "history" itself, or any one historian, exerted a sole influence upon William Temple, or the one predominant influence. Perhaps there was no one predominant factor at work moulding his intellect, shaping his character, or determining his destiny. He tells us that Plato, St. John, and Browning influenced his thinking more than any others.(8). F.A. Iremonger, a contemporary friend and co-worker, leaves no doubt in his masterly biographical treatment of the influence exerted by Archbishop Frederick Temple upon his son. The atmosphere and environment of a good home in which there was real love and religious fervour, ample opportunity for the best social contacts, with provision for "liberal" education, show their value in the development of the man. But although his father maintained an eagerness for his son's intellectual development, he wished always to remain only as a help and guide and never tried to dominate his thinking. He must be

left free to think things out for himself; but he must see the necessity of doing so.(9). But the method of "fairness" which was inculcated by his father was stamped even more indelibly upon his mental habit by Dr. Edward Caird who came to Balliol while Temple was still a student. In his *Nature, Man and God*, the author tells us that Dr. Caird to whose memory he dedicated that great work, had taught him that "Descartes started at both ends of the road at once and never met himself in the middle". Dr. Caird never allowed his Hegelian idealism to preclude the reality of the external world and the facts of empiricism, and it was from him that Temple learned the habit of philosophical debate, the art of analytic enquiry, and of synthesis. The following words from Professor McCunn's "Memorial Speech" in which he expounded the genius of Dr. Caird, might also be taken as equally descriptive of William Temple: "He gave us of his best unstintedly, never making the mistake of 'talking down' to his audience, but rather seeking to stimulate his hearers by confidence in their powers. The effect thus produced was as if we were witnessing the creation of a new world. The dead-weight of custom and tradition was insensibly lifted, and we felt that for the first time we had begun to see things as they are".

It was a world of intellectual conflict into which William Temple came. Nowhere was it more clearly drawn than between science and religion, and it was largely the outcome of the emphasis upon biological science. The concept of evolution had introduced an entirely new element into the positivist view of the world of existence. The Newtonian physics may be taken to mean the world is self-explanatory. Even so it was a mechanical explanation it

had offered in presenting man with the spectacle of a vast poise in power, principle, and potentiality. Even if Religion could produce an answer for this, it was doomed to failure in the face of the new evidence advanced by Darwin's theory. For now, man himself became a product of that vast universe and was not merely a spectator. This led to a materialistic and skeptical position and found its exponents in thinkers such as T.H.Huxley. There was a rising tide of unbelief and a repudiation of the old orthodoxy. To those who could not see what the world was producing William Temple had an answer. Amongst other things, and at a certain stage in the evolutionary process, mind occurs. Now, if the universe can produce that which is of the nature of mind, then it is very difficult to conceive how the universe can be explained without some reference to Mind.(10).

It was inevitable that the rising tide of liberalism should demand a further consideration of the place for Orthodox Christianity. Theological liberalism had its roots in German philosophical idealism - Kant, Schleirmacher, Hegel, Ritschl, Lotze and Troeltsch. In Germany the idealistic movement took two opposite trends; a mystical, metaphysical trend leading towards pantheism (Schleirmacher, Hegel, Lotze) and an ethical, social trend leading towards humanism (Kant, Ritschl, Troeltsch). (Cf. Addendum). It may be true to say that both of these antithetical trends were strongly resisted in England by philosophers and theologians alike, but it is impossible to study either the theological or philosophical currents, much less the tendencies leading to social reform, of this period without seeing how largely these trends helped to mould and shape the life and thought of England at the turn of

the century and later. In all this William Temple was influenced by such contemporaries as Lord Balfour, Bishop Gore, A.E.Taylor, Dean Rashdall, Archbishop Lang and A.E.Garvie on the one hand, and by Dean Ralph Inge, Scott Holland, Hugh Martin, and later, Dick Sheppard, Studdert Kennedy, Canon Quick and W.R.Matthews on the other.(11). Meanwhile, there was a power at work behind the scenes. Between the years 1880 to 1910 T.H.Green was not only indoctrinating the minds of students at Balliol with a new philosophy, but he was also inculcating the paramount importance of the need to put their vocation into practice; and this conviction was being instilled into William Temple along with men of such diverse creeds as Asquith and Milner and such contemporaries as Toynbee. Seized with this conviction and armed with the powerful dialectical method of Edward Caird, it was possible for William Temple to restate the old orthodoxy in a new manner. This method runs throughout all his writings and he was particularly able to use it in his treatment of the scholastic as opposed to the mystic (12), for "the spiritual health of mankind very largely depends on the possibility of establishing a harmony between these two types". (13).

There was a need of a reconciling voice to be heard in the changing world. This voice was Temple's and he took on the role of the reconciling prophet. In addition to the impact of the evolutionary natural science which was shaping theological thought, there was also the influence of the new Biblical Criticism and the impact of a new ethical-social conscience. These produced the new theological "liberalism" of which Temple stood at the forefront. During the early years of the century the new social conscience expressed in the Social Gospel Movement was the most formative force in liberal theology

and Temple was perhaps its leading exponent. Before, during, and after the First World War with the hope of Christianising the Social Order and building the Kingdom of God on earth was the main positive message of the liberal movement of theology at its height. He never lost cognisance of it. It led him to write "The Kingdom of God" in 1912 and it remained as a predominant theme on through the Second World War when he produced "Christianity and The Social Order" in 1941. Yet he was able to perform as great a role and still show the glory and the truth of the orthodox Christian creed. The fact that we are presented with a "new world" need not unduly disturb us and cause us to "cut the painter". He never ceased to recognize the place and needs of man and he seized the opportunity of taking a direct lead in social reform and even became the whip of the Labour Party in the House of Lords. Still he resolutely rejected the lead of Evangelical Protestantism to the extent of a rather humanistic interpretation of Christianity.

The important questions which confront man in a changing order are: Can a man believe? On what grounds can he believe? and what can he believe? William Temple made use of the new psychology in expounding the tenets of his belief. Must everything be explained in terms of the material or of the spiritual? Is it possible to give a full account of the nature of things in terms of objective or subjective truth to the exclusion of the other? Should we explain things ultimately in terms of Mind or Matter? With these questions the mind of Temple's time was occupied, and ranging on the one side were those of the Fabian social school with Spencer as its predecessor and Ward and Webb as its adherents, and on the other philosophers like Bradley, Bosanquet, Bergson and Von Hugel. It is impossible

to make sharp distinctions here, and these men are not listed in this manner to indicate a sameness or identity of treatment but to indicate that William Temple recognized the place of both in his philosophical and social outlook. He realized the importance of value alongside of Bosanquet, was fully aware of emergent process along with Bergson, and also captured the "abiding values" and "abiding consequences" alike of Von Hugel. The main point is to see that William Temple fully realized that a new world had dawned but also sensed its implications for the social and international order. Industrial expansion had created an accentuation of the nationalist society, with an enlarging emphasis on the "group" and minimising of the importance and worth of the "individual", tending to the Socialist Republic and the rise of modern communism in Europe under the leadership of Karl Marx, Engels and Lenin. In England it meant liberal-social reform under the leadership of men like Lloyd George, with whom Temple had much in common and with whom he participated in a leading role. The tension between national states together with the rise to industrial power led to the quest for dominance in world power. William Temple saw quite clearly that the social tension in which he entered existed on two fronts- (1) the National, and (2) the World Order. At the same time he was keenly aware of the incompetence of the ordinary man to understand and appreciate and therefore to provide a solution. What was needed?- obviously a "new man" in a new society.

The answer called for an extensive programme of education and a new religious fervour, and both on a national and international scale. The problems could only be met by the establishing of a Christian Social Order, which would do full justice to the individual

and to society, and would enable men to live in brotherhood and cooperation both in the nation and in the world. The welfare of Christianity was the answer to the "welfare state". The state and society must not be confused, and the state could only be an instrument for society as it became obedient to God. The answer to world domination lay in the extension of Christ's domain to the social order.(14). Just as there is an order in the Universe and we can watch it unfolding in the evolutionary process, so too in Christ we see God's creative activity(15); so too, it is impossible to eliminate Christ from the social order. William Temple never adopted the role of a combatant in the class-struggle. He never indulged in polemic, neither in his treatment of the new Dialectical Materialism nor in his attitude toward the Barthians. In everything he demonstrated a "sweet reasonableness". He had indeed a definite view of the nature of sin, but he also had a vision of the Kingdom of God which could, through Christ operating in man, become visible. Christ was the fulfilment of the natural promise and made it shine forth. This was not an alien truth, and truth was not alien to it. There was only one Truth; all other truths were subservient to it, and what man saw and experienced was the revelation of that Truth. His Mens Creatrix indicated his indebtedness to Bergson and his difference from him. As men accept the Truth, as Christ becomes realized and operative in the minds and hearts of men, there will be a temporal manifestation of God's Kingdom which for its fullest accomplishment requires all eternity.

The task for accomplishing the transformation of the human society into the Society of the Kingdom of God, William Temple assigned to the Church. Rather, he considered this task as a Divine commission to the Church which is the Body of Christ. If modern science had

taught us anything it had taught us that its conception a hundred and fifty years ago of a self-explanatory world going on its own steam and impelled by its own nature could no longer be held. But the new science had convinced men that they could believe that everything can be explained by natural law, and there was nothing incompatible with this and the belief in Divine law.(16). Indeed, the principles which are seen at work in the universe are themselves a guarantee, a token, of what is revealed in Christ Jesus. The operation of the same law or spirit is seen in the Church which is the Body of Christ still being built up unto perfection until all will "come to one perfect Man".(17). The task of the Church is the ingathering of all into one fellowship of service under the full suzerainty of the reign of God.

The task, then, was the missionary task of the Church, and so Temple threw himself into it with all the force and enthusiasm at his disposal. It has been truly said that "the Oecumenical Movement is the most important thing of modern times". Its measure of success is in no small part due to the initial force and driving power of William Temple. The romantic, even quixotic, manner in which he took up the challenge and the leadership he gave to the Student Christian Movement, the cause of International and Interdenominational Missions, the World Council of Churches and the great World Conferences such as Lausanne, Jerusalem, Edinburgh, Madras and Stockholm afford most interesting reading.(18). But he never conceived of The World Council of Churches as a sort of super-Church, nor even as the Holy, Catholic Church. It was itself a demonstration of a fellowship of service and co-operation for bringing in the Kingdom of God. While he remained a staunch and loyal Churchman of the Anglican Communion and discharged

nobly and with consummate skill the duties of the highest Office that Church could confer upon him, yet he could be hailed as a Christian brother and leader by Churchmen of other Denominations.

And so this chapter ends as it began, with a reference to the greatness of the man Temple. He was acknowledged by his contemporaries as a chairman without a rival, in the discharge of which duty he proved himself a master of procedure and unswervingly impartial. As a chairman he was neither lax nor a hustler and, possessing an almost infallible memory, he was particularly accurate in summing up a debate or in presenting resolutions and decisions which had been reached. He possessed amazingly keen powers of observation and had such a retentive memory that he could recall almost anything he had ever heard or read and give the reference for it. He laid it down as a first requisite of education that it should inculcate the habit of concentration, and it was observed by those who knew him that he never allowed his own attention to wander, and at the same time, could never be accused of any lack of courtesy or patience toward others. He had a resourcefulness in overcoming difficulties, and his aptitude for reconciling divergent views has been called his "parlour trick". He was at all times radiantly happy and possessed a flair for friendliness and was characterized with a spirit of great humility.(19) His personal charm and abilities made him peculiarly fitted to take a unique place and make a contribution, perhaps unrivaled by his contemporaries, in a world of tension.

Annotation:-

- (1) Such tributes are paid by the following writers, and they refer to many other testimonials to the greatness of William Temple's character and achievements: Sidney Dark- The People's Archbishop; F.A.Iremonger- William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury; Anthony Otter- William Temple; and William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation by six contributors.
- (2) F.A.Iremonger: William Temple, p.627.
- (3) The People's Archbishop, p.7.
- (4) Lord Acton: Lectures on Modern History, pp.1-2.
- (5) Cf. Temple: Christianity and Social Order, p.53.
- (6) Lord Acton: Lectures on Modern History- both quotations p.3.
- (7) Cf. # (5) same p.
- (8) Mens Creatrix: Preface, p.VII.
- (9) Iremonger: William Temple, p.3. Also cf. Sidney Dark: The People's Archbishop, p.13.
- (10) The argument occurs again and again in his writings. Cf. esp. Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of Nature, Man and God.
- (11) In this connection I have read and list as typical the following- A.J.Balfour: The Foundations of Belief; Bishop Gore: Belief in God; A.E.Taylor: The Faith of a Moralist; Dean Rashdall: Philosophy and Religion; A.E.Garvie: Handbook of Christian Apologetics; Dean Inge: Faith and Its Psychology; R.H.L.Sheppard: The Impatience of a Parson; G.A.Studdert Kennedy: The New Man in Christ; Canon O.C.Quick: Christian Beliefs and Modern Questions and W.R.Matthews: The Purpose of God.
- (12) Cf. Essays in Christian Politics, p.152.
- (13) Ibid: p.154.

(14) Cf.-Basic Convictions.

Personal Religion and the Life of Fellowship, 64ff.

Christianity and the State, p.139; p.183ff.

Christianity and the Social Order, pp.46 & 63.

The idea runs as a theme throughout them all. It is also a main contention of Christus Veritas. Cf., also Mens Creatrix pp.135 & 136.

(15) Cf. Mens Creatrix; also Readings in St.John's Gospel,esp. Introduction & pp.1-42.

(16) The Faith and Modern Thought,p.153.

(17) Ibid,p.163.

(18) F.A.Iremonger, Chapter XXIV.

(19) This character sketch of William Temple is gathered from F.A. Iremonger, Anthony Otter, Sidney Dark, and the contributors of William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation.

ADDENDUM

I am aware of the apparent weakness of thus linking the German thinkers so closely together. I realize that Lotze affords a point of departure. In linking the name of Ritschl with humanism I would draw attention to the words "leading towards". After writing this, I had access to Canon Raven's Gifford Lectures and I find that he confirms my judgment. Cf.Science and Religion:"Notes" p.213.

III. Facing the Issues.

The world of tension which loomed so largely in the last chapter needs further elucidation, and this chapter will be an attempt to see it more clearly as William Temple saw it and to watch how he handled it.

Colonel Blimp's 'boys', when they sang 'Where do we go from here?' in the War of 1914, were really expressing the mind of the times. The whole world (though not, of course, in the song) was envisaged as being at the cross-roads of history (1), and the answer to the question may well depend on another: Where are we? It is obviously important to know our exact starting-point.(2). The answer to this second question may well again depend on the still further question: How did we get where we are? It was characteristic of William Temple to use this method of approach. It forms the focal-point of all his effort and writings and he especially adopted it as the approach to his Gifford Lectures (3), where, in contrast with Karl Barth, he did leave a very real place for "natural religion".(4). But the point of our enquiry has been thus introduced to indicate that Temple as he faced the issues of his time approached them with a magnanimity of mind and spirit which could hardly be preclusive or unfair in his treatment.

The whole impact of the modern "sciences" since 1850 had tended to a bifurcation in all knowledge and a consequent fragmentation in men's thinking, attitudes and actions. William Temple's father had dealt with the question in his Bampton Lectures in 1884. He was concerned with the "apparent" conflicts which had arisen and aimed at showing that Revelation was no obstacle to the progress of Science, but that the unity which science sought would be found "not in the

physical world alone, but in the physical and spiritual united".(5). The inherent danger lay in the fact that the "supposed" conflict would incline men to superstition, blindness and stagnation. By the time Lord Balfour produced his Foundations of Belief (1894) the inroads had become more securely laid and more severely felt. In the face of the 'doubts' and 'perplexities' with which mankind was beset he wished to "recommend a particular way of looking at the World-problems, which, whether we like it or not, we are compelled to face"; he desired to lead up to a point of view "whence the small fragments of the Infinite Whole may appear in their true relative proportions".

(6). The change in a Christian world where men asked themselves whether they should adopt the truths of the new science to a world in which a scientific mentality asks whether it can any longer accept the beliefs of Christianity had pretty well taken place by 1903 when Dr. William North Rice endeavoured to maintain a place for the Christian Faith in An Age of Science.(7). It is interesting to read the book with its many 'diagrams' and 'equations', particularly as he aims to show a physical explanation of miracle. He considered Archbishop Frederick Temple's Bampton Lectures the best answer to the problem of Free-Will.(8). But despite such attempts the tendency was overwhelmingly towards the either : or, the this or that, in the whole question of belief and practice. This is not to suggest that all Christian belief was by that time tottering or that no applause was accorded the theologian's interpretation of that belief or his view of the universe. The voice of historical Christianity was still speaking from within England, as is evident by the appearance of Lux Mundi, edited by Gore in 1892. There, within the Church, was a group of men who were well aware of the problems and stated the

fundamental positions which were to be the foundations on which Temple was to build and establish his argument for the place of the Incarnation. But the "critical" attitude within the Church, as typified by such men as Schweitzer in Germany and Percy Gardner in England, was tending towards a form of criticism even to the point of rejection of the Christian Faith in the lay mind. By the time of World War I the inadequacy of the Church was felt at home (in England) and abroad (9) and by the first quarter of the century there were powerful lay movements becoming openly hostile. One of the evidences of this was to be seen in the "question time" and "soap-box oratory" of Hyde Park (10) where the contrasts of ideals in the intellectual, industrial and political worlds, as well as in personal and religious life, became in open conflict. Even in the writings of Julian Huxley, Bertrand Russell and Somerset Maugham it was suggested that the Christian view of life should be abandoned.

When William Temple came upon the scene the situation was grave. In 1904 he produced an Essay on The Province of Science and in 1908 he resolutely set himself the task of showing that the universe is "Christo-centric".(11). During his whole career he was in the thick of the fight. It is enlightening to see the difference in the way Temple faced the issues in comparison with most of the thinkers of twenty years ago. The literature which attempted to solve the problems in "the thirties" was characterised by question marks. This in itself is suggestive. In 1932 we had, for example, Cave: What Shall We Say Of Christ? and Storr: Does Science Leave Room For God? In 1933 Weatherhead: How Can I Find God?, Taylor: Does Science Leave Room For God? and Findlay: What Did Jesus Teach? In 1938 H.G.Wood was asking Did Christ Really Live? In all this it is not to be inferred that

such writers did not make a plausible and worth-while contribution to theistic thought, but it is indicative that not one of Temple's contributions was thus characterised by a question mark! What was the distinctiveness that was Temple's?

It has already been hinted in the claim put forward for his largeness of view. It was axiomatic of Temple that we should never treat the present as isolated. Conflicts arise because there is tension and tension arises because there is misunderstanding, or at least, a lack of understanding. All history has its roots in the past, its meaning in the present, and its eyes to the future. First of all we must clarify the issues and start from there(12), being careful never to adopt the either:or attitude. This is especially true when we face the whole problem with its accentuation on mind or body, matter or spirit, the natural or supernatural. The conflict, on its major field between the natural and spiritual, can be resolved by adopting the Christian view. "The spiritual and the material are not in themselves naturally hostile, though they easily enough become so; they are mutually supplementary. The spiritual is only active, perhaps only actual (if these are to be distinguished), so far as it possesses and expresses itself through the material; the material only realises its potentialities when the spiritual dwells in it and controls it. Christianity is far the most materialistic of the great religions; its central affirmation is, "The Word was made flesh". It is materialistic not because it is unspiritual, but because its spirit is so strong that it need not run away from matter - even from flesh - but faces it and dominates it".(13). Here indeed was a manifesto for the combatants providing a charter by which they could not only make a truce but work together in peaceful co-operation,

if they would adopt it.

The advance of scientific knowledge need not lead to a tearing asunder the whole fabric of man's existence and achievements and a scattering of them piecemeal to be trampled underfoot in his onward march. The problem was not so much one of general knowledge as a problem of the knowledge of God. Knowledge had advanced with the growth of the sciences and this growing comprehension of the world was tormenting the mind of man. Could he, in the face of it, be sure of ultimate existence and of value? In this, too, thinkers tended to adopt the 'either:or' attitude. On the one hand there was the attempt to equate Christianity with Idealism. The dogmatic attitude of those who proclaimed the "Absolute" was exemplified in F.H. Bradley and Bosanquet.(14). Bradley had distinguished between Reality and God. Dire results of literary and historical criticism had led to an attack on the authoritarian basis of the Bible. Schweitzer had run the Gospel into an apocalyptic mould, and subsequently the very origin of Christianity had been questioned. The whole issue seemed to be leading to confusion and to a questioning of reason itself. For had not rational thinking crept into theological thought and led to this wholesale questioning of the Scriptures? The Hegelian position could hardly longer be justified. Reason, when it applied itself to objective reality in the form of scientific enquiry led to equally dire results. Here, indeed, was perplexity as well as tension, for it had come about through the triumph of Reason! The reason of science was an empirical reason but the rationalistic collapse had been due to science requiring a new approach. The new approach, of course, was that of the evolutionary hypothesis. In the hands of William Temple the evolutionary hypothesis received an entirely new treatment and

gave a new significance for history and human development. But up to this time it had accentuated the problem of man. Its method had been applied to religion in various senses, notably in the field of the study of Comparative Religions, but here, again, it led to dire consequences. As a result it led to a doubt as to whether there was any distinctive truth in Christianity. In answer to such bewilderment Temple pointed out that "Man is a finite mind; but because he is Mind he cannot be content with his finitude. And one of the ways in which he tries to rise above it is in the pursuit of knowledge - a pursuit which, once started, never stops until the whole Universe is focussed in his intelligence".(15).

On the other hand were those who seized the opportunity of the rationalistic collapse to seek the truth of existence by another method. Since it could no longer be claimed that science had explained the whole world and given an account of the whole of existence they were encouraged to look in another direction. It is natural for a man in doubt and perplexity to apply his mind to these doubts, in other words to look within. In this the existentialists were further encouraged by the new psychology. The upshot of this led to an accentuation of conflict between authority and experience, tradition and modernism, conservatism and progress. It was characteristic of a tendency to get rid of dogmatism. The tendency to look within, as well as the tendency to look at nature itself (16) led to an acceptance of "self-sufficiency" as a satisfactory explanation of existence. Against such self-sufficiency W.R. Matthews argued in *The Purpose of God*.(17). As against the whole tendency, William Temple pointed to the fact of the on-going Church and asked how on that basis we could account for that. The Church did not just "grow up".

If we are seeking a solution to the question of subjective or objective, then we shall find it in Revelation. "All human experience contains two factors, the subjective and the objective".(18). Just as there is evidence of an order in the physical world so God intended that there should be an order in the intellectual realm. If we seek to see it or know it in its entirety that is probably beyond our ken, for all life is a "growth" or "process" and man himself is included in that process. So we may not be capable of obtaining a complete objective view, any more than we can have a complete subjective view. "All the realities of life are processes, moving from point to point in an ordered growth....Life itself, that is, human history as a whole, may be presumed to be the noblest drama of all; but it is at once so long and so complex that most of us can see no real and coherent significance in it at all, unless some man of genius has isolated some relatively complete whole and made us see its value".(19). This, of course, is the role of the poet or dramatist, but we see it also in Jesus Christ. He is the crown and criterion of all revelation, for the whole reality of revelation finds its perfect and focal point in Jesus Himself.(20).

When man makes himself or the world he experiences the criterion of his knowledge and judgments he makes a mistake. When man acts in this way he leaves God out and there seems no plausible way of understanding the world except as God's creation. "God is the world's creator"(21) and "it is the whole world, inclusive of matter - of flesh and blood - which God so loved that He gave His only begotten son".(22). "He is not just the soul of the universe, so that it is as necessary to Him as He is to it. He exists, so to speak, by his own right; the universe only exists because He chooses. 'Thou hast created all things, and for Thy pleasure they are, and were created'.

Now this is a very definite and distinctive philosophical doctrine. I believe that it affords a general view of things which is , even philosophically, better than any other."(23). After examining the various types of recent philosophy in 1936 Professor John Laird pointed out that in all seriousness very eminent people were advocating a return to the past: "Back to Kant", "Back to Hume", "Back to Locke", "Back to St.Thomas", "Back to Plato".(24). Up to the point of accepting the value of past tradition William Temple would agree. When examining the case for Natural Theology in his Gifford Lectures of 1939 Professor Laird had this to say: "Of 'communion with God' I can speak from hearsay only. If a man believes that he walks with God, that God responds to his heart and mind, in brief that there is genuine although infinitely unequal fellowship between deity and himself, he is claiming, in principle, a personal acquaintance with the divine being not wholly dissimilar from his acquaintance with other men....Accordingly I submit that the 'right use of ordinary means' of knowing has an intelligible if not a precisely demarcable sense, that it is doubtful whether we have any other means of knowing, and that it need not be true that the knowledgeable powers we apply within nature could not apply to nature or to nature's God".(25). Had William Temple remained a professor of philosophy only, he no doubt could have said all this and more. Indeed, he did say more in his Essay on The Province of Science in 1904. But when he faced the issues he did so as a man of faith and stated the traditional Theistic position in terms of modern scientific thought and in the light of reason. Thus doing, he recaptured the great tradition laid down by Bishop Butler.

In any attempt to see how William Temple faced the great issues

of scientific, philosophic or theistic thought it must be remembered that he saw clearly the pitfalls of all these great endeavours of the human mind. It has been due to the inherent weakness of human thought and the inability or refusal to think things through clearly and fully that men have been led to produce the "deist" theories of God and the universe. Even supposing God has created the universe, if He remains outside His creation we are left with a mechanical view of the universe. On the other hand if God and matter are equally real they may be mutually independent of each other and then we are led to the position of a dualism, or even of pluralism. Again, when man has sought a way out of these problems and tried to account for the presence of God at work in His universe he has been led into pantheism. What Temple clearly saw was that "if all were God, nothing were God"; or, to state it differently, if all is divine, then how can we distinguish between good and bad, between truth and error? When one tries to conceive of "pure spirit" he arrives at an Aristotelian God, whereas when he tries to account fully and adequately for "immanence" he lands in pantheism. The only conceivable way out is along the lines of both "Immanence" and "Transcendence". Temple outlined the answer to the problem under the double-caption of "the Transcendence of the Immanent" and "the Immanence of the Transcendent" in his Gifford Lectures.(26). The fact that this is God's world, that it needs Him and that He can be seen in the great processes of its emergence runs through the whole of Temple's development. (27). The world is not as necessary to God as He is to the world(28) but He is at work in the arena of His creation for guidance and for judgment (29). "Our religion rests upon the conviction that God is the living God and that He is active in His world in fulfilment of

His purpose".(30). It is because of this that there can be events or episodes which men call miracles. If God created matter, surely He can operate upon, or work out His purpose in and through matter, and where the "occasion is sufficient, He can and will do something contrary to the ordinary course of nature. It will not be a more divine act than that which is regular, but it will reveal Him more completely".(31). It is not only in this way that we can understand God's action in world crises, but here we also have a clue to understanding God revealed in one particular place and at a particular moment in world history in Jesus Christ. Temple does not attempt to "gloss over" the fearful consequences of the supreme Revelation of God in Christ, nor does he refuse to face the demand which such a faith and experience makes upon the individual. "The place of crisis is in our own hearts. Do you believe - vitally and emotionally believe - that the Creator is the Redeemer, that Jesus Christ reveals the ultimate reality? I don't. My mind believes; my conscience approves; my heart applauds; but my heart is also set on too much else to trust effectively. And if it were not that the Creator-Redeemer both can and does offer Himself to dwell within us and make us like Himself, I should have neither faith in God nor hope for the world. In Him, and in Him alone, is salvation...Though all our lower nature shrinks from the sacrifice which it must face, yet in our best moments we know that the one satisfaction of our souls is to be found in their surrender to Jesus Christ, that He may shape them into the likeness of His perfect love, and that the accomplishment of this for mankind is the one means of purging out of the world all that now spoils and embitters life".(32).

That statement meant personal commitment for Temple. He was

particularly aware of the issues at stake, as has been said; but he was not only a great apologist, he not only gave a reasonable statement of the theistic position in the tradition of a great Christian Platonist, he also went into action on the Christian front. In other words, he was not only "a hearer of the Word, he was a doer also".(33).

We are deeply indebted to F.A.Iremonger for a masterly treatment of the manner in which Temple faced the issues of his day on the practical level. Others have attested to the greatness of the task and the immensity of Temple's contribution.(34). This chapter is not an attempt to reiterate that story, but something must be said insofar as the intellectual and theological and the practical contributions are complementary. In fact, the two cannot be divorced, for the neglect of the one impairs the other. The onrush of modern thought was reflected nowhere else perhaps clearer than it was in the Student Christian Movement, though not only there. By 1908, when he was a Deacon in Holy Orders, Temple was already wanted everywhere and by everybody; his help was sought by societies, councils, conferences, and propagandists of all kinds. In that year he gave his first reasoned statement of his social and economic faith to the Pan-Anglican Conference of London. Thus early he was caught up in the great Labour Movement and he declared: "This is not an economic question. It is a question touching the nature of personality. It asks what are the deepest and most potent motives in the human soul. The question is not economic - to the Christian it is religious.... If Christianity is to be applied to the economic system, an organization which rests primarily on the principle of exploitation must give way to one which rests primarily on co-operation...The question of the competitive principle is driven down into the Labour market,

so that men compete against each other for the right to work which is the right to live. Go and see it at work in the London Docks. If one man is to secure the means of feeding himself and his family, he must deprive another. Is that an exhibition of Brotherhood? Such a system embodies no principle but selfishness and mutual antagonism. ...As citizens we are guilty of a whole system of oppression: it is there: we tolerate it, and so become responsible for its results. There is nothing inevitable in it: it is all the result of human choices. I do not mean that any one deliberately put it there; it is the greatest fluke in creation. But it is the net result of innumerable choices, and by human choices it can be modified. Here lies our duty - and our guilt".(35).

The issues at stake were issues of life and death and so they were issues dependent on 'choice', and choice depended on 'value', and value depended on 'personality'. The great task is that of liberating human persons from the bondage of conflict and corruption, a bondage which arises as the result of wrong choices due to misunderstanding and misjudging the issues which confront mankind. We see Temple grappling with these problems in almost everything he ever did or wrote.

I. The primary task is that of Education. Here, the need becomes one of sufficient education for all, not merely for the select few, and not just up to a point. The Church and State must see that facilities are provided and that the means are adequate for an efficient education. The main duty of educators is to see that the child is taught the first rudiment, which is the art of "concentration". Education is not just filling the mind with the data of text-books, it is the endeavour to develop the whole personality so that the mind can concentrate on the great issues of life and make right

judgments. Man will fulfil his purpose in the divine plan adequately only when he achieves a development which will enable him to use all his faculties in the task of co-operation with his fellow-man and with God. He must be educated for "service" to the point of "sacrifice", for service and sacrifice are the essential requirements in a "sacramental" world. This is to be understood in the way that we understand the 'cross' as the 'throne' of God's 'glory'.(36).

Because he saw the problem of Education in a new light and dared to proclaim the possibilities and the glories of its achievement, Temple was at the forefront of a movement which 'revolutionized' the educational system of Great Britain. When it is remembered that the Education Acts of 1918 and 1944, together with the setting up of the vastly improved Board of Education in England, were largely due to the initial drive and guiding influence of Temple, it is almost impossible to overestimate the results of his endeavours in this great and all-important field as he faced the educational problems of his time.(37).

II. Then there is the great Labour problem. Temple sensed keenly the tension which existed between Labour, Management and Capital, and gave a critical analysis of the intricate and delicate situations which led to strife and strikes. The primary requisite, as in education, is that we must instil a sense of "vocation" into the labouring and managing classes alike. The problem arises because of misunderstanding and misdirected service. The cause, as well as the result, is one of misguided endeavour: there is a lack of 'co-operation' where we ought to find a real 'fellowship'. The 'economic problem' is yet another instance of the false way of treating man's problems in isolation. R.H.Tawney in Religion and the Rise of

Capitalism pointed to a deep truth: "when the age of the Reformation came, economics is still a branch of ethics and ethics of theology: all activities are treated as falling within a single scheme whose character is determined by the spiritual destiny of mankind".(38). Temple knows that the new science had driven a wedge in here as elsewhere. He sees quite clearly what Barry explained in *The Relevance of Christianity*: "Secular knowledge has given mankind an understanding of God's ways, a power of controlling environment, a field for research, venture and enterprise which would never have been open to us within the circumference of that premature synthesis".(39). But he is also aware of something else: he knows that this new scientific conception, great and illuminating as it is, reveals the unity of creation and a progressive order. Yet we do not see that unity and order in the problem of labour. Rather labour is treated as a commodity which those who need it buy as cheap as they can and those who possess it sell as dear as they can; but labour is not a commodity- you cannot divest labour from the labourer.(40). The problem of 'Supply and Demand' is a misnomer if we take it as the proposed principle on which the capitalist works. In reality it works in exactly the reverse order from that which is claimed for it in theory: 'goods' are not produced because men need them, nor do we ask the 'proper' price for them because of this same reason, rather they are produced and sold in a great competitive scheme for the sole purpose of making money. As Barry suggested, secular knowledge may have supplied the power for "controlling environment"; it has obviously not supplied the power for controlling man in his environment. We are working on sub-Christian levels, with sub-Christian standards. So the first Christian

principle needed is liberty or the sacredness of personality. Here, too, we must be careful with our lines of demarcation and inclusiveness. While the basic need is the inculcation of the principle of personality, still a man must not be treated as a mere person, as another instance of a class of persons, but as an "individual". It is precisely here that we see Democracy at its best when contrasted with any 'bourgeois' or 'totalitarian' system. Strikes are justified for Temple, not on the principle of mere acquisitiveness, nor merely to 'get' something even if it is right that the labourer should have it: they may be necessary on any system of 'haves' and 'have nots'; but they are really justified because they show a demand that human beings should be treated as sacred personalities. Thus the problem becomes a theological one. The Christian system is not an impracticable, Utopian ideal. If Christ were only a great moral teacher, then it might be true that what He taught was too good to be true; but if Christ is the Creator of the world, then we can be sure that His thought about anything is what that thing truly is. So Christ's conception about human nature is what human nature really is, and if we want to be 'practical' we must treat human nature after the example and teaching of Christ. Therefore the whole problem is one of bringing industry under the domain of Christ: then Labour, Management and Capital will take their rightful place in a great scheme of Christian co-operative endeavour. We observe Temple bringing an end to the debate, as he offers his solution to the problem of the issue thus faced, with the following characteristic flourish:-

" 'But this puts off for ever all hope of a solution; you are impracticable; you are a dreamer.'

If so, then Christ was a deluded fanatic and His religion is a fraud.

'But what you propose is impossible; you cannot alter human nature'.

No; but God can; and Christ was born and died and rose again and sent the Holy Spirit to do that very thing."(41).

III. Thirdly, the great issues resolve themselves around the grave social problems. Because of Temple's connection with the Labour party he has often been called a "socialist". This is really a misnomer, as W.G.Peck clearly points out (42), and his social hope was grounded in a doctrine of ethical redemption rather than in any doctrinaire theory either of progress or revolution. As a Platonist, Temple believed that the "good man" was the "good citizen" and that it was primarily the business of education and the Church to make him so. The whole problem is one of the relationship of persons as they exist in communities. In society man is faced with the question of 'rights' or 'duties', and it is hardly too much to say that his only 'right' becomes 'duty' to others. When conduct is motivated by the desire of putting "rights" first, then the individual comes into conflict with others who similarly assert their rights, and this creates the kind of tension which ultimately leads to war. The same sort of thing prevails when the 'state' exerts its demands upon the 'citizen': we must always remember that the State exists for the citizen and not vice versa, whatever the historic origin of the State, whether it arose by 'Social Contract' or otherwise. But the individual, when he casts a vote, hands over to the state a certain right to govern him and to legislate on his behalf. However, the State does not and cannot control the whole of social life; yet the State "has a universal authority over its members such as is not elsewhere to be found. The force with which the State is entrusted

is the means of making actual and effective this universality of Law. And force is confined to the State in order that its exercise may always be in the service of Law". Both the universality and the force at once set limits to the appropriate spheres of action. Because of its universality Law can only deal with general situations, and because its instrument is force it cannot control opinion or aspiration."(43). When the doctrine of "National absolutism" grew up as a consequence of the Reformation it was inevitable that the trend would lead to war if men did not keep before them the concept of Christian brotherhood. Due to modern progress the world has become inter-related to the extent that we are faced with conflict or cooperation. Greek philosophy and culture gave us the "Ideal" State, but here "Hellenism comes to its utmost limits and bursts them, and Plato is left at last, wondering whether his Ideal State may not, even as he writes, exist somewhere outside the knowledge of the Greeks, in what they would call a barbarian land, and with his whole system manifestly incomplete because it is waiting for just that one final touch - that one crowning glory - which only Christianity could give."(44).

Basic in Christian teaching and living is "the idea of the family". It is the glory of Christianity that it can point the way to a family-relationship for a troubled world. The answer to all national and international problems can and will be realised when the whole of "society" becomes united as one family in the Kingdom of God. That is not merely an idle dream, for Temple can point to an actual analogy in the British Commonwealth of Nations - which, while it is not perfect, nevertheless can be seen developing progressively along the lines of a Christian brotherhood. The task is immense, the problems

are acute, but it is not merely the task of a struggling mankind; it is a divinely appointed task, and is therefore the task of God Himself which we may observe Him working out for the salvation of man and with his co-operation.

IV. Last of all, there is the task of the Church. What is the sense, Temple asks, of questioning the Church or its place in ordering and organizing the society of men? As every individual is born into a family and a nation, and as a nation is a product of historical development and not a deliberately manufactured structure, so too the Church is inevitably "born", so to speak, in the world. It comes about pretty much in the same way as any other 'biological' fact - it is the 'extension' of Christ's Body, existing to carry on His redeeming work of saving and restoring mankind until all come to "one perfect man in Christ". To ask the question whether the Church should interfere is simply silly. If it is the Body of Christ, it exists at God's bidding and in it we simply see God at work as we see Him at work in other "natural" ways. The Church's primary task is to make war upon existing evil; its concern is with social questions - the educational influence of the social and economic system in which men live, to develop in men a Christian character. The answer as to whether the Church should interfere is the statement that it has already interfered, and the proof is seen in history.(45). Church History is the story of the impact made by the Spirit of Christ upon the life of mankind. In one sense the Church may be said to have "interfered" in a particular way in the great Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship held at Birmingham in 1924. It is very interesting to read Karl Barth's 'Theological Existence To-Day' and to see him pleading for the right and the duty of the Church to

institute reform from "within", also to see the tragic truth that it (or he) was too late. He wrote in June 1933 and was too late by at least the intervening months from March of that year when orders went out from the Reichstag which silenced the voice of the Church and altered the course of events. It is refreshing to return from that and see how "revolutionary" measures were brought about in England during the 'in-between-war' years largely due to the leadership of William Temple. Even so, according to Temple, there are certain ways in which the Church cannot interfere. There are laws; for example, the laws set forth by the exact science of Political Economy, and with these laws the Church has nothing to do any more than it has with Geometry.(46). But it has a great deal to do with man as he comes under these laws, and should strive to see that as far as possible leaders in all fields of human endeavour are Christian or guided by Christian principles. A man's own political convictions are his alone and the Church must not interfere but should insist that he makes his choice, here as elsewhere, after careful and deliberate reflection, and should be ready and competent to educate him to that point. Nor should the Church 'coerce' men into its membership; for to use, in the name of Christ, any other means of persuasion than spiritual appeal and rational coherence is to betray His first principles of action. It is the task of the Church to see that as far as possible the order of society corresponds to the "Natural Order". Even so, it is God's 'order', not man's. "All Christian thinking, and Christian thinking about society no less than any other, must begin not with man but with God."(47). If there is a choice to be made between making men Christian and making the social order more Christian, it must be the former; for it is, to use

a mixed metaphor, as "fishers of men" that the Church must seek to "leaven the whole lump" till all mankind is brought into the "commonwealth" of "fellowship" in the Kingdom of God.

Temple's forcefulness of thought and presentation is seen at its best in *Mens Creatrix*, *Christus Veritas* and *Readings in St. John's Gospel*. The philosophic crux of the whole matter is stated on pages 58 to 60 of *Mens Creatrix*, but the student of Temple must grapple with the full problem as it appears in his *Gifford Lectures*: for all of this is headed up in the intellectual and philosophical question.(48)

As Temple examined the basis of the Gifford Trust he discovered that the supposed clearness of the distinction between Natural and Revealed Religion, as conceived in the mind of theologians at the time the Trust was founded, was partly illusory, and that the distinction had been drawn by theologians, not by philosophers. If it is a question of "spheres" then the Bible itself falls under the scope of Natural Theology, while it is at the same time the content of Revealed Truth; therefore the distinction must clearly be one of "method" and not of "spheres". One of the best examples of the problem facing theology could be seen in Julian Huxley who attempted to show that "natural religion" itself could supply man's religious needs, without recourse to "revelation".(49). To the argument that we must not treat religion as an abstract science, Temple's answer is that it does not hold here any more than in mathematics. We have religion first of all on authority, and when we scrutinize it we find by experience that it is trustworthy: experience is its authentication.

He next deals with the great vogue of the psychologists. The modern psychologists tended to recognise the existence of God but only as a form of consciousness. Both Jung and Coe had interpreted

the reality of God as essentially a psychological process.(50).Such a view would say that man is by nature religious, and without religion man will never attain to mental health, to complete sanity. There is no need for the ontological argument. Jung would say that man has a dual nature: (a) spiritual, (b) material. Temple saw clearly that we may question his hypothesis on the same basis on which he questioned the ontological argument. Everything may be explained as a projection; and even if you do not raise the ontological problem, it is still there, and the whole efficacy of the argument relies upon it. We are here back upon the old problem of EITHER, OR. Are we to treat religion as a natural phenomenon without pronouncing upon its validity? When confronted with the "psychological vagaries of the human mind...it is not unreasonable to prefer the alternative hypothesis and adopt the view that man's religion is a movement within him of some great force which it behoves him to appreciate" (i.e. Subjective), "or his response to some object of supreme import which it behoves him to understand" (i.e. Objective), "or both of these at once" (i.e. Subjective \pm Objective). Natural Religion has the burden of seeking to establish its own validity. The fact that astronomy reveals God only as mathematician is not surprising, for if we start by attending to objects only insofar as they are measurable we are apt to end up with nothing only the measurement of these objects. Aquinas began with reason and ended with revelation; Temple begins with revelation and ends with reason. The philosophy of religion is seen as the preparation for Systematic Theology, more really it should be the fruit, but actually the two go pari passu, hand in hand. All religion begins on authority: but this is not to deny freedom. We are not born free, we are born to develop freedom,

and this is the truth as St. Paul saw it. The movement in Christianity is from Law to Grace, but we are never free from authority: under Grace we come under a new Authority. The freedom of Luther means a new authority of internal constraint, only it is now a personal acceptance on personal experience. This is basic in the whole Christian conception and experience. Neither Luther, nor any other Christian, can be free from an Infallibility. There can be no such thing as a fallible authority - otherwise it would not be authoritative.(51). In any case religion, per se, may be bad - we have to come to a standard of values. No "quantum" theory can account for the truths of religious experience: Natural Religion needs the aid of Revealed Religion.

The two "methodologies" under consideration have somewhat in common, and both claim to be ultimate. Authority for religion is divine, external, imposed from without: God is God and must be obeyed. On the other hand, the philosopher has the authority of human reason: here man may be the measure of all things. While philosophy is a detached science, religion is not. The difference is one of aim: philosophy seeks knowledge for the sake of understanding, while Religion seeks knowledge for the sake of worship. The "primary assurances of Religion are the ultimate questions of Philosophy". There are difficulties in the way of the religious man who wishes to be a philosopher and for the philosopher who wishes to engage himself in the exercise of religion, but they are not insurmountable. The divergence of view is especially evident in three main convictions of Religion:

"First is the conviction that Spirit is a true source of initiation of processes;

"Second is the conviction that all existence finds its source in a Supreme Reality of which the nature is Spirit;

"Third is the conviction that between that Spirit and ourselves there can be, and to some extent already is, true fellowship".(52).

Thus there exists a real tension between philosophy and religion, but this is not to be regretted because it is "right in principle and stimulating in effect".

The problem is not one of the moment; it is inherited from Descartes who was responsible for two important contributions to European thought: (a) the bifurcation of thought and things, and (b) the establishing of mathematical science. It was Descartes who started Analytical Geometry whereby space could be reduced to an arithmetical formula. Leibniz had posited a pre-established harmony: he developed the "integral calculus". Newton gave us the "differential calculus". He gave a new form to Cartesian Rationalism in his *Philosophiae Principia Mathematica* in which he explained everything by one universal law. Thus he perfected the mechanical conception of nature inaugurated by Kepler, Descartes and Galileo.

The upshot of all this was that when John Locke, influenced by Newton, produced his *Treatise on Human Nature*, he imagined he could reduce human nature to the same simplicity. In all fairness it should be said that Newton anticipated Einstein. What Einstein has been doing in our day, especially in his attempt at "unification", Newton tried to do: he admitted he couldn't, but anticipated the day when somebody would: he hoped that this principle would explain all being. So, in fairness to Locke, we must understand him under the influence of that type of mathematical thinking. His empiricism led him to distinguish between ideas and objects - which are character-

ized by primary and secondary qualities. But the things-in-themselves do not correspond with our ideas of them. His subjectivism, his philosophy of "representationism" was followed by Berkley's suggestion that you might as well abolish the qualities, and then you have nothing left but the idea. Hume followed with his utter skepticism to say that then you have nothing left at all. Hume was the logical outcome of Descartes - solipsism. There remained nothing left for Kant to build on (this, of course, is not to "bow out" Bishop Butler), and he had to begin all over again. But as Temple reminds us, Dr. Caird used to tell his students: "Kant started from both ends of the road at once, but never met himself". He began from the standpoint of the empirical method, but then he had to account for "experience". He had both "noumena" and "phenomena" on his hands - and "never the twain shall meet": if you start with "ideas" and "things" as dwelling apart, this is where you end.

This was the historical situation with which William Temple had to deal: the development of philosophical thought since Descartes. The whole question of the existence of God had fallen into dubiety. Temple faced the situation and recognized that it was impossible to reconcile this bifurcation of knowledge and reality without the existence of God. Thus he raised the Ontological Argument and introduced it as of utmost importance. If God does not exist ontologically, He does not exist at all; and if God does not exist, nothing else exists. "Communication" is the great fact of all existence and experience. Without some "medium" it is impossible to account for real knowledge. There must be "some existent" which enables "discourse" between the subject and object, between the "selves" which exist, and which gives "authentication" to experience. We live in a meaningful

world. The fact of discourse establishes the existence of God. It is the dictum of Berdyaev, whom Temple accounted "one of the most important writers of our time", that God is the meaning of existence. In this manner Temple returns to his Authority. The clue to the solution of the problem which faces philosophy and religion is to be found in this fresh recognition of the essential nature of Authority, this "Authentication" which is exempt from either coercion or dictation, this Authority - the God of all religious experience.

Annotation:-

- (1) Julian Huxley dealt with the problem in 1927 from another angle: Religion without Revelation, p.9: "The head and the heart of civilization are being torn in different directions".
- (2) The Preacher's Theme To-Day, pp.36-37 and Christianity and Social Order, p.52, where Temple, in jocular fashion, likens it to the Englishman in Ireland asking his way to Roscommon.
- (3) Cf. the first chapter of Nature, Man and God.
- (4) This attitude is seen in Barth's Credo, Epistle to the Romans, and God in Action. Cf. esp. the opening and closing sentences of Chap. IV, Creatorem Coeli et Terrae in Credo, and The Knowledge of God and The Service of God.
- (5) Cf. The Relations Between Religion and Science- Macmillan & Co., p.230.
- (6) A.J. Balfour: Foundations of Belief, p.3.
- (7) W.N. Rice: Christian Faith in An Age of Science.
- (8) Ibid, pp.298-9.
- (9) For Temple's contribution in the War Years of Ire monger, pp.167-265.
- (10) We are indebted to Canon C.F. Rogers, both for his contribution to the discussions at Hyde Park and for his 'Lectures in Hyde Park', three volumes (1925-29) and 'Verify Your References' (1938)- all published by the S.P.C.K.
- (11) This was to be the theme of Mens Creatrix, started at Oxford in 1908. Cf. the preface.
- (12) This method runs through all Temple's work and is seen unfolded in Essays, Foundations, Christianity and Social Order, and Nature, Man and God.
- (13) Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship, p.17.
- (14) Cf., e.g., Bradley's 'Truth and Reality'.

- (15) Mens Creatrix,p.29.
- (16) This is the philosophy of "Analysis" as advocated by Bertrand Russell.
- (17) The Purpose of God,p.30.
- (18) Revelation,edited by Baillie and Martin,p.100.
- (19) Mens Creatrix,pp.130-and 131.
- (20) Revelation,supra,p.114.
- (21) Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship,p.5.
- (22) Readings in St.John's Gospel,p.XIII.
- (23) Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship,p.5.
- (24) John Laird: Recent Philosophy,p.250.
- (25) John Laird: Theism and Cosmology,p.54.
- (26) The Gifford Lectures were delivered 1932-3 and 1933-4,published under the title 'Nature, Man and God'.
- (27) This is especially true of Nature, Man and God, Mens Creatrix, Christus Veritas, Basic Convictions, The Preacher's Theme To-Day and Readings in St.John's Gospel. It is also developed in his Essays.
- (28) Nature,Man and God,p.435,"the World - God = 0;
God - the World = God".
- (29) Repeatedly stated in Readings in St.John's Gospel.
- (30) Basic Convictions,p.20.
- (31) Ibid,p.21.On 'law' and 'miracle'of.Faith and Modern Thought,p.1531
- (32) Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship,pp.13-14.
- (33) St.James 1:22.
- (34) Along with Iremonger's great work,cf.Sidney Dark, Anthony Otter, and William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation,contributed to by W.R.Matthews, S.C.Carpenter, Carl Heath, F.Harrison, W.G.Peck and A.E.Baker.
- (35) F.A.Iremonger,pp.94-95.

- (36) Cf. Readings in St. John's Gospel, p.14.
- (37) As typical of Temple's treatment of "Education" of Christianity and Social Order, pp.87ff., 99, 104-105, 109. Education = "nourishment", Nature, Man and God, p.421. 'Plato and Christianity' was delivered and dedicated to the Worker's Educational Association. Cf. Iremonger, pp.56, 90-93, 557, 569-578, 618.
- (38) Page 278. Temple commemorated Christianity and The State "To my friend, R.H. Tawney".
- (39) Page 13.
- (40) Essays, p.11.
- (41) Ibid, p.18. We observe Temple at his best as he deals with man in his environment. The theme appears repeatedly in many of the Essays; The Nature of Personality; Foundations; Christianity and the State; Nature, Man and God; and is fully dealt with in Christianity and Social Order.
- (42) William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation, p.64.
- (43) Christianity and The State, pp. 111, 113f.
- (44) Plato and Christianity, p.102.
- (45) Cf., for best references, Christianity and Social Order, esp. p.18f.
- (46) Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship, p.59.
- (47) Christianity and Social Order, p.52.
- (48) The remainder of this chapter deals with Temple's "approach" to the problem, covering the first three chapters of Nature, Man and God.
- (49) Julian Huxley: Religion without Revelation. Cf. Preface & Chap.1, esp. p.8.
- (50) Cf. Coe: The Psychology of Religion; also Jung: Psychology and Relig.
- (51) In stating the importance of Authority, Temple has the support of such modern writers as Otto, Barth, Brunner, and Von Hugel.
- (52) Nature, Man and God, p.35.

IV. Doctrine of Reason.

Introductory.

Two things need to be stated quite clearly at the outset of any discussion of Temple's "doctrine of reason". The first is that he did not have any, if by that we mean any clear-cut and well-defined statement or treatment which he elaborated as such. Nowhere do we find in any of his works an exposition of a doctrine of reason clearly and distinctly and separately set forth, as for example, his views on Freedom or Value or Revelation. The same would be true for any doctrine of sin. Yet this does not mean that Temple has no "doctrine of reason", and the student must of necessity examine the place given to Reason in his writings and grasp the importance of the role of reason in his exposition in order to understand his contribution to the philosophy of religion. The second thing is that although Temple began with Revelation and led up to Reason in his Gifford Lectures (as we saw in the last chapter), yet it would be true to say that in actual development over the years of his contribution to the thought of philosophy and theology he began with Reason and led up to Revelation. Even then, we must not be tempted to any view of over-simplification or of making fine distinctions, for "human reason" is not essentially different from the "reason" of "revelation".

Reason not an Absolute.

This leads at once to an emphatic statement that Reason is not an Absolute in Temple's thought. On the contrary, human reason is an impaired reason: in man Reason has become vitiated (1) and it

needs Revelation, not so much to contradict it as to enable it to fulfil its function as a God-given faculty. Although reason is corrupt because of man's sin, it is nevertheless an evidence of God's activity within the soul of man enabling him to achieve his true destiny. Unlike Kant, who found it necessary to distinguish between 'practical' and 'pure' reason, Temple in true Kantian style seizes upon Reason which is at the same time both 'ideal' and 'practical' and finds in it a kinship conjointly with God and the universe which He has created.

Here, again, we face the problem of conflict, due to the achievements of scientific advance and discovery in the realm of human knowledge; and the conflict, as Julian Huxley saw, was one which involved "the very conception of God"(2). "A familiar but striking feature in the life of the nineteenth century was the severance of culture from the received forms of religion".(3). We are here at the very heart of the matter: the realm of ideas, which is the arena of the activity of the human mind. "The century saw a great change in the body of these ideas themselves, a change not officially recognized but none the less effectively used. The consequence is that, if we try to describe the general view of the world held today by the majority of educated people, we shall find it to be the product of three distinct influences which modify one another — that of religion in the accepted sense, that of science natural and historical, and that of ideas derived from philosophy and imaginative literature. And it is perhaps not too sanguine to believe that the further consequence is a decided tendency towards closing the rift between progressive culture and religion." (4). Just how near the last sentence comes to the truth of the matter

may be judged in the light of a statement made by Dr. John Baillie to the Alumni of the Faculty of Divinity of McGill University in October, 1954. He said that in the world in which he grew up it was very difficult for one not to be a practicing Christian, in matters of Church attendance, etc.; whereas at the present day the converse holds true: it is very difficult, almost impossible, in our world to practise Christianity.

Polarity of Thinking.

The difficulty arises here due to the polarity of human tendencies of thought when confronted with such main issues as were discussed in the last chapter. Thus men in their thinking may be driven all the way from utter pessimism to sheer optimism, or led to accept or develop utterly conflicting and irreconcilable views ranging from abject materialism to absolute idealism. The problem may be solved if it may be shown that the "three distinct influences" are complementary rather than in conflict. A.C. Bradley tells us that "Progress is made in religion, as everywhere else, by negation, and the new idea is therefore apt to appear as the blank denial of the old one".(5). Whether William Temple would say that is questionable, but he did realize the inherent danger of divorcing the common-stock knowledge of to-day's achievements from the tradition of the past. He set himself the task of reconciling divergent views in such early writings as *The Kingdom of God*(6) and *Foundations*(7); he was particularly anxious to relate the truth of Plato to the modern problem(8); and he dealt specifically with 'Truth and Tradition' and 'Tradition and Modernism' in his *Essays*. He was aware of the difficulty stated by Canon Raven: "Knowledge divorced from life, knowledge

specialised, anatomised, dessicated, speedily becomes valueless and is always dangerous"(9), and he aimed throughout at "seeing life whole". All life is a "process"(10); and "the process is a unit"(11). Similarly, Truth must be seen as a "oneness": "There is only one truth, and all its parts are mutually interdependent"(12). Here Temple is in the company of such men as Herbert Spencer who maintained that it was an incredible hypothesis to hold that there are two orders of truth, in absolute and everlasting opposition. However, Truth for Temple is much larger than Reason, but the trouble is that people either refuse to think or accept on a blind faith. "We are always misunderstanding because we try to apprehend Christian doctrine from a sub-Christian point of view."(13). "We who have received sight in some measure are often asked, sometimes by implication, sometimes by direct challenge, from what source we gained it; and frequently we answer 'I do not know' - either from cowardice, or from real ignorance. Not all men recognize their obligation to trace the source of light by which they live."(14). If we are going to be rational about life we need to recognize the place of faith alongside of reason; or, at least, to see that faith is also rational. For, not only is all life a process and must be seen in its totality, but "all life rests on faith. No conceivable activity can take place without it. Reason itself as a guide to action, depends upon the faith that the world is rational". (15). Still, the faith of the scientist and the faith of the Christian, though both of them are rational, are not necessarily one and the same. Having quoted St. John 8:31-2, "If ye abide in the word which is mine, ye are truly my disciples, and ye will recognize the truth", Temple went on to say: "This perception or knowledge of

the truth is more than intellectual and scientific knowledge, for which there is another word; it is the knowledge of acquaintance. Loyal adherence to what they believe will convert that belief into trust; they will advance, so to speak, from being orthodox to being real Christians".(16). What he is saying is somewhat similar to Bacon: "Gos uses the help of our reason to illuminate us, so should we likewise turn it every way, that we may be more capable of receiving and understanding His mysteries; provided only that the mind be enlarged, according to its capacity, to the narrowness of the mind".(17).

Reason, Faith and 'Feeling'.

All this is not to suggest that Temple considered reason as "inferior" to faith or that reason is a sort of "coward's castle", and if this sentence were rewritten substituting faith for reason it would also be true of Temple's thought. But he did realize that the real issue between philosophy and faith lies not in the compatibility or incompatibility of their conclusions as in the reconciliation of two very different attitudes of mind. "The primary assurances of religion are the ultimate questions of philosophy".(18). After submitting the whole problem to a very close scrutiny in the development of his Gifford Lectures he showed that the reason of natural religion "hungers" for "that Divine Revelation" which only the faith (here, again, one might almost say reason) of theology can supply. Dr. W. S. Urquhart comes near to what Temple is saying when he tells us: "We are intrinsically creatures of faith and hope; even utter despair as Tillich points out, implies a positive belief over against itself without which

it is unintelligible. But as we are set in a cosmic situation which is constantly changing, we demand, always and ultimately, as Heim points out, a necessity for our action. No relative authority such as the custom of society or the tradition of the ages is sufficient for us, for these have all to be traced back in an almost infinite regress to some ultimate standard. And, seeing that we are surrounded by other selves, unique as we are, the need for unification demands a universal standard, transcending individual opinion and practice".(19). This sounds very much like Temple's explanation of Mind as it arises in process and is able to comprehend the truth of the reality of which its own existence is a part and which, at the same time, is aware of its own limitations. It also serves to remind us of the influence which Plato exerted on Temple's thought, how he could declare that "Plato is the culmination of the Greek genius" and trace so clearly the immense influence of Plato on modern civilisation.(20). His Platonic "reason" has a counterpart in Whitehead's "feeling".(21). The "feeling" and the "reason" are similar and are similarly confronted by truth - the mind does not manufacture it. "The mind recognizes in Truth, or in the mind expressed in Truth, a proper object of reverence quite other than is appropriate as a part of the mind's apprehension of bare fact."(22). This bears a marked resemblance to one of Plato's Letters in which he repudiates an account of his "doctrine of the Good" which one of his hearers had published: "There is no writing of mine on this subject, nor ever shall be. It is not capable of expression like other branches of study; but as the result of long intercourse and a common life spent upon the thing, a light is suddenly kindled as from a leaping spark, and when it has reached the soul, it thenceforward finds nutriment for itself. I know this, at

any rate, that if these things were to be written down or stated at all, they would be better stated by myself than by others, and I know too that I should be the person to suffer most from their being badly set down in writing. If I thought that they could be adequately written down and stated to the world, what finer occupation could I have had in life than to write what would be of great service to mankind, and to reveal Nature in the light of day to all men? But I do not even think the effort to attain this a good thing for man, except for the very few who can be enabled to discover these things themselves by means of a brief indication. The rest it would either fill with contempt in a manner by no means pleasing or with a lofty and vain presumption as though they had learnt something grand. (341c-e)". (23). There is not the slightest doubt about the immense influence of Plato on Temple's thought. Whether, as Dorothy Emmet maintains, he remained a Platonist throughout, may be open to debate, but she has captured the mind of Temple when she asserts that, at least in his early period, "the dominant temper is that of speculative idealism, reinforced by his studies of Plato." (24).

Temple's Method of Thinking.

We are fortunate that William Temple has left us an account of his own mental character. "Men seem to differ very profoundly in the fashion of their thinking. If two men are presented with a novel suggestion and both exclaim "I must think about that," one will begin by putting together what he knows with reference to the subject, his former opinions based upon that knowledge, his general theories concerning that department of enquiry, and so forth; piece

by piece he will work out his conclusion with regard to the suggestion made to him. The other will find that his mind goes blank; he will stare into the fire or walk about the room or otherwise keep conscious attention diverted from the problem. Then abruptly he will find that he has a question to ask, or a counter-suggestion to make, after which the mental blank returns. At last he is aware, once more abruptly, what is his judgment on the suggestion, and subsequently, though sometimes very rapidly, he also becomes aware of the reasons which support or necessitate it. My own mind is of the latter sort. All my decisive thinking goes on behind the scenes; I seldom know when it takes place - much of it certainly on walks or during sleep - and I never know the processes which it has followed. Often when teaching I have found myself expressing rooted convictions which until that moment I had no notion that I held. Yet they are genuinely rooted convictions - the response, not of my ratiocinative intellect, but of my whole being, to certain theoretical or practical suggestions."(25).

We may well accept this as an accurate self-analysis, but by no means a confession to the weakness or inadequacy of reason. Nor does it mean that there is no argument or connected train of reasoning. But it does imply that there is a real faculty of reason to be called in and which may be used to articulate, to communicate and sustain a vision of Reality which is intelligible because it is enjoyed through a "response of our whole being". It is because of the majesty of the role that reason plays that Temple was so confident in his demand that all knowledge and experience should come under the scrutiny of Reason itself. It would be difficult to find stronger language than his own to express this conviction:

"Let it then be frankly and fully recognized that there neither is, nor can be, any element in human experience which may claim exemption at the bar of reason."(26).

The point needs to be stressed, for unless one grasps the centrality of the part played by Reason in Temple's structure one may land in unnecessary and grave misunderstandings. This Thesis is an attempt to understand Temple's contribution to philosophical theology. It is not an attempt to show that he said the final word or that he said everything that could be said. But one must try to grasp the truth and importance of what he did say. W.R.Matthews, an admirable philosophical thinker among theologians, states: "We have observed that Temple in the later phase of his thinking adopted a "realist" standpoint, that is to say he is opposed to every theory which questions the reality of the external world or holds that objects are "mind-dependent".(27) With the latter part of this statement we are not now chiefly concerned, although subsequent discussion in this chapter may throw some light upon it. As over against the first part of the statement, Dorothy Emmet in a masterly discussion of the subject in F.A.Iremonger's biography doubts "whether his conversion to 'realism' went very deep"(28), while at the same time reminding us that Temple repeatedly states Christianity to be the most materialist of all the great religions. Now, words are merely the working tools of thought, and nobody can do better than to use the tools which he has at his disposal to the best advantage, and it may be contended that Temple, as well as W.R.Matthews and Dorothy Emmet did just that. It may further be contended, upon an examination of such works as Plato and Christianity, The Faith and Modern Thought and his Essays that Temple adopted a "realist" standpoint from the

start. No doubt it could be shown, upon an examination of his entire works, that he was an ideal realist throughout. Further, when Miss Emmet says "the contention in *Mens Creatrix* that in itself the intellect might be satisfied by coherent order" is dropped in the Gifford Lectures, it is necessary to point out that this does not seem to be the contention - certainly not the main contention - of *Mens Creatrix*. What does seem to be there contended is that "man's search" (which comprises the whole of Book I) is met by "God's act" (comprising Book II). This, in essence, is the position taken in the Gifford Lectures: the "reason" of natural theology needs the "reason" of Divine Revelation - and they are not two "reasons", but essentially one and the same.

Since *Mens Creatrix* affords one of the best instances of observing Temple's treatment of Reason, it is necessary to explain what he appears to be doing there. The chapters constitute the main foundations of Temple's philosophical argument; yet they are not all philosophy, and he tells us himself that the first part was philosophical in method, while the second part was theological. The key to its understanding is to remember that basic in all Temple's thinking was his simple-minded faith in God. *Mens Creatrix* is an attempt to show the mind as it grapples with the truth of its own existence and its demand for coherence in the whole scheme of things wherein it finds its own existence and meaning. It is a comprehensive work, depicting the mind in its on-going, relentless search, dealing with principles underlying different interests and activities, logical, moral, political, aesthetic, seeking to show how these may be integrated in a unifying whole. Although it is a treatise on intellectuality, *Mens Creatrix* is not essentially 'theoretical'; it

deals with practical problems. "I have not hesitated to include practical matters. With Plato's example before one it is absurd to shrink from them".(29). Having examined the great topics of philosophical enquiry,- knowledge, art, conduct and religion, Temple is led to the conclusion that Reason is the basic principle and guide; it is a sort of "ground" of the whole framework of life, supplying the clue we need to give coherent satisfaction. Science, Art, and Ethics in their various pursuits and with their various faculties all point to goals hitherto unattained. These are human endeavours, and man cannot evolve out of himself either the purpose or the fellowship which would require the actualisation of the ideal to which these point. They are all efforts of Mind in its search for satisfaction and demanding the actuality of an ideal which can never be met unless there is a Divine Will which answers to these deep needs of the human mind and supplies the explanation of the principles of the universe which it orders or informs. Temple asks whether there is such a Will, and claims that the basic conviction of every developed religion asserts that there is. The answer, then, lies in 'religious experience'. Religious experience discloses a Divine creative Mind with which man's creative mind may be in communion, and herein it finds its satisfaction. In this manner Temple claims that religious experience confirms the whole tendency of philosophy, and is in turn confirmed by it. Thus philosophy and religion are found supporting one another, and the ground for belief seems to be almost complete.(30).

"Almost", but not quite; for the intellect is still perplexed as it is confronted with the problem and nature of Evil which threatens the whole structure. How can the intellect be satisfied

when it is torn and distraught in the face of the puzzling, perplexing problem of 'evil'? Temple proceeds to deal with the problem in Chapter XX, and suggests that the answer is to be found in regarding the very existence of evil as "rational". The rationality can be seen in the view that he presents: "that evil overcome by good is often justified". This means that the "ultimate solution of the problem of evil in its details is to be found not in thought but in action"(31). If the intellect finds some "purpose" in the existence of evil, and more particularly if the purpose is for Good, then the existence of evil is intellectually justified, for beyond this Reason makes no further demand. Evil in its three forms, Intellectual Evil or Error, Emotional Evil or Suffering, Moral Evil or Sin can be seen to be justified, theoretically and actually, when it is overcome or used as subservient to good, and as therefore necessary to real progress. "The theoretical and the practical are not really two functions, but one, and it is not sensible to give one priority to the other. Always our aim is to systematise or harmonise experience; sometimes the mind does this by "thinking", sometimes by "acting"; to leave out any of the mind's functions will make it incapable of the full apprehension of Reality".(32).

Reason and The Problem of Evil.

In the very next sentence Temple tells us that evil is not a "concept", and we have here a large hint as to what he is doing when he brings all this into discussion under "mens creatrix"- creative mind. But two other important quotations are necessary before making further statement. After considering the contribution of Hebrew and Greek culture, with a particularly fine reference to the Logos

doctrine(33), Temple concludes: "Platonism met with Judaism in the new city of Alexandria which Alexander the Great founded largely with Jews taken from Palestine. In the fusion of the two streams there arises a new interpretation of both, and in particular an identification of the Logos of the Greeks with the expected Messiah of the Jews, so that the former becomes a personal power of righteousness in this world, and the latter becomes, not merely the deliverer of a nation, or the renovator of the earth, but the controller of the Universe. Everything is ready now for the appearance of the Son of God".(34). He then considers the historical Revelation which God has made in Christ, and draws the following conclusion: "Going back to the earliest stage of our enquiry, we remember how the intellect in its purely scientific procedure led us to the belief that the world is perfectly coherent and forms a single system, but could not find what is the actual principle of unity that holds that system together....When we see how Science and Art and Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion present converging lines which though converging can never by the human mind be carried far enough to reach their meeting-point, but that that meeting-point is offered in the fact of Christ as Christians have understood it, we have no longer any reason to hesitate in proclaiming that here is the pivot of all true human thought; here is the belief that can give unity to all the work of mind. The creative mind of man can never attain its goal until the creative mind of God, in whose image it was made, reveals its own nature, and completes man's work. Man's search was divinely guided all the time, but its completion is only reached by the act of God Himself, meeting and crowning the effort which He has inspired."(35).

Thus, not only is evil not a 'concept', but neither is "reason" which pronounces upon it a 'concept'. As a Christian apologist Temple is an exponent of the place of Reason in determining the truth of Theology. In almost all his works we find him engaged in an examination of the activity of reason. When people ask about the Reason of natural theology or the Reason of revelation, are they not asking about one and the same thing? Is it not a question as to how far the mind of man can penetrate the truth of Reality? And, what of "authority"? - is it reasonable to accept "on authority", and does the principle of reason carry with it its own authority? Although Temple never sets such queries up as a body of questions to which he gives the answers in an outlined doctrine of reason, yet his use of Reason does throw a great deal of light on any attempt to answer them; and his chief contribution was in showing that Reason is not merely a method of thought, it is not static but creative, dynamic and constitutive.

In *The Nature of Personality*(1911), Temple approached his subject by distinguishing between Thing, Brute and Person, and suggested that the key to understanding what man is and what God is (as He has been revealed) is to be found in Personality. He stated that "the fundamental vice of eighteenth century rationalism was not its appeal to Reason, which is right enough, but its tacit assumption that the canon of reasonableness is what seems sensible to the man in the arm-chair".(36). Thus early he refuted any appeal to "static" Reason. He also demanded that we "look at the continuous course of Evolution.. ..The true meaning of evolution is surely this - the world moves on to ever greater manifestations of its capacity".(37). In *Christus Veritas*(1924) he examined the Structure of Reality and suggested

again that the key to its understanding is Value, which is most clearly seen and understood in terms of Personality. He did not consider man as representing the fullest development of one single line of evolution, but rather as the representative of one among several lines. He thought Bergson was right in differentiating between intelligence and intellect, and in maintaining that intelligence was not in any way superior to intellect but that they express different and incompatible lines of an evolutionary process. Yet he felt that human nature was the fullest illustration of the principle of evolution. "In our bodies we belong to the physical, chemical, vegetable, and animal worlds; these bodies are largely directed by our minds or intelligences; our minds are capable of being directed by spirit, or, in other words, of exerting themselves in the fulfilment of obligation. We shall therefore learn more about the true nature and meaning of Reality from the study of man, in all his activities, than from any other study; and human nature will be more capable of expressing the Creative Will than any other created thing known to us."(38).

Reason evolves as Dynamic Process.

This way of viewing reason, intelligence, or mind, provides the spring-board for Temple's theism. He is obviously using Reason as something dynamic: in his hands it becomes constitutive, regulative and operative. Reason itself 'evolves' in the on-going process of Reality, and is therefore not a static entity, laboriously and meticulously or speculatively set up as a piece of intricate machinery. If there is any way in which we may get 'back to nature' in the sense of Voltaire's "reason" or Rousseau's "instinct", it can only be in the light of evolutionary progress. This method of tying-in "reason"

with "evolution" could not have been anything new for Temple, as it had been done by Lord Balfour in his Foundations of Belief. "From the point of view of organic evolution there is no distinction, I imagine, to be drawn between the development of reason and that of any other faculty, physiological or psychical, by which the interests of the individual or the race are promoted."(39).

How are "the interests of the individual or the race promoted"? by Reason? or by Science? or by the "reason" of Science? Temple's insight appears to be amazingly clear on this point. As over against the commonly-accepted, scientific notion of Reason, he is using the whole concept of scientific development and progress to show that Reason is a dynamic and creative process. He recognized the significance of a growing movement, or of a Universe in movement, and used the great theme of Evolution to show that in this "universe of movement" in which reason emerges as process, it has naturally a right to consider and to render judgments upon that process. We do not have freedom as a great boon thrust upon us and which is the right of the individual by inheritance; but we are, nevertheless, born to freedom; freedom grows,- it is a matter of development, and especially of character. So too, it appears to be with Reason. Reason is not so much a "legacy" set up as a sort of bank account on which we may draw in an emergency, nor is it a doctrinaire arbiter to which we may refer for the legitimacy of religious experience, or against which we may "pit" the "doctrines" of the Church. But Reason itself is similar to religious experience, and arises in "process". Thus he brings Reason up to the bar of Truth. The "doctrines" of the Church are not given to us as revealed "truths", they are the results of men's reason as they have tried to formulate

Truth as they have experienced it. In this way he has turned the tables, as it were, on the common conception of reason. Truth is not given to us as cut-and-dried formularies; we "find out how to find Truth".(40).

Here, no doubt, we have the main point of divergence between Temple and the "Barthian school",- the disparagement of human reason. All Barth's theology centers around one main theme- the Word of God. He attacks philosophy because it is the word of man, built upon and around human reason, and so he has no place for natural theology. Barth would deny any short-cut to truth, and rebels against 'liberalism' and 'orthodoxy' alike.(41). Here also, no doubt, is the point of divergence which called forth Brunner's letter to Temple, quoted by Dorothy Emmet(42), in which he questioned Temple's "conception of natural theology". Towards the end Temple confessed to a "modification" in his thinking(43): "what we must completely get away from is the notion that the world as it now exists is a rational whole". But he does say that it presents a "unity", not after the analogy of a picture but rather after the analogy of a drama. He concludes his letter: "All this is really there in the Gifford Lectures, but I don't think the total presentation in that book or in *Christus Veritas* sufficiently gives this impression of a dynamic process and leaves too much that of a static system". It would be regrettable for the student to draw wrong or radical conclusions from the manner in which the letter is quoted. Surely the inference which may be drawn is not that Temple underwent any radical change of mind so much as that he wished to emphasise what he had already said. He unquestionably and modestly underestimated the forcefulness of what he did say, for that is precisely the "impression" which he creates on the mind

of the student, and that is the point which would have been developed in this chapter even if there were no extant copy of the Letter. A few quotations from his chapter on Process, Mind and Value in the Gifford Lectures will suffice to illustrate:

"We have now reached these six results: (1) Process is real, and whatever has no relevance for the actual world-process is fictitious; (2) Mind arises in the course of the world-process and is one of its episodes; (3) but it is an episode of which the distinguishing feature is its capacity, by means of "free ideas", to survey the process of which, initially, it is a part; (4) in that survey it apprehends process as an organic unity, such that not only does the past condition the present, but the future qualifies and even sometimes occasions past and present alike; (5) it thus achieves a certain superiority to, and independence of, the process - not indeed such as to endow it with a life wholly detached from the process, but such that the process falls within its grasp, not it within that of the process."(44).

Mechanistic Theories Break Down.

Whitehead had suggested that in this world of process, in which consciousness arises, due importance must be accorded to the place and significance of "feeling".(45). Temple is saying that when we are confronted with a choice between Idealism and Materialism we need accept neither.(46). Even to say you are a materialist means that you are not one.(47). While you assent to body-mind, subject-object, you must not separate them - you cannot draw sharp distinctions. If mind arises within the process and is able to differentiate and interpret, then you can no longer say it is merely material: mind has been there all the time."Volition is organically active.The

true nature of that one thing is mind, not mechanism".(48). "Either the process from the beginning has the nature of mentality, which becomes apparent in the reaction of some living objects to their environment; or else Mind is superadded to the natural objects of which the Process has hitherto consisted, by a Mind which, if it could act thus, must be presumed to have been at work in or upon the Process throughout its course.(49).

"But into such a scheme (i.e.the Physical-Scientific) Mind and value can only be inserted from without...Starting from the physical end we can never account for Mind.(50).

"The simple and plain fact is that the scientific method wins its success by ignoring parts of reality as given in experience; it is perfectly right to do this for its own purposes; but it must not be permitted by a kind of bluff to create the impression that what it ignores is non-existent.

"We are not attempting to start with Mind and find the way to Matter. That was part of the Cartesian blunder. But we start with the totality of experience in which Mind is one given element; and we refuse to reduce Matter to any state of Mind or consciousness just as much as we refuse to reduce Mind to any combination of Matter."(51).

Such language surely conveys a doctrine of Mind or Reason as dynamic rather than static. No doubt Temple had laboured to show that Reality is a "rational whole"; even so, he was enabled to do so by a far wider use of Reason than that of the sciences, namely a mens creatrix, a Reason which is more than a discovery: it is creative, and he uses it as a razor to cut, and provides us with a Mind which grows. Temple was seized with a passion for showing life "whole", and used the concept of a "growing", "expanding" intelligence to

prove that life is "one whole", a Unit, thus using Mind as a key to the universe. His philosophic account of Reason is not unlike Plato's doctrine of Love, and bears a similarity with modern philosophers in the search for a "driving power" which is at the same time "intelligent purpose". The situation has changed somewhat since Temple delivered his Gifford Lectures, but thinkers are still haunted with the desire for a principle of unity, although now it appears as an attempt to explain unity in diversity or multiplicity.(52). Yet all this seems to be there; at least, the germ thought. "Extension of the apprehended environment and development of the apprehending mind are two ways of describing the same fact...But this fact of knowledge is more remarkable than all the varieties of known objects put together...That there should 'emerge' in the cosmic process a capacity to apprehend, even in a measure to comprehend, that process is the most remarkable characteristic of the process itself. For though minds emerge as episodes within the process, it is, as will appear, essential to their nature as minds that they are not mere episodes. Thus the cosmic process gives evidence that it is not only process, and history supplies the proof that reality is more than historical." (53). What Temple is aiming to show throughout is that we must have recourse to a Concrete Universal, not an Abstract Universal; and he uses the very fact of knowledge, the principle of cognition, to prove his point. It becomes necessary to observe how he arrives at this position - the focal point in his doctrine of Reason.(54).

Philosophical Review.

He started by reviewing the method of philosophy (a false method, he says, at least prior to and including Descartes), of starting with the assumption of the priority of intellection in order to account

for the problem of cognition. This led to "the whole farago of Subjective Idealism, Pre-established Harmony, Psycho-physical Parallelism, and other outrages upon common sense".(55). The need was unquestionably for an organon for thought and this lay behind the whole development of deductive reason; and so Aristotle developed his "prior analytics" and gave us the syllogism. Now, whether or not all existence is organic, there appears an obvious need for an organic principle to enable us to understand our apprehension of the world. "The flower turns its face to the sun, and closes its petals to protect itself from the damp night; the dog hurries to the place where he is fed when it is time for feeding; the child runs to his mother when he is hurt; the sinner, when he becomes aware of his sin, humbles himself in penitence before God. Anyone can see differences in these different activities...but it seems quite arbitrary to draw a sharp line at any point or totally to deny continuity of principle." (56). By the use of the syllogism Aristotle was able to bring everything under genera or general ideas. You bring any object into the general class or kind and you can identify or explain that object. But the difficulty arises when we are faced with novelty. By the device of logic Aristotle's world became arranged as heirarchy. Everything was arranged by him in grades from the lower to the higher, or from the higher to the lower; and by means of the "universal" he was able to establish "particularity". He explained Plato's "idea" by referring objects to a combination of form and matter. At the highest level we find "pure form", that is God; now, pure form has no matter, so God is the base of all things, and Absolute Form is pure thought. This form of mathematical thinking was so clear and precise that it became the guiding principle of all logic, law, and

science. When you can bring particular instances under general law you can define them.

That, as temple pointed out, dominated all philosophy up until the time of Descartes. On page seventy-one of *Nature, Man and God* he suggested that it would be a rather interesting speculation to ask what would have happened if Darwin had appeared before Kant. For Darwin smashed this whole method of classification by showing that species were not fixed at all, and so their explanation would rely upon the principle of change. What, then, happens when you have a developing universe, a growing universe, in which things change? Mathematical conceptual thinking is all very well for a static world wherein nothing changes; but once you are faced with a world of dynamic process then mechanism does not apply. Mathematical formulae just fail to explain an on-going world and mechanistic theories break down. In the world of science we see cause passing into effect; but how can we account for the "novelty" which occurs in the effect? In a static world we can establish an equation which will be self-explanatory; but how do we form an equation which will account for evolution, for a world of growth? In mathematical formulae, and a science built upon it, you must have a continuum; there is necessity for a principle of continuity. In this way Temple attempts to throw some light on the whole modern problem of epistemology. There is obviously need for a "concrete universal": the fact of knowledge demands it, for no "abstract universal" will explain that fact. How is it possible to obtain concrete knowledge by methods of abstraction? Admitted that we have the kind of world as visualised by Descartes: how, then, can we account for the "individual"? Is the individual a mere abstraction? So Temple leads to the principle of Mind by which

we can account for both generality and particularity. As Science gives you things in their generality, Art gives you things in their particularity; and both are examples of the endeavours of the mind. We repeat: a mere cause passing into effect will never account for diversity; there must be a cause which is "akin". As Aristotle clearly saw, there are different kinds of thought in the mind of man. It is in the unity of mind that you get the concreteness of mind; and so it is in a Concrete Universal that you get the clue to all reality and to all diversified experience. This, Temple suggests, is the answer to the whole problem of "cognition": a permanent, not only amidst change, but which also accounts for change. The concrete universal, not the abstract, enables us to find the principle required; and so to the truth of rationalism must be added the further truth of empiricism.(57).

Whenever the word Reason is used in connection with some philosopher, the hearer usually proceeds to conjure up in his mind some doctrine of, or attempt to explain "ratiocination". If this were put in the form of a question concerning Temple's philosophy the answer would have to be in terms of the argument here set forth. By means of such astute logical reasoning, set forth in the form of valid argument, Temple reached an interpretation of existence by means of an interpretation of experience, that is, from cognition. In order to do so he fell back from Aristotelian 'logic' and 'organon' to the philosophy of Plato's idealism. By doing so he broke with the traditional method of scholasticism which had dominated European philosophy to the present time. In doing so he reconstituted the whole doctrine of Reason by showing it was not only a method of thought but a dynamic, creative process constituent with and

operative in and upon the world of existence.(58).

Reason is Divine.

Reference was made above to the fact that the clue to Temple's thought lay in his simple-minded faith in God. It is therefore to be understood that he reconstituted the doctrine of reason with some end in view,- namely, to establish a basis for his Theism. Not only is mind the principle by which we understand the meaning of existence, and particularly of progress, but wherever and whenever we see Purpose present we see Mind at its best. Here is a self-explanatory principle: wherever mind discovers purpose - in an event, in drama, poetry, or art, even in pain and suffering - it is completely satisfied and desires to go no further. "When we turn from the World as apprehended by Mind to Mind which apprehends the World, we find among its functions a principle which is self-explanatory - the principle of Purpose or of Intelligent Choice. This is an ultimate principle of explanation."(59). At this point Temple disagrees with A.N.Whitehead's suggestion that the evolution of history can be "rationalised".(60). He does so because "the more completely we include Mind within Nature, the more inexplicable must Nature become except by reference to Mind".(61). We can, then, and do, rationalise history by reference to Mind; but for the full understanding of history we need to have reference to a Transcendent Mind. "If, as science has disclosed, Mind is part of Nature, then Nature (to contain such a part) must be grounded in Mind. In short, the more we identify ourselves with the rest of the natural order, the more are we compelled to assert the reality of a supernatural Creator."(62). But, he argues, if we adopt this self-explanatory principle of purposive intelligence we cannot avoid coming to a theistic

conclusion. "To adopt the hypothesis that the process of nature in all its range is to be accounted for by the intelligent purpose of Mind is Theism."(63). There is, then, a Divine reason. The reason which is natural to the historical, evolutionary process, the cosmic reason and the human reason, are in their very essence Divinely created Reason.

Annotation:-

- (1) Nature, Man and God, p.368; Basic Convictions, p.63.
- (2) Religion without Revelation, p.7.
- (3) A.C. Bradley: Ideals of Religion, p.5.
- (4) Ibid, p.6.
- (5) Ibid, p.45. On the question of "change" in "religion" cf. Huxley: Religion without Revelation, p.39.
- (6) Cf. esp. Chapter IV.
- (7) Cf. Chapter V.
- (8) In Plato and Christianity (1916).
- (9) Canon Raven: Science, Religion and The Future, p.11. Cf. also p.63.
- (10) Cf. Nature, Man and God, Lect. VIII, where Temple acknowledges he is influenced by Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, and Process and Reality.
- (11) Ibid, p.204.
- (12) Essays, p.92. Cf. also Mens Creatrix, p.3, & Christus Veritas, p.XI.
- (13) Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship, p.9. Coe recognizes the problem in The Psychology of Religion, p.45: "A great part of our intellectual process is not thinking in any strict sense, but drifting with the idea that happens to be presented".
- (14) Readings in St. John's Gospel, p.156.
- (15) Essays, p.93.
- (16) Readings in St. John's Gospel, pp.141-2.
- (17) Bacon: De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bk. IX., Ch. I.
- (18) Nature, Man and God, p.35.
- (19) W.S. Urquhart: The Scientific Attitude and The Reality of Morals in The Expository Times, vol. LXVI, No. 2, p.38.
- (20) Plato and Christianity. Cf. p.101

- (21) Nature, Man and God, p.199.
- (22) Ibid, p.249.
- (23) Quoted from John Burnet: Greek Philosophy, Pt. I, Thales to Plato, p.221.
- (24) F.A. Iremonger, p.522.
- (25) Nature, Man and God: Preface, pp.VIII - IX.
- (26) Ibid, p.17.
- (27) William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation, p.11.
- (28) F.A. Iremonger, p.527.
- (29) Mens Creatrix: Preface, p.VIII.
- (30) Ibid, pp.258-260.
- (31) Ibid, p.269.
- (32) Ibid, p.281.
- (33) Ibid, p.309.
- (34) Ibid, p.310.
- (35) Ibid, pp.353-4.
- (36) The Nature of Personality, p.89.
- (37) Ibid, pp.XXVIII-XXIX.
- (38) Christus Veritas, pp.49-50.
- (39) A.J. Balfour: The Foundations of Belief, p.68.
- (40) Faith and Modern Thought, p.39.
- (41) This estimate is based on a consideration of Barth's Theological Existence Today, God in Action (cf. Chs. on The Church, and Theology), Credo (cf. Appendix IV, p.183), Epistle to Romans (cf. Truth, p.287f.; p.425; pp.436-438); also on Birch Hoyle: The Teaching of Karl Barth.
- (42) F.A. Iremonger, p.531.
- (43) Ibid, pp.537-8—a Letter to Dorothy Emmet.

- (44) Nature, Man and God, p.212.
- (45) Ibid, p.199 where Temple quotes Emmet: Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism.
- (46) Ibid, pp.198-9.
- (47) Ibid, p.199.
- (48) Ibid, p.200.
- (49) Ibid, p.212.
- (50) Ibid, p.214.
- (51) Ibid, pp.216, 217.
- (52) Cf. Canon Raven's "multi-dimensional space-time continuum" and his discussion of "Holism" in his Gifford Lectures. Particularly relevant to the view taken here are his Notes XII & XIII, pp.218-9 of Experience and Its Interpretation.
- (53) Nature, Man and God, pp.128-9.
- (54) Ibid, Lect.V: The World as Apprehended.
- (55) Ibid, p.109.
- (56) Ibid, p.114.
- (57) Ibid, p.130.
- (58) Temple makes ample use of A.N.Whitehead's philosophy to establish his position: there are at least 20 references to Whitehead in Nature, Man and God.
- (59) Nature, Man and God, p.131.
- (60) Ibid, pp.131, 133, 258.
- (61) Ibid, p.133.
- (62) Ibid, p.134.
- (63) Ibid, p.257.

V. Philosophy of Value.

Introductory Statement.

Closely connected with Temple's "doctrine of reason" is his theory of value. The fact that the consideration of one leads to the other, at least in *Mens Creatrix* and *Nature, Man and God*, is by no means to be taken as arbitrary or accidental. He uses both in an effective effort to undermine the materialist conception of the universe, especially so in the light of evolution; and the consideration of "values" has a direct bearing, consequent upon his treatment of the 'emergence' of Mind, on his approach to theological problems. It is for this reason that his theory of value is of special importance.

The fact that Temple raised the question of 'value' gives no distinctive feature to his philosophy for, as Dean Inge remarked, "the idea of Value is beginning to dominate all Philosophy"(1); but the unique manner in which Temple used the whole concept of value added significance to the truth of Christian theism.

The Importance of Value.

Dean Inge by no means overestimated the situation, for modern philosophy has indeed been characterized by a relentless search for meaning and value. Milne tells us: "There is a remarkable difference between physics and philosophy. On the one hand, physicists agree with one another in general at any one time, yet the physical theories of any one decade differ profoundly from those of each succeeding decade- at any rate in this twentieth century. On the

other hand philosophers disagree with one another at any one time, yet the grand problems of philosophy remain the same from age to age".(2). This seems a pretty fair estimate, and from Greek philosophy to the present time thinkers have engaged their attention upon the great problems of 'knowledge' and 'reality', 'ideas' and 'matter', 'time' and 'space', and 'values' in general. Nevertheless, the conclusion which may be drawn from the momentous issues which have already been reviewed is this thesis is that the accentuation of tensions arising within the first half of the twentieth century has driven men to rethink and reconstitute the whole fabric of philosophy. No doubt it would be possible to show that even in the field of philosophy, as well as in physics, there have been characteristic distinctions between one decade and another, but on the whole, philosophy in general during this century has been characterised by a search for "meaning" and "value". Harold A. Bosley takes a look at the Main Issues confronting Christendom to-day and tells us that disintegrative forces reach, like a sword, into our standards of life and society, constituting a spiritual tragedy for our time. He asserts that skepticism is a lost cause intellectually and that its sweeping condemnation has been supplied by Dr. Dewey's 'A Common Faith' and by such philosophic "giants" as A.N.Whitehead, John E.Boodin, Edgar Brightman and S.Alexander. "Nevertheless, intellectuals, individually and collectively, can be rescued from aimlessness only by getting a firm grasp on two emphases that are fundamentally religious in nature; (1) Human values are neither optional nor arbitrary but are organic to the universe. (2) The achievement of these values is a social process".(3).

Elias Andrews has supplied us with an excellent treatment of

Modern Humanism, and has rendered a great service in pointing out its merits and defects.(4). He stresses the emphasis on 'value' in humanist philosophy, but decries its intolerable dualism of fact and value, and comes to the conclusion that were modern humanism bolstered by an acceptance of Incarnation Theology we may all subscribe to Christian Humanism. Dean Inge has made a tremendous contribution to Christian Theology in this century and has won wide repute. Working along the lines of Christian Mysticism he has perhaps endeavoured more than any one else to show the proper sphere, relevance and significance of value for our age. In such works as *The Eternal Values*, *God and The Astronomers*, and *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*, he strives to recall men to a position where they may walk with their feet firmly planted on terra firma while their head, and consequently their conversation, is in heaven. He claims that such modern thinkers as Otto, Eucken and Troeltsch have taught us that "we need a new type of Christianity, more ethical, more mystical, and less dogmatic than the traditional forms".(5). In this list he might very well have included Baron Von Hugel with his "abiding consequences" and "lasting values". Against the background of deep disillusionment Dean Inge observed modern thinkers returning to the doctrine of "recurrent cycles" as a suggested answer.(6). "The decay of secular religion in the twentieth century has produced a widespread disillusionment...Its appearance will be an advantage to the higher religion, because a hope which rests on a rotten foundation is an obstacle in the way of reasonable idealism. The thinkers of our day are more ready to recognise the existence of a kingdom of values, exalted above space and time, and independent of the problematical advances which may or may not be in store for the human race."(7).

W.R.Sorley attempted a systematic investigation of the whole question of value in its bearing upon Theism in his Gifford Lectures. He insisted that value experiences are as much data of experience as are sense-perceptions, and must be taken into account in any philosophical view of reality as a whole.(8). Perhaps Bosanquet influenced the mind of Temple in this important phase of theistic thought more than any other contemporary.(9). He was chiefly noteworthy in the History of British Idealism for his defence of thought as a pathway to absolute reality. Temple was undoubtedly aware of the empirical element which was finding its way into philosophic and theistic thought in America. William James was the leader of the American philosophic movement known as Pragmatism and is best known by the 'Varieties of Religious Experience'. His philosophy was a reaction against excessive intellectualism and the "block universe" of absolute idealism. According to James, the "true" is only the expedient in the way of behaving: anything will only be seen to be "true" or "right" if it "works". In European thought the modern stress on value goes back to Lotze's phenomenological thinking and is characterised by an attempt to break away from rigid Hegelianism.(10).

Theory of Knowledge.

From the start William Temple saw that value had a close connection with knowledge: it was, indeed, that which 'coloured' or gave meaning to all human knowledge. The fact of knowledge, as we have seen, is in itself something altogether unique.(11). In The Faith and Modern Thought(1910) he aimed at showing that the fact of religious experience, and therefore religious knowledge, must be treated the same as all other facts of experience and knowledge. A rational

coherence is assumed by science as running through all our experience. There is some mentality in all the facts of experience, and so everything which exists must be the embodiment of rational principle. But we find in our experience one principle which will be self-explanatory and will thus explain the fact of existence, namely the principle of Purpose. "It is not as though we had to invent the term "Purpose" to explain the fact of the world, as the old scientists invented Caloric to explain the fact of heat. Purpose exists in our everyday experience. It supplies an answer to our question. It is then scientific to accept that answer provisionally as a hypothesis."(12). This, then, the fact of Purpose would be Temple's answer to Miss Emmet's question as to whether he "assumed" too easily the "unique explanatory value of the category of Purpose" and that such an explanation there must be since the mind requires it.(13). It is not simply a question as to whether the mind "requires" it, which no doubt it does; but it is the further question that the mind cannot avoid it: it is confronted by it as a fact of experience. Temple would surely say that the principle of Purpose 'appears' in the world of experience; the mind 'discovers' it; the mind neither placed it there, nor "assumes" it; it is part of the "givenness" of our experience, and the mind cannot explain it away. W.R.Matthews says something very similar to this in The Purpose of God: "The supreme fact in the process of nature is the emergence of mind...The minds which begin to know have, as they believe, the power to distinguish good and evil, the beautiful and the ugly. But in these two activities of knowing and valuing we already appear to transcend the physical universe. It becomes our object, we even decide whether, on the whole, it should be described as good, indifferent, or evil. The process of nature which has given

rise to this activity, which by its nature stands partly above nature, has obviously a peculiar quality which demands explanation".(14).

In the exposition of his theology Temple proceeds to explain the fact of value, its nature and meaning. From the start he obviously saw that it is not enough merely that the mind should discover purposiveness in the world of experience: we are also presented with other facts and problems in the world of experience; and so "the demand of reason that the world should appear coherent would stand over against the facts of experience in hopeless antagonism unless we accept the whole essential fabric of Christian Theology".(15). To the truth gained by knowledge of apprehension of the world there must be added the knowledge of faith in God as revealed in Jesus Christ. The demand of reason that the world should appear rational leads to a belief in an Almighty Will, but we cannot even believe in that Almighty Will unless it is demonstrated to us as "good", and this demonstration has been supplied in Jesus Christ.(16). It may be true to say that Temple "increasingly in his later work puts forward the idea of a Divine Purpose for Good as a venture of faith, supported though not demonstrated by reason and experience".(17). It would be much nearer to the truth to say, especially after an examination of *The Faith and Modern Thought*, that from the start Temple showed that reason and experience demand a belief in the Divine Purpose for Good. Another way of stating the same fact would be to say: Faith supplies what Reason demands. A candid examination of *The Faith and Modern Thought* may also lead to a question as to whether Temple did not "assume" something from the start: did he not assume that purpose of itself would explain nothing because it may only indicate an evil or malicious design, and so the world may be the creation of an Evil Mind

or the Devil? This question resolves itself into another in the great scheme of values: the nature of personality.

Materialism.

Materialism fails as an explanation of the universe, for while it has considerable success in dealing with a great part of what we know, it fails completely to account for our knowing it.(18). Not only does the materialist fail when confronted with the fact of knowledge, but "when we proceed to 'values' the difficulties of materialism are still greater...A world which has value is not a purely material world."(19). Here, again, Temple found himself confronted by Huxley: "It is in itself of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter - each statement has a certain relative truth...The further science advances, the more extensively and consistently will all the phenomena of Nature be represented by materialistic formulae and symbols".(20). He admitted that it was quite arguable that materialism is right, but supposing that it matters whether it is right or wrong, then we cannot be content to let the question be settled on Huxley's grounds. Why? Because 'Person' and 'Thing' are diametrically opposite to each other, and you cannot account for 'Personality' on the basis of 'Things'. A Thing does not make the same claims upon us as a Person(21), so Temple distinguishes between Thing, Brute, and Person. A Thing has no feelings or thoughts, and for it there is no good or evil. Whereas a Thing has no conscious life at all, a Brute has consciousness but only in the present; but a Person is conscious of continued existence and attributes value not only to the present, but also to the past and future. Moreover, persons exist in society; and society is always a number of persons united

by a common purpose: here we find conditions which make character and purpose possible.(22). Temple also distinguishes between 'individual' and 'person': "An individual is what it is in terms of its relations; that is true; but we are not justified in concluding that apart from its relations it is nothing at all."(23). While the germ thought of the distinction appears here, it is elaborated more fully in one of his latest works.(24).

Personality and 'Value-judgments'.

It is in his view of the nature of Personality that Temple has a distinctive contribution to make to the philosophy of value. This is developed in *The Nature of Personality* (1911) but finds fuller treatment in later works, especially in *Christus Veritas* and *Nature, Man and God*. He examines the perennial question as to whether Persons are 'free' or 'determined' and concludes that Determinism must be given up on the basis of observed "differentiation". Freedom, he asserts, is not necessarily a treasure; freedom, like the intellect, grows. Purpose is always conscious, and desires, intellect, and imagination are the material out of which it is made up. Purpose involves the Will, "for it is in volition that character is expressed, and volition in its full development is Purpose". The problem arises when we consider the Will as a separate entity which has been set up as a constitutive part of a substantial soul, as a "faculty" rather than as dynamic force: "as Purpose is certainly different from any one of our chaotic impulses and ideas, a Will was invented to be the organ of Purpose". This came about not so much as a result of the intellect but through an effort of the imagination to apprehend activity apart from that which acts.(25). "For the normal life of

intellect is abstract and restless while the normal life of imagination is concrete and contemplative".(26). We are here right at the heart of the very issue which enables us to understand Value as Temple sees it, for the intellect passes out of itself through the imagination into will, and "what we require, if we can find it, is some embodiment or presentation of Universal Truth which may awaken and lead into captivity to itself the whole emotional nature of men".(27).

The whole question resolves itself around "value-judgments" as the individual finds himself confronted with the possibility of "choice", and Temple sees a very good analogy in the education of a child. At first, and this is the first requirement of education, there is inculcated in the child the art or habit of "concentration" or fixed "attention". "Gradually that period is extended, and the whole system of regulations, called "discipline", is developed, till 'lessons' and 'discipline' together cover nearly the whole life; then the external pressure is relaxed again, and the individual is set free in the sense that he is now left to the guidance of the habits which discipline has created in him; and the educator may say- 'I have created a will in you; at first you were a mere mass of impulses; I have co-ordinated and systematised those impulses so that now you have a real will and purpose of your own; I have forced you into freedom; now go and exercise that freedom'."(28)

The question arises, are the "impulses" good or evil? Many philosophers and theologians have engaged themselves in the dispute as to whether the natural impulses are good or evil. According to Temple, the strict doctrine of Original Sin has always considered them to be evil, while many modern thinkers have tended to the belief that

they are good in themselves while they become evil by abuse.(29). Temple himself asserts that they are neither: they are neutral; the plain fact being that they are neither good nor evil but the very material out of which vice or virtue is to be made. The true freedom of man consists in the use which he makes of them in the development of character, so that he comes to the point where, free from external control and internal compulsion alike, he accepts full responsibility for his decisions and actions. "Just as in ideal Democracy all the citizens together constitute the sovereign power which each individual obeys, so in perfect Personality all the impulses, under the guidance of Reason, constitute a Soul or Self which all obey. The truly free man, or the man of strong will, is not the man who may do anything at any moment, but the man who has some great purpose which he follows despite all impulses and all obstacles".(30). In *Christus Veritas* he also tells us that this capacity to concentrate attention on one object to the exclusion of all others is the foundation of the Will, but because there is more in every human being than has come within the sphere of consciousness Personality is always more than Will.

But we never come to a full understanding or appreciation of value when we consider Personality[•] as an abstraction, or when we consider a person as an isolated self. The importance of value is most acutely felt when we consider the problem of ethics or of right conduct. The concept of law fails to do justice to the value of human personality for the simple reason that it raises the question of rewards or punishment. On the question of 'moral value' it is difficult to get beyond the "autonomy" of Kant's

Categorical Imperative; for when we consider the whole question of "rights" and "duties" then we must take into consideration the "rights" of other Persons in society and "act at all times from a maxim fit for universal law". "Kant's fundamental argument to prove that only the Good Will is absolutely good rests on a surreptitious reference to the admitted interests of Society; and so it must always be. The isolated individual may be wise or foolish; he cannot be moral or immoral. The atheistic debauchee upon a desert island is not liable to moral censure".(31). It may be rightly objected here(32) that Temple assumes there are no intrinsic values which an individual has a duty to consider apart from those found in personal relationships. What we must observe is that he is here raising a hypothetical instance. Without going into a debate of the whole question it may suffice to say that if there were such a case the man would be confronted with choice none the less: for example, that of ending his own life. Were he to do so it would preclude the possibility of his ever being rescued and therefore performing some future role or act of value for other persons in society as well as for himself. The point of the argument is that in fact that is not the way we observe man: he exists in society. Man was made for fellowship in society, and the whole question of moral good, and in particular the Categorical Imperative, centres around that fact. We should fail in any attempt to set up a formula for the "isolated debauchee". Even in the realm of personal relationships since "our actual obligations are such as arise out of our actual moral relationships they can seldom be represented by any formula". Temple saw that there were problems consequent upon Kant's formulation of the Categorical Imperative

and suggested that the nearest we can come to it is: 'Love thy neighbour as thyself'. But love is not at our command: you cannot command a person to love another; indeed, it hardly seems possible to command oneself to do so, for love doesn't work that way. Still, "if we want to find the right thing to do, we must ask what will do most to increase the volume of love. Love alone has absolute moral value".(33). How, then, can we have a science of morals? That seems to be what Temple is suggesting: there can be no exact science of ethics; and it is incumbent upon us to try and understand the argument by which he comes to this interesting decision.(34).

The Triad of Values.

(a) Truth.

Along with other philosophers, such as Dean Inge and Professor Sorley, Temple accepts the "triad" of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness as "absolute values", and for Temple they are good in themselves apart from all consequences.(35). He rather leans towards Sorley's tendency to think less of truth and beauty than of goodness(36); but it would be truer to say that he thinks of goodness more as absolute in an unqualified sense, for there may be knowledge which it would be better not to have and beauty which would be better away. While Dean Inge states that we must not subordinate Truth or Beauty or Goodness to either of the other two, nevertheless he notices that there are differences between them.(37). But we must see why Temple makes a distinction, for it is not just an arbitrary choice: "In principle Goodness has a priority over the other two because it is the distinctly human type of value and we are human. Indeed when we follow after Truth and Beauty with an absolute devotion, if we are not neglecting

some other and yet stronger claim we are manifesting Goodness".(38).

Nevertheless, Temple does raise the question of "absoluteness" of the classical trinity of Values, and stresses the fact that they represent three types of excellence- Intellectual, Aesthetic, and Ethical. The three have always been claimed to be Absolute, shining in their own light, and regarded as three sisters that can never be separated. He maintains that only Goodness has that quality of Absoluteness.(39). Introductory to a discussion of the nature of Truth and Beauty, he substituted Knowledge for Truth and proceeded to ask the question whether truth were an abstraction or a relationship. He pointed out that a lie exists; that an illusion, or a false statement, exists; and argued that if Truth were the equivalent of Absolute Reality, then there could be no distinction between truth and error. Truth is always of subject-object relationship, and it is something at which you arrive, not from which you start out. Always when confronted with knowledge the Mind asks Why? and again Why?(40), so that Knowledge or Truth may be relative. "Truth is the end of the intellect; man does think and he may think right or wrong; to think is to attain truth so far as his thought has gone. Men always desire to reach some truth, for their plans will break down if they are calculated on a basis of error; but this is to desire truth as a means, not as an end. To desire truth as an end is to desire the perfect correlation of mind to Reality. And this is a good in itself, so clearly a good as to impose upon all who have understood its nature an obligation to seek it. The end is not to acquire masses of information, though that may be a means to the end and must be included in it, if it is perfectly attained; the end is perfect correlation with Reality".(41). Knowledge may not

only be a good thing in itself: it may enable us to pursue right conduct, and this is precisely where, for Temple, we come to 'value-judgments'. "We find ourselves in a world over whose destiny we have no control whatever. It is an ordered world; and the most important question we can ask is the question- What is the nature and character of the Power or Force that orders it? This governing principle is not anything that we can do or possess: knowledge of it will not add to our skill in weaving or in carpentering, in medicine or in generalship. But without it everything is uncertain, and all resolution becomes infected with ultimate doubt. This knowledge will perhaps not help us to do what we want to do, but it may help us to do the right thing. In fact, the truth seems to be this, So far as the possession of knowledge is the exercise of a natural function and the satisfaction of a real impulse, it is a good thing; the knowledge of great subjects, the science which is itself on the borderland of art, is one of the best things in life. But there is a petty kind of knowledge, the pursuit of which is pedantic and contemptible. Even in the sphere of the great sciences, and of philosophy itself, we very rarely, and perhaps never, find a pursuit of knowledge for its own sake alone ...Knowledge divorced from other goods becomes pedantry and dry-as-dust. Its value is then slight. But the exact knowledge of the man of wide culture and sympathy is undoubtedly one of the best things in the world. Knowledge is therefore to be pursued for its own sake, but not for its own sake alone, nor in isolation from all other interests...Knowledge, in short, is one of the good things of the world; and, as we shall find to be the case with all good things, its value lies in its relation to some individual personality. It may be as good- for some people- as anything else whatever; it is

not for anybody the highest good, for the highest good is a condition of the whole soul in which knowledge takes its place with other good things. It is one of the proper treasures of a complete personality, the first and simplest deliberate work of the creative mind".(42).

(b) Beauty.

Temple treats Beauty very much in the same manner as Truth. Beauty is something we discover in the object to which we give attention, but it depends on the subject no less than does Truth. It, too, is a matter of subject-object relationship. But whereas science is mental restlessness, art is essentially mental repose. Expression is an essential function of art: art serves to express or reveal value.(43). We may again here ask the question Why? and, yet again, Why? Why should a sunset be beautiful? Again a materialist answer would not suffice. From sheer physical relationship the beauty may simply be defined in terms of rays of light. But such an answer fails to account for the fact that the apprehended is representative of the person who apprehends. There appears to be a need for a doctrine of harmony within the universe, something which is more than pleasing and which represents and also accounts for the emotion involved in apprehension.(44). There is no such thing as abstract Beauty or abstract Truth. Can a thing which is ugly or immoral be beautiful? Wickedness may be presented artistically, even aesthetically, but will it be representative? You cannot divorce Beauty and Truth from reality in this manner and still have them as "representative". "If we are to be in the aesthetic attitude our whole nature must be satisfied".(45). We must see truth and beauty in the last resort in the light of reality which is spiritual. We do not do justice to

Truth and Beauty if we reduce the rational solely to the apprehensible or intellectual. We must needs introduce these elements of emotional and moral judgments to get a whole picture of reality. We do, as Temple suggested, encounter particulars in religious experience, but we must treat them not in isolation but against the background of religious experience 'as a whole'. It is for this reason that he regarded William James as the "great offender". Apprehension of Beauty not only indicates that we are in the presence of a master-mind, but is in its own essence a communion with that mind.(46). The objectivity of Beauty is emphasised by Temple. "There are at least some Goods of which it is true to say that though Objective in essence they are subjectively conditioned. Of these the most conspicuous is Beauty." The good of Beauty may be potential only, but when it is appreciated the condition of its potential good becomes actual, and the good is in the Beauty as appreciated, not in the appreciation. So it is that scenes of rare beauty await mountaineers in the Himalayans as they seek to scale Mt.Everest. It is true that the artist creates beauty; he not only tries to create what is not found in normal experience since true beauty is something more than most men see, but he also tries to catch and depict the Beauty of Reality, the Beauty which is really there.(47). This "objectivity" of Beauty carries with it a principle of tremendous value for theology: "There is potential spiritual worth which awaits appreciation as the condition of its actualisation; secondly there is an appropriate appreciation for each individual to exercise, so that each contributes to the entire scheme of good not only by individual fruition but also the actualisation of potential worth or good which this occasions".(48).

In *Christus Veritas* we find a repudiation of the position taken in *Mens Creatrix* that we can have no knowledge at all short of omniscience.(49). Still the search for truth leads to an ever-widening context and there is lacking any sense of mental repose or satisfaction as we have in Beauty. Absolute knowledge may be attainable but only as abstraction; nevertheless there is correlation with Reality in the sense that the mind is always ready to apprehend rightly. The apprehension of Beauty proceeds by another method and instead of abstraction we find "intimacy of acquaintance" and "concentrated attention". "There is, therefore, possible to us an absolute apprehension of absolute Beauty such as is not possible of absolute Truth".(50).

(c) Goodness

When Temple considered Goodness he found the same principles operating as in the case of the other two, but in the case of Goodness there is perfect correlation with Reality.(51). His own suggestion for the interpretation of Value may be set out in summary form:

"The essential condition for the actualisation of Value is the discovery by Mind of itself or its own principle in its object.

"When Mind makes this discovery in the activity of contemplation, the form of Value actualised is Beauty.

"When Mind makes this discovery in the activity of analysis and synthesis, the form of Value actualised is Truth.

"When Mind makes this discovery in the activity of personal relationship the form of Value actualised is Goodness."(52).

It is impossible to command all men to be scientists, though all

men should speak the Truth; likewise it is impossible to command apperception or appreciation of Beauty. Is it the same with Goodness? In his First Critique, Kant found there was no solution to his antinomy. How can we come from phenomena to noumena? It is possible through the 'moral judgment', where we pass from the "is" to the "ought-to-be". We may rightly ask ourselves, Temple suggests, whether there is "universal goodness", and how it can be so. That there is universal Truth all will admit, for $2 + 2 = 4$ for all times and places whatsoever. But in the world of ethics we are confronted with "changing morality", with an "endless relativity of knowledge". Nevertheless we find here also a universal in the sense of obligation. Although the content of the moral judgment might differ, we are nevertheless faced with the universal fact of Conscience as Butler so clearly saw. On this question of right judgments Temple considers the distinction between action and act as drawn by Dr.W.D.Ross in *The Right and The Good*, where he attached the term right to acts, and moral good to actions. His criticism appears valid and amounts to suggesting that if a man pursues "Honesty because it is the best policy", then he is not doing it because he is honest at all. This raises the whole question of the objectivity of the moral good: is there such a thing as a universal, objective good? In answer to that question Kant had answered: "nothing can be called good unqualifiedly except the Good Will". So he distinguished between Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives. He was impressed by science and the fact that science had discovered there were laws in the world, such as gravity, which were always and universally true. He desired the same impressiveness for his Categorical Imperative: so will that thy will may become law universal, so that anybody in the same position would

be under obligation to do the same. Kant suggests that in this way we get objective control over subjective action. You must act, therefore, so as to treat individuals as ends in themselves, never as means to ends. Human society is thus "a kingdom of ends".

Here Temple raises the important question: can you universalise an act? He introduced the interesting and puzzling problem of Sinclair Lewis's professor and pupil on the island with their serum (53) to show that the problem of moral judgments was not so simple as Kant thought. Sometimes, as in the case of war, whatever anyone does is bound to be wrong. Is there, then, an absolute reality? Does conscience always speak with such clear reality that we observe it as evidence of the "stern daughter of the voice of God"? Because you cannot legislate universally for a man in every particular instance or relationship in which he will find himself, Temple suggests you cannot have a science of ethics. What moral action really is does not rely on specific acts but on conscientiousness-the habit of acting with a sense of responsibility. This constitutes the kingdom of the good; and reverts the absoluteness of obligation from the act to the agent, from conduct to character, from "do righteousness" of the law to "be righteous" of the Gospel. While there is absolute moral obligation, the absoluteness of "duty" may differ. It may be a doctor's duty to save a patient's life, while it may be the duty of a clergyman to prepare the same patient for death. The "duty" for each may differ, but what is common is the fact of obligation. "To have a sense of absolute obligation is implicitly to claim inherent and ultimate value".(54). Goodness is the habit of the Will, the real focus of obligation is to be found in character. As Kant said, you must act conscientiously, and that not as an individual

but as a member of society. There is a good which is more than personal with which one is confronted, and which is by no means alien. "This actual membership of our own society, which is part of the constitution of our nature, is the root of the consciousness of obligation". What matters for Temple is the judgment of what is good and the various grades of good. Here he parts company with the Utilitarians whose error, he claims, was not in being utilitarian as regards conduct but hedonist as regards the true ends of life. The end, as Plato said, is Righteousness.(55). In the last resort there can be no command to be good, but there is a constraining force: it is love. So, when you analyse the law of obligation you come to the law or principle of love.

'Mind Purposive'.

All the foregoing has tremendous consequences for Temple's philosophy of value, of which it forms a part but leads to something more significant. For these values indicate that Mind Purposive, or Intelligent Purpose, supplies the explanation of the universe. But Purpose is directed mainly toward Value or Good and this involves the logical priority of Value to Existence. Temple explains this view when dealing with the nature of Reality and the relation of value to it.(56). The universe derives its origin from a Creative Will, but Good and Value are correlative of Will; therefore the most fundamental element in things is their Value. "Value is thus, in the order of being, prior to existence. But Value is not Existence, and must receive(or come into) existence in order to be a part of Reality". Substance itself is nothing else but Value; everything which exists exists to be the expression of the

Creative Will. Although value determines existence, value is only actual when it is appreciated. In all existence we observe that which is symbolic of the Creative Will. The universe is therefore sacramental and symbolism is the supreme philosophic principle. Temple asks: what is the nature of Value? and answers: "No definition is possible, for you cannot state the Genus and Differentia of your highest principle...For any actual Value or Good there must be two factors in a certain relationship - the "valuable" object and the apprehending and appreciating subject; and these must meet in an experience which "satisfies" or is fit for permanence....Science seeks a totality of perpetually wider extension; Art seeks a totality of perfected inner unity; Goodness is the achievement of inner unity in the individual and extended unity in the society - totality in both. Value, in short, is a system of experience in which a subject free from inner causes of change finds satisfaction in an object which (therefore) it does not seek to change...Because it is a subject-object system, perfectly co-related, the object must reveal the characteristics of Mind and the subject must be absorbed in the object...Mind discovers itself in the Real, and in the discovery becomes its full self: that is Value or Good. But Mind will only perfectly discover itself in other minds; therefore Fellowship is the true norm of Value, and Love its perfect realisation."(57).

Value depends more upon the tendency and conclusion of an experience in the time-process, and not on the stages in isolation. Therefore the value of past acts can be altered even though the facts remain the same. The presence of evil, then, is no argument against the perfect goodness of the whole. Totality is the distinguishing feature in all value. "The whole is the Will of God and what

it has created; therefore every apprehension of Value is in principle a religious experience...Certainly there is no apprehension of Value which is not an incoherent apprehension of God - and no human experience is utterly without value".(58).

There is a place for value in the world of science in which we find Mind as subject of value-judgments. It is impossible to stress too clearly the importance of 'value-judgment' for Temple, and one of the best examples of the use he makes of it is to be found in his chapter on Religion and Ethics in The Kingdom of God. There he claimed that the significance of the moral judgment points to the fact that the truth of the world of value can only be realised by the whole Society of Spirits each doing his own part. Temple stresses the fact that Mind in pursuit of good or as Purposive is the expression of Personality, and we thus discover that Personality may express its identity through an infinite variety of adaptation. "The man who always acts in the same way whatever the circumstances, is reliable indeed, but is not strong or loving or wise". In "variability", as well as in constancy of expression, we may observe Divine Personality. So we arrive at a view of value which admits the possibility of Miracles: "Personality, whether human or divine, is, in so far as it is immanent, a principle of variation. There is in the world an immanent Reason - a Logos. If this is impersonal, it may be only a principle of logical coherence. If it is personal, it must be a principle of perpetual adjustment according to "sufficient reason". But behind, or above, the successive moments of conduct in which personality is immanent, there is the personality itself, transcendent, and in proportion to its completeness of integration, unchangeable.

Because of such a philosophy of value there arise other

possibilities: the essence, or chief characteristic, of personality is spirit, and not only is fellowship possible between human spirits but there is also communion of the divine and human spirit, and so Revelation is possible. Such a view of the rationality of nature involves both the immanence and the transcendence of God. From the fact of rationality Milne argues similarly: "I think that these considerations go against the, at first, attractive idea of S. Alexander's, namely the evolution of the deity itself. He contemplated plane upon plane of existence - like Dante's series of heavens - mineral, vegetable, animal, human, intellect-possessing, conscience-possessing, immortality-possessing. But this scheme does not account for itself. It does not explain how it came into existence, or why the laws of nature of inanimate matter should be capable of rational deduction by the denizen of a much later stage in the history of the universe. To have a rational origin for the laws of nature requires a transcendental God, Himself rational, as the source of the universe".(59).

Value and the Problem of Evil.

Any philosophy which tends to account for the universe in terms of Value must deal with the fact of Evil; but the fact that the problem of evil is raised at all automatically raises the fact that there is a problem of good; or, in other words, that people are seeking to establish an explanation of the universe in terms other than those of efficient causation. When people ask one to account for all the evil that is in the world then they are supposing that it should be there, they are posing "grounds" of dealing with it. In a purely mechanistic or materialistic scheme there could be no problem of evil. Evil when seen in the light of the perfect Goodness of God

and His Universal Sovereignty has thus far defied solution. Temple, as has been already explained, considered Evil in its three forms - as Ugliness, Error, and Moral Evil - and considered it as Negative Value. Nevertheless the Evil is Positive in that it really exists: as ugliness it is something that should not be there; as error it exists as over against truth, and the danger is that there may be a wrong decision which leads to evil action. It is necessary to have a clear distinction between the nature of good and evil, for it is only in the light of an absolute good that we may see the final solution of the problem. Evil is never final; in fact the power of good is such that it may turn evil to good. The Cross of Christ is an example, and stands for the embodiment of evil, but in its environment it was turned to good. When we seek to account for the cause of evil and the justification of its occurrence we must also account for the immense amount of natural evil that there is in the world. "God created the world and beheld it was very good"; whence comes evil? Temple suggests that it arose in the evolution of Process. Many of the so-called "accidents" are not accidents at all, and much of the animal suffering has been exaggerated. The animal level of mentality is quite different from the human level; in any case there is a difference between pain and suffering. The act of organism feeding on another cannot be called evil when there is no consciousness.(60). What appears to be the evil in the natural order is part of the whole structure of the on-going universe. Many of the ills or apparent evils excite or incite us and we find means of adapting them to a much finer, better purpose: they may be good for 'adaptation'. Leibneiz used the word "compossible" - all-things-together: what appears evil in isolation may be good when viewed in totality.

It is quite possible that Temple does not penetrate far enough into the problem of evil; perhaps moral evil, at any rate, goes far deeper than he thinks. But he is at least on solid ground when he suggests that evil in its finitude can be blotted out in relation to the good. Man, he suggests, never chooses evil as such: he always chooses it as his 'apparent good'. The conflict thus becomes one between two goods (the apparent and the real) and not between good and evil. Man chooses what appears to him good, although now it may be evil. This tendency to evil in human nature has always been described as Original Sin.(61). We are born into an environment, an evil tradition becomes our inheritance. In the natural order there is no such thing as evil. Until mind arose as an episode all other value had only a potential existence. What comes to an animal as instinct he chooses and uses: so, too, what comes to man as his inheritance he makes his own. Temple makes the choice of evil a stage, a necessary stage, in the development of man. In this way he can be made fit for society in the Kingdom of Ends. It is not that God has predestined man to evil; He has predestined him to be good, but it is necessary for him to be subjected to the influence of evil in order to achieve the higher good. That is the story of the Prodigal Son: the father had to give him the chance to be made more perfect. People usually suggest that if only men would be more reasonable, if they would allow their better nature to predominate, if they would use their Will, then such sin or evil would not be. But, Temple asks: who said that reason was such an infallible guide? And, what of the Will? Now, the Will is the whole personality in action. The trouble is that Reason itself is vitiated and the Will is weak. Man needs to be delivered from his self-centredness. This, then, is Temple's solution:

evil seems to be something that is involved in Good. In that sense, it is a tribute to good and can be used for good. It is necessary, not because man is evil but because he is good, and the greatness of God is that He can lead men to good in this manner. The fact of Evil points to the necessity and the good of Atonement.

Temple flatly refuses to divorce "fact" from "value". The reality of anything must not only include the fact of its occurrence but its value as well. Even the "Fall" becomes a "Fall Upwards" for him, because in that way we are able to see the value as present in the fact.

"(1) God made the world and saw that it was very good;

"(2) Man arrived at conscious realisation of Value (Good and Evil) by doing what was in fact forbidden, but was (ex hypothesi) not realised as wrong; in breaking a rule he discovered a principle;

"(3) Thereby he became a conscious sinner;

"(4) But thereby also he became capable of fellowship with God.

"This is a true analysis of all natural human progress. Man stumbles, by the impulse of his nature, into something which, by his misunderstanding of it, is first a source of new evils, but is the condition of a hitherto impossible good." (62).

The Goal of History - The Commonwealth of Value.

Such a view of Value as inextricably bound up with the on-going process of what may be called the 'bundle of life' in our factual world of experience inevitably affects one's concept of history, and this is particularly so in the case of Temple. History, he assures us, if it is considered as a mere succession of events, is meaningless. Thus he is in agreement with such a unique historian as Toynbee,

and stands along with the pioneers of the 'modern view' of history. History as a science is but a recent invention, and Temple is unquestionably right in his claim that until recently history had no significance for philosophy. He pointed out that Oriental philosophies made history meaningless by treating it as an illusion, but here again in providing us with the opposite view we have an opportunity of observing the uniqueness of Christianity. History, when viewed as past, present and future in the light of a philosophy of Value, reveals the principle of choice. History, therefore, demonstrates the principles of immanence and transcendence at work in an on-going process. We don't just have history: history is not just 'given'; it is a matter of growth and development, and the temporal becomes necessary to the eternal as the arena where God works out His purposes for judgment or guidance of personalities, individual and corporate. The historical process becomes the arena where human beings are organized and fashioned for membership in the Commonwealth of Value. The goal of History, therefore, because of the inherent principle of value, becomes the Commonwealth of Value.(63).

The Commonwealth of Value or the Kingdom of God is realisable here on earth. Temple says there are only three possible relationships in which one human being can stand in regard to others: he may ignore them, compete with them, or co-operate with them. If he seeks only the satisfaction of his own elementary desires, he ignores others. If he lives for comparative values such as wealth, fame, honour or power, he may be aiming at a satisfaction of his whole self, but is largely indulging in competition with others. But if he lives for an end which has inherent and absolute value, he is co-operating with others and there will be no conflict between his success and that of

others. In this last way a man will be seeking true social goods which promote social unity.(64). This is what makes the Commonwealth of Value a real possibility; but each individual is now not bringing into it his own good or value so much as a goodness which is an obedient response to a call. If it is in response to a call, a response to love, then it is real goodness, but it is both the individual's and not his. It is something which all may share and all may contribute. If that be true, it further follows that life is not static, it is rather a process, a growth. And if that be true it also follows that Immortality is not static, not a place or state, but the very stuff into which such a life as this is capable of expanding: it is not just unending existence, it's a quality of life. Consequently there can be no such thing as an atheist for he is saved by the very God whose existence he denies. But the Commonwealth cannot be realised on republican principles; it is not merely, as Huxley conceived, the sum of all human good; it requires the concept of King for its actualisation and thus becomes a Monarchy. Thus the Commonwealth of Values finds its unity in God and becomes the Community of Saints or Kingdom of God. To be less than a child of God in the Kingdom of God is to be un-social;"its perfection is in eternity, but to bring its divided and warring members into that Harmony and Peace wherein alone it is actual is the purpose which gives meaning to History".(65).The key to its understanding and realisation alike is Love - Infinite, All-Powerful Love. The very name of God signifies the union of perfect goodness and absolute power.(66).

Annotation: -

- (1) W.R.Inge: God and the Astronomers,p.174.
- (2) Milne: Modern Cosmology and The Christian Idea of God,p.2. On the prominence of value in modern philosophy,cf.Christus Veritas,p.3; Nature, Man and God,p.162.
- (3) Harold A.Bosley: Main Issues Confronting Christendom,pp.18;37;39.
- (4) Elias Andrews: Modern Humanism and Christian Theism.
- (5) Christian Ethics and Modern Problems,p.378.
- (6)Ibid,p.195.
- (7)Ibid, same p.
- (8) W.R.Sorley: Moral Values and The Idea of God.
- (9) The reference is,of course,to Bosanquet's Knowledge and Reality, Principle of Individuality,and Value and Destiny of the Individual. Cf.the frequency of references to Bosanquet in Nature,Man and God, also Mens Creatrix p.154.
- (10) An Outline of Modern Knowledge,p.35; also Caldecott & Mackintosh: Selections from the Literature of Theism,p.9.
- (11) This was stated in our last chapter. Cf. The Nature of Personality,p.XXVI.
- (12) The Faith and Modern Thought,pp.10-11; 18.
- (13) F.A.Iremonger,p.527.
- (14) The Purpose of God,p.95.
- (15) The Faith and Modern Thought,p.145.
- (16) Ibid,pp.145-6.
- (17) Dorothy Emmet,in F.A.Iremonger's biography,p.527.
- (18) The Nature of Personality,p.xxvi.
- (19) Ibid, p.xxvii.
- (20) Collected Essays,Vol.I,p.164,quoted in Nature of Personality,p.2.
- (21) The Nature of Personality, p.3.

- (22) Ibid, pp.5, 9.
- (23) Ibid, p.15.
- (24) Christianity and Social Order, pp.65-6, 108-9. Cf.also Christus Veritas, pp.68-9.
- (25) The Nature of Personality, pp. 20, 24-5.
- (26) Mens Creatrix, p.153.
- (27) Ibid, pp.153-161.
- (28) The Nature of Personality, pp.28-9.
- (29) Ibid, p.37.
- (30) Ibid, pp.29-32. Christus Veritas, pp.60-1.
- (31) Ibid,p.51; Mens Creatrix,p.182.
- (32) As Miss Emmet does; cf. F.A.Iremonger, p.536.
- (33) The Nature of Personality, p.76.
- (34) The argument is stated in chpts.vi & vii of Nature,Man and God.
- (35) Christus Veritas, p.31.
- (36) Sorley: Moral Values and The Idea of God. Cf.Inge: The Eternal Values,p.7; and William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation,p.13.
- (37) The Eternal Values, p.18; p.7.
- (38) Christus Veritas, p.31.
- (39) Nature, Man and God, Chpt. vi.
- (40) Mens Creatrix, p.90.
- (41) Christus Veritas, p.27.
- (42) Mens Creatrix, pp.33-35.
- (43) Ibid, pp.93-111.
- (44) Ibid, pp.120-8.
- (45) Ibid, p.120.
- (46) Nature, Man and God, p.252.
- (47) Mens Creatrix,p.42; Nature,Man and God, p.157.

- (48) Nature, Man and God, pp.411-13.
- (49) Christus Veritas, p.29.
- (50) Ibid, p.30.
- (51) Ibid, p.28; Nature, Man and God, p.167.
- (52) Nature, Man and God, p.164.
- (53) Ibid, Appendix B, p.196.
- (54) Ibid, p.190.
- (55) Ibid, p.193.
- (56) Christus Veritas, pp.10ff.
- (57) Ibid, p.32f.
- (58) Ibid, p.34.
- (59) Milne: Modern Cosmology and The Christian Idea of God, p.156.
- (60) Cf. Nature, Man and God, Lect.XIV, p.356ff.
- (61) Temple deals with Original Sin in many of his works. The basis of our observation here is the Lect.on Finitude and Evil in Nature, man, and God, cf.p.363; also Christianity and Social Order, p.49ff.
- (62) Christus Veritas, p.74.
- (63) Nature, Man and God, pp.445ff. & esp.p.448.
- (64) Christus Veritas, p.79.
- (65) Nature, Man and God, pp.407ff., esp. p.426.
- (66) Christus Veritas, p.273.

VI. Revelation.

Introductory.

Revelation is the great theological issue of our time; it has captured a place in the realm of intellectual discussion and endeavour second to no other single concept in the whole field of theology.

"The whole of my theology is an attempt to understand and verify the words: 'He that has seen Me hath seen the Father'."(1).

"God as immanent is the Eternal Logos, the personal expression of the divine character, thought and purpose: this logos is the explanation of all things that occur, whether it be the regular and customary growth of the seed in the plant, or the birth of His own fleshly tabernacle from a Virgin-Mother; neither of these is more or less divine than the other; neither represents a divine intrusion from without; each is a manifestation of divine activity appropriate to the occasion. But in the variety of activity there is no instability or incoherence, if only because the personal Logos does nothing of Himself, but in all things expresses the transcendent God. Yet once more, that transcendent God is unknown to finite minds except through His self-expression in the immanent activity of His Word or Son."(2).

Both of these quotations indicate the supremely important place of Revelation in the thought of Temple and point significantly to the manner of his treatment of this vast subject. While the first indicates the 'Whom' of revelation, the second indicates the 'Why' or 'Nature' of revelation: both together point to the possibility of Revelation against the background of faith in a Living God.

What is Revelation?

The big question which the theologian is asked to decide to-day is whether Revelation is the one essential factor in the philosophy of religion. Even that is a vague, cold and dispassionate statement if one considers the meaning of Revelation for William Temple who constantly declared that religious faith does not consist in a belief that there is a God but in a personal trust in God which rises to personal fellowship with Him. This would seem to indicate that the nature and meaning of revelation is not to be sought in philosophic discussion. The fact of revelation, it is true, depends upon the Being of God, but it further depends upon the question as to whether that Being has, or can, or does disclose Himself. All the great religions of the world, with the possible exception of Confucianism, claim to be founded upon a revelation. With the comparative value or merit of such claims to revelation William Temple dealt, along with others, in a book by that name edited by Baillie and Martin, and claimed that because Jesus Christ is the crown, He is also the criterion of all Revelation.(3). As was the case with the doctrine of reason and the philosophy of value, so too the emphasis upon Revelation finds a dominant place in practically all Temple's writings. This may be inferred from the opening quotation of this chapter, but he did not deal with this important theme merely in a general way. He gave it a distinctive place and treatment, not only in the Essay already quoted, but also explicitly in Nature, Man and God, The Faith and Modern Thought, Basic Convictions, and The Preacher's Theme To-Day. It was also the underlying theme of Mens Creatrix and Christus Veritas, as well as a recurrent topic in Readings in St. John's Gospel.

On the basis of these writings it is evident that Temple

reconstituted the whole Doctrine of Revelation and thus clarified what he himself considered one of the chief problems of our times.(4). Testimony to his distinctive presentation of this great problem can be seen in the estimate of his contemporaries.(5). He stated the doctrine of revelation with such a forthright presentation and clarity as to rescue it from the pitfalls of modern vagueness and disparity in an age of empirical and scientific knowledge. Temple considered Revelation as the self-disclosure of God in His world and in human experience, not as a "datum", either in its several phases or in its totality, as something to be proved by some process of reason; but it is itself reason, it is a rational revelation. Revelation is not the assent to some doctrines or articles of faith, it is rather apprehended by faith and is a personal relationship with the living God. It is obvious that Revelation, thus conceived, is not something that we come to or that we find, it is rather "given" and is something which finds us: we reach the fellowship of which revelation speaks, and to which it points, by going to school not with the philosophers but with the saints.(6).

Merely to state the fact of revelation is to make some contribution towards a solution of the ever-growing tendencies of humanism and secularism of our day. Dr. John Baillie has performed a useful service in pointing out the contrast and comparison between the present attempts at explaining Revelation and the traditional presentation of a "doctrine" of revelation. In the Preface to the Volume already cited he points to the urgency of the topic in the twentieth century and shows that there is a growing tendency to realise that if we are to have any religion at all there must be something given to us by God rather than provided by ourselves.

He also draws attention to the problems which beset modern attempts at stating a doctrine of revelation, and among them: the deistic protest, the Aufklärung, romanticism, nineteenth-century liberalism, the 'growing tendency to substitute for the old distinction of natural and revealed knowledge the new distinction between a general and a special revelation', and the growth of new philosophies which indicate not so much a tendency to religionlessness as aiming at false and evil religions and flouting at reason rather than appealing to it.(7). W.R. Matthews claims that there has been no part of the philosophy of religion which has been so little treated as the idea of revelation, but shows that the main lines of a modern view are taking shape. It is against the background of the prominence given to it in the modern mind, and the grave problems which beset it, that Temple's contribution to Revelation is to be understood.

How is Revelation Possible?

It is incumbent upon those who make the claim that there is a revelation to explain how it works, to show how such a revelation is possible; or, in other words, to explain its "mode". Thus revelation will be shown to be either 'natural' or 'supernatural' and will disclose the essential quality or qualities whereby man may justify his claim to the truth of religious experience. It will at the same time open up the question as to whether man plays any part in revelation, whether man's 'reason' is involved and to what extent, and will determine the ultimate acceptance of one or more theories of monism, dualism, pantheism or theism. The acceptance or rejection of Divine Revelation determines a man's view of the nature of ultimate reality.

At least one aim of this thesis has been to show that Temple presents a 'rationalist' universe the key to the understanding of

which is to be found in Mind, and is therefore able to proclaim a Society of free Persons characterized by Purpose and exhibiting Fellowship in a Commonwealth of Value under the Sovereignty of a King who is a living, personal God. In the face of such an on-going universe whose very essence is that of dynamic process, the question becomes not one as to whether Revelation is possible but rather one as to whether it would be possible to exclude Revelation at all. How could it be possible to exclude Revelation in such an orderly scheme of things? To do so would be to destroy the whole fabric of an on-going order of creation. Creativity implies revelation: without Revelation history would be meaningless. So Revelation becomes a pivotal point in Temple's Theism, and the manner and method of its working a demonstration of the character and meaning of all life and existence. "The relation of Process to Value is specially important. The fact is fixed; but the value of the past is alterable. It is even true that what was bad when it occurred may come to be rightly judged good. Thus Christians regard the Crucifixion as, in itself, the worst thing that ever happened, yet, taken in conjunction with its consequence, the best. If we start from the physical end, we cannot account for mind; if we start from mind, can we account for physical existence? That way of putting the question is misleading. What we may reasonably ask is whether either of the two elements in the datum of actual experience is capable of accounting finally for that experience. In principle mind has this capacity....Personality is always transcendent in relation to Process; it acts within it, yet stands apart from it; and this is alone adequate to the need. Personality expresses its own constancy in the infinitely delicate adjustments by which it pursues one

purpose in varying conditions. As immanent it is a principle of variety; as transcendent it is (in proportion as it is variously integrated) unchanging. It is the transcendent personality of God which gives their quality as awe-inspiring to the Values in which He is immanent and through which He is known".(9). This quotation enables one to see at a glance what Revelation meant for Temple and also shows how he considered it as operative. It is the fact of Personality which enables the further fact of Revelation: without personality there could be no Revelation, for its nature is that of communication from mind to mind; revelation is from person to person and it can only be understood, as indeed can all other subject-object relationships, in terms of immanence and transcendence. It is not mere tautology to say that since revelation is necessary therefore there must be a revelation: it is merely another way of stating the fact of Revelation. So, again, it is not a question as to whether there can be a revelation; the fact is there is Revelation and it becomes necessary for the theologian to account for that fact and to express it in terms of acceptance. To explain revelation in terms of 'propositions' or to conceive of it in terms of 'miraculously' revealed dogma is to miss the essential character of revelation and to fail to give any satisfactory explanation of the manner in which it works, for of its very nature it is a matter of relationships. If there cannot be any "self-disclosure" in the field of "relationships", where, then, may we look for it? The answer is, surely, nowhere else. Moreover, to accept any other view is to misunderstand the Biblical view where, Temple tells us, the centre of interest is not anything that goes on in people's minds but "what goes on upon the plain of history in actual fact".(10). His view of Revelation

obviously carries with it some very important consequences.

The Old View.

Nowhere are these consequences more evident than when applied to the traditional doctrines of revelation. To go into a minute and detailed description of the traditional theories of revelation would lead us too far afield in a thesis of this nature, and would indeed require a thesis of major proportions in itself. It is sufficient to note that there has been a sustained writing on the subject by men who have worked over the traditional views in which the doctrine has been presented and have restated them in more or less detailed or summary form.(11). Nearly all of the traditional views have dealt with 'distinctions' or 'differences' either as to the God who reveals Himself, the manner in which He has revealed Himself, or the created world in or through which He reveals Himself. They tend to point to a severance between the sacred and the secular, to separate 'revealed' knowledge from 'scientific' or other knowledge, to distinguish between reason and revelation, to point to a "constancy" of natural law as against the fact that God reveals Himself "now and then" or by "miracles", or to point to a 'spiritual' interpretation of the universe which would admit of a general revelation while not leaving any room for specific revelation. The upshot of the traditional views has been to present revelation as "problematic", leaving theology with the task of determining how or why an omniscient, omnipotent God should ever have created a world in which He should constantly be called upon, or find it necessary, to 'interfere'. It becomes difficult on the basis of the older views, which made such sharp distinctions, to understand anything like a "normalcy" of revelation: if God 'intervenes', whether it is by means of an accident, event, or person,

the tendency will be to think of the intervention as 'abnormal'.

According to Thomas Aquinas mankind has discovered certain truths by the activity of his reason, while there are other truths such as the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Redemption of man, which have been 'revealed' to him. Where reason leaves off God supplies man's inadequate knowledge with greater, or at least more, truths about Himself; but this other knowledge is not contrary to human reason, but above it. Revelation also conveys truths of "natural religion" to men who would not otherwise have the opportunity or ability to discover them.(12). It will be noticed at once that Bishop Butler's view of Revelation was, at least in one respect, similar to that of Aquinas. For him revelation derived part of its importance from the fact that it affords a "republication of natural religion". For Butler the dictates of Conscience are the voice of God and thus afford another evidence of the revelation of God.

But for Temple this simply will not do. He saw the importance of Butler's position and admitted that ethics and religion had much in common, probably developed side by side, and that the moral judgments may even have had their origin in the pursuit and practise of religion. He acknowledged the growth of the moral judgment and was willing to admit that the fact of conscience pointed to the existence of God. But the fact that there can be a division between man's moral sense and God shows clearly that the moral consciousness is not dependent on the religious life. The importance of the moral sense in man for Temple was that it showed him that God is at least a moral Being, otherwise we should have an effect which would transcend its own cause. The really important question for Temple is the fact that modern man, simply because of the moral conscience,

when confronted with so much evil in the world, questions the very existence of God. The moral judgment, although developing independently of religion, is appealed to by Christ. When men suggest that we appeal to the best that is in man they usually fail to recognise that the best that is in man needs to be appealed to by God. This is the case with conscience itself. "Our consciences are never much better than we are ourselves; they are just our accepted moral standards."(13). The recognition of duty does not carry with it the incentive or the power to discharge it; ethics therefore needs the power which the revelation of God can alone supply.

Such a view as Temple suggests goes a long way to defeat materialism and humanism alike. But there still remain the difficulties of pantheism and dualism which beset the old views. These views, in some measure, failed to avoid the inherent weakness of the Deists, the alleged theory that God held a sort of "residuum" of His power and saving grace in store, the position that God had revealed certain "truths", that the Bible itself is a revelation - and a contradictory one at that, and that revelation is a matter for faith but cannot be shown to be acceptable to reason. Temple's argument against such objections is in effect that God is adequate to His world and has never left it without His witness. In essence it is the statement quoted by Canon Raven in 'Experience and Its Interpretation': "We affirm, then, that unless all existence is a medium of Revelation, no particular Revelation is possible".(14). Temple resolutely rejected what he called the tendency to an "un-philosophic dichotomy of events into normal and miraculous".(15). The clue to his interpretation is to be found in his explanation of the universe in terms of organism rather than as mechanistic. The lines of his argument may be set forth

in propositional form:

- 1) The aesthetic spirit presupposes revelation, otherwise it is unintelligible, for there is more to Beauty than Beauty alone; it denotes communication from, and communion with, personal Spirit.
- 2) The sense of obligation carries with it a sense of reverence which cannot be accorded to Law apart from a Lawgiver.
- 3) Mind initiates activity, and so the universe is not a closed system governed by its own laws.
- 4) Mind keeps the universe going and thus rules out the possibility of mechanistic determinism.
- 5) Mind, as the ground of the universe, is its interpretation and affords its own explanation.
- 6) Personality is always transcendent to the Process in which it is immanent.
- 7) "In nature we find God; we do not only infer from Nature what God must be like, but when we see Nature truly, we see God self-manifested in and through it." (16).

Thus Temple arrives at a doctrine of Revelation which is uniquely different. If God can be said to hold anything in reserve it is Himself. He is the author of the universe and as creator He stands outside it, so to speak; He is transcendent to His created cosmos; but as Cosmic Mind He pervades all creation and is immanent to it as its Creative Will. This is what gives constancy, while allowing for diversity, in a creation which is still going on. No Law of physical science is ultimate. (17). What gives constancy in the universe as we experience it is the same Ultimate Being which also accounts for variability, and this is so because the principle of Personality is "separable". A person is always transcendent to his

acts, and his character is only revealed at its best, not in the constancy which always portrays him as 'reliable' but on such occasions as when a special demand is made upon him and he reveals himself in such a manner that people say "we never knew he had it in him". "What a true doctrine of divine transcendence will assert is not a reservoir of normally unutilised energy, but a volitional as contrasted with a mechanical direction of the energy utilised."(18). The only true immanence of a person is to be found in his conduct as it occurs, and it gives to that conduct its direction, its quality and its energy. The man who always acts in the same way, regardless of circumstances, is obstinate and stupid. Constancy may sometimes cut across purposive actions and hinder the fulfilment of purpose. When man is confronted by 'accident' or 'war' it is always wise to make a distinction and ascertain how much such accidents may be due to people's own choice. Much that people call 'accident' is not accident at all but necessary episodes in an on-going universe. Accidents themselves may be a necessary revelation to develop man's character. (19). God's constancy is shown in the form and method of adjustability.

Still another theory under the old way of regarding revelation was that through revelation men received divinely guaranteed Truths. Temple's answer to this is that there are no revealed truths, but there are truths of revelation,(20), and these consist of propositions expressing the correct results of men's thinking about revelation. The fatal mistake of Christian history has been a tendency to regard revelation in this manner and cause men to think of knowledge received through revelation as completely distinct and separate from all other kinds of knowledge. There is only one truth, and all knowledge whatsoever is knowledge of that truth. All knowledge comes

from God, and therefore all knowledge is at least indirectly knowledge of God. Still there is a difference between the philosopher and the prophet, the difference being one of "inspiration" whereby the prophet obtains his knowledge of God through "relationship" with God. Here, also, we have the clue to understanding revelation: it is a 'relationship'. It is because of this fact that inspiration is never a 'guarantee' of truth.(21). There is always a possibility of error because of the human element involved in revelation. Deuteronomy affords methods for testing "false prophets" and Micaiah believed in the possibility of false inspiration. It is in the intercourse of the human mind with God that revelation takes place. "Knowledge of God can be fully given to man only in a person, never in a doctrine, still less in a formless faith, whatever that might be".(22).

The Bible.

What, then, are we to say about the Bible? Is the Bible a revelation? To this question Temple's answer is that the Bible in itself qua book cannot be a revelation. The traditional doctrine has been that the Book itself is a revelation, but that led to a great deal of anxiety and misunderstanding. In the first place the doctrine has led to the view that God acted in a way contrary to His normal dealings with men so as to save the human faculties of those through whom the revelation was given from error, and miraculously guided pen and voice from further error in its communication. In the interpretation of the Scriptures men were led to advance the theory of "allegory" to save the writings from discrepancies, and the infallibility of the Scriptures led subsequently to the doctrine of an infallible Church, For the characters of the

Bible as well as for all men everywhere what is offered to man's apprehension is not truth concerning God but the living God Himself. Therefore we should treat the Bible not as an inspired record but as the record of inspired men. The revelation is in the Bible where we find God speaking in the lives of men and making Himself known in the events of history. The picture that we get from the Bible is not one where God is forcing certain truths or doctrines into men's knowledge, but rather an evidence of God speaking in the mind of men who were "attuned" to the Infinite. A thing cannot be a revelation; and, anyway, nobody supposes that the Bible has set before us the whole truth. It is the duty of the individual and the Church to discover truth.

So, too, it appears to be with the Creeds, or the Faith, of the Church. "Doctrine is of an importance too great to be exaggerated, but its place is secondary."(23). One should not believe in any creed but rather use certain creeds to express and to deepen faith in a living God, for faith does not consist in the holding of correct doctrine but rather it is a personal relationship and fellowship with God. Considered in any other way Creeds and Bible alike become an affront to man's intelligence and are an injustice inflicted upon his personality. All that God does is expressive of what God is. It is when God is most human that He is most unmistakably divine. What the Bible and Faith alike tell us is that God is unchangeably the same: there is a regularity upon which we must stand. But this sameness is evident in the variability of His activity in the arena of history where His Purpose is constantly being worked out. Faith rests upon this conviction that the righteous God is in His world doing at every moment that which is in accordance with His eternal purpose.

"He guides the process; He guides the minds of men; the interaction of the process and the minds which are alike guided by Him is the essence of revelation".(24)

Recent Tendencies.

Temple stated his doctrine of 'revelation in events' with such a clarity that it has made a mark upon modern theology. It is precisely because of this, together with his view of the normalcy of revelation and the natural manner in which he maintained that spirit needs the material in which to express and reveal its character, as well as the 'rationality' of his doctrine, that he presents a sharp contrast with modern tendencies in philosophy and theology. He was himself aware of this and mentioned them in *The Preacher's Theme To-day*, *The Faith and Modern Thought*, and *The Kingdom of God*. It is sufficient here to point out that he showed that scientific enquiry does not erase the value of revelation(25); that materialism, dialectic or otherwise, fails to account for the values and choices of life and for the fact that man is motivated by reason no less than by cause(26); that a 'formless faith' which the modern mind demands would be difficult to transmit or propagate throughout the world(27); that the Christian "tradition" which has been questioned by the modern mind has been justified in the experience of the Church and the individual, and that progress in revelation allows and even demands 'changes' of belief(28); that ethics requires the incentive power of revelation for the fulfilment of its moral judgments(29); that Absolute Idealism is not only 'impersonal' but is a frank abandonment of the problem of evil, the solution of which can only be achieved by the revelation of Supreme

Love which utilises and overcomes it(30); that the philosophy of Nietzsche flaunts revelation by cutting the moral question and providing an "Overman" by trampling upon the sacred rights of personality(31); and that the view of 'Natural Selection' fails to account for 'selection' and 'survival' on the highest level of nature- that of human nature, and that being true to nature means being true to the general course and tendency of nature wherever it may be found and whatever its cause of progress may be(32).

Such writers as Dean Rashdall and Clement C.J.Webb on the English scene had helped to make the transition between the old and modern views of Revelation and pointed out that sharp distinctions could no longer be drawn between 'natural' and 'revealed' truth(33). Nevertheless many modern thinkers continue to make such distinction, and this is particularly true of the theology of Karl Barth and of the 'existentialist' philosophy generally speaking.

When Temple's theory of Revelation is compared with that of the 'Barthian school' we find that there is a slight similarity but they are essentially different. Barth and Brunner alike admit of specific revelation and both claim that revelation is not something about God, but the revelation is God Himself.(34). It is in respect of the 'rationality' of revelation that the gulf of dissimilarity is drawn between the two views. Brunner states emphatically that "revealed knowledge is poles apart from rational knowledge" and claims that "the fundamental contradiction between the believing knowledge of revelation and the knowledge of reason confronts us far more sharply than in the time of the Scholastics".(35). Barth similarly disparages reason in man. Between God and man there is a great 'gulf' set and far from there ever being a possibility of man rising to a state

where he can co-operate with God through an inherent reason or capability, he has become a sinner to the extent that he is incapable of responding to God except through God's assistance. God breaks in upon man's world in Crisis. God eternally says Yes to man, but man says No to God- again and repeatedly it is the same: to God's Yes man says No. The only hope for man is when he comes to the point where he says No to himself and Yes to God. The primary thing in revelation for Barth is not reason but faith,—and, at that, it is not a human faith, it is faith that has been implanted by God. Barth's view of Revelation presents a doctrine of complete transcendence and practically a denial of immanence. The difficulty with Barth's doctrine is to determine how man ever reaches the point where he will stop saying No to God and say Yes instead. Before he can ever begin to do so, it would appear that the Grace of God must become operative within him, and the question is: how does he arrive at this point? How does man arrive at the point where revelation, and therefore salvation, begins? On such a view it would appear that the gulf between God and man has become so ultimately drawn that it is difficult to see how even God can bridge it. Barth and Brunner have presented us with a view of Revelation in which the only thing that is left is 'faith'. Of course Barth maintains that God Himself has bridged the gulf by the 'God-man'. Temple's doctrine of a rational revelation, comprehensive in its sweep, providing for constancy and variability alike because of God's character and creativity, avoided such pitfalls. He regarded all creation in the light of revelation. His answer to the Barthian disparagement of reason and rejection of natural theology(which is implied in any doctrine of immanence) can be summed up in one sentence: "Unless all existence is a medium of

Revelation , no particular Revelation is possible".(36).

It is interesting to see how Temple's use of Personality plays so important a part in the development of his philosophical theology and particularly in his teaching on revelation. Karl Heim and Martin Buber also introduce personality but in a different manner and both introduce the category of the "I" : "Thou" relationship. Heim was seeking for a frame of reference against the background of natural science which always points beyond to a transcendent world. The 'polarity' of "I": "Thou" is nevertheless bridged with reference to God where a relationship is established- in "dimensionalism". Heim's endeavour is in the field of natural theology and his doctrine is one of immanence. Buber, on the other hand, would do away with philosophy altogether. What Israel has presented to us is an account of revelation and not a philosophy: a discourse between God and man. He maintained that it is only through revelation that one can get a correct view of man and his universe(although, of course, he does not accept the revelation of Christ). Thus Buber begins where Heim leaves off and asserts a doctrine of transcendence.(37). Without criticising either of these points of view, it is important to emphasise that Temple takes account of both. Worship, if it means anything at all, is an experience in the presence of an "Other" who has made Himself known to the worshipper. Mere transcendence leads to something rather remote and abstract; man needs a revelation of God, as the prophets always present Him, in human form. Man needed the occurrence which was given in a Life, in Jesus Christ. The revelation which was given in the historical Jesus was needed for two reasons: the one psychological, the other logical and philosophical.(38). Revelation at its best and in its complete form is

the full actuality of the relationship between nature, man, and God.(39).

General Revelation.

There is not the slightest doubt in Temple's mind that there have been and can be particular revelations, but he is equally emphatic in his insistence upon the fact that there can be specific revelations only if there is general revelation. Only if God is revealed to the Greek and the Jew, to the Mohammedan and the Hindu, can He also be revealed to the Christian; only if He is revealed in the universal fact of birth can He be revealed in the Birth of a Virgin Mother; only if He is revealed throughout the whole course of history and everywhere in the universe which He has created can He be revealed at one particular place and at a particular time in the world's history.(40). Only if He is revealed to men's reason can He further be revealed to men's faith: for faith is reason. The fact of Creation is witness to this. For Creation is not to be thought of as an initial push-off, as a mechanistic system to continue on its own way, but as a constancy of activity continually passing into novelty, into new creation. We are bound to look for varieties in the kind of world which is ours, and these varieties are the evidence of a constant revelation.

So Temple regards the traditional view of miracle as inadequate. On that view men regarded God as only revealing Himself now and again when He wanted to make an impression upon men and did so by means of miracles. This is contrary to what we find in Jesus who is not always interested in the striking and untoward but in the commonplace. It is not simply in the unusual that we are to look for God, but rather everything that happens is in some measure a revelation of Him.

Miracles, thus conceived, are themselves "natural"; they are a manifestation of God's immanence as other processes of nature.(41).

It is almost impossible to improve on Temple's own words in which he states his contention in summary form. He himself quoted them on different occasions,(42), and they have either been quoted in full or in part or referred to by others. "The possibility of Revelation depends on the personal quality of that supreme and Ultimate Reality which is God. If there is no Ultimate Reality, which is the ground of all else, then there is no God to be revealed; if that Reality is not personal, there can be no special Revelation but only uniform procedure; if there be an Ultimate Reality and this is personal, then all existence is Revelation. Either all occurrences are in some degree revelation of God, or else there is no such revelation at all; for the conditions of the possibility of any revelation require that there should be nothing which is not revelation. Only if God is revealed in the rising of the sun in the sky can He be revealed in the rising of a son of man from the dead; only if He is revealed in the history of Syrians and Philistines can He be revealed in the history of Israel; only if He chooses all men for His own can He choose any at all; only if nothing is profane can anything be sacred. It is necessary to stress with all possible emphasis this universal quality of revelation."

It was upon the basis of his view of general revelation, no less than upon the particular revelation in Christ, that Temple sought to put forth an argument which would defeat pantheism and dualism alike. (43). It was characteristic of Temple that he saw good in everything - a "fighting speech" gets you nowhere - and he saw the value of pantheism and dualism which he likened to the Greek view as compared

with the Hebrew, but the Biblical view held a philosophical superiority for him. This was due partly, no doubt, to his own buoyant faith; but partly, too, because he saw both these views as static. Both placed Reality 'on one side' and contemplation 'on the other', while ethical inspiration and knowledge of God go pari passu in a progressive revelation.(44).

Are there Special Revelations?

To this question Temple answers, as all Christian theologians must, an emphatic 'Yes', but he thinks that Christian philosophers and theologians have been too timid in dealing with the matter of revelation. No science creates its own material and theology, which is scientific thinking about God, does not create its data(45); it is supplied in revelation. The Christian will regard the particular revelations which are insisted upon by the great religions as valid, but he will regard them all as partial with one exception - the Revelation of God in Christ Jesus. The Christian Revelation surpasses others in providing a fully satisfactory philosophy of life and of the universe. This is formulated by the New Testament writers in the form: "Jesus Christ is come in the flesh". Ultimate Reality which is spiritual and personal finds its complete expression in the birth, life, death, and resurrection of the Son of God. When the Christ of St. John's Gospel declares "I am the Truth", He is not uttering rhetoric but stating sober fact. The Christian revelation demonstrates its superiority not by ignoring the material or denying its reality but by the use it makes of matter, even of flesh, in fulfilment of Divine purpose.

The one purpose of the Son was to reveal the Father, and this is evident in His complete and utter submission to the Father's Will.

Only so could the Kingdom of God be inaugurated. At the outset of His earthly ministry Christ rejected all temptations to inaugurate the Kingdom of God and establish His Messiahship according to the expected 'norm'. He would not dominate people's wills or command their allegiance by means of 'demonstration'. He heals, restores, forgives, and even shows His power over the elements of nature, in a service of Love. He brings with Him, because He is, the Light, the Love, and the Life of men. The Lord Who is set before us in the Gospels, and Whose broken Body takes on visible form in the redeemed Society of the Church, is not only the promised Messiah but He is the eternal principle which governs the universe. The Revelation is a new fact breaking forth upon the world, but what breaks forth is the power itself which has always been in control; not some alien principle coming into the world, but He by Whom the world was made, and apart from Whom no one thing has ever happened. He is the perfect and focal expression of all revelation. Hence it becomes impossible to make sharp distinctions between the "natural" and the "revealed", or between the "natural" and the "supernatural" in revelation, and all must now be seen as a natural revelation. The principle which has always been present in the process of history, which guided the prophets and determined the "prophetic consciousness", and was revealed in times of famine or plenty, peace or war, became visible in human form in the Person of Christ. That is not a static principle; that Person was not "done to death" on the Cross; Christ "still reigns from the Tree"; the Eternal is still present in history guiding the destinies of men, revealing itself in events which are not interventions but manifestations of an omnipotent power which has been always there; and Christ becomes the answer to the question

Cur Deus Homo, providing the Atonement which unites God to man.

The Incarnation provides the key to the understanding of life and of the universe. Christ not only was, but is, historical fact; He provides the only satisfactory and completely intelligible solution to man's problems; He is the pivot of all Christian faith and philosophy. The Incarnation afforded men an opportunity of seeing God in action in a concrete manner. Jesus Christ was not just one man, even the best man, among others, but the revelation in one man of the eternal God. Even to state the naturalness of Christ as He appears in the Gospel is to invite criticism or misunderstanding if we do not at the same time remember that the Christ of the Gospels was indeed a supernatural and miraculous figure; nevertheless He goes about His work and teaching with consummate ease. In the long run, it is not what Jesus says or what He does that counts for most; it is rather What or Who He is.

Nevertheless, in Temple's estimation, a person's character is sometimes revealed at its best in what he does; so, to the question, are there revelatory actions? he answers in the affirmative. We see revelation at its best and highest wherever God finds occasion for unusual action. Yet the occurrences or actions are not in themselves the revelation. They are rather the token or "mode" of the revelation. The revelation itself is the mind that is in the act speaking to the mind observing and appreciating the act. Both subject and object relationships are necessary: where there is no perception and appreciation the revelation does not take place. The appreciation need not be contemporaneous with the event, but it is necessary to complete the revelation. The Incarnation may have taken place in the world's history, but if no one had recognized

Christ it would not have been an effective revelation of God. The principle of revelation always remains the same - "the coincidence of event and appreciation".(46).

What did God Reveal?

The important question for theology to-day is, What did God communicate? Did God communicate a body of law, a doctrine of grace, a theory of rewards and punishments, a method of salvation, a system for discerning truth, or any such thing? These are all important and all of them in some way are necessary questions to be considered in the light of revelation. In the formulation of his reply to this all-important question Temple offered an answer to Pringle-Pattison who had suggested that Jesus did not have to be God to give us the revelation, to bring us authentic tidings about the character of God.(47). Temple answers: "What is offered to man's apprehension in any specific Revelation is not truth concerning God but the living God Himself".(48). What is given in revelation is not something about revelation but the Revelation itself; therefore what really communicates God to us must be God Himself. Christ not only brings God to us; He is God. So Jesus Christ is the perfection of revelation: the deed or act and the person are one. Here we have his argument for the Divinity of Christ. All this is put in a simple and straight-forward manner, and is, of course, the logical answer. If an objection is raised Temple can only point to Christ Himself, to the Church, and to Christendom.

Christ Himself made claim to Divinity, and announced that He and the Father were One: 'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father.' To Pilate's question as to whether He is the Messiah He says, 'I am.'

He was alleged to be the Incarnation of God by His followers who worshipped Him as such. The Resurrection and subsequent 'appearances', the miraculous emergence and growth of the Church, the testimony of saints down to the present time, the world-wide fellowship of Christendom - "the great new fact of our age",- all bear impressive tribute to the Eternal God who in Christ Jesus came and still comes "to us men for our salvation". What men saw in Christ in the days of His flesh, and what they still see in Him, is a moral and spiritual ideal not only upheld but realised, and Power unto Victory. Our Atonement is accomplished and the problem of evil solved through the revelation of the love of God in Christ. As then, Christians can say with St. John that the Word "tabernacled among us full of grace and truth". The whole fabric of the Christian Faith rests upon the authentic revelation given by God Himself of Himself. But this does not mean that Christ revealed all that can be meant by the word God. "There ever remains the unsearchable abyss of Deity". Any theory which professed to comprehend fully the Revelation given in the Incarnation would thereby be condemned, for the psychology of the God-Man must remain beyond man's grasp. Nevertheless the Revelation was given and the difference which it made is still experienced in communion with the Risen Christ.(49).

Revelation and Authority.

Temple does not hesitate to deal with the important problem of authority which rises automatically from the fact of revelation. Does the Revelation carry with it its own authenticity? What is the guarantee of its authority? Both authority and experience are involved in the occurrence of revelation: is there a conflict between that

authority and the religious experience? Temple raises the two-fold question: How far does the objectively given revelation hamper the free development of religious experience? and what is the relation of the spiritual Authority to the vehicles of the revelation - the Scriptures, Institutions and Ceremonies - through which it is mediated? First of all, he points out, we are all under authority - the authority of environment, tradition, parents, Church, or such. Even in intellectual pursuits, as everywhere else, we are under authority - the authority of the truth. In the next place, "the supposed conflict between Authority and Experience in religion is really a tension between two indispensable elements. For the individual, Authority, whether as tribal custom or as alleged Revelation, is prior to Experience; in the race as a whole Experience is prior to Authority". Both had their origin in an indistinguishable fusion; although they have become distinct, they still remain inter-dependent. Moreover, all life rests on faith, but faith usually changes its own basis as it develops. At first it rests on authority but gradually becomes rooted in accumulated experience.

The tension which Temple attempted to explain, if not indeed to resolve, provides a point of sharp contention between theism and humanism, and has been inherited by philosophical theology as a historical development. Both Oman and R.H.Strachan have dealt with the problem in modern theology(50), and Strachan suggested that religious experience was the final authority.(51). The controversy goes back at least to Descartes and beyond. Descartes was in revolt against the ecclesiastical authority of his day. This mediaeval structure of sheer authoritarianism was in large measure an outcome of Aquinas, who had systematised what he considered to be the authority

of Aristotle's philosophy and developed it into a doctrine of reason. The "reason" of the Scholastics had led to the Authority of the Mediaeval Catholic Church. It was against this interpretation of religious experience as authority that Descartes was in revolt; and against the authority of the religious experience there has been widespread revolt in the modern mind. Calvin taught that the illumination of the Holy Spirit was the final authority even for the interpretation of the Scriptures. Schleiermacher considered the 'emotions' as having predominance, while Ritschl substituted a 'sense of values'. Wilhelm Herrman followed with the suggestion that the authority resides in a 'sense of communion with God'. In the end the question of the authority of revelation led to sheer individualism: unless the individual experiences it for himself it has no authority.

It was in the consideration of this whole question of authority and experience that Temple developed his synthesis of reconciliation. He never considered things abstractly. How does the individual come to believe in the first place? He doesn't just start believing; faith doesn't just come to one, - there is some kind of authority which brings it to him. There is some kind of authority to begin with and which is objectively considered - Church, parent, Scripture, or such like. In primitive life the authoritarian element seems to predominate. Even in civilised life, under conditions of advanced Christianity, religious truth, like all other truth, is mediated. How can the authority ever operate in vacuo or in a sheer mechanistic fashion? There must be an experience which recognizes it and receives it, in and through which the individual makes it his own. It must ring a bell within us. The less orthodox form of revelation is not independent of authority, and orthodoxy itself is constantly being reformed

by the synthesis of an ever-growing religious experience. So the revelation of religious experience is something that comes to us, it is not an original discovery.

Temple regards the distinction between religions of authority and those of the spirit as false. There is no such distinction in actual fact. Of course religion finds its expression in an institutionalised Church - he could never understand what people meant by a 'formless faith'. A mere tradition never accomplished anything. The growth of religion is a dynamic force and the supreme example of this is to be seen in the Hebrew Prophets. But the prophets did not just happen; they entered into a heritage. The revelation must pass into individual experience as dynamic power before it becomes effective. But when the prophets began to announce the revelation they did not proceed by way of argument, nor did they suggest that the authority of the experience was their own: on the contrary, the the authority and the revelation alike were God's. It was not just a unique, unrelated spiritual experience they were announcing; they came into an environment.

What is it, then, that gives authority to revelation? The revelation is something which comes to us from God, and which carries with it its own authority. Creaturely dependence upon God, the essence of which is submission to authority, is the very heart and core of all religious experience. In Revelation what comes to us is God Himself before Whom we bow and obey. The Revelation leads to communion of the creature with the Creator; it is self-disclosure of Personality to persons who are free to respond with worship and obedience.

Conclusion.

Thus Temple presents us with a rationalist view of Revelation

for which he has drawn on the 'authority of Christian experience'. He has pointed out that 'faith' is necessary even if we are to have a 'natural religion', and further that the revelation of natural religion, or revelation in general, leads to and culminates in the specific Revelation given in Jesus Christ, that is, in a Personality. This Christian, or 'Personal' Revelation, unifies, illuminates, and brings to a focus of light all other revelations, not by contradicting them but by bringing them to a clarity and truth.

The question arises as to whether he has not created confusion by over-simplification. He has certainly simplified the matter: has he presented us with an over-clarification? He has painted a picture of a beautiful world, but Barth would query whether it were not too beautiful. In other words, the criticism of Temple's view of Revelation is the question: what about sin? Barth would say that what makes Revelation necessary is the sin of man. Temple said the same thing, at least in *The Preacher's Theme To-Day*, but his theory of Revelation demonstrates the essential unity of God and man. To this the Calvinistic answer would be: yes, granted; but it has become corrupted by sin. Brunner, even more so than Barth, treats sin, not as a metaphysical problem, but as a dark stain on man's actual life, as a dire 'fact'. Temple does refer to the 'corruption' of man's nature, but he does not seem to have any conception of the depth of sin, of which more will be said later. He extols reason, but has he seen evil as personal as it is, and has he given a personalist interpretation of history? It is to his credit that he has captured the essential 'rationality' of the scheme of things in an on-going universe, to which Revelation not only bears record but becomes necessary if man is to exist in any sense in a world which becomes an ordered 'cosmos' rather than sheer confusion and utter chaos.

Annotation:-

- (1) From a Letter to R.A.Knox, October 1913.
- (2) Nature, Man and God, p.299.
- (3) Revelation, edited by Baillie and Martin, pp.92, 117. Cf.also Basic Convictions, p.17.
- (4) The Preacher's Theme To-Day, p.1.
- (5) Cf.William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation: W.R.Matthews, p.16; also Dorothy Emmet, Iremonger, p.532.
- (6) Basic Convictions, p.16.
- (7) Cf. Preface to Revelation, supra.The contributors are T.S.Eliot, Karl Barth, William Temple, Sergius Bulgakoff, M.C.D'Arcy, Walter M.Horton, and Gustaf Aulen.
- (8) An Outline of Modern Knowledge, p.81.
- (9) Nature, Man and God, pp.xxi and xxiii.
- (10) Basic Convictions, p.17.
- (11) Cf.,e.g. Hasting's Article in the Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels; Garvie:Handbook of Christian Apologetics; Orr:Revelation and Inspiration; Rashdall:Philosophy and Religion; Fisher:Nature and Method of Revelation; Sanday:Inspiration; Illingworth:Reason and Revelation; Gore:Belief in God; and Tillett:The Paths that Lead to God.
- (12) An Outline of Modern Knowledge, pp.80-81.
- (13) The Argument is developed in The Kingdom of God. Cf. esp. pp.48, 53, 56, 57. Quotation is from p.141.
- (14) Nature, Man and God, p.306; quoted by Raven: Experience and Its Interpretation, p.56. The passage is repeated by Temple in Revelation: edited by Baillie and Martin, p.96.
- (15) Nature, Man and God, p.267.

- (16) Ibid, pp.253-266.
- (17) Ibid, p.267.
- (18) Ibid, p.284.
- (19) Ibid, pp.290-295; Christus Veritas, pp.192-199.
- (20) Baillie and Martin: Revelation, p.101; Nature, Man and God, p.317.
- (21) The Faith and Modern Thought, pp.40, 41.
- (22) Nature, Man and God, p.321.
- (23) Baillie and Martin: Revelation, p.105.
- (24) Nature, Man and God, p.312. For Temple's view of the Bible as Revelation, cf. The Faith and Modern Thought, Chap.2; Baillie and Martin: Revelation, p.101ff.; Nature, Man and God, p.307ff.
- (25) Baillie and Martin: Revelation, p.110.
- (26) The Preacher's Theme To-Day, p.2f.; The Kingdom of God, p.119ff.
- (27) Baillie and Martin: Revelation, p.105.
- (28) Essays, pp.81-92.
- (29) The Kingdom of God, Chap.II: Religion and Ethics.
- (30) Ibid, p.106ff.
- (31) Ibid, p.109ff.
- (32) Ibid, p.116ff.
- (33) Cf. Dean Rashdall: Philosophy and Religion, pp.127-148; Webb: Problems in the Relations of God and Man, pp.49-55.
- (34) Baillie and Martin: Revelation - Karl Barth, pp.76, 81; Brunner: Revelation and Reason, p.8.
- (35) Brunner: Revelation and Reason, pp.16, 17.
- (36) Nature, Man and God, p.306; Baillie and Martin: Revelation, p.96.
- (37) Heim develops his view in Christian Faith and Natural Science, Spirit and Truth, and The New Divine Order. Buber's view appears in Between Man and Man, Two Types of Faith, I and Thou, and Images of

Good and Evil.

(38) *The Faith and Modern Thought*, pp.49, 51, 57.

(39) *Nature, Man and God*, p.312.

(40) On the universal quality of Revelation cf. *Nature, Man and God*, pp.306-307; also *Baillie and Martin: Revelation*, p.96.

(41) *Nature, Man and God*, p.296.

(42) *Ibid*, pp.306-307; *Baillie and Martin: Revelation*, pp.96-97.

(43) Cf. *The Preacher's Theme To-Day*, p.2ff.; *Baillie and Martin: Revelation*, p.83f.

(44) For a somewhat similar view of an on-going, historical revelation cf. *Basil Matthews: Supreme Encounter*, pp.12-16.

(45) *Essays*, pp.117, 118.

(46) This estimate of Temple's views concerning Special Revelation is based on the relevant chapters in *Nature, Man and God*; on *Revelation*, ed. by Baillie and Martin; *Christus Veritas*, Chap.X; *Mens Creatrix*, Chap.XXIII; *The Preacher's Theme To-Day*, Chap.I; and *Essays*, p.217ff.

(47) *Pringle-Pattison: The Philosophy of Religion*, p.252.

(48) *Nature, Man and God*, p.322.

(49) For Temple's view of God's revelation of Himself, in addition to "(46)" cf. *Readings in St. John's Gospel*, esp. pp.1-18.

(50) *Oman: Freedom and Authority*; *Strachan: The Authority of The Religious Experience*.

(51) *Strachan* developed his view in *The Authority of The Religious Experience*.

VII. Nature of Man.

1. Man in Relation to the Universe.

It is its view and treatment of man which gives to any philosophy the decisive vote for its ultimate acceptance or rejection, for it is this which gives to philosophy its colour and dominant interest. Any philosophy which omits any reference to man and becomes mere speculation, whether of inert matter or of the phenomonological galaxy of cosmic forces swirling unendlessly about in rythmic manner in a multi-dimensional space-time continuum, and fails to account for man in relation to his problems or in his pursuit of knowledge, art, morality and religion, becomes the most fruitless of all pursuits.

'Man goeth forth to his labours' as the Psalmist sang long ago, but whence did he come? Remembering the distinction between 'origin' and 'beginning', Temple answers: He is a 'child of God' and no other explanation is satisfactory.(1). Whether he had his beginning as a result of God's 'fiat' or arose in the progressive stages of the dynamic forces of the creative order of the cosmos, he is indelibly stamped with the imprint of the 'image' of God.(2). If God made man a little lower than the angels He did so in order to crown him with glory and honour. The glory of God is declared by the heavens and by the firmament which is His handiwork, but it is also observable in man and perhaps more perfectly so. Thus, man must be seen in his "creatureliness", to adopt Von Hugel's expression. Even if the creation story is a "myth"(and Temple is willing to accept it as such), creation itself is a fact - for that is part of what we mean by God's nature, not that He was but still is creative, and His creativity can still be seen in His creative acts of Redemption. The Doctrine of Redemption rightly conceived is a part of the

Doctrine of Creation.(3). If man is created by God then God has endowed him with gifts, characteristics and propensities which fit him for fellowship with God and with his fellow-man, and when that fellowship is refused because of man's self-interest or when he is prevented because of some other reason or external force from discharging this God-given capacity and duty, then he becomes something less than a child of God and fails to co-operate with God, with his fellow-man, and with nature of which he is a part. The whole meaning and use of sex, and the only use for which it should ever be indulged, is that man may co-operate with God as His pro-creator.(4).

As man emerges in the creative process he is endowed with Mind, and this provides the clue for his understanding of himself and his universe. The world exists in a series of grades - matter, life, mind and spirit. These grades are not disjointed, separate entities; they are intimately related, and the lower can only be explained in reference to the higher, not vice versa. The mind of man has a kinship with the universe, and there is some mentality in all the facts of experience: the universe is a rational whole, and this is what gives coherence to human existence.(5). But no theory of man is satisfactory which fails to do justice to his material existence - this much at least he has in common with the natural world: he has a physical nature, a bodily form; he is not just a mind, and the four fundamental things that man stands in need of are air, light, earth and water. These Temple says are freely provided by God and all that man can do with at least the first two is to spoil them(6), he can never improve upon them, and he tacitly assumes that if it were possible man would 'reign in' or 'exploit' these two because of the profit motive.

It was his insistence upon the demand to do full justice to the material side of man's nature which led Temple to accept as his starting-point the Materialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and for which he has been largely criticised. It is to be noted that the adjective, "Dialectical", has been omitted in this statement, for he held that when materialism becomes dialectical it is on the way to sealing its own fate; it is then doomed to failure and must end in some form of Theism or Pantheism.(7). What he finds wrong with Dialectical Materialism is the polarity which it makes, the discontinuity between the physical and the spiritual, and the further fact that it gives the initiative to 'matter'. His solution to the problem is to be found in his view of the universe as 'sacramental'.(8). Once again, we find the clue to Temple's doctrine of man and his theory of the universe lies in his simple-minded faith in God. It is the quality of life, not the extent of its diffusion in space, which endows it with meaning and importance for the philosopher. For a complete view of man we need the Greek view of life with its emphasis upon the artistic, the Hebrew view with its emphasis upon the aesthetic, the Roman view with its emphasis upon the law, and the Christian view which combines all three and adds its Christology. To philosophy which gives us a picture of man with regard to his existence in the general scheme of things we need to add theology which gives us the completion of that picture as we see man in view of God's revelation. What does this mean for Temple? Accepting the evolutionary hypothesis, he finds degrees of reality and denies that some of these exist more genuinely than others, but that man is at the top. Between existence and non-existence there is no middle term. Both matter and spirit are necessary, though one may become the

vehicle of the other. He does not think it necessary to make the claim for consciousness in what we call the material universe (9), but if the physical can be used as a vehicle of the spiritual then there must be something in the physical which is spiritual: even the physical has spiritual qualities. This is his answer to the Dialectical Materialism of Marx and Lenin. If you can show that matter has the quality of becoming spiritual, then you can no longer discuss it as materialistic. In this way he comes to his own view of Realism. If there's a dialectic at work at all within the world it cannot be materialistic. You end with or by means of philosophic discussion about man and his universe right where you began with religious faith in God as Creator: natural theology is the pointing finger for revealed theology, and all along one must have had faith, for one has to be religious to have a natural religion. Temple seems to see it, then, somewhat in this light: if you think of man and his universe at all along these lines, you are carried forward to God, not as a view-point but as a dynamic forceful entity. God needs man and the universe but not in the sense that man needs God. God and the world are two correlates, but the relation is that of Creator and creature.

Of course in all this, Temple can point to the revelation of God in Christ. Since creation is still going on man is not yet perfect. We need some evidence of the perfection of the principle which we see at work in the universe. To a certain extent that principle finds an imperfect expression in man himself, but it was necessary for its perfect expression to see it embodied in a Divine Personality. This God supplied when He took the initiative by means of the Incarnation and broke in upon our space-time world, when the "Word became flesh and tabernacled among us".

The "natural order" has become reversed because of man's aggrandizement. Man's nature is imperfectly realised because he is a free being and is still in the making. But what lies at the root of Nature and personal existence is one and the same thing - the spirit of God. Since this is so, the perfect embodiment which man has seen in the God-Man becomes an omen: as St. Paul stated it "until we all come to one perfect man in Christ Jesus". What for Bradley was 'appearance and reality' and became for Whitehead 'process and reality' becomes for Temple simply Reality. At the centre of the Universe we find the principle and the person combined in the perfect man, Christ Jesus.

2. Human Personality.

Nowhere is Temple's reaction from Idealism to Realism more abrupt than in his treatment of human personality. Yet this statement can only be made if we are thinking in terms of the development of philosophic thought from the Scholastics down through Kant, Hegel and Scheilermacher. For there is a great deal of Plato in Temple's thought as is evident in all his writings and more particularly in 'Plato and Christianity' and 'The Nature of Personality'. Even if Matthews (along with others) thinks Temple allowed too much to the Materialists, it must be admitted that he rendered a service to modern philosophic thought in his insistence upon treating man as 'concrete human personality' and in his refusal to admit of the dichotomy which shows up in the contrast of 'reason' and 'feeling' or the 'noumenal self' and the 'empirical self'. Whatever may be said of his view of 'reality as a whole', he displayed great courage in his insistence upon the dignity and worth of human personality and his equal insistence upon

treating the individual as "one whole",- a view, incidentally, which led him to develop his doctrine of "universalism". In passing, it is necessary to remark that Temple insisted upon the intrinsic worth of a human being, not because he is a person, but because he is a child of God. All God's "creatures" should command our respect-even the elements, and particularly the earth - for it is in man's use of them that he is co-operating with God in the 'supply and demand' of human personality. To use nature from the profit motive is an affront to God and to human personality.(10).

Man is an organism, both as organic to the universe and also as a human person comprising a unity of impulses, instincts, sentiments, emotions and ideas. As in all things else, a human person does not just 'happen', and is so basic to the structure of reality as to form the key to Temple's understanding and interpretation of it. Evidence of this is to be seen in Canon Baker's review of Nature, Man and God, which, he said, embodies the following four principles: "First, personality is sacred; that personal element shows itself above all things in free, intelligent choice; secondly, we are members of a brotherhood; progress means the perpetually fuller realisation in practice of this fact of fellow membership in the family of God; thirdly, the duty of man is to serve God by serving his fellows; fourthly, power is subordinate to love and love exerts its power by self-sacrifice".(11) To arrive at his concept of personality Temple distinguishes between thing, brute and person. He asks, What is Matter? and points out that the old materialists thought they knew but we now know they did not know. We may be nearer to an understanding by calling it force or a combination of forces, but "matter" is always changing its meaning in a bewildering

way. He asks, What is a Law of Nature? and suggests that it is not an explanation of anything but is a mere statement of fact. What distinguishes the 'brute' from a 'thing' is the presence of 'feeling', and this fact of 'consciousness' is not merely a by-product. Personality does not only depend upon continued existence but upon consciousness of continued existence and displays an interest in the past and future as well as the present. A person expresses 'character' and is conscious of a sense of moral obligation, of 'rights' and 'duties', of 'purpose' and 'volition' and 'value'. A society is always a number of persons united by a common purpose. A person has a character of his own, but in society or a state there may be a certain character which is applicable to all its citizens: thus the term 'Britons' designates persons who are determined never to be slaves. This 'character' is 'the product of a mass of tradition and sentiment which permeates all citizens'. But you can never describe personality, any more than you can a 'thing', in terms of cause and effect because of the 'new' element which is always appearing.(12).

In man there is, then, a sense of divided consciousness and an apprehension of value, and this carries with it four main results:

- 1)"Man begins to bring to full actuality the Value of Good which is the raison d'être of the universe; through his experience it begins to find its end.
- 2)"For the same reason man is capable of fellowship with God, for he can share the motive of Creation - 'ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil'.
- 3)"For the same reason man himself becomes creative.
- 4)"For the same reason also man is involved in deliberate selfishness. The Value which he seeks is focussed in his own individual

consciousness...Thus the arrival of man at full self-consciousness makes possible deliberate sin, makes it indeed so probable as to be almost certain."(13).

Temple never seems to be able to dissociate 'person' and 'value' in his thinking; it is the fact of value-judgments that gives distinction and uniqueness to human personality. Man is a kind of being who acts by reasons and not only by causes, or who is not only under the compelling influence of forces but also under the influence of what seems good. It is for this reason that Temple is adamant in his insistence that no materialist view, in fact nothing short of the Christian view and experience, can do full justice to human personality.(14). Human nature demands that man be treated as an end and never as a means. The real enemy which Christianity must face is not materialism as a philosophy, which is as 'dead as a door nail', but "a spiritual interpretation of the Universe which gives a place to the supreme values of the spiritual life - beauty, goodness and truth - but which does not give full value to the fact of Personality".(15). Human personality is sacred, and this sanctity must be upheld and fostered for it is in and through fellowship that personality is made real - fellowship with God and man. To be a person is more than to be an individual, and a man is something more than can be expressed in all his social relationships and obligations. You may hire a man: you may buy his labour, but you cannot buy his personality. At the root of all existence lies the principle of personality, and as this finds expression in the human person he exhibits constancy in all that he is, in the quality of transcendence; and he exhibits variety in all that he does, in the quality of immanence.

Somehow Temple, although he never used the terminology, seems to indicate that the human person is a 'mediator', a 'go-between', which gives us the clue, or at least a still further clue, to the understanding of God and the universe. A comprehensive study of his conception of human personality would indicate that Matthews has failed to do justice to it when he suggests that Temple falls short of what Gore called "the core of personality" and of "the doctrine that there is an element in selfhood which is not a part of the evolutionary process and which is not, at least in the ordinary sense, 'in time'." (16). Although Temple's language can by no means be compared, either in content or meaning, with Marcel's (17), still he has left us something of the 'mystery' of the 'being' of human personality. What he has done, surely, is to indicate that the human person has his beginning in the evolutionary process, 'in time', but has his origin in God. And, although one can make an exhaustive study of Temple's treatment of personality, one cannot make an exhaustive study of human personality as he conceived it, for there is always more to it than meets the eye. This must be so, for human personality as he saw it, is not a doctrine or a dogma for formulation, it is of the very nature of 'process' and of God himself - not a static reality, but creative and dynamic.

3. Man in Relation to God.

Since all men are by nature children of God it follows that for an understanding of man's nature we need to look at God. To do this we need the aid of reason and of conscience, no less than a virile faith and the gift of imagination. Temple always insists upon "seeing life whole", and it is important to do so as far as possible and more particularly so in regard to religious experience, for any view

which leaves out that part of man's experience gives a distorted picture and is therefore a false view. This has serious consequences for falsity creates tensions between God and the self and makes it impossible for man, perhaps even for God to experience the peace of attainment until they are overcome. It is in the view of man's relation to God that Temple thinks the 'Barthian school' is at fault. Judged by the canon of reason or Revelation he considers it a heresy in that it is an exaggeration of the truth. In God's relation to man as Creator and creature, Redeemer and redeemed, or Sanctifier and sanctified, there is indeed an 'impassible distinction' - a distinction in kind. But in so far as God and man are spiritual or rational they are of one kind.(18). In one respect we should have to say God is "Wholly Other", in another sense He is the "Other Which is akin".

Tillich asks the question: "Does not the value theory itself demand that it be replaced by ontology"? (19). For Temple, the existence of value itself points to the ontological argument. If value is prior to existence then simply to state the existence of something is to give it 'value'. The existence of God carries with it a value of its own, and this is what gives meaning or value to the religious consciousness.

So religion is no mere convention; to say that a man is a child of God is to give status and dignity to man as such independently of his membership in any earthly state; it is also to state his duty and privilege to worship God. No earthly organisation has the right to deprive man of the dignity of worship, therefore the Church transcends the state. Worship is the expression of fellowship with God, but worship itself should find expression in a man's conduct. A man's true value is to be found, not in what man is worth to himself or to

the state, but in what he is worth to God.(20). This worth has been bestowed upon him by the Love of God, and it will show itself in love to his fellow man. Prayer is necessary as the vital breath of the Christian, and when offered on behalf of others it becomes "intercession" - not in the sense of begging God to change His will or disposition towards them, but in opening up the 'sleuce-gates' for the channeling of His Love that it may reach them. A Christian is under obligation to pray for his enemies: in war there is no difference, actually, in pushing the war to a successful conclusion and in praying for one's enemies, for war is the choice of the lesser of two evils and to pray for one's enemies may enable God to bring the war to a successful conclusion in a shorter time and with less bloodshed and suffering than otherwise might have been.(21). One's conduct, towards friend and foe alike, is the test of how much there was of the person in the worship that he gave to God. The worshipper can no more treat his God dispassionately than the scientist can enquire whether truth is worth finding.

The 'great divorce' which has occurred in men's thinking to-day is the willingness to regard the individual as a child of God but to make a distinction in this relationship as far as society or the nation is concerned. While it is still maintained that the Church has the right to address the individual it is denied that she has the right to speak to the nation or 'man in society'. This is to deny God of His rightful title and character of Kingship, as 'Lord of all life'. Man is a child of God also as he is the member of a family or a state - the complete development of this is what is meant by 'mankind'. This is also the point of St.Paul's reference to the 'perfect man', - not that the individual is going to become 'perfect',

for perfection is impossible this side of Heaven, but that all men should come in a 'togetherness' into a greater measure of completed membership until all are members of the body of Christ. For that we need a Catholic Church.(22). Christ is the absolute manifestation of human perfection and supplies the power which ethics requires to enable man to discharge his moral obligations.

Although man is a child of God he is born self-centred and his self-centredness becomes accentuated by the society in which he lives. Freedom of choice is characteristic of personality. In order that the world may be a 'vale of soul-making' it was necessary that man be given this freedom. God could conceivably have acted otherwise and placed man in a different relation to Himself, but then He would not have been acting consistently with His own character as Personality. But man chooses to place himself at the centre of the universe and in doing so is guilty of 'idolatry' for God Himself rightfully and solely is deserving of that place. In Jesus Christ we see man at his best, as son of His Father and in dependence on Him. Thus man learns that he may become a child of God in a different sense - by 'adoption' into Christ, whereby through the grace of God he will be enabled to reproduce Christ's character. What really becomes necessary is the sacrifice of God whereby man may be delivered from self-centredness, and that is what God offered on the Cross.(23). In the revelation of God in Christ on the Cross we see Divine Love manifesting itself in self-sacrifice calling men back to a right relationship with Him. This is the method which God uses to reconcile man to Himself, the method of Righteous Love which alone has the power to win man back to the dignity of sonship. Christ becomes not only man's Guide and Light, but his very Life.

4. Man in Relation to Man.

The corollary to the fact that all men are God's children is the fact that all men are brothers. Man can only stand in one of three relationships with his fellow man: he can treat him with hostility, he can ignore him, or he can co-operate with him. If he chooses any other than the last he is not treating his neighbour as a brother. In fact, if he acts in any way, or regards himself in any other manner, than as a child of God he is not acting in accordance with his own nature. His own nature requires that he live in right relationship with others and discharge his obligations towards them for the fullest development of his own personality. This may at times involve him in compromise; but although the individual may compromise the Church must never do so.(24). It is always difficult to standardise actions or to lay down rigid rules. It is futile to ask 'What would Jesus do?' or even to imitate His action, for it was called forth under particular circumstances and we cannot repeat that act: ours will be a new act, and entirely different. Whether forgiveness is right in a given situation, and the question as to what extent a person should forgive, may well depend on what it costs to forgive and what the forgiveness will accomplish. Of course, one should as far as possible accept the standard of Christ, but that standard should be one which is inculcated by the 'spirit' of Christ. What is called for is 'the inwardness of the good', without which the command to 'love thy neighbour as thyself' is impossible for the categorical imperative resolves itself into character.

Man is naturally and incurably social and so problems of ethics always arise within a context of personal relationships, whether it be in the family, community, Church or State. The Divine Purpose for

Good is not an abstract ideal but is realisable in the relations of persons with the Absolute Person and with each other. That act is always right which will promote the most good on the whole, and the motivating force is always love. The ideal community of persons which ultimately finds expression as the 'commonwealth of value' is the goal towards which all creation is striving. Another name for it is the Kingdom of God, where God is King, and which will therefore be a monarchy. God must be Lord of all or else He is not Lord at all and the net result will be anarchy and chaos. Associations such as a trade union or an employers' federation cannot love one another, so it is necessary to have Christian men of goodwill in key positions in institutional and political organisations in order that transactions may be carried out for the good of all without greed and without self-interest. Above all, there must be respect for personality and the maintenance of the principle or law of love.

Human nature is essentially social and the human race is spiritually one.(25). Nations, like individuals, must realise that fact; they exist by God's providential guidance of history and have their part to play in the Divine purpose, therefore nations have loyalties and obligations which transcend merely national limits or considerations. The answer to war is not peace but love - a federation of world states in which each exists for the good of the other. There will probably always be wars until some nation is ready to take the step of self-sacrifice which may mean annihilation of the national state in order that war may be abolished. But although a nation may take such a step when there is only itself to consider, it cannot take such a step if there are other and smaller states involved for it has a duty to them which is, first of all, to seek to preserve them. The

reason for war and the reason for the 'condition' of the world are one and the same- it is to be found on the spiritual level of the individual. In a world where men are as good as we are ourselves, and no better, war is inevitable; it is not the will of God, it is His 'judgment' upon mankind. He wills perfection of personality for man but that can only come about if man renders the free-will offering of 'service' to God and his fellow man. Human personality grows, and it needs to be developed to the level where self-interest becomes the same as interest in our fellow man and God. The Christian will insist upon certain convictions and strive to co-operate with men of all classes and creeds for their fulfilment. These are: (a) There is a natural world order and men and women and their activities have a place in it; (b) As part of the order of nature man must not exploit natural resources; (c) Within human society we must establish a right harmony between various functions and activities such as ownership of land or money: all must be used for the general well-being.(26).

Is there any hope for a better world order in which the ideal relationship between men may be realised? Temple sees such a hope; and he observes it in the rise of a new industrial order in which closer co-operation between labour and management has become possible and the worth and dignity of the labourer is at last being recognised, although we have a long way to go; and strikes have been justified in so far as they have helped to bring this about. He sees it in the growing movement for better facilities in education and the curtailment of unemployment. He sees it in the greater desire for international justice and world peace; and, although he recognises that there can be no 'absolute security' for man in this world, international organisation and co-operation will increasingly bring about worldwide

fellowship. He sees the hope realisable, and to a large extent already realised, in the growth of worldwide fellowship and co-operation of the Christian Churches in the 'oecumenical movement'. All of this is something of what Temple meant by the 'realisable good'.

5. Freedom and Determinism. (27).

Any philosophy which sets forth a view of man must give some account of the great problem of human freedom and determinism. The question is: Can you have both? Or, does the one preclude the other? It would seem as though we are compelled to think of both. How, then, can you reconcile freedom with determinism, or freedom with authority, or free moral action in man with an over-ruling, determinate God?

Temple says you must have some sort of determinism. A man is determined by the very fact of his 'being': he is determined by birth, by heredity and environment; he is determined in so far as he is under 'law' or authority; he is determined to the extent that he is himself and cannot be somebody else; and he is determined by his own choice. Man is determined in the fact of his physical organism. This is so, partly because his body is one, partly because his 'soul' is a distinguishable group of psychic forces which can only be active in so far as they combine, and partly because there is a unity possible for him which it is his duty to achieve. But man is more than all this, for he is not only a combination of external forces nor a combination of the forces within him. He is also self-conscious and as such is self-determining, and because of this, in society as in the individual, there is the further fact of mutual determination.

The popular view of determinism, according to Temple, is false because it overlooks the predominant element in personality. It says

truly that in a complex of ABC, A is A because of B and C, B is B because of A and C, and C is C because of A and B. But this does not account for the "difference" which appears in the individual. A child is nothing at all apart from all the processes which 'determined' him, but he is not merely a resultant of his parents' family history. There is a 'new' element in personality, and when you admit of 'differentiation' the theory of Determinism has to be abandoned.(28). In stating his objection Temple repeats the question which Coleridge asked about the self-differentiation of Schelling's Absolute - *Unde haec nihila tam portentosa transnihilatio?* To introduce the time-series into it is to add to the difficulty, for it merely pushes the difficulty of accounting for something arising out of nothing one stage farther back into Infinite Time. This places determinism in its true context of logic where it rightly belongs instead of regarding it, as is usually done, as a term reserved for ethics; but the difficulty remains, for bare being (*sein*), which is not something, is indistinguishable from not being (*nicht sein*). The trouble is that the pure Determinist tries to treat Personality as a Thing, and this Temple simply will not tolerate because on that basis one cannot possibly account for the activity of the Will.

Freedom involves responsibility; a person must have regard for his act. Freedom is not merely absence of determination; it is not external and mechanical; it is a spiritual and inward determination towards some good, and is therefore purposive. Freedom of its very necessity involves the will. But, is the Will free or determined? In order to answer the question it is necessary to understand what is meant by 'Will'. Temple points out that it has been customary to talk about the Will as though it were a faculty, a separate entity

or functional element of the 'ego' distinguishable from the rest of personality. He asks, by way of analogy, whether there is such a thing as 'pure cognition', and points out that the mind never acts in detachment from the rest of personality but that such things as 'feelings' and 'judgments' are always involved in thinking. So, too, one must never think of the 'will' as detached. 'Feeling' and 'desire' are involved, 'means' and 'ends' enter into the acts of volition; the whole man is involved. To ask, 'Has man got free-will'? is to put the question wrongly. The Will is something of a growth and it is a growth towards something. Perfect freedom will mean that a man will realise all that he is bound to be and to do; it will mean a co-ordination of all his instincts and impulses towards the realisation of the general purpose and goal of life. Jesus was the only man who never needed to be converted; in Him was the perfect embodiment of the free-will; He was the only sinless character. Freedom, then, is a growth and development, positive rather than negative, and there is a 'constancy' about it. Like 'the good', it resides in character, and character itself grows. Real achievement is not posse non peccare but is non posse peccare. 'The man of strong will has certain splendid incapacities'; that man has no need to stand and puzzle out every moment what he must do, but has within him the qualities which enable him to act spontaneously in any given situation; it is character which becomes free. The Will, then, is a matter of character, and now you can leave that man free and depend upon him.(29). Freedom is not mechanistic, nor deterministic; at the same time it is not an absence of determination, it is determination within.

Such would be true freedom, but Temple hastens to add 'it is not

ours'. Man is self-centred and the self is bound -man cannot free himself from the center of his own endeavour. Herein tragedy arises. "Fate is the law of the world of which men and women are members; they both make it and obey it; they cannot escape it, for it is themselves; nor can they modify it, for that would involve themselves becoming other people. They are free, for the origin of their actions is themselves; they are bound hand and foot for from themselves there is no flight".(20). Without self-determination man would never be called into fellowship with God, for it necessitates self-surrender before an Other which may lift man out of his own self-centredness. If you are going to have freedom, then you are bound to have God; but does that lead to more freedom, or less, or none at all? If the doctrine of Predestination as taught by Augustine, Knox and Calvin were accepted, then everything is determined and there is no value or meaning to be seen in moral choice and action at all. Temple points out that their evangelistic endeavours would indicate that they themselves did not accept such doctrinaire positions too seriously, and, in any case, there is the great experience of life which declares otherwise.

Neither is there any solution to be had to the problem by recourse to logic, by adopting the Either:Or attitude. We begin with the fact that we are determined by nature. Freedom is not something man has qua man. We live in a universe which is determined by law, we are under physical restraint, and the first step to man's freedom is to understand what determines him. In other words, like Carlyle's Margaret Fuller, "we accept the universe", for sheer external compulsion is a universal fact. This is the first stage on Temple's famous three-fold path of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. When one begins

to accept truth he makes a choice. But there is no choice to a truth of one's own. The seeker for truth repudiates the very notion that the truth is his own: he discovers it; it is God's truth; but truth does not deliver man from self-centredness. So it is with Beauty: you cannot compel a man to see or paint beauty, but when he does he comes to a point of grace. Nevertheless beauty likewise fails to deliver man completely from his self-centredness; it only leads to a partial release. It is similar with Goodness, but Goodness is a call to desert self-centredness altogether. What the self desires, and what it glories in, is not salvation, for that would be to place the emphasis still upon self, - which is the very essence of the deceitfulness of pride. Man's chief end is to glorify God, and only incidentally to enjoy Him for ever. By God's act of redeeming grace man is delivered from self-determination into the determination of God. It is Divine Grace which gives man Freedom.

6. Self-centredness.

The consideration of freedom and determinism leads to the fact that we are here in the realm of antinomies and "the one hope of bringing human selves into right relationship with God is that God should declare His love in an act, or acts, of sheer self-sacrifice, thereby winning the freely offered love of the finite selves which He has created".(21). The very nature of man's self-centredness, which is sin, presents a condition in which man has departed from the way of God and is such as to call forth a special revelation. For the most part God's action follows a normal and regular process, but it will only be set aside when there is sufficient occasion to demand it. Since sin, or man's self-centredness presents such an occasion, it is necessary to examine further what Temple means by it.

First of all, man is born self-centred; he inherits a nature with a tendency to corruptness, a nature with impulses and instincts, desires and longings, which tend to self-centredness, which demand that he look after "number one" and therefore lead him to put himself at the centre of things. There is an inherent tendency to weakness in all nature, and this is Original Sin. It is not merely that Adam sinned and therefore all men have sinned ever since, although that may be one way of looking at it. It is rather that every man who has ever been born has inherited the same nature as Adam. It is futile to draw distinctions between certain 'faculties' when seeking to understand the nature of sin or when seeking for its cure, as though one could point to 'reason' or 'conscience' or 'will' and think of these as being good over against man's physical nature which is evil. Human nature is all-of-a-piece, man is 'one whole', so that 'good' and 'evil' are both involved in man's nature. This is what 'selfhood' means, for selfhood is the basis both of all spiritual good and of all spiritual evil. It is not that man is utterly and totally depraved and is only aware that there is 'good' or 'value' which is outside him; nor is it that man is in a state of perfection and can point to an 'evil' or 'sin' which lies outside him. While knowing that there is a Good which is Ultimate or Absolute he also knows that he falls far short of it and that the true descriptive word for him is 'sinner'. The fact that man can choose truth, involves the fact of error; the fact that man may distinguish a thing as beautiful, involves the fact of ugliness; the fact that a man may choose an 'apparent' good, involves the fact of evil. When man makes a choice he does so because the object of his choice appears good for him; even though it may be evil, he still chooses it as his good. Sin is

the acceptance of a scale of values, and it involves character. It is not the doing of this or that; it is self-will.

Man starts with a sort of handicap, his very nature involves him in the entanglement of sin. What seems good to a man is determined by his character. It is not just being on the wrong side of a line or missing the mark, it is giving undue prominence to all that concerns self. All about man are other finite selves doing the same thing, and so there arises an accumulative evil which is the 'sin of the world'. The great evils of society do not arise because of an appalling wickedness of a few individuals; they are the result of the self-centredness of millions of individuals, and even if the world were 'put right' for us it would all be spoiled again in a fortnight by such human beings as we are. Man, then, is living in a world of self-centredness, a world of tension, from which he cannot deliver himself. If he could, no doubt he would; he has the will to do so, but the will is powerless to order itself, otherwise it would not need to do so since the will is the active volitional part of man. It is man's will, his whole character, which needs to be 'changed' or 'made over'. Since man cannot liberate himself from this greatest of all perplexities, from the impasse of self-centredness, his deliverance must come from without. In other words, the only solution is that man may be drawn away from his self-centredness to devotion to good other than his own apparent good. He cannot achieve disinterestedness by his own effort. He needs to be made AT-ONE within himself - in his divided will, in his divided loyalties - and with God Who is at the centre of his universe. The answer to man's self-centredness is God's righteousness. The only solution to sin is God's revelation of Love in a self-sacrificial

act sufficient to call out man's whole response in devotion to it. Sin necessitates the Cross of God which is a revelation of His glory. Evil has at least this much of power about it that it defeats itself; evil defeated itself on the Cross. Sin is cosmological, and it is only the 'Lamb of God' which 'taketh away the sin of the world'. God in Christ brings about the Atonement whereby the cure of man's self-centredness is effected. But in order that it may be effective it is not enough for man to 'see' it, he must 'experience' it.

7. Immortality.

If God is eternal and if man can be made 'at one' with God, it follows as a logical necessity that man may become 'immortal'. Temple would conclude in terms somewhat like these: 'a necessity of logic, yes; but does that mean a necessity of actuality, in the sense of being actually realisable'? Pointing out that Immortality does not mean 'everlastingness', he claims that Immortality is a necessity arising out of the fact of human nature, of the being and nature of God, and of the nature and meaning of history.

Immortality, in Temple's theology, centres around two main concepts: 'good' and 'history'.(32). He says that a great deal of helpful thought has accrued from the manner in which the Greek and Latin Fathers considered the matter. Greek theology was worked out in terms of substance or nature, and for them 'redemption' was the key word, for redemption was the imparting of incorruptibility to that which is corruptible and immortality to that which is mortal. The categories of law prevailed in Latin thought and with the emphasis upon ethical character Immortality had to do with imputing 'righteousness'. 'The Greek theories were defective on the ethical

side; the Latin and scholastic theories defective on the more intimate spiritual side'. We have an advantage in that we have inherited a synthesis of the two, and a further advantage in that our thinking is predominated by evolutionary terminology. We tend to think in terms of dynamic process instead of static reality. But it is important to bear in mind that we must think in terms of 'ends' and not of 'means' if we are to arrive at any understanding of the great problems of 'redemption' and 'immortality'. If life is dynamic, and not static, then it is presumably moving towards some goal or objective. Thus 'goodness' itself is only attainable if we can think in terms of a 'transcendent' good towards which all goodness is a growth and development. Goodness is imparted to man by the Grace of God: can it then be said to be my goodness? or, my righteousness? Temple points out that moral righteousness is only self-assertion. Goodness must in some way be an individual moral righteousness, but while the individual has it he realises that he has it in a 'converted' sense; it is his by obedience to a higher good which transcends his own. There seems to be something to goodness which is not 'mere individual goodness'; it is a response to Righteous Love. If that is so; if goodness is answering a call, a response to love, then it is a real goodness which while it is the individual's is still in a very real sense not his. This is the very essence of 'conversion', and Temple says that important as education is for the individual it is obvious that conversion is more important still. Conversion leads to 'salvation'; but Salvation is not a fixed state, it is the process of adoption into a Universal Good - into a fellowship with God, and, incidentally or consequently, with others. Immortality, thus understood, is not a static reality which is man's

by right; it is a gift of fellowship, of life, a kind of life into which this present life is capable of expanding and developing. Rightly conceived, it is not a question of man's life here and now, and then a life hereafter: the two go together. Immortality is a quality of life, not just unending existence; it is a fellowship of realisable good, in which each and every individual soul is a participant and is therefore a 'Commonwealth of Value'.

We find a similar evidence of Immortality in the meaning of 'history'. Man is both a product of history and he also makes history. 'His destiny is fulfilled in the achievement of two unities, unity of individual personality and unity of universal fellowship'. For the realisation of this goal it must be supposed that man is not only a creature of time but also of eternity. History is such that its meaning must lie partly in its result; but only partly, for its meaning lies also partly in the process itself, otherwise history would be meaningless. But if this is so, then history is only apprehensible from the point of view of a process outside and above itself from which it may be viewed as a whole. In other words, history is fully intelligible only in the light of eternity, and the progress of history is a progressive revelation of God. The eternal nature of God is such that it necessitated His entry into the temporal, and the eternal is thus grounded in the historical, and that not accidentally but essentially. The goal of history is the Commonwealth of Value, and eternity enters into history and takes it up into itself as it were. But, again, it is no mere 'unendingness', for history is nothing other than human beings themselves: men and women make history by living out its processes in the power of the Eternal Life which is available to them.

Admitting that this may be a fine view of the matter, even a plausible explanation of the age-long problem of time and eternity, is it a convincing answer to the 'hope which springs eternal in the human breast' or is there a further word which needs to be said? Temple presumes that there is and proceeds to say it. He repeats the view that the contemplation of a final end of universal process would make history itself entirely meaningless, and that this is by no means acceptable to human reason - the contemplation of the fact that it might end up in nothing at all is abhorrent to man's thought. Still, the possibility of such an end has always haunted the imagination, and even if the end were conceived as a long way off, the mere postponement would not detract from the meaninglessness of life. Temple contemplates the possibility, which "will one day make no difference whether we have striven or not for noble causes and lofty ideals. An earth as cold as the moon will revolve about a dying sun. Duty and love will have lost their meaning. The President of the Immortals, if there be either immortals or president, will have finished his sport with man".(33). The possibility of such an end has become immensely more acute since the time of Temple's Gifford Lectures in an age of the hydrogen bomb and brings with it a greater urgency for asking the question which the mere possibility leads men to ask: is there a world to come?

Temple answers: Yes, of course; Immortality is inevitable, but we need to clear our thinking about it. Mediaeval thinking had the idea of an after life all tied up in a neat little system which presented three 'states' or departments of the hereafter: Hell, for those who are beyond pardon; Purgatory, for those who are pardonable; and Heaven, for those who are pardoned. There was at least a hope for

the sinner that he might find his way into Purgatory and at last, after his pardon was obtained, enter Heaven. The Reformation, desiring to rid the doctrine of Purgatory of its abuses and indulgences, abolished it altogether and sharpened the issue by leaving the stark alternatives of Heaven and Hell. One consequence of this was to lead man to think of Heaven as an escape from Hell, but the other was more serious still, for it is impossible to think of an eternal burning Hell, kept burning with the souls and/or bodies of human beings as fuel for it, if we think of God as the all-righteous, loving Father of Jesus Christ. Consequently Hell, as Purgatory had been before, was banished from popular belief, leaving a widespread sentimental notion in a genial God who sees to it that men who die are henceforth translated to Heaven. Protestant theology, following upon the Reformation, led to the idea of a God so 'genially tolerant as to become morally indifferent'.

So men have come by a sheer process of historical development to think of Immortality as their right. Just as man is entitled to a life here, so is he entitled to a life in the world to come. But this is contrary to the teaching of the Bible which shows us that the aim of all religion is to transfer the centre of interest and concern from the self to God. The Biblical view is that life, whether in terms of here or hereafter, is not the right of man at all but a right of God, a gift of God. There is nothing religious about a mere hope of survival - that is simply selfishness. The only hope of Immortality, in so far as we can cherish it at all, is to be found in the hope that man can participate in a life of God, in a life which God gives.

Nor does Temple think that there is any hope to be had from the

endeavours or results of 'psychical research'. He thinks that the verdict of Jesus on the matter is still true: 'neither will they be persuaded even if one should come back from the dead'. He reviews the question of Immortality from the standpoint of Ethics which thinks of Heaven and Hell in terms of rewards and punishments. Even from the viewpoint of Ethics itself conduct which is motivated by rewards and punishments is less than moral. If the element of fear has to be introduced into the moral life then we have not reached the worthiest view of Immortality, which, if it is anything at all, must be moral. He considered Kant's view of immortality as coming nearest to the Christian view for it postulated immortality as a hope or means of adjustment of the goodness and happiness which Reason demands. Such a view of the hope of immortality is wholesome 'as an implicate of an independently established morality'. This leads to Temple's emphatic assertion that the Christian Doctrine is not a doctrine of Immortality but of Resurrection. Therefore Immortality is not to be thought of in terms of continuity, but rather in qualitative terms of the coming into life here of the activity of God. This is Christian Platonism, and Temple does not hesitate to draw on Platonic thought to express his view. Plato at first sought to demonstrate Immortality as an inherent capacity of the soul and later as a bountiful gift of God. The New Testament presents the view of Immortality as the attainment of a gift rather than an achievement.

Does this mean that the 'attainment' is unconditional and for everybody, and that there will be no such thing as punishment for wrong doing or wrong choice? Temple points out that Jesus never talks about 'eternal punishment'; there was an 'eternal fire' in His

teaching but He never said there was anybody in it. Nevertheless that is not to be taken with an over-abundance of optimism in the sense that all may rejoice for there is heaven for everybody. There still remains in Jesus' teaching an element of what Von Hugel called 'abiding consequences'. The sinner will go into the next world as a sinner - but, Temple adds, we shall all go in as sinners. The joy of heaven will indeed be the joy of sinners forgiven. There is, then, a possibility of heaven, and it is possible on the basis of a changed human nature. The spiritually minded man does think differently from the materially minded man, and this is precisely the type of life that Plato envisaged in the Phaedo for the true philosopher as the man who lives detached from the involvement of the body. In such a life there is full human freedom to decide and there is also the Grace of God - the one is not abolished at the expense of the other. In such a view of Immortality the demands of Law, Reason and Love are all justified; while you do not abolish moral choice and moral responsibility, you assert God's supremacy - His Universal Will of Love is sovereign. 'Man is not in his own nature immortal, but he is capax immortalitatis', he is able to become immortal because there is offered to him resurrection from the dead and eternal life if he will receive it at the hands, and on the conditions, of a Righteous God of Love. Some emphasis must be placed upon the human hope, for it is man's immortality that is under consideration; but the basis of the hope of Eternal Life is the Love of God, and Redemption is the method God uses to fit man for Immortality.

Thus Temple arrives at his doctrine of Universalism. Immortality is not conditioned by man - he cannot 'win' his way into heaven, he can only accept Immortality as a gift of God. If man has any 'right'

to immortality at all, the right is obviously on God's side and not on man's. If sinners can go into heaven, then all may go in, for all men are sinners. This is to accept Jesus quite literally: 'not one of these little ones shall perish'.(34). If God is to be 'all in all', there is a sense in which the doctrine of universalism becomes a sheer necessity. Since man's chief end is 'to glorify God', then immortality must be possible for everyone; to assert otherwise is to place limitations on either God's power or love, or both. God would be defeating His own purpose of creation, were He to deny any individual the goal of immortal life; He would be placing limitations not upon man, but upon Himself, and denying Himself of His own glory. Moreover, His creation would not be complete unless and until all His creatures have been enabled to achieve their destiny in an eternal fellowship in the Commonwealth of Value.

Annotation:-

- (1) Essays, p.38; The Hope of a New World, p.91.
- (2) Christianity and Social Order, p.54.
- (3) Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship, pp.10-11.
- (4) The Church Looks Forward, p.65ff.
- (5) This is the predominant theme of Nature, Man and God. Cf. The Faith and Modern Thought, pp.11, 12.
- (6) Cf. The Church Looks Forward, esp.p.110.
- (7) Nature, Man and God, pp.ix, 487-8, 490, 498; The Preacher's Theme To-Day, pp.4-5, 9; Baillie and Martin: Revelation, p.86ff.
- (8) Nature, Man and God, Chap.XIX.
- (9) Cf. his reference to the "holism" of J.C.Smutts: Nature, Man and God, p.488. Bradley had introduced "degrees" of reality, and the doctrine had been much debated.
- (10) The theme is developed in The Hope of a New World and The Church Looks Forward. Cf. also Papers for War Time.
- (11) Sidney Dark: The People's Archbishop, p.52.
- (12) The Nature of Personality; Introductory Lecture; p.1ff.; p.55f.
- (13) Christus Veritas, p.73.
- (14) The Preacher's Theme To-Day, p.4.
- (15) Essays, p.173.
- (16) William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation, p.19. Cf. concluding chapter of Thesis.
- (17) Cf. Marcel's Gifford Lectures: The Mystery of Being: Pt.I.
- (18) Nature, Man and God, p.396.
- (19) Tillich: Love, Power and Justice, p.75.
- (20) Christianity and Social Order, p.54.
- (21) Papers for War Time.

- (22) The Preacher's Theme To-Day, p.34; Papers for War Time, No.19.
- (23) Readings in St. John's Gospel, pp.10-13; Basic Convictions, p.66.
- (24) The question of compromise is dealt with repeatedly in The Kingdom of God.
- (25) The Faith and Modern Thought, p.55.
- (26) The Hope of a New World, pp.66-68.
- (27) Temple's views on Freedom and Determinism are set out in Christus Veritas, pp.3-73; Mens Creatrix, pp.68-70 and 153-177; The Nature of Personality, pp.11-36; Christianity and Social Order, p.65ff.; Nature, Man and God, Lectures IX and XV.
- (28) Mens Creatrix, p.69; The Nature of Personality, p.12ff.; Christianity and Social Order, p.63.
- (29) Mens Creatrix, p.171.
- (30) Ibid, p.144.
- (31) Nature, Man and God, p.400.
- (32) Cf. Christus Veritas, p.75ff., p.187ff.; Nature, Man and God: Lectures XVI and XVIII.
- (33) Nature, Man and God, p.452.
- (34) St.Mtt.18:14; Cf. also St. John 10:28,29.

VIII. The Kingdom of God.

Introductory.

A glance at the works of William Temple is in itself enough to indicate that he was no mere visionary, for even the titles show that his philosophical theology had a practical bearing on almost every issue of 'life' in some form or other of its 'ethical' or 'political' aspects. Men saw in him not only a prophet of God engaged in writing and teaching theology, but a man fully aware of the trend of the times and the nature of its problems. He maintained a close contact with intellectual and social experts and advisers who could lend added help and power to the moral and spiritual guidance which as a leader he was called upon to give. His practical efforts towards a 'realisable' ideal are nowhere to be seen more clearly than in his attempts to express a Christian doctrine of society against the background of the immense impact of social agitation. The result of his ability to enlist the help of experts in their own fields towards the attainment of this ideal is not least observable in 'Men Without Work', a report prepared for the Pilgrim Trust. He was particularly aware of the modern industrial order and endeavoured to give a reasonable statement of the economic problems of his day in the light of the Christian faith. He not only raised the moral atmosphere of his own country and infused a new sense of vocation into the Church, but he took a leading role in the oecumenical movement with its efforts to bring the world a step nearer to his vision of a Christian world order. In seeking to set forth a distinctively Christian philosophy of society he presented a new approach to the interpretation of 'The Kingdom of God'. In fact, his views may be classified as a

doctrine of 'The Kingdom of God', the dominant ideas of which fall under four main headings: (a) the eternal creative order, (b) the cosmic order, (c) the world order, and (d) the social order.

(a) The Eternal Creative Order.

Temple's idea of the Kingdom of God stems from his concept of God as personal, righteous and transcendent Creator, and his Christology, or, more precisely, his view of the Incarnation. But since his aim was to explain the whole process and meaning of creation in terms of the Kingdom, or the Reign, of God, his religious political philosophy stresses the immanent, rather than the transcendent, aspects of Deity.(1). His social philosophy was developed side by side with his metaphysical concept of the universe as dynamic, purposive creativity, in the light of evolutionary process. He looked out upon the world through his theological and metaphysical conception and sought to adapt his philosophy to the swiftly changing issues of the contemporary scene, and the only thing which seemed adequate to the situation, indeed to any situation for any and all time, was his interpretation of the whole process of events in relation to the Kingdom of God.

Accordingly he begins with the idea of God as Creative Intelligent and Purposive Will. This is what gives unity to the multiplicity of phenomena: "what anything is in the Mind of God, that it is in reality".(2). Temple is concerned with the danger which so easily besets religion - the tendency to resort to an abstract universal.(3). The history of science, art, and ethics discloses that they have been seeking a principle which will account for the activity of mind itself and also the ground of all existence. The efforts of each of

these point to a goal, an ideal, which they can never reach; they suggest a Will, which if it did exist as Purposive activity, would be self-explanatory and provide the only basis upon which the Universe could be deemed rational. Man's creative mind can find satisfaction only if there is a Divine creative Mind with which it may have communion.(4). This agrees with the three central convictions of religion: (a) that Spirit is the true source of initiation of process, (b) that all existence finds its source in a Supreme Reality which is spirit, and (c) that between that spirit and ourselves there can be, and already is, fellowship.(5). No abstract principle or concept can account for the nature and meaning of existence, for human nature which is the main part of the constitutive nature of all things, is essentially social. Human character depends upon the fact that man is a member of society: character is a process of formation and is developed in fellowship. "Humanity is a Social Fact". (6). Since human life is fundamentally social and society involves a plurality of individuals, the Supreme Reality must be such as to account for this fact. Here Temple relies on three central themes for the explanation of his doctrine of a creative order of society: firstly, the implications of a doctrine of the Trinity; secondly, the idea of a gradual evolution; and thirdly, the timelessness of the Infinite.

Plurality of itself would simply mean chaos, and not order or cosmos. Therefore, it is necessary to believe in the one Will from which all things are derived. But, does this mean that all individual wills are simply absorbed in that one Will? The method of creation and the world's history points to the contrary. For love is involved in Will; it is a will which is Perfect Love. (7). The very principle

of the spiritual world as a society of individuals is involved in the Trinity of the Godhead which is its source. The answer to the 'either: or' question of God's Omnipotence and Perfect Goodness is also solved in the principle of Personality, for Love itself both involves freedom and sets limits to its own power. It also settles the question of rights and duties, for beyond the 'right' of a person to set himself the obligation of loving every other individual you cannot go. Temple maintains that the universe is unintelligible without a doctrine of the Trinity and that it was formulated to guard against a view of 'distinct centres of consciousness'.(8). In a very real sense the individuals of society constitute the Kingdom of God as they "emanate" from the Divine Will and all their individual wills are determined by His Will. Creation, Redemption and Sanctification constitute the experience from which the doctrine of the Trinity arose. As the philosophy of the Incarnation is for Temple the only tenable metaphysic, so the doctrine of the Trinity is the only adequate formula of universal history.(9). All history is, in one sense, an evidence of the coming of the Kingdom of God. The only hope for a real unity of the world is that all men may realise their membership in that Kingdom and be prompted by the love which should be the guiding principle of a mutual society, which owes its very existence to Love.

The Biblical doctrine of the Kingdom of God shows that it 'came down out of Heaven' - its nature, origin and order are found in God Himself. It also shows that the Kingdom of God is the goal towards which all history is tending. St. Paul endeavours to explain this in the Epistle to the Ephesians (Chap.1:1-23) which Temple analyses as meaning: (a) the end is a society of free spirits; (b) the church

is the instrument for accomplishing this end; (c) the foundation of the Church and the impetus of all its activities is the revelation of the love of God in Christ; and (d) in the background, determining the conditions under which the Love of God was revealed and His Purpose has still to be accomplished, is the Fall of Man. (10). Thus the condition of Man's well-being resides in this fact of his membership in the Kingdom of God, for therein he is in right relationship to nature, to society, and to God. Man's duty is to recognise the creative and redemptive activity of God working in and through the society of individuals in His Kingdom, and through working with God as a member of His Kingdom he is thus fulfilling his own destiny and 'adding to God's glory'.

All Christian thinking, therefore, and thinking about society no less than any other, should begin and end with God. There are certain principles on which a Christian should act in order to achieve the ideal of God's Kingdom, which is a present fact in the world, but which can only become fully realised as all men take their full share in acknowledging God as King - in other words, in order to achieve a Universal Fatherhood of God and Brotherhood of man. These are: the sanctity of Personality, the duty of Service, and the power of Sacrifice.(11). God is the chief and deciding factor in His Kingdom, and history shows that He is Ruler of the Universe. Once more, Temple points out that the Kingdom owes its existence to God in a way that He does not owe His existence to it. God is creator of the world which without Him could neither begin nor continue to exist: it owes its very existence to Him.(12). The world is not necessary to God as an object of His Love for He has such an object within Himself in the persons of the Trinity; but His Love has gone

forth to men and women whom He has created and is winning them from self-centredness to Himself in His Kingdom.

Evolution points to a gradual progress, not only of individuals but of individuals in society. Temple maintains that States, no less than individuals, owe their origin to God: they arise out of, and because of, the very nature of man. The Divine order has been at work in their development, and it is the task of man to realise it: God has thus revealed Himself and is waiting to be made manifest in them. It was not by any accident that philosophy, as it developed in Greek thought, culminated in the Platonic doctrine of the 'logos', and that ethico-religious development in Hebrew thought reached a demand for a "Messiah", and that God then sent forth His Only-begotten Son as the world's Redeemer. Christ's mission was to inaugurate the Kingdom of God, and He accomplished this by methods entirely different from those of ordinary monarchs. In Him the Logos of the Greeks became a personal power of righteousness in this world, and the Messiah of the Jews became not only the deliverer of a nation but the controller of the universe. Natural selection and development, at least partially, may account for the rise of nations or states, but it cannot account for Jesus Christ and, therefore, the Church. Temple criticises the Marxist 'economic' theory precisely on the ground that it cannot account for the event of Jesus Christ in the world.(13). He does so by asking one question: whether there was any economic, social, or political organization in Palestine at the time which could account for Christ? The Church, then, as the extension of His Body, is supernatural; and her members are members of Christ. God, as immanent, exists in a very real way in the world which He has created and governs; but as transcendent He exists outside of and independently

of the world; still, in another very real sense, God as transcendent exists in His Church, which is the Body of Christ and guided by the Holy Spirit. The Church exists to leaven society and bring men under the sovereignty of God in His Kingdom 'till all become one man in Christ'. As the Church evolves, every generation finds some special message in the Gospel which has been overlooked in previous ages of the Church. So the great discovery of our age has been the prominence given in the Gospels to the Kingdom of God.

The Church's task is the implementation of the Kingdom, and for that task it has to be equipped. In the early days of the Christian Church entrance into the Divine society was by confession of faith, and to say 'Jesus is Lord' was so great a commital that only the activity of the Divine Spirit could be held to account for it; to be baptized was to experience a spiritual re-birth; and to be a member of the Church and to be filled with the Spirit were one and the same thing. Through the 'edict' of Milan for the first time a 'political kingdom' became synonymous with the 'spiritual kingdom' and there appeared the first signs of a real Christendom. (14). The sharp contrast between Church and World disappeared, but with it emerged a partly Christianised World and a partly secularised Church. The Church and the State both exist to carry out God's will, but the form or manner of doing so remains different. The State relies on law, whereas the Church relies primarily on love and spirit. The Church points to an ideal beyond the realisation of the State, even beyond the realisation of organized society in this world, for the final consummation of the perfect service of adoration and worship can only be realised in an Immortal fellowship of the Communion of Saints. The Church has appointed at least four means towards its goal

of achieving the absolute sovereignty of God's universal rule which she proclaims; they are: the Canon of Scripture, the Creeds, the Sacraments and the Ministry. The Church is the army of God's Kingdom, carrying His banner forward towards His victory of Love. God is not only Creator; He is King. The same power which created the national States and the Church is not a remote person watching the world from outside; He is the root fact of reality and the inner life of human history. Progress can only come in His way - by sacrifice, and not by force, unless it be the force of conquering love.

There can be no limits set to God's sovereign will; nor can there be any limits set to man's obligation, for all our time and all our places are God's. (15). While men are members of the Church, they are also members of a worldly society; as such they are engaged in competition and wrangling and strife. War arises on the level of human conduct, and conduct is an expression of character; 'wars are made in drawing-rooms and in Pall Mall Clubs'. So, too, 'unemployment is made, at least to some extent, by extravagant expenditure on the Riviera'. (16). An example of what happens in everyday normal life can be seen in the challenge which Christ presented as He proclaimed the Gospel of the Kingdom. Temple reiterates in Personal Life and the Life of Fellowship, The Kingdom of God, and Mens Creatrix the view that in His "temptations" Christ rejected the normally expected methods of instituting the Kingdom, and came forth from them to win men to the service of the Kingdom by the method of love and self-sacrifice. As He taught the people they were perplexed, and their 'perplexity turned into antagonism'. The Kingdom was present, because He, the King was present; it was present in His mighty acts

and words; but it was still to come, - it is something to be planted, to grow here and there as it found receptive soil. Then there came a decided change: His message was no longer for anybody and everybody, whether they would hear Him or not, but to the chosen Twelve; but, after the confession at Caesarea Phillipi, when someone had recognised Him to be not only the Herald of the Kingdom, but its King, He knew that His mission could not fail, and deliberately set Himself the task which led to the Cross. If God is to be omnipotent, He must rule not only over men's conduct but over their hearts and wills - but they cannot be compelled, they can only be won. Only if they can be won, can they be conquered; and the only method of accomplishing this is that of self-sacrificing Love.

Religion leads to something far different from that of doing the right thing, of keeping a moral code, - it leads to 'being good'. Righteousness is not merely 'doing right', but 'being right'. And so Temple argues that the Christian Church presents us with the Platonic Ideal, for the Platonic End is not the pragmatic success of a social order, but 'the Justice of the Individual Soul'. There is need of a transcendental ethic for the transformation of society. Temple prefers Plato's ethical ideal of "the good man" to "the good citizen" of Aristotle, for the simple reason that the good man will be able to transform society. He will be committed to an ideal, and not merely the good citizen of an imperfect State. This is the function of the Church and of the individual Christian: to point to, and to lead to, an ideal hitherto unrealised. The principle of society seems to be involved in the philosophy of value, and the supreme value for anything is the value which it has for Ultimate Reality. When we pronounce things good or bad we are not doing so in terms of pleasure

but in terms of the welfare of the community(17), and, for Temple, the welfare of the community is the same thing as the welfare of the Communion of Saints or the Kingdom of God. This can be expressed in terms of worship, and man is so constituted that he needs an object of worship. As worship leads to conduct, it will be man's experience of God as righteous, personal, loving and transcendent Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier which will transform the world into the Kingdom of God. This entails growth and progress, but it is obvious that the task of bringing all men into the fellowship of God's Kingdom will not be completed till the end of history.(18). There ought to be something supra-temporal about worship, for the worshippers stand together in the presence of history - in the presence of historic symbols, with Scriptures, and in prayer and communion with each other and with the Eternal. Whereas the Kingdom of God is a present reality here and now, it can be perfect only in the eternal order,

(b) The Cosmic Order.

The word 'cosmic' occurs repeatedly in Temple's writings(19), and it was by no means an accident that he prefaced his Gifford Lectures with two quotations in the original Greek from the Phaedo and St. John's famous statement of the 'logos made flesh'. His metaphysics bear a striking resemblance to Plato's "intelligible forms" with, of course, a Christian interpretation and developed along the lines of modern evolutionary hypothesis. There is a strong suggestion throughout that Temple is anxious to guard against modern tendencies to waive belief in an original guiding power and to explain actual creation merely on scientific lines. He affirms repeatedly that the universe has its origin in the Divine Will, and is itself the organic

self-expression of that Will. Therefore, the universe itself is sacramental.(20). The universe exists as an expression of God's Will, but it also exists to do or carry out His Purposive Will: God's universal sovereignty is obeyed in the world of natural order, with 'wind and storm fulfilling His word', in the sunset, the budding of trees and production of fruit, bird and beast, in an on-going, evolutionary development and growth. The same principle is observable in the kingdom of society, where the transcendent God is immanently at work and revealing Himself in the affairs of men either for guidance or for judgment.

Different interpretations have been placed on the philosophical arguments advanced in Nature, Man and God. Whatever view is ultimately adopted as the most correct must take into account Temple's own estimate, which states that he is seeking to set forth a "dialectical theism" and in doing so is under obligation to Edward Caird. Under his influence he strives to develop a coherent and unified view of the inter-play of factors in a real world. He sees the universe as an organic whole in an orderly arrangement of 'grades' of reality developing and unfolding as dynamic process. The lower grades give rise to the higher, but are not able to account for them. 'Mind' appears as organic to the world, but cannot be accounted for except in reference to Mind itself, and so the empiricist analysis of the real world of common sense and actual experience leads to the first dialectical transition. Upon examination of Mind which 'appears' and its various activities we find that mind is not merely the principle of immanence, or immanently present and organic to the world, but of its very nature is an evidence of Personality. Since a Person 'transcends' his activity or creativity, as an artist to his picture or

an author to his play, so we are led to the second dialectical transition which demands that Mind be considered as Transcendent. But Mind is not only or wholly transcendent; in a very real way it is immanent to the world and makes itself known to other finite minds. This in itself would be enough to establish a theistic conclusion, but finite minds are confronted by evil and this fact threatens to destroy any theistic hypothesis which seeks to develop a metaphysical view of the Universe as the expression of Purposive Will. It would indeed destroy that hypothesis if it could not be shown that Evil itself may be subservient to that Purpose,- and it not only can, but is shown to be so, under the aegis of Love which both utilises and overcomes Evil. This is the third dialectical transition and elsewhere Temple quotes and enlarges upon Dean Inge to establish his position: "If a Divine Being chose to become incarnate for the sake of sinners, it is impossible to regard our earthly lives either as an unworthy choice or as a punishment. They are rather the means by which Divine love may be brought down into an imperfect world, as the rest of nature is the means by which the wisdom and beauty of the Divine mind are made manifest".(21). But the 'bare' existence of anything has only relative meaning: 'value' is prior to existence, and reality consists of existence plus value. Man is a chemical compound, a biological organism, and a living mind or spirit. Spirit arises with the organism and expresses its superiority over matter by controlling it. In this relation of spirit to matter we observe the same relationship of eternity to history. The universe is sacramental in its nature and scope and is grounded in a living God. Human nature, as part of the natural creative order, achieves its destiny in an eternal society of spirits also as the expression of the will of God.

The natural order points to a desire or hunger for a specific Revelation of the Supreme Reality of which its principles are an indication. This is the fourth and final dialectical transition: and so the Incarnation, with all that it entails, becomes a necessary part of the on-going order. It is not as though we had a separate metaphysic, a separate cosmic order, and then the Incarnation as an adjunct, or in addition to the natural, on-going, historical process: it is part and parcel of that process. Temple insists upon placing the Incarnation firmly in the general order and nature of dynamic process: the cosmic order demands a specific Revelation; and so a Christo-centric metaphysic is the only one which will supply a satisfactory explanation of the Universe.

This view of the world as a dynamic, constitutive, organic order was such for Temple that it 'behooved' Christ to enter into it and even to 'suffer' for its redemption. It is the coming of Christ which brings it to fruition and which will be its final creation. Whatever view may be taken of the difference between Canon Raven and Temple on the explanation of the ground of the Universe in terms of Love or Will, the former is essentially in agreement with Temple's metaphysics when he states in his recent Gifford Lectures that "theology rightly understood must always testify to the essential holistic and personal character of the universe as man perceives it - that it is indeed a cosmos".(22). The idea of a mysterious, awe-inspiring metaphysic enters into Temple's descriptions and discussions of world tragedy. (23). God is normally the power that controls the universe and exercises that control in righteousness. Modern, thoughtful people as a rule understand what the word God means, but their question is one as to whether there is any reality corresponding to the word. Temple

answers the question by saying that we cannot any longer hesitate in supposing that behind the world of nature as we know it there is a guiding power at work corresponding with and akin to our own minds and guided by similar principles. To regard reality in any other light would be to flaunt reason and the laws of the universe discoverable by science.

Human nature arises in this world of nature, but we are creatures who are able in some measure not only to understand it but to master it: therefore human beings exhibit a principle which is superior to all the vastness of the universe. This principle of personality is what marks men off from the rest of nature and fits them for membership in society as children of God's Kingdom. Everything which tends to bring about divisions or disunity in that society is sin against God. When he was invited to the Headmastership at Repton, Temple informed the Governors that he thought the Public Schools seemed to accentuate class-divisions and he hoped to devise a system which would abolish them. Towards the end of his life he said that it was a terrible shame that a Churchman should have to be in a position where he would have to say about another Christian that he was not "in Communion with him". Since mind emerges out of nature, and there appears every reason to consider human nature as under obligation to the whole of nature, then it follows that there can be no limits set to man's obligations to the God of that nature. In the natural order we discover the purpose of God. The commission to the Church was to carry out the purpose of God. God made the Universe, sun and planets, molecules and atoms, precisely for the same purpose - that they might obey His Will. The purpose of God in creation was manifested in Jesus Christ, and is to be accomplished through the Church, the Society of

free spirits.

But the order of the world is an eternal order. Philosophy is beset by the insuperable difficulty of trying to account for a 'beginning' and an 'end', whereas Infinitude involves neither beginning nor end. When we think of 'ends' it is necessary to remember that the world has had many 'ends' in the New Testament sense of "the end of the age"; there was, for example, an end of the ancient world, and an end of the mediaeval world. But there must be an end to human history, and the end will be the finally and fully established Kingdom of God. 'The Kingdom of God will come when men conduct History as citizens of Eternity'.(24). We are already realising our citizenship in that Kingdom, but man's citizenship is always to be found in a 'new creation'; his citizenship is in Heaven, and for that the Resurrection is needed to confer upon him the qualities which fit him for Immortality.

(e) The World Order.(25).

From such a view of the Universe interpreted in terms of an eternal, creative, and cosmic order, it follows logically that Temple's metaphysic could not tolerate any doctrine of 'exclusiveness'. Therefore the command of Jesus to His Church to 'go into all the world and make disciples of every creature' must be taken quite literally; for the Kingdom of God, though actually present and constantly coming, will not be fully realised until every member of the world order has become a citizen of the 'civitas' which comes down out of heaven. The goal of society is total membership in the society which is Christ's Body. Everything which hinders or prevents this is enmity against God, and when Christians allow it or contribute to it they are stultifying the purpose of God for His world which is universal

goodwill in a Kingdom of 'ends' or Commonwealth of Value. If we ask why it is that nations or societies fail to order their conduct in accordance with eternal principles, the answer is that they have no conduct apart from that of their individual citizens. Nations and states have no organs of choice or purpose other than the wills of the individual citizens. It is the self-will of the individual citizen which becomes the self-will of the nation and accounts for international discord and world chaos.

The onus of responsibility and obligation is thus placed on the individual. When the interest of the state is placed over against the interest of the individual, or vice versa, we find an unbalanced arrangement of society. The state and the individual have mutual obligations to each other, and obligations beyond either for the welfare of the whole. Since all men are children of one Father, apparent differences of quality or capacity are unimportant. In the sight of God, all are equal. There is no good purpose to be served by allowing the kind of society where some may have full opportunity for the development of their capacities in freely-chosen occupations, while others are confined to a stunted form of existence with no means of choice or facilities to enable them to achieve their God-given destiny. The 'sin of the world' is the accumulated sin of the individual members; its cause is selfishness, and its cure is Love. God causes the rain to fall and the sun to shine on saint and sinner alike, on 'the just and the unjust', and men should treat others with the same impartiality. This is the 'charity' which, like justice, should prevail in the councils of men and operate in their hearts and wills. Therefore members of the Church should not belong to it for what they can get out of this world or any other world, but in

order that they may take their full share in the fulfilment of God's purpose in the world and beyond it.

The purpose of the Incarnation, which was an event in the historical world process, was that Jesus should be the embodiment of the principle of love which created and sustains the world; that He should reveal it in a form intelligible to men and women and gather together a fellowship of those who responded to that appeal as a nucleus of the universal fellowship of love and the chief means to its establishment. Because of the rise of societies which are antagonistic to each other, the 'natural order' of God's world is 'out of joint', so to speak; it is suffering from a 'dislocation' of the structure of life, and this can only be put right by some power which transcends temporal power. In the creative world of God's activity we are led to see that power is subservient to love, and the hope of an international world order which will be an expression of a realisable Kingdom of love is seen in the fact of Christendom. Here, as all the various branches of the true Vine are brought together and bear fruit there will evolve an ordered society which will unite the Kingdoms of the world into the 'Kingdom of God and of His Christ'. Here, too, will be a realisation of the fact which the religious genius of the Old Testament Hebrews foresaw and proclaimed: that the one, righteous, almighty God is King of the world. Finally, here will be seen at work the principles of immanence and transcendence which are inherent in the concept of personality and required in a society of persons united in a Commonwealth owing its allegiance to one King.

Men are usually led astray in their thinking about the function of a Kingdom or the laws upon which it operates; and they are further led astray by the 'notions' of their relationship to the King. Thus

men usually think of the Divine Fatherhood in terms of what good things the all-loving Father can, and does, supply for them. Jesus teaches that we should think of the Fatherhood of God first and foremost in terms of children in a family relationship. In doing so, He admits the divine origin of the law, but proceeds to rewrite the law: 'It was said by them of old time, but I say unto you'.(26). This, as Temple points out, was a divine function; no one else may do it, except God. In that Jesus declared His Kingship; but He also declared that the one principle upon which the Kingdom of God was founded, and by which it operates, is service. He is amongst people as their 'minister', and He calls others as 'friends' into the fellowship of service. God works in the world like Jesus works in the Gospels, along lines of personal service. The basis of world order, then, is found to be 'personal' and is supremely observable in the principle of personal service; therefore it is a Social Order.

(d) The Social Order.

The words 'order' and 'kingdom' must be repeated in any attempt to explain Temple's metaphysic of the universe until the mere recurrence becomes monotonous. They are correlates, the one to the other, and he insists upon a reiteration of the importance because the 'Kingdom' of God must be an 'ordered' Kingdom, otherwise it would be an anarchy and existence would be sheer chaos. Coupled with Temple's insistence upon the need for 'seeing things whole' is his insistence upon the necessity for personal faith in God and the acceptance of Christ for the achievement of the goal of individual and corporate personalities. The ground of all that exists, if it is to be understood at all or have any meaning for philosophy or theology, is to be

considered in terms of universal will, or good, or love, which is personal. Therefore he is adamant in his denial of a static 'absolute' and in his insistence upon a dynamic process in the realisation of which all may share. The Kingdom is God's: it is impossible to have God's Kingdom without God, so the first duty of the individual is loyalty to God. But duty always involves relations; obligation arises in society, and thus the very nature of 'democracy' is involved in the concept of the Kingdom of God. But neither the Kingdom of God nor Democracy can rely on the supposition of 'automatic progress'. The method of 'advance' is that of 'Christian revolution', and the Church becomes the task force or 'army' of the Kingdom. But this does not mean that the Church must resort to militaristic means; the 'weapon' of the Church is the Love of God, the sword of the Spirit. Every Christian must be a 'soldier' of Christ, but first of all he must 'revolutionise' his own life according to the standards of Christ and by submission to the controlling influence and power of God's indwelling Spirit.

Man, as a member of society, has basic needs, but these needs are not to be his first care or concern. It is because man has put these first that he has inverted the natural order of God and of society. When we put self, nation, class, race or any worldly-preoccupation first we make the basis of life materialistic; but the basis of life is not materialistic, it is spiritualistic. The Christian must recognise his national loyalty, for he is a national 'product' and owes a great deal to the nation; national allegiance is morally superior to class-loyalty, but absolute allegiance is due only to God. The Christian must seek first 'the Kingdom of God and His righteousness', then all these other gifts will be 'added' to him.

By 'seeking' God's Kingdom, Temple does not mean 'looking' or 'longing' for it even in the sense of 'praying' for it; he means co-operating with God in order to make it a reality. "The farmer who cares for his land and neglects his prayers is, as a farmer, co-operating with God; and the farmer who says his prayers but neglects his land is failing, as a farmer, to co-operate with God".(27). Temple went on to say that it is a mistake to suppose that God is concerned only, or even chiefly, with religion; but of course, he added, the truly Christian farmer would be interested in his land and prayers alike. That is typical of Temple's thought. He did not preach Utopianism. From the outset, and all through to the end, he maintained that there is no such thing as a Christian social ideal.(28). Christianity offers something far more practical than a Utopianism or a social ideal: it offers at least four principles which may form the base of a real, full-blooded, normal life — Personality, Fellowship, Service and Sacrifice.

When these principles are acted upon, society, both in its individual and corporate aspects, realizes its end which is the achievement of God's Kingdom, for the root of all Christian sociology lies in the Being of God. Whether Temple is thinking of politics, economics, capitalism, labour, management, agriculture, education, nationalism, internationalism or oecumenicity, he does so with the idea of the Kingdom of God in the background of his mind. Either God is Lord of all or He is not Lord at all; and it is impossible to have the Kingdom of God without God. In reviewing the nature of the state and its historical development in his excellent treatise on 'Christianity and the State' Temple said that Plato was unquestionably right in making a distinction between 'society' and 'state' and

in his insistence on the fact that a society is not a state; that it is primarily ethical, and then political; and that even if men were purely selfish by nature, society would still come into effect. Society is not a static reality, it is a political and spiritual growth, and therefore endowed with capacities. Society is the arena where the moral and spiritual destiny of mankind is wrought out. Society is nothing at all except in respect to the individuals which make it up, and social free-will is the same thing as individual free-will. Freedom at its best is self-control, self-determination and self-direction; but man is self-centred by nature and can be counted on to abuse his freedom. Even self-control is usually determined by self-interest. But even if our care is for the Commonwealth of Value, the Commonwealth of Nations or the total good of society as a whole in a world-wide fellowship, that will be an interest of the self far richer and greater than self-interest which is mainly pre-occupied with wages and conditions of labour. Therefore we need a graded loyalty (not 'loyalties', for essentially it should be the same kind of loyalty) - first of all to God and His Kingdom, then to the Church, next to the State, and lastly to our own class or family. Absolute loyalty is due only to God; other forms of loyalty are only relevant.

Laws are needed in the State, but they are necessary not so much to curb the interest of the individual as to encourage and develop it. Laws exist to preserve and extend real freedom, and it does so by preventing the selfishness of one from destroying the freedom of others. Therefore, laws exist to protect the individual's purpose of fellowship against being violated or destroyed by the same impulse which promotes it! Laws, similarly, exist for the development and

preservation of peace, but peace is the condition and result of general well-being. It is high time that we exploded "the hoary hoax" which declares that if we want peace we should prepare for war. If we want peace we should prepare for peace, which is the same thing as being prepared to live together as children of God; for peace, like plenty, is the result of living in a right relationship to God and with each other. But perfect freedom, either from want or war, or in any other form cannot be achieved except through perfect faith. Thus we cannot divorce thinking about the Social Order from thinking about conversion or the power of the grace of God. As Temple repeatedly uses his three-fold path of Goodness, Beauty and Truth to lead to his metaphysic of the Universe, so he repeatedly refers to his four-fold principles of Personality, Fellowship, Service and Sacrifice as the means of developing the Social Order into the Kingdom of God.

Nothing short of the love of God in Christ as it captivates the individual conscience working upon men in society will free man from his self-centredness which will otherwise vitiate his own life and his contribution to the life of society.(29). Is there any hope for the world that this may finally take place? Temple answers: yes, for if it is faith that will save the world, then that faith must be rationally defensible and morally adequate; but that requirement is a fact, for there is in society the Church expressly founded by God and endowed with the power of His Holy Spirit for that very purpose. (30). But the Church was intended by Jesus to be universal, not merely local and denominational, and despite views or opinions to the contrary and although Christianity is still in its infancy, we can observe the Church unfolding as a world-wide agency for the subjection

of universal order to God's Will. This is the supremely important fact which overrides all divisions and disunity of the Church. The Anglicans went out to far-flung places of the world to convert people to God and make them Anglicans, the Baptists to make them Baptists, the Presbyterians to make them Presbyterians, etc., and we are now reaping the result which is not simply the addition of more members to the various Denominations, but the Oecumenical Church. The Oecumenical Movement of modern times affords the hope of a world gathered at last into the universal fellowship of the Kingdom of God.

The Gospel of the Church provides what the world needs, which is not merely a doctrine of the rationality of the universe but the development of conditions under which we may reach a spiritual world. In that type of life, law becomes subservient to the spirit. When one of the two brothers came to Jesus and asked Him to act as an arbiter and decide over the dispute which had arisen over their inheritance, He did something far better than giving a particular decision - He pointed to a condition of life in which such disputes would not arise. The Divine constraint of Christian Missions is the method and means which God uses for reaching and perfecting the individual members of society. God is always reigning in His world and He will stop at nothing, provided it be in accordance with His own nature as a Being of Love, until men acknowledge His universal sovereignty. His respect for personality brought Christ to the Cross, and the Cross became the throne of His glory.(31). National ambition and ecclesiastical pride and prejudice made the Cross necessary; these, like all other elements of human nature which hinder the coming of God's Kingdom of Universal Love, do not exist as abstractions but arise in human hearts and wills. Thus Temple arrives at his

assertion that the predominant need of the world is evangelism. What the world needs most of all is what the individual also stands most in need of, namely, release from frustration and futility, and this can only be found in complete submission and surrender of the individual will to God's Will. The appeal, then, is to the individual, so that as self-determining he may become God-determined, and this is the sole condition for universal harmony within the society of spirits which make up the Kingdom of God. But, as Temple saw, this perfection is only realisable 'in part' in the temporal realm; although the Kingdom of God is a present fact, it is an on-going reality, and is always 'coming'. We cannot hope to see the Kingdom of God established in its perfection in this mortal life; that belongs to eternity, and the concept of Immortality is involved in the very nature of the Kingdom; but man's duty, insofar as he is a member of that Kingdom, is to do all in his power to make human history a movement in the direction of that eternal goal. There can be no unemployment in God's Kingdom: 'My Father worketh hitherto, and I work': man has his being in a Social Order for co-operation with God in the Eternal Order of His Kingdom.

Annotation:-

- (1) **Christianity and the State**, p.41.
- (2) **Ibid**, p.39. Cf. **Mens Creatrix**, p.255ff.
- (3) **Mens Creatrix**, p.20.
- (4) This is the theme which is developed in **Mens Creatrix**. Cf.p.258; also p.267.
- (5) **Nature, Man and God**, p.35.
- (6) Cf. **Nature of Personality**, Chap.VII: **Personality and the Universe**; **Christus Veritas**, Chap.IV.
- (7) Cf. **Note on Canon Raven's 'Creator Spirit': Christianity and the State: Appendix 1**, p.186f.
- (8) **Mens Creatrix**, p.364; **The Nature of Personality**, p.97f.
- (9) **The Nature of Personality**, p.112f.; pp.119-120.
- (10) **Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship**, pp.20-21.
- (11) **Ibid**, pp.66-68; **Christus Veritas**, pp.203-207.
- (12) **Christianity and Social Order**, p.52.
- (13) **The Kingdom of God**, pp.119-120.
- (14) **Mens Creatrix**, pp.325-6; **Christus Veritas**, pp.158-160.
- (15) **Essays in Christian Politics**, pp.208, 210-11.
- (16) **Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship**, p.78.
- (17) **The Kingdom of God**, p.48; **The Nature of Personality**, pp.50-52.
- (18) **Christianity and Social Order**, p.53.
- (19) Cf., e.g., **Mens Creatrix**, pp.139, 148, 151; **Readings in St. John's Gospel**, pp.7, 8, 9, etc.
- (20) **Christus Veritas**, p.234; **Nature, Man and God**, Lect.XIX.
- (21) Quoted in **Christus Veritas**, p.212.
- (22) **Canon Raven: Experience and Its Interpretation**, p.15.

- (23) Cf., e.g., his discussion of St. John, Shakespeare and Shaw, Essays, esp. p. 150.
- (24) Christus Veritas, p. 210-211.
- (25) Temple's view of a 'world order' underlies the development of his theology in Nature, Man and God. Other works which set forth the world order as basic to the 'Kingdom of God' are: Basic Convictions, Essays in Christian Politics, The Hope of a New World, The Church Looks Forward, and Christianity and Social Order.
- (26) Basic Convictions, pp. 37-38.
- (27) The Hope of a New World, p. 70.
- (28) Christianity and the State, pp. 3-6; Christianity and Social Order, p. 51. Cf. also Personal Religion and the Life of Fellowship, pp. 66-68; and Christus Veritas, pp. 203-207.
- (29) Christianity and Social Order, p. 61.
- (30) On the Church's theory of its own foundation, cf. The Faith and Modern Thought, pp. 62-63.
- (31) Cf. Basic Convictions, esp. Chap. III.

IX. Summary and Review.

Temple's Position.

It has always been difficult for commentators and critics to 'place' William Temple within any of the traditional 'systems' of philosophic endeavour, and the student is always presented with the problem of having to decide 'where he stands' in the great stream of philosophical and theological culture. He has been claimed by liberals and catholics alike in the Christian tradition, has been hailed as both an idealist and realist in the field of philosophy, and has been labelled as both a conservative and a reformer in his social outlook. The truth of the matter is that he commands such a central place in the broad field of Theism that it is hardly possible to 'categorise' him. When he is referred to as a Platonist, the appropriate retort is to use one of Temple's own phrases in answering: 'Yes; and how much more'. When it is said that he was a "socialist", it becomes necessary to point out that this is a 'misnomer'; for he remained loyal to the great tradition of Christian orthodoxy and applied it to the on-going world of his time, insisting that 'there is no such thing as a Christian Social Gospel' but that Christianity points to a 'state' of being where its principles become applicable to any given situation. When people are determined to call him 'modern', it is necessary to recall that he has his essential roots in the past - in the great sources of basic contribution to be found in Hebrew thought and experience, in Greek culture and philosophy, in primitive Christianity, and resides in the historical development of these. When it is claimed that he 'allows too much to the materialists', it

is again only necessary to point out that the golden-thread close-binding all his theology is the endeavour to maintain a preponderance of the spiritual. If it were possible to make a claim or supply a description for Temple which would be more applicable than any other we should have to call him a great Christian Platonist, and even then we should not have used an epithet which would capture the mind of Temple or determine his entire contribution. All of this points to the fact that Temple retains a central position among the contributors of Christian theology of the present century; indeed, that he is the most important single figure in the English-speaking world of contemporary philosophy of religion.

This claim can easily be substantiated on the basis of his comprehensiveness and power of statement, for both of which he stands without a peer. He was endowed with an immensity and variety of talents, and will go down in the history of theological thought as he was known by his contemporaries as a man of intellectual genius, gifted with an amazingly retentive memory, possessing the art of assimilation and a clarity of insight which can best be described as a 'prophetic sense'; all of which was enhanced by a colourful imagery which characterised itself in a forcefulness of presentation both in the spoken and the written word. Much of his contribution comes to us from his own mouth but through the pen of others, for he was able "to speak pamphlets" and his utterances were preserved by 'stenographers' who 'took down' what they heard. The bibliography at the end of this thesis is sufficient to indicate the variety of topics to which Temple gave his attention, and it can truly be said that there was scarcely a subject in the sphere of philosophy and theology on which he has not touched. But he not only touched on them, he

enhanced and enriched them as he reconstituted their main tenets and presented them in a form equally intelligible and acceptable to the modern mind.

In this comprehensiveness Temple remains unique. There were, of course, others of his own contemporaries who made an outstanding contribution to the theological thought of the English-speaking world; but these can, as William Temple cannot, be placed within a certain frame-work or category. Thus, Dean Inge made an impressive contribution to Christian mysticism; W.R. Matthews gave a modern interpretation of and made an original contribution to the Doctrine of God; while both A.E. Taylor and Professor Sorley have made a unique contribution to the study of ethics. But Temple's contribution was far wider; he dealt with the overall contribution of Christianity, demonstrating quite successfully and with amazing results that the Christian faith has a claim upon rational men and that it has something important to say about the complex problems of modern society. He was able to rescue the truth of Christianity from the realm of abstract doctrine and gave theology and philosophy an important place as he brought them into actual contact with everyday human life.

Significance.

In a very real sense the student is not presented with the problem of relating Temple to his times: he has done that for himself; for he stands as a powerful personality in the predominant role of a pioneer, not in any sense of aloofness but as Plato's 'philosopher king' who is enabled to penetrate to the very heart of reality on the level of his contemporaries in the stream of the on-going process of life. Because of his intellectual power he was able to develop the truths of a Christian philosophy of life in such a coherent whole

as to give it a central place along with ethics. Even in the field of ethics itself he made a significant contribution which wins for him a full claim to the title of 'moralist'. The fact that no single epithet is to hand for describing the significance of Temple's contribution to philosophical theology points still further to his comprehensiveness and adds to his uniqueness as a thinker, for we cannot comprehend him in a word.

It may be objected that Temple was not an original thinker and that he gave us no new 'doctrine'. There is a great deal of truth in that statement, and yet it adds to his greatness, for it shows indubitably that he was related to his times and may further indicate a significance which is destined to establish for him a permanence as a thinker. Very often we are tempted to the view that great thinkers such as Plato were 'original' in the sense that they 'invented' their doctrines. We need to remind ourselves that not even Plato developed his doctrines 'out of nothing' and that he did not pluck his theories 'out of the air', so to speak. It needed a great deal of Pythagorean mathematics and Socratic ethics to go into the making of what we know as Platonism. It is similarly the case with Temple. If it may be claimed that he excels in any one particular accomplishment more than in others, then it is surely in the comprehensive and coherent 'synthesis' which finds its expression chiefly, though not solely, in Nature, Man and God, a work which displays the excellence of his mind, the originality of his thinking, and crowns all his philosophic endeavour with glorious achievement. To say this is not to diminish or to detract from the glory of his other works; there are many who would prefer Christus Veritas or Mens Creatrix or Readings in St. John's Gospel, while some may prefer

one of his delightful yet smaller or minor books. Here, too, there is a striking resemblance with the philosopher for whom he expressed his preference. To mention Plato is to conjure up in people's minds the image of the Republic, while on reflection there comes to mind a remembrance of some of his other great works such as the Phaedo, Timaeus, or the Laws, or some other equally distinctive contribution. Those who remember Temple 'in the flesh' or know him only by his writings, are apt to recall upon the mention of his name the great achievement he accomplished for his own Communion, or for the 'Universal Church', or his achievements toward social benefits and the amelioration of poverty and distress, while the philosopher is apt to think first of what he himself called his 'Dialectical Realism'; but all will, upon reflection, remember his equally worthwhile contribution in other spheres of activity. He can only be fully known and appreciated as one grasps the entirety of his outreach and interpretation in the all-inclusiveness of his scope and contribution, for which no better word seems to suffice than that of 'synthesis'. And, here he stands uniquely alone. It is possible to take Plato's contribution and label it 'Platonism'; it is possible to take the contribution of Aristotle and call it 'Aristotelianism', whereas Temple's comprehensive sweep defies any attempt at being reduced to a single epithet.

When it is alleged that Temple contributed no new 'doctrine', we may still claim the same originality for him as for other 'masters' in their field; nor need we confine our 'parallel' references to the masters of the past. He stands on a par with such contemporaries as Eddington and Jeans or Toynbee. What Eddington and Jeans did for science and Toynbee is still doing for history in presenting these

in their 'comprehensive wholeness', so Temple did for theology in his 'synthesis'; and, in doing so, he commands the same claim to originality and novelty of treatment. In the development of his synthesis Temple drew from the contributors of the past and the best in modern 'trends', and in so doing he made a distinctive contribution to philosophical theology.

Temple's Contribution.

Temple's distinctive contribution resides in the fact that while developing his synthesis he reconstituted at least five 'doctrines' of philosophical theism and presented them with a freshness of appeal and a cogency which gives them added vigour. They are, as we have seen, the 'doctrines' of Reason, Value, Revelation, Nature of Man, and Kingdom of God. Rightly understood his theology is a re-statement of Christian 'orthodoxy' (or, if preferable, of orthodox Christian theism) retold in the language of modern parlance and relevant to the needs of his own day. He entered into a world of 'tension', and whereas others tried to bring about an 'unholy alliance' of science and religion he stated the position of the Christian faith so clearly as to show, while not using the terms himself, that there is a 'science of religion' and even a 'religion of science' which may work side by side in an on-going process of reality. He took the scientific concept of evolution and wove it into the very fabric of the Christian truth thereby showing the nature of reality to be that of a creative, dynamic, spiritual process. In his endeavour he may also be said to have added to the concept of 'time' by showing the interpenetration of time and eternity as necessary correlates to each other. In his treatment of the perennial controversy of 'natural' and 'revealed' religion he declared that both are indeed revelations

of One Truth. He introduced value-judgments into the discussion of the problems of theology and demonstrated the fact that Mind as Purposive is basic to the understanding and appreciation of the nature of reality. This led him to make a contribution to the ancient problem which has persisted down through the ages in philosophic thought of 'the One and the Many', and he demonstrated fairly conclusively that the plurality of existence can only be understood as it resolves itself into the nature of Personality. In accomplishing all this Temple created the impression that theology can only be presented, at least at its best, in a philosophic mode, and that philosophy is as dry as bones unless it be developed along the lines of theology; thus he came nearer than any other of his predecessors in his own field to achieving a real "meeting point" for philosophy and theology, and if he failed in the final achievement of doing so he at least came nearer to establishing a reconciliation in the hostile camps by showing that the 'tension' between the two is 'wholesome'. One obvious example of this is to be seen in the recurring controversy between ethics and theology. In his insistence upon 'seeing things whole' he propounds a view of the final reality of the world as a Society of Spirits or Commonwealth of Value as a dynamic process into which we may all be caught up. "This ethical religious faith was the aspect of his philosophy with which Temple was able to inspire people's imagination, and it was the secret of his moral leadership. It would surely stand even if a good deal of his systematic metaphysics were to be re-thought".^{1.} 'Systematic' is not usually the word used to describe Temple's contribution, but he has surely produced a schema of systematic theology approaching the

^{1.} Dorothy Emmet: William Temple: Iremonger, p.537.

Summa of Aquinas which he regarded as the supreme need of our time.

Critique: Minor Criticisms and Drawbacks.

Temple's modesty did not permit him to make any claim to producing an elaborate 'system' of philosophical theology, and his main endeavour consisted in trying to stimulate others thinking in the right direction of formulating an answer to the problems which confronted the world of his day. When his contribution is observed in retrospect it is not only seen to be immense but remains unassailable from the point of view of the theist. It was entirely coherent, well-balanced and written with a cogency of thought that gives it a preponderance in the field of theological thought of the twentieth century. Therefore any 'critique' must of necessity be a balanced critique, and could in no wise be a matter of fault-finding.

Minor Criticisms.

But Temple was not regarded as a demigod in any sense of the word or in any sphere, and critical voices were raised against him even in his own Communion. He has not passed without criticism; nevertheless, as will be presently shown, the criticisms did not seem to be very well founded. Three minor 'flaws' or inadequacies can, of course, be detected, but these are inconsequential to his main argument and are on such a minor note as to constitute no real threat to his theism. The charge of repetitiveness cannot be regarded as a major fault. Anyone who examines Temple carefully finds that he repeats himself, but if he is still careful to observe closely enough he will find that the repetitions add to the dignity of his contribution rather than diminish from its charm. Temple is one of those masters, and they are relatively few, for whom it became a necessary

fault to reiterate since so many of the things he said were worth saying twice. A similar verdict has to be rendered when he is charged with 'inconsistencies'. Reference has already been made to the immensity of his contribution. His mind was so great that it did not even contemplate any neat formula to fit every situation. This is particularly true with regard to his attitude to war. His contribution to the solution of this great problem was unique and he faced boldly and resolutely the demands which any consideration of its many ramifications make on the teacher of ethics. Problems of such major proportions do not admit of any neat formula and where Temple did propose solutions he was consequently led into inconsistencies. But it must be observed that his 'demands' have led the nations (whom, incidentally, he insisted must be treated as Persons) closer to a realisable ideal; and it was largely due to his personal initiative and selflessness as he became passionately devoted to this ideal which brought into being the World Council of Churches in the great trend of 'oecumenicity' which may yet be the harbinger and means of bringing the nations "into the way of peace". Men have detected a similar 'inadequacy' with regard to Temple's teachings on divorce. Here, again, the problem was a grave one and it was inevitably impossible to set forth any neat formula which would take care of every given situation. It must be said in all fairness that Temple led his own Communion in an all-out campaign against any lowering of moral standards, especially in matters of sex. Perhaps he was at fault in not declaring a more decisive stand on the question of re-marriage, but it is doubtful as to whether he could have said anything that would have appeased parties who were ranged on opposite sides of a raging dispute. Had he adopted a more restricted and

conservative attitude or taken a more liberal view in a 'modern' society with its changing moral customs, he would have certainly lowered his own prestige and impaired the scope of his trusted leadership. After all he was the Archbishop of a great Church and could not utter an individual opinion; on such matters he had to speak "the voice of the Church" and could not sound a trumpet with any unclear or uncertain note. If here, as elsewhere, he is surrounded by shadows, they are shadows which are cast by the shining of a great light.

It was perhaps because Temple did not consider himself an original thinker that he did not attempt to formulate any new doctrine. He exercised a stewardship beyond the attainment of most men and the essential quality of the steward is that "he should be found faithful". The fact that he did not state any new doctrine is therefore a tribute to his fidelity. Moreover, there is no novelty in revelation; the essential feature of revelation, from man's side, is its reception, and so Temple presents us with the ancient doctrines of Christian theism re-examined and re-expressed. In a sense, Temple's defects are almost tributes to his greatness, but there are certain drawbacks which should be considered.

Drawbacks.

The first serious drawback which becomes apparent upon an examination of Temple is that he had no 'doctrine of Scripture'. This indeed is very much to be regretted, and it is impossible to surmise that Temple regarded the Holy Scriptures as supplying their own doctrine. He was too well aware of the nature and controversy of 'doctrine' for that. This is not to imply that Temple had nothing to say about the Scriptures. His references to the Scriptures are by no means

copious, although he did draw fairly liberally from them to elucidate many of his points. When he did so he exhibited an amazing insight and a clarity of elucidation, and the reader feels that he has chosen aptly, and expressed himself well, and without waste of either subject-matter or space. Occasionally the scholar of the Old Testament comes across an item of major importance such as the laying down of regulations governing prophecy in Deuteronomy only to observe that Temple referred to it in a casual manner as though it were commonly known, at the same time placing it in such a context as to give it fresh meaning; or, he finds the whole historical trend and unique development of the Hebrew prophets given succinctly in a paragraph or two and stated in such a way that the uninitiated in Old Testament problems may easily grasp and appreciate it; or, again, he finds the challenging statement that if one human agent could in any way be said to have founded the Church, that man was Abraham, thus adding an important presentment to the Old Testament doctrine of 'Election'. Temple regarded the religious genius of the Hebrew people, along with Greek philosophy and the Roman gift for law, as basic among the contributing forces which shaped Western civilisation and indeed the history of the world. Additional instances could be cited from his writings to show his unique grasp of the content and importance of the Old Testament scriptures. It is rather an interesting speculation to imagine what a wealth of information and funded knowledge there might have accrued to Old Testament scholarship in the all-important discussions of this field which are so prevalent and prominent in current research had his mind applied itself to the task of producing more Biblical commentaries.

A similar wish may be expressed with regard to the New Testament.

Amongst others, including Temple himself, W.R. Matthews considered it no accident that the only commentary he published was on the Gospel of St. John. This excellent commentary will long remain a masterpiece and especially so as a contrast with Barth's 'Romans'. When Temple quotes from New Testament sources he exhibits the same amazing aptitude for penetrating to the very heart of their content and origin and uses them with the same telling forcefulness in 'clenching' his arguments. Two obvious examples are seen, firstly, in the manner in which he represents the 'Temptations' as explaining our Lord's refusal to establish the Kingdom of God after the manner of the people's expectations; and, secondly, in the way that he draws on St. Paul's use of the 'one body' and the ultimate goal of "the one perfect man" to demonstrate his gospel of an on-going universalism. Temple certainly could not have failed to see the importance of the Scriptures as basic in the development and presentation of the Truth of theology, nor does he anywhere imply that he wishes to minimise that importance. Temple's references to Scripture are so aptly chosen and delightfully presented that he creates in the reader a desire for more. If only he had given us more such commentaries as the one on St. John - either on the Synoptics or the Epistles, or even on the Book of the Revelation or on the Acts of the Apostles, we might have been able after the manner in which his doctrines on Reason or Value or Revelation have been treated in this thesis, to piece together a 'doctrine of the Scriptures' which otherwise remains lacking in his comprehensive scheme. Certainly a doctrine well-thought-out and presented by himself would have thrown incalculable light on the conflicting tenets of theology in the all-important subject of the interpretation

of Scripture.

But it is grossly unfair to criticise a man for what he did not do or did not say, unless it were to place him under the general category of the 'sins of omission or commission' of the General Confession. Perhaps we find here a clue for an answer to the objection of Dorothy Emmet that he "was never really clear about what he understood by natural theology".¹ Temple was so much of a universalist that he tended to place a great deal of store on 'truths of revelation' which afford a real knowledge of reality whatever their source or origin. The Barthian objection would surely be that he placed too great an emphasis on 'natural religion'. Another way of stating the same fact would be to point out his preference for Plato. He was alarmed by what he saw as the modern tendency which seemed to regard all revelation in general and to admit of no particular revelation, and concerned himself with the demonstration of a 'concrete' universal since no abstract universal takes care of all the facets of reality, yet it may be asked whether his mind was not so preoccupied with 'universals' as to be somewhat lacking in the recognition of the great fount of truth which lay in Holy Scripture. The remark that his contemporaries used to make of Dr. John Baillie when he quoted Plato so frequently seems to be applicable to Temple, even if it is used rather flippantly: that "Plato had not been admitted to the Canon".

A second drawback which becomes apparent when a critical eye is cast in Temple's direction is again in the nature of a wish that he had said more about 'the life after death'. Others have thought that Temple was the one man who could have produced a Summa, comparable

¹. Iremonger: William Temple, p.532.

with that of Aquinas, in the first half of the twentieth century had he confined himself solely to intellectual pursuits. But, then, of course, we should not have had Temple, for he was a man of practical affairs and had to be in the thick of the fight. Numerous testimonies are to hand which witness to his remarkable achievement in Church and State, but perhaps none are more praiseworthy or speak more eloquently than those which applaud him for having done more than any other single individual for the cause of 'oecumenicity' and the "World Council of Churches". No one individual could possibly be permitted to 'do it all' any more than to 'say it all'. "For that", Temple would naturally remark, "we need eternity". Subsequent history has shown that Aquinas did not say it all either, not even for his own age, and even if Temple had devoted himself entirely to intellectual pursuits we might still find ourselves wishing that he had said more about the "hereafter". But, just to express the wish is to bear testimony to his integrity, and we are tempted to suggest that if the Oxford Group were searching for a concrete case of 'absolute honesty' they might find it, at least in this instance, in William Temple.

Temple so often states his views of the hereafter so succinctly that the reader who is at all acquainted with such preachers as Dr. Leslie D. Weatherhead on the subject could wish that he had dealt with it more fully. He made a tremendous contribution to the theological view of Immortality, especially as he developed it with the concept of Personality as basic in his metaphysics and with his theory of the interpenetration of Time and Eternity which finally culminates in the Kingdom of God as a Commonwealth of Value. Temple sketched the historical development of the doctrine of Immortality

and its implications for modern thought with telling precision and clarity of insight and enhanced it by the development of his theory of Value. He lacked neither the gift of imagination nor the literary ability to enhance his doctrine had he attempted to lead the reader further into a penetration of the nature of the Hereafter. But he was content to remain faithful, and that he did not do so is a further tribute to his essential honesty of mind. Where definition was not possible, he was content to remain silent.

The third drawback is of a somewhat different type, yet here too it is of the nature of a shadow which is cast by a great light and does credit to the greatness of Temple's character rather than detract from the essential nature of his contribution. The drawback consists in a failure to do justice to the profundity of sin. The criticism arises in the form of negation, for it is impossible to find fault with what Temple actually said about sin and evil. Here, as in his general presentation, he is unassailable from the Theist point of view. He took a look at man and at man's world and saw poverty in the midst of prosperity due to inherent weakness and the need for God; he also saw that we cannot understand either apart from Him, that He is necessary to complete man's creation as man is not necessary, notwithstanding Dean Inge, to add to His Being. He also realised, notwithstanding Dr. Slater, that the words 'perfect' and 'good' are only relative terms to be used adjectivally of Reality.¹

He then set forth his view of Reality 'as a whole' with a cogency and coherence applicable and acceptable to the scientific and philosophic concepts of his day. The result was a comprehensive theology well-thought-out and nicely and neatly arranged. But this

¹Cf. R.H.L. Slater: God of the Living: Chapter XII, The Meaning of History.

would be precisely the objection of Karl Barth - it was all too nice.

William Temple had never plumbed the heart of the abyss. He did, of course, have a doctrine of sin and evil. He saw evil as a malicious power baffling the mind of man and threatening the theistic position unless some account could be given of its nature and existence. He saw 'the sin of the world' and gave a lucid exposition of the doctrine of 'Original Sin'. He considered sin as 'not just missing the mark' but as all that separates between man and man, and between man and God. He realised that evil cannot simply be regarded as a necessary consequence of the very existence of finite spirits and along with most other theists accepted Shelly's interpretation of the world as a 'vale of soul-making'. Unlike others, he maintained that every form of evil has its peculiar utility and regarded error as a symptom of the adventurous character of the intellectual life. Nevertheless, he appears to have lacked a full sense of the utter depravity of sinful man and failed to grasp the 'active' sin which penetrates to the heart of God. The sinner may wake up to find that when he perpetrated his evil deed it was 'as though he struck his mother in the face without knowing it'; but Temple seems to have failed to grasp the fact that even while 'awake' from the very beginning a man could still strike his mother in the face, knowing it all the time and seemingly not worried about it either before or after. The point is that there is a horrible, shocking truth about the depth to which the human being can willingly and knowingly descend, and Temple never seems to have plumbed this depth. It would, of course, be shocking to suggest that he should have actually plumbed it in real life, but his theology shows a lack of dealing with it. This is a far different thing from the philosophical problem of evil, and

Temple does not appear to have realised fully how deep and powerful evil can be in a human personality; and although he saw that 'evangelism' was the greatest need of the day, his theology lacks the lustre of a full-blooded, dynamic redemption to answer the deep human need.

Perhaps Barth and Brunner had recognised the drawback, were aware of this lack in Temple's theology and therefore it made them critical of his position, for there did not seem to be any dark pages in it at all. He was 'born to the purple' and never exposed to any of the great tragedies of life or the depraved living conditions which tend to develop rotten characters. Still, he must have been aware of the fact that men born with the proverbial 'silver spoon in their mouth' may sink to very low levels of conduct. The marvel is that Temple, brought up under ideal conditions in such an environment, did see the need and distress of the underprivileged classes, and by every kind of natural expectation he ought to have been a Tory.

It may be argued that Temple never had any real distresses or temptations to face and that he had an *anima naturalita Christiana*. It is possible to get well advanced in the reading of Temple's theology and remain with the impression that "education" appears to him to be not merely the primary but the only need for man; that if we educate an individual we may then leave him to his fate. It rather comes as a mixture of surprise and relief to find later that he regarded 'conversion' as the primary requisite. He did venture the belief that God is stern, but he was never stern himself. He regarded class-distinction as the besetting sin of Repton and set himself the task of abolishing it; but Iremonger leaves us with the impression that he made no attempt to deal with 'malpractice' amongst the boys.

We may surmise that he did not realise the on-going power of sin. He had a clear view of the significance of the Cross; and laboured his point at showing that it means, among other things, that we cannot take the attitude that God could ever say "never mind" to the sinner; but in his actual treatment of evil he creates the impression that he never fully realised the real personal power of sin. On the whole this does him great credit, but if there is anything deficient in his treatment it is this lack of a thoroughgoing analysis of the nature of sin. Yet when all this has been said, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the marvel of the fact that a man of his privilege was so acutely aware of the snares and pitfalls which arise in human society due to man's inherent 'selfishness'; in a word, that he was so acutely aware of the 'sin of society' and dealt so faithfully with it. Nobody has stressed more than he did the need for conversion, and therefore he was one of the outstanding leaders in what has become predominately more and more the primary task of the Church in our day,- namely, evangelism. Thus, when Temple's relationship to the problem of evil is under review, or his contribution to a theological view of the nature of sin is questioned, it becomes necessary to remind ourselves that he was not only aware of the grave problems which beset man because of his sinful nature, but that he fought valiantly against them as a good soldier of Jesus Christ; that he was not only abstractly aware of the problem of evil and the power of Satan, but like St. Paul he "wrestled against principalities and powers" as a lusty contender for the faith. Such a claim is not based on fanciful thinking; it rests on a consideration of the enormous achievements of his accomplishment in the practical field for worker's federations, for education, for the Student Christian

Movement and other groups, and for the unity of Christendom. "If any man could be described as the moving spirit in the formation of the World Council of Churches it is the late Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, who described the Ecumenical Movement as 'the great new fact of our era'." ¹.

Theism well-founded.

It has been the aim of this thesis to present William Temple's main arguments for and contribution to, a schema of Christian Theology. There has been no attempt to diminish or to add to his contribution: the views presented, and the manner in which they have been stated, are essentially those of Temple himself. If the contention of the main thesis or of this concluding chapter is valid, then it may be claimed without reservation that Temple stands without a peer as the leading theologian who has made the most notable contribution to Theism in the first half of the twentieth century; also, that it is thoroughly defensible as being intrinsically sound. We have noted that there are certain 'drawbacks' but they are apparent because of what Temple did not say. In a sense, this is merely to reiterate the desire which remained on people's hearts and minds when the world became informed of his untimely death; namely, the wish that he had been spared to say and do so much more. There is cause for rejoicing in the fact that so many of his predictions have come true and so much that he hoped for has been realised within the past decade. There does not seem to be much use quarreling with what Temple did say. Time and again we may observe others taking him to task on some important point while it is possible to turn back to some page of his

¹. The Bishop of Chichester in the Geographical Magazine, July 1954, p.120.

multifarious works and find him using the exact words of their objection. Two examples will be sufficient to illustrate.

W.R. Matthews criticises Temple for 'allowing too much to the materialists' and expresses a preference for Gore's view with its appeal on behalf of "the core of personality".¹ Surely Temple aimed throughout at showing that reality is meaningless unless it can be interpreted on a spiritual basis. The truth of the matter is that he "allowed" nothing to the Materialists. Whether he is thinking in terms of "Revelation" or of "natural theology" as elaborated in his metaphysic which appears chiefly in his Gifford Lectures, he seeks to establish a spiritual interpretation of the universe and of existence. His 'Mens Creatrix' has the same goal in view. The glory of the Christian view of life is that it does not ignore matter or treat it as illusion but accepts it and uses it. "A sacramental universe" discloses the nature and meaning of things to be spiritual. It is for this reason that he avows Christianity to be "the most materialist of all the great religions" - not because matter, but because spirit predominates. Dorothy Emmet has captured the mind of Temple at least on this all-important point when she says: "it is implicit in this view that we can only believe in the supremacy of Spirit if we also believe in the reality of Matter which it informs".² Temple was at first tempted to use "A Study in Dialectical Realism" as a sub-title for his Gifford Lectures because he saw the Dialectical Materialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin having such a strong appeal as to constitute a real threat to the Christian philosophy of

1. William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation, p.19.

2. Iremonger: William Temple, p.528.

life. We have already intimated that he saw clearly that the Marxist dialectical materialism could only arise in a "theological" world, a world which expresses the activity of a living God. He sought to show that Whitehead's view leads to a spiritual interpretation of reality, whose very nature is that of process and is therefore dynamic and spiritual rather than static and material. Temple introduced 'value-judgments' for the same reason: the fact that we can speak of "value" at all shows that the ultimate ground of reality is spiritual. He insisted that the reality of a thing must include its value as well as the mere fact of its occurrence. This is sound Christian philosophy; and it is to be regretted that Temple has not been heeded more on this point, for then we may be spared the whole 'farago' of present-day logical positivism.

W.R. Matthews is himself a philosopher of some repute, a contemporary and an erstwhile admirer of Temple's. It is not to be wondered, that misconstruing Temple at this point, he should have expressed a preference for Gore's "core of personality". He could not have failed to observed the predominant place which Temple gave to Personality. It is Temple's view of personality coupled with his view of the nature of reality as spiritual which gives the added significance that Matthews requires. Perhaps the wording of his objection conveys more of a criticism than he intended. Perhaps, indeed, as his words later on implied, he was seeking to show that the Christian view of personality cannot be interpreted on a basis of the theory of evolution. But, this again, is to misjudge Temple's view of evolution. If Temple's view of 'evolution' has been interpreted correctly in this thesis, then there is more to it than 'meets the eye'. It is true that Mind 'appears' in the evolutionary process; but it appears as

'Purposive', and therefore as transcendent to, as well as immanent in, process. Temple is at pains to show that Personality transcends the actions which disclose it: "a person is more than a mere individual". Bearing in mind firstly, that throughout his entire theology Temple sought to demonstrate a 'spiritual' view of the universe, and claimed that the distinctive 'spirit' accepts and uses 'matter' in a 'sacramental' universe; and, secondly, that Temple's entire structure rests on his unique doctrine of "personality"; it is only necessary, in answer to Matthews' objection, to refer to Temple's own words and ask what he meant by "a core of original being"? ¹.

A similar approach may be taken to Dr.R.H.L.Slater's criticism when he takes the view that Temple shrinks from drawing the conclusion that 'history makes a difference to eternity, and therefore to God Himself' and maintains that Temple's hesitation was apparently due to his failure to see the implications of history when considered as an on-going 'process'. ² Dr. Slater obviously failed to appreciate the view which Temple presented in Mens Creatrix, Christus Veritas and Nature, Man and God of history and eternity as correlates, and that his view of history is precisely that of a dynamic, creative "process". Again, Temple uses the exact words in which the objection to him has been stated when he declares that the events of our Lord's earthly life and what happened to Him, especially at the crucifixion, "made a difference to God Himself". ³ Here, as was observed when the lack of a 'colourful' presentation of a life to come was considered,

1. Christus Veritas, p.213.

2. Supra, R.H.L.Slater: God of The Living, Chap.XII.

3. Personal Religion and The Life of Fellowship, pp.16-17.

we observe that Temple's essential integrity prevented him from elaborating on the difference which history does make to God. From the point of view of the Theist it would be sheer folly to do so. Nor need we think that Temple shrank from it out of timidity. In one sense, he does so, as Dr. Slater suggests, because it would seem to make man appear as greater than God. Temple's line of argument here would no doubt follow the analogy of father and son. The fact that a man has a son, or that the son does or does not do certain things, does make a difference to the man. This is so from the very nature of things in an on-going process of reality. But the difference, in a very true sense, is the difference that the man, now 'father', himself makes. So, Temple would say that the difference in the end is the difference which God Himself makes.

Here, Temple would come near to the Barthian view that "all is of God"; nor should we think that he would shrink from saying so, having made the following pronouncement about Re-union: "In a certain sense what is required is that every existing Christian communion should die in order to rise again into something more splendid than itself. But that points to the action of God beyond all that man can ever do, and in the end the reunion of the Church will not be something fabricated by us at all".¹ Elsewhere Temple states that the joy of heaven will be the joy of sinners converted. The difference, then, that the converted sinner makes by adding to the joy of heaven is, after all, the joy that God Himself makes by converting the sinner. Life hereafter, as life here and now, is the gift of God, and the glory which will be added to Him in Immortality will really be God Himself adding to His own glory. Of course Temple did not say all

¹. The Church Looks Forward, p.30.

this in these words, for he made no fine or clear-cut distinction between Time and Eternity. But, then, how could he? He regarded Time and Eternity as necessary correlates in an on-going process of Reality; and the difference which will be made will be the difference 'in relationships' in the eternal, creative order of that on-going process.

Permanence.

Temple's philosophical theology, then, appears to be so thorough-going, so consistent and intrinsically sound that any criticism must appear in the light of a critical appreciation rather than as a destructive critical analysis. A decade has passed since his untimely death, two decades have elapsed since he delivered his Gifford Lectures, and his theology still commands an established place on the curricula of schools and colleges of the English-speaking world; nor is it absent from the libraries of 'foreign' Universities. It begins to appear that his Theism will long remain as basic for theological study. It is a pity that the younger theological students, especially in America, think only in terms of Nature, Man and God when the name of Temple is mentioned. Since his theology appears destined to become 'standard' and enjoy that distinction along with the best, not only in English but also in German scholarship, it seems appropriate to point out a current lack in theological colleges. It is almost impossible to find the complete works of Temple in most Libraries of the American (including, of course, Canadian) Universities, and the student who would 'master' Temple has to have recourse to several. This chapter has had something to do with the question of 'wishing'. Temple often expressed the wish that somebody who was more competent than himself would come forward and answer a 'felt' need to which he

regarded it his duty to point. There is a great need for scholarship to do a thoroughgoing job of research and assimilation on the Theism of William Temple. No greater boon could be rendered for the young theological student of the English-speaking world than to have the immense contribution of his philosophical theology systematically arranged and compressed in approximately three volumes. Such an assimilation would meet the need of the student who cannot afford the time to 'wade' through his entire works, and no finer theology could conceivably be placed at his disposal.

Temple stands in the line of a great tradition. His name can be classed with the 'greats' of theological exposition and Christian apologetic - with Aquinas, Origen, Irenaeus, and Augustine. It is true that whereas Aquinas and Origen had a doctrine of the Scriptures, Temple has none; but he makes up for the lack in his overall contributions, and he has in addition to them a theory of history and his work is enhanced by a masterly treatment of the concept of evolution which for them was impossible. He has done for our time what Aquinas and Origen did for theirs; and in content and exposition of a "systematic", he stands alongside of Irenaeus or Augustine.

Temple never abandoned his 'first love' - philosophy -, but used it to advance his theistic claims. In the wide sweep of his treatment he has a message for this age which it is difficult to refute: a Living God, adequately at work in an on-going Church leavening society, individually and collectively, unto perfection. He has provided a basis equally sound for the faith of theology and intelligible for the reason of philosophy.

To-day the whole philosophic endeavour is casting around, with an emphasis on 'frames of reference', for a new structural basis on

which to raise an appropriate edifice which will testify to the nature and adequacy of envisioned Truth. Even Karl Barth could not go on saying things indefinitely without coming closer, as he does in his Dogmatics, to Temple's view of 'the dignity of man'.¹ Although Brunner's terminology is diametrically opposite to Temple's and he sets out from a starting-point exactly the reverse of Nature, Man and God in his 'Revelation and Reason', nevertheless it contains certain points of similarity with Temple's thinking. Upon the estimate of Temple's philosophical theology discoverable in the examination presented in this thesis it may be safe to predict that his CONSTRUCTIVE and COMPREHENSIVE ANALYTIC will provide, if not the main basis, at least one of the pillars, of the new structure.

1. Cf. David Cairns: The Image of God in Man, Chap.XVII, esp. pp.249-250.

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