SLAVERY IN HAUSALAND:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SLAVE MODE OF PRODUCTION

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KANO EMIRATE, NIGERIA.

by

Thomas W. Dunk

Department of Anthropology
McGill University
Montreal

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

April 1983

THE SLAVE MODE OF PRODUCTION IN HAUSALAND

ABSTRACT

This thesis aims to assess the efficacy of the concept of the slave mode of production in understanding the nature and role of slavery in nineteenth-century Hausaland, particularly Kano emirate. The evolution of the Hausa states is outlined, as well as the *jihad* which gave birth to the political and economic structures of the region in the nineteenth century. Several problematic issues concerning African slavery are discussed, particularly the question of the origins of African slavery, the definition of the term slavery in the African context, and whether slaves form a social class. The concept of the slave mode of production is found to be inadequate for an analysis of slavery in Hausaland. The concept was not developed systematically by Marx and Engels and its definition remains unclear. In Kano slaves occupied a variety of positions in the social relations of production, surplus product was extracted from them in several ways, and, the use of slave labour did not transform the process of production in manufacturing activities. Thus, while slaves, as a legal category, were very important in the economy of Kano, concepts other than the slave mode of production which are not derived from European or North American historical experience, must be developed to explain and classify Hausa society.

RESUME

Le but de ce mémoire est de considérer l'utilisation du concept de mode de production esclavagiste dans la compréhension du caractère global et du rôle de l'esclavage dans le Hausaland du dix-neuvième siècle, et en particulier l'émirat de Kano. L'évolution des états Hausa est esquissée, ainsi que le *jihad* qui était à l'origine des structures politiques et économiques de la région au dix-neuvième siècle. Plusiers questions concernant l'histoire de l'esclavage en Afrique sont abordées, en particulier celle de son origine, de la définition du terme 'esclavage' dans le contexte africain, et celle de savoir si les esclaves constituent une class sociale. Sur la base de cette analyse il est considéré que le concepte du mode de production esclavagiste n'est pas suffisant pour comprendre la réalité de l'esclavage au Hausaland. Ce concept n'a pas été élaboré systématiquement, ni par Marx, ni par Engels, et n'a toujours pas été défini clairement, à ce jour. La place occupée par les esclaves dans les rapports sociaux de production à Kano était marquée par beaucoup de variation; l'appropriation du surproduit se faisait de différentes façons; et l'utilisation des esclaves n'a pas changé le processus de production manufacturière en tant que tel. Ainsi, même si les esclaves ont été très importants dans l'économie de Kano, en tant que catégorie sociale legalement définie, il est important que d'autres concepts que celui de mode de production esclavagiste soient développés pour permettre une explication valable de la société Hausa.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to express my gratitude to several people who assisted me in the development of this thesis. My advisor, Professor P.C.W. Gutkind, provided guidance, encouragement and constructive criticism, and was always available when needed. Professor John Galaty gave useful advice which served to temper my ideas in a fruitful manner. Professors Myron Echenberg and Keith Hart read and criticized my initial attempts to organize this project.

For his talents as a draftsman I would like to thank Bruce Jamieson. Also, I would like to express my thanks to Christopher McCall and Snoo Picard who came to my assistance at short notice. A very special thank you goes to my wife, Pamela, without whose patience, understanding, and incredible skills this thesis could never have been finished.

I would also like to thank the McConnell Foundation for their financial support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS

INTRODUCTION

Aim of the Work

The goal of this thesis is to assess the efficacy of the concept of a slave mode of production in understanding the role of slavery in nineteenth-century Hausaland, particularly Kano emirate. This area lies in the central part of the West African savanna and was the core of an integrated regional economy based on the exchange of specialized goods across ecological boundaries. Kano emirate was a prime agricultural region and was renowned for its manufacturing activities, especially for the production of dyed-cloth. Numerous recent publications have analyzed the nature and function of slavery in precolonial Africa (Lovejoy 1981a; Meillassoux 1975; Miers and Kopytoff 1977; Watson 1980a) although the use of the term is one of many problematic issues in the economic history of the continent (Kopytoff and Miers 1977). In the large states of the West African savanna, such as those of Hausaland, slave labour was used extensively, and similarities with the slave-plantation economies of the New World and the coast of East Africa have been noted (Lovejoy 1978b; M.G. Smith 1954). I seek to investigate the function of slave labour in the economy, the various ways in which surplus product was extracted from slaves, and how this relates to the political and religious structures of Kano emirate. The concern with these issues follows from a number of problems involved in the application of the concept of mode of production to precapitalist societies.

At first glance, the concept of mode of production offers a systematic model by which one can comprehend the connections between social relations and forces of production and the manifold reciprocal determinations between this infrastructure (or base) and other structural levels such as politics

and religion (superstructure). It offers a theoretical paradigm in which society is conceived as several structural instances, linked together and yet each maintaining a relative autonomy. However, in precapitalist societies the social relations of production are mediated through superstructural features such as politics and law which define social categories but do not specify their role in the production process. Slavery is one such social category. Slaves are defined jurally as a form of property, albeit in many African societies there is no clarity even at this level. But their place in the social relations of production is variable, as is the mode by which surplus product is taken from them. The notion of a slave mode of production presents many problems for it is not clear what it tells one about the nature of production, the class relations, exploitation, or the social formation taken as a whole. The analysis of the use of slave labour in Kano emirate will elucidate some of the complexities involved in these issues.

African history and the models used in the attempt to understand it are not merely of academic interest. West Africa remains one of the poorest regions on earth. It is a well-known fact that numerous development projects have failed, no doubt due in large part to an ignorance of the indigenous history and conditions. The precolonial period was less than 100 years ago, although European contact began long before then. The formal colonial intervention altered things considerably, but the effect of the conquest can only be assessed on the basis of proper knowledge of the precolonial period. The analysis of the role of slave labour is central to the region's economic and social history since it was one of the main forms of labour in the indigenous economy. The problems involved in urbanization and the commercialization of agriculture can only be comprehended when it is known what the nature of the society was upon

which the external forces pressed.

The use of concepts and models is inherent in the production of knowledge. They are what makes it possible for us to order the potentially infinite number of facts with which our minds are presented, and thereby make some sense of the manifold details and complexities of the world. A continual process of adjustment takes place, a dialectic in which concepts are invented and altered or discarded depending upon the needs of the researchers and the empirical data which they face. The present research is an attempt to help clarify the utility of one of the many models which have been used in the endless attempt to capture the reality of another time and place, and thereby clarify our conception of precolonial Africa.

Modes of Production and African History

French scholars were the first to use the concept of mode of production in the characterization of precolonial African states. The Asiatic mode of production was employed by Suret-Canale (1964). In his eyes the state emerged in Africa through a three-stage development involving the primitive community, segmentary society based on tribo-patriarchal structures such as the extended family and lineage, and class society in which an aristocracy emerges above the village patriarchy. Suret-Canale recognized, though, that even in these state societies production was based on the rural village community and exploitation by the aristocracy was mediated by the village community. It is the coexistence of self-sufficient village communities and a state aristocracy which does not intervene directly in these communities that Suret-Canale wished to characterize with the concept of the Asiatic mode of production.

A variation on this model was posited by Godelier (1978, first published 1963). He noted that the Asiatic mode as presented by Marx

and Engels was intended to account for the growth of an absolute ruler, who is the embodiment of the community at large, along with a bureaucracy which organizes large-scale projects beyond the means of the village communities. In Africa there were no large-scale projects such as the Chinese irrigation works. Long-distance trade was, however, a very important phenomena. Godelier therefore proposed a variant form of the Asiatic mode of production in which large-scale projects are not important. It is

> another form of Asiatic mode of production in which a minority dominates and exploits the communities intervening in their conditions of production not directly, but indirectly, by appropriating surplus labour or produce as profit. In West Africa the emergence of the kingdoms of Ghana, Mali, Songhay, etc. was not the result of the organisation of major projects but seems to be linked to the control exercised by the tribal aristocracies over intertribal and interregional trade in rare commodities, gold, ivory, hides, etc. between Black and north Africa (Godelier 1978:241).

In the 1960s and early 1970s there was a great deal of interest in the exchange networks and traders of West Africa (Meillassoux 1971a). This was a response to substantivist economics which did not recognize formal economic rationality in the behaviour of West Africans, and part of a historical revision which focused on the indigenous accomplishments of West Africans. In this intellectual atmosphere Coquery-Vidrovitch (1969) revised and extended the thoughts of Suret-Canale and Godelier. She posited a new concept, the African mode of production, as a means of characterizing the precolonial states of Africa within a Marxist framework, while at the same time rejecting Eurocentric models of historical evolution.

The African mode of production was intended to capture the specificity of African social formations characterized by Coquery-Vidrovitch as the combination of lineage-based self-sufficient communities with chiefly aristocracies who are supported by long-distance exchange and the domestic

slaves they purchase with the profits of trade. The aristocracy does not control the community lands; these are distributed by the village communities. She notes, as does Godelier, that in Africa the state did not intervene in the life of the village communities so as to extract surplus or labour for large-undertakings. The generalized slavery of the Asiatic mode of production, whereby everything and everybody ultimately belongs to the community embodied in a despotic ruler, was not a phenomena in Africa. African rulers did not really exploit their own subjects, rather surplus was extracted from neighbouring groups through unequal exchange or raiding for captives. This is how the nobility's wealth was "produced".

Coquery-Vidrovitch's paper contains several contradictions, and can be criticized on this basis alone. Perhaps the most significant is that she admits that long-distance trade was not necessarily assimilated to centralized political forms. A point which undermines her whole thesis, although she attempts to overcome this problem by arguing that the distinction between state and stateless societies in Africa has been overdrawn. However, the focus of academics studying African history continued to change and it was, therefore, destined that yet another mode of production would be posited as a characterization of precolonial African states. Because of the critiques by French Marxist anthropologists of the substantivist-formalist debate (Dupré and Rey 1973; Godelier 1977:15-62), as well of course other factors, attention was directed away from modes of exchange and towards production.[1]

The concept of a slave mode of production was applied to a West African society by Terray in an analysis of the Abron kingdom of Gyaman (Terray 1974). Terray criticizes other scholars for the emphasis they place upon long-distance exchange as a crucial factor in the evolution of African states. He notes that in West Africa trade was for the most

part under the control of specialized groups of traders who were not reliant upon centralized powers for protection, and who could and did change trade routes and destinations in response to the favourable or unfavourable conditions imposed upon them by local rulers. In Gyaman trade was not under the control of the Abron aristocracy. The economic basis of the nobility was their control over the production of specialized commodities destined for foreign markets, especially gold. This was accomplished through their control over slaves, either bought or captured in war or raids, who laboured in the gold mines or on estates where they produced subsistence produce. Trade was important to the aristocracy in that it allowed them to realize the economic benefits of their political domination, but it was not the basis of their position. According to Terray, the use of slave labour determined various other factors such as the militarism of the nobility and the relatively light impositions made on the free peasantry. Therefore, he asserts the slave mode of production was the dominant element in the social formation.[2]

In the 1970s mode of production analysis became more popular among anglophone scholars. Hindess and Hirst created a theoretical work on precapitalist modes of production (1975), but subsequently rejected the central concept of this work (1977). Nonetheless, the concept of mode of production is now used widely. Crummey and Stewart (1981a) have edited a series of articles which use the concept in the analysis of African precolonial history. Klein and Lovejoy (1979) claim that the slave mode of production is an accurate depiction of most of West Africa over the last 300 years. Given the historical evolution of the application of the concept of mode of production to African history over the last 20 years, a critical appraisal of its utility is a necessary undertaking.

Methodology

This thesis is based on library research. The sources are all secondary, a situation which creates many shortcomings in the data, but which cannot be overcome at this time. I have used the written accounts of Europeans who visited the region in the nineteenth century, the reports of early colonial administrators, and ethnographic and historical writings of professional social scientists. The latter include the remembrances of a Hausa woman who lived during the latter part of the nineteenth century (M. Smith 1964) and a translation of the description of life in nineteenth-century Hausaland written by a Hausa Imam (Ferguson 1973). I have also referred to translations of some precolonial Arabic literature on the region (Bello 1826; Bivar 1961; Bivar and Hiskett 1962; Hiskett 1957, 1960, 1962, 1964, 1965).

There are several reasons for the emphasis upon Kano emirate. It was the location of important manufacturing activities which were tied into long-distance exchange networks, as well as being a rich agricultural region. The city of Kano was probably the largest in sub-Saharan Africa. Urbanization and manufacturing have a very long history in the region. Kano was one of the most economically advanced regions in West Africa. It, therefore, presents the opportunity to study the relationships between commerce, production for the market, a specialized division of labour and the use of slave labour. From a more practical perspective, Hausaland generally, including Kano, is well represented in the ethnographic and historical literature.

The thesis is not a comparative analysis, but comparison is an implicit aspect of research of this kind. The specificity of African slavery can only be assessed in light of the characteristics of the institution in other societies and attempts to understand it theoretically.

After an initial introduction to the material on African slavery and Hausaland I read several works in which the notion of a slave mode of production was theoretically elaborated and applied to other societies (Anderson 1974a; Hindess and Hirst 1975; Padgug 1976), as well as criticisms of some of these attempts (Wood 1981). My thoughts about slavery in Kano and the efficacy of the slave mode of production were developed in the context of and in reaction to these other descriptions and analyses.

The Plan of this Work

The thesis is composed of three chapters followed by a short conclusion.

Chapter One is an outline of the history of Hausaland and the broad political structures within Kano emirate and within which the emirate existed. The purpose is to illustrate the growing complexity of division of labour, commerce and political relations in the region from the end of the first millenium up to and including the nineteenth century.

Chapter Two is an overview of some of the problematic issues involved in a discussion of African slavery, including the question of its origin, the definition of the term slavery, and the question of whether slaves form a social class.

In Chapter Three I attempt to address the issue of whether the slave mode of production as a concept aids in the understanding of slavery in Kano. I begin with a short commentary on Marx and Engel's view of slavery and note that they did not use the concept of slave mode of production. Moreover, some of the differences in the way the concept has been employed recently are noted. A notion's utility is vitiated if it does not have a broadly agreed upon definition. There is a discussion of slavery in Kano, which also draws on data from other emirates in the Sokoto Caliphate,

and a section on slave labour in manufacturing activities, particularly blacksmithing and the dyed-cloth industry. It is evident that slaves were used in a variety of economic activities, that their place in the social relations of production was variable, that they did not constitute a force of specialized workers in manufacturing activities, and that surplus was extracted from them in a number of ways. On the ground it was very difficult to distinguish slaves from other dependent people whose legal status was different. Given the lack of clarity in the definition of a slave mode of production and the empirical complexities of slavery in Kano emirate the heuristic value of the concept can be questioned. This is not, however, a rejection of Marxist theory *per se*; rather, I agree with Meillassoux:

> Loin de révéler pourtant l'incapicité du matérialism dialectique à analyser scientifiquement l'esclavage, cette interrogation conduit au contraire à exiger, pour son application à des sociétés non capitalistes, -- qualitativement différents --, la recherche de concepts adéquats et l'élaboration d'une théorie des pratiques sociales qu'il nous est donné d'observer. Elle conduit donc à rejeter le placage protomarxiste empruntés à quelques écrits ou remarques de Marx ou d'Engels (1975:20-21).

Notes - Introduction

1. I am, of course, referring to general tendencies in the interests of academics. Scholars have always studied all aspects of African economics and economic history, and the history of trade, traders and trade routes remains of interest today. The essence of the critiques by Dupré and Rey and Godelier is that production is logically prior to exchange and therefore this is where analysis must begin, rather than the other way around.

2. It is noteworthy that Meillassoux (1971a) says that a slave mode of production was not present in West Africa. Subsequently he has become one of the leading French experts on indigenous African slavery. The collection of essays he edited (Meillassoux 1975) put slavery at the center of the social history of precolonial Africa. In the introduction Meillassoux notes that western researchers have been much more reticent to discuss African slavery than have Africans. Thanks to the initiative of these French scholars this is no longer true. Meillassoux's edited book (1975) remains an accessible and informative introduction to indigenous African slavery in the countries colonized by France (see his introduction for a brief indication of the French reaction to African slavery) as well as the problems involved in the discussion of African slavery.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FORMS IN HAUSALAND: 1000 to 1900 A.D.

Introduction

This chapter seeks to provide the necessary background to the discussion of slavery in nineteenth-century Kano. It is, therefore, mainly descriptive. The subject of analysis is Hausaland, with an emphasis on Kano. The major point I want to establish is the need to view Hausaland and each of the emirates as part of a larger regional political economy. The direction of history in the Central Sudan has been towards greater integration of the economy and society in the rest of West Africa and beyond. In this sense the rise of the Sokoto Caliphate is a reflection of economic and social processes which had already bound much of the region together.

What follows is the barest outline of a series of very complicated matters. It is based on secondary sources, recent historical and anthropological research and the recorded observations of Europeans who visited Hausaland in the nineteenth century and early colonial officials. Many of the subjects which are mentioned are treated in more detail in the works which are cited. This chapter is not intended as an exercise in historiography. I aim only to synthesize the research and writings of others as a basis from which I can attempt to understand the nature and function of a specific social form of labour, namely, slavery.

The Material Setting

Kano emirate (now Kano state) lies in the heart of the West African savanna, and of the region known as Hausaland. The savanna belt of Africa runs in a strip some 200 to 400 kilometres wide from the Atlantic ocean through to the Red Sea. The width varies according to the success with

which the Sahara desert has impinged from the north. Hausaland refers to the area where the Hausa states evolved over the last millenium and where Hausa is the language of the majority of the population. This is situated roughly between 8° and 14° north latitude and 4° to 11° east longitude. Today the region is contained within the northern part of Nigeria and southern Niger.

In 1896 Robinson estimated the population of Hausaland at 15,000,000 (Robinson 1896a:203). Colonial censuses reduced this number by half, but more recent discussions have found the colonial figures to be gross underestimates. Eight to ten million is now believed to be a realistic appraisal of population size in the early colonial period. Of this, perhaps three million resided in Kano emirate, two million of which lived within a 30 mile radius of the city of Kano (Hill 1977:17-19). In the nineteenth century this was one of the most densely populated regions on the African continent.

Environmental variation has been and still is a major factor in the organization of society and commerce in West Africa.[1] The savanna experiences a marked seasonality. A wet season of approximately seven months, from April/May to October/November, is followed by a five month dry season. During the wet season rain is unpredictable and often sporadic. The dessication of the dry season is enhanced by the hot, dusty harmattan wind which blows off the desert. Wide diurnal variations add to the general discomfort, especially in the dry season, and make clothing of some sort necessary.

Soils are of the relatively unfertile lateritic type. But local variation and man's activity alleviate this condition somewhat. Heavy, loamy soils and a high water table are two important factors in the concentration of population around Kano city. Natural fertility has been increased by a heavy use of human and animal waste from the city as

fertilizer. There are also alluvial soils in river valleys, and the floodplains of the Hadeija River (McDonell 1964:357).

Savanna vegetation is composed primarily of grasses dispersed with open woodlands. Even the 'natural' vegetation is largely affected by human practices. Deliberate use of fire and animal husbandry have favoured the expansion of grassland. The appearance varies, of course, with human activities and population density. A vision of how the settled regions appeared in the precolonial period is given by Wallace, who visited the vicinity of Kano in the 1890s.

> Most of the land is under cultivation, with the exception of perhaps a fourth lying fallow in its turn. Much of the ground in the neighbourhood of the towns is divided into fields by raised earthwork dykes or hedges, mostly of cactus. Great numbers of the economic trees are left standing in the fields (Wallace 1896a:212).

The principal subsistence crops are sorghum and millet, the latter being more important in more northerly drier regions. Other crops include some wheat, rice, cassava, peas, beans, sweet potato, ground nuts (today the major cash crop), as well as various herbs. The basics of dyed-cloth manufacture, cotton and indigo, were also widely grown, especially in Kano emirate (Ferguson 1973:59-96; Wallace 1896a:214).

For the savanna as a whole rotational bush or grassland fallow was and still is the principal agricultural technique. But in the close-settled-zones around the large towns permanent cultivation was normal. Swamps and river banks were also intensively cultivated to produce cash crops, including indigo and vegetables for sale in the city (Ferguson 1973:59-96; Hill 1972: 230; 303-306; Wallace 1896a:213).

Kano was the richest of the Hausa states, and in the nineteenth century the wealthiest emirate in the Sokoto Caliphate. This was partly a function of its natural endowments. It also benefited from its geographical

location in the nexus of regional exchange. The savanna was a crossroads. The role of large savanna cities as termini of the trans-Saharan trade is well known (Bovill 1968). More important though was their function in the regional economy. Products from the desert and the sahel, salt, livestock, and hides were traded for savanna products such as grain and cloth. Goods from the forest regions such as kola nuts were also transported to the savanna and exchanged for the produce of the desert and savanna goods. Kano was a central hub in such a regional network (Baier 1980, Baier and Lovejoy 1975).

Of course, geography is merely the setting for human practice. It is an important factor in human history, but the environment does not determine that history, representing only the raw material out of which it is forged. Geography favoured Kano. However, its nineteenth-century wealth was also a function of human actions. For example, the advantageous trade position of Kano's rival, Katsina, was ruined by the *jihad*. The creation of the state of Maradi on its northern border by the ousted Hausa nobility made the trade route to Katsina hazardous (Barth 1965,1:479; Smith 1967). Moreover, large numbers of slaves captured and bought from surrounding districts supplied labour for Kano's production. Through various practices Kano became the metropole of a regional economy. I turn now to a discussion of the evolution of the social structures which determined this fact.

Kano Prior to the Sokoto Caliphate

The origin of the earliest inhabitants of the region called Hausaland is a matter of uncertainty. H.F.C. Smith (1971) traces the beginnings of the evolution towards the centralized Hausa states far back in history to the dessication of the Sahara, 7,000 years ago. The extension of the

desert southward pushed people to the present savanna belt. Periodic drought and famine forced people to move frequently and generated population concentration in favoured areas of the savanna.

The semi-legendary histories of the Hausa people refer to a northern or eastern influence. The *Girgam*, a written account of the history of Daura, one of the most ancient Hausa kingdoms, traces the people's descent to Canaan. The story of Bayajidda, the forefather of the kings of the seven Hausa states, gives his place of origin as Baghdad (Palmer 1967,3: 132-134). Both explanations probably reflect a Muslim influence in the attempt to link the dominant elite with non-black populations from the Middle East. Mohammed Bello, the son of Usuman dan Fodio, and second Fulani Sultan of Sokoto, claimed the first people in the region were the descendants of slaves. "It is presumed that the first father of the Soodans of this country was a slave, named Ba-oo, belonging to one of the former kings of Barnoo; and, on this account . . . their origin was from the slaves of the Barbars, and the people of Barnoo" (Bello 1826:162). This explanation can be read as a barely concealed justification of Fulani rule over the country.

As H.F.C. Smith (1971) has argued, though, it is unnecessary to look to external immigration or other outside forces to explain the origin of the population or the formation of states. Drought and famine in the area generated much movement which created a concern for defence among those people settled in the ecologically stable and fertile regions. Certainly Kano was one such region. Aside from the soils and high water table, the rock outcrops which came to be incorporated inside the city walls were rich in iron. Archaeological data indicates iron was smelted there before 1000 A.D.

Beggars in the streets of Kano chant the 'Song of Bagauda'. In the

version translated by Hiskett (1965) it is said a killing famine drove people from all directions to the Kano region where food remained abundant. The population was living "widely dispersed over the open country, not subject to any authority . . . . There was no chief, no protecting town wall" (Hiskett 1965:115). A group of immigrants conquered the local population and appointed Bagauda as protector. The "Kano Chronicle" describes a priest-chief who already resided at Dalla Hill, one of the rock outcrops in Kano city, when the newcomers arrived. The local people were organized into 11 clans and the priest-chief, Barbushe, prophesized their conquest by strangers (Palmer 1967,3:98). Regardless of whether either of these stories is factually correct, they probably do reflect the actual processes involved in the early growth of division of labour, social inequality and the state, that is, movement, warfare and the development of specialized social functions.

Subsequent developments were the result of several interrelated processes. The evolution of social classes and of specialized social functions and conquest presupposes the possibility of the production of a surplus which can support those not engaged in subsistence activities. The same movements of people which initiated the growth of social inequalities helped distribute the basic food crops throughout the savanna. Bulrush millet, sorghum, rice, pepper and pulses were disseminated through the region about 1,000 years ago. A second minor agricultural revolution occurred in the first half of the present millenium with the appearance in the savanna of improved strains of rice, sorghum, hard wheat, and new crops such as cotton, cocoa yams, sour oranges, lemons and limes (Lovejoy 1978a:186-187).

Hand in hand with growth in social inequality and increased productivity was the establishment and growth of towns. A. Smith (1970) sees this as

the crux of state formation in Hausaland. Significantly, the few written accounts of the creation of the early towns make no mention of trade, a factor which has been granted much importance by social scientists in the discussion of the origin of Sudanic towns and cities (c.f. Gugler and Flanagan 1978:11). According to the "Kano Chronicle" the city was founded strictly through local initiative, at a time when class relations were only beginning to emerge. The city's founder, Gijimasu, a descendant of Bagauda came to the area and "beguiled the elders with gifts, till by his gifts he obtained dominion over them . . . . The Sarki consulted the people about building a city. The people agreed . . . . The Sarki slaughtered a hundred cattle on the first day of the work . . ." (Palmer 1967,3: 100).

Relations between the 'Big Man' and the rural population soon developed into well-defined social divisions. Within a century of the city's foundation there were raids into the surrounding countryside and the exaction of tribute. Naguji (Sarkin Kano A.D. 1194-1247) had to put down a revolt and instituted a land tax (Hausa: *kurdin kasa*) of one-eighth of the crop on all husbandmen (Palmer 1967,3:101).

The creation of walled cities (Hausa: *birane*, sing. *birni*) where the military and bureaucratic elite is based certainly is the turning point in the evolution towards statehood. At one and the same time the city fulfills a protective function and an exploitative one. Kano grew out of an original fortress built around Dala Hill. As the population grew the walls were continually expanded so as to maintain a large unoccupied area within the walls. Even in the nineteenth century only a half to a quarter of the land was occupied by dwellings. Barth is perhaps the best known of the nineteenth-century travellers to have visited Kano. He had this to say:

> The reason why the fortifications were carried to so much greater extent than the population of the town rendered necessary was evidently to make the place capable of sustaining a long siege (sufficient ground being enclosed within the walls to produce the necessary supply of corn for the inhabitants), and also to receive the population of the open and unprotected villages in the neighbourhood. The inhabited quarter occupies at present only the south-eastern part of the town between Mount Dala and the wall . . . (Barth 1965,1:506).

But despite their protective function the cities were also a drain upon the rural economy, especially the large *birane* such as Kano. They were the bases of the political and military elite which lived off, in part, the tax and tribute taken from the surrounding population. And if the city protected the rural inhabitants from some of the ravages of foreign aggression, it also served as the stronghold for an elite which could and periodically did ravage this same countryside. The royal residences were protected from the rest of the city by a wall of their own.

The growth of the city from an armed camp to a market and production centre was a function of the presence of the military and political elite. To a great extent expansion depended upon the ability to increase the size of the dependent territory and the intensity of the exactions upon the rural inhabitants. The surplus which accrued to the city based elite was the revenue which supported scholars, religious leaders, merchants of luxury goods, and the specialized manufacturers of the needs of the royal court and all its retainers.

Frishman (1977) has investigated the historical demography of Kano for the years 1200-1824. His estimates suggest that the population of the city doubled in the 324 years between 1500 and 1824, rising from 21,453 to 40,000. Over the same period the population density of the city was maintained by expansion of the walls. This suggests that despite its growth the basic function of the city did not change.

The city grew as it was drawn into the developing regional economy, and as the politically dominant group extended its control over a larger area, including smaller walled towns.[2] Rano, one of the seven original Hausa states, was absorbed into Kano, perhaps in the last half of the fourteenth century (see Palmer 1967,3:104). In the same century slavery[3] became a widespread phenomena. This was related to the appearance of new military technologies, including the first guns brought from Bornu.

> All this time the Galadima [war chief] Dauda was in the south making war on the pagans every day, conquering them and taking them as slaves . . . . Every month he sent a thousand slaves to Sarkin Kano . . . . Slaves became very numerous in Kano . . . . When he was returning he stopped every three miles and built a town. He left at each a thousand slaves, five hundred males, and five hundred females (Palmer 1967,3:110).[4]

The extension of oppressive social relations are not unrelated to external factors. Political troubles at home and the increasing wealth of Hausaland attracted clerics and traders from Songhai who are known as Wangara. They began to arrive in Kano during the late 1300s. The Wangara helped tie Hausaland into a widespread commercial network that opened the door to trade beyond the areas controlled by the Hausa aristocracy. They may have introduced the Songhai monetary system based on gold and cowries (Lovejoy 1978a:180-181). The Wangara certainly played a central role in the adoption of Islam, nominally at least, by the dominant elite in Hausaland. "When they came they commanded the Sarki to observe the times of prayer. He complied and made Gurdames his *Liman*, and Loual his *Meuzzin* (Palmer 1967,3:104-105). The latter fact underscores the close relations which developed between this Muslim "middle-estate" and the Hausa rulers.

Early in the fourteenth century the first city market was opened in Kano; notably, a rebel prince from Bornu is credited with this act. Eunuchs and kola nuts were imported into Hausaland through Zazzau, and the 'roads'

from Bornu to Gonja were opened (Palmer 1967,3:104-105). This was followed by another important influx of immigrants.

> In Yakubu's time [A.D. 1452-1463] the Fulani came to Hausaland from Melle [Mali] . . . . At this time too the Asbenawa [Tuareg] came to Gobir, and salt became common in Hausaland. In the following year merchants from Gwanja [Gonja] began coming to Katsina; Beriberi [from Kanem-Bornu] came in large numbers, and a colony of Arabs arrived. Some of the Arabs settled in Kano and some in Katsina (Palmer 1967,3:111).

During the reign of Mohammed Rumfa (1463-1499) Kano achieved a new level of wealth and power. Rumfa's reign was the culmination of several centuries of territorial expansion, the extension of trade links, and the formalization of various modes of surplus extraction; it also represents a new phase in the evolution of the state, with more opulence at the court, stronger adherence to Islamic laws, and some changes to the state bureaucracy. Both the cosmopolitan outlook and the despotism of the dominant elite became more pronounced (Palmer 1967,3:111-112).

Under Rumfa, Kano became a prominent intellectual centre for Islamic scholars and students. Rumfa's own commitment to Islam is evident in that he ordered the destruction of the sacred tree of the pagan cult which had, evidently, persisted in the city until then. In its place he constructed a Friday Mosque. The Algerian scholar, Al-Maghili, visited Kano and wrote a treatise on Islamic government for Rumfa.

Rumfa is famed for his 12 innovations. These include the opening of a second market in the city and the expansion of the walls, indications of increasing wealth. They also include material and symbolic signs of a growing despotism and alienation from the population. Rumfa initiated the practice of wife seclusion; he is said to have kept 1000 wives, and to have taken every first born virgin in the city for himself. He began the tradition of extravagant ritual displays. He wore elaborate gowns

and ostrich feather sandals, and long trumpets announced his arrival and departure. Rumfa also established *kame*, that is, the right of the nobility to free hospitality on demand from a village or other settlement of free persons.[5] Finally, Rumfa was the first to give eunuchs offices of state, putting four of them in charge of the treasury. This reflects the need for a more specialized division of labour in the state administration, as well as the ruler's fear of the emergence of rival power centres within the bureaucracy.

As the Hausa states grew and were integrated into a regional economy they also were drawn into the power politics of the region. The empire of Kanem-Bornu had relocated on the west side of Lake Chad in the late 1300s after a century of internal strife. By the reign in Kano of Burja (A.D. 1438-1452) Bornu was able to press its demands for tribute. Bornu maintained a sporadic, albeit nominal, lordship over several of the Hausa states until the nineteenth century. Until its destruction by Moroccan forces in 1591, Songhai sought control over parts of Hausaland. In 1515 it seized the important caravan town of Agades. When Leo Africanus visited Hausaland in 1513 he listed Kebbi, Zamfara, Katsina, Kano and Zazzau as Songhai vassals (Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1966:82). Although Songhai's dominance of Hausaland has recently been questioned (Lovejoy 1978a:182), it certainly prevented any expansion by the emerging Hausa states in its direction.

The nature of the Hausa states -- the militaristic elite whose existence depended upon the taxes and tribute of rural populations, the produce of slave labour, and the booty of raiding -- inevitably generated expansion, and, consequently, endless clashes between the different Hausa states. Between 1500 and 1804 two axes emerged (Adelye 1971a). In the eastern section of Hausaland Kebbi, Zamfara and Gobir battled for supremacy, while in the west Kano, Katsina and Zazzau struggled with one another.

Kebbi broke free from Songhai tutelage after the latter's conquest -- with Kebbi's aid -- of Agades. Under Kanta, Kebbi extended its overlordship to most of the Hausa states and contested with Bornu for control of Air. A confederation of Gobir, Zamfara and Air broke Kebbi's domination. Zamfara rose to predominance by the end of the 1600s, only to have its ascendancy nipped by Gobir in the 1760s (Bello 1826:163-164; Arnett 1920:10-14). Both Zamfara and Gobir raided into Katsina and Kano in the first half of the eighteenth century (Palmer 1967,3:123-125).

Beginning during Rumfa's reign Kano and Katsina launched into two centuries of continual and inconclusive war. Sometime in the fifteenth or sixteenth century under the enigmatic Queen Amina,[6] Zazzau was a threat in parts of Hausaland. A common fear of the Jukun tribes from the Benue River area finally drove Katsina and Kano to conclude a peace (Adelye 1971a: 509). Katsina reached the peak of its prosperity during the eighteenth century. Kano, on the other hand, was in decline. It found itself at war with Borno, the Kel Owi Tuareg from Air, and several of its own tributary regions. This turbulence seems to have generated a tendency to increase the intensity of the exactions upon local populations. *Jangali*, the cattle tax, was imposed on the pastoral Fulani during the reign of Kutumbi (1623-1648) (Palmer 1967,3:119). Sharefa (Sarkin Kano 1703 to 1731) "introduced seven practices in Kano all of which were robbery . . . . He invented many other methods of extortion" (Palmer 1967,3:124). Among these was a tax on "maidens on marriage." Sharefa's successor was so energetic in collecting the market taxes that the market was nearly killed. "The next year he collected *jizią* [tax] in Kano and made even the malams pay. There was so much disturbance that the Arabs left the town and went back to Katsina, and most of the poorer people in the town fled to the country" (Palmer 1967,3:124).

Towards the end of the eighteenth century a fragile balance of power emerged (Adeleye 1971a:524). The explanation of this involves a host of complex factors. It is a safe assumption, however, that a stalemate was reached partly because of the dialectics of the system. Years of inconclusive warfare led to the development of more sophisticated defenses and the movement of populations in the reserve areas near to the Hausa states would have become more difficult prey as they developed their military skills and defensive arrangements. Of course the entire area was increasingly drawn into the growing regional economy, and wealth from trade may have increased. But the greater difficulties involved in military expansion could have generated greater pressures on local populations from the ruling elite, and in this way may underlie subsequent developments in the region's political history.

In Kano the last 24 years of the eighteenth century were relatively peaceful. Under Dauda Abusama (A.D. 1776-1781) there was no war or rebellion. The reign of his successor, the last Hausa Sarki in Kano, was complicated by a drought. Mohamma Alwali lost his throne and his life to the Fulani at Burum-Burum (Palmer 1967,3:127),

The *Jihad*

The events of the *jihad* have been described a number of times (Arnett 1920:23-31; Abdullah 1963; Last 1967:23-45). It began in the Hausa state of Gobir in 1804 when Usuman dan Fodio, a Muslim Fulani Shehu, led his community on *hijra* away from the control of the King of Gobir. Usuman at one time had close relations with the royal court in Gobir, acting as a Muslim teacher and advisor to the royal family. Disputes about the 'illegal' behaviour of the Sarkin Gobir, and the growing influence of Usuman among many segments of the population led to an irreconcilable split. The Muslim community under Sheik Usuman wandered and fought a series of

battles in the area of Gobir, Zamfara, and Kebbi over the next four years. Not until the autumn of 1808, on the third attempt, was Alkalawa, the capital of Gobir, captured. Sarkin Gobir, Yunfa, and all his men were killed. A year later, Usuman's son, Mohammed Bello, built the walls of the new town of Sokoto. By the spring of 1810 the main part of the *jihad* was over. Most of the former Hausa states, Nupe, and Adamawa were under the nominal control of Fulani Emirs who recognized the authority of the Amir al-mu'minin now based in Sokoto.

Outside of the region occupied by the Hausa states of Gobir, Zamfara and Kebbi, most of which was included in the new emirates of Sokoto and Gwandu, the *jihad* was led by local Fulani leaders. In Kano state there were four main clans of Fulani: the Mindibawa, the Sulebawa, the Daneji, and Yolawa. In the dry season of 1805-1806, Usuman's son, Mohammed Bello, met the Fulani leaders from eastern Hausaland at Birnin Gada and they were given the blessing of Sheik Usuman and a flag. It is not clear whether or not a single leader for Kano was chosen at this time. Arnett (1920:26) says Suleimanu of the Mindibawa was named first Emir of Kano. Gowers (1921: 11), on the other hand, asserts that no single leader was chosen until after the defeat of Alwali, the Hausa Sarki, in 1807. In any event Suleimanu eventually received Usuman's recognition as the first Emir of Kano. This did not settle the matter, however, and with Suleimanu's death in 1819 a struggle for the throne ensued. Ibrahim Dabo, the son of Malam Jemo, leader of the Sulebawa clan and the most prominent Fulani leader in Kano during the *jihad*, finally succeeded to the throne (Gowers 1921:12; Palmer 1967,3:128).

Discussions of the rise and success of the *jihad* usually focus on three factors -- ethnicity, religion, and political economy.[7] Certain of

the early colonial officials favoured the notion that the *jihad* was a struggle between races. For Meek (1925,1:100) the *jihad* represented ". . . the arrival of a virile race of a higher type among peoples who, owing to centuries of a sedentary life, have lost their virility." Less racist theories centre on the different forms of livelihood between pastoral Fulani and sedentary Hausa, as well as the fact that the leaders of the *jihad* were all Fulani, and its outcome was to replace a Hausa elite with a Fulani elite. The argument from economic and political causes was also adumbrated by colonial authorities.

> It was a movement at Kano for the reformation of the prevailing faith, corrupted as the reformers truly alleged by superstitious customs and practices. But like most religious risings which succeed by force of arms, its inception was due to economic and political rather than religious motives (Gowers 1921: 12).

For Muslims the *jihad* was a religious reform movement, an attempt to create the ideal Muslim state on earth (Al-Hajj 1964). Of course, the fact is all three aspects played a role. The problem is to clarify the particular manner in which they were combined, and how this combination was ideologically presented so as to generate a hegemonic world-view that inspired and justified the actions of the *mujihaddin*.

The critique of the incumbent regimes had begun at least a century before the *jihad* of Usuman dan Fodio. The *Shurb al-zulal*, a poem written in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century, is an implicit attack on the prevailing customs of the Hausa states (Bivar and Hiskett 1962:130). In the *Kitab al-farq* Usuman dan Fodio lists his complaints against the Hausa governments. Many of them are explicitly economic: various "illegal taxes", arbitrary exactions, the need to present "gifts" to officials of the state and courts to get action. Others are of a moral character: treatment of women, tolerance of non-Islamic rites and cults, general corruption

and decadence (Hiskett 1960:567-569).

The expression of political and economic criticism in terms of religious reform is, of course, not unique to West Africa or Islamic societies. The Protestant reformation, and the growth of the Anabaptist movement are well known examples of a similar phenomena in European history. In a world where the design or sanction of an omnipotent God is the primary explanation for the existence of man and the form of society, political practice necessarily takes the form of a religious struggle. In modern society the religious sanction is often replaced by a scientific one, and political views and economic ideas are based, or at least are claimed by their proponents to be based, on the findings of science. This is a fairly recent development, however, and is another example of the unique character of capitalist society. Thus, it is not surprising that Usuman dan Fodio attacks various forms of taxation because they are not sanctioned in the *Shari'a*, rather than because they are exploitative. This does not lessen the political content of the criticism.

Nonetheless, one must not reduce the religious aspect of the *jihad* merely to politics and economics. Religion was a relatively autonomous structural instance of the social formation. It cannot be doubted that, at least for the devout, the *jihad* was carried out and experienced as the fulfillment of a religious duty. The lived experience of the *jihad* for these people was primarily a religious one. The political and economic effects of the *jihad* cannot necessarily be equated with the motivational force behind the actions of the people involved. Moreover, the reform and spread of Islam accomplished by the *jihad* itself had effects at the political and economic level. For example, many people were enslaved in the battles and raids undertaken by *mujihaddin*; and the spread of Islamic practices such as wife seclusion (*kulle*), wearing turbans, veils and

other garments obviously had important effects on labour supplies, and the market for cloth.

Because the ideological struggle, which is such an important aspect of any political action, was framed within the religious setting of Islam the activities of wandering Muslim scholars were crucial to the success of the *jihad*. The Toronkawa, a grouping of Fulani clans, brought Islam with them from Futa Turo sometime in the fifteenth century. Islam already had a presence in the cities, but many Toronkawa became famous as rurally based malams. In the seventeenth century there was an increase in the number of these travelling teachers; a group whose preaching and criticism did much to change the spirit of the age, and helped crystallize the frustrations of their Fulani brethren, Hausa peasants, and perhaps even slaves settled on rural estates. They stood aloof from the city-based Muslims who were inextricably wrapped up in the corruption of the Hausa dominant class -- at least this is how it would appear to the population in the country. Adeleye has stressed the importance of the growth of a critical intellectual spirit.

> The intellectual awareness, as distinct from irrational belief, lent crucial vigour to the spirit of questioning which cut at the root of traditional religions, values and customs, and the whole moorings of the existing societies in so far as they affected the life of the Muslim man *per se*. Similar questions had indeed been raised in the courts in preceeding centuries and there had been reformist rulers in Hausaland and Bornu. But these were operating in situations in which Islam, despite royal support, was a fifth wheel in the state. Its base was too narrow successfully to challenge prevailing traditions and attitudes. With the spread of education and the growth in depth of intellectual awareness, by the eighteenth century the time was ripe for a revolution (Adeleye 1971a:526).

One must not, however, put the cart before the horse. Important as the spirit of questioning was, it did not produce the *jihad*. Indeed, it was generated by the economic and political condition which the malams

criticized.

That ethnicity was not the fundamental category upon which the *jihad* forces were organized is evident in the makeup of the armies that met. Fulani and Hausa, as well as other groups like the Tuareg fought on both sides (Waldman 1965, 1966; Last 1967:27-29). Abdullah, Usuman's brother, noted that prior to the *jihad* when the "Community" was in formation, their own tribesmen were slow to join, even though "most of the country, the common people and the nobles" were coming to the Sheik (Abdullah 1963: 98). Certain of the economic complaints of Usuman were problems specific to Fulani clans, i.e. the attack on *jangali* as an illegal tax. But in other respects the criticisms appealed to many of the rural population, as well as members of noble lineages excluded from positions of power.

Pastoral Fulani undoubtedly experienced many problems with the sedentary Hausa peasantry. However, one must take care not to overemphasize the contradictions between cattle herders and agriculturalists. Fulani exchanged pastoral products for grain and manufactured goods made by settled peasants. Symbiotic relations such as the practice of letting the Fulani pasture cattle in already harvested fields -- i.e. exchanging stubble for manure -- were common. Agriculturalists arranged with Fulani to take care of cattle which they owned. Finally, the pastoral Fulani population is only a minority of the overall Fulani community (Hopen 1958:3-5). The ethnic category Fulani included city based malams and traders, sedentary peasants, semi-sedentary peasant-nomads, and finally the pastoral Fulani. It is, perhaps, a bias in ethnographic reporting which has led to the impression that all or even most Fulani are nomadic pastoralists.[8]

Given the factors noted above one must question the degree to which the conflict between pastoralists and peasants overdetermined that between city dwellers and all rural people, or between the dominant class and all

the subordinate groups regardless of their ethnicity. The pastoral Fulani and the sedentary Hausa were both rural peoples subject to the exactions of the city-based elite. In this sense they had more in common with each other, than either did with their ethnic brethren in the city. Ethnicity was utilized by the leaders of the *jihad* to garnish and consolidate support, especially in the eastern Hausa states. Ethnic differences, in and of themselves, did not generate the *jihad*.

Once the *jihad* began the shroud of religious sanctity which surrounded Usuman's community, and those attached to it, was very soon soiled. The exigencies of warfare soon transformed the nature of the community (Last 1967:57-60). Even in the Sheik's home region this was true. The followers of Usuman plundered the peasantry in Gobir without provocation (Abdullah 1963:114). Towards the end of 1807 Abdullah became so disgusted with the materialism of the army that he felt compelled to perform a retreat to the wilderness. Apparently there was a very wide divergence between the ideals expressed by the leaders of the *jihad* and the actual behaviour of the rank and file (Abdullah 1963:118-121). Raiding was undoubtedly savage on both sides. On an expedition into Gurma Abdullah coldly reports that women and children were taken prisoner "and their men were slain with the axe" (Abdullah 1963:126).

Thus, it is evident that the *jihad* was a complex historical event. Reference to any single category is insufficient as an explanation. Economic and political factors undoubtedly underlay the revolt. But these were expressed through the idioms of religion; the fight was ideologically presented as a struggle for adherence to true Islamic principles. The result was the removal of the dominant social class, that is to say, the outcome was political as well as religious. Ethnicity was not a prime motivating factor. However, it was employed to strengthen the forces of

the *jihad*, to rally support to the Sheik's community, and to consolidate state power after the main part of the *jihad* was successful. After all the Hausa nobility was replaced by a Fulani nobility.

Caliphate and Emirate

The *jihad* gave rise to the Sokoto Caliphate, the largest single political entity in West Africa during the nineteenth century. After the defeat of the King of Gobir in 1808 the size of the Caliphate continued to grow until almost mid-century as local *jihads* along the borders extended the area in allegiance to Sokoto. This was especially so in Adamawa where individual leaders of Fulani clans (*ardo'en*) carried out their "religious" wars of conquest (Burnham 1980). Although the Caliph or Amir al-mu'iminin in Sokoto maintained more of a ritual than practical control of the individual emirates, enough cohesion existed among these emirates to put an end to the numerous wars that had plagued the Hausa states since the fifteenth century. In this sense Adeleye is correct when he asserts, "the *jihad* by enthroning Islam supplied these states and their neighbours with a supra-state ideology for integration" (Adeleye 1971a:530).

When Bello met the leaders of the eastern Fulani at Birnin Gada they had made *bay'a* (hommage) to Sheik Usuman. This along with the flags given to these men by Usuman indicates that they accepted the status of subordinates. In the classic Islamic sense an Emir is the lieutenant of a Caliph. He owed the Caliph certain responsibilities and in return could expect support of various kinds (Abubakar 1974:216).

The Caliphate was divided in two after the main part of the *jihad* was complete, and it became evident that administrative structures were required (Last 1967:40-45). Usuman's son, Muhammed Bello, based in the new city of Sokoto, was given control of the east, and his uncle Abdullah

MAP 1

THE FULANI EMPIRES OF SOKOTO AND GWANDU



from Johnston (1967: facing p. 97)

situated in Gando, was given the west.[9] When the Sheik died in 1817 Abdullah reluctantly recognized Bello's overall predominance, although administrative control of the west remained in his hands (Last 1967:63-66).

The political domination of the eastern emirates by Sokoto was evident in at least three practices (Abubakar 1974:216-217). Firstly, as vassals the emirs were expected to contribute military contingents for campaigns undertaken by the Caliph. Secondly, they paid annual tribute to Sokoto. Thirdly, the appointment and deposition of the emirs was in the hands of the Caliph in Sokoto. On the basis of these relations Abubakar concludes "that the Caliph was not a nominal leader, but, he was in fact the overlord of the Emirs and the territories they governed were dependent and not independent states" (Abubakar 1974:217).

The actual degree of control exercised by the Caliph over events in the emirates was, however, variable, to say the least. Abubakar cites several examples of the emirates contributing military contingents to aid the Sultan. Further, there is no doubt that tribute was paid, each emirate contributing goods which were particular to it.

> Kano produces the greatest revenue which the sultan receives, and is paid monthly in horses, cowries and cloth. Adamawa pays yearly in slaves; Jackoba, in slaves and lead ore; Zegzeg in slaves and cowries; Zamfra, the same; Hadiga and Katagum and Zaonima, in horses, bullocks and slaves; Kashna, in slaves, cowries and cloth; Ader or Tadela, in bullocks, sheep, camels, and a coarse kind of cloth of cotton . . . (Clapperton 1966:215-216).[10]

However, the size of the tribute was not under the control of Sokoto. It varied with economic conditions, and with the state of political relations between Sokoto and the emirate government. Aliyu Baba, the ultimate victor in the Kano civil war of 1892-1894, reduced the payments to Sokoto, partly because of the fact that Sokoto had supported the rival faction (Fika 1978:74-75).

During his visit in the 1850s Heinrich Barth described the Sokoto Caliphate as "great in extent, but weak beyond description in the unsettled state of its loosely-connected provinces" (Barth 1965,2:234). The weakness of Sokoto's control was clearly indicated by the events of the Kano Civil War. The Sultan's appointed man was opposed by part of the local hierarchy and Sokoto was incapable of militarily enforcing its candidate's claim.[11] In Zazzau, on the other hand, Sokoto had a more direct influence in the emirate's internal politics. The throne was rotated among the three principal Fulani lineages, a practice which generated a great deal of competition among the numerous candidates for succession. Even Kano was able to influence the outcome of the inevitable intrigues caused by this dynastic tradition (M.G. Smith 1955:68-69; 1960:73-77). Thus, while it is true that in theory the emirates were dependent states, and there are certain symbolic and material examples of Sokoto's control, practically speaking Sokoto's domination varied in relation to the strength of the ruling elite in each emirate.

Kano in the Regional Economy

Even though the Sokoto Caliphate did not represent a tightly-knit political unit, it did form a coherent economic unit bound up in a regionally differentiated economy. In the aftermath of the Kano civil war Aliyu Baba, the Sarki, resumed his position as a dependent subject of the Caliph in Sokoto despite the fact that he had won his position in opposition to the Caliph's wishes. Fika astutely summarizes the reasoning behind this decision.

> It made sense for Aliyu to return to the fold for he could not expect to derive any advantage by seceding from the Caliphate. The latter step could have lost him support from hitherto sympathetic neighbours, while membership of the Caliphate provided Kano with a vast trading hinterland which was the basis of the prosperity of Aliyu and his subjects (Fika 1978:74).

MAP 2

THE COMMERCIAL NETWORKS OF THE HAUSA PEOPLE



Adapted from Adamu (1978: facing p. 65)

For historical and political reasons Kano was one of the metropolitan and industrial centres of the Islamic community united under the leadership of the Caliph of Sokoto. The creation of the Caliphate through *jihad* increased the total area where Kano produce could be marketed and from which "raw materials" such as slaves could be acquired.

A regional division of labour had long been a recognized fact of the Hausa states. The legend of the origin of the Hausa states assigns special activities to different ones. Gobir was renowned for its military talents, Katsina and Daura were centres of commerce, Kano and Rano specialized in dyeing cloth, and Zazzau supplied slaves (Barth 1965,1:470-472). The creation of the Caliphate provided a political and ideological framework for this division of labour, and the boundaries of the system were expanded. Frontier emirates such as Adamawa were created under the aegis of the holy war, but the principal economic support of the Fulani *ardo'en* who waged these local *jihads* was the trade of their pagan captives. These slaves were destined for the trans-Saharan trade or use in the central emirates such as Kano. Traders from the central emirates were able to move into these new areas under the protection of local leaders loyal to Sokoto, thereby increasing the market for manufactured goods (Burnham 1980).

Kano was the richest of the emirates in the nineteenth century. The disruption of the trans-Saharan trade route through Katsina, by the creation of the kingdom of Maradi under the exiled Hausa rulers of Katsina, favoured Kano. But its wealth depended more on local manufacturing and regional commerce with the desert region to the north and the forest to the south than it did on long-distance trade across the desert. There can be no doubt that the reentrenchment and expansion of Islam which accompanied the establishment of the Caliphate stimulated these activities.

Islam maintains important strictures against the consumption of

stimulants, kola being a significant exception. It also enjoins against nakedness (Trimingham 1959:197). Two of the major commercial enterprises of nineteenth-century Kano emirate were the kola trade with the Ashanti region and the production of dyed-cloth. Barth commented on the kola trade during his visit to Kano in the 1850s.

> Besides these [local] manufactures, the chief article of African produce in the Kano market is the "guro" or kola-nut; but while, on the one hand, it forms an important article of transit, and brings considerable profit, on the other large sums are expended by the natives upon this luxury, which has become to them as necessary as coffee or tea to us (Barth 1965,1:514).

Trade was estimated by Barth to be worth between 80 and 100 million cowrie shells annually, half of which was profit to the merchants.[12]

He also observed the cloth industry for which Kano was famed. Dyed-cloth was produced in the city and in the surrounding towns, and was traded all over West Africa and beyond.[13]

> There is really something grand in this kind of industry, which spreads to the north as far as Murzak, Ghat, and even Tripoli; to the west not only to Timb'uktu, but in some degree even as far as the shores of the Atlantic, and the very inhabitants of Arquin dressing in the cloth woven and dyed in Kano; to the east all over Bornu, although there it comes into contact with the native industry of the I'gbira and I'gbo, while toward the southeast it invades the whole of 'Adamawa and is only limited by the nakedness of the pagan *sans-culottes*, who do not wear clothing (Barth 1965,1:511).

The last comment is interesting for conversion to Islam was one way of avoiding enslavement, in theory at least, and the spread of the religion increased the demand for clothing.[14] Consequently, the expansion of the Caliphate borders through *jihad* increased the size of Kano's market. Robinson claimed that Kano clothed

> . . . more that half the population of the Central Soudan, and any European traveller who will take the trouble to ask for it, will find no difficulty in purchasing Kano made clothes at towns on the coast

> as widely separated from one another as Alexandria, Tripoli, Tunis or Lagos (Robinson 1896b:113).

There can be no doubt that while agriculture was the primary occupation of the vast majority of the population of Kano cloth and other manufactures, such as leather goods, were important additional sources of income. Barth estimated the value of the export trade in dyed-cloth at about 300,000,000 cowrie shells,

> and how great this national wealth is will be understood by my readers when they know that, with from fifty to sixty thousand kurdi [cowrie shells], or from four to five pounds sterling a year, a whole family may live in that country with ease, including every expense, even that of their clothing (Barth 1965, 1:511-512).

On the basis of his research into Kano's precolonial textile industry Shea believes there were "tens of thousands of dyers in Kano and even more craftsmen engaged in other aspects of the production and trade of textiles" (Shea 1975:60).

With its natural endowments, favourable position between the desert and forest, and long tradition as a centre of learning, manufacturing and trading Kano was a dominant metropolis in the regionally differentiated and hierarchical economy. The hinterlands were, in some cases, opened by people with close ties to Kano. Yola, the capital of Adamawa, was named after a ward in Kano city thereby reflecting its colonial origin (Barth 1965,1:508).

The hinterlands were not necessarily on the outer edges of the Caliphate's borders. Within the boundaries, between the emirates in hilly or mountainous territory, non-Islamic populations survived, and were continually preyed upon by state-organized slaving expeditions. One European traveller noted that slaves were,

> being continually recruited from the wholly pagan races who live in the mountainous regions that lie

> within easy raiding distance from the capitals of most of the provinces. Each emir has his own preserves, on which his neighbour is not supposed to encroach (Wallace 1896:217).

Zazzau had traditionally been the largest supplier of slaves to the Hausa states and it appears this function continued in the nineteenth century. State organized raids into the preserves were annual dry-season events (Hogendorn 1980).

The government of Kano may not have been as interested in annual raiding, but it did carry out campaigns into the Ningi plateau region on its southeastern borders. During his stay in Kano between December 1894 and March 1895 Robinson observed about 1,000 captives from a single raid against the Ningawa (Robinson 1896b:130). These more or less acephalous groups were not easy, passive victims, though. By the 1880s the Ningawa were raiding into Kano (Fika 1978:40).

The importance of slavery in Kano will be treated in detail in Chapter Three. At present it is enough to note the regional structure of these slave reservoirs in relation to the large central emirates where the slaves were used or sold to the trans-Saharan trade.

Town and Country in Hausaland

In an often-quoted phrase Marx said:

> The foundation of every division of labour which has attained a certain degree of development, and has been brought about by the exchange of commodities, is the separation of town from country. One might well say that the whole economic history of society is summed up in the movement of this antithesis (Marx 1977:472).

The importance of the establishment of *birane*, the large walled cities, in the evolution of the Hausa states has already been indicated. I want here to outline in more detail the political and economic ties between town and country with special reference to Kano emirate. The nature of these

relations indicate some general features of the region's political economy and provide some clues as to the kind of social and economic formation which was represented there.

Although large cities were important nodal points in the region's political economy, it must be remembered, as Polly Hill (1977:3-4) has made clear, that a very small portion of the population lived in the large metropoles. Even if the population of Birnin Kano was 60,000 to 90,000 in 1900 it contained only two or three percent of the population of the emirate. The general statements of Europeans who visited Hausaland in the nineteenth century can be misleading. Robinson journeyed from Loko on the Benue River to Birnin Kano in 1894. "Every day as a rule we passed two or more villages of considerable size and about every 50 miles we came across a town containing from 10,000 to 30,000 inhabitants" (Robinson 1896a:203). But the actual settlement patterns were far from homogeneous. They varied in relation to geographical, historical, social and political factors.

Geographers have identified a settlement hierarchy on the basis of demographic criteria (c.f. Mortimore 1972). At the bottom of this system of classification is the *kauye* or village area. Such "villages" were not necessarily nucleated, especially in the secure regions of the central emirates. In Kano two million of the emirate total of three million people lived within a 30 mile radius of the city (Gowers 1921:6; Hill 1977:17-19), and it seems the majority of these lived scattered about the region in single family compounds (*gidaje*, sing. *gida*) or in loosely clustered groups of compounds (*unguwayi*, sing. *unguwa*).[15] In the early 1850s Heinrich Barth commented while just outside Kano city: "The villages are here scattered about in the most agreeable and convenient way, as farming villages ought always to be, but which is practical only in a state of considerable

security and tranquility" (Barth 1965,1:487). Robinson visited Kano in the 1890s. "Within three days' march of the city, we saw for the first time since leaving Loko single houses attached to farms and away from the protection of any fortified village or town" (Robinson 1896b:99). One should keep in mind that the Kano-Close-Settled-Zone (KCSZ hereafter) had a very high population density.[16]

The second order of settlement in Hausaland is the *gari*, "translated either as village or town" (Mortimore 1972:119). The primary distinction between the *gari* and the *kauye* is that the former is always nucleated, surrounded by an area of permanently cultivated lands, and -- as defined by geographers -- contains a population greater than 500 "upwards to a limit that is not easy to define" (Mortimore 1972:119). Prior to the British conquest these settlements were often walled. Lugard reported 170 walled towns in Kano emirate at the turn of the century (Northern Nigeria. Annual Report. 1904). Of course, the physical and human constitution of the *gari* depended upon its size and economic specialization, if there was one.

The third order of settlement is the *birni* (pl. *birane*). This was the political capital of the emirate or state. Generally they were large, with a sizeable land area encompassed by the walls. It is important to note that, as with the other types of settlement, objective factors such as size are not the definitive features signified by the term *birni*. Mortimore comments:

> The term [i.e. *birni*] is logically translated 'city' not in the American sense of a large town but in the English (and European) sense of a one time important political centre having a defined status in society and often of considerable antiquity. It is noticeable that the capital of some smaller emirates set up after the Fulani *jihad* in the early nineteenth century have not come to be known by the term *birni* (Mortimore 1972:119-120).

The large *birni*, because they were centres of political power, were

also centres of manufacturing and mercantile activities, but they by no means had a monopoly on these activities. Kano is probably the most famous *birni*. Certainly it was the largest city in West Africa in the nineteenth century. Barth (1965,1:504-525) has left the most complete description. The city was composed of many wards or quarters as Barth calls them.[17] The two largest ethnic groups in the city, Hausa and Fulani, lived in their own sections. There were also large numbers of immigrants, chiefly Beriberi, Nupe, Tuareg and Arabs.[18] Population size and composition varied with the seasons. Aside from the wards distinguished on the basis of ethnicity, occupation and political office, there was a special quarter for the blind and another for the lame (Clapperton 1826:63-64). Rural settlements were by no means egalitarian or homogeneous in terms of income, but it was in the large cities that the extreme differentiation between social classes was most readily apparent. Furthermore, the differences between the urban and rural populations were very strongly perceived. "Hausa themselves emphasize these rural-urban differences, and these conditions are occasionally cited in pleas for divorce" (M.G. Smith 1960: 239).

This threefold hierarchy must be supplemented. Other forms of settlement may have physically resembled the *kauye* or *gari* but their social makeup places them outside these categories. Mary Smith provides the following definition. "*Rinji*, pl. *rinjoji*, *rumada*: The place where slaves lived; it might be in the forecourt of their master's compound, or a separate village settlement . . ." (M. Smith 1964:255). M.G. Smith says: "The *rumada* or slave estates were hereditary settlements of slaves with some freemen, but mostly the former, built by nobles and others enjoying similar means" (M.G. Smith 1955:102-103). Lovejoy has recently argued that *rumada* should be translated as a slave plantation rather than as slave

villages.

> Methods of slave plantation varied, and in some cases slaves lived in what appeared to outsiders as villages under headmen. These headmen, usually slaves themselves, are here identified as overseers, since they supervised agricultural production for the slave owner. The description of slave settlements as villages clouds the economic relationship between master and slave and is therefore avoided (Lovejoy 1978b:343).

Hill reports three "plantations" in the area she studied just outside the Kano city walls. A prominent Koranic scholar had about 30 slaves settled on his; an estate belonging to the Emir of Kano had about fifty male and female slaves; the city's chief blacksmith owned an estate slightly smaller than that which belonged to the Emir (Hill 1977:214-215). In other regions these slave settlements could be very large. The Emir of Zazzau, Mommon Sani (1846-1860), owned several such estates the largest of which may have included 3,000 slaves (M.G. Smith 1960:157).[19]

The analytical problems presented by these slave "villages" will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four. Now I will briefly describe the relations between the large *birane* where the political elite lived and the other settlements.

Birnin Kano had important economic links to the KCSZ. It was a market for cash crops, cattle, firewood and rural manufactures. It contained ten retail markets (Barth 1965,1:506-507, 523), although their economic importance is hard to measure because much commercial activity took place outside of market places (Morel 1968:217; Hill 1969). The city did contain many manufacturing activities such as cloth dyeing, metal smelting, and leather work, but it was not necessarily the most important site of these activities. For the textile industry, at least, most of the city's production was consumed in the city, the big export-oriented centres were villages in the rural regions (Shea 1975:102-140). The city was an important source of fertilizer for the KCSZ where permanent cultivation

was the norm. Donkey loads of human and animal waste were sold to the peasantry (Hill 1977:1-20).

The first British officials in northern Nigeria referred to the political system as feudalism. But the nature of the rural-urban relations shows this is incorrect. Birnin Kano was the centre of political power, the seat of the Emir and the senior state office holders (*hakimai*). The entire emirate was divided into districts (often called fiefs by the British) which were given to the *hakimai*, primarily as sources of revenue. These districts included towns and villages. Urban centres were not, in this sense, self-governing communities outside of a feudal political structure as was the case in medieval Europe (Merrington 1975). Neither can the *hakimai* be compared to the feudal nobility. In Kano they had to live in the capital,[20] whereas feudal lords lived on their own manors and estates, for the personal relation between lord and vassal was a central feature of feudal social relations (Bloch 1961). The feudal lord also had monopoly ownership of the land and the vassal's tenure was determinate upon his declaration of allegiance to his lord. In Kano, to the contrary, the towns and villages were under the immediate control of their local headmen; land distribution and occupancy were not usually controlled by the *hakimai*. Thus, although they were absent from their domains, they cannot be considered absentee landlords as the British called them, for they did not actually own the land (Hill 1977:10). Slave estates do bring an element of confusion into this picture, but for now I will only note that sometimes they were attached to political office rather than the individual who occupied the office, although there were privately owned slave estates.

Basically, the *hakimai* had little administrative or judicial function in their so-called fiefs. They represented a source of income, and tax collection was the main concern of those who had been granted them. The

hakimai were represented by *jakuda*, representatives who oversaw tax collection and looked after their masters' interests generally in the districts. Often the *jakuda* were slaves.

The geographical distribution of the fiefs, or districts as Polly Hill prefers, was complicated. In Kano the four major Fulani clans had conquered different parts of the emirate during the *jihad*. Their role in the *jihad* determined that several of the senior state offices were controlled by these clans. Those offices were, in essence, the heritable property of these clans, and the fiefs or districts attached to these offices were distributed according to the regional predominance of the four clans. However, not all the state offices were hereditary. The Annual Report for 1902 lists 46 state offices, ". . . 12 chiefs, who are appointed from the royal family, 20 hereditary offices, six non-hereditary and eight held by the Emir's chief slaves." It has been estimated that there were 400 fiefs (Hill 1977:8), and not all of them were contiguous. Some consisted of individual towns, villages or estates dispersed through the emirate. This being so substituting the term district for fief does not clarify the matter. Clearly, this is an issue which requires more research, for it is central to our understanding of the political system in the emirate.

Because of the loose control the *hakimai* exercised it has been argued that the peasantry were essentially autonomous. Hill (1977) says that the British colonial practice of indirect-rule was *de facto* non-rule in northern Nigeria, since it maintained the indigenous political structure. It is evident, though, that while daily activities and other matters were local business only, the presence of the state was felt.

State revenue was derived primarily from a series of taxes, although it was augmented by levies on commerce, slave-trading, and "gifts" from those seeking favour, as well as the produce of royal slave-estates and

practices such as *kame*. State revenue was not separated from the Emir's personal income. There were four basic taxes (Fika 1978:39-41). 1) A tithe was paid on harvested grain and cattle (the latter was known as *jangali*). 2) A ground rent (Arabic: *kharaj*) was charged to non-Muslims. Since all of Kano had been conquered by Fulani in the *jihad*, no distinction was made between non-Muslims and Muslims in this regard. The Hausa term for this rent was *kurdin kasa*. 3) A levy was imposed on cash crops (*kurdin shuka*), with the significant exception of cotton and indigo. 4) Finally, there was a tax on dye-pits paid in cowries (*kurdin karofi*), the lone "industrial" tax in Kano.

The weight of these taxes on the peasantry is hard to measure. Citing their value in cowries is meaningless outside of a knowledge of the yearly income of the peasantry. *Jangali*, the tax on cattle, was a source of tension between the Hausa rulers and the nomadic Fulani prior to the *jihad*. If the Annual Reports are to be believed the peasantry avoided payment when possible. After the British conquest in 1903 it was reported,

> At first there was considerable lawlessness in the country districts; the Fulani faction were driven out, and the people refused to pay any taxes, while the slaves of the Fulani deserted them in large numbers. This caused some resentment towards the new Government on the part of the country Fulani, for the peasantry showed a desire to throw off the yoke and attacked the tax collectors . . . (Northern Nigeria. Annual Report. 1903).

Thus even though technical and administrative factors rendered close monitoring of the peasantry difficult, it cannot be said that the state was not a factor in rural life. Revolts and rebellions were common throughout the nineteenth century in Kano and although they cannot all be claimed to be struggles against the "system" popular discontent is always a factor in upheavals of this kind.

Kano, like other states of precolonial West Africa, was overwhelmingly

rural in orientation. The large capital city was first and foremost the camp of the political elite, the nodal point of a despotic, if loose, domination of the countryside. It did not exist, as in feudal Europe, in the interstices left by rurally based social relations. It sat on top of the rural society, not interfering in it directly but drawing surplus from it. Thus, we must question Polly Hill's idea that the state played no role in the lives of the rural people in Hausaland. Moreover, the political elite did extract surplus from the local people, contrary to what Coquery-Vidrovitch claims in her theory on the African mode of production (see the introduction). It is now necessary to examine the role of slave labour in Kano. It is appropriate, therefore, to introduce some general issues concerning African slavery.

Notes - Chapter One

1. The geography texts I have used are Church (1980) and Gleave and White (1971).

2. Lugard reported there were 170 walled towns in Kano emirate (Northern Nigeria. Annual Report 1904).

3. Of course, whether slavery is the correct term is a problem. Insofar as it involves the absolutely involuntary subjection to authority, I would argue this is slavery (see Chapter Two). The legal status of these people, and the evolution of their status is unknown.

4. This is interesting because Hill (1977:209) states that the slave estates discussed by Smith (1955) for northern Zaria were Fulani institutions, not Hausa. This passage suggests that slave estates were established very early on in the Hausa states. The problem is to discover what became of these settlements.

5. For a description of *kame* in nineteenth-century Maradi see M.G. Smith (1967:117-118).

6. The "Kano Chronicle" says Amina was active during Dauda's reign (A.D. 1421-1438)(Palmer 1967,3:109). The chroniclers of Zazzau set her conquests in the middle of the sixteenth-century. M.G. Smith thinks "Amina's Walls" may have been built by different people at varying times (M.G. Smith 1964:349). For other comments on Amina see Bello (1826:162).

7. The brief analysis which follows is heavily influenced by Waldman (1965, 1966).

8. The classic ethnographies of pastoral Fulani who live within what was the Sokoto Caliphate are C.E. Hopen, *The Pastoral Fulbe Family in Gwandu* (1958) and D.J. Stenning, *Savanna Nomads* (1959).

9. Barth listed the "provinces" under Gando,

> "They are, the western half of Kebbi, Mauri or Arewa, Zaberma, Dendina (comprising Kenga-kay and Zagha), a great part of Gurma (comprising the provinces of Galaijo, Torode, Yagha, and Libtaka) with a small portion of Borgu and Barba, a large portion of Yoruba, with the capital Alori or Ilorin, and, on the east side of the river, the provinces of Yaura and Nupe or Nyffi". He continues on to say: "But at that time most of the provinces were plunged into an abyss of anarchy . . . ." (Barth 1965,3:147-148).

The east eventually included Zamfara, Katsina, Kano, Daura, Bauchi, Gombe, Katagum, Zaria, Hadeija and Adamawa (Last 1967:44).

10. Clapperton was in Hausaland in the 1820's. Barth was there in the 1850's. According to Barth Zazzau paid Sokoto 2,000,000 cowrie shells, 500 tobes, and 30 horses (1965,3:95). During a second visit

to Wurno, the Sultan's residence outside Sokoto he said:

> ". . . notwithstanding the extreme weakness of this empire, if viewed from a European point of view, it even now is not quite destitute of means. During my stay the messengers arrived from Zariya with a bi-monthly tribute of 300,000 shells, 85 slaves, and 100 tobes" (1965,3:564).

Robinson visited the Caliphate in 1894. He made the following record of tribute to Sokoto.

> "Kano sends 100 horses, 15,000 tobes of various patterns, 10,000 turbans, and several other miscellaneous articles. Katsena sends 100 slaves, besides horses and cowries; Gorim Bautshi 500 slaves, and Adamawa 10,000. (According to another account which I subsequently received this should be reduced to 2,000)" (1896b:105).

Apparently, then there were great variations in the amount and kind of tribute, although the reliability of these reports cannot be measured.

11. The immediate cause of the civil war was that the Sultan had broken with custom in arbitrarily appointing Tukrur, without consultation with the Kano electors (Fika 1978:59).

12. For the history of Hausa - Ashanti kola trade see Lovejoy (1973).

13. The history of this dyed-cloth industry is described by Shea (1975).

14. It is clearly wrong to equate paganism with nakedness. But the differences in dress between Muslims and pagans is a theme in the travel literature. Describing the costume of the Kanembu who lived on the shores of Lake Tchad, Barth says it left the body naked except for a leathern apron. He continues; "This is a remarkable peculiarity of costume which seems to prevail among almost all barbarous tribes" (Barth 1965,2:67-68).

    Charles Monteil argued that the spread of Islam and cotton cultivation were closely linked in Africa (Monteil 1932:11). The Wangara clerics and traders who first came to Kano in the fourteenth-century definitely stimulated the production of dyed cloth (Lovejoy 1978a).

15. Mortimore (1972:119) refers to these as wards. Hill (1972:329) defines them as: "A hamlet an area of dispersed settlement, or a ward. An administrative area."

16. Gowers, who was several times the British resident in Kano estimated the density at 350 persons per square mile (Gowers 1920:6). He arrived at this figure via an estimate of the KCSZ population of 1,000,000. Hill's estimate of 2,000,000 would double this figure to around 700 persons per square mile.

17. These wards were not formal administrative districts in the nineteenth century (Paden 1973:10).

18. Ethnic figures for 1931, the earliest available, are: Hausa 77%, Fulani 12%, Beriberi 7% (Paden 1973:22).

19. For an economic analysis of two such estates see Hogendorn (1977).

20. The custom varied in each emirate. In Katsina and Sokoto the *hakimai* lived in the districts assigned to them (Northern Nigeria. Annual Report 1902; Hill 1977:7).

CHAPTER TWO

GENERAL ISSUES CONCERNING SLAVERY IN AFRICA

The discussion of African slavery is complicated by a number of conceptual problems. These problems are not peculiar to the institution of slavery; they spring from the process of the production of knowledge. Concepts and definitions are essential tools in our ability to comprehend and order the infinite complexity of the real world. These are not given by our perception of empirical facts; they are created in response to perceptions of the real world and within and upon a cultural tradition which is rooted in a specific form of society. The problem lies in the attempt to transfer concepts across cultural boundaries, to apply definitions developed in one society to the empirical reality of another society. It is a problem of the commensurability of different paradigms.

This chapter focuses on three issues which are directly related to these epistemological concerns: the question of the origin of slavery in Africa, the definition of the term slavery in the African context, and whether or not slaves constitute a social class. The first of these matters may appear to be a historical problem rather than an epistemological one. This is true in part, but some aspects of the discussion involve the interpretation of the meaning of terms used by early European visitors to the coast of West Africa. In this manner the question of the origin of African slavery is related to the second issue, the definition of the term slavery. Social class is a theoretical concept intended as a heuristic aid in the explanation of the functioning and historical development of social formations. Assessing the efficacy of social class as a concept for analyzing slavery cannot be separated from the issue of the definition of the term slavery. Thus, these three problems are inextricably bound together, and a discussion of them, however tentative, must precede the analysis of the

utility of the concept of a slave mode of production for understanding precolonial Hausaland.

The Origin of Slavery in Africa

The debate over the origin of slavery in Africa revolves around the question of whether it was an indigenous phenomena generated by the internal structures of African society, or whether it developed as a result of external commercial and ideological influences on what were essentially classless communities. Walter Rodney (1966) holds to the latter view. He argues that the first Europeans to contact the Upper Guinea coast did not report any harsh forms of social oppression. The societies in this region were not egalitarian in some utopian sense of the term. There were leaders and the common people, but, according to Rodney, class-like relations akin to serfdom or chattel slavery were absent. They only arose later on the coast under the impetus given to the development of social hierarchies by trade with European merchants. Central to this process was the commoditization of human beings in the Atlantic slave trade. In the interior savanna of West Africa conditions were somewhat different. The open, relatively flat environment facilitated the use of cavalry and thereby encouraged tendencies towards centralization and state formation. But the crucial impulse in this process came from outside sub-Saharan Africa in the form of trans-Saharan commercial and religious influences, including, once again, the slave trade. Some regions of the coast were strongly affected by the events in the western and central Sudan. Outside of these areas, however, Rodney contends that slavery and other extreme examples of social inequality were absent. He postulates that this hypothesis holds for all of Africa — the development of social inequality was the result of external, non-African influences.

Rodney's theory is based, in part, on his interpretation of the terminology employed by the early European visitors to the coast of West Africa. European languages did not contain words which could correctly convey the reality of the world the Europeans saw, and, in any event, their perceptions were predetermined to some extent by the feudal society in which they lived. Words such as king and slave were applied to social categories which they did not understand. For example, entire populations were said to be the slaves of the king, a statement which is more confusing than enlightening. A general submission to a despotic ruler is not commensurate with the institution of slavery as it existed in Europe, and it is unknown what the legal status and responsibilities of the so-called slaves were.

Although Rodney has raised some important questions his argument has several problems. It is based on negative evidence, that is to say, what is not reported rather than what is (Kopytoff and Miers 1977:66). The data is relevant only to a very small part of the Guinea coast. Moreover, statements can be found which suggest that the first European visitors did find clearly demarcated differences in social status and material well-being in the societies they encountered.

Rodney's most vocal critic is Fage (1969, 1980). He does not deny outside influence was a factor in the growth of inequality in Africa, merely that there was nothing inherent in these societies which prevented such development. While Fage's theory is logical, his method of arguing is faulty, for he debates Rodney's interpretation of the European texts, but is unable to clarify the disputed meaning of terms.

Fage, for instance, asserts that "there is a remarkable constancy about the social categories mentioned by European observers of the western coastlands . . . between 1450 and 1700" (Fage 1980:293). But he notes that

his category number two, 'Merchants', is an alternative way in which the Europeans perceived his category number one, 'people of authority', kings, captains, nobles and gentry. He places slaves and servants in the same group. And Fage himself points out that in some societies the king was the absolute owner of everything, including the people, and that "all the people consider themselves slaves to the king" (Descouvries, quoted in Fage 1980:309). These are exactly the kinds of terminological problems Rodney used to support his case.

A more useful approach to this issue is to examine the material conditions of life in precolonial Africa that may have influenced the growth of social inequality, and particularly slavery. Nieboer (1910) developed the thesis that slavery evolves in response to certain economic conditions, namely, an abundance of land in relation to population. In this situation the only means of securing a labour force is through legal attachment to an owner. This idea is particularly relevant to discussions of slavery in Africa.

That land is abundant is a basic fact of the political economy of Africa. There are, of course, regional variations, and certain areas achieved very high population densities in the precolonial era. The Kano-Close-Settled-Zone is one such example. In general, though, it is true that population densities have been, and still often are, low. This fact is central to many theories of social and political evolution in Africa. It is the basis of Goody's (1971) theory that control of the "means of destruction" was essential for political domination since it was impossible to restrict access to the means of production. Hopkins posits that the land/labour ratio explains the use of slave labour.

> As noted earlier, the scarce factor of production in West Africa was labour rather than land. In these circumstances there was a natural tendency towards

> dispersed settlement and extensive agriculture, since the optimum factor combination was that which economised on labour and made as much use of land as possible. As long as the labour force remained mobile and could engage freely in a variety of occupations, hired labour would be expensive . . . . Slaves were preferred because the costs of acquiring them and maintaining them were less than the cost of hiring labour (Hopkins 1973:24-25).

This view is common. According to Terray (1974, 1975) slavery was important is the Abron kingdom of Gyaman because the means of production, land plus a simple technology, was readily available. Since access to means of production could not be controlled, direct personal dominance of the labour force was required.

There are, however, several factors which must be considered in conjunction with the land/people ratio. The notion that a low population density means land is easily accessible must be altered to take account of the environmental and political factors which created a variety of settlement patterns. In West Africa, distribution of soil types, the water table, periodic drought, political, commercial and religious factors "pushed" people into certain pockets. Similar factors rendered other regions virtually uninhabitable.

The argument that pressure towards the use of slaves is related to low population density presumes the trinity, land, labour and capital, as the basis of the labour process. For Hopkins (1973) African economic history can be understood as the attempt to maintain the most efficient balance of these three factors. But these categories, taken from classical political economy, are not readily applicable to precolonial Africa. The vast majority of producers were involved in agriculture. Capital requirements were very low, at least for subsistence production. Furthermore, the problematic nature of slavery obfuscates analysis. The slave is legally a piece of property, but he is also a human being (see discussion

below). Is a slave an input of constant capital or of variable capital? Moreover, how does one define labour in precapitalist economies? "When people's work schedules are barely differentiated from their general routines, it does not always make sense to reduce them to classical political economy's abstract category, 'labour'" (Hart 1982:10).

Despite these problems it is evident that the low population density and simple technology created unique problems regarding the control and organization of labour. Size of the labour force was, and still is in many areas, the crucial variable affecting productivity. The above comments indicate how complex these issues are. However, analyses which start from these facts appear to be more fruitful in regard to the question of the origin of slavery in Africa than do those based on competing interpretations of the reports of European travellers.

The Definition of Slavery

Discussions of any aspect of slavery are confused because of the lack of consensus on the definition of the term. M.I. Finley, widely regarded as an expert on the matter, emphasizes two features: the idea of the slave as property, and the slave's deracination (Finley 1968:307). The first of these is the crucial one.

> All forms of labour on behalf of another, whether 'free' or 'unfree', place the man [one should add or woman] who labors in the power of another; what separates the slave from the rest, including the serf or peon, is the totality of powerlessness in principle, and for that the idea of property is juristically the key -- hence the term 'chattel slave'.

But he continues:

> For a sociological analysis, however, equal stress must be given to the slave's deracination. The law may declare him, in a formal way, powerless and rightless; one reason the law is enforceable is that he lacks any counterweight or support, whether from a religious institution, from a kinship group, from his own state

> or nation, or even from other depressed groups within the society in which he has become a slave. Legally he is not a person. Yet he *is* a human being, and therefore juristic analysis in terms of property, though necessary, is not sufficient (Finley 1968:307-308).

The problem in Africa is the lack of formal legal codes in many areas, as well as the variety of actual life situations in which slaves are found.

Meillassoux, ignoring the juridical issue, identifies three main types of West African slavery (1971b:63-65). Domestic slavery, where the slave is attached to a household or lineage as a dependent or junior member, was common throughout West Africa. It was the dominant form of slavery in the forest region, where the lineage was the basis of social organization. The slave worked the common land and shared in the common product, both of which were under the control of the lineage head. The function was to enlarge the labour force and demographic potential of the lineage. In concurrence with this end female slaves were more highly valued than males. The marginal status of the slaves was slowly ameliorated over generations until they became full-fledged members of the community.

In the savanna and sahel slaves were often allocated their own plots as well as being obliged to work on their master's land. Surplus extraction was in the form of a labour-rent. Although the labour power of male slaves was more important here than in the forest, female slaves were still valued for their reproductive capacity through which the master could enlarge his household.

A third form, also found in the savanna and sahel, was slave villages. Surplus extraction was in the form of a rent-in-kind, as the village owed regular prestations to the master. In this situation the community as a whole was dependant. Often the village head was chosen from among the slaves. Kin and other ties developed among the slaves and they gained

some control over their offspring.

More than a decade has passed since Meillassoux briefly outlined these three varieties of slavery. A great deal more research has been conducted on African slavery, as is evident in the publication of four edited volumes on this subject (Meillassoux 1975; Miers and Kopytoff 1977; Watson 1980a; Lovejoy 1981a). Numerous other variations have been described and analyzed, although the three types outlined by Meillassoux remain a useful guide.

This activity has increased our empirical knowledge of precolonial African societies. It has also drawn attention to the lack of precision in terms such as slave and slavery. The confusion stems from the general nature of precapitalist social and economic formations as well as the specific characteristics of different African societies.

In capitalism the economic structure dominates the whole mode of production. Social differentiation is based, in the first instance, on the positions people occupy in the economic structure. The two major social classes can be identified on the basis of the social relations of production, although it must be noted that this in itself is not sufficient for an analysis of the role and function of social classes. The principal mode of exploitation is economic, in the sense that workers are not required by law to work, and surplus is extracted in the form of unremunerated labour through the wage contract. In precapitalist societies the economic structure is not dominant. Social differentiation is based, in the first instance, in law, politics, kinship, or some other non-economic factor. This social differentiation is not necessarily related to economic functions. Exploitation is extra-economic in that more than economic compulsion is required to force the exploited social groups to produce and relinquish surplus product. Surplus is extracted in a variety of forms -- rent-in-kind, labour-rent, and money rent are common examples. Thus, strictly

speaking, the term slave indicates no more than a legal status.[1] The term proletariat, on the other hand, immediately signifies a place in the relations of production, the nature of exploitation, the form of surplus extraction, as well as a legal status (i.e. a freeman).

Slavery is an even more problematic issue in Africa because clear legal definitions such as those which existed in Ancient Greece and Rome -- which themselves are not unproblematic -- are often absent. It must be emphasized that the lack of formal legal definitions was not a problem for Africans. These societies functioned well without them. The problem is for westerners trying to understand and typologize the nature of these societies. Kopytoff and Miers (1977) find the absence of a legal definition of slavery so significant that they place the words slave and slavery in inverted commas each time they use them.

The essence of their critique is that the phenomenon frequently referred to as slavery cannot easily be differentiated from the legal and political situation of the majority of the population. It is simply the extreme end of a continuum of servile relations, which is not differentiated on the basis of a notion of the slave as property. In lineage based societies the lineage holds corporate rights over all its members; women and children, as well as the so-called slaves, can be bought and sold. There are no written legal texts, and western notions such as freedom and ownership have no meaning in the traditional practices. Kinship relations, which are the matrix of these societies, involve domination and subordination and are therefore difficult to separate from other institutional means of domination and exploitation.

> Neither the criterion of property nor that of salability can be useful, then, in separating 'slavery' from simple 'kinship' in African societies, in which rights in wives, children, and kin-group members are usually acquired through transactions involving material transfers and

> in which kin groups "own" and may dispose of their blood members in ways that Westerners consider appropriate to "property". These rights and transactions are an integral part of the traditional social organization of African societies. As such, they comprehend phenomena for which no Westerner would use the term slavery. Yet a few of these transactions, *were they to take place in the Westerner's society*, would clearly partake of the bundle of rights by which he would identify slavery in the West. Hence, we must discard Western concepts as we try to understand what it is that Western observers have, for various reasons, called 'slavery' in Africa. The position of the 'slave' must be examined in the context of the society to which he belongs -- comparing his position not to the free in the West but to other members of his own society (Kopytoff and Miers 1977:12).

The approach taken by Kopytoff and Miers is, in effect, to place preeminence on the second of Finley's criteria, the slave's deracination. The slave is not an abstract object, property, but a stranger. The host community is faced with the problem of absorbing him. Kopytoff and Miers focus on the processual transformations in social status, material well-being and treatment of those who enter the society as a stranger, either captured, bought or acquired in some other way. Slavery is perceived as the institutionalization of marginality.

This paradigm does not suggest that African slavery, because of its unique character, was a benign institution. The use of a kinship idiom to express the slave's position in society should not conjure images of love and affection. "To modern Westerners, the kinship metaphor suggests nurture and closeness; in Africa, and elsewhere, it conveys authority and subordination" (Kopytoff 1982:215).

On the other hand, slaves are not seen as an exploited strata. In lineage societies they occupy a social position similar to children. In the hierarchical states of the savanna slaves are said to be attached to the side of society; stratification exists among them as an extension of the stratification in society at large. It ranges from the highest state

offices down to the most menial position in a peasant household.

Given the lack of an explicitly legal status and the variety of positions slaves occupied the efficacy of the term slavery in the African context can be questioned. By the same logic, however, the validity of words such as kinship, lineage and adoption, each of which carries semantic baggage from western societies, can also be doubted. Yet anthropologists have utilized such concepts to good effect when describing and analyzing non-western social forms.

Of course, Kopytoff and Miers' objections do not apply to the large states of the savanna. The impact of Islam has been a significant force for, perhaps, 1000 years. For this reason, even though it did not originate in Africa, it is not sensible to continually treat Islam as an external influence. It long ago became an entrenched feature of the Sudanic societies with its own local colour and variations, albeit its influence varied from time to time and place to place (Trimingham 1959).

In these regions Islamic law did define the legal status of slavery. Slaves were subject to the right of ownership exercised by a man or woman. They could be sold, given away, and inherited. In this respect they were commodities, and the *Shari'a* ranked them with animals in the various categories of property. As in Ancient Greece and Rome the fact that the slave was a human being was implicitly recognized, and the different legal traditions outlined proper forms of treatment and the grounds and means for emancipation (Brunschvig 1960).

Another objection to Kopytoff and Miers has been raised by Watson. "My only difference with those who accept the 'slavery-to-kinship continuum' as an adequate representation of the slave's position in society is that it obscures, rather than clarifies, the relationship between slavery and kinship" (Watson 1980b:19). For Watson several features are central to

the definition of slavery: (1) slaves are acquired by purchase or capture, (2) their labour is extracted through coercion, and (3) slaves are not accepted into the kinship group of the master. However, he follows Finley and asserts that the property element is preeminent (Watson 1980:8; see also Lovejoy 1981b). Moreover the emphasis on process which is found in Kopytoff and Miers' discussion is misleading for it focuses attention on the future situation of slaves and their descendants, rather than their actual conditions; it highlights the possibilities and not what exists.

Unfortunately, reemphasizing the importance of the property element in slavery only begs the question of how one deals with situations where the jural conditions of property are not clearly developed. Watson ignores this matter. But he is surely correct in asserting the importance of examining the position of new slaves rather than their potential future. He offers a materialist explanation of the openness of African slavery, that is to say, the pressures which generate the amelioration of slave status over time.

The important factor, once again, is Africa's low population density. It creates the need to enlarge the community, to include as many people as possible within it. Therefore once language and body markings no longer delineated the slave from the general population, for instance in the second generation, there were no objective reasons for exclusion. Slave status ended with absorption into the kin group. In many parts of Asia the reverse situation existed. High population densities meant access to resources had to be limited and protected; there was a tendency to exclude people, and slaves rarely had their status improved. In contrast to the open systems of Africa, Asian slavery remained closed.

Watson's explanation of the differences between Asian and African slavery holds great potential. But his perception of African slavery as

an open institution is only a reiteration of Kopytoff and Miers. It points to features unique to Africa but does not elucidate the problematic issue of definition.

The issue will never be settled in any final sense. There are, though, some considerations which cast doubt on the wisdom of defining slavery primarily through a legal notion of property. The roots of the institution called slavery lie in societies that lack well developed property laws (Meillassoux 1978:321). From a materialist and evolutionary perspective it is evident that the development of class-like distinctions, including patriarchal or domestic slavery, gave rise to the political and legal superstructure which provided the definition of the slave as property. The process obviously was not mechanistic; no one argues that there is a simple cause and effect relationship between base and superstructure. However, it is clearly a mistake for social scientists to begin their analysis of slavery on a legalistic basis when the jural forms were, in part, a complexly-derived effect of the growth of the institution they seek to understand. This is to put the cart before the horse.

Without the clarity of legal codes the issue is complex, but not hopeless. Weber provides a clue. Speaking of the types of legitimate domination he says: "Only in the limiting case of the slave is formal subjection to authority absolutely involuntary" (Weber 1978:214)[2]. As indicated earlier Watson also placed importance on the fact that the slave is always either bought or captured. Another important criteria is the complete lack of power of the slave, due to the absence of a connection to anyone other than his master. In lineage societies, where the kinship idiom is often applied to the slave, they are still marked off from real kin by the fact that they have no lineage which might be able to intervene on their behalf, as is the case, say, with a woman acquired

through marriage. A consequence of this powerlessness was that masters had free sexual access to slaves. This is a very significant fact which Finley (1968:309) says marked "them off from all other persons as much as their juridical classification as property." When these three factors are absent one can seriously question the efficacy of the term slavery; unless, of course, the law states otherwise.

Are Slaves a Social Class?

Given the absolute involuntary subjection to authority which is a central feature of the life of a slave it is curious that slave revolts are rare historical phenomena, even in those societies most often referred to as slave systems (Finley 1973; Hindess and Hirst 1975). The rebellions that did take place were quite unlike their more modern counterparts; the rebels were not concerned with abolishing the institution of slavery. In West Africa there were no widespread slave revolts, although there were mass desertions at the end of the nineteenth century when European governments abolished the legal status of slavery, and it is a safe assumption that slave frustration was one of many factors involved in the religious upheavals that swept the savanna in the nineteenth century. Escaped slaves may have swarmed to Usuman dan Fodio's community in Gobir prior to the outbreak of his *jihad* (Last 1967:14, n. 57) against the Hausa rulers. In 1826 Clapperton found Hausa slaves in revolt against their Yoruba masters with the assistance of the Fulani who were making a push southward (Clapperton 1966:28). Nonetheless most commentators do not see slave revolt as a significant factor in West African history.

This leads to the question of whether the concept of social class is useful in a discussion of slavery. I have already indicated that Kopytoff and Miers deny the existence of a slave strata, preferring to view slaves as attached to the side of society. Meillassoux also rejects the notion

that slaves formed a conflictual class.

> Several factors indicate that this stage had not been reached: the close ties between masters and slaves; their inalienable status after the second generation; their occupations, identical to those of their masters; the fact that they did not devote themselves entirely to producing for the market; and their progressive integration into the society as minor citizens, all these elements show that a social division of labour had not yet been achieved and that the basic structures of the patriarchal society, out of which slavery was a prolongation, have been preserved (Meillassoux 1971b: 64-65).

He adds, though, that the germs of class society were present in the exploitation of slave labour for profit, even though the slaves did not form a self-conscious class.

Terray (1975) employs the dichotomy class-in-itself/class-for-itself in his analysis of the Abron kingdom of Gyaman. He says the slaves never achieved the consciousness of a class-for-itself for reasons similar to those cited by Meillassoux. However, Terray treats the amelioration of the slaves' condition as explicitly political in motivation. The Abron nobility "could not risk a class of true slaves at the very heart of the kingdom, slaves like those whose insurrection endangered the very existence of the Roman Republic" (Terray 1975:127-128).

A full discussion of the concept of social class is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I wish to make a couple of tentative comments on the notion of class used by Terray and hinted at by Meillassoux, for I do not find it useful.

Let it be noted, first, that the distinction between a class-for-itself and a class-in-itself has been criticized from within the structural-Marxist paradigm (cf. Poulantzas 1975:58-70). Also Marx, and Engels were of the opinion that the evolution of capitalism greatly simplified class antagonisms as society was progressively split into two large hostile camps. Precapital-

ist societies were constituted by a morass of orders and gradations of rank (Marx and Engels 1959:7-8). This situation is a function of the dominance of superstructural features such as politics, law, kinship, or religion in the latter, and the preeminence of purely economic factors in the former.

The dominance of the economic instance in the capitalist mode of production eases the task of identifying classes in the relations of production. As I have shown part of the confusion surrounding the definition of slavery in Africa stems from the fact that the position of slaves in the process of social production and reproduction was variable. Yet the idea of a class-in-itself is based on the location of a given group within the economic structure. A class-for-itself is formed when a group so defined acquires a collective conscience of itself and begins to have effect at the ideological and political level (see, for instance, Terray 1975:91-93).

But this issue aside, one can ask what the definition actually helps one to understand. A class-in-itself has no effect on the social formation; if it did it would be called a class-for-itself. A class-in-itself is only a potentiality; a class-for-itself is the realization of this potential. The two terms represent the beginning and end of a teleological process, and only when they are understood as such does the distinction have any use. In Terray's case, for example, it allows him to explain why there are no examples of class action by the slaves in the Abron social formation. Of course, this is only an issue when one presumes that, unless other factors intervene, the process of evolution leads in a predetermined direction, i.e. to the formation of a politically conscious and active social class. This is not a sound method of social or historical analysis.

Slavery as an institution is defined by criteria located in the superstructure. In some areas these criteria are formalized in legal codes; in

others they are based on the absence of political or kin ties of any kind. The relationship between social orders or estates, defined first in the superstructure, and the sociological concept of social class is very complex. Self-fulfilling notions such as class-in-itself and class-for-itself do not clarify matters, especially in the already complex African context.

The utility of the concept of class can only be measured in analysis of specific societies. The patriarchal slavery of lineage based societies does not appear to merit the term. In the large states slaves functioned in various capacities, and it is to be suspected that if there was a slave class it did not include all those legally defined as slaves. It is also necessary to look to reaction other than revolt or desertion in the attempt to identify class action.

Conclusions

It is difficult to summarize these disparate comments. Their value will be seen in the analysis which follows. Perhaps, though, I can end this chapter by citing a remark by the noted Marxist historian Perry Anderson.

> It is evident, in fact, that the complex *imbrication* of economic exploitation with extra-economic institutions and ideologies creates a much wider gamut of possible modes of production prior to capitalism than could be deduced from the relatively simple and massive generality of the capitalist mode of production itself . . ." (Anderson 1974b:404).

The problems inherent in the discussion of slavery in Africa suggest that we need to widen the gamut to include another form which is yet to be adequately described. We have yet to transcend the limitations of our western experience in our conception of social forms.

Notes - Chapter Two

1. One may object that slaves, by definition, do not own anything, not even their own lives. But the lived experience of slaves varied widely. Often they did have access to some means of production and the right to some of their own produce. There were also usually restrictions on the slave owner's right to dispense of the slave in whatever way he saw fit. Frequently serfs are distinguished from slaves on the basis that serfs were tied to the land while slaves belonged to a master. This is, however, misleading. Serfs did not own the land, nobles did. The serf's occupation of a given piece of land depended upon his personal oath of allegiance to his lord. The enclosure acts were possible because the landowners could legally assert their ownership rights over those of their serfs. Thus serfs are also bound to a master. The bind may not be as absolute as that of the slave to his master, but the difference is a matter of degree. This again indicates the complexity of precapitalist societies because non-economic structures predominate.

2. The absolutely involuntary nature of the slave's subjection to authority draws attention to the importance of force in the production and reproduction of societies which have large numbers of slaves. In his analysis of slavery in the Abron kingdom of Gyaman Terray (1975) views the militarism of the Abron aristocracy as structurally related to the use of slave labour. Obviously, the relationship between military structures and slavery is a subject for a thesis in itself. The importance of the connection between militarism and slavery should not be underestimated. However, two qualifying points must also be made. Brute force alone is never sufficient for the maintenance of any system of social inequality. Other factors, especially ideology, are crucial in the reproduction of inegalitarian social formations. Moreover, militarism is a historical feature of many societies in which slavery was either unimportant or absent. This is so, for instance, in feudal societies, and in many social formations which exist in the world today.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SLAVE MODE OF PRODUCTION IN KANO EMIRATE?

Historical Context of the Concept of Mode of Production[1]

It is necessary to place the theories and concepts one employs in academic research in their proper social and historical context. The focus of this thesis is the applicability of the concept of a SMP to a given West African social formation. The concept of a SMP is the product of a recent variety of Marxist intellectual thought. Given the concept's place within this intellectual tradition it is important to note that neither Marx nor Engels used the term mode of production in a consistent manner (Cohen 1978: 79-85)[2], nor did they anywhere systematically outline a notion of the SMP.

The writings of Marx and Engels are products of the material conditions of the world in which they lived. The nineteenth-century in Europe was a period of transition, from the last vestiges of feudal society to industrial capitalism; a period which witnessed the most fundamental transformation of society, giving rise to previously unseen social forces and hitherto undreamt productive potential. Marx and Engel's work reflects the principal concerns of the age which called it forth. The sense of history, increasing complexity, and human alienation which imbues their writings stems from this fact.

In this respect the thought of Marx and Engels must be classed with other nineteenth-century evolutionists such as Morgan and Tylor (Kopytoff 1982:211). Slavery, in this paradigm, is not treated as a static category. It is seen in processual terms, a social institution which evolves and changes parallel with and in reaction to the development of the forces of production, and changes in other social relations.

The concept of a mode of production as it is used in modern Marxist parlance was developed in France by the philosophers Althusser and Balibar

(1970) on the basis of their "correct" reading of *Capital*. It is the product of a society with very different problems and goals than that experienced by Marx and Engels; a society which has completed the first major phase of industrialization, where scientific rationality reigns supreme in intellectual circles, and, after 1945, a world seemingly frozen into two antagonistic blocks. Although the geneology of the concept of mode of production is traced back to Marx and Engels, it is more influenced by contemporary systems theory and twentieth-century French structuralism than by the writings of Marx and Engels. The latter lived at a time when understanding history and the direction in which society was moving was the task at hand. Mode of production has been explicitly and systematically developed as a concept in a society where describing and categorizing are the principal concerns of professional social scientists.

This is what mode of production analysis aims for -- a systematic model which can be used to typologize historical change. A recent work claims this is one of the most important values of historical materialism with regard to Africa, it will facilitate periodization. "It does so on an objective and indigenous basis, by fixing itself on the modification to or succession of distinctive modes of production and on alterations in the forms and degrees of surplus extraction" (Crummey and Stewart 1981b;25). One must remember, though, that mode of production is a concept. A succession of modes of production is a succession of concepts, not a transformation of the concrete world. Concepts can aid in the comprehension of historical change. Indeed, as Kant proved long ago, knowledge cannot exist without concepts. But one must beware of mistaking the concept for reality, and thereby arriving at a discussion of ideal concepts rather than the material world. Nothing could be less Marxist.

Marx, Engels and the SMP

The disjuncture between the works of Marx and Engels and contemporary structural Marxism is evident if we trace their comments on slavery. Although it is a common belief that Marxism has a rigid stage theory of history -- tribalism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism -- there is no place where either Marx or Engels explicitly express this view. Indeed, with regard to slavery it is apparent that they were not set in their opinions as to its historical significance. There is no clear proof that they perceived the concept of SMP as a useful tool in the analysis of a given social and economic formation. One must also remember that Marx and Engel's comments on the issue are by and large based on their knowledge of classical antiquity and the American south.

There are passages where slavery is treated as the fundament of a given society. For example in *The Holy Family* Marx asserts:

> It has been shown that *the recognition of the rights of man* by the *modern State* has only the same significance as the *recognition of slavery* by the *State in antiquity*. The basis of the state in antiquity was slavery . . . (quoted in Bottomore and Rubel 1961:224).

In the opening lines of the *Communist Manifesto* (1959) the class contradiction between freemen and slaves is treated as one of several historical class struggles. However, Marx and Engels continue on to note that historical epochs previous to capitalism included a "complicated arrangement of society into various orders, a manifold gradation of social rank." Moreover:

> Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat (Marx and Engels 1959:7-8).

This statement carries the implication that the analysis of the capitalist

mode of production differs somewhat from the analysis of precapitalist modes of production. Concepts based on the historical example of capitalism may not apply to noncapitalist societies. It certainly suggests that the concept of class is more applicable to capitalist society than to precapitalist societies.

In the *German Ideology* (1961) Marx and Engels outline the evolution of property forms. Slavery develops during the reign of tribal property, as a function of population growth, trade and warfare. However, the social structure remains based on the patriarchal family, and the institution of slavery is merely a logical manifestation of the slavery latent in these family structures.

The second form of property is the communal and state property of classical antiquity, and it is this form which generates the full development of the class relations between free citizens and slaves.

> It is only as a community that the citizens hold power over their labouring slaves, and on this account alone, therefore, they are bound to the form of communal property. This is the commercial private property of the active citizens, who are forced to continue in this natural form of association in the face of their slaves (quoted in Bottomore and Rubel 1961:126-127).

With the division of labour between town and country and the influence of commerce private property develops and dissolves the community.

The most explicit statement on the historical significance of slavery comes from Engel's *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1948). The empirical example is the rise and decline of the Athenian state.

> How well this state, now completed in its main outlines, suited the new social condition of the Athenians was apparent from the rapid growth of wealth, commerce and industry. The class antagonism on which the social and political institutions rested was no longer that between the nobles and the common people, but that between slaves and freemen, dependants and citizens . . . . With the development of commerce and industry come the accumulation

> and concentration of wealth in a few hands; the mass of the free citizens was impoverished and had to choose between going into handicrafts and competing with slave labour -- which was considered ignoble and base, and moreover, promised little success -- and complete pauperization. Under the prevailing circumstances what happened was the latter, and being in the majority they dragged the whole Athenian state down on them. It was not democracy that caused the downfall of Athens . . . but slavery, which brought the labour of the free citizen into contempt (Engels 1948:117-118).

Although this passage is specific to ancient Athens it does contain a theory of the technological and economic consequences for a social formation in which slavery is the predominant form of labour. Of course, this development is part of a dialectic. It is evident that in its origin slavery represented a progressive step in the development of productivity (Engels 1976:204-205).

Marx's opinion on this matter is not as strong as Engel's, but again slavery is treated as a stagnating force.

> But the slave system too -- so long as it is the dominant form of productive labour in agriculture, manufacture, navigation, etc., as it is in the advanced states of Greece and Rome -- preserves an element of natural economy. The slave market maintains its supply of commodity labour power by war, piracy, etc., and this regime is not promoted by the process of circulation but the actual appropriation of the labour power of others by direct physical compulsion (quoted in Hindess and Hirst 1975:142).

The statements recorded above are suggestive, although not unambiguous. In other passages, from Marx at least, slavery is treated as a contingent phenomena, not a determinant feature of any social formation. For example, in the famous preface to *The Critique of Political Economy* Marx says: "In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society" (Marx 1970:21). This perspective is somewhat more developed in the sketchy notes known as the "Formen".

As in the *German Ideology* slavery evolves in the tribal community, it modifies the forms of tribalism but does not determine further evolution. In the Asiatic economic and social formation slavery, which results from war and conquest, does not alter the essential characteristics:

> . . . since the individual in this form never becomes an owner but only a possessor, he is at bottom himself the property, the slave of that which embodies the unity of the community. Here slavery neither puts an end to the conditions of labour, nor does it modify the essential relationship (Marx 1964:91-92).

Even in the more dynamic Ancient social and economic formation neither the need for slaves nor the conflict between slaves and freemen is the motor of historical movement. Rather, the attempt to reproduce the community as a grouping of landed proprietors leads to war, conquest, slavery and consequently social differentiation.

In the *German Ideology* relations between freemen and slaves are said to generate pressures towards the maintenance of state and communal property. In the "Formen":

> The community is based on the fact that its members consist of working owners of the land, small peasant cultivators, but in the same measure the independence of the latter consists in their mutual relation as members of the community . . . (Marx 1964:72-73).

The internal dynamic of ancient society is rooted in this fact. The war-like and expansive tendencies which the reproduction of the community requires tends to destroy the small peasantry which is its basis. Marx says:

> . . . where each individual is supposed to possess so many acres of land, the mere increase in population constitutes an obstacle. If this is to be overcome colonisation will develop and this necessitates wars of conquest. This leads to slavery, e.g., to the enlargement of the *ager publicus*, and hence to the rise of Patricians who represent the community, etc. Thus the preservation of the ancient community implies the destruction of the conditions upon which it rests, and turns it into its opposite (Marx 1964:92-93).

According to Marx ancient society is not transformed into something called the slave social and economic formation. In fact Marx does not indicate where these pressures lead, other than to say they drive the community beyond its limits. Apparently, Marx maintained this mode of thinking about classical antiquity. In a note in the first chapter of *Capital* he asserts: "one needs no more than a slight acquaintance with . . . the history of the Roman Republic, to be aware that its secret is the history of landed property" (Marx 1977:176, n.).

The fact is, then, that there is no unambiguous position on the historical significance of slavery that can be rooted in the thought of Marx and Engels. Different statements suggest different thoughts. Undoubtedly, their opinions changed through time, and therefore it is hard to locate a single "correct" Marxist perspective on slavery in the writings of Marx and Engels. This situation is reflected in recent divergent formulations and uses of the SMP. Despite agreement on several issues scholars disagree on the criteria by which the SMP is defined, as well as its applicability to given historical examples, and its effects on economic evolution.

The Slave Mode of Production

The construction and application of a theoretical model of the SMP is a recent phenomena, and is based on empirical examples from classical antiquity and the American south. According to Anderson (1974a:21) and Hindess and Hirst (1975:110) the legal definition of the slave as property is the basis of the SMP. In the SMP the reduction of man to a piece of property, an *instrumentum vocale*, is attended by the development of hitherto unknown levels of juridical freedom. Society is split into the two extremes of complete unfreedom and unfettered liberty (Anderson

1974a:23). Bloch (1947) discusses how the decline of slavery in Europe was matched by a decline in the legal status of the free population, and the development of a complex number of intermediate levels of servility. Finley comments:

> Only when slaves became the main dependant labour force was the concept of personal freedom first articulated (in classical Greece), and words were then created or adapted to express that idea. It is literally impossible to translate the word "freedom" directly into ancient Babylonian or classical Chinese, and modern European languages cannot render *mush kennum* or *k'o* (Finley 1968:308).

However, while the legal definition of the slave as property is necessary to the SMP, it is not sufficient. The legal institution of slavery existed in many societies, but it did not necessarily transform the production process. The term domestic or household slavery describes a situation where slaves are attached to production units organized around the family or lineage. This is not a distinct mode of production (Padgug 1976:5-6). In the SMP the slave has no access to means of production.

> Unless the slave can be separated from the means of production slavery will be no more than a legal status and the appropriation of surplus product will be separated from the labour process (Hindess and Hirst 1975:140).

This distinction is crucial for Hindess and Hirst. It differentiates the mere ownership and use of slaves from the SMP. The latter involves the former, but also includes a specific social form of the labour process, specifically, one in which neither the labour, the means of production, nor the product are at any time under the control of the direct producer. In other words, for Hindess and Hirst the SMP delineates a specific form of surplus extraction.

Hindess and Hirst construct a theoretical model of the SMP and

while they hold that it is theoretically possible for a SMP to exist, they do not believe it ever has existed independantly of other modes of production. They do not use the SMP to characterize Ancient society, and the slave society of the American south is regarded by them as an aberrant extension of the world capitalist economy. They posit that the SMP is never the dominant element in a society: ". . . the character of a slave system is dominated by the social structure in which it exists and not vice versa" (Hindess and Hirst 1975:115). The SMP does not have any specific effects at a political, ideological and social level.

Padgug (1976) takes a rather contrary view to Hindess and Hirst regarding the historical reality of the SMP. He agrees that the American south can only be understood as part of the world capitalist economy; however, he also holds that there is "only one socio-economic formation which can justly be termed 'slave-society' -- Greco-Roman antiquity", although even there "for only a portion of its history" (Padgug 1976:22).

Anderson (1974a) refers to classical antiquity as a SMP, although in his detailed discussion he adds so many qualifications that the efficacy of the concept of the SMP can be questioned (Wood 1981). He also contradicts Hindess and Hirst's assertion that the SMP does not have any specific effects at a political, ideological and social level. Indeed, Anderson follows Engels and claims that the SMP determined the technological stagnation and eventual downfall of classical antiquity. This was not a straightforward economic phenomena, rather, it was the result of the ideology surrounding labour which accompanied the spread of slavery.

> The structural constraint of slavery on technology thus lay not so much in a direct intra-economic causality, although this was important in its own right, as in the mediate social ideology which enveloped the totality of manual work in the classical world, contaminating hired and even independent labour with the stigma of debasement (Anderson 1974a:27).

The result was that no attempts were made to improve productivity through technical innovation, and growth was only possible through geographical expansion. As Wood (1981) has pointed out, though, this vision of labour in Ancient society was that of the anti-democratic, aristocratic class of ancient Greece, and it has mistakenly been taken as the dominant ideology by modern scholars. Both Hindess and Hirst and Padgug consider slavery to have been the most productive and advanced form of labour in classical antiquity. It enabled larger-scale cooperation and the development of highly specialized skills, neither of which could be accomplished when the production units remained small and scattered as in the peasant household.

Scholars who have discussed the SMP in relation to African societies have, not surprisingly, emphasized different factors from those discussed above. Formal legal definitions are not seen as essential (Meillassoux 1978). The radical distinction between free and unfree typical of European societies in which slavery was important was not true of Africa.[3] However, the distinction between domestic slavery (or patriarchal slavery) and other forms of slavery is maintained. Terray (1974, 1975) treats the free peasantry in Gyaman as maintaining a domestic mode of production even though they do use slaves. For Terray the SMP refers to the use of slaves in the production of commodities for trade. Slaves in the SMP have no control over means of production or the product. In this Terray appears close to Hindess and Hirst's identification of the SMP with a specific mode of surplus extraction. However, the matter becomes confused because Terray shows that the slave's status was ameliorated through generations. It is unclear how one should conceive of second and third generation slaves, nor how they relate to the SMP.

The form of surplus extraction is ignored by some scholars. For

instance, Klein and Lovejoy (1979) assert that the SMP was dominant in most of West Africa during the nineteenth century. They refer to the large numbers of slaves in the population, the fact that it was a "self-perpetuating" mode of production, based on "enslavement as an institutionalized process" (1979:209), and that slaves were essential to the reproduction of society.[4] Thus in their definition of the SMP they draw attention to important general features of societies in which slaves are numerous, and do not concern themselves with the variable economic roles and functions which slaves fulfilled.

The upshot of this brief discussion is that there is little agreement about what the central features and effects of the SMP are. This is a crucial fault, for if the concept of the SMP is to have any general validity it must point to certain features which distinguish the SMP clearly from other modes of production, as well as have a widely agreed upon and stable definition. If the concept is used differently to fit each specific historical example then its general utility is vitiated, and it cannot aid in typologizing or classifying societies. I turn now to a discussion of slavery in Hausaland. The question is whether such an ill-defined concept helps clarify the complex nature of slavery and of the society in this region.

The Slave Population

Estimating the slave population of nineteenth-century Hausaland is difficult due to a lack of dependable demographic data and the problematic issue of defining slavery, for even though Islam gave the institution a legal basis practice did not always follow the formalized rules. Nonetheless it is important to give at least a rough impression of the numbers of people who were slaves.

Robinson expressed his calculation in an interesting manner.

> If it be true that the Hausa speaking population of the interior numbers fifteen million, it is certainly the case that the Hausa slave population numbers at least five million, or, to put it another way that one out of every 300 people now living in the world is a Hausa slave (Robinson 1896a:207).

Robinson's population estimate is too high, but the suggestion that one-third of the population were slaves is not out of line. It may even be conservative. More recent writers are no more specific. Polly Hill, taking a population figure of eight to ten million in Hausaland in 1900, says "it is likely that several million people were in servitude" (Hill 1977:203). The historian Paul Lovejoy asserts that in the Sokoto Caliphate "between a quarter and half the population was slave, and estimates from some key provinces, particularly the capital districts of Sokoto and Gwandu, suggest percentages that are much higher" (Lovejoy 1981c:201). Lugard thought that at the time of the British conquest of the region under the direct administration of Sokoto "the vast bulk of the labouring classes were slaves" (Lugard 1970:222). Half the population of northern Zazzau, that is the Hausa area, may have been slaves (M.G. Smith 1954:241). Estimates from Kano deal only with the city and their wide range illustrates how tentative the numbers are. On his first visit in 1824 Clapperton thought the city's population was 30,000 to 40,000 "of whom more than one half are slaves" (Clapperton 1826:49). During his return two years later Arab merchants told him there were 30 slaves for every free man (Clapperton 1966:171-172). Barth and Robinson agreed with Clapperton's first guess (Barth 1965,1:510; Robinson 1896b:113).

Of course in attempting to assess the overall significance of slavery in a given society numerical proportion or totals are less important than the function slaves fulfilled and the effect the use of slaves had on

the social formation perceived as a totality. It is evident that in the Sokoto Caliphate, whose boundaries extended well beyond Hausaland; the importance and function of slavery varied regionally in relation to historical, political, economic, ethnic and military factors.

For instance, forced settlement and slave estates were common in the frontier regions where the Fulani rulers were concerned to secure the Caliphate's borders and extend their control over acephalous societies (Lovejoy 1978b:351-353). Slave estates (Hausa: *rumada*, sing. *rinji*) were numerous in Adamawa, where it was reported many individuals had more than 1,000 slaves (Barth 1965,2:174). M.G. Smith's numerous writings on Zazzau show that *rumada* were very important there as well, probably because of the large pagan enclaves which were tributary to Zazzau. They were the main support of the dominant Fulani. Apparently, the primary attraction of political office was the opporturnity to acquire slaves which such positions allowed (M.G. Smith 1965:231). However, one did not have to hold state office to establish a *rinji*, although the *hakimi* had to grant permission (M.G. Smith 1960:91). Since the political elite did not have to buy slaves -- they captured them in raids and warfare -- their estates were usually larger. I have earlier (Chapter Two) referred to Mommon Sani, Emir of Zazzau, who owned 9,000 slaves at his death, 3,000 of which were settled on a single *rinji* (M.G. Smith 1960:157-158). Perhaps more typical was the slave village of Karo where 130 slaves lived along with the family of the owner (M. Smith 1964). Hogendorn (1977) has recently analyzed two *rumada* near Zaria city. One, owned by the Emir of Zazzau, had a population of 100 or more slaves; the other belonged to a private person not of a noble family and consisted of only 40 or so slaves.

Polly Hill strongly distinguishes the social patterns in the regions

beyond the Hausa heartland, but which were part of the Sokoto Caliphate, from those characteristic of the Hausa area. She emphasizes the fact that most slave owners in Hausaland "were ordinary private farmers, who literally invested in slaves in the same spirit as that in which they may invest in plough oxen today" (Hill 1977:205). Rural communities, however, were anything but egalitarian so that the majority of farmers owned no slaves at all. In Dorayi, the village area just outside the Kano city walls which she investigated, "informants constantly emphasized that the slave-owners were relatively rich people" (Hill 1977:213; see also Hill 1976:417).

When her research was carried out in 1971-1972 the population of this area was 3,500, which is probably somewhat larger than what it was in the early colonial period.[5] She was able to identify 34 slave owners of whom 24 were locals. The locals owned no more than about four farm slaves each "who were often related to each other" (Hill 1976:417). These local owners were mostly ordinary farmers holding no political office or large trading interests. Some were women, and at least one woman was a freed slave who acquired two slaves of her own. However, there were three local men who owned fifteen or more slaves (Hill 1976:417). Two of these slave-owners also had homes in the city.

The non-local slave-owners were from the city. Two of them were office holders, the Emir of Kano and the Emir's chief blacksmith. The slaves were settled on estates which belonged to the office rather than the person. The Emir's estate had about 50 foreign slaves while the blacksmith's estate was "much smaller" (Hill 1976:418-419). There were nine other non-local slave-owners, none of whom held political office.[6] Unfortunately, most of these private absentee landlords vanished from Dorayi leaving no trace. Hill reports that one of them was a woman salt

trader. Another was a butcher, and slave and cattle dealer who owned about 70 slaves and 100 head of cattle. Most of his slaves left when he received a prison sentence from the British for slave trading (1977: 216). Because Dorayi is located adjacent to the main route between Kano and Zaria it was a prime spot for wealthy merchants to establish slave estates, but with the abolition of slavery most of these were thrown out of cultivation (Hill 1977:215).

Regretfully there have been few, if any, intensive studies of the incidences of farm slavery in Kano such as Hill's. Her data, insofar as it is representative of more general patterns -- an issue which cannot be resolved -- presents some interesting problems. For one, it is evident that if most of the slave owners were ordinary private farmers as Hill asserts, most of the slaves were owned by people who cannot be considered ordinary in terms of income or activity. The true "ordinary" resident of Kano emirate was a poor peasant (Hausa: *talaka*) who owned no slaves and was primarily concerned with subsistence production. On the other hand, statements such as: "In Kanō, a rich man has three or four thousand slaves" (Richardson 1970,2:274), are overestimates, or at least do not reflect the general pattern. Barth was speaking of the population of the city when he said.

> The number of domestic slaves, of course, is very considerable; but I think it hardly equals, certainly does not exceed, that of the free men, for while the wealthy have many slaves, the poorer class, which is far more numerous, have few or none (Barth 1965,1:510).

This roughly reflects the situation in Dorayi reported by Hill. The figures given to Clapperton by the Arabs in Kano of 30 slaves for every freeman must reflect the average number owned by men such as themselves, rather than the ratio between slave and free (Clapperton 1966:171-172).

The social composition of the rural population undoubtedly varied regionally, both at the micro and macro level, and perhaps changed over the course of the nineteenth century. Within the Dorayi village region the numbers of slave descendants varied significantly in different subdivisions, from four percent of the population to 35 and 40 percent. As Hill points out this discrepancy is partly due to post-emancipation (i.e. British conquest) migration, as well as regional variation in the incidences of farm slavery. Outside the KCSZ political factors may have encouraged slave concentrations in some areas. One of the defensive policies of the post-*jihad* emirate rulers was to establish new fortress towns (Fika 1978:42). The subsistence needs of these regions would presumably have been supplied by the forced settlement of slaves.

The informants of contemporary researchers are, of course, older people whose reminscence is of the latter part of the nineteenth century. It is a safe assumption that the number, nature and conditions of the slave population taken as a whole were somewhat different towards the latter part of the century than they had been earlier on. The activities of the *jihad* and the expansion of the Caliphate's borders would have created a large number of slaves who were available for use in areas where they were strangers. By the second and third generation, however, the descendants of the original captives would have spoken local dialects and languages and taken on the other cultural trappings of their new home (M. Smith 1964:43). Interestingly, Hill claims the stock of farm slaves in Hausaland did not have to be continually replenished by raiding (Hill 1977:205). Hogendorn's data on the origin of *rumada* slaves in Zazzau towards the end of the nineteenth century partially supports Hill's claim, especially when one considers that in Zazzau slave raiding was a state-organized annual activity.

> The best breakdown of how a *rinji* obtained its slaves comes from Hanwa [a *rinji*]. Of approximately forty slaves inhabiting the settlement just before the arrival of the British, about twenty percent were said to have been captives purchased at Zaria or other slave markets directly from the nobles who had taken them. Another forty or so percent had been sold in the market by previous owners, and had served on other *rumada* in the vicinity. The remainder, around forty percent, were born into slavery (Hogendorn 1977:373).

By the second or third generation many descendants of the slaves would have become indistinguishable from the Hausa peasantry. Through emancipation and birth[7] there was a steady loss to the slave population which had to be made good. The disruption caused by slave raiding througout the region is a common theme in travellers' accounts and early colonial reports. But a tendency towards stability and cultural assimilation was an important aspect of slavery in Hausaland. Moreover, inheritance laws[8] and general economic processes generated pressure towards the break up of larger holdings as the century progressed.[9]

There is another aspect of the political economy of Kano emirate which must be considered in conjunction with the size, distribution and settlement of the slave population. It is indicative of the complex overlap of relations of domination and levels of servility which existed throughout the Sokoto Caliphate. South of Katsina, on route to Kano, Barth commented: "It is astonishing how much property is held in these fertile regions by the Tawarek of A'sben and to what consequences this may eventually lead everybody will easily conjecture" (Barth 1965,1: 481-482). Further on he observed the town of Bichi northeast of Birnin Kano.

> The town is very remarkable, as exhibiting the peculiar circumstances of the social state in this country; for it belongs partly to the Tawarek tribe of Itisan, whose bugaje or serfs -- properly half-castes, born of free mothers, but slaves from the

> father's side -- live here, cultivating for their lords, the fields around the town (Barth 1965,1: 486).

The Tuareg had a complex hierarchy of statuses which was not clear to the Hausa who employed the term *bugaje* (masc. sing. *buzu*; fem. sing. *buzuwa*) to cover all those at the lower end of the scale (see Baier and Lovejoy 1977). Presumably, towns such as Bichi could only be established by permission of the *hakimi* in whose territory it lay. Bichi is indicative, though, of the complexity and variability of the relations of domination in the region. I already pointed out that the *hakimai's* territories were not necessarily contiguous. They could be separate villages and estates dispersed erratically in the emirate. Besides them, apparently, were towns such as Bichi, not directly under the domination of the Kano government, and on which a different system of social inequality existed. It would be an error to discuss the emirate's political economy without including these settlements, a fact which illustrates the shortfalls of models based on the relations between one dominant and one subordinate class. A manifold gradation of ranks and overlapping claims on people and territory were characteristic features of the emirate's political economy.

Slavery and the Mode of Surplus Extraction

The mode of surplus extraction and the intensity of exploitation varied, of course, depending on the social position of the owner and the nature of the work the slave was given. As is often pointed out slaves did occupy influential positions in the government and were able to enjoy the benefits of their office. In Chapter One I related that in Kano eight of the *hakimai* were slave functionaries of the Emir. Thus they enjoyed the fruits of the slave estates and tribute from peasant villages in their districts. The Emir also used slaves to satisfy what can only be

described as a perverse sense of humour, as is evident in the story related by the Hausa woman Baba to Mary Smith.

> I remember when a slave known as the Chief of Adamawa came touring the country [this is Zazzau] , he came to our market place, riding his horse; he filled his hand with tobacco flour and put it all into his mouth. He came with praise-singers, he dismounted and danced. We were all laughing. The king of Kano had bought him and appointed him "Chief of Adamawa"; he went about the country and every slave who had been caught in Adamawa country came running to him and crouched down and greeted him with gifts of money. He couldn't talk (Hausa) properly and his praise-singers couldn't talk properly. He sang a song saying he only wanted groundnuts. The Chief of Adamawa, the groundnut-eater! The king of Kano sent him on this ridiculous tour -- the king didn't get a tenth of a penny out of it, but it amused him . . . (M. Smith 1964:42-43).

Nonetheless, these functionaries were slaves and their supreme status and lifestyle could quickly be reduced to nothing at the whim of the Emir. Borno was outside the Sokoto Caliphate but Denham observed there in 1823 an event which exemplifies this principle. The Sheik Al-Kameni had inadvertently bestowed a gift horse upon one of his slave generals which had been intended for someone else. When he asked for its return, the slave, having grown presumptuous,

> sent back all the horses which the sheik had previously given him, saying he would in future walk or ride his own. On this the sheik immediately sent for him, had him stripped in his presence, and the leather girdle put round his loins; and after reproaching him with his ingratitude, ordered that he should be forthwith sold to the Tibbo merchants, for he was still a slave (Denham 1826:172).

Such episodes reaffirm the existential reality of the notion that the slave was a commodity.

The majority of the slaves owned by the nobility never occupied the higher positions, and were sometimes condemned to extreme forms of exploitation. Travelling between Kano and Sokoto in 1827 Richard Lander observed how brutal this treatment could be when 50 slaves belonging to the "king of Jacoba" were killed by the conditions of their employment.

> These unfortunate creatures had to carry heavy burdens on their heads the day before; and being unable to keep up with the rapid pace of the camels were necessarily obliged to be left behind and thus miserably perished of thirst (Lander 1966:284).

Nobles and merchants obviously had a very different relationship to the slaves who performed the mundane tasks of manual labour than did the small farmer who was concerned to maintain a labour force on his farm, and did not have the means to chase down runaways or replace them through purchase. Those who possessed political and economic power could afford to treat their slaves in a manner commensurate with their legal standing as a piece of property. Also, for the devout, the pagan origin of slaves may have generated a deep-seated disrespect, for these people were less than human in the sense that they were outside the community of God. Iman Imoru, a Muslim scholar, stated: "People have nothing but contempt for slaves in Hausaland. The slaves suffer: people look at slaves as worthless creatures; they do not consider them human beings; and they treat them harshly" (Ferguson 1973:230). The most notorious slave-owner in Dorayi was a Koranic scholar who "had been an unusually cruel master who chained his slaves if they refused to fetch manure from the city; and . . . bought many farms 'from those without food'" (Hill 1977:214). Clapperton met an Arab merchant in Katagum, on the eastern border of Kano, whose relations with his household slaves were so bad that he slept with a dagger and loaded pistol. According to this source almost all the Arabs did the same and it was mainly their female slaves whom they feared, "the master being often strangled at night by the women of his household" (Clapperton 1826:132).

Such statements contrast markedly with comments on domestic slavery made by the European travelers. Barth commented on the difference in the nature of the relationship between slave and owner when the owner was an

Arab and when he was a native.

> The quiet course of domestic slavery has very little to offend the mind of the traveler; the slave is generally well treated, is not over-worked, and is very often considered as a member of the family. Scenes caused by the running away of a slave in consequence of severe and bad treatment occur everyday with the Arabs, who generally sell their slave as soon as occasion offers, but with the natives they are very rare (Barth 1965,1:527).

This delineation should not be overemphasized; however, there are good reasons for such a difference in treatment to exist. There were religious and racial distinctions between Muslim Arabs and pagan black slaves. More importantly, though, the Arabs in Hausaland were mostly merchants interested in the slave trade, or employing slave labour only as a means to realize a profit through unequal exchange. The merchant's economic role was in the circulation of commodities of which the slave was one.

For the slaves involved in agricultural production -- and this is where the majority of them were -- the material reality was necessarily different, for the very nature of production demanded it be so. Legally these slaves were also property. Their initial origin was capture or purchase. But for the "private farmer," to use Hill's terminology, slaves were not a short-term investment. The turn over on capital invested in slaves could only be realized if the slaves stayed on the land. Escaped slaves were hard to recover.

> Slaves sometimes escaped . . . . You would hunt and hunt for them, and then one day you would hear that someone had seen them in a far-away town. If anyone questioned him the slave would say he had been sent to do an errand for his master. You never caught them again (M. Smith 1964:43).

Thus, the problem was to "tie" them down, so they would become a reliable member of a production unit over the long-term.

The conditions of labour experienced by the farm slave varied in accordance with the size of the holding to which he was attached. On a

small-holding where only a few slaves were owned, such as was common in Dorayi, the slaves lived in the compound just as other members of the household. Iman Imoru's description of the Hausa family and its treatment are interesting in this regard.

> The "core", *farko*, of the family is the wife, *mata*, children, *'ya'ya*, slaves, *bayi*, servants, *baruwa*, and the brother's children, *'ya'yan dangi*.
>
> A man's family works for him: in return, he feeds, clothes, and marries them off. When he has money, he disciplines them, and punishes them -- to the point of tying them up -- when they wrong him (Ferguson 1973:284).

The slave worked the fields alongside his owner and shared in the product of their labour. They formed an addition to the domestic labour force and the conditions of labour and of living facilitated the development of personal relations similar to those with actual family members. Joking relationships existed between the owners and their slaves and kinship terms were extended to cover slaves as well (M.G. Smith 1955:45). Baba's "eldest son", Usuman, was a freed slave, "He came into the kin and became the eldest son in every way -- except that he would not inherit" (M. Smith 1964:119). If a man owned a female and male slave they were married (Ferguson 1973:284). Offspring of slaves who belonged to different owners belonged to their mother's owner (M. Smith 1964:41). It is evident that for the small-scale peasant the function of slavery was to enlarge the labour supply and reproductive potential of the domestic unit, hereby contributing to its immediate productivity and long-term security.

On the larger estates (*rumada*) belonging to state offices or private persons the conditions were somewhat different. The slaves lived in separate houses built for them by the owner (Ferguson 1973:284) or by themselves (Hill 1977:214). These estates were operated as *gandu* units are today, except that now the members of *gandu* are only father and sons,

or sometimes brothers.[10] These estates consisted of commonly worked fields (Hausa: *gandu*) and plots (Hausa: *gayauna*) that the slave was allowed to use for himself. On the Emir of Kano's estate in Dorayi these latter could be inherited by the slave's son or lent to another person, but could not be sold (Hill 1977:214).

A slave foreman (*sarkin gandu*) was put in charge of the estate's slaves (Hill 1977:214; Hogendorn 1977:373). Married slaves lived in their own compounds. Their time was divided between their obligation to their owner and their own needs. While visiting Sokoto in 1826 Clapperton observed the life of these slaves.

> The males who have arrived at the age of eighteen or nineteen are given a wife, and sent to live at their villages and farms in the country, where they build a hut and until harvest are fed by their owners. When the time for cultivating the ground and sowing the seed comes on the owner points out what he requires, and what is to be sown on it. The slave is then allowed to enclose a part for himself and family. The hours of labour for his master, are from daylight till mid-day; the remainder of the day is employed on his own, or in any other way he may think proper. At the time of harvest, when they cut and tie up the grain, each slave gets a bundle of the different sorts of grain, about a bushel of our measure, for himself. The grain on his own ground is entirely left for his own use, and he may dispose of it as he thinks proper. At the vacant seasons of the year he must attend the calls of his master, whether to accompany him on a journey, or go to war, if so ordered (Clapperton 1966:213-214).

At Karo, in northern Zazzau, the slaves worked on the *gandu* fields between 9:30 A.M. and 2:30 P.M. Aside from the early-morning meal everyone on the *rinji* was fed from the produce of the *gandu* fields. The same crops were grown on the common land and the private plots — guinea corn, cotton, millet, cowpeas, sweet potatoes, pumpkins, groundnuts, peppers, bitter tomatoes, sugar-cane, rice, okras, tomatoes and green peppers.[11] The slaves were free to market the produce of their own fields, and those born on the *rinji* (Hausa: *cucanawa*, sing. *bacucane;*

Fulani: *dimajai*, sing. *dimajo*) could engage in craft work or other activities. Baba gives the following list of activities:

> Some wove on the men's narrow loom, some were brokers in the market, some were salt-sellers, some sold kola-nuts or sugar cane or sweet potatoes or cotton or other things. Some were dyers, some grew onions or sugar-cane in marsh-plots. Some just farmed their own plots (M. Smith 1964:42).

Slaves who had been bought on the market were only permitted to farm.

It is interesting to note that the slaves on the Emir of Kano's estate in Dorayi were required to labour for him only during the agricultural season. They were paid for any work they did for him during the dry season, even though most of them were pagans who had recently been captured (Hill 1977:214-215).

The situation of slaves born into their status was somewhat different from that of their parents who had been captured or bought. Barth (1965,1: 527-528) held the opinion that domestic slaves were rarely allowed to marry. He distinguished the natives of "Negroland" in this respect from the Tuareg "who seem to take great pains to rear slaves" (Barth 1965,1: 527). This contradicts the previously cited statement by Clapperton that once slaves reached the age of 18 or 19 they were married. It also runs counter to Hogendorn's (1977) finding that some 40 percent of the slaves on *rumada* were born there, and to Baba's description of life on the *rinji* at Karo. Maliki law states that a slave can have four wives, just as a freeman (Brunschvig 1960:27).

The second generation slaves spoke Hausa and were sometimes educated in Koranic verse as were the children of free parents (Clapperton 1966:214; M. Smith 1964:42-43). Of course, the progeny of a free man and a slave concubine were free, and the mother was emancipated upon their birth. The situation of second generation slaves in Hausaland was complex. According

to Clapperton: "The children of slaves whether dwelling in the house or on the farm, are never sold, unless their behaviour is such that, after repeated punishment, they continue unmanageable" (Clapperton 1966:214). I surmise that in this passage Clapperton is describing the custom rather than the formal legal rules. Lugard reports that public opinion mitigated against the sale of a slave who had been with his master for two or three years, and the break-up of a husband and wife through their sale was considered a disgraceful act (Lugard 1970:247). In strictly jural terms, though, there was no restriction on the sale of a slave even in the second generation (Hill 1977:206).

The status of second generation slaves presents another example of the variety of forms of surplus extraction which existed in the Sokoto Caliphate. Hill emphasizes the difference between Hausa practice, as described above, and the Fulani where second generation slaves were less alienable. "Might it not be . . . that in Fulani society the *dimajai* were not slaves at all, but members of a class which was intermediate between slavery and freedom" (Hill 1977:206-207).[12] She refers to Stenning's (1959:66) observation that among the pastoral Fulani *dimajo* were the male offspring of female slaves who had had children fathered by their master and were therefore partially emancipated at his death. The significance of this fact is not clear. For instance, there is no data on whether this influenced the situation of second generation slaves living on the *ruwada* owned by Fulani nobles or on the farms of sedentary Fulani peasants. One should also question whether it is useful to distinguish between Hausa and Fulani society when both ethnic groups were inextricably bound together in a single social formation.

Under Maliki law slaves were allowed to ransom themselves. Clearly, if slaves born on the *rinji* were allowed to participate in activities other

than farming, as Baba stated, they were in a better position to purchase their freedom than those who had been bought. There were two means by which ransom could be paid: *pansa* or *fansa* was a single large payment by which the slave was immediately freed, and *murgu*, whereby a slave ceased working for his master so as to earn the cost of his emancipation (Hill 1977:204; Lugard 1970:247). Obviously, for both these systems to have any meaning slaves had to have partial access to both means of production and their own labour power, so as to be able to raise the money required.

Under Maliki law an emancipated slave had no obligation to his former owner (Brunschvig 1960:30). However, the actual condition of freed slaves, whether freedom was attained by purchase or by the grace of the owner, is not known. Baba of Karo's information suggests that they were free to leave the *rinji*. All the children of the slaves were freed, and were called brothers. "When they grew up some of the children of our slaves married us and some of them married outside the family" (M. Smith 1964:40). The children of the *sarkin gandu* (who were freed) married in the town. M.G. Smith, however, found that after the British abolished the legal status of slavery, the offspring of former slaves had to pay a rent-in-kind for the use of their farm land and compound site. Escape through migration was uncommon because of the social pressure on Hausa to marry and the difficulty involved in arranging and maintaining the marriage. Movement to local unused land was easily blocked by the former master (M.G. Smith 1960:253-259). This kind of clientage is unimportant in Doravi today, and, perhaps, throughout the central Hausa emirates, and is not a phenomena necessarily connected to former slave status (Hill 1977:219). Be this as it may, one can speculate that in precolonial times it would have been more difficult to exist as a totally autonomous peasant. Poverty alone must have driven many free farmers to seek relations to those better off than themselves.

The problems of finding and keeping a wife mentioned by M.G. Smith would have existed. Moreover, security in the countryside was not assured, and for defence free persons would have had to rely on the military capacity of the local noble. It is unlikely a freed farm-slave could make his or her way in this world without any relationship to a higher authority.

Slave Labour and Manufacturing

Craft production[13] was a crucial, if subsidiary, feature of the pre-colonial economy of Hausaland. Numerous specialized activities were pursued in Kano emirate, although as I have indicated in Chapter One the production of dyed cloth was the most important. Kano cloth was marketed throughout West Africa and tens of thousands of people were involved in its production. Given the importance of manufacturing activities it is necessary to attempt to assess the degree to which slave labour was a factor in their development.

It is essential, however, that one maintain a proper perspective. As significant as craft production was its overall development was limited, and the population of Kano remained first and foremost agricultural producers. There certainly was specialization, but the basic factor in the separation of agriculture from industry was the climatic fluctuations of the region. The dry season halted many farming activities and was the time when raiding, warfare, trading and craft production took place. Only a very small proportion of the population undertook skilled activities as a full-time year-round occupation. The technology and organization of production also remained relatively simple. There does not appear, for instance, to have been anything similar to the "workshops" wherein slaves were put to work at various trades as was present in the Roman empire (Finley 1973:73-74). With this proviso one can, nonetheless, appreciate the importance of manufacturing to the economy as a whole.[14]

It has been claimed that "the craft industries operated under direct

state control, each craft being organized under a chief responsible for quality and price control, taxation, and production for the needs of the emir" (Smaldone 1977:139). This overstates the case, however. The organization of the manufacturing activities depended upon social and economic conditions besides state control. The relationship between the state and craft production was not the same in each emirate. Emirate governments had to secure necessary items such as agricultural implements, weapons, and goods for the tribute to Sokoto, but outside of imposing levies on some groups of craftsmen the state had no control over the process of production. M.G. Smith (1960:219) says the system of occupation taxation was developed during the reign in Sokoto of Aliyu Baba (1842-1859). The offices for craft chiefs were created mainly as mechanisms for tax collection. But Shea (1975:11) asserts that taxation was a matter over which the Emirs exercised "considerable prerogative", and which was never standardized throughout the Sokoto Caliphate.

The number or nature of the occupational taxes in Kano is not clear. Shea states "the only occupational tax reported for Kano was on indigo dyeing" (Shea 1975:11). That there was an office of chief blacksmith in Kano has already been established. The primary task of this official was to gather the annual levy of agricultural tools, weapons and other metalware required for the royal farms, military activities and the upkeep of the city jail and gates.[15] He also distributed the orders from the state for goods among the different groups of blacksmiths. There was a division of labour between city and rural based blacksmiths, the latter producing the farm equipment for the annual tax and the former concentrating more on weapons, chains, shackles, and bars.

Outside of the tax the state did not interfere in the organization of the blacksmiths. Different groups in the city developed their own

specialties, and factors such as location and ethnic origin were the main bases of what little organization there was. Sons tended to follow their fathers, but there were no guild-like restrictions on entry into the trade. Indeed, formal rules restricting access to craft skills or equipment were not present in Hausaland.

Given the large numbers of slaves available to the rulers of the emirate it is surprising that a strategic activity such as blacksmithing was not developed as a specialty of royal slaves. "It is claimed that blacksmiths, as the suppliers of weapons of war, were always among the first to be sought out by an invading enemy, who sometimes tortured them with weapons they had made themselves" (Jaggar 1973:19-20, n.14). Despite their obvious importance the production and distribution of essential metal goods was left in the hands of the blacksmiths from whose ranks their chief was chosen. Some items, such as guns, were expensive and difficult to acquire, and although a few were made there seems to have been no attempt to develop the required skills. Evidently it was more practical to trade slaves for such high technology than use them to produce it closer to home.

If it is possible to draw analogies to the precolonial period on the basis of the techniques of modern-day blacksmiths, it appears that the labour process involved only rudimentary cooperation and was based around the domestic unit. Forges were rarely shared by more than two men and only the heaviest tasks are done cooperatively. Otherwise a man and son or junior relative worked together. In the past slaves may have been attached to this unit but there is no evidence that changes in the organization of production were effected because of their presence.

The traditional means of mining iron ore is no longer practised. The Kano smiths had to rely upon ore from other emirates, although it is known that Dalla Hill in Kano city was once the site of mining and smelting.

Jaggar provides a little information on this aspect of the precolonial metal industry, including the following intriguing comment: ". . . Kano smiths claim their ancestors did not as a rule mine (*diba*) or smelt (*dafa*) their iron ore, and that this specialized and arduous task was performed mainly by professional iron ore smelters (*madafi*) most of whom were Maguzawa, living in these rather remote mining areas" (Jaggar 1973:24). It would be interesting to know what the legal status of the "professional iron ore smelters" was, for the Maguzawa were pagan Hausa. In the nineteenth century they would have been open to enslavement. Unfortunately, at present one can only speculate.

Textile production was not as strategic an activity as was blacksmithing. But economically it was far more important. Cloth was produced throughout West Africa, and outside of the desert regions or where for cultural reasons clothing was not important, it was made and consumed locally. In Kano emirate, especially in the city and to the south of it, a number of specialized centres developed which produced high quality cloth, much of it for export.

Kano developed into a renowned textile producing region for a number of reasons.[16] Ecological factors were important. The availability of cotton and especially indigo were the primary determinants in the location of the industry. Kano produced more cotton than any of the other emirates (Morel 1968:239), although Zamfara, northern Zazzau and southern Katsina all exported cotton to Kano and other regions. Indigo is a light, bulky product, and therefore expensive to transport. Kano produced large amounts of high quality indigo (Ferguson 1973:81-82). Transport costs of indigo partially explain why the most important export-oriented dyeing centres were located outside the city of Kano, in a belt which ran southward into Northern Zazzau.

Cotton is usually intercropped with other plants in West Africa, a technique which protects the plant from infection (Irvine 1968:48-49). Barth claimed, during his travels in the region, that "a field of full grown cotton-plants, in good order, is very rarely met with in these countries, as they are generally left in a wild state, overgrown with all sorts of rank grass" (Barth 1965,1:430). Nonetheless cotton was grown for market as well as for home use. Indigo was evidently a valuable cash crop, which was often intensively cultivated on marsh lands which were utilizable year round. State policy encouraged the production of these two crops in that they were exempt from taxation. However, the monocrop plantation typical of the American south was not a phenomenon in Hausaland. The market for cloth was too small.

Overall, the technology involved in the textile industry was simple, and was available to everyone. Clapperton's description of the processes involved is cited in the appendix. Improvements and additions were made during the nineteenth century. The most significant of these was the adoption of dye-pits which were larger and more durable than the fired clay pots which were used previously. This technical improvement was an outcome of the dyeing process, for it was based on the development of *katsi*, a residue which was left after the dyeing was complete. This was a multipurpose product used in the construction of dye pits and tanning pits, as waterproofing for walls and roofs, as a mordant, for degumming silk, and was highly valued as fertilizer. The dye pits were a form of capital investment. Their use had important effects on the structure of the Kano economy:

> . . . this new field of capital investment did introduce into the economy some elements of what is commonly considered the basis of capitalism, or perhaps increased capitalist tendencies which were already present in the society. By this I mean that wage labour became more

> and more important and that capital equipment was increasingly owned by people other than those who used it (Shea 1975:161).

It marked a shift in the sexual division of labour. Dye pots could be owned by women, dye pits could not.

Labour for dyeing was supplied, aside from the pit owners themselves, by itinerant Koranic students, poor peasants in search of dry season employment, and even handicapped persons such as the blind. The basic technique was easily learned. Shea says (1975:202) there was a "slight prejudice shared by many against teaching slaves how to dye, or allowing them to do so, but in some areas which experienced rapid growth in the industry slaves did do some dyeing." Of course, the more arduous tasks such as carrying water were open to them. Moreover, the offensive odour of the dye solution discouraged people from getting involved. It appears safe to conclude that slaves were an important additional source of labour, but were not a crucial element in the dyeing process. In fact Shea sees labour mobility, as an important element in the economic well-being of the emirate. There was no rigid organization of dyers; the nature of the work militated against this.

The most skilled aspect of the process of dyed-cloth production was beating. It became a separate specialized activity only in the last two hundred years or so, a development which is clearly linked to the expansion of demand for high quality cloth. Slaves were not trained as beaters, even though the work was very hard. Although some people beat cloth on their own, the best work was done by men who worked together. Morel (1968:212) gives a picturesque description of a beating hut.

> In a dark and spacious hut perspiring men kneel in rows facing one another on either side of a huge log of wood, stained black and smooth polished with constant use, upon which the cloths are spread and vigorously beaten with rounded wooden mallets.

Cooperation was essential in this kind of work and because of this beaters were somewhat more organized. Entry was more restricted, although it is not evident there were formal restrictions, and beaters have maintained their near monopoly. The rural dyeing centres died out as long distance markets for their products were lost and replaced by a wealthy, nationally-conscious, urban, middle class. Beating centres have not moved, however. Kano was made famous by its shiny black cloth, the finish of which was produced by the beaters. The presence of beating centres was the mark of production for export. Rich beaters invested in their own beating huts and even dye pits. Apparently, the idea of investing in a skilled work force of slaves was not attractive.

The other aspects of cloth production, spinning and weaving, were very widespread. Spinning was a woman's activity. There is no evidence slaves were restricted from the activity. The practice of wife seclusion (*kulle*) affected the textile industry in that it freed women from more mundane tasks and allowed them to pursue their own crafts and trade. It probably resulted in an increase in spun thread. Towards the end of the nineteenth century women's upright looms were introduced to Kano from the south. Their acceptance may be related to the spread of *kulle*, and the opportunities this offered women to participate in craft production. The seclusion of women, however, depended upon the availability of labour to perform the necessary tasks those in *kulle* no longer did.

Weaving on the horizontal loom was men's work. There were no restrictions on this activity. I have previously cited Baba of Karo's observation that second generation slaves used weaving as a means of earning their emancipation money. Again, because the equipment and knowledge required was easily acquired there seem to have been no guild-like restrictions on this widespread craft.

Certain ethnic groups were renowned for their skills as weavers and spinners in Hausaland. These were brought to some regions as slaves. Clapperton made the following observations when he was at Sokoto in 1824.

> The exports are principally civet and blue check tobes, called sharie, which are manufactured by the slaves of Nyffee [Nupe], of whom the men are considered the most expert weavers in Soudan, and the women the best spinners (Clapperton 1826:113).

When he returned to Sokoto two years later he said: "The weavers . . . are mostly natives of Nyffé, as are also all their blacksmiths" (Clapperton 1966:222). He did not specify their legal status the second time. Outside of this comment my research has revealed no other indication that slaves were utilized in high skill tasks, at least none that non-slaves did not also perform.

However, slaves were a form of capital investment. Traders invested in them as well as in farms, and such investments could enable the merchants to exercise some control over the production of cloth. Shea cites the example of a Kanuri (from Bornu) cloth trader who moved to Kano and who did just this.

> They must have had a fairly large amount of capital, in the form of cows which they sold, because they invested in cloth and slaves and began to lodge the Kanuri traders who came to the area to buy dyed cloth produced there. They had a fair number of slaves (but fewer than ten) who farmed during the rainy season but who wove cloth for their masters during the dry season. Malam Umaru [the trader] and his father had this cloth dyed and beaten for a fee, and they sold this cloth, as well as the cloth of others in the town which they handled for a commission, to the Kanuri traders who visited the area (Shea 1975: 234).

Slaves may not have been used widely in the most specialized tasks of cloth production but they were nevertheless an important means of production, the control of which meant mastery over part of the production process.

There is one problematic issue, which for now remains a mystery.

The only tax on the cloth industry in Kano was a tax on dye-pits which was paid in cowries (Barth 1965,1:523-524). The dye pit owners arranged the payment of this themselves to the extent that there were no state appointed tax collectors (Shea 1975:196). This may be unique to Kano. However, the tribute paid by Kano emirate to Sokoto included a large number of cloth products. Where did these come from? Perhaps the slaves of the royal estates were involved. The answer must await further research.

These brief comments on slave labour in blacksmithing and the textile industry of Kano suggest that the situation in Kano was different from that of the Ancient world, at least as summarized by Hindess and Hirst. They assert (1975:164-167) that slavery was the most productive form of labour in the Ancient world. It allowed for growth in the division of labour, simple cooperation and the development of skills. The free peasantry, on the other hand, restricted the development of production because it had neither the time nor wealth required to develop skills, and cooperation was hampered by the scattered and small production units. In Kano, by contrast, it appears slaves were bought as productive investments by merchants involved in trading manufactured goods, but they were not employed in activities requiring a high degree of proficiency. The use of slave labour was undoubtedly bound up with the spread of commerce, but it does not appear to have been the most highly skilled labour, nor necessarily the most productive. The organization of craft production was not transformed by the use of slave labour.[17]

A solid conclusion on these issues requires more detailed research into the use of slaves in all the manufacturing activities of the emirate, including leather work, tailoring, and construction, as well as cloth production and blacksmithing.

The Slave Mode of Production in Hausaland?

For Marx the form in which surplus is extracted from the direct producer is a definitive criteria in the individuation of social forms.

> The essential difference between the various economic forms of society, between for instance, a society based on slave labour, and one based on wage labour, lies only in the form in which . . . surplus labour is in each case extracted from the actual producer, the labourer (quoted in Cohen 1978:82).

By strict definition all the slave's product is retained by his owner. However, reality rarely corresponds to abstract definitions (Cohen 1978: 82). This is why Hindess and Hirst specified that in the SMP slaves are dispossessed of the means of production. The total product of the labour process in which they take part is expropriated from them. The legal status of slavery does not in itself guarantee this condition.

It has been shown that in Hausaland surplus was extracted from slaves in several forms. Certainly, many suffered the full consequence of their status as mere commodities. However, in Kano most slaves worked on farms and the expropriation of surplus took forms that were barely distinguishable from those of other dependants. Slaves in small peasant households were part of the domestic production unit, and were exploited in the same manner as the *gandu* heads' own offspring. On the larger estates it appears a labour-rent was required, but slaves did have access to some land and the product of this land. Second generation slaves, whose numbers must have increased as the nineteenth century progressed, could also undertake craft and trading activities. In other words the majority of slaves had access to some means of production and some of their own product. Those slaves settled on estates which belonged to the state offices were tied to the estate rather than the individual who occupied the office. Their condition was somewhat reminiscent of the Spartan helots, and in being

bound to an estate rather than an individual they resemble serfs. This situation suggests that in Hausaland the distinction between serfs who are tied to the land and slaves who are tied to an owner may not have much analytical value. Other categories, specific to the region, need to be developed.

Given the variety of ways in which surplus was extracted from slaves one can question the efficacy of the concept of the SMP as a characterization of the region. Slaves were obviously very numerous and important in the economy. However, reference to a single form of surplus extraction under the name of the SMP cannot explain all the roles which slaves fulfilled in the economy. The forms of surplus extraction were too numerous and complex to be captured in a meaningful way by a single general concept.

The growth of commerce generated investment in slaves as means of production. However, means of production are objects, they do not determine social relations. Thus slaves could be used in various social forms of production without necessarily changing them. Moreover, in manufacturing activities slave labour was not crucial. Slavery was not the most productive or most advanced form of labour, as may have been true in classical antiquity.

The social formation of precolonial Hausaland was unique in history. Its complexity and history need to be studied in their own right. There is little to be gained by either forcing the society into a European derived general typology, or of changing concepts developed for other societies to fit the Hausa example. The concept of the SMP is not a useful heuristic aid in understanding precolonial Hausaland.

Notes - Chapter Three

1. I am indebted to Dr. Keith Hart for allowing me to read his unpublished paper "The Contribution of Marxism to Economic Anthropology."

2. Cohen identifies three ways in which the term mode of production is used: 1) The material mode — roughly synonymous with technique; 2) The social mode — this covers three social properties of the production process, a) the purpose of production, b) the form taken by surplus labour, c) the mode of exploitation; 3) The mixed mode — covers both the material and social properties of the production process.

   In a note (p. 84, n.4) Cohen comments that the definition of mode of production in Hindess and Hirst is "a mixed mode of our usuage, but one with special theoretical features." He continues: "I do not find this conception especially clear, and in so far as I understand it, I do not find that the authors are faithful to it in their detailed discussions."

   Of course Hindess and Hirst (1977) have repudiated the concept of mode of production. It is curious that Stewart and Crummey (1981) adopt mode of production "as the primary analytical tool in historical materialism" (1981:23) at a time when the usefulness of the concept has been questioned. In a footnote regarding the concept of mode of production they cite *Capital*, Althusser and Balibar (1970) and Hindess and Hirst (1975, 1977). They comment: "The last work rejects the concept altogether" (1981:30, n.10). Apparently this does not bother them in the least.

3. For instance, it seems the Hausa concept of freedom is inextricably bound to the notion of kinship.

   > In Hausa, a freeman is a "son" (*da*) or "daughter" (*'ya*) (the plural of both of which is *'yan* or *'yaya*). The state of being free is *'yanci*, that is, the state of being a son. Thus a freeman is *'yantacce*, a freewoman is *'yantatta*, free people are *'yantattu* (also freed slaves) (Paden 1973:34, n.48).

   Schon (1876,2:56) gives the following definition:

   > Free, to be, *da*. He is free, *si ne da* child. He told me, now thou art a free man, not a slave, *ya fada mani yanzu kai da ka ke, ba bawa ba*. To be made free, *samu diyautsi* . . . .
   >
   > Freedom, n. *diyautsi*, or *diautsi*.

   According to Paden the Hausa concept of freedom is similar to that of the Fulani. "The Fulfulde word for "freedom" (*ndimaku*) is taken directly from the word "born" (*rim*) and implies the state of being a blood relative (Paden 1973:34).

   Of course the difficulty lies in distinguishing the meaning of the term as used in speech or writing, from a legal definition of a free person.

4. I do not think Klein and Lovejoy quite understand what is meant by "reproduction" in the Marxist sense. They have reduced it to the biological production of individuals. For instance,

> Assimilation through control of reproduction was, of course, also an important element of social control. It assured the powerful and wealthy who dominated West Africa reproduced at a disproportionately higher rate in terms of the population as a whole (1979:209).

Firstly, there is no reason why the powerful and wealthy should want to reproduce at a faster rate than others. The problem of the dominant class is how to restrict membership. Offspring of noble lineages for whom there is no official office are frequently a source of inter- and intra- dynastic trouble in these societies. This, of course, was one of the reasons eunuchs were commonly given important high posts.

Secondly, and more importantly, reproduction in the Marxist sense refers to the continual renewal of the structure of the social formation, not simply biological reproduction. Indeed, under capitalism the reproduction of the social formation can be threatened by high birth rates.

5. "As most of the slave-descendents left this overpopulated area, it is not certain (though it is likely) that the present population is larger than in early colonial times" (Hill 1976:415).

6. Hill's numbers do not add up. Of 34 slave owners, 24 were local people. This leaves 10 non-local. The Emir and Chief blacksmith equal 2. With 9 others, the total is 11?

7. Children fathered by the free owner of their mother were free and their mother was emancipated at their birth.

M.G. Smith's (1954) comparison of slavery in Zazzau and Jamaica shows how different the Hausa pattern was from that of the New World. In the New World s strict social and cultural separation was maintained, and of course still exists, between the slave population and the free. In Hausa, legal status notwithstanding, there were pressures for slaves to take on the religion, language, education, etc. of the Hausa population.

8. The Maliki school of Islamic law reigned in West Africa, although the formal rules of inheritance were adjusted to local realities and custom (M.G. Smith 1965).

9. On the transformation of large holdings note the following comment by Lovejoy (1978b:343).

> Savanna and coastal economies diverged in the second half of the nineteenth century, however. For Hopkins, the most significant development in areas of 'legitimate' production was the emergence of a peasant sector and the gradual demise

of large holdings. This reflected the lack of economies of scale in the production of palm products and other agricultural goods, unless some individuals had access to slave labour. Over the long run small farmers could compete favourably with large entrepreneur and slave owners, so that as the source of slaves began to disappear the peasant sector gradually became dominant. The change was perhaps first evident in the Akwapinn region of southeast Asante, and only later in the Yoruba states, but it began a dramatic shift which accelerated with the eventual emancipation of slaves. This change also occurred in the savanna, first in the groundnut belt of Senegambia where plantation and peasant production competed side by side, but it was not fully in effect until the beginning of the colonial period after 1900. Nonetheless, even of this point developments in the Sokoto Caliphate, at least, reflected the larger pattern and were evident by the last decades of the nineteenth century. Once again, however, the reasons were more closely related to the internal dynamics of savanna economy and society and were less affected by trade with Europe. There was a time-lag for the Islamic savanna, but the outcome was again similar: small-scale production began to replace large-scale enterprise.

10. *Gandu* is represented in the literature as the main form of agricultural production unit in Hausaland. Hausaland is significant in that corporate lineages' holding rights over land or people are absent. The family unit is the basis of production. Today the *gandu* is merely an outgrowth of the domestic cycle involving fathers and sons, or brothers usually. However, at any point in time a minority of peasant households are in *gandu*, although virtually all of them do participate in *gandu* at some time. Nonetheless, the numerous variations in the actual working of *gandu* units has led to the questioning of its efficacy in understanding agricultural production in Hausaland (Wallace 1978). See also (M.G. Smith 1955:20-21; Hill 1972:38-56, 249-250; Lovejoy 1978b, 1979).

11. Hogendorn found that crops which required marshland (*fadama*) were not grown by slaves. He also says no tax was paid on the gayauna plots.

12. M.G. Smith does not make the distinction between Hausa and Fulani systems.

> Among the Hausa, owners had no power to alienate those of their slaves who were born in captivity, the *dimajai*, . . . (M.G. Smith 1954:244-245).

13. The term "craft production" is, perhaps, a misnomer. Lenin's comments on the term handicraft production are instructive. He rejects the term because it is a coverall term for smaller activities which hides the actual economic structures in which it exists (Lenin 1972:451-453).

14. Barth's comment is especially informative for it points to the radical distinction between a domestic industry and one which is completely separated from other aspects of life.

> In fact, if we consider that this industry is not carried on here, as in Europe, in immense establishments, degrading man to the meanest conditions of life, but that it gives employment and support to families without compelling them to sacrifice domestic habits, we must presume that Kano ought to be one of the happiest countries . . . (Barth 1965,1:512).

See also the comments in Gowers (1921:37,39).

15. The discussion of blacksmithing is based on Jaggar 1973.

16. The discussion of Kano's textile industry is based on Shea 1975. Other sources are indicated in the text.

17. Craftsmen in Kano had a choice of a number of different kinds of organization, and these different organizations could operate at the same time, at different levels. One such could be identified as a firm, where an individual, working alone or together with others who may contribute something to the capital of the firm or who may be hired and paid according to how much they produce. Another kind of organization is based on the family structure, and would sometimes resemble a *gandu*. These family ties may sometimes be much looser than other times and can expand or contract; similarly they could include people who are not relatives of the head, such as slaves and clients who are not paid according to how much they produce but rather are supported as part of the household by the head. Another form of organization more temporary than the others involved cooperation between men at a dyeing or beating centre in projects which affected the welfare of all of them . . . (Shea 1975:218-219).

CONCLUSIONS

The subject of this thesis is the utility of the concept of the slave mode of production in analyzing slavery in Africa, with particular emphasis on Kano emirate in Hausaland.

In Chapter One I outlined the early history of the Hausa states. A central feature of their evolution was the creation of large walled cities as bases for the politically dominant class, which extracted surplus from the surrounding rural areas. These states grew through a combination of conquest, and the extension of trade and commerce with other parts of West Africa and beyond. Kano developed, for geographic, political, and economic reasons, into the metropolitan heartland of a widespread regional economy. The *jihad* of Usuman dan Fodio (1804-1810) gave a political structure to the regional economy. This revolution was complex in origin, but at base were economic issues which were expressed critically in a religious form. Differences of ethnicity were also played upon, and a Fulani ruling class emerged victorious.

Despite its wealth in craft production and trade Kano, as all of West Africa, was overwhelmingly rural in orientation. I have argued that the relation between the city-based rulers and the rural agricultural producers was the primary division in society, overdetermining the inequalities existing within rural communities. Although evidence is scanty it appears that the weight of the urban domination was felt by the peasantry, who did take opportunities to resist paying the taxes imposed upon them. The nature of urban-rural political relations distinguishes the situation in Kano from European-style feudalism.

In Chapter Two I briefly introduced several problematic issues in the discussion of slavery in Africa. I argued that regardless of the

possible interpretations of early reports on social conditions in Africa, the land/people ratio was an important factor in the use of unfree labour, albeit categories such as land and labour must be used critically in reference to precapitalist societies. In parts of Africa the lack of formalized laws governing property and slaves makes it difficult to define who was and who was not a slave. I doubt the value or necessity of focusing on legal definitions since as a superstructural feature these definitions developed in response to the evolution of a social category which they eventually wrapped in an explicitly jural form. Finally, I addressed the issue of whether slaves formed a social class. Because slaves were not concentrated in a single economic activity or geographical region they did not form a politically conscious social class. However, the efficacy of the notion of a class-in-itself is questioned, since it does not say anything about the effect of classes on a social formation as a whole. Indeed, class-in-itself denotes that there is no class activity.

In Chapter Three I attempt to directly answer my original question. My response is that the concept of the slave mode of production is not a useful heuristic aid. It must be emphasized that this is not to claim that slavery was not an important form of labour in Kano emirate, nor that exploitation was limited. To the contrary, my argument is that slaves, along with other forms of dependent labour, and the free peasantry were exploited in myriad ways which the SMP does not help us distinguish.

The slave mode of production is a problematic concept. Marx and Engels were never set in their opinions on the historical significance and social effect of slavery. The creation of a systematic model of the SMP has not overcome these original qualms about how slavery fits into a larger scheme. Those working primarily against the backdrop of European and American slavery have emphasized the internal social relations between

slaves, freemen and means of production. Hindess and Hirst, following Marx, emphasize the importance of the form of surplus extraction. Some suggest that the SMP was never a dominant mode of production, and that it had little effect on political or ideological forms. Africanists, on the other hand, have emphasized the central role of slaves in African states, and the importance of enslavement as an institutionalized process in some African societies. There appears to be little agreement on exactly how the SMP is defined.

The data on slavery in Kano and indeed all of Hausaland is scanty. Nonetheless certain characteristics are discernable. A large portion of the population were slaves, and the majority of these were involved in agriculture. Perhaps half of the slaves were born into their status, and their actual life conditions varied from those who were recently captured. Although in theory slaves have no control over their labour, means of production, or product of their labour the conditions in Hausaland determined that in fact slaves were given some access to all three. Surplus was extracted in a variety of ways not all of which can be easily distinguished from the means of surplus extraction suffered by non-slaves. Besides the peasantry, there were also dependants of the Fulani and Tuareg in the region whose legal status was unclear. There was no clear dichotomy between the slave and free as in the American south or classical antiquity.

Given these facts and the lack of agreement on the criteria by which a SMP can be identified, there is no obvious way in which the concept of the SMP aids us in understanding these societies. It does not direct us to one form of surplus extraction as the notion of a capitalist mode of production does. The reality of precolonial Kano, and West Africa more generally, was too complex to capture with a single ill-defined concept. Perhaps it is this complexity which explains the fact that in the last

twenty years three modes of production have been offered as characterizations of the West African states: the Asiatic mode (Suret-Canale 1964), the African (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1969), and the slave (Terray 1974, Klein and Lovejoy 1979). As Hindess and Hirst (1977) realized a concept based on the relations between two antagonistic classes is too simple to capture the great variety of relations and contradictions in any concrete society. Thus one needs to move away from such ideal concepts as mode of production to ones which enable us to more fully grasp reality in its manifold complexity. Rather than concentrate on the application of general concepts it is more useful to study the historical specificity of precolonial African societies.

GLOSSARY

ardo'en: a Fulani clan leader or headman

bacucane, pl. *cucanawa:* a person born into slavery

bauta: slavery

bawa, pl. *bayi:* a slave

birni, pl. *birane:* walled city; capital

buzu, pl. *bugaje:* a Tuareg slave or self, although it must be noted that the applicability of either of these terms is questionable

dimajo, pl. *dimajai:* Fulani term for someone born into slavery, although *dimajai* are not alienable in the sense true slaves are

fansa (or pansa): emancipation from slavery by a single large payment

galadima: war chief

gandu: a production unit based on the cooperation of a father and sons, or sometimes of brothers; it also refers to the commonly-worked plots

gari: a village or small town; differs from *kauye* in that it is usually nucleated

gayauna: a plot of land given to a slave by his master the produce of which belongs to the slave

gida, pl. *gidaje:* house, family compound

hakimi, pl. *hakimai:* a senior state office holder, a "fief-holder"

jakuda: a messenger and tax-collector for the *hakimai*

jangali: tax on cattle

jizia: tax or tribute

kame: the practice whereby nobles and office holders had the right to seize or demand goods and services from the free residents of a village

kauye: a small village, usually unnucleated

kharaj: a land tax or ground rent charged to non-Muslims

kulle: to lock up, the practice of wife-seclusion

kurdin kasa: land tax

kurdin karofi: a tax on dye pits

kurdin shuka: a tax on cash crops

maguzawa: pagan Hausa; heathen

mujihaddin: Islamic reformers

murgu: payment by a slave to his master so he can work for himself

rinji, pl. *rumada:* a slave estate

sarki, pl. *sarakuna:* king; often applied to a headman, or leader

talaka, pl. *talakawa:* a commoner

unguwa, pl. *unguwayi:* a cluster of households

Appendix

Clapperton's Description of the Production of Dyed-Cloth

The following description of the techniques and stages involved in the production of dyed-cloth was recorded by Clapperton when he was in the city of Kano in 1824.

> Cotton, after it is gathered from the shrub, is prepared by the careful housewife, or a steady female slave, by laying a quantity of (60) it on a stone, or a piece of of board, along which she twirls two slender iron rods about a foot in length, and thus dexterously separates the seeds from the cotton wool. The cotton is afterwards teazed or opened out with a small bone, something like an instrument used by us in the manufacture of a hat felt. Women then spin it out of a basket upon a slender spindle . . . . It is now sold in yarn or made into cloth. The common cloth of the country is . . . only three or four inches broad. The weaver's loom is very simple, having a fly and treadles like ours, but no beam; and the warp, fastened to a stone, is drawn along the ground as wanted. The shuttle is passed by the hand. When close at work, they are said to weave from twenty to thirty fathoms of cloth a day. Kano is famed over all central Africa for the dyeing of its cloth; for which process there are numerous establishments. Indigo is here prepared in rather a different manner from that of India and America. When the plant is ripe, the fresh green tops are cut off, and put into a wooden trough about a foot and a half across, and one foot deep, in which, when pounded, they are left to ferment. When dry, this indigo looks like earth mixed with decayed grass, retains the shape of the trough, and three or four lumps being tied together with Indian corn-stalks, it is carried in this state to market. The apparatus for dyeing is a large pot of clay, about nine feet deep, and three feet broad, sunk in the earth. The indigo is thrown in, mixed with the ashes of the residuum of a former dyeing. These are prepared from the lees of the dye-pot, kneaded up and dried in the sun, after which they are burned. In the process of dyeing cold water alone is used. The articles to be dyed remain in the pot three or four days, and are frequently stirred up with a pole; besides which, they are well wrung out every night, and hung up to dry till morning, during which time the dye-pot is covered with a straw mat. After (61) the tobes, turkadees, & c. are dyed, they are sent to the cloth-glazer, who places them between mats, laid over a large block of wood, and two men, with wooden mallets in each hand, continue to beat the cloth, sprinkling a little water

Appendix I cont'd

> from time to time upon the mats, until it acquires a japan-like sic gloss. The block for beating the tobes is part of the trunk of a large tree, and when brought to the gates of the city, the proprietor musters three or four drummers, at whose summons the mob never fails to assemble, and the block is gratuitously rolled to the workshop. The price of a good tobe of the darkest blue colour is 3000 cowries, or a dollar and a half; and for glazing it, 700 cowries. The total price of a tobe is 5000 cowries, and of a turkadee, from 2000 to 3000 cowries (Clapperton 1824:59-61).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdullah b. Muhammad
1963 *Tazyin al-waraqat.* Ed. and transl. by M. Hiskett. Ibadan: n.p.

Abubakar, Sa'ad
1974 The emirate-type of government in the Sokoto Caliphate. *Journal of the historical society of Nigeria* 7(2):211-229.

Adamu, Mahdi
1978 *The Hausa factor in West African history.* Zaria and Ibadan: Ahmadu Bello University Press and Oxford University Press.
1979 The delivery of slaves from the central Sudan to the Bight of Benin in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In *The uncommon market: essays in the economic history of the Atlantic slave trade.* Eds. H.A. Gemery and J.S. Hogendorn. New York: Academic Press, pp. 163-180.

Adeleye, R.A.
1971a Hausaland and Bornu 1600-1800. In *History of West Africa, vol. 1.* Eds. J.F.A. Ajayi and M. Crowder. London: Longman, pp. 485-530.
1971b *Power and diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906: the Sokoto Caliphate and its enemies.* New York: Humanities Press.
1974 The Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century. In *History of West Africa, vol. 2.* Eds. J.F.A. Ajayi and M. Crowder. London: Longman, pp. 57-92.

Ajayi, J.F.A. and Michael Crowder, eds.
1971 *History of West Africa, vol. 1.* London: Longman.
1974 *History of West Africa, vol. 2.* London: Longman.

Al-Hajj, Muhammad
1964 The Fulani concept of jihad; Shehu Uthman dan Fodio. *Odu* 1:45-58.

Althusser, Louis and Etienne Balibar
1970 *Reading Capital.* Transl. by Ben Brewster. New York: Pantheon.

Anderson, Perry
1974a *Passages from antiquity to feudalism.* London: New Left Books.
1974b *Lineages of the absolutist state.* London: New Left Books.

Arnett, E.J.
1920 *Gazetteer of Sokoto province.* London: Waterlaw and Sons.

Baier, Stephen
1980 *An economic history of Central Niger.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Baier, Stephen and Paul E. Lovejoy
1975 The desert-side economy of the Central Sudan. *International journal of African historical studies* 8(4):551-581.
1977 The Tuareg of the Central Sudan: Gradations in servility at the desert edge. In *Slavery in Africa: historical and anthropological perspectives*. Eds, S. Miers and I. Kopytoff. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 391-409.

Baikie, W.B.
1867 Notes on a journey from Bida in Nupe to Kano in Hausa. *Journal of the royal geographical society* 37:92-108.

Barth, Heinrich
1965 (1857) *Travels and discoveries in North and Central Africa, 3 vols.* London: Frank Cass.

Bello, Mohammed
1826 Appendix XII. In *Narrative of travels and discoveries in Northern and Central Africa, in the years 1822, 1823 and 1824.* D. Denham, H. Clapperton and Dr. Oudney. London; J. Murray, pp. 158-167.

Bernstein, Henry and Jacques Depelchin
1978 The object of African history: a materialist perspective - I. *History in Africa* 5:1-17.
1979 The object of African history: a materialist perspective - II. *History in Africa* 6:17-39.

Bivar, A.D.H.
1961 The "Wathiquat ahl al-sudan": a manifesto of the Fulani *jihad*. *Journal of African history* 11(2):235-243.

Bivar, A.D.H. and M. Hiskett
1962 The Arabic literature of Nigeria to 1804: A provisional account. *Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African studies* 25(1):104-148.

Bloch, Marc
1947 Comment et pourquoi finit l'esclavage antique. *Annales* 2:30-44, 161-170.
1961 *Feudal society, 2 vols.* Transl. by L.A. Manyon. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1975 *Slavery and serfdom in the middle ages.* Transl. by William R. Beer. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Bottomore, T.B. and M. Rubel, eds,
1961 *Karl Marx: selected writings in sociology and social philosophy.* 2nd edition. Harmondsworth; Penguin.

Bovill, E.W.
1968 *The golden trade of the Moors.* 2nd edition, New York; Oxford University Press.

Brunschvig, R.
1960 'Abd. *Encyclopedia of Islam* 1:24-40.

Burnham, Philip
1980 Raiders and traders in Adamawa: slavery as a regional system. In *Asian and African systems of slavery*. Ed. James L. Watson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 43-72.

Buttner, T.
1970 The economic and social character of precolonial states in tropical Africa. *Journal of the historical society of Nigeria* 5(2):275-290.

Church, R.J. Harrison
1980 *West Africa*. London: Longman.

Clapperton, Hugh
1826 Captain Clapperton's narrative. In *Narrative of travels and discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in the years 1822, 1823 and 1824*. D. Denham, H. Clapperton and Dr. Oudney. London: John Murray.
1966 (1829) *Journal of a second expedition into the interior of Africa, from the Bight of Benin to Soccatoo*. London: Frank Cass.

Cohen, Abner
1966 Politics of the kola trade. *Africa* 36(1):18-36.

Cohen, G.A.
1978 *Karl Marx's theory of history: a defence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine
1969 Recherches sur un mode de production africain. *La pensée* 144:3-20.

Crummey, Donald and C.C. Stewart, eds.
1981a *Modes of production in Africa: the precolonial era*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
1981b The poverty of precolonial African historiography. In *Modes of production in Africa: the precolonial era*. Eds. D. Crummey and C.C. Stewart. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp.

Dalziel, John McEwen
1937 *The useful plants of West Tropical Africa*. London: Crown Agents for the Colonies.

Denham, Dixon
1826 Major Denham's narrative. In *Narrative of travels and discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in the years 1822, 1823 and 1824*. D. Denham, H. Clapperton and Dr. Oudney. London: John Murray.

Dihoff, Gretchen
1970 *Katsina: profile of a Nigerian city*. New York: Praeger.

Domar, E.D.
1970 The causes of slavery or serfdom: a hypothesis. *Journal of economic history* 30:18-32.

Dumett, Raymond
1979 **Precolonial gold mining and the state in the Akan region: With a critique of the Terray hypothesis.** *Research in economic anthropology* 2:37-68.

Dupré, Georges and Pierre Philippes Rey
1973 Reflections on the relevance of a theory of the history of exchange. *Economy and society* 2:131-163.

Engels, Frederick
1948 *The origin of the family, private property and the state.* Moscow: Progress Publishers.
1976 *Anti-Duhring.* Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

Fage, J.D.
1969 Slavery and the slave trade in the context of West African history. *Journal of African history* 10(3):393-404.
1980 Slaves and society in Western Africa, 1445-1700. *Journal of African history* 21:289-310.

Ferguson, Douglas E.
1973 Nineteenth-century Hausaland being a description by Imam Imoru of the land, economy and society of his people. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, UCLA.

Fika, Adamu Mohammed
1978 *The Kano civil war and British over-rule.* Ibadan: Oxford University Press.

Finley, M.I.
1968 Slavery. *International encyclopedia of the social sciences* 14:307-313.
1973 *The ancient economy.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Fisher, A. and H. Fisher
1970 *Slavery and Muslim society in Africa.* London: C. Hurst.

Foster-Carter, Aiden
1978 The modes of production controversy. *New left review* 107: 47-77.

Frishman, Allan
1977 The population growth of Kano, Nigeria. In *African historical demography: proceedings of a seminar held in the centre of African studies, University of Edinburgh 29 and 30 April 1977,* pp. 212-250.

Gemery, H.A. and J.S. Hogendorn, eds.
1979 *The uncommon market: essays in the economic history of the Atlantic slave trade.* New York: Academic Press.

Gleave, M. B. and H.P. White
1971 *An economic geography of West Africa.* London: G. Bell and Sons.

Godelier, Maurice
1972 *Rationality and irrationality in economics.* Transl. by

B. Pearce. London: New Left Books.

1977 *Perspectives in Marxist anthropology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1978 The concept of the 'Asiatic mode of production' and Marxist models of social evolution. In *Relations of production*. Ed. D.E. Seddon. London: Frank Cass, pp. 209-257.

Goody, Jack

1971 *Tradition, technology and the state in Africa*. London: Oxford University Press.

1980 Slavery in time and space. In *Asian and African systems of slavery*. Ed. James L. Watson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 16-42.

Goody, Jack and T.M. Mustafa

1967 The caravan trade from Kano to Salaga. *Journal of the historical society of Nigeria* 3(4):611-616.

Gowers, W.F.

1921 *Gazetteer of Kano Province*. London: Waterlaw and Sons.

Gugler, Josef and William G. Flanagan

1978 *Urbanization and social change in West Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hart, Keith

1981 The contribution of Marxism to economic anthropology. Paper presented at the inaugural conference of the Society for Economic Anthropology held in Bloomington, Indiana, April 27-29, 1981.

1982 *The political economy of West African agriculture*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hill, Polly

1969 Hidden trade in Hausaland. *Man* 4(3):392-409.

1972 *Rural Hausa: a village and a setting*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

1976 From slavery to freedom: the case of farm-slavery in Nigerian Hausaland. *Comparative studies in society and history* 18:395-426.

1977 *Population, prosperity and poverty: rural Kano 1900 and 1970*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Hindess, B. and P.Q. Hirst

1975 *Precapitalist modes of production*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

1977 *Mode of production and social formation: an autocritique of pre-capitalist modes of production*. London: Macmillan.

Hiskett, M.

1957 Material relating to the state of learning among the Fulani before their jihad. *Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African studies* 19(3):550-578.

1960 Kitab al-farq. A work on the Habe kingdoms attributed to Uthman dan Fodio. *Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African studies* 23(2):558-579.

1962 An islamic tradition of reform in the Western Sudan from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. *Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African studies* 25(3):577-596.

1964 The 'song of Bagauda': a Hausa king list and homily in verse - I. *Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African studies* 27(3):540-568.

1965 The 'song of Bagauda': A Hausa king list and homily in verse - II. *Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African studies* 28(1):112-135.

1973 *The sword of truth: the life and time of the Shehu Usuman dan Fodio.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Hogben, S.J. and A.H.M. Kirk-Greene

1966 *The emirates of Northern Nigeria.* London: Oxford University Press.

Hogendorn, Jan

1977 The economics of slave use on two 'plantations' in the Zaria emirate of the Sokoto Caliphate. *International journal of African historical studies* 10(3):369-383.

1980 Slave acquisition and delivery in precolonial Hausaland. In *West African culture dynamics: archaeological and historical perspectives.* Eds, B.K. Swartz and Raymond E. Dumett. New York: Mouton, pp. 477-493.

Hopen, C. Edward

1958 *The pastoral Fulbe family in Gwandu.* London: Oxford University Press.

Hopkins, Anthony G.

1967 The Western Sudan in the middle ages: underdevelopment in the empires of the Western Sudan. *Past and present* 37:149-156.

1973 *An economic history of West Africa.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Hymer, Stephen

1970 Economic forms of precolonial Ghana. *Journal of economic history* 20(1):580-606.

Irvine, Frederick Robert

1969 *West African agriculture.* 3rd edition. London: Oxford University Press.

Jaggar, Philip J.

1973 Kano city blacksmiths: precolonial distribution, structure and organisation. *Savanna* 2(1):11-25.

Johnson, Marion

1976 Calico caravans: the Tripoli-Kano trade after 1880. *Journal of African history* 17:95-117.

Johnston, H.A.S.

1967 *The Fulani empire of Sokoto.* London: Oxford University Press.

Klein, M.A. and P.E. Lovejoy
1979 Slavery in West Africa. In *The uncommon market: essays in the economic history of the slave trade*. Eds. H. Gemery and J.S. Hogendorn. New York: Academic Press, pp. 181-212.

Kopytoff, Igor
1982 Slavery. *Annual review of anthropology* 11:207-230.

Kopytoff, Igor and Suzanne Miers
1977 African 'slavery' as an institution of marginality. In *Slavery in Africa: historical and anthropological perspectives*. Eds.S. Miers and I. Kopytoff. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 3-81.

Lander, Richard
1966 (1829) Journal of Richard Lander. Added to *Journal of a second expedition into the interior of Africa*. Hugh Clapperton. London: Frank Cass.

Last, Murray
1967 *The Sokoto Caliphate*. London: Longman.
1974 Reform in West Africa: the jihad movements of the nineteenth century. In *History of West Africa, vol. 2*. Eds. J.F.A. Ajayi and M. Crowder. London: Longman, pp. 1-29.

Lenin, V.I.
1972 *The development of capitalism in Russia. Collected works 3*. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Levitzion, Nehemia
1973 *Ancient Ghana and Mali*. London: Methuen Company Ltd.

Lovejoy, Paul E.
1970 The wholesale kola trade of Kano. *African urban notes* 5: 129-142.
1971 Long-distance trade and Islam: the case of the nineteenth century Hausa kola trade. *Journal of the historical society of Nigeria* 5:537-547.
1973 The Hausa kola trade (1700-1900): a commercial system in the continental exchange of West Africa. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin.
1978a The role of the Wangara in the economic transformation of the Central Sudan in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. *Journal of African history* 19(2):173-193.
1978b Plantations in the economy of the Sokoto Caliphate. *Journal of African history* 19(3):341-368.
1979 The characteristics of plantations in the nineteenth-century Sokoto Caliphate (Islamic west Africa). *American historical review* 84:1267-1292.
1981a (ed.) *The ideology of slavery in Africa*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
1981b Introduction. In *The ideology of slavery in Africa*. Ed. Paul E. Lovejoy. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 11-33.
1981c Slavery in the Sokoto Caliphate. In *The ideology of slavery in Africa*. Ed. Paul E. Lovejoy. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp.201-243.

Lugard, F.L.
1922 *The dual mandate in British Tropical Africa*. London: Archon.

1970 *Political memoranda.* 3rd edition. London: Frank Cass.

Malowist, Marion
1966 The social and economic stability of Western Sudan in the middle ages. *Past and present* 22:3-15.

Marx, Karl
1964 *Pre-capitalist economic formations.* Transl. by Jack Cohen, ed. by E.J. Hobsbawm. New York: International Publishers.
1970 *A contribution to the critique of political economy.* Transl. by S.W. Ryazonskaya, ed. by Maurice Dobb. New York: International Publishers.
1977 *Capital, vol. 1.* Transl. by Ben Fowkes. New York: Vintage.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels
1959 (1848) Manifesto of the communist party. In *Marx and Engels: Basic writings on politics and philosophy.* Ed. Lewis S. Feuer. New York: Anchor Books, pp. 1-41.

Mason, Michael
1969 Population density and 'slave raiding' -- the case of the middle belt of Nigeria. *Journal of African history* 10: 551-564.
1973 Captive and client labour and the economy of the Bida Emirate: 1857-1901. *Journal of African history* 14(3): 453-471.

McDonell, Gavin
1964 The dynamics of geographic change: the case of Kano. *Annals of the association of American geographers* 54:335-371.

Meek, C.K.
1925 *The northern tribes of Nigeria, 2 vols.* London: Oxford University Press.

Meillassoux, Claude
1964 *Anthropologie économique des Gouro de Côte d'Ivoire.* Paris: Mouton.
1971a (ed.) *Development of indigenous trade and markets in West Africa.* London: Oxford University Press.
1971b Introduction (English version). In *Development of indigenous trade and markets in West Africa.* Ed. C. Meillassoux. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 49-86.
1975 (ed.) *L'esclavage en afrique precoloniale.* Paris: Maspero.
1978 Correspondence. *Economy and society* 7(3):321-331.

Merrington, John
1978 Town and country in the transition to capitalism. In *The transition from feudalism to capitalism.* London: Verso, pp. 170-195.

Meyers, A.
1971 Slavery in the Hausa-Fulani emirates. In *Aspects of West African Islam.* Eds. D.F. McCall and N.R. Bennet. Boston:

Boston University African Studies Center, pp. 173-184.

Miers, Suzanne and Igor Kopytoff, eds.
1977 *Slavery in Africa: historical and anthropological perspectives.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Miller, J.C.
1977 *Slavery a comparative teaching bibliography.* Waltham: Crossroads.
1980 Slavery: a further supplementary bibliography. *Slavery and abolition* 1:199-258.

Miller, J.C. and D.H. Borus
1980 Slavery: a supplementary teaching bibliography. *Slavery and abolition* 1:65-110.

Monteil, Charles
1932 *Cotton chez les noirs.* Paris: Publications du comité d'études historique et scientifique de l'A.O.F.

Morel, E.D.
1968 *Nigeria: its people and its problems.* 3rd edition. (1st ed. 1911). London: Frank Cass.

Mortimore, Michael
1972 Some comments on pre-industrial urbanism and the emergence of 'growth poles' with reference to Kano in Nigerian Hausaland. *Ghana social science journal* 2(2):117-128.

Mortimore, M.J. and J. Wilson
1965 *Land and people in the Kano-Close-Settled-Zone.* Zaria: n.p.

Nadel, S.F.
1942 *A black Byzantium.* London: Oxford University Press.

Nierboer, H.J.
1910 *Slavery as an industrial system.* Hague: Nijhoff.

Northern Nigeria
n.d. *Annual reports 1900-1911.* n.p.

O'Laughlin, Bridget
1975 Marxist approaches in anthropology. *Annual review of anthropology* 4:341-370.

Paden, John
1973 *Religion and political culture in Kano.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Pagdug, Robert A.
1976 Problems in the theory of slavery and slave society. *Science and society* 40(1):3-27.

Palmer, H.R.
1967 (1928) *Sudanese memoirs: being mainly translations of a number of Arabic manuscripts relating to the Central and Western Sudan, 3 vols. in one.* London: Frank Cass.

Poulantzas, Nicos
1975 *Political power and social classes.* Transl. by Timothy O'Hagen. London: New Left Books.

Rey, Pierre Philippe
1979 Class contradiction in lineage societies. *Critique of anthropology* 4(13-14):42-61.

Richardson, James
1970 (1853) *Narrative of a mission to central Africa performed in the years 1850-51, 2 vols.* London: Frank Cass.

Robinson, C.H.
1896a The Hausa territories: Hausaland. *The geographical journal* 8(3):201-211.
1896b *Hausaland: fifteen hundred miles through the Central Sudan.* London: Chapman and Hale.

Rodney, Walter
1966 African slavery and other forms of social oppression on the Upper Guinea Coast in the context of the Atlantic slave trade. *Journal of African history* 7(3):431-443.

Schon, J.F.
1876 *Dictionary of the Hausa language, with appendices of Hausa literature.* London: Church Missionary House.

Shea, Phillip J.
1975 The development of an export-oriented dyed-cloth industry in the Kano emirate in the nineteenth century. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin.

Smalldone, J.
1977 *Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Abdullahi
1970 Some considerations relating to the formation of states in Hausaland. *Journal of the historical society of Nigeria* 3:329-346.

Smith, H.F.C.
1971 The early states of the Central Sudan. In *History of West Africa, vol. 1.* Eds. J.F.A. Ajayi and M. Crowder. London: Longman, pp. 158-201.

Smith, Mary
1964 *Baba of Karo: a woman of the Moslem Hausa.* New York: Praeger.

Smith, M.G.
1954 Slavery and emancipation in two societies. *Social and economic studies* 3(3-4):239-290.
1955 *The economy of two Hausa communities of Zaria.* London: HMSO.

1959 The Hausa system of social status. *Africa* 29(3):239-252.
1960 *Government in Zazzau 1800-1950.* London: Oxford University Press.
1964 The beginnings of Hausa society, A.D. 1000-1500. In *The historian in Tropical Africa.* Eds. J. Vansina, R. Mauny and L.V. Thomas. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 338-356.
1965 Hausa inheritance and succession. In *Studies in the laws of succession in Nigeria.* Ed. J.D.M. Derrett. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 230-281.
1967 A Hausa kingdom: Maradi under Dan Baskore, 1854-1875. In *West African kingdoms of the nineteenth century.* Eds. D. Forde and P. Kaberry. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 93-122.
1978 *The affairs of Daura.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stenning, D.J.
1959 *Savannah nomads.* London: Oxford University Press.

Suret-Canale, J.
1964 Les sociétés traditionelles en afrique noire et le concept de mode de production Asiatique. *La pensée* 117:19-42.

Tambo, D.
1976 The Sokoto Caliphate slave trade in the nineteenth century. *International journal of African historical studies* 9:187-217.

Terray, Emmanuel
1972 *Marxism and primitive society.* New York: Monthly Review Press.
1974 Long-distance exchange and the formation of the state: the case of Abron kingdom of Gyaman. *Economy and society* 3(3): 315-345.
1975 Classes and class consciousness in the Abron kingdom of Gyaman. In *Marxist analysis and social anthropology.* Ed. Maurice Bloch. London: Malay, pp. 85-135.

Trimmingham, J. Spencer
1959 *Islam in West Africa.* London: Clarendon Press

Waldman, Marilyn R.
1965 The Fulani *Jihad:* a reassessment. *Journal of African history* 6(3):333-355.
1966 A note on the ethnic interpretation of the Fulani *jihad. Africa* 36:286-291.

Wallace, Christine C.
1978 The concept of *gandu*: how useful is it in understanding labour relations in rural Hausa society. *Savanna* 7(2):137-150.

Wallace, William
1896 The Hausa territories: Notes on a journey through the Sokoto empire and Borgu in 1894. *The geographical journal* 8(3):211-219.

Watson, James L., ed.
1980a *Asian and African systems of slavery.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
1980b Slavery as an institution, open and closed systems. In *Asian and African systems of slavery.* Ed. James L. Watson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 1-15.

Weber, Max
1978 *Economy and society, 2 vols.* Eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wood, Ellen
1981 Marxism and ancient Greece. *History workshop journal* 1981(1): 3-22.