The Human Process as a Spiritual Odyssey: Educational Implications of a Juxtaposition of Robert Kegan's Constructive-Developmental Model and Joseph Campbell's Interpretation of Hero Mythology.

Lisa Marie Comeau

Department of Religion and Philosophy in Education
McGill University
Montreal
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ABSTRACT

Robert Kegan follows in the constructive-developmental tradition of Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget. He presents his theory of human development as a "metapsychology" which addresses humans in their psychological, biological and philosophical aspects. For Kegan, meaning-making activity is the primary motion of the human developmental process.

Kegan's theory is juxtaposed with Joseph Campbell's interpretation of hero mythology. Striking parallels between the two models are revealed, yielding the conclusion that the process of human development can be understood as a spiritual journey, a hero's quest. The juxtaposition of these two models suggests that the ultimate purpose of the human process is self-transcendence.

Inherent in the claim that the goal of human development is self-transcendence are important implications for the nature, purpose and process of education. Although self-transcendence itself cannot be taught, the nourishment of those heroic qualities which may facilitate self-transcendence, can and must be an aim of education.

RÉSUMÉ

Les travaux de Robert Kegan s'inscrivent dans la tradition constructive-développementale de Lawrence Kohlberg et de Jean Piaget. Robert Kegan présente sa théorie du développement humain comme une "métapsychologie" qui tient compte des aspects psychologique, biologique et philosophique de l'être humain. Pour Kegan, l'activité signifiante est le geste fondamental du processus de développement humain.

La théorie de Kegan est juxtaposée à l'interpré de la mythologie du héros de Joseph Campbell. L'auteur établit de saisissants parallèles entre les deux modèles, ce qui l'amène à conclure que le processus de développement humain peut être perçu comme un cheminement spirituel ou un parcours de héros. La juxtaposition de ces deux modèles donne à penser que l'objectif ultime du développement humain est le dépassement de soi.

L'hypothèse voulant que la transcendance soit l'objectif du développement humain revêt une importance capitale au niveau de l'éducation et plus particulièrement au chapitre de sa nature, de sa vocation et de ses procédés. Même si la transcendance est une notion qu'il est impossible d'enseigner, l'éducation peut et doit privilégier l'acquisition de qualités héroïques susceptibles de favoriser le dépassement de soi.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, John and Diane, for loving me and supporting me on my own journey.

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There goes neither the eye, nor speech, nor the mind: we know It not; nor do we see how to teach one about It. Different It is from all that are known, and It is beyond the unknown as well.
(Kena Upanishad, 1:3, cited in Campbell, 1949, p. 191)

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INTRODUCTION

At its most fundamental level, this thesis concerns the human developmental process and the purpose that is inherent in it. The primary focus will be Robert Kegan's constructive-developmental theory. Kegan's theory follows in the tradition of Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget among others. However, Kegan maintains that his theory surpasses those of his predecessors in that it is a "metapsychology" which addresses itself to the biological, psychological and philosophical aspects of human development. It is philosophical, he claims, because it addresses the metaphysical context within which human development occurs, this context being the activity of meaning-making. By offering meaning-making activity as the essential motion of the human process, Kegan claims that his theory switches the figure/ground of earlier theories. For example, where the psychodynamic tradition interprets life events relative to infancy, Kegan proposes that all life events, including infancy, can be better understood against the "ground" of meaning-making activity. Using meaning-making activity as a metaphysical ground, Kegan claims that his theory turns into dialectics the dichotomies that exist in other theories. His framework considers the individual *in relation to* the social context; it bridges the gap between epistemology and ontology--the way we know the world defines who we *are* and what we feel.

For the purposes of this thesis, Kegan's most critical claim is that his theory is also about the spiritual or religious reality of human beings. Essentially, this claim will not be disputed in this thesis. However, Kegan's reasons for making this claim will be criticized, and a number of more legitimate reasons why Kegan's theory invites a spiritual interpretation will be suggested. Kegan goes as far as equating meaning-making activity with the "ground of Being" because it is the universal human activity through which people construct their psychological realities (1980, p. 437). It is on this basis that Kegan claims his theory has spiritual significance, because he maintains that meaning-making activity is "that life motion which [persons] do not share so much as it shares them" (1982, p.254).

It was stated above that most fundamentally, this thesis concerns the human process and purpose. The basic assertion is that humans are not only biological and psychological in nature, but spiritual as well and that the ultimate human purpose is of a spiritual nature--it is the transcendence of the biological, psychological and philosophical construct known as "self" through the recognition of the essential unity of all things. In order to support both this assertion and the critique of Kegan's similar claim, Kegan's theory will be juxtaposed with Joseph Campbell's interpretation of hero mythology. To facilitate this juxtaposition, the first two chapters of this thesis will be purely expositional. Chapter

One will constitute a presentation of Kegan's theory, and Chapter Two will introduce Joseph Campbell's interpretation of hero mythology.

In Chapter Three, it will be shown that there are striking similarities between Kegan's and Campbell's theories. It will be proposed that the human developmental process, as Kegan presents it, strongly parallels the hero's journey as Campbell presents it. Both processes are explicitly claimed to be both psychological and spiritual. Furthermore, the cycle of death and rebirth of self is present explicitly in Campbell's theory, and, it will be proposed, implicitly in Kegan's. Indeed, it will be suggested that this death and rebirth of self can be understood as the ultimate purpose which informs the process of human development. It is out of this parallel that the fundamental statement of this thesis arises: the human developmental process is a spiritual odyssey.

Drawing from the work of Campbell, James Fowler, Gabriel Moran and P.B. Walsh, the legitimacy of Kegan's claim about the spiritual import of his theory will be questioned. Kegan's concept of meaning will be considered, as will the notion of "meaning-making". Also to be considered is the paradoxical nature of Kegan's final "Interindividual" developmental balance; the developmental process which Kegan maintains is one of continual refinements and definitions of what is self and what is other, ends with a balance wherein

self is realized to be a mere construct--where self becomes non-self. Each of these considerations will support the conclusion that Kegan's reasons for claiming that his theory addresses itself to the spiritual reality of human persons are inadequate. At the same time, these considerations suggest interesting ways Kegan's theory might be interpreted and developed in order to more legitimately make this claim.

Inherent in any statement about the human process and purpose are implications for the nature, purpose and process of education. This will be the focus of the final chapter of this thesis. Referring to Paulo Freire, Gabriel Moran and Sam Keen, it will be suggested that education is a lifelong process in which every person is both teacher and student, and which is inherently political and moral in nature. Furthermore, it will be suggested that education must address itself not only to mundane reality, but also to the ultimate spiritual purpose of transcending self and recognizing the essential unity of all things. It will be maintained that since self-transcendence--recognition of this essential unity --is of an order which is beyond logic and rationality, it can only be directly experienced, and not directly taught. However, the "heroic" qualities of humility, acceptance, faith, courage and love can be nourished, thus facilitating self-transcendence. Precisely this, it will be suggested, may be the ultimate pedagogical purpose.

Finally, the reader is asked to note the recurrence

throughout this thesis of the metaphor of a journey and the motif of the still point and the dance. These are significant if only because they do, in fact, appear in significantly different theoretical contexts represented by several authors referred to in this thesis. The metaphor of a journey is most obvious; indeed, as already noted, the fundamental statement in this thesis is that human development *is* a spiritual journey. From this perspective, a human life becomes an exciting adventure filled with intrigue and suspense, the sheer experience of which makes it worthwhile. As Joseph Campbell suggests, people are not really looking for meaning in life; rather they seek "the rapture of being alive" (cited in Flowers, 1988, p.5).

The metaphor of a dance also surfaces in a number of ways throughout this thesis, and is offered as a different way to think of human development. The most intriguing dance motif for the purposes of this thesis, is T.S. Eliot's paradox of the still point and the dance. Kegan borrows the title of his main statement on the religious implications of his theory from this motif, claiming that his theory is as much about the still point as it is about the dance. As has been noted, Kegan equates meaning-making activity with the ground of Being, and suggests that this *is* the still point where the dance is (1980, p. 437). Once again, it has been noted that it is precisely this point that is the focus of criticism in this thesis, for it is maintained that the still point cannot

be captured in theory. It cannot be explained or taught, but can only be directly experienced. Again, it is T.S. Eliot who reminds us that

> For most of us, this is the aim
> Never here to be realized;
> Who are only undefeated
> Because we have gone on trying...
> (The Dry Salvages,V)
> For us, there is only the trying. The rest is
> not our business.
> (East Coker, V)
> (cited in Steindl-Rast, 1983, p.22)

CHAPTER ONE

Robert Kegan's Constructive-Developmental Framework

Robert Kegan is a professor, researcher, and therapist in association with Harvard Graduate School of Education and Massachussetts School of Professional Psychology. His background is quite diverse including work in literature and Judaic studies as well as philosophy, psychology and education. As he writes of himself, "I am not alone a professional. I have been told it helps to know about me that I am a father; influenced by the Hasidic expression of Judaism; an airplane pilot; a Woody Allen fan; a magician since adolescence; and a pretty fair kite flyer" (Kegan, 1980, p. 440).

The primary focus of this chapter will be Kegan's model of human development, the main source being his 1982 book, The Evolving Self. In the first section of this chapter, a brief consideration of the history of his model will be presented, focussing specifically on the influence of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg. The second section will consist of a presentation of Kegan's understanding of the religious dimensions of his own model, referring primarily

to his piece "There the Dance Is: Religious Dimensions of a Developmental Framework" (1980).

History

As Kegan understands it, the discipline of psychology, with the exception of strict behaviourist theory, is fundamentally about meaning, and about the "zone of mediation where meaning is made" (1982, p. 2), that is, "that most human of 'regions' *between* an event and a reaction to it - the place where the event is privately composed, made sense of, the place where it actually *becomes* an event for that person" (1982, p. 2). Within this context, Kegan suggests that the two most influential schools of psychology are the neo-psychoanalytic school, including neo-psychoanalytic object relations, and second, the existential-phenomenological tradition. Yet despite the significance he ascribes to both of these traditions, Kegan is unsatisfied with each of them in themselves. He is critical of the neo-analytic school for its inability to synthesize the conservative Anna Freud's concept of the self-protective function of the ego with the more progressive Heinz Hartmann's notion of ego as adaptive. According to Kegan, these two concepts could not be integrated

> so long as the anxiety Anna Freud's defensive ego sought to ward off could only lead, if unchecked, to the ego's breakdown. A conception of growth tied to the ego's very activity of making meaning was needed before growth and breakthrough could be seen as a possible consequence of the ego's breakdown. (1982, p. 6)

Kegan is equally critical of the existential-phenomenological tradition, albeit on different grounds. Referring to Carl Rogers as a representative of this tradition, he notes the explicit attention given to the "actualizing tendency", an intrinsic process of adaptation and growth which gives rise to the 'self' (1982, p. 4-5). Kegan raises, however, a number of important questions that are apparently unasked let alone answered by Rogers' theory. For instance, why is there no consideration of the history of developments--the commonalities and differences between different moments in the developmental process? How is it that while adaptation is traditionally about both differentiation and integration, Rogers focusses only on differentiation--development toward autonomy (1982, p. 5)? Kegan concludes his criticism with a consideration of Rogers' approach to therapy:

> Rogers' many discussions of "unconditional positive regard" and its expression by the counsellor are at a level of exposition that

> provides more warmth than light, quickly ascending to quasi-religious piety. It is the bane of humanistic psychology in general that at precisely those moments when its powerful and transforming ideas need the protection of rigorous explication it becomes only musical and loses its voice. (1982, p. 6)

In an attempt to compensate for the incompleteness of these two schools, Kegan points to a third tradition for consideration, the "constructive-developmental" school. He cites James Mark Baldwin, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead as forerunners of this tradition, and names Jean Piaget as its central figure (1982, p. 4). Kegan asserts that while this school has traditionally been understood as dealing only with cognitive development and ignoring the emotional experiences of development, that "its root metaphors and premises may actually make it better equipped to deal with the very issues central to those psychologies which have been most influential to the therapeutic enterprise" (1982, p. 7), for it focusses on the *process* of development itself, on the *interactions* that take place between the person and the environment, and "integrates [the notions of the previously mentioned schools] into a consistent theoretical whole" (1982, p. 7).

Jean Piaget

Kegan notes that Piaget is understood to "be about" stages of cognitive development in the way that Newton "is about" gravity. But he suggests that Piaget's work is far more significant than this. Kegan borrows the following metaphor from William Perry: that Piaget's resolutions to the problem of cognitive development are really a Trojan horse concealing a much more powerful army (1982, p. 42), namely that the process of evolution is the process of meaning-making activity (1982, p. 42). Kegan believes that Piaget's work explodes the psychoanalytic understanding of each individual as an autonomous biological system possessing its own "inherited code that unfolds...along a largely predetermined path or sequence" (1982, p. 43). This exists--yes; but it exists within a larger framework.

> Piaget's vision derives from a model of open-systems evolutionary biology. Rather than locating the life force in the closed individual or the environmental press, it locates a *prior context* [italics added] which continually elaborates the distinction between the individual and the environment in the first place....it does not place an energy system within us so much as it places us in a single energy system of all living things. Its primary attention, then, is not to

> shifts and changes in an internal equilibrium, but to an equilibrium in the world, between the progressively individuated self and the bigger life field, an interaction sculpted by both and constitutive of reality itself. (Kegan, 1982, p. 43)

Through his years of research, Piaget defined four stages of cognitive development spanning the period from birth to adolescence (Piaget, 1972, 1973). The first is the sensorimotor era (0-2 years) in which the infant develops from being unable to distinguish between self and other, to an understanding that there is an external environment which exists independently of him/herself. In the second phase, the pre-operational era (2-5 years), the small child is unaware that the external world operates according to fixed laws of physics. The toddler accepts his/her perceptions of the world as the truth of the world. During the third phase, the concrete operational phase (6-10 years), the child learns that there exist stable categories or classes of things; for instance, that wooden beads can include both white beads and black beads (Langer cited in Kegan, 1982, p. 41), and that there are certain physical laws, such as the law of invariance, which rule physical things. The classic Piagetian study demonstrating the difference between the pre-operational and concrete operational levels of cognitive development works this way: a child is shown two

identically shaped beakers filled with equal amounts of water. The water from one beaker is then poured into a third beaker which is taller and thinner, resulting, therefore, in a perceptibly higher water level. The preoperational child thinks there is more water in the taller beaker because it *looks* like there is more. Furthermore, this child has no problem thinking that the water becomes less when it is poured back into the smaller beaker again. This preoperational child is unable to understand that the volume of water actually remains the same and that the properties of the beakers make the amount *appear* to change. The concrete operational child, however, is capable of understanding that taller and thinner "cancels out" shorter and wider. This older child understands that the volume of water does not change; s/he has the capacity for "reversibility", the ability to move back and forth between perceptions (Kegan, 1982, p. 28). The final stage is that of formal operational thought (11 years-adulthood). It is during this period that a person becomes aware of the rules of logic and is able to reason about reasoning, to think on a purely abstract level.

For Piaget, this cognitive-developmental pattern is innate; it unfolds naturally as a matter of genetics. Indeed, Piaget referred to himself not as a psychologist, but as a "genetic epistemologist" (Piaget, 1970, 1972). As noted above, however, Kegan sees far more than the

delineament of these stages in Piaget's work. As we will see in the forthcoming section on Kegan's model, he proposes three fundamental re-interpretations of Piaget's theory:

> first, that each of his stages is plausibly the consequence of a given subject-object balance, or evolutionary truce; and second, that the process of movement is plausibly the evolutionary motion of differentiation (or emergence from embeddedness) and reintegration (relation to, rather than embeddedness in, the world);...[and third] that this evolutionary motion is the prior (or grounding) phenomenon in personality; that this process or activity, this adaptive conversation, is the very source of, and the unifying context for, thought and feeling. (1982, p. 39-43)

Finally, as noted above, Kegan believes that this evolutionary process is the activity of meaning-making. "Meaning is, in its origins, a physical activity (grasping, seeing), a social activity (it requires another), a survival activity (in doing it, we live). *Meaning, understood in this way, is the primary human motion, irreducible* [italics added]." (Kegan, 1982, p. 18-19)

It is at this point that Piaget's model ends and Kegan's begins. But before moving directly to a presentation of Kegan's theory, a brief consideration of

Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development is warranted.

Lawrence Kohlberg

Lawrence Kohlberg is very well known for his research into the development of moral reasoning. As Piaget did with cognitive development, Kohlberg devised a stage model of moral development in which he conceives of moral judgment as progressing through three levels, each with two stages. The first level, the preconventional level, is the most basic one consisting of Stage 1, the "punishment and obedience orientation", and stage 2, the "instrumental relativist orientation". In this first level, moral value resides primarily in physical circumstances rather than in persons or rules and standards. The second level is the conventional level, comprised of Stage 3, the "interpersonal concordance of 'good boy - nice girl' orientation", and Stage 4, the "law and order orientation". At this level, morality is a matter of conforming to and actively maintaining the existing social order. Finally, the postconventional, autonomous or principled level includes Stage 5, the "social-contract legalistic orientation" and Stage 6, the "universal ethical principle orientation". This is the only level where moral judgments can be made independently of concerns of physical punishment or reward,

or group authority concerns. At this level, autonomous moral principles guide moral judgments (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 164-165).

Although this chapter is not the appropriate venue for a detailed exposition, it must be noted that Kohlberg's research methods as well as his conclusions have been criticized by several authors (Falikowski, 1982; Gilligan, 1983; Moran, 1981, 1983; Peters, 1971; Sullivan, 1978) not so much for being incorrect, as for being incomplete. For more detailed accounts of these criticisms, the reader is referred to the sources cited above.

The main reason for considering Kohlberg's work in this chapter is to present Kegan's suggestion that the stages of moral development, as Kohlberg presents them, coincide with the stages of cognitive development as Piaget presents them and further, that "these [moral meanings] are plausibly the consequence of the same basic motion which...is the fundamental motion in personality itself" (1982, p. 50), namely, meaning-making activity. Kegan's main point vis-a-vis Kohlberg's work is that the process of meaning-making occurs not only in the physical-cognitive domain, but also in the social-cognitive domain where morality operates. In the same way as different stages of cognitive development allow for different ways of knowing the physical world, different stages of moral development yield different ways of knowing the social world. In Kegan's words,

> each of Kohlberg's stages, like each of Piaget's may be the consequence of a single underlying process of evolution, an evolution that is imagined to go on not within the body alone but within the life-surround, an evolution which continually reconstructs the relationship of the organism to this bigger environment, an evolution more of the mind than of the brain." (1982, 71-72)

Having thus far considered Kegan's roots in constructive-developmental theory, it is now time to move on to an exposition of Kegan's own model.

Robert Kegan's Model

Kegan's theory is not primarily a stage-progression theory of human development, therefore lengthy discussion of the various evolutionary balances presented in The Evolving Self is not required in this chapter. Rather, it is the metaphysical context or framework of development which will be the main focus. What is human development all about? What are the more fundamental aspects of human development and how do they interact with each other throughout the developmental process? Finally, what might be the implications of Kegan's theory beyond the realm of applied psychology?

The essence of Kegan's theory of human development can be expressed in one simple sentence: The development of a human being is the life-long process of meaning-making activity. In his own words, "'person' is understood to refer as much to an activity as to a thing - an ever progressive motion engaged in giving itself a new form" (Kegan, 1982, p. 7-8).

Implied in both of these sentences are the two "Big Ideas" [sic] of constructivism and developmentalism--the two theories which Kegan sees as highly influential, almost omnipresent throughout the past century of intellectual life. Kegan refers to such authors as Marx, Darwin, Freud, Hegel, Whitehead and Dewey among others noted in the previous section, as thinkers who made monumental contributions using the two notions of constructivism and developmentalism (Kegan, 1982, p. 8-13). These are the same two theories out of which Kegan synthesizes his own theory of constructive-developmentalism.

Constructivism is the theory that "persons or systems constitute or construct reality" (Kegan, 1982, p. 8). To provide an illustration, Kegan turns to perception. "Ambiguous figures" are trick pictures which can be interpreted as two entirely different images. The point is that although two people can see two completely different images, the actual ink on the paper is the same. The two perceptions are not, therefore, the property of the picture

itself; rather, it must be concluded that the people seeing the picture participate in the very construction of their own perceptions. In Kegan's words, "the picture is not so much on the page...as it is composed in the metaphysical 'space between' the page and a meaning-making organism--namely, [the person looking at the picture]" (1982, p. 10-11).

A human being, or being human, is an activity. It is a dynamic rather than a static condition. It is the activity of meaning-making. "There is thus no feeling, no experience, no thought, no perception, independent of a meaning-making context in which it *becomes* a feeling, an experience, a thought, a perception, because we *are* the meaning-making context" (1982, p. 11).

Kegan recalls Herbert Fingarette's recognition that "meaning-making" can refer to the "'scientific process of developing a logical, reliably interpretable and systematically predictive theory' or to an 'existential process of generating a new vision which shall serve as the context of a new commitment'" (1982, p. 11). As implied in the previous section on the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, Kegan sees the validity of connecting meaning-making with the construction of a logical system; indeed, from this perspective, the activity of meaning-making is naturally epistemological. Recall, as well, Kegan's criticism of the existential-phenomenological tradition's inability to make

many solid claims because of their theoretical and methodological weaknesses. As suggested in the previous section, Kegan believes his reinterpretation of Piaget's constructive-developmental theory can legitimize and provide theoretical grounding for both of these approaches to meaning-making. Indeed, as he often asserts, "'meaning' [refers to a] simultaneously epistemological and ontological activity; it is about knowing *and* being, about theory-making *and* investments and commitments of the self" (Kegan, 1982, p. 45).

Developmentalism is the theory that "organic systems evolve throughout qualitatively different eras according to regular principles of stability and change" (Kegan, 1982, p. 13). This statement, in itself, needs no further elucidation. Recall, however, the reference in the beginning of this chapter, to the significance of such varied schools of psychology as the neo-psychoanalytic tradition with its primarily affective focus, and the cognitive-developmental tradition with its predominantly cognitive focus; Kegan sees developmentalism as fundamental to both of these traditions. Furthermore, as Kegan seeks to justify two different yet equally relevant conceptions of meaning-making, so does he propose that affective and cognitive development are two aspects of one and the same process. He writes:

> evolutionary activity is intrinsically cognitive, but is it no less affective; we *are* this activity and we experience it. Affect is essentially phenomenological, the felt experience of a motion (hence 'e-motion'). In identifying evolutionary activity as the fundamental ground of personality I am suggesting that the source of our emotions is the phenomenological experience of evolving - of defending, surrendering, and reconstructing a center." (Kegan, 1982, p. 81-82)

Kegan calls, therefore, for a metapsychology that will address itself to the biological, psychological and philosophical aspects of humans, and which will contribute to the understanding of the relationship between the psychological and the social, the past and the present, emotion and thought. "No new light on these or similar polarities will emerge until we are able to locate - philosophically, psychologically, and biologically; theoretically and empirically - a broader context in personality in which to reconstruct the questions" (Kegan, 1982, p. 15). Kegan proposes that his theory of constructive-developmentalism is such a metapsychology and, as has been seen, that the "broader context in personality" is the development of the activity of meaning-making.

Before moving on to consider the elements that are actually involved in human development, it is necessary to

note explicitly one of the more important contributions of the notions of constructivism and developmentalism, namely that both ideas afford a dynamic rather than a static view of phenomena. Both ideas focus on process and dialectic as opposed to entity and dichotomy. Without a clear understanding of the primacy of this notion of ongoing interaction, the essence of Kegan's thought will not be captured.

There are two main elements in the process of human development: the person developing and the "culture of embeddedness" or the "life-surround" in the context of which development takes place. In Kegan's words,

> "Individual" names a current state of evolution, a stage, a maintained balance or defended differentiation; "person" refers to the fundamental motion of evolution itself, and is as much about that side of the self embedded in the life-surround as that which is individuated from it. (1982, p. 116)

The individual lives in made meaning; the person is actively engaged in making meaning.

The culture of embeddedness is the real-world context in which human evolution occurs. It is a psychosocial environment (recall the tension between the psychological and the social to be addressed by metapsychology). It "is the *particular form* [italics added] of the world in which

the person is, at this moment in his or her evolution, embedded....'Culture' here is meant to evoke both an accumulating history and mythology and something grown in a medium in a Petri dish" (Kegan, 1982, p. 115-116).

As has been seen, human evolution is about meaning-making. In terms of the person and the culture of embeddedness, evolution is the process of distinguishing self from other. It is the ongoing process of a person engaged in differentiation from and reintegration of the culture of embeddedness. It is about the definition of personal boundaries. This understanding of human development gives rise to a recognition of a dialectical tension between person and culture of embeddedness; each implies the other. From this perspective, the person cannot *be*--cannot make meaning--in isolation from this culture. Self cannot *be* without other because its very definition is relative to other. There is a necessary relationship between the person and the life-surround, and as each changes throughout the developmental process, so too does the relationship itself evolve.

This notion of a fundamental connection between person and culture of embeddedness is apparent in Kegan's discussion of object relations. Kegan turns to etymology to define "object" as "that which some motion has made separate or distinct from, or to the motion itself" (1982, p. 76). From this perspective, he argues that "object relations" is

concerned with a person's relations with that which some motion has made separate from him or her, and/or to the separating motion itself. Given his thesis that the evolutionary motion of meaning-making is the prior context of personality, Kegan concludes that

> evolutionary activity involves the very creating of the object (a process of differentiation) as well as our relating to it (a process of integration). By such a conception, object relations (really, subject-object relations) are not something that go on in the "space" between a worldless person and a personless world; rather they bring into being the very distinction in the first place. Subject-object relations emerge out of a life-long process of development: a succession of qualitative differentiations of self from the world, with a qualitatively more extensive object with which to be in relation created each time;...successive triumphs of "relationship to" rather than "embeddedness in". (1982, p. 77)

The discussion thus far has centered on the necessary relationship between the person and the life-surround, and on the person's activity of differentiating self from other. But what of the culture of embeddedness itself--does it

remain passive throughout this process or does it play an active role in the drama of human evolution?

Kegan ascribes three functions to the culture of embeddedness: it must support the person in his/her evolutionary truce, it must allow the person to move out of the balance, and it must remain available to be reintegrated as object (no longer subject) and related to. This three-part structure is very important both to Kegan's thesis and to this thesis, for, as will be seen in Chapter 3, this is a major point of similarity between the two models considered in this thesis.

The very idea that development is the process of differentiating self from other implies that self is, in some way, confused with other. By allowing this symbiotic attachment to exist, the culture of embeddedness is performing its first function, namely the holding or supporting of the person in an evolutionary truce. The culture thus acknowledges the balance the person has struck between self and other. It recognizes the person in his/her current mode of meaning-making and functions as a good "evolutionary host", nourishing him/her in the balance.

Because the activity of meaning-making is "a naturally scientific method...which is intrinsic to personality" (Kegan, 1982, p. 30), the person, barring abnormal circumstances, is naturally impelled to move beyond the evolutionary truce in which s/he lives. This amounts to no

less than leaving his/her understanding of self behind and finding a new balance--a new way of relating to a new world --a new self. This transition phase can be a frightening time filled not only with anxiety, but with a real sense of loss on the parts of both the evolving person, and the culture of embeddedness. Thus, the second function, that of letting go, is arguably the most difficult, yet simultaneously the most crucial of the three functions performed by the culture of embeddedness, because it is precisely this function which allows for the evolutionary motion to unfold naturally. It is vital to the healthy continuation of a person's life project that the culture of embeddedness recognize the proper time to cease holding and to allow, even to assist, the person in moving on to the next balance.

Finally, the culture of embeddedness, which was recently confused with self, must remain in place to be recognized and reintegrated as other. As will be noted in the final section of this chapter, Kegan sees this as vital in terms of community. It is important that the loss experienced during a transition between balances is recoverable; if it is not, the whole life project is jeopardized because movement and growth represent simply a loss of self rather than a refinement or reconstitution of self. Kegan states that the

> most striking feature [of evolution and its experience] is its depiction of growth as involving more than a new relationship between self and other; it involves a new *construction* of self and other; it involves a redrawing of the line where I stop and you begin, a redrawing that eventually consists in a qualitatively new guarantee to you of your distinctness from me (permitting at the same time a qualitatively "larger" you with which to be in relation). (1982, p. 131)

In using the terms evolutionary "balance" or "truce" rather than "stage", Kegan makes a number of important implications. First is the implication, once again, of motion. If a thing is in balance, in equilibrium, there is a possibility that it could fall out of balance, into disequilibrium. Moreover, being in balance is a rather precarious position--one which takes much effort to maintain. A stage, on the other hand, is of a much more fixed and static nature. A second implication in the words "balance/truce" is that of a struggle. A truce is a temporary lull in an ongoing battle and, like a condition of equilibrium, is not easily preserved.

If there is a struggle, what is its nature? It is primarily an inner struggle concerning the very structure of the person. One can only live in a given evolutionary

balance for so long before s/he becomes aware that "*something is fundamentally wrong* about the way [s/he] is being in the world" (Kegan, 1982, p. 41). Through one's dealings with the world, one is confronted with the limits of the way s/he constructs meaning. The natural inclination is to move forward--to construct a more sophisticated way of making meaning, one that can effectively handle the complexities of life. Yet at the same time however, there is a reluctance, a fear even, of losing one's self in the process. In Kegan's words,

> Ultimacy is the issue in every shift. Phenomenologically, it seems that our way of making meaning is to us, not merely an adequate way of construing the world, but the most adequate construction; and it is this feeling that makes the crisis-inducing discrepancy so threatening. It raises the possibility of making relative what [had been] taken for ultimate." (1982, p. 207)

To clarify the notion of "ultimacy", it must be pointed out that it refers to the notion that any given truce is both epistemological and ontological in nature. The result is, therefore, that an individual not only understands the world according to his or her current evolutionary balance, but *is* that balance. Evolutionary movement can seem at first to be threatening to one's very self. It is interesting to note here Kegan's suggestion that the Chinese

capture the essence of this evolutionary struggle in their depiction of the word "crisis"; it consists of two characters, one meaning danger, the other meaning opportunity (1982, p. 63).

At this point it will be most helpful to present the helix model which Kegan uses to illustrate his theory of development. This model (see Figure 1) shows the direction in which human beings grow. The process of evolution is one which moves "upward" through a hierarchy of evolutionary phases. But in addition to this upward direction, it oscillates between truces favouring differentiation or independence as the dominant approach to meaning-construction, and those favouring integration or inclusion as the basic way of being in the world. The diagrammatic presentation of constructive-developmentalism helps to clarify the notion that there is one common thread running throughout the developmental process, namely the activity of meaning-making. Kegan proposes a shift of figure and ground from the psychoanalytic tradition which holds that the issues of differentiation and integration, as they arise throughout life, can be understood in terms of infancy and childhood. Instead, constructive-developmentalism understands the issues of infancy and childhood, as well as those of adolescence and adulthood--indeed all of the *life* issues--in terms of differentiation and integration--in



Figure 1. Robert Kegan's helix model of evolutionary truces. (1982, p. 109)

terms of a particular type of balance between self and other.

Although, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, lengthy elaboration on the intricacies of each evolutionary balance is not required in this chapter, a very brief overview of them is warranted. In the first truce, the incorporative phase, the infant is embedded in his/her reflexes. S/he *is* his/her physicality and makes no distinction between self and other (Kegan, 1982, p. 113-132). In the next stage, the impulsive stage, the toddler is now embedded in his/her perceptions and impulses. S/he has differentiated from and reintegrated his/her reflexes (Kegan, 1982, p. 133-160). By the third stage, the imperial stage, the child no longer *is* perception and impulse; s/he now *has* them and is embedded in his/her own needs. This is an over-differentiated phase wherein the child experiments with his own freedom and independence, power and agency (Kegan, 1982, p. 161-183). These first three balances can be seen to be primarily physical; the culture of embeddedness still consists of the very small group of family and peers, and is still necessary for the actual physical survival of the child.

The adolescent in the interpersonal balance is *subject* to his/her relationships. This is an over-integrated balance in which the person is psychologically fused with his/her "significant others". S/he *is* his/her relationships

(Kegan, 1982, p. 184-220). As an example, an adolescent girl is her boyfriend's girlfriend, her parents' daughter, her teachers' student. As a young adult in the institutional phase, the same girl now *has* a relationship with her boyfriend and parents and teachers. Significantly, this balance marks the first appearance of both a *self-conscious* self, and of ideology. It is an intrinsically political balance wherein the self-organization mediates all elements of life (Kegan, 1982, p. 221-254). These two stages, the interpersonal and the institutional, can be seen to be predominantly psycho-social phases since it is at this level that the self is confused with other.

The final stage is the interindividual stage. In this balance, the self-as-system of the previous balance has been refined into self that *has* a system. The interindividual person is capable, for the first time, of true intimacy. This person no longer *mediates* other people through the organization s/he is, but rather *relates to* them as other individuals (Kegan, 1982, p. 221-254). This balance may be understood as a philosophical one.

As has been seen throughout this chapter, the person is physical/biological, psychological and philosophical throughout his or her lifetime. However, it interesting to note that the six evolutionary balances can be broadly conceived of as physical first, then psycho-social, and finally philosophical. First, these classifications are

similar to those of Piaget and Kohlberg as seen earlier. Second, it should be recalled that these are the three elements of the metapsychology Kegan presents. Finally, since this thesis will suggest in Chapter 3 that the human process is ultimately a spiritual one, it is interesting to note that this progression is quite reminiscent of Jesuit theologian Teilhard de Chardin's vision of evolutionary unfolding (1959).

Having considered each truce itself, it is now important to consider the common nature of all truces. In the discussion above of the ultimacy of a balance, there was an implicit recognition of the strengths, the limits and the integrity of each evolutionary truce. Each derives its strength from the fact that it enables the person living in it to relate to the world as an object from his/her particular perspective. But each balance is limited by virtue of its being *over*-integrated or *over*-differentiated. In this way, each truce places a restriction on the way the person makes meaning--on what is accepted as subject and what is recognized as object. Every balance is the hard-won result of evolutionary struggle. It is a new structure built upon the foundation of former ways of being in the world, and it is pregnant with the potential for further growth, for finer distinctions of what is self and what is other.

Finally, there is a normative element built into the constructive-developmentalist understanding of human development. The claim that all persons have integrity, that no one person is better than another, is reminiscent of of cultural or ethical relativism, according to which there is no nonarbitrary basis for judging anything. As Kegan so aptly notes, this position confuses integrity with validity, a confusion which can be rectified by his constructive-developmental approach. By attending to the person in the evolutionary process, the statement can be made that all persons have integrity. At the same time however, the limits of the person's "made-meaning" and the potential for growth beyond this confining situation must be recognized. As Kegan phrases it, "persons cannot be more or less good than each other; the *person* has an unqualified integrity. But stages or evolutionary balances (the structure of made meanings) can be more or less good than each other; stages have a qualified validity" (1982, p. 292).

As noted earlier, Kegan offers his theory as a metapsychology--one which considers the person in his/her biological, psychological and philosophical entirety, with the underlying framework or context being the evolutionary activity of meaning-making. Furthermore, Kegan claims that there is a normative aspect to human development. As he states so precisely:

> The framework suggests a demonstrable conception of development as the process of "natural philosophy", later stages being "better", not on the grounds that they come later, but on the philosophical grounds of their having a greater truth value. The popular psychological notions of greater differentiation and greater integration as goals are here given a substantive and justifiable meaning. Each new evolutionary truce further differentiates the self from its embeddedness in the world, guaranteeing, in a qualitatively new way, the world's distinct integrity, and thereby creating a more integrated relationship to the world. Each new truce accomplishes this by the evolution of a reduced subject and a greater object for the subject to take, an evolution of lesser subjectivity and greater objectivity, an evolution that is more "truthful"....
>
> [Truth] is an activity, an activity of relation or balance. And from a psychological point of view, it is the same activity as personality. (1982, p. 294)

Before moving on to the last section of this chapter, there remains one final point to consider, namely Kegan's conclusion that the notion of the unconscious, as presented by the psychodynamic tradition, is invalid. This point will

prove central to the juxtaposition in Chapter 3 of Kegan's theory against that of Joseph Campbell.

Kegan's Critique of the Unconscious

In his 1977 doctoral dissertation, Ego and Truth: The Piaget Paradigm, Kegan presents essentially the same model of human development as has been presented in this chapter based on his 1982 book, The Evolving Self. However, one significant assertion is made in the dissertation which does not appear in the book or in any other of Kegan's writings. Since his presentation of the model itself has not changed, it can only be assumed that the point made in the dissertation remains to be seriously considered. The assertion in question, is that if one accepts that the basic human evolutionary motion is one of meaning-making, and that this motion is the prior context of personality and is constitutive of reality itself, then the notion of the unconscious as presented by the psychodynamic tradition must be re-considered.

Kegan does not deny that people encounter situations which they do not wholly engage and that this unwillingness to deal with certain things is motivated by the urge for self-protection. Nor does he deny "that categories like 'the defenses', 'selective inattention', or 'repression' speak to real phenomena or activity; the disagreement is

over what such terms shall mean" (1977, p. 357). More specifically, he asks

> what is the ontic status of this denied "material" presumed to be? More simply put: *Is* it? And if so, how? All so-called psychodynamic psychologies which speak of the unconscious do presume it to be. Repressed material exists; it is "residual"; it *resides*. Perhaps the most radical implication of the Piaget paradigm as constructed in this thesis is its claim to a unity of operations within personality. That unity is constituitive [*sic*] activity. Constituitive [*sic*] activity is not "consciousness" to the exclusion of that activity or domain psychodynamic psychology associates with the "unconscious". The root premise behind a consideration of constitutive [*sic*] activity as prior is that experience, per se, is not "met" by the individual at all. A person may be said to meet "opportunities" for experience, but personality is itself creative of experience; it constitutes it....[So] can [experience which is said to be "cut off"] exist if it was never "there", never "made"? (Kegan, 1977, p. 357-358)

Kegan suggests that the psychodynamic understanding of the unconscious is that of a "'basement', a subterranean

metaphysical space where that cut-off material is said to reside, contemporaneously with consciousness, impinging indirectly upon consciousness" (1977, p. 359). Furthermore, he asserts that this notion of the unconscious and his own understanding of development as meaning-making activity which yields increasingly more refined definitions of self and other, are incompatible. Kegan accepts that any evolutionary balance may include vestiges of past balances which, for some reason, have not been re-integrated into the newer constitution. But he cannot accept that this material somehow "knows better" than a person's current construction of meaning. In conclusion, Kegan proposes to integrate the psychodynamic tradition with his own constructive-developmental one by

> [bringing] the basement to the constituitive [sic] apparatus. Our conception suggests that "repressed material" occupies no metaphysical space in the activity of personality. It is not there. What it could be said to "occupy"...is a metaphysical *time*: i.e., the future is the "unconscious" of the present....Is [a person's] defending, an action against something that is already "in" him...or is he defending that balance which *is* him against those impingements which threaten that balance? (1977, p. 362)

Thus, Kegan poses an interesting question concerning the nature of the unconscious. However, in the interests of clarity, this question must be temporarily abandoned in order that the exposition of Kegan's theory be completed. This question will, however, be taken up again in Chapter 3 where it will be more closely analysed and criticized.

Thus far, this chapter has been an exposition of Kegan's theory of human development. To complete this presentation of Kegan's theory, the final section will be a consideration of his view of the religious dimensions of his own theory as presented in "There the Dance Is: Religious Dimensions of a Developmental Framework" (1980).

Kegan's Understanding of the Religious Dimensions of his Own Model

Kegan borrows his title "There the Dance Is: Religious Dimensions of a Developmental Framework" from T.S. Eliot's "Burnt Norton", the first of his Four Quartets (1943).

> At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless; Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is....
> Except for the point, the still point, There would be no dance, and there is only the dance. (Eliot, 1943 p. 6)

For Kegan, the dance is the evolutionary motion of meaning-making activity, "the restless creative motion of life itself, which is not first of all 'individual' *or* 'world', 'organism' *or* 'environment', but is the source of each" (1980, p. 407). Furthermore, by quoting this passage from Eliot, Kegan implies that the still point is as central to his theory as is the dance. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, this will prove to be a central point of criticism of Kegan's thoughts in Chapter 3.

As has been seen in the previous section, Kegan posits meaning-making as the logically prior context of personality, and claims that this prior context has biological, psychological, social and philosophical meaning. In addition, Kegan goes further and also claims that this context has a religious meaning. It must be noted explicitly at this point, that Kegan is unclear about the meaning he ascribes to the words "religious" and "spiritual". Yet for the sake of clarity, Kegan's ideas will simply be presented in this section, and the question of terminology will be taken up again in more detail in Chapter 3.

Kegan writes:

> It should be clear that in suggesting religious or spiritual, dimensions to the framework, I will not be tacking anything onto the framework or speaking from its periphery; rather, I will be speaking

> from its heart. I will be suggesting that the *same* reality said to be philosophically real, and socially real, is also "religiously" real, that it partakes of the numinous...the graceful...the holy, the transcendent...and the oneness of all life. (1980, p. 409)

In order to expose this religious dimension of his model, to show how it is about an "ever-expanding relationship...of the meaning-we-compose to the ground of being which is doing the composing" (Kegan, 1980, p. 411), Kegan considers the following three phenomena: first, the universal tension between the longing to be included, integrated, and the longing to be distinct, autonomous; second, the universal and recurring experience of losing and recovering a sense of meaning and order in life; and finally, the universal need to be recognized (1980, p. 411). For the sake of clarity, the same order will be followed in this presentation.

Inclusion/Independence

As seen briefly in the previous section of this chapter, the urge for inclusion and independence are both characteristic of three phases of Kegan's six-phase helix model. It is significant however, that the truces *alternate* between these two general approaches to meaning; this

movement is itself evidence of the tension Kegan says exists between the longing for attachment and detachment. Again, as seen in the beginning of this chapter, Kegan's model owes much to Piaget and Kohlberg, in whose work can be seen evidence of the same tension. Perhaps Kegan's claim for the universality of this tension is supported by the fact that a similar tension is noted in these theories as well as in such diverse places as the work of Protestant theologian Paul Tillich (Kegan, 1980, p. 413-414), the ancient Chinese notion of Tao (1990), the existential psychologist Erich Fromm's notion of "existential dichotomies" (1975, p. 48-54), and Lincoln Holmes' notion that the activity of hope is the dialectic of limit and possibility (cited in Kegan, 1980, p. 414). Regardless, the fact that there is tension, and therefore *relation*, between these two, universal or not, is of great significance to Kegan. For him, this is reflective of what Whitehead called "fundamental reality" (cited in Kegan, 1980, p. 410). Indeed, the oscillation between the two yields

> our experience of the single, restless, creative motion of life itself. The motion of evolution in which all living things participate, of which all living things are a part, brings into being an increasingly organized relationship of the part to the whole....Thus every equilibrated level of adaptation represents a kind of temporary

> compromise between the move toward differentiation and the move toward integration; every developmental era is a new solution to this universal tension....their tension is our experience of the single, underlying ground of being which gives rise to, and resolves, the tension in the first place. (Kegan, 1980, p. 412-413).

Kegan also suggests that this tension manifests itself between genders and across cultural lines. Drawing primarily on the work of Carol Gilligan, Kegan suggests (1980, p. 410; 1982, p. 213) that a bias in favour of individuation has been incorporated into all aspects of the culture, including academia, and even in psychology finds expression in the emphasis on self-realization and self-actualization. These are characteristically the goals of the truce Kegan calls institutional, the achievement of which, he suggests, is still more encouraged for men than for women. At a cultural level, Kegan notes that cultural anthropologists tend to classify Western cultures as placing a higher value on individuation, while Eastern cultures, including North American aboriginal peoples, tend to be more integrative. Yet as has already been seen in terms of individual development, Kegan is not daunted by these gender-related or cultural diversities. He writes:

> Our differences...do not *radically* separate us because there is a single context we all share and from which *both* sides of the tension spring--namely, meaning-constitutive evolutionary activity, the motion of life itself.
> ...in the midst of [these tensions], we have the opportunity for...a religious experience, to drop back to consider the whole of which we are a part....a single community of man and woman, of Oriental and Occidental, who together give expression to the full complexity of being alive, of being a living organism; a universality, and, miraculously, one which each of us can find reflected in ourselves...for each of us reflects these same ambivalences. The individual mirrors the universe and the universe mirrors the individual....Who among us is not in this way a God? (Kegan, 1980, p. 417-418)

Recurrence of Evolutionary Transitions

It must be recalled that while each evolutionary truce is a construction of reality, a way of *knowing* self and other, and therefore of an epistemological nature, it is at the same time ontological--it is a way of *being*--it forms the very self. And again, as has been seen earlier, the

transition from one balance to another can be extremely unsettling and painful. What is at stake is not just the way we conceptualize our world, but who we are. In this sense, transition requires the death of one self in order that a new self be born. The process of development is, thus, a process of self-transcendence.

In explaining the religious dimensions of the *experience* of evolution, Kegan refers to theologians H. Richard Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. When the ultimacy of a current evolutionary balance is threatened, the self faces a "void", a complete unknown, what Niebuhr calls "God-the-enemy"; and this experience gives rise to what he calls the "ethics of self-maintenance" (Kegan, 1980, p. 420). In trying to defend self against "nothingness, against destruction, we see the world as composed of good and bad, of those people who will help us maintain ourselves, and those intent on our demise. Yet for Niebuhr, this maintenance of balance is the essence of sin which is disloyalty to the true God. "Sin is the failure to worship God as God" (Niebuhr cited in Kegan, 1980, p. 421). Kegan adds that "in this sense, any stage theory involves a succession of sinful 'henotheisms'...or what Tillich would call 'idolatry' - the taking for ultimate what is only preliminary, the making of any given way of knowing the world, *the* way of knowing" (1980, p. 421).

From Tillich's perspective, during the early phases of transition the self faces the "'meaning of nonbeing'" which threatens self-affirmation. Furthermore, "'self-affirmation, if it is done in spite of the threat of non-being...is the courage to be'" (Tillich cited in Kegan, 1980, p. 421). Reflecting on the simultaneous pain and promise of the transition period, Kegan recalls Tillich's metaphor of "labor" as it refers both to childbirth and to the work of tilling the land:

> "...Individualized and separated from the encountered reality, life goes beyond itself to assimilate other life...but in order to go out, it must submit to the surrender of a well-preserved self-identity. It must surrender the blessedness of a fulfilled resting in itself; it must toil...It cannot escape the labor of destroying a potential balance for an actual creative imbalance." (Tillich cited in Kegan, 1980, p. 422)

Tillich sees this creative imbalance as an ecstatic experience--"ex-stasis" meaning "standing outside one's self" (cited in Kegan, 1980, p. 422). Kegan speaks of the experience of transition in a very similar way noting that although we tend not to be consciously aware of the process we go through, that the essence of transition is captured in cliche phrases like "I'm not myself" and "I'm beside myself" (1980, p. 419; 1982, p. 265).

Returning to Tillich's notion of "creative imbalance", it is important to note again the notion that the process of development is a life/death/rebirth cycle in which the birth of a new self is always dependent on the death of a former self. As will be seen in both Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, this notion is central in Joseph Campbell's writings and will, therefore, be an important element of the juxtaposition of Kegan's and Campbell's models.

Finally, the experience of transition can be understood as an experience of revelation of the ultimate mystery in which we live. Niebuhr suggests that we can move from "God-the-enemy" to "God-the-friend" (cited in Kegan, 1980, p. 423). The most important point here is that revelation occurs in *this* world in the *natural* process of growth. Tillich writes that "historical realism becomes self-transcendent; historical and self-transcending realism are united" (cited in Kegan, 1980, p. 424). This notion of a "dual reality" is also a foreshadow of Joseph Campbell's notion of the essential unity of the "microcosmic" and "macrocosmic" levels of reality. However, as will become apparent in Chapter 2, Campbell implies that once the unity of this dual reality is revealed, it is always known, while Kegan, referring again to Niebuhr, Tillich and Martin Buber, claims that such revelations are only fleeting phenomena; that the disequilibrium will yield a new balance, a new

"idolatry", or in Buber's words, "that *Thou* passes over continually into *It*" (cited in Kegan, 1980, p. 425).

Need for Recognition/Community

Kegan understands the meaning-making process to be an intrinsically religious one in which *all* people are engaged; the implication is that together we naturally form a kind of "global religious community" (1980, p. 426). It is Kegan's conception of this community as *culture of embeddedness* that will be considered in this final section.

Recall that the culture of embeddedness has three functions in the evolutionary process, namely those of holding, letting go, and staying in place to be reintegrated in the new balance. Concerning the spiritual dimension of these functions, Kegan notes first, that the religious community must be able to hold *each* of its members, regardless of their current balance. This kind of support is more than simply a matter of quantity of caring--the *structure* of caring is important. It is a "matter of *knowing*; a matter of shape, as well as intensity" (Kegan, 1980, p. 432). Second, the religious community must be able to let go--to become "God-the-enemy" (Kegan, 1980, p. 431). However, the most crucial function for the religious community is to stay in place and be reintegrated.

Kegan notes that there is seldom a problem with this during the childhood transitions, because the culture of embeddedness is restricted to the parents, the school environment and the like. But since, as has been seen earlier, our Western society places such high value on separation and individuation, adults can no longer rely on a community to stay in place. Indeed, Kegan suggests that "we may be faced with a task at the growing edge of a culture's evolution--how to fashion long-term relations, even 'long-term communities'...which are the context for fundamental change rather than ended by it" (1980, p. 433).

Kegan is quite insightful in his observation that when a transition has been completed, we often feel ashamed of the self we once were, and perhaps even angry at those who allowed us to "be" in such a "primitive" way. And so we sometimes seek out a new community feeling secure that only the new self will be known. Yet as Kegan claims so passionately,

> Long-term relations and life in a community of considerable duration may be essential if we are not to lose ourselves, if we are to be able to recollect ourselves. They may be essential to the human coherence of our lives, a coherence which is not found from looking into the faces of those who relieve us because we can see they know nothing of us when we were less than ourselves, but from

> looking into the faces of those who relieve us because they reflect our history in their faces, faces which we can look into finally without anger or shame, and which look back at us with love. (1980, p. 433-434)

In conclusion, this chapter has been a presentation of Kegan's re-interpretation of the work of Jean Piaget and his proposal that human development is a life-long process of a dialectical rather than a dichotomous nature. Kegan's "metapsychology" considers human development to be both individual and social in nature; both epistemological and ontological; and to consider the evolving self in its biological, psychological and philosophical aspects.

> But most of all, the framework becomes not only philosophical but also theological; it studies the tension between the preliminary (any given adaptive truce) and the ultimate (meaning-making as the ground of Being). The making and surrendering of meaning, it is suggested, is a "universal" activity; but not because Someone remembers to make each person this way. It is universal because it is a single activity, there where the dance is, an activity which may itself be the Someone. (Kegan, 1980, p. 437)

Having concluded this exposition of Kegan's theory, it is time to continue with a similar presentation of Joseph Campbell's understanding of hero mythology in Chapter 2, and then on to Chapter 3, and a juxtaposition of these two models of the human process, an exercise which will afford a more analytical and critical consideration of the material presented thus far.

CHAPTER TWO

Joseph Campbell's Interpretation of Hero Mythology

By the time of his death in 1987, Joseph Campbell had enjoyed a lengthy career as a mythologist and scholar and had proven to be a most prolific writer. His books have covered topics as diverse as Jungian psychology, Native American Indians, and Eastern mysticism, yet all have revolved around the common theme of myth. "What is the secret of the timeless vision? From what profundity of the mind does it derive? Why is mythology everywhere the same, beneath its varieties of costume? And what does it teach" (Campbell, 1949, p. 4)?

For the purpose of this thesis, two main original sources, The Hero With a Thousand Faces (1949) and The Inner Reaches of Outer Space (1986), will be referred to in presenting the essential elements of Campbell's answers to these central questions surrounding mythology. In the first section of this chapter, it will be seen that Campbell views myth as concerning both psychology and metaphysics, and thus being fundamental as both a revelatory tool and a model to be imitated. The second section will consist of a presentation of Campbell's interpretation of Hero mythology in particular. What is the mythological hero's quest really about? What is the pattern that Campbell sees as common to

all hero myths, regardless of their culture of origin? Finally, who *are* the heroes and is the heroic figure of any relevance today? Following this, Chapter 3 will present a juxtaposition of Kegan's model of development and Campbell's model, this juxtaposition yielding quite easily to the suggestion that the two models refer to one and the same process.

Campbell as Mythologist

According to Robert Segal (1987), mythologists tend to belong to one of two groups, namely particularists, or comparativists. Particularists are those mythologists who are interested in what distinguishes one myth from another, while comparativists are more concerned with what myths have in common. As Segal points out, it is not normally a problem to have two different approaches to the same phenomenon; different questions yield different answers and as such, can be mutually supportive. Yet in the case of mythology, Segal contends that these two approaches are very much in opposition to each other for "each side declares its approach not just necessary for understanding myth but sufficient. Each denies not the compatibility but the importance of the other (1987, p. 90).

As relevant as the particularist/comparativist debate might be to mythologists, it need not be resolved in this

thesis. It is sufficient to note the difference, and to note further that while Campbell explicitly acknowledges the differences in myths, attributing such differences to diversity in the general conditions of existence (geography, social experience etc.) out of which particular myths arise, he remains a staunch comparativist. "Myths, for him, are fundamentally the same: in origin, function and meaning" (Segal, 1987, p. 94).

Segal notes that Campbell shares with other comparativists including Edward Tylor and Lord Raglan, the argument for the greater importance of similarities than differences, namely the simple fact of the similarities. He also shares the conviction that the similarities are so common, that they must also have a common source (1987, p. 95-96). Campbell does differ from other comparativists, however, on the point of interpretation of myth. Segal cites Tylor, Raglan and Vladimir Propp as three comparativists who grant a literal, though not historical, interpretation to myth (1987, p. 97). For example, all hero figures are instances of a class because they all undertake heroic actions. Campbell not only classifies them in the same way, but unlike these other mythologists, gives them a symbolic interpretation. Again, for the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to note that not all comparativists share Campbell's insistence on a symbolic interpretation of myths, and leave this point to be debated by them.

Origin, Function and Meaning of Myth

Now that it has been established that Campbell is a comparativist who interprets myths symbolically, we can proceed to a presentation of Campbell's understanding of what myth is all about--its origin, function and meaning. Admittedly, the separation of these three aspects of mythology is somewhat artificial as they are inter-related. This interconnection will become increasingly clear as the chapter progresses. However, for the sake of clarity of presentation, each one will be considered separately beginning with the essential aspect, the origin of myth, and moving through the increasingly complex aspects of the function and finally, the meaning of myth.

Origin

The question of origin of myth is another point of debate among mythologists, centering on the question of diffusion versus independent invention of myths. In other words, do myths begin in one culture and spread throughout others, or does every society create its own myths which happen to have certain points of similarity as well as difference? Furthermore, if myths do occur through independent invention, what accounts for the similarities between them? Can the fact of the similarities simply be

attributed to the fact of similar experiences by the creators of myths, or must it be claimed that the similarities are inherited (Segal, 1987, p. 101-103)? As Segal points out, Campbell does not use one explanation to the exclusion of the other; both are valid for him. He does argue, however, for independent invention as the primary cause of similarities among myths. "[Diffusion] can account for similarities within a 'culture sphere'...but not for similarities that cut across culture spheres" (Segal, 1987, p. 102).

In accounting for cross-cultural similarities, Campbell borrows the term "archetype" from psychiatrist Carl Jung. Campbell, like Jung, accepts the existence of a collective unconscious--"the inherited unconscious that contains the 'archetypes', the symbolic epitomes of the experiences of the whole human species" (Flew, 1979, p. 67), and further, holds that it is out of this repository of psychologically meaningful symbols that myths arise. In summary, Campbell's most basic answer to both the questions of comparativism--why myths are the same--and the origin of myths is psychological: myths emanate from the human psyche which is everywhere the same.

Function

Campbell attributes four functions to myth:

> First, the mystical or metaphysical function of linking up regular waking consciousness with the vast mystery and wonder of the universe. Any part can be a symbol for the whole.
>
> Second, the cosmological function of presenting some intelligible image, or picture of nature.
>
> Third, the sociological function of validating and enforcing a specific social and moral order.
>
> And finally, the psychological function of providing a marked pathway to carry the individual through the stages of life: the dependency of a childhood, the responsibility of adulthood, the wisdom of old age, and the ultimate crisis of death. (cited in Keen, 1970b, p. 72)

In his writings, Campbell does not offer lengthy discussion of the sociological function of myth mentioned above. This function is implied, however, in his discussion of various rituals and rites of passage to which he attributes greater psychological significance. For the purposes of this chapter, consideration of the other three functions mentioned above will suffice. This will begin directly with a discussion of the meaning of myth.

> of the psyche. But in the dream the forms are quirked by the peculiar troubles of the dreamer, whereas in myth the problems and solutions shown are directly valid for all mankind. (1949, p. 19)

Thus in the same way that an individual can analyze his or her dreams in order to discover their hidden meaning and relevance to a current life situation, so, Campbell holds, myths can be read and understood in either a microcosmic way as revealing a hidden truth about the desires, fears, hopes, potentialities of any individual, or in a macrocosmic way as revealing a truth about life itself.

The forthcoming section of this chapter wherein Campbell's interpretation of hero mythology will be presented, will provide more specific examples of ways myths can be psychologically symbolical. For now, this discussion will remain on the abstract level focussing on the metaphysical significance of myth.

In his book, The Inner Reaches of Outer Space, (1986), Campbell recalls his fascination during the Apollo space flights. He was struck that although this was humankind's first venture into "outer space", the scientists responsible for the project knew all the details necessary to send the craft into space to begin with, to land it on the moon, to allow it to re-enter the earth's atmosphere, and to make it touch down within a mile of the battleship waiting for it in the ocean. Then he recalled Immanuel Kant's explanation

that "the laws of space are known to the mind because they are *of* the mind. They are of a knowledge that is within us from birth, a knowledge *a priori*, which is only brought to recollection by apparently external circumstance" (Campbell, 1986, p. 27). Campbell goes on to state that "outer space is within us inasmuch as the laws of space are within us; outer and inner space are the same" (1986, p. 28). It is in this way that the individual mind can see beyond itself; for the beyond *is* itself. These are the two sides of the mystical coin. "In vision the mind may expand to that cosmic range, as in the raptures of shamans and mystics; for the energies shaping the natural world are the same as those that operate through the organs of the human body" (Campbell, 1986, p. 56). To make explicit the connection to myth, Campbell writes:

> The distinguishing first function of a *properly read* [italics added] mythology is to release the mind from its naive fixation upon...false ideas, which are of material things as things-in-themselves. Hence, the figurations of myth are metaphorical (as dreams normally are not) in *two* senses simultaneously, as bearing 1) *psychological*, but at the same time, 2) *metaphysical* connotations. By way of this dual focus the psychologically significant features of any local social order, environment, or supposed

> history *can become transformed through myth into transparencies revelatory of transcendence* [italics added]. (1986, p. 56).

What is to be transcended is the wide range of dualities which constitute our myopic view of reality. As Campbell quotes from William Blake's poem "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell", "If the doors of perception were cleansed, every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite" (1986, p. 19-20).

One main aspect of the metaphysical reality which Campbell states is revealed by myths is that of the dual focus of reality, already briefly considered above. This is the notion that the reality we believe we live in, based on what we know from our sense perception, is a mere splinter of a greater reality. This prepares the way for discussion of a second important aspect, the notion that a natural harmony exists which is beyond the limits imposed by human logic and morality, and which itself governs temporality and spatiality, and in which human beings participate whether we realize it or like it or not. An important part of this cosmic order is the existence of a life/death/rebirth cycle.

Campbell recounts poet John Neihardt's tale of Black Elk, an old Sioux medicine man in Nebraska, who told of a vision he had in which he was standing on the "central mountain of the world", which for him was Harney Peak in the Black Hills of South Dakota. In his vision he

> "was seeing in a sacred manner...the shapes of all things in the spirit, and the shape of all things as they must live together, like one being. And [he] saw the sacred hoop of [his] people was one of the many hoops that made one circle, wide as daylight and as starlight, and in the center grew one mighty flowering tree to shelter all the children of one mother and one father". (Black Elk cited in Campbell, 1986, p. 33)

As Campbell goes on to explain, "from the humanity of an awakened inner eye and consciousness, a vision released from the limitations of its local, tribal horizon might open to the world and even to transcendence" (1986, p. 33-34). Campbell's point is that the greater reality in which we participate is within, and therefore available to each one of us. For as Black Elk remarked, "'But anywhere is the center of the world'" (cited in Campbell, 1986, p. 34). The message is that if we could only open ourselves to see and accept this reality, we would truly know God. This notion is similar to the Chinese notion of Tao--following the way, the path (Lao-tzu, 1990); to the Buddhist notion of enlightenment, Nirvana; to the Platonic notion of climbing out of the allegorical cave and beholding the sun--the forms themselves (Cornford, 1941); to the Christian notion that the Kingdom of God is spread upon the earth but people just do not see it; and finally, as shall soon be seen, this

truth is the object of the hero's quest. As Campbell quotes from the Hindu Vedas, "Truth is one, the sages speak of it by many names" (1949, p. viii).

Before finally moving on to a presentation of hero mythology as Campbell interprets it, it will be helpful to elaborate somewhat on the above-mentioned idea of natural harmony, cosmic order and the life cycle that is a part of this. This done, the two final functions of myth, namely myth as a vehicle for encountering this greater reality, and myth as a model to be imitated, will be considered.

> As the consciousness of the individual rests on a sea of night into which it descends in slumber and out of which it mysteriously wakes, so, in the imagery of myth, the universe is precipitated out of, and reposes upon, a timelessness back into which it again dissolves. And as the mental and physical health of the individual depends on an orderly flow of vital forces into the field of waking day from the unconscious dark, so again in myth, the continuance of the cosmic order is assured only by a controlled flow of power from the source. The gods are symbolic personifications of the laws governing this flow. The gods come into existence with the dawn of the world and dissolve with the twilight. They are not eternal in the sense that the night is

> eternal. Only from the shorter span of human existence does the round of a cosmogonic eon seem to endure. (Campbell, 1949, p. 261)

As with everything in myth, the life cycle operates at both a microcosmic and a macrocosmic level. People come in and out of existence, and worlds come in and out of existence. Both of these cycles are part of a divine reality which cannot even be conceived. "The ultimate leave-taking is the leaving of God for God" (Meister Eckhart cited by Campbell in Maker and Briggs, 1988, p. 55). "The transcendent transcends all of these categories of thinking. Being and nonbeing - those are categories. The word 'God' properly refers to what transcends all thinking, but the word 'God' itself is something thought about" (Campbell cited in Flowers, 1988, p. 62). Campbell borrows an image from the Upanishads to illustrate this notion of God beyond God. The Indra god is the governor of the world, a new one of which comes into being and passes out of being every time Brahma, the creator god, opens and closes his eyes. Brahma sits on a lotus, which is a symbol of divine energy and grace. The life of a Brahma is 432,000 years, a number which, as will be noted later, is quite significant in ancient cosmology. When the Brahma dies, a new lotus is formed with a new Brahma. Each lotus grows from the navel of the god Vishnu who is asleep in the cosmic ocean and whose dream is the universe (Campbell cited in Flowers,

1988, p. 63). Tracing this image from the individual human perspective through the infinite number of Indras, through all the Brahmas through to Vishnu, who himself is floating in the cosmic ocean, must yield a sense of humility in the face of "the Beyond".

Unfortunately, this thesis does not permit for a detailed consideration of the many creation myths and apocalyptic myths that Campbell presents in the final chapters of The Hero With a Thousand Faces. It is, however, important to note that according to Campbell, these kinds of myths do exist in most cultures and, not surprisingly, they share remarkable similarities. Some of the important elements that they have in common include the notion of the spontaneous union of father/spirit and mother/earth (Campbell, 1949, p. 297), resulting first in "the framing of the world stage of space; [and] second [in] the production of life within the frame: life polarized for self-reproduction under the dual form of the male and female" (Campbell, 1949, p. 273). Another shared notion is that of the original mother/father god being killed and often dismembered and eaten by the offspring (Campbell, 1949, p. 281-288). This is significant for a number of reasons: first, it brings attention to the life/death cycle, but perhaps more intriguingly, it points to the existence of cosmic order and reminds us that what appears to us as violence and disruption may be, on a grander scale, a

manifestation of natural will. Referring to a particular Babylonian myth, Campbell makes precisely this point:

> The myths never tire of illustrating the point that conflict in the created world is not what it seems. Tiamat, though slain and dismembered [by her offspring Marduk], was not thereby undone. Had the battle been viewed from another angle, the chaos-monster would have been seen to shatter of her own accord, and her fragments move to their respective stations. Marduk and his whole generation of divinities were but particles of her substance. From the standpoint of those created forms all seemed accomplished as by a mighty arm, amid danger and pain. But from the center of the emanating presence, the flesh was yielded willingly, and the hand that carved it was ultimately no more than an agent of the will of the victim herself. (1949, p. 287-288)

From the very different perspective of calendar systems, Campbell discusses the harmony between the microcosm and macrocosm in The Inner Reaches of Outer Space. The central figure is 432 and its multiples and quotients. Campbell finds these numbers in a wide variety of places including the Upanishads, the Old Testament, the Icelandic Eddas, astrology, and even in the pattern of human heart

beats (Campbell, 1986, p. 37). He summarizes his findings and makes the connection to myth in the following way:

> The mystery of the night sky, those enigmatic passages of slowly but steadily moving lights among the fixed stars, had delivered the revelation, when charted mathematically, of a cosmic order, and in response, from the depths of the human imagination, a reciprocal recognition had been evoked. A vast concept took form of the universe as a living being in the likeness of a great mother, within whose womb all the worlds, both of life and of death, had their existence....And the human body is in miniature a duplicate of that macrocosmic form. So that throughout the whole an occult harmony prevails, which it is the function of a mythology and relevant rites to make known. (Campbell, 1986, p. 38-39)

Some of the mythological evidence Campbell offers in support of his notion of a divine reality beyond the conceptual grasp of human beings has already been presented. This divine reality is seen to have its own will through which it defines all life. It has also been seen that in spite of our human incapacity to comprehend this reality, we are, nevertheless, a part of it; indeed, we are microcosm to

that macrocosm. To complete this section, a final brief consideration of the life cycle is warranted.

As the stories of Tiamat and the plethora of Indian gods indicate, gods are born and they die. Furthermore, it seems that new gods cannot be born until the old ones have expired. Such is also the case on the smaller human level. All of life ends in death, and all of life requires the death of other things. Indeed, Campbell cites the urge to destroy other life in order to maintain one's own as the first of three "primal energies and urges of the common human species" (1986, p. 13), the others being the sexual generative urge and the impulse to plunder and possess respectively (1986, p. 13-14). The fact that whether we are vegetarian or carnivorous we eat other life forms is the most obvious physical example of this life/death cycle.

But myths and certain associated rituals illuminate the existence of this cycle on other levels as well. Campbell goes into elaborate detail in presenting circumcision rituals, wedding rituals and healing rituals in various cultures (1949; cited in Flowers, 1988). All of these are rites of passage signifying movement from one state of being to another. For example, in puberty circumcision rituals, the boy must die in order that the man may be born. Indeed, the second function of myth, to help people encounter the macrocosmic reality, operates at this level. As Campbell writes,

> a mythology is a control system, on the one hand framing its community to accord with an intuited order of nature, and on the other hand, by means of its symbolic pedagogic rites, conducting individuals through the ineluctable psychophysiological stages of transformation of a human lifetime - birth, childhood and adolescence, age, old age, and the release of death - in unbroken accord simultaneously with the requirements of this world and the rapture of participation in a manner of being beyond time. (1986, p. 20)

The final and most important death, however, is the death of the self or the ego, for it is only by dying to our microcosmic self that we can realize our self in the macrocosm--or the macrocosm in our self. It is important to emphasize here that this death of self really works at both the microcosmic and the macrocosmic level; recall that from the smaller perspective, Tiamat was destroyed by Marduk, but that from the larger perspective, her death was the result of her own will. Indeed, this is what Campbell asserts all hero myths are essentially about: the death of the ego is required in order to be reborn in spirit.

> Perhaps the most eloquent possible symbol of this mystery is that of the god crucified, the god offered, "himself to himself". Read in one

> direction, the meaning is of the passage of the phenomenal hero into superconsciousness....But also, God has descended voluntarily and taken upon himself this phenomenal agony. God assumes the life of man and man releases the God within himself at the mid-point of the cross-arms of the same "coincidence of opposites", the same sun door through which God descends and man ascends -- each as the other's food (Campbell, 1949, p. 260).

In the following section Campbell's interpretation of hero mythology in particular will be considered, using this as an example of the final function of myth, namely that of a model to be imitated.

Hero Mythology

There is one thing that cannot be forgotten as Campbell's interpretation of hero mythology is presented, namely that Campbell believes *all* myths are symbolical of the psychological and metaphysical realities in which we live. Therefore, as captivating and entertaining as the stories themselves may be, Campbell insists that the real value of myths lies in what they reveal to us about ourselves. As Robert Segal writes,

> The ultimate meaning of hero myths is that all is one. Psychologically, not only is there an

> unconscious realm beyond the conscious one, but the two realms are really one, and consciousness will eventually return to its unconscious origins. Metaphysically, not only is there a supernatural realm beyond the everyday one, but again the two are really one, and the everyday realm will one day return to its supernatural roots. (1987, p. 26)

According to Campbell, there are three main phases in hero myths, namely the hero's departure on his adventure, his initiation into the order of the world in which he has arrived, and finally, his return to his point of origin (1949). As is indicated in Figure 2, each of these phases is composed of several components. Unfortunately, it is far beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a detailed account of each of these elements of the hero's quest; for such an account, the interested reader is referred to Campbell's own work, The Hero With a Thousand Faces. Rather, this discussion will be restricted to a consideration of the significance of the three main phases noted above, as these will prove to be a major point of comparison between Campbell's thoughts and Kegan's model in Chapter 3. Finally, it must be noted that the third function of myth mentioned in the first section of this chapter, namely the notion that myth serves as a model to be imitated, is implicit in Campbell's interpretation of hero mythology.



Figure 2. Joseph Campbell's presentation of the mythological hero's journey. (1949, p. 245)

Departure

The heralder of the hero's adventure is often ugly or evil--an outcast of some sort, and only the first of many to be encountered by the hero. Yet without its intervention, the journey might never take place (Campbell, 1949, p. 53). Whether the hero's adventure begins as a matter of chance, or as the result of his/her conscious decision to go in search of someone or something, it promises to be a thrilling yet dangerous journey which will test the hero's courage and faith, and ultimately, will be a transforming experience. For the hero is called by destiny into the depths of his unconscious and along the way he must do battle with the demons and dragons of his own mind. The hero must die to his ego in order to secure and return to the world with the saving elixir which is the realization of the divine unity of all things.

Not everyone heeds the call to adventure; as Campbell notes, "the usual person is more than content, he is even proud, to remain within the indicated bounds, and popular belief gives him every reason to fear so much as the first step into the unexplored" (1949, p. 78). Indeed, it is much easier and more comforting to refuse the adventure because it requires the sacrifice of what is believed to be one's own interest. Yet, even when the call is refused, "one is

harrassed, both day and night, by the divine being that is the image of the living self within the locked labyrinth of one's own disoriented psyche" (Campbell, 1949, p. 60).

For those who do accept the call to adventure, supernatural help is found at the outset, often in the guise of a little old crone or old man who provides the hero with whatever amulets will be needed to pass the upcoming tests (Campbell, 1949, p. 69). It is important to remember that although the hero does not yet know it, all things are one. In keeping with Campbell's symbolical reading of the myth, this supernatural helper, *and* the hero's own faith in that help, are representative of the hero's own power and position in the cosmic order.

> Protective and dangerous, motherly and fatherly at the same time, this supernatural principle of guardianship and direction unites in itself all the ambiguities of the unconscious - thus signifying the support of our conscious personality by that other, larger system, but also the inscrutability of the guide that we are following, to the peril of all our rational ends. (Campbell, 1949, p. 73)

And so, "with the personifications of his destiny to guide and aid him, the hero goes forward in his adventure until he comes to the 'threshold guardian'...[beyond whom] is darkness, the unknown and danger" (Campbell, 1949, p.

77). At this point, it is imperative that the traveller possess a "genuine psychological readiness" (Campbell, 1949, p. 84); otherwise, s/he will not succeed in his/her journey. The hero who does pass the magical threshold often finds himself or herself in the "belly of the whale". This, according to Campbell, is an often used motif in mythology which "gives emphasis to the lesson that the passage of the threshold is a form of self-annihilation...[in this motif], instead of passing outward, beyond the confines of the visible world, the hero goes inward, to be born again" (1949, p. 91).

Initiation

Once past the threshold and into the belly of the whale, the realm of the deep unconscious, the hero must again submit to a number of dangerous trials; "[this] ordeal is a deepening of the problem of the first threshold and the question is still in balance: can the ego put itself to death" (Campbell, 1949, p. 109)? Campbell writes:

> And so it happens that if anyone - in whatever society - undertakes for himself the perilous journey into the darkness by descending, either intentionally or unintentionally, into the crooked lanes of his own spiritual labyrinth, he soon finds himself in a landscape of symbolical figures

> (any one of which may swallow him)....In the vocabulary of the mystics, this is the second stage of the Way, that of the "purification of the self", when the senses are "cleansed and humbled", and the energies and interests "concentrated upon transcendental things"; or in a vocabulary of more modern turn: this is the process of dissolving, transcending, or transmuting the infantile images of our personal past. (1949, p. 101)

The notion of self-annihilation as the necessary precursor to rebirth is one which has already been considered in the first section of this chapter, one which, it will be recalled, operates at both the macrocosmic and the microcosmic levels. The reason why the ego must die is the same reason that God must die: because both are constructs of a rational, logical mind, and as such, are confining and limiting. Just as the true essence of God is beyond all duality, beyond all conception, so too is the essence of the individual--because the individual *is* the macrocosm mirrored as microcosm. So once the individual can relinquish his/her ego, then s/he can recognize him/herself in the ultimate divine unity. Dying to self thus leads to rebirth in the spirit; it is not death at all but self-transcendence.

In partial illustration of this point, Campbell offers the Sumerian myth of the descent of Inanna, a goddess of

light and life, into the underworld to attend the funeral of the husband of Ereshkigal, her enemy and sister goddess of death and darkness (1949, p. 105-108). Once there, she is stripped, piece by piece, of her queenly garments and jewels which are representative of her self-definitions. Finally, she is turned into a corpse and hung from a stake. Campbell writes:

> Inanna and Ereshkigal, the two sisters, light and dark respectively, together represent, according to the antique manner of symbolization, the one goddess in two aspects; and their confrontation epitomizes the whole sense of the difficult road of trials. The hero, whether god or goddess, man or woman, the figure in a myth or the dreamer of a dream, discovers and assimilates his opposite (his own unsuspected self) either by swallowing it or by being swallowed. One by one the resistances are broken. He must put aside his pride, his virtue, beauty, and life, and bow or submit to the absolutely intolerable. Then he finds that he and his opposite are not of differing species, but one flesh. (1949, p. 108)

After the hero has overcome all the barriers and submitted to all the trials, s/he experiences the ultimate adventure, namely the discovery of his/her true nature. Depending on the particular myth, this is symbolized in many

ways. One common motif Campbell cites is that of "a mystical marriage...of the triumphant hero-soul with the Queen Goddess of the World" (1949, p. 109), a marriage which "represents the hero's total mastery of life; for the woman is life, the hero its knower and master" (1949, p. 120). A second important motif is that of atonement with the father who is often an angry ogre or trickster figure (Campbell, 1949, p. 126-149). In atonement with the father, the hero glimpses the source of all things and is able to understand how *all* of life is a manifestation of the divine will.

As noted repeatedly above, what the hero ultimately discovers on his quest is the divine unity of all things, or in other words, "that the hero himself is that which he had come to find" (Campbell, 1949, p. 163). In explaining this element of myth, Campbell turns to the Buddhist traditions and their notion of the Bodhisattva, "he whose being is enlightenment" (1949, p. 151), noting some important details. The Bodhisattva him/herself, is a hero figure--a mortal whose journey has ended at the brink of Nirvana. The first thing Campbell notes is the androgynous character of the Bodhisattva. The figure is represented as both male and female, a motif seen also in the Tao symbol of Yin and Yang (the spherical representation of the perfect interaction of dark/light, male/female) (Lao-tzu, 1990), in the Gnostic Christian notion of the "World Made Flesh as Androgynous - which was indeed the state of Adam as he was created, before

the female aspect, Eve was removed into another form" (Campbell, 1949, p. 152-153). Indeed, Campbell suggests that the separation of the male and the female elements is the beginning of the fall from perfection for it is the fall into duality (1949, p. 153). In Campbell's words,

> This is the sense of the first wonder of the Bodhisattva: the androgynous character of the presence. Therewith the two apparently opposite mythological adventures come together: the Meeting with the Goddess, and the Atonement with the Father. The second wonder to be noted in the Bodhisattva myth is its annihilation of the distinction between life and release-from-life - which is symbolized...in the Bodhisattva's renunciation of Nirvana. (1949, p. 162-163)

The Bodhisattva has transcended all duality and thus knows that all things are of the same essence. The Bodhisattva recognizes in every sentient being "The Lord Looking Down in Pity" and "The Lord Who is Seen Within"; s/he sees that suffering and redemption are both aspects of the "long world dream of the All-Regarding, whose essence is the essence of Emptiness" (Campbell, 1949, p. 161). So the Bodhisattva does not abandon life for Nirvana.

> Turning [his/her] regard from the inner sphere of thought-transcending truth (which can be described only as 'emptiness', since it surpasses speech)

> outward again to the phenomenal world, [s/he] perceives without the same ocean of being that [s/he] found within....Having surpassed the delusions of [his/her] formerly self-assertive, self-defensive, self-concerned ego, [s/he] knows without and within the same repose. What [s/he] beholds without is the visual aspect of the magnitudinous, thought-transcending emptiness on which [his/her] own experiences of ego, form, perceptions, speech, conceptions, and knowledge ride. And [s/he] is filled with compassion for the self-terrorized beings who live in fright of their own nightmare. [S/he] rises, returns to them, and dwells with them as an egoless center, through whom the principle of emptiness is made manifest in its own simplicity. And this is [his/her] great "compassionate act"; for by it the truth is revealed that in the understanding of one in whom the Threefold Fire of Desire, Hostility, and Delusion is dead, this world *is* Nirvana. (Campbell, 1949, p. 165-166)

Finally, it is important to note that these two wonders of the Bodhisattva, namely the androgynous form and the identity of time and eternity, of the microcosm and macrocosm, are symbolical of each other.

> For in the language of the divine pictures, the world of time is the great mother womb. The life therein, begotten by the father, is compounded of her darkness and his light. We are conceived in her and dwell removed from the father, but when we pass from the womb of time at death (which is our birth to eternity) we are given into his hands. The wise realize, even within this womb, that they have come from and are returning to the father; while the very wise know that she and he are in substance one. (Campbell, 1949, p. 169-170)

And this, for Campbell, is the third wonder of the Bodhisattva myth.

The three wonders of the Bodhisattva are symbolized in various ways in different myths. But for Campbell, the hero's recognition of the divine within him/herself, his/her knowledge that self-transcendence is possible for all people, is ultimately the "boon" with which all heroes must return to their point of origin.

Return

In order to solidly affirm the truth of the hero's realization, it is imperative that s/he return again across the threshold to the mundane world. Otherwise, what has been learned is not really that the two worlds are one, but

that one can transcend the lowly profane world into a removed world of spiritual calm. Campbell cites a number of instances in which the return is either not successfully negotiated, or in which superhuman help is used to cross the return threshold. "And yet," he writes, "if the monomyth is to fulfill its promise, not human failure or superhuman success but human success is what we shall have to be shown. That is the problem of the crisis of the threshold of the return" (Campbell, 1949, p. 207). So again, the idea is reinforced that the hero's quest is, indeed must be, a distinctively human quest.

However, returning is very difficult for the hero. In the "Allegory of the Cave" in his Republic, Plato describes the pain of leaving the beatific vision of the sun--of the forms themselves, in order to return to the cave to teach and enlighten the shadow-watchers. He describes the blindness suffered upon leaving the light, the anguish of having to leave behind such beauty, and the mockery and disbelief with which the traveller is met upon his return. (Cornford, 1941, p. 227-235). Campbell writes that "the first problem of the returning hero is to accept as real, after an experience of the soul-satisfying vision of fulfillment, the passing joys and sorrows, banalities and noisy obscenities of life. Why re-enter such a world" (1949, p. 218)? And yet the hero must return. Recalling the preceding discussion of the second wonder of the

Bodhisattva, if the return is not made, then the whole lesson of the myth is lost. For

> the goal of the myth is to dispel the need for such life ignorance by effecting a reconciliation of the individual consciousness with the universal will. And this is effected through a realization of the true relationship of the passing phenomena of time to the imperishable life that lives and dies in all. (Campbell, 1949, p. 238)

This brings us, finally, to a summarizing statement of both the third function of myth, namely to serve as a model to be imitated, and of this chapter as a whole. Although, as Robert Segal notes (1987), it is not always clear in Campbell's writing exactly who the hero is or can be--an extraordinary person or Everyperson--this discussion has provided substantial evidence that Campbell truly believes there is a hero in each of us. Indeed, this is finally what the hero myths are all about. They tell us what the nature of the journey is, that it will require great courage and faith, but that if we are ready and willing to embark upon it, we can--and the reward will be great. As Campbell writes,

> we have not even to risk the adventure alone; for the heroes of all time have gone before us; the labyrinth is thoroughly known; we have only to follow the thread of the hero-path. And where we

had thought to find an abomination, we shall find a god; where we had thought to slay another, we shall slay ourselves; where we had thought to travel outward, we shall come to the center of our own existence; where we had thought to be alone, we shall be with all the world. (1949, p. 25)

CHAPTER THREE

Juxaposition of Kegan's and Campbell's Models

The first two chapters of this thesis have consisted solely of exposition of two apparently quite different approaches to human nature and the human developmental process. As was seen in Chapter 1, Kegan himself maintains that his theory is as much about the "religious" as it is about the biological, psychological and philosophical reality. Indeed, he claims that meaning-making activity, the fundamental activity of the developmental process as he understands it, is the "ground of Being" (1980, p. 437)--that it is the "still point" of the dance. It will not be disputed that Kegan's theory invites a spiritual interpretation. Indeed, the very similar statement that the human developmental process can be understood as a spiritual journey is the fundamental statement of this thesis. However, the adequacy of Kegan's claim, which ultimately appears to be based on his equation of meaning-making activity with the "ground of Being", will be questioned. In addition, two different perspectives on Kegan's theory will be offered, which, it is proposed, more legitimately support

the proposal that his theory is open to a spiritual interpretation.

It was suggested in Chapter 1 that Kegan is vague about his usage of the word "religious". Therefore, the first section of this chapter will present the justification for the usage of the terms "spiritual" and "spirituality" instead of "religious" in this thesis. The second section will present a juxtaposition of Kegan's and Campbell's theories, yielding the fundamental claim of this thesis that the human developmental process can be understood as a spiritual journey--a heroic quest. This is the first of the two perspectives referred to above. Before continuing with the second such perspective, Kegan's theory will be criticized on three points. First, his own critique of the unconscious, as was presented in Chapter 1, will be discussed. Second, James Fowler's critique of Kegan's notion of "meaning" will be presented, followed by Gabriel Moran's critique of the notion of "meaning-making". Each of these critiques will undermine the adequacy of Kegan's attribution of spiritual significance to his theory. Finally, P.B. Walsh's consideration of Kegan's interindividual balance in the context of Buddhist psychology will be presented as the second perspective which more legitimately supports the claim that Kegan's theory can be interpreted in a spiritual way. This discussion will

conclude this chapter and pave the way for a consideration in Chapter 4 of the implications for education of both Kegan's theory, and of this thesis.

Clarification of the Term "Spiritual"

It has been suggested that Kegan's usage of the word "religious" is vague. In writing about the "religious" dimension of his theory, Kegan refers to such authors as Paul Tillich, Martin Buber and H. Richard Niebuhr. Each of these men is representative of distinct theologies, incidentally or not, Western ones. It is partly due to this reference that the term "religious" will not be used in this chapter. "Religious" often connotes organized, institutional religion--religion as it is *practised* within the confines of a particular denomination. "Theology", in a similar way, is often the attempt of a specific denomination to reflect upon God--its *own* God as already delineated by the constructs of that religion. The integrity of religion and religious people or theology and theologians is not being questioned. It is merely being suggested, as Campbell does, that religious institutions *can* become dogmatic and thus remove themselves further from the possibility of truly knowing God. As Campbell says, "the problem of the theologian is to keep his symbol translucent so that it may not block out the very light it is supposed to convey"

(1949, p. 236). In quoting Carl Jung, Campbell echoes this thought: "Religion is a defense against the experience of God" (cited in Flowers, 1988, p. 209). In a similar vein, Sam Keen suggests that an honest theology is necessarily agnostic and that theology can only explain the *function* of the word "God", but cannot define it (1970a, p. 156). Campbell understands religions to be myths themselves, and thus acknowledges that they serve a dignified function. But he also claims that precisely what he warns against above, has happened. The symbols have become opaque. Instead of looking at the moon, we focus on the finger that points at it. It is for this reason that Campbell cries out for a *new* mythology--"so that through every detail and act of secular life the vitalizing image of the universal god-man who is actually immanent and effective in all of us may be somehow made known to consciousness", but, he hastens to add, "this is not a work that consciousness itself can achieve" (Campbell, 1949, p. 389).

The word "spirituality", on the other hand, does not refer to any particular doctrine, but suggests the very essence of the human person--the mystery which animates the person, which enlivens the person--the source, as Brenda Ueland suggests (1987), of human imagination and creativity. Surely this is fundamental to the process of meaning-making activity, which is essentially a process of creating and discovering one's self and one's connection to the other

beings in the world. Indeed, the paradoxical Interindividual balance, the balance that Kegan posits as the "end" of, and therefore that which informs the entire developmental process, is a balance wherein "self" is recognized as a mere construct and is transcended. Self becomes non-self. In Sam Keen's words,

> *Spirit is the capacity to transcend the encapsulation of personality (the roles and myths that in-form the adult ego), as well as the autonomous individuated self of the outlaw. Spirit is the realization that we are embodied within a continuum, that we are alive only when a universal life force flows through us like breath through lungs, like wind through the evergreens.* (1983, p. 200)

It is for all of these reasons that the words "spiritual" and "spirituality" rather than "religious" will be used when referring to that aspect of the human process that is implicit in, yet beyond, mere psychological development.

Parallels Between Kegan's and Campbell's Models

It has been seen in the first two chapters that both the developmental process and the hero's quest, if only symbolically, concern coming to a better knowledge of the self. It has also been seen that arriving at this greater

self-awareness is neither an easy nor necessarily a joyous task. In both scenarios terrible trials must be undergone and apparently insurmountable obstacles and barriers must be overcome. And again, in both models, the limits that are tested are the self-created limits of our own psyche. Indeed, what is required of both the evolving self and the hero, is the death of the self, for without this, the new self cannot be reborn. "We are born not once but a succession of times, and each time, there is a qualitatively new culture of embeddedness, a qualitatively new social environment in which the motion of life represents itself, and out of which the individual is born" (Kegan, 1980, p. 409). In this way, both the developmental process and the hero's quest can be seen to be about self-transcendence.

Recall that Campbell states quite plainly that what the hero's outward quest is symbolic of, is the individual's journey into the psyche and that the dragons to be slain are the psychological restraints we put on ourselves. Recall as well, that *everyone*, by virtue of their being alive and being human, is engaged, in some way, in meaning-making activity, because it is "...that life motion which [persons] do not share so much as it shares them" (Kegan, 1982, p. 254). These two concepts give additional support to the notion that the hero does not have to be someone of extraordinary powers or insights, but is Everyperson. "The mighty hero of extraordinary powers...is each of us: not

the physical self visible in the mirror, but the king within" (Campbell, 1949, p. 365).

At this level, it appears that Kegan and Campbell are referring to the same process, or at least very similar ones. It seems that the strongest connection between the two models occurs during the transitional period between two evolutionary truces. In Figure 3, Kegan's three phases of evolutionary transition have been superimposed onto Campbell's representation of the hero's journey. It appears to be a very easy match. The hero's "call to adventure" corresponds with the person's realization that his/her current mode of meaning-making can no longer sufficiently account for the world being the way it is. The ultimacy of the current evolutionary balance is threatened. This is followed by the period of trials in which both the hero and the evolving self must face the ultimate challenge of allowing the self to die. Once this has occurred, the hero, reborn in spirit, must return across the threshold to the mundane world and the evolving self faces the task of reintegrating as object/other what formerly was subject/self. The triumphant hero and the newly evolved self have access to both their current and their prior selves, for both now see the two selves as part of the greater, all-encompassing self which, for the hero is the divine within, and for the evolving self is the brand new ultimacy.



Figure 3. Juxtaposition of the three elements of Kegan's developmental transition period with Campbell's presentation of the mythological hero's journey.

Although Campbell's writings sometimes seem to suggest that the hero's journey is the journey of a lifetime, there is also the sense that the journey *is* the lifetime. Indeed, he refers to Karlfried Graf Dürckheim's suggestion that "when you're on a journey, and the end keeps getting further and further away, then you realize that the real end is the journey" (cited in Flowers, 1988, p. 230). This may be illustrated in the diagram (see Figure 3) by the fact that the circle is solid; it is possible that the arrows indicate not only the sequence of events, but suggest that this sequence repeats itself. Certainly this notion is supported by Kegan's notion of development--that structurally similar transitions occur *throughout* life. It is also suggested that this interpretation is appropriate in the context of Campbell's emphasis on the notion that life/death/rebirth cycles operate at various levels of existence, both microcosmic and macrocosmic.

Thus far, a very strong case has been made that structurally, there are solid grounds for comparison and compatibility of Kegan's and Campbell's models. Furthermore, strong theoretical parallels have been illuminated. Both models present the human process as essentially one of increasing self-knowledge. In both cases, this process is presented as being frought with trials and tests, the ultimate one being the death of self. Finally, the new, more encompassing, more knowledgeable self

is a self *re-born*. The whole process can be seen, therefore, as inherently one of *self-transcendence*, the implication being that it is not only a psychological process, but a spiritual one.

Critique of Kegan's Interpretation of the Unconscious

Whereas Campbell bases his understanding of mythology and its relevance to human nature largely on the very central notion of the unconscious, Kegan disputes the very existence of the unconscious, which implicitly, is also central to his theory. This poses a significant problem, for such a theoretical discrepancy undermines the connection this thesis is making between Kegan's and Campbell's theories. It must, therefore, be addressed. It should be explicitly noted, however, that both Kegan and Campbell adopt the term "unconscious" from other sources, most particularly Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. Because the primary focus of this thesis is the work of Kegan and Campbell, only *their* usages of the term "unconscious" will be considered.

As seen in Chapter 1, Kegan asserts that the unconscious does not actually exist in the "metaphysical space" where meaning-making occurs. There is no "basement" of repressed material which somehow "knows better" than and imposes itself upon, the current evolutionary balance. Yet

he does allow that such protective devices as "repression", "selective inattention" and "the defences" are operative. Finally, Kegan suggests that while the unconscious occupies no "metaphysical space", it can be said to occupy "metaphysical time", noting that the future can be understood as the unconscious of the present. These are highly ambiguous concepts which must be explored.

First, Kegan does *not* make clear precisely what he means by "metaphysical space" or "metaphysical time", or how these are any different, as seems to be implied, from "regular" space and time. Indeed, by their very nature, space and time are metaphysical because they define physicality. From this perspective, therefore, it makes no more sense to say that the unconscious "occupies" metaphysical time than to say that the unconscious "occupies" metaphysical space. It seems that this kind of terminology merely confuses the issue.

What does, however, seem clear, is that at the physical level, meaning-making must occur in the very real space of the brain's neural mechanisms. For it is here that the as yet mysterious workings of electricity "produce" thoughts, perceptions, emotions, memories, and allow for the more complex operations of conceptual analysis and volition. (This is, in part, what Piaget, as a "genetic epistemologist", was studying: the pattern of increasing complexity of these kinds of cognitive functions). Indeed,

this is the stuff of consciousness: knowing, willing and acting. Yet it seems that many of these things are done in a less than conscious way. Certainly the actual activity of neural mechanisms are not available to consciousness; we can think *about* them, but we are no more directly conscious of them as they operate than we are of meaning-making activity itself. It seems that this is what Kegan means by his statement that meaning-making activity is constitutive of reality; meaning-making by nature is a metaphysical activity which occurs in a physical space.

In a similar way, what we are conscious of in our daily tasks is only a fraction of all the thoughts and events that we have been conscious of at one time or another. These past occurrences *do reside* in our neural structure in the form of memories of which we are not usually conscious. We can often recall our memories at will, or through the use of hypnosis, and quite often they appear spontaneously in dreams or are evoked by a current happening. Furthermore, these can and do influence our conscious decision-making processes and it seems logical to suggest that they would also "color" our meaning-making activity. Finally, it is significant to recall here that Kegan understands *reintegration* of the past to be the final phase in the transitional process. This means that old meanings are continually being reconsidered. Recall Kegan's helix model (see Figure 1). Instead of looking at this diagram

broadside, as it is presented, it is interesting to re-orient our perspective and look down on the helix. When we do so, we no longer see a helix, but one continuous ever-expanding circle that begins at the center and just keeps on going--similar to the groove in a recording disc. From this perspective, we can see how the very first meanings are forever a part of all subsequent meanings, even if we are not always actually conscious of them.

Returning to Kegan's use of the term "unconscious", it is suggested that he is both correct and incorrect. The problem is not simply a matter of whether the unconscious occupies time and space, metaphysical or otherwise. The problem is, rather, whether the unconscious, or the conscious, for that matter, can properly be understood as entity or as process. It may be illuminating to note that we commonly speak of "the unconscious" but we refer to "consciousness". The first implies entity, the second implies process. It is proposed that this common inconsistency is a large part of the problem. Kegan presents his understanding that the psychodynamic conception of the unconscious is an entity. Surely most "Introduction to Psychology" professors are also guilty of the same thing: presenting the "id" and the "superego" not as unconscious processes, but as demons and angels sitting on the shoulders of and whispering into the ears of the ego. Yet Kegan repeatedly makes very explicit assertions that

ego/self/personality is *process* and not entity. Surely if one is process, the other must be also.

It is proposed, therefore, that Kegan is correct in his criticism of the unconscious *if the unconscious is taken as an entity* with functions distinct from the self. In other words, he is correct to insist on self-as-process and to include "the defences" as part of that process. But this, in itself, does not mean that self-as-process can only be conscious. For, as is now evident, the word "unconscious" is also commonly used to refer simply to that of which we are not aware. Furthermore, Kegan's likening of the unconscious to the "basement" of the psyche, may also be appropriate if what fills it are the things that are present in the physical space of the brain, but of which we are not always conscious. In this way, rather than say the future is the unconscious of the present, it might be more appropriate to suggest that past and future *selves* are unconscious to the present *self*. This would be inclusive not only of past meanings, but of future potentials which exist in our genetic structure itself. Thus the unconscious can be understood not only as an aspect of self-as-process, but also as a repository of memories (individual or collective with reference to Campbell) and dormant potential. This is certainly in keeping with the notion of developmentalism, namely that there exists a path which, in optimum conditions, unfolds naturally. From this

perspective, it could be said that "formal operations" are unconscious in the "sensorimotor era", or that the interindividual evolutionary balance is unconscious in the incorporative balance--and vice versa.

Thus far, Kegan's criticism of the unconscious has been found to be inadequate in a number of ways. Yet, Kegan's theory can retain its integrity and still allow that aspects of the self-as-process may be unconscious. Furthermore, on a strictly physical level, the unconscious can be understood as a repository of past memories and future potential from which self-as-process draws, without admitting that this material "knows better" than self.

A brief consideration of Campbell's understanding of the unconscious is now warranted. As Campbell refers to two levels of existence, the microcosmic and the macrocosmic, he also accepts the existence of two levels of unconsciousness --the individual unconscious from which dreams emanate, and the collective unconscious from which myths emanate. For Campbell, both of these operate in accordance with the above conclusions regarding the unconscious. That is, both the individual and the collective unconscious "contain" past events significant in the life of the individual *and* his/her human ancestors, in the sense outlined above that past events are present in the memory even if we are not always consciously aware of them. In addition, both individual and collective unconscious are influential in the way the person

and/or culture currently interprets new events, or in other words, how they make meaning. Furthermore, it has been seen that Campbell claims that the unconscious and the metaphysical are reflections of each other. Indeed, he equates the two. This is a crucial statement that Kegan, given his opposition to the very notion of an unconscious, does not make. Yet this statement can now be made without undermining the integrity of Kegan's theory, if the conclusions concerning Kegan's dismissal of the notion of the unconscious are accepted.

Campbell implies a connection not only between the unconscious and metaphysics, but between spirituality and metaphysics in the following way: the hero can only be reborn in the spirit by slaying the demons, both conscious and unconscious, of his/her own mind, and rebirth in the spirit means rebirth into the macrocosmic, metaphysical realm. Therefore the statement that the unconscious is equated with the metaphysical is a crucial one because it is precisely this statement which opens the whole human process to a spiritual as well as a psychological interpretation. This connection is the "swinging door" between the microcosm and the macrocosm through which the triumphant hero can pass at will. This is where Campbell's "paradox of the dual focus" resides. This is the point of recognition that within us is the unitary divine reality which is beyond the duality-imposing restrictions of time, space and logic. But

as Campbell has suggested above, this is not a recognition that "consciousness itself can achieve" (1949, p. 389). Rather, this divine reality must be allowed to shine through us as individuals in a similar fashion as Campbell believes religious symbols must be translucent.

James Fowler's Critique of Kegan's Notion of Meaning

The essence of Kegan's theory is that human development is the ongoing process of meaning-making. We organize what happens to us. "We literally make sense. Human being is the composing of meaning, including, of course, the occasional inability to compose meaning, which we often experience as the loss of our composure" (Kegan, 1982, p. 11). Kegan takes this as an indisputable truth. (As will be seen in the forthcoming section, Gabriel Moran severely criticizes this notion.) Furthermore, Kegan recognizes that his framework invites a spiritual interpretation as well as a psychological one. In fact, as has been seen in Chapter 1, he has been very explicit in pointing out the "religious" aspects of his model, equating meaning-making activity with the "ground of Being" (1980, p. 437). However, from the perspective of spirituality used in this thesis, meaning-making is a limited concept.

The meaning that Kegan refers to, both epistemologically and ontologically, is a meaning born of

rationality and cognition. The reader will recall Kegan's reference to Kant: "Percept without concept is blind" (Kegan, 1982, p.11). But, as was seen in the earlier discussion of "the unconscious", the stuff of cognition exists in the physicality of the brain, and therefore, in time and space. Furthermore, knowledge, understanding, and meaning obey the rules of logic and thus, duality. It is true that we cannot "rationalize", as such, paradox: from a logical stance, it simply makes no sense--it is non-sensical. Yet paradox seems to be the essence of spirituality. It seems, therefore, that there is a significant chasm between the two orders of meaning-making activity and spirituality.

James Fowler makes a very similar criticism of Kegan's theory in his article "Faith and the Structuring of Meaning" (1980). He acknowledges Kegan's attempt to close the gap between positivism and existentialism, or in Kegan's terms, between epistemology and ontology. But he suggests that Kegan fails to account adequately for "how various subfunctions of knowing, such as perception, feeling, imagination, and rational judgment, are related and are to be distinguished from one another" (Fowler, 1980, p. 61). Fowler calls for an examination of the relationship between the "logic of rational certainty" and the "logic of conviction", noting that they are not alternatives, but that the latter is an anchor which contextualizes the former.

"Recognition of a more comprehensive 'logic of conviction' does lead us to see that the logic of rational activity is part of a larger epistemological structuring activity, and is not to be confused with the whole" (Fowler, 1980, p. 62). Fowler does not dispute the fact that humans make meaning. He simply suggests that it begs the question of *why* we make the particular meanings we make. Fowler's point is that this question cannot be answered without referring to a "center of value" or an "ultimate environment" which is beyond Kegan's framework of rational knowing. Fowler writes:

> the challenge is to see how rational knowing plays the crucial role of conceptualizing, questioning, and evaluating the products of other modes of imaginal and generative knowing....we are trying to grasp the inner dialectic of rational logic in the dynamics of a larger, more comprehensive logic of convictonal orientation. (Fowler, 1980, p. 63)

It is proposed that because Kegan focusses solely on a very rational kind of knowing and meaning which operate according to rules that limit knowledge to the physical "explainable" world, he cannot make the central link between meaning-making activity, which is of the rational, microcosmic level, and the "ground of Being", which is of a macrocosmic level. This cannot be done because the two are

not of the same order. One cannot move from A, which philosophically dismisses the possibility of B, to B.

This is another way in which Campbell's more mystical perspective can enrich Kegan's model. Within the context of the current discussion, it can be suggested that Kegan and Campbell are presenting fundamentally different notions of God--a convenient name for the essential and eternal unity of all things. On the level of meaning-making activity which Kegan asserts is fundamental to the human person cross-culturally, it is accepted that neither the Eastern nor the Western concepts, *made* meanings, are better or prior to the other. Thus for the purposes of this thesis, it may be preferable to refer to "mysticism" which exists in both Eastern and Western traditions. The mystical understanding of "God" seems to be more to the point because *explicitly* it is not about understanding in a rational manner and from the limited context of logical meaning-making, it "makes more sense" to simply wonder at the mystery of the divine within, than to pretend to understand or explain it. It must be emphasized that Kegan is not being accused of such pretention. However, if it is accepted that Kegan's notion of "meaning" refers solely to rationality, then Kegan's equation of meaning-making activity with the "ground of Being" implies that humanity can arrive, at least theoretically, at a cognitive understanding of God. Yet from the perspectives of Fowler's notions of "logic of

conviction" *and* "logic of rational certainty", this cannot be so.

Gabriel Moran's Critique of Meaning-making

Before continuing with this critical analysis of Kegan's framework, it is important to briefly consider Gabriel Moran's critique of the concept of meaning-making itself. Moran begins his argument by stating that meaning is neither invented nor destroyed (1989, p. 13). Rather, meaning resides in language, in the way words are used in political, historical and cultural context. To simply define a word is to miss the point because the definer of the word cannot simply invent the meaning or decide what the meaning ought to be. Thus the meaning of words changes as a function of changes in the world. Meaning arises from dialogue and action (Moran, 1989, p. 14).

Moran's thoughts on the word "making" are most relevant to this thesis. He acknowledges that the word has legitimate uses, but maintains that it has been mistakenly associated to certain human activities. In the contemporary Western mind, the word "making" is in the "context of a consumer economy" (Moran, 1989, p. 21), and yet "organic, mutual, and communal relations should not be described in the reductionistic language of maker, owner and user" (Moran, 1989, p. 22). A case in point is the term "meaning-

making"; Moran suggests that this term calls into question the meaning of meaning itself (1989, p. 21).

Moran acknowledges that the idea of "meaning-making" is one of the most predominant ones in contemporary thought; and yet he maintains that

> [man is the maker of meaning] is a presumptuous, not to say arrogant phrase; it is not based on any kind of proof or discovery but is an assumption reflected in a choice of language. The claim can seem to be self-evident today only because the way has been prepared by turning everything over to "man the maker". (1989, p. 21)

Moran also proposes that it is no accident that *man* is called the maker of meaning; he suggests that "if one speaks of men and women in their relation to meaning, other active verbs emerge, such as revelation, discovery, or birth" (1989, p. 21 -22).

To further illustrate his point, Moran proposes that there is a close connection between making meaning and making decisions, and notes that in contemporary Western society, the notion is constantly reinforced by our accepted authorities (psychologists, ethicists, business experts and so on) that the successful, well-adjusted, mature people are the ones who are able to make decisions--to "make something of themselves" (1989, p. 22). Yet Moran admits his suspicions that "the attempt to 'make meaning' in their

lives is today driving many people into despair....[and] that lives may be distorted by the effort to make decisions, instead of simply deciding or letting decisions emerge" (1989, p. 22).

Obviously this is a most essential criticism of Kegan's entire theory and yet it is too soon to simply discard the theory. For it is unclear exactly what Kegan means by meaning-*making*. On one hand, he is adamant that meaning is not inherent in events per se, but that as persons, we participate in the construction of an event. On the other hand, he notes that meaning-making activity goes on in the metaphysical "space between" the event and the person (Kegan, 1982, p. 11). In this way, Kegan's notion of meaning-making may be more in line with Moran's notion that meaning arises from dialogue or from the complexity of an event. What is clear is that Moran's criticism warrants serious consideration and the words used by Kegan may be in need of revision in order to more precisely convey the meaning he intends.

Walsh's Consideration of the Interindividual Balance and Buddhist Psychology

Recalling Kegan's helix model, the sequence of the balances and what the inherent purpose of development is, it can be seen that the meaning we make is about *who we are*

relative to others. The process is, therefore, a social one as well as a psychological one. When a person is fully embedded in a particular culture and is completely convinced of the ultimacy of that balance, then that person is subject to his/her reflexes, perceptions, impulses, needs and relationships, as the process unfolds. Every time a transition is successfully negotiated, what once was subject now becomes object. The small child is no longer subject to his/her perceptions, but now *has* perceptions and thus can *relate to* them. The whole process is a process of increasing refinements of self and other, subject and object, thus allowing for more truthful, because more expansive, *relationships to* the world. This whole reconception of psychological development is a very interesting and theoretically important one because it does a good job of integrating seemingly dichotomous approaches. It is more encompassing, therefore "better" than its predecessors.

One of the aspects of Kegan's theory that is most praiseworthy is his final interindividual balance. Kegan breaks from the traditional emphasis on a very differentiated kind of "self-actualization" and proposes instead, a higher developmental pinnacle, namely the more integrative interindividual balance. He thus takes a major step from White-Western-Male-generated theories toward more

holistic theories, including feminist theories and Eastern philosophies. In describing this balance, Kegan writes:

> the capacity to coordinate the institutional permits one now to join others...as individuals - people who are known ultimately in relation to their actual or potential recognition of themselves and others as value-originating, system-generating, history-making individuals. The community is for the first time a "universal" one in that all persons, by virtue of their being persons, are eligible for membership. The group which this self knows as "its own" is not a pseudo-species, but the species. (1982, p. 104)

It was suggested in Chapter 1 that this balance is a distinctively philosophical one. Indeed, the interindividual balance can be conceived of as a kind of "metaphysical homecoming". It entails a recognition of the metaphysical framework of meaning-making and a recognition of one's own place within the "single energy system of all living things" (Kegan, 1982, p. 43). It is also a paradoxical balance. For this is the final stage, the "end" and therefore, as has been suggested earlier, that which informs the entire developmental process of refining and defining self. Yet this is the balance wherein self is transcended--self becomes non-self. From this perspective therefore, it can also be seen to be the phase which

corresponds most closely to the notion of spirituality used in this thesis, thus supporting the claim that human development can be understood as a spiritual journey.

P.B. Walsh (1984) makes a similar observation about the interindividual balance. Walsh compares Kegan's model with Buddhist notions of development and concludes that the end of both is very similar. Both hope to arrive at a sort of "personal sovereignty" (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1987, p. 5) "which allows experience to be perceived as that-which-is, without clinging or aversion" (Walsh, 1984, p. 11); at a "wholeness [which] does not refer to completion, but rather to the ability to stand outside of the autonomous self system and to open to relationship with all the rest of that-which-is--to be able to experience both the figure and the ground" (Walsh, 1984, p. 13).

But Walsh also notes that the Eastern and Western notions of how to get there are quite different. From the Western perspective, full development is not arrived at until the end of the process. As Kohlberg insists, cognitive structure is what makes higher stages better than lower ones; the more advanced the stage is, the better it meets the formal criteria of differentiation and integration (Kohlberg in Munsey, 1980). But as Walsh notes, Buddhist psychology understands development to refer to the increasing skill at observing unhealthy mental factors and substituting them with healthy ones; "it doesn't lend itself

to phenomenological descriptions of phases on the way because the developmental process is constantly in flux, mind-moment to mind-moment and because full development, which is Enlightenment, is always present and potentially available" (1984, p. 10).

Here again is the notion of the "dual focus"--that the divine is within and simply needs to be recognized rather than having to be arrived at through a logical process of development. This point has been sufficiently elaborated above. Therefore, a more detailed consideration of the parallels that Walsh sees between the interindividual balance and the notion of Enlightenment is warranted.

What happens when a person evolves from the "self-actualization" of the institutionalized balance? In keeping with the framework, what formerly was subject now becomes object. In other words, rather than *being* a self, the person now *has* a self.

> It is at this point when formal operations are experienced as former limitations and where autonomy is perceived as an empty achievement, that the Constructive-Developmental model and de-constructive Buddhist psychology relate most intimately. Here, as process becomes the "form", they meet....Self-as-self is taken as object, is recognized as nothing but a constructed form....The Institutional self is seen to be/have

> been a necessary fiction....The self is seen as being "many selves" that may be intrapersonally coordinated and interpersonally shared. (Walsh, 1984, p. 13-15)

The end of the developmental process of refining the notion of self, is non-self. The "death of self" is not only required at each transition along the way, but is definitive of the very purpose of the process. Thus each transition, a heroic quest in itself, is merely one of the trials in the course of a larger journey which never ends.

The interindividual balance, like any other, bridges the gap between epistemology and ontology and between the individual and the society. Yet in a world that still celebrates the goal of self-actualization, a world which Kegan suggests is largely embedded in the institutional balance (1980, p. 416; 1982, p.214), the transition to the interindividual balance is an exceedingly difficult one. Because the integrative stance of the interindividual balance is reminiscent of the interpersonal balance, it is regarded with suspicion by those still institutionally-embedded. Furthermore, this old culture, rather than assist its members to evolve to the higher balance, is pre-occupied with holding on: therapists help their clients "become themselves" again and function well in society; educators teach with the similar goal that their students become productive and "well-adjusted" members of society. It is

difficult to "be non-self" when the required culture of embeddedness does not really exist. But it cannot be forgotten that the culture of embeddedness is as much a rational construct as the self is. The people who comprise the culture are always there--what changes is the way they understand the world. Herein lies a major challenge to educators--to see beyond not only the various political and ideological components of the status quo, but also beyond the epistemological and ontological structure which defines it.

This is a profound challenge because it poses a threat to the ultimacy of the institutional balance; it requires the death of the collective institutional self. Perhaps this is the same plea, in a different language, as Campbell's cry for a new mythology. If this is so, then this discussion has come full circle, for mythology emanates from the unconscious.

Having returned to the starting point, it seems that Campbell is likely correct in his statement that finding a new mythology to awaken us to the mystery of the divine within cannot be "a work that consciousness itself can achieve" (1949, p. 389), any more than *understanding the concept* of the interindividual non-self is the same as *being* non-self. Perhaps this final transition is rarely completed, except perhaps, by the likes of the Buddhas and Christs of the world, those "'representative persons'...who

have taught and usually also exemplified a way of life which has then attracted others who have seen in it a manifestation or even a revelation of authentic humanity" (Macquarrie, 1982, p. 138). But here again is the "call to adventure"--because each of us has the capacity to be a hero.

Both Kegan (1979, 1982) and Campbell (1986) quote T.S. Eliot: "At the still point, there the dance is". While Kegan's framework may only provide the choreography, Campbell's helps give us a better feeling of what the dance is all about. In the final analysis however, perhaps the still point is revealed only to those who lose themselves in the dancing.

CHAPTER FOUR

Implications for Education

> How teach again, however, what has been taught correctly and incorrectly learned a thousand thousand times, throughout the milleniums of mankind's prudent folly? That is the hero's ultimate difficult task. How render back into light-world language the speech-defying pronouncements of the dark? How represent on a two-dimensional surface a three-dimensional form, or in a three-dimensional image a multi-dimensional meaning? How translate into terms of "yes" and "no" revelations that shatter into meaninglessness every attempt to define the pairs of opposites? How communicate to people who insist on the exclusive evidence of their senses the message of the all-generating void? (Campbell, 1949, p. 218)

Perhaps as the section of the Kena Upanishad quoted at the outset of the thesis suggests, the question Campbell poses above is unanswerable because "It" cannot be taught! Even if it could, Campbell notes that such lessons are for

the hero to give, and surely it must be recognized that not all teachers are triumphant heroes--even if they have the capacity to be so. Perhaps Campbell's question is not the final one; it may be that the final pedagogical question concerns not the ultimate reality itself, but rather how to enable people to realize *for themselves* their participation in it. Indeed, in the context of the assertion that the human developmental process can be understood as a spiritual journey, the end of which is self-transcendence, then the ultimate goal of educators may be to nourish those heroic qualities in themselves and in their students which may facilitate self-transcendence. For it must be acknowledged that self-transcendence itself cannot be taught, but can only be directly experienced.

This is the most fundamental implication for education that arises from this thesis. However, a number of other more specific implications for the nature, purpose and process of education arise from both Kegan's model of human development and from this thesis. These implications are wide-ranging in scope and content; some deal with such concrete questions as tne nature of the teacher-student relationship, others concern the more esoteric questions of cultivating the heroic qualities that permit us to learn the ultimate spiritual lesson of our participation in the divine unity of all things.

This chapter will consist of two main sections. In the first section some of the implications for the nature of education will be considered. It will be suggested that education is a lifelong pursuit which is inherently political and moral. The writings of Paulo Freire and Gabriel Moran will be extensively referred to in this section. The focus of the second section will be the purpose of education, noting that while education must be concerned with mundane reality it must also reach beyond this to foster human creativity and spirit, and to nourish the heroic qualities of courage, faith, humility, love and acceptance in order that self-transcendence may be possible and that the divine reality may be recognized. Gabriel Moran and Sam Keen will be the principal authors referred to in this section. Finally, it must be noted that as with other distinctions made throughout this thesis, the separation of the nature and purpose is an artificial one made only in an attempt to achieve a certain clarity in presentation. Furthermore, pedagogical practice is implied by both. Such a distinction cannot be absolute, and some overlapping between sections is unavoidable.

Nature of Education

In Kegan's framework, the life-long activity of meaning-making requires both a person and a culture of

embeddedness, and both are modified throughout the process. At the risk of stating the obvious, there is a close connection between meaning-making and education: each involves the process of learning new things and acquiring new knowledge. In any learning situation involving two people, each is not only "person", but each is part of the other's culture of embeddedness. This gives rise to two main points: first, that insofar as we learn and acquire knowledge from people and events other than professional educators, then it must be admitted that we are all simultaneously teachers and students; second, from this perspective it is very clear that learning in school constitutes only one aspect of education.

Student-Teacher Relationship

The first idea that we are all teachers and students is reminiscent of Paulo Freire's conviction that "the teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in turn while being taught also teach. They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow" (Freire, 1970, p. 67). In the same way that studying is part of the student's journey, teaching is part of the teacher's and both are part of the person's meaning-making activity.

In schools, there is a tendency for the teacher to be the one who has the knowledge and, therefore, the power while the student has no knowledge, no power, and is, therefore, subordinate to the teacher. In the "banking" model of education (Freire, 1970) the student is an empty vessel into which the teacher deposits information. But if, as Freire insists, we allow for education to be a process of true dialogue between teacher-student and students-teachers in which both learn, then the political nature of the relationship must also change. All those involved in such a dialogue would be deserving of respect and their perspectives valued. All learning experiences would have to be approached with humility and trust, and such an approach requires courage. Freire maintains that the similar qualities of love, humility and faith are the foundations of true dialogue (1970, p. 77-80). These are some of the qualities required by the hero in order to be successful in his/her quest.

Education as a Lifelong Pursuit

Accepting that we are all simultaneously teachers and students throughout the life process, and acknowledging that this is implicit in the dialectical nature of the framework which defines the entire process itself, leads again to the second conclusion that education extends beyond the very

limited classroom situation to the whole life process. This notion is reminiscent of John Dewey's idea that there should be no difference between school and society; the school must be a microcosm of the larger society and education must be seen to continue throughout life (1915).

Similar concepts are also present in Gabriel Moran's writings. Although Moran suggests that giving education such a broad definition as simply "socialization" is ineffective, and contrary to Freire he implicitly accepts that inherent in the notion of teaching, of "showing how", is some "directive and controlling power" (1987, p. 149) by the teacher, he does explicitly acknowledge that everyone, at some point in their lives is a teacher. Parenting is the most obvious example he provides of non-professional education (1987, p. 1949). Like Dewey, Freire, and as Kegan's theory implies, Moran believes education is a lifelong process. "While school is a definite institution and schooling is a particular form of learning, *education is not a thing at all but a lifetime process constituted by a set of relations*" (Moran, 1987, p. 12). More specifically, "*education is the reshaping of life's forms with end (meaning) but without end (termination)*" (Moran, 1987, p. 13). Finally, Moran believes that "*morality and education are essentially the same process*" (1987, p. 14). Thus the educational process is a never-ending one through which we attempt to imbue life with meaning and purpose.

Furthermore, it is an inherently moral process. Moran's designation of morality as a process rather than the conventional understanding of a static code of right and wrong is interesting because it is similar to Kegan's emphasis that development is process. Nevertheless, it will soon become apparent that Moran is highly critical of the very notion of development. For now, the question of morality and education will be considered.

Education as a Moral Process

Walsh's concern: the absurdity of morality.

Much of this thesis has been concerned with questions of religion, spirituality, even God. These kinds of considerations are often seen to be interconnected with questions of morality, both in theory and in practice. Moreover, it can be argued, as does Moran, that education is inherently moral in nature. Indeed, Moran's argument to this effect will be presented below. It is interesting first to consider a peculiar problem which, according to P.B. Walsh, arises from the sorts of mystical notions raised in previous chapters. Walsh suggests that from the perspective of the "macrocosm", of the interindividual "non-self", of the ultimate reality of the unity of all things, from beyond the illusory duality of good and evil, "morality

and ethics become relativistic--a source of tolerance as well as absurdity" (Walsh, 1984, p. 15). Recalling Campbell's notion of the "dual focus" of microcosm/macrocosm, and accepting that the macrocosm, "by definition" so to speak, is beyond logical, rational explanation, then analysis must be limited to the microcosmic level and from this perspective, morality and ethics are very important concerns.

It has been suggested that perhaps the ultimate educational concern is to nourish heroic qualities so that people may come to their own realization of the divine reality. However, it must be recalled again that such an understanding does not arise from rationality. With specific regard to the learning that occurs in schools, it would be imprudent, to say the least, to attempt to "educate beyond morality" because this would be open to serious misinterpretation and grave abuses. In our institutionally-embedded society, wherein an ethics of rights (Moran, 1987) is enshrined in law and protected by a political system of rights (Ignatieff, 1984), it would be irresponsible to teach children in school that morality is absurd because ultimate reality is beyond all duality, including the dualities of good and bad, right and wrong! In spite of the suggestion in Chapter 3 that the death of the collective institutional self is required in order to see beyond the epistemological and ontological structure of the status quo to a more

mystical understanding of the human process, it must also be emphasized that in Kegan's model, successive evolutionary truces do not replace former truces; rather, they re-integrate them. Therefore, even from the macrocosmic perspective of interindividuality, *all* the "made-meanings" of former truces, including morality and ethics, remain important and necessary. Recall from Chapter 2 that the Bodhisattva refuses to cross the threshold to Nirvana out of compassion and because s/he realizes that Enlightenment is always and everywhere present. In Campbell's words,

> the hero [the interindividual] whose attachment to ego is already annihilate passes back and forth across the horizons of the world, in and out of the dragon, as readily as a king through all the rooms of his house. (1949, p. 93)

In the context of ethics and morality, the hero recognizes the limitations of codes of ethics, but can still appreciate their usefulness in the mundane world.

Accepting the importance and relevance of morality and ethics in education, it must be noted that the purpose of this section is not to articulate the implications for "Moral and Religious Education" as it exists as an official part of school curricula. Rather, in keeping both with the assertion that the entire developmental process has a spiritual element, and the conclusion of the previous section that education itself is a lifelong process in which

the whole world is the classroom, then it becomes apparent that any question of moral and religious education becomes as much a matter of process as of content. As teachers, whether professional or not, it is as important to teach morally as it is to teach morality.

Kegan is explicit about the call for compassion implied by his framework, and on this point, Moran may well be in agreement with him. Kegan writes of his own theory that it

> is apparently about a way of seeing others [yet] its secret devotion is to the dangerous recruitabilty such seeing brings on....what the eye sees better the heart feels more deeply. We not only increase the likelihood of our being moved; we also run the risks that being moved entails. For we are moved somewhere, and that somewhere is further into life, closer to those we live with. They come to matter more. Seeing better increases our vulnerability to being recruited to the welfare of another. It is our recruitability, as much as our knowledge of what to do once drawn, that makes us of value in our caring for another's development, whether the caring is the professional caring of teacher, therapist, pastor, or mental health worker, or the more spontaneous exercises of careful parenthood, friendship, and love. (1982, p. 16-17)

With specific reference again to professional teachers and schools, this quality of recruitability is integral to being a good teacher, for it allows teachers to understand the particular realities of their students. Kegan suggests that knowledge of developmental theory can only enhance the good teacher's effectiveness because it enables him/her to better understand how each student currently makes meaning, and to act appropriately as culture of embeddedness--whether by holding on, assisting in a transition underway, or remaining in place to be reintegrated by the new person in his/her new balance (1980, p. 438-440).

Moran's Critique of Developmental Theory and Moral Education.

An essential aspect of developmental theory as a whole is that stages are sequential, hierarchical, and invariant. Indeed, there is always a final stage, goal or purpose which informs the entire process. Inherent to this concept is the notion that more advanced stages are "better" than earlier ones. When the subject of development is the human person, then "better" takes on a moral connotation, and, in turn, striving to "attain" the highest stage takes on a moral significance. Lawrence Kohlberg wanted to "educate for justice" (Kohlberg, 1970), a sense of justice constituting full moral maturity at the final stage 6,

excluding his very late speculations about a possible stage 7 (Kohlberg, 1981). From this perspective it can be argued that such a "moral imperative" is also implicit in Kegan's theory. As noted earlier, however, Gabriel Moran is critical of both the very notion of development and the way it has been integrated into school curricula. Moran contends that developmentalism uses the visual image of a "ladder to the sky"; that "modern Western thought is based on the hope of ascending above the earthly conditions of human life" (1987, p. 3). Every successive rung climbed, every new developmental stage attained, is one step closer to the sky, one step closer to "heaven" and whatever that means to the economic developmentalist, the psychological developmentalist, the moral developmentalist and so on. Referring to Kohlberg's work, Moran insists that moral education must consist of more than learning how to reason in increasingly sophisticated ways about hypothetical moral dilemmas. Moran recalls Maria Harris' notion that "overall, the steps of development are...not steps up a staircase but steps in a dance" (1987, p. 171).

Moran's Concept of Morality of Goodness.

For Moran, the image of a ladder to the sky gives rise to an ethics of rights when what is needed, as Michael Ignatieff agrees (1984), is an ethic of the good and a

morality of goodness. When Moran uses the words good or goodness he refers to something *prior* to the ethically good or correct--a *mystical* goodness which is always there and which informs all things.

> Beyond good and evil, as we ethically conceive these terms, there is some unimaginable harmony. We cannot see it or grab hold of it, but it is available within an appropriately disciplined experience. "One does not get to the end of the world by travelling", says the Buddha. What we have to do is to stop imagining that life consists in travelling "to my own good". If we could do that, if we could recognize that the end is always with us, we would discover that the good surrounds us, is within us and is beneath our feet. (Moran, 1987, p. 51)

Therefore, morality, as search for goodness, is not so much about doing the right thing, as it is about the way we approach what is already there. Hence a major aspect of the morality of goodness is humility and acceptance in the face of the world. Another major aspect is responsibility--*for* oneself, and *to* the *total* environment. It is important to note that Moran does not use the word "responsibility" in the conventional way as a sense of duty or obligation. Rather, it too is more a matter of the attitude with which we respond to the world. Thus moral development and

"educational morality", Moran's preferred term, is about a "continual conversion....a circling back on oneself and a recapitulating of life at a deeper level....a movement of responding that deepens the personal center of response while broadening the area to which response is made" (Moran, 1987, p. 169). Furthermore, Moran sees no inherent developmental limits in his morality of goodness, but rather "a sense of aesthetic harmony and of the need for restriction based on responsibility" (1987, p. 170). From this perspective of the morality of goodness, the following statement by Mary Caroline Richards is an interesting response to Walsh's suggestion that morality and ethics eventually become absurd:

> Acceptance is part of love. It is devotion to the whole. When the doctrine of acceptance speaks of doing away with the categories of good and evil, it is not in order to turn everything into good, nor to turn everything into nothing. Rather, it is to prepare a meeting between man and phenomena at a level free of category, or evaluation. This is a preparation for the acceptance of the "is-ness" of each thing. (1989, p. 139)

The goodness that Moran is talking about seems to be the thing that motivates Kegan's interindividual and Campbell's triumphant hero. Indeed, Moran suggests that "the people most successful at taking down the ladder to the

sky have been the great religious mystics....Their lives demonstrated the conditions for living without an escape upward: love for creation, the experience of communion, and immersion in the present" (1987, p. 5-6). These people, Jesus, Buddha and other "representative persons" (Macquarrie, 1982, p. 138), are the people who personify the human purpose which, it is proposed, must be reflected in the educational purpose.

Thus a conclusion similar to P.B. Walsh's has been reached, namely that the morality of goodness coincides most closely with Kegan's interindividual balance. Moran also shares with Walsh (and even Kegan, although it is maintained that his theory, as it is, does not support it) the conviction that goodness is always there--it just needs to be recognized. "Humans do not have to go anywhere to find goodness; they do have to stop, be quiet, and listen" (Moran, 1987, p. 7). In other words, "the moral and mystical journey is not to ideal and spiritual forms above the world but to the deepest, darkest center of the material cosmos where goodness bubbles up in gentle, just, and caring attitudes" (Moran, 1987, p. 64). Finally, Moran writes that

> this meaning of the good is implicit at the beginning of life's journey; that is, *the child is a natural mystic* [italics added]. But the full flowering of the good that is consciously received as gift and freely willed so as to overflow into

> other lives usually takes the better part of a lifetime....For the young child, what is, is. In the Zen formula: "The mountains are mountains, the rivers are rivers, the trees are trees". (1987, p. 61-62)

Perhaps this is one interpretation of Jesus' statement, "I tell you solemnly, unless you change and become like little children you will never enter the kingdom of heaven" (Jerusalem Bible, Matthew 18:3). The nurturance of the heroic and childlike qualities of faith, humility, courage, love and acceptance, seems to be the opposite of current mainstream schooling practices which strive, as noted in Chapter 3, to produce "well-adjusted" and contributing adult members of society. Once again, therefore, Campbell's question which opened this chapter, must be asked: how is it possible for educators to move beyond this goal towards the goal of self-transcendence?

Educational Purpose

What Can We Be?

In a short article entitled "The Broken Record", Kegan claims that like politics and religion, education asks "the Big Question: What can we be" (1975, p. 251)? He then goes on to suggest that the goals of educational reformers are inherently "religious goals" because they imply,

regardless of their attempts to claim otherwise, that people can be improved through education. Kegan claims further that this is a matter of placing a high value on a "better life", a value which "is a living tie to the spirit and demands nourishment" (1975, p. 262). He completes his argument with a rewording of his original question: "Life might be more than it is, but what" (Kegan, 1975, p. 262)?

While it must be acknowledged that many "reformers" might take Kegan to task for his interpretation of their goals, this question need not be resolved in this thesis. Rather, for the purposes of this thesis, it is more to the point to consider Kegan's question "What can we be?" Put another way, what is the human potential, the human purpose, the human end? Kegan thinks that we can be recruitable to others and that we can be interindividuals. Campbell thinks we can be heroes. It has been proposed throughout this thesis that the juxtaposition of these two theories implies that we can be self-transcendent. Friere implicates education as the historical and political process of "conscientization" (1970)--of becoming more fully human. Moran sees the lifelong process of education ending with mature morality, or morality of goodness. In all of these instances, the people who personify the "ends" are remarkably similar; they are courageous, creative and effective people who are motivated by compassion and love, who have an acute awareness of the subtlety, complexity and

often the pain and difficulty of their concrete situations, and yet who still have a sense of peace and acceptance of that which is. They are people who have taken down the "ladder to the sky". Therefore, perhaps Kegan's statement that "life might be more than it is" is somewhat misplaced. Perhaps it is more a matter that life can be more truly *what* it is. Again, it must be concluded that the ultimate pedagogical purpose lies in cultivating these heroic qualities which allow us to be more truly who and what we are, namely, self-transcendent participants in the divine unity of all things.

Sam Keen: Autobiography as a New Mythology

Recalling Chapter 2 and the functions that Campbell attributes to myth, it will be noted that all of them are essentially educational. The primary focus in that chapter was on the role of myth to reveal, and to teach people to live with an awareness of, the macrocosmic level of reality.

It must be emphasized that myth *is* story. As Campbell suggests, it is "one, shape-shifting yet marvelously constant story that we find together with a challengingly persistent suggestion of more remaining to be experienced than will ever be known or told" (1949, p. 3). When Campbell calls for a new mythology therefore, he calls for a new story through which we can understand ourselves.

Sam Keen agrees with Campbell on this point. Indeed, he proposes that an entire course named "Storytelling and the Discovery of Identity" be offered in his hypothetical department of "Wonder, Wisdom, and Serendipitous Knowledge" (1970a, p. 42-81). Keen suggests that instead of replacing the old mythology with a new one of the same cultural order, we must now move to *autobiography*, and he outlines a number of Gestalt therapy exercises which might facilitate the learning of this kind of approach to life (1988). We must come to see our unique lives as stories of which we are the authors, even if, as is commonly acknowledged by writers of fiction, the characters *reveal themselves* as the story progresses. Again, we have the paradoxical notion that the story is not entirely of our own making--that if we are honest with ourselves, we will always be aware of a certain "serendipity" in life's happenings. Milan Kundera, in The Unbearable Lightness of Being (1984, p. 51-52), makes a similar suggestion that each of us can "compose" a life as we would create a piece of art--giving it symmetry, balance, texture and making it beautiful --if we are truly aware of the things that go on around us, and pay attention to the coincidences and chance happenings of life. Mary Catherine Bateson writes of essentially the same idea (1990).

> For Keen,
>
> the entire legacy and burden of cultural and familial myth come to rest, ultimately, on the

> individual. Each person is a repository of many stories, old and new. But what Santayana said about cultures is equally true for individuals: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." *Unless we try to become conscious of our personal myths, we are in danger of being dominated by them* [italics added]...We need to reinvent ourselves continually, weaving new themes into our life narratives, remembering our past, revising our future, reauthorizing the myth by which we live. (1988, p. 45)

This is essentially what Kegan says we *do* do throughout our personal evolution. From this perspective, it can be suggested that each balance, each way of making meaning *is* a myth.

All good stories have beginnings, middles and ends, and so too does the story of the human journey. From this perspective can be seen the continuous thread that runs through Kegan's helix model--"beginnings without end" (Keen, 1975), the journeys within the journey, that past, present and future are in the context of each other. The made-meanings, the personal myths of our individual histories *are* reintegrated by the present and will be, eventually, by the future. Being mindful, living fully in the present, does not mean losing oneself in the transitory moment, but being fully oneself in the moment. To use Moran's terminology, it

means responding from the whole self to the total environment both of which include past and future. It means recognizing ourselves as gestalts within a gestalt.

Teaching and learning to see our lives as unfolding stories filled with subplots, authored by ourselves, and in which each of us is the hero, may well facilitate our reintegration of our former selves and help to cultivate the sense of community that Kegan claims is lacking in contemporary Western culture. Such an approach to our lives would thus be important both psychologically and spiritually for it would foster an awareness of the *wholeness that we are*, and of the *wholeness in which* we are.

It is equally important, however, to learn to see ourselves in the appropriate physical context; to learn to integrate our "embodiedness" into this sense of wholeness, and to learn that not only are we socially interdependent with other people, but that we are physically interdependent with all living things including the planet itself. The sense of community and wholeness referred to above must be extended to include the physical environment in which we live. For as Keen writes,

> The only *Beyond* I can know is the one found *within* the intimate experience of the world as it is given to me. Only as I remain true to that being whose autobiography I alone can write and whose flesh I am, do I transcend my self, find my self

> encompassed in Being-becoming-itself. To be carnal means to re-cognize that *flesh is spirit*. My life, my time, my community is the locus of revelation. God is always incognito, hiding on a busy street, in falling rain, caressing us in every breath, in our DNA, encouraging us to become who we are. (1983, p. 209-210)

Furthermore, Keen suggests that "it is no less possible today to experience natural or fabricated objects with wonder and reverence than it was when the Greeks celebrated the divinity of the cosmos" (1970a, p. 59). It is proposed that precisely this is the final objective of education: to learn once again to celebrate the divinity of the cosmos.

In this chapter several implications for the nature and purpose of education have been considered. While it has been briefly acknowledged that education must address itself to the requirements of mundane reality, the main emphasis has been that the ultimate pedagogical purpose must reflect the ultimate human purpose which, as proposed throughout this thesis, is the spiritual purpose of self-transcendence--of recognition of our participation in the divine unity of all things.

Three important authors and educators, Freire, Moran and Keen, have been widely referenced in this chapter, each one dealing with three apparently different aspects of education: the political, the moral and the

"serendipitous". Yet significant similarities between the three are also obvious. Each of them suggests, whether explicitly or implicitly, that certain personal qualities, which have been referred to as "heroic qualities", namely humility, acceptance, faith, courage and love, are central to the learning process--for both teachers and students. Furthermore, all three agree that becoming more truly who and what we are--self-transcendent, whole--is the ultimate educational goal. Various educational techniques may be proposed ranging from Freire's dialogue (1970, p. 67) to Keen's psychotherapeutic and meditative exercises (1970a, p. 50-61; 1988, p. 45). Yet none of these methods can be anything more than means through which the desired experience may become possible. The best that any of these practices can do is prepare us to be open for self-transcendence and the realization of our participation in the divine reality. Once again, this chapter ends where it began with the conclusion that Campbell's opening question of how to teach the ultimate lesson must remain unanswered for "It" cannot be taught.

CONCLUSION

Motifs and Metaphors

The fundamental statement in this thesis is that individual human development is not alone a biological and psychological process, but it can also be understood as a spiritual journey. It is not only about growing into mature, confident and competent adults, but also about coming to recognize our most essential connectedness with all things. It is not only about becoming independent and self-sufficient, but about being able to see the artificiality of this "self" and being able to transcend it in order to be what we truly are--All things, No-thing, God, Emptiness...

Various questions raised by this thesis concerning the nature and purpose of education have also been considered: Who is a teacher and who is a student? How must they approach one another? Where and when does education take place? Education has been seen to be a lifelong process that is inherently social, political and even moral in nature. It has been suggested, furthermore, that the

educational purpose and process *must* reflect the purpose and process of human life and development--it must be directed not only at the body and the mind but at the spiritual aim of self-transcendence. Yet the paradox that has been present throughout this thesis is that this ultimate spiritual reality cannot be taught or learned through the means of rational thought alone, for self-transcendence can only be directly experienced by the individual. The best that teachers can do, whether professional or not, is to encourage in learners an openness to and a sense of acceptance of a sacred reality which is beyond rational comprehension. As Thomas Merton says, "Openness is all" (cited in Hart, 1974, p. 89). But, as was suggested in Chapter 3, this is essentially threatening to who we are collectively, and is, therefore, not generally the attitude with which we approach living, learning and teaching. To conclude this thesis, brief comments are warranted on the two main motifs and metaphors that have been present throughout, namely the metaphor of the journey, and the motif of the still point and the dance.

The Journey

The metaphor of the journey, first introduced in Chapter 2 with the discussion of the hero's quest, was seen again in Chapter 3 with the assertion that the human

developmental process is a spiritual odyssey. Each of us has the capacity to be a hero on a quest. Each of our lives is a journey comprised of a number of shorter journeys and adventures. The end of each of these is a greater understanding of our personal realities.

In Chapter 4, the metaphor of journey was connected to the notion of story; it was suggested that we learn to tell the stories of our lives in order to better understand ourselves in the context of the larger reality of which we are a part. An essential element of this metaphor of journey is the notion that the journey is not entirely under our control --we are not the sole authors of our own stories. We must live as intelligently and wisely as we can, but we must also accept those things which are beyond our personal control. The triumphant hero learns to make his/her will one with the "cosmic" will.

There is also the interesting idea that the journey ends where it began. "The basic principle of all mythology is this of the beginning in the end" (Campbell, 1949, p. 269). "Alpha is Omega" (Teilhard de Chardin, 1959). The adult becomes as a child again. In Sam Keen's words, "the most profound paradox of the struggle to explore the highest reaches of consciousness is that in the end we come home again to the ordinary" (1983, p. 207). Yet paradoxically, the process that has been undergone *has* influenced the end. In T.S. Eliot's words:

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploration
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time
(cited in Keen, 1983, p. 207-208).

This is one notion that Kegan's helix model misses.

At the Still Point, There the Dance Is

T.S. Eliot writes, "Except for the point, the still point, There would be no dance, and there is only the dance" (1943, p. 5). This is the second prominent motif of this thesis, first seen with Kegan in Chapter 1, and referred to by several authors considered throughout. Like the metaphor of the journey, this motif is paradoxical--koan-like.

Only the dance can be the stuff of education; to an extent, the steps of the dance can be taught and learned. But the still point, which is always there, without which "there would be no dance", which can only be recognized but not rationally learned, must at least be acknowledged by teachers.

Campbell writes about the Hindu holy syllable AUM in which the A represents waking consciousness, the U refers to dream consciousness, and the M refers to deep sleep. The syllable is surrounded by "the Fourth" which is silence (1949, p. 266-267). "The syllable itself is God as creator-

preserver-destroyer, but the silence is God Eternal, absolutely uninvolved in all the openings-and-closings of the round" (Campbell, 1949, p. 267). The still point parallels this notion of silence as "the Fourth". P.B. Walsh suggests that "the heart of the universe simply goes on beating, and while the contemporary Western ear listens to the rhythm of the heart-beats, the Buddhist ear is tuned as well to the emptiness between the beats" (1984, p. 6). In Elie Wiesel's words, "silence...is the soul of the word. It is what cannot be said that is important" (cited in Bonisteel, 1980, p. 54). The ultimate criticism of Kegan's theory has been that it claims to be as much about the still point as the dance, yet the still point cannot be captured in any theory.

Here again the imprecision of Kegan's helix model is apparent. Perhaps a more appropriate visual image would be the image of the growing concentric circles of waves that emanate from a point in a still pond. The waves start from a still point, an unexplained origin, and continue to grow until the surface of the pond becomes flat again--back to the still point. This might also be an interesting way to conceive of interpersonal relating--as patterns of wave refractions when two or more waves meet each other--all on the same pond, all emanating from, and returning to, the stillness. The actual points of origin are different, but

as Black Elk remarked in Chapter 2, "anywhere is the center of the world" (cited in Campbell, 1986, p. 33).

The extent of human folly can be seen in the fact that the question of the still point has been the object of speculation since humans were able to speculate. But the punchline to the cosmic joke is that the question cannot be answered through speculation alone, for the answer is available to us all the time and simply needs to be recognized. Thus Sam Keen's words provide a fitting end to this thesis:

> It all depends upon
> trusting
> silence
>
> and
>
> laughing
> because
> It must be said.
> (1970a, p. 140)

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