

7

SØREN KIERKEGAARD'S CONCEPTION OF TEMPORALITY

Wayne B. Hamilton

SØREN KIERKEGAARD'S CONCEPTION OF TEMPORALITY

This thesis investigates Søren Kierkegaard's conception of temporality by reference to the sundry pseudonyms and life orientations through which his thought is developed.

After linking his conception with the notion of "existential time", Chapters II - V describe the sense of temporality associated with the aesthetic, ethical, "transitional" and religious life orientations respectively. This description indicates that there is no single conception of temporality; there are many, and these are contingent upon and vary with one's life orientation.

Chapter VI summarizes the findings, indicates Kierkegaard's contribution to the study of temporality, and concludes (a) that temporality is a relational category which denotes the continuing struggle to hold together in human existence the two ontologically autonomous concepts of time and eternity, and (b) that the categories of "subjectivity", "existence", "spirit" and "consciousness" are, and can only be, defined in terms of temporality.

SØREN KIERKEGAARD'S
CONCEPTION OF TEMPORALITY

by

Wayne B. Hamilton

Submitted to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

McGill University

1971

© Wayne B. Hamilton 1972

PREFACE

This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in that it investigates Søren Kierkegaard's conception of temporality by reference to the sundry pseudonyms and life orientations through which his thought is developed. In this way Kierkegaard's complete conception is expositied and not simply one segment which is abstracted out of context and is taken to represent the total. Furthermore, Kierkegaard's contribution to our understanding of temporality, which has long been overlooked, is established. The originality of his thought on this subject also contributes to the originality of this thesis. This is true especially in regard to the notion that one's conception of temporality is correlated to one's life orientation and that therefore there is no single definitive description of temporality (a notion which I intend to clarify in this thesis).

I am grateful to Professor Alastair McKinnon of the Department of Philosophy, McGill University, for providing me with technical material (as well as valuable time) from a computer word study of the Danish concept Timelighed and related terms. The high quality of supervision and scholarship demonstrated by Professor McKinnon in his assistance with the thesis in general

7

has been a source of personal and professional inspiration for me from the outset.

I am especially grateful to my wife, Wanda, who not only lent encouragement and helped with the proofreading, but who, in an advanced stage of pregnancy, typed the thesis in toto. She, more than anyone else, knows the full meaning of SK's notions of expectation and patience.

W. B. H.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	ii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Nature of Temporality; Scope and Limitations of the Study, 1	
Indications of the Importance of Temporality for Kierkegaard, 10	
The Problem of the Stages and Indirect Communication, 16	
Questions and Procedures, 42	
II. AN AESTHETIC VIEW OF TEMPORALITY	45
Introductory Remarks, 45	
Aesthetic Temporality, 48	
Summary, 75	
III. AN ETHICAL VIEW OF TEMPORALITY	81
Introductory Remarks, 81	
Ethical Temporality, 84	
Summary, 121	
IV. A TRANSITIONAL VIEW OF TEMPORALITY	125
Introductory Remarks, 125	
<u>Repetition, Fear and Trembling, "Guilty?/ Not Guilty?"</u> , 132	
<u>Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscien- tific Postscript, and The Concept of Dread</u> , 158	
Summary and Analysis, 202	
V. RELIGIOUS VIEWS OF TEMPORALITY	213
Introductory Remarks, 213	
Religiousness A, 218	
Religiousness B, 250	
Summary, 304	

VI. CONCLUSIONS	308
Introductory Remarks, 308	
Summary of Findings, 311	
Conclusions, 325	
SK's Contribution to the Study of Temporality, 340	
APPENDIX	371
BIBLIOGRAPHY	383

7

Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

The Nature of Temporality; Scope and Limitations of the Study

"Temporality" is a noun which refers to time or time relations, but since no one is quite sure what time is, everything about the concept is ambiguous if not mysterious. Thus we may sympathize with St. Augustine who wrote: "What is time? If no one asks me I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not."¹ This quotation is popular with people who write about time these days--I have found it over and again in sundry books and articles--and this is perhaps an indication that, unfortunately, nothing has happened since Augustine wrote his Confessions which would enable one to answer his question more directly and definitively.²

1. Confessions, Book XI, Chap. XIV. Trans. E.B. Pusey (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 194.

2. There are numerous admissions similar to that of St. Augustine. Attributed to the mathematician Louis Painsot is the following "test". When asked to define time, Painsot would in turn ask the questioner whether he knew what he was talking about. If the reply was, "Yes", Painsot would answer, "Very well, let us talk about it." But if the answer was, "No", he would say, "Very well, let us talk about something else." See A. J. Lotka, Elements of Physical Biology (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1925) p. 17.

Actually the quotation from Augustine is significant in two ways: Not only does it allude to the fact that "time" is a difficult concept, but it also points to the elusive character of our awareness of time. In a recent article¹ Canon J. H. Jacques begins with this same quotation from Augustine, and immediately following it he adds:

However, I can take some little courage from the fact that primarily my subject is not time but man's awareness of time. I am going to use the phenomenological method as an excuse to rule out consideration of an objective time independent of our experience of it.²

Attractive as it may seem, I think this attempt to avoid the problem is untenable for the present thesis for two reasons:

First, I do not think it is correct, especially phenomenologically, to describe the phenomenon of temporality by first separating the problem of the nature of time and the problem of our awareness of time. Perhaps after extensive investigation one might discover that these are separate problems, but one would certainly prejudice his description of the phenomenon if, at the beginning of his study, he assumed something about the nature of that which he was just setting out to discover, namely that objective time

1. J. H. Jacques, "The Phenomenology of Temporal Awareness", The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. I, no. 1 (Jan., 1970), 38-45.

2. Ibid., 38. What Canon Jacques is actually concerned about is the neglect of the phenomenological approach to this subject by English and American philosophers.

is different from our awareness of time. In fact, in the Augustine quotation above, these two aspects of the problem seem to be held together, which is precisely why in my view the statement is worthy of quotation. Time and our awareness of time are both elusive, but at least part of the reason they are elusive is that they are elusively connected.

Secondly, I cannot follow Jacques' tactic of dividing the problem of temporality simply because this thesis is concerned with Søren Kierkegaard's¹ conception of temporality, and I must, therefore, follow his approach. And SK's approach, as I hope to demonstrate, illustrates vividly that ~~it is he who shows that~~ the problem of temporality cannot really be separated in the way Jacques wants to separate it. Time and our awareness of time are, for SK, really but two sides of the same coin.

By the foregoing I did not mean to suggest that there are to be no limitations placed on this study. On the contrary, the limitation is that I shall be concerned with SK's conception of temporality and, aside from a few necessary and pertinent comparisons, not with any other.

A second limitation follows from this. SK discusses temporality (and everything else, for that matter) existentially. That

1. Hereafter, following accepted practice, cited as SK.

is, while there is a formal, abstract analysis of time in some of his works, he is primarily interested in the peculiar relation of time and eternity in human existence. For SK, then, the problem of temporality must be seen in light of the problem of human existence.

Since there is a ~~lack of~~¹ confusion about uniformity in terminology used in describing temporal phenomena and since SK does not really provide a proper name for what he thinks of as temporality, I propose the term "existential time" to indicate what we shall be dealing with here. I introduce this term simply in an attempt to make clear the kind of phenomenon we shall be treating and to indicate the limits of our subject. It is the purpose of this thesis, of course, to say what "existential time" is, and this will require the remaining pages. However, it is important now

1. What terms are used usually depends on who is using them. E.g. see Stella Booth, "The Temporal Dimensions of Existence" in The Philosophical Journal, Vol. 7, no. 1 (Jan., 1970), 48-62; who relates the following: "Sir Arthur Eddington calls time in which matter moves in space 'space time' and past to future time [Miss Booth's own designation] 'directed time', whereas Henri Bergson calls the former 'mathematical time' and the latter 'real duration'. Then a modern physicist, A. R. Ubbelohde, calls Bergson's 'mathematical time' 'duration' and Bergson's 'real duration', 'trend in time'. Besides these variations in terminology, a present-day biologist, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, speaks respectively of 'astronomical' and 'thermodynamical' time; and the late Hans Reichenbach, referring to the time of human consciousness, called it 'positive time'." (p. 49).

to recall that, for SK, "existence" is a very special term. Therefore, to speak of "existential" time does not make time a purely "subjective" problem.¹ It would be a most illegitimate procedure, I think, to approach SK's thought concerning temporality with an a priori assumption that there is "objective time" and that there is "subjective time" and that these are somehow different. I wish to leave aside as a point of departure the entire epistemological problem of the subject-object dichotomy. There is no reason to begin with an assumption about the division of or difference between "subjective time" and "objective time." We shall be treating a complex phenomenon; we cannot afford to make assumptions which will abort a successful approach to SK's thought. Perhaps the most sensible course to follow would be to agree with R. M. Gale that "the problem of time" is not a single problem (that of defining time), but a "group of intimately related

1. Friedrich Kummel has seen this well in his penetrating studies on time, Über den Begriff der Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962) and the translated article, "Time as Succession and the Problem of Duration" in J. T. Fraser, ed., The Voices of Time (New York: George Braziller, 1966), pp. 31-55. In the latter he writes that ". . . although a great variety of temporal phenomena have a reality independent of man, man is nevertheless the only being on earth with an awareness of time, a being for whom the problem of time is not merely one of theory but one which is supremely and intimately related to the conduct of his life." (p. 32). Unfortunately, while many of Kummel's insights are truly perceptive, he fails, I think, to free himself from the "independent of"/"awareness of" dichotomy which I wish to avoid when approaching SK.

questions having to do with the nature of the concepts of truth, events, things, knowledge, causality, identification, action, and change.²"

Obviously SK knew nothing about the Einsteinian space-time continuum, and therefore we shall not be attending to that here. By this I do not mean to imply that modern scientific conceptions of time have no place in our experience. On the contrary, I believe the editor of a recent anthology has said correctly that

. . . there is no one who can give a satisfactory answer as to just how these numerous manifestations of time are interconnected; scientific concepts of time and the feeling of duration are seldom spoken of in the same context. Clearly our experience is rich and varied. Yet it would be disappointing if this were to force us to live in a world of fragmented knowledge and accepted chaos.²

I hope to show that SK, in his analysis of temporality, helped diminish this sort of chaos. Instead of formulating one all-embracing concept of temporality, he allowed for the diversification of temporal spheres of reality and actually attempted to distinguish different temporal experiences.

In order to further delimit our subject and in order to avoid carrying into the study another common prejudice, we must understand that, for SK, "temporality" signifies something more than

1. Richard M. Gale, The Philosophy of Time (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1967), p. vii.

2. Fraser, Voices, xix.

time viewed simply as succession. The notion of time as succession is important for SK, and we shall have to investigate this importance in detail, but regardless of how significant succession is, his description of temporality includes more than that. For SK temporality includes duration as well as succession, permanence as well as change, and both of these concepts must be held together if we are to understand him correctly.

The idea of temporality including succession and duration is not startlingly new or unusual, and if we are willing to admit that ~~the~~ nature of time is an open question worthy of investigation, then we need not assume in advance that time is succession only. Throughout the history of philosophy there is weighty precedent (supported by a vast literature) which suggests that succession and duration are both aspects of temporality. Even from a purely formalistic point of view we might devise the concept of a duratio successiva and say that every unit of time measure has this characteristic of flowing permanence. An hour streams by while it lasts; its succession is thus identical with its duration. Time, from this point of view is transitory, but its passing away lasts. As a result of studying the ideas of time in the history of philosophy, Cornelius Benjamin takes this position and suggests that one of the "facts" about time is just that it is tied up with both the notions of change and constancy. He thinks

that an element of permanency is necessary for change. If there is any change, he suggests, something must change. "If the entire universe changes, it must remain a universe while undergoing change; if I myself change, I must in some way retain my identity in order that I--or anyone else in fact--can know that I have changed."¹ He believes, therefore, that all change is relative to a constant background, and without the element of permanency, change would be meaningless.

Both Plato and Aristotle knew well that if time is succession, then it is logically necessary to distinguish it from what is not succession, i.e. from that which is immutable. This is a logical necessity because, as Plato insisted in his discussion of the "same" and the "other", neither of these concepts is logically reducible to the other. Thus, a denial of the distinction would jeopardize the process of thought itself. If all is mutable and nothing remains the same, then there is no fixed point of reference against which meanings of concepts might be tested.

Even before Plato and Aristotle there were disputes over constancy and change. Heraclitus thought all of reality was in flux, and the appearance of constancy, symbolized by fire, was just an appearance. Parmenides and Zeno believed the reverse:

1. Cornelius Benjamin, "Ideas of Time in the History of Philosophy," in Fraser, Voices, p. 7.

Reality was constant and only appeared to change. Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno all recognized constancy and change were somehow paradoxically linked, but they solved this paradox of time by making one or the other aspects real and the other apparent. This problem became the core of Greek philosophy. Plato recognized these two aspects of temporality; he said that time was a moving image of eternity. However, it is not my intention to trace the history of philosophy, but rather to make the simple point that constancy and change have both been central to the concept of temporality from the beginning.

Apart from this, and perhaps more important for us here, is that the same point might be made from an analysis of human existence. We all recognize ourselves as the same person we always were even though we have changed enormously, physically and mentally. "The unity of life as an inner form or entelechy," writes Kummel, "is the decisive trait of each form of duration presupposing always, as it does, that something remains the same even as it alters in time."¹

This phenomenon is indeed much more than an abstract concept; it stems from our very existence. Temporality really represents an intuition or sense of life, a sense of life so powerful that

1. Kummel, op. cit. in Fraser, Voices, p. 35.

it seems to touch on man's deepest emotions concerning his dreaded limitations and highest aspirations. This study hopes to show that SK draws out and profoundly clarifies this special sense of life that "temporality" represents.

Indications of the Importance of Temporality for Kierkegaard

Throughout the history of western thought many great minds¹ have been deeply concerned with the problem of temporality, but

1. Just as concern with temporality did not begin with SK, neither does it end with him. One thinks immediately of the great studies by Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, but there are also profound studies by men of a different philosophical bent -- Bradley, McTaggart, Alexander, and Findlay, for example. Nor have Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno disappeared from the philosophical scene; cf. e.g. the vigorous response stimulated by Max Black's article, "Achilles and the Tortoise," which appeared in Analysis, Vol. XI, no. 5 (March, 1951). There is today a renewed emphasis on interdisciplinary studies on the nature of time such as G. J. Whitrow's The Natural Philosophy of Time (London: Nelson, 1961), S. G. F. Brandon's History Time and Deity (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1965), S. A. Toumlin and J. Goodfield, The Discovery of Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), R. W. Meyer, ed., Das Zeitproblem im 20. Jahrhundert (Bern: Franke Verlag, 1964); R. Schlegel's Time and the Physical World (East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press, 1961) to mention only a very few. This same trend is seen also in the fine collections of essays such as the two already cited by J. T. Fraser and Richard M. Gale, but also cf. J. J. C. Smart, ed., Problems of Space and Time (New York: Macmillan, 1964). The problem is not limited to philosophers, and literary people especially have contributed their genius to the sense of temporality. Without mentioning a long list of literary giants for whom temporality is a central theme, a few new studies are worth mentioning here: H. Meyerhoff, Time in Literature (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1960); M. Church, Time and Reality (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1949); J. Campbell, Man and Time (New York: Pantheon, 1957); George Poulet, Studies in Human Time (New York: Harper, 1956); J. B. Priestly, Man and Time (New York: Dell, 1964).

few, in my opinion, have provided as penetrating an analysis or have shown as deep an involvement with the problem as did SK. For him it was not only an academic exercise, but embraced the whole meaning of life.

SK's concern with temporality seems to me to underlie all of his thought; it runs like a thread through his entire "authorship". "Purity of heart is to will one thing," wrote SK, and it seems almost as if the one thing to which his whole being and his whole activity turned was temporality. Martin Heidegger once expressed a similar idea when he said that all great men think only one thought. In any case, this movement of one's will, of one's existence from a concern with many seemingly disparate things toward one single thing is itself a manifestation of the movement of temporality, the movement of constancy and change. I shall attempt to clarify this in the pages which follow, but for the present

1. Yet while so many volumes have been written about SK I do not think the importance of temporality in his thought has been sufficiently appreciated. Nor, in my opinion, has SK's contribution to the understanding of the nature of temporality been adequately stated. I believe an understanding of SK's conception of temporality would facilitate the understanding of his thought as a whole. The most notable exceptions to what I have just said are Jean Wahl and Calvin O. Schrag. Cf. especially Wahl's introduction to P. H. Tisseau's trans., Craint et Tremblement (Paris: Fernand Aubier, editions Montaigne, 1946), and Schrag's "Kierkegaard's Existential Reflections on Time," The Personalist, XLII (Spring, 1961), 150 ff. and his Existence and Freedom: Toward an Ontology of Human Finitude (Chicago: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1961).

the point is that SK's understanding of temporality informs all his works.

Even the most cursory reading of SK will reveal an explicit concern with temporality. This is evident throughout the "authorship". In Either/Or,¹ Vol. I, we find several characterizations of how one living "aesthetically" frantically pursues the "now" and is caught in the momentariness of an existence in which time is a succession of distinct instants and in which nothing endures. In Either/Or, Vol. II, an element of duration is introduced primarily through a characterization of faithful marriage. There one is able to sustain the blissful moment of first love in time. In Fear and Trembling² and Repetition,³ both published simultaneously and "for her" in 1843, we find two different characterizations of the same theme, the transformation of time. In Fear and Trembling, Abraham is portrayed as the father of faith who believed that time itself would be transformed and that he would grasp the eternal,

1. Trans., David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson with revisions by Howard A. Johnson (New York: Anchor Books, 1959). Hereafter cited as E/O.

2. In paperback form this work appears in one volume along with The Sickness Unto Death; both are trans. by Walter Lowrie (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1954). Hereafter these two works will be cited as FT and SD respectively, though the pagination for the latter will follow successively from the former in this edition (pp. 142-262).

3. Trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964).

not in the afterlife, but within the temporal itself. In Repetition this transformation of time is discussed in terms of SK's category, "repetition", by means of which a young lover receives back "in double" the integrity of his life in a way analogous to Job's restoration, in which everything is received back in this life under new temporal conditions.

Of the so-called philosophical works of SK, the entire theme¹ of the Philosophical Fragments of 1844 concerns what is there called the "contradiction of existence", namely the entry of the² eternal into human temporal existence. The Concept of Dread³ contains a formal, abstract, philosophical analysis of time, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript³ of 1846 (which SK had thought to be the end of the "authorship") moves away from this abstract, intellectual analysis of temporality and again attends to time and eternity in existence, the medium in which SK holds them to be unified. In the Postscript we read:

1. Trans., David F. Swenson with revision by Howard V. Hong (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964). Hereafter cited as Fragments.

2. Trans., Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1946). Hereafter cited as Dread.

3. Trans., David F. Swenson (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945). Hereafter cited as Postscript.

In the life of the individual the task is to achieve an ennoblement of the successive within the simultaneous. To have been young, and then to grow older, and finally to die, is a very mediocre form of human existence; this merit belongs to every animal. But the unification of the different stages in life in simultaneity is the task set for human beings.¹

This "task" of the "unification of the different stages in life in simultaneity" is really the undercurrent of SK's entire authorship. The explicit concern with temporality is not limited to the pseudonymous, indirect literature. From the beginning, in 1843, those writings to which SK signed his own name develop this same theme. From the first of the "Edifying Discourses", which speaks of conquering the future by means of the eternal which is introduced into the overwhelming flux of aesthetic existence,² to the last of these discourses we find constantly recurring the theme that to be human is to be involved in a contradiction between the temporal and the eternal.³

As for the specifically "Christian" writings, we need only read their table of contents to see that they too are explicitly

concerned with

1. Postscript, 311.

2. Edifying Discourses, trans., David F. Swenson and Lilian Marvin Swenson, and published in two volumes (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Publishing House, 1962). Hereafter cited as Ed. Dis. The title of the particular discourse will be cited when necessary to avoid confusion.

3. "The Expectation of Faith", Ed. Dis., I, 37.

1

concerned with temporality. Thus there should be little question that SK's concern was explicit and constant throughout his direct and indirect writings.

Even more striking than the explicit interest, and perhaps even more significant in the last analysis, is an implicit concern with temporality which seems to be reflected in SK's personal life. He was a man possessed with the fantastic hope that time itself would somehow be overcome in such a way that he would have the young maiden, Regine Olsen, eternally--within time. Just as Isaac was restored to Abraham in Fear and Trembling and as Job and the young lover of Repetition received back all they had lost, so too SK would have Regine. Jean Wahl's comment on this point is extremely perceptive. Writing about SK's attitude toward marrying Regine, he says:

Voici, en effet, la réponse que va nous proposer Kierkegaard: Si j'ai assez de foi, si je suis vraiment digne d'Abraham, le père de la foi, oui, je puis épouser Régine; je puis renoncer à elle, et, par un miracle incompréhensible, Dieu me la rendra; ce mariage me sera possible, comme il fut possible à Abraham

1. For example, one of the 1847 Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits, "Purity of Heart", begins and ends with chapters of the same title, "Man and the Eternal". Again, a typical title of the 1848 Christian Discourses (trans., Walter Lowrie, London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1940) is "The Joy of It--That What Thou Dost Lose Temporally Thou Dost Gain Eternally". Hereafter Christian Discourses will be cited as CD.

de retrouver son fils auquel il avait renoncé. Et le temps même sera changé; de telle sorte que je serai au-dessus du temps ordinaire, dans un temps mûri, mais où le rein ne passe, et où la jeune fille restera présente dans la femme. Mais suis-je Abraham? Et on sort que Kierkegaard a répondu «non» à cette question, et c'est pourquoi il n'a pas épousé celle à qui il avait donné sa parole.¹

In a sense, all of what SK thought, felt and wrote about temporality is contained in this statement by Wahl. It was all a fantastic absurdity, but, as SK would have it, an absurdity made possible by virtue of faith. But how can this be even for one living in faith? How can the transformation of time even be conceptualized? In the pages which follow I want to elucidate these questions.

The Problem of the Stages and Indirect Communication

Reflections about SK's personal life are important and relevant to our study in many ways. It is well known that his life is intimately connected with his writings and even though the "biographical approach" to SK is carried on ad nauseum, it is important for us in regard to his attitudes concerning temporality, if for no other reason than that attitudes toward time may be conditioned by matters of personal adjustment. As Margaret Church

1. Crainte et Tremblement, op. cit., p. ii.

points out in her study of several writers:

. . . a self-styled 'extrovert' like the early Aldous Huxley finds a reliance on the outer world of objects and events a necessity whereas a man like Kafka retreats to an inner world where he finds refuge from the very objects and events sought out by the extrovert. Time, therefore, for the early Huxley is clock time; time for Kafka is the time of the dream where past, present and future have no meaning.¹

The knowledge that attitudes toward time are connected to personality traits is relevant here not so much because it may shed light on SK's own life but, more importantly, because this connection of personality and one's experience of time is critically relevant to SK's notion of "indirect communication."

Volumes have been written on SK's theory of indirect communication,² and I do not wish to belabor it here, but it does pose something of a problem for this study, and its solution will determine the approach we shall be taking.

1. Margaret Church, Time and Reality, p. 4. Experimental evidence for Miss Church's observation has been available for some time. In 1958, e.g., R. H. Knapp and J. T. Garbutt discovered that personality traits correlate significantly with attitudes toward time, and they actually identified personality groups on this basis. Cf. Journal of Personality, 26 (1958), p. 426.

2. Cf. especially Lars Bejerholm, Meddelelsens Dialektik: studier i Søren Kierkegaard's teorier om sprog, kommunikation och pseudonymitet [Dialectic of Communication: Studies in SK's theory of language, communication and pseudonymity], publications of the Kierkegaard Society, Copenhagen, Vol. II (Copenhagen, Munksgaard, 1962). See also Marvin F. Christopherson, "Søren Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Communication: An Approach to the Communication of Existential Knowledge," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Purdue Univ., Aug., 1965) who reviews all the existing literature on SK's theory of communication.

Indirect communication is related to the connection between personality and temporality. It is well known that, instead of stating his thoughts directly, SK chose to express himself indirectly, and one feature of this method was his use of pseudonyms. There are two main theories about SK's use of pseudonyms, each theory having its source in SK, who apparently held both at one time or another. On the one hand SK suggests that the use of pseudonyms was intrinsic to the kind of literary activity he was doing. By means of pseudonyms, ideal characters, he was able to present psychologically consistent, ideal types or possibilities, usually muddled in real, existing persons.

My pseudonymity or polynymity has not had a causal ground in my person. . . but it has an essential ground in the character of the production, which for the sake of the lines ascribed to the authors and the psychologically varied distinction of the individualities poetically required complete regardlessness in the direction of good and evil, of contrition and high spirits, of despair and presumption, of suffering and exultation, etc., which is bounded only ideally by psychological consistency and which real actual persons in the actual moral limitations of reality dare not permit themselves to indulge in, nor could wish to.¹

On the other hand, it is possible to regard the pseudonyms as representations of the various alternatives or possibilities of SK's own personality carried out to its logical extreme. By this means, SK's personality was able to "spill over" into the various

1. Postscript, p. 551.

possibilities which were held together in actual existence and which were actually impossible in their pure, exaggerated forms. Thus, by indirect communication and by means of his own hyper-critical powers of reflection, SK provides us with a kind of phenomenology of the various aspects of his own personality.

In either case, with regard to this study, I believe it is quite important to take very seriously SK's famous statement which is found in his "First and Last Declaration" of 1846 appended to the Postscript and which immediately follows the passage just quoted:

What is written therefore is in fact mine, but only in so far as I put into the mouth the poetically actual individuality whom I produced, his life-view expressed in audible lines. . . . So in the pseudonymous works there is not a single word which is mine, I have no opinion about these works except as a third person, no knowledge of their meaning except as a reader, not the remotest private relation to them, since such a thing is impossible in the case of a doubly reflected communication.¹

It would seem that if we are to attend seriously to SK's notion of temporality, we must be prepared to attend to what each of the pseudonyms has to say on the matter, for what each has to say might be different not only from each of the other pseudonyms, but from SK himself. Of critical importance to our decision to take seriously SK's avowed difference from the pseudonymous authors is a necessary commitment to take seriously SK's theory of the "stages" (Stadler).

1. Ibid.

SK carried out his authorship of pseudonymous indirect communication by offering his readers a series of contrived "deceptions"--pseudonymous heroes who portrayed every type of human existence in what SK called "stages on life's way."¹⁹ These "stages" are actually styles or ways of life.²⁰ Basically, there are three: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious.

The doctrine of the stages must not be held too rigidly, for the "stages" are not sequential; the movement from one to another is accomplished by choice and not by learning or understanding some philosophical system. There is no gradualism in SK; rather there is "movement" in terms of passionate leaps of decision and

1. See especially the book by the same title, Stages on Life's Way (tr. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1940), hereafter cited as Stages. Cf. also the Postscript.

2. Professor Emanuel Hirsch in Kierkegaard Studien, II (Verlag C. Bertelsmann, Gutersloh, 1933) pp. 672 ff., was the first to draw attention to this, and today most commentators agree that "stages of life" is a somewhat confusing phrase considering what SK had in mind. E. g. see the annotations of Walter Lowrie to his translation of Stages. Cf. Harry Broudy, "Kierkegaard's Levels of Existence", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, I (1941), pp. 294-312, and James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (London: Secker and Warburg), 1954, pp. 42 ff. Collins prefers the phrase "spheres of existence", since as he says, "spheres may well be treated as simultaneously present and as overlapping" (p. 45). SK himself referred to the "stages" as "spheres", (see Postscript, p. 448 and Lowrie's note 19). We shall utilize the phrase "styles of life" insofar as what SK means to express is a certain orientation toward life, a certain way of living involving a person's fundamental commitments. The doctrine of the "stages" is well known, and may be reviewed in almost any secondary source about SK. Therefore, I do not propose to go into any detail here. There is, besides, some doubt as to the importance of this three-fold division in SK's later writings as well as in his non-aesthetic works.

faith. Thus, the doctrine of the stages is a dialectic, but an existential dialectic, where the passage is effected by choice. It is also an anti-Hegelian dialectic by means of which SK rends the synthesis into paradoxes. He speaks of the paradoxical nature of reality.¹ SK feels that an individual is able to change his style of life only by his own free decision in a passionate "leap" of commitment or faith. Nevertheless, (and this is one reason why the doctrine of the stages must be held loosely) SK did recognize certain "border-line" styles of life--life orientations which fringe the three main styles of existence. These are the "stages" of irony and humor. Irony is present in one's life whenever there is a contradiction between inward, hidden commitment and outward behavior. "Not to be able to win the splendours of the world is never irony," writes SK, "but to have them, and in profusion, within one's reach so that power and authority are almost forced upon

1. Many articles have been written on what SK meant by "paradox". E.g. see Richard Schmitt, "The Paradox in Kierkegaard's Religiousness A", Inquiry, Vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring, 1965), pp. 118-135. Cf. N. H. -Soe, "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox", in Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, eds., A Kierkegaard Critique (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., Gateway Edition, 1962) pp. 207-227, who lists five different uses of "paradox" by SK, and Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's 'Paradox' and Irrationalism", Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, no. 27 (Spring, 1967), pp. 401-416, who distinguishes six different uses of that term. Cf. the same author's "Believing in 'Paradoks'; A Contradiction in Kierkegaard?" Harvard Theological Review, 61 (1968), pp. 633-636, and also Elmer H. Duncon, "Kierkegaard's Uses of 'Paradox' Yet Once More", Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, no. 27, pp. 319-328.

one, and then to be unable to accept them: that is irony."

When irony appears, an individual is existing in a way characterized as a transition between immediacy and the ethical. James Collins writes: "A cynical and despairing irony marks the man who has lived an esthetic life through to its bitter end, and is consequently placed at the borderline, where a leap into the ethical sphere is possible."² In SK's terms, irony is the incognito of the ethical.

An analogous contradiction between inwardness and outwardness is the transitional stage of humor--the incognito of the religious. Concerning humor Collins adds:

At first, Kierkegaard regarded humor as the proper attitude of the Christian in regard to the things of time, a kind of protective covering or incognito, useful in dealing with worldly fortunes and with individuals who do not see the world through the eyes of faith. But by 1845, he felt that humor is not so much a religious as an ethical passion--indeed, that it signifies that one has reached the borderline of the ethical life and is faced with the choice of becoming religious in a plenary way or of thwarting the natural inclinations of ethical existence to surmount itself.³

Collins is certainly correct, for in the Postscript, Johannes Climacus, who regards himself essentially as a humorist,

1. The Journals, trans. and ed., Alexander Dru (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938), entry 727 (p. 229). Hereafter cited as Journals, followed by entry number and the page number in parenthesis.

2. Collins, Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 44.

3. Ibid.

repeatedly insists upon the closeness of the humorous to the
¹
 religious.

The harshness of the three-fold division is also softened by SK's further division of the religious style of existence into "religiousness A" and "religiousness B", i.e. between all "natural" (or immanent) modes of religiosity and the unique Christian (transcendent) religious spirit in which sin and faith are vital.

Hence, we are left with a schema which looks something like this:

irony humor
 Aesthetical ↓ Ethical ↓ Religiousness A - Religiousness B

We must remember, however, that these are not chronological; they are simultaneously present and overlapping.

Yielding to the grossest kind of over-simplification, we may
²
 describe the ways of life as follows: The aesthetic stage or style of life is exhibited by those who have no continuity in their lives. Such life is an infinite succession of instants of new pleasure. The aesthete frantically gropes for an erotic moment and seeks to avoid any moments which would involve his past or

1. Postscript, pp. 144-145; 242-43; 400-404; 448 ff.

2. The reader is reminded that our purpose here is purely introductory, and we shall not attempt any detailed analysis.

responsible decision which would affect his future. He shuns the past and future and lives in what Howard and Edna Hong describe as "episodic immediacy".¹ Thus the aesthetic life is characterized by sensual immediacy, doubt, and despair. These he associates with the figures of Don Juan, Faust and Ahasuerus, the Wandering Jew, respectively. There is a definite refusal to recognize oneself in the search of ever new experiences so as to avoid boredom. The person who lives for the erotic present is thus receptive to everything, but commits himself to nothing. The past and future have no significance, only the ephemeral present counts. Actually, in the aesthetic style of life there is no choice; there is no real self.

The ethical orientation is that of resolute decision and responsibility. Existence is no longer a series of undifferentiated instants which limit the temporal perspective to the immediately erotic present. In making an either/or decision, the individual has assumed responsibility for his past behavior, and realizes that what he now does will affect his future. This style of life is epitomized by Socrates, SK's hero, who like everyone with an ethical attitude, is able and willing to make a decision which involves his whole person. One living this style of life commits himself. To what? To the universal in the form of a moral law.

1. In the translator's introduction to Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. by Howard and Edna Hong (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 14. Hereafter cited as Works of Love.

The Law is affirmed and shaped and determination begins to characterize one's life. This kind of commitment brings unity, continuity, centredness and purpose to one's existence. The ethical man hence becomes more of an individual than the aesthetic man. That is, there is a self integration; a self is found.

Yet something is missing. The ethical remains attached to the general. There remains a nostalgic glance toward happiness-- to something temporal (no matter how universal) without any relationship to the transcendent being affirmed. To fully realize himself, the individual must become the Unique. This involves placing himself before God. Reason, which may be instrumental in making an ethical choice, is here of no avail. Only a "leap of faith", made in the consciousness of one's sinfulness, will bring one to the transcendentally religious stage of existence.¹

Thus, the religious stage is the one of faith. Here the individual is not subordinated simply to an impersonal universal law, but stands in an immediate relation, affirmed by faith, to the Supreme Subject. The religious stage is always a personal one; it is always my truth, not a collective one. SK states that for the individual to place himself before the Transcendent is also to

1. The following description actually only refers to religiousness B. We shall clarify the distinction between religiousness A and B in Chapter V, but for the present general introduction religiosity indicates Christianity.

transcend time; the person existing religiously makes himself a contemporary of Christ; he goes back to his religious origin, and only then does he really become a "witness for the truth". The leap of faith, then, is also a leap over time. God transcends the universal, and so does the religious individual when he affirms himself before God. He chooses himself in the deepest sense, and in this affirmation he transcends the universal.

Even with such a cursory review of the "stages", we are able to see that the entire indirect presentation resembles something of a cross between a phenomenological description of various existential possibilities¹ and an abstraction out of existence, carried to the logical extreme, of various aspects of human life reminiscent of Socrates and classical philosophy.²

The real problem of indirect communication for this study is as follows:

1. If we are to take seriously the indirect communication in general and the stages in particular, there are two precautionary

1. As one student remarks, SK "does not impose $\times$ dogmatic formulae but proposes a descriptive morphology". He adds that SK will offer no direct conclusions, results or facts; only an analysis of the varied ways of existing. George B. Arbaugh and George E. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard's Authorship (Rock Island, Ill.: Augustana College Library, 1967), p. 17.

2. Stages was in fact consciously patterned after Plato's Symposium. For an analysis of SK's relation to the Greeks see esp. John Wild, "Kierkegaard and Classical Philosophy", The Philosophical Review, 49 (1940), pp. 536-551.

measures we must take. First we must not fall into the easy practice of quoting SK indiscriminately. For example, it would be easy, but false, to glean from Dread SK's total view of temporality. There is in Dread a neat, formal analysis of time, but the author of that work is not SK but Vigilius Haufniensis. And SK had implored us over and again not to identify him with his pseudonyms.¹ "Not a single word is mine."² We must guard against proof-texting--an easy pitfall as SK himself recognized. Secondly, with regard to the stages, we must be careful not to think of them as successive. This is especially important for this study because if each existence sphere represents a different existential possibility, a different way of living, then we might justifiably expect to encounter a different experience and conception of temporality in each stage. This, of course, is one of the things we wish to investigate.

2. We must not take the indirect presentation literally. We shall take it seriously, but not literally. Let me explain: Repeatedly SK reminds us of the religious discourses which he delivered to the world with his right hand while he held the aesthetic

1. Computer studies show that SK's repeated warnings ought to be heeded. Cf. Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms: A New Hierarchy", American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6, no. 2, (April, 1969), pp. 116-126.

2. Postscript, p. 551.

works in his left.¹ They were in fact published simultaneously and thus he has an excellent argument; he was from the outset a religious author. With the Discourses, he writes, "it was established that from the very beginning, and simultaneously with the pseudonymous work, certain signals, displaying my name, gave tele-graphic notice of the religious."² Thus SK tells us that there was one purpose behind the indirect authorship from its beginning. This, if true, would seem to seriously effect the unprejudiced autonomy of the stages for which I have just been arguing, for if SK's purpose underlies each stage, then the representative of each ostensibly does not really speak for himself.

The purpose seems to be to call attention to the religious by first meeting the reader on his own level in order to help him move up to the higher level of Christian faith. The point is that when one is suffering under an illusion (in this case that one is already religious by virtue of being born into Christendom), one must be deceived into the truth.³

Indeed, it is only by this means, i.e. by deceiving him, that it is possible to bring into the truth one who is in an illusion. Whoever rejects this opinion betrays

1. The Point of View For My Work as an Author, trans., Walter Lowrie, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 20. Hereafter cited as Point of View.

2. Ibid., p. 39.

3. Ibid.

the fact that he is not over-well versed in dialectics, and that is precisely what is especially needed when operating in this field. For there is an immense difference, a dialectical difference, between these two cases: the case of a man who is ignorant and is to have a piece of knowledge imparted to him, so that he is like an empty vessel which is to be filled or a blank sheet of paper upon which something is to be written; and the case of a man who is under an illusion and must first be delivered from that. Likewise there is a difference between writing on a blank sheet of paper and bringing to light by the application of a caustic fluid a text which is hidden under another text. Assuming then that a person is the victim of an illusion, and that in order to communicate the truth to him the first task, rightly understood, is to remove the illusion--if I do not begin by deceiving him, I must begin with direct communication. But direct communication presupposes that the receiver's ability to receive is undisturbed. But here such is not the case; an illusion stands in the way. That is to say, one must first of all use the caustic fluid. But this caustic means is negativity, and negativity understood in relation to the communication of the truth is precisely the same as deception.¹

This deceiving for the sake of truth is what SK meant by saying
 2
 that his entire authorship was, from first to last, dialectical.

There is a further important consideration here for this study. The question arises as to how to regard the pseudonyms. I have said that we would treat them seriously but not literally;

1. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

2. Point of View, p. 15. Socrates, of course, is SK's acknowledged master in this kind of dialectic. However, I think there is a subtle and important if perhaps deceptive difference. Whereas Socrates attempted to draw out the truth from one suffering under an illusion, SK wanted to bring one into the truth. I shall have more to say about this difference later.

yet the question remains as to the extent of autonomy the pseudonyms achieve. In regard to the problem of indirect communication, then, we are faced with the following dilemma: If the pseudonyms are autonomous, then they speak for themselves, and it would be prudent at least to allow for the possibility that they might represent different views of temporality. These views need not necessarily be different, but as they purport to represent different styles of life, we might reasonably expect them to contain differences with regard to temporality. On the other hand, if there is some unified purpose behind them all, we might reasonably suspect that the differences between the pseudonyms are not essential in regard to their views of temporality.

Another question important to the interpretation of SK's relation to the pseudonyms is relevant here. It concerns the motives which underlie this relationship. If the pseudonyms are allowed to speak freely, why are they permitted to do so? One's answer to this question will affect one's interpretive approach. That there seems to be some ulterior motive behind the freedom of the pseudonyms, that there is a unity underlying their diversity, seems to challenge those who want to interpret SK as one who simply established various alternatives and forced the reader to choose for himself.¹ This interpretation is actually based on the belief

1. Paul Sponheim has a brief but good discussion of this in his introduction to the paperback edition of Stages (New York: Schocken Books, 1967).

that the key to SK is to be found in the ethical norm with which he is said to operate, viz. that it is better to choose than not to choose. This notion seems to have support in the Point of View, where SK often suggests that "even if a man will not follow where one endeavors to lead him, one thing it is still possible to do for him--compel him to take notice".¹

At times, however, SK himself does not appear to be sure about his clarity of purpose or "unity of intention". He acknowledges the share "Governance" had in his activity as a writer and admits that his deceit was a little ambivalent:

. . . it is Governance that has educated me, and the education is reflected in the process of the productivity. In view of this it must be admitted that what I set forth above about the whole aesthetic production being a deceit is not quite true, for this expression assumes a little too much in the way of consciousness.²

Paul Sponheim finds this passage important for those (such as Karl Barth and the dialectic theologians) who take the opposite approach to SK and emphasize the "paradox" of SK's work, that it is really the work of God (who is absolutely "other") and that transcendent Christianity must be set apart from all that goes before.³

1. Point of View, p. 34. Cf. Postscript, p. 261 and "What We Learn from the Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air", published in English in the Gospel of Suffering, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1948), pp. 228-229.

2. Point of View, p. 73.

3. Sponheim, Stages.

Yet in the very same passage SK adds:

At the same time, however, it [the idea that the whole aesthetic production is a deceit] is not altogether false, for I have been conscious of being under instruction and that from the very first. The process is this: a poetic and philosophic nature is put aside in order to become a Christian. But the unusual feature is that the two movements begin simultaneously, and hence this is a conscious process. . . .¹

Furthermore, in his later (1851) "accounting" of his authorship,²
My Activity as a Writer, SK describes the whole movement of his authorship as follows:

This movement was accomplished or described uno tenore, in one breath. . . so that the authorship, integrally regarded, is religious from first to last--a thing which every one can see if he is willing to see, and therefore ought to see. . . so the discerning mind will recognize that corresponding to this authorship there is an originator who, as author, 'has only willed one thing.'³

And in fact this is the final conclusion of the earlier Point of View.⁴

Yet the problem seems to remain: If the authorship was accomplished uno tenore, we might suspect that SK's conception of temporality remains the same throughout the various stages, and contrariwise if the stages are autonomous, then we might suspect a different view of temporality to be presented in each stage. In

1. Point of View, p. 73.

2. Published in English in Point of View.

3. Point of View, p. 143.

4. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

light of this, how shall we attend to the stages? Let me say in the beginning that there are two paths which we ought not to follow. First, we might treat the problem as if it were a phantom by saying that in the stages we shall be treating different aspects of the same phenomenon. But this would be too facile a solution in that it would virtually ignore SK's own preoccupation with the matter and would certainly not do justice to his own statements and feelings about its importance. Secondly, we might resolve at the outset that there simply is no solution. Was not SK himself ambivalent about his purpose throughout? And if SK was not clear about the matter, then how can we hope to be clear about it? There is truth in this attitude, but it fails to penetrate in any depth to what underlies his ambivalence.

I believe that these two quasi-solutions are specious, and because I think the matter is important for this study, I would like to put forth the following as a working hypothesis which takes SK's ambivalence itself as its basis: Because SK kept changing his mind throughout as to the nature of his authorship, ¹ because he sometimes understood its purpose and sometimes did not, because he produced it in such a short period of time and at such a frantic

1. Recall also how he tore out the original ending of Repetition and wrote a new one after he learned of Regine's engagement to Schlegel. Cf. Lowrie's introduction to that work.

pace (he was not even sure when it was over) and because he was engaged in an outward, accompanying deception in his own personal life,¹ just because of these things, can we not say that he never had a firm grasp of his own purpose until his "activity as a writer" was completed? And, if this is so, can we not say that the real sense of temporality he presented might not have been the sense of temporality he thought he was presenting? For all his deceptive reflection, it is entirely possible that he might have deceived himself. This would, I submit, be truly ironic.

By the foregoing I do not want to suggest that SK was merely a tool in the hands of Governance; that is also too facile an idea--it may or may not be true of us all. I mean to suggest simply that SK did not fully understand the purpose and direction of his authorship from the beginning because the purpose and direction were not complete at the beginning. In the beginning (if I may paraphrase SK) it was just beginning, and its completion was held until the end. The purpose and direction emerged throughout the authorship. It is difficult to imagine that SK did not know this, but I wish to suggest that it is possible that he did not. But we need not decide the matter one way or the other. Let us simply acknowledge that there is something of human depth and subtlety that underlies the indirect dialectic.

1. See Chap. II off Point of View.

We know well, for example, that SK distinguished between impersonal, objective, scientific knowledge and personal, subjective, existential knowledge. And we know too that SK felt that man, suffering from an illusion, had forgotten what it means to exist and what inwardness signifies. Again, we know that SK, although without authority, took it as his task to communicate this "existential knowledge" or inwardness in such a way that an appropriate response might be elicited from his reader. Now, an "appropriate response" in SK's view would hardly be an attitude of detached objectivity and disinterestedness such as one might assume when memorizing "facts". On the contrary, the response SK would like to have had from his reader was that of inward appropriation, the kind of interested reflection which "makes a difference". Detachment is not an attitude befitting the existential knowledge in which a man attempts to know himself. For self-knowledge some digestion is needed; there must be some process of appropriation; it must become slowly and passionately.

Passionate, inward appropriation of self-knowledge has always been of prime importance to the existentialists. It is a correlate of their rejection of the premise that man relates most significantly to his world by knowing it, and it results in their subsequent emphasis on the precognitive encounter with phenomena and their insistence that ontology is prior to epistemology in philosophical importance. Certainly for SK existence itself precedes

theorizing about existence, and the sundry psychological phenomena about which he writes (e.g. dread, despair, love) are categories which suggest a pre-cognitive level of experience. These categories would, of course, demand an involved response.

But inward appropriation is not the exclusive property of the existentialists. On the contrary, we find it quite passionately represented by Plato. Plato, too, had an aversion to direct communication, and he wrote only dialogues. We recall that in the dispute over the negative influence of Plato's philosophy on Dionysius, Plato intimated that he had never divulged the essence of his philosophy to the young ruler (or to anyone else) because this was, in fact, impossible.¹ Philosophy, he said, could not be a system of knowledge or ethics or politics, etc., because first something (a certain body of knowledge or experience) was required before philosophy could be done. He introduced the notion of "in affinity with" the subject matter which is philosophized upon and connected this with the notion of "recollection". Recollection was not only the memory of past experiences, but the awakening of eternal truths. Furthermore, when we recall ourselves, we become aware of our lives. When one reflects upon oneself

1. For the historical details see A. E. Taylor, Plato (London: Methuen & Co., 1926), and for the content see especially Epistle VII, trans., R. G. Bury, "The Loeb Classical Library", Plato, Vol. VII (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952).

and upon the matter in question, when one becomes "in affinity with" the subject matter, the subject matter and the self are illuminated at the same time. Whereas before there was darkness, suddenly there is light. This kind of attitude is the source of the doctrine of knowledge in which knowledge is illumination. The point here is that this attitude, the philosophical attitude for Plato, was not simply an intellectual exercise; it involved a feeling of affinity with the subject matter and a first-hand participation in it.

Plato had another point about communication as well. When the philosopher attempts to express what each object of knowledge is, he fails owing to the weakness of human language. Language is not quite capable of fulfilling its task--there is always the possibility of being misunderstood, if for no other reason than the fact that language changes. In the process of communicating knowledge, therefore, the point is not to convince others by rhetorical skill. The communication must be such that the other can think about the truth by being submitted to it. One must "see for oneself". One must be willing to change, and if one is thus willing, a light will burst forth and there will be a living relationship between the understander and that which is understood.¹ This is why for Plato philosophy is a passionate activity; a

1. In the Phaedo Plato says the aim of philosophy is death.

passionate love of man.

SK's classical hero, Socrates, whose daemon would never permit him to remain detached, also allowed for something to happen between himself and his "student". The master draws the truth out of the student and at the same time self-knowledge comes to the master as well as to the student. Be that as it may, let us at least admit the possibility that there is something to all of this dialectic and that something might happen between the reader and SK's writings. Clearly SK believed that something would happen.

Further, let us at least admit the possibility that the purpose--clear and yet unclear to the author--becomes (it is not) in the dialogue between the reader and the author. For reader and writer alike the purpose might be hidden in the beginning, and yet become as the dialogue (in this case the authorship) proceeds. If this does not really happen, at least we can say that SK hoped that it would happen. The point relevant to this study is this: It is possible that SK's notion of temporality itself becomes in the authorship.

A significant clue as to how we should attend to the stages in this study, and one which I think supports what I have been saying above, comes from within the pseudonymous literature itself, from Johannes Climacus. We recall that SK felt the Postscript to be a turning point in his authorship. In fact, he once thought

it would be the end of the authorship; hence it is appropriate that we learn from it how to approach the stages. In his "Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature",¹ Climacus reviews the stages in general and the book Stages On Life's Way in particular. There he tells us that the key to the division of the stages is time itself. The stages can be structured by asking what meaning time has for each.

The significance attached to time is in general decisive for every standpoint up to that of the paradox, which paradoxically accentuates time. In the same degree that time is accentuated, in the same degree we go forward from the aesthetic, the metaphysical, to the ethical, the religious, and the Christian-religious.²

This is significant because we are now informed that beneath all the indirect communication--no matter how ambivalent or inconsistent--lies a notion or notions of temporality. It is significant also in that it supports what we have been suggesting above, namely that according to the "degree of accentuation" there is a movement of the concept of temporality through the stages.

Furthermore, it is significant that this "movement" is not really one away from "the temporal" toward "the eternal". On the contrary, it seems that, for SK, man is always in time. Abraham, Job and the young lover in Repetition "receive back" everything here and now under new temporal conditions. The movement is not

1. Postscript, pp. 225-266.

2. Ibid., p. 265.

toward the eternal, but toward the eternal in time. As ~~two~~ students of SK aptly puts it, the eternal must be grasped "incarnate". "Man is in time," ~~they~~ writes, "and true existence is his orienting himself to the eternal within the temporal."¹ And we recall also that the "double movement" or "repetition"--a religious movement in faith--is a movement back to the temporal.

It is difficult to say what the implications of this movement are; this is one of the things we hope to learn from our study of temporality, and perhaps any conclusion about implications ought to be left for the end of the thesis. Nevertheless, one observation might be mentioned here as being worthy of further development. The "movement" of the authorship seems to be from what SK terms "aesthetic immediacy" to what he often speaks of as "a second immediacy". Louis Mackey, always a perceptive student of SK, suggests this:

All of Kierkegaard's writings lament an immediacy hopelessly lost in reflection, a youth-that-never-was recollected in the impuissance of eternal old age. His vision of Christian consummation is a miraculous and elusive redintegratio in statum primum, a new immediacy, a contemporaneity with oneself possible only by virtue of the absurd.²

Considering the following quote from the Point of View, Louis

1. Arbaugh and Arbaugh, p. 33.

2. Louis Mackey, "The Poetry of Inwardness", in George A. Schrader, Jr., ed., Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967), p. 47.

Mackey would seem to have it well interpreted: "I have never had any immediacy, and therefore, in the ordinary sense of the word, I have never lived."¹

From this I feel that it is not altogether far-fetched to state that, in a way, the movement of the authorship itself reflects a sense of temporality. It moves full circle. From the "Accounting" of 1851, in the passage about willing one thing which I have already cited, we read the following:

The discerning mind will at the same time recognize that this one thing is the religious, but the religious altogether and utterly transposed into reflection, yet in such a way that it is altogether and utterly withdrawn from reflection and restored to simplicity--that is to say, he will see that the road travelled has the aim of approaching, of attaining simplicity.²

The simplicity alluded to here is that simplicity of thought and expression of the religious works which accompanied the more flamboyant, complex and paradoxical indirect literature. The religious literature communicated directly had no need for the "modification" of reflection--hence its "simplicity".

This psychological movement of the authorship toward simplicity is the movement of willing one thing, and this movement of forming one out of the multifarious, of transposing and withdrawing from the manifold possibilities into simplicity, this movement of the entire authorship itself reflects a sense of temporality.

1. Point of View, p. 81. Cf. Postscript, p. 261, and Journals 22 (pp. 15-20).

2. Point of View, p. 143.

Questions and Procedures

In terms of SK and his pseudonyms we want to emboss the sense of temporality expressed in selected existential possibilities as well as in SK's own life orientation. However, stated in more general terms, this study will seek the answers to the following questions: Does one's sense of temporality differ according to one's life orientation? If so, how does it differ, and what are the implications of these differences? If not, what are the implications of this? Thus, the underlying assumption of this thesis is that an investigation of SK will yield some answers to these questions.

In terms of procedures, I intend to trace the notion of temporality throughout SK's authorship, investigating both the pseudonymous and the acknowledged works. Following SK's own advice I shall allow those pseudonyms treated here to speak freely, thereby permitting the intuition of temporality in each "stage" on life's way to be fully and autonomously presented. The intuition of the acknowledged works will also be presented. In this way I hope to emboss the total, composite conception of temporality which, directly or indirectly, can be regarded as Kierkegaardian, while avoiding the pit-fall of identifying SK with one or another of his pseudonyms.

Chapters II through V of this study will be more or less an exegesis of representative existence possibilities in regard to the concept of temporality, including the acknowledged works. Parallels and discrepancies will be discussed as they are encountered.

Specifically we shall be tracing the Danish word Timelighed (and its cognates) which, depending on the translator, is variously and inconsistently translated in English, but which we shall translate as "temporality". One of the problems of Kierkegaardian scholarship is that there are a number of different translators of SK, and this itself causes numerous differences of translation from work to work. The differences are further accentuated by many inconsistencies on the part of the individual translators-- a problem which is particularly noticeable with regard to a term such as Timelighed, which is intrinsically difficult, and a problem with which this thesis is plagued. ¹ Timelighed and all its cognates were traced by computer through all of the pseudonymous and acknowledged works.

Actually, however, we shall be tracing much more than a word of the Danish language. What we hope to discover is a sense of temporality. This sense of temporality may be manifest even in

1. The sundry translations and many inconsistencies, as well as our reasons for preferring the translation "temporality", are presented as part of an Appendix which follows Chapter VI.

works where Timelighed and related terms rarely or never appear. This fact is itself significant for the study, and I shall comment upon it at the appropriate time.

Chapter VI will summarize the findings of the study and make the appropriate philosophical comparisons, observations and conclusions. The importance and relevance of the study will be outlined, and SK's contribution to the understanding of temporality will be assessed and criticized.

Chapter II

AN AESTHETIC VIEW OF TEMPORALITY

Introductory Remarks

Most students of SK would probably agree that a systematic presentation of SK's thought would be a distorted approach. It would be distorted because SK thought and wrote about existence, and existence, as he himself repeatedly remarked, could not be systematized since it was not yet finished. Only that which was complete could be systematized, and existence is, for one who exists, in progress.

Besides being an affront to all of SK's diligent anti-Hegelian work, it would be most inappropriate to advance "SK's theory of ethics", or "SK's theory of time", etc. In regard to our subject, we must acknowledge that SK does not develop a theory of temporality in a systematic way as does, for example, Martin Heidegger or Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

The present writer, as indicated in Chapter I, is in sympathy with this particular anti-systematic attitude and wishes to remain open and receptive to the "incompletedness" of SK's thought. Yet, while it is certainly true that SK does not develop a

finished system of thought, there is a sense in which his open-ended existential notions are presented systematically. I refer to the manner in which SK portrayed differing life orientations, each of which was intended to be an existential possibility and therefore open and incomplete in a systematic way.¹ In his works we are confronted with a systematic representation of incomplete human existences. This being the case, it is possible to present SK's views in a systematic way so long as care is taken to preserve the incomplete nature of existence in each life orientation which is described. In short, it is possible and legitimate to do what SK did, viz. to describe the sense of temporality embodied by the spokesman for each existence sphere.

It seems clear that such an approach would not appear foreign to one close to SK, namely Johannes Climacus. As we have seen, he noted that each existence sphere was distinguished by its peculiar conception of time, so it would hardly vitiate SK's thought to examine it in the manner in which he presented it. By following in SK's descriptive footsteps we hope to avoid the fallacy of identifying his thought with that of any one of his pseudonyms. Here we shall allow the dramatis personae--in and through whom the "existence spheres" are made manifest--to speak for themselves.

1. This combination of existential open-endedness and systematic description qualifies, in the present writer's view, as phenomenology.

In this chapter we shall attempt to understand the notion of temporality held by one who was characterized by SK as an aesthete. A cursory view of the aesthetic "sphere" was outlined in Chapter I, but now we must probe the aesthetical more deeply and allow the aesthetic personality to declare itself in its own way without external commentary. In particular, the many statements about the aesthetic life made by non-aesthetic pseudonyms will be bracketed out or held in abeyance in this chapter.¹ The ethical Judge Wilhelm devotes a significant portion of his writing to the criticism of aesthetic existence, but here we shall regard his remarks as biased and, therefore, prejudicial to an honest description of the aesthetic existence. The Judge's remarks are perceptive, and he will have a chance to speak later. Now, however, we must hear about aestheticism from an aesthete. Our task in this chapter is to glean the meaning of temporality which accords with the aesthetic conception of life, reality and truth, and this must be understood from one who knows the subject from within.

1. As will SK's own statements from the Point of View and the Journals. I wish to re-emphasize that words of explanation about a life orientation either by a pseudonym or by SK differ from a description of a life orientation by one living it. As an actor performs and also discusses his performance, so SK describes and also discusses. Here we are concerned only with the performance or description, and we need to hold the discussion in abeyance until we are ready for it. As it happens, any discussion of a life orientation represents a point of view different from that of one living it.

It has been popular for students of SK to point out that there ~~is not one but~~^{are} many literary representatives of the aesthetic life orientation. This is true enough if one takes into account all the participants of "The Banquet" which is "recollected" in the first section of Stages On Life's Way,¹ but in effect what each of these men had to say was contained in a very few pages² and contributed very little to the formation and character of the Kierkegaardian aesthetic as it has always been understood. What we normally consider to be aesthetical comes from the pen of one aesthete, the young man designated A, the author of the diverse writings edited in Vol. I of Either/Or. It is true, however, that we are presented with an array of aesthetic experience, and A makes an excellent representative of that "sphere" for the present chapter.

Aesthetic Temporality

The first volume of Either/Or is a complex work. It consists of sundry writings which allude to and reflect many variations of

1. Stages, pp. 21-93.

2. The "young man", c. 15 pp.; Constantine Constantius, 7 pp.; Victor Eremita, 8 pp.; the Ladies Tailor, 5 pp.; Johannes the Seducer, 7½ pp.

aesthetic sensibility. These papers were edited by one Victor Eremita¹ who claimed to have found them in an old desk drawer. As if this were not sufficiently complicated, A claims to have edited the selection entitled "The Diary of a Seducer". This, if true, would leave us with a pseudonymous editor of a pseudonymous editor. Eremita, however, suggests in his preface that A might² himself be the author of the diary.

Such an array is presented in Either/Or I that at first glance there seems to be no common ground or unifying principle of interpretation. We know, of course, that they are united as "aesthetic", but this is of no help unless we understand what "aesthetic" means for the author. From a first, cursory reading we can perceive that "aesthetic" stands for a mood or attitude as opposed to an intellectual conceptualization. In fact, we find no definite statement or definition made by an aesthete as to the nature of the aesthetic; it is unlikely that they understood it intellectually themselves.

Owing to this lack of intellectual statement, perhaps it will not be entirely hypocritical to resort to some outside comment prior to our description. We do have some statements from those who knew well the writings of Either/Or I from close at hand, and

1. The pseudonym means victorious religious recluse or solitary individual.

2. E/O I, p. 9.

these we might well regard as authoritative. Judge Wilhelm, for example, corresponds directly with A, and his definite views in regard to the nature of the aesthetic might reflect those of his younger friend. "The aesthetical in a man," he writes, "is that by which he is immediately what he is."¹ Johannes Climacus concurs; the aesthetic is immediacy. An aesthete is one who is immediate, that is one who finds no contradiction in the fact of existing.²

In fact, immediacy (Umiddelbarhed) is a concept of paramount importance for SK throughout his authorship. It seems to underlie all his aesthetic themes, and it deserves our close attention here. Indeed, some scholars have implied that immediacy is the primary concept to be analyzed if one is to comprehend SK at all. Two examples come to mind of philosophers whose approaches to and conclusions about SK differ but who agree about the centrality and significance of immediacy: Louis Mackey, providing what may loosely be called a "psychological" interpretation of SK, suggests that all of SK's writings lament an immediacy hopelessly lost in reflection.³ By "immediacy" Mackey has reference to a common understanding of the term as direct experience, "simply given"

1. E/O II, p. 182.

2. Postscript, p. 507.

3. Cf. op. cit., pp. 45-107.

and "simply had" prior to the onset of conscious reflection about this experience. On this interpretation "reflection" vitiates "immediate" experience and represents a loss of pristine innocence. Consequently Mackey submits that SK's view of the Christian consummation represents a "new immediacy, a recovery of the Self as simply given, only now by virtue of the absurd."¹

Ingvar Horgby, with his interest in SK's ontology,² also alludes to the primacy of "immediacy" in the authorship. Horgby refers to "immediate reality", and by this he means "reality that is not reflected upon". This, he says, is what SK calls "immediacy". Such a rendering would indicate SK's closeness to Hegel who often speaks of immediacy in this way. For example, at the beginning of The Phenomenology of Mind, in the context of a consideration of certainty at the level of sense-experience, Hegel writes that "the thing, the fact, is; that it is merely because it is. It is--that is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and that bare fact being, that simple immediacy, constitutes its truth."³

1. Ibid., p. 47. Cf. Stages, p. 365; Postscript, p. 310.

2. Ingvar Horgby, "Immediacy-Subjectivity-Revelation: An Interpretation of Kierkegaard's Conception of Reality", Inquiry, Vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring, 1965), pp. 84-117.

3. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. by J. B. Baillie, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967), p. 150. Hereafter cited as Phenomenology. The immediacy described in this passage is, in Hegel's terms, pure (unmediated) immediacy.

This kind of immediacy is denigrated by both SK and Hegel; it is tenuous, unstable, external, and in stages subsequent to the aesthetic it is ostensibly transformed by conscious reflection. We shall consider this in a later chapter wherein life orientations more reflective than the aesthetic will be discussed. For the present, these philosophical considerations will be set aside as foreign to the aesthetic way of life and thus inappropriate to our descriptive task at this point. Yet we may utilize this brief "outside" information as a legitimate observation about the aesthetic existence as a point of beginning: The aesthetic is a life orientation in which the trick is to live "immediately", i.e. wherein the aesthete desires to be what he is pre-reflectively, where he would like to live, to remain, as it were, at a level of experience prior to reflection. In short, the aesthete wants to live in conformity with the original meaning of the concept αἴσθησις, at the level of sense-perception.

The conclusion of all this would seem to be that whatever aesthetic immediacy is, it is impossible to apprehend it by reading books or doctoral theses which are attempts to analyze and are thus several times removed from any kind of immediacy. This is a problem even for the practicing aesthete, or, better, it is especially a problem for the aesthete who has been selected to represent the aesthetic in writing. Nevertheless, I believe it

is important to recognize that in the writings of A we have just such an attempt.

In his essay entitled, "The Immediate Stages of the Erotic or the Musical Erotic",¹ A proffers a quasi-philosophical analysis of the essence of pure aesthetic immediacy. The essay is fascinating for our purposes because in the process of his inquiry into immediacy, A reveals his own sense of temporality. In this essay he wants to emboss the quality or inmost essence of sensuousness, that which he calls the "sensuous genius" (Sandselige Genialitet)² and which he regards as "the most abstract idea".³ In a passage which is particularly revealing about his view of temporality A argues that this idea of sensuousness can be expressed solely in the medium of music:

It cannot be expressed in sculpture, for it is a sort of inner qualification of inwardness; nor in painting, for it cannot be apprehended in precise outlines; it is an energy, a storm, impatience, passion and so on,

1. E/O I, pp. 43-134.

2. E/O I, p. 55.

3. David Swenson's note on the translation of Sandselige Genialitet concerning the word sandselig is helpful. He points out that the Danish language (unlike English) does not distinguish between sensuous and sensual. Sensual carries moral overtones, whereas sensuous does not. Genialitet, he says, designates not a person but a quality or capacity. The complete phrase indicates "the quality or inmost essence of sensuousness". (E/O I, p. 447). It is clear that A has reference to an energy or force which is prior to any reflections of morality. Here he is writing of "immediate" at the level of αισθησις.

in all their lyrical quality, yet so that it does not exist in one moment but in a succession of moments, for if it existed in a single moment, it could be modeled or painted. The fact that it exists in a succession of moments expresses its epic character, but still it is not epic in the stricter sense, for it has not yet advanced to words, but moves always in an immediacy. Hence it cannot be represented in poetry. The only medium which can express it is music. Music has, namely, an element of time in itself but it does not take place in time except in an unessential sense. The historical process in time it cannot express.¹

From this passage we learn that (a) the essence of immediacy is sensuous energy or passion, the sensuous erotic, (b) this "sensuous genius" is an abstract idea that can be expressed only in music, and (c) this is so because inherent in music is an element of time which is necessary for the expression of this sensuousness.

In consideration of this last point it is important, I believe, to realize that the interpretation, so common among students of SK, of "immediate" as "momentary", (i.e. without regard for time) and the accompanying caricature of the aesthete as one who lives "for the moment" without care for the future, is not altogether correct. The immediate cannot exist in a single moment-- it is not "momentary" in this sense--for it requires a succession of moments. That is, it moves and must keep moving in order to qualify as immediacy. It exists not in one moment but in a succession of moments.

1. E/O I, p. 55.

The passage quoted above is significant for our investigation because it expresses A's view of time as a succession of moments. This succession, an element of music itself, is essential to aesthetic immediacy. A, of course, has specific reference to the music of Mozart and particularly to the opera Don Giovanni which, in his opinion, is the perfect medium for the "sensuous genius". This latter is an abstract idea, but, owing to the time-succession element, it is an idea which is absolutely musical. For this reason, "the music does not appear as an accompaniment, but reveals its own innermost essence in revealing the idea."¹ This explains why A praises Mozart as the "highest among the Immortals" and Don Giovanni as the classic of all classical works.

The character Don Juan is also the perfect embodiment of the sensual erotic. He represents sensual immediacy at its zenith, and his ideal existence is marked by its lack of reflection. Don Juan is lack of reflection; he is pure sensuous enjoyment, and as such he resists reflection, the enemy of the immediate. His is an existence without reflection or morality² and, therefore, without contradiction. He is not a seducer of reflection or consciousness. Moral categories do not apply to him; he is not immoral,

1. E/O I, p. 56.

2. E/O I, p. 97. Cf. T. H. Croxall's arguments in his Kierkegaard Studies and Kierkegaard Commentary.

but a-moral. He floats between being an individual and being
 a force of nature.¹ He desires and is desire--and this desire
 is indiscriminant: "purchè porti la gonella, voi sapete quel
chè fa."²

This brings us back to the point I wish to make here concerning temporality. A tells us that Don Juan is the abstract idea of sensuous immediacy expressed musically. More specifically, the real "epic" of Don Juan is the musical aria, "The List of the Seduced".³ The point A wants to make is that the "epic" of Don Juan is the unrolling of the list, that is, its quality of going on. Don Juan, the character, will never finish his unreflective "seductions", and the music which best expresses this quality of going on will itself never finish. Of course, the libretto does end, and the musical epic is even comparatively short, but this is only, we should imagine, for the sake of the audience. Actually, according to A, the music has "in an inimitable manner the epic quality that it can go on as long as it will, since one can constantly let it begin again from the beginning, and hear it over and over again, just because it expresses the general in

1. E/O, I, p. 95.

2. Wolfgang Mozart, Don Giovanni, "The List of the Seduced": "If only she wears a petticoat, you know what he does." Cf. E/O I, pp. 96 ff.

3. The passage I have reference to is E/O I, pp. 94-95. I believe this passage to contain the essence of A's view of temporality.

the concreteness of immediacy."¹ In this "going on" Don Juan becomes "sensuous genius".

Only in this manner can Don Juan become epic, in that he constantly finishes, and constantly begins again from the beginning, for his life is the sum of repellent moments which have no coherence, his life as moment is the sum of the moments, as the sum of the moments is the moment.²

This, in substance, is A's notion of temporality. Don Juan simply "goes on". He does not reflect. "He requires no preparation, no plan, no time; for he is always prepared."³ For this reason Don Juan is absolutely musical.

He desires sensuously, he seduces with the daemonic power of sensuousness, he seduces everyone. Speech, dialogue are not for him, for then he would be at once a reflective individual. Thus he does not have stable existence at all, but he hurries in a perpetual vanishing, precisely like music, about which it is true that it is over as soon as it has ceased to sound, and only comes into being again, when it again sounds.⁴

In Don Juan as depicted by A, we discover an existence which is completely determined by immediacy. Such an existence is dominated by the transitory. Like Mozart's music, it does not endure;⁵

1. E/O I, p. 95.

2. E/O I, p. 95. My italics.

3. E/O I, p. 100.

4. E/O I, p. 101.

5. The writer wishes to emphasize that this is A's interpretation of Mozart's music. Whether music in general and Mozart's music in particular are characterized by transition and lack of endurance is a matter of debate, but it is a debate I wish to avoid for the moment. Here we are attending to A's point of view only, and it is that music exists only in the moment (dieblik) of its performance. E/O I, p. 67.

it passes away and begins again with each new moment, and the
 ideal aesthetic life is simply the sum of the successive moments.¹
 And, like music, it is constantly being annulled.²

In all of this, however, we must recognize that we are not
 attending to "immediacy" immediately. Music is, after all, an
art, and art requires the spirit or genius of the artist. For A
 music is far superior as an expression of the immediate. Langu-
 age involves reflection, and reflection destroys the immediate.³
 In fact, even music as an art (i.e. as "qualified spiritually")
 can be used to express something other than immediacy, but when
 it is so used, then music is a "foreign sphere"⁴ and is out of
 its element. This happens, for instance, when music is utilized
 to express some spiritual theme. But when music is used to ex-
 press sensuous immediacy, then it is at home.

The genius of sensuousness is hence the absolute
 subject of music. In its very essence sensuousness is
 absolutely lyrical, and in music it breaks forth in all
 its lyrical impatience. It is, namely, spiritually de-
 termined, and is, therefore, force, life, movement,
 constant unrest, perpetual succession; but this unrest,
 this succession, does not enrich it, it remains always
 the same, it does not unfold itself, but it storms un-
 interruptedly forward as if in a single breath. If I

1. E/O I, p. 95.

2. E/O I, p. 69.

3. E/O I, p. 68.

4. E/O I, p. 69.

desire to characterize this lyrical quality by a single predicate, I should say: it sounds; and this brings me back again to sensuous genius as that which in its immediacy manifests itself in music.¹

Music, then, is formal and abstract; it lacks content; it is perpetual succession. Precisely the same is true of Don Juan. He is an idea, an abstract idea, and not a real man. He represents immediate, undifferentiated sensuousness and, as such, is abstract in his lack of specificity. His desire has no specific object. He is formal, abstract, amoral "sensuous genius". Don Juan is a pure type; he is art. The opera, owing to Mozart's musical sensibilities, is a pure representation of a pure type. Don Juan is impossible in real life--1003 in Spain would scarcely leave one time enough to attend to the rest of Europe, even if one were, as Don Juan, a man in a hurry. Real life is characterized by reflection, the destroyer of immediacy, even for the aesthete. When one begins to think about immediacy or even to consciously attempt to live immediately, immediacy is lost in the attempt.

From A's perspective this is extremely unfortunate, for he is an aesthete, and an aesthete is one who attempts to be what he is immediately. His aim is to achieve direct satisfaction of his desires; he lives for pleasure, yet it is impossible to achieve, for the aim itself suggests the element of reflection. He is drawn into "the paradox of immediacy" which ensnares the aesthetic

1. E/O 1, p. 70.

life. His existence is not characterized by immediacy but by preoccupation with immediacy. The aesthete is not Don Juan but one who esteems Don Juan.

A is captivated by the Don, by this life of repellent moments without coherence which hurries in a perpetual vanishing. Failing to achieve satisfaction of immediate pleasures, A strives for the satisfaction of contrived pleasures. Failing to make his life immediacy, he makes his life art, and takes pleasure in the idea of immediacy. In this he is somewhat successful.¹ By finding pleasure in the transitory existence of Don Juan, he seeks to make his own life transient. His life becomes for him the art of the transient.

The secret of the aesthetic life, then, is to avoid anything which so much as hints at permanence. The aesthete must shun any type of personal involvement. This requires substantial effort. In his essay on "Social Prudence, the Rotation Method", A puts forward a guide for the successful aesthete. One must own nothing nor desire to own anything so that one has nothing to lose. One must guard against friendship and, above all, never enter into a relationship of marriage.¹ The aesthete must remain utterly

1. E/O 1, pp. 291-293.

independent of all entrapments. He must have his own way¹ so that he might control the art of the transitory which is his existence.

This independence is made possible only by hard work. For instance, one must cultivate certain skills such as the art of remembering and forgetting. This art will insure one "against² sticking fast in some relationship of life", and undergirds the entire "rotation method", since every particular change in the changing mode of cultivation comes under the categories of remembering and forgetting.

Life in its entirety moves in these two currents, and hence it is essential to have them under control. It is impossible to live artistically before one has made up one's mind to abandon hope; for hope precludes self-limitation. . . . To forget--all men wish to forget, and when something unpleasant happens, they always say: Oh, that one might forget! But forgetting is an art that must be practiced beforehand. The ability to forget is conditioned upon the method of remembering, but this again depends upon the mode of experiencing reality. Whoever plunges into his experiences with the momentum of hope will remember in such wise that he is unable to forget. Nil admirari [to wonder at nothing] is therefore the real philosophy. No moment must be permitted so great a significance

1. Cf. one of the Diapsalmata: "The essence of pleasure does not lie in the thing enjoyed, but in the accompanying consciousness. If I had a humble spirit in my service who, when I asked for a glass of water, brought me the world's costliest wines blended in a chalice, I should dismiss him, in order to teach him that pleasure consists not in what I enjoy, but in having my own way." E/O I, p. 30.

2. E/O I, p. 291.

that it cannot be forgotten when convenient; each moment ought, however, to have so much significance that it can be recollected at will.¹

The "remembering" to which A alludes in this context is a "poetic remembering". Remembering poetically is really another expression for forgetting, for "the more poetically one remembers, the more easily one forgets."² This is so, according to A, because in a poetic memory, the experience has undergone a transformation by which it has lost all its painful aspects. Thus, poetic memory, unlike involuntary memory, requires some editing. Note, however, that this editing must be in advance; it would not be very poetic to remember the complete experience and then block out the painful aspects. No, one must be prepared to "edit", to "remember", in advance, while the experience is going on. This is not an easy task.

To remember in this manner, one must be careful how one lives, how one enjoys. Enjoying an experience to its full intensity to the last minute will make it impossible either to remember or to forget. For there is nothing to remember except a certain satiety, which one desires to forget, but which now comes back to plague the mind with an involuntary remembrance. Hence, when you begin to notice that a certain pleasure of experience is acquiring too strong a hold upon the mind, you stop for a moment for the purpose of remembering. No other method can better create a distaste for continuing the experience too long.³

1. E/O I, pp. 288-289.

2. E/O I, p. 289.

3. E/O I, p. 289.

The reader will recognize in this attitude of existential "interruptus" that which underlies the experience of Johannes the Seducer and of the young lover of Repetition, and perhaps of SK himself.

When two beings fall in love with one another and begin to suspect that they were made for each other, it is time to have the courage to break it off; for by going on they have everything to lose and nothing to gain. This seems a paradox, and it is so for the feeling, but not for the understanding: In this sphere it is particularly necessary that one should make use of one's moods; through them one may realize an inexhaustible variety of combinations.¹

The point for the aesthete, then, is to stay in control. Since genuine immediacy is ideal, one must be psychologically prepared to contrive the pleasure, lest the realities inherent in an experience ruin the aesthetic enjoyment entirely. And to be able, in the midst of one's enjoyment, to look back upon it for the purpose of remembering it, is contriving par excellence. In A's account: "One who has perfected himself in the two arts of remembering and forgetting is in a position to play at battledore and shuttlecock with the whole of existence."²

1. E/O I, p. 294. Cf. the following from the Diapsalmata: "The moment I have remembered some life-relationship, that moment it ceased to exist. People say that separation tends to revive love. Quite true, but it revives it in a purely poetic manner. The life that is lived wholly in memory is the most perfect conceivable, the satisfactions of memory are richer than any reality and have a security that no reality possesses. A remembered life-relation has already passed into eternity, and has no more temporal [timelig] interest." E/O I, p. 32.

2. E/O I, p. 290.

The aesthete who is in control (and every aesthete must be in control) confirms, by the art of poetic remembering, a past of pleasure without dissonance. At the same time, by the art of forgetting, he avoids a present cluttered with unpleasant difficulties. Further, by holding both arts together, i.e. by expertise in the art known as the "Rotation Method", he evades the future and its apprehensions altogether. Of course, the future is not entirely obliterated unless one abandons hope, for hope is the very spirit of human anticipation. It is needless to say, therefore, that the first step recommended by A as a rigorous warm-up for the practice of Rotation is to abandon hope entirely. By this means the aesthete is able to elude all permanence thoroughly by living a life of formal, contrived pleasure which consciously shuns all pain, suffering, hurt or discomfort. By consciously rotating his pleasures, he is able to mimic on the reflective level the idea of pure immediacy, Don Juan. Attending his guiding motto, nil admirari, he is never so foolish as to attach any great importance to one person, event or pleasure. He thus leaves himself free to enjoy every pleasure. If one were to set one's life on one thing only, the rotation method would fail as utterly as if a farmer had only one acre of land, making it impossible for him to fallow. The "essential secret" of aesthetic rotation is that one must

constantly vary oneself.¹ "The eye with which you look at reality must constantly be changed."² This means that one must have absolute command over one's moods, and this in turn requires that one discover how to utilize each passing moment.

Hence the aesthetic sense of temporality, far from involving any sort of personal constancy, requires that one attune his life with the fluctuations of external events and moments. In this way one strives to make the best out of each passing moment. The secret of this utilization lies in the art of arbitrariness.³ Arbitrariness is a theme of exceptional import for the aesthetic existence, and it links with another significant theme for the aesthete: the accidental. According to A, it is not easy to be arbitrary; on the contrary, it demands much study and effort.

One does not enjoy the immediate but something quite different which he arbitrarily imports into it. You go to see the middle of a play, you read the third part of a book. By this means you insure yourself a very different kind of enjoyment from that which the author has been so kind as to plan for you. You enjoy something entirely accidental; you consider the whole of existence from this standpoint; let its reality be stranded thereon.⁴

The aesthete's arbitrary interest fragments reality and he is able to transform something accidental into something absolute,

1. E/O I, pp. 294-295.

2. E/O I, p. 296.

3. E/O I, p. 295.

4. Ibid.

which he then makes the object of his admiration.¹ He regards everything in life from the standpoint of a wager. This is the zenith of aesthetic stimulation, for the ensuing combinations and possibilities become increasingly amusing. This arbitrariness in oneself corresponds to "the accidental" in the external world.² Therefore, A admonishes us to keep our arbitrarily changing eyes open for the accidental. Always be expeditus, he charges, just in case anything should turn up. "The so-called social pleasures for which we prepare a week or two in advance amount to so little; on the other hand, even the most insignificant thing may accidentally offer rich material for amusement."³

With an eye open for the accidental, the aesthete is able to remain in control. In control, ~~in~~ expeditus, means simply that he is prepared to enjoy what he cannot control, that which lies outside of him and which comes toward him at random or accidentally. By making himself arbitrary, A is able to reap amazing benefits, even to the extent of enjoying misfortune and death.

-
1. E/O I, p. 296.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

At first this seems odd: The aesthete supposedly devoted to a life of pleasure is preoccupied with sorrow, misfortune and death.¹ Indeed, many of the aesthetic writings are imagined addresses before a society or brotherhood of persons who are obsessed with death, the "Symparanekromenoi",² the living deceased.

Misfortune and death, the ultimate limitations to pleasure, are themselves transformed by the contriving aesthete into occasions for pleasure. In this the aesthetic art has reached its zenith. One must be able and willing to stop in the very midst of "ordinary" pleasure and joy, and at that precise moment recall some sorrow or despair. This practice rehearses the ultimate form of aesthetic enjoyment,³ melancholy.

Like the practitioners of the Rotation Method, the Symparanekromenoi are enchanted by the transitory and the arbitrary.

1. We find a preoccupation with these themes throughout A's writings; they appear over and over again in the Diapsalmata, where he connects pleasure and death. "There are well-known insects which die in the moment of fecundation. So it is with all joy; life's supreme and richest moment of pleasure is coupled with death." (E/O I, p. 20.). In the "Shadowgraphs" he ponders sorrow and "reflective grief"; in "The Ancient Tragical Motif As Reflected in the Modern", anxiety and sorrow occupy his thoughts; in "The Unhappiest Man" unhappiness and death engage him.

2. Coined by A who juxtaposed the Greek terms. Edouard Geismar translates it as "the fellowship of buried lives", and T. H. Croxall concurs that these lives are "spiritually or mentally entombed and isolated". Cf. Swenson's note, E/O I, p. 450.

3. E/O I, p. 20.

They form a society dedicated to the art of aesthetic living.

Let us then describe our purpose as an attempt in fragmentary pursuits, or in the art of writing posthumous papers. A completely finished work has no relation to the poetic personality; in the case of posthumous papers one constantly feels, because of the incompleteness, the desultoriness, a need to romance about the personality. Posthumous papers are like a ruin, and what haunted place could be more natural for the interest? The art, then, is artistically to produce the same effect, the same appearance of carelessness and the accidental, the same anacoluthic flight of thought; the art consists in producing an enjoyment which never actually becomes present, but always has an element of the past in it, so that it is present in the past.¹ This has already been expressed in the word: posthumous.

Like the Rotation practitioners, the Symparanekromenoi experience life as arbitrariness and view reality as accidental. The accidental reality is distinguished by its continual passing. "All things² vanish" is the primary catechism of the Symparanekromenoi, and as a result their essays are "fragmentary" and incomplete. Nothing is completely finished; all things vanish.

According to A's logic, two things follow: (1) Since reality passes and because its passing is desultory, it can never be concluded or fulfilled. Consequently, all of reality is "posthumous";

1. E/O I, p. 150; my italics.

2. E/O I, p. 165.

1
it is characterized as having already passed away. (2) This
being so, it is essential for the aesthete not only artistically
to produce works which "have the same effect", but, since aesthe-
tic existence is an art of living, it is essential for the aesthete
to live posthumously. That is to say, the aesthete must live as
2
if already dead. Here again we see that the aesthetic sense of
life requires that one shuns any personal cohesion of the tem-
poral modes. There really is no personal past, present, or fu-
ture for the Rotation practitioner or for the Sympanek³kromenoi.

The same sense of temporality is given further expression in
the quasi-Hegelian essay, "The Unhappiest Man"³ in which A shows
the unhappiest man to be, paradoxically, the happiest man. For
Hegel, ~~the~~ unhappy consciousness is one which has its ideal out-
side itself, with the result that this consciousness is in con-
flict and never present to itself either in the past or in the
4
future.

1. Compare the emphasis in the Banquet scene in Stages where
the participants vow to forget each speech immediately with a gulp
of wine.

2. Cf. the motto of Quidham's Diary: Periisem nisi periisem
(I had perished, had I not perished). The same phrase is found in
the Journals (no. 767) where SK refers to it as the motto of his
life.

3. Cf. Hegel's teaching concerning the "Unhappy Consciousness"
(unglückliches Bewusstsein) in his Phenomenology, B. IV B: Philoso-
phy of History, part 4, sec. 2, chaps. 1 & 2, and History of Phil-
osophy, Intro. and part 2.

4. Phenomenology, IV B; pp. 241-267.

A agrees with Hegel that the unhappy person is he who is not present to himself, and he outlines two main existential expressions of this in his search for the unhappiest man. Some individuals who live in hope may be unhappy, so long as they are never present to themselves in this hope. This qualification is important because it is possible that one might hope (say for eternal life) and in a certain sense be unhappy, since he has renounced the present. Yet he still would not be unhappy in a strict sense because he would himself be present in his hope. To be truly unhappy, one must not be present to himself in this hope; he must lose his hope, then hope again and again lose and again hope until he is absent from himself not only with respect to the present, but also with respect to the future.¹

Secondly, there is a parallel unhappiness in the case of a man who lives in memory. If he can find himself in the past, he is not, in the strict sense, unhappy. To be truly unhappy, he must be constantly absent from himself in the past.² A claims that memory is the real element of the unhappy. The past, because of its pastness is further from the present than is the future (which

1. E/O I, p. 221.

2. Ibid.

is yet-to-come and, therefore, in "a certain sense" nearer the present than the past).¹

In his involuted way, A next imagines a combination of the two types of unhappiness, such that when it is memory which prevents the unhappy individual from finding himself in hope, and hope which prevents him from finding himself in his memory:

When this happens, it is, on the one hand, due to the fact that he constantly hopes something that should be remembered; his hope constantly disappoints him and, in disappointing him, reveals to him that it is not because it is already past and gone, has already been experienced, or should have been experienced, and thus has passed over into memory. On the other hand, it is due to the fact that he always remembers that for which he ought to hope; for the future he has already anticipated in thought, in thought already experienced it, and this experience he now remembers, instead of hoping for it. Consequently, what he hopes for lies behind him, what he remembers lies before him. His life is not so much lived regressively as it suffers a two-fold reversal.²

Thus the truly unhappy individual has neither memory nor hope. In fact, he has no time at all. His life is "restless and without content". Because he is absent from himself, he does not live in the present; nor does he live in the future, for the future has already been experienced; nor in the past, for the past has not yet come.

1. E/O I, p. 221.

2. E/O I, p. 223.

He cannot become old, for he has never been young; he cannot become young, for he is already old. In one sense he cannot live, for he is already dead. He cannot love, for love is in the present, and he has no present, no future and no past; and yet he has a sympathetic nature, and he hates the world only because he loves it. He has no passion, not because he is destitute of it, but because simultaneously he has the opposite passion. He has no time for anything, not because his time is taken up with something else, but because he has no time at all.¹

The unhappiest man, before whom the Symparanekromenoi bow low, is thus the one who absents himself not only from the present, but from the past and future as well. There is absolutely no content to his life. His future, constantly anticipated, is thus already past, and his past, never really lived, has not yet come. The greatest happiness, death, is kept alive by the one whose life is death. Dying in life is the greatest unhappiness, and is thus the greatest happiness.²

Who is the unhappiest man whose life seems divorced from temporality? None other than the aesthete himself. It is hardly surprizing, then, that we find the same theme throughout A's writings.³ It is especially evident in the singular seduction achieved

1. E/O I, p. 224.

2. E/O I, p. 228.

3. Cf. e.g.: "Vainly I strive against it. My foot slips. My life is still a poet's existence. What could be more unhappy? I am predestined; fate laughs at me when suddenly it shows me how everything I do to resist becomes a moment in such existence. I can describe hope so vividly that every hoping individual will acknowledge my description; and yet it is a deception, for while I picture hope, I think of memory." (B/O I, p. 35, my italics).

1

by Johannes the Seducer. His actions disclose his belief that only the love that lives in memory is worthwhile. He is eager to seduce Cordelia² so that at the precise moment of seduction he might leave her. Johannes reflects the same orientation in life as do the practitioners of the Rotation Method, the Symparanekromenoi and the Unhappiest Man, viz. an attraction for the external and ephemeral and an apprehension of the permanent. This sense of life may be summarized in the following reflection by Johannes:

How Cordelia engrosses me! And yet the time is soon over; always my soul requires rejuvenescence. I can already hear, as it were, the far distant crowing of the cock. Perhaps she hears it too, but she believes it heralds the morning. --Why is a young girl so pretty, and why does it last so short a time? I could become quite melancholy over this thought, and yet it is no concern of mine. Enjoy, do not talk.³

All the themes we have been discussing are contained in this passage. The Seducer is melancholic over the ephemeral nature of

1. "The Diary of a Seducer" stands in an odd relation to the rest of A's writings. A purports to have discovered the manuscript in an unlocked secretary, but, as Victor Eremita intimates in his preface (E/O I, p. 9), it probably represents the logical extension in possibility of A's own personality as viewed objectively by himself. This amounts to the beginning of reflection and the end of immediacy, and indeed Johannes is the ideal form of reflection--pure reflection--just as Don Juan was pure immediacy.

2. Unlike Don Juan, who was indiscriminant in his desires, Johannes wants a particular young girl. And, of course, for Johannes the seduction is purely mental.

3. E/O I, p. 430. My italics.

that which he prizes above all--in this case a young girl's beauty. It vanishes like all things, as the Symparanekromenoi taught. Consequently he can see the end of it just when he first begins to notice it. His task, then, is to ready himself for the moment of seduction so that he might enjoy it without reflection, for it will soon slip by.

What Johannes does reflect on is precisely what moment should be regarded as the most seductive.¹ This moment is of the greatest importance, and the Seducer stakes everything on it even though he knows it will eventually elude him. He invests the moment with all of eternity: "The moment is everything, and in the moment, woman is everything; the consequences I do not understand."²

Thus the Seducer unites that which he values most, a woman, with the moment itself. He gathers together all the aspects of feminine beauty and concentrates them into one particular woman whom he must have above all else. "Let God keep His heaven if only I can keep her."³

Johannes mirrors here the aesthete's concern for an existence which is governed by "the moment". This moment, this now, is

1. E/O I, p. 431.

2. E/O I, p. 427.

3. E/O I, pp. 423-424.

everything; it is an eternity for the aesthete.¹ He connects it with what he wants most, makes the young woman's existence into an idea useful to himself, and pours his being into it: "How much I have gathered into this one moment which now draws nigh. Damnation if I should fail!"²

This moment carries the aesthete away in a wave of emotion which is expressed as mood. But, of course, he is capable of a variety of moods. Indeed, the aesthete strives for a multiplicity of moods. A devoted practitioner of the Rotation Method, he rotates his personality until it disappears in the multiplicity. This is the aesthetic art, with its emphasis on transience and lack of continuity and its avoidance of permanence.

Summary

There are two negative observations concerning the aesthetic conception of temporality which need to be recorded at the outset of this summary. First, we find no formal conception of temporality proffered by the array of aesthetic writings we have perused. Temporality is not a concept which A discusses academically. Second, we observe no positive sense of constancy amid

1. E/O I, p. 433. Cf. p. 427.

2. E/O I, p. 439.

change represented in the aesthetic. The aesthete avoids any personal connection of the temporal modes.¹ However, it would be wrong to conclude that there is no aesthetic sense of temporality. Let me summarize:

We have seen that the highest aesthetic value, actively sought by A above all else was "immediacy". Our inquiry into the nature of immediacy which traced A's analysis of the "musical erotic" and the "sensuous genius" revealed that the principle which underlies immediacy is successive movement. In immediacy what is of interest to the aesthete is the moving. The aesthete must put his being in flux lest he be bogged down in some sticky permanence. But always the nature of the moving is succession. Don Juan's "going on" is defined in terms of one conquest after another. As the "List" unfolds, one by one, so the Don's life unfolds; his existence is defined successively, in terms of one conquest after another as separate quanta in a series. His life, as A expressed it, is the sum of "repellent moments".² The endeavor

1. Both these points seem to be corroborated by our computer word-study of the Danish text. The concept Timelighed (temporality) fails to make a single appearance in any of the writings which represent the aesthetic life orientation. Nor do any of its cognates appear, not even the adjectives--with two insignificant exceptions (timlig in E/O 1, p. 32 and in Stages, p. 88, translated as "temporal" in both places). See Appendix. Considering SK's literary skills and the subject matter of the writings, this hardly seems accidental. However, I wish to defer a discussion of SK's literary intentions to a later chapter.

2. E/O 1, p. 95. Cf. supra p. 57.

to make his life a sum of repellent moments requires that the aesthete attune himself to an external world in which he is able to experience successivemoments which approach him accidentally or at random. In order to utilize these moments, he must strive to make his life arbitrary and attempt to live in contingency, separating himself from anything permanent or enduring. He affects arbitrariness in his life by practicing the art of rotation, and by this art his personality becomes manifold. Speaking spatially, we say that by rotating his personality, the aesthete is able to remain outside himself. Speaking temporally, we say that he avoids being present to himself. By abandoning hope and by poetic remembering and forgetting he evades all content and becomes a passing moment in the existence of the world.¹ By "rotating" or, as the Symparanekromenoi would express it, by making himself posthumous, the aesthete skillfully shuns the future entirely. He accomplishes this by exercising his poetic memory.

The life that is lived wholly in memory is the most perfect conceivable, the satisfactions of memory are richer than any reality, and have a security that no reality possesses. A remembered life-relationship has already passed into eternity, and has no more temporal interest.²

As we have seen in "The Unhappiest Man", A describes two forms of unhappiness. First there is the self which has

1. See supra p. 64. Cf. E/O I, p. 35.

2. E/O I, p. 31-32. Cf. note 18, supra p. 63.

abandoned hope and thus cannot find itself in the future. This self fails to relate itself to its possibilities, thus refusing to acknowledge its future. And, since possibilities already constitute the self in its present mode, the future is severed from the present mode of consciousness. The second form of unhappiness results when the self is absent from itself in memory and is therefore unable to find itself in its past. In this case, the temporal mode of pastness has become irrelevant to the present; it has simply "gone by" without having been taken up into present existence.

Further, the aesthetic view of temporality is expressed in a life orientation not only toward succession of moments, but to a succession of moments which lies outside itself. In this way an aesthete escapes his present because, like everything else, it vanishes. This is clear in the case of Johannes the Seducer who stakes everything on the moment which lies outside himself. And it is characteristic of these moments that they pass by. "How much I have gathered into this one moment which now draws nigh. Damnation if I should fail!"¹ For Johannes and for every aesthete, everything is invested in the moment which quickly passes by. The sense of this is the aesthetic sense of temporality.

1. E/O I, p. 439.

~~temporality~~. It is a life orientation indeed, but it is a conscious orientation toward the successive and toward the external.

In spite of all this, there are hints from time to time that the aesthete is capable of drawing together his purposely multifarious personality into one--which would be a movement into himself or a discovery of himself. For example, after the Seducer has glowingly enumerated all varieties of feminine traits, he then speaks of his reaction to them as first multitudinous and then unified:

And when I have gazed and gazed again, considered and again considered the multitudinous variety, when I have smiled, sighed, flattered, threatened, desired, tempted, laughed, wept, hoped, feared, won, lost--than I shut up my fan and gather the fragments into a unity, the parts into a whole.¹

Again, when expositing the moment of seduction, Johannes at one point writes that "everything must be unified, the greatest contrasts be united in the moment."² Or again, speaking of the same moment: "How much I have gathered into this one moment which now draws nigh."³

Now this "gathering up" is suggestive of some psychic movement in the direction of the self, and that the aesthete has the

1. E/O I, p. 423.

2. E/O I, p. 431.

3. E/O I, p. 439. My italics.

power to "gather up" should never be denied. But this "gathering up", while it is formally the same movement in temporality which we shall encounter later, is not strictly a drawing together of the temporal modes into the present self (certainly a movement of temporality). On the contrary, because the aesthete has taken pains not to attach himself to anything permanent and to make his being arbitrary, what is "gathered up" always passes away. In terms of temporality this arbitrariness which we have seen to correspond to the accidental in the external world, is a "gathering up" or sense of time which corresponds to an external flux of moments. The aesthete draws up, but he has so externalized himself that the drawing up passes away. In terms of pleasure and enjoyment, the aesthete is constantly dependent upon conditions outside himself, and these conditions vary and vanish. The point is for him to orient his life in such a way that this passing away will not matter. If he is well prepared, he will take pleasure even in that.

Chapter III

AN ETHICAL VIEW OF TEMPORALITY

Introductory Remarks

From the standpoint of a study of temporality, the ethical mode of existence represents a significant advance over the aesthetic--at least in the opinions of Johannes Climacus and SK. In his "Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature", Climacus indicates that the ethicist progresses beyond the aesthetic¹ by emphasizing the category of time. SK himself also denotes the importance of time for the ethical existence. In the context of a discussion of Either/Or he remarks that the aesthetic life "comes to grief upon time" and for this reason the significance of time is stressed in the ethical.²

Impressive as this testimony may be, we shall attempt to hold it (and any conclusions associated with it) in abeyance on the ground that any such testimony might prejudice our immediate

1. Postscript, p. 262.

2. Journals, 467 (p. 128).

task which is to describe the ethical view of temporality as held¹ by one who lives ethically.

In this chapter the "ethical" will be represented by B, or Judge Wilhelm as we have come to speak of him. He is a lower court Assessor or Judge, author of the second volume of Either/Or² and defender of marriage in the second part of Stages. It is fitting for the Judge to personify the ethical, for the ethical is largely delineated negatively, vis-à-vis the aesthetical, and it is appropriate that one strong figure with such singleness of purpose as he demonstrates should stand in contrast to the barrage of Either/Or I.

The writings of Judge Wilhelm consist of two long "letters", which comprise the bulk of Either/Or II, and an essay entitled "Various Observations About Marriage in Reply to Objections" found in Stages on Life's Way.³ The letters of Either/Or II are

1. Cf. supra p.47 , n. 1 .

2. It may be argued that Johannes Climacus, as well as some other pseudonyms, also represents an ethical viewpoint, but nevertheless I shall exclude them from this chapter. Their voices will be heard in Chapter IV which will be devoted to a more abstract, philosophical and systematic discussion of temporality within the "authorship". Here I want to relate the ethical sense of temporality as a way of life and to avoid an abstract discussion. Rather than presenting SK's view by strictly adhering to the "stages", I believe it is more to our purpose to touch on as many of the multifarious portrayals of the authorship as possible.

3. Stages, pp. 95-178.

"in reply" and are addressed to A, who is a younger acquaintance of Judge Wilhelm. The two acquaintances apparently see each other often, so the letters are not written for purposes of tidings or tittle-tattle. Rather they probe A's aesthetic existence, and the Judge writes out of deference to A who, as we learn, does not appreciate direct confrontation regarding his "inner history".¹

The first essay (they are not really letters), entitled "The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage",² defends the aesthetic import of marriage against the momentary eroticism of A's brand of aestheticism. The second, "The Equilibrium between the Aesthetical and the Ethical in the Composition of Personality",³ is an attack on A's way of life and a lobbying for the ethical mode of existence, which is delineated vis-à-vis the aesthetical. These writings, along with the observations about marriage in Stages, are informal, polite exhortations directed toward A which calmly urge him to change his way of life for his own sake.⁴ Thus, the writings are not argumentative or theoretical in character (though at times they are rigorous), but rather they reflect the Judge's own life

1. E/O II, pp. 337-338.

2. E/O II, pp. 5-157.

3. E/O II, pp. 161-338.

4. See esp. E/O II, pp. 161-165.

style; they are replete with advice and wise counsel, and they constantly emphasize the importance of choice and resolution in the conduct of life.

Judge Wilhelm thus serves as spokesman for the ethical and hence as critic of the aesthetical. Here we need not be overly concerned about the correctness of his critique, for our task is simply to understand his point of view and his notion of temporality.

Ethical Temporality

As a judge, Wilhelm's days are incessantly filled with adjudications; indeed, his life itself is epitomized by decision. As an ethical man, he does not hold the matter of decision-making lightly. Understandably he is quite seriously miffed by A's attitude toward choice. Utilizing a phrase which Judge Wilhelm would hold sacred, A entitles one of his Diapsalmata "Either/Or: An Ecstatic Lecture"¹. In this A mocks the very idea of choosing one way or the other. We can imagine the painful effect its opening lines would have on Judge Wilhelm:

If you marry, you will regret it; if you do not marry, you will regret it; if you marry or do not marry, you will regret both. Laugh at the world's follies, you

1. E/O I, pp. 37-39.

will regret it; weep over them, you will also regret that; laugh at the world's follies or weep over them, you will regret both¹

This attitude, evident throughout the Diapsalmata, A terms "the sum and substance of philosophy".³ The "either/or" amounts to nothing.

In this same context A scoffs at what he calls the "successive dialectic in either/or" by means of which some deluded philosophers believe they progress by mediating opposites. Over against this A sets forth his "eternal dialectic" by means of which, he says, philosophy remains within itself. That is, by not deciding one way or another (thereby avoiding regret in either direction), A neither initiates nor ceases his philosophy. As he states it: "But since I never start, so can I never stop; my eternal departure is identical with my eternal cessation."⁴ Because he stops at the time when he begins, A's philosophy has the advantage of brevity. It is, then, completely without movement, an "eternal dialectic".

1. E/O I, p. 37.

2. Cf. "I do not care for anything. I do not care to ride, for the exercise is too violent. I do not care to walk, walking is too strenuous. I do not care to lie down, for I should either have to remain lying, and I do not care to do that, or I should have to get up again, and I do not care to do that either. Summa summarum: I do not care at all." E/O I, pp. 19-20.

3. E/O I, p. 37.

4. E/O I, p. 38.

Judge Wilhelm's position is best understood as the opposite of the foregoing; it is precisely a consideration of the nature and significance of choice as it bears upon the matter of personal identity that leads him to ruminate upon the significance of time and, thereby, to reveal his own sense of temporality.

A employs the phrase "either/or" only to express a profound indifference; either this or that, it makes no difference which you choose, for you will regret both. For Judge Wilhelm, on the other hand, "either/or" has an effect on his soul "like a magic formula of incantation",¹ and when he merely pronounces the words his soul becomes "exceeding serious, sometimes almost harrowed".² Consequently, he hurls the phrase back at A, asserting that A's soul is far too "dissolute" or dissolved to grasp what is implied in such a dilemma. A's personality lacks the energy to say "either/or" with pathos.³ For Judge Wilhelm, a man's personality or self is constituted by the choices he makes. One who counsels, "do it or don't do it, you will regret both", ridicules others and himself. This counsel, he cautions A, "is not a mere nothing but a profound mockery of yourself, a sorry proof of how limp your soul is."⁴

1. E/O II, p. 161.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. E/O II, p. 163.

Judge Wilhelm knows very well that not choos~~ing~~^{ing} is impossible, and he knows too that A is not altogether serious in his counsel of indifference. For this reason he does not pity the aesthete, but rather urges him to "come out with" what really dwells within him. This was, of course, the whole point of writing to A. A's problem, according to Judge Wilhelm, lies in his approbation of life as a masquerade, as inexhaustible material for amusement. "Your occupation consists in preserving your hiding-place, and that you succeed in doing, for your mask is the most enigmatical of all. In fact you are nothing; you are merely a relation to others, and what you are you are by virtue of this relation."¹ It is A's way to exist in persona, and for this he is chided severely: "Do you not know that there comes a midnight hour when everyone has to throw off his mask? Do you believe that life will always let itself be mocked? Do you think you can slip away a little before midnight in order to avoid this?"²

As a result of its constant masquerade, the real danger to the aesthetic way of life is that the personality itself actually dissolves or becomes dispersed and eventually becomes identified with its many masks.

1. E/O II, p. 163.

2. E/O II, p. 164.

Or can you think of anything more frightful than that it might end with your nature being resolved into a multiplicity, that you really might become many, become, like those unhappy demoniacs, a legion, and you thus would have lost the inmost and holiest thing of all in a man, the unifying power of personality?¹

The masquerade leaves the aesthete outside himself as merely an external relation, i.e. as nothing. In Kierkegaardian language, the aesthetic masquerade yields a multitude of selves and therefore no self at all.

Like Judge Wilhelm, A of course knows what every teacher of introductory Ethics is so eager to instill, viz. that not choosing is itself a choice. He knows that, in spite of his regrets, he will either have to stay in bed or get out of it. The aesthete does choose, but what is so alarming is that in so doing he still fails to gain a self. This is because the aesthete's choices do not commit him to anything; they are all for the moment.²

In contrast, our ethical spokesman contends that authentic choosing occurs only when the chooser is somehow committed in the choice. Underlying this idea of commitment is the notion of endurance. The committed choice endures. By "endurance" he means "lasting through time" so that a committed choice is one which

1. Ibid.

2. In Chapter II we saw that the aesthete strove diligently to make his choices momentary and to avoid any commitment or anything else that smacked of permanence.

is held continuously through time. Furthermore, this idea of "lasting through time" is decisive for the formation of a self. Only when the choice is extended temporally does a self emerge. Time and personal identity are correlated in choice extended temporally.

Thus the ethical "either/or" requires more than simply a choice; it needs a committed choice which shapes the personality through time. The aesthete also chooses, and in this he takes a truly decisive step, but as his choice hinges so much upon the moment which cannot be held fast, it is simply carried away and amounts to nothing.

The choice itself is decisive for the content of the personality, through the choice the personality immerses itself in the thing chosen, and when it does not choose it withers away in consumption. For an instant it is so, for an instant it may seem as if the things between which a choice is to be made lie outside of the chooser, that he stands in no relation to it, that he can preserve a stand of indifference over against it. This is the instant of deliberation, but this, like the Platonic instant, has no existence, least of all in the abstract sense in which you would hold it fast, and the longer one stares at it the less it exists.¹

The instant upon which the aesthete has invested himself has no real existence, and hence the aesthete has no real self.

In the main, Judge Wilhelm illustrates this point profusely and paradigmatically by reference to marriage. In the essay,

1. E/O II, p. 167. The Judge's reference to the non-existence of the Platonic instant will be pursued in Chapter IV.

"The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage", he does this by contrasting Romantic and conjugal love. At the outset he makes several subtle distinctions concerning love and sensuality. Romantic love, he intimates, is essentially based upon the sensuous; it is immediate; "to see her was to love her."¹ Nevertheless, Romantic love is "noble" in that it embodies "a consciousness of eternity."² All love is distinguished from lust, according to Wilhelm, in that it bears "an impress of eternity".³ That is to say, the lovers are sincerely convinced that their relationship is in itself a complete whole which can never be altered. But this conviction or assurance is based upon "a natural determinant", i.e. it has its foundation in "immediacy", and for this reason the Judge is compelled to add that "the eternal is based upon the temporal [Timelige]" and thereby cancels itself."⁴ Romantic love, in so far as it is love, is saved from being mere sensuality. The sensual is momentary; it seeks instant satisfaction. Therefore, the conviction of the lovers that their love is complete and unalterable ennobles Romantic love by adding to it an element of "eternity". But this is only a "presumptive eternity" in that it amounts to

1. E/O II, p. 20.

2. E/O II, p. 21.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

little more than a refined sensuality "that knows how to make the instant of enjoyment a little eternity"¹. To this "presumptive" eternity Judge Wilhelm contrasts the "true eternity" of love.² True eternity is produced only by a determination of the will and is, therefore, indigenous to the ethical sphere of life.

There is nothing of real permanence in Romantic love. When the lovers endow the instant of embrace with eternity, they simply delude themselves; for while their intentions may be good, their love is based on the sensuous, and the sensuous is transient.³ And what is fundamentally transient can never be truly permanent.

As we have seen, the Judge refers to "the temporal" (Timelige) in this context, and it is not precisely evident from this particular passage what this concept means. We know that he has already spoken positively of time and of the necessity of extending a choice temporally if a self is ever to emerge.⁴ Here he seems to be speaking negatively about "the temporal", and it is perhaps well that we at least notice that there is some difficulty

1. E/O II, p. 22.

2. Ibid.

3. E/O II, p. 23.

4. Supra, p. 89.

here for our description.¹ We do know that the eternity claimed by Romantic love was "built upon" the "temporal" and that this "temporal" was "refined" into a kind of false or sensuous eternity and that this eternity is illusory. Judge Wilhelm further states that this is a kind of eternity characterized by an "outward teleology",² and this is tantamount to saying that it is built upon the temporal. As to whether the temporal is a positive or negative for Judge Wilhelm, I believe at this point we can only say that it is positive so long as one does not begin with it. One ought to begin with the real eternal, and the mistake of the Romantic lovers is that they think they have begun with the eternal, whereas in fact they have not. On the other hand, the temporal functions positively for one who has already begun with the truly permanent. That is, the temporal is a positive force in the ethical life secondarily in that it sustains or transforms the eternal beginning.

Perhaps this is clarified by Judge Wilhelm's contention that the conviction of immediate love requires a test. Even though

1. I wish to remind the reader that we want to save any detailed analysis for a later chapter when all the descriptive data is before us. Here the point is simply to take notice of a possible descriptive difficulty, and since in the passage in question Judge Wilhelm does not really concern himself with clarifying his use of terms, we shall not pursue the matter now.

2. E/O II, p. 28.

the Romantic lovers may be convinced of the absolute durability of their love, there is no certainty of this so long as their love is based on an "outward teleology", i.e. on the temporal. According to Judge Wilhelm, only trials and temptations of an internal¹ nature can provide such certainty.

What Judge Wilhelm calls for, then, is not the abolition of Romantic (or "first") love, but rather the transformation of it. Indeed, he devotes himself to demonstrating that marriage is the transformation of "first love", not its annihilation.² So he sets out to orient his reader toward the true nature of marriage, and since it is love that gives marriage its substantial content, he begins with a discussion of its nature. All love has in it, he says, the characteristic of eternnity. He begins with the notion of "first love" not only because he feels this to be "the most beautiful thing in life"³ but also because this enables him to contrast his position easily with that of his aesthetic friend.

The notion of "the first"--such as the first moment of love, the first green of the spring, or the first taste of a fine wine--has, he says, special significance. The aesthete also feels "the first" to be of the utmost importance; he too eulogizes not only

1. E/O II, pp. 28; 21.

2. E/O II, p. 32.

3. E/O II, p. 37.

the first love, but everything that is "first".¹ But Judge Wilhelm accuses him of not explaining what lies behind this significant concept. Indeed, the aesthete does not really know, and the Judge points out that his conception of "the first" is contradictory. A applauds "the first" and wants it to recur. However, Judge Wilhelm insists that this is self-contradictory and consequently he declares that his young friend has either never reached "the first" or else he has already had it and that what he is now enjoying is merely a reflection.² The Judge goes on to clarify "the first". He tells us that whatever significance this concept has for a particular individual is definitive for his "spiritual situation" as a whole.³ For one to whom "the first" is significant there are two possibilities: He will either be impelled by it or repelled by it.

Either 'the first' contains promise for the future, is the forward thrust, the endless impulse. [sic.] Such are the fortunate individuals for whom 'the first' is simply the present, but the present is for them the constantly unfolding and rejuvenating 'first.' Or 'the first' does not impel the individual; the power which is in 'the first' does not become the impelling power in the individual but the repelling power; it becomes that which thrusts away. Such are the unfortunate individualities who constantly withdraw more and more from 'the first.'⁴

-
1. At least this is Judge Wilhelm's impression. E/O 11, p. 40.
 2. E/O 11, p. 39.
 3. E/O 11, p. 40.
 4. Ibid.

Naturally, Judge Wilhelm places himself in the first class of individuals, the fortunate ones who make "the first" the present. It is his task to say what this means and how it is possible.

For those who truly feel its power, the significance of "the first" does not rest on a separation of its temporal aspect from the content of the associated idea; for them "the first" is the whole content. The Judge's explanation of this is not unambiguous, for he wants to make even more subtle distinctions, but I believe our purposes will be served if we continue to follow along with his sketch.

"The first" can bring a whole content to evidence in two ways, depending on the weight of its temporal and eternal determinants. If, for example, God's grace came to men a "first" time, as, say, with the coming of Christ, and some men were enlightened by this but then had fallen away, then this "first" would have all its deep significance. But, even though in this "first" the deep Christian life as a whole came to evidence, nevertheless he who had fallen away or who had apprehended it amiss would be lost. For the Judge this example serves to explain how "the first" is the whole content, but in this case "the first" is determined and interpreted too much in its temporal aspects without much trace of the eternal. However, when what is implied by "the first"

rests upon a synthesis of the temporal (Timelige) and the eternal, then the whole is present in "the first" implicitly and ¹hiddenly.

In regard to "first love", this means that for those fortunate individuals Judge Wilhelm mentioned, the first love is at the same time, the second, the third and the last, and this is because the first love has "the determinants of the eternal".² For those "unfortunate" individuals who see first love in determinations of the temporal (Timelighedens), first love is merely a moment. "For the fortunate individuals the first love, in the very fact that it is, is the present; for the others, in the very fact that it is, it is the past."³ Thus, for one who reflects, say, on the first kiss in a temporal way, this kiss will be a past fact; but for one who reflects in an eternal way, the kiss will be an eternal possibility. Or, to put it another way, if the first love comprises the whole content, then it would be contradictory to proceed by quickly exhausting it and then going on to a second "first love". This would be to take "the first" in vain, in which case "the first" would vanish.⁴ But, if we

1. E/O II, p. 42. The Danish (3rd ed.) text reads implicite and κατά χρόνον respectively.

2. E/O II, p. 42.

3. Ibid.

4. Judge Wilhelm obviously means to imply that this is A's mistake.

reflect upon the content of "the first", then it is "the first" only in so far as we remain in it. If we remain in it, however, does it not then become a second love? "No," answers the Judge, "precisely because one remains in it, it remains the first, if one reflects upon eternity."¹

First love is directed toward a single, definite and actual object ("which alone has existence for it, everything else being nonexistent"),² and since the object is not abstract but a definite living being, there is in this "intentionality" a factor of sensuousness and beauty. Yet first love is not simply sensuous; it also has the character of necessity, the character of the eternal. In short, first love is characterized by what Judge Wilhelm calls "a unity of freedom and necessity".³

Precisely in the necessity the individual feels himself free, is sensible in this of his whole individual energy, precisely in this he senses the possession of all that he is. It is for this reason one can inerrantly observe in every man whether he truly has been in love. Love involves a transfiguration, a spiritualization, which lasts his whole life long. In him there is a union of all the factors which ordinarily are dispersed; he is at the same moment both younger and older than men commonly are; he is a man and yet a youth, yea, almost a child; he is strong and yet so weak; he is a harmony which, as was said, echoes through his whole life.⁴

1. E/O II, p. 42.

2. E/O II, p. 43.

3. E/O II, pp. 44, 46.

4. E/O II, p. 44. My italics.

First love is a unity of freedom and necessity. In it one individual feels drawn to another individual by an irresistible power, but precisely in this he is sensible of his freedom.

So Judge Wilhelm extols first love as does the aesthete, and, further the ethicist has it not by reflection, but immediately. His first love has the unity of freedom and necessity, of the universal and the particular, not by virtue of reflection, but immediately.¹ But unlike the aesthete, he will not lack the courage to put this first love to the test.

What he sets out to show is that first love, in all its immediacy, can be, indeed must be, "assumed into a higher concentricity", i.e. the ethical sphere. Subsequently he demonstrates that it is essential for first love to be historical and that the condition for this is marriage. To meet this condition the lover must be ready to act, not in an outward, but in an inward sense,² with the will to hold this love fast. In this resolution first love is elevated into the ethical without its nature being changed.

A, of course, does not feel the need to allow his love to become "transfigured" in a higher sphere. According to Wilhelm, this is because A's love is characterized by feverish restlessness and continuous change. "Indeed," he writes to A, "at the same

1. E/O II, p. 46.

2. E/O II, p. 48.

moment you could wish that you both might have an eternity before you and that this instant were the last; and therefore the death of your love is certain."¹ As we might suppose, A is fearful that the nature of first love will be altered when it is "taken up" or "assumed" into the ethical sphere, i.e. into marriage. What he holds to be most precious, namely immediacy, would, he thinks, be lost--and along with it the moment of first love.

But Judge Wilhelm's point in this first letter is precisely that the immediate will not be lost when first love is drawn up into "a higher concentricity". He does admit a kind of "metamorphosis"² of first love, but this is not owing to a dissolution of the immediacy of first love. On the contrary, it is the result of a growth of first love in all its immediacy. A cannot realize this because his feeling for the nature and power of will and resolution is simply deficient; and because his young friend lacks this sense of will, the Judge accuses him of having a false sense of eternity.

You talk so much about the erotic embrace--what is that in comparison with the matrimonial embrace! What richness of modulation in the matrimonial 'Mine!' in comparison with the erotic! It re-echoes not only in the seductive eternity of the instant, but only in the illusory eternity of fantasy and imagination, but in the eternity of clear consciousness, in the eternity of

1. E/O II, p. 57.

2. E/O II, p. 58.

eternity. What power there is in the matrimonial 'Mine!'--for will, resolution and purpose have a deeper tone. What energy and pliability!--for what is so hard as well, and what so soft? What power of movement!¹

A really cannot comprehend this power of movement to which Judge Wilhelm alludes in this last sentence. A understands "movement" very well, as we saw in Chapter II, but only "movement" external to himself. Successive "instants" or opportunities move toward him and then pass by him; he does not control this movement; he is at the mercy of it. Hence, we can imagine that when Judge Wilhelm speaks of "movement" and of marriage containing "the law of motion",² A is understandably alarmed that its movement might transport the moment of first love.

Judge Wilhelm, however, has a different conception of motion. He distinguishes between inward and outward motion and indicates that he is campaigning for the former. First love remains "an unreal an-sich which never acquires inward content" so long as it moves only in an external medium. In the ethical purpose,³ marital love possesses the possibility of an inner history. Thus

1. E/O II, p. 59.

2. E/O II, pp. 95, 98 et passim.

3. The same holds for "religious purpose"; this passage is one in which the Judge juxtaposes the ethical and the religious without really clarifying whatever distinction there may be between them.

marital love is distinguished from first love as the historical from the unhistorical. That is, marital love goes on internally, not externally. "Marital love is armed; for by the resolution the attention is not directed merely towards the environment, but the will is directed towards itself, towards the inward man."¹

By means of this distinction the Judge arrives at two important conclusions: First, he suggests that because A's "first love" is external and thereby beyond his control, it is not really immediate, but is acquired. That is, if first love is achieved by the aesthete it is achieved accidentally. It simply happens. Secondly, he suggests that in the inward resolution immediate first love remains immediate; it goes on in inner history. "Marriage," he says, "is precisely the immediacy which has mediacy in itself, the infinity which has finiteness in itself, the eternal which has the temporal [Timeigheden] in itself."²

He charges that, for the aesthete, first love remains "a moment outside of time";³ it lacks the historical element and does not possess in itself the law of motion.⁴ It is precisely the "movement" of inward appropriation (the resolution is the movement

1. E/O II, p. 96.

2. E/O II, p. 96.

3. E/O II, p. 98.

4. E/O II, p. 98.

turned inward) which constitutes the historical aspect of first love in marriage. Therefore, conjugal love, far from losing the immediacy of first love, unites first love and time in its resolution. It has "apriority in itself, and, likewise, constancy in itself, and the power of this constancy is the same as the law of motion, i.e., it is the resolution."¹ In marriage the sensuous and the spiritual are united, and thus marriage remains aesthetically beautiful.

The aesthete in his masquerade affects a mysteriousness by which, according to Judge Wilhelm, he hopes to delude time. Thus the Judge accuses him of having a temporal purpose (Tids-Bestemmelse)². A married man, by contrast, has an eternal purpose (Evigheds-Bestemmelse) in which "first love" is not "once for all" but a continuous process. It is not lost but is continuously "lifted up" in the ongoing conjugal life. The aesthete stops with first love as a transitory moment.³ While the aesthetic lover may, if he is lucky, win first love in the fortuitous aesthetic instant, the married man continuously wins again his love in a glorified form. In other words, the "aesthetic validity of marriage" is contained in the thought that in marriage one has the aesthetic instant continuously renewed.

1. E/O II, p. 100.

2. E/O II, p. 120.

3. E/O II, p. 129.

In a sense it is difficult to imagine how an aesthete can be said to in any way possess the moment of first love. In fact, according to Judge Wilhelm, the aesthete believes himself incapable of possession in any form. His nature, so he believes, is bent on conquest, not possession. Indeed, he even prides himself on this. But the sadness of the conquering nature is evident when the moment of pleasure approaches, for when the culminating point has been reached, "everything then shrinks to a poverty-stricken and uninviting abbreviation."¹

Judge Wilhelm chides his young friend for thinking that he is incapable of possessing. The ethicist reminds the aesthete that in fact he does have an instant of possession. Since, however, this instant passes away immediately, it amounts to a rather pale holding. For true possession a deeper, inward appropriation is necessary. Indeed, even more than inward appropriation is required, for the Judge's real instruction is that the appropriation must involve historical succession. The notion of historical succession not only underlies the distinction between true and false possession, but is the key to a sound comprehension of his ethical conception of temporality.

We have seen already that Judge Wilhelm distinguishes between internal and external history. Now, on the basis of this

1. E/O II, p. 131.

distinction we shall learn that the essential shortcoming of the aesthete is that his sense of history is wrong because it is external.

The Judge's argument runs as follows: The aesthetic consciousness always requires a concentration in the moment. "Now it is only by this concentration that the happy, the indescribable moment, the moment of infinite significance, in short, the moment, acquires its true value."¹ The more value given to the moment, the more aesthetic it is. For the Judge, this aesthetic attitude is "natural", i.e. not historical.

Nature, as a philosopher has said, takes the shortest way. One might say that it takes no way, for at one stroke it is present all at once; and when I would lose myself in contemplation of the vaulted heaven I do not have to wait until the innumerable heavenly bodies take shape, for they all are all there at once.²

Against this aesthetic and natural "way", the Judge opposes the historical way, of which there are two kinds: external and internal. These are "currents of two sorts with opposite movements."³ External history has two sides, both of which aim toward possession. In the one case the individual does not have that for which he strives, and history is the strife in which he acquires it. In the second case, the individual has that for which he

1. E/O II, p. 135.

2. E/O II, p. 136.

3. Ibid.

strives, yet cannot come into possession of it because there is always something external which hinders him from doing so; then history is the strife in which he triumphs over these hindrances.¹ In both cases history is that which strives for possession. The second kind of history begins with possession, and history is² the development through which one acquires possession inwardly.

The fault of the first kind of history, external history, is that its goal lies "outside" the individual. For this reason³ external history "has not true reality", for its aim is to hasten on to the intensive aesthetic moment. Judge Wilhelm bids us imagine a knight who has slain five wild boars, four dragons and has delivered three enchanted princes, brothers of the princess whom he worships. For the aesthete it is of no importance whether there are five or only four monsters slain; he does not care even to relate how the hero accomplished the destruction of each individual wild boar, for he hastens on to the moment, the moment

1. E/O II, p. 136.

2. Ibid. The Judge's language here is a bit loose, and I have added the word "inwardly" to what would otherwise have been a direct quote. He writes: "The second kind of history begins with possession and history is the development through which one acquires possession." Obviously history cannot begin with possession if it is the acquiring of possession. I do not wish to critically analyze the Judge's statements at this point since I am here attempting only to present his point of view. However, I do not think it illegitimate to add "inwardly" to the statement in question. It is obvious from the context that this is what he meant.

3. E/O II, p. 136.

of possession. The historical succession of events is of little importance. From the Judge's perspective, the aesthete fails to contend with time. In moving toward possession, the succession of external events is of little consequence; only the moment of possession has value. And, since external history is that movement toward possession, it (external history) is of no importance. Hence, Judge Wilhelm's statement that this kind of history has no true reality.

On the other hand, in internal history every little moment is of the utmost significance, and this is why internal history alone has true reality; it alone is truly involved with time. "Internal history is the only true history; but true history contends with that which is the life principle of history, i.e. with time [Tiden]. But when one contends with time, then the temporal [Timelige] and every little moment of it acquires for this fact¹ immense reality."

The Judge likens this kind of history to an "internal process of blossoming" and states that when this internal process has not yet begun, then there can be only external history; conversely, when the blossoming process begins, so begins internal history. Internal history begins with possession, and its progress is the acquisition of this possession. "It is an eternity in which the

1. E/O II, p. 137.

temporal [Timelige] has not vanished like an ideal moment, but in which it is constantly present as a real moment.¹

In the case we are considering, "first love" stands for the eternal in the above passage. Note, however, that this eternity is not an abstract eternity such as that which an external history might seek; it is not the illusory eternity of aesthetic first love. A faithful, romantic lover, for instance, might wait fifteen years for the instant which rewards him. His fifteen years of faithfulness can be concentrated--it makes no difference whether he had waited fifteen years or twenty-five, for his faithfulness can be poetically represented simply as hastening to the moment. If, on the other hand, a married man is faithful for fifteen years, he has had possession during those years. "So," adds Judge Wilhelm, "in that long succession of time he has continuously acquired the faithfulness he possessed, since after all conjugal love contains within itself first love and by the same token the fidelity thereof."² He has not fought with lions and dragons like that romantic knight we encountered earlier, but he has fought with the "most dangerous enemy": Time. The meaning of this has tremendously important implications which we must not fail to notice. The married man does not gain eternity

1. E/O II, p. 140.

2. E/O II, p. 141.

after the fight, as in the case of the knight, but "he has had eternity in time, has preserved eternity in time."¹

In a sense, then, the married man has not triumphed over time. The romantic knight has come closer to that feat than has he, for it is the knight who has killed time. A man constantly wishes to kill time, says the Judge, only when it has no reality for him.² The married man achieves a more perfect victory, for he has not killed time "but has saved it and preserved it in eternity."³ Thus the married man solves "the great riddle of living in eternity and yet hearing the hall clock strike."⁴ Furthermore, the stroke of the hour does not shorten, but prolongs his eternity--a "profound contradiction".⁵

So conjugal love has its foe in time, its triumph in time, its eternity in time, and even its trials in time. But we must remember that all of these, even the trials, are inward qualifications of the individual and have nothing to do with externals. Even in his trial the ethical man fights not with external foes but with himself. In contrast the aesthete is accused of fighting for a vanished time. "For you are fighting for the moment against

1. E/O II, p. 141.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

time, you are actually fighting for what has vanished."¹ For, as Judge Wilhelm says, the essence of the matter is to preserve love in time. "If this is impossible," he says, "then love is an impossibility."² The aesthete believes that the value attached to first love is precisely the qualification, "the first time", and that, therefore, a repetition is impossible. But note, he sees the matter this way simply because he has externalized the signs of first love and recognizes love simply and solely by these visible signs. In this way he associates the moment of first love with the seemingly accidental, external circumstances surrounding the moment. But the married man has an entirely different conception of time and of the significance of repetition.³

The Judge now moves his argument one step further. Whereas before he spoke of time as if it were merely a "simple progression" in which the original datum is preserved, he now shows that it is a "growing progression" in which the original datum increases.⁴ One whose eternity grows in time is a "healthy individual" because he has the correct relation to time. Both those men who live predominantly in hope and those who live predominantly

1. E/O II, p. 143.

2. E/O II, p. 144.

3. As outlined in the book by the same name. We shall treat "repetition" in a later chapter.

^{hope.}

4. E/O II, pp. 144 ff. Cf. supra p. 99.

in recollection have a wrong relation to time. The healthy individual, in contrast, lives at once both in hope and in recollection, and thereby his life acquires "true and substantial continuity."¹ He has hope and does not will to turn backward in time in order to recall past moments of ecstasy. But he does not live merely in hope, for he constantly has both hope and recollection in the present. ("At the first wedding hope has the same effect that recollection has at the last."²) In fact, for Judge Wilhelm the true present is a unity of hope and recollection.

This notion of continuity is related to the Judge's notion of choosing himself which we have discussed earlier, but which I think we should reconsider in the Judge's other writings in order to emphasize more fully the importance of history and succession as central to the ethical sense of temporality.

In his second letter concerning the composition of personality, the Judge again emphasizes the importance of choosing oneself, but here the connection of this choosing with the matter of history and succession is clarified. With this we reach the heart of Wilhelm's criticism of A.

Our discussion of aestheticism revealed that the only way an aesthetic man could hope to gain pleasure was to remain in

1. E/O II, pp. 144-145.

2. E/O II, p. 145.

absolute control over himself and his situation.¹ Yet by externalizing the conditions for pleasure, he ipso facto forfeits his control. "But he who says that he wants to enjoy life always posits a condition which either lies outside the individual or is in the individual in such a way that it is not posited by the individual himself."² The aesthete cannot be in control; this is the paradoxical tragedy of aesthetic existence; it leads to despair. Indeed, the aesthetic life-view is despair itself, and it is despair because it remains constantly beyond itself; it has lost all reality.³ The aesthete's life lacks all continuity and so lacks any meaningful activity.⁴ So, then, the aesthete cannot do what we have seen he must do: Stay in control so that his pleasures may be contrived. He can but wait with the Seducer for the right moment to appear accidentally in hopes that he will not be surprised by it.

From the Judge's point of view, however, this aesthetic despair may be a blessing in disguise. It offers a tremendous possibility in that it may be the occasion for the emergence of the ethical since the ethical comes about in the choice of despair.

1. See esp. supra pp. 64-65.

2. E/O II, p. 184.

3. E/O II, pp. 199-200. Cf. "But every life view which hinges upon a condition outside itself is despair." (E/O II, p. 240).

4. E/O II, p. 200.

That is to say, when one despairs, he has reached the point at which he might turn to himself and gain the continuity he lacks.

So then choose despair, for despair itself is a choice; for one can doubt without choosing to, but one cannot despair without choosing. And when a man despairs he chooses again--and what is it he chooses? He chooses himself, not in his immediacy, not as this fortuitous individual, but he chooses himself in his eternal validity.¹

By this the Judge means that the aesthete must abandon the masquerade which is his life--only then will he be in a position to become himself. In his first authentic choice, the choice which is despair, he actually becomes himself. His "eternal validity" as a self is precisely the freedom by which he chooses himself.

"But what then is this self of mine? If I were required to define this, my first answer would be: It is the most abstract of all things, and yet at the same time it is the most concrete--it is freedom."²

The sense of this may be observed psychologically in the fact that one never seriously wishes that he might become another man. Of course one may wish to have this man's strength or that man's intelligence, etc., but one never wishes to become someone else. Here we are close to the meaning of one's "eternal validity". There is something in a man which is absolute in relation to

1. E/O II, p. 215.

2. E/O II, p. 218.

everything else, something whereby a man is the man he is. In recognizing the eternal validity of one's personality, one chooses both absolutely and concretely.

He chooses himself, not in a finite sense (for then this 'self' would be something finite along with other things finite), but in an absolute sense; and yet, in fact, he chooses himself and not another. This self which he then chooses is infinitely concrete, for it is in fact himself, and yet it is absolutely distinct from his former self, for he has chosen it absolutely.²

In a difficult piece of reasoning Judge Wilhelm adds that this self did not exist previously; for it came into existence with the choice. Yet in a sense it did exist prior to the choice; it existed as immediately given in nature. The self that becomes in the choice is the immediate self raised from its immediacy into self-consciousness by means of freedom.

In this case choice performs at one and the same time the two dialectical movements: that which is chosen does not exist and comes into existence with the choice; that which is chosen exists, otherwise there would not be a choice. For in case what I chose did not exist but absolutely came into existence with the choice, I would not be choosing, I would be creating; but I do not create myself, I choose myself. Therefore, while nature is created out of nothing, while I myself as an immediate personality am created out of nothing, as a free spirit I am born of the principle of contradiction, or born by the fact that I choose myself.³

1. E/O II, pp. 218-219.

2. E/O II, p. 219.

3. E/O II, pp. 219-220.

In this context the Judge firmly accentuates an aspect of the ethical existence which is fundamental to his notion of temporality; it is finiteness, concreteness, worldliness, or, as he so often terms it, "temporalness". When one chooses oneself, he says, one must do so concretely, i.e. one must do so in complete recognition of one's finiteness, so that in choosing oneself, one must choose himself back into the world. This kind of choosing is termed "ethical choice" or, again, "choosing repentantly". By "repentance" he has reference to man's relation to and fight to preserve the whole continuity of his personal history. When a man chooses himself he realizes that the self he chooses contains "an endless multiplicity" inasmuch as it has a history. It is in history that he acknowledges identity with himself.¹ For example, he stands in relation to various individuals, to the race as a whole, he has had glorious moments and painful ones. And, indeed, he is the man he is in consequence of this history. This being the case, it requires extreme courage for a man to choose himself, for when he does so, it seems that he is isolating himself from the whole in which he is so absorbed, from that in which his self took root. This alarms him, and when "the passion of freedom" is aroused in him by the choice, he chooses himself and at the same time fights for the possession of the historical whole. "He cannot relinquish anything in this whole, not the

1. E/O II, p. 220.

most painful, not the hardest to bear, and yet the expression for this fight, for this acquisition is. . . repentance. He repents himself back into himself, back into the family, back into the race. . . ."¹

Thus when one chooses rightly, he chooses ethically, and one can choose ethically only by repenting oneself, and only by repenting oneself does one become concrete, and only as a concrete individual is one a truly free individual.²

In his present choice, the repentant takes responsibility for all of his past and is thereby able to face his future in concrete freedom. This is what distinguishes an ethical man from a mystic. With a strong sense of duty, the ethical man faces his future concretely. A mystic chooses himself abstractly, that is, without the element of repentance in his choice. He chooses himself outside himself,³ which means he interprets abstractly what it is to choose and has not grasped himself in his concreteness. He chooses himself out of the world; he scorns the temporal (Timeligheden). Now, for the mystic, what the temporal has to offer is unimportant in comparison with what he eternally possesses.

1. E/O II, p. 220.

2. E/O II, p. 252.

Everything comes with him to a standstill, he has, as it were, reached eternity before the time. He relapses into contemplation, he gazes at himself, but his gaze cannot fill up the time. Then it appears to him that time [Tiden], that the temporal [Timeligheden], is his ruin; he demands a more perfect form of existence, and at this point there comes to evidence a fatigue, an apathy, which resembles the languor which is the attendant of pleasure.¹

Such a situation, Judge Wilhelm tells us, has ended not infrequently in suicide.

As the last sentence of the preceeding quote indicates, the mystic and the aesthete have something in common. Unlike the aesthete, the mystic does choose himself, but he fails to realize that "choosing oneself is identical with repenting oneself."²

The mystic chooses himself abstractly. One can therefore say that he constantly chooses himself out of the world. But the consequence is that he is unable to choose himself back again into the world. The truly concrete choice is that wherewith at the very same instant I choose myself out of the world I am choosing myself back into the world. For when I choose myself repentantly I gather myself together in all my finite concretion, and in the fact that I have thus chosen myself out of the finite I am in the most absolute continuity with it.³

Lacking this sense of concretion, the mystic forfeits what the ethical man abides in--the principle of motion.⁴ As the

1. E/O II, p. 235.

2. E/O II, pp. 252-253.

3. E/O II, p. 253.

4. Cf. supra p. 100.

aesthete has his earthly first love, so the mystic has his religious first love. Both have "tasted the whole bliss of it" and now have nothing to do but wait to see if it will come again in just as much glory.¹ According to Judge Wilhelm, reality for both the aesthete and the mystic is simply a delay, a bidding for the next moment of eternity. Both conceive of the significance of life as a moment. The ethical man, by contrast, sees the true significance of life as succession.² Here we might bring out the Judge's meaning by substituting "the temporal" (Timeligheden) for "life". The mystic, for example, far from seeing any real significance in the temporal, wants only to be done with it. Consequently, according to Judge Wilhelm, such a man makes two mistakes: He misunderstands reality by construing it metaphysically as vanity, and he misunderstands the historical by construing it metaphysically as "unprofitable labor".³

For the ethical man, the temporal constitutes the possibility of the glorification of the finite spirit.

It is precisely the beauty of the temporal that in it the infinite Spirit and the finite spirit are separated, and it is precisely the greatness of the finite spirit that the temporal is assigned to it. The temporal therefore, if I may venture to say so, does not exist for God's sake,

1. E/O II, pp. 253-254.

2. But note that this is a succession which comes after the resolution; it is internal succession. Cf. supra pp. 101, 106.

3. E/O II, p. 254.

in order that in it, speaking mystically, He may test and try the loved one, but it exists for man's sake and is the greatest of all the gifts of grace. For man's eternal dignity consists in the fact that he can have a history, the divine element in him consists in the fact that he himself, if he will, can impart to this history continuity, for this he acquires only when it is not the sum of all that has happened to me or befallen me but is my own work, in such a way that even what has befallen me is by me transformed and translated from necessity to freedom.¹

Thus, in human life, as viewed ethically (or at least by Judge Wilhelm), one comes to the aid of the Deity and can "understand" Him. Such a man "understands" the Deity by "freely appropriating" everything that comes to him, both the joyful and the sorrowful.² This is the ethical view of life. The ethical man chooses himself concretely as a definite individual, and he attains this concretion "by the fact that this act of choice is identical with this act of repentance which sanctions the choice."³

The individual becomes conscious of himself as a definite individual with certain particular talents, dispositions, instincts, passions and as influenced by certain particular surroundings. Being conscious of himself as a definite product of a definite environment, the ethical man assumes responsibility for all this.

1. E/O II, pp. 254-255.

2. E/O II, p. 255.

3. Ibid.

He does not hesitate as to whether he shall include this particular trait or the other, for he knows that he stands to lose something much higher if he does not. Thus at the instant of choice he is in the most complete isolation, for he withdraws from the surroundings; and yet at the same moment he is in absolute continuity, for he chooses himself as product; and this choice is the choice of freedom, so that when he chooses himself as product he can just as well be said to produce himself. Thus at the instant of choice he is at the conclusion, for he concludes himself as a unity, and yet the same instant he is at the beginning, for he chooses himself freely. As a product he is pressed into the forms of reality, in the choice he makes himself elastic, transforming all the outwardness into inwardness. He has his place in the world, with freedom he chooses his place, that is, he chooses this very place. He is a definite individual, in the choice he makes himself a definite individual, for he chooses himself.¹

Hence the Judge's definition of the ethical as that by which a man
²
 becomes what he becomes.

The emphasis on this in-worldness is echoed in the Judge's later "Observation about Marriage" in the Stages. There he writes of a man who makes an eternal resolution but who conducts himself negatively towards the temporal (Timelike) as being lonely at the instant of resolution. The Judge here distinguishes between a positive and a negative resolution. The ethical (married) man, unlike the aesthete or the mystic, does not make a negative resolution which has reference only to the eternal but rather a positive resolution which has reference to the temporal (Timelike)

1. E/O II, pp. 255-256.

2. E/O II, p. 229.

and to the eternal. This is positive because man in fact is at once temporal and eternal. "The ideality of the true resolution consists therefore in a resolve which is just as temporal as it is eternal The true idealizing resolution accordingly has this characteristic: it is signed in heaven and then it is countersigned in time [Timeligheden]."¹

Furthermore, as life goes on, the married man is constantly getting newer and newer endorsements, each one of them as precious as the others. The problem, then, with a negative orientation toward the temporal is that even one's eternal resolution vanishes from sight. "He is an unfortunate man who goes through time with his eternal resolution but never gets it countersigned"² The point of a positive resolution, a resolution with a positive attitude toward the temporal, is that it perseveres through "the fleeting and the transitory".³ It is this emphasis on the importance of the temporal as the medium through which the eternal resolution is actualized in reality and not abstracted out of reality that is the essence of the ethical notion of temporality. The ethical sense of temporality is certainly one of the eternal in time.

1. Stages, p. 116. The last word in this passage translated as "time" actually reads Timeligheden in the Danish (Vol. 7, 102) which Lowrie usually translates as "the temporal". Thus the distinction between "time" and "the temporal" in this context stems from Lowrie and not from SK.

2. Ibid.

3. Stages, p. 121.

Summary

In this chapter we have attempted to allow a representative ethical man to advance his conception of temporality. What he put forth, however, was not a detached philosophical analysis of a concept, but rather a way of life. His "existential possibility" was one for which temporality was a dominant concern. Thus what we have been treating as temporality in this chapter has reference more to a way of life than an abstract concept.¹

As for the ethical conception of temporality itself, we have seen that the Judge formulates his views in contradistinction to the aesthetic existence. By emphasizing the nature and importance of choice, he reveals that the ethical life consists of a committed choice or resolution which he represents as the moulder of personality through time. That is, the eternal or absolute, if extended through time, ushers in a self. We may conclude, therefore, that there are two distinct elements of temporality,

1. Yet, judging by our survey of the use and frequency of our concept and its cognates we can see that now for the first time in the authorship they appear as important matters of concern. Cf. Appendix. In E/O II our words appear 27 times in 314 pages of text as compared with only one time in 420 pages of text in E/O I. In the second part of Stages we find our words 22 times in 81 pages of text and only once in 67 pages concerning the aesthetic Banquet.

the temporal and the eternal, and that these are of the utmost importance for the ethical life.

In his first "letter" the ethicist admonishes the aesthete for having a false view of eternity; he suggests that the aesthete mistakes the temporal for the eternal.¹ Here he seems to equate "the temporal" with a kind of "outward teleology" which amounts to an externalized "going on" characteristic of immediacy. He indicates that while the eternal requires the temporal in order to go on in life, it must not be based on the temporal. The temporal is important not as a base for the absolute, but only secondarily as that which allows the prior eternal to go on. In the ethical life, the eternal is made to move. Hence, in the second essay the Judge states that, for the ethicist, time is all-important. The ethical man, he says, contends with time and, in his life, the eternal goes on in time. This essential involvement with time characterizes ethical existence.

There are two important aspects of this view of the temporal which require our attention here: First, it is characterized by historical succession in which each little moment is of the utmost significance. That is, it is not simply a movement toward

1. Supra, p. 92.

2. The Judge makes no clear distinction between "time" and "the temporal." Cf. supra, pp. 106, 116; 120, n. 1.

some eternal moment. Secondly, this succession is signified as internal. Temporal succession is internal.¹

Thus the difference between aesthetic existence and ethical existence is that they are based on different notions of "the temporal". "The temporal" of the former is external to the subject, whereas "the temporal" of the latter is internal.

Furthermore, since the ethical movement (process, succession, history)² has reality only internally and because only internally do they contend with time, it is only internally that time has reality. For the ethical man there is no real time external to his own existence. There is no "natural" time.³ The ethical man has preserved eternity in time and has saved time by preserving it in eternity.⁴

Under this interpretation of time the ethical man is able to gather up the whole of his past in repentance and orient himself toward his future in duty. In the ethical choice his life gains a continuity that is truly concrete and this-worldly. That is to say, the ethical man finds continuity in time. This happens in the movement of inward appropriation of the true absolute in which

1. Supra, p. 106.

2. Supra, p. 106.

3. Supra, p. 104.

4. E/O II, p. 114.

every successive moment counts. Ethical existence is characterized by an internalized successive movement. Judge Wilhelm, of course, feels that the significance of life is succession.¹ And by this he naturally means the ethical life. Yet, as we have seen from our study of the aesthetical, the difference between the aesthetic and the ethical is not simply that one has a sense of succession and the other does not (such is not the case, for the aesthete, too, has a sense of succession). The real difference between them in regard to succession is that for the ethicist succession has been internalized. This is the true sense of Judge Wilhelm's statement about the significance of life as succession. The temporal, it is now clear, has no reality outside of life; it is not "out there" in the world. And the true significance of ethical life is found in the temporal as internalized succession.

1. Supra, p. 117.

Chapter IV

A TRANSITIONAL VIEW OF TEMPORALITY

Introductory Remarks

Having treated the aesthetic and ethical views of temporality in Chapters II and III respectively, it would seem natural simply to proceed directly to the religious stage. However, that procedure would be artificial for two reasons. First, our intention here is not simply to hold rigidly to an alleged Kierkegaardian triad of existential spheres but rather to understand the whole of his conception of temporality by investigating as many pseudonymous and acknowledged^W_A works as are necessary to complete the total picture. Secondly, and related to this, the pseudonyms we shall treat in this chapter bear no simple one-to-one relationship¹ to the three main "stages". Indeed, with respect to the final view of the authorship, they represent a transitional phase and they are described most accurately as such. I believe this is so because most of them embody primarily two "transitional" themes: a disillusionment with aesthetical and/or ethical

1. Cf. the discussion of this problem in Chapter I.

existence and a journalistic anticipation of religious existence. Let us briefly examine each of these themes.

Disillusionment with Judge Wilhelm's ethical way of life is first indicated by the "Ultimatum" which concludes Either/Or II.¹ This piece is ostensibly a sermon written by a priest of a lonely Jutland parish; its intent is to attack the underlying assumptions of the ethical and thus to serve as an "ultimatum" upon that way of life. To the ethicist who is convinced of the essential rightness of his life and standards, the priest suggests that no matter what one's moral worth, one is always guilty as over against the Absolute. The ethical way of life in which men judge themselves as sometimes right and sometimes wrong or sometimes both in certain degrees, only leads to befuddled casuistry. When one measures one's actions as compared with others, one is constantly discovering new difficulties and ever doubting that one is right at the present instant. This process of doubting is a long one, for there is always the next instant to worry about. "If we are able to determine definitely whether at the present instant we are in the right, this question must be definitely determined with a view to the preceding instant, and then further and further back."²

1. E/O II, pp. 339-356.

2. E/O II, p. 348. The priest goes on to suggest that we put this constant doubt to rest by meditating upon "the edification implied in the thought that as against God we are always in the wrong." (Ibid.).

This criticism of the ethical is echoed by Johannes Climacus in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript. He believes that the repentance and devotion to duty, extolled ad nauseam by Judge Wilhelm, lead simply to a moral impasse. The ethical motto, "One does what one can", is insufficient, for one cannot really do very much. When, for example, Judge Wilhelm spoke of "choosing himself absolutely" in freedom, he indicated that he would thereby assume complete responsibility for his past in repentance and for his future in duty. It was this freedom-assuming responsibility that constituted his absolute worth as a human being. But Johannes Climacus, like the Jutland priest, doubts that Judge Wilhelm or any other man has the ability to master his own life so completely.

Climacus alludes to inconsistencies in ethical life, specifically to certain "difficulties" in Judge Wilhelm's observations on marriage.¹ One might suppose, for example, that after all his talk about "choosing oneself absolutely", the Judge would affirm his own wife's freedom. But in fact he does not, for he has assumed all along that her "freedom" was simply a function² of his nature. Since woman is "a more earthly being" than man, it is her duty as a wife to "explain" finiteness to her husband.

1. Postscript, 161.

2. E/O II, p. 312. She conceives children; he ideas. (Cf. ibid., p. 316.)

That is, when he participates in all she undertakes, he becomes "reconciled with time" and finds again that time has significance for him.¹ "Woman explains finiteness," adds Judge Wilhelm, "man is in chase of infinitude."² As finiteness, a woman's being is simply an aspect of man's being; finiteness is her raison d'être.³ She is his "life root".⁴

This denigration of the absolute freedom of woman seems to Climacus to be a chink in the ethical life, and he suspects that the ethical is not nearly so solidly founded as Judge Wilhelm would have us believe.

Doubt of the ethical is also expressed magnificently by Johannes de Silentio in Fear and Trembling wherein he identifies the ethical with the universal and sees it as a barrier to a life of faith which needs to be "suspended". Again, the young lover we encounter in Repetition comes to understand that the advice and understanding of friends, that is the advice of the ethical community, has no bearing on his own life situation. And Vigilius Haufniensis, the pseudonymous author of The Concept of Dread, indicates the sin and dread which undercut one's ethical self

1. E/O II, p. 312.

2. E/O II, p. 316.

3. Needless to say, Judge Wilhelm is pained by the mere thought of the emancipation of women: "God forbid that ever it may come about." E/O II, p. 316.

4. E/O II, p. 316.

assurances and yet which indicate the opportunity for advancement beyond this way of life.

Disillusionment with the aesthetical and ethical life orientations is certainly a characteristic of the points of view considered in this chapter. On the other hand, they do not generally regard themselves as representatives of the religious. They are able to identify the fallacies in the aesthetical and ethical styles of life, and they can recognize the necessity for the religious, but they are not ready to affirm the religious in their own lives. They point the way to the religious, but from without. Climacus, for example, regards himself as a "humorist", and in his Fragments he indicates that he intends only to think about quasi-religious matters as a project of thought and not to participate himself.¹ Constantine Constantius, author of Repetition, and Johannes de Silentio are constantly bewildered by the "far too transcendent" things they themselves discuss.

But these same authors are also transitional in their conceptions of temporality. In fact, as I shall try to show in this chapter, these authors give the notion of temporality an explicit and radically new formulation. It is this new formulation of temporality which I term collectively "a transitional view".

1. Fragments, p. 7. "Let no one invite me, for I will not dance."

In Chapter III I suggested that ethical existence was characterized by its emphasis on time. This emphasis was supposed (at least by Judge Wilhelm and Johannes Climacus) to be what distinguished the ethical from the aesthetical. Now, when we begin to read about the limitations and possible breakdown of the ethical, we are led to realize that any thought of ethical disintegration would entail a reformulation of the central notion of temporality. In fact such is the case for the authors who represent the "transitional" view. Time was central for the ethicist; here we shall find time "transformed".

This transformation of the concept is at first rather confused. This is so especially in the writings of Constantine Constantius, Johannes de Silentio and Frater Taciturnus, who treat the subject "poetically". Soon, however, it appears that SK came to realize that the works of these pseudonyms, though
¹
 redundant, were in need of clarification. To this end he

1. This is the opinion of the writer, not that of SK. Most students of SK would probably agree that at least the Stages is a rather bulky rehashing of familiar themes. Cf., e.g., Lowrie's comment on Quidam's Diary: "I will say for my part that I heartily wish SK had never written this Diary--nor written the hundreds of pages on the same theme which he confided to his Journal. I am tired of reading it all, and find it still more tiresome to translate it." (Stages, p. 13). Frater Taciturnus, who claims to have found the Diary in a lake, also suspects that the reader might weary of this long "experiment". (Stages, p. 363). What these men have reference to is, of course, the rehashing of the "love affair" which seems to underlie most of SK's works. Cf. also L. Mackay (op. cit.) and Arland Ussher's chapter on SK in Journey Through Dread (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1968), pp. 9-60.

introduced works which can correctly be termed "philosophical" even though they too are pseudonymous. These works (I refer to Climacus' Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript and to Haufniensis' Concept of Dread) differ from the others in that they endeavor to give a synoptic view which is more analytical and abstract than that of their pseudonymous fore-¹runners.

My aim in this chapter is then a simple one. Following the authorship I shall here pause to reformulate and then to analyze before proceeding to what is claimed to be a more definitely religious expression of temporality. Put another way, this chapter will be concerned with personalities who indicate the breakdown of the ethical, who point toward the religious, and who, in the process, formulate their own peculiar conception of temporality² and who even pause to analyze the concept "objectively".

1. This distinction between the "poetical" and the "philosophical" is, in my view, quite thin in SK's works, and the reader will know well that no pseudonym misses an opportunity to engage in anti-Hegelian metaphysics.

2. As the discussion of temporality becomes more abstractly philosophical, it will be less important to remain strictly descriptive in my presentation here. That is, outside opinions might be entertained without distortion of the text, when the text itself is an analysis.

Repetition, Fear and Trembling, "Guilty?/Not Guilty?"

The artistic or literary representation of what I have termed the "transitional" notion of temporality appears in the works, Repetition, Fear and Trembling, and "Guilty?/Not Guilty?".¹ The pseudonymous authors of these works indicate in one way or another the inadequacies of the aesthetical and ethical, and though they themselves are not of it, they intimate the significance of religious existence. At the same time they set in relief important "categories" and philosophical problems which require analytic treatment. In short, they provide material for the pseudonymous philosophers who attend them in the "authorship".

We shall treat Repetition first, for its beginning represents a reaction against the aesthetic way of life, whereas Fear and Trembling takes the ethical orientation as its point of opposition.

The pseudonymous author of Repetition is Constantine Constantius, who presents himself as an aesthete and psychologist. As his name suggests, he is constantly interested in the possibility of attaining constancy--continuity and repetition--within the aesthetic sphere. He is intrigued with the possibility of escaping unstable momentary existence by gaining enduring reality.

1. This latter work comprises the third section of Stages, pp. 179-444.

More specifically, he wants to know if events in the past can be recaptured in the present. In this context he introduces the formidable concept of "repetition".

By means of this concept, and in contrast to the profoundest wisdom of "the Greeks"--which was contained in the conviction that what is now, has also been from all eternity--Constantine suggests that what has been in the past can receive new being in the present. He informs us that "repetition" is a decisive expression for what "recollection" was for the Greeks.

Just as they taught that all knowledge is a recollection, so will modern philosophy teach that the whole of life is a repetition . . . repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions; for what is recalled is repeated backwards, whereas repetition properly so called is recollected forwards.¹

This is not a self-evident statement, and we shall investigate it in some detail later. Our main focus of attention now is on the statement that the whole of life is a repetition. Indeed, Constantine suggests that repetition is what gives life its originality and freshness while offering reliable support in a world of constant change. He contrasts repetition not only with recollection but with hope as well. The only happy love, he says, is that of repetition. Unlike the love of recollection, repetition has not the disquietude of hope, "the anxious adventuresomeness of discoverers, nor the sadness of recollection; it has the

1. Repetition, pp. 3-4. My italics.

1
 blessed certainty of the instant." The particular passage in question is quite important for the present chapter:

Hope is a new garment, starched and stiff and glittering, yet one has never had it on, and hence one does not know how it will become one and how it fits. Recollection is a discarded garment, which beautiful as it may be, does not fit, for one has outgrown it. Repetition is an imperishable garment, which fits snugly and comfortably, neither too tight nor too loose. Hope is a charming maiden but slips through the fingers, recollection is a beautiful old woman but of no use at the instant, repetition is a beloved wife of whom one never tires. For it is only of the new one grows tired. Of the old one never tires. When one possesses that, one is happy, and only he is thoroughly happy who does not delude himself with the vain notion that repetition ought to be something new, for then one becomes tired of it. It requires youth to hope, and youth to recollect, but it requires courage to will repetition. He who would only hope is cowardly, he who would only recollect is a voluptuary, but he who wills repetition is a man, and the more expressly he knows how to make his purpose clear, the deeper he is as a man. But he who does not comprehend that life is a repetition, and that this is the beauty of life, has condemned himself and deserves nothing better than what is sure to befall him, namely, to perish.²

In his attempt to elucidate the category of repetition, Constantine searches for concrete instances of the phenomenon. He alludes to a young man whom he has befriended, a man who is distraught over an ambiguous love affair. In his confused and melancholic condition, the young lover is somehow able to "live through" his entire love affair--from desire to fulfillment--every day.

1. Ibid., p. 4.

2. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

He was in love, deeply and sincerely in love; that was evident, and yet at once, on one of the first days of his engagement, he was capable of recollecting his love. Substantially he was through with the whole relationship. Before he begins, he has taken such a terrible stride that he has leapt over the whole of life . . . he longs for the girl, he has to restrain himself by force from hanging around her the whole day and yet at the very first instant he has become an old man with respect to the whole relationship.¹

Constantine is deeply moved by this "strange dialectic", and he correctly recognizes that the young lover is incurably caught up in the aesthetic, melancholic dilemma (experienced by all who love) of being able to see the end of the affair already at the beginning.² He finds evidence of an eternal expression of love in the young man's potentiated act of recollection-at-the-beginning. Yet he suggests that his young friend lacks the "ironic" elasticity requisite for the utilization of this eternal element. The young lover senses the eternal at the beginning of the whole affair in his "pre-recollection", but because he lacks the power to make use of it, the affair ends before it begins, and his life is made miserable. In this sense, his life is over at the first instant, and for that reason Constantine urges that

1. Ibid., p. 12.

2. Ibid., p. 13.

"there must be vitality enough to kill this death and transform it into life."¹

We can recognize the young lover's dilemma as aesthetic, for his condition closely parallels situations described by A in his perceptive analysis of the aesthetic way of life in Either/Or I. Indeed, even though Constantine unquestionably has something else in mind (viz. repetition) as a way out of the dilemma, A can also suggest a way out: the Rotation method.² This "poetic remembering and forgetting" is a way to cope with a situation which is all too familiar to an aesthete who fears becoming stuck in a relationship which smacks of permanence. Thus, or so I believe, the Rotation method is the aesthetic analogue to repetition, but it is certainly not repetition.

In any case, we are here confronted with an attempt to escape an aesthetic dilemma by means of repetition, a notion which Constantine sets out to test. To this end he attempts to establish a concrete instance of repetition by repeating a visit to

1. Ibid., pp. 13-14. Some students of SK see in Constantine's account of this episode a concrete example of "repetition" on the aesthetic level. See, e.g., George J. Stack, "Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Repetition", Journal of Existentialism, VIII, no. 26 (Winter, 66-67), p. 112. However, I believe this interpretation is somewhat misleading, for the young man--as an aesthete--knows only of recollection and nothing of repetition. The passage in question indicates clearly that his dilemma is precisely what prompts Constantine to search for a way of overcoming the "death" to which it leads. There is no repetition on the aesthetic level.

2. See supra, pp. 61-62. E/O I, pp. 279-296.

Berlin. He stays at the same inn, attends the same theater, etc., in hopes of recapturing some delightful moments which he had experienced on a previous visit.

1. Jean Wahl (Les Philosophies de l'Existence, Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954, p. 110) has suggested that the pseudonymous author was here motivated by the same ambition as Marcel Proust in his A la Recherche du Temps perdu (Paris: NRF, 1954), namely to recapture a given moment of the past so as to define his personal happiness. However, while their motives may have been similar, there is a dissimilarity in their respective quests for repetition itself. To begin with, Constantine's search failed. It was bound to fail precisely because it was a search, a reflective artificiality which vitiated the immediacy which characterized the original experience. We have seen (supra, pp. 50-51) that reflectiveness obstructs immediacy unless the aesthete is prepared to enjoy the reflectiveness itself--as when he himself contrives the pleasurable event. But any attempt to recapture the immediacy of the original experience necessarily results in failure. This fact is what makes the aesthete so melancholy.

On the other hand, Proust found that the repetition of a pleasurable experience in the past is possible if that experience is encountered without planning or reflection. Consider, e.g., the case of Swann (in "De Cote de Chez Swann," Recherche, Vol. I) who, in a depressed mood, dips his Petite Madeleine in his afternoon tea and raises it to his lips. Then, precisely at the moment of first taste, he exclaims: ". . . je tressailis, attentif à ce qui se passait d'extraordinaire en moi. Un plaisir délicieux m'avait envahi, isolé, sans la notion de sa cause. Il m'avait aussitôt rendu les vicissitudes de la vie indifférentes, ses désastres inoffensifs, sa brièveté illusoire, de la même façon qu'opère l'amour en me remplissant d'une essence précieuse: ou plutôt cette essence n'était pas en moi, elle était moi. J'avais cessé de me sentir médiocre, contingent, mortel." (p. 5).

In this example Swann's past experience is recalled in the present, but in a general way. He is overwhelmed with the sense of unity (une essence précieuse) which endures throughout change. Perhaps we have all had experiences of this kind which seem to transcend time. It is likely--as I hope to indicate--that SK did too. Nevertheless, it is certain that Constantine did not interpret his second visit to Berlin as a transcendent experience of any kind. In fact, his attempt at an alleged aesthetic repetition ended in his complete disillusionment and pessimism in regard to the entire notion. (Repetition, pp. 71-73, Cf. p. 94).

However, the attempt fails utterly, and he returns to Denmark with the feeling that there is no such thing as repetition.

Yet while he is engaging in this mock attempt at aesthetic repetition, Constantine notices some odd psychological changes in his young friend. The latter, as we recall, loves his sweetheart but to his dismay finds his happiness rather in remembering her in absentia than by being in her presence. He has decided that he is unfit to be a husband, and so has put the girl off. But now, as Constantine observes, he is slowly changing his mood. He no longer laments his aesthetic love affair, but has become very confused and even bored with his psychological conflicts. He has begun to read the Book of Job and is quite fascinated with Job's dilemma. He is especially taken with the fact that Job, instead of being consoled by his friends, carries his complaint directly to God in "anguish of Spirit".¹

The young lover has reached the point of aesthetic despair which we first encountered in Judge Wilhelm's writings, and he is in hopeless confusion. He finds that his life has been brought to an "impasse", and he loathes his existence which is without savour. "One sticks one's finger into the soil to tell by the smell in what land one is: I stick my finger into existence--² it smells of nothing." Having reached the point of aesthetic

1. Repetition, p. 111; Cf. Job 7:11.

2. Repetition, p. 114.

despair the young lover has, like Job, put himself in a transitional position with regard to a way of life. Like his ancient paragon, he searches for a meaning of his nameless pain and suffering,¹ but he is lost in his despair.

Yet, having attained the unbearable condition, he is driven to a new resolution of his problems. Indeed, Constantine now records a strange transition in his "patient's" attitude.² The latter ostensibly feels that if he is to overcome his sufferings, he must first understand them. He knows that Job had overcome his sufferings in receiving back everything "in double". Therefore, he sees Job as a "private practitioner" of repetition "who does not cut a figure in a university chair and with re-assuring gestures vouch for the truth of his thesis [of repetition] but who sits among the ashes and scrapes himself with a potsherd, and without interrupting this manual labor, lets fall casual hints and remarks."

The young lover now comes to identify his entire life with that of Job⁴ because like his ancient forebear, his life has

1. Ibid., p. 120.

2. And this is simply a documentation of observation, for Constantine acknowledges that it is far "too transcendent" a transition for him to understand. Repetition, p. 94.

3. Ibid., p. 94. He contrasts "private practitioner" with "professor publicus ordinarius".

4. Ibid., p. 113.

reached a point wherein it not only no longer makes sense but has become loathsome. "The whole content of my being shrieks in contradiction against itself."¹ As Job before him, he agonizes over his condition, over the awful fact that of all things that ought to be enjoyable, it was a love affair which brought him to such a condition. He wonders if the whole affair was not an accident. His own contention is that his lover had only a shadowy significance beside his own "spiritual reality" and that the very moment he would attempt to make her a genuine reality² (i.e. a wife), she would be crushed. He contends, therefore, that no matter what others might say, he was in the right in³ breaking the engagement.

There is, of course, much more involved here than a lost fiancée. One's entire existence is at stake, one's whole life is analogous to Job's desperate situation. This is why the

1. Ibid., pp. 114-115.

2. Ibid., pp. 116-117. Cf. Jean Wahl's introduction to Crainte et Tremblement (op. cit.), who has expressed SK's thought with regard to his own experience with Regine quite well: "Devais-je, l'épouser, alors que Dieu à fait de moi sinon un élu, du moins un individu isolé, différent de tous les autres, et quand le mariage aurait été pou elle un malheur? Devais-je l'épouser quand je sentais en moi, à côté de mes sentiments religieux, d'autres sentiments dont je ne suis pas toujours maitre et qui me font peur? Devais-je l'épouser enfin quand je sentais si profondément que, en meme temps qu'elle serait devenue ma femme, elle aurait cessé d'être l'idéale jeune fille que j'aimais, pour prendre place dans le reel, tandis que son souvenir seul me, serait resté précieux, qu'elle me serait restée précieuse, mais seulement dans le passé?" (p. 1).

3. Repetition, p. 116.

contradictions of existence along with its despair must not be seen as accidental and must instead be viewed as a "trial of probation"¹ to be contested before the Highest Court. When one does this, one moves away from the aesthetic and ethical categories because it involves a personal, paradoxical relationship between oneself and God. Here we are on the borderline of the religious sphere.²

But what of "repetition"? We are now able to witness the transformation in the young lover's thought. He knows that if there is such a thing as repetition, it must occur on a transcendent, religious level. He knows this not only because he and Constantine failed to achieve the experience of repetition on the aesthetic level, but by musing over the nature of Job's repetition. Job was blessed and had received back everything in double. But the young man notices that this repetition occurred only after a "thunderstorm", that is, only after God and Job had been reconciled. Repetition is not comprehended by explanation, only by a "thunderstorm", only "before God".³

1. Ibid., p. 128. As we shall see, this is precisely the position of Abraham as told by Johannes de Silentio in FT. Johannes Climacus, in his exposition of the notion of Anfechtung (Postscript, pp. 410 ff.) agrees.

2. Indeed, Job's real significance is that "the border conflicts incident to faith are fought out in him" Ibid., p. 130.

3. Repetition, pp. 132-133.

We have reached a very important point in the text of Repetition. What kind of repetition does the young lover expect? What does he think he will get back after his thunderstorm? Does he expect to regain his lover, and if so, how? Does he await a physical repetition, as Job had who received back everything in double? That is, does he expect a physical-temporal repetition?¹

Let us take a closer look at the concept of repetition. Earlier we saw that Constantine compared his "new category" with the Greek notion of recollection and found them to be similar movements toward or attempts to grasp the eternal. The difference was that these two movements were in opposite directions. Recollection moved backward to grasp that which did not change,

1. Considering these questions from the synoptic standpoint of the entire authorship, it is appropriate to note here that SK himself does not at this point provide us with any direct answers to them. In fact, he was demonstrably confused about the matter. We know, for example, that at the point in Repetition when the young lover was awaiting his thunderstorm and repetition, SK, having just learned of Regine's engagement to another, promptly tore out the last ten pages of his manuscript and wrote a completely new ending to the book. It is likely that SK sought a physical-temporal repetition before he learned of Regine's marriage; hence the Journal entry of May 17, 1843: "If I had faith, I should have remained with Regina" Certainly this physical-temporal repetition is given abundant expression in Repetition as well as in Fear and Trembling. I interpret the change coming with the new ending in a simple way: After SK learned of Regine's marriage, it came to him (perhaps as a thunderstorm) that the true repetition was religious and was the equivalent of the atonement. This he shows by the literary device of the pseudonymous authors, none of whom claim to be able to understand it religiously. And this is why we have the "new" ending of Repetition.

that which had always been. The Greeks asserted that all knowledge is "recollection".¹ But, unlike recollection, repetition admits the character of novelty. "When the Greeks said that all knowledge is recollection, they affirmed that all that is has been; when one says that life is a repetition, one affirms that existence which has been now becomes."²

Repetition seems to be held with the utmost philosophical seriousness by the pseudonymous author, and the context of the passage just quoted is concerned with a criticism of the Greek notion of κίνησις³ and the Hegelian conception of transition or "mediation". Yet the notion of repetition remains obscure, and we are yet to receive an answer to the question of ; how "existence which has been" can now become.

To begin an answer to this enigmatic question negatively, Constantine himself warns us not to interpret the new concept as

1. E/g/ as expressed in the story of the slaveboy's guidance by Socrates in Plato's Meno, 82 B ff.

2. Repetition, p1 34.

3. Because the criticism in the passage itself does not go beyond what I survey in the paragraphs which follow, I shall not pursue the matter in depth at this point.

1
 applying to any process of nature. For him, repetition is a "movement" forward, not backward; it is a movement by virtue of the absurd wherein the future repeats and restores the past in the present under a new possibility. The only real "future" is eter-
 2
 nity, and "repetition" in Constantine's sense occurs whenever eternity comes into being in time. As we have noted, Constantine also contrasts his conception of repetition with "hope".
 3
 Repetition is not simply a looking forward to the future; it is the actual realization in the present of that which is hoped for in the future. Thus the movement of repetition is evidently not meant merely as a movement by which we incorporate our projected future into our present lives; it means much more.

Further, we have just seen that repetition is the restoration of that which has been lost in the past. Now, if we combine this latter thought with the notion of repetition as the realization of what is hoped for in the future, we may make some sense out of

1. This was the erroneous interpretation of Prof. J. L. Heiberg, a contemporary of Constantine. The latter criticized Prof. Heiberg's interpretation in an open letter which is now found in the Papirer (IV, pp. 280 ff), and which is used by Lowrie as part of his introduction to Repetition (pp. xv ff.). Cf. the review given by Vigilius Haufniensis in the Concept of Dread, pp. 16-17. Heiberg was ostensibly misled by the "whimsical" first part of Repetition wherein Constantine mocked the true repetition by actually traveling to Berlin. We might add that one should also guard against making too close a comparison between this notion of repetition and that which Nietzsche held. E.g. see Gregor Malantachuk, "Kierkegaard and Nietzsche" in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 116-129. (pp. cit.).

2. Dread, p. 80.

3. Repetition, p. 4.

of the idea of a restoration of the past under a new possibility and hopefully obtain at least an inkling of how a forward movement can restore that which lies behind.

Still this is difficult if not impossible to grasp, and it is no small wonder that Constantine notices a change in his young friend's attitude as he moves in the direction of the religious.¹ Finally, to comprehend the notion at all we must be mindful of the fact that repetition, as the young lover comes to realize, is possible only as a religious movement.

It is not in the sphere of the temporal that repetition takes place; true repetition is eternal.² Here in the "new ending", the young man affirms that the existence which has been now becomes, but it "becomes" spiritually, not temporally.³ It is a transcendent becoming, the eternal becomes in "repetition", whereas in "recollection" the eternal is (in the past; one goes back to it--it does not change). "Recollection" is the mode of immanence; "repetition" is the mode of transcendence. In short, when viewed objectively ("through the eyes of psychology") repetition appears

1. Nor is it strange that SK tore out the last ten pages and rewrote the new ending.

2. Repetition, p. 144. Cf. Constantine's letter concerning Heiberg (IV B 120, pp. 308 f.) quoted by Lowrie in Repetition, p. xxvii.

3. Ibid.

"as a transcendancy, as a religious movement by virtue of the
absurd."¹

Thus in the "new" ending of Repetition, we meet a kind of internalization of the "movement" of repetition. The lover writes to his silent confidant after he has learned of his fiancée's marriage (after the "thunderstorm"):

I am again myself. This self which another would not pick up from the road I possess again. The discord in my nature is resolved, I am again unified. The terrors which found support and nourishment in my pride no longer enter in to distract and separate. Is there not then a repetition? Did I not get everything doubly restored? Did I not get myself again, precisely in such a way that I must doubly feel its significance? And what is a repetition of earthly goods which are of no consequence to the spirit--what are they in comparison with such a repetition. Only his children did Job not receive again double, because a human life is not a thing that can be duplicated. In that case only spiritual repetition is possible, although in the temporal life [Timeligheden] it is never so perfect as in eternity, which is the true repetition.²

The true repetition is indeed inward; its yield is the self regained. The young man now exists as a religious man, and this existence seems paradoxical to the non-religious man. "He explains the universal as repetition, and yet he himself understands repetition in a different sense; for while reality becomes repetition,

1. Again from Constantine's letter, Repetition, p. xxvii.

2. Ibid., p. 144. Note that the new "spiritualized" repetition is based on the recognition that Job's children were not duplicated. Cf. Job 1:2, 42:13. My italics.

yet for him his own consciousness raised to the second power is
 1
 repetition. We have then a restoration here and now of the personal consciousness to its normal integrity; this restoration does not lie in the distant future, it is here and now by a transformation of time.

We are now at the core of the "transitional" stage with which this chapter is concerned. At this point the young lover of Repetition is experiencing a religious conversion. And in this context--that of his relation to the young girl--the "conversion" means something analogous to what he supposes was going on in Job's mind.

We see clearly the extent to which these pseudonymous authors represent a transitional view of temporality. Constantine is portrayed as being able to recognize but not really understand what is happening to the young man or to Job. This is characteristic of the pseudonymous authors with whom we are dealing in this section. They are able to recognize that something significant is happening, and they "know" (intellectually) that it is "religious" or "transcendent", but they cannot understand it from within. To them it is either too complicated or it is absurd.

1. Ibid., p. 155. Cf. Ibid., pp. xx-xxi (taken from Papirer IV, pp. 280 ff.). Constantine is quoting himself in his letter which was to accompany Repetition. The actual quote as rendered by Lowrie (pp. xxvii) is this: "That repetition is not merely for contemplation, but that it is the task of freedom, that it signifies freedom itself, consciousness raised to the second power"

The "repetition" really makes no sense. Lowrie has expressed the case well in his introduction to Repetition:

The pseudonymous authors, though they could see that Repetition was the same thing as the Platonic Recollection, only with a movement forward instead of backward, and that it might well be substituted for the Hegelian 'mediation,' were yet unable to see that in the religious sphere it meant subjectively (on man's part) the fruits of repentance, and transcendently (on God's part) atonement!¹

So the young lover experiences his own thunderstorm and finds the true nature of repetition to be a religious movement which comes only from God. He knows also that it is inward and learns that what is regained is the unity of his self which had been dispersed in the multifarious aesthetic life.

In the unpublished letter against Heiberg, Constantine elucidates his comparison of the young lover and Job:

So step by step he [the young lover] discovers repetition, being educated by existence. It appears to him in his distress that Job experienced repetition when he received everything double. What really attracted him to Job, however, was the fact that he was in the right. Upon this point new everything turns. Fate had played a trick in letting him become guilty. If this is the way it stands, he can never recapture himself. His nature has become split, and so the question is not about the repetition of something outward, but about the repetition of his freedom. He is glad of the thunderstorm, if only it will come, even though his sentence were to be that no repetition is possible. For the thunderstorm must justify him, that is all he requires. Now providence intervenes with a helping hand, it saves him from his entanglement²

1

1. Ibid., p. x. Cf. pp. xxvii-xxviii.

2. Ibid., pp. xx-xxi.

So Constantine sees Job's repetition as symbolic of the whole of life. In a parallel way, since he sees that Job was actually undergoing a trial of probation, we may infer that for Constantine, one's whole life is a trial. What it means that one's whole life is a trial can never really be known from without. That is, the pseudonymous authors can recognize it and even point to it, but they cannot really comprehend the sufferings associated with it. Life seen as a trial of probation is comprehensible only from within the religious style of life.

The same obscure temporal transformation and the same transitional conception of temporality is found in Fear and Trembling, by Johannes de Silentio. In this work the term "repetition" is not used, but the subject matter seems the same, and repetition is further clarified by the introduction of a new concept, Resignation. Indeed, since Fear and Trembling was written simultaneously with Repetition, it is highly probable that we shall increase our understanding of the temporal transformation by attending carefully to this new concept.

The book opens with a multifaceted panegyric of Abraham on Mount Moriah.¹ We soon learn that Abraham, too, experienced what Constantine had referred to as repetition. Let us accompany Abraham on his fateful journey to Moriah. We may visualize the scene:

1. FT, pp. 26-37.

Isaac lies bound and prepared. His father stands over him and draws the knife. Immediately in that precise instant, as his hand is poised to strike, and when he has fully committed himself to a seemingly absurd sacrifice which no one will ever be able to understand,¹ in that instant the sacrifice is no longer demanded. Then Abraham receives Isaac back. He regains the son whom he had given up. Obviously this was no ordinary reception, for Abraham received Isaac back eternally. But, as if that were not enough, de Silentio emphasizes something even greater, the fact that all the while Abraham held to the temporal as well.² "For it is great to give up one's wish," as de Silentio writes, "but it is greater to hold it fast after having given it up; it is great to grasp the eternal, but it is greater still to hold fast to the temporal after having given it up."³

This is unquestionably a repetition similar to that which Job experienced. But there are important new features here which serve to clarify the entire phenomenon. At first it seems that, in receiving back Isaac, Abraham's repetition was superior in force to that of Job. The latter, we recall, could not receive back his children on the grounds that a human life could not be

1. And about which he will always need to remain silent--hence the author's name, de Silentio.

2. And according to de Silentio this is why Abraham is the father of faith.

3. FT, p. 33.

reduplicated. Perhaps, we might reflect, Isaac could be "repeated" because he had not actually died. Perhaps, but here our reflections would carry us too far in the direction of literalistic interpretation of metaphorical stories.¹ Here de Silentio's description helps us to see that the phenomenon we are treating is a subjective phenomenon. What Abraham really symbolizes is the "movement" of resignation and faith. The giving up of Isaac is a movement of resignation, but it is the giving up while not giving up that accounts for the movement of faith as well. Further, it is this double movement that describes the individual overcoming of time.²

Faith, as we learn from de Silentio, is the greatest passion, capable not only of moving mountains, but of transforming time. Faith does this in the "religious instant" by opening onto eternity. It "opens onto" eternity by means of a "double movement" whereby the individual first moves toward the infinite by placing himself above the general and is ready to sacrifice what is most dear to him and then moves back toward the finite when God ceases to demand the sacrifice. De Silentio clarifies this double movement by creating the knight of infinite resignation and the knight of

1. Although Constantine's description in the "old" section of Repetition certainly led us in that direction.

2. Jean Wahl in his introduction to Crainte et Tremblement (op. cit.) is certainly correct in pointing out that the individual's relation to time is one of the major concerns of the work (p. 1).

faith. The former is easily recognized, for he has clearly abandoned the temporal in pursuit of the eternal. But the latter is not so easily recognized--even by so astute an observer as de Silentio, who seeks in him some intimation of the eternal ("a little heterogeneous fractional telegraphic message from the infinite"¹), but finds him quite at home in the world ("solid through and through"). The knight of faith is an earthly man, and yet (to the envy of de Silentio) he has made, and with every instant is making, the movement toward infinity.

With infinite resignation he has drained the cup of life's profound sadness, he knows the bliss of the infinite, he senses the pain of renouncing everything, the dearest things he possesses in the world, and yet finiteness tastes to him just as good as to one who never knew anything higher, for his continuance in the finite did not bear a trace of the cowed and fearful spirit produced by the process of training; and yet he has this sense of security in enjoying it, as though the finite life were the surest thing of all. And yet, and yet the whole earthly form he exhibits is a new creation by virtue of the absurd.²

So, whereas the knight of infinity is a stranger to the world, the knight of faith expresses the sublime in the pedestrian.³

De Silentio proceeds to describe a few of the prerequisites a knight must have before he is able to advance to "the movements". This description is found in a few quite unspectacular passages

1. FT, p. 49.

2. FT, p. 51.

3. FT, p. 52.

which may easily go unnoticed, but they contain what I believe to be an intimation of a particular sense of temporality which underlies the notion of repetition in the works with which we are particularly concerned in this chapter.¹

The passages to which I refer are found within the context of the fable of the young swain who falls in love with a princess.² He says there that the knight who is to perform the movements must possess certain powers:

So for the first thing, the knight will have the power to concentrate the whole content of life and the whole significance of reality in one single wish. If a man lacks this concentration, this intensity, if his soul from the beginning is dispersed in the multifarious, he never comes to the point of making the movement In the next place the knight will have the power to concentrate the whole result of the operations of thought in one act of consciousness. If he lacks this intensity, if his soul from the beginning is dispersed in the multifarious, he will never get time to make the movements, he will be constantly running errands in life, never enter into eternity, for even at the instant when he is closest to it he will suddenly discover that he has forgotten something for which he must go back.³

Thus, unlike "lower natures" (such as the butterfly which has entirely forgotten that it was a caterpillar), the knight remembers the whole content of his life, for "it is a contradiction to forget

1. One of the striking things about the subject of this thesis is that the real sense of temporality, of time and eternity, and of "the instant" is often to be found between the lines written by the sundry pseudonymous authors, and often in the least expected places.

2. FT, pp. 52 ff.

3. FT, pp. 53-54. My italics.

the whole content of one's life and yet remain the same man

The deeper natures never forget themselves and never bēcome anything else than what they were."¹ In a related passage de Silentio speaks of a man who in an instant can "concentrate his whole soul in a single glance."²

In these "preliminary" powers of the knight which are exercised in one instant, we are able to glimpse something of the essence of temporality which underlies the religious "repetition". It is this grasping of the whole beyond the succession of parts which, by attending to de Silentio's treatment of these concepts, I will attempt to show to be the essence of the intermingling of time and eternity in the instant.

We have before us now two important aspects of the movement (or, rather, the double movement) which is "repetition": It occurs only in the religious sphere, in the sphere of the "transcendent", and it has a certain characteristic of inwardness. We know these two are related, but the issue is not yet clear. Before treating the more analytic works, however, it will perhaps be helpful to take a brief look at the third section of Stages On Life's Way. "Guilty?/Not Guilty?" does not really yield the kind of detailed

1. FT, p. 54.

2. FT, p. 60. A power which de Silentio admits he lacks (Ibid.).

clarification we seek regarding the ambiguous concepts before us, but it does serve to add something to our understanding of resignation.¹

In "Guilty?/Not Guilty?" there is a somewhat copious account in diary form of a young man, Quidam, who is in the process of breaking a marital engagement. The dissatisfied Quidam understands himself to be "religiously constructed", which means that he is a lowly temporal (Timelige) being whose business it is to stand fast in God's love. Thus to dabble in temporal love--the love of a young woman--and still to stand fast in eternal love, requires that he raise his relation to his fiancée to a higher status.² In brief, he must bring the temporal relationship under what he calls a "God-relationship",³ and thereby be bound both in time and in eternity.⁴ He invokes God's name in the wish for and declaration of the temporal love-relationship, and he must therefore stand by his word. He must in every instant hold fast to the declaration that this was his only wish which he took so seriously, so eternally, that he ventured to give it religious

1. And, of course, this story has the alleged advantage of putting the ambiguous in closer proximity to SK's own real life situation in that it is more straightforwardly autobiographical than the other works.

2. Stages, pp. 224-227.

3. Ibid., p. 224.

4. Ibid.

1
 expression. This religiousity is taken with fanatical seriousness, and the temporal love relationship is made impossible because the girl is not herself capable (or so her lover believes) of the resignation requisite to the God-relationship. Needless to say, Quidam is deeply troubled about this and is worried that he has already carried her "too far out upon the sea".

Not even do I dare to give my outward existence a decisive religious expression, for fear she might misunderstand this and venture out upon the sea of infinity. That she is not able to do, at least not yet. What must save her (such was my first thought, and such it is still) is a certain healthiness of the temporal [Timelighedens] sort. I am convinced that even at the most decisive instant, when I posited the separation between us, she had no conception of resignation. Either the thought, 'Now I am dying and then it is all over'--but that is not resignation; or she continued to hope simply in the form of immediacy--but that is not resignation; or she recovered by virtue of her natural healthiness and was inflamed by the desire to grasp the temporal [Timeligheden] precisely at that moment--but this is not resignation.²

It would seem that Quidam has the same pessimistic view about woman's capabilities as did Judge Wilhelm. She simply does not have what it takes to achieve a true resignation.

And what is a true resignation? It is not simply the capacity for passion--a woman may possess passion as strong or even stronger than that of a man. Rather it is a capacity for contradiction in passion. A prime example of this would occur when one

1. Ibid., p. 225.

2. Ibid., pp. 226-227. Cf. the young lover's complaint about his sweetheart in Repetition (pp. 116-117). Supra, p. 140.

gives up a wish while retaining it at the same time. This is true resignation. And so here we come to understand its nature by contrasting it with an inferior feminine apprehension of religiosity. We see now why Quidam felt he had to give up his fiancée and what is required for true (masculine) religiosity; it is the complete revolution of infinity.

Perhaps the religious movement of infinity is not within the compass of her individuality. Her pride had not energy enough to raise her temporally [Timelighedens] to a higher power. If she had been absolutely proud, this, humanly speaking, would not have happened. Perhaps, therefore, religiousness in her does not accomplish the complete revolution of infinity. Her religious eternity is possibly not the eternal decision but an indefinite extension of time [Timelighed]. So eternity has dwelt with her, comforted her, as when in Homer's descriptions a god or goddess hastens to the help of one of his heroes. She believed it was the decision of eternity, she believed it was her death, she believed all was lost; but behold, instead of waking to this eternal decision she became weary of fruitless wishing, weary of the fruitless act of renunciation, and fell gently asleep in eternity, while time passed, and she awoke and belonged again to life. Then there would even be a question of a new engagement, a new love.¹

The point of resignation, then, is not to "fall gently asleep in eternity", for that would be an escape from life. Rather the object is to hold fast to both the temporal and the eternal in such a way that--in contradiction--the eternal is retained in time.

We now know the following about this "transitional" view of temporality: Repetition, or the double movement of resignation,

1. Stages, p. 280.

is somehow a movement which transcends time and the temporal world, and it is a movement which lies beyond the aesthetic and ethical existential possibilities. In fact, it is only when these existential possibilities are overcome or "teleologically suspended" that repetition or anything like it is possible. The real possibility of repetition comes only when one's existence is grounded in the infinite. The subjective "movements" of Job, Abraham, Quidam and the young lover of Repetition provide the clues to the meaning of the transformation of time termed repetition. Repetition occurs in the constantly renewed struggle to achieve the posture of true resignation.

Again, from the works we have investigated to this point, we have learned something else: We know that everything treated thus far is described as absurd. That is, in spite of all the articulate speeches about religiosity, the subjective movements do not yet make sense.

Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript
and The Concept of Dread.

Our exposition of SK's conception of temporality has reached a point which obviously requires philosophical analysis. The path we have followed in reaching this point parallels the path of the Kierkegaardian authorship itself, and it is at this point

that SK himself, seemingly recognizing the need for a more synoptic and less "poetic" presentation than had been given thus far, introduced the works Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, by Johannes Climacus, and The Concept of Dread,¹ by Vigilius Haufniensis.

As we begin to investigate these works, I believe it is important to keep a few methodological points in mind. First, we must be mindful that these writings are pseudonymous and ought to be regarded as such. Perhaps because SK added his name to the title page of the works by Climacus as "responsible for publication", or perhaps because the works themselves are more analytical, they have traditionally been regarded as representing the real opinion of SK himself.² Here I shall regard that interpretation³ to be mistaken and will treat these writings as fully pseudonymous

1. Fragments and Dread were both published in June, 1844; the Postscript did not follow until February, 1846. However, I shall treat Fragments and Postscript before Dread because (a) they were meant to represent the thought of one pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, and (b) Dread contains a formal analysis of time and thus serves our exposition best if it follows the other two works.

2. This interpretation is widely held in all phases of Kierkegaardian scholarship, but pertaining to our subject specifically cf. George C. Bedell, "Kierkegaard's Conception of Time", Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 37, no. 3; Calvin O. Schrag (op. cit.); Walter A. Stromseth, "The Time-Eternity Correlation in Western Theology: An Exploration of Metaphysical Foundations", unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1960; James Daane, "Kierkegaard's Concept of the Moment: An Investigation into the Time-Eternity Concept of Soren Kierkegaard", unpub. Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1947.

3. Recent evidence would suggest that it is. Cf. Alastair McKinnon, "New Hierarchy", op. cit. Cf. our discussion of this problem in Chap. I, pp. 26-27.

and, therefore, as but a segment of the entire authorship and as but a part of SK's view of temporality. I shall treat these works as "transitional", at least in regard to the concept of temporality. In short, I shall continue to assume it ^{as} likely that SK's view was still emerging at the point when these works were introduced and that his view was neither static nor systematized.

Secondly, I think we should keep in mind that these works which we shall treat in this section are, as their titles suggest, fragmentary and unscientific in character. Just as we cannot find in them a unified theory of existentialism, neither can we discover a systematic theory of time. At least with respect to our subject, these works are fragmentary and unscientific attempts to come to grips with some of the thoughts and concepts put forth "poetically" in the works previously studied.

A third consideration is that these works engage ~~heavily~~ in anti-Hegelian metaphysics and represent, at least in form, an attack on Hegel's "system" in particular and on speculative philosophy in general. Climacus especially objects to the immodest self-assuredness of speculative thought in which all things are accounted for systematically. This general attack on Hegel and speculative philosophy is well described by many Kierkegaard

1
 scholars, and I wish to pursue it here only insofar as it relates to the matter of temporality.

In the account of temporality described in Fear and Trembling our attention was focused on the psychological moment of temporal transformation in which an existing person performs the double movement of resignation. It is at this precise instant that the eternal somehow impinges upon time. The works which follow represent a further elucidation of that very instant with which we have been concerned. Indeed, Johannes Climacus writes the Philosophical Fragments precisely as an inquiry into that moment. In his subtitle he has this moment in mind when he poses the following questions: "Is an historical point of departure possible for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure have any other than a merely historical interest; is it possible to base an eternal happiness upon historical knowledge?"² The Philosophical Fragments does not contain answers to these questions from the standpoint of a committed Christian apology. We are confronted instead with what amounts to an intellectual query into the truth of Christianity from the standpoint of a

1. Besides the translator's introductions to each of these works, especially helpful comments are found in James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (op. cit.), pp. 98-136; Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1948), and in Niels Thulstrup's introduction and commentary to the Fragments.

2. Fragments, title page.

non-Christian. Climacus intends only an intellectual exercise, a "project of thought" simply as a "nimble dance" to investigate the questions in the subtitle.

At the outset, therefore, he merely asks the reader to consider two "hypotheses". Either (1) the moment (i.e. the "historical point of departure") when a man comes into contact with the eternal has no significance in regard to eternal Truth, or (2) it has decisive significance as the time when the Truth first comes to be for the one who learns it.

As representative of the first hypothesis Climacus refers us to Socrates, for whom knowledge is recollection. Strictly speaking, in Socratic teaching one does not ¹ learn eternal Truth, for it dwells in the individual who needs only to remember it. Of course an individual might require help with his recollection, but his helper is more midwife than teacher. The midwife merely aids in delivering what was there eternally in the immortal soul ² of the one giving birth. Thus the Truth is not introduced into the individual from without, but was always within him. ³ In this

1. The language Climacus uses is somewhat confusing here (Fragments, p. 11). He writes that in the doctrine of Recollection, "all learning and inquiry is interpreted as a kind of remembering." Actually his point is that, in regard to the Truth, learning is replaced by recollection. In this sense there is no learning.

2. Climacus here refers us to the Meno, and we can see that he has the Greek midwife well interpreted. Cf. Socrates' remarks in the opening pages of Theaetetus, pp. 149 A ff.

3. Fragments, p. 11.

case, then, the historical moment when the Truth is remembered is of no real consequence.

The temporal. [timelike] point of departure is nothing; for as soon as I discover that I have known the Truth from eternity without being aware of it, the same instant this moment of occasion is hidden in the Eternal, and so incorporated with it that I cannot even find it so to speak, even if I sought it; because in my eternal consciousness there is neither here nor there, but only an ubique et nusquam.¹

It should be sufficiently clear that Climacus' use of the concept "eternal" is intentionally that of Greek Idealism, i.e. the eternal is defined as unchangeable and is, therefore, beyond the fluctuations of time.²

We come now to the alternative suggestion by Climacus, that the moment in time does have decisive significance. In this case the moment would be crucial because the Eternal, which hitherto did not exist, comes into existence in this very moment.³ This hypothesis is clearly represented by Christ, who acts as a unique and necessary teacher who not only brings the Truth but also gives the conditions necessary for understanding it at the crucial moment of conversion of the soul away from sin. At such a moment, called the "Fullness of Time", one becomes a new creature.⁴ "In

1. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

2. Cf. Timaeus, 37-38; Parmenides, 140 E ff. and Aristotle's Physics II, 221 B. We shall investigate Hegel's notion of the eternal later in this chapter.

3. Fragments, p. 16.

4. Ibid., pp. 16-23.

so far as the learner was in Error, and now receives the Truth and with it the condition for understanding it, a change takes place within him like the change from non-being to being. But this transition from non-being to being is the transition we call birth.¹

Having placed these alternative hypotheses before us, Climacus goes on to emphasize the dichotomy of an eternal Truth and a temporal truth seeker. When a historical existence comes into contact with eternal Truth, we have a paradox.² To put the matter in theistic terms, God is absolutely unlike man, and for man even to understand this he needs the help of God. This in itself seems a paradox,³ but as a matter of fact, the only legitimate understanding of human existence is to see it as a contradiction.⁴ To understand existence as fundamentally a contradiction suggests to Climacus the importance of faith. In this he would agree wholeheartedly with the emphasis on contradiction and faith which we encountered earlier in Repetition and in Fear and Trembling.⁵

1. Ibid., p. 23.

2. Ibid., pp. 46-67. Cf. supra n. 1, p. 21.

3. Ibid., p. 58.

4. It would appear that Climacus thus rules out as illegitimate the Platonic attempt to solve the same problem, viz. the notion of "participation". This is perhaps a hasty decision on Climacus' part, but we shall not pursue the matter at this point.

5. Cf. supra, pp. 157-158.

Now if we assume that it is as we have supposed . . . that the Teacher himself contributed the condition to the learner, it will follow that the object of Faith is not the teaching but the Teacher. The Socratic principle is that the learner being himself the Truth and in possession of the condition can thrust the teacher aside; the Socratic art and the Socratic heroism consisted precisely in helping men to do this. But Faith must steadily hold fast to the Teacher. In order that he may have the power to give the condition the Teacher must be the God; in order that he may be able to put the learner in possession of it he must be man. This contradiction is again the object of Faith, and is the Paradox, the Moment. That the God has once for all given man the requisite condition is the eternal Socratic presupposition, which comes into no hostile collision with Time, but is incommensurable with the temporal [Timelighedens] and its determinations. The contradiction of our hypothesis is that man receives the condition in the Moment, the same condition which, since it is requisite for the understanding of the eternal Truth, is eo ipso an eternal condition. If the case is otherwise we stand at the Socratic principle of Recollection.¹

The contradiction arises when the historicity of human existence rather than its supposed eternal essence is taken as reality.

These themes are expanded by Climacus in the Fragments and Postscript into the well-known and much heralded contrast between the essentialist philosopher, who views life from the point of view of eternity¹ and the existential thinker, who begins with the

1. Ibid., pp. 76-77.

2. Sub specie aeterni is the pseudonymous author's acceptable version of Spinoza's sub specie aeternitatis. Cf. Lowrie's note on the phrase in Postscript, p. 560 (n. 1 to p. 75).

paradoxes of his life and progresses toward subjective truth in
¹
 faith.

This contrast, which takes the form of a general critique
²
 of Hegel, is familiar and beyond the scope of the present thesis.
 Nevertheless, there are aspects of the difference between Hegel
 and the Kierkegaardian pseudonyms which we must understand before
 proceeding.

In regard to the relationship of eternity and time, the at-
 tack upon Hegel is not based on some distaste for the identifica-
 tion of the eternal with the pure Being of Platonic philosophy.
³
 Both Climacus and his fellow representative, Vigilius Haufniensis,
 are quite willingly in accord with Hegel in making this identifi-
 cation. However, there is an important difference. Hegel's no-
 tion of the dynamic relationship of time and eternity is rooted
 in his rationalistic monism, and as a result of his identification
 of Thought and Being, he blurred the distinction between essence
 and existence. This is the real point of contention between Cli-
 macus and Hegel. And indeed a perusal of Hegel indicates that
 Climacus' objections are well taken. In the so-called "Lesser
⁴
 Logic" Hegel first distinguishes essence from Being. The latter

1. Fragments, pp. 47-48; Postscript, pp. 267-322.

2. See supra, p. 161, n. 1.

3. Dread, p. 75 n.

4. William Wallace, The Logic of Hegel: Translated from the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 2nd ed., sec. 112, pp. 207 ff.

is "immediate" or "mere seeming" as compared with the former.

That is, while there is a simple self-relation in Being, Essence is "higher" than Being because Essence is Being which has "gone into itself".² Again, Essence is "Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself"³ That is to say, the reflecting into itself is the negation (in Hegel's dialectical sense) of immediacy, and the result of this "reflection" is Essence. Thus the immediacy of Being is reflected or mediated,⁴ and we have essence.

Next we come to Hegel's concept of "existence" which is a kind of reverse correlation or "mediation" of essence.

Existence is the immediate unity of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-another. It follows from this that existence is the indefinite multitude of existents as reflected-into-themselves, which at the same time equally throw light on one another,--which, in short, are co-relative, and form a world of reciprocal dependence and of infinite interconnexion between grounds and consequents.⁵

1. Ibid., p. 208.

2. Ibid., p. 207.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 208. From this we come to understand why the aim of philosophy is often represented as the ascertainment of the essence of things. According to Hegel this means "that things instead of being left in their immediacy, must be shown to be mediated by, or based upon, something else. The immediate Being of things is thus conceived under the image of a rind or curtain behind which the Essence lies hidden."

5. Ibid., p. 230. This is precisely the passage that so troubled Climacus in Postscript, p. 267 n.

"Existence" (derived from existere) suggests to Hegel the fact of having proceeded from something. "Existence," he writes, "is Being which has proceeded from the ground, and been reinstated by annulling its intermediation."¹ "Ground" in this connection is a category or expression for the reflection of essence, and so it is that the distinction between essence and existence is erased. "Having issued from the ground, existence contains the ground in it, the ground does not remain, as it were, behind existence, but by its very nature supersedes itself and translates itself into existence."²

Let us put the objection of Climacus and Haufniensis to Hegel's treatment of essence and existence into historical focus. We recall that for the philosophy of the Middle Ages the distinction between essence and existence was of critical importance. Indeed, existentia as a scholastic concept was the opposite of essentia. This dichotomy was critically efficacious for everything created by God. God Himself was of course the sole exception. In Him alone essence and existence occur together as one. At least such is the claim and purpose of the "ontological" proof of God's existence begun by St. Anselm.³

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid. My italics.

3. An excellent analysis of and commentary on the ontological argument in its long tradition is M. J. Charlesworth's translation of St. Anselm's Proslogion (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965).

Kant, in his famous "refutation" of the argument,¹ showed that existence was not an attribute or property and established the new distinction between what a thing is (essence) and the fact that it is (existence). As we have seen, this critical distinction was completely obliterated by Hegel.

Karl Löwith² has said well that when Hegel's logic defined the "real" as the "immediate unity of essence and existence", this had the effect of applying to every existing thing what had formerly characterized only the being of God. Now essential being, "that which is real and has effect" is the "idea" or the "notion".³

In all of this and especially in regard to the Being of which Plato wrote, it is likely that Climacus was a more radical purist

1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan & Co., 1933). "Transcendental Dialectic", Book II, Chap. 3, sec. 4.

2. From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought, tr. by David E. Green (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 113-114.

3. Hence the identification of Thought and Being.

1
 than either Hegel or Plato. In any case, Climacus rejects (and
 quite explicitly)² any "being-continuum" whereby the sharp existence/essence distinction is smoothed over by holding that existence is the determination of the essence that gives anything the measure of Being it has and resulting in an infinite gradation of Being which increases or decreases according to the intensity of participation in the absolute (pure) Being. There is no chain of being for Climacus. The Ideas stay in the sphere of eternity --they do not change; they may be, not become.

Factual existence is wholly indifferent to any and all variations in essence, and everything that exists participates without petty jealousy in being, and participates in the same degree. Ideally to be sure, the case is quite different. But the moment I speak of being in the ideal sense I no longer speak of being, but of essence. The highest ideality is necessary, and therefore it is. But this its being is identical with its essence; such

1. Soren Holm, "L'être comme catégorie de l'éternité," Orbis Litterarum, Tome X, fasc. 1-2 (1965), pp. 84-92, proffers some constructive thoughts on this subject. He locates the Hegelian notions squarely in the Platonic tradition and then quotes Hermann Cohen as stating that the error of Plato was that he attributed to the "Ideas" Dasein, whereas he should have only attributed Sein to them (Sein, spelled with fewer letters than Dasein, is therefore a more fundamental concept), p. 87. But Climacus did not allow for any such distinction as Sein and Dasein, and indeed, as Holm responds about SK in general: "Chez lui, les idées sont des concepts purs, elles ne sont pas supratura comme chez Platon. Mais Kierkegaard n'est pas nominaliste. Chez lui, contrairement à ce qui est le cas de Sartre, l'existencia est précédée d'essentia." (pp. 87-88).

2. In Fragments (pp. 52-53, note) he writes: "A fly, when it is, has as much being as the God"

being does not involve it dialectically in the determinations of factual existence, since it is; nor can it be said to have more or less of being in relation to other things.¹

As far as Climacus was concerned, Hegel's dialectical monism (in which Being and beings could not be distinguished owing to the identification of Being with pure thought) cut him off from any insight into the finite mode of concrete being. And, of course, it is to this latter that Climacus wants to devote his attention. He had no desire to develop a new science of metaphysics; he wanted only to set forth the tensions, "passions" and "leaps" above and beyond the conceptual plans of action which motivate change in the human sphere of freedom.² And, as he indicates in the Postscript, an existential system is impossible.

In summary, Hegel's failure to understand real changes is at one with his failure to grasp the meaning of finite being. But we must not be led by this constant emphasis on the temporal to think that SK failed to stress the eternal. As we have seen, this was far from the case.

1. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

2. Cf. Haufniensis: "In the sphere of historical freedom transition is a state. However, in order to understand this affirmation one must not forget that the new situation comes about by the leap. For if this is not kept in mind, transition acquires a quantitative preponderance over the elasticity of the leap." Dread, p. 76.

One further aspect needs to be mentioned before leaving this anti-Hegelian issue: While it is true that Climacus does belong to a philosophical tradition which sharply separates existence and essence, he nevertheless goes far beyond this traditional distinction in his interpretation of existence. And, further, in spite of his warning that "existence" cannot be strictly defined because in definition it is turned into essence,² he goes on to use "existence" in a personal sense of a subjective thinker (whose thinking proceeds from his personal involvement).³ A brief analysis of the difficulty posed here might help us to grasp the new distinction between "existence" and "human existence".

We have seen that Climacus rejects any "being-continuum" idea and adopts a "value-indifferent" concept of existence. A fly, as far as existence is concerned, has as much value as God. Generally speaking, man, like the fly, also "exists", but this general concept of "existence" only applies to man in a certain sense. What man is essentially is different from what a fly is

1. I write "mentioned" because I plan to pursue this point in more detail later. Here I bring it up as a point of clarification only.

2. Fragments, p. 53.

3. Cf. Michael Wyschogrod, Kierkegaard and Heidegger: The Ontology of Existence (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), who at "one level" locates Kierkegaard in the tradition of the Thomistic essence-existence distinction, also notes that "existence" refers to the personal existence of a subjective thinker (pp. 26-27).

(and from what all other kinds of existents are) because man has consciousness. That is, "existence" applies to a man in the same way as it applies to a fly, but because of what man is essentially, "existence" does not sufficiently "cover" him as it does a fly-- it does not say enough about the way he is. Does this mean that "existence" is large enough to "cover" a fly? Yes, it does, if we think of it relatively and make a further qualification. We do not mean to say that "existence" tells us what a fly is essentially, but rather that it tells us that the fly is in such a way that it has no difficulty in becoming what it is essentially. We might say, for example, that a fly exists immediately. With the introduction of this qualification, we can go on to say that a man does not exist immediately because he has some difficulty in becoming what he is essentially and that therefore he does not exist in the same way as a fly; man exists consciously. So that while in regard to existence alone man and fly are of the same value, in regard to the way they exist--¹i.e. in regard to immediacy and consciousness--they are not of equal value.

1. The writer recognizes that this analysis is extremely cursory, says only what every schoolboy already knows, and involves many problems. Actually, the analysis has only said that man is more than "existence" alone (with the implication that God, if He existed, would also be more than "existence" alone and that a fly is not more than existence alone). I do not mean to do injustice to a fly; I want only to pursue Climacus' own statement in Fragments, p. 33, and to make the distinction between immediate existence and conscious, subjective existence, which I feel is justifiable on the grounds that Climacus himself operates with such a distinction. There is, therefore, a question of whether talking

In contrasting existence and conscious, subjective existence, Climacus is himself guilty of blurring the distinction between what a thing is and that it is, but nevertheless, because the distinction helps us understand his real objection (and the point of our excursus into Hegel). The substance of this excursus in connection with our interests here is as follows: Climacus objects to the notion of a steady, systematized progression toward the Absolute in which the individual's existence is but an ephemeral moment in the existence of the universal. He suggests instead that each moment takes on ultimate significance in that it is "the Fullness of Time" which demands decisive choice and the risk of faith. In these decisive moments one becomes truly human. In the Fragments and Postscript Climacus repeatedly extols the virtues of the risk and of the leap as requisite to authentic human existence. And we are constantly reminded that individual, subjective existence is higher than any abstract universal. This is the basis of the contrast made by almost every commentator on Kierkegaard between existential philosophy and essentialist speculation. For Climacus the latter amounts to a "pantheistic contempt for individual man."¹ The speculative philosopher is the characterized Privatdozent who has become a comic figure, who comprehends

about different ways of existing violates the strict existence/essence distinction which we have said SK makes. There is some ambiguity, but I hope to clarify it in what follows.

1. Postscript, p. 317.

all life sub specie aeternitatis.¹ He has forgotten that he must blow his nose and has abdicated his human existence in favor of the Idea and the System. But, as Climacus repeatedly reminds us, "a particular existing human being is surely not an Idea, and his existence is surely quite different from the conceptual existence of the Idea."²

Man is not a moment in the "world-historical process", for that is a mere abstraction. He is "an existing infinite spirit".³ Yet it is not precisely correct to say that he is an existing infinite spirit, for he is not anything in the sense of an essence; he is in process--it is his task to become.⁴ Here we return to the notion of contradiction mentioned earlier. Climacus believes that the only true certainty is the eternal, and he knows that the mind will rebel when it is asked to view the eternal as being in a subject, that is, as being in existence. That the eternal becomes, that it actually comes into being, is an elusive yet "tremendous contradiction."⁵ Nevertheless, Climacus is concerned to discover how such a phenomenon can be expressed. Therefore, what was formerly a problem of the "Interlude" in the Fragments, is

1. Ibid., p. 75.

2. Ibid., p. 203.

3. Ibid., p. 75.

4. Ibid., pp. 146 ff.

5. Ibid., p. 76.

reiterated in the Postscript. He objects to the deficiencies in the language of abstract thought which fails to express, much less explain, the difficulties inherent in existence. "Because abstract thought is sub specie aeterni it ignores the concrete and the temporal [Timeiigheden], the existential process, the predicament of the existing individual arising from his being a synthesis of the temporal [Timelige] and the eternal situated in existence."¹ By forgetting this, abstract philosophy deserted existence. Climacus does not want to attend to the abstract problem of reality, but rather to the question of what it means that a "definite something" is a reality. He wants to bring this definite something and the ideality of thought together by "penetrating the concrete particularity with thought."² Abstract thought fails to attend to this precisely because it abstracts itself out of the difficulty in the first place ("and then proceeds to boast of having explained everything").³ Abstract thought busies itself with explaining things like "immortality in general" (which goes along smoothly "in that immortality is identified with eternity")⁴ but fails to inquire whether an existing individual human being

1. Ibid., p. 267.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 268.

4. Ibid.

is immortal, which is the difficulty.¹ He also expresses this in another way: He says that the trouble with abstract thought is that it is disinterested. "But the difficulty inherent in existence," he adds, "constitutes the interest of the existing individual, who is infinitely interested in existing."² Forgetting his own existence, his own "relationship to himself" makes the abstract philosopher comic because he is in the process of ceasing to be a human being. A truly genuine human being, according to Climacus, finds his reality in holding the factors of the finite and the infinite together, which is to say he is infinitely interested in existing.³

The contradiction and tension from this holding together of the eternal and the temporal can only be apprehended by passionate thinking and not by disinterested, abstract curiosity.⁴ This is why the highest task is to become subjective.⁵ Man, then, is not to be comprehended essentially as having a fixed nature or as something abstractly finished and complete; he is a freedom or a fluidity between the temporal and the eternal; he is constantly

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. In a sense this is why Climacus and the other pseudonymous authors who are represented in this chapter fall short of participation themselves--they merely observe or inquire into the matter intellectually.

5. Postscript, p. 146.

striving between them, and is thus constantly in the process of becoming.¹ "Existence is the child that is born of the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal and is therefore a constant striving."² This constant striving does not constitute an abstract nature; its reality is an interest, an inter-esse, a being between the contradictory factors of time and eternity which are not mediated but are held together in the passion of becoming oneself. "Reality is an inter-esse between the moments of that hypothetical unity of thought and being which abstract thought presupposes."³

Therefore, when thinking about this "existential" matter, it is vitally important to realize that the notion of subjectivity as a dynamic and fluid inter-esse replaces the notion of an eternal esse or nature. Contemplating man's nature will not bring us close to Climacus' thought, because he espouses a dynamic subjectivity. The basic expression of the synthesis between the temporal and the eternal which comprises existence is passion. "It is impossible to exist without passion,"⁴ writes Climacus, and this, if anything, is the "essence" or, better, the "inter-est" of subjectivity. "Subjectivity is essentially passion, and in

1. Ibid., p. 84.

2. Ibid., pp. 85. Cf. pp. 375, 54.

3. Ibid., p. 279.

4. Ibid., p. 276. Cf. p. 33.

its maximum an infinite, personal, passionate interest in one's eternal happiness.¹ This existence-constituting passion is at bottom the struggle to bring the eternal into the temporal.²

It hardly needs to be said that this has a quasi-Hegelian character, especially in the notion "synthesis".³ However, this is no synthesis in "Thought", and indeed the actual "togetherness" of time and eternity in "existence" is always for Climacus an irreconcilable contradiction. His "synthesis" is at bottom an "absurdity" which never admits rational "mediation".⁴ In what may be referred to as an inward or existential dialectic, the Hegelian identification of Thought and Being is dissolved, and the task of the new dialectic is to become subjective. This "dialectic of inward appropriation"⁵ is the interested point of view from which the problem of time and eternity must be viewed if we are to make sense of Climacus' ideas. His exposition of temporality is always from this interested point of view.

1. Ibid., p. 33.

2. Ibid., pp. 76, 85, 279 f., 350.

3. This is true of course for most of SK's "philosophical" pseudonyms who are represented in this chapter. It has been observed often (e.g. see Karl Löwith, op. cit.) that SK was a Hegelian. This seems ironic, since he spent so much of his time bitterly attacking Hegel, but, as I believe, it is only apparently ironic, for it is natural for one who expresses himself negatively in terms of Hegel's philosophy to appear to be Hegelian.

4. Ibid., pp. 82 ff. Cf. Fragments, pp. 47, 50, 71, 80.

5. Postscript, pp. 72, 541.

For our purposes we need only focus on the importance of the moment in opposition to a notion of objective truth. An individual is not able to transcend himself abstractly by viewing himself as part of some speculative system of world-historical process, but he is able to achieve a momentary "transcendence". "It is only momentarily that the particular individual is able to realize existentially a unity of the infinite and the finite which transcends existence. This unity is realized in the moment of passion."¹

In explanation of this point Climacus effects what might be termed another Copernican revolution.² As Copernicus wanted to take into account (for the sake of simplicity) the hypothesized movement of the earth in calculating the movement of the heavenly bodies, so Climacus wants to consider the movement of the existing subject in this momentary realization of a unity of the eternal and the temporal which transcends existence. The alleged transition or mediation of abstract, objective thought is a mirage, for, from an abstract point of view, everything is and nothing comes into being.³ For example, it is true that objective knowledge may indeed have the existent for its object; but since the knowing

1. Ibid., p. 176.

2. That is, a post-Kantian Copernican revolution.

3. Postscript, p. 177.

subject is an existing individual, and through the fact of his existence in process of becoming, philosophy must explain what and where the individual is in the moment of transcendent synthesis.¹ That is, philosophy must explain what the individual is in the moment.

Climacus sets as his task the clarification of the difference between objective and subjective reflection and proceeds to show that subjective reflection "makes its way inwardly in inwardness."² And, as we have already seen, the inwardness in an existing subject culminates in passion, and therefore the truth which corresponds to this passion becomes a paradox.³ The difference between objective and subjective reflection is described as follows:

When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth, as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not focused upon the relationship, however, but upon the question of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related. If only the object to which he is related is the truth, the subject is accounted to be in the truth. When the question of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individual's relationship; if only the mode of this relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true.⁴

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 178.

4. Ibid.

Thus it is how and not to what that is central in the relationship, and for this reason it is a waste of time and energy to attempt to resolve the question of whether objective or subjective truth is the real truth by resorting to the notion of mediation. That is, it does no good to say that the truth lies not in one side or the other but in the mediation of both. "For to be in a state of mediation is to be finished, while to exist is to become."¹ Climacus wants always to take into account the movement of the existing subject as he becomes. Such a one has truth not by objective deliberation (as if he and the truth were not in the flux of becoming), but by virtue of the infinite passion of inwardness. The objective accent, he says, falls on the what, i.e. upon the content of, say an utterance. The subjective accent, on the other hand, is on the how, and refers to the relationship sustained by the existing individual in his own existence with the content of his utterance. "Objectively the interest is focused merely on the thought-content, subjectively on the inwardness. At its maximum this inward 'how' is the passion of the infinite, and the passion of the infinite is the truth. But the passion of the infinite is precisely subjectivity, and thus subjectivity becomes the truth."²

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 181.

Now, this emphasis on truth in inward subjective relational categories is of critical importance for the notion of temporality. We can see this most clearly in this very context where Climacus goes on to assert that the subjective-relational is itself "subject¹ to a dialectic with respect to time". In the passionate moment² of decision, "where the road swings away from objective knowledge" it would seem that the infinite decision would somehow be realized. It is not, however, and precisely because in that same moment the existing individual finds himself "in the temporal order [Timelighedens]"³, the subjective "how" is "transformed into a striving." Further, this striving receives its impulse and repeated renewal from the decisive passion of the infinite.

At this point we need to pause to underscore the importance of the dynamic character of the concepts before us. We noted⁴ earlier the fluidity of human existence which was defined as an inter-esse or constant striving between the temporal and the⁵ eternal. Now in this context of a "dialectic with respect to time", we see the temporal dimension or expression for the same thing. Here again the emphasis is repeated renewal and striving.

1. Ibid., p. 182.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Supra, pp. 177-178.

5. Postscript, pp. 85, 375, 54.

It would seem, therefore, that existence defined as striving means that existence is defined in terms of temporality. That is to say, the fluid, dynamic "basis" of existence is expressible only in terms of temporality. If we had static concepts at our disposal (which of course we do not), we should have to say that the essence of human nature is itself dynamic, which is to say that there really is no static human nature and that, therefore, existence can be comprehended only in terms of temporality.

In addition, it is not sufficient simply to emphasize that existence is characterized by "repeated renewal". We recall that Judge Wilhelm's ethical way of life was characterized by an emphasis on time. However, here it is not only repeated renewal which is emphasized, but repeated renewal as striving. The emphasis is neither on a temporal lapse of moments nor on the retention of an important moment through time. The notion before us now is the repeated renewal of a moment which is itself a fluid concept. There is a double-fluidity in this notion. There is the dynamism involved in the constancy of the striving and the dynamism of that which is renewed, viz. that "Moment" which itself transforms time.

Hence, so far in this chapter on a "transitional" view of temporality, we have seen the significance of the moment itself (that it is dynamic and subjective) and that existence itself must be defined as temporality.

1. And of course "existence" indicates human subjective existence. See supra, p. 172.

In the Postscript Climacus emphasizes both the fluidity and the tension in existence by connecting his definition of truth with the notion of faith, and the entire connection leaves one feeling a bit giddy. First, the definition of truth:

When subjectivity is the truth, the conceptual determination of the truth must include an expression for the antithesis to objectivity, a momento of the fork in the road where the way swings off; this expression will at the same time serve as an indication of the tension of the subjective inwardness. Here is such a definition of truth: An objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness is the truth, the highest truth attainable for an existing individual. At the point where the way swings off (and where this is cannot be specified objectively, since it is a matter of subjectivity), there objective knowledge is placed in abeyance. Thus the subject merely has, objectively, the uncertainty; but it is this which precisely increases the tension of that infinite passion which constitutes his inwardness.¹

This definition of truth is, for Climacus, an equivalent expression for faith, which is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and the objective uncertainty. If one is not capable of grasping God objectively, then he must believe. Therefore, one who is intent on holding fast to this objective uncertainty, "so as to remain out upon the deep, over seventy thousand fathoms of water" is one who preserves his faith.² It is this notion which Climacus

1. Postscript, p. 182.

2. Ibid.

sees as carrying him beyond the Socratic principle.¹

Thus it is by way of his extensive attack on Hegelian metaphysics that Climacus returns in effect to the moment of temporal transformation familiar to Abraham, Job and the young lover of Repetition.

An important aspect of the philosophical inquiry remains with respect to the pseudonymous authors represented in this chapter; it is the inquiry into the nature of the transformation so central to the concept of the moment. More specifically, it is an inquiry into the concept of transition. We recall that Constantine Constantius first treats this matter briefly in Repetition. There he objects to the appropriation of the Greek concept of κίνησις² in the sphere of logic (by which of course he means Hegelian logic).³

There they have called repetition 'mediation.' Motion, however, is a concept which logic cannot endure. Hence, mediation must be understood in relation to immanence. Thus understood, mediation cannot be employed at all in the sphere of freedom, where the next thing constantly emerges, not by virtue of immanence but of transcendence. The word mediation has therefore occasioned misunderstanding in logic because it permitted the notion of motion

1. Ibid., pp. 183 ff. Cf. the "Moral" of Fragments and the note in Postscript, pp. 184-185.

2. Motion or change. Cf. Plato, Parmenides and Aristotle, Physics III, 1.

3. Cf. especially Postscript, pp. 99-100, et passim.

to be associated with logic. In the sphere of freedom again the word mediation has been harmful for the fact that, being transferred from logic, it contributed to make the transcendency of motion illusory.¹

In order to prevent this ambiguous agreement between logic and freedom, Constantine sought to preserve "repetition" for the sphere of freedom.² Repetition assumes motion, and the author observes that motion "is dialectical not only with respect to space (in which sense it engaged the attention of Heraclitus and the Eleatic school . . .), but it is dialectical also with respect to time, for the point and the instant correspond to one another."³

His conclusion is that if motion is allowed in relation to repetition in the sphere of freedom, then its development in this sphere is different from its development in the sphere of logic, because in freedom "transition is a becoming".

1. Repetition, xxix (from Papirer IV); Cf. p. 33. Cf. Postscript, pp. 273 ff. to 278, and Fragments, p. 64 n.

2. Ibid., p. 34, he states that "repetition" is the interest of metaphysics but at the same time the interest upon which metaphysics founders. By this he means (and he himself tells us this in the open letter, Repetition, p. xxix) that since metaphysics is a disinterested discipline, it must move aside as soon as interest emerges (Cf. Hauftiensis in Dread, p. 16 n.). The point being that "the whole interest of subjectivity emerges in real life, and then metaphysics founders," for metaphysics has nothing to do with real life.

3. Ibid., p. xxx.

In the sphere of logic transition is mute; in the sphere of freedom it becomes. So when possibility in logic qualifies itself as actuality it merely disturbs the hushed reticence of the logical process by talking about motion and transition. In the sphere of freedom, on the other hand, there is possibility, and actuality emerges as transcendency.¹

Therefore, when Aristotle said that the transition from possibility to actuality is a κίνησις, he was talking not about the logical sphere but about the possibility and actuality of freedom.² Neither motion nor transcendence occurs in any logical process.

What Constantine means by saying that in the sphere of freedom actuality emerges as transcendency is clarified by Vigilius Haufniensis in a note in Dread in which he suggests that in "repetition" the "whole of life and existence begins afresh", but not through any immanent continuity with the foregoing, but "by a transcendent fact which separates the repetition from the first existence."³ There is a qualitative distinction between the "first time" and the second.

In the sphere of nature repetition exists in its immovable necessity. In the sphere of the spirit the problem is not to get change out of repetition . . . but the problem is to transform repetition into something

1. Ibid., p. xxxi.

2. Ibid.

3. Dread, p. 16 n.

inward, into the proper task of freedom, into freedom's highest interest, as to whether, while everything changes, it can actually realize repetition.¹

We must now investigate this transcendent sphere of freedom where repetition is transformed inwardly. In Dread Haufniensis defines man in terms of a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal.² He readily admits that such a definition is not new. In this synthesis of time and eternity Haufniensis identifies time with man's continual change from one mental or physical state to another. That is, for him "pure" time is viewed in the Aristotelian (and Hegelian) sense of "infinite succession". He is quite explicit about this.³ In fact, by conceiving of time as infinite succession, he is able to contrast it sharply with the eternal. But even in holding these two elements apart, Haufniensis focuses his analysis on the establishment of a moment or "present instant" where there could be transition.

1. Ibid., p. 17. The author adds that at this point the finite spirit falls into despair, for it is possible only by virtue of the religious and is indicated by Constantius' stepping aside (the religious repetition being too transcendent for him) and allowing the young lover to carry on the discussion in the proper sphere.

2. Ibid., p. 76. "I have no wish to discover novelties, but rather it is my joy and my darling occupation to think upon things which seem perfectly simple." The ostensible lucidity of his definition is somewhat blurred, however, by the Christian Anti-Climacus, who writes that the "self" is not the synthesis, but the synthesis related to itself (Sickness, p. 146).

3. Dread, pp. 76, 77.

Without eternity, Haufniensis tells us, there would be no distinction of the modes of time:

When time is correctly defined as infinite succession, it seems plausible to define it also as the present, the past and the future. However this distinction is incorrect, if one means by it that this is implied in time itself; for it emerges with the relation of time to eternity and the reflection of eternity in it. If in the infinite succession of time one could in fact find a foothold which would serve as a dividing point, then this division would be quite correct. But precisely because every moment, like the sum of moments, is a process (a going-by) no moment is a present, and in the same sense there is neither past, present, nor future.¹

Time, then, is a process of pure succession, and as such it is infinitely void of content. However, as soon as we posit a "present" (which we do "as soon as we let one moment succeed the other"),² then we are able to posit a content. The "present", however, is not the concept of time. "On the contrary," adds the author, "the eternal is the present."³ The purely eternal, as opposed to the infinite succession of pure time, would be an infinite presence of content completely devoid of succession--infinite duration as opposed to infinite succession. It is clear, then, that there can be no present instant of pure time. For a present instant is required some content which endures. This

1. Ibid., pp. 76-77. My italics.

2. Ibid., p. 77.

3. Ibid.

is why he says that whereas time is succession, the eternal is the succession "annulled" (aufgehoben).¹

Now we are able to see that as was the case with time, with the eternal there can be no division of the past and the future. This follows because the present is posited as the "annulled"

1. The German verb, aufheben, so important for Hegel, is used also by Haufniensis. Here Lowrie has translated it as "annulled", but it may also mean: lift, raise, hold up, seize, capture, keep, reserve, restore, preserve, abolish, suspend, counteract, neutralize, repeal. For Hegel himself the term has both a logical and a temporal dimension. In the "greater logic", The Science of Logic, Vol. I (tr. by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961) he writes: "To transcend [aufheben] has this double meaning, that it signifies to keep or to preserve and also to make to cease, to finish. To preserve includes the negative element, that something is removed from its immediacy and therefore from at Determinate Being exposed to external influences in order that it may be preserved." (p. 119).

For Climacus this Hegelian "trick" of using a word with double meanings in crucial passages is equivalent to speaking with a "mouth full of hot mush" and only indicates that "speculative philosophy knows nothing of decisiveness." (Postscript, p. 199).

In our context here concerning Dread, the French translation by K. Ferlov and Jean J. Gateau, we find la succession abolie (Le Concept De L'Angoisse, editions Gallimard, 1935, p. 126). Another French rendering is la succession supprimée (Søren Holm, op. cit., p. 85).

By way of comparison it is interesting to note that Karl Barth also uses the term in a crucial context in his Church Dogmatics I, pt. 2, sec. 17, where in translation he writes of the revelation of God as the abolition of religion. However, the Barthian scholar, Herbert Hartwell, points out that the proper rendition should be "abolition" and "exaltation". (The Theology of Karl Barth, London: Duckworth Press, 1964).

1
 succession. "The present is the eternal, or rather the eternal
 is the present, and the present is full."²

If not in pure time or in the eternal, then where are the temporal divisions of the past and the future to be found? What Haufniensis has proffered us thus far seems quite mechanical. Let us conjure a mechanical image: A conveyor belt, on which are lined in succession some empty glasses, is moving beneath a water tap. If the tap is turned on just as one of the empty glasses is directly underneath it, and if the glass is sufficiently filled, its increased weight will slow the conveyor. The conveyor rate and the amount of liquid in the glass are correlated in such a way that a full glass would stop the conveyor completely. Analogously, eternal content would annul the succession of time.

The image in Haufniensis' mind is hardly so mechanical as this. Yet, to reach a more dynamic conception of what he is about, we must recover the past and the future; and we must know something more about the relationship of time and eternity. That is, we must have Haufniensis tell us more about what he calls the "present instant".

In his exposition of "the instant" in the pages of Dread which we are treating, Haufniensis constantly alludes to "the

1. Dread, p. 77.

2. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

Greeks" in general and to Plato in particular. He refers to Parmenides where, according to him, the instant appears to be "that strange being . . . which lies between movement and repose, without occupying any time; and to this and out of this 'the moving' passes over into rest and 'the peposing' into movement."¹ Plato held the instant to be the general category of transition (μεταβολή), and Haufniensis criticizes him for conceiving of the instant in a purely abstract way (for leaving it as a mute abstraction).² The passage in Parmenides to which Haufniensis alludes is found at the very end of Hypothesis II (concerning a One Being or One Entity).³ There Plato was concerned with distinguishing a temporal sort of existence as distinct from the being which belongs also to things that are not in time. He does this by defining "becoming" and "ceasing to be" in the sense of "beginning" and "ceasing to exist". Having first established that "becoming" implies that a thing passes (μεταβάλλει) from one condition to another,⁴ Plato focuses his attention on the

1. Ibid., p. 75 n.

2. Ibid.

3. 155 E - 157 B. F. M. Cornford refers to this as Hyp. II A: "A corollary on becoming in time", (Plato and Parmenides, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964, p. 194). I refer to Cornford's translation of the dialogue here.

4. 155 E - 156 B. Cf. Timaeus 53 D and Laws 894 A.

lapse of transition and argues that the transition occupies no time whatsoever.

But when, being in motion, a thing comes to a stand, or being at rest, it changes to being in motion, it cannot itself occupy any time at all. For this reason: Suppose it is first at rest and later in motion, or first in motion and later at rest; that cannot happen to it without its changing. But there is no time during which a thing can be at once neither in motion nor at rest. On the other hand it does not change without making a transition. When does it make the transition, then? Not while it is at rest or while it is in motion, or while it is occupying time. Consequently, the time at which it will be when it makes the transition must be that queer thing, the instant [τὸ ἐξαίφνης]. The word "instant" appears to mean something such that from it a thing passes to one or other of the two conditions. There is no transition from a state of rest so long as the thing is still at rest, nor from motion so long as it is still in motion; but this queer thing, the instant, is situated between motion and the rest; it occupies no time at all; and the transition of the moving thing to the state of rest, or of the stationary thing to being in motion, takes place to and from the instant.¹

Here in spite of Haufniensis' objections we are able to see the striking similarity between his treatment of the instant and Plato's. As Professor Cornford points out, Plato's argument may have been directed against some of Zeno's arguments against motion which were based on the notion of the instant as an indivisible part or atom of time and of time as made up of a number of such atomic parts succeeding one another.² Such a view would suggest that each atom of time would be isolated and exist apart

1. 156 C - 156 E.

2. Cornford, op. cit., p. 202.

from its neighbors, and this is precisely the notion that Plato rejects. No transition can occupy even the most minute part of time. Thus it would seem that, at least on this point, Haufniensis and Plato are in accord. Indeed, Haufniensis' analysis owes much to Plato in spite of his objection to the abstract character of the latter's argument.

Haufniensis cannot settle for any abstractions concerning the instant, and he quickly pulls us back to the existential level. For example, he asks us to consider a life which is characterized by sensuousness, i.e. a life which is in time and is merely that of time and which, therefore, has no present.¹ It is true that it may be "commonly said" of such a life that it is "in the instant" and only in the instant, but the instant is then understood as "something abstracted from the eternal, and if this is to be accounted the present, it is a parody of it."² The present is not something abstracted from the eternal, the present is the eternal (and the present is full).

If the instant is purely an abstract exclusion of the past and the future, then the instant is not really the present, because "for that which in purely abstract thinking lies between the past and the future has no existence at all."³

1. Dread, p. 77.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 78.

From this we see that the instant is not a mere characterization of time ("for what characterizes time is only that it goes by") and if one were to define time by any of the characterizations revealed in time itself, it would be the passed time. "On the other hand," he concludes, "if time and eternity are to touch one another, it must be in time", and with this we have again¹ reached the "instant".

"The instant" (in Danish, Øjeblikket or in modern spelling Øieblikket) is a metaphysical term meaning "a glance of the eye". Haufniensis likes this term. "Nothing," he says, "is so swift as a glance of the eye, and yet it is commensurable with the content and value of eternity . . . a glance is therefore a designation of time, but note that this means, of time in the fateful conflict when it is touched by eternity."²

Some light may be thrown on the nature of "the instant" by realizing what Haufniensis has written earlier in Dread. In the first chapter of the book he has defined man as a synthesis of soul and body which is sustained by "spirit".³ "Spirit" was the third term in such a sense that there could be no question of a synthesis until the spirit was posited (i.e. the synthesis becomes

1. Ibid.

2. Dread, p. 78.

3. Ibid., p. 44.

actual only when the spirit becomes actual).¹ Here in the section of Dread which concerns time--where man is seen as a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal--the author poses an important question. If, in the body-soul synthesis, spirit was the third term, what then is the third term in the time-eternity synthesis?²

The answer we have already been discussing, "the instant", is the third factor. And as Haufniensis has accused "the Greeks" of having treated the notions of time and eternity too abstractly because they "lacked the concept of the temporal owing to the fact that they lacked the concept of spirit,"³ so too he accuses them of misunderstanding the instant:

Thus understood, the instant is not properly an atom of time, but an atom of eternity. It is the finite reflection of eternity in time, its first effort as it were to bring time to a stop. For this reason Hellenism did not understand the instant; for even if it comprehended the atom of eternity, it did not comprehend that it was the instant, did not define it with a forward orientation but with a backward, since for Hellenism the atom of eternity was essentially eternity, and so neither time nor eternity had true justice done it.⁴

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 76. "And if there be no third term, there is really no synthesis; for a synthesis of that which is a contradiction cannot be completed as a synthesis without a third term, for the recognition that the synthesis is a contradiction is precisely the assertion that it is not a synthesis."

3. Ibid., p. 79.

4. Ibid., my italics.

It is now evident that there can be no present instant unless something non-successive and abiding is synthesized with time considered as pure succession. In the present instant also the modes of time become meaningful.

The instant is that ambiguous something in which time and eternity touch one another, and thereby is posited the concept of temporality,* [Timelighed] where time constantly cuts off eternity and eternity constantly penetrates time. Now only does the aforementioned division get its significance: the present time, the passed time, the time to come.¹

Haufniensis has thus established the basis of the temporal divisions of past, present and the future. The instant for which Haufniensis has campaigned at great length is the only possible base for the temporal divisions. This means that, since the instant is comprised of both time and the eternal, temporality itself is not homogeneous, as is commonly held, but a synthesis of two heterogeneous (indeed, opposite) elements: that which is in its own nature pure succession and that which is in its own nature unlimited duration and pregnant content.²

1. The quote is from Dread, but the translation is by Paul Dietrichson in "Kierkegaard's Concept of the Self", Inquiry, Vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring, 1965), p. 7. Hereafter cited as Dietrichson. The italics are mine. The asterisk (*) affixed to "temporality" is explained by Dietrichson in his note 9, p. 30: "'Temporality' --the noun--is used rather than the adjectival phrase 'the temporal' when he [Haufniensis] refers to the synthesis of time [the temporal] and eternity." Needless to say, for the passage in question (Dread, p. 80), Lowrie has "the temporal". Dietrichson's translation is certainly more illuminating. Cf. Appendix.

2. Cf. Dietrichson, p. 7.

It is now clear that Haufniensis has reached the same point as had his fellow pseudonyms who are represented in this chapter. The "moment" is not some abstract entity; it is rather a subjective category and occurs only in a living human existence. Eternity is not "reflected" in the ongoing temporal process¹ in some quasi-Platonic fashion; it appears only in the decisive present moment, such as when Abraham draws his knife. It is the personal moment of resignation and faith which is constituted only by a free, reflective spirit in the instant of time-transforming decision. As personal "spirit" the existing individual possesses the only genuine present, the only "now" there is. Through this conscious now he is able to transcend and transform the infinite succession of immediacy, the continuous flux of nature.²

Thus, as Constantine had suggested earlier,³ this "existential now" is the genuine harbinger of novelty. It represents a real "coming-to-be" in which one enters eternity forwards.⁴ inasmuch as the eternal is made actual in the moment. The moment is the occasion of the "becoming" of the eternal, for it is the "now" when time and eternity are conjoined in living human existence

1. Dread, p. 79.

2. Ibid., pp. 76 f.

3. Repetition, p. 34.

4. Dread, pp. 79, 80 n.; Repetition, pp. 3 ff.

by a "movement" of resignation and repetition which is oriented forward.

It is only through the moment of free personal decision that a genuine "now" or present emerges, and only here do the temporal modalities past, present and future acquire significance. It is clear that at least for the authors represented in this chapter temporality is existential and subjective since it appears only in the passionate movements of a living subject. It is critically important to note that the paradoxical moment of existential becoming constitutes a different order of transition from the successiveness or time of nature or of world-historical transition. This existential time transcends all temporal flux, and it alone is able to annul the time succession (Tids-Succession) and make possible a real past and future.

There is a further implication of the passage in Dread which we touched on earlier.¹ We recall not only that the instant is "that ambiguous something" where time and eternity touch one another, but also that thereby is posited the concept of Timelighed or temporality, where time constantly cuts off eternity and eternity constantly² penetrates time. With this notion of repeated renewal one achieves an existential continuity. Furthermore,

1. Supra, pp. 195, 198.

2. Dread, p. 80.

this continuity is realized in the very midst of external succession of temporal flux.¹ This conscious "movement" is the incessantly renewed task for the truly subjective thinker. "But really to exist, so as to interpenetrate one's existence with consciousness, at one and the same time eternal and as if far removed from existence, and yet also present in existence and in the process of becoming: that is truly difficult."² This is "difficult" because the eternal comes to be in time only briefly in the Moment and must, if it is to endure, be continually repeated in a process of inward appropriation.³ Free inward repetition of the Moment "posits" the understanding of "temporality" for the pseudonymous authors investigated here. This inward repetition alone provides the continuity requisite for a true "existence" apart from, but yet in, the infinite succession of time. This repetition of inward appropriation yields a kind of existential duration in the midst of temporal flux, a constancy amid change, which is temporality (Timelighed).

1. Cf. Postscript, pp. 365, 367 f. where Climacus suggests that to always maintain a relationship with the eternal while "remaining in the relativities of life" requires the repeated "reinstatement" of the moment of resignation.

2. Ibid., p. 273.

3. Ibid., pp. 79, 541.

Summary and Analysis

In what I have termed "a transitional view" the concept of temporality seems to have emerged gradually; it was not firmly and definitively delineated from the outset. At first, in "poetic" formulation, we were confronted with a notion of repetition which itself seemed to change from a physical-temporal restoration to an inward psychological renewal. Next we learned of the psychological movements of infinite resignation requisite for a decisive transformation of time. From both we were led to a more abstract, philosophical analysis of the moment of decision in which this transformation was realized. Finally, we moved from an account of the moment in isolation to a description of a fluid constancy of these decisive moments taken together. This movement was depicted in two ways: First, Climacus described the meaning of subjectivity or human existence as inter-esse in terms¹ of a dynamic repetition of the moment in inward appropriation. Secondly, Haufniensis recounted the same phenomenon in terms of the concept of temporality where time and eternity touch each other constantly in the inward repetition of the decisive instant. Both concepts, "subjectivity" for Climacus and "temporality" for

1. Supra, p. 178.

Haufniensis, describe the continuation of the Moment. We can hardly fail to recognize that the formulation of temporality for all of the transitional pseudonyms is highly subjective or, better, "existential". Temporality describes a continuation which is itself highly existential, and neither the Moment nor the continuation of Moments refers to an abstract time of the natural physical world.¹ Yet, at the same time, these authors seem to hold to traditional definitions of "eternal" and of "time". The former, as we have seen, is still identified with the unchanging Being of classical definition,² and the latter, defined as perpetual succession of vanishing "nows", seems straightforwardly Aristotelian.³ The implications of retaining these two separate

1. Supra, p. 199.

2. Dread, pp. 77-78.

3. Not that Aristotle's conception of time is by any means straightforward. His definition of time seems straightforward enough: time is the "number of motion in respect of 'before' and 'after'" (Physics IV, 219 B--I refer to the edition by W.-D. Ross, The Works of Aristotle, Vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953). That is, time is the quantifiable change from "before" to "after" and as such is restricted to that particular form of change which he calls motion (Kίνησις). On the other hand, this definition is designed to exclude such cases as coming into being (generating) and passing out of existence (perishing) because movement is a single process whose beginning and ending are the same. In regard to cases of generation, Aristotle's analysis is strikingly similar to Plato's investigation of "the instant" on which it relies heavily (Cf. Physics IV, x-xiv and Plato's Parmenides, 156 C - 157 B; see supra, p. 194). It is this notion of time (as the quantification of motion) as separate from generation (which entails the mysterious instant) which I refer to as "straightforwardly Aristotelian". However, even this "time" is quite complex. Indeed, for Aristotle's perpetual succession of

Greek concepts are far-reaching. For example, we know that time has to do with the world of sense and the eternal with the realm of knowledge and that these metaphysical opposites are contrasted epistemologically as sense versus intellection.¹

The question here, however, is how these contrasting elements are related in the works we have just treated. It is evident that the transitional pseudonyms do operate with this time-eternity polarity, and the question of how these elements are related is perhaps answered best when seen against the backdrop of Hegelian metaphysics.

We know already that time and eternity are related as contrasting elements in a "present" conscious existence. The result of this can be easily described in terms of a dialectical relationship² which "mediates" the succession of "nows" and the unchanging eternal. Such an interpretation indeed seems quite Hegelian. It may be helpful in this respect to think of the Kierkegaardian "existential dialectic" as an internalized version of the Hegelian dialectical Structure of the Universal History of Reason. For Hegel, the time-eternity poles need to be "mediated"

"nows" implies a substratum of identity (Physics IV, 219 B), that is, a something which proceeds and which is thus itself unchanging (V, 226 A). An analysis of this phenomenon, however, is beyond the scope of the present thesis.

1. Stromseth (op. cit.) has described this well (pp. 217 ff.).

2. Hence the notion of an "existential dialectic" propounded especially by Herman Diem (Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, tr. by Harold Knight, Edinburgh & London: Oliver & Boyd, 1959).

in the world historical process, whereas (at least for Climacus and Haufniensis) the contrast is overcome by acts of passionate consciousness.

In order to test the usefulness of this for the interpretation of our subject, we must look more closely at Hegel's notion of temporality. Of course Hegel's thoughts on temporality are as complex as SK's, and a full treatment of them would require another thesis.¹ However, I would like to attempt here a cursory review of Hegel's position in order to set in relief what I believe is implied in the view of temporality set forth in this chapter.

It is no secret that Hegel's analysis of time is largely Aristotelian.² He is especially impressed with Aristotle's concentration on the "now" or the "present instant". Aristotle follows Plato in his fascination with the present instant,³ but he goes beyond Plato by formulating the notion that a perpetual

1. Beside Hegel's own works there exists a number of useful commentaries on his notion of time (although these by no means agree). Those which I have found most helpful are Karl Löwith (op. cit., see esp. 207 ff.); A. B. Brinkley, "Time in Hegel's Phenomenology", Studies in Hegel, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. IX, The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff, 1960, pp. 3-15); Walter Stromseth (op. cit.); and two recent articles in Dialogue, Vol. IX, no. 2 (1970) by Klaus Hedwig, "Hegel: Time and Eternity", (pp. 139-153) and M. E. Williams, "Time in Hegel's Philosophy", (pp. 154-167).

2. E.g. cf. Löwith, p. 207.

3. Supra, pp. 194 and 203, n. 3.

succession of "nows" implies a "substratum of identity"¹ which endures amid the change. Hegel echoes both Plato and Aristotle when he writes: "Only the present is; before and after are not. The concrete present is the outcome of the past, and is pregnant with the future. The true present is thus eternity."² This "true present" refers to the totality of the perpetual succession of time in which the future becomes past, and the perpetually passing present moves on toward the future. That is, the movement itself reduces to a "perpetual present" which contains within itself both past and future. The "true present" is thus eternity immanent in time. And like Aristotle, Hegel describes the "perpetual present" as a "substance" which is immanent in the transitory.³

Though Hegel was greatly influenced by this Aristotelian notion that the totality of the succession was somehow more than the succession, he actually only used the notion as a jumping off point for his own peculiar formulation of temporality. In fact, Hegel goes far beyond the Greeks in that he enriches the concept of temporality by means of his notion of Spirit.⁴ In the

1. Physics IV, 219 B.

2. From Encyclopaedia, Sect. 259, quoted in (and trans. by) Lowith, p. 207.

3. Cf. Hegel's preface in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, tr. by T. M. Knox (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965).

4. Variouslly called Reason, Idea, Spirit, Absolute, Divine, Notion.

development of this concept of Spirit, we find a vivid resemblance to the view of temporality presented in this chapter. Spirit, like the totality of time, is characterized by being completely present in that it contains the past and future within itself, but there is a significant difference: The spirit is a rational principle or power which lives in history by being a cyclic recurrence of all stages of world history.

This implies that the present stage of Spirit contains all previous stages within itself. These, to be sure, have unfolded themselves successively and separately, but Spirit still is what it has always been. The differentiation of its stages is but the development of what it is in itself. The life of the ever-present Spirit is a cycle of stages, which, on the one hand, co-exist side by side, but, on the other hand, seem to be past. The moments which Spirit seems to have left behind, it still possesses in the depth of its present.¹

2

In the Philosophy of History proper, Hegel portrays the Spirit as a rational power which transforms the universally negative decadence of the infinitely vanishing succession of moments.³ However, even though the rational Spirit is set over against "the decadence of succession", it is not radically opposed to time. Rather it is related to time as the Aristotelian totality or

1. Hegel, Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History, tr. by Robert S. Hartman (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953) p. 95.

2. Trans. by J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications, 1956). Hereafter cited as Philosophy of History.

3. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

"substratum" is related to the flow of "nows". However, the Spirit is rational and has a goal of self-actualization. Thus the Spirit "empties itself into time". That is, the Spirit remains immanent in the finite in order to transform the finite in accord with its own rational goal. However, it is only when Spirit is fully actualized that time is fully annulled (aufgehoben)¹; in the meantime the immanent relationship of Spirit and time is characterized as a dialectical project toward the future self-actualization of Spirit. Thus the "present" which we have seen as characterizing the Spirit is pregnant with unrealized futurity. The relationship of decadent time and rational Spirit is not simply negative though, for we recall that the Spirit utilizes or actually embodies the previous stages of history in its ever-present present. Thus the finite--or what is essential in the finite for progressive self-actualization of the Spirit--is not totally destroyed (aufgehoben) but is taken up (aufgehoben)² and preserved (aufgehoben) in the life of the Spirit.

Hence it is that while Hegel's conception of temporality may be "abstract" it is certainly more fertile and living than that of Plato or Aristotle. Furthermore, it is not radically different

1. Ibid., p. 73.

2. The centrality of the ambiguous aufgehoben is obvious; it is the perfect concept to express the immanent relationship of time and Spirit.

from the conception of temporality contained in the work of our author's "transitional" pseudonyms. In fact, it is not altogether accurate to say that the transitional pseudonyms describe temporality in personal subjective categories, whereas Hegel resorts to external, objective, world-historical categories. There is some justification for that statement, but it fails to do justice to the Hegelian formulation. For Hegel the Spirit's transformation of time is not formulated only in abstract categories utterly foreign to man. On the contrary, the power of the Spirit is human consciousness itself. In fact, human consciousness in its development is the transformation (aufgehoben) of time by thought, and this precisely is the reason why man's historical existence transcends immediacy.¹ It is this reflective or philosophical consciousness (connected everywhere by Hegel to universal human freedom) which finally comes to understand the entire process of the Spirit's self-actualization.

What then is the difference between the transitional pseudonyms and Hegel on the matter of temporality? Briefly, in my view, the former simply thought that Hegel had gone too far in his speculation regarding the stages leading up to and away from the stage of philosophical consciousness. For our authors the existential appropriation of eternity had to be the sole possession and unique

1. Wallace, op. cit. ("The Lesser Logic"), pp. 46-59.

act of a particular finite spirit. This particular spirit alone is able to transcend immediacy and to remain distinct from the eternal as well. It is important to recognize, however, that this objection amounts to more than an appeal for the Hegelian stage of human consciousness minus the speculative frills of origin and destiny. On the contrary the pseudonyms recognize all too well that this speculation is absolutely essential to the Hegelian moment of reflective human consciousness. Indeed their objection is precisely that the speculative prolegomena makes the moment of consciousness what it is, simply a moment of the world historical self-actualizing of the Spirit. As such this precious moment is an abstract illusion. Furthermore, since the moment of reflective consciousness is really a determinant of the world-historical, the potential for the further mediation of its opposites still exists. For our authors this means that the real significance of the moment is vitiated, and its alleged freedom is a mockery. For them, it is essential that these opposites remain in paradoxical tension and dialectical opposition, for it is the tension which makes existential freedom vital, real, and distinctively personal. Even the possibility of a rational mediation would, in their view, negate the passionate moment. It is passionate

decision and not rational mediation which dominates the sense
of temporality for the transitional authors represented here.¹

Once again we see that the "transitional" conception of temporality is closely identified with their conception of subjectivity. Further, if we recall that "subjectivity" is linguistically equivalent to "existence", then we see that the basic distinction in regard to subjectivity is not between subject and object, but between the eternal/temporal and existence. The problem for subjectivity is not how to know the object, but how to relate itself to the eternal and to the temporal. Man is not the eternal; he is the existing (which is to say that he is a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal).

Any individual who becomes conscious of what it means to exist (that he exists) will instantly become an individual who distinguishes absolutely, not between the finite and the infinite, but between existing finitely and existing infinitely. For the finite and the infinite are put together in existence, in the existing individual; the existing individual has therefore no need to trouble himself to create existence, or to imitate existence in thought, but needs all the more to concentrate upon existing.²

1. Of course this says nothing about which analysis of time is correct. Here I attempt only to indicate something of the difference and postpone the argument as to correctness. Cf. Karl Löwith's remarks in discussion of Martin Heidegger's criticism of Hegel's "vulgar" understanding of time: "But the question remains whether an analysis of time oriented according to Kierkegaard's 'moment' which reduces the present to a time merely 'accidentally-present' [Heidegger's term], contains a truer understanding of time than Hegel, who, still following Aristotle, comprehended the totality of time, and, as a philosopher, was free of anxiety over his own 'ability to be whole.'" (p. 209).

2. Postscript, pp. 376-377.

Neither eternity nor time adequately depicts man. Man's "existential nature" is best apprehended as the realization of eternity in time. When eternity is found in time--this is human (subjective) existence. But note well that precisely the same thing may be said about the concept of temporality. Temporality is where time and eternity constantly touch one another, and the concept is also radically subjective. Even the emphasis on paradoxical tension and passionate decision may be described in terms of temporality, for when it is suggested that eternity is not always found in time, that it is not there as a logical perpetuity¹ and that it is man's task to capture the eternal in time by means of a passionate leap, then we have returned full circle to the "Moment". For all the "transitional" pseudonyms the Moment is the temporal equivalent of the leap. For them there is neither a "moment" nor a "leap" apart from subjective categories. In this they went far beyond both Aristotle and Hegel.

1. Cf. Ibid., pp. 75, 376, 273, 513.

Chapter V

RELIGIOUS VIEWS OF TEMPORALITY

Introductory Remarks

Having treated aesthetical, ethical and transitional views, we are now ready to describe the concept of temporality from the "religious" point of view. Because the religious perspective is complex, a few qualifications must be stated at the outset. First, it is necessary to remember that SK delineates not one, but two religious points of view. These are described by Johannes Climacus as religiousness A and religiousness B.¹ This being the case, it is wrong to think of the Religious Stage as the third in a triadic schema. The triad is blurred not only by the distinction of two types of religiosity, but by the delineation of so-called "transitional" stages as well--especially that of humor.² Furthermore, it now seems clear that the entire author-ship has had a religious teleology from the beginning. SK

1. Postscript, pp. 493 ff.

2. Cf. discussion of "stages" in Chap. I.

insisted that all of it constantly gave "telegraphic notice of the religious",¹ and that its entire "movement" was accomplished uno tenore, in one breath, "so that the authorship, integrally regarded, is religious from first to last."²

It would appear, then, that we have finally arrived at the place which has been prepared for us. Here, at long last, we seem sufficiently prepared to understand, and SK seems ready to describe "directly" what it means to live in faith, what it means to live as "before God". Let me explain this by reference to the transitional pseudonyms discussed in Chapter IV. SK tells us that the whole point of the authorship is to urge men to practice, to live the passionate life of faith.³ Thus the life of faith is often termed a "new immediacy".⁴ Yet, in spite of this, the urging up to now has been "indirect". And, apart from its meaning as a literary technique, "indirect", in the context of the writings themselves, suggests recognition of but not participation in the life of faith. The pseudonymous authors of the "transitional" stage are able to see that a life of faith is of the greatest significance; they can even know what its significance is and

1. Point of View, p. 39.

2. Ibid., p. 143 (From the late "accounting" of 1851).

3. In Fear and Trembling, e.g., faith is set forth as the highest passion.

4. Postscript, pp. 310 n., et passim.

why it is significant, but they are not practitioners of this life. However, since the alleged aim of the entire authorship was to impel the reader to practice the life of faith, it is appropriate that SK finally recounts this life from the standpoint of a practitioner--from within. In brief, it is appropriate that SK did not conclude with the Postscript.

Let us consider the example of Johannes Climacus who repeatedly refers to himself as a "humorist". A humorist is one who stands on the brink of the religious, but who will not "go over" into the religious.¹ Such a person comprehends the religiousness of a given situation, but he treats it abstractly; he recognizes and even discusses an abstract God relationship, but he does not concretely enter into the relationship.² Naturally, it may be extremely distressing to recognize the profundity of a situation without entering in, and it is at this point that the notion of humor enters, for it is precisely when he begins to suffer that the humorist eases the distress of the situation by means of a jest. It is true, of course, that Climacus begins his study with the personal question, "How can I, Johannes Climacus, become a

1. This posture or attitude is symbolized in his very name, which indicates that he is still climbing, that he has not yet arrived. SK found this name applied to a Greek monk who was reputed to be the author of a book entitled "The Ladder of Heaven", and as Lowrie indicates, SK adopted it when he first began a polemic against the Cartesians in his unfinished Johannes Climacus; or De Omnibus dubitandum est. Postscript, p. xvi.

2. Postscript, p. 401.

Christian?", but the point is that the study is simply an inquiry, not a participation. Climacus seeks information, much as did the Young Ruler who approached Jesus with the question of what he must do to be saved.¹ Climacus' inquiry does not appear to be a dispassionate intellectualism--he is certainly opposed to that--but it is an inquiry nevertheless. His "thesis" is that subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, and it happens that Christianity is the maximum expression for this thesis. Hence² the opening question about his becoming a Christian.

On the other hand, a humorist is extremely close to one type of religiosity,³ and we have perhaps been unjust to Climacus in excluding him altogether. Indeed, he thinks of himself as struggling within the bounds of what he terms "religiousness A": "My opinion is that religiousness A (within the boundries of which I have my existence) is so laborious that it is always enough of a task."⁴

In order to see our problem more clearly, let us quickly recount the distinction between religiousness A and B.⁵ In

1. Luke 18:18.

2. Postscript, p. 248.

3. Ibid., pp. 144-145; 242-243; 400-404; 448 ff.

4. Ibid., p. 495.

5. I intend here only a few sentences by way of introduction; the entire chapter will be required to account for the full depth of these distinctions in regard to our subject.

the briefest terms, the distinction is between immanence and transcendence. By immanence Climacus has reference to the human or subjective, i.e. to all those categories which are appropriate to subjectivity in a non-paradoxical manner. Immanent religion, then, refers to a generalized, anthropocentric religiosity which stems from human situations and experience. Religiousness B is Christocentric, and therefore its categories are both transcendent and (at least from Climacus' perspective) paradoxical. The closeness of Climacus' own thought to that of religiousness A lies in its subjectivity and inwardness. Existing in inwardness, for which he campaigned at length, may indeed be religious, though it need not be Christian.¹

In regard to our subject of temporality, Climacus indicates that the distinction is between the "immanent fundamental kinship between the temporal and the eternal"² characteristic of religiousness A on the one hand, and the paradoxical use of time and the historical in relation to the eternal,³ characteristic of religiousness B on the other.

In this chapter I shall utilize these distinctions set forth by Climacus in that I shall treat religiousness A and religiousness

1. A point which he felt had been sufficiently demonstrated by the Greeks. Postscript, p. 248.

2. Postscript, p. 507.

3. Ibid., p. 88.

B separately. Therefore, in light of the proximity of Climacus' thought to that of religiousness A, it may seem at first that procedurally we are going back somewhat and that the distinction between Chapters IV and V is less vivid than that between religiousness A and B. In a sense this is so insofar as Climacus is religious but not Christian. Yet, in another sense, insofar as Climacus and his fellows of Chapter IV stand outside and inquire about the religious, it is more appropriate to treat the contrast between religiousness A and B by considering the writings of those who definitely stand within each type of religiosity.

Religiousness A

Religiousness A is represented here by material taken from the Edifying Discourses¹ published by SK under his own name in sets of two, three and four which were intended to accompany the sundry pseudonymous works. The fact that they are religious and were published from the beginning of SK's literary activity, naturally supports SK's claim that the authorship was religious² from the start. It seems clear that the discourses are a

1. Op. cit.

2. Point of View, p. 20. SK often states that he held out to "the world" the pseudonymous literature in his left hand and the discourses in his right, and he complains that nearly all his public grasped with their right what he held in his left.

significant part of the total authorship and should not be omitted if one ever hopes to understand SK completely. Some commentators feel that the discourses provide the clue to the goal of the entire authorship.¹ Indeed, based on the fact that the discourses are direct communications signed by SK, at least one student feels that they represent the final end of the authorship. Paul Holmer sees the purpose of all of SK's writings to be that of bringing "the subjectivity of every reader to the point of eligibility for Christian inwardness and concern."² He adds:

But the Edifying Discourses, though paralleling the pseudonymous works, spoke a little more directly, albeit without authority. They spoke of the real author's conviction and were the purpose of Kierkegaard's life work. Whereas all the rest of his writing was designed to get the readers out of their lassitude and mistaken conceptions, the discourses, early and late were the goal of the literature. Though they do not convey results either, they aim to elicit that specific kind of existing, that mode of subjectivity and inwardness, which is the truth for every reader.³

There is much to what Holmer says. Because SK signed his own name to the discourses and because he was inordinately scrupulous about such a practice, it is reasonable to assume that they

1. E.g. Paul L. Holmer in his introduction to the 2 vol. 1962 ed. of Ed. Dis., p. ix. Cf. also the same author's introduction to his own edition, Edifying Discourses, A Selection (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958).

2. Holmer, Edifying Discourses, A Selection, op. cit., p. xviii.

3. Ibid.

represent his own point of view. Again, it seems fitting that the long campaign in behalf of subjectivity be brought to fruition in discourses which connect religiosity to immanent, subjective categories. Initially one wonders if this fruition in subjectivity is not a bit premature, considering SK's assertion that the goal of the authorship is that of becoming a Christian, and considering his statements to the effect that Christian categories are transcendent and paradoxical. Yet, on second thought, we must remember that, at least in 1843 when the discourses first began to appear, SK did not regard himself as having the "authority" to speak for the transcendently Christian. His category is "without authority", and that is why he insists that these writings are discourses and not sermons.¹ Furthermore, the discourses are not at all inconsistent with the purpose of becoming a Christian. Indeed, they are meant to lead the reader toward Christianity, and are even seen as prerequisite to Christianity.² In exploring the possibilities for religious edification, they help prepare the way for Christianity.³ Holmer

1. From the Preface to the Ed. Dis. (Vol. I, p. 21); Cf. the Journals, 519 (pp. 139-140) and Postscript, pp. 243, 244, 255-266. Commentators have made much of this. E.g. cf. Holmer's introduction to the Ed. Dis. and Lowrie's introduction to the Christian Discourses (op. cit.).

2. Postscript, pp. 494 ff.

3. That they are themselves quasi-Christian writings prompts David Swenson to remark that "they express what we should perhaps call a Unitarian Christianity". Fragments, p. xxxviii.

states the issue well in referring to the Edifying Discourses:
 "His [SK's] pages are conceived in Christian interest, but still
 without using Christian categories. He wanted to make a plain
 point, namely, that the faith of a Christian was not completely
 alien to our common life."¹

In any case, it seems clear that SK wants the reader him-
 self (whom he addresses personally as "that solitary individual")²
 to participate in these discourses by making them "edifying" or
 uplifting for himself.³ Climacus concurs: "Whenever the God-
 relation is found by the exister in the inwardness of subjec-
 tivity, there is to be found the edifying which belongs to sub-
 jectivity, whereas by becoming objective one abandons this . .
 ."⁴ Hence, considering the process of becoming a Christian,
 it is imperative that SK not begin his adventure into the re-
 ligious with the "doubly-reflective" categories of paradoxical
 Christianity. Such a procedure might serve to frighten off the
 reader at the outset. Rather he begins with the categories of
 immanence. That is, the Edifying Discourses point to human, sub-
 jective, psychological phenomena and to human situations in life

1. Ed. Dis., I, p. xii.

2. hiin Enkelte, literally, that individual or single one.

3. Hence the subtle distinction between "Edifying Discourses"
 and "Discourses for Edification" which a teacher might deliver to
 an audience. Ed. Dis., I, p. 21.

4. Postscript, p. 497.

which are familiar to all men and which explore the possibilities for edification (uplifting) in the feelings, wishes, expectations, sufferings and events occurring in our own subjective lives.

So it is, then, that within religiousness A one can express one's relationship to an eternal happiness (or to immortality or to eternal life) completely by means of the categories of immanence alone, with "only human nature in general" as one's basic assumption.¹ The transcendent categories of Christianity are not required for this.

Granted the foregoing, it appears that we can anticipate from within religiousness A an immanent expression of temporality, an expression of temporality which is achieved fully within human, subjective categories. It is not surprising, then, that according to Climacus (who complains about the matter) in religiousness A eternity is concealed within existence; it is, as he says, ubique et nusquam.² Let us attempt to understand this with an eye not only to recognizing an immanent expression of temporality, but with an eye also to seeing why and how this expression is "religious".

In reading the Edifying Discourses one is struck (though not necessarily edified) by the fact that certain categories

1. Ibid., p. 496.

2. Ibid., p. 506.

stand out. Suffering, for example, is a dominant motif and so are the categories of expectation and patience. The latter two are especially important for our subject, and I shall treat them in some detail here.¹

The very first of SK's discourses, "The Expectation of Faith",² introduces the notion of "expectation" and utilizes it to show how in faith one possesses a power which can triumph over the future. Expectation is a concept which figures heavily in the majority of the discourses³ and as a general category; it is one in which SK believes the majority of the world participates. That is, most men expect something, and it is largely this which keeps them alive. Those "poor wretches" who expect nothing are those who have already "made up their account with life".⁴ Expectation is an immanent, subjective concept which can be apprehended (or so the present writer believes) by reference to psychological feelings. Imagine, for example, a metronome beating at a desired rate. If one is attentive to the tick-tock of the beat for only

1. I intend to de-emphasize somewhat the notion of suffering on the grounds that, while it is central to SK's thought as a whole, it is less essential than the durational categories of "expectation" or "patience" for our study of temporality.

2. Ed. Dis., I, pp. 22-49. This discourse was to accompany Either/Or, May 16, 1843.

3. It often appears in the titles themselves as in "Patient in Expectation", and "The Expectation of an Eternal Happiness". (Vol. II, pp. 25-51 and 75-100 respectively).

4. Ed. Dis., I, p. 33.

a short period, then one can appreciate the sensation which would occur if the metronome were to stop in mid-beat--tick-tock, tick At the sound of the last "tick" one is filled with expectation for the "tock".¹

SK of course recognizes that there are many varieties of expectations, but asserts that they all have something in common: a preoccupation with the future. He who expects something is preoccupied with the future, and for SK this preoccupation is truly a moment of edification. It is:

. . . precisely man's greatness, the proof of his divine heritage, that he can occupy himself with the future; for if there were no future, neither would there have been a past, and if there were neither past nor future, then would man be enslaved like the beasts, his head bent toward the earth, his soul ensnared in the service of the moment.²

The edification in the phenomenon of expectation is far-reaching, and SK uses it to emboss the fallacy of the oft-heard complaint that in their preoccupation with the future men forget and neglect their present. He submits that "living for the present" is no great thing and that we need to occupy ourselves with the future until we have conquered it. We must strive with the future until we are able to return to and find significance for our lives in the present. Until we have conquered the future,

1. It is no accident that musicians, the masters of the metronome, are the masters of keeping time.

2. Ibid., p. 34.

we have yet "one more enemy" with which to contend, and this will not leave us strong in the fight with the present. Not until one has conquered the future does one's present life become¹ sound and strong.

In this context the future with which one strives is also a category of subjectivity, and it only appears to be a phenomenon which transcends man. When one fights with the future, one fights with oneself. And so it is in the struggle itself² that one comes to know oneself. This is edifying in the sense that once we come to see that the striving is really with ourselves, we see too that we need help in the struggle. "When a man strives with the future, then he learns that however strong he is compared with the rest, there is one enemy who is stronger, that is himself; one enemy he cannot conquer by himself, that is himself."³ To do battle with the future we require more than experience ("experience as a friend has a double tongue which says now one thing, now another")⁴; we need to find some constant force amid the changes of our lives which will enable us to overcome the future. We need to find in ourselves an

1. Ibid., p. 35.

2. Ibid. Passages like this, though written in a non-analytic mood, suggest to the present writer that SK is ever alert to the Socratic battlecry, "Know Thyself!"

3. Ibid., p. 36.

4. Ibid., p. 37.

eternal or permanent guide, much as a sailor finds the unchanging stars a guide to the changing waves.¹ This guiding eternal power in man SK calls faith. "Through the eternal can one conquer the future, because the eternal is the foundation of the future; therefore through this one can understand that. What then is the eternal power in man?² It is faith."

Thus faith is an immanent, eternal power which functions as a permanent guideline against which we can gauge the many changes we experience in life. But note well that this is a rather fluid notion of a permanent guideline. Faith is a power which is constant or "eternal" only insofar as we exercise it, which, unfortunately we may suppose, we do not always do. Note further that the concept of faith expressed here is itself an immanent category; it is not a faith in something ontologically external to ourselves; it is an immanent power of constancy.

SK does not analyze the notion of faith here, for his interests lie elsewhere. In the context of the first discourse, the significant issue is that he connects this notion of faith to that of expectation. In combination the "expectation of faith" is interpreted as victory over the future. The subjective constancy of faith is combined with the impulse of expectation establishing a subjective relation to the future which

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

conquers the future. Thus the victory comes already at the beginning in the expectation of faith. "The believer is therefore done with the future before he begins on the present; for what one has conquered no longer has power to disturb one, and this victory can only make one more powerful in the present."¹

Now this is certainly excellent material to accompany Either/Or I, for it affords the aesthete the possibility of edification. It was precisely fear of the rapid approach of the moments coming from the future which terrified the aesthetic personality. ("How much I have gathered into this one moment which now draws nigh. Damnation if I should fail.")² The crucial difference between the aesthetic personality and the religious personality on this point is not that the latter has faith in God and that God saves him from the future. On the contrary, it is simply that the religious man has faith, period. That is, for the immanently religious personality, but not for the aesthetic personality, the future does not exist external to or independently of his own subjective being. It is an immanent, not a transcendent category. The future is man's pre-occupation. When man "faiths",³ he "holdsto", and this "holding

1. Ibid., p. 38.

2. E/O I, p. 439.

3. The present writer thinks that a verbal form is required to best express the active nature of SK's view of faith in this context.

to" itself becomes a constancy, and this constancy within his subjective existence is the eternal element therein. Thus faith in its expectation prevents one from falling out of oneself into the manifold. One remains in oneself; this is "the circle of immanence",¹ and one need not transcend this in any way to overcome the future.² "Certainly the soul, in the expectation of faith, is prevented from falling out of itself into the manifold; it remains in itself; but it would be the greatest evil which could befall a man if he escaped from this circle."³ The task is one of self-integration. One must fix one's gaze on the constant, as the sailor fixes upon the stars, and in so doing, one achieves integration of the soul.

SK's thought here seems to be the opposite of that once expressed by Alexander Pope: "Blessed is he who expects nothing,

1. Ibid., p. 43.

2. This point perhaps needs emphasis in light of what I believe is a popular error in Kierkegaardian interpretation, viz. interpreting everything he says from the standpoint of transcendent Christianity. For example, consider the following sentence from Paul S. Minear, "Thanksgiving as a Synthesis of the Temporal and the Eternal" in A Kierkegaard Critique (op. cit.) p. 305: "But when in faith the self accepts itself as God's creature, the future is overcome." Now this is clearly not a thought which is foreign to SK, but taken (as it is) as a comment upon the thought represented in the discourse here under discussion, it is at best premature and at worst false. Minear seems to have missed SK's whole point in this context, that all this is accomplished within immanence.

3. Ed. Dis., I, p. 43. SK uses "self" and "soul" interchangeably throughout the discourses.

for he shall never be disappointed." ¹ For SK, faith must accompany expectation; only one who believes expects; when one expects nothing, one does not believe. ² It is the expectation of faith itself which is victorious over all the vanishings of the world; it is itself the constancy which remains and which can never be taken away. For after all of life's disappointments, the expectancy of faith remains, and this itself conquers. Thus "integration" of the soul, while it takes place in the realm of immanence, is of course not automatic. Indeed, SK says elsewhere that the soul must be "acquired in patience." ³

If both constancy and change are immanent categories, then it follows that the eternal too is an immanent, psycho-temporal phenomenon. Of course, it would not do to imply that this was the end of the matter for SK, for certainly the entire authorship was not undertaken simply to point out that there is a psychological phenomenon of constancy. No, SK is more Christian than that, and Christians tend to think of "the eternal" as God. Yet, we must be mindful that the Edifying Discourses are not Christian, and their object is precisely to draw out the significance of

1. A letter to John Gay, October 16, 1727, in George Sherburn, ed., The Correspondence of Alexander Pope (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), Vol. II, p. 453.

2. Ed. Dis., I, p. 47.

3. Ed. Dis., I, pp. 190-210. "To Acquire One's Soul in Patience". Cf. Luke 21:19.

immanent categories. For SK it is a significant thing that we have an experience of the eternal, that there is an eternal aspect of our subjective consciousness, and he wants to make the most out of it--for edification.¹ An immanent constancy and change is edifying in that it suggests an analogy to God. In an early discourse² this analogy is made explicit. God is constant, and He remains so while everything else changes. Accordingly, our task in life is to heed the admonishment of St. James to love God so that "our being may come into likeness with His Own, in order that we may win God in constancy, and save our souls in patience."³ This is not only a preoccupation of the earliest discourses, for the same theme is found throughout. In the very last of the discourses SK speaks of our task as becoming "transfigured", by which he means that we come to reflect God's image in our own subjectivity.⁴ So it is that these immanent categories reflect the Divine, but it still holds true that in the discourses SK is describing subjective phenomena.

As the passage quoted above indicates, another such concept is "patience". Patience is the psychological counterpart to

-
1. Though he does not make as much out of it as did Socrates.
 2. "Every Good and Every Perfect Gift is from Above", Ed. Dis., I, pp. 51-71, published May 16, 1843 to accompany Either/Or.
 3. Ibid., I, p. 61. My italics.
 4. "The Righteous Man Strives in Prayer with God and Conquers--In That God Conquers", Ed. Dis., II, p. 252.

temporal duration. It is a concept of primary importance in the discourses and it is first given detailed expression in "To Acquire One's Soul in Patience".¹ Patience dovetails nicely with expectation, for, as we can well imagine from intimations in the foregoing, it might be necessary for one to expect for a long time. Patience is "the strength of soul which every man needs to attain his goal in life,"² as one goes on in expectation, much as one who cultivates the earth waits upon the early and the late rains, or as a mother who expects to find her happiness in her child, does not want it to grow up too fast, "but watches patiently through sleepless nights and anxious days."³

There are two important aspects of the combination of expectation and patience which need to be underscored here. First, patience is a subjective, durational category; it is not measured by means of passing, external moments. Secondly, in combination with expectation it is a durational category which is also directional in an inward sense.

And is it not alarming to enter upon this way where we constantly see the goal ahead of us, but never reach it; not like the traveler who finally reaches his destination, not like the burden-bearer who accomplishes his purpose; where we, as it were, never

1. Op. cit., published December 6, 1843 to accompany Fear and Trembling and Repetition.

2. Ibid., I, p. 192.

3. Ibid.

make any progress; not like the traveler who constantly sees a shifting scene, not like the burden-bearer who leaves one point after another behind him; where nothing changes for us; not like the merchant who sees one customer after another, not like the man who catches birds or fish, who now sees one caught, now another, while we never see anyone but ourselves¹

In patience expectation endures; in expectation patience moves inwardly. Expectation and patience combine as a subjective phenomenon of constancy and change, and in the end it is we who mark the point of constancy, and through all the striving we acquire ourselves.² We hear no shouts of approval from many voices as we press on toward some external goal--there is no external goal just as there is no external reward. We hear rather only a "solitary voice" which remains constant amid the manifold tribulations of life and by whose guidance we find ourselves.

This thought presents something of a dilemma (especially seen in the light of Repetition, which accompanies this discourse). SK's thought can be paraphrased as follows: If we are attentive to our inherent, permanent element, that "solitary voice" within us, and if it is our self which marks the point of constancy, and if it is our self which we acquire, then it seems that we both possess a self and seek to acquire a self at the

1. Ibid., p. 193.

2. Ibid., p. 194.

same time. If a man owns his own soul, he does not need to acquire it; and if he does not own it, then he is not in a position to acquire it because the soul (described as the constant factor or "solitary voice" which urges us on) becomes the final condition for its acquisition.¹

Now in the external world it seems obvious that one cannot at one and the same time own and acquire the same thing, for that is a contradiction. In "temporal existence" (Timeligheden) something either is or it is not. Nor is any contradiction allowed in the eternal, for the eternal simply is. It is only in the inward, which is a contradiction between the eternal and the temporal, that the contradiction can have any meaning. But since the soul is defined as this contradiction, it makes sense to say that it may be owned and acquired at the same time.²

The soul exists in such a way that it must be acquired, acquired inwardly. In SK's view, any other type of acquiring or ownership is worthless. To own the world, he says, is to be

1. Ibid., pp. 194-195.

2. Ibid., p. 195. There is an equivocation on "own" in this passage; we do not "own" our souls in the same way as we "own" external possessions. SK would probably not blanch at this, however, since difference of ownership is partly his point. Something of the same is true of "acquire", which SK takes in an "inward" sense unlike the "acquire" which refers to external things. Cf. Ibid., p. 196: "That which secures against the ownership of the soul being an illusion, is exactly its acquirement, and that which guarantees against its acquirement being an illusion is just the fact that it is previously owned."

owned by the world, because the loss of the world can diminish
 one's possessions, and precisely this is to be owned by the world.¹

The imperfect can not be owned by a man as his exclusive possession, except insofar as he is owned by it, for if a man cares only about the external, the worldly, the temporal [timelig], then are not the world and the temporal existence [timeligheden] unconditionally stronger than he? Therefore a man can truly own the imperfect only by relinquishing it, which really indicates that he does not own it, even if he owns it. A man can own the perfect when he also owns himself, without his ownership being a relinquishment, since, on the contrary, it is a deepening in perfection.²

It seems evident, then, (as the young lover of Repetition came to discover) that a physical-temporal repetition would be self-contradictory; an inward repetition is quite conceivable, but it is conceivable only against the backdrop of an attitude of worldly renunciation, a dominant motif of SK's Edifying Discourses. Man's situation as described in the discourses by means of all the subtle categories can be summarized in one well known proposition: Man is in the world but not of it. This, for SK is a given datum of life. Being distinct from the world, man begins to feel antipathy toward worldly life. Once he feels this antipathy, or what SK terms disquietude, he is faced with two options: If he wants to acquire the world, he must first overcome this disquietude until he "vanishes like a wave in the

1. Ibid., I, p. 197.

2. Ibid., my italics.

sea of the worldly life,"¹ and only then will he own the world. On the other hand, if he wants to win his soul, he must allow this antipathy or disquietude to become more and more explicit, and in this very process of making it explicit, he acquires his soul, "for his soul was exactly this distinction from the worldly life; it was the infinitude of the worldly life in its distinction from itself."²

Although man participates in the world, he only owns the world by relinquishing it (just as earlier we saw that he only gains the present by first conquering the future). If a man thinks otherwise, that he owns the world as it is, then he deludes himself, because this is an indication that he himself has lapsed completely into the world and has actually become owned by the world; the world is only truly what it is when no one owns it.

The human soul is a contradiction between the external and the inward, the temporal [Timelike] and the eternal. It is a self-contradiction, because that which makes it what it is, is the fact that it wishes to express the contradiction in itself. The soul is therefore in contradiction, and is self-contradiction. If it were lost in the earthly life, if it were not self-contradiction, then movement would be impossible. It must at the same time be owned and acquired; it belongs to the world as its unlawful possession; it belongs to God

1. Ibid., I, p. 196.

2. Ibid.

as His true possession; it belongs to man as his own possession, that is as the possession which he must acquire. Consequently he then acquires, if he actually does acquire it, his soul from the world, of God, through himself.¹

The idea expressed here of striving and moving in contradiction is basically an expression of temporality, for it represents what we have earlier described as a constancy amid change. Acquiring one's soul is a task which ushers in a struggle with the world. It is a matter of discharging one's "debt" to the world by giving to the world what belongs to it. so that one may come to oneself. This may be described in terms of immanence as psychological phenomena or, in SK's terms, as subjective movements. This relinquishing of the world is edifying in that it introduces the possibility of a relationship with something else, namely God.

The relevance and significance of this for our present study is that it is made comprehensible by durational concepts alone. For example, it requires nothing but patience to acquire one's soul. To acquire something external might require something more than patience, but for inward acquisition, patience alone is necessary. One does not seize upon one's soul as if it

1. Ibid., I, p. 199.

2. Ibid., I, p. 200.

were "an affair of a moment", that is, as the soul rushes by, for then everything would be lost in the moment. Precisely this is the aesthetic dilemma ("Damnation if I should fail"). SK indicates more clearly here than the confused Constantine did in his little book just how inward a phenomenon repetition is as it connects with the immanent concepts of acquiring and patience.

That which has already been emphasized in this word 'acquire' is brought home ever more forcibly by the addition of the phrase, 'in patience.' Moreover, the phrase itself is a picture of the whole acquisition, in that this develops as the phrase advances in expressiveness, that is the whole is a repetition. There is nothing said about conquering, about pursuing and seizing upon something, but only about becoming more and more quiet, because that which is to be acquired is within one; and necessity forces one to be outside of himself. Because that which is to be acquired, is in patience, not hidden in itself in such a way that he who patiently, as it were, strips off patience, finally finds it farthest in, but in such a way that it is patience itself into which the soul in patience spins itself, and thereby acquires patience and itself.²

In patience one, as it were, "waits out" the stronger world, but just in this very "weakness" of waiting, the soul becomes stronger than the world. It is just this capacity for patience which carries one over the temporal, over the world in which time is used deceptively to prolong torment and agony for nought.

1. Ibid., I, p. 203.

2. Ibid., I, p. 204.

It is in patience that one acquires oneself by translating oneself¹ into eternity.

The ontological dichotomy of the temporal and the eternal, and especially the emphasis on the eternal, naturally influences SK's formulation of expectation and patience. This is most evident in his distinction between true and fragmentary expectations, and this distinction is coupled with "patience" in a later² discourse in which SK reiterates that expectation is a fundamental aspect of human existence.

And while human life thus goes forward with highly different expectations according to the different times and opportunities of the different personalities, the whole of life is again one night-watch of expectation, and no one dares, prudently or foolishly, to forfeit and wear himself out irretrievably on fragmentary expectations, so that in his security or in the press of business, in his joy or in his despondency, he forgets the eternal, which is waiting every moment to the end of time. For this is one and the same thing, only the earthly and temporal [*timelige*] mind explains ambiguously, to its own perdition, that which wishes to be understood in patience confidently and soothingly, in earnestness saving and guiding.³

The time of expectation, in other words, comes not through impatience, but only (as we have seen) through patience. The task for a man is never to give up as long as he lives; while there

1. *Ibid.*, I, p. 210.

2. "Patient in Expectation", published March 5, 1844; *Ed. Dis.*, II, pp. 25-51.

3. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 26-27. My italics.

is life there is hope, and consequently one ought always to hope¹ for "the immortality which expects eternity."

SK distinguishes between "heavenly" and "earthly" expectation and urges his reader to engage in the former, which begins² precisely where the earthly "sinks down in weakness and despair." The point is to expect the eternal and not busy oneself with the temporal in any way. Expectation of the eternal, if it is true expectation, is victory over the temporal (Timelige).³ We recall that earlier SK described expectation as victory over the future,⁴ and we are reminded that now as then the categories are immanent in spite of the fact that they discuss a transcending of the temporal. While it is indeed a dominant theme of the discourses that one comes to expect something other than the fruits of temporal existence only after one has renounced the temporal in order to gain the eternal,⁵ it is nevertheless the case that the categories remain those of immanence. This is

1. Ibid., II, p. 36.

2. Ibid., II, p. 37.

3. Ibid., II, p. 38.

4. Ibid., I, p. 35. Cf. supra, p. 224.

5. Ibid., II, p. 41. The same theme is evident in the later Christian Discourses, op. cit.

true of course even for the "eternal", for one comes to see the eternal ¹ as expectation in time.

There is a strong counter-theme in the discourses which suggests that world renunciation does not mean escape from the world. We have touched on this theme earlier when we discovered that the victory of expectation over the future freed one to live more fully in the present. ² In a still later discourse ³ SK states explicitly that true expectation is not a phenomenon which takes one out of life, and he repeatedly stresses its significance for the present life.

It happens that the expectation of eternal happiness cuts two ways: The vigilance of expectation is an occupation which is also a reward in this life and a blessing in time. ⁴ This is so because expectation works both in heaven and on earth. It seeks first "the Kingdom of God and His Righteousness", and then

1. Ibid. Cf. I, p. 127 ("Strengthened in the Inner Man", published October 16, 1843): "Moreover he who looks only upon the external, to him every expression is figurative and unreal; for he believes that God gives the good gifts as a father gives, but still in such a way that the gifts are the proof, as it were, that God is our Father, then he judges outwardly, and to him the truth itself becomes something figurative."

2. Supra, pp. 226-227. Cf. Ed. Dis. II, p. 38 where SK speaks of expectation making our present burdens "light".

3. "The Expectation of An Eternal Happiness", published June 8, 1844, Ed. Dis., II, pp. 75-100.

4. Ibid., II, p. 82.

1

"these other things are added to it". Its operation and result are two-fold.

If the expectation does not do this, then it is deceitful, a sick soul's craftiness that would sneak out of life, not a sound soul's frank presence in the temporal [Timelike]. Then it is not an expectation of the eternal, but a superstition about the future; then man does not rest in the trustworthiness of the eternal, but jests with the possibility of the future, which is merely intriguing, like solving a riddle. Then is the expectation an insidious craving which has not taken counsel with earnestness about the various decisions of fulfillment; for the more profoundly earnestness understands the fear of separation--if this does not destroy the responsibility and force the soul, as it were, to surrender--the truer is the expectation.²

Expectation is correlated to fulfillment; without expectation there is no possibility of fulfillment. The possibility of fulfillment is further qualified by the distinction between true and false expectation. True expectation is of that which concerns a man ultimately,³ whereas false expectation is of daily, "trivial" concerns. Since false expectation is not a matter of what concerns a man ultimately, it is correlated merely to temporal fulfillment. True expectation, on the other hand,

1. Ibid., II, pp. 82-83.

2. Ibid., II, p. 83.

3. Ibid., II, p. 45 ("Patient in Expectation"). There is in Paul Tillich a strikingly similar though unacknowledged formulation of faith as ultimate concern and of true ultimate concern as corresponding to that which concerns a man ultimately. Cf. esp. Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 8-12.

is correlated to eternal happiness,¹ and thus is correlated to eternal fulfillment. This means, by a subtle shift in logic, that an expectation is not true simply because it is a matter of ultimate concern, it is true because the object of ultimate concern is the eternal. This seems (at least within the context of religiousness A)² a circular argument.

True expectation must maintain a "frank presence" in the temporal, and SK proceeds to elaborate a few ways in which the expectation of eternal happiness helps a man in temporal existence: First, true expectation helps a man to understand himself in temporal existence (Timeligheden).³ In attempting to understand oneself in temporal existence one usually tends to rely on experience. And, in fact, experience is a help in that it does provide standards by means of which one can measure one's progress in life. The problem with reliance on experience, however, is that the standards it provides are all within temporal

1. Ibid., II, pp. 45, 83.

2. Outside of religiousness A it would be an invalid argument owing to an equivocation on "ultimate concern" (being once a psychological attitude and again a correlate of something beyond the psychological). This is a problem which we encounter again in religiousness B. To the present writer it seems that SK was in the process of thinking the problem through, and, like so many of the passages in all the authorship, this one reflects the fact that SK's thought was "in progress" and that he did not have a logically consistent and complete system that could simply be written and passed on.

3. Ibid., II, p. 83.

existence, and this is why, says SK, expectation "despises" experience.¹ Of course SK recognizes that one needs standards to live by, but he warns his reader that earthly standards vary, and when they vary, so does the life which is guided by them. In such manner one might lose himself in the shuffle. "Still, he who has only the standard of the temporal existence [Timeligheden]² goes down with the temporal [Timeligheden],² and perhaps does not even last as long."³

There is a possible confusion here which the reader will avoid if he bears in mind that SK is speaking within the framework of immanent religiosity. It seems at first that he is inconsistent in discussing the standards by which a man is guided. On the one hand, his whole point is that expectation helps a man in temporal existence, and he urges that a man ought not want to escape it. On the other hand, he admonishes a man who has only the standard of temporal existence. Yet the inconsistency here is only apparent, for SK addresses himself to a man who affixes himself to externals, to standards which lie outside himself and thereby is assured of losing his self when the standards change. But the standard which SK advances in lieu of this is

1. Ibid., II, p. 84.

2. As Timeligheden is used again here, the translation should read: "the temporal existence" for the sake of consistency.

3. Ed. Dis., II, p. 84.

not external, but internal. "If on the contrary, a man preserves that expectation in his soul, then he has a goal that is always valid, a standard which is always valid, and valid in itself; by means of this goal and this standard he may always understand himself in the temporal existence [Timeligheden]."¹ SK's real goal, then, is for a man to live in temporal existence without being carried away by it. It is again a matter of being in but not of the world. But the point is that man cannot see that he is in but not of the world until he fixes his gaze upon² the constancy within him.

SK will not tolerate anything less than an unceasing expectation. We must never cease to wonder and to expect as when we were children.³ Experience becomes an insidious force when it vitiates the child-like quality in expectation. "When the demands of life exceed the judgment of experience, then life becomes confused and comfortless, unless the expectation of an eternal happiness regulates and calms it."⁴ It is only in the expectation of an eternal happiness that one's sufferings

1. Ibid., II, p. 85.

2. Cf. supra, p. 226. In this sense the "immanent eternal" does transcend the world inwardly.

3. Ed. Dis., II, p. 51 ("Patient in Expectation").

4. Ibid., II, p. 89.

are made light¹ through the understanding that man receives of himself in the world.

The expectation of an eternal happiness also has significance for the present life in that it reconciles every man with his fellow men, friends and enemies, "in understanding of the essential"². In this connection SK again attacks the idea that experience has anything to do with what is essential to human life. Experience, he acknowledges, works tirelessly in temporal existence by putting everything in place and by giving each his due, etc., but haplessly it ends there. Experience never carries us beyond this level of existence, beyond pettiness, monotonous security or "sheer reciprocity"³. A life based solely on experience, a life which lacks expectation, is simply wretched. This is so because it has an unmistakable backward orientation which only expectation can correct.

Even if it is attractive to look at, such a life belongs to the temporal-existence [Timelighedens], is the first of the temporal existence and the most one can say of it is that it was a beautiful moment. But this beautiful moment of the temporal existence is still, in comparison with the eternal, only like the brief, silvery gleam of counterfeit metal. On the contrary, he whose soul expects an eternal happiness,

1. Cf. II Corinthians 4:17, 18 which heads this particular discourse.

2. Ed. Dis., II, p. 90.

3. Ibid.

has always present in himself that which is valid in itself, and against which all the petty appears as the petty.¹

A man who lives in expectation of eternal happiness is thus reconciled to his fellows in that he is constantly influenced by "an aspiration" which does not bring him into conflict with anyone (or with anything earthly) and whose possession does not exclude anyone else.²

SK is deeply moved by the force of II Corinthians 4:17-18 which this discourse exposit:

For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal.³

He feels that "earthly things" ought to pass for what they are, finite, momentary and fleeting; by no means should they be respected as "the last word". This view finally expresses itself in a type of world renunciation. We ought to "lose" the temporal, he says, for if we lose it in the right way, then its loss will make the difficult easier.⁴ What underlies this feeling is

1. Ibid., II, p. 91.

2. Ibid.

3. KJV (the version used by Swenson in his translation of the discourse).

4. Ed. Dis., II, p. 91.

not simply a straightforward exegesis of II Corinthians nor the simple conviction that "he who regards the temporal will gradually become incapable of considering the eternal"¹. There is more to it than this, for underlying all these attitudes is a sense of deep dissatisfaction and disillusionment with temporal existence, which is based on the entire Platonic metaphysical suspicion of the changing world. This underlying metaphysics is what finally carries SK above the categories of immanence.

"But the things seen are temporal [timelige]; and the temporal [Timelige] is not only perishable but is at variance with it-²
self, and therefore must be dissolved and cannot endure."

For this reason one who turns away from the temporal to the eternal and is concerned for his own eternal happiness is reconciled with himself and with everyone. "For the eternal is always in harmony with itself, and its harmony excludes only that which excludes itself."³

Any kind of temporal assurance is illusory; it is like a bird in the hand which wants only to fly.⁴ Temporal existence is itself an illusion because it insists on its "rights" which

1. Ibid., II, p. 92.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., II, p. 93.

(as we have learned from the discourse on acquiring one's soul)¹
 are deceptive. Temporal existence delights in this deception,
 and hate and wrath and earthly partiality have deceptively
 intruded on the eternal, have set it at odds with itself and
 made it contentious. "Who is not terrified by such perversity?"
 asks SK, and then adds: "For my part, I have always tried in-
 vain to understand it."² SK's true feeling is echoed in a pas-
 sage from another discourse:

Is this not terrible! Man looks for tranquility, but,
 behold, things change: day and night, summer and win-
 ter, life and death. Man looks for tranquility, but
 lo, things change: fortune and misfortune, gladness
 and sorrow. Man looks for tranquility and constancy,
 but lo, things change: the glow of purpose and the ab-
 horrence of impotence, the green forests of expectancy
 and the withered glory of fulfillment.³

There seems to be little doubt that in the Edifying Dis-
courses SK is essentially Greek in his religiousness. It is
 this fact that inflames his most ardent critic, Johannes Climacus,⁴
 who accuses SK of slipping into the eternal by way of recollection.
 Of course we must remember that SK made no claims about his dis-
 courses reflecting anything more than an immanent religiosity,
 the sort in which any mildly religious pagan could easily

1. Supra, pp. 232 ff.

2. Ed. Dis., II, p. 93.

3. Ed. Dis., II, p. 162, no. XVI, "The Thorn in the Flesh",
 published August 31, 1844.

4. Postscript, p. 508.

participate. Climacus is certainly correct, however, in observing that there is something lacking in these discourses. In fact, much of the character of religiousness A can be discovered by viewing it in contrast to religiousness B, which we shall proceed to do after briefly underscoring some of the most important aspects of religiousness A.

First, expectation and patience are categories of subjectivity and of temporality; they refer to subjective, psychological phenomena and are durational in nature. They describe a dynamic movement of constancy amid change, all within the bounds of subjectivity. At times they appear to refer to external, transcendent categories, and often they even allude to a transcendent God, but in doing so they point only to the subjective phenomena which are analogous to the introduction of God and objective time. Second, religiousness A is religious. That is, the phenomenon of constancy and change contained therein is not tantamount to Aristotle's notion of a passing time which itself creates the epiphenomenon of constancy.¹ In this Aristotle had reference to some objective time and not to any subjective "passions" which might properly be termed "religious". Nor is this phenomenon identical to Hegel's world-historical² notion of temporality. Such a notion is even

1. Cf. supra, p. 203, n. 3.

2. Supra, pp. 205 ff.

more abstract than that of Aristotle. Contrariwise, what SK meant to describe by means of the categories we have treated here must be connected with the "religious" in that they are inward, intentional "movements" which require such sublime attitudes as faith, hope and renunciation. They are religious at least in the sense that they lift a man above the humdrum and trivia of the quotidian and urge him not to lose himself in the manifold flux of temporal existence.

Finally, there is no need to charge this sort of thing up to the Christians. After all, religiousness A is near to the notion, characteristic of both Greek philosophy and mysticism, that one moves inward and backward by means of one's immortal soul into participation with the unchanging eternal.

Religiousness B

Edifying as they may be, the discourses of religiousness A are somehow not satisfying. They are too indefinite, and the reader is left in expectation¹ of something more. There is "movement" in religiousness A, but its direction is somewhat vague; it is a movement in the direction of the eternal, but the

1. It is of course entirely possible (perhaps even likely) that SK intended to leave his reader with such a feeling; it is certainly not beyond the scope of his literary talents.

eternal itself is amorphous and elusive--it is, as Climacus suggests, ubique et nusquam.¹ Climacus is a keen analyst of religiousness A, and there are several foci of his criticism of it which may serve to introduce religiousness B.

According to Climacus, the main trouble with religiousness A is simply that it is immanent. It represents a dialectic of inward appropriation in relation to an eternal happiness, and as such it is not "conditioned" by anything outside itself; that is, it depends only on itself, being conditioned "only by the inwardness of the appropriation and its dialectic."² In contrast religiousness B, or "paradoxical" religion, lays down definite external "conditions" which are not simply deeper dialectical apprehensions of inwardness and which have the effect of defining the eternal happiness itself.³ Whereas religiousness A defines the individual's apprehension of eternal happiness in subjective, inward categories, religiousness B defines the eternal as it is apart from the psychological apprehension of it. Climacus acknowledges that religiousness A is worthwhile, but complains that it is too immeshed in the "cycle of immanence" and does not advance beyond introspection. One needs to get

1. Postscript, p. 506.

2. Ibid., p. 494.

3. Ibid.

beyond oneself and one's own feelings to the eternal itself.
 In simplest terms, Christianity demands that God cannot simply be a manifestation of human subjectivity; He must be transcendent of mere human categories.

Inasmuch as the edifying is essentially a predicate of all religiousness, religiousness A will also have its own particular edification. Whenever the God-relation is found by the exister in the inwardness of subjectivity, there is to be found the edifying which belongs to subjectivity, whereas by becoming objective one abandons this; for although it belongs to subjectivity it is not necessarily associated with it, any more than love is or being in love, which also may be abandoned by becoming objective.²

The edifying element of religiousness A is therefore essentially that of immanence; religiousness B, on the other hand, concerns that which is external to the individual. "In religiousness B the edifying is a something outside the individual, the individual does not find edification by finding the God-relationship within himself, but relates himself to something outside himself to find edification."³ Thus the edification of religiousness B is based on the fact that it corresponds to the "condition" or determination of God-in-time as a particular historical

1. The criticisms suggested by Climacus are very much the same as those much later leveled by Rudolph Otto against Schleiermacher's religious psychology. See The Idea of the Holy (New York, Oxford University Press, A Galaxy Book, 1958), pp. 9-11.

2. Postscript, p. 497.

3. Ibid., p. 498.

person, and the individual is thereby related to something¹ outside himself.

In religiousness A the individual reflected in his own subjectivity a relation to the eternal, but the eternal was but one's own subjective aspect of constancy. In religiousness B the individual does not relate himself to this subjective eternal but the eternal-in-time, to the eternal at a particular time and place. Such a relationship conflicts equally, says Climacus, "with all thinking, whether one reflects upon the individual or upon the Deity."²

The paradoxical religiousness places the contradiction absolutely between existence and the eternal; for precisely the thought that the eternal is at a definite moment of time, is an expression for the fact that existence is abandoned by the concealed immanence of the eternal. In the religiousness A the eternal is ubique et nusquam, but concealed by the actuality of existence; in the paradoxical religiousness the eternal is at a definite place, and precisely this is the breach with immanence.³

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 506.

3. Ibid. In this way religiousness B has something of a tension within itself which makes it the antithesis of any basically mystical form of religious experience which even so much as hints at a notion of the infinite indwelling the finite in terms of "God-in-us". Religiousness B begins with the assumption of a significant difference between the Divine and the human. It was for that reason immediately attractive as a starting point for Karl Barth whose "Nein!" might as well have been directed at religiousness A as at Emil Brunner. It is probable that Barth was far more radical on this point than was SK, but it is certain that in religiousness B God cannot be derived from immanent, subjective categories.

The historical particularity of the God-in-time gives precise definition to the eternal, but there are other effects and implications as well. For example, it has the effect of cutting off that avenue of approach to eternity which Climacus so bitterly deplores, recollection. If there is no historical starting point for the eternal, then the individual merely discovers that he has always been eternal, and he reaches eternity by returning to it through recollection as Plato had said. Hence, religiousness A, insofar as it has any orientation, is oriented backwards.

The moment in time is therefore eo ipso swallowed up by eternity. In time the individual recollects that he is eternal. This contradiction lies exclusively within immanence. It is another thing when the historical is outside and remains outside, and the individual who was not eternal now becomes such, and so does not recollect what he is but becomes what he was not, becomes, be it observed, something which possesses the dialectic that as soon as it is, it must have been, for this is the dialectic of the eternal. This proposition inaccessible to thought is: that one can become eternal although one was not such.¹

A further implication of the foregoing is that free choice is an important aspect of religiousness B. Indeed, Climacus calls religiousness B the decisive stage of religiosity; an individual not only expresses a relation to eternal happiness, he must choose it as well.²

1. Ibid., p. 508.

2. Ibid., pp. 345-346.

In light of the rather heavy auto-criticism concerning the inadequacies of religiousness A, questions arise as to why SK bothered with it in the first place. There are also a number of differing views as to why SK continued the authorship "beyond" religiousness A. In the main these explanations are biographical in nature and are therefore somewhat beyond our interests here. Therefore, we shall not pursue them in detail but only mention what is necessary in order to draw out their implications and to indicate a rationale for our procedure in this section.

We know that at one time SK did plan to conclude his authorship with the Postscript and become a pastor of a rural congregation or a theological professor somewhere. Swenson¹² believes SK did not carry through with these plans because his devastating experience with the Corsair³ convinced him that he was not suited for a clerical position and because there was a "vast wealth of religious thought and passion within him which demanded a literary expression, and which inevitably carried him into a second and religious phase of his authorship."⁴

1. Cf. Journal entry 555, p. 149 (III A, 4) and Lowrie's introduction to the Postscript, pp. xii ff.

2. See his preface to The Gospel of Suffering and The Lilies of the Field (op. cit.). Hereafter cited as Suffering.

3. Cf. Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962) Vol. II, pp. 347 ff.

4. Preface to Suffering.

Lowrie agrees that the works of the "second phase" of his authorship are qualitatively different. However, he believes that this is because in Easter Week of 1848 SK underwent a "metamorphosis"¹ and truly became a Christian; that is, for the first time he really believed that God wanted his melancholy isolation from others to be broken and that he could now speak directly as a Christian. "My whole being is changed. My reserve and self-isolation is broken--I must speak."² If this is so, it means that SK's works are now for the first time not only truly Christian but are also for the first time truly direct. This makes the "directness" of the Edifying Discourses somewhat questionable.³ Lowrie writes:

Although the [Edifying] "Discourses" from first to last were published over SK's name and undoubtedly reflect his personal beliefs, I have the impression that in the earlier period they regularly lagged behind the religious stage he had actually attained at the moment of writing, whereas in the pseudonymous works he was not restrained by diffidence or modesty from asserting positions somewhat in advance of his positive and secure attainment at the moment.⁴

1. See esp. his introduction to Christian Discourses (op. cit.), his preface to Training in Christianity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944---hereafter cited as Training), and his Kierkegaard, Vol. II, p. 388.

2. Journals, 747, p. 235. Entry of April, 19, 1848.

3. It also questions the theory that the Edifying Discourses provide the clue to the entire authorship. Cf. supra p. 219.

4. Training, pp. xix-xx. Cf. Christian Discourses, p. xvii.

Lowrie is confident that the very last (Christian) works represent SK's true position and that everything found in them "gives exact expression to his thought and faith."¹ The present writer agrees with Lowrie about the Edifying Discourses, but believes that the true SK is only apprehended from the whole of his literature and not from any one (even the final) phase of it.

What all of this implies for the writings we are about to investigate is that they will no longer be maieutic in any way; they are not meant to evoke self-knowledge, but rather are intended to bear witness to Christianity. Christianity, as we are told, is an "existence communication",² so it is appropriate that it is communicated by one who feels openly that he is a Christian.³ In SK, however, this feeling is accompanied by humility and some self-doubt. As a Christian, he does not doubt God, but he does doubt himself, and therefore engages in constant penitance, always realizing that he was an imperfect

1. Ibid., p. xxvi.

2. Postscript, pp. 506 ff.

3. Some scholars question whether SK was ever really a Christian. E.g. Arland Ussher (Journey Through Dread, op. cit.) wonders if SK "really sought sainthood through despair or whether he was fascinated by despair when he thought he was in love with sainthood" (p. 22); S. U. Zuidema writes that SK had never really had faith, but had only an unhappy love of religion (Kierkegaard, trans. by D. F. Freeman, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1960, p. 30), and Theodore Haecker suggests that SK was always becoming and never really was a Christian at any time (Kierkegaard and the Cripple, New York: Philosophic Library, 1950, p. 11).

Christian. Perhaps it is in this connection that SK assigned a new pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, for the idealistically perfect Christian works, Sickness Unto Death and Training in Christianity. Apparently SK did not want to appear as if he were exacting a perfection from others which he himself could not meet. This new pseudonym, as Lowrie points out, was reminiscent of Johannes Climacus, who could with exceptional competence expand upon the nature of Christianity but who could not himself confess it. Anti-Climacus, as his name implies, is the opposite; he is a Christian in a superlative, almost "demoniacal", degree.¹ Lowrie, eager to identify SK with this late stage of religiosity, indicates that the pseudonym was adopted only for practical reasons:

This pseudonym was adopted merely to relieve his own fine feeling of propriety.² It must be understood also that this form of pseudonymity was totally different from that which hitherto he had used. In the case of the other pseudonymous works, SK was scrupulous to make the text agree with the character he ascribed to the pseudonym. Hence he was justified in affirming that not a word uttered by his pseudonyms could properly be referred to him as an expression of his personal view. There is nothing of the sort here, for these later works were the sincerest

1. Training, p. xxiii.

2. Among other things it seems that SK had reservations about offending Bishop Mynster or perhaps even Regina by publishing an attack on the church. See Lowrie's introduction to Training, p. xxiii.

expression of his own belief, and he had expected to publish them under his own name. The pseudonym was an afterthought.¹

2

Be that as it may, it is certain that the sundry writings which are "Christian" in scope represent a substantial part of the total SK. There are a variety of these works, and we shall not attempt to treat them all here. Nor shall we try to treat them in a strict chronological order. In general our procedure will be to attend first to those writings which appear under SK's signature and then to those of Anti-Climacus. Our primary concern, however, is to understand religiousness B as a whole.

One of the first of the specifically Christian writings,³ Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing, provides, in my view, a fine stepping stone between religiousness A and B. In this work the elements of temporality within the personality are

1. Sickness, p. 138. Cf. Training, p. xxvi where Lowrie alludes to a statement by SK (in reference to the second edition of Training) to the effect that if it were to be published now for the first time it would be under his own name.

2. Alastair McKinnon, "New Hierarchy" (op. cit.) concurs in stating that Anti-Climacus is most like the acknowledged SK.

3. Trans. by Douglass V. Steere (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1956). Hereafter cited as Purity. Purity was originally the first part of a trilogy published March 13, 1847 as Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits. These three were published separately in English, the latter two in reversed order under the title, The Gospel of Suffering and The Lilies of the Field (op. cit.). To some extent the three discourses of the trilogy correlate with the three familiar stages of the authorship. Purity at least utilizes ethical categories such as purity, will and Good in the process of its religious exposition.

seen to be significant, but at the same time temporality is no longer conceived in merely immanent categories alone. In a sense this work describes both sides of the coin. In it we may read about psychological or subjective phenomena, where eternity seems to be an epiphenomenon, a constancy amid change. (For example, "willing one thing" is a psychological process of putting off manyness and focusing on one thing, a psychological movement in the direction of constancy.)¹ Yet we also learn from this discourse that at the very same time that we are "narrowing" ourselves, we are moving outside ourselves by entertaining notions of transcendence. The very narrowing of our focus from manyness to oneness is itself self-transcending. Let me explain: At the very outset of Purity we learn that God is "that one thing" so that in willing one thing we are actually moving by psychological analogy in the direction of the objective, eternal God.

SK comes to this position by contrasting the temporal and eternal elements in a man. The temporal element, the element of changeableness, does indeed have its own wisdom in talking about life. For example, Ecclesiastes 3:1 ("to everything there is a season") or 3:9 ("what profit hath he that worketh in that wherein he laboreth") are expressions of this "temporal" or earthly wisdom. Such wisdom is based on experience, SK's old enemy,²

1. Purity, p. 47.

2. Supra, p. 245.

and as such is not related to man as truly present, but expresses that which lies behind us.¹ Temporal wisdom is always based on the past. On the other hand, Eternal wisdom about life is always current. "Only the Eternal is always appropriate and always present, is always true. Only the Eternal applies to each human being, whatever his age may be."²

In brief, SK means to say that there is more to life than temporal, experiential wisdom suggests; indeed, the most important aspect of human life is left out when we speak only of changeableness. "For all the talk about the natural changes of human life over the years together with what externally happened there, is not in essence any different from talking of plant or of animal life."³

One cannot logically recount the story of human life by reference only to the categories of change. If one were to say, for example, that one is immortal, then the "immortality" would be present at each instant of one's life and would not just become meaningful at the end of life. The whole story of one's life would have to be retold to meet this claim, for any changelessness would not be altered by the passage of the years and would have to be accounted for throughout.

1. Purity, p. 32.

2. Ibid., p. 33.

3. Ibid., p. 34.

The wisdom of eternity does account for this. SK again refers to the same passage of Ecclesiastes (3:11) which he translates, "God made all things beautiful in his time; also he hath set eternity within a man's heart."¹ Now, unlike the wisdom of the passing years which is confusing, the wisdom of the eternal is constructive and edifying. But here in Purity the eternal is more than a subjective epiphenomenon of constancy; it is a God-ward self-transcending element of "that individual" (hiin Enkelte) which prevents man from being resolved into merely temporal relationships.

The eternal does not "have its time" as does everything else; it stands above time and "fashinns time to its own desire" and "gives its consent that the temporal [Timelige]" should also be given its time."² Furthermore, in relation to this eternal man never becomes older, and he never grows away from the eternal which is always as near as it ever was. "For in relation to the Eternal, a man ages neither in the sense of time nor in the sense of an accumulation of past events."³

This eternal element in man is an expression of man's true freedom⁴ and requires his free choice. In short, what there

1. The RSV reads: "He has made everything beautiful in its time; also he has put eternity into a man's mind"

2. Ibid., p. 37. My italics.

3. Ibid., p. 38.

4. Cf. supra, Chap. IV for a discussion of man's freedom.

is that in no temporal sense shall have its time is precisely what at all times should be done.¹ In man's free existence he is constantly in touch with the eternal by willing one thing, and is thereby enabled to transcend all temporal wisdom. It is imperative, therefore, that we come to understand the manifestations or experience of the eternal which we have, for it will provide us with a clue to the transcendent Eternal.

SK locates our experience of the eternal in the concepts of repentance and remorse, which he calls "Eternity's Emmisaries to Man".² These act as two constant guides in life: repentance calls a man forward to the good, and remorse calls a man back from evil. Their call comes to us at the "eleventh hour" (in which "life is viewed differently"), but this is not the eleventh hour in any temporal sense, for repentance and remorse are eternal categories and link our experience to that which is not eroded by time. These categories are actions achieved by "a collected mind"³ and do not belong to this or that specific time of life; they are in no sense temporal. It would not make sense, for example, to speak of a time to be carefree and a time to repent, for repentance is urgent and must be done instantaneously, for it is an eternal category and has nothing to do

1. Purity, p. 38.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 42.

with the temporal; in the words of Ecclesiastes, it does not have its own time.

Of course SK fully realizes that while from the point of view of eternity repentance must come instantaneously, man nevertheless is in the "temporal dimension" (Timeligheden)¹ and needs time to order his understanding so that he ~~may~~¹ apprehend the eternal. For this reason the eternal enters upon a kind of nurturing process to help man in his weakness.

Thus the Eternal and the temporal [Timelige] seek to make themselves intelligible to each other. Just as the temporal [Timeligheden] does not wish for delay simply in order to withdraw itself, but, conscious of its weakness, asks time to prepare itself; so the Eternal yields not because it gives up its claim, but in order by tender treatment to give frail man a little time.²

In this way the eternal is of assistance to the temporal throughout a man's life. Participation in the nurturing process requires, on man's part, great patience,³ and one must learn patiently to collect oneself to comprehend "the one thing" which is eternal. To illustrate his meaning, SK takes the case of repentance, which is the resigning of oneself to God. Repentance is a daily concern, but at special times (such as the solemn occasion of the office of confession) it should be able to collect

1. Ibid., p. 43.

2. Ibid.

3. Recall the importance of this concept for religiousness A.

itself or prepare itself by an act of laying-off of manyness.

It is indeed like a changing of raiment to lay off manyness, in order rightly to center down upon one thing; to interrupt the busy course of activity, in order to put on the quiet of contemplation and be at one with oneself. And this being at one with oneself is the simple festival garment of the feast that is the condition of admittance.¹

The "manyness" of which SK speaks may be seen with a "dispersed" or divided mind, whereas the one eternal can be approached only with singleness of mind. SK does not only speak of a psychological phenomenon of singlemindedness, however, for singlemindedness has an objective reference. The pure in heart, and they alone, see God. They draw nigh to Him, and in drawing nigh² they maintain their purity (singlemindedness). The singleminded purity has objective significance. To will one thing is to will "the Good", and the Good is a single thing.³ The Good is one thing, and the route to it is definitely not through any kind of "doublemindedness".

SK discusses various "barriers" to the willing one thing which is necessary in order to attain the Good.⁴ One is "doubleminded"

1. Ibid., p. 47.

2. Ibid., p. 53. SK refers to James 4:8 : "Draw near to God and he will draw near to you. Cleanse your hands, you sinners, and ³purify your hearts, you men of double mind."

3. Ibid., p. 54. SK refers to the eternal as "the Good" throughout Purity; it is the one thing willed.

4. Ibid., pp. 53 ff.

when one wills the Good for the sake of reward or out of fear of punishment. It is also an act of doublemindedness when one wills the Good out of a self-centered wilfulness; that is when one wills that the Good itself be victorious, but victorious through oneself. This is the doublemindedness of pride--a kind of egocentric service to the Good; there is more to willing one thing than immanence or involvement with one's own ego. One who has the doublemindedness of pride is guilty of impatience and fails to understand the necessity of the nurturing process which requires time. One must be patient, for it is the nurturing process itself which counts, and it is out of mercy that the Good is slow.¹ It is out of love for the freedom of persons who participate in the Good by willing it that the Eternal does not force its victory upon anyone.

An impatient person "effervesces", according to SK, and he who effervesces loves the moment.² Such a person fears time, that in the course of time his doublemindedness might be revealed, and this indicates that for him eternity is merely an elusive psychological epiphenomenon. "For him eternity is the deceptive sensory illusion of the horizon; for him eternity is the bluish haze that limits time [Timelighedens]; for him eternity is the

1. Ibid., p. 101.

2. Ibid., p. 102.

dazzling sleight-of-hand trick executed by the moment."¹

Such a person has overcome the world but has lapsed into a "higher deception". This doublemindedness is not recognizable from the standpoint of immanence, from within the world, but it is recognizable at the "boundry² where time [Timelighed] and eternity touch upon each other." Here at this "boundry²" is where God recognizes the deception and where the Good is eternally victorious. This we have as a "blessed assurance" (a "security which passeth all understanding") within ourselves at each moment.³

SK's point here is to show the necessity of the eternal's involvement in time. An impatient person sees the Good as victorious, but he is unable to comprehend that the Good is victorious only in eternity. He cannot see that in time the Good and the Good-as-victorious are not synonymous, intentionally not synonymous. "The Good puts on the slowness of time as a poor garment, and in keeping with this change of dress one who serves it must be clothed in the insignificant figure of the unprofitable servant."⁴ The Good becomes victorious in time for the

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. It is interesting to note that from this one would have to conclude that religiousness A is essentially "doubleminded."

4. Ibid., p. 103.

sake of man who lives in temporal existence and who requires time to understand.

It is not difficult to recognize this as a Christian motif which clearly has Christ as its model (the "Key that explains all").¹ In simplest terms, the Christian does not relate himself to the eternal as would a religious pagan, but relates himself paradoxically to the eternal-in-time. The historical definiteness of the eternal, as Climacus suggested earlier,² allows a man to apprehend the eternal in his own temporal existence.

There is another aspect to the Christ model which is important for SK's thought here, namely the matter of his suffering. The notion of suffering, that one who wills one thing suffers for it, serves more than anything else to point out that the eternal is no longer an immanent category. The temporal order is in no way a "homogeneous transparent medium of the Eternal";³ if it were then "every eternal volition in a man, and every volition of the Eternal would straightway become perceptible in the temporal order"⁴ It would then be possible for everyone to measure a man's willing the eternal by his temporal accomplishments, much in the way that Job's friends would measure

1. Ibid., p. 135.

2. Postscript, p. 506. Cf. supra, pp. 252-253.

3. Purity, p. 135.

4. Ibid.

a man's accomplishments.

If matters stood like this between the temporal order [Timeligheden] and the Eternal, so that they answer each other as the echo answers to the sound, then that which is accomplished would be a trustworthy rendering of the eternal volition in a man. By what a man had accomplished, one could immediately see how much will toward the Eternal there was in him.¹

If such were the case, then it would never have come about in the temporal order that Christ (who certainly willed the eternal) would have accomplished so little and would have been crucified and repudiated by the temporal order. What is true of Christ in this respect is true also of the Apostles and so many other "witnesses of the Good".

The conclusion of this is simply that the temporal order cannot be the transparent medium of the eternal.² Indeed, in its "given reality" the temporal order is in conflict with the eternal. In terms of man's willing, this makes the determination to accomplish things in the world less plain.

The more active the Eternal is toward the witness, the stronger is the cleavage. The more the striver, instead of willing the Eternal, is linked with temporal existence [Timeligheden], the more he accomplishes in the sense of the temporal existence. So it is in many ways or in all possible ways in the temporal order [Timeligheden]. When a peculiar thinker, who just by his peculiarity is more tied up with the Eternal and less with time's moment [Timeligheden], addresses his speech to men, he is rarely understood or listened to.³

1. Ibid.

2. This of course is a slap at Hegel.

3. Purity, p. 136.

What happened to the God-man in the world was not an accident; the same would happen if he lived at another time. Eternally understood Christ accomplished all; temporally understood he accomplished nothing.¹

In any case, when one "collects oneself" in the willing of the one thing, one arrives at the boundry where time and eternity as distinct elements touch. Thus it is man's spirit which provides him with self-transcendence and which carries him above the world. This (as we learn from the discourse on the lilies and the birds)² is the meaning of the notion that God created man in His own image.³ The lilies and the birds remind us of God, but we resemble God.⁴ We resemble Him in that we are spirit; God is invisible and "to be spirit is man's invisible glory".⁵ This is what carries man above the temporal world, above the visible glory of the lilies and the birds. "So when the concerned person stands out in the field, surrounded by all the witnesses, when every blossom says to him, 'Remember God!'

1. Ibid., p. 138.

2. "What We Learn From the Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air" in Suffering, pp. 165-236.

3. Ibid., pp. 210-211.

4. Cf. the statements in the earlier Edifying Discourses about our likeness to God, supra p. 230.

5. Suffering, p. 211.

then the man answers, 'I shall certainly do that, little children, I shall worship Him; you poor things cannot do that.'¹ It is this spiritual ability to "cast one's self down in worship" which is man's world-transcending glory. "Man and God do not resemble each other directly, but conversly: only when God has infinitely become the eternal and omnipresent object of worship, and man always a worshipper do they resemble one another."²

The birds of course neither sow nor reap nor have a care for the necessities of life, but this is hardly a perfection. Perfection is to be aware, to be able to have a care for the necessities and dangers of life in order to overcome the fear that accompanies life, "in order to let faith and confidence drive out fear, so that one is in truth without a care for the necessities of life in the unconcern of faith."³ Such is faith's freedom from care; it is "the soaring", the lifting of ourselves on the "wings of faith", that lofty soaring of faith which flies high above the birds. But this freedom is precisely man's consciousness, and it is this which carries us above the moment.

I quote now a long passage of critical importance to this study:

We shall now consider this more carefully. Why does the bird have no worldly care for the necessities of life? Because it lives only in the moment, hence

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 212.

3. Ibid., pp. 213-214.

because there is no eternity for a bird. But is this indeed a perfection! On the contrary, how does the possibility of an anxiety about subsistence come about? From the fact that the temporal [Timelige] and the eternal touch one another in consciousness, or rather from the fact that the human has consciousness. In the possession of consciousness he is eternally far, far out beyond the moment; no bird flew so far away, and yet precisely thereby he becomes aware of the danger which the bird does not suspect: when eternity came into being for him, then the morrow also came into being. Through his consciousness he discovers a world which not even the most traveled bird knows: the future; and when this future through the consciousness is withdrawn in the moment, then a concern is discovered which the bird does not know; for however far it flew and from however far it returned, it never flew to the future and never returned from the future.

Since now the man has consciousness [Bevidsthed], he is the place where the temporal [Timelige] and the eternal constantly touch one another, where the eternal interests itself in the temporal. Therefore time can seem long to a man because he has the eternal in his consciousness, and with this he measures the moments; but time never seems long to the bird. Therefore the man has a dangerous enemy which the bird does not know: time.¹

Time is dangerous because one of the numerous ways the temporal and the eternal can touch one another in consciousness is in the care for the necessities of life. This seems far from the eternal, and one is tempted to "fill out the time" with some glorious achievement, whereas what is called for is patience in humble labor. One must make the temporal and the eternal constantly touch one another in consciousness; for this, impatience is no help.

1. Ibid., pp. 214-215. My italics.

A man's free consciousness is the point of departure for everything transcendently religious in SK's thought. Consciousness and freedom are intimately connected. Man's ability to reflect or ponder involves an element of choice. In Danish "to ponder" (at overveie) is derived from "to weigh" (at veie) and, according to SK, it indicates something more than the ability to state the relationship between two magnitudes or to be able to point out the relationship impartially.¹ It is also to choose; a man in reflecting does more than weigh as scales do, he rises above the weighing and chooses. Pondering, therefore, is essential to man's spiritual nature. Man qua man is an insufficient notion for spirituality; for this, man needs a self or consciousness. Furthermore, being a spirit involves more than being a synthesis.

For in order to weigh there must be two magnitudes; hence the reflective man, merely in order to be able to weigh, must be so made up that he has two magnitudes. This is also the case; he is compounded of the temporal [Timelighed] and the eternal. Temporal existence [Time-ligheden] and eternity are in the spiritual sense the magnitudes which are to be weighed. But in order to reflect, the man again must himself be or have a third with respect to the two magnitudes. This is the choice: he weighs, he reflects, he chooses.²

The notion that spirit or self is more than a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal is given more extensive treatment

1. Ibid., pp. 118-119.

2. Ibid., p. 119. My italics.

in Sickness Unto Death. This work approaches the problem negatively by investigating a sickness (despair) which befalls the spirit through its wrong use of freedom. That is, beginning with the premise that the self is sick, the Christian Anti-Climacus sets out to show how the self is sick; of course he first needs to know what the self is.

He opens with an obscure definition which (probably for that reason) has attracted a wealth of scholarly attention:

Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation [which accounts for it] that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but [consists in the fact] that the relation relates itself to its own self. Man is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal [Timelike] and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short it is a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two factors. So regarded, man is not yet a self.¹

2

Scholarly opinion as to the meaning of this varies, a fact which, in the present writer's view seems only to add to the obscurity.³ The anthropology of this definition is familiar

1. Sickness, p. 146.

2. E.g. Hermann Diem in his Kierkegaard (trans. by David Green, Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1966) believes this definition will "delight any dialectician by its concise clarity" (even though Diem himself feels the need to "expand" it somewhat), but Paul Dietrichson ("Kierkegaard's Concept of the Self", op. cit.) finds it unmanageably obscure and seeks other works to make it clear.

3. I refer to this particular opening passage in Sickness which seems to me simply an example (of which there are many) of SK being carried away by his own powers of dialectic and of literary grandiloquence. Of course this is only an opinion and of little consequence. What is of consequence is that SK's notion of the self is not altogether mysterious or obscure as I hope to show.

enough: By nature a man is somehow a synthesis of body and soul; through his relationship with a transcendent eternal, however, a man acquires a third-order factor which is "spirit";
 the nature of this spirit is ¹freedom which involves the necessity of choice.

What is it then to be a self? It is duplication. Hence in this case the phrase, 'truly draw to oneself', [said by Christ in John 12:32] has a duplex meaning. The magnet draws iron to itself, but iron is not a self: hence in this case 'draw to itself' indicates a single and simple act. But a self is a duplication, it is freedom: hence in this case 'drawing truly to oneself' means to present a choice.²

Christ, in drawing all things to Himself, naturally takes into consideration the nature of that which is being drawn. Now man is a rather fluid, free, relational thing and requires

1. Sickness, p. 162. Paul Dietrichson (op. cit.) has correctly interpreted the "self" as the relational category of freedom in the sense of liberation from, but in suggesting that the self is not the synthesis of the temporal and the eternal conscious of itself (p. 9), he has failed to do justice to the full depth of SK's conception of consciousness. Consciousness means more than awareness; it incorporates within itself the very notion of "freedom from" that Dietrichson wants for the definition of self. The self may not be the synthesis aware of itself, but Dietrichson has completely ignored the passages in Suffering (pp. 118-119), as well as those in Training (159-160) which round out the notion of consciousness in connection with freedom and self. Instead, he elucidates the "definition" in Sickness by reference to the "Equilibrium" of Either/Or, II. See supra, pp. 112 f. for a discussion of Judge Wilhelm's conception of the self as freedom (Cf. E/O, II, pp. 218 ff.).

2. Training, p. 159.

peculiar handling.

Hence Christ would first and foremost help everyman to become himself, would require of him first and foremost that by entering into himself he should become himself, so as then to draw him unto Himself. He would draw man unto Himself, and in order to draw him truly to Himself, He would draw him only as a free being, and so through a choice.¹

So free choice is all important, but we must remember that the thought here amounts to more than a radical subjectivity which might be described in immanent categories. No, man only² becomes himself by freely relating to God who is transcendent. This is the point of religiousness B, and SK wants to describe something more than the psychological feeling of a pseudo-eternity, a "feeling" of timelessness. Rather he shows that such inward phenomena as despair (and despair certainly does not derive from external consequences) are precise disclosures that the ontologically real eternal really breaks into time. Without the eternal man could not despair, for without the eternal man would be purely temporal and would have nothing to bear or protest the flux of time which carries away all personal identity.³ Despair intimates the knowledge that one is related

1. Training, p. 160.

2. Cf. Sickness, pp. 173-174.

3. Ibid., pp. 153-154.

to the true eternal and calls out for a rendering of the relationship.¹

In Augustinian fashion, then, SK describes a natural man who in his struggle to become a true self, finds himself to be dependent upon a transcendent God. Only by acknowledging this relationship can he properly relate himself to himself. When this happens, the eternal lifts a man above the successiveness of time, which would carry away a self in each perishing instant. Without freely relating himself to God a man would never achieve true selfhood but would only reflect a quasi-permanence created by the perpetual vanishing of time. Thus, only a Christian² can become reflective spirit, for the eternal truly enters into his experience of time and transforms his quasi-permanence into a genuine present. In the genuine present a man is no longer "natural", no longer fears death, no longer clings to momentary pleasures and fleeting instants; he is a Christian who is fully conscious that in the vanishing instants of temporal existence he gains no real selfhood.

At this point there are a number of implications of the foregoing which need to be collated and explicitly stated.

1. Hence the description of despair as sin, which indicates the wrong use of freedom in the will to absolutize the relative and to ignore the absolute. Cf. Sickness, pp. 220, 225-227.

2. Anti-Climacus is idealistically exclusive in his Christianity.

Let us review them categorically: A man in his likeness to God¹ is spirit. A man becomes spirit when he becomes free consciousness² (that is, when he weighs, reflects and chooses).

As free consciousness man is the place where the temporal and the eternal touch one another.³ But earlier Vigilius Haufniensis said that the place where the temporal and the eternal touch one another is temporality.⁴ Combining these last two premises, it follows that free consciousness is temporality. Now, this is a fine and valid categorical syllogism, but does it mean anything? Naturally this writer believes it does mean something and that its meaning is significant. It means that for SK a man's conscious being is defined as temporality and that there is no way to speak of a man who has consciousness apart from the categories of temporality. Note well, however, that a cautionary qualification must be appended: Consciousness is not something natural to homo sapiens; it is spirit and is gained and sustained only by the free decisions of faith.

Yet two major questions remain, both of which concern the conception of consciousness now under discussion and its relation

1. Supra, pp. 270-271.

2. Supra, p. 273.

3. Supra, pp. 271-272.

4. Supra, p. 198.

to the "external point of reference" discussed earlier. Let me pose these questions separately:

1. As earlier it was said that in religiousness B the individual's relation to the eternal was made dependent upon an "external condition", or to "something outside himself",¹ how can it now be said that consciousness is itself the point of departure for an eternal happiness?

2. If it is granted that consciousness is "the key to all"² what justification is there for associating it exclusively with Christianity? This would be to deny consciousness to Socrates, a rather absurd consequence. What follows is intended to answer both questions.

We need to be mindful of the fact that in ^{this} context SK is speaking of a religious consciousness, or more specifically of a transcendent, paradoxical Christian consciousness. It is true that the non-Christian philosopher, Johannes Climacus, stresses the "externality" of the eternal and does not dwell upon the matter of the consciousness of a Christian. But at least part of the reason for this is that he is not a Christian and cannot report on the matter from within. We must recall that in religiousness B eternity is not an element of consciousness in the sense of an epiphenomenon, as a "sensory illusion", as a

1. Supra, p. 252. Cf. Postscript, pp. 497 ff.

2. Supra, p. 273.

"bluish haze" that limits time, or as a "sleight-of-hand trick" executed by the moment.¹ Rather it is there in consciousness as an ontologically real, objective, particular eternal-in-time. We need to explain this more fully from within Christianity, but first let us recount what Climacus says on this matter.

In the Postscript "paradoxical" religiousness depends on a definite external condition.² This condition, we learned from the whole of the Fragments, is an eternal condition which a man receives in what Climacus terms his eternal consciousness from the Teacher himself; the God-in-time is the historical point of departure for man's eternal consciousness. The form of the God-in-time in time is the eternal consciousness. From the beginning Climacus indicates that he refers not to some "Greek" consciousness which always has the eternal immanent within itself (which the doctrine of recollection can prove only by a backward reference to the soul's preexistence).³ Contrariwise, the Eternal⁴ is introduced into the transcendent consciousness from without⁵ (that is what makes the transcendent

1. Supra, p. 267.

2. Supra, pp. 253-254.

3. Fragments, pp. 11-12.

4. I capitalize "eternal" here in order to follow the translation consistently.

5. Fragments, pp. 11-12.

consciousness transcendent). As Climacus expresses it, Greek or Socratic consciousness is in error because the Teacher serves only as a reminder; it is merely an occasion for remembering because the learner in his own person is the real condition for understanding the eternal--he needs only to recall it. ¹ Now if the learner is to acquire the eternal, the Teacher must not only bring it to him but must also give him the condition necessary for him to apprehend it. ² The moment of learning thus takes on decisive significance; it is a moment of transformation or re-birth in which the individual who, being in a state of deprivation without the eternal, now receives the eternal. ³ In short, God moves or resolves Himself not out of need but out of love to inform man's consciousness in the moment.

For love finds its satisfaction within and not without. His resolve, which stands in no reciprocal relation to the occasion, must be from eternity, though when realized in time it constitutes precisely the Moment; for when the occasion and the occasioned correspond, and are as commensurable as the answer of the desert with the cry that evokes it, the Moment does not appear, but is lost in the eternity of Recollection. The Moment makes its appearance when an eternal resolve comes into relation with an incommensurable occasion. Unless this is realized we shall be thrown back on Socrates, and shall then have neither the God as Teacher, nor an Eternal Purpose, nor the Moment. ⁴

1. Ibid., p. 17.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 18, 26, passim.

4. Ibid., p. 30.

The eternal resolve is realized in time (the Moment) in man's now transcendently religious consciousness which is the Moment constantly renewed by acts of faith. A man receives the eternal condition in the Moment and is aware that he has so received it. Man does not merely come to himself in the consciousness that he has had the eternal from eternity; he receives¹ the eternal in the Moment and from the Teacher Himself. But Climacus speaks from without, and we need to understand this Divine informing of consciousness from within the specifically Christian point of view.

In the Works of Love SK uses the concept of "reduplication" to help us understand something of the operation and reality of the eternal in a man.

The temporal [Timelike] has three times and therefore essentially never is completely nor is completely in any one of the periods; the eternal is. A temporal [timelike] object can have a multiplicity of varied characteristics; in a certain sense it can be said to have them simultaneously, insofar as in these definite characteristics it is that which it is. But reduplication in itself never has a temporal object; as the temporal [Timelike] disappears in time, so also it exists only in its characteristics. If, on the other hand, the eternal is in a man, the eternal reduplicates itself in him in such a way that every moment it is in him it is in him in a double mode: in an outward direction and in an inward direction back into itself, but in such a way that it is one and the same, for otherwise it is

1. Ibid., p. 79.

not reduplication. The eternal is not merely by virtue of its characteristics but in itself is in its characteristics; it does not merely have characteristics but exists in itself in having the characteristics.¹

The realization of the eternal "in a man" is a genuine "reduplication", not simply an immanent epiphenomenon. It is a manifestation of Climacus' insistence on the presence of the Teacher in the teaching. The same is expressed from within Christianity by Climacus' nominal opposite, Anti-Climacus.

Whenever it is the case that the teacher is essentially involved in the teaching, there is a reduplication. Reduplication consists in the fact that the teacher is a part of it; but wherever there is reduplication, the communication is far from being the direct paragraph-or professor-communication; being reduplicated in the teacher by the fact that he 'exists' in what he teaches, it is in manifold ways a discriminating art.²

It is important to recognize that the realization of the eternal in man is not conceived to be an abstraction by SK or by Anti-Climacus. Christ, the Teacher, is a person. The God-man is not a speculative unity of God and man, sub specie aeterni, alleged to be manifest in "the nullipresent medium of pure being".³ On the contrary, "the God-man is the unity of

1. Works of Love, p. 261.

2. Training, p. 123. In fact it is because the teacher (who is inseparable from and more essential than the teaching) is also a paradox, that all direct communication is impossible.

3. Ibid.

God and an individual man in an actual historical situation."¹
 That the God-man is himself present in the "teaching" which a man acquires in the Moment amounts to a second coming of Christ. In fact, "reduplication" is "the possibility of a second coming into existence within the first coming into existence".² Indeed, insofar as the Moment is constantly renewed, the God-man is constantly present in temporality or in free consciousness, which is the same. Further, we have seen earlier that this "present" is the only true "present", the only real meaning the present can have.³

Man's present, however, is not in any way determined. The present moment is characterized by freedom and decisiveness and is brought into being by choice. In Works of Love SK best elucidates these themes by suggesting that the present moment or "now" is itself forward or future oriented. This orientation is the mode of decision, by which he means that it leads to the eternal by decision and not backwards by recollection.⁴

1. Ibid., my italics.

2. Fragments, p1 94.

3. Supra, p. 198.

4. Cf. Postscript, p. 533; Dread, pp. 79-80. Again the themes here are carried over from the Edifying Discourses as well.

SK makes a subtle distinction not only between the temporal and the eternal, but also between a temporal understanding and an eternal understanding of the same phenomenon. For example, he considers the notion of "hope". "Hoping is composed of the eternal and the temporal [Timelige]; from this it arises that the expression for the task of hope in the form of the eternal is to hope all things and in the form of the temporal [Timeligheden] to hope always."¹ Hoping is an activity or movement of the consciousness which is related to the future, or to what SK calls possibility as opposed to actuality. Thus, hoping is always a "duality" in that possibility includes advancing or retrogressing, "of rising up or of going under of the good or of the evil."² So it is that the future, or possibility, is not to be identified as the eternal.

The eternal is, but when the eternal touches time [Timelige] or is in time, they do not meet each other in the present, for then the present would itself be the eternal. The present, the moment, is so quickly past, that it really is not present; it is only the boundary and is therefore transitional; whereas the past is what was present. Consequently if the eternal is in the temporal it is in the future (for the present can not get hold of it, and the past is indeed past) or in possibility. Eternally the eternal is the eternal; in time the eternal is possibility, the future.³

1. Works of Love, p. 233.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp. 233-234. Cf. the discussion of the Good-as-victorious and the Good becoming victorious in time, Purity, pp. 102-103; supra, p. 267.

"Future" thus indicates the eternal in the temporal--the mode of possibility. This is why SK often speaks of Christianity as the religion of the future. Christianity is present in futuro.¹

There is a certain "duality" about possibility, for it may indicate the eternal as in "eternal life" or it may indicate tomorrow. The eternal relates itself equally to its duality, says SK, and likewise a man to whom the possibility is relevant relates himself equally to the duality of the possibility.² In doing so a man expects and, since it is a duality of possibility to which he relates himself in expectation, the importance of choice becomes evident. "To expect contains in it the same duality which possibility has, and to expect is to relate to the possibility simply and purely as such. Thereupon the relationship divides inasmuch as the expecting person makes a choice."³

The options of this choice are clearly set out. To relate oneself expectantly to the possibility of good is to hope, whereas to relate oneself expectantly to the possibility of evil is

1. VIII A, 305. Trans. and ed. by Howard and Edna Hong in Soren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, Vol. II, 1970), entry 1639, pp. 233-234.

2. Works of Love, p. 234. We have seen earlier in religiousness A some of the immanent aspects of one side of the duality. Even this immanent experience of possibility was seen to be edifying, and in the passage before this SK subtly clarifies why this is so.

3. Ibid.

to fear.¹ Naturally hoping and fearing are equally attitudes of expectation, but according to SK hoping differs from fearing in that it expects the possibility of the good, and therefore is not mere temporal expectancy. It is rather an eternal hope.² That is, the possibility of the Good is the eternal, so that as soon as the choice is made, the possibility is altered. "It is only in the moment of contact that the duality of possibility is equivocal. Through the decision to choose hope, one thereby chooses infinitely more than is apparent, for it is an eternal decision."³

In this passage we are able to see that Climacus has interpreted well the difference between religiousness A and B. In regard to the notion of "expectancy" we see that choice is what differentiates the two types of religiosity. Also it is now certain that the eternal which is chosen and efficacious is transcendentally real and ontologically autonomous apart from man's consciousness, which it indwells as God indwells time.

It is thus a "fact" that one who hopes can never be deceived, "for to hope is to expect the possibility of the good, but the

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid. Elsewhere SK expressed this same thought in ascribing to the eternal a certain "overweight" in the weighing of the decision. Suffering, p. 120. Also cf. supra, pp. 273 ff.

3. Works of Love, p. 234. Cf. Purity where the movement of willing one thing corresponds to willing the good.

possibility of the good is the eternal."¹ It is for this reason that SK urges that "the whole of man's life shall be the time of hope!"² Expectancy becomes a matter of focusing on one thing so as to take oneself out of the manifold possibilities of temporal existence and to enter into a life oriented toward the one true eternal.

One who fails to see that hope relates itself to the one true eternal also fails to see the real significance of time as necessary for the nurturing process established by the eternal. Such a person will speak only of experience and will understand time by dividing his life into specific sections and ages, calling the first period that of hope or possibility. A life orientation which speaks of hope on the basis of experience merely "sloughs off" the real eternal.

Just as in a drama, by shortening the time and condensing the events one gets to view the content of many years in the passage of a couple of hours, likewise one speaks theatrically to arrange matters within temporality[Timeligheden].³ One rejects God's plan of existence--that time[Timeligheden] is purely and simply development, prior complication, and eternity the solution. One arranges the whole of things within temporality[Timeligheden]: one uses a score of years for development, ten years for complications, then tightens the knot for a few years, and thereupon

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 235. Earlier he said the same of expectation.

3. Note that Hong translates Timeligheden as "temporality" here but he refers to what (following Lowrie) we have been calling "temporal existence".

follows the untying or solution. Without a doubt, death certainly is an untying or solution and then it is past, one is buried--yet not before the dissolution of putrefaction has begun. In truth, everyone who does not understand that the whole of life shall be a time of hope is in despair, no matter, absolutely no matter whether he is conscious of it or not, whether he thinks himself fortunate in his presumed well-being or whether he wears himself out in tedium and trouble. Everyone who dismisses the possibility that his existence could be forfeited in the next moment--unless he hopes for the possibility of the good and therefore does not dismiss this possibility--everyone who lives without possibility is in despair; he breaks with the eternal; he arbitrarily closes off possibility and without the assent of eternity makes an end where the end is not, instead of doing as one who takes dictation and continually keeps his pencil ready for the next words so that he does not presume to put down a period meaninglessly before the meaning is complete or rebelliously to throw the pencil away.¹

The idea here is the same as that which we encountered
²
 earlier, namely the process of nurturing which is necessary for a creature of temporal existence. If the whole task is laid out in front of a child all at once, the child despairs and abandons hope, so it must be laid out a bit at a time. Likewise man, the "child of time" with weak powers and poor capacities, has his "greatest task--the eternal" meted out in similar fashion.
³

1. Works of Love, p. 236.

2. Supra, p. 264.

3. Works of Love, pp. 236-237.

But it is a wonderful thing that the eternal, the greatest power, can make itself so small, that it is divisible in this way and yet eternally one, that clothing itself in the forms of the future, the possible, with the aid of hope it educates the child of time [Timelighedens] (man), teaches him to hope (for to hope is itself instruction, is the relationship to the eternal), if he does not arbitrarily choose austere to be disheartened by fear or cheekily hopes to despair--that is, withdraw himself from the education of the eternal.¹

The eternal in the guise of possibility oversees a man's education by constantly laying out a small piece of itself at a time. In possibility, therefore, the eternal is "near enough to be at hand and yet far enough away to keep man advancing toward the eternal in forward movement In this way the eternal lures and draws a person in the possible, from cradle to grave,² if he just chooses to hope."

Christian religiousness clearly proceeds slowly through the temporal with the aid of the transcendent eternal which utilizes the temporal to nurture man at his own speed, in his own freedom. This theme which we have found to be basic to SK's conception of Christinity serves, in the present writer's view, to separate SK from mysticism. This is especially noteworthy in precisely the context we have been discussing (of keeping the eternal near), for it is here that SK seems to be close to

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., p. 237. Cf. Christian Discourses, p. 140.

a mystic renunciation of the world, "this thing of giving up the temporal [Timelige] to grasp the eternal."¹

Once again we must be mindful of the subtleties of SK's thought on this point. For example, in Part II of Christian Discourses in "The Joy of It--That What Thou Dost Lose Temporally Thou Dost Gain Eternally"² SK distinguishes between "lost" and "perdition".³ Only the temporal, he says, can be lost temporally. Temporal existence can only claim or take away that which is temporal, and should this happen it would be "loss". On the other hand, if in temporal existence one lost the eternal, this would not be "loss" but "perdition".⁴ It follows that this perdition is sin, for sin is "in time to lose eternity."⁵ Strictly speaking, a man can only lose the temporal. Since he has the eternal in him, if the eternal were lost, this would not be "to lose" but "to be lost".⁶ Let us consider this in light of the concept of repetition.

1. Christian Discourses, p. 160.

2. Ibid., pp. 139 ff.

3. In Danish it is Tab (loss) and Fortabelse (perdition).

4. Christian Discourses, p. 141.

5. Ibid.

6. The converse is also true: If man did not have an eternal aspect he could not be lost.

The point of this particular chapter in Christian Discourses is, as the title suggests, that what one loses temporally, one gains eternally. What SK means here is not some temporal restoration of temporal possessions, but an eternal repetition which comes only after one wills to give up the whole of the temporal. It will simply not do to wish to gain in eternity the temporal just as it was, for this wish itself is an indication that one still clings to the temporal.

But perhaps thou wouldest say, 'Will eternity give back to me the thing lost just as it was when my soul clung to it?' Oh, no, certainly not, for then the discourse would not be, as it is, about gain-- thou dost get it again eternally. However, there is perhaps a little cunning hidden in this question of thine. For in losing the object, it was in fact taken from thee, it was no act of thine; and from this it cannot be deduced that thou hast thoroughly willed to let it go. Perhaps (oh, be on thy guard!) thou art not far from willing to have eternity as a means of getting again in eternity that temporal possession just as it was in temporal existence, thine eyes' delight and thy heart's desire¹----this also is perdition.²

This is a clarification of sorts of the young lover's repetition in Constantine's Repetition. SK seems to have resolved the question of temporal restoration more to his satisfaction here than in the earlier work. Yet the description of Abraham's

1. As Lowrie points out in a note, this is a phrase SK often used with reference to Regina, his lost love. This passage has the ring of self-admonition, and it is not unlikely that SK felt himself guilty at one time of this "perdition". Cf. Repetition.

2. Christian Discourses, p. 143.

act of faith in Fear and Trembling is not essentially in disagreement with the remarks in the passage before us now. Abraham, we may recall, was finally willing to give up the temporal, Issac was restored under new conditions, and the repetition was a gain.¹ What one loses temporally one does not get back in a temporal sense, for that is impossible, but one gets it back in the sense of eternity. in a "transfigured" way. "Thou lovest thus an earthly friend--thou gainest a transfigured friend. For eternity does not give back to ^{thee} the lost temporal object in the temporal sense; no precisely this is the gain of eternity, which gives back the lost object in the sense of eternity"²

The key to understanding the message of this discourse is to remember that a man is a synthesis of the temporal and of the eternal; so when he loses something temporally it only applies to one aspect of himself, and he retains the surplus of the eternal which cannot be lost temporally--that is impossible. The only real danger occurs when a man who suffers a temporal loss himself assigns too great a value to the loss and thereby commits "an act of treason" against himself.

The sufferer himself is in fact compounded of the temporal [Timelige] and the eternal. So when temporal existence [Timeligheden] inflicts upon him the greatest

1. Ibid., p. 144.

2. Ibid., p. 145.

loss it is able to inflict, the question is whether, by an act of treason against himself and against eternity, he will bestow upon the loss of the temporal [Timelighedens] the power to become something other than it is, a temporal loss, whether he wills to lose the eternal; or whether true to himself and to the eternal, he does not permit the loss of the temporal to become something other than it is, a temporal loss. If he does this, then the eternal in him has conquered. To let go of the temporal in such a way that it is lost temporally, to lose only temporarily the lost temporal possession, is a precise indication of the presence of the eternal in the loser,¹ is the token that the eternal in him has conquered.

2

Such is the strife waged to save one soul, and one must decide whether to lose the eternal temporally (and thus to be lost) or to lose the temporal temporally (and by that choice to gain the eternal).

Throughout the writings of religiousness B in general and in the Christian Discourses in particular, the suffering faithful are urged to rejoice because their sufferings are only of the moment, whereas their triumph will be eternal. Suffering and affliction may indeed be a source of hope³ in that it seems that the poorer one becomes, the richer are the blessings. That this has always been the case in Christian history can be seen by considering some paragons of Christianity such as Christ himself, St. Paul, and St. Francis. But the mood of transcendent

1. Ibid., p. 146.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 161.

religiousness is not one of consolation in "the sweet by and by". The message relates to the notion of the synthesis, which is man, and his proper attitude toward the elements of that synthesis. Temporal existence is given its proper honor only by first transferring one's dedication from the worldly to the eternal; worldly joy and suffering can thereby be put into proper perspective. The task of every true believer is to sustain or recover or "repeat" the element of the eternal in his soul, which he is able to do because the eternal itself enters into time in the Moment and makes itself available already in temporal existence.

With Christ as his model, the true believer takes up his task of keeping the eternal in his life. As Christ made the eternal true by doing it and not by talking about it,¹ so the true believer's task is not to study the eternal but to keep the eternal in his life. Now in order to carry out his task the believer must have two things: (1) inner strength which will allow him to perform the "trick" of letting go of the temporal, and (2) help. A man must derive his strength from the eternal, SK repeatedly² warns us, lest he become impatient and end in despair. In this strength he takes up the task, but in order to achieve the

1. Ibid., p. 104.

2. Ibid., p. 105. Cf. Works of Love and Sickness.

goal of eternity or, as SK identifies it, the Kingdom of God, one must first "turn himself about"; he must convert.¹ Eternity is the converse of the temporal existence (Timeligheden), and so it is necessary for a man oriented toward the temporal to turn about and face the goal. In striving for the goal, good fortune and the triumphs of worldly existence merely delay a man; so if he is to first seek the Kingdom of God (and not first seek the temporal), he must freely renounce every temporal goal.² The point is that a man must fix his mind upon the goal of eternity. Now, "this thing of giving up the temporal to grasp the eternal"³ is difficult. "Only by the aid of the eternal is a man able to let go of the lost temporal possession in such a way that he merely loses it temporally. If the eternal does not lend its aid, he loses much more than the temporal."⁴

From our present vantage point we can now see that essentially what we have been dealing with in religiousness B is a combination of human action in the Moment of faith and the reception from God of the "eternal condition" which is given to man in

1. Ibid., p. 156.

2. Ibid., p. 157.

3. Ibid., p. 160.

4. Ibid., p. 147.

time.¹ The "how" of faith becomes grounded in the eternal Now of God's "eternal resolve"² in the occasion of the Moment. We must now inquire as to the mechanics of this extraordinary event. In order to do this we must investigate SK's notion of contemporaneity which is expressed in the zenith of the Christian writings from the very last part of the authorship.³ These writings indicate the importance of Climacus' idea that the individual's relation to the eternal is made dependent on "something outside" himself; they do this by adding that the "something outside" is actually instanced in the historical and given an historical starting point. This latter makes the external condition "offensive."

The notion of contemporaneity really contains the whole message of religiousness B, at least in regard to our topic of

1. This of course received special emphasis from Johannes Climacus in Fragments (79 ff.) and Postscript (pp. 497 ff.). See supra, p. 252 ff.

2. Fragments, p. 30.

3. I refer to those works originally published between SK's "metamorphosis" of Holy Week, 1848 on one side and the beginning of a three-year hiatus in which nothing was published on the other. The pamphlet attack upon the established church which was issued during the last weeks of SK's life does not properly belong to his "authorship" and will not be considered here. Specifically I refer to Training in Christianity and The Sickness Unto Death, both ascribed to the pseudonym, Anti-Climacus and so representing SK's thought in the very last phase of the authorship. Both Training and Sickness endeavor to introduce Christianity into Christendom, and so actually stand together. In fact, as Lowrie mentions in his introduction to Training (p. xxiii), SK at one time proposed to publish them jointly under the subtitle, "A Poetical Endeavor--Without Authority".

temporality. It is, after all, the transcending of time in the Moment of faith, as epitomized by Abraham on Mt. Moriah, which religiousness B is meant to inform from within.

Earlier we noted that it was essential for the Christian to become like the eternal,¹ and now SK proposes to clarify the mechanics of this rather sublime feat by the notion of becoming contemporary with Christ. In Training, Anti-Climacus does not see the Christ-event as a bygone happening which has passed into history. Believers, he says, are contemporary with Christ, and indeed this contemporaneousness is the condition of faith; or, more closely defined, it is faith.²

This is expressed in Training where Anti-Climacus reminds us that when one is in danger, one calls for help; and when one calls for help, one hears the call of one who has help to give: "Come hither to me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, I will give you rest."³ Now, according to Anti-Climacus, this invitation makes sense only if there is likeness between the inviter and the invitee. "If a man will invite the sufferer to come to him, he must either alter his condition in likeness to the sufferer's or the sufferer's in likeness to his own. Otherwise the difference will be all the

1. Supra, pp. 270-271.

2. Training, p. 9.

3. This is the constant refrain in Training.

more glaring by reason of the contrast."¹ This contrast is surmounted by Christ in the role of Savior--His life (and not just His words or teachings) shows this to be so. He is what He says: He is the Word. Now, this very tidy bit of theology would be quite agreeable were it not for the fact that the Inviter insists upon being the definite historical person He was in the first century. This is a stumbling block for any potential be-² liever because it is quite frankly offensive. In that an individual man declared himself to be God, a claim which is at variance with human reason.³ Because such a claim is at variance with human reason, it makes no sense to try to prove this claim, for none of this is a matter of historical proof at all; it is a matter of faith. Christ, the Inviter, comes to the believer in humility and suffering as one spat upon, and He can never be received unless one unites with Him in humility. As Anti-Climacus expresses it, one must become contemporary with Christ in His humility,⁴ and Anti-Climacus means this literally.⁵ To make themselves literally one with "the most miserable" is

1. Training, p. 13.

2. Ibid., pp. 26 ff. Cf. Fragments, pp. 61 ff.; Postscript, pp. 323 ff.

3. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

4. Training, p. 40.

5. Ibid., p. 63.

a heavy burden, but Anti-Climacus is unrelenting. Christ came¹ into the world as the absolute, not as consolation. Thus the Christian's task is to be "transformed into likeness with God."

Transformation is important here. In light of the transcendent contrast between God and man emphasized by religiousness B, any immanent assimilation of the two is rejected outright. "Likeness" cannot be achieved without transformation. But ~~this~~² can only happen if one becomes contemporaneous with God-in-time. Transformation into likeness with God occurs when a man suffers the offense and paradox of Christ in his own person.

For in relation to the absolute there is only one tense: the present. For him who is not contemporary with the absolute--for him it has no existence. And as Christ is the absolute, it is easy to see that with respect to Him there is only one situation: that of

1. Anti-Climacus is particularly hostile to any immanent, pietistic or Schleiermachian conceptions of Christianity. He lashes into the "snivelling pastors" who attempt to make it "so gentle a thing" in the heart of man. All of this is falsehood and misrepresentation, he insists, for Christianity is the absolute. (Training, p. 66).

2. There is a striking difference here between the Platonic participation which involves exercise in becoming "in affinity with". For the Christian the participation has an historical aspect of becoming "contemporary with". Again, considering the "endless, yawning difference between God and man" (Ibid., p. 67), the necessity of transformation (i.e. contemporaneity) is obvious.

contemporaneousness. The five, the seven, the fifteen, the eighteen hundred years are neither here nor there; they do not change Him, neither do they in any wise reveal who He was, for who He is is revealed only to faith.¹

In the movement of faith one completely transcends the modes of time. In the moment of faith the "past" becomes "present"; the present embraces the eternal which, in the guise of possibility, is the future. The new "present" of contemporaneousness is the future in terms of decision. Thus the individual is able to transcend the modes of time in part because of his capacity for collecting himself and withdrawing from "manyness", but mainly because the absolute to which he relates is not merely an historical person. Since after all Christ is the Paradox, He is an extremely unhistorical person.² That is, He does not have His reality in a merely historical sense. Indeed, the past (that which "really" occurred) is not the real because it lacks the determinant of truth-as-inwardness for which Johannes Climacus had so vigilently campaigned. The historical past lacks the determinant of all religiousness, adds Anti-Climacus, it lacks the for thee.

The past is not reality--for me; only the contemporary is reality for me. What thou dost live contemporaneous with is reality--for thee. And thus every man can be

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

contemporary only with the age in which he lives-- and then with one thing more; with Christ's life on earth; for Christ's life on earth, sacred history, stands for itself alone outside history.¹

Anti-Climacus does not seem to go as far as do some existential historians² in suggesting that contemporaneity is possible and even desirable for all past events, for the Christ-event is unique (Christ is a most unhistorical person) and does not belong to the temporal alone.³ It is the absolute and has nothing to do with any of the relativities of worldly life. The relative indicates a period within the temporal, and a man oriented toward the relative seeks only the rewards of his earthly labors. A man oriented toward the absolute seeks only the eternal and thereby transcends all of time.

But this thing of eternity is not quite sure enough for the sensuous, the natural man, not even for the ablest, and hence the absolute is an offence to him. The believer looks upon the whole of life as the natural man does upon some few years of it. The natural

1. Ibid., p. 68.

2. I have in mind here Wilhelm Dilthey and Rudolf Bultmann (especially the latter) whose discussions of hermeneutics in general suggest that some preliminary relationship must exist between interpreter and text if what is apprehended is not to be completely alien and incomprehensible. E.g. see Bultmann's Essays: Philosophical and Theological, trans. by James C. G. Greig (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 72, and his History and Eschatology: The Presence of Eternity (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp. 110 ff.

3. Cf. Training, p. 26.

man puts up with these few years--with a view to reaping the reward [in time]. The believer thus disposes of the whole of life in time.¹

The Christian believer is called upon, therefore, to step over the whole of life in time, to make "the greatest possible sacrifice, to dedicate his whole life as a sacrifice" in becoming a contemporary of Christ. He is able to do this in faith, when he collects himself away from manyness, because he receives the "condition" for doing so in his eternal consciousness. The reality of time transcending contemporaneity stems from the actual presence of Christ in the man who makes the movement of faith. The God-man is the unity of God and an individual man in an actual historical situation.² Through the God-man the eternal is "reduplicated" in the believer's free consciousness, and such a man lives freely as a contemporary of Christ in the everlasting presence of the Kingdom of God.

What is joy? or what is it to be joyful? It is to be present to oneself; but to be truly present to oneself is this thing of 'today', that is, this thing of being today, of truly being today. And in the same degree that it is more true that thou art today, in the same degree that thou art quite present to thyself in being today, in that very same degree is the baleful tomorrow non-existent for thee. Joy is the present tense, with the whole emphasis upon the present. Therefore it is that God is blessed, who eternally says, Today. 3

1. Ibid., p. 121.

2. Ibid., p. 123.

3. Christian Discourses, pp. 349-350 (from "The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air").

Summary

Considering religiousness A and B together we must conclude (or so the present writer thinks) that the two are intimately related. The edification in A finally results in B. This writer believes that the relationship can best be described by utilizing one of SK's own terms: metamorphosis. Religiousness A is metamorphosed into religiousness B. Between the writing of the Edifying Discourses and the specifically Christian works, SK claims to have undergone a personal "metamorphosis",¹ The effect of this experience in regard to the two types of religiosity is somewhat analogous to the following example: A mathematician who has been seeking industriously and laboriously for the solution to an important problem finally (after several weeks) gives up in exhaustion. Then one evening when he is preoccupied with something else--perhaps while he is enjoying a leisurely bath--the solution suddenly comes to him as if it were a revelation from above. Though the "revelation" may seem not to be directly related to his own exhaustive labors, it is certainly correlated to his familiarity with the field of mathematics and his long work on the particular problem as well. The same solution would

1. Supra, p. 256.

be incomprehensible to a poet. Likewise, SK had been working long and hard in the field of religiosity, and he was near to a solution of his problem in his dabbling with religiousness A. His metamorphosis is intimate to immanent religiosity. There are in fact essential (and recognizable) points of familiarity between A and B.

The central edification of religiousness A, that the subjective constancy amid change which suggested by analogy a certain likeness to God, is made into something more than an analogy in religiousness B, where the likeness is said to be real. But nevertheless the edification stems from religiousness A.

Even the acknowledged difference between A and B, that difference between immanence and transcendence, is blurred somewhat in two main ways: First, it seems clear that both A and B operate with the classical ontological assumptions of time as infinite succession and eternal as unchanging presence.¹ Secondly, in spite of SK's protests against subjective immanence, in religiousness B he is still preoccupied with consciousness and volition even if the eternal is actually present; it is present in consciousness.²

1. Cf. discussion of this in Chap. IV. Cf. the formulation of these concepts in religious passages in Ed. Dis.; Purity, p. 63; Works of Love, pp. 201, 227; Christian Discourses, pp. 349-50; "The Unchangeableness of God" (in P. Holmer's Selections), p. 260.

2. Supra, p. 281.

Both A and B intimate that in conquering the future one is truly free to live in the present. In A this movement becomes giddy in that it is ensnared in the "circle of immanence" and even flirts with the dangers of Platonism. But it is at least analogous to what must finally be taken as the governing theme of transcendent religiosity, that this conquering of the future and true living in the real present is not only actually possible but is actually fulfilled. This is so because the eternal is no longer a psychological phenomenon which is ubique et nusquam but is the ontologically and historically specific God-in-time. Living in the true present is possible because God ¹ is that all things are possible, and God actually informs man's free consciousness in the moment of faith. Thus the possible is fulfilled in the true present when one becomes contemporary with the God-in-time.

The fulfillment is achieved in time because it is decided in time. The man who lives religiously transforms time by establishing in time a relationship with the ontologically real God-in-time. That this time has not to do with any objective world time is expressed well by Denzil Patrick in his discussion of ² Training in Christianity:

1. Sickness, p. 173.

2. Denzil G. M. Patrick, Pascal and Kierkegaard (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947), Vol. II, pp. 275 ff.

The true time in which we can become contemporary with Christ is the time of 'actuality' (Wirklichkeit), the present moment in our inner life, the time in which we make our decisions. This time has nothing to do with the flow of the relative timestream, in which any one point is exactly the same as any other, and in which 'the present' is only the relative point of transition from the relative past to the relative future. For the time of actuality, the present moment in our inner life has the quality of absoluteness; here we come face to face with Christ as the absolute and eternal Reality--real in His humiliation as well as a not merely relative and temporal, but absolute and eternal significance: the decision between faith and offence.¹

To summarize: A man living the transcendently religious existential possibility affirms that temporal existence is "at variance with itself",² and he lives in constant expectation of a relationship with the Eternal-in-time which he believes to be historically and ontologically real. Thus he lives in contemporaneity which he confesses constantly to be the only valid mode of temporality appropriate to a relationship with the absolute, and he affirms this in the decisive moments of faith in which the past and the future enter into his decisions of the contemporaneously valid present. One who is truly religious is spirit or free consciousness, and as such he is the place where the elements of temporality come together in time. In being temporality, he transcends any temporal mode.

1. Ibid., pp. 276-277.

2. Supra, p. 247.

7

Chapter VI

CONCLUSIONS

Introductory Remarks

Perhaps the fundamental discovery of this study is that SK's conception of temporality is essentially complex. This seems banal, for only a fool would imagine any philosopher to have a simple and straightforward conception of such a difficult notion, but I must nevertheless underscore the peculiar complexity which we have found in SK's conception of temporality.

It is true of course that temporality is a knotty concept, but the complexity to which I refer concerns SK's approach. We have found his approach to be "biographical" or existential and have attempted to emulate it in this thesis. By "biographical" I intend not the prevalent historico-psychological treatment of SK himself (I have certainly attempted to avoid that here), but rather SK's own attempt to correctly relate time and eternity in a manner which could legitimately be called Christian. SK did not set out to solve an obstinate problem of Christian theology, for that would have been to attempt to resolve the tension in the relationship of time and eternity within this life.

Rather, he intended to state the problem in terms of his own life and in other possible life orientations delineated in his various writings. He saw the entire authorship as an instrument of his own essential education and only hoped that a few (perhaps one would suffice) "single individuals" who read it would also be assisted in becoming aware of their own lives and so might approach nearer to God in order, as he said, that they might "remain¹ on the spot and be renewed inwardly".

There are two main facets of this approach. First, it is now clear that the dialectic of this education-in-inwardness, the passionate concern to elucidate the distinctively personal reality of the individual in all existential possibilities, completely qualifies SK's conception of temporality. He views his own existence (and indeed existence per se) in terms of spiritual inwardness, and he seeks to elucidate existence in terms of the Christian Incarnation. Everything is seen from this point of view. Secondly, his approach is intended to indicate that there is not one conception of temporality, but many. His conception of temporality is then complex in the double sense that he links it with existence and then proceeds to describe various existence

1. Journals, 694, p. 217.

orientations.¹ One's conception of temporality would seem to depend on how one is.

The present study has attempted to parallel this approach by attending to the subtle distinctions and points of view of the various life orientations and by treating the authorship from representative sides. In this way we tried to avoid becoming "a Kierkegaardian grabbag" and to remain open to the actual complexity of his conception.

Under all the possible life orientations, however, we have sought a common denominator. We have found that in all the life orientations a man's existence is described as a synthesis of the two elements of temporality, time and eternity. The notion of the Moment where the two are conjoined is absolutely foundational to SK's thought. Time and eternity can meet only in the Moment, when succession is annulled and a genuine present comes to be for an individual in time. I have tried to show that this phenomenon, as constantly renewed and repeated, is the basic meaning of temporality. Further, I have suggested and attempted to elucidate the idea that the categories of "subjectivity",

1. It remains true that while most students of SK admit he cannot be easily paraphrased or summarized, many continue to smoothe over the complexity of the sundry life orientations by identifying SK's thought with that of one particular "stage" or pseudonym. Usually SK is mistaken for Johannes Climacus and, especially in regard to temporality, for Vigilius Haufniensis. This identification often leads to a jumbled mixture of Kierkegaardian notions which are misleading.

"existence", "spirit" and "consciousness" are and can be only defined in terms of temporality.

In what follows I want first briefly to draw together the findings of this study¹ and secondly to draw out some of the implications of the findings. Next, I propose to indicate SK's contribution to the study of the concept of temporality by reference to some recent studies.

Summary of Findings

The suggestion that subjectivity is temporality or that consciousness is temporality is easily misunderstood, especially in light of current distinctions utilized by contemporary students of the subject and in light of SK's seemingly "traditional" use of the concepts time and eternity. In Chapter I, I indicated that the separation of the idea of psychological time or our awareness of time from the notion of objective time or time-itself was not a useful distinction when referring to SK. I suggested instead the notion of "existential time" to help describe his² conception of temporality. Now I believe our findings substantiate

1. As each chapter already contains a summary, I shall not reproduce these here, but simply ask the reader to refer to them as he deems necessary.

2. Supra, pp. 4-5.

the claim that the idea of existential time does not necessitate the assumption of a dichotomy between an alleged subjective or psychological time and objective time.

Our findings indicate that for SK temporality was indeed a category which is contingent upon a person's life orientation. That is, SK rarely considered the concept apart from the milieu of human existence.¹ In fact, his entire project was to consider various types of existence possibilities so as to indicate that everything depends on who and how you are.

Nevertheless, at least in regard to our topic, this has proved to be something of a problem, for the suggestion that temporality is an existential category does not imply that SK ever abandoned the objectivity of the elements of time and eternity. On the contrary, we have found that he held to traditional, even classical, definitions of time and eternity throughout the authorship.

Time is defined in Dread as an infinite succession which while it may yield a parody of the present, yields no true present.² This view is maintained throughout the authorship.³ Of course we learn from the same work that free personal decision

1. Dread and at times the Postscript contain rather detached analyses of time and eternity, but even there temporality is described in terms of human existence.

2. Dread, pp. 76 f.

3. Cf. Works of Love, pp. 233-234.

divides time so as to provide a real temporal "now" and a genuine¹ distinction between past, present and future. Again we found that eternity met the classical definition of unchanging being.² As SK and many of the pseudonyms repeat, the eternal is.³ In a late (1851) discourse SK writes: "He changes all, Himself unchanged. When everything seems stable (for it is only in appearance that the external world is for a time unchanged, in reality it is always in flux) and in the overturn of all things, He remains equally unchanged." In his metaphysical commitment to these concepts, SK also remains unchanged, and they underlie all the various existence possibilities. There are far-reaching problems and implications of this which we need to review here.

We note that time and eternity, being ontological opposites, are always related as irreconcilable contradictories. If they meet, they do so only paradoxically--whether in the individual, who is described as a synthesis of these elements, or in temporality, which is defined as the place where time and eternity touch one another. Both these categories are self-contradictory, but as we know from SK's prolific writings, they are not for that reason inexplicable. On the contrary, even though they are

1. Dread, pp. 76-79.

2. Ibid., p. 78; Cf. Postscript, pp. 217, 279 ff.: Purity, p. 145; Works of Love, p. 261; "The Unchangeableness of God" in Holmer's Selections of Ed. Dis., pp. 260, 256.

3. Holmer, Selections, p. 256.

contradictions by ontological definition, they become the very starting point for SK's discussion. Time and eternity do not naturally come together; they are conjoined only by a free action of an ontological freak called man who exists in contradiction.

Eternity is not reflected in time¹ by the present-less continuity of temporal succession; it occurs only momentarily in the decisive present moment where it is actively conjoined with time in human subjectivity. Its continuance depends upon the free repetition of the Moment which is temporality. "Existence", in which this conjoining of ontological contraries takes place, is thus described as a struggle and a task.²

Yet all of the foregoing marks the beginning, not the ending of SK's thought concerning temporality, for in spite of his use of traditional conceptions of time and eternity, his real objective is to describe the place where they touch one another. Thus by describing temporality in terms of time and eternity, SK conceives his task to be that of describing a relational phenomenon. The overview of this description, as we have found, takes the form of a description of the various ways which we relate to these categories which seem to be ontologically prior to our own existence. In this sense, then, the description of

1. Dread, p. 79.

2. See esp. Chap. IV. Cf. Postscript, pp. 75, 82 f., 85, 350, 376; Dread, p. 15.

temporality as an "existential" category does not necessarily preclude the independent ontological status of time or eternity apart from our lives.

The problem, however, is complex, and it is evident that SK measures temporality more by psychological intensity than by the orbit of the earth around the sun. At times his discussion seems to concern a totally psychological phenomenon and at other times a completely objective entity. What is certain is ~~whether~~ the description ~~is~~ "objective" or subjective, internal or external, depends entirely on how one exists. The description of temporality depends on one's existential orientation.

Central to the dialectic of the relational concept is the problem of the category of God-in-time. If, as I have suggested, eternity remains unchanging being throughout the authorship, then how do we account for the concept of God-in-time? It would seem that any account would itself require another category. But SK never means to discuss God's nature, and he utilizes the category of unchangeableness only to make clear the notion of temporality. Here again he attends to this problem by reference to different life orientations.

The problem is this: On one hand SK, as we have seen, wants desperately to keep separate the divine and the human, the eternal and the temporal; yet on the other hand, he wants to show how they are related. This is a Christian theological problem stated succinctly by Herbert Brabant: "In any case

Greek thought took the first step and the right step when it separated the temporal from the eternal; no one who does not see clearly the separation between the Divine and the human can hope to understand how they are connected.¹ Naturally what Brabant says is so, for there would be no problem unless the two were first separated.² It is, in short, a problem of the theologians' own making. It is certainly a problem for SK, and most of his works may be described as attempts to elucidate it. In this SK characteristically appears to go from one extreme to another. Sometimes it appears that time and eternity are radically disparate; at other times it seems as if they are nearly fused. Now for SK all of this depends entirely on one's life orientation.

Much of the force of SK's approach to the problem of temporality lies in the fact that he never loses the idea that the real nature of temporality depends only on the existing individual and not upon some other standard. This is so even though he holds to traditional conceptions of time and eternity. SK described

1. Frank Herbert Brabant, Time and Eternity in Christian Thought (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1937), p. 33.

2. It may of course be inevitable that time and eternity are separate. One would not refer to the temporal unless he always was contrasting it to the eternal (much as beautiful suggests by contrast the not-beautiful). Cf. Chap. I, pp. 7-8. This need not entail going as far as did Descartes in his 3rd Meditation concerning the grounds for believing in God. There he suggested that a temporal being could not know the eternal unless he had the notion previously.

existential possibilities, and this is the criterion of the relation of the elements of temporality. Temporality cannot be "measured" by the conventional methods; it is a relational category and the relating happens only in existence. If we resorted to some spatial or numerical standard, then we would be violating our experience. A man does not experience events and moments in his life as homogeneous succession demanded by conventional chronological measurement; rather he experiences qualitative heterogeneous changes which overlap and permeate one another without precise outlines.¹

The same is true on the level of the existence possibilities. One does not pass through the "stages" successively or chronologically, for one incorporates what he has passed through qualitatively in his most recent possibility or orientation. It is clear from our study of SK that the stages also overlap and permeate one another often without precise outlines.

Let us briefly recount our findings in reference to the existence possibilities we have investigated: The aesthetic existence was oriented on the one hand toward "immediacy", especially in the form of successive movement, and on the other hand it was oriented away from permanence in any form. Such a

1. Henri Bergson says this well in his Time and Free Will (trans. by F. L. Pogson, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928). Cf. esp. Chap. II concerning the idea of duration, pp. 77 ff.

life as described from within by A is defined as a sum of repellent moments;¹ the task of such a life is to emulate the external world which is characterized by successive change. One achieves this by making one's life arbitrary and contingent. One practices the art of rotation and becomes manifold, thereby remaining completely outside oneself; by "rotating" a man avoids any real present or any real self; he himself becomes a passing moment in the existence of the world. The aesthete experiences time as a series of instantaneous moments or "nows" which lie external to himself and beyond his control. This is another way of saying that he does not experience himself; his life is projected onto the external world which he then attempts to emulate by making his life a series of repellent moments. He moves out of himself by investing in external happenings and moments which constantly slip by. The task of aesthetic existence is to externalize so that nothing can go on or endure in time, but can only go by in time. For such a person time is objective, external, successive passing. Temporality, which involves the concept of the eternal is virtually non-existent, for there is no real relating of time and eternity.² The aesthete "externalizes" himself to the extent that "he" is not.

1. Supra, p. 76.

2. Hence presumably the absence of the concept from E/O I. Cf. Appendix.

By contrast, the relating of time and eternity becomes immensely important for the ethical way of life. By means of willful resolution and ethical choice a person comes to stand out as over against the external flow of time. In the ethical life orientation "the temporal" is first distinguished from "the eternal". An ethical man is the first to notice "the temporal" as "the temporal"; that is, he first begins to see it as distinct from that which is not temporal. He becomes preoccupied with the eternal and accuses the aesthete of confusing the temporal and the eternal, of living with an eternity of "outward illusion".¹ In brief, he accuses the aesthete of externalization. The ethical man begins to relate the eternal (which he sees as the ethical absolute) to the temporal, and he stresses what is characteristic of the ethical way of life, that the temporal becomes the vehicle for the movement or proceeding of the eternal.² The temporal is the medium through which the eternal resolution is actualized. At the same time the ethicist, in order to relate time and eternity, entertains a distinction between external and internal history which enables him to describe succession as internal succession.³ Thus even time is internalized for the

1. E/O II, p. 28. Supra, p. 92.

2. Supra, p. 122.

3. Supra, p. 123.

ethicist, though he acknowledges external time as well. In this movement of inward appropriation the ethical man finds continuity in time. The notion of succession is still vital, but it has been internalized. Going-on remains important. In ethical existence, therefore, we find that the notion of temporality (where time and eternity are related) comes to the fore in company with the notion of inwardness.

Following the ethical life-orientation, the idea of temporality emerges gradually as we noted in Chapter IV. The representatives there began to speak of the inward movements of resignation and repetition as transforming time. Temporality was described as the continuation of a decisive Moment in which time and eternity are brought together voluntarily. Temporality therefore never emerges as an "objective" concept, and even though it relates two ontological contradictories, it does so in contradistinction from Hegelian monism simply by maintaining the absoluteness of the cleavage between two forms of being and by relating them only in decisive free acts of passionate consciousness. Temporality emerges as an existential concept which relates radically opposed concepts which remain in paradoxical tension and dialectical opposition. It is described not as an immanent fusion but as the result of the actions of a free, finite spirit. A subject/object dichotomy has no real meaning here, for "subjective" itself is defined in terms of the relation of two "objective" categories; as such the subject comes to be only when time and eternity are conjoined.

In the writings dealing with religiousness A we found temporality described in completely inward terms. It seemed as if SK were describing psychological feelings of constancy amid change. The ontologically "external" categories of time and eternity seemed abstract and distant and the phenomenon described really had no need of them. It seemed as if SK had followed the pseudonymous crusade for inwardness to the utmost and had discovered that temporality ended in psychology. At best it offered a psychological analogy to God in time. It appears, however, that SK eventually realized that this could not be, for he moved on to transcendent religiosity which meant to do justice to the transcendent eternal. Here, while yet referring to the concept of consciousness, he insists (with the help of Anti-Climacus) that the transcendent eternal is realized (in the sense of becoming actual) in time through a man's eternal consciousness. This happens, in distinction from Hegel's thought, only in the presence of free volitional action on the part of the Christian believer.

In sum, it is now evident that the various experiences and conceptions of temporality are intimately bound to one's orientation in life. SK has shown that it would not be possible to describe the phenomenon of temporality accurately without taking this into consideration. This would seem to be true even if SK's particular descriptions are inaccurate.

Each existence possibility portrays differently a particular sense of temporality, at least insofar as each depicts a different relationship of the concepts of time and eternity. We recall Climacus' words: "The significance attached to time is in general decisive for every standpoint up to that of the paradox, which paradoxically accentuates time. In the same degree that time is accentuated, in the same degree we go forward from the aesthetic, the metaphysical to the ethical, the religious and the Christian-religious."¹ Aesthetically time is accentuated and so externalized that it virtually avoids any type of constancy whatsoever. In the sense of a relation of time and eternity, the aesthetic way of life really avoids any temporality; in its externalizing it avoids spirituality and hence temporality. The ethical possibility exaggerates an absolute ideal and links it with a time which goes on and is internalized. In the decisions linked with the ethical way of life a new kind of moment emerges which later, in religiousness B, paradoxically posits that the eternal enters time. Internally time goes on, and ethically one is able by means of time to sustain a decision made in a moment. The point is to "keep it going", and this must be done internally. Aesthetically speaking, the idea of something continuing in consciousness would be a desperate

1. Postscript, p. 265.

bore. What would cause the ethical man to grow would cause the aesthete to die. Time provides the ethical existence with historicity and continuity; it provides escape from permanence to the aesthetical existence.

The importance of these transitions is of course affirmed by describing the existing individual as a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. In a sense then it is not time but the eternal that is decisive for the changing of the existence possibilities. Michael Wyschogrod has stated in Kierkegaardian terms that as soon as the self becomes aware of its componentiality, the category of choice (and therefore the ethical) is¹ posited and, further, that it is the introduction of the eternal into the ethical which effects the next existential possibility.

Finally we have seen that the increase of inwardness corresponds directly to the intensity of the sense of temporality so that when a man truly becomes a Kierkegaardian individual in inwardness, he is then ready to have a relationship with the true eternal (God) in time. "And having a relationship with the eternal means that the eternal penetrates time, not as it is itself out of time, as pure Being, but in the form that it adopts in time, that of the individual."² One's relationship with the

1. Wyschogrod, p. 88.

2. Ibid., p. 91.

eternal arises in direct correlation to one's relationship with oneself, so that finally when one experiences the real eternal one does so through one's consciousness. Or, to put it another way, when one actually relates himself to himself, he is actually forming a relationship with the eternal-in-time. In "repetition" a man experiences a reformation of himself and this is a manifestation of the fact that SK never discusses the nature of the eternal nature of God apart from man's existential relation to it. In possessing a consciousness a man possesses a genuine present by means of which he transcends (and stands fully related to) the infinite succession of objective time. In this present he encounters more than an occasion for remembrance of things past; he discovers an eternal that comes into being in this movement¹ which allows him to stand free in the present and free in orientation to the future.

Of the various existential possibilities, then, which is the genuine Kierkegaardian view? The only correct answer is: All of them. We have found that to understand SK's conception of temporality we must take into account the fact that his thought progresses. There is no need to speak of an "early" SK or a "late" SK, for he was constantly changing. SK has provided us with a multifaceted description of the phenomenon of temporality, a phenomenological description which so connects the phenomenon

1. Fragments, p. 8; Postscript, p. 372.

with human existence that the only conclusion is that its meaning depends on one's life orientation.

Conclusions

Granted that the experience of or even the definition of temporality depends on life orientation, the question remains whether this is nothing more than a matter of emphasis. Is there an essential difference between the conception of temporality in the various existence possibilities?

There is evidence to suggest that there is no essential difference. In the main this evidence concerns a particular psycho-temporal sense of constancy amid change. In Chapter II¹ we received a certain "telegraphic notice", from within the aesthetic life orientation, of an aesthetic personality being collected together or unified out of its multifariousness. An aesthete was said to "gather himself together" in putting all his hope and expectation on some fleeting external moment. I said earlier² that the capacity to collect himself was immediately vitiated by the approaching and passing of the external moment of time. Now I wish to stress that A has given evidence that it exists even though it is extremely ephemeral. This capacity is an

1. Supra, pp. 79 f.

2. Ibid.

amazing gift for one who strove to avoid any sort of permanence in life.

Judge Wilhelm advances the same theme in his distinction between internal and external history and in the suggestion that the ethical task is the inward preservation of love in time.¹ The task is one of inward appropriation and as such represents a choosing of oneself,² a process of collecting away from externals. He expounds the notion of true resolution by means of which an ethical man "withdraws from the surroundings" and transforms all outwardness into inwardness.³ Further, the ethical man gathers up the whole of his past in repentance and thereby faces his future in concrete freedom.⁴

The real emphasis on resolution, however, occurs in de Silentio's Fear and Trembling where he subtly switches the meaning from resolution to resignation in the double "movements" of resignation and faith.⁵ Earlier I quoted a passage from Fear and Trembling⁶ which speaks of a man having the power to concentrate the whole content of life and the whole significance of

1. Supra, p. 108.

2. Supra, p. 112.

3. E/O II, pp. 255-256. Cf. Stages, p. 116.

4. Supra, pp. 115 ff., 123.

5. Supra, p. 153.

6. FT, pp. 53-54 ff.

reality in one single wish. This power of concentration was said to be prerequisite to having a collected soul; otherwise the soul would be dispersed in the multifarious. A man of faith, according to de Silentio, must be able to concentrate his whole soul in a single glance. In this way he steps into himself and out of the temporal flux--yet in full recognition that he is still living, that things are still going on, but he now experiences himself as more than even the sum total of the temporal flux.

We also found the same theme in religiousness A, the essence of which is an experience of constancy amid change expressed especially in psychological phenomena of gathering oneself in expectation or collecting oneself in patience.

Again in religiousness B one can hardly fail to notice that the idea that purity of heart is willing one thing is strikingly similar to the notion of a gathering of multiplicity into one. In Purity SK speaks of the laying off of manyness¹ and the maintaining of singlemindedness.²

This experience of gathering up or collecting from many to one, this narrowing of focus or coming to oneself amid the flux of temporal existence is certainly an experience common to the

1. Purity, p. 47.

2. Ibid., p. 53.

various pseudonyms and the acknowledged SK. This experience represents a notion of temporality completely within the bounds of psychological subjectivity. This has important implications for the study of temporality in general and SK's conception in particular. First, the process of gathering up implies the capacity to grasp the whole of one's life beyond its manifoldness and changingness; in the process one's life is seen to be more than mere succession. As T. H. Green once said, a mere succession of feelings could not feel the succession or know that it was separate from it.¹ This power to grasp that which endures amid the flux is exercised instantaneously from within, so that constancy-in-change is present all at once in the subject. I would like to provide a musical analogy to support the claim that a sense of "more than" is not only possible completely within the bonds of subjectivity, but is also an indication of the self whenever it is. In a letter to a friend concerning the manner of his composing Mozart is alleged² to have written:

1. Thomas H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. by A. C. Bradley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1883).

2. This letter was argued to be spurious by the influential biographer of Mozart, Otto Jahn, but the issue remains open to debate. Cf. A. Hyatt King, Mozart in Retrospect: Studies in Criticism and Bibliography (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 239, n. 2. For our purposes, the expression of the letter is more important than the author. It seems certain, however, that the aesthete, A, would never have believed that such a statement could have come from the hand of the Mozart he knew.

When I am, as it were, completely myself, entirely alone, and of good cheer--say, travelling in a carriage, or walking after a good meal, or during the night when I cannot sleep; it is on such occasions that my ideas flow best and most abundantly. Whence and how they come, I know not; nor can I force them. Those ideas that please me I retain in memory, and am accustomed, as I have been told, to hum them to myself. If I continue in this way, it soon occurs to me how I may turn this or that morsel to account, so as to make a good dish of it, that is to say, agreeably to the rules of counterpoint, to the peculiarities of the various instruments, etc.

All this fires my soul, and, provided I am not disturbed, my subject enlarges itself, becomes methodised and defined, and the whole, though it be long, stands almost complete and finished in my mind, so that I can survey it, like a fine picture or a beautiful statue, at a glance. Nor do I hear in my imagination the parts successively, but I hear them, as it were, all at once (gleich alles zusammen). What a delight this is I cannot tell! All this inventing, this producing, takes place in a pleasing lively dream. Still the actual hearing of the tout ensemble is after all the best. What has been thus produced I do not easily forget, and this is perhaps the best gift I have my Divine Maker to thank for.¹

Our apprehension of a tune depends on there being more than a single note present to our minds at one time. What we have already heard is not merely remembered as a series of past events, but is grasped as part of a compresent pattern. Now, the apprehension of this "more" represents a sense of constancy amid change which we have found to characterize temporality. I believe that our findings indicate that SK had a particularly fine sense of this, especially since the foregoing implies the

1. Cited in Edward Holmes, The Life of Mozart (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Everyman's Library, 1922), pp. 255-256.

presence of a self. If we glean from Mozart that a part of a whole cannot explain the whole, that for this the whole is required, then we can infer also that any apprehension of a "more" requires a point of view. There must be a mind or subject for there to be an apprehension of the "more"; such could not be explained meaningfully in sheer Aristotelian terms. In our musical analogy we note that everything happens within the mind of Mozart; it is all within the subject. Temporality, which is linked to this subjectivity, embraces all the instants; it is the dynamic realm in which the real past, present and future acquire significance by becoming "more".

Now, I stress again, the writings of SK teach us this, and it is no mean instruction. In fact, if SK had ended his authorship with this thought or intuition, he would have distinguished himself in proffering a new theory of temporality. At least he would have anticipated Henri Bergson, who is famous for connecting temporality and consciousness and (rightly, I think) is regarded as a profound contributor to the understanding of both concepts.

Let me refer to another musical analogy, one suggested by Bergson, to illustrate my point. Bergson uses this analogy to clarify his notion of "pure duration"; that is, the personal duration which assimilates past and present into an organic whole. Recalling the notes of a tune which seem to melt into one another he writes:

Might it not be said that even if these notes succeed one another, yet we perceive them in one another, and that their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected? The proof is that, if we interrupt the rhythm by dwelling longer than is right on one note of the tune, it is not its exaggerated length, as length, which will warn us of our mistake, but the qualitative change thereby caused in the whole of the musical phrase. We can thus conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought. Such is the account of duration which would be given by a being who was ever the same and ever changing¹

SK certainly corroborates (and nearly fifty years earlier)² that such an account would be given by a being who is himself constancy and change. The above thought is at least in harmony with SK's thought, and, as I said, if SK had said only this he would have made an original contribution to our understanding of temporality. But, as we have discovered, SK did not stop with this, and using Bergson as a foil I would now like to indicate why he did not.

Bergson continues his analysis by defining the pure duration of the ego as a "succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to

1. Bergson, op. cit., pp. 100-101. My italics.

2. Bergson's Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience (retained as a subtitle to Time and Free Will by Pogson) was originally published in 1889.

one another, without any affiliation with number: it would be pure heterogeneity."¹ Now, SK is in complete accord with the notion of duration as qualitative heterogeneous changes, as opposed to abstract homogeneous changes, but he finally reaches a point in the authorship where he would not agree that this notion is sufficient. For SK there must be an externalization process in the conception of temporality, not an abstraction, but an externalization correlated with an ontologically real eternal. There is, in short, more to SK's conception of temporality than is suggested in the musical analogies proffered by Mozart and Bergson.

Of course this would have to be so if there is any real difference between any of the existence possibilities. For if indeed a point of view or a self is implied in the apprehension of a whole beyond the succession of parts and if the process of gathering together implies this capacity of grasping that which endures amid the change, then the presence of a self is indicated at all levels of the Kierkegaardian authorship. That is, a self would be implied even in the aesthetic life orientation, SK's comments to the contrary notwithstanding. Granted that the self may be quickly lost and that it may need to be recovered, but this is true in all life orientations, and there

1. Ibid., p. 104.

would yet be intimations of a self on the aesthetic level.

As I have said, it would appear from our findings that there is evidence to suggest this common sense of temporality in all existence orientations. But despite this evidence it is clear that SK does not leave the matter at that. We have already mentioned the importance of SK's campaign to keep apart the elements of time and eternity. Seen negatively, this enabled SK to combat Hegel's monistic reduction of existence, and seen positively it enabled him to describe human existence as an inter-¹esse, a being-between the contradictory factors of time and eternity. Such an existence can be described only as a constant striving between two irreconcilable contradictories, and never as a peaceful or even logical blending of the elements of temporality. Any attempt at reconciliation would be absurd, unless of course the eternal ~~were~~¹ first ~~be~~¹ reduced to the temporal. The "synthesis" of time and eternity which is man can never be "mediated" in any Hegelian sense of a logical transition from a lower to a higher actuality. Real becoming occurs only in the interested leap in which real movement from possibility to actuality is effected. And this latter movement makes sense only if the eternal and time remain distinct; otherwise the eternal is concealed within the temporal as a womanish immanentalism.

1. Supra, p. 178.

SK's eternal is foreign to time; it enters time in the present moment of decision and "touches" time voluntaristically in the existence which is ever described in terms such as task, striving, suffering, willing and faithing. Thus, while there is psychological intuition of a constancy and change as native to human existence per se throughout SK's thought, it is nevertheless the essence of his thought that any immanent indwelling of the eternal and the temporal would vitiate the decisiveness of the Moment and the repeated striving which comprises temporality. The fluid inter-esse¹ is a constant striving between time and eternity.

Now the point I wish to make here is that it is owing to the strife that existence is defined in terms of temporality. It is only by means of the tension and strife caused by the juxtaposition of the two contradictory elements that we can finally understand the temporal modes of past, present and future, the reality of present, and the reality of the inter-esse. Furthermore, one could never adequately speak of SK by leaving out this tension which, in existence, makes temporality. The very

1. Supra, p. 184.

intensity and feverishness to the point of absurdity or even
¹
 insanity is itself Kierkegaardian.

In addition to this tension which is visible throughout SK's authorship we have seen that in the transcendent religiosity of Christianity it is mandatory that the elements of time and the eternal not only be kept apart, but also kept ontologically external to human existence. A Christian hopes to avoid any sort of immanentist language or pantheistic thinking; he might be interested in discovering how the temporal might yield real knowledge or apprehension of the eternal, but he is fastidious beyond the normal call of prudence not to confuse the Creator
²
 with the creation.

How then can we best understand internalization and externalization, the two seemingly different tendencies in SK's authorship? I suggest the following as the best ~~int~~erpretative framework for SK's manifold conception of temporality:

1. Denis de Rougemont articulates well what I believe to be this essentially Kierkegaardian thesis in Man's Western Quest (tr. by Montgomery Belgion, New York: Harper, World Perspectives, Vol. 13, 1957). De Rougemont suggests that tension-in-thinking is characteristic of the western mentality. From the early Christian councils which claimed Jesus to be both truly God and truly man, to modern physics which claims light to be both truly wave-like and truly corpuscular, western men have always thought by holding together irreconcilable contradictions. It is interesting that the Incarnation is for de Rougemont, as for SK, at the root of this tension.

2. For a good discussion of this caution see Brabant, op. cit., pp. 174 ff.

There is a process of "re-externalization" evident and traceable in the authorship. Our criticism of the aesthete was that he had externalized his being by attaching himself to the uncontrollable flow of passing moments which lay outside himself. Then, in the ethical existence possibility a process of internalization¹ was seen to begin. In Chapter IV we found in the pseudonyms an emphasis on subjective existence carried to a peak of intensity in which it was claimed that subjectivity, inwardness is the truth. This emphasis seemed to culminate in the comparatively peaceful religiousness A which appeared almost blissful in its inwardness. Yet, finally in religiousness B this process is transformed. The ontological priority of the eternal is vigorously asserted, and it appears as if a Christian, like the aesthete, orients himself once again to what lies outside himself. We note, however, that this new re-externalizing is accomplished by first proceeding through the individual's own consciousness. The aesthete cannot sustain any real self, but the Christian, having found a self in the acts of faith actually reduplicates the ontological eternal in himself. In this way the eternal is realized in time. This notion of re-externalization, while it is absurd when seen from without, is an externalizing which is funneled through free consciousness and is a

1. Cf. summary of Chap. III.

matter of ontological reality, not simply a psychological experience. Re-externalization is a process which renders intelligible such notions as repetition which attempt to do justice to the concept of temporality.

Temporality, as Bergson insisted, must be conceptualized as a heterogeneous phenomenon and not as a homogeneous succession of abstract moments. SK, while in agreement with this thesis, insists that real heterogeneity in temporality derives only from the real heterogeneity of the elements of temporality, time and eternity, and he consistently argued that they remain distinct. Evidence of this can be found throughout the authorship. For example, the notion of reduplication proffered by Anti-Climacus in religiousness B dovetails neatly with Climacus' idea that subjective conscious existence transforms in inwardness everything toward which it is directed (the process of reappropriation).

In sum, if the elements of temporality are not kept distinct, the result is Hegelianism, which SK charges with immanentism. Following Mozart's musical analogy, SK would insist that any sense of "more" requires a transcendent reality. Concerning the whole and the parts, SK would urge that if there is no transcendent reality, then the whole of reality and its parts would be one and the same. If the musical metaphor is to have any force in the real world, then there must be a real

transcendence. This, for SK, could not simply be consciousness; it must be an informed, or in his own terms, a constituted consciousness in which there is an ontologically real eternal.

This is finally expressed in religiousness B by Anti-Climacus who, in defining the self, speaks of it as impregnated with the eternal. The self is not only a relation which relates itself to itself, it is also related to that which constitutes it.¹

The ontological validity of spiritual inwardness depends on the transcendence of the eternal which "touches" time in free consciousness.² In the resolution of faith one relates to the transcendent reality of God. In the final analysis, then, it is not correct to interpret SK in such a way that subjective intensity and inwardness refer to the psychological alone. When one relates to himself freely, one issues in the content of the eternal; free choice and faith involve the transcendent eternal --this is the point of reduplication and repetition.

Of course the fact that an individual relates himself to a transcendent reality does not remove him from the historical Christian revelation, for in consciousness the eternal transcendent reality is God-in-time. Ingvar Horgby is mistaken I think when he writes:

1. Sickness, pp. 146-147.

2. We have seen this in our analysis of "existence" and "subjectivity" in Chapter IV.

If the historical revelation is accepted as real the picture is changed entirely. The fact of historical revelation implies to subjectivity that the eternal, the truth, is not immanent in subjectivity but transcendent. The eternal truth is not inside man, in his subjectivity, but outside him in an external historical fact. Subjectivity is outside truth, that is subjectivity is untruth.¹

Horgby feels that the accepting of subjectivity as the untruth is a consequence of accepting the historical revelation as real.

It is the eternal in the synthesis of the self that creates the conscious existence of man, i.e. subjectivity. Now the eternal is outside man, is the not-subjective event of the historical revelation. Hence, when revelation is established man's subjectivity must die.²

Revelation, he continues, cannot be assimilated into subjectivity because when the eternal is outside man, the power of subjectivity is extinguished.

Now Horgby has made what I believe to be a basic mistake, though what he says has a certain logical validity. He has failed to take seriously the notion of temporality associated with religiousness B, and his exposition has mainly to do with the Postscript and Fragments. We have seen that in the transcendently Christian life orientation SK and Anti-Climacus would both agree that there the eternal is ontologically prior to man and that there is no immanent relationship of the two; the eternal cannot be assimilated in subjectivity. Surely this

1. Horgby, op. cit., p. 112.

2. Ibid., p. 114.

is true not only of religiousness B but of the entire authorship--the eternal cannot be assimilated. Otherwise, there would be no reason to emphasize so heavily the notions of tension and strife. If the eternal could be assimilated we would have Hegelian immanentism. Horgby has failed to see that, in religiousness B, the eternal is in consciousness by free choice and as transcendent. The eternal is in consciousness as transcendent--precisely this is the meaning for SK of the eternal-in-time. When a man relates to the "historical revelation" in faith, he himself transcends time and is in contact with the God-in-time in his consciousness. There is no time transcending contemporaneity with Christ without the eternal-in-time being in touch with, but not assimilated by (for this has no meaning for SK), man's eternal consciousness.

SK's Contribution to the Study of Temporality

It is not my intention in this section to review various contemporary theories of temporality in detail; I wish rather to expand the foregoing thoughts by comparing them to a few of these theories. I agree wholeheartedly with Louis Mackey that SK has been "prolifically pilfered from" without acknowledgment. I think further that this is so especially in regard to his conception of temporality.

1. Op. cit., p. 104.

Martin Heidegger does acknowledge (in passing) the importance of SK¹ for his own work (at least he mentions Dread and the Edifying Discourses), and I would like to begin this section with Heidegger's remarks in criticism of SK.

Heidegger believes SK has described temporality quite well on the existentiell level, but rather poorly on the existential² level.

In the 19th century, SK explicitly seized upon the problem of existence as an existentiell problem and thought it through in a penetrating fashion. But the existential problematic was so alien to him that, as regards his ontology, he remained completely dominated by Hegel and by ancient philosophy as Hegel saw it. Thus, there is more to be learned from his edifying writings than from his theoretical ones--with the exception of his treatise on the concept of anxiety.³

1. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 494; 497.

2. "Existentiell" translates the German existentiell and "existential" translates existenzial. "Existentiell" denotes the concrete act of existing, and "existential" refers to the universal structure present in the concrete act of existing. The former designates man's immediate apprehension of himself in various concrete situations; it defines what is now often called man's ontic understanding of himself. The latter refers to Heidegger's notion of the universal structures in the concrete, and thus constitutes the level of ontological analysis. (See Being and Time, p. 33). Heidegger also distinguishes both of these concepts from "categories" (Kategorien) which are characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein (Ibid., p. 70).

3. Being and Time, p. 494.

Again:

He [SK]clings to the ordinary conception of time, and defines the 'moment of vision' with the help of 'now' and 'eternity'. When Kierkegaard speaks of 'temporality', what he has in mind is man's 'Being-in-time' [In-der-Zeit-sein]. Time as within-time-ness knows only the 'now'; it never knows a moment of vision. If, however, such a moment gets experienced in an existential manner, then a more primordial temporality has been presupposed although existentially it has not been made explicit.¹

There is truth in Heidegger's accusation concerning the ordinary use of the eternal. SK's "moment" is characterized by the penetration of eternity (as unchanging being) into time (as succession), thus assigning ontological significance to the "now" as well as to the components.²

Heidegger's connection of SK and Hegel is not altogether clear, but it undoubtedly reflects the fact that so much of SK's

1. Ibid., p. 497.

2. Michael Wyschogrod (op. cit.) believes this criticism to be an indication that for SK the moment is directed toward the present, whereas for Heidegger it is oriented toward the future. He writes: "As a consequence [of SK's view of the penetration of the eternal in time], the moment of Kierkegaard is directed towards the present. For Heidegger this would be impossible. His accusation that Kierkegaard adheres to the 'vulgar time-concept' means that this concept of time is based on a succession of 'nows' which, in passing, constitute time but as such reflect the presence of pure Being." (p. 126). It is difficult to understand in this comment precisely who is in error. If Heidegger means to say that SK's view of time expresses the eternal as a reflection in time, as Aristotle, then I believe our findings in Chapter IV have shown this to be incorrect (although there is some suggestion of it). As regards Wyschogrod's point concerning the present orientation of SK vis a vis the future orientation of Heidegger, we need to recall Chapter V, pp. 224 ff. where SK indicates his future orientation as well. Wyschogrod's comment on this matter is somewhat misleading.

thought is a polemic against Hegel. We recall that the main thrust of SK's polemic was that the "System" was abstract and had no relation to an existing being. As Wyschogrod remarks:

" . . . Kierkegaard's attack is directed at the identification of pure Being with the situation of the thinker and not at pure Being itself."¹ In other words, SK's concern is not to destroy Hegel's ontological categories; he wants only to stress in this case the individual's relation to these categories in such a way that the freedom and strife which characterize human existence will not be lost in abstraction. What is important for SK is the new juxtaposition of these categories, not the abolition of them.

For Heidegger, however, this acceptance of the ontological validity of pure Being represents an acceptance of the "vulgar" ontology of Hegel and of classical philosophy. In brief, according to Heidegger the novelty of SK's thought is not rooted in a basically new ontology, but in an existential innovation or "new juxtaposition" of old ingredients.

Yet Heidegger's point that SK's analysis remains on the ontic level and never attains the ontological is somewhat moot for two main reasons:

1. Wyschogrod, p. 127.

First, SK would not only agree fully with this "criticism", but would insist on remaining at this level; he would express utter disbelief at the incorrigibility of any "professor" who attempted to make ontologies out of his own categories.

Second, the force of Heidegger's remarks is somewhat undercut by his own acknowledgment of the significance of ontology for SK's thought.

I want to consider these two points in some detail. As to the first, we have found that SK is keen to show that temporality is a matter of life orientation. The point of the entire authorship is to discover the orientation in life which will properly enable an existing human being to face the phenomenon of becoming. Such a life is described as a task for one living, not in an abstract world of Being, but in the world of becoming. In such a world the task at hand is to grasp the whole of life while yet standing in the midst of successiveness, much as a knight of faith gains instantaneous simultaneity. SK is concerned only with finding the proper life orientation which would enable a man to do this; he does not care for scientific or ontological theories about existence. Climacus expresses this well:

In the life of the individual the task is to achieve an ennoblement of the successive within the simultaneous. To have been young, and then to grow older, and finally to die, is a very mediocre form of human existence; this merit belongs to every animal. But

the unification of the different stages in life in simultaneity is the task set for human beings.¹

It is the phenomenon of constancy and change from within, i.e. from the perspective of a human being-in-time, which concerns SK. And, as I have stated earlier, the originality and significance of this thought as a contribution to a new vision of temporality should not be minimized. SK finally does not mean to consider time or eternity abstractly, even if he accepts these concepts as ontologically prior to human existence. His analysis of temporality attempts to elucidate phenomena of constancy and change from the standpoint of a being who exists in time. He does not consider, for example, the permanence of a diamond, over which time seems to pass imperceptibly; he realizes that this permanence amid change differs essentially from the permanence of human existence. A man knows that he is finite, that he is in the temporal world, that this is the basis of his existence and also the harbinger of his end. When he collects himself or relates himself to himself and not to the external world of temporal flux, a man sets up a tension which forms the root of his subjective existence. Only a formalistic, abstract argument or systematic philosophy could resolve this constancy and change into one abstract entity. For a human existence the constancy and the change cannot be regarded as some sort of synthetic

1. Postscript, p. 311.

unity but only as a perpetual opposition of contraries. A man endures (if he assumes the proper life orientation toward becoming) by opposing his constancy to his transitoriness or finiteness in time. His spiritual life proceeds in the struggle of the one attempting to annul the other. If the struggle ends quickly, as when a man attaches himself to externals, then his spiritual life too is ephemeral. Indeed, its beginning, as A would have it, is its ending.¹ If the flux of time is experienced as coming from the future to the past, then a man either directs his life toward the future in defiance of the flux (as a Christian who accomplishes this by stepping aside, collecting himself and delivering the knockout punch to the future, thereby freeing his present life) or is carried away by the flow of time (as an aesthete who perishes therein). In the works of SK the struggle of constancy and change unfolds in the sundry existence possibilities and not in an abstract reflection on the nature of time. SK thus allows for differences in the concept of temporality, never permitting it to become rigid or inflexible. The antinomies of temporality are rooted in the life possibilities described by SK. Abstract time cannot support the concept of constancy or duration, for this constancy stems from a point of view in time, from an individual who is

1. Supra, pp. 71 ff.

able to collect himself out of the stream of time and provide himself with a real present or real point of view. Time qua flux does not possess in itself any such "present" or point of view and hence has no real constancy. Without a point of view there is nothing which abides in all the world. This is why, as we have seen, the temporal modes of past, present and future are established only by the point of view and not by an abstract conception of time as succession.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his celebrated Phenomenology of Perception¹ has described a conception of temporality strikingly similar to the above interpretation of SK.² He speaks of a movement or search of the modes of temporality which he identifies with subjectivity, a movement away from the being of the non-temporal world over into the "not-being" which accords with the nature of the temporal mode.³ This movement, in different language, is analogous to the movement SK describes as collecting oneself. Let me explain: Merleau-Ponty describes his view of temporality in terms of metaphors which express a constancy within

1. Trans. by Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962). Phénoménologie de la Perception was first published in 1945.

2. Naturally Merleau-Ponty's conception of temporality cannot be analyzed in any detail here. I intend only a brief comparison in order to clarify some of the implications of SK's own thought.

3. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 412.

change. For example, the view of the distant landscape from a train window seems to endure while the ground immediately beneath the window seems to rush by. Again, a water fountain continually gushes, but the form remains constant at a certain height. These metaphors are meant to suggest something of the nature of constancy and change, of temporality. According to Merleau-Ponty, the dimensions of time "exist only when a subjectivity is there to disrupt the plenitude of being in itself, to adumbrate a perspective and introduce non-being into it."¹

This teaching contains language foreign to SK, but I believe the thought behind it is quite similar. In fact, SK's language is the opposite; where Merleau-Ponty speaks of the world as the plenum of being in itself and the subjective "perspective" as non-being, SK speaks of the world as immediacy, almost in the sense of non-being, and the perspective as the plenum or content which impregnates the non-being of immediacy. But for each the thought is that a man is a perspective or a point of view so that when he moves toward them, a past and a future spring forth. This "dehiscence" of the present towards a future is what Merleau-Ponty calls an "archetype of the relationship of self to self"² which appears as an "interiority" or "ipseity".

1. Ibid., p. 421. This passage I feel represents the central teaching in the whole of the Phenomenology of Perception.

2. Ibid., p. 426.

Temporality moves away from "a being which reposes within itself" and actually makes possible ipseity, significance and reason. Both Merleau-Ponty and SK see in this movement and openness to "significance" the hope of gaining an understanding of the relationship between inside and outside ourselves (between consciousness and nature). "Subjectivity is not motionless identity with itself: as with time, it is of its essence . . . to open itself to an Other and to go forth from itself."¹ In openness to the "other" we can see the significance of the "more" in life to which we alluded earlier. When events appear to us as an achievement or expression of a single aim or when we are able to see things as signs or as expressive of something other than themselves,² then, as our earlier musical analogies indicated, we are able to see lives and events as significant.

This thought is Kierkegaardian. It is the perspective, the point of view, which provides that which abides beyond the chaos and establishes a significance which otherwise would be absent. It is the idea of subjectivity as temporality, which in its movement or "going forth" opens itself to the "other" or to the "more", which unites SK and Merleau-Ponty.

1. Ibid., p. 426.

2. Ibid., p. 428.

But I believe that there is a similarity which is yet more basic. SK and Merleau-Ponty are united through a conception of temporality first suggested by Plato. In the Timaeus Plato wrote that the creator, in ordaining the universe,

. . . took thought to make, as it were, a moving likeness of eternity; and, at the same time that he ordered Heaven, he made, of eternity that abides in unity, an everlasting likeness . . . to which we have given the name Time . . . [days, months and years] are all parts of Time and 'was' and 'shall be' are forms of time that have come to be; we are wrong to transfer them unthinkingly to eternal being. We say that it was and is and shall be; but 'is' alone belongs to it¹

Time "images" eternity insofar as it is rhythmical, because that which exhibits such an order as to admit to some kind of sense is that which admits rhythm. Time is like eternity as an image, but unlike eternity insofar as it moves. In the whole which is seen beyond the succession of parts, in the suggestion of a form which abides, we find images very much like that suggested in the myth of the Timaeus.

Considering the entire phenomenon of constancy and change, both SK and Merleau-Ponty seem to share a basic intuition with Plato. Yet, of course there are differences. It may be too facile a comparison, but I believe that in reference to Plato, Merleau-Ponty is concerned only with the reality of the "image", whereas SK is concerned also with the reality of the eternal.

1. 37 D-E. Francis M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1937), p. 98.

The thrust of Merleau-Ponty's conception of temporality is to make time explicit as a dimension of our being. As for eternity, he warns us that any "thetic consciousness of time which stands above it and embraces it merely destroys the phenomenon of time."¹ If we are destined to make contact with a "sort of" eternity, he adds, it will be at the core of our experience of time and not in some "non-temporal subject whose function is to conceive of it."² For Merleau-Ponty eternity is an illusory feeling; "The feeling for eternity is a hypocritical one, for eternity feeds on time."³

Such a statement would of course be horrifying to Plato, who said precisely the opposite, and in fact it is at this point that SK remains with Plato and parts company with Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's view, from SK's perspective, would amount to a psychological reduction of the Platonic conception. Were we to adhere to such a view, we would be left with nothing but a psychological experience which, as we have seen, SK could never tolerate, for he was never satisfied with a mere "image" in the sense of psychological experience. Now Merleau-Ponty, like SK,

1. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 415.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 423.

would never say that a man is nothing but a moment in the ongoing process of the world or of history; nor would he speak of subjectivity as a series or succession of psychic events. However, neither would he allow that a man is in any way eternal. Merleau-Ponty is interested in a genuine experience of constancy but insofar as it is an experience which is genuine he purposely remains within what SK would call the field of immanence. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that man is an incarnate being (a being-in-the-world), and he balks at any externalized notion of eternity which might distort this point. Eternity is a feeling of constancy and as such it is an epiphenomenon of the temporal; it is always immanent to life. The withdrawal into subjectivity of which he speaks does not take a man out of the temporal in any way; it reveals only the phenomenon of constancy amid change. This constancy is experienced as an eternal present, but this "image" of the eternal is finally illusory.

This writer believes that SK was very close to Merleau-Ponty's intuition of the nature of temporality; in fact some of his works (especially those of religiousness A) seem quite similar. Yet he was also very much aware of the dangers implicit in such a conception. It appears that he finally came to understand that if the matter were left at that, one might very well develop an intelligent phenomenology of temporality which describes constancy and change as an immanent phenomenon, but

which would forever bind one to the realm of psychological experience.

SK saw that succession alone cannot explain the complete phenomenon of constancy and change, and in that insight he is perhaps a precursor of contemporary phenomenologies of temporality. But as a Christian (i.e. in the Christian life-orientation) he realized that he had to progress beyond the notion of constancy as experience of the eternal to the real eternal. In this he indicated the usefulness of what Heidegger called holding to a classical ontology. By means of this ontology SK was able to carry his conception of temporality beyond immanence. Furthermore, he was thus able to express a genuine difference in various existential possibilities and thereby to describe an enriched conception of temporality.

I want to illustrate this further by reference to another contemporary scholar, Calvin Schrag.¹ Schrag believes that SK demonstrates that which he calls "the existentialist understanding of time" which is a departure from the objective view in which time is spatialized and conceived as an infinite succession of "nows". He cites a passage in Either/Or I to support his thesis: "In order that the man of hope may be able to find

1. See especially his Existence and Freedom (op. cit.).

himself in the future, the future must have reality or, rather, it must have reality for him; in order that the man of memory may find himself in the past, the past must have had reality for him."¹ Because of this and similar statements, Schrag sees SK as a precursor of contemporary phenomenologies of human existence. In regard to temporality, what we gather from his reflection on the passage just quoted is that he connects SK especially with Heidegger.

In the unified consciousness the reality of the future and the reality of the past are integrated, and time is experienced as an interrelated and inseparable unity. Futurity, pastness, and presence are constitutive elements or moments of the self as such. Time as thus experienced is not a succession of instantaneous 'nows.'¹ The three modes of time are ecstasies or directions of selfhood out of which and into which the self lives.²

Now, like Schrag the present writer believes that there is something Kierkegaardian about contemporary existentialism and phenomenology, even in regard to studies on temporality. Yet I believe too that our findings indicate that there is more to SK than some contemporary scholars acknowledge. I refer now, not to my comparison of SK and Merleau-Ponty, but to the fact that Schrag has failed to do justice to the richness of SK's conception of temporality by identifying it with one single view,

1. E/O I, p. 221. Cf. Schrag, pp. 128-129.

2. Schrag, p. 129.

namely the quasi-Heideggerian view which he designates as the existentialist view. Schrag is certainly correct in noticing that temporality represents a direction of being or life orientation, but he has failed to notice that there are many life orientations and for that reason he has prematurely associated SK with a particular existential (or phenomenological) point of view which he himself brought to the interpretation. What is at issue here is not simply a confusion of SK and the aesthete called A, but rather the notion that if time is a direction of being, then this means that time is not experienced as a succession of "instantaneous 'nows'".

This logic, I think, is somewhat confused; it rests on an odd manipulation of "time". If in fact "time" is a direction of being, then Schrag seems to be saying: Because time is a direction of being, this means that a direction of being is not experienced as a succession of instantaneous moments. I see no logical reason why this should be so. But far more important for our purposes is that, for A, it is manifestly not so. In fact, A's point is precisely that an unhappy consciousness does experience time as a succession of instantaneous "nows". This is what he meant by the "repellent moments" which characterized the direction of being termed "aesthetic". Furthermore, since the task of the aesthete is to learn to enjoy unhappiness, he is bound to make his life a series of repellent moments. Certainly

for A temporality is a matter of life orientation or "direction of being", but it is a life orientation in the direction of successive "nows".

Again Schrag wants to make the point, familiar to readers of contemporary phenomenology, that "subjective" time, i.e. time as lived existentially, is prior to "objective time" which is spatialized, reflective and abstract. "Subjective time" is allegedly prereflective and not yet prejudiced by abstract theories about time such as those which characterize externalized, objectivized time. But, while this may in fact be so, the question remains open as to whether it is so for SK or for A. As for A, I think his writings suggest that the issue is not so simple. His point is that being absent from oneself as he describes it means to experience the "repellent moments" as external to oneself. "The unhappy person is one who has his ideal, the content of his life, the fullness of his consciousness, the essence of his being, in some manner outside of himself. He is always absent, never present to himself."¹

A goes on to say that it is an aesthetic aim to make one's life into a sum of repellent moments; this requires diligent, reflective effort. So, while again I think Schrag is correct in saying that temporality is a matter of life orientation, he

1. E/O I, p. 220.

is certainly incorrect, if we adopt A's point of view, in suggesting that this means it must be a pre-reflective life orientation. A's point is the opposite. The distinction between subjective and objective temporality cannot be directly equated with the distinction between pre-reflective and reflective temporality. Besides missing A's meaning, such a distinction is infelicitous. The aesthetic view of temporality is expressed in a life orientation not only toward a succession of moments, but to a succession of moments which lies outside itself. In this way an aesthete escapes his present, because, like everything else, it vanishes.

Now I submit that SK's conception of temporality reveals and "corrects" two important limitations to the "contemporary view" championed by Schrag. First, by delineating the various existence possibilities SK indicated that no single definition or no single description of temporality based on one catch-all life orientation would suffice to describe the phenomenon. The concept is conditioned by one's life orientation, but contemporary theories often speak as if there is but one such orientation. SK clearly shows that this is not so, as indeed the aesthetic orientation shows that the concept may not be equated simply with psychological inwardness. Second, contemporary theories have not seen the importance of and implication of SK's holding to the ontological priority of the categories of time and eternity. This, as we have discovered, is not only implied in the

"externality" vivid in the aesthetic orientation but is seen throughout. The Christian orientation also demands that the elements of temporality be "more than" immanent. On the one hand time is real. The dreadfulness of time, for example, is maintained not as an experience of psychological forboding, but as the real destructive power which poses an absolute threat against unity and immutability--against everything which counts. Pure succession dissolves all content in its vacuous change; it surrounds us with nothingness. Even in the state of dreaming innocence this "nothing" was the "object"¹ of dread. Thus dread does not have a specific object as does fear, but it does have an objective referent in pure succession. "Repetition" indicates the reality of time for SK throughout the authorship. On the other hand, the eternal is also real; it cannot be a mere psychological experience of constancy. The eternal is God and has power and efficacy in our existence in that the eternal-in-time is really reduplicated in our consciousness.

I would like to suggest the force of SK's position, vis a vis the contemporary theories we have cursorally mentioned here, by use of a new metaphor of temporality.² The metaphors

1. Dread, p. 38.

2. Metaphors are popular and abundant in studies on temporality, and the present writer does not wish to be unfashionable in this respect. However, like all metaphors, the one which follows contains serious limitations and is intended mainly to contrast with the metaphors previously described.

suggested by Merleau-Ponty of the landscape viewed from a window of a moving train and of a fountain which flows and yet remains at the same height disclose a phenomenon of constancy amid change. A metaphor which would throw light on SK's conception of temporality must reveal more than that. I wish to draw the reader's attention to the familiar water sport of surfing. A surfer fixes his gaze on the shore and moves constantly toward that one goal amid the roaring flux of the waves. Such a metaphor captures the constancy amid change essential to any view of temporality, but it also advances beyond this in that it is directional. Again, it is voluntaristic in that the surfer must mount the board at precisely the right time and place, and in that he is able to guide the board himself, even though it is moved along by the water. But it is the goal, the directional aspect which is meant to indicate the future orientation of the metaphor. This accounts not only for constancy amid change, but a struggle and danger between them which is voluntary. And there is movement and direction. Furthermore, the real eternal is not simply the constancy of the will of the surfer as he moves through the waves (though it is experienced to be that); it is the goal toward which the will is constantly aimed. It would perhaps be stretching the metaphor to suggest that the shore is brought into the surfer's mind, but I believe that it

is not an exaggeration to describe the surfer as being-toward-the-shore (Sein-zum-Ufer). It is the eternal that draws us forward in the ever continuing struggle of constancy and change, and finally it is this goal which is "more than" the single-mindedness of the surfer. At every moment the present is oriented in the direction of the future, and existence becomes the voluntary task of filling the temporal with the eternal. The metaphor finally breaks down because the task is unending.

In sum, SK feels that to progress beyond mere experience (his arch enemy in so many ways), it is necessary to retain in the concept of temporality the ontological autonomy of the eternal and of time. If SK had stopped his authorship short of the transcendent religiosity, he would have done well in at least suggesting the significance of constancy amid change as the basic phenomenon of human existence. But this would have left him in the realm of immanence and experience, and in the end he could not tolerate this. Of course he recognized that it may well be the stopping point for some non-Christian existence possibilities (and this he shows well), but he also moves on to describe something more; for the Christian life orientation the eternal does not remain as possibility but as actuality.¹

1. James Daane, op. cit., has failed to see this in his study of the moment when he suggests that one constantly relates to the eternal as sheer possibility--an indication, he feels, that SK's thought differs from "classical Christian thought" insofar as it is a desperation response, (p. 184).

Finally, for SK the immanent view was a cul-de-sac of experience which was transcended by the reduplication of the eternal which involved a re-externalization of the self.

SK never really discussed the nature or richness of God's being; he did not describe the content of the eternal. God was rather described as eternal so as to indicate the transcending of time. Eternal is an expression for the real transcending of the temporal in human existence. The notion that the eternal enters time is an expression for the belief that time and change alone are insufficient to satisfy the deepest demands of the human spirit. Again, the realization of God-in-time makes the reality of time and its modalities necessary not simply as psychological "ecstasies" or directions of our being, but as ontologically real temporal divisions. The past does not simply live in the present; we know in mourning, for example, that the past is somehow really gone. Time too is real, a real danger and threat which could carry us away, as we have learned from the description of the aesthetic life orientation.

The reality of time poses a threat to existence and is intolerable to a Christian monotheist. Indeed, there are tendencies in the authorship to do away with objectivized, external time, as we have seen. There were times in his description of temporality when SK would and could have dispensed with it.

¹
altogether. However, in the process of relinquishing "externalized", objectivized time SK realized that for consistency he should abandon the non-subjective eternal as well. Not willing to do this, he retained both.

Of course if God is described in terms of unchangeableness, the changeable is somehow less real in the sense of being like God, but this does not necessarily mean it is unreal.² It is real, though inferior, in terms of our own evaluation; it is significant, though not ultimate. As with Plato, so with SK the real question concerns not so much the unchangeableness of the eternal as its perfection. The Greek notion of perfection did not really admit change, and though SK holds to Greek metaphysics, as a Christian he advances beyond this to the notion of God-in-time. Time and eternity are related in the Incarnation. But this relationship poses an onerous dilemma for a Christian who does not wish to say either (a) that God is absolutely apart from the world, unaffecteding it and unaffected by it (as with Aristotle), or (b) that the world is a part of God in the sense that He somehow needs it for the fullness of His being (as with Hegel). The Christian wants God in the world, but not immanently. It is a difficult position, and SK tries to make a serious contribution

1. Cf. Supra, pp. 203 ff.

2. As Plato knew very well.

to it, as witness religiousness B.

Yet we need to be mindful that SK presents other views as well. Along the way to becoming a Christian we see that he at least provided inchoate intimations of a new conception of temporality. He disclosed that the nature of the temporal flow depends on our life orientation and on our feelings, that (to refer again to a musical analogy) the rhythm of time depends on how we are. As we become "freer", our "temporal rhythm" becomes freer and is no longer bound to a pure succession in which the past is over before the present begins. In free rhythm the past is felt in the present as is the future. Time is thus intimately connected with our free consciousness. SK maintains the centrality of consciousness in religiousness B, but there he sees it in a new transcendent way in which a transcendent eternal and an ontologically external temporal are maintained. This he feels to be necessary for a transcendently Christian position. For that reason I suggest a movement in the authorship toward immanent temporality in which SK is on the brink of an understanding of temporality similar to that of some contemporary phenomenologists. But this is not the whole story since SK then moves toward transcendence.

There remain underlying assumptions of this movement which need to be considered. For example, it seems clear that in regard to the notion of the actuality of the spirit in consciousness

SK's thought remains close to that of Hegel. We have stated¹ that this would be Hegelian except for SK's intense emphasis on the volitional aspect of the eternal-in-time. On the one hand the eternal does not take part in time as if it were one with time--this would be immanentism, which the transcendent Christian could not allow, for he would want to reject the notion that our thoughts (even our highest inspirations) were really the thoughts of God. Yet, on the other hand, in the movement of faith in which the eternal is realized in time SK again seems to approximate Hegelianism. In consciousness or temporality the eternal is incarnate though it remains always in but not of the temporal. Temporality, as we must finally conclude from our study, is not merely the eternal-in-time; it is the eternal-in-time-in-the-temporal. It is consciousness. However, as SK would be the first to acknowledge, there are grave problems with this idea for a Christian.

Both the emphasis on the activity of consciousness and the insistence upon the ontological incompatibility of the eternal and the temporal (and associated notions such as infinite and finite, inward and outward, subjective and objective) tend to undercut any real interest in the history and the incarnation of Jesus of Nazareth. We have seen that the historical in any

1. E.g. supra, pp. 208-209.

objective or concrete sense has no real consequence, for SK.¹

In the moment of consciousness the real incarnation or re-incarnation occurs. This means that the eternal-in-time depends on us for actualization. It is safe to say, I think, that God is otherwise left out of the world. Of course, no one (especially SK) would want to say that God could not enter time in some other way if He so desired, but it happens that He makes His entrance depend on us. We have seen that time and eternity are conjoined in the double movement of faith, negatively as renun-²ciation and resignation, and positively as the task of redupli-³cating the eternal while remaining within the relativities of life.

Ultimately it is relative to this expression of the temporality of faith that SK's metaphysical commitments must be examined. By maintaining the absolute, ontological difference between time and eternity, the eternal enters time only precariously in the decisive "moment" of faith and is sustained there in a state of voluntaristic becoming by the movement or process of continually repeated inward appropriation. This is freedom's

-
1. Cf. Fragments, pp. 73-74 and Training, p. 121.
 2. Training, pp. 231 f., 234, 242 f., 245.
 3. Postscript, p. 365.

"highest interest" that while everything changes it can actually¹ realize repetition. The actual historical changes finally amount to the occasions by which temporal existence is inwardly transcended by one who exercises faith. In this way the classical notion of eternity is placed in contradiction with the temporal in a negative dialectic which prohibits Hegelian immanence, but which also vitiates the Christian involvement in the world historical process. In fact, the relation of eternity to time in terms of any sort of temporal historical continuity or development is rejected outright. The thought of any world-historical process is vile to SK.

Throughout the authorship temporality is viewed in light of a struggle to overcome real temporal flux. As the roaring waves might carry away the surfer if he does not strive with them, so the pernicious flux would carry away the man who does not act in faith. Thus SK returns to a transcendent position (the aesthetic was transcendent in the sense that time was transcendent), but now having braved the process of collecting himself, he is able to re-transcend his temporal existence in a truly free way.

Negatively seen, one might call this inevitable because SK was not willing to surrender his commitment to the dualistic

1. Dread, p. 17 n.; Cf. Postscript, p. 110.

Greek ontology. I think that he was simply unwilling to give up the transcendent Christian God. Yet SK's conception of temporality requires that a man go through the exercise of collecting himself so that in diligent training he will be able to re-externalize himself without danger of losing himself. So much is essentially Kierkegaardian.

There is a further criticism concerning SK's ontology. Certainly the eternal is not an existential category in the sense that it is existential in nature. It is, as we have discovered, ontologically prior to existence. It is accordingly somewhat unfair and hypocritical of SK to reprove the Hegelians for utilizing categories which were divorced from human existence. However, as SK does not really discuss the eternal in the abstract but only from within human existence, the God-in-time is, in this sense, existentially derived. We come to understand the necessity for the reality of the eternal first by reference to our own existence where we encounter it.

It is only when the concepts of time and eternity are wedged apart as in philosophic speculation (which is ex post facto) or in theological precommitments (which are extraneous) that they seem divorced from existence.

Thus, while it sometimes appears as if SK has confused or even vitiated his own exaltation of subjectivity by describing it in concepts which were not existentially derived, it seems

clear that religiousness B was the logical goal of the authorship, even though it did come with the aid of a "metamorphosis".

Furthermore, I believe that our findings indicate that while SK was perhaps not always clear about the direction of his thought (he was after all "in process"), his thought was directional nevertheless. It seems as if SK always understood, even if vaguely, that he had somehow to return to an "externalized" conception of temporality. Consider, for example, these passages, taken from various places, which describe the concept of temporality:

The instant is that ambiguous moment in which time and eternity touch one another, thereby positing the temporal [Timelighed]¹ where time is constantly penetrating eternity and eternity constantly permeating time.²

* * *

Hence his double-mindedness is first recognizable at the boundary where time [Timelighed] and eternity touch upon each other.³

* * *

Since now the man has consciousness [Bevidsthed] he is the place where the temporal and the eternal constantly touch one another, where the eternal interests itself in the temporal.⁴

1. See supra, p. 198.

2. Dread, p. 80.

3. Purity, p. 102.

4. Suffering, p. 215. From "What We Learn from the Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air".

* * *

The eternal is, but when the eternal touches time [Timelike] or is in time, they do not meet each other in the present, for then the present would itself be the eternal. The present, the moment, is so quickly past, that it really is not present; it is only the boundry and is therefore transitional¹

The virtually identical language in these passages indicates that SK's conception was at least linguistically in focus for some time. Hence, we conclude, the various existence possibilities represent not so much a fundamental ambivalence in SK's conception of temporality as a shifting of relational emphasis. The difference between these possibilities is how one orients oneself vis-a-vis the external categories of time and eternity.

1. Works of Love, pp. 233-234.

APPENDIX

Appendix

Introductory Remarks

Part of the supporting research for this thesis consisted of a computer word study of the Danish noun Timelighed and all its etymological relatives.¹ I intend here only a very brief explanation and summary of the results of this study.

It is well known that SK insisted on the literary independence of his pseudonyms and did not wish to be identified with any one of them; indeed, he begged his readers not to use his own name, but rather that of the pseudonym when citing a pseudonymous work.² That SK possessed sufficient literary talents to endow the pseudonymous representatives of distinctive life styles with distinctive styles of writing as well has long been demonstrated.³ Recently a computer has been used to show that

1. The writer is indebted to Professor Alastair McKinnon who provided the technical knowledge, programming, personal and computer time (both extremely valuable) which made this study possible.

2. Journals, 1238, pp. 453-454. Cf. the "First and Last Declaration" appended to the Postscript, pp. 551-554.

3. F. J. Billeskov Jansen, "The Literary Art of Kierkegaard", trans. Margaret Grieve in A Kierkegaard Critique (op. cit.), pp. 11-21. Cf. also Niels Thulstrup's "Commentary" to Fragments, pp. 146 ff., and E. Hirsch, op. cit., II, pp. 672 ff.

SK's account of his pseudonymous authorship is substantially correct and must therefore be taken seriously.¹ This independent account has confirmed not only that the pseudonymous works differ from SK's acknowledged works (and from each other), but also that each possesses a distinct vocabulary by which to express his life orientation. As McKinnon states:

. . . the distinction between pseudonyms is not simply a matter of style; the pseudonymous works are best seen as a generally successful attempt to overcome all facile versions of the style/content dichotomy. As Kierkegaard suggests, the pseudonyms are literary personalities whose distinctive life-style is so perfectly expressed in their work that what they say is finally indistinguishable from the way in which they say it.²

By comparing the vocabulary densities or richness of the pseudonymous and acknowledged works and by comparison of their internal coherence or homogeneity by the vocabulary connectivity method, McKinnon has shown that all these literary personalities are absolutely distinct. "It seems, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the pseudonyms are, in the sense which Kierkegaard intends, from different hands."³ McKinnon has gone on to rank the pseudonyms in relation to the acknowledged SK, and the

1. Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms: A New Hierarchy", op. cit.

2. Ibid., pp. 117-118.

3. Ibid., p. 120.

pseudonym whose vocabulary most closely approximates that of the acknowledged SK is assumed to be at the top of the "new hierarchy".¹

My purpose in the present thesis, however, was not to rank the pseudonyms in a hierarchy according to their proximity to SK, but only to allow that each pseudonym is a distinct literary personality, differing from SK and from each other. Having assumed this, it became important to see which of the authors used our concept and its relatives (and to what extent) and which did not use them. The point was not to see which use (i.e. which meaning) most closely approximated the usage in the acknowledged works, but, more fundamentally, to learn whether the concept had the same meaning for each distinct author with whom we were concerned. In this manner we were able to record the distribution and meaning of our concepts throughout the authorship.

1. Ibid., p. 118. Also important for this study is the fact that each pseudonym has his own distinctive vocabulary through which he expresses that view (i.e. many vocabulary items are reserved for some particular pseudonym).

Distribution

Specifically our central concept, Timelighed, and its relatives were traced throughout the entire corpus of the Kierkegaardian authorship.¹ The results are given in Table I below. A few preliminary remarks will aid the reader not familiar with the Danish language.

In Danish there are two genders, common and neuter. Time-ighed is a noun of the common gender. The definite article in Danish is post-positive or enclitic, and in the singular for the common gender, the enclitic article is -en. Thus the word, Time-igheden, is the noun with the enclitic definite article. If the noun is preceded by an adjective, the enclitic article is not used; instead, for the common gender, -den is used. However, the form den Timelighed never appears in SK's authorship.

Danish, like English, has only two cases of the noun: the common form (identical for the nominative, accusative and dative) and the genitive. The genitive ending is always -s (without an

1. There are two exceptions: The Danish noun, Time, an obvious relative, means "hour"; since this meaning was peripheral to our interests, its occurrences were not located. The Danish word for time, Tiden, was actually located for this study, but owing to its extremely high frequency and ordinary usage, the results were not helpful or significant for our purposes. In fact, most often Tiden was used in the ordinary sense as in "it's time to go", "What time is it?", or as "age", as in "the classical age."

apostrophe) both in the singular and the plural. Hence, the word Timelighedens is the genitive form of our noun.

In Danish, as in German, nouns are capitalized.

The words timelig and timelige are adjectives; the -e is a plural ending. Adjectives may be used as substantives, and as such they are capitalized. Hence, Timelig and Timelige.

Adverbs derived from adjectives ^{ending} ~~and~~ in -ig or -lig add -t when modifying a verb; hence timeligt.

Frequency, Distribution and Translation Summary

1. timelig appears 58 times and timelige 50 times throughout the authorship. In many works they are not used at all; in most they appear only once or twice, and in only four works do they appear more than five times: Edifying Discourses (13), Purity (13), Suffering (19), Works of Love (21).

With only a few exceptions they are translated as "temporal" (the adjective) throughout. In their version of Works of Love, the Hongs once translate timelig as "time-bound" (46:6), and once in Purity (38:3) Steere renders it as "time".

2. timeligt appears 93 times, almost exclusively in Christian Discourses (63); in Purity it occurs six times and in Edifying Discourses and Works of Love four times. In most works it appears only once or twice, if at all.

TABLE I

	Bd.	Standard Danish Abbreviations	date	pages	timelig	timelise	timeligt	Timelig	Timelise	Timelighed	Timeligheden	Timelighedens	Total
Papers Living	(1)	LP	Sept. 7 1838	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Concept Irony	(1)	BI	Sept. 27 1841	264	0	5	0	0	3	2	0	0	10
Either-Or I	(2)	EE1	Feb. 20 1843	402	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2
Either-Or II	(3)	EE2	Feb. 20 1843	314	1	2	1	0	9	0	12	2	27
Edifying Disc.	(4)	T	1843-1847	341	5	8	4	0	17	0	11	11	56
Fear-Trembling	(5)	FB	Oct. 15 1843	103	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	5
Repetition	(5)	G	Oct. 19 1843	80	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Forwards	(5)	F	June 17 1844	56	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fragments	(6)	PS	June 17 1844	87	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	1	5
Dread	(6)	BA	June 17 1844	134	0	1	0	0	6	6	22	1	36
Crucial Situations	(6)	TTL	April 29 1845	77	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
Stages I	(7)	SVI	April	72 ^a	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Stages II	(7)	SVI	30	82 ^a	2	0	1	0	5	1	7	6	22
Stages III	(8)	SV2	1845	268	2	1	0	0	2	1	3	4	13
Postscript	(9-10)	AEH2	Feb. 27 1846	525	1	2	2	0	4	0	12	1	22
Purity	(11)	LT	March 12 1847	126	10	3	6	0	5	2	43	21	90
What We Learn	(11)	HLF	March 12 1847	48	2	1	2	0	5	0	3	1	14
Suffering	(11)	LE	March 13 1847	112	7	12	0	1	10	1	10	5	46
Works of Love	(12)	KG	Sept. 29 1847	359	14	7	4	2	9	0	25	18	79
Christian Discs.	(13)	CT	April 26 1848	268	1	1	63	0	48	2	53	21	189
L.Notice (Present Age)	(14)	LA	March 30 1846	92	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Crisis-Actress	(14)	KH	July 24-27 1848	20	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	2

* approx.

TABLE I (cont.)

377

	Bd.	Standard Danish Abbreviations T.C.	date	pages	timelig	timelige	timeligt	Timelig	Timelige	Timelighed	Timeligheden	Timelighedens	Total
Lilies & Birds (14)	LF		May 14 1849	36	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	3
Priest-Woman-Sinner(14)	YTS		Nov. 13 1849	22	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Two Minor Treatises(15)			May 19	49									
a) Has man right	TSA		1849		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b) Genius & Apostle	TSA		1849		0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3
Sickness (15)	SD		July 30 1849	114	1	0	1	0	4	0	3	3	12
Training (16)	IC		Sept. 27 1850	224	3	1	1	0	0	0	7	3	15
An Edifying Disc. (17)	EOT		Dec. 20 1850	10	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Disc. Comm. Fri. (17)	TAF		Aug. 7 1851	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
For Self-Examin. (17)	TS		Sept. 10 1851	69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Judge for Selves (17)	DS		1851- 1852 Post.	103	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	1	5
Fatherland arts. (18)	BFF		1834- ff.	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Work as Author (18)	FV		Aug. 7 1851	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Point of View (18)	SFV		1848 Post.	88	1	1	1	0	0	1	2	3	9
Newspaper arts. (Attack) (19)	B21		1854- 1855	66	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	0	4
This ...to be said (19)			May 16 1855	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Instant I-II (19)	Ø		May- June 1855	30	3	0	3	0	1	0	0	1	8
Christ's Judgement (19)	HCD		June 16 1855	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Instant III-VIII (19)	Ø		June- Aug. 1855	83	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	4
Unchange. of God (19)	GU		Aug. 1855	12	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
Instant VIII-X (19)	Ø		Sept. 1855	47	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
TOTAL					58	50	93	3	141	17	225	106	693

It is an adverbial form and is usually translated as "temporally". In Purity Steere renders it as "temporal sense" (41:33), "this world" (97:1) and "temporal" (170:20). In Works of Love Hong and Swenson both use "time" (H., 44:20; S., 24:28), "temporal" (H., 82:24; S., 59:39); "temporal" in H., 340:17 as opposed to "worldly" for Swenson at the same place (S., 298:28). Lowrie in Christian Discourses (where it appears most often) normally translates it as "temporally"; however, he is inconsistent. Occasionally he translates it as "temporal" (five times: 141:3, 144:9, 144:10, 145:32, 146:22) and this meaning on the same pages (145-146) where he uses "temporally". Once he uses "time" (141:23). In Sickness and in Training it appears only once, and Lowrie uses "temporal". In "The Instant" articles he uses "temporally" three times and "temporal" once.

3. Timelig is found only three times in the authorship where it is simply timelig capitalized because it begins a sentence.

TimeTimelige, the adjective used as a noun, appears 141 times: 48 in Christian Discourses, 17 in Edifying Discourses, less than 10 in any one of the remainder, and not at all in many.

Most often it is rendered as "the temporal" by all translators, but in Purity Steere uses "temporal order" (215:20) and "temporal element" (33:12). Swenson in Suffering (121:31 and 32)

prefers "temporality", and Lowrie (not unduly concerned with consistency) prefers "temporal possessions" at Christian Discourses 143:22, 144:6, 145:36, 147:13, 147:22, 148:12, and "temporal things" on the same pages at 144:23, 144:26, 145:24, and Sickness 165:28.

5. Timelighed, the noun in which we are most interested, appears only 17 times throughout the authorship, six times in Dread. It is absent from the majority of works.

This concept is variously translated as "time" (by Lowrie in "Lilies and Birds", 335:34 and Christian Discourses 74:38, 106:38 and Stages 280:28 and by Steere in Purity 102:26; "the temporal" (by Lowrie in Dread, except at 83:24 where he uses "sense of time", and by Swenson in Suffering 119:18 where on the same line he also translates it as "sense of time"); and as "temporal existence" in Purity (149:7) by Steere. Capel, in his translation of The Concept of Irony, likes "temporality" (49:27; 132:23). This writer obviously agrees with Capel. The noun is not best translated as an adjectival phrase, "the temporal"; for this Timelige or the enclitic Timeligheden would have served better.

1. Cf. Dietrichson, op. cit. and supra, p. 198.

6. Timeligheden, the enclitic noun, appears 225 times--more than any other word in this study and most often in Christian Discourses (53) and Purity (43). In most works it appears less than 10 times and it is absent from many.

This word is translated most often as "temporal existence" by Swenson in Edifying Discourses and Suffering (although as "the temporal" in Edifying Discourses II, 84:32). Swenson and Hong like either "the temporal" or "the temporal world" in Fragments. In Stages Lowrie prefers "the temporal", and in Christian Discourses he uses "temporal existence"; in Sickness, Training and Point of View he prefers "the temporal", but he evidently has no particular preference in any of the writings which appear in Attack Upon Christendom where he translates the term variously as "temporal life", "time's duration", "life", and "the temporal". Hong in Works of Love also varies the translation by using "time", "temporal existence", etc., but he seems to prefer "temporality" (47:4, 96:35, 129:26, 131:29, 231:6, 236:5, et passim). Steere, in Purity, uses "the temporal order" or "the time order" often, but he also uses "the temporal", "temporal existence", and "world of time".

7. Timelighedens, the genitive, appears 106 times, again most often in Christian Discourses (21) and in Purity (21). It is variously translated in the manner of Timeligheden--the most numerous renderings being "of the temporal", "of the temporal

existence" and "of the temporal order". In Training, Lowrie uses "of duration" at 186:5, and in Works of Love Hong likes "temporality" at 97:15 and 283:5. Stephen Critess in Crisis in the Life of an Actress also uses "of temporality" at 91:8.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Kierkegaard: Primary Works

- Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye. Attack Upon "Christendom". Trans., with Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. London: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- _____. Christian Discourses. Trans., with Introduction, by Walter Lowrie. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.
- _____. Le Concept De L'Angoisse. Trans. by K. Ferlov and Jean J. Gateau. Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1935.
- _____. The Concept of Dread. Trans., with Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946.
- _____. The Concept of Irony: With Constant Reference to Socrates. Trans., with Introduction and Notes, by Lee M. Capel. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
- _____. Craint et Tremblement. Trans. by P. H. Tisseau, with an Introduction by Jean Wahl. Paris: Fernand Aubier, éditions Montaigne, 1946.
- _____. Crisis in the Life of An Actress and Other Essays on Drama. Trans., with Introduction and Notes, by Stephen D. Crites. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967.
- _____. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, with Introduction and Notes by Walter Lowrie. London: Oxford University Press, 1945.
- _____. Edifying Discourses. Trans. by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, with an Introduction by Paul L. Holmer. 2 Vols. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1962.
- _____. Edifying Discourses: A Selection. Edited, with an Introduction, by Paul L. Holmer. Trans. by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1958.

- Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye. Either/Or. Trans. by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, with Revisions and Foreward by Howard A. Johnson. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959.
- _____. Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death. Trans., with Introductions and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954.
- _____. For Self-Examination and Judge For Yourself! Trans., with Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.
- _____. The Gospel of Suffering. Trans. by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1948.
- _____. Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. Trans., with an Assessment, by T. H. Croxhall. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.
- _____. On Authority and Revelation: The Book on Adler, or, A Cycle of Ethico-Religious Essays. Trans., with Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955.
- _____. Philosophical Fragments or A Fragment of Philosophy. Trans. and Introduction by David F. Swenson; New Introduction and Commentary by Niels Thulstrup; Translation revisions and Commentary translated by Howard V. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- _____. The Point of View For My Work as an Author: A Report to History. Trans., with Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. London: Oxford University Press, 1939.
- _____. The Present Age and Of the Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle. Trans. by Alexander Dru, with an Introduction by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962.
- _____. Purity of Heart Is to Will One Thing. Trans., with an Introductory Essay, by Douglas V. Steere. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1956.
- _____. Repetition. Trans., with an Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. London: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- _____. Stages on Life's Way. Trans. and Introduction by Walter Lowrie, with a New Introduction by Paul Sponheim. New York: Schocken Books, 1967.

Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye. Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life. Trans. by David F. Swenson. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1941.

_____. Training in Christianity. Trans., with Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

_____. Works of Love. Trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, with a Preface by R. Gregor Smith. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962.

The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard. Trans. and ed. by Alexander Dru. London: Oxford University Press, 1938.

The Last Years: Journals 1853-1855. Edited and trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith. London: The Fontana Library, 1968.

Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers. Edited and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malant-schuk. 2 Vols. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967, 1970.

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer. Edited by P. A. Heiberg and V. Kuhr. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel Nordisk Forlag, 1909-1948.

Søren Kierkegaards Samlede Vaerker. Edited by A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange. Third edition, Vols. I-IX. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel Forlag, 1962-1964.

II. Kierkegaard: Secondary Literature.

Arbaugh, George B. and George E. Arbaugh. Kierkegaard's Authorship. Rock Island, Illinois: Augustana College Library, 1967.

Bedell, George C. "Kierkegaard's Conception of Time". Journal of the American Academy of Religion. Vol. 37, No. 3, 266-269.

Bejerholm, Lars. Meddelelsens Dialektik: Studier i Søren Kierkegaards Teorier om Språk, Kommunikation, og Pseudonymitet. Publications of the Kierkegaard Society, Copenhagen, Vol. II. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1962.

Broudy, Harry. "Kierkegaard's Levels of Existence". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. I. (1941), 294-312.

- Christopherson, Marvin F. "Søren Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Communication: An Approach to the Communication of Existential Knowledge". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University, 1965.
- Collins, James. The Mind of Kierkegaard. London: Secker and Warburg, 1954.
- Comstock, W. R. "Aspects of Aesthetic Existence in Kierkegaard and Santayna". International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6 (1966), 189-213.
- Croxyall, T. H. Kierkegaard Commentary. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956.
- _____. Kierkegaard Studies. London: Lutterworth Press, 1948.
- Daane, James. "Kierkegaard's Concept of the Moment: An Investigation into the Time-Eternity Concept of Søren Kierkegaard". Unpublished Th.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1947.
- Diem, Hermann. An Introduction to Kierkegaard. Trans. by David Green. Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press, 1966.
- _____. Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence. Trans. by Harold Knight. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959.
- _____. Philosophie und Christentum bei Søren Kierkegaard. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1929.
- Dietrichson, Paul. "Kierkegaard's Concept of the Self". Inquiry, Vol. 8. No. 1 (1965), 1-32.
- Duncan, Elmer H. "Kierkegaard's Uses of 'Paradox' Yet Once-More". Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, No. 27 (1967), 319-328.
- Dupré, Louis. Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963.
- Geismar, Eduard. Lectures on the Religious Thought of Søren Kierkegaard. With an Introduction by David F. Swenson. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1938.
- Grimsley, R. "Romantic Melancholy in Chateaubriand and Kierkegaard". Comparative Literature, Vol. 8 (1956), 227-244.
- Haecker, Theodor. Søren Kierkegaard. Trans., with a Bibliographical Note, by Alexander Dru. London: Oxford University Press, 1937.

- Henriksen, Aage. Methods and Results of Kierkegaard Studies in Scandinavia. Publications of the Kierkegaard Society, Copenhagen. Vol. I. Copenhagen: Ejnar Munksgaard, 1951.
- Herbert, R. "Two of Kierkegaard's Uses of 'Paradox'". Philosophical Review. Vol. 70 (1961), 41-55.
- Hirsch, Emanuel. Kierkegaard Studien. 2 Vols. Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1930-1933.
- Holmer, Paul L. "Kierkegaard and Logic". Kierkegaardiana, Vol. II. Edited for the Søren Kierkegaard Selskabet by Niels Thulstrup. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1957, pp. 25-42.
- _____. "Kierkegaard and Religious Propositions". Journal of Religion, Vol. XXXV (1955), 135-146.
- _____. "On Understanding Kierkegaard". Orbis Litterarum, Tome X (1955), 93-106.
- Horgby, Ingvar. "Immediacy-Subjectivity-Revelation: An Interpretation of Kierkegaard's Conception of Reality". Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1965), 84-117.
- Jansen, F. J. Billeskov. "The Literary Art of Kierkegaard". Trans. by Margaret Grieve. In Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, eds., A Kierkegaard Critique. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962, pp. 11-21.
- Johnson, Howard A. and Niels Thulstrup. (eds.). A Kierkegaard Critique. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962.
- Jones, Ozro T., Jr. "The Meaning of the 'Moment' in Existential Encounter According to Kierkegaard". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Temple University, 1962.
- Lowrie, Walter. Kierkegaard. 2 Vols. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962.
- Mackey, Louis. "Kierkegaard and the Problem of Existential Philosophy". Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 9 (1956), 404-419; 569-588.
- _____. "Loss of the World in Kierkegaard's Ethics". Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 15 (1962), 602-620.
- _____. "The Poetry of Inwardness". In George A. Schrader, Jr., ed., Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty. New York: McGraw Hill, 1967, pp. 45-107.

- Malantschuk, Gregor. "Kierkegaard and Nietzsche". In Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, eds., A Kierkegaard Critique. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962, pp. 116-129.
- Martin, H. V. Kierkegaard: The Melancholy Dane. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950.
- McKinnon, Alastair. "Believing The 'Paradoks': A Contradiction in Kierkegaard?" Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 61 (1968), 633-636.
- _____. "Kierkegaard's 'Paradox' and Irrationalism". Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, No. 27 (1967), 401-416.
- _____. "Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms: A New Hierarchy". American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1969), 116-126.
- Miner, Paul S. "Thanksgiving as a Synthesis of the Temporal and the Eternal". In Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, eds., A Kierkegaard Critique. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962.
- Patrick, Denzil G. M. Pascal and Kierkegaard. 2 Vols. London: Lutterworth Press, 1947.
- Schmitt, Richard. "The 'Paradox' in Kierkegaard's Religiousness A". Inquiry, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1965), 118-135.
- Schrag, Calvin O. "Kierkegaard's Existential Reflections on Time". The Personalist, Vol. XLII (1961), 149-163.
- Spe, N. H. "Kierkegaard's Doctrine of the Paradox". In Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup, eds., A Kierkegaard Critique. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1962, pp. 207-227.
- Sontag, Frederick. "Kierkegaard and the Search For a Self". Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, No. 27 (1967), 443-457.
- Stack, George J. "Kierkegaard and the Phenomenology of Repetition". Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, No. 26 (1966-1967), 111-127.
- Stevens, Eldon L. "Kierkegaard's Categories of Existence". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 1964.
- Swenson, David F. Something About Kierkegaard. Revised and enlarged edition. Edited by Lillian Marvin Swenson. Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1945.

- Thévenaz, Pierre. "La Dialectique de l'Existence chez Kierkegaard". Lettres, Vol. III, No. 1 (1945), 63-76.
- Thomte, Reidar. Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948.
- Ussher, Arland. Journey Through Dread: A Study of Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre. New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1968.
- Wahl, Jean. Études kierkegaardiennes. Second edition. Paris: Librairie Philosophique, J. Vrin, 1949.
- Wild, John. "Kierkegaard and Classical Philosophy". Philosophical Review, Vol. 49 (1940), 536-551.
- Wyschogrod, Michael. Kierkegaard and Heidegger: The Ontology of Existence. New York: Humanities Press, 1969.
- Zuidema, S. U. Kierkegaard. Trans. by D. F. Freeman. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1960.

III. Other Literature Cited and/or Consulted.

- Alexander, S. Space, Time and Deity. 2 Vols. London: Macmillan Co., 1927.
- Anselm. Proslogion. Trans. by M. J. Charlesworth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Aristotle. The Works of Aristotle. Edited by W. D. Ross. Vols. II, III, VIII. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930, 1931, 1928.
- Augustinus, Aurelius. Confessions. Trans. by E. B. Pusey. New York: Collier Books, 1961.
- Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics. Vol. I, 2 pts. Trans. by G. T. Thomson. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936, 1956.
- _____. "Nein! Answer to Emil Brunner". In Natural Theology. London: The Centenary Press, 1946.
- Benjamin, Cornelius. "Ideas of Time in the History of Philosophy". In J. T. Fraser, ed., The Voices of Time. New York: George Braziller, 1966.

- Berger, Gaston. "Approche Phénoménologique du Problème du Temps". Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie. Séance du 3 Juin, 1950. Vol. 44-45 (1950-1951), 89-132.
- Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will. Trans. by F. L. Pogson. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928.
- Black, Max. "Achilles and the Tortoise". Analysis, Vol. XI, No. 5 (March, 1951), 91-101.
- Booth, Stella. "The Temporal Dimensions of Existence". The Philosophical Journal, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Jan., 1970), 48-62.
- Bowman, Archibald Allan. A Sacramental Universe: Being A Study in the Metaphysics of Experience. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939.
- Brabant, Frank Herbert. Time and Eternity in Christian Thought. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1937.
- Brandon, S. G. F. History, Time and Deity. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1965.
- Brinkley, A. B. "Time in Hegel's 'Phenomenology'". Studies in Hegel, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. IX. The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff, 1960, pp. 3-15.
- Broad, C. D. "Symposium: Time and Change". J. MacMurray, R. B. Braithwaite, and C. D. Broad. Aristotelian Society, Supplementary, Vol. VIII (1928), 143-188.
- Bultmann, Rudolf. Essays: Philosophical and Theological. Trans. by James C. G. Greig. New York: Macmillan, 1955.
- _____. History and Eschatology: The Presence of Eternity. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962.
- Campbell, J. Man and Time. New York: Pantheon, 1957.
- Church, Margaret. Time and Reality. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1949.
- Cornford, Francis MacDonald. Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' 'Way of Truth' and Plato's 'Parmenides'. Trans., with introduction and running commentary, by F. M. Cornford. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1939.

Cornford, Francis MacDonald. Plato's Cosmology: The 'Timaeus' of Plato. Trans., with a running commentary, by F. M. Cornford. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1937.

_____. Plato's Theory of Knowledge: The 'Theaetetus' and the 'Sophist' of Plato. Trans., with a running commentary, by F. M. Cornford. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1935.

Cullmann, Oscar. Christ and Time. Trans. by Floyd V. Filson. London: S C M Press, 1951.

Fackenheim, Emil L. The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967.

Findlay, J. N. Hegel: A Re-Examination. George Allen & Unwin, 1958.

Frank, Erich. Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth. London: Oxford University Press, 1945.

Fraser, J. T. (ed.). The Voices of Time. New York: George Braziller, 1966.

Gale, Richard M. The Philosophy of Time. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Book, 1967.

Green, Thomas H. Prolegomena to Ethics. Edited by A. C. Bradley. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1883.

Hartwell, Herbert. The Theology of Karl Barth. London: Duckworth Press, 1964.

Hedwig, Klaus. "Hegel: Time and Eternity". Dialogue, Vol. II, No. 2 (1970), 139-153.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Trans. by Gustav Emil Mueller. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.

_____. Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Trans. and Notes by T. M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.

_____. Hegel's Science of Logic. Vol. I. Trans. by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961.

_____. The Logic of Hegel. Trans. by William Wallace. Second edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892.

- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Trans. by E. S. Haldane. London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co., 1892.
- _____. The Phenomenology of Mind. Trans. by J. B. Baillie. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967.
- _____. The Philosophy of History. Trans. by J. Sibree, with Prefaces by Charles Hegel and J. Sibree, and Introduction by C. J. Friedrich. New York: Dover Publications, 1956.
- _____. Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History. Trans., with an Introduction, by Robert S. Hartman. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1953.
- Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- Holm, Søren. "L'être comme catégorie de l'éternité". Orbis Litterarum, Tome X, fasc. 1-2 (1965), 84-92.
- Holmes, Edward. The Life of Mozart. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Everyman's Library, 1922.
- Husserl, Edmund. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Edited by Martin Heidegger. Trans. by James S. Churchill, with an Introduction by Calvin O. Schrag. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964.
- Jacque, J. H. "The Phenomenology of Temporal Awareness". The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. I, No. 1 (Jan., 1970), 38-45.
- Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. by Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan & Co., 1933.
- King, A. Hyatt. Mozart in Retrospect: Studies in Criticism and Bibliography. London: Oxford University Press, 1955.
- Knapp, R. H. and J. T. Garbutt. "Time Imagery and the Achievement Motive". Journal of Personality, Vol. 26 (1958), 426-434.
- Kümmel, Friedrich. "Time as Succession and the Problem of Duration". In J. T. Fraser, ed., The Voices of Time. New York: George Braziller, 1966, pp. 31-55.
- _____. Über den Begriff der Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962.

- Lotka, A. J. Elements of Physical Biology. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1925.
- Löwith, Karl. From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought. Trans. by David E. Green. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967.
- Lowrie, Walter. Johann Georg Hamann: An Existentialist. Princeton: Princeton Theological Seminary, 1950.
- McTaggart, J. McT. Ellis. Philosophical Studies. Edited by S. V. Keeling. London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1934.
- Meissner, W. W. "The Temporal Dimension in the Understanding of Human Experience". Journal of Existentialism, Vol. VII, No. 26 (1966-1967), 129-160.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. by Colin Smith, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.
- Meyer, R. W. (ed.). Das Zeitproblem im 20. Jahrhundert. Bern: Franke Verlag, 1964.
- Meyerhoff, Hans. Time in Literature. Berkely: University of California Press, 1960.
- Mure, G. R. G. An Introduction to Hegel. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940.
- Otto, Rudolph. The Idea of the Holy. Trans. by John W. Harvey. New York: Oxford University Press, Galaxy Book, 1958.
- Plato. The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Edited, with Introduction and Prefatory Notes, by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series LXXI, 1961.
- _____. Epistle VII. Trans. by R. G. Bury. In "The Loeb Classical Library", Plato, Vol. VII. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Poulet, George. Studies in Human Time. Trans. by Elliot Coleman. New York: Harper, 1956.
- Priestly, J. B. Man and Time. New York: Dell, 1964.
- Proust, Marcel. A la Recherche du Temps perdue. Vol. I. Paris: NRF, 1954.

- Rougemont, Denis de. Man's Western Quest. Trans. by Montgomery Belgion. New York: Harper, World Perspectives, Vol. 13, 1957.
- Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von. The Ages of the World. Trans.; with Introduction and Notes; by Frederick de Wolfe Bolman, Jr. New York: A M S Press, 1967.
- Schlegel, R. Time and the Physical World. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1961.
- Schrag, Calvin O. Existence and Freedom: Toward an Ontology of Human Finitude. Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1961.
- Sherburn, George. (ed.). The Correspondence of Alexander Pope. Vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.
- Smart, J. J. C. (ed.). Problems of Space and Time. New York: Macmillan, 1964.
- Stace, W. T. Time and Eternity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952.
- Stromseth, Walter A. "The Time-Eternity Correlation in Western Theology: An Exploration of Metaphysical Foundations". Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1960.
- Taylor, A. E. Plato: The Man and His Work. London: Methuen & Co., 1926.
- Tillich, Paul. Dynamics of Faith. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.
- _____. Perspectives on 19th and 20th Century Protestant Theology. Edited by Carl E. Braaten. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.
- Toumlin, S. A. and J. Goodfield. The Discovery of Time. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.
- Wahl, Jean. Les Philosophies de l'Existence. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1954.
- Weiland, J. Spena. Philosophy of Existence and Christianity. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1951.
- Weiss, Paul. "'Existenz' and Hegel". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. VIII (1947-1948), 206-216.

- Whitehead, Alfred North. The Concept of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920.
- Whitrow, G. J. The Natural Philosophy of Time. London: Nelson, 1961.
- Williams, Daniel Day. God's Grace and Man's Hope. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949.
- Williams, M. E. "Time in Hegel's Philosophy". Dialogue, Vol. IX, No. 2 (1970), 154-167.