Political Globalization versus Anarchy:
An Operationalization of the Transformationalist Approach
Through the Turkish Case

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Abstract

This study asks how national power capacity and state structures are reconfigured when faced simultaneously with the power diffusion impact of political globalization—defined as a consensus of ideas and subsequent pressure on states for further democratization and liberalization—and the power maximization demands of internal and external security dilemmas. Hypothesizing a resulting bifurcation of such state structures, this study identifies and explores the transformation dynamics of states being pressured by these two forces through an in-depth analysis of the Turkish case. First, the roots of the two pressures are explored from the late Ottoman and early Republican eras, and a pendulum period is observed, in which the incompatibility of the two drives becomes accepted. As the inevitability of the transformation from more authoritarian to more liberal regimes is realized, a resulting gradual development and institutionalization of a dual state structure into hard and soft agendas and, eventually, realms is shown. Within such a structure, a compromised governance system emerges, in which both a form of democracy and democratization is maintained for legitimacy purposes, and a strong power-holding mechanism, unaccountable to the public, is preserved as an ultimate guard to maintain control over the transformation process. An analysis of changes in the Turkish constitutions is used to reveal traceable reflections of the gradual expansion and consolidation of the hard realm. The actual workings of a dual state structure, revealing the realms' actors, their domestic and external allies, their positions, arguments and rhetoric, is provided by focusing on the clash in the Turkish case over the issue of minority rights in relation with the country's application process for European Union membership. The study identifies the new security dilemma of these countries as being the challenge of securing the inevitable transformation, including the management of the desecuritization process, and concludes with the presenting of a generalizeable model for exploring the transformation of states subject to the simultaneous pressures of security dilemmas and political globalization. The study provides a reassessment of relevant issues within the comparative politics and international relations literature.

Résumé

Cette étude porte sur la reconfiguration de la puissance nationale et des structures étatiques due, d'une part, à la décentralisation des pouvoirs provoquée par la mondialisation politique (définie comme un consensus concernant la poursuite de la démocratisation et de la libéralisation économique, sans oublier les pressions sur les Etats qui en découle), et, d'autre part, aux exigences sans cesse plus grandes de sécurité, interne autant qu'externe. Formulant l'hypothèse selon laquelle les structures étatiques se transforment face à ce double phénomène, cette étude se penche sur ces mutations par le biais d'un pays particulier : la Turquie. Dans un premier temps, l'étude d'une période couvrant les derniers instants de l'Empire Ottoman et les débuts de la République Turque permet d'établir la genèse de ces deux formes de pression politique (à savoir la mondialisation et les exigences de sécurité). On observera une époque intermédiaire où l'incompatibilité apparente entre les deux éléments s'effacera peu à peu... Quand cette inévitable transformation, celle qui mène de l'autoritarisme à un régime libéral, a eu lieu, il est possible de démontrer qu'il en résulte une apparition graduelle, puis une institutionnalisation, d'une structure étatique duale, divisée en domaines "négociables" et "non négociables". A l'intérieur d'une structure de ce type, un mode de gouvernement, basé sur le compromis, émerge, gouvernement dans lequel, d'une part, une forme de démocratie et de démocratisation est sauvegardée, dans des buts de légitimité, et, d'autre part, un pouvoir fort est maintenu, sans possibilité de contestation publique, avec pour but, cette fois, de garder le contrôle du processus de transformation. Une analyse des réformes des constitutions Turques est proposée pour révéler les traces visibles d'une expansion graduelle et d'une consolidation du domaine réservé "non négociable". Les travaux actuels sur une structure étatique duale, révèlent l'existence de ceux qui ont la maîtrise de ce domaine réservé, et traitent de leurs alliés, tant au niveau national qu'international, de leurs positions, arguments et discours. Ils se focalisent, dans le cas Turc, sur les clashs engendrés par le processus de préadhésion à l'Union Européenne concernant la question des droits des minorités. L'étude identifie ce nouveau dilemme de la sécurité comme étant le défi d'une transition inévitable mais potentiellement factrice de troubles, sans oublier le processus de "désécurisation" sensé suivre! Elle conclut en présentant un modèle voué à une généralisation de cette analyse du processus de transformation des Etats devant faire face à la pression simultanée de la mondialisation et des problèmes de sécurité. L'étude fournit par ailleurs une réévaluation de certains problèmes relevant de la politique comparée et/ou des relations internationales.

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The primary determinants of the traditional state-centric international system have

been security concerns, both external and internal. These concerns kept the minds of

statesmen largely occupied with geopolitics and anarchic conditions in their immediate

environments, as well as in the global system. In order to curb security threats and maintain a

constant position of readiness, the national forces of a state had to be kept centralized and

concentrated—though of course the degree to which this was true varied according to the

acuteness of the nation's security threat. In order to achieve centralized and thus maximized

power, a ruling elite not only had to keep security issues and rhetoric prominent on the public

agenda, but it also had to seek to enhance the existing institutionalization of the security

establishment. This process, which could be labeled as 'securitization', is one through which

everything becomes linked to the idea of national security. National security becomes the

primary directive when assessing the feasibility of any major political project requiring power

reallocation at the national level. Ultimately, this led to the creation of security-oriented

nation states, and in extreme examples, to garrison states. The power pattern, securitization

process, and resulting state type described above are shown in the first row of diagram 1.

Diagram 1. A taxonomy of state power configurations in the modernizing world

	Pattern of Power	Resulting State Power Agenda	State Type
State-Centric World/ security dilemmas	Power Maximization/ Centralization	Securitization	Security-oriented Nation State
Modernizing World	Turbulent balancing of the two	Conflictive power reconfiguration	Torn State
Multi-Centric world/ globalization	Power Diffusion/ decentralization	Desecuritization	Western/globalized

The third row of diagram 1 outlines the new epoch of globalization. This new epoch

has enabled a mobility of resources, ideas, and individuals, and thus empowered new actors

above and below the state level. These new actors, with their varied agendas, produce

demands for a sharing of national power and a consequent pressure for decentralization. The implication of this process in terms of security, can be labeled as 'desecuritization'. This term should not imply an automatic minimizing of security issues, but rather a lowering of the 'prime directive' status of security over all other issues, and a reconsidering of security as one of several major needs to be satisfied by national governance. Achieving this involves increasing the transparency of and civilian control over the determining of threats and the implementing of national security policies. States that seem to be successfully managing this process can be identified as western or globalized states, such as those of Western Europe and North America.

Many modernizing states[1] in particular however, seem to fall somewhere in between these two worlds, as expressed by the middle row of the diagram. As such, these states are forced to try and balance contradicting patterns of power. It can be argued that the resulting conflictive process of power reconfiguration can, if institutionalized, lead to a bifurcation of the state structure and, in the extreme, to a torn state. Exploring these proposed dynamics and processes in greater detail will allow us to respond to the main research question of this dissertation, which is to identify the transformation dynamics of states being pressured by these two forces. More specifically this study asks, how are national power capacity and state structures reconfigured when faced with the power diffusion impact of political globalization and the power maximization demands of internal and external security dilemmas?[2]

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[1] The modernizing world of the diagram refers here to those states of the developing world that have long-standing strong state traditions, that have a history of aspiring to modernize, and that are highly concerned with traditional security dilemmas. Examples of such states can be as diverse as China, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Iran, to name a few. The definition is discussed in more detail in the next section.

[2] While various forms of globalization have been identified (for more on these forms see David Held et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999]), this research refers primarily to globalization in its political form. Political globalization is understood here as a consensus on the combined ideas of economic liberalism and liberal democracy and the pressure this creates on states for further democratization and liberalization, which in turn necessitates a diffusion of national power. Focusing on this aspect of globalization is crucial because it is the liberalization impact of political globalization in particular that leads to a reconfiguration of state power structures. Power maximization and centralization may, at least initially, co-exist with, for example, economic globalization and liberalization—as evidenced by existing non-democratic regimes with relatively liberal economies—but is incompatible with political globalization and liberalization pressure. Security dilemmas in the modernizing world are seen as based not only

Defining the Modernizing World

The so-called modernizing world can, for the purpose of this research, be also considered as the democratizing world since political globalization (i.e. pressure for democratization and liberalization) is one of the study's independent variables. The idea of a "democratizing world" stems from the postulation that the world political system can be divided into two or more spheres in which the rules of the game as well as the types and natures of the actors may differ from each other. By making such categorizations we not only can present a more accurate picture of reality but can also provide a more convenient base for intellectual exercise in order to describe, explain, and possibly predict the external and domestic dynamics within these spheres.[3]

A further and equally important advantage of such a classification is to help tackle better the problem of broad but unjustified definitions of the developing world. Since the end of the Cold War, the Second World is considered to have disappeared. Its subsequent incorporation into the traditional Third World exacerbated the problem of definition by widening the already existing degree of variation and diversity.

Neumann writes that the "disappearance" of the "Second World" is widely accepted along with the construction of the "two worlds" image[4]. She also points out that no particular definition has gained recognition or acceptance, and various terms such as weak, developing, South, non-Western, LDCs, industrializing, peripheral and Third World, are now used interchangeably to refer to countries in Africa, Asia (with the exception of Japan), the Middle East, Latin America, and the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union.

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on external vulnerabilities, but also on domestic ones such as regime insecurity issues. This means that traditional states of the modernizing world have to protect themselves from both an external anarchy and an increasing internal one.

[3] For similar views see Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflicts, and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995) and Barry Buzan's position in Anthony McGrew's "Realism vs. cosmopolitanism: A Debate between Barry Buzan and David Held," *Review of International Studies* 24, (1998): 387-398.

[4] Stephanie Neumann, ed., *International Relations and the Third World*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

Others subscribe to the "disappearance of the Second World" since, mostly for reasons of theoretical parsimony, they find the "two world" image useful. Goldgeier and McFaul use the distinction of 'core' and 'periphery' which is based primarily on economics/degree of industrialization[5]. Another classification is based on the power situation, and points out that there are also "Middle Powers" and "Semiperipheral States".[6]

One common concept in the classifications of world political systems is the type and nature of the unit actor: the state. The concept of the state warrants further elaboration since a state-based classification scheme is a significant part of this research. Since democratization as a way of responding to political globalization is another variable, not only the type of the state but the degree of its political development is also important for this research. This means determining how the relationship between the state and the society is structured, in other words, how are "power" and "consent" mixed? This question is significant because this domestic characteristic, which was emphasized by Hobbes and Machiavelli, has a strong role in the interrelationships between unit level factors and global processes.[7] This link is also important when categorizing world spheres according to the type of the states because the management of power without the exercise of force has become the true measure of states' political capacity.[8]

The assumption in the following works is that developing world states are not fundamentally different from Western ones (since we at least know that they want to progress into a similar 'successful' structure—the common nation-state,) rather they are located at different stages of a developmental process.[9] The criteria, therefore, for the differentiation is the level of development towards modern statehood. In terms of this research, the

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[5] James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era," *International Organization* 46, no. 2, (1992): 467-491.
[6] Martin Wight. *Power Politics*. (New York: Leicester University Press, 1995).
[7] Michael William, "Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration", *International Organization* 50, no. 2, (1996): 213-236.
[8] Robert W. Jackman. *Power Without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation-States*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).

measurement of these criteria could be seen as the degree of ability to balance the needs of effectiveness (power) and consent (legitimacy).

Within this measurement, one could conceive of the world political system as follows: In the first sphere, also known as the core, the state is powerful enough to exercise force in order to gain consent, but does not and can not, due to the level of accountability it is subject to from society. What we have is a state which is weak in terms of accountability to society, and a society strong enough to exercise considerable power over its state. This category is similar to what Buzan and Segal label the postmodern state, which has a much more tolerant attitude toward cultural, economic, and political interaction, and define[s] a much narrower range of things as threats to national security.[10] In the postmodern state 'civil society' has, in a sense, more influence than the government—fitting with the criterion of high degree of accountability of the state to society.

This categorization also resembles somewhat Holm & Sorensen's "operational sovereignty", which refers to limits on sovereignty that states choose to place on themselves.[11] In other words, state control over institutional or issue domains which they are willing to give up or trade in return for greater influence at the system level. If a state is currently in a strong position or if it carefully uses its bargaining power, it may be able to influence decisions/changes/trends at the system level.

At the opposite end of the spectrum it is difficult to speak of any type of accountability due to the poorly developed political entities and incoherent (sociologically and politically) societies. In these units the state is so premature that, even if it wanted, it would not be able to use force to gain consent. This is also due to the level of fragmentation in the society.

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[9] Barry Buzan.*People, States and Fear*. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991).
[10] Barry Buzan and Glenn Segal. "The Rise of the 'Lite' Powers: A Strategy for Postmodern States", *World Policy Journal* 13, no. 3, (1996): 1-10, and Buzan & Segal, *Anticipating the Future*, (London: Simon & Schuster: 1998).
[11] H.H. Holm and Georg Sorensen, eds., *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

What we have in this sphere is a weak state and fragmented society.[12] This is similar to what Buzan calls a "premodern state", or what Holm & Sorensen refer to as "negative sovereignty". While such a state may aspire to becoming a modern state, it is prevented by the weakness at both the political and societal levels. With essentially no room for a wide sense of accountability, there is more of an anarchy than a hierarchy within the state. Some examples of such states are located primarily in Africa and Central Asia, e.g. Afghanistan, Tadjikistan, Somalia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zaire.[13]

In between these two groups is the third type of state in which the balance between effectiveness and consent/legitimacy is still biased towards effectiveness/power. In other words, the state and the representative governments continue to enjoy strong prerogatives either constitutionally or not, and are able to use force to gain the necessary consent from society—a strong state and weak/fragmented society in which the state and power-holders are not highly accountable to society. Although there is some accountability, it is between weak political figures—e.g. the products of imperfect elections—and society. The state itself is not accountable in a number of domains.

This is similar to what Buzan labels a "modern state", or Holm & Sorensen categorize as a "positive sovereignty". Such a state desires to become a postmodern one but has not yet been able to overcome the improper accountability problem. According to Buzan, the major characteristics of this type of state is the "strong government control over society."[14] He adds that these modern states typically define a wide range of military, political, economic, and cultural factors as threats to national security. The aspirations of these states are not only to become a postmodern state but also, and more importantly, to become great powers, or at least regional hegemons. Some examples are named as Iran, Iraq, Russia, China, India,

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[12] Ayoob.
[13] Barry Buzan, "Conclusions: System versus Units in Theorizing About the Third World,"in Stephanie Neumann ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).
[14] Ibid, 221.

Turkey, and the two Koreas. These status-related intentions combined with other unit and system-level sources, increase a high degree of vulnerability and pressure for the unit actors and their policies. Basically, in the regions in which these states are located, and the international relations in which they take part, classical realist rules remain valid since armed conflicts are still applicable as policy options.

Dynamics of the Transformation

The nature of power in security-oriented nation states has been based on the idea of power maximization through power centralization. State security bureaucracies grew ever larger during the centralization process, primarily at the expense of a societal role or input. The primacy of state interests and national security reached such a level in some cases that these states can be argued to have become in fact giant security apparatuses, which possessed nations and societies. Thus a model of a strong state and correspondingly weak society emerged. Global democratization and liberalization waves have targeted this particular state/society relationship by promoting, if not provoking, more societal input in the national governance. Nevertheless, the primacy of national security and the consequent steady securitization of the public agenda by these security apparatuses, have been trying to resist against these powerful global liberalizing dynamics.

Due in part to its own internal inefficiencies and as well to the increasingly irresistible attractiveness of global liberalization dynamics, the lowering of the perceived levels of international anarchy and its accompanying vulnerability, put the strong state/suppressed society structure to a serious test. Securitization of the public agenda has become much more difficult in these governance structures.

As long as securitization of the public agenda and the consequent allocation of material and psychological national resources remained relatively unquestioned, strong states

were able to keep the society and its potential hazards under control. The primacy of national security and the exaggerated characterization of vaguely defined internal and external enemies and threats rendered the fragmented societal structure and its potential demands less relevant and urgent. Therefore, a strong state-fragmented society relationship was able to endure.

One of the major problems of the seeming resistance of the strong state-fragmented society model was that the fragmented nature of the society and its potential demands were only curtailed, but did not necessarily transform in a manner the state elite would like to portray to the outside world or even to their own domestic public opinion. The state elite, and in particular the giant security apparatuses, knew of the potential societal threats, and calculated for them as a part of the larger security dilemmas they perceived for their states. These considerations, however, viewed these domestic vulnerabilities as potential weak points that might be manipulated by others during the anarchic geopolitical atmosphere between nation states. Such an understanding provided not only additional bases for the primacy of national security over other domestic public agendas, but also further provoked power centralization at the national level in order to weaken those fragmented societal elements deemed threatening. Most states with such governance structures appeared on the surface as relatively stable nation states who were prepared to play by the rules of the realist anarchic world. In these states, certain types of gradual and carefully supervised modernization projects were implemented, also in an effort to minimize outside impact and thereby remaining national and protectionist.

In the overall picture portrayed above, the strong state (centralized power) was the best possible response not only to handle external threats and security dilemmas, but also to cope with potential problems stemming from the fragmented nature of the societies. Relentless securitization was the order of the day.

The emergence of the multi-centric world, the significant rise in global liberalization (hereafter, political globalization) forces, and most importantly, the end of the Cold War and the impact this had on reducing the perception of external threats, has led to an environment in which, for many of the modernizing world states, the primary security agendas of the previous world order have become less able to function as determining instruments of public life. First, a general need for some kind of change—most often towards a more democratic form of state/society relations—now appears inevitable and unavoidable. Second, the capacity of security apparatuses to use external threat calculations for domestic securitization has shrunk. Large, strong security apparatuses no longer seem to have a definitive mission, and, moreover, societal interpretations of western liberal democracies do not look favorably on large roles for states and security apparatuses. The strong state, therefore, is feeling not only systematic pressure from the external and internal environment to downsize and share some of its power or halt some of its functions, but is also facing a society that is more actively demanding a share from the centralized power structure. The weakening process of the strong centralized state has been put into action. Fragmented societal elements can no longer be considered merely potential challenges to national security; these potential threats are already politicized and empowered by economic globalization, and are beginning to corner the state power structure.

What does a centralized state structure do to respond to such power demands? One can anticipate first an immediate reflexive move by elites to try and hold on to their already established prerogatives in the name of stability and the survival of the state. Although this point is important since it can freeze or delay the budding power struggle for an uncertain period, it can ultimately be overcome when the sitting elites or administrators are replaced. Thus, some form of inevitable transformation is assumed in this dissertation.

There is more to the story, however, than just power-holding elites resisting domestic power reconfiguration. Though designed to in fact overreact to security issues, the existing state structure now must find a way to, at minimum, preserve its centralized/maximized power structure in order to cope with the combined remaining amount of perceived external threats and the resurfacing of formerly suppressed domestic threats, such as power demands and potentially even secessionist efforts of segments of their fragmented societies.

Ideally, a centralized domestic governance structure should adapt to a decentralized power structure, perhaps even taking on a managerial or supervisory role in the transition process. However, most developing world state security apparatuses do not know how to adapt due to their inherent nature of overreacting to frightening situations of instability. Rather than an ideal response of decentralizing and downsizing while simultaneously maximizing its effectiveness for meeting new security challenges, the strong state structure reacts in its traditional manner of trying to even further maximize and centralize the power configuration at the national level. It is difficult to find an example of an old-world state structure, i.e. garrison states or a variant thereof, with the potential for such a rapid adaptation and transformation process. This is especially true because this new threat demands an immediate securing of the conflictive transformation process in order to avoid dangerous domestic instability. There is not sufficient time, therefore, for the nation state as a whole to produce a new, sophisticated functioning power structure to meet this new security dilemma.

Globalization

Power diffusion / decentralization

MULTICENTRIC WORLD

Western State

(Globalized)

TORN
STATES
(In transition/
conflicted)

Garrison State

(Nation State)

Security dilemmas

Power maximization/centralization

STATE CENTRIC WORLD

Diagram 2. LOCATING THE TORN STATES ALONG THE POWERCONFIGURATION LINE

Thus, security vs. liberalization becomes the primary impasse faced by the national governance structure. The state is pressured by power diffusion dynamics that can not be dismissed yet there remains the need to preserve if not maximize its power at a time of (over)perceived insecurities. The position of such torn states is expressed above in diagram 2, which is, in a sense, a dynamic representation of the middle row of the taxonomy in diagram 1. Can the necessary transformation for these states occur in a peaceful manner? In the course of such a transformation over issues of power, and in the absence of an overarching agency to manage this tumultuous process, the answer seems to be no. The dynamics of this new security dilemma will be even more acute in those countries in which societal fragmentation levels need significant time to develop cohesive national understandings and structures.

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Hypothesizing on the torn state

The taxonomy and discussion of the first part of this chapter suggest certain outcomes that we might expect of such a torn state, both at the macro and micro levels, and which provide the guidelines for the conducting of this case study. First, if power maximization leads to an agenda of securitization, and power diffusion leads to one of desecuritization, then the existence of both forces could lead to a bifurcation of the national agenda into two parts—one belonging to a relatively closed realm that might be labeled as "hard politics" and include issues such as state unity, sovereignty, geopolitical concerns, foreign policy, and domestic and external security issues. This realm would presumably be controlled by conservative security elite/bureaucrats, and nationalists among the public officials. The second half of the agenda, belonging to a relatively more open realm, might be labeled as "soft politics", and may include issues such as economic and political liberalization, and domestic links to global elements such as civil society and human rights groups. This realm would likely be run by, for example, political parties, the liberal elite, intellectuals, and the newly emerging globally-linked NGOs.

Second, a bifurcation of the national agenda, depending on the context, i.e. the level and length of exposure to either or both of the external pressures, the particular qualities of the leadership, or the possible existence and strength of coalitions, may lead over time to a dual institutionalization of the two political realms. Since the powerful security-minded elite can not ignore the political globalization impact due to international legitimacy needs and other factors such as IMF financial aid and often embedded modernization drives from within, they can be expected to allow the soft politics realm of civilian governments and political parties to expand--as long as it does not intervene in the hard politics realm. In the extreme case this might be anticipated to lead to a double state structure that could be deconstructed as an inner

state and an apparent state. While the former would remain to respond to the state-centric world demands, the latter would exist to meet increasing globalization pressures.

One might anticipate certain implications of such a state structure on the level of stability at both the domestic and regional levels. With power relocation and resistance to it remaining the main ingredient of the domestic level agenda, repression and counter insurgencies would be expected to occur, leading to bumpy transitions to democracy and conflictual domestic settings.

Finally, if such a bifurcation in the national political space of these torn state structures is indeed discovered, it becomes necessary to explore in depth the nature of the relationship between the two realms of hard and soft politics. Since presumably there would be an interaction between the two realms and, consequently, the potential for a shifting of their respective boundaries, it is important to look at these shifts in the domestic balance of power and ask: 1) when, why, and how do the boundaries shift, and, 2) under what conditions and to what extent does dual institutionalization of the two realms take place?

Assumptions

This study begins with several assumptions about the type of modernizing world states addressed in this study. First, the study assumes that these modernizing world states faced with the pressure of change can neither reject it nor remain ambivalent, but will adapt, as they have proven masters of doing in the past. These states are unable to reject the pressure despite even a perceived weakening effect on their ability to control and maximize power, because of the inevitable need for increasing international and national legitimacy. Second, most states in this sphere are still unitary, power-maximizing, and security-concerned actors. Third, most of these modernizing world states that have acute security concerns, also tend to have a state-society relationship that can be categorized as strong states and weaker, fragmented societies.

Fourth, the regions in which these states are located are still not experiencing the same levels of the phenomena that moderate anarchy in the core, such as interdependence, cooperation, and transnational links. Therefore, a high degree of vulnerability and anarchy continues to exist and realist premises are still highly valid. Fifth, due to their history and potential of modernization drives, these states are the most open entities to globalizing pressures. Sixth, the state security elite in these states will be most reactionary against the power diffusion impact of political globalization when there is a perception that the collective identity and institutions such as national unity, state sovereignty, security of the nation and state, are threatened. In summary, those parts of the developing world that have long-standing state traditions, that aspire to be modernized/globalized, and that are highly concerned with traditional security concerns, constitute the arena for observing the conflicting pressures of the traditional state-centric system and those of the multi-centric world/globalization.

Globalization and the State Debate

Two major bodies of literature appear to be most relevant to any research that is ultimately exploring the interrelationship between external factors and domestic change: the recent literature on globalization and the state, and the literature on international dimensions of democratization. Enriched largely by IR globalization scholars, the globalization and the state literature—similar to that of the international dimensions of democratization—is perhaps most useful here in its potential of clarifying questions and agenda-setting. One primary advantage of the globalization and the state literature over the other, is that it views the state as a holistic entity (since IR scholars largely view it that way), which in turn enables researchers to include all the traditional primary missions and outcomes of the state, e.g., sovereignty, security, etc., into the discussion. Of course, the biggest handicap that emerges from such a perspective is that since this literature comes from largely systemic

understandings, it is not well equipped to monitor the "black box" of domestic state

structures—something required for a full operationalization of the transformational dynamics

that this study's research question raises. In this section I first critically outline the primary

venues of the globalization and the state research agenda and literature, and then assess the

extent to which it was useful to me in the construction of a framework of analysis and,

ultimately, in theoretical modeling.

The Hyperglobalists

Two sets of perspectives have been dominating globalization debates, and provide a

ground for contesting viewpoints on the relationship between globalization and state capacity.

The first of these perspectives is about the primary attempt to understand and explain the

social phenomenon of globalization. A first group of scholars, "hyperglobalists", claim that

globalization represents a new epoch of human history in which traditional nation-states have

become unnatural, or even impossible business units in the new global economy[15]. Based

mostly on economic globalization, this strand of the debate stresses the "denationalization" of

national economics by the powerful transnational networks of production, trade and finance.

The hyperglobalists also recognize this same global change in the political realm. The

global economy has introduced a new level of allegiances between different national elites

based on an ideological attachment to a neoliberal economic orthodoxy, which is linked to the

global spread of liberal democracy. This reinforces an emerging global civilization defined

by universal standards of economic and political structures. Within this new "civilization",

states and people are increasingly the subjects of the new private and public global

authorities[16].

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[15] K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State* (New York: Free Press, 1995); W. Wriston, *The Twilight of Sovereignty* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1992), and J. M. Guehenno, *The End of the Nation State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
[16] Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert Cox, "Economic Globalization and Limits to Liberal Democracy,"

With respect to the nation state, the verdict of this branch of thought is that it is nearing its end. Susan Strange writes that the "impersonal forces of world markets" are leading to the declining authority of states, with forced power diffusion to other institutions and associations[17]. Others are also convinced that the demise nation states is a fact, since their authority and legitimacy are challenged by failing to control their borders and by not being able to live up to the demands of their own citizens[18]. Ohmae claims that the erosion of the nation state has reached such a level that the role of the nation state powers has become a "transitional mode of organization for managing economic affairs"[19]. The hyperglobalists appear convinced that as an actor, the nation state is being replaced by human action and agency since globalization seems to be fundamentally strengthening human action[20].

The Rejectionists

As opposed to the champions of globalization, its skeptics first make their argument that globalization is not new by drawing on statistical findings on world trade and on the level of economic interdependence in the nineteenth century. They imply that state capacity survived those periods and was perhaps even strengthened. They see intensification of interconnectedness as heightened levels of internationalization, which again emphasizes the key role of national capacities[21].

This line of argument essentially rejects the popular understanding that the power of national governments is being undermined in the current era by economic internationalization

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in *The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy*, ed. Anthony G. McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), and Ohmae, *Nation State*.

[17] Strange, *Retreat*..

[18] E. Luard, *The Globalization of Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1990), and M. Albrow, *The Global Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

[19] Ohmae, 147.

[20] Albrow, *Global Age*.

[21] P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

and global interconnectedness[22]. Several arguments have been produced in order to support this rejectionist position. Some argue, for example, that national governments sometimes manipulate globalization as a convenient political reasoning in order to implement unpopular neoliberal strategies in the economic realm[23]. Others, pointing out the significant differences among adoption and implementation of macroeconomic policies worldwide, argue that national characteristics still make a difference[24]. At the extreme of this line of thought is the argument that the state may be even stronger in its capacity based on the understanding that all economic formations reflect the salience of the political formation[25]. A similar argument is that the economic factors reflect rather than cause geopolitical conditions[26]. One step further along this line of thinking argues that the state, at least in public policy, still has decisive autonomy[27]. Overall, the state is seen as resilient, if not as the main actor of production and regulation of globalization through increasing levels of internationalization.

With its concentration primarily on economics and in part on public policy arguments, this line of thinking also claims that the "democratic" forces, which believe in and support the role of the nation state, may be behind the convergence of the international practices[28]. This again implies that the state and the state system are not the ones being subject to intensified interconnectedness and therefore eroding, but are rather the actors who are shaping the outcome.

The Transformationalists

[22] S. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia," *International Security* 20, no. 3 (1995): 115-151, and "Economic Interdependence and Independent Statehood," in *States in a Changing World*, eds. R. H. Jackson and A. James (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
[23] P. Hirst, "The Global Economy: Myths and Realities," *International Affairs* 73, no. 3 (1997): 409-426.
[24] L. Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); and K. Armingeon, "Globalization as Opportunity," ECPR Conference Workshop 12, Bern, 1997, cited in David Held et al., *Transformations*.
[25] Weiss, *Powerless State*.
[26] J. A. Hall, *International Orders: A Historical Sociology of State, Regime, Class and Nation* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
[27] Hirst, "Global Economy."

In between the total erosionist and statist arguments lies the transformationalist strand of thought regarding the fate of state capacity when confronted with globalization. The transformationalist approach is by nature closer to that of the hyperglobalizers than the rejectionists since it subscribes to the starting conviction that in the new epoch globalization is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political, and economic changes that are reshaping states, societies, and the world order[29]. According to this group of scholars, globalization dynamics may not be new, but they are certainly existing at unprecedented levels, and are creating a world of affairs in which there does not exist a clear distinction between international and domestic lines to which every actor in world affairs feels the need to adopt and adjust[30].

While the direction of the globalization impact is not fixed within the transformationalist approach[31], and therefore it does not include claims about future trajectories of globalization and its impact, these scholars' core emphasis is that globalization is a powerful transformative force that introduces a "massive shake-out" for the subjects--including the states[32].

The transformationalists' main argument regarding state capacity is that contemporary globalization is reconstituting and reengineering the nature and configurations of national governments. This argument does not claim that the territorial frontiers have no political or military significance, but rather it accepts that these issues have become increasingly challenged in an era of intensified globalization. The major basis for this conviction is that

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[28] Albrow, *Global Age.*

[29] Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

[30] James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990); J. A. Cammilleri and J. Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of Shrinking and Fragmented World* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992); J. G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47 (1993): 139-174, and S. Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[31] M. Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-state?" *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 3 (1997): 472-496.

[32] Anthony Giddens, "Globalization: A Keynote Address," *UNRISD News* 15 (1996), cited in Held et al., *Transformations.*

the world is not just state-centric or only state governed. Rather, as authority becomes diffused among public and private agencies at the local, national, regional, and global levels, nation-states are not the principal form of authority in the world[33].

States and national governments, being subject to these pressures, devise strategies to adapt to the new conditions. Distinctive strategies lead to different forms of states--from the neoliberal minimal state to varying types of developmental states to the "catalytic" state, in which the government is a facilitator of coordinated and collective action. What is proposed here, therefore, is that states adapt and transform to become more activist in determining their destinies[34].

Diagram 3: Chart of the globalization and the state debate[35]

	Hyperglobalists	Skeptics	Transformationalists
Patterns of the new era	A global age	Trading blocs, weaker geogovernance than in earlier periods	historically unprecedented levels of global inter-connectedness
Power status of national governments	Declining or eroding	Reinforced or enhanced	reconstituted, restructured
Dominant motif	McDonalds, Madonna, etc.	National interest	transformation of political community
Summary argument	The end of the nation-state	Internationalization depends on state acquiescence and support	Globalization transforming state power and world politics

Justification for the transformationalist approach

There are several arguments why the transformationalist approach is the most appropriate to explain the dynamics of current world affairs. First, the hyperglobalist argument that a perfectly competitive global economy is emerging (or has already emerged) is an unlikely assumption since we have yet to achieve perfect national economies. In other

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[33] Rosenau, *Governance.*
[34] Ibid.
[35] Adapted from a table in Held et al., 10.

words, a fully integrated global market with a minimized, if not completely diminished role for states, does not represent the true nature of the new epoch.

The rejectionist approach also has shortcomings. The empirical evidence on which this approach relies can easily be interpreted differently. For example, even if the trade/GDP ratios in the 1890s were higher than the ones in the 1990s, this reveals little about the social and political transformations to which this trade led. To draw an analogy, Chinese speakers may constitute a larger number worldwide than English speakers, but this does not make Chinese a global language[36]. It is clear that the expanding liberal economy is also attached to the expansion of liberal democracy, which implies that the qualitative implications of these transformations must be studied in order to understand the phenomenon better.

As opposed to these two approaches, the transformationalist understanding does not see any fixed future in the globalization debate. There is neither a perfect global economy nor state-system dominated global changes. Moreover, contrary to the hyperglobalists and rejectionists, the transformationalists do not see globalization as a singular process (economic or cultural) nor as a linear movement to a known destiny. The dynamics of globalization may include progress as well as retreat and reversals, and they can happen in very different ways in all major areas of life including political, military, environmental, public policy, etc. Most importantly, integration and fragmentation, convergence and divergence, can all occur simultaneously in a highly interconnected manner, so that states, in particular, will have to find their way in adapting not only to globalization but to "fragmegration"[37].

In addition to the previous arguments, the diversity of state types and of capacity levels in current world affairs requires a flexible approach and one that emphasizes the

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[36] David Held and Anthony G. McGrew, "Globalization and the Liberal Democratic State," *Government and Opposition* 28 (1993): 11.
[37] The term "fragmegration" is used to suggest a worldview that an interaction of both 'fragmenting' and 'integrating' dynamics are leading to new spheres of authority and transforming already existing ones. The term and concept was first discussed in James N. Rosenau, "'Fragmegrative' Challenges to National Security," in *Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader*, ed. Terry Heyns (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1983).

differentiated processes that are also influenced by other realities of life, such as security. The transformationalist approach is particularly suited for a study that is concerned with states of the developing world since the states and national capacities in this realm seem to be the most in transformation and also the most entrapped between the new world and the traditional one. The vast spectrum of the degree of development in these states is also an indication of transformation and of being subject to fragmegration.

Has the transformationalist approach achieved all that it could in order to explain the transformation of the state within fragmegration/globalization? The answer, quite simply, is no. Perhaps because they have been occupied within the debate by establishing their strand of the argument, most scholars have concentrated on trying to establish the approach in their work rather than to operationalize it. We are therefore left still not knowing how the transformation actually occurs. We now know that there are different types of states--e.g. neoliberal, or developmental--we now know even that we can label different nation-states as security states, sovereign states, or democratic states, which are most of the time intertwined and overlapped[38]. What we do not know is how these different characteristics of state identity and capacity coexist or compete and, most important, how they transform from one to the other. This leads to the core inquiry of this research: the dynamics of the transformation of state identity and capacity at the domestic level.

Thusfar, transformationalist studies have focused on the sovereignty concept as evidence of a transformation, suggesting that a new "sovereignty regime" is replacing the traditional sovereignty concepts of an absolute, territorially exclusive form of public authority[39]. As Keohane writes, sovereignty is a kind of bargaining resource for politics, characterized by complex transnational networks rather than a concept defined completely by

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[38] Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
[39] David Held, "Democracy, the nation-state, and the global system," in *Political Theory Today*, ed. David Held (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

territory[40]. These excursions do not tell much about the dynamics of state transformation, since they are not designed to uncover the dynamics of the state power or transformation type at the domestic level. There is a need for a study to go beyond the domestic-foreign border and investigate how the transformation occurs even though the major causal factors behind the transformation may be occurring at the international level.

What then are these important transnational phenomena that are subjecting state-power to both integration and fragmentation and therefore imposing a need to transform its structure in order to better adapt? In the current age and for most developing world states, these phenomena are political globalization's reforming impact and the resilient forces of security dilemmas. These two elements are particularly crucial to analyze since their ultimate impact is about national power--whether they are forcing it to diffuse or to maximize, to decentralize or centralize. Once the national power configurations and the nature of a state have been changed, one can then truly talk about a transformation of state identity and capacity and of global transformation.

International Dimension of Democratization

This study looks at the effect on state structures that are simultaneously pressured by political globalization and security dilemmas. Since political globalization is defined here as political liberalization pressure, and can therefore itself be understood as signifying transnational forces for domestic change towards liberalization, the obvious second significant body of literature that warrants discussion is that on the international dimensions of democratization.

The global wave of democratization, which marked the end of the 1980s and the 1990s, sparked increased interest in investigating the international factors in regime change.

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[40] Robert O. Keohane, "'Hobbes' dilemma and institutional change in world politics: sovereignty in international society," in *Whose World Order?*, eds. H.H. Holm and G. Sorensen (Boulder: Westview Press 1995).

In general, such "linkage" literature has continued to grow[41] in the quarter century since Gourevitch made his criticism that "students of comparative politics treat domestic structure too much as an independent variable, underplaying the extent to which it and the international system are parts of an interactive system."[42] The linkages between the international and domestic systems have been labeled as being among the "most interesting and important theoretical questions"[43]. The globalizing nature of world politics suggests that this trend will only increase. On the issue of democratization, the necessity of taking into consideration the international dimensions of the phenomenon is perhaps best summed up in the words of one of the fathers of democratization studies:

> Since 1974, an entirely new structure has been created at the international level for the promotion and protection of democracy. This infrastructure did not exist at the time of the first democratizations in Southern Europe...Now any country, anywhere in the world, even as it begins experimenting with democracy, is invaded by elements of the international environments—by movements, associations, party and private foundations, firms, and even individual personalities. The network of non-governmental organizations has certainly contributed to the contemporary wave having, so far, produced few regressions to autocracy, at least in comparison with previous waves...Traditional protestations of "noninterference in domestic affairs" have

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[41] Among those who have looked at and emphasized the need for a study with a perspective that combines the international and the domestic are: Charles Tilly, *European Revolutions, 1492-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); James N. Rosenau, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International System* (New York: Free Press, 1969), and *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction," in *Bringing Transnational Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, ed. Thomas Risse-Kappen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Matthew Evangelista, "Domestic Structure and International Change," *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, eds. Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (Boulder: Westview, 1997), 202-228; Michael Zum, "Bringing the Second Image (Back) In. About Domestic Sources of Regime Formation," in *Regime Theory and International Relations*, eds. Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 282-430; Andrew Moravscik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Explanations of International Bargaining," in *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, eds. Peter Evans, Harold Jacopson, and Robert Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 3-42; Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, " *International Organization* 42 (1988): 427-460; Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Miller, *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
[42] Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Source of Domestic Politics," *International Organization* 32, no. 4 (1978): 900.
[43] Karen L. Remmer, "Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development: The Resurgence of Institutional Analysis," *World Politics* 50 (1997): 55.

become less compelling, and the line between the realms of national and international politics has become more blurred[44].

Admittedly, evaluating the effect of international factors on actors, aspects, and dimensions of regime change, including democratization, is not an easy task, and the growing literature on the issue still contains gaps. One of these is the underdevelopment of a "causal mechanism" of the external/internal linkages, as well as the failure to operationalize the resulting domestic transformations. In the first part of this section I look at the literature from international relations concerning "regime analysis", international norms and compliance with them, transnational relations, decision-making theory, and certain relevant debates from social psychology and conventional regime change analyses. The goal in doing this is to assess the use and relevance of this literature with respect to the study's research question as well as to provide an understanding of certain theoretical and methodological choices made in this study.

Schmitter reminds us that international factors are notoriously difficult to specify, because the international environment is, by definition, omnipresent. Moreover, international factors and context vary according to geopolitical and geostrategic positions, regional context, size, and alliance structure of a country[45]. As a way of addressing this complexity, Pridham suggests differentiating the international context into 1) background and situational variables, 2) different external factors, and 3) forms of external influence[46].

Background or contextual factors would include the nature of international alliances and the patterns of global power distribution. For example, a bipolar world divided along ideological lines had a certain impact on domestic transformations and structure in many

[44] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Transitology: The Science or the Art of Democratization?" in *The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America*, eds. Joseph S. Tulchin and Bernice Romero (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 35.

[45] Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies," in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, ed. Laurance Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

countries. Again, the salience of a spreading capitalist system as well as increasing loyalty to certain international norms and regimes, e.g. human rights practices or humanitarian intervention in certain contexts, have had an impact over domestic policies. Geographical positions also play a significant role, with countries in regions bordering Europe, such as Turkey or North African countries, facing strong western influence, while sub-Saharan African countries on the other hand, basically fall off the map and might get forgotten.

The second category, external actors, includes such global and regional organizations as the UN, EU, OAS, NATO, IMF and OSCE, as well as international non-governmental organizations. Membership or even candidacy to these organizations may mean obedience to their particular cultures and/or conditions, and may therefore have a transformative impact at the domestic level. Turkey's membership in NATO and candidacy to the EU for example, have had clear influences on the country's domestic political structure. A country's special or close relationship with another state might also include a certain type of influence on the former's domestic political affairs. Again in the Turkish case, Turkey's close relationship with the United States meant that it could not avoid American influence on its own domestic political structure.

The third category, forms of external influence in the sense of contagion, control, conditionality, and consent, will be discussed in more detail below.

Of these variables, the ones most directly relevant to this discussion are those in the second and third categories, as well as a discussion on international norms, as it provides support for an understanding that political globalization as a phenomenon has a real and significant impact at the domestic level.

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[46] Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Dimensions of Democratizations: Theory and Practice and Inter-regional Conclusions," in *Building Democracy? The International Dimension in Eastern Europe*, eds. Geoffrey

For Pridham, "background" refers to the situations of the international economy,

international system, and the external policy patterns of a given country, and "background

variable" refers to the ensemble of positions of international hegemony, international rules,

international political economy, international norms, international organizations, geopolitical

variables, etc.[47] Since a discussion of such a wide range of concepts is not feasible here, I am

focusing instead on the concept I believe most relevant to this study.

Linz and Stepan summarized what I believe to be the crucial notion in these

background variables in their concept of *zeitgeist*, or the "spirit of the times"[48]. The term has

been used to describe rather loosely the "general qualities of any period"[49], and in Linz and

Stepan's work, is used to indicate the significance of the ideological part of an international

hegemony of democracy:

> We do maintain that when a country is part of an international ideological
> community where democracy is only one of many strongly contested
> ideologies, the chances of transiting to and consolidating democracy are
> substantially less than if the spirit of the times is one where democratic
> ideologies have no powerful contenders[50].

This idea of a particular idea, value, ideology, system, etc. as holding a hegemonic position

has been addressed under various headings in the IR literature, such as "international

regimes", "international rules", or "international norms". Perhaps of greatest interest and

relevance to this study, is the literature on international norms, which were defined by

Katzenstein as, "collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given

identity"[51]. The debate in the IR literature over international norms tends to revolve around

the role(s) they play in the international arena, and how effective they are in it.

Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994).

[47] Ibid.

[48] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 74-76.

[49] Gordon Marshall, *A Dictionary of Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 712.

[50] Linz and Stepan, 74.

[51] Katzenstein, 5.

"International norms"—having been largely dismissed as "epiphenomenon" by the realist school of international politics—swept back into popular interest in the late 1980s, and soon became a central theme of discussion in particular among the works of the constructivists. Relatively recent works have looked, for example, at the different kinds of international norms[52], at the evolution of international norms[53], and at the relation between international norms and domination.[54]

What is significant for this study among these debates is the domestic impact of these norms. Undoubtedly, democracy, political liberalization, and related concepts/ideals constitute a powerful international norm which governments and NGOs consider in developing their domestic and international policies.[55] This understanding of international norms is key to the defining of political globalization in this study as a popular convergence around the Western liberal democracy model, and to an understanding of that democracy model as representing the only remaining route for modernizing states to choose. In a sense, it is this notion of the hegemony or unavoidability of democratic norms that sets this study's hypothesizing in motion, and forces it to progress. Political globalization pressures are seen as taking on a life of their own[56]—an attribute again stemming from the idea of democratization as an international norm—and this in turn forces the centralized forces within a state structure to respond by seeking to expand their own power whenever possible.

Having located the salience and determining capacity of political globalization at the systemic level, now we must consider how the impact of political globalization extends across the frontier into domestic politics.

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

[54] Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, "Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 1 (1998): 3-21.

[55] The related concept of human rights has, for example, been described as a "new, international 'standard of civilization'". Jack Donnelly, "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis," *International Organization* 40, no. 3 (1986): 1.

Forms of External Influence

Whitehead has proposed three main titles describing the forms that external influence on regime change can take: contagion, control, and consent[57], to which Schmitter has added a fourth, conditionality. The "contagious" nature of external influence occurs through the physical proximity of states (e.g. in terms of democratization, Whitehead gives the examples of Peru-Ecuador-Argentina-Bolivia-Uruguay-Brazil, or Poland-Czechoslovakia-East Germany-Hungary-Rumania-Bulgaria), and may be either in the direction of democratic or authoritarian regimes. He also adds that contagion is not sufficient for understanding why "democracy" spreads, and thus he introduces the concepts of control and consent.

Control refers to the "promotion of democracy" via means ranging from military occupation to aid and sanctions. Conditionality might arguably be considered a part of control. Scholars who have engaged with the concept of conditionality have divided it into positive and negative conditionality[58]. The former concentrates on reinforcing conditions of democracy and human rights through aid projects, the latter refers to the use of sanctions in response to human rights violations or other various undemocratic practices of governments. Various other terms as well have been developed to explain this overall phenomenon, including the good government approach[59], promoting democracy[60], and democracy

[56] Jack Donnelly, "The security dimension of humanitarian intervention: Bosnia and Kosova", talk given at Bilkent University, July 18, 2002.

[57] Laurance Whitehead, "Three International Dimensions of Democratization," in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, ed. Laurance Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[58] See for instance Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy," *Democratization* 4, no. 3 (1997): 109-132.

[59] Robert Archer, "Markets and Good Government," in *Governance, Democracy and Conditionality: What Role for NGOs*, ed. Andrew Clayton (Oxford: INTRAC, 1994), 7-34, and Peter Burnell, "Good Government and Democratization: A Sideways Look at Aid and Political Conditionality," *Democratization* 1, no. 3 (1994): 485-503.

[60] Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, Instruments, and Issues," in *Democracy's Victory and Crises; Noel Symposium No. 93*, ed. Axel Hadenius (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

assistance[61]. In addition to states, certain international organizations such as the UN, IMF, EU, OAS, British Commonwealth, and OAU, have also used conditionality in an attempt to improve democracy and human rights in authoritarian and newly democratizing countries. As Schmitter points out, the IMF has traditionally made use of conditionality, tying in policy responses to political objectives[62].

Powell (1996) has looked at the use of conditionality and the role of the EC/EU in trying to promote the transition from authoritarian rule to consolidated democracies in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, and the Eastern and Central European countries[63]. Adherence to democratic norms has always been a specified condition for membership in the EU. From the *Birkelbach Report* (1962) of the European Parliament, which restricted entry to the EU to states which could "guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect for

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[61] Thomas Carothers, "Recent US Experience with Democracy Promotion," *IDS Bulletin* 26, no. 2 (1995): 62-69. The United States' policy on democratization, including the use of sanctions, the promotion of democracy and human rights, is itself a huge area of study. While the US efforts to contribute to democratization in many countries are undeniable, the extent and effectiveness and rationale behind some of the sanctions used and the relationship between aid and *realpolitik*, are quite controversial. See for example, Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglington, *Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid?* (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992); Thomas Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: US Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), and "The Resurgence of United States Political Development Assistance to Latin America in the 1980s," in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas,* ed. Laurance Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Laurance Whitehead, "The Imposition of Democracy: The Caribbean," in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Andrew Hurrell, "The International Dimensions of Democratization in Latin America: The Case of Brazil," in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas,* ed. Laurance Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Alan Angell, "International Support for the Chilean Opposition, 1973-1989: Political Parties and the Role of Exiles," in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas,* ed. Laurance Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Tony Evans, *US Hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996); Steven Poe et al., "Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Revisited: The Latin American Region," *Human Rights Quarterly* 16 (1994): 539-558; William B. Quandt, "American Policy toward Democratic Political Movements in the Middle East," in *Rules and Rights in the Middle East: Democracy, Law, and Society,* eds. Ellis Goldberd, Reşat Kasaba, and Joel Migdal (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993); William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Diamond, 311-370. For some discussion of the European efforts to promote democracy abroad via aid and sanctions see, for the German case, Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, "International Political Finance: The Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Latin America," in *The InternationalDimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas,* ed. Laurance Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 227-255. For the Netherlands see, Peter R. Baehr, "Problems of Aid Conditionality: The Netherlands and Indonesia," *Third World Quarterly* 18, no. 2 (1997): 363-376.

[62] Schmitter, "Influence."

[63] Charles Powell, "International Dimensions of Democratization: The Case of Spain," in *International Dimensions of Democratization,* ed. Laurance Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

fundamental rights and freedoms," to the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, which impose a requirement for "the stability of the political institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for the protection of minorities", to the Amsterdam Treaty which allows for the suspension of an EU member state which violates basic democratic values and human rights[64]. While the earlier documents were generally absent of a clear definition of what was meant by "democracy", a more detailed and concrete understanding is now evident in the contents of the EU's annual reports on the progress of the various candidate countries' performances—which will be discussed further in chapter 5. In terms of the EU, conditionality, and democratization, three cases are often mentioned in the literature. First, the forced withdrawal of Greece from the Council of Europe in 1969 due to the Colonels' regime, the disrupting of Turkey's associate membership during the brief military interlude of the early 1980s, and Spain's settling for a preferential trade agreement in 1970 because of its authoritarian regime.

Whitehead's final concept, "consent", refers to the harmonious interactions between the international environment, system, and actors on the one hand, and domestic elements on the other, that engender democratic norms. Huntington describes consent as occurring through a "wave of democratization," a period in which the numbers of transitions towards democratic regimes outnumber those towards authoritarian ones[65]. He points to the increasing relevance of a "demonstration effect," described by Whitehead as a "universal wish to imitate a way of life associated with the liberal capitalist democracies of the core regions…[which] may undermine the social and institutional foundations of any regime perceived as incompatible with these aspirations"[66]. The full picture of the consent concept in all its complexity may be of increasing importance if one agrees with arguments such as Robinson's, who writes that

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[64] Alan Mayhew, *Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 319.
[65] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

the hegemonic power(s) of the world today have changed their foreign policies from "straight power concepts" to "persuasion", that is, from supporting authoritarian regimes openly to promoting democracy as a way of maintaining their hegemonic power.[67]

Effectiveness of conditionality

The question remains as to how these international factors of contagion, control, conditionality, and consent, actually influence a political regime, and how effective they are overall, in respect to democratization. What are the mechanics behind any such international impact on a country's democratization process?

There is little consensus in the literature as to how or even whether conditionality methods of aid or sanctions actually work to change the behavior of states or elites within target states. Morgan and Schewebach[68] are among the skeptics who maintain that sanctions do not work in the sense of bringing about a desired change in policy, while others, e.g. Huntington, concluded that US support to democratization in various Latin American and Asian countries in particular was "critical"[69]. Crawford has also argued that conditionality has been an effective instrument[70].

Darren Hawkins suggests three main reasons behind the difficulty in evaluating the effectiveness of an outside foreign policy role in a country's democratization, first, that it is difficult to differentiate between relevant change and mere "window dressing", second the "veil of secrecy" of the authoritarian regime's decision-making process, and third, the over-

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[66] Whitehead, "International Dimensions", 21.

[67] Robinson accuses some American scholars such as Huntington and L. Diamond of being "'experts in legitimization' who do the political and theoretical thinking of the dominant groups, thereby constructing the ideological conditions for hegemony...they theorize on the conditions of a social order as whole, suggest policies and their justifications, and even participate in their application." Robinson, 42. He goes on to say that while these scholars speak of "promoting democracy", they are in fact suppressing popular democracy in theory and in practice. Ibid., 62.

[68] Clifton T. Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (1997): 28, 47.

[69] Huntington, 98.

emphasis often given by Western governments to minor changes made in cases when those same Western governments are receiving political, economic, or strategic benefits from the authoritarian regimes[71]. Moreover, he notes the necessity of differentiating between the short and long-term characteristics of democratization. In his case study of Chile he concluded that:

> In the short term, these changes resulted in marginal yet salutary improvements in the human rights situation in Chile; specifically, a decline in murder and disappearances. Their long term implications were more complex. On the one hand, the changes actually shored up the regime's promise of more democratic institutions and behavior became an important tool for the opposition in the 1980s and eventually helped end Pinochet's rule[72].

Sikkink's study of the effectiveness of U.S. human rights and democratization policies in Argentina, Guatemala, and Uruguay in the 1970s and early 1980s also pointed to the need to look at both long and short term effects:

> Most discussions of the effectiveness of US human rights policy look only at the shorter-term impact of the policy on repressive practices. Although the short-term impact of a human rights policy is important, it is equally essential to evaluate the longer-term impact of human rights policies, especially the impact on democratization[73].

While these scholars rightly point out that studies must look at the longer-term impact in order to be sure that any observed "effect" or change is real, the point still does not address the question of where we need to focus our studies. To answer that question we must ask yet a further question, namely, how do we choose to define or measure 'change'? Can it be considered as the introduction of multi-party politics? Additions or subtractions to a constitution? The emergence of NGOs? Taken from an IR perspective, and in line with this study's research questions, I would consider significant change as only having occurred when there is significant power

[70] Gordon Crawford, "Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency," *Democratization* 4, no. 3 (1997): 69-108.

[71] Darren G. Hawkins, "Domestic Response to International Pressure: Human Rights in Authoritarian Chile," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 4 (1997): 404.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Kathryn Sikkink, "The Effectiveness of US Human rights Policy, 1973-1980," in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, ed. Laurance Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 93.

reconfiguration at the domestic level. To measure such change one needs to determine whether the existing centralized power has gone through a substantive decentralization process—is there clear evidence, for example, that the security establishment has come under the control of civilian politics? Without such a power reconfiguration, we cannot say that significant change has occurred. Consequently, the focus of investigation must be on the very centers of power themselves.

Continuing the debate on the effectiveness of conditionality, other works have attempted to discern exactly under which conditions conditionality is likely to be effective[74]. These findings evolve around the issues of the set conditions being unambiguous and well-defined, the degree of economic, political, and strategic significance of the target country for the donor/pressuring country (it is argued that the greater the significance, the less effective the conditionality will be), the degree of political will of the outsider country,[75] the overall relations between the two countries (stronger ties leads to more effective conditionality), ability of the target government to exploit the external pressures,[76] the extent of the aid dependency, and whether the conditionality is unilateral or multilateral. Crawford argues that multilateral actions have more of an effect at getting better human rights policies implemented.

Here again, assuming a perspective more in line with IR scholarship, the absence of security concerns from this list of factors is a striking one, and may lead one to a criticism of this literature at a more basic level. In essence, the literature on international/transnational level influences on domestic level change envisions a mechanism of transnational democratic

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[74] Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz, "How Sanctions Work: A Framework for Analysis," in *How Sanctions Work, Lessons from South Africa*, eds. Neta C. Crawford and Audie Klotz (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Olav Stokke, "Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of Art," in *Aid and Political Conditionality*, ed. Olav Stokke (London: Frank Cass/EADI, 1995), and Crawford, 69-108.

[75] Crawford compares the examples of the US-El Salvador, the European Parliament and Turkey, Sweden-Vietnam, and the UK-Nigeria, in terms of this argument. Crawford, 88.

[76] In some cases, dubbed "counterproductive" cases of conditionality, regimes can benefit from the outside pressure when, for example, they use it to provoke nationalist sentiments, or to argue a position of being isolated

forces crossing the external/internal frontier to affect the domestic level of liberalization. What this conceptualization fails to note, however, is that this mechanism—which I will purposefully call "mechanism II"—is not the only such mechanism existing. Prior to the existence of a discussion on such an external influence on domestic change, there was already an understanding of the existence of security demands (combined international and internal ones) affecting domestic change, or the potential thereof. We can call this previous conceptualization of external/internal security factors affecting domestic change as "mechanism I". While a new mechanism may have arisen, the old one is certainly far from gone. Particularly in the countries that this study is focussed on, the security issues of "mechanism I" remain very influential, and may in fact be still the primary factor in determining domestic change. It is both theoretically and methodologically unsound, therefore, to look at either of the mechanisms without considering the other. Before looking at the impact of the external liberalizing factors in mechanism II, it is important to first recognize the existence of both mechanisms and the possibility of a competitiveness, perhaps downright confrontation, between the two. Moreover, rather than trying to separate the outcomes of these simultaneous pressures, the projected resulting domestic transformation can be better studied as an extension of the relationship, or possible confrontation, between them.

Returning to the question of transnational forces and how they are studied, the remaining question of why states comply with human rights and democracy conditions mostly set down by Western states, is largely explained with an analysis to cost and benefits. This has been described by Crawford and Klotz as a "compellance" model[77], and has been used by Hawkins to analyze hypothetical cases[78]. Hawkins' analyses evolved around the effects of various factors on the likelihood for change, for example, domestic costs, the lack or existence

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and therefore raising resentment against foreign interference. Such arguments might actually serve to strengthen the government in charge.

[77] Crawford and Klotz, 26-27.
[78] Hawkins, 403-434.

of local pressure, and the degree to which the authoritarian regime's legitimacy is at stake

(e.g. increasing the country's international reputation). Also affecting the likelihood of change

are the attitudes of the decision-making elite themselves. The elite's assessments of what

counts as a cost or a benefit is of course influenced by their perceptions of events[79] and their

cognitive maps and psychologies.[80] Such an understanding relies on a concept of rationality,

that is, the actors have an understanding and rationale underlying the decisions they make.

Non-rational variables may also be significant, though it is not yet clear to what extent[81].

In terms of a cost and benefit analysis as applied to the Turkish transition to

democracy in 1945-1950, Yılmaz argues that the reforms of the late 1940s were carried out in

response to international factors. The authoritarian regime at the time regarded the cost of

democratization as relatively low vis-à-vis the high benefits of integration with the US-led

Western camp. Secondly, a soft-line faction within the Kemalist ruling elite emerged, leading

Yılmaz to the conclusion that:

> Although the expected internal costs of suppression were well below the
> expected internal costs of toleration, the Kemalist ruling bloc did indulge in
> liberalization and democratization under the influence of the expected external
> benefits of democratization. What motivated the Kemalist ruling bloc to
> inaugurate, maintain, and complete the democratic transition was their foreign
> policy strategy of integrating Turkey with the international system of the
> democratic victors of the war[82].

Such a cost and benefit analysis may be explanatory in this case only to a degree. Two initial

cautionary words need to be considered: first, the ruling elite referred to by Yılmaz was not a

completely unitary body that could be expected to have reached such a fully rational choice of

a cost/benefit analysis. Moreover, the very rapid adoption of democratic ways occurred at

several levels of the nation, not only among the elite, and without major opposing debates,

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[79] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), and Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
[80] Yaacov Vertzberger, *The World in their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision Making* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
[81] Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment," *European Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 1 (2000): 109-139.

suggesting again some sort of preparedness for this move, rather than merely a cost and benefit analysis. I would suggest that a deeper analysis is necessary rather than looking at the leading elite alone. Ultimately, some sort of cost and benefit analysis probably did occur, but it is important to go beyond that and look at how the domestic power apparatus restructured itself in order to manage the "acceptable costs" of liberalization. Only an analysis of such a restructuring can show the real parameters of domestic transformations initiated by international influence. In chapter 3, I show how such a restructuring did take place among the elite and between the state elite and the society. I also show how the management of the "acceptable costs" ultimately became one of the primary determinants of the Turkish domestic state structure.

In addition to a cost and benefit analysis, the complex relations between the states and the non-governmental actors must also be taken into account to gain a more complete understanding of the international factors of democratization. Much of the literature on compellence includes a constructivist approach, taking the decisionmakers' calculations into consideration within the context of a broader structural, ideological and cultural environment. As a part of this, these studies often emphasize issues of elite socialization, international norms, and the internalization of international norms by the ruling elite and the masses in the policy-making process[83].

The influence of INGOs also finds its place in the analysis. For Keck and Sikkink the role of the international and domestic NGOs is central to so-called "advocacy networks,"

[82] Hakan Yılmaz, "Democratization from Above in Response to the International Context: Turkey, 1945-1950," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 17 (1997): 32.
[83] Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda," *International Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (2000): 65-87; Thomas Risse, "Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics," *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (2000): 1-39, and "International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area," *Politics and Society* 27, no. 4 (1999): 529-559; Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 83-114, and "International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 4 (1997): 473-495; Finnemore and Sikkink, 887-917, and Schimmelfennig, 109-139.

which they draw on to explain democratization, among other internal and external affairs[84].

Finnemore and Sikkink have dealt with human rights NGOs, and explained their central position as stemming from their role of providing alternative information within the democratizing country about domestic human rights abuses, and thereby leading to the internationalization of these abuses[85].

The possible influence of transnational networks is seen to vary according to state-society relations.[86] According to the literature exploring transnational access to domestic structures, the more open and the less centralized a domestic political regime, the easier access to domestic policy-making—though gaining access does not automatically mean policy impact. Using the case of the Soviet Union, Evangelista confirmed that in fact, although gaining access to domestic decision-making is more difficult in centralized, closed states, if access is granted more impact would be observed[87]. This concept is illustrated in the following chart from Risse-Kappen[88]. In this chart, the type of domestic structure goes from that of greatest amount of state control over society (state-controlled), progressively down to a state structure that is societally dominated. The final category of fragile refers to a situation of no clear control by either side.

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[84] Keck and Sikkink, *Activists*.
[85] An example from their book cites a Dutch diplomat and director of the UN Center for Human Rights as thanking the NGOs for the UN's ability to carry out its work, saying that "85% of our information came from NGOs." Finnemore and Sikkink, 96.
[86] The state vis-à-vis society constitutes an important part of the political sociology and comparative politics. Joel Migdal defines state power as its capability to penetrate the periphery, control the social relations, and use resources. *Strong Societies and Weak States*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988): 4-5. See also Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in *The State: Critical Concepts*, ed. John A. Hall (London: Routledge, 1994); Metin Heper, "The Strong State and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective," in *Democracy and Modernity*, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992); Robert W. Jackman, *Power Without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation-States* (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), and Martin J. Smith, *Pressure, Power and Policy: State Autonomy and Policy Networks in Britain and the United States* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
[87] Evangelista, "Domestic Structure."
[88] Risse-Kappen, 28.

Diagram 4: State-Society Relations and International Impact

Domestic Structure	Access to domestic institutions	Policy impact in case of access
State-controlled	Most difficult	Profound if coalition with state actors predisposed to transnational actors' goals
State-dominated	Difficult	Same
Stalemate	Less difficult	Impact unlikely
Corporatist	Less easy	Incremental but long-lasting if coalition with powerful societal and/or political organizations
Society-dominated	Easy	Difficult coalition-building with powerful societal organizations
Fragile	Easiest	Impact unlikely

While this domestic structure hypothesis is useful in evaluating the impact of network, it does not, for example, tell us why some transnational networks operating in the same context succeed while others do not. Keck and Sikkink attribute such variations in success to the nature of the issues and the networks[89]. Risse agrees with this assessment that "the more the new ideas promoted by transnational conditions resonate or are compatible with pre-existing collective ideas and beliefs of actors, the more policy influence they might have"[90]. This "resonance hypothesis" is supported by the works of Cortell and Davis, Jeffrey Checkel, and Jeffrey Legro[91].

The above discussion and Risse-Kappen's chart are helpful in providing a framework based on state/society relations in order to better assess the impact of transnational/international influences. However, a thorough analysis and ultimate operationalization requires that we look as well at how the state-society relationships themselves reshape vis-à-vis these influences. Not only the state and the society but different

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[89] Keck and Sikkink, 202.
[90] Risse, "World Politics", 31-32..
[91] Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "How do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms," *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (1996): 451-478; Cortell and Davis, "Understanding", 65-87; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism," *International Organization* 51, no. 1 (1997): 31-63, and Checkel, "National Identity", 83-114.

parts within the state itself, such as the political parties and the bureaucracy, are likely to transform differently not only in terms of their interaction with the international/transnational links, but also towards each other, since they are often positioned in a confrontational manner.

Thus this dual formation may be reflected in a growing distinction between different parts including a state bureaucracy and elected government figures. So, for example, a certain distribution of power between state and society or within the state, such as having large bodies of unaccountable power (e.g. large security bureaucracies), constitute a 'structure' themselves only through which can the international context influence domestic change. Along with the power shifts and struggles within such 'structures,' these parties may appeal for support from the international environment.

For Risse-Kappen, the domestic structure of a state is seen as an intervening variable of sorts, between the independent variable of transnational factors and the dependent one of likely domestic impact. As such, he provides a useful starting taxonomy. I would again argue, however, that when looking for the effect of international/transnational factors, the "intervening variable" of the domestic structure needs to be examined in depth and indeed operationalized as a dependent variable.

Transnational Actors, INGOs, Advocate Networks, Epistemic Communities

Political globalization as a process affecting domestic settings has gone beyond the realm of ideas. Not only has it proved to be more than just a temporary phenomenon, but it has clearly bred its own international/transnational actors, with their embedded missions and reputations. In other words, a significant institutionalization of political globalization actors, mechanisms, and missions has been deepening in the global system. Their increasing visibility has meant that domestic power structures are increasingly under the influence of these elements, particularly in the modernizing world.

The activities of transnational actors[92] have been broadly defined as extending from "informal networks exchanging material and ideational resources (epistemic communities, for example) to large bureaucratic organizations such as MNCs or globally operating INGOs such as the Catholic church or the International Committee of the Red Cross"[93]. In various different studies, they have been considered as transnational social movements[94], issue networks[95], and epistemic communities[96]. When Whitehead wrote his chapter in the often-cited *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, he underlined the significance of the international activities of democratic Western political parties, in particular the member parties of the Socialist International, but did not pay as much attention to the role of the other international NGOs[97]. This oversight may have reflected the reality of the time, but since then, the number of NGOs has swelled considerably. Studies which have looked at various particular INGOs and their roles in regime transformations include Brysk and Keck and Sikkink, which considered the role of Amnesty International in the Argentina case, or Chilton, which looked at Charter 77 in Eastern Europe during the Cold War[98]. Other works of this type include Bouandel on Amnesty International, Gaer and Thakur on the significance of INGOs for the UN, and Smith et al. who take a broader look at the work of transnational human rights NGOs in the 1990s[99].

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[92] The overall area of Transnational Relations was defined by Keohane and Nye as "regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent..." Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction," in *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, eds. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), xxii-xvi.

[93] Risse, "World Politics", 3.

[94] Jackie Smith, C. Chatfield, and R. Pagnucco, eds., *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

[95] Keck and Sikkink, *Activists*.

[96] Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," in *Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination,* ed. Peter M. Haas (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997).

[97] Laurance Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives,* eds. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurance Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[98] Alison Brysk, "From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in Argentina," *Comparative Political Studies* 26, no. 3 (1993): 259-285; Patricia Chilton, "Mechanics of Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, and the Transformation Process in Eastern Europe," in *Bringing Transnational Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions*, ed. Thomas Risse-Kappen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), and Keck and Sikkink, 103-110.

[99] Youcef Bouandel, *Human Rights and Comparative Politics* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997); Felice D. Gaer, "Reality Check: Human Rights NGOs Confront Governments at the UN," in *NGOs, the UN and Global*

Further works have explored the close relation between transnational actors and international norms. On the one hand, some scholars (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) have stated that INGOs and networks have a substantial impact upon the creation of international norms and the further development of norms, on the other hand, existent norms have been shown to facilitate INGO activities.

The above discussion has shown that, as far as international factors are concerned, two basic foundations of influence on democratization exist. One is generally related to coercion and bargaining power, including political conditionality. This kind of relation is analyzed mostly by the Realist school of IR. The other, the Idealist school, emphasizes the persuasive power of principled ideas. Governments accept binding international human rights norms and democracy because they are swayed by the "seemingly inescapable ideological appeal of human rights in the postwar world"[100]. In this account, the most fundamental motivating force behind international politics of democratization and human rights is transnational socialization. In this view, transformations in actor identities take place through the impact of INGOs and transnational advocacy networks, epistemic communities, and the hegemonic position of human rights and democracy, leading to the eventual socialization of the elite and masses.[101]

Such consolidated political globalization actors, institutions, and missions show us that it is not only difficult to dismiss political globalization as merely a popular ideational construct, but it is also difficult to deny its existence at the systemic level and its regulating impact over domestic structures, actors and perspectives. We should also not neglect however,

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Governance, eds. Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996); Ramesh Thakur, "Human Rights: Amnesty International and the United Nations," Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 2 (1994): 143-160, and Jackie Smith and Ron Pagnucco, with George A. Lopez, "Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s," Human Rights Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1998): 379-412.
[100] Donnelly, "International Human Rights...", 638.
[101] Such an argument is used by Audie Klotz, who claims that the emergence of a global norm of racial equality is at the heart of the explanation for the ending of apartheid in South Africa—leading states to redefine interests even when they did not gain material benefits from doing so. Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

that this new (in terms of impact) transnational transforming process must be studied together with traditional transforming processes affecting domestic power structures.

Political globalization's penetration into national power configurations

In light of the above discussion, it is possible to identify and summarize various pathways via which globalization, in particular its political form, is able to penetrate into the national power configurations and to force the state power to transform and adapt. The first of these is the rapid growth across nations of civil societies that are increasingly becoming the parts of a highly linked global civil society, in other words, those organizations, associations, and movements that exist among "individuals and collective citizen initiatives...both within states and transnationally." [102] This growing global connectedness increases the convergence around liberal democracy as a democratization goal, and is helping to redefine the boundaries of democratic political space. The second pathway is the demonstration impact, in which significant liberalization in one place sparks similar movements in others, and which partly explains democratic waves and reversals. A third pathway concerns the revolutionary developments in the communication industries (e.g. media penetration), the "mobility upheaval" of goods and peoples (e.g. guest workers) across the world[103], and the impact of these phenomena on the diffusion of ideas. Social transformations such as democratization and liberalization rely heavily on the rapid circulation of ideas.

Fourth, economic globalization, namely the expansion of the free market leading to new economically powerful elites, pushes for open societies in the developing world. Direct foreign investment figures can actually be looked at as a measure of this link. Furthermore, the conditions set by some international donors for more open societies,

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[102] Richard Falk, "Global Civil Society: Perspectives, Initiatives, and Movements," *Oxford Developmental Studies* 26, no. 1 (1998): 99-111.

democratic reforms, and improved human rights records, is another form of this type of linkage between economic globalization and political liberalization.

A fifth pathway concerns the actual pressures coming from the developed world and the leading world powers in their formal policies for further democratization in the world. Reflecting in part the democratic peace argument in practice, the Clinton administration, for example, adopted a policy of aiding democracy abroad as part of its foreign policy. Though this is not entirely new in U.S. foreign policy--Congress has created NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy to support democratization abroad--it is clear that currently a tremendous escalation is taking place in this sphere. Pressures from INGOs such as Amnesty International and the Soros Foundation have also become more influential, since human rights issues have become more binding criteria for international legitimacy.

Finally, as a generic outcome of all these transnational influences is an additional pressure that begins to grow from within. This internal pressure may stem from a combined effect of wanting to become like the developed countries (modernization drive) and resisting against isolation from the international society. Both of these could be considered true, for example, in the case of Turkey and her national project to become an EU member. Moreover, it has been clear that even the most radical examples of isolationist countries, such as Syria and Libya, have taken action to have themselves removed from the list of "state sponsors of terrorism". A certain need for legitimacy in order to remain a part of the international club seems to be felt ever stronger.

Locating the gap

The literature on globalization and the state has begun to explore the possible correlations between globalization and the state at a conceptual level, but, as discussed above,

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[103] These two developments are listed as some of the primary sources for 'distant proximities' that lead to globalized practices as well as fragmentative responses in James Rosenau's *Distant Proximities: Dynamics*

has failed to operationalize the proposed correlation. The literature on international dimensions of democratization on the other hand, has attempted some operationalization, but has ignored the state as a holistic entity, and focused primarily on certain soft issues. For example it looks at the effect of international sources on emerging democratizing elements in the focus countries, e.g. civil society awareness, NGOs, etc. When looking at this literature from an IR perspective, we can argue that it has inadequately dealt with what happens to the existing power centers in those focus countries, and in doing so has ignored what is arguably the largest determining factor in regime change—the existing power structure or national governance system. Since political globalization/liberalization necessitates power diffusion, for political globalization to take effect, power structures need to be reconfigured. The true impact of political globalization must therefore be observed by looking at the existing power centers rather than on emerging "signs" of a political liberalization impact.

It becomes obvious that both a new taxonomy based on the most relevant assumptions and, ideally, a theoretical modeling are necessary in order to best respond to the research question posed at the beginning of this study. Only by doing this can we project what can be expected when we focus on the 'black box' in which transnationally ignited domestic transformations take place.

The Case of Turkey

> The Turkish state has become a taboo and sacred subject...in 2000 I want a republic in which democracy administers free thoughts and beliefs, not the state. I want a democratic republic[104].

> [Selçuk's words are] very nice, but Turkey's special geopolitical conditions require a special type of democracy[105].

Beyond Globalization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
[104] Quotation belongs to Sami Selçuk, Chief Justice of Turkey, from a manifesto published in *Sabah* (Istanbul), 3 September 1999.
[105] Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's response to above remarks by Selçuk. *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 7 September, 1999.

The selection of Turkey as the focus of this case study was based on a variety of reasons, including the results of a previously conducted quantitative study designed to determine countries that have been under simultaneous pressure of both security concerns and political globalization (see Appendix A for details). In addition to those results pointing to Turkey, there was also observed evidence of the country's geographical location and historical affinity to Europe. This evidence could be seen as confirming that Turkey has been subject to relatively intense and long-term contagion effects of democratization. These liberalization pressures have been even further increased by those of conditionality, brought about by Turkey's membership in NATO and the expectations clearly set for Turkey in order to meet its goal of EU membership. Second, in support of the quantitative findings about Turkey's security demands, the country has clearly been faced with a high level of geopolitical vulnerability.[106]

Third, as discussed earlier, the focus of this research was on states likely to be classified as "strong states" with "weak, fragmented societies". In the Turkish case, before facing international pressures for liberalization, Turkey had already built up an authoritative bureaucratic class that controlled a strong state. The idea of the Turkish strong state has been argued by various Turkish scholars, including Heper, who compares the Turkish state with other state types:

> [T]he difference between Turkey and many new countries lies in the presence of a strong state in the former, and the state's weakness...in the latter...as a means of political integration, the Turkish state has filled the void created by increased praetorianism. For many Turks, this particular role has reinforced the legitimacy of the state...but Turkey has also differed radically from the continental European countries...: in the Ottoman-Turkish polity, the state did not develop alongside the politically-influential social groups, but evolved by making these social groups politically impotent. Even at the pinnacle of their powers, the French and Prussian absolutist kings had to grapple with

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[106] Ersel Aydinli, "Geopolitics vs. Geoeconomics: The Turkish Foreign Ministry in the Post-Cold War Era", *International Insights: The Dalhousie Journal of International Affairs*, special volume (1999): 12-24. Also, for detailed information see F.A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosporous: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), and for current implications of the former "territorial contraction" see Roderick H. Davison, "Ottoman Diplomacy and its Legacy" in *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, Carl Brown ed., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

the demands and pressures of their *parlements* and *Stande* respectively. The Ottoman Sultans, on the other hand, faced no aristocracy that could impinge upon the affairs of the centre.[107]

In other words, it was already a national security state that was then put under the influence of political globalization. In terms of Turkish society, it can be considered as very much fragmented[108]. While this fragmented nature means that the society can also be considered as "weak", it also contributes to the state's perception of an internal threat. Again, this is an issue that has been discussed in the literature. Perhaps best known among such works is that of Mardin, who drew on Edward Shil's "Center and Periphery" formulation to assert that center-periphery relations in Ottoman-Turkish society are key to understanding and explaining Turkish politics.[109] He describes a heterogeneous periphery, composed basically of small farmers, peasantry, artisan and religious groups (*tarikats* and *tekkes*) and regional or ethnic groups (Kurds for example), whose main common tenet is their hostility towards the center.

A further reason behind my choice of Turkey as a case study relates obviously to my own role as a researcher. What began as an assumption and was later confirmed in the conducting of this study, was the fact that in order to uncover the below-the-surface, subtle, and often purposefully concealed or masked arguments and perceptions that were so crucial to the study's analysis, I needed to have a very deep understanding of the society and more importantly of the state that I was investigating. It was for this reason that my position as not only a Turkish native, but as someone with more than ten years of conscious observation of Turkish politics and, most crucially, someone educated in the police college and academy and with more than five years of active service as an internal security officer with the Turkish government, proved so important. My former position in the government helped me at a technical level to gain access to relevant government and state officials for interviews, but

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[107] Heper, "Strong State."

[108] In Turkey, an obvious fragmentation occurs along ethnic (e.g. the Kurds), religious (e.g. the Alevis), and political (in the case of political Islamists) lines.

[109] Şerif Mardin, "Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics," *Daedelus* (1983): 180-194.

also, with some, contributed to a more comfortable atmosphere (based on common backgrounds) that led to more thoughtful and substantive data being produced. Moreover, my former position helped lend experience and insight to my subsequent interpretations and analyses of the data (from interviews and otherwise), thereby lessening my chances of being accidentally or purposefully misled. Unlike someone who is a complete outsider to the state structure, I believe I was less likely to be positioned by my participants (or to position myself) in a reactionary way (e.g. completely dismissive of hard realm actors' rationale and understandings), and also less likely to be, in a sense, fooled by them. In other words, in terms of the hard realm, my background helped guide me in separating what could be considered as rhetoric of manipulation, from simply misguided perceptions, and from genuine/legitimate concerns.

As a final note, it should be added that, while various Turkish scholars have looked at certain aspects of the question under investigation in this work, their methods, approaches, and findings all suggest the continuing need for a study such as this one. Turan, for example, discusses stability vs. democracy as being the main dilemma of Turkish politics.[110] Karpat identifies a two-tiered regime in Turkey's 1982 Constitution, arguing that the state felt that some form of tutelage was necessary at that time to respond to the instability fear.[111] In the Turkish literature in general, however, stability is used mainly to refer to political stability. In other words, the fragmented nature of politics and the inability of political parties to perform their functions well, leads to chronic governance crises and, thus, instability. The current work looks at the instability factor as a much larger and comprehensive phenomenon, including internal/external security challenges and regime security, and the effects that all of these have on the state. Interestingly, although the former works generally point to the military as a, if

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[110] İlter Turan, "Stability versus Democracy: The Dilemma of Turkish Politics," *Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi* 2, (1991): 31-53.
[111] Kemal Karpat, "Military Intervention in Turkey: Army-Civilian relations Before and After 1980," cited in Ibid.

not the, key actor, they then fail to consider the issue of stability from the perspective of what this primary agent thinks. Stability from the perspective of the military involves a much broader understanding of national security rather than just political stability. If one agrees, therefore, with the idea of the military as a primary, if not sole, representative of the state elite, the debate should evolve around national security versus political development, rather than around political stability versus democratization.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the discussion in the Turkish literature has evolved in this manner, since many of those scholars who have discussed these issues, such as Mardin, Heper, Özbudun, Karpat, and Turan, have looked at them from a comparative politics point of view rather than an international relations perspective that considers concepts such as anarchy, security dilemmas, national security conceptualizations, or external/internal linkages of security. The result of earlier discussions, though useful, has been to discuss only a part of the instability fear identified here. Perhaps more significantly, while the earlier works may recognize the two key concepts, or even point to a two tiered system, they have largely failed to conceptualize the relationship between the two in a way that would allow us to understand the causes, justifications, rhetoric, or degree of institutionalization of parties within them.

Methods

The goal of this longitudinal case study was to explore the expectations of the middle row of diagram 1, in other words, the pattern of power, power agenda, and resulting state type of states pressured from both security and political globalization demands. In chapter 2, therefore, I provide a historical perspective of the two pressures of political globalization and security dilemmas in the Turkish case. This chapter explores the roots of the two pressures beginning in the late Ottoman era and extending through the early Republican era, as well as looking at the effect of the two pressures on the ruling elite in order to set up the basis for

what would eventually emerge as a dual-track state structure. The chapter describes a

"pendulum" period, in which the idea of the incompatibility of the two drives becomes

accepted. While the management of the two pressures was still able to be largely dealt with by

shifting political emphasis from one to the other, the gradual wide acceptance of the

precedence of security concerns takes shape. To show the roots of political globalization

pressures, I look at documentary evidence of late Ottoman liberalization efforts, discuss the

creation and ideas behind liberal organizations, and provide evidence from the media and

intellectual commentary of the time. However, with closer examination of certain documents,

including the *Tanzimat Fermanı* and the 1876 Constitution, I show how security concerns in

fact forced a moderating of the liberalization efforts. The second part of the chapter focuses

on the two early attempts at multi-party politics in the Republican era, and in particular on

excerpts from actual political discussion/debate at the time (from parliamentary records, the

press, and memoirs of political figures) in order to further reveal how the primacy of security

became established.

Chapter 3 goes on to look at the point in the hypothesizing at which the political

globalization pressure becomes forced by external conditions, and thus the two pressures face

an unavoidable clash. The goal of the chapter is to show how the system dealt with this first

actual test of dealing with the pressures simultaneously. The chapter achieves this goal by

tracing historical documents and personal accounts showing the increasing external demands

for liberalization and democratization placed on Turkey in the late 1930s and, particularly, the

1940s, and the state's responses to these demands—resulting ultimately in the launching of

multi-party politics in 1946. Again, historical documents and personal accounts are examined

to show how the pressures directly confront each other when the opposition Democrat Party

wins the election of 1950, and how this confrontation gradually led to the dual state structure

of hard and soft realms, the 1960 coup, and ultimately to a compromising of the democratic process.

In order to see whether, as suggested in the introduction, the realms of hard and soft politics did actually become institutionalized in the Turkish case, chapter 4 undertakes an analysis of articles from and amendments to the constitutions of 1961, 1971, and 1982. The analysis reveals a cyclical motion, or perhaps "self-feeding" aspect, in a state's transformation process. Once the soft realm has been allowed to emerge, it takes on a life of its own, and begins an automatic process of expansion through, for example, the establishment of unions, NGOs, etc. In turn this forces a response from the hard realm—which hard realm actors might refer to as a "management" or "balancing" of the liberalization process. Knowing that the erosion of its position is in a sense inevitable, the chapter shows that the hard realm will, whenever possible, seek to expand its interests. Thus an analysis of constitutional changes is used to reveal traceable reflections on paper of the gradual expansion and consolidation of the hard realm.

Finally, chapter 5 attempts to outline the actual workings of the dual state structure— the forces of security vs. liberalization at work, the various actors of the hard and soft realms, their allies both domestically and externally, their rhetoric, and overall, how the conflict between the two realms plays out. In order to accomplish this, I chose to look at the process of Turkey's application for European Union membership and the issues, actors, and conflicts within this process. Turkey's EU membership process provides a particularly interesting issue through which to explore the conflict between the two realms, as it on the one hand represents the "peak" of the liberalization process and includes with it the most stringent liberalizing demands reflective of a deepened political globalization pressure. On the other hand, by many of these very same demands, it directly raises up and provokes many security dilemma concerns of the hard realm. In particular I chose to focus on the issue of minority rights during

the period following the Helsinki summit of 1999. The minority rights issue is one about

which, perhaps more than any other, the two realms most clearly clash, and therefore it

proved most useful for identifying the different actors of the realms, and for delineating their

respective arguments and positionings.

In looking at Turkey's overall EU accession process and the minority rights issue in

particular, I employed a variety of data collection techniques. These begin with document

analyses of the annual progress reports, strategy papers, etc. issued by the European

Commission, various reports of the European Parliament, the "Accession Partnership

Agreement" document drawn up in December 2000 to outline the exact stipulations of EU

demands on Turkey for EU membership, and Turkey's subsequent "National Program,"

which was intended to show exactly how Turkey planned to meet these demands. While these

documents themselves were used primarily to chart the concrete demands, proposed

responses, and changes within both over time, the analysis of the attitudes behind their

creation and the perceptions towards them was supplemented by in-depth, daily monitoring of

primarily the Turkish, but also in some cases the American and European, print media, over a

more than 5-year period, from 1995 throughout the writing of this dissertation in 2001-2002.

Primary to the overall analysis of this chapter, was a series of interviews made in

Turkey over the course of 2001-2002. These semi-structured interviews were carried out with

currently active Turkish political figures (e.g. members of the nationalist MHP party, centrist

DYP and ANAP parties), retired Turkish political figures (e.g. former Turkish President

Suleyman Demirel), Turkish and European figures directly associated with Turkey's

accession process, currently active and retired members of the Turkish armed forces, and

members of the Turkish intellectual and media community.

Chapter 2 A Genealogy of the Turkish Pendulum between Globalization and Security: From the late Ottoman era to the 1930s

The primary goal of this chapter is to understand the historical dynamics which led in Turkey to the emergence of a pendulum between liberalization/globalization—at the time perceived as integration with the modern and popular west, in particular, Europe—and national security—seen as the preservation of the Ottoman lands against both external (ironically the large European powers and Russia) and internal enemies (internal in the sense of those nations and ethnic groups which aspired to be independent from Ottoman rule and which were, again ironically, open therefore to the manipulation of the external enemies). To understand these dynamics requires two main missions. First, by looking into the political liberalization initiatives of the late Ottoman era (seen in the most general sense as those attempts to share political power with the Sultan) and their relation with the tremendous public concern over the empire's security, I will try to identify the genealogy and formation as well as the overwhelmingly shared perception of a dichotomous relationship between security and liberalization.[112] Second, by carrying out a detailed analysis of the two attempts to introduce multi-party politics during the republican era, I will try to show how the previously identified dichotomy between liberalization and security developed into a National Security Syndrome, through which the democratic liberalization process would be systematically administered, managed, and, ultimately, contained.

It should be pointed out that, despite the presence in this era of the two pressures that, in a sense, set off the hypothesizing in the previous chapter, the discussion in this chapter describes an era prior to the resulting hypothesizing. During this era we see the growth of and

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[112] In a widely read book, *100 Soruda Anayasanın Anlamı*, Mümtaz Soysal identifies a similar dynamic (*sarkaç* in Turkish) between poles of "freedom" and "authoritarianism". He sees the ups and downs of the constitutional

struggle between the mindsets which will ultimately comprise the primary values of the hard and soft realms. At the concrete level, however, what we see in this era is a clear predominance of security issues, with occasional swings towards liberalization—the political globalization impact—whenever security demands would permit.

The Ottoman State

It can be argued that the Ottoman state was, by and large, a garrison state, in which the waging of war was one of the main factors behind its construction and resulting structure.[113] At a time of history when the rule of the day was conquest, power, alliances and geopolitics, the Ottoman state was a true example of a geopolitical state/empire. This primacy of geopolitics made the Ottoman state a largely centralized and highly hierarchical power apparatus at the hands of the Sultans, and for the most part, security issues were able to be handled quite efficiently.

In particular towards the end of the 19th century, the Ottoman state began to face an increasingly destructive security problem of which the loss of lands and territories became the obvious indicator. Within the centralized state's power configurations, the grave security threat galvanized already existing tendencies and structures for further centralization in order to remaximize power.[114] Unitary, centralizing power policies were perceived as necessary in order to deal with the number one threat to the Ottoman Empire: military losses and subsequent geographical contraction.

This security-concerned political environment of the time also faced a second global pressure requiring a response from the Ottoman state system—namely, the liberalization

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movements in Turkish history as indications of his proposed pendulum. Mümtaz Soysal, *100 Soruda Anayasanın Anlamı* [The Meaning of Constitution in 100 Questions], 9th ed. (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1992).

[113] For a detailed discussion see Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

[114] Mahmut II was one of the first to introduce measures aimed at restoring a more centralized power than the more "dangerous" looking federal/confederal one.

attempts which marked Ottoman political life throughout much of the 19th century. In what could perhaps be labeled as "defensive modernization," liberalization/ westernization was introduced in part to create a better state apparatus for coping with the destruction and defeat of the Ottoman Empire.[115] Eventually however, these liberalization ideas began to have a substantive influence on the elite. As a result, the elite began pushing for power sharing demands for the sake of freedom too—though admittedly their demands were presented as being necessary in order to save the Ottoman state. What is important, however, is that liberalization/power decentralizing attempts were in fact strong, and the demands of those making them could not be ignored completely by the Ottoman political apparatus.

These increasing demands, motivated by a combination of both liberalizing efforts to increase power sharing within the regime, and efforts to bring about greater security, ultimately sought to decentralize power in a state body, the foremost tendency of which was to remain strong and centralized. Since centralized power was represented solely by the Sultan, these decentralization efforts were based on the demands of local rulers (e.g. the regional governors and local chieftains) and bureaucrats, who in earlier times had been true subjects of the Sultan, but who by now had gained a certain status and were demanding much more.

Four periods have been identified in the history of liberalization attempts of the late Ottoman era.[116] The first incident is the *Şer-i Huccet* or *Şer-i sözleşme* (Şer-i contract) that was agreed upon by the new Padishah Mustapha IV, who replaced Selim, and the bureaucracts who were supporting his accession to power in 1807. In essence, the contract aimed to place certain limitations on Mustapha's power. He agreed to stay away from things

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[115] Since the primary goal was to renew the state structure, the agents of this mission were the Ottoman intellectuals who had been highly associated with the state structure. These same intellectuals were identified by Şerif Mardin as being the bureaucrats. *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Turkey from Tanzimat to the Republic] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1985), s.v. "Tanzimat ve Aydınlar," ["Tanzimat and Intellectuals,"] by Şerif Mardin.

"undesirable"—implicitly referring to the concerns of the high level bureaucrats. In return for abiding by these conditions, the bureaucrats would keep the army—which had been increasingly used to topple sitting Sultans—out of politics[117].

The second incident is called *Sened-i Ittifak*, referring to a document drawn up by the same name in 1808. The document, which focused on defining the rights and responsibilities of local powers in relation with the Ottoman authority, came into being at a period when various Ottoman *begs* and chieftains had built up autonomous local administrations in parts of the Ottoman lands. In the most general terms, it gave these local powers the right to resist against 'unjust' orders from the Sultan's administration. While many of those in the central bureaucracy signed the paper, the Sultan, and even the Chiefs of the local powers themselves did not. Their failure to sign the document has led to an understanding that it was not in fact substantial in real life—except as another piece of evidence in the continuing accumulation of liberalization efforts and a memorable reference point for future attempts at reform. One interesting aspect however, was that the demand for such a contract came largely from those local powers which were situated in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire. This trend would later be continued as European ideas and practices as well as the European origins and experiences of the Turkish elite would become the primary directional force in Turkish integration and globalization efforts with the modern world.

The third and fourth cornerstones for the Ottoman era liberalization pressure were the *Tanzimat Fermanı* and *Islahat* movements. These require a more in-depth discussion than the first two, since it is with the former that liberal power-sharing demands begin including the rights of the people in relation with the central authority, the rights of the bureaucracy and elite towards the Sultan, and, later on, such concepts as freedom and equality. The *Tanzimat*

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[116] Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiyenin Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950* [The History of Turkey's Democracy 1839-1950] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999).
[117] Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernization in Turkey] (Istanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1978), 128-132.

Fermanı of 1839 was a uni-lateral declaration by Sultan Abdulmecit, an "auto-limitation" if

you like, which curtailed the powers of the central authority through the introduction of a

limited number of rights and liberties as well as the upholding of the rule of law principle[118].

With the *Tanzimat Fermanı* we begin to see for the first time in the Ottoman empire a

political liberalization movement similar to those in the European nations. While the power-

sharing demands of the previous attempts can be considered as largely a part of the on-going

power struggle between the elite and the various traditional power holding figures, for

example, the local and regional governors (who enjoyed a certain amount of autonomy and

desired more), the movement now began to appear more like one about the safety and

freedom of the people and about the limitation of central authority—viewed as being

unhelpful (if not even harmful) to the safety and freedom of the society. Even though this

new emphasis was almost purely rhetorical, it was, as a start, very significant, since it would

help in preparing a proper environment for future, more concrete transformations, such as the

1876 Constitution, which officially made the Ottoman Sultanate a *meşrutiyet*, or monarchy. It

is also important to note the salience of foreign influence in the conception and

implementation of these liberalization efforts because of its pendulum-creating potential, that

is, while promoting liberalization, foreign influence was also considered one of the primary

sources fueling the Empire's vital security concerns.

The *Tanzimat Fermanı* (*Tanzimat* Rescript)

The *Tanzimat Fermanı* document was first publicly read aloud in Istanbul's Gülhane

Park by Mustafa Resit Pasha, the main architect of its contents. The document had five

sections[119], the fourth of which provided the principles most relevant to this discussion. The

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[118] Bülent Tanör, *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri* [Ottoman-Turkish Constitutional Developments] (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), 75-95.
[119] The first section said basically that the Ottoman state had been very successful and powerful because it obeyed and conducted Islamic Law, and the second section says that the Ottoman state was in decline and

general spirit of the five principles, on which the new laws would depend, could be said to evolve around a strengthening of the people/society against the state and rulers. The main emphasis was on the safety of lives and properties, the prevention of arbitrary punishments, and the introduction of various lawful procedures. "People" in this case referred primarily to minorities as well as to the elite of the Ottoman society, whose lives were often in jeopardy due to the practice of execution for political reasons (*siyaseten katl*), the use of which was very popular among Ottoman rulers.[120]

By also introducing various laws and principles designed to protect peoples' wealth and properties, the document was also trying to strengthen the elite of society in relation to the state. Until that time, for example, the properties of those executed for political reasons were confiscated by the state treasury. Properties thereafter could be inherited even in cases where the owner was executed or sentenced to long prison terms. This practice led to a gradual accumulation of wealth in the hands of elite figures other than the Sultan and thereby began creating an alternative source of power.

The *Tanzimat Fermanı* document also aimed at reorganizing the taxation system, and in doing so, overhauling an arbitrary conduct of the state that led to insecurity among the elite and society. As an interesting part of the proposed 'just' taxation system, one point addressed was that military expenditures would be limited and carefully supervised.[121] Since state power was seen as largely consisting of the mightiness and influence of the military apparatus, this is relevant to the current discussion as it indicated a direct limiting statement on the state's

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poverty because it had become less obedient to Islamic Law. The third section follows with the argument that if correct measures are taken in the state administration, the Ottoman state, with its strong geographical position, fertile lands, and skillful people, would develop in 5-10 years' time. The fourth section lists the principles upon which the new laws would depend, and the final section prescribes the necessary steps to be taken in order to reach the desired outcomes. Several authors have analysed the above items. See for example, Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 1, *Empire of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808* (Cambridge, London, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Sina Akşin, ed., *Osmanlı Devleti 1600-1908* [The Ottoman State 1600-1808] (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1993), and Fahir H. Armaoğlu, *19.Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1789-1914* [19th Century Political History] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997).

power. Yet another principle limiting the state's ability to control society in a powerful manner, involved military service. Until this time, the Ottoman state conscribed its subjects whenever it wanted, and for limitless time periods. The idea was now introduced that conscription rates had to be balanced according to regions and that military service should be limited to between four and five years. Yet another major reform introduced by the *Tanzimat Fermanı* was its proposal to set up some kind of bodies resembling parliamentary councils. The members of these councils would be the constituents of the military political bureaucracy and the religious elite, and thus in terms of at least some types of proposing legislation, the bureaucracy would be given a say. In a general overview, however, while the *Tanzimat* document introduced certain new ideas about peoples' rights in relation with the ruler, these rights would still remain mostly rhetorical for ordinary people. The true contract in this case appeared to be between the rights of the bureaucratic elite and those of the Sultan.

One of the most important characteristics of the power-decentralizing attempts was that they had a tremendous foreign influence to them. Foreign influence would continue to emerge as both a rhetorical and concrete source of support for elements in support of liberalization and power decentralization in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the foreign— primarily European—influence on decision-making, can be seen as roughly equivalent to the early signs of a political globalization impact.

Some degree of European influence in the declaration of the *Tanzimat* document is largely undebated, but it is possible to go further and argue that European stimulus was even a forceful factor behind the document's creation. Such a claim begins with arguments about foreign economic interests. It is argued, for example, that Britain supported the writing up of this document because it was seeking to secure the rights of the merchants, elites, and the Ottoman bureaucracy, who constituted the main players in a British/Ottoman trade

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[120] Sina Akşin even argues that Mustafa Reşit Pasha, by introducing the principle of safety for lives and properties, was trying to save his own and his peers' lives and wealth. Akşin, 121.

relationship that was very favorable to the British.[122] Another argument says that the Sultan and his government, by creating a document like the *Tanzimat Fermanı,* wanted to show the Europeans that the Sultan could build a regime which could be at least as liberal and modern as Mehmet Ali's one in Egypt.[123] Yet a final point which supports further the argument that European stimulus was an influential factor behind the *Tanzimat,* was that at the end of the document there was included a statement reading that the document would be officially presented to the foreign ambassadors in Istanbul as witness of its durability. Thus it can be seen that the foreign powers were seen as a kind of "notary" or "guarantor" for the laws introduced within the document, and were expected to use their power to oversee and supervise its implementation.[124]

Islahat movements

The foreign role in domestic transformations was becoming a norm for the following decades. Starting in the 1850s, various waves of reforms (*ıslahat hareketleri*) took place, and many times international dynamics played a determining role in their outcome as well. Most of the time, these international dynamics and pressures had direct implications of further pressure for power decentralization. While the Crimean War was being fought, the Europeans quite understandably did not apply their full weight to pressing for the implementation of the *Tanzimat* reforms, but after the war was over, they began immediately to do so. One of the conditions included in the Paris Peace Treaty, which ended the war, was that the Ottoman state had to reaffirm 'by herself' what had been promised to the empire's minorities in the *Tanzimat* document. Moreover, the Ottomans were obliged to take concrete steps in order to

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[121] Shaw, 60.

[122] Oral Sander, *Anka'nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü: Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi Üzerine Bir Deneme* [The Rise and Fall of the Phoenix: A Study on the Ottoman Diplomatic History] (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 1987), 125-131

[123] Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu* [The Emergence of Modern Turkey], trans. Metin Kıratlı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1984), 107.

[124] Akşin, 122.

further facilitate foreign economic trade. This pressure on the part of the Europeans was met quite cooperatively by the Ottoman state, which on February 18, 1856 declared a new confirming document entitled the *Islahat Fermani* (Reform Rescript).[125] This document further than the *Tanzimat* reforms, consolidates the rhetoric of reform and liberalization as well as proposing concrete steps for their implementation. Among the original and even more liberal ideas that it brought with it was one stating that all Ottoman citizens, notwithstanding religious differences, were now considered as full equals.[126] The document also was the first to mention the possibility of representation of the people in local administrations and councils.[127]

In the period between the *Islahat Fermani* and the first constitution of 1876, there were other developments, which basically opened even further the Ottoman political, economic, and social space to European influence. Some examples of these were the law regarding foreigners' rights to purchase properties in Ottoman lands (1858), the sea trade agreement (1864), and the regulations about trade courts and jurisdictions (1862).[128]

Pathways between the international and national liberalizing elements

While the previous section has discussed external influences along the lines of an implicit pressure directed from the west, the next section looks at how external influences (popular ideas and practices from abroad) became internalized by local figures and transformed into an energy source for the local figures to reach their own goals.

The combination of foreign influences, material interests, and forced creation of certain institutions, accelerated the socialization of the Ottoman elite in their thinking about political rights and freedoms in line with the debates and movements occurring in Europe at

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[125] Ibid., 130.
[126] Lewis, 114.
[127] Çavdar, 21.
[128] Lewis, 118.

the time. By the 1860s, the Ottoman elite had already been introduced to and significantly influenced by European political and cultural values. There are several factors that affected how international/foreign ideas and issues made their way to the Ottoman elite as well as how the Ottoman elite themselves accessed these ideas.

The first point is that young Ottoman officers and intellectuals, already somewhat familiar with western political beliefs following the *Tanzimat* period, grew much closer to these ideas while fighting alongside their British and French colleagues during the Crimean War.[129]

Another major point was that Europe was still the closest neighbor to the Ottoman capital, and Ottomans therefore regularly sent their diplomatic representatives and later their young brains to Europe for education and training. For example, the creator of the *Tanzimat* document, Mustafa Reşit Paşa, had been the ambassador to Paris and London for many years. These years abroad enabled him to learn about Louis Phillipe's liberal regime and other liberal political transformations while they were unfolding.[130] He lived through, for example, the 1848 revolutionary movements, and observed the political ideas and figures. It is even said that he was personally acquainted with LaMartin, Renan, and many liberal circles in France.[131] When he returned to Istanbul, he then sought to convince the government to send young people to Europe for their education.

In the 1860s the *Tasvir-i Efkar* newspaper, owned by the poet Şinasi Efendi, became the center around which the ideology for transforming Ottoman political, economic, and cultural life—and the important public figures promoting this ideology—centered.[132] In the first issue of the newspaper, on June 27, 1862, Şinasi introduced concepts that had not been expressed before in the Ottoman world. These included 'nation', 'liberty', 'freedom', 'public

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[129] Ibid., 118
[130] Armaoğlu, 223.
[131] Çavdar, 24.
[132] Ibid., 24.

opinion', etc. He referred to peoples' right to talk about a nation's problems and to propose solutions. The following phrase illustrates best the degree to which his rhetoric included substantive reformist ideas about the relationship between a ruler and his people: "The state functions as the representative of the nation and works for the welfare of the people. The nation, through oral and written means, expresses its ideas about its welfare."[133] According to Şinasi, adapting western institutions was the only efficient way to solve all the major problems faced by the Ottoman state, and by western institutions, he referred to popular western "democratic institutions", stemming from the bourgeois ideology.[134]

The new reformist substance of his ideas made the newspaper the center of a growing elite intellectual group, which gradually grew into a movement. One figure of this group, and another contributor to the newspaper, was Namık Kemal. In his writings he too concentrated on concepts such as nation, homeland, freedom, liberty, and revolution.[135] Yet another important contributor to the overall movement was Ali Süavi, and his own newspaper, *Muhbir*, or Informer. This newspaper concentrated largely on the question of Crete, and strongly proposed a national assembly as the only possible means of arriving at an efficient solution to the problem—thus reintroducing the idea of a parliament.[136]

The gradual construction of an environment of liberal ideas and the increasing number of proponents of those ideas, eventually led to the creation of an organization, the *Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti*, or New Ottomans' Society[137]. This group became crucial for the transformation of the Ottoman political structure, because it was the first organization aimed

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[133] Cited in ibid., 25.
[134] Çavdar, 25.
[135] Lewis, 151.
[136] Çavdar, 26.
[137] This name was intended as a Turkish translation of "Jeune Turquie", which was used by one of the movement members, Prens Mustafa Fazıl, in a letter he wrote to the Sultan from Paris. Fazıl was inspired by the popular terminology in use in Europe, such as Young Italia, Young Germany, Young France, etc. Lewis, 152-153. This letter not only coined the term 'New Ottomans' but also formed the basis of the program of this society. Its content was strikingly liberal in the sense that it posited freedom as the foundation of all progress. In the same vein, the letter upheld freedom of conscience as well as secular administration and public accountability. More

specifically at dramatically changing the Ottoman state structure.[138] The Young Ottoman

movement was not only the first political freedom movement using western terms, but it also

adopted completely western ways in its relations with the Ottoman public opinion—relying

increasingly on the popular press and publishing media.

The ideological support the movement gained from the European front was at a

maximum at this point. Namık Kemal, for example, was reported as saying, "the other day I

talked with Gianpietri about Constitutional Monarchy, and after two hours he convinced me

that we too can have a working constitutional monarchy in the Ottoman state."[139] European

influence and support was not, however, limited to ideological training, but included as well

practical means. Frequently, the government clamped down on these groups, shut down their

newspapers and attempted to persecute their members—at which times, many figures were

able to find shelter in Europe and continue both their ideological training and the publishing

of the newspapers there.[140] While organizing their activities in Europe, even the task of

compiling a written directory for their organization and its members was undertaken by the

Europeans.[141]

During the European years, the young Ottomans were able to analyze events and carry

out a type of self-evaluation. Through this process they reached a consensus on the reasons

why reforms on papers were not being materialized in reality, namely, they felt this was being

caused by a lack of institutions to initiate the implementation process. The solution, they

resolved, was a parliament. Only a parliament that represented the society would be able to

protect the interests of the people and therefore make the proposed reforms work. Such an

institutional reform would of course require a written constitution.

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radically, it argued that for every country the legitimate way of governance was a constitutional arrangement. Çavdar, 27-28.

[138] Akşin, 141-142.

[139] Cited in Çavdar, 27.

[140] For example, by 1867, Namık Kemal, Ziya Bey, Ali Süavi, Reşat Bey, Nuri Bey, Agah Efendi, Mehmet Bey, Rifat Bey, and Hüseyin Vasfi Paşa, had all escaped to Paris. Şinasi was there from 1865 onwards. Ibid., 28.

Having described and diagnosed what they felt were the problems and having

prescribed what they saw as solutions, a constitution and a parliament, the Young Ottomans

were ready to adopt them. By also adding their own strongest common value—Islam[142]—to

these elements, they were ready to put their plan into action. Most of the young elite were

former members of the Ottoman elite bureaucracy, and it was understandable that they saw a

benefit in rejoining the system that they were in fact fighting against, taking a role in that

system, and then waiting for the right time to implement their plan. By the time that their

disliked head of government, Ali Pasha, died in 1871, most of the Young Ottomans were back

in Istanbul.[143]

The early 1870s brought about the right conditions for the plan's implementation.

Military expenditures were out of control, and the economy was in a shambles. On top of

this, several bad harvests had made matters worse, and in 1875, the state declared bankruptcy.

Externally, things were also going badly. Rebellions in Bosnia-Herzegovnia and in Bulgaria

were repressed by Ottoman armed forces and this led to protests from the European powers.[144]

The Ottoman state seemed trapped between both external and internal impasses.

Domestic unrest and instability reached the level of mass protests—virtual

rebellions—in Istanbul. On May 10, 1876, divinity students in the capital rebelled against the

government and the Prime Minister, Mahmut Pasha. The Sultan had to give in and make their

requested changes in the government, including the introduction of new ministers. It was

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[141] One of these foreigners was Slodyslaw Plater, a Polish nationalist and a bourgeois revolutionary. The other was Simon Deutsch of Vienna. Ibid., 29.

[142] Şerif Mardin addresses a different aspect of the change in the thinking of the Young Ottomans in this era. As he points out, the Young Ottomans also agreed that one of the major shortcomings of the *Tanzimat* period was that an overarching philosophy—namely, the enlightenment philosophy in the West—was seen as the primary driving force behind Western parliamentarism and constitutionalism. To them, *Tanzimat* dismissed Islam's world view as a potential overarching philosophical perspective, and this led to a groundless and weak construction of liberal reforms. Instead, they proposed, Islamic principles could provide a philosophical platform for a democratic system. Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi: Makaleler IV* [Turkish Modernization: Articles IV] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1991), 185-186.

[143] Erik Jan Zürcher, *Milli Mücadelede İttihatçılık* [Unionism in the National Struggle], trans. N. Salihoğlu (Istanbul: Bağlam, 1987), 21.

[144] Tensions in European and Ottoman relations were further heightened after the 1876 killing of German and French Consul Generals by crowds in Selonika. Lewis, 158.

obvious that there was little trust between the new ministers and the Sultan, and finally, the ministers implemented a well-designed plan to force the Sultan to step down. He was replaced with Murat V.[145]

While the new Sultan was an intelligent and educated man, open to liberal thoughts, he also had psychological problems of paranoia, based on his fear of being killed by his rivals. By the time that the first Balkan wars were about to begin, powerful ministers gained a confirmation from the head religious leader (*Şeyhülislam*) that the Sultan was too sick to perform his duties. Prince Abdulhamit, who became the new Sultan on the condition that he accepted the constitution, thus replaced Murat V.[146] This constitution was an important step in the guaranteeing of some degree of power sharing/decentralization within the Ottoman governance system.

The Security-Liberalization Relationship

Liberalization, or power-sharing attempts, did not take place in a vacuum. In fact, there were several other issues, such as the economic situation, political rivalries, etc. which affected these efforts. Perhaps the most significant concern in the public sphere in the late Ottoman era, and bound, therefore, to also have an influence on liberalization efforts, was that of the external and internal security concerns they faced. The state was continually losing its territories, and it seemed as though there was nothing to be done to stop this process. The main question being addressed by many, therefore, was how to protect and save the country from these external and internal attacks. In the next section I will therefore discuss how the acts and needs for liberalization interplayed with those for national security, and thereby introduce the dynamics and character of the gradually forming dichotomous relationship between the liberal reforms and the national security issues.

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[145] Shaw also reports that the divinity student rebellion was provoked and designed by a liberal bureaucratic group led by Mithat Pasha. Shaw, 162-163.

Attempting to carry out liberal political reforms at a time when the survival of the state was increasingly at risk, created a very complicated relationship between these two great pressures facing the Ottoman state. It should be noted that most of the time, the security of the state enjoyed a clear primacy over the liberalization efforts, resulting in a kind of "reserved" westernization that contradicted fundamentally with the ideal forms of liberalization/westernization ideas.[147] This may explain why the liberalizers generally made great efforts to express their proposed liberal reforms as ways of "protecting the state/nation" from external defeats and gradual territorial contraction. This starting characteristic would ultimately have very important implications, since it implied that the liberalization efforts were generally seen as a means of reaching a primary goal of protecting the security of the Ottoman state.[148] One of the clear indications of this nature of the relationship is that the reorganization of the state power in terms of limiting the Sultan's powers, was done not directly in favor of the masses, but rather in terms of creating a power-sharing between the Sultan and the bureaucracy—whose primary job was to prevent the state's military defeats and put an end to the territorial contraction. In a sense, power reconfiguration was sought in order to give further rights and prerogatives to those who could provide best for national security needs. At least, this was the main rhetorical justification for power-sharing demands. One can even argue that the bureaucrats were only able to force the Sultan to share his power because he was unable to perform well his job of providing security, or at least, not as well as the previous eras had witnessed.

Evidence of how security concerns were used for liberalization efforts can be seen in the Young Ottomans' famous letter from Paris. In this letter, written by Mustafa Fazıl Pasha

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[146] Ibid., 163-166.

[147] Berkes, *Çağdaşlaşma*.

[148] Thus the West would be defeated by its own weapons (Westernization). Aykut Kansu, "20. Yüzyıl Başı Türk Düşünce Hayatında Liberalizm," ["Liberalism in Early 20th Century Turkish Thought,"] in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce* [Political Thought in Modern Turkey], vol. 1, eds. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

and published in the form of an open letter to Sultan Abdülaziz in 1867, it was pointed out that "most of the problems and underdevelopment could be overcome by freedom" and that the "lack of freedom makes it much easier for the European powers to work against the Ottoman state by intervening in its domestic affairs."[149] Invested in the liberalization efforts is obviously a hope for the "good old days" of security and welfare. The ultimate goal can be seen as one of stability and security—in the context of which, room could be found for modernization.

Yet another indication of the prioritizing of security over liberalization can be seen in the administrative reforms introduced by the *Tanzimat* document. While the liberal political proposals it introduced would not be implemented in reality for a long time to come, certain administrative reforms, introducing a total centralization of government power, took effect very quickly. The periphery of the Ottoman state was put under further control with the introduction of a French system of appointing governors and district administrators from the center. The state was also divided into governorships, which were in turn divided into districts, and again into villages. One security chief and two administrators were also assigned from the central government to assist the governor.[150] Such a heavy central authority was clearly able to supervise and indeed control the newly introduced local councils, which were made up of local people. This tendency of introducing one policy in order to balance new powers emerging from another new policy of liberal reforms, points to the traces of a dichotomous relationship between liberalization and stability/security, as well as to a mistrust of the central authority over its subjects, i.e. the ordinary people and their political representation.

To many it seemed that power decentralization was obviously making the state's internal affairs more open to foreign involvement, and was therefore creating a security

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[149] Cited in Lewis, 153.
[150] Armaoğlu, 222.

problem. The resulting mistrust of the various nationals, citizens and societies of the Ottoman Empire was perhaps best illustrated when the liberal bureaucrats replaced Sultan Abdulaziz with Murat V, yet throughout the process, no mention was made of a constitutional monarchy. When, after the successful coup, one of the liberal ministers, Suleyman Pasha, asked, "if we were not going to declare the constitutional reform, why did we overthrow the Sultan—to get a new one?" The Prime Minister answered, "the people don't have the quality for a system based on their desires and representation." Another minister went even further, saying that, "the state trusts you [the bureaucrats], will you go ask the ignorant Turks of Anatolia and Rumeli about the important affairs...about security?"[151] Fear about society's potential in terms of state affairs and bureaucratic mistrust in the fragmented characteristics of society, were apparently present from early on.

One other major characteristic of the relationship between liberalization and security was that the elite, whose primary intellectual interest was to liberalize the state, also happened to constitute the primary group whose job it was to protect the country's national security, and to prevent its territorial contraction. At first, liberalization was considered as having either a potentially positive or merely irrelevant effect on security. Later on, indications were that liberalization efforts in and of themselves might be creating security problems, such as leading to self-determination movements among minorities, and the consequent foreign manipulation of these. As long as the needs of both missions had a conflicting nature, the elite had to come to terms with the true nature of the dichotomy and were forced most times to make a choice. At the beginning, they were perhaps able to avoid seeing the conflict by convincing themselves—and trying to convince others—that liberal reforms could in fact bring about unity, stability, and security. Such a tactic was risky, however, because in the event that liberal reforms did not bring about security and welfare, they would then be

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[151] Çavdar, 37. *Rumeli* referred at the time to the European side of the Ottoman Empire.

considered unsuccessful, and would have to be dropped from the agenda—with no one else there to continue promoting their implementation.

Reflecting the Dichotomy in the 1876 Constitution

The drawing up of the 1876 Constitution signified a turning point in developments for placing some degree of limitation on the ultimate central authority of the Sultan. The 1876 Constitution was a true reflection of the previously discussed philosophy adopted by the elite, revealing a belief that since Europe, with her various institutions, was successful at home and abroad, then these same institutions should logically bring about similar results within the Ottoman Empire. Imitating the west, and relying on whatever means of European influence were available, were again the primary motivations behind the 1876 Constitution.

There are again several points that can be made in order to show the salience of external factors leading to the 1876 Constitution. The major ones are as follows. The year 1875 saw an unprecedented economic crisis within the Ottoman economy. Combined with minority rebellions in the Balkans and European intervention due to a reopening of the debate over the Eastern Question, this economic crisis led to serious political struggles. In the ensuing debates over which way the Ottoman state should head in terms of its international relations, Sultan Abdulaziz and the Russian ambassador supported keeping the Ottomans as a part of Asia and resisting against the Europeans, while the leading bureaucrats and the European powers took the opposing position of trying to anchor the Ottoman government firmly on the side of the Europeans and their great power politics.

At the same time that the European powers, via their diplomatic representatives in Istanbul and their domestic allies among the Ottomans, were preparing to replace the Sultan, they were also organizing an international conference to be held in Istanbul in 1876 on the future of the "eastern question" and the future of the rebelling Balkan nations. This

conference, popularly known as *Tersane Konferansı*, was fiercely opposed by the Ottomans

fearing that it would be used by the independence-seeking nationalities within the empire to

capitalize on Western help in their struggle against the central power[152]. When the Sultan was

replaced and the constitution of 1876 was declared, the news was rushed to the Europeans in

hopes that they would cancel the conference. The argument ran that the Ottoman state now

had a constitution—something that did not even exist at that time in Russia—and therefore

there were no points left to discuss about the Balkan nations' rights and other issues on the

conference agenda. By accepting the constitution, the Ottomans hoped, among other things,

to stop what they considered to be European manipulation of Ottoman security issues. The

Europeans did not agree, and the Turks withdrew from the conference.[153] As is obvious, once

again liberalizing turning points were very much intertwined with the national security of the

Ottoman state, and, as it was argued earlier, liberalization was seen as a means of meeting

national security needs.

This nature of the liberalization/security relationship was also clearly reflected in

several parts of the 1876 Constitution—parts which would ultimately prove fatal for the

constitution itself and for the newly-established parliament. One example of this was that the

only part of the parliament with elected representatives in it, the *Heyet-I Mebusan*, was

largely impotent, and was surrounded by more powerful institutions, which were not

democratically elected.[154] In other words, this constitution was not based on the principle of

power separation, but rather on the continuing primacy of the non-elected segments—whose

primary goal and concern was national security.

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[152] Tanör, 128-129.
[153] Çavdar, 39.
[154]*Heyet-i Mebusan*, which can be compared to the House of Commons in a bicameral system, could propose laws only in areas falling within its jurisdiction, and these areas were not clearly defined in the 1876 constitution. When this assembly drafted a law, it was supposed to be approved first by the upper chamber of the parliament and then by the Sultan. Rejection by either of these two meant that the law would be abandoned. Tanör, 141-144.

While the 1876 Constitution provided a progressive agenda in terms of judicial processes and personal liberties and rights[155], it simultaneously introduced a few crucial exceptions to the liberal rhetoric, which basically nullified all the other progress it made. For example, Article 113 gave the right to the Sultan to declare an emergency situation in order to postpone (indefinitely) the constitutional rights and to send into exile anyone found to be dangerous to state security. This created more room for applying security issues as tools in domestic political power struggles. Another example, Article 36, also allowed that when the parliament was on holiday or during times of emergencies, the Prime Minister could make any decision in order to protect the security of the state—without having to ask the permission of parliament. One other point was that the 1864 provincial reforms giving more central authority control over local developments, were also given a place in the constitution.[156] It was obvious that the power decentralization impact of possible liberal political aspects of the constitution were being balanced by various centralized control mechanisms.

The constitution had also held the promise of averting a war with Russia, which was complaining about the conditions of Slavic minorities living under Ottoman rule. The hope had been that the constitution would remove Russian justification for intervening in the areas of Slavic minorities, in other words, removing the cause for declaring war on the Ottomans. The promise failed to hold, however, as the Russians nevertheless declared war in 1877. Once it was clear that the declaration of the constitution would neither prevent the probability of a war with Russia nor the increasing foreign involvement in Ottoman domestic affairs (in the sense that the Conference had been conducted despite the constitution), the Sultan first decided to appeal to Article 113 of the new constitution and get rid of the Prime Minister—

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[155] These rights included, first and foremost, the equality of all Ottoman subjects before the law. Arbitrary punishment outside the rule of law was prohibited. In addition to the security of life, the security of property principle was adopted within the new constitution. No longer could property be confiscated by the state unless it was compensated or confiscation was legally justified. Likewise, the taxation system would be rearranged on a more just basis to include all Ottoman subjects. Ibid., 145-147.

[156] Articles 109 and 110 were included at the insistence of Prime Minister Mithat Pasha, because of his governorship experience. Shaw, 178.

ironically the primary individual behind the creation of the constitution. With the Prime

Minister out of the picture, the Sultan then took advantage of the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian

war in order to disassemble the parliament. The parliament and the constitution were

sacrificed mainly due to their failure to bring about security and defense against foreign

involvement. This should hardly be surprising of course, since the entire liberalization

process and the declaration of the constitution can be seen as largely as a means of defending

the country, and when they did not work, they had to be dropped. The Sultan was then given

the opportunity to try his own method of achieving the same goals, one which was the most

traditional means of securing the state: an absolute authoritarianism (*istibdat*), which lasted

for roughly the next thirty years.

The primacy of security and authoritarian methods to reach a more centralized power

and thus better defensive capacities in the constant wars against external enemies and internal

rebellions, overwhelmingly determined the nature of the period between the 1876

Constitution and the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Granted, there were certain

periods in this era in which we see a return of the constitutional monarchy. In the case of the

1908 movement for example, this was even a bottom-up movement including actual real

society elements as opposed to merely the elite. Nonetheless, the main characteristic of this

period—in terms of the liberalization/security dilemma—was one of constant political

struggles with the sole purpose of being able to better fight against foreign enemies and

territorial contraction. Even the rhetoric of freedom and liberalization that came out after the

1908 coup and the reintroduction of the constitutional era[157], lasted for only a few months.

The rule of the day soon became Jacobean policies aimed at centralizing authority, and in

essence, the authoritative policies of the Sultan were replaced by the authoritative policies of

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[157] Unlike its predecessor in 1876, the new constitution protected individuals not only from arbitrary punishment but also from arbitrary arrest. The infamous Article 113 of the previous constitution, which subjected all rights and liberties to the Sultan's will, was excluded from the new constitution. It still did not allow full freedom of

the *İttihad Terakki Cemiyeti*[158] (The Society of Union and Progress). This era has been

described nicely as one in which the liberal wing of the Young Turks lost the battle to the

authoritative elements, whose primary aim was to protect the state and who would never

consider liberalism as a means and in fact more likely saw it as a weakness and danger to state

security.[159] The regime became a semi-military one, in which years were spent trying to

suppress political elements and conducting defensive—sometimes offensive—wars against

external enemies.

Turkish Nationalism

The *İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti's* somehow successful efforts to centralize power were

largely made through a provocation of Turkish nationalism and thus an attaching of the idea

of nation (Turkish) with efforts of protecting the state.

Once the complexities of carrying out liberal transformations in a context of a highly

fragmented, multi-national societal structure and a constant threat of war and insecurity were

fully recognized, the Ottoman state elite turned to the trend of nationalism as a means of

responding to both security needs and liberalization drives. It became clear that "Ottoman

citizenship" or some form of multi-cultural constitutional democracy would not be adequate

to secure the Ottoman lands and successfully modernize and transform the state and society.

Most of the minorities or ethnic populations of the empire were turning the energy of

liberalization/modernization trends into nationalist projects in order to build up their own

nation states. Under these circumstances, the Ottoman state elite also began developing its

own nationalist project based on Turkishness. In essense, the goal remained the same, to

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thought, but introduced certain measures on the way to freedom of press. In addition, freedom of association was
institutionalized with the new constitution, though in a limited fashion. Tanör, 196-197.
[158] Tanör gives a nice account of how this organization used terrorizing tactics in order to control everything.
The central committee of the party became the seed of an iron core in the whole Ottoman state—sometimes well
hidden, and sometimes overt. Ibid., 202-207.
[159] Ibid., 198.

preserve and protect the homeland, but the scope and concept of the homeland was somehow smaller.

It is very important to note that this nationalist project was in fact a very modern one, in which a nearly perfect combination was often reached between the two determining forces of the public discourse and agenda, namely, security/stability and liberalization/ modernization. In other words, the protection of the homeland while simultaneously transforming and modernizing it, were perceived as highly possible under the nationalist ideology[160]. Starting with the *İttihat Terakki* and peaking with the foundation of the Turkish Republic, nationalism seemed to have found a way of modernizing/liberalizing while insuring safety and security. At the beginning of the *İttihat Terakki*, through WWI and the War of Liberation, security was clearly seen as a must, and therefore liberal modernization efforts were considered as secondary. Once the nation and the state elite began to feel that they had reached their goal of protecting the homeland and securing the safety of the transformation from absolutist regime to republic, the deeply inherent desire for liberalization resurfaced. Of course, in this new period the understanding was that the borders of liberalization were still determined by national unity and security.

From pendulum to national security syndrome

In the early part of the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire and subsequent young Turkish Republic experienced a period marked by much warfare—from the late Ottoman wars in the Balkans and World War I, to the Turkish War of Liberation. As the early 1920s came and the wars came to an end, the ruling elite that had established the new Turkish

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[160] Fuat Keyman raises a somewhat similar point in his discussion on Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism, in line with other Third World nationalisms, possesses an inherent dilemma. The crux of the dilemma is that while it is fiercely anti-imperialist Turkish nationalism at the same time accepts the normative and epistemological dominance of the West as evident in the project of modernization/ Westernization it embarked upon. For more information see, Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation between Global Modernity and Nationalism: The Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 13 (Fall 1995): 93-120.

republic began to feel somewhat in control. The major internal and external security

challenges had, at least for the moment, been met.

This section of the chapter explores how this globalized/Western-integrated

(intellectually and in spirit) Turkish state elite, once they felt they had secured their state,

began pushing for further liberalization. Their efforts, however, failed to go beyond the

previously identified dichotomous relationship between political liberalization and security.

Moreover, the failure of these liberalization experiments can be argued not only to have

consolidated their perceptions of a zero-sum-gain between political liberalization and security,

but also to have turned the dichotomy into a national/regime security syndrome. This

development is perhaps best illustrated by looking at the two early attempts that were made at

multi-party politics and their heritage on the system. The following section shows how much

of the political discussion in the early republican era, even that about non-security issues like

democracy or corruption, ultimately became securitized[161], that is, seen as threats to the

republican regime, as the national security syndrome took hold.

The Progressive Republican Party and the Response of the Regime Elite

After Atatürk dissolved the Grand National Assembly on April 15, 1923, nation-wide

elections were held over the months of June, July and August of the same year. The

candidates' political records and qualifications were closely scrutinized by Atatürk, and

consequently a parliament consisting largely of Atatürk's chosen candidates was produced.[162]

Yet, seeds of opposition to the ruling elite and their vision of governance were nonetheless

present in the second parliament of the Republic, and were growing more vocal. This was

largely due to the revolutionary changes that were being made, including the declaration of

the republic itself, and consequent resistance to them. The opposition was primarily built up

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[161] A "securitization process" can be considered as a process of security becoming the lens through which all
issues are viewed. During such a process, an increasing primacy of security over all other issues can be seen.

around the army Pashas (generals), who had previously worked closely with Atatürk, namely, Refet Pasha, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, Ali Fuat Pasha, and the former Prime Minister (and apparent leader of the opposition group) Rauf Bey. The opposition's arguments were also supported by some of the press, primarily the large Istanbul newspapers. Atatürk saw the potential for a strong opposition among the generals, who could draw on the prestige of their military backgrounds within the political arena, and therefore forced them to choose between parliament posts or military ones. They all chose to become civilian parliamentarians—thus creating the potential for an opposition via politics and the parliament. It can of course be argued that the domestic power struggles were the primary driving source for creating a second political party, and that the rhetoric of seeking a more democratic governance system was nothing more than just rhetoric to help the opposition forces gain a foothold for their struggle. On the other hand, a genuine discussion about democracy was definitely present and influencing the process to some extent. Prominent journalist Hüseyin Cahit of the daily newspaper *Tanin*, for example, wrote at the time that "the current dominant single party is only paying lip service to democracy...the republic is not a true republic if it is not based on democracy."[163]

Before an actual second political party was formed, the nature of the opposition to a second party from the members of the existing political party, Atatürk's People Party, became apparent in the everyday political debates. For example, a parliamentary inquiry in 1924 into corruption charges concerning the population exchange between Greece and Turkey, turned in fact into a struggle between the government and opposition forces. Against each of the charges raised by the opposition, the representative members of parliament for the government insisted that the opposition's views were actually about being anti-Republican

[162] Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* [Turkey, A Modern History], 3rd ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 1998), 233-234.
[163] Quoted in Çavdar, 264.

and even pro-Sultanate.[164] Although leaders of the opposition declared repeatedly that they were in favor of the republic, national independence and liberties, explaining that "national liberty is the real source of the republic not the other way around,"[165] the debate had already become one of regime security, with a tendency to create pro and anti elements.

The government elite preferred concentrating on out-of-context excerpts of opposition speeches, such as "the declaration of the Republic is rushed," rather than on broader opposition statements such as "we became MPs in order to establish the system of democracy, not to pass this authority over to the hands of institutions that are not directly responsible to the society."[166] The first episodes of the debate between republic and democracy had begun, and the republicans were determined to use the shield of regime security in their struggle against "democratic" arguments and their proponents. This tactic seemed to pay back when, for example, an influential MP from the side of the governing elite, and owner of the influential newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, said that he would support the government's side on the alleged corruption charges made against it because "the republic was at stake" and "there was no need to confuse the minds of the public with the debate about which comes first—republic or liberties."[167] Finally, all the charges were ignored, and the parliament protected the government in the name of protecting the regime and its security.

Despite the resistant environment, the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) was founded on October 17, 1924.[168] Immediately thereafter, the existing Peoples' Party also adopted the adjective "republican" to its title as well, indicating the sensitivity to the regime debate mentioned above.

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[164] Çavdar reports a speech by a constituent representative of the government, Recep Bey, who says that he carefully followed the opposition's speeches and noted that "not once did they mention the word "Republic". Ibid., 264.

[165] Ibid., 265.

[166] Ibid.

[167] Ibid.

[168] The chairman was Kazım Karabekir Paşa, deputy chairs were Dr. Adnan and Rauf Bey, the General Secretary was Ali Fuat Paşa, and the board included Muhter Bey, İsmail Canpolat, Halis Turgut, A. Şükrü Bey, Necati Bey, Faik Bey, and Rüştü Paşaç.

At least in rhetoric, the new party had come into existence in order to radically expand the democratic dimension of the republic's governance system. The party program went as follows:

> We are strongly in favor of general liberties and rights... individual liberties and consequent debate will fix the defects that exist in our public system...Individual liberties will be effective at every level...In order to show our sincerity about individual liberties and freedom we will have a high level of inside-party democracy.[169]

As opposed to the existing Republican People's Party (CHP), which seemed to represent the authoritative dimension of the liberalization project—a characteristic stemming from the Tanzimat period and therefore seen as the extension of the *İttihat Terakki* tradition— the TCF was clearly representing the liberal, democratic dimension of the Ottoman-Turkish integration with western political norms.[170] It should therefore be noted that even though the initiation phase for this party can be partly explained by domestic power struggles, its main philosophy and the energy upon which it drew for support came from an effort to instill more deeply the effects of political globalization on the way to western-style democracy. In rhetoric at least, the TCF was seeking a deepening or consolidation of the political transformation that had long been sought, and had finally been reached—on paper.

As was noted, the struggle between dominant and challenging ideas was forced into being based on a largely perpetuated concept of regime security. Unfortunately, there were at this time events taking place in Turkey to which the security-minded elite could point and then forcefully claim that not only the regime but the very state itself was at stake. This meant virtual death knells for the democratic elite and their arguments. The Kurdish rebellions and the state response to them would bring about a securitization period both in public discourse and action, and once again political globalization attempts would be sacrificed in the name of stability and security by a security-minded elite.

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[169] Ahmet Yeşil, *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* [Progressive Republican Party] (Ankara: Cedit Neşriyat, 2002), 446.
[170] Çavdar, 266.

Once the insurgent movements began in Turkey's south east, CHP leader, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, asked for a declaration of emergency law. The rejection of his proposal by the parliament led to his resignation. A new cabinet was formed, one headed by Ali Fethi Okyar, who had a "softer" approach towards managing the rebellions.[171] As will be shown in the next section, however, the manner in which incidents progressed, and the way in which Atatürk and elite opinion treated and reacted to these developments, paved the way for future hawkish policies and politicians—such as would be expected under a national security regime. Security-minded politicians were present and ready to retake the government in order to crush the rebellions—once again at the expense of many liberties.

The Sheik Said Rebellion and the Turkish State's Response

There were several Kurdish rebellions in both the Ottoman period and in republican times.[172] Some elements of Kurdish society—inherited from the late Ottoman times to the republican era—were not easily willing to subordinate to the regime and policies of the young Turkish republic. Starting with the republican period, several Kurdish groups wanted to have more control and autonomy in their affairs. Among these were, in particular, the remaining members of the *Hamidiye Alaylari*, or the forces of Abdulhamit that had been derived primarily from the Kurdish tribes in order to fight against the advancing Russian armies and cooperating Armenian rebels. While it is unnecessary to give extensive details about the reasons behind these Kurdish rebellions throughout history, it is important to note that these movements were at least partially stimulated by the emerging nationalist tendencies prominent in the world at the time. The important factor is that the Ottoman/Turkish modernization project as a nation-state with a centralization agenda was disturbing to Kurdish

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[171] He reportedly said that he would not "shed blood unnecessarily". Ibid., 277.

[172] For a thoughtful analysis by an army officer of the rebellions made during the republican era, see Reşat Hallı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Ayaklanmalar 1924-1938* [Rebellions in the Turkish Republic 1924-1938] (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Harp Tarihi Başkanlığı, 1972).

elements that were accustomed to some—and wanting even more—local autonomy. It can be argued that, ironically, Kurdish demands for more autonomy were both in part the result of political globalization (in the sense of nationalism at the time) while at the same time helping to create a basis for the governing elite to resist against the further power-diffusion impact of that same force of political globalization.

The Turkish revolutions, i.e. the removal of the Caliph and the Sultan and the emerging Turkish characteristics of the new republic, even further incited the existing insurgent potential of some Kurdish figures. When Sheik Said declared his rebellion in 1925, several other tribes joined him, constituting a substantial front that was able to begin taking over power in some small towns in the Turkish southeast. Military developments in terms of how the rebellion progressed and the Turkish military responses will not be discussed here since it is the political implications that are relevant to the topic. Suffice it to say that the Turkish side, with some help from the French government, was able to mobilize a large number of troops to the region, thereby changing the military balance in the region in favor of the government forces. The rebellions were suppressed, and the leaders, including Sheik Said, were caught and executed in April 1925[173].

The political implications of the rebellions and, perhaps more importantly, of the state's responses, are important to analyze. The government of Prime Minister Fethi Okyar, relying on the constitution, declared emergency law, and appealed to the parliament for confirmation. He supported his request by pointing to the possible external-internal linkages in terms of the real causes behind the rebellions, referring to the agreement plans with foreign powers such as Britain for the southern border. His understanding that the rebellions may have had external support received wide backing in the parliament, including that of its chairman, Kazim Karabekir Pasha, who said that, "everybody should know that all the

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[173] Yeşil, 404-427.

children of this homeland will unite, be ready to make any sacrifices in order to stand against internal and external enemies."[174]

Despite the declaration of the emergency law, a sense of insecurity seemed to be growing. From leading local figures in every corner of the country, Atatürk received telegrams condemning the rebellions and pledging support to the government.[175] A complete securitization and full-fledged national campaign for national security and stability was being formed. Such an environment in which the primacy of security was now deemed absolute, was seen as a golden opportunity for the hawks who thought that the state was at stake and that the then Prime Minister was overly soft and "democratic". The hawks strongly criticized the government's attitude in parliament. In the name of security, huge political changes could be rushed through with little debate, and once Mustafa Kemal also voiced the opinion that a harsher response to the rebellions was necessary, a new hawkish government, again headed by security-minded Ismet İnönü, promptly took over. İnönü's opening speech in the new parliament signaled the coming securitization period and a slowing down of democratic movements: "We will take every measure in order to crush the recent events quickly and forcefully and to protect our homeland from any chaotic situation. This will be done to strengthen and consolidate the state's power."[176]

İnönü's government immediately introduced a proposed law, known later as "*Takrir-i Sukun*" (Reconstruction of the Calm). The law's overarching main article, which could be used to arbitrarily block any political activity, stated that: "The government can—with the

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[174] For the negotiations over the decision to declare emergency law, see Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi* [Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly], vol. 14, session 4, 25 February 1925, 306-309.
[175] Çavdar, 276. Mustafa Kemal's responses to these telegrams were issued in the newspapers. *Anadolu News Agency*, 26 September 1925.
[176] Ibid., 277.

confirmation of the president—forbid and abolish any institution, behavior, and publications which disrupt the country's social order, calm, security, and safety."[177]

Many liberal parliamentarians opposed the authoritative, dictatorship-like proposal. One parliamentarian said in response that combating the rebellions should be done "with respect to the people's individual rights and safety." Yet another, representing a region in which there was rebellion, remarked bitterly that, "there is no concept in the world as big as national safety and order, especially the word security, such a concept that arbitrarily can include even the thoughts in people's brains". Still another parliamentarian pointed out that the arbitrary potentials of such a blanket law meant that the government did not trust its nation." [178]

Government representatives, such as Defense Minister Recep Peker, rejected this last accusation, saying that there were "realities" and these realities should not be allowed to disappear among the idealist and philosophical theories—suggesting that democratic approaches in response to threats were only a delusion. Meanwhile, the Justice Minister reiterated the idea that the law was necessary in order to block the growing anarchy in the country. Ultimately, the irresistible supremacy of security over liberal political approaches became evident, and the law passed with a significant majority.

Along with the Reconstruction of the Calm law, two war-time type tribunals with extraordinary powers were also established in the mid-1920s. One was established to handle cases within the rebellion zone, but the second was given a jurisdiction that extended outside of the rebellion zone, and could therefore be considered as an indication that the state elite was preparing to take authoritative measures across the country—meaning, in other words, a

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[177] For the three brief points made in this law, see Zafer Üsküll, *Siyaset ve Asker* [Politics and the Army] (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1997), 88.

[178] These quotes of Feridun Fikri Bey, Hulusi Turgut Bey, and others, as well as further details of the liberal parliamentarians' arguments, can be found in Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması 1923-1931* [The Establishment of One-Party Rule in the Turkish Republic 1923-1931] (Ankara: Cem Yayınevi, 1981), 142-143.

much larger securitization.[179] Using the new tribunal, the government quickly shut down several newspapers that had positioned themselves largely independent from the dominant government perspective.[180] Even after the rebellions were under control, the emergency laws including the tribunals continued, allowing the security-minded, hawkish elite to take care of various problems they had been concerned with earlier. All measures were taken with the express reason of the state's security and the regime's security, and nothing, not even the opposition party, whose democratic ideas and proposals meant little in public opinion at a time of widespread securitization, could resist against such a major drive.

The general mood of the more security-minded ruling elite at the time seemed determined to use the opportunity to eradicate all political alternatives and opposition potential. At the peak of its activity, in 1926, the war-time tribunal (*Istiklal Mahkemesi*) sent a note to the chief prosecutor's office, saying that it had been proven that the Progressive Republican Party had used propaganda and activities based on political Islam for its political interest, and that the government should be informed about this. The chief prosecutor's office lost no time in passing the note on to the government, which in turn applied the *Takrir-i Sukun* law and closed down the TCF in order to protect the people from "being provoked."[181] Clearly the government was not prepared to entrust the people with further liberties, believing that such liberties could be manipulated and could pose risks to the regime and to state security.

There is little doubt that the security-oriented, statist elite used the securitization process, but it is less clear whether the fear for the state's and regime's security was based on genuine or simply constructed perceptions of danger. The fact is that the implementation of the dictatorship-like laws did continue well after the immediate danger of the Kurdish

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[179] This interpretation is also implied in Üskül, 82.
[180] These included "Tevhid-I Efkar", "Son Telegraf", "Istiklal", "Sebilurreşat", "Aydınlık", "Sadayıhak", "Sayha", and "İstikbal." Tunçay, 142-146.
[181] Çavdar, 281.

rebellions was suppressed,[182] and was used with the aim of curbing not only alternative political elite attempts at power, but also Islamic and left-wing movements.[183] It is also clear that this practice of appealing to security issues would become the expected form of behavior of the dominant security-oriented elite in its future relations with democratic forces.

Second Multi-Party Attempt and the State's Response: The Free Party Experience

There are two main arguments to explain why, by the early 1930s, Atatürk wanted to promote the formation of an alternative party and make another attempt at multiparty politics. The first argues that after five years of intensive transformations—including the major reforms in dress code, alphabet, etc.—and a period of iron fist rule by a single party with little economic success to show--the opposition among the society had been provoked. Were this opposition to be allowed to continue in a manner uncontrolled by the state, it might have led to the decay of public order, ultimately threatening the power of the state and regime. A new party attempt to channel the opposition in more manageable directions could have seemed highly desirable.[184] Certain leaders of the newly created Free Party (*Serbest Fırka*) report having had doubts themselves about the possible truth of this argument.[185]

On the other hand, it could also be argued that Atatürk was an idealist in terms of developing the nation's republican structure into a democratic one, and was in fact seeking

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[182] One example of this was the wide and arbitrary naming of suspects for an assassination attempt on Mustafa Kemal in June 1926. The law was then used to try, dismiss, and discredit many opposition figures. For details on the assassination attempt and its implications see Ergun Aybers, "İstiklal Mahkemeleri 1923-1927" ["War-time Tribunals 1923-1927"] (Ph.D. diss, Ankara Üniversitesi, 1979).

[183] A fascinating example of how the extraordinary tribunals acted virtually on behalf of the government is shown in the case of a private letter from a member of the East Revolution Court, in which he tells how diligently he is working to "punish the journalists in the area". He ends the letter by asking for his "new orders" and for the route that he should follow to do his job better. Çavdar, 282.

[184] Tunçay seems quite sure that Mustafa Kemal, with his well-known pragmatism, must have organized and supported the formation of the Free Party in order to make the potential societal opposition more focused, and therefore more visible and controllable. Tunçay, 249.

[185] In a memoir by one of the leading figures in the Free Party, the author indicates that during the course of events, he and some other Free Party leaders were not really sure of Atatürk's true position in terms of his promotion of their party, and were concerned that they were just being used in order to explore the true trends within society. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları* [Free Party Memoirs] (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969).

opportunities to acclimate Turkish society to true notions of democracy. The same Free Party

leader cited as expressing his doubts also reports in his memoirs that Atatürk personally

offered to him the following reasoning behind his decision to ask him to start the Free Party,

"Our new republic does not look that impressive. I am a mortal, before I die I want to see my

nation accustomed to real freedom and democracy, and for this there is the need for a new

alternative political party."[186] Moreover, in a speech given to the parliament during the period

of the Free Party, Atatürk stressed three issues he felt should be emphasized at that time:

justice, economic policies, and the "untouchableness" of election freedom, and he supported

his calls for freedom of the press by saying it was the way to reach a "more democratic

government".[187]

Whichever is the case, clearly he was giving great importance to the multiparty

attempt. One major factor that may have forced him into this position were external images of

the Turkish elite. It is reported that there was an increasing discontent among some of the

Turkish ruling elite that Turkey's single-party system symbolized some form of "inferiority"

next to the western type of democracies. Mustafa Kemal particularly felt an increasing

discomfort with western criticisms about this issue.[188] Moreover, it has been reported that the

speaker of the Turkish parliament told Mustafa Kemal and Fethi Bey that it was "really

embarassing" to try and defend the single-party system when he was in Europe. The report

also states how Mustafa Kemal was very pleased with the positive reactions from the West

with respect to the Free Party attempt in Turkey.[189]

Most likely, Atatürk was pushed to seek further liberalization by a combination of the

above factors. While he was someone who had always had in mind an historical project of

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[186] Ibid., 64.
[187] Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 22, session 1, 1 November 1930, 3.
[188] This atmosphere among the Turkish elite and, in particular, with Mustafa Kemal, was reported by the then American Ambassador to Turkey, J.C. Grew in his book, *Turbulent Era* (Cambridge: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952), 869.
[189] Tunçay, 245-246.

transforming the country along the lines of western governance systems, he was also a very practical man, who would seek to avoid risks, and might therefore be expected to comfortably set up a control mechanism to secure the country's transformation in the face of circumstantial challenges. In fact, in the course of this experience, Atatürk would reflect this split, as he was torn between further liberalization and the stability and security of the governance system, as well as the safety of the elite who had managed to bring about the existing level of Turkish integration with western norms. For the argument being presented here, what is important is the outcome of the second multi-party experience, the tragedy of which served to solidify the already budding national security syndrome among the state elite.

Development of the Free Party

Fethi Bey, former Prime Minister and later Turkish ambassador to France, as well as close personal friend of Atatürk, wrote a letter to Mustafa Kemal in spring 1930. After giving his opinions on the problems in Turkey, he drew on his observations about democratic developments abroad to make certain recommendations for improvement:

> In order to consolidate and further the republican regime in Turkey, instead of having a single party system [we need] a multiparty system that will establish freedom, debate, and control over the government about its policies vis-à-vis society. With your permission, I intend to enter politics with another party in order to reach this goal.[190]

In his response, Mustafa Kemal stated his agreement with the ideas:

> Since my youth I have been in love with the idea of a system which would control and check government affairs. During my tenure as president, I assure you that with all my power and responsibilities I will treat every political party equally, staying within the parameters of the secular republican system. Your party won't have any obstacles...[191]

Following this exchange, Fethi Bey came to Istanbul on a two-month leave from his post as ambassador. He met with Mustafa Kemal, who repeated his views, adding that the current

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[190] Ahmet Ağaoğlu, 8.
[191] Ibid., 11.

system looked like "a dictatorship", and that he did not want to leave behind such an authoritative system.[192] He reemphasized his only reservations, a sensitivity to the republican regime and to secularism. This may be why he entrusted this mission only to his closest friends, thus choosing Fethi Bey, whom he probably felt he could count on to recognize and appreciate the line between liberalization values and risks to the regime and state.

Once agreed upon, the procedures were quickly made, and the party was established on August 12, 1930. The nature of the party was clearly one in favor of liberalism. One of the founding figures, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, whom Mustafa Kemal strongly encouraged to become one of the party founders, was a well-known firm supporter of liberal economics and politics. Even the very name of the party itself (*Serbest*—means "free") referred to freedom and free politics.

The Free Party soon began receiving a tremendous amount of positive attention from the society,[193] and also support from some newspapers.[194] Unlike in the case of the first multi-party attempt and the resulting TCF, which, to a large extent had come about as the result of an internal power struggle among the ruling elite, the Free Party began to receive support from the society. For the first time a true mobilization of the masses seemed possible, and the ruling elite saw the potential for a movement that could truly threaten the status quo and the goals of their revolution.

When the leadership of the Free Party traveled to the city of Izmir, the local CHP city administrators tried to block their coming, nevertheless the support of the people was overwhelming.[195] The Free Party slogans of "long live the free republic" and "long live the

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[192] Tunçay, 252.

[193] Fethi Okyar, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Nasıl Doğdu Nasıl Feshedildi* [How was the Free Republican Party Born and Dissolved] (Istanbul: n.p., 1987), 443. Also see Furuzan Hüsrev Tökin, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler ve Siyasi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi 1839-1965* [Political Parties and the Development of Political Thought in Turkey 1839-1965] (Istanbul: Elif, 1965), 74-75.

[194] *Son Posta, Yarın*, and *Halkın Sesi*. Tunçay, 257.

[195] Fethi Okyar even reports that the father of a child, who was killed in clashes between Free Party supporters and government representatives, said to him that the dead child was his sacrifice to save the people from the current administration. Okyar, 448.

free country" also reflected what the people saw in this party, or what they wanted from it for themselves. It began to appear as though the party was more than just an alternative competing political party in parliament, but rather a people's revolutionary movement, that could possibly take over the entire state power.

It was said that the party came to represent everything reactionary to the existing system.[196] Then Prime Minister, Ismet İnönü, commented on this, saying,

> Everybody who was against the Atatürk administration and my government due to the rapid revolutionary reforms such as the dress code, and to the relocation of some people due to the eastern rebellions, they all found a common place and shelter in this party.[197]

His thoughts are supported by evidence from some Free Party gatherings and demonstrations, in which slogans against secularism and demands for reversing the more revolutionary reforms were in evidence.[198] It was even charged that "anti-revolutionary elements" were taking advantage of the party and trying to "hide behind the nice name of the party [and] poison the society against the government/state."[199]

More important than the personal historic accounts of what happened, is the evidence of how the state structure and elite reacted to the Free Party experience. The ruling elite had first thought that having a small, weak alternative, would strengthen their own party's image in society. When it became clear that the new party was poised to become a truly competitive one, a kind of panic broke out among the ruling elite.[200] The CHP immediately established a "counter-struggle group", consisting of 40 deputies in control of several state functions.[201]

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[196] Çetin Yetkin, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı* [Free Republican Party] (Istanbul: Özal Matbaası, 1982), 111.
[197] İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar* [Memoirs] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), 2: 229-230.
[198] Tökin, 74-75.
[199] Hilmi Uran, *Hatıralarım* [My Memoirs] (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959), 219.
[200] Fethi Okyar himself admits that, even to his own surprise, it appeared that the Free Party was getting overwhelming attention from society, and this panicked the ruling elite, since it threatened their status and power. Okyar, 490-491.
[201] These deputies had formal and informal ties to the different executive branches of the state, for example to MPs who were on the Committee for Internal Ministry Supervision. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, 28.

Thus the party began using the "state machine"[202] to block the new party's progress. When, for example, the Free Party leadership was planning to make an important trip to Izmir, the CHP governor of the city refused to provide even basic services, such as some security arrangements.[203]

The security-minded bureaucracy and the CHP elite quickly resorted to similar measures as they had in the first multi-party attempt, and brought charges on the Free Party concerning threats to the regime and to state security. With references to dissident elements among the Free Party's supporters, the ruling elite revived the debate over the republican regime, secularism, and the country's safety.[204] Finally, a leading parliamentarian and owner of the pro-regime newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, wrote in his newspaper an open letter to Mustafa Kemal on September 9, 1930, showing how the securitization of this political issue was nearly complete, "Some other parties are trying to show that our chief, Mustafa Kemal, is on their side, *even if that might be the case*, we [the CHP and the state elite] have a life mission to protect the republic and are ready to defend it under any condition" (italics mine).[205] It was obvious that the power of the status quo was based on a linking of the elite's interests to the claimed interests of the regime and state. Without this, it should have been extremely difficult to declare such a threatening message to the founder of the republic in the name of that same republic.

Once again, the state elite preferred to emphasize the security of the regime over the arguments for liberalization in the debate. Their approach and emphasis on the security dimensions of public life produced a rhetoric, which basically argued that further democratization attempts, including a larger societal over state role, would bring anarchy and

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[202] Tunçay, referring to Okyar, points out that the Free Party, in order to avoid the enmity of the state apparatus, guaranteed the presidency of Mustafa Kemal. Tunçay, 254.

[203] It is even reported that government agents tried to physically block the society from showing their support for the new party. Ibid., 41.

[204] One leading CHP member, Cevdet Kerim İncedayı, accused the Free Party leadership of "betrayal to the motherland". Ibid., 45.

insecurity. The Free Party, on the other hand, was trying to argue that if the state apparatus would refrain from taking sides or otherwise intervening, then politics (elections) could take place in a normal way, and then there would be no need to worry about security and stability. The following dialogue between Mustafa Kemal—who seemed at this time to suscribe to the elite's securitization campaign—and a leading Free Party figure, clearly shows the faultlines between security and political liberalization:

> Ağaoğlu: My pasha, we [the Free Party] would be more successful if the police and the state forces didn't openly block us and side with the other party...
> Mustafa Kemal (a bit angrily): Efendi, anarchy is emerging everywhere. The people hit the army commander on the head in Antalya, he's a patient guy, if it were me...
> A: Pasha, what was the commander doing in the election-polling station?
> MK: He was there to stop the anarchy.
> A: No, anarchy emerges because he goes there in order to block a free election. People go there to vote, and what they see are soldiers in front of them.
> MK (very angrily): Anarchy, there is anarchy everywhere, you are oblivious or blind to this fact...how can you expect me to be impartial then (about political parties)? [206]

There were many similar dialogues over security and democracy. When the leader of the Free Party, Fethi Bey, was giving a parliamentary speech in which he criticized the existing conditions for the improvement of democracy, another deputy responded saying, "the alternative [to the current authoritative system] is anarchy; you want anarchy." Yet another parliamentarian said, "we can not give up state authority in the name of freedom and democracy," adding that free politics would "plunge the country into a blood bath." Still another went further and proposed that the Free Party leadership be tried for betrayal and treason to the motherland.[207]

At this moment, the process of securitization was irreversible. The dichotomous understanding about the relationship between democratization (liberalization) and the security

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[205] Yunus Nadi, "Atatürk'e Açık Mektup" ["Open Letter to Atatürk,"] Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 9 September 1930. For Atatürk's response to this letter see, Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 10 September 1930.
[206] Ahmet Ağaoğlu, 63-64.
[207] Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 22, session 1, 1 November 1930, 16-23.

of the nation and state, obviously had become the primary lens used by most of the elite to make sense of what was taking place. The argument boiled down to "anarchy" vs. "democracy". The position of the powerful elite was best reflected in the personal situation of Mustafa Kemal. As someone who was impatient to transform his country as quickly as possible into a western nation-state with a democratic structure, he probably felt trapped. While his "youthful dreams" were of the west and their political governance techniques and his inherited genes from the Ottoman modernization attempts forced him to go ahead with political liberalization attempts, his constant worries over keeping the state and the regime intact (particularly in consideration of the major characteristics of the previous Ottoman period of anarchy, loss of control, and ultimate defeat), kept his progressive tendencies cautious and guarded.

It was clear that Mustafa Kemal did seek solutions for this torn situation. In a newspaper article in August 1930, the idea of a kind of "block"—which he had apparently devised—was introduced. According to the article, Mustafa Kemal would become the chair of both of the two parties, and would nominate candidates for each party's upcoming elections. These candidates would then be elected through free elections, and the parties would be represented in the parliament according to their election success. Both parties, however, would be strictly loyal to secularism and would avoid "harmful" policies and constituents.[208] This suggests that Mustafa Kemal was looking for a way of keeping political competition (seen as producing anarchy) under control, and therefore securing the system, while still maintaining an image of political plurality.

At the end, however, Mustafa Kemal apparently surrendered to his fears of security, and decided not even to opt for the "block" idea. The security elite no doubt played their role in this decision. Many army commanders visited Mustafa Kemal, and revealed their ideas that the Free Party experience was having a negative impact on the army, and that if things were

allowed to continue, it would become difficult for army commanders to control the situation.[209] Clearly the degree of securitization of the public agenda had reached such a level that it could reveal the limits of even Mustafa Kemal's power.[210] The situation also made clear that even the most powerful elements of the elite, those who had started the revolution, now had to respond to the needs of the increasingly consolidated and institutionalized status quo concepts and structures. We can now see at this point some kind of convergence between the interests of the consolidated elite and the continuance of the regime and the governance system as it was. In a sense, when the elite—including Mustafa Kemal—thought about the security of the regime/state/nation, they were also very much looking at the safety of their own interests and power.

Under these circumstances, the Free Party experience came to an end. Mustafa Kemal made his choice and told the Free Party leadership that he would chair the existing CHP party, and they should therefore compete against him. Fethi Bey, as leader of the Free Party, said that the party had not been formed in order to fight against Mustafa Kemal, and on October 17, 1930, the Free Party closed itself down. A party which had sought to introduce multi-party politics, whose ideas clearly reflected the cutting-edge political freedoms and liberalization issues in Western Europe,[211] and whose main mission was making Turkey's governance system as democratic as those of the European states, had fallen prey to the sometimes genuine, sometimes distorted understandings and manipulations of the securitization process.

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[208] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 5 August 1930.

[209] Ahmet Ağaoğlu, 77.

[210] It was reported at the time that at least one of Mustafa Kemal's closest friends said at a dinner party that if it were necessary, "they" would even fight against Mustafa Kemal himself, in the name of the security of the republic. Ibid., 71.

[211] These were more or less outlined by Fethi Bey during his famous Izmir visit, when he described European progress as the result of "a balanced combination of capital and labor in a very free competition," free politics, a liberalism that "leaves people's issues to the people", individual initiatives and a well-defined state role. Çavdar, 300.

Shortly after the closure, an incident took place that provided a kind of justification to the elite who had emphasized the importance of state security and regime safety. A rebellion attempt took place in the small town of Menemen, near Izmir, where the Free Party had had significant popularity. Apparently, a religious person named "Dervish Mehmet", taking advantage of a political environment favoring opposition, organized some pro-caliphate circles[212]. On December 30, 1930, they called for a rebellion, citing the "siege" on religion and Islam, and calling for *shariat*. The incident became more dramatic when the local security chief tried to stop them, and was murdered. The rebels made a show of this, cutting off the man's head and carrying it around the city on a stick. Shortly thereafter, the rebellion attempt was quickly squashed, and the leaders were captured, tried, and executed.

Such an incident had a huge influence on the minds of the elite. First, Mustafa Kemal and the security-minded elite who suscribed to the argument that democratic expansion would lead to anarchy, now seemed proven right. The securitization process had the evidence it sought. Second, related to the previous point, this incident was taken as an indication of the potential of the fragmented characteristics among society, and further consolidated the national security syndrome. It became now "obvious" to many elite minds that society was not ready to be trusted with democracy. Therefore, 'sincere feelings' about world-standard democratic values had to be at least postponed, if not sacrificed, in the name of preventing anarchy and regime insecurity.[213] The national security syndrome now had a significant element in it which saw a serious counter-revolution potential stemming from society's fragmented characteristics. By this time, the Kurdish rebellions, which had characterized and led to the end of the first multi-party attempts, along with the Menemen rebellion, which justified the accumulated fear about the opposition, presented sufficient evidence and grounds

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[212] These were religious circles that were opposed to the new secular reforms, and which sought to overthrow the secular administration and reinstate the Caliphate. Neşet Çağatay, *Türkiye'de Gerici Eylemler: 1923ten Bu Yana* [Regressive Activities in Turkey: From 1923 until Today] (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1972), 33-34.

for justification for the Turkish state elite and society that they had a real national (in)security problem.

The "what if anarchy comes" understanding had won, and, furthermore, the related fears seemed even more consolidated after now a second attempt at multi-party politics had had such an unfortunate outcome. Perhaps most significantly, such a high and consolidated level of national (in)security would serve to significantly reduce the capacity of the inherently globalizing elite to push for further political liberalization attempts on its own. In other words, future political liberalization efforts would have to be initiated and strongly urged by foreign international dynamics in order for the Turkish elite to respond, and even such responses would be plagued by an ever-increasing national security syndrome. Any deepening of democracy would now be postponed until political globalization once again knocked at the door of the Turkish republic.

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[213] Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Turkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, 1859-1952* [Political Parties in Turkey, 1859-1952] (Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları, 1952), 623-625.

Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the Turkish republic and state were in a political environment in which the safety and security of the regime and state held primacy in public life. There was an increasing societal unhappiness with the policies of the state but the state elite apparently felt that an authoritarian system could and should continue in order to further consolidate the radical societal reforms. Despite this strong belief and consequent policies, at the end of World War II—a time when arguably the security orientation was even more acute in the public realm—the Turkish state elite decided to opt for multi-party politics, this time a true deepening attempt of democracy, on a long-lasting Turkish journey towards political liberalization.

One can quickly list the possible reasons for why the state elite would make such a move. First, it is possible that Ismet İnönü, by this time President of the republic, was sincere in terms of democratic developments and wished to materialize this long-time dream of Atatürk's.[214] Second, similar to the argument about the Free Party experience in the previous chapter, İnönü may have seen the multi-party system as a cure for the high levels of public discomfort and bad conditions, of which he could not help but have been aware.[215] Third, and perhaps most important, the international environment and Turkey's foreign and security policy concerns must have played a significant role. Turkey's increasing isolation from the world and consequent security threats were reaching dangerous levels, and probably pushed Turkey to seek shelter in the camp of the winning parties of WWII—most of whom had an overarching democratic agenda. Such a repositioning of Turkey in order to integrate her more

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[214] İnönü is reported as referring in a radio speech in 1962 to how important it had been to pay attention to this goal of Mustafa Kemal. Şevket S. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, İsmet İnönü* [The Second Man, Ismet Inonu] (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1968), 2: 33.
[215] William Hale, *1789'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset* [Turkish Military and Politics], trans. A. Fethi (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1996), 86.

with the West would have forced liberal democratic reforms in the country. In an interview years later, İnönü implied that the foreign impact was crucial.[216]

While the elite's decision to introduce multi-party politics undoubtedly rested to some degree on both a sincere desire for democratization as well as a desire to soothe societal unease, I would argue that those same issues were consistent throughout the 1930s and even early 1940s (though admittedly the world war would have made any liberalization attempt less possible) yet the single-party regime during those years never made a move towards political liberalization. On the contrary, by creating its own totalitarian ideology and policies, it virtually consolidated an anti-democratic style. It is necessary therefore, to look in detail at the external conditions, to see how this elite—who appeared in no rush for further democratization—was forced into a real democratic experience.

In looking at this issue, the chapter begins by showing how security concerns, which constituted the main agenda in the minds of the state elite, led to the drive for further integration and political liberalization. In essence, we will see how the events of the Ottoman times are repeated, as the need for security again forces integration with the west, which, in turn, forces political liberalization. The chapter goes on to show how these forces for political liberalization, in other words, the political globalization impact, began to undergo a fundamental change, which might be termed as a "deepening" process. This change sparks for the first time a true conflict in Turkey, along the lines of the hypothesizing in chapter one. Where previously the security/liberalization debate had been carried out at a largely philosophical level, with security taking the obvious dominant position, liberalization demands now began requiring concrete and substantive responses, such as the introduction of multi-party politics. The chapter provides a detailed picture of the conflictive transformation that results as the security and liberalization demands clash in earnest. Within this discussion,

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[216] Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Turkey's Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective," in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin

the chapter first explores the growing division between the institutions and even individual figures of the traditional state elite and those of the "political realm" that emerges with multi-party politics. It goes on to identify two syndromes, which ultimately define the parameters of a "grand compromise"—in other words, a kind of balance achieved between the state and political realms in their efforts to address the two conflicting pressures on the nation. This "grand compromise" will serve as the starting point for the dual institutionalization of the state.

The Turkish security problematic during and after World War II: The Threat of Isolation

Largely because of its geopolitical significance, Turkey was pressured by the war-waging sides in WWII to align itself as quickly as possible. Torn between the competing demands of both sides, Turkish foreign policy of the time came to be called *denge politikası*', or balanced politics, and was neither terribly smooth nor clear. The main goal of the policy was to try and keep the country out of the war, and thereby not risk losing its sovereignty and independence.[217] This key aspect of the policy, with all the risks it brought—such as being left truly alone and defenseless—also indicates just how the safety of the regime, domestic order, and state were the dominant mission of the elite.

With its main strategic goal of keeping the country out of the war, the policy of *denge* evolved mainly around using and playing off the power relations and competition that existed between the axis powers of Germany and Italy, and the Allied powers of England, France, the Soviet Union, and USA.[218] The Turkish elite did not pay much attention to the ethical or moral responsibilities of war-time international relations, rather, for them the war was a

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(Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988).

[217] Taner Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş* [Transition to Multi-Party Politics in Turkey] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1991), 38, and Yusuf Sarınay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi ve NATO'ya Girişi (1939-1952)* [Orientation of Turkey to the Western Alliance and Her Entrance to NATO (1939-1952)] (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988), 20.

European major power affair, and had nothing to offer to Turkey.[219] Through skillful

diplomatic maneuvers, Turkey managed to stay outside of the physical destruction of WWII.

This did not mean, however, that Turkey was able to reach a secure environment—the

ultimate goal of the *denge* policy.

During 1944, the Allies increased their pressure on Turkey to join in the war, or to at

least let them use Turkish air and land facilities in their war effort. In January 1944, a British

envoy came to Turkey and wanted to talk about the preparation of various air defense systems

and bases for the Allies. The Turkish side made it clear that as long as the Allies did not

provide a sufficient amount of equipment to the Turkish side, Turkey would not allocate bases

for their use.[220] When it was clear that a kind of impasse had been reached between the two

sides, Winston Churchill instructed the British envoy to tell the Turks that if they did not

cooperate, or if they demanded amounts of supplies that could not be provided by the Allies,

the Allies would cut off whatever aid they had been giving to Turkey, and she would find

herself isolated and alone at the end of the war. He added that the Turkish Straits were not so

important for Britain, and that Turkey would not be able to rely on British support in the face

of possible Russian demands on Turkey about the Straits.[221] By February, Turco-British

relations were on the rocks. British military aid to Turkey was called to a halt, and the British

community in Turkey, including engineers and even diplomats, were instructed by the British

government to cut off all contact with Turkish officials. By April, American aid ("Lend and

Lease") was stopped.

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[218] Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945): Dönemin İç ve Dış Politikası Üzerine Bir Araştırma* [The National Chief Era in Turkey (1938-1945): A Research on the Internal and External Policies of the Era] (Ankara: Yurt Yayınevi, 1986), 398.

[219] Selim Deringil, "İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası," ["Turkish Foreign Policy in World War II,"] *Tarih ve Toplum* 3 (November 1986): 35. For similar views see, Rıfkı Salim Burçak, *Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçiş (1945-1950)* [Transition to Democracy in Turkey (1945-1950)] (n.p.: Olgaç Matbaası, 1979), 43-44.

[220] Deringil, 186-187.

[221] Kenan Öner, *Siyasi Hatıralarım ve Bizde Demokrasi* [My Political Memoirs and Our Democracy] (İstanbul: Osmanbey Matbaası, 1948), 220-221.

At the same time, the Turks, having considered the Soviets a threat since the beginning of the war, began to grow even more uncomfortable with the Soviets' attitude. In a March meeting between a Turkish foreign ministry official and the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, the Soviet side made it clear that they no longer cared whether Turkey joined the war on their side, which clearly meant the evaporation of one of the main pillars of the *denge* policy[222]. A policy which had saved Turkey from getting into the destructive war, now seemed to lead to a very insecure psychological and physical environment, in which Turkey felt politically isolated, that is, without allies, and threatened.

The Turkish side immediately launched initiatives to regain the support of the Allies, especially as it became clearer that they were going to be the victors in the war. First, having resisted the Allies' constant pressure to do so during the war, the Turkish government now chose to not renew a German trade agreement which contained high volumes of chrome—a crucial element for the war industry.[223] Once Turkey's anxiousness to please the Allies became clear, the Allies began to make new demands. Another sticking point during the war had been Turkey's refusal to prevent German ships from using the Turkish Straits. In particular the Soviets had been upset by this, and had written often to the Turkish government claiming that supposed German trade ships were in fact carrying military equipment for the German army. In fact, some of their claims had been proven true when searches were forced by the allies.[224] This discovery forced the resignation of the seemingly pro-German foreign minister, and is considered as one of the turning points in Turkey's shift towards the Allies.

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[222] Necdet Ekinci, *II. Dünya Savaşından Sonra Türkiye'de Çok Partili Düzene Geçişte Dış Etkenler* [External Factors in Turkey's Transition to Multi-Party Politics in the Aftermath of World War II] (Istanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 1997), 221-229.

[223] The Turco-German trade agreement signed on July 25, 1940, stipulated that Turkey would export raw materials and in turn import industrial manufactured items. For details see Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk-Alman Ticaretinde ki İkitisadi Siyaset," ["The Political Economy of Turco-German Trade during World War II,"] *Belleten* 35 (January 1961): 97.

[224] One such incident led to the resignation of Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu, since he, with the guarantee of the German Ambassador, had granted passage permission to that particular ship. Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Soviet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* [Turco-Soviet Relations and the Straits Question] (Ankara: n.p., 1968), 238.

This turn peaked when the Allies, encouraged by growing Turkish cooperativeness, increased the pressure on Turkey to declare war on Germany.[225] The Turkish government was already reconsidering its relations with Germany, and finally, after the official request by the British ambassador, sent on to parliament a decision to cut relations with Germany.

Meanwhile, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Stalin revealed his idea that the existing Montreaux regime of the Turkish Straits had to be revised, since, in his opinion, it gave too much power to Turkey. The second important issue at the Yalta Conference was that of possible Turkish membership in the United Nations—soon to be formed at a meeting in San Francisco. The leaders at Yalta decided that only countries that had declared war on Germany could qualify to attend the conference in California. The issue became even more concrete when the British Ambassador to Turkey delivered a note to the Turkish government reading that in order to be a member of the UN, Turkey had until March 1 to declare war on both Germany and Japan.

The Turkish response to these developments was very cooperative. In an urgent general assembly meeting of the Parliament, overwhelming support was given to the allied demands, the common understanding being that cooperation with the allies was the best move that Turkey could make in trying to reposition itself against existing and future external threats.[226]

The Turkish state elite realized that in order to materialize a fuller, deeper integration with the west, and therefore a greater sense of security, a greater embracing of western political values and identities would also be required. A general effort became evident among the leading makers of public opinion to find ways of identifying Turkey with the West. Since

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[225] The British ambassador to Washington, in a note to US officials, made it clear that they should come up with further pressure on Turkey. Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: 1920-1953* [Turco-Soviet Relations: 1920-1953] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991), 1: 266; Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası* [Fascist German Propaganda in Turkey], trans. Arif Gelen, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, n.d.), 235-236, and Deringil, 172-173.

one of the major characteristics of the west was its democratic look (particularly vis-à-vis the alternative bloc's major characteristics of authoritarianism and communism) an emphasis was quickly placed on democracy and democratization. By emphasizing democracy, Turkey was not only revealing its desire to be a part of the 'safe' West, but also its disinterest in the alternative world of the Soviet bloc.

Since Turkish integration with the West was seen by the Turkish elite as a means of both solving the security problem and securing—if not speeding up—the modernization project, and therefore could be considered as a solution to their biggest challenges, they appeared willing to do whatever it would take to achieve the goal of integration. Achieving this strategic goal would justify adopting virtually anything western, from values to practices, and in particularly those things that would create more permanent links, such as membership in NATO.

Therefore, as efforts towards de-isolating Turkey and encouraging its engagement with the world community were growing to a peak, there was an equally increasing adaptation of rhetoric by the state elite on Turkey's desire to embrace western values. Much of this rhetoric was focused on the "democratic and free" characteristics of the western world. Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, for example, in a speech to parliament during the negotiations over the declaration of war, said, "Turkey, since the first minutes of the danger [war], has invested its material and heart on the side of democratic nations…and finally, with this decision shows its will to join among those who want to save humanity, civilization, freedom and democracy."[227]

In a unanimous vote, parliament supported Turkey's desire both to become a member of the United Nations, and to declare war on Germany and Japan. Consensus ruled outside

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[226] Foreign Minister Saka pointed out, for example, that Turkey would be a part of a large coalition which would lessen the dangerous degree of isolation they were then experiencing. Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 15, emergency session, 23 February 1945.
[227] Ibid.

parliament as well, with the Turkish press enthusiastically supporting the decisions, emphasizing such concepts as democracy, the west, and freedom both as rationales for the decision and as the characteristics of the world that Turkey wanted to be a part of.[228]

The various diplomatic maneuvers designed to keep Turkey out of the actual war and later on to position it among the winning parties, seemed to succeed in reducing Turkey's isolation. But while this was largely true on paper, it was nevertheless obvious among the Allies that Turkey had reached this end through last minute diplomatic moves rather than substantive contributions. It was additionally clear that diplomacy and rhetoric alone would be insufficient to truly move Turkey from her isolated position. Rather, some form of substantive transformation of the political system and deepening of the existing rhetoric would be necessary in order to gain what Turkey really wanted from the war's victorious democracies. In other words, integration—and with it a greater security—could come, but with a major condition.

Democracy as a primary identity of the post-WWII order

The allied victory of WWII was in large part a victory over authoritarian single-party regimes. The conducting of the war on behalf of 'democracy' had already named the primary regime type of the new world order, and the next chapter of history would include a growing tendency towards further democratization. Several studies have pointed out a diffusion of democracy taking place in regular and 'predictable' patterns, which can be classified as increasing waves. While Huntington[229] and Starr[230] are the primary works identifying these

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[228] Various examples from the press include: Nadir Nadi, "Tarihi Karar," ["Historical Decision,"] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 24 February 1945; Ömer Rıza Doğrul, "Dünya Hürriyeti ve Dünya Barışı Uğruna," ["For the Sake of World Freedom and Peace,"] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 24 February 1945, and Necmettin Sadak, "Türkiye BM arasında," ["Between Turkey and the UN,"] *Akşam* (Istanbul), 24 February 1945.

[229] Huntington considered the post-World War II period as one of the primary waves of the global democratization pattern. Huntington, *Third Wave*.

[230] H. Starr, "Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (1991): 356-381. Still another seminal work identifying global democratization trends is Whitehead's *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Laurance Whitehead,

trends, there are also certain quantitative works that have attempted to locate these patterns over time and space.[231]

In connection with the post-World War II democratization trend, human rights and the real progress of individual liberties were to be materialized in order to reach a true democracy, and a deepening process in terms of a convergence around global political liberalization entered a new phase. In Turkey, the global wave of democratization began exerting pressure from two sides. On the one hand, the local elite in Turkey felt the pressure that if they wanted to be on the side of the victorious West, they would have to at least make necessary gestures towards adopting the democratic identity of the West. On the other hand, the West itself, as the apparent source for a global diffusion of democratization, had its own agenda for provoking—or at least stimulating—further democratization abroad in the developing world. Hakan Yilmaz has analyzed declassified U.S. documents from between 1947 and 1960 in order to show U.S. perspectives on the newly emerging Turkish democracy. He points out that while the security of the region was the first priority for American interest in Turkey, another important motive was to "present Turkey as a showcase of fast economic growth within the framework of democracy and capitalism."[232] To him, democracy was seen by the U.S. as a safeguard for political stability in Turkey. A democratic Turkey, according to U.S. policymakers, would more easily "identify itself with the United States and Western Europe."[233]

For the Turkish state elite, this change in the forces of political globalization meant that for the first time, they would be truly forced to respond simultaneously to the two

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ed., *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[231] See for example John O'Coughlin et al., "The Diffusion of Democracy 1946-1994," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 88, no. 4 (1998): 545-574.

[232] Original documents cited by Yilmaz cite a policy of, "encouraging continued development of democratic ideas and institutions in Turkey...[which] would help to ensure Turkey's identification of interest with the Western European and other free nations of the world...it can well serve as an example of peaceful evolution for other underdeveloped areas." Hakan Yilmaz, "American Perspectives on Turkey: An Evaluation of the Declassified U.S. Documents between 1947-1960," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 25 (Fall 2001): 77-101.

pressures that mark the starting point of the hypothesizing in chapter one. Rather than being able to make liberal gestures whenever the security situation seemed stable enough to allow them to do so comfortably, they would now feel required to make certain substantive liberalizing moves regardless of their potentially destabilizing results.

The cornerstones of this new era and its democratic hub had begun to be set in place while the war was still continuing. The first of the cornerstones was the Atlantic Declaration, which stated that "every nation was entitled to choose their regime type freely."[234] The second could be considered as the UN declaration, signed by the 27 nations openly at war against the axis nations, and clearly stating that democratic developments and nations were one of the primary goals of waging the war and the primary characteristics of the post-war future they envisioned.[235]

The role of democracy in the post-war period was also emphasized in the Moscow Conference convened between October 19-30, 1943, as well as during the Dumbarton Oaks Negotiations held between England, the USA, China, and the Soviet Union.[236] Again, during the Yalta Conference towards the end of WWII, the major powers clearly emphasized the primacy of democratic regimes and methods both in domestic and international affairs, referring to "the rights of the people to elect their administrations freely."[237] Another important emphasis on democracy and political liberalization was visible during the Potsdam Conference, at which it was made clear that the axis-supported regimes and countries and similar regimes would not have a place in the United Nations system. This clearly showed the Western reaction against authoritarian regimes, which were considered as the primary causes of the World War.

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[233] Ibid.
[234] Seha Meray, *Devletler Hukukuna Giriş* [Introduction to International Law], 3rd ed. (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1965), 2: 140.
[235] Ekinci, 61-63.
[236] Ibid., 50-54.

All of these developments reflected a growing tendency in Western political strategy of, first, attempting to expand the democratic front by making democracy a primary condition for joining the dominant "civilized" world, and second, isolating anti-democratic or authoritarian fronts in world affairs. It became clear that countries that did not wish or could not afford to be isolated, would be forced to make a choice. This overarching international pattern created a kind of homogenization pressure in terms of the expansion of political liberalization and democracy, as a domestic goal not just among the elite but among the public as well. In other words, a new phase, a deepening one, of the political globalization impact was unfolding. Isolation was becoming increasingly costly, and the major alternative to it was to make progress towards democracy. For Turkey, already feeling isolated and threatened by the Soviets, there seemed little choice at all but to push for further democratization[238]. This time the push could not exist merely on paper or in the form of manipulative practices, it would have to be a substantive effort, regardless of the earlier experiences of the ruling elite.

As one of the leading Turkish diplomats of the era remarked, it was impossible for Turkey to not be influenced by the multi-party transitions and democratic developments in Europe at a time when Turkey desperately wanted to be a part of the western world. Turkish statesmen knew very well that the essential requirement of joining the west was to have a western-style domestic governance and understanding at home. Particularly, a Turkey with a single-party regime and a dictatorship-like structure, which had narrowed individual rights and freedoms even further during the war years, had to be transformed into a liberal political regime.[239]

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[237] Haluk Ülman, *İkinci Dünya Savaşının Başından Truman Doktrinine Kadar Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri 1939-1947* [Turkish- American Diplomatic Relations from the Beginning of World War II until the Truman Doctrine] (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1961), 49-51.
[238] Ibid., 51-53.
[239] Zeki Kuneralp, *İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türk Dış Siyaseti: Dışişleri Bakanlığının 11 Telgrafı* [Turkish Foreign Policy in the World War II: 11 Telegrams of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] (Istanbul: Istanbul, 1982), 89.

It was obvious that the western bloc's criterion for any form of real interconnectedness[240] was democracy, and Turkey had already been criticized for its anti-democratic regime.[241] Similarly, British radio began broadcasting programs criticizing Turkey's conduct of political affairs.[242] This western attitude and pressure would continue even after Turkey initiated multi-party politics, constituting a constant pressure on the Turkish elite to allow the deepening impact of a democratic experiment.[243]

The Turkish state elite seems to have been fully aware of the priority of satisfying the external audience by making immediate promises about democratic reforms. This is evidenced by their emphasizing of external communications rather than internal debate at a domestic level. As the Turk: lite was preparing to attend the San Francisco conference to form the UN, Feridun Ceman Erkin, an important figure among the crowded Turkish delegation, reports that President İnönü instructed him as follows:

> Americans may ask when we are going to start multi-party politics. Answer them this way, Atatürk was a great reformist in Turkey's history, İnönü's role has been to consolidate those reforms and to form the real democratic regime that Atatürk always wanted. İnönü wanted to start this process, but the inconvenient conditions of the war did not help, but in the new environment, reaching this goal of democracy is the President's biggest aim.[244]

An important member of the delegation, Foreign Minister Saka, assured Reuters that Turkey would soon enter multi-party politics while another, future Prime Minister Nihat Erim, announced that İnönü had given their delegation authorization to declare in the US that

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[240] Admittedly, the U.S. was at the time supporting many authoritarian regimes, but one could argue that the relationship was a qualitatively different one from the more "equitable" partnership held between the democratic states.

[241] It was reported that the American economic warfare office asked the Congress to declare Turkey as an unfriendly state because of its political system. Ahmet Emin Yalman quoted in Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi 1930-1945* [Single-party Rule in Turkey 1930-1945] (Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1983), 236.

[242] Ibid., 236.

[243] For example, the American aid which was to be given to Turkey and Greece under the Truman Doctrine led to extensive debates in Congress. Those who were against the aid package said that since there were no democracies in those countries, such aid would be used by the government to suppress further the opposition, and that such aid should be given only when they became real democracies. Oral Sander and Haluk Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler (2)," ["Factors Shaping Turkish Foreign Policy (2),"] *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 27 (March 1972): 1-24.

Turkey would initiate multi-party politics after the war.[245] These and other communications clearly suggest that the external environment and influence were determining factors in Turkey's choice to initiate multi-party politics. Otherwise, how could one explain the fact that the Turkish President chose to inform foreigners, particularly Americans, about his plans for multiparty politics, when the Turkish public was given no clue about these intentions?

Leading figures in the media, who sensed a sea change in the world and the forthcoming policies of Turkish leaders in response to this, showed great interest in this opportunity for further democratization. One commentary, for example, pointed out that Turkey had already chosen its natural side before the war had started, by siding with the democracies.[246] A leading journalist remarked that Turkey had never even glanced at the Nazi camp, in fact, Turkish policy shared common goals with the free democracies of the world, and this had to be told to the American public.[247] Still another journalist claimed that Turkey already had a system inspired by freedom and democracy, and all it needed was the consolidation of democratic rules and the institutionalization of multi-party politics.[248] A leading journalist and statesman pointed out that Turkish democracy was in progress and that everything was ripe for the flourishing of western-style democracy. He added to this that "the members of the single party are the ones who want democracy most."[249] Another commentary made in a newspaper that was the unofficial publication of the ruling elite, stated that "what the Americans want from Turkey in terms of democratization is exactly what the Atatürk

[244] Feridun Cemal Erkin, "İnönü, Demokrasi ve Dışilişkiler," ["Inonu, Democracy and Foreign Relations,"] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 14 January 1974.
[245] Burçak, *Türkiye'de*, 46.
[246] Sadi Irmak, "Avrupa Savaşının Bitmesi ve Memleketimiz," ["The End of the Euroepan War and Our Country,"] *Ülkü*, May 1945, 88.
[247] Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Türk-Amerikan Dostluğu," ["Turkish-American Friendship,"] *Tanin* (Istanbul), 7 January 1945.
[248] Necmettin Sadak, "Beklenen Netice Tam ve Gerçek Bir Tenkit, Kontrol İmkanının Doğmasıdır," ["The Expected Result is the Birth of a Full Review, Control Possibility,"] *Akşam* (Istanbul), 10 September 1945.
[249] Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Türkiye'de Demokrasinin Tekamülü," ["The Maturation of Democracy in Turkey,"] *Ulus* (Istanbul), 22 August 1945.

Republic was born to progress."[250] Obviously, the perception of outside pressure for

liberalization and democratization was enough to release the political liberalization genie that

had been kept in the bottle by an elite who was entirely captivated less than a decade earlier

by the national security syndrome.

Such a foreign reempowerment of those circles ready for democratic expansion was

also made clear in a speech given by the man who would become the first prime minister of

the democratic era in Turkey, Adnan Menderes. Already acting as opposition among the

single party, Menderes was clearly referring to the UN Declaration and its democratic

characteristics when he said on August 15, 1945 that it was essential for Turkey to launch

multiparty politics or liberal democratic steps. Turkey's democratic elements were clearly

seeing the global democratic values and dominant democratic nations as their biggest allies

against the authoritarian state structure, in Turkey's long struggle towards liberalization.

Menderes demanded in the same speech that the "discrepancies between the rights and

entitlements on paper and the de facto situation in Turkey's political governance [had to be]

reconciled."[251] This point made it clear that the formal democracy made on paper by the

republican regime was reaching its limits, and a deepening practice was becoming

unavoidable. In a speech on May 19, 1945, President İnönü made public the idea that this

period was coming to an end, when he said that after the war "democratic principles will take

a larger role in the nation's political life."[252] The same year, the President finalized the

process in his opening speech to parliament, when he said that what was missing in Turkish

political life was an opposition party, "We have past experiences with this...which were even

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[250] Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, "Amerikalılar Türkiye'den Ne Bekliyorlar?" ["What do Americans Expect from Turkey?"] *Ulus* (Istanbul), 11 September 1945.

[251] Quoted in Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye* [From Single-party to Multi-Party] (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1970), 98-99.

[252] For this famous speech see, "19 Mayıs Gençlik ve Spor Bayramı Münasebetiyle Cumhurbaşkanımızın Türk Gençliğine Hitabı," ["The Presidential Speech to the Youth on the Occasion of May 19 National Festival,"] *Ayın Tarihi*, no. 138 (Mayıs 1945), 52-53.

promoted by the existing power."[253] This speech was taking place at the exact time that the

UN was being formed in San Francisco. A very pro-regime commentator who had had, for

reasons of national and regime security, serious reservations during the first and second multi-

party attempts, now said that Turkish democracy would have a "San Francisco label" on it.[254]

In other words, foreign determination on the democratization issue was clear enough that

resistance against it was now seen as futile.

The era of multi-party politics: Separation of the State and Government

Until the launching of multi-party politics, there had been no separation in terms of

power sharing between the state bureaucracy and the single party elite; the state and the party

were virtually the same entity. As the main founder of the republic, the Republican People's

Party (CHP) not only exercised full power within the bureaucratic process, but the party's

elite were essentially the same figures as the bureaucratic elite. With the state and the party

being virtually the same, the introduction of multiparty politics meant above all else, a

separation of these two. Since the state elite had until this point controlled the society via the

CHP, the society's genuine entry into politics through the Democratic Party and consequent

entry into the state apparatus, insured that the separation would not be a smooth one. The

introduction of multi-party politics brought with it the potential for producing a state vs.

society divide that would eventually come to be represented as the hard and soft realms

hypothesized in chapter one. The following sections of this chapter look at how the struggle

between the two realms played out as each sought to gain and maintain power within the

syste, and ultimately how, since neither side could be eliminated, a compromise would be

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[253] "Cumhurbaşkanı İsmet İnönü'nün B.B.M.nin Yedinci Döneminin Üçüncü Toplantısını Açan Tarihi
Nutukları," ["The Historical Speech of the President Ismet Inonu for the Inauguration of the Third Meeting of
the G.N.A.,"] *Ayın Tarihi*, no. 144 (November 1945), 22.
[254] Nadir Nadi, "Yaşasın Demokrasi," ["Long Live Democracy,"] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 26 August 1945.

reached. This compromise would come to represent the working system of a torn state structure.

The Democratic Party (DP) was established on January 7, 1946. The party Chairman was Celal Bayar, a former prime minister from the Atatürk era, known for his liberal economic ideas. It was said that the major item in the party's platform was to control government influence by providing a check on the single party bureaucracy.[255] It was obvious that this was not only a challenge to compete with the existing political party, but a challenge against state influence, which was seen everywhere. This marks the beginning of an era in which power diffusion was to be forced by competition between the state (hard realm) and the government (soft realm), i.e. between the non-elected elite and the government elite who gained their legitimacy via the election votes of the society. The Democratic Party's provincial members were made up almost exclusively of non-state-affiliated elements[256] who, by nature, were against the bureaucracy, from which they felt they had been excluded, and which consisted in fact of the state itself under the strong control of the single party.

This anti-state/bureaucracy positioning of the Democratic Party did not change even when they came to power themselves after the elections of May 14, 1950.[257] Even with such an extraordinary election victory, the Democrats felt insecure in power. They were worried about the state apparatus, in particular the army, which they considered to be very loyal to the previous regime and its leader, Ismet İnönü.[258] These concerns were further provoked by the widespread claims that some leading officers had told İnönü that they would like to keep him

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[255] See for the early party program *Cumhuriyet*, 1-9 January 1946.

[256] In Samsun, for example, the party executive committee consisted of four businessmen and two lawyers.

[257] Even though the existing single party declared that they would consider the right to go on strike and to make democratic changes in the constitution—a significant turn towards a highly populist strategy—the new DP gained 408 parliamentary seats while the CHP got only 69. In other words, the people showed their enormous support for the new party.

[258] Feroz Ahmad, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu* [The Making of Modern Turkey], trans. Y. Alogan (Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995), 158.

and the CHP in power despite the election results.[259] This insecurity and fear consolidated the

Democratic Party's strategy that, in order to remain in power and to in fact become more

powerful, they had to organize and expand within the state apparatus. In a sense, they had to

win it over from the long-reigning party/state elite. Thus emerged an increasingly bitter

struggle between the new governing elite of the Democratic Party and the well-consolidated

state apparatus.

The Democratic Party's Policies vis-à-vis the State/Army: The Emerging Structure of State

vs. Politics

The Democratic Party's goal was to change the unbalanced power situation between

itself and the rest of the political system, which, at the time, was a kind of mixed, embedded

body of the state and the single party elite. To do so meant gaining the support of and control

over the armed forces[260], since they presented the most organized power with the state

apparatus. In an early move that they hoped would be insurance against being blocked later by

the state elite and its apparatus, the DP leadership worked hard to convince the legendary

Chief of Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, to run in the parliamentary elections as a DP candidate.

Suprisingly he agreed, and in total the DP was able to nominate four generals in their

elections.[261] This would not prove enough however to secure the DP's relations with the

army.

It is reported that on June 5, 1950, a colonel visited the home of Prime Minister

Menderes and informed him that, three days later, leading generals loyal to İnönü were

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[259] While there is not a consensus about whether this actually took place (Metin Toker writes, for example, that İnönü denied it. Metin Toker, *DP'nin Altın Yılları, 1950-1954* [The Golden Years of Justice Party, 1950-1954] [Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1991], 23-24), others claim that a meeting between İnönü and unhappy generals did take place, and that İnönü argued that the new world values had forced the multi-party politics and that therefore the army should not worry—if there were a real danger, he, İnönü, would "ring the bell" for the army. Ahmad, *Modern*, 181.
[260] This reportedly included even such tactics as searching for a "puppet" chief of staff. Hikmet Özdemir, *Rejim ve Asker* [Regime and the Army] (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1989), 84.

planning to carry out a coup against the government.[262] After a series of emergency meetings, the government drastically fired the commanding elite of the army. This was one of the largest and most comprehensive dismissals of military personnel in the history of the Turkish Republic. Sixteen generals and almost 150 colonels were forced to retire almost immediately,[263] in what was considered by the political and public actors of the era as a kind of counter-coup.[264] While the operation was probably in fact the end result more of an internal power struggle between senior and mid-level officers within the army[265], for the government and the ruling DP politicians, it was presented as a necessary move to save the democracy.[266] The government also wanted to present its move as a way of reforming the army by replacing the old with the young and more skillful. Though this argument was a bit controversial,[267] the young army officers, who were hoping to replace the older generations and were thinking that continued reforms would pave the way to their doing so, gave their support to the government's move. In a declaration issued by an organization called the "Young Pilot Officers' Association" for example, it was made clear that they felt the "old commanding elite" had come to power "by accident" rather than because of their skills, and therefore a

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[261] Feroz Ahmad, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye, 1945-1980* [Turkey in Democratic Transition] (Istanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1992), 179.

[262] Doğan Akyüz, "Askeri Müdahaleler ve Ordu Üzerinde Etkileri" ["Military Interventions and Their Effects on the Army"] (Ph.D. diss., Ege Üniversitesi, 2000), 35.

[263] Hikmet Özdemir, *Ordunun Olağandışı Rolü* [The Unusual Role of the Army] (Istanbul: İz Yayınları, 1994), 143-150. Also, Ümit Özdağ, *Menderes Döneminde Ordu Siyaset İlişkileri ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali* [The Relations Between the Military and Politics in the Menderes Era and the May 27 Revolution] (Istanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 1997), 25-27.

[264] A leading military figure of the time argued that, "It was like a coup, maybe a counter-coup." Tekin Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi* [Ten-year Long Struggle] (Istanbul: Ticaret Postası Matbaası, 1963), 33-34.

[265] The young officers, particularly those of colonel rank and below, were known to be uncomfortable with the attitudes of the high-ranking commanding elite, whom they saw as refusing to leave their positions and allow room for the lower ranks to move up. The lower-ranking officers were very much ready, therefore, to seize whatever opportunity to get rid of the senior commanders.

[266] Menderes was reported saying, "all of these activities are designed to consolidate democracy in our country." Şevket S. Aydemir, *İhtilalin Mantığı ve 27 Mayıs İhtilali* [The Logic of Revolution and May 27 Revolution] (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973), 44.

[267] This point was controversial because, as Ümit Özdağ shows in a chart listing the names of the command elite before and after the operation, there wasn't in fact a significant age difference between the officers of the former and the latter. Özdağ, 25.

reform favoring the young officers was necessary.[268] Another document with similar demands and also showing support for the government's reform agenda was a letter written by some army officers to Prime Minister Menderes, in which it was argued that the reforms were necessary for the safety and the interest of the homeland.[269]

Ultimately, the government did not opt for the more comprehensive and radical personnel reforms that it might have taken to truly bring the army under governmental control. The primary reason for this was that the goal of the Menderes government in firing the selected personnel was to secure itself by gaining the loyalty of the remaining army commanding elite. As part of this all out effort to get the army on its side, the Menderes government even sacrificed its own defense minister and the far more radical reform projects that he had in mind for the army.[270] In other words, the Menderes government tried to "protect democracy" by cooperating with the commanding elite of the army. This meant that the old system based on primarily seniority rather than skills remained in place, and that the opposition of the mid-level officers would go unaddressed. This latter fact would prove fatal in the coming years since many of these same young officers would come to start secret organizations that would ultimately target the government and its conduct. With its strategic cooperation with certain high level generals, the Democratic Party would not eliminate but only postpone the risk of military interventions.

Coup Preparations—The Beginning of Hard Realm Institutionalization

Mid-level officers who thought that the country was being left to incapable figures (new politicians and sycophantic old generals) began to set up secret organizations[271]. They

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[268] Samet Ağaoğlu, *Demokrat Parti'nin Doğuş ve Yükseliş Sebepleri: Bir Soru* [Reasons behind the Birth and Rise of the Democratic Party: A Question] (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972), 190-192.
[269] Ibid., 194-195.
[270] Akyüz, 40.
[271] Özdağ, 75-88.

saw themselves as both able and powerful,[272] and they saw the "incapable ones" (i.e. the old commanding elite) as having cooperated with the politicians only for the sake of self-interest.

The mid-level officers' criticisms against the government were very comprehensive. In a brochure that would be released immediately after the 1960 coup, the following items were listed as justifications for the military intervention:

1. the foundation of a partisan administration and the disappearance of the principle of rule of law;

2. manipulated and poorly planned investment policies;

3. inflationary monetary policy and resulting economic hardship;

4. repression over intellectual life and threatened freedom of the press;

5. emergence of a single-party dictatorship and the disappearance of parliamentary legitimacy.[273]

The young officers had been observing the seemingly endless political struggles between the government and the opposition party (CHP), as they fought over control of the state apparatus. These struggles seemed at best to make no sense and at worst seemed highly detrimental to the state structure—causing many of the young officers to lose their belief in democracy. One active officer among the anti-politics organizations wrote that politics and the political parties (in essence therefore, democracy) were there only to secure the interests of the politicians themselves, at the expense of the interests of the country and the nation. This, he felt, had to be stopped "in the name of the homeland."[274]

This psychology of the officers was even further consolidated by the fact that the DP government had by now concluded that the executive power of the state apparatus was simply

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[272] In a declaration to the government demanding reforms in the army, they made an analogy between themselves and the leaders of the *İttihad ve Terakki*, who staged a coup during Ottoman times and led to a whole new era in the history of the land. This also shows a kind of continuity between that old logic of not relying on the government system—at the time the sitting government officials were not seen as apt for the managing the security of the country. Samet Ağaoğlu, 192.

[273] Reported in Dündar Seyhan, *Gölgedeki Adam* [The Man in the Shadow] (Ankara: Nurettin Uycan Matbaası, 1966).

too deeply intertwined with their rival political party for them to fight it in any other way than to use their only weapon, their legislative majority. The result of this conclusion was a series of measures that ultimately gave ammunition and justification to the officers' later moves. As one observer of the era pointed out, "in 1959-1960, the Democratic Party of 1950, which had struggled for free opposition and free press, disappeared and was replaced by an authoritative single-party-like structure with dictatorship tendencies."[275] Early measures, for example, included the increasingly repressive governmental policies towards university professors (professors belonged largely to the statist-conforming elite). These measures included curbing their rights to join political parties or to publicly express political ideas.[276] Soon the universities became one of the major centers for anti-government activities, and student demonstrations featured slogans and signs such as "Resign Menderes" and "Long live the Turkish Army".[277] Later, the financial rights of the opposition party itself came under attack[278], leading to the confiscation of CHP properties by the treasury. These moves were followed by a banning of parties from making so-called "propaganda" speeches on the radio—though government figures were still allowed to make their speeches. Needless to say, this was seen as partisan usage of the radio—the most effective media tool of the time.[279]

By the early 1960s, clashes between the DP and the CHP were taking place in the streets and had to be dispersed by armed police.[280] The government was also trying to block the CHP leader, Ismet İnönü, in his public activities, for example, stopping his train when he

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[274] Ibid., 39.
[275] Ali Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş* [The Rise and Fall] (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), 142.
[276] Law no. 6185 dated 21 July 1953 published in *Official Gazette* (the daily publication of the state, in which reports, laws, official documents etc. are reprinted), 28 June 1953.
[277] Ali İhsan Gencer, ed., *Hürriyet Yolunda* [On the Way to Freedom] (Ankara: MTTB Yayınları, 1990), 21. See also for the details of how the student demonstrations were organized, Sabahat Erdemir, *Türk Devrim Ocakları* [Turkish Revolutionary Associations] (Ankara: Beyazıt Ocağı Yayınları, 1961), 1: 68.
[278] Law no. 6195 dated 14 December 1953.
[279] Muammer Aksoy, *Partizan Radyo ve DP* [Partisan Radio and the DP] (Ankara: Forum Yayınları, 1960).
[280] "Polis Yeşilhisar'da Halka Ateş Açtı," ["Police fire at people at Yeşilhisar,"] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 25 March 1960.

was en route to a party meeting in Kayseri.[281] During such confrontations between the government and the CHP, the anti-government position of the army became gradually consolidated. Officers showed their support for the CHP and the statist political elite by kissing İnönü's hand—an ultimate sign of loyalty[282]. While the army had always been deeply infiltrated into the state apparatus, it was now blatantly obvious that the army was allying itself with the statist political elite of the CHP. Such a party-state coalition was basically declared to the public when several army officers began resigning from their posts amid much publicity, claiming that the government was forcing them to take illegal positions against the CHP and its activities.[283] With the officers having deserted the DP government and sided with İnönü, the CHP leader was now empowered to state clearly that the Democratic Party had lost its crusade to capture the state apparatus, "You are trying to suppress us but you will not be successful. Did the Korean President Syungman Rhee succeed? He even had an army and policemen and bureaucrats. *You don't have an army, bureaucrats, the universities, not even the police...*" (italics mine).[284]

As the pattern of state vs. politics became even more obvious, a large army cadets' demonstration made it clear that the state apparatus was galvanizing its true potential to stand up against the civilian government (the cadets represented the informal core institution of the military). Though the demonstration began with army cadets, officers as well soon joined in. Not only were the efforts of some army commanders unable to halt the demonstration, the whole event never resulted in any investigation or arrests being made—strongly suggesting that the army as a whole was largely in support of the demonstrators' arguments.[285] This

[281] "İnönü'nün Kayseri'ye Girişi Olay Yarattı," ["İnönü's entrance to Kayseri creates turmoil,"] *Cumhuriyet* (İstanbul), 5 April 1960.
[282] Ibid.
[283] Some of these officers were Lt. Colonel Selahattin Çehner, Major Osman Özkücak, Colonel Kamil Savaş, and Colonel Kemal Eker. *Cumhuriyet* (İstanbul), 6 April 1960.
[284] Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve Ideolojisi* [The Democratic Party: History and Ideology] (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 1991), 157, and Aydemir, *İkinci*, 406.
[285] Sıtkı Ulay, *Harbiye Silah Başına* [Cadets on Duty] (İstanbul: Kitapçılık Tic. Ltd, 1968), 80-81.

protest walk was taken as the final alarm call on the road to toppling the civilian government.[286]

The ultimate DP-led government act to confirm in the minds of the elite that the state elite and apparatus were in danger, was the government's proposal to establish a parliamentary committee to investigate the opposition CHP party, with the goal, some argued, of removing the opposition from the parliament.[287] In fact this may have been the DP's intention, since the investigating commission was to be authorized in such a way that it could ban political party conventions and the establishment of new party organizations. The commission's presence would pose a clear threat to the CHP, and would hang heavily over the opposition party like a sword of Damocles.

The government chose to ignore warnings from opposition leader Ismet İnönü that the government's dictatorial policies were sure to bring on outside intervention (i.e. a coup).[288] Instead, the foundation of the investigation committee was sworn into law. The committee was an entity equipped with not only legislative and executive, but also judicial powers. It was seen at this point by the state elite as a "revolutionary organ"[289] which could achieve the DP's perceived desire to conquer the state and carry out their own counterrevolution.

The fear of such a counterrevolution can be argued as one of the determining factors for the growth of the opposition among the officers against any expansion of the government over the state. Moreover, there is ample evidence to show that the state elites' perception that they were under siege by the government, and the exacerbating effect this had on their already existing insecurity fears, led to a growing resecuritization of the public agenda and, ultimately, to a rejuvinating of the national security syndrome.

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[286] Orhan Erkanlı, *Askeri Demokrasi, 1960-1980* [Military Democracy, 1960-1980] (Istanbul: Güneş, 1987), 38.
[287] The commission was to investigate the "illegal and destructive activities of the opposition party", thus the opposition party was made to look like an illegal criminal organization.
[288] İnönü said to the Democratic Party that if they did not stop this investigation project, the conditions would become ripe for a revolution. Eroğul, 155-156.

The Democratic Party's policies regarding religion were seen as evidence of the party working against Atatürk's revolution, in particular secularism. This perception was obvious among the leading figures of the 1960 coup.[290] For these Atatürkist officers, the government's policies of, for example, changing the call to prayer message from Turkish back to Arabic, allowing religious broadcasting on radios, and making religious education compulsory in schools,[291] were clear and "shocking" indications that this government was heading in a counterrevolutionary direction.[292] The DP's subjective categorization of Atatürk's revolutionary goals into those seen as having been digested by the public and those not digested,[293] poisoned even further the officers' opinions about the government, which they saw as questioning the basic pillars of the Turkish modernization project.

The DP did not let up in its efforts to win its power struggle against the state, and thus its accommodative polices towards Islamist circles and figures became even more visible in the late 1950s, when the party felt it had to be more populist to remain in power.[294] According to the anti-government army officers, however, the regime could not afford such policies, since they would prevent true modernization.[295]. While the DP continued to push the envelope

[289] Law no. 7468 published in *Official Gazette*, 27 April 1960. For the extraordinary powers of the committee, see Ergün Özbudun, *Parlamenter Rejimde Parlamentonun Hükümeti Murakabe Vasıtaları*, [Methods of Checking on the Government in a Parliamentarian Regime] (Ankara: n.p., 1962), 114-116.

[290] Several speeches given by key coup leaders shortly after the May 27 intervention presented the "anti-secular" policies of the government as one, if not, the major reason for the securitization process before the coup. *Cumhuriyet* daily published several interviews with the coup leaders, including Cemal Gürsel, Alparslan Türkeş, Osman Köksal, Orhan Erkanlı, İrfan Solmazer, Orhan Kabibay, and Muzaffer Yurdakuler.

[291] For the cooperative relations between the Democrat Party and the Islamist circles see Şerif Mardin, *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset* [Religion and Politics in Turkey] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991); Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *İslamcılık Akımı* [Islamist Movement] (Istanbul: Simavi Yayınları, 1991), and Eroğul, 79-81.

[292] Seyhan, 32-33. For a similar stance see Orhan Erkanlı, *Anılar, Sorunlar, Sorumlular* [Memoirs, Problems, Those Who are Responsible] (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1972), 10.

[293] In a speech during a parliamentary session, the Prime Minister said that they would preserve only those revolutionary measures that had been digested by the public. This meant that some of the drastic changes imposed on society remained only because of repressive enforcement, and would not continue to be backed by the government. Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 9, session 3, 29 May 1960, 24-32.

[294] It was reported that Prime Minister Menderes even began sympathizing openly with the religious Nurcu movement, meeting with movement supporters when they were carrying clear Islamic or pro-Shariat banners. One such account was witnessed in Emirdağ on October 19, 1958, and reported in Doğan Duman, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık* [Islamism in Turkey in the Process of Democracy] (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül, 1997), 48.

[295] For the speeches of the revolutionary leaders see, *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 16-23 June 1960.

in order to gain as much societal support as possible, the state elite saw the government's moves as a major threat to the stability of the regime. While previously mentioned reasons (largely political) as well as the worsening economic conditions of the officers[296] played a significant role in terms of getting ready to topple the existing government, fears about the safety of the state and regime were the connecting bond among the elements unhappy with the government. Consequently, a securitization of the public agenda was clearly under way and was being vocalized largely through a rhetoric that the regime and state were under a general threat.

Emergence of Secret Army Organizations

During the tenure of the Democratic Party, various secret organizations emerged within the army. One author, whose father was an influential member in some of these organizations, counted at least seven different ones, and two allied groupings among them.[297] The early examples of such groups date back as far as 1951, just one year after the Democratic Party took power.

These organizations had several goals, according to the memoirs of former members and publications that appeared after the 1960 coup. The primary ones of the various organizations were to topple not only the Democrat Party but "any type of civilian political system"[298], and to "protect the homeland".[299] Various others also sought to reform the armed forces and "prepare them for unexpected future developments",[300] to "protect the republic,

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[296] It is largely agreed upon that inflationary economic policies badly hurt the officer corps at the time. According to one analysis, in 1954, a young officer could not afford to get married or even afford standard living expenditures. Ahmad, *Demokrasi*, 186, and also Erkanlı, 9.

[297] Özdağ, 77. Other sources estimate that there were more secret associations at several levels. Hikmet Özdemir, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti* (Istanbul: İz Yayinlari, 1995), 219-220.

[298] Muzaffer Özdağ and his group had this goal, while others had a more Turkist-populist ideology. Özdemir, *Türkiye*, 221.

[299] *Tuzla Uçaksavar Gizli Örgütü*—one of its leaders, D. Seyhan, mentioned this in his memoirs. For similar points see also Abdi İpekçi and Ömer Sami Coşar, *İhtilalin İçyüzü* [The Inside Story of the Revolution] (Istanbul: Uygun, 1965), 27-28.

[300] *Harp Akademisi Örgütü* (Army Academy Organization). Erkanlı, 12. See also Nazlı Ilıcak, *15 Yıl Sonra 27 Mayıs Yargılanıyor* [May 27 Being Judged 15 Years Later] (Istanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1975), 1: 7-12.

Atatürk's principles and democracy"[301], and to replace the government and set up an authoritarian regime in order to develop the country faster and more safely with radical reforms.[302]

While the organizations' goals may appear at first quite dispersed, this is in part due to the lack of reliable documentation about these organizations and to the secret nature of events which probably led to a certain amount of exaggeration and distortion in what reporting was made by involved actors. Nevertheless, certain common characteristics in their goals can be noted. First is the clear hegemony of a rhetoric that the nation-state must be protected. Although it is not made very clear who the enemies are, the perceived danger is apparent in such phrases as the "chaos of instability" or the "increasing risks" for the state and regime. Most important is the consideration of these negative things as being the result of multiparty politics and its dependence on the society—whose intentions and demands are unreliable and fragmentive. There is evidence of an erosion (if indeed it ever existed) of trust of the young army officers in democratic ways, which they saw as "based on superficial (not long-standing) foundations."[303] In a sense, what was underlying this approach was the idea that the Turkish state was not ready for this type of democratic experience which would shift domestic power balances and therefore allow a threatening potential to form. At best, such a process needed to be managed by an iron fist—the "homeland and its politics [were] too important to be left to its own destiny".[304]

Such a negative positioning towards politics made itself evident in several ways. First, those secret organizations among the army that had clear goals of destroying the political system and party-based politics were allowed to flourish without much backlash from the rest

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[301] Okon-Aydemir Organization. This organization strictly forbade its members from any type of contact with civilians, a prohibition indicating the large degree of mistrust for civilians. See Talat Aydemir's memoirs. Talat Aydemir, *Talat Aydemir'in Hatıraları* [Memoirs of Talat Aydemir] (Istanbul: May Matbaası, 1968). Also Uğur Mumcu, *Inkılap Mektupları* [Reform Letters] (Ankara: UM:AG Vakfı Yayınları, 1997), 11-19.

[302] *Aydemir Yüksek Kumanda Akademisi* (Aydemir High Command Academy). Özdağ, 208.

[303] A very active member of this organization claimed that politics, with its governing and opposing parts, were forgetting the priorities of the state/homeland, and were therefore detrimental to the system. Seyhan, 39.

of the army command, who apparently must have shared the general sentiment. When revolutionary colonels looked for leadership support from high-ranking generals, for example, they were generally rejected, but on the other hand they also never got into trouble. The generals did not even inform the necessary institutions or activate disciplinary processes.[305] In a more dramatic example, one coup-planning group of army officers approached the defense minister of the Democratic Party, former army member Şemsi Ergin, and offered him the leadership of the coup. The minister refused the offer, but still failed to arrest these figures who were openly planning to stage a coup against a government in which he himself was a minister.[306] One author describes this general anti-politics/government mood among the army officials as "passive resistance".[307] Yet another example of just how defenseless the political realm was against these organizations can be found in the case of nine officers from anti-government secret organizations who were arrested in 1957. Most army generals remained indifferent to the whole issue,[308] and the suspects were released after a military court trial, despite substantial evidence collected against them by an informant.[309] As the most organized and powerful part of the state elite, the army was clearly unwilling to remain objective, let alone be loyal to the idea of a primacy of politics. This naturally made the government less willing to press on and pursue the mid-level revolutionary officers, since it did not want to confront the whole army face-on.[310]

Eventually, this passive resistance among the high army command developed into a kind of tacit support for the radical mid-level officers. In 1958, the Chief of Land Forces,

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[304] An official slogan written in several state intelligence organizations that have been around since the 1960s.
[305] Özdağ, 89.
[306] Coşar, 58-67.
[307] Özdağ, 90.
[308] Except one general, Rüştü Erdelhun, who did send a letter to the Prime Minister expressing his loyalty to the government. Sadi Koçaş, *Atatürk'ten 12 Mart'a* [From Atatürk to March 12] (Istanbul: Ajans Türk, 1972), 1: 389.
[309] The informant was in turn arrested and jailed for two years on charges of provoking the army to make a coup. Talat Aydemir, 51-55.

Necati Tacan, when approached by the revolutionary figures, did not accept their leadership offer openly, but told them to be sure and contact him if they needed him in the future.[311] The second army officer approached, Cemal Görsel, also adopted a strategy of neither openly rejecting nor accepting the offer.[312] The commander of the emergency government in Istanbul, Fahri Özdilek, also told the young officers that they could trust him "when the time comes"—though his primary job should actually have been to arrest them.[313] Clearly there was a significant consensus among the army officers in terms of curbing the political system and "protecting the state" from the infiltration of the Democratic Party. A preliminary explanation for these relatively converging ideas among the army may well be that the state elite, which was opposing the decentralization of the state power over which they had a hegemony, was in the early stages of an institutionalization of their goals and organizations. What we are seeing here, therefore, are the grounds for the emerging institutionalization of the hard and soft realms.

The 1960 Coup

On May 27, 1960, a group of approximately 60 officers who had been meeting in secret organizations, conducted a coup in a four-hour operation. One of the major problems the officers faced was the fact that they were an assembly of differing hierarchical ranks and therefore had a problem of maintaining discipline among themselves as well as between them and the rest of the army. The other major problem they had was that there was no consensus or plan among them about the dynamics of the post-coup era.[314] It appears that the only major

[310] Prime Minister Menderes preferred not paying much attention to the secret organizations, even though the President, Celal Bayar, himself a former revolutionary during the Ottoman and Liberty Wars, insisted that the government conduct detailed investigations about these matters within the army. Koçaş, 1: 392.
[311] Ibid., 1: 401-407.
[312] Ibid., 1: 451-458.
[313] İpekçi and Coşar, 154-160.
[314] Orhan Erkanlı says that there was not a major plan but that some general principles existed. Erkanlı, 16-17. When we look at transcripts of interviews made just after the coup, we see that there was no consensus. For an

thing on which they did agree was getting rid of the civilian government and taking over the executive power.

The major characteristics of how their ideas differed became clearer after the coup, in particular within the *Milli Birlik Komitesi* (National Unity Committee), as the assembly of the coup-making officers came to be called. Two general categorizations can be made here in terms of their general ideas about how the nation should be administered. Some officers, in particular high-ranking ones led by the Chief of the Committee, Cemal Gürsel, argued that the main goal should be to reduce the politicization of the army and pass the power to a 'proper' civilian government. The other track, generally made up of the younger, more radical officers, felt that the army should stay in power in order to speed up the radical social and political transformations in the country. Both groups' ultimate goal was to modernize the country in as safe a manner as possible. They and their respective supporters met at an ideological consensus of agreeing on the need to go back to Atatürk's reforms,[315] which implicitly meant some degree of backing away from civilian or populist governments.

While some have chosen to look at the relative degree of harshness in the speeches of the two groupings, and thus categorized them in such ways as "radicals" and "moderates,"[316] these labels seem to limit the classification to a particular issue or period. Since the main source of difference between the groups rested on questions of style and speed, and related therefore to their respective long-term trajectories vis-a-vis, in particular, the country's modernization project, I believe a more appropriate categorizing of the two groups would be

interview summing up the conflicting views, see the interview made with the coup leader, Alparslan Türkeş, in *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 17 July 1960.

[315] See for the details of how Atatürkism was being formulated as a supporting ideology or the proposed hierarchical political system. Özdağ, 281-283.

[316] Ahmad, *Demokrasi*, 198. See also Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi 1945-1971* [The Annonated Chronology of Multi-party Politics in Turkey] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1976), 217.

"absolutists,"[317] for the radical, fast-track front, and "gradualists", for those who were opting for a quick return to political rule, albeit under a serious level of control by the statist elite, and in particular, the army.

In the sense that both groups were seeking to continue the country's modernization project but were concerned by the risks that such a transformation project entailed, they can both be seen as reacting to the conflicting affects of security and political globalization pressures. In the case of the absolutists, the risks, i.e. the security pressures, took precedence and convinced them of the need for rapid modernization under military control—the military being considered more capable than squabbling politicians of handling the tricky transformation without totally destabilizing the country. The gradualists, on the other hand, could perhaps be seen as more receptive to the pressures of political globalization, and sought therefore a rapid reinstatement of an elected government, which, under the firm guiding hand of the military, could navigate the transformation.

The two groups were clearly heading for a confrontation. A law proposal entitled the "Ülkü ve Kültür Birliği" or Union of Culture and National Cause, which was intended to bring education, religious administration, press, foundations, and cultural affairs under one ministerial administration in a very authoritarian manner, proved to be the breaking point. Since the proposal was presented to the public as one supported by the absolutists, the leader of the gradualists announced that they were determined to establish the democratic order and would not permit any decision to be made that could cast a shadow over this.[318] Following this proclamation, the National Union Committee's gradualist wing, in a drastic move, declared the forced retirement of fourteen radical members from their army posts, and

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[317] With the exception of wanting to hold on to power indefinitely, there was little homogeneity among the "absolutists" at the individual level. They varied from racist nationalists, also called "Turanists" (*Turancı*), to CHP sympathizers, and even socialists. Özdağ, 281-283.

[318] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 18 November 1960.

assigned them diplomatic posts to keep them outside of the country.[319] This was a significant defeat for the absolutists. More importantly, the subsequent lack of any clear signs of protest from the army ranks against this radical move, suggests at least a general tendency among the army towards gradualism rather than absolutism.

The gradualists then went on to try and get rid of further absolutist potential. Eleven airforce officers and a few others from the secret organizations were subsequently dismissed from their posts on October 13. The most interesting characteristic of this second operation was how the gradualists in the army came to cooperate with the political elite of the CHP.[320] This cooperation was the first cornerstone of an emerging consensus between the gradualist coup officers and the political elite that replaced the overthrown DP elite. In order for such a consensus about the nature of the power distribution in the government to be reached however, the gradualist army officers had to first consolidate and institutionalize their position within the state apparatus. Hierarchical discipline and structure within the armed forces had been damaged significantly due to the fact that a combined level of officers had risen to power during the coup. This was perceived as completely unusual for the Turkish army, which had several centuries of tradition based on hierarchy.[321] Moreover, the National Union Committee (NUC) members who staged the coup, had done so on behalf of the army, and therefore should have included the Chief of Staff and army commanders.[322] The failure to proceed according to traditional hierarchical rules and traditions and the resulting competitiveness and rivalries among the army leaders, led to an inevitable further politicization as they sought support and allies from the political realm.

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[319] See the details of the letter sent to them in İpekçi and Coşar, 502-504.
[320] Walter F. Weiker, *1960 Türk İhtilali* [1960 Turkish Revolution], trans. Mete Engin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1967), 159-160.
[321] Suat İlhan, *Türk Askeri Kültürünün Tarihi Gelişmesi: Kutsal Ocak* [The Historical Development of Turkish Military Culture: the Sacred Hearth] (Istanbul: Ötüken, 1999).
[322] Talat Turhan, "Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği," ["The Armed Forces,"] in *Darbeler, "Demirkıratlar" ve 27 Mayıs,* ed. Sadik Goksu (Istanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar, n.d.), 166-191.

Consolidating the Hard Realm Structure and Positioning

Under these conditions, the Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği, or Armed Forces Union (AFU) was founded. There are different explanations about how it was started,[323] yet the general philosophical reasoning expressed in their rhetoric was that they wanted to restore hierarchy within the armed forces and to keep the forces out of politics as much as possible.[324] This desire to return to their former institutional identity and structure was not without its own problems and internal paradoxes. Once again, the organization of this movement was being driven from the bottom up, and against the hierarchy. Still, due to the wide acceptance of the organization's goals, it succeeded in gaining the support and participation of the leading generals.[325] Thus the AFU came to be seen as an "umbrella organization" to control the potentially uncontrollable elements and formations within the army.[326]

With the increasing number of generals joining the AFU, it became clear that the balance of power was shifting away from the NUC and towards the AFU.[327] This was also obvious to the NUC members, who immediately began making plans to discredit and destroy the AFU. The target was Air Force Commander, Irfan Tansel, who was leader of the AFU at the time.[328] The NUC first tried to force Chief of Staff Sunay to fire Tansel, but when this proved impossible they instead had him assigned to a post at the NATO delegation in Washington.[329]

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[323] Talat Aydemir claims that with a group of friends, who felt it was their national duty to "do something," they started this organization. Talat Aydemir, 90. Faruk Güventürk on the other hand, claims that he initiated it in Istanbul. Ihcak, 195.

[324] Talat Aydemir, 90.

[325] By the middle of 1961, the Chief of the Air Force, İrfan Tansel, the Chief of the Navy, Necdet Uran, the Chief of the Gendarmerie, Abdurrahman Doruk, The Chief of the 1st Army, Cemal Tural, the Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Muhittin Önür, and the Chief of Staff himself, Cevdet Sunay, all joined the AFU. Hale, 126. The remaining generals, Celal Alkoç and Zeki Özek, and the commander of the 2nd Army, would be soon removed.

[326] Ahmad, *Demokrasi*, 202.

[327] For the advantages and disadvantages of the various parties and their relative balance of power see, Weiker, 151.

[328] At a meeting held in the presidential palace the NUC reached the decision to have Tansel removed. Can Kaya İsen, *Geliyorum Diyen İhtilal* [Evident Revolution] (Istanbul: Can Matbaası, 1954), 15-16, and Talat Aydemir, 91.

[329] Muhsin Batur, *Anılar ve Görüşler: Üç Dönemin Perde Arkası* [Memoirs and Opinions: The Inside Story of Three Eras] (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1985), 95-96.

This action was essentially too little too late, because by now the AFU had consolidated enough strength to be able to respond.[330] The AFU promptly prepared an ultimatum to the President, Cemal Gürsel, in which they demanded the restoring of Tansel to his position in Turkey, while also demanding the resignations of various leading army figures who supported the NUC.[331] The ultimatum stated that were the demands not met, air force jets would bomb the presidential palace, and the AFU would take over the government in a new coup.[332]

The ultimatum was accepted by the President and the NUC, and most of its demands were met, including the forced resignations of influential NUC members from their army posts, such as Madanoğlu and Köksal.[333] Air force jets stopped en route the airplane that was transporting Tansel to his new post in Washington, and had it return to Ankara. Through this "coup within a coup" the AFU established their superior strength over the NUC in the army. Although the AFU kept the NUC around as a front, it was in fact the AFU that was now the major power source in the army, and was holding both the potential and intent to extend its power base throughout the entire Turkish armed forces.

This power and intent was made obvious in an executive declaration disseminated by the Chief of Staff, Cevdet Sunay, who had opted to be the head of the AFU after the Tansel incident. The declaration, which was broadcast on June 28, 1961 and was entitled "Armed Forces Union Principles", reveals very clear ideas about the parameters of the slowly shaping governance structure in Turkey.

First, the tone of the declaration consistently makes the point that the AFU was now representing the Turkish Armed Forces as an integrated unit. Second and more importantly,

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[330] AFU members knew that if they gave up on their leader, their turn would soon come. Erdoğan Örtülü, *Üç İhtilalin Hikayesi* [The Story of Three Revolutions] (Konya: Milli Ülkü Yayınları, 1977), 136.
[331] The ultimatum also demanded that some influential NUC members leave their actual army posts and only sit on the Committee, a move designed to weaken the NUC further by cutting its links to the real power. Seyhan, 139, and Talat Aydemir, 93.
[332] Koçaş, 2: 815.

the declaration makes it clear from the start that the armed forces, from that point on, could and would send warnings and if necessary use armed intervention on behalf of the "safety of the state and the regime."[334] This sense of a constant threat of the political elites/politics being overthrown was to emerge as one of the most significant elements in the 'engagement rules' in the governance dynamics of Turkish democracy. A second important message of the declaration was that while general elections would be allowed to take place after the DP leaders had received their punishment, the political figures who would subsequently come to power through those elections would not be allowed to seek revenge for the May 27 coup. Moreover, the NUC, now directed behind the scenes by the AFU, would monitor the political parties until the election in order to keep them from carrying out any 'unwanted' activities.

With these moves, the military elite, its Chief of Staff having now become leader of the AFU, had "righted" the hierarchical order within this organization and thereby placed it back under normal control. It was obvious that the military was not only simultaneously consolidating its own institutional positioning and structure within the political structure, but was also clarifying what it expected from the politicians in the new era. From then on politics would be allowed, but would have to be performed within the parameters that the military elite saw best fitting to the safety of the regime and the state. In a sense, while the AFU seemed to be trying to pull the military out of politics, it was, out of mistrust and fear of revenge, actually placing it above politics.

The Colonels' Junta and the "Menderes Syndrome"

The previous debate among gradualists and absolutists about how to deal with politics had not disappeared however, and this give and take with the political realm was not

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[333] These were followed by other forced resignations such as that of the defense minister, Muzaffer Alankuş, and two chiefs of the army and navy. *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 14, 20, 28 June 1961.
[334] Seyhan, 144-145, and Talat Aydemir, 102-103.

acceptable for some in the armed forces. Very soon a "colonels' junta", including Talat Aydemir of the army, Emin Arat of the gendarmerie, Nazim Oran of the navy, and Halim Menteş of the air force, was formed.[335] Even though this junta had previously agreed to allowing elections to take place on October 29, 1961, they later began to back off from this decision, claiming that elections would bring back politics as usual, and a "rebirth to the ghost of politics of the pre-May 27 era."[336] According to this group, in order to materialize all of the coup's goals, power should be used directly by those with the ultimate authority.[337] With the failure of the high command to disregard or deal with the junta, the latter's self-confidence grew, and they began voicing their ideas more loudly and insistently.[338]

The colonels' ideas were threatening to the other actors. Neither the generals in the NUC and AFU nor the existing political parties, namely the CHP, were comfortable with the colonels' approach, and ultimately, the existence of this threatening element served to force the rest of the politico-military actors to come together. In a sense, the presence of this small but radical absolutist group in the military led to an ad hoc consensus among the dispersed members of the gradualist front. Since the gradualist generals saw the CHP as the natural party to whom power should be given after the elections, the consensus between the two sides was reached very quickly.

There were other political developments that also sped up the formation of this consensual alliance because they reopened the previously discussed problematic between state and society. Namely, the gradualist state elite also realized it also had to pay attention to the possible return (through elections) of societal elements with 'dangerous' potential. For example, one of the new political parties, the Justice Party (JP), which claimed that it had inherited the political position of the DP, produced propaganda that to vote against the

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[335] Turhan, 82.
[336] Seyhan, 146.
[337] Ibid., 146.

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constitution in the upcoming referendum would mean a rejection of the coup and the current administration.[339] Ultimately, 38% of the referendum votes were against the constitution, and this was taken as a clear indication that a significant percentage of society had not "internalized" the meaning of the coup and that therefore "bad politics" could easily return again.[340] Not only did this seem to constitute proof of a genuine and significant threat that needed balancing against, but it also made the other threat, i.e. the colonels' junta and their anti-politics rhetoric, more relevant and thus stronger. Both issues had to be dealt with simultaneously by the gradualist coalition of the politico-military elite. To this end, first the general secretaries of the political parties were gathered together between August 31 and September 3,[341] and then a summit of the political party leaders was held in the presidential palace. The result of their discussions was a "National Agreement," in which the political party leaders agreed to not question the May 27 intervention, to protect the Atatürk revolutions, to not appeal to religion on their politics, and to not exploit the judicial decisions about the DP leaders.[342]

Unsurprisingly, the absolutist colonels were unhappy with the consensus reached by the gradualist state and political elites. In order to prevent what they viewed as an early demilitarization, they began to prepare for another intervention. Their moves coincided with the decisions by a military court on the fate of the overthrown DP leaders: fifteen sentences of capital punishment were handed down, including ones for the former president, Celal Bayar, the former prime minister, Adnan Menderes, former foreign minister, Fatih Rüştü Zorlu, former finance minister Hasan Poltakan, and former speaker of the house Refik Karaltan. The decisions were confirmed the same day by the NUC, with the exception of changing Celal

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[338] For example, when the deputy chief of staff was approached by an influential officer, Sadi Koçaş, with the proposal that they should get rid of this junta, deputy Tağmaç refused. Koçaş, 2: 908-910.
[339] Altuğ says that rejection was even presented as a sign of being a good Muslim and the opposite of being a communist. Kurtul Altuğ, 27 Mayıs'dan 12 Mart'a [From May 27 to March 12] (Istanbul: Koza, 1976), 213.
[340] Seyhan, 146.
[341] Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 1 September 1961.
[342] Örtülü tells that a secret protocol was signed during the summit in Çankaya. Örtülü, 165-166.

Bayar's sentence to life imprisonment.[343] The absolutists played an important role in this rushed confirmation, with appeals that they, "as the real owners of the revolution did not want these decisions to be manipulated" and that the executions would "bring more peace to the country."[344] It is clear that the executions were allowed in order to pacify the absolutist radicals,[345] in a sense buying time for the gradualist generals to establish further their hierarchy and to gain concessions from the absolutists that would allow them to tell the politicians that they could soon restart their party politics.

Nevertheless, other developments in the still on-going state vs. society dilemma strengthened the absolutists' voices. The results of the first general elections were generally disappointing to the state elite, as a majority of votes went to the Justice Party (JP), which was following the former DP's ideology.[346] Once more the absolutists began criticizing the return of power to society without the "proper conditions" having been prepared for such a move.[347] In the words of one absolutist colonel, Talat Aydemir, the experience showed they should "only go to elections after forming indoctrinated parties and preparing the conditions for democracy."[348] This was a clear demand for a system in which politics would be managed and limited along lines determined by the state elite.

Radical voices such as Aydemir's began to gradually suppress moderate ones within the AFU. After a meeting at the Military Academy in Istanbul on October 21, 1961, the conclusion was drawn that power could not be given back to the parties, which represented those same parts of society that had given strength to the uncontrollable DP, and therefore a

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[343] Rıfkı Salim Burçak, *Yassıada ve Öncesi* [Yassiada and Before] (Ankara: Cem, 1976), and Şevket S. Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı, 1899-1960* [The Drama of Menderes] (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970).

[344] Ulay, 219. It is also reported that the Chief of Staff agreed with the confirmation, saying that otherwise the army officers would be disturbed. Hale, 130.

[345] Ahmad, *Demokrasi*, 205.

[346] Metin Toker, *Demokrasinin İsmet Paşalı Yılları: 1944-1973* [The Ismet Pasha Years of Democracy: 1944-1973], vol. 5, *Yarı Silahlı Yarı Külahlı Bir Ara Rejim, 1960-1961* [Half-armed, Half-civilian, An Interim Regime] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1990), 240.

[347] Seyhan clearly mentions this concern. Seyhan, 151.

[348] Örtülü, 176 and Talat Aydemir, 105.

new intervention was required.[349] Shortly thereafter, the same decision for a coup was accepted by an Ankara group.[350] October 25, 1961 was chosen as the date for the coup since after that the new parliament would be open and would thereby gain a sense of legitimacy.[351] The aim was to stop politics and the political realm before it could become active again.

Under the threat of a new coup by the absolutists, the gradualist state elite of the political party leaders and the generals gathered on October 24 in the presidential palace, and signed the Second Çankaya Protocol (the name referring to the Ankara district in which the presidential palace is located).[352] With this protocol, the generals and political party leaders agreed on the "operation of the democratic system" and on "homeland affairs" against the absolutist elements in the military. In this manner, the parliament was allowed to open on October 25, and Cemal Gürsel was selected as president by a majority of the parliament on the following day.[353]

With the Second Çankaya Protocol, it appeared as though a kind of power-sharing among the gradualist state elite had taken place. The power-sharing was based on the exclusion of both the radical absolutist elements of the military and their constant threat of conducting coups, as well as on the exclusion of a large portion of the society, whose direct participation (through voting) in the ruling of the country was seen as dangerous to the safety of the regime and the state. In a sense, a "Grand Compromise" had been negotiated. This compromise can be seen as the resulting governance structure of a state structure torn between pressures that each demanded a response. Thus the liberalizing demands of political globalization (in the form of multi-party politics) would be allowed to continue, but security

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[349] M. Emin Aytekin, *İhtilal Çıkmazı* [The Revolutionary Deadend] (Istanbul: Dünya, 1967), 127.

[350] Talat Aydemir, 110.

[351] Aytekin, 120-123.

[352] The *Cumhuriyet* daily summed up the protocol with the following title: "Political party leaders give promises to the army". One of these was that the extra rights passed for the soldiers would not be changed later, and second that they would support the presidential candidacy of Cemal Gürsel—the leader of the May 27 coup. *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 25 October 1961.

[353] One civilian professor, Ali Fuat Başgil, became a candidate, but was forced out of joining into the election. Ulay, 229-231.

demands would be permitted to impose certain restrictions on the political realm when necessary.

The political leaders apparently felt it necessary to compromise with a limited and "managed" democracy in order to give leverage to the generals to keep the more radical elements of the military under control. Lack of obedience to this compromise was virtually unthinkable, as the vivid image of the hanged DP leaders, including the former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, haunted the political elite. In fact, as chapter 5 will show, the fear of such an end, which can be labeled as the "Menderes Syndrome," continues to hang over politicians in Turkey.

While the civilian politicians inherited their lessons and syndrome from these events, the absolutist radical elements within the military would also need a lesson—if not a syndrome of their own—to keep them under control and allow the Grand Compromise among the gradualist state elite to consolidate and be strong for the future. Very soon both the challenge and the opportunity arose for this. With the opening of the new parliament, the military found itself in a torn situation. On the one hand they had to stick to the principles of the coup and its rhetoric, and yet they also had to promote the virtues and practices of the parliamentary democracy.[354]

Absolutist radicals, having not gotten over the fact that the great gradualist compromise had changed everything on the eve of their planned complete takeover, lost no time in exploiting this situation. They saw the compromise as a "selling out" of the "body" of the army by its "head", i.e. the generals,[355] as indicated by the fact that the new government consisted of not only the CHP but also the Justice Party (JP)—whose predecessors, the DP, had been strong enemies of the CHP. Only the threat of coups had made such a coalition

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[354] Feroz Ahmad also sees this dilemma. Ahmad, *Demokrasi*, 214-215.
[355] Seyhan, 158.

possible.[356] Perhaps in part because of this forced and rather artificial coalition, the government appeared quite unsuccessful at providing political and economic stability, leading to a gradual loss of popularity in public opinion.[357]

Absolutist attempts to regain power: The February 22 coup attempt

The absolutist colonels first tried to convince certain high command generals and the chief of staff to join them in their plans for a full takeover. While the chief of staff did not give in to their demands, he and the generals also did not completely reject their words. This can be seen as a tactical move designed to gain time since they could not afford to drastically cut the ties with the lower levels of the army command.[358] This situation led the colonels to make certain decisions and distribute these messages to the lower level military officers. The main theme of these messages was that the armed forces should never support any political groups—a criticism of the alliance between the generals and the CHP politicians—and that if the armed forces believed that giving power to the politicians (referring to the DP successors) would bring chaos and anarchy to the country, then the armed forces should take over the government entirely.[359] The colonels also increasingly believed that the generals were using them, i.e. manipulating others' fear of them in order to consolidate the tutelary democracy they wanted to have.[360]

Under these circumstances, the Ankara group of the absolutists gathered in Istanbul with the Istanbul group on February 9, 1962. The representative of the Ankara group, Dündar Seyhan, said in his talk to the group that the goals of the May 27 coup had not been materialized and that this had led to a constant instability and tension in the country. In order for Turkey to conduct the necessary radical reforms—never clearly defined, but presumably

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[356] "CHP-AP Kabinesi Nihayet Dün Hakikat Oldu," ["RPP-JP Cabinet eventually realized yesterday,"] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 16 November 1961.
[357] It was also said that one of the first issues the parliamentarians passed legislation on was their salaries.
[358] Seyhan, 172.

referring to follow-up modernization reforms to Atatürk's—the country had to be governed by a homogenous idea and a centralized power system. Therefore, he concluded, a new coup within the hierarchy of the military had to be carried out.[361] After some debate over whether the planning committee for such a coup should be supervised by the Istanbul or the Ankara group, a consensus was finally reached for a protocol stipulating clearly that a coup would be conducted before February 28, 1962 and would be carried out—as much as possible—within the hierarchy of the military.[362]

News of the protocol soon spread to the high command and the government, both of which were concerned. The Chief of Staff began to take countermeasures, setting up a committee to plan a response. The committee was also designed in order to shift, at least symbolically, some of the power concentration away from the AFU to the hierarchical command of the military.[363] Similarly, Prime Minister İnönü, after having met with Chief of Staff Sunay and air force commander Tansel, declared that those officers who "drag the army into a coup" would be punished.[364]

The Chief of Staff met with the generals of the Istanbul absolutist group. Interestingly enough, following this meeting, those generals who had previously agreed with the absolutist colonels, began to gradually change sides again, this time in favor of the existing alliance between the high command and the government.[365] As it became clearer that the coup within the military hierarchy was looking less and less feasible, the Istanbul group informed their Ankara counterparts that they were withdrawing from the February 9 protocol. Not only did the absolutist plans appear to have collapsed, but the entire group itself seemed on the verge

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[359] Ibid., 165-171, and Talat Aydemir, 112-115.
[360] Talat Aydemir, 115.
[361] Seyhan, 176.
[362] Örtülü, 213-224, and Talat Aydemir, 122-123. This protocol also included plans of the post-coup administration, which would include the chief of staff and high army commanders. These were probably included in order to incorporate the support of the high commanders.
[363] Seyhan, 178.
[364] Örtülü, 215.
[365] Talat Aydemir, 129, and Seyhan, 180.

of being eliminated by those elements of the military which were cooperating with the political elite. One of the leaders of the absolutist colonels, Talat Aydemir, says that he received a note from a friend on February 20, warning him that he would be arrested the following day. At the same time, Prime Minister İnönü announced that the primary responsibility for the execution of the DP politicians belonged the colonels' junta, and that they had to be punished.[366] Fearing what was coming, Aydemir went to the army college where he was a commander and met with his friends—in particular, Central Commander Selçuk Atakan, and the commander of the gendarmerie school, Necati Ursalan. His moves led to an order by the Chief of Staff that the airforce should be on alert and that if the colonels should attempt to make their move, they should be stopped.[367] Simultaneously, the regiment guarding the parliament also went on alert, in turn provoking tank units to be put on alert by the colonels.[368]

The following day, the Chief of Staff called the colonels into his office and told them that due to their "irresponsible behavior" he would reassign them to his personal units for their own "protection," to which Aydemir bluntly responded that he didn't need protection from anyone, and that "in [his] veins what circulated was not the blood of politics and the CHP but rather the blood of patriotism."[369] As he said these words, he took out his pistol, and in a threatening gesture towards the Chief of Staff, placed it on the table in front of him. The Chief of Staff warned that the air force would bomb them if they made any coup attempt, to which Aydemir responded that the army was therefore ready to wage war. As this talk was taking place between the revolutionist colonel and the Chief of Staff, the commander of the army, who was also present, had reportedly lost control and was crying.[370] This rather

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[366] Talat Aydemir, 130. It is possible that Aydemir exaggerated such an impression in order to justify his coup attempts.
[367] Örtülü, 222.
[368] It is said that these new units went on alert upon an order by Aydemir. Örtülü, 226-227, and Seyhan, 115.
[369] Örtülü, 233-234.
[370] Talat Aydemir, 135-136.

dramatic picture illustrates how deeply the state was torn, and the high level of the conflictual structure in the state system.

Aydemir consulted with the Istanbul group, and gave a further ultimatum to the Chief of Staff.[371] In response, several of Aydemir's supporters within the army were arrested. Aydemir then put several of his army college units on alert. The escalation of events led to a summit meeting in the presidential palace between the parties of the politico-military alliance, including the political party leaders, the prime minister, the president, the chief of staff, and the commanders of the armies. While they were discussing which units of the armed forces could be counted on to support them and what they should do with the rebelling colonel, the commander guard of the presidential palace, Fethi Gürcan, called Aydemir and informed him that he had all of these important figures surrounded and that if given the orders, he could arrest them all and put them in jail. Aydemir's surprising, and to this day unexplained, response would spell his ultimate defeat, "let them go."[372]

In the end, due to a deadlock in the power balance between the air force and army, Prime Minister İnönü promised the rebelling colonels that if they stopped their actions, he would not initiate any investigation or legal procedures against them. The colonels accepted, and thus this absolutist coup attempt was ended. Though no one was tried, several of the officers were reassigned or forced to resign from military duty. Perhaps, for this research, the most interesting element of this coup attempt is that the colonels did finally agree to an election system—but one which would exclude illiterate people—on the argument that these people posed a societal threat to domestic stability because they were easily manipulated by "bad politics".[373]

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[371] Örtülü, 235. In this ultimatum he also wanted the air force elements to be reassigned to other posts.
[372] Ibid., 246-247, and Talat Aydemir, 139. Another version of the story is that by the time Aydemir got the news and prepared the order to arrest them, the elite in the palace had already left. Erkanlı, 106-110.
[373] Örtülü, 245.

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In retrospect, it can be argued that one of the primary reasons behind this collapse of the absolutist attempt was that the high command generals did not support a direct military ruling of the government. They were ready and willing to share the governing power with the political elite. This can be attributed in part to the individual characteristics of the prime minister, who was a former soldier and commander during the Liberty War. A second reason can of course be made that the absolutists were tactically poorly prepared.

In terms of the implications of this failed coup attempt, it should be noted that the primary beneficiaries from it were the army command/military elite, and the statist part of the political elite. For the military, the failed absolutist coup attempt further consolidated the confidence in rebuilding the army hierarchy. More importantly, it strengthened the arguments, position, and the raison d'etre of the great compromise. For the state elite, they were strengthened in relation to the rest of the political realm, in particular that part which was more societally based in its orientation. The fear of a constant threat of a coup and the need to curb it through an alliance and compromise among the whole state elite, was visibly becoming a primary structural determinant in the Turkish governance system.

In order to consolidate further the boundaries and major characteristics of the great consensus among the politico-military state elite, one more historical episode, a tragic one this time, was about to be played out, again with Talat Aydemir.

The "Aydemir Syndrome"

Aydemir told the cadets at the war college that the revolution had been stopped, but it was not finished, "I will be leading you and we will be making revolution."[374] With this spirit, Aydemir, now retired, continued his organizational activities both inside and outside the army. Soon, he and other absolutists who had been forced to resign or retire began to come

together. Although not chosen as the movement leader, Aydemir was in fact the de facto

leader. His continued ability, even after enforced retirement, to successfully recruit members

from the lower level officers into the absolutist movement of lower level officers[375] can be

interpreted as evidence that the absolutist understanding still had serious grassroots potential

within the armed forces. Perhaps their success was also due to the huge gap, observed by

Aydemir, between the generals who were cooperating with the politicians, and the masses of

lower-ranked officers in the army.[376] According to Aydemir, the army was deeply torn by this

cleavage, and thus yet another operation was designed to solve this problem by removing the

"corrupted" command elite.[377] The ultimate goal of the operation was to end the constitution

and replace the constitutional regime with a central committee type of administration, without

elections.[378]

In addition to these plans of the Aydemir group, a group known as the "14s" (the

radical contingent of the May 27 coup who had been sent into exile and had now returned),

were also planning a new military intervention into politics.[379] Still another group who was

said to have plans for a military takeover were the "11s", also known as the Air Force

Junta.[380] All of these groups were reflecting a similar understanding among some of the

military state elite that politics were not to be trusted, and had to be either stopped or at

minimum controlled with an iron fist. Such an authoritarian state structure would be much

more efficient for radical transformation. The major problem for all of these groups was that

there were problems among them, both in terms of leadership and style. For example,

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[374] Talat Aydemir was apparently still very popular among the war college cadets, even as a retired colonel. On the weekends, he reports, students liked to pass by his house, and would salute him. They did not salute the chief of staff, general Cevdet Sunay, who also lived in the same street. Talat Aydemir, 271.

[375] *İddianeme* (prosecutor's accusation) in ibid., 273-275.

[376] İsen, 218-219. See also Aydemir's full defense in the same book. Talat Aydemir, 204-254.

[377] Talat Aydemir, 241.

[378] *İddianame* in ibid., 276-277.

[379] Even though Türkeş later claimed that he preferred the worst type of democracy to revolutions, his activities were highly political and clandestine. Örtülü, 342-343 and Hulusi Turgut, *Türkeş'in Anıları: Şahinlerin Dansı* [The Memoirs of Turkes: The Dance of the Hawks] (Istanbul: ABC, 1995), 384-386.

Alpaslan Türkeş of the "14s", seemed to have shifted towards a position a bit closer to the gradualists.[381] Due to these problems, Aydemir feared he would lose the leadership of the absolutists, and therefore decided to attempt yet another coup.

At the same time, there were certain political developments which were helping to create a suitable environment for the revolutionary absolutists. The conditional release of former DP era president Celal Bayar and his return to Ankara, had caused mass demonstrations between those who were broadly against the May 27 coup and those who called themselves "the guards of Kemalist Turkey". It was already becoming a highly securitized environment, so much so that the National Security Council was convened.[382] The convening of the National Security Council left no doubt that these events were seen as a serious security challenge. In such a chaotic environment, radical moves would likely be considered more feasible, since public opinion would be more willing to support anything that could calm things.

The new coup attempt took place in such an unstable environment. As usual, the perpetrators—Aydemir's men—first raided the radio station and broadcast a speech saying that the Turkish armed forces, following the principles of Atatürk, were going to establish a revolutionary and democratic republic. Once again, the rhetoric was of radical, rapid transformation with an iron fist.[383] The counter-speech was delivered immediately by the chief of staff, who announced that "the Turkish armed forces are at the government's service, and all the force commanders and generals support the government. Talat (Aydemir) and his few men are poor adventurists and they will be punished."[384] The government immediately sent in the necessary forces against the coup perpetrators, who were now based in the war

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[380] Bedii Faik, İhtilalciler Arasında Bir Gazeteci [A Journalist among Revolutionaries] (Istanbul: Dünya Yayınevi, 1967), 229-230.
[381] Turgut, 349-355.
[382] Cumhuriyet (Istanbul), 25-27 March 1963.
[383] See for the full text of the speech, Talat Aydemir, 248-249.
[384] Örtülü, 456-458.

college.[385] The entire war college was surrounded by forces loyal to the government, and Aydemir was soon forced to surrender to the police.[386]

After the subsequent trials, several of the failed coup leaders were sentenced to death, and others to long jail terms. Many were ultimately released, but Talat Aydemir and Fethi Gürcan were hanged in June and July of 1964.[387] The stronghold of the Aydemir group, 1,459 cadets of the war college, were all expelled from the school as a "lesson for the future generations."[388] Later an amnesty was given to these students and they were settled in civilian universities.

The Grand Compromise Finalized

Talat Aydemir's execution in particular was seen as the ultimate lesson to the uncontrollable absolutist approach to governance. It simply meant that moves outside of the military hierarchy would not be tolerated and would be severely punished. The execution instilled a clear syndrome for those lower level officers of the Turkish armed forces who harbored absolutist demands for radical transformations. The Grand Compromise between generals and statist politicians had prevailed, and gradualism had won. The fear of coup threats by uncontrollable elements would now be curbed by the institutionalized, hierarchical unity of the military (maintained in part by the "Aydemir Syndrome"), while the fear of uncontrollable societal elements via anti-statist political representation, such as the DP, would be curbed by the "Menderes Syndrome" inherited by civilian politicians and the entire political realm. Two sets of executions had created two peculiar syndromes—one for the absolutist state elite of the military, and one for the "risky elements" of liberal democracy.

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[385] Batur himself was a first air force commander. Batur, 117-118.
[386] In this coup attempt 8 died, 26 were wounded. İsen, 173.
[387] See, for the process of the trials and the executions, *Türkiye Yıllığı 1965* [Turkish Yearbook 1965] (Istanbul: Gün Matbaası, 1965), 147-153.
[388] Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları* [The Memoirs of Kenan Evren] (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1990), 1: 133-135.

Together, they constituted the boundaries of the type of democracy as well as the power structure of the Turkish state. The Turkish elite could neither give up on democracy nor hand over power to society due primarily to its (in)security perceptions about the future of the transformation of the state. A middle road had now been found, and it required a high level of management of democracy and governance in Turkey.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how a changing political globalization impact brought about a genuine clash between the conflictive demands of security and political globalization's liberalization pressures. It then detailed how exactly this clash took place. First, the clashing pressures were shown to become identified with different elements within the state structure—the security demands of the state provided the legitimizing arguments and raison d'etre for the statist elements (largely the military and the CHP), while the liberalizing demands of political globalization provided legitimacy and support for the maintenance of a multi-party system (at this point represented by the opposition Democrat Party). These two sides can be seen as the early representatives of the hypothesized hard and soft realms.

Second, the chapter shows how the need to find a manageable way to govern under these simultaneous pressures resulted in a compromise between the two realms. Within this compromise, the hard realm agreed to reign in its most security-minded elements (those who were unable to envision any political control over a stable transformation), and thereby permit the political realm to continue. The political "soft" realm, on the other hand, agreed to limit its own extreme elements, thereby bowing to the hard realm's wishes on issues that would have a determining impact on power distribution in the system and which would fall within the rubric of national security conceptualizations. The political realm also agreed to leave the defining of these issues in the control of the hard realm. In this case, the national security

threat was defined as being posed by the unreliable society and their political representatives. Such a dangerous threat to the safety and security of the state system had to be countered by a particular type of national governance, which required a great compromise among the nation's elite.

With the grand compromise between the military and statist elites, what was revealed was an understanding that the soft realm could only be effectively controlled by an institutionalized hard realm, in other words, the stability of the unavoidable democratic transformation could only be assured by an autonomous hard realm. The route and mode of the institutionalization of the hard realm would be linked to the attitudes and loyalty of the soft realm to the consensus. A dual institutionalization was now inevitable, and perhaps more interesting, the institutionalization of the hard realm was leading it into a role of "risk manager" for the soft realm. The following chapter will therefore include an analysis of the Turkish constitutions and changes within them, as the clearest concrete reflections of the expansion and further consolidation of the institutionalization of the hard realm, whose main mission was emerging as the ultimate guard of the state and regime against the 'dangerous' but inevitable transformation of liberalization.

Chapter 4

Consolidation and Institutionalization of a National Security Regime

Introduction

   After the consensus between the political and hard realms had been achieved,

there remained an under-institutionalization of mechanisms for implementing this form of

governance. The hard realm first saw the presidency as a key position, with the control of

which they believed they could watch over and manage the political realm. Societal and

intellectual input during the preparation of the 1961 Constitution, however, had placed

considerable emphasis on legislative over executive power, thus creating a challenge to

the hard realm's understanding about the presidency. Even though the introduction of the

National Security Council in the 1961 Constitution was most likely designed in order to

overcome this challenge, it was not immediately clear how well it would function.

Therefore the hard realm sought additional ways of 'autonomizing' from the rest of the

system, and thus moving beyond the supervision and control of the political soft realm.

The hard realm's attempts to institutionalize autonomously were a precondition for the

creation of constitutional control mechanisms over the soft realm. These control

mechanisms would emerge to constitute the national security regime, i.e. a regime in

which there is a clear primacy of security considerations over politics. In such a regime,

the armed forces could later use the mechanism of the National Security Council to

maintain a sense of control over the soft realm's management of national political affairs,

whenever this management was judged to be posing a risk to national security.

This chapter begins with a look at the primary steps of further autonomization and consolidation of the hard realm. I show how the hard realm's inner core, namely the military, constructed its cohesiveness, strength, and internal integrity, in order to be able to stand as a solid power within the Turkish governance structure. This is followed by an analysis of the control mechanisms of politics/society by looking at the evolution and expansion of the national security regime, particularly in terms of the National Security Council, in the constitutions and constitutional changes of 1961-1982. Finally, I provide a narrative of the 'February 28th Process' of 1998, commonly labeled as the "post-modern coup", in order to show how the National Security Council mechanism was used and how the hard vs. soft realm battles are fought.

Autonomization of the Hard Realm

The Position of the Chief of Staff and the Armed Forces

In 1949 a law was passed clarifying the position of the Chief of Staff and the military vis-à-vis the political authority. According to this law, the Chief of Staff was placed under the authority of the Defense Minister, and thus the defense ministry became the primary responsible unit in preparing the military for conditions of war and peace. Moreover, the law stipulated that the Chief of Staff would be appointed by the government, upon the recommendation of the Defense Minister.[389] During the ten years that this regulation was in effect, it is noted that the military was both uncomfortable and

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[389] Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *Düstur* [Parliamentary yearbook], vol. 30, 3rd category (Ankara: Başbakanlık Yayınevi, 1949), 1076.

resistant to being placed in this "inferior" position in respect to the political authority.[390]

Following the 1960 coup, the residual resistance and discomfort turned to action. Although the parliament tried to insist that the Chief of Staff should remain responsible to the Defense Minister, the coup leading soldiers of the National Unity Committee forced instead their own proposition that the Chief of Staff be responsible only to the Prime Minister. Under the full pressure of the National Unity Committee, the relevant article of the constitution (Article 110) was finalized, placing the Chief of Staff position above the defense ministry.[391] According to the new law, the Chief of Staff would be appointed by the President, upon the recommendation of the government.

In 1967 the Constitutional Court not only reconfirmed that the Chief of Staff was above the defense ministry[392] but also cancelled the laws and regulations that had placed the defense ministry in charge of promotions for military officers working at the headquarters of the ministry. At this point the Chief of Staff and military command held a de facto autonomy from the defense ministry. In 1970 legislative proposals to consolidate and codify this de facto situation were prepared by the High Military Council and brought before the parliament "without any governmental input at all."[393] Transcripts of the discussions in the parliament at the time reveal that the soft realm, due to its competitive characteristics, was unable to resist against this further autonomization of the hard realm. The opposition parties, for example, did not oppose the strengthening of the Chief of Staff against the defense ministry because they were worried that if the soft realm were to

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[390] For additional details on the protocol crisis that ensued (e.g. who was going to sit where, and how were people to address each other etc.) see Mehmet A. Birand, Can Dündar, and Bülent Çaplı, *Demirkrat* [Ironcrat](Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), 118-119.
[391] Ibid., 443.
[392] For this Constitutional Court decision see Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *Düstur*, vol. 5, 5th category (Ankara: Başbakanlık Yayınevi, 1966), 2373-2386.

have final say over the military (as, in a sense, they would, if the military were under the control of a defense ministry dominated by the ruling party) then one political party would potentially be able to use the military against its political rivals.[394] In a sense, competing elements in the soft realm (e.g. different political parties), knowing that it was difficult to control the armed forces by themselves, did not want them to be controlled by or to ally with anyone else. The tremendous fear on the part of the soft realm that the hard realm might be somehow manipulated by other soft realm elements, kept the soft realm from supporting the placing of the military under the control of a soft realm ministry. The result of this concern is seen in the voicing of such popular but ultimately ironic arguments as, "there is no need to provide a distinct legislation for the defense ministry, all power is and should belong to the Chief of Staff."[395] One Nation Party MP expressed the point that Turkey was "no France or England" and that the military needed to be kept "totally outside of political power". He went on to say that Turkey had a "unique case...we should not leave even the management of the military technology and factories under the defense ministry, they should all be under the direct control of the Chief of Staff."[396] Of course, this desire to keep the military separate and therefore away from the control of any rival political parties, had the interesting side effect of also paving the way for the raising of the military's image above that of the political realm. Being outside of politics kept the military free of criticism, rarely spoken about, and graced with an image

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[393] For the details of the proposals and ensuing debates, see Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, vol. 6, session 104, 16 June 1970.
[394] Ibid., 446-447.
[395] Ibid. The Nation Party MPs in particular stressed this point repeatedly.
[396] Nation Party MP, Hilmi İşgüzar, went on to say that once these industries went under political power, the workers might want to use the rights of union etc., and that would jeopardize the safety of the country. Ibid., 454-456.

of being problem-free, as opposed to the daily scandals and intrigues that stained the political realm.

Ultimately, the legislative proposals became law in June 1970, turning the defense ministry into a more or less supporting role for the military, which was given virtually all power over its own personnel, education, and financial resources. The military would now "instruct the defense ministry" as to its own needs, and the government would then provide for these needs.[397] The situation was perhaps best described by the then Defense Minister, who said, "I am the only civilian in the Ministry. We couldn't build up a civilian unit. In a lot of developed countries military budgetary and some technical expertise issues are carried out by civilians."[398]

The High Military Council (*Yüksek Askeri Şura*)

Another important step to note in the gradual autonomization of the hard realm was the restructuring of the High Military Council (HMC), in which the promotions of the high military personnel are determined. This step was taken after the 1971 military intervention into politics. The new law that restructured the HMC determined that the council members should include the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, the force commanders (army, navy, air), army division commanders, military police commander, navy fleet commander, and all the 4-star generals in the armed forces. This was a new development since many of the previous high military councils had included only a few

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[397] Law no. 1324 dated 31 July 1970 published in *Official Gazette*, 7 August 1970.
[398] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, *Muktedirlerin Siyaseti* [The Politics of Power-holders] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), 73.

selected top ranking generals, thereby leaving others distanced and often resentful.[399] The

inclusion of all the high generals into a kind of power-sharing, cohesive body, reflected

the increasing institutionalization of the military high command. The HMC now became

a platform in which every voice of the command elite could be heard and could therefore

present a unified front with less likelihood of dissent.

The primary job of this council was and still is to determine the national military

concept and revisions of it if necessary, to consider all legislative activities specifically

concerning the armed forces, and to pass on their considerations about these activities to

the government. While the Prime Minister is the chair of the HMC, in his absence the

Chief of Staff—rather than the Defense Minister—becomes the chair. Traditionally,

following the first day of the annual meetings, the Prime Minister relinquishes the chair

position to the Chief of Staff.[400] The HMC does not have to answer to any political

authorities, yet it can make decisions and pass resolutions that are constitutionally outside

of judicial supervision. The Prime Minister and Defense Minister, with two simple votes

(each member has a single, equal vote), nevertheless assume all political responsibility

for possible consequences of decisions taken. The HMC not only shows a clear indication

of the military's complete control over its own internal affairs, reflecting its absolute

autonomy, but it also suggests how the military is able to keep the political authority at

arms distance and in a notary position of the military's decisions on internal matters.

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[399] For a comparison of the old and new regulations in detail, see the law no. 1612 published in the *Official Gazette*, 26 June 1972, and law no. 636 published in the *Official Gazette*, 22 April 1972.

<u>Restructuring the Internal Service Law of the Armed Forces</u> (*TSK İç Hizmet Kanunu*)

While the restructuring of the HMC helped to appease formerly sidelined

commanders and thereby secure a higher level of stability and maintenance of hierarchy

in the military, the revision of the internal service law[401] intended to rehabilitate the poor

economic conditions for military personnel as well as extending to them privileges in

their daily life. These privileges include special housing, department stores, education

opportunities, and more. The idea behind the law seemed to be to give the military and its

members a privileged status as well as to isolate military personnel and their families

from society to a degree that they would be less likely to be influenced by societal

fluctuations or developments.

The internal service law described the main mission of the armed forces as one of

protecting the Turkish country and republic. Later on, this article of the domestic code

would be used as a justification for military interventions, such as the 1980 coup.[402] The

domestic code also emphasizes that the armed forces would be "outside and above" every

type of political belief and consideration. Military personnel would only be allowed to

become members of associations deemed apolitical by the defense ministry.[403]

This law also carried several regulations intended to raise the living standards of

military members above that of the Turkish average, particularly in the realm of health

services (Articles 62-70). In accordance with this, health services both in Turkey and

abroad would be virtually free for all ranks of armed forces members, and would be of

"high quality". Social services as well (Articles 98-109) would be provided, in the form

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[400] Law no. 636 published in the *Official Gazette*, 22 April 1972.
[401] Law no. 211 was passed by the military administration two days prior to the opening of the parliament on January 4, 1961.
[402] Turkey, *Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law*, Art. 35.

of nearly free military guest houses[404], restaurants, entertainment centers, seaside campsites, and guaranteed free housing regardless of the location assignment. All of this helped significantly in the shaping up of a separate military class. This class, with its separate economic, social, and ideological (above politics) position, remains only loosely tied to the rest of society.

The Foundation of the Discipline Courts

The military administration following the 1960 coup wanted to establish new courts to handle disciplinary cases within the military. Based on their previous experiences, these military leaders appreciated the need to maintain discipline among military personnel, especially at times of turmoil. To them, such discipline could only be ensured by the expansion of the legal powers of the commanders. Their primary goal was not, therefore, to distribute justice, but rather to strengthen the power of control over the personnel. For this reason it was decided that court members would not have to be professional judges, but military officers. Such a decision obviously did not fit well with the spirit of law, a point raised repeatedly by the law professors who had been appointed to assist with the preparation of the proposal. Whether the Supreme Court and the Parliament did not share the law professors' concerns or were not able to comfortably express their views because the proposal was raised by the military administration, ultimately they did not oppose the proposal.[405] The result was a decision that basically strengthened the power of the commanding elite in terms of controlling the entire military

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[403] *Ibid.*, Art. 43.
[404] These are essentially high quality hotels built up across Turkey that provide accommodations almost free of charge to traveling military personnel and their families.

apparatus with powers that may not have been necessarily legally binding, but were effective nonetheless. For example, according to the law, the commander has the option of sending personnel to one of these courts or to determine the punishment himself—e.g., imprisonment without food.[406] It was hoped that the internal hierarchy of the armed forces would be strengthened by this law and that this would help the military act as a cohesive and integrated unit in its future dealings with the other elements of the national state structure such as the political elements of the soft realm.

The Foundation of the Military High Appeals Court

The regulations of the post-1960 coup era, and the introduction of the military discipline courts, did not prove sufficient in terms of maintaining internal discipline in the military, particularly before and during the March 12, 1970 military intervention. Increasingly, military members had begun taking their legal complaints against the military establishment to the civilian high appeals court, which was frequently ruling against the military[407]. The Turkish General Staff was naturally uncomfortable with this trend, which they saw as creating a breach in their discipline. It was growing ever clearer that a greater degree of legal autonomy was required. The armed forces sought therefore to create their own judiciary including their own high appeals court, which would remove them entirely from the civilian judiciary system.

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[405] For National Assembly records, see Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, D:1, B:9, I:3.

[406] For the text and related articles of the law see Ahmet Kerse, ed., *1961 Anayasına Göre Gerekçeli Notlu Askeri Yargı Mevzuatı* [Annotated Military Judicial Directory According to the 1961 Constitution] (Istanbul: n.p., 1964), 2: 14.

[407] For a detailed history of these issues and important cases, see İlhan Toğrul, *Askeri İdari Yargı* [Military Administrative Law] (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Basınevi, 1973), 10-11.

During the constitutional changes after the 1970 military intervention, therefore, an article was added to the constitution along with law number 1488, establishing a new Military High Administrative Appeals Court to the group of Turkish High Appeals Courts.[408] The arguments in the law proposal signed by then Prime Minister Nihat Erim, clearly show why such a court was seen as necessary for the autonomization of the armed forces from society. As he wrote, "...the unique characteristics of the armed forces require a special separate legal system...soldiers belong to a strong and higher authority, *independent from and outside of* the civilian power" (italics mine).[409]

With this increased judicial autonomy, the military was and remains now able to deal with elements it sees as harmful to its institutional mechanism, without being supervised by any higher judicial authority.[410] This direct impact on the military's internal control ability had as well an automatic impact on its confidence, strength, and coherence, attributes which would again become apparent in its future dealings with the Turkish political system. In other words, by making a radical jump in its ever-deepening consolidation and autonomization process, the inner core of the hard realm would also now prove to be more coordinated in its mission of engineering national policies according to its own perceptions and understandings.

Evolution of the National Security Regime and its Mechanisms

The deepening consolidation of the hard realm needed to be accompanied by a widening as well, as the hard realm expanded its position within the power structure in

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[408] For details of the law see the *Official Gazette*, 20 July 1972.
[409] For details of his justifications for the law, see Toğrul, 80-90.
[410] After obtaining this judicial autonomy, for example, the Turkish General Staff was able to dismiss officers—including those of the highest ranks—in a confident manner, since these figures could no longer

order to keep the soft realm and soft politics and its "risky" fragmentive and insecure potential under control. The system to carry out this mission of providing the security of the modernization project and transformation would be the national security regime, and its crucial institution, the National Security Council. This council would evolve as the mechanism through which the hard realm would, when necessary, exert its influence over the soft realm and the latter's ruling politicians. The question of "necessity" would be contingent on the hard realm's own interpretation and perceptions of the security concerns. The soft realm on the other hand, having already compromised with the supremacy of the hard realm and of security issues over politics, would now have to comply with the limits and the parameters of the national security regime.

The second part of this chapter turns to the 1961 constitution in detail, outlining the introduction of the National Security Council as a 'safety belt' against 'uncontrollable' democracy. It continues by showing how the National Security Council evolved and expanded as the hard realm interpreted the fluctuations in democratic developments as a resurgence of societal fragmentation and therefore sought to add to the hard realm's prerogatives whenever possible—i.e., whenever there was a break from multiparty politics, namely, during the intervention periods of 1970, 1980, and 1997.

The search for a strong, even dominant executive power (state) against a "dangerous" fragmented societal one (legislature), demanded some type of mechanism at the constitutional level. This mechanism would also have to appear as democratic as possible, in order to meet external and internal legitimacy needs. In a country like Turkey, whose history had virtually revolved around internal and external security

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return after a legal battle. For examples of such incidents, see Celil Gürkan, *12 Mart'a Beş Kala* [Five Minutes to March 12] (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1986), 280.

concerns, the concept of security/national security provided a convenient and plausible justification for the creation of democratic-in-appearance mechanisms. Beginning largely with the 1961 constitution and increasing with the later constitutional changes, we can clearly see the consolidation of this national security mechanism through which the hard realm would administer and manage the "dangerous" soft realm. Or in the critical words of one Turkish scholar, we can see evidence that the problems of "anti-democratic institutions" marked by "eroding judicial independence", "empowerment of the executive branch", and in general, the "weakening of party governments against...the military bureaucracy", were all "introduced to Turkish law in the 1961 Constitution...the 1982 Constitution is not the "first sin".[411]

From National Defense to National Security

Though the 1961 Constitution, with its creation of the National Security Council, is an important starting point in looking at the evolution of the national security regime, it is helpful to jump back in time again and look briefly at the pre-1961 institutions which particularly foreshadow the NSC. Prior to the foundation of the National Security Council, there had been organizations with similar looking missions and structures. These were the War Council (founded in 1922), the High Defense Council and General Secretariat (1933), and the High National Defense Council (1949). The primary difference between these and the National Security Council of 1961 and subsequently, is that these earlier versions were largely concentrated around the external defense considerations of the Turkish Republic, rather than on a combination of internal and

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[411] Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Anayasalar* [Constitutions in Turkey] (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), 48.

external security needs—with even a specific emphasis on internal security. It is clear though, that the tradition of leaving the defense and security responsibilities to the non-elected parts of the state apparatus were reflected even in these early versions of national security organizations. This characteristic is consistent with the pendulum between security and democracy and the resulting national security syndrome based on the fear of societal input as discussed earlier.

Emergency War Council

During Turkey's War of Liberation, leading to the founding of the Turkish Republic, when the graveness of Turkey's position was reported by Chief Commander Fevzi Pasha to the parliament[412], a proposal was made to form a War Council and to transfer some of the authority of the parliament to this council, which would be under the direct responsibility of Commander in Chief, Mustafa Kemal.[413] The proposal led to long and heated debates in the parliament. In particular the opposition members saw the idea as both undemocratic and dictatorial. One parliamentarian responded that the organizing of support for the army was the parliament's job and could not be transferred to some other power, "...this is a dictatorship...let's give up on these, let's work like a civilized government just like other nations...".[414] The primary concern among these opposing voices was that the executive power of Mustafa Kemal would be overly strengthened vis-a-vis the parliament. Their resistance was successful, and ultimately the proposal was not confirmed.

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[412] Fevzi Pasha reported to the Parliament that there were serious problems particularly in terms of providing logistical support to the army, and support activities such as these had to be much better coordinated. Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *TBMM Gizli Zabıt Ceridesi* [Turkish Grand National Assembly Confidential Records] (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1980), 2: 454-456.

Nevertheless, the executive power, and Commander in Chief Mustafa Kemal, declared an executive decree, in which a body with authority similar to that of the proposed War Council was created. The resulting body consisted of the Commander in Chief, the Chief of the Parliament, and the Ministers of Finance and Defense.[415] With this move we see the reallocation of some political power to the military, e.g. the finance minister was assigned to this military body. Since this council was directly responsible to the Commander in Chief rather than the parliament, the de facto power belonged to the military establishment. In fact, this council made decisions through which some of the parliamentarians themselves would be assigned missions in the battlefield without any consultation of the parliament.[416] According to a leading Turkish expert on the military and politics, Professor Hikmet Özdemir, the War Council worked as an organ above the elected parliament, which was representing society, directly under the Commander in Chief, and had the power even to instruct the parliament under certain circumstances.[417]

High Defense Council (Yüksek Müdafaa Meclisi)

During the early 1930s, the Turkish government, in order to prepare the national defense for a possible war, launched an organ called the High Defense Council (HDC). This council, also created by executive decision without the involvement of the parliament, consisted of the ministers of the government as well as the Chief of Staff if he should happen to also be a minister as well. The council was designed to decide upon the

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[413] For the details of the proposal see ibid., 2: 502-503, 2: 508-509.

[414] Hüseyin Avni Bey, as reported in ibid., 2: 578-579.

[415] Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *TBMM Gizli Zabıt Ceridesi* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1980), 16: 80.

[416] For details on the debate about the executive decree and subsequent developments, see ibid., 142-143, and Turkey, Turkish Grand National Assembly, *TBMM Gizli Zabıt Ceridesi* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1980), 18: 73.

particular missions of the various ministries during times of war or preparations for such.[418] A bureau within the National Defense Ministry was also assigned to work as the general secretariat for the HDC. The council was to convene under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister if the President were not in attendance. Hikmet Özdemir points out that the HDC was a kind of prototype for the National Security Council of the 1961 Constitution in the sense, for example, that it had a Secretariat and convened under the Prime Minister.[419] In fact, when the current National Security Council celebrated what it referred to as the 64th anniversary of its foundation in 1997, this was in direct reference to the starting date of the High Defense Council in 1933.[420]

National Defense High Council

The experience of the Second World War, even though Turkey did not take part in the actual combat, brought further attention to the issue that war management and preparation for war needed to be synchronized between the soldiers and the civilians for optimal organization. The reflection of this desire to synchronize civilian/military contributions led to the foundation of the National Defense High Council (NDHC) on 30 May 1949.[421] Backed by the high military leadership, the proposal for its foundation was made law with little or no parliamentary debate.[422] The first article of the law creating the National Defense High Council overtly declares the primacy of security in the state's

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[417] Özdemir, Rejim, 106.
[418] Ibid., 107-108.
[419] Ibid., 107.
[420] Hürriyet (Istanbul), 1 June 1997.
[421] Ibid.
[422] Hikmet Özdemir reports that in 1946 another proposal by the Chief of Staff was brought to the attention of the Prime Ministry, the main issues in which were then reorganized and added to by the High Military Council in 1949, and the revised version constituted the articles of the law passed in 1949. Özdemir, Rejim, 108.

agenda when it states that, "national defense issues and missions are the top priority of state affairs."[423] There was no clarity in the law however, over how comprehensively such "national defense issues and missions" would be defined, a vagueness that would become crucial later on since it could be manipulated when necessary. In fact, this lack of definition would provide the grounds and means for future securitization, in the sense that the hard realm, with little if any political input, would be able to appeal to it when determining and defining what constituted security risks and how to deal with them.

Although it had a similar mission to those of the previously mentioned councils, the NDHC differed from them in the respect that it was made up of a majority of civilian members. The NDHC was to be chaired by the Prime Minister, who would be joined by the Chief of Staff and selected ministers from the cabinet. When deemed necessary, the council could invite members of the High Military Council and other experts to attend meetings as well.

Even though the NDHC had only one clear military member, the Chief of Staff, and a heavy representation of civilians, the leadership of the latter seemed to show little interest in the workings of the NDHC until it was abolished during the May 27, 1960 military intervention.[424] This apparent lack of interest points to the responsibility that needs to be taken by the civilian leaders for leaving military issues outside of their primary interest area—a move which would later prove quite disastrous since in their absence, the military establishment was there to automatically fill the gap. Subsequently, all actors in the political system would come to perceive the military establishment as

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[423] *Official Gazette*, 3 June 1949.
[424] During the twelve years of the NDHC's existence, the President joined the meetings only one time, a record only slightly improved on by the Prime Minister. The chairmanship of most meetings was left to the Defense Minister. Tayfun Akgüner, *1961 Anayasasına Göre Milli Güvenlik Kavramı ve Milli Güvenlik*

having an automatic autonomy in affairs of national defense/security, the exact

parameters of what constituted such would as well be defined by the military

establishment.

Towards the National Security Regime

When the 1960s arrived, the rationale of national defense with an external

emphasis, which had primarily led to the formation of the previous organizations, was

gradually transforming into an understanding of national defense with a larger emphasis

on internal/regime security. There were two primary reasons for this. The first was again

related to the external security environment, namely the East-West conflict or Cold War.

Mirroring the external picture of the American/Soviet conflict, a cold war was also

opening up domestically within certain countries, particularly those on the front line of

the East-West divide, e.g. Turkey, Greece, Pakistan, Afghanistan, or the Green Belt

project countries.[425] Soviet ideological warfare was starting to provoke the domestic

fragmentation potential within Turkish society, in the hope of sparking a left-wing

counter revolution to separate Turkey from the U.S. bloc. This possibility automatically

turned internal issues, domestic political threats and political instability, into a major part

of the national security syndrome. In fact, as it became gradually seen that the Cold War

also brought with it a reduction in inter-state wars and confrontations, internal security

concerns became the primary focus of the national security concept.

Kurulu [National Security Concept and National Security Council according to 1961 Constitution]
(İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Fakültesi, 1983), 187.
[425] The "Green Belt" refers to a project conducted by the United States as part of their containment policy
of the communist expansion threat. "Green" here refers to Islam, and to the idea of using the Islamic factor
in order to contain the "red" communists.

The second primary reason behind the transformation from national defense to national (in)security was that, as has been argued in the previous chapters, the Turkish state elite saw the true security dilemma as one of securing the stability of the transformation to a westernized country, in other words, managing modernization. They therefore looked at democratization and liberal politics as excessively dangerous to simply 'let go', and saw instead the need for a mechanism to manage the emerging soft realm of politics. The dangerous empowering of the 'unprepared' society had also to be included on the list of national security considerations. The ruling elite were faced with the dilemma. On the one hand, the country had a fragile domestic political structure. On the other hand, the constant pressure of political globalization, as discussed in the previous chapter, would not permit them the luxury of taking a break from democratization. Further securitization[426] and institutionalization of the hard realm in order to meet the needs of managing stability/security during the democratization process was inevitable, and was epitomized with the National Security Council mechanism provided in the 1961 Constitution. Or as one high-level general responded when asked about the risks that democratization poses for a country's stability/national security, "why do you think we have the NSC?"[427]

Preceding the confirmation of Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution, establishing the National Security Council, were a number of debates. The Istanbul University Constitution Commission, which was established immediately following the 1960 coup, first prepared a draft of the constitution. Under the section entitled "State Assisting

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[426] For the argument that the East-West conflict (Cold War) led to a wave of securitization of constitutions, see ibid., 100.
[427] Interview with Turkish Army general on customary condition of anonymity, Ankara, 14 November 2001.

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Organizations/Councils," the establishment of a National Defense Council was proposed.

The members of the Council were to be the Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, Foreign

Minister, Interior Minister, Defense Minister, Transportation Minister, Commanders of

the Navy, Air Force and Army, and the General Secretary of the National Defense High

Council. The mission of the proposed council was to "maintain national power and make

the necessary plans to provide for both the military and civilian safety of the country." [428]

The Scholar Commission created by the coup leadership to assist in the writing of the

new constitution was headed by a famous professor, Sıddık Sami Onar, who also

recommended the founding of such an organization which would bring together the

political and military elites. Onar would later explain this recommendation by saying that

"the National Security Council would prevent the political authority/government from

taking advantage of national security measures for their political interests." The NSC

would also, in Onar's words, "resist against the executive branches with its apolitical

members, when there were political pressures through the bureaucracy."[429] In other

words, the NSC, insulated from politics, would have the power to resist against any

political pressures or attempted manipulation.

There was heated debate in the representative council about the proposal to create

the NSC. In particular those members from military backgrounds made demands that

revealed the clear shift in the hard realm's emphasis from national defense to national

(in)security. They demanded, for example, that next to the Chief of Staff, force chiefs

should as well become permanent members of the proposed council. One retired general,

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[428] Server Tanilli, *Anayasalar ve Siyasal Belgeler* [Constitutions and Political Documents] (Istanbul: Cem, 1976), 98-199.
[429] Sıddık Sami Onar, *İdare Hukukunun Umumi Esasları* [General Principles of Administrative Law], 3rd ed. (Istanbul: İstanbul Tecrüme ve Neşriyat Bürosu, 1966), 1: 218.

then an MP, argued that the commanders of the four forces (navy, air, army, gendarmerie), should all be voting members of the Council, otherwise the "military representation would be in the minority."[430] Other members' comments also reveal how the military establishment viewed the proposed institution. General Fahri Belen, also an MP, wanted the word "security" to replace the word 'defense', since, he argued, there was already a national defense ministry to deal with defense issues. The new council would be responsible instead for 'national security', and in such a way could better fit in with its counterparts in the western countries.[431] These efforts reveal a tendency of trying to at least make the Turkish structures appear compatible with their counterparts in the western democratic systems.

The members of parliament with civilian backgrounds, on the other hand, tended to reject the proposed militarization of the council. Given their majority in the parliament, Article 111 of the Constitution proposal did not include the hardliners' suggestions. However, this civilian resistance by the parliament meant nothing since the proposal ultimately had to be ratified by the National Unity Committee that had conducted the coup, and which was of course made up entirely of military members. The National Unity Committee revised the proposed article, to a format virtually the same as that suggested by the parliament members with military backgrounds. The commanders of the forces were included and given voting power in the Committee, and the name was finalized as the National Security Council. With the parliament unable to resist against these revisions, Turkey now had in its a constitution a National Security Council with a much

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[430] Özdemir, *Rejim*, 116.
[431] Ibid, 116.

larger power and comprehensive influence than any of the previous 'defense' oriented organizations.

The position and mission of the National Security Council were basically expressed in the Constitution as such: "...to assist in passing basic views to the government."[432] In this sense, it appears as though the military was given a high constitutional channel via which to pass its opinions to the government within a democratic system. On paper, neither Article 111 nor law 129 (which outlines the proceedings of the NSC) present any notion of compulsory compliance by the government with the views passed to them, which might suggest to some that in the early years of the NCS's institutionalization, a consulting characteristic seems the most valid assessment.[433] In line with this position one can point to the predominance of civilian members over military ones on the council, and cite this as a further indication of the NSC's role as consulting institution rather than executive decision-making body.[434] Even from this perspective however, there is no doubt that through the NSC, the 1961 Constitution at minimum granted a permanent access to the military to influence governmental decisions.[435]

A more skeptical position could argue that even on paper the NSC was not a democratic institution since its creation completely altered the existing democratic mechanism of using the national defense ministry as the channel through which the

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[432] Turkey, *1961 Constitution*. Art. 111.

[433] For further details on how the NSC became a part of the Constitutional system after 1961, see Rona Aybay, "Milli Güvenlik Kavramı ve Milli Güvenlik Kurulu," ["National Security Concept and National Security Council,"] *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* 33 (1978): 59-82.

[434] As opposed to the four military members, there were at least ten civilian members of the council, sometimes more, as the Prime Minister was given the right to invite relevant ministers to attend if the situation seemed to call for it. For details see ibid., 76.

[435] Serap Yazıcı, "Turkiye'de Askeri Müdaheleler ve Anayasal Etkileri," [Military Interventions in Turkey and Their Constitutional Effects] (Ph.D. diss., Ankara Üniversitesi, 1995), 55.

military could communicate with the political authority. This new "half military, half civilian" high state council that was invented in the 1961 Constitution, would open the door for greater constitutional changes in the early 1970s and in 1982, leading ultimately to the consolidating of the national security regime.

In light of subsequent developments and the gradual growth of the NSC's influence as an organization, the more skeptical of the two perspectives seems justified. Whenever problems arise between the soft and hard realms, in other words, whenever the soft realm seriously challenges the hard realm, it appears as though the NSC has been used as a platform for the hard realm to not only send strong messages but also play a more direct role in the decision-making process. For example, in March 1963, in response to the street demonstrations on the second anniversary of the DP leaders' executions and in an attempt to please the voters, the government decided to release former DP president Celal Bayar and grant a partial amnesty for former DP members. This angered the military greatly, and a meeting of the NSC was convened, during which a decision was made to instead relocate Celal Bayar to a "safe place" as well as to take necessary measures to restore stability and national safety.[436] The government's decision was dropped, and that of the NSC was promptly complied with.

The increasing ideological fragmentation and subsequent conflictive street violence and demonstrations towards the end of the 1960s strengthened the military's position that the NSC mechanism was more necessary than ever. Accordingly, the military was increasingly determined to block any constitutional changes that might disturb the hard realm's increasing primacy in the governance system. For example, when the soft realm attempted in 1969 to change the constitution in order to return political

rights to the banned DP members, military commanders visited the president and made it clear they were opposed to such a constitutional change. The proposal was withdrawn by the political leaders.[437] Following the general elections of 1969 the soft realm again attempted to pass a law lifting the ban on political activities for former DP figures, but in June 1970, this law was cancelled by the Constitution Court.[438]

The 1971 Military Intervention and Subsequent Constitutional Changes

A quick look at the year 1970 in Turkey reveals a situation of economic hardship and political instability. Widespread general strikes and politicized workers were resulting in a reduction of production, governmental stability was lost, and violent student demonstrations and a handicapped university system were the rule of the day. The Justice Party government led by Süleyman Demirel was in its fifth year in power after winning the parliamentary elections for the second time in 1969. However, by the year 1970 Demirel was no longer able to control either the declining economic situation or the political turmoil besetting the country. His leadership was facing increasing opposition within the Justice Party, and this opposition culminated in the establishment of the splinter Democratic Party in late 1970. With this split, the Justice Party lost parliamentary majority, a factor which clearly contributed to Demirel's inability to effectively deal with the worsening political and economic situation in the country[439].

According to William Hale, attempts by the soft realm to liberalize political rights, were one of the major reasons behind the military intervention of March 12, 1971.

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[436] Ahmad, *Modern*, 219.
[437] For details of this incident see Toker, 152-170, and Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı, 155-162.
[438] Hale, 158.
[439] Ahmad, *Demokrasi*, 288-291.

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The other major reason cited is the governmental failure to curb the increasing terrorism and violence that was significantly destabilizing the country.[440] All of these developments were seen by the hard realm as "regime chaos and instability". Meeting in late March 1970, the NSC went beyond its consulting position in declaring that the autonomy of the decentralized state universities (viewed as the cause of the widespread student demonstrations) would be ignored or limited if deemed necessary. Rumors soon followed that a coup was being planned within the armed forces--which might have been true because the government subsequently dismissed 56 generals and 516 colonels from their positions.[441] Following particularly violent demonstrations in Istanbul and Kocaeli, during which four workers died, the government was finally forced to declare emergency law,[442] under which the governance of certain areas/regions passes temporarily to the military in order to restore security, essentially, making the military a partner in the daily governance of the country.

It appears that the main trend among the military generals of the time was that they should stay offstage, so to speak, but be active in forcing the political system to bring about stability. If the political figures resisted the often radical, military recommended methods to bring about this stability, the military threatened to extend the NSC to include all the officers of the army and even establish a founding national parliament. In other words, to replace the elected legislature.[443]

The Demirel government was not only failing to stop the violence and terror wracking Turkey, but was also resisting against the expansion of the emergency law. A

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[440] Hale, 161-162.
[441] Such large dismissals generally take place at times of internal turmoil and power struggles within the military.
[442] Birand, Dündar, and Çaplı, 168.

well-known Turkish journalist who was close to the statesmen and politicians reports that, based on his personal interviews with Demirel, politicians of the time did not want high military involvement in the "protection of the democracy" because they were not sure whether the military, once involved, would then willingly leave power.[444] The government was seeking therefore to bring about stability by relying on civilian forces, namely the national police.

The on-going struggle between the hard and soft realms ended with a presentation of a manifesto by the Chief of Staff and the force commanders to the parliament and the president. The manifesto was then broadcast by national radio, and contained the following messages:

1. The future of the Turkish Republic has fallen into a great danger due to the failure of the parliament and government policies, which have put this country into a situation of anarchy in which brother is fighting brother...[they] have failed to implement the reforms required by the constitution.

2. It is vital to form a strong government...in order to implement the constitutionally required reforms with Atatürkist principles, to act above political parties and politics and to remove the hopelessness and sadness, the Turkish Armed Forces...have become involved.

3. The Turkish Armed Forces will take over governmental power unless the above mentioned needs are fulfilled.

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[443] This constant threat of a coup was omnipresent, and was particularly obvious in the ultimatums given by the reformist general Muhsin Batur.

Prime Minister Demirel submitted a letter explaining that the armed forces' action was both unlawful and against the constitution, and then he resigned.

Once again the Turkish Armed Forces had made an appeal to regime and national stability/security in order to justify the toppling of a democratically elected government. A half-coup regime was then set up, in the sense that the parliament was allowed to survive, but an unelected government—one which was "above" politics—would govern. The hard realm had clear expectations from this unelected government, led by Nihat Erim[445], and from the intimidated parliament. Namely, they were to restore stability and safety in the country and also to materialize certain reforms the military had been pushing for years.[446]

The Erim government kept the emergency law in place for two years. During this period several journalists and academics were detained or arrested[447], and generally repressive measures were used to curb the violence and terror that had been one of the major justifications for the military intervention. In addition to short-term measures, the hard realm was also working to take more systemic 'measures' to not only consolidate its supervision over the soft realm, but also to make this consolidation more acceptable to the Turkish public.

While the Erim government was not terribly successful in meeting the first of the military's goals for it, namely, providing economic and political stability, it was much more successful at getting passed certain constitutional reforms that the military was

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[444] Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Çankaya'ya Giden Yol, 1971-1973* [The Road Leading to Cankaya] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), 39-41. This book also contains comprehensive details about the violent activities and movements prior to the 1970 intervention.

[445] CHP member, Nihat Erim, was asked to resign from the CHP in order to appear independent and above politics. His cabinet included 11 "technocrat" ministers (considered as being non-political). For names of his cabinet members see Ahmad, *Demokrasi*, 371-372.

[446] Yazıcı, 83.

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pushing to have passed.[448] The hard realm generally held the impression that the

threatening levels of anarchy, terror, social unrest, and political violence were largely due

to the "excessive freedom that the constitution provided to the society."[449] Unsurprisingly

then, their manifesto to the political realm on March 12, 1970 included in it eight items,

requiring eight changes to the constitution. On the very day the intervention was made

public, there was already in existence a committee of three members for the planning of

constitutional changes. Further evidence that the constitutional changes were planned and

imposed by the military was the statement of Pertev Bilgen, who worked as a law council

at the General Staff Headquarters, and who claimed to have witnessed the preparation

there of various drafts, which later on became constitutional articles.[450] Kenan Evren,

who was leader of the military intervention ten years later in 1980, also wrote in his

memoirs that the 1971 changes to the constitution were made along the will of the

military.[451]

Of these constitutional changes in question, the most important took place on

September 20, 1971, and on March 15, 1973. With these changes it was clear that the

executive power was gaining considerable strength against the legislative one, in other

words, the hard realm was expanding at the expense of the soft realm. Along with this,

the grounds and means for securitization were being widened. First, the power of the

National Security Council was strengthened. This included the expanding of the list of

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[447] For details on these arrests and detentions of the era, see *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 19 May 1971.
[448] For details on the debate about these particular reforms, see *Yankı*, no. 26, 23 August 1971, and also *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 6, 7, 13 September 1971.
[449] Ergun Özbudun, *Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı* [Constitution Making during Transition to Democracy] (Ankara: Bilgi, 1993), 22-23.
[450] Pertev Bilgen, *İdare Hukuku Dersleri: İdare Malları* [Administrative Law Lectures: Administrative Property] (Istanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1996), 132.
[451] Evren, 3: 292.

acceptable reasons for declaring emergency law (Article 124). The supervisory role of the

High Financial Appeals Court was limited vis-a-vis military properties (Article 127/2), a

High Military Administration Court was founded (Article 140) including the State

Security Courts to the Constitution (Article 136), and the emergency courts and their

military judges, which had considerably increased the military's influence within the

judicial system, were legitimized (Article 32).

Constitutional Changes to the NSC

Turning specifically to the changes regarding the NSC, changes were made to the

description of the council's mission. While in the 1961 Constitution its role was one of

"informing" the government in order to "assist", the 1971 changes now read that the NSC

was there to "advise" (*tavsiye etmek*) the government, and the reference to "assisting"

was removed. Moreover, while the 1961 version said that the "representatives" of the

armed forces would join the NSC, the 1971 version replaced "representatives" with

"commanders", meaning that the five top commanders of the Turkish armed forces now.

became automatic members of the NSC. Yet another change that could be interpreted as a

sign of the hard realm's expansion through and within the NSC, was the word ordering of

the council members. The 1961 Constitution lists the members as "Prime Minister,

ministers, Chief of Staff...", whereas with the changes of the 1971 version, the Chief of

Staff is listed first. At least one scholar sees this as an indicator of the prevailing mood in

which the constitutional changes were made, that is, one in which the military was taking

on an increasing role within the system.[452] Tanör also sees the influence of this mindset in

the removal of the reference to "assisting the government," which he writes implies that

the change has deeper meanings than just symbolic differences. He suggests that the military did not want the NSC to appear as only a simple assisting department for the government, but saw instead for the NSC a more significant role.[453] Duran also sees the Turkish word "tavsiye etmek" (which can be translated in English by "advise" or "recommend") as including an instructive or directive tone, and suggests that such 'recommendations' would have restrictive connotations for the policies of the recipient, i.e. the civilian government.[454]

On the other hand, others argue that despite differences in tone, the constitutional changes of the early 1970s are ultimately insignificant because there are no clear sanctions outlined if the government fails to comply with the recommendations—in other words, the NSC's advice is not considered binding.[455] I would argue that even if the decisions of the NSC were and are not legally binding, we need to bear in mind that the type of influence that is exerted is both political and psychological. The true nature of the influence becomes clear, therefore, when one looks at the de facto compulsion contained in the NSC decisions. Examples of the resulting pressures and the mechanisms used to exert them will be shown at the end of this chapter, in the discussion of the February 28, 1997 "post-modern coup".

The State Security Courts

Before showing how the hard realm expanded and consolidated even further its position in the 1980 coup and via the 1982 Constitution, it is additionally important to

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[452] Aybay, 77-78.
[453] Tanör, 55.
[454] Lütfi Duran, *İdare Hukuku Ders Notları* [Administrative Law Lecture Notes] (Istanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1982), 130.

discuss the case of the State Security Courts. These were established in 1973 by the hard

realm in order to not only protect the state from normal judicial mechanisms, but also to

create a special shield by prosecuting 'crimes' against the hard realm under extraordinary

trial conditions.[456]

The creation of such special courts was clearly 'requested' by the armed forces.

Arcayürek includes in his book the full text of a letter signed by the Chief of Staff, Faruk

Görler, and sent to the Prime Minister, which clearly states the military's desire to have

these courts be established and to have an article of the Constitution changed since, as it

stood, it would conflict with certain subjective characteristics of these new courts.[457]

These courts' main mission is to rule on crimes related to state security,

democratic order and national/territorial integrity as identified and guaranteed in the

Constitution. Until the year 2000, the members of these courts included by law judges

and prosecutors who were professional military officers, meaning that the military held a

permanent influence over the judicial process even at times when the emergency law was

not in effect.[458]

In a series of interviews with members of these courts and others familiar with

their workings and personnel, clear patterns emerge of a court policy to protect the

state—a priority ranking equal if not higher to that of dispensing justice. In a case in

which the state is pitted against society, these courts are not likely to work on behalf of

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[455] See for example, Soysal, 272-273; Aybay, 79, and Yazıcı, 101.
[456] These courts were established by law no. 1773, which is based on Article 136 of the 1961 Constitution.
[457] Arcayürek, 14-16.
[458] This was changed in 2000 out of a concern that decisions taken by these courts would be found improper by the European Human Rights court—the jurisdiction of which Turkey had officially recognized. In particular, Turkey wanted to avoid any overturning of a ruling in these courts of the Abdullah Öcalan case.

society's rights. As one military member of the state security court system reported when asked to comment on their overall effectiveness, they are very successful in terms of:

> ...curb[ing] every type of threat to state security. While the normal judiciary may be corrupt or have wrong ideologies, or may not be able to see the interests of the state, the State Security Courts consistently employ patriot judges and prosecutors who know where the state's interests lie. Those people or groups who have problems with the state, like some NGOs, they try to take advantage of democracy. But our judges and prosecutors are removed from 'liberalizing' corruption and betrayal.[459]

A civilian prosecutor in the State Security Court system also referred to the qualities of the system's personnel, saying that, "not everyone can work for the State Security Court, that person must be a patriot and a nationalist."[460] In numerous informal discussions with police officers, particularly those in the counter-terrorism department who have the most frequent dealings with the State Security Court system, the State Security Court personnel are reported to have "the best" relations with the police because, in the words of one police chief, "they understand us and our job because it is them and us who protect the state from its enemies."[461] With the creation of these courts we see evidence, therefore, of the hard realm once again seizing the opportunity to expand, consolidate, and build up shields not only to protect itself from the "corrupting" impact of the soft realm but also to control and influence as much of the public realm--in particular security issues--as possible.

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[459] Interview with a military prosecutor from the State Security Court on customary condition of anonymity, Ankara, 22 April 2001.

[460] Interview with a civilian prosecutor from the State Security Court on customary condition of anonymity, Ankara, 15 March 2001.

[461] Interview with a police chief in the Department of Counter-terrorism on customary condition of anonymity, Ankara, 29 November 2000.

The Peak of Hard Realm Consolidation

<u>The 1980 Coup</u>

Similar to the 1960s, the 1970s can also be characterized by two major issues. The first of these was a fragmentation of politics, in which no sound majority for stable single-party governments could be reached thereby resulting in shaky coalition governments. The second issue was the increasingly polarized ideological confrontation among society and the youth in particular, between left and right-wing ideologies.

The 1973 general elections, the first since the 1971 military intervention, revealed the country's fragmented politics much the same as had the previous post-coup election of 1961.[462] The lack of a sufficient majority for any one party launched a decade of shaky coalitions in Turkish politics. The left-wing victor in the 1973 elections, Bülent Ecevit, was forced, for example, to form a government with right-wing Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, and the result was a government constantly on the ropes.

Interestingly enough, while politics were extremely fragmented, the soft realm began to act in a somewhat more coordinated manner in its relations with the hard realm, perhaps coming slowly to realize that without cooperation among soft realm elements, the hard realm was bound to continue taking advantage of them. During the presidential election of 1973 for example, Süleyman Demirel and his center-right Justice Party tried to resist the imposition of the military in determining who would become the next

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[462] Ironically, even though the coups came with the 'goal' of uniting the fragmented politics, what in fact happened in each case was a further fragmentation of politics, probably due to the unnatural interruption of the institutionalization of ideology-based political parties. For example, in 1980, the coup generals closed down all the major ideological parties in order to avoid having dozens of small parties, which, to them, represented the fragmented character of politics. It can be argued that it was precisely because of this that there later ended up being even more parties, since all the closed parties ultimately returned, and were added to the new parties the generals had created. Thus the generals' attempts at uniting the public under the heading of a couple of parties, and thereby preventing political fragmentation, failed and even greater fragmentation resulted.

president. This resistance was taken up and supported by Ecevit's left-wing party, and ultimately Fahri Korutürk, a former soldier nonetheless, but a moderate one, was elected president by a parliament relatively free from hard realm pressure.

The soft realm also succeeded in working together to have declared a general amnesty for criminals even though it was opposed by the security establishment.[463] Still, the amnesty did not extend to violators of Articles 14 and 142 of the Penal Code, which were directed at communist/left-wing activities against the state. Apparently, while it was alright for the hard realm to forgive crimes committed against society, it was not acceptable to them to forgive crimes committed against the state.[464]

In 1974, when once again no single party was able to gain a majority vote and form a government, President Korutürk appointed an independent senator, Sadi Irmak, to form one. Irmak also failed to do so, but stayed in power for five months as there was no alternative.[465] Finally, he was succeeded by the first of the nationalist front governments[466] comprised of the Justice Party, the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party, and the Islamist National Salvation Party. This coalition lasted until the 1977 election. During its 21-month rule, ideological confrontation and violence rocketed, with a total of 170 people being killed[467]. The period also saw the beginnings of a strong polarization between right and left-wings of the national police officers.

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[463] The soldiers considered this amnesty a mistake, and blamed it for the unstoppable terror problem.
[464] The hard realm always opposed allowing the political realm to include crimes against the state/security realm in the general amnesties. This remains true, as witnessed in the latest amnesty in 2000, which also excluded ideological crimes against the state.
[465] Ahmad, *Demokrasi*, 399.
[466] The term "nationalist front government" was given to those coalitions in which the major right-wing parties, Demirel's Justice Party, Erbakan's National Salvation Party, and Türkeş's Nationalist Front Party, came together.
[467] For a detailed discussion of the violence in this era see Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, "Sonuç," ["Conclusion,"], in *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* [Turkey in Transition], eds. Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1994), 391-392.

The situation worsened during the second nationalist front government, which began on July 21, 1977, and the volume of political killings and assassinations increased still further under the subsequent Ecevit government. As time passed, the victims of the terror began to include more and more members of the press and academia, and there were growing occurrences of societal confrontations based on religious or sectarian differences. The latter included Alevis vs. Sunnis in the Malatya, Sivas, and Bingöl regions in 1978. These led to a high number of casualties, and ultimately forced Prime Minister Ecevit, despite his misgivings, to call for a declaration of emergency law, thereby giving once again extraordinary power to the military in daily life and politics.[468]

Although he had declared emergency law, tension remained between Ecevit and the military. The Prime Minister wanted the military's influence to be limited even under the emergency law, to something he termed as a 'coordination mission,' an inadequate role in the eyes of the military.[469] The increasing level of violence and accusations by the political opposition that Ecevit was intervening too much in the military's handling of the situation, however, was beginning to weaken Ecevit's resistance against the security establishment (hard realm). The need to respond immediately to the obviously critical demands of security issues was detrimental to the soft realm's ability to resist against hard ream expansion. The soft realm's weakness was exacerbated due to the fragmented character and natural tendencies of political life, in which the opposition would use whatever it could to discredit the government in power even if that meant an automatic harm to the entire political realm. These self-destructive tendencies of the soft realm

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[468] The official reason for declaring emergency law was that there were "clear indicators of overarching threats to the constitutional order, rights, and freedoms," meaning that the state and regime were in danger--a clear call for the hard realm to reign in. Üskül, 191-192.

would even lead the following government (led by the former opposition) to give unprecedented rights to the soldiers to stop the increasing terror and violence. Although this would further weaken the soft realm vis-à-vis the hard realm, the government would do this in order to stop the increasing terror that they themselves simply did not know how to cope with. Moreover, they were aware that if the military measures worked, their government would also benefit from the resulting appreciation and good will of the public. The military's efforts to stop the violence were still not successful however, and soon the daily casualty rate reached into the 20s.[470]

Once it became clear that even the emergency law and the increased military role were not helping put an end to the terror and violence, some political circles began to question why the terror was not stopping. The commanders' responses were that the existing constitutional and legal order prevented them from taking effective measures.[471] This line of argument brought further skepticism that the military might not be fully ready and willing to try and terminate the 'threat' before carrying out a full takeover of power in the country.[472]

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[469] Hale, 233. Ecevit was trying to reduce the military's role. By calling it a "coordination" mission, he saw the military as merely helping to coordinate the civilians' efforts rather than taking control themselves.

[470] The increase in terror and violence was drastic and clear. By June 1980 the daily casualty rate was around 10, by July it reached 15, and by August 20. Schick and Tonak, 392-393.

[471] It is obvious that the hard realm maintained its long-time understanding that too much liberalism would create a security problem at the national level. Kenan Evren, leader of the 1980 coup, writes that the commanders "truly believed that the main reason behind the tragic and horrible period before September 12 was the existing constitution and its rights." Evren, 3: 274-276.

[472] The reasons behind the military's hesitation might lie in part in something called the "Muğlalı Complex". The reference is to a general who led a clampdown on a small rebellion in the Southeast in the 1940s and in doing so allegedly used extremely harsh military tactics, including having 33 suspects executed without trials. When the civilian government came into power not long afterwards, they pressured to have the general tried, and ultimately he was convicted of his crimes. The result was a sense of betrayal on the part of the military, and a lingering "complex" about being later held accountable by civilian governments for actions taken in times of crises. The result of the complex is said to be a reluctance on the military's part to deal with internal security challenges under civilian terms, rather, they prefer to have complete control over the situation. Ahmad, *Demokrasi*, 424-425.

At the end, the fragmented structure of politics, rocketing levels of insecurity and a worsening economic situation, reached a level at which the military felt required them to take over power in order to fix the system. While the worsening economic situation and the fragmented structure of political life were also major reasons for this move, the primary reason was the societal anarchy, administrative chaos and the resulting insecurity of the regime and the state. Once again, a pattern of securitization in both daily life and public rhetoric was helping lead to a collapse of democracy, and a takeover by the hard realm.

In late 1979, the commanders presented a warning letter to the President, expressing their discomfort with the performance of the political parties.[473] The text of this letter shows the general perspective that the hard realm had about the soft realm. Even though the emergency law had given the military full power to stop the terror, in this letter the commanders accused the government and political parties of "politicizing the state bureaucracy and therefore automatically causing fragmentation and confrontation in society. This fragmentation...leads to polarization and conflict."[474] In other words, they were trying to place the blame on the soft realm. Once again, societal fragmentation was presented as the biggest threat to national security, and moreover the cause for this threat was identified as the political process that accompanied democratic experimentation. In a sense, the hard realm was seizing the opportunity to kill two birds—a growing public involvement in political life and the speeding up of democratization—with one stone, namely, national security and the safety of the regime.

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[473] Kenan Evren says in his memoirs that they did not think this letter would be useful. This disbelief supports the argument that they were preparing the public opinion and themselves for a mood that nothing less than a complete takeover would suffice. Evren, 3: 331-332.

[474] Arcayürek, 269.

The discrediting of politics approached a level at which politics were presented as the cause of all bad things happening in the country at the time. This negative presentation of the soft realm would have a huge impact on the ease with which the 1982 Constitution would be able to expand the hard realm to extreme levels at the expense of the soft realm.

The emphasis on the inability if not outright destructiveness of the soft realm was also obvious in the first declaration of the coup: "political parties, with their uncompromising attitudes and vicious policies could not protect the state...from the destructive and divisive elements...therefore the state is left weakened and powerless and on the brink of civil war." Also in the first speech of coup leader Kenan Evren, the general states that because of "their simple political games and interests", the political party leaders were provoking "destructive and divisive elements."[475] It is once again clear that politics, the political system, political parties, in essence, democracy, was presented as the factor which led to the chaotic atmosphere, and was being discredited. Even though the coup leaders immediately declared that they would restart democracy and that they were in fact there to protect democracy,[476] I would argue that what they had in mind was a 'stabilized' and controlled democracy, one which they felt would not jeopardize national safety and security. Just as with previous experiences, the hard realm was aware however of the need to have at least the appearance of democracy, which is why they immediately declared that they would continue to respect all previous international agreements to which Turkey was party. They also declared their readiness to continue the relationship with the European Economic Community (current European Union).[477] This indicates that the hard realm was well aware of the internal and external need for

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[475] Evren, 3: 546-547.
[476] Ibid., 553.

legitimacy, a need met by having a western-style democracy. They also clearly recognized the need for democracy in avoiding isolation in the international arena, particularly from the western democratic bloc with which Turkey had been trying for so long to integrate.

In its first declaration of the coup, the high military command made it clear that this intervention was based on the military's internal service code to protect the Turkish republic and nation, and was conducted within the hierarchical order of the armed forces. This clarification draws a distinction between this and the previous coups in that this time the hard realm appeared as a cohesive, well entrenched, and cohesive body facing off with the soft realm. We can say that the hard realm had by this point completed its own deepening and autonomization, as well as its own distinct institutionalization. Now another mission (repairing the situation), was combined with an opportunity to reshape the control mechanisms over the soft realm and democracy. With its own internal strength complete this new job could be done with greater ease. This can explain why the armed forces expressed their willingness to return to their main job of protecting the country from international sources of danger once it had completed this 'historic mission'. Of course, the nature of this 'historic mission' would include "remov[ing] all constitutional, legal and other institutional obstacles which prevented the system from functioning properly and replac[ing] them with new ones so that future interventions to protect the system would not be necessary."[478] By looking at the nature of the constitutional and legal changes that were actually made, this statement could be interpreted as meaning that the hard realm should, and would, expand to a degree that the

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[477] Ibid., 542.
[478] Ibid., 40.

dangerous game of politics and the soft realm could no longer harm the safety and security of the Turkish state. The following section will turn to an analysis over how, via the 1982 constitution, the hard realm continued to institutionalize at the expense of the soft realm.

The 1982 Constitution

Immediately following the 1980 coup, the military administration restrengthened the emergency rule law, which had already given an extreme amount of influence to the commanders in governing specific areas. The new emergency law, number 1402, now gave the commanders the freedom to use virtually any measures to stop the terror. With the changes, for example, the period of detention was raised to 90 days. In connection with these changes, several cases of torture and disappearances were reported.[479] Nearly 45,000 people were arrested and tried under these circumstances, and within two years, terror-related killings were reduced by 90%.[480] The rapid reduction in the street violence comforted the society tremendously, and kept the criticism of repression to a minimum.

Societal gratitude to the military administration and confirmation of its actions surely provided a suitable backdrop for the hard realm to plan and carry out a reshaping of the constitutional order. The results of this reshaping would expand their own prerogatives, and consolidate the supervision mechanism over the soft realm.

The founding parliament put into place by the generals after the 1980 coup clearly reflected the military's desire to supervise the soft realm. The parliament consisted of the entire National Security Committee (the five generals who led the intervention, the Chief

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[479] Hale, 252.
[480] Ibid., 251-252.

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of Staff, and the force commanders—not to be confused with the National Security Council), and a Consulting Assembly, whose procedures were determined by a law passed by the above military committee. The Consulting Assembly had 160 members, 120 of which were chosen by the governors of the provinces, themselves appointed by the military committee, and another forty, who were chosen directly by the military committee. The members of this Consulting Assembly had to be chosen from among people who had not previously been members of any political party—an attempt to depoliticize/apoliticize the assembly.[481] According to this same law, the Consulting Assembly could legislate but only upon confirmation of the National Security Committee.[482] Yet another decree passed by the military administration, forbid any public criticism of the constitution and determined that any official public comments on the constitution only be made by the leader of the National Security Committee.[483]

The hard realm and its inner core of the military committee was clearly unwilling to share the power making constitutional changes with the societal or political elements. It wanted to seize the opportunity and power to construct a constitution under which they believed they could best secure the inevitable but dangerous transformation of Turkish society and governance system.

Ultimately, the 1982 Constitution was by and large a combination of the laws passed by the National Security Committee after the coup.[484] Most of these laws were

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[481] See for details, law no. 2485, which determined the components and missions of the founding parliament.

[482] Article 25 of the law 2485 makes it clear that the National Security Committee had the ultimate legislative power, as it was able to confirm or change and then confirm proposals from the Consulting Assembly.

[483] For details of this decree see the *Official Gazette*, 21 October 1982.

[484] See for a similar point, Tanör, 111, and Soysal, *Anayasanın*, 131.

about the basic state functions and mechanisms,[485] and were simply imported into the constitution. Kenan Evren himself admitted later on that the five generals who had led the coup had given the mission of preparing the constitution draft to the General Secretary of their committee, and that the General Secretary had done so before the Consulting Assembly had even begun considering the constitution issue.[486]

The 1982 Constitution represents, therefore, the preferred mechanism and prerogatives through which the hard realm and its inner core, the armed forces, wanted Turkish governance to be carried out. It also shows the peak of the autonomization of the hard realm and a concurrent minimization of the 'dangerous' soft realm and of politics. At its core, it is a constitution of the national security regime.

Institutional Landmarks of the Hard Realm Expansion

There are two levels at which to look at the constitutional changes of 1982 in order to see the institutionalization of the hard realm and its primacy over the soft realm. The first is to look at the temporary articles of the 1982 Constitution which were included primarily to secure the immunity and prerogatives of the figures and institutions that had conducted the coup. I will not go into the details of these temporary articles however, since such regulations are very common in post-coup arrangements. What is far more relevant are those constitutional changes that affect the arrangements in the subsequent 'normal' civilian periods, i.e. not in immediate post-intervention eras. Namely in this

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[485] Among the laws inserted into the new constitution were the establishment of the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, State Control Board and High Education Council. Amendments made in the Court of Appeals, Military High Administrative Court and Military Judges laws by the NSC were also included. Another measure of the NSC later to be inserted into the 1982 constitution was the establishment of local administrative and tax courts. Soysal, *Anayasanın*, 131.

[486] Evren, 3: 274-276.

case, those changes that would allow the hard realm to control the stable transformation of the Turkish nation state.

Article 108

The first change of note is Article 108, which speaks of the State Inspection Council. Coup leader Kenan Evren writes that the coup-leading generals thought that such councils within the army institutions had always proven useful, and therefore there ought to be one within the Turkish state in order to deter and control wrongdoings.[487] Article 108 calls therefore, for the creation of an inspection council to assist the President by inspecting all public institutions, including labor unions, associations, and foundations.

Such extensiveness in terms of mission—spanning all state and societal institutions—had only two exceptions, the first being judicial institutions, which can be considered as normal given the universal immunity and independence of the judiciary, and the second being the armed forces, which can not be interpreted as 'normal'. Even though the new Inspection Council was under the direct authority of the president (a position which would for at least the next seven years be held by General Kenan Evren, and which was traditionally occupied by former military men), the inner core of the hard realm was apparently unwilling to take the risk of leaving the armed forces under the possible supervision of a potential future civilian president or state. The Inspection Council is a clear-cut example of the hard realm's institutionalization and nearly complete autonomy from the soft realm.

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[487] Ibid., 272.

Article 118—the National Security Council

Perhaps the most significant example of the evolution and institutionalization of the hard realm core, comes from an analysis of the constitutional changes regarding the National Security Council. Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution begins with a description of the National Security Council as being presided over by the president, and including the Prime Minister, the Chief of Staff, the Defense Minister, Interior Minister, Foreign Minister, and the Commanders of the army, navy, air force, and military police. The expansion of the military influence is most clearly revealed in the following changes and additions. First, the top force commanders are distinctly listed. Previously, the document had merely referred to representatives of the various forces, which could have included therefore even lower level officers, and thus left open the possibility for a reduced military appearance. The civilian ministries to be listed are also done so explicitly, as opposed to the earlier Constitution in which their identities and numbers were left to be determined. This change blocked the chance for any additional civilian ministries to be added. In the traditional case of a president sympathetic to the hard realm, the civilian membership thus became limited to four, to a ratio of five clear military figures. This imbalance can predict the orientation the council would adopt for issues on which there could conceivably be both militaristic or civilian solutions.

A second major change concerned the power of the council's decisions. While the 1961 Constitution had clearly stated that the NSC would "present its opinion" to the government, the 1971 changes had made this "advise the government". While arguably a stronger role, an optimistic stance could still have argued that this change maintained the

council's mission as a consulting body. The 1982 Constitution's article 118 section 3,

also begins with a sentence that on issues of "national security [and] required policies…"

the NSC will "present its ideas and considerations to the government." This appears not

much changed from the past, and may even seem to represent a reversal in the direction

of the 1961 wording. The following sentence however, has a punchline effect, as it writes

that whatever the NSC considers necessary on matters of national security, the

"government must take into priority consideration". Thus the government is instructed by

the constitution to leave aside other matters when instructed by the NSC with a particular

mission or implementation of one. This is a crucial point. While it was possible to argue

earlier that the NSC was still a tutelary consulting power because there were no clear

binding regulations for the government to carry out what the NSC "advised" or

"recommended", it had now become a constitutional obligation for the elected

government to give priority in its functioning to the opinions passed by the NSC. With

this binding addition, the previous understanding of 'presenting ideas' clearly becomes

one of 'sending instructions'.

Some optimistic scholars might nevertheless argue that even such a mechanism

does not necessarily mean that the government has to automatically comply, since the

constitution still does not say this outright. While a reasonable argument in theory, in

practice it does not hold up to scrutiny. First, this council convenes regularly, allowing

the permanent military members to follow up and 'remind' the government of previous

instructions. A second reason why the civilian leadership can rarely refuse to comply

with the proposals of the hard realm within the NSC and are subsequently pressured then

to implement them, stems from the fact there is less continuity among the civilian

members of the council than the military ones. While certain figures are omnipresent on the Turkish political scene, government changes in fact take place quite often. This political volatility also means a frequent shifting of those in ministerial positions, including those who are assigned to the NSC. Consequently, the civilian members of the NSC change regularly, and are deprived of the chance to accumulate experience or become institutionalized. The military members, however, have more stable terms. Moreover, they come from a tradition and an institution in which they pass on and inherit the ongoing debates and projects—signifying a clear institutionalization and continuity. The unevenness of this picture is exacerbated by the fact that, perhaps as an outcome of the great compromise outlined in chapter 3, the soft realm seems to have largely relinquished any authority over security issues to the hard realm. Perhaps as a sign of this, civilians in the NSC do not have research centers, institutional backgrounds or staff with technical expertise to advise them, while on the side of the military members, there is the backup support of one of the largest, most experienced, and well functioning armies in the world. Even when simply looking at a picture of the convened members of the NSC, this unevenness is immediately evident in the thick, blue, standard folders in front of the generals, as opposed to the thin—if any—folders in front of the civilian members.

The unevenness of the supporting units and expertise relates to a third major point that keeps the civilian members of the NSC generally in a 'receiving' as opposed to 'contributing' position during council meetings. As a main part of their regular job, the military generals are given the task of determining what is or is not a threat to the safety and security of the nation and state. Civilians, lacking both research and security expertise support, not only are unable to provide different proposals or perspectives on

whatever is characterized as national security threats, but can not even easily question or contribute to what is being put forward. This inability to contribute ultimately makes even the question of the soldier/civilian ratio on the council irrelevant, since, in the words of one council general, the problem is more of a "qualitative" than a "quantitative" one.[488]

Ultimately then, security/securitization and therefore the resulting prescriptions to deal with them, become the job and the right of the hard realm. They are not considered a part of what the soft realm does. This is again not surprising perhaps, when one remembers that the NSC meetings are arguably the leading part of the various military commanders' jobs. Each of the forces, including the Chief of Staff, has a second commander position, who is primarily responsible for the running of practical issues of the force, leaving the lead commander open to deal with the NSC and other political responsibilities.[489] The civilian politicians, plunged as they are in the mess of daily politics, most likely go through something verging on psychological humiliation each time they meet with their extremely well-prepared military counterparts at the NSC meetings.

In addition to these points, the General Secretary of the NSC and the vast majority of its staff, are by law also an integral part of the armed forces, and are thus primarily responsible to the Chief of Staff rather than the civilian portion of the NSC. The secretariat, with its power of organizing the council meetings and coordinating the agenda, falls to a large degree, outside of the civilian contribution. In this sense the

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[488] Retired navy general Atilla Kıyat, speaking on Turkish national TV channel NTV, 13 November 2000.
[489] Interview with a 4-star general on customary condition of anonymity, Ankara, 10 May 2001.

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civilian members appear like a football team that never has the chance to play in their home field.

Finally, even if the existence of the civilian members indicates a certain amount of civilian power in the council, the actual "true" civilian members may be even fewer than appears. First we must remember that when a government is being formed the Prime Minister generally appoints as defense minister a person who is already ideologically—at times even professionally—close to the armed forces (the armed forces have been known to sometimes veto certain names[490]). Moreover, the interior minister position is also generally given to a security-oriented figure. Thus the true civilian, in the sense of 'non-securitized' portion of the NSC is in reality often quite lower than what immediately appears the case.

The picture that emerges of the NSC shows that the soft realm civilian politicians, after several decades of military interventions, is squeezed into a corner that is not only constitutionally and institutionally but also psychologically and physically imposed on them as part of the way democracy is done in Turkey.

In order to illustrate how the hard realm has used its supremacy and prerogatives in order to curb a national security threat that it had itself determined, the following section relates the events of the February 28, 1997 'process', which has come to be labeled as a "post-modern coup". In the course of this discussion, we will see as well how the government and state are in fact different entities in Turkey, and how the hard and soft realms wage their conflict—with the hard realm appearing to be the general victor.

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[490] In the early Özal era, for example, the Prime Minister's nominee for defense minister, Hüsnü Doğan, was changed under pressure from the military.

The February 28th Process

The general elections of December 24, 1995 dropped a bombshell on the Turkish political system, as the Islamist Welfare Party came out on top with 21.4 percent of the vote. This outcome came as a particular shock to the hard realm of the Turkish state structure. Undisputable heir of the earlier Islamist parties in Turkey, namely *Milli Selamet Partisi* (MSP) and *Milli Nizam Partisi* (MNP) which were closed down after the 1971 and 1980 *coup d'etats* respectively, the Welfare Party flourished in the post-1980 political environment due in part to the tolerant attitude of the post-coup administrations towards religion as part of a strategy to balance against 'dangerous' ideologies, including left-wing radical movements. This strategy was later highly criticized when the Welfare Party, with its largely anti-secular ideology, grew into a political party commanding the support of one fifth of the society. The party's rhetoric called for more religion to be inserted into the political, social and economic life of the country. Welfare's political motto, in other words what they promised to the electorate, was *"adil düzen"* (just order). In this would-be just order, which at a deeper level represented a critique of Turkish modernization/ Westernization, religion would no longer be pushed to the margins of politics. In opposition to Turkey's Western orientation in foreign affairs, better relations with the Islamic world would be established. In the economic realm, interest earnings, which are seen by some Muslims as anti-Islamic, would be abolished. In short, the agenda of the Welfare Party represented everything the hard realm opposed. Now the dangerous religious potential of the 'fragmented' society seemed to be finally coming forth, and needed to be curbed before it destroyed the state and the regime.

While Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan—leader of Turkey's political Islamist movement since the late 1960s—celebrated the election day results by saying that the nation had "broken its chains,"[491] the hard realm protectors of the state were already warming up for a battle. The High Education Council, after an immediate gathering of university rectors, released a declaration condemning the Welfare Party as being disloyal to Atatürkist principles. This promptly indicated that several segments of the state were prepared to speak out against the rising tide of the Welfare Party. Shortly thereafter, the Chief of the Parliament, Mustafa Kalemli, gave a speech in parliament in which he spoke with particular emphasis on secularism. This act met with a prompt warm response from the military commanding elite, who 'thanked' Kalemli by paying him a personal visit in parliament on February 7, 1996.[492] Two days later the *Turkish Daily News* published the results of a poll—commissioned by the Turkish General Staff—which said among other things that 56.8 percent of the public was against the idea of a Welfare Party/Motherland Party coalition.[493] This attempt to, arguably, sway public opinion away from supporting a coalition between the Welfare Party and the centrist Motherland Party, is yet another indication that the military was opposing the attempts to bring the Welfare Party into an actual government. When news nevertheless broke that negotiations between the two parties were progressing well, a messenger[494] was dispatched to the chief of parliament to report that the military did not want Welfare in the government or else "bad things" could happen, and that rather, their preference would be a coalition between the two center-right parties, the Motherland Party and the True

[491] Hakan Akpınar, *28 Şubat: Postmodern Darbenin Öyküsü* [February 28: The Story of the Post-modern Coup] (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2001), 24.

[492] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 8 February 1996.

[493] *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara), 9 February 1996.

Path Party, which had come in second and third in the elections.[495] When this message

was passed on to Motherland Party leader Mesut Yılmaz, he immediately dropped

negotiations with the Welfare Party. At the same time, Chief of Staff İsmail Hakkı

Karadayı had a secret talk with the leader of the True Path Party, Tansu Çiller, and

convinced her to join with Mesut Yılmaz for a coalition.[496] The 'desired' coalition

government between the Motherland and True Path Parties was formed on March 3,

1996.

During this period, the Welfare Party was preparing to bring corruption charges

against Tansu Çiller, at least partly in hopes of destroying the coalition. The Welfare

Party was also beginning to have increasingly conflictual quarrels with the armed forces.

The armed forces, after being criticized among Welfare Party affiliates as 'anti-religion'

for its internal regulations and policies against religious personnel within the military,

faxed a declaration to the Anatolian Press Agency--which would circulate it to all major

publications--in which it accused the Welfare Party of including "shariat-seeking

elements that belonged to the Middle Ages."[497]

The corruption charges against Tansu Çiller combined with the attitude of her

party's coalition partner (the Motherland Party was unhelpful if not downright supportive

of the corruption charges), brought a quick end to the coalition, and Prime Minister

Yılmaz was forced to resign when he faced a no confidence vote in the parliament on

June 6, 1996.

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[494] The messenger in question was Alpaslan Türkeş, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, but well known to have close ties with the military.

[495] Akpınar, 37.

[496] Motherland Party leader, Mesut Yılmaz, was quoted later on as saying that what the soldiers wanted was "to keep the Welfare Party out of politics." "Ordu'nun İsteği ANAYOL," ["What the Army Wants is ANAP-DYP Coalition,"] *Zaman* (Istanbul), 14 March 1996.

[497] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 24 March 1996.

As the actual winner of the 1995 elections, Necmettin Erbakan was now given the mission to start negotiations to form a new government. His target was Çiller, who seemed at this point cornered by the corruption charges. Erbakan then told Çiller that his party had raised the corruption charges in parliament "not to label her with corruption" but to give her the "opportunity to explain her position"[498]—suggesting that they would vote down the corruption charges in parliament if Çiller were in the government with them. The tactic appeared to work, and shortly thereafter the two parties joined in a coalition. For the first time in the secular Turkish Republic, an Islamist political party was leading the government. Prime Minister Erbakan not only led his first press conference with the Muslim greeting, "essalamunaleykum", but did the same even on a visit to army headquarters.[499]

The Turkish General Staff was clearly disturbed by Erbakan's prime ministry. The Chief of Staff expressed the military's unhappiness at a reception of the High Military Council, when he openly accused the True Path deputy leader of "making Erbakan prime minister." When the deputy leader tried to respond that being in the government would reveal the Welfare Party's "true face" to the public and they would then lose forever, the Chief of Staff responded bluntly, "we are not as calm as you are...our generals even voted for the lady [Tansu Çiller] and she went and formed a government with the Welfare Party...we are very upset with the lady now..."[500]

The Turkish General Staff, having made clear they did not want the Welfare Party in government, had nonetheless been unable to keep this from happening, and therefore

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[498] "Erbakan'dan Çiller'e ilginç teklif," ["Interesting Offer from Erbakan to Çiller,"] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 23 June 1996.
[499] Akpınar, 74.
[500] Ibid., 77.

had to now find alternative ways of ousting them. The result would be a new kind of military intervention in Turkish politics, one using indirect methods (as opposed to direct military intervention), and making use of the already prepared mechanism of the National Security Council. The result would come to be known as the "post-modern coup."

Increasing securitization and gradual state containment of the soft realm

Certain figures within the judiciary observed the problematic relationship between the armed forces and the new government, and began to add their own criticisms of the government as well. Their criticisms seemed to become more relevant as the Welfare Party began to emphasize the distinction between "secularists and Muslims", which was interpreted by the judicial elite as "destructive and treasonous rhetoric."[501] The elite of the judiciary were subsequently congratulated at a reception hosted by the military elite— notably not in attendance was the Welfare Party representative, who declined to come in protest of the judiciary's comments.

The next move made in the gradual state containment of the government came once again from the High Education Council and its President, Kemal Gürüz. In addition to the High Education Council's own open criticisms of the new government, its efforts to encourage state university rectors to also protest the government, were proving effective. Even though one might have expected the rectors to remain silent—as heads of state institutions, the government should logically have held some leverage over them— they were in fact making significant symbolic gestures of protest. In the fall of 1996, for

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[501] The Chief Justice of the Turkish High Criminal Court, Mufit Utku, labeled the rhetoric as such while Eralp Özgen, President of the Turkish Union of Bar Associations voiced the opinion that Turkey was being governed by a power that treated "religion and god as the solution to every problem" though he assured that "no one's power will ever be enough to bring back Sharia to Turkey." Quoted in ibid., 29.

example, during the opening ceremony of Ankara University's academic year, the orchestra played the "Izmir March" with a pointed emphasis on the lyrics about Atatürk and particularly directing their attention to Prime Minister Erbakan, who was present at the ceremony.[502] Similar emphasis was made during a speech by Gürüz at Mersin University. Read directly to an attending Tansu Çiller, his message stated that the universities would not give in to any power, and that they were determined to protect Atatürkist principles.[503]

Public opinion in general was becoming increasingly preoccupied with an understanding that the Turkish regime was under a security threat from Islamist fundamentalism, and that this threat had to be curbed at once and at any cost. On the day that the Turkish parliament was having its opening ceremony for the legislative year, October 1, 1996, President Demirel attempted to sound reassuring when he said that "the fundamentals of the Republic can not be changed."[504] The scene however, symbolically reflected the national security fear, as the military leaders sat in their reserved balconies watching over the proceedings, and, in particular, watching to see whether the Welfare Party representatives were applauding the president's words. Their failure to applaud was duly reported by the Chief of Staff to his colleagues.[505]

The Welfare Party leadership not only refused to applaud—and thereby confirm the president's rhetorical warning—but moreover they began to implement a foreign policy that disturbed the hard realm even further. The first sign of this was a visit by Prime Minister Erbakan to Libya, against the insistent warnings by the Turkish

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[502] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 2 October 1996.
[503] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 5 October 1996.
[504] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 2 October 1996.
[505] Akpınar, 98.

ambassador in Tripoli. During this visit, Libyan President Khadafi openly criticized Turkish policy towards the Kurds, thereby strengthening and seeming to justify the state's already negative position towards the Libya visit. Turkish Interior Minister, Mehmet Ağar, a former national police chief and close to the Turkish armed forces, had opposed the Libyan trip, and in fact had refused to sign the decree approving it. Ağar was becoming an increasingly vocal critic of the government of which he was a part, and it was not long after the Libyan visit that he was quoted as saying that in Turkey, "the regime belongs to the nation and National Security Council...it belongs to the legitimate powers of the state."[506] It seems quite evident from these words that a confrontation was brewing between the hard realm and the soft realm of politics, and it was apparently becoming time to choose sides in the fight. As a security establishment figure, it was obvious that Ağar was positioning himself alongside the military even though he was a minister in a civilian government.

Many of the alleged wrongdoings of the Welfare Party were immediately reported and published repeatedly by the majority of the Turkish media. Even private conversations were reported in an effort to reveal the "true goals" of the Welfare Party. It was reported, for example, that the Welfare Party mayor of the city of Kayseri told his supporters that he "suffered deeply" when he had to attend the ceremonies of Atatürk's death anniversary.[507] Around the same time, it was reported that the Welfare Party wanted to redetermine the status of the armed forces and make them solely responsible to the Defense Minister.[508] A law proposal for regulating the press was also considered by

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[506] Cited in ibid., 120.
[507] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 11 October 1996.
[508] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 15 October 1996.

many as a Welfare Party plan to try and silence the press and thereby block them from reporting the truth about the Welfare Party's intentions.[509]

The government's perceptions of media treatment of the conflict between the state and the political realm are perhaps best reflected in a speech by Tansu Çiller, in which she said, "These [newspapers] have already become independent political parties. They act like political parties, they say, 'look, we hanged Adnan Menderes, we can have you hanged too.'"[510] Perhaps most significantly, her words provide fairly obvious evidence that the "Menderes Syndrome" discussed in chapter 3 still holds a strong relevance in the minds of the politicians as well as for hard realm members, who perhaps view it as a tool in the struggle to contain the soft realm.

Yet another incident between the Erbakan-led government and the armed forces took place in December 1996 when the High Military Council, whose decisions were by now completely immune by constitutional law from normal judiciary supervision, decided to fire various military personnel on charges of being involved in dangerous religious activities. The Prime Minister tried but failed to have the decision overturned as the Chief of Staff argued that these personnel were under the influence of their religious leaders rather than taking orders from their commanders. Moreover, the defense minister, who was in fact very close to the armed forces, reminded the Prime Minister that these decisions were constitutionally immune from judicial appeal.[511]

Ultimately, Erbakan had to sign the decisions to fire the personnel, though he did so unwillingly. Some argue, however, that the government took its revenge shortly thereafter when approximately US $500 million was cut from the National Defense

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[509] All major Turkish daily newspapers, 21 October 1996.
[510] Quoted in Akpınar, 140.

Ministry budget. Needless to say, this only hardened the soldiers' opinion that the government was out to get them.[512]

Yet another incident occurred during a government meeting on December 12, 1996, when several files were brought into the room an hour after the ministers had convened. Erbakan introduced them as having come from the National Security Council. After glimpsing quickly at them, the Health Minister protested because in the file the NSC was complaining about the health policies he was organizing in the Southeast region. More insistent opposition came in a complaint from State Minister Ensarilioğlu, an MP from Diyarbakır, an important city in the Southeast region, with a large Kurdish population. He announced that one of the NSC reports, according to him, argued that "the state was promoting divisive policies by saying that the Turkish government has to take measures since the faster rise in Kurdish population over Turkish would lead to an increase in their political representation."[513] The document went on to add that this would create risks for national security. The minister compared the document to a military intervention (muhtıra). Erbakan was hard pressed to calm the representative, and promised that the reports would be returned to the NSC. They were ultimately returned, no doubt leading to unrest on the side of the security establishment.

On January 11, 1997, Prime Minister Erbakan held a dinner party for non-government related religious leaders and tarikat (sect) leaders. The overall appearance of this gathering, even the very clothes that they were wearing, seemed to be the final straw

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[511] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 5 December 1996.
[512] Akpınar, 147.
[513] Ibid., 153.

for the military.[514] Two weeks after the event, the top generals convened in the naval headquarters for a marathon 72-hour meeting with an "extraordinary agenda" of aiming to discuss how best to proceed with the "challenging government."[515] A few days later, on January 31, the NSC General Secretary, General İlhan Kılıç, The director of National Intelligence, Sönmez Köksal, and the Chief of Staff, İ. Hakkı Karadayı, visited President Süleyman Demirel and made clear the state's position as they told him of their opposition to various projects of the Erbakan-led government.[516]

The inner core of the hard realm had revealed its institutional position of opposition towards the civilian government, but this time it was the "turn of the unarmed forces to handle the situation,"[517] an obvious reference to the previous times (1960, 1971, 1982) in which the armed forces had themselves handled such challenges. Though the NSC's warning was only implicit, this did not mean that the threat of a military coup was no longer real. In fact, in response to a religious night celebration called "Jerusalem Night", which was organized by the Welfare Party mayor in an outlying district of Ankara, military tanks were sent into the area, and remained in the city center all the following day. The Deputy Chief of Staff Çevik Bir commented a week later on the event by referring to it as a "fine balancing of the democracy,"[518] His speech not only clarified the military's psychology for handling with this 'challenging' civilian government, but

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[514] All the daily newspapers and television channels broadcast the details of the party, revealing that the attendees wore traditional religious style clothing that had been forbidden by the 1930's dress code.
[515] *Hürriyet* and *Sabah* (Istanbul), 27 January 1997
[516] These included an alleged government plan to construct a mosque in Taksim Square in Istanbul. This was seen as a symbolic challenge to the secular characteristics of the country. The plans also involved the lifting of the headscarf ban in universities. *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 1 February 1997.
[517] The leading columnist of the *Hürriyet* daily newspaper reported this as coming from one of the top five generals. By 'unarmed forces' he was allegedly referring to the military's civilian extensions in the state. Reflecting this, demonstrations were organized alongside the idea that secularism had to be protected, and more than 200,000 people marched against the government. Ertuğrul Ozkök, "Bu defa işi silahsız kuvvetler halletsin," ["This time let the unarmed forces deal with it,"] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 20 December 1996.
[518] *Hürriyet* and *Sabah* (Istanbul), 21 February 1997.

also revealed the overall managerial role of the hard realm vis-a-vis democracy and the political realm.

The NSC meeting of February 28, 1997

The NSC meeting that would later be referred to as a "post-modern coup," took place on February 28, 1997. The NSC General Secretary told Prime Minister Erbakan and Deputy Prime Minister Çiller what the agenda of the meeting would be, namely a discussion of "*irtica*", or regressive religious movements in Turkey. Rather than a discussion, in fact the government was to be questioned by the Council (State) at this meeting. The agenda had been completely arranged by the NSC and the presidency, which represented the state, with no input in the process by the government.

The military members of the NSC had been preparing for the meeting for months, and gathered together at the presidential palace an hour prior to the meeting in order to attend to last minute details. When they arrived they brought with them the thick folders full of their staff's prepared materials. The civilian members more closely resembled students, ill-prepared for an oral examination—the topic of which they had only been informed a day earlier.

Following short briefings by the regional governor of the Southeast and the Director General of the National Police, most of the bureaucrats who were directly responsible to the government left the meeting. Only the voting members of the NSC remained. The Chief of National Intelligence and the Chief of Military Intelligence were both invited to give briefings about the national security challenges to the state/regime as posed by religious activities. Their accounts were openly critical of the government, and

attempted to make the case that the Welfare Party's political activities were connected to the regressive religious movements. Again in this case, the state institutions were using their ultimate power in terms of defining the national security threat and connecting the political life to this threat potential.[519]

As the meeting progressed, the generals referred repeatedly to alleged speeches of the Prime Minister that had appeared in the media, making the case that he and his party were intent on destroying the regime by provoking the society against the state.[520] As chair of the Council, the President was apparently siding with these arguments and accusations, since he did not raise any questions as to whether the speeches had been actually made, or whether they had been reported accurately. The Prime Minister attempted weakly to defend himself by reading some definitions of secularism, and then to tell about certain routine governmental projects, but was cut off by the Naval Commander, who demanded a response to the issues they had raised about religious activities. The civilian government was being slowly squeezed between the state and the promises it had made to society, as though support gathered by being sensitive to the populist wishes of parts of society was not enough to rule in Turkey. Illustrative of this perhaps, the Chief of Staff clearly told the Prime Minister that the stability of the main characteristics of the regime was as important to them as democracy itself.[521] Obviously

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[519] By saying that *the state* was 'defining the threat' and 'connecting the political life to this threat potential' I am not denying that the Welfare Party's activities may have had connections with 'regressive religious activities' in Turkey. Rather, I am expressing it in this way to show how the securitization takes place under a monopoly of the hard realm, and involves a largely critical or accusatory approach to the soft realm. At minimum, the hard realm emphasizes the soft realm's 'inability' to cope with the problem (i.e. passive responsibility).

[520] The Naval force commander cited a speech by Erbakan in which he was reported to have told an audience, "if you don't work for the Welfare Party, you belong to the potato religion." This was interpreted as a divisive speech, saying in essence, work for my party or you are sinful. Quoted in Akpınar, 196.

[521] Ibid., 198.

it looked as though certain agendas of the state and of the electorate were in potential conflict.

During the nine critical hours that this NSC meeting lasted, the generals did most of the talking, and the civilians listened in a defensive position. One can read in this picture a positioning of the hard realm as owner of the state, and as such, questioning the civilian government in the manner of a CEO criticizing a branch manager. An analysis of the mood and nature of this meeting also suggests that the true position and status of the NSC itself can be best seen in these extraordinary crisis periods, since the council was particularly designed, at least in part, to manage soft realm challenges to the stability of the system. The true nature of the national security regime was being revealed: the hard realm was using the NSC mechanism in order to manage the soft realm—or at least to keep the democracy in "balance."

At the end of the meeting, an 18 article package of "recommendations," the first draft of which had been prepared by the NSC general secretariat prior to the meeting, was given to the government representatives for implementing [522]. The so-called "recommendations" were quite detailed, focusing directly on those issues which had disturbed the military establishment in the words and deeds of the Erbakan-led government. The recommendations began with a clear and strong reinstatement of the commitment to the principle of secularism and the need to protect it. They involved various measures to curb the power of religious orders (tarikats), which were accused of growing more influential among the government and civil servants, to bring religious

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[522] For a full list of the February 28, 1997 NSC decisions see Appendix B. In a recent study dated May 2001, Niyazi Gunay takes a closer look into the implementation of these decisions by political authorities in the time elapsed since the infamous NSC meeting. For details, see Niyazi Günay, "Implementing the

schools of various sorts under state control, to stop the questioning by the government of dismissals of allegedly fundamentalist personnel from the Turkish Armed Forces, and to enforce the observation of the headscarf (*baş örtüsü*) law, which was openly challenged by the Welfare Party affiliates. The recommendations also targeted the financial sources of Islamist groups, and called for certain restrictions on the licensing of weapons. When the President asked whether there was anyone who opposed the 'recommendations', he reportedly looked directly at the Prime Minister, who was unable to oppose. The irony in this was that implementing the articles would necessarily mean an eventual end to his political success since the recommendations were particularly designed to curb the very things the Prime Minister and his party had been promising to society.

The very evening that the meeting ended, the NSC general secretariat immediately faxed the "recommendations" to the media, as though delivering the consensus-based policies of the NSC. The generals were well aware that the government would be unable to implement the Council's decisions, as they were clearly in contradiction to the ideas the government promoted to its societal constituents.[523]

In the months following the February 28 NSC meeting, the tension between the Erbakan government and the military gradually grew. As the government delayed implemention of the generals' recommendations, the Armed Forces grew increasingly impatient. In order to topple the Welfare-led government, the military first and foremost attracted the support of the civil societal organizations as evident in the frequent briefings on regressive religious movements given to various sectors of civil society by high

'February 28' Recommendations: A Scoreboard," The Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, Research Note 10 (May 2001) <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/junior/note10.htm> (27 June 2002).
[523] Interview with a retired army general who was active at the time of the February 28 period on customary condition of anonymity, Ankara, 22 November 2001.

military commanders. The removing of Islamist personnel within the Turkish armed forces picked up pace, and the judicial apparatus seemed to make its position clear on the side of the generals. The Chief Public Prosecutor Vural Savaş indisputably proved this when he brought his case before the Constitutional Court for the closure of the Welfare Party on May 21, 1997 (a process that ultimately resulted in the closing down of the Party in the early months of 1998.)

The end of the ruling coalition came in June 1997 when Erbakan resigned as part of a bargain to hand the premiership over to Çiller, thereby easing political tension without dissolving the coalition. To the surprise of both Erbakan and Çiller, however, President Demirel appointed ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz as the new Prime Minister, an act which broke the tradition that the president would give the premiership to the majority leader in the parliament. The new government would have to be a coalition and the Armed Forces did not want the Welfare Party or the True Path Party to be included in it. On the 30th of June, the new government was formed with the participation of the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP), the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP) and the Democratic Turkey Party (*Demokratik Türkiye Partisi*, DTP.

International Reactions to February 28

Contrary to what might have been expected, the February 28 process did not seem to have serious repercussions for Turkey's relations with the EU. Conscious perhaps that EU members might be troubled by this intervention of the Turkish military into politics, some Turkish officials were anxious to soothe any concerns. As a reflection of this, Tansu Çiller contacted Western governments shortly after the infamous NSC meeting to

reassure them that Turkish democracy did not face any danger[524]. The Armed Forces also seemed to be aware that their deeds might cause controversy in Turkey's EU bid, and took pains to avert such doubts. In March, navy commander Güven Erkaya said "democracy, secularism and the rule of law are our framework."[525] Even in the actual declaration that came out of the February 28 NSC meeting, this awareness was quite evident: "At a time when the priority for Turkey is the EU, it is necessary that all official and civil institutions support this process. Therefore, it is necessary to end all kinds of speculation which create doubts about our democracy and harm Turkey's image and honor abroad"[526].

Curiously, there was only vague reaction on the part of the EU to the goings-on in Turkey at that time. A few weeks after the meeting, the EU ambassador to Turkey implied that if Turkey wanted to join the EU, the NSC should be abolished[527]. However, when Klaus Kinkel, German Foreign Minister, visited Turkey in late March to ease the tension between Germany and Turkey created by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's remarks earlier that month, he chose not to mention the role of the military in Turkish politics as a barrier to Turkey's rapid accession to the EU. Rather, in his words, Turkey would not become an EU member "in the near future because of human rights problems, the Kurdish problem, problems with Greece and economic problems"[528].

Somewhat similarly, the US refrained from openly criticizing the generals' move of February 28, and from a certain perspective, the US may be said to have given tacit approval to the Turkish Army's efforts to safeguard secularism. Only a little less than a

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[524] John Barham, "Turkish PM warned on Islamists," *Financial Times* (London), 3 March 1997.
[525] "Turkish PM feels sting of military whip," *Financial Times* (London), 28 April 1997.
[526] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 1 March 1997.
[527] "Just not Our Sort," *Economist*, 15 March 1997.

week after the NSC meeting, Nicholas Burns, then the State Department Spokesman, in response to a question on the recent squabble between Necmettin Erbakan and the military, said, "We are not going to get involved in the internal affairs of the Turkish people. Turkey is a great secular democracy. And, that secular democracy, we believe, will thrive. The secular foundations of modern Turkey since Ataturk are very important". In a qualifying remark, he added that the US "encourage[s] civilian rule." But following this, he pointed out the good bilateral relations between the US and the Turkish military, and reasserted US unwillingness to get involved in Turkey's domestic affairs for that reason[529].

Around mid-June, when the rumors of an imminent coup reached the other side of the Atlantic, Nicholas Burns adopted a much more circumspect language. Referring to then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's earlier remarks on Turkey that the problem should be handled within the constitutional framework and democracy, Burns clearly asserted the US's preference for the solution of the political crisis through democratic means. Beyond this, however, the US seemed unwilling to get involved in the internal affairs of Turkey[530].

International reaction to the February 28 process seems to have been relatively neutral. Such a result could be considered as surprising given the history, particularly of European countries, of being critical of any 'democratic malpractices' in Turkey. In this situation however, they did not choose to seize the opportunity for further criticism. This may have stemmed in part from their own perceptions—like those of the Turkish armed

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[528] John Barham, "Blow to German Hopes on Reconciliation with Turkey," *Financial Times* (London), 27 March 1997.
[529] US, *State Department Regular News Briefing*, 4 March 1997.
[530] US, *State Department Regular News Briefing*, 13 June 1997.

forces—of the Islamists as a threat. Although the ultimate reactions may not have proven

dramatic, nevertheless, the Turkish military clearly had felt that they had to manage the

situation in more subtle ways than in their previous interventions. Their perceptions

about the EU, combined with the US's positioning against an open coup, clearly

constituted a limiting impact on the military.

Sarmısak Incident[531]

While ultimately the dilemma facing the Welfare Party leadership would defeat

the government and force it to resign, in the spring and early summer months of 1997, the

soft realm did make an attempt to resist with whatever means they had. As the only

alternative organized power similar to the Turkish military, the means they would turn to

would be the national police.

The national police had, by and large, long been under the influence of the hard

realm, at least psychologically. With increasing democratization, however, the elected

governments began to gain greater influence over the national police, since the latter is

directly under the command of the Interior Ministry. By looking at a direct confrontation

between the national police and the military, we may see in fact the clearest and biggest

indication of Turkey's torn state structure.

Following the February 28 meeting, Erbakan tried but was unable to find a way to

avoid signing on to the NSC decisions. Ultimately, even his own Deputy Prime Minister

Tansu Çiller told him reportedly that there was no way out due to "military and media

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[531] Sarmısak was the surname of a police informant who worked undercover to gather information on alleged coup preparatory activities and report them to the National Police Intelligence.

pressure."[532] The government was forbidden even from bringing the decisions before the parliament due to the law stipulating that NSC decisions had to be kept secret. This meant that the soft realm could not respond to the NSC decisions in its own forum, the parliament, because a hard realm intervention in the name of security now also demanded that the intervention be kept secret from society/parliament *again* in the name of security. The NSC mechanism was proving successfully autonomous from the political realm.

Even the signing of the NSC decisions did not exactly satisfy the hard realm, since the ultimate goals were the removal of Erbakan's Welfare Party government and actually getting these decisions implemented in order to expand the hard realm's controlling mechanism of society and the soft realm. The primary goal of removing the Welfare Party government kept the threat of a coup still alive, and rumors and various statements kept this potential clear and valid. President Demirel, for example, followed up a comment that coups never solved anything, with the far less sure statement that these were however "hard times" and "anything can happen."[533]

The crucial question here is why the military chose to refrain from performing an actual coup, in the sense of taking over power immediately. The answer may lie in a combination of factors. First, as President Demirel pointed out, there was no doubt an awareness that, while coups and military administrations may halt immediate 'threats,' they were far less able to fix things in the long term, and ultimately this did not reflect well on the military. Second, the military was gradually realizing that a direct confrontation against society—or at least part of it—over such an embedded issue as religion, would not directly be in the interest of the very positive reputation that the

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[532] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 2 May 1997.
[533] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 23 March 1997.

military still held in society. In other words, there was no need to play bad cop when there was a chance of using intervening tools—in this case, the political figures. A final and perhaps even more important factor, was that the military did not see the international environment as being convenient for a complete military takeover. In late March, for example, when the European Parliament leader met with Çevik Bir, one of the leading military figures of the February 28 "post-modern coup," General Bir gave his guarantee that the Turkish military would be faithful to democracy and would work hard for Turkish integration into the European Union.[534] Later, In June, when rumors of a coup were circulating very heavily in Ankara, American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made a public statement that the Americans had, "told them that whatever the debate is it has to remain within democratic parameters, and has to stay within constitutional borders."[535] The 'them' in this case is assumed to have referred to the Turkish military. On June 17 the *Los Angeles Times* published an article saying that the US had "warned the Turkish military by saying 'no coup'."[536]

While the hard realm had to compromise by only using the threat of a coup due to international and national legitimacy reasons, the civilian government of the soft realm was attempting to uncover real coup preparations. If they could do so, they would be able to label the hard realm as coup perpetrators and thereby balance their intrusiveness in the eyes of national and international public opinion. The means by which they tried to discover such preparations, was to use the intelligence gathering potential of the national police.

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[534] *Yeni Şafak* and *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 15 June 1997.
[535] *New York Times*, 14 June 1997.
[536] *Los Angeles Times*, 17 June 1997.

The earliest sign of an emerging struggle between various intelligence organizations with primary loyalties directed at the opposing forces of state and government, came in February 1997. The director general of National Intelligence Organization (MIT)[537], an organization traditionally close to the military,[538] announced that they were very upset that "other intelligence organizations" were not cooperating with them, and reminded that the centralization of the national intelligence network was extremely important.[539] Of the various intelligence organizations, military intelligence is known to work hand in hand with the MIT director's office since several professional military officers have active positions there. The National Police Intelligence[540] on the other hand is under the direct control of the Interior Minister—who is part of the civilian government. It is highly likely then that this complaint was being lodged against the National Police Intelligence.[541]

It was only after Erbakan's resignation that the conflict that had been going on between his civilian government and the state, and the roles played in this conflict by the various intelligence organizations, became clearer. The in-coming Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, announced publicly that he had been advised by the President that the previous Welfare Party government had directed the National Police Directorate to set up a secret special force to gather intelligence on the Turkish General Staff Headquarters.[542]

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[537] In general MIT is the Turkish equivalent of the American CIA, though the Turkish version is much more involved in domestic intelligence gathering.
[538] Politicians have complained, for example, that the National Intelligence Organization has never informed them about previous coup preparations. Metin Toker, "Asker-Polis Hikayesi," ["Soldier-Police Story,"] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 5 June 1997.
[539] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 12 February 1997.
[540] Roughly the equivalent of the American FBI.
[541] This opinion was repeatedly put forth by active officers in the police, military, and national intelligence organizations, in interviews carried out throughout fall 2001 and spring 2002 in Ankara.
[542] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 12 July 1997.

The former Interior Minister—from the fallen Welfare Party government—later

revealed that the police intelligence director had brought her a file documenting that the

Turkish military was involved in activities that could be considered as preparations for a

coup. The file included, for example, a document obtained secretly from Naval

headquarters, showing that a comprehensive unit working across all of Turkey had been

formed for the purpose of, in the words of Interior Minister Meral Akşener, "gathering

information about almost everybody in the country—governors, journalists, mayors,

party chairmen, etc.—in order to see who might be involved in 'dangerous' activities

against the state."[543] Although the Minister tried to give the impression that it had been

police intelligence that had initiated this spying action on the military, Prime Minister of

the time Çiller later admitted that the Interior Minister had given an order to the police to

conduct the investigation into the military's "coup preparations."[544] One journalist who

was close to Çiller and the Welfare Party government, wrote that the Prime Minister had

indeed gathered information through the police about coup preparations, and had in fact

even informed the USA about this in order for them to react.[545]

Comments made later on in interviews with some of those involved suggest that

not only was the civilian government trying to use the only organized security apparatus

available to them in order to fight back against the military's possible intervention into

politics, but that they clearly felt it was their right to do so. The deputy police intelligence

director, Hanefi Avcı, was later charged on the grounds that he 'spied on the military'. As

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[543] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 1 March 2000.

[544] See Çiller's statements that Interior Minister Akşener had given the order. The Prime Minister did add however, that it was possible the police intelligence director had first informed the Interior Minister about the coup preparations, and then the minister gave the order to probe further. *Sabah* and *Yeni Yüzyıl* (Istanbul), 5 July 1997.

[545] Nazlı Ilıcak, "Genelkurmaydaki Casus," ["The Spy in the General Staff Headquarters,"] *Akşam* (Istanbul), 5 July 1997.

he expressed, however, "if there are preparations being made for a coup, then it is the mission of the national police to investigate them. That is our legal right and job."[546] The Police intelligence director himself also criticized the charges, pointing out that article 7 of the law determining police jurisdiction gives the police the right to carry out whatever type of intelligence investigations[547] are necessary to block activities which might hurt the constitutional order and safety of the country.[548] He added that even if there was intelligence gathered on the military, all the information was given to the Prime Minister, who is supposed to have authority to which the military was responsible.[549] The reality of course in this case was that it was the Prime Minister himself who was being targeted by the alleged coup preparations. These words seem, therefore, to be a reminder that the military should not normally have anything to hide from the political authority, if there is a true democracy. The director closed his statements by pointing out that there can not be a right to stage a coup, and therefore plans to do so must be investigated—and in doing so, the police were protecting the regime and constitution, and had in fact saved the democracy from the state and military, i.e. the hard realm.[550]

The situation was perhaps best summed up by the journalists, one of whom described the situation as, "the government planted a spy in the state."[551] If rephrased in the terminology used in this work, this would read as the soft realm trying to defend itself

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[546] *Yenişafak* (Istanbul), 3 July 1997.
[547] Article 7 of the law no. 2559, "Polis Vazife ve Selahiyetler Kanunu" (The Law for Police Mission and Rights), published in *Official Gazette*, 14 July 1934, is as follows: "The police, in order to take preventive and protective measures regarding the territorial integrity and unity of the state, the constitutional order and common security, and to establish public security, gather intelligence at the national level; with this purpose, collect and evaluate information, and take this information to relevant offices or where it will be used. It works in cooperation with other intelligence institutions of the state."
[548] Statement made by Police Intelligence Director Bülent Orakoğlu to *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 5 July 1997.
[549] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 5 July 1997.
[550] Ibid.
[551] Bekir Coşkun, "Hükümet devlete casus soktu," ["Government Spy in the State,"] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 4 July 1997.

or fight back against the powerful hard realm with the only tool available: the national police.

The events that followed were perhaps even more indicative of the torn state structure and the ongoing conflict between the hard and soft realms, in the sense that they show how any attempt by the soft realm to balance against the very well consolidated hard realm would face definite consequences. If there actually was in this case some kind of blocking of an actual coup, the effects were not long-lasting and the results were very costly to the "defenders of democracy." The police intelligence director who first reported the coup preparations, was removed from his post due to military pressure placed on the Interior Minister.[552] Then, after having made the statement publicly that it was "not easy to make a coup anymore" since there were "170,000 national police,"[553] he was arrested and tried by a military tribunal—even though he was a civilian—on the charges that he had been involved in treason. The Navy prosecutor charged the police director with violating Article 54 of the Military Criminal Code (#1632), which corresponds to Article 132 of the Turkish Criminal Code, and which reads: "whoever destroys or transfers any documents which can create a security danger against the state or steals such documentation, can be jailed for no less than eight years."[554]

As a leading columnist wrote during the trial, this was the first time a high level bureaucrat, a police chief, would be tried in a military court on charges of treason. More

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[552] Yasemin Çongar, "Mafya, Orduya Sızdı," ["The Mafia inflitrated the Army,"] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 5 July 1997. In fact, the Deputy Director of Police Intelligence Bülent Orakoğlu even suggests that the Interior Minister was actually "threatened" by the military leaders to fire the Director. *Yeni Şafak* (Istanbul), 8 July 1997. Also reported in a private interview held with then-deputy chief of police intelligence, Hanefi Avcı, in Ankara, 25 March 2001.

[553] It was reported in the newspapers that once it became clear that a police chief had given this statement, the Turkish General Staff made an immediate investigation to discover who had given the statement. From that point on, the blame was placed on the Intelligence Director Orakoğlu.

[554] Turkey, *Turkish Criminal Code*, Art. 132.

importantly, it was the first time that an activity of the "government against the state" would be tried.[555] The police director was held in a military jail for almost a full two months, and later found not guilty. Nevertheless, the trial and jailing was a clear message to the police and the political system that the hard realm mechanisms were there for a reason. Moreover, these moves expressed a warning that the hard realm was organized and equipped with whatever tool necessary to deal with resisting or challenging attempts from the soft realm. This particular attempt at resistance by the soft realm ended ultimately in defeat, since the national police efforts were unable to prevent the military-coordinated hard realm pressure which in the end forced the fall of the elected civilian government.

Expansion Plans of the Hard Realm post-February 28

In this section I analyze the types of expansion plans the hard realm attempted to carry out during this period of the "post-modern coup"—even though it did not take over power directly. These plans range from the overall continued effort to control the securitization process via additional expansion of the hard realm, to efforts designed to enhance the mechanisms through which the hard realm could control society. In the second case, this meant building up the means for containment of what the hard realm considered as a societal threat. To achieve this threat containment, they would seek ways of using the soft realm elements themselves in order to create means for the hard realm to gain control over the initiation of 'dangerous' societal potential.

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[555] Fikret Bila, "Orakoğlu Davası," ["Orakoğlu's Trial,"] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 5 July 1997.

Controlling securitization

After the forced fall of the Welfare Party government, the new government was perceived first as one that would do whatever the hard realm wanted—in a sense, one that would act according to the 'great consensus' achieved in the 1960s and thus knew the 'limits' of political power. As one newspaper headline described it, "The commanders say jump, the new government says how high."[556] The government seemed to be complying with whatever the military demanded from the political realm, though it was in subtle ways seeking to gain more say in the defining of threats and the securitization process. For example, on the one hand the government ordered put into motion the "Western Working Group." This was the group organized by the military during the previous administration to gather information about 'dangerous' civilians, and which had caused the previously discussed problems between the national police and the military.[557] On the other hand, the new Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz was making public statements that the government was as sensitive as the military was to the security dangers facing the regime and state, and therefore it was unnecessary for the military to continue any interest in political issues.[558] By putting the blame for failing to protect the state from danger on the previous government, Prime Minister Yılmaz openly declared that the military could put an end to such special organizations as the Western Working Group, because the government could handle with the danger now. The military, he added, could

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[556] "Komuntanlar 'Tak' diye istiyor, Anasol-D 'Şak' diye yerine getiriyor," [A literal translation of this idiomatic expression would read something like, "'Tak' The Commanders want it, 'Sak' the government gets it"] *Yeni Gunaydın* (Istanbul), 29 July 1997.
[557] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 4 August 1997.
[558] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 5 August 1997.

return to their primary mission of the external defense of the country, "the Western Working Group is finished for me."[559]

The military did not appear to share the Prime Minister's opinion. The General Secretary of the Turkish General Staff, General Erol Özkosnak, known for being a hawkish type, made it known that the Western Working Group would nevertheless continue since the "threat" still remained, and would now convene twice daily as opposed to once.[560] It was evident that the hard realm's inner core was not going to quickly give up on its monopoly over defining what did or did not constitute a threat, its degree of acuteness, or how it should be handled. For its part, the soft realm generally conformed with the great consensus and obeyed the hard realm. Nevertheless, they seemed to at least be trying to seize some type of power over the military-monopolized securitization process, presumably sensing that otherwise, they could not predict where the military would stop. At the very least, the soft realm seemed to be making efforts to buy itself some breathing space.

The conflict over who was to determine the parameters of securitization, or more accurately, the struggle to determine whether the soft realm would have any say at all in defining the nature, scope, and response to national security threats, continued. The Prime Minister released a statement regarding a planned NSC meeting for March of 1998 that if there was to be any "imposition" or "pressure" at the upcoming meeting, it would be by the government, because the army was "too busy with its primary mission"[561] of defending the country against external threats. To this the military promptly responded

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[559] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 12 September 1997.
[560] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 13 September 1997.
[561] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 17 March 1998.

that they did not need anyone to remind them of their mission, and that no one could deter the military from being sensitive toward internal threats.[562]

In July 1998, Deputy Chief of Staff, General Çevik Bir insisted that the number one security threat in Turkey was posed by regressive religious activities, and therefore the parliament had to pass new laws to limit certain political and social rights.[563] The Deputy Prime Minister opposed this assessment, saying that political Islam as an internal security threat could not be stopped at the expense of democracy, and suggesting that an obsession with the fear of such a threat ran the risk of damaging the democracy.[564] Meanwhile Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, upon learning that the military had officially added "religious capital"[565] as a target on the National Military Strategic Concept (the document which defines the security threats facing Turkey and projected measures to tackle with them), stated that it could not easily be said that the number one security threat in Turkey was political Islam.[566]

These statements reveal attempts by the government to vocalize its own ideas on how to define and deal with a threat to national security in a manner different from that of the military. The military on the other hand, insisting on its own conceptualization of threats, was striving to expand the hard realm's influence and control. These efforts would allow the hard realm not only to curb immediate threats of 'dangerous' societal/political action, but also to make expansionary institutional moves that would help guarantee a degree of hard realm control even in normal political times. In other words, even at times not immediately following military interventions, the soft realm

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[562] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 19, 21 March 1998.

[563] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 1 July 1998.

[564] In his words, "we can't go to bed every day with the fear of this threat and wake up with the same fear, this is not right." *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 2 July 1998.

would remain very much controlled, and thus would be unable to produce threats to national security.

Similar confrontations over the defining of what constituted security threats continued to occur between the hard and soft realms throughout 1999. While the new Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, announced that the February 28 process was "finished,"[567] and implied that civilian politics were in charge in terms of dealing with security threats, the new Chief of Staff, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, responded with a statement that, "so long as the security threat remains, the February 28 process could continue for a thousand years."[568] With the Chief of Staff's words, the message seems clear that, to the hard realm, security came before every other consideration. Since the national security regime was designed to give ultimate authority to the hard realm to conceptualize the security threats, the quote ultimately meant that it was in the hard realm's power to continue with this controlling mechanism for as long as they deemed necessary.

The hard realm's resistance to the civilian attempts to take part in the securitization process can be directly linked to the pattern that the hard realm had regularly followed during the periods of military interventions into politics. One of their primary goals during these interim periods had been to use them to try and consolidate further the institutionalization of the hard realm and its supervisory mechanisms over politics. In that sense, this time was no different from the past, with the exception that this time there was not much to add to the institutional expansion of the hard realm. There was, however, much to be added to the hard realm's preemptive capacities of

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[565] The emerging segment of the bourgeoisie that is believed to be involved in religious politics.
[566] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 11 July 1998.
[567] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 23 January 1999.
[568] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 4 September 1999.

containing the fragmented society, and this time doing so from within the political and/or societal realms—a new expansion area that will be discussed in further detail later on in the chapter. The hard realm's confrontational positioning vis-à-vis society was expressed effectively in the words of Prime Minister Yılmaz, when he said that if the society and the state could not reach some kind of compromise or peace, "there will be no nation in the future."[569]

Societal positioning

With the hard and soft realms struggling over who would be permitted to be a part of the defining of threats, society's own attitudes towards the specific threat posed by political Islam seemed to be closer to those being presented by the soft realm. A poll conducted in July 1998 revealed that 23% of society still saw terror as the biggest threat facing the country, followed by, in varying degrees, the economic crisis, the lack of democracy and human rights violations. Only 1% characterized political Islam as the leading threat.[570]

In terms of attitudes towards the overall confrontation between the two realms during this period, societal positioning seemed to remain quite mixed. While the segments of the society that were the supporters of the Welfare party politicians were clearly in opposition to the hard realm's actions, other segments—primarily the supposed representatives of society such as the media, some unions, and various NGOs—largely positioned themselves alongside the hard realm. These 'representative' actors and their ability to vocalize their position, made it seem as though the majority of society

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[569] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 2 July 1999.
[570] *Yeni Yüzyıl* (Istanbul), 25 July 1998.

disapproved of the Islamist party-led government's political views, feared the risk that this government seemed to pose to the secular system, and therefore wanted the government removed.

What is crucial here is that the image of the Islamist-led government as a threat to regime security was fostered and promoted by the hard realm. Efforts to do this could be considered as a kind of societal engineering. Certain unions and NGOs that approved of the hard realm's ideology and style of modernization, acted as civilian extensions of the hard realm in order to mobilize critical reactions against the civilian government. As one political party leader would later comment, "the Turkish armed forces worked as a democratic societal association in order to help unmask the government's secret agenda and to rally public opinion against the government."[571]

In order to better understand the weakness of the soft realm and its overall inability to galvanize the necessary support from the society, it is important to clarify the parameters of civil society's role in this phenomenon. In Turkey, civil societal forces emerged long after the Turkish political system was introduced to society and therefore they found it difficult to develop "horizontal ties."[572] This is one major reason behind the weakness of Turkish civil society[573]. This weakness is combined with the equally important factor of hard realm influence. Therefore civil society forces have often had to prioritize their demands, frequently in the face of strong destabilization fears which were either in existence already or were introduced and promoted in the public agenda by the

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[571] Deniz Baykal cited in Cengiz Çandar, *Çıktık Açık Alınla* [We Survived with Honor] (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2001), 117.

[572] Metin Heper, *The Strong State Tradition in Turkey* (North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1985), 99.

[573] Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey," in *Towards Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Jillian Schwedler (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). The weakness of Turkish civil society vis-a-vis the state has also been discussed by Aykut Kazancıgıl, *The State in Global Perspective* (Paris: Unesco, 1986) and Ali Y. Sarıbay, *Postmodernite, Sivil Toplum ve Islam*, (Istanbul: Iletişim, 1994).

hard realm. Consequently, civil societal organizations and groups have been persuaded at times to show more sensitivity towards maintaining the status quo than to addressing their own intrinsic group or individual interests. Because the threats to the status quo are arbitrarily defined and potentially exaggerated by the hard realm, the impression is given that a failure to respond to them immediately will prove fatal to the very infrastructure which permits civil societal organizations to progress. With such an understanding, civil societal forces in Turkey have justified sacrificing or postponing their own goals, and siding with the stability of the overall state and regime over the risky promises of the discredited political realm.

At the operational level there has been a second reason to explain why civil societal organizations would turn towards the hard realm forces and away from their natural partners, the politicians. In the brief history of civil societal organizations in Turkey, their members and directors have primarily been drawn from the educated, young generations of the nation, which have themselves been socialized via the hard realm's philosophies, such as the Sevres Syndrome. Arguably, this segment of the population views itself as distant from the less educated, more traditional societal masses. In the issue of political Islam this distancing was very evident, since the forces behind this challenge were clearly driven and popularized from within the less educated—and therefore threatening—population. In the absence, however, of mass level societal movements, civil societal organizations are awarded a perhaps unjustified degree of representative power, which they are more likely to place with the hard realm, even in cases where large segments of those they "represent" would be inclined to support the soft realm.

Overall, civil society as a contribution to democratic consolidation can only be seen as such when its institutions themselves sincerely adhere to democratic credentials. In the Turkish case, one can argue that civil societal associations do not always meet this criterion in terms of their ideas and inner structures. Some of these associations have strong relations with the state (professional chambers for example), while others, such as the religious oriented ones, often have very oligarchic natures. Some can even be said to have authoritarian tendencies, such as those of the extreme right or left and the ultra-Kemalist organizations.[574]

In the case of political Islam, once the hard realm had concluded that an Islamist party—even one in a coalition with a secularist party—constituted a serious challenge to the stability of the regime, the forefront elements of the civil societal forces actually organized demonstrations against the elected government. Such associations of Turkish civil society as the Confederation of Labour Unions of Turkey, the Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions (DİSK), The Union of the Chambers of Industry, Commerce, Maritime Trade, and Stock Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and the Confederation of Tradesmen and Artisans of Turkey (TESK) were among those to join in the effort to "protect Turkey from religious reactionarism."[575] At the end, the hard realm was able to overthrow an elected government, thereby curtailing democratic and individual rights, with the apparent support of those 'representing' societal views.

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[574] For more on these, see Stefanos Yerasimos, *Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milleyetcilik*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

Hard Realm expansionary moves

The hard realm made several moves in the post-February 28 era in order to

expand and, as a consequence, further their potential to maintain a monopoly over

securitization. These efforts included immediate moves and more long-term strategic

plans. As one of the immediate moves, the military recommended to the new government

that they issue a decree by which 45 governors were either removed from their positions

or relocated.[576]

A second move involved the reformulating of the National Security Political

Document. The National Security Political Document is treated as the prime directive for

the Turkish state structure and its governance. As such, it determines the parameters for

all national policies. This document and its contents are supposed to be taken into

primary consideration by all decision-making parties in the Turkish political system. The

reformulation in question stated that although separatist terror and its international

connections continued to constitute a primary threat to the Turkish state and its structure,

a second threat had now become even more vital, namely that of regressive and

destructive religious activities.[577] The addition of this primary directive was not only for

symbolic purposes, it also served to determine the security-based parameters for political

activities and reforms. According to Prime Minister Yılmaz, all the laws, law proposals,

and international agreements Turkey would sign, would be done so along the parameters

of the National Policy Document.[578] In this way, security was being considered as the

primary lens for analyzing and making decisions about everything. This is precisely what

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[575] "Demokrasi için sivil muhtıra" [civil memorandum for democracy] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 22 May 1997.
[576] This reassignment was followed up by the relocation of 18 police chiefs across the country. *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 30 October 1997.
[577] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 3 October 1997.

this study defines as the securitization process. On December 26, 1997, the changes to the National Security Document were signed into law by the government by a secret decree.

Yet another example of the expansion efforts of the hard realm in this era, was the case of a national document outlining all state investments in the defense industry, including details on all defense projects, acquisitions of military and technical equipment, etc. This document was completely revised by the military and again quickly confirmed by the government with very little if any civilian contribution.[579]

The NSC also continued making decisions that would keep security on the public front burner. For example, one decision made it compulsory for high level bureaucrats to attend a 3-month long course in national security.[580] The NSC also decided that, along with a bureaucratic committee, it would inspect political actors and agencies to determine whether the February 28 demands were being met.[581]

Yet another NSC decision, this one made at the insistence of the military, marks an example of the hard realm's efforts to set up control mechanisms for blocking problems before they had actually even emerged. This involved making moves into the societal realm to take on the challenges of potential threats. The decision in this case was that the government would take measures to block the expansion of religious capitalist groups, or the so-called "green capital".[582] On March 14, 1998, Çevik Bir, asked the Economy Minister to "take radical measures against religious capital," which the state considered dangerous.[583] Even before the government was able to begin making any arrangements for this, the Ankara State Security Court Prosecutor ordered the arrest of 17

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[578] *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 26 December 1997.
[579] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 5 October 1998.
[580] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 20 October 1997.
[581] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 24 December 1997.

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businessmen believed to belong to this "green capital" on charges of accumulating capital in order to support religious political movements.[584]

The Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center

One of the most important developments of the February 28 process, in terms of institutional guarantees for a supervising role for the hard realm, was the foundation of the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center. This Center can be considered as a measure to block future challenges to the system from the soft realm from within the soft realm. This method circumvents the need for true hard realm takeovers in an ever increasingly globalized Turkish state, in which such takeovers are more difficult to carry out.

The story of the foundation of the Crisis Management Center is an interesting one, because the founding decree and regulations were signed into law during the Erbakan-led government, which then itself fell victim to a process it had in part legalized with this decree. While it can be understood why the hard realm quickly—three months after the Welfare Party took over the government—pushed for the creation of what can be considered an additional mechanism for managing the soft realm, it is much less easy to understand why Erbakan went along with signing such a decree. Possibly he was not completely aware of what exactly it was he was signing. This could have happened since, given the lack of civilian staff with security expertise combined with the soft realm's tradition of unquestioningly leaving security issues to the hard realm, papers regarding security matters rarely get scrutinized closely. It is also possible that Erbakan, well aware

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[582] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 25 December 1997.
[583] *Radikal* (Istanbul), 14 March 1998.

of the military's feelings towards him, was already surprised that they had allowed him to become Prime Minister, and did not want to immediately create a problem at the beginning of his administration. The truth probably lies in a combination of the two factors.

The decree outlining the foundations of a Crisis Management Center to operate within the Prime Ministry was signed into law on January 9, 1997. The Center aims first to prevent or if necessary to eliminate the conditions causing and perpetuating a crisis situation by coordinating the activities of all other state agencies. The crisis definition covers hostile activities against the unity and territorial integrity of the state, and against the national interest; violent movements aiming at the destruction of individual rights and liberties established by the constitution; natural disasters and grave environmental pollution; economic crises and large population and refugee movements. If the Center cannot prevent the exacerbation of the crisis situation, it has the right to advise relevant state agencies to declare an Emergency Situation (*Olaganustu Hal*), Emergency Rule (*Sıkıyonetim*), Wartime Mobilization (*Seferberlik*) or State of War (*Savas Hali*)[585]. Although the center was shown to be primarily responsible to the Prime Ministry, its physical location is within the National Security Council Secretariat, and the headquarters of the Turkish General Staff were determined to be in charge of coordinating all state activities during a crisis.[586] The decree also assigns the NSC Secretariat the responsibility of keeping the crisis management system always prepared and ready to be operated.[587]

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[584] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 16 April 1998.
[585] The Decree on the Establishment of the Directorate for the Prime Ministry Center for Crisis Management, published in *Official Gazette*, 9 January 1997.
[586] Ibid., art. C, sec.: definitions, and art. 6, sec.: goals.
[587] Ibid., art. 3, sec.: responsibilities.

Obviously the most interesting question is to wonder what exactly qualifies as a crisis situation. The list begins with such expected crisis situations as wars, near-wars or natural disasters such as earthquakes. It includes as well, however, such internal challenges to the constitutional order or serious indications of these challenges as terrorist activities or public unrest based on ethnic or religious differences. It is easy to consider previous situations in Turkey such as the securitization periods preceding the 1960, 1971,1980, and even the 1997 interventions, and imagine how it could be possible to interpret each of these eras as constituting a crisis, and therefore belonging completely to the security bureaucracy, the NSC Secretariat and the Turkish General Staff. There may very well even be a risk of manipulation or misuse of this mechanism, particularly within a system in which the political circles have very little experience or say on issues of threat analysis and security conceptualization. This is an important concern since at the times when the Center becomes activated, it will be able to mobilize a huge apparatus, reaching to every corner of the nation.[588]

Concern over the legal and institutional ramifications of this center have been voiced, perhaps the most direct criticisms have come from the President of the Istanbul Bar Association. He has pointed out that the regulating of such a center is in fact illegal, since it creates a parallel state authority, which is not constitutionally based, and is therefore illegal. Since this authority appears to have the right during crises to even supercede the legal boundaries outlined by the constitution, it is a direct threat and danger to constitutional order. He also criticizes the lack of transparency and legal oversight for this Center, since the true administrators in charge of the Center and the source of their

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[588] See for the details of this potential, Articles 6-11 of the regulations published in *Official Gazette*, 9 January 1997.

salaries is not clear, but rather kept secret allegedly for reasons of national security. He

concludes by saying that with an authority such as this, with which the military

establishment is in essence organized within the civilian realm, there is "no longer a need

to have coups."[589]

It has also been revealed that when the Istanbul Bar Association went to the

Administration Court to argue that the decree initiating the Center was not legal, the state

issued a response that the decree was based on an international agreement—that which

Turkey signed with NATO.[590] In a sense, by responding this way the state was pushing

the issue into a larger box of the national security rubric—the international security of the

country—about which civilians have the least information.

Conclusion

It is difficult to deny at this point that a dual structure does indeed exist within the

Turkish state. Perhaps the speech that was most illustrative in identifying the torn

structure between the hard realm state and the soft realm society/government, came from

Mesut Yılmaz, after he was accused by Tansu Çiller of being a corporal to the generals,

i.e. leading the military's 'desired' government after the fall of the Welfare Party

government. In this speech he said, "if I [my political party] did not take part on the side

of the state and were not a part of the government they wanted, what happened recently

in Pakistan [a military coup] would happen here in Turkey. We saved democracy."[591] The

speech reveals how the soft realm had apparently deemed it necessary to compromise

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[589] Yücel Sayman, "Kanun Devletinin de Gerisine Düşmenin Sancıları," ["The Contractions of Falling behind even the Rule of Law,"] *NPQ Türkiye* 2, no. 2 (2000).

[590] According to Turkish law, international agreements that are signed and properly confirmed, will, in cases of conflict, take precedence over Turkish law.

with a limited—supervised—democracy, in order not to lose democracy altogether. From

another perspective, in a speech by General Pervez Musharraf, the coup leader in

Pakistan praised Turkey as an excellent example for him, and stated that in order to

provide a secure management of Pakistan's democracy, he hoped to also set up a National

Security Council along the Turkish model.[592] Musharraf's words indicate the rationale

and justification of a national security regime by security establishments that feel their

mission is to manage and balance out the dangerous outcomes of an increasing adoption

of liberal democratic norms in their countries.

With such a securitized mindset, the hard realm sees itself under constant threat,

both internally and externally. Like any normal military commander, the inner core hard

realm figures want first to secure the solidarity, integrity and centralized power of their

'armies'—in this case, the entire country and nation state.[593] As one of the leading

Turkish generals of the February 28 Process said, "the armed forces are the skeleton of

the state, and this skeleton has to be very strong against this type of destructive

democratic understandings and the chaos caused by the alleged freedoms of thought and

speech."[594] The same general also expressed very neatly the justification for the armed

forces mission, saying that the armed forces "produce security. National security faces a

360 degree challenge both external and internal—if there is no security, there will be no

social, economic, cultural, political infrastructure."[595] This quote reminds us of the

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[591] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 16 October 1999.
[592] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 19 October 1999. Of interest, Musharraf was trained in Turkey by the Turkish military, and is very familiar with the Turkish system.
[593] During the February 28 process, one high level politician reportedly said that he felt the army owned the nation, not the other way around. "Ordu Politikacı Bulamıyor," ["The Army Unable to Find Politicians,"] Aktüel, 7 January 1998, 49.
[594] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 28 August 1999.
[595] Ibid.

perceived primacy of security, and suggests that democratic consolidation will have to wait until everything is "secured" in a guaranteed way, all the while existing in an environment in which there is threat at every side. This perhaps explains why the Chief of Staff said that the February 28 process would continue for 1000 years if necessary.

When looking at the February 28 post-modern coup, what we see primarily in respect to the workings of the torn state structure and the dual institutionalization within Turkish governance, is that the hard realm's later institutionalizing efforts have converged largely around those that might guarantee the management of the soft realm *from within* the soft realm. Such mechanisms have the obvious benefit of appearing least undemocratic. In other words, by seeking a system in which the hard realm can have the soft realm respond to security needs—needs that are determined by the hard realm—the measures are more likely to look good on paper and not create problems for international and internal legitimacy. Rather than adding to its internal autonomization, therefore, which by now can be considered as well consolidated, the hard realm looks into perfecting its potential of fine balancing their management mechanisms of the soft realm and society.

It is important in this discussion to first separate from the general arguments, those cases of individuals who have supported the idea of an actual coup—perhaps in order to gain for themselves a better position, e.g. the Presidency. Certain army generals, for example, Çevik Bir, were said to be seeking a coup to satisfy their own personal future political projects and Mesut Yılmaz also stated that one general was trying to manipulate the fight against the religious activities in order to secure the presidency for himself. Overall, there seems to have been an institutional positioning on the part of the

military both during and after the February 28 process to enhance its managerial powers over the soft realm and politics, without conducting a traditional coup. Of course this does not mean that the military does not recognize that half-coups or intervening without taking power ultimately handicaps their ability to have every radical transformative project or law proposal implemented. Even the most 'hard-realm friendly' soft realm government is unable to abide by every wish of the hard realm due to the soft realm's accountability to society. In other words, soft realm elements are brought to and remain in power through the direct votes of the electorate. Depending on the portion of society to which a political party's platform addresses, agreeing to fulfil hard realm demands may lead a party to quickly lose political power. On the other hand, the government is also accountable to the hard realm in the sense that refusing to satisfy hard realm demands may also cut short their political life. A soft realm government that opts to confirm the hard realm's wishes is cornered—it may accept the supremacy of security/the hard realm and be satisfied with a limited sphere of influence, but then it runs the risk of perhaps alienating voters. If it chooses to dispute the hard realm's wishes, it will have to seek for support in order to build up its own sphere. Since doing the latter has proven difficult domestically, particularly with the now well-consolidated hard realm, such a government is likely to look abroad for such support.

In the next chapter I will analyze how political globalization is reflected in the process of Turkey's EU accession efforts, and how the soft and hard realms' confrontational rhetoric, ideology, and tactics have become clearer as the accession process becomes more real. The chapter also shows how a nation state, whose primary agenda has been always security-oriented, perceives a challenge to its stability as certain

aspects of political globalization pressure force it to undergo a transformation. We will see how during this challenge, the hard realm, who believe that they are on duty to defend their system and nation against this intruder, will find themselves in an increasingly difficult situation, since the traditional strategies and consequent mechanisms of securitization will be harder to appeal to.

Chapter 5

Contemporary Confrontation between the Hard and Soft Realms: Turkey's EU Adventure

Introduction

The previous chapters have explored various events and eras of the last hundred or more years of Turkish/Ottoman history, in order to reveal the emergence, deepening, and institutionalization of a dual-track state structure based on opposing forces of securitization and political globalization. This chapter will now look at the process of Turkey's application for European Union membership and the issues, actors, and conflicts within that process, in order to see how the dual-track institutionalization of securitization and globalization currently operates. In particular, the chapter focuses on the period following the Helsinki summit of 1999, as the era in which the conflict between the securitizers of the hard realm and the globalizers of the soft realm has become most evident. Within this period, the issue of minority rights will be emphasized, as it is particularly useful for delineating the current arguments and positionings of the two realms and revealing most vividly the points at which they clash.

This chapter refers to a division of positions based on security vs. integration, or of "gradualists" vs. "integralists." In linking the hypothesizing of chapter 1 to the context and terminology used in this chapter, we can see that the demands of economic and political integration of Turkey with the European Union correspond directly to the specifics of a political globalization pressure. This can be understood in the sense that integration requires, for example, democratization/liberalization, homogenization of

Turkish democracy with western democracies, and power decentralization (e.g. the boosting of local municipal government and of ethnic minority rights). The second position discussed in this chapter, that of the security-minded "gradualists", corresponds to external/internal security concerns (anarchic pressure). In terms of external security concerns, the Turkish security establishment believes that, along with Turkey's integration with the EU, Turkey's strong standing vis-a-vis her external threats (e.g. the Cyprus or Aegean issues, or Turkey's ability to deal with her southern neighbors) will be weakened. In terms of internal threats, the security establishment feels that they will be weakened by the empowerment of domestic entities such as the Kurdish minority or the Islamists, which accompanies various demands of the integration process. The internal threat is thus seen as reaching a level that it could potentially challenge the very integrity of the nation state. Thus there is a link between the decentralization outcome of integration, and the resulting (in)security agenda.

Moving on to the next part of the hypothesizing, we see a general correlation between the gradualist/integralist rhetorics, strategies, and philosophies and the hard and soft realms of the Turkish state. One of the primary goals for much of the soft realm can be seen as the integration of Turkey with the European Union, and so in this chapter the term "integralists" can be understood as referring to the position of the soft realm. Similarly, security is a primary goal of the hard realm, and therefore the hard realm tends generally to support a slower, "a la carte" attachment of Turkey to the world, in other words, integration on its own terms, selecting those aspects it wants and rejecting others. Because of their more reserved time frame for integration, the term "gradualist" is used to describe the overall hard realm's way of conduct concerning Turkey's EU accession.

In some cases, certain figures or groups do not necessarily match perfectly with the rhetoric and positions of their expected realms. This occurs increasingly as various changes in the accession process force the parties to turn rhetoric into reality. We will see, for example, that while the security-oriented gradualist front of the hard realm naturally holds tight to national security reservations—some of which clearly block further integration efforts—they nevertheless claim to be in support of globalization. The occasional mismatches may also be uncovered when one considers a micro-level examination of individual figures. Such figures may, for example, favor integrative policies even though their institutional identities are rooted in securitized, staunchly resistant arguments.

History of Turkish-EU Relations

As chapter 2 showed, turning westward has long been a part of Turkish and previously Ottoman policies. In fact, one could argue that one of the most important factors that have influenced Turkey's political system has been its continuing modernization and Westernization since the 17th century Ottoman Empire. By the 19th century, European supremacy in virtually every field of life was recognized by Ottoman statesmen and intelligentsia,[596] and Turkish embracing of Europeanization/ Westernization had firmly begun. These efforts were of course intensified by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his peers after creating the modern Republic of Turkey in the early 20th century, and have been often recognized from the perspective of security from the

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[596] A sentiment captured most expressively perhaps in Ziya Pasha's famous poem:
   "I visited the Christian land and palaces I saw,
   I visited Islam's lands and ruins I saw."

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days of the Cold War onward.[597] The peak of Europeanization, however, can be perhaps best encapsulated in Turkey's quest for membership in the European Union, a process begun in 1987 with official application by the late President Özal. In the words of Ali Bozer, then Turkish minister in charge of Turkish-EC relations, with the presentation of the application Turkey "demonstrated her determination to become European."[598]

The first ten years after the initial application saw numerous ups and downs in Turkish-EC/EU relations. When the European Commission rejected Turkey's application for EC membership in late 1989 for both political and economic reasons, it was clear that the process would be neither short nor easy. The decision was made, therefore, to at least keep up closer ties with the Europeans by entering into a Customs Union.[599] With the rediscovery of Turkey's geopolitical significance due in large part to the emergence of the newly independent Turkic states, combined with European concerns that failure to accept an agreement with Turkey would have greater detrimental results both on the Turkish domestic situation and on the region, steps towards the customs union were sped up, and the signing of the union was made final in 1995.

The quest for full membership continued along its bumpy road, with the on-going Kurdish question and crises such as the problem with Greece over the island of Kardak keeping relations cool between Turkey and the EU. Relations deteriorated even further in

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[597] Turkey has been a staunch ally of the West as a member of NATO since 1952 and the Council of Europe since its establishment in 1949. For more on Turkey's relations with the West during the Cold War see, Dankwart Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally* (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1987). For relations immediately after the Cold War, see Atila Eralp, "Turkey and the European Community in the Changing Post-War International System," in *Turkey and Europe*, eds. C. Balkır and A.M. Williams (London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 1993), 24-44, and Sabri Sayarı, "Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis," *Middle East Journal* 46 (1992): 9-21.
[598] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 15 April 1987.
[599] Özal was personally against the idea of Customs Union without full membership, but the European Commission was very much interested in such a prospect, and eventually the Turks gave in. Interview with Cengiz Çandar, Washington, June 10, 2000.

1997 as Turkish-German relations became particularly unpleasant, the fallout from the

March 4 declaration of the European Christian Democrats made its effect[600], and, most

importantly, the December 1997 Luxembourg Summit dealt its blow to Turkish hopes.

The summer of 1997 had seen the release of a massive study presented to the

European Parliament, in which were included assessments of each of the applicant states

to the EU. The study made recommendations to open negotiations in 1998 with five

countries in Central and Eastern Europe[601] as well as with Cyprus. The discussion about

Turkey only noted measures for improving and deepening EU-Turkish relations within

the framework of the Customs Union agreement, and failed to give any clear prospects

for membership. The speeches of EU figures in the last months before the crucial EU

summit in Luxembourg also bode poorly for Turkey's chances.[602] Complicated further by

the untimely detentions of some human rights activists in October, it became increasingly

clear that even the greatest of diplomatic efforts were unlikely to change the opinions of

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[600] What made Turkish-German relations particularly unpleasant at the time was the chilling statement of Helmut Kohl on Turkey's EU bid. At a meeting of the heads of the mainly Christian Democrat European People's Party, a meeting attended by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, and Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, a consensus decision was reached stating that for largely civilizational differences, Turkey "is not a candidate to become a member of the European Union, short term or long". Prime Minister Prodi later declared that he was not in agreement with all the views of the other European Christian Democrat leaders regarding Turkey's EU bid. The Union itself also preferred to back down from this stance only two weeks after the meeting as Turkish officials expressed their outrage over the statement, and the US and the UK openly protested it in favor of Turkey. Fifteen foreign ministers from the EU ultimately declared that the same terms as offered to the other 10 candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe would apply to Turkey. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel also made a two-day visit to Turkey in late March specifically to fix the damage caused by Kohl's remarks but this was to no avail. After calling Turkey a part of Europe, he then ruled out any possibility of rapid accession to the Union because of human rights violations and economic problems in Turkey. Not surprisingly, Turkish-German relations failed to improve after Kinkel's visit. *Turkish Probe* (Ankara), 14 March 1997; Ian Davidson, "Polite Hypocrisy," *Financial Times* (London), 19 March 1997, and John Barham, "Kinkel runs into Ankara deadlock," *Financial Times* (London), 27 March 1997.

[601] The Agenda 2000 report recommended starting negotiations with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.

[602] Jacques Poos, then president of the EU, said that Turkey could not become a full member unless it solved its Kurdish problem through dialogue. *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 3 September 1997. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel argued that while Turkey's place on the European train had been reserved since 1963 (a reference to Turkey's signing of the Ankara agreement for membership in the European Economic

certain European countries (in particular, Germany),[603] that Turkey's standing for EU membership was less secure than that of the other aspirants. These suspicions became truth when, on December 13, the Luxembourg summit named ten Eastern and Central European countries and Cyprus as candidates for full membership. Turkey was not named among countries that the EU included in its enlargement in the foreseeable future, and was not granted a pre-accession strategy.

While Turkish-EU relations continued to fluctuate, beginning with Turkey's cutting off of negotiations after the Luxembourg summit, warming somewhat after the defeat of Helmut Kohl's Social Democrat party in 1998, and shaken again by the refusal of the Italian government to turn over PKK leader Öcalan, the EU progress report of 1999 seemed to hold out some hope for Turkey's chances in the 1999 Helsinki summit. The report remained full of criticisms and recommendations for political reforms, however it also stated that,

> To encourage in-depth reforms, it is now time to take a step forward and to further develop the strategy with regard to Turkey. While retaining specific features linked to the current situation of the country it can in future be aligned more closely on the strategy followed with the other candidate countries.[604]

The signs of hope were proven true, and on December 10-11, 1999 in Helsinki, the EU stated clearly for the very first time that Turkey could, upon compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria, become an EU member.

Community), they had "no chance of getting on the train in the near future." *Turkish Probe* (Ankara), 19 September 1997.
[603] İlnur Çevik, "Did the French really convince the Germans on Turkey?" *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara), 8 November 1997.

The Helsinki Era

The decision taken at the Helsinki summit clearly marked a tremendously

significant step in Turkey's relations with the EU. One might even venture to call it a

paradigmatic shift in relations, since the heretofore abstract ideal of Turkey's eventual

accession was now set in place with a concrete political program. With this development,

Turkey's ruling elite could no longer avoid acknowledging the potential costs and

implications of implementing the demanded domestic reforms. Consequently, what had

previously appeared as a more or less uniformly positive attitude toward EU membership

among the majority of the Turkish military and civilian elite, now began to take on a

greater complexity, most vividly in response to the requirements concerning minority

rights in Turkey. The primary division within this complexity can be considered as

reflecting the dual track of the state structure, that is, the parties, actors, elements of the

securitizing hard realm, and those of the globalizing soft realm—though as the following

analysis will reveal, the lines between the two are not always precise.

The Accession Partnership Agreement and the National Program

The exact stipulations of the demands on Turkey for EU membership were spelled

out in the Accession Partnership Document that was eventually agreed upon, after much

haggling in Brussels and between Ankara and Brussels, by the European Council of

Ministers in December 2000. The document called for reforms to be made in three areas:

the aligning of Turkish/EU laws and practices; a continuation and consolidation of

economic reforms begun in the 1980s; and, most troublesome for Ankara, a list of

political reforms. The reforms were classified into two main groups: short and medium

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[604] European Commission, *Composite Paper: Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards*

term. Short term issues were meant to be completed or have substantial progress made on them by the end of 2001, while medium term issues were those "expected to take more than one year to complete although work should, wherever possible, also begin on them during 2001."[605]

Under the heading of short term political reforms, were such issues as freedom of expression, freedom of association, torture, reforming the state security court, and maintaining a moratorium on the death penalty. A further point asked that Turkey "remove any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting," but no specific mention was made to either "Kurds" or "minorities."[606] Initial reaction in Turkey to the Accession Partnership document was fairly positive, but relations soon soured over a reference in the document to the Cyprus and Aegean issues and to a European Parliament recommendation to include a reference to the Armenian genocide. While the Armenian issue has at least temporarily lost some of its front burner status, the Cyprus and Aegean issues were dealt with finally by placing them in a separate paragraph defined as "enhanced political dialogue."[607]

Also released in late 2000 was the third of the so-called "progress reports[608]" and a strategy paper[609], both of which were evaluating Turkey's progress over the year 2000.

Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, 13 October 1999, 5.

[605] European Commission, *Proposal for a Council Decision on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey*, 8 November 2000, 5.

[606] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 10 November 2000.

[607] According to some Turkish newspapers, this new paragraph was created under pressure of the United States on behalf of Turkey. *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 5 December 2000. For the full text of the new paragraph see *Turkish Probe* (Ankara), 10 December 2000.

[608] European Commission, *2000 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, 8 November 2000.

[609] European Commission, *Strategy Paper: Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries*, 8 November 2000.

Short term (2001)	Medium term
Settlement of the Cyprus problem	Settlement of border disputes (Aegean disputes.)
Safeguarding freedom of association and peaceful assembly	Guaranteeing full enjoyment of human rights, freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Preventing torture	Reviewing of the Turkish Constitution and other relevant legislation
Further aligning legal procedures concerning pre-trial detention	Lifting the death penalty and signing and ratifying Protocol 6 of the ECHR
Combatting human rights violations	Ratifying the ICCPR and the ICESCR
Intensifying training on human rights issues	Improving prison conditions
Improving the functioning and efficiency of the judiciary	Making the NSC an advisory body in accordance with the practice of EU member states
Maintaining the moratorium on the death penalty	Lifting the remaining state of emergency in the southeast
Removing any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother language in TV/radio broadcasting	Ensuring cultural diversity and guaranteeing cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin. Any legal provisions preventing the enjoyment of these rights should be abolished, including in the field of education
Developing a comprehensive approach to reduce regional disparities, and in particular to improve the situation in the southeast, with a view to enhancing economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens	
Safeguarding freedom of expression in line with Article 10 of the ECHR	

Table 1

The Accession Partnership with Turkey – Enhanced political dialogue and political criteria[610]

The progress report declared that in terms of the political criteria, the situation in Turkey since 1999 had "hardly improved", though it did point to one positive development as the

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[610] *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 85, 24 March 2001, 16-19.

"launching in Turkish society of a wide-ranging debate on the political reforms necessary with a view to accession to the EU."[611] In terms of the demands addressing in particular minority rights, the progress report made both general and specific references. Under the heading of civil and political rights, concern was raised for the problems of freedom of expression, particularly "the situation of the population of Kurdish origin", and also the freedom of religion, specifically, the "[examining of] concrete claims of non-Muslims, whether or not they are covered by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty." Under the heading of economic, social and cultural rights, a general complaint was raised about the prevention of mother language use by minorities in both education and broadcasting. Finally, a general note was made about the importance of the question of cultural rights, in particular in the southeastern region of the country.

Turkey responded in March 2001 with the release of its National Program for the Adoption of the *Acquis*. This wide-ranging document addressed most of the priorities stated in the Accession Partnership agreement, and was seen as a "welcome development" at the EU summit that summer—though further improvements in such areas as human rights were seen as needed.[612]

Minority Rights

In the course of Turkey's application and possible accession to EU membership, the pressures of political globalization have been in a sense operationalized in the form of European demands for further democratization and improved human rights. The second of these, often made in relation to the Kurdish question, has proven a frequent stumbling

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[611] Commission, *2000 Regular Report*, 20.
[612] European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, 15-16 June 2001, 2.

block to a smooth Turkish accession. Heated discussions in the early years occurred over such events as the arrest of the Diyarbakır mayor, Mehdi Zana, hunger strikes in the Diyarbakır prison over the banning there of the Kurdish language, and allegations of violations to Kurdish cultural rights made in the 1988 Walter report.[613] Much of the criticism of Turkey regarding human rights stemmed from the European Parliament, which, starting in earnest in 1990, began issuing numerous resolutions condemning what it considered as the Turkish state's violations of fundamental human rights, focusing mainly on the Kurdish problem.[614]

The drastically increasing intensity of the military conflict with the PKK in the early 1990s often had results that caused flare-ups in tensions between Ankara and Europe. Turkish army cross-border operations into Northern Iraq, violent crackdowns on Kurdish demonstrations and celebrations[615], and accusations that the Turks were using German-donated tanks in their war[616], were all harshly criticized. Some bright points from the Turkish perspective included a report on Turkey-EC relations prepared by the UK at the request of the Council of Ministers in July 1992, which was moderately positive. While pointing to continued human rights abuses, the report conceded that efforts to improvement had been made, and recognition of Turkey's difficult position in dealing with the PKK—openly called a "terrorist organization" in the report—was made.

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[613] Gerald Walter, *Report on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on Resumption of the EEC-Turkey Association* (Brussels: European Parliament, 1988).

[614] These included resolutions asking for the recognition of political, cultural and social rights of Kurds, the release from prison of Turkish and Kurdish figures arrested for their anti-state speech, the nullification of the state of emergency law in Southeastern Turkey, and more general human rights abuses such as police torture.

[615] Between 30 and 90 civilians died in clashes with Turkish security forces during Nevruz celebrations in March of 1992. Amberin Zaman, "Kurds at the End of the Road," *The Middle East*, May 1993, 8.

[616] This led to the Germans cutting off military aid to Turkey on March 26, 1992. *Sabah* (Istanbul), 28 March 1992.

In large part, however, discussion of the Kurdish issue was highly unsettling for

Ankara. A report by an Italian parliamentarian in mid-June 1992 said that Turkey needed

to recognize the cultural rights of Kurds and condemned Turkey's efforts to solve the

Kurdish problem through purely military measures[617]. A second report issued by the

European Parliament asked Turkey to both respect human rights in its conflict with the

PKK, and also to withdraw its troops from Cyprus.[618]

The Kurdish issue again became a point of contention when, in early 1994, the

Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) abolished the political immunities of six

parliamentary members of the Kurdish-dominated Democratic Labor Party (DEP) and of

an independent parliamentarian who was formerly of the DEP, and had all of them

detained. The situation worsened a couple of months later when the Turkish Constitution

Court banned the DEP altogether. The debates and negotiations that stalled and

threatened to hinder the signing of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EU often

dwelt on issues of human rights, and the Kurdish issue in particular. When the Customs

Union agreement was signed in 1995, it was done so only by including a stipulation that

in the case of a deterioration of human rights, financial aid could be suspended.[619]

Subsequently, significant amounts of aid money were in fact blocked as a result of

alleged human rights abuses in Turkey.[620]

With the first of the European Commission's reports on Turkey's progress

towards meeting EU membership criteria, released in 1998, the issue of Turkey's Kurds

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[617] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 10 June 1992.
[618] İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği: Ulus-devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı* [Turkey and the European Union: Turkey's Approach to Europe Trying to Overcome the Nation-state] (Ankara: Ümit Yayınları, 2000), 284-285.
[619] European Parliament, "Resolution on the human rights situation in Turkey," *Official Journal of the European Communities* C017, 22 January 1996.

is not dealt with directly, but rather is placed under the general subtitle of Minority Rights

and the Protection of Minorities.[621] Although the EP had frequently asked Turkey to

recognize Kurdish cultural existence, this report marks the first occasion of a strong

request for Turkey to solve its Kurdish problem politically, underscoring the connection

that a political solution meant beginning with recognition of Kurdish identity:

> [Turkey] will have to find a political and non-military solution to the
> problem of the southeast...a civil solution [that would include] recognition
> of certain forms of Kurdish cultural identity and greater tolerance of the
> ways of expressing that identity, provided it does not advocate separatism
> or terrorism.[622]

Specific mention is also made in this report under the heading of Minority Rights

to the rights of TV broadcasting in Kurdish.

If the Accession Partnership agreement was causing the Turks to face the harsh

realities of membership requirements for the first time, the 2001 Progress Report by the

European Commission indicates that the Europeans too were starting to look at Turkish

membership in a more serious manner. Before the Accession Partnership agreement, the

Europeans were perhaps even comforted by what was conceived as structural problems in

Turkey that would make her accession virtually impossible. Their natural reservations

about allowing Turkey in did not surface fully, therefore, until the possibility of accession

became a reality. Subsequently we notice in the report an increasing emphasis on

ethnic/religious minorities and their rights in Turkey. Though the report accepted that

recent constitutional amendments in Turkey were "a significant step towards

strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and

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[620] Hundreds of millions of dollars targeted to help Turkey implement the Customs Union were blocked. *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara), 25 October 1996.
[621] European Commission, *1998 Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, November 1998.

limiting capital punishment", it also pointed out that a number of restrictions on the

exercise of fundamental freedoms had remained.[623] It also makes mention for the first

time of the importance of considering the implementation of the improved legislation,

and stresses the practical application of the amendments. In terms of the direct evaluation

of the National Program, the progress report points to the need for clearer timetables and

deadlines, and also states:

> The NPAA (National Program) falls considerably short of the Accession
> Partnership priority of guaranteeing cultural rights for all citizens irrespective
> of origin. Furthermore, the priority on the removal of all legal provisions
> forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio
> broadcasting is to be included...The document should specify how Turkey
> intends to guarantee freedom of religion, in particular with respect to minority
> religions not covered by the Lausanne Treaty (Muslim and non-Muslim
> communities).[624]

Perhaps most noteworthy at this point is the mentioning for the first time of "minority

religions", specifically Muslim and non-Muslim religions not covered by the Lausanne

Treaty. The general reference is then followed by a direct comment on the state of the

Alevis[625]. The Alevis represent arguably the most politically volatile—and therefore

worrisome to the hard realm—minority group in Turkey after the Kurds.

The progress reports, the Accession Partnership document and the National

Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) all make it quite clear that Turkish

compliance with the political criteria, which is sine qua non for opening accession talks,

is the basic problem in Turkish-EU relations. Within the political criteria, "minority

rights and the protection of minorities" in particular constitute the thorniest problem. It is

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[622] Ibid., 19-21.
[623] European Commission, *2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, 13 November 2001, 13.
[624] Ibid., 103.

clear that the EU is asking Turkey, even though sometimes in oblique ways, to throw

away its minority regime as created by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), in which Turkey

recognized only three groups as "minorities:" Jews, Greeks, and Armenians. While

Turkish officials and politicians continue citing the Lausanne Treaty to defend Turkey's

official thesis on minorities, the EU's official documents have already proceeded well

beyond that treaty, recognizing new minorities other than those previously defined.[626]

Namely, a thorough analysis of the Progress Reports reveals references to four additional

categories of minorities: Kurds; other ethnic groups living in Turkey (Laz, Caucasian,

etc); some non-Muslim groups, like Syrian Orthodox Turkish citizens; and the Alevis.

Having stated that these minorities exist in Turkey, the European Union strongly

asks Turkey to grant them certain rights, in particular, for the ethnic minorities, rights to

broadcasting and education in their mother languages. The recent progress reports, for

example, have criticized Turkey on its failure to address this point, stating that "for

persons belonging to groups that are outside the scope of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty

(Armenians, Greeks and Jews), the actual situation has not improved notably in relation

to broadcasting and education...there has been no improvement in the ability of members

of ethnical groups with a cultural identity and common traditions to express their

linguistic and cultural identity."[627]

Similarly, the Accession Partnership document, which was accepted by the

Council on 8 March 2001 and is the cornerstone of Turkey's pre-accession strategy, asks

Turkey officially to "remove any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens

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[625] The Alevis are the Anatolian sect of Muslims who are followers of the Caliph Ali. Their religious practices are to some extent influenced by the Jaferi and Shiia traditions of Iran, but carry as well certain characteristics of ancient Turkish belief systems.
[626] Commission, *2000 Regular Report*, 19.

of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting" in the short-term (2001). In the

medium-term, the EU calls on Turkey to "ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural

rights" for all minorities, and any legal provisions that prevent the enjoyment of these

rights "should be abolished, including in the field of education."[628]

In a similar vein, all Progress Reports and the Accession Partnership document

demand that Turkey find a "civil" or "political" solution for its South-east situation:

"Turkey will have to find a political and non-military solution to the problem of the

south-east... A civil solution could include recognition of certain forms of Kurdish

cultural identity and greater tolerance of the ways of statement of that identity..."[629]

Even though the decisions held in the European Parliament (EP) are not

legally binding, it is possible to assert that they are plainer and freer from

diplomatic rhetoric than the documents of the Commission and Council, and

therefore more indicative of what might be considered Europe's "true"

positioning. What the EP requires of Turkey includes 'cultural autonomy' for

Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, and an official recognition of Kurdish identity/

the Kurdish minority by the Turkish state.[630] The Parliament has even used the

word "Kurdistan" when describing Turkey's southeast—something Turkey is

extremely unlikely to ever agree with.[631] Furthermore, the EP refrains from

labeling the PKK militants as "terrorists," instead calling them "freedom fighters"

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[627] Commission, *2001 Regular Report*, 28-29.

[628] *Official Journal of the European Communities* L85, 24 March 2001, 16, 19.

[629] Commission, *1998 Regular Report*, 20.

[630] European Parliament, "Resolution of the Committee of the Regions on the arrest of Mr. Ocalan and the need to find a political solution to the Kurdish problem," *Official Journal of the European Communities* C198, 14 June 1999, 82.

[631] European Parliament, "Resolution on the political situation in Turkey," *Official Journal of the European Communities* C320, 28 October 1996, 187, and "Written question no. 293/89 by Mrs. Raymonde Dury to

and has referred to Abdullah Öcalan, arguably the most hated man in Turkey, as "president."[632]

In addition to growing documentary evidence that reforms on the Kurdish issue are essential before Turkey can become a European member, visits to Southeastern Turkey by European Union and E.U. member government officials began to boom following the Helsinki summit. In early 2000 alone, some three hundred reported meetings took place between European officials and Kurdish figures in the southeast region, primarily members of *Halkin Demokrasi Partisi* (HADEP), Turkey's only political party overtly representing Kurdish politics.[633] Confirmation that reforming the Kurdish issue would very soon be one of the backbones of framework guiding Turkey's route to join Europe was given by Gunther Verheugen, the European Commissioner responsible for enlargement, who openly said on one of his visits to Ankara that the Kurdish issue would be a "crucial part of the Partnership Accession document",[634] that was being prepared to delineate the necessary steps for Turkey's admission into the EU.

Turkish perceptions of and responses to European demands on the Kurdish issue

One perception that has slowed Turkey's response to the EU demands has been the overarching impression among primarily the security establishment that the PKK itself was drawing on and gaining strength from the EU's demands, in a sense collapsing the PKK/Kurdish issue with EU political demands—an effort referred to in Turkey as a

the Commission: The poisoning of Kurdish refugees from Iraq in the Mardin Camp in Turkish Kurdistan," *Official Journal of the European Communities* C47, 27 February 1990, 1.
[632] European Parliament, "Resolution on the situation in Turkey and the offer of a ceasefire made by the PKK," *Official Journal of the European Communities* C32, 5 February 1996, 93.
[633] The figure of 300 and related information were reported in *Özgür Politika*, referring to a police report submitted to the Turkish National Security Council. *Özgür Politika* (Istanbul), 27 February 2000.
[634] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 22 March 2000.

"politicization" of the Kurdish issue. This identification of the politicization of the Kurdish question with full membership in the EU was consolidated in many Turks' minds after a much-quoted speech in which coalition leader Mesut Yılmaz stated that "the road to the EU goes through Diyarbakir,"[635] the largest city at the center of the Kurdish-majority region of Turkey. Former Turkish Foreign Minister, Mumtaz Soysal, also captured this concern with his reference to the "EU's Kurdish card."[636] The perception of EU manipulation of the Kurdish issue increased once the clearly detailed conditions of full EU membership were made public.

This perception has led to some strong responses on the Turkish side. In January 2000, the Turkish High Broadcasting Authority shut down CNN-Turk, a 24-hour news channel for one day due to an anchorman's questioning of a guest on whether Abdullah Öcalan would become "the next Mandela". Only a few days later, the Turkish State Security courts released a decision about the leadership of the Kurdish-based HADEP party, sentencing sixteen leading figures to three years and nine months imprisonment based on charges that they had helped and followed orders from the PKK.[637] The Turkish state's positioning became clearer still in a statement in mid-March 2000 from a member of the National Security Council, stating that Turkey was unlikely in the near future to allow either education or broadcasting in Kurdish, on the grounds that they would "tear apart the mosaic" of Turkey's multi-ethnic society.[638] Then President Demirel echoed

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[635] *Milliyet* and *Sabah* (Istanbul), 19 November 1999.
[636] Mümtaz Soysal, "AB'nin Kurt Kartı," ["EU's Wolf Card,"] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 1 March 2000.
[637] *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara), *Milliyet, Hurriyet* and *Sabah* (Istanbul), 18 January 2000.
[638] General Secretary of the NSC, General Asparuk, quoted in *Financial Times* (London), 17 February 2000.

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this sentiment a few days later when he said, "if we give Kurds free broadcasting and educational rights we will fall to pieces".[639]

Another of the Turkish state's responses to what it viewed as evidence of the PKK's politicization attempt of the Kurdish issue was the detention in early 2000 of three Kurdish HADEP mayors on charges of supporting the PKK. These detentions, coming on the heel of the mayors' meetings with European officials, were heavily criticized in Europe. Then President Demirel responded that this was a criminal court case and therefore an internal Turkish matter[640], though the leader of the coalition party ANAP, Mesut Yılmaz, admitted that the political leadership had been unaware of what the security establishment had been planning, indicating essentially that the security establishment had acted on its own.[641] The HADEP mayors were released after three days and reinstated to their offices, though their trials continue. Their quick reinstatement in office was partly due to apparently increasing European pressure, however, it also suggests that their arrests and detentions were less a matter of law enforcement than the Turkish State sending a message to the PKK, to Europeans supportive of the PKK's new strategy, as well as to other HADEP mayors and Kurdish political figures.

With these arrests, the hard realm made a move against further politicization of the Kurdish issue and sent a warning to HADEP to cut its links with the PKK and to resist seeking alliances in Europe. Turkey also reminded Europe that it still saw the Kurdish issue as an internal problem, even if EU membership was on the table. A former

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[639] *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara), 22 February 2000.
[640] *Sabah* and *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 23 February 2000, and *The New York Times*, 25 February 2000.
[641] NTV, "Türkiye'den Haberler," [News from Turkey] 25 February 2000.

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Turkish army officer and politician, Orhan Kilercioğlu, was reported as saying that by

dealing with HADEP and the Kurdish issue, the EU is "on the wrong path."[642]

Mistrust in European goals

One factor that must be considered when analyzing the Turkish perspective on

relations with the EU and in particular, minority rights, is Turkey's traditional mistrust of

European goals regarding the Kurdish issue. An understanding may be gaining strength

in Turkey that Europe is using the EU membership "carrot" in order to facilitate political

solutions to the Kurdish issue.

The reason why the Europeans are increasingly anxious for a political solution to

the Kurdish issue is argued to stem from a change in the way Europeans view the

Kurdish/minority issue, that is, no longer as just an exotic attraction and potential

geopolitical instrument, but as a problem which must be responded to immediately. The

existence of the Kurds in Europe—up to 600,000 by some estimates—and their active

political character, which has even been seen as a threat at times to the domestic law and

order of European countries, has made the Kurdish issue a European one.[643] Ever since

the multinational Kurdish movements showed their destabilizing potential during

Abdullah Öcalan's search for shelter and subsequent arrest by Turkish authorities, the

Kurdish issue has not only been internalized in Europe, but has come to constitute a

ticking bomb which must be defused as quickly as possible. The answer? To increase

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[642] *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara), 25 February 2000.

[643] Attesting to this idea are various remarks by European officials. For example, the German ambassador Hans Joachim Vergau remarked that "Turkey's Southeast is not only Turkey's but Germany's problem as well." *Sabah* (Istanbul), 12 December 1998. Similarly, Pauline Green, the Chairman of the European Parliament Socialist Group, speaking after the violent demonstrations connected with Ocalan's arrest, said "when the Kurdish problem is in question, Turkey says that this is her internal issue, however, the recent

pressure on Turkey for minority rights, and try to solve this new European problem at the home source.

While there were several potentially contentious points among the European demands within the Accession Partnership Document, the ones about the Kurdish issue grabbed the lion's share of the attention. The Turkish hard realm in particular saw a parallel between the existing PKK demands and the European requests. On December 1, 2000 the Turkish army released a report emphasizing this overlap and named several European countries as supporters of the PKK's politicization tactics. This report implies that Europe can be considered a major part of an international conspiracy against Turkish unity.[644] This report cannot easily be seen as an isolated perception or understanding since a large portion of Turkish public opinion seems inclined to share these concerns. On December 3, nearly every major newspaper allocated their headlines to an incident that took place within the European Union bureaucracy. It was reported that the Chief of the Turkish Desk in the EU sent an official letter to the PKK Central Committee, and later claimed it was done by mistake.[645] Many Turkish journalists and apparent public opinion, seemed to view this as the long awaited-for evidence of an EU-PKK link.[646] In the following days, Prime Minister Ecevit's statements were released confirming Turkey's mistrust in the European agenda and suspicions of Europeans' support for the PKK and

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events showed that the stability of the whole Europe is in question." *Anadolu News Agency*, 25 February 1999.

[644] The report names Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Germany, and France as making the same demands as the PKK. *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 1 December 2000.

[645] The bureaucrat, Alain Servantie, later apologized, saying it had been a secretarial mistake. All major Turkish daily newspapers, 3 December 2000.

[646] Openly skeptical columnists used this opportunity to once again criticize the EU. Emin Çölaşan referred to this as an opportunity to see the true face of Europe. He also called the Turkish EU adventure as a "dangerous dream." Emin Çölaşan, "Bir Rezalet Daha," ["One More Scandal,"] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 3 December 2000.

its strategies, while Deputy Prime Minister Bahçeli stated that he did not find Europe "sincere" vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue.[647]

The Divide among the Turkish Elite

Unsurprisingly, the concrete reforms—both in terms of minority rights and other sensitive issues—and timetables required by the Accession Agreement and set out in the National Program, have caused considerable debate within Turkey. In the course of this debate—which continues as of this writing—two general positions on the idea and route of EU accession have emerged: that of the "integralists" and that of the "gradualists." These names, unlike for example, pro-/-anti Europeans or reformists/ traditionalists, reflect the fact that both groups accept as largely necessary and positive the idea of further integration with the EU, and both portray themselves as supporters of Turkey's continued modernization. What they disagree on boils down basically to a question of whether to rapidly implement all of the EU's demands or whether to support the accession overall, but oppose some of the opposed conditions and in general carry out the accession process over a longer timetable.

The gradualist strategy stems from the fear that an overly quick and radical loosening up of domestic power configurations, e.g. in the form of rapid political liberalization, could have dangerous destabilizing effects on the country. As was shown in the previous chapters, such destabilization has been a long time concern of the ruling elite, and has reflected in, among many other things, their resistance against changes to·

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[647] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 8 December 2000, and *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 10 December 2000. Further evidence can be found in the columns of various journalists, for example, İlnur Çevik, "Has the EU been misleading us for 30 years?" *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara), 6 March 1997, and Hasan Cemal, "Kültürel Irkçı Kohl!" *Sabah* (Istanbul), 8 March 1997. This article, the title of which translates as "cultural racist Kohl", was

the 1982 Constitution, which protects certain unaccountable state power sources against

societal control. The general idea behind the gradualist position, and one which is

revealed in their positioning on certain democratizing demands on the Accession

Partnership agreement, is that Turkish society is not sufficiently mature for a "real"

democracy. During the process of becoming fully mature, a gradual and strictly-

Human Rights and the Protection of Minorities	Points concerned
Civil and political rights	1. Torture and mistreatment are still a problem, particularly in the southeast and in the case of the "incommunicado" detention 2. Several serious problems concerning the freedom of expression (notably Articles 159 and 312 of the Penal Code and Articles 7 and 8 of the anti-terrorist law 3. The procedure to establish NGOs remains Cumbersome and they are subject to harassment and intimidation, particularly in the southeast 4. No improvement in the situation of non-Sunni Muslim communities has taken place
Economic, social and cultural rights	1. Minorities outside of the scope of the Lausanne Treaty should use their Mother tongues in education and Broadcasting
Minority rights and the protection of minorities	1. No improvement for ethnic groups to express their linguistic and cultural identity 2. Turkey should sign the Framework Convention for the protection of National Minorities 3. HADEP often faces difficulties from the authorities

Table 2 – 2001 Progress Reports Political Criteria

controlled process to last an indeterminate time[648], society will learn to cope with full-

fledged democracy without falling to pieces[649].

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written after the announcement by the European People's Party that Turkey would never be an EU
candidate.
[648] See chapter 4 and the discussion of the February 28 process.

On the other side, however, are a number of Turkish political elites and intellectuals who have increasingly begun advocating a more rapid and complete modernization process via integration with the EU—the integralists. In general, proponents of this position concentrate on rapid and total democratization as inspired by the momentum and stimulus of political globalization as represented by EU membership. They are sometimes joined by various radical Islamist and Kurdish groups seeking EU integration in order to strengthen their own positions against the military-political elites. Two major points need to be made about the integralists: first, they tend to see external pressure on Turkey as the sole feasible way of speeding up the democratization and modernization process, that is, they are generally pessimistic about the country's internal potential for a democratic reconfiguration of political power. Second, they seem to differ from the gradualists in thinking that Turkey, with the overall experience of 70 years since its inception as a republic and with 55 years' experience of multi-party politics—albeit with four military interventions—is sufficiently matured to face the ultimate challenges of modernization, i.e. the democratic reconfiguration of political power within a liberal democracy. To them, the young girl of footnote 58, who has been protected for all these years by an iron fist, is now grown and not only can but must experience life on her own if she is to survive and be successful.

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[649] Reflecting the fear of Turkey as being unprepared and immature, a retired general, when asked when Turks would be allowed the full rights of a liberal democracy, responded with the following question, "If you had a 13-year-old daughter, would you comfortably send her out alone at night?" Interview with retired general on customary condition of anonymity, Ankara, 20 May 2002.

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Delineating the divide

<u>Kurdish broadcasting and educational rights</u>

The following two sections provide snapshots of the dual structure system at work. The first section focuses on one issue, that of Kurdish TV and education rights, and one time frame, the month of December 2000, to show how the struggle between the hard and soft realms, or as referred to in this section, "gradualists" and "integralists," is waged on a daily basis. The second section, a very brief look at certain discourse used in the National Program, provides another angle on this same question.

The various actors' responses to the minority rights demands in the Accession Partnership Agreement are useful for delineating the sometimes surprising divide between individuals and groups falling on one side or the other of the gradualist/ integralist divide. Those integralists in favor of responding to the EU demands with further democratization, holding tight to the justification of entering the EU, declared in early December 2000 that recognizing some Kurdish rights is a "must"[650] or at least something to be considered. Security-concerned gradualists, on the other hand, did not back down from their negative position, though at the same time trying not to appear completely opposed to EU accession. Leading the latter group, the army nevertheless declared on several occasions that it was against the recognition of Kurdish cultural rights. Its strongest ally appeared to be the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), whose leader Devlet Bahçeli had earlier expressed his clear opposition to Kurdish rights, saying that this would lead to further separatist tendencies and conflictual developments.[651] The

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[650] Deputy Prime Minister Yilmaz, who is in charge of Turkey's accession to the EU, stated that Kurdish TV and education was not only necessary for entering the EU but was also a domestic need to be met. *Sabah* (Istanbul), 8 December 2000.
[651] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 15 October 2000.

speaker of the parliament, also an MHP member, added that the demands for Kurdish rights in the Accession Partnership agreement would prove more damaging than the Sevres Agreement, which sought to divide Ottoman lands in the 1920s.[652] Yet another MHP politician, Ömer İzgi, earlier revealed the bottom line of his party's stance on the issue when he announced that they were against it "all the way" because they could not allow the use of state resources to "artificially create a language and a nation."[653]

In late December 2000, a surprise ally for the integralists appeared as the director of the National Intelligence Organization announced that Kurdish TV and education might in fact help the state to better manage problems in Turkey's southeast, since more than half of all Kurdish mothers in the region do not know Turkish. He further implied that the army had a similar understanding.[654] In the next National Security Council meeting, however, the army generals stipulated clearly that the army did "not share the thoughts of the intelligence director" and added that such rights would be against the unitary character of the Turkish state.[655] Earlier in the month, another surprising voice for the integralists, former navy commander Salim Dervişoğlu, stated publicly that Kurdish TV broadcasting would not create a problem for Turkey.[656] Supreme Court Chief Justice Mustafa Bumin also declared that "some amount of Kurdish TV" could be allowed,[657] and the Foreign Ministry, under the leadership of Ismail Cem, continued its general

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[652] In fact there is a "Sevres syndrome" concept in Turkey, referring to the 1920 agreement that officially ended the Ottoman Empire and divided the Anatolian lands, creating an Armenian state and a Kurdish autonomous region with a possibility of independence in the future. The Turkish Independence War halted and made void the agreement. Nevertheless, since the Sevres Agreement was imposed by Western powers, its goal to divide the country continues to weigh heavily in the common memories of the Turkish state and society.
[653] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 14 October 2000.
[654] NTV, "News," 1 December 2000.
[655] *Radikal* (Istanbul), 23 December 2000.
[656] *Sabah* (Istanbul), 1 December 2000.
[657] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 1 December 2000.

support for Kurdish rights.[658] Conversely, the security-minded gradualists gained the

perhaps unexpected support at this time of the Turkish High Education Council, which

issued a statement saying it opposed Kurdish TV and education for similar reasons to

those outlined earlier by the army.

Feeling surrounded and pressured to a degree rarely experienced in Turkish

politics, the military made a strong move of reiterating its own stance on the Kurdish

issue at a very sensitive moment. Just as Prime Minister Ecevit was at the EU Summit in

Nice attempting to show Turkey's complete willingness to become a full EU candidate,

Turkish news agencies released a report that had been passed to them by the Chief of

Staff's General Secretary. In this report, the "Evaluation of Internal Security Operations

in 2000", the army clearly labels Kurdish TV and education demands as the "second

dimension of separatist terrorism" and the "revival and restructuring of the separatist

movement through political means."[659] After stranding the Prime Minister in this very

difficult position while abroad, the military refused to let up. Chief of Staff Kıvrıkoğlu

then visited Ecevit the following week, just prior to the coalition leaders' summit to

design the outlines of Turkey's National Program for EU accession, and again clearly

indicated the army's opposition to Kurdish cultural rights and to the political strategies of

the separatist movement. After this visit Ecevit avoided direct mention of his ideas on

Kurdish TV and broadcasting. He also seemed to show tacit agreement with the

military's position that the PKK's politicization process constituted a genuine security

concern for Turkey, particularly in light of the support being given to the process by the

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[658] Sedat Ergin, "Dışişleri ve Kürtçe TV," ["The Foreign Office and Kurdish TV,"] *Hürriyet* (Istanbul), 2 December 2000.
[659] *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 8 December 2000.

Europeans.[660] At the subsequent summit of the party leaders, no decision on the issue was taken.[661]

Since the end of 2000 there have not been any concrete forward moves made on granting either educational or broadcasting rights, surprisingly however, it does appear that those in favor of doing so have begun to gain ground. There is reportedly an increasing private understanding among the military that while educational rights remain an impossibility, there is an "implicit OK" for broadcasting in other languages to be allowed.[662] Among the leading government parties, the nationalist MHP continues to take its cues from the military, ANAP leader Yılmaz remains very much in support of granting these rights, and Ecevit continues his reserved support for them.

The apparent acquiescence on the side of the hard realm for at least broadcasting may be explained in part by the country's dramatic economic crisis of 2001. Under the current tenuous economic conditions, no one wants to do anything that might upset the EU. Thus they would not want to give the impression that there is no chance for certain EU demands to be met. Moreover, there is also the understanding that if Turkey in fact does follow through with the educational and broadcasting reforms, that negotiations for membership may actually begin. Again, no one wants to be in the position of being blamed for this not taking place.

The National Program

The following two and a half months saw the behind-closed-doors preparation of Turkey's new National Program. While it was always emphasized that a presumed

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[660] *Radikal* (Istanbul), 12 December 2000.
[661] *Radikal* (Istanbul), 13 December 2000.
[662] Interview with Suat İlhan, Ankara, 13 April 2002.

necessary public debate would occur to make the program "national", the politicians and

bureaucrats nevertheless kept the public largely in the dark about the contents and

contending issues in the program.[663] In fact, the very secrecy surrounding the program's

preparation can be read as an indication of the continuing struggle among the competing

realms of the Turkish state structure over the membership issue.

On March 19, 2001, the National Program, drawn up and finalized by the

coalition government in order to show exactly how Turkey planned to meet EU demands

as required in the Accession Partnership Agreement, was finally released. It was

introduced with the emphasis that it was based on a consensus among the coalition parties

and the security bureaucracy within the National Security Council. Upon analysis, it is

evident that although some kind of consensus was reached in order to issue the document

in a timely fashion, this does not necessarily indicate that a true consensus was achieved

in terms of full commitment to the required reforms. With regards to the reforms

regarding minority rights, the National Program responds with such complicated and

unclear words that one is forced to interpret them as signs of hesitation and

undecisiveness on the program's actual contents. For example, regarding the use of

unofficial languages, the document states that "Turkish citizens can freely use different

languages, though Turkish is the official language." But this is promptly followed by a

national security reservation that, "this freedom can not be used for separatist or divisive

activities."[664]

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[663] Approximately one week before the anticipated release of the national program, the director of the EU General Secretariat in Turkey participated in a popular television talk show program, on which he said that he could not release information about several articles on the program—strongly suggesting that the secret internal debate and bargaining was not yet over and that a consensus had not yet been reached. More importantly, his refusal to speak revealed that the political elite was not ready to share the contentious issues with the public. *ATV*, "Siyaset Meydanı," 16 March 2001.

[664] National Program, reprinted in the daily newspaper *Radikal* (Istanbul), 25 March 2001.

It is almost possible to see the torn approach between the integration and the security in the above sentences. As it is, this document stands as a perfect indication of a de facto compromise between the hard and soft realms yet it could have been only reached on paper since the finding of a balance between security and political globalization in real life—especially one that would satisfy the EU—looked far from being a conceivable prospect.

One preliminary observation that can be made from this brief picture of the hard and soft realms' struggle, is that there appears to be little or no evidence of actual compromise. Rather, the debate is conducted as a battle, with each side attempting to minimize each other's role in the decision-making process.

Philosophical foundations of the resistance

The underlying philosophies for the claims of those who, to various degrees, are resisting against integration, seem to converge around three main points: the challenges that integration will present to Turkish identity, Turkish sovereignty, and Turkey's economic independence. What becomes visible in all of these arguments is that they all are linked ultimately to the survival of the Turkish nation-state. In other words, the underlying issue again is that of national security.

The presence of securitization in considering the EU accession issue is evident in the words of retired general Suat İlhan, who claims that his book, *Avrupa Birliğine Neden Hayır*, (Why No to the European Union) provoked the first coordinated spark of anti-EU sentiments in Turkey. İlhan says that EU membership and the accession process is "basically the end of Turkey" for several reasons. The primary reason is that "Turkey's

distinct history, geopolitics, and mission do not and can not tolerate the EU objectives and values."[665]

He admits that soldiers do not know much about economics, and therefore, "make realpolitik decisions based on history, geography, balance of power and historical rivalries."[666] This perspective has been observed when security establishment figures participate in meetings about the EU issue, with most of the debate and discussion boiling down to security factors and threat analyses, such as the Cyprus issue, the Greek conflict, and recalling the Sevres Syndrome.[667] Suat İlhan's book argues that, "Eurasia is the land where all the major geopolitical rivalries have played out historically...the EU on the west has emerged as the island of stability, and China is emerging in the east as one. In between, there is instability and geopolitical rivalry. For this reason, they are trying to destroy us and our potential."[668] What is striking in İlhan's analysis is that its starting point, framework, and context all evolve around traditional geopolitics and related major power/civilizational rivalries. He automatically assumes that everything, be it an international development or a transnational movement, should first fit with and make sense according to the parameters of geopolitical thinking, which is based on conflictual competitions and zero-sum gain confrontations. Europe and its project of the European Union is therefore first considered along these lines and is thus seen as a European crusade against the east.

Along the same lines but in a more sophisticated formulation of this positioning, Dr. Ümit Özdağ, head of Turkey's largest strategic think-tank, also defines the whole

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[665] Interview with Suat İlhan.
[666] Ibid.
[667] Personally observed by the author at a meeting at the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM).

EU-Turkish adventure as a part of the political rivalry that has been taking place between East and West ever since Atilla the Hun's attacks against Europe. To Özdağ, Europe still sees Anatolia/Asia Minor as part of the old west, i.e. the former Roman Empire, and is trying to reconquer it now by way of the EU project. [669] This geopoliticization of the EU integration issue transforms any subsequent discussion into an evidence-seeking mission for this geopolitical rivalry and enmity. Following this line of thought, for example, a document showing the "astonishing" overlap between the goals and demands of the PKK and EU demands of Turkey, is presented as evidence of how what is naively thought of as integration or globalization, is in fact a geopolitical issue. This same document has repeatedly been circulated among Turkish parliamentarians in order to present the 'true face' of the European trap.[670] The language gets even blunter in some cases, as people warn that "Turkey is to be raped while trying to become an EU member."[671]

The first major source of arguments against integration evolve around the issue of identity, proposing that since Turkey belongs to the East, traditional Turkish identity will be lost in the accession and membership process.[672] Özdağ takes this position and asks whether it is possible to be a Turkish nationalist while still supporting the EU process, since, to his mind, the EU is aiming to federalize Turkey and the unitary Turkish nation-state. [673] Yet another rejectionist scholar, Dr. Ali Özcan, draws on the former ideas and says that promoting other cultural characteristics in Turkey, namely Kurdish nationalism,

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[668] Suat İlhan, *Avrupa Birliğine Neden Hayır* [Why No to the European Union] (Istanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat A.Ş., 2000), 25.
[669] Interview with Ümit Özdağ, Ankara, 22 April 2002.
[670] Unpublished document, obtained from former military commander.
[671] Interview with former National Security Council member on customary condition of anonymity, Ankara, 4 May 2002.
[672] Interview with Suat İlhan.
[673] Dr.Ümit Özdağ, "Avrupa Birliği ile Türkiye İlişkilerinin Jeopolitik Ekseni" [Geopolitical Dimensions of Turkey-EU Relations] unpublished paper, June 2002.

might lead to Turkish nationalism becoming part of an action-reaction process which could ultimately culminate in civil war.[674] With such a conclusion he takes the securitization aspect of the cultural or identity based arguments to their extreme.

In terms of the second argument, the loss of Turkish sovereignty, former general İlhan proposes that one can not be a true "Atatürkist" if one agrees with ever giving up sovereignty rights to the EU, since Atatürkism is based on national sovereignty.[675] Moreover, the sovereignty argument goes on to express the concern that with a sharing or relinquishing of sovereignty, Turkey will also lose her historical potential of becoming a regional—or even "world"—power. The logic behind this suggestion is that with EU membership, Turkey will lose her capacity to formulate and carry out any major foreign policy objectives. Furthermore, the EU is seen as instigating this "weakening" process in order to reduce the threat they feel from the "other" that is Turkey.[676]

The third main argument combines economic with security issues. Erol Manisalı, the academic ideologue of the resistant block, agrees with most of the above points, but emphasizes the possibility of Turkey becoming a colony of the West and the EU. To him, the EU is bent on colonizing the economic energy of Turkey, while at the same time solving various security challenges in the region to its advantage, for example, the Cyprus issue and the Turkish/Greek problems.[677] İlhan, meanwhile, links this economy-based argument to the geopolitical and cultural ones and says that, "we are the first nation which fought against imperialism, and now we are changing sides. This does not fit with

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[674] Interview with Dr. Ali Özcan, Ankara, 2 April 2002.
[675] Ibid.
[676] Interview with Ümit Özdağ.
[677] Erol Manisalı, *Yirmibirinci Yüzyılda Küresel Kıskaç: Küreselleşme, Ulus-devlet ve Türkiye* [Global Clamp in the 21st Century: Globalization, Nation-state and Turkey] (Istanbul: Otopsi, 2001).

traditional Turkish identity and culture."[678] With this statement he is implying that Turks

were one of the first peoples to fight a war of liberation against the West and had

therefore, long ago built up an identity of being against imperialism. Also implicit in this

argument is the idea that Turkey should not abandon her position among the exploited

countries in order to join the ranks of the exploiters.

Ultimately, the underlying foundation of the resistance against integration seems

to be the threat-based geopoliticization of the agenda, which can be summed up best in

General İlhan's words, "We have been waging war against Europeans for the last 1500

years...that is why all European Parliament decisions, e.g. Cyprus, Armenia, Kurdish,

have all been against us—they are still waging a war against us."[679]

Charting the Faultlines

The following chart is a final summary of the sides in this debate. It outlines the

rhetoric and arguments of the sides, their levels of coordination, and philosophies, in

order to provide a framework for assessing the overall capacities of the different positions

and also to provide a starting point for future research.

Table 3. Charting the Faultlines

Rhetoric and Arguments of the Pro-EU/Integration (globalists)	Rhetoric and arguments of the Anti/EU (localists)
1. We can't afford being isolated from the developed and modernized world. We don't want to be 2nd class, we want to be in 1st class. (Almost all parties of this group, e.g. Mesut Yilmaz, TUSIAD, etc.) 2. We're going to be rich, industrialized, and modernized. We'll solve the underdevelopment problem. (All parties)	1. Our territorial integrity and national security will be destroyed. (Almost all parties of this group, e.g. Nationalist Movement Party, some members of the True Path Party, Workers Party, retired General Suat İlhan, Turkey's largest think-tank ASAM, Professor Erol Manisali—for him this will be done through the federalist policies of the EU)

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[678] Interview with Suat İlhan.
[679] Ibid.

3. We'll get first quality democracy and human rights standards. (Generally used by those parties who have had problems with the practices of the regime and system, e.g. HADEP, the Islamist Ak Party and Saadet Party, Alevites, and some liberals, e.g. The Liberal Thought Association.)

4. With integration, the Kurdish question will be resolved. The underlying theme being that our chronic unsolved problems will be easily solved during the process of becoming part of the EU. (HADEP, PKK-related circles, and some politicians who would like to see a solution to the Kurdish issue.)

1. Integration with Europe will also solve some of our long-standing geopolitical problems, primarily the Cyprus issue. (İlter Turkman, former Foreign Minister and retired ambassador, says that the Cyprus problem can be solved with the Belgian model, which would be possible with integration.)

6. There is no alternative to integration. Without EU integration, we will not get richer or more developed, and will not remain an integral part of the 1st class world. (All parties)

7. The national security of this country will be jeopardized if we *don't* integrate with Europe. This argument implies that the separatist movements in Turkey will become more threatening if we don't deal with them via the European context. The underlying idea is that we can find better solutions to our internal and external security problems as a member of the EU and with EU standards. (Former Chief of Parliament, Hikmet Çetin in personal interview, Mesut Yilmaz statement, and Cengiz Aktar's book.)

8. Integration is a necessity because of the historical direction of our modernization and westernization process, therefore it is both consistent and even required by Atatürkism that we integrate. (TUSIAD, ANAP)

9. The EU is a geopolitical necessity for Turkey. Historically we've always turned to the West, and we belong to that part of the world, not to the East. (Deputy Chief of Staff, General Yaşar Büyükanit)

This country will be "raped" along the road to Integration. (Mumtaz Soysal, Ümit Özdağ)

2. Our national sources will be colonized and exploited. (Erol Manisali, the Workers Party and its leader, Doğu Perincek)

3. Our identity will be destroyed. The underlying argument is that what primarily determines international relations is the clash of civilizations. In a conflict between Christians and Moslems, Turkey belongs to the Islamic civilization. We don't fit therefore, and if we get in, it will mean that we have given up on our identity. (Suat İlhan, Workers Party, and some Islamist ideologues)

4. Integration goes against one of the primary pillars of Ataturkism: full independence. (Suat İlhan. Since Atatürkism is used by both anti and pro integration arguments, there is a clash of interpretations here.)

1. Integration goes against our geopolitical place in the world. We belong to the Turkic and Islamic geopolitical sphere of the world. If we become an EU member, that will mean that we have given up on our potential of becoming a major power in our own geopolitical sphere. (Dr. Ümit Özdağ and General Suat İlhan)

6. Turkey may turn into a "hell of ethnicity." (Ali Resul Usul, 2002) The idea being that with at least 47 different ethnic groups in Turkey, and if integration brings with it an emphasis on their sub-national ethnic identities, such a fragmentive impact might lead to this 'hell' due to Turkey's "volatile" historical and geographical conditions.

7. They will never accept us. Integration is impossible. (most parties in this group)

** There are also important circles which seem to want an integration with the EU, but who have strong reservations that, to a large extent, mirror the arguments of the above group. Since the EU criteria will not accept such conditionalities these circles would like to insert, these circles ultimately fall closer to the anti-EU groups. Turkish military figures can be generally categorized in this group, in a sense revealing the tornness between globalization and security at the micro level. The argument can be made that due to the current high popularity of EU accession among Turkish society, potential anti-integration elements are not anxious to reveal their positioning. (This idea was suggested by the words of a former NSC military member, who explained the army's reticence in taking

	a strong position by saying, "the army would prefer to wait for the society to see the 'real face' of Europe." The idea also comes through in the words of a minister of the nationalist MHP party. When asked why his party did not play for the 30 percent of anti-EU vote potential among society, the minister responded that the society will digest the "dangerous dimensions" of the EU issue only step by step, so it would not be wise to bombard them all at once with anti-EU rhetoric. The underlying idea is that this group wants the benefits of EU integration, but on their own terms and without having to change. To draw an analogy, the Europeans are offering a 'fixed menu', this group wants to order a la carte (Ali Resul Usul)

Methods	
1. Constant usage of the argument—some might label this as propagandizing—that all good things (best democracy, best economy, best human rights standards, etc.) come with globalization, in other words, integration with the developed world, EU and the accession process is a "stepping stone" to transform and integrate this country to the "best of the world" (interviews with former human rights minister Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik and former Chief of Parliament and Foreign Minister, Hikmet Çetin.) This method is also used frequently by influential circles of the media (the major newspapers and television channels).	1. The underlying method used by the anti-EU/integration parties is the securitizing of the EU accession issue, i.e. putting forward and emphasizing the security and threat dimensions of the issue. For example, trying to show the correlations between the EU requirements and the Sevres Agreement, as well as the founding Lausanne Agreement (the founding agreement of the Turkish Republic.) They try to link the EU demands to Turkey's long-standing security problems in Cyprus and the Aegean, telling that any compliance to the EU requirements will require concessions on these two issues. This method also includes emphasizing the overlap between the EU accession requirements and the PKK's demands. In connection with the PKK issue, the overall 'securitization method' also involves keeping alive societal sensitivities, both nationalistic and security-oriented, (for example, recalling the years of battle with the PKK, the general argument is made, "did we lose those 5,000 martyrs in the Southeast for nothing?").
2. NGO cooperation/alliances. Several Turkish NGOs which are promoting EU integration or the various aspects of the EU accession requirements, receive money from the west to fund their activities. For example, the Liberal Thought Association receives money from the European Commission for publishing books, organizing conferences, etc. Several foundations get financial support from Europe, for example, from the Adenauer Foundation. This support includes educational opportunities, e.g. AISEC.	Ultimately, every analysis is tied to the "survival" of Turkey. As a result of this, pro-EU figures are sometimes labeled as "traitors."
3. Pro-EU elements in Turkey, NGOs, political figures, journalists, etc., provide valuable information to certain European parties, in order that the Europeans can more effectively pressure Turkey. For example, the European Commission gathers information from the above-mentioned groups/individuals, and then, via the EU country diplomatic representatives in Turkey, pressures the Turkish state. This mechanism is conducted through, for example, diplomatic notes, the annual European Commission progress reports, and European Parliament decisions. The overall system works on a "boomerang" effect, in the sense that information provided from Turkey 'returns to its source' in the form of concrete pressure.	2. Promoting the idea of mistrust in the EU, restoring historical enmity and societal mistrust between Turkey and Europe.
	1. The state intelligence organizations are allegedly used to gather information about the pro-EU elements. One scandal erupted when the *Aydınlık* newspaper revealed the private email messages of EU representative Karen Fogg. The Workers' Party leader added in his book (*Karen Fogg'un Postalları*) that these email messages were in the hands of state and military officials. Erol Manisali also implied in an interview with the *Radikal* newspaper, that these messages were probably intercepted by military intelligence services.
1. Official and unofficial visits. Formal and informal officials or individuals from Europe, e.g. from the European Parliament, regularly visit Turkey, largely for the purpose of building up informal networks. For example, many of these visits are paid to the Southeastern Kurdish populated region of Turkey in order to talk to the leading societal figures there. These same local figures also are invited to travel to Europe. A classified document revealed that in 2001, the HADEP party mayor of Diyarbakır spent more than half of his working days in Europe.	4. Related to the previous method, when translating intercepted information, the information may be even further distorted by the anti-EU elements and then disseminated.
	5. Trying to affect public opinion by counterbalancing the pro-EU rhetoric. For example, NSC General Kilinc, says, "since Europe doesn't want us, we should, without ignoring the US, turn to Russia, Iran and China." In this statement he is trying to counterbalance the argument of there being no alternative to the EU,

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5. European Union representation in Turkey created an informal network which seems to be expanding among the journalists and intellectuals, who have been struggling against the anti-EU circles. Intercepted emails of current EU representative, Karen Fogg, revealed that she had built up such a network.	by pointing to the alternative of Eurasia.

Alliances and coordination ability	
1. The Economic Development Foundation in Istanbul, seems to be used as a platform/ Headquarters for coordinating the pro-EU activities. TUSIAD and the influential Istanbul-based think-tank, TESEV, also provide coordinating activities. It seems as though this side of the debate seems more coordinated in their rhetoric and activities than the anti-EU side. This side has more financial backing, more professional people involved, more societal support, and is able to work out in the open since the state's official, i.e. legitimate, policy is pro-EU.	1. The anti-EU elements do not appear as coordinated as the pro-EU, but there are indications that this side is emerging as a much more confident and louder voice. This voice seems to be increasingly associated with a new nationalism based on anti-globalization, anti-EU, and full independence arguments. The most interesting phenomenon here is that in this newly emerging nationalism, you see even previously competing figures and ideologies coming together, e.g. the nationalist MHP together with the Marxist Workers' Party. At the individual level you also see the a growing movement including such figures as Turan Yazgan, a long time anti-Communist and pan-Turkist professor/ activist and Professor Anıl Çeçen, long-time left-wing and Atatürkist activist, and Sina Aksin, representative of the anti-right wing Atatürkist left group, and Şaban Karataş, who belongs to the conservative religious philosophic groups. This growing group has begun gathering and discussing strategies to fight against globalization and integration efforts.

Concluding remarks

Not unlike the left/right distinction in the 1970s in Turkey, the new distinction between gradualists/integralists, or security-minded vs. integration-seeking elements, is the major division or faultline among the Turkish nation-state in the new century.

When these rhetorically and philosophically competing positions face their inevitable confrontation, each side automatically turns to its institutional and organization backgrounds, revealing the overlap between these positions and the torn structure/dual institutionalization of the state. In other words, the gradualist understanding falls back on the hard realm institutions and the integralists on the soft realm institutions to help in their battle.

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When you look at the rhetoric of and philosophies behind the two positions, what is obvious in the hard realm gradualists, is that much of the discourse boils down to securitization, either references to internal-external security concerns or to geopolitical goals and expectations. The soft realm integralist elements on the other hand, tend to devise counterarguments—emphasizing issues of economy, welfare, democratization, and integrating Turkey with the modern world. These could be labeled as 'desecuritization efforts.' Along the securitization/desecuritization line, the division among the state structure becomes clearer.

If one asks who is going to win this debate, the answer is not immediately clear. The pro-integralist side seems to have the advantage of the global advance of the values of integration with the West (e.g. democracy, human rights, free trade, etc.) and subsequent legitimacy which provides a huge potential for mobilization. Even though the anti-EU side seems less coordinated, it nevertheless has the most organized and influential institutionalized potential within it—namely, that most determining of actors in Turkish politics, the military. The question is whether this key potential will be able to weigh in or not. This chapter seems to suggest that the problem may lie in the mind of the military--itself torn between security and globalization.

Chapter 6   Conclusion

Introduction

This chapter begins with a summary and discussion of various themes that emerged in the course of conducting this study. A brief consideration of events in Turkey in the years leading up to the introduction of multi-party politics and the effects of these events on the perceptions and actions of the Turkish state, is followed by a discussion on the relationship between the state and society. Subsequently, the major thematic findings of the study are presented, beginning with the development in the governance system of a 'grand compromise' for limited democracy, the resulting structural instability and governance crises, and the particular dilemmas facing the soft realm portion of the torn state structure. This is followed by a discussion of two security-based themes, namely the relevance of this study for the arguments recognizing the salience of internal threats in the national security conceptualizations of modernizing countries, and the revealing of a new security dilemma concept as based on the hypothesizing of chapter 1. The first part of this chapter ends with the introduction of a generalizeable model for presenting the study's hypothesis about state transformations under simultaneous pressures of political globalization and security dilemmas.

In the remainder of the chapter, an introductory look at how the model might be applied in a case study of the Iranian state is provided, as well as a discussion of the contributions of this study for the specific literature on globalization and the state and the literature on international dimensions of democratization. The chapter ends with a look at

the latest developments in the struggle for power between the hard and soft realms, and projections for the future of the Turkish state structure.

From Pendulum to Conflict

When looking at the Turkish experience since Ottoman times, the study reveals an understanding on the part of the state elite of an underlying dichotomous relationship between security and political liberalization. In its earlier stages this mindset is materialized, in terms of governing, as a pendulum, swinging between the conflicting requirements of power maximization (the need to insure security) and power diffusion (responding to political globalization and liberalization). For decades, this conflicting relationship between security and liberalization was manifested primarily at the rhetorical level. Nevertheless, the dominance of security issues was gradually strengthened by failed liberalization attempts that were generally perceived as having endangered security. The obvious examples of this were the two early attempts at multi-party politics (1924 and 1930), both of which were seen as leading to anarchy and were therefore ended. Thus liberalization efforts were sacrificed when necessary, and security concerns took on the eventual aura of a national security syndrome.

After the Second World War, however, the situation began to change. The Turkish elite both felt and was pressured to make more substantive liberalization moves in order for Turkey to take its place on the side of the victorious, and largely democratic, front. Subsequent Turkish efforts to liberalize stemmed both from their own long-time desire to be westernized, but also from the need to meet the security challenges posed by

the Soviets by securing themselves under the democratic front in an emerging polarized world.

Events from this and later eras contribute to a deeper understanding of the concept of 'political globalization' pressure, and show that it is insufficient to conceive of political globalization as only an outside force imposed on an internal situation. In fact, it appears that equally important to the actual external demands for political liberalization (or, for that matter, of security demands as well) are the domestic perceptions of these external demands, and, perhaps related to this, domestic use of these demands in order to achieve certain goals. In other words, while both the pressures for security and liberalization certainly exist, they may also be tools serving to the needs of various groups within the ruling elite. Security problems are real, but they also provide justification for the security-minded elite's existence and continued prerogatives. Political globalization pressure is real, but it also can be used by the liberalizing elite to back up and expand its own position.

The combination of a shift in external conditions for liberalization, such as trying to side with the democratic front after WWII, and internal perceptions and use of these conditions, led to a need for a fundamental 'deepening' of liberalization. This 'deepening', most clearly reflected in the adoption of a multi-party political system with free elections, moved the ideological debate between security and liberalization into a situation of true conflict. Subsequently, with the actual emergence of a political realm distinct from the state, the conflict moved into a growing division between the institutions and individuals of the political realm and the state elite respectively.

<u>Society and the Torn State</u>

In its attempt to answer the general research question of explaining how a state in an anarchic environment transforms when faced with conflicting pressures of political globalization and security dilemmas, the discussion in this dissertation focuses primarily on the state institutions and state elite, rather than on societal elements. Social elements were touched on, for example, in the first and second chapters and in the section below on state/societal conflict, but mostly from the perspective of the state, in the sense of how society was perceived by the state as a threat, or as touched on in the case of the February 28 process, how societal elements were manipulated by the state. The reasoning behind this choice of focus can be explained on two different levels: general theoretical reasons, and reasons stemming from particular qualities of the Turkish case.

First, looking at institutions was considered the best way to observe substantive changes in the power configurations of such a state over time. Institutions themselves take time to change, and are more enduring than societal beliefs or interests. While ideas alone may change quite rapidly and easily, institutions in a sense represent an idea that has been consolidated. If societal beliefs or interests are strong enough, they eventually become institutionalized. Institutions can thus be considered to represent concrete reflections of power configurations and dominant ideas, and therefore, in a longitudinal study, institutions are a practical focus to show substantive change. Looking at the state elite is important at a general level because they are the actors who construct the pathways between political globalization and the power structure, as well as between securitization and the power structure.

In terms of the Turkish case, looking at the state elite is particularly crucial. The state elite, as inherited from Ottoman times, were the ones who set up and organized the

modern Republic, and who mobilized the people behind this endeavor, in what was very much a top-down process. With this advantage of being key figures in the state from the time of its foundation, combined with the fact that the society is very much fragmented, the state elite have traditionally become the final decision-makers and thus the determining power center in the state structure. In this study about the transformation of power, it is important to focus on the representatives of this power, and in this case the power is concentrated in the institutions and the elite that founded and manage them, not the society. The finding that the power configurations include areas unaccountable to the society-- discussed in more detail in a following section--further supports the decision to focus on the state institutions and elite.

As further sections in this chapter will suggest, however, the role of society in state transformation may be considered as growing, and is an element worthy of future study, some of the possible directions of which may be suggested below and in the following sections. As a general starting point however, if one were to explore the connection between societal input and the workings of the torn state structure revealed here, such a study would need to begin with an understanding of the divisions and fragmentations in this highly diverse society. For example, the particular societal segment of the Alevis have been traditionally seen as siding with the state, due to their fears of Sunni-dominated rule that could result from democratic political elections. More recently however, they have in a sense begun going against the state in their support for EU integration, recognizing the benefits of such a move for their group identity politics. Combining sociologically based studies of the various societal groups with the points raised here in order to see how these groups interact with the parts of the governance

structure, and how these relationships develop over time, would provide interesting input both for an understanding of the particular groups, as well as insights into the continuing evolution of the torn state structure itself.

It is possible that society may eventually play a more important role in determining the outcome of struggles between the hard and soft realms for greater power in the governance system. Subsequent studies might also be proposed therefore, to look at the various options of how society might choose sides in such struggles, and what the affects of their choice might entail. For example, one could imagine the following scenarios: 1) society could side fully and strongly with the soft realm and the hard realm would have to accept a reduction in its prerogatives, resulting in further democratic consolidation. 2) Society could side with the soft realm but not powerfully enough to contain the hard realm. The hard realm would not become subordinated and, possibly with the support of politically unrepresented parts of society, could opt for conflictual relations with the existing soft realm. 3) Society could side with the hard realm, resulting in tutelary regimes.Ultimately, society's choice may be determined by the level of threat—actual or perceived, foreign, domestic, or combined. If sufficiently high, the resulting societal fear of a loss of social control could cause them to opt for choice three, in other words, to seek a guardian.

Increasing State/Society Conflict

In terms of societal impact as it was incorporated into this study, it was shown that the transformation brought about by clashing security and liberalization demands led to a perception by much of the state elite that the society was a dangerous force. Once of globalization's indirect pressures on the state comes about with the empowering of

society, in the sense that deepening political globalization can be considered as greater democratization, and thus more input from society. Given that in the countries relevant to this research the state is the existing power center, any empowerment of some other element logically means a reduction or compromising of the state's power—a situation bound to lead to conflict between the two.

The impact of Turkey's post-WWII integration with the democratic world and the subsequent deepening of liberalization as substantiated by the introduction of multi-party politics, can be understood as a strengthening of the society vis-a-vis the state, in that it revealed the previously suppressed societal demands from the state and government. It is important to note that this did not mean that society was a cohesive and integrated unit. On the contrary, although some amount of repression may have lent an appearance of uniformity, the loosening up would soon reveal the very much non-cohesive and segmented character of the society along, for example, ethnic, religious or ideological lines. The roots of this conflict between society and state can be seen as having emerged during the first multi-party attempts in the early days of the republic. At that time, the very fact that society was fragmented and diverse became seen by the state elite as a possible national security risk in the event that their own agenda did not overlap with those of society.

In 1950, society was given a tool for making its voice heard, and given an opportunity to cast a vote for alternatives to the traditional state elite. This led to a surfacing of certain societal demands, such as that for some religious input into the public domain, that had previously been curbed by the state. These societal demands were seen as a direct challenge to the existing power structure (and the modernization project of

which it was the ultimate guard), and therefore as having a weakening impact on state power. They were thus seen as making the state vulnerable both domestically (in the sense that power might be so widely diffused that the entire system could collapse) but also externally since they could be manipulated by other states in Turkey's anarchic and dangerous part of the world. This concern can be seen therefore, as one factor in subsequent actions taken to keep the Turkish state strong internally, even as a tactic in the state's struggle to survive international security challenges.

Grand Compromise: A Limited Democracy and Controlled Democratization

The initiation of multi-party politics in 1946 meant that the state security elite now had to face societal demands which had previously been easily suppressed in the name of security. The volatile societal potential became increasingly seen by the state security elite as a part of the power game—a real and dangerous potential to state/regime security. When a divergence occurred between certain societal demands and the state's vision and agendas--which clearly accepted the primacy of security over other political issues—this presented a 'security challenge.' Such a security challenge had to be managed by a particular type of governance system, in which both a form of democracy and democratization was maintained for external and internal legitimacy, and at the same time a strong power-holding mechanism, unaccountable to the public, would be preserved as an ultimate guard against losing control. Turkey would have a 'grand compromise' in which there would be certain guarantees to keep the fragmented societal potential at bay—preventing it from destroying the state system or from disturbing the transformation and modernization the state elite saw as necessary. In other words, the security elite of the emerging 'hard realm' would agree to control its more unpredictable

and radical elements, and the liberalizing elite of the emerging 'soft realm' would agree to relinquish their—that is, society's—full say on any issue that could be considered as a threat to national security.

Structural Instability: Chronic Governance Crisis

This confrontational positioning of the state elite and societal masses has meant a base for indefinite domestic instability in political affairs, since no one can be sure when society will be deemed to have reached a level of 'maturity' at which their fragmentive demands, it is assumed, will not be harmful to state security needs.

The structural mistrust that this confrontational positioning engendered, proved difficult to overcome, and ultimately came to be characterized by a series of governance crises, dramatically revealed every decade or so by a military intervention. As chapters 3 and 4 showed, the strategy for dealing with the compromised governance system involved a gradual institutionalization, autonomization, and consolidation of the hard realm, particularly its core institution of the military. These observations in the Turkish case support and add important details to the hypothesizing on the torn state that was made in the first chapter. Indeed, the emergence of a divided agenda between security and liberalization was found to have first developed into a dual agenda of hard and soft politics, or, if we draw on terminology from International Relations, into a kind of domestic high and low politics. This dual agenda was shown to have developed into a dual institutionalization of two distinct corresponding realms within the state structure: the hard realm of the state and the soft realm of politics.

In the course of this institutionalization, an evolution of the earlier pendulum can be seen in the form of a swinging from an expansion of the hard realm to a

corresponding subsequent expansion of the soft realm. Again, however, the dominance of security issues seem to prevail, as the soft realm gains appear each time to be less significant than those of the hard realm, and the result seems to be ultimately one of a soft realm that is narrower and more restricted than its hard counterpart.

The Soft Realm's Catch-22

The weakened political realm and the constant reality of governance crises, helped to breed a deep fear among the soft realm's constituents that a total collapse of the system could reasonably be expected at any time. This fear seemed to lead many to an unspoken understanding that a guard must be ready at all times to avoid such a collapse—and the hard realm is there to fulfill the need. Ironically, this adds up to what can be called a governance 'Catch-22', as the roots of the governance crises can be traced back to the extended hard realm, which is at the same time perceived as a panacea to such crises. In other words, in a political realm that is narrowed by the over-expansion of the hard realm, it is extremely difficult for Turkish politicians to successfully cope with the complex problems the nation faces, such as the Kurdish problem. Whenever a strictly political initiative, as opposed to more forceful, security-oriented ones, is proposed to respond to such sensitive issues, its proponents run the risk of being labeled as 'treasonous,' or of jeopardizing national security. The late Turgut Özal, for example, when attempting to deal with the Kurdish issue politically, was labeled by some hard realm elements as a traitor. He subsequently felt the need to arrange for a liason officer from the private realm to engage in secret negotiations with Kurdish elements on his behalf. He even confided in some that he could not speak openly in front of his officer asisstants since they did not

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"work for him."[680] Moreover, the political realm is unable to make necessary decisions independently since their decisions must conform to those of the NSC. This may explain in part why so few politicians have ever even attempted to directly deal with, for example, the Kurdish issue.

On the other hand, in a normal governance system and presumably in the eyes of society, the political realm is technically responsible for finding solutions to such major problems. The political realm's limited maneuvering space prevents it from thus proving itself by actually responding to these problems. The unbalanced power distribution, supported even constitutionally, does not allow soft realm politics the capacity to fulfill expectations that are held of it. The political realm is further weakened by its inability to fully institutionalize over extended periods of time—a problem that can be explained in part by the repeated political party closures that accompany major securitization periods. The irony behind this has been noted that the military has in fact often considered party fragmentation as a major cause for their interventions, yet it is arguably these same closures that have led to increased fragmentation. Due in part, for example, to the closure of the main center right Justice Party (AP) and center left Republican People's Party (CHP) after the military coup, there are today no comprehensive center parties.

With the disturbing of a natural institutionalization of mass mainstream political parties, an excess of marginal parties have been produced, leading to a situation today in which there are six parties in the parliament, and 56 parties overall. With the fragmentation of the political realm and the increasing electoral success of the former 'fringe parties,' it has become increasingly difficult to reach parliamentarian majorities

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[680] Interview with Turkish journalist and close friend/assistant of the late President, on condition of anonymity. March 25, 2000.

and single party governments. Another sign of the political realm's weakness is the low level of partisan attachment among the electorate, as indicated by high volatility in voting practices. One analysis of the period between 1954 and 1999 has shown an average volatility of 21 percent, in other words, on average, 21 percent of the electorate gives their votes to different parties in subsequent elections.[681]

Non-Accountability and Double Accountability

This study of state transformation showed how, in the face of internal and external security demands and a simultaneous need to liberalize politically, accountability to the public is often perceived as a destructive and weakening force in terms of security (a perception 'verified', in the Turkish case, by experiences such as the electing of an Islamist led government, or the domination of a Kurdish based party in the south east region.) Therefore, it became considered as necessary to preserve a non-accountable power source that is seen by many as an ultimate guard against the total collapse of the system. The hard realm emerged as the center for non-accountability.

For the soft realm, on the other hand, the portrayal of society by the hard realm as a space from which risks to state security could emerge at any time, would ultimately lead to a clear dilemma, as discussed in chapter 4. Members of the political realm have become squeezed between a combination of demands, and what can be labeled as a double accountability. First, of course, the nature of a multi-party system means they are faced with the competition from various rival political parties. More importantly, they must also remain alert to shifting societal support, since they are accountable to the

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[681] Çarkoğlu et al., 2000 p. 41

society through their votes. Finally, depending on the context and the particular issues at stake, the soft realm is as well accountable to the hard realm due to certain stipulations of the constitution and de facto governance institutions. On the other side, the hard realm faces no similar accountability to either the government or to the society. Whenever the agendas of the hard realm and particular segments of society do not mesh, it is the "doubly-accountable" soft realm politicians in particular who become trapped. The policies resulting from such mismatched agendas are rarely judged successful, and, perhaps unfairly, the politicians are largely given the blame. Also adding to the uneven image of the two realms is the fact that soft realm dealings with the hard realm are not publicized, but dealings among soft realm members and parties themselves are very much available to scrutiny. This one-sided transparency guarantees that all the soft realm's mistakes will receive full attention, and again the image of the realm decreases.

Emerging primacy of internal threats

The bulk of third world security studies recognize to varying degrees the salience of internal threats in developing countries' national security conceptualizations, that is, national security is both external and internal.[682] These and other studies[683] also in general recognize the overall connection between the international environment and

[682] Ayoob 1995, Buzan 1991, Edward Azar and Chung-in Moon, (eds.) *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (College Park, MD: Aldershot, 1988); Y. Sayigh, *Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries*, Aldephi Papers 251; B. Job (ed.) *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
[683] For example, Michael Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1996); JeffreyHerbst, "War and the State in Africa," *International Security* 14, no. 4, 1990; T.R. Gurr, "War, Revolution and the Growth of the Coercive State," *Comparative Political Studies* 21, no. 1, 1988; E. Mansfield and J. Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, no. 1, 1995: 5-38;Gregory Gause, "Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2, 1992.

internal security concerns.[684] An additional result of this research therefore, was evidence

supporting these arguments emphasizing the international dimensions of domestic

political developments including internal instabilities and also the salience, if not even

primacy, of internal security over external security in parts of the modernizing world.

This does not mean that these countries are no longer concerned with external security

threats. It also does not deny that internal threats are still partly of concern due to their

external connections, that is, such threats cause instability and weakness that can be taken

advantage of by external rivals and thereby weaken the country within the regional

balance of power. However, the research does suggest that internal threat perceptions

themselves are at least equal if not increasingly salient in provoking power centralization

needs. As such, survival at home can be seen as almost a prerequisite even for just being

an actor in the international system, let alone for playing power politics at the

international level. As a sign of this argument, it can be seen that over the last decade in

Turkey, despite the anarchic nature of its environs, the National Security Council has not

once identified an external threat as *the* primary threat to national security, but has named

instead internal threats.

The New Security Dilemma

The research shows that transformation from more centralized to more diffused

state structures is inevitable in the new era. If it is inevitable, it must therefore be

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[684] For regional variations on the (in)security environment in the developing world and comprehensive analyses of conventional vs. nonconventional security concerns, see Buzan 1991, Barry Buzan and S. Segal, "Rethinking East Asian Security," *Survival* 36, no. 2, 1994, M. Alagappa, "The Dynamics of International Security in South East Asia: Change and Continuity," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 1991; B. Korany, P. Noble, and R.. Brynen, (eds.) *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); N. MacFarlane, "Africa's Decaying Security System and the

managed. Maintaining the stability of this unavoidable transformation when there is a simultaneous combining of power centralization and power diffusion demands, can be considered as the new security dilemma facing the states under investigation in this research. In the process of managing this transformation, states must find a balance between the two pressures in which, first, neither influence is excluded to a point that it jeopardizes the stable transformation, and, second, the balance is maintained at a level at which the dynamism of the progress continues. While the phenomenon might not in fact be a new one, the pressures have become more acute and immediate, and therefore require a more drastic and immediate formulation of a response. It is this aspect of the rapidity of the transformation and response to it that can be seen as the new security dilemma.

Since the power holding elite in these states traditionally know how to manage power centralization, the emphasis in dealing with this transformation is understandably on how to manage the power decentralization/diffusion that the new epoch requires. Since power centralization in these countries was traditionally carried out through a securitization process—relying on security's primary role in public life—decentralization can generally be equated with desecuritization. The challenge therefore becomes one of managing and stabilizing the desecuritization process without damaging the traditional mechanisms of power centralization and thus one's sense of national security in a particular country's context.

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rise of Intervention, *International Security* 8, no. 4, 1984; D. Thomas and Al Mazrui, "Africa's Post Cold War Demilitirization," *Journal of International Affairs* 46 no. 1, 1992.

Introducing the Model

The examination of the Turkish case clearly revealed evidence supporting this study's major hypotheses, to a degree that it seems both feasible and necessary to attempt some kind of generalizeable modeling on the transformation of states subject to simultaneous pressures of security dilemmas and political globalization. The model given in diagram 5 is an attempt to do this.

The model first shows how security dilemmas (A) and political globalization (B) translate into respective pressures for power maximization and centralization (C) and power diffusion (D). When the national response to these strong simultaneous pressures becomes inevitable—in the sense of a perception that neither pressure can be sacrificed for the other—it results in a bifurcation of the national political space into realms of hard and soft politics (E) and, eventually, into varying degrees of dual institutionalization of inner and apparent states (F). As the model suggests, the boundaries between these realms and institutions are not static. They may shift depending on the relative degrees of the security dilemma and political globalization pressures, the leadership, possible coalitions within the states, and other contextual factors, to comprise a dynamic domestic balance of power. Finally, the model proposes that there is a self-justification process for the realms and institutions.

(A)

SECURITY DILEMMAS
-external/anarchy
-internal /regime security
(strong states,fragmented societies)

Self justification (G)

(C)
power
maximization
pressure

HARD
POLITICS/REALM

(E)

SOFT
POLITICS/REALM

INNER STATE

(F)

APPARENT STATE

(B)

POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION
-global civil society
-demonstration impact
-communication revolution/
 diffusion of ideas
-economic globalization /free trade
-internal modernization drive

Power
diffusion
pressure (D)

Self justification (H)

DIAGRAM 5. EVOLUTION OF THE TORN STATE STRUCTURE AND NATIONAL POWER
RECONFIGURATION

While hard politics/the inner state appeal to the security dilemma to preserve--if not

expand--their prerogatives and realm (G), soft politics/the apparent state turn instead to

the increasingly influential elements of political globalization (H).

Three major stages of evolution can be identified in the above model. The

presence of the two interacting pressures on the far left marks the initiation of a

pendulum between security and globalization as discussed in chapter 2. Moving to the

right, as the two pressures are applied simultaneously, we see in fact the first actual stage

of evolution in the form of a dual national agenda of hard and soft politics. This

corresponds to the introduction of multiparty politics and the conflictive process of reaching a volatile compromise between the state and political realms. At this stage the model also reveals a reliance in the rhetoric of the two agendas on self-justification, in other words, the domestic usage of the two pressures to supplement their arguments and positions. The second stage of evolution on the model displays the dual institutionalization of these agendas into distinct realms labeled as hard and soft, a stage discussed primarily in chapter 4, with particular emphasis on the autonomization, expansion, and consolidation of the hard realm in reaction to the soft realm expansions.

Applicability of the model to other cases

The following section includes a brief discussion of one case study in light of the model, in order to consider its practicality for better understanding the dynamics and projected pathways of other countries in transition. The case of Iran can be considered to fit the description of the type of states to which the model can apply. It is a strong state with external/internal security challenges, and therefore a need for power maximization. At the same time it is under varying degrees of political globalization pressure. This introductory sketch, based primarily on informal interviews with various intellectuals and figures from Iran, provides a first glimpse into the potential generalizeability of the model, and points to the value of conducting more in-depth studies of this sort in Iran and in other countries.

<u>Iran</u>

It has been nearly 25 years since the Iranian Revolution, in which politicized Shi'i clergy seized power. Despite upheavals, war, chronic economic crisis, and internal

political struggles, the Islamic Republic they created has managed to remain intact.

Although there are obvious stark contrasts with the Turkish case, various characteristics

of the Iranian political system strongly suggest that a process along the lines of the model

presented above can also be identified in the Iranian case. The following very brief

exploration of the current Iranian system and power structures is an attempt to point out a

few of the common elements and processes, and, perhaps more importantly, to make the

argument that a much more in-depth investigation of the Iranian case along the lines of

the model should be made.[685]

Traces of the Political Globalization impact, state vs. society conflict, and the

inevitability of transformation

As a starting point, it should be stressed that there is indeed a political

globalization impact in Iran, and it is not one that can be easily dismissed. Debate and

discussion are vibrant in Iran, evolving around such issues as Iranian identity, Islam, and

public participation in governance, all of which suggest a search, at least by some, for

change. More specifically, the core of the demands coming out of this debate are those

for political development, in particular, for greater political freedom at least somewhat

along the lines of Western style democracy and democratization, and can therefore be

considered at least in part as a reflection of a globalization impact. One need only look at

the Iranian revolution itself, which saw street demonstrations bring about the collapse of

a regime, to understand why the current leadership takes quite seriously the need to

address societal demands. The discourse of change is of such prominence that even the

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[685] One recent study that represents a valuable first step in uncovering the layers of Iranian power structures is Wilfried Buchta's *Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic* (Washington: The

General Secretary of the Iranian National Security Council, speaking at a conference in Tehran in March 2002, apparently felt obliged to fill his speech with references to democratic expansion and reforms.[686] At the most general level, this debate reveals itself first in a division between the ruling state elite and the society, both of which can of course be subdivided into various factions and fragments. In identifying elements or processes of the model presented here, however, it should be noted as a starting point that societal demands for political change exist and that some kind of resulting transformation on the part of the state structure seems inevitable.

If there is a clear societal demand for change, the majority of these demands can be said to relate to open governance and more societal influence over the political system.[687] Evidence for this can be seen in the widespread public support given in recent years to the state elite who fall into the 'reformist' category. In general, the idea of reform is popular among much of society simply because of their unhappiness with the hardships of daily life. The last two decades have seen desperate economic crises and massive poverty. A population of 35 million before the revolution has ballooned to around 65 million today, yet the infrastructural capacities to deal with this growth remain relatively unimproved.

Yet there are also international/transnational forces, elements of what we might describe as a political globalization pressure, that seem to be affecting Iranian society. Satellite broadcasting of foreign television, particularly from Turkey, is very widespread, and reports of tremendous numbers of books entering the country and being translated are

Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2000).
[686] Author's notes of a speech by Hasan Ruhani, given at the 12th Annual International Conference on the Persian Gulf, Institute for Political and International Studies, Tehran, March 7-8, 2002.

also heard. Interestingly, there even seems to be evidence that the long-standing US embargo—despite criticisms that such things only hurt the people not the state against which they are directed—may have been having the intended affect. In fact, many among the predominantly young population appear less willing to understand or accept the state's oppositional positioning towards the international arena. For much of society, in particular again the youth, the "us vs. them" mentality and the domestic suppression that goes along with securing that positioning, not to mention direct deprivation, is clearly undesirable. As anti-American demonstrations draw fewer people, informal observations of Iranian society suggest a generally favorable attitude towards America—not, certainly, towards the country's overall foreign policies, but to the lifestyle it represents.

Some parts of society even have an increasing mistrust of what some see as the ruling elite's manipulation of religious interpretations to suit their own needs. Examples can be suggested, such as the shifting arguments during the Iran-Iraq war (appeals to a necessary jihad when they wanted people to fight, and religious interpretations of the importance of peace when they wanted to end the war) or even alternating positions on whether chess is acceptable by Islamic principles or not.

The New Security Dilemma

If reform along democratic principles is accepted as to some degree irrepressible, it is also seen by much of the state elite as a clear threat on at least three levels. It is first an ideological threat to the security of the Islamic regime, second a threat to Iran's territorial integrity (via a breakup along ethnic lines and external manipulation thereof),

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[687] For more in depth discussion of trends in Iranian social discourse, see Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Emerging Civil Society in Iran," *SAIS Review* 26, 2 (1996): 87-107.

and third a threat to the position of the ruling elite themselves. In general, there is a sentiment among many that political development with western origins may be fine in western oriented societies, but the process of implementing such developments in a non-western society can be destructive. Considering the second threat mentioned above in particular, the democratization process is seen as threatening the entire Iranian state system. As one Iranian intellectual put it,

> Democracy's primary merit is to protect societal divisions and differences while at the same time making them work together. But the distance between these divisions in Iran as well as the distance between the society and the state are too big to be bridged by democracy. Maybe a working democracy could manage it, but a democratization process would bring out the worst in these cleavages.[688]

The philosophy behind this interpretation begins with the understanding, much the same as in the Turkish case, that society is fragmented along various ethnic, religious, and cultural lines, and that releasing this fragmentive potential through democratization and power sharing poses a threat to national security, including that of the regime. Supporting this proposition, one can point to several occasions in the last century of Iranian history. From the early 1920s, when rebellions in Iranian Azerbaijan led to the proclamation of an independent government of Azadistan, to the ethnic movements in Iranian Khuzistan, Kurdistan, and Azerbaijan in the early 1940s, and again to the ethnic disturbances of the late 1970s, these and other examples are shown as evidence that a fragmented society will take advantage of a weakened central state authority to assert itself. The argument that societal parts want to take advantage of democratization is not without justification. The leader of a Turkish movement in Iranian Azerbaijan has quite logically argued that democratization will either lead to a collapsing of the Iranian state, in which case they will get their own state, or it will transform the current Iranian state

into a system that will recognize the rights of his movement. Either way, it can be seen as a boost for his separatist movement, and in turn, a weakening of the central state authority.[689]

Adding to the historical evidence, Iran's geopolitical position is also given as a reason for why granting freedom to society is seen as threatening state security. In the words of one Iranian scholar, "Iran's geopolitical surroundings are the first and foremost determinant of its national security challenges—even at home. This is because Iran is neighbor to five different areas of greater Eurasia and the Middle East, and contains cultural elements and citizens belonging to all five, but is itself not a part of any of them."[690] In other words, Iran's domestic political developments, for example, rising ethnic movements, are seen as a potential 'card' for regional rivals to use, thereby weakening Iran vis-a-vis her neighbors.

Ultimately, what the previous discussion has described, is the making of a dilemma in Iranian politics. The push for democratization and reform is there, and can not be completely ignored, but allowing a democratization process to take place is viewed as an undeniable threat to national security. Arguably we see here the starting point of the model, with its simultaneous yet conflicting pressures of political globalization and security being exerted on the state system, the dichotomous understanding of these two pressures as incompatible, and the resulting new security dilemma in the form of maintaining both power centralization and decentralization simultaneously.

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[688] Private conversation with an Iranian intellectual in exile, Ankara, June 17, 2002.
[689] Private presentation given at the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, Ankara, May 2002.
[690] Dr. Seyyed Sajjadpour, Director of the Institute for Political and International Studies, speaking at the conference on Globalization, the State and Security, Ankara, June 15-16, 2002.

Traces of the dual agenda/realms

Understanding the various sides in Iranian politics, and clearly identifying the
actors behind a dual agenda and dual realms is far beyond the scope of this brief
overview[691]. Nevertheless, certain observations can be made. While the broadest level of
conflict in terms of political development and demands is described here as existing
between the society and the state elite, the latter are far from unitary. What they share is
common experiences in opposition to the late Shah Reza Pahlavi's regime and a loyalty
to the person and teachings of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini. Nevertheless, certain divisions among the elite are recognized as being closer
to societal positions, and are generally painted as "reformists." The obvious example of
this group would be current President Khatemi. In fact, the divisions among the elite are
more complex than a simple dual categorization of "conservatives" and "reformists"
implies, but there is a clear predominance of two main ideological factions, which will be
referred to in the following discussion as the traditional right and the reformists.

As written in the constitution, the strongest power authority in the Iranian political
system, and representing the very core of the state elite or "hard realm" of the model, is
the *vali-ye faqih* (ruling jurisprudent). This position of 'supreme leader for life' is
currently held by Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, a member of the traditional right. Also within
this realm is the 12-member *shura-ye negahban* (Council of Guardians), a strong center
of power charged with determining whether Parliamentary laws are compatible with
Islamic law. This council, which is dominated by the traditionalist right, has effective

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[691] For a good overview of the governing institutions of Iran—though without the same understanding of
power structures taken here—see Bahman Bakhtiari, "The Governing Institutions of the Islamic Republic

veto power over everything passed by the legislature. The *majles-e khobregan* (Assembly of Experts), which is responsible for choosing the supreme leader from among their ranks (or replacing the current one if he is deemed unfit), is also dominated by members of the traditional right, as are various parts of the judiciary, which is independent from executive power and works under the complete control of the supreme leader, and certain key parts of the military and the intelligence structure. As part of the last of these, we see the *heraset* (Protection Bureau), which has staffed intelligence bureaus within every segment of the government, and which serves to determine that all government activity is in line with Islamist principles. In cases of disagreements between these bureaus and the government, the former nearly always preside. Finally, the *majma-e tashkhis-e maslahat-e nezam* (Expediency Council) exists to advise the supreme leader and to make final decisions in the case of a disagreement of opinion between the Parliament and the Council of Guardians. Now headed by former President and member of the right, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Expediency Council is interpreted by some as holding de facto power over the other leading power authorities—outside of the supreme leader. The 31 member council is meant to be comprised of members from different ideological strands of the political picture, but in fact it is still very much dominated by its non-reformist members. Despite the Constitution of 1979, which in fact includes certain guarantees for improving the rights of the political realm, the above shows that the hard realm state elite has made rapid progress in its institutionalization and consolidation, filling a gap that might otherwise have been occupied by the soft realm of electoral politics.

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of Iran: The Supreme Leader, the Presidency, and the Majlis," in *Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability*, ed. Jamal al-Suwaidi (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996).

On the other side of the political picture, you see the society and its political representations of the president and the parliament, in other words, the societal/political or "soft" realm. According to the constitution, the position of the presidency is second in command to the supreme leader, but in reality, this depends on the relationship between the two figures. If the president is seen as being in opposition to the supreme leader, his position is weakened considerably. This division between what is written in the constitution and what is in truth occurring, extends beyond the position of the presidency, and includes such constitutional articles as those calling for education rights in minority languages. One of the most prominent demands of the reformist agenda, therefore, has been for the full implementation of the constitution. This is a sign of the soft realm trying to materialize its constitutional rights in order to be able to push back the hard realm.

What was seen beginning in the late 1980s, was an emerging connection between the society and the reformist leaning members of the state elite. At the time, the Council of Guardians, which also has power over selecting who will or will not be allowed to run in the elections, used this tool strongly to prevent reformists from running. As a result, the 1992 and 1996 parliaments had very few reformist members. The election of Khatemi as president in 1997, however, made clear that society was not going to be dissuaded from its desire for reform. In recognition of the reality of the demand for reforms (in a sense, political globalization pressure) but still very much aware of the need for security, the core elite made certain controlled steps towards transformation, by having the Council of Guardians permit more reformists into the next parliamentary elections. The result, in February 2000, was the winning of around 75% of the parliament by reformist oriented candidates.

Perhaps most confusing when looking at this picture, is pinning down what the reformist members of the soft realm want. In recent years, from the 1997 election of president Khatemi, to the local elections of 1998, the parliamentary elections of 2000, and the reelection of Khatemi in 2001, the public has been voting for the elements they believed were against the core conservative state elite. In the last presidential election, this core elite reportedly did not even want to name which candidate it was placing its support behind, for fear that doing so would spell his defeat. In any case, large portions of the society seem to be saying that they no longer want what the core elite represents, that is, a religious-based authoritarian system. Taking this to its logical extension, one could argue that these parts of society would prefer a more secular, more democratic system.

It is not clear however, whether the so-called reformist position among the political elite represents those committed to upholding the political liberalizing demands of the society but constrained by structural realities, or whether they are simply locked in an internal power struggle with the traditional right and are using the reform ticket to gain ground via public support. Current reformist efforts of trying to slow down the society in terms of its struggle against the state, could be seen as supporting the argument that they are not as reformist as society might like. An example of this stepping back of reformist arguments occurred during the student protests in 1999, when President Khatemi, rather than fanning the protests as a move against the conservatives, instead used his prestige among the protesters to get them to stop protesting. In fact, over the last two or so years, Khatemi seems to have spent time talking a lot about civil society, freedom, and democratization, but taking very little action. On the other hand, others have argued that

the current balance of power in Iran simply does not yet allow the kind of changes that the reformists would like to make.[692]

Double Accountablity

Whether there is indeed a back-peddling on the part of the reformists or whether their efforts are simply being stymied by the system, it can be argued that, as with the Turkish soft realm, the Iranian reformists are facing a double accountability pressure. On the one hand, Khatemi was elected to power because of his identity as a reformist, and as such he should be responding to the society's demands for greater liberalization. On the other hand, he is subject to the pressure from the conservative state elements and, perhaps, even his own fears, about the risks of such liberalization. The 'reformists' may even be frightened of the societal potential, and the ramifications of a true counter-revolution. Should such a counter-revolution occur, it would presumably have to remove the reformists along with the conservatives, since both were the founders of the current Islamic Republic. Moreover, a volatile and outspoken society and confrontational incidents give legitimacy and justification to a process of securitization, which inevitably leads to gains for the hard realm. Therefore Khatemi is trapped. If he permits and encourages the society to speak and act out—which is his key to power—societal demands might spin out of control and destroy the system, including him. If he does not respond to their demands, he will lose their support, and eventually, his position.

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[692] For arguments on the structural obstacles to reformist promises of trying to achieve legal acceptance of political parties in Iran, see Stephen Fairbanks, "Theocracy versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political Parties," *Middle East Journal* 52, no. 1 (1998): 17-31.

Towards a Grand Compromise

It seems that recently Khatemi has been leaning towards the side of the state in his balancing of the two positions. This has been perceived by some in society as a sign of his insincerity as a reformist, and by others as a sign that he has abandoned society. In either case, it will be interesting to see which way this balance will fall. If one looks at the model for an indication of where the Iranian political system might go, the following picture seems to emerge. The initial permitting of reformists to enter more prominently in the governance structure, balanced by a reliance on various entrenched institutions, seems to reflect a kind of pendulum period, in which liberalization is doled out in bits to ease societal demands, but security (of the regime, the state, and the ruling elite) remains primary. As the gap between society and the state widens, eventually, one can assume that a sort of compromise will have to be reached between the two. Presumably, this will be in the form of a limited democracy, that can balance the demands of both liberalization and security.

Contributions to the literature

The globalization and the state debate

In terms of the study of globalization in general, the research had various implications. First, as a concept that has been criticized for lack of clear definitions, this study provided a definition at least in a specific context for one particular dimension of globalization—political globalization. The study also provided an example of how to investigate globalization in a more concrete sense by considering it in combination with a

very familiar concept from International Relations analysis, that of power. By focusing on the concept of power configurations and the implications on them of globalization pressures, it was possible to decode at least a part of the elusive globalization concept.

A further implication for the study of globalization, and very much related to an understanding of the impracticality of an international/national divide in political science research, was the example provided for studying globalization from a multi-level analysis perspective. The study provides a basis for arguments supporting analyses at the individual level (e.g. individual tendencies of military leaders), institutional level (e.g. military, various governmental ministries), state level (e.g. assessment of internal and external security threats), and systemic level (e.g. anarchic pressures and transnational activities). Attempts to study globalization at a systemic level only are likely to miss important elements because a large share of globalization's impact is at the local level. Moreover, a single level analysis could fail to note such points as the idea of globalization as a multi-directional process. An example of how this process might work can be found in the case of the Kurds in Turkey, who may originally have internalized and been influenced by democratic norms coming from Europe, but who subsequently have adopted strategies and agendas that make them very much an unavoidable part of European affairs.

Turning to the particular arguments of the hyperglobalists, who, focusing primarily on economic aspects of globalization, would claim that we have entered a new epoch of human history marked by increasing transnational networks, a global spread of liberal democracy, and the shrinking significance of the nation state, this study would, first, agree that the global spread of democracy and liberalization pressure is increasingly

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at work. Not only is this spread real, but most modernizing countries are aspiring to be a part of this 'new civilization' that is symbolized by the spread of liberal economy and democracy.

On the other hand, this research would seem to conflict with various other points of the hyperglobalist literature. First, given that the hyperglobalists have tended to focus their research on primarily the developed world, the study suggests that this selectivity of data has prevented them from seeing the resillience of the state, which is more visible in other parts of the world. It would also suggest that the hyperglobalists have placed too much emphasis on economic globalization, which, again in relation to geography, may not have the same impact against security issues when it comes to the still largely anarchic developing parts of the world. While even in developing areas the state, with its traditional character, may seem to be less visible in the economic realm than it used to be, this does not mean that it is not still a huge body within the political realm. The alleged primacy of economics over politics may not necessarily be true in, particularly, security concerned areas of the developing world—or at least, it is likely to be different than in the developed world. For states dealing with issues of basic survival, economics may still seem a luxury. From a different angle, while hyperglobalist arguments that globalization is strengthening human agency, i.e. society, may be true, making an automatic link between that strengthening or expansion and a weakening or replacing of the state structure is premature without deeper analysis. This study has shown that in Turkey, and arguably, in similar states of the modernizing world, relations between state and society do not have an automatic convertability. Such an assumption ignores the different degrees of autonomy on the part of the state from society.

Turning to the rejectionist arguments, their tendency has also been to rely on studies of economic globalization, but, in their case, using them to show how national capacities are surviving and, in many key aspects such as sovereignty, border control, or the authority to generate economic policy, remaining unchanged. Such an approach tends to ignore the transformative power that political globalization may have over the state. Yes, the state may be able to manage—and perhaps even manipulate—economic globalization, but political globalization may have dramatic transformative effects even on that manager itself. This is shown in the Turkish case. Most of the time, the state and its core institutions, leave economic factors to the politicians to handle (the exception to this, of course, is in cases when the Turkish state sees a significant economic change as a security factor, and thus intervenes to maintain control, as in the case of Islamist-based "green capital"). On the other hand, we observe how the military, the solid core of the state, is itself being torn when it comes to the effects of political globalization and modernization.

The Transformationalists

Finally, in terms of the arguments of the transformationalists, this study can be considered, at its most basic level, to have confirmed that indeed, a transformation of the state is occurring, and that therefore this approach can be considered the most appropriate one to adopt in discussing issues of globalization and the state. In the case of Turkey, this study showed that this very real transformation may even take the form of going 'underground'. Such an observation points to the most significant contribution of this work to the transformationalist body of literature, which is that it addressed the need for

operationalizations of the theorized transformation. From this holistic study of how the transformation is occurring in the Turkish case, this study takes transformationalist claims that the state will devise strategies to adapt to new conditions, and helps us identify exactly how they might be trying to do this in certain contexts. It showed how a state apparatus, realizing that it can not ignore the political globalization impact, may try to construct a 'compromised' structure in which it feels it can address to its (in)security prerogatives while still maintaining an image of responding to the new global civilization of democratization and political globalization.

International dimensions of democratization

The current research has various contributions to make as well to the second major body of literature discussed in chapter 1, that on the international dimensions of democratization. Turning first to the question of whether and, if so, how, various methods of conditionality are able to change states' behaviors, the Turkish case seems to provide evidence supporting the idea that conditionality can be effective. While early stages of Turkey's relations with the EU do reflect the challenge discussed by some scholars, of differentiating between true changes resulting from conditionality and those that look good but lack substance, more recent developments in Turkey's accession process may be refuting this. The passing of laws with concrete consequences, such as abolishing the death penalty, is clear evidence of a move beyond 'window dressing' and rhetoric, to substantive change—all of which, arguably, is the outcome of the conditionality faced by Turkey in her efforts to join the EU.

Even assuming that substantive change can be achieved through conditionality, the question remains of how to define and measure such 'change'—can it be considered

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as the introduction of multi-party politics? The founding of NGOs? This research offers a power-analysis method of definition, which, it could be argued, provides a more accurate standard (than the above two standards, for example) for determining substantive progress towards liberalization. Using such a power-analysis method saves us from spending excessive time on issues or factors which, when considered in isolation, might appear to be growing in influence, but which, when considered according to the determining power configuration of the particular country, may not in fact be growing in transformative power. This was, for example, the case in Turkey for a long period. The early multi-party attempts, or the blossoming of civil societal organizations starting in the early 1980s did not automatically mean genuine power sharing, and therefore a genuine liberalization of the national governance. Instead, an analysis that is aware of the system being very much bifurcated, would realize that no matter what progress was made within the soft realm, there nevertheless remained other power centers which could control the governance system when they felt it necessary.

Related to this, this power-analysis method also enabled this research to identify the unaccountable sources and their proportional position within the overall system. The picture this provides of the context allows us to measure the relative importance of the different parties involved, such as political parties, NGOs, societal role. Current literature can be considered as handicapped when it measures various factors such as the rise of human rights NGOs, if it makes its analysis without an holistic understanding of where those NGOs, for example, fit in to the overall system.

Yet another problem with much of the international dimensions of democratization literature is that it has emphasized the mechanism of transnational

democratic forces crossing the external/internal frontier to affect the domestic level of liberalization, as if there were no other prior mechanisms for looking at external influences on domestic change. In fact, such a mechanism clearly existed in those studies examining how external security demands affect domestic change. Both of these types of studies--in the latter case, looking at the impact of international survival on the domestic situation (e.g. IR realist studies looking at the assumption that a potential of war leads to the creation of strong security-oriented states, or that anarchy leads to strong centralized units), or in the former case looking at the impact of political globalization elements on domestic change (e.g. international norms, human rights practices, democratic institutions)--have tended to ignore each other. This research provides an example of trying to move beyond a singular mechanism-based approach and to combine the two simultaneously.

The dissertation also reveals an interesting phenomenon of how, from two very different perspectives, security concerns can in fact speed up the responsiveness of a country to political globalization—at least initially. First, earlier literature has often failed to recognize how a country could positively respond to political globalization/liberalization pressures due to a motivating factor of survival needs and security strategies. This was particularly the case for Turkey beginning in the Ottoman times, when an efficient mechanism to provide internal and external security was seen as only attainable by adapting western governance systems and institutions, e.g. new army styles, reforming the administration system. As a motivating factor, therefore, security problems may be a positive influence in a state's response to liberalizing forces, even if, as this dissertation primarily argues, the two forces ultimately clash. A second

perspective on how security needs may contribute was shown in the Turkish case as occuring after WWII, when it became clear that the victorious countries were largely members of a democratic block as opposed to a more expansionist (and therefore threatening) authoritative block. Being isolated from the former block was seen as bringing about additional security risks. Thus, as a kind of alliance for safety, Turkey saw more reasons to embrace the values and standards of the western democratized world. This alliance can be seen as also having sped up Turkey's adaptation of western values and standards.

Turkish Studies

Finally, the study may contribute to Turkish studies. In Turkey many concepts studied by both comparativists and IR scholars alike, are affected by the state, making a good grasp of it fundamental. Nevertheless, a holistic, power-based analysis of the Turkish state structure has never been made. Studies of the Turkish state have identified it as a strong one, and have even in some cases[693] suggested a duality to the state. They have not, however, provided a holistic picture of this dual or torn state, its components, decision-making bodies, their respective powers, or provided a model for understanding how and why this structure came to be. This study provides a dynamic model and theory of the Turkish state structure and governance system. In doing so, it opens up countless new venues for research. Concepts introduced in the course of providing this picture of the state structure, such as dual institutionalization, non/double accountability, the new security dilemma, or the "Aydemir Syndrome" for the military, can all be used as starting points for future studies.

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[693] Karpat 1991 and Lowry 2000, for example.

Perhaps most importantly, the deeper understanding of the state that this study provides sets up the groundwork for more fruitful studies in the area of Turkish foreign policy analysis decision making and security policy. While current Turkish foreign policy studies generally emphasize analyses of relations between Turkey and other countries or regions, a greater understanding of the state might help to produce more studies of foreign policy decision making. For example, an understanding of the conflictual structure within the state, the resulting balance of power struggle between the hard and soft realms, and the possible resulting concerns of the hard realm, could contribute to an analysis of the nature of foreign policy making. One might suggest, for example, that such a structure leads to a more defensive foreign policy--an example being Turkey's 'wasting' of more offensive opportunities towards Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union. This understanding of the state structure could also contribute to a better understanding of who is making the decisions in different types of foreign policy formulations. Security-based foreign policy decisions, such as incursions into Northern Iraq or threatening Syria over the Kurdish issue in 1998, are left up to the military, with little or no intervention by the civilians. Without understanding the state, one might exaggerate the role of, for example, the Prime Minister.

As a methodological note, it can be added that the author in fact originally sought to make this a purely IR dissertation, asking a foreign policy question, but soon came to realize that without knowing the state, such a work was impossible.

Whither Turkey?

<u>A Strengthening Political Globalization Impact</u>

Experiences in Turkey over the last few years, seem to be showing the effects of a strengthening on the side of political globalization pressure (or perception thereof), and a corresponding decrease in the ability and perhaps desire of the hard realm to rely on traditional methods of control, such as securitization and overt takeovers. In terms of expansion, we see an increasing effort by the hard realm to move beyond autonomization and institutionalization—already quite successful—to carrying out a fine-tuning of the soft realm while maintaining an appearance of democracy. The result is the conducting of 'post-modern interventions', and, perhaps increasingly, the setting up of mechanisms to cope with security challenges from within the soft realm itself.

The most recent—as of this writing—sign of an apparent strengthening political globalization pressure came in August 2002, with the remarkable and, for many, unexpected passing by the Turkish parliament of a wide-ranging set of laws, designed to meet some of the most sensitive political demands for EU accession.

Among these laws, the Turkish Parliament abolished the death penalty, although, in line with Protocol No. 6 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, it remains in the books to be used in times of war or the imminent threat thereof. Most significantly perhaps, this means that PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and other leading PKK militants will not be executed. The laws also amended article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code, which is related to crimes against the State, so that the Republic, Turkish Parliament, the government, the ministers and the security forces (including the military) can now be criticized, provided such criticism does not contain insults.

As well, non-Muslim minority communities established by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) will now be allowed greater rights over religious property, such as churches, and greater freedom to satisfy their cultural, religious, educational, social and health needs through their foundations, provided they first receive governmental permission.

In addition, the amendments introduce provisions that make retrial possible for civil and criminal law cases that receive approval from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Under the new law, a Turkish citizen subject to a conviction that the ECHR has found to contravene the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, can force the Turkish courts to review the original verdict. This amendment will not go into force for a year however, and therefore will not be applicable to past applicants to the ECHR (including Kurdish former deputies Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan, and Selim Sadık).

Finally, the new laws also allow Kurds and other ethnic groups in Turkey to make broadcasts in their mother tongues (provided they do not violate the "national unity and the principles of the Republic"), and allow minorities to establish language courses. The measure does not, however, specifically provide for Kurdish and/or other minority language courses in state education, nor do they cover the use of these languages as a medium of instruction.

Taking all these points into consideration, arguably the most important aspect of the new package is the official recognition of a Kurdish presence as well as that of other ethnic groups including Laz, Circassians, and Arabs. For the first time in the history of modern Turkey, the official state ideology, arguing that everyone living in Turkey is

Turkish, has been radically altered. Given what this dissertation has discussed about the state's fears of precisely these matters, the question immediately arises as to how these laws were able to pass. Two primary—but on the surface conflicting—explanations seem to be possible.

The first of these is that, after years of political globalization pressure, the local representatives of the soft realm have finally begun to gain power over the hard realm structures. Pointing to this explanation could be the evidence that, in this case, the pro-EU NGOs were able to make significant contributions to the ultimate passing of the controversial legislation, and also the understanding that the pro-EU discourse could basically not be matched by any other.

The acceptance of the bill in the Parliament does seem at first to show the influence of the pro-EU civil forces, including the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSIAD), and the Economic Development Foundation (IKV). Both of these groups utilized several tactics to create a strong pro-European climate among the Turkish public, deputies, and civil and military elite, including the release of a declaration by 175 civil society organizations, in which the Turkish government and Parliament were strongly urged to comply with EU demands on democratization and respect for human rights, including minority rights. Yet another influential pro-EU civil initiative was the European Movement 2002, which, among other things, conceived of a simple yet effective tactic of mounting a digital clock opposite the entrance to the Parliament, counting the days, hours and minutes left until the December summit in Copenhagen.

In terms of the current discourse on the subject, as the discussion in chapter 5 showed, the pro-EU elements certainly hold the upperhand on "attractive" arguments. While the skeptics' arguments are mainly about concerns over sovreignty or the vaguely defined 'national security' of the country, EU proponents respond with equally vague but far more seductive discourse that promises democracy, a better life, and world respect. Perhaps because the issue of EU membership is treated as a magical passkey that will open the doors to all good things, or perhaps because there is an unquestioned association of EU integration with the high values that have long been cherished in the dreams of the Turkish elite, (such as a working liberal democracy and a western style modernization), very few elements in Turkish public life seem able to reject outright the idea of EU integration. Even its harshest skeptics only seem able to take the position of agreeing with integration—though with some conditions. By appealing to what might be seen as the public's longtime psychological inferiorities towards the developed world, the issue of EU membership has become a ritualistic collective belief, against which, it appears, even a powerful entity like the military can not easily dare to resist.

On the other hand, the second argument could be that the legislation was able to pass because, for some reason, the hard realm allowed it to do so. As the end of chapter 5 suggested, the reason that such an event might occur, is that the hard realm and, in particular, its core body of the military, is not without its own internal divisions on issues of liberalization versus security. As pointed out in chapter 5, despite the skeptics' attempts to often rely on arguments of security, the military has remained almost unnaturally quiet throughout the membership debates. In fact, what has become clearer of late, is that the fundamentals of EU membership and its discourse, such as modernization

and westernization, overlap with the basic long-standing philosophies of the Turkish military. Denying the EU discourse would therefore mean denying their own primary mission since the inception of the Republic--something they're obviously not willing to do.

The first argument above suggests that domestic pro-globalization elements, in particular when supported by an international body like the EU, are becoming more influential in genuinely affecting change and in encouraging moves to greater liberalization in Turkey. The second argument would suggest that the domestic elements are not sufficient to make a significant difference on their own, rather, for major liberalizing breakthroughs like the passing of these laws to occur, the state itself has to feel pressured by the international phenomenon. If the state hard realm were not hesitant, that is, if it were not itself torn between its globalizing and securitizing instincts, the societal elements would not have been able to succeed to the extent that they have. In other words, it is still the hard realm that primarily determines how far Turkey responds to political globalization pressures.

Proponents of the first argument might contest that the hard realm core, i.e. the military, was not balancing between its own globalizing and securitizing instincts, rather it was in this case forced to suppress its predominantly securitizing views because of the 'strength' of societal elements—in other words, societal pressures really did count. Others could counter that were this in fact the case, the military had plenty of material it could have used to support a securitization of the issue and help curb the pro-integralist efforts. For example, recent polls[694] have shown that while 65% of society supports EU accession, an equal percentage is opposed to the abolition of the death penalty and to the

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legalizing of minority language rights. The hard realm's decision to not take advantage of this fertile ground to emphasize the security risks of the issues included in the legislation package, reflects an internal hesitancy to do so.

The truth probably lies in a combination of the two arguments. The pro-EU discourse does seem to hold an irresistably attractive message of welfare, democracy and becoming a part of the first league countries, leaving alternative discourse attempts basically marginalized and regressive. The strength of the discourse has even had a cyclical effect of strengthening as well the actors who use it, who can then work more effectively to strengthen the discourse, and so on. It is understandable therefore, that the military would be unwilling to go against this popular front, opening itself up to unfamiliar criticism. Moreover, as discussed above, there are reasons to believe that the military is itself torn between its philosophy of modernization/ liberalization, and its concerns over security. Nevertheless, at this point, the nature of the Turkish state structure makes it very difficult to believe that if the hard realm truly wanted to block particular liberalization attempts, such as the passage of these recent laws, that it could not do so.

The question then arises of what the apparently torn military core of the hard realm is likely to do in terms of future liberalization moves that will need to be made for EU accession. Presumably their preferred choice would be that the integration process would continue to progress, with the Europeans making substantive responses in recognition of Turkey's efforts, and with the security risks/prerogative cuts to the military remaining minimum. On the other hand, the military is likely holding on to a second possibility, which is that the current strength of the pro-EU discourse will be weakened

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[694] See the June 2002 poll by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Ankara.

by other developments. One such development could be the EU's failure to respond adequately to Turkey's efforts, leaving Turks feeling cheated. Another possibility could be that the current vague (but pleasant) characteristics of pro-EU discourse could, as the realities of integration become clearer, turn out to be less idyllic than they now seem. Similarly, this could be brought about by reconsiderations of the nature of some upcoming sensitive EU demands, such as the Cyprus issue. Ultimately, if the discourse should begin losing in popularity, the military will no longer have to worry as much about the challenges to conducting traditional security-based policies.

Summary

When we look at the current situation in Turkey, it appears that the left/right divide of the 1970s and the religious/secular divide of the 1990s are being replaced by the divide over globalization—as currently manifested in the debate over EU integration. As chapter 5 suggested, the key question that remains to be answered is which side of this debate the military—the core power of the hard realm—is going to side with. Clearly the Turkish military in general sees both advantages and disadvantages in integration, and they would like to reap the benefits without risking national security or the prerogatives of the hard realm. In favor of integration, it is obvious that the military has long represented one of the most modernized entities in Turkey, and as an institution, is known as the champion of westernization and Europeanization. In this sense it cannot refute the EU. There is also the understanding, as shown in chapters 2 and 3, that even security needs can in some ways be addressed through further integration since, given Turkey's geopolitical environment, isolation is one of the greatest fears.

On the other hand, drawing on a very uneasy historical relationship between the state and certain segments of society, the military is naturally disturbed by potential side effects of integration. From this perspective, groups such as the Islamists and ethnic political movements, can be seen as trying to use the EU integration process to further their own positions.

How does the military react? Perhaps the most appropriate word to describe its current behavior is 'hesitant'. By not making its position clear, it is able to wait to see whether a security risk—either in the sense of national security or in the sense of a loss of hard realm prerogatives—will emerge as a result of integrative moves. If it does, the military can still step in and put things under control. If no such risks or only acceptable ones appear, it will probably give increasing support to integration efforts.

Since the security risks remain as yet only speculation, overall hard realm efforts are logically going to be on preventing or lessening the signs of risks that are now evident. As mentioned above, perhaps the most clear of these is the growing alliance they see between parts of the soft realm (primarily the Islamists and the ethnic political groups) and the EU. Since the military can neither go after the external side of this alliance nor, as the experience of the February 28th process indicated, can they resort to traditional security-oriented tactics to deal with the domestic side, what we will likely see are efforts to work from within the soft realm in order to weaken the alliance. This could include using their power to strengthen other parts of the soft realm which are more attractive to the military, namely, parts which can still respond to political globalization and integration efforts, but which nevertheless are seen as respecting existing security conceptualizations/concerns and the prerogatives of the hard realm. One example of a

new figure on the political front who is currently meeting those requirements—and reportedly receiving the approval and support of the military—is Kemal Derviş, who recently left his position as economic minister in order to enter the upcoming elections as a member of the Republican People's Party. Given the extremely fragmented nature of the soft realm, however, and the resulting high levels of political competition, other parties or individuals are surely willing to do or say what is necessary to gain military/hard realm support, even if it means sounding cool towards integration. This destructive competition and in-fighting for the military's approval, will help keep the military 'above' politics. In such a way the military may continue to be a figure that is much bigger than and still unaccountable to the rest of political sphere.

The current period of military hesitancy seems likely to continue for some time. The hard realm's controlling of the stability of the transformation will also certainly continue, but along the lines of what was seen during and post February 28th. The manipulations and interventions will be subtle, and will probably involve attempts to make use of alternative means, such as those from within the soft realm. Since there does seem to be a gradual strengthening of the political globalization pressure, the balancing of liberalization and security demands, in other words, the new security dilemma identified in this research, may require a more frequent involvement of the military in daily politics, albeit in a subtle manner. As it becomes more difficult for the hard realm to stay behind the curtains, there will be the need to develop more societal allies—a manner of control which is never as reliable as running the show directly. This increased involvement, even though subtle, will likely open the hard realm up for greater criticism—in a sense,

chipping away at its former non-accountability—and also increase the overall instability potential within the national government.

Ultimately, one can argue that after a century in which political globalization pressures challenged but were generally subordinated to security pressures, the current manifestation of this security/liberalization debate may increasingly see substantive gains for globalization. The traditional security mind seems to be ever more torn, as reflected in the hesitant attitudes of the military establishment towards to EU integration demands, and it may only be a matter of time for the ever-threatening security risks to become seen as acceptable. At that point, the hard realm will have to start subordinating itself to an increasingly empowered soft realm.

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NEWSPAPERS, NEWS AGENCIES AND TV CHANNELS

Akşam

Anadolu News Agency

ATV

Cumhuriyet

Financial Times

Hürriyet

New York Times

NTV

Özgür Ülke

Radikal

Sabah

Tanin

Turkish Daily News

Turkish Probe

Ulus

Yeni Günaydın

Yeni Şafak

Yeni Yüzyıl

Appendix A: The quantitative study

· In carrying out the quantitative study, the research question's two main factors were first taken into consideration. The most important relevant characteristic of the state-centric system is the security dilemma, to which the states have been traditionally designed to respond. Using existing databases, I attempted therefore to identify those states most concerned with security and thus, most purposefully designed for responding to the state-centric system. Simultaneously, it was necessary to identify states that have been and remain under pressure to respond to the political globalization impact. These could be considered as those countries that have been trying to democratize for an extended period of time, thereby revealing an openness to globalization, but which are not considered as "democratized." The underlying assumption of this preliminary investigation was that those long-term seriously democratizing countries with simultaneous high security pressures would show some sign of the hypothesized dual state structure—perhaps in the form of a long-time pattern of near, but not consistently perfect, democracy scores.

Based on an understanding of political globalization pressure as synonymous with political liberalization/democratization pressure, I used the Polity III database to first determine those countries that have experienced over an extended time a liberalization pressure. Polity III consists of annual indicators of institutional democracy and autocracy for 161 states over the years 1946 to 1994. I chose this database over other measures of institutional democracy[695] because of the highly nuanced gradations of its operational indicators of institutionalized authority characteristics. Unlike the other measures, Polity III gives separate rating scores ranging between one and ten for both democracy and autocracy. This allows a more accurate interpretation of states that are not purely democratic nor purely autocratic. The two scores can also be combined to give an overall positive or negative score. For confirmation purposes, I also referred to the Freedom House rating scale.[696]

Focusing on the post-World War II era, I attempted to first define and locate democratizing countries that could be identified as being under a political globalization

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[695] For example, Zehra Arat, *Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Rinner, 1991);.M. Coppedge and W.H. Reinecke, "Measuring Polyarchy," in *On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants*, ed. Alex Inkeles (London: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Kenneth Bollen, Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures, *American Journal of Political Science* 37, no. 4 (1993): 1207-1230; or Mark Gasiorowski, *The Political Regime Change Dataset*, (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana Population Data Center, Louisiana State University, 1993).

[696] Freedom House assesses each country annually and assigns a rating of free (1-2.5), partly free (3-5.5) or not free (5.5-7) based on an averaging of political rights and civil liberties ratings.

pressure. To locate these countries I selected from the Polity III database countries, which, though they did not have consistently perfect democracy scores of ten, had at least ten years of democracy minus autocracy scores that were positive. This resulted in a list of forty countries.[697]

I then turned to the International Crisis Behaviour Project (ICB) database in order to determine which of these forty countries could be considered to have experienced during the same time period a high level of concern about security (a high degree of vulnerability) simultaneously with political globalization pressure. In order to determine a high level of vulnerability I looked at each country's recorded conflicts between 1918 and 1994. For each conflict I determined a "threat" score ranging between two and twenty. This score was based on the ICB coding scheme for two particular variables: the gravity of the threat as perceived by the decision makers of the particular crisis actor (threat to existence = 10; threat of grave damage, threat to territory, political threat = 6; economic threat, threat to influence of non-great power = 4; limited threat or other = 1), and the violence experienced by the crisis actor (full-scale war = 10; serious clashes = 7; minor clashes = 4; no violence = 1). I then totaled the individual conflict scores to arrive at an overall vulnerability score.

From my initial list of countries, thirteen had high total vulnerability scores of at least forty points (see Table 1). Eleven of these are actors in what the ICB identifies as unresolved protracted conflicts, and the remaining two, South Africa and Zimbabwe, were involved in protracted conflicts considered to have ended in 1988 and 1980 respectively. The ICB distinguishes protracted conflicts from other forms of conflictual relations as those that extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks.

Table 1 - Vulnerability Scores

Country name	External vulnerability score	Country name	External vulnerability score
Ecuador	40	Greece	166
Honduras	75	India	138
Israel	266	South Korea	70
Nicaragua	120	Pakistan	133
Peru	43	South Africa	124
Turkey	176	Zimbabwe	78

I chose, therefore, to classify as "high vulnerability" those thirteen countries directly connected with protracted conflicts since World War II.

Although the database study identified thirteen countries as possible cases for more in-depth study, these countries can be further broken down into four general types, the last of which seemed most appropriate for studying in-depth in order to try and refine the hypothesizing. The first type, consisting of Zimbabwe and Lebanon, were initially

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[697] Argentina, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Israel, Jamaica, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia.

included on the list of "democratizing" countries because of the criterion that they simply have ten years or more of positive democracy scores since World War II. In both cases, however, the positive scores occurred in the early part of the time period (Lebanon between 1944 and 1975, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia up until 1978). Each country then experienced a disrupting revolution or civil war, following which their democracy scores have gradually worsened. The results from these two countries are therefore of less interest to this study since, despite early and long exposure to some democratization, internal/external security issues have firmly and overtly taken precedence over any political globalization pressures of the last two decades.

The second type comes from the cases of Honduras, Nicaragua, and South Africa. Although none of these three countries had by 1994 achieved perfect democracy scores, and despite some fluctuations up and down, the overall pattern in these countries was one of slow improvement. It is impossible to say from these results that the democratization process has been excessively long, or that there has been any consolidation of an imperfect democracy. What is interesting in these three cases is that there may no longer be a significant level of vulnerability. Although the ICB still considered the Honduras/Nicaragua protracted conflict to be unresolved in 1994, it may be that its roots were more lodged in the East/West conflict, and have therefore been eased. In South Africa, where the protracted conflict involvement over Angola was already noted to have ended in 1988, there has also been the significant change in the domestic situation since 1994. On the basis of vulnerability level therefore, it is inconclusive what course the democratization process in these three countries will now follow.

The third type consists of South Korea and Greece. These two countries are unique because despite the early fluctuating scores which placed them on the original list of countries, they have subsequently achieved and maintained perfect Polity III scores of 10 and, in Greece, a near perfect Freedom House score of 1,2. They nevertheless both face clearly high levels of vulnerability in their unresolved conflicts with North Korea and Turkey. One contributing factor to this seemingly inconsistent result may be the tremendous support the two countries receive from, respectively, the United States and the European Union. It is also important to remember that the scores found by these various measures are neither identical nor infallible. South Korea, for example, has only been able to achieve a very good, but nevertheless imperfect, score of 2,2 from Freedom House. In terms of possible misinterpretations when assessing a perfect score, the case of Greece could be an example. In 1998, three Greek cabinet ministers were forced to resign their posts when it was revealed that what was, in fact, an unaccountable source of authority within the state structure had been protecting the Kurdish insurgency leader Abdullah Ocalan. What this might indicate is that there may exist a differentiation between hard and soft politics and a reorganization of the state structure, but since they are only revealed over issues involving extreme vulnerability, their significance may be missed by the large measures of political regime and political freedom.

The final pattern occurred in the countries of India, Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, Peru, and Ecuador, and suggests that these cases have seen the longest consistent exposure to the two pressures and, therefore, would be the best in which to explore further. In Pakistan and Peru there have been large and frequent fluctuations in the various scores and with generally unsatisfactory results. Neither country has been able to break out of the "partly free" category of Freedom House or to exceed a Polity III rating of eight.

Ecuador has oscillated between "partly free" and "free" in recent years, but has yet to achieve a perfect score of ten on Polity III. Israel is an interesting case because, despite having maintained a perfect Polity III score of ten for the first seventeen years after its founding, it subsequently fell to a score of nine, a position from which it has not been able to move since 1967. Although its Freedom House scores rank it in the category of "free" nations, it has never achieved a perfect score, and in recent years has maintained a civil liberties score of three. The final two cases of India and Turkey clearly reveal patterns of a very long democratization process marked by ups and downs. Both countries have for the most part had very high democratization scores over the last fifty years. India, however, has never achieved a perfect Polity III score of ten, and has only in 1998-1999 managed to enter the "free" category of Freedom House. Turkey has achieved and lost a perfect Polity III score of ten on three occasions, but has never managed to break out of Freedom House's "partly free" category due to its consistent civil liberties rating of four.

While the results of the quantitative study were quite interesting to me, they indicated perhaps more than anything else, the need to carry out an in-depth case study in order to further explore and, if necessary, revise my hypothesizing. The resulting final six countries of the study provided a justifiable pool of candidate countries for a case study— countries that could be argued to have experienced simultaneously the two pressures for a long period of time.

Appendix B: NSC Recommendations of February 28, 1997[*]

I.   The principle of secularism should be strictly enforced and laws should be modified for that

purpose, if necessary.

II.   Private dormitories, foundations, and schools affiliated with Sufi religious orders (tarikats)

must be put under the control of relevant state authorities and eventually transferred to the

Ministry of National Education (MNE), as required by the Law on Unified Education

(Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu).

III.   With a view toward rendering the tender minds of young generations inclined foremost

toward love of the republic, Atatürk, the homeland, and the nation, and toward the ideal and

goal of raising the Turkish nation to the level of modern civilization, and to protect them

against the influence of various quarters:

(1) An eight-year uninterrupted educational system must be implemented across

the country.

(2) The necessary administrative and legal adjustments should be made so that

Koran courses, which children with basic education may attend with parental

consent, operate only under the responsibility and control of the MNE.

IV.   Our national education institutes charged with raising enlightened clergy loyal to the

republican regime and Atatürk's principles and reforms must conform to the essence of the

Law on Unified Education.

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[*] The English version of the 18 recommendations of the National Security Council is borrowed from Niyazi
Günay's study. Niyazi Günay, "Implementing the 'February 28' Recommendations: A Scoreboard," The
Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, Research Note 10 (May 2001),
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/junior/note10.htm> (27 June 2002). For the Turkish version see,
Akpınar, 206-210.

V.   Religious facilities built in various parts of the country must not be used for political

exploitation to send messages to certain circles. If there is a need for such facilities, the

Religious Affairs Chairmanship should evaluate the need, and the facilities must be built in

coordination with local governments and relevant authorities.

VI.   Activities of religious orders banned by Law no. 677, as well as all entities prohibited by said

law, must be ended.

VII. Media groups that oppose the Turkish Armed Forces and its members should be brought

under control. These [groups] try to depict the Turkish Armed Forces as inimical to religion

by exploiting the issue of personnel whose ties to the Turkish Armed Forces have been

severed by decisions of the Supreme Military Council (SMC, or *Yüksek Askeri Şura*) based on

their fundamentalist activities.

VIII. Personnel expelled from military service because of fundamentalist activities, disciplinary

problems, or connections with illegal organizations must not be employed by other public

agencies and institutions or otherwise encouraged.

IX.   The measures taken within the framework of existing regulations to prevent infiltration into

the Turkish Armed Forces by the extremist religious sector should also be applied in other

public institutions and establishments, particularly in universities and other educational

institutions, at every level of the bureaucracy, and in judicial establishments.

X.   Iran's efforts to destabilize Turkey's regime should be closely watched. Policies that would

prevent Iran from meddling in Turkey's internal affairs should be adopted.

XI.   Legal and administrative means must be used to prevent the very dangerous activities of the

extremist religious sector that seeks to create polarization in society by fanning sectarian

differences.

XII. Legal and administrative proceedings against those responsible for incidents that contravene

the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, the Law on Political Parties, the Turkish Penal

Code, and especially the Law on Municipalities should be concluded in a short period of time,

and firm measures should be taken at all levels not to allow repetition of such incidents.

XIII. Practices that violate the attire law and that may give Turkey an anachronistic image must be prevented.

XIV. Licensing procedures for short- and long-barrel weapons, which have been issued for various reasons, must be reorganized on the basis of police and gendarmerie districts. Restrictions must be introduced on this issue, and the demand for pump-action rifles, in particular, must be evaluated carefully.

XV. The collection of [animal] sacrifice hides by anti-regime and uncontrolled [unregulated] organizations and establishments for the purpose of securing financial resources should be prevented, and no collection of sacrifice hides should be allowed outside the authority recognized by law.

XVI. Legal proceedings against bodyguards dressed in special uniforms and those responsible for them should be concluded speedily, and, taking into account the fact that such illegal practices might reach dangerous proportions, all private bodyguard units not envisaged by the law should be disbanded.

XVII. Initiatives that aim at solving the country's problems on the basis of "umma" [religious community] rather than "nation" and that encourage the separatist terror organization (Kurdistan Workers Party [PKK]) by approaching it on the same basis [i.e., as a part of the umma] should be prevented by legal and administrative means.

XVIII. Law no. 5816, which defines crimes against the great savior Atatürk, including acts of disrespect, must be fully implemented.