Stages of Moral Development as Understood by Beauvoir

STAGES OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT AS UNDERSTOOD BY SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR AND LAWRENCE KOHLBERG

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ABSTRACT

The moral development of the adolescent and adult has been of great interest to philosophers and educators for centuries, and recently psychologists have joined them. The idea that we develop in stages which depend on certain social and intellectual perceptions has been put forward by the French existentialist Simone de Beauvoir. Using a base of existential philosophy, she describes the stages by which it is possible to attain "authentic being", a way of behaviour involving intense awareness of others, deep compassion, and a need to act morally at all times. Such behaviour requires a constant struggle against self-deception and laziness, but the reward is the throwing off of indifference and the creation of a meaningful, active universe.

Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg, using tests on adolescents in many countries, has come up with a set of stages of moral development quite similar to Beauvoir's. Although valid criticisms of short-sightedness may be applied to both, these theories offer much of interest to those concerned with the hows and whys of moral development.

RESUME

Le développement moral de l'adolescent et de l'adulte a été intéressant aux philosophes et éducateurs pour des siècles. Récemment, çà devient intéressant aussi aux psychologues. L'existentialsite française Simone de Beauvoir écrit que nous développons dans des étapes, celles qui dépendent de certaines perceptions sociales et intellectuelles. Commençant par une base de l'existentialisme, elle décrit les étapes par lesquelles on peut parvenir à "l'existence authentique." C'est d'avoir conscience des autres d'une manière intense et constante, d'avoir de la compassion, et d'avoir un besoin continuel d'agir d'une façon morale. Ce type d'action exige une lutte constante contre la mauvaise foi et la paresse. Mais la récompense, c'est de rejeter l'indifférence dt de créer un univers actif qui a un sens.

Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg, lui aussi, s'intéresse à ce développement moral. Il a fait un examen, utilisant les adolescents de différents pays. Les résultats l'ont convaincu qu'il y a des étapes de la croissance; les siennes sont similaires à celles de Beauvoir. Bien qu'on puisse critiquer ces deux théories avec validité, elles offrent beaucoup à ceux qui s'intéressent au pourquoi et au comment de la moralité.

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INTRODUCTION

The first concern of this paper will be to describe the existential analysis of the human condition, specifically in so far as it leads to and suggests a type of morality. I will then examine two developmental theories of moral growth closely tied to the analysis. Modern existentialism has had a great influence on many fields of contemporary philosophy, and French writers have been particularly articulate. Although Jean-Paul Sartre may be the best known of the current French existentialists, his long-standing friend and intellectual partner Simone de Beauvoir has also made important written contributions. Sartre promised his readers a full-scale study of morality near the end of Being and Nothingness, and has touched on it occasionally, but has never developed the theme. At this point in his life, it seems unlikely that he will.

Mlle. de Beauvoir, however, did turn her attention to morality. The result was a stimulating book called Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguité, published in 1947 and translated soon after as The Ethics of Ambiguity. The existential point of view understands moral behavior as a process of never-finished choosing, and as such sees it in a developmental way. Beauvoir uses half of her book to refute untruths and misunderstandings about existentialism, and then goes on to discuss the individual's moral development. She posits a set of possible stages, showing her usual love for words and drama by giving them all titles. Each stage in development brings the individual closer to authentic free moral behavior.

The idea of stages in moral development is not a new one, but Beauvoir has gone to great intellectual lengths to describe each one and to have them all make sense within her particular philosophical framework. Coming from a completely different background twenty years later, Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg, a Harvard psychologist, began to develop a Piagetian-based scheme of the stages of moral development. Kohlberg is a scientist, and thus has been keenly interested in finding out if his hypothesizing has been correct. He has created a set of tests which attempt to measure moral development. Using them on samples of adolescents from various countries, he claims his results can be assumed for any population, regardless of culture and background. Many have praised his work; many have criticized it. More attention will be given to some of the criticism in chapter seven.

What is of interest here is the apparent complementarity of the stages of moral development postulated by Kohlberg and Beauvoir. They use very different terms, but the basic processes of self-other relations which largely determine morality seem much the same. The epitomes of the moral man created by each author bear a great resemblance to each other. The scientific Kohlberg and the philosophical Beauvoir seem in agreement on the highest values known to mankind. She calls it freedom; he translates it into its practical societal meaning and calls it justice. Both are concerned with the encouraging of dignity and respect for all individuals. The kind of just society Kohlberg looks for would no doubt be made up of the type of aware, self-transcendent individual Beauvoir writes about.

Criticisms of both their theories can be validly made, but the impress of truth still makes itself felt on the intellect.

It may be useful to note here that Beauvoir's ideas can be gathered as much from her many novels, volumes of autobiography, and plays as from her few purely intellectual and philosophical essays. Thus I have made use of much of her writing. Whenever possible, I read her work in French. The translations of passages from Pour une Morale are my own. As for Kohlberg, being a man of science and not at all a lover of words, his writing is presently limited to a large number of somewhat repetitious journal articles and lectures. I have made use of as many as seemed necessary. The two thousand or more pages of Beauvoir's autobiography offer excellent insight into the developing thought of Sartre. In any case, she is quite honest about using his philosophy as a springboard, and frequently assumes that the reader has familiarity with his ideas.

Chapter 1: The Sartrean View of the Human Condition

A. Life Without God

It seems to make sense to begin with a look at the human condition as understood by existentialists, using the terms and ideas of Jean-Paul Sartre. Beauvoir, as will be seen, picks up where he left off, and in some important ways parts company intellectually with her fellow traveller.

The human condition, in Sartre's eyes, is a desperate one. Life itself is unasked-for, and comes as a shock and surprise to the consciousness of the newborn. Far from seeing life as a gift, it is seen as a burden, a difficult passage from nothingness toward nothingness. Only by great effort can the individual make life itself something other than a ridiculous drama of alienation and emptiness. There are no rules and regulations, no givens and no God or gods in Sartre's universe. Thus we cannot fall into the acceptance of absolutes or some idea of the Good, because we do not know that there exists some infinite and perfect consciousness to think up and create absolutes and Platonic ideas.[1] On the contrary, the evidence of life around us makes such an idea laughable. There is no way of classifying human nature, or defining it, because each man makes himself and creates his own nature.

What is shared, then, as Beauvoir also points out, is the human condition itself. As brief as a lifetime is, there are nonetheless countless moments to live through, to agonize through, to create and use if one is not to be terrified, nauseated, and bored with them. Life must be a process of taking and making yours. Beauvoir talks of holding onto

the past only by bringing it in the direction of the future, filling it with continuing possibilities of meaning for the future as well as present. The house you did not build, she writes, becomes yours only when you begin to live in it.[2] There must be an ongoing giving of the self to the world, objects and others.

What does the self have to give? Sartre has quite forcefully erased the idea of human nature. There is no pre-formed self, no soul, no essential you. The teachings of the major religions thus brushed away, Sartre replaces them with his harsher reality.

First, the person comes to exist. Only after existence can he go on to define and create his own essence. Thus is born the famous idea that "Existence precedes essence." The coming into consciousness, the beginning of existence, is accepted as a mystery of sorts. There is no place even here for a creator God; human beings, along with their other abilities, usually possess and utilize the ability to procreate. Where did it start, this chain of beings? Sartre seems uninterested; what matters is the here and now, that we <u>are</u> here existing with no God to support help, reward or punish us. How can we posit a universally valid morality then? We have no absolutes to measure our behaviour against. We exist singly and separately in our empty world. Some writers assume that existentialism is necessarily amoral because of its emphasis on isolation and its anti-community feelings.[3] But to interpret existentialism this way is to see only part of it. There may indeed be a strong distrust of universally valid decisions, particularly in Sartre's work, but this does not totally cut out a place for individual moral behaviour.

As Beauvoir has explained, the idea that if God does not exist all is permitted does not make sense. On the contrary, if there were a God he could pardon and compensate in this or the next life; since there is not, human sins and errors are inexpiable. Thus the death of God movement leads one not to amorality or immorality, but to total responsibility.[4] It is now up to each individual person to make it important to be alive, to exist as an individual. It is the responsibility of the self to make not only his own life important and meaningful, but also the lives of his fellow men, because there is no superhuman agency to do it if he does not. Each time that we choose something, we are affirming its value, and it might be decided that it is good for us because it is good for all people. This Kantian way of choice leads to a huge responsibility for each individual at every choice and at every moment.

B. The Creating of Values

Sartre contends that we must create values for ourselves, but we must repudiate "the spirit of seriousness" which leads us to consider values as givens and transcendent. Values are never independent of the world. They can only have meaning when they are drawn from the very midst of human experience, and personally chosen. There is not an idea or action that is simply good in itself, good in the vacuum of a non-experiential context. Nor can we assume that an action or idea is good because it leads to desirable consequences.[5] To do so is to separate the means from the end, the intent from the result, and this is to ignore the reality of human experience. Somehow we are to choose certain goals, and reject others, and so assign more value to one idea or action than to another.

Despite Sartre's hard practical view of the world, in this matter he is somewhat romantic and imaginative. Having pushed aside many of the more traditional aids in choosing values he leaves the individual to make these crucial decisions concerning action on the basis of his conscience, his own frenetic mind. (This does not, however, imply any sort of a priori knowledge of the good, or an inborn sense of justice; Sartre would have us rely on clear, analytic thinking and the promptings which follow from it. It is a more rational than intuitive conscience that is referred to here). In reading Sartre's work, it becomes clear that the individual can only choose and create his own values when he has accepted the responsibility for doing so and knows what he is doing, that is when he has accepted and wills his own freedom.

This is a most awesome responsibility, for the willing of one's own freedom leaves no place for compromises or easy outs. The burden is there, always, to choose for oneself and others in a mature and wise way. To know and will oneself as free entails a recognition and willing of the freedom of all others. Unless all are free to choose, then my choice is not really free. The interlocking universe allows for no isolation and separation in the field of morality.

C. The Use and Abuse of Freedom and Awareness

Morality can only be a reality where there is freedom. So liberty becomes the prime value, the ground from which other values grow. It is not a quality, it is a reality one lives in. There is an interchange in Sartre's The Flies between the creator God Zeus and his rebellious son Orestes. Zeus is indignant that Orestes is defying his will and is deciding what action to take by himself. He tries to convince Orestes that

freedom is just another cause, another banner to follow under, another way of obeying someone else. He speaks;

> Zeus:....this freedom, whose slave you claim to be.
>
> Orestes: Neither slave nor master. I am my freedom. No sooner had you created me than I ceased to be yours.[6]

Yet freedom is not necessarily a joyous thing to choose. In a world where many men do not think for themselves, freedom frequently means exile, an idea that is reflected in Sartre's plays and in many of Beauvoir's novels, such as The Mandarins and The Blood of Others. The protagonists of these books are men and women who take action, who think and agonize over their decisions, who choose freedom for themselves and others and are often castigated and left alone as a result of their choices.

History is full of people who have accepted total responsibility for their actions, and acted strongly and many times. But to do so takes tremendous strength. We can only choose freedom when we have accepted the consciousness of it. To broaden ones consciousness, to sharpen one's awakeness, is a neverending task. It is a task that cannot be shirked, however, as we have only this life to live and are accountable only to our fellow men here and now. If one accepts the responsibility for all of his actions and accepts that he makes choices not just for himself but for all men, anguish is upon him.

Who can escape the doubts and indecision which follow on the act of again and again making choices for all human beings? There is always

the knowledge that we sometimes fail and err, and thus can destroy possibilities for others at every moment. The world is thrown at our consciousness without rhyme or reason, and we stumble into it as individuals. Not being able to break out of our individual shells of consciousness, Sartre points out that there is always some degree of alienation for the individual facing the rest of human society. The other is a threat and largely unknowable, yet necessary to my self-knowledge. Furthermore, knowing the limitations of my own consciousness I must still make wise and considered decisions for my own life and the lives of these innumerable others.

When the tension and anguish gets too great, the sensitive individual may not have the courage to deal with it. At times, he resorts to subterfuges and deceptions. To avoid anguish, Sartre reminds us, we frequently deceive ourselves. We act in bad faith, mauvaise foi. We can choose to play a role, and then can regard our behaviour as determined by that role. If I am a socialist, I act as a good socialist should act, and so have done away with the exhausting and frightening need to create and justify my actions and the reasons for them. Bad faith has "infinite explanatory possibilities",[7] and thus can rescue us from a multitude of difficult decisions and thoughts. The acceptance of less obvious givens or of social/ethnic categories are other examples of bad faith.

Yet there is a catch. It is definitely not the perfect way out. We must still choose which role we will play, and decide on the attitudes that will go with that role. My interpretation of being a liberal, or a Christian, or a conservative, might be totally different

from yours.

So there we are, caught again beneath the weight of free and authentic choice and decision. The tension may subside, but never disappears for the aware individual.

There is yet another deep source of tension and alienation for the existentialist. The aware individual is first conscious of himself, but only so by defining himself in comparison to and over against the rest of the world and the others in the world. Sartre's terminology here describes our relationships with other things and people in the world. Being-for-itself (etre-pour-soi) describes a conscious being. The consciousness is directed toward something other than itself, and it exists in relation to that something other. However, it is a failure in that it is not anything itself. It strains and yearns toward being something in itself but exists as a lack, "un manque d'etre". Such is the typical human being. He who is aware of this lack and tortured by it is a conscious being.

Being-in-itself (etre-en-soi) on the other hand refers to an unconscious being. Such beings exist, but the whole of their existence is absorbed in being whatever it is they are. The stone is totally taken up by its stoniness and stone nature, its existence as stone. The being-in-itself has a pure, solid, concrete existence. There is no lack in its existence. It is towards this that the being-for-itself strives, although the very awareness that allows him to know his lack and strive to change it, dooms his project from the beginning.[8] So the relation of man to objects is fraught with tension.

Equally difficult are the individual's relationships with other individuals. I know that to myself I am subject, the main and central perceiver of and actor on the world. I can assume that to Mr. X, Mr. X is subject. But to me, locked in my own consciousness, Mr. X will always be object. What is worse, I will always be object to Mr. X. Others are present with me in the world, but I relate to them far differently than I relate to myself. The other threatens my own freedom by his existence, possible choices, and possible actions.[9] He negates my attempt at transcendence of myself, my movement towards being-in-itself, by throwing me back onto myself in relation to him. He too can act and plan, and I rarely am aware of his decisions and plans. By his action it is possible that I will become only a means directed towards an unknown end. In this way he can take my responsibility from me, or force me to unknowingly take part in an action or choice I would disapprove of if I knew of it.

But the picture is not all bleak. There is this lack of similar perceptions between us, and I will always be object to others and they objects to me, but we do at least "share the material field of reality." There are many unifying actions in this field, planned and unplanned overlapping choices. Men may realize their unity without knowing it,[10] Sartre contends, so that the world is not really as solipsistic a place as it may sometimes seem. There still remains the problem that I need others to know myself, need objects to become complete subject. My definition of myself depends on what others define me as, and my point

of view about myself may change when others' perceptions of me change. Thus I seem to be free as subject in my consciousness and perception of the world, yet am also used as object in order to attain my own freedom. Beauvoir, as will be shown, focuses on other possibilities of human interaction.

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[1]Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Sartre on Humanism", ed., Contemporary European Ethics, (Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, 1972), p. 256

[2]Simone de Beauvoir, Pour une Morale de l'Ambiguité suivi de Pyrrhus et Cinéas, (Paris, Gallimard, 1947), p. 246

[3]Norbert O. Bobbio, The Philosophy of Decadentism, translated by D. Moore, (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1948), p. 28

[4]Pour une Morale de l'Ambuiguité, p. 22

[5]Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (2nd edition), (London, Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 136

[6]Jean-Paul Sartre, No Exit and Three Other Plays, translated by L. Abel, (New York, Vintage Books, 1958), p. 121

[7]Warnock, p. 125

[8]Jean-Paul Sartre, quoted in Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (2nd edition), p. 119

[9]Regis Jolivet, Sartre - The Theology of the Absurd, translated by W. Piersol, (New York, Newman Press, 1967), p. 81

[10]Ibid.

Chapter 2: Simone de Beauvoir

A. Autobiography

The basic Sartrean framework and terminology having been reviewed, we can now move on to looking at Beauvoir's particular interpretation of the human condition. Her personal background accounts for a great deal of her early thought, and the new directions her thought took later in her life reflected specific historical situations that she and her society were confronted with. Born in 1908, Simone de Beauvoir had a pleasant intellectual childhood full of material comfort and books. She had her taste of Christianity from early years at a Catholic school and pious mother, but dropped her belief in God soon after her closest friend died as a young teenager. This had an unsettling effect on her relationship with her parents, and was the start of her family reputation as the rebel. Actually, Simone started out feeling quite close to her parents. She has written, "Any reproach from my mother, the slightest frowning of eyebrows, disrupted my security; deprived of her approbation, I no longer felt I had the right to exist".[11]

But her repudiation of Christianity, followed by her proclaimed desire to be a philosophy teacher and to stay unmarried, disturbed the family. Beauvoir herself has noted her strong push for personal happiness, which she sees as a possible channel for freedom, and so we are not surprised to learn that she continued in her atheism and her studies against everyone's wishes. In university, at the age of 19, she met Sartre, and from that point on her life has centered around him. Although they never married, they have shared and continue to share a very full intellectual and emotional life. During the time they were both in their

twenties and teaching, she was in love and highly optimistic about everything. She was at "that point of Kantian optimism where you should implies you can", she writes, and where will and belief coincide at certain moments of choice and affirmation.[12] (Kohlberg does not seem to have moved past this position, as will be seen in chapter 6). She fought stubbornly at her job and in her private life to achieve the happiness she wanted so much. She later accused herself, as a young woman, of having embraced the bourgeois tenet of aggressive individualism, a way of life that does not concern others.[13] (As she and Sartre were quite busy at this point criticizing the bourgeois way of life, it is ironic that she was unwittingly living it in many ways).

When she was in her early thirties, the second World War broke out and hit France hard. Suddenly her comfortable lifestyle was gone. Sartre called up into the army, friends killed, and the suffering of mankind made horrendously evident from firsthand reports of survivors and the daily headlines. It took this catastrophe to shock Beauvoir and Sartre out of their rosy individualism into solidarity with their fellow man, from concern for the self (soi) to concern for others (l'autre). Their almost solipsistic philosophies changed to become focused on recognizing the rights and existence of others. The fact that there was a responsibility between the self and the rest of the living, acting universe became clear and began to assume primary importance in their writings.[14]

Both survived the war, and both were changed greatly. Sartre became quite involved with the French resistance movement during the war, and they both supported the French left wing movement after the war.

Lectures and travel tours became commonplace and both Beauvoir and Sartre published various items and letters in the press. Sartre was the more famous of the two, but Beauvoir also was quite busy. Her writing became more clearly ethical, and more focused on making sense out of life for mankind as a whole. She had finally realized that silence, inaction and absenteeism are also choices, fatal choices for the individual. With a consciousness strikingly aware of others, Beauvoir has written and spoken on her own and also worked with Sartre for the last 30 years. She was interested in relating her own experiences and perceptions to others, to share her own growth as a person, so she set out to write a one volume biography; it turned into four as her fascinated readers kept asking her "And then what happened?" One of her biographers has noted that a driving force in her life has been "the need to feel necessary, and the attempt to justify her life by participation in essential activity."[15]

Despite having lived through and shared many of the same experiences of despair and horror during the war, Beauvoir came out of it aware and concerned but still hopeful, whereas Sartre became more pessimistic than ever. Sartre, as already noted, developed the idea of human existence as absurd, and seems quite ready to discard many possibilities of individual potential in emotional, ethical and spiritual spheres. Yet Beauvoir, immersed in the angst of living, comes up with a different set of ideas.

She has been characterized as having a certain naivete, and even of coming out in favor of an "often quite charming form of romantic in-

dividualism."[16] This ability of the individual to act on his/her own, unaffected by the society and forces around him, is something that Sartre would likely scoff at. But it is true that Beauvoir has a definite romantic, at times almost visionary, flavor to her writing. The reason for this goes back to her own particular analysis of the human condition. Agreeing with Sartre's basic observations and definitions, she comes up with different conclusions. To Beauvoir, the human condition is not absurd but ambiguous, and that is the key to her more positive attitude.

B. Ambiguity of Existence

Beauvoir certainly goes along with Sartre in his descriptions of angst, despair, alienation, and bad faith. Beauvoir would likely agree with Kierkegaard's statement that the intensity of our despair increases with the intensity of our consciousness,[17] and she seems to feel it to be a human responsibility to ever expand our consciousness of self and others. Beauvoir, however, has a tendency to see both sides of the coin; perhaps her analytical father and more mystical mother have influenced her more than she would like to admit. She has written of the need to confront the two truths of life, both the gaiety of existing and the horror of finishing existence.[18] For, despite the difficulties facing the aware person, the ambiguity of existence leaves open possibilities for love, happiness, and right action. Life may, at times, be a thing we are indeed unhappy to lose. A look at her autobiography confirms this.

Beauvoir herself has experienced many warm and fulfilling relationships, travelled to many countries, and participated actively

in various political activities. Her readers will recall the many pages she has written delighting over a view from a mountaintop, a discussion with a friend, or even a good meal. Yet the fact that she has spent her life searching for answers and for order suggests that she is just as aware of the injustices, sorrows, and isolation that life invariably brings to the thinking person. It seems to me that she has put some of her own early doubts into the mouth of a young discontented man in her novel The Mandarins. In the midst of a serious political discussion, where everyone is busy voicing his definite opinions and eager plans for actions, the young man says, "When you begin asking yourself questions, nothing stands up. There are a lot of values you're supposed to take as fundamental facts. In the name of what? When you get right down to it, why freedom? Why equality? Does justice have any meaning? Why give a damn about other people?"[19] It is exactly such questions Beauvoir addresses herself to.

The ambiguity of our existence can be described in sets of paradoxes. Out of the seemingly contradictory facts of human life we create our essence. We each have what Beauvoir calls "the taste of our own life on our lips", yet we feel insignificant in the midst of that mass of others who make up the entire world. To ignore them is possible only to certain people, that is only to people at certain levels of thinking and perceiving. For Beauvoir, ignoring others is unthinkable and an impossibility. In the midst of these others, then, we create ourselves and our actions and thus become individuals. Our choices, what we do, are all-important to each of us. Yet we are also all confronted with the certain knowledge that at some point each one

of us will die.[20] Is the value of life all-important, or is it cancelled out by its unknown length and certain transience? Both, Beauvoir would probably answer.

Accepting Sartre's ideas of being-for-itself and being-in-itself, she discusses the failure of the person to be totally taken up in itself, to have the lack of self-consciousness that a stone has. But she goes one step farther than Sartre, who sees our yearning for being-in-itself as cause for anguish only. Beauvoir writes that in denying or negating the negation, we are affirming existence as positive. As all good language teachers know, a double negative in English creates a positive. And so, in knowing and feeling that I am not merely not - stone, I am making a positive if vague statement about what I am. To be more accurate, I am making a positive statement that I am. Assuming the failure to exist in the total, completely unselfconscious manner of a tree, we can yet live out of the ambiguous situation of being this lack of total being.

Another way to describe the ambiguity of our existence is to look at the subject - object problem. Given that we exist as manque d'etre, knowing that at some point we will cease to function as human beings, we also have the rest of the world to contend with. We have already gone over the idea that we need others in order to exist as subjects, yet others are objects to us and we will always remain objects to them. So, then, are others helpful to our personal growth, or destroyers of identity since they do not perceive us as subjects? They are both, and they are necessary to us whether or not we like that fact.

The ambiguity of our existence as moral beings follows the same

pattern. To develop morally in isolation is impossible. We can develop morally only as a result of social interaction, only as a member of various groups. However, as will be examined in more detail later, we are acting in the most moral way possible when we leave behind group judgements, ideas, and traditional values and learn to develop our own personal responses. Without the group we are moral imbeciles, but we must break from the group mentality if we are to become truly advanced in the ethical realm. Choices must ultimately be unique, yet one's capacity to choose depends on having been part of the typical group choices before. Genuine personal choice, de Beauvoir contends, is a way of facing up to reality and escaping the temptations of acting out of bad faith.

C. Freedom as the Supreme Value

To act in good faith, to make real and valid choices, we need always to opt for freedom. Beauvoir is convinced on this point, and it turns up frequently in her various philosophical writings. It is more subtley suggested in her novels, and one can examine her own life to see the way in which she believes such a philosophy can be carried out. She understands freedom to be the original condition of all justification for existence. It is the creating of our freedom, a continuing process, which is the creating of ourselves and the realizing of our human-ness. Pushing past the negating of the negation, we choose freely if not what and who we will be, at least the directions we wish to go in.

For this reason, freedom is the source of all other values. In acting freely we may also be acting wisely, with an interest in peace and

co-operation, etc., but none of these things are possible without choosing freedom first. Beauvoir sees freedom as the earth from which the other values spring up. With no earth, we can make only imitations of plants and flowers; opting for peace without freedom, we get only an imitation of peace, we act from mauvaise toi. Beauvoir feels that freedom is not a value outside of me that I decide to adhere to abstractly, rather it is the cause of my real being. Because of this understanding of freedom as the basis for all morality, Beauvoir writes that to want to be free and to want to make the best moral choices is the same desire.[21] The decision for the former assures the coming into being of the latter.

Beauvoir points out that being free is not a stage that one can reach and, once there, sit back and sigh in relief. Freedom is never a permanent way of being. There is constant tension as one strives to be free. It is never finally realised, it is always being realised.[22] Once more, the ambiguity is reflected. We have the possibility of valid moral judgement and action, but we are always struggling to attain it. It is never attained once-for-all. This continuing struggle is the only thing that can truly justify the efforts that we make. Beauvoir seems to suggest that efforts, no matter how valiant, directed towards other ends will ultimately prove to be failures or somehow ineffective.

Efforts to use one's liberty can be directed to various possibilities, depending on the situation. More will be said about this later in the paper. The self that strives for freedom creates projets, projects or goals which help us to become ourselves and realize our

humanity as positive thing rather than as a lack. The continual nature of the choosing of freedom means that new projects are always being created, and thus new futures.[23] The free, moral person always has an open future, since he chooses and creates its possibilities at every moment. He is not locked into unchanging goals, nor does he follow a cause. The responsibility is awesome, but allows one the chance of living fully out of the condition of ambiguity that we find ourselves in.

What is the relation of freedom to other values? We have already said it is the source of other values, so it clearly stands at the top of any hierarchy. Without it, there would be no hierarchy of morality. Being free, being moral, or to use another of Beauvoir's favorite terms, authentic being, means coherent existence. No other value can claim that, writes Beauvoir. Without freedom we cannot choose, but it is assumed that some will courageously opt for freedom and will choose. So freedom can lead to the recognition and acceptance of other values. Beauvoir has written that the only true good is liberty, which belongs to the individual and only to him, and takes him above all things given. This liberty may be beyond our attainment, but we strive for it.[24]

The authentic person is one who is intensely aware of the rest of the world. Thus the truly moral person acts in an interrelated, interlocking universe. Beauvoir's description of the world parts company with the more solipsistic system that Sartre seems to see before him. The possibilities for the self have everything to do with the judgements and actions of others. The attainment of freedom has to do

with human dignity, worth, and respect. For Sartre, this is because the reality of freedom is a process which gives the emphasis to reason, which he sees as a liberation force from the determinism of the emotions and passions.[25] He seems to conceive of emotion as a clouding and obscuring sort of energy, and of reason as a clarifying force. This would certainly help explain his lack of belief in human solidarity or possibilities for worthwhile and supportive group interaction.

Beauvoir does not share his bias against emotion at all. She seems to be interested in the balance of all human energies within each individual working together for moral choice. She has noted about herself that she is proud to have both a clear, analytical mind and also deep, warm feelings and the capacity for more intuitive knowledge.[26] Although she regards the former as a typically masculine trait and the latter as an essentially feminine trait, she values both equally and is most happy to find both qualities in any one person.

Freedom is accepted as the foundation of all possible morality. It is understood as the main source for all other values, since without it none of the other values have their full meaning and effective force. To live freely, since it is a condition of authentic being, is not a static way of life. Rather it is a way that must be chosen continuously. It is a necessary condition for that sort of personal development and affirmation which has been called self-actualization by the humanist psychologists. Freedom for the individual cannot be realized until the individual is intensely aware of the needs, desires, and problems of others, and then acts from the basis of this knowledge and understanding

of the world. In making choices and utilizing freedom, both reason and emotion are important elements. They should work in harmony together.

If the choosing to affirm ones lack of being, the choosing of freedom and awareness is so difficult, what do we get out of it that makes it worthwhile? Why not float along only half-aware through life, following the ideas and values of others? Sartre contends that we are not truly alive and not comfortable with ourselves when we give in to such a way of life. To act from bad faith may be easy, but it is not a fulfilling and satisfying way to exist. It makes no attempt to deal with the alienation and angst in a constructive way. Yet, for Sartre, even the continuing attempt to be free does not make other things clear.

In Being and Nothingness he seems to finally decide that, even working from the basis of free moral choice, no other value judgements are possible.[27] His basic ethical theory has a nihilistic tinge to it. Authentic being is set up as the only standard of moral judgement, but he does not go on to specify what the authentic being should work and fight for. He does say that one must know that one is free, and thus unite one's whole being in some activity.[28] Commitment of this sort is all-important. But commitment to what, or what kind of activity? Here Sartre offers no suggestions. One writer has noted that to Sartre the specific action chosen is not so important as the degree of consciousness that the action possesses of its ideal goal.[29] To know that one's action has been reasonably, clearly, and freely chosen may be more important than what it is one does. The originality of the act is significant, but it need not be particularly creative in order to be valuable.

Nor does Sartre understand freedom to be a value that helps us in our search for self-identity or in our relations with others. Beauvoir, writing about Sartre, has described his idea that sometimes circumstances can steal our individual possibilities away from us, such that no individual salvation is any longer possible. Collective struggle becomes the only thing left.[30] Yet how much can one expect from a group of beings who are, in Sartre's words, only a bunch of "useless passions"? We are aware of the existence of these others, as they keep us from what we most want at times. If I am free, then others too must be; yet others are not free, and I cannot be free alone since I cannot exist alone. Sartre does seem to suggest that encouraging the freedom of others is valuable[31], but he never gets to the point of offering a set of secondary values and concrete aims. Nor does he offer much hope about the possibility of significant relationships between the self and the rest of the world.

For Beauvoir, the recognition and acceptance of freedom as the supreme value helps us to determine secondary values, possible actions, self-identity, and our interaction with others. She firmly believes that the world can be known, ordered, and given meaning by the efforts of sensitive individuals who perceive the ambiguity of existence. This meaning comes about not through reflection in an armchair, but through thoughtful involvement in the world of others. Her lack of reliance on reason, Sartre's fallback, may be one of the things that gives her a more other-oriented outlook. One writer has noticed Beauvoir's desire to confront reality in its ambiguity and opacity as an astonishing pro-

cess, not as something reduced to mere facts to be reasoned over.[32] For example, she has written that each of us "experiences his own conscience as an absolute. How can several absolutes be compatible? This is something as mysterious as life or death".[33] She does seem to feel that the following of one's conscience can, in certain individuals, lead us to find values which follow from the dominant value of the encouraging of freedom in our own lives and others' lives.

Beauvoir's moral theory, it has been written, seems to be a mix of Marxism and Kantianism. It is a mix of universality, universal responsibility, and the desire of freedom for all people.[34] She has, from her own evidence in the autobiography, been drawn to both Kant and Marx, as well as to other philosophers, and she takes what she finds valuable from each. She exhorts us to be moral, to choose freedom. The most important virtue is to be committed to the freedom of others, and other virtues will follow from that one. An example of commitment and action in her own life would be her strong support of and participation in the French Resistance movement during the war, and her left-wing political activities in the post-war years up to the present.

From her books The Woman Destroyed, The Blood of Others, The Mandarins, and her play Useless Mouths, we get some indications of the values that seem to follow from a perpetual commitment to freedom. Some of these values are tenacity, honesty, integrity, and a hope for optimism expressed in outbursts of love and joy. She has put up her own defense against those who criticize existential ethics in Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité. She writes that some accuse the desire for freedom of being a hollow formula that does not propose any concrete suggestions for ac-

tion. If this is true, she continues, it is because the word freedom has been emptied of its own concrete meaning.[35]

There is another reason for not giving a list of specific actions to follow if one hopes to be an authentic person: the nature of choice and action itself. "The unique moral recommendation of existentialism is the obligation to struggle and live with the laceration of consciousness."[36] Such a continuing struggle means that there are not major plans or universal actions. Instead, solutions and acts must be individual, practical, and also provisional. The consistency of choice and action is derived by each individual only from the continual unfolding of actions. There is no preordained unchanging game plan. Beauvoir writes about this need for continuing attainment, doing always more and different actions, by commenting that paradise must offer new promises or it would not be paradise.[37]

The individual, then, creates himself by his actions. These actions are informed by the desire for freedom, and may take various paths and directions. Every new occasion offers itself up to the person as a clean sheet. If yesterday I was selfish, today I can choose to be selfish or be not selfish. The freedom to decide, frightening as it might be, is with us always. A person is not selfish, cowardly, brave, etc., a person just <u>is</u>.[38] (Kohlberg agrees with Beauvoir that we cannot label individuals in this way. See chapter 6). One can, of course, choose to limit oneself, by giving up one's freedom to one's past. Thus since yesterday I was X I can assume that today I must also be X. Such a surrender of choice is an example of self-deception and bad faith.

To act from good faith takes much more strength, but allows one to give importance and meaning to the world through the identity and confirmation of the self. How does this happen? Only through and against others does the self become evident and truly exist. Beauvoir writes, "It is because my subjectivity is not inertia, not a falling back on the self and separation but on the contrary a movement toward others, that the difference between others and myself ends and I can call the other mine...The bond that exists between us is something only I can create. I create it from the fact that I am not a thing, but a project towards the other, a transcendence."[39] To the authentic being, moral action consists of that which draws me toward others, in projects involving freedom for all. The transcendence of self, that is, the constant attempt to become more and to become closer to others, is another favorite idea of Beauvoir's. Transcendence can be realized through unique and practical projets.

It is important to Beauvoir that her philosophy be one of thought and action, reflecting the strange reality of human existence. She writes that the ambition of a philosophy worthy of that name is to be a mode of life which possesses its own justification. Full and responsible existence seems to be the justification for her moral philosophy. "Life is never divorced from philosophy," she claims.[40] Looking back on her own philosophical foundations she says that she found Hegel fascinating, but his idea of abolishing one's individual self and merging with Universal Being was too tempting to accept, implying as she saw it a move away from personal responsibility. The detached attempt to see one's life

in the perspective of Historical Necessity would be destroyed by emotion, she felt. She tends to feel more at ease with Kierkegaard, focusing as he does on the living certainty that "I am, I exist." In his works she found none of Hegel's lightening of the burden of responsibility. For Beauvoir, each person expresses and accomplishes separately the total human reality. Each person can jeopardize that reality as a whole, and each has the power to challenge those collective decisions which help to form our lives and identities.[41] So the individual's action are of huge significance, influencing not only his own self and projects, but the lives and possibilities of others.

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[11]Simone de Beauvoir, quoted in Henry, L'Echec d'une Chrétienté, (Paris, Artheme Fayard, 1961), p. 15

[12]Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, translated by Peter Green, (New York, World Publishing, 1962), p. 15

[13]Robert D. Cottrell, Simone de Beauvoir, (New York, Frederick Ungar Publisher, 1975), p. 26

[14]Anne-Marie Lasocki, Simone de Beauvoir ou L'Entreprise d'Ecrire, (Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 61

[15]Cottrell, p. 57

[16]René Girard, "Memoirs of a Dutiful Existentialist", Yale French Studies, Vo. 27, 1961, p. 44

[17]C. H. Waddington, The Ethical Animal, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960) p. 164

[18]A. M. Henry, Simone de Beauvoir ou L'Echec d'une Chretienté, (Paris, Artheme Fayard, 1961), p. 25

[19]The Mandarins, p. 180

[20]Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité, p. 12

[21]Ibid., p. 33

[22]Ibid., p. 37

[23]Lasocki, p. 73

[24]Pyrrhus et Cinéas, p. 73

[25]Jolivet, p. 63

[26]The Prime of Life, p. 369

[27]Jolivet, p. 66

[28]Colin Wilson, The Age of Defeat, (London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1959), p. 115

[29]Frances Jeanson, "Simone de Beauvoir" in Kockelman, p. 277

[30]Simone de Beauvoir, Force of Circumstance, translated by Richard Howard, (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1964), p. 242

[31]Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900, 2nd edition, (London, Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 136

[32]Rima Drell Reck, Literature and Responsibility, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 97

[33]Christian van den Berghe, Dictionnaires des Idées, (Paris, Mouton & Co., 1966), p. 78

[34]M. Cranston, "Simone de Beauvoir" in Cruickshank, p. 176

[35]Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité, p. 114

[36]Jeanson in Kockelman's, Contemporary European Ethics, p. 292

[37]Pyrrhus et Cinéas, p. 4

[38]The Age of Defeat, p. 110

[39]Pyrrhus et Cinéas, p. 245

[40]L'Existentialisme et la Sagesse des Nations, p. 12

[41]The Prime of Life, p. 373-74

Chapter 3: The Development of Beauvoir's Philosophy

A. Moving Away from Sartre: A Comparison

How is it that Sartre and Beauvoir come up with such very different conclusions about moral choices, actions, and behavior when they start with the same basic analysis of the human condition? Outlook seems to be the answer. Sartre has placed his faith in reason. Of the two, he tends to be much more of an abstract thinker. Beauvoir's philosophical works are less in quantity than her novels, autobiographical writings, and plays. When we look at Sartre's writing, there is somewhat more of a balance, although the scales tip in favor of philosophical writings. Sartre emphasizes the negative, lacks of things, what is not there. Beauvoir is a much more concrete thinker. She sees what it is possible to build, what might be there in the future if not at present. She has been characterized as more emotional, even in her philosophical essays, than Sartre. She does show more feeling for the flesh-and-blood entities who are her audience, but she is not gushing or sentimental. Beauvoir has chosen to never have children; thus we cannot explain her emotional emphasis as derived from her role as creator of life, mother-image, etc.

The ideas of Beauvoir and Sartre concerning human possibilities are most clearly reflected in their novels and plays. These writings always have a philosophical basis, but are often much clearer and more enjoyable than the strictly philosophical works. Sartre's focus on the isolation and aloneness of individuals is captured in his play The Flies. Orestes, a boy who has lived an easy, luxurious life, yearns to have

something happen to him so that he will be a more substantial person, a more aware person. He begins to take some action. He goes to the city of his birth, which he has not seen since he was a baby, and finds the people there weighted down with sorrow and suffering. Usually we want to share the happiness of others. Orestes pleads that he will be happy to be able to share even their grief, guilt, and pain. But he is told, "You cannot share in their repentance, since you did not share their crime."[42] Orestes is forced to commit crimes of his own; the isolation of one person from all the others does not make genuine sharing possible between strangers, and even infrequently between friends.

Sartre's ideas about the alienation, frustration, and hatred between people is probably most clearly shown in No Exit. Here, three selfish individuals find themselves in Hell, yet it looks like a poorly furnished living room and they wait for the tortures. Soon it becomes clear that they torture each other, with insinuations, jealousies, and manipulation, and no thumbscrews will ever be needed. Near the end, one character realizes this, and breaks out with the sad line, "Now I understand....Hell is - other people!"[43] There is not much thoughtful action in Sartre's plays, and those who are aware and choose freely usually end up as outcasts.

Beauvoir, on the other hand, manifests her more optimistic beliefs in her works. This is not to say that there are not characters who hate, despair, and feel alone in her books. There are many, such as the young man in The Mandarins already mentioned. But there are characters who accept the difficulties and ambiguities and try to create

freedom, love, and solidarity. If there is not always a strong note of hope in her books, one finishes them with at least a belief in human possibilities and potential. Beauvoir describes love as that which "breaks up the daily routine and chases away boredom, that boredom (ennui) which Stendhal thinks is such a deep evil because it is the absence of all reasons to live or to die."[44] Love can be a motivating force or energy, as it is for various of the characters in The Mandarins and The Blood of Others, in which love and concern force previously unaware characters to enter the world of responsibility, decision, and action.

In Les Bouches Inutiles, a small town has been surrounded by its enemy and its food supplies cut off. The mayor puts out a proclamation that women and children, being "useless mouths" who are eating up the precious food reserves, are to be put outside the city walls and abandoned to starvation and the enemy. He privately exempts his own wife, but is startled to hear her say she too is going. Although he feels that the town as a whole cannot defeat the enemy, through his love for his wife and her love for others he gradually becomes aware that they must all survive or die together. His responsibility for his wife as other extends to all others. The play closes as the townspeople open the city gate and prepare to meet the enemy and perhaps their death. The love of which Beauvoir speaks has been described as "the communion of two liberties", and thus must be free and conscious, an emotion which renounces possession and confusion.[45] It is this sort of mutual regard that must be fought for, cared for, and acted on, rather than the more typical regard of defensiveness and fear that exists between subject-object

relationships. Beauvoir holds that this mutual regard, the closest thing to a subject - subject relationship, can and does exist.

Beauvoir believes not only in the intimate sort of love between two persons, but also in a more generalized love and concern that one person can hold for mankind as a whole. It has been written, quite accurately I believe, that Beauvoir expresses the emotional side of moral issues through the obvious joy she takes in life and her fervent desire for human justice.[46] The value of one's existence can be measured in terms of a morality of choice and action in relation to others. The introduction to Le Sang des Autres (The Blood of Others) is Dostoyevsky's line, "Each of us is responsible for everything and to every human being." The young protagonist of the story, a boy who has left a rich home to become a simple worker, is repeatedly struck by the isolation of one from the other. As he sits in a room watching a girl he loves die, and trying to share the experience with her, he thinks, "It is not my death. I close my eyes, I remain motionless, but I am remembering things about myself, and her death enters into my life, but I do not enter into her death."[47] This young man continues to be troubled by his isolation from others, but he believes an alternative does exist. He describes it this way. "For years I patiently struggled to get there, to the confirmation of that serene solidarity where each man found in his comrades the strength to impose his own will, without infringing on the liberty of any one person and nevertheless remaining responsible for himself."[48] Here we find Beauvoir's hope, her alternative to Sartre's vision of despair, hatred, and alienation. The human solidarity she speaks of, although frequently introduced in her books by characters belonging to the communist party (like the youth above),

has nothing to do with government structure or class warfare. She sees it simply as a human potential for all aware individuals. It may tend to produce certain political structures, but it suggests no one structure as ideal. Neither does it suggest anarchy and nihilism. It seems to hint at co-operation, respect, and creative action, on the part of all directed towards all. "There is more than one way of unifying the moments of time through which one passes: by subordinating them to some specific action, for instance...The cares of personal existence can be momentarily lost in the fullness of the universal state," she writes.[49]

This has an almost mystical sound to it, reminding us of Hegel and the great religions of the East which speak of absorption of the many into the one. But Beauvoir suggests this only for moments, and does not hope for a homogenous group all with the same projects and actions. Our liberties are not unified or opposed; they are separate. "We situate ourselves in projects, situating others around us. Thus we create solidarity. But we do not all choose the same goals because our choices are free."[50] Thus in The Mandarins, two devoted and concerned political figures take opposite stances on the same issue, both hoping to encourage freedom and solidarity. In Tous les Hommes sont Mortels (All Men are Mortal), the immortal protagonist sadly watches as young people believing in love and solidarity go willingly to their death on battlefields, or escape the sanctuary he has so carefully prepared to protect them from the world.

It should be evident by now why Beauvoir was so drawn to Kant's ethical ideas. His unrelenting concern for all, and his interest

in every action at every moment are her own concerns and interests. But Beauvoir has lived through and thought enough of life to be wary when it comes to generalizing. She usually writes in terms of possibilities and maybes and rarely suggests concrete actions because she does not know all the "ifs" surrounding any specific situation. Authentic being is a possibility for all of us, but moral development is certainly not an inevitability. The process of development that she describes she contends is true and accurate, but that does not mean that all people follow the process all the way to the understanding of freedom. We can get to the point where we assume our situation and work with it, rather than submissively accepting it. Through choice like this we can transcend concrete situations. One's femaleness, poverty, or ethnic background are all examples of situations that can be dealt with in this positive and creative way.

Beauvoir is an intelligent woman, and thus has not ignored the many factors that influence our moral development. She accepts that family, friends, soci-economic background, luck, and even fate may effect us. "Mine is a striking example of how dependent the individual is upon his childhood," she writes. But one can, as an adult, work with one's circumstances. "My freedom was used to maintain my very first projects, and it has continually devised and contrived ways of remaining faithful to them throughout the variation of circumstance."[51]

B. Ideas on Art and Its Value

Her ideas on creativity, art, and human nature are all informed by her stance on ambiguity and the possibility of authentic being. Here

again we see Sartre's more negative attitude contrasting with Beauvoir's. Describing Sartre's attitude to writing, and perhaps tingeing it with her own thought, Beauvoir says that it involved renouncing being for doing, making, and taking action. Writing can be seen, as can any creative expressive art, as a rallying cry and a commitment. Sartre did not have contempt for literature, but rather a strong intention to restore its true dignity. The sense of engagement, of total participatory commitment, should be gathered from the writing. We should be able to sense the writer's total presence in what he has written.[52] This type of creativity should allow us to respond and react to situations without roles; thus it is an escape from bad faith.

Sartre himself, when he goes to observe and comment on writing, retains his usual clear and perceptive but negative tone. He desires that all literature would be moral, but not moralizing. It should not preach, but help us to understand and encourage us to make free choices. "There are walls everywhere - no exits to choose. One invents an exit and thus himself." The act of writing is a self-affirming act of freedom. But, he continues, "The world can very well do without literature. But it can do without man still better:"[53] Lest we think art and literature are really significant acts, Sartre is quick to wipe out all their significance with a sharp comment on mankind.

Beauvoir finds a need for a balance of feeling and reflection in order to write. If you feel nothing, she says, you cannot write. If you are too overcome by your feelings and cannot control them, you can no longer give them adequate expression. Words "have to murder

reality to hold it captive;" the most intense and important aspect of reality, its here-and-now presence, always escapes words.[54] She talks in her autobiography about what she calls her "trances", states of deep unselfconscious joy that came to her during moments of great beauty. They were usually experienced while outside; Beauvoir is a great lover of nature, and has walked hundreds of kilometers around Europe. Yet these trances, cherished for their peacefulness, left her too overcome by feelings to be able to describe them well. She wanted to hold on to her trance experiences and still be a writer. Sartre knew of this conflict within her and used to tease her about her trances.

If in her own writing there was at times some sort of conflict, she still saw successful writing (i.e., writers whose books were acts of engagement) as a partial solution to the self-other problem. Through art, there is the possibility that the artist will become alive in the hearts and minds of others, and thus become part of their subjectivity. This does seem like a possibility, but it seems to depend as much upon the understanding and receptivity of the reader as upon the emotional input of the author.

The production of real, thoughtful, committed literature seems to be accepted as a good, whether or not the audience is influenced, although he might assume the value would increase in proportion to the strong influence it has on readers. The consequences of the freely chosen act can never be known and sometimes not even accurately guessed at. Still the art must be created, the change from mere being to actual doing must take place, if the self is to be created. The book is

written, thrown out into the world, and as such it is a good thing.

Sartre does not give much place in his works to discussion of the good. If pushed, he might admit that being free was the best way to be, but simply because it is the only way to actually be, to realize oneself as existing.

Beauvoir, in an essay she wrote in 1948, said that "it is only in human relationships of love, friendship, and brotherhood that each individual can find the foundation and realization of his being." Such relationships, undertaken out of free choice by the authentic person, affirm the value of existence and as such are good.

In that same piece of writing, she opposed existentialism and its morality to the morality of self-interest.[55] Almost 25 years later, her thinking on the subject had not changed in the least. In the last volume to date of her autobiography, she clearly stated this. "According to Solzhenitsyn, the more intensely aware one is of the world and the more one is concerned with helping others the better one lives. I fully agree with these conclusions."[56] The good is that which expands and encourages awareness, responsibility, and so free choice and action.

Any action that falls into this description can be seen as good. One of the characters in Les Bouches Inutiles says, "A death freely chosen is not an evil."[57] In the same spirit, a monk in Tous les Hommes sont Mortels says as he is about to be burned at the stake for heresy, "There is only one good. It is to follow your conscience."[58] For Beauvoir, what is a conscience other than the promptings and knowledge of your awareness of the world? Creation is affirmation, even if the

act created is self-destructive. What is given and merely accepted is not of value. Beauvoir writes, "That which has value...is never that which we receive: it is that which we make. If we cannot create, we must destroy, but in some way we must refuse that which is. If not, we are not men."[59] And there are indeed many who are not truly men, not fully human because they do not take responsibility on themselves and choose freely.

C. Ideas on Guilt and Human Nature

Yet for those who do move toward authentic being and that total responsibility of one for all, it is not all ecstatic feelings of freedom and solidarity! Far from it. In Sartre's work we find the idea that when one becomes aware of existing for others as an object, aware of being seen, there develops a great feeling of shame and guilt. There is a guilt implicit just in being, being here and now, being an other who effects the rest of the others. Thus the realization of solidarity and of concern for others brings to light guilt.

Intertwined with feelings of solidarity and community are strands of guilt. "I am that anguish which exists alone in spite of myself," cries out one of Beauvoir's characters.[60] We do not feel guilt because of what we intentionally do to others, but at the awareness that even unintentionally we are affecting others, perhaps interfering with them. I can do nothing for or against another. The other does things for himself. But still I have to deal with my rapport with him, as I am always responsible for my acts. Everything I do changes his situation.[61] Others who are equally aware must feel this guilt toward me, but that

knowledge does nothing to assuage my own feelings. It is an inescapable problem.

There can be, one writer comments, at least temporary cleansings from the guilt of existing and the shame of being. Some sort of attenuating of the guilt is found in common responsibilities, and in the exalted awareness of human solidarity that Beauvoir describes. Yet most of the time the guilt is operating on some level. There is constantly the need for a witness and for affirmation from others, vying with the fear of being perceived as object and of being judged.[62] As one of Sartre's characters puts it, "I suppose that you're half victim and half accomplice, like everybody else."[63] Responsible action can help to resolve the guilt, as suggested, and thus it can at times become of positive value. Much strength and courage is needed to take up the weighty and sorrowful responsibility of freedom, with all it entails.

And where are we to find all this strength and courage? Is it part of our natural human nature? As one might expect from a philosophy that contends that existence precedes essence, and that man creates himself through his actions and choices, there is no belief in the type of human nature familiar to us from ancient philosophies and from traditional religious belief systems. Beauvoir comments that man is neither good nor bad naturally. He is nothing at first. It belongs to him to make himself good or bad, according to whether he takes on his liberty or rejects it. Good and bad only appear above and apart from nature and givens.[64] "I am free," she writes, "my projects are not defined and determined by pre-existing interests."[65] Why aren't all people free? Why don't we all make the choice to live freely and

responsibly?

The existence of bad faith, the self-deception that aids us in deciding not to be moral, affirms the self as nothingness. This sort of behavior is possible because of the negative feelings and anguish in man at the real possibilities of danger and failure that confront him. Beauvoir does not go along with the Platonic idea of evil as ignorance or error. As we shall see in chapter 6, Kohlberg does follow this line of thought.

To Beauvoir, evil is the not-choosing of freedom, the intentional giving in to laziness, impatience, caprice, or cowardice.[66] Human nature, in the traditional sense, would be seen by Beauvoir as being the tendency to react in some way to the world. There is always the desire to react to the problem of the isolated self, the desire for self-transcendence. Whether the reaction will lead to fear and defensiveness or concern and strength is more determined by the influence of friends, family, and personal circumstances than by any preordained natural tendencies.

Despite her recognition of the many failings and weaknesses of men, Beauvoir still has much faith in the future. She does not foresee utopia, but she has respect for individuals and hope that difficult choices will be made by many. Several writers interpret her work as fairly optimistic; one talks about her belief in one absolute in human nature, that of good will.[67, 68] Beauvoir, one suspects, would agree that good will is a strong force that men create within themselves but would probably object to the term "absolute" in conjunction with human nature. Her own life has shown much concern and

and good will, and an outstanding need to be useful. Pity for others does not concern her, but observation, explanation, analysis, and participation have, and continue to concern her.[69] She does not look down on others, only across to them, although she has strong criticism for those who do not make the choices for free moral behaviour.

We might note something about her attitude towards religion and God. Although she is an avowed atheist, she at times refers to God in her writings, both philosophical and fiction. Perhaps she does this because she is aware that God is a strong reality for many of her readers, and another accepted way of making sense of the world. Her desire to order the world, to encourage love and brotherhood, to transcend the self, and to create a significant meaning to life, all seem very much in accord with typical religious ethics. Her trances of joy and her moments of losing herself in the community of others sound exceedingly much like the descriptions given by firm believers in the realm of the spiritual. Perhaps what is most important are her actions, not her particular belief system. In that case her warmth, compassion, hope, and participation in society provide a good model for a follower of any religion.

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[42] The Flies, p. 59

[43] No Exit and Three Other Plays, p. 47

[44] Berghe, p. 36

[45] Genevieve Gennari, Simone de Beauvoir, (Paris, Editions Universitaires, 1958), p. 33

[46]Reck, p. 88

[47]The Blood of Others, p. 10

[48]Ibid., p. 64

[49]Prime of Life, p. 286

[50]Pyrrhus et Cinéas, p. 282

[51]All Said and Done, p. 30

[52]Force of Circumstance, p. 41

[53]What is Literature? p. 296

[54]Prime of Life, p. 37

[55]L'Existentialisme et la Sagesse des Nations, p. 42

[56]All Said and Done, p. 168

[57]Les Bouches Inutiles, p. 132

[58]Tous les Hommes sont Mortels, p. 193

[59]Ibid., p. 214

[60]The Blood of Others, p. 78

[61]Pyrrhus et Cinéas, p. 331

[62]Victor Brombert, The Intellectual Hero, (London, Faber & Faber, 1961), p. 232

[63]Dirty Hands in No Exit and Three Other Plays, p. 189

[64]L'Existentialisme et la Sagesse des Nations, p. 41

[65]Ibid., p. 214

[66]Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité, p. 49

[67]Gennari, p. 56

[68]Jolivet, p. 67

[69]Jacques Ehrmann, "Simone de Beauvoir and the Related Destinies of Woman and Intellectual", Yale French Studies, Vol. 27, 1961, p. 17

Chapter 4: Ideas on Moral Development

A: Recent Work and Theories

As the infant matures to a child, the child to teenager, and the teenager to adult, infinite changes occur. Various kinds of development happen, at different rates. Many of the changes cannot be seen. Moral development occurs as one's perception of the world expands and is clarified, and it can be noticed through the evidence of statements and actions. Factors such as sensory perception abilities and intelligence enter into moral development, but interaction with others is the most needed component for growth.

Moral development, although it may be arrested like any other sort of growth, is a usual maturation process in the normal human mind which occurs in the presence of others. Concepts of morality emerge only from social experience, such experiences having the power to transform egocentricity into rationality and interest in others.[70] Moral consciousness is, then, a special form of social consciousness. The awareness that one exists not alone but in community leads to many ideas. It certainly leads to a need for co-operative effort, truth-telling, kindness, and various other social practices, "on the desirability of which writers on ethics are agreed and without some degree of which no society can long survive."[71]

The point to focus on here is the question of the degree of morality needed for the survival of a society. Many civilizations throughout history have shown a startling lack of co-operative effort and truthfulness, yet have survived for some time. But if, like Beauvoir,

we set our hopes somewhat higher and dare to believe that man can do more than just survive, then we become more demanding. The more aware and socially conscious people we have in a society, the more moral the entire society will be, since each authentic person will work for the freedom of all others. But, as has already been noted, we do not have a checklist of actions that the free man takes. If we cannot judge and evaluate morality by looking at actions taken, how can we?

The ways of defining and measuring values exceed even the number of conceptions of intelligence, that slippery entity which has long eluded many writers of definitions. Clearly the evaluation of moral development and action has been of interest to philosophers for centuries. More recently, psychologists and scientists have joined the exploration. Values can be broked down to terminal values, desired end states of human existence, and instrumental values, desired modes of behaviour.[72] From Beauvoir's point of view, the two are intertwined. The instrumental value cannot in any way diverge from the terminal value, as might be possible in other ethical systems. (Any action not freely chosen and not encouraging the freedom of others by its means has no relation to the desired end state of human existence.)

For the last 50 years, research in various fields has been going on to determine whether or not there exist general patterns of development. Since philosophy has long suggested that there are universal ideals for the truly moral person, science has stepped in to see if there might not be universal patterns of growth in the direction of those ideals. Research has also been directed towards attempting to determine what sort of behaviour and attitudes characterized different

ages, what moral controls were most effective at what ages, what relationship exists between moral development and intellectual development, and what reasons might be validly suggested for a theory of sequential moral development. There have been re-examinations of the idea of evil, the idea of the child's mentality, and the place of pedagogy in moral development. The psychologists best known for pioneering work on these topics are Piaget, Hartshorne and May, Isaacs, and Gesell.[73]

Comparatively recent psychological theory has thrown new and different light on ancient Greek and other classical ethical theories. The Freudian scheme of the mind has made motives and intentions less clear and more complicated. Moral consciousness, it must be admitted, can be deeply influenced by unconscious factors. This makes observation of moral development much more difficult. The ancient philosophers usually set up a whole range of values, and Love, Truth, or Beauty frequently topped the hierarchy. The less important values, it was felt, inevitably and naturally led one to the higher values. Yet we know now that the formation of the lower values depends not just on the top value, but on social influences along the way, such that development is anything but inevitable.

Advances in learning theory have done away with the Platonic notion of evil as ignorance or lack of knowledge. Studies have documented the fact that those motivated by selfishness or other destructive reasons are often quite intelligent, and far from being ignorant of what "ought" to be done. Existential ethics, having grown up in the twentieth

century next to such psychological theories, takes into account the modern views of man and his maturation.

Beauvoir writes that morality is not a mixture of values and principles, but rather the movement by which values have been decided upon. Morality is manifested by action and the clear justification of actions taken.[74] The justification, of course, is the affirmation of self and others through freedom. What we must do is escape from the danger of being sucked into the abyss of indifference.[75] Yet the action we take for the purpose of expanding liberty is important. We must distinguish good from bad in our usage of liberty, Beauvoir writes, and so determine the secondary values.[76] After accepting our limits, we sometimes do move on to be able to choose and act.

In Beauvoir's view, moral development includes the authenticity of and commitment to both ends and means. She takes into account recent work on intention and reasoning, and sees both as significant. The ends and means form an indissoluble totality, she writes. The end is defined by the means. Action happens as a mixture of ends and means.[77] Sometimes we will fail, sometimes the outcome will be horrible, but we must always take both into account when we choose.

For example, do we kill one person to save ten others, or do we let ten die so as not to betray one? In both cases, the end is one which will encourage freedom and human dignity. Yet in both cases the means go against the saving and preserving of human life. There are no easy answers to this sort of dilemma. The final choice would be one which was a result of reflection and passion, and even so might not be totally satisfactory. But we must choose, as we develop, in accordance with

the sometimes less than ideal situations we find ourselves in. The situations themselves influence our choice, presenting different alternatives as they often do, different kinds of means to the same ends.

B. Moral Development as Process of Social Interaction

We can now look at moral development as a process involving the working out of the tension between the self and others, keeping in mind that changes of circumstance and various social, economic, and political situations may help or hinder the continuation of the process. Moral choice, being free decision-making, is impossible to see beforehand. The child, at an early stage of development on all scales, does not contain the adult person he will become. Yet I do decide what I want to be from the basis of what I have been. These early decisions are frequently made without clear reasons, however.

Being free and making sense of the world, processes which happen as the more adult self confronts the world at large, are two sides of the one reality of existence. They both imply the liason of one man with all other men. To want to be is to want to be certain of the existence of people by whom and for whom the world is given human significance. No project defines itself except by its interference with other projects.[78] The tension between ourselves and others need not be seen purely as a negative force. It is definitely a catalyst bringing about the need for identity formation and clarification of values, as well as an energy which can give us the initiative we need to participate in the world and attempt to take effective action.

The individual does have absolute value to himself, but he

defines himself through his relations with others. He exists in the transcending of his own self, which could never happen unless the concerns and interests of others become known to him, experienced by him, and accepted as his own.[79] My freedom only comes about through the freedom of others. The personal interfaces within any community provide the idea formation and opportunities for empathy necessary to moral development.

Let us look more closely at the process of morality as the working out of the relation between the self and the other. A chronological survey is useful here. The infant does not experience self as separate from other. The baby's first discoveries of any import are that the end of his bed is not the end of his body, that he can be taken away from the breast that feeds him. There is a feeling of total oneness with others for the infant, caused not only by his simplistic perceptions but also by this total dependence on others. He cannot physically survive without the others. The identification of the self as a separate thinking and reacting entity seems to begin in early childhood. The self is discovered through a continuing relationship of dependence on others. Self identity begins to be formed, and this definition comes from the ideas and expectations of others.

The continuing affirmation of the self by others happens through later childhood. The dependence on others for self identity lessens slightly, although approval of significant others is still extremely important. If a parent has decided that one of his children is usually good and the other usually bad, he will likely pass these ideas on to his children, intentionally or otherwise. The child is encouraged to

become one with what he hears about himself so as to be the person others think he is. Various tests have proven this to be true, even when all the child has to "live up to" is that he is bad or difficult to handle.

In adolescence, the defining of the self mostly takes place in severe opposition to others. In constant opposition to others, the teenager helps himself to become someone different from them. Thus we have the first stage of gradual independence. Others are, as always, needed to react to one and to affirm one's existence in the world, but the decision of "who am I?" is finally taken in hand more by the person involved than by those around him. From the total dependence on and need for approval from others that the child experiences, the adolescent moves toward independence and definition by opposition to others. This stormy period can resolve itself into a new phase, that of the mature adult.

At this time, the awareness of the self and responsibility to self expands to include awareness of others and responsibility to the whole of society. There is the task of the continual giving of meaning to the world through thought and action. The drive for independence so strong in adolescence can, at this point, mellow to an acceptance of inter-dependence among individuals. The adult's definition of self does not rest solely on his own ideas of identity, and he can grow to be aware of the oneness that exists between himself and the rest of mankind.

Clearly this pattern does not always develop to its fullest. The fact that we have prisons full of criminals, and reports of the lack of awareness and solidarity among people available every day in our newspapers, is evidence that not every child grows up to be an authentic,

moral adult. Beauvoir, as has been noted, accounts for this by writing about the weaknesses and fears of mankind. But the pattern does exist. One psychologist summarizes it by saying that the growth of the ethical sense involves the dynamic of self totally identifying with others, changing to a social-reference phase, and finally to a reciprocal self and society phase.[80] The tension between self and parent becomes tension between self and family, and then "the other" grows to include peers, institutional figures, institutional laws, adult peers, and laws in general. From adolescence on, the claims of reason struggle with the claims of love, and this struggle frequently goes on until death ends it.

Beauvoir writes that the will for freedom develops through time. So it is only when the child can see himself in the past and look to his future, when the moments of his life become "organized", that he can make decisions and choices. It is only at this point that he can become moral.[81] Before this point, the child is not immoral but amoral. We cannot criticize him for this lack since he is not yet intellectually, perceptually, or emotionally equipped to deal with the concept of freedom, let alone act on it.

The child passes through life in a state of irresponsibility. He is thrown into a world he did not make, where he finds absolutes to which he must submit. Values are there for him, ready-made products. He believes the real world to be that of the adults, and takes them as gods; bear in mind the overwhelming dependence of the child on adults at this point. Good and evil and goals exist although the child has had no hand in creating them. In this situation, the child is happy. What he does

concerns only himself, and his actions have no effect on anyone but the most immediate members of his family. His very insignificance gives him security, along with the knowledge that the adults who care for him will make all the right decisions for him. Such is the picture Beauvoir paints of the child's pleasant amoral world.[82]

But this state of affairs does not go on indefinitely. At adolescence begins the push for independent moral thinking, although it may only be a switch from following the standard morality of one's parents to that of one's peers. There is also, however, a coming to grips with the transience of life and the certainty of death, and the sometimes gaping abysses between our desires and our actual possibilities. The ambiguity of existence comes to be felt as real.

When this sort of awareness strikes the teenager, the added dimension of responsible choice comes into his life. Values must begin to be created personally. The period of adolescence is usually one of revolt, irrespect, and astonishment. Contradictions and weaknesses in the world become obvious to the teenager as he begins to discover himself and others in opposition. If he realizes that his own acts weigh just as heavily in the balance as the acts of others, he must begin to choose.[83] What does he do now that the possibility of freedom has revealed itself? Assuming his own subjectivity, will he immediately accept the risks, tensions, and passion of truly authentic and thus moral existence?

Beauvoir is a realist, so she would likely answer such a question by saying that some individuals will accept their freedom, but that others will just run from it, try to ignore it, or find sophisticated ways to

escape it. She has developed a set of stages of moral development that categorize the various ways adults choose to deal with the burden of freedom and total responsibility. We shall start with the least courageous person and work our way through the possibiliites she has written about in Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité.

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[70]R. Osborn, Humanism and Moral Theory, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959), p. 59

[71]Ibid., p. 47

[72]Milton Rokeach "Conceptualizing the Role of Values in Education", in Phillipps, Developing Value Construct in Schooling, (Worthington, Ohio, Ohio Associates for Curriculum Development, 1972), p. 7

[73]William Kay, Moral Development, (London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970), p. 69-69

[74]L'Existentialisme et la Sagesse des Nations, p. 92

[75]Gennari, p. 29

[76]L'Existentialisme et la Sagesse des Nations, p. 165

[77]Ibid., p. 99

[78]Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité, p. 100-103

[79]Ibid., p. 225

[80]Osborn, p. 21

[81]Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité, p. 38

[82]Ibid., p. 51

[83]Ibid., p. 56

Chapter 5: Beauvoir's Stages of Moral Development

A. Inferior Man

The first type of individual is the sous-homme, the inferior or sub-man. This person possesses no living vitality at all. He intentionally makes sure to keep himself blind and deaf to the world. Inferior man experiences no love and no real desire. This clearcut apathy show inferior man's great fear of the risks and tensions inherent in true existence. He avoids them totally. He refuses the passion of trying to become and rests as a complete manque d'etre, passive to his circumstances. His acts are not personal and unique results of deep thought. They are not positive choices at all but rather a means of flight.

His refusal to true existence is, of course, his way of existing. Inferior man takes refuge in borrowed values, prolonging in this way his amoral childhood. Since he is at the point where he is aware of the need for choice, however, he does not share the amorality of the child. He is immoral. He attempts to hide his indifference by going along fervently with whatever is popular, regardless of what that might be. He does not consider the consequences and implications of his choices, since to do so would mean the acceptance of responsibility. He is too frightened to do that. He fears anything coming at him which will shock him into the agonizing consciousness of self. Thus he is afraid of the future, and mindlessly rides out the present on waves of popular thought and action.[84]

Inferior man, although he has lived through the crisis of awareness during adolescence, has chosen not to take on any of the responsib-

ilities of authentic existence. He continues to accept the identity that others create for him, and the values that are handed to him. He is totally dependent on others for his moral stance. Fear has stopped his moral development. Consequently, this seemingly civilized person is alienated from his own soul, his own name, his work, even his property. Living inauthentically, he need not take responsibility for anything.[85]

B. Serious Man

One step past the inferior man is l'homme serieux, the serious man. In order to get rid of the burden of his own subjectivity, the serious man loses himself in some object or cause. He believes in unconditional values which will give his own life and work permanent values. He may believe in science, in philosophy, in revolution, etc. He seems to be involved in the attempt to give meaning to his life, but it is not a genuine attempt. Serious man reeks of mauvaise foi. He willingly gives up his own freedom for the profit of those absolute ends he believes in. However, he has not personally chosen these ends, in the true sense of choosing. He has not created them. Serious man accepts the sure and certain values of others. He is content to lose himself in others' values rather than to take up the difficult questions and doubts involved in creating his own values. Like a child, serious man accepts the values of others as givens, but like inferior man, he is guilty of immoral behavior when he does so. Serious man sometimes becomes a slave to his cause, whatever it might be, quite forgetting his shadowy knowledge that human freedom is the final goal of action and should be the only

unconditional goal.

Serious man likes to see himself as a member of a group or as an official, rather than just as another person, since he can cloak his own refusal to be under the existence and values of the particular cause or group he is associated with. Serious man does occasionally question and think over values, but not those of his own choosing. He may at times achieve personal transcendence through his devotion to a casually chosen cause, his god, but otherwise he uses his cause as a means of escape. Cut off from this cause and its goal, his life loses its sense and significance. He then experiences the absurdity of a life which has searched outside of itself for the justification which must come from the inside.[86]

Serious man makes a weak attempt to work with the freedom he knows he can make exist. He avoids it, but sometimes appears to be thinking about it. He, like inferior man, continues to be dependent on others in society for his morality, although he at least seems capable of genuine devotion to a cause. Without his peers to make the most important decisions, serious man's morality collapses.

C. The Nihilist

The morality of the serious man can give way to quite a different stance, that of the nihilist. He is a disappointed serious man, one who has perhaps realized that without the cause he loves he is nothing and can make no decisions. His potency depending on others, he realizes that individually he cannot be anything at all. He decides, then, to be nothing. Even this not-being is a sort of being, a given. The problem here is

that this individual exists, and he knows that he exists. In order to realize one's not-being, one's negativity, one must constantly contradict all the numerous movements of existence in oneself. But we do not exist alone. If he is to completely refuse his existence, the nihilist has to deal with the others he confronts. Their very existence means that he is being perceived as existing by them. He must also refuse the existence of others who confirm his own existence. How can he refuse the existence of others? He must destroy them. Hence we have his thirst for destruction.

In his desire to annihilate all others who might affirm his own existence he develops a strong will for power. He has come full circle at this point and obviously his search for non-existence, not being, has failed. He attempts to realize himself as existing by being the one through whom nothingness is brought into the world. He is aware of the ambiguity of existence, but his position understands it wrongly. He is aware of himself as a lack of existence, rather than as the positive existence of a lack. (The latter is open to possibilities and change; the former can bring only despair). The nihilist is certainly correct in thinking that the world possesses no justification. However, his great fault lies in forgetting that he must create the justification for his and everyone's existence.[87]

The nihilist is somewhat more advanced morally than serious man. He refuses to accept givens, and sees the world fairly clearly. But he is bent on destruction rather than creation. He has rejected the phase of morality in which dependence on others is total, but has not yet moved to the stage of total opposition and supposed independence. He has not

yet become aware of the need to build and share, and fails in the need that he does recognize, that of the destruction of his own existence.

D. The Adventurer

Another way to cope with the realization that the world has no inherent justification, and that our existence is a lack of true being; is to become what Beauvoir calls an adventurer. In some ways he is closer to authentic being than the nihilist. The adventurer, with his awareness of ambiguity, hopes for no justification of the world at all. He accepts life just as he finds it. He lives complacently. He will join up in a campaign of war, love, or politics with great ardor. The adventurer joins up and participates in the fight just for the conquest, however, not out of interest in the goal. The goal does not necessarily have much value to him. He believes in action for the sake of action. This type of person does indeed use his freedom. He neither depends on others to make his decisions for him, nor does he confront them in intense opposition and hatred. There is the fault, though, that he is indifferent to what he does with his freedom and actions.

To use his freedom to gain conquests, he will invariably need guns, money, or power. He may need authority to back him up. Thus he too eventually becomes a slave. His own freedom has been given up to those who give him what he needs and he is left with only an abstract sort of independence. He is a union of vitality and scepticism, with his energy used in the handiest direction since he doesn't care what it is used for. Some people might take the adventurer as the hero of existential ethics; Camus' Stranger bears a close resemblance to this type. However, in Beauvoir's interpretation, existentialism is not solipsistic. So he is

not a hero or authentic being. He does not care about the consequences of his actions.[88]

The adventurer has reached the phase of acceptance of others in his world and takes personally chosen action. He co-operates with others and creates the value of action for action's sake. He is more moral than any of the other types examined up to this point. But his actions, although freely chosen, lack concern for their consequences. He has no interest in the freedom of others, just in his own. He cares for the ends but not the means and sometimes loses his own freedom through the means he uses to attain his conquests. Solidarity is never one of his own goals. He is aware, but chooses to ignore the need to encourage the freedom of all through action.

E. Passionate Man

The passionate man, l'homme passionné, directs his activity towards the making of sense in the world. Thus he is more moral than the adventurer. Passionate man accepts objects and causes as absolutes when they are decided on as valuable by his own subjective framework. Out of his perceptions of the world he peoples it with desirable objects and animates it with significance. He has accepted the responsibility to create his own values and to act. However, he wants possession of desirable objects, whether they be animate or inanimate. He needs desperately to attain and hold on to that which he considers valuable. Outside of the thing desired, nothing else exists. His awareness of others shrinks away. Having engaged his life in an exterior object which can always escape him in some way, passionate man never fully exists. The

doubts and fears of losing what he considers of value never let up, so he can never totally enjoy himself.

This sort of freedom can only realize itself in separation from others, since safe possession of the valued is the end that this type has in mind. Although it is a free choice, it involves no need for others. In fact, others may be in the way. When others are perceived as obstacles, as means, there is clearly no interest shown in their freedom or situation.[89] So the passionate man, despite his acceptance of responsibility and free choice, is not an authentic being. He is aware of others, and creates his own values, but does not always opt for freedom. Furthermore, his craving for possession of what is valuable can put him in the position where he treats others as interfering elements. Solidarity has no place in his thought of the good, since closeness with others would mean that he would have to share his valued object/person.

The first four stages of moral development involve types who either follow the ideas of their peers and the rules of society implicitly, or else violently oppose both but create nothing in their place. The passionate man creates his own values, and does not go by institutional or societal rules, but he becomes a slave to his own freely-chosen valuable. For him, co-operation with others and respect for all is easily forgotten.

E. Authentic Being

The authentically free person is the one who is intensely aware of himself and others and who is continually involved in the struggle for

freedom through projects. He desires an open future, and is not attached to his goals although he is committed to them. The only unconditional goal is freedom for all. He respects the freedom of others and helps them to liberate themselves in ways that are suited to his own abilities. His acts have meaning at all times. He acts in an orderly, thoughtful way, whether he wins or loses in any particular situation. The authentic being has concern for all, thus he is always interested in both the means and the ends. He is conscious of the means he employs and their possible effects. The truly moral man knows that no person can save himself alone, but that we all depend on each other.[90] Thus he works for solidarity, and co-operates respectfully with others even while he makes his own choices independent of popular thought and action. The authentic being loves deeply, but without any thought of possession. Clearly he is the ideal figure of a moral being in Beauvoir's thought.

It might be helpful here to look at the method of making decisions that the authentic being uses. In each case, Beauvoir explains, the realized and foreseen values should be confronted. The sense of the act is grasped in terms of what it consists of and in terms of its context.[91] If this seems somewhat vague as to actual guidance in making value decisions, it is the best that can be done. Not being able to say what is exactly a good or bad decision, we can at least follow the certain knowledge that persons must always be treated as ends in themselves, since this is a corollary of a belief in the absolute value of human freedom. The interior truth on account

of which the act is done also counts on the evaluating sheet.[92] Since we are interested in means as well as ends, we can never classify as good an action based only on the conquest of an end, even if that end is freedom. Besides, every end when attained is a point of departure, and thus of ambiguous value, although sometimes we can see it as working for the freedom of mankind.[93] Actions, not objects, are the only things which belong entirely to us, and are thus ours to create, destroy, remember, or reflect on.

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[84] Ibid., p. 61-66

[85] Berghe, p. 24

[86] Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité, p. 66-74

[87] Ibid., p. 78-81

[88] Ibid., P. 83-86

[89] Ibid., p. 91-93

[90] Ibid., p. 87-91

[91] Ibid., p. 220

[92] Ibid., p. 194

[93] Pyrrhus et Cinéas, p. 260

Chapter 6: Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg

A. Background of Kohlberg's Work

Despite Beauvoir's obvious personal interest in theorizing and creating philosophy, the final goal for herself and all others is that of responsible action. If the words and ideas do not have an active counterpart of doing in the world, they lose their potency. If we turn to look at Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg's studies of moral development, we find the same interests. Dr. Kohlberg's earliest articles concentrated on attitudes and ideas, but he has since changed his emphasis somewhat. He seems to feel that the expression of a particular set of attitudes will usually lead to the individuals acting out those attitudes. The reason the problem comes up is that Dr. Kohlberg attempts to evaluate moral development in children and adolescents through written tests.

In his tests, individuals are given written situations to reflect on and react to. The situations are open-ended, and individuals must decide on what is the right thing to do for the characters involved. Their answers reveal basic values and ways of thinking. (Having experimented with these tests myself, with a group of 50 adolescents, I feel that they can be quite helpful. They aid students to clarify their values thinking, show what students consider to be important in life, and reflect the way students relate to themselves, their peers, and society). But does an answer written on a piece of paper assure us that the individual will indeed act in accordance with what he has written?

There certainly does not seem to be any guarantee. After studying the problem, Dr. Kohlberg has assumed a fairly high positive correlation between the two.

Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg, presently working at Harvard University, looks to the works of Piaget for his own stance and psychological framework. Piaget is best known for his work on the development of cognitive skills in the young child. Most of his work was on intellectual development, and he believed that skills and abilities in measuring, using abstract concepts, and spatial perception followed specific patterns of development. The patterns were linked to age, and their order was unchanging. Although the ages Piaget suggested have since been changed somewhat, the existence and order of his stages of development have been tested and found to be valid over the last forty years. Piaget wrote one book on the moral maturation of the child, following the same sort of scheme as he did for intellectual processes. It is from this point that Dr. Kohlberg picked up his own work.

He expanded the stages of moral development, detailed the attitudes prevalent in each and continued on to adult morality. His findings, although scientific in nature, are much like those of Beauvoir. Both agree on the existence of stages of moral development, which can overlap, but which usually follow along in a certain order. Neither writer assumes that progress from immorality to a high degree of morality is inevitable, but both agree it is possible. Nor does either one spend too much time thinking over why any <u>particular</u> individual does or does not become truly moral.

We have already examined Beauvoir's ideas about the amorality of the child. She does not hold the child responsible for moral behaviour since she contends that he is not yet capable of emotionally dealing with and realizing the true import of our ambiguous existence, or the fact of death. Kohlberg agrees here, although he designates certain of his stages as those of the child's "morality". He too feels that adolescence must be reached before the individual can begin to function with some independence and with a clear awareness of the rest of society.

Kohlberg feels that a certain level of intellectual maturity must be reached before the child can function in a truly moral way. In order for consistently moral behaviour at some levels to occur, certain cognitive principles used in moral judgement must be in operation; responsible decision-making is impossible for children at particularly low intellectual levels.[94] There seems to be a positive correlation between intelligence and morality, so that a certain amount and quality of intelligence serves as a necessary but not sufficient condition for continuing moral development.

Although Beauvoir does not directly tackle the question of the relationship between moral and intellectual development, the kind of awareness of social realities and the reasoned decision-making process she speaks of for the authentic being suggest that she too requires a certain basis of intelligence for truly moral behaviour. In her books the characters who are authentic seem to be endowed with at least normal if not high intelligence.

Both writers also make note of the fact that childhood exper-

iences, peers, and socio-economic conditions may help or hinder moral development. Kohlberg states what Beauvoir seems to suggest in her novels: the middle-class child, exposed to many ideas and situations and not worried about survival, seems to have the best chance of continuous moral development.[95]

Kohlberg was among those psychologists who opposed the generally accepted idea that there exist virtues that children can possess or learn to possess. The idea was that qualities such as honesty, loyalty, and courage would show up consistently, or never show up, in any given child. Thus there are good children and bad children.[96] Kohlberg felt that sometimes, in a specific situation, a child might be honest, but that in another situation he might be dishonest. His principles and values would determine whether or not that situation called for honesty. It is impossible to totally predict behaviour in such a scheme of understanding. Beauvoir certainly agrees with this idea. She writes, "vitality, sensitivity" and intelligence are only manners of acting on and with the world, not qualities."[97]

It might be worth noting here that Kohlberg and Beauvoir have very different opinions on the value of knowledge. Kohlberg is an avowed Platonist, and so accepts learning as a good in itself. Ignorance is seen as an evil. For Beauvoir, ignorance is less important than are indifference or fear as forces which block growth towards awareness and freedom. Knowledge may be abused, she contends, since it may be used for selfish means or in cases of bad faith as well as for the choosing of compassionate actions. Kohlberg would likely

disagree that the intentional abuse of knowledge happens frequently past the early stages of immorality.

Kohlberg is not the poetic and emotional type of person that Beauvoir is. His writing is clear, factual, and repetitive on occasion. His many articles go over the same ideas. No fancy names are to be found when he describes his stages of development. However, his first three stages generally correspond to Beauvoir's early stages, his fourth and fifth to her adventurer and passionate man, and his last stage to her authentic individual. The general pattern of total dependence on others for self definition, moving eventually to independence mixed with regard for the needs of others, is found in both writers. Kohlberg too accepts the need for paying attention to motives and means, as well as to consequences of actions taken, as morality matures.[98] What comes before and after the act, although more difficult to get to and know, are also parts of the choice.

Kohlberg's stages of moral development show us how the individual deals with the world. His tests for morality are able to focus on things such as how the person solves problems, acquires, recalls, and utilizes information, how he reasons, and how he makes inferences.[99] From this list of basically intellectual abilities, one might think that Kohlberg will end up with a more adequate evaluation of cognitive skills than of moral development. But one is necessary to the other, so to an extent there is a place for such an evaluation. However, the tests attempt to focus on many other abilities as well and how they are used. The development of a sense of

reciprocity, the foreseeing of consequences and remote goals, and the judging of consequences play a part in the response the test-taker will give. So does the ability to evaluate, discriminate, and adapt to and thus resolve conflicts. The test can help us to understand the individuals's powers of empathy and imagination as well.

Kohlberg has written that ethical principles are distinguishable from arbitrary conventional rules and popular beliefs in form and in content. Thus, the process of the development of true morality is quite different from the simple inculcation of arbitrary cultural beliefs.[100] The individual must act on his world, rather than accept it passively, if he is to become an autonomous moral being. He must, in Beauvoir's terms, strive for subject-subject relationships wherever possible as a moral adult. To resign oneself to acceptance of conventional morality which exists as a given outside oneself is to willingly accept the self as object in the eyes of others.

The stages of moral development imply total ways of thinking for Kohlberg, as for Beauvoir, not just specific attitudes toward particular situations. The stages do overlap; since we are talking about human growth, cut and dried categorizing is an impossibility. We tend to grow gradually, not by leaps and bounds, particularly in an area as subtle and complicated as our definition of our own identity and our relations with the world around us. Changing circumstances may influence at any and every moment the direction of our growth and/or its pace.

Any individual, at any given time, is not usually entirely at one stage of development. Those who are lower on the scale of moral behaviour may catch intimations of more mature attitudes from time to time and reflect this in their behaviour, just as the authentic truly moral individual may not always be consistent in his ability to relate to and understand others. Despite these qualifications, the stages are still useful as representations of typical ways of dealing with the world. Each stage can best be seen as a structured whole involving a certain unified treatment of basic aspects of morality.[101] This statement should be kept in mind when looking at Kohlberg's or Beauvoir's work.

For Beauvoir, the movement from one stage to the next seems to have depended on several things. Most important is the degree of awareness that the person possesses. To be aware of the ambiguity of existence, with its consequent burden of the creation of values and total responsibility, is to know a whole new world. The unconditional absolute value of freedom can then be chosen, secondary values determined, and personal projects created. The increase in the ability to recognize, relate to, understand, and be concerned for others is also an important component in development. The building up of energy, initiative, and strength also facilitates moving from one stage to another.

Probably Kohlberg would generally agree with all the above elements as being necessary conditions for moral maturation. He adds that movement on to the next stage also involves internal cognitive reorganization. This is not just the addition of more difficult

content matter from the outside world. It is a changing of ways of thinking, a new awareness which leads to a restructuring of the person's conception of self and others. Kohlberg feels that this internal reorganization happens as a result of what he calls cognitive conflict.[102]

When ideas and relationships which are not easily assimilated by the mind strike someone, conflict occurs. The experience or information can be tossed out, or the mind can struggle to make sense of it. If significance is to be created in this situation, change is necessary. The individual may move himself from one stage to another. Kohlberg contends that conflicts such as this arise in situations of social participation involving peers, family, and institutions. Need for new role-taking can eventually lead to a genuine restructuring of thought and action.

B. Kohlberg's Six Stages of Moral Development

Kohlberg's early stages relate to children, and we can recognize shades of Beauvoir's analysis of the state of the amoral child.[103] In these early stages, moral value is found in external, quasi-physical happenings, in bad actions, or in quasi-physical needs rather than in persons or general standards. The stage one child is totally oriented to obedience and punishment. His motive for doing something is that he will not be punished if he does it. He accepts the adult's decision of what is right or wrong, and knows wrong as that which is deserving of punishment by adults. Although he is quite egocentric, he will defer to superior power or prestige. He will toe

the line drawn for him by others, and may choose to avoid trouble-provoking situations to obey adult commands. He sees responsibility objectively; if x action is wrong, that is, one deserving of punishment, and you have done it, then you deserve to be punished. The irresponsibility of the child for any but the actions in his own small world is complete, and actions he takes are dictated to him as right or wrong.

The stage two child continues with a naively egotistical orientation to life. The right action is that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs. Occasionally the needs of others may also be satisfied. The needs of the child are still at this point largely decided on and created by the adult others he is in contact with. He begins to be aware of the way values differ for different people, depending on that person's need and perspective. Going along with what he needs and actions that will satisfy him, with no thought at all as to consequences and little self-identity, the stage two child is reminiscent of the serious man. The fear and obedience of the stage one child reflects the more adult fear of the inferior man.

At stage two, a simple egalitarianism begins to exist. Having enlarged his group of others past his own family at this point, the stage two person desires that others have only what he has, no more, no less. This almost instinctive desire for common and usually popular standards is like that of the serious man as well. The idea of reciprocity begins to develop at this point. Piaget had noticed that stage one children considered telling lies to be evil because

they would get punished and the lies wouldn't help them get what they wanted; stage two individuals, often around ages 10-12, thought that lies were not good because they showed a lack of co-operation and trust, both necessary to reciprocal relationships.[104]

At this point of moral development, the basis of moral value shifts. It is now found to reside in the performing of good and right roles, and in the maintenance of the conventional order and the expectancies of others. The ideas of others continue to play a large part in the affirmation of self, although at this time the self may go through a period of intense negativism that Beauvoir characterized as the nihilist stage.

For some individuals, stage three has a basic "good-boy, good-girl" orientation. The emphasis is on pleasing and helping others, but this interest does not spring from a genuine concern for others, understanding of them, or feelings of solidarity. One helps others because the good person, as defined by the family and by the institutional laws, does so happily. There tends to be conformity to the stero-typical images of the majority.

Living up to the expectancies of others, however, may involve something other than carrying out a good-boy role. The serious man gets his pat on the back with the stage three person for carrying out an action even th ough he didn't freely choose it; there also exists the type of stage three person who, like the nihilist, performs the role of bringer of destruction. As any sociologist will tell you, marginals are needed to maintain conventional order. The role of bad boy, which is defined by others and thus not a totally original choice, fits into society too.

Stage four morality allows some free choice to enter into the picture. Authority is respected, but the role that the stage four individual will play to maintain social order is more truly chosen. The specific role is not usually dictated. There is an orientation to doing one's duty and maintaining the social order. The social order is to be maintained for its own sake, not because it necessarily reflects any important goals, much as the adventurer takes action for the sake of taking action, whether or not it is good action. The stage four person, like the adventurer, has some free choice and some regard for others. He still accepts external authorities, however, and has no feeling for mankind as a whole.

He is not running away from choice and responsibility, as the early stages of Kohlberg and Beauvoir do, but he is not yet clearly thinking through his actions. Motives may count, but consequences don't. The means are not particularly important if the end is considered worthwhile.

As we near the development of mature and genuine morality, once again the place where moral value resides changes. It is now beginning to be found in the conforming of the self with shared or shareable standards, duties, or rights. The importance of maintaining the social order has diminished. General moral principles and responsible action are now possibilities.

At stage five, a contractual, legalistic orientation can be noticed. The person may act in accordance with the rules, but does so recognizing the arbitrary element or starting point of these rules,

which has been decided on for the sake of agreement. He sees that those who follow rules and the social order without being aware are not really making their own choices. He accepts the rules, but still considers himself responsible for his actions. He has a sense of commitment. His duty is now defined in terms of the social contract; for his action and support of x, it is fair that he in turn receives y.

This interest in receiving, and the aware yet somewhat ungenerous attitude, reminds us of the passionate man, who makes free choices and acts on the world but is highly concerned with the obtaining and possessing of the valuable. The stage five person generally avoids violating the will and rights of others, but does not make a special campaign of it. Unlike the passionate man, however, for whom others can actually become obstacles, the stage five individual has some interest in the general welfare of the majority as set forth in the social contract. Neither individual has attained true concern for all others, and neither acts with this as the absolute goal.

It is only when we reach Kohlberg's stage six that we find the equivalent of Beauvoir's authentic being. This individual's orientation is toward freely chosen principles embodied in his conscience. Action follows belief, and intentionality is counted as significant.

It should be noted here that Kohlberg seems to feel that intention almost always assures action. It may be only the stage six person whose intentions are genuinely his own and sincerely compassionate, but especially in the cases of these individuals he takes a

Kantian stance. The knowledge of the right and good, for Kohlberg, usually implies like behaviour.

The orientation is not only to actually ordained social rules, but also to principles of choice involving an appeal to logical universality and consistency. From the stage six viewpoint, the means must be consistent with the end. The conscience is used as a directing agent. Thus this autonomous moral being creates and acts responsibly on his own values just as Beauvoir's authentic man does. Mutual respect and trust between all people is taken as a condition of interaction, and as a goal where it is not yet in evidence.

C. The Complementarity of the Two Theories

The stages of moral development suggested by Beauvoir and Kohlberg have a definite complementarity, as I have tried to show. Given the totally different background and biases of the two, the parallels are striking. I do not know if either is aware of the other's work. They seem to have come to their conclusions totally separately, and each seems valid in itself. Kohlberg has the added dimension of testing out his theory, which gives it additional weight; yet Beauvoir has not suggested any substantial changes to the theory she devised over thirty years ago. I certainly did not expect the stages to match exactly. But I find that the repetition of the attitudes, actions, and goals stated in the same order of development are close enough to make them good neighbors. Seeing one totally abstract and one totally scientific thinker approach the same topic and leave it with such similar views convinces me of the validity of their views.

It might be noted here that neither Beauvoir nor Kohlberg have much hope for many people reaching the most mature stage of morality. The process, as we have seen, can be long and arduous, requiring continuing reclarification and commitment to goals that occasionally clash with those of the society in general. Kohlberg has remarked that each of his stages of moral judgement represents a step toward a more genuinely and distinctly moral judgement, that is, a judgement more closely in correspondence to genuine morality as it has been defined by philosophers.[105] Beauvoir could certainly be included in this group.

Yet philosophers frequently deplore the lack of good and courageous individuals in the world. Beauvoir seems open to hopeful possibilities, but is certainly not convinced that next century will see a society of authentic beings. Kohlberg also seems to feel that many adults will never reach stages five and six. Earlier results of tests like Kohlberg's, which attempted to evaluate moral autonomy and the making of truly moral judgements, had discouraging results. Few young adults measured up to authentic being, and Kohlberg's results seem much the same.[106]

Kohlberg and Beauvoir are in agreement not only about the difficulty of reaching the most mature stage of morality, but also about the structural changes which lead the person to moral growth. As might be expected, Kohlberg focuses on details and explanations of a scientific-psychological sort; his ideas do seem to complement Beauvoir's, however, if we look at general patterns. The process of moral growth is seen as one involving the development of self-identity

through, against, and/or for others. The way in which Beauvoir's and Kohlberg's specific stages parallel each other has already been described. The more general pattern of total identification of self with others, confirmation of self by significant others, further definition of self as opposed to others, and a growing awareness of the interaction of self and society which can eventually lead to responsible consistent morality - this pattern seems reflected in both writers.

The important changes in moral thinking have been accepted as occurring during adolescence. There is, at this time, a greater awareness of moral questions coupled with a greater capability for dealing with them. The world becomes increasingly diverse and less limited to the adolescent, and if he does not take the easy way out through bad faith, many difficult choices are inevitable.[107]

Beauvoir notes, like Kohlberg, that during adolescence introspection and the creation of new values frequently are in evidence. Kohlberg feels that these new and growing concerns have to do with the ability to entertain hypotheses or theoretical propositions which depart from immediately observable events. "The awareness of the discrepancy between the actual and the possible helps to make the adolescent a rebel."[108]

It is just such awareness which seems to motivate the adolescent girl in Beauvoir's The Mandarins. Dissatisfied with the plodding and sometimes compromising political actions of her socialist father, she dreams of immediate and direct action and excitement. True to

stereotype, she runs off to travel with an older man, leaving behind traditional values in her search for new ones that will give meaning to her world. Somewhere past such a stage of anarchistic morality, subjectivism gives way to thought which is capable of transcending one's own immediate experience and considering others' points of view.

To a certain extent there seems to be tacit agreement between Beauvoir and Kohlberg that intellectual development enhances the ability to analyze and criticize, and to have more accurate perceptions of the world. However, the external environment of the individual interacts with his own internal environment. One influences the other. Kohlberg writes that value orientations are related to social class differences, and that the social hierarchy condones varying values for persons at varying steps on the ladder.[109] Beauvoir's young bourgeois protagonist experiences this reality in The Blood of Others, in which he finds that his newly-made friends of working class origin question his sincerity and his comprehension of their own values and concerns. His different social background classifies him in their eyes, and his arduous struggle down the social ladder is not easily accepted by those born at the bottom.

Both Kohlberg and Beauvoir write about the development of social awareness in the mature individual such that the stage six/authentic man acts with regard to others at all times. Kohlberg, as noted, has written of a reassertion in his own work of the Platonic faith in the power of rational good.[110] Beauvoir too reflects the idea that awareness and the knowledge of right action is a development of intel-

lectual as well as of emotional potential. In Beauvoir, as has been suggested, an almost mystical element of spiritual feelings towards all of mankind is also evident.

An emphasis on the universal is found in both thinkers. Moral judgements, involving decisions about the goodness or rightness of actions, are not like aesthetic decisions. They tend to be universal judgements, inclusive, consistent, and grounded on impersonal or ideal grounds. The responsibility of one towards all others must never be neglected, nor dealt with according to personal and selfish preferences. The fact of our existence, our interference into the lives of others must be compensated for by continuous, thoughtful, compassionate choice and action.

Kohlberg has written that justice represents an ideal equilibrium of social interaction,[111] and certainly Beauvoir's driving force is towards the goal of human freedom, dignity, and worth, which can be reflected in any social order as justice. Justice requires somewhat less personal sacrifice than the continual loving actions for freedom of others suggested by Beauvoir, but it is easier to legislate and carry out and it sanctions many of the same actions. This central moral value of justice is not understood as a rule or a set of rules, but as a way of choosing which we attempt to follow at all times. It is a freely chosen and acted on ideal. Kohlberg brings up the point that a knowledge of the principle of justice does not predict virtuous action but at least makes it a possibility.[112] In Beauvoir we find the same idea: recognizing one's freedom may not lead to acceptance of it

in all cases, but it is a necessary preliminary to free moral choice.[113] The problem of the relationship between thought and action has not been solved, but both writers recognize it as a problem.

A writer commenting on Kohlberg's work has noted that Kohlberg's stage six moral person follows closely the authentic man described by Heidegger, and, we may add, that described by Beauvoir too. He possesses the "moral skills" of being able to attend to other peoples' feelings, treating others as ends in themselves, thinking and acting on empirical facts and consequences, communicating clearly, and being able to formulate universalizable principles.[114]

Beauvoir's explanation of morality seems to be that it develops through the recognition that we create ourselves through others and that we act by choosing projects which make ourselves richer as persons while showing our concern for others. According to Kohlberg, morality happens through changes in what is clear and valuable to us, such that eventually the whole world is included and we act by following our increasingly other-oriented moral perceptions and decisions. In both cases, it is the recognition, acceptance and eventual resolution of the self-other conflict which are the signals of moral development. The growing awareness of the interdependence of humanity seems to be the key to moral growth, although Beauvoir focuses on freedom and Kohlberg on cognitive maturation as the paths leading to this awareness.

It is questionable whether or not Kohlberg would accept Beauvoir's statement that to be free is to be moral. Kohlberg seems to feel that justice can be chosen and administered even in a situation in which not all individuals are free. In his concrete way, he does

not analyse the actions of the individual as having effects on all others, but just on the specific society he is involved in. Kohlberg's less mature individuals, for example in stages three and four, are less wracked by angst and fear than Beauvoir's cowards and nihilists. Beauvoir again here focuses more on abstract and internal anxieties, whereas Kohlberg is interested in the specific and the external. It might be argued that if Kohlberg understood freedom in the way that Beauvoir does, he would agree that the free man would be more likely to attain stage six morality than any other.

Although the complementarity of these two systems of thought has been established, one is not necessarily better than the other. Both have their advantages: Kohlberg has specificity, Beauvoir her greater sensitivity to individuals despite her philosophical tone. Neither theory escapes some criticism, however. Both have received much criticism, and some of it seems to be warranted. Beauvoir especially has been dealt some harsh words, perhaps because of her audacity in daring to continue Sartre's line of philosophy, when most people know her best as a "mere" prize-winning female novelist.

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[94]Lawrence Kohlberg "Moral Education in the Schools" in Grinder, Studies in Adolescence, (Toronto, Macmillan Co., 1969), p. 239

[95]Lawson, p. 39

[96]Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education for Justice" in Sizer, Moral Education, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 63

[97]Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité, p. 58

[98]Osborn, p. 27

[99]Mussen, p. 327

[100]Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stages of moral development as a basis for moral education", in Beck, Moral Education, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 33

[101]Ibid., p. 36

[102]Beck, p. 49

[103]The following descriptions are taken from Kohlberg in Sizer, Moral Education, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 71 ff.

[104]Osborn, p. 29

[105]Kohlberg in Grinder, p. 253

[106]Kay, p. 173

[107]Mussen, p. 605

[108]Ibid., p. 553

[109]Kay, p. 177

[110]Kohlberg in Sizer, p. 57

[111]Kohlberg in Beck, p. 53

[112]Kohlberg in Sizer, p. 69

[113]All Said and Done, p. 112

[114]Kay, p. 208-9

Chapter 7: Criticism of Kohlberg's Theory

The tests that Kohlberg worked up to evaluate moral reasoning and decision-making abilities have not been criticized too much. Their use, however, and conclusions drawn from their results are another matter. Kohlberg attempted to avoid any specifically Western biases in his test. The test situation involves a man whose young wife is dying from cancer. The only available cure is one invented by a druggist. The man, after trying all ways possible, is unable to come up with the amount of money the druggist demands for the medication. He has only half the money, and the druggist refuses to sell it. The man, desperate at this point, steals the drug. The person taking this test is asked a series of questions following from the initial one: should the man have stolen the drug?

The test has been used in Canada, the United States, England, Turkey, Central America, Mexico, and Taiwan. Kohlberg has been criticized for assuming the universality of his theory after tests in only these countries. It seems true that most of them operate under the same dominant social values anyway. Kohlberg, in his rush to be scientific, immediately speaks of his theory as accurate for moral development in all cultures and countries.

It is questionable to what extent he has figured in or considered the effect of the impact of culture on young teenagers and young adults. If a scale of morality is made with Western values consciously or unconsciously in mind, then a totally different culture with different values will come out as a low scorer on Kohlberg's test.

The test will, in Kohlberg's eyes, still be accurate; country X will simply be categorized as somewhat immoral.

Along these lines is the problem of class structure. Although Kohlberg touches on the influence of the socio-economic sphere, he does not appear to compensate for it in the analysis of his test results. There is also the difficulty of assuming that one word or idea will be understood in the same way in all cultures. Surely there are sometimes vast differences in interpretation even in one city or country let alone between countries. If stealing is considered to be wrong, the person who steals may be "correctly" punished in one culture by being fined, in another by being jailed, and in another by having his hand cut off. If the principle of morality behind all three punishments is the same and can still lead to such different actions, then its universality loses much of its real concrete meaning.

Kohlberg has been accused of categorizing and thus falling into danger of making morality a static thing, but he has stated that the stages do overlap. Thus there is a place for change even within his categories. But this leads to another problem. If an immature action is taken, but for mature reasons, how are we to tell apart the stage three from the stage five person? What is the importance of the practical consequence of an action? Since Kohlberg evaluates moral decision-making, we can only assume that like moral actions will follow. He does not show us evidence for his Kantian certainty on this point, since he does not test behaviour, only decision-making abilities. But there can be a discrepancy between words and actions

which throws Kohlberg's theory into a less valuable position, since we are all familiar with where good intentions and ideas can lead us.

One of my own criticisms of Kohlberg's work, although not a major one, is that he does too much generalizing of character types. Although the antonomous stage six person sounds complex and interesting, and various types of personalities could fit that stage, this is not true of the lower stages. The immoral person sounds stereotyped, and too predictable to be real. Kohlberg's immorality is boring. There is not even more than a hint, for example, of the teenaged rebellious searcher for values. The emphasis in stages two through four is on the (immoral) yes-man. What of the many other ways in which we deceive ourselves and others?

In Kohlberg's stages there is little of the diversity of character and thought that we find represented in Beauvoir's work. She may be dramatic or poetic at times, but her stages have more accurately captured the dynamics of creative coping and non-coping that real people experience in their moral development throughout adolescent and adult life.

Beauvoir avoids some of the criticisms directed at Kohlberg because of her very different approach, style, and interests. She cannot be criticised on the grounds that she has misinterpreted scientific data, since she does not claim to use any data other than her own experiences and perceptions of other people. Beauvoir has travelled greatly during her life, and known and spoken with people from various socio-economic strata, and her observations come from reflections on

behaviour she has seen or read about. Beauvoir also seems less guilty of the sort of static stereotyping of man that we find in Kohlberg. Her stages, flexible like Kohlberg's, offer greater variety. We could fit many personalities to the type of moral or immoral characters Beauvoir suggests in her stages.

Beauvoir does not attempt to persuade us that her theory of moral development is absolutely and universally true and accurate. She seems to take specific historical and cultural context into consideration as an influence on development much more than Kohlberg does. She is definitely more concerned with moral action than Kohlberg is, although she sees a close relationship between thought and action. She worries about the consequences of actions taken; Kohlberg seems to look at actions, moral or immoral, in a more isolated way.

Chapter 8: Criticism of Beauvoir's Theory

There are certainly valid criticisms to be made of Beauvoir's work. One of them she give words to herself in The Blood of Others. "I knew for ever that one cannot discern the limits of an action; that which one is in the midst of doing, one cannot know in advance."[115] She contends that we must, as moral beings, take responsibility for all consequences of our actions. Yet it is impossible for us to know all these consequences before the action is taken. Can we, in good faith, decide to do anything? This particular contradiction is never really dealt with. It might be assumed that any action taken, no matter how much it seemed to be one that would work towards the freedom of all others, might still have unknown negative consequences. No action can be accepted as totally valuable, then, and uncertainty and doubt continue to plague even the authentic being. Yet, in some volumes of Beauvoir's autobiography, any doubt of the value of Sartre's actions seems to have disappeared. The theoretical problems of acting that Beauvoir sets up are not always felt so keenly in day-to-day life.

Her own criticism of Ethics of Ambiguity, as found in her Force of Circumstance, is that her descriptions of the stages of morality were too abstract. She writes that she considers the polemical part to be valid, including her defense of existentialism, but that her stages were not closely enough situated "in levels of reality."[116] To a certain extent, this seems a valid criticism. Morality, she feels, must be defined in a social context, but Beauvoir's morality demands a specific historical context as well, concerned as it is with groups

and not just individuals. Her theory made no mention of such specifics, although I think that she might condone certain actions in one historical situation that would be totally out of place in another.

Along with this lack of historical specificity, Beauvoir focuses too greatly on the isolated individual. She seems to lend all value to the individual, although her theory focuses on humanity as a whole and on the possible development of groups and nations. She is not a communist, but is enough of a socialist for one to expect slightly less moral value to be placed on the actions of one person acting alone. Her authentic being sounds like an altruistic hero, but even he can do little without the support and co-operation of others. Although she dwells on the constant self-other interface when explaining the human condition, some of her stages pay little attention to this dynamic. Authentic man comes closest to the ideal behaviour, but he too suffers from lack of knowledge of the consequences of his actions and from the difficulty of objectifying others.

Beauvoir is rather idealistic in assuming that authentic man is a consistently tenable position of morality, given her own admission of the weaknesses of humanity. Like Kohlberg, she does not say what proportion of humanity she thinks can reach or has reached authentic being. She seems to have a bias towards artists, however, shown throughout her autobiographical work. Perhaps such idealism was necessary to her, since she herself, although a teacher for many years, always considered herself a writer first and foremost. It may be that her own circle of friends and acquaintances, including as it did many of the most im-

portant thinkers in Western Europe, gave her quite unintentionally a more optimistic view of human possibilities than that of the average 20th century Frenchwoman.

Here in her own life, then, are examples of things that have had a great influence on her own development as a person. Yet she does not take much account of how they influence the moral development of others. The first factor is that of emotional tendencies. The personality of any individual, psychologists have shown us, is a complex and frequently contradictory entity. But certain tendencies show up stronger than others. Beauvoir has always been both more practical and more concrete in her thinking than the abstract and dreamy Sartre. What accounts for this difference is a whole complex of factors involving genetic inheritance, family influence, social training, and personal experience. The early years leave one with a marked tendency towards certain types of reactions and certain ways of coping with and expressing fears and hopes. Beauvoir's fictional characters make value decisions for good or evil under the strong influence of their emotions, but she does not write much in her ethics about this sort of influence on moral decision-making.

Nor does she deal with another important experience it seems likely she or her friends knew of, the possibility of inspiration. This too is a highly personal and unique way of comprehension, which may not strike many individuals, although we might suspect her artist friends would be familiar with it. Like religious conversion experiences, inspiration might lead to a new level of thinking and acting,

even if it does not have as its direct source the needs of and responsibilities to others. These exceptions to the rule of moral development have not been dealt with.

Beauvoir's belief in freedom as the source of all values is reflected in all of her works, and explained in Ethics of Ambiguity. Without it, she contends, there is no moral action possible. It is an intriguing idea, and is argued strongly. However, it is not totally acceptable because of the way in which Beauvoir defines her terms. To her mind, freedom consists of a sharp awareness of the world, of the rights of others, and of the ambiguity of human existence. There are certainly many thinkers, both religious and otherwise, who would and do quarrel with her analysis of man as the giver of sense to his world.

To those accepting an imposed order and set of values, be it that of God or of nature, the human condition is not seen as being particularly ambiguous. There are not, for other points of view, the same problems and anxieties that there are for those following Beauvoir's theories and perceptions. Thus there are many people who in Beauvoir's eyes are not free, because they do not accept the arbitrary fact of their existence and do not accept a need for personal and original sense-making. If they are not free, they cannot possibly be moral. The most virtuous action, if not taken with freedom as its goal, would be considered not of very great value by Beauvoir. Clearly this view limits the number of moral actions to be found in our world. It seems more reasonable to accept that the struggle for personal awareness and

freedom is one of several sources of moral action.

She also contends that freedom is the only value which can in any and all situations be taken as the supreme goal. Freedom is the only value she deems safe to use as an ideal. She is afraid that other values set up as goals might be distorted by individual interpretations, and so only freedom should be sought unconditionally. Beauvoir does not give any reason for her belief that freedom alone will stand unabused as an ideal.

Although she mentions that the less moral person will choose other ideals than freedom, she discards these others as not valuable. They may indeed be less valuable, but they should be reckoned with. Beauvoir does not take into enough account the influence of the society we live in. It may make the kind of freedom she speaks of close to impossible for most individuals. There may be various ideals which are encouraged, e.g., the individual who gets ahead no matter what, which work on our brains whether we are conscious of the influence or not. The consumer society does not naturally think of sharing and of being responsible to fellow men. The social set-up does not work to strengthen altruism and concern for humanity in most cases, with its push for personal material welfare and well-being. Beauvoir has admitted her stages are too abstract as they are not grounded in real historical situations, and comparably her philosophy of freedom as supreme value is not grounded in the realistic structure of our Western socio-economics.

It certainly does not seem to be necessary to possess Beauvoir's

type of freedom in order to act morally, although freedom does indeed facilitate such actions. If one is not completely aware of one's responsibility and self-worth, the spectrum of moral action is very likely limited, but it is not non-existent. The phenomenon of the right thing being done for the wrong reasons has existed and will continue to exist, and despite the importance of intention, an act done for the wrong reasons is still an act of practical consequence for the world.

This matter of doing the right thing for the wrong reason brings up another problem. Beauvoir seems to assume that we do what we want to do, and that with enough luck, courage, and struggle, we will see our way clear to the understanding of our own worth and responsibilities. I have already noted her lack of attention towards those external social factors that influence our value perception, and towards the individual emotional factors that influence our expression of our values. But she also forgets about, or chooses not to do more than mention, our frequent difficulties in controlling our actions. We do <u>not</u> do everything we wish to, and we are rarely free to do all we would, because of our human weaknesses. She lists off some of them, but does not go on to suggest how or if they can be dealt with. In her books some characters are simply stronger and more compassionate then others. Yet if she will not accept a theological basis for their better condition in life and better understanding of it, she ought to suggest something else. Human nature, as has been noted, she says has possibilities for good <u>and</u> evil. But if evil tend-

encies exist, it would seem the part of a writer concerned with moral action to suggest how we might combat them. This is not explicitly done.

Beauvoir's stages of development are by no means invalidated by this criticism, but her "free man" and her assumptions should be examined more carefully. It seems she has limited him too much to being an artificial created figure who holds her own philosophical views, and cannot include other traditionally virtuous models.

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[115] The Blood of Others, p. 63

[116] Force of Circumstance, p. 67

Chapter 9: The Problems of Freedom

A. Choosing Valuable Actions

If we go along with Beauvoir's idea of authentic being as the most moral way to exist, there are various problems to confront. The move toward morality is the move toward genuine free choice, which we might imagine would be personal and varied in character. The complexity of humanity seems to assure us a variety of interpretations of that which would serve to move the individual and his society towards freedom. How can it be assumed that individuals' free choices will perfectly mesh with the furthering of freedom for mankind as a whole? If choices do not further this goal, they are not all that moral after all. Beauvoir attempts this reconciliation by saying that at the point of perception and awareness of authentic being, the one is the same as the other. That is, thoughtful free choice and consequent action on the part of the individual cannot help but further the cause of human freedom. Her lack of historical context here is helpful to her argument, since facts and specific cases might show otherwise. Her interpretation seems possible but not inevitable.

How does Kohlberg deal with this problem? He seems to feel that the autonomous moral agent will have as much respect for others as for himself, and will therefore in making individual choices at least do nothing to interfere with the freedom of others. This seems a more realistic approach. Kohlberg's belief in justice as the supreme value allows for personal choices and actions which, although highly moral, may not be overly helpful to the furthering of justice on the

large scale. As has been noted, however, his acceptance of justice as the supreme value seems somewhat culturally determined, and therefore may not be the most useful measure for evaluating the morality of all individual actions.

Kohlberg comes in for the same criticism as that given to Beauvoir: he has not shown sufficient attention to those social and cultural factors that influence us. Nor does he, any more than Beauvoir, account clearly for our own problems in doing all that we wish we could.

Beauvoir is particularly concerned with the practical consequences of actions, as well as with their intentions. What kind of action or projet is accepted as being valuable in the movement towards human dignity, solidarity, and freedom? Is moral action only possible for those possessed of artistic and philosophical talents? Beauvoir actually goes into more detail concerning the personalities and concerns of the immoral or less moral than she does for the authentic man. The characters in her novels and plays here again should be kept in mind. These fictional and semi-fictional characters help give specific form to the abstract ideas in her Ethics of Ambiguity. In her books we tend to find mostly artists, writers, and politically inclined figures portrayed as the most aware and frequently the most moral.

In other writing, she is less discriminating. "True liberty is that which realizes itself by a positive project."[117] In a tone that Kohlberg would probably go along with she writes, "When action

is a living reality, when one believes in its goals, the word justice has a meaning."[118] Our projects, if they are to be important and merit our time and effort, must affirm the depth of the world and the singular reality of our own lives. They must have as their ultimate significance the quest of freedom. In her idealistic vein, she writes that, "It is only from the moment of choice on that reality has value;"[119] she does not like to openly accept that reality may dictate choices in some situations.

B. Creativity and Violence

Worthwhile projects are those that lead to new possibilities, new ideas, and new communication. She uses the examples of work in the fields of science, industry, art and culture, invention, and philosophy. These fields all seem to have great potential to move in creative and positive ways toward greater sense-making of the world and so toward freedom. Sometimes, however, negative action is necessary, such as violent revolution.[120] As we might expect, Beauvoir contends that violent action which comes from an increasing awareness of oppression on the part of an individual or group is moral action. In such a case, to abstain is to be an accomplice to greater violence and the abuse of freedom.

Beauvoir is not here condoning violence across the board, nor is she suggesting that being free means being able to do what you feel like. "To be free is not to be able to do what one wants; it is to be able to pass the given bounds towards an open future. You oppress me if you throw me in jail, not if you keep me from throwing my neighbor in

jail."[121] Elsewhere she writes, "Respect for the freedom of others is not an abstract rule: it is the first condition for the success of my efforts."[122] Surely others must be treated respectfully. It is to those others that Beauvoir and her fellow writers called out.

Although Beauvoir no doubt hoped to reach individuals from all backgrounds, it is unlikely that she does. Her novels had and have great success, but even those who read long novels tend to be of a certain class. Needless to say, her philosophical works have attracted a much smaller audience. She herself has revealed a certain bias about what it is worthwhile to do in her frequent praise of the kind of writing which reaches out to others. She once wrote, "In any activity there can be freedom, and particularly in intellectual activity, because there you find little place for repetition."[123] Projects which open up new possibilities for thought and action, which are oriented to growth and the future, are the most valuable kind to Beauvoir.

If we are truly aware, we will know that even the most carefully thought-out and executed project, and the new ideas that spring up in its wake, will not make much difference to the world as a whole. Still we must continue to think, choose, and act, to live a life so committed and so justified that we can continue to cherish it even when all our illusions have been lost.[124] The interaction of the hopes of the individual and the complex world they grow up in is reflected in Beauvoir's statement: "My life has been the fulfillment of a primary design; and at the same time it has been the product and expression of the world in which it developed."[125] The coming to grips with freedom

demands the constant creating and carrying out of active, thoughtful projects, even in the face of their frequent failure. The choice and the acting out from the choice is essential.

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[117]Berghe, p. 176

[118]Ibid., p. 170

[119]L'Existentialisme et la Sagesse des Nations, p. 91

[120]Pour une Morale de L'Ambiguité. p. 116-118

[121]Ibid., p. 131

[122]Pyrrhus et Cinéas, p. 358

[123]Berghe, P. 20

[124]Cottrell, p. 145

[125]All Said and Done, p. 30

Chapter 10: Concluding Remarks

A. An Appreciation and Criticism of Beauvoir and Kohlberg

During the course of my research and thought on this thesis, I came up with more objections to the ideas of Beauvoir than I had imagined I would. Nevertheless, I think she has made a valuable and thought-provoking contribution to ideas about moral development. Her description of the human condition is frightening, but clearly written. We cannot say it is wrong, since no one individual's interpretation of existence based on experience is any more right than another's. Accepting Sartre's ideas and presuppositions, she then moves on to add her own. I find her focus on the possibilities of sense-making and value-creating, with its hopeful tone, an assuring response to Sartre's negativism. Beauvoir may be justly accused of idealism in the almost mystical human solidarity that she wants us all to be in touch with, but her belief in loving action is concrete and real. Her concern for human responsibility and dignity is admirable, and her own life shows ample evidence of her beliefs.

I am not totally in accord with Beauvoir when it comes to her idea of freedom as the supreme value. Her idea of freedom, involving as it does an intense awareness of the world and an acceptance of total responsibility, is clearly beyond the intellectual and emotional capacities of many people. Yet she sees it as an essential ingredient to moral behaviour, and discounts as moral any actions taken that did not have freedom as their ultimate goal. (It might even be argued that this kind of freedom is only possible for those of a certain socio-economic

class who have the leisure to consider such problems.) It also gives little credit to those who accept a different set of values that they have not personally created. Here again, if Beauvoir insists on freedom as the source of all value, many valid actions lose their moral character.

What I find more valuable in Beauvoir's work is the way in which she has taken her idea of freedom as the supreme value and worked it through in respect to the moral development of the individual. Although one may not agree with her world view, her examination of moral development seems quite valid. She has recognized that the child exists in a state of amorality until he is capable of certain perceptions and the taking on of heavy responsibilities. After this point, she focuses on various stages or social structures that the growing person experiences. The change in the predominance of certain values seems realistic, and her descriptions of the compromises and deceptions that we employ are very accurate. The general movement from total dependency on others, to partial dependency on (and identification through) others, to rebellion, to an eventual choice and acceptance of interdependence is given support in her work. The moral being is, at best, the aware and altruistic mature social being.

Beauvoir's use of stages has been criticized. However, to conceive of moral development as occurring in stages is not a new idea. Neither is it an idea for which there is no evidence. Stages do not imply inevitable progress, nor quick and isolated breaks in growth. There need be no inference of the inevitability of moral development.

We plot stages in intellectual and physical growth without assuming that it is inevitable. Neither Beauvoir nor Kohlberg is so superficial as to assume inevitable development, although both might wish it were so. Stages are a shorthand for the discovery that moral development, like other kinds of human development, happens in fairly distinct complexes of attitude and behaviour.

This idea does not totally discount the possibility of religious conversion experiences, which sometimes result in an immediate jump in moral awareness. An intense realization may produce speeded-up development. However, most people will never have such a realization but will progress more painstakingly through the stages of social interaction and development.

Our expectations must differ for individuals who are at different levels of thought. Even the word levels, connoting perhaps a ladder of progress, is inaccurate, since Beauvoir notes that the stages are gradually grown into. They do not exist alone. The authentic man may slip into attitudes and behaviours befitting a less responsible stage. Perhaps we use the word stages because it gives us a more valid tool to use in the exploration of human growth than other less flexible or more vague structures or terms. It is not enough to say that Gandhi was different from Idi Amin in his moral development. There do exist, various studies and many writers have convinced me, complexes of moral thought involving certain sets of values and consequent behaviours. Such complexes follow each other almost invariably in a

certain order, and although they leave room for further questioning and research, the stage idea is a valid one in this field.

Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg is obviously one of the researchers who has influenced my ideas. His philosophical basis is nowhere explained in the sort of detail that Beauvoir's is, but his goal also seems to be towards human dignity and responsible action. He accepts justice as the supreme value rather than freedom, and bases his thought on psychological testing and scientific objectivity rather than on philosophical analysis and subjective reflection.

If Beauvoir's moral man is one who has escaped from indifference and fear, Kohlberg's moral man is one who has escaped from ignorance and fear. Despite these differences, Kohlberg is generally supportive of the self-other pattern of identity and moral growth mentioned above, and his final description of the moral person is almost identical with Beauvoir's authentic being. Kohlberg also feels that the idea of stages of moral development is a sound one, and has followed in the footsteps of highly respected psychologists in his attempt to substantiate his claim. He has not totally successfully proven the universality of his particular values hierarchy, but he has given much evidence in support of the stages idea. The fact that two thinkers with backgrounds and presuppositions as different as Beauvoir's and Kohlberg's have independently come close to having the same understanding of moral growth is in itself a supportive fact, given the scholarity and hard continuous work of these two.

It should be clear that I have criticisms of both Beauvoir and

Kohlberg. Kohlberg should attempt to account for his necessarily Western biases, and continue his testing before he proclaims the universality of his theory. He should also attempt to deal more clearly and to a greater extent with the problem of intention vs. action if he wants his theory to have more practical application.

Beauvoir, it seems to me, in her zeal to explain freedom as the supreme value and source of value, has become blind to other possible interpretations of human growth. Her insistence on personal total responsibility has led her away from closer examination of the spiritual outward-reaching dimension of humanity; the picture of freedom and responsibility she holds up is indeed an awesome and frightening one. She is certainly correct in her focus on the need for compassionate thought and action, and her concern with personal responsible decision. "Each man decides the place he occupies in the world, but he must occupy one; deciding not to is also occupying one."[126] But she does not offer much in the way of concrete suggestions.

Part of the problem with her work is that it gets too abstract for its own good. She writes that we must accept total responsibility for our actions, and thus for their practical consequences as well. Yet since, as she admits, we can never be sure of those consequences, where does this leave us? It leaves us, as always, in a state of ambiguity, but it also may leave us in a paralysis of indecision. And to not act is the beginning of death and meaninglessness. Perhaps if Beauvoir had lessened the severity with which she demands our awareness and knowledge, there could be more considered action. As she herself

suggested, a more specific morality, one lodged in a particular historical context, would be more helpful.

B. Possible Direction for Further Thought

Finally, both Kohlberg and Beauvoir might be criticized for not having been clear enough about some of their assumptions. Neither has dealt completely with the problem of the strong influences which the ideals, social roles, and unspoken values of our society have on us. Kohlberg's justice may be as inaccessible as Beauvoir's freedom because of socio-economic factors. In the same way, human nature itself can limit our moral development. Kohlberg assumes that intellectual development is the path to virtue, ignoring emotional and personality factors. Beauvoir hedges on this point, admitting we at times do struggle with ourselves, but not really explaining why this happens or how it can be successfully dealt with. She leaves the motivation for moral growth a partial mystery.

It is, however, clear in Beauvoir's work that she has undertaken her study of moral development in the hopes of encouraging greater awareness, thought, and concerned action. This interest is laudable, and if her stages and Kohlberg's are less than completely accurate and not totally philosophically grounded, nevertheless they offer interesting directions for the understanding of moral behaviour and continued research in this field.

Moral development needs to be more clearly understood in a world where crime, destructive anti-social behaviour and apathy increase yearly. If we can know more about how and why morality develops in some cases

and not in others, we may have important information for psychologists, sociologists, and educators. It seems possible that the stage theories have some relevancy to more accurate explanations of motivation, and may clarify the kinds of social interaction we can expect from different individuals. If Beauvoir's, Kohlberg's and other theories are studied with an emphasis on the problem of the relationship between moral judgements and moral action, we may find concrete suggestions and practical application for the encouraging of moral behaviour.

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[126] Pyrrhus et Cinéas, p. 263

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