The Paradox of a Modern (Japanese) Architecture

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the problems and contradictions inherent in modernity's levelling of the fabricative and political realms. Seeking a broader perspective on the origins of aesthetic culture and aestheticized politics, it examines the relation of architecture to technology, culture, and politics. The thesis examines the consequences of the Enlightenment and "Radical Enlightenment" (understanding the rise of the modern nation-state as a direct consequence of the 18th century's yoking of history and nature) from the perspective of Japan and its encounter with modernity. Japan as a modern nation-state, neither part of the European Enlightenment nor colonized by its instruments, was able to initiate a unique discourse around the question of history and the concomitant issues of identity and nihilism.

The thesis tracks the discourse through architecture as the terms shift and become more and more indistinguishable from the Western manifestations from which the Japanese architects wished to claim distinction.

The discussion on difference and possibility—cultural identity and the creative project—as fundamental questions for a contemporary practice of architecture is undertaken through an analysis of the polar positions of Tange Kenzo and Shirai Sei'ichi.

RÉSUMÉ

Le Paradoxe d'une Architecture (Japonaise) Moderne

Cette thèse analyse les problèmes et les contradictions inhérentes au nivellement du domaine structurel et du domaine politique de la modernité. En essayant de prendre une perspective plutôt large des origines de la culture esthétique et de la politique esthétisée, la thèse examine le rapport de l'architecture à la technologie, la culture et la politique. Cette thèse examine aussi les conséquences du Siècle des Lumières et même le Siècle des Lumières 'radical' (considérant l'ascension de l'état-nation comme une conséquence directe du dix-huitième siècle et son attelage de l'histoire et de la nature), du point de vue du Japon et de sa rencontre avec la modernité. Le Japon, un état-nation moderne, qui ne fit pas partie du Siècle des Lumières Européen et ne fut pas colonisé par les instruments de ce dernier, fut capable d'initier un discours unique sur la question de l'histoire et des problèmes concomitants d'identité et de nihilisme.

La thèse suit l'évolution des termes dans le discours de l'architecture qui finissent par se confondre de plus en plus aux manifestations analogues de l'Ouest dont les architectes japonais voulaient se distancer.

La discussion sur les différences et les possibilités – sur l'identité culturelle et le projet créatif – comme questions fondamentales pour une pratique contemporaine de l'architecture se fait à partir de l'analyse des deux positions polaires suivantes; celles de Tange Kenzo et Shirai Sei'chi.

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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction

> *It should be stressed that despite being Japanese ourselves, today we see Japan with the eyes of a foreigner, precisely like those of Lafcadio Hearn or Bruno Taut. Indeed, having gone beyond the process of modernization, we see Japan from a viewpoint similar to that of Westerners. It follows that the latter view of England incorporates the same mechanism of distancing as our view of England.*
> - Isozaki Arata, *The Island Nation Aesthetic*[1]

In March 1997 Karatani Kojin presented a lecture at Columbia University entitled "Japan is interesting because Japan is not interesting"[2]. The lecture makes a number of succinct points. First, what we take to be traditional Japan has in fact a very short history, most of it a mythology constructed this century based on the century before it. And second, as fascism is not essentially war-oriented, but rather dependent on a quality of total mobilization (Junger/Heidegger), that Japan's current economic crisis was not the result of its apparent shift from a 'cultural model' to an advanced 'capital model', but that Japan's successes and failures were no more than the logic of total mobilization playing itself out.

The essay, which I read several years ago when I started this venture, has come back to mind as I finish it and recent events have once again made clear that globalization is neither without cost nor universally accepted as either necessary or desirable.[3] Moreover, these same events seem to point to the fact that the means of history's resistance are the very motor of its accomplishment. I do not wish to explain Japan's current trials, but the case of Japan has become even more relevant to my own understanding of the relation of national identity to the cultural universals which precede and authorize the technical universals that underpin our technological and globally oriented world. What makes Japan so interesting and so relevant is precisely the hinterland in which it sought to dwell—or was made to dwell—apparently free of the castrating subjectivity of history and not responsible to it, yet totally capable of producing and acting within it. That position outside of history afforded the best perspective for its critique, but by the same token

(previous page) fig.1.1 1937 Paris Exposition. View of Italian, German, and Soviet Pavilions.

it required no accounting and no responsibility. (I am referring here to the fact that Japan was not explicitly colonized, and at least until the end of WWII, was able to modernize on its own terms). As Karatani observes, the Nationalist discourse of 'overcoming modernity' dating from the 1920's and 30's is remarkably similar to the post-modern one of the 1980's. And equally fraught with contradiction.

As an architect, the issues raised by Karatani are relevant both from the point of view of a history of architecture per se, as well as specifically with respect to Japanese architecture. The architectural consequence of 'total mobilization' playing itself out may be no more than critical regionalism in its various forms.[4] If this is the case, the question arises as to what degree Japan's case is unique and to what degree the categories of 'traditional society' vs. 'advanced capital society' reveal a deeper problem inherent in that which links them in the first place, namely history. What Karatani terms a cultural model and an advanced capital model may be understood as societies which gain their appearance primarily through cultural universals as opposed to those revealed by technical or historical universals. A crucial distinction lies therein, one which we will explore at length. Suffice it to say, however, that to leave the distinction in the realm of material historical categories is to preempt the possibility of criticizing those categories themselves, and perhaps fully revealing the relation of architectural making to the political realm through which it ultimately gains its appearance.

The mechanism which Isozaki refers to in the quote above, that which puts all of us at a distance with regard to our own cultures, is of course, modernity. Isozaki begins from the same critical standpoint as Karatani, and like Karatani, whose main object of criticism is the residue of Nationalist power which continues to exist in Japanese politics today, Isozaki's object of criticism is the Nationalist wolf of architecture parading as the modernist sheep, most specifically and famously, Tange Kenzo. Tange bases his reputation and his position as national architect on the authenticity of Ise as the authentic origin of Japanese architecture.[5] Isozaki, Tange's once-disciple, raises questions concerning both the authenticity and the nature of the 'origin',

given the role of history which intervenes. Tange, it seems, has always been loathe to deal with the specifics of history, preferring to leave it as an ambiguous entity which he calls "spirit". However, Isozaki is not the first to launch this criticism. He takes his cue from his other mentor—and Tange's greatest rival and critic—Shirai Sei'ichi.

Modernity was, of course, originally a Western phenomenon, with immense implications for how human beings order their lives and think about what they create. This thesis uses the case of Japanese architecture to examine the relationship of technology to culture and politics. These are all terms that either originated with modernity or were fundamentally altered by it, and they are all intimately tied up with what architecture is.

The thesis seeks to challenge existing conceptions of what architecture is and how it came to be what it is. It seeks to raise awareness of how deeply and fundamentally modernity has shaped our understanding of architecture and its relationship to politics and to the imaginative shaping of society.

In doing so, it considers two formidable opposing forces in Japanese architecture –Tange Kenzo and Shirai Sei'ichi. These men, the theoretical positions they espoused, and the debate they found themselves in, are highly instructive both in terms of how architecture has developed as it has faced modernity's challenges—and ostensibly how it could yet develop.

All societies—both Western and non-Western—have had to face the challenges and the aftershocks of modernity, whose implications became clear after the French Revolution, when the writings of the Enlightenment came to fruition and the 'people' sought to remake the political order. Modernity, then, begins with actualizing the principle of freedom, and all its implications follow from that. The order of the world, after the French Revolution, was not ordained from above, by a larger, suprahuman power, but rather was seen to begin and end with human beings and their freedom.

The implications of this principle have been staggering for all societies. They

have appeared to be most staggering for non-Western societies, as they have come from outside, and most frequently on the heels of the guns of colonizers.

What is fascinating about Japan—and the reason that it is a unique case study—is that Japan was never colonized. Japan had to grapple with the West and with technology, as did everyone else, but it did not also have to deal with wresting statehood from the colonizers, and so it could be relatively clear about what it was facing. For Japan, modernization was Westernization.

Implications of Modernity

The challenge, following the French Revolution, has lain in differentiating the individual will from the common will, where the challenge for the individual is in not disappearing into the common will. The tripartite base of the French Revolution – liberty, brotherhood, equality – destroys the possibility of a secure cultural universal. Conversely, it substitutes and defines the individual in terms of a substantive universal—what we may term a 'concrete' or 'technical' universal. There follows, necessarily as a consequence, a constant tension between the individual and the group precisely in that the concrete universal, no matter how it is limited or defined, precludes the intentionality of the individual subject. The way this inherent tension plays itself out gives rise to the three permutations which characterize the political landscape of the 19th and 20th centuries. Hence the three foundations of the modern revolution—freedom, equality and brotherhood—map directly on to liberalism, socialism and fascism.

If one premises freedom, one premises the individual but casts her at the mercy of a technical universal by upending the primacy of a universal per se. Hence one champions the individual at the expense of the political, or the common, and can only turn to the authority of the technical for validation. Ironically one has denied the means to judge or act humanly with respect to the technical precisely by disavowing the cultural standards or cultural universals which could come to one's aid. This is of course the criticism the

Nationalists would level at *effete* liberal societies such as America, England and France.[6]

If one premises equality and the universal that applies to all equally, regardless of particular distinctions, one premises the technical universal explicitly, but can speak to it "politically" only in the technical language of absolutes. Hence one ends up more or less in the same position as that of liberalism.

The nationalist criticism of liberalism then stands for socialism as well. If one seeks to save the cultural universal in the face of the new criteria of actualizing history—the reason for the revolution in the first place—one is forced to recast its mythical roots in terms of a new cultural authority. Hence the previously amorphous universal of language and culture is recast in terms of ethnicity and the concrete facticity of 'blood'.

Given the absolutely radical nature of this revolution, the new universal can have no authority without being able to hide its roots. There may be nothing given or necessary about history, but it must appear inevitable in order to ring true.

This desperate search for, and recasting of, the universals which could sustain the human, in the face of this immediately evident 'de-humanizing' history, can be termed modernity's romanticism. Both the proponents of an explicitly future-oriented enlightenment and the reactionary modernists who looked to the past recast their visions of the future by way their respective pasts and judged those future visions by what they could bring to pass concretely. Modernity's constant deferral toward the future is romantic in its essence. Normally one thinks of Romanticism as a movement of the 19th century, rather than associating it with the likes of Le Corbusier and Gropius. More accurately, though, as Octavio Paz has observed, Romanticism is the essence of modernity itself: a tradition 'against itself', i.e. a tradition which is always in the midst of becoming other.[7] The historicist consciousness that emerges in post-enlightenment or post-revolutionary Europe should indeed not simply be characterized by a passive historical relativism and scepticism but by an active will to bring about change. This concentration upon the future comes from modernity's way of conceiving temporality: time becomes

that in which human accomplishments unfold. The more we can bring about the new by overcoming the past and controlling the future, the more history we 'make', the more legitimacy we achieve for ourselves. The inherent aimlessness or nihilism of such a process is eclipsed by the redemptive ideology of progress (we will achieve the perfect kingdom of man on earth). Romanticism understood the irony in this and sought to transcend the inherent historical aporia by appealing to a universal. Art, in its universality, somehow lifted the political, in its particularity, and subsumed it within the universal. Romantic irony is nothing other than the birth of this aesthetic culture: the vague understanding that the presence of poetry could render meaningful the 'prosaic modern'. To act 'romantically' is thus to confront a specific perplexity or resentment: in order to act one must somehow reconstitute the universal while hiding or dissolving its very historicity—one must appeal to a 'timeless' and naturally given 'secular' truth. Again it leads us to the two great ideological systems that have marked the last two centuries: International Socialism, which claims a universal for all people, anywhere, anytime, and National Socialism, which limits the universal to a people bounded by race and blood. While it leads us to these systems, it does not confront the originating tension which remains: that between a cultural universal, inherently inarticulate and bound by context (i.e. so that there is nothing universal about it) and the technical universal with which it must be reconciled.

To understand the extent and consequence of this tension, it is instructive to consider the driving focus of Heidegger's critique of modernity, namely technology as nihilism. Heidegger's originating observation with respect to technology is simple: its language is a language of identity, x=x, or this = this (notice how confusing things are when they are identical to themselves; we can never get anywhere). No matter what, when we go to speak about it—to say what it is, or what it means—we speak in a language of human possibility: x is like x, or "this is that". In other words we rely on the process of deferral in order to create a space in which to operate, in which to appear.[8] The problem of universals, then, is one in which the technical universal must always be recast or stated in the language of cultural universals. An aporia results from the fact that the language of identity—the technical universal— precludes the possibility of a gap in which to appear humanly. Put another way, to define ourselves in terms of actualizing history, i.e. in terms of the

technical universal, is to define ourselves in terms of the very condition which cannot support or "parent" a properly human existence. Furthermore, this technical universal is undeniable in either its legitimacy or its efficacy. Who can or would argue with the fact that technology works, and that it works the same way for anyone who uses it? A gun shoots regardless of who pulls the trigger. Microsoft Windows works no worse in Cyrillic than it does in Greek. That it might crash regularly, or have more functions available in English, is merely a question of efficiency. The point is that while the technical universal, or history, seems to provide a convincing mode of engaging the world, and indeed a convincing ground for human appearance, that appearance is still by virtue of the cultural universals with which we give them expression, but which the technical universals, by definition, preclude. This is the aporia of modernity, and modernity's romanticism. To paraphrase Nietzsche's characterization of nihilism, this romanticism is the weirdest of all the guests who stands at our door. It is precisely that it is foreign to us, and yet of our own blood, that makes confronting this guest so difficult. And so pressing.

As we said, the concrete, technological universal that is at the root of modernity leads both to an internationalist focus and a nationalist one. In the first iteration, with its concomitant formal expression as modernism, the universal should mean the same thing to all people everywhere at all times. These internationalists, or modernists, chose to engage the future directly—however they chose to define it. This is the direct engagement of the future associated with the enlightenment—as we have seen still expressively romantic—and is the modernism exemplified by the likes of le Corbusier and CIAM (Le Congrès international de l'architecture moderne).

However, by the same token, le Corbusier and CIAM ran into severe criticism precisely because there is no room in the internationalist paradigm for cultural specificity. Metaphorically speaking, the individual is erased by the group. Internationalism, then, ran into a dead end because it could not account for cultural identity. This is the problem the nationalists needed to resolve, and is indeed the problem of the radical enlightenment, or what we might also call 'reactionary modernism'.

The nationalists wanted to find room for cultural specificity, for the cultural universal. Motivated by a need to establish and maintain cultural identity, the nationalists' proposal was to link the modern condition, or their interpretation of its cultural attributes, to history. They sought to legitimate their construction of the future by way of the past (the former cultural universal). Specifically, they sought to define their future by rooting it in the idea of 'nation' as a race, as an identifiable people. They set out to define the future of the nation by its ethnic group. To make this happen, they needed to actively create a sense of commonality, a 'common sense'. The important point about common sense is that it is a shared understanding that has no articulation. It is inarticulate. Moreover, because it is shared and not articulated, no individual can take responsibility for it. To articulate it would be to separate oneself from it and to differentiate oneself from it. The author[10] of such an articulation brings into question its commonality, subjects it to question, raises its very subjectivity. Only when it is not subjective—not questioned, not articulated—is it the shared understanding of common sense.

The fascists, therefore, in bringing their project to fruition, actually needed to hide their roots (the process of proceeding from what must be thought through and articulated, i.e. the need to find a place for cultural particularity in the future, to what has no need for articulation and can be said to be common sense). They wanted to make their particular cultural project appear natural and given, when in fact there was nothing given or natural about it. Demonstrating the machinations of such a project shows the *historicity* of history: the machinery behind history, the man behind the curtain in Oz. The successful completion of the project requires the 'hiding' of the machinations, so that history and its outcome appear to be a logical, seamless progression through time.

Indeed, there is nothing given about history, and Japan, then, did not have to react as did colonized states, but the interesting thing about it is that one can see in it nuances, degrees and ramifications of liberalism, nationalism, and socialism. All the ramifications of history and modernity were played out in Japan, and particularly quickly in the field of architecture. But in order to have this discussion in a context which allows us to step out of either the necessity of history, technology or architecture, we have to reveal the historicity of these terms and their appearance, themselves.

Some Questions Concerning The Validity Of Traditional Definitions Of Architecture Given The Modern Context In Which They Appear

> *This earthly home becomes a world in the proper sense of the word only when the totality of fabricated things is so organized that it can resist the consuming life process of the people dwelling in it, and thus outlast them. Only where such survival is assured do we speak of culture, and only where we are confronted with things which exist independently of all utilitarian and functional references, and whose quality remains always the same, do we speak of works of art.*
>
> -Hannah Arendt

So begins Arendt's thought experiment concerning the crisis in culture. Permanence and duration as implicit qualities of the work of art find their roots in the earliest understandings of techne and poesis. As much as one would yearn that such conditions could persist in a contemporary understanding of architecture—even merely as possibilities—the qualities of permanence and duration are undermined not by an absence of a traditional understanding, so much as by their collusion in the erasure of historical continuity. The paradox lies not in our ability or desire to produce 'things'—objects which ascribe permanence and duration to an existence marked by passing—but the authority vested in the things we make by history itself.

Any one of us would be loathe to define architecture in terms of a finite and quantifiable property—one which when identified would result in a reduction of architecture to a recipe or a 'science' (sic technique). The necessary resort is to culture and the 'arts', hence the cliché that architecture is both science and art, emphasizing a deeper affinity to the ancient Greek techne with its explicit poetic debt—as opposed to the modern technique with its disenfranchised history. With the poetic disclaimer in place, there follows little contestation of the claim that architecture involves making—and not just 'making', but making things, if not buildings.

Things, in the Heideggerian sense, have a thingly character. That is, what the thing brings to presence is given *not* so much in its objectness, but in what it renders plausible, legitimate and authentic in terms of a culture's inarticulate but real self-understanding. The question follows then: Are we

as architects concerned with substance, or are we concerned with authority? Moreover, do we necessarily have to declare one in favour of the other? Put simply, do we fabricate (produce) culture the way we fabricate (produce) art?

Let us recast this question in terms of the making and judging of architecture as embodied in the question of architectural theory. Is it even a problem that architects theorize about the possible and the probable everywhere as much as they theorize about the impossible and the improbable? The question of theoretical vs. practical architecture is an old one. For the most part, a theoretical approach is deemed a useful element of a student's liberal education, but it poses the risk of degenerating into a luxury or an irresponsible expenditure of time when confronted with real necessity. Theory, we are told, is necessary either to ensure political responsibility, or to rescue architecture from the prosaic. My contention, however, is neither. I have two different motives in posing the question of substance vs. authority. One is to call attention to the syllogism which plagues *both* the argument for and against 'theoretical architecture'. The other is to cast light on the problem of permanence and duration. This latter problem is ultimately the more intriguing since the argument will be made not for the legitimacy of ephemerality (as the opposite of permanence), but for recasting the architectural 'object' per se.

What Happens to the 'Thingly' Character of Things When Making and Knowing are Yoked?

The above introduction yokes two facets of architecture which, given separately, we might easily take for granted. The first is a given relationship between making and knowing, or praxis and theory. The second is duration— and its implied corollary, permanence—as desirable, if not necessary, aspects of things. What is in fact curious about such a yoking is that inherent within it are mutually exclusive modes of engagement. The first is unavoidably modern—no matter how nostalgic we wish to be—and the second is ironically nostalgic—no matter how indispensable it may be to the appearance of human being, properly so-called. It is modern to assume a dialectical relation between making and knowing. It is nostalgic to naively invoke permanence when the objects appearance assumes its own dialectical passing. Hence

we are faced with a basic aporia—an unresolvable paradox: Architecture either gives up any claim to a possible autonomy or it abandons the right to 'producing' meaning.

The original sense of *techne*, from which we derive our modern word 'technique', belongs squarely to the human realm of fabrication. So does the word *poesis*, from which we derive our own 'poetics'. What is missing in our modern rendering is the specific allusion to the eternal, or supramundane, from which the original terms gain both their sense and their legitimacy. But wherever these understandings had gained their appearance, the outcome of their use, i.e. the things of this world, offered their own legitimacy. There is a certain quandary here. A technique, ancient or otherwise, aims at a specific goal. If that goal is achieved, one gauges the mastery of both the artist and the technique itself. The goal may be the representation of 'beauty'. It may similarly be the creation of an implement or tool. No matter what is brought into this world, it is done so precisely through a means-end relationship. And this in itself was problematic for the ancients. While the artist, or *Homo faber*, was perhaps the best qualified and the best capable of bringing enduring things worthy of their permanence into being, for the very same reasons *Homo faber* was the least qualified to judge them. The means-end rational appropriate to the creation of those things was itself anathema to the political realm which they created.

Why Do Things Create a Political Realm?

Things, as the products of human intentionality, create a world. By this we mean that the very object in its objectness stands as a kind of contradiction. The thing is always more in its presence than can be reduced to a set of rules, techniques, or identifiable ends. Yet those rules, techniques, and identifiable ends are perfectly sufficient to bring things into being. We might put it the following way: human intentionality, actualized into things, presents a kind of "being in principle" as the duration of the things cuts across the natural stream of becoming, and presents a locus, or mooring, from which our own being may take root. And this is precisely the Aristotelian understanding of the relation of the polis to its constructed manifestation: Without the objectivity of a constructed world, human intentionality and the

political realm—the locus of properly human action—has no means of appearance. Human action, properly so-called, is predicated on the possibility of being "free" in itself, as opposed to being born of coercion and the necessity of achieving a specific end. Human intentionality, as with human action, is enacted towards a possible future, and the necessary condition for both in the first place is the possibility of being other than the given. It is the possibility of the word to found new meaning as much as the action to found a new world which allows either one to appear in the first place, regardless of whether the "new" is valued or not. The 'thing' functions the same way. Only the thing in its ability to exist independently of all utilitarian and functional references presents us with the very objectivity of the properly human. That objectivity stems from the shared (multivocal) realm of the political, not from the particular (univocal) realm of production. Recognized as such, we begin to speak of culture. The specific logic characteristic of the cultural or political realm is by definition a logic of "being able to think in the place of everybody else". Objectivity is itself a political concept derived from a consensus of free and equal individuals. Objectivity, as a naturally given, autonomous property of a thing, is merely a particular case, or subset, of the prior concept of political objectivity, not the other way round. Understanding this, we can appreciate the Greek or Roman distrust of the logic of identity particular to *Homo faber.*[10]

The long and the short of this is that the political realm and the realm of making share a mutually dependent relationship. They should not, and indeed cannot, operate according to the same logic. By the same token, their distinct modes of operating guarantee their respective possibilities. The cultural realm ascribes meaning to the products of *Homo faber* beyond the originating aims of their production, while the things of *Homo faber* guarantee the objectivity by which the transient and fleeting words and deeds of the political gain both their measure and their immortality.[11]

Modernity and the Aporia of "Time as History"

As we stated above, there is an irreconcilable paradox in the modern understanding which yokes knowing making and acting. The question is, what brings about this yoking, and what makes the yoking irreversible or unavoidable? The following section will try to answer this.

When we speak of theory as a corollary of practice, it is by definition modern. Theory in this sense has its clearest representation in Marx's famous adage where philosophy is to be turned on its head. Theory replaces philosophy in that it is no longer the 'love' of wisdom, but the possession of wisdom. In other words, philosophy is not a disinterested activity removed from «what is really happening» but is in fact engaged in the determination of how and what should happen. The consequence of this simple inversion is that theory surrenders its disinterestedness (as in the love of wisdom) and sets itself up as the arbitrator of what is, rather than the observer of what is. Theory, then, is inherently autonomous and answers only to itself. By definition, it is a 'discontinuous' moment in a heretofore process of continuity.

It should be noted, however, that the inversion is not by virtue of Marx, Hegel, or any other particular articulation. The inversion is manifest concretely when the arbitrating forces in our lives are removed from the supramundane and inserted in the mundane itself. In other words, when the authority of power does not ultimately lie with the gods but within the concrete world itself. And this of course can only happen when we ascribe ultimate judgement not to the supramundane but to the mundane world itself. While the 'state' represents this condition, where it represents the will of the people as opposed to the will of gods, the state too is only symptomatic and not the cause. Again the possibility only arises in conceiving of the properly human in terms of history. But it equally requires an understanding of the natural as part also of the process of history. In terms of the state, then, if the state represents the will of the 'people', one has to define 'people' naturally. And here is the critical shift and discovery of the 18th century. What heretofore existed as a cultural or political entity is redefined in terms of the concept of 'society'. Just as the state replaces the divine in terms of the 'cultural universal', society replaces the political realm in terms of the 'objective' body by which the individual gains his identity.

The concrete condition is the recognition of being born 'free' (i.e. biologically existing humanly) and recognising the lack of freedom in one's actual or concretely given condition. The irony is that the mundane becomes then not merely the natural as something prior and distinct from the human, but the natural is now a subset of the human itself since it is by virtue of manipulating

the "natural" that one changes one's historical condition. Truth comes to be what can be actualised or made concretely. This is another way of saying: Truth=history. Similarly, truth=nature. Notice the natural is now a subset of artifice. And this we all know well. Science is what appears according to the models and techniques by which we grant it appearance.[12]

This genealogy reveals another potent facet of both modernity and theory. As we said, theory predicates its verity—its 'truth'—on actualization. This is the yoking of knowledge and action. Both the mode of its verification—how it changes the world or changes history—and the very dialectical movement of continuous discontinuity is precisely how we define its corollary: technology. Technology is the yoking of knowledge and making (techne + logos). Theory/praxis, so linked, is technology. What separates the theory/praxis and techne of the ancients from the theory and technology of the moderns is *not* merely a matter of sophistication. It is precisely the removal of the distinctions governing the various spheres of human endeavour as well as the distinctions between the mundane and the supramundane, and the subsequent insertions of these formerly distinct entities into the natural. The result is their subsequent appearance as "naturally" given versions of the former—precisely what allows Marx's understanding in the first place: their insertions into the only possible object of human science: history.[13]

The Politicization of Art and Aestheticization of Politics

There are two points we wish to pursue here with regard to interpreting the human, the natural, and the divine in terms of 'history': What are the ramifications for the political realm, and what are the ramifications for the fabricative realm?

First of all we noted that both realms were now characteristically technological. In other words, they are combined. Hence it is ridiculous to think of technology as signified in a computer, an instrument or a machine any more or less than it is in a bird, a flower or one's neighbour. The political, in being rendered a mechanism of history, is reduced to a process, the logic of which, as we have seen, is governed by a means-ends relationship. One may naively call

this progress, so long as the end is known and constant. If the end is questioned—as in whose 'history'—'progress' is reduced to 'process', and politics reveals itself as a wilful 'means-means' process with the burning question "whose will?" at issue.

To answer this, let us return to the fabricative realm, and specifically that of architecture. Let us also begin with the idea of history as progress—dominant perhaps until the 1960's and 70's when finally the necessity of history finally began to be questioned outside of philosophy and a few disparate art movements.[14]

While we have argued that politics and fabrication are inherently levelled with the modern state, the two are not initially perceived as equivalent, or interchangeable modes of understanding. Characteristically, perhaps as a holdover from the ancients, perhaps the simple fact that architecture was already accepted as an 'art' while politics was yet to be so perceived, the crisis that followed in architecture was one where architecture became as much about its 'meaning' as about building.[15] What caused this was not that architecture heretofore had lacked 'meaning', but precisely that that meaning could no longer be taken for granted. The external or 'supramundane' had been placed within the mundane and therefore called upon to account for itself. All standards were accountable to the new 'god' of human history. Before that, the 'eidos' had been constant and the building was a relatively transient and pale manifestation of that constancy, but both at least provided a basis for a notion of duration from which a political or 'human' world could take root. Now both were rendered inherently fleeting, slated to be overcome by history's passing. The ultimate meaning or 'eidos' of the architecture was that it appeared obsolete before it was built (i.e. actualized). Architecture seemed to be shooting itself in the foot so long as it could not outrun its own shadow.

The initial response—perhaps the more obvious—is that all artifice comes to respond to this historical necessity. Art in effect becomes 'socially responsible'—whether it seeks to manifest society as given or spurn it (note the irony in the latter case: culture comes to rely on those who would flee its confining bounds the most). The naive form of these two responses is the

simple engagement of the future directly. I say naive because it assumes that the image of the future which it engages is simply there. This position, generally what we call 'the enlightenment', or even 'modern', sees historical necessity as a matter of simply working out the mechanics of how we get from here to there. It does not question the necessity or origin of that 'where'.

The reaction to this, what we call romantic—and later, 'reactionary modern'—is what follows from the realization that any future orientation requires an idea of what that future should be. Hence an idea of the future is constructed through what one knows or understands of the past. In that case, whether the future looks like a Gothic ruin or a vision of Sant'Elia, it is still a historical engagement and betrays the same future orientation.

Octavio Paz's observation, that Romanticism is the essence of modernity itself: a tradition "against itself", i.e. a tradition which is always in the midst of becoming 'other', is useful here. One may see this revolt as progress. Or upon reflection on the historicity of 'progress', deem it mere 'process'. Nonetheless one is still faced with the problem of a future fundamentally different from the past from whence it came. 19th century Romanticism rightly concluded that any future was posited based upon a specific past, and that it was the nature of that conceived ideal which was essential. Hence any "modern" movement was in essence acting romantically. Regardless of the specific ideal one chose to enact, one constructed the future 'actually', and judgment, or legitimation, lay in its actualization. Thus, were Romanticism to have been forced to concern itself with the prosaic and political present, it would have been every bit as modern as the enlightenment, and ultimately every bit as technological: both acted toward the future and both required that the posited future come to pass. Both were wilful constructions of the future, and by the same token had to see their own overcomings. Romanticism sought to use art as a universal that would transcend the inherent historical aporia. Art was seen to be able to lift the particularity of the political and subsume it within a universal. Romantic irony—and its sense that things are not what they seem at first to be—was the movement's solution, and its attempt to render the 'prosaic' meaningful.

Defined this way, however, Romanticism cannot act politically, because any

direct action would reassert the singularity of the present. Acting 'romantically', then, requires an attempt to somehow reconstitute the universal while hiding its historicity and appealing to a 'timeless' and 'secular' truth. This is what lead to International Socialism and National Socialism. And where one chooses to deny the relation of politics and making, the result is every much the espousing of an aesthetic culture that is «art for art's sake», or mere formalism.

The implications for such critiques of visual culture that would expose the machinations of aestheticized politics are largely beyond the scope of this paper, but it is relevant to point out that both politicized aesthetics and aestheticized politics take for granted the same relationship, namely that culture, like history, can be made.

Let us stick, for the present, with architecture. As we have briefly sought to argue, in yoking building and logos, architecture can only respond by becoming socially meaningful. The response however is not volitional. It is necessary so long as the terms of history and nature are in essence equated and one is understood in terms of the other. This is crucial. What is made stands as a possible paradigm and therefore regardless of its intention it remains projective and therefore dialectical.[16]

What then are the conditions that would allow architecture to be simply 'building' —not yoked to any logos — and give architecture back its autonomy?

The Architectural 'Object'

The argument thus far cites the crucial moment in the grounding of the human in the natural, thus making 'actualization' the necessary condition for meaning to appear. It is this equation which renders 'science' technique as much as it reduces human history, human being, and nature itself to mute stuff deprived of any thingly context or characteristic. In Marx's observation, "we can only know what we have made." But here the assumption in Marx is that what is made is revealed objectively in its material nature. Let us compare this with Vico's similar formulation: "We can only know that which we have made, *but*

that making is poetic." The crucial difference lies in the locus of meaning. For both Marx and Vico, history is man-made, *therefore* it is the proper object of science. But Vico's qualifier clearly understands history within human artifice—as distinct from nature—therefore grounding the political within the realm of the imagination. For Marx the results are measured concretely, and therefore the locus of the human is placed within the natural. This, however, is a contradiction since meaning grounded in the natural would deny the conditions that allow human intentionality in the first place, and by consequence reduce the human to a historical dialectic.

What we get from Vico is a relation of the human to the natural which precedes any possible appearance of equivalence. Vico's advocacy of the imaginative as prior to the appearance of meaning is not (in architectural terms) a call for make-believe. On the contrary it is a clear distinction between the imaginative universals which are cultural products and by definition inarticulate, and the intelligible universals which are articulate expressions of identity. The former results in the possibility of temporal movement and imaginative (sic monstrous) fecundity (that necessary source of human freedom), while the latter allows for the demonstrating and legitimizing authority of recognition. Together these comprise a dialectic of sorts, to be sure, but one not to be confused with the castrating impotence of historical materialism or its derivatives.

But this still does not address the question of architectural autonomy. We may distinguish between the universals implied by a historical dialectic— whether by blood, birth, or mere existence—and the universals which constitute language and culture. But of what use is the distinction to architects? Again, if we recall a traditional understanding, the necessary condition for architecture's autonomy was the separation of the political realm, with its multivocal freedom from coercion, and the fabricative realm, with its univocal logic of necessity. That works when one's world is not seen to be fundamentally changing, but what is the possibility of such a distinction where the relation is given by time/history/change itself? Hence the claim at the beginning that either architecture gives up its right to produce culture (a claim we have already shown to be a contradiction in terms) or it gives up its claim to autonomy. Since the first is a contradiction (i.e. is unable to author

adequately a cohesive human realm), we are left with thinking through the implications of the second.

Architecture as Political Thought

To this point architecture has always tried to accommodate itself to the political model. That the political had become fabricative seemed irrelevant. Further, the model of architecture as an art seemed necessary where architecture had in fact taken on the responsibility of political judgment. The question is: why does the thinking only work in one direction i.e. fabrication follow ideation (praxis follow theory). Theory following praxis is hardly satisfactory if it implies the suspension of judgment and the relinquishing of architectural thought to randomly applied formulae (topological – blob architecture comes to mind, but only as the most recent manifestation of the same 'aesthetic culture'). This obviously is not the answer.

Once again we have to backtrack and consider the relation of creativity (making anew) to the dialectic of progress. Obviously one does not occur without the other. And indeed here, as so well evinced by every Socratic discourse, thought is every bit as fabricative as the technical arts Socrates uses to move the dialectic forward. In fact, to take a Socratic line in this argument we would almost want to end it now by simply declaring that it is not a question of throwing out imagination in favour of reason. It is a matter of not leaving something as potent as imagination in the hands of those ill-equipped to use it (namely the poets and the architects).

Thought in its essence is fabricative. It monstrates and requires demonstration in order to be granted the legitimation necessary to continue the process of worlding. Such demonstration is a communal act, not a singular one, and can only take place within the bounds of an understood discourse.

In this case, the only possibility is to scribe limits of consensus around the architectural ground. In other words, the dialectic is recognized as necessary, but is limited to a situation of cultural consensus, as opposed to a technically given universal. The onus is either placed on the role in which architecture is

conceived, i.e. as a repository of tradition, or as a mimetic thrust into a possible future. The second is perhaps the more recognizable. It is what we have come to term a hermeneutic approach in which history is actively reconstrued through the faith that the poetic act itself guarantees the possibility of legibility through shared experience. The former, however, is the more difficult, for as should be expected by now, it contains within it its own traps and qualifiers.

Architecture as Cultural Repository

In the traditional model, the crisis of meaning is irrelevant because it can safely be assumed. One would not even need the word 'tradition' until the very horizon of its identity could no longer be assumed. The word itself points to the very lack of its authority as well as its authenticity. How then does an architecture become a repository of tradition which can author—found with authority, that which by definition is a «creation ex nihilo of an irretrievable past»—yet remain accountable to the very culture which gives birth to it?

Progress as a political means of creating and judging, and progress as technical advancement, are two separate and in fact contrary modes of being. They must be separated from the start in order to elucidate the inherent devaluation of meaning which plagues progressive, or 'modern', societies. This is the crisis inherent in the devaluation of the cultural universal's end by virtue of the technical universal's absence of ends.

Technical universals apply to rational beings with no particular ground. Political (cultural) universals are cultural phenomena limited to the cultural ground which gives rise to them. The crossing point between the two types of universals lies in the shared being of the culturally produced artefact: the things of the world (speech as much as science, architecture, painting, sculpture and poetry). It should be noted that while things come to share both universals, the universals themselves are mutually irreconcilable but mutually dependent. One can conceive of them in the following way: The technical universal refers to mathemata, or the intelligible—what is already known—while cultural universals are predicated upon the imaginative (only partially known). As contrary as the two are, both types of universals begin

from a speculative standpoint, and therefore from a standpoint where meaning is given apriori. While both types of universals thus share fundamental characteristics, the objects they give rise to are in fact opposite. The speculative standpoint of each is implicitly creative: both perceive and demonstrate meaning in its appearance. However, as described already, if the objects they give rise to are taken as finite in their givenness (i.e. purely natural), fabrication, production and the appearance of meaning are all confounded as part of the same process. If, however, we think of 'objects' and 'objectivity' as embedded in a historical horizon, and we recognize our relation to that horizon as a speculative but mimetic one, then the problem changes. The issue becomes one of cultural authority. Hence the first problem of science—first as in radical—is itself the problem of imagination, and the imaginative origins of speculative thinking. As this speculative imagination arises out of a common understanding and in fact legitimates that common sense, it is the basis of authority. Hence its appellation as a 'universal'. As it refers to the cultural ground by which thinking and knowledge are in fact possible, it is a 'cultural universal'.

We still have to deal with the context of time as history which brackets this entire discussion and constitutes the context in which we all act. Time as history judges our actions according to what we call progress. An understanding of "for what sake is progress" obviously precedes the means of progress itself. But this also means separating judging from action and making. Attaining this critical distance is not easy, for the simple reason that technical progress not only presents its own set of possibilities, but also provides the internal authority of its 'truthfulness' (i.e. certainty). But our contention is that in fact this authority is incapable of supporting the ground whereby one objectifies and creates in the first place. For this reason, the only mode of action possible may indeed be historical and dialectical, but profound qualifiers now modify this understanding: The necessity of history results from the need to judge one's actions in the face of infinite possibility and an absence of historically given ends. Irony then is no more than the ability to account for historical authority in the face of this infinite possibility. The task of reading history is (already) ironically given as a creative, interpretive task of authentication where one is required to construct the ground. The dialectic of meaning (as in the original meaning of the word) is

limited to accountability and dialogue and for the sole purpose of allowing right judgement. And this is the role of architecture. To provide that moment of duration from which the dialogue of authentication begins. Yes , it includes making objects. It also means accountability in a sense heretofore unexplored.

Sure enough, architects have a choice: They can pursue their quest for an autonomous discipline and reconcile their contribution to that of worker drones. Or they can accept a loss of autonomy and accept the challenge of historical self-consciousness. The latter may be the harder to swallow—and more work—but at least one would no longer be burdened by such problematic conceits as the production of culture.

Modernity and Architecture in Japan

Tange was the post-war hero of the modern in Japan. He came from the intense nationalist environment of Tokyo University, but after the war, he established himself as the demiurge who represented the nation, and who did so by radically appropriating an architectural tradition.

Tange's solution was what Frampton would later term "critical regionalism". Tange's "regionalism" was a means of circumventing a number of impasses: internationalism and its lack of a place for national identity; and nationalism which appears inauthentic unless it can hide its own historicity. Critical regionalism allows for the legitimation of both as well as hiding the very historicity of the project itself, which is the reconciliation of universals with the individual.

This, incidentally, is the very problem of the Hegelian subject: how one allows the particular and the universal to stand concretely, actually, and simultaneously. Tange uses a vague understanding of *zeitgeist* for the same concrete end: a Japanese iconography is appropriated as «spirit» rather than "moment".

Critical regionalism, then, sought to sublimate the technological universal/ cultural universal face-off by critically engaging modernism, not through the vernacular, but through cultural or regional "traditions".

Tange is the quintessential representative of postwar modernism, and in him we shall see the extent to which modernism is the dialectical synthesis of internationalism and nationalism, extracting each from its own dead end. Tange is an emblematic demonstration of why nationalism and internationalism are two sides of the same coin, and why the whole notion of cultural regionalism is suspect precisely because it legitimates, in apparently criticizing, the terms of modernity. It erases the historicity of modernity and legitimizes it at one and the same time.

fig.1.2 - 1.4 clockwise from top: Soviet, Spanish, Japanese Pavilions.

In the thirties, Japanese architects were of the opinion that it was shameful that although Japan had become the conqueror, the cities of conquered Asia were full of more glorious buildings than were those of Japan. Japan had no useful architectural precedent with which to dominate its subjects. The modern architects were confronted with remaining true to modern architecture, which came out of an implicit internationalism, and being able to present a nationalist image, one now complicated by the need for monumentality.[17]

Tange was the most successful at achieving a monumental Japanese modernism. The base of Tange's success lay as much in a loose appropriation of sukiya as it did in the appropriation of Western planning. Sukiya, a formalized way of building associated with the tea ceremony, which by definition invokes the paradox of "no style," had already been recognized as a viable mode of engaging modern architecture. Sukiya was indeed authentically Japanese (and therefore solved the problem of a lack of a cultural specificity), but did not have the definitive presence in scalar terms to be called monumental, never mind qualify as appropriate for public space. It is precisely through the notion of cultural specificity that Tange was able to address nationalism, later picked up by Frampton to amend modernism's Achille's heel in the form of critical regionalism.

Nationalism's need to confirm the concrete truthfulness of its culturally constituted universals is merely the inverse of modernism's inherent need for validation by the regional. The racial or biological qualifications which accompanied nationalism's reasoning is an example of this. There is no paradox, then, in a myth-based nation such as fascist Italy or Nazi Germany— or imperial Japan—engaging in the sophisticated use of the concrete (technical) universals and producing great technological advances. Nor is there any paradox in internationalists invoking a monumental dimension to their work any more than a regional one. In fact, the regional is merely a more palatable form of the monumental, and this is borne out in how Yatsuka presents Tange as an extreme form of Sukiya, as opposed to seeing him outside the Sukiya paradigm.[18]

Tange's source of appropriation is not as much the recognisable forms of the teahouse as the conceptual appropriation of the teahouse. Consequently, Katsura Imperial Villa as much as the shrine at Ise become historical grab bags—appropriately rendered—out of which one may construct this regional/ monumental modernism. Crucial to the project, given the latitude being taken with the definition of tradition and the creation of the "authentic" architecture, is the presence of the originating myth. Tange, to successfully launch his own trajectory as both demiurge and national architect in every sense of the word, needed to hide his own subjectivity within the "modern" original, and to recast the original as the source of the modern spirit. For Tange, this was successfully done with Shinto, and specifically the shrine at Ise—the most sacred and culturally significant of Japan's Shinto shrines. Tange had arrived at the formula for designing "monumental buildings with gabled roofs in symmetrical, centralized, hierarchical complexes."[19] Later Tange would make the claim that the shrine at Ise was the prototype for Japanese architecture. When confronted with the question of tradition and appropriation, he retorted "We inherit spirit, not details"[20]. The Shinto shrine, interestingly, only appeared after the import of Buddhism into the country from China, which makes the search for an 'authentic' Japanese style suspect from the beginning.

Tange was not without his critics. Kawazoe's designation of Tange as a war criminal and his observation regarding the similarities between the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere competition and the Hiroshima Peace Park were not unique, and neither were they particularly consequential.[21] Wartime guilt did not amount to much because the post-war assumptions were not necessarily fundamentally different. In other words, the criticism was not offered from a fundamentally different perspective and therefore could not be forcefully argued. One man who did offer a critique from a different perspective was Shirai.

Shirai's understanding of history is neither modern nor postmodern. Shirai accepted the dialectic but did not interpret it as a Hegelian for its inevitability, but in the Greek sense, as dialogue. Shirai maintained that one cannot accept history at face value and not cut oneself off at the roots. What Tange was doing, he said, was legitimating a romantic role for the architect as the demiurge, the talent-creator who can pull ideas seemingly out of nowhere

and use them to found the new nation, the new common sense. Shirai's argument was that this is what the nationalists had always tried to do. He, like Kawazoe and others, saw that there was nothing new in Tange's actions, but more importantly, that there was nothing legitimate about it without the de-monstration of the demiurge's creation. Tange's appeal to a vague notion of spirit, where that spirit is characterized by a critical dialectic but sanctioned by an origin beyond criticism, is contradictory. One's connection to that origin is precisely mediated by the ability to demonstrate the connection, something Tange perhaps wished to avoid. For Shirai, the only common sense that is legitimate is one which comes about through a shared discourse and which allows a passing of the "new" as something recognizeable and understandable to slip into the inarticulate ground of a common sense. Tange's bid, however, was to outwit history's relentless overcoming, the very dialectic of spirit that saw its own obsolescence in every step forward. It was a bid for his own immortality, but it was still predicated on a Romantic bid to deny that passing by obfuscating the conditions of its own particularity.

As we shall see, Shirai's position, in contrast, is in support of a dialectic which is limited precisely by the cultural re-enactment of history, the living dialogue of history. It involves accepting and attempting to acknowledge the connection of dialectic to creativity in all its consequences. Rather than hide the dialectic and attempt to erase its historicity in order to render it universal, its very point is to force the issue of its re-creation as a creative or appropriative act. Hence rather than trying to outwit time as that in which human events unfold, it sees time as a human concern in which the durability of the made is the very standard by which one's articulation of the common is constructed.[22]

Shirai and Tange conducted their debate informally through the architectural publications. Interestingly enough, Shirai, who was widely travelled and connected to a broad range of international thinkers, including the French writer André Malraux, abandoned the dialogue when the dominant magazine, *Shinkenchiku*, reoriented itself towards an international audience. He objected to the publication's projection of an image of Japan implicitly aimed at an international and universal community instead of a closed and particular community.

The crux of the thesis, and of the Shirai-Tange debate, revolves around Japan's ambiguous relation to history. In elucidating the issues therein, and in telling the story of Japanese architecture to date, we will examine the notion of an origin or the existence of a prototype of culture and what it is to propose it to be accessible across Modernity's divide. We will examine the formulation of this question through Okakura Kakuzō and his ideas on history versus the assumed idea of history which eventually took root within the architectural profession. We will examine the search for Japanese style in sukiya, and we will analyze, in detail, the implications of the divergent approaches of Tange and Shirai as fundamental paradigms of architecture.

Architecture in the modern sense had not existed in Japan before 1868. It is important here to differentiate between 'style' and 'architecture'. Style had been understood in Japan in one sense or another for millennia.[23] The oldest existing wooden structure in the world, Hōryūji is a temple in Japan. There are names and precise designations regarding styles and types of building. Style was always critical in Japan because style denoted status, and therefore building was inseparable from the realm of appearance, the realm of everyday life. There were particular details that certain classes could or could not use to remain in keeping with their societal positions. Nonetheless, architecture did not exist before 1868, because history, as such, did not exist in Japan before 1868. The notions of style and building, on the one hand, and architecture, on the other, meant something completely different, and had nothing to do with one another until after modernization.

Shirai argues that we are all modern, and we all act dialectically, but if building becomes bound up with the social and responsible for meaning, and politics becomes making, then architecture does not just serve the social. The social is not the definition of politics to begin with. Architecture in the modern condition becomes a mode of thought itself. Architecture becomes political, not as a social device, but as a requisite to the realm of appearance.

The thesis makes the case that architecture is a modern phenomenon, a phenomenon of modernity, and there is nothing given or necessary about it, including the definitions we use on a regular basis to describe it. The Japanese case provides us with a perfect vehicle for understanding this, but its instruction is relevant to all, precisely as participants in modernity.

Review of Literature

One important contribution to the discourse is this dissertation's recasting of pertinent observations from the perspectives of alternative disciplines. By this, I simply mean that architecture has traditionally borrowed the language of other disciplines to explain and further itself. But this exchange is, for the most part, one way. Further, when a backward glance is cast on architecture to write its history, for the most part it remains within the bounds of that history: i.e. art history, or a history of architecture. As has been repeated numerous times already, this acting within a given horizon precludes confronting the very historicity of that horizon, and leaves its *de facto* authority in place. As the principle aim of this thesis is to understand how architecture is used and functions within the wider spheres of everyday life, it is in our interest to draw on these architectural histories, as much as on the works and writings of architects themselves to elucidate our analysis. In this respect, the thesis owes a tremendous amount to existing works in the field. Primarily I have drawn on the scholarship of Evelyn Kestenbaum and David Stewart. Stewart's "Making of a Japanese Modern Architecture" remains the single most encompassing thesis on the subject in any language—including Japanese, much to the chagrin of many Japanese scholars. One significant difference between the two authors is seeing Modernism as a consequence of Ito's Nihon Shumi rather than one of Sano's "engineering" approach. Kestenbaum's study on Tange, narrated concisely around key competitions, is exceedingly thorough in revealing both Tange's nationalist roots, even in his post-war "populist" phase. Similarly she is convincing in revealing Itō Chūta's role in facilitating an argument for modernism. As her title suggests, her interests lie primarily with the dialectic of modernism and tradition within, as she calls it, an architectural ideology. What remains outside this discussion, and is perhaps occluded by such a formulation, is the relation of both tradition and modernism as products of a dialectical understanding of history in the first place. The focus here considers tradition and modernism as symptomatic of history rather than causes of the history we may wish to write. Japan wished to capitalize on an ambiguous relation to history, the fact that it was not a colony of the West and could claim distinction. To accept a dialectic of the modern and tradition within an architectural ideol-

ogy is to accept a historical engagement and all the repercussions associated with it. In the case of Tange this appears to be a completely accurate assessment. Yet the fact that at least one question can be raised—and appears to be raised consistently if not entirely successfully by the likes of Okakura and Shirai—then the necessity of that acceptance must be questioned. If Karatani is right about "total mobilization", Japan may have surrendered an ambiguous relation to history a long time ago. Either way, we still need to ask how that came to pass in order to speculate on alternatives. Hence the question of what is implied in a "history of architecture" and why Itō Chūta's understanding of history as opposed to Okakura Kakuzō's is so critical to understanding Tange's paradigm versus Shirai's. We should not be surprised by the fact that Tange's modernism has roots in *Nihon shumi* (the general name for the Japanese historicist style), nor that *Nihon shumi* is necessary in the development of a modern Japanese architecture. Both belong to modernity's paradigm of history. As David Stewart had observed already, both historicism and secessionism were equally 'new', equally 'modern' and equally 'Western' from Japan's perspective. Thus Stewart points out the irony of a 'modernism' which is inherently 'postmodern' from the start. Stewart chooses to cast his narrative within the tradition of architectural history, while pointing to these ironies and moments of slippage. As with Kestenbaum, he does not primarily seek to pursue their consequences in other realms. This may explain why neither he, nor any of the aforementioned writers, is particularly interested in Shirai. Shirai does not shed light on straightforward understandings of history.

One particularly speculative writer who takes a different stance is Yatsuka Hajime. Yatsuka, as an architect as well as a scholar, and beginning from a position resonant with Karatani, early on in his career saw the crucial differences between Shirai and Tange as a means of discerning conflicting issues within the architectural discourse. While bringing Shirai to the attention of Anglophone readers, he did so realizing that Shirai was destined to remain, in his terms "a papal figure."[24] Nonetheless Yatsuka has managed to bring a number of fundamental concerns to the forefront. Aside from the fruitful pairing of Shirai and Tange as protagonists, he has raised the issue of aestheticization as a form of orientalism operative both from within the Japanese architectural scene as well as without. Once again, Tange is deeply

entangled within the debate. A third incisive characterization that Yatsuka makes is to include Tange within a discussion of modern sukiya and to analyze this characterization within the context of a critical regionalism. And this is where Yatsuka goes to the heart of Kestenbaum's narrative. The only reason Tange can resolve the impasse of nationalism and internationalism is because they are subsequent moments of the same dialectic. As Yatsuka points out, critical regionalism serves to legitimize modernism and the universal it invokes precisely by accepting its validity. The recognition it accords the universal allows the constructed nature of that universal to slip invisibly into what becomes common sense.

The intent of this thesis then lies primarily outside the bounds of traditional scholarship. The questions I wish to pose to Shirai are not those of traditional architects but are the concerns of political theorists. As political theorists do not generally consider the kind of thinking which is architectural as pertinent to their inquiries, this line of approach is relatively untried. One exception is Karatani and his study *Architecture as Metaphor.*[25] Karatani's thrust, in general, is particularly relevant given the nature of his critique: he still mounts a critique of "the West", thus pursuing the cosmopolitan ambition of recognisable difference, yet self-consciously pursues a re-appropriation of Marx through the Kantian Marxist, Tosaka Jun. There is an interesting coincidence here but it will not address the debt to Karatani. Tosaka and Shirai were extremely close friends as students in Kyoto. Shirai subsequently left for Europe to study with Jaspers, the only real disciple of Kant. His return to Japan saw him distance himself significantly from the Marxist movement (which was also banned the year after he returned to Japan). Nonetheless, I do not follow Karatani's lead. While I believe that the return to Kant to bypass the limitations of Marx is perhaps fruitful, and may reveal similar concerns and intuitions as those relevant to Shirai, it is my understanding that the key point about Kant's political theory lies in its confirmation of the role of imagination.[26] The aporia revealed is what Bataille called the Scylla and Charybdis of post-Hegelian philosophy: the substitution of nature for logic.[27] The return to Kant is still an attempt to get a grasp on the problem of logic. In my attempt to distinguish between technical/historical universals and cultural universals, I have interpreted the role of imagination as the basis for a political realm using Vico's distinctions of the intelligible and imaginative universals. This has been particularly useful in fusing together the disparate strands of thought brought together in the person of Shirai.

Approaching the problem of history in this manner, Shirai's critique of Tange becomes that much more manageable. As in Tange, creativity is indeed tied to history, but for Shirai the dialectic which governs it makes no sense unless it engages the common sense of the community: a sense which can be neither articulated, represented, nor constructed, but can indeed be affected and framed by the very critical process of worlding initiated by the individual: the author/architect. The ramifications of this position in the context of a modern engagement are the prime contributions of this thesis.

Notes

1 Isozaki, Arata. The island nation aesthetic. (London : Academy Editions, 1996), p. 8.

2 see http://www.karataniforum.org/jlecture.html.

3 I am referring to the destruction of the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001. But the discussion is by no means limited to, nor any less relevant with respect to terrorism in general, issues of Basque statehood, or even Italian gameshows featuring naked housewives where the television signals are picked up in Algeria.

4 The term is primarily associated with Kenneth Frampton and his landmark essay, "Towards a Critical Regionalism," architecture's contribution to Hal Foster's The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (Townsend: Bay Press, 1983), pp. 16-30. The project sought to contrast Habermas's argument for an incomplete modernity with alternative notions, and featured such prominent "postmodern" critical thinkers as said, Beaudrillard, Jameson and others. Critical regionalism, much like the title of the book, "Anti-aesthetic", are still framed in terms of the inherent premises of modernity—negation, overcoming, concrete recognition, etc.— and thus serve to legitimate rather than fundamentally differentiate themselves.

5 This position is self-appointed, but more importantly, hardly-contested. The various nuances of this perception of Tange, and the motives for casting Ise as the origin of a Japanese spirit will be dealt with below. For a detailed presentation of Tange's rise to the position, see J.E. Kestenbaum's "Modernism and Tradition in Japanese Architectural Ideology, 1931-1955." (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, New York, 1996), pp. 309-310.

6 A clear expression of this critique would be Carl Schmitt's in The Concept of the Political. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). For an extensive discussion of this point, see Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). See also, Jonathan Irvine Israel, Radical Enlightenment: philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750 . (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

7 Octavio Paz. Children of the Mire: Modern Poetry from Romanticism to the Avant-Garde. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).

8 "The truths of the modern scientific world view, though they can be demonstrated in mathematical formulas and proved technologically, will no longer lend themselves to normal expression in speech and thought," in Hannah Arendt, Human Condition. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 3. See also Barry Cooper "Nihilism and Technology" in Nietzsche and the Rhetoric of Nihilism. (Ottawa: Carleton

University Press,1989), pp.165-182.

9 Vico's understanding of the creative act as capable of founding a meaningful political or shared ground is reflected in the words, author and authorize. To author is not merely to create, but is to create recognizeably such that the creation authorizes a recognizeable future legitimate for all. We should also be sensitive to the subtle difference between Vico's authoring process and the "projective" nature of a historical action. Again, it is a question of the relevant universal.

10. Arendt notes that it would not be out of place for a Greek to say in one and the same breath: "He who has not seen the Zeus of Phidias at Olympia has lived in vain" and : "People like Phidias, namely sculptors, are unfit for citizenship." Pericles, in the same oration in which he praises the active intercourse with wisdom and beauty, boasts that Athens will know how to put "Homer and his ilk" in their place, that the glory of her deeds will be so great that the city will be able to dispense with the professional fabricators of glory, the poets and artists who reify the living word and the living deed, transforming and converting them into things permanent enough to carry greatness into the immortality of fame. Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Culture", Between Past and Future. (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 217.

11. Compare Pericles taunt above. ibid.

12. Marx, following Vico, though with a significant difference, recognized that "we can only know that which we have made." What is crucial is that it does not stop us from interpreting the world as given. It merely means that Science, like philosophy, is not with respect to Eternal truths, but is now with respect to what it can make. Engineering is not applied Science. Science is a subset of human technique (engineering). As Heisenberg was quick to point out, at the end of every experiment we only encounter ourselves.

13. Heidegger jokingly compares this inversion and hence human judgment of the divine to "judging a fish according to its ability to breathe air". Hegel in a similarly amusing moment compares facile "material" interpretations of the Phenomenology to reducing the multifaceted nature of the male organ to a "pisser".

14. Nietzsche is the "Romantic" philosopher to have questioned the necessity of history in Uses and Abuses of History for Life. At the same time, he is the inspiration for countless politically-motivated movements and artists from Dada to Deconstruction. Most recently we have seen the French Left use Nietzsche to salvage Marx from the criticism of historical necessity itself. Hence deconstruction, a Nietzschean concept, is employed to jump-start a stalled revolution. Perhaps the most interesting Nietzschean artists are those who avoided the "modern" political trap, i.e. Alfred Jarry, Duchamp, and arguably Le Corbusier.

15. Within politics, there was of course the art of war, the art of rhetoric, the art of statesmanship, etc. But politics itself by definition could not be reduced to a technique. The first clear articulation of politics as a modern art fundamentally opposite to the conception of the ancients can be found in Machiavelli's Prince. Already in the Epistle Dedicatory, Machiavelli tauntingly warns the prince that blood and birth are no longer relevant in a world governed by the politics of taste and technique. See Leo Paul S. de Alvarez' translation and notes (Irving: University of Dallas Press, 1980).

16. The claim that one's work is not projective simply because one would will oneself out of a dialectical engagement of history is like closing one's eyes to make oneself disappear.

17. Internationalism here refers of course, not to the MOMA christened style but to the operative universals of international socialism. The MOMA exhibit and the problem engendered by even the nomenclature of an American bid to domesticate the "International STYLE" are symptomatic of the same need to sanction the universals by hiding the specificity of their origins. This is merely the inverse of the need con-

fronted by the so-called modernist architects in search of a nationalist specificity. See Hajime Yatsuka, "Internationalism Versus Regionalism," At the End of the Century, One Hundred Years of Architecture. (Los Angeles: The Museum of Contemporary Art, 1998), pp. 166-189.

18. Yatsuka, "Internationalism Versus Regionalism," pp. 166-189.

19. J. E. Kestenbaum. Modernism and Tradition, pp. 257, 258.

20. The argument was with Ernesto Rogers at the CIAM meeting in Otterlo, 1959. Tange's text on Ise as the prototype of Japanese architecture was published three years later. Tange & Kawazoe, Ise Prototype of Japanese Architecture. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 13-57.

21. Kawazoe Noboru. Gendai kenchiku wo tsukurumono (Tōkyō: Shōkokusha, 1958), p.68.

22. Yatsuka Hajime. "Urban Dessert," Oppositions 23 (Cambridge: MIT Press, winter 1981), p.3. Yatsuka notes that Tafuri's description of Tange as an architect whose works wish never to be consumed is perhaps even more appropriate for Shirai. The question is what is each architect's characterization of time and how is their architecture conditioned by it.

23. Yatsuka Hajime. "A Genealogy of Architectural Style," author's manuscript.

24. Yatsuka. "Urban Dessert," p. 3.

25. Kojin Karatani. Architecture as Metaphor : Language, number, money. (Cambridge, Mass: MIT, 1995).

26. Arendt's notes on Kant's political theory is particularly relevant. Arendt is of course Jaspers's student and Shirai's colleague. These are really just coincidences and I do not ascribe one's degree of self-consciousness or motivation to the other, but the terms are helpful in what they open up. Hannah Arendt. Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 79-85.

27. Georges Bataille. "Critique of the foundations of the Hegelian Dialectic," Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939. (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1985), p.107.

CHAPTER 2 - Tange and the Appropriation of Ise

Tange embodied a host of contradictions, none of which on its own is necessarily particularly problematic or surprising, but which, taken together and in the cultural context of when and where he was working and of what he produced, bear a closer assessment.

What allowed Tange to differentiate himself from his masters was the salient way in which he reconfigured a notion of space that appeared singularly Japanese. It was this political savvy that more than anything characterized his career.

Tange's reputation had been made in a series of competitions which preceded the Hiroshima memorial (the competition which catapulted him to international fame). What characterized the early competitions was a monumental but hidden use of European planning typologies, presented visually in a Japanesque language. It was a strategy not so different from the "postmodern" strategy of Nihon shumi.[1] What was markedly different in Tange's case was that the borrowed, visual style was neither European, nor a Japanese version of the European, nor did it restrict itself in its Japanese iconography to specific moments, but rather visually alluded to the most archetypal moments of the Japanese tradition—shrine architecture in an entirely modern aesthetic. The Europeans who had backed the modern movement in Japan had often described Japanese architecture in terms of its purity of structure and lack of ornamentation, and indeed had characterized traditional Japanese architecture as springing from the same ground and cultural purity as that which was sought in modern architecture. This is a proposition that was supported by both the Japanese and the Europeans, for obviously different reasons: the Europeans as a means of coping with the aporia inherent in any kind of internationalism, and the Japanese as a means of vouchsafing both their position and membership in the international community, as well as their claim to distinctiveness.

For the Japanese architects, though, the argument had to be more carefully considered. A number of Japanese arguments would indeed stick to that simple comparison initially forwarded by Gropius or Taut, a comparison which

still continues to be made and defended by architects on both sides of the cultural divide (fig.2-1).[2] I want to make it clear from the start that Tange, and perhaps more articulately Kawazoe, the architectural theorist, were more articulate and more discerning in their understanding of the argument and qualified it in pointing out that it was not quite the way Gropius or Taut had termed it. Their ideas concerning the importance of shrine architecture were not merely about lack of ornamentation or purity of structural integrity, but were much more complex and culturally sensitive than that.

Tange's pre-Hiroshima competitions were undertaken at a time when Tange was both vehemently modernist and vehemently nationalist, and they, too, were characterized accordingly by a nationalist and a modernist fervour. After the war, Tange converted from nationalism to populism along with most of official Japan, and his conversion was demonstrated by his Hiroshima entry. What essentially still needed redress, and if not redress, legitimacy, was his Nihon shumi approach.

What Tange did was to recast his references in such a way that the notions of history and authenticity made room for the radical appropriation of detail. Tange did this first by recasting the notion of tradition as authenticity through the argument that we inherit a creative spirit, not details. The creative spirit is forged by a cultural climate, a climate which is historical as well as spatial, and that sense of space is historically as well as culturally given. This argu-ment was more clearly articulated by Tange's rival and critic, Shirai, but both were plugging into a discourse which was well-developed and rooted in stud-ies and critiques of the Western philosophical tradition, beginning with Watsuji Tetsurō, and his work Fūdō (Climate and Culture).[3]

Tange, therefore, tackled the notion of history and appropriation through a historical argument. He then applied this historical argument—the notion of spirit—both consciously and unconsciously with all its implications to his analysis of Ise.

The Development of the Shrine at Ise

Tange's initial thrust regarding Ise is that it is comparable to the Parthenon in its ability to father an entire culture's production. It is illustrative that he makes that comparison, and indicative of the need of Japanese architects to posit that they had something to compare to the Parthenon.

Both Taut and Gropius made the comparison of the Parthenon to Ise, and for them it was a comparison of structural honesty and lack of ornamentation. But Gropius then asks what are Ise's shadows compared with the radiance of the Parthenon. In answer, Tange points out that that comment reveals the essential contrast of the relation of western cultures to nature versus that of the Japanese, where the former is the vanquishing of nature, glorified by the light, while the latter is concerned with its place within nature, symbolized by the shadows of Ise. This is a generally recognized metaphor, understood both in its Heideggerian overtones and as a metaphor received through Tanizaki (*In Praise of Shadows*) and Watsuji.[4]

Tange published his history of Ise in 1962. It is cognizant of Ise's mixture of sources. He is fully aware that it is the product of the mixing of races, but he sees this as its strength. He sees Ise as the perfect balance of Jomon vitality (a violent and sexual vitality whose mythological base is that the only way the earth can be convinced to give forth its offspring is to kill it every year, and whose gods spring from the sheer materiality of rock) and the gentle sophisticated elegance of the Yayoi (embodied in their myths of ethereal gods who descended from the heavens onto the tops of trees and thence to earth). Tange is fully aware that the Jomon and Yayoi peoples, the founding peoples, and the mythologies they brought with them, were peoples who themselves had migrated to Japan from China and Korea both before and after the sea levels rose and cut the Japanese islands off from mainland Asia.

Tange's reading does not deny external influences and formative forces on indigenous culture. As such it would be quibbling to query Tange on his emphasis on Ise as authentic origin and prototype. The problem, we will recall, is in the relation of an ambiguous spirit to an origin reconstructed

through looking backward critically. There are two areas in which we can see how this retroactive or euhemeristic thinking works. The first is in his assertion that the mythic mixture was a product of their respective heroic leaders being given god-like status as a means of conciliation. The second is that it is palace architecture that is reinserted in the shrine at Ise and becomes shrine architecture. We will examine each in turn.

Myth and Divinity

The first issue is one of perspective, and concerns how we interpret the motives and perceptions of people living in an earlier age. My contention — in contrast to Tange — is that we cannot ascribe to them the perceptions and outlook that we ourselves have, and that any analysis of their motivations must attempt to take their world-view into consideration.

Somewhere between the 3rd and 6th century a tremendous transformation in power occurred in Japan between rival clans, and the power structures coalesced into a country. Ise, as a sacred site, came to play a crucial role through the necessity of mediating in order to legitimize the lineage of power. The negotiations concerned the interests of the Yamato clan and the indigenous people of the Wakayama peninsula, where Ise is situated and where these different forms of worship and different gods came together. At the end of the day, the Yamato clan, represented by Amaterasu, the sun goddess, is enshrined in the Naiku. A couple of kilometres away on the Isuzu river is the Geku, which is the shrine to Toyōke, who is the god of the rice fields. Together, they are enshrined with a host of connected deities at Ise.

At this juncture it is necessary to discuss mediation, what it is and how it happened in this case.

Records of Chinese influence go back to 200 AD. The end of the Yayoi period was marked by the rise of powerful leaders who had a divine status. This was called the tumulous period, for its characterizing huge earth tombs, and lasted about 300 years. During this period, these powerful leaders, who were connected to tribes in Korea and were probably immigrants, carried

with them special mirrors made in China and handed down from generation to generation as concrete manifestations of divine lineage and power. The possessor of the mirror was considered divine. By the end of the tumulous period, the mirrors were no longer carried by their leaders. Instead, they were buried with them, or else they were placed in permanent abodes built just for the mirrors. These were the shrines. Ise became the abode for the most important mirror, the mirror of the dominant family of the Yamato clan, which claimed its legacy directly from Amaterasu, the sun goddess, and whose shrine became the Naiku.

The site at Ise had long been a sacred site but the construction of a shrine building even remotely resembling what now exists did not take place until much later, the 6th century, which is the century when Buddhism asserted itself and became deeply connected with the Imperial court. What we see in Ise is this notion of mediation — the shrine becoming the nexus of power which stands between the divine and the descendant of the god. The emperor was still seen as divine but was no longer a mythological figure living in the mythology. The mythology was now formalized and completed. This is analagous to Vico's model: the movement from an age of gods to an age of heroes to an age of men. And with the construction of the shrine at Ise, we are now crossing between the age of heroes and the age of men where the vertical power structure is guaranteed by the existence of the shrine as much as the hereditary lineage.[5] It is a crucial shift here, and we see it reflected in the fact that the mirrors stop moving. They cease to be passed down through the generations and the mirror of Amaterasu comes to be enshrined at Ise.

When mediation occurs, divinity ceases to reside in a specific person but comes to be formalized in an institution which comes to be represented in the shrine. These things were not consciously imposed as structures on a nation from outside, but rather materialized from societal changes within.

Mediation becomes necessary for two reasons. One is the increasing sophistication of the cultural structure, which demands mediation. But the specific impetus for making this leap in the Japanese context came from two things, the presence of Buddhism and the presence of text. The presence

of text already embodies the notion of one thing standing in for another. We can see that it is crucial that the ability to posit one thing as standing in for something else is manifested experientially before it is manifested in any formalized institution. And it was the presence of the mirrors, which ceased to act as the lineage themselves, but came to be symbols, which were connected with the presence of text.

Buddhism, an organized religion, in contrast to Shintoism, in its very presence transcended the material presence of the spirit or the individual into a larger organization. Buddhism demanded the reconceptualization and remanifestation of the divine in an external representation. It prompted the shift within Shintoism whereby it was no longer assumed that the gods were needed in different places at different times, and were in fact transported physically from the storehouse to the field and back, housed and protected in a built institution which was the portable shrine itself. We see a transition from a lived divine existence to a separation of the divine and the profane, and a kind of redundancy or a recasting of the divine in a representative institution. Individuals cease to interact directly with the divine; their engagement with the divine is now mediated by a chorus, by a temple, by a shrine, by a permanent institution. This is what, in the Shinto context, was brought about by the physical presence of first, the Chinese artefact (the Chinese Other) and subsequently, the concrete presence of Buddhism.

In early Buddhist architecture, a religious structure that mediates between an individual and the divine is not a space to enter and worship, but rather a box for an artefact. It is inhabited by an object of the sacred, not the human. Shinto shrines, similarly, follow this model.

The shrine at Izumo is different but related. It is built on 90-metre-high poles, and there is a ramp up to the tops of the trees where the shrine sits, in a clear reference to the Alteic myth whence it comes. The god that is worshipped here, *Okuninushi-no-kami*, is a lesser god in the overall pantheon, a patron deity of happy marriages and prosperity.

Izumo was the locus of one of the powerful clans that were defeated by the Yamato clans, but their god was absorbed into the mythology. Part of the

political reconciliation was permission to build in this manner, but it is obvious that the manner had some resonance for the people permitted to do it. It is not strictly a style belonging to the Yamato clan, and it points to a more complicated relationship between the clans.

Tange argues that the leader of this clan was a hero who was mythologized and turned into a divine character as a means of placating and coopting him, and that an important concession was the permission the clan was given to build in an imperial, or official, style (with fewer *katsuogi*[6] on the roof, however).

I argue, in contrast, that in fact he was not seen to be a hero at the time, but was actually seen to be a god. The identity of the leader did not matter, because when he assumed leadership of the clan and began to act in a fitting manner, he actually embodied that god. Tange, in fact, speaks about the conceptualization of this people. But it is not about conceptualization: The temple was not built to symbolize a relationship. The temple is prior; it came first.

At the time that these events occurred, it was not possible to speak in terms of concepts in the way that we do. Their lives were much more literal. The movement from an age of gods to an age of heroes to an age of men is not that clear in any cultural history, but what is fascinating in Japan is how quickly it happens. A scant 200 years separated the mirror-carrying Yayoi in 300 AD to the building of Ise in the 6th century and the new unified Japan that functioned through text, had a written culture, and saw itself as distinct from that which came before it. It still did not see itself in a linear fashion the way the West might see it, but it did so in much more of a linear fashion by virtue of text than it had a hundred years before. Japan saw a change over a couple of hundred years that was equivalent to perhaps a thousand years in Greece.

This was a huge acceleration. Yet Tange is mistaken in interpreting the myth as our kind of human situation glorified into mythological or divine status. The leader was not a human made divine. The leader was divine, because the people could not imagine being led by anyone except a divine

figure. Japan is still an ancestor-worshipping culture. One's ancestors are divine.

It is only once the myths are written down that the writers have a choice in how they portray the story. That is what Tange is doing, but it is wrong to take concepts that we take for granted and to assume that a contemporary way of thinking would have applied then. The development of our thought patterns is not automatic. We cannot explain how we got here if we begin with thinking and speaking as "thinking and speaking in concepts".

The Hierarchy of Work as it Relates to the Divine

The second issue concerns Tange's contention that the emperor's house-building style is mixed with the style of the granary or the storehouse to produce the shrine style, and that the fact that certain columns do not touch the floor or the roof, and therefore do not bear weight, is because they became stylistically redundant over time as building styles shifted.

Tange argues that of the two shrine sites that make up Ise, the Geku is the purest. Ise is a shrine that still rebuilds. Many shrines were constantly rebuilt at regular periods, some every generation as is the case with Ise, but generally speaking the practice has all but disappeared. In the case of specific deities and instances, there were two sites to accommodate the rebuilding. The unused site would lie empty when not in use. This method of rebuilding meant that there was always a physical model of what was being rebuilt, and it was not, therefore, rebuilt from memory, drawings, or purely the method of the craftsman. Therefore, the shrines did not change unless there was a major typhoon or fire and the "model" was destroyed.

At Ise, there are the outer and the inner precincts. The outer one, the Geku, which is on the plain, was destroyed less frequently than the inner one, the Naiku, situated in a densely wooded area.

Tange argues that the perfect balance of Jomon and Yayoi we see in the Geku is in fact the process of borrowing and appropriation in mixing together

the styles of palace building and granary/storehouse structures. The Jomon were concerned with marking agricultural space horizontally, primarily using rocks, while the Yayoi created vertical constructions – a legacy of the Alteic myths and the gods descending into the trees.

I would counter, however, that Tange's reading, which is a material historical one, is in fact backwards.

What is important is not that the emperor style is something that exists separately and is then mixed with this other granary style to produce the shrine style, but rather that both the granary and the house are developments of the same world-view, which has to do with the relative vertical positioning of the elevated structure, which is inhabited by a god. This is where the relation of the emperor to the divine, and the structure which houses the divine, is crucial.

Both the house and the granary housed gods at one time, but the appearance of Buddhism was critical in causing the next step, the replication of this structure in a third vehicle which represents the initial two: the shrine.

The important thing about the storehouse—and consequently about the shrine—is that the columns do not work, because the columns represent the gods, and gods do not work. The structures that hold up the roof are the horizontal boards. The end-pieces stop the boards from falling apart. They are not primarily columns.

At some point in the process of standing one thing in for another—mediation—"place" was marked by a branch from a sacred tree, a cryptomaria tree, one that the gods alighted on, planted in an area marked by stones. Already the vertical Alteic myths combined with the Jomon sense of marking sacred space. The tree was understood to be a kind of altar. It was always present in the structure in one form or another. The tree itself is enshrined as the column comes to be enshrined and is understood in divine house architecture as necessary, but not structurally necessary. Structure is not the issue.

In the granary there is no column above the platform: the god sits on the

tree. In palace architecture, the tree is the column, and has two forms. It is at either end and coming up to and past the gable, but it does not hold the roof. In the main sanctuary of the Geku, this applies not only to the two outstanding columns but applies equally to all columns. It is the walls which are load-bearing.[7] Tange says at one time a column was needed at the gable ends because the roof was much bigger. He says that when the entrance was changed and the roof cut back, the columns were no longer necessary and no longer structural. This is problematic. Tange, himself, claims Ise is never a question of structural integrity.

The shrine sits over a *himerogi* (a cryptomeria branch wrapped in silk) which is planted in the ground. The shrine building is there to protect the branch. In the storehouses, the *himerogi* are present as the columns and which stop before they need to work. If any columns are made to do work, they only work for those above in status, not below. The integrity is not about supporting the roof efficiently but is rather about being consistent with the hierarchy of humans and gods.

The raising of a column, therefore, is the most sacred thing that can be done. The column up through the middle is inconsistent with structural logic as we understand it, but not inconsistent with a logic of status and hierarchy. So the modern argument that this is a perfect example of Japanese structural integrity and lack of ornamentation makes no sense. The column in the centre is the most precious thing in the world and is not there to work. The columns around it work to hold up the structure that protects it; they are the lower gods. They do not work to hold up the roof. A separate structure holds up the roof. There is a direct and hierarchical connection between the structure and the purpose of various parts of the shrine, and the political/religious hierarchy that they establish, and these cannot be separated.

Buddhism became the state religion at the end of the 9th century when the Imperial family adopted it and decreed it mandatory for everyone else as well. To the factions opposed to those backing the adoption of Buddhism, Ise would appear uncorrupted by foreign influence and gains an entirely different significance in its appearance. This appearance which "uses" the shrine for a purpose obviously distinct from that which creates the shrine in

the first place, is already "conceptual" and belongs to a significantly different political being. That the notion of Ise as authentically Japanese is problematic because Ise itself was a repercussion of the import of Buddhism and Chinese culture, is already beside the point. Still this appearance of something authentic or uncorrupted lends credence to a proto-nativist position.

The proto-nativist direction, then, of Ise being the essence of an authentic Japanese architecture, is the line appropriated by Tange. The obvious criticism is that Ise is no more Japanese than okanomiyaki (a popular Japanese dish which probably came from Korea and became common daily fare during the 1930's). This is precisely the criticism leveled at Tange by Isozaki. The search for the prototype of the Japanese spirit is a suspect modern notion, and this, too, we shall see again below.

Notes

1 "Postmodern" here is used in the sense described in the introduction following David Stewart: Namely everything that appeared in Japan post-1868 is equally modern. This removal of the sequence of history and its replacement with style smacks of architecture's discovery of postmodernism in the late 1970's and 80's.
2 Yatsuka, in his discussion of this issue of seeing the Japanese through Modernism and vice versa, notes that following the introduction of architecture, a knowledge of classical Japanese style and technique was less common than that of Western styles and movements. The intimation is that later discussions of correlations and similarities were already cast through the modern lens. Yatsuka, "Mies and Japan," unpublished manuscript.
3 The relation of Watsuji to the Nihonromanha (Japanese Romantic Movement) and the latter to Tange and Shirai is covered in chapter 6. Watsuji was pivotal in framing the question of cultural specificity with respect to the notion of universals. While he critiqued the assumptions of the West, his methodology and premise were by virtue of a European epistemology. Watsuji, Tetsurō. Climate and Culture: a Philosophical Study. Trans. Geoffrey Bownas. (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press,1971).
4 Tanizaki Junichiro makes clear on the first page of the book that the description to follow is useless as an attainable model. Yet Tanizaki was for the Nihonromanha another proto-romantic. Tanizaki. In Praise of Shadows. (New Haven: Leete's Island Books, 1977).
5 Arguably, according to Vico's model, Japan to the degree that it premises the formalized as the public realm, never fully actualizes the age of Man, and thus hangs on the ambiguities associated with the age of heroes. Note the posssibility of a divine human in the form of the emperor. Such ambiguities are obviously extremely useful when recast as modern ideologies.
6 Tapered wood cylinders set cross-wise along the ridge beam. Roof weight and grandeur are intimately connected.
7 Interview, Master Carpenter, Ise Jingu. June 2001.

fig 2.1 Jomon pottery figure with West Treasure House of the Geku (Outer Shrine).

fig. 2.2-3 Aerial view of Geku showing occupied and vacant mirrored sites.

fig. 2.4-5 Approach to Naiku, okutsu-iwakura of the Omiwa Shrine, respectively. (Images from Tange's essay.)

fig. 2.6 Toro archaeological site, Shizuoka Prefecture: a raised floor storehouse, as reconstructed by Dr. M. Sekino.

fig. 2.7-9. Main Santuary of the Naiku.

fig 2.10 Main Sanctuary of the Izumo Shrine in ancient times, according to a reconstruction by Dr. T. Fukuyama.

fig 2.11 (left) Izumo, artist rendering after Dr. T. Fukuyama's reconstruction.
fig.2.12 (right) Present day Izumo, View from West.

CHAPTER 3 - Conflicting Models of History

I know that you are fond of Japanese things. Now, do you really imagine Japanese people, as they are presented to us in art, have any existence? If you do, you have never understood Japanese art at all. The Japanese people are the deliberate self-conscious creation of certain individual artists. (. . .) In fact the whole of Japan is a pure invention. There is no such country. There are no such people.

-Oscar Wilde[1]

fig. 3.1. Sugiura, Poster (Mitsukoshi Dept. Store - Fine Clothing). 1914

The poster, created in 1914, appears at first glance to be nothing more than a fashionable advertisement employing a graphic style current at the time, specifically, that of the Vienna Secessionists, who were widely known and influential. It does not strike one as surprising that a Japanese kimono ad should employ the "style of the times" to assert its continuing relevance to a discerning clientele. Yet it is because this poster's devices are so common that it warrants a careful reading, if only to allow us to work backwards in time as much as forwards towards later styles and movements.

Let us first describe the contents of the scene and their recognizable traits before speculating on the ironies involved. A women, clad in kimono, is seated on the edge of a sofa, apparently about to relax (elegantly) while thumbing through the latest Mitsukoshi clothing catalogue. Behind her on the left are flowers, a vase, a table and chair. A framed picture, Secessionist but perhaps à la Egyptian, completes the scene. Behind her to the right, blending seamlessly with the scene to the point that one may mistake it for her own choice in wallpaper, is the bordered lettering announcing the purpose of the ad: Mitsukoshi Fine Clothing.

Judging by the seamless but subtle plays of texture, patterns and colour, one would assume that there was nothing more natural in the world than this scene. One might even go so far as to decide that Secessionism as a style made even more sense in Japan than in its native Austria. The woman's kimono is "traditional", and yet it seems to flow from the same cultural source that gives rise to the patterns and style of the vase, the table, the chair, and even the picture frame itself. Pattern predominates to the degree that it not only ties the advertising sponsor to the portrayed scene (in the wallpaper-like quality of the company name) but actually works to break down the perspectival "reality" of the poster and create, in its place, the more "culturally truthful" and recognizable appearance of a flattened, shifting "reality".

The mode of presentation, or representation, then, has altered the way in which we recognize the scene's component parts. The table and the sofa here are every bit as Japanese as the kimono, something which one could argue is true anyway. (Indeed we have seen this argument already with respect to the way in which language and text appropriate concepts). Per-

spectival depth is subtly denied in the poster through the flattening of planes. The planes tend to assert themselves as areas of colour and pattern rather than objects in space. For example, notice how the butterfly wings on either side of the woman's neck remain perspectivally flat despite the fact that they cut across an undulating surface. This is a time-honoured Japanese technique employed as much in garden design as in traditional scroll painting, and is culturally relevant (or tasteful) precisely because it reveals the vanity and hubris of an enduring subject. (The latter is the premise for the perspectival "depth" of Renaissance painting). In other words, the same mechanism which Western artists such as Henri Matisse were using to critique the limits of Western painting (and implicitly, the limits of a historical subjectivity), is the very mechanism employed by Sugiura to reveal a kimono as the height of refined elegance.

Advertising tends to rely on fairly commonplace truths, or a "common sense" in order to make its points. If something is "common sense", it cannot, by definition, be "cutting edge", since it is already common knowledge. The key word is "already", i.e. "past". In this case, what is important is that it was a commonly held notion that European high art and fashion were appropriated from something originally "Japanese". What we should keep in mind here is how the poster is playing both sides of the coin (a kind of concrete cosmopolitanism, if you will): It is playing on the natural recognizability of a Japanese aesthetic, comprised of what is, in fact, an intricate set of composites, making the viewer feel at home with what is essentially a "new" situation. For example, the *obi* which ties the woman's *kimono* prevents her from relaxing the way one normally would on a sofa, yet at the same time it preserves the dignity expected of someone wearing such finery. The result is a modified way of using the imported device which suits the Japanese perspective.

What exactly is the Japaneseness of the "modern" in this poster? We have referred to Japan's attitude to style not so much as a movement from the past into the future, but as a series of moments, each complete in itself, standing side by side. In this sense, the Japanese confrontation with modernity was one of addition, rather than negation. It amounted to the addition of a set of practices, rather than the overcoming and replacement of previous ways.

The creators and observers of the poster may not have understood it this way. History finds meaning precisely because it is looking back and has the advantage of hindsight. At the time, Japan was not necessarily any more self-conscious about the limits of Western history than the West was in the midst of its own rush to progress. It is true that Japan always had the distance of isolation to substitute for the distance of hindsight. In its headlong rush to modernize, Japan went through a stage where it denied its recent past and sought only the "new", but this reaction was strongly tempered in the realm of culture.

Prior to modernization, Japan had kept its various imports as prized possessions rather than as successive stages of some historical development. To properly understand how Japan encountered modernity, one must understand the mechanisms of appropriation that it used in encountering China.

Karatani has written extensively on Japan's appropriation of the fundamental imports of alphabet and religion – basic elements of cultural life – that it nonetheless succeeds in keeping separate.[2] Buddhism as well as Chinese characters were incorporated into Japanese life almost 1500 years ago, and yet still today in Japan Buddhism is considered a Chinese religion, and Kanji an alphabet which identifies Chinese-derived words. Buddhism and Kanji, then, were kept within their boxes of Otherness, a phenomenon and an approach to confronting the Other that has had profound implications. As Karatani suggests, Japan foreclosed the 'castration of the subject' through this method.[3] It was able to avoid identification with Buddhism (compare this with Germany's complete self-identification as a Christian country, even though Christianity was a Roman and, prior to that, a Middle-Eastern import).

Japan's approach, then, was to permanently tie every import to its origin. If everything foreign is always identified by its origins, it never forces one to confront the question of one's own identity. The apparent benefit of the approach is that one can still use the import; it is just as potent as if it were one's own. One need never be clear about one's relationship with it. To use Karatani's metaphor, when castration never takes place, the subject is never forced to declare itself. The subject, then, is that much more fluid.

It is an approach that led, in the course of the Tokugawa years, to formalism.

The years 1573-1603 saw turbulent times in Japan. Power was contested among the various samurai houses and the emperor was reduced to a figurehead. Culturally, however, it was a period of tremendous growth, a sort of combined Baroque and Renaissance, crammed into half a century.

Then, for almost 300 years, during the Edo period of 1603 – 1868, the Tokugawa family controlled the country. Tokugawa Ieyasu sealed Japan off from the outside world, and, as a part of his formidable control of every aspect of civil life, formalized every aspect of Japanese life: architecture, language, class, identity, behaviour, and art. During this period the tea ceremony and the arts associated with it – flower arranging, poetry, sukiya architecture – became prominent, all of it in an official, formalized way.

Kojeve has argued that history as progress implies the removal of action negating the given, but it cannot get here until every example and permutation of living has been examined and made the centre.[4] Japan, therefore, in an eerie short-circuit, had already achieved what Kojeve called the end of history. In the Japanese model, everything is formalized in principle and emptied of substantial meaning, but one continues to act humanly. One does not have to actualize every possibility as a (slavish) subject of necessity.

For Tokugawa, this formalization was an important way in which he maintained control over the country for an extraordinary time. It was a level of control that extended to all the samurai families under his rule. He set up his capital in Tokyo and forced the samurai to spend a certain portion of every year there as well as in their home precincts. But he was careful to keep the samurai's families in Tokyo when the samurai was at home, so that there was always a hostage under his control. Equally significantly, the samurai were forced to keep two households in the appropriate manner and style, worthy of the status of an elite samurai.

Japan, because it was closed, did not go through the industrial revolution or engage in imperialism at this stage, and therefore kept an agrarian, rice-

based economy throughout the Edo period. After 260 years, the elite samurai were broke. A mercenary class, socially inferior but wealthy, began to arise. While there were clear parallels to Europe in the political and economic instability produced by this situation, there were also startling differences.

Japan was ripe for modernization once a modern means of production could be introduced. Nonetheless, in contrast with the West, in formalized Japan everyone in principle could be a master precisely because of his ability to engage with the rules of formality. Knowing the rules and the style guarantees the possibility of one's being a master. Style in a formalized world does not have the pejorative connotation that it does in the West, where the original is authentic and what copies it – its style – is inauthentic and a fraud. In a formalized situation, a style embodies the apogee of behaviour or appropriateness.

The samurai had an appropriate way of building befitting their status and position, called shoin-zukuri. In contrast to the static determinism of *shinden zukuri* (palace style) *shoin zukuri* freed the organization of columns so that the columns and roofs need not follow each other directly. The flowing space of *shoin* style as an alternative method of construction opposed to a classical mode of framing reflects the political discrepancy between the real power of the samurai government and an emperor with nominal power. Preserved however is an operative correlation of form and status.

Japan was very ready to modernize at this juncture, for many of the same reasons as European countries, but it is important to recognize that the Japanese approached modernization, when it came, in a fundamentally opposite way from Westerners.

Japan attempted to employ the same approach to the Western other that it had always employed with foreign imports. It attempted to keep it in its box of Otherness, of Western-ness. Added to this habitual approach was the formalization adopted during the Edo years, which served to encourage and exacerbate the habit of keeping things in particularly stylistic boxes, each

with its own dress, behaviour, attitudes, and appearance. Finally, because Japan was never colonized, and was able to maintain its independence, it could maintain that it met the West on its own terms, and that its adoption of Western imports was a matter of "Western techniques, Eastern morals".

In 1868, the samurai government collapsed and under external pressure Japan opened its doors to the world. The combination of internal and external forces led Japan to open its borders to trade, and to sign a series of treaties which, while leaving Japan independent, were heavily weighted against it. The emperor was reinstated, his capital moved to Tokyo, and the modern era began.

Japan entered the community of nations highly aware that its treaties were unequal, and that only an increase in its own power would allow it to force their reassessment on more beneficial terms.

It set itself, therefore, the formidable task of modernizing and industrializing in record time, and this it did: by 1903, a mere 35 years later, it had grown powerful enough to invade Taiwan and win battles against Russia and China.

A part of modernizing meant establishing architecture, which, it was recognized, had no relation to shrine-building or house-building or palace-building, but was an entirely new thing requiring a new approach and new language.

From a formalized logic, the adoption of modernity appeared to be a simple matter of creating new boxes and acting appropriately within them. A new form of government requiring a constitution was simply added to the old: it required a new kind of building to act in and new clothes to act there, but there seemed to be no reason to jettison the old in order to accommodate the new.

Formalization is all about context, and is concerned with the relation of things rather than the things themselves. When the buildings of Ise are taken down and moved, for example, the old ones are not sacred anymore, and for a time, anyone can enter them.

Formalization implies an ability to act differently, without conflict, in different contexts. There is never a conflict between the subject as it is declared and what it is at any moment, and therefore no tension or inconsistency between in being, for instance, a Christian who observes Buddhism and chooses to marry in a Shinto ceremony.

There is a fundamental difference between what has just been described and European Christianity, where the appearance of science generated a conflict between faith and reason. That could not happen in Japan because science and reason do not exist as terms that have to answer to each other or cancel each other out. They merely co-exist as terms that are particular to their own discourses. One operates according to context. For example, museums and the science of taxonomy are Western phenomena so the artefacts within a museum should be within a Western building, and not something that looks Buddhist.

Styles, in a formalized context, have nothing to do with a historical trajectory or genealogy. Therefore, in the Japanese context, neo-classicism is as modern as Bauhaus.

The notion of "western technique, eastern morals", was of course a contradiction in terms. It was a fallacy to think that one could confront the whole package that is Western history and treat technology as technique, all the while preserving "eastern morals" intact. And this is where the crisis lay.

Nonetheless, after Japan's decision to modernize, it was in the realm of culture that certain events allowed it to maintain a thread of perceived continuity.

One of these events was in 1867 when the Shogunate sent a great many Japanese artefacts to the World exhibition in Paris. The impact was tremendous — the articles completely sold out and were of such influence that the subsequent rise of Art Nouveau was seen as inseparable from the rage for "things Japanese" which swept Europe. Ukiyo-e (prints of the floating world) became prized possessions and the influence on artists was immediate. Frank Lloyd Wright was no less touched by this current than Van Gogh.

A kind of "aestheticization of the other" occurs here, which is what Oscar

Wilde is referring to in the quote above. But from the point of view of the Japanese — who despite their proud independence were still at the losing end of a number of bad treaties and still doing everything to catch up — the realization that they had something to export beside raw materials was of tremendous value. Art, in effect, was the one commodity which Japan produced that put it on an equal footing with the West. This is the concrete cosmopolitanism referred to above: Japan had something to trade which could not be negated (like steel or timber) but required due recognition from the other.

Some discussion is relevant here as to how this discovery of art as a commodity was treated. To repeat, as Japan sought to modernize, it rejected everything that was traditional in almost every field. What was taught in the Tokyo Music School, was Western music. What was taught in literature was Western literature, distinct from Kanbungaku (Chinese classical literature). Japan even went so far as to reject the Chinese classics. This was a radical shift, and its equivalent occurred in all fields except the fine arts. The reason for this, quite simply, the 1867 world exposition. Until this point, Japan's single export had been silk. Suddenly, art was a valued commodity. In the next exhibition about 4000 artefacts would be sold. Japan saw that it could influence the rest of the world. Art Nouveau was seen as proof of this, and it illustrated that Japan had something valuable.

Hence it was that only one school, the Tokyo School of Art, was teaching something Japanese. As Karatani notes, "this does not quite mean that the visual arts managed to escape Westernization altogether, for it was an American scholar, Ernest Fenollosa (1853-1908), who informed the peculiarity of the genre."[5] Fenellosa had been brought out by the Japanese government to teach Hegel's philosophy of history, and Herbert Spencer's "Social Evolutionism". Working with Fenellosa was a young man named Okakura Kakuzō. When Fenellosa came to Japan, he knew that Western representation was in a crisis and he saw a perfect way out (the phenomenon being similar to that of the European painters discussed earlier). His perspective was that Japan shared something tragic with the Greeks and Greek art and that there was something in Japanese art that spoke of the heroic and the tragic. Here was an unnegated universal leading one out of the impasse created by

Western history's relentless drive to actualize the universal and thus render it prosaic. Fenellosa saw something in this heroic understanding and the Japanese understanding of the fine arts that was reminiscent of the Greeks. The Japanese situation illustrated a universal relevant and sought by all.

Okakura, on the other hand, noted an irony in Fenellosa's view of Japanese art "as something else" (in this case, a Western universal). Art identified as part of a historical progress, as opposed to simply existing independently, has tremendous ramifications. The content of its artefacts seems to point to where that progress is heading. Strikingly, however, a discourse on the process, rather than the content, is productive in itself. It is not a question of where that thing is heading, therefore, but the fact that it creates a discourse which has its own repercussions and possibilities. Simply creating a discussion around the artefacts produced a kind of meaning which was useful. Okakura, then, recast Japan and its art not so much as the embodiment of a "Greek universal" but simply as a receptacle for Asian arts. Asia here was seen as the principle with which to oppose the overarching principle of "the West". In other words, Okakura saw that there was something in Fenellosa's universalizing process that Asia could disrupt. It could disrupt it precisely by the understanding that 'Asia as one' was itself made up of multiple moments that did not cancel themselves out, and it was in that kind of manifold unity that it could destroy the Hegelian universal or Hegelian dialectic. Okakura sought to overturn Fenellosa's very argument and to reverse the inherent Orientalism of Fenellosa's approach. He eventually took over the art school, wresting it away from Fenellosa.

What both Fenellosa, with his neo-Hegelian outlook, and Okakura, understood, but from different poles, was that art itself can be the political means of change— precisely because the idea behind the change is already present in the art. In other words, any notion of history with an eye to the future, and an eye to enacting change, is itself the product of the concept of "art", and therefore the product of the idea existing demonstrably in the world already.

Okakura saw the value of fine art as a commodity for this very dimension. It interested him because he saw it would allow a critique of the West. Okakura understood that in Japan previously there had been no understanding of art

per se. What this new understanding did was to create a museum—which is a spatialized, legible, readable organization of time. He wanted to have it understood that it was not only Japan's artefacts that were important, and that Japan was not only part of an Asian whole, but its very nexus, the place one came to understand all of Asia's artefacts. Japan was the whole which is Asia. Of note is the fact that the collected artefacts of Asia's cultures in Japan are the most pristinely preserved on the continent. (All the moments of Japanese history are those of the rest of Asia imported). The idea is that the manifold moments are preserved as crystalline, perfect museum pieces, where Japan is the museum. His positing of Japan as the museum was intended as a complete subversion of the Hegelian understanding of the museum which put Europe at its centre.

Let us return to the question of style. The buildings produced by the first generations of Japanese architects were characterized by the skilful execution of specific styles. Eventually the question arises as to which style is most appropriate for buildings of national (and therefore international) import, as well as its corollary: Is an architectural style even necessary at all? The latter question was eventually asked—and answered in the negative—by Noda Toshihiko with his stance that "architecture is not art".[6] This "engineering approach" could, as David Stewart argues, be said to pave the way for the Secessionist/Expressionist style in architecture precisely through the problematized (engineered) "lack" of style and the void created for the individual artist to fill. From there we would see a progression into modernism. At least this would be the historical point of view, i.e. that of an architectural historicism.

Condor, the "Oyatoi"[7] brought over to train the first generation, had worked in London under Burges. Tatsuno Kingo, a graduate of Condor's first class, went to work for Burges. Burges was an Orientalist, a Japanophile, and a collector. When Burges askeTatsuno the history of his country's architecture, Tatsuno couldn't answer for the question was at the very least confusing. The interchange—and the fact that he had found no satisfactory answer—affected him deeply. When he returned to Japan and took over as a professor at the Imperial university, he immediately initiated a course on the

history of architecture. However, for all intents and purposes, it became a history of Western architecture.[8] The question had been confusing because architecture (as history) was a Western institution, and therefore had no Japanese answer (or in Tatsuno's terms, Japanese "traditional" architecture had no relevance to contemporary practice). Burges, the Japanophile, had meant no malice, for in his assumption that architecture exists as such, and further that it has a history, his reasoning was that a history must exist "even for non-historical architectures".[9] It is a function of conceiving architecture *as such*, rather than a function of the buildings themselves. Or to recall Okakura, 'art' is an invention which recasts the artefacts within a binding concept as things completely different from what they necessarily were beforehand.

There is thus nothing given about history. The moment something is understood as a participant in a sequence, it completely changes what that thing is and the observer's relation to it. In other words, once one understands the object in the context of history (which is a temporal relationship), it creates a discursive setting. A discourse is created. The temporal setting of history rendered spatially is a museum. The museum, by housing the object—ripping it out of its context and placing it objectively (i.e. "object-like") on the table—creates this historical dimension.

When Tatsuno returned to Japan, he initiated a series of events problematizing a historical approach to architecture. Inherently here there is a problem, namely that Tatsuno started a history course when there was actually no compelling reason to do so. A kind of crisis had to emerge because it is not possible to successfully argue the historicity of architecture when one's relationship to history is ambiguous. One first has to create an understanding which is itself historical. In the most literal sense, Japan always knew what belonged to what period—there was no lack of accurate record-keeping in Japan— but what makes it a historical understanding is to see this in terms of some sort of progress. Because of Japan's ambiguous relationship to history, the only way to understand it is in terms of a question of style, but this question, from the perspective of progress, or history, appears empty or irrelevant. The result is that the impetus for the course began to appear as a question. The consequence of Tatsuno's initiative was a

dilemma: ultimately one would have to accept the progression of history which naturally led to a Eurocentric position, or one posited one's own style — itself a European derivative — as a worthy counter-initiative to the imposed original. Either way one had accepted the "inevitability" of history, itself a contradiction to a basic lived experience of an ambiguous historicity. While Tatsuno initiated this dilemma through a discursive understanding of architecture, it was Ito Chūta, a student of Tatsuno, who articulated it as such, and hence paved the way for a "modern Japanese architecture".

Ito realized the discursive nature of architecture conceived as Tatsuno taught it—in effect the Western Art of Architecture as opposed to mere "house building". The word used for "architecture" at the time was in fact "zouka" (literally "house building"). Ito would, in an essay published in 1894, call for the renaming of both the department at Tokyo Imperial University, and the professional association of architects, arguing that "house building" hardly conveys the substance of architecture ("The tomb, the monument and the monumental gate certainly do not fall under the rubric of house building").[9] His proposal was to use a recently constructed term, *kenchiku* (ken: to construct, build, establish; chiku: to build, establish), a word created at the very end of the Edo period, concurrent with the changes in construction accompanying the foreigners. His proposal was adopted.

Ito recognized the conundrum of Tatsuno's teaching, but only so far as it concerned the necessity of posing a countermeasure capable of matching a Western history of architecture. Ito sought to extend the assumption of historical architecture to Japanese architecture (what we now take for granted as common sense). But in arguing for a "Japanese architecture", he implicitly accepted the notion of history, thereby forfeiting the possibility of critiquing the concept. In effect, he wished to legitimize a Japanese original style through the "creation" of a history.

The inherent dilemma is that in accepting a historical understanding, one accepts the inevitability of movement. After all, history moves. To argue for a Japanese style which is both worthy of being "historical" but not given to the judgment of history would be a contradiction. It is for this reason that in creating an architectural discourse, Ito, with his strong predilection for "Japa-

nese-looking" buildings, would come to be seen as anachronistic, an impediment to the progress of Japanese architecture and certainly an impediment to modern architecture. But this is jumping ahead.

Consider the contradiction for a moment. Ito has argued for architecture as a discursive art, in the interest of creating a Japanese history of architecture. What this allows, and obviously with great success—as Ito demonstrated—is the "scientific" reconstruction of lost treasures, in this case, Hōryūji and Tōdaiji. The reconstruction is of course not based on the hand-me down knowledge of the craftsman, but on the "theoretical" knowledge of the professional architect, who constructs the past based on an understanding of the whole. The ability to posit the whole, i.e., the complete story, is integral to the endeavor. Ito was no less ambitious in this regard. The problem, however, is not *how* Japanese history plugs into Western history, but *when* it plugs into Western history. Once the connection is established, what preserves "Japanese" history from "universal" history? And this Ito never confronted.

Unfortunately, Ito completely missed Okakura's critique, and Okakura's understanding of the inherent danger of a "universal" history. For Ito, who was ignorant of the inherent contradiction, Fenellosa's position appeared perfectly acceptable and not the slightest in contradiction with what he had learned from Tatsuno. One of his "discoveries" (speculations) was that the entasis of the columns at Hōryūji must somehow be connected to the use of entasis in the Parthenon, and this led him to believe that Fenellosa was right.

Architecture in Japan, as we have seen, was essentially a government enterprise and a key part of modernization. The creation of an architectural establishment therefore was similarly a government enterprise. The government funded architects to go and work in Europe, to study and to travel. It was a tradition established early on and one that lasted for a significant time. Where customarily graduates from university would go to Europe to study the precedents first-hand, Ito travelled by donkey to Europe via China. In fact it took him three years to cross Siberia. His objective was to track the route that would have linked Japan to the Greeks. He did not come up with

anything, but his motive is highly revealing. For Ito, one had to understand Japanese architecture in terms of world history. Here one would do well to recall, that for Okakura, "Asia was one, but the Himalayas divide".

There are two stories one might be inclined to construct here:

The first would be that architecture in Japan follows the same progression of styles that a history of architecture would infer: neo-classical—national style/ International style—post-modern.

The second would be that these styles are all equally modern. Due to the problematic way in which they are introduced they are always "inauthentic" - i.e., they stand apart from their natural context. But this is equally untenable since there is nothing inauthentic about existence: There is nothing inauthentic about the language we use to convey real feelings, especially when that meaning is understood by those with whom we speak, even if that language is slang, a day old, or imported. Hence if we read these architectural works as part of their own context, then the inauthentic argument is inadequate, but so is the argument of a historical progression, and they stand simply as ahistorical—for lack of a better term, "postmodern". But now we realize that the problem with the term post-modern, just like the word post-colonial, or post-anything else, is that it actually serves to legitimate the very concept from which it seeks to differentiate itself. And the postmodern is particularly inappropriate because Japan was never modern.

Notes

1 Oscar Wilde. Intentions: The Decay of Lying, Pen Pencil and Poison. (New York: Brentano's, 1905).
2 See Kojin Karatani, "Buddhism, Marxism Fascism." html://www.karataniforum.org/bmf.html. The discussion of foreclosure picks up earlier themes begun in Origins of Japanese Literature, Karatani. (Durham: Duke University Press,1993).
3 ibid
4 Kojeve, Alexander.reIntroduction to the Reading of Hegel. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,1969), pp.159-162.
5 See Karatani, "History as Museum," html://www.karataniforum.org/histmuse.html.
6 David Stewart. The Making of a Modern Japanese Architecture, 1868 to the Present. (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1987), pp. 94-95.
7 The "oyatoi gaikokujin" were the foreign experts sought out by Meiji officials to come to Japan and train future generations of Japanese students in all realms of Western learning. Condor was selected to run the first architecture program at the Imperial College of Engineering.

8 According to Yatsuka, "Tatsuno started a course on Japanese architecture, hiring Kiko Kiyonori who belonged to the family of the Royal carpenters in Kyoto. Apparently Kiko was a man of practice, not a historian, and that his lectures were far from the normal type for a course on architectural history (Condor had previously given some lectures on Western architectural history). Kiko did however manage to give students information on historical buildings. Ito was among Kiko`s students, but never regarded it was an *authentic* lesson" (my italics). While Tatsuno (naively) enacted the form of a history of architecture—albeit Japanese—it inherently raised the "Western" spectre of progressive time. Tatsuno did not perceive this, however. Nor could he respond to Ito's criticism. Yatsuka, author's manuscript.

9 Yatsuka relates the story of Tatsuno in Burges' office as having taken place some 15 years before the publication of Fletcher's "History of Architecture". Yatsuka, author's manuscript.

fig. 3.2 (left) Burges, project for an art school in Bombay, 1865.
fig. 3.3-4 (middle and right) Condor, Ueno Imperial Museum 1882, Iwasaki Villa, Tokyo, 1889.

fig. 3.5-6 (top left and below) Katayama, Akasaka Detached Palace, Tokyo, 1899.
fig. 3.7 (top right) Tatsuno, Bankers' Association, Tokyo, 1885.

fig. 3.8-11 (clockwise from top left) Itō Chūta, Bentendo, Hōryūji, Tsukuji Honganji (1934), and Heian Jingu.

fig 3.12-13 (from top) Imperial Diet Building, Tokyo.
First scheme and second scheme, unrealized, 1887.
fig 3.14 Sano, Maruzen Book Store, Nihonbashi,
Tokyo, 1909.
fig. 3.15 Sano, Seitoku Memorial Gallery, Aoyamam,
Tokyo, 1926.

fig 3.16 (from top) Bunri Ha Kenchiku Kai, active 1920-1928: four projects.

fig. 3.17 Horiguchi: Memorial Tower, Peach Exhibition, Ueno, Tokyo, 1922.

fig. 3.18 (lower leff) Kamahara: Kosuge Prison, Kosuge, Tokyo, 1929-1930.

fig. 3.19 (lower right) Horiguchi: Oshima Weather Station, Oshima Island, Shizuoka Prefecture, 1938. Tower.

CHAPTER 4 - Nationalism, Internationalism, and Sukiya

The general assumption is that the 'modern' automatically sees itself in contrast to the 'traditional'. In fact, rather than a simple dichotomy between traditional and new, the 'traditional' itself has been severed from what is merely "old" and placed in a position where things are characterized by progression: the sequence of history. In the case of Japan, therefore, the word 'tradition' is a Meiji word, a product of post-1868 Japan, and therefore a facet of modernity itself.

All nations, in fact, defined 'tradition' for themselves only after encountering modernity. The 'traditional' need only be defined when one's relation to it is no longer secure. As the writer Paz has described it, "modernity is the tradition against itself". It must describe "tradition" precisely because tradition's meaning cannot be assumed. The definition of modernity is that it is always 'other', i.e. it is already 'other' than what it is. This is more than semantic foolery: to recap an earlier argument, the things that we create are valid precisely because, 1) they are new and because they do not simply repeat what already exists, and, 2), because they can be used or applied in an innovative way and are not forever mired in their initial incarnation. Therefore inherent in our reasons for making things is the notion of progression and the intention always of making again. The object of our making contains the seeds of its own overcoming.

'Tradition' is understood the same way. It appears when the past is conceived not simply as "an authority by virtue of it having come before", belonging to an age which gives birth to another and therefore can show the way, but as an age which, precisely because it came before, is one that must be succeeded by the new. An age now exists as part of a sequence. Tradition then is judged relative to the new, both in terms of what it gives, and what it denies.

On top of this, and to further complicate matters, we have been arguing that, much in the way that Japan adopted Buddhism but then continued to distinguish it as a foreign concept, its understanding of tradition, history and

architecture is similar to, but radically different from, its European manifestations.

It is useful to reiterate the point that, while Ito was concerned with the problem of a distinctive and appropriate architecture for Japan, he exacerbated the conundrum of the Japanese subject in exactly the same way we have seen with the operation of Buddhism in Japan and the foreclosure of actualizing a Japanese subject. To put it in slightly different terms, the *de facto* legitimacy of a Japanese (modern) architecture both permits and irrevocably affects the manner in which a national architecture develops. It is monstrously creative in that it does produce something completely new, while at the same time it appears recognizable and can be understood in common, acceptable terms.

The Debate Over a National Architecture

Itō Chūta's influence in the development of 20th century Japanese architecture was due largely to his influence over the competitions for major national projects. These competitions were aimed at producing a 'national' architecture resonant with worthiness, power and prestige, and that would promote Japan's project to put itself on an equal footing with the West. However sincere the motive of the competitions, they were immediately perceived as blatantly biased showcases for the views of the Nativists: Tatsuno, Ito and others—powerful bureaucrats with a huge say in the form Japan's national architecture would take.

The issue came to a head in a public debate organized by Tatsuno in his role as the head of the Association of Japanese Architects. The debate took place in 1910 and saw two essential positions advocated: Itō Chūta, Mitsuhashi Shiro and Sekino Tadashi argued for a visually identifiable Japaneseness; in contrast to Nagano Uheiji, who presented the argument that it was anachronistic for Japan to seek out a 'national' style in a world marked by international currents. It is interesting to note that the basis of his argument was technological progress and the concern that a 'traditional' Japan would get left behind. Ito's argument, as we have already seen, called for a style appropriate to Japan's history as a nation.

These were not the only views, but they carried the most ideological weight. In addition there were the large number of architects influenced by Riki Sano who saw no need for a style at all. The great Kanto earthquake of 1923 did much to draw attention to Sano's recommendations and to give credibility to their position. And needless to say, the sheer efficiency and economy of such a freedom from historical burden made financial sense to a government and a people still labouring to catch up to the rest of the world and even to float an empire on the resources of spirit alone.

In fact if we look at the types of buildings sponsored and built by the different loci of power within the 'official' attitude to architecture, we find some significant discrepancies. The early attitude that architecture should represent Japan to the rest of the world was obviously that of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and not that of the Ministry of Finance.[1]

As long as the task of rewriting its treaties was still seen as foremost among the budding nation's priorities, the Foreign Ministry had precedence, but its views were increasingly questioned as the importance of domestic affairs grew. From the point of view of the Ministry of Finance, and as evidenced by the range of public works built around the turn of the century, the energy and expense spent on style appeared to be, at the very least, an extravagance. The Ministry of Finance preferred straightforward construction that concentrated on economy of detail, was suitable to resisting fire and earthquakes, and was capable of fulfilling the demands associated with increasingly diverse programs.

I make this point only to emphasize that what we call 'modern architecture' made its appearance in Japan in varied and disparate ways. There was, in fact, no simple historical progression of styles, because, again, all styles were modern. The Secessionist works were launched as a kind of reaction to Sano Riki's 'architecture without art'. Witness, for instance, the Horiguchi weather station. Horiguchi was one of the exhibitors in the Japanese Secessionist Exhibition (Nihon Bunriha) and was responsible for the Memorial Tower at the Peace Exhibition in Ueno Park (Tokyo).

The question that is frequently asked, by people concerned purely with the

making of things rather than the repercussions of made things once they enter the world, is "Does the question of style not become obsolete and simply go away?" Style, however, is not so much a question of decoration as it is a reflection of a particular way of being for a community—be it a city, a province or a country. Just as Sano's so-called style-free architecture is entirely 'stylized' and particular to a specific cultural horizon, one can no more dispense with 'style' or 'taste' than one can dispense with one's culture or one's 'being'. As humans it is impossible to act without this sense of the judgment of the 'other'.

'Modern' architecture, as a language bound to a specific cultural horizon, is no different. It is constituted and formed as an idea within a common sense— however varied the ideological forms of expression common sense may take—but all these various expressions share something, and that is the notion of progress. Before delving into the Japanese expression of the 'modern', I would like to step back for a moment and consider again what we have seen about all these 'styles'.

Consider the irony of these various positions. Itō is calling for a style appropriate to Japan's history as a nation. Nagano says that given the rate of progress, such an anachronistic concern will place Japan at a disadvantage in an ongoing competition between nations. Sano/Noda are calling for an architecture free of "art". The secessionists attempt to celebrate the role of the individual artist but practice something that celebrates the universal without the specificity of a country, never mind the individual. What do these positions all have in common?

Let us begin with Nagano's position since it is the most straightforward. Simply put, it assumes progress as a direct movement forward. We posit the future and we move toward it. We could say it is the least critical understanding of progress since it cannot say exactly what that future looks like. It merely knows that it wants to get there.

Ito's position, on the other hand, seeks to answer that problem. Any image of the future is projected out of an image (understanding) of the past that one holds in the present. Out of all the possible futures (i.e. all the choices

that one can create out of the past), it chooses the most easily identifiable as common. It proposes to determine the 'authentic' root of the nation and the people by determining what is recognizable.[2] While this understanding, which we can call a Romantic engagement, apparently looks backwards, it is no less future-oriented than Nagano's Enlightened position.

Now one can be naive about this and simply believe that the past is better because one 'knows' what it looks like, and therefore build one's future upon it. But it does reveal that whatever the future looks like, one has a stake it in, and that future is anything but neutral. Therefore the notion of looking to the past for the past's sake is not the essence of Romanticism. Rather, it is the observation that one's relation to the past (i.e. how one constructs history) has very concrete ramifications, not all of which are desirable. The moment that one criticizes the Enlightenment, and points out that it requires the past in order to know where it is going in the future, one realizes that simply being cognizant of the past does not alter one's future orientation. This future orientation serves to undermine whatever one builds in the present and thus devalues all that becomes past, even if one holds it dear. One's world is given as change, rather than the very made objects which create the world. This is simply because what one builds is as much determined by what one can build. However much more desirable a Disney fairy-tale world of castles, princes and princesses may be, it must be built with the same technology as 'Space Mountain' or any other amusement ride.

The Romantics, then, are sensitive to the crisis inherent in a historical engagement and wish to get around it. What one seeks as a Romantic is that which is not consumed by the relentless drive of progress, and this is what the Romantic calls the 'universal'.

What can we distill from this? Inherent in Nagano's position is the condition of not being able to judge the future through not understanding how one arrived where one is. This is where the argument derives for a history that can be read and understood, i.e. the argument for a visible or recognizable cultural identity.

By the same token, the identity that would be created could not be that of an

'ahistorical' Japaneseness-in-a-vacuum, but one constructed by way of a historical mirror. This has very concrete repercussions. As much as the Romantics may wish to dwell with the timeless universals revealed by their poetic aspirations, the images they construct out of those poetic images are both immediately useful and full of nascent potency.

Here we are faced with a choice. Either one exploits the use of the 'constructed universal' —i.e. the image of what the culture should aspire to—or one denies its prosaic usefulness, its historical weight, and claims it as the expression of the individual alone, which leads, as in the case of the Expressionist movement, to a kind of "art for art's sake". In this latter argument, it is as if the poetic expression of the artist binds the soul of the modern historical individual to the poetic universal and frees it from the debilitating and dehumanizing march of history—which was the argument used by the Secessionist/Expressionist architects with respect to Sano/Noda on the one hand, and Ito/Tatsuno/et al. on the other.

The problem with "art for art's sake" is that it either deteriorates into meaningless decoration (kitsch)—in which case it ceases to accomplish what it set out to accomplish, which is to guarantee the individual as an artist—or it gives up acting entirely. Why? Because the very fact that the artistic work is intended to be meaningful by refraining from being "useful" means that it can't engage in anything at all. It is paralyzed by the immanence of history's utility.

The net result is that Romanticism has no choice but to become political. The universal must be "engaged'. Now the question is simple: To whom does the universal apply? If it applies only to a specific nation, it results in a 'national socialism'. If the universal applies to anybody and everybody, and is truly universal in the modern sense, it results in an 'international socialism'.[3]

This tells us something about the ideological expressions that accompany the notion of 'modern'. One does not need an in-depth comparison between the fascists in Germany and Italy, the International Socialists in the Soviet Union or Holland, and the Nationalists in Japan. It suffices to point out that

it is not the political view which accounts for one particular style or another, but that in the modern condition, all making is tied up with the political and cannot escape that fate in one way or another.[4]

Internationalism was no different in Japan. While many architects sided vociferously with the left and were anti-nationalist, there was no conspiracy to ban modernist architecture. While the competitions remained largely weighted in favour of Nihon shumi, the government still allowed Sakakura Junzo—an ardent modernist— to manage the commission representing Japan at the World Exposition in 1937.[5] Generally speaking, however, the main argument against modernism was precisely its lack of (national) character and therefore its inability to stir up patriotic fervor, its inability to educate, and its inability to stage national festivals or other culturally-grounded (sic nationally-useful) spectacles. Hence the association of historicist styles like Nihon shumi with nationalism. The point I would like to stress, however, is that while it is easy to associate Nihon shumi with the Nationalists, and a modernist aesthetic with that of the political left, both can be made to serve the other equally well. The reason is that both are Romantic reactions to the modern condition, and therefore both are given by a historical engagement.

So now comes the real question: in the light of these perplexing ironies and inescapable dilemmas, where and how is Japanese architecture constructed?

Sukiya: A Modern Response

In Meiji Japan, as Tatsuno and his students began to speculate on the nature of a legitimate Japanese architectural style, an architect named Takeda Goichi proposed looking at a form of building known as *sukiya*. The academy promptly dismissed his proposal, citing the 'tea-house style' as 'effeminate' and hardly befitting a nation seeking to hold its own in a world of aggressive powers.[6] Takeda went on to become associated with 'Art Nouveau', but his original intuition had by no means been far-fetched or without significant cultural resonance. Even within the discussion of romanticism that we have had thus far, it is easy to see how an eye to a recent past as opposed to a far-flung past may be useful. It was abandoned in this case due to its

'inutility' given the perceived parameters at hand. However a more careful understanding of the issues, namely an understanding of the concept of history itself, may warrant a reconsideration of the art of tea-house construction precisely in the context of nationalism and internationalism (i.e the most extreme utilitarian approaches to history). And this is precisely what happened, both by advocates from within and from without Japan.

Sukiya literally means 'tasteful hut'. During the late 16th century, right before Tokugawa unified the country and Japan entered the Tokugawa Period, the formalization process of many of the arts was highly advanced. Key among them was the art of tea (*chanoyu*). The tea ceremony, although called an art, was tied to a religious state of mind. There was a direct connection between the ceremony of drinking tea, the surroundings in which it was partaken, and a condition of purity of spirit and body, in keeping with a specific Buddhist orientation. The aesthetic of 'the favoured hut' arose from the simple aesthetic that accompanied such purity of spirit, standing almost as an oasis amidst the formal conceits of court and warrior life. These artistic conceits had themselves reached a state of extreme craft and eloquence. The teahouse then stood as a 'natural artifice' conceived in direct contrast to its surroundings, moored in the teachings and aspirations of its Buddhist foundations.

It should be noted that while the art of tea reached its pinnacle very early in its development with the tea-master Sen no Rikyu, and already included a particular way of building the garden and its structures, the term sukiya appears later when the art had given rise to formalized artistic conceits of its own. This formalization was inevitable, given the contradictions of a formalized vertical society entertaining itself with the paradoxes of artifice: the very paradox of the tea ceremony. Rikyu—despite being recognized as a master whose patronage included Nobunaga's successor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi — was in fact eventually forced to commit seppuku (self-disemboweling) perhaps for asking his lord, Hideyoshi, to accept less wordliness than the aristocrat was willing to do. Rikyu in fact predicted that the art of tea would soon be lost but would be revived at a much later date.

The Katsura Detached Palace is generally seen as the finest example of

Sukiya architecture. It belongs to the formalized period of the art following the death of Rikyu, and was built by Rikyu's disciples.[7]

Part of the process of purification of the art of tea was the importance of freeing oneself from the vanities of everyday life. The 'dirt' was the trappings of worldly conceits, and of course to this end there was a clearly prescribed process, itself a model of formalized (prescribed) action. Making one's way from the refined and relatively controlled surroundings of the *shoin* style main house,[8] one traversed a path through a garden, gradually shifting one's attention from the worldly to a scale of the sublime (a 'modeled' sublime, mind you—compare Entsu-ji , for example as a garden using *shakkei* or 'borrowed landscape' with the scenery surrounding Katsura's *Amanohashidate'*. see fig. 4.11)

As one made one's journey, the very substance of the ground one travelled changed from the predictably secure and manicured to the random and un-even, forcing a concomitant shift in what one could assume as known. Fi-nally, one's journey reached its goal in the tightly enclosed space of a primi-tive hut, bereft even of a view out, but rather allowing only cognisance of the closest details at hand. The tea room was dominated by a Buddhist scrip-ture, framed within the principal built feature of the room, the *tokonoma*, or altar. The accouterments for preparing tea—the kettle, tea brush, pot, etc.—were anything but extraneous but could be completely hidden away as much as they could be incorporated seamlessly into the entire moment.

At Katsura, one may enter the garden through a gate adjacent to the main house proper. The gate already greets us with a vocabulary subtly different from that of the house although they seem in perfect harmony with each other. The house, actually built in a number of stages by different hands, is a mix of *shoin* and *shinden* details. But one may definitely perceive the fi-nessed treatment of the walls and surfaces. (Temple architecture requires a carpentry tolerance within 1/32nd (1mm) of an inch, sukiya: about 1/4" (6-8mm). Shinden is essentially derived from Temple building.) Elaborate treat-ments may be in place merely to hide a nail. Nothing 'found' or plain or earthy is in evidence. Every surface bears the mark of having been 'worked' or formed, even to the point that the workmanship becomes inconspicuous.

The roof is slate tile, neither *kawara* (Chinese roof tile) nor thatched.

A participant enters the garden and moves around and through a number of different structures located in the landscape. These are much more reminiscent of farmhouse construction than temples. On the walk there are formalized stages of purification to go through: participants wash and walk over certain materials. There is a clear consciousness of the role of material in relation to the state of purification of the visitor, in preparation for the state of cleanliness in which one is finally ready to drink the tea. It is important to stress this aspect of the ceremony because of its pivotal relationship with the scripture which dominates the tea space. It is also highly indicative that nobility are immersed within an agrarian vocabulary as the appropriate choice for the architectural moment.

Entrance into the actual tea house is extremely important. Participants must simultaneously climb off the ground and bend low to enter the small doorway (nijiriguchi) of the tea house, thereby supplicating and humbling themselves.

A key aspect of the interior is the orientation to the *tokonoma*. The *tokonoma* was originally a space devoted to a piece of scripture, which guarantees the explicit religious aspect to the tea ceremony. Later on, the tokonoma became a place for flower arrangements and other secular works of art .

Again, key are materials and surfaces. Generally the materials appear as found materials, yet if we look at them closely, they are 'un-natural' in their context. This is important. One can note in the contrast of meanings, worlds, allusions and materials, that nowhere is there a simple nature/artifice dichotomy. In other words, the architecture seems entirely based on an understanding of 'nature', but it would be utterly naive—and definitely neither Buddhist nor Zen to see in it an assumption that the world of humans exists in that dichotomy and requires its harmonization. To conjecture in this way would be to assume that both continue as fixed 'objects', each autonomous in its own right regardless of the other. It is problematic to assume that 'nature' as it appears is still nature and that being 'in tune' with it, one simply engages it or enters it, as if in either case it is not already transformed in the

process.

Additionally, while sukiya tends toward the simple and the unadorned, it would be amiss to assume that the 'simple' here is posed as the mere absence of sophistication, artifice and artistic conceit. It is anything but that. Rather, it is the natural, itself, already revealed as a conceit in order to shift the object of appearance.

We will return to its meaning, but let us first explore concrete details. The juxtaposition of different materials is important, as one sees in the uneven stones. This is furthered with a reinterpretation of the specific materials themselves. Clay, for example, is associated with the ground, but here forms the walls. The 'sacrilege' is then heightened by covering the walls in a mixture of soot to yet deepen the potency (and irreverence) of the situation. A noble has moved from a realm of refined purity to a realm of unrefined soot and dirt. The miscellany of woods used in the construction are given a patina, not the reflective deep pool of fine lacquer, but a stain that heightens the grain and calls attention to the random aspects of the wood. Yet in this darkened space, what gleams is the parchment of the scripture and the random moments of the uneven surfaces which have escaped the blackening treatment. Finally, the alcove wherein lies the scripture is marked by an untreated column, unique in the extreme of its unhandled state. Anything but random, the most natural of elements in the hut serves to convey the height of artifice.

Long after Takeda's failure to make anything of sukiya, a later generation of architects began to mine its significance.

Critique, the Notion of Space and the Haunting Problem of Universals

Sutemi Horiguchi participated in the *Bunriha* (Secessionist movement) exhibitions. He also produced impeccable examples of international style. Yet as Yatsuka discribes, Horiguchi is driven to reconsider his own relation to modernism by a daunting encounter with a radiant Parthenon. Thus his turn to sukiya was framed entirely within the problem of 'overcoming modernity' as

Horiguchi found himself caught in the twin aporias of 'national' and 'architecture'.[8] If we see it this way, the move to sukiya becomes an instructive conceit in itself. I will argue here that it was in fact the architects who engaged in sukiya construction that furthered this dialogue or argument, including the 'outsider', Bruno Taut.

What is important for us here is which argument, and in which direction they furthered it, and whether all in the same direction. The first question, however, is which argument they furthered.

Again: Inevitably, any modern individual was caught on the horns of a dilemma: Whether one tried to move straight forward, or tried to move forward by consciously interpreting the past, one's actions were inevitably judged in the future, and therefore were judged by their ability to enact change concretely. This meant the 'cultural universals' by which we normally judge our actions were in fact fundamentally changed as the standards of judgment became 'concrete' or 'technical universals', i.e. something demonstrably objective where the community of consensus was either anybody anywhere (internationalism) or simply one's own nation (nationalism), in which a 'biologically', or concrete, test differentiated between who was included and who was excluded in that community. Culture becomes a racial issue, but nowhere is the cultural universal preserved as such. It is still rendered a concrete universal, thus losing its ability to reconcile the entwining aporias of history. The problem then is how one frames the dilemma without trying to enter into a historical dialectic with it.

For Okakura, history could only be subverted, quite seriously, by 'tea'. (Okakura published "The book of Tea" in which a thesis of the book is that Westerners mistake the form for its essence, rather than allowing form to be form.[9]) Okakura understood that art itself is the political means of change because the idea is always present within it. Okakura was romantic in the sense that he was trying to insert this idea into the dialectic and derail it, but his mode for derailment is the Asian understanding of the 'why'. He maintained that Asia has always been understood in terms of a universal as the 'why', while Europe has always been interested in the particular or the means. The 'why' is a kind of speculative or ontological understanding, the 'how' is

an epistemological understanding. What Okakura was doing was trying to remain speculative by saying that Europeans did not have enough tea, meaning that they could not get the account of why because they had lost the understanding of the whole, whereas Asia always had this understanding of the whole by allowing these different parts to stand side by side without necessarily negating each other.

Horiguchi in 1923 and Yoshida Isoya in 1924 both had similar experiences during their travels to Europe when confronted with the presence of European history as embodied in its architecture. The reaction, similar in both men, was one of extreme isolation. Yatsuka quotes Yoshida in reference to the latter's encounter with Renaissance and Gothic architecture: "When architecture comes this far it becomes an issue of more than wisdom and ability. It has something to do with race, family, history, and tradition, and is an issue which won't be understood unless one goes back to the difference in the colour of skin or the difference between the lifestyle of a chair versus a tatami mat."[10]

Yatsuka continues with respect to Horiguchi: He stated that when he saw the capital of the colonnade at the Parthenon, "I could not help but moan" and "was desperately aware that this is not the type of achievement we from the Far East, would ever be allowed to approach."[11] The profound experience of encountering Western architecture *in situ* led the two architects to reconsider their own regional traditions upon their return to Japan.

One thing was clear. Japan could neither emulate nor lay claim to that history. Japan's was a tradition of wood that nowhere brought into appearance the same 'being'—the same culturally-given subject—concerned with eternity, passing and history. Yet perhaps this was exactly how one was to proceed. Sukiya was perhaps exactly the self-consciousness that engaged such historical conceit. I should point out here that it is not a question of whether any of the following architects were explicitly self-conscious in indicating this approach. It is enough that sukiya proceeded to become not just a viable player in the context of architectural discourse, but a dominant one.

The most important thing in understanding the approaches of Horiguchi,

Yoshida, or any of the others for that matter, is that at no point was any one abandoning modernity and returning to some past way of life. (It is significant that there was no equivalent of the Amish or any fundamentalist-type objection to modernization, in large part because it would be strange for most Japanese to see faith and reason, or progress and revelation, in some sort of dialectical argument.)

If the nationalists were posing the issue as 'overcoming modernity', it was clear to those who were neither nationalists nor naive 'internationalists' that the only resort was to be neither one nor the other and to refuse to enter into a dialectical antithesis of modernism (such as Ito and his fellow Nativists were doing), but to create a conceit that would stand alongside all the other conceits and recast the meaning of both.

For Horiguchi, modernism was not an onward labour revealing the truth of history in its own overcoming, but it was a style (in the Japanese sense) in its own right: it was already complete. Horiguchi, understanding style in the Tokugawa, or even an Okakuran sense of moments complete in themselves, continued to do perfect white boxes. However, neither competing nor interfering with these boxes, yet carefully sited adjacent to them, would sit the perfect sukiya retreat—itself a frozen moment neither desecrated nor devalued by the presence of modernity.

Yoshida, in contrast, would have no problem inserting air-conditioning and fluorescent lights behind sukiya-inspired grilles. *Sukiya*, after all, if it had any rules at all, strove to create the conceit that revealed the essence behind the conceit itself. *Sukiya* was more about interpretation and demonstration than something that could be reduced to a formal set of directives. This was, after all, the lesson of Sen no Rikyu.

Hence with this playful attitude, a playfulness hovering on the brink of unbridled nihilism, *sukiya* presented itself as a viable answer to both the 'overcoming modernity' of the nationalists, and the anonymous cultural death of Western history—the Scylla and Charybdis of modernity's Romanticism.

Horiguchi, as this story unfolds, was perhaps the most critical of the next

generation of modernists, including Tange, precisely because of their willingness to blur the boundaries and hence to engage historically. Horiguchi was intensely critical of their relation to tradition, and their contention that tradition is not in the details or in its form, but in something they called "spirit". Tradition, as Horiguchi saw it, is then reduced to nothing but a warehouse of parts which one uses as one sees fit at the moment. Before we deal with the consequences of an unbridled *sukiya*, let us consider the less critical use of sukiya as exemplified by Walter Gropius and other aestheticizing Orientalists.

The Notion of Space in Japanese Architecture

We have, then, a situation in which skilled and sympathetic modernists returned to a form of practice seemingly in contradiction with modernist principles, ventures into the past that were widely supported by such famed modernists as Bruno Taut and Walter Gropius. Moreover, while comparative norms of sukiya and modernism came to be stressed by almost every Western writer without exception as sharing the same concerns, we may also find later Japanese commentators taking the same position.

> In *West Meets East: Mies van der Rohe,* Werner Blaser tried to demonstrate how Mies' works share common qualities with Japanese and Chinese architecture, including component simplicity, edge (or phenomenal) transparency, overlapping and flowing spaces, interpenetration of landscape and architectural spaces, and asymmetry of composition. This list is typical of comparative norms. The Japanese architect Ishii Kazuhiro, in his lecture at Yale, also worked in this tradition when he gave a presentation comparing the works of two architects, Mies and Yoshida Isoya, who modernized sukiya building techniques and aesthetics from the 1930s onwards. The result was a persuasive demonstration that the seemingly traditional parts of Yoshida's buildings, which were mostly private houses and Japanese style restaurants, were informed by the same kind of sophisticated aesthetic compositional intentions found in the works of the German master.[12]

The point here then would seem that there was in fact no contradiction, and

that sukiya was able to answer the modern concerns with space without entering into the modernist argument with history and style. It seemed to be the best of both worlds. Arguably, it was the best of both worlds. But how were the Japanese and the Western proponents understanding it, and are the lessons the same? Let us look a bit closer at these analyses and consider their differences.

Consider first the voice of Bruno Taut—an architect sometimes credited with introducing the concept of 'modern' sukiya at a popular level.[13] Taut was a German expressionist architect (Glass House, 1914), later associated with Gropius and the International movement, who left Germany on account of the Nazis. He had been invited to Japan by a group of Japanese architects (the same ones pushing for recognition of modern architecture in the national competitions) to bring international weight to their cause. Taut, who arrived in 1933 and subsequently spent a number of years in Japan publishing several books on his experiences and perceptions, is famous for his admonishment to the Japanese people upon seeing the embellished and overwrought decorations of Nikko. The Toshogu Shrine at Nikko, built by Tokugawa Ieyasu, and contemporary with Katsura, appears to reveal an utterly prosaic degree of kitsch in its use of decoration, and for Taut, a veritable defilement of the architectural surface. Citing Nikko in an analogous comparison with the decline of Baroque into Roccoco, Taut encouraged the Japanese to seek an authentic tradition in the simplicity of Katsura. Walter Gropius would echo these sentiments in his analysis of Japanese architecture.

Gropius writes with respect to the old shoin at Katsura:

> The building and its immediate surroundings are one homogeneous, integrated space composition; no static conception, no symmetry, no central focus in the plan. Space, here the only medium of artistic creation, appears to be magically floating.

He continues, farther on:

> As in most Japanese creations we find here also a predilection

for clear contrasts: against the austere purity of the architectural frame—the spontaneous, sketchlike painting and the wealth of magnificent garments; against the light, transparent house construction—the heavy, sculptural roof. The use of contrasting materials which enhance each other in their effectiveness had been developed early, and nowhere one finds an attempt at "matching" by identical forms and colours (one of the American preoccupations), but always great care in complementing, relating and counterbalancing. Man's oneness with nature is expressed by the use of materials left in their natural colours and by a worship of the deliberately unfinished detail, corresponding to the irregularities in nature. For only the incomplete was considered to be still part of the fluid process of life; symmetry, the symbol of perfection, was reserved for the temple. The aesthetic effect is a pure, architectonic one, achieved by simple contrast of bright and dark, smooth and rough, and by juxtaposition of plain squares, rectangles, and stripes. However, none of these means are aesthetic abstractions; they are all meaningful realities, related to daily life. The builder subordinated himself and his work to the supra-individual idea of a unified environment and thereby avoided the traps of vanity, the "nouveauté" and the stunt. This is the lofty abode of man in equilibrium, serenity.[14]

Strangely enough this attitude of restraint had during the same period, its counterpart in the ostentatious display of the mausoleum of the powerful Tokugawa Shoguns at Nikko. Tremendous skill in craftsmanship was misused here by the Shoguns to glorify themselves in an overbearing profuseness of ornament and decoration, which destroys the clarity of the architectural composition as a whole and leaves an impress of conceit and self-praise.[15]

I have quoted Gropius at length above so that we may get a clear indication of what was at stake in the comparison between modern architecture and what could be seen in sukiya. There is a clear contradiction between my

presentation above and what Gropius proposes as significant concerning the understanding of nature, the natural, and the human relation to them. Gropius sees a number of salient points. The admirable qualities evidenced in Katsura, and only emphasized by their perversion at Nikko, are 1) the clarity of spatial composition where space is the architectural medium; 2) the separation of magnificent and austere into complementary objects rather than through the compromise of one by the other in a decoration of surface; and 3) the sublimation of ego in the supra ego.

Before we begin a discussion of space, we should recall that as Yatsuka has pointed out, Horiguchi's international/modernist pieces, as with almost all early Japanese modern architecture, went entirely disregarded by the international community. Furthermore, all his architecture, including his sukiya work, was seen as flat and lacking a sense of depth. How do we read this in the light of Gropius' first claim about space as a medium and spatial composition in Katsura? Is it a question of lack of skill on Horiguchi's part, or is there more to it than that? It would seem that the question of lack of spatial sense is a common criticism of Japanese early modern architecture, which was not seen to come into its own until Tange radicalized sukiya in the 1950's.

Is Gropius then seeing something that is more a reflection of his own predicament than that of the Japanese, and what then can we learn from it? As usual, the question of terms and categories requires a significant amount of unpacking before it can be of use in an analysis.

Let us begin with what Gropius is concerned with in the three points listed above, since they are all derivative of the same world-view. The notion of space as an autonomous quality of architecture is the fallout of the crisis of history itself. Think of space as Gropius and the 'moderns' referred to it, and as it is discussed by Sigfried Gideon in *Space, Time and Architecture*. Architecture is seen as having progressed over time from a sculptural object to a static conception comprised of the building in plan and facade operating independently. Finally, with the moderns, this static conception gives way to a dynamic conception of space wherein both plan and section are players in the service of this new concept. For the moderns, who are by definition 'revolutionaries', the tradition of the old—now reduced to 'styles' in a pejorative

sense—must give way to an authentic architecture based on 'space'. Furthermore, as we saw with the influence of Ukiyo-e on art nouveau in Europe, the way it is perceived by artists says more about themselves than it does about the culture that produced the original. (Remember Oscar Wilde's admonition to Van Gogh lest "Japan become entirely a creation in the mind of the artists"). Hence the same way that Ukiyo-e served as a criticism of the limits of Western art, Japanese traditional architecture was seen as 'useful' in support of these new spatial concerns. What was useful were precisely the points elaborated by Gropius: the lack of a static plan, no simple axial arrangements, no need for useless decoration, a system of construction based on a modular unit, a plan freed of structural limitations in which space was allowed to flow continuously and to break down constricting distinctions between inside and outside. Much like the argument Mies made about Japan, it is easy for a Westerner to assume that the basic tenets of modernism find resonance in Japanese traditional architecture, a reading that is both misleading and problematic.

To begin with, there is no notion of space in Japanese traditional architecture. If anything, we can find nothing but the denial of 'space'. It is a world-view that dismisses the notion of any such autonomously existing construct. This means that the notion that space simply exists contradicts the phenomenological wherein the appearance of phenomena is an embodied experience: phenomena arise in the perception of the individual and cannot be taken as prior or autonomous to that perception. The notion of the artistic conceit as a vanity does not take aim at banishing all such conceits, but merely reveals conceit as the locus of appearance itself—an entirely different issue.

I mentioned that all Gropius' observations regarding Japanese traditional architecture sprang from the same world-view, and it would do to elaborate that statement. The notion of space begins with a historical engagement which assumes the autonomy of the subject—the political individual—and seeks affirmation of that autonomy through its natural, or concrete, actualization, inevitably in the future. In other words, to see time as history is not only to place the locus of meaning somewhere in the future, but to put the onus of revelation on an autonomously existing individual. Politically speak-

ing, an individual who is born 'free', exists 'naturally' or prior to any social contract (modern terms) or prior to any culturally-given universal (traditional terms). Hence that individual must actualize the conditions of his/her own recognition without the guarantee of his/her own cultural horizons. An obvious contradiction, an impossible situation, and hence inevitably a crisis. (The crisis is the issue of identity/nationalism vs. internationalism, or again, regionalism vs. internationalism.)

What we seek in the modern condition of 'architecture-as-space' is an affirmation of this autonomously existing 'subject'—the autonomous individual. Since recognition must come from another autonomous individual who is similarly prior to culture, the role of culture in this exchange must be mute. Language, the archetype of all artifice, can only obscure the affirmation of this subject. Hence as Gropius reads Katsura, it is pure surface (self-evident in its meaning) unencumbered by decoration (allegorical language which does nothing but obscure meaning), in which the artist himself disappears (is sublimated) in the face of the universal. An entirely romantic reading of a situation which has no need of, nor relevance to Romanticism.

And this reveals precisely the double standard that Karatani refers to concerning Japanese art which appears Western (hence fake to foreign eyes) vs. Japanese art that appears Japanese, and hence avant garde. Curiously, just as Japanese modern architecture was always perceived by foreigners as 'flat' in contrast to *shoin* and *sukiya*, Japanese literature and culture is always analyzed in terms of its lack of a subject.[16] The lack of a 'subject', a theme we have dealt with since the beginning, is apparently both the source of creativity and a hindrance in the creation of Japanese arts.

It is the source, because it is precisely the lack of the subject which gives the ironic play of *sukiya* vs. *shoin* and *shinden* its quality: the quality of formalized conceit which both creates depth and denies its value. It is the hindrance, because it is what prevents the 'Japanese' from being the same as everybody else — at least so goes the myth.

Notes

1 As David Stewart describes the positions of Tatsuno and Katayama, they were in effect "architect to the nation" and "architect to the crown" respectively. But the "nation" itself is a multi-faceted entity.

2 The obvious questions are: Recognizable by whom, and does "it" adequately represent everyone it is supposed to represent? The artist/architects would obviously disagree.

3 The terms are familiar from other contexts—National Socialism as being connected with Hitler's Nazis and International Socialism with something that the Soviet Union was supposed to have propagated—where the word "socialism" enters the story. The social is another modern word, (18thC. for French and English, Meiji for Japanese) which specifically refers to the public realm understood concretely, i.e. as a measurable concept. Why is it used in our context? Quite simply, the universals that we are talking about both refer to that which is actualized historically, i.e. concretely. In the case of international socialism, with respect to anybody anywhere, and with national socialism, with respect to a limited universal, where the limit is that of the nation. What is key is that in both cases, the universal is validated or legitimized, not by some inarticulate common understanding, but by something which is actualized concretely, or "naturally".

4 It is as Benjamin would have it, not only the aestheticization of politics but the politicization of aesthetics. The phenomenon is not restricted to Europe, the Americas or any where else for that matter.

5 Sakakura was actually never a participant of the competition. It was initially won by Maekawa but was then rejected by the Association for the Expo in Japan on the grounds of not looking Japanese. The association then unilaterally opted for the entry of Maeda Kenjiro to be built. Sakakura was hired to supervise the construction in Paris being well familiar with the site. Sakakura changed the design completely on his own on the grounds that Maeda`s original design didn't fit the actual site.

6 Kestenbaum, p. 5
7 As to which desciples are specifically responsible is a matter of dispute. Long attributed as the work of Enshu Kobori w/ Sakyo Nakanuma and Yoshiro (aka Kentei), Kobori is no longer generally accepted as the principle designer. Interestingly enough, both Nakanuma and Yoshiro were of low birth.

8 "Overcoming modernity" was the specific name given by the nationalists to the task of avoiding the pitfalls of Western history/modernization and of constructing a cohesive Japanese identity.

9 Kakuzō Okakura. The Book of Tea. (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1989).

10 Yatsuka quoting Yoshida Isoya. Yatsuka Hajime. At the End of the Century. One Hundred Years of Architecture. (Los Angeles: MOCA, 1998), p. 173.

11 ibid. Yatsuka quoting Horiguchi.

12 Yatsuka Hajime. "Mies and Japan." Author's manuscript.

13 Taut was too late to actually "introduce" the idea of using sukiya to counteract modernity. It was already being explored by a number of architects. What his voice did do was lend a credibility to the concept, indicative of the reverse aestheticization characteristic of late-developing countries. Things Japanese appeared inauthentic while things modern were sought after—unless that is, things "Japanese" gained the title of "avant-garde" as bestowed by the West.

14 Gropius. Architettura in Giappone. (Milano: G. G. Gorlich, 1965), p. 51.

15 One cannot even directly relate Western phenomenology to the Japanese conception without severely qualifying it: the sheer role of the formalized context in the creation of the work underscores the assumption of a cultural horizon as pivotal in the appearance of meaning.

16 Kojin Karatani. "Buddhism, Marxism, Fascism," http://www.karataniforum.org/bmf.htm.

fig. 4.1-2 Katsura, Detached Palace. Plan and site plan.

fig. 4.3-4 Katsura, Entrance from Garden Side and Exit at North East corner of Old Shoin.

fig. 4.5-6 Moon viewing platform and west facade of new palace.

fig. 4.7-8 Amanohashidate and Shōkin-tei.

fig. 4.9-10 Views of Amanohashidate.

fig. 4.11 Entsuji.

fig. 4.12 Horiguchi, Kikkawa Residence, Meguro, Tokyo, 1930.

fig. 4.14-15 (left, right) Horiguchi, Okada Residence, Omori, interior and exterior.

fig. 4.16-17 (left, right) Horiguchi, Okada Residence, Omori, exterior detail and interior view.

fig. 4.18-19 (top, bottom) Yoshida Isoya,
Sekirekiso Villa, Shizuoka, Japan, 1941,
exterior and interior.

CHAPTER 5 - Tange and Shirai

"Tange also dreamed of Speer"

-Hamaguchi Ryūichi, 1942

1.   One thing was clear. Japan could neither emulate nor lay claim to that history. Japan's was a tradition of wood that nowhere brought into appearance the same 'being'—the same culturally-given subject—concerned with eternity, passing and history. Yet perhaps this was exactly how one was to proceed. Sukiya was perhaps exactly the self-consciousness that engaged such historical conceit.

2.   Hence with this playful attitude, a playfulness hovering on the brink of unbridled nihilism, sukiya presented itself as a viable answer to both the 'overcoming modernity' of the nationalists, and the anonymous cultural death of Western history—the Scylla and Charybdis of modernity's Romanticism.

Horiguchi, as this story unfolds, was perhaps the most critical of the next generation of modernists, including Kenzō Tange, precisely because of their willingness to blur the boundaries and hence to engage historically. Horiguchi was intensely critical of their relation to tradition, and their contention that tradition is not in the details or in its form, but in something they called "spirit". Tradition, as Horiguchi saw it, is then reduced to nothing but a warehouse of parts which one uses as one sees fit at the moment.

— Nationalism, Internationalism, and the Teahouse

The above paragraphs recall the argument implicitly made thus far: Posing sukiya as a 'critical, yet distinct,' way of engaging modernity, without becoming dialectical or legitimating modernity's universalizing pretenses, risks fail-

ure the moment sukiya ceases to operate as a distinct style in itself. Yet the fact that *sukiya* actually prescribed no rules other than to reveal conceit would indicate that such a project was impossible from the start. We will now explore the ramifications of this 'modern tradition' as it played out through the personalities and influences of Tange Kenzō and Shirai Sei'ichi.

To start, it would do well to repeat the intended relevance of sukiya: namely, that its lack of prescribed rules, as opposed to intentions, made it well suited to act as a counterpoint to the dialectical ironies of international architecture. The point was made that internationalism could not be easily absorbed into the common sense of everyday life for the simple reason that it failed to catch the imagination of the 'unitiated', i.e. those who were not so politically inclined, or came from differing cultural horizons. In other words there was nothing 'international' about it. In addition to the fact that it excluded those who were politically inclined in the other direction and wished to capture the *national* imagination, internationalism's internal logic required a critical over-coming of itself which included that which it was not. In other words, interna-tionalism—as the historical—needed to account for, and be accounted for, by the non-historical, or the regional. Internationalism (modernism) required regionalism to hide its own historicity and its own limited conception in order to legitimate its status as a universal. That nationalism might be the result of this turning inward is not surprising but there is no necessity that it should take the forms immediately associated with nationalism. It required a crisis to push it there. One can easily imagine that a vernacular architecture con-ceived from the perspective of history could be just as useful.

We distinguished nationalism from internationalism based on the particular political need of each to create a functional universal, and what distinguished them was merely the community to which that 'universal' applied—either a national community constituted by racial confines, or an international com-munity constituted by biological existence (anybody anywhere).

The inherent need for modernism's validation by the regional has its coun-terpart in nationalism's need to confirm the concrete *'truthfulness'* of its cul-turally constituted universals, i.e the racial or biological qualifications which accompanied its reasoning.

There is no paradox then in a *mythically-based* nation such as Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, or Imperial Japan engaging in extreme technological advances. Nor is there any paradox in Internationalists invoking a monumental dimension to their work — any more than a regional one. In fact, regionalism is merely an innocuous form of the monumental.

Instead of seeking only the sukiya-like appearances in modern architecture, we can now broaden our examination to include all modernist work which engages head-on the problem of identity, be it monumental, eclectic, or vernacular in character. However, the moment sukiya fails to appear as sukiya, it forfeits its ability to function as an 'indifferent critique' in the senses intended by Sen no Rikyu or Okakura.

We are interested in two separate problems. The first is the aporia of internationalism and nationalism, what we have called romantic paradoxes. The second is that from the Japanese point of view, i.e, one which does not assume the necessity of Western history, the problem is still one of style. But to say that the problem remains one of style is to say that the principle concern is still one either of a 'national architecture' or an ahistorical approach. They (the Japanese architects) wished to avoid the aporia of western history simply by not being like the West, yet the characterization of architecture as somehow connected to nationhood is by its nature conceived modernly or historically. Hence 'style' ceases to function ahistorically.

The essential facet of sukiya— a lack of a prescribed formal language — lends itself all the more to engaging 'critically' with modernity, i.e. in an interested manner rather than a disinterested or indifferent manner. The question of self-consciousness which, in the spirit of both Sen no Rikyu and Okakura, we are obliged to raise, will reveal the underlying intention of a work's author. Regardless of the answer, what we are most concerned with is the resultant work's ability to engage critically and yet remain distinct.

Our discussion of Horiguchi has thus far left the impression that he was a modernist and neither a Nativist nor a Nationalist. Records of public de-

bates, correspondences, and competitions, however, indicate that Horiguchi was every bit as vocal as Itō had been in desiring to represent the nation. There were very few architects who did not identify with the problem of a National architecture (Shirai was one). Horiguchi's experiments with sukiya mark the earliest such propositions in the field of residential architecture, and had their corollary on the institutional and urban scale. This is where the ultimate test lay, given the consensus that architecture was a national issue.

Sakakura's winning project at the 1937 Paris Exposition shared the *Grand-Pris* with Sert's Spanish Pavilion and Aalto's Finnish entry. All three projects point in the critically regional direction modernism as a socialist ideology seemed to be taking. Sakakura's proposal appeared to represent a strong rebuff to the Nativists when the military Nationalists endorsed a modernist scheme.

With the military in control of parliament, as it had been since 1932, this was to be expected. Japan was in essence embarking on building an empire with little or no resources and was therefore hardly solicitous towards building expenses with dubious returns. On the other hand, it had largely accepted the results of modernist architecture, without the cultural horizon that predicates it.[1]

With a martial Government in place, the cultural horizon jettisoned in this case—the ideal of a substantive universal applicable to all—was inverted and recommissioned to provide the pretext for constructing an all-Asian empire. Thus 'Internationalism' (the ideology) masked a kind of Western Imperialism threatening Asia. The threat of Western enslavement, when combined with "Japan as the empty centre" (Okakura's argument for Japan as museum was also inverted to validate Japan's position as the representative of Asia) appeared to some to legitimize Japan's expansionist intentions. Furthermore, Sakakura, in the written text accompanying his proposal, specifically criticized the functionalist theories of the Internationalists, arguing instead for an organic architecture. For Sakakura, humans and their cultural expressions were the product of their being biological creatures. We have already discussed the importance of biological arguments—especially

when they could combine the indisputable *facticity* of natural selection with the *certainty* of cultural imperatives.[2]

The modernists' quest to play a much larger role in representing the nation architecturally was further complicated with Japan's invasion of China in the summer of 1937. By the fall of the same year, all resources were being rationed, diverting everything that could be used by the military towards the war effort. New buildings were limited to 50 tons of steel and/or a cost of 100,000 yen. By 1939 all non-military projects virtually ceased.[3]

In contrast, and where Japan's expansion had put an end to architectural exploration at home, opportunities began to present themselves in the conquered territories. For the modernist architects, the *tabula rasa* of Manchuria offered opportunities that Japan's crowded, overbuilt and overly treasured land would never allow.

Between 1905 and 1931, Japan developed and maintained a presence in north-east China's Manchuria and established itself firmly in Taiwan. Both territories were spoils of the respective wars fought with China and Russia. The Russians lost their leaseholds in the Liaotong Peninsula and railway rights to the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria from Dairen to Changchun. In addition to a wealth of sorely-needed material resources, Manchuria in particular gave Japan a chance to experiment and develop the technological resources it needed to achieve any success as an expansionist power. Eventually, however, the civil exploitation[4] was challenged, and to defend its interests, Japan came to occupy Manchuria militarily in 1931. Following this change, urban planning also came to be conceived as just such a technological endeavor in which construction, infrastructure and logistical factors of production, labour and mobility formed the basis for its organization. During the first 25 years of the civil occupation, research and planning had largely been the result of careful observation of the Soviets. Manchuria was the front between Japan and Russia. Additionally, with the formation of the Soviet Union, it became a key precedent for operative strategies of expansion and control. (Yatsuka notes that Japan's research on the Soviets by 1932 was said to exceed in amount and quality that of the American government at the time[5]).

The careful organization of research and the deliberate and measured implementation of policy in Manchuria was largely the work of Goto Shinpei. Goto took over the South Manchuria Railway Company (Man-tetsu) in 1906. A doctor by training, he had been responsible for successfully implementing strict and effective hygiene measures in the army during the Russia/Japan war and effectively wiping out devastating epidemics which inevitably plagued army campaigns. (His measures were eventually adopted by Western armies as well.) Yatsuka describes him as "a typically enlightened colonialist". Between 1898 and 1906 he was Chief Officer of the Bureau of Civil Administration of Taiwan, during which time he was responsible for amassing a tremendous body of information on the geography, social customs, land ownership systems, and conditions of public sanitation in Taiwan. He then introduced a modern infrastructure and became responsible for planning the city of Taipei.[6] Goto was only briefly head of Man-tetsu, but he created an effective research unit, largely responsible for the wealth of information on the Soviet Union available to the military. Goto became foreign minister and then ultimately returned to Tokyo to become mayor in 1920. He held that position while overseeing the reconstruction of Tokyo following the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake.

Between 1932 and 1937, Manchuko (the name given to the Japanese puppet state created in Manchuria) became the arena for an experimentally-controlled economic plan. The research department of Man-Tetsu was expanded and brought under closer supervision of the government through the creation of the Man-tetsu Economic Research Institute. This was headed by Sogo Shinji. Sogo had worked with Sano[7], implementing many of the latter's planning guidelines while in charge of the reconstruction of Tokyo under Goto.

With the *tabula rasa* of Manchuria as the laboratory, more than 25 years of careful planning and research, and a planning department spearheaded by a vanguard of progressive Japanese teachers and bureaucrats, the new capital of Shinkyo was conceived to be built as the paragon and standard for a new empire. Goto and his highly capable "Think Tank" in Manchuria had been both systematic and absolutely pragmatic in their approach. The urban

planning schemes which evolved relied heavily on the devices of a 19th century vocabulary, including immense urban layouts, axial boulevards, vast roundabouts, and monumental buildings combined with a technology of sanitary and electric utilities and rationalized traffic flow.[8]

The economic plan conceived of the city as an aggregation of systems working within the framework of a particular ambition or objective. In principle, the *built* is neither prior to nor greater than any other component system in the overall scheme. At least that is the net result of total planning. This of course would seem counter to the interest of architects. Yet despite this explicit intention, built results, as well as proposed schemes, illustrate anything but a total plan. The 19th century inheritance was not that easily deposed. The results were largely the excessive plans already described with their tendency to overwrought grandeur. Furthermore, the military itself, consistent with the logic of planning, sanctioned no particular style, nor even the concept of style per se—much to the chagrin of the Japanese modernists. To compound the architects' problems, the outbreak of total war in 1937 caused a steady dilution of the region's five year plan into a balancing act of material logistics and reaction in support of the war.

Despite these two forces, modernist architects were still intent on experimenting and practicing in Manchuria.

Elite Modernists in Manchuria — Nippon Plastic Cultural Association

Despite its problems, Shinkyo was still intended to showcase the most advanced ideas and leading techniques in city planning throughout the world. At least so was the claim of Kishida Hideto. Kishida a professor at Tokyo University, began as a design assistant to Uchida Yoshikazu, a colleague of Sano's. Actively involved in the Nihon shumi debate and a prolific writer, Kishida was a sort of diplomatic liaison between the young 'rebel' modernists and the architectural establishment.[9] He was in every respect a supporter of the modernists, including the outspoken Maekawa. Kishida was thus instrumental in Sakakura's selection as supervisor for the 1937 Paris exposition entry and hence Sakakura's superior, so to speak.

Kishida, as an advisor and as an architect, looked to Manchuria to advance modernism. The last pre-war modernist movement to be established in Japan was the Nippon Kousaku Bunka Renmei (Japan Plastic Cultural Association). It was active from 1936 until 1940 and included among its members Kishida, Horiguchi, Maekawa, and Sakakura[10]. The association was conceived as a Japanese werkbund, devoted to proposing architectural solutions on the Asian continent. It established its own monthly journal in 1939, *Gendai Kenchiku*, publishing individual building and urban scale projects[11]. Among the projects published was Sakakura's Housing Plan for Nanko (the Southern part of Shinkyo).

The Nanko Housing project had a decidedly Corbusian flavour. Sakakura had been in the employ of Le Corbusier until 1936. Returning to work in Asia, he had continued to work in the manner he had learned. In this case, the *Ville Radieuse* was easily adapted to Shinkyo's environment. What is significant about the presence of the *Ville Radieuse* conception in the midst of the differing conceptions of "command planning" and modernist aspirations is the presence of a regionalist critique of both the Nationalists and the Internationalists—or in Japan's case, of the monumental and the non-monumental.

Monumentality: A question of Form, of Space, or of Program?

Kestenbaum argues that there was no precedent for the monument in Japan, either in language or in actuality. As she points out, the word *kinensei* refers to an event, specifically the temporal aspect of monument. There is also the prefix *dai,* meaning 'great', which may be added to a word such as temple or shrine to emphasize an aspect of scale or importance. However there existed no separate word capturing both qualities. The result was the adoption of the katakana *monyumento.*[12]

The closest thing to a monument was the shrine at Nikko, a site that brought only derision from Manchurian visitors who knew Beijing's Forbidden City or even Nanking's Sports Stadium.[13] Japanese monuments could only be seen as miniatures of Chinese achievement. Architects were particularly sensi-

tive to the fact that not only were building standards superior in the colonies to those in the homeland (Sano's sewer system for Shinkyo is a case in point, but also the fact that brick and masonry as opposed to wood were the basic building materials), but that even the cities put those of the conqueror to shame. For architects, Japan had yet to solve the problem of recognition, with an appearance appropriate to its status as a world power. Horiguchi writes in the association's *Gendai Kenchiku,* "Japan is not an island country of the Far East but a world-class culture which can oust the European and American powers and lead Asia....We need a contemporary Japanese style of global stature."[14]

The problem is not so much one of monuments. Monuments do not start with modernity, but they, just as architecture itself, are completely transformed by modernity. Monuments are suitable vehicles for achieving what architecture in general is saddled with, namely political construction. Monuments are thus particularly suitable for a nationalist agenda in achieving the aims of education, presenting a tangible common memory, and for staging the spectacle of actively remembering and celebrating that common past. What Horiguchi, Sakakura and others were searching for was recognition by an indifferent leadership to the possible contribution architecture could make. In failing to understand the meaning of history, the military was either indifferent, cheap, or satisfied with the more simplistic notion of identity presented by Nativist architects like Itō Chūta. Indifference, however, was the dominant attitude.

The modernists were equally straight-jacketed by their own proximity to the 'tradition' of modernism itself. But here we must make some distinctions. First of all, there is no paradox in the Japanese modernists doing monumental architecture in the first place, any more than in the Nationalists' use of technology. Nor are they abandoning a political agenda; they do not embody that agenda to begin with. What guided their approach were the tenets of modernism inherited as holy writ. These tenets included essence of material and the specificity of program.   Therefore they dealt with the requisites of monumentality primarily through program.

Horiguchi's entry in the *Chūreitou* (Monument to the loyal dead) competition

was an elaborate scheme involving not only the requisite tower monument but a relocated *Yasukuni Jinja* and a huge sports complex. (Yasukuni Jinja is the official shrine for the souls of soldiers killed in the service of the emperor. It goes back only so far as Meiji in that function, and, as such, is tied to Japan as a modern polity.) Horiguchi contended that separate monuments would diminish their importance, but that a combination of them would be that much more powerful. Thus he combined a planned national history hall in honor of the 2600 year celebration of the imperial line from Emperor Jimmu, the (cancelled) Olympic stadium, the required *chūreitou* tower itself, and the expansion of Yasukuni Jinja, all of these gathered together into a people's commemorative plaza. He wanted in this to achieve the desired temporal and scale aspects of monumentality.

Horiguchi's tower, a pole with five circular disks, is a cross between his Secessionist *Tower of Light and Thread* (1921) and his weather stations in Kōbe and Oshima (1938). His proposal failed to convince the judges, probably not from the point of view of appropriate style, but because of the plan to move Yasukuni Jinja, which was considered offensive. The idea behind the program, however, was probably not lost on younger architects.

The more notable of Sakakura's entries combined the chūreitou, a pyramidal structure facing an urban plaza, with a connecting colonnade.Re-published, he portrayed it inserted into his Nanko (Shinkyo) housing plan. The republished version resonated with a paper written by Sakakura the year before (1939), emphasizing the necessity of the monument being posed within an urban context. His drawings included a miniature of Le Corbusier's Palais des Soviets, on which Sakakura had worked. The point was to emphasize Le Corbusier's argument for the monument within the urban context (*Ville Contemporaine*, 1922).

Maekawa also entered the *chūreitou* competition, with one aspect of his submission being particularly relevant here. While he also heeded Kishida's advice and used the pyramid as a suitably non-western but monumental precedent (a strategy used by a number of entrants in addition to Sakakura and Maekawa), Maekawa included interior drawings as part of his presentation. As opposed to Horiguchi who relied on recognizable program and rhe-

torical object in his presentation, Maekawa actually argued for the spatial quality of the project as being integral to its monumentality. Apparently this as well was not lost—on one younger architect in particular.

Tange Kenzō

Tange was born in Osaka and raised in Kagawa. He did not travel outside of Asia until long after the war. Educated at Tokyo University (Kishida's laboratory) and a product of Maekawa's and Sakakura's office, but especially influenced by Sakakura and his Le Corbusier connection, Tange was an ardent nationalist and a self-proclaimed Romantic. His first published article was an introduction to Le Corbusier entitled Ode to Michelangelo. The rhetorical style it employed was that of another of Tange's heroes: Yasuda Yojūrō, one of the leaders in the Nihon Roman-ha (Japanese Romantic movement).

The first project that thrust Tange into the limelight was his first prize accomplishment in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Competition.[15] The competition, held in 1942, was part of the Architectural Association's yearly tradition of holding a small-scale competition for manageable entry-level projects for young architects and up-and-coming students. That year, however, the competition was much more significant, a thinly disguised modernist instrument aligning itself with military success (Japan was at this stage doing exceedingly well in the war with 1942 already seeing the effective removal of Western powers from South East Asia and the region falling completely under Japanese control) and intent on resolving the problem of monumentality. It was the *chūreitou* competition again with a clearer grasp of the importance of program in deriving a modernist monumentality. The outline was as follows:

> Requesting commemorative building projects which suitably represent the heroic aim of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. (Do not be enticed by pre-existing notions of "commemorative architecture"; the entrants themselves shall decide the scale and content of the project. Projects must contribute significantly to the architectural culture of Greater East Asia.)[16]

Tange's entry in this competition is significant for a number of reasons. First, it managed to elicit recognition of sorts from critics as well as supporters for its innovativeness. We have already mentioned Horiguchi's summation of Tange — that he treated Japanese history like a warehouse of parts for indiscriminate use. Maekawa was equally critical. While deeming Tange's win merely a lucky break, his own support went to another Corbusian scheme which dealt more with 'architectural' issues than 'form-making'[17].

If Tange's scheme was merely form-making, why was it so ground-breaking? (Even Murano Tōgo, who largely disliked Le Corbusier and his deified status among Japanese architects, recognized the possibility of Tange's entry serving as a "guidepost"[18] for where to go with modernism.) Let us first consider the extent of what Tange proposed.

Taking the entries of the chūreitou competition seriously, Tange enacted a number of key changes. Beginning with Sakakura's monument with plaza and colonnade, the pyramid was dispensed with and replaced with a relevant symbol. If to Tange, the pyramid was problematic because it was Western, the use of Western classical hierarchy certainly wasn't (possibly because it took a professionally trained eye and was not common knowledge). Tange used a modified Campidoglio with St. Peter's enclosing colonnade and a ramp reminiscent of the funerary temple of Hatshepsut at Deir el Bahri,[19] with an iconic Japanese shrine at its centre. The iconic shrine was none other than a modernist's appropriation of Ise.

The whole complex, lying on the slopes of that most recognizable (modern) icon of Japan[20], Mount Fuji, lay along an axis drawn from the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. The program statement accompanying the presentation proposed the construction of a new urban centre as a cultural capital and true centre of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. This new capital was to be anchored by Tange's project, the Shrine, and Mount Fuji.

Tange was not the first architect to propose shrine construction as a viable source for architecture. Previous examples had fashioned a number of secular programs out of shrine architecture. Nor was Tange by any means the first

architect to propose a new shrine. He was, however, the first to propose a shrine to be constructed in concrete, where it was neither a copy of the original (mere craft), nor a secularization of the sacred original (though this would follow).

Tange wrote:

> Forms which soar, cut off from the earth and severed from nature; forms which are abstract symbols of mankind's will to dominate: these forms were created in Egyptian culture and in medieval Christian culture. In the end, the Anglo-American craving for world financial dominance has appropriated these forms. Forms that rise and masses which oppress men have no connection to us. The very fact that we do not have this Western European 'monumentality' is the triumph of the holy country of Japan...
>
> The road we walk points toward the traditional spirit of Japan's architecture....Further, in these various forms I have completely avoided anything random or not historically certified; for the seeds of our great future development are found in historically validated forms.[21]

Tange, with a deftness that had seemed to elude Horiguchi, effectively succeeded in programming a monumentality which seemed beyond reproach, without attacking the foundations of Shinto and Emperor alike. However, it is still Nihon-shumi, only instead of tacking the Japanesque on like a decorative element, the Japanesque was rendered inseparable from the material and logic of construction. For Horiguchi and Maekawa, it still avoided the problem of meaning in architecture, and somehow seemed to have muddied the waters as to what was Western and what could be Japanese. The issue was no longer that of Horiguchi and Yoshida Isoya, namely the incontrovertible difference that refused to enter the dialectic of modernism and nationalism, even while Horiguchi was incapable of identifying what that quality was. With Tange, most onlookers seemed satisfied that modernism and internationalism had finally been reconciled through a Japanese (regional) monu-

mentality. If this were the case, it would be a grave loss for the discourse of architecture.

The Japan Cultural Hall competition, Bangkok

Maekawa had not participated in the Greater Asia competition, but rather served as secretary to the judging and offered extensive commentary of his own. In the year following the Greater Asia competition, an official competition sponsored by the Ministry of Greater East Asia was held for the Japan-Thailand Cultural Hall. Only about half the judges were architects. The rest were high-level bureaucrats and 'official' artists. (Unlike architecture, all the other arts had been heavily co-opted by the military in support of the war effort.) Among the architects, both Kishida and Chuta Ito served as judges. Maekawa took part in this one.

The principle issues framing the competition were the location—Bangkok with its hot, humid climate—and the issue of cultural exchange. Thus the guidelines made the following stipulations: The buildings were to be elevated 2m off the ground and finished in Teak with the optional use of small amounts of brick. There was to be maximum usage of openings and no air-conditioning. In addition, the following stipulations were made concerning style:

As this Japan Cultural Hall is to be constructed in Thailand, the building itself must assume the most important role of promoting Japanese culture. Its architectural style shall be based on our country's unique, simple and elegant traditional style of architecture. However, avoid vainly imitating the past; one should offer one's own originality [in designing] something deserving our pride as the first palace of Japanese culture to be built overseas.[22]

The cultural issue resulted in a suggested plan and program being given to the competitors with the expectation that once again (as in the early competitions) it was a matter of designing a facade treatment for a set plan and structure.

The results of the competition were that Tange came first and Maekawa

second. Several issues were at stake in the judging, but what is of particular interest to us are the changes in approach, most noticeably by Maekawa.

Tange, we have already seen, was not that far removed from the Nihon shumi espoused by Ito. In the Greater Asia competition, Tange made explicit reference to a specific and recognizable artefact of Japan in constructing a new symbol. While the original was recast, literally, in a modern form, it was still a kind of historicism. For the Japan Cultural Hall, Tange again used a specific referent in constructing his scheme. However, Maekawa did as well—something he had specifically avoided to this point.

Kishida in the project outline had pretty much given it away that for him the most appropriate precedent was the Kyoto Gosho (Imperial Palace). Along with Katsura, it was the most palatable of Japanese sources for the modernists, for the very same reasons Taut had identified—simplicity, clarity, lack of ornamentation, etc. In this case *shinden zukuri* offered both the dignified presence of bilateral symmetry as well as the desirable Imperial connotations.

Tange combined the *shinden zukuri* of Kyoto Gosho with the *shinmei zukuri* of Ise. As Kestenbaum notes, the net result was that he had won two major competitions using "monumental buildings with gabled roofs in symmetrical, centralized, hierarchical plans".[23]

Maekawa also used a historicising method of sorts, though he went to great lengths to qualify it. First of all, Maekawa greatly reworked the suggested plan of the competition outline. Avoiding bilateral symmetry, shifting entrances and major spaces off axes, and using a stepped plan, all characteristics reminiscent of *shoin zukuri* and its derivative, *sukiya zukuri*, Maekawa achieved a much more dynamic composition, which was in fact his intention. Maekawa strongly argued that the motivation should not be form but rather an attitude to space - an idea he had begun to explore in the *chūreitou* competition. In his statement he made the following claims:

To contemplate tradition does not mean simply to indulge in the dead forms of Japanese architecture. Today we cannot resolve problems by such crude means as merely decorating the eaves of the new Cultural Hall with brack-

ets from Japanese classical architecture. That architectural history considers something to be Japanese architecture just because it has brackets attached...is barbaric.[24]

The dichotomy that Maekawa was pursuing reflects the issues we have been tracking. His position that 'active/spatial' qualities were inherently Japanese reflected a view that active/spatial qualities were appropriate antidotes to the Western obsession with the concrete material object [*Kouiteki/kukanteki* vs. *buttaiteki/kouchikuteki*].[25]

There are a number of significant consequences we can extract from these two projects. First, the debate on modernism vs. tradition had now permanently changed its direction. Space was to be, from that point on, a 'Japanese' characteristic [*ma /kukan*], a quality heretofore tellingly absent from Japanese modern architecture. Second, both space and form were, from this point, able to be abstracted and manipulated freely within the 'modern' parameters, and not seen to be contradictory to its aims.

What Yatsuka has perceived in the relation of sukiya to internationalism does indeed hold true: It is not a question of the level of formal similarity between Tange's abstracted *shinden zukuri* or Maekawa's *shoin zukuri,* but that these forms of making were now recast relative to the modern problematic of history and a historical subject.

Another consequence of the competitions was the change in position of the players with respect to the development of a modern architecture in Japan. It was really Maekawa and Sakakura who were facilitating the appropriation of *space* in the direction of a Japanese modernism, and this was perhaps far more important than the appropriation of Japanese form in the direction of an internationally-valid regionalism as can be credited to Tange. Tange's buildings to this point were, after all, still Nihon-Shumi. The significant change was that Tange, by winning the two competitions, unseated Maekawa as the uncontested leader of the heroic modernists, and firmly established himself as a contender for that position. While Maekawa may have unwittingly dis-

covered the key strategies, he was never able to exploit them to the degree that Tange would.

Post-War Hiroshima

Before leaving Tange, there is one more competition we should briefly consider. It is of course the one for which he is best known, the one which established him internationally and, most importantly, established Japanese modern architecture as a legitimate force in the international arena—the Hiroshima Peace Centre Competition.

As is well known, Japan's post-war recovery was orchestrated, under the auspices of the United States, by the same bureaucrats who had conducted the war, and who had in fact been responsible for the planning and control which supported and facilitated Japan's empire. By the same token, the pre-war nationalistic architects were of course the same ones now rebuilding democratic Japan and responsible for the planning and construction of an entire nation. Reconstruction and Progress were the single most important concerns, and all pre-war issues of identity and international recognition seemed completely irrelevant. Whatever validity those pre-war concerns held vis-à-vis the crisis of history—history as nihilistic, politics being rendered effete, etc.—sheer necessity now vanquished any doubts and everyone, almost without exception, became engaged in the project of the new Japan.

In 1948, Tange published his *Problems Relating to Architecture*. The 'conversion' exhibited in the article professed the need for freedom over controlled planning, and evaluated the possibilities in a controlled capitalist economy. Yet Tange was hardly going to sacrifice the hard lessons of planning learned, nor give up the position of 'national architect' that he almost held within his grasp. Planning, with its concomitant ideological underpinnings, would have to be adapted, but by no means abandoned.

If the modernists (none of whom were internationalists) had to wriggle and squirm to beat modernism's ideological strait-jacket during the war—the product of which was the basis for a regional architecture—after the war no such

manoeuvering would be necessary. Thus once again, Tange used the strategies he had employed in the previous winning competition entries. Consequently, in the original entry he had no problem using Western sources in forms as well as in plan. (The original entry used arches taken from Saarinen's St. Louis Jefferson Memorial Project.) While some found the Corbusian elements still too literal and strong, no one argued against the axial sense of the project, connecting the existing east-west thorough-fare at the bottom of the site, and the 'atomic dome', the single remaining structure in the area located directly under the epicentre of the explosion, and the obvious 'environmental' icon as a fitting basis for the scheme. In this respect the strategy of the pilotis certainly worked as the colonnade of the plaza and could easily be justified. In the final manifestation of the project the pilotis stayed, the colonnade was limited by the buildings at the entrance of the site not being connected, and the Saarinen arches were replaced by a saddle-like arch marking the axis and housing the cenotaph of the victims' names.

Tange had worked with Moto Take of Waseda University on a zoning study for Hiroshima in 1946-47. He was well familiar with the site and had the added advantage of conceptualizing his competition entry within an entire plan for its urban context. This he presented to the CIAM meeting in 1951 to an exceedingly positive reception. Tange had succeeded in convincing the world that Japanese modernism was the innocuous answer to the dilemma faced by internationalism in its post-war vacuum. The world responded by accepting Tange and the new Japanese architecture as spatially rich and culturally driven, all in accordance with the guidelines of an entirely historical engagement of architecture.

Shirai Sei'ichi and the Vexing Problem of History and Dialectic

Let us now recall the position constructed at the beginning of this thesis regarding Shirai's attempt to engage history both politically and imaginatively through architecture. The attempt appears that much more heroic, and that much more doomed, given the sweep of events and sentiments surrounding the architectural debate. One can now begin to read backward of Shirai's words and realize how important and relevant was the endeavour to engage a tradition not founded on either form nor space. The problem was neither identifying the correct source nor the correct language. It was a

problem of moving between one's own language and that which allowed one to posit the existence of the other language in the first place. It was, so to speak, both a problem of first principles, and a problem of translation.

It should be pointed out that in no respect was Shirai the only one to argue with Tange, but we can also recall that all the objections so far were either in favour of an ideologically honest modernism or a stylistically honest modernism. The former criticism was made by a number of architects. Hamaguchi, for example, was one of the first to connect the 'democratic' Hiroshima project with the Nationalist Greater East Asia project; Kawazoe flat-out stated Tange was a war criminal; and Masami Naka asked why Tange had remained silent when even the Italian modernists had confessed and come clean. The latter criticism was made by, among others, Horiguchi. But none had managed to frame their criticism outside the dialectic of modernism and nationalism.

In stark contrast to these types of objections stands the work of Shirai. With his idiosyncratic style, and the dark, brooding manner of both his architectural and written language, he undertook to propose an alternative reconciliation of Hiroshima. The contrasts with Tange's official project speak volumes. To begin there is no real site, not even the location of the blast itself. Shirai tells us that the problem cannot be caught between re-presenting the trauma and therefore trying to recreate the scene of the horror, or trying to abstract it into general terms in order to negate it. The latter is a clear criticism of Tange. How can the language of modernism with its celebration of technology or the language of formal manipulation with its celebration of cultural identity be used in the context of the instrument of their union? The problem is not abstraction, but clarity of thought. The problem is to understand human conception in the moment of its birth, in the context of the instrument of its result.

Quite literally, Shirai proposes a building structured like a mushroom cloud. It rises from a reflective pool—water so still as to present an absolutely perfect image, yet the pool itself is no pool but a slow moving river. The still reflection, while useful, cannot be divorced from the flow which produces it. Further, to enter the building one needs to go underground, to lose sight of

the building and its image in order to enter it. There is no axis constantly reinforcing the intended meaning. When one emerges above ground again, the pool is no longer the same water as when one entered.

For Shirai such literal imagery was sufficient. The problem was a logical one which never could be displaced, but rather was precisely made concrete by the immediacy of the symbol. The symbol was intended to appear face to face with its referent in a relation demanding as much commitment as it demanded articulation and judgment. The relation was not allowed to remain at the level of the inarticulate.

Here is the principle disagreement with Tange. Both architects are appealing to the legibility of symbol. Both architects know that the architect is able to construct a symbol, which means that the tradition to which it alludes is given through the spirit of the time, rather than a tradition which is written in stone. Tradition for both men is inarticulate and therefore ready to be formed according to a particular vision: a vision coalesced out of the inarticulate common sense just as all meanings are called forth and allowed to function in everyday currency. The difference, however, is that for Tange it serves as a legitimation for the action of the demiurge—a vestige of his pre-war romanticism which would place him in the position of 'architect to the nation'. For Shirai, it is the self-consciousness of the architect's dependence on dialogue which frames and limits the ability of the symbol to function.

Shirai's argument is able to negotiate the relation of tradition to history and the creativity sanctioned by progress, as well as the problem of Japanese recognition within a modern globalized understanding. Shirai addresses the problem of history without relying on space or form as given.

What becomes clearer in his successive projects, beginning with the Atomic Catastrophe project (note the title alone does not recast the original event in the way Tange's 'Peace Park' is no longer a mourners' monument), and continuing through his subsequent work, is the circular nature of each project as it poses itself as its own problem within the larger discourse. Included below are images of a number projects. While the Shinwa Bank in Sasebo explicitly takes the Atomic project as its starting point, allowing Shirai to locate his own discourse, so to speak, it then limits and frames the terms of its

discourse, thus actively engaging the user as an interlocutor. The irony is the eerie fact that the 'discourse' is always framed by the Japanese city, which is not only permitted, but actively invited, to intrude on it.

We began this long investigation of the use of form and space in Japanese architecture with Horiguchi's conjecture that sukiya was perhaps the way to meet Western architecture head-on: Against the enduring being premised by an architecture of stone, the artistic conceit of sukiya was precisely the 'deconstructing' conceit pertinent to allow both to flourish—a desirable condition if Japan were to assert itself as a recognizable but different entity in the global community. We also said that the underlying motivations of the individual practitioners would reveal much about how they saw sukiya functioning in this respect. We have come full circle with Shirai then, especially with *Kyo Haku-an* (Small White Hermitage), Shirai's own residence in Tokyo).

Toyokazu Watanabe, a disciple of Bunzō Yamaguchi (a Secessionist architect, who worked for Gropius before starting his own office), made the following comment in an interview, "[We all have a huge debt to Shirai] and for this he deserves our respect, but I cannot forgive his arrogance in naming his house 'Small White Hermitage'. That is not Japanese."[26] The name is of extreme religious significance, implying the lack of pretension, the freedom from conceit and the purity synonymous with a scripture itself emanating light from a Tokonoma within. Watanabe obviously could not stomach such conceit.

Tellingly, the house itself has no windows to speak of. Finished in dark brick and dark wood, there is nothing that calls to mind the name. On the wall connecting the entrance with the study, there is a scroll hanging in the dimly-lit hall. 'Sunlight' is *written* on the parchment. Slightly to the left, neither with it nor ignoring it, is a classical Greek sculpture of a face. Passing into the study which connects with the living room, one enters the area connected to the courtyard—the sole source of natural light in the house. Here again one has been adequately prepared linguistically in order to make sense of the beginning point from which the architecture proceeds. For the house, it is a

question of light.[27] As one stares out into the courtyard the question of style is literally posed as a question of history. Not which history, but what is history.

The viability of *sukiya* as a logic of approach—the artistic conceit which serves only to frame appearance as a necessary conceit to begin with—is in fact picked up only by Shirai. In that sense, the house is rightfully named Kyo Haku-an, and Shirai is the rightful guardian of the tradition of Sen no Rikyu and Okakura.

Notes

1. Simply put, we all know from common experience that "Modern" architecture is the easiest to reduce to the most prosaic "developer" architecture precisely because of its initial premises. This is not to say that the two ("developer" architecture and modern architecture) are the same, but that one becomes the other with the least amount of effort, precisely through jettisoning the specific cultural horizon that gives birth to the initial manifestation. Developers are not some alien breed. While perhaps ceasing to act humanly in merely reacting to environmental pressures (market forces) they literally become agents of the most *common*.
2. I am playing on Vico's Verum Factum principle quite deliberately. This is in fact the conflation of "objectivity as concrete" and objectivity as consensus" necessary for the "modern" logos.
3. Kestenbaum, p.133
4. Kestenbaum includes the following quote from Goto:"we can generally call our policy one of invasion in civil garb." [J. Fogel, *Life Along the South Manchurian Railway.* p14]
5. H. Yatsuka, Tange and the 1960 Tokyo Bay Project
6. ibid
7. Sano designed a water and sewage system for Shinkyo far superior to anything comparable in Japan at the time. ibid
8. ibid
9. Kestenbaum, p. 28-29
10. Other leading modernists held as members were Kurata, Ichiura, and Tsuchiura Kameki. Kestenbaum, p.135
11. 15 issues were published in total. It was eventually closed by the Ministry of the Interior due to paper rationing.
12. See Kestenbaum, p. 151. Kestenbaum gives an extremely in-depth analysis of the chūreitou competition which I largely summarize here. What is pertinent to this study is the weaving of monumentality with "modern" concerns of space and architectural programming.
13. "To those whose eyes have seen monuments such as the Forbidden City and the

Temple of Heaven of Peking, or Sun Yat-sen's Mausoleum or the sports stadium of Nankin, Japanese monumental architecture to this point has a tiny scale and makes a weak impression." [A Plan for a People's Piazza which has Yasukuni Jinja, the Memorial Tower, the National History Hall and the Sports Stadium], *Kokusai Kenchiku*, Feb. 1940 p51.

14. As quoted in Kestenbaum, p. 153

15. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a thinly disguised euphamism for Japanese Imperialism. True enough, it did include Thailand which while under effective domination of the Japanese, was diplomatically independent.

16. *Kenchiku zasshi*, June 1942, p2. (transl. Kestenbaum)

17. Maekawa Kunio, "16kai Kenchiku gakkai tenrankai" *Kenchiku Zasshi*, December 1942, p.960

18. *Kenchiku to shakai*, January 1943, p. 42

19. Kestenbaum, p.203

20. As Karatani notes, the notion of Mt. Fuji as synonymous with Japan is a phenomenon of modernity connected to the coeval discovery of landscape, and the discovery of the modern subject. (cf. Mona Lisa as a landscape painting). It is telling that Mt. Fuji - Fuji San - in Japanese is actually a modern phrasing. The custom of using the *On-yomi* for the Chinese character for mountain is a 20thC. custom. The appelation, Fuji *Yama (Kun yomi)* is only used by German tourists and very elderly inhabitants of a single village on Mt. Fuji! (NHK documentary, July 2001)

21. *Kenchiku zasshi*, Dec. 1942, p963. (transl. Kestenbaum)

22. Sekkei Kokoroe no.6 pt.1 (transl. Kestenbaum)

23. Kestenbaum, p.257

24. Maekawa.

25. This particular phrasing belongs to a disciple of Maekawa's, Ryuuichi Hamaguchi.

26. Watanabe. Interview with author, Kōyasan, 1997.

27. The literalness of the pun, combined with Shirai's penchant for expensive and occasionally elaborately worked materials had lead to his dismissal by Western critics as little more than *po-mo* at best, if not just a practitioner of expensive hotel architecture. This is, on one level, hard to argue with given that Shirai's greatest building, the computer tower of the Shinwa Bank (Sasebo) has for its *cha-shitsu* (tearoom) a fake column which lands square on the tatami without any kind of footing or connection - it can even be lifted or kicked off vertical. Further the top two floors— the inner sanctum of the Bank—is filled with treasures from Czarist Russia and has not a moment which could be identified as Japanese. On the floor below is a gallery which contains *fake* Japanese artefacts: Chinese art produced in China, made to look like a Japanese reproduction of Chinese art.

fig. 5.1 (top to bottom) Palace of the Soviets, Moscow, 1931. Unrealized competition entry by Le Corbusier.
fig. 5.2-3 Tange, Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere Memorial Building, near Mt. Fuji, 1943. Rendering and approach map from Tokyo.
fig. 5.4 Tange, Japanese Cultural Center, Bangkok, 1943. Unrealized wining competition entry, main elevation.
fig. 5.5 Maekawa: Japanese Cultural Center, Bangkok, 1943. Unrealized competition entry, elevations and plan.

fig. 5.6 (top to bottom) Tange, Peace Park site plan.
fig. 5.7 View of epicenter ruin.
fig. 5.8 View from axis of Peace Park, looking back at the ruin.

fig. 5.9 (top to bottom) View along axis looking South.
fig. 5.10 View along axis looking North to ruin.
fig. 5.11 Elevation view of Exhibition Hall, Hiroshima
Peace Park.

fig. 5.12 Shirai, Temple Atomic Catastrophes, 1955.

fig. 5.13 Shirai, Shinwa Bank, Nagasaki, logo for Bank.
fig. 5.14-15 (left, right) Shirai, Shinwa Bank building 1 and 2.

fig. 5.16 Shirari, Shinwa Bank, space between building 2 and annex.

fig. 5.17 (top) Shirai, Shinwa Bank, computer annex. 1974.
fig. 5.18 (bottom) Shirai, Shinwa Bank, front entrance, 1974.

fig. 5.19 - 20 Shirai, Shinwa Bank, interior garden.

fig. 5.21 - 24 Kyōhaku-an. (clockwise from top left) path, porch, entrance hall towars study, interior view of entrance hall.

fig. 5.25 - 26 (left, right) Kyōhaku-an, living and garden.

CHAPTER 6 - Shirai Sei'ichi

In an essay entitled "Tradition's New Crisis: Our National Theatre", Sei'ichi Shirai complained that:

> ...We have not had, thus far, an architecture which speaks
> and expresses clearly to the world its ethnic foundation. If
> the symbol of civic culture ends up being the reconstruction
> or transformation of the Heian and Momoyama ages, or
> mimicry of European 'headquarters' upon unconditional faith,
> it would go against the progress of creation and the given
> opportunity, and merely become a construction which robs
> the people of the ground.[1]

Shirai, in this paragraph, expressly denies the 'traditional'. Who in his right mind would not define 'traditional' architecture as expressive of its ethnic foundation? If traditional architecture does not express its ethnic foundations, what does? How are we to understand this explicit denial of the 'traditional'?

Shirai championed a cosmopolitan approach. Cosmopolitanism may be understood as an attempt to define an essential 'Japaneseness' with respect to a multi-cultural understanding—one where the essential quality of 'Japaneseness' maintains its originating characteristic and is not diminished in the face of a dominant (foreign) discourse. That discourse was history, and specifically, "time as history". Shirai was not the only one of his contemporaries to engage in this attempt. We see variations on this idea in Tetsuro Watsuji's *Climate*, and then later with Yasuda Yojūrō and the Nihonromanha.[2] Watsuji sought to extend the Western ontology to include the specificity of place as well as time, but the attempt remained a dialectical inquiry and therefore did not address the essential characteristic of that European ontology—precisely that which rendered it an epistemology rather than an ontology and therefore defined both time and place in terms of a naturally given subject. In other words, Watsuji did not attempt to engage the dependence of the concepts, time and space, on history itself. While both Shirai and the romantics appreciate Watsuji's concern for Japan's health in the rush to

modernize, without a sense of irony his critique remains too similar to the object of its criticism.

The idea of Cosmopolitanism emphasized not just the importance and specificity of place, but the insistence on a specifically Japanese identity. It was more than a universal notion of difference in which all nations maintain their unique horizon; it was meant to explain specifically why the Japanese escape the identity-stripping effects of modernity. The notion was to describe and capture a difference beyond anything which can be dialectically negated and consumed by the encroaching *Other*.[3]

But this does not address the problematic issue which Cosmopolitanism seeks to reconcile in the first place: the issue of the universal. In other words, for Shirai's Romantic colleagues—both those overtly associated with the Japanese Romantic Movement and those who sought more direct modes of political action—Japan is fundamentally different from the West but irrevocably tied to it. What pervaded recognition of this difference was a sense that, without a suitable means of articulating this difference, the culturally castrating effects of modernization were a foregone conclusion. One either denied the very historical/dialectical nature of Western techniques themselves (i.e. the head-in-the-sand approach of "Eastern Values, Western Techniques") or redefined one's culture in terms of a historical dialectic. Either alternative cut the tradition off from the ground which had nurtured it in the first place.

The Romantic Movement's solution was irony: the vague understanding that the presence of poetry could render meaningful the 'prosaic modern'. Art, in its universality, somehow lifted the political, in its particularity, above that particularity and subsumed it within the universal. Yasuda's irony could be defined as the "creation of an irretrievable past". However, while recognizing the importance of irony in subverting the dialectic, the Romantic solution merely furthered the dialectic. It engaged the future by way of the past surreptitiously rather than explicitly as in the case of the European Enlightenment. Irony functioned ultimately to clothe power in a (modern) myth, thus making those wielding power even less accountable. Neither a national socialism nor an international socialism were satisfactory solutions to the prob-

lem of a Japanese identity. What was essential in the Romantic critique was the understanding of irony in relation to a historical dialectic, and its corollary in the relation of art to the political.

Shirai, like Yasuda and his Romantics, accepted the irreversibility of modernization, as well as the necessity of understanding history in order to avoid its pitfalls. For Shirai, apropos of his training with Karl Jaspers, the issue was not one of using history romantically (i.e. using the past to engage the future) but of understanding history as a poetic endeavor to begin with.[4] The issue was not so much curing Japan's immanent decline of its Western ills as establishing self-knowledge through an understanding of the process of history. Ironically, given Yasuda's political stance as well as his stance towards poetry, the difference between Shirai and Yasuda's understanding of history would again be analogous to that of Vico and Marx, as outlined in the introduction. Where Marx would say "we can only know that which we have made (history)", Vico would say "we can only know that which we have made, BUT that making is poetic". Again, the crucial difference lies in the locus of meaning. For both Marx and Vico, history is man-made, therefore it is the proper object of science. For Marx the results are measured concretely, and therefore the locus of the human is placed within the natural. Vico's qualifier, on the other hand, clearly understands history within artifice, grounding the political within the realm of the imagination. Meaning grounded in the natural reduces the human to a historical dialectic, so any attempt to circumvent that dialectic would have to address the relation of the human to the natural. The romantics may have intuited this, given their predisposition for the ironic, but hampered by their loathing to enter politics, they could at best derive a definition oscillating between nostalgia and political irresponsibility.

Shirai wished to ground cultural self-knowledge within the process of political imagination itself, thus explicitly confronting the relation between politics, making and creativity. Let us return to the article quoted above to consider how this works. Our objective is to derive an understanding of Shirai's sense of irony and how it informs an architecture grounded in the political imagination.

The cultural experience of Europe can be described as a complication and development of essentially contradictory elements of openness and closedness. In architecture, it developed from the closedness of Egypt to the openness of the Greek colonnade, from the closedness of Rome, the Middle Ages and Renaissance, developing into Modern infinite space. What we have to learn of creation, we who have little experience in the practice of creation, is the process indicated in this history, the process of growth in which the tradition of rationalism has developed within which the mechanism emerged with flowing blood—2000 years of Mediterranean culture overcoming the numerous walls of creation thus creating the essence of the so-called European sensibility. Even now in Japan, as a pattern, the study of Katsura or Ryoanji can be considered as a seeking for tradition. Jomon artifacts as the potential of the race lose authority and the imported abstract and peculiar object gains power as if overcoming the tradition. Do we just observe this as a reflection of this generation with its stabilization of conservative politics and the amendment of the police act from an eye for an eye.[5]

We noted earlier on that Shirai dismisses any "traditional" architecture as expressing the ethnic foundations of a people. This is further corroborated here by the observation that the study of Ryoanji or Katsura is, at one level, an inauthentic and futile seeking for tradition. How are we to understand this assertion?

First of all, the word "tradition" is a Meiji invention. The word is coeval with the crisis of history introduced by Japan's modernization. This is not surprising. One would not need to identify something which was identical to its horizon of meaning. Yet being faced with a certain 'Other', tradition becomes a recognizeable entity. The West, however, is far from being Japan's first encounter with an Other. What is so specific to Japan's encounter with history that its *traditional* means of encountering the Other is fundamentally undermined?

Japan, Shirai tells us, lacks a historical sense. Japan's conception of creativity and the creative process is linked to its (mis)understanding of history as much as its experience with the Other. The connection between the problem of creativity and the emergence of the word 'tradition' is the problem raised by 'progress'. Progress refers to a recognition that one moment is critically different from another—each moment stands as a criticism to be applied concretely to each moment before it in the production of all future moments.[6] Now what constitutes progress is debatable. The content of progress is a matter of will and can be contested. What goes uncontested is the fact that progress must be actualized in order to occur. In other words, if progress (i.e. a conceivable future) is valued, and that future can be actualized, then it is only a matter of making it. Possibility is tethered to the political is tethered to making. And since what can be actualized (made natural) stands equally to be used by anyone, it transcends cultural bounds as much as it undermines them, and the only remaining standard for judging what can be made is whether it works or not. The standard is pure use itself. We now recognize the reason for Watsuji's concern with history (time), and the similar concern among his colleagues: history empties any discussion of cultural identity of meaning and renders it subject to a standard of universality ('objective' truth). The paradox is, if Shirai shares this concern, why is he advocating creativity? Has he not advocated developing a creative sense, and shown the creative talent to be tethered to a historical temperament?

The paradox in Shirai's counsel recognizes the following: If action and judging are now tied to making, conversely making is a way of thinking and judging. Shirai obviously sees the irony so desperately sought by the romantics to lie in the relation of making to thinking, and, moreover, thinking concretely.

The Creative Process And The Dialectic Of History

The crisis brought on by 'history' changes the relation of judgment, making and acting by changing the ground of 'universality'. The authorities by which one previously judged, communicated and understood—the very universals bounded by culture—are suddenly recast as historical universals which are culturally mute—incapable of giving rise to the cultural authorities by which the historical universals could be cast in the first place. Where cultural uni-

versals referred specifically to a shared ground of language and culture, historical universals necessarily exclude these as subsequent to the truth of history: a technical universal whose 'truth' lies in the fact that it works, and doesn't interest itself in who or where .

Shirai gives us two insights into the nature of the crisis. One, it is a modern problem, and therefore must be confronted on modern terms. Two, the attitude required for this challenge is no less than heroic. This heroic modernism, in order to distinguish itself from internationalism, must somehow manage to reconcile a world spirit with cultural development. In other words, the task of architecture (or making/thinking in general) is to reconcile the irreconcilable in a manner explicitly different from a dialectical overcoming of history. This is to be accomplished through true creativity. Shirai further tells us that, "What we have to learn of creation, we who have little experience in the practice of creation, is the process indicated in ... history".

Shirai yokes history to creativity, and phrases the problem directly in terms of political responsibility. However Politics is now *not* about the social (a 'natural' conception of the human realm) but refers to the cultural imagination. The issue for Shirai is not what one builds, but how one conceives of the role of building in the first place. Shirai says as much when he tells us that "As true as it is for every art, it must be the author's belief that architecture also is the channel for thought."[7]

To say creativity is integral to the historical process is another way of saying artistic creativity is part of progress. As obvious as this may sound, there is nothing self-evident about this without a prior acceptance of progress as an authority in itself. Progress implies movement toward a goal whose meaning is known. If this is the case, and creativity is the means of actualizing that goal, then implicit in the realization of the goal is the removal of the conditions which make the goal possible. In other words, creativity would contain its own self-overcoming. In fact if creativity is the *sine qua non* for action, creativity would have to oscillate between a rebellion against the necessity of progress, and a rebellion against the need to rebel (the impetus for willing against necessity in the first place). In other words, linking creativity to history, in its simplest conception, seems to result in one of two crises: the

eventual undermining of creativity itself, or the undermining of the being that creativity opens up. The former results from a primacy of progress, the latter from the primacy of the new. Either way is perilous, but in fact constitutes the most basic understanding of history as dialectical. Let us consider the possibilities for a 'naive' dialectical understanding as it applies to architecture concretely.

Historically, we are already aware of the attempt in modernism to engage directly the notion of progress, and its dismal failure in the realization that there was nothing absolute about the content of progress, and moreover, there was no reason that history should have meaningfully emerged at all. This is the simple evolution of what we commonly identify as modernism/post-modernism/deconstruction. But before we jettison the notion of progress completely, let us rethink the necessity of the terms which constitute this dialectical understanding.

According to Isozaki, indeed the crisis at the end of the 18thC. does precipitate a split in architecture between architecture as building, and architecture as idea. Isozaki writes:

> Already at Durand's point in time, architecture and building have become separated. Building as thing, more so as commodity, and architecture as metaconcept are considered as separate. As a matter of fact, all architectural theory from the 19thC. on proceeds from an attempt to ascertain the distance between these two conceptions.[8]

A number of difficulties are inherent with this understanding. To start, if the architectural idea and the building are separated, and theory is merely a third term which attempts to ascertain the distance between the two, the question arises, 'what is architecture?'.

Isozaki's attempt at deflection, 'architecture as metaconcept', is problematic for the following reason: As Hegel clearly demonstrated, a concept differs from a notion—an undemonstrated (unbuilt) proposition—in that the concept follows the negation of space. The 'meta-concept' upon its articulation

is no longer a notion, but may be appraised and judged actually. In other words, a concept (meta or not) is already past, and therefore is synonymous with an articulated understanding. If meaning is given historically, building and concept are equivalent in terms of actualizing meaning. Theory = building. If indeed architecture alternates between building and concept, we are faced with the following dilemma: Architecture oscillates between the real and the ideal: i.e. a problematic and unhappy tension between the actual and the 'in principle'. If this is the case then the meaning of theory is not the simple measuring of the gap, but is in fact the labor of closing it. Any understanding which does not recognize the loaded implication of closing the gap can do more than oscillate between nostalgia and political irresponsibility.

In fact one remains within the dilemma made explicit in the 18thC., and nowhere is the crisis resolved. Architecture in its more common form resolves the tension between theory and practice by reducing architectural meaning to concepts accommodated within mathematical or formal proofs. Examples of this range from functionalism to typology, behaviouralism, postmodernism, structuralism, and post-structuralism. In fact the endless parade of movements can easily be demonstrated as attempts at constructing or imposing new 'systems' of meaning. In other words, all are attempts at resolving the tension between practice and theory. Thus despite the claim that theory is simply measuring the distance, we have nothing but examples to the contrary. This is not a semantic quarrel. Simply denying dialectical overcoming does not make the historical dialectic disappear. In fact, what we can learn from this is precisely the recognition that it is not a question of merely holding a dialectical understanding of history (Hegel, Marx, etc.) which is problematic, but recognizing the persistence of a dialectical movement despite our attempts to disavow it.

If we are to resuscitate the link between creation and history (which at any rate, is inevitable), we would do well to rethink the relation between progress and dialectic. This is, in fact, Shirai's intention.

Shirai's Endeavor: Technology, Irony and the Self-Overcoming of Nihilism

To recap the argument from the introduction, progress as a political means of creating and judging, and progress as technical advancement, are two separate and contrary modes of being. They need to be separated to elucidate the crisis inherent in the devaluation of the cultural universal's end by virtue of the technical universal's absence of ends.

Again, technical universals apply to rational beings with no particular ground. Political (cultural) universals are cultural phenomena limited to the cultural ground which gives rise to them. The crossing point between the two types of universals lies in the shared being of the culturally produced artefact: the things of the world (speech, science, architecture, painting, sculpture or poetry). It should be noted that while things come to share both universals, the universals themselves are mutually irreconcilable but mutually dependent. One can conceive of them in the following way: The technical universal refers to mathemata, what is already known, while cultural universals are predicated upon the imaginative or only partially known.

But both types of universals begin from a speculative standpoint, and therefore from a standpoint where meaning is given apriori. While both types of universals thus share the characteristics of the other, the objects they give rise to are in fact opposite. The point is that the speculative standpoint of each is implicitly creative: both perceive and de-monstrate meaning in its appearance. As described already, if the objects they give rise to are taken as finite in their givenness (i.e., purely natural), fabrication, production and political action are all confounded as part of the same process. However if we think of 'objects' and 'objectivity' as embedded in a historical horizon, and we recognize our relation to that horizon as a speculative but mimetic one, then the problem changes. The issue becomes one of cultural authority. Hence the first problem of science—first as in radical—is itself the problem of imagination, and the imaginative origins of speculative thinking. As this speculative imagination arises out of a common understanding and in fact legitimates that common sense, it is the basis of authority. Hence its appellation as a 'universal'. As it refers to the cultural ground by which thinking and knowledge are in fact possible, it is a 'cultural universal'.

To return to our discussion of progress, an understanding of "for what sake is progress" obviously precedes the means of progress itself. But this means separating judging from action and making. Attaining this critical distance is not easy, for the simple reason that technical progress not only presents its own set of possibilities, but also provides the internal authority of its 'truthfulness' (i.e. certainty). But Shirai's contention is that in fact this authority is incapable of supporting the ground whereby one objectifies and creates in the first place.

For this reason, the only mode of action possible may indeed be historical and dialectical, but profound qualifiers now modify this understanding: The necessity of history results from the need to judge one's actions in the face of infinite possibility and an absence of historically given ends. Irony then is no more than the ability to account for historical authority in the face of this infinite possibility. The task of reading history is (already) ironically given as a creative, interpretive task of authentication where one is required to construct the ground. The dialectic of meaning (as in the original meaning of the word) is limited to accountability and dialogue and for the sole purpose of allowing right judgement.

For Shirai, this self-conscious circularity and the necessity of irony are not mere tools that we may choose to use or not to use, but in fact constitute the very terms of our condition. One cannot simply decide irony is no longer necessary since anything which can be negated—conceptually or concretely—would in fact be historically dialectical. This is the basis of Shirai's understanding of a modern 'heroic' architecture: it is useless beyond a specific articulation. There is nothing 'international' or universal about it, except to the degree that a culture is articulated and legitimated through it.

> We cannot create by relying on others, even if we have a Japanese model or a European model. There is no other way except to discover the universal language upon this ground and within the autonomy of life and thought. This can be described as an ethics of creation.[9]

Shirai has two main concerns for architecture. One is that, as a member of the international community, the onus on any culture is in seeking the origin of human culture, only out of which one can extend one's own culture to begin with. The second concern is specifically with respect to the case of the Japanese. This is what is meant by the absence of any ethnically-derived architecture which speaks to the world. Japan must—as it had never had to do before, either for itself or for others—articulate self-consciously the meaning of its sensus communis. This is the historical imperative, and for Shirai this amounts to a heroic task. The articulation of the sensus communis is nothing short of establishing the ground.

> A matter of the human spirit—kokoro—cultural certitude broadly conceived in terms of various historical and aesthetic verifications has served to frame technology within what is known for sure. Cultural self-knowledge, in other words, must be firmly grasped as a prior condition if technology is to acquire proper grounding. Culture precedes and frames technology, informs its ideology, grants it power, and alternatively, generates contests over its own meaning.[10]

These words belong to Tetsuo Najita writing on the ambiguous relation of technology to Japan. Najita infers a reconsideration of the Cosmopolitan aim of subjugating technology to the cultural primacy of a people. In the light of Shirai, and his patient search for an ethics of creation, the implications are obvious. Self-knowledge is the prior condition to acting humanly, to grounding our (technologically given) actions in a creative manner. Shirai's creativity refers not only to the new, but to the culturally recognizable. It is the act which authorizes and legitimates the sensus communis and slips back into it in its subsequent self-overcoming. Irony is no more than this articulate self-knowledge which sees its own self passing. Self-knowledge was never a tool to be used and discarded with the discovery of a new set of tools. We can no more do without it than language or water. It is an understanding no less critical today than when Shirai articulated it earlier this century.

Notes

1. Shirai Sei'ichi, "Dentou no atarashii kiken" [Tradition's New Crisis], in *Without Windows* [Musô] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobou, 1979), p. 43.

2. Tetsuro Watsuji. Climate and Culture: a Philosophical Study. Trans. Geoffrey Bownas. (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1971).

3. This idea of difference, inherited from the romantics, remains so pervasive now as to go completely unquestioned as an aspect of the Japanese identity. See Kevin Doak, Dreams of Difference (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

4. Jaspers is a Kantian. Neither of the two explicitly elaborated a political theory based on the imagination. This was begun by Hannah Arendt, Jasper's student and Shirai's senior, and she only did this towards the end of her life. I do not claim that Shirai was following similar lines of thinking, only that he began with a Jaspers/Kantian question as to the nature of the universal citizen, and approached the problem from the perspective of the fabricative.

5. Shirai, p. 42.

6. This is identical to *techne* + *logos*. It may help to recall the argument alluded to previously, which interprets technology as being historically given, i.e., technology as the concept of history made real, or again, technology as the historical actualization of freedom.

7. Shirai, p. 41.

8. Arata Isozaki, Preface to the Japanese edition of Durand. [trans. of Jean Nicolas Louis's Recueil et parallèle des édifices de tout genre anciens et modernes, remarquables par leur beauté, par leur grandeur ou par leur singularité et dessinés sur une même échelle.] (Tokyo: Reifuu Shobou, 1996).

9. Shirai, p. 43.

10. Tetsuo Najita. "On culture and technology in postmodern Japan." (South Atlantic Quarterly v 87, Summer 1988), pp. 401-18.

CHAPTER 7 - Conclusion

As we reach the end of this investigation and survey the landscape over which we have travelled, questions still hang as to the relevance and necessity of the disparate themes raised initially, all the more troubling now that we have viewed them in their original contexts. What, for example, are we to make of "total mobilization" in the context of the Aristotelian definitions of permanence and duration ascribed to architecture in the introduction? This question is all the more pressing once the Aristotelian is explicitly linked to Shirai, and the radical cultural commitment of the nationalists is linked to a critical regionalist mentality and caught in a recurring loop of formalist manipulation.

The steps we have taken bear restating.

Let us begin with the motive for initially casting the question in terms of Heidegger's notion of radical cultural commitment, "total mobilization". We began with an argument of Karatani Kôjin's, and a quote by Isozaki. The literary critic's argument implied that what we call modern Japan is a mix of modern ideology and nationalist politics that are still being played out. The architect's quote questioned both Japan's distinctiveness, given the lens of modernity to which all of us are bound, and the possibility and usefulness of an architectural origin. In pairing these two, I was of course aware of the ties that bind the two commentators, and the temptation to see Isozaki as the architectural equivalent of Karatani. We resisted this, however, and as helpful as it was to frame the question in Isozaki's terms, it was not necessarily helpful to investigate the answers through his work. Isozaki's concern is with the modernist Tange—a nationalist in modernist guise. Karatani's concern is with a modern democratic Japan—nationalist in modernist guise. But as Karatani himself points out, 'postmodernism' is in fact a redress of old issues, issues that in our context are more clearly seen in the "overcoming modernity" debate of the 1920's and 30's. Isozaki's characterization of the issue belongs to postmodernism. To explore the question ourselves, we needed to heed Karatani and seek the architectural manifestation of "overcoming modernity". We thus chose Shirai, Isozaki's mentor and Tange's interlocutor.

Shirai's concern was not, however, modernism vs. nationalism, but history as spirit, and history as dialogue. Both Shirai and Tange spoke in similar terms. They both recognized the necessity of history, and history's role in sponsoring the creative life of a nation. Where they differed vehemently was over the accountability of that creative spirit and of the individual architect to take charge of that spirit in his or her ability to represent a nation. The nationalist agenda from the start had been to speak for a people as a unified voice, confident in the identity it created for itself. At issue then between Shirai and Tange was the role of the architect: demiurge or self-conscious author. At issue was the status of the work: architecture as object, or architecture as part of the city—the backdrop of human temporality. Each assumes a different conception of the political subject. Each assumes a different conception of the maker and of the status of the made artefact. Each offers a different understanding in terms of resisting the historical overcoming of history's relentless dialectic. Each secures the author in a significantly different facet of his humanity.

By exploring the question through Shirai, then, the focus of our discussion shifted significantly. We did not frame the discussion in terms of modernity and what comes after, or why what it is now is still what it was in a prior moment, and therefore we stand to gain much more than merely revealing the workings or machinations of fascism in its various forms. We did not merely want to argue a postmodern position which sees itself as a consequence or an overcoming of a former condition. Instead, we sought to frame the question of modernity and history in a context which would allow us to view it from a distance. We recognize, along with the interlocutors of the debates we are following, that the consequence of technology, and the consequence of history, is both irreversible and unavoidable. So anything we propose is, by definition, projective and useful within a historical context. The point of this thesis, as with Shirai, is not so much to overcome the historical dialectic, but, conversely, to limit it. And this is Shirai's intent: to limit and to qualify the terms of that historical dialectic.

Duration and Permanence as requisite qualities of Architecture

As I have stated at numerous points throughout the thesis, the inevitability of history and of Westernization was never an issue. The Japanese architects either advocated it outright in the name of progress, or as a Japanese version of the universal story of history. I am referring here specifically to the debate on architecture initiated by Tatsuno and argued by Ito, Mitsuhashi, Sekino, and Nagano. The debate, inherited by Shirai and Tange, is already one that accepts the inevitability, or at least the inclusion, of history. Regardless of what position we wish to take in the debate, we need to be able to discuss the terms 'architecture', 'history', and the 'political subject', in order to say anything about them. Hence, we needed to establish working definitions for architecture and the political realm, which we did in the introduction.

These definitions were pointedly cast in my language (drawn primarily from Arendt) for the simple reason that in this way we were able to point out the crises initiated by understanding the human and the natural in terms of history. It was crucial that architecture not be seen as a universal or constant that simply appears in different forms in different cultures at different times, but that architecture be seen itself as a literal 'construct' with its own historicity, its own erasure, and its own established authority. Similarly, it was necessary to see how the Aristotelian understanding was invoked as an authority in a context which completely undercut and castrated the originating context. We had to establish for ourselves, as relevant objects of inquiry, the distinct elements involved in this discussion and how they are related. Moreover, if we were to analyze Tange to establish the status of the architectural artefact and the status of the assumed subject of that architecture, we first had to reveal the relationship of these terms – architecture, history, political subject – in a larger context. Similarly, if we were going to make the argument that Shirai's architectural project was indeed an "ethics of creation" (to use his own words), we first had to establish not only what he meant, but what might slip by unnoticed in the pool of our own common sense. Given that both men, and indeed all the players in this debate, accepted the inevitability of history, and the facticity of history and architecture as coeval developments, it seemed appropriate to take these terms apart on their own.

Still, it is evident that I presented an Aristotelian viewpoint with the intimation that this was an argument and viewpoint relevant to Shirai. Shirai's critique is still very much rooted within a classical Western philosophical tradition. The argument, which he makes himself, is that it has to be, as he says, because he has to contend with history—and history is Western in its conception. Nonetheless, he is adamant that we distinguish out of history, not universals, but appearances specific to those who enact, appropriate, and author a future based on these appearances. In other words, history as "being towards the future" is actively created and constantly interpreted, but its ability to found and validate a community's common sense can only exist to the degree that the interpretations form an active and relevant context to the community. This is a crucial qualification applied to the notion of universality, which yet avoids the naive means of limiting through blood or nation.

Shirai's informal debate with Tange—his publications on tradition, the origins of Japanese culture, notions of ornament and use, etc.—was abruptly suspended when *Shinkenchiku*, the main forum for discussion, underwent a huge editorial transformation and chose as its principle audience an international, as opposed to a Japanese, one. All articles were hence aimed at a final (English) translated form. Kawazoe, previously the editor, soon resigned, and Shirai ceased to submit. At issue was not the readership, but that language was in fact the basis for community, and the debate ceased to be relevant beyond the scope of that immediate community. Tange was not the least bit perturbed by this development, since he had been for some time more concerned with an international audience than a domestic one for his Japanesque modernism.

For our own purposes, Shirai's withdrawal from publication means that we are still faced with tying up the loose ends of certain implications of the historical imperative, however it be limited or restricted in scope. As we said above, there are significant consequences with respect to architecture as object versus architecture as part of the city: the stage of human temporality, the implied political subject, and the ability of the artefact to present a locus of duration and resistance to history's relentless movement.

Aesthetic Culture and the Shadow of Resentment

The acceptance of history and Westernization, then, was never at issue. The initial reaction questioned its inevitability in itself, but never its usefulness nor the power it lent those who embraced it. The Japanese architects thus advocated it outright in the name of progress, either naively as a Japanese version of the universal story of history, or obliquely as a means of individual self-advancement. The synthesis of these positions points perhaps too easily to Tange, especially the latter charge, but to resist the connection is to miss noting the relation of the work to its author, namely the role of the work in securing and validating the individual both created and problematized by a modern condition. I am referring to the argument made in the introduction that modernity, by defining itself in terms of a concrete future, renders the individual responsible for securing his/her own meaning and recognizeability. We will recall a similar requisite is placed on the fabricative arts themselves. No longer are they purely mimetic (referring to an external and eternal standard). Rather, the standard they are called upon to manifest is itself in the midst of becoming. Thus, as we have said, the traditionally separate realms of the political and the fabricative become conflated with extreme consequences for all. The conflation renders all meaning in terms of a concrete future, the shape of which is still unknown. As time passes, and the future comes to be, our actions and creations (now the same thing) are rendered obsolete and emptied of whatever securing and validating function they fulfilled. Hence our creative actions prefigure their own overcoming, and are conceived within this cycle.

We have said that the outcome of this is a need to break the cycle by seeking refuge within the universal. The universal here seeks to replace the eternal/the immortal/the divine in which the mimetic act had always been founded. The universal now, however, is still cast within the terms of history, and, moreover, a concrete future. Thus the universal invoked still seeks to secure the creative actions and the being of the modern individual.

We argued that this gave birth to either an aesthetic culture or a culture of aestheticized politics, and that both in fact manifest the same modern subject and the same aporia. Both manifest historical subjects that have to

secure their own identity in terms of history, but that that very securing is constantly eroded by the overcoming itself of history.

Thus embroiled in a temporal relation, in which our creations spiral ever-outward away from us in directions beyond our control and beyond the 'I' they are meant to secure, we are caught in a losing battle both against a past which is utterly different, and a future which is utterly 'indifferent'. If the mimetic underpinnings of our world had always allowed a reconciliation between human temporality and an indifferent nature, identical with itself, then the degree to which we now claim exemption from a mimetic order is precisely the degree to which we rub up against this problem of 'time' and the inevitable *ressentiment* with which we are left. Our flight to universals of any kind neither recovers the mimetic reconciliation nor hides the projective consequences of our flights to futures not yet come to pass. These are the extremes of aesthetic culture and aestheticized politics and the resentment towards time to which they both lead.

The mimetic underpinnings of human action when tied to a future moment erode the very authority of the object of that mimesis and argue for a reinterpretation of that mimetic act. Yet the degree to which one claims exemption from the necessity of that mimesis is precisely the degree to which one is confronted by a past pointing to a future *other* than the one being created.

Yatsuka observes that both Shirai and Tange each in their own way wish to escape this relentless march of overcoming. Let us first consider Tange in light of the observations above.

Tange, as we saw, did indeed resolve the problem of a monumental modernism. He then claimed to make the jump from nationalist to populist architect, although without fundamentally recanting or changing either his way of working or what was manifest by that work. He successfully created an architecture that was both spatial as well as, apparently, culturally specific.

To define architecture in terms of space is to already accept the terms of autonomy—an autonomous architecture, an autonomous subject—as appropriate terms for understanding architecture. In other words it is to oper-

ate wholly within the terms of modernity. As we noted, early Japanese modern architecture was always judged flat by the West. This was seen as resulting from a lack of an autonomous subject in language, culture, and daily life. This is perhaps what prevented Horiguchi and Maekawa, both ardent modernists, from achieving international recognition. But when they achieved a spatiality working in a Western idiom, they failed to escape the operative aestheticization which demanded that a Japanese architect look Japanese, even when doing the *International* style. The architects of the 1930's had already realized how a Japanese style best confronted modernism, namely through the simplicity of sukiya. But as opposed to the European proponents of the style, the Japanese architects were aware of the differences at stake. Thus Horiguchi, a modernist, would still keep the two modes of engagement separate. Tange on the other hand had no qualms mixing and reinterpreting. He did so even to the extent of overcoming the problem of scale and monumentality seen to be missing in the sukiya idiom. Tange could do this precisely by claiming exemption from the necessity of mimicking tradition as inherited. Hence the appeal to spirit rather than detail. But as we said, the degree to which one claims exemption from the necessity of that mimesis is precisely the degree to which one is confronted by a past pointing to a future OTHER than the one being created. Tange, as with any manifestation of will, was pressed to hide that expression within a general expression of a people. His need to outstep the historical drive of spirit, that whose legitimacy he sought, could only be secured by invoking the authority of the origin of that spirit and identifying his own work as that spirit at work. The implication: if you depose me you cut off your own roots. We see explicitly the connection—and aporia—opened up by basing the human appearance of an individual on the condition of the architectural object. Tange, in order to outwit history, needs to achieve the status of the demiurge capable of representing the nation in its identity, of subsuming Tange's particularity within the concrete universality of Ise.

If Tzonis and Lefaivre, as much as Frampton, identified Tange as exemplary for the appropriate path for modernism, they did so for the model of history he preserved and legitimated, which amounts to preserving the hegemonic sovereignty of a universal history over a Japanese difference. For what happens to Japanese difference in Tange's manifestation is that it is no more

than a local version of universal history. One cannot articulate that differ-ence beyond the loose notion of spirit and the romantic ploy of constructing the "irretrievable memory". The critics of universalism were, as much as Tange, in need of stemming the tide of history for their own self-preserva-tion.

How, at the end of the day, is Shirai different? Let us consider once again the notion of overcoming at work here, as well as the intended audience for this discussion. As we have seen, Shirai retired from public debate when the ultimate audience was conceived to be an English, international one. From an international perspective or a critical one, Shirai appeared shallowly postmodern. Hence the fact that he has never been translated into English, nor monographed outside of Japan.[1] This is significant for it precedes the very motivation for this thesis: how does one even begin a discussion about a Japanese architecture in terms that do not see it caught inextricably within the light of history or simply preserve the hegemony of the universal?

Shirai, after all, accepts the condition of history. This condition is the very dialectic of history and why whatever we do is already given in terms of its utility and therefore the future that it suggests as a possibility. Further, if we are to learn anything from history, it is that its future orientation is by way of the past, but that that past is not self-evident. We still have to construct its identity and our connection to it. So far, there is little difference in this be-tween Shirai and Tange or the romantics. But a difference *does* lie in the relation of the author to the work and the status of both. First of all, Shirai questions the ability of an artist or individual to represent the identity of a people in an unmediated way. Second, that identity itself must be there, inarticulate, and shared. The authority of the work exists to the degree that it is reabsorbed into the common sense and severed from the subjective ar-ticulation of its author. To recall the working definition of objectivity proposed in the introduction: objectivity refers to the degree that multiple viewpoints are already taken into account and may be assumed precisely because they are beyond discussion. Objectivity does not refer to number, but to the con-dition of certainty and to the political character of consensus.

In the same model that accepts this understanding of truth and certainty

(obviously neither a technological nor a historical one), architecture may follow a means/end logic to bring it into being (a mimetic logic). Viewed from the political realm, it may reveal precisely that which transcends the utility of that logic, and through the excess of that logic which it points to, reveal the space in which the humanly political may safely unfold. This is the Aristotelian understanding of the relation of the built polis to the political polis. Neither is possible without the other. Neither can be brought into being with the logic of the other but neither is *recognisable* without the presence of the other, and the other's logic. The fabricative is univocal. The political is by definition one of speech, one of discussion, and therefore multivocal. Without the possibility of being perceived otherwise, there is no future into which human intentionality may project itself. Hence the difference between what something is projected to be and what it results in, is not only useful, but requisite. The relation to time is here not one of resentment. Time becomes the requisite ground of appearance.

How then does one accept history, which conflates the logic of fabrication and the logic of appearance, yet still maintain a relation to time which is one of appearance? As we said, Shirai is similarly concerned with overcoming— or at least delaying the inevitability of its coming to pass.

If architecture is responsible for its own meaning, as is the political subject revealed by that historical architecture, the space of appearance is only secure in a condition of self-consciousness: a condition characterized by atemporality—nothing substantially changes—rather than being characterized by time and change.[2] If one compares this with the *traditional* relation of being and becoming, it is precisely being's approximation by the world of becoming which reveals both (appearance is an entirely 'human' concern). It is the duration, the permanence revealed by worldly things, human artefacts, that reveal the quality of being. Duration is born not merely from the natural causes of the *thing,* but by virtue of what is manifest in excess of those coercions. The built, in that it endures, at least for a period of time, and for so long as it endures, is but the human approximation of *being.* That the revelation of *being* is no longer either secure or guaranteed within a historical context is superfluous. What matters is that the atemporality-in-principle which prefigures, founds and allows the appearance of things in the temporal is

preserved as the "self-consciousness in principle" allowed by the narrative of history. Only the architectural, as the backdrop of everyday life, can constantly stand to problematize the common sense and give birth to—create—an articulation of that identity.

Architecture here is not conceived as a collection of autonomous objects, nor does it define itself in terms of autonomous space and an analogous, autonomous subject. Architecture can only be spoken about in the context and language of an 'actively-becoming' community. It ceases to make sense the moment one takes its existence to be a *fait accompli*. The political subject implied and revealed by the built work is no more autonomous, or free from the conditions out of which it arises, than the building exists as architecture outside of its articulation. Both the appearance of the individual and the appearance of the building belong to the political ground of a community. And this logic has nothing to do with the logic of biology or the logic of building which bring both into being. Ironically, Shirai recovers the autonomy of both.

The community in which each has its appearance is no more guaranteed by the words themselves than the number of people who speak those words. Regardless of the size of the community, translation exists as the responsibility of the community for translating the inarticulate into the articulate to allow the life of appearance. *This* is the ongoing creative act. Shirai is not excluding the foreigner from the community. He is merely not interested if the direction of translation is unidirectionally outward, for such an understanding of translation already assumes the autonomy of the original, and thus misses the point.

Notes
1. Frampton indeed dismissed him precisely as a second-rate postmodern.
2. One may take as an example of this the circularity of Duchamp's *Etant Donné* and the way in which it is revealed as a *fait accompli* 10 years after his death.

伝統の新しい危険
われわれの国立劇場建設
初録：「朝日新聞」、58.11.12。
再録：「無窓」、筑摩書房、1979。
　「白井晟一全集」、同朋社、1988。

Tradition's new crisis: Our National
Theatre - Shirai Sei'ichi
(Tokyo: Asahi Newspaper, Feb. 23,
1958)

　　　世界はいまや「建設」という言葉がふさわしい時代に入ったのではないかとある評論家がいった。ぼうだいな富か力を蓄えた国々はもちろんのこと、第二次世界戦争の破壊から立ち直ろうとし、あるいは民族解放の旗印をひるがえした世界のあらゆる場所で、事実、建設のツチ音は日々に高まりつつある。日本の「建設」もこれに劣らず、いずれは海にあふれでようとするくらいブームは続いている。これが宇宙時代につながる「建設」であるかどうかは別として、二十世紀の後半は急速に人間の土が消えてゆく時代になるのだろう。

　　　ところでわれわれの国立劇場だが、すし詰め校舎やスラム住居はあとまわしで衆議院や参議院の議長公舎よりは遅れるというが、とにかく難航の敷地も決定し予算の一部も計上された。早過ぎるとも遅過ぎるともいえないが、日々の空腹に関係のない芸能王国の殿堂も積極的な反対の声を聞かなかったのはさすが文化国民の雅量だという人もあるかもしれない。

According to some critics, the world has entered an age for which the word "construction" is the most apt. It goes without saying for countries where a vast wealth allowed an accumulation of power, but equally so for those trying to rebuild from the destruction of WWII, and all places where the flag of liberated peoples has been raised, everywhere the sound of hammers striking rises daily. Japanese construction in no way lags behind, as if some day the boom will overflow into the sea. Regardless of whether this construction boom might continue into the space age, the second half of the 20thC. may be the age of the depletion of ground.

As for our National Theatre, it is said that it will be after the official residences of the Chairs of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, but before the neglected issue of tightly packed schoolhouses and shanty dwellings. At any rate, the troublesome issue of a site has been resolved and a portion of the budget has been set aside. Some people may say the reason there was no strong objection to a palace for kingdom of

どちらにしてもこんどは歌舞伎座やコマ劇場ではない、国立といえばいかめしいが、国民の意思と責任において造られるものであって政府の施設ではないのだから、国民大衆の希望や意見は十分尊重してもらわねばならぬ。世紀に一つか二つしかない国の文化的建設が一般国民の知らぬ間に計画されできあがったなどということになっては親切過ぎて失敬な話だというだけではすまされない

設計はもちろん公募でなくてはいけない。国民文化の表徴として長い時間に耐えこれからの世界へ豊かな夢がつなげる建物を造ろうとするにはなによりも自由で創造的なアイデアが必要だ。整理や技術の問題はいくらでも解決の道があるはずだ。

そしてできることなら思い切って公募のワクをひろげ、広く世界からも参加してもらうことを提案したい（外国作家に設計を委嘱することと混同してはいけない）。もちろん国民的なものであるためには日本人のハダになじめるものでなければならないが、それも民族の成長を計算にいれた世界的視野のもとに共存の未来へ結ぶものであって欲しい。日本の建築家にとっては他

performers that bears no relation to day-to-day hunger, is indeed the magnanimity of a cultural people.

Either way, this time it is not a Kabuki theatre or a Koma Theatre, and whether it may be too solemn to call it "National" being built as the intention and responsibility of citizens and not as a facility for the government, it is desirable that the national public's hope and opinion be fully respected. In one century there are maybe only one or two national cultural building projects, and if they are constructed and completed without the general public's knowledge, it cannot be dismissed as being so much kindness or politeness.

The project of course needs to be a public competition. In order to create a building which endures as a national cultural symbol and which can nourish the abundant dreams of the coming world, nothing is needed more than free and creative ideas. There must be many ways of solving organizational and technical problems.

So if it is possible, I propose that the participation framework be decisively opened to include international participation (which should not be confused with entrusting the project to foreign designers). Of course for the design to be "national" it must be fitting to Japanese sensibility. But I would hope that under a global vision

流試合だが、創造の世界では同族保護などいってはおられないし、世界的まさつによって光を失う「すぐれた文化伝統」でもあるまい。

　さて昨年はオーストラリアでもシドニー国立劇場計画当選案が発表されたし、今年はまたカナダのトロント市市庁舎設計にわれと思わんものが参加した。ともに国際競技であった。老ヨオロッパや新アメリカが、それぞれ伝統、プラグマチズムの「壁」の前で低迷している間に、このような文化的には若い国々が民族と国家の門戸を開いて自由な創造のために道を作ったことは、いわゆる近代建築に対する不信ばかりではなく、時代の人間心理の底にすでに実質的な世界共存の可能性を信ずるきざしのあることを暗示するものだと思う。

　シドニー劇場当選案には技術上の問題が少なくないといわれているが、平面計画や構造の説明をみると、これからの総合劇場に大切な空間の多元的な目的に応えた新しい工学的工夫のあることは認めなければならない。しか

which includes the race's growth, the design of the building leads to a future of coexistence. Although Japanese architects would have to play under a different set of rules, in the creative world, one cannot fall back on the protection of one's own race. Similarly the spark of excellence of one's cultural tradition should not be lost merely in rubbing up against international competition.

Last year the winning entry design of the Australian National Theatre was announced. This year, capable designers participated in the Toronto City Hall competition. Both of these were international competitions. While both old Europe and new America are stagnating in front of the wall of pragmatism and tradition, culturally young countries like Australia and Canada are opening the gate of race and nation. I think this paving the way for creation is not only a so-called distrust in modern architecture (internationalism) but also there is an expectation and indication at the bottom of the psychology of the age, which is a belief in the possibility of universal coexistence.

Although it is said that there are many technical problems with the Sydney Opera winning entry, one would have to concede there are new engineering solutions which respond to the needs of a multi-purpose space im-

しなによりわれわれをひきつけるのは、その意匠を決定したシェルエボールト＝貝殻式天蓋＝の交錯に、何か幼年期のもつ未来への夢というようなほほえましいものが感じられ、シドニー港の自然みずからその造型を助けたと思われるほど自然環境のとらえ方が的確なことである。

　　写真で見る、「はらむ白帆」の造型には、たしかに海洋的デンマーク人の感覚が通り、生活の伝統が感じられる。伝統は好むに好まぬにかかわらず自然に生活や創作ににじみ出てくるもので、伝統自体がもっている本能なのだ。この作者は自信の伝統から形を借りて来たのではない。たとえばこのドーム（湾曲した天井）の原型はオリエントに起こり、中部ヨーロッパで発達したもので、デンマークの建築伝統にこのような典型は見当たらない。伝統を創作の粉本とする態度とは根本的に異なるものだ。

　　とにかく私には、全体の造形からデンマーク人伝統の自然な流出と同時に、シュメール（古代西アジアの民族）文化への強い歴史的関心が感ぜられた。人類文化の源泉を追求しながら、作者の内にある新しい強固な世界共同体への願いをこめた「伝統拡大」という自由で積極的な思想を表わすものに違いない。すべての芸術がそうであるように、

portant for a comprehensive theatre. Nonetheless what fascinates us the most are the freshness in the crossing of the shell vaults, the design of which determines the building–a freshness which we feel like a childhood dream of the future–and the accurate grasping of the environment, as if the nature of Sydney harbour itself helped the creation of the shape. Judging from a photograph one can surely feel the permeation of a maritime Dane's sensibility and tradition of living in the form of the billowing white sail. Whether one likes it or not, tradition naturally seeps into living and making; it is the essence tradition itself possesses. This author didn't borrow the shape from the tradition of his own country. For example, the archetype of the dome occurred in the Orient, then developed in middle Europe. One cannot find an example of this type in the Danish architectural tradition. This is fundamentally different from the attitude which uses tradition as an example of creative activity.

Anyway for me, I sensed from the overall form, simultaneously, the natural tradition of the Danes as well as a strong historical interest in Shimael culture. While seeking for the origin of human culture, the designer's inner wish for a new and strong world community emerged as thinking —

建築もまた思想の通路だという信条であろう。

　作者ヨルン・ウッツォンはシュメールが残したジグラット（頂部が平らなピラミッド）を思わせる閉鎖型の基体に、海を渡る白帆かちょうの羽根のように自由な貝殻式屋根の開放性を律動的に組み合わせたのだ。この調和を、構造と意匠の一致の中にとらえたメカニズムにはヨーロッパの合理精神の伝統が作者の空間感覚の質としてつらぬかれているのを見逃してはならない。

　ヨーロッパの文明的経験は閉鎖と開放という本質的に矛盾するもののかっとうであり発展だったといえる。建築にしてもエジプトの閉鎖からギリシャ列柱の解放へ、ローマの大ドームから中世、ルネッサンスの閉鎖を通って近代の無限定空間まで成長してきたのだ。

　「創造」について実戦の経験の乏しいわれわれが学ぶべきことは、空間感覚と技術に関するこれらの歴史が示すように、二千年の地中海文明をのみ、数知れぬ「創造の壁」を乗りこえて、いわゆるヨーロッパ的感覚の質を作っていった合理主義の伝統が、こうしたメカニズムの中で血を流しながら育っていった過程にあると思う。

which is the extension of culture. As true for every art, it must be the author's belief that architecture also is the channel for thought.

The author, Jørn Utzon, rhythmically combined the main body of a closed form, reminiscent of a Shimael Ziggurat, with the openness of a free shell-structured roof— like a white sail upon the ocean or the wings of a butterfly. This harmony is achieved without any conflict of structure and design, and we shouldn't miss recognizing this mechanism, the European spirit of reason, as a quality of the author's spatial sensibility.

The cultural experience of Europe can be described as a complication and development of essentially contradictory elements of openness and closedness. In architecture, it developed from the closeness of Egypt to the openness of the Greek colonnade, from the closedness of Rome, Middle Ages and Renaissance, developing into Modern infinite space.

What we have to learn of creation, we who have little experience in the practice of creation, is the process indicated in this history, the process of growth in which the tradition of rationalism has developed within which the mechanism emerged with flowing blood—2000 years of Mediterranean culture overcoming the numerous walls of creation thus creating the

essence of the so-called European sensibility.

日本では今もってパターンとしての桂離宮や龍安寺石庭の復習などが「伝統の深い追求」とされたり、民族的な潜在力である「縄文的なるもの」がよろめいて、輸入のアブストラクトや怪奇なオブジェが「伝統を克服する」ぞという勢いである。保守政権の安定、毒をもって毒を制そうという警職法改正が騒がれる世相の反映であるかもしれない。

Even now in Japan, as a pattern, the study of Katsura or Ryoanji can be considered as a seeking for tradition. Jomon artifacts as the potential of the race lose authority and the imported abstract and peculiar object gains power as if overcoming the tradition. Do we just observe this as a reflection of this generation with its stabilization of conservative politics and the amendment of the police act from an eye for an eye.

国立劇場の建設がこのような国民の精神的背景の中で民族の表徴という最大前提をどのように受けとめるのか。時代の河床に逆流する「伝統の新しい危険」を予感するのは果たして私ばかりであろうか。

How does this construction of the National Theatre acknowledge the greatest preposition of symbolizing a race within the spiritual background of citizens like this? Am I alone in having this foreboding sense of the "new danger of tradition" which runs counter-current to the mainstream of the age?

とにかくわれわれは、今まで民族主体の基盤に立ってはっきり世界に語りかけ表現する建築をもたなかった。国民文化の表徴が平安朝や桃山の復元I変形であったり、あるいは無条件信仰のようなヨーロッパ的本店依存のまね事に終わるようなことになっては、それこそ創造の進歩にさからい、せっかくの機会も人間の土を奪う「建設」に過ぎなくなってしまう。

At any rate we have not had, thus far, an architecture which speaks and expresses clearly to the world its ethnic foundation. If the symbol of civic culture ends up being the reconstruction or transformation of the Heian and Momoyama ages, or mimicry of European "head quarters" upon unconditional faith, it would go against the progress of creation and the given opportunity, and merely become a construction which robs the people of the ground.

われわれが欲しいものは最高の借

What we desire is not the best bor-

り物でなく、最低の独創であるべきだが、日本の手本があろうと、ヨオロッパの手本があろうと、他力本願で「創造」はできない。この土の上で、自主の生活と思想の中から世界言語を発見するよりほかにない。それが創造の倫理というものだ。

　われわれの国立劇場も、民族の表徴であるだけでなくシドニー国立劇場当選案が示したような世界共存の思想の通路となる創造でありたい。それには身近な新しい伝統の危険を克服しながら、一歩進んで世界史的な鍛錬の中で「伝統拡大」という目標を持つことだ。「創造の壁」の一つの突破口である。

rowed thing but even only the worst original creation. However we cannot create by relying on others, even if we have a Japanese model or a European model. There is no other way except to discover the universal language upon this ground and within the autonomy of life and thought. This can be described as an ethics of creation. I wish that our National Theatre will be not only a symbol of ethnicity but a channel for the thought of Universal coexistence as demonstrated by the Sydney Opera House. In order to achieve such a creation, while overcoming the "New" danger of tradition immediately at hand, we have to step forward in the training ground of the world historical, maintaining the goal of extending culture. This is one way of breaking through the creative wall.