

The Shaping of Bulgarian and Serbian National Identities, 1800s-1900s

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Katrin Bozeva-Abazi

**Department of History
McGill University, Montreal**



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Abstract

The nation-state is now the dominant form of sovereign statehood, however, a century and a half ago the political map of Europe comprised only a handful of sovereign states, very few of them nations in the modern sense. Balkan historiography often tends to minimize the complexity of nation-building, either by referring to the national community as to a monolithic and homogenous unit, or simply by neglecting different social groups whose consciousness varied depending on region, gender and generation.

Further, Bulgarian and Serbian historiography pay far more attention to the problem of “how” and “why” certain events have happened than to the emergence of national consciousness of the Balkan peoples as a complex and durable process of mental evolution.

This dissertation on the concept of nationality in which most Bulgarians and Serbs were educated and socialized examines how the modern idea of nationhood was disseminated among the ordinary people and it presents the complicated process of national indoctrination carried out by various state institutions.

The historical data examined demonstrate that before the establishment of their sovereign states ordinary Serbs and Bulgarians had only a vague idea, if any, of their national identity. The peasantry was accustomed to defining itself in terms of religion, locality and occupation, not in terms of nationality. Once the nation state was established peasants had to be indoctrinated in nationalism. The inculcation was executed through the schooling system, military conscription, the Christian Orthodox Church, and the press.

It was through the channels of these state institutions that a national identity came into existence.

Résumé

L'état-nation est maintenant la forme dominante du Statehood souverain, cependant, il y a un siècle et demi, la carte politique de l'Europe comportait seulement une poignée d'états souverains, très peu d'entre eux, des nations dans le sens moderne du terme. L'historiographie traditionnelle tend souvent à réduire au minimum la complexité de la création d'une nation, soit en se référant à la communauté nationale comme étant une unité monolithique et homogène, ou simplement en négligeant certains groupes sociaux dont la conscience a changée selon la région, le genre et la génération. De plus, l'historiographie Bulgare et Serbe prête bien plus d'attention au problème du comment et du pourquoi certains événements sont arrivés, qu'à l'apparition de la conscience nationale des peuples balkaniques comme un processus complexe et durable d'évolution mentale. Cette dissertation sur le concept de la nationalité dans lequel la plupart des Bulgares et des Serbes ont été éduqués et socialisés examine comment l'idée moderne du nationhood a été diffusée parmi les gens du peuple et elle présente le processus compliqué de l'endoctrinement national mené divers établissements d'état. Les données historiques examinées démontrent qu'avant l'établissement de leurs états souverains, les peuples serbes et bulgares n'avaient qu'une vague idée, ou même aucune, de leur identité nationale. Le paysannat a été accoutumé à se définir en termes de religion, de localité et de métier et non en terme de nationalité. Une fois que l'état-nation était établi, les paysans ont dû être endoctrinés dans le nationalisme, par le

biais du système scolaire, de la conscription militaire, de l'église
orthodoxe chrétienne et de la presse. C'était par les voies de ces
établissements d'état qu'une identité nationale a pris naissance.

(Handwritten notes in French, partially illegible due to blurriness and bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text appears to discuss the role of state institutions in the formation of national identity.)

Note on Transliteration and Spelling of Names

A contemporary historian has written that “he felt great sympathy with T. E. Lawrence who once announced he was going to use as many different systems of transliteration as possible because he considered it the only effective form of protest against the inadequacies of them all”.

Bulgarian and Serbian names have been distinguished in the text by the use of **š**, **č**, **ć** and **j** for the Serbian, which correspond to the Bulgarian **sh**, **ch** and **ya**. Bulgarian **u** is transliterated as **ts**; **ж** as **zh**; **ѣ** as **ŭ**. All foreign terms are first translated into English, followed by the original spelling in brackets. Since there is no generally accepted form of standard for Serbian regions like Krajina or the Krajina; Banat or the Banat; Vojvodina or the Vojvodina, they might appear in either form. In the Serbian case the “linguistic” system of transliteration applied uses diacritical marks such as **č** (**ч**); **š** (**ш**); **ž** (**ж**) and is based on the Croat form of Serb-Croat language. The Serbian name of Beograd is Anglicized into Belgrade; the Greek port of Thessaloníki (Thessalonica) could be also found as Solun (the Bulgarian version of the name); the same is valid for Istanbul (Tsarigrad). Some towns and cities have more than one name or a form of spelling like Dojran (Doiran in Bulgarian); Ksanti (Xanthe; Xánthi in Greek); Zaječar (Zaichar in Bulgarian).

The name of the leader of the First Serbian Uprising Djordje Petrović (1768-1817) has many different spellings. It could be read as Kara George, Karadjordje, Karageorge or Black George. I prefer to use Karadjordje.

I have tried to avoid any unusual spellings of personal names and towns, however, I take responsibility for any technical errors and quotes.

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Introduction

How “popular” nationalism was created

The southern Slavs, divided according to historical regions rather than ethnographic principles, without a uniform language and spelling, were no more than ethnographic raw material out of which nationalities could grow.

- Hans Kohn

The nation state is now the dominant form of sovereign statehood. However, a century and a half ago the political map of Europe comprised only a handful of sovereign states, very few of them nation-states in the modern sense. In the Balkans, the Ottoman conquest of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries destroyed what was left of the Byzantine Empire and the medieval states of Bulgaria and Serbia. For some five hundred years their territories were part of the Ottoman Empire. From the 1820s to the end of the First World War, the Great Powers decided which parts of the Ottoman Empire in Europe would be granted autonomous status and which governed directly by the Sublime Porte, the “Sick Man” of Europe. As a result Serbia and Greece became autonomous in 1829 in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Odrin¹; the Danubian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were united after the Crimean War (1859-1861) and constituted

¹ The status of the Principality of Serbia was reviewed in Articles 28 and 29 of the Paris Peace Treaty (1856) and according to Article 28, Serbia was to remain a vassal state with the recognition of “*son administration indépendante et nationale, ainsi que la pleine liberté de culte, de législation, de commerce et de navigation*”. The next article stipulated that Ottoman garrisons were to remain in Serbian forts, but that no armed intervention could be launched against Serbia without previous agreement between the signatories to the Treaty. See Ljubodrag Ristić, “Serbo-Russian relations from 1856 to 1862 according to reports by British Consuls in Belgrade”, *Balkanica* XXVII, (Belgrade, 1996), 99- 100.

as the Kingdom of Romania in 1880; Bulgaria was declared autonomous in San Stefano (March, 1878) and her status finally determined by the Treaty of Berlin (July, 1878).

When Serbia and Bulgaria were created, in 1830 and 1878 respectively, their populations could not be said to have been nationally conscious. By 1914, however, every Serb and Bulgarian knew he was both a member of distinct cultural community and a subject of a nation state. The thesis which follows addresses the question of how this transformation came about.

Most Balkan historians would question the truth of the foregoing statement, maintaining that the establishment of sovereign Serbian and Bulgarian states was the consequence of national movements, of the people's own efforts². However, the frontiers of the new states did not coincide with ethnic-linguistic boundaries which were in any case blurred³. This dissertation will demonstrate that until the creation of the state, most

² Although Mirjana Marinković has recently acknowledged that there were no national movements in the Balkans until “the culture [sic] created cultural institutions and announced historical programs”. She also claims that at the beginning of the 19th century the Serbs did not have a clear national program and cultural institutions to support it. Only to argue further on that the absence of Turkish ethnic element on the Serbian territory contributed largely to “the preservation of the Serbian national entity”. See Mirjana Marinković, “The Shaping of the Modern Serbian Nation and of its State under the Ottoman Rule”, ed. Marco Dogo and Guido Franzinetti, Disrupting and Reshaping Early Stages of Nation-Building in the Balkans. (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2002), 38. As Richard Crampton points out, Bulgarian nationalist writers have been wrong to argue that there was a national commitment amongst the *haiduks* (armed bandits who operated in the mountains and woods). The *haiduks* might have provided a model for organized nationalist rebels but in Crampton's view they were simply bandits robbing Christians and Muslims alike. There is no evidence that the *haiduks* had any nationalist sentiments. See Richard Crampton, A Short History of Modern Bulgaria, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 8-9.

³ During the nineteenth century, the boundary evolution of Europe was regulated by three international forums, namely, the Congress of Vienna (1815), the Paris Conference (1856), and the Congress of Berlin (1876). J. R. V. Prescott argues that in Central Europe boundary construction was relatively simple because this part of the continent was divided into a hierarchy of local administrative units such as cantons; principalities, bailiwicks, counties, duchies, and parishes which provided a series of building blocks from which national territories could be created. This advantage was not available in the Balkans where feudalism as known and practiced in Western Europe did not exist but Prescott is surely wrong. Serbia and Bulgaria were made out of the “building blocks” of Ottoman administrative units (*sanjaks*; *nahija* etc.) See J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 176-177. Ernest Gellner even claims that in pre-modern times the congruence of political, ethnic and cultural boundaries was not an issue. “It is only in modern times”, Gellner states, “that this congruence...becomes a matter of

Bulgarians and Serbs were not aware of belonging to a national community. In the Balkans the modern nation was largely formed by the state.

“Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent...political destiny, are a myth”, writes Gellner. “Nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them: that is a reality”⁴. Yet the argument, still defended by Serbian and Bulgarian historians is that both countries were “liberated” as a result of intensive national “awakening” which roused the dormant national consciousness of the peoples.

In pre-modern times Balkan peoples identified themselves chiefly in terms of religion, not in terms of nationality. The thesis will examine how the modern idea of nationhood came to be disseminated among the people and focus on the specific characteristics of nineteenth- century Bulgarian and Serbian nationalism.

Although the scope of this dissertation is broad in time-frame, it makes no claim to provide an exhaustive description and interpretation of Bulgarian and Serbian historical developments over the period. During the process of research I became aware of an important “blank” spot in the existing literature. The role of the state and its various institutions in the gradual transformation of the Bulgarian and Serbian peasants into loyal citizens is a neglected aspect of Balkan national development and one which this thesis will address. The task, however, is complicated by the sheer weight of the romantic tradition in Balkan historiography. Therefore the comparative approach has been chosen.

pressing concern, and that, consequently, a polity without nationalism becomes well-nigh inconceivable”. Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 62.

⁴ Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: 1983), 48-49.

Comparative history seems to be an alternative to traditional history limited by national perspectives and designed to promote national pride at all cost.

The main objective is to delineate the complicated and uneven process of national indoctrination carried out by the nation state. The five chapters deal with the problematics of integration and indoctrination of the two communities in the Balkans. However, they do not follow a single set of chronological events in linear fashion. The first chapter, “Peasants and Intellectuals”, argues that integrated national communities in the Balkans only appeared after the nation-state was established. It also addresses some of the more widespread misconceptions about the development of Bulgarian and Serbian nationalism, in particular the legend of the Kosovo Battle (1389) and its impact on later Serbian nationalism; the myth of the five centuries of Ottoman rule being times of unrelieved tyranny and oppression and endless rebellion by the Balkan Christians against the infidels; the idea that “ancient hatreds” explain why the Balkan peoples engaged in fratricidal wars in 1913 and between 1914 and 1918.

At the beginning of the period under examination, most of the people who were to become conscious of themselves as Bulgarians and Serbs saw themselves as peasants and Christians. The question arises therefore as to how peasants were educated in nationalism and how the conservative nature of the peasant society influenced the forms and expressions of popular nationalism in the Balkans. The end of Ottoman rule in the Balkans and the peasants’ appropriation of arable land at Muslims’ expense were also pertinent. Once the states of Serbia and Bulgaria were established, the question of land became a significant part of the national states’ agenda. National “freedom” came to

mean legalized expropriation of Muslim property and forced emigration of the Muslim inhabitants⁵.

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Over the last century and a half the notions of “nation” and “nationalism” have become a central issue in European historiography⁶. National identity has been the last of the modern collective loyalties to emerge⁷; even though national communities are commonly assumed to be static units which have always existed in fully consolidated and integrated forms. Modern scholars such as Eugene Weber, Ernest Gellner, John Breuilly and Benedict Anderson have rejected this idyllic notion of permanent and unchanging national communities⁸. Yet the influence of early nineteenth century romantic nationalism, which implied that all members of the national community were well aware of their uniformity and shared common traditions, religion, history, language and territory, is still quite influential.

⁵ One of the most detailed studies in English on the ethnic cleansing of Ottoman Muslims executed by the sovereign states of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece is Justin McCarthy's Death and Exile. The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims 1821- 1922 (Princeton: The Darwin Press, 1995).

⁶ Most scholars dealing with nationalism agree that the term is ambiguous. Nationalism could be defined both as a political principle and as a certain type of sentiment, a feeling of loyalty to one's community. It derived from the Latin *natio*, originally meant “birth” or “race”. From the seventeenth century onwards, the juridical use of the term nation as the population of a sovereign political state has prevailed and subsequently contributed to further confusion and ambiguity. A less ambiguous term than nation is “nationality” which usually indicates citizenship. However, to be a member of a nation and to have one or another nationality imply different things. Carlton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism (New York, 1926), 4-5.

⁷ As Liah Greenfeld points out national identity is not a generic identity; it is a specific one. According to her, generating an identity may be related to a psychological need; generating national identity, however, is not. Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge London: Harvard University Press, 1992), 12.

⁸ Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, John Breuilly and Eric Hobsbawm together represent what has come to be known as the “modernist” view, the principal current orthodox trend in nationalist studies, but one increasingly challenged by medievalists. For critical revision of their views see Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood. Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1997.

As we shall see Bulgarian and Serbian mobilizers used state propaganda to cultivate the national attitude of the masses⁹. Most historians dealing with Balkan nationalism ignore the problem of nation building, either by referring to the national community as if it already existed or else by presenting it as a simple process. The fact that consciousness varied according to social category, region, gender, and generation, has received little attention¹⁰. Serbian and Bulgarian historians have resisted a critical revision of the nineteenth-century romantic perception of nationalism and opposed the introduction of a developing nation, whose formation reflects specific stages of historical evolution. Most contemporary Serb historians assume that the Serbian nation existed as a self-conscious community long before 1830 and that its identity was based on common traditions and the Christian Orthodox religion¹¹. Mirjana Marinković, for example, cites Ottoman sources reporting on the First Serbian Uprising referring to Serbian non-Muslims (*Sirb reayasi*), the Serbian unbelievers (*Sirb keferesi*) and the Serbian rebels (*Sirb eşkiyasi*) to prove that the term Serbian nation was in use from the very beginning

⁹ Based on William Friedmann's definition in 1943, "nation state" is understood as a "technique of government and a method of organizing the public power of coercion". The "technical" element, however, has been overshadowed and significantly modified by nationalistic rhetoric to give an idealistic flavor to the exercise of power. National ideology shifted the emphasis from the coercive attribute of sovereignty to the government. See William Friedmann, The Crisis of the National State (London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd, 1943), 4-5.

¹⁰ Some of them like the late Milco Lalkov have criticized western historiography for having neglected the elements of class struggle presented in the Bulgarian "national" revolts before the "Liberation" (before 1878) See the polemics between Marco Dogo and Milco Lalkov in "Razmisljanja o pelemickom clanku Marko Doga" (Some considerations on the polemical article by Marco Dogo), Godisnjak za drustvenu istoriju (Annual of Social History), Vol. 2, # 3, (Belgrade, 1996).

¹¹ Marinković, "The Shaping of the Modern Serbian Nation", 40; 44-45;

of the uprising¹². But these were administrative terms which carried no such national connotation.

The same is true of the popular reaction by Bulgarian and Serbian peasants to the messages of nationalism conveyed by educational, religious, military, and cultural state institutions. The thesis which follows will explore this neglected ground. State-building molded the emergence of Serbian and Bulgarian national identities to a much greater extent than has hitherto been recognized.

For decades scholarship on nationalism focused primarily on the activity of political leaders and their decisions, while underestimating the importance of the common folk¹³. Moreover, some historians, Western as well as Balkan, developed an understanding of Balkan national communities as historical entities which had existed before the Ottoman invasion in the fourteenth century in the region. For example, in The Balkans since 1453, Stavrianos argues that the Ottoman conquest “denationalized” Balkan towns, and that during most of the Ottoman period big towns in the region reflected the “nationality” of those who held political and economic power. When a Serb, or Bulgarian went into a town in his native land he found himself a foreigner¹⁴.

Both Stavrianos and Lory assume that Greeks, Bulgarians and Serbs under Ottoman rule longed for freedom and waited impatiently for the opportunity to liberate

¹² Ibid., 40-41.

¹³ In the early 1970s Elie Kedourie was among the first experts on nationalism to suggest that “the formation of a nation-state is the process of nationalism moving from being a doctrine at the political margins” to becoming the central (mass) ideology of the modern state. Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London, 1971), 9. More recently John Breuilly has argued that in the case of Germany the sense of national identity which makes a new state a nation-state, has been constructed and inculcated by the state itself. See John Breuilly, The State of Germany. The national idea in the making, unmaking and remaking of a modern nation-state (London: Longman, 1992), 2.

¹⁴ Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (London: 2000, reprint), 99.

their lands from the Turks¹⁵. This reading cannot be sustained. In fact, during the first four centuries of Ottoman rule the Balkan peoples were not much inclined to revolt in any cause. The Ottoman administration functioned relatively well, and neither fiscal pressure on the peasantry nor economic crisis was evident until the last two decades of the eighteenth century. Indeed Stavrianos himself admits that the Ottomans had less trouble ruling their Christian subjects in the Balkans than their Muslim subjects in Asia Minor¹⁶.

Konstantin Mihailović, a Christian Serb from Ostrovica, captured by the Ottomans and sent to the Janissary corps, describes in his memoirs how “in the lands these pagans [the Ottomans] rule, there is great righteousness. They are just to themselves and to each other and also to their subordinates. Whether they are Christians or Jews great justice exists among the heathens [the Ottomans]”¹⁷. Even more revealing is the difference in the manner in which the Muslim Ottomans and the Catholic Venetians, for example, treated their Greek Orthodox subjects. In the Peloponnese, the Venetian authorities forbade the appointment of Orthodox bishops, compelled the lower clergy to obey the Catholic hierarchy and supported the latter in their persistent effort to convert the local population to Catholicism¹⁸. The Ottomans, on the other hand, introduced the *millet*-system of religious self-government and mass conversions to Islam, which were

¹⁵ Stavrianos, 110; Bernard Lory, “Razsüzdēniya vŭrhu istoricheskiya mit: pet veka ni klaha”(Some Thoughts on the Myth: “Five Centuries They Exterminated Us”, *Istorichesko būdeshte (Historical Future)*1, (Sofia, 1997), 92-98.

¹⁶ Stavrianos, 112.

¹⁷ Konstantin Mihailović, *Memoirs of a Janissary*. Translated by Benjamin Stolz (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1975), 29.

¹⁸ Stavrianos, 106.

for the most part voluntary, occurred only in Bosnia and Albania around the mid seventeenth century¹⁹. As André Gerolymatos observes, myth and mythmaking have been an integral part of Balkan historiography, and they are still the “yardstick by which each Balkan society measures its national consciousness”²⁰.

As the following chapters will attempt to demonstrate modern Bulgarian and Serbian consciousness and national culture were both shaped by the Christian Orthodox Church, the education system, and the army. The peasantry had to be educated and socialized in nationalism in order to comprehend what a national identity was and it was gradually strengthened for purely pragmatic reasons, such as the defense of the state and loyalty to the monarch. Both the Bulgarian and Serbian populations were dynamic entities whose collective consciousness changed in response to the administrative and political development of the nation state, which were to contribute more than is usually recognized to the rise of the Serbian and Bulgarian self-awareness.

Certain questions have to be asked because most scholars dealing with Balkan nationalism have not addressed them. For example, how different was the Serbian population in 1830 from what it was in 1878, when independence was obtained; in 1885, when a military attack against Bulgaria was ordered; or in 1912, when the First Balkan conflict started? What combination of internal and external historical factors facilitated or prevented the Bulgarian population becoming nationally sentient? Why would the

¹⁹ Conversion in Bosnia and Albania was mainly voluntarily, as wealthy and modest families, especially in urban areas, increasingly melted into Ottoman polity and society.

²⁰ André Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars. Myth, Reality, and the Eternal Conflict* (Stoddart, 2001), 46.

prospect of liberating Ottoman Macedonia not be an issue in 1885 and yet be the foremost factor sparking the Balkan Wars of 1912/13?

* * *

State building in Serbia and Bulgaria ran parallel to the process of national building. Anastasia Karakasidou claims the opposite, that Balkan nationalism created the Balkan communities²¹. However, I look at the course of state formation as a process which allowed the Serbian and Bulgarian political elites to monopolize the institutions of educative and cultural hegemony and to utilize various means to instill a notion of national unity in their subject populations.

There were two ways of creating nationalism. The first one was institutional and the second linguistic. Cultural nationalism relied on the standardization of colloquial languages and projected images of the nation through poetry, folklore, and traditional music collections. This second means was much more influential among the Balkan intelligentsia at the turn of the nineteenth century, in particular among the Serbs. The latter were strongly influenced by the “memory” of the medieval Serbian kingdom and a “tradition” of struggle against Ottoman oppression, which had been communicated to the peasantry through the *pjesme* (Serbian epic poetry). However, there is no reason to assume that the influence of the *pjesme* was as great as modern schooling. Adrian Hastings claims that the deeply nationalist influence of such oral poetry proves how dangerous it is to follow too closely the Benedict Anderson line that a nation is

²¹ Anastasija Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood. Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870-1990 (The University of Chicago Press: 1997), 26. Kostas Kostis also agrees that at least until late in the 19th century, it would be incorrect to speak of a nation-state in the Balkans and argues against the idea that the modern state was a product of a national revolution. See Kosta P. Kostis, “The Formation of the State in Greece, 1830-1914”, Disrupting and Reshaping, 49; 51.

unimaginable before the coming of mass print-capitalism²². Although it is true that the tradition of oral poetry facilitated the construction of nationhood along with other factors, it by no means eliminated the need for modern schooling as Hastings argues. Also it depends on how the oral poetry was understood-e.g. Marko Kraljević was seen as local hero by both Bulgarians and Serbs but the real Marko fought on the side of the Ottomans at the end of the fourteenth century. This example supports the view that the talk tradition might have been ‘shaped’ deliberately by nationalist indoctrinators.

Miroslav Hroch suggests that European nationalism was attained in a series of stages²³. His scheme fits both the Serbian and Bulgarian cases well. In this account the first phase corresponds to period between the 1830s and 1870s, when a handful of well-educated Serbian and Bulgarian intellectuals embraced the national idea. Soon the intellectual vanguard was directly engaged in both spreading and creating a standard language defining an allegedly unique national culture and history. The second stage of Hroch’s periodization, defined as a period of “patriotic propaganda”, was a time when the Bulgarian and Serbian merchants, craftsmen, and peasants were gradually made aware of the existence of a national communal consciousness, although they embraced nationalism rather slowly and unevenly. The last stage of Hroch’s periodization overlaps with the emergence of mass national movements in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

²² Hastings, 135. John Breuilly points examines the institutional approach and how it was applied to create and diffuse a sense of nationality. See John Breuilly, “Sovereignty and boundaries: modern state formation and national identity in Germany”, National Histories and European History, edited by Mary Fulbrook, (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 94.

²³ Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Countries. Translated by Ben Fawkes, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

As we shall demonstrate the state mobilized a handful of intellectuals capable of indoctrinating large masses of illiterate people and by doing so, facilitated the spread of national consciousness in Bulgaria and Serbia. As everywhere else, the ultimate goal of a Balkan nationalism was to persuade a large proportion of people to identify themselves emotionally with their national communities and, when necessary, to mobilize politically in its defense. However, the emergence of the Serbian and Bulgarian nation states would not have been possible without the active intervention of the Great Powers, given that the concept of modern nationalism was shared by only a tiny group of intellectuals unable to mobilize ordinary people without the assistance of state institutions.

A central question of my dissertation is to examine how the states of Serbia and Bulgaria became committed to policies of indoctrinating and socializing their populations in nationalism. This was necessarily a long and complex process given that between 80 to 90% of the population were illiterate villagers²⁴. There is no evidence that the great majority of peasants, isolated as they were from the outside world and distrustful of cities, strangers and novel ideas alike, ever participated in the process of nation building. The state therefore, had to create a national consciousness. This was done through the media of educational and military institutions. The state imposed obligatory attendance at Church for conscripts during Lent and at various ceremonies such as, raising the national flag and holding parades on public holidays commemorating the end of the Ottoman

20 For example, the first Serbian newspaper was published in Vienna in 1791 (outside Serbia proper). Autonomous Serbia did not have its own newspaper published inside the country until 1834. Printed materials in Cyrillic script were supplied by the printing press of the Budapest University, which had a "monopoly" over the circulation of Serbian and Bulgarian books up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 1874 Belgrade had only 27.000 inhabitants, Sofia had even less population (about 20. 000 after the war of 1878).

governance. The purpose of such ceremonies in both countries was to forge a general consciousness of national identity and it is examined in Chapter 2.

Religion was already the major focus for collective identity; and in the Christian Orthodox tradition Church and State operated in “symphony”. This suggests that the Church should also be a focus for tracing the state’s attempts to manipulate popular opinion and even indoctrinate the people in nationalism. The function of the Church in promoting loyalty and raising national consciousness will be considered in Chapter 3.

Defense required a national army with soldiers who had been taught patriotism so that they would not desert once mobilized. The army was a crucial agency for teaching young men what the nation was about and we shall investigate its role in Chapter 4.

Many historians have regarded the nationalist intelligentsia as educators of the people, but Bulgaria and Serbia both set up national education systems and we should inquire into their roles in popularizing nationalism. Besides, the nationalist intelligentsia came to be largely employed as teachers (as well as governmental functionaries, army officers and journalists). The role of education and teachers in inculcating a sense of uniqueness in order to promote nationalism will be examined in Chapter 5.

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The problem of constructing “false” historical memory was not only a Balkan phenomenon. In a recent publication on the development of English national identity, Edwin Jones describes how in the sixteenth century the government deliberately created an erroneous view of the English past in order to fabricate a collective memory for the English people²⁵. The development of modern nationalism was commonly based on the

²⁵ Edwin Jones, *The English Nation. The Great Myth* (Sutton Publishing: 1998), xiii.

assumption that a national spirit could be traced back much like a thread through the centuries, and gradually over time, this simplification became uncritically accepted as dogma²⁶.

The cases of nineteenth-century Bulgarian and Serbian nationalisms were not particularly exceptional in regard to the forgoing. John Breuilly in his study on nineteenth-century Germany exemplifies the transformation of weak national institutions, which had no impact on the everyday life of most Germans in 1800 into a powerful administrative machine in charge of such matters as food rationing and the content of newspapers in 1918²⁷. Lyric poetry, because of its emotional impact, and pamphlets and brochures using popular images and stereotypes also provided national models of conduct which helped to convey a sense of national identity among the Germans²⁸. In fact the press and traditional popular songs contributed significantly and lastingly to the cultural creation of the German national myth. Nationalistic literature had emotional impact to the process of collective self-ascription.

²⁶ Ibid., Jones exemplifies how medieval evidence has been misread in order to “fit” in the model set by modern nationalism.

²⁷ As John Breuilly has demonstrated, at the end of the eighteenth century Germany was only an idea in the minds of some intellectuals and statesmen. In 1800 most Germans lived in the countryside, traveled by foot and communicated by word of mouth. Mass transportation, telegraph, telephone, cinema, and the mass print media introduced the Germans to the idea of a common national space. John Breuilly, Nineteenth-Century Germany. Politics, Culture and Society 1780-1918 (London: Arnold, 2001), 3. Another historian dealing with the German *Sonderweg* (special path), Karen Hagemann, has examined the Prussian press and patriotic literature- such as pamphlets, brochures, sermons, poems and songs- between 1813 and 1815, when Prussia declared war on France. In her ground-breaking article “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor’ Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising Against Napoleon” published in 1997, she shows how the media assisted the process of turning the Prussian conscripts into the “patriotically-minded”, “combat-ready” men needed to win the war against Napoleon. See Karen Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor’: Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising Against Napoleon”, Central European History, 30:2 (1997), 187-221.

²⁸ Ibid., 191.

Both Breuilly and Hagemann argue that the press was a force in spreading the national idea in Germany. Germans were much more literate than Bulgarians and Serbs at the time, however, the historical data examined in Chapter 2 suggests that even in the Balkans the press was a powerful force in disseminating the national idea.

Eric Hobsbawm warns that the official ideologies of states and movements cannot guide historians as to what it was in the minds of even their most loyal citizens or supporters²⁹. Furthermore, national identification is dynamic, it changes and shifts even in the course of short periods.

Radovan Samardžić suggests that after the Ottoman conquest Serbs were known by a variety of names that reflected occupation and status, and that this somehow blurred their sense of nationality. Serbs who served as guards of passages and bridges were usually called Vlachs; Serbs inhabiting the Military Frontier between the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires were known as Croats; Serbs who performed transport services were associated with Bulgarians and Serbs guarding well-to-do merchants or Ottoman officials were known as Albanians³⁰. Yet there is nothing but his assertion to show that Romanian speaking Vlachs and Catholic Croats were in fact Serbs. Furthermore, Samardžić claims continuity between the autonomous Serbian state of 1829 and the tradition of medieval Serbia and the Nemanja Empire.

By contrast, Dragoljub Nikić suggests that the Serbian national idea developed due to the combined efforts of a handful of political leaders such as Ilija Garašanin,

²⁹ Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 11. John Breuilly agrees that even if the national idea did matter to ordinary people, it did so in different, changing and often conflicting ways. Breuilly, Nineteenth-Century Germany, 3.

³⁰ Radovan Samardžić, Ideje za srpsku istoriju (The Idea of Serbian History) (Belgrade, 1989), 28.

Vladimir Jovanović, Mihailo Polit Desančić, Svetozar Miletić, Vasa Pelagić and Svetozar Marković³¹. In his opinion, their visions of a Serbian national state were a part of a wider diplomatic concept of settling the Eastern Question and expelling the Ottomans from Europe.

Nikić rightly suggests that the Serbian idea of political revival of Dušan's empire could be compared to the contemporary Greek *Megali* Idea, and it was similar to the Bulgarian "memories" of the medieval kingdom of Samuel and the Albanian cult of Skenderbeg, who would create a Great Albania³².

A major problem in Balkan historiography is connected to obvious discrepancies between Yugoslav and Serbian ideas of South Slavic unity in the past. In 1989, Milorad Ekmečić was still following the Yugoslav line, referring to Serbo-Croatian historical and cultural uniformity based on linguistic similarities (*Srpskohrvatsko jezičko područje*) among three main dialects and 21 sub-dialects³³. However, Ekmečić agreed Croats were conscious of a separate ethnic origin. In 1805 762, 000 people were registered as Croats in Slavonia and Croatia which came to about 9, 782 families (*plemička porodica*). The Croatian *Sabor* (Assembly), which registered noble families approved only 658 families

³¹ Dragoljub Nikić, "Od "nachertanija" do koncepta balkanskog povezivanja i sardn'a", *Jugoslavenski Istorijski Časopis*, 3-4, (Belgrade, 1988), 27.

³² Nikić, 42. In Greece the Megali Idea was conceived by the Prime Minister Kolettis in the 1840s. It was based on the assumption that Hellenism could unify the Greek ethno-linguistic and religious community referring to its cultural and historical hegemony dating back to ancient times. The Serbian *Nacertanije* was certainly not an exact equivalent of the *Megali* Idea, although the two projects were outlined around the same time. See Marco Dogo, "The Balkan Nation-States and the Muslim Question", *The Balkans. National Identities in a Historical Perspective*, 66.

³³ Dositej Obradović was among the first to introduce the connection between "rod i jezik" (national consciousness and spoken language). See Milorad Ekmečić, "Istorijski koren i socialna dinamika Jugoslovenskog jedinstva u XIX veku", *Jugoslovenski Istorijski Časopis*, 1-4, (Belgrade, 1989), 12, 17.

between 1805 and 1835³⁴. The rest who were not officially registered Croat were labeled as “Hungarians” (*ugarskim plemstvom*), or “subjects of the Holy Hungarian Crown” (*membra sacrae Hungariae Coronae*).

What territories should be labeled “historically” as Serbian is another disputed issue set before historians dealing with the evolution of Serbian nationalism. Ekmečić, for example, claims that Šumadija, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Sandjak, Montenegro, northern Albania, Kosovo and northern Macedonia have been considered Serbian from time immemorial³⁵. He quotes J. Humbert, who, in *Témoignages française sur les populations Yugoslaves, 1804-1914*, argues that Napoleon’s diplomacy regarded Bosnia as a Serbian territory³⁶. To prove his idea of the development of Serbian national consciousness before the creation of the state, Ekmečić cites the “*Gravimina et postulata*” of the Serbian *Sabor* in 1790 in Temešvar whose participants complained of having no Serbian representative of the national body (*narodno tijelo*) in the Habsburg Empire³⁷.

Around 1849, Mihovil Pavlinović tried to create a youth organization (*omladinski center*) to propagate the Serbian national cause in Dalmatia. However, even such an ardent proponent of the existence of Serbian national consciousness before 1836 like Ekmečić agrees that the peasant uprisings in 1875 in Bosnia-Hercegovina were an agrarian revolution rather than a national one³⁸. In fact both revolts began as protests

³⁴ Ekmečić is not very precise in defining what exactly “family” (*plemicka porodica*) means in this context. *Ibid.*, 13.

³⁵ Ekmečić, 17.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

³⁸ The appeal in the original is: “*Ustajte age i begovi*”. See Ekmečić, 25.

against economic policy of local Ottoman overlords and were encouraged by Austro-Hungarian propaganda and arms shipment.

Similar anachronisms are not uncommon in contemporary Bulgarian historiography. On the other hand, the Marxist historiography of the Communist period was far more precise in defining elusive categories as “national” and “ethnic”. In 1956, for instance, Borislav Primov referred to the “Bulgarian national eponym” in an article on the *Bogomil* heretic beliefs³⁹. More recent Bulgarian publications on the development of nationalism, however, tend to mix incompatible historical categories and substitute “national” for “ethnic”, and vice versa. The main problem in tackling Bulgarian and Serbian nationalism seems to be related to the question of how and when both national sentiments were formed. Communist historiography claims that historical continuity had a great impact on the development of the Bulgarian nationalism throughout the nineteenth century. Some recent Bulgarian publications even suggest that the earliest demonstration of the Bulgarian national consciousness was the appearance of a Bulgarian kingdom in the ninth century⁴⁰. A more realistic approach to the riddle of historical aspects of nationalism is demonstrated in a collection called Why are We the Way We are? Searching for the Bulgarian Cultural Identity (Zashto sme takiva. V tarsene na balgarskata kulturna identichnost). Here the idea of historical continuity and the importance of the medieval legacy is abandoned. The editors Ivan Elenkov and Rumén

³⁹ Borislav Primov refers to *bŭlgarskoto narodnostno ime* (the Bulgarian ethnic eponym) in his article “Bŭlgarskoto narodnostno ime v Zapadna Evropa vŭv vrŭzka s bogomilite”(The Bulgarian Ethnic Eponym in Western Europe in Connection with the Bogomils), *Izvestiya na BAN*, Sofia, 6 (1956), 359-406. In English, however, it is difficult linguistically to distinguish between “national” and “popular”, whereas all Slavic languages employ two separate terms.

⁴⁰ Iliya Todev, “Natsionalnata ideya u bŭlgarite 1762-1912” (The National Idea of the Bulgarians 1762-1912), *Istorichesko bŭdeshte 1*(Sofia, 1998), 90.



Daskalov acknowledge that national identity is a far more complex phenomenon than traditional historiography makes it out to be. Yet they do not attempt to define a true frame, preferring to repeat the old motif that Paisii Hilendarski, the monk who wrote the first short history of the Bulgarian people, was the first proponent of Bulgarian nationalism⁴¹.

A rare exception to the prevalent historiographical tendency is a recent study by Ivan Ilchev on the development of Bulgarian nationalism. This disregards the myth of a homogeneous Bulgarian people before 1878 and its high level of self-consciousness⁴². Alexei Kalionski and Diana Mishkova also try to revise the old idea of the National Revival as an "awakening" of the Bulgarian community at the end of the 18th century⁴³. Kalionski outlines the Bulgarian "national" space as encompassing Mœsia, Dobrudzha, Thrace and Macedonia and defines it as "imaginary" because modern Bulgaria was never able to forge an administratively, territorially and ethnically homogenous nation within this space⁴⁴. Furthermore, the same author rightly emphasizes that the Bulgarian national idea was based primarily on linguistic arguments as the decisive factor in determining the

¹ Elenkov, Daskalov, 9. On the other hand, Bernard Lory claims that the ideological contribution of Paisii Hilendarski or Sofronii Vrachanski to the development of the Bulgarian national cause was significant, but at the beginning of the nineteenth century there were very few people who could appreciate it⁴¹. The fact that some merchants of Bulgarian origin were growing wealthier from the mid-nineteenth century and formed a bourgeoisie did not lead immediately to a national ideology as Communist Bulgarian historiography claims.

² Ivan Ilchev, Rodinata mi prava ili ne! Vünshnopoliticheskata propaganda na balkanskite strani (1821-1923) (My Motherland- Right or Wrong! The Foreign Political Propaganda of the Balkan States (1821-1923) (Sofia, 1996).

³ See Alexei Kalionski, "Ethnicity and migrations. The Bulgarian case, 1830-1915", Disrupting and Reshaping Early Stages of Nation-Building in the Balkans, 81-103; Diana Mishkova, "The nation as *adruga*: Remapping nation-building in nineteenth-century Southeast Europe", Disrupting and Reshaping, 103-117.

⁴ Kalionski, 81-82.

ethnicity of one or another local group. In the course of the nineteenth century, and in the first decades of independent statehood, efforts were made to prove that various Bulgarian-speaking groups such as *Pomaks* and *Torbeshi*⁴⁵ were Bulgarians, despite their affiliation to Islam.

Creating national identity was a process whereby Balkan people determined their own identity by attaching significance to points of similarity or difference. However, Stefan Detchev suggests that as early as the 1880s and 1890s various social fractions were far less attracted by the cause of nationalism than Bulgarian historiography claims. Public opinion as a reflection of successful nationalist campaigners was only successful in persuading a thin layer of urban and literate Bulgarians. In 1887, of 3,154, 375 Bulgarians only 160, 464, or 5.09%, lived in settlements with more than 20, 000 inhabitants. For 1892, the figure was 184, 648, or 5.58%⁴⁶. The percentage of literate males was 41.7 % in 1887 and 63.2 % in 1892⁴⁷. However, Detchev overlooks the paucity of urban centers. A greater density of urban settlements might have speeded up national indoctrination because of their greater accessibility to educational facilities, libraries, and coffee-shops. He refers to the few Bulgarian urban settlements at the time as either centers of “national” or “regional” importance⁴⁸, overlooking the connection between size of a settlement, number of inhabitants, and the degree of political activity.

⁴⁵ Popular names of Bulgarian converts to Islam whose descendants continue to speak Bulgarian.

⁴⁶ Stefan Detchev, “Gradüt i obshtestvenoto mnenie v Bülgeria prez 80-te i 90-te na minaliya vek”, (The Town and the Public Opinion in Bulgaria in the 1880s and 1890s) Balkanistichen Forum (Balkan Forum), 2 (1997), 109.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 108.

Centers like Tŭrnovo, Burgas, Gabrovo, and Lom with about 8,000 inhabitants were to become very active politically⁴⁹.

Diana Mishkova has argued that the projection of hostile images “enriched” the nationalistic agenda at the turn of the twentieth century. As she herself points out research based exclusively on the press and propaganda provides information only about what literate people thought of nationalism; it could not be valid for the illiterate majority⁵⁰. Mishkova argues that the influence of images depends on the level of literacy and that the negative attitude to the Serbs was therefore restricted only to the literate strata, while ordinary Bulgarians continued to feel sympathy towards their neighbors up to 1913. Her conclusions contrast with those of Tom Nairn who in his analysis of peasant chauvinism points to its close relation to illiteracy and conservatism, which Nairn defines as “the curse of rurality”⁵¹. In Faces of Nationalism. Janus Revisited, Nairn argues that extreme forms of nationalistic behavior such as chauvinism and jingoism were essentially of peasant origin⁵².

By the beginning of the twentieth century chauvinistic and jingoistic attitudes were already an integral part of governmental decisions and diplomacy. Following the end of the Great War in 1918 Greece, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria agreed to exchange minorities. A total of 400,000 Turks, 250,000 Bulgarians and 1,300,000 Greeks

⁴⁹ Ibid., 109.

⁵⁰ Diana Mishkova, “Friends Turned Foes: Bulgarian national Attitudes to Neighbors”, Central European History Department, Working Paper Series 2 (Budapest: 1995), 164.

⁵¹ Chauvinism is a term of French origin related to the name of Nicolas Chauvin, a ploughman-soldier (*le soldat-laboureur*) who became popular after the Napoleonic Wars and whose attitude to anything foreign was profoundly xenophobic. Tom Nairn, Faces of Nationalism. Janus Revisited., (London: Verso, 1997), 90; 102; 103.

⁵² Nairn, 103.

were repatriated⁵³. At the same time, following the unification of the South Slavs within Yugoslavia, Serbs overcame the negative consequences of their migrations to Hungary, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Croatia between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries⁵⁴. Were they still Serbs by the turn of the twentieth century, and if they were, which factors prevented their assimilation? Hessel Tiltman offered a partial answer in his Peasant Europe (1934). Tiltman mentions that all over Eastern Europe - in Romania, Bukovina, Hungary - he came across “pockets” of Bulgarians who had settled in foreign parts long ago⁵⁵. They were peasants who grew vegetables and fruits commercially and kept their customs and language, making it easy for Tiltman to recognize their origin, even in 1934. Did tradition and language play the principle role in preventing assimilation? Did geography make nationalities?

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As we have seen most Serbian and Bulgarian historians assume that the Bulgarian and Serbian populations gradually embraced the ideas of the few outspoken nineteenth-century intellectuals who advocated the overthrow the Ottomans. They claim that over the course of time this process led to the formation of national communities and ultimately political independence. This “national character” approach has been adopted by the majority of Serbian and Bulgarian historians. They argue that all nationals conformed to a standard pattern of conduct and shared common ideals. But this version

³ Stavrianos, 11.

⁴ The most extensive migrations during the Ottoman period occurred among the Serbs. In the fifteenth century large numbers of Serbian population crossed the Danube River to Hungary while others migrated to Dalmatia, Bosnia and Croatia. Such population movements had long lasting repercussions. Stavrianos, 98.

⁵ Hessel Tiltman, Peasant Europe. (London, 1934), 68.

needs revision. It fails to recognize that the populations of the future Bulgaria and Serbia were nowhere near as uniform as native historians argue. As Richard Crampton points out, even if ethnic identity was preserved in the villages this did not mean that anything resembling a nationalist movement or a national political consciousness existed⁵⁶.

The inability of Bulgarian and Serbian historians to accept this fact may be due in part to the fact that in the Balkans the state preceded the appearance of popular national consciousness. The Balkan states were established thanks not to the nationalists but to the diplomatic and military interference of the Great Powers. Indeed the new states of Greece (1830), Serbia (1830), Romania (1865), and Bulgaria (1878) had to create a sense of national identity in order to train their respective populations in loyalty. Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Serbia are so different in culture and historical experiences that no general model is possible. Nevertheless, these countries may be said to have conformed to two basic social patterns. In Greece and Romania the process came earlier because these countries had more stratified societies than Serbia and Bulgaria; the educated classes were larger, and more accessible to Western influences and modern political ideas. The elites of the Danubian Principalities and Greece found it easier to mobilize peasants to a nationalist cause than those of Bulgaria and Serbia, with their less developed societal structures and smaller intelligentsia capable of constructing a nationalist cause and indoctrinating the masses with it.

The thesis will investigate what techniques were used by Bulgarian and Serbian mobilizers to convey the message of nationalism to ordinary people. The chapters that follow will explore these processes of national indoctrination in both Serbia and Bulgaria,

⁵⁶ Crampton, A Short history, 8.

process that was neither as even nor rapid as Balkan historians claim. They will consider three main points. First, that the Bulgarian and Serbian national identities were created as a result of deliberate state policy of mass indoctrination. Second, state institutions such as a modern schooling system, the army, the Orthodox Church, and the media played a role in instilling national consciousness. Third, the extent to which these institutions contributed to the development of nationalistic mythologies, assisting the "invention" of traditions as well as promoting loyalty to the monarchy will be assessed. A significant part of the examination deals with the importance of monarchical public rituals, such as coronation ceremonies, royal births and deaths; the place which the court life had in the periodicals examined; and the extent to which journalistic descriptions influenced and shaped public opinion in the two Balkan countries.

John Lampe once suggested that as passionate as nationalism had been throughout the nineteenth century, it would not have welcomed the notion of a "blank state" without a glorious historical past. We shall see that the very idea of starting from a "blank" historical space in the Balkans would have been awkward to the statesmen engaged in the process of establishing the nation-states. During the period in question, the Bulgarian and Serbian governments spent as much effort in inventing and popularizing historical myths as in building the framework of modern institutions. True, the training of bureaucracies, the organization of modern schooling systems and national armies, the implementation of constitutions were unquestionably priorities. However, once started, the process of state building had to be supported by the common folk, and the role of national mythology based on historical speculations was irreplaceable.

National sentiment and the whole set of values related to nationalism and patriotism were inculcated by state schools. The latter facilitated the formation of firm national identity and the form of state culture. However, this dissertation will argue that the national state in the Balkans was not a homogenous institution in which the national and the bureaucratic elements blended naturally. As the Swiss sociologist, Norbert Elias, argues, it is still not common practice to link the current social and national habitat of a nation to its experience of state formation. In the Balkans, the contemporary problems of a nation are usually related - by the common people and historians alike - to mythologized events from the past⁵⁷. Although the relationship between past and present seems close, there is still very little understanding of what popular nationalism was designed to be and how state agencies promoted it. I saw my scholarly task as organizing the data and indicating some of the shortcomings of the existing approaches in Serbian and Bulgarian historiography.

The thesis which follows attempts to clarify how the national identities of the Serbian and Bulgarian peoples were molded by the state administrative and cultural institutions, a nationally oriented education system, the Christian Orthodox Church, and by the army; and how through the massacres of the Balkan Wars in 1912/1913 and the suffering of the Great War nationalism came to serve as the most crucial mobilizing force at the disposal of Balkan governments.

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⁵⁷ I completely agree with André Gerolymatos who argues that in doing so, the Balkan nation-states managed to instill their own interpretations of the period predating the Ottoman conquest which was quite often a grotesque one. In the circulated versions of "national" history Balkan Christians were said to have been impaled, roasted, flayed, drowned, decapitated, and burned individually or en masse. Women were said to have been raped, forced into harems of Ottoman pashas; children were sold into slavery. However, they had managed to preserve a sense of national and religious distinctiveness. Gerolymatos, 130.

Chapter 1

Peasants and Intellectuals, 1830-1914

It is the state which makes the nation
and not the nation the state.

- Josef Pilsudski⁵⁸

A variety of socio-historical factors impeded the development of Bulgarian and Serbian national identities. Foremost among them was the peasant nature of the population, for to be a peasant implied isolation from the wider world. Peasant families spent most of their energies farming plots of land and they consumed most of what they produced. Any surplus was sold at market to raise cash to pay taxes or buy necessities like matches, tobacco, salt and sugar⁵⁹. At the turn of the nineteenth century, peasant society in the Balkans contrasted markedly with modern industrial society, both in tempo of living, in the simplicity of its institutions, and minimal contact with the outside world. Gale Stokes defines Serbia in 1800 as “simply a border province of a Muslim military empire governed with capricious severity by Janissaries and *spahis*”⁶⁰. The literacy rate

⁵⁸ Josef Pilsudski cited in H. Roos, A History of Modern Poland (London, 1966), 48.

⁵⁹ Though the Balkan peasantry did not bother to produce more unless to meet the demands of tax and rent-collection.

⁶⁰ Gale Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism. Vladimir Jovanović and the Transformation of Serbian Politics, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1975), xiii. One of the experts on Serbian economic development, Michael Palaret cites 94,45 percent rural population in Serbia in 1863. Before 1863 it is difficult to draw precise conclusions about the structure of the Serbian economy because of the paucity of statistical data. See Michael Palaret, The Balkan Economies c.1800-1914. Evolution without development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5.

mong the Serbs was 1-2 percent; no urban centers had developed and contacts with Europe were minimal⁶¹.

Other characteristics derive from this. Peasants had common characteristics which varied little from one region of Europe to another, notably profound conservatism, and ignorance. In Gellner's words peasants could not be either scholars or scholastics; they danced, sang and lived their culture, but they could not read or write it⁶². The absence of education restricted people's horizons, and reinforced their isolation to the point that they exhibited hostility to all authority, including state institutions. This often was to result in the refusal to participate in the process of state building⁶³.

The everyday life of the peasantry in both Serbia and Bulgaria was governed largely by tradition. National perspectives were alien to their traditional thinking. In the Balkans, people were accustomed to defining themselves in terms of religion, locality, occupation and status, not in terms of nationality. Peasants had to be indoctrinated before they could embrace nationalist sentiments.

National indoctrination was to be initiated and nurtured by Serbian and Bulgarian political leaders through the schooling system, military conscription, the Christian Orthodox Church, and the press. Many of the issues dealt with in this chapter are highly controversial because of the elusive nature of national sentiment, and the evidence must

¹ Stokes, xiii.

² Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism, 40.

³ In 1969 a Serbian philosopher, Radomir Konstantinović, published Filozofia Palanke (Philosophy of Provincialism) in which he analyzed the "secret fears" of the Serbian peasant mind and elaborated how the mentality of the provincial mind constituted and affected Serbian nationalism. In this study Konstantinović exemplifies how the inability of the peasant mind to comprehend the dynamics of modernization leads to frustrations and makes modern developments (such as nationalism) impossible within the parochial system. Radomir Konstantinovic, Filozofia Palanke (Belgrade, 1969), cited in Balkan as Metaphor. Between

be examined from various perspectives. Hessel Tiltman, for instance, argues that the natural conservatism of the Bulgarian peasants retarded and hampered the efforts of the Bulgarian government to improve the standard of life in the villages in the beginning of the twentieth century.⁶⁴ According to the same observer, the land and the village formed the peasant's entire universe, the absence of modern roads in both Serbia and Bulgaria having the effect of confining life for the most part of the village.

Well acquainted with the nature of the Serbian peasant society and a witness to some developments analyzed in this thesis, Edith Durham remarked that the people of these regions were "slow to grasp new ideas and with no traditions of good government behind...and were eternally dissatisfied with the government they happened to be under."⁶⁵ The reason, in her view, was that for centuries government in Serbia was synonymous with the Ottomans and was to be either resisted or at least evaded. Either way the Serbian peasant ascribed every evil to it.⁶⁶ According to Durham, Serbian peasants were "underdeveloped". "His wants were so simple that he could satisfy them easily without working to his full power, and he had no ideas beyond, even though all his spare time was dedicated to politics."⁶⁷

Globalization and Fragmentation, edited by Dušan I. Bjelić and Obrad Savić (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002), 13.

⁴ Tiltman, 70. The same opinion is shared by Ruth Trouton who in the 1950s wrote extensively on the development of the Yugoslav peasant society between 1900-50. See Ruth Trouton, Peasant Renaissance in Yugoslavia 1900-1950. A Study of the Development of Yugoslav Peasant Society as Affected by Education (London: 1952), 3-7. Paul Stirling, an expert on Turkish peasant life, agrees that peasants are proverbially conservative. See Paul Stirling, "A Turkish Village," Peasants and Peasant Societies. Selected Readings, Edited by Teodor Shanin (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971), 46.

⁵ Mary Edith Durham, Through the Lands of the Serb (London, 1904), 207.

⁵ Ibid., 207.

⁷ Ibid, 207-208. Even in the eve of World War I, Serbia, more than any other European country, was a nation of peasant proprietors. In 1910, 89,2 percent of the population lived in communities of less than

When schools opened, a significant number of Serbian and Bulgarian peasants refused to enroll their children because they needed them to help with the next harvest. Cases where Muslim fathers refused to send their daughters to school also abound⁶⁸. When the Balkans began to acquire some industry, contacts increased as peasants in search of jobs went to the cities or to sell their agricultural produce. On the other hand, as Eric Hobsbawm points out, peasants were enormously sensitive to the divide between them and the non-peasant population, whom they neither liked nor trusted.⁶⁹ Townspeople reciprocated and tended to accuse the peasantry of “being ignorant, full of prejudices, without any scruples in craft or in deceit.”⁷⁰ As the Bulgarian newspaper Makedoniya (Macedonia) wrote in 1871, “the citizenry thinks that the peasants are barbarians; the peasants think that the citizens are exploiters.”⁷¹ To walk or eat like a peasant was not only inappropriate, the urban population considered it “sinful”.⁷² Peasant behavior and costumes were visibly different from townsman’s behavior and dress. Indeed, the so-called *à la franga* (European-fashion) style was the butt of jokes among

2,000 inhabitants (in 1834 it stood at 93 percent). Peasant welfare remained wholly dependent on farming. According to the analysis of Michael Palaret Serbia bore all the hallmarks of economic backwardness. See Michael Palaret, “Rural Serbia Reshaped and Retarded, 1739-1914”, Disrupting and Reshaping, 65-66.

⁸ See for more details Chapter 5 on education.

⁹ Eric Hobsbawm, Uncommon People. Resistance, Rebellion and Jazz (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998), 149.

⁰ Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France, 1870- 1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 6.

¹ Cited in Goran Todorov, “Kŭm vŭprosa za proizhoda i sŭshnostta na politicheskite programi na partiite v Jchreditelnoto Sŭbranie (The Origin and Content of the Political Programs of the Parties participating in the Founding Assembly), Izvestiya na BAN (Sofia, 1957), 7; 65.

² Weber, 7.

the peasantry.⁷³ On Fridays, as peasants and craftsmen went to market, an observer could immediately recognize who were customers and who were producers. Peasant women wore brightly colored aprons and picturesque head kerchiefs. They carried wooden poles with swinging baskets full of eggs while peasant men were conspicuous with their black fur hats.⁷⁴ Folk costume was not only traditional, the different colors and accessories indicated precisely the region the wearer hailed from and his or her marital status (whether bachelor, spinster, married or widowed).

According to one observer, Bulgarian peasant elders dressed in unspeakably ugly pants, huge-seated and tight-legged, with tiny bands of wool along the collars of their coats to denote authority, and with flat-heeled coarse shoes. These were the people who preserved what he called Bulgarian identity (*Bŭlgarshtina*).⁷⁵ Everyday life in the Bulgarian villages was patriarchal. Every decision was taken by the village elders, who tended to preserve the traditional social structure. Any deviation from the norm prompted widespread discussion. As Hobsbawm has pointed out in respect of Europe, throughout

⁷³ The Montenegrins all wore their picturesque national costumes and as late as 1910s any man in tweeds was generally considered a stranger in Montenegro. Harry De Windt, Through Savage Europe (London, 1910), 29-30. However, as the same observer points out, all Montenegrins, irrespective of rank, wore the *kapa* (folk hat), the sole difference between nobles and peasants being the initials NI (Nicholas the First, the last Montenegrin monarch) enclosed in five semicircles and worked in gold thread on the hats of the former. *Ibid.*, 31.

⁷⁴ Lena A. Yovičić, Pages from Here and There in Serbia (Belgrade, 1926), 79.

⁷⁵ Robert Markham, Meet Bulgaria, cited in Tiltman, 87; The same was reported by Otto von Pirh in his itinerary written in 1829. See Otto von Pirh on the folk costumes of Serbian men and women. Putovanje po Srbiji u godini 1829 (Traveling across Serbia in the Year of 1829) (Belgrade, 1900), 33-36. As far as the very term is concerned, Richard Crampton translates it in English as "Bulgardom". See Crampton, A Short history of Bulgaria, 8.

the nineteenth century the idea of communal solidarity shared by all peasants was more powerful and meaningful to them than any national idea.⁷⁶

Daily life in peasant society was regulated by tradition. Dimitrije Nikolajević describes peasant women of Serbian origin who could easily pass for Turkish because they were dressed in Turkish style, with *šalvari* (wide pantaloons) and decorated silver belts.⁷⁷ Nikolajević's account is one of the rare Serbian sources of the nineteenth century that describe relations between people of Serbian origin and Ottoman officials as friendly. The author and his four companions traveled between Poreča (a small island on the Danube) and the fortress of Belgrade, changing horses at every station on the road; everywhere they were welcomed by the *bülükbash* (low-ranking officer in the Ottoman army), who treated their Serbian guests to fresh veal, onions and eggs⁷⁸. In the mid-1910s Harry De Windt was surprised to discover that the bazaar of Bosna-Saray (the main market in Sarajevo) had only four working days. Friday, Saturday and Sunday were all Sabbaths-days for Muslims, Jews and Christians respectively, a fact which exemplifies that religious tolerance was a mark of Ottoman rule.⁷⁹

Both Weber and Hobsbawm suggest that the European peasantry often resisted urban culture. Peasants who visited the city usually returned to their villages with few, if

⁷⁶ Hobsbawm, Uncommon People, 151. Ruth Trouton agrees that the South Slav village headman with his various functions was by far more influential than any official authority. He represented the whole community in its relations with other villages and non-peasant organs of control; he was chairman of the village council of elders; he was charged with the safety of the village in case of attack; and after 1804 he became military commander as well. See Trouton, 35-36.

⁷⁷ Dimitrije Nikolajević, "Putovanje po Srbiji 1808 godini" (Traveling across Serbia in 1808), Putovanja po južnoslovenskim zemljama u XIX veku (Traveling across the Southern Slavic Lands in the XIX Century), (Belgrade, 1963), 6.

⁷⁸ Nikolajević, 9.

⁷⁹ De Windt, 98.

any, new habits.⁸⁰ Yet there was an ethnic dimension to this peasant culture which was to feed into nationalist sentiment. Describing Serb society in the earlier nineteenth century Vuk Karadžić vividly makes the point that:

“among the Serbian people there are no people other than peasants. Those few Serbs who do live in towns, such as tradesmen, craftsmen, mostly furriers, tailors, backers, gunsmiths and coppersmiths, are called townspeople. Since they dress as Turks and live according to Turkish customs...not only can they not be counted among the Serbs, but the Serbs despise them.”⁸¹

Some historians tend to stress insubordination and the lack of civil discipline as typical attributes of peasant public conduct. Mark Wheeler, for example, suggests that one of the main factors delaying the effective participation of the Balkan countryside in state-building and administrative integration was the local anarchy inherited from the Ottoman period of decay, which continued to disrupt the process of effective state formation long after formal political sovereignty had been achieved.⁸² Neither Bulgarian, nor Serbian peasants were accustomed to complying with administrative regulations; they tended to despise and, whenever possible, ignored officials representing the state authorities⁸³.

⁸⁰ Weber, 43.

⁸¹Vuk Karadžić, *Istorijska Čitanka, odbrani tekstovi za istoriju srpskog naroda*,(Textbook in History. Selected Texts (Belgrade, 1948), 84-86. Cited in Joel Halpern, Barbara Halpern, *A Serbian Village in Historical Perspective* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 12.

⁸² Mark Wheeler, “Not so black as it’s painted: the Balkan political heritage,” *The Changing Shape of the Balkans*. Edited by F. W. Carter & H. T. Norris (Boulder: Westview Press: 1996), 4.

⁸³ In a recent publication Branka Arsić refers to this tendency as to “the closedness of the parochial mind”. Branka Arsić, “Queer Serbs”, *Balkan as Metaphor*, 254.

Was peasant consciousness “national” before the creation of the national state? Traditional Serbian historiography argues that the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 started as a “national” revolution. In fact, it was a peasant rebellion directed against four Ottoman *dahii* (minor janissary commanders) who had been exploiting and terrorizing people in the area. The movement erupted in the *pašalik* of Belgrade in February 1804 and was not an uprising of Christian peasants against their Muslim overlords. On the contrary, the local Serb peasantry cooperated with the officials appointed by Selim III, the “Sultan-Reformer”. The revolt only began after Hajji Mustafa, the region’s administrator loyal to Selim, was killed by the four *dahii*.⁸⁴ The murdered Hajji Mustafa was known as “the mother of the Serbs”[sic], and the *dahii* themselves were Muslims of Slavic origin. Certainly Aganlija was from Bosnia and Küçük-Alija Djevrjelić was from Rudnik in Šumadija, regarded by Serb historians as the “most Serbian” part of Serbia proper. The story of the “national” revolution supposedly organized by the then Serb leaders and carried out with the wholehearted support of the Serbian population does not conform with historical record. Moreover some details, such as the looting of Turkish properties and burning were actually modified for propaganda purposes.

As Pribičević has shown, the movement could not rely on patriotism, which did not yet exist. When Serbian peasants afraid of Ottoman reprisals refused to join the revolt, Karadjordje hanged the bodies of Turks his men had killed in an ambush at night in order to intimidate the peasants. Only then did they flee to join the rebels in the hills—

⁸⁴ David Urquhart, A Fragment of the history of Servia (London, 1843), 63-65; Misha Glenny, The Balkans. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804-1999 (Viking, 1999), 6. Hajji Mustafa was killed on 27th of December 1801 by janissaries. See also in Valjevo. Grad ustanikan (Valjevo. Collection of Articles) Edited by Živorad Gajić, (Belgrade, 1967), 32.

out of fear of Turkish repression.⁸⁵ The same approach was recommended by Prota Matija Nenadović, who wrote in his memoirs that if a *knez*⁸⁶, did not stand firm and keep “his men together that *knez* would die in torments”; and if a Serb soldier deserted his post, he would be impaled outside his house.⁸⁷

Terror achieved more than patriotism at the time. Historical circumstances and a geopolitical position close to the Austrian frontier and far from the Ottoman capital provided Serbs with opportunities to develop their own communal organizations headed by local elders called *knezove*; it even afforded them the right to bear arms, as in the district of the military frontier of Krajina⁸⁸ in Croatia and the rebellious Belgrade *pašalik* (district), at the turn of the nineteenth century. However, discipline was a permanent problem, and according to Glenny, the commanders had difficulties motivating their irregular peasant troops. As mentioned above, to forge loyalty and some cohesion, the rebel leadership often opted for coercion.⁸⁹

Prečani Serbs⁹⁰ from across the Sava River in Austria who had military experience in the Austrian army regarded themselves as bearers of Western culture. These *prečani* created friction, however, and their dress, language and outer appearance all divided them from their less civilized brothers of Serbia proper. Instead of the familiar

⁸⁵ Pribičević, 114.

⁸⁶ Literally *knez* meant prince. It was also used for Serb elders.

⁸⁷ The Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenadović. Edited by Lovett F. Edwards (Oxford, 1969), 157.

⁸⁸ Since the middle of 16th up to its abolishment in 1881 the Military Frontier was a key element of the Habsburg defense system against the Ottomans. The number of Serbian settlers in the region increased significantly after the exodus of 1691.

⁸⁹ Glenny, 17.

⁹⁰ *Prečani* was the term used for Serbs living in Austro-Hungarians territories.

“thee” and “thou”, they used the polite German form of addressing each other in the third person. This sounded ridiculous to the Serbs, who resented the *prečani* and refused to refer to them as “brothers”.⁹¹ Had the *prečani* possessed a wider vision most Serb peasants might eventually have overcome their localism. However, a national outlook introduced by the *prečani* remained stillborn due to localism and regionalism.

An interesting piece of evidence, which exemplifies how people could not imagine a “Motherland” in any way other than their immediate locality, is a letter written by a Serb, Professor Božidar Grujović, who joined the peace delegation sent to the Russian Emperor in the beginning of September 1804. Grujović himself had been born in Srem, but his grandfather had come from the village of Vrela in Temnava, in the district of Valjevo. Only when the whole Valjevo region was in turmoil, did Grujović decide that he had to do something for his “Dear Motherland” (“dear land of my grandfather, *mila dedovina*)⁹². But only then, and not before.

* * *

In the early spring of 1829 the Russian archeologist and ethnographer V. Teplyakov left Odessa for Varna on an expedition to study ethnicity among the Sultan’s Balkan subjects. Varna was an excellent choice with its 4,000 households and 26,000 inhabitants, representing a great range of both ethnicities and religions. Yet Teplyakov noticed little contrast in their appearance. Turkish, Bulgarian, Armenian, and Greek males all wore similar clothes, apart from the turban, which was reserved exclusively for

⁹¹ Trajan Stojanovich, “The Pattern of Serbian Intellectual Evolution,” Comparative Studies in Society and History (March, 1959), 243, cited in Misha Glenny, 17.

⁹² Valjevo. Grad ustanikan, 37.

Muslims.⁹³ Nor was the language spoken in public places such as the market or in the *čarši* (the main shopping street) a reliable indicator of ethnic division. Turkish was commonly used, and, as late as the 1870s, the British consuls Saint Clair and Charles Brophy acknowledged that the *raya*, (the non-Muslim tax-paying subjects), was always bilingual.⁹⁴ Bulgarian men, however, were distinguished by their black round fur hats. Further, according to Teplyakov, the most visible indication of Muslim domination was the condition of the Christian churches, which were generally dilapidated and rose no higher than the roofs of the neighboring houses, while the mosques were well maintained and had tall minarets.⁹⁵

Another Russian scholar, Jurii Venelin, began to collect data on ethnic Bulgarians about the same time as Teplyakov. Venelin thought that the Bulgarians deserved as much scientific attention as the Serbs and the Greeks who had earlier fired the historical imagination of educated Europe. Venelin was the first to accuse the Russian government of indifference to the sufferings of the Bulgars, who had the misfortune to be less popular in Russia than the “heroic” Serbs and “civilized” Greeks.⁹⁶ He challenged the official figure of 1 to 1.5 million Bulgarians, estimating their numbers at 2,545,000 people

⁹³ “Svedeniya na ruskiya arheolog V. Gr. Teplyakov za Iztochna Bulgaria” (Evidence by the Russian Archeologist V. Gr. Teplyakov about Eastern Bulgaria), Bŭlgarskite zemi prez pogleda na chuzhdi pŭteshestvenitsi 1828-1853 (The Bulgarian Lands through the Look of Foreign Travelers 1828-1853). Edited by Ivan Snegarov (Sofia, 1997), 18.

⁹⁴ Saint Clair, Charles Brophy, A Residence in Bulgaria, or Notes, on the Resources and Administration of Turkey; the Condition and Character, Manners, Customs, and Language of the Christian and Muslim Populations, with Reference to the Eastern Question (London: John Murray, 1869), 14.

⁹⁵ “Svedeniya na ruskiya arheolog”, 17-19.

⁹⁶ “Jurii Iv. Venelin za bŭlgarite” (Jurii Venelin about the Bulgarians), Bŭlgarskite zemi prez pogleda na, 25.

inhabiting not only the region of Bulgaria proper, but Rumelia (southern Bulgaria today), Macedonia, Ottoman Thrace, Tsarigrad (Istanbul), Bessarabia and the Novorosiisk area.⁹⁷

During his travels across the northern Bulgarian lands, Venelin gathered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that by the 1830s the Greek religious and educational monopoly was impeding the emergence of a separate Bulgarian consciousness. In Zheravna, a rich town between Sliven and Kotel, he met the son of the local priest, who promised to show him a document written in Old Church Slavonic dating from the beginning of the XIV century. When the Russian historian asked the young man to read the document for him, the boy could not recognize a single word despite the fact that he had studied in Sliven, where the majority of the population was Bulgarian. The reason was that at school the boy had been taught to read and write in Greek.

Venelin reported a similar experience in Silistra, a town on the Danube. He entered a local *dyukyan* (small shop) and saw a boy of about thirteen or fourteen years writing a notice in Greek. “Are you a Greek?” asked Venelin. “No, sir. I am Bulgarian,” answered the boy. “Then why are you writing in Greek?” “I am not writing in Greek, this is in Bulgarian.” Venelin examined the notice and was able to read eleven Slavonic words in Greek letters.⁹⁸

The mixture of different ethnic groups in Macedonia also attracted the attention of foreign travelers, who have left intriguing evidence about the complicated composition of this particular Ottoman province. An Italian observer, Kuzineri, published a guidebook in the 1830s that described some towns and areas in Macedonia as “Bulgarian”. A passage

⁹⁷ Venelin, 30.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 38.

written in 1590 by a monk named Viktor and a copy of the religious compilation known as the *Kormchiya kniga*, which was kept in the Church St. George at Struga, call Macedonia “Bulgarian land”.⁹⁹ According to Kuzineri the Christian population of Voden and the surrounding parish were of Bulgarian origin. The name of the town was Bulgarian and meant “watery”, because of the springs and waterfalls in the vicinity. All Greek bishops in the region had to learn Bulgarian, because the inhabitants of the hundreds or so villages around spoke no other language.¹⁰⁰

All the examples cited show that the local population had an idea of their origins and knew they were different from Greeks, Turks, Armenians and Albanians. This is not to suggest, however, that Bulgarian peasants were prepared to sacrifice their property or endanger their lives in order to assert their ethnic distinctiveness. In fact, the Russian historian Durnovo argued that they were not prepared to do so. At the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877/78, he recalled that both soldiers and generals in the Russian forces wondered why they had been sent to “liberate” people who had never asked to be liberated and who had been cooperating with the Ottomans for centuries.¹⁰¹ The same author claimed that Bulgarians tended to be politically indifferent, even obedient and servile, to the Turks.

Another source which includes an account of the war of 1877/78 describes how the peasants of the village of Vetren, which was occupied by the Russians during the war, sold wine, cattle, and food supplies to the occupiers at high prices, trying to profit from

⁹⁹ Goran Todorov, Nikolai Zechev, “Documents ayant trait aux luttes des Bulgares pour une eglise-et des ecole Nationales en Macedoine vers le milieu du XIX e siecle”, *Études historiques* (Sofia, 1966), III:173.

¹⁰⁰ “Egeiska Makedoniya po nablyudenyata na E. M. Kuzineri” (Aegean Macedonia according to the Observation of E. M. Kuzineri), *Bŭlgarskite zemi prez pogleda na*, 53.

¹⁰¹ Durnovo, *Russia and the Orthodox East*. (Sankt-Peterburg, 1880), 10.

the situation.¹⁰² While being “Bulgarian” made sense to the peasantry, insofar as it was related to everyday activities like speaking Bulgarian or singing Bulgarian folk songs, theoretical notions like Motherland, “patriotic duty”, and “sacrifice” meant little, if anything, to a person who had never left his village. Bulgarians had to be taught to understand what the Motherland represented. Furthermore, popular culture was neither monolithic nor homogenous, and therefore hardly national. This constitutes a major problem that the existing literature often overlooks.

Bulgarian national culture, like others, was a mosaic based on a variety of social layers. At least four elements deserve investigation - the regional factor, the gender factor, the generational component, and the social element.¹⁰³ It is difficult to sort out and explore all the data available according to such a principle of division; yet only by analyzing each of the elements can one hope to solve the puzzle regarding indoctrination.

By comparing the age structure of the Serbian population of Orašac in 1863 and 1890, Joel Halpern found that the youngest age group (ten years and younger) had decreased 42 % to 32 % of the population. On the other hand, within the age group of 51 years old and over, there was a twofold increase from 5 to 10 percent.¹⁰⁴ However, the state continued to consider mass illiteracy a major problem and the establishment of a national schooling system required time and sufficient funds. The percentage of illiterate Bulgarians and Serbs remained high as late as the mid-1930s in comparison with Central

¹⁰² “Ot Vitosha do Rodopa. Bŭlgariya, Rumeliya i Turtsia. (From Vitosha to the Rhodopes Mountains. Bulgaria, Rumelia and Turkey.), Trud (Labor), Veliko Tŭrnovo, 3 June 1888, 449.

¹⁰³ George Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind (London: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1991), 10.

¹⁰⁴ Joel Halpern, Barbara Halpern, 26.

European countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary. According to the data of the 1930s, about 67 % of Serbian men and almost 93 % of Serbian women had been illiterate at the turn of the century. The figures for Bulgaria were slightly lower with a 58% illiteracy rate for men and approximately 89% rate among women.

The reasons why such a prolonged effort to educate the peasantry was required were both economic and cultural. Many peasants could not afford to send their offspring to school, either because they possessed insufficient means to do so or because they needed their childrens' assistance at peak points in the agricultural year such as harvest time. Furthermore some peasants did not allow their daughters to go to school at all because they believed that women should help at home or in the fields. Where the schooling system failed to serve the cause of national consolidation, a variety of other possible channels for indoctrination were mobilized: the Orthodox Church (see Chapter 3), military conscription (see Chapter Four), the symbolic role of the monarchy, and the ruler as the "father" of the nation (see Chapter Two). All were deployed in one way or another to imbue the masses with a national consciousness.

* * *

Geographic location may help explain why Bulgarians were the least rebellious subjects of the Ottoman sultan. The Bulgarian lands were among the closest to the Ottoman capital and hence, the easiest to control and keep in order.¹⁰⁵ Their proximity to

The principle of organization was military service in exchange for exemption from taxation for all frontiersmen of Serbian origin. Otto von Pirh visited the Balkans in 1829 and described how frightened the Bulgarians were whenever they saw weapons or armed soldiers in proximity. His description is important in another aspect as well. He did not explicitly mention nationalities but he did speak of "Christians inhabiting the lands of Bulgaria, Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Rumelia etc." and defined them in terms of religion and language. See Otto von Pirh, Putovanje po Srbiji u godini 1829, 2-4.

¹⁰⁵ With the exception of the so-called "Troubled times", the period of *kürdzhalii* (armed bandits rebelling against the central administration and the sultan's authority, 1770s- 1810.)

the Ottoman capital and the poor prospects of successful revolt gave impetus to increasing numbers of monastery cell-schools, which were eventually to be replaced by a net of secular institutions after independence.¹⁰⁶ In 1833, the first Bulgarian high school using modern Western educational methods was opened; yet the Serbs, by then autonomous for five years, had no such school. Further, active printing and publishing served as channels for the transmission of national ideas to many educated people. In the mid-1850s, more newspapers, periodicals and books were printed in Bulgarian than in any other Slavic language in the region.¹⁰⁷

The Serbs in southern Hungary declared the Vojvodina autonomous in May 1848. According to Milorad Ekmečić, there were plans for Vojvodina to unite with a future triple kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia.¹⁰⁸ Patriarch Josip Rajačić, the Serbian patriarch in the Habsburg monarchy, tried several times unsuccessfully to contact the Croatian Governor Jelačić to appoint a local Serb military commander, since the governor was Catholic.

However, to reiterate, one cannot speak of Bulgarians and Serbs as integrated national communities in the first half of the nineteenth century. Although historians refer to “Serb” and “Bulgarian” to denote ethnic origin, the notion of a modern nation was an intellectual invention of the late nineteenth century; and terms like “Montenegrin” or

¹⁰⁶ Cell schools functioned within monasteries and provided elementary education for children of Bulgarian origin throughout the seventeen and eighteen centuries.

¹⁰⁷ Ekmečić, “Istorijski koren i socijalna dinamika”, 23.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

“Macedonian” were even more recent.¹⁰⁹ Even today, there are scholars who define the Montenegrins as “Christian Serbs”.¹¹⁰ Linguistic differentiation which used to be the most usual criterion of differentiation in the early nineteenth century, is not always accurate. Croats and Serbs shared the same spoken language. At least the Croat Ljudevit Gaj and the Serb Vuk Karadžić had both adopted the same peasant dialect as the basis for modern Serbo-Croat. As Pribičević wrote in the 1930s, if someone wanted to determine where an accent fell in Serbian or Croatian or how a phrase should be constructed, he would not write to “an Academy, but go to Hercegovina and listen to how the people there pronounce it.”¹¹¹ Noel Malcolm argues that even if the Serbian language clearly differentiated Serbs from Albanians, for example, it still did not define the Serbs as Serbs.¹¹² In this sense, if language to Bulgarian and Serbian peasants was the limited vocabulary of an intelligible dialect and not the standard written language of the educated, then what was their notion of common history so often regarded as the second most decisive element of a national agenda?

Dennis Hupchick argues that the average person appears to have an historical awareness spanning only a lifetime, if that. In his words, ordinary people have little real understanding of the momentous issues involved in earlier historical events and

¹⁰⁹ J.B. Allcock, “Borders, states, citizenship: unscrambling Yugoslavia,” The Changing Shape of the Balkans. Edited by F. W. Carter and H. T. Norris, 73.

¹¹⁰ Zora Milich, A Stranger’s Supper. An Oral History of Centenarian Women in Montenegro (London: Twayne Publishers, 1995), xxiv. Most historians identify Montenegrins with Serbs. However, a few exceptions, such as Tomasević, who argue that Montenegrins had a different political history, many of whom perceived themselves as a separate nation up to the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1918. See Christopher Boehm, Montenegrin Social Organization and Values: Political Ethnography of a Refuge Area Tribal Adaptation (New York: Ams Press, 1983), 63.

¹¹¹ Stojan Pribičević, World Without End. The Saga of Southeastern Europe (Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939), 149.

¹¹² Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short History (Harper Perennial, 1999), 12.

especially of how those distant occurrences might have shaped their lives.¹¹³ Even nowadays, with sophisticated communication networks and modern schooling, understanding of historical processes in the countryside is often based on rumors and popular legends. This being the case, it is easier to imagine what influence folklore, legends and rumors had on popular understanding in the nineteenth century and how respected Serbs or Bulgarians were who had traveled across the Empire or had been enlisted in a foreign army during one of numerous Austrian or Russian wars against the Ottomans since 1774.

It is difficult to understand the Bulgarian and Serbian peasant worlds of the nineteenth century from the perspective of the modern urbanized world. These societies were illiterate and hostile to city culture and city dwellers. Moreover, their idea of time was based on the natural cycle of the changing seasons and agriculture, on which they depended. The peasants had very little interest in anything other than bread-winning and the well-being of their immediate families. Both societies were traditional and conservative, and any social or political change would take much effort and time. The high percentage of illiterate Serbs and Bulgarians (see table 1) suggests that scholarly speculations about the central importance of printing, education and the press in the development of nationalism may have been exaggerated.

Table 1¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Dennis Hupchick, Culture and History in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 4.

¹¹⁴ Dobrinka Parusheva, « Politicheskata kultura i kultura v politikata. Balkanite v kraya na XIX i nachaloto na XX vek' » (Political Culture and Culture in Politics. The Balkans at the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX Century), Istorichesko büdeshte, 1 (1998), 117.

Percentage of illiterates in the Balkans at the beginning of the twentieth century)

Country	Total	Men	Women
Serbia (1900)	79.7 %	67.3 %	92.9 %
Greece (1907)	60.8 %	41.8 %	79.8 %
Romania (1899)	78 %	-	-
Bulgaria (1900)	72 %	57.9 %	86.9 %

Nevertheless, when Bulgaria became independent in 1878, newspapers did report some isolated cases of peasant activity and peasant interest in political events. An issue of Maritsa of 8 of August 1878 published a protest against the decisions of the Berlin Treaty composed and signed by Bulgarian peasants. When some peasant elders met the French official and submitted a formal protest to him, he clearly doubted that the peasants who signed it had also written it. "Who really wrote the protest?" was his first question.

"We did it ourselves," the elders proudly assured him.

"How come you knew what had happened at the Congress of Berlin?" persisted the official. *how do you know about that?*

"We always read newspapers and learned from them about the injustice done to Bulgaria."¹¹⁵

After the decisions of the Congress were made public, a stream of petitions demanding "freedom" for Macedonia and memoranda addressed to the Great Powers, written and signed by Bulgarian peasants, had been sent to Western and Russian consuls in Istanbul. They included a request submitted to the governor of Sliven, signed by

¹¹⁵ Maritsa, Plovdiv, 4 (1878), 3.

peasants from Krk-Klise, Lüleburgaz, Bunar-Hisar, and Baba Eski regions which had remained within the Ottoman Empire¹¹⁶; a memorandum sent by Bulgarian peasants to the representatives of the Great Powers in Constantinople¹¹⁷; an appeal sent to the European Committee by a delegation representing the inhabitants of Koprivshtitsa, Panagyurishte, Klisura, and the neighborhood of Sredna Gora Mountain¹¹⁸; and a letter from rebel villages in the region of Melnik to the military governor based in Petrich.¹¹⁹

The separation of the autonomous principality of Bulgaria from Eastern Rumelia, which remained under the Sultan, as the Treaty of Berlin required, was to be challenged within seven years. Events of the late summer of 1885 showed that Bulgarians could successfully organize and implement a national campaign without assistance or protection from any of the Great Powers. The process of unification of Eastern Rumelia and the Principality and the subsequent war with Serbia was a serious ordeal for the new nation. But Bulgarians, it seemed, were capable of defending their national cause. The early 1890s were a period of national optimism and great expectation of absorption of Macedonia by Bulgaria in the near future. However, failure to unify Bulgaria proper and Ottoman Macedonia eventually was to breed a severe defeatist complex¹²⁰. Peasants from villages around Sofia and near the border with Serbia celebrated their newfound

¹¹⁶ Maritsa, 8 (1878), 1.

¹¹⁷ Maritsa, 23 (1878), 4-5.

¹¹⁸ Maritsa, 26 (1879), 5.

¹¹⁹ Maritsa, 46 (1879), 3.

¹²⁰ Paul Lendvai, Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969), 210.

confidence in hyperbolic style, declaring that “there was no city more populous than Sofia,/ no river more majestic than the Iskür River,/ no mountain higher than Vitosha”.¹²¹

Yet, not all changes in popular mentality can be explained with reference to the events of 1885 and the subsequent disappointment. By the end of the nineteenth century national indoctrination had reached its high point, a trend clearly illustrated by the changes by the age structure of the Bulgarian and Serbian populations. Balkan historians investigating problems of nationalism not only tend to neglect age structure, they continuously neglect demographic and gender issues. A closer look at the age structure of the Bulgarian and Serb population suggests that in 1900 the majority of the population had been born after the nation-states had been established.

Table 2¹²²

Age structure of the Bulgarian population in percentages

Age group	1866	1900	1905
0-19 (young)	47.7	51.1	49.7
20-59 (adult)	43.8	40.5	41.8
60+ (old)	8.5	8.4	8.5

Table 3

Age structure of the Serbian population in percentage¹²³

¹²¹ Irwin Sanders, Balkan Village (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1949), 15.

¹²² Maria Todorova, Balkan Family Structure and the European Pattern. Demographic Developments in Ottoman Bulgaria (Washington D. C.: The American University Press, 1993), table 2.4., 20. The data provided by Todorova illustrates an interesting phenomenon: throughout the nineteenth century in the Balkans men outnumbered women at a sex ratio of 109.6.

Age group	Orašac-1863	Towns-1900	Villages-1900	Total 1900
0- 20	62. 8	44	55	53
20-60	36. 2	51	41	43
61+	1.0	5	4	4

A British traveler, Edward Dacey remarked that in 1894 there was not a Bulgarian over the age of eighteen who had not been born under Ottoman rule, and that until the 1890s there was no child at school who could not remember the times when the Turks were masters of the country.¹²⁴ The same observer provides us with valuable information about the differences in everyday behavior of the generations born before and after 1878. Older people avoided any contacts with strangers and foreigners due to a deeply-rooted, almost instinctive fear of trouble. However, the older generations, though still mostly illiterate, had the advantage of being able to compare life under the Ottoman Empire and life in independent Bulgaria. This helps to explain the extent of disappointment with independence and expression of indignation against the Bulgarian politicians and even statements like “Damned be the Sultan who yielded his kingdom,”¹²⁵. John Bell argues that the popular Bulgarian saying in similar vein: “it is worse than it used to be under the Turks” expressed the disappointment of ordinary people with the failure of the nation-

¹²³ Ibid., table 2.5., 21.

¹²⁴ Edward Dacey, The Peasant State. An Account of Bulgaria in 1894 (London: John Murray, 1894), 52.

¹²⁵ Anton Strashimirov, Kniga za bŭlgarite (A Book about the Bulgarians) (Sofia, 1918), 114.

state to achieve sufficient political and economic progress in its first two decades of sovereign existence.¹²⁶

Although many Bulgarian peasants profited economically from independence by obtaining ownership of arable land, in the 1880s and 1890s this advantage for individuals operated against the interests of the state. The generally low level of productivity of peasant farms met living needs but provided no surplus. A dramatic decline of grain prices made farming an unprofitable occupation in the late 1870s, and the steady growth of population could not be absorbed because of the lack of successful industrialization and urbanization.¹²⁷ In this sense, the Gordian knot of nationalistic and social agendas was becoming even more complicated after 1894, when the Bulgarian Peasant Union was organized and started its official activity.

From the middle of the 1890s, peasant frustration became a growing concern of journalists sympathetic to the peasant cause. Reports and articles demonstrating discontent with the government expressed even anti-national trends. An article published in the newspaper Selska дума (Peasant Word) in January 1910, for example, defined entrepreneurs, traders and civil clerks as idlers interested only in their personal profit. They along with teachers, railwaymen, and doctors simply wanted to steal a larger piece of the people's bread. The monarch, the clergy, even the army were characterized as parasites who made the life of the peasantry miserable.¹²⁸ Three decades after 1878, the

¹²⁶ John D. Bell, Peasants in Power. Alexandŭr Stamboliiski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 4.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹²⁸ Selska дума (The Peasant Word), Sofia, 1 (1910), 2.

author of this material was presenting the nation-state as a stepmother who did not even try to improve the standards of the peasants' everyday life.

Another example of hostility to the state was the common comparison between the situation of the peasantry then and their conditions under the Ottomans:

“That was at a time when the now ‘free’ Bulgarian peasant was enclosed within the iron walls of the great Ottoman Empire. However, he could trade and sell the products of his labor. After the Liberation the old forms of communal organization began to disappear and, when the principality was separated from the Ottoman Empire, existing markets were closed down. The shortage of money which was badly needed by our peasants in order to buy arable land forced them to borrow from usurers at unbearable rates varying from between 30, or 50 to 100%. Nobody has tackled these serious problems. Indeed, the state has encouraged speculators, so we have come to this sorry state. Instead of a prosperous agriculture and productive peasants, we have a ruined peasantry which does not produce anything. Under such circumstances nobody can seriously expect that our peasant will be a good Bulgarian.”¹²⁹

However, sometimes the peasantry was not difficult to manipulate. One of the most accessible criteria for estimating the degree of peasant participation in political life are election returns. According to the provisions of the Tŭrnovo Constitution of 1879, all Bulgarian men over 21 years of age had a right to vote. The Serbian Constitution of 1888 required a minimal property qualification of 15 *denars* in tax payment per year.

Table 4¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Selski glas (The Peasant Voice).Sofia, 1.

¹³⁰ Parusheva, 115.

Percentage of electorate voting

Participation in elections	Year	Year	Year	Year
Serbia	1903	1905	1906	1908
Peasant population	53.9	55.4	67.5	70.4
Urban population	54.4	55.8	66.5	67.3
Total	53.9	55.5	67.5	70.1

Table 5 ¹³¹

Bulgaria	1901	1902	1903	1908	1911	1913	1914
Peasant Districts	41.1	49.6	40.4	51.3	-	-	-
Urban Districts	48.1	50.4	43.7	46.4	-	-	-
Total	42.7	49.8	41.2	50.2	47.2	55.0	67.1

The foregoing suggests that by the turn of the century the Bulgarian peasantry already had its own organization, whose structures in the villages could influence not only the life of its members but the views of others as well. There were also several newspapers directed towards a peasant readership. Irwin Sanders points out that as late as the mid-1930s the newspaper was still the only source of information accessible to the

¹³¹ Parusheva, 116.

peasants. The reading of the newspaper was a social event. Men gathered in the village tavern not only to rest after hard work and have a drink but also to listen to the news. Villagers who were not regular visitors of the tavern were perceived as people uninterested in finding out what was going in the world.¹³² As a matter of fact, all newspapers concerning peasant matters, even those whose editorials categorically stated their “independence” from any kind of political organization or party, were involved in politics. Otherwise, how could anyone explain the discrepancy between the statistics provided by one the ablest Bulgarian economists of the 1890s, Ivan Evstatiev Geshov, and the journalist’s complaints cited on page 57? If the Bulgarian state did not alleviate the grievances of the peasantry between 1878 and 1899, how could one explain the palpable progress made by exports in 1891-1892? Of all the European countries, Bulgaria in that period occupied first place as a grower of wheat and sheep, second as a producer of grain, and third as a cattle breeder.¹³³

Further, Geshov condemned some representatives of the Peasant Union who were, claiming in the press that the Bulgarian peasants were “fictitious owners” of the arable land and that the majority of them lived on the edge of poverty, repaying their credits with unaffordable interest. The figures showed that in 1891/92 2,111,547 people were engaged in the farming of 17,918,769 *dyulums* of land and that these farmers could afford to survive their loans at interest rates varying between 3 to 10 *levs* per *hectar* per year (a relatively reasonable rate).¹³⁴

¹³² Sanders, 5.

¹³³ Ivan Evstatiev Geshov, *Dumi i dela. Ikonomicheski i finansovi studii* (Words and Deeds. Economic and Financial Essays) (Sofia, 1899), 129-30.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 134.

Civil servants responsible for the collection of taxes, government ministers, deputies whose election campaigns depended on peasant support - in short, all officials - were customarily described as oppressors: "In our country the administration seems to be created only to hinder the progress of individuals, community and the state. The bureaucrat is omnipotent and whatever he accomplishes is presented as a blessing'. All our laws have been created to protect the interests of the rich. The state is a mother to officials but a stepmother to peasants"¹³⁵.

"What is this power that brings only bandits and fools to the top of Bulgarian policy?", a journalist asked bitterly in 1910¹³⁶. The same question disturbed a Bulgarian peasant who had fought in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877/78 two decades earlier. He found work as a railwayman, but was satisfied with neither the pay, nor with the official attitude towards the veterans who had fought against the Ottomans.¹³⁷ "Fight and then starve," he remarked bitterly.¹³⁸ Newly-liberated countries needed heroes whose patriotic example would be a model for generations to come, but once independence was obtained and enthusiasm cooled, new political and economic realities blotted out the old-fashioned romantic patriotism propagated by intellectual revolutionaries with their talk of readiness to sacrifice their well-being and their lives for the national cause.

Until the 1890s the vast majority in both Serbia and Bulgaria were politically ignorant and expressed no interest in their constitutional and civil rights. A sharp line can

¹³⁵ Selska дума, 2 (1910), 2-3.

¹³⁶ Selska дума, 14 (1910), 3.

¹³⁷ Ot Vitosha do Rodopa., 451.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 451. Further, the problems of the Bulgarian veterans (volunteers) who participated in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877/78 are presented in Chapter Six on the army.

be drawn between the 1830s to 1870s when the ideals propagated by national leaders predominated and the post-independence period with its new economic trends of merciless social competition. Peasants in both countries tended to be disappointed with the new conditions. In the early 1970s, the Soviet historian Naumov suggested that if in 1867 there were only 5% landless peasants in Serbia proper, this percent increased to 16.7% in the 1880s and reached 21.5% in 1897.¹³⁹ In the new criminal code published on May 27th 1850, the Serbian government provided harsh punishments, including lashing and imprisonment for any “suspicious, idle beggars.”¹⁴⁰

In view of these frequent expressions of social bitterness in Bulgarian newspapers and their generally negative attitude toward the nation’s politicians, anti-state invective should have swayed Bulgarian peasant readers more easily than their Serbian counterparts. Judging from the evidence available in the Serbian sources, however, the expressions of popular discontent and criticism were either atypical or public discussion of them was discouraged.

Moreover, national indoctrination was necessarily restricted primarily to males. The demographic structure under discussion shows an interesting phenomenon: Bulgarian and Serbian men outnumbered women throughout the whole nineteenth century. Early marriage, high fertility, higher maternal and childbirth mortality, high female mortality rates generally due to common neglect of female health,¹⁴¹ and limited access to education were some of the reasons why women did not play a really significant

¹³⁹ E.P. Naumov, “K voprosu o social’noi structure Serbskoi derevni v 30-x-50-x gg. XIX v.,” *Études balkaniques* 2 (Sofia, 1970), 125.

¹⁴⁰ *Zbornik zakona i uredba i uredbeni ukaza, izdani u kneževina Srpskom*, kn. 5 (Belgrade, 1853), 136.

¹⁴¹ Todorova, 2.

role in the rise of national consciousness¹⁴². A Bulgarian traveler states clearly that parents were not inclined to send girls to school.¹⁴³ In other words, because of the discrepancy between female and male social patterns of behavior and various demographic developments, nineteenth-century Serbian and Bulgarian peasant women could not be indoctrinated through official channels.

A recent study of the life stories of thirty illiterate centenarian Montenegrin women published by the American anthropologist Zora Milich has shed some light on the mechanism of “educating” women in nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century. Although, illiteracy prevailed in Montenegro through the first three decades of the twentieth century, Milich argues that listening to these women she could hardly believe that they had not been to school nor studied history. All of them spoke of historical events as if they had read about them in books—telling the story of the Battle of Kosovo for instance, as if it were a current event.¹⁴⁴

One way to develop awareness about their past was through the heroic epic sung by *guslars* (folk singers). Although only men were allowed to sing them in public, women were able to listen to these ballads. Whether sung or recited, these epic poems often concerned pre-Ottoman history and could be interpreted in terms of nationalist themes. Singers like the blind Filip Višnić, a Serb from Bosnia, used the medium to record and glorify the Serbian past.¹⁴⁵ Folklore and religious confession was the only

¹⁴² Except for teaching positions. In both Serbia and Bulgaria such cases were not rare after 1850s; however, compared to men earning a living as teachers women were very few.

¹⁴³ Ot Vitosha do Rodopa. (1888), 449.

¹⁴⁴ Milich, 7.

¹⁴⁵ Glenny, 11.

medium accessible to women which encouraged them to define themselves as members of a national community. It is arguable to what extent an illiterate woman defined her membership of a community larger to and different from her own family (or clan); but Milich's study provides evidence of mother's role as the first teacher of her sons.

In mountainous region like Montenegro, the cult of bravery, with its two elements *čojstvo* and *junastvo* (honor and heroism), was basic to a boy's upbringing. Men were educated from childhood in the need for courage. A Montenegrin was formed from a proud awareness of belonging to the community of Orthodox Montenegrins combined with a natural fondness of freedom. Tribalism had molded the region of Montenegro into a warrior society with little tolerance for change. Males dominated, females were subordinated. However, both sexes were expected to respect and glorify their history through an oral, intricately-developed epic tradition.¹⁴⁶ Albert Lord in his book The Singer of Tales illustrates how illiterate Serbs learned epic songs by heart. He cites the example of Šaban Rahmanović (born 1890), from Bihać. Though illiterate, Šaban was able to memorize the words to the songs of the *Matica Hrvatska* collection, thanks to a friend, who read them to him.¹⁴⁷

The impact of regional and local traditions on the peasant mentality were profound, yet this is another significant aspect of nationalism that has been largely neglected by the literature on the creation of national consciousness. Besides the specific example of regional difference which Montenegro represented, there were many other cultural and historic divisions within the Serbian lands. The establishment of an

¹⁴⁶ Milich, 6.

¹⁴⁷ Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 23.

autonomous Serbia after 1830 had not implied the immediate unification of all ethnic Serbs with those in the territory of the new nation-state. Significant numbers lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was Ottoman before, and Austrian after 1878, and the Vojvodina which was Hungarian. Regionalism did not disappear after 1918, with the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Slovenes and Croats. The attitudes of Serbs brought up in the Vojvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Šumadija continued to differ. The already-cited military frontier of Krajina had a large Orthodox population in the Lika, Petrovaradin, and Knin areas. People who thought of themselves as Serbs constituted 43 % of the total population in Dalmatia. The central Serbian territory of Kosovo which had been the nucleus of a medieval Serbian state (Raška) remained under Ottoman rule until the Balkan Wars (1912).

Halpern emphasizes that central Serbia and Šumadija in particular exemplified the transformations of nineteenth-century Serbian peasant society.¹⁴⁸ Largely depopulated during the great exodus of Serbs in 1699, central Serbia was repopulated during the eighteenth-century through migrations mainly from the Sandjak and Montenegro. Indeed, the family of the first Serbian leader, Karadjordje, had migrated to Šumadija around 1781. Šumadija was to become the center of the first Serbian uprising and eventually came to be regarded as a land of heroes and fighters for national liberation. Regarding themselves as the only genuine Serbs, people born in Šumadija tended to be more xenophobic than the rest. Serbs who had grown up in border zones like Vojvodina or Croatia-Slavonia were more moderate and accustomed to communicating with other ethnic groups. However, affiliation to Christian Orthodoxy and negation of the Ottoman

¹⁴⁸ Joel Halpern, Barbara Halpern, 9.

legacy were common elements of Serbian popular consciousness and then they came to share.

During the 19th century, the sharp line dividing Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats constituted an indispensable national and cultural bond. To a lesser extent, the same was true for the Bulgarians as well. Bulgarian religious texts, such as late medieval hagiographic compilations, used the term “Christian” only of the Orthodox. Catholics were usually called “Franks” (*frenki*) and were treated with the same hostility as Muslims. In this context, Bulgarians were merely people who professed Orthodoxy, while converts were excluded as traitors of the community. Apostasy, therefore, implied a change of ethnicity. For example, in the late 1870s, Todor Stanković did not even recognize that Albanians who professed Islam could have been people other than Serbs before their conversion. He defined them as *Arnautaša* (Albanians), or Serbs alienated from the community because of their conversion. His itinerary, Putne beleške po Staroj Srbiji (Travel Remarks on Old Serbia),¹⁴⁹ provides plenty of similar factual inaccuracies that exemplify the importance of religious division in everyday peasant life.¹⁵⁰ When reporting on Catholic villages in a certain region, Stanković never called the inhabitants Serbs but “Catholics with Serbian customs who spoke Serbian.”¹⁵¹

On the other hand, refusing to convert and dying a martyr’s death were treated by both communities as heroic and patriotic. In folklore, whose influence on both female and male illiterate populations was considerable, examples of personal fortitude were

¹⁴⁹ Todor Stanković, Putne beleške po Staroj Srbiji. 1871- 1898 (Belgrade, 1910).

¹⁵⁰ Stanković, 1, 3.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 46. The examples cited were the region of Kosovo: the villages of Šašare, Vrnazovo, and Vrnaokolo.

usually exhibited by young and beautiful women refusing to marry infidel Muslims and preferring death to disgrace. In a famous song describing an episode from the early stage of the Ottoman advance in the Bulgarian lands, a large group of maidens threw themselves into an abyss to avoid ignominious slavery in some Ottoman harem.¹⁵²

Historically “Serbian-ness” became identical with Christian Orthodoxy. When modern concepts of nationhood started to spread among the different layers of the Serbian society in the nineteenth century, membership in the Orthodox Church had already been established as a category of Serbian identity.¹⁵³ Whereas foreign travelers more often than not described the Bulgarians not as deeply religious, but rather as pragmatic or traditional Christians, Serbs always boasted about their religious zeal and fervor. There is some evidence to the contrary, such as Čedomil Mijatović’s observation that the religious sentiment of the Serbs was neither deep nor warm but mysteriously connected with the very existence of the nation.¹⁵⁴

* * *

It is not easy to define how nationalism penetrated the minds and hearts of the peasants and become an effective mobilizing force. During the early phase of “national awakening” peasants were disinclined to get involved in risky undertakings to defend the “national interest”. It is true that the traumatic experience associated with the Russo-Turkish wars, which were invariably followed by severe Ottoman punitive measures,

¹⁵² Originally a popular medieval legend, it was eventually turned into a song about Kaliakra, the most beautiful among the girls who jumped first from the rocks into the Black Sea. Eventually the settlement that was founded near the spot where the girls had died was named Kaliakra (close to the port of Varna).

¹⁵³ Malcolm, 12.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 13.

acted as historical catalysts accelerating the emergence of a sense of belonging among the Bulgarians and Serbs. However, in some cases at least, it is difficult to argue that certain actions were genuine expressions of patriotism and, not the traditional values of masculinity (*yunachestvo*) and fondness of freedom. The dividing line between the two is blurred. What passed for love of the country could pass for valor as well, and the Montenegrin oral epic is a good example of such overlap.

The differences between peasants inhabiting isolated mountainous regions like Montenegro and others who had settled in areas more exposed to contacts with different ethnic communities, deserve more substantial treatment. Historically, the mentalities of different groups of peasantry—such as crop-raising or animal-rearing peasants, the peasant soldiers of Krajina, and the peasant warriors of Montenegro—did not overlap, and the process by which national consciousness came about certainly differed between groups cited.

A recent trend in national historiography presents many social rebellions in the Serbian and Bulgarian lands as early attempts to obtain independence from the Sublime Porte. In 1836, the Christian land tenants of Pirot and Berkovitsa rebelled against the Ottoman ill-treatment of the local population. Despite the accusations of the local governor, the *vojvoda* of Berkovitsa Haji Sherif, against Miloš (whom he suspected of sending Serbian troops in the region to back the rebels), the uprising had no national objectives and was clearly directed against the local Muslim landlords who were mistreating their Christian subjects.¹⁵⁵ Miloš, who by 1838 had spent much effort seeking an official title from the Sultan, even refused to associate his name with the disturbances

¹⁵⁵ Boryana Lilić, “Dve interesni pisma ot Berkovska *nahiya*” (Two Interesting Letters from the Berkovitsa County), *Balkanistichen Forum*, 1 (1997), 81-82.

¹⁵⁶ It is as well to recall that, in their nascent phases, the uprisings of the nineteenth century tended to have social causes. Mass national movements were only to be developed when conditions permitted. There is no evidence that earlier conflicts between the Ottoman administration and local Bulgarian and Serbian populations were “national” in any sense at all.

So far as the chronology of the Bulgarian and Serbian national movements is concerned, historiography on the Balkans continues to divide the period according to major political events. The First (1804) and Second Serbian uprisings (1815), the autonomy of Serbia (1830), the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78, and the Congress of Berlin are all presented as political watersheds. The logic of this approach shows how historical calendars have been created and popularized for public consumption. Once Bulgarian and Serbian states had been established and the Ottoman threat only existed in territories considered by the two nation-states as “historically theirs”, such as Macedonia, Kosovo, and the Sandjak, it was time to redirect efforts and invent a new enemy whose political conduct and potential threat could mobilize the loyalty of the two communities.

As late as 1939, Stojan Pribičević argued that the Balkan intelligentsia had not been gestated and born in a natural way. Throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century, Serbs and Bulgarians who could afford to spend several years in the Latin Quarter (with a few respectable exceptions) eventually learned how to play poker but never to speak decent French. The “intellectual” returned home bringing a thin Gallic polish over his Balkan coarseness, and then he expected (and usually received) a nice

¹⁵⁶ Lilić, 82.

governmental job.¹⁵⁷ By and large, Pribičević was right. However, there had always been a thin layer of intellectuals devoted to the national ideals who did their best to serve the fatherland and their people. Who were these people, the first to combine religious zeal with the romantic modern ideas of emerging nationalism? More often than not, the first mobilizers of the local Bulgarian and Serbian intelligentsia were either monks who wrote the first romantic compilations of native histories (Paisii and Dositej Obradović in the eighteenth century) or self-taught linguists who modernized the Bulgarian and Serbian written languages on the basis of colloquial speech like Petür Beron and Vuk Karadžić in the nineteenth century.

There is no need to follow the general development of the Bulgarian and Serbian intelligentsia from the 1830s to the beginning of the Great War. Hundreds of such detailed books on intellectual elites have been published.¹⁵⁸ Rather, my purpose is to suggest a model of intellectual behavioral response to the needs of the nation-state institutions, demonstrating, for example, how Bulgarian and Serbian village schoolteachers, and university professors, could influence and indoctrinate their audiences in nationalism.

During the nineteenth century, a minority of the Bulgarian and Serbian intelligentsia (teachers, writers, clergymen, and some of the well-to-do merchants) who cherished the national idea and who were its propagandists came to sponsor the establishment of primary schools, gymnasia and, later on, universities¹⁵⁹. This

¹⁵⁷ Pribičević, 210.

¹⁵⁸ One of the best studies is the research done by Jordan Kolev, Bŭlgarskata inteligentsiya 1878- 1912 (The Bulgarian Intelligentsia 1878- 1912) (Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski, 1992).

¹⁵⁹ The brothers Hristo and Evlogi Georgievi donated a large amount of money to help establish the state university in Sofia.

development followed the foundation of the Serbian autonomous state in 1830 and of the Bulgarian Principality in 1878, because these changes altered the structure of the intelligentsia. From then on secularly-educated intellectuals gradually replaced the clerical element that had dominated hitherto and had “led” during the first phase of the “national awakening”¹⁶⁰. Another significant modification occurred in the beginning of the twentieth century, when more and more alumni graduated from the native universities of Belgrade and Sofia and began to exert influence on the shaping of the national agenda. One of the major objectives of this study is to find out how the intelligentsia came to influence the population.

Bulgarian historiography suggests that the period of Bulgarian national awakening began with Paisii and his appeal to the Bulgarian people to recall their glorious past, an appeal he used as a springboard to develop Bulgarian identity further. For Paisii, Bulgarians were all people who were Orthodox Christians and who spoke Bulgarian. The idea which made the monk from Hilendar influential and popular was his cyclical view of human history. If Bulgarians had shared a glorious past, they would certainly enjoy a bright future; therefore, they had to preserve their identity and resist any attempt to be assimilated.¹⁶¹ Petür Beron, the scholar to influence the process claimed all who “cherished the Bulgarian name”, and contributed further to the creation of national identity by emphasizing the importance of schooling. In his view, national ideas were unintelligible without education and literacy. The third element of the Bulgarian identity

¹⁶⁰ The term “national awakening” is frequently used by traditional Bulgarian and Serbian historiography. However, its usage in my context does not imply that the nation already existed as traditional historians assume.

¹⁶¹ Iliya Todev, “Natsionalnata ideya u bŭlgarite » , 91.

after language and common history, namely the uniqueness of Orthodoxy, was emphasized by Neofit Bozveli (1785-1848). According to Bozveli, the Bulgarian nation had to establish a national church in order to be acknowledged as a separate community.

Theoretically, all these positions are plain to everyone who is aware of contemporary processes of modernization and national evolution. Practically, however, the spread of such innovative perceptions required a long period of education and absorption and the efforts of several generations of intellectuals—in fact, until the 1900s, by which time the process of Bulgarian national integration could finally be said to be complete.¹⁶²

Like Paisii and Beron, Dositej Obradović, thought that education would eliminate Serbian cultural backwardness and give impetus to Serbian national unity. Creating a consciousness accepted by the population as a whole was not possible without schooling. These ideas were elaborated on by Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864), who considered language and folklore the most urgent items in the Serbian national agenda¹⁶³. After a literary reform, which he hoped would provide the basis of the modern Serbian language, Karadžić turned his attention to an inspirational presentation of the history with Serbs as eternal heroes whose fate was doomed¹⁶⁴. In Karadžić's "Downfall of the Serbian Empire", Lazar has to make the difficult choice between the empire of heaven and the empire of earth. He chooses the first in the hope that the earthly state may be resurrected

¹⁶² This, as far as mental evolution of the commoners was concerned. In political terms, the consolidation would be finished only when Macedonia joined the Bulgarian kingdom.

¹⁶³ One of the best biographies of Vuk Karadžić written in English is Duncan Wilson's The Life and Times of Vuk Stefanovic Karadžić 1787-1864. Literacy, Literature, and National Independence in Serbia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).

¹⁶⁴ Karadžić view was not original. It was a quintessentially Romantic view.

some day. Karadžić considered the moment had come for the Serbs to fulfill their mission and revive their kingdom.

Later still Garašanin (1812-1874) dressed up most of the ideas propagated by Obradović and Karadžić in spiritual and allegorical terms. Only Garašanin turned Christian martyrdom and historical mythology into a practical and articulated political ideology. His *Nacertanije* (1844) was a blueprint for a Greater Serbia, consolidated and powerful enough politically to serve eventually as the Balkan Piedmont for all South Slavs¹⁶⁵.

The Bulgarian national movement had no counterpart which clearly stated its goal. For most of the revolutionary and intellectual leaders, the unification of Thrace, Mœzia (part of Dobrudzha), and Macedonia was an unquestionable priority. However, there was not a single program to be followed, as in the Serbian case.

* * *

In the early 1830s, Juri Venelin remarked that there was little interest among potential sponsors for raising the literacy of ordinary Bulgarians. Even in such rich Bulgarian communities as that of Bucharest, only a few merchants donated money regularly to support Bulgarian schools. The rest were satisfied with access for their offspring to Greek schools and even wrote in Greek to their relatives across the Danube.¹⁶⁶ Gradually, however, the situation changed. In 1836 a general history of the world, translated by the Bulgarian Anastas Kipilovski, was published in Pest. The

¹⁶⁵ In a recent publication Marco Dogo suggests that the *Nacertanije* plan of expansion regarded the *lebensraum* (space) of the state, rather than of the nation. In his words the plan was not even irrendist and inexplicit on how to incorporate the Serbian speaking Diaspora into the Serbian nation. It is an original assumption, however, it needs further elaboration based on the very content of the program. Dogo, "The Balkan Nation-States", 66.

¹⁶⁶ Venelin, 39.

Following table prepared by Nikola Palausov and sent to Venelin shows the distribution of copies of the book to Bulgarians in different regions inside and outside the Ottoman Empire:

Table 6¹⁶⁷

Regions	Urban Settlements	Subscribers	Copies
Wallachia	Bucharest	53	124
	Brâila	60	63
	Krajova	20	40
	Gurgevo	2	3
Moldavia	Galac	13	35
Russia	Odessa	17	156
Hungary	Pest	4	17
Turkey	Karlovo	71	73
	Klisura	10	12
	Veles	3	3
	Total	258	524

Between 1833-1837, nineteen new Bulgarian titles, mainly schoolbooks and didactic studies, were either published or ready for the press.¹⁶⁸ As a criterion of literacy, the number of published titles hardly can be overestimated, because, as already

⁶⁷ Venelin, 40.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 42.

mentioned, illiteracy predominated and books were still purchased mainly by well-to-do merchants.

The very term “intelligentsia” (i. e. the educated class) was not accepted without reservation by the peasants even after the nation state was established. After 1878, the Bulgarian intelligentsia included all kinds of low-ranking civil servants capable of making the life of the peasants really miserable. Therefore, the term was used in a pejorative as well as an approbatory sense.¹⁶⁹ The popular press was the most active in accusing Bulgarian civil servants of corruption and ignorance, and in comparing them to greedy Ottoman officials. Journalists were the first to mock the state administration for being both ineffective and empty-headed. The latter epithet could not possibly be valid for the high ranks of government, for the available data shows that the Bulgarian governmental elite between 1878 and 1915 was well educated. Of 102 ministers after independence, 38 were lawyers; fifteen had military education; six had graduated in political science and economics; three had graduated in the classics; four were mathematicians, two engineers, six medics, and six clergymen.¹⁷⁰ However, they were accused of lacking a sense of patriotic duty, of caring too much about their personal benefit and of lacking selflessness and willingness to sacrifice themselves for the Fatherland.¹⁷¹ The press even tried to instill the notion that Bulgarian politicians could not belong to the Bulgarian nation, because they did not understand the life of the peasantry and did not spend much effort to improve it.¹⁷²

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 17

⁷⁰ Parusheva, 120.

⁷¹ *Selski glas* (The Peasant Voice), 5 (1908), 2.

⁷² *Selyanin* (The Peasant), 48 (1880), 3-4.

Interestingly enough, similar journalistic criticism of the nation-state's administration cannot be found in the Serbian newspapers. "Our progress depends on our communal efforts, not on our government," Srpski dnevnik (The Serbian Diary) wrote in 1888. Serbian ministers and deputies were praised as efficient and competent.¹⁷³ However, this may have been due to the strict censorship during the reign of Milan, who abdicated in 1889. At any rate examples of journalistic social propaganda representing the nation state as incapable of liquidating the poverty of the Serbian peasantry were very rare. An exception is an article published in Uskok in 1896:

If a man asks our peasants "How is your life?" he will receive the same answer everywhere: "We live in poverty". Some might be astonished at how it is possible to live miserably in a country as rich in natural resources as Serbia. But sadly it is true, because whilst in other countries educated people are brought up to be patriots and, above all, to consider the national interests of their states, Serbian politicians and intellectuals fight each other to preserve their own personal interests and profits....The whole of our society should understand that it is not possible to achieve any progress if the peasants are poor....It is well known that miserable people are not capable of sacrifices in the name of national ideals.¹⁷⁴

⁷³ Srpski dnevnik (The Serbian Diary), 57 (1888), Belgrade, 1.

⁷⁴ Uskok, 10 (1896), Dodatak (Appendix), 1

The same inseparable link between well-being and readiness for sacrifice in the name of the fatherland was developed in an article entitled “What is Serbia today (*Šta je danas Srbija?*)”. The nation state had to be effective in resolving the everyday problems of the commoners; otherwise it could not blame her citizens for neglecting their patriotic duties and for disloyalty. The journalist who wrote this article presented Serbs as sincere patriots who immediately forgot party disagreements when the collective fate was to be decided. Even Serbian politicians who believed in a common national ideal and communal mobilization, which had helped Serbs in the past, terrified their enemies.¹⁷⁵

The materials explored here suggests a link between the standard of living of the peasantry and their readiness to make sacrifices for the national cause. The authors of newspaper articles designed to attract the attention of an audience sympathetic to the peasantry acknowledged that the potential power of the rural population was enormous. However, its actual participation in the life of the nation-state was very limited. Another trend clearly expressed in the Bulgarian press, in particular, was the disrespect shown to and even open mockery of politicians of all colors and ranks, including ministers, deputies and members of the Synod. By emphasizing the economic and cultural differences between the elite and the masses, these journalists impeded the process of national integration. Indeed, they seemed to have encouraged confrontation between illiterate and educated, the governed and the governing.

However, there were two groups of intellectuals who were never targets of peasant derision or disrespect. Bulgarian public school teachers, who numbered some 6,000 in the late 1890s, were very influential among the peasants. So were parish priests.

¹⁷⁵ Uskok, 1.

They could inculcate nationalism either at school or in the local tavern through contacts with their pupil's fathers. Despite public declarations about the national importance of primary education and instructors who educated the future citizens of the state, Bulgarian teachers were poorly paid, closely watched by the local authorities, and enjoyed no job security or other social benefits.¹⁷⁶ Teachers of Bulgarian origin outside the country were compelled to work and carry their educational and patriotic duties in even harsher circumstances.

However, as mentioned above, the term "intelligentsia" does not adequately reflect the diverse composition of this social group in the Balkans. It is as misleading as the term "peasantry" can be. At the turn of the century, intellectuals were defined as clerics, doctors, lawyers, writers, journalists, civil administrators, pharmacists, officers, etc, and the list can be lengthened to include at least ten more professions requiring higher-level education. The participation of these groups in the process of indoctrination varied according to the character of their occupation and the opportunity to influence the peasants. Another relatively small and perhaps underestimated group were the professional actors and musicians who influenced crowds through their performances, not only in cities but also in the larger villages.

Hobsbawm argues that in the nascent stage of nineteenth-century nationhood, few intellectuals were "nationally conscious" and that the rest had a vague or no idea at all of identification with a national community.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 17. On the social role of the Bulgarian and Serbian teachers and their participation in the process of national indoctrination, see Chapter 5 on education.

¹⁷⁷ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 5.

As we have seen, in Serbia and Bulgaria the process by which the people came to identify with the nation was both stimulated and completed by the state. The next chapter will examine how and to what extent the state and the institution of the monarchy were involved in the indoctrination of the Bulgarian and Serbian peasantry.

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Chapter 2

The Invention of the Modern Balkan State: Serbia and Bulgaria, 1830-

1914

Most Serbian and Bulgarian historians attribute the organizational difficulties of their nation-states in the nineteenth century to the cessation of sovereign existence in the 14th century¹⁷⁸. However, recently west European scholars have argued convincingly that pre-modern Europe boasted no states in the modern sense of political entities embracing all the inhabitants of a certain territory.¹⁷⁹

The modern nation state since the nineteenth century had been impersonal, (unlike political authority in the medieval period which was based on personal bonds between rulers and vassals, lords, tenants and slaves); omnipresent, and linked to centralized institutions rather than devolved.¹⁸⁰ Once established, it had eventually to operate on behalf of the entire national community, and effective incorporation of religious and administrative institutions became of primary importance to successful political development. In this sense every newly-established nation state encountered an administrative vacuum that had to be filled if it was to survive and function effectively. This was a common problem in nineteenth century Europe, when a number of new states came into existence, in the west as well as in the Balkans.

¹⁷⁸ For example, Branimir Anzulović argues that Serbia displayed a strong expansionist trend in the late nineteenth century because it had reemerged (underlining mine) as a sovereign nation-state after a long period of foreign domination and political fragmentation. I disagree with his definition and suggest that Serbia emerged as a sovereign nation-state. Anzulović, 2.

¹⁷⁹ See Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 6.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, 12-13.

Neither Serbia in 1830 nor Bulgaria in 1878 possessed many subjects with much administrative experience. Nor, for that matter, did they command many educated people capable of serving as bureaucrats. These facts made transformation to a modern nation state a difficult and uneven affair. In the case of Montenegro, for instance, tribal loyalties were particularly resistant to government interference. Perhaps this resistance prevented the emergence of a common national identity before the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913¹⁸¹.

This chapter will describe the building of state institutions in Serbia and Bulgaria and the ways in which they were used to promote a sense of nationhood. The first section of the chapter (pages 81 to 106) investigates Serbian and Bulgarian state bureaucracies, constitutions, parliamentary bodies, monarchical prerogatives, and internal politics. The second section (pp. 106-130) focuses primarily on how the state used these institutions to promote real and invented historical traditions both to stimulate a sense of common identity and national loyalty. In doing so, it tries to determine the extent to which state and nation-building in Bulgaria and Serbia involved a deliberate effort by official “consciousness-raisers” and how this was reflected in everyday life¹⁸².

Furthermore, since the state had to legitimize itself in popular consciousness, the roles of both Serbian and Bulgarian monarchical court ceremonies (coronations, royal births, and deaths) will also be considered. Last, but not least, the press also helped to

¹⁸¹ It is true that since 1870s prince Nikola ruled by grace of God over all Montenegrins and consulted periodically with representatives of the population (some 200,000 shepherds and mountaineers), but he declared his subjects were not ready for the implementation of a constitution and no political parties existed. See Borovitch, 15.

¹⁸² Gale Stokes argues that from 1850 to 1870 Serbian liberals, among them Vladimir Jovanović and his circle of friends, created an ideology of liberal nationalism in which a representative government was to act, at least in theory, on behalf of a sovereign people. The liberal view regarded the Serbian nation as the new locus of sovereignty and it was propagated by the Organization of the United Serbian Youth, the *Omladina*. Stokes, xiv.

shape public opinion in both Balkan countries. However, the romanticized vision of nineteenth-century Bulgarian and Serbian communities as ideologically homogenous, and historically complete entities owed more to a state-promoted national agenda more than to anything else. The historical record suggests that the process of national homogenization was far from complete and required the active involvement of many agencies. As Tom Nairn rightly points out in the beginning nationality politics was unavoidably fixated on rurality¹⁸³. Peasants had to be taught to imagine themselves as a part of the modern nation, and monarchs, their advisors, politicians, intellectuals and journalists, the military, and clerical elites all helped invent and impose modern national identities on the rest of the population. As we shall see was the establishment of the state that accelerated the emergence of common national identity, not *vice versa*. It was the Serbian and Bulgarian political elites of the late nineteenth century that “reconstructed” the period of national awakening.

Neither official state ideology nor the ideology of political movements can define patriotism at the popular level. On the other hand, the investigation of state national policy and the commitment of politicians and intellectuals to the national cause can at least indicate the extent to which nationalistic issues were a state monopoly. Once the nation-states of Serbia and Bulgaria were established, nationalism was aided by a lack of congruence between ethnic and geographical boundaries. Populations of Serbian origin remained largely outside the borders of the autonomous Belgrade *pašalik*—in the regions of Krajina, the Banat, and the Vojvodina on the former frontier between the Habsburg

¹⁸³ Nairn, 72.

and the Ottoman Empires.¹⁸⁴ The Hungarian census of 1910 showed that 18% of the Banat's inhabitants were Serbs.¹⁸⁵ In the Habsburg Vojvodina, the percentage of Serbian dwellers was close to 40%¹⁸⁶. In the case of regions with a highly mixed population, like the Dalmatian coast and Ottoman Macedonia, sometimes even the members of a single family could have different national identities. As late as the 1930s, the ethnologist Wendel reported that in a private talk with an "average" Dalmatian family, the father defined himself as Dalmatian, the eldest son as Serb, a third member as Croat, and the fourth as Italian.¹⁸⁷ A native Bosnian could pass for a Serb in Belgrade, Croat in Zagreb, and Turkish in Macedonia depending on the circumstances. The leader of the Serbian Radical party Nikola Pašić was born to Bulgarian parents but educated at a Serbian school and identified himself as a Serb. Contemporaries recalled that in his speeches in the Parliament he frequently used Serbian and Bulgarian words. His compatriots often mocked him for such lapses¹⁸⁸.

¹⁸⁴ Autonomous Serbia in 1830 included the territory of the Belgrade *pašaluk* and six neighboring *nahii*, namely, Kruševacka, Deligradska, Grgušovacka, Svrligo-Banska, Chernorečka and Krajinska. Until 1878 the districts of Niš, Pirot, Vranje, and Toplič were excluded from autonomous Serbia. For more details see Nikola Kostandinović, Beogradski Pašaluk (Severna Srbija pod Turcima). Teritorija stanovništvo proizvodne snage (The District of Belgrade and Northern Serbia during the Ottoman Period. Territory, Population and Production) (Belgrade, 1970), 5-6; Otto von Pirh, Putovanje po Srbiji, 12.

¹⁸⁵ Wazlav Kolarz, Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe (London: Lindsay Drummond Ltd., 1946), 26. Sources report a number of 36-40,000 Serbs who migrated in 1690 to Hungary and settled in the Banat, Temešvar, and Bačka. See Jova Adamović, Privilegije srpskog naroda u Ugarskoj i rad Blagoveshtenskog sabora, 1861 (The Privileges of the Serbs in Hungary and the Blagovesteniye Assembly in 1861) (Zagreb, 1902), 15; István Deák, Beyond Nationalism. A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848- 1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 12-13.

¹⁸⁶ Vasilije Krestić quotes a figure of 448.319 Serbs in the Vojvodina and 657.817 people in total in 1857 in the Military Frontier, among them 45 percent Serbs. See Vasilije Krestić, "Srbi u Hrvatskoj od 1850 do 1868 godine", Jugoslav Historical Review, 3-4 (Belgrade, 1975), 33.

¹⁸⁷ Kolarz, 26.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.* 32.

In sum, a number of historical factors prevented the Serbian and Bulgarian people from developing a firm identity before the establishment of their respective nation-states. Serbian and Bulgarian peasants had to be subjected to an institutional framework of state agencies which imposed a standard administration and promoted a higher level of national uniformity of behavior within their territories.

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Serbia had been granted autonomy in 1829 after the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-29; Bulgaria received the same status fifty years later after another conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Both Bulgarian and Serbian constitutions defined the states as territorial units, administered by standard institutional and legal arrangements. Constitutional monarchy seemed to be the most appropriate form of governance in the region; although Serbian princes had much more legislative power than their Bulgarian counterparts. The official religion of both principalities was Christian Orthodox¹⁸⁹. A significant discrepancy between Serbian and Bulgarian parliamentarisms was the degree of effective implementation of the constitutional provisions. The first Serbian Prince, Miloš, disliked constitutionalism, and so Serbia remained without a constitution until 1838, when the so-called Turkish Regulation (*Ustav*) was introduced. Even then, the traditional mediator between elders and the people, the National *Skupština* (assembly), was virtually inactive.

In the case of Bulgaria, the Tŭrnovo Constitution of 1879 granted broad legislative prerogatives to the National Assembly (*Narodno Sabranije*) and her liberal

¹⁸⁹ The data about the religious structure of the Serbian society at the beginning of the nineteenth century is not very clear. In 1804 there were between 40,000 and 50,000 Muslims in the *pašaluk* of Belgrade. Most of them were Serbian-speaking. In 1815 their number was reduced to 20,000. In 1834 Milos expelled around 8,000 Muslim peasants living near the Drina river. For more details see Mirijana Marinković, 40.

provisions were flaunted as an expression of Bulgarian “traditional” democracy. However, the first Serbian and Bulgarian rulers were notorious for their categorical and uncompromising approach to anybody who dared question their authority. For instance, when Montenegrin ruler Petar I wrote a letter in May 1829, in which he addressed the son of Karadjordje as “the only leader of the Serbian people”, Miloš was genuinely infuriated and described Metropolitan Petar as the “divider of Serbdom.”¹⁹⁰

One of the most important elements in the construction and mobilization of invented state traditions was the institution of monarchy. Both Bulgaria and Serbia were established as constitutional monarchies; yet the personal role of the monarch was critical for the future national integration. Bearing in mind the advantage that native monarchs had ruled Serbia from its inception, and the disadvantage that Bulgaria’s first two rulers were foreigners, it is perhaps helpful to apply to both states the model that David Cannadine has suggested in his study on the British monarchical ritual. This is not an attempt to transpose Cannadine’s patterns mechanically to Balkan realities, but his analysis suggests that a number of postulates may be relevant to the British as well as to the Bulgarian and Serbian monarchies.

Cannadine suggests that in a period of abrupt changes, conflicts or crises, monarchy can create a spirit of communal existence and bring comfort to people who feel displaced.¹⁹¹ He differentiates at least ten aspects of monarchical ritual, performance, and context which ought to be investigated in order to assess its impact on national

¹⁹⁰ Nikola Škerović, *Zapisnici sednica Ministerskog saveta Srbije 1862-1898* (Notes of the Meetings of the Serbian Cabinet, 1862-1898) (Belgrade, 1952), ix.

¹⁹¹ David Cannadine, “The Context, Performance and meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the Invention of Tradition, c 1820-1977,” *The Invention of Tradition.*, 105.

consciousness. The most pertinent to the present research is the fourth aspect, which relates to the attitude of the media towards the monarch and the monarchy. In the Balkans, the press had the ability to contribute to the popularity of the monarchical institution and the people who embodied it. It could also erode popular sympathy towards the royal family by creating a negative image, or simply by emphasizing how expensive the maintenance of the court was.

A significant part of the image of the monarchy was provided by rumors about rulers spread among the people. During the first Serbian uprising when newspapers were still uncommon and difficult for most to access, the main source for knowing who the leaders of the rebellion were was rumor. Stories about the violent and uncompromising nature of Karadjordje¹⁹² were commonplace. It was said that he had killed his stepfather for refusing to obey his commands and hanged his brother on suspicion of rape.¹⁹³ He was described as an ideal man in a particularly turbulent period for the Serbian community. Karadjordje was chosen partly because of his previous military experience in the Austrian *Freikorps* and partly because no prominent Serbian elder dared risk his head in case of failure.¹⁹⁴ Determined, steadfast and merciless, Karadjordje seemed to be the

¹⁹² The spelling of the name of Djordje Petrović (1768-1817) varies in different sources. It could be Karadjordje or Black George, or Anglicised as Karageorge.

¹⁹³ In fact, rumors about Karadjordje's cruelty echoed the Byzantine tradition of presenting monarchs as stern and just. Byzantine emperors usually presented images of themselves through the medium of public ceremony and portraiture, but they also resorted to rumors. See Philip Longworth, "Legitimacy and Myth in Central and East Europe", Historical Reflections on Central Europe. Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies (Warsaw, 1995), 8.

¹⁹⁴ David Urquhart describes the events of 1804 as follows: "In 1804 there was a military conflict between Serbs and Janissaries near the village of Šibnitza. After the Serbian victory, the Serbs decided to choose a leader. The first proposed was Glavatsch, but he refused...Then they proposed *Knez* Theodose. He answered: "The Turk can forgive the *haiduks* (bandits) but when the Turks return, who can forgive the *knez*?" Then they proposed Karadjordje...but he answered, "I don't understand government...I am a man of quick temper, and not fit to be ruler of men". They answered, "such a temper the times require," and thus did Karadjordje became chief of Serbia. David Urquhart, 66.

complete opposite of the flexible, cunning and notoriously corrupt Miloš who “succeeded” him. The official title used by Karadjordje, was “commander in- chief of the Serbs.”¹⁹⁵ Prota Matja Nenadović called him *gospodar* (master), and it is said his seal had the inscription “by the grace of God, George Petrović, [in the name] of all the people of Serbia and Bosnia.”¹⁹⁶ The seal was decorated with a cross and the four Cyrillic Cs as a reminder of the medieval Serbian kingdom, along with the double-headed eagle borrowed from the medieval Byzantine coat of arms.

However, many Serbs could not forgive Karadjordje the retreat of 1813 and the sufferings that followed, when many villages were destroyed and many men enslaved. On 17 of October 1813 alone, 1,800 Serbian women and children were sold as slaves in Belgrade.¹⁹⁷ By that time, Karadjordje had managed to escape through Austria to the town of Hotin in Bessarabia and did not return until the spring of 1816. Karadjordje was also unable to establish lasting contacts with the Serbian Diaspora of Montenegro, Bosnia, and Herzegovina which could provide valuable support.

The “liberation” of the country was to be associated not with Karadjordje, but with the governor of Požeš, Miloš Obrenović whom the Serbian elders chose as a leader after Karadjordje had fled.¹⁹⁸ In his *Servia and the Servians*, Čedomyl Miatović describes the rustic pomp of the occasion on Palm Sunday, 1815, when Miloš himself appeared

¹⁹⁵ “Commander in- chief of the Serbs” reads at the end of an official letter sent in 1805 to the Habsburg Emperor Francois I. However, in February 1808 the *Gazette de France* cited his name with the title of emperor, and there were rumors that Napoleon had agreed to refer to him as to “Roi des Slaves”. See Dušan Žataković, “La France et la Serbie 1804-1813”, *Balkanica* XXIX (Belgrade, 1998), 128; 132

¹⁹⁶ Glenny, 15.

¹⁹⁸ Karadjordje was elected in the same fashion by an assembly of notables in Orašac M. Vladislavljević, *Žazvoi ustavnosti u Srbiji* (Belgrade, 1938), 8.

before an assembly of notables and crowds of armed Serbians gathered around the wooden church of Takovo. Dressed in his costume of *vojvoda* (commander), the national standard in his hand and relying on the support of the elders, he declared a second war on the Ottomans.¹⁹⁹ Intelligent and ruthless, he led the fight against the Ottomans, but he would not tolerate a rival and so did not hesitate to order the murder of Kadjordje when he later returned from Bessarabia, sending his head to the Sultan in Istanbul as a token of his loyalty. The years 1816-17 witnessed the murders of the rest of Miloš's most outspoken opponents - Petar Moler, Pavel Cukić and Milan Nikšić, leaders of the Serbian emigration residing in Srem who resisted the concentration of political power in the hands of one man. Once Miloš had liquidated them he wrote his advisor M. German: "All the opposition parties have been purged. The people are satisfied."²⁰⁰

The Sultan's *hatisherif* of August 29, 1830 declared Serbia autonomous and his order was read in public in Belgrade on St. Andrei Parvozvani Day (*Andrei the First Called*), the day on which fourteen years earlier the Serbs had captured the fortress of Belgrade from Ottoman troops.

The title given to Miloš by the Sultan was Supreme Prince and Governor of the Serbian People".²⁰¹ Miloš monopolized both political and economic power and managed to keep it until his deposition in 1839. In 1832, Karadžić, bitterly disappointed with Miloš's despotism, wrote a letter to Miloš complaining that nobody was happy with his rule

¹⁹⁹ Čedomil Mijatović, *Servia and the Servians* (London: Sir Isaac Pitman, 1908), 16.

²⁰⁰ V. Popović, *Istorija Jugoslavije (History of Yugoslavia)* (Belgrade: 1933), 453.

²⁰¹ *Kneževska kancelarija nahija Požeška 1815- 1839* (The Chancellery of the Prince). Edited by D. Vulović (Belgrade, 1953), (Preface), v.

except Miloš's own two sons.²⁰² For his part, on several occasions Miloš spoke of the Serbian people as his own children, explaining that as their responsible father he was 'compelled' by the circumstances to take the steps he did to protect the interests of the community as a whole.

After Serbia gained autonomy in 1830, peasants from territories remaining within the Ottoman Empire began to look for protection to the Prince of Serbia. When, at the beginning of 1835, it had become clear that Niš and its surroundings would remain within the Ottoman Empire, peasants from sixteen villages signed a petition to Prince Miloš complaining of Turkish abuses (*zuluma*) and asking his protection. Miloš immediately sent his representative Avram Petronijević with an official letter addressed to the governor of Niš, Salih Pasha suggesting that he resolve the problems between local Christians and Turks, and threatened to intervene militarily if he did not.²⁰³

In other words Miloš tried to present himself as a ruler who had been empowered by all Serbs not only within the boundaries of Serbia but outside it, too. However, he failed to benefit from such a sanction because he had also cooperated with the Ottoman authorities and used to suppress internal opposition.

Prince Michael Obrenović also played the role of defender of Serbdom like his predecessors before. For example, the inhabitants of Leskovac and all the villages in the district of Leskovats sent numerous complaints to the Serbian Prince, complaining of rape, robbery, and murder and sought the protection of "His Majesty, the honorable

²⁰² Istorija Jugoslavie, 475.

²⁰³ M. Milečević, Kraljevina Srbija. Novi Krajevi. Geografija. Orografija, Hidrografija. Topografija. Arheologija. Istorija. Etnografija. Statistika. Prosveta. Kultura. Uprava. (The Kingdom of Serbia. Geography. Topography, Archeology. History. Ethnology, Statistics, Education, Culture, Administration.) Belgrade, 1884), 36-37.

Master of sacred Serbia”²⁰⁴. Just before his assassination in 1868, Michael sent 1,000 lucats of his own in addition to the 1,500 ducats allocated by the Serbian Cabinet for famine relief in Hercegovina.²⁰⁵

In government documents from the early 1870s, references to the sufferings of “the Serbian brother under the Ottomans” were frequent.²⁰⁶ In May 1876, during intensive discussions between Milan and his ministers in the cabinet of Stefće Mihailović, the Serbian state was presented as the only hope for Hercegovina and Bosnia and it was recommended that an agreement be signed between the two Serbian states, Serbia and Montenegro, in case of a military conflict with the Ottoman Empire.²⁰⁷ Although the uprising in Hercegovina which started in the June of 1875 was not a national revolt, but rather a peasant reaction following successive crop failures and inability to pay taxes to local Ottoman lords, it was presented by Serbian governmental officials as a patriotic war against the Ottoman Empire. Serbia declared war on the Empire on 30th of June 1876 and Montenegro followed suit on July 1st. In August, Milan asked for a truce because his army had been badly defeated and Alexinac had fallen. Ottoman troops, however, mounted an offensive against Serbia, and in October 1876 Count Ignatieff of Russia presented an ultimatum to the Sublime Porte demanding an

²⁰⁴ Milečević, 48-49.

²⁰⁵ See Document 113, “Sednica od 14 marta 1868 pod preds. Predsednika”(A Meeting on March 14, 1868), Zapisnici sednica Ministerskog saveta Srbije, 54. Last but not least, during Michael’s rule, both the Russian government and the Pan-Slavs favored Serbia’s leadership of the Balkan Christians. Serbia was the natural center and point of support for other Slavs living in the Ottoman Empire. A. M. Gorchakov, cited in David MacKenzie, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875-1878 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1975), 9.

²⁰⁶ See Document 446, “Sastanak Ministerskog Saveta pod predcednistvom Negove Svetlosti Knjza u subotu 1 maja 1876 g.”(An Assembly of the State Council on Saturday, May 1, 1876), Zapisnici, 168.

²⁰⁷ Document 447, “Sastanak Ministerskog Saveta pod predsenistvom Knjaza u ponedeonik 3-g maja 1876 god.”(A Meeting of the State Council on Monday, May 3, 1876), Zapisnici, 169.

immediate truce with both Serbia and Montenegro, and threatening to break off diplomatic relations if this was not done.²⁰⁸ When the Russian-Turkish War was declared in 1877, 5,000 Turks from the district of Leskovac left for Turkey speeding up the ethnic homogenization of Serbia proper²⁰⁹.

During the 1830s a division had arose between most of Serbian politicians and the Prince. All claimed to protect the interests of the Serbian nation, however, the politicians wanted to limit the power of the ruler and introduce a constitution which would establish a parliament. The Prince, however, was not inclined to share his legislative and executive prerogatives with any kind of representative body. The opposition was organized by the so-called *Ustavobranjeteli* (the Constitutional Defenders). Its most active leader, I.V. Perišić, succeeded in attracting the peasantry to his cause by stating that they should have right to kill any official who claimed more than five *talers* indirect tax from a peasant.²¹⁰ After much political intrigue and pressure from the British Consul, George Hedges, in December 1838 Miloš finally accepted the so-called Turkish *Ustav* (Constitution), providing for a State Council of seventeen members appointed for life. Its main task was to advise the prince and to exercise some modest control over his decisions. Unable to

²⁰⁸ Ivan Panaiotov, “Kŭm diplomaticheskata istoriya na Tsarigradskata konferenciya [dekemvri 1876-yanuari 1877]”, *Izvestiya na Instituta za bŭlgarska istoriya* (Sofia, 1956), kn.6, 47- 113.

²⁰⁹ There were various ways of maltreating of the Muslim population remaining within Serbia proper. One of well-to-do Ottomans living in Belgrade Rašid-bej mentions in his memoirs that the Serbian authorities built tall houses with windows looking at the gardens of Muslim citizens. This violation of the privacy of family life was one of the main reasons for many of the Muslims to sell their property and leave Belgrade. *Rašid-beja, Istorija čudnovatih događaja u Beogradu i Srbiji, Spomenik Srpske kraljevske akademije*, Vol. XXIII, Belgrade, 1884, cited in Mirijana Marinković, 42.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 32.

tolerate even this minimal limitation of his power, Miloš abdicated in the summer of 1839²¹¹.

The National Assembly was to be convoked twice during the reign of Alexander Karadjordjević (1842-1858), in 1848 when the revolutionary wave reached the Hungarian province of Vojvodina and the Serbian prince had an opportunity to mobilize her Serbian inhabitants, and ten years later when the so-called Saint Andrej' *Skupština* deposed him (1858-59).²¹² According to the description of Alimpij Vasiljević, the decision of the Saint Andrej Assembly to depose the Karadjordje dynasty led to a surge of patriotism among the entire Serbian population. The demonstration against the new Serbian ruler started when 370 representatives refused to attend the official dinner given by Alexander. Later on, Jevrem Gruić who was Secretary to the Assembly, asked all the representatives if they had reached a consensus and decided the fate of the monarch. They confirmed that deposition was the will of the "Serbs as a people".²¹³

From the historical picture presented so far, it is clear that despite every effort, genuine and manipulative, to introduce a radical Serbian constitution acknowledging the legislative power of the National Assembly as a representative body of the Serbian popular will, the Prince was accorded the title of King with almost unrestricted legislative and executive prerogatives and enjoyed them throughout the nineteenth century. Most

²¹¹ The opposition to Miloš was led by the so-called Constitutionals (or Constitutional Defenders, see reference on pp. 90), many of whom were *prečani* (Serbs from the Habsburg Empire). They favoured limitation of the prince power and a rule based on an oligarchy of notables. Their aim was to organize an efficient bureaucracy; to establish a legal system, and to expand Serbia's educational facilities to create a well-ordered aristocratic state based on West European experience. Stokes, *Legitimacy through Liberalism*, 6.

²¹² The Assembly was called on November 30, which was the religious holiday of St. Andrej—this is why it was called Sveto-Andrejska. Alimpij Vasiljević, *Sveto-Andrejska skupština (The Saint Andrej Assembly)* (Belgrade, 1899), 13.

politicians were consigned to the political background. However, Garašanin, Ristić, and Pašić at different times exercised significant influence over the decisions of Michael, Milan, and Alexander Obrenović.

The most important document of state-promoted nationalism to address the issues by way of foreign policy was Garašanin's Nacertanije, written in 1844. Although the Nacertanije was kept secret for decades in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it reveals Garašanin's idea of active Serbian interference in Balkan affairs and his calculated support for the initiatives of communities across the frontier such as the organizing of the First Bulgarian Legion. Active political interference in the region contributed enormously to the positive image of Michael Obrenović as a ruler. For the first time since autonomy was granted, a Serbian monarch could act as a self-confident head of a state that could afford to shelter some of the prominent Balkan leaders wanted by the Ottoman authorities.²¹⁴

Garašanin was the first Serbian statesman to believe that only a united Yugoslav state dominated by Serbs could strike a balance between Austrian and Russian hegemonic pretensions in the region and become the Piedmont of the Balkans.²¹⁵ Despite his value as a counselor, Garašanin was dismissed in 1867 when he expressed disapproval of Mihael's intention to divorce his wife, the Hungarian aristocrat Julia Huniady, and to marry one of his nieces. Serbian national history might have been very different had king

²¹³ Vasiljević, 20.

²¹⁴ Such as Georgi Stoikov Rakovski, the organizer of the First Bulgarian Legion, who planned to coordinate a future rebellion in Bulgaria against the Ottomans from abroad.

²¹⁵ Recently, there has been much debate over Garašanin's commitment to the Yugoslav idea. Some doubt that up to the beginning of our century the Yugoslav unification was an objective of Serbian policy. See Ivan Ilchev, Rodinata mi-prava ili ne, 33.

Milan remained hostile to Pašić and not called him back from exile in neighboring Bulgaria. Until the coup d'état of 1903, which ended the reign of the last Obrenović, Serbian politicians by and large had little opportunity to influence either the domestic or the foreign policy of the state. In other words, except for Garašanin, the nineteenth century's nationalistic agenda was dominated by the Serbian monarchs.

Politicians were divided over matters like state centralization, constitutional development, and the parliamentary system. The Liberal and Progressive Parties favored the so-called "state idea" [*državna ideja*] and wanted a highly centralized administration with a large bureaucracy, while the Radicals favored a higher degree of decentralization based on municipal government [*opštinska samouprava*]. The only common ground between the three was foreign policy. Since the Russian Empire supported the Radicals and Liberals in this, while Austria-Hungary offered no support to the Progressive Party, all dreams of liberation from their co-nationals remaining outside Serbia were doomed.

However, the unification of all who perceived themselves as Serbs within the borders of the nation-state was clearly the primary objective of Michael Obrenović and supported by both the Serbian politicians in power and those in opposition. Although the Prince made many political enemies during his ten-year reign, soon after his assassination in 1868 a memorial in his honor was built. It represented him on a horse with his right hand pointing towards Bosnia. According to Miodrag Purković the monument was constructed to remind the Serbs that Bosnia was waiting to be liberated.²¹⁶ Though such an explanation seems inadequate, Serbian politicians who promoted an active foreign policy were supported by the press, although up to the abdication of Milan in 1889, it had

²¹⁶ Miodrag Purković, *Srpski vladari* (Serbian Rulers) (Windsor: 1958), 140.

not yet developed into a powerful medium with a broad audience because of the very high percentage of illiteracy (about 85% of the male population) and the strict censorship imposed by the government during most of the nineteenth century. Further, Belgrade's supremacy among the Serbs was eroded under the regency of the 1870s when Serbia's relations with Prince Nikola of Montenegro and the Russian Empire also became strained. Particularism grew stronger and Montenegro and Novi Sad in the Vojvodina emerged as rival centers of the national movement²¹⁷. After the death of Michael Obrenović Serbian unity appeared to be disintegrating. It was at that point, however, that Svetozar Miletić of Novi Sad started propagating the idea that political reform in Serbia proper was essential. At the same time he adopted a broader national approach based on the union of Serbs and Croats.

However, publishing ideas of reform was easier than implementing them. In Serbia political debates over the implementation of a new constitutional law became a diversifying strategy applied by monarchs and politicians when the Serbian internal situation was unstable. Since the political and social life of the new state was turbulent during most of the nineteenth century, constitutional projects and the extension of civil rights served to distract the electorate's attention from far more important problems and grievances.

Michael Obrenović, for instance, replaced the old Turkish *Ustav*, on his own initiative. He ordained that elected representatives should meet every three years to hear the government's report. Immediately after Michael's assassination in 1868, Jovan Ristić, suggested another constitutional project to deflect any social reaction to the unfortunate

²¹⁷ Borovitch, 16.

event²¹⁸. He proposed that the National Assembly should have 99 elected members and 33 nominated by the Prince. They were to meet every year to vote on the state budget and to amend or reject the bills proposed by the government, but they had no right to propose any bill on their own initiative. A new version of “constitutional modification” was suggested by King Milan, who had to find an effective way of distracting public attention from his divorce from Queen Natalija which was unpopular. In 1888, he convoked a great commission of politicians to work out a new constitution. Again, to distract public opinion from his scandalous marriage to Draga Mašin, Milan’s successor, Alexander, suspended his father’s radical constitution and suggested, for the first time in modern Serbian history, a bicameral parliament.

Another way of successfully distracting the Serbian peasants from current political problems was to expel the Ottoman population remaining in Serbia proper and the liquidation of the institution of *spahilük*²¹⁹. In 1833 the prince issued an order (*ukaz*) terminated the *spahilük* and codified the nationalization of arable land which belonged to Ottoman landlords²²⁰. The former landlords were inadequately compensated with government pensions. According to the *hatiserifs* issued in 1830 and 1833 the Muslims were ordered to leave Serbia except for the fortresses where Ottoman garrisons resided. Muslims were paid unrealistic prices for the properties they were leaving behind and Rašid-bej wrote in his memoirs that no Serbian court ever gave a just verdict in benefit of

²¹⁸ Jovan Ristić (1831-1899) was Regent between 1868 to 1872 and Foreign Minister of Serbia, 1875; 1876-1880.

²¹⁹ *Spahilük* or *sipahi* estate was a service estate in the Ottoman Empire.

²²⁰ Palaret, “Rural Serbia Reshaped and Retarded”, 71.

any Muslim during the expulsion²²¹. The peasants received legislation to protect their homesteads and almost unlimited possibilities to deforest and farm new land acquired in such a way. The nation-state could provide some land but no infrastructure, or accessible credit to the peasantry yet. For two decades following the autonomy of Serbia in 1830 the Serbian peasantry continued to live “separately” from “their” state; they had to get more acquainted with it in the mid-1870s when fiscal pressure started rising steadily.

In sum, the expulsion of Muslims was not caused by pressure for more land. Serbian population pressure on the land was extremely low in the 1830s, when Michael Palairet cites density of 15,1 per square kilometer²²². Politics was used to appease the peasants and give the impression that the state would do anything (including aggravating the diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire) to promote the interests of its citizens. The formal liquidation of the *spahiluk* was rather a political manifestation of Serbia’s breaking free from the Ottoman legacy than an economic necessity.

No matter how rapidly Serbian administrators wanted to erase any trace of the Ottoman legacy, the old Turkish administrative unit, the *nahija* (district) proved to be the most practical division for autonomous Serbia, and so the state continued to be divided into twelve *nahii*. To the districts of Belgrade, Valjevo, Kragujevac, Jagodina, Požarevac, Pozeš, Rudnik, Smederevo, Sokol, Užice, Čuprina, and Šabac were added six districts newly annexed from the Ottomans in 1833: Kruševac, Gurgušovac, Deligrad, Crnoreka, Krajina, and Svarlica-Bansko.²²³ Miloš experimented with other divisions, but his

²²¹ Rašid-bej cited in Marinković, 43.

²²² Palairet, “Rural Serbia Reshaped and Retarded”, 66.

²²³ Kneževska Kancelarija. Kragujevačka nahija 1815-1827. Edited by R. Marković (Belgrade, 1954), v.

administrative reforms failed to improve the efficiency of the local bureaucracy very effectively. In 1834, he divided the country into five “great military districts” [*veliki serdarstva*], only to replace them a year later with nineteen districts [*okruga*]. Finally, the Turkish Constitution of 1830 (*Ustav*) reintroduced the old division of districts [*srezove*] and municipalities [*opštini*].

In 1878, four new districts with a population of 299,640 people (the so-called “New Territories”) were incorporated into Serbia. Niš, Pirot, Vranje, and Toplič joined the Principality after the end of the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78. By 1879 the population of the Principality of Serbia was entirely Serb except for 6,567 Turks and 1,443 Jews living in the four new districts.²²⁴

The state not only tried to make its presence felt by its own subjects but to expand its frontiers to include neighboring territories. In September 1885, the Governors Kurdulić, Vlasotinski and Luticki agitated in the Bulgarian villages of Vlasina, Kalna, and Studena along the Serbian-Bulgarian border urging them to admit their Serbian identity.²²⁵ The mayors of these villages were promised 500 *minca* (old currency), forgiveness of tax and five year’s tax exemption.²²⁶ The three Serbian governors had been trying to attract the local Bulgarian population before the Serb-Bulgarian War of 1885 broke out. The political and economic authority of a district governor was so great that, as one contemporary argued, he could transfer a monk from a monastery to another without even bothering himself to ask the bishop for permission.²²⁷ Theoretically, the

²²⁴ Milečević, xvii.

²²⁵ Dokumenti I:104.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, 103.

²²⁷ Kneževska kancelarija, xiii.

post was reserved only for respected elders, who, when necessary, could sign official documents on behalf of the head of state; as George Parezan, governor of Lepenica signed his initials on credentials in ‘place of the Lord Miloš ‘ [*u mesto Gospodara Miloša*].²²⁸

However, the level of literacy among the Serbian elders was very low, and Miloš was himself unlettered. So, it was necessary to assign a secretary to each local chief. Illiteracy was among the most serious obstacles hampering the effective functioning of the Serbian state bureaucracy. At the time of the adoption of the Serbian Civil Code in 1844, only one of the presiding judges had a law degree, three were illiterate, and ten literate enough to sign their names.²²⁹ The role of some of the secretary officials (*pisari*), who often were quite well-educated, was therefore significant in respect of the evolution of local state-promoted nationalism. Such an example was the Serbian scholar Avram Gasparović. Well educated and wealthy, Gasparović had enrolled in a philosophy course in Budapest. He returned to Serbia in the early 1820s to visit his brother. After spending a couple of years as a tutor of the young Ilija Garašanin²³⁰, Gasparović copied the map drawn by Captain Paul Kozebue, a member of the Russian-Turkish Commission in order to resolve territorial disputes between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire. This map was given considerable and was eventually included in all Serbian schoolbooks.

As an important institution designed to protect the interests of the state, the Serbian local militia was organized in the beginning of the 1830s. It was divided into

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, xiii.

²²⁹ Dragnić, 24.

²³⁰ Ilija Garašanin (1812-1874) was Foreign Minister of Serbia in 1852-1853; and again in 1861-1867 and wrote *Načertanije* which was considered the first Serbian national program.

three types of servicemen: guards [*panduri*], gendarmes [*panduri opšti*] and mounted guards [*panduri konački*]. Their main task was to preserve internal order and pursue rebels (*haiduts*) and brigands, who were still numerous especially in the frontier regions with the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Serbian policemen encountered much trouble in the *nahija* (district) of Kragujevac where the local population was so accustomed to tumult that it had great difficulty accommodating to a peaceful, more productive way of life.²³¹ The role of the local policeman as a state agent protecting and promoting the national interests of ordinary people was significant, since a guard represented the law. Although over the course of time the reputation of the Serbian *pandur* diminished and the post became associated mainly with the guards' assistance in tax collection, in the years following the liquidation of the Ottoman governance even his uniform was a source of national pride.

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As in the Serbian case, the development of a Bulgarian monarchical profile using places of residence, titles, public holidays, public ceremonies and parades was also a long process. So lacking in equipment was the new Bulgarian state that in 1879, the piano for the concert celebrating the arrival of Battenberg had to be fetched from Istanbul.²³² The main public attribute of the monarchy, the palace, was the previous Turkish residence of the local governor (*valiya*) that had been refurbished by Russian military engineers.²³³ Even so, it was in such poor condition that the first Bulgarian ruler, Alexandür

²³¹ Kneževska kancelarija, xxvi.

²³² Kolarz, 44.

²³³ Alexander Mosolov, Bulgariya 1878-1883 (Sofia, 1991), 38-39.

Battenberg, had to rent a house in the center of Sofia for more than a year.²³⁴ The description of the palace which Ferdinand's advisor, Count de Bourboulon, has left us in his Bulgarian Diaries recalls a rural inn. It also shows how much needed to be done by way of creating public symbols.

The walls of Ferdinand's office were devoid of portraits of previous monarchs. The interior and the exterior of the palace were both plain and unattractive, and so was the capital.²³⁵ Even if we acknowledge that de Bourboulon was of French origin and came to Bulgaria straight from one of the most gorgeous European courts, still the means of the Bulgarian monarchy was far too modest to impress even its own citizens. Sofia did not have the sophisticated charm of trade centers like Plovdiv or Ruschuk (Russe) or the old medieval capital Tŭrnovo. Besides, the whole outlook of the town was still visibly marked by Ottoman architecture.

Mosques, public baths and covered markets were reminders of the Ottoman legacy. On several occasions, the Russian Commissar Dondukov tried to obtain Ottoman sanction for the destruction of the city's numerous mosques but failed. According to the Treaty of Berlin Bulgaria was autonomous but not sovereign, so that the Sultan had to give permission. Considering the negative impact that mosques might have on the enthusiastic newly liberated Bulgarians, Dondukov decided to change the public face of the capital himself. During a stormy night, he ordered Mosolov, commander of the royal guard, to call out the engineering battalion and lay explosives in as many mosques as they could. The assignment was highly successful. Mosolov recalled in his memoirs that next

²³⁴ Ibid., 39.

²³⁵ Count de Bourboulon, Bŭlgarski dnevnitsi (Bulgarian Diaries) (Sofia: Kolibri, 1995), 20-21.

morning the newspapers in the capital reported that a heavy thunder storm had badly damaged the *minarets* of seven mosques. What was left of them had to be demolished immediately for safety reasons.²³⁶ Under so-called “public pressure”, deliberately provoked by the Russian authorities and inspired by the media, all the mosques in Sofia were eventually demolished with the exception of *Banya Dzhamiya* Mosque and the Black Mosque.

Though anxious that Muslim places of worship be destroyed, Bulgarians had to accept the alien Protestant confession of its monarch. The first Bulgarian ruler after the Liberation was of German origin and he remained a stranger to his subjects during most of his short reign (1879-1886). However, for many Bulgarians who crowded the pier to watch his arrival at Varna on July 6, 1879, Alexandŭr Battenberg was the embodiment of a radical change. At last the Bulgarians had a ruler of their own in place of the Ottoman Sultan. He was attractive and young, and that at first sight was more than enough for the ordinary Bulgarians, who could not possibly know how experienced and wise he would prove to be. He was also a protégé of the Russian Emperor Alexander the Liberator²³⁷ and consequently enjoyed wide popular support.²³⁸

However, Battenberg’s decision to suspend the Tŭrnovo Constitution, which was perceived as sacred by the first generation of Bulgarian liberals, and introduce rule by commissions (1881-1883) was unpopular. Indeed it broadened the gap between the ruler

²³⁶ Mosolov, 28.

²³⁷ Alexander II was called by the Bulgarians the Tsar Liberator.

²³⁸ The Russian Empress was Battenberg’s aunt.

and his subjects²³⁹. After his failure to establish a dictatorship, Alexandŭr Battenberg needed to regain the respect of his people and with this in view, he supported the unification of Principality Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia. This proved to be a popular step. Battenberg did not show the same determination when Milan declared war on Bulgaria, and even thought of giving up positions around the capital. Nevertheless, the eventual victory of the Bulgarian army defending unification made him the “hero of Slivnitsa”.

In his proclamation of war on Serbia, Battenberg acknowledged the “sacredness of the cause of the Unification” and defined the conflict as “a defense of the Motherland, the honor and freedom of the Bulgarian people.” “The government of the Serbian people, our neighbor”, his manifesto continued, “following egotistical goals [i.e., King Milan’s] and desiring to prevent a sacred undertaking, the Unification of the Bulgarian people, has today declared war on our country without any legal or just reason. We learnt this news with great sorrow because We would never have believed that our brothers in blood and religion would raise a hand against us and launch a fratricidal war. The Serbian people and its government must take full responsibility. We are declaring war on them and are ordering our brave and heroic armies to start operations against the Serbs to protect the land, honor, and freedom of the Bulgarian people.”²⁴⁰

The manifesto clearly stretch a cord with the people because the popular response to the statement was whole-hearted and following the victory of 1885, Battenberg’s name

²³⁹ In 1881 Alexandŭr Battenberg suspended the Tŭrnovo Constitution of 1879 and tried to rule by decrees. The three year- period was called a “regime of commissions”.

²⁴⁰ The text is cited in Milcho Lalkov, “Knyaz Alexandŭr I vŭrhu Prokrustovoto lozhe na protivorechivite otsenki” (Prince Alexandŭr I on the Prokrustus’ Bed of Contradicting Evaluations), Bŭlgarskite dŭrzavnitsi (1878- 1918), (The Bulgarian Statesmen, 1878-1918) (Sofia, 1996), 23. The entire translation is mine.

was to be associated with the triumph of the Bulgarian national cause, namely the unification of the principality and Eastern Rumelia.

The personality of the second Bulgarian monarch Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was no less controversial than Battenberg had been earlier in his reign. Ferdinand had great political ambitions and Bulgaria was too small a state to satisfy his imperial dreams.²⁴¹ The first significant victory won by Ferdinand was the resignation of the most powerful Prime Minister since the Liberation, Stambolov. Although the latter had spent a lot of effort, first to bring in and then to strengthen the position of the prince, Ferdinand's election was a clear violation of the Berlin Treaty, and in the early 1890s conflict between Stambolov and the Prince became inevitable. In 1893, when Alexandŭr Battenberg died in Graz, Stambolov in his official capacity, expressed the "people's will" that the first Bulgarian ruler be buried in Bulgaria and that a memorial be erected on one of the main boulevards of the capital.²⁴² As a contemporary observer argued, Stambolov's maneuver was not accidental. The late Alexandŭr Battenberg could not found a ruling dynasty, but he had left a son, named Krum Asen after two kings of medieval Bulgaria and Stambolov wished to demonstrate to Ferdinand that no monarch was irreplaceable. Hostility between Prime Minister and Prince reached its climax with the resignation of Stambolov in 1894. Only then did Ferdinand feel able to impose his will on party leaders and parliamentary groups and to dictate the course of internal policy.

Reading the parliamentary speeches of Stambolov in the period 1879 to 1894, one can understand the main problems experienced by the first generation of Bulgarian

²⁴¹ This opinion belongs to Ilcho Dimitrov. Cited in Lalkov, "Ferdinand I-imperatorski blyan, tsarska korona" (Ferdinand I- An Imperial Dream, a King's Crown), *Bŭlgarskite dŭrzavnitsi*, 106.

²⁴² The tomb is still preserved in the center of the Bulgarian capital.

statesmen. Stambolov's election as a deputy to the National Assembly was nearly declared illegal because he had been born in Tŭrnovo when it was under Ottoman rule. Since no official register of births had been kept at Tŭrnovo he could not prove that he had reached the required age of 30 in order to represent his district²⁴³.

Dimitŭr Grekov, another young politician at the time, faced a similar but far more complicated problem. His father was a well-to-do merchant who, afraid of Ottoman repression after the retreat of the Russian army in 1828-29, migrated to Bessarabia. Dimitŭr was born in Russian Bessarabia which had been given to Romania after the Crimean War in 1857. Both Grekovs, senior and junior were therefore Romanian citizens. In 1880, Bulgarian delegates questioned Grekov's nationality and his right to be elected a deputy. In reply, Grekov stated that he had not felt Bulgarian before the emergence of the state:

"I have lived outside the fatherland but not by my choice. It was not I who left the country but my father, in 1829, when so many people left. I have indeed been a citizen of Wallachia, but my heart and blood have always been Bulgarian. My only desire has been to remain Bulgarian and although the country is not my Motherland, I think of myself as Her son."²⁴⁴

The great patriot Evlogi Georgiev—who, along with his brother Hristo Georgiev, was to donate a large amount of money to found the University of Sofia—encountered the same problem as Grekov. His foreign citizenship, the result of the different historical

²⁴³ Stefan Stambolov, Parlamentarni rechi 1879-1894. (Parliamentarian speeches, 1879-1894) (Sofia, 1995), 21-23.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

circumstances preceding the establishment of the nation-state, prevented him taking a seat as a deputy in the Bulgarian national assembly.²⁴⁵

Another thorny problem which the government representatives had to resolve after 1878 concerned veterans who had fought for a sovereign Bulgaria, the so-called *pobornitsi*. On the one hand, the budget of the newly-independent country was insufficient to support them; on the other hand, it was regarded as disgrace that such people should be left destitute. In 1880, Stambolov initiated four different solutions for the Bulgarian veterans. The first option was to find them a government post which suited their education and level of literacy. If a veteran was also an invalid, he was eligible to apply for the post of doorman or school janitor; veterans who could be useful as colonists, were given abandoned plots on which found their own farms. The idea was to exempt veterans and their families from tax, especially the poll tax.²⁴⁶ In Serbia, twenty-five years after he had ordered the assassination, Miloš began referring to Karadjeordje as a great champion of modern Serbian history and approved a pension for his widow.²⁴⁷

In the early 1880s, the first sessions of the Bulgarian Assembly witnessed remarkably heated debates over the irridenta and the promotion of nationalism among them. The government wanted to attract and settle refugees of Bulgarian origin, but there were serious financial and administrative impediments. Despite these both the Temporary Russian Administration and Bulgarian governments viewed refugees from Ottoman Thrace and Macedonia not as a burden but as a significant addition to the tax-paying

²⁴⁵ See "Zashto Evlogii Georgiev ne moze da bade naroden predstavitel?"; Ibid., 54-5.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 59.

²⁴⁷ Dragnić, 17.

population.²⁴⁸ The influx of refugees from Odrin, Dimotika and Dedeagach had begun in September and October 1878, when some 16,636 Bulgarians crossed the border between the Empire, the Principality and Eastern Rumelia.²⁴⁹ For 9,444 people of them governments of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia provided railway transport. A sum of 105,150 rubles also made available for loans to help some Macedonian refugees pouring into Sofia (20,000) and Sliven (about 15,000).²⁵⁰ In 1879, some 98,000 people who had abandoned their native villages during the war returned to the Principality. Of these 68,972 were Muslims and 28,957 were Christians (Bulgarians and Greeks).²⁵¹ Although the immigration was viewed positively at first, by the early 1880s governmental officials were expressing concern about the flow of capital out of the country. Between 1878 and 1883 alone, in the district of Stara Zagora, Muslims had sold arable land worth the considerable sum of 22,915,348 *gosh* to Bulgarian peasants. In the longer term, this aggravated the condition of the peasant tax-payers, because the money had become available after purchases of working cattle and heavy borrowings from local usurers.

As Justin McCarthy rightly argues the motives of the Bulgarian peasants who persecuted Muslims was perhaps more greed than ethnic hatred or nationalism²⁵².

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²⁴⁸ Stambolov, Parlamentarni rechi., 75.

²⁴⁹ “Vedomost za broya na bezantsite ot Odrinsko v Knyazestvo Bŭlgaria i Iztochna Rumelija ot 28/09 do 11/10 1878”, (A Report about the Numbers of Refugees from Odrin to the Principality and Eastern Rumelia between 28/09-11/ 10/ 1878), Istoriya na Bŭlgarite v dokumenti, 1878-1944 (The History of the Bulgarians in Documents; 1878- 1944), Volume 1, 1878- 1912, Sofia: 1994, 27.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 34.

²⁵² McCarthy, 72.

The period 1885 to 1914 witnessed dramatic changes in the ideological and political agendas of Bulgarian and Serbian state-promoted nationalism. Within three decades the establishment of obligatory primary education and the development of a countrywide administrative apparatus facilitated the promotion of state-conducted nationalism to an extent that had not been possible in the previous era of oral communication and absence of native bureaucracy.²⁵³ By the late 1880s and early 1890s, national identification ceased to be primarily a matter of personal choice and gradually became a respectable political force able of mobilizing large masses of population.

Throughout the nineteenth century the foremost medium of nationalistic propaganda was the school. In both Serbia and Bulgaria, nationally-oriented educative systems focused on the study of native history and geography. These subjects had the goal of teaching children how to become loyal citizens and good subjects (see Chapter 5). However, as we shall show, there was another influential transmitter of nationalistic beliefs, often overlooked in the existing literature. Mass education was a crucial development, but so was playing the “patriotic” chord of popular state-promoted mythology.

One influential strategy aiming at the dissemination of standard national values and unified common perceptions was to create a national mythology out of the medieval past. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, state-orchestrated propaganda in both Bulgaria and Serbia succeeded in constructing versions of Bulgarian and Serbian history and new public symbols designed to appeal to the general public were created. State coats-of-arms, flags, national anthems, military standards were meant to engender

²⁵³ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire 1875-1914* (Abacus, 1997), 149.

powerful means of creating a strong sense of belonging, providing respectable credentials and historical roots for national sentiments.

External factors such as the nineteenth-century unifications of the Italian and the German people stimulated similar trends among the Balkan communities. Serbian nationalism, for instance, was significantly influenced by the ideas of the Italian Risorgimento. In 1859, a Sardinian Consulate was established in Belgrade, and Cavour appointed his secretary Francesco Astengo consul with instructions to involve Serbia in a Hungarian-Yugoslav revolution directed against the Habsburg Empire.²⁵⁴ In the 1860s, Garibaldi's agents maintained contacts with some Hercegovian nationalists, who wanted to organize a general Balkan uprising in Greece, Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia proper. Some Serbs had emigrated from the Austrian Military Frontier to Italy, where they served in the "Yugoslav Battalion", a military unit within the "Hungarian Legion" organized after the Revolution of 1848. The Italian Risorgimento strongly influenced the movement of "United Serbian Youth", which followed the example of nationalistic societies like "Young Italy" and "Young Germany". Vladimir Jovanović, who was one of the leaders in close correspondence with Giuseppe Mazzini in 1862- 1866 claimed that Mazzini had become the idol of the Serbian nationalists and even identified him with the medieval hero Marko Kraljević.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ Dimitrije Djordjević, "The Influence of the Italian Risorgimento on Serbian Policy during the 1908-1909 Annexation Crisis," *Balkanica* III (Beograd, 1972), 334. It should be stressed, however, that such influences originated even earlier than the 1860s. In 1848, the Dalmatian Nikola Tomazeo, who opposed Croatia's annexation of Dalmatia, appealed to Serbia as the sacred country that would defend "the Cross and Freedom". "Dei canti del popolo serbo e dalmata" in: Essai historique sur les revolutions et l'indépendance de la Serbie depuis 1804 jusqu a 1850, cited in Lujo Bakotić, Srbi u Dalmaciji. Od pada Mletachke republike do jedinenije (Novi Sad, 1991), 48-9.

²⁵⁵ Even though the real Marko was an Ottoman vassal and fought for the Ottomans. See Djordjević, 334.

Gradually the Serbs of the Diaspora became more politically articulated and were able to formulate their national pretensions more categorically. The state of Serbia was regarded as a power that would defend the interests of the Diaspora. In January 1861, preparations began for the organization of a Serbian assembly in Karlovac and discussions on the urgent need of widening the autonomous rights of the local Serbs. The religious leader of the Serbs living in Hungary, Patriarch Rajčić, helped choose representatives among the laymen of Sombor, Novi Sad, Temesvar, and the Serbian priesthood.²⁵⁶ The Assembly was opened on March 21, 1861, by Patriarch Rajačić who in his opening speech declared its purpose to be, to demonstrate the power of the Serbian nationality and the Serbian language (*narodnost i jezik* in the original)²⁵⁷. The cornerstone of all pretensions for further autonomy of the Serbs in Hungary was the privileges granted by Leopold I between 1690-1694. However, there were also some vague allusions to “unification with our brothers in Slavonia, Croatia and Dalmatia” and even representatives who broadened the idea of a future Serb confederation under the Hungarian Crown.²⁵⁸

Apart from the strong Italian influence as an external stimulus for the Serbian nationalism of the late 1860s, governmental policy promoting the Serbian national cause at the internal and international levels was the most powerful factor to shape the Serbian identity. Since Benedict Anderson coined and popularized the phrase “invented tradition”, the term has been associated with the formation of practices and rituals

²⁵⁶ Jova Adamović, Privilegije srpskog naroda, 175-178.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 184-185 (italics mine).

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 234.

designed to inculcate certain national values and common norms of societal behavior by constant repetitions and deliberate propaganda among all citizens.²⁵⁹ One constructed tradition does not necessarily overlap with historical custom, but rather denotes a deliberate attempt to create certain national beliefs based either on medieval heritage (in the case of Serbia) or on affection for the royal family (in the case of Bulgaria). When Serbia and Bulgaria became independent, they both faced the urgent need to utilize certain aspects of their medieval history and to include the most popular of them into the very fabric of a new nationalistic mythology.

National fictions should not be regarded as reflections of ideology but as active and creative components of an ideology in the making. Popular national characters had a palpable impact on shaping societal values and it would not be exaggerated to state that national martyrs served as imaginative blueprints²⁶⁰ for the community. Further, scholars have agreed that ceremonies and rituals “revealed” specific cultural and historical patterns of behavior.²⁶¹ By bringing people together, religious celebrations and public commemorations of historical dates declared crucial from a “national” perspective, such as June 28 (*Vidovdan* when the Kosovo battle had been lost), or the Bulgarian public holiday of March 3, when the San Stefano Treaty had been signed—exemplified the powerful symbolism of shared goals and values. The very presence of Bulgarians and Serbs at the rituals of celebration were an expression of solidarity and strengthened the

²⁵⁹ Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” *The Invention of Tradition*, Edited by Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1.

²⁶⁰ Raphael Samuel, “Introduction: the figures of national myth,” *Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity*, Volume III (Routledge: London and New York, 1989), xviii.

²⁶¹ David Gilmore, *Carnival & Culture. Sex, Symbol, & Status in Spain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 27.

self-serving mythologies, which the states introduced to justify origin, uniqueness, and sacredness of values and norms. Public celebrations provided the national community with a cognitive map of prescribed events and associated beliefs and so helped to preserve its internal cohesion²⁶². They became an inseparable part of the emerging conception of the state. It was the most influential source for nurturing a modern state perception and overcoming localism.

Two decades ago Dimitrije Djordjević suggested that the Serbian concept of the state was based on three essential elements. The first was peasant conservatism, the second Orthodox historicism,²⁶³ and the third the political activity of the nascent states of Serbia and Montenegro, which presented themselves as the fatherland for the Serbian Diaspora.²⁶⁴ Serbian historicism assumes that the modern nation-state was resurrected as an heir of the medieval Serbian kingdom lost at Kosovo before five hundred years. The major problem in exploring the uniqueness of Serbian national thinking comes from abundant scholarly interpretations of the Battle of Kosovo that tend to distort its original influence on the Serbian psyche. Undoubtedly, Serbian state mythology developed in the nineteenth century and firmly instilled a notion of the Kosovo Battle as the most significant and crucial turning point in medieval Serbian history. Once seen as a distressing event, the battle of 1389 has been turned into the cornerstone of the Serbian

²⁶² Ibid., 27.

²⁶³ The exact meaning of this phrase is difficult to determine, for Djordjević does not elaborate on its implications in detail and is satisfied with providing the mere definition. Nevertheless, by historicism he seems to denote the inseparable link between the evolution of the modern Serbian national identity and the early historical development of the Serbian Church.

²⁶⁴ Dimitrije Djordjević, "The Serbs: A Historical Survey", Landmarks in Serbian Culture and History., edited by V. D. Mihailović (Pittsburgh: Serbian National Federation, 1983), 10.

national identity. It is often said even that there is no parallel to its subliminal effect on the Serbs in all European history.

In fact, however, the encounter at Kosovo was no different from other decisive battles like the clash between Christians and Ottomans on the Maritsa River in 1371, or the fall of the Bulgarian Kingdoms in 1393 and 1396.²⁶⁵ Similar to others in the long chain of Ottoman successes through the whole 14th century, the Battle of Kosovo has always inspired various heroic and epic qualifications, one of the most recent being a comparison to nothing less than the biblical Golgotha.²⁶⁶

Since historical knowledge is gained mainly from written documents, there is a tendency to ascribe this sophisticated perception to all individuals in the past, as if they were able to perceive the events of their own life span through the medium of literary sources. Noel Malcolm states that in the case of the Kosovo Battle, no single description written by any of its participants has been preserved. As a result, it is very difficult nowadays for a historian to separate the original myth and its impact on previous Serbian generations from later scholarly speculations and hypotheses that twisted the primary content. In recent publications, the defeat of the Christian army in 1389 has been defined as an historical crossroads marking the end of Dušan's Empire²⁶⁷ and the beginning of sufferings for the Serbs, who were "chosen" to undergo ordeals much like the people of Israel in ancient times.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁵ After the death of Ivan Alexandŭr in 1371, the Bulgarian medieval state was split into two successor states, ruled by Sishman and Sratsimir. Nominally, two kingdoms came into being, Sishman ruled over the northeastern part with residence in Tŭrnovo, while his half-brother Sratsimir kept the northwest with his residence in Vidin.

²⁶⁶ Thomas Emmert, *Serbian Golgotha Kosovo, 1389.*, East European Monographs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

²⁶⁸ Emmert, 1.

As Malcolm points out, the two most widespread assumptions, that the Ottoman victory destroyed the Serbian empire and that the defeated Serbs were immediately enslaved, are false.²⁶⁹ The medieval kingdom of Dušan was dismembered shortly after his death in 1355, but the Serbs in fact were not finally conquered until 1521, when the last fortress, Belgrade, surrendered. By that time, however, Belgrade was under Hungarian, not Serbian rule. Annals and chronicles formed the mainstay of Serbian medieval historiography. According to Wendy Bracewell, the *žitije* (narration about lives of Serbian saints) introduced the practice of presenting the dynasty as the embodiment of the Serbian nation and created a cult around the “hallowed Serbian royal lineage”.²⁷⁰

The core of the myth of the Kosovo Battle seemed to have originally three main components: “tragic” Prince Lazar decided to resist the infidel Ottomans which was presented as a tragic Christianity; Lazar’s death and the death of ‘the best’ of Serbian warriors; and the end of the medieval Serbian state. These three elements were presented in this way by the nation-state ideologists in order to raise Serb national confidence. Nineteenth-century official propaganda insisted that Serbs had every right to be proud of their history (including defeats like the one at Kosovo), because their leader tried to stop the hordes of Murad and Bayazid and did not hesitate to sacrifice his own life, the lives of his soldiers, and the very existence of his state. Serbs were depicted as warriors and champions of Christianity, the only opponents of the Ottomans in the region. The facts of the past were treated as “blank” history, incompatible with the goals of the nineteenth-

²⁶⁹ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 58.

²⁷⁰ Wendy Bracewell, “National histories and national identities among the Serbs and Croats,” *National Histories and European History*, edited by Mary Fulbrook (Westview Press, 1993), 143.

century Serbian national agenda. Hence the reinvented myths of the “glorious” kingdom of Dušan and the long-remembered Kosovo defeat became crucial to the further indoctrination of the people.

The motifs of “national sacrifice” and five “tragic centuries” marked by suffering and destruction is characteristic not only of Serbian folk poetry and historiography. In his study of these themes in Bulgaria, Bernard Lory examines the myth of five “devastating” centuries of Ottoman rule and proves how deeply rooted in the Bulgarian national psychology is the notion of systematic Ottoman oppression, massacres and forced conversions of local populations.²⁷¹ Despite Vera Mutafchieva’s sound criticism, by and large Lory’s main argument about the Bulgarian inclination towards self-pity is credible. A significant part of the state-promoted nationalism was the construction of both Bulgarian and Serbian identities as anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim.

The encouragement of such hostilities by the state was a difficult task, for both peoples shared a common hatred towards the Muslim populations within their territories, whether the Muslims were of Turkish or Slav origin. After the Serbs obtained independence, all eleven mosques in Belgrade were closed down.²⁷² A popular occasion for Serbian public celebration was the destruction of Varoš-kapu, a gate built by the Ottomans between the new part of Belgrade and the old one. The biggest embarrassment for the Serbian national pride, however, between 1830 and 1862 was the Ottoman garrison within the citadel of Belgrade. Otto von Pirh reported that during his visit to the residence of the Serbian Prince in 1829 in Belgrade, he saw the Sultan’s coat of arms at

²⁷¹ Lory, 92-8.

²⁷² They could not be demolished because a convention requiring their preservation was signed in Istanbul. R. Zmorski, *Na Savi i Dravi., (On the Sava and the Drava Rivers)* (Warsaw, 1956), 22-3.

the entrance.²⁷³ But an incident involving undisciplined Ottoman soldiers and patrolling Serbian policemen was followed by a five-hour bombardment that brought alleged Ottoman harassment in the Serbian capital to an end on September 8, 1862.²⁷⁴

Five centuries of Ottoman rule was the object of post-liberation excoriation. Both Bulgarian and Serbian national ideologies presented the Ottomans as the villains in their vision of lost historical chances. In doing so, and by assuming that the development of the two countries would have been immeasurably more successful had the Ottomans never set foot in the region, they created a biblical myth of a medieval paradise lost.²⁷⁵

The Serbian and Bulgarian intelligentsia, the centuries without sovereignty and the myth of interrupted national development were to form the nucleus of the tragic Balkan archetype. Popular legends, for example, often spoke of how Christians were forbidden to educate their children in their own language and how schools had to be secret, though in fact, education was never forbidden under the Ottomans. The widespread character of these tales, similar versions of which were popular in Greece as well, suggests their importance in the construction of national traditions.²⁷⁶ Consequently, both Bulgarian and Serbian statesmen were prone to use the years of Ottoman domination

²⁷³ Otto von Pirh, 26.

²⁷⁴ On this date, a convention was signed between the Sublime Porte and the Serbian ruler which obliged all Ottoman soldiers to leave the territory of autonomous Serbia. As a result, Soko, Uzica, Šabac, Smederevo and Belgrade expelled their Turkish inhabitants. R. Zmorski, 40; The cabinet held a meeting on August 9, 1862 and approved the expulsion of all Muslims out of Serbia proper, Nikola Škerović, Document 1, "Ministerska sednica drzana pod precdavanjem Negove Svetlosti u dvoru 9 avgusrtu 1862" (A Meeting of the State Council with His Excellency held on 9 of August, 1862), 3-4.

²⁷⁵ Predrag Palavestra, "Aliens outside the Door. Andrić and Crnjanski in the Frame of European Literature", Tradition and Modern Society. A Symposium at the Royal Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities, edited by S. Gustavson (Stockholm: November 26- 29, 1987), 181.

²⁷⁶ Karakasidou, 97.

as a pretext every time they faced internal problems. Gradually, the Ottoman excuse became a convenient justification for historical failures and unaddressed social grievances.

The inclination of the Balkan nations to present themselves as victims and their propensity to blame one or another of the Great Powers for their fate is characterized by Maria Todorova as “a Balkan conspiracy theory”. Real or false, these “conspiracy” theories served the purpose— namely, to exemplify the “bitter” truth that despite their national virtues the Bulgarian and Serbian communities were merely pawns in a political game played by international bullies. The trend is conspicuous in some influential Bulgarian provincial and national newspapers in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

The intention of the political elite, who relied on such manipulations, was transparent. Previous and present errors damaging the national interests of Bulgaria had to be justified by presenting the state as a target of the political maneuvers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia in the region. The latter was relevant to the case of Serbia as well.

Another essential component of nineteenth century Balkan nationalism were constructed historical myths and legends. Oral epics were easy to pass from one generation to another, told and retold by storytellers and singers. In Saint Patrick’s People. A New Look at the Irish, Tony Gray describes the psychological importance of telling a story to the peasants who would listen breathlessly to every word and then would take “fierce pride for the past glories of their race.”²⁷⁷ Albert Lord examines how

²⁷⁷ Tony Gray, Saint Patrick’s People. A New Look at the Irish. (Warner Books, 1996), 11.

the fever of nationalism in the nineteenth century led to the use of oral epics for nationalist propaganda.²⁷⁸

There were various ways of doing this. Gatherings at coffee house (*kafana*) or tavern were the most popular way for them. Taverns were entirely male establishments and there peasants gathered at the end of the working day. They sat, talked, sipped coffee or *raki* (brandy), and listened to songs.²⁷⁹ Lord summarizes two main features that all the singers he investigated shared: illiteracy and the desire to attain proficiency in singing epic poetry. The former is of particular value to the present research, because in societies where reading is not widespread, the art of narration flourishes and it is revised and enriched by professional singers and storytellers.

The epic poem was a chronicle in verse through which the Serbs tried to recall their past. According to Emmert, Serbian epics were characterized by a peculiar (and very selective) periodization of history, in which the events viewed as turning points in the history of the Serbian people became so dominant that earlier events were all but forgotten.²⁸⁰ However, his analysis does not make clear who “viewed” certain historical events as “turning points” and how they became popular.

From the 1870s, the Ottoman province of Macedonia became a target for both Bulgarian and Serbian nationalist propaganda. These claims over the ethnicity of the Macedonian population clashed not only with each other but with those of the Greeks,

²⁷⁸ Lord, 7.

²⁷⁹ Lord, 14.

²⁸⁰ Emmert, 122.

who regarded the province as a Hellenic region.²⁸¹ The Greeks projected their own state's interests as far north as the cities of Nevrokop and Monastir (Bitola). The Serbs extended their claims south to Florina (Lerin), Strumica and Monastir. In other words, the national interests of Bulgarians and Greeks overlapped in the region of Central Macedonia, while Bulgarians and Serbs fought over the central and northern parts of Ottoman Macedonia. Whereas the Bulgarian government relied on the IMRO from the mid-1890s, the Serbs had no similar organization to rely on. By 1887, the Serbian Parliament had allocated secret funds for educational purposes and for more intensive pro-Serbian propaganda in Macedonia²⁸².

Historians exercised great influence over the shaping and circulation of myths among the literate strata of Bulgarian and Serbian society at the turn of the twentieth century. Public speeches on the so-called Macedonian question,²⁸³ written and delivered by prominent Bulgarian historians after the Bulgarian army occupied Macedonia in 1941. In their justifications of Bulgarian pretensions to Macedonia, Petür Mutafchiev, Ivan Snegarov, Ivan Duichev, and Mihail Arnaudov refer to medieval precedents and exemplify a pattern which had become popular at the turn of the twentieth century. Professor Snegarov in his speech delivered on 2 of July 1941 called the city of Ohrid the

²⁸¹ Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia (Thessaloniki, 1964), 12. Popular speculations on the Macedonian past constituted a significant part of this kind of story. Since different forms of state propaganda are extensively examined in chapter 5, the present chapter will only attempt to frame the process of "involving" the Macedonian population into the orbit of Bulgarian and Serbian state-promoted nationalism.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 29.

²⁸³ The Macedonian question was a political formula referring to the future of Ottoman Macedonia in the period preceding the Balkan Wars of 1912/13. Unsatisfied with the status of Macedonia after the end of the Great War, the Bulgarian side continued to refer to the Macedonian question up to the occupation of 1941-1944. See Toncho Zhechev.

“sacred cradle of Bulgarian national consciousness (*Bŭlgarshtina*)”²⁸⁴. Such statements were sustained by historical inertia and they propagated national values codified in myths. Such “aggressive” myths, as Leszek Kolakowski defines them, were capable of keeping a national community mobilized by anachronistically relating medieval tradition and contemporary reality.²⁸⁵ Once the nation-state had been established the power of “aggressive” mythology was well utilized by the press.

The first Serbian newspaper, *Novine Srpske* (1813) had been published in Vienna with the permission of the Habsburg Emperor, and understandably, his editors, D. Davidović and Frušić, could not afford to publish any materials that propagated the Serbian cause. The newspaper contained very short reports from the main European capitals informing the Serbian reader about the latest international news. Reports about events from the Serbian territories were virtually nonexistent. One editor complained that during the first year of the paper’s existence in Serbia proper, the newspaper had only 120 subscribers in a population of 3,000,000.²⁸⁶

In the 1840s, when the printing of newspapers and historical books in the native languages reached its climax in the Balkans, law implementing strict censorship over printed materials was introduced in Serbia. Prince Michael Obrenović saw no reason to suspend the censorship; on the contrary, he found it very useful, since it kept “the natural

²⁸⁴ It was in Ohrid Kliment opened the first religious school teaching reading and writing in Old Bulgarian (Church Slavonic) at the end of 9th century. See Ivan Snegarov, “Deloto na Klimenta Ohridski” (The Life of Kliment of Ohrid), *Makedoniya kato bŭlgarska zemya (Macedonia as Bulgarian Land)*. Sofia, 1993, 34.

²⁸⁵ Leszek Kolakowski, *The Presence of Myth*. Translated by Adam Czerniawski, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 95.

²⁸⁶ *Novine Srpske*, Volume I (1813), (Prilozi), Novi Sad: 1964.

Serbian inclination toward anarchy” under control.²⁸⁷ During his reign only the official newspaper Vidovdan (Saint Vitus Day) was published. Nationalistic issues if any, were addressed with circumspection. In 1869, the censorship was modified with the introduction of a clause of “collective guilt”, which meant that in the event that unacceptable material was published, the author, editor, publishing house, and printer were all assumed to be guilty.²⁸⁸ Consequently, the authority of the Serbian ruler over printed matter prevented the development of the Serbian media as an influential medium that could popularize nationalistic ideas until the early 1890s.

Official newspapers were used to publicize laws, international agreements, monarchical proclamations and parliamentary decisions. They were an important medium for reaching the literate part of the population, albeit one little explored by hundreds. One such periodical was the Bulgarian Dürzhaven vestnik (The State Newspaper), founded by a decree of Battenberg on July 28, 1879.²⁸⁹ Its counterpart in Eastern Rumelia was called Obshtinski list (The Municipal List) and was printed in format which allowed it to be posted outdoors where it could be read aloud to reach a larger audience²⁹⁰. From November 1st, 1880 the State Newspaper introduced a new column called “The Court Circular”, which helped enlarge the newspaper’s audience further.²⁹¹ The court column introduced aspects of the private life of Ferdinand’s family

²⁸⁷ Vladislavljević, 52.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

²⁸⁹ R. Rangelov, Yuridicheskata periodika v Bŭlgaria, 1879- 1923 (Juridical Periodicals in Bulgaria, 1879-1923) (Sofia, 1995), 13.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 15.

in an attempt to promote loyalty. Before the marriage of Ferdinand to the Italian princess Maria Luiza, public interest had been focused on the monarch's public image. Early in his reign it was widely rumored that the prince had prevented cruelty to a seal captured by a fisherman near the residence of Euxinograd. The fisherman had exhibited the seal for money. The prince hearing of this act, rode all the way to the fisherman's hut, bought the seal for 600 francs and returned the poor creature back into the Black Sea.²⁹²

Ferdinand was the first ruler after 1878 to marry in Bulgaria, and his son Boris was the first heir of the new dynasty. Both occasions were marked by public celebrations. The custom arose of celebrating the birthdays of Princess Maria Luiza and the heir, Boris at the same time as religious festivals. Although Ferdinand was of mixed German-French blood, his wife of Italian origin and his heir had been baptized as Catholic, the press encouraged the view that while not native, he and his dynasty were "naturalized" Bulgarians.

A journalist's report from Plovdiv describing the celebration of one of the biggest Orthodox festivals, the Blessing of the Waters [*Jordanovden*], honoring St. John the Baptist (6 of January, 1894) illustrates the growing role of ceremony and the association of the royal family with the people. All representative houses, shops, and public buildings in the center of Plovdiv, the second biggest Bulgarian city, were decorated with Bulgarian flags. After the crucifix was "found" in the Maritsa River and brought to Bishop Nathaniel, he blessed the army units and the officials present at the ceremony. At this point readers were informed about the development of Prince Boris, the heir to the throne. The public was informed that the prince was very advanced for his age both

²⁹² J. MacDonald, *Czar Ferdinand and His People* (Arno Press: New York, 1971, reprint), 94.

physically and intellectually and that his parents were trying hard to raise him in a “purely Bulgarian way”.²⁹³

A traditional Spartan Bulgarian upbringing was supposed to ensure that the child would not grow up to be effeminate, a condemned associated with Western manners. The future Bulgarian monarch often took cold showers, so the public was informed and the windows of his room were kept open even in wintertime. No opportunity was wasted to project the image of a strong and healthy boy. A concerned attempt was made to persuade readers that the future of Bulgaria was in good hands. The heir had been born in Bulgaria and his parents were trying to educate him in the traditional way of most Bulgarian families. Boris’s birthday was celebrated on January 18. On that date, throngs of enthusiastic, joyful citizens went to Church, and bells tolled everywhere. Among the happiest, reportedly, were gardeners who had a double reason for celebration. January 18th, the birthday of Prince Boris, being the day of their patron saint, St. Atanasii.

This editorial demonstrates how the media constructed and disseminated national traditions. It links a religious ceremony dedicated to Saint Atanasii, to a royal event worthy of celebration. It provides a vivid description of how representation of all social layers of Bulgarian society high-ranking from officers to humble citizens, and from artisans and peasants to deputies and government ministers, all celebrated the occasion together. The article ends with a remark designed to please patriots that despite the celebration of the gardener’s saint’s day (*slava*), Plovdiv was not, and hopefully would never be a Serbian city.²⁹⁴

²⁹³ Stara Planina (The Balkan), 3, 11/01/1895, 2.

²⁹⁴ The remark of the author is an allusion to Serbian claims that the practice of *slava* existed everywhere the population was of Serbian origin.

The press often used religious festivals to convey nationalistic messages. In 1895, the staff of the Serbian newspaper Uskok sent Christmas greetings to their Serb compatriots living in Macedonia, on the Struma River, Vardar and Ohrid Lakes, and to all Serbians living in Sredec (Sofia), Lom-palanka, Trŭn, and Brezник. “Jesus Christ is born” was the happy greeting for all Serb speakers outside Serbia even if as the paper added they were forbidden to call themselves “Serbs”.²⁹⁵ Nor was it by chance that Sofia was called by its medieval name Sredec. It was a reminder to those Serbians who had read about the great Stefan Dušan’s conquests that the city had once been part of medieval Serbia. Official Serbian propaganda had also claimed that the regions of Lom, Vidin, Brezник, and Trŭn on the grounds that they were solidly Serb ethnically.

On January 18, 1895 in the capital, Sofia, there was a celebration at the military school. It ended with Bulgarian folk dances, and it was reported that the joyful princess Maria Luiza was among the dancers. This presented the reserved Catholic princess as an outgoing woman who had been caught up in the spirit of the Slavic folk dance, the *horŭ*. At the first birthday of the heir to the throne a popular appeal was launched to raise money for a fund called the “Bulgarian Fatherland”. Ferdinand made the first donation of 20,000 *levs* to help popularize Bulgarian history among ordinary people by providing cheap printed books.²⁹⁶ In February 1895, the biggest city park in the capital was named after his heir. The decision was said to have been reached unanimously by the city council, without royal interference and on behalf of the whole Bulgarian nation.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ Uskok, 12/1895, 4.

²⁹⁶ Stara Planina (The Balkan), 7, 25/01/1895, 1-2.

²⁹⁷ Stara Planina (The Balkan), 3, 14, 18/02/1895, 2-3.

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The nation states of Serbia (1830) and Bulgaria (1878) were established before national consolidation had been fully accomplished. The creation of the state hastened the development of national awareness, although national loyalty continued to be a vague, even a weird, notion to the majority of Serbian and Bulgarian peasants. Before the emergence of their modern states, ordinary people were accustomed to thinking not in terms of nationality but in terms of religion. Alphabets associated with certain churches could serve as a factor either uniting or dividing communities.²⁹⁸ Moreover, the generally low level of literacy in the Balkans limited the influence of such division to only the few intellectuals writing either in Cyrillic or Latin.

The state provided an institutional framework designed to engage mass populations into a methodically organized process of indoctrination. To instill standard sense of patriotism into the population, a number of state agencies were created and encouraged the popularization of a mythology of reinvented and constructed traditions. The processes of nation building in both countries shared many common features, but there were also certain discrepancies. Among the state's priorities in constructing the nation were the implementation of a constitutional law which regulated the life of all citizens, the issuing of personal documentation, and the taking of regular censuses; the registration of births, marriages and deaths; the bureaucratization of local and central administrations, the development of a national army and schooling system, the encouragement of modern media, and a policy of encouraging to the core lands in order

²⁹⁸ Kolarz, 21.

to improve the financial situation of the emerging states. The institution of monarchy and the personality of the ruler had both symbolic and pragmatic functions in this process.

Some attempts to promote national ideas through cultural and linguistic affinities had been made before the emergence of political formations. In 1827 in Graz Lujdevit Gaj joined the circle Srpska Vlada, which included Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes committed to the cause of spreading the “beauty of the Serbo-Croat language and promoting a Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian brotherhood based on shared linguistics.”²⁹⁹ However, the influence of the so-called “Illyrian Movement” remained limited to language and did not attract most of educated Serbs. As Svetozar Miletić put it in 1846, Serbs were proud of being Serbs but, a Serb could be neither a Croat nor an Illyrian.³⁰⁰ A cultural organization founded by Serbs living in Hungary was called *Matica Srpska*. It was very active in promoting Serbian ethnic identity [*srpstvo*] and published magazines and newspapers such as Srpskii narodnii list (The Serb Popular Newspaper), Srpska pčela (The Serbian Bee) and Srpske ljetopisi (Serbian Annals) between 1824 and 1835.³⁰¹

Yet during the late 1840s and 1850s, the ability of autonomous Serbia to express categorical support for, and claim affiliation with such informal organizations was very limited. The Serbian government did send representatives to the Serbian Assembly in Karlovac (1848) which voted for the unification of Srem, the Banat, Bačka, Baranÿa, and the Vojvodina into a separate administrative unit under the Habsburgs. Nor did Serbia support Serbs in the Vojvodina and the Banat. Forty years after 1848, however, the organization of St. Sava (1886), relying on the nationally- oriented schooling system of

²⁹⁹ Istorija Jugoslavie, 466.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., 473.

Serbia and using the well-developed state machine—was to launch more successful, and palpably nationalistic propaganda in Ottoman Macedonia. The spur was rival Bulgarian and Greek indoctrination campaigns.

Briefly then, until Serbia and Bulgaria gained their political autonomy in 1830 and 1878, respectively, criteria for belonging to the Serbian and Bulgarian national communities did not exist. The easiest way of distinguishing Serbs and Bulgarians was the link between language and nationality. However, this could be misleading in the case of Serbs and Croats, for example. The central claim of this chapter is that the nation had to be explicitly and legally defined to enable the institutions of the nation state to foster any profound sense of community displayed in collective emotions, invented traditions, and comradeship in arms. The next chapter will examine how Serbs and Bulgarians discovered their identity through the erection and protection of national frontiers.

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³⁰¹ Istorija Jugoslavie, 473.

Chapter 3

The Church and National Indoctrination

This chapter examines the transformation from Orthodox Christian identity, which all Balkan peasants of non-Turkish origin shared before the turn of the nineteenth century, into national awareness. It also tries to clarify the role of the Christian Orthodox Church, and especially of its priests, in the process of nation- building in the region. Up to that point, religion was the main criterion for distinguishing different communities living in territories with highly mixed populations—such as Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Hercegovina. Thus, in some parts of inland Dalmatia and Bosnia, Croatian and Serbian identities were not as deeply entrenched as Balkan historiography would like us to believe. Peasants described themselves as Catholic or Orthodox Christians well into the twentieth century indicating that they did not yet think of themselves as Serbs or Croats.

Before the concept of loyalty to a particular national community emerged, religion was one of the chief factors that shaped collective identities and distinguished peoples of different origins. Religion served as a cement for what Hobsbawm calls “proto-nationalism”. Certainly its rituals reinforced a sense of identity among members of a religious community.³⁰² However, religion also helped to mould nationalist beliefs, and, as John-Paul Himka has recently argued, in Eastern Europe the relationship between religion and nationality has been particularly important.³⁰³ Bishops in the Habsburg

³⁰² Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 68-71.

³⁰³ John-Paul Himka, Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine. The Greek Catholic Church and the Ruthenian National Movement (Montreal & Kingston, 1999), 25.

Empire, for instance, played an influential part in preserving ethnic identities.³⁰⁴ Soon after the Compromise of 1867, when the Habsburg Empire was reorganized into a dual monarchy, a Greek Catholic priest, Father Ioann Naumović, speaking in the Galician Diet claimed that Serbian priests had strong national feelings and that they kept the national identity of Austrian Serbs alive. Naumović argued that no Serb would tell his children “you will no longer be, as I am, Serb.... You will become Magyars.”³⁰⁵ Himka’s research suggests that in the late nineteenth century in Western Ukraine and the other border regions of the Habsburg Empire, the priestly vocation was becoming increasingly associated with national propaganda.

As Dennis Hupchick suggests, Balkan historians have accepted the fact that the Orthodox Church played a central role in preserving the national identities of the Balkan Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, a reading which he claims, contains both truth and fiction.³⁰⁶ Ljubodrag Ristić may argue that even holy places and relics of saints buried in churches and monasteries had great significance and played a prominent role in preserving the historical memory of the Serbs and stimulating their patriotism.³⁰⁷ However, historians should argue from evidence rather than assumption.

If religion as the social cement in the period preceding the emergence of modern statehood is one issue, subsequent utilization of it by the state is another. My argument is based on the premise that it is anachronistic to associate the Orthodox religion and

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 25.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., 25.

³⁰⁶ Dennis Hupchick, *The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century. Slavic Orthodox Society and Culture under Ottoman Rule* (London: McFarland & Company, 1993), 8.

³⁰⁷ Ljubodrag Ristić, “Serbian Holy Places and Miraculous Events- Based on Nineteenth- Century Travel Books”, *Balkanica XXIX* (Belgrade, 1998), 65.

national identity prior to the establishment of the modern Balkan states. Though the Church kept the Christian collective identity alive, this identity remained purely religious and was not “national in content and expression”³⁰⁸. Furthermore, though national historians describe Bulgarian and Serbian monasteries as “protectors” of the various attributes of nationhood³⁰⁹ because they preserved a few medieval manuscripts, the monks saw them as relics of an era associated with Byzantium. At that point they did not engage in the construction of nationalism.

Indeed, the Orthodox Church was an official institution of the Ottoman state and a major part of the *millet*-system. The Ottoman Empire was not based on national divisions. The empire’s People of the Book [*zimmis*]³¹⁰ were divided into four *millets*, for Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians and eventually Roman Catholics and Jews too. Each *millet* had the right to tax, judge, and order the lives of their respective memberships. The Ottomans called all Orthodox the *millet-i Rum*, or “Roman” *millet*³¹¹. The administrative responsibilities of the millets were placed into the hands of their highest religious authorities (the *millet bash*) who were held accountable by the Ottomans for the proper functioning of the *millet*-system. Richard Clogg suggests that with the growth of Balkan nationalism in the nineteenth century, Greek dominance over the

³⁰⁸ Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy. Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-Eastern Europe (Variorum, 1994), 178.

³⁰⁹ Svetozar Marković defined the Serbian monasteries as “hearths which kept national consciousness alive”. See Svetozar Marković, Serbia na vostok (Serbia in the East) (Moscow, 1956). Even recent publications refer to the union of the Serbian Church and the nation as a “Byzantine heritage which became even tighter after the Ottoman conquest. See Branimir Anzulović, Heavenly Serbia. From Myth to Genocide (New York and London, 1999), 33. To avoid such anachronisms, Dennis Hupchick suggests “Slavic Orthodox culture” as a substitute for “national”. See Hupchick, 143.

³¹⁰ *Zimmis* included the non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire.

³¹¹ Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, 10.

Church hierarchy came to be resented by all non-Greek members³¹². In my opinion, however, how and when principles were altered and by whom is a highly controversial and speculative question that requires careful analysis.

Up to the Ottoman invasion of the Balkans in the fourteenth century the religious diversity of the region was represented by two more or less compact units. Bulgarians, Serbs, Romanians, and some Albanians were Christian Orthodox and belonged to the Byzantine religious community [*oecumene*]³¹³. The use of native Slavic languages in sermons was usually encouraged and the clergy wrote in Cyrillic³¹⁴. The Catholic enclaves of Croatia, Slovenia, and parts of Bosnia followed Catholic Rome³¹⁵. In those regions, Latin was the language of the Mass and Latin script was used for administrative and clerical purposes.

The division between the two “halves” of the peninsula had occurred as early as 870 A. D., when the medieval Bulgarian church became autocephalous, though it remained close to Constantinople. When, at the turn of the twelfth century, the First Bulgarian Kingdom was demolished by the Emperor Basil II, the Bulgarian church ceased to be autonomous. Soon after the conquest, the Byzantine Emperor established a new archiepiscopal see at Ohrid to exercise control over the territories of the former Bulgarian kingdom and Macedonia. A separate archbishopric was established at Zica

³¹² Ibid., 10.

³¹³ *Oecumene* was essential to the Byzantine imperial statecraft and it represented the civilized world led by the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Church was perceived as the “*caput et mater ecclesiarum*” and there was no question of “*primus inter pares*” within the *oecumene*.

³¹⁴ Dennis Hupchick, The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century, 2.

³¹⁵ Catholicism did not spread to the Bulgarian lands until the very end of the sixteenth century, when some Catholic communities appeared in Western Bulgaria (Chiprovtsi) and in Central Bulgaria around Plovdiv.

during the reign of Stefan II (1196-1227)³¹⁶, and in 1346 self-proclaimed Emperor of Serbs and Greeks Stefan Dušan got the Serbian Archbishopric of Peć raised to the status of a Patriarchate.

Although the Ottoman invasion destroyed the medieval states of Bulgaria and Serbia, their ecclesiastical structures were left intact. From the mid-fifteenth century most of the Orthodox Christian population was directly governed by the Patriarchate in Constantinople, though autocephalous Ohrid and Peć (Ipek) continued to exist as archiepiscopal sees until the end of the 1760s³¹⁷. Another religious center, the Rila Monastery, continued to operate throughout the sixteenth century as an important institution. Its status was protected by the sultan's official decrees (*fermans*) and the confirmation of *vakūf* status upon its extensive properties.³¹⁸ A monastery [cell] school had been functioning during the second half of the fifteenth century at Rila, and it continued to operate well into the eighteenth. Hupchick argues that education on the pattern of the Rila Monastery served two purposes. It facilitated the spread and maintenance of Slavic Orthodox literacy, and it promoted the development of a Bulgarian literary language. The monks of Rila spread the cult of their patron, Saint Ivan of Rila and this activity happened to include the transmission of an awareness of the medieval Bulgarian kingdom's greatness.³¹⁹

³¹⁶ The year was 1219.

³¹⁷ Peć had been an important religious center since the reign of Stefan Dušan. In 1346, after being crowned as Czar of all the Greeks and Serbs, Stefan Dušan raised the Archbishop of Peć to the rank of Patriarch of the Serbian Church. This formal recognition occurred with the concurrence of the Greek Archbishop of Ohrid, the Bulgarian Archbishop of Tŭrnovo, and the monks of the Holy Mountain of Athos. It remained the seat of the Serbian Patriarchate until 1760s, when the Greek Phanariots pressured the Ottoman sultan to suspend the office.

³¹⁸ Dennis Hupchick, The Bulgarians in the Seventeenth Century, 145.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 148-49.

In the medieval period “autocephaly, that is, the self-government of a church independent of the Patriarchate, had been sought by Balkan monarchs as acknowledgment of their political sovereignty. Yet, no Balkan ruler questioned the idea of the religious integrity and spiritual affiliation of the Byzantine religious and cultural *oecumene*. Orthodox Christianity, as a religious unity in terms of ritual and practice, remained intact during the period of Ottoman governance, regulated and preserved by the *millet* system. The development of the Serbian and Greek national movements, in the early nineteenth century gave impetus to a struggle for independent church organizations in the Balkans between the 1830s and 1870s. The Russian Panslavs also played a role demanding the establishment of independent churches which would serve the Slavs’ spiritual needs. Russian educational institutions like the seminary in Odessa were indirectly major forces for change since the late 1850s. By 1878, about five hundred Bulgarians sponsored by the Slavonic Benevolent Society in St. Petersburg had been educated in the Odessa seminary alone³²⁰. The establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate Church on February 28, 1870 signaled a major accomplishment for Orthodox Slavs, though it was still required to mention the name of the Patriarch in its liturgy, to allow him control in procuring of Chrism, and defer to him in matters of doctrine³²¹. From the late 1860s, however, the Orthodox Church was increasingly exploited by indoctrinators whose main purpose was to foster nationalist attitudes. The creation of the autocephalous

³²⁰ Duncan M. Perry, Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern Bulgaria, 1870-1895 (Durham & London, Duke University Press, 1993), 6. It has to be mentioned that the Russian goal after the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate was to heal the breach between the Balkan churches. However, due to the involvement of the churches in the process of national indoctrination little success was achieved.

³²¹ Richard Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918 A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 16.

Greek Church on June 23, 1850, of a Serbian one on October 20, 1879, and of the Bulgarian Exarchate all served political purposes³²².

The ideal of a community of all Orthodox Christians was to be gradually to be eroded, as local Churches came to be associated with “national” institutions and became actively involved in the propagation of nationalism. Religious disputes between the various ecclesiastical structures did not concern dogmatic, but territorial, differences. Much was at stake, and the fights between the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serbian hierarchies to obtain official charters (*berats*) for the appointment of local bishops determined whether a certain diocese with a mixed population was to be ascribed to one or another nationality.

While relations between the Patriarchate and the independent churches of Greece and Serbia remained friendly, on September 16, 1872 Constantinople declared the Bulgarian ecclesiastical organization schismatic. Neither dogma nor theological differences accounted for this. Rather it was a political dispute over their right to hold a plebiscite in the regions of Macedonia and Thrace, which had mixed Bulgarian and Greek populations.

According to the Sultan’s *ferman* of February 27, 1870 the Bulgarian Exarchate had jurisdiction over eighteen sees, but virtually any other ecclesiastical district could join the Exarchate by plebiscite.³²³ It was not this issue, however, that complicated the

³²² The call for a separate Bulgarian Church was not even universally accepted in Bulgarian circles. For instance, the bishops of Vratsa and Lovetch resisted any idea of separation from Constantinople, as did Neofit Rilski, an abbot of the Rila monastery in the late 1850s. Crampton, 13.

³²³ The authority of the Bulgarian Exarchate included the sees of Russe, Silistra, Shumen, Tŭrnovo, Sofia, Vratsa, Lovech, Vidin, Niš, Pirot, Kyustendil, Samokov, Veles, Varna (excluding the town of Varna and twenty nearby villages whose populations were not of Bulgarian origin), Sliven (excluding Anhialo and Mesembria), Sozopol, Plovdiv (excluding the main city and Stanimaka *kaaza*). See Stefan Lafchiev, *Spomeni za Bŭlgarskata Ekzarchia, 1906-1909* (Recollections about the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1906-1909) (Sofia, 1994), 119. In the event that two-thirds of the inhabitants of a see with mixed population voted for the Bulgarian Exarchate, the see could become exarchist.

development of the Bulgarian national church after 1878. According to the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, the Exarchate had jurisdiction in the Principality, Eastern Rumelia, and Ottoman Macedonia. The administrative diversity and the involvement of different state authorities in the regions, however, impeded the organizational reforms that the Exarchate wished to introduce. For obvious political reasons, the Bulgarian Assembly in 1879 decided not to change the permanent seat of the Exarch (the head of the Bulgarian Exarchate) and he continued to reside in Istanbul, though he spent a year and a half in Plovdiv (1878-1879) trying to strengthen the church's organization of the province.

Religious questions in the Principality were decided by a four-member Synod, whose head acted on behalf of the Exarch and who was appointed directly by him and for life.³²⁴ Bulgarian independence was followed by a series of discriminatory measures against the remaining Muslim population in the country. Once their arable land was confiscated and redistributed, in the late 1870s and 1880s, there were no blatant examples of religious repression in Bulgaria.³²⁵ Officially, religious tolerance was to be ensured by the "Temporary Regulations for Administrating the Christians, Muslims and the Jews of Bulgaria" (July 1880). According to the provisions of this document, the division of Christian dioceses corresponded to the administrative districts of the state.³²⁶ The

³²⁴ The place of residence and the prerogatives of the Bulgarian Exarch were a subject of heated debates among the Bulgarian members of the Parliament, priests, and laymen, and involved various groupings. Some priests and laymen thought that the Principality had to take over and coordinate the future activity of the Exarchate; others supported the so-called dual structure, which did not provide grounds for the Synod in Sofia to interfere in the activity of the Exarchate. Kiril Bulgarian patriarch, *Exarh Antim, 1816-1888* (Sofia, 1956), 838; Jordan Kolev, *Bŭlgarskata intelegentsia*, 151.

³²⁵ The first Bulgarian Prince Alexandŭr Battenberg who participated in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877/78 wrote in his Diary that Bulgarians used to set in fire to villages with a predominantly Turkish population and after the fall of the fortress of Pleven, massacres of Turks committed by Bulgarians were common. See *Alexandŭr Battenberg. Dnevnik* (Diary), translated by Ivan Pŭrvev (Sofia, 1992), 30-31; 62, 78.

³²⁶ There were 10 districts: Kyustendil, Vidin, Vratsa, Pleven, Tŭnovo, Ruschuk (Ruse), Shumen, Silistra, and Varna. See Velichko Georgiev and Staiko Trifonov, *Istoriya na Bŭlgaria v dokumenti*, volume 1, 201.

Regulations, however, became a source of dispute between the Liberal Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religion, Dragan Tsankov, and Archbishops Grigorii, Simeon, Kiril, and Meletii. Tsankov disregarded the suggestions of a special committee comprised of archbishops and priests to work out temporary regulations and introduced a project of his own, which was sanctioned by Alexandŭr Battenberg. In protest, Exarch Iosif published a letter which encouraged Bulgarian priests to disobey the Regulations and claimed the actions of the minister to be unconstitutional.³²⁷

The same year, 1880, the Liberal Government managed to pass a law denying monks their constitutional right to be elected as members of parliament.³²⁸ In November of that year, the Liberal cabinet resigned and a new Assembly of Archbishops was convoked in Sofia. Despite the political change, their second project for Temporary Regulations also failed. Only in November 1881, after Alexandŭr Battenberg had suspended the constitution, was the status and administration of the Bulgarian Church in the Principality finally regulated.³²⁹ Forced by circumstances Exarch Iosif reluctantly expressed his official support for the unconstitutional regime of the Prince.

According to the Regulations, every district with a Muslim population was to have its own *mufti* elected by the local Muslim community to supervise its religious activities. Christian parishes were divided into urban and rural. A report of the Governor of Plovdiv district dated 1888/89 states there were 171 Christian churches—137 of them Bulgarian, 20 Greek and twelve Catholic in the region. There was also an Armenian and

³²⁷ Exarh Antim, 845.

³²⁸ Petko St. Petkov, "Pravoslavnaia cerkov' i gosudarstvennaya vlast' v knyazestvo Bolgarii" (1878-1896) (The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and government in Principality Bulgaria (1878-1896), Bulgarian Historical Review, 3-4 (Sofia, 2000), 57.

a Bulgarian Protestant Church.³³⁰ Ninety-five imams were serving 117 mosques, and five rabbis eight synagogues. Most monasteries in the district were poor, except for the rich Bachkov monastery (Greek), which owned a lot of arable land and received generous financial support from the Patriarchate.³³¹ The Bachkov monastery used part of its income to support the Greek schools in Stanimaka (present-day Asenovgrad), Plovdiv, and the seminary in Constantinople.³³²

Until April 1879, discrimination against Muslims in Eastern Rumelia commonly aimed to “cleanse” the region of its Muslim elements.³³³ The strategy applied by the authorities varied. Usually, officials would systematically ignore Muslim petitions, confiscating property and arable land, and forcing people to flee.³³⁴ Before the Unification with the Principality in 1885, the clashes had been gradually waning in number and severity. As the above-cited report from Plovdiv exemplifies, the late 1880s witnessed stable and tolerant relations among the various communities in this district. From the 1890s, however, stricter state control was evident in religious matters, and there was increasing official concern about the efficiency of the Bulgarian Church in promoting the national cause.

In a report of 1891 on the Church’s activity in the district of Burgas, the governor complained that mosques in the area were more numerous than the Christian churches, 86

³²⁹ Kiril Patriarh Bŭlgarski, *Exarh Antim*, 855.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 205.

³³¹ It was under the direct authority of the Constantinople Patriarchate.

³³² Georgiev, Trifonov, 206.

³³³ See Zhorzheta Nazŭrska, “Maltsinstveno-religioznata politika v Iztochna Rumelia (1879- 1885)” (Minority and Religious Policy in Eastern Rumelia (1879-1885), *Myusyulmanskite obshnosti na Balkanite i v Bŭlgaria. Istoricheski eskizi* (The Muslim Communities in the Balkans and Bulgaria. Historical Sketches) (Sofia, 1997), 117.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, 116-117.

against 78.³³⁵ Furthermore, three of the serving bishops (*vladikas*) were of Greek origin—based in the towns of Sozopol, Anhialo (Pomorie), and Mesembria (Nesebŭr), all of which had predominantly Greek populations. The big monasteries in the district were also Greek—St. Anastasiya (close to Anhialo), St. Georgii, and St. Nikola. The civil administrator also complained of the low morale and insufficient education of the Bulgarian clergy. He was concerned particularly about the heavy drinking of priests and inappropriate conduct during liturgies, baptisms, and funerals. He also reported that they failed to preach sermons that admonished their flock.³³⁶

Another contemporary report lists shortcomings in the condition of the church in Trŭn, Tsaribrod, and Breznik. There were fifty-one churches in these dioceses but only five of them had been built after 1878. The priests were dirty, drunken and quarrelsome and instead of preaching to their congregations, they involved themselves in shameful public scandals. One priest was responsible for no fewer than 1,056 souls. But most of the parish priests had been ordained before 1878 and were not up to the demands of the new times. All thirteen monasteries were in poor condition and received no financial help.³³⁷

Besides abundant examples of inefficiency and indiscipline among the Bulgarian priesthood, cases of religious intolerance were reported. One target was the American Protestant missionaries. Although not very successful in attracting Bulgarians to Protestantism, American Methodist missionaries had by the mid-1890s established 15

³³⁵ Georgiev and Trifonov, 207.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*, 207.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 208.

churches representing fourteen pastors and 200 members.³³⁸ In Macedonia alone, they had eight churches with 1,553 members and 88 pastors, among whom 62 were of Bulgarian origin.³³⁹ Plovdiv was chosen to coordinate Protestant religious propaganda in Bulgaria proper; Samokov was a center for education (with two functioning schools), and most printed materials were coming from Istanbul.³⁴⁰ The petition signed in July 1894 by the inhabitants of the poor suburb of Sofia Juch-Bunar protested against the activity of Anabaptists, who were actively proselytizing among Bulgarian women and teenagers. This offended Bulgarian Orthodox tradition.³⁴¹

* * *

In 1876, after the April uprising but before independence, Exarch Antim I, head of the only Bulgarian institution recognized by the Ottoman administration, asked the great powers to intervene on behalf of his flock. Even after the Ottoman government had deposed him in the spring of 1877, he continued to be active in the political life of the newly established state. He was Chairman of the Founding Assembly that drafted the Tŭrnovo Constitution and elected the first Bulgarian Prince Alexandŭr Battenberg. Nevertheless, his participation in the political life of the Principality was more symbolic than effective.

The second Bulgarian Exarch Iosif I had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the Bulgarian state. He disliked even the idea of political involvement in the Bulgarian administration and the wide range of the Exarchate's activities. However, convinced that

³³⁸ Petkov, 25.

³³⁹ Ibid., 25.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 26.

³⁴¹ Georgiev, Trifonov, 208.

the Ottoman administration of Macedonia had no future, he dedicated 40 years to promote, as he put it, “Bulgarian identity” [*Bŭlgarshtina*] in Macedonia.³⁴² Whenever a clergyman got involved in politics as the unfortunate Bishop Kliment did, becoming Prime Minister after the coup d’etat that deposed Alexandŭr Battenberg, church interference caused immediate political unrest.

The fact that the first and second Bulgarian monarchs were not native Bulgarians and were not Orthodox by confession also constituted a problem. On 1/12 January 1889, from his pulpit in Tŭrnovo, Bishop Kliment deliberately omitted Ferdinand’s name from his service and spoke publicly against the Catholic who had come to rule Bulgaria. Between January and May 1889 Kliment continued to denounce the new Bulgarian Prince as an alien and enemy of Orthodoxy until he was reprimanded by Prime Minister Stambolov³⁴³. Though popular sympathy for the Bishop’s behavior was minimal, Parliament tried to resolve the problem of the Prince’s religion.

According to article 38 of the Tŭrnovo Constitution, the Bulgarian prince could not belong to any other confession than the Christian Orthodox Church. However, the first monarch elected to the throne was allowed to keep his original religion and the same right was given to his first-born heir.³⁴⁴ Since Alexandŭr Battenberg did not found a

³⁴² Iliya Todev, “Josiph I Ekzarh Bŭlgarski- diplomatŭt v raso” (Josiph I Bulgarian Exarch-the Diplomat in a Cassock), *Bŭlgarski Dŭrzavnitsi (1878-1918)* (Sofia, 1996), 84.ŭ Josiph’s task was by no means an easy one. In 1883, the Ottoman government officially warned the Bulgarian Exarch that it did not acknowledge the Bulgarian Constitution and it would not allow the Bulgarian Synod’s convocation in the administrative center of the Exarchate Constantinople. In a letter addressed to the archbishop of Plovdiv Panaret, written on October 24, 1883, Josiph wrote that the Ottoman government insisted that the Bulgarian people from the Principality should not have the right to participate in the administration of the Exarchate, but that this right had to be exercised by church officials or by delegates whose relations with the Exarch would be the same as between the Bulgarian monarch and the Ottoman Sultan. See “The Record of the Minutes of the Bulgarian Exarchate 1883-1886”, folio 3 cited in Petkov, 59.

³⁴³ Perry, 150.

³⁴⁴ *The Tŭrnovo Constitution*, Article 38, *Bŭlgarski konstitutsii i konstitutsionni proekti* (Bulgarian Constitutions and Constitutional Projects) (Sofia, 1990), 24.

dynasty (he married and had a son after his abdication in 1886), the troublesome article 38 was forgotten for a while. The real problems began in 1886 when Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg-Gotha was elected Bulgarian monarch but no Great Power officially recognized him. Since he was not formally recognized, no bride from a royal family could be found who was ready to enter into a morganatic marriage. Finally when the Italian princess Maria Luiza agreed to give her hand in marriage, her father, a devout Catholic, gave his blessing only after an assurance that his grandchildren would be baptized Catholic.³⁴⁵

The Bulgarian Parliament debated an amendment to article 38 to guarantee the future of the Bulgarian royal dynasty at the end of 1892 and the beginning of 1893. It was a stormy debate. Some deputies were absolutely against any amendment of the original text. One, Dr. Stranski complained that the monarch might live for fifty more years and his heir for another fifty years. If so, he complained, Orthodox Bulgaria would be governed by Catholics for a century, and her dynasty would be essentially Catholic.³⁴⁶ Stambolov was one of the most ardent proponents of corrections which could facilitate, in one way or another, the royal marriage, and so permit the founding of a dynasty. In his own words, he would rather agree to a Bulgarian Catholic or Protestant ruler than to some Orthodox Mingreli.³⁴⁷ On December 19, 1892 the Bulgarian Parliament voted an

³⁴⁵ Petūr Stoyanovic, *Mezhdū Dunav i Neva. Knyaz Ferdinand I Būlgarski v ochite na avstro-ungarskata diplomatsia (1894-1898)* (Between the Danube and the Neva Rivers. Prince Ferdinand I Bulgarian in the Eyes of the Austro-Hungarian Diplomacy, 1894-1898) (Sofia, 1999), 30. The marriage was arranged by the influential and ambitious mother of Ferdinand Princess Klementina, who had good relations with the Duke of Parma Robert Burbon-Parma. The Duke agreed to bless the marriage only if article 38 of the Tŭrnovo Constitution were to be eventually changed and his grandchildren baptized as Catholics. See Hristo P. Dermendzhiev, *Būlgarskata kriza i svetoto miropomazvane na prestolonaslednika Knyaz Boris Tŭrnovski 1887-1896* (The Bulgarian Crisis and the Baptizing of the Heir Prince Boris Tŭrnovski 1887-1896) (Sofia, 1998), 18.

³⁴⁶ *Stefan Stambolov pred Narodnoto sŭbranije. Izbrani rechi.* (Stefan Stambolov before the National Assembly. Selected Speeches). Edited by N. Boyadzhieva (Sofia, 1995), 86.

³⁴⁷ Nikolai Davidovic Dadiani Mingreli (1846- 1903) was a minor Georgian aristocrat whose name appeared on the list of possible Bulgarian monarchs after the abdication of Alexandŭr Battenberg.

amendment which changed the content of Article 38 and accordingly, the future heir was not obliged to profess Orthodox Christianity.³⁴⁸

On January 18, 1894, Maria Luiza gave birth to the heir Boris, and four days later he was baptized in the palace by Catholic Archbishop of Sofia and Philippopolis (Plovdiv) Roberto Menini. As the mother of the future heir to the Bulgarian throne, Maria Luiza was presented with a crown of diamonds, rubies, and emeralds arranged in the stripes of the Bulgarian national flag.³⁴⁹ The question of religion remained important enough for Ferdinand to promise to re-baptize the heir as Orthodox if the Russian Emperor would accept the compromise. Metropolitan Kliment³⁵⁰ was chosen to lead the Bulgarian delegation sent to Petersburg in 1895. The infant Boris was duly re-baptized Orthodox on February 2, 1896 in the royal cathedral of Sveti Kral (the Church of the Holy King, now the Church of Sveta Nedelya), Sofia. The child's godfather was Major-General Golenishchev-Kutuzov, representing the Emperor Nicholas II.³⁵¹ Bulgaria's Orthodox character was now assured.

* * *

Evangelos Kofos argues that ecclesiastical autonomy was the first step toward Bulgarian independence.³⁵² In 1872, the Ecumenical Patriarchate had declared the Bulgarian Exarchate schismatic, and the Exarchate initiated a wide-ranging program to

³⁴⁸ Dermendzhiev, 19.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

³⁵⁰ His secular name was Vasil Drumev (1841-1901). From November 1879 to March 1880 he was Prime Minister and briefly served a second term after Alexandŭr Battenberg was deposed on August 9, 1886.

³⁵¹ Stoyanovic, 33.

³⁵² Kofos, 14.

detach the peasants living in the province of Ottoman Macedonia from the orbit of the Patriarchate which had been promoting the Greek cause since the early 1830s. A significant part of the Bulgarian Exarchate's activity in Ottoman Macedonia was the maintenance and control over Orthodox parishes and the establishment of schools. From 1870, it was a responsibility of the Exarchate to maintain Bulgarian primary schools and to appoint teachers. The organization and maintenance of the schooling system was the responsibility of a special educational department. This department was staffed by a director; a secretary responsible for the correspondence of the Exarchate; two inspectors, whose main occupation was to visit Ottoman provinces with Bulgarian populations; an accountant; a registrar; and a typist.³⁵³ The Director was Stefan Lafchiev, a member of the Exarchate Council and Secretary of the Educational Department from 1906. In his memoirs, he recalled that 95% of all problems discussed by the Council were connected with the organization of schools.³⁵⁴ Different strategies were contemplated to make the exarchist schools more attractive to the population.

The various regions of the Ottoman Empire required different means of coping with what was perceived as the potential danger of assimilation and loss of Bulgarian identity. In December 1891, a Bulgarian secondary religious school was opened in Pera in the European quarter of Istanbul. In 1906 the Exarchate bought a massive four-story building in the center of Pera to open a primary school for the children of Bulgarians living in the districts of Pera and Galata. Both had a special uniform, so that when the children went about the city, everybody knew that they were Bulgarians.³⁵⁵ In 1897-98,

³⁵³ Lafchiev, *Spomeni za Bŭlgarskata Ekzarhiya.*, 37.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 38.

³⁵⁵ Lafchiev, 58-59.

1,312 boys and 644 girls in the Gornodebar and Reka *kaaza* (districts) were enrolled in schools opened by the Exarchate.³⁵⁶ However, the importance of these institutions to the efficient indoctrination of the local population should not be exaggerated. The conditions were miserable; new school buildings were virtually non-existent and the pupils gathered in old peasant houses lacking any kind of educational materials.³⁵⁷ Ecclesiastical communities consisting of respected local elders in charge of teacher appointments preferred to hire local people to avoid paying for accommodation. In 1897, a letter signed by the peasants of Drenok to the Church municipality in Debar asked that Anton Jovchev, from the same village, be appointed as a teacher for the year 1898-99. Jovchev had passed the first grade of the secondary school in Debar and his fellow-villagers, determined to economize on the cost of food and accommodation for a teacher from outside, considered him the best choice for the available position.³⁵⁸

Nevertheless, church communities became increasingly involved in the encouragement and dissemination of nationalistic propaganda. At its meeting on December 19, 1897, the Bulgarian community of Debar decided to bribe an influential Ottoman administrator in the region to prevent the opening of any Serbian schools. The necessary amount of 30 Turkish liras was to be raised by the mayors of the nearby villages.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁶ Gligor Todorovski, *Srpsko-Makedonskite odnosi v minaloto* (Serbian-Macedonian Relations in the Past) (Skopje, 1987), 19.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

³⁵⁸ "Pismo na selyanite, kmetot i parventsite od selo Drenok, isprateno do Tsarkovnata opshtina vo Debar na 15 yuni 1897 godina" (A Letter from the Peasants, the Mayor and the elders of the Village Drenok, sent to the Church Municipality in Debar on 15 of June, 1897.), cited in Todorovski, 21.

³⁵⁹ Todorovski, 21.

The unsuccessful Ilinden uprising of August 1903 had many negative repercussions on the activity of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Ottoman Macedonia. Bulgarian teachers appointed by the Exarchate were arrested for spying for the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)³⁶⁰. In some cases, the suspicion of the Ottoman authorities was justified. Lafchiev describes in his memoirs how Garvanov and Sarafov tried to pressure him into appointing committed revolutionaries as teachers in some schools in Macedonia.³⁶¹ When he refused to comply, the IMRO leaders threatened his life.

The clergy themselves were very divided about how to organize and conduct more successful national indoctrination in Macedonia and Thrace. After the inspector previously in charge of the Educational Department, Naumov, was fired for misuse of funds and replaced by Lafchiev in 1906, a number of policy changes were implemented. First, the new director stopped the practice of sending 13- to 14-year-old Bulgarian boys to study in Turkish secondary schools (*idadie*). The assumption that such a cadre could easily become clerks at the Ottoman administration and facilitate an eventual pro-Exarchist policy had proved mistaken.³⁶²

The progress of nationalist indoctrination can be traced through statistics which were now circulated, based on the annual reports sent in by teachers in the Bulgarian Exarchist schools. Up to 1906, reporting had been a mere formality. Nobody seemed

³⁶⁰ The original title of the organization was “The Bulgarian Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization”. It was changed in 1902 to “The Secret Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Organization”, whilst in 1905 it became “The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization”, giving it the most popular acronym, IMRO. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History., 236.

³⁶¹ Lafchiev, 62-3.

³⁶² Lafchiev, 50-52.

concerned about possible errors or deliberate exaggerating of student numbers to extract additional funds. After Lafchiev's appointment, however, strict control was imposed over the annual reports and they were sent back if seemed unsatisfactory.³⁶³

It was also suggested that the main efforts of indoctrination be shifted from the regions around Odrin and Strumica to those of Veles and Skopje, which were increasingly endangered by rival Serbian activity.³⁶⁴ In some cases, the lack of adequate information and effective response caused frictions between devoted officials working for the Exarchate and the governmental authorities. At a meeting with Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitŭr Stanchov, Lafchiev tried to present as an urgent problem the unclear status of the so-called Kutso-Vlahs³⁶⁵ and the difficulties they posed for the indoctrination campaign being carried out by the Exarchate. The majority of the Kutso-Vlahs living in Macedonia were under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate and were married, buried, and baptized by Bulgarian priests. Since the early 1900s, however, the Romanian government began a campaign to establish a separate see to deal with the religious needs of the Kutso-Vlachs on grounds of their national distinctiveness. Unfortunately, for Lafchiev, Stanchov showed little interest and sent the representative of the Exarchate to the director of the political department of the Ministry, who did not recognize the threat to the indoctrinal program.³⁶⁶

³⁶³ Ibid., 30-34

³⁶⁴ Lafchiev, 42-3.

³⁶⁵ Ethnic group which spoke a Romanian dialect.

³⁶⁶ Lafchiev, 82-84.

During the 1886-87 academic year 491 schools were opened by the Exarchate in Macedonia and Thrace, and 640 teachers engaged to teach 23,810 pupils.³⁶⁷ Table 1 shows the number of pupils attending schools opened by the Exarchate in various towns of Ottoman Macedonia:

Table 1 ³⁶⁸

Year	The number of pupils attending schools opened by the Exarchate (in total)	Thessaloni ki (Solun)	Ohrid	Bitola	Debar	Odrin	Tulcha	Küstendja
1879	-	6.000	6.000	2.000	-	6.000	-	2.000
1880	-	-	6.000	10.000	-	-	-	-
1881	50.000	-	6.000	-	-	-	-	-
1882	100.000	-	-	-	600	-	6.000	-
1884	603.242	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1885	474 .907	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

³⁶⁷ Kolev, 47.

³⁶⁸ Ibid., 47.

In the winter of 1904, the situation on the frontier of Ottoman Macedonia and Bulgaria was very unstable. The refugee problem which the failure of the Ilinden Uprising (1903) had helped to aggravate in Macedonia continued after a series of military clashes between insurgent Bulgarian bands and Turkish forces in the district of Serres in October 1903. The British Consul, R.W. Graves, reported that overall 7,000 or 8,000 people had arrived from Upper and Lower Draglishte, Obidim, Kremen and Belitsa (Razlog) and Gouzvitsa near Nevrokop where their homes had been destroyed.³⁶⁹

The increasing numbers of refugees from Macedonia and Ottoman Thrace in Bulgaria put enormous pressure on the Bulgarian authorities, which lacked the means to settle the constant flood of displaced and dispossessed people. Repatriating the fugitives was not an option since the winter had already set in with unusual severity, and there was no guarantee of their survival even if food and shelter could be provided.³⁷⁰ The Metropolitan of Varna Simeon Preslavski, organized a charity committee to collect and distribute financial help for the Bulgarian refugees from Macedonia and Thrace and became its honorary president.³⁷¹ From September 16 to October 17, the Rila Monastery sheltered 2,682 refugees and Abbot Joanikii distributed regular clothes, shoes, and food supplies from the Charity Committee.³⁷² The latter appealed to various cultural and

³⁶⁹ See Document 238, 275. "Doklad ot angliiskiya generalen konsul v Solun do poslanika v Tsarigrad za razrusheni bŭlgarski sela v Makedonia po vreme na vŭstanieto, zhitelite na koito izbyagali v Bŭlgaria" (A Report from the English Consul General R. W. Graves to the Ambassador in Tsarigrad about Destroyed Bulgarian Villages in Macedonia during the Uprising), Migratsionnite dvizheniya na bŭlgarite, 1878- 1941 (Migrations of the Bulgarians, 1878-1941), Volume I (1878-1912) (Sofia, 1993).

³⁷⁰ Ibid., See also documents 238, 274-75.

³⁷¹ The committee was organized by the Metropolitan and Professor Agura and included representatives of all political parties. See document 231, "Vŭzvanie ot Blagodetelnata Komisiya v Sofia za podpomagane na bezantsite ot Makedoniya i Trakiya (An Appeal by the Beneficent Committee to Assist the Refugees from Macedonia and Thrace), Migratsionnite dvizheniya na bŭlgarite, 267.

³⁷² See telegrams 232/233, Migratsionnite dvizheniya na bŭlgarite, 268-69.

political organizations for donations, as a result of its appeals, by the middle of October 1903, the significant amount of 150,000 *levs* was collected.

Territorial changes resulting from the wars in 1912-13 led to spontaneous outbursts of religious intolerance in Bulgaria. For example, in 1913 the Bulgarian Patriarchate decided to return the Bulgarian *pomaks* to the bosom of the Christian Orthodox Church. The campaign resulted in numerous internal migrations in the Eastern Rhodope region. A large group of *pomaks* left their native village Byal izvor (near Ardino); and while passing through Razgrad, the *hodza* [religious leader] decided to baptize twelve newborn infants and give them Bulgarian names to avoid further pressure from the authorities.³⁷³ Not all *pomaks* were willing to accept forceful “conversion” to Christianity. The *hodza* of Hüsemli (now Diyamandovo) swore that the local *pomak* population would not even communicate in Bulgarian, because this was the language of infidels.³⁷⁴ The resistance of the *pomaks* to the forcible change of their Islamic names resulted in bloody conflicts between the police and the local population and numerous casualties in the villages of Brashten, Zhizhevo, Ablanitsa, Vülkosel, and Zrantsa in the Western Rhodopes.³⁷⁵

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³⁷³ V. Zlatilov, “Iztochnorodopskata oblast v politikata na turskiya natsionalizm 1913-1944” (The Eastern Rhodope Region and the Turkish Nationalistic Policy 1913-1944), *Istoricheski Pregled*, 2 (1990), 40.

³⁷⁴ Zlatilov, 41.

³⁷⁵ It is curious that only two years later, in 1914, political speculations made union between the Liberal Party of Vasil Radoslavov and local *pomak* elders possible. The *hodzas* declared the green bulletin of the Liberals “sacred” [green is a sacred colour in islam] and persuaded the local illiterate population to vote with the color of the Prophet of Islam. A declaration signed by the elders was sent to all mosques in the Rhodopi region claiming that the Liberals would protect the interests of the Muslims. Whoever hesitated and did not vote with the green bulletin was considered a traitor of the faith. In return, after the elections Radoslavov was to bring back the names of 150,000 *pomaks* who had been baptized during the campaign of 1912/1913. Petar Dulgerov, *Razpnati dushi (Crussified Souls)*, Sofia: 2000, 20-22.

As we saw (in Chapter I) Serbian historians have often suggested that Ottoman rule threatened the very existence of the Serbian people. However, the proverb “no grass grows where the foot of the Turk has trod” seemed inapplicable in the case of the Serbian Church. In fact, religious activity did not cease, and Serbian church structures were preserved under the Ottomans. The traveler, B. Kuripechich, who visited the Serbian lands around 1530, has left us an account of the good condition in which the Serbian monastery of Dobruna was maintained by its eight monks.³⁷⁶ His evidence is supported by other contemporary observers—such as B. Ramberti (1534), K. Zen (1550), and M. Pigafeta (1567), who mentioned the functioning monasteries of Milishevo and Radavanica.³⁷⁷ Popović, a Serbian cultural historian, notes that in the late seventeenth century about two hundred monks were working in a Serbian religious center at Raca by the Drina River.³⁷⁸ The number of monasteries in Ottoman Bosnia and Hercegovina was even higher than in Serbia proper. In the sixteenth century, Zitomišlic, Ozren, Lomnica, Vozuca, and Mostanica were all functioning. Between 1524 and 1537, nine Christian churches were built in Ottoman Dalmatia.³⁷⁹ From 1585, the monks of the Serbian Hilendar monastery could travel across the Ottoman Empire without any official obstacles. Archbishop Prohor of Ohrid convoked a church council in 1528-29 to discuss urgent religious matters and a few Serbian bishops from Southern Serbia participated. After some disagreements between Prohor and the bishop of Smederevo Pavle, the latter declared the archdiocese of Peć to be independent from the authority of Ohrid, but a

³⁷⁶ *Istorija Jugoslavije*, 310.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 310.

³⁷⁸ Popović, *Vidovdan in casni krst.*, 49 cited in Branimir Anzulović, *Heavenly Serbia*, 34.

³⁷⁹ *Istorija Jugoslavije.*, 310.

quarter of a century was to pass before Makarii Sokolović, brother of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokolović, was able to call himself Patriarch of Ipek (Peć) in 1557³⁸⁰.

Some historians argue that from 1557 to 1766 the Patriarchate of Peć represented the authority of the medieval Serbian state and the identification of the Serbian Church with the Serbian state was symbolized by the day-to-day celebrations of the lives of Serbia's saintly rulers in the liturgy.³⁸¹ The beginning of the eighteenth century certainly saw an increase in religious and cultural activities among the Serbs from the Diaspora. The Serbian scholastic gymnasium, which opened in Sremski Karlovci around 1733, is often cited by Serbian historians as the first center of a new type of literary culture that exploited historical events and popularized heroic images of medieval Serbian rulers. In fact hagiographic descriptions constituted a significant part of the so-called Srbljak, which was a compilation of services and prayers dedicated to Serbian saints, arranged according to the liturgical year. The first full version of the Srbljak was published in 1761 and reprinted in Venice at a later date. Orthodox Christianity was certainly a badge of identity for a significant number of Serb-speaking subjects of the Habsburg Empire, if not the only one. In a catechism of 1772 by Stojan Šobat, the answer to the question "who are you?" was: "I am a man, a Serb, and an Orthodox Christian".³⁸² The Austrian authorities did not allow the publication of Serbian books, so religious books were published mainly in St. Petersburg, Venice and Leipzig. In 1790, Emanuil Janković and Damijan Kaulici both signed petitions, independently of each other, for the founding of a Serbian printing

³⁸⁰ Istoriha Jugoslavije, 311.

³⁸¹ Wendy Bracewell, 144.

³⁸² Ibid., 145-46.

house in Novi Sad to meet the needs of the Serbian Orthodox Church there, but their request was rejected by the authorities in Vienna.³⁸³

Serbian historians suggests that most of Serbia's secular elite was either killed in battle or converted by force during the Ottoman advance. In consequence, they claim, the Serbian clergy had to lead the community. However, the clergy only eventually adjusted to the new heroic national rhetoric in times of uprisings, migrations, and punitive Ottoman campaigns. The migration of the Serbs in 1690 that followed an unsuccessful Austro-Serbian campaign against the Ottomans was indeed led by the clergy. Although the Serbian "Moses", Patriarch Arsenije III led his flock away from the promised land rather than towards it, and his concerns were religious rather than national or nationalistic, but the episode was to be represented as national.

In the late 1890s, this episode became a favorite motif of the Serbian artists, and in 1896 the Serbian Patriarch Georgije Branković commissioned a large canvas depicting the exodus for exhibition in the Patriarchate Palace in Belgrade.³⁸⁴ Paja Jovanović was flattered to receive the commission, and the painting was also exhibited at the Archbishop's palace in Sremski Karlovci. Later on, reproductions appeared in all Serbian periodicals, followed by popular lithographs in color.³⁸⁵

The shift of Serbian literary and cultural life to the Habsburg territories did not diminish the influence of the Orthodox Church. On the contrary, with the establishment of the scholastic gymnasium in Sremski Karlovci (1733-1739), the level of education

³⁸³ Pavle Ivić, Mitar Pešikan, "Serbian Printing", *The History of Serbian Culture*, 144.

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

³⁸⁵ J. Milojković-Djurić, *Tradition and Avant-Garde. Literature and Art in Serbian Culture 1900-1918* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 18.

among the Serbian clergy was significantly increased. However, living within the borders of a Catholic Empire hid other risks. In 1726, despite some previous promises given by Leopold I that ensured the religious freedom of the newcomers, a Catholic parish was founded in Smederevo. In Belgrade a Latin school was opened by Jesuits. As Simeon Pišćević explains in his memoirs, Slavonia's Serbs refused even to learn German, because of the potential threat to their religion.³⁸⁶ The Serbian clergy feared assimilation and felt endangered by increasing Catholic prozelytization. The Serbian bishop of Arad, Vikentii Jovanović, tried to counter it by opening a Russian-Slav primary school in the city and inviting a Russian, Pavel Suvorov, to teach there.³⁸⁷

Nineteenth-century Serb national rhetoric presents the increasing politicization of the Serbian Church from the 16th to the 18th centuries as an inevitable development. Since all other Serb organizations had been dismantled, the Christian Church necessarily became the prime focus for Serbs, a lighthouse in a stormy sea.³⁸⁸ Any effort to “free” the Serbian people would have been doomed, it is argued, without the support of the so-called “holy apostles” at the Patriarchate of Peć.³⁸⁹ In the nineteenth century, the belief spread that Karadjordje himself had helped bear upon his shoulders the reliquary from Studenica Monastery containing the relics of St. Stefan, the first Crowned King of Serbia. The alleged act was symbolic, proclaiming that Karadjordje meant to revive the ancient glory of Serbia under the Nemanja dynasty.³⁹⁰

³⁸⁶ Pišćević, Memoari, 12.

³⁸⁷ Istorija Jugoslavije, 378.

³⁸⁸ Alfred Stead, Servia by the Servians (London, 1909), 154.

³⁸⁹ See S. M. Veselinović, “Religion”, cited in Stead, 154.

³⁹⁰ Božidar Kovačević, “Crkva Svetog Save” (The Church of Saint Sava), The Serbian Orthodox Church. Its Past and Present, volume 6 (Belgrade, 1983), 15.

In 1831, Miloš Obrenović's protégé and close friend, Melentius, was appointed head of the Serbian autocephalous Church.³⁹¹ After Melentius' death, the prince continued his policy of placing his people in key Church posts. His former secretary, Peter, became the second Serbian archbishop. Peter's contribution to the effective administration of the Serbian Church was immense. However, in 1859 following the abdication of Alexander Karadjordjević, he had to flee for political reasons. Michael (Mihailo), Bishop of Šabac, was elected Serbian Archbishop in his place. He governed the Serbian Church for almost forty years (1859-1881; 1889). However, his popularity and devotion to the Serbian cause did not deter Milan from dismissing him in October, 1881, an effort to reduce Russian influence in Serbia³⁹².

Nominally internal control over religious, legal, and financial issues belonged to the Synod. This comprised all the bishops of the five Serbian dioceses: Archdiocese of Belgrade and the sees of Šabac, Niš, Čačak, and the Timok (which had its seat at Zaječar (Zaichar)).³⁹³ Each bishop ran the internal affairs of his own diocese but was responsible to the Metropolitan and the Council in judicial matters. The Council elected a bishop to a vacant see from three chosen candidates, and the election had to be ratified by the prince.³⁹⁴ The problem with Mihailo, however, demonstrated that the Serbian monarch

³⁹¹ Stead, 154.

³⁹² Educated at the Kiev Ecclesiastical Academy, Mihailo had a great respect for Russia and helped increase the Russian influence in Serbia. When in 1881 the Serbian government decided to impose new taxes on the church, Mihailo protested vehemently. Milan used this as a convenient pretext for dismissal. Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism. Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879- 1886 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), 175-176.

³⁹³ The last one did not exist separately in the 1860s, when Denton visited Serbia. He mentions only four dioceses—namely, Šabac, Negotin, Niš and Čačak. See Stead, 155; Denton, 86.

³⁹⁴ Stead, 155.

was able to interfere in ecclesiastical matters and even dismiss a Metropolitan without the approval of the Synod. When the Russian Emperor Alexander II was assassinated in March, 1881, Milan forbade Mihailo to deliver a funeral oration in honor of the late monarch³⁹⁵. Since Milan could not control the Synod, he altered its composition through a new law, introduced in December, 1882, which allowed the Serbian government to appoint enough members to form a majority in the Synod. In March 1883 there were elections for a new metropolitan. The government's candidate was a retired professor of theology, Archimandrite Theodije Mraović³⁹⁶. The latter was formally recognized by the Austrian government and Milan gained a completely subservient church hierarchy which would eventually help him promote his own national policy through the Serbian Church.

By the beginning of the twentieth century there were 976 secular parish priests in five Serbian dioceses. The statistics provided by the Serbian government for 1903 show two Catholic, one Protestant, six Jewish and nine Muslim religious leaders in Serbia.³⁹⁷ A total of 2,448,139 people were reported to be Christian Orthodox.

Since the Ottoman occupation of medieval Serbia the link between the people and the clergy had become increasingly strong. Nationalist propaganda later used this fact to prove that the Christian Orthodox religion was the cement of modern Serbian identity. In the *hatti-sherif* of 1830 the Sultan agreed to restore the autonomy of the Serbian Church which had been abolished in 1766. Miloš was now able to regulate ecclesiastical matters as he pleased. He regarded the church as an arm of the state and for a long while the

³⁹⁵ Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 177.

³⁹⁶ The election took place, however, Theodosije had to be recognized by another bishop. Since Serbian bishops refused to do so, he traveled to Karlovac to be confirmed by the Orthodox Patriarch in Austria-Hungary, German Angelić. Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, 180-181.

³⁹⁷ Stead, 156.

nature of Serb piety and commitment to their church was overlooked. In fact everyday life was full of superstitions and customs that were incompatible with the teachings of the Church. For example, the custom of *slava* (celebration), always described as essentially Serbian, had nothing to do with Christianity since it glorified a pagan household protector only formally replaced by a saint.

The Serb's religion was enriched by peasant superstition, historical mythology, and official propaganda. Ljubodrag Ristić has examined travel books, composed by early nineteenth century writers like Joakim Vujić, Djordje Magarasević, Miloš Milojević, Mita Rakić—all of whom considered relics of Serbian saints buried in churches and monasteries to have miraculous, healing, and sacred powers.³⁹⁸ At the beginning of the 1860s, an Anglican clergyman described a village fair on St. Mark's Day (May 7-8, two days after the feast of St. George). That day was dedicated to the memory of the dead, and to the surprise of the observer, the dead were indeed honored by dancing among their graves in the Cemetery of St. Mark on the outskirts of Belgrade.³⁹⁹ The road leading to the gate of the cemetery was lined by canvas booths, where wine, cream, Hungarian beer, cakes, and gingerbread were sold. There were lotteries, gypsy musicians singing Serbian songs, and men and women dancing with such vigor that the perspiration streamed down their faces and necks.⁴⁰⁰ The joy of the festival was little disturbed by a funeral

³⁹⁸ Ristić, "Serbian Holy Places", 67.

³⁹⁹ William Denton, *Servia and the Servians* (London, 1862), 96.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 99.

procession to bury an infant, whose mother was wailing in a way that, in the words of the author, was difficult to forget.⁴⁰¹

There were some shrines which were revered by both Serbs and Muslims. The Serbian consul in Priština, Branislav Nušić, recalls that the Serbs were allowed to come to the Pirinac mosque in Priština and light candles for good health.⁴⁰² Many Serbs came to pray in that particular mosque, because they believed Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović had been buried there before being transferred to the monastery of Ravanica.⁴⁰³ At Vranje (Vrania), another famous mosque, the “Mosque of the Crusaders”, had been constructed on the foundations of an earlier church after the Ottoman conquest. Rumors spread that its minaret was about to collapse until both a crescent and a cross were placed on the top and it “saved” the construction. This shrine was visited by both Muslims and a great number of Serbs in hopes of being cured of maladies.⁴⁰⁴

In 1913, an obelisk of St. Lazar, dedicated both to those who died in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, was erected directly in front the tomb of Sultan Murad. The space intended as a place for worship was turned into a shrine (*tekke*) visited by sick Christians and Muslims. The number of visitors was unusually high on St. George’s Day, which was celebrated by both Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Albanians with feasts of roast lamb and dancing.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰¹ Denton, 101.

⁴⁰² Ristić, “Serbian Holy Places”, 69.

⁴⁰³ Two of the most famous buildings dedicated to Prince Lazar were Ravanica, built between 1377 and 1381, and Lazarica (1377-1380). The first was intended as the mausoleum for him; the second one was built at the Prince’s court at Kruševac. Vojislav Korać, “Architecture in Medieval Serbia,” The History of Serbian Culture, 85.

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁴⁰⁵ Olive Lodge, Peasant Life in Yugoslavia (London, 1941), 31.

In the 1880s, in the kingdom of Serbia and Old Serbia, many churches were erected on the foundations of mosques. Another case is that of the tomb of Saint Lazar⁴⁰⁶ near Priština. Every year on Palm Sunday (*Lazarov subota*), both Muslim and Christian women handed out rice and coffee to the crowd in the courtyard.⁴⁰⁷ According to Lodge's observation, it was common during the service for those at the back of the church "to hold long conversations and gossip but no one seemed to mind in the least!"⁴⁰⁸

Branimir Anzulović suggests that Serbia was unique in creating a national pantheon. No fewer than twenty-six medieval rulers were made saints.⁴⁰⁹ In fact, there is no other Slavic nation, either Orthodox or Catholic, which has as many saints as the Serbs. The Serbian Church provided religious justification for nationalistic indoctrination by putting the holy images of Saint Sava, the martyr Lazar, and many other saints to the service of official national propaganda. Anzulović has coined even a special term, "Saint Savaism" to describe how Sava, the medieval Archbishop, was gradually transformed into a father of the nation and a holy icon of the nineteenth century.⁴¹⁰

According to the official legend this practice of canonizing saints had been introduced by Saint Sava himself, when he witnessed myrrh flowing from the relics of his father Simeon Nemanja.⁴¹¹ In the seventeenth century, when Saint Sava was adopted as the patron saint of the Serbian schools, his *slava* was celebrated on his name day,

⁴⁰⁶ The head and corpse of Lazar were buried separately.

⁴⁰⁷ Lodge, 34.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., 165.

⁴⁰⁹ Anzulović, 24.

⁴¹⁰ Hobsbawm defines "the holy icons of nationalism" as shared images or practices that could mobilize and unite a certain community. See Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 71-72.

⁴¹¹ Kovačević, 16; Jovan Grčić, *Istorija Srpske književnosti* (Novi Sad, 1903), 12-3.

January 14/27⁴¹². In 1847, when a group of pupils from the Belgrade Lyceum transformed the existing “Dušan’s regiment” (*Dušanov polk*) into the Organization of the Serbian Youth, their seal bore the image of St. Sava blessing two Serbian children holding hands over the Serbian coat of arms.⁴¹³ The icon of Saint Sava was the only decoration that Reverend Denton could see in the apartment of Michael, Archbishop of Belgrade and Metropolitan of Serbia during his visit in 1862.⁴¹⁴ In January 1895, the Society for the “Construction of the Church of Saint Sava” was founded in Belgrade, and in March of the same year it launched an appeal to all Serbs to begin donating to the monument.⁴¹⁵ A temporary wooden chapel was erected in twelve days and solemnly consecrated in April 1895; though, construction of the monument was not completed until 1927.

Though Ottoman domination of the region had not impeded the earlier process of politicizing the Serbian Church, it had changed it by requiring its leaders to act as representatives of their communities. The “Great Exodus” of 1690 greatly increased the Church’s authority over secular issues. That Serbian clergy was involved in two uprisings in the beginning of the 19th century was symptomatic, perhaps of this increased political involvement. In conversation with a British journalist, the Serbian bishop of Niš said:

⁴¹² Lodge, 170.

⁴¹³ Among the members of the patriotic organization were the Serbian politicians J. Gruić, M. Janković, J. Ristić, R. Miloiković. Slavenko Terzić, *Srbija i Grčka (1856-1903). Borba za Balkan (Serbia and Greece. Struggle for the Balkans)* (Belgrade, 1992), 64.

⁴¹⁴ Denton, 78.

⁴¹⁵ The relics of Saint Sava were burnt in 1594-5 by Sinan, the pasha of Belgrade. M. Janković, “The Memorial Church of Saint Sava at Vračar,” *The Serbian Orthodox Church. Its Past and Present*, Volume 7 (Belgrade, 1989), 14.

“Please tell our English friends that it would be much better if, instead of sending us Bibles, they were to send us some guns and cannons”⁴¹⁶.

After Serbia became autonomous, religious feasts became the favorite occasion for politicians to show in public Orthodoxy’s closeness to the Serbian national identity. Olive Lodge claims that the Serbian church played a crucial role in promoting affection of the Motherland, especially among illiterate peasants.⁴¹⁷ The narthex was used to store wreaths for funerals of local elders and the national flag for display on state occasions was also stored there.⁴¹⁸

In his Servia and the Servians, Reverend Denton describes the celebration of mass on a Saint George Day, in the beginning of the 1860s. By 8 o’clock in the morning, the main cathedral of Belgrade was already three parts filled by men of all classes and representatives of the Serbian ruling elite. Prince Michael, the Minister of Police, the Bishops of Čačak, and Negotin were in attendance, together with crowds of ordinary Serbs.⁴¹⁹ The successful symbiosis achieved by the state in linking the indoctrination in nationalism with the activity of the Church was not achieved overnight. It was the result of deliberate coordination and required a high level of political thought and strategy to achieve.

Serbian policy of the early 1860s did not rely entirely on the Church. For example, secret agents were used to prepare the Christian population of the Ottoman

⁴¹⁶ Čedomil Mijatović, Servia and the Servians, 50-53.

⁴¹⁷ Lodge, 161.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 163.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 72-3.

Empire for a future uprising.⁴²⁰ On the other hand, the Church was put in charge of primary schools in regions with mixed population, where the struggle between the rival Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek propaganda was fought in so uncompromising manner later. Serbia had already started to send religious literature in Serbian to Veles and Kriva Palanka as early as 1858.⁴²¹ Terzić claims that in the middle of 1858, the Serbian government answered request for 1,600 books to be sent to village schools in western Macedonia. The request came that of Jordan Hadji-Konstantinov-Djinot and the name of the villages were Kuchevishte, Banjani, Kozle, Drachevo, Poboziye, and Galichnik.⁴²²

In 1862, a Serbian agent Stefan Verković was sent to Serres (Sjar) to investigate the most suitable means to block Greek indoctrination of the Slavic population and to start organizing a Serbian one.⁴²³ The establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate posed an obstacle to Serbia's policy in Ottoman Macedonia. To facilitate the efforts of the Serbian government to promote the national cause, a seminary was opened at Prizren in 1871. At the same time, the seminary in Belgrade opened a special department for "children from all Serbian lands remaining under Ottoman rule."⁴²⁴ However, organizational problems delayed the development of Serbia's promotional campaign and had not developed fully before the unification of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia took place in 1885. The different circumstances after the unification of the Principality with Eastern Rumelia endangered Serbian interests, and by the end of 1885, Minister Novaković had undertaken intensive

⁴²⁰ Terzić, 163.

⁴²¹ Ibid., 164-5.

⁴²² Ibid, 165.

⁴²³ Terzić, 163.

⁴²⁴ Ibid., 171.

discussions with the Greek representative in Belgrade, Nazos, on the prospects of a Serbian-Greek agreement on a future division of Macedonia into Greek and Serbian spheres. The Greek side offered to drop their claims to Strumica, Bitola and the region of Ohrid. For his part Nazos suggested a new dividing line to follow along Lake of Ohrid, through Krushevo, Prilep, Melnik and Nevrokop, with adjustments only in the region of Melnik and Nevrokop.⁴²⁵

The talks between Novaković and Nazos raised the question of a corresponding ecclesiastical network in Macedonia. However, Serbia's lack of a well-organized church structure in the region was a major deficiency, and so the shrewd Novaković was sent as ambassador to Constantinople in 1886 to expand it.⁴²⁶

In March 1887, a new department was founded within the Serbian Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. It was charged with responsibility both for education and for Serb ecclesiastical organizations, and its prerogatives were extended to territories beyond Serbia's frontier. In 1889, the department was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its main responsibility became the establishment of Serbian schools, control of religious municipalities, bookstores, and stipends for Macedonians to study in Serbia.⁴²⁷ The Serbian government also provided the Patriarchate with financial support to help facilitate the bishops' upkeep and control of Serbian schools and cultural organizations in Macedonia.⁴²⁸ Serbian consulates were opened in all the main cities of Ottoman Macedonia, Skopje, Bitola, Thessaloníki, and Priština. The Serbian consul in

⁴²⁵ Ibid., 263.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., 276-77.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., 289.

⁴²⁸ The amount was 200 napoleons or 4,000 *denars* annually. See Terzić, 289.

Thessaloníki, Petar Karastojanović, met the Greek metropolitan Grigorii and had a productive talk with him about the urgency of a Serbian-Greek agreement against the activity of the Bulgarian Exarchate.⁴²⁹

From 1897 to 1902 the Serbian government tried to obtain an official appointment for the Serbian bishop Firmiljan in Skopje. The so-called “Firmilijan’s question” was resolved on May 9 (22), 1902, when the bishop obtained an official document from the Sultan’s chancellery (*irade*). Serbian-Bulgarian arguments over appointments of bishops in the parishes of Ottoman Macedonia were followed by the Bulgarians with great concern. In fact, the Bulgarian media reflected political and religious developments in neighboring Serbia more than they reflected these of any other Balkan country.

The Firmilijan question (1897-1902) initiated a whole series of articles on the Serbian political and economic development in some Bulgarian newspapers. Dnevnik (The Diary) was one of the papers that presented the Serbian claims to a Serbian bishop in the see of Skopje in detail. The newspaper declared that the conflict was not only between the Serbian protégé, Firmiljan, and the Bulgarian bishop Sinesii, but that it was also related to current economic difficulties of Serbia.⁴³⁰ The appointment of Firmiljan would widen Serbian influence in the region and encourage trade.

The official appointment of the Serbian bishop strained the relations between the two countries. The Serbian Consul Ivan Djaja was accused of betraying Serbian interests during the campaign for Firmiljan’s inauguration and dismissed from his post.⁴³¹ Djaja,

⁴²⁹ Terzić, 290.

⁴³⁰ Ibid., 2.

⁴³¹ Dnevnik (The Diary), 10, 17/05/1902, 3.

who was suspected of pro-Bulgarian sentiments, was replaced by Pavel Marinović. The Bulgarian government contested the appointment of Firmiljan before the Sublime Porte and the Patriarchate in Constantinople.⁴³² As a result, the Ottoman government reconsidered its position and changed the content of the *irade*. Firmiljan was appointed—as “vicar for life” but not bishop. The Serbian diplomatic agent in Constantinople Gruić immediately protested.⁴³³

* * *

Many foreigners also commented on the Bulgarians’ lack of religious piety and devotion. The British consuls in Bulgaria during the 1870s, St. Clair and H. Brophy, reported that they had never seen a burning oil lamp in front of the icon of the Madonna in any Bulgarian peasant house.⁴³⁴ In the 1890s, Dicey, who traveled across the country, wrote that he had seen neither icons of the Virgin Mary nor roadside shrines nor crosses, unlike in Russia.⁴³⁵ Hristo Tatarchev recalls in his memoirs that in March 1896 one of the leaders of the IMRO, Boris Sarafov, visited the Zograf and Hilendar monasteries in Amos as a pilgrim and tried to steal money from their safes. His initiative to acquire financial means for the organization was supported by then secretary of the Supreme Council, Dame Gruev.⁴³⁶

The same lack of religious scruple was reported among the Serbs, whom Western observers described as indifferent. Serbian monasteries and churches were not only

⁴³² *Ibid*, 3.

⁴³³ *Dnevnik*, 11, 18/05/1902, 1.

⁴³⁴ Clair, Brophy, *A Residence in Bulgaria, or Notes, on the Resources and Administration of Turkey*, 5.

⁴³⁵ Dicey, 64.

⁴³⁶ Hristo Tatarchev, *Vŭtreshna Makedeno-Odrinska revolyutsionna organizatsia kato mitologichna i realna sŭshnost* (The IMRO as Myth and Reality) (Sofia, 1995), 54.

places of worship but places of refuge in times of distress. The peasantry visited them for great religious festivals and *slava* celebrations; but since the beginning of the nineteenth century, national indoctrinators used them more and more as symbolic “meeting-places” where the fate of the community was decided, and where plans for revolt against the Ottomans were made. In Lodge’s words, the political situation was debated in the churchyards and monastery enclosures because Serbian peasants considered themselves safe there from the authorities.⁴³⁷

After Serbian autonomy was achieved (1830), some mosques had been destroyed and the demolition of Muslim religious buildings continued into the first two decades of the twentieth century. As soon as the Serbs conquered Prizren, after the First Balkan War in 1912, they reconstructed the mosque near the monastery of Sveta Petka into a church, although the minaret was not taken down until 1925.⁴³⁸ Despite the rhetoric with which both the Serbian and Bulgarian states promoted nationalism whenever the role of Orthodoxy was debated, the politicization of the Serbian Church and the Bulgarian Exarchate during the nineteenth century seemed unquestionable.

The turn of the twentieth century witnessed bitter arguments between the Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek churches over earthly, purely nationalistic matters. Obtaining the sultan’s decrees (*berat*) for a metropolitan’s appointment in Macedonia, the establishments of schools, monasteries and cemeteries gradually became more important than internal spirituality and religious devotion. Religious municipalities and the symbiosis between schooling system with carefully controlled schools, and churches

⁴³⁷ Lodge, 179.

⁴³⁸ Lodge, 175.

which provided a venue for the transmission of popular nationalism. Almost every appointment of a bishop in the Macedonian dioceses was contested by rivals of different national allegiance. In 1897, the appointment of the Serbian archbishop Firmilijan to the see of Skopje (see pp. 158) provoked a long-lasting conflict between the exarchists and the patriarchists, because bishops deeply involved in the process of “indoctrinating” the Macedonian population, could decide the fate of the existing schools and the final success of the propaganda campaign in general.

So far as relations between the church and state within the borders of the existing nation states were concerned, the clergy in neither Bulgaria nor Serbia could rival the secular ruling elite. Church leaders in Serbia were frequently changed for political reasons. As a result, none of the nineteenth century bishops could match the respect and authority of the Bulgarian Exarch Iosif I (1840-1915), who for forty years seemed to personify the Exarchate itself. In the autumn of 1883, however, when Exarch Iosif I was not invited to the ceremony of the circumcision of the Sultan’s sons, the oversight was interpreted by the Bulgarian government not only as a sign that the Sublime Porte did not recognize his official status but as a blatant national insult as well.

In fact, the Exarch wished to distance himself from any involvement in the process of Bulgarizing Macedonia and did not appoint any candidates of Macedonian origin to the ecclesiastical organization. The Exarchate was the main transmitter of Bulgarian nationalism among the local population. It had a symbolic role. It was after all, an ecclesiastical structure; however, since the 1880s its main efforts had been focused on enlarging of the Bulgarian schooling network in Macedonia, and on preaching the cause

of liberation from the Ottomans and unification with Motherland Bulgaria among the locals.

Serbian priests are said to have participated in the destruction of valuable Bulgarian medieval manuscripts in the region of Kratovo in 1880s and thefts of rare printed books in northern Macedonia.⁴³⁹ During the Ilinden Uprising in the summer of 1903, many Patriarchist priests fought along with ordinary peasants. The Daily News reported one of them on Reverend Toma Nikoloff, priest (Protoiereus) of Kichevo, near Monastir (Bitola). When John MacDonald, the Daily News correspondent, interviewed him, Nikoloff was dressed in a *komitadji* uniform. “How did you become a *komitadji*?” MacDonald asked. “Because of Turkish barbarity,” the priest replied. “A Christian girl from my flock was kidnapped by a Turk and her parents begged me to intercede with the *vali* (the local administrator, who acted as judge). The abductor and the girl were discovered and ordered to appear in court. The girl appeared in Turkish dress. She declared herself a Mohammedan (Muslim).”⁴⁴⁰ Nikoloff complained to his superior, the Metropolitan of Debar (Dibra), but he was denounced and arrested. He spent eight months in the prison of Kichevo and five months in the prison of Monastir. He survived the imprisonment, an assassination attempt and a second charge of treason. Facing a second arrest, Nikoloff ran away to the mountains and joined a band of *komitadjii*.

The formal division between Patriarchists (Orthodox acknowledging the authority of the Patriarchate of Constantinople) and Exarchists (Orthodox acknowledging the authority of the Bulgarian Exarchate) began to affect popular thinking profoundly.

⁴³⁹ Efrem Karanov, Roden sŭm Bŭlgarin. Izbrani sŭchineniya i dokumenti (I was Born Bulgarian. Selected Studies and Documents) (Sofia, 1991), 14-5.

⁴⁴⁰ Angliiskiyat pechat za Ilindensko-Preobrazenskoto vastanie 1903 (The English Press about the Ilinden-Preobrazenje's Uprising, 1903 (Sofia, 1998), 107-9.

The British Pall Mall Gazette published an article on the Macedonian *komitadji* in August 1903 in which an eyewitness claimed that the members of rival bands, the Exarchists and the Patriarchists, hated each other even more than either hated the Turks, and that neither hesitated to destroy a mixed village for supplies of clothing and food.⁴⁴¹

Anastasija Karakasidou has reported episodes of constructing “otherness” on the basis of the difference between patriarchists and exarchists in the Macedonian villages of Gnoina and Assiros. At the turn of the century, the inhabitants of Assiros spoke Greek and were under the authority of Constantinople, while the peasants of Gnoina were Slavic speaking and preferred the Bulgarian Exarchate. Eventually, the “Greeks” of Assiros started spreading unbelievable stories about the dead, who they claimed had turned into vampires in Gnoina because the “Bulgarian” Gnoinans did not have a proper Orthodox priest sent by the Patriarchate.⁴⁴² According to one story, a man from Gnoina, reportedly deceased, suddenly sat up and called out to two men by name: “Traiko! Petko! Don’t run away!”⁴⁴³ The fact that the names were clearly of Slavic rather than Greek origin suggests that the tale was designed to show that Bulgarians were to be associated with vampires and evil spirits.

Another example of a close link between national image and religious “otherness” was suggested by popular stories spread among the Serbian peasantry after the Balkan Wars. They presented Bulgarian soldiers as desecrators. It was said that the eyes of the icons in Serbian churches, which sheltered Bulgarian soldiers, were gouged out. Serbian

⁴⁴¹ Ibid, 138.

⁴⁴² Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood, 38-9.

⁴⁴³ Ibid., 39.

peasants were encouraged to believe that the enemy had done this to damage the Serbian saints protecting the army.⁴⁴⁴ Long before the Balkan conflict broke out, stories of icons' eyes being gouged out had existed among Serbian peasants who believed that the eyes of a saint could heal.⁴⁴⁵ However, with the advent of nationalism hostility involving traditional beliefs was exploited to depict the enemy as a desecrator. Lodge, for example, recalls that when she visited Serbian Macedonia in 1919, the peasants told her that in the nineteenth century the Bulgarians destroyed frescoes of Serbian kings and saints for purposes of propaganda. In the yard of the church of Staro Negorichane, near Kumanovo, which had been built in the fourteen century, the Bulgarian authorities set up a stone during the occupation of 1915/1918 stating that this was a Bulgarian church.⁴⁴⁶ Furthermore, Lodge claimed that her general impression of the Serbian Orthodox Church was of something friendly and human, as if it belonged to the country and the people, and not an outside institution that had to be obeyed.⁴⁴⁷

The transformation of the Orthodoxy into an influential element of the modern Serbian nationalism exemplifies the exploitation of religious beliefs and popular superstition to create a new historical mythology. In 1827, Vuk Karadžić, describing Ottoman rule in the Serbian lands, had stressed the fact that every Turk encountering a Serb had the right to swear by his mother, his religion, and by the cross.⁴⁴⁸ In other

⁴⁴⁴ Lodge, 156.

⁴⁴⁵ Olive Lodge calls this belief "curious" and explicitly mentions that Serbs believed sore eyes to be cured by making decoctions of saint's eyes. As a result, in many churches the eyes of all the saints in the frescoes within arm's reach, especially those of figures of great authority or holiness, have been picked out. The women were continually pilfering them for lotions to cure their own eyes. Plundering the eyes of frescoes was not confined to large and famous churches only; it seemed to depend on the holiness of the saints portrayed. See Lodge, 159-60.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 174.

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 160.

⁴⁴⁸ Vuk Karadžić, "Tursko gospodarstvo nad Srbima," *O društvu*, 49.

words, the three most sacred words to Serbs could be desecrated at any time. Anzulović suggests that two figures have played a crucial role in promoting the symbiosis between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the community. In his words, Saint Sava was the architect of the close association between church, state and nation wherein state interests and national ambitions have proved stronger than the Christian spirit.⁴⁴⁹ The second essential idea—which Petar Njegoš of Montenegro expressed for the first time— was to use force to eliminate religious and cultural barriers to a homogeneous nation. In the words of Anzulović Karadžić, the language-nation equation brought him close to a conflict with the Serbian Church and the nineteenth century myth of an equation between church and nation.⁴⁵⁰ However, these differences were soon overcome. After all, both concepts favored the creation of future Greater Serbia.

In the early 1890s, Bulgarian Prime Minister Stambolov became alarmed by the religious propaganda spreading over Ottoman Macedonia. He wrote in his diary that every Bulgarian lost by the Orthodox Church was lost for his national community as well.⁴⁵¹ In his words, the Bulgarian people were able to preserve their ethnic distinctiveness and achieve independence because they did not betray their religion. “Our ancestors preferred to go to the gallows or to prison to betraying their religion”.⁴⁵² Stambolov’s thoughts as a statesman reveal an important aspect of national mythology. A

⁴⁴⁹ Anzulović, 73.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 76.

⁴⁵¹ Stefan Stambolov, *Lichen arhiv* (Personal Archive), Volume I (Sofia, 1997), 497.

⁴⁵² *Ibid.*, 498.

handful of examples of martyrdom did exist⁴⁵³. However, they hardly reflected the atmosphere of religious tolerance that had reigned in the first century of Ottoman rule. Perhaps the Bulgarian prime minister was referring to later persecutions, like the punitive measures that followed the end of the so-called April Uprising in 1876. From the end of the nineteenth century, the Orthodox Church was regarded by both Serbian and Bulgarian politicians as one of the most important institutions for transmitting nationalism. The church was subordinated to the state, and the fusion of ecclesiastical and political spheres facilitated the spread of the latter and gave them the aura of sacred causes. The Serbs even coined a special term—Saint-Savaism (*Svetoslavlje*)—to define the strange mixture of church and state institutions that Saint Sava had allegedly prescribed in the early thirteenth century.⁴⁵⁴ The concept of Saint Savaism regards the Serbian national community as holy and its national cause as sacred, because of its identification with the only true religion, Orthodox Christianity. Anzulović quotes one of the most influential Serbian theologians, Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović (1880-1956), who in the early 1900s really feared that his generation would not be able to participate in war to defend the national interests of Serbia.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵³ In the sixteenth century, two martyrs for faith were beatified—Saint Georgi from Kratovo and Saint Nikola from Sofia.

⁴⁵⁴ Anzulović, 30.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 31.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Serbian Church worked methodically to popularize the association of war with Serbia's salvation; so on the eve of the Balkan Wars, military confrontation was regarded as a tool for achieving holy unity and fulfilling the mission of the Serbs as defenders of Christianity.

As for the Bulgarians, their holy mission was to "liberate" their "brothers", the Macedonians. The Bulgarian Exarchate spent considerable effort to create and maintain a wide and effective network of primary and secondary schools in Macedonia. Belonging to the bosom of the Bulgarian Exarchate was no longer a matter of Orthodoxy but of ethnic self-awareness. Slavic Orthodox culture, as Hupchick defined the mores of the nineteenth century, was doomed; and surprisingly enough, it was the institution of the Christian Orthodox Church which played a decisive role in fortifying separate national identities and shattering the spirit of unity which the Byzantine *oicumene* and the Ottoman *Rum-millet* had preserved for such a long time.

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Chapter 4

The National Army, 1830-1914

A primary obligation of the nation state is the defense of its population and the integrity of its borders. Throughout the nineteenth century territorial disputes made the maintenance of well-trained and efficient standing armies a major priority of the Balkan states.⁴⁵⁶ A standing army aided modernization by showing many young men horizons beyond the village; it promoted social order by giving an opportunity to people many of whom would be unemployed and it provided the authorities with the opportunity to indoctrinate *en masse*. Modern armed forces gradually became a special sort of social organization, rigidly disciplined, with their own rituals and distinctive code of behavior. An army kept order when policing agencies could not and assisted in propaganda, encouraging the belief that sacrifice in the name of the fatherland was the most honorable contribution to the common good. The many rituals of an army— parades, the consecration of regimental colors flags or going to church during Lent⁴⁵⁷—helped bolster a sense of belonging and pride in the national community. However, as we saw in Chapter One, neither Bulgarian nor Serbian peasants felt any personal involvement with

⁴⁵⁶ John Gooch argues that in the age of “combative nationalism”, which in his view lasted from 1789 to 1945, military preparation and fighting were two of the most important activities in the life of any nation-state. According to Gooch, the citizen’s obligation to perform military service, when required to do so became a distinctive characteristic of the nation-states, providing a counter-weight to the right to vote. John Gooch, Armies in Europe (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 1.

⁴⁵⁷ The Church at the Bulgarian Military School in Sofia, for example, was the only religious building designed to serve as a chapel within the barracks. No other military unit had a chapel or a specially attached military priest. The duties of the latter were assigned to the priest of the nearby parish. See Nikolai Epanchin, Obikolkata na N. Epanchin. Polkovnik ot ruskiya generalen shtab v Bŭlgariya prez esenta na 1899 godina. (The Visit of N. Epanchin. Colonel of the Russian General Staff) (Sofia, 1901), 36. Epanchin was surprised to find so few icons in the Bulgarian barracks and claimed that the Bulgarian soldiers were by far less religious than their Russian instructors.

the nation or state at first. They tended to resent government, saw soldiers as its agent and had only a vague idea of local patriotism.

Between 1871 and 1914, every major European state adopted and modified the institution of general military conscription to meet its political needs.⁴⁵⁸ Only the Balkans were different in that Serbia and Bulgaria had no hereditary military caste. Neither had a significant noble class, so not only did officer cadres have to be created, but the officers corps had to be imbued with an appropriate ethos, as well as being trained technically.

Since both armies relied on conscription, the institution of the national army was to become one of the most influential transmitters of national indoctrination to the population as a whole. Serbs in the Habsburg Empire had some military experience prior to the 1830s, when some attempt was made to establish a Serbian standing army. The Bulgarians, on the other hand, had no significant military establishment prior to 1877, when a small volunteer corps participated in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-8.⁴⁵⁹ However, the organization of the Serbian military forces was hampered for some thirty

⁴⁵⁸ The crisis in the Balkans and the resulting Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78 prodded Greece to institute a uniform program of military conscription. Greece was among the last European states to enact such legislation. A November 1878 law substituted an army raised by universal conscription. Victor Papacosma, *The Military in Greek Politics: the 1909 coup d'état*. (The Kent State University Press: 1977), 18.

⁴⁵⁹ Small numbers of volunteers of Bulgarian origin took part in the First Serbian Uprising (1804-1813), in the Russian-Turkish War of 1806-1812 and in the Greek Revolution in 1821. In 1810, the Danubian principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania organized a separate military unit, *Bolgarskoe Zemskoe Voisko* (Bulgarian Land Army) which crossed the Danube with the Russian army and entered Bulgarian territories. Iliya Iliyev and Momchil Yonov argue that this volunteer unit should be considered the first Bulgarian military detachment. The Bulgarian Legion created by Georgi Rakovski in 1862 in Belgrade is also seen as a nascent form of a Bulgarian military unit. See Iliya Iliyev, Momchil Yonov, "Evolution of the Bulgarian Armed Forces from the eighteenth century until 1920," *Essays on War and Society in East Central Europe, 1740-1920*, edited by Stephen Fischer-Galati and Bela Kiraly (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 86-87. However, the first military unit of significance was the Russian-Bulgarian Volunteer Command (*druzhdina*), and a Bulgarian battalion was included in the Second Serbian Brigade. Dimitür Azmanov claims a figure of 12 officers of Bulgarian origin and 10 cadet-officers in the Bulgarian Volunteer Corps. See Dimitür Azmanov, *Moyata Epoha 1878-1919* (My Epoch, 1878-1919) (Sofia, 1995), 10.

years by the interference of the Sublime Porte, which kept Turkish garrisons inside Serbia proper and demanded that the Serbian army serve as a domestic police force⁴⁶⁰.

One of the first initiatives of the Russian Temporary Government in Bulgaria (1878-1879) was to introduce a Bulgarian standing army. It was to be commanded by Russian officers but young Bulgarians were to be sent to Russian military schools for training.⁴⁶¹ John Gooch considers the Bulgarian army to have been the “healthiest” of all the nineteenth century’s Balkan armies for two reasons. It was well organized by the Russians on sound German principles, and it had no pre-existing military institutions which had to be modified or incorporated into the army.⁴⁶² Conscription was obligatory and all men between 20 and 46 years of age were recruited for two years.⁴⁶³

In the first stage of Bulgarian and Serbian state- building, when few peasants had received even primary education and the majority of the population had no access to

⁴⁶⁰ A Serbian eyewitness of the First Serbian-Turkish War of 1876 described the Serbian army as a motley force of peasants, many still dressed in sheepskins and fur caps, who looked more like “some primitive tribe on the move during the medieval Great Migration of Peoples than like a modern army. The peasant soldiers were undisciplined and inexperienced men who would not march unless they saw an officer leading them”. The war cost Serbia 15,000 casualties: 5,000 dead, 9,500 wounded, and the rest missing. This was a severe loss for a country that numbered only 1,300,000 inhabitants. Michael Boro Petrovich, 386-387; 389.

⁴⁶¹ In April 1878, twelve brigades were organized as a Bulgarian local (*zemska*) army by a decree of the Russian Temporary Governor Dondukov-Korsakov. After the Congress in Berlin (July 1878), the brigades located in Eastern Rumelia had separate numbers (20 to 28) and from January 1879 constituted a separate military force, the Eastern Rumelian Militia. Up to the Unification of 1885, the language of instruction in the army was Russian; and the Bulgarian Military Regulations (*Ustav*) were also in Russian. The latter were replaced as late as 1905 when the new ones were translated from French. As late as 1885, the Bulgarian Minister of Defense was himself a Russian Count Kantakuzin. See Azmanov, *Moyata epoha*, 85; Dimitür Zafirov, *Major Konstantin Nikiforov* (Sofia, 1995), 34-5.

⁴⁶² At the time the Bulgarian army consisted of eight regiments of infantry and counting engineers and all reservists, its total strength was fifty-five thousand men. The Eastern Rumelian militia numbered about thirty-five thousand men. Gooch, 126; Dimitür Azmanov, *Bŭlgarski vishi voenachalnitsi prez Balkanskata i Pŭrvata Svetovna vojna* (Bulgarian Military Commanders during the Balkan and the First World Wars) (Sofia, 2000), 41; Perry, 82.

⁴⁶³ The Law regulating the military duties of all able-bodied Bulgarian men was revised in 1897 and 1903. See Colonel Kosta Nikolov, *Bŭlgarskata armiya predi i sled Svetovnata vojna* (The Bulgarian Army before and after the Great War) (Sofia, 1922), 5.

media and could not understand its messages even if they had, the conscript army was a powerful transmitter of popular nationalism. Recruits were not only drilled and trained in the use of weapons but taught to follow a specific code of behavior; they were indoctrinated in a set of specific notions including patriotic duty, loyalty to the community, and sacrifice for the Motherland.⁴⁶⁴ Service was presented as the only opportunity for young male citizens of peasant origin and without formal education to be personally involved in the defense of the nation state; and the army assumed responsibility for the recruits' education.⁴⁶⁵ Control over the everyday routine of both soldiers and officers was strict. They were given an extensive education in national history and geography, were obliged to subscribe to official military newspapers, and subject themselves to censorship. The army was to indoctrinate large numbers of males, who would probably have remained indifferent to the national cause had there been no conscription. Some rituals like the daily raising of the military standard in the morning and its lowering in the evening, and public religious ceremonies before going to the

⁴⁶⁴ An order of the Bulgarian Minister of Defense Count Kantakuzin published on 10 of January 1885 states that for the repair of musical instruments, buying musical notes, note books and books necessary for the education of the Bulgarian soldiers, every detachment could spend as follows: infantry platoons up to 600 *levs*; artillery platoons up to 1,000 *levs*; the royal guards of His Excellency the Bulgarian Prince no more than 300 *levs*, and the same amount was allocated to the Military School and the Flee. Prikaz po voenoto vedomstvo # 4. Voenen minister Count Kantakuzin (Order of the Minister of Defense Count Kantakuzin) (Sofia, 10/01/1885), 6-7.

⁴⁶⁵ Stokes advocates an approach that stresses the social significance of the national army rather than structural developmental processes. In his view, this approach would summarize the modernizing effect that service in the army had on peasant life. He suggests that historians discuss the impact of uniforms on the standardization of clothing; how the provisioning of mess halls affected peasant diet; how the training of conscripts raised skill levels; and similar issues which have not been dealt with here. See Gale Stokes, "The Social Role of the Serbian Army before World War I: A Synthesis," War and Society in Central Europe, 1740-1920s, 105.

training camps, were designed to strengthen their sense of belonging.⁴⁶⁶ Regulations prescribed that soldiers should call out the names of the ruling Prince, Princess Klementina and the Minister of Defense before the evening report as a sign of respect to the Bulgarian monarch, his family and his closest advisors.⁴⁶⁷

At the turn of the twentieth century, financial difficulties pressured some of these military advisers to propose a reduction of the military service from two years to one. The expense of maintaining a large Bulgarian army had been a controversial issue and was to remain so, repeatedly provoking heated debates in the Assembly. There is little doubt that the proponents of the big army prevailed because of its value in integrating young Bulgarians from all parts of the country and teaching them to be loyal Bulgarians.

Serbia faced similar problems. Edith Durham might think that too much of “Serbia’s money was spent upon military outward show” and that no other army was so over-officered⁴⁶⁸, however Serbia’s leaders, like Bulgaria’s, considered the army to be the third pillar of nationhood along with the crown and the Church.

Senior Serbian and Bulgarian officers wrote extensively on the problems of military training and have left valuable accounts on the army’s importance as an indoctrinating institution at the turn of the twentieth century. One prolific author, whose analyses of the Bulgarian military forces constitute a major source for this thesis, was the Bulgarian Colonel Petūr Dürvingov. A fervent opponent of any reduction in conscription, Dürvingov argued that military training was essential to national consolidation. Apart

⁴⁶⁶ Military standards were raised up after signal and taken down after signal. Praying before going to training camps was prescribed by regulations called Sluzhba v uchebnite lageri i v pohodite v mimo vreme (Service in Military Training Camps and Marches in Peace) (Vidin, 1891), 17, 45.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid, 66.

⁴⁶⁸ Mary Edith Durham, Through the Lands of the Serb 1904, 163.

from specific military skills, it encouraged a comradely spirit and inculcated the notion of patriotic duty, two virtues vital for the defense of national interests.⁴⁶⁹ Dürvingov argued that Bulgarians, who did not wish to be perceived as backward, tended to adjust themselves to foreign Western customs, traditions, and languages easily.⁴⁷⁰ He thought that the Bulgarian state machine showed disturbing symptoms of cultural anemia and that both church and secular administration was characterized by apathy and inertia. In schools even algebra was taught with more enthusiasm than Bulgarian national history and geography. Nevertheless, Dürvingov stated, there was still hope for the Bulgarian people if “the most national institution”, the army, was properly trained to defend the national interests.

The atrocities committed by all participants in the Balkan Wars in 1912-13 in the name of national interests demonstrated the success of the ideological indoctrination. The reports of the International Commission, which was established to inquire into causes of atrocities and combatant conduct, demonstrated clearly what national indoctrination had achieved through conscription, mass media, and public education. Presenting the results of the Commission’s investigation, the French member, D’Estournelles de Constant, expressed his indignation at the frenzied jingoism of the press and considered Balkan journalists the main culprits for the excessive popular excitement.⁴⁷¹ The Balkan press, however, was not the only institution to influence public opinion in Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. Whilst the tone and messages of the press were of importance to the civilian

⁴⁶⁹ Petür Dürvingov, Izbrani proizvedeniya (Selected Works) (Sofia, 1988), 56.

⁴⁷⁰ Dürvingov, 57. His main concern was the lack of self-respect shared by both soldiers and officers alike.

⁴⁷¹ Report of the International Commission to inquire the causes and conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, D.C., 1914), 9.

population, the direct participation of Balkan soldiers in the escalating military confrontation proved to be far more influential.

On September 17, 1912 the Bulgarian monarch signed the order for a general mobilization.⁴⁷² Shortly afterwards hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians hurried to report to their regiments. Patriotic enthusiasm that transformed the dead letter of an official order into a formidable military force was not an overnight occurrence. Rather, it was the result of a long and deliberate state campaign, organization, training and indoctrination accomplished largely by means of compulsory military service and was specially designed for the needs of the army media. The mobilization in Bulgaria produced eleven infantry divisions, a division and a brigade of cavalry, and eighty National Guard battalions. All told, the Bulgarian Army comprised 300,000 infantrymen, 5,000 cavalrymen, and 720 guns.⁴⁷³ Based on a conscription system⁴⁷⁴, in time of peace, the regular forces numbered around 36,660, of whom 1,577 were officers.⁴⁷⁵ To secure efficiency three military districts were introduced in 1906, each district corresponding to a separate army unit.⁴⁷⁶ King Ferdinand was the official Commander-in-Chief, although

⁴⁷² The order was cosigned by Bulgarian Prime Minister Ivan E. Geshov. The full text of the order is cited in Kishkilova. Pasha, Balkanskite voini po stranitsite na bŭlgarskiya pechat 1912-1913 (The Bulgarian Wars as reflected in the Bulgarian media 1912-1913) (Sofia, 1999), 25.

⁴⁷³ A Concise History of the Balkan Wars 1912- 1913, published by Hellenic Army General Staff (Athens, 1998), 20.

⁴⁷⁴ The Bulgarian army was organized on 8/07/1878 by order Number One of the Temporary Russian Commissar Count Dondukov. Order Number Three required the recruitment of twenty- five infantry divisions, six cavalry, and seven artillery brigades. Ten divisions remained stationed in Eastern Rumelia.

⁴⁷⁵ The figures provided are based on statistics published in Voenni izvestiya (Military News), 60 (3/04/1893), 4.

⁴⁷⁶ There were three separate army units—the First, Second and Third Armies. The reform was started in 1903, after General Mihail Savov was appointed minister of defense. The number of divisions was increased from six to nine, the artillery received new weaponry, and six new battle ships were added to the Navy. See Azmanov, Moyata' epoha., 80-1; Petŭr Stoilov, "The Bulgarian Army in the Balkan Wars," East

his assistant, General Savov exercised the actual command, and General Fichev was Chief-of-Staff.⁴⁷⁷

Marxist historians used to argue that the great majority of Bulgarians enthusiastically welcomed this war and the opportunity it seemed to afford them “to save their oppressed brothers in Ottoman Macedonia and Thrace.” The speed of mobilization and the number of volunteers certainly support such an argument, although the data cannot provide an explanation of how such readiness and consent were achieved. In the 1910s, the Bulgarian military recruits were mainly of peasant origin; while priests were exempt from conscription, and teachers and students served shorter terms.⁴⁷⁸ Simeon Radev, for example, recalls in his memoirs that none of his colleagues from the military censorship commission (1912-13) had served in the army prior to the war.⁴⁷⁹

Since most peasants lacked formal education, seminars in national history and geography had to be introduced to facilitate the process of indoctrinating the soldiers. It was not uncommon for commanding officers to deliver speeches to their troops in which speculations about the medieval past were employed to promote national confidence and patriotism- glorification of the “creativity” of the Bulgarian nation, whose medieval state was said to be the first in the Balkans after that of Byzantium. The Bulgarian ruler Krum the Terrible was presented as an excellent model. Before his victory over the

and Central European Society and the Balkan Wars., ed. by B. K. Kiraly and D. Djordjević (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 35; Azmanov, Bŭlgarski vishi voenachalnitsi prez Balkanskata i Pŭrvata Svetovna voina, 58-9.

⁴⁷⁷ A Concise History of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913, 20.

⁴⁷⁸ Petŭr Dŭrvingov, Voenna Bulgariya. Sociologicheski etjud na bŭlgarskata deistvitelnost. (Military Bulgaria. Sociological Characteristic of the Bulgarian Present) (Sofia, 1911), 60.

⁴⁷⁹ Radev, 14.

Byzantine Emperor Nicephorus I (802-811), Krum allegedly told him, “Since you don’t want peace, then here is the sword.” This along with other myths and invented military traditions developed to assist the work of national indoctrination.⁴⁸⁰ Ivan Evstatiev Geshov, the Bulgarian Prime Minister recalled in his memoirs that he was surprised upon return from Western Europe in 1911 to find the Bulgarian public so excited and bellicose. All the newspapers, including the semi- official Den (The Day) and Rech (The Speech) were proponents of the forthcoming war.⁴⁸¹

In fact, the role of the Bulgarian media had becoming increasingly important at the turn of the twentieth century. Since 1893, the subscription to the two main military newspapers Voenen zhurnal (The Military Newspaper) and Voenni izvestiya (Military News)⁴⁸² had become obligatory for Bulgarian officers and the serving rank and file. During his visit in the autumn of 1899 Colonel Epanchin noticed that almost all military units in Bulgaria had their own military theaters. The barracks had small halls with stages for performances that could normally accommodate up to 300 soldiers. The repertoire of these improvised amateur theaters consisted of patriotic dramas written by Bulgarian authors and usually dedicated to famous Bulgarian *haiduks* and their fight against the Turks.⁴⁸³ Colonel Epanchin was surprised to discover what amusement and pleasure theatrical performances brought to ordinary soldiers.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸⁰ Petür Dürvingov, V sluzhba na Rodinata. Istini, koito ne tryabva da se zabravvat.(Serving the Motherland. Truths which Should not be Forgotten) (Sofia, 1938), 4.

⁴⁸¹ Ivan Evstatiev Gueshoff [Geshov], The Balkan League (London: John Murray, 1915), 19.

⁴⁸² Voenni izvestiya was the official newspaper of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense and as such was authorized to publish results of military training campaigns and any statistics related to the condition of the Bulgarian army.

⁴⁸³ Epanchin, 44. *Haiduks* were bandits turned irregular soldiers who infested the frontier zones and eventually most of the Balkans, especially the mountaneous areas.

The Bulgarian General Staff included an Educational Bureau, which was responsible for the patriotic indoctrination of the rank and file. From 1908 all officers had been reading Voenen glas (The Military Voice). The journal's motto was "Fatherland, Army, Comradeship" and the stated ambition of the editors was to bring the Bulgarian army and the Bulgarian people closer.⁴⁸⁵ Anything that could possibly impede the smooth and efficient process of patriotic education was the newspaper's concern. For example, why did Bulgarians not celebrate August 11, the anniversary of a victory the Bulgarian Volunteer Corps and Russian troops won over the Ottoman army at Shipka and Sheinovo in 1877?⁴⁸⁶ What should a Bulgarian officer's uniform look like? Should a round fur hat be worn, in keeping with Russian fashion until 1892?⁴⁸⁷ Why was there widespread favoritism in the army? And why had most senior officers been born in the capital, while those of peasant background found it difficult to gain commissioned rank at all?⁴⁸⁸ According to Colonel Epanchin's observation, both soldiers and officers had well appointed libraries and easy access to both Bulgarian and Russian military publications.⁴⁸⁹

When international tensions escalated after the Young Turks took power in Istanbul in 1908, the tone of the Bulgarian military media changed. From that date on, the

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid, 52.

⁴⁸⁵ Voenen glas (The Military Voice), 15/08/1908, 1.

⁴⁸⁶ Some of the most decisive battles of the war of 1877-8 between Ottoman and Russian troops took place at Shipka and Sheinovo. See Voenen glas, 15/08/1908, 4.

⁴⁸⁷ Voenni izvestiya (Military News), 3, 28/08/1908,

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., 3.

⁴⁸⁹ Epanchin, 44-5.

idea of war with the Ottoman Empire became increasingly popular. Bulgarian independence proclaimed in the Church of the Forty Sainted Martyrs at Tŭrnovo on September 22, 1908 made the headlines of the day and turned into the most widely discussed event in the Bulgarian press. The choice was hardly-surprising. Tŭrnovo was the medieval capital and the Church of the Forty Sainted Martyrs was associated with the royal House of Asen, the victorious dynasty which had created the second Bulgarian kingdom in the beginning of the twelfth century⁴⁹⁰. The proclamation of Bulgarian independence there was therefore a profoundly symbolic act. Ferdinand and his advisors were proclaiming both historical continuity and determination that the country's future would be as bright and glorious as it had been supposedly under the House of Asen.

Some popular newspapers, such as Selska Duma (The Peasant Word), went so far as to accuse the King of committing "high treason" for his reasonable decision to avoid military confrontation with the Ottoman Empire after the proclamation of independence on September 22, 1908.⁴⁹¹ Yet even the most influential military newspapers suggested that war with the Ottoman Empire was both inevitable and necessary. The editorial of Voenen glas of October 23, 1908, for instance, argued that the chances of peace had been exhausted long since and that war with the Ottomans was inevitably, even essential.⁴⁹²

Ever since 1878, Bulgarian statesmen had explored various religious, educational, and diplomatic means to consolidate national feeling. As demonstrated above, however, few succeeded. Therefore, in 1911 the Bulgarian government headed by Prime Minister

⁴⁹⁰ In 1185 two brothers Petŭr and Ivan Asen raised a revolt against the Byzantine Empire in its Bulgarian lands and in 1186 compelled Emperor Isaac II Angelos to sign a truce giving them control of lands between the Danube River and the Balkan Mountains.

⁴⁹¹ Selska Duma, 12 (1910), 2.

⁴⁹² Voenen glas, 11, 23/10/1908, 1; See also the next issue #12, 30/10/1908, 1.

Ivan E. Geshov decided to employ military means to achieve national unity. The chosen instrument of the future national crusade, the Bulgarian army, was destined to play a crucial role in the process. The government could influence the military through its control of finances and appointments.⁴⁹³ It could also control standing orders and dictate army education.

The tone of all the editorials of the military newspapers examined was shrilly patriotic in tone and laced with pompous rhetoric, in order to appeal to their readers. Several issues of Voenen glas listed territories and towns lost to Bulgaria after 1878 and 1886 and transferred to neighboring Serbia and the Ottoman Empire. There was a series of articles by Ivan Kurshovski on the current situation of the Ottoman army. In his view the discipline of Turkish soldiers was poor, and reports of their demoralization helped raise Bulgarian self-esteem and confidence.⁴⁹⁴ Vecherna poshta (The Evening Post) published several caricatures of the Ottoman sultan as a wounded soldier with a bandaged head.⁴⁹⁵

Voenen glas published an interview with Colonel Georgiev, a veteran of seventeen years service, in December 1908. The Colonel said that he had never met a Bulgarian who had not wanted to serve his country and that Bulgarians made the most disciplined soldiers of any in the Balkans.⁴⁹⁶ As agitation for a military conflict with the

⁴⁹³ Richard Hall, "Civil-Military Conflict in Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars," East European Quarterly (September 1989), 23, 3:293.

⁴⁹⁴ Voenen glas, 8, 12/06/1909, 3.

⁴⁹⁵ The caricatures were drawn by the Bulgarian master of charge, Alexander Bozhinov, and were extremely popular. Cited in Simeon Radev, 16.

⁴⁹⁶ Voenen glas, 18, 11/12/1908, 1.

Ottoman Empire intensified, in the summer of 1912, pro-Bulgarian Macedonians organized bombings in the Ottoman towns of Štip and Kochani (now in Macedonia). Such bombings had become more frequent over the past two years and the Ottoman authorities replied with repressive measures, which may have been the bombers' aim⁴⁹⁷. Certainly, ensuing clashes between the army and civilians were used as a convenient pretext for some Bulgarian officers and politicians to launch a campaign in favor of military intervention.

However, Russia supported intervention against the Ottoman Empire by the Balkan states and military cooperation between them. Russia was the main backer of the Balkan League, and her minister of foreign affairs, Sazonov, considered a combined military force of approximately 500-600,000 men a solid guarantee for a future Bulgarian and Serbian victory over the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁹⁸ The prospect of independent Balkan countries cooperating in a war against the Ottomans to gain control over disputed territories with mixed populations depended on whether the participants could forgo nationalistic rhetoric and mutual hostilities for a while.

However, the negotiations between Belgrade, Sofia and Athens about how Ottoman Macedonia should be divided that achieving a reasonable compromise would be

⁴⁹⁷ In November 1911, again in Štip, the mosque *Charši Džamis* was bombed. A Turk and two Bulgarians were killed. The local Turks responded with violence and about twenty people of Bulgarian origin were murdered. In July 1912, two bombs exploded in the market of Kochani. The local police and irregular troops killed 34 people, wounded 200, and Bulgarian priests were arrested. Marko Semov, Pobeditelyat prosi mir. Balkanskite vojni 1912-1913. (The Winner begs for Peace. The Balkan Wars 1912-1913) (Sofia, 1995), 55, 75.

⁴⁹⁸ Mihail Madzharov, Diplomatičeskata podgotovka na nashite vojni. Spomeni, chastni pisma, shifrovani telegrami i poveritelni dokladi. (The Diplomatic Campaigning of Our Wars. Memoirs, Private Letters, Telegrams and Confidential Reports) (Sofia, 1932), 58.

difficult.⁴⁹⁹ The period preceding the formation of the Balkan League witnessed frequent anti-Serbian as well as anti-Turkish articles in the Bulgarian military media. Nikola Kilifarov published two articles in March, 1909 in which he argued that for thirty years Serbia had been more dangerous for the stability of the region than the Ottoman Empire. Kilifarov referred to precedents from the medieval period to prove his argument about the treacherous and dishonest nature of the Serbs. They had been plotting against Simeon when the latter was on his way to conquer Constantinople in 924, and they continued to display an aggressive attitude towards Bulgaria in 1885, when King Milan contested the Unification of the Principality with Eastern Rumelia. Yet Bulgarian public opinion still favored the Serbian cause, as the recent confrontation (the so-called “Pig War” of 1906) with the Dual Monarchy had demonstrated. Clearly, the author found this both surprising and annoying⁵⁰⁰. Obvious anti-Serbian insinuations could also be found in a letter signed by a Bulgarian “peasant” with the odd nickname “the Old Vidul”, published in Voenen glas in May 1909. The “Old Vidul” claimed to be outraged when he could not find a single sentence about Macedonia and the “pure” Bulgarian towns of Niš, Pirot, Negotin, and Vranja in his son’s school primer.⁵⁰¹ The man criticized the Bulgarian educational system and agitated for more patriotic education.

⁴⁹⁹ Bulgarian diplomat, Dimitür Rizov, former ambassador to Rome and representative of the Bulgarian government in the preliminary negotiations between Serbian and Bulgaria, had a favorite statement: “Autonomy or anatomy for Macedonia.” He was the first to speak officially about a future division of the Ottoman province in case of victory. See Istoriya na Bŭlgarskata diplomatsiya 1879-1913 (History of the Bulgarian Diplomacy, 1879-1913) (Sofia, 1994), 425-6. One of the most exhaustive Serbian sources are the memoirs of Dimitrije Popović, Balkanski Ratovi 1912-1913 (The Balkan Wars 1912/1913) (Belgrade, 1993).

⁵⁰⁰ Voenen glas, 32, 34/ 1908, 1.

⁵⁰¹ Voenen glas, 41, 7/05/1909, 3.

The autumn of 1912 witnessed radical changes in the tone of the media. The newspaper Mir (The Peace) suggested that in a future war against “the Crescent of the Ottoman Empire, the allies must raise their common emblem, the Cross.”⁵⁰² Bulgarian ambassador in London, Mihail Madzharov, recalls in his memoirs that the First Balkan War not only changed the attitudes of the participants—Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece—but transformed popular mentality as well. Madzharov, who had been brought up at the height of the conflict between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate (see Chapter III on the Church), was one of the main proponents of the exclusion of the Greek language from the Plovdiv Seminary. In the autumn of 1912 he was listening to the Greek liturgy in London’s St. Sofia, his heart filling with satisfaction and hope. However, his was not the popular view.⁵⁰³ As a French correspondent reported from Sofia, Bulgarians looked forward to fighting the Turks as if the combat would be a great joy.⁵⁰⁴ This was just as well since an anonymous Bulgarian colonel wrote in his diary, military efficiency required war to be popular among those who would be at the battlefield, not just among the organizers of public rallies and political dabblers.⁵⁰⁵

The army was a strictly hierarchical institution and officers were required to use authority to influence the rank and file. Yet until 1885 the highest rank in the Bulgarian army open to Bulgarians, was captain. All higher ranks were filled by Russians. One hundred and eighty Russian officers but only 37 Bulgarians served as instructors up to the

⁵⁰² Madzharov, 66.

⁵⁰⁴ Radev, Tova, koeto vidyah ot Balkanskata voina., 9.

⁵⁰⁵ Voenna Bulgaria (The Military Bulgaria), 10, 21/01/1914, 2.

Unification of the Principality with Eastern Rumelia in 1885.⁵⁰⁶ In his memoirs, Colonel Azmanov claims that the use of the Russian “Military Regulations” and the pedagogic tone of some Russian instructors gave a negative impression to the Bulgarian officers, who thought that they should be responsible only to their own monarch. The successful war against the Serbs in 1885 gave Bulgarian officers confidence, and the rapid promotions that came to them after the victory stimulated the growth of their political aspirations. However, the 1890s also witnessed growing popular resentment towards the Bulgarian military elite, which some newspapers labeled with typical Balkan earthiness as a “cast of criminals and decorated cattle.”⁵⁰⁷ Colonel Azmanov recalls that there were several incidents in the mid-1890s, involving officers and civilians, and an increasing vocal campaign was conducted against the Bulgarian officers who were portrayed as “murderers and butchers.”⁵⁰⁸

One of the biggest educational centers whose alumni tended to choose a military career was the Belgrade gymnasium in Bessarabia. For forty years following 1878, about a hundred officers born in Bessarabia served in the Bulgarian army.⁵⁰⁹ The figure of Bulgarian officers born in territories outside Bulgaria proper, like Ottoman Thrace and

⁵⁰⁶ Azmanov, *Moyata epoha*, 11. Russian officers were in charge of the Bulgarian gendarmerie as well. When in July 1881 Alexandür Battenberg suspended the constitution the gendarmerie was converted into dragoon corps of armed mounted police, intended primarily to suppress local disturbances. See Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism*, 109-110.

⁵⁰⁷ See Nikolai Zhekov, *Politicheskiyat zhivot na Bŭlgaria i voinstvoto. Mnenie za segashnoto ni polozhenie* (The Political Life of Bulgaria and the Army. An Opinion about our Present Situation) (Sofia, 1924), 13.

⁵⁰⁸ One of the most anti-officer newspapers was *Pryaporets* (The Standard), which was officially associated with the Democratic Party. Azmanov, *Moyata epoha*, 41.

⁵⁰⁹ K. Kalchev, *General Danail Nikolaev* (Sofia, 1995), 8. Some of the top officers such as Major-General Georgi Todorov (Commander of the Seventh Rila Division) and Major-General Atanas Nazlamov (Commander of the Cavalry) were born in Belgrade. See *80 godini ot Balkanskite voini* (Eighty Years after the Balkan Wars) (Sofia, 1995), 38.

northern Dobrudzha, was also considerable,⁵¹⁰ and a significant number had been born in Ottoman Macedonia. From the statistics it is clear that a military career was the most popular among young males of Bulgarian origin from the periphery. For these people a military career not only carried some pay and it afforded the opportunity to contribute to the Bulgarian national cause. Bulgarians from the Diaspora tended to be more nostalgic, and indeed more patriotic, than the Bulgarians from the heartland. They were effective in expanding Bulgarian nationalism. The following table shows how many of the Bulgarian officers at the turn of the twentieth century were born outside Bulgaria proper:

Table 1⁵¹¹

Ranks (1900s)	Place of birth	
	Ottoman Macedonia	Northern Dobrudzha
Generals	1	1
Colonels	8	2
Lieutenant-Colonels	16	1
Majors	31	5
Captains	86	14
Lieutenants	5	4
Second Lieutenants	12	2

On the eve of the Balkan Wars, of 2,448 officers on active duty, 241 were from the Diaspora. In the reserves their number was only 183 out of 3,567.⁵¹² Between 1878

⁵¹⁰ Petūr Stoilov, "The Bulgarian Army in the Balkan Wars", East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars (New York, 1987), 43.

⁵¹¹ Columns 3 and 4 from the original table "Distribution in ranks" in P. Stoilov, 43.

and 1912, 2,680 officers graduated from the Military School in Sofia.⁵¹³ Of those who applied in the first ten years of the school's operation a few had graduated from the Robert College in Constantinople, but the vast majority had not even finished secondary school.⁵¹⁴ The age of the applicants also varied widely; some cadets were 15-16 years old, while others were 30 or more. Those who graduated with distinction were sent to continue their training in the Russian Artillery and Engineering Academies. In the 1890s, some Bulgarian officers were sent to the Italian Military Academy, the Scuola di Guerra; and military schools in France and Belgium.⁵¹⁵ Around 1915, according to the data provided by Dimitür Azmanov, 524 Bulgarian officers had graduated from military schools abroad; 392 were trained in Russia; and the rest were alumni of Italian, French, Belgian and Austrian military schools.⁵¹⁶

In the late 1890s, the military school as a training center attracted more and more Bulgarians born in Ottoman Macedonia. In the academic year 1892-3, Dürvingov reported that eleven of his colleagues were of Macedonian origin (*makedonci*). Azmanov recalls that in 1897, when Colonel Mihail Savov was appointed director of the military school, the Macedonian cause had become the main subject of conversations among the

⁵¹² 80 godini ot Balkanskite voini 1912-1913, 37.

⁵¹³ The military school in Sofia had four classes: preparatory; junior; middle; and senior. The curriculum of the first two covered grades 5, 6, and 7 of ordinary secondary school. The curriculum of the two special classes included tactics, artillery, fortification, topography, military pedagogy. Azmanov, 27.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

cadets. Some of the cadets of Macedonian origin had been imprisoned by the Ottoman authorities and enjoyed enormous respect and popularity.⁵¹⁷

In 1896, an attempted uprising was organized by Macedonian Bulgarians in northern Macedonia. The leaders were officers trained in Bulgaria.⁵¹⁸ Boris Sarafov, one of the leaders of the IMRO, maintained intensive contacts with Bulgarian officers, and at the end of 1899, Darvingov, Lieutenant Stoenchev, and Davidov spent almost every evening in meetings with members of the IMRO.⁵¹⁹ In 1896, secret officer brotherhoods whose task was to work for the “liberation” of Macedonia were founded within the Bulgarian army. Drangov, one of the instructors in the military school, finished every drill with an appeal to his students, “Remember Macedonia!” pointing with his index finger to the South.⁵²⁰

As she watched a parade of the Bulgarian military forces on such an occasion, a young Greek woman visiting Bulgaria, Demetra Vaka, had a discussion with her Bulgarian hosts:

“That is the army that is going through yours like a knife through cheese,” the Bulgarian said.

⁵¹⁷ Azmanov quotes the name of his colleague from Ottoman Macedonia, Parush Shikov, who had spent a year in prison in Diar Bekir, Asia Minor. Azmanov, 31.

⁵¹⁸ Petür Dürvingov, *Moeto vreme* (My Times) (Sofia, 1996), 18.

⁵¹⁹ Dürvingov, 5. Jordan Badev recalls in his memoirs that Gotse Delchev, Boris Sarafov, Efrem Chuchkov, and Boris Drangov had organized a group of Bulgarians born in Macedonia to propagate for the future unification of Macedonia and Bulgaria among the cadets of the military school in Sofia. Jordan Badev, “Boris Drangov- zhivot i delo. Püt na dostoinstvo i velichie.” *Fenomenüt Drangov. Spomeni za polkovnik Boris Drangov*. Edited by Krasimir Uzunov (Sofia, 1997), 25.

⁵²⁰ Azmanov, 75. When Bulgaria lost Macedonia after the adventure of the summer of 1913, Drangov finished his patriotic speeches before commanding a platoon by pointing south of Kyustendil and kissing the earth to symbolize the loss. Jordan Badev, 27.

“Why do you call the Turkish army my army, just because I was born in Constantinople?” asked Demetra.

“I am not speaking of the Turkish army. I am speaking of that pampered, pretty army of the Greeks.”

“You wish to fight the Greeks? Why?”

“Because when Macedonia ceases to belong to the Turks you will claim it [the conversation took place on the eve of the Balkan Wars], and we want it. Once it was ours.”

“But it was ours a thousand of years before Europe even heard your name.”

“That is a lie-a lie, I tell you. Because you could always read and write, you wrote the histories and filled the world with lies.”⁵²¹

In her memoirs Demetra Vaka, describes many personal conversations with Bulgarian women of her age [she was 22 when she visited Bulgaria]. All were convinced that Bulgaria would very soon dominate not only Macedonia but the entire peninsula. Daka was concerned because she could easily imagine how these women would teach their sons the lesson of the conquest-to-come.⁵²²

In 1900, the Principality published statistics which showed that there was a Bulgarian majority in Ottoman Macedonia:

⁵²¹ Demetra Vaka, The Heart of the Balkans (Boston/ New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), 192-193.

⁵²² Daka defines the propaganda as “Prussianization of the Bulgarian soul,” Daka, 198.

Table2⁵²³

Turks	499.204
Bulgarians	1.181.336
Greeks	228.702
Albanians	128.711
<i>Vlahs</i> (Aromanians)	80.767
Jews	67.840
Gypsies	54.557
Serbs	700
Other	16.407
Population in total	2.258.224

Despite large discrepancies in official statistics published by Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian governments, the general public in each of these countries was satisfied that its own territorial claims were “well grounded”. Hence the mass enthusiasm shown on the eve of the First Balkan War. A headline in the newspaper *Voenni izdaniya* (Military News) of October 5, 1912 informed the readers that in Sofia, nobody ordered Turkish coffee anymore, they called for “Balkan” coffee instead.⁵²⁴ This would suggest that

⁵²³ Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, D.C., 1914), 28-30. According to the Serbian statistics of 1889, no more than 57,600 Bulgarians lived in Macedonia while the number of the people of Serbian origin was 2,048,320. According to the Greek census, excluding the Kosovo *vilaet* (district) the Bulgarians were 332,162; there were no Serbs and 652,795 Greeks lived in the Ottoman province. The Bulgarian statistics took into account the national consciousness of the people; the Serbian calculations were based on dialects and identity of customs; the Greek ones claimed influence exercised by Greek and Byzantine civilization on urban population. See also Appendix (Statistical Table of Various Reckonings of the Macedonian population) in: The Serbs. Guardians of the Gate. Historical Lectures on the Serbs., by Robert G. D. Laffan (Oxford, 1918), 283.

⁵²⁴ Voenni izdaniya # 13, 5/10/1912, 2.

public opinion had been influenced by the bellicose press, which the state-orchestrated nationalistic propaganda had used as a tool. But it was the advent of censorship which further stimulated patriotic indoctrination.

Since 1878, three kinds of censorship existed in Bulgaria—the police, the pre-publishing control of the mass media, and the military censorship. Most newspapers except for the semi-official papers Mir and Bulgaria suspended publication at the outbreak of the First Balkan War due to a shortage of staff and newsprint.⁵²⁵ In 1912-13, twenty-four Bulgarians were responsible for military censorship. They included popular writers and university professors. Together they controlled the content of all published materials.⁵²⁶ War correspondents in particular were subjected to numerous detailed restrictions, and, as Leon Trotsky recalled, censorship was also imposed on material accessible to foreign correspondents covering the Balkan Wars.⁵²⁷ The attitude of the High Command was summarized by Chief-of-Staff General Ivan Fichev, who after a major battle told a foreign correspondent, “Why should we report it? We don’t want to advertise, we wanted to fight.”⁵²⁸ Richard Hall argues that in fact such strict censorship seriously impeded the government’s ability to influence European public opinion and leave a positive impression of the Bulgarian war effort.⁵²⁹ Censorship weakened the

⁵²⁵ Hall, 295.

⁵²⁶ Romyana Koneva, Golyamata sreshta na bŭlgarskiya narod. Kulturata i predizvikelstvata na voinite ot 1912-1918 godina (The Big Meeting of the Bulgraian People. The Culture and the Challenges of the Wars 1912-1918) (Sofia, 1995), 38-9.

⁵²⁷ Radev, 12.

⁵²⁸ Cited in Richard Hall, 295.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, 295.

government's control over the military and left the general public a prey to rumors and popular fantasies concerning the current military situation.

Preference was given to reports presenting Tsar Ferdinand in a favorable light. The Bulgarian public was kept well informed on his visits to the battlefield and his paternal interest in the problems of the rank and file. In fact, the war provided an opportunity for Boris, the young Bulgarian heir apparent, to create his own public image, as he suddenly began to participate in more and more public ceremonies and investitures. The military media often quoted foreign correspondents who boasted of Ferdinand's abilities as a commander, portraying him as modest, efficient, and tireless. Jul Rosh predicted in the French paper, Figaro, that the Bulgarian monarch would soon be crowned Simeon II in St. Sofia in Istanbul.⁵³⁰ On January 20, 1912, a celebration of the heir's birthday was organized at Sofia's military school. His name's day, on Saint Boris day, was also officially celebrated in May 1912; and in August, when Tsar Ferdinand had a quarter-century jubilee on the throne, he presided over a ceremony in which cadets were promoted to officers and appointed to their regiments.⁵³¹

Once the Balkan War started, the media reported visits of the Princess-consort Eleonora and Princesses Evdokiya and Nadezhda to German and French military medical missions open in the capital, and their moral support to the wounded soldiers was commented on. Evdokiya was said to have distributed her portrait to the soldiers in one ward she visited while her stepmother listened to Captain Chakalov of the eighth Marine

⁵³⁰ Voenni izdaniya, 20, 27/10/1912, 1.

⁵³¹ Ibid., 31; M. Zlatev, "Voennoto uchilishte v navecherieto i po vreme na Balkanskite voini (1912-1913)", 80 godini ot Balkanskite voini., 27.

Platoon tell her of a heroic attack he had carried out with his men. When he had finished, she was reported to have exclaimed: “O, my brave children!”⁵³²

With the escalation of the military conflict early in 1913, the media focused on more extensive reporting of Bulgarian officers killed in action in order to create a martyrlogy. The newspaper Voenna Bulgaria (Military Bulgaria) introduced a special column called “Fallen Heroes” dedicated to the memory of those killed in combat. The newspaper presented the stories of Bulgarian soldiers who had recently returned from Greek captivity. Publishing excerpts from the soldier’ letters remained a popular journalistic practice in Bulgaria until the end of the Great War.

In 1913 after an offensive of the Bulgarian army in the region of Razlog the mail of the 19th Division of the Greek Army was seized. Copies of letters written by the Greek rank and file to their families and friends were published, along with the full names and original signatures of the authors. One of them described how of 1,200 Bulgarians captured by the Greeks in the region of Nigrita, only 41 had been imprisoned. The rest had been slaughtered.

Cases of this kind began to proliferate and soon spread to civilian newspapers. Balkanska zvezda (The Balkan Star), a newspaper aimed at the Bulgarian Diaspora, published a personal letter written by a Greek soldier to his family in which he wrote that the Bulgarian nation “must be destroyed.”⁵³³ Another letter provided details of massacres of Bulgarian civilians in the villages of Dotli and Banitsa, without any expression of

⁵³² Voenni izdaniya, 20, 27/10/1912, 2.

⁵³³ Balkanska zvezda (The Balkan Star), 51, 5/09/1913, 3.

compassion or regret. Women, children and the elderly, he wrote- “everybody must be killed.”⁵³⁴

Such material both reflected and encouraged further escalation in violence and hostility to neighboring nationalities. After the adventure of 1913, when Bulgaria lost the Second Balkan War there was a steady flow of battlefield reports and tales told by former prisoners of war about atrocities committed by both Serbs and Greeks in combat and against civilians. Diana Mishkova cites some of the newspaper headlines: “Massacres of Bulgarians”; “The Barbarities of Greeks and Serbs”; “Greek Ferocities in Macedonia”, “The Horrors of Thrace”, “Serbian Terror in Macedonia.”⁵³⁵ The constant reminders of atrocities were a simple and efficient propaganda tool to keep up the spirit of the army. Once Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in the Great War of 1914, a monthly magazine called Voinishka biblioteka (The Soldier Library) was distributed free among the rank and file.⁵³⁶ In it Serbs were referred as “pigs”, an allusion to their pig breeding. The Soldier Library and another magazine called Az znam vsichko (I know everything) featured the satirical characters as Jesus Christić, Ristophor Columbić, and Napoleon Bonapardić. It was a way of casting Serbs as megalomaniacs. The litany of hatred did not cease until the end of the war.

⁵³⁴ Ibid, 1.

⁵³⁵ Mishkova, 178.

⁵³⁶ Ibid, 179. Colonel Azmanov recalls in his memoirs that during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, all newspapers published by the Bulgarian Headquarters were stopped. Voenni izvestiya, Voenen zhurnal (The Military Magazine) and Voinishka sbirka (The Military Collection) were not published until the end of 1913. However, according to research done by Ivan Shipchanov, Voenni izvestiya continued to be published but only three times a week. See Ivan Shipchanov, “Balanskite voini i bulgarskiyat periodichen pechat” (The Balkan Wars in the Bulgarian Periodical Press), 80 godini ot Balkanskite voini, 155. After the Balkan Wars were over, Azmanov was appointed editor-in-chief, and along with the old newspapers, he started a new magazine for officers called Podofiterski sbornik (A Magazine for Officers). Azmanov, 136-137.

In 1995, Mihail Ionov published a collection of memoirs written by Bulgarian officers and military journalists who had participated in the Balkan Wars of 1912-3. Todor Peev, who as a civilian had accompanied the Bulgarian army marching to Thessaloniki, recalled ⁵³⁷ how Major-General G. Todorov had asked the population of Kochani to maintain the graves of the Bulgarian soldiers and light candles for the souls of those “who had died for the liberation of *kochantsi* [the inhabitants of Kochani], because their wives and children are far away.”⁵³⁸ The public speeches of military commanders, newly appointed governors and local bishops contributed to indoctrination in much the same way as they had popularized the Bulgarian cause during the First Balkan War.

Another example of patriotic speech was the speech given by Bulgarian Bishop Gerasim when the Bulgarian army had entered Strumica, on October 23, 1912. Addressing a crowd of local people and soldiers, he welcomed the brave army bringing back the “glory of Kliment of Ohrid who had studied in the ancient town of Tiveriopol” (believed to be present day Strumica) and the “medieval Bulgarian king, Samuel.”⁵³⁹ Peev also reports a case where Bulgarian soldiers brought a Bulgarian woman, who had converted to marry a Turk, to the residence of the bishop. The soldiers insisted on dressing the woman in Bulgarian folk costume, removing her veil and reconverting her to Christianity.⁵⁴⁰

⁵³⁷ “S shtaba na 7 Pehotna Rilska diviziya ot Kyustendil do Solun” (With the Headquarter of the Seventh Infantry Division from Kyustendil to Solun), Momchil Ionov, Makedonski dnevnitsi i spomeni 1912/1913 (Macedonian Diaries and Memoirs 1912/1913) (Sofia, 1995).

⁵³⁸ Ionov, 22.

⁵³⁹ Ibid., See Todor Peev, 32.

⁵⁴⁰ Peev, 34.

According to the evidence provided by Peev the Bulgarian army was welcomed in every town in Macedonia where the local population considered themselves Bulgarians.

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The Serbs had more by way of military tradition than the Bulgarians. “The character of the Serbs fits them best for military service,” wrote Simeon Pišćević in the mid-eighteenth century. Pišćević was a descendant of those Serbs who had emigrated from the Ottoman Empire across the Sava to Slavonia and organized their own military units within the Habsburg army (*prečani*). In the late 1740s, Pišćević mentions an infantry corps of 2,000 Serbs that constituted the so-called “Danubian land-militia”, the Potiska (after the name of the Tisa River), and Slavonian militias. These Serbian soldiers had their own distinctive uniforms and weaponry.⁵⁴¹ Along the military frontier, the Serbs in Croatia proper had been rewarded for their military service to the Habsburg Emperor by being relieved of all tribute to the local Croatian nobility as far back as the 1630s.

Though serving the House of Austria, they disliked the idea of learning German, because they feared cultural and religious assimilation. As a result, according to Pišćević, they could only rise to the rank of captain and were excluded from promotion to field rank. Istvan Déak claims that the inhabitants of the eighteen *Grenzer* regiments had enjoyed the privilege of compulsory elementary education since Maria Theresa’s time. Supervised by the colonels and captains of the regiment, the sons, and to a lesser extent daughters, of these peasant-soldiers were taught to read and write in both their native tongue and in German, usually by a non-commissioned officer. If talented or well-

⁵⁴¹ Simeon Pišćević, *Memoari*, 9; On the military organization of the Serbs living in the Habsburg Empire and Hungary, see also Jova Adamović, *Privilegije srpskog naroda u ugarskoj i rad Blagoveshtenskog sabora, 1861* (The Privileges of the Serbs in Hungary and the Assembly in 1861) (Zagreb, 1902), 17-23.

connected, a boy was then sent to a higher *Grenzeschule*, free of charge.⁵⁴² Some of them, like Captains Jovan Popović from Resava and Jevta Vitković from Valjevo, were representatives to the region's Assembly (*Sabor*) at Karlovac in 1735.⁵⁴³

In 1787, the commander of a division patrolling along the Military Frontier, Colonel Mihalevich, was ordered to recruit Serbian volunteers who would support the Austrian detachments in case of war with the Ottoman Empire. A future leader of the First Serbian Uprising, Alexa Nenadović from Brankovina was recruited into the *Freikorps* and subsequently commissioned.⁵⁴⁴ This military experience of the *prečani* was to prove very useful in the first Serbian uprising because many of the participants were soldiers who had taken part in the Austro-Turkish war of 1788-90, in which Karadjordje himself had served as a volunteer.⁵⁴⁵ When Serbs raised against the authorities in Budapest in 1848 the bulk of their forces was made up of *Grenzer* units. However, they were imperial loyalists, not nationalists. They were led by Habsburg officers and carried the imperial flag.⁵⁴⁶ The last *Grenzer* revolt took place in 1871, when some soldiers of the third Ogulin regiment tried to set up a Croatian national army which might eventually support an independent South Slav state. These events caused the dismantling of the military border and the incorporation of all its regiments into the regular infantry by the

⁵⁴² István Déak, *Beyond Nationalism*, 78.

⁵⁴³ D. Popović, *Srbija i Beograd* (Serbia and Belgrade) (Belgrade, 1950), 45; Jerotije Vujić and Milan Sikirica claim that in the first decade of the 1700s, Serbian officers Jevta Vitković from Valjevo, Vuk Isaković from Šapc, Ivan Metanović from Prnavor, and Alexa Pišćević from Čačak bought the right to gather state taxes in the districts of Šabac, Valjevo, and Peleš. There were cases of abuse and even murders of Serbian peasants by the bands of these mentioned officers. *Valjevo. Grad ustanikan*, 21.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 26.

⁵⁴⁵ Stead, 80.

⁵⁴⁶ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 35.

end of 1873.⁵⁴⁷ The main result of these years of frontier warfare was that it gave the Serbian population military experience which was to prove particularly valuable during the First and Second Serbian Uprisings.

In the early stage of the first Serbian Uprising, the commander-in-chief had been elected by the soldiers, but subsequently commanders had to be approved by the head of the supreme council (*vrhovni vožd*)⁵⁴⁸. The rank and file provided their own clothing, food supplies, weaponry, and horses if they were in a cavalry unit. The first two cannons the Serbs deployed had been supplied by Austria and additional artillery armament was obtained after the Serbs managed to capture Belgrade and Smederevo.⁵⁴⁹ At this point, the Serbian army was divided into regular (*regularna vojska*) and volunteer corps (*narodna vojska*). The Military Regulations (*Vojnski Ustav*) of 1813 required each soldier enlisted in the regular army to wear uniform.⁵⁵⁰ A French source of 1812 reported that at the end of the Russian-Turkish war, the Russians had evacuated their army from Serbia and had left only two platoons “which were dressed in Russian military uniforms though all the soldiers were Serbs.”⁵⁵¹ The regular army organized during the first Uprising had ranks similar to the Russian ones: captain, lieutenant (*poručnik*), second lieutenant (*potporučnik*), sergeant-major (*vahtmajstor*), ensign (*estandarfirer*), corporal (*unteroficir*), and drummer (*barabančik*).

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁵⁴⁸ After May, 1804, Karadjordje was able to sign his military orders under the titles of “Supreme Duke” (*vojvoda*) and “Commander of Serbia”. Charles Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 31.

⁵⁴⁹ Before the end of the First Uprising the Serbs had acquired about 300 cannons. Stead, 81.

⁵⁵⁰ Pavle Vasić, “Unifrome Srpske voiske za vreme prvog ustanka,” Zbornik istorijskog muzeja Srbije (Belgrade, 1968), 47.

The development of the Serbian army in the 1830s was hampered by its continuing subjection to the Sublime Porte. The first Serbian military force formed in 1830 consisted of a battalion of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery of artillery. A dozen young Serbs were sent to Russia for officer training. There was a plan to open a military school in Požarevac, but it came to nothing when the Turkish Constitution of 1838 brought the army under the authority of the Department of the Interior and recommended that it be used solely for domestic policing. Nearly thirty years later, in the summer of 1867, when Turkish garrisons left the fortresses of Belgrade, Smederevo, Kladovo, Šabac, Užice, and Soko further developments became possible. The Ottoman Sultan remained suzerain of Serbia and the Ottoman flag continued to fly on the walls of the fortresses, but the Serbian state flag was now allowed to fly alongside it.⁵⁵² A gun-factory and arsenal were opened in 1848; and an artillery school, which was also to train cannon-founders, was opened in 1850.⁵⁵³ A census of all able-bodied Serbian citizens and their equipment was made during in 1854 and regulations enacted to supply the army with food from communal granaries in time of war.⁵⁵⁴

All male citizens from twenty to fifty years old were compelled to serve in the local militia, which was commanded by a small cadre of professional officers trained in Russia. The assassination of Michael Obrenović in 1868 coincided with the beginning of

⁵⁵¹ Cited in Vasić, 48.

⁵⁵² Ilustrovana Istorija Srba (Illustrated History of the Serbs), Volume 11 (Belgrade, 1995), 13.

⁵⁵³ The military gunpowder factory was located in Obilicevo (near Kruševac) for smokeless and in Straghari (near Kragujevac) for common powder. Stead, 91. In 1877-8, Russian General Bobrikov visited the arsenal near Kragujevac and was pleasantly surprised by its good production, totally subsidized by the state. General Bobrikov, V Srbii. Iz vospominanii o voine 1877/78 (In Serbia. Memories of the War in 1877/78) (Sankt-Peterburg, 1891) 57.

⁵⁵⁴ Stead, 82.

the politicization of the new army, which was to be involved in several coups d'état. According to the law, no male could receive a state or church appointment without proof of army service ⁵⁵⁵. Regulations provided for obligatory annual drills lasting at least 25-30 days, but Serbian governments rarely enforced the rule because of strong peasant resistance.⁵⁵⁶ Never the less, the avoidance of conscription was punishable by an additional year of service and anyone else involved in cheating the enrolment commissions was fined 300 francs. The recruits were enrolled in July and August after harvest.

In the early twentieth century recruits numbered 21,000 men a year, which meant that with two-year service Serbia had 42,000 recruits.⁵⁵⁷ Service in the Serbian army was for a term of twenty-four years. The recruit could start his service at any time between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one; he served for eighteen months in the infantry, or for two years in the cavalry and artillery. He was then transferred to the reserve for eight-and-a-half years (first echelon) and then did a further six years in the second echelon and another eight years in the third ⁵⁵⁸. If circumstances demanded it all able-bodied men between eighteen and twenty-one and between forty-five to fifty years old could be called up.

⁵⁵⁵ Stead, 84-85.

⁵⁵⁶ General Bobrikov, 39.

⁵⁵⁷ This figure was relatively high and imposed a burden on the state's finances; therefore the period was reduced to one-and-a-half year service. See Stead, 85.

⁵⁵⁸ The active army was organized in three bans, and a *zadna odbrana*, or last line of defense. See Woislav Petrovitch, *Serbia: Her People, History and Aspirations* (London, 1915), 32.

Non-commissioned officers received uniforms, food, and salary from the State.⁵⁵⁹ Corporals usually received about 60 francs a year while sergeants were paid 360 francs. Married officers also received free fuel for their families. Regulations provided several other privileges. Non-commissioned officers were exempted from government taxation. After completing fourteen years' satisfactory service, all Serbian non-commissioned officers were entitled to a gratuity; and if they died on active service, their families continued to receive half to three quarters of this pension.⁵⁶⁰ Since most non-commissioned officers were conscripts their educational level was low. Special schools were opened to train non-commissioned officers of all branches. The infantry school was in Belgrade, the artillery in Kragujevac, and cavalry and engineering in Niš.

Since 1838, officers for all branches of service had graduated from the military academy in Belgrade. Their splendid uniforms, regular salary, and the prestige derived from service continued to make the occupation of army officer very attractive. Captains received 2,600 francs a year; colonels 7,200; generals 10,104; and the highest rank, general [*voivode*], 15,000. Every commissioned officer was allowed a further 243 francs a year for a servant and 27 cubic meters of wood for fuel.⁵⁶¹ Yet throughout the nineteenth century, well-trained officers were scarce and a high portion of the commanding staff was recruited from reserve.

In 1883 when a law of Army Organization was enacted, the old system of a territorial militia was abandoned. Instead the country was divided into five military

⁵⁵⁹ Enlisted men or noncommissioned officers included sergeants (regimental; hospital; supply; stable, etc.); corporals and privates.

⁵⁶⁰ Stead, 86.

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 87.

districts. The King of Serbia was nominally the commander-in-chief of the army, and every soldier was to swear an oath of allegiance to him. Serbian military commanders of the nineteenth century were very popular among the peasantry. Vuk Karadžić published in *Danica* a cycle of poems dedicated to Serbian military commanders—among them Djordje Djurica, Haiduk Veliko Petrović, Hajji Ruvim.⁵⁶² A Court Military Band was organized in 1831 in Kragujevac which was then the capital.⁵⁶³ The founder and first bandmaster of the Court Military Band was Josif Schlesinger (1794-1870), a native of the Vojvodina, a part of the Habsburg Empire with a high population of ethnic Serbs.⁵⁶⁴ Schlesinger had noticed that Serbian choral societies which had become popular in the Vojvodina had helped to preserve Serbian identity there when it came to be threatened by Magyarization after the fall of the Bach regime in the 1850s. He suggested that the formation of choral societies in Serbia proper should be encouraged too⁵⁶⁵. He himself helped to raise national pride through the music he composed for the Court Band.

The annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina by Austro-Hungary in 1908 was catalyst for Serbian officer corps, triggering a fierce reaction of outrage and intensifying sentiments of loyalty into a fierce nationalism. Yet, it was the ongoing customs war with Austria that was to radicalize the rank and file.⁵⁶⁶ The trade war between Serbia and

⁵⁶² Vuk Karadžić, “Rat i ratnici” (War and Soldiers), *O društvu*, 87-129.

⁵⁶³ In the early 1830s, the Serbian court still resided in Kragujevac, even though Miloš had an official residence in Belgrade.

⁵⁶⁴ M. Pavlović, “Serbian Music in the Period 1830-1884”, *Balkanica* (Belgrade, 1989), 20:151.

⁵⁶⁵ The first Serbian choral society had been founded in 1838 in Panchevo, a small border town in the province of the Vojvodina with a rich local bourgeoisie and well-organized parochial council.

⁵⁶⁶ The Austro-Hungarian commercial treaty was the foundation of Serbia’s foreign trade. Nearly 90% of Serbia’s exports went to the Dual Monarchy. When Serbia opened negotiations with Bulgaria to abolish the tariff duties between the two countries, the Habsburg Empire closed its frontier with it for two years. This conflict came to be known as the “Pig War”, after Serbia’s main article of export. Laffan, *The Serbs.*, 81-2.

Austro-Hungary (1906-11) had a severe effect on the Serbian economy, and Serbian farmers were the first to bear the brunt. Not only was the close and convenient Austrian market closed off but Austrian credits lost, and the higher transportation costs to other neighboring countries aggravated the economic situation of the Serbian peasants, the vast majority of the population. Indeed from 1906 Serbian popular nationalism was fed largely by disputes over customs with the Dual Monarchy but it was channeled into demands for a greater Serbia.

As early as 1898, a Serbian journalist had told the British Ambassador in Belgrade that the Austro-Hungarian idea of Serbian disarmament did not please Serbian public opinion. Since ethnic Serbs were split between seven governments, Serbia could not be satisfied with the current political status quo. The ambassador thought that political circles in Serbia shared the hope of exploiting general conflagration whenever it took place.⁵⁶⁷

The population of Bosnia-Hercegovina was hardly touched by nationalism, however, Serbian officers visiting Bosnia fomented Serbian feelings there by popularizing the idea of future unification with Serbia⁵⁶⁸. Immediately after the annexation, a secret society was organized to recruit Serb volunteers ready to fight against the Austro-Hungarian army. *Narodna Odbrana* (National Defense) established a network of agents in Bosnia whose self-professed task was agitation and the

⁵⁶⁷ N. Ferguson, *The Pity of War* (Basic Books, 1998), 146-7.

⁵⁶⁸ After 1878, the two occupied provinces were under military administration, with considerable differences in treatment. In Bosnia, Baron Josef Philippović was of Croatian origin. In Hercegovina, Baron Stephan Jovanović was moderate and quickly reconstituted the local administrative institutions. Universal conscription was introduced between 1894-1903, and by 1894, the province of Bosnia-Hercegovina had four infantry regiments of locals and one Jager battalion. Deák, 63.

popularization of a war against the Dual Monarchy. In 1909, the Serbian government dissolved *Narodna Odbrana* (National Defense), although the espionage network continued to function.

King Petar arranged a loan for 95,000,000 *denars* to complete the railway network in Serbia and to buy new weaponry. In 1910, 23 % of the entire state budget went on military expenditures and 28% on debt service for previous loans to improve the army.⁵⁶⁹ By contrast the entire budget of the Ministry of Agriculture for 1910 came to only 3% of the state budget.⁵⁷⁰ According to Gale Stokes, the ideology that fit such policies best was nationalism. Nationalists justified the expansion of state activities and the extraction of ever-greater amounts from the peasantry to pay for them. This also explains, in part, why the one area in which the Serbian peasantry benefited from the state policy was education, through which the state could build mass support for itself.⁵⁷¹ The homogeneity of the Serbian people was also an advantage. For example, on the eve of the Balkan Wars, of 2,784,016 citizens, 90% defined themselves as Serbs; while only 10% were of some other origin besides Serbian.⁵⁷²

The first Serbian monarch to look for support in the army was Milan. In Serbia, where no landowning class could provide social support for the monarchy, Milan decided to create a powerful substitute in the national army. In 1877 the Russian General

⁵⁶⁹ According to the statistics provided by Colonel Alexander Stojčević, the consolidated state debt of Serbia for 1909-10 was 536,950,500 *denars*. Alexander M. Stojčević, Istorija naših ratova za oslobodjenje i ujedinjenje ot 1912-1918 god (The History of Our Wars for Liberation and Unification 1912-1918) (Belgrade, 1932), 17.

⁵⁷⁰ Stokes, 107.

⁵⁷¹ Ibid, 107.

⁵⁷² Stojčević, Istorija naših ratova, 13.

Bobrikov reported that the Serbian army was still organized more like a people's volunteer army (*narodnoe opolchenie*) than a regular military force.⁵⁷³ The loyalty of the officer corps to the prince became a controversial issue in Serbian politics from 1878 to 1903.⁵⁷⁴ Milan's military reforms of 1898 had increased significantly the number of officer candidates, who came from more diverse social backgrounds than the old officer corps.

Most of these young men became involved in secret nationalistic organizations such as National Defense (*Narodna Odbrana*) and Union or Death (*Ujedinjenje ili Smrt*) whose members were predominantly Serbian cadre officers. The leading figure of the society was Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević-Apis, who since 1913 had been head of Serbian military intelligence. With tacit government approval, Apis had organized clandestine bands of marauders who fought against the IMRO and the Greeks over the national consciousness of the Macedonian peasants. "Union or Death" was connected to the ultra-nationalist newspaper Pijemont (Piedmont), whose program included the unification of all Serbs within the nation state and claimed that "all political parties have shown in practice their lack of patriotism and understanding of Serbian culture."⁵⁷⁵ The organization had an elaborate initiation ceremony, and new members took a solemn oath

⁵⁷³ The appearance of the Serbian soldiers contributed to Bobrikov's impressions, because they were not dressed according to the regulations. The regulations demanded that Serbian soldier be in a uniform consisting of a blouse, trousers, and a hat. The government, however, economized with the blouses and trousers and kept the soldiers dressed in thick woolen shirts. General Bobrikov, 19; 51.

⁵⁷⁴ Stokes, 109. On the other hand, the involvement of the military in politics was typical of all the Balkan countries at the time. Elements within the armed forces dissatisfied with a particular regime, would try to replace it. Hence the Military League in Greece which was organized to overthrow the unpopular regime of Theotokis in May 1909. For more details see Victor Papacosma, 47-8.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid, 112. The organization and number of the Serbian military units was accordingly the military regulations published on 31 of March 1904. For more details about the Serbian mobilization of 1912 see Alexander Stojchević, Istorija naših ratova, 26-29.

at a table covered with a black cloth on which lay a cross, a dagger, and a revolver. The procedure alluded to early nineteenth century' Serbian fighters for independence.

Apis was also in charge of recruiting Serbian volunteers in 1914. He worked out a set of special regulations on how to organize the military training of Serbian volunteers, approved by Minister of Defense Dušan Stefanović. Accordingly, an order to organize volunteers corps was signed on August 4, 1914 and four military detachments were formed: Zlatibrod's division of 750 men; Jadarski's, Rudnicki's, and Gornjački's, each of 500 men.⁵⁷⁶ The high command envisaged Serb volunteers in Bosnia carrying out sabotage and raising rebellion against the Austrian authorities.⁵⁷⁷ Apis continued playing a very active role not only in organizing these volunteer detachments but supervising their operations in Bosnia.⁵⁷⁸

On the eve of World War I, officer conspiracies and national organizations flourished in Serbia and in South Slav lands under Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule. Differing widely in membership, methods, and degree of official governmental support, they had a common aim, to unite all Serbs within a nation state to be called either Greater Serbia or the South Slav state.⁵⁷⁹ From October to December 1914, only 452 volunteers

⁵⁷⁶ The text of the order which Serbian Minister of Defense Colonel Dušan Stefanović signed on August 3, 1914 was cited in Nikola Popović, Petar Jović, Dobrovolci u Srpsko-Austrijskom ratu 1914 godine (Volunteers in the Serbian-Austrian War in 1914) (Belgrade, 1989), 3.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 1.

⁵⁷⁸ On August 9, 1914, Apis signed an order for the deployment of the Gornajchki division in case of an offensive. Popović, Jović, 2.

⁵⁷⁹ David Mackenzie, "Officer Conspirators and Nationalism in Serbia, 1901-1914," War and Society in Central Europe, 1740-1920s., 117. The "Black Hand" managed to monopolize even the organizing of volunteer corps on the eve of World War One. Though loyal to the secret society officer, volunteers were recruited in the café the Golden Gun on present-day Boulevard of the Revolution in Belgrade. The instructions for organizing sabotage in Bosnia by such volunteer military detachments were written by Apis himself. See Popović and Jović, Dobrovolci 1912-1918 , 1.

were recruited. Although, the Serbian military command wished to present this figure as a huge success, the vast majority were Serbs from Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Lika. Only 26 were Croats and a few were Slovenes.⁵⁸⁰ Many more Serbs fought in the Austrian army, and the Serbian Ministry of Defense issued a special decree giving Serbian prisoners “second chance” if they agreed to fight as volunteers for Serbia.⁵⁸¹

In 1912, Serbia was able to mobilize ten infantry divisions, two independent infantry brigades and a cavalry division. The total numbers included 220,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 500 guns.⁵⁸² On October 5, 1912, King Petar I issued a proclamation in which he reiterated the old propaganda motif of Serbs in Priština, Skopje, and Prizren who were still “suffering and moaning”, having awaited liberation for nearly a century. The proclamation alleged that the Ottomans authorities were continuing to execute innocent Serbs and to convert Serbian women.⁵⁸³ However, one should bear in mind that during the Balkan Wars all printed materials were subjected to censorship. Serbia introduced military censorship in 1912. This was covered by a special censorship section attached to the army headquarters. The chief censors were Professor Stanoja Stanojević and Milutin Milanković. Their main task was to eliminate any pro-Bulgarian materials and to present anything that informed the public about Bulgarian territorial claims.⁵⁸⁴ In

⁵⁸⁰ However, not all Bosnians who had opted to be volunteers were approved. In the list quoted by Popović and Jović, it is registered that half of the applying Bosnians were returned (the reason is not made explicit), 9.

⁵⁸¹ A detailed register of captured Serbs with their posts in the Austrian army is provided by Popovic and Jovovic, 8.

⁵⁸² *A Concise History*, 20; Stojčević, *Istorija naših ratova*, 26-8.

⁵⁸³ The complete text of King Petar’s proclamation of October 5, 1912 was published in Alexander Stojčević, *Istorija nashih ratova*, 66-8.

⁵⁸⁴ Vladimir Belić, “*Ratna dejatelnost prof. St. Stanojevića*”, cited in Ivan Ilchev, *Rodinata mi-prava ili ne!* 141.

1914-15, Macedonian teachers of Bulgarian origin were obliged to take courses in Serbian language and history.⁵⁸⁵

The Balkan Wars had strained the economic, demographic, and military reserves of all the participating countries. Since victory required both quick and efficient mobilization and a high fighting spirit, efforts were made to step up national indoctrination. Combat provided unique opportunity for the press to focus on national symbols and present mutual hostilities to manipulate public opinion further.

Military standard-bearers in particular attracted much public attention. Military colors served as rallying points on the battle-field. However, standard-bearers presented easy targets to the enemy, and their casualty rate was high. In his memoirs, Joyce Cary, a member of a British mission to the Balkans in 1913, recalls that in the Montenegrin regiments the post was “hereditary”. If the standard-bearer was hit, a son or nephew took up the standard.⁵⁸⁶ Cary observed an attack by Montenegrin grenadiers at Vallos. These were all old men, some over seventy years old, and as they told Cary, it mattered little if they got killed.⁵⁸⁷ However, no such cases were reported by the official press or circulated in public, because it would have destroyed the myth of spontaneous and steadily- increasing popular enthusiasm.

It seems that official Serbian sources at the time did not stress the significance of historical tradition in the case of Montenegro. When Edith Durham visited Montenegro in 1904, *junaštvo* (heroism) was a subject that occupied a large space in the Montenegrin

⁵⁸⁵ Azmanov, 151.

⁵⁸⁶ Joyce Cary, *Memoirs of the Bobotes* (London: 1964), 75.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 119.

mind and it was every man's ambition to be considered *dobar junak* (valiant warrior) and therefore worthy of his forefathers.⁵⁸⁸ Montenegrins often talked cheerfully about war, if there happened to be one, accompanied by the long monotonous chant of minstrels scraping upon their one-stringed *gusles*.⁵⁸⁹ In Montenegro, which Stoyan Pribičević calls “a sister state”, there had been a special type of ideal man-fighter against the Turks for centuries.⁵⁹⁰ Although Serbian politicians defined Montenegro as ethnically Serbian, Durham could tell immediately that a policeman she met in Belgrade was a Montenegrin and not a “Serb of Serbia”. The man defined himself as “Montenegrin from the village of Kolašin” (*Crnogorac* from Kolashin). He was so excited that the young English lady had visited what he called his fatherland that he broke down into tears. He confessed that he did not marry because he detested “Serbian women”, who were unfaithful, but he could not afford to return to Kolašin for a wife.⁵⁹¹

When Demetra Daka visited Montenegro she was proudly told which women had lost family members in the last wars. The Montenegrins even had a special curse for peaceful activities, which were not considered masculine enough: “May you die in bed like a woman!”⁵⁹² However, the same source reports that when, in 1914, a captured

⁵⁸⁸ Edith Durham, 5.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 5.

⁵⁹⁰ Stojan Pribičević[Pribichevich], World without end. The Saga of Southeastern Europe (New York, 1939),111.

⁵⁹¹ Edith Durham, 160-1. In this sense, General Bobrikov reported an interesting debate among Serbian senior officers during the early stage of the Russian-Turkish War in 1877-8. When in November 1877 the defense of the Serbian frontier was in question, there was a split in opinion. Some senior officers insisted on advancing in Montenegro while the rest suggested Bosnia, because it had been historically Serbian. General Bobrikov, 61.

⁵⁹² Pribičević, 111; Harry de Windt describes how street fights had started among Montenegrin youths. It was enough one simply to tease his friend that his grandfather had not died as a man on the battlefield but

Montenegrin soldier was asked by an Austrian captain: “Why do you poor Montenegrins fight us, anyway?” the soldier’s reply was, “For bread.”⁵⁹³

In 1915 an American Red Cross doctor in Serbia told the correspondent of The Daily Mail Basil Clarke that Serbian soldiers were great: “Pain! Suffering! You have not seen bravery till you have seen these men suffer. I’ll take off a hand, an arm, a leg without anesthetics, and will the fellow budge? Not an eyelid. If you hear him say “*Kuku lele*” (Oh, dear!), that is as much as you will hear, and not often that much. And die! They will die without a sound. Where this race of soldiers sprang from, I don’t pretend to know, but I tell you right now they are God’s own men.”⁵⁹⁴ This quotation was taken from the Daily Mail (February 23, 1915) and included in the introduction of Serbia: Her People, History and Aspirations, by Vojislav Petrović, the attaché to the Royal Serbian Legation in London, in order to demonstrate to the English-speaking peoples the virtues of the Serbian soldiers and their leaders.⁵⁹⁵

Another simple and effective technique applied by commanding officers was to underestimate the efficiency of rival armies and to exaggerate the strength of their own military forces. General Vladimir Belić in his Ratovi Srpskog naroda u XIX i XX veku explained the Bulgarian victory in 1885 in terms of the slow and inadequate mobilization of the Serbian army.⁵⁹⁶ He argued that had Serbia mobilized sufficient forces, it would

peacefully in his bed. Natural death was considered the biggest embarrassment and humiliation for men. De Windt, 53.

⁵⁹³ Pribičević, 111.

⁵⁹⁴ Petrović, Serbia: Her People, 34-5.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 14, 32, 33.

⁵⁹⁶ Vladimir Belić, Ratovi Srpskog naroda u XIX i XX veku (1788-1918) (Wars of the Serbian People in XIX th and XXth Centuries 1788-1918) (Belgrade, 1937), 92.

have won easily. A rare exception of precision and objectiveness were the reports of Colonel Azmanov, who in 1914 was appointed military attaché in Belgrade and had spent two years in the Serbian capital.⁵⁹⁷ His comments on the discipline and qualities of the Serbian army were so objective that when one of his reports was published by the Bulgarian Headquarters, a newspaper called the author a “Serbian agent” and saboteur.⁵⁹⁸ Azmanov compared the progress of the Bulgarian army with the achievements of the Serbian military forces and discovered that the victory in 1885 had instilled too much confidence in the Bulgarian officers but little desire for reform. In Serbia, on the other hand, the defeat of 1885 stimulated the implementation of reforms in all spheres: the economy, the army, culture, and education.⁵⁹⁹

One of the most popular historians among the Serbian officer corps was Professor Stanojević. His book Fight for Hegemony in the Balkans (*Borbi za provlast na Balkanu*) presented the conflict between Bulgarians and Serbs as a continuation of the thirteenth-century battle for territorial and political hegemony in the Balkans. To obtain an outlet to the Adriatic Sea was of crucial importance to Serbia, Stanojević argued, otherwise the country would not be able to function effectively economically.⁶⁰⁰ Stanojević also observed how popular the *guslars* were and how their songs about the feats of Serbian

⁵⁹⁷ In 1915, the Serbian Ministry of Defense was transferred to Niš because of the war with the Habsburg Empire.

⁵⁹⁸ The newspaper was Utro (The Morning). See Azmanov, 146.

⁵⁹⁹ Azmanov, 145.

⁶⁰⁰ Cited in Azmanov, 145.

heroes, soldiers, and commanders-in chief brought crowds of people out onto the streets of Belgrade.⁶⁰¹

Last but not least, historical monuments told the people about previous battles and the heroism displayed in them. Monuments played a considerable role in keeping historical memory alive and, indeed, in creating that “memory”. One impressive monument was the so-called tower of skulls (the *čela kula*), on the Pirot road. In 1809, a small Serbian stronghold near Pirot commanded by Stefan Sindjelić, resisted the Turks for a short while. When Sindjelić saw that the battle was lost, he fired his gun into the powder magazine and blew the place up. The Turkish commander ordered the heads of the dead Serbian soldiers to be collected. Paying twenty-five *piastres* a piece, he obtained over nine hundred. They were placed in rows in a great tower of brick and cement. Later, by order of King Alexander Obrenović, a chapel was built over it, and four skulls continued to stare from their sockets where the Turks had placed them.⁶⁰² Serbs were encouraged to consider this place sacred, and the ruins of the tower kept alive the hatred between Turks and Serbs, telling the local population of Sindjelić’s sacrifice and Turkish barbarism.

Another example of a military monument designed to impress a sense of a glorious past upon Serbs and educate them in patriotism was the monument of *Haiduk Veliko*, erected in Negotin in Eastern Serbia. When visiting Negotin in 1904, Mary Edith Durham reported that this monument was the chief glory of the town. *Haiduk Veliko* had

⁶⁰¹ Ibid., 145-6.

⁶⁰² Durham, 176-7; Vaka, 131-2.

been a leader of 18,000 men at the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising and had waged war in East Serbia against the Ottomans.⁶⁰³ Eventually, he was captured and executed.

When Demetra Vaka visited Serbia after the Balkan wars in 1914, she saw monuments of plain stones everywhere, each of them, carved in flat relief, with the full-length portrait of a man who had died for his country. These gardens gave her the impression that Serbia was one vast Thermopylae, and as “if the past was presenting arms to the present.”⁶⁰⁴ It was a petrifying song of battle sung by the dead to the living and reminding people what sacrifice in the name of the Motherland meant.⁶⁰⁵

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As we have seen, by the end of the nineteenth century, both Bulgarian and Serbian conscript armies had played an indispensable role in the process of indoctrinating the people. However, military drills did not indoctrinate by themselves. It was the rituals accompanying military drills such as singing “Hail to the King” and the consecration of military colors which played an important role in the process of patriotic education. Icons of Orthodox saints, heraldic symbols like the double-headed eagle or the lion of Bulgaria came to have a profound emotional influence on the rank and file. The soldier did not have choice. He had to attend parades; to go to Church during Lent; to salute the colors morning and evening.

Participation in military conflict was justified in terms of both religious duty and historical tradition. As early as 1877-8, when Serbia took part in the Russian-Turkish war

⁶⁰³ Durham, 197-9.

⁶⁰⁴ Vaka, 133.

⁶⁰⁵ Vaka, 133.

on the Russian side, Milan urged his people to fight, because the Serbs had historical obligations to do so as members of the Eastern Christian community.⁶⁰⁶ When the Serbian army marched off to Alexinac on December 4, 1877, Archbishop Michael blessed the soldiers and the Prince as protectors of Christianity and fighters for liberation.⁶⁰⁷

The process of national indoctrination was facilitated to a large extent by hierarchy and military routine. As in any army, the lower ranks executed the orders of those higher up; and there was no room for personal doubts about the correctness of a decision. Once the national doctrine had been defined and the enemy had been identified, the rank and file had simply to follow instruction in the matter. Life in the barracks made the implementation of certain notions less complicated in comparison with the indoctrination of the civilian population, which was free to express disagreement with any official doctrine. Russian General Bobrikov, who was in charge of the Serbian military detachments fighting against the Turks in 1877-8, wrote in his memoirs that wild vengeance and deeply-rooted hatred against the Ottomans were the leading motives for the Serbian peasants' participation in the conflict.⁶⁰⁸ Most of the 15,000 volunteers were in fact Serbs from the former Military border, Bosnia and Montenegro, not from the Principality.⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁶ Proclamation of Milan, published on December 1st, 1877. The full text of the proclamation translated in Russian is cited in General Bobrikov, 81-3.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid, 82-3.

⁶⁰⁸ General Bobrikov, 60.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid, 71.

The wars of 1912-13 provided an opportunity for the heirs of the Bulgarian and Serbian thrones, Boris and Alexander, to participate more actively in the life of their armies and to project a public image. Boris accompanied his father Ferdinand on tours of the battlefield, while Alexander Karadjordjević was appointed Inspector General of the Serbian army at the beginning of 1911.⁶¹⁰ Early in 1912, he found out about “Union or Death” (*Ujedinjenje ili smrt*) and its purposes. To combat it, he eventually organized a counter-faction loyal to the crown officers called White Hand (*Bela Ruka*). Frictions between the two officer cliques were to influence the politics in Serbia in the coming decade.

Although Serbian and Bulgarian historians cite the quick mobilization of the two armies as evidence of mass enthusiasm and a sudden eruption of patriotism, in fact, politicians, military commanders, and media had extensively prepared people in both countries for the war with the Ottoman Empire. At the turn of the twentieth century Bulgarian conscripts practiced shooting drills on immovable targets covered with the traditional Turkish cap, the *fes*.⁶¹¹ During drills, the Bulgarian infantry was taught that use of the bayonet was preferable to the use of fire because it demonstrated moral superiority and stamina.

Statistics show that in 1912-13, every 11th officer in the Bulgarian infantry was born outside the Principality. Most of the Bulgarian officers coming from the Diaspora were from either Bessarabia (Bolgrad, Kishinev, Kongaz, Shikerlitai) or Northern

⁶¹⁰ Sava Skoko, *Vojvoda Radomir Putnik* (Commander Radomir Putnik), (Belgrade: 1990), 232.

⁶¹¹ Radev, 17.

Dobrudzha (Tulcha).⁶¹² According to the research of Nikolai Yanakiev, 87% of the officers coming from Bessarabia and Northern Dobrudzha received at least two medals for bravery.⁶¹³

However, after the Balkan Wars one-tenth of the Bulgarian male population had been killed or crippled. Bulgarian agriculture could not afford the loss. Without an adequate working force, the future of the state was bleak. The Serbs had entered the wars with a reserve of ready money and their losses in Macedonia, though heavy, were not economically crippling⁶¹⁴. The territorial compensations in Macedonia and the victory in the Second Balkan War in 1913 compensated for previous misfortunes.

The Bulgarians' disastrous strategy in the summer of 1913 was dictated not so much by the desire to inflict a complete defeat on the Serbs and Greeks as by the intention of driving the disloyal allies rapidly out of Macedonia. It is said that in the evening of 29/16-30/17 June 1913, the Serbian and Bulgarian armies were fraternizing round Štip. Serbian officers were asked to dine on the Bulgarian lines. Hosts and guests made merry and were photographed together. At about ten o'clock the Bulgarians saw the Serbs to their camps. Five hours later, the Bulgarians advanced, murdered the guards and surrounded their "guests" in their sleep.⁶¹⁵

Richard Hall argues that the lack of coordination between government, monarch, and High Command proved disastrous for the success of Bulgarian nationalism. In

⁶¹² 80 godini ot Balkanskite vojni, 39.

⁶¹³ Ibid, 41.

⁶¹⁴ Laffan argues that through sound finance and expanding economic life the Serbian government had command of over 30.000.000 francs in 1909. See Laffan, 80.

⁶¹⁵ Laffan, 152-3.

theory, all of them had one and the same goal, national consolidation and territorial expansion. Yet, the inability to achieve cooperation between the army and politicians doomed the Bulgarian national cause in 1913 and the country never fully recovered from this catastrophe. Its participation in the First and Second World Wars also ended in failure.

Leaving aside the patriotic sentimentality of Bulgarian and Serbian wartime propaganda discussed above, the images of soldiers who had sacrificed their lives for the national cause became a source of inspiration and further enthusiasm. Jay Winter in his Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning claims that the remembrance of human losses in the Great War played a very significant role in reviving nationalism after 1918.⁶¹⁶ War memorials in cities, towns and villages were a reminder that every family was in mourning and stimulated the process of national consolidation. In other words, what mattered most was that deaths of the Bulgarian and Serbian peasants turned soldiers became a powerful catalyst in generating further nationalistic policies in the region. The Wars consolidated both communities by bringing the feeling of common suffering and solace.

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⁶¹⁶ Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Chapter 5

Education and National Indoctrination

An education system is an obvious medium by which a government can influence a population and inculcate nationalism. It can be used to convey a sense of the past, even to establish territorial claims in people's minds. This chapter argues that in both independent Bulgaria and Serbia primary education was focused primarily on literacy in the mother tongue, national history, and geography in order to promote the transmission of nationalistic values. The educational policymakers of the Balkans considered the educational weapon as important for indoctrination of the masses, and the introduction of universal elementary schooling reflected their determination to indoctrinate the traditional peasant community.

The means were ample. The printing of school readers in both countries, *chitanki* was a responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The state carefully selected historical events taught in state schools and had control over the curriculum. Ordinary people were led to believe that school readers contained accurate information but in both Serbia and Bulgaria they were used to glorify the national past and justify national claims.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, primary schooling in Bulgarian gradually became more accessible. However, schools were not the only educational institution. In the Ottoman Empire, various cultural organizations also promoted the Bulgarian national idea at different levels.

One such institution was the reading room (*chitalishte*). Financed by local communities, it provided a modest library collection, including a few periodicals, and

organized theatrical performances of patriotic dramas and other cultural events.⁶¹⁷ As a result of the Bulgarian-Greek conflict over the Macedonian bishoprics and the opening of public schools, a Bulgarian *chitalishte* in Istanbul started functioning in late 1866. Jointly funded by the Exarchate (after its establishment in 1871) and by Bulgarians living in the Ottoman capital, the new *chitalishte* organized numerous fund-raising events to help improve the quality of Bulgarian schools in Macedonia by supplying them with books, atlases, and writing materials and coordinated the efforts of other cultural organizations promoting Bulgarian education in Macedonia.⁶¹⁸

As a result of this activity, a Macedonian Society was established at the end of 1871 to control and distribute donations as financial aid for the Bulgarian schools in Thessaloniki, Serres, Kostur, Gevgeli, Voden, Veles, and Lerin.⁶¹⁹ In the summer of 1874, a Trusteeship for Bulgarian schools in Ottoman Macedonia was established. It was funded by the Bulgarian Church and Bulgarian merchants based in Istanbul. The Exarchate, however, stood clear of direct financial involvement for fear of offending the Ottoman government.

In 1911, Efrek Karanov published an article about the Cultural and Reading Society of Kyustendil in western Bulgaria, highlighting its most important activities. They were to make newspapers and magazines available; to stage theatrical

⁶¹⁷ One of the most exhaustive historical descriptions of the institution of the Bulgarian *chitalishte* is that of Efrek Karanov, Deyatelnostta na Kyustendilskoto Chitalishte "Bratstvo" za 42 godini ot osnovavaneto mu-1 Julii 1869 do 1 Julii 1911 (The Activity of the Kyustendil's Reading Society "Union" for 42 years (July 1 1869-July 1 1911)), Efrek Karanov, Roden sum bulgarin (Efrek Karanov. I was born Bulgarian) (Sofia, 1991), 280-90.

⁶¹⁸ S. Ezekiev, Nastoyatelstvoto za bednite uchilishta (The Trusteeship of the Public Schools in Tsarigrad and the Bulgarian Education in Macedonia 1874-1876), 53.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 53-4. An annual report on the fundraising in 1873 provided the following figures: 86,753, 25 *gros*h for 1873 and 75,068 *gros*h for 1874.

performances; and to organize celebrations on such feast days as the Name Days of Saints Cyril and Methodius.⁶²⁰

Serbs had similar cultural societies called *matica*,⁶²¹ which encouraged publishing and reading in Serbian. A *matica* was opened in 1826 in Pest but later moved to Novi Sad in 1864 where the Serbian population was more numerous.⁶²² However, cooperation between the early nineteenth-century schooling network and the *chitalishte* was better in Bulgaria than in Serbia, even though Serbia had achieved autonomy four decades before the Bulgarian Principality.

In traditional peasant society parents taught their children on the family farm. Each child was trained to take a place in the community similar to that of his grandparents and parents. New ideas penetrated slowly and contact with peasants from other villages was limited. Serbian village schooling in the beginning of the nineteenth century as described by Vuk Karadžić was distinctly primitive. The teachers were local priests and monks from nearby monasteries. Each monastery kept goats, sheep, hens, and pigs and children taken into care by the monks looked after them. In winter, the monks would show them how to read but in summer, the children would forget what they had learnt and this “cycle” was repeated for four to five years until the children left.⁶²³

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*, 281.

⁶²¹ *Matica* as patriotic organizations promoting reading and encouraging literacy were very popular among the South Slavs. In 1842, a Croatian *matica*, *Matica Hrvatska* was established and it played an essential role in popularizing the Croatian language and literature throughout the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century.

⁶²² *Ljetopis Matice Srpske* had been published since 1826. The society was in charge of “importing” books, which were supposed to spread the Serbian national consciousness. See Ekmečić, “Istorijski koren i socialna dinamika,” 22.

⁶²³ Vuk Karadžić, “Škola” (School), *O društvu* (Belgrade, 1964), 147. The same practice existed in Montenegro. The first Montenegrin school was opened in 1834-5 in a monastery around Cetinje. The

Similarly, children taught by the village priest were expected to help tend his animals and do his domestic chores. If the village was big and relatively well-to-do, then it might have a school where children spent all day (except for a short lunch break) reciting and reading out loud.⁶²⁴ The readings included the Book of Hours and the Psalter. Before 1830, such schools were supervised by Orthodox priests, most, though sometimes Catholic priests also participated. However, the evidence gathered by Vladan Djordjević, suggests that even in the eighteenth century it was the Serbian language rather than religion which was decisive in defining the belonging to the Serbian community. According to his survey, as early as the beginning of the eighteenth century, Slavic and Latin schools for Serbian children were functioning in Karlovac, Belgrade, Osijek, Sombor and Dal, but most of them were closed down after the war between Austria and the Ottoman Empire of 1737- 1739.

Between 1740 and 1750, a seminary founded and sponsored by Metropolitan Visarion Pavlović was opened in Novi Sad.⁶²⁵ When Pavao Nenadović became Metropolitan of Karlovac, he organized a special fund of 31,000 *forints* designed to assist the opening of Serbian schools. The teacher Simeon Morokvašić active at Sombor between 1750 and 1760, was of Serbian origin. He received a salary of 50 florins a year. At the same time, at the high school of the Sombor Orthodox Municipality, the Latin

school functioned owing to financial subsidies ordered by Archbishop Petar II called *blagodejanie* (alms). The number of students was around 30; they studied reading, writing, some math, religion, and Serbian grammar. See Petar Popović, "Postanak i razvitak prve škole u Crnoj Gori (1834-1934)," *Cetinska Škola 1834-1934* (Montenegrin School 1834-1934) (Belgrade, 1934), 75.

⁶²⁴ Popović, 147.

⁶²⁵ The Seminary was called *Collegium Vissariono-Pawlovicsianum Petrovaradinense* and trained Orthodox priests. Vladan Djordjević, *Grčka i Srpska prosveta* (Greek and Serbian Education) (Belgrade, 1896).

teacher was a Catholic priest whose post later was inherited by a Protestant pastor.⁶²⁶

Pupils who graduated from the school went on to the gymnasium of Szeged.

Around 1775 in another province of the Habsburg Empire, the Banat, there were no fewer than 40 Serbian schools.⁶²⁷ In 1776, Teodor Janković Mirijevski, who was educated in Budapest, published recommendations for Serbian teachers on how to organize the teaching process. They were to remain in use until 1857. Mirijevski's disciple Avram Mrazović of Sombor insisted that Slavic grammar was a crucial subject for developing national consciousness. In 1782, an educational committee appointed by the Austrian authorities recommended that the alphabet in which Serbian textbooks were printed be changed from Cyrillic to Latin. Mrazović protested to the Emperor insisting that "Serbian books had to be printed in Cyrillic."⁶²⁸

In 1805, a Serbian teacher Sava Tekilija published a syllabus for educating Serb's peasant children in Arad (present-day in Romania). During the first decade of the new century Vuk Karadžić, Dositej Obradović, Sima Milutinović, and other Serbian intellectuals were engaged in heated debate on how to establish and develop a modern Serbian educational system. Influenced by their linguistic and educational debate, a reading society was opened around 1811 in the district of Negotin.⁶²⁹ Karadžić, who advocated the introduction of a standard Serbian vernacular, regarded reading societies as

⁶²⁶ Vladan Djordjević, 101.

⁶²⁷ Djordjević cites the figure of 373 schools in the Banat, but he does not refer to them as Serbian. See Djordjevic, 101.

⁶²⁸ Ibid, 103. Jovan Grčić also writes about the activity of Todor Jankovic Mirijevski and Avram Mrazović in *Istorija Srpske knjevnosti* (The History of Serbian Literature) (Novi Sad, 1903), 82.

⁶²⁹ R. Midjic, *Portreti iz Srpske Kulturne Istorije*. (Portraits from the Serbian Cultural History) (Novi Sad, 1995), 8-9.

a useful institution for communication and exchange of ideas among literate Serbs. The society in Brza Palanka attracted the attention of Karadjordje's secretary, and as he emphasized in an open letter addressed to one of the local leaders, Stefan Živković, teaching Serbian was patriotic.⁶³⁰ However, linguistic reforms and the efforts of the Serbian circle around Vuk Karadžić to establish education in Serbian came to be regarded as dangerous and provocative by the Austrian administration. In June 1815, the Imperial Chancellery issued a decree which prohibited the printing of both Illyrian [Serbian] and Romanian books.⁶³¹

However, no educational initiative preceding the establishment of the Serbian and Bulgarian nation-states is comparable to the results which the nation-oriented schooling systems achieved in terms of mass indoctrination. In both countries, primary education was to become obligatory and aimed at enrolling all children between 7 to 11 years old into a four-year teaching course that stressed national history and geography.

After Serbia became autonomous in 1830, a major concern of the Serbian intelligentsia was the lack of an efficient network of primary schools and trained teachers. In 1832, there were only 36 schools and 40 teachers in the entire country. Thirty years later, in the early 1860s, Prince Michael admitted bitterly that if he were to count all the Serbs in the country who had received their education in European universities, the number would not exceed twenty.⁶³² As Sava Popović Tekelija (1761-1842) put it in a political memorandum sent to Napoleon at the turn of the nineteenth century, "the

⁶³⁰ Ibid., 9. In the original is: "...*Otečestvo poslužiti*...."

⁶³¹ Ibid, 15.

⁶³² Sava Skoko, Vojvoda Radomir Putnik (Commander Radomir Putnik) (Belgrade, 1990), 20.

ignorance of the Serbian people is great. Even priests barely know how to read and write; therefore, it is difficult with such kind of people to create...a unified state.”⁶³³ The first gymnasium was opened in Kragujevac in 1835 and three years later a second one was opened in Belgrade.⁶³⁴ In 1837, three other gymnasiums were opened in Šabac, Čačak, and Zaječar respectively.⁶³⁵ The first lyceum, opened in 1838/39, and was subsequently transformed into the University of Belgrade. At the same time, the Serbian Military Academy was moved from Požarevac to Belgrade and the Theological College successfully completed its second academic year with forty-seven students and two lecturers. According to Vuk Karadžić, as early as 1810, a Serbian school training primary teachers was opened in Szent Andre, not far from Budapest but it was later was moved to Sombor, also in Hungary.⁶³⁶

While the development of higher education showed some progress in the years 1836-1839, the effective organization of Serbian primary education was hampered by lack of cooperation from the peasantry, who as we have seen, often refused to enroll their children at school because it prevented them from helping out on the family farm. The system of elementary education was reformed in 1834-5. Elementary schools were divided into three groups: state, municipal, and village. The Serbian state took responsibility for appointing teachers, printing textbooks, and building new schools.

⁶³³ Midjić, 22.

⁶³⁴ Milan Šević argues that it was opened as early as 1833. See Milan Šević, Srednite uchilishta v Sürbia. Kratük istoricheski pregled. Vünsna organizatsiya Vütreshna uredba. Pregled na uchebnite planove. (Grammar Schools in Serbia. A Short Historical Review. Internal Organization. Review of the Teaching Programs) (Sofia, 1906), 1.

⁶³⁵ At first they both had only two classes. Šević, 1.

⁶³⁶ Vuk Karadžić, Škola (School), 149.

Several small villages constituted a municipality responsible for the support of the local school. Quite often, because of remoteness and lack of roads, all peasant children of school age had to take up residence in an *internat* (boarding school) during the week.⁶³⁷ By the mid-1850s, schooling for children in Serbia usually lasted four years, but in the countryside the requirement was reduced to three years.

The four-year curriculum included basic knowledge of the Christian Orthodox religion, reading, writing, mathematics, general knowledge defined as “useful for any Serb”, Serbian history dealing with the Serbian lands and the relationship of the Serbs to the rest of the southern Slavs, geography, singing, and “practical advice for writing letters and other useful skills.”⁶³⁸ The level of teaching was inadequate, however, and most pupils barely learnt how to read and write. Svetozar Marković recalled that his teacher in the village school of Jagodina used to come to class drunk, and most of his classmates could read only a few of the Psalms and the Catechism.⁶³⁹ From 1848, elementary education in Serbia for both sexes became compulsory⁶⁴⁰. However, in outlying or mountainous villages, it was still difficult to enforce regulations, and children could not attend regularly especially in winter, when the lack of roads and harsh weather made long trips virtually impossible.

⁶³⁷ Sava Skoko, *Vojvoda Živojin Mišić. (Commander Živojin Mišić)* (Belgrade, 1990), 25.

⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁶³⁹ Skoko, 21.

⁶⁴⁰ Michael Boro Petrovich cites a law from December 1882/January 1883 which in his words established for the first time universal compulsory elementary education. The law required children who did not go on to higher schooling after completing four years of elementary school had to remain in elementary school another two years. Petrovich, 418.

A regulation of 1853 defined a secondary school (gymnasium) as a school with a seven-year curriculum, the final goal of which was the patriotic upbringing of Serbian youth and preparation for higher education. For four years pupils in the so-called “lower” gymnasium (*nepotpuna gimnazija*) were taught the history of Christianity, the Catechism, Serbian grammar, Old Slavic, Latin, German, rhetoric, geometry, algebra, geography, and Serbian history.⁶⁴¹

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Bulgarian and Serbian attitudes towards the teaching of Greek was completely different. To the nineteenth century’s Bulgarian intellectuals who tried to create a network of Bulgarian public schools, the fast spread of education conducted in Greek was very dangerous and would inevitably lead to a change of national identity. On the other hand, on August 22, 1836, Prince Miloš himself ordered that Greek be taught at the Kraguejvac secondary school. In 1837, Vukašin Radišić from Zemun composed a Greek Primer for use by Serbian Youth (*Grčka čitaonica (čitanka) za upotrebljenje Srpske junosti*) which was published in Belgrade. On the back of the title page was a thought from a moral from Dositej’s third fable on the importance of learning Greek: “This language has been dear to me since youth. I wish it to be esteemed by many of our youth.”⁶⁴²

However, between the late 1860s and early 1890s reforms were introduced to encourage the teaching of native history and the Serbian language and to strengthen state control over primary and secondary school curricula. From 1863, the number of hours in Greek language was reduced to a minimum. Six years later Latin was also limited to

⁶⁴¹ Ibid., 22.

⁶⁴² M. Stojanović, “From Rigas Velestinlis to Ivo Andrić. Serbo-Greek Literary Mutualities.”, *Balkanica* (Belgrade, 1998), 29:227.

twelve hours a week. The difference of seven to eight hours was given over to Serbian language and Serbian history.⁶⁴³ A special regulation introduced in 1898 limited the number of private schools with the result that only one private primary school was left at Alexinac and one gymnasium, at Belgrade.⁶⁴⁴

Sporadic attempts were made to establish grammar schools with a classical curriculum but the state insisted on teaching hours devoted to the mother tongue and native history. The Minister of Education, Milan Kujundžić, tried to impose this in 1887 and again in 1893, but without any significant results.⁶⁴⁵

Secondary education was not compulsory; and teaching standards were little better than in the primary schools. Teachers forced pupils to learn by heart, and punished errors of any kind with the stick, as almost everywhere else in Europe at the time. According to Article 18 of the Law for Secondary Schools, enacted on July 14, 1898, pupils and teachers were obliged to attend church every Sunday and on religious festivals (such as the *slava* celebration of Saint Sava's Day).⁶⁴⁶

Religious education was coordinated by the Law for Religious Administration and the Christian Orthodox Church in Kingdom Serbia of April 27, 1890). The Assembly of the Serbian Archbishops decided which religious texts were appropriate for use in secondary schools and local bishops were obliged to recommend two candidates for the

⁶⁴³ Šević, 3.

⁶⁴⁴ The administration of all state schools was the responsibility of the Minister of Education, and he had the right to control private institutions as well. However, Šević cites only two private schools in 1906 in Serbia. The first one was the above-mentioned primary school in Alexinac and the second one a secondary school (gymnasium) established by Professor Zdelar in 1905 in Belgrade. Šević, 2.

⁶⁴⁵ In 1898, a grammar school with classical curriculum was founded in Belgrade but was closed down four years later. Šević, 4.

posts of teachers of religion in state schools to the Minister of Education.⁶⁴⁷ Prayers were said every day before the first class and after the last; and religion was taught in classes I to IV of the secondary school. Although it was not obligatory to take communion at Christmas and during Lent, the school administration offered a day off, to any pupil who wished to take communion. In 1906 a contemporary complained that religious education in Serbia was too formal and that religious duties were being neglected by both teachers and pupils.⁶⁴⁸

In 1868, a special Department for the Defense of Serbian Schools in Macedonia was created. Its purpose was to control Serbian education in Ottoman Macedonia and to supply schools with readers, atlases and teaching materials approved by the Serbian Ministry of Education.⁶⁴⁹ This Department functioned illegally until 1897, when Firmilijan was appointed Serbian bishop of the diocese of Skopje. The Department was the latest of the Serbian propagandizing institutions in Macedonia. Serbian consulates had been opened ten years earlier at Thessaloníki and Skopje, and there was also a functioning Society of Saint Sava⁶⁵⁰. In March 1880, the Serbian *Skupština* (parliament)

⁶⁴⁶ Šević, 7.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid, 13.

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid, 34.

⁶⁴⁹ Sava Skoko, *Drugi Balkanski rat 1913* (The Second Balkan War) (Belgrade, 1968), 55. Seven years earlier, a similar Greek society was organized in Istanbul to help “promote the Greek national cause among the Macedonian population.” In 1869, in Athens the Society for Spreading Greek Education was created and special Macedonian funds planned by the Greek treasury. See S. Ezekiev, “Nastoyatelstvoto za bednite uchilishta v Tsarigrad i búlgarskata prosveta v Makedoniya [1874-1876],” *Istoricheski Pregled* (1990), 2:52-53.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibid, 55. In 1889, a religious Department was opened within the Ministry of Education which was later transferred under the jurisdiction of the ministry of foreign affairs and whose main task was the spreading of Serbian national consciousness in Ottoman Macedonia. When cultural and religious propaganda failed to achieve what had been expected, a department for Macedonian bands (*cheti*) was created.

enacted the creation of a Supreme Educational Council, which would propose reforms for elementary and secondary education that would satisfy the demands of both “the state and contemporary scholarship.”⁶⁵¹

In 1882, the Novaković Law finally decreed four years of elementary education to be compulsory. The school curriculum was reformed, and by 1883, of 93 hours of class time, 26 were devoted to the Serbian language, eight to a course on world geography and history, and four to Serbian history.⁶⁵² Those subjects represented 40 percent of the student’s total hours in school. As Charles Jelavich suggests, with the eight hours dedicated to religion—a compulsory subject in all schools—50 percent of all class time was devoted to subjects dealing with Serbia.⁶⁵³ Novaković had laid it down that students should know that the Serbian language was written in two scripts, Cyrillic and Latin. The second edition of his reader, printed in 1895, describes the Croats as a separate nation, albeit closely related to the Serbs.⁶⁵⁴

In her book, Peasant Life in Yugoslavia, Olive Lodge provides the following description of Serbian schooling in early 1919:

The school day begins at eight o’clock as a rule, in remote districts it cannot start till ten or eleven in winter because many of the pupils must wait for daylight before starting their long trudge in the snow. The schools are mostly co-educational, though some towns have separate

⁶⁵¹ Charles Jelavich, South Slav Nationalisms—Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914. (Ohio State University, 1990), 32.

⁶⁵² *Ibid.*, 35.

⁶⁵³ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁶⁵⁴ Jelavich, 71.

buildings for boys and girls. After four years at the gymnasia (high school) the examination for *mala matura*, a kind of preliminary certificate, must be passed by those who wish to proceed farther in the ways of education. At the end of eight years in the gymnasia some simply leave, some pass the matura, or matriculation examination, and go to the university. Girls often enter the domestic schools (*radonička škola*), and, after passing the requisite examination, may become teachers. All education is free and state-controlled. The Ministry of Education not only directs, appoints, and pays the teachers, but settles the curriculum, which seems to be uniform in all schools of the same type. So a teacher may be moved at any time from one school to another.⁶⁵⁵

Defining which territories were historically Serbian was a major objective of the readers published between 1855 and 1910. Jelavich's review of the textual modifications made by different authors of readers—such as Hristić, Protić, and Stojanović—exemplifies how, between 1855 and 1907, Serbia's territorial claims were gradually extended at the expense of lands which neighboring nations regarded as ethnically theirs.⁶⁵⁶ A reader published in 1907 described “the beautiful Serbian lands of Bosnia, Hercegovina, Srem, the Banat, Bačka, Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Macedonia, Vidin and Sredec (Sofia) provinces”.⁶⁵⁷ The criteria for identifying the Serbians

⁶⁵⁵ Lodge, *Peasant Life in Yugoslavia*, 82.

⁶⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁶⁵⁷ Jelavich, 75.

territories was “historical”; in other words, an area in which the Serbian people had lived from antiquity.⁶⁵⁸

While the education of the youth was an issue in the first three decades of Serbia’s existence, the indoctrination of the Serbian Diaspora became an objective of deliberate government policy between the mid-1870s and the 1890s. However, popular initiatives to support Serbian schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina by raising funds among the local Serbs had existed even before Belgrade began to contemplate plans to spread Serbian national consciousness.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have a local printing press, and school-books were “imported” from Serbia and the Vojvodina.⁶⁵⁹ The first primary school whose curriculum was taught in Serbian was established in Sarajevo in 1851 by the local Serbian lay community.⁶⁶⁰ A Serbian youth organization was also established in Sarajevo. It maintained contacts with the Serbian Youth Organization and its leaders—Vaso Pelagić, Stevo, and Teofilo Petranović.⁶⁶¹ When the Austro-Hungarian administration arrived in 1878, there were fifty-six Serbian primary schools with 3,523 pupils, sixty-six teachers, and nine female teachers.⁶⁶²

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid, 141.

⁶⁵⁹ Vojislav Bogičević, Pismenost u Bosni i Hercegovini (Literacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina) (Sarajevo, 1975), 214. The first printing press started functioning in 1866 in Sarajevo. It printed two newspapers, Bosna (1866-1878) and Sarajevski Tzvejtnik (1868-1878). Both of them were printed in Turkish but had a section translated in Cyrillic and the Croatian alphabet. Bosnian Muslims who could not read Turkish could use the translation in old Cyrillic. The same printing press was responsible for printing schoolbooks for primary schools in the province.

⁶⁶⁰ H. Djurić, Školske prilike muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini 1800-1878., (Schooling similarities between the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1800-1878) (Belgrade, 1965), 43.

⁶⁶¹ Bogičević, 215.

⁶⁶² Ibid., 44.

Sunday schools, such as the Žitomislic monastery school run by Archbishop Serafim Perović and his brother Jovo which was opened in 1866, were also strongly encouraged to ensure that their curricula were compatible with the “national interests of the Serbian people and the Orthodox Church”.

The motive behind opening so many Serbian schools across Bosnia and Hercegovina was eloquently explained by Vaso Pelagić, who founded a religious school in Banja Luka. “The task set before Serbian schools in Bosnia”, he wrote in 1869, “was to educate the people, to prepare them for spiritual evolution and when the despised darkness of slavery had lifted, to sing the song of a united, sacred Serbdom”.⁶⁶³ The seminary in Banja Luka accepted students between 15 and 35 years. These students were taught Orthodox Catechism, Serbian grammar, Serbian history, geography, grammar, math, and German. Books and other necessary materials were sent from Serbia free of charge, teachers were recruited mainly from Serbia proper and from Austria-Hungary.

Nevertheless, the importance of educational institutions is often overestimated. For example, Djurić emphasizes the potential of the seminary at Banja Luka, yet it functioned only for nine years between 1866 and 1875; and of the 219 students it enrolled, only 67 ever graduated.⁶⁶⁴ Its service to the Serbian national cause was in fact comparatively modest. As for the Serbian confessional schools in the Croatian part of the Dual Monarchy, while their curriculum was designed to promote Serbian national

⁶⁶³ Djurić, 49.

⁶⁶⁴ Djurić, 51.

consciousness, Austria-Hungary's decision to secularize primary education in 1870 rendered their efforts futile.⁶⁶⁵

The Serbian secular schooling system in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however seems to have been successful enough in propagating the Serbian national cause and, as Ivo Lupašević put it in a letter to R. W. Seton-Watson, after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, Bosnian Serbs "dreamed of Serbia and the day Serbia would proclaim war to Austria, conquer her, and deliver them."⁶⁶⁶ They refused to reconcile themselves to the new situation and "shared phantasies of going over to Serbia."⁶⁶⁷ From 1850 onwards Serbian propaganda in the region was quite active, and as early as 1872 Count Gyula Andrassy recommended that "Serbian Orthodox subjects in Bosanska Krajina and Herzegovina should be mixed with Catholics from Dalmatia" in order to eliminate potential danger of pro-Serbian sentiments among the population.⁶⁶⁸

Taken aback by the Bulgarian propaganda in Ottoman Macedonia, the head of the Political-Education Department of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1902, Svetislav Simić, advocated a more active policy on the part of the Serbian government there. As a result in August 1903 a new Serbian cultural and educational organization was established to help all Christians in Macedonia.⁶⁶⁹ It was called the Circle of the Serbian sisters (*Kolu srpskih sestara*).

⁶⁶⁵ The decision was taken by then governor of Croatia, Ban Ivan Mazuranić. See Ivo Goldstein, *Croatia. A History* (McGill University Press: 1999), 95.

⁶⁶⁶ R. W. Seton-Watson and the Yugoslavs. *Correspondence 1906-1941* (London-Zagreb, 1976), 57.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁶⁶⁸ Bogičević, 216.

⁶⁶⁹ Vladimir Jovanović, "Srbija i Ilindenski ustanak" (Serbia and the Ilinden Uprising), *Balkanica* (Belgrade, 1998), 29:196.

Within Serbia itself, the choice of literature to be read by students was essential to the success of the national indoctrination program. Due to the reorganization of the Serbian schooling system and the increased control over the curriculum at the turn of the twentieth century, the Ministry of Education was able to introduce various in-class activities designed to promote patriotism. However, other methods were used too. For example, on December 10, 1908 the Serbian Minister of Education introduced an essay competition for children in secondary schools. The subject of the assignment was “All About Reading”.⁶⁷⁰ According to the organizers, the competition had two purposes: to evaluate the level of education at the secondary schools, and to promote patriotism. A committee was organized to judge the entries and to approve a list of books to be awarded to the winners. The committee, consisting of the Chief Librarian of the Serbian National Library J. Tomić and three university professors, P. Popović and J. Skerlić and M. Ivanić, decided on 4 books to be given as prizes. They were: Karadžić’s Dictionary, his Collection of Serbian Folk Songs, Njegoš’s Mountain Garland, Nenadović’s Deeds, and the poems of Jovan-Zmaj Jovanović⁶⁷¹. Karadžić’s Dictionary and Njegoš’s Garland had been two of the most Serbian popular titles throughout the nineteenth century.

They had become crucial to Serbian national sentiment, as they combined elements of medieval folklore and myths concerning Serbian heroism, stamina and courage.⁶⁷² Karadžić had also suggested the idea of continuity between Dušan’s empire and the new Serbian state. In 1828, for example, he had written: “Today Belgrade, which

⁶⁷⁰ Slobodan Jovanović, Spomenica Slobodana J. Jovanovića.(The Memoirs of Slobodan J. Jovanović) (Belgrade, 1935), 39.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid, 39.

⁶⁷² Vuk Karadžić was a very prolific author; see the collection O društvu.

used to be a town on the border of Dušan's kingdom, is the most important fortress in Serbia and its capital.⁶⁷³ Karadžić was also concerned that the Serbian Prince, Miloš Obrenović, being illiterate and lowborn, could not appreciate the importance of education and its role in national indoctrination.⁶⁷⁴

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Through the nineteenth century in both Bulgaria and Serbia teachers were mostly male. In Ottoman Macedonia the situation was the same. For example, in 1893 there were only two women in the village school of Gniljane out of a total of seven teachers.⁶⁷⁵ In the 1870s there were four out of eleven.⁶⁷⁶ Serbian village schoolteachers experienced similar problems to those of their Bulgarian colleagues. In 1859, the teacher in the Gniljane's school received 1,100 *gros*h, or the equivalent of 220 *denar* per year.⁶⁷⁷ For such a modest payment he was not only to instruct the children of four hundred households in the elements of literacy but to stimulate the patriotism of the local Serb population as a "zealous defender of the Serbian name" against the rival efforts of Albanians, and Bulgarians to recruit them to their own causes.⁶⁷⁸ Ultimately, the success of educational programs and national indoctrination depended on the teachers.

⁶⁷³ Vuk Karadžić, *O društvu*, 35.

⁶⁷⁴ The first high school in Belgrade was opened when Miloš abdicated in 1839. See David Turnock, *Eastern Europe 1815- 1945* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 116; Wilson, *The Life and Times of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić*,

⁶⁷⁵ Stanković, 6.

⁶⁷⁶ Bell, 7.

⁶⁷⁷ Stanković, 7.

⁶⁷⁸ The same author reports that in 1878 Gniljane had a mixed population of 28,695 *Arnautiša* (Albanians), 19,812 Serbs of Orthodox confession; 1,600 Catholics; see Stanković, 8- 9.

One of the most respected teachers in Ottoman Macedonia was Zafir Popović. He taught at Gniljane from 1859 to 1864, at Vučitrn from 1864 to 1869, and at Kumanovo from 1869 to 1871. Every fifth year, Popović changed schools and within ten years he was well-known among the Serbian inhabitants of three large communities: Gniljane, Vučitrn and Kumanovo. He also liaised with the Bishops Paisii of Skopje and Melentii of Prizren, who disliked the division of the local population into the followers of the Patriarchate and those of the independent Bulgarian Exarchate (since 1870).⁶⁷⁹ It was thanks to their cooperation that Bulgarian efforts to replace the bishop of Prizren failed.⁶⁸⁰

As late as the beginning of the Great War, Serbian peasants could generally afford to send only one son to school, the child they hoped might become a priest, teacher or monk. His siblings would remain and work the land, unable to read or write.⁶⁸¹ According to Olive Lodge, in many districts only boys went to school, so that as late as 1919 most Serb women between forty-five and fifty-five could neither read nor write.⁶⁸² In the 1970s, in the course of his research on the Serbian village, Joel Halpern had numerous conversations with old Serbian peasants who recalled that “going to school used to be a great privilege and completing the four-year village school was an accomplishment.”⁶⁸³

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⁶⁷⁹ Ibid., 10.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid., 10.

⁶⁸¹ Lodge, 83.

⁶⁸² Ibid., 83.

⁶⁸³ Joel Halpern, Barbara Halpern, 89.

Education in Macedonia proved to be the key to creating and propagating a national cause. Under Ottoman law, the national community could open a school and enjoy the privilege of conducting education in its own mother tongue if there were at least thirty households that acknowledged belonging to this community.⁶⁸⁴ In 1868, a special committee was created in Belgrade to promote the establishment of Serbian schools in Macedonia and Kosovo. At the time, the linguist Miloš Miloević and the historian Professor Panta Sretković, were propagating the idea that the whole Balkan peninsula had been originally inhabited by Serbs and that the Bulgarians were of Tatar origin.⁶⁸⁵ By 1873, Serb official sources claimed there were over sixty such schools on the territory of the Ottoman province, but some experts have argued that they disappeared shortly after the Serbian-Turkish conflict of 1876.⁶⁸⁶ The Belgrade journal The East (Istok) was one newspaper that campaigned for the expansion of the Serbian schooling system in Macedonia.

In August 1886, the Government in Belgrade organized a meeting with some of Serbia's most prominent scholars, including Stojan Novaković, Sveta Nikolajević, and Vladimir Karić, to discuss how to conduct successful nationalistic propaganda in what they called "Old Serbia". They decided to found a patriotic organization named after the Serbian patron saint, Saint Sava, to establish Serbian schools, train teachers and promote Serb national consciousness in Macedonia. The main strategy of the Society of St. Sava

⁶⁸⁴ Hough Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 2000), 51.

⁶⁸⁵ Voin Bozhinov, Bŭlgarskata prosveta v Makedoniya i Odrinska Trakiya 1878-1913 (Bulgarian Education in Macedonia and Odrin Thrace 1878-1913) (Sofia, 1982), 83.

⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 64. Bozhinov cites some twenty Serbian schools opened up, mainly in Northern Macedonia, between 1867 and 1876. See Bozhinov, 84.

was to attract young Macedonian graduates by offering them scholarships to continue their education in Belgrade.⁶⁸⁷ Its Chair was Professor Sveta Nikolaević, Stojan Novaković was sent to assess the Bulgarian gymnasium in Thessaloniki and persuade some of its students to transfer to Belgrade⁶⁸⁸. Vladimir Karić and Spiridon Gopčević who became frequent visitors there, had the same purpose. In 1888, 23 boys responded to their offer of generous scholarships and were transferred to the Society's boarding school in Belgrade. However, they stayed in Belgrade only for a year and then left for Sofia, disappointed with the pressure put on them by the school to change their identity.⁶⁸⁹ By the mid-1890s, Serbian authorities claimed that there were more than a hundred Serbian schools in Macedonia, but attendance was low and Serbs proved no match for the Bulgarians in the fierce struggle over the control of Macedonian education.⁶⁹⁰

Serbian authorities regarded the teaching of Serb national history to the Serbian population outside the independent Serbian state and preaching to them in Serbian vernacular as crucial to the development of Serbian national identity. A religious school in Prizren had been opened as early as 1871. In 1892, a Serbian school was opened in Skopje with the idea of spreading Serbian consciousness in Macedonia. However, the local Bulgarian community complained that it had been established illegally since there was no official registration of the required thirty Serbian households in Skopje, the chief city of Ottoman Macedonia. The school was therefore shut down. The same happened in

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid., 64.

⁶⁸⁸ Bozhinov, 87.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid, 88.

⁶⁹⁰ See Chapter Three on the role of the Bulgarian Exarchate in opening schools in Macedonia.

Kumanovo, another Macedonian town. The two Serbian schools which opened there after 1893 were registered as private, not communal.⁶⁹¹

From June 1889, propaganda activities were directed by a special political Department of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Professor Vladimir Karić. Its secretary was Branislav Nušić, from the district of Kostur, who was later to become Serbian consul in Macedonia and a popular writer.

In the 1880s and 1890s, the Exarchate and the Bulgarian governments began to coordinate their plans for systematically extending Bulgarian education into Ottoman Macedonia and Thrace. One of the first to propose a plan for spreading the influence of the Exarchate into Macedonia was Kuzman Shapkarev from Ohrid. After extensive consultations with Archbishop Metodi Kusev and representatives of the Bulgarian community in Thessaloniki (Solun), Shapkarev proposed to the Bulgarian Government to extend its educational network into Ottoman Macedonia and Thrace. According to Shapkarev's plan, Thessaloniki was to become the coordinating center of the Exarchate's schools in Macedonia, with two gymnasiums for male and female pupils respectively.⁶⁹² Bitola, Skopje, and Serres were each to have primary schools, and the Exarchate was to subsidize their running costs. As a result of the coordinated effort of the Bulgarian government, the Exarchate and the Bulgarian community in Thessaloniki, a gymnasium for male pupils was opened in the fall of 1880. Two years later, a gymnasium for girls opened its doors. Its first director, Tsarevna Miladinova, was the daughter of Dimitŭr

⁶⁹¹ Poulton, 64.

⁶⁹² Bozhinov, 34.

Miladinov, one of the most enthusiastic proponents of the Bulgarian national cause in Macedonia in the first half of the nineteenth century.

The local Greeks saw these Bulgarian gymnasia as a threat and their religious and communal leaders petitioned to have the schools closed down. In 1883, the Greek Archbishop of Thessaloniki Kalinik sent an official request to the Sublime Porte, arguing that the schools were financed by Russia and presented political danger to the interests of the Ottoman government.⁶⁹³ By coincidence, in 1882, the Bulgarian government for the first time provided significant financial help—to the order of 100,000 *levs*—for support the schooling network in Macedonia and Thrace. The Bulgarian community, however, managed to prove that the major portion of subsidies had come from annual fees paid by the pupils and that the rest were donations from local elders and Bulgarians from the Principality channeled through the Exarchate.

Problems of this sort were common in other Macedonian towns, where Bulgarian primary and secondary schools were opened. In March 1883, a Greek priest in Strumica complained to the local Ottoman judge that the Bulgarian school was a center of revolutionary activity, and demanded that all Bulgarian schools in the region be closed.⁶⁹⁴ Between 1881 and 1883 the Bulgarian communities in Serres, Nevrokop, Štip, and Lerin faced similar problems. The Greek archbishops repeatedly petitioned the Ottoman administration to close down the Bulgarian schools, and the Ottoman authorities did prohibit the opening of new schools by the Exarchate. Teachers and laymen who assisted

⁶⁹³ In the Ottoman Empire, education was not obligatory; the education of the Christian subjects of the empire was a priority of their own religious communities. However, if a given *millet* wished to open a school, it needed an official acknowledgment from the Ottoman administration. Receiving a *ruhstname* (allowance) was a difficult and time-consuming procedure. See Bozhinov, 42.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 37.

for Bulgarian educational institutions in any way were denounced as rebels (*komitadzii*) and eventually imprisoned, because their activity endangered the Greek influence in Ottoman Macedonia.⁶⁹⁵

Despite the efforts of the Greek communities in Macedonia in 1882/83 to close them down, the network of Bulgarian schools in the region continued to expand, and by mid-1885, 237 schools had been established, with 351 instructors and 16,068 pupils.⁶⁹⁶ This was the period when Bulgarian governments became more actively involved in the process of opening more Bulgarian schools in Macedonia and financing them. As Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstantin Stoilov put it, “it was time the Principality took over and the Exarchate just confined itself in coordinating Bulgarian national propaganda in the province.”⁶⁹⁷

From the late 1880s, the number of schools continued to increase steadily and in 1896, the Bulgarian Exarchate enacted temporary regulations which coordinated the activity of both religious and school boards (*nastoyatelstva*). These stipulated that the elder in charge of the local Bulgarian community must reside in the main town of the district, even if Bulgarians were a minority there (as in Kostur and Serres). He was also to arrange meetings of the board and liaise with representatives of the Exarchate. Meetings

⁶⁹⁵ In Štip, for example, the elder father Atanas who was eighty years old was imprisoned because the Greek archbishop denounced him as a rebel against the Ottoman administration. In the village of Patele, district Lerin the local judge sent soldiers to close down the Bulgarian school but the peasants resisted. As a result all men were arrested and sent to prison in Bitola. Bozhinov, 38-39.

⁶⁹⁶ Bozhinov, 39.

⁶⁹⁷ Konstantin Stoilov even presented a report in which he suggested the appointment of a special governmental committee to work out new regulations and to transfer the prerogatives of the exarchate administration to a governmental board of five to seven members, who would reside in Sofia; and for the appointment of teachers in Macedonia and the distribution of subsidies for the Bulgarian schools there. Bozhinov, 43.

were to be called to decide the annual budget and distribute the available finances between the local Bulgarian church, the school, and the reading room, if any.

Both private donations and Bulgarian financial assistance were essential to the survival of the schools and since they were the key to the dissemination of Bulgarian national identity in the region, Bulgaria did not stint its support. In 1883/84 alone, the Exarchate received 564,142 francs from the government in Sofia; 34,500 francs from Eastern Rumelia; and 4,600 from a humanitarian society in Plovdiv—603,242 francs in all.⁶⁹⁸ This was a significant sum, given that it was to be distributed only to the Bulgarian schools in Ottoman Macedonia which were directly administered by the Exarchate (the so-called *ekzarhiiski* schools). In 1903, thanks to the financial contribution of Bulgarian governmental institutions and the Exarchate’s administration, the number of Bulgarian schools in Macedonia reached 781. The following table demonstrates the increase not only of schools, but teachers, and pupils in the region at the turn of the twentieth century:

Table 1⁶⁹⁹

Bulgarian schools, teachers and pupils in 1899/1900	Primary Schools	Secondary schools	Schools (in total)	Pupils in preschool	Pupils in primary school	Pupils in secondary school	Pupils in total
Districts							

⁶⁹⁸ Bozhinov, 44.

⁶⁹⁹ See *Natsionalno-osvoboditelното dvizenie na Makedonskite i Trakiiski bŭlgari 1878-1944* (The National Liberation Movement of the Macedonian and Thracian Bulgarians 1878- 1944), vol. 2 (Sofia, 1995), 95.

Thessaloní ki	286	32	318	5 002	8 763	1 073	9 836
Bitola	258	15	273	5 596	8 671	894	9 565
Kosovo (Skopje)	174	16	190	2 862	5 780	813	6 593
Odrin	147	14	161	2 042	5 599	486	6 085
Total	865	77	942	15 502	28 813	3 266	32079

The teachers' annual reports submitted to the Exarchate indicated that most teachers were natives of Ottoman Macedonia; although some had come from the Principality, usually in the capacity of consultants, because of their previous experience in teaching.⁷⁰⁰ As Table 1 suggests, the schooling network was well organized and the number of pupils enrolled in primary schools impressive.

The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, which started functioning in 1893, regarded the Exarchate's schooling network as a useful vehicle to achieve two of its main goals: the further indoctrination of children in Bulgarian nationalism, and the infiltration of revolutionary activists into Macedonia as teachers.

The latter became a source of constant frictions between the leadership of the IMRO and the Exarchate after 1896. The IMRO insisted on interfering in the appointments of teachers in Macedonia, while the Exarch refused to appoint revolutionary activists as teachers for fear of the Ottoman administration's reaction. However, the IMRO did not give up easily, and in 1898, the leadership prepared a list of "suggested" names of activists to be appointed in strategic towns and cities. The list was

⁷⁰⁰ Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoto dvizenie na búlgarite, 95.

taken by Giorche Petrov, a prominent activist of the organization, to the Exarch, who finally agreed to appoint all the names suggested.⁷⁰¹ Very often the candidates were not even well trained for their occupation. Anastas Lozanchev recalls that neither Pere Toshov nor Dame Gruev could write well, and they were not good speakers. Toshov was impatient and notorious for his angry outbursts; he was known to throw shoes, apples, and pears at both pupils and colleagues.⁷⁰²

Argir Manasiev was another revolutionary activist appointed teacher in Ottoman Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth century. In his memoirs—published in 1957, twenty five years after his death⁷⁰³—Manasiev recalls that he had been born in 1873 in the village of Sehovo, Gevgeli' district, which remained under the Ottomans until the Balkan Wars. Sponsored by his well-to-do uncle, he had graduated from the French Catholic College “*Zeitnlak*” in Thessaloniki, and in 1891 become a teacher. Two years later, in the spring of 1893, Manasiev was forced to leave the college, because of the nationalist tone of his welcoming speech delivered upon the arrival of the Bulgarian Catholic Bishop Mladenov from Rome.”⁷⁰⁴ The following year, 1893-4, he spent as a village teacher in Novo Selo, again in the district of Thessaloniki: There, he had several meetings with Dame Gruev and Gotse Delchev, who were building up a network of

⁷⁰¹ Ibid., 101. Most Bulgarian teachers in Ottoman Macedonia were members of the IMRO. In his memoirs, Anastas Lozanchev recalls that teaching was a convenient shield (*udobno prikritie*). As a teacher, he was able to travel across the province and visited Kostur, Ohrid, and other towns where he could agitate. Teaching in Prilep were also Pere Toshov and Dame Gruev, who were prominent members of the IMRO. See Boyan Mirchev, “Spomeni na Anastas Lozanchev, Spomeni na nyakoi aktivni deitsi v makedonskoto revolucionno dvizhenie,” *Izvestiya na BAN* (Sofia, 1956), 6:483; 485.

⁷⁰² Ibid, 485.

⁷⁰³ The memoirs were published by Boyan Mirchev in *Izvestiya na Instituta na BAN*, vol. 7 (Sofia, 1957).

⁷⁰⁴ Welcoming the bishop Manasiev and his pupils sang the Bulgarian anthem at the time, “Shumi Maritsa” (The River Maritsa), Mirchev, 348.

Macedonian brotherhoods and revolutionary cells. In 1895-6, Manasiev moved to Negovan, a strategic point between Gevgeli and Strumica, and began to enlarge the already existing local peasant brotherhood. In 1897-8, he became a teacher in the village of Smokvica, Gevgeli district, because the IMRO had decided to open a smuggling channel for weapons between Gevgeli and Bitola.⁷⁰⁵

How could Manasiev contribute to the further indoctrination of the inhabitants of Thessalonica district who already had a Bulgarian national consciousness? First, as an alumnus who had graduated from Catholic College, he could appeal to the nationalistic feelings of the local people who were not Exarchists. Secondly, having personal contacts with the most influential leaders of the Macedonian movement, he could, and did, popularize materials propagandizing the cause of the Macedonian “liberation” among his pupils.⁷⁰⁶ Finally, he encouraged peasants loyal to Bulgaria to cooperate with the Macedonian *chetniks* in developing a local network of people supporting the idea of eventual union with Bulgaria. Of course, few contemporary village teachers had the experience and activist career of Manasiev. However, their contribution to spreading the idea of Macedonian union with Bulgaria ideal of future union with Macedonia was incalculable. And personal contacts between professional revolutionaries and village schoolteachers were the most decisive element of this development of nationalist sentiment.

Nevertheless, the worst fears of the Bulgarian Exarch were to be realized after the collapse of the Ilinden Uprising in the summer of 1903. Immediately after the rebellion

⁷⁰⁵ Ibid., 353.

⁷⁰⁶ Mirchev, 348.

was defeated, the Ottoman inspector-in-chief of Macedonia, Hilmi Pasha, issued a decree prohibiting the appointment of teachers without the personal guarantee of someone who had held office under the Ottomans and was willing to recommend the person applying for a teaching position.⁷⁰⁷ Of 1,640 Macedonian Bulgarians convicted of political offenses at that time and later amnestied, 200 were teachers.⁷⁰⁸ From 1904, Bulgarian teachers from Bulgaria proper who applied for positions in Macedonia had to obtain certificates from the Ottoman Commissariat in Sofia showing that they had no criminal record.

The following table sets out data on schooling in Macedonia derived from Turkish sources for the academic year 1911-12:

Table 2⁷⁰⁹

	Serbian		Bulgarian		Greek		Turkish	
Districts	Schools	Instructors	Schools	Instructors	Schools	Instructors	Schools	Instructors
Skopje	27	37	60	114	1	4	18	37
Kumanovo	56	75	52	73	1	2	28	45
Tetovo	46	55	43	58	-	-	75	89
Kavadarci	1	1	43	68	9	24	4	14
Debar	23	28	32	52	-	-	26	40
Bitola	25	45	60	128	36	112	6	43

⁷⁰⁷ Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoto dvizhenie na Makedonskite i Trakiiskite bŭlgari 1878-1944. (The National Liberation Movement of the Macedonian and Thracian Bulgarians), vol. 3, 88.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁷⁰⁹ Gligor Todorovski, Prosvetnata Politika na Kralството Serbia vo Makedonija po Balkanskite vojni 1912-1915 (The Educational Policy of Kingdom Serbia in Macedonia during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1915) (Skopje, 1975), 12.

In Bitola, the Serbian gymnasium had only four classes and was categorized a secondary school (*niza gimnazija*). The secondary school in Skopje had eight grades, 195 pupils, and 13 instructors. Skopje also had two Serbian professional schools, one for training teachers with four classes and 55 pupils. The other with five classes and 90 pupils.⁷¹⁰ Bulgarian schools in Skopje taught a total of 262 pupils (142 in the gymnasium; 120 in the professional school). In Bitola there were a classical gymnasium for boys with seven grades and 222 pupils, a secondary school for girls had four classes and 105 pupils; a seminary had twelve pupils and two instructors, and a technical school had two classes and 39 pupils.⁷¹¹ However, the defeat of Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War of 1913 changed this favorable situation irreversibly. The “New Territories” which the Serbian Kingdom acquired were eventually divided into four educational districts, supervised by inspectors appointed by the Ministry of Education in Belgrade.

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Article 78 of Bulgaria’s Tŭrnovo Constitution laid it down that primary education was compulsory and free for all Bulgarian citizens. On May 21, 1880 a “Regulation for the Maintenance and Academic Reorganization of the Bulgarian schools” was enacted by the parliament.⁷¹² Schooling was to be conducted only in Bulgarian, and private institutions were ineligible to apply for state subsidies. As one expert on Bulgaria’s minority problems, Zhorzheta Nazarska has argued, legislation on Bulgarian

⁷¹⁰ Ibid, 14-5.

⁷¹¹ Ibid, 15-6. The list of Bulgarian schools cited by Gligor Todorovski is a very long one. For more details see Todorovski, 16-7.

⁷¹² Kolev, 40.

education was written by Bulgarians for Bulgarians.⁷¹³ In state schools, teaching had to be conducted only in Bulgarian, minorities' access to schooling that was different from the state's was restricted. Through such means, the Bulgarian authorities planned to squeeze out the Protestant and Catholic missionary schools⁷¹⁴. The local Muslim and Jewish local leaders, by contrast hoped to legalize forms of education that would satisfy the needs of religious minorities.

During the period examined here the Bulgarian educational system began with four years of elementary schooling (grades I to IV); three years in preparatory school (*progimnaziya*) for pupils between the ages of 12 and 14 years; and four years of gymnasium, or grammar school, (grades IV to VII for 15 to 19 year- old).⁷¹⁵ Elementary education was free and obligatory.

From 1881 onward, statistics are available for the capital and the district of Sofia, from which it is possible to trace how the network of primary schools was expanded in Bulgaria between 1884 and 1915. In 1880-1, the number of Bulgarian primary schools was 2,211; In 1884-5, it had increased to 2,532.⁷¹⁶ However, the opening of new primary schools did not mean that all school-age children attended regularly or that they completed the curriculum required. In 1882, in the district of Sofia (excluding the cities of Sofia and Samokov), for instance, only 43% of school-age children attended regularly.

⁷¹³ Zhorzheta Nazürska, Bülgarskata dörzava i neinite maltsinstva 1879-1885 (The Bulgarian State and its Minorities (Sofia, 1999), 85.

⁷¹⁴ Two American Evangelist schools, (separately for girls and boys), were opened in 1875 in Samokov by missionaries. See Petko Petkov, "Amerikanski Misioneri v bülgarskite zemi (XIX- nachaloto na XX vek), (American Missionaries in the Bulgarian Lands, 19th-the beginning of the 20th century)," Istoricheski Pregled, (1990), 5:21.

⁷¹⁵ M. Gechev, "Obrazovaniето v Sofia (1878-1914)" (The Education in Sofia) in: Sofia prez vekovete.(Sofia during the Ages), Volume 2 (Sofia, 1991), 210.

In the neighboring districts of Trŭn and Kyustendil in western Bulgaria, this percentage was closer to 28%.⁷¹⁷ To support primary education and further improve it, the Ministry of Education planned to spend some 144,900 *levs* during the financial year of 1882. The following table shows what budgets the Principality and Eastern Rumelia spent for educational purposes in the period 1879-85:

Table 3⁷¹⁸

The Principality	Funds Allotted (in <i>levs</i>)	Funds Spent	Eastern Rumelia	
Years			Years	Spent
1879	–	328.850	1879/80	1.268. 717 <i>gros</i> (291.804) <i>levs</i>
1880	827. 774	807.784	1880/81	4.000.200 <i>gros</i> (920.046) <i>levs</i>
1881	1 365 020	946 559	1882/83	5.032.242 <i>gros</i> (1. 157 415) <i>levs</i>
1882	1 691 700	1. 113 340		
1883	1 879 548	1 112 877		
1884	2 215 994	1 276 727		
1885	2 508 701	1 127 931		

In addition, in 1882 the Ministry of Education spent 3,450 *levs* on Muslim schools in the Principality, 3,240 on Jewish schools and 2,000 on the Armenian. It has been suggested that this demonstrated the government's tolerance at a time when Bulgarian schools in neighboring countries were being closed down⁷¹⁹. However, the amounts were trivial and specifically ear-marked for the appointment of Bulgarian language teachers. Stjepan Radić, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, wrote in 1913 that there were

⁷¹⁶ Kolev, 40.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid, 40-1.

⁷¹⁸ Kolev, Tablica 1 (Table 1), 41.

⁷¹⁹ Kolev, 40-41

about 1,000 Muslim schools in Bulgaria, all of them were private. According to his data, in 1909-10, 31,000 boys and 27,000 girls were enrolled in 1,090 Muslim schools.⁷²⁰ There were also 45 Tatar schools with 1,221 boys and 1,010 girls; nineteen Jewish schools with 3,552 pupils in total; and two Romanian schools with a total of 1,379 students.⁷²¹

After the Unification of the Principality and Eastern Rumelia in September 1885, the state introduced new educational regulations. These legalized private schools supported by various religious communities on Bulgarian territory. Bulgaria provided for a school-building program as a result of which the number of new state primary schools reached 240 in 1889.⁷²² The existing schooling system was further reorganized in 1891, when financial support for, and effective state control of education was extended, according to a new “Law for National Education”, Article 10 of which stipulated all subjects were to be taught in Bulgarian in both state and minority primary schools.

Financial assistance in building new schools was increased. However, statistics of the mid-1890s show that many pupils registered in first grade failed even to finish the full four year-curriculum of primary school. Of the 95,506 pupils who started first grade in the school year 1899-1900, only 34,486 or 36.3% finished fourth grade in 1902-3. In 1908-9, 136,393 pupils were registered in first grade; yet only 69,587, just over half of them completed the four-year course.⁷²³

⁷²⁰ Stjepan Radić, *Vüžrodena Bŭlgaria (Obnovljena Bugarska) 1878- 1913 (Bulgaria Revived)*, (Sofia: 1993), 88.

⁷²¹ *Ibid.*, 88.

⁷²² *Ibid.*, 42.

⁷²³ Kolev, 44.

Inspectors offered various reasons for the dropouts. Among the most common were “parental neglect”; “poverty” and “sickness”. In 1881-2, Minister of Education Konstantin Irechek received a request from peasants living in the district of Vraca stating that they did not want their children to attend school. The main reason was the traditional one: they needed their help on the farm.⁷²⁴

In time the state developed an effective system of penalties and district inspectors were empowered to impose a variety of fines on parents whose children did not attend school regularly. If a child was absent for ten days or more, the parents were fined between 5 and 25 *levs*, which they had to pay within five days of the inspector notifying the school board.⁷²⁵ Five *levs* was a significant sum for any average Bulgarian peasant household, which did not usually have much cash.

The state was interposing itself between the schools and the local authorities when, for example, peasant communities had reduced the salaries they had agreed to pay their teachers. As a result teachers’ salaries were regulated without forcing teachers to go through the humiliating experience of begging the school board for more money. Proper funding of teachers’ pay was needed and so in December of 1891, the Minister of Education, Georgi Zhivkov, introduced a law empowering the state to provide two-thirds of teachers’ salaries.⁷²⁶ According to Article 182 of this law, teachers in villages were to receive between 720 and 1,200 *levs* a year; teachers’ pay in towns and cities was fixed at between 940 and 1,800 *levs*. In order to encourage more teachers to work in the

⁷²⁴ Cited in Kolev, 45.

⁷²⁵ Radić, 77.

⁷²⁶ Ibid., 79.

countryside, in 1899, the government equalized teachers' salaries in towns and rural areas. From 1904 the state met teacher salary costs in full.⁷²⁷

* * *

In Europe as a whole female literacy is reckoned to have lagged in the period under discussion from 10 to 25 points behind male⁷²⁸. Girls tended to suffer more neglect, especially in poor countries, where scarce resources went first to sons before the daughters.⁷²⁹ Table Four shows the proportion of boys and girls attending school from the Unification of Bulgaria in 1885 to the beginning of the Great War.

Table 4

Academic Years	Schools	Male Teachers	Female Instructors	Total	Male Pupils	Female Pupils	Total
1884-1885	5	-	-	20	-	-	1150
1889-1890	9	-	-	36	1115	798	1913
1894-1895	16	44	44	88	2330	1770	4100
1899-1900	16	32	60	92	2497	2048	4545
1904-1905	15	47	65	122	3011	2872	5883
1909-1914-1915	20	59	84	143	3487	3192	6679

The data for the first decade of the twentieth century suggests that discrepancy between male and female pupils was diminishing. The first gymnasium in Sofia, the Male Classical Gymnasium, was opened in January 1879. In 1903 a second one was opened,

⁷²⁷ Ibid., 79.

⁷²⁸ David Vincent, *The Rise of Mass Literacy. Reading and Writing in Modern Europe*, (Polity Press: 2000),11.

⁷²⁹ Ibid, 11.

and in 1906-7, a third. However in 1906, the number of secondary schools for male and female pupils was equal.⁷³⁰ Statistics show that the Bulgarian state pursued a policy of gender equality in education which did not confine national indoctrination to the male population but included an increasing number of women.

Table 5

Academic year	Schools		Total	Pupils (total)
	Male	Female		
1878-1879	1	-	1	106
1879-1880	1	-	2	152
1903-1904	2	3	5	1318
1904-1905	2	3	5	1306
1906-1907	3	3	6	-

In the first decade of the twentieth century, Bulgarian girls of school age gradually began to share some of the advantages hitherto reserved only for boys. However, girls were still not allowed to enroll in a university. Mothers had to be made into good patriotic Bulgarians but their place was still in the home.

* * *

The beginning of 1885 saw a huge celebration to commemorate the millennium of the death of Saint Methodius (d. 885). Exploiting the historical significance of the occasion, Prince Alexandŭr Battenberg launched a national campaign to found a state

⁷³⁰ Genchev, 221.

university dedicated to Saint Kliment of Ohrid.⁷³¹ This idea was realized in 1888 when the University was opened. In 1895-6 a campaign by feminist activists resulted in the Parliament and the Ministry of Education being flooded with petitions from women demanding the right to enroll in the university. After heated debates in the press and the parliament, they got their way and within ten years, 96 women had graduated.⁷³²

The establishment of a state university in the early 1890s was a significant step in creating a significant Bulgarian educated class. Ivan Sishmanov, one of the most ardent advocates of a state support for higher education, argued that the university would train a Bulgarian intelligentsia loyal to the national cause and prevent the erosion of the Bulgarian identity in territories remaining outside the Principality.⁷³³ For him, nationalism was above all a cultural idea and a Bulgarian university would counter any sense of inferiority and raise national confidence.⁷³⁴ Sishmanov's opinion was shared by Dimitür Agura, one of the first Rectors of the university, who saw the University as the product of positive national energy and initiative.⁷³⁵ Furthermore its existence increased the possibilities of national indoctrination. By producing Bulgarian professors in humanities, particularly history, geography and linguistics, the nation state was able to mold the next generation of the intellectual elite.

⁷³¹ Maria Radeva, "Ot vishe uchilishte kŭm universitet (1888- 1907) [From High School to University]", *Universitetŭt. (The University)* (Sofia, 1999), 14.

⁷³² Radeva, 48.

⁷³³ Dr. Ivan Sishmanov in *Misŭl (The Thought)*, 1892. Cited in Maria Radeva, "Ot Visshe uchilishte kŭm universitet, 30.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*, 30-1.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid.*, 31.

Despite a continuing scarcity of scholars educated in respectable institutions, some remarkable professors taught in the University during its first decades. Among them was the colorful Slavist Lyubomir Miletich, who had graduated from the University of Zagreb, taught Old Bulgarian phonetics and was one of the most zealous propagandists of the Macedonian cause and the unification of Macedonia with Bulgaria. Miletich roundly declared that Macedonia was “a part of the Bulgarian Motherland”, that its history was integral to Bulgaria’s development. His lengthy correspondence with the celebrated Croatian scholar, Vatroslav Jagić, shows how Miletich and other intellectuals linked national indoctrination to historical research.

In the 1910s, the Croatian Academy launched a project for “Yugoslav Encyclopedia Dictionary”. The idea was to include materials sent by prominent Balkan specialists, and its editor, Konstantin Irechek asked Miletich to assure Bulgarian cooperation. At first, Miletich’s response was positive. He even thought of ways to support the project financially. However, tensions emerged when the Serbian Academy also joined the undertaking. The main ground for argument was Irechek’s ruling that Serbia’s claims to disputed territories such as Macedonia, be excluded from the discussion. Disagreeing with this, Miletich refused further cooperation.⁷³⁶

Another example illustrates how professional historians engaged in the business of national indoctrination. The Serbian historian Kosta N. Kostić’s study, Our New Towns in the South (*Naši novi gradovi na Jugu*) published in 1914,⁷³⁷ was an attempt to present the history of Veles, Debar, Kichevo, Kriva Palanka, Prespa, Resen,

⁷³⁶ Lyubomir Miletich do Vatroslav Jagić. 1896-1914. Pisma. (L. Miletich to V. Jagić. Letters). Edited by Romyana Bozhilova (Sofia, 1996), 284.

⁷³⁷ Kosta N. Kostić, Naši novi gradovi na Jugu (Our New Towns in the South) (Belgrade, 1926).

Struga, Štip—in other words, of the lands taken from the so-called “disputed” zone of Macedonia—as having always been Serbian. Prizren was presented as “our glorious [Serbian] Prizren”.⁷³⁸ Bitola, he said, had been originally built by Serbs (it was Serbian “since the times of the crusaders”),⁷³⁹ Skopje was the “Serbian Constantinople”,⁷⁴⁰; and Prilep was the residence of “our [Serbian] national hero [*narodni junak*], Marko Kraljević”.⁷⁴¹ The list continues with Ohrid, the capital of Tsar Samuil (with no indication, who Samuil was or what his realm might have been), and descriptions of Debar, Kichevo, Struga, Doiran (Dojran), Veles—which, he claimed, were either were founded by Serbs or were residences of Serbian rulers.

The fact that the towns cited had significant (some of them overwhelming) numbers of inhabitants who thought of themselves as Bulgarian was not mentioned. To judge from Georgević’s preface, the author was an excellent scholar.⁷⁴² In fact, Kostić was a professor at the Belgrade Gymnasium (1912) and a very prolific writer, who published six books published between 1900 and 1914. An enthusiastic and patriotic historian, rather than a critical scholar, Kostić was nevertheless popular not least in academic circles. The war period of 1912-18 tightened cooperation between the army and educational institutions particularly in the area of indoctrination and propaganda. On September 17, 1912, 35 of Bulgaria’s 55 regular university professors were mobilized.

⁷³⁸ Ibid., 1.

⁷³⁹ Ibid., 7.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid., 12.

⁷⁴¹ Ibid., 34.

⁷⁴² Ibid., iv.

The university had to close for six months until March 1913, when the Academic Council decided that lectures could resume with a decreased number of instructors and students. The administration of the university tried to save professors and excellent students from mobilization but the effort was unsuccessful. A patriotic atmosphere influenced the Academic Council's decisions, and in March it agreed to consider the winter term completed by the students who had been mobilized. In June, the decision was extended to the entire academic year.⁷⁴³ On June 25, 1913, the Rector Stoyan Kirov called a meeting of the academic staff to discuss the letter of Greek professors from the University of Athens about "Bulgarian atrocities against Greek, Serbian, and Romanian civil populations."⁷⁴⁴ Two days later the Academic Council protested the partition of Macedonia.

After Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in the Great War, several academics were sent on an ethnological expedition to Macedonia to research local Bulgarian dialects, and to gauge the extent to which Macedonians espoused the Bulgarian national cause. They included Professors Atanas Ishirkov (geography); Iordan Ivanov (history) and Vasil Zlatarski (history); Mihail Arnaudov (Slavonic literature and linguistics) and Dr. Bogdan Filov, the Director of the National Museum. All except Filov had served in the Balkan Wars.⁷⁴⁵

Prompted by Serbian and Greek statements to the effect that there was no Bulgarian national consciousness in Macedonia, Filov organized three expeditions to

⁷⁴³ Radeva, 85.

⁷⁴⁴ Radeva, 85-86.

⁷⁴⁵ "Proekt za izsledvaneto na novozaetite zemi (A Project for Research of the Newly Occupied Territories)", in Vladimir Penchev, Anatol Anchev, Mihail Arnaudov- edna nauchna komandirovka v Makedonia (Mihail Arnaudov-a research trip to Macedonia (Sofia, 1999), 25-6.

Thrace, the Rhodope Mountains, and Macedonia between 1912 and 1916. During his first visit, Filov concentrated his attention in artifacts in the Thessaloníki, Enidje Vardar, Dedeagach (Dedeğaç), Kavala, Serres, Ksanti (Xánthi), Kukush, Strumica, and Doiran (Dojran) regions.⁷⁴⁶ Armed with a special governmental decree he instructed the governors of Serres, Drama, Štip, and Kukush to preserve relics discovered on their territory and to punish vandals.⁷⁴⁷ His initiative received the moral and financial support of the Bulgarian Ministry of Education, which also sent ethnologists to the “newly-liberated” territories.⁷⁴⁸ In June 1915, Anton Stoilov and Stefan Kostov visited the same places investigated by Filov in order to collect ethnological materials for the Ethnological Museum in Sofia.⁷⁴⁹

As a result of these expeditions, many Macedonian relics were transported to the Archeological and Ethnological Museums in Sofia. They included medieval icons from Melnik, a marble statue of the “Madarian Rider” from Giumiurdzhina (Komotinê), Roman inscriptions from Maroniya, and many photographs and drawings of Macedonian jewelry from different epochs.⁷⁵⁰ Filov made his last trip to the core land of Macedonia between July and September 1916, when he was able to gather archeological materials from Melnik, Strumica, Negotin, Kavadarci, Bitola, Ohrid, Struga, Prilep, Kichevo, Gostivar, Tetovo, Priština, Prizren, Skopje, Kumanovo, and Veles. He also studied the

⁷⁴⁶ Bogdan Filov, *Pútuvaniya iz Trakiya, Rodopite i Makedoniya 1912-1916* (Traveling across Thrace, the Rhodope Mountains and Macedonia) (Sofia, 1993), 6-7.

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁷⁴⁸ This was how the parts of Macedonia and the Marmara Sea Thrace taken by the Bulgarian army 1912/1918 were officially called.

⁷⁴⁹ Filov, 8.

remains of medieval churches and monasteries in these areas.⁷⁵¹ Both Filov and Mihail Arnaudov, who also published an extensive report on his observations in Western Macedonia—namely, Skopje, Kachanik, Prizren, and the watershed between the Vardar River and the Radika River—asserted that the overwhelming majority of the population in these parts of Macedonia had a “Bulgarian identity”.

* * *

The spread of national education systems was associated with the erosion of the traditional differentiation between the town and the “mute” countryside.⁷⁵² In Serbia and Bulgaria, both print and schooling penetrated in the rural areas, and the level of literacy had increased significantly countrywide by the turn of the twentieth century. In 1887, though, only 10.71% of the Bulgarian population was literate; in the 1900s, the percentage was 23.87%, though as Jordan Kolev points out only 12-3 had completed the 13 years obligatory primary education⁷⁵³. The role of the nation state in introducing a mass schooling system designed to facilitate the process of indoctrination had nonetheless been considerable. However, the Serbo-Croat population living within the Dual Monarchy showed a 75% illiteracy rate, according to a census conducted in 1900.⁷⁵⁴ The creation and running of a comprehensive elementary school system required huge state investments in trained professionals and buildings. Toward the end of the nineteenth

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid., 9.

⁷⁵¹ Filov was able to visit Saint Spiridon (both monastery and church by the same name) around Melnik; Saint Nedeliya between the villages of Mravintsi and Demir Kapu; Saint George close to Negotin, etc. See Bogdan Filov, Notes on My Trip to Macedonia July 12 to September 12, 1916, 118-94.

⁷⁵² Vincent, 12.

⁷⁵³ Kolev, 43.

⁷⁵⁴ Vincent, 14.

century education accounted for the biggest state expenditures after defense.⁷⁵⁵ Education had become a major force in the rise of nationalism.

Teachers formed the vanguard of the Bulgarian intelligentsia from the end of the Ottoman rule in 1878 until the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. They influenced the formation of the intelligentsia itself and its reproduction.⁷⁵⁶ In the mid-1870s, more than 4,000 people in Mœzia, Thrace, and Macedonia were in the teaching profession,⁷⁵⁷ the vast majority of them primary teachers. Furthermore, most Bulgarian university professors at the turn of the twentieth century had been born in Macedonia. They included Lyubomir Miletich born in Štip, Ivan Georgov (Veles), Dimitür Matev (Veles), Nikola Milev (in the District of Kostur), Alexandür Stanishev (Kukush), Alexandür Balabanov (Štip) and Ivan Snegarov (Ohrid). Their background influenced their scientific interests and research. It also shaped their contacts with the students especially on the eve of the 1912-13 Balkan Wars, when the future of Ottoman Macedonia was at stake.

Olive Lodge claimed that in Serbia and early Yugoslavia (1919), teaching was a perilous profession. The end of term was sometimes punctuated by revolver shots whenever aspiring pupils were disappointed in their failure. Schoolmasters occasionally carried revolvers in their pockets at this time of the year, just to be on the safe side.⁷⁵⁸ This was a reflection of the countryside, but gradually the state-controlled, nationally-

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid, 36.

⁷⁵⁶ Kolev, 24.

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid., 24.

⁷⁵⁸ Lodge, 83.

oriented schooling system and universal elementary education changed the nature of peasant communities in both Serbia and Bulgaria.

Education affected the two main institutions characteristic of peasant society—the traditional family household (*zadruga*) and the isolated village community. In the 1880s and 1890s, when the Bulgarian and Serbian educational systems at all levels began forging a new sense of national unity, the old peasant “world”—which was synonymous with the village—was altered for good. Once reading and writing became more common than rare in peasant society, the peasants’ horizons and his ability to absorb more complicated information increased. As a result, the turn of the twentieth century marked a significant change in peasant tastes, lifestyles, customs, ethics, and levels of patriotism. Although rural schooling in both Serbia and Bulgaria tended to lag behind the urban, both in quantity and quality, the process of transforming various local loyalties into a universal national one proved irreversible. The nation-state had to mobilize different means to facilitate the process of indoctrination and it used every opportunity to drive the messages home. Even some of the public buildings, where academic institutions were located, illustrated the symbolic value that the nation state placed upon the ancient cultural legacy—for example, the buildings of the Greek Academy of Science (completed in 1886) and the State University of Sofia were both decorated with representations of the glories of the past.⁷⁵⁹

In 1910, the Greek Prime Minister Eleutherios Venizelos wrote: “The material and moral resources of the Nation [the Greeks] are enough, in the hands of committed

⁷⁵⁹ The present-day central part of the university complex was built later (between 1924 and 1934). However, the building of the university began in 1898, when a parliamentary committee (*eforiya*) approved 10,200 square meters of space for this purpose. See Radeva, 82-3.

workers for revival, to re-create a Greece worthy of the demands of present day civilization.”⁷⁶⁰ His optimism was shared by Bulgarian and Serbian national mobilizers, and education provided excellent opportunities for both mass indoctrination and the training of future indoctrinators in nationalism. Anastasia Karakasidou argues that education was the principal means by which new national identities were legitimized and accepted in Macedonia.⁷⁶¹ Greek and Bulgarian church officials and educators were often the same individuals. Between 1911 and 1913, words such as “identity”, “history”, “faith”, “solidarity”, and “loyalty” became part of everyday vocabulary in Macedonia, due to the effort of two generations of Bulgarian, Serb, and Greek teachers, who were often revolutionary activists working under cover.

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⁷⁶⁰ Venizelos cited in Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, 79.

CONCLUSIONS

Nationalist Bulgarian and Serbian historians have long advocated the view that the creation of Balkan national identities was the natural consummation of age-old historical processes; and that by destroying the medieval Balkan states, the Ottoman conquest severed a link which would otherwise have existed between premodern and modern development in the region. This, in their view, accounts for the backwardness and sluggish pace of modernization of the new Balkan nation states. On the surface this appears to agree with what scholars have been arguing for a long time: namely, that attributes like common language, “national” space, religion, and traditions are essential for the emergence of collective consciousness.

In this thesis, we have argued against all these generalizations, presenting evidence that contradicts, in particular, the nationalist view of many Bulgarian and Serbian historians. Until the establishment of modern Serbia and Bulgaria in the nineteenth century, national communities did not exist as such. Serbian and Bulgarian peasants had, at best, the vaguest conception of their common medieval past and Byzantine heritage; and they had, at best, an ill-defined linguistic distinctiveness. In Ottoman times, the Balkan peoples bonded most effectively on the basis of common religion, which transcended linguistic lines. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire had rarely been questioned, so long as the state administration functioned relatively well and before economic stagnation began to undermine it towards the end of the eighteenth century. And while Ottoman repression no doubt came to be resented, so was that of the police and other agents of the newly independent states when they ventured into the villages.

⁷⁶¹ Karakasidou, 105.

In sum, most citizens of the newly established states had little national consciousness, either in the sense of recognizing that their primary loyalty was to the state (rather than village or religion) or to the collective *ethnie*. Rather than precede state-building, the creation of Serbian and Bulgarian national identities was largely dependent on it. In the two cases examined in this thesis (Bulgaria and Serbia), the concept of the nation had to be created and disseminated among ordinary people through the mass media, modern schooling system, religious institutions, and military conscription. Serbs and Bulgarians had to be indoctrinated into nationalism in specific ways. Short of this, notions such as “patriotic upbringing”, “popular mobilization”, and sacrifice in the name of the motherland might have remained meaningless abstractions to most people.

The intellectuals—that is, the educated—were a crucial factor in this process. In both Bulgaria and Serbia, they played a prominent role, which was largely a product of urbanization.⁷⁶² Lacking national consciousness, the peasantry had to be indoctrinated and socialized in nationalism. Nevertheless, the number of intellectuals devoted to national ideals who were ready to serve the motherland and their people was quite small. Unlike Western and Central Europe, where there existed an educated class by 1800 and a political middle class by the 1850s, Bulgaria and Serbia remained predominantly peasant societies throughout the nineteenth century.⁷⁶³ Thus, before the creation of sovereign states, the only national sentiments and social solidarity felt were based predominantly on rational self-interest, custom and habit. Incapable of subscribing to notions of national

⁷⁶² Richard J. Crampton, Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 4.

⁷⁶³ Even in the late nineteenth century, the percentage of peasant population in both counties was close to 85 percent. See Iván T. Berend, György Ránki, East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiado, 1977), 33.

loyalty they could not understand, peasants invariably defined themselves in terms of religion, locality and occupation. In the case of Bulgarians, there was not even a standard literary language before the turn of the twentieth century. As late as the 1890s, dialects ruled and all seven Bulgarian grammars in use differed significantly from each other.⁷⁶⁴

In response to these conditions, Balkan nationalism had to be cultivated through various governmental, educational, military, religious and cultural institutions. By the end of the nineteenth century, the construction of national history was well under way. The proponents of this “history” presented a highly selective version of the past: a series of glorious achievements deliberately designed to appeal to ordinary people. However, religion and language remained critical factors in the formation of a concept of nation. This was true right up to the early part of the twentieth century.

Intellectuals had a few means to achieve their nationalist goals, but it was through state intervention that they best contributed to the formation of national consciousness. The printing of school readers in both Serbia and Bulgaria fell under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. The state had full control over school curricula in a region where, as late as 1900, 79 percent of all Serbs and 72 percent of all Bulgarians remained illiterate.⁷⁶⁵ The Serbian and Bulgarian states took responsibility for appointing teachers, printing textbooks and building new schools. As a result, ordinary people came to believe that school readers contained accurate information, regardless of how much the national past was glorified or national claims justified.

⁷⁶⁴ Philip Longwoth, The Making of Eastern Europe. From Prehistory to Postcommunism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 136.

⁷⁶⁵ Ránki, Berend, 17.

Nevertheless, during the first and second phases of their evolution in the early nineteenth century, both the Bulgarian and Serbian national movements faced a common enemy—the Ottoman Empire and the *status quo* it embodied—and organized terror often proved more useful than even patriotism. Karadjordje did not shrink from intimidating and punishing Serb peasants in order to “persuade” them to join the first uprising in 1804. It was only after Serbian autonomy was granted in 1829 and Bulgarian independence in 1878 when both states gradually established effective schooling systems with obligatory primary education focused on national history and geography that patriotism could be understood. Education in Macedonia proved especially effective in the creation and propagation of a national cause. And Serbian cultural societies like *Matica Srpska* in Hungary and Bulgarian societies, such as the Trusteeship for Bulgarian schools in Macedonia, actively promoted ethnic identity and published magazines and newspapers in Serbian and Bulgarian.

A third factor was the press, which was used deliberately to influence personal choice of national identity. It helped transform the Orthodox Churches into national institutions that promoted nationalism. In the summer of 1903, during the Ilinden uprising, many Patriarchist priests fought alongside peasants against the Ottoman authorities. Soon, the rivalry among national communities became so intense that, at the turn of the nineteenth century, Serbian priests participated in the deliberate destruction of valuable Bulgarian medieval manuscripts and thefts of rare printed books in Macedonia. The rise of nationalism was closely associated with both the Orthodox religion and elementary education, where the Church sometimes assumed a leading role, as it did in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

When military conscription, a fourth factor, was introduced, it was intended to defend the state and assure public order, but clearly it also helped control the mass of predominantly illiterate males, who otherwise would have remained indifferent to the national cause. By the end of the nineteenth century, a military career was most popular among young Bulgarian and Serbian males, allowing them to contribute effectively to their respective national causes. In Bosnia, Hercegovina and Macedonia, secret societies like *Narodna Odbrana* (National Defense) and informal networks of officers allowed national ideology and identity to develop to an even greater extent.

Of prime importance, indoctrination was thus achieved through various means: the Churches, the schooling system, the press, and the conscript army. All these institutions helped teach young people who they were and where their loyalty lay. Beyond that, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 provided a new opportunity for the heirs of the Bulgarian and Serbian thrones, Boris and Alexander, to project a positive public image and to connect their personas to the national cause.

In premodern times, dynasty and tradition, religious faith and hereditary custom served to unite communities without recourse to a common national identity.⁷⁶⁶ Richard Crampton has argued that without a sense of a common national past, religion alone was of little use in the formation of a modern national consciousness.⁷⁶⁷ The Macedonian Question—essentially a conflict among Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia for possession of the Ottoman province of Macedonia—demonstrates well how Balkan politicians used

⁷⁶⁶ Fulbrook, 4. Patrick Geary also agrees that the sense of belonging to a nation did not constitute the most important of bonds. Rather, it was religion, kindred, lordship and social stratum by which politically active elites identified themselves. See Patrick J. Geary, *The Myth of Nations. The Medieval Origins of Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 19.

⁷⁶⁷ Crampton, *Eastern Europe*, 5.

mythmaking about the past to cultivate the national feelings of the common folk about the past. In this respect, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia played an important role in the development of Serb and Bulgarian nationalism. First, they supplied immigrants to the “motherland” who were enthusiasts for the national cause and employed in various ways as nation-builders. Second, they provided a post-independence agenda of adding the people of Diaspora to the nation state. Without this impulse, most Bulgarians and Serbs might have sunk back into their former torpor.

The Bulgarian indoctrinators advanced arguments that Macedonia had been an integral part of the first Bulgarian state (681-1018), and its regional capital, Ohrid, had been the seat of the first independent Slavic Orthodox Church, the Bulgarian Archbishopric-Patriarchate of Ohrid. Macedonia, it was argued, was merely a dialect of Bulgarian rather than a distinct language.

Rival Greek historical claims to the province were based on allusions to ancient Macedonia and the “heritage” of Alexander the Great (336-23 B. C.). Furthermore, the idea of recreating the Byzantine Empire as a Greek nation state constituted the core of the “Great Idea”, advanced by Greek propagandists, who believed that Macedonia had always been Greek.

For historical legitimacy, the Serbs referred to the Stefan Dušan’s empire, whose capital had been the Macedonian city of Skopje. In fact, Serb claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina were based on both historical and linguistic grounds. When the province was occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1878, its population had already been administratively divided into three groups, namely Orthodox (43 percent), Muslim (39

percent) and Catholics (18 percent).⁷⁶⁸ The two Christian communities developed their identities through the influence of Church institutions, which had infiltrated into Bosnia from its neighbors. The Orthodox espoused a Serb identity, the Catholics a Croat. A similar process unfolded in Macedonia, where those who lived under the religious authority of the Exarchate developed a Bulgarian identity and those under the Patriarchate developed a Greek identity.⁷⁶⁹

While a selective reading of history was important in the creation of national consciousness, it was not the only tool. The state also helped to promote a sense of national tradition by investing Christian festivals with national associations and by inventing new holidays. Confident of its ability to influence the process of national indoctrination, it began to change the significance of established Christian rituals. Baptisms, weddings, funerals, and the liturgical calendar, which had shaped the peasant's year until the end of the nineteenth century, gave way to a different sort of ritualized public event. Celebrations of royal birthdays and anniversaries; patriotic holidays like the Serbian celebration of the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, or the Bulgarian holiday of March 3rd commemorating the peace agreement of San Stefano (1878) between Russia and the defeated Ottoman Empire —became increasingly important in cultivating a wider sense of “togetherness” and collectivity amongst the peasantry. In time, policemen began to patrol in uniforms decorated with national symbols and soldiers

⁷⁶⁸ Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox, The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas of the Balkans (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

⁷⁶⁹ I agree with Richard Crampton who argues that the correlation of ethnic identity and religion helped in the formulation of national consciousness. Most Balkan Orthodox peasants could be persuaded by their intelligentsia that they did not wish to be ruled by Muslims. Crampton, Eastern Europe, 5.

to march on parades with the national flag raised, becoming vivid reminders to the peasantry that their village community was part of a much larger entity, the State.

As a result of these major transformations, by the turn of the twentieth century most Balkan politicians had learned to present the most cherished ideals of their communities through the prism of nationalistic rhetoric, and to exploit the power of national sentiment to mobilize the masses. The last two decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century saw intensifying confrontation between neighboring Balkan communities. This, in its turn, assisted the construction of separate ethnic and linguistic identities. Nevertheless, in some regions education remained the primary means by which national identities were preached and popularized. This was true of the first decade of the twentieth century in Macedonia, where Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian state and church officials competed to attract large numbers of local population to their respective national causes.

Finally, modern nationalism assumes or propagates the idea that the national community has always been a homogenous unit, whose existence is traceable through the centuries. However, ordinary Bulgarians and Serbs had little understanding of national agendas and, until the intervention of their states, very little interest in anything besides breadwinning and the wellbeing of their families. Our analysis of national indoctrination in Bulgaria and Serbia has demonstrated why the dissemination of the idea of nationhood was a far more uneven affair than Balkan and some western historians have made it out to be. It took place through a complex network of state institutions, nationally- oriented schooling and obligatory primary education; through conscription into national armies; through the Church and mass media.

This was how Serb and Bulgarian peasants were gradually transformed into conscious national communities.

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