EDUCATION POLICY IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: THE MAGHREB

Abstract

Henry C. Thomas
Master of Arts
Department of Political Science
McGill University
July 1971

EDUCATIONAL POLICY IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:

A THREE-COUNTRY STUDY IN NORTH AFRICA

This thesis examines the use of educational policy in an overall
plan for national development. In particular the educational policies of
Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria are studied and compared.

Education is related to four major areas of theoretical interest:
(1) Political Socialization, (2) Social Stratification, (3) National
Integration, and (4) Economic Growth. However, in discussing the actual
policies formulated and implemented in North Africa four distinct policy
questions are used to provide a framework. These four questions are:
(1) Democratization, (2) Rationalization, (3) Nationalization, and
(4) Arabization.

This study of educational policy is carried out with a view to
discovering the relative importances of both ideology and regime capabilities
in planning and administration for policy formulation.

The thesis concludes that Morocco, lacking as it does both an
action-oriented ideology and a competent administration, has been unable to
evolve a coherent education policy for development. Tunisia and Algeria
both subscribe to socialist ideologies. Yet Tunisia, despite its less radical
ideology, has made more direct use of educational policy for development than
has Algeria, principally because of its superior planning and administrative
capabilities.

i.

Table of Contents

PREFACE

My interest in North Africa as a field of study grows from my experiences in Morocco as a volunteer in the Peace Corps from September 1968 to August 1969. These experiences, although in many ways disappointing personally, did leave me with what can only be described as a fascination for Morocco and the rest of North Africa. This thesis results from a desire to understand the area more fully.

The precise focus of this study, the uses of education in political and economic development, was suggested to me in a course on political development given by Professor Baldev Raj Nayar. Subsequently, Professor Nayar, in his capacity as my thesis advisor, has been of invaluable assistance to me in the writing of this thesis.

Much of the research for this study was facilitated by the Institute of Islamic Studies Library at McGill University.

I would also like to extend a general thanks to my friends and colleagues who have at various stages helped me to clarify my thinking or otherwise aided in the preparation of this work.

As my own knowledge of Arabic is very limited I have decided to use the French transliteration of most Arabic terms, although I realize full well that there is considerable debate as to their validity.

HCT

I.   Introduction

I.   Education and Development in North Africa.

For some time now authors concerned with the problems of political
and economic development in the new nations have pointed to education as
both a force behind development and a major problem in development. As
Anderson and Bowman point out, education lies at the crossroads of the
major institutional systems. It is locked into the following major
institutional systems: (1) Cultural, (2) Stratification, (3) Political,
(4) Economic.[1] Elsewhere, Coleman calls education "the master determinant
of social change."[2] But, if we grant the place of importance these authors
accord education, we must equally concur with them when they ennumerate
the problems education can cause in the developmental process. These
problems flow from the very position and nature of education in society.

This study is an examination of the concrete manifestations of
the problems and possibilities of education in three developing countries.
In particular the relationship between the overall strategy of development
adopted by a regime and the specific educational policy it has pursued is
analysed. This is done with a view to discovering whether or not education
is being used as a tool in a broad plan for national development. The
three countries chosen for this purpose are the three countries of the
Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. It has been asserted by some

---

[1]C. Arnold Anderson and M.J. Bowman, "Theoretical Considerations in Educational
Planning," in Education Planning, ed. by Don Adams (Syracuse: Center for
Development Education, All-University School of Education, Syracuse University,
1964), p. 11.

[2]James S. Coleman, "Introduction: Education and Political Development," in
Education and Political Development, ed. by James S. Coleman (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 3.

authors that the more development oriented a regime is the more it will be willing to use the educational system as a tool for development.[3] If this hypothesis is correct, and there are no intervening variables, then a study of educational policy in North Africa should provide some interesting comparisons. Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were chosen for this study because their political systems are representative of three fairly common approaches to national development among the underdeveloped countries. These three approaches are diverse enough so that they should result in three distinct educational policies. Moreover, the common cultural and historical heritages of the three nations should make comparison more fruitful by eliminating many intervening variables.

The consideration of education within a political context is important because of the all-pervasive nature of politics. Politics should not be viewed as merely the study of the institutions of government, but rather should include all institutions in their political aspects.[4] The boundaries of the political system can fluctuate widely and under conditions of stress and change the boundaries are extended. Under these conditions many seemingly neutral aspects of society become politicized. The primacy of politics is especially evident in the developing nations where the necessities of ordering a new society and directing change has led to the politicization of all institutions. North Africa is no exception to this rule. Therefore the study of the political problems in the North African context necessitates the study of many primarily non-political institutions.

---

[3]James S. Coleman, "Introduction to Part I," in Education and Political Development, ed. by James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 45.

[4]Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 18.

Conversely all institutions have, in addition to what may be a primarily non-political function, a latent political function which they perform.

The analysis of the educational policies of the three countries under consideration will stress education as an output of the political system. It will provide a means of measuring each system's ability to achieve the goals it has set for itself. In other words, the actual per-formance of each regime will be measured against its stated ideology. To be sure, the classification of regimes on the basis of their ideologies alone is often deceptive, since quite often the regimes in question lack the capability of putting their ideology to work. In such cases the study of the stated goals and objectives of a regime can lead to a false understanding of the situation. Nevertheless, it is useful to start out, for purposes of comparative evaluation of political systems, with a preliminary classification of each regime's ideology and capability.

The most useful classification system for present purposes is David Apter's. Apter's model allows for the classification of governments by the way they cope with the problems of development as well as their ideological system. This model thus avoids, in part, the pitfall of ignoring the regime's capabilities. However, it should be noted that Apter's categories are rough and do not allow for very fine distinctions. In fact, the three regimes in North Africa can all be classified as sub-systems of the same system in Apter's model.

Apter's model divides regimes on the basis of the nature of authority and values. That is, whether authority is hierarchical (centralized) or pyramidal (federal or dispersed); and whether values are consummatory (sacred) or instrumental (secular). The model presents three major types

of political systems: (1) mobilization system, combining hierarchical
authority and consummatory values (such as Communist China), (2) recon-
ciliation system combining pyramidal authority and instrumental values
(such as in India), (3) bureaucratic system, combining hierarchical
authority and instrumental values. This last system consists of three
sub-types: (1) the modernizing autocracy, (2) the military oligarchy,
(3) the presidential monarchy. The differences among these sub-types will
become apparent in the discussion of the political systems of North Africa.

Morocco fits into the modernizing autocracy subsystem. Here the
king is the sole source of authority and social life is regulated by custom.
Modernization is sought so long as it does not seriously threaten the
existing power structure. In effect, Morocco acceded to independence under
Mohammed V, the then reigning member of Morocco's traditional ruling family.
Thus the traditional ruling élite still rules in Morocco, but it can not
escape the necessity of change and modernization. It has allowed for a
limited form of economic planning which aims at some modernization of both
the economy and society. Coercive techniques are used to press modernization,
but only to the extent that it does not threaten the sources of power and
legitimacy. The source of power and legitimacy is the institution of the
monarchy and its relation to Islam. The consummatory values merely center
around loyalty to the king.

By contrast Algeria came to independence as the result of a war
of national liberation. Its national leaders have relied, to a greater
or lesser degree, on the army to keep them in power. However, given the
circumstances of the war for independence, all the leaders in Algeria are
imbued with a socialist ideology. They have affirmed their desire to

reshape society and have tried to politicize all aspects of Algerian life.
Ahmed Ben Bella, the country's first leader, tried to break away from
depending exclusively on the army. However, since 1965 Algeria has most
clearly fallen in the category of a military oligarchy. The leadership of
the country has been bureaucratic and many former military men are now in
the government. Apter points out that this type of system has, because of
the lack of political skills, only a limited capacity to cope with the tasks
of modernization. However, in the case at hand the regime continually
reaffirms its commitment to certain socialist ideals and asserts that it is
"progressive."

Finally, Tunisia is best described as a presidential monarchy, in
which ritualized charisma focuses on the office of the president. As
President of the Republic Habib Bourguiba has relied heavily on his own
personal prestige and charisma. Nationalism is also an important factor
in Tunisia. Bourguiba and his ministers often invoke socialist slogans,
but appeals to Tunisian nationalism are both more frequent and more effective.
Since independence the regime has shown a clear willingness to push modern-
ization. However, it has not been elevated to the level of a consummatory
value. The degree of coercion in Tunisia is relatively low since the regime
has generally tried to avoid pushing its programs of change with force.

The major part of this thesis is devoted to an analysis of the
education programs of each of the three countries and its relationship to
the overall philosophy of development of that country. Specifically, this
involves looking at the degree to which the educational systems of Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia have been adapted and fitted to a plan for national
development. The spread of development options exhibited by these three

countries is wide enough to allow for a fruitful comparison of this type.
These options range from the radicalism of Algeria to the underlying con-
servatism of Morocco passing by the pragmatism of Tunisia. Moreover, the
basic similarities of these countries eliminate a number of intervening
variables which otherwise might lessen the value of a comparison of this
nature. All three nations are at much the same level of economic development.
All three share the same cultural heritage and social make-up. Finally they
were all ruled by the same colonial power which means that all three had much
the same school system when they acceded to independence. All these simila-
rities mean that all three post-independence regimes have had to cope with
much the same problems. Therefore differences in their policies can be
attributed to either variations in their political outlooks or in their
capabilities.

The necessity of changing the school system left behind by the
French was widely accepted at the time of independence. The system that the
French created was designed to maintain the colonial order. A more complete
examination of the French system in North Africa, presented in the second
chapter, will show the goals towards which the French were working. Given
the nature of the colonial system, it was only natural that with the
achievement of independence there would be a movement in favor of a new type
of national education. The post-independence regimes set out to mold edu-
cation to fit their own particular view of national development.

Coleman has outlined some of the directions education change tends
to take in the underdeveloped countries. He sees a pressure for curriculum
revision in the direction of: (1) greater practicality in subject matter,
(2) "indigenization", and (3) greater politicization.[5] In addition there

---

[5]James S. Coleman, "Introduction to Part I," p. 43.

is an effort to make the school system reach the entire population. Finally,
all of these countries engage in some sort of economic planning and in the
planners' minds education is usually linked with manpower needs. This fact
leads to a situation where education becomes an adjunct of overall economic
planning and is tied to the development needs of the country.[6] The pressure
for greater practicality which Coleman mentions is related to the identifi-
cation of education with manpower planning. In setting out their educational
programs, all three North African countries began to move in the directions
outlined above. However, if all the regimes started to move in the same
direction it is to be expected that the priorities set in educational
reform would vary from country to country, depending on the regime's ideo-
logical stand and capabilities.

The preceding discussion contains a view of education that is
relatively new in the social sciences. Education was for a long time
viewed as a neutral institution concerned only with the passing on of a
cultural heritage from one generation to the next. Comparative studies in
education were left to the educators, who tended to see the educational
system in isolation from other social institutions.[7] Typically, political
scientists showed little interest in the political aspects of the school
system.

However, since World War II two phenomena external to the social
sciences have combined with a new outlook within the discipline to bring
about a new appreciation of the role of education in society. The first

---

[6]C. Arnold Anderson and M.J. Bowman, "Theoretical Considerations in
Educational Planning," p. 9.

[7]James S. Coleman, "Introduction: Education and Political Development," p. 9.

external consideration is the realization in the advanced countries that

their continued progress in a technological age is dependent on education.[8]

The second is the advent of the former colonies to full nationhood.[9] In

these new nations education is associated with both personal and societal

betterment. The first point, concerning the link between education and

economic progress in the advanced nations, is equally true with regards to

the developing nations. The link between education and economic growth is

so universally accepted that even a conservative institution like the World

Bank now considers the granting of loans for investment in education.

These two factors have coincided with the growth of a new school of thought

within political science. The rise of the structural-functional school has

resulted in the examination of many social institutions previously ignored.

For example, political scientists are interested in the family as an agency

of political socialization and in the press as an agency of political

communication. Likewise, political scientists are now interested in the

political aspects of education.

Education relates to a number of very important social functions.

In the following pages some of these functions that are particularly

relevant in the developing areas are discussed. Specifically, the relation-

ship between education, on the one hand, and social stratification, national

integration, political socialization and economic growth, on the other,

are examined. The analysis also attempts to focus on some of the concrete

problems that have arisen in this respect in North Africa. In other words,

---

[8]Ibid., p. 3.

[9]Ibid., p. 3.

the following sections contain a general theoretical discussion of the problems of education viewed within a political framework, along with an analysis of the specific issues that have arisen in North Africa. Subsequent chapters give more detailed attention to the particular problems of each country in the Maghreb.

II. Education and Social Stratification

Education is intimately related to social stratification. Political recruitment is in all countries related to education; however, the relationship is particularly close in the developing areas. In the advanced nations attainment of higher education is quite important in the process of elite formation, both political and economic. In the developing nations the situation is somewhat simpler and education is vitally important in the process of elite formation. In the colonial period education was by design elitist, especially in the French-ruled areas. The colonial powers had no interest in creating a public school system free to all, since the colonial system depended on the supposed inferiority of the colonized peoples vis-a-vis the colonizers.

However, to keep the government and commerce operating the colonizers needed a small number of educated natives. Therefore most colonies had a small school system that dispensed a Western style education. The graduates of these schools staffed the lower and middle levels of the colonial administration. This elite, although it had very little of the power of the Europeans themselves, was nonetheless quite powerful in relation to the masses. Therefore, in most colonies attainment of Western education became synonymous with attainment of elite status. There thus developed a

situation where education was viewed as a sure means of bettering one's social status. This was especially true in the French colonies where the only hope for advancement lay in assimilating French culture.

In the post-independence era this instrumental attitude towards education has continued in most of the developing areas of the world. Parents send their children to school so that they will have a chance to achieve a higher social status. These societies are characteristically illiterate to an overwhelming extent, and consequently education confers superior status.

In North Africa, during the first decade after independence, personnel trained to staff the government and the economy were at a premium. During the colonial period the men who ran these countries were for the most part French. At the time of independence the French managers and civil servants left to return to France, and educated North Africans were promoted rapidly to fill the spaces thus left. In recent years this situation has changed somewhat, in that there are more educated North Africans while most of the available posts are now filled. Nonetheless, education is still highly valued and a secondary or university diploma is a vital minimum for elite status. Regimes with a commitment to social equality can work to widen the base for elite recruitment by making education available to a wider sector of the population. Policies that operate in this direction can be called democratizing. By democratization is meant the elimination of all class biases in the school system and the suppression of elitist tendencies in education. Democratization in North Africa has meant aiming at universal primary school attendance and a greatly expanded secondary and university program.

Options of this sort reflect the underlying political philosophy
of the regime. The regime with a radical egalitarian ideology could be
expected to show the greatest interest in using education to overcome the
problems of stratification. A regime such as Morocco's, dependent on
tradition, would in theory be less concerned with an egalitarian society
and therefore less concerned with counteracting the elitist tendencies of
the school system. In Tunisia the government's ideology is more concerned
with democracy. Therefore one would expect it to have made some efforts
to counteract the elitist tendencies in education. Algeria, with the most
radical official ideology, in theory would have designed far more radical
educational reforms.

III. Education and Political Socialization

A second aspect of society that education affects is socialization
in general. For the purposes of this thesis it is the specific relation-
ship between education and political socialization that is examined. The
possible roles for education in political socialization are obvious. A
government-run school system not only dispenses a basic education, but can
also give citizenship training and try to inculcate underlying attitudes
to authority.

Coleman points out why education is at one and the same time both
less and more important in the socialization process in the Third World
nations.[10] It is of less importance in these nations because the traditional
socializing agencies retain a much larger role than they do in the Western

---

[10]Ibid., pp. 21-22.

nations. In other words, institutions such as the family and religious groups are still very influential in the socialization process. The child in the developing areas is more likely to be influenced in his attitudes to government and authority by one of these traditional institutions than is his counterpart in one of the more developed areas. Characteristically the traditional institutions tend to socialize the individual into local loyalities.

Paradoxically, it is the influential role of the traditional socializing agencies that makes it necessary for the formal educational system to assume a heavier burden than it does in most Western nations. The school system is the most effective weapon the government has to counter-act the traditional and local patterns of political socialization. In the rural areas it is the only institution that helps to socialize youth into national loyalities. Beyond the general task of socializing the child into the new nation, the schools are often used to inculcate a particular ideology. The government can politicize the curriculum and use citizenship classes to press its own ideological point of view. Finally, in a much subtler way the schools can foster attitudes to work and society, which may have no immediate impact on politics but which nonetheless shape society.

In North Africa there have been definite attempts to use the schools to affect the socialization process in one way or another. Specifi-cally, there have been calls for the nationalization of education. This has meant the revision of curriculum so that it relates to the nation in which it is being taught. Even stronger demands have been made for the Arabization, that is the use of Arabic as the language of instruction in place of French. The schools have also been used to give citizenship training.

Coleman claims that the tendency to politicize curriculum is strongest in those regimes with strong modernizing ideologies.[11] If this is true then one would expect that Algeria would have done the most to change its curriculum, and that Morocco would have done the least. Tunisia, with its pragmatic outlook would be expected to have pursued a moderate policy. However, to assess the degree of overt politicization is problematical without detailed fieldwork and a careful examination of the materials being taught. In the absence of such research in North Africa the analysis in this area will remain somewhat incomplete.

IV. Education and National Integration

The third major function which education affects is that of national integration. Some problems relating to national integration have already been discussed indirectly in the preceding sections. Recruitment of elites and the effective socialization of youth into the national policy are part of national integration. But education can also be dysfunctional to national integration. In the first place, education can help perpetuate the so-called elite-mass gap. It can as well serve to perpetuate or intensify social cleavages in society.

A certain gap exists between the masses and the elite in every country, but it is especially pronounced in the developing countries. In most of the more advanced nations elites are socialized into society before attaining elite status. In developing nations the pattern is likely to be different; elites are often socialized separately from the rest of society.

[11]James S. Coleman, "Introduction to Part I," p. 47.

This accounts for the situation where the elite has a more Western outlook than the mass of its countrymen. Even at the secondary school level students are aware that they are a privileged minority.

Education can also operate to aggravate the existing social cleavages in a society. In developing areas, where educational resources are scarce, it is common to see governments concentrate their efforts on the urban areas at the expense of the rural areas. Although such a policy is understandable from an economic point of view, it can only serve to widen the gap between urban and rural areas. Education also affects the relations between minority groups and the rest of society. In the colonial era education was often used to exacerbate tensions between racial or linguistic groups. Minority groups frequently had easier access to the schools as part of an overall policy aimed at dividing the colonial society. In the post-independence period policies aimed at eliminating this inequality will be viewed with great suspicion by the minority groups. However, if the inequality is allowed to continue, even more serious hostilities will be aroused in the majority group.

In North Africa educational policy problems relating to both horizontal cleavage (such as, elite-mass) and vertical cleavages (such as racial and linguistic groups) are to be found. The horizontal cleavages are particularly acute. Gordon discusses at some length the gulf that separates the elite, educated in French-style schools, from the largely illiterate masses.[12] It has been pointed out, as well, that Moroccan and

---

[12]David C. Gordon, North Africa's French Legacy: 1954-1962 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 54-64.

Tunisian students seem quite conscious of their elite standing.[13] In

largely illiterate societies it is unavoidable that cleavages of this

nature should exist. However, the gap is being made more pronounced by the

continued use of French as the language of instruction at all but the very

lowest levels of instruction. This leads to the unfortunate situation in

which the elite is almost incapable of expressing itself fully in the

language of the people. The language of government and business is French,

whereas the language of the people they are supposed to serve is dialectal

Arabic. In seeking to overcome the problems of horizontal cleavages North

African leaders have urged the democratization of schools and the "Arabization".

Of equal concern for educational policy in North Africa is uneven

regional development, especially the contrast between the urban and rural

areas. In the colonial era the French concentrated their efforts in the

cities. The number of schools and the rate of school attendance is much

higher in the urban areas in all three countries. Policy-makers in all

three countries have been aware of this disparity and have made varying

efforts to overcome it.

The vertical cleavages pose less serious problems in North Africa

than they do in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Morocco and Algeria the Berbers are

an important minority group that is racially and linguistically different

from the Arab majority. However, the Berbers do not contest the dominance

of the Arabs and have not pressed for linguistic rights. For these reasons,

the Berbers do not pose any major problems for the present regimes and there-

fore are not given particular consideration in this study. It is, of course,

---

[13]Douglas E. Ashford, Second and Third Generation Elites in the Maghreb
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 24.

possible that as these groups become increasingly mobilized they could

cause problems.

In theory one would expect the regimes most interested in creating

a unified nation in the Western sense to be most concerned with overcoming

the vertical and horizontal cleavages in society. Both Algeria and Tunisia

are committed to creating modernized states and have strong egalitarian

strains in their respective ideologies and would thus be expected to be

interested in overcoming the biases of the colonial system. Morocco, which

depends on traditional loyalities, would in theory be less interested in

overcoming these cleavages since they are part of the system of traditional

loyalties.

V. Education and Economic Growth

A fourth, and vitally important sector that is affected by education

is the economic system. The role of education in economic development has

been the object of increasing interest in economic circles. Many economists

have come around to a view that holds that "investment in human resources"

is the key to economic growth. Formerly the term investment was used to

describe additions to productive capital and infrastructure. It is now felt

that the term should also be used in describing programs designed to improve

the quality of the population (e.g., education, public health, etc.). In

the developing nations this view is widely held by the economic planners

responsible for the direction of the economy. In their minds education is

linked to the solution of the manpower problems of the country. This view

holds that education helps to improve the people as producers and in effect

can be seen as investment in units of production. Those who press for a

manpower planning approach to education assume that the type of education

to be given will be technical and vocational in nature. There are a

number of problems, both theoretical and practical, associated with a

purely economic treatment of education.

In the first place, education is not exclusively an investment;

it is also a consumer item in the view of those who either go to school or

send their children there. This means that the consumer may have different

expectations of the school system than do the economic planners. The

individual may desire a general liberal arts type of education because of

its higher prestige. Such expectations are in conflict with vocational

training that the planners have in mind. In the developing areas the

luxury of freedom of choice in education is one that can be ill-afforded at

present. Therefore the fact that education is a consumer item can be

ignored, with certain qualifications which are noted further on.

Balogh and Streeten formulate a number of penetrating criticisms

of the "social investment" view of education.[14] Firstly, the returns to

investment in education are diffuse and spread over a long period, and in

any case cannot be easily quantified. In other types of investment the

returns can be calculated with relative ease and a fair degree of accuracy.

This cost-benefit analysis allows the investor to evaluate the desirability

of one investment over another and thereby establish priorities. If the

returns cannot be calculated then it is difficult to treat education as an

investment like all others. To further complicate matters, one must also

take account of the fact that education is also a consumer item and thus

---

[14]T. Balogh and P.P. Streeten, "Do Investment Models Apply to Developing Nations?", in Education and the Development of Nations, ed. by John S. Wagner and Cole S. Brembeck (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 136-148.

has a certain value independent of the instrumental values of the economist. Finally, gains in productivity thought to be due to education are frequently correlated to other causes for higher productivity from which they cannot easily be separated. Thus it is difficult to run a simple cost-benefit analysis on education.

In addition to these theoretical problems there are a number of practical problems that must be dealt with. If, as is usually the case, education is linked to manpower planning then the planners must be able to accurately forecast the manpower needs of the economy well into the future. There is a long lead-in time on education, so that programs implemented today will not begin to pay off for five to ten years at the very least. However, the efforts at forecasting the long run needs of an economy have not been notably successful.[15] The principal problem appears to be that although one can project manpower requirements in the service industries and replacements in the productive industries, it is almost impossible to forecast changes in the skill requirements in the productive industries.[16]

From this point of view manpower planning is especially difficult in the developing nations since they are the ones hoping for the most drastic changes in their production functions. For current decisions the manpower planners must estimate the requirements of the economy one to two decades hence, and these estimations often prove to be wrong. If the education given to the students is too specialized then an unforeseen change in the production function will render their training useless. This problem can

---

[15]C. Arnold Anderson and M.J. Bowman, "Theoretical Considerations in Education Planning," p. 23.

[16]Ibid., p. 24.

be avoided by making the training as general as possible, at the risk of

foregoing some of the economic benefits to be derived from a successful

specialization.

Despite all these criticisms, no one seriously denies that

education can be instrumental in economic development. The problems dis-

cussed above deal for the most part with the implementation of a program

of education for economic development and do not negate the original

assumption that education has a role to play in the economic transformation

of a country. The inability of economists to calculate an exact return

on investment in education makes it difficult to decide how much to invest,

but does not mean that education does not contribute to economic growth.

Likewise, the problems involved in manpower planning are concrete problems

of implementation and not fundamental problems with theory. The difficulties

in consumer preference are also of the same nature. However, together these

criticisms do point to considerable difficulties of implementation. The

theoretical role of education in economic growth is clear, but its trans-

lation into actual fact is problematical.

However, decisions to invest in developing countries are almost

never purely economic and usually involve a large political component. In

the case of education a number of political considerations outweigh the

economic problems and make investment in this area very popular. In the

first place, education is seen by a great number of people in the developing

nations as a means of social advancement and is therefore an investment

which tends to make regimes popular. Secondly, to further their own goals,

such as social democracy, these regimes favor investment in education.

Therefore despite all the problems involved, each of the North African

countries devotes around one quarter of its total annual budget to national

education.

It is only natural to expect that the investment will take

different forms in the various countries and that, according to our hypo-

thesis, these differences will be due to variations in regime ideology.

In other words, it is probable that some regimes will quite consciously tie

education to economic development plans and alter the curriculum to give

it a more practical bent. That is to say, they would undertake a <u>rationa-</u>

<u>lization</u> of the educational system and curriculum in order to cope with

problems of economic development. Other regimes, with a weaker commitment

to economic growth, will tend to pay lip-service to the idea of rationaliza-

tion but will delay its implementation. The Algerian and Tunisian regimes

with their commitment to development and centralizing tendencies would

theoretically fall into the former category, while Morocco with its under-

lying conservatism would fall into the latter.

VI. Conclusion

In summary, for the purposes of this study education is seen as

affecting four areas of socio-economic interest: (1) Social Stratification,

(2) Political Socialization, (3) National Integration, (4) Economic

Growth and Planning. This thesis examines the degree to which the policy

makers in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are aware of the role of education

and the extent to which they use it to further their own plans for

development.

The major hypothesis for examination in this study is:

> The more radical and development-oriented a regime is,
> the more likely it is to use education as a tool to further
> its particular view of national development; but that the
> success of its efforts in this direction will be a function
> of its capabilities, internal and external.

Ideology can often serve as a causal explanation of policy,
because it plays such a major role in goal determination. But, in judging
policy and its implementation one must also be sensitive to the constraints
operating on the regime in question. Actual policy often does not conform
to the theoretical expectations and in such cases one must look at the
constraints that the regime has had to cope with. These constraints can
be either external or internal to the regime. An external constraint could
be a heavy dependence on foreign aid with the donor placing restrictions
on the use of this aid.

Internal constraints are more numerous. One internal constraint,
frequently found in the new nations, is the lack of strong internal organ-
ization and a high turnover of personnel which makes it difficult to carry
out consistent policies. Also, the government may have very weak control
over the population it seeks to govern.[17] A further constraint would be
the existence of contradictions in the stated ideology of the regime.
Alternatively the stated ideology could be internally consistent, but the
regime might have no real intention of implementing it. Taken together the
internal constraints may result in an education policy that on some points
is at odds with the regime's ideology of development.

[17]Aristide Zolberg brings out the ramifications of this problem with great
clarity in Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), pp. 128-151.

The study focuses on education as a policy output of the regime
and thus concentrates on policy and its implementation. In the absence of
field work it is difficult to expand this to include a detailed analysis
of the complementary question of the impact of changes in the educational
sector on the political system. Each regime's performance is evaluated
on the basis of the policies it decides upon and its implementation of
these policies.

This study consists of six chapters, including the present intro-
ductory chapter. Chapter II examines the traditional and colonial settings
in North Africa. It includes a brief history of the region and looks at
both traditional and colonial patterns of education. Chapters III through
V deal with politics and education policy in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria
since independence. Each chapter treats a separate country, but comparisons
are made to point up the differences among the three. Each chapter
analyses the style of politics and the strategies for development of the
respective regimes. This analysis is necessary to provide the background
against which the educational policies can be judged. The second part of
each chapter looks at the policies that have been followed in the field of
education, and the regime's successes and failures in implementing them.
Finally, Chapter VI presents the conclusions of the study and assesses the
validity of the hypothesis presented in the introduction.

Chapter II

The Pre-Independence Setting

I. The Pre-Colonial Period

The populated section of North Africa has always been the narrow

strip of land between the Mediterranean to the north and the Atlas Mountains

and the Sahara to the south, comprising an area of some 930,000 sq. km. This

region consists of a series of coastal plains and steppe-like highlands.

For the most part the area is cut off from the Sahara by the Atlas Mountains

which stretch from southern Morocco almost to the Tunisian border. Tradi-

tionally this has been an area of subsistence agriculture and sheep herding;

however, the natural constraints to agriculture are enormous. The lack of

rain and its irregularity have been a constant menace to farming. It has

been estimated that in an average six year period three years will have

catastrophic harvests, two will be average, and only one year will have

what might be considered a good harvest.[1] In addition to the lack of water

which dominates all other problems, there is a general lack of rich soils

in most areas. In recent years the introduction of a modern sector (in

both industry and agriculture) by the French and the discovery of a number

of new resources (notably petroleum, gas, phosphates, and a few non-ferrous

metals) has added some diversity to the economic picture.

The Maghreb has been invaded and occupied by a number of foreign

powers. Both the Phoenicians and the Romans settled in North Africa. With

the decline of the Roman empire the Byzantine empire eventually gained some

---

[1]René Gallissot, L'Economie de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 1969), p. 11.

control over the region. However, none of these powers left any lasting

traces in North Africa, and never mixed with the native Berber population.

The Arab invasion and the spread of Islam were to have lasting influence on

the Maghreb. The first Arab incursions occurred in the 7th century and

succeeded in converting the Berber population to Islam without much trouble.

The Berbers shortly thereafter rallied to a heterodoxy known as "kharidjism",

which provided an ideological base for a revolt against Arab domination.[2]

Arab domination was not assured until the 10th century and only after a

long series of wars. Since that time the Arab language and culture have

made uninterrupted progress among the Berbers to the point that today a

large part of the so-called Arabs of the Maghreb are in reality Arabized

Berbers. This process has been a gradual one and did not result in the

polarization of the two groups.

From the 10th to the 13th century a series of native dynasties

ruled over the Maghreb. In the 13th century the Almohade dynasty under

attack by the Spanish Christians on the continent and beset by internal

decadence allowed the area to fall apart, and it has never again been

unified. Although a semblance of central government was maintained in what

is now present-day Morocco, the rest of the Maghreb fragmented into an

infinite number of principalities, free ports, and autonomous federations.[3]

This state of affairs continued down to the second half of the 16th century,

when the Turkish empire extended its control to the region (excluding

Morocco, which continued to be ruled by native dynasties). However, from

---

[2]Charles-Andre Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique Blanche (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1966), p. 81.

[3]Ibid., p. 102.

the outset the control of the Porte over the area was minimal, and both the

Dey in Algeria and the Bey in Tunisia rapidly became independent rulers who

owed only nominal allegiance to Constantinople. Despite the seemingly

centralized government in Morocco (under the Alaouite dynasty), in Algeria

(under the Dey), and in Tunisia (under the Bey), in fact all three were

gravely fragmented internally, with entire regions escaping from central

control.

Morocco was formally divided into two regions: the bled el-makhzen

which was the region ruled indirectly to a greater or lesser extent by the

central administration (the makhzen), and the bled es-siba where the tribes

escaped entirely from the makhzen and no taxes could be collected.[4] Even

in the bled el-makhzen the sultan could only rule by constant recourse to

force and by delicately balancing his tribal alliances. In the times of a

weak sultan the area of the bled es-siba grew. The situation in Algeria

was even worse in that the Deys (Turkish provincial governors) were elected

rulers and had none of the divine power of the Moroccan sultans. Algeria

was divided into three beyliks (provinces) each ruled over by a largely

independent bey (also a Turkish governor) and a hierarchy of caids and

cheikhs. The area effectively controlled by the Deys and the beys corresponded

roughly to one sixth of present day Algeria.[5] Moreover the ruling class was

of Turkish origin and never was well integrated into Algerian society.

Finally, it should be noted that the Deys were usually more interested in

raiding shipping on the Mediterranean than in governing the country. In

Morocco and Algeria "ruling" the country often consisted in nothing more

---

[4]Charles-Andre Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, tome II (Paris: Payot, 1969), p. 212.

[5]Ibid., p. 295.

than tax collection. The Tunisian Bey was also of Turkish origin but was transformed into a hereditary post in the 17th century. In general the Turkish elite in Tunisia became integrated into society and lost most of its separate identity. The Beys' authority extended over most of present day Tunisia and the country prospered under them, in the early period at least (schools and roads were constructed, and commerce expanded). In brief Tunisia with a tradition of government and order dating to Carthaginian times and a largely urban population escaped the worst anarchies that afflicted its two neighbors.[6] By the early 19th century all three became increasingly opened to European commerce and the rulers of all three fell into debt, principally to France. These debts were to provide the immediate excuse for the eventual French intervention, although France's real motivation was her colonial ambition.

Given the general weakness of the governments of the Maghreb, described above, it is not surprising to find that education was neglected and that no centralized school system was in operation. However, this does not mean that it was non-existant. Education in the pre-colonial era was of a traditional Moslem type. At the primary level, the Koranic schools concentrated on memorization and recitation of the verses of the Koran.[7] At one time this memorization was made more meaningful by drills in reading and writing, but by the latter part of the 19th century students memorized the verses with little explanation or supplementary exercise. Koranic schools were found in almost every town and village in the Maghreb, but

---

[6]Ibid., p. 277.

[7]John P. Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944 (Cambridge: Center for Middle-Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1967), p. 98.

estimates of the total school population are vague and vary widely. Halstead asserts that "a large proportion" of Morocco's youth attended these schools at one time or another,[8] whereas Brown, writing about Tunisia, estimates that in 1881, 17,000 students attended these schools out of a population of 1,300,000.[9] Finally, Barbour, quoting another source, claims that practically all Algerians could read and write.[10] This last claim seems extravagant; although a substantial proportion of the male population did attend these schools in all three countries, most probably remained functional illiterates due to poor pedagogical methods and irregular attendance. Of those who attended the Koranic schools only a very few went on to follow the secondary and university level instruction given at a few mosques and medersas (a sort of boarding school usually associated with a mosque). At one time the two major university-mosques, the Qarawiyin in Fez and the Zitouna in Tunis, were active centers of learning. However, by the 19th century the curriculum consisted mainly of religious tradition, Koranic law and a dilute form of theology, and at each of the two centers the student body had sunk to no more than 1,000.

In the pre-colonial period education probably had little significant effect on the formation of elites and the ruling class, since position and power were hereditary or were acquired by conquest. In any case, education was not intended to provide any practical training. However, even if

---

[8]Ibid., p. 98.

[9]Leon Carl Brown, "Tunisia", in Education and Political Development, ed. James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 144.

[10]Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib) (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 239.

education had almost no role in creating or preserving elites it was at

the upper levels reserved in large measure for the sons of the urban bour-

geoisie. The students at the Qarawiyin were more often than not the sons

of rich Fassi families; at the Zitouna the situation was similar. The

only part of the power elite formed at these schools were the ulama and

the Koranic judges, and here education sometimes served as a means of

upward mobility for individuals of a poor background.

The role of education in the socialization process in pre-colonial

Maghreb is clear-cut. The dominance of religious subjects in the curriculum

supported the theocentric state. However, since large portions of the

population never went to school and those that did never went for long,

the most important socializing agency was the family. As a result most

individuals were primarily socialized into a tribe and only secondarily into

the "nation". The schools, although they inculcated the fundamental values

of the regime, did not occupy a very significant position in the overall

socialization process. The schools did nothing to bring about national

integration as we understand it. As has been noted above, education played

a very minor role in socialization and elite formation and therefore did

not have a very strong position from which to foster national unity.

Finally, the traditional educational system was dysfunctional with respect

to economic growth. In the first place, no practical matters were taught

and education was in no way geared to the needs of the economy. Secondly,

the religious values that were taught favored a respect of the past and a

negative attitude to change of any sort. In summary, education had only a

very minor role to play in traditional North African society of the 19th

century and this minor role could in no way be considered progressive.

The only exception to this characterization of pre-colonial
education was the foundation of Sadiqi College in 1875 by Khayr al-Din
Pasha, the progressive chief minister to the Tunisian Bey. Sadiqi College
was a secondary level school and the students there were first thoroughly
trained in Arabic and Islamic studies and then were immersed in a modern
Western secular course.[11] The school was intended to produce a small
modernized ruling elite but since it was established only six years before
the Protectorate it never really had a chance to perform this function in
an independent Tunisia. Nonetheless the teaching of a Western style
curriculum by Western instructors was a notable departure from the usual
pattern of education in pre-colonial Maghreb. The French, recognizing
the value of Sadiqi, used it throughout the colonial period to train the
native elite.

II. The Opening of the Colonial Era.

Algeria was the first of the three North African countries to
pass under French control. Following a confused argument over credits to
the Dey, a French expedition took control of Algiers in 1830, but at that
time the French Government did not intend to keep Algeria as a colony.[12]
The army, however, after a number of initiatives forced the hand of the
government and in 1847, after a long colonial war, the French achieved a
tenuous control over the entire country. However, there were periodic
uprisings for at least another 25 years. From the very outset Algeria was

---

[11]Brown, "Tunisia," p. 146.

[12]Charles-Robert Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1969), p. 9.

open to immigration from France. Although this form of colonization

slackened under the Second Empire, by 1896 there were about 578,000 colons

(the European settlers) in Algeria. This population was mainly urban

(64 per cent in 1886), but land alienation was nonetheless very great. By

the end of the colonial period the colons owned 40 per cent of the land

actually under cultivation.[13] Under the competition of the modern European

sector of agriculture, the subsistence sector gradually collapsed. Given

the size and importance of the European population, Algeria was not admini-

stered as a colonial possession, but was administered directly by the

ministries in Paris the same way that France was. The predominantly

European communes elected their own mayors and councils. In the Moslem

areas the administration was direct and French, although civil law was

left to traditional authorities and judges. The traditional Algerian

society had its structures and institutions broken and by the turn of the

century had literally collapsed.[14]

In 1881, Tunisia became the second country to fall to the French. Again, as

in Algeria, the immediate reason for intervention was the financial troubles.

of the Bey, complicated in this case by a growing Italian presence which

worried the French. However, rather than proclaim it an outright colony,

the French decided to treat Tunisia as a protectorate. In theory the Bey

was still all powerful, but in actual practice the French Resident-General

controlled all external and internal affairs.[15] The traditional corps of

[13]Gallissot, L'Economie, p. 30.

[14]Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie, p. 57.

[15]Jean Ganiage, L'Expansion Coloniale de la France, Sous la Troisième
Republique (Paris: Payot, 1968), p. 80.

administrators (caids, cheikhs, etc.) remained in place but the French

assigned their own functionaries to watch over them. In the long run the

power and prestige of the caids and cheikhs were diminished by the colonial

regime, but they nonetheless retained some power.[16] Hence the traditional

elite was not entirely broken as it was in Algeria. The European immigration

into Tunisia was considerably less than the flood of colons into Algeria.

The 1911 census shows 148,000 Europeans living in Tunisia. Furthermore

land alienation was less severe, and hit its peak at 21 per cent of the

land actually under cultivation.[17] The French intervention in Tunisia did

not cause a total disruption of the traditional society. Unlike Algeria

the colonization of Tunisia did not involve a long war of conquest, and

the subsequent political intervention and immigration was small compared

to the former. Many Tunisian middle class elements appeared to support

the Protectorate and many more were ready to learn what they could from the

apparently superior French culture. Tunisia was long known as the most

tranquil of all French colonies.

Finally, in 1912 Morocco lost its independence to the

French. Morocco's internal decomposition had long made it an easy

prey for any colonial power. After a series of crises and intricate nego-

tiations, the French were allowed to take control of most of the country

as a Protectorate, while the Spanish were given the smaller northern zone

as a Protectorate, and Tangier was declared an international city. The

French easily gained control of all of the bled el-makhzen by the end of

---

[16] Ibid., p. 291.

[17] Gallissot, L'Economie, p. 30.

1914 and gradually extended the control of the makhzen over the bled es-siba
with only minor uprisings to fight. The Protectorate rested on the fictional
sovereignty of the Sultan but as in Tunisia the Resident-General held the
real power. The central makhzen was reformed and alongside of it European-
style ministries (les services Chérifiens à personnel français) were created.[18]
Although they were briefly replaced by the French military, the traditional
civil authorities (caids, cheikhs, etc.) were progressively reorganized,
their authority defined, and reinstated. As in Tunisia, a corps of French
bureaucrats watched over their administration. The European immigration
which started before the establishment of the Protectorate reached 80,000
by the end of 1921 (this figure is for the French zone only).[19] Land
alienation was the lowest in Morocco, reaching a peak of 8 per cent, and
hence there was less forced displacement of natives to the new urban centers.[20]
Although the immediate form of colonization in Morocco was the same as in
Tunisia, over the long run the French had less influence on Moroccan
society.

III. Education in the Colonial Period

One of the cornerstones of French colonial doctrine was the concept
of assimilation. The French felt that they had a duty to give the benefits
of their civilization to all their colonial subjects; this was their mission
civilisatrice which they used to justify their possession of the colonies.

---

[18]Ganiage, L'Expansion Coloniale de la France, p. 300.

[19]Jean-Louis Miege, Le Maroc (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966),
p. 54.

[20]Gallissot, L'Economie, p. 30.

In theory this would have meant giving all the colonial peoples an education equivalent to the one in France. Moreover, once an individual has assimilated French culture, France stood ready (in theory) to grant him full citizenship. However, the French never seriously attempted to implement such a policy anywhere in their possessions. In practice, they did not accord a very high priority to education in the colonies until the end of World War II and the few cases where French citizenship was granted were exceptional and were not the result of a systematic policy.[21] They were wary of the hazards of producing a class of unemployed intellectuals.[22] In general the French cared little for education in their colonies and up to 1945 had no real coherent policy on the matter other than an instinctive distrust of educated natives.

The situation in the Maghreb was different from that in the rest of the colonies in that there was a sizable population of European settlers. The school laws of the 1880's in France provided for compulsory primary education for all children. Although the laws were not generally applied overseas, they were applied for all French citizens residing in the colonies. This meant that in Algeria, and later on in Tunisia and Morocco, a system of primary schools and lycées (the French secondary school) was established to serve the ever growing colon population. However, this school system was intended solely to serve the French and other Europeans residing in the area. Although some North Africans attended these schools from the very outset, their attendance was exceptional and not a matter of policy. Education

---

[21]Michel Debeauvais, "Education in Former French Africa," in Education and Political Development ed. James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 80.

[22]Ibid., p. 78.

for the North Africans during the colonial period is therefore best con-
sidered as a separate but related topic.

According to most sources, in the early colonial period there was
a reluctance on the part of North Africans to enter French-run schools
even when this rare opportunity presented itself.[23] The negative attitude
derived in large part from the pre-colonial tradition of totally religious
education. Education had been so intimately bound up with religion that
many North Africans undoubtedly viewed attendance in the French-run schools
as heresy. The French for their part also realized the position that
traditional education had occupied. As a result they were reluctant to
interfere directly with the traditional Moslem school system.

In Algeria, however, conditions were different because of the
large colon presence. The principle of religious freedom was declared in
Algeria but the French viewed all Moslem institutions with great suspicion.
From the Third Republic onwards the number of Koranic schools was strictly
limited, and the confiscation of goods belonging to the mosques and habous
(a religious institution that receives inheritances and carries on some
social and religious works, including education) severely limited their
ability to provide advanced instruction.[24] The fate of the Moslem school
system in Algeria was part and parcel of the destruction of the indigenous
society.

The situation in both Tunisia and Morocco was quite different.
In Tunisia the French were much more scrupulous in their dealings with

---

[23]Ageron, L'Economie, p. 70, and Miege, Le Maroc, p. 65.

[24]Ageron, L'Economie, pp. 36 & 64.

Moslem institutions; particularly with regard to the Koranic schools.[25]
These schools were modified by a native Tunisian reform movement that aimed
at introducing modern pedagogical methods and subjects into the traditional
curriculum. By the end of the colonial period these modern Koranic schools
accounted for about one out of every five children in school in Tunisia,
and provided one of the outlets for the Neo-Destour's nationalist propaganda.
However, in terms of prestige and actual numbers of pupils attending, the
Franco-Arab schools (described below) were far more important.

The fate of the Moslem schools in Morocco was much the same as
that in Tunisia. There was no serious official interference, but there
occurred nevertheless a marked decline in their relative importance. The
"free school" movement in Morocco was the equivalent of the modern Koranic
school in Tunisia; however, it started at a later date and had less influence.
Both the Qarawiyin in Fez and the Zitouna in Tunis continued to dispense an
orthodox Islamic education and in fact the size of their student bodies
started to increase in the colonial era. The Protectorate status of Morocco
and Tunisia and the smaller size of their European populations undoubtedly
protected them from the worst excesses found in Algeria. The continued
existence of Islamic-type schools was to provide a valuable political link
between the modernized nationalist elites and the masses, especially in
Tunisia.[26] In addition, these schools provided the Moroccans and Tunisians
with a bridge to their cultural past, which the Algerians did not have.

---

[25]Brown, "Tunisia," p. 147.

[26]Clement Henry Moore, Politics in North Africa (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1970), p. 51.

In Algeria, the French established a Franco-Arab school system
to dispense a mixed French-Islamic curriculum during the period of the
Second Empire. By 1870, this school system consisted of 36 primary schools,
three collèges franco-arabes (secondary level schools) and an école normale
(teacher training college). The entire system was opposed by the colons
as a threat to their domination and, with the establishment of the Third
Republic, they had their views enforced. By 1882 all the secondary schools
for North Africans had been closed and only sixteen of the primary schools
remained. Moreover, none of the French schools were opened to the North
Africans as compensation. The number of Algerian children attending French
schools in 1890 was 10,000 or 1.9 per cent of the school-age population.
In 1914, despite the development of a system of auxiliary schools run by
North Africans, only 47,263 Moslems were in school (this represents only
5 per cent of the school-age population). The secondary schools opened
their doors to an average of 150 North African students a year before 1914.
It should be noted, however, that until the end of World War I the French
were still having difficulties in getting Algerians to attend European-type
schools.[27] From 1918 onwards, the French schools became increasingly popular,
and freer access to them for all Algerians became one of the principal demands
of the growing Algerian elite that had itself been trained in these schools.
Nonetheless, the percentage of primary school-age Algerian children actually
in school in 1944 was only 8.8 per cent (the secondary schools received only
1,358 Algerian students in 1940, and for the same date only 89 in university).
Following the war considerable progress was made, so that by 1954 the rate

[27] Ageron, L'Economie, p. 71.

of school attendance was up to 14.6 per cent and over 500 students were in
university. However, by this point the legitimacy of French rule was in
question and the war for independence was just starting.

The French policy concerning education for Algerians throughout
most of the 132-year period that they controlled the contry might be character-
ized as one of malignant neglect. Algerians were for the most part excluded
from the French schools and no separate school system was set up for them.
The few who did go through the French schools became, because of their
education, alienated from their own society and culture. Most of those who
reached the secondary level were completely fluent in French yet could not
write and could barely speak their native Arabic. The best example of this
acculturation is contained in a 1936 statement by Farhat 'Abbàs in which he
denied the existence of anything that could be called an Algerian nation or
culture.[28] Although 'Abbàs and many others of the modernized elite were
later to rally to the cause of Algerian nationalism ('Abbàs himself was one
of the co-opted leaders of the F.L.N.), their desertion from the pro-French
ranks was due more to inability of the French to live up to their own ideals
than to a rejection of French culture by the Algerians themselves. Due to
the destruction of traditional society, its ruling classes included, it cannot
be said that the French used education as a means of perpetuating the tra-
ditional ruling class. However, those who did finish secondary school or
university, although from a varied background, soon formed a distinct elite
in the colonial society. This elite was ill-equipped to cope with the

---

[28]Roger Le Tourneau, Evolution Politique de l'Afrique du Nord Musulmane,
1920-1961 (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1962), p. 314.

problems of a developing society in that it was concentrated in the white-collar professions such as law.[29]

In Tunisia the French followed a quite different policy from that which they followed in Algeria. However, despite the differences, the Tunisians were confronted with many of the same educational problems by the end of the colonial era. The cornerstone of the colonial school system was the Sadiqi College which dispensed a mixed Franco-Arab curriculum. The Protectorate authorities built up around Sadiqi an entire Franco-Arab school system which approached the French schools in quality, but in which one third of the instruction was given in Arabic.[30] In addition to the Franco-Arab system a purely French system was established for the benefit of the colon population. This system was theoretically open to Tunisians as well as French, but in fact Tunisians were denied entry (usually on the grounds of inadequate preparation).[31] Although the Tunisians fared better than the Algerians in terms of total educational opportunities offered, the proportion educated was still small. The number of Tunisians in either French or Franco-Arab primary schools jumped from 2,823 in 1904 to 35,000 in 1930 (this latter figure represents 7.4 per cent of the eligible population, as compared with 5 per cent in Algeria for the same year). At the end of the Protectorate in 1955, 26 per cent of the primary school-age population was in school, while at the secondary level the figure was only 3 per cent (for comparison the equivalent primary school figure for Algeria

[29]Ageron, L'Economie, p. 86.

[30]Brown, "Tunisia," p. 148.

[31]Ibid., p. 148.

was 14.6 per cent). However impressive the pre-independence figures may

be, it must be borne in mind that they are primarily the result of the

post-war effort.[32] Nonetheless, in terms of numbers of children in school

the Tunisians fared better than either Algeria or Morocco.

The Franco-Arab system spared the Tunisians the worst forms of

acculturation that occurred in Algeria. However, the modernized elite in

Tunisia was better acquainted with French culture than with their own.[33]

It was only the existence of the modern Koranic schools and the continued

operation of the Zitouna that truly preserved something of the traditional

identity. Finally, although the French tried to favor the sons of important

families in the schools, very early in the colonial period a new elite

began to arise. This elite, which was later to lead the fight for

independence, came predominantly from lower middle class families from the

Sahil. Much like Algeria this elite was concentrated in the liberal arts.

This preference for liberal arts, which shows up in all three countries,

is due to the abstract and literary slant of French education. However, in

Tunisia teaching and government service were frequent career choices, so

that Tunisia had less difficulty in finding native cadres than did Algeria

and Morocco.

With some differences the French implemented in Morocco the same

educational policy as they did in Tunisia. Access to a European-type school

was a rare privilege throughout the colonial period for most Moroccan

children.[34] During the Protectorate, education in Morocco was dispensed in

---

[32]Ibid., p. 150.

[33]Ibid., p. 150.

[34]Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation, p. 101.

two separate school systems. The first was the French system which was

primarily reserved for the colons and dispensed the same curriculum as in

metropolitan France . In 1932, only 122 of 5,644 students in the secondary

cycle of this system were Moroccan Muslims (Moroccan Jews were counted

separately and as in Tunisia were favored by the French). The second

school system was the Franco-Moroccan system which was created to cater to

the needs of the traditional elite.[35]

In Morocco the French were more successful in limiting educational

opportunities to the sons of influential families. Those Moroccans who

reached secondary school or university were in large majority the sons of

old Fassi families, whereas in Tunisia the old bourgeoisie of Tunis

gradually lost their privileged position. The Franco-Moroccan system was

based on a mixed French-Islamic curriculum with greater weight being given

to French. Up to 1936 there were only two collèges musulmans (the title of

the secondary school in the Franco-Moroccan system) for all of Morocco.

In 1930 there were only 1,600 children in the entire Franco-Moroccan system.

Very few ever managed to progress to the secondary cycle (about 500 by

1929) and fewer still finished the cycle once in it; in the period from

1920-1934, twelve Moroccans received a baccalauréat in the French lycées

and another thirty-five finished the course of study in the collèges

musulmans.[36] Prior to World War II the school budget for the European

population (200,000) was twice as large as that for the Moroccans (6,000,000).

In 1945, only 4 per cent of the primary school-age population was in school

[35]Ibid., p. 105.

[36]Ibid., p. 107.

(compared to 8.8 per cent for Algeria and slightly more still for Tunisia).
After the war the French made a greater effort to spread education and the
Moroccan prejudices against European education broke down, so that in 1955
some 17 per cent of the eligible population was in primary school.[37]

In all three countries the French did relatively little until
World War II to carry out their mission civilisatrice in North Africa. The
educational systems they did set up had very marked effects on the societies.
Colonial education formed a readily identifiable elite of Europeanized North
Africans. This elite was most influential in Tunisia and to a lesser degree
in Morocco where the myth of the Protectorate allowed some North Africans
to acquire positions of minor power and prestige. In Tunisia this meant
the emergence of a totally new elite; in Morocco it meant a new legitimacy
for an old elite. In Algeria where the colons formed the real ruling class
there was much less place for a native elite.

Since the number of children in the modern school system was
never very large, the schools had little to do with the socialization
patterns of the broad masses of North Africans during the colonial period.
However, for the small number that were admitted, and especially those who
reached the secondary level, the colonial educational system had a significant
impact. The school's emphasis on French culture and language helped to
cut the students off from their own society: this alienation became more
pronounced as the student progressed. At its best this type of modernized
elite was a force that led the rest of society to national independence and
then articulated new goals for society, as in Tunisia. At worst, this

[37]Moore, North Africa, p. 263.

elite was largely cut off from the rest of society and could not establish
a meaningful contact nor exert a real leadership, as was the case in Morocco
and Algeria.

The colonial educational system had a dual effect on national
integration. On the one hand, it alienated those few who were in the
schools from tribal and regional loyalties. However, in itself the colonial
school system did not offer a positive national alternative. As has already
been noted, those in the schools were a tiny minority and often at the end
of the secondary cycle they had more in common with the French than with
their own countrymen. This sort of elite-mass gap is common in most of
the former colonial areas. In the long run, despite its dysfunctional
aspects, education was important in creating a new type of national elite
that had not existed before the colonial era. By introducing new political
and social ideas to North Africa in the schools, the French helped to create
the force that would end their domination.

Finally, colonial education, although it helped to keep the modern
sector of the economy running, was predicated on the supposition that the
colons would dominate the important positions in the economy. Hence, a
very small percentage of the population was given basic literacy skills
needed to work in the factories and a still smaller percentage was given
secondary education to work as clerks and as other low grade functionaries.
However, the school system was not designed to make any great contribution
to economic development. This was especially true at the secondary level
where the curriculum was theoretical and literary instead of practical and
technical (this fact resulted not so much from any colonial design for
domination as from the underlying French prejudices concerning education).

In summary, the colonial educational system was principally intended to continue French domination and made very few positive contributions to the political and economic development of North Africa. Its positive effects stemmed from its position as a modernizing institution in a traditional society.

IV. North African Society on the Eve of Independence

The impact of the colonial experience was probably as great in the Maghreb as in any other area of the world, with the exception of South Africa. This statement is especially true in Algeria, where, because of the long duration of the colonial period and the large settler presence, the traditional society was complete broken. This phenomenon reoccurred to a lesser extent in Tunisia and lesser still in Morocco. At the end of the colonial era in Algeria there was nothing left of the traditional government of the old elites. Algeria had been governed directly from France. In Tunisia the old elite was gradually dying out and a new modernized elite was supplanting it. Although the Protectorate formula had retained the traditional government, the fact that real power resided with the French Resident-General led to an erosion of the legitimacy of the former, and enhanced the position of those who could work with the French on their own terms. Because the colonial period was relatively long in Tunisia there was time enough for a new class to arise from the Franco-Arab schools. Due to the much shorter period of colonization Morocco's traditional government and class structure were the least changed of the three countries. The old Fassi families made a rather successful transition to the new semi-modern roles expected of them. A new elite was in the process of formation

in the schools in the period immediately preceding independence, but did
not have time to supplant the old elite as nationalist leaders.[38]

In the economic sphere the impact of the period of French rule
was profound and not without its repercussions on social life. The most
important factor in this respect was the massive European immigration
and the resulting land alienation, although there were marked differences
between Algeria on the one hand and Tunisia and Morocco on the other. Old
forms of collective land ownership broke down under the French drive to
establish land as a marketable commodity. In Algeria habous lands were
taken over and land belonging to "rebel" tribes and families was confiscated.[39]
The massive land alienation and the competition from the more advanced
European farms broke up the traditional rural economy and peasant way of
life, leading to widespread unemployment and underemployment. This in
turn led to a migration to the cities. Urbanisation did little to solve
the basic problem of employment, since the government and the nascent
industrial sector could absorb only a small portion of the new urban
dwellers. Ironically, Morocco which in the immediate post-war period had
the greatest industrial growth and could thus usefully sustain the new
urban population also had the least disrupted rural sector. The traditional
artisanal industry in the old cities had been in decline from the competition
of manufactured goods, now allowed free entry from France.

René Gallissot sums up the effects of the colonial system by
saying that:

[38]Moore, North Africa, p. 47.

[39]Gallissot, L'Economie, p. 27.

> Le bilan général qui résume les conséquences de la dé-
> composition de l'économie ancienne est donc simple et terrible
> à la fois: un homme adulte sur deux reste sans travail; la
> moitié de la population active est hors de la production. Les
> autres effets qui révèlent le sous-développement, accompagnent
> cette absence de travail, déjà source d'avilissement comme
> l'insuffisance alimentaire et l'analphabétisme. La ruine de
> la société traditionelle qui portait un élémentaire enseigne-
> ment arabo-musulman, s'est doublée d'un affaissement culturel.
> Au terme de la colonisation, l'exclusion de toute instruction
> apparaît catastrophique: en 1960, analphabétisme touchait
> 89% des adultes morocains, 88% des adultes algériens, 76% des
> adultes tunisiens...Trop souvent, ces faits sont présentés
> comme les effets de la seule croissance démographique, alors
> qu'ils résultent de la destruction de l'économie et de la
> société ancienne; ... un résultat de la pénétration coloniale
> à travers l'ancienne société.[40]

This pattern of colonial domination became worse as the colonial

era progressed and the North Africans became increasingly alienated from

what was their own society. Throughout the first half of the twentieth

century the size and importance of European land holdings were constantly

increasing. European immigration continued without let-up. In terms of a

percentage of the total population the Europeans were not that important

(Algeria 11 per cent; Tunisia 6.7 per cent; Morocco 5.2 per cent), but in

political and economic terms they were the ruling class. Europeans

controlled all the top and middle level jobs in industry and government.

This population was particularly concentrated in the large towns and cities

with the result that urban life became very Westernized. For the North

African all this meant the destruction of his society and patterns of life

coupled with the imposition of a new order in which he was never allowed to

fully join.

---

[40]Ibid., p. 38.

[41]Ibid., p. 77.

Of course, as a result of their investments and constructions the
French left North Africa with a substantial infrastructure. In rural areas
they built up an advanced irrigation system and introduced new crops and
techniques which did much to solve the traditional problem of agriculture
in the area, but the benefits were reserved in large part for the European-
owned farms. An advanced transport and communications system was established.
However, the system aimed at the export of raw materials and was not designed
under any overall plan of development.[42] The development of the industrial
sector was uneven. Heavy industry, such as steel and chemical works, was
rudimentary and most of the industrial development had been in secondary
industries, especially those specializing in the processing of food stuffs.
The contribution of industrial production to total internal production was
still relatively small: 22 per cent in Tunisia, 28 per cent in Algeria,
and 32 per cent in Morocco.[43] Although the industrial sector was proportion-
ally the largest in Morocco, the Moroccan proletariat remained closely tied
to its earlier rural traditions (it came to industrial work most recently
and more as a result of jobs being offered than because of any disruption
of the countryside).[44]

The French also made a great impact on the cultural and linguistic
sphere. The colonial school system and the daily necessity of working under
the French ruling class imposed a bilingualism on a large number of North
Africans. It has been estimated that in 1964, 52 per cent of the population

[42]Ibid., p. 58.

[43]Ibid., p. 65.

[44]Moore, North Africa, p. 56.

in Algeria, 44 per cent in Tunisia and 31 per cent in Morocco spoke French as a second language.[45] Language is not merely a neutral means of communication, but represents a "shaper of ideas" and a way of viewing reality.[46] In the North African context the choice between Arabic and French is of great symbolic importance in that Arabic is held to represent the Arabo-Islamic cultural tradition and identity whereas French is represented as being the key to the modern world and at the same time an instrument of colonial domination. In most cases, bilingualism poses a severe problem of identity to the individual and the majority never fully integrate themselves into either of the two value systems represented by the two languages. Although post-independence policies on this problem have varied from country to country, at the end of the colonial period the nationalists in all three countries insisted on the necessity of re-Arabizing society. This loss of identity was especially acute among those North Africans who had spent any time in the colonial secondary schools.

On balance, it can be said that the French did too much and too little for North African society. On the one hand the influx of large numbers of colons, entailing as it did widespread land alienation, massive dislocation of the rural society and disruption of the traditional urban society, was too much for these countries to cope with. On the other hand, the French did far too little in the way of positive construction to supplant the structures and institutions they destroyed (i.e. industrialization, improvement of traditional agriculture, and the establishment of a school

---

[45]J.A. Fishman, C.A. Ferguson, & J.D. Gupta, ed., Language Problems of Developing Nations (New York: John Wily, 1968), p. 134.

[46]Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality (Cambridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 212-213.

system that could bridge the gap between the old and the new). The mix of

positive and negative effects varied from country to country and this mix

had much to do with the shaping of the outlook of the nationalist leaders

who led their respective countries to independence. It also played a

major role in the formation of the post-independence policies followed in

each country.

An excellent analysis of the colonial dialectic is presented by

Moore in his Politics in North Africa. In summarizing his own arguments he

states that:

> ...the circumstances of the French presence were more conducive
> in Tunisia than elsewhere to a constructive conflict engendering
> new bases of social and political cohesion. Algeria experienced
> too much social disruption and a conflict too violent to promote
> new elites capable of reknitting the many and varied segments
> of its society. Morocco, on the other hand, was too lightly
> touched for conflict basically to transform the old patrimonial
> structure and its segmented underpinnings. Tunisia was the
> most fortunate, in retrospect, because the French presence did
> not, as in Algeria, eradicate the traditional elites who were
> the carriers of Tunisia's past, yet it provided favorable
> circumstances for the new elite to displace the old and rein-
> terpret its values and practices in light of modern European
> models.[47]

When independence came in North Africa (Morocco in March 1956;

Tunisia in March 1956; Algeria in July 1962) it brought different social

forces to power in each case. In Morocco the leader of the nationalist

movement was the king, Mohammed V, who led the country to independence

through negotiations with the French. Mohammed V was the only leader that

all Moroccans could agree on and was obviously a representative of the

traditional elite. In Tunisia independence was achieved by Habib Bourguiba

---

[47] Moore, North Africa, pp. 62-63.

and the Neo-Destour party, and entailed the abdication of the Bey. Bourguiba,
who comes from a relatively modest Sahil family but who nonetheless managed
to get through Sadiqi College and go on to study law in Paris, is quite
representative of Tunisia's new elite. The peaceful transition to inde-
pendence in Morocco and in Tunisia contrast sharply with the long bloody
war that had to take place for Algeria to gain independence. Unfortunately,
the Algerian revolution produced no real nationalist political organization
or great charismatic leaders (Ben Bella who emerged after the war was quite
popular but never channeled the energies of his supporters into any long-
term programs). Algeria's leaders all subscribed to a vague revolutionary
socialism, but never agreed on a coherent action-oriented ideology.

V. Educational Policy Problems in North Africa

As has been shown above the colonial experience affected the three
North African countries in varying degrees. However, all three have had to
face similar problems once independence was achieved. Foremost among these
problems have been those of education. The needs and problems of education
in each of the three countries were much the same. In brief they can be
summarized under four interrelated categories: (1) Arabization, (2) demo-
cratization, (3) nationalization, and (4) rationalization. As will be
illustrated below, these policy categories are related to the four areas
of theoretical interest outlined in the Introduction.

For the nationalist elites one of the major problems with the
colonial school system was the emphasis it placed on the French language
and culture. In all three countries the nationalist leaders decried the
process of acculturation that was taking place in the schools. There was

universal agreement that one of the major needs to be fulfilled after
independence was the need to Arabize the schools. In other words, the
Arabic language was to replace French as the language of instruction in
the schools. Arabization was an almost universally popular program.
Traditionalists approved of it as the first step towards recapturing the
Arabo-Islamic past, while the modernists saw it as a means of creating
national unity and throwing off the colonialist yoke. However, all three
countries soon found that the colonial school system could not be changed
without incurring other problems.

In the first place, there are very considerable differences
between classical Arabic, which is written but not spoken, and dialectal
Arabic which is spoken but not written. Secondly, none of the countries
had enough teachers trained in Arabic and capable of teaching in that
language. The majority of native North African teachers had been trained
in French. Finally, there is the problem of the Arabic language itself,
Despite the progress made in recent years in modernizing Arabic, it remains,
relative to Western languages, weak in technical and scientific vocabulary.
The modernist opponents of Arabization who have sprung up since independence
have probably overly emphasized the problem, but even the traditionalists
recognize that the problem exists.

Arabization of the schools affects the socialization patterns of
the country and more importantly it can reduce some of the rigidities of
social stratification. Clearly, if the elite is educated in Arabized schools,
then the linguistic element in the elite-mass gap disappears. Arabization
can also have indirect effects on economic growth. Since the effort at

Arabization has often entailed a drop in the quality of education, it thus adversely affects the quality of manpower furnished to the economy.

The second major policy problem in the field of education is that of democratization. Here democratization is taken to mean the opening of the school system to the entire population. The school system the French left in the Maghreb was clearly elitist in its operation. Thus one of the major goals in all three countries has been the expansion of the school system. More concretely the policies in this area have aimed at universal primary school attendance and a greatly enlarged secondary school and university program. It should be noted from the outset that although all the countries have expanded their school systems not all have done this with an eye to making them more democratic. The rapid expansion of the school system, coupled with the shortage of teachers, has led to a marked deterioration in the quality of education.

Obviously the effort to democratize the schools has as its aim the removal of some of the rigidities of social stratification. In the past the schools had been instrumental in forming elites and now it is the hope in some circles that they will be instrumental in making the elite more democratic in its make-up.

The desire to nationalize education is a more general symptom of the same anti-colonial feeling that led to demands for Arabization. Nationalization is taken to mean the teaching of a national culture in the schools by teachers of the same national origin. The emphasis on French culture in the schools which were predominantly staffed by French teachers lies at the root of this movement. Here again there have been some difficulties in implementation. Nationalization presupposes an adequate supply of native

teachers and professors at all levels in the school system. Yet even today, more than a decade after independence, this is definitely not the case.

Nationalization of the schools affects the socialization patterns of the country in that the country's youth is being inculcated with a national culture. It also has much the same effect on social stratification as Arabization does, since by ensuring a common socialization experience to all it breaks down the elite-mass gap. And more generally, by helping to overcome rigidities of social stratification, nationalization promotes national integration.

Finally, rationalization refers to planning education for national economic development. In other words, the schools are used to satisfy in some rational way the manpower needs of the country. Demands for rationalization usually come from the modernized elite who are cognizant of the risks of producing a generation of students educated in inappropriate areas. In North Africa proposals for rationalization have included measures that would put a ceiling on secondary general education and liberal arts at the university level and redirect the funds to relatively high-cost technical education. Proponents of rationalization often urge the retention of French as the language of instruction since in their eyes Arabic is not yet suited for technical purposes. Such programs are not popular in most of the Maghreb since the population still regards mass education as a desirable goal in itself and has a great emotional attachment to the goal of Arabization. However, for a variety of reasons in government circles demands for rationalization, particularly at the post-primary levels, are being viewed with increasing favor.

Arabization, democratization, nationalization, and rationalization in education have then been the focus of governmental policy in all of the countries of the Maghreb. However, in each country the regime in question has often been able to lay aside or defuse one or more problems while concentrating its efforts on the solution of others. Any comparative analysis must therefore pay special attention to those problems a particular regime chooses for attention, as well as why it ignores the others.

Chapter III

Moroccan Immobilisme

I. The Style of Politics

In the Maghreb, Morocco has probably been the least touched by the colonial experience. Not only was the period of colonial domination the shortest, lasting only 44 years, but the French allowed many traditional Moroccan institutions and customs to go unchanged. Of major importance in understanding the policies and problems of the new regime after independence is the fact that the old ruling elite of Morocco had been able to make a successful transition to the new semi-modern society, and that its position had not been challenged by any new social group. There is a striking continuity of a few well-to-do Fassi families in Moroccan politics from the pre-Protectorate period down to the present.[1] It was only a slightly changed traditional ruling elite which took power after the departure of the French. This meant that the new Moroccan government had a great deal of traditional legitimacy, since the Sultan had never lost his traditional, quasi-religious appeal to the people and at the same time had a certain nationalist appeal to the modernized elements of Moroccan society.

The rise of the nationalist movement in Morocco in the 1930s and 1940s had the effect of bringing a group of traditionalistic thinkers to the fore, since the completely westernized elements in society were not yet strong enough to lead such a movement. In 1943 the leaders of this movement formed a political party called the Istiqlal (the Independence Party) and named Allal al-Fassi as their leader. Allal al-Fassi and the Istiqlal

---

[1]Octave Marais, "La classe dirigeante au maroc," Revue Française de Science Politique, XIV (August 1964), p. 735.

looked to Islam and the Moroccan past for their inspiration and quite

naturally fixed on the Sultan as the symbol of the nation they hoped to

liberate. The Sultan, or king, as he was progressively termed, was at

this time Mohammed V. Himself a skillful politician, Mohammed V rapidly

became the real leader of the nationalist movement. The French inadver-

tently reinforced his stature as a nationalist when they deposed him and

sent him into exile in 1953. The public outcry against this move was

totally unexpected and was so great that in 1955 Mohammed V was returned

to the throne. By this time his popularity was so great that the French

were forced to negotiate the terms of independence with him. Although

Allal al-Fassi possessed a considerable following, the Istiqlal was not a

unified organization with close contacts with the masses. In fact, the

party was already badly divided between its traditionalistic wing and the

modern wing which was eventually to break away. Therefore when independence

came in 1956 there was no group sufficiently strong to contest Mohammed V's

assertion that he was the retainer of the nation's sovereignty.[2] The

uneducated masses believed in his traditional legitimacy, while the seg-

mented forces of modern nationalism looked to him to satisfy their demands

for a national government.[3]

The survival of the monarchy since independence has depended on

the relatively homogeneous social make-up of the political elite and the

political factionalization of the same elite. Waterbury estimates that the

[2]John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite: A Study in Segmented Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 267.

[3]Clement Henry Moore, Politics in North Africa (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 79.

political elite of present-day Morocco numbers about one thousand men at

the most, who to an astonishing degree are bound together by ties of

friendship or family.[4] Socially this elite is much the same as that which

governed pre-Protectorate Morocco except that relative to the rest of the

population it has a high level of Western education and is modernized.

The introversion that characterizes this elite is heightened by the

increasing tendency to inter-marriage among elite families. The important

families interpenetrate each other, the political parties, and the government.

Even the UMT (Union Marocaine du Travail), the largest of Morocco's trade

unions has its share of scions of notable families.[5] Thus in any given

situation these interpersonal relationships are as important as the formal

political roles that the individuals are filling. These personal links

help to ensure that no radical positions not susceptible to reconciliation

are taken by the political actors. Moreover, the web of social and family

ties among the political elite prevents the emergence of political parties

with clearly articulated ideologies and social bases. The elite which

should provide the leadership for such parties is wary of extreme or inflexible

positions and is usually more interested in spoils and patronage.

The king has survived by creating and encouraging the political

factionalization of this elite and then controlling their competition for

power and patronage. The result is a political fragmentation not found in

either Tunisia or Algeria, but a form of fragmentation that does not reach

very deeply into Moroccan society. In the short-run this sort of fragmentation

---

[4]Waterbury, The Moroccan Political Elite, p. 86.

[5]Moore, North Africa, p. 188.

is not dangerous to the king since the social homogeneity of the political
elite prevents it from becoming hardened or from spreading to the rest of
the population. Morocco has a multi-party system with at least six prominent
parties, two major labor unions, and a variety of institutional interest
groups representing land-owners, commercial interests and the students.
Furthermore, within the government itself the army and the Ministry of the
Interior are both powerful groups in their own right. In addition to these
formal groups, the leaders of the tribes and the Fassi cultural-religious
establishment also enter into the bargaining process. However, almost
without exception these groups are controlled by the elite, and the positions
they take tend to reflect to a considerable degree the divisions among the
elite and not the expression of constituency demands.[6] The palace as the
sole source of patronage and legitimacy can play one group off against another
with the assurance that the elite's social homogeneity will hold the whole
segmented system together. To keep this style of politics viable the king
must ensure that no one faction becomes too powerful, and at the same time
he cannot let any faction disappear since that would leave him with fewer
alternative coalitions. Above all, this system depends on the social
cohesion of a small elite that does not seek solutions outside the system.
The rise of a larger heterogeneous group from the secondary schools and
the university poses therefore a fundamental problem for the Moroccan
political system.

In the short-run, the system has been maintained by keeping the
political elite satisfied and ensuring that no social group is antagonized.

---

[6]Ibid., p. 207.

This style of politics is strongly reminiscent of the pre-Protectorate system in which the king carefully balanced his tribal alliances. However, if the tension and competition hold the segmented system together in the short-run they also lead to a stalemate in terms of policy formulation that in the long-run may well endanger it. The country is caught in what the French call immobilisme because the palace cannot undertake broad long-range programs to modernize the country since such programs would disrupt the delicate balance of factions. Moreover, since most of the influential factions tend to be conservative in their outlook they oppose any sort of planning, which to them means socialism.[7]

The short-term necessity of political control has consistently taken precedence over the long-range necessity of economic growth and modernization.[8] The king is almost entirely caught up in the day-to-day problems of manipulating elite conflicts and, as a result, long-range strategies are rarely formulated. From time to time the monarch may announce some spectacular program to solve this or that problem. However, he is able to give only limited attention to any one particular problem and being unwilling to delegate responsibility to the bureaucracy he is soon forced to drop his own programs. Contributing to the overall confusion and lack of direction is the fact that the king is perpetually reshuffling his cabinet and as a consequence no minister ever becomes really familiar with his field.

In such a system, the only political institution of lasting importance is the monarchy. The other institutions of government have been

[7]Ibid., p. 142.

[8]Waterbury, The Moroccan Political Elite, p. 304.

changed to fit the king's convenience. Mohammed V had committed himself

to giving the country a constitutional monarchy, but died in 1961 before

fulfilling this promise. His son, Hassan II, had a constitution written

and approved in a referendum in 1962. This constitution was inspired

by the French Fifth Republic with the monarch occupying the position of

the President. Although the king's unofficial party controlled the Parlia-

ment the whole parliamentary system proved nonetheless to be a nuisance

to the normal style of Moroccan politics. In 1965, therefore, as his

majority began to crumble, Hassan II dismissed the Parliament and, under

an emergency powers clause, reassumed all power. Since 1965, Hassan has

ruled as the arbiter of contending factions. In 1970 he proposed and had

approved by referendum a new constitution. Although it is far too early

to comment on its actual operation, the terms of this document make it

clear that the monarchy retains considerable powers.[9] Given the societal

context of Moroccan politics it is likely that these powers will be used

for political manipulation rather than development.

II.   Regime Strategies of Development.

Within the Moroccan context it is difficult to speak of clearly

articulated strategies of development or regime ideology. Given the style

of Moroccan politics, policy is usually a result of successive short-term

compromises worked out by the king to satisfy contending elite factions.

The primary goal of both Mohammed V and Hassan II has been the institution-

alization of the monarchy. To achieve this goal in the short-term both men

---

[9] William Spencer, "Morocco's Monarchical Balancing Act," _Africa Report_ XV
(December 1970), p. 21.

have been dependent on the traditional elite. This dependence has in turn

resulted in a patchwork of short-lived policies aimed at preserving the

status quo by pleasing all the contending factions. Long-range strategies

aimed at shaping the Moroccan society of the future are absent.

In the sphere of economic policy the palace has allowed the

landowners and private industrialists to dictate their own terms in the

formulation of economic plans. The private sector is more influential in

Morocco than in either Tunisia or Algeria. The landowners have blocked

almost all projects of agrarian reform and as a result Moroccan agricultural

policy closely resembles the colonial policy of credits and extension work,

but no fundamental reform. In addition, agricultural policies have aimed

at keeping the population on the land by mitigating rural misery with a

series of "make-work" projects, which keep the population employed but are

of questionable economic value.[10] In the short-run this serves the king's

interests since the reformed traditional rural administration, now under

the control of the Ministry of the Interior, is one of the monarchy's most

reliable instruments and effectively screens the countryside from potential

troublemakers.[11] In the long-run the lack of a coherent policy of rural

reform will pose serious problems for the monarchy, since agricultural

production is stagnating while the population is expanding. The rural

sector is already characterized by falling production and diminishing

caloric intake.[12]

---

[10]René Gallissot, L'Economie de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), p. 124.

[11]Moore, North Africa, p. 137.

[12]Waterbury, The Moroccan Political Elite, p. 305.

Economic planning in Morocco has not been very successful
primarily because the king is unwilling to endanger his political support
by radically transforming the economy. Moreover, the planning process in
Morocco, such as it is, is rigidly controlled by the palace and does not
include most of the important political factions.[13] Little has been done
to mobilize public support and interest for the Plan and nearly all pro-
jects become bogged down in bureaucratic delays and quarreling.[14] The
plans have few specific proposals for agriculture and are especially weak
on the problems of manpower development.[15] Finally, having been excluded
from the formulation of the plans, the influential groups (e.g., the unions,
farmers' organizations and the political parties) refuse to support them.

For the most part the private sector is unaffected by the so-called
economic plans. The first Moroccan Plan (1960-1964) called for substantial
private investment, both foreign and domestic, but in fact private capital
left the country faster than it entered it in the first years of the Plan.[16]
Therefore the first Plan had to be abandoned in 1963. A second Plan for
the period 1965-1967 was announced in 1964. Morocco's second Plan was
little more than an investment schedule for the various ministries and not
a true plan for economic development. Even the modest provisions of this
Plan were not met and the growth of the economy has barely kept up with that
of the population. Morocco lags far behind Algeria and Tunisia in its
ability to extract revenue from the population and its economy is heavily

---

[13]Douglas E. Ashford, Morocco-Tunisia, Politics and Planning (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1965). p. 35.

[14]Ibid., p. 37.

[15]Ibid., p. 42.

[16]Gallissot, L'Economie, p. 83.

dependent on foreign aid (the public foreign debt in 1964 had already reached 40 per cent of the G.D.P.).[17] The public and semi-public sectors did acquire increased importance as the state took over the marketing and export of a number of commodities. However, the private commercial elite has assured itself of the neutrality, if not the partiality, of these state-controlled sectors by having their own men placed in charge of them.

Waterbury provides a concise summary of the economic problems of Morocco:

> It has already been posited that the monarchy is unwilling to sponsor dynamic programs of economic development that would have as one of their results a certain amount of social and economic upheaval. The short term necessity of political control has consistently superseded the long term necessity of vigorous economic growth. The fact that Morocco, relative to many other countries in the Near and Middle East, has considerable economic potential, may have lulled the monarchy and the elite into a false sense of security. A low level of investment, a steady capital flight, and a high birth rate have stifled the modest economic growth rate since independence.[18]

Rather than articulate new social goals for the nation, the monarchy has been content to extol the virtues of traditional Moroccan society. The reliance on traditional values and institutions flows logically from the class make-up of the regime. The important supporters of the monarchy all represent some aspect of the traditional society. Moreover, the legitimacy of the monarchy as an institution rests in large part on the king's position as "Commander of the Faithful", i.e., the

---

[17]Moore, North Africa, p. 133, and Gallisot, L'Economie, p. 84.

[18]Waterbury, The Moroccan Political Elite, p. 304.

religious leader of the nation. Thus the regime aims at reinforcing the position of the traditional elites and encourages the observance of traditional customs and values. In Morocco, reformist trends in Islam are frowned upon by the Moroccan religious leaders.[19] The religion that the king protects is an institutionalized outlet for despair and not an ideology for social transformation.[20] However, as Morocco becomes increasingly urbanized, Islam and patrimonial styles of authority seem increasingly inappropriate.

III. The Educational Problems of Morocco

Moroccan educational policies reflect many of the contradictions and tensions of its overall political life. The educational policies also reflect the traditionalistic nature of national politics. The Istiqlal, with its Arabo-Islamic nationalist outlook, has been especially concerned that education be Arabized and nationalized. Mohammed V and Hassan II both have been committed, in word at least, to the principle of Arabization. Thus it is that since independence the country has been committed to Arabizing its schools. However, balancing the Istiqlal's demands for complete Arabization, the professionals and civil servants of the Ministry of National Education have stressed the importance of maintaining high standards in the schools. At first these pleas went unheeded, but as the negative effects of hasty Arabization became increasingly clear they were listened to. Nonetheless, the forces for Arabization still hold the upper hand.

---

[19]Ibid., p. 317.

[20]Moore, North Africa, p. 151.

At independence there were strong demands for the immediate
expansion of the school system, especially at the primary level. These
demands came from all quarters and were impossible for the regime to ignore.
The government, like the governments of Algeria and Tunisia, gave into these
demands, but unlike the latter two the Moroccans gave little or no thought
to the direction which the expansion ought to take. The school expansion
in Morocco was poorly coordinated and did not include planning by educational
experts.

To implement its hastily conceived plans for Arabization and
democratization the government was forced into an equally hasty program
of nationalization of both the teaching corps and the curriculum. This
has meant the hiring of poorly trained teachers at all levels to teach the
Arabic language curriculum. The net effect of the three programs has been
a general and consistent lowering of the standards in Moroccan schools.

In general, educational policy has been a series of short-lived
compromises with only a bare semblance of continuity. The Ministry of
National Education has very poor statistical services and has never been
able to engage in effective manpower planning. This has meant that calls
for rationalization are impractical since the ministry does not have the
know-how to carry them out; besides they would be politically unpopular
since they would limit the expansion of the school system. Adding to the
overall confusion has been the rapid turnover of the Ministers of Education:
from 1956 to 1970 there have been nine changes, including a two-year
period when the ministry was split into four separate ministries.

A. Democratization

When Morocco achieved independence in 1956 the two most emphasized problems relating to the schools were Arabization and democratization. In terms of democratization the Moroccans have accomplished little and have limited themselves to a school expansion program. The expansion of the school system was undertaken in a haphazard manner and has therefore raised a number of new problems. The expansion of the schools was supported by all the influential political groups at the time of independence. The program had great popular appeal in that the French had created a generalized demand for education among Moroccans but had never satisfied it. Curiously enough the political elite made no effort to thwart the plans for the spread of education, despite the fact that its style of politics depended on a restricted access to secondary schools and the university. It seems as if the elite gave in to popular demands without thinking through to their consequences. The creation of a large class of educated young people in the vastly expanded school system will pose serious problems for the elite. For reasons detailed below, Morocco is only just now beginning to experience problems in this regard. However, in the long-run problems of elite absorption will endanger the particular style of politics that Morocco has developed. Yet, the present elite, after a brief period of concern following the student-worker riots of 1965 in Casablanca, has "ceased to worry about their successors and have returned to the womb of their own internal intrigues."[21] The rapid expansion of the primary and secondary school systems was the one educational reform with near universal support and therefore was the only reform to be fully implemented.

---

[21]Waterbury, The Moroccan Political Elite, pp. 313-314.

Viewed in numbers of children in school, the progress accomplished
is most impressive. While only 17 per cent of the primary school children
were in school in 1956, by 1965 some 60 per cent were.[22] From a total
of 438,918 primary school pupils in 1956 Morocco had progressed to 1,105,237
in 1967 (see Table II). There was a corresponding growth in the number of
school buildings to accommodate this explosion in enrollment. Although
there was a worsening of the teacher-pupil ratio in the early 1960s according
to UNESCO statistics the ratio is now back to the pre-independence level.[23]
Since 1965 primary school enrollment has been leveling off and in fact there
has been a slight decline (see Table II). It appears that the Ministry of
National Education decided to limit primary enrollment and concentrate on
the secondary cycle.[24] This corresponds with an increasing concern being
voiced in government circles to improve the quality of education. Although
Morocco has made very real progress towards its stated goal of universal
primary education, it has lagged behind its two neighbors. But more
importantly, the progress it has made is seriously flawed.

The expansion of the primary schools was essentially haphazard
with little thought given to the future needs of the country.[25] The school
construction program was uncoordinated, involved scant local participation,
and often the new schools were without teachers or textbooks. In its report
on the Moroccan school system the World Bank found a marked imbalance between

[22]UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1969 (Paris: UNESCO, 1970), pp. 70-77.

[23]Ibid., pp. 139-145.

[24]André Tiano, Le Maghreb Entre les Mythes (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1967), p. 72.

[25]Douglas E. Ashford, "Attitudinal Change and Modernization," in Modernization
by Design ed. by Chandler Morse et al.

rural and urban enrollment, thus indicating that although the school system had been expanded it had not been made more democratic.[26] The same report showed that teacher shortages and inadequacies in the school building program resulted in many first and second year classes going to half time schedules and double shifts for the teachers. From 1956 to 1967 there has been a slight regression in the percentage of females enrolled in the primary schools (see Table II). All sources note a marked decline in the level of Moroccan education as a result of the rapid expansion of the system. Although the program of Arabization played a role in this decline, it is principally due to the hasty expansion of the system.

At the secondary and higher levels the expansion of the school system has been even more spectacular, in terms of the total number of students in school and even more wasteful in terms of its results. In 1956 only 4 per cent of the secondary school-age population was in school whereas by 1967 12 per cent was in school.[27] This meant an increase in student enrollment from 31,367 in 1955 to 287,039 in 1967 (both figures include secondary enrollment of all types, i.e. general, vocational, and teacher training; see Tables III-V).

For higher education the increase in enrollment has been from 1,771 students in 1955 to 9,034 in 1967.[28] Higher education in Morocco is dispensed primarily at the University Mohammed V in Rabat and a variety of specialized institutes for engineering, teacher training, agronomy, etc. The university is a creation of the post-independence era. In addition to modern subjects the university also has a number of traditional courses of study, especially in the faculties of law and letters. Finally, the

[26]International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Morocco (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 246.
[27]UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1969, pp. 70-77.
[28]Ibid., pp. 257-260.

Qarawiyin in Fez has survived as a separate institution and continues to
offer a completely traditional curriculum. Morocco devotes some 40 per
cent of annual budget for education to secondary and higher education
(see Table VIII).

However, the criticisms pertaining to the development of mass
primary education are equally applicable at the secondary and university
levels. The development of the two upper levels of the school system was
not guided by any coherent plan and little consideration seems to have been
given to the future manpower needs of the country. At the secondary level
most of the students are enrolled in general education courses and the
enrollment in vocational courses is extremely low (see Table VI).

The expansion of secondary and higher education has not helped
to make the system notably more democratic. The school system still has
a marked bias in favor of urban areas. The percentage of females enrolled
in the secondary schools and the university has shown a marked decline since
independence. The existence of a number of elite schools is a basic barrier
to the democratization of the system. The well-to-do Moroccan families
send their children to the school system operated by the Mission Universitaire
et Culturelle Française (MUCF) or to a number of French-style schools operated
by the Ministry of National Education itself. The MUCF received approximately
15,000 Moroccan children at both the primary and secondary level each year
and gives them a high quality French education. It seems that these children
are destined to take over the elite positions of their parents.[29] In addition
to the lycées run by the MUCF the Moroccans themselves operate sixteen

---

[29]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," Maghreb XXXVII (January-February
1970), p. 41.

schools which offer the same curriculum as a French lycée with the same
high standards.[30] Thus even the government-run secondary system is elitist
and anti-democratic in its operation.

In summary, although the Moroccans have made a notable effort
at expanding the school system they have not consciously tried to make it
more democratic. The operation of a number of elite schools aims at
preserving the present elite. Thus far Morocco has been able to absorb
the other secondary and university graduates without any major problems.
This has been due to the large number of positions that were opened by the
departure of the colon population. But with the economy stagnating and
the civil service lists saturated, Morocco is beginning to develop an
unemployed intellectual proletariat. As the standards in the secondary
schools have declined, both public and private employers have become
increasingly wary of hiring secondary school graduates.[31] This growing
pool of disappointed elite aspirants will, almost undoubtedly, pose
serious problems for the regime, and is the result of an ill-conceived
expansion program. This expansion program has not made the schools notice-
ably more democratic, nor has it helped to preserve the elite's position in
the long-run, since the disappointed elite aspirants will threaten the
present style of politics.

B. Arabization

The problem of Arabization has been the subject of much heated
debate in Morocco and has caused more trouble for the Minister of National
Education than any other issue. Arabization was set as one of the major

---

[30]Martena Sasnett and Inez Sepmeyer, Education Systems of Africa (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1966), p. 70.

[31]Waterbury, The Moroccan Political Elite, p. 307.

goals in education after independence. It was and still is a very emotional

issue in the country and the Istiqlal has portrayed those who urge caution

on the subject as traitors. Yet despite its emphasis on the matter Morocco

has been unable to make much more progress on it than either of its two

neighbors, both of which have placed relatively less emphasis on the

problem. After the failure of a massive effort at Arabization immediately

following independence, the Moroccans have had to settle for a de facto

bilingual policy in the schools. Yet the forces in favor of Arabization,

the Istiqlal above all, remain powerful and repeated efforts have been

made to force the pace.

In appointing Mohammed al-Fassi, a founding member of the Istiqlal

and a former rector of the Qarawiyin, as first Minister of National Education,

the king appointed a leading partisan of Arabization. With Mohammed V's

complete support, al-Fassi set out, in 1956, a plan that called for expansion

of the entire system and its rapid Arabization. The program of Arabization

envisaged by al-Fassi provided for immediate Arabization of the first grade

and the progressive Arabization of the remaining primary grades to a total

of two-thirds of curriculum by 1959.[32] There were no immediate plans

announced for the secondary level. The whole program was to be accomplished

in a period of time much shorter than was deemed wise by the experts in the

ministry. The language used in this program was an ad hoc mixture of

Moroccan dialectal and classical Arabic.[33]

In attempting to implement this policy the Moroccans encountered

serious difficulties; primarily relating to the lack of teachers trained to

---

[32] I. William Zartman, Problems of New Power: Morocco (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 163.

[33] Ibid., p. 167.

teach in Arabic. At this time nearly half of the primary school teachers
in the Moroccan system were French and at the secondary level nearly 90 per
cent of the professors were French.[34] Thus the system simply did not have
the teachers necessary to give lessons in Arabic. Moreover, there were
no textbooks for the Arabized courses. The result was that Arabization was
carried out on an ad hoc basis when conditions permitted. The informal
manner of implementation, combined with the chaos brought on by the expansion
of the school system, makes it impossible to cite any reliable figures on
Arabization for this period. The only fact that is clear is that the
al-Fassi plan resulted in a general decline in the quality of teaching at
both the primary and secondary levels, without at the same time achieving
one of the principal objectives it set itself, i.e. the Arabization of the
schools.

By late 1956 al-Fassi was already under attack for the conditions
of chaos in the schools. In May 1958 he was replaced as minister by a man
with a reputation as a competent administrator, which everyone agreed
al-Fassi was not. The new Minister of National Education began a cautious
policy of retrenchment that slowed down enrollment and Arabization.[35] This
move reflected the thinking of the professionals in the ministry who favored
Arabization and expansion as long-term goals but who insisted on maintaining
some semblance of quality in the meantime. Nonetheless pressures for
immediate Arabization were still strong and the ministry was forced to keep
up a pace that it deemed too fast. Debate on the pace of Arabization has
never subsided in Morocco and the Istiqlal continues to make it an emo-
tionally charged issue. Thus far the Moroccans have not been able to agree

[34]Ibid., p. 166.

[35]Ibid., p. 192.

on a permanent policy on the matter. In the short period from 1956 to 1960 there were seven different official and semi-official plans proposed.[36]

From 1960 to 1970 the pace of Arabization has been slowed somewhat, and Morocco has made more modest progress towards the goal of total Arabization. However, there is a considerable gap between official slogans and actual achievements. The progress that has been accomplished has been disorganized and has contributed to the continued low standards in the schools. Much of the progress is due to the now greater supply of Moroccan teachers. By 1965 primary instruction was almost entirely in Moroccan hands. Yet this has entailed an acceptance of many persons without the minimum qualifications for teaching. For the academic year 1969-1970 it appears that the first two years of the primary cycle were completely Arabized, with the subsequent years having fifteen hours a week in Arabic and fifteen in French. At the end of the five primary grades a one year classe d'observation has been added to try and bring up the students' knowledge of French, which appears to be quite low.[37] In the first half of the secondary cycle only one third of the curriculum is taught in Arabic; while in the second half only Lettres Originelles (Traditional Literature) is given in Arabic.[38] Even with the addition of the classe d'observation most students have great difficulty adjusting to the secondary school curriculum, because their knowledge of French is so weak. The switch in language from the primary to the secondary is one of the major causes of the high failure rate in the secondary.

---

[36]Ibid., p. 186.

[37]Le Monde (Paris) October 6, 1967, p. 5.

[38]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," Maghreb, p. 44.

Although the proponents of Arabization have failed in their goal

of immediate Arabization they have managed to keep the traditional system

from being incorporated into the larger Franco-Arab system. Morocco there-

fore continues to have two distinct school systems: (1) the traditional

system which is completely Arabized and dispenses a largely traditional

education, and (2) the semi-modern system which accounts for the vast

majority of school children and dispenses a mixed curriculum. The tradi-

tional system at all levels accounts for only 65,000 students, including

those at the Qarawiyin.[39] Although the Ministry of National Education

officially administers this system and sets standards, in fact the tradi-

tional system is semi-independent and its standards are, in the main, much

lower than those in the regular system. The curriculum is basically Islamic,

but includes a hodgepodge of modern subjects. This system enjoys a lower

prestige than the regular system and its Arabized graduates find it par-

ticularly hard to find employment. In Morocco it has the reputation of

being a political sop for the traditional elements of the Istiqlal.

In summary, although the Istiqlal, and to a slightly lesser extent

the king, have widely proclaimed their support for Arabization the actual

pace of the program has been disappointing to both parties. It was carried

out in the first years without detailed plans and at a far too rapid pace

considering Morocco's pedagogical resources. Since 1958 it has advanced

at a more reasonable pace, but apparently little thought was given to the

students' difficulties in transition from the largely Arabized primary cycle

to the largely French secondary cycle. Furthermore, when the students

---

[39]Ibid., p. 44.

graduate from the schools they find little use for the Arabic they have
learned, since French is still the dominant language of government and
business.

C. Nationalization

The problem of nationalization of the school system is largely
bound up with the problems of Arabization and democratization. Although
nationalization includes much more, Arabization can be seen as part of it,
in the sense that it is the use of the national language that is being
promoted. However, this section is devoted to some of the other problems
of nationalization. Apart from demands for Arabization, demands for
nationalization focused on curriculum changes and the replacement of
foreigners in the teaching staff. The colonial curriculum, although it did
allot time to the teaching of Moroccan subjects, was heavily oriented to
French culture. As was noted above, Frenchmen in large numbers taught in
the school system at all levels. The nationalists and the monarchy sought
the elimination of this foreign bias in the schools by devising a distinctively
Moroccan curriculum which was to be taught by Moroccans.

Efforts at creating a truly national curriculum paralleled those
at Arabization. During the period in which Mohammed al-Fassi was Minister
of Education, from 1956 to 1958, he generated a considerable enthusiasm for
curriculum changes. However, the attempts to change the curriculum in a
short period of time ran into the same problems that were encountered by
the program of Arabization. The curriculum changes he envisaged included
the reorientation of all social studies (i.e., history and geography) to
the Moroccan context and a strong emphasis on Islam and the institution of

the monarchy in all civic training courses. The implementation of these

changes would have entailed new textbooks in Arabic and the recruitment of

teachers qualified to teach them. Yet both of these requirements were

missing. To overcome the lack of texts a committee was formed immediately

to prepare the necessary books. By 1958 the committee had produced texts

in Moroccan history, Arabic readers, and arithmetic for the first three

primary grades.[40] Since that time the Minsitry of National Education has

continued to produce Arabic language textbooks for the rest of the primary

cycle and for the secondary cycle as well. However, the principal problem

in nationalizing education since 1958 has been the lack of qualified

teachers.

In the academic year 1956-1957 nearly half of the primary teachers

and over 90 per cent of the secondary teachers were French. This heavy

dependence on French teachers blocked all plans for both nationalization

of the curriculum and Arabization. In the short-run, the government tried

importing teachers and professors from the Middle East. During the school

year 1957-1958 a total of 225 from the Middle East were introduced into the

Moroccan school system at all levels. This experiment proved to be a total

failure because of the language differences between the Maghreb and the

Middle East, and because the professors from the Middle East were more

interested in an Arab nationalism than in a narrow Moroccan nationalism.[41]

As a result almost all of these teachers went home at the end of one year

and the program was dropped.

[40]Zartman, Morocco, p. 163.

[41]Ibid., pp. 163-164.

The expansion of the school system and the necessities of
Arabization and other curriculum changes required that many more Moroccan
teachers be found. The long-range solution to this problem lay in the
training of Moroccan teachers to take the place of the French. Immediately
following independence large numbers of Moroccans, with widely varying
degrees of training, were given jobs as teachers. Nationalization of the
teaching corps was hasty at the primary level while at the secondary and
university level moderately high academic standards limited the number of
Moroccans who were allowed to teach. The primary system had 6,179 Moroccan
teachers in 1956, but by 1959 their number had risen to 13,062, with the
number of French teachers declining only slightly. By 1966, however,
nearly all the 30,804 primary school teachers were Moroccan.

However, the nationalization of the teaching corps is still
incomplete and the progress that has been made was at a heavy cost. The
achievements at the primary level were made possible only by the acceptance
of many completely unqualified applicants as teachers. One survey showed
that a number of "teachers" could barely do the four basic arithmetical
operations.[42] In 1963 over half of the Moroccan primary school teachers
possessed only a certificate of primary education as their highest diploma.[43]
Although primary education is now in the hands of Moroccan nationals,
secondary education and the university are both, more or less, still in
French hands. The percentage of foreigners teaching in the secondary
system has fallen from 89 per cent in 1956 to 64 per cent in 1969. Although

[42]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," Maghreb, p. 40.

[43]Tiano, Le Maghreb, p. 78.

this 64 per cent includes a few non-French foreigners, the vast majority

are still French, either on private contract with the Ministry of National

Education or cooperants. In higher education, excluding the Qarawiyin,

foreigners account for between 52 and 71 per cent of staff depending on the

faculty. Again the nationalization of the upper levels of the teaching

corps has meant the acceptance of insufficiently trained teachers.[44]

Once there were sufficient numbers of Moroccan teachers present

in the school system, changes in curriculum could take place. However,

for the most part the Moroccans have eschewed any wholesale changes in

curriculum. At the primary level history and geography courses are now

oriented towards Morocco and the rest of the Maghreb. Moreover, religious

studies and moral training courses get increased emphasis. At the secondary

level these same changes have been introduced along with courses in Arabic

literature. Yet, despite the changes, French language and literature are

still very important, especially at the secondary level, where French

literature is taught for as many hours a week as Arabic. At the university

level it is difficult to assess the degree to which the curriculum has been

altered. The sciences and technical studies, with their continuing depen-

dence on French faculty members, have probably changed little. The humanities

and social sciences are both split between those who follow their courses

in French and those in Arabic.

At the primary and secondary levels of the school system the

courses in Islamic thought and civic training are strikingly conservative

in their orientation. There is absolutely no mention made of the reformist

---

[44]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," Maghreb, p. 43.

movements in Islam.[45] The Allah presented in the religious manuals is

all-powerful and must be obeyed by mankind for fear of divine retribution.[46]

The idea of man as Allah's lieutenant on earth is not presented. The

textbooks on morality insist on individual morality, but make little mention

of social justice and the common welfare of all. The rigid hierarchical

conception of the family that is taught is congruent with the hierarchical

conception of the political system in which the king is the "spiritual father ·

of all good Moroccans."[47] Although these textbooks declare that Morocco is

progressing towards a parliamentary system, this system is never fully

described. This very traditional moral and civic teaching is only partially

balanced by the more modern thinkers who are presented in courses on French

literature and general philosophy. In these latter courses the writers and

thinkers of the French humanist tradition are treated. On balance, the

political and social orientation of the new Moroccan curriculum is conser-

vative and traditional and faithfully reflects the regime's world view.

The actual effect of this teaching upon Morocco's youth is

difficult to gauge since there have been no complete attitudinal studies

done on the subject. In studying what he calls the "third generation elites"

(those youths who are presently in university or who have recently graduated

from the university) Ashford finds that their thinking is most influenced

by French leftist writers and theoreticians, like Fanon.[48] The major

[45]"L'orientation de pensée du maroc à travers les manuels scolaires en
langue arabe," Maghreb XXXVI (November-December 1969), p. 38.

[46]Ibid., p. 37.

[47]Ibid., p. 39.

[48]Douglas E. Ashford, Second and Third Generation Elites in the Maghreb
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, p.34.

Moroccan student union, the UNEM, has a radical outlook that is opposed
to most of the regime's policies. Thus far no study has been made of the
political attitudes of the broad mass of secondary school students. However,
judging from the number of strikes and student-police confrontations over
the past three years, it is safe to say that these students share the
attitudes of their elders in the university. Hence it would seem that the
schools have not been successful in their attempts to socialize the students
into the conservative philosophy of the regime.

D. Rationalization

Morocco's educational policy has essentially been dictated by
the pressure from influential political groups and the public. This was
especially true in the matters of Arabization and school expansion where
changes were made against the best professional advice. In such a climate
of policy formulation it is not surprising to find that there has been
little or no effort at the rationalization of the educational system. The
Moroccan government is almost incapable of the long-range planning which is
required in rationalization. Moreover, the government is unwilling to
consider real reform since it would be politically unpopular, implying as
it does the limitation of enrollment and perhaps a shift away from Arabization.
However, the alternative to rationalization, that is, continued expansion
of general educational programs, also has its political and economic costs
for the monarchy. Hassan II has shown some concern for the political
threat posed to his regime by the small, but growing, pool of unemployed
secondary school graduates.

The departure of French civil servants and the general expansion
of administrative services after independence has meant that in general
Morocco, up to the present, has had no trouble in employing the graduates
of its expanded secondary school system and university. However, in recent
years the regime has been faced with a growing problem in this regard. Both
private enterprise and the government bureaucracies have been requiring
progressively higher levels of education for their top-level employees,
so that a university degree is now necessary for elite status.[49] The
graduates of the Islamic schools are especially hard to employ. In the
general secondary system the holders of the certificate of secondary studies
(the diploma awarded at the end of the first cycle, lasting four years, of
secondary studies) are now finding it very difficult to find employment even
as clerks.[50] Holders of the baccalauréat (awarded at the end of the full
seven-year secondary cycle) are also finding it difficult to find employment.
Yet at the same time the nation desperately needs trained teachers and
technical cadres. But the government has not emphasized these fields enough
and the students do not seem willing to choose them voluntarily.

UNESCO statistics on education clearly show that the Moroccan
education system is heavily oriented to the liberal arts. In fact, at the
secondary level there has been a steady decrease in the percentage of students
enrolled in vocational courses (see Table VI). The secondary schools of
Morocco are the least adapted to the necessities of economic development in
North Africa. Teacher training and vocational education together receive

---

[49]Ibid., p. 10.

[50]Waterbury, The Moroccan Political Elite, p. 307.

only 5 per cent of total expenditure on education while general secondary

education receives 29 per cent (see Table VIII). The distribution of

students by field of study at the university level reveals the same imbalance

(see Table VII). Tentative data for 1969 shows a slight improvement of the

distribution in favor of the sciences, but the humanities are still the most

favored discipline at the university.[51]

From time to time a variety of Moroccan public figures, including

the king, have called for the reorientation and rationalization of national

education. These calls have primarily come from the more modernized elements

of the Moroccan elite. Although minor changes are possible without upsetting

conservative groups like the Istiqlal, basic reform seems impossible. The

example of the reforms proposed by Mohammed Benhima, Minister of National

Education, in April 1966 is a good illustration of what happens to major

reforms in Morocco. Dr. Benhima, in a speech, declared that Arabization

was leading to a dead-end and, admitting the necessity of French as the

language of instruction, he called for the reorientation of secondary educa-

tion to technical studies.[52] The Istiqlal, outraged by this attack on Arab-

ization, organized a vigorous public campaign against the Benhima proposals.

As a result of the public reaction that the Istiqlal aroused, the king pre-

vented the implementation of the proposals.[53]

Since Arabization and school expansion are still very emotional

issues in Morocco it is extremely doubtful that the proponents of rational-

ization will be able to achieve any of their major objectives. The Moroccan

---

[51]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," Maghreb, p. 45.

[52]Le Monde (Paris) April 4, 1966, p. 7.

[53]Moore, North Africa, p. 269.

regime has a poor record in the kind of long-range planning that rationalization requires. More importantly, however, it is unwilling to undertake any fundamental reform that would endanger any of its bases of support. Although the king is aware of the problem and frequently speaks of the necessity of adapting the schools to the needs of the country, he has yet to fulfill these promises. Therefore, it is unlikely that Morocco will catch up with Tunisia and Algeria in its efforts to make education more relevant to the tasks of economic development.

IV. Conclusions

The formulation of educational policies in Morocco mirrors policy formulation in other areas. After independence a number of reforms were hastily implemented against the advice of the Ministry of Education merely to satisfy the demands of political parties and public opinion. Rather than reshaping society the Moroccan regime merely seeks to manage societal demands to its own best advantage. As Ashford points out:

> ...The goals and needs of one phase of reform could not be related to those in other phases. Debate degenerated into bitter personal rivalries and intraparty squabbles. The action that was taken was, on the whole, simply to give way to the greatest pressure, namely, the demand for primary education, with little thought to teacher training, teaching materials, or overall developmental needs. Competing goals and values were swept aside, ignored, or downgraded to achieve the immediate gratification of large primary enrollment and ostensible devotion to cultural values.[54]

Despite the spread of primary and secondary education to large sections of the country there has only been minimal progress in Morocco in overcoming some of the rigidities of social stratification. The operation

---

[54]Ashford, "Attitudinal Changes," pp. 167-168.

of the MUCF schools and the Moroccan-run French-style lycées alongside the lower quality Moroccan general secondary schools offsets the democratization of these latter. Although it would seem on first inspection that the expansion of the school system would run counter to the regime's interest in preserving ascriptive recruitment criteria, in fact it does not do so since there are still distinct schools for the elite. Nonetheless, the formation of a large pool of disappointed elite aspirants will pose serious problems for Morocco's present regime and its particular style of politics.

Through the programs of Arabization and nationalization the Moroccans have sought to ensure that the socialization efforts of the schools reflect the traditional Islamic philosophy of the regime and to encourage a greater sense of nationhood. As has been seen, the content of the moral and civic training does reflect the thinking of the regime. However, it seems that in the secondary schools and the university the students reject this extremely conservative outlook and in its place have adopted a more radical Marxian point of view. The effect of the civic training courses at the primary level is not known.

In terms of national integration the Moroccan educational policies have done little to correct the faults of the old colonial system. There are still glaring inequalities between rural and urban school attendance rates. Moroccan policies have also been dysfunctional with respect to the "elite-mass gap" problem. The elite is still being formed in schools that dispense a largely French curriculum (i.e., the MUCF and Moroccan lycées). Even in the general secondary schools the students must follow the majority of their courses in French.

Finally, the Moroccan schools have been quite poorly adapted to
the necessities of economic growth. The entire system was expanded where
expansion was easiest and not where it was needed. For all practical
purposes Morocco has never engaged in manpower planning and the linking of
these plans to educational policies. The result has been an increasingly
acute shortage of technical cadres and an overabundance of liberal arts
majors. Although the regime is aware of the problem, it lacks the political
courage to implement the necessary solutions. On strictly economic grounds
the investment in education in Morocco has been put to very poor use.

Chapter IV

Tunisian Rationalism

I. The Style of Politics

Unlike Morocco, Tunisia was greatly affected by the colonial
experience and as a result its social and political life after independence
has been quite different from that of Morocco. The colonial period in
Tunisia lasted 73 years and, although the French had consciously tried to
preserve much of the traditional society, the length of the period of
colonization coupled with the colon presence brought many societal and
political changes. Among the most important changes was the rise of a new
elite, owing its position to Western education. This elite comes principally
from the Sahel region south of Tunis and is of lower middle class origins.[1]
The French had tried to protect the position of the traditional aristocracy
and upper classes of Tunis but were unsuccessful. The men who led Tunisia
to independence and took control of the government afterwards are characterized
by their relatively advanced Western education and modernized outlook. Al-
though the elite is significantly more modern than most of the Tunisian
population it has taken care not to cut itself off from the masses.

The elite is organized into the Neo-Destour party which is the
party that pressed for independence. The Neo-Destour party, whose full name
in translation is the Tunisian Liberal Constitutional Party, was formed in
1934 and was a break-away faction of the Vieux-Destour. The Vieux-Destour
was a traditionalist anti-colonial party formed in 1920. Its ideology was
essentially Islamic and harked back to Tunisia's precolonial past.[2] The

---

[1]For a more complete analysis of this elite and problems of class in Tunisia
see Jean Duvignaud, "Classes et conscience de classe dans un pays du maghreb:
la tunisie," Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, XXXVIII (1965), pp. 185-200.

[2]Clement Henry Moore, Politics in North Africa (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1970), p. 66.

Neo-Destour was inspired and guided by Habib Bourguiba. Essentially

Bourguiba and his followers were impatient with the old leaders and sought

to form a broadly based mass organization.[3] The goals of both parties

were, in large part, the same, that of liberation from foreign rule; but

the Neo-Destour emphasized its contact with the people and its desire to

create a new society after independence. Bourguiba sought not only to

organize the masses but also to educate them to want a better life. The

Neo-Destour has always identified with pedagogy and teachers have always

been prominent among its leaders. Although the nationalist elite in the

Neo-Destour was French educated, the lower echelons were staffed by graduates

and teachers in the modern Koranic schools and the Zitouna. These tradition-

ally educated cadres provided the link between the essentially modern leader-

ship and the still conservative society.[4] The Neo-Destour, using these

local cadres, was able to use traditional religious symbols for modern

political purposes in the fight against the French.[5] However, its long-

term goal was to educate the masses into the language and symbols of modern

politics.

The Neo-Destour quickly supplanted the Vieux-Destour as the leading

nationalist organization. By 1937 the Neo-Destour had an estimated member-

ship of some 28,000 active members organized into local branches all over

the country. By the mid-1950's the party had created parallel national

organizations for the students (the Union Générale des Etudiants Tunisiens-

UGET), for the women (the Union Nationale des Femmes Tunisiennes-UNFT), for

---

[3]Lars Rudebeck, Party and People, A Study of Political Change in Tunisia
(Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1967), p. 30.

[4]Moore, North Africa, p. 70.

[5]Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia Since Independence (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1965), p. 33.

the farmers (the Union Nationale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens-UNAT), and for

commerce and industry (the Union Tunisienne de l'Industrie, du Commerce et

de l'Artisanat-UTICA). Although the Union Générale des Travailleurs

Tunisiens-UGTT was formed independently of the party, it was quickly taken

under the Neo-Destour's guidance. Thus the party could reach and mobilize

all sections of Tunisian society. Moore describes the network of Neo-

Destour organizations as a virtual political system outside the formal legal

framework of the Protectorate.[6] In the absence of a strong monarchy the

party under Bourguiba became the symbol of the emerging nation. When the

French became ready to grant independence they dealt with Bourguiba and not

the Bey. Subsequently, Bourguiba had little trouble in procuring the Bey's

abdication and in declaring Tunisia a republic.

Since independence Tunisian politics have focused on Bourguiba

in his dual role as leader of the Neo-Destour and as president of the

Republic. When once asked about the political system in Tunisia, Bourguiba

is said to have replied, "The system? What system? I am the system!"[7]

Formally, Tunisia is a republic with a written constitution that was pro-

mulgated in June 1959. The constitution gives the President of the Republic

a wide range of powers and makes the government responsible to him and not

the National Assembly.[8] The National Assembly itself has only a very limited

role to play and is primarily the forum where decisions, already made, are

tested before the opinions of prominent citizens.[9] The constitution also

---

[6]Moore, Tunisia, p. 37.

[7]Ibid., p. 51.

[8]Charles A. Micaud, Tunisia, The Politics of Modernization (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 94.

[9]Rudebeck, Party and People, p. 51.

provides for an independent judiciary, but in fact the courts have been

used for political purposes. In fact, the formal institutions have been

dominated from the outset by the personality of Bourguiba.

Bourguiba is representative of the new political elite of Tunisia.

He comes from a modest family of a low ranking civil servant in the Sahel.

After attending Sadiqi College in Tunis he went to study in Paris and took

degrees in law and political science. Returning to Tunisia in 1927 he

began a legal practice in Tunis and became involved in Vieux-Destour politics.

In 1934 he led in the founding of the Neo-Destour and rapidly emerged as its

undisputed leader. Although Bourguiba is closely attuned to modern Western

political and intellectual trends, he remains, nonetheless, close to the

Tunisian people and has a near spontaneous appeal for them. Yet his authority

and prestige go beyond mere personal charisma. Moore presents an excellent

analysis of Bourguiba's role and position in Tunisia, pointing out that:

> In the last analysis Bourguiba's leadership was unique. It was
> not charismatic in the sense of resting upon some inspiration.
> It was not traditional in the sense that Tunisia's absolute
> monarchy used to be. It was not democratic in the sense of
> being limited by the institutional devices of modern constitu-
> tional governments. Yet all three elements were included in
> the man's personal synthesis. Instead of charisma, Bourguiba
> had political genius and the prestige of having successfully
> led his country to independence. As Head of State, there was
> much of the monarch in Bourguiba. "Le système? C'est moi le
> système." Yet his political success depended upon his ability
> to persuade rather than force people to accept his point of
> view. The democratic basis of his authority remained the
> Neo-Destour party and the national organizations, for they were
> his mass instruments of persuasion. Just as Bourguiba needed
> a mass party to convince France of the reality of Tunisian
> nationhood, he needed it to maintain the cohesion of the
> nation and to elaborate a modernist consensus.[10]

[10]Moore, _Tunisia_, p. 104.

In national politics Bourguiba reigns supreme and no minister or
other political figure can survive without his confidence. The political
process centers on Bourguiba's cabinet and inner circle of private advisors.
Somewhat in the manner of Hassan in Morocco, Bourguiba periodically reshuffles
his cabinet and acts as the arbitrator of shifting cliques in the government
and party.[11] Generally, however, there has been a much greater governmental
stability in Tunisia than in Morocco. Furthermore, since Bourguiba's
policies have remained relatively constant, a ministerial change does not
necessarily indicate a policy change. In the final analysis, Bourguiba has
made all the important decisions himself, but he does not reach them in
complete isolation. Important decisions are seldom made hastily and have
usually been debated in the party, administration, and the national organ-
izations at great length. After such consultation Bourguiba and his inner
circle of advisors try to take account of all the interests articulated.
At the national level policy consultations often involve sharp debate, since
Bourguiba apparently appreciates straightforward criticisms from his sub-
ordinates as long as they are made in private.[12] But, on occasion he has
not hesitated to take unpopular decisions.

Most of Bourguiba's decisions have favored technocratic decision-
making over politics. The area of politics in Tunisia, as Moore puts it,
"shrinks even as that of administration expands and creates new areas of
choice."[13] As the area of decision-making has expanded under rational
economic planning, the range of independently articulated interests has

[11]Moore, North Africa, p. 105.
[12]Moore, Tunisia, p. 102.
[13]Moore, North Africa, p. 227.

contracted. The national organizations are so completely tied to the party that they have lost their credibility with their membership. The Neo-Destour activates the articulation of interests under its control; usually only those interests which support and reinforce technocratic decision - making.[14] However, the regime has not sought to straightjacket interest articulation entirely. At all levels Tunisians can voice criticisms and offer alternatives but dissenting opinions cannot be organized. The dangers of this type of attempted control without sufficient coercion to back it up are shown by the regime's problems in controlling the discontent generated by Ben Salah, the architect of most of Tunisia's economic policies in the 1960s, in his attempt to rapidly expand the co-operative sector. Eventually the discontent became so widespread that Ben Salah was put on trial for treason and his policies were repudiated by the regime. It now appears that the regime has swung in the opposite direction and has liberalized to such an extent that many interests that had not been heard from since independence are now allowed free expression and access to the press. In this respect the recent activities of traditional religious organizations are particularly significant.[15]

The party and the state are intimately bound up and at the provincial level the Regional Committees of Coordination provide an institutionalized means of contact. According to official party statements "the party is the motor of the state." At the local and regional levels, where some real power has been transferred as a result of the 1963 reforms, the party

---

[14]Rudebeck, Party and People, p. 254.

[15]Les Selections Hebdomadaire du Journal "Le Monde" (Paris), No. 1172, April 14, 1971, p. 6.

initiates and encourages many of the development projects that the Plan has
called for. In analysing the activities of the Regional Committees of
Coordination and the local party branches, Rudebeck finds that they show
an active interest in general social problems and point to modernizing
solutions.[16] Moreover, the Regional Committees seem to maintain regular
and direct contact with the branches to ensure that they in turn maintain
close contact with the masses. Finally, within the general guide lines set
at the national level, the Committees attempt to involve large numbers of
ordinary citizens in the planning process.

The political elites of the country are the Neo-Destour militants.
The party leaders, from the local branch officers up to national officials,
form an elite group in the sense that they are better educated and economi-
cally more secure than the rest of the population and in that they control
the political process.[17] However, it is not a closed social group as in
Morocco and over half of its members come from ordinary lower middle class
backgrounds.[18] The party's national leadership does not seem to be a
closed oligarchy. It has systematically been promoting young, well-educated
men over the heads of older party militants. The average age of the members
of the Regional Committees of Coordination is 38 years and that of the
provincial governors is only 39 years.[19] At the time of independence in
1956, a secondary education was more than sufficient to rise in provincial

---

[16]Rudebeck, Party and People, pp. 138 & 184.

[17]Ibid., p. 125.

[18]Micaud, Tunisia, p. 125 and, Rudebeck, Party and People, p. 125.

[19]Ibid., pp. 105 & 121.

and national politics, while today a university diploma is almost a pre-requisite. The elders of the party have generally been retired with little or no trouble.

II. Regime Strategies of Development

While Morocco has floundered about since independence without any overall strategy for economic and political development, Tunisia has moved ahead with a relatively well integrated plan for modernization. Under Bourguiba's guidance the Tunisian regime has attacked a broad range of social and economic problems. The Bourguibist approach has been pragmatic and flexible, although where it deems a particular program vital to its overall scheme it has stood firm. In the first five years after independence Bourguiba stressed a "psychological revolution" which was to create a climate of opinion favorable to radical reforms and socialism.[20] In this period economic reforms were very mild.

It was not until 1961 that the Ministry of the Plan was created and the concept of Neo-Destour socialism was introduced. In the 1964 party congress the name of the party was changed to the Parti Socialiste Destourian (PSD). Throughout the 1960s Tunisia has been committed to socialism and economic planning. Neo-Destour socialism was defined by Ben Salah as "the use of reason in the general interest."[21] Tunisia's brand of socialism sprang more from French rationalism than from orthodox Marxism, which Bourguiba has condemned as inappropriate to Tunisia's problems. At present with Ahmed Ben Salah, the man behind most of the socialist ideas in Tunisia, in prison and his co-operative program in ruins it is difficult to assess what the future of Neo-Destour socialism will be.

[20]Ibid., p. 70.

[21]Moore, Tunisia , p. 196.

The Tunisian regime has sought to rework society and the economy
according to a predetermined plan. The "psychological revolution" of the
first years following independence aimed at breaking down old cultural
prejudices in favor of a more rational world view. Although the consti-
tution proclaimed Islam as the official religion of the country, Bourguiba
and his lieutenants emphasized all the reformist trends in Islam. Religion
was used for modernist ends and where it could not be used it was attacked.
In decreeing a Code of Personal Status in 1956 Bourguiba launched an attack
on traditional Islamic jurisprudence. The new code was modeled on Western
personal law and was particularly notable in its provisions for the protection
of women's rights.[22] The wearing of the veil was attacked by Bourguiba as
a retrograde social custom. In 1957 all private habous land (land theore-
tically in religious trust but which in fact benefitted wealthy landowners)
was placed under state control. In 1958 a series of reforms which aimed at
modernizing the Islamic school system were announced.

The most publicized Bourguibist social reform was his famous attack
on the fast during the month of Ramadan. Early in 1960 he proclaimed that
religion had no right to impose such sacrifices and that the continued
imposition of the fast was an abuse of religion. Most Tunisians, however,
continue to observe Ramadan. But, the campaign did have the effect of
underlining the extreme importance of the war on underdevelopment.[23]

Some of Bourguiba's social reforms, such as the legal reform, the
abolition of habous land, and educational reforms, have been successful.
Others like the attacks on the veil and on Ramadan which require profound

---

[22]Micaud, Tunisia, pp. 145-149.

[23]Moore, Tunisia, p. 58.

social changes and the active support of the population, have been failures

in the short-run. On balance the regime has had some notable successes in

societal reform and has not given up its modernizing outlook. Since the

regime does not believe in forcing changes but relies instead on persuasion

and example one cannot expect easy successes in all areas. Bourguiba and

the PSD are deeply committed to continuing evolution toward the creation of

a rational society, but are flexible in their tactics.

Of the three countries under study Tunisia is undoubtedly the

most advanced and efficient in its planning procedures. Since 1961, when

Neo-Destour socialism was first announced, Tunisia has allocated its scarcer

resources more "rationally then either Algeria or Morocco by generating

more public investments without cutting social or educational expenditures."[24]

Gallissot notes that the Tunisian state has a greater effectiveness than

the other two and that the provisions of the Plans are generally carried out.[25]

The Four-Year Plan for 1965-1968 allocated 25 per cent of investment to

directly productive projects whereas in Algeria and in Morocco the corres-

ponding figure is around 12 per cent. Proportionally Tunisia spends less

than half the amount the others spend on the military and the police. Tunisia

also receives substantial amounts of foreign aid but makes much wiser use of

it.[26] As a result of all these factors, Tunisia is the only one of the three

countries of the Maghreb whose Gross Domestic Product has kept up with the

annual population increase.[27] On the population side, it should be noted

---

[24]Moore, North Africa, pp. 146-147.

[25]René Gallissot, L'Economie de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris: Presses Universi-
taires de France, 1969), pp. 85-86.

[26]Ibid., p. 86.

[27]Moore, North Africa, p. 145.

that Tunisia is the only one to go ahead with a full-scale program of family planning.

The formulation of the Three-Year Plan 1962-1964 and of the Four-Year Plan 1965-1968 shows the willingness of the regime to listen to informally expressed interests. The party and the administration called on as many groups and individuals as possible for their opinions. The farmers' and businessmen's organizations (the UNAT and the UTICA respectively) generally advocated preservation of free enterprise and private ownership. The PSD, the UGET (the students' union) and the UGTT (the workers' union) were favorable to increased government intervention in the economy and the movement towards co-operativization in the rural sector. The press published full accounts of discussions leading up to the final formulation of the Plan.

In agriculture the Tunisians have not been notably successful in land redistribution and have not set limits on land holdings.[28] But they have attempted to move ahead since the mid-1960s with a co-operativization plan; even to the point of using force if necessary to get the peasants to join. The co-operativization program was run by Ahmed Ben Salah, who controlled all the ministries dealing with economic affairs in one "super ministry". In the period from 1968 to 1969 Ben Salah tried to achieve a rapid expansion of the co-operative sector in what has been termed one of the few radical experiments in developing co-operatives in Africa.[29] His attempts met with failure because of peasant opposition and the misgivings of many of Bourguiba's advisors. The opposition of members of Bourguiba's

[28]Ibid., p. 253.

[29]Goran Hyden, "Can Co-ops Make it in Africa?", Africa Report XV (December 1970), p. 15. for the co-operative movement also see Manuéle Peyrol, "L'experience des cooperatives en tunisie", Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africains LXI (January 1971), pp. 33-48.

entourage to the projects appears to have sprung, in large part, from fears

that with the co-operatives under his control Ben Salah would be too powerful

politically.[30] In addition some of the advisors opposed the program as

being far too radical a policy for Tunisia to follow. In any case, Ben

Salah was relieved of all of his official posts and put on trial for treason

and mismanagement of public funds. With government support for the co-

operatives gone the whole movement collapsed in a period of a few months.

In the industrial and commercial sectors Destourian socialism has

been quite flexible. For the most part industrial development has been

carried forward by mixed public and private companies. The Tunisians also

tolerate completely private undertakings as long as they have some social

value. Unlike the Moroccans and the Algerians who have to a great extent

tied their industrial development to the extraction of mineral resources

(phosphates and petroleum respectively), the Tunisians, with no large or

important mineral resources to exploit, have had to diversify their indus-

trial expansion.[31] Proportionally Tunisia has created more new industrial

jobs since independence than either of its two neighbors. In the commercial

sector, the regime has been relying on co-operatives to rationalize trade

and also to fix prices. Here again, however, the future of the commercial

co-operatives is clouded by the disgrace of Ben Salah.

On balance, Tunisia is more actively engaged in trying to change

the economy and society than either Morocco or Algeria. In Tunisia the

regime attempts to mold society rather than let the society mold it. The

---

[30]Douglas Ashford, "End of an Era for Tunisia," Africa Report XV (January 1970), p. 30.

[31]Gallissot, L'Economie, p. 106.

state controls all key economic sectors and has been effective in achieving
the changes outlines in the plan.[32] Moore states that "Tunisia has been
engaged in sustained economic planning since 1962... (and that)...neither
Algeria nor Morocco has developed a comparable capability."[33]

III. The Educational Problems of Tunisia

The policies that the Tunisian regime has adopted for education
are consistent with the overall spirit of rationalization and modernization
that it has evinced in other policy spheres. A large part of Bourguiba's
"psychological revolution" was concerned with mass education, since, with
some justification, he believed that each graduate of the modern school
system would be a convert to the regime's plan for social modernization.[34]
In addition it was realized that the country was going to need competent
cadres to run the state and the economy. Although the educational policies
implemented have been debated widely in Tunisia, they have in the final
analysis been decided upon by Bourguiba and the Ministry of National Education.
Policy has never been dictated by interested pressure groups as has been the
case in Morocco.

The type of education to be dispensed and its goals were clearly
enunciated by Bourguiba shortly after independence in what was called the
Ten-Year Perspectives for Education.[35] Bourguiba's plans for education were
largely drawn from studies done by Mahmoud Messadi during the early 1950s.

[32]Moore, North Africa, p. 140.

[33]Ibid., p. 141.

[34]Leon Carl Brown, "Tunisia," in Education and Political Development ed.
James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 158.

[35]Ibid., pp. 159-161.

Messadi, a school teacher himself, had been commissioned by the Neo-Destour
to study the educational problems of the country and was subsequently made
the second Minister of National Education. The Ten-Year Perspectives were
outlined by Bourguiba at the graduation exercises of Sadiqi College in 1958.
One of the major points of the plan was universal primary education, an aim
to be achieved by 1970. The plan recognized Arabization as a desirable goal,
but emphasized the necessity of maintaining a bilingual education for an
indefinite period. In addition to the standard literary education offered
in the Franco-Arab schools, a system of intermediate schools was to be
created offering a more practical technical education. The creation of a
university with a Western-style curriculum was envisaged.

The problems that the Tunisians sought to attack were above all
those of democratization and rationalization. Arabization was acknowledged
as a laudable goal but one which realistically could not be achieved in the
immediate future without jeopardizing the quality of education. Although
Bourguiba did not make major pronouncements concerning nationalization of
the schools, the regime worked out a plan that in the long-run would assure
the nationalization of the teaching corps.

On the whole the Tunisians have kept this order of priorities in
educational policy and have integrated them into a coherent plan for educa-
tional development. Reforms in one phase of education have usually been
carefully synchronized with those in other phases. Moreover, the regime has
tried to gear the output of the schools to the manpower needs of the economy.
Although broadly conceived, the plans do go into considerable detail;
teacher-student ratios, costs of school construction, rates of attrition
among students, and demographic projections of the school population are

all carefully worked out.[36] The Moroccan educational planners with their

poor statistical services, had none of these statistics to work with. The

coherence of educational policies in Tunisia has been enhanced by the

stability of the Ministry of National Education. Tunisia has had only four

Ministers of Education since independence; one of these, Mahmoud Messadi,

served for ten consecutive years.

A. Democratization

    In Tunisia, as in Morocco and Algeria, the French had stimulated

a widespread demand for education without satisfying it. In setting uni-

versal primary education as a goal Bourguiba was in part merely acquiescing

to popular demands. Beyond this, however, mass education was an integral

part of the strategy for social modernization. The regime equated accept-

ance of the necessity for social change with the spread of education. Even

before Bourguiba announced the Ten-Year Perspectives for Education, considerable

progress had been made in enlarging the school system. In the two years follow-

ing independence the primary school enrollment increased from 241,426 to

322,000. The expansion of the school system did not arouse any political

controversy at this time; virtually everyone was in favor of it. In recent

years there has been some criticism of the program.

    The Tunisians have been quite successful in their efforts to

democratize the nation's schools. It should be borne in mind, however, that

Tunisia started off with a relatively developed school system that reached

27 per cent of the primary school age population in 1955.[37] By 1960 the

---

[36]Douglas E. Ashford, Second and Third Generation Elites in the Maghreb
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 13.

[37]Brown, "Tunisia," p. 158.

schools accommodated 44 per cent of the primary school population and this

figure had increased to 61 per cent by 1965.[38] The primary school population

passed from 241,426 in 1955 to 826,069 in 1967 (see Table II). Moore

estimates that in 1967 the rate of primary school attendance was as high as

70 per cent. The number of schools has more than doubled in the ten year

period from 1955 to 1965. Without any doubt Tunisia has made more progress

towards universal primary education than either of its two neighbors.

Moreover, in the case of Tunisia one is justified in speaking of

democratization and not just expansion. By this is meant that the school

expansion has favored all segments of the population. School construction

is highest in the poorest provinces.[39] Tiano notes that Tunisia is the

only country of the Maghreb to have made progress in breaking down the

regional disparities left by the French.[40] Moreover, Tunisia is the only

country where female enrollment in the primary schools has been increasing

(see Table II). Although the school system is still biased in favor of

males and the urban areas, the regime is actively engaged in attenuating

these disparities.

Tunisia's efforts in this respect flow from the regime's commit-

ment to creating an egalitarian society and in winning converts to its program

of modernization. The local party branches have been active in planning and

organizing the construction of new schools. In the first years after

independence primary schools often had to go on to double shifts, but it

seems that this is no longer necessary in most areas. There has been some

---

[38]UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1968 (Paris: UNESCO, 1969),   .

[39]Brown, "Tunisia," p. 163.

[40]André Tiano, Le Maghreb Entre les Mythes (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1967), p. 80.

criticism of the expansion program on the grounds that it has compromised
the quality of education. However, the quality of instruction does not
appear to have been seriously affected as in Morocco. The Tunisians have
by far the best qualified teachers in North Africa.[41]

The Tunisians have also made solid progress in the expansion of
secondary and higher education, while at the same time integrating this
expansion with a larger plan of manpower development. Total secondary
enrollment has risen from 42,124 in 1955 to 134,609 in 1967. In comparison with
its two neighbors Tunisia's secondary schools reach a greater proportion of
the eligible secondary school age population (see Table I). Moreover, as
the following section indicates, these students are more rationally dis-
tributed by field of study. The number of Tunisians pursuing higher studies
has risen from 2,374 in 1955 to 5,903 in 1966. Proportionally Tunisia has
almost double the number of university level students as Algeria and Morocco.

At the secondary and university levels the Tunisian expansion
program has also resulted in the democratization of the system. As noted
above, the school construction program has favored the more backward pro-
vinces. No figures on female enrollment levels in the secondary schools are
given out by the government, but the figures for university level students
show a slow, but steady, increase. This would seem to imply that the
secondary schools, which supply the university with its students, also are
enrolling progressively more female students. At the university Tunisia
still lagged behind Algeria in 1967 in percentage of females enrolled, but
was making progress where Algeria was falling behind.[42] The former bias in

[41]Ibid., p. 81.

[42]UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1969 (Paris: UNESCO, 1970), pp. 257-260.

the university in favor of students from the Sahel (they once formed over half of the student body) has been corrected.[43]

In summary, the Tunisians have been notably successful in their efforts to democratize the school system. Although regional disparities still exist, the regime is making a sincere and concerted effort to overcome them. Furthermore, although Tunisia still lags behind Algeria in female enrollment in the schools, it is the only country in the Maghreb to show steady progress in overcoming this problem. At the secondary and university levels there do not appear to be any elite schools in the Tunisian system comparable to those in Morocco. Even enrollment in a vocational school does not cut a student off from future advancement, since promising students can transfer to the general secondary system. An indication of the success of Tunisia's program of democratization is the attitude of the students themselves towards the future. Tunisian students appear to believe that future success depends on hard work and technical competence; Moroccan students, on the other hand, indicate that they think family background is most important.[44] Without a doubt the Tunisians have made their schools more democratic than either of their two neighbors.

B. Rationalization

The principle of rationalization was clearly emphasized in the Ten-Year Perspectives for Education announced in June 1958. At that time Bourguiba and his associates were clearly conscious of the fact that education, especially secondary and university level education, had to be reoriented to

---

[43]Moore, North Africa, p. 290.

[44]Ibid., pp. 289-290.

the needs of the nation. In its push for rationalization the regime had to
face adverse public opinion but did not sacrifice what it felt was an
important, indeed vital, principle. Specifically, supporters of Arabization
have been disappointed by the adoption of a bilingual policy. In addition,
traditionalists were angered by the absorption of the Zitouna and the modern
Koranic schools into the larger Franco-Arab system. The decision to en-
courage vocational and technical education did not raise any adverse political
comment, but this decision was more difficult to implement than a general
secondary expansion would have been.

The decision to eliminate the Zitouna was potentially a dangerous
political move to make.[45] In the years preceding independence the modern
Koranic school movement had spread over all of Tunisia and educated one out
of every four Tunisian school children. In fact, at the time of independence
in 1956 the traditional Islamic Schools were more powerful in Tunisia than
in Morocco. But, whereas the Moroccan regime was more than willing to allow
the Koranic schools to continue their traditional teaching, Bourguiba's
commitment to the creation of a modernized society ruled out the continuation
of the Koranic system. After independence Bourguiba waited for two years
before attempting to eliminate the Zitouna and its ancillary Koranic schools.
This wait was evidently dictated by the necessity of consolidating his power.
In 1956 he prepared the ground for reform by having a relatively modernized
sheikh appointed as rector of the Zitouna. Finally, in his June 1958 speech
on education Bourguiba openly outlined his reforms which included the creation
of a single unified school system and the gradual elimination of the Koranic
system.

---

[45] Moore, Tunisia, p. 54.

By 1958 the Neo-Destour and Bourguiba effectively controlled the country and were able to carry out the elimination of the Zitouna with no trouble. The Minister of National Education admitted later that the regime was risking the revival of political opposition.[46] The Koranic schools were eliminated over a period of some three to four years and the Zitouna was absorbed into the new University of Tunis. Although some of the traditional teachers were taken into the modern system, many were released as sub-standard.[47] That the Tunisian regime could carry out this reform without provoking a political controversy of major proportions is evidence of its strength and political astuteness.

The Tunisians have been relatively successful in emphasizing vocational and technical education. However, total enrollment in these courses is still very low compared with general secondary education. At the university level it would appear that the Tunisians have been slightly less successful than the Algerians in orienting their students to careers in science and engineering. In general the Tunisians have come closer to fulfilling their manpower needs on their own than either of their neighbors.

The UNESCO figures on the distribution of students at the secondary level long showed Tunisia lagging behind Algeria and Morocco in enrollment in secondary vocational courses, even though it was spending proportionally more on this type of education. In the 1969 Statistical Yearbook the figures have been adjusted for the year covered by the yearbook and the preceding years. The adjustment involved the reclassification of many general secondary students as vocational students, and thus brings

---

[46]Ibid., p. 54.

[47]Brown, "Tunisia," p. 159.

enrollment figures for vocational education into line with other statistical
indicators, such as the known importance of this type of education in the
budget for education. The adjusted figures show that where in 1960 24 per
cent of all secondary students were registered in vocational courses, by
1967 some 34 per cent were so registered (see Table VII). The Tunisians
have also been successful in directing students towards careers as teachers.
Tunisia has always had proportionally more of its students enrolled in teacher
training courses than either Morocco or Algeria (see Tables V and VII). As
a result it has been able to nationalize its primary schools without
seriously compromising the quality of education. At the university level
32 per cent of the students in 1966 were in the sciences or engineering
and the remaining 68 per cent were in the humanities and the social sciences.

Relative to the other North African countries, Tunisia has done
the most to adapt the schools to the needs of the economy. Nonetheless,
in 1967 Ben Salah criticized Tunisian educational policy for being too
oriented to universal primary education and general secondary education,
and not being interested enough in vocational and technical education. He
proposed postponing the date for the achievement of universal primary
education and redirecting the resources to a more useful secondary system.
Ben Salah's proposals were aimed at giving education a more instrumental
and elitist outlook.[48] Although Tunisian educational policy had always been
sensitive to the necessity of making education instrumental, it also was
very much oriented towards democratic values. Thus Ben Salah's proposals ran
counter to one of the underlying premises of Tunisian educational policy.

[48]Moore, North Africa, p.269.

As a result of Ben Salah's criticisms, the party undertook a

full review of education in 1967. A major debate took place between Mahmoud

Messadi, who supported his democratic reforms implemented since 1958, and

Ben Salah, who favored a more instrumental approach even if it meant intro-

ducing anti-democratic policies. The debate became so heated that it was

decided to carry it on in private and to bar the press from covering it.

Interestingly, in a radio address in March 1967 Bourguiba also severely

criticized Tunisia's educational policies as not being sufficiently oriented

to the problems of the country.[49] He took up as his own many of the

criticisms that Ben Salah had made against the Ministry of Education.

Finally, in July 1968, after ten years as Minister, Messadi was replaced in

the Ministry of National Education by Ben Salah.

The achievement of universal primary education, economically

wasteful in Ben Salah's eyes, was now put off until 1973 as against the

original deadline of 1970. At the secondary and university level a general

reform was announced that shifted the emphasis in Tunisian education from

quantity to quality. At the secondary level new short courses ending a

professional degree were instituted and at the same time limitations were

placed on the number of students entering the general secondary school

system. At the university level, enrollment quotas were fixed for each

faculty which channeled the students to the sciences and engineering. In

addition, each student was required to do a stage each year in order to

acquire practical experience.[50] Ben Salah's reforms aimed at eliminating

uneconomic degree programs (i.e., those degrees in fields with no practical

[49]Jeune Afrique (Tunis) No. 393, July 21, 1968, pp. 20-21.

[50]Ibid., No. 407, October 27, 1968, pp. 54-55.

applications), and a general tightening of academic standards.[51] Salaries
in certain professions that were deemed socially useful, such as teaching,
were increased in order to attract more young Tunisians to them.

In summary, Tunisia has consciously tried to make education serve
its economic needs. Even under Messadi, who in the recent disputes over
education appeared to minimize the importance of directly relating education
to manpower planning, technical and vocational education was an important
part of the Tunisian secondary school program. Ben Salah's reforms in 1968
and in 1969 greatly increased the emphasis placed on practical training.
Thus the regime has long recognized the need for rationalizing education
and has worked to direct it to the tasks of development. Given Bourguiba's
and the regime's commitment to practical education, it is doubtful that
Ben Salah's downfall will radically alter Tunisian policies in this regard.
Tunisia probably has the deepest commitment to rationalization and, because
of its superior ability to make and implement long-range plans, it has been
able to effectively translate this commitment into action. Although there
has been on this issue some debate, the regime did not allow it to become a
matter of public controversy. Furthermore, the debate in Tunisia centers
on the degree to which education should be tied to manpower planning and
not the importance of doing it. On balance, although there is room for
improvement, the Tunisians have made solid progress in adapting the schools
to the economic needs of the country.

C. Arabization

On the subject of Arabization the Tunisians have demonstrated a
prudent pragmatism. The long-range goal, as in Morocco and Algeria, is the

---

[51]Ibid., No. 492, June 9, 1970, p. 53.

complete Arabization of the nation's schools. However, rather than risk

destroying the high standards of the Franco-Arab schools, the Tunisians decided

to maintain bilingual education. The Tunisians have seen national identity

and pride as residing not only in the use of a national language but more

importantly in concrete achievements, such as the training of teachers and

the meeting of professional needs.[52] Cultural unity to them is not a matter

of safeguarding a tradition, but rather is associated with the creation of

a common culture for the future.[53]

In deciding to maintain a bilingual policy for the schools the

Tunisians were in fact opting for a predominantly French curriculum. At

the primary level about one half of the curriculum is given in French and

the rest in Arabic. This represents a slight increase in the time devoted

to Arabic, since in the colonial schools only one third of the class hours

were given over to Arabic. At the secondary level only one third of the

class time is devoted to studies in Arabic. In achieving this level of

Arabization in both the primary and secondary schools the Tunisians have

moved very slowly. Arabization of the schools was permitted only when

qualified teachers were available.

Implementing a bilingual policy without public reaction against

it required some political preparation. In eliminating all habous land and

in closing the Zitouna as a separate institution Bourguiba greatly weakened

those traditional elements who might have aroused public opinion against him.

Neo-Destour militants explained to the people the necessity of maintaining

---

[52]Douglas E. Ashford, "Attitudinal Change and Modernization," in Modernization
by Design ed. by Chandler Morse et al. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1969), p. 152.

[53]Micaud, Tunisia, p. 152.

French as one of the languages of instruction. The combination of these factors has allowed for the continuation of a bilingual policy with gradual Arabization only as trained teachers become available.

Bourguiba refused to make Arabization of the schools a matter of national pride following independence in 1956. For him national identity is associated with more concrete rational achievements. Morocco, which placed such great emphasis on Arabization, is only slightly ahead of Tunisia in terms of total classroom hours given in Arabic. Moreover, even with fewer hours of Arabic on the class schedules the Tunisians have made more effective use of the language in the schools.[54] Finally, by moving with great caution, they have avoided affecting the quality of French language instruction which is necessary for those going on to secondary education.

D. Nationalization

With fewer complexes on the subject of Arabization the Tunisians have concentrated on the more concrete aspects of nationalization, such as the training of teachers to replace the foreigners in the school system. Tunisian efforts at nationalization have concentrated on the nationalization of the teaching corps and curriculum revisions. The government has worked to replace all foreigners teaching in the schools with competent Tunisian teachers. Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour also wanted to ensure that the new school graduates shared the regime's belief in the necessity of rationalizing society. This meant devising new courses that would inculcate Tunisia's youth with rational, modern values. Since these two aspects of nationalization, changes in curriculum and changes in the teaching corps,

---

[54]Ashford, "Modernization," p. 170.

were not tied to a simultaneous program of rapid Arabization, as in

Morocco, they succeeded more easily in Tunisia.

Despite a real commitment to nationalization of the schools, the

primary goal of Tunisia's education planners was the expansion of the entire

system while at the same time maintaining high standards. In the short-run

this meant sacrificing the goal of nationalizing the teaching corps since

the country did not have enough competent teachers to replace all the French

teachers. Therefore, even at the height of the Algerian war and the Bizerte

crisis in 1961 (concerning the continued presence of French troops on

Tunisian soil) when feeling against France ran high, the regime renewed

its cultural agreement with the French.[55] Significantly, they released as

substandard some 800 Zitouna trained graduates, despite the political

capital that might have been gained for the regime in traditionalist

circles by keeping them on as teachers.[56] Yet if the Tunisians faced up

to their immediate dependence on the French for teachers, they were planning

programs that in the long-run would end this dependence. Specifically this

meant allocating funds to the establishment of teacher training schools at

both the secondary and university levels. By 1967 Tunisia had 7,297

students enrolled in secondary courses for teacher training; Morocco and

Algeria, both with school populations nearly twice the size of Tunisia's,

had enrollments of 1,771 and 5,439 respectively (see Table V). Of the three

Maghreb countries, Tunisia also had the largest teacher training program at

the university level.

---

[55]Brown, "Tunisia", p. 162.

[56]Ibid., p. 159.

As a result of planning adequate teacher training programs,
Tunisia is now least dependent on the French for staffing its schools. Like
Morocco, Tunisia no longer has any foreigners teaching in its primary schools
(Algeria still has 13 per cent), but unlike Morocco and Algeria the nation-
alization of the teaching corps in Tunisia has not entailed a marked drop
in quality.[57] At the secondary level in 1969-1970 24 per cent of the
professors were foreigners, while in Algeria 55 per cent were foreigners
and in Morocco 64 per cent.[58] The expansion of the teacher training programs
to meet the expected demands of school expansion and nationalization is an
excellent example of the regime's ability to relate one phase of reform to
another.

With the exception of moral and religious training, the Tunisians
planned many of the same curriculum changes as did the Moroccans. In other
words, history and geography are now more oriented to the Maghreb and the
Arab world in general. However, in Tunisia courses that help to build up
national identity take second place to the modern disciplines such as
science and mathematics. Thus in the primary schools arithmetic is taught
more hours a week than geography, history, civics, and morality all combined.[59]
This sort of orientation in the school curriculum flows from the regime's
choice to associate national identity with the rational and the concrete
rather than the affective and the abstract. It also helps to prepare pupils
for the secondary education that is heavily technical and vocational in its
outlook.

[57]Tiano, Le Maghreb, p. 81.

[58]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," Maghreb XXXVII (January-February
1970), p. 43.

[59]Brown, "Tunisia," p. 165.

The civic and moral training courses instituted in Tunisia are quite different from those in Morocco. The Tunisian curriculum changes in this regard were conceived in an Arabo-Islamic context that was widely open to contemporary humanism.[60] In the primary schools verses from the Koran are still memorized but the emphasis is placed on the pupil's comprehension. The teachers' guide for the courses on religious thought at the primary level recommends avoidance of all speculative theological arguments and calls for the formation of tolerant and fraternal attitudes.[61] At the secondary level three times as many hours are devoted to the study of modern Western philosophy as to the study of Islamic thought.[62] The philosophy courses are designed to give the student a comprehension of the modern world and its technological demands. The teaching of Islamic thought stresses the social and psychological aspects of religion and in fact is almost a course in sociology.[63] The course seeks not to have the student believe but rather to be critical. Civic training at this level focuses on tolerance and human solidarity, and condemns all fanaticism and chauvinism. Over and over again the students are taught social responsibility and the necessity of serving the common welfare.[64] Finally, in an effort to give practical meaning to the teaching of democracy, from the primary school onward class elections are recommended.

On the whole the Tunisian regime has made effective use of the schools for socializing the country's youth into its modernizing, rational

[60]Michael Lelong, "La formation civique, morale, et religieuse dans l'enseigne-ment tunisien," Institut de Belles Lettres Arabes, No. 99 (3rd trimester 1962), p. 257.

[61]Ibid., p. 260.

[62]Micaud, Tunisia, p. 153.

[63]Lelong, "La formation civique tunisien," p. 261.

[64]Ibid., p. 262.

outlook. Although some secondary school and university students may resent Bourguiba's paternalism they can agree with most of his programs.[65] The PSD works in the secondary schools both directly and indirectly through its youth wing to recruit students for the regime. But if the schools and the party are successful in shaping the attitudes of the majority of the students, they have been unsuccessful in coping with a minority of radical students. Whereas earlier the UGET used to incorporate these radical critics of the regime, they are no longer able to do so. As a result, since 1966 these radical students have been active in promoting strikes and a number of violent street actions. In 1967 a number of the dissident leaders were put on trial and imprisoned. It is impossible to gauge from a distance the amount of sympathy these students command from the general student population. However, it is certain that Tunisia's students are not as alienated from the regime as are Morocco's.[66]

Tunisia's efforts at nationalizing the schools have on the whole been successful. In its concrete aspects, i.e. providing Tunisian nationals as teachers, they have pursued a long-range policy that has been quite successful. Moreover, by refusing short-term compromises such as the hiring of unqualified teachers, they have maintained a relatively high quality of instruction. However, in the more abstract aspects of nationalization, i.e. the use of the schools to foster a sense of national identity, the Tunisians have not been as successful as they might have been. Although re-oriented to the North African context, courses on history, civic training, and social studies occupy a very small portion of the students' schedule.

[65]Moore, North Africa, p. 291.
[66]Ibid., pp. 289-300.

Although Bourguiba has repeatedly stated that the country's identity should be based on concrete, technical achievements, it would seem that there is nonetheless a need for inculcating an affective national culture. Even so, most of the students have been, up to the present, effectively socialized into the regime's modernizing outlook, notwithstanding the reduced place given social and civics courses in the school curriculum.

IV. Conclusions

On the whole, Tunisia's educational policies reflect the superior planning capabilities of the government and its commitment to societal change. Shortly after independence the government announced a Ten-Year program for education. This program contained clearly articulated priorities which the regime felt were most likely to promote its overall plans for development. The Tunisians had two major goals in mind for education. Firstly, the regime was interested in eliminating the elitist bias of the colonial school system. Secondly, there was a realization that education had to be changed to fit the needs of economic development. Aware that these goals could not be realized overnight, the regime left much of the implementation to the professionals in the Ministry of National Education. Thus the Tunisian educational policies have been relatively coherent and practical. Political influences in their formulation come from only one source, Bourguiba, and not from a number of disparate sources as in Morocco.

Tunisia's cautious programs of Arabization and nationalization have ensured that teaching in the schools reflects the rational orientation of the regime. Courses in philosophy and civic training were very definitely designed to convert the country's youth to "Bourguibism". Up to the present

time, most of the students have been socialized into the official philosophy. However, the courses which inculcate a sense of national identity occupy a small part of the students' total schedule. Furthermore the students are taught to think and be critical rather than to believe and have faith. Therefore the regime must constantly live up to its own standards or else run the risk of coming under attack from dissident students. In other words, the regime has a relatively low symbolic capacity and must constantly work to satisfy demands for progress and modernization, demands which for the most part it created itself.

Tunisia is the one country of the three in the Maghreb that has made real progress in overcoming the problems of social stratification left behind by the colonial regime. Using the party to stimulate local interest, the government has made a conscious effort from the outset to push school construction and attendance in the backward regions of the country. Although regional disparities still exist they have been reduced and will be reduced further. Progress has also been made in encouraging female enrollment. Furthermore the Tunisians have not created elitist schools within the regular system as the Moroccans have. Any future Tunisian ruling elite is likely to have the same characteristics as the present one. In other words, it will be distinguished by its superior education and income, but will not be a closed social class.

As was pointed out in the introductory chapter, education is operative in relation to national integration in two ways. In the first place, it can be used to either deepen or smooth over vertical cleavages, that is cleavages on regional or linguistic lines. Here, Tunisian policies have helped to reduce regional inequalities and thereby promote national

integration. Secondly, education can affect national integration by
intensifying or reducing horizontal cleavages, that is cleavages on class
or caste lines. Here, again, Tunisia has adopted policies aimed at helping
the poor in rural areas instead of concentrating on the relatively well-to-do
Tunisois, while the operation of a single uniform school system has pre-
cluded the existence of prestigious elite schools.

Equally, the Tunisian schools have been deliberately adapted to
the needs of the economy. As early as 1958 the government emphasized the
need for turning out graduates in vocations needed for economic development.
In Tunisia's plans for economic growth the sections dealing with manpower
planning are particularly well worked out. Although there has been sharp
debate in the country over the degree to which education should be tied to
manpower needs, compared to Morocco and even Algeria, Tunisia has done
more to adapt education to the necessities of economic development. As a
result, the Tunisians are less dependent on foreign sources for trained
manpower.

Chapter V

Algeria: Systemic Weakness

I.   Style of Politics

Of the three North African countries under consideration Algeria was the most deeply affected by the colonial experience.   For Algeria the colonial period lasted 132 years and was ended only after a long and costly war of national liberation.   During much of the colonial period Algeria was ruled as an integral part of France.   In Algeria the French made almost no attempt to preserve the traditional society and its institutions. At the same time, because of the _colon_ population's monopolization of the state and the economy, very few Algerians were fully integrated into modern society.   Education levels were quite low in Algeria, as was seen in Chapter II.   By the time Algeria won its independence in 1962 its traditional society had largely been destroyed while the modern sector of society had been the preserve of the French.   As a consequence, social and governmental institutions have been very weak; the army with its monopoly of the means of violence and tight organization, has been the main prop for the two post-independence regimes in Algeria.

On the basis of his experience with the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), Fanon asserted that wars of national liberation help to eliminate old vertical cleavages and aid in promoting a new revolutionary organization.[1]   Politics in post-independence Algeria shows that, contrary to Fanon's expectations, wars of liberation do not necessarily produce

[1]Franz Fanon, _The Wretched of the Earth_ (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968), pp. 132-136.

national unity. The internecine struggle for power among Algeria's leaders

in the summer of 1962 showed how deeply divided they were.

During the Ben Bella period (1962-1965) politics was limited to

a small elite divided into cliques which competed for power. The FLN had

yet to effectively penetrate the countryside and mobilize the population,

principally because its militants evinced more interest in partisan politics

than in mobilizing the populace.[2] Elite cleavages rarely, if ever, reflected

deep regional or ideological conflicts. Rather, they were most frequently

struggles for personal power and influence.[3] The roots of this particular

feature of post-independence Algerian politics lie in the peculiar nature

of the FLN and the entire war for liberation.

The FLN was founded in 1954 by a small isolated group of intran-

sigents who favored an armed uprising against the French as a means of

awakening the masses.[4] It was not until 1956 that other Algerian nationa-

lists began to join the FLN. The FLN then became what its name implied it

was from the outset: a front of all Algerians for national liberation.

This meant that it was a politically heterogeneous grouping whose only

common goal was the defeat of the French. Quandt finds that the leadership

of the FLN was extremely fragmented.[5] During the years of the war of

national liberation this badly divided leadership managed to do most of its

quarreling behind closed doors so as to present a strong front to the French.

---

[2]David and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 116.

[3]William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1969), p. 266.

[4]David C. Gordon, The Passing of French Algeria (London: Oxford University
Press, 1966), p. 57.

[5]Quandt, Political Leadership, pp. 21-24.

Elite disputes were further limited by the fact that of the nine founders
of the FLN five spent most of the war in French prisons.

However, as the war progressed new cleavages formed in the leader-
ship and new power centers were created. The civilians in the FLN and in
the provisional government (GPRA) clashed with the leaders of the regular
army (ALN) based on the borders in Morocco and in Tunisia. The general
Staff of the ALN clashed with the guerrilla leaders doing the actual
fighting inside Algeria. The guerrilla leaders of one willaya (the FLN
divided Algeria into six military regions or willayas) quarrelled with
those of another. The majority of these leaders paid lip-service to a
vague revolutionary, socialist ideology, but a practical program which
could guide post-war politics was never developed.[6]

When the Evian Agreements of March 1962 put an end to the war
the façade of unity collapsed and the feuds among the elite were brought
out into the open.[7] Throughout the summer of that year Algeria bordered
on total civil war as opposing factions struggled for power. In the end
two major factions emerged and their struggle resulted in armed conflict.[8]
One faction, centered in eastern Algeria, was made up of GPRA members and
some of the willaya commanders. The other was an anti-GPRA coalition that
emerged behind Ben Bella and enjoyed the support of the ALN General Staff
and the political Bureau of the FLN. The struggle between these two
factions was motivated by a desire for leadership of the country and neither

---

[6]Clement Henry Moore, Politics in North Africa (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1970), pp. 89 & 118.

[7]Arslan Humbaraci, Algeria: A Revolution that Failed (New York: Frederick
A. Preager, 1966), p. 70.

[8]Ottaway, Algeria, p. 19.

one took a clear ideological stand.[9] In August Ben Bella entered Algiers

and by September most of the dissident willaya had accepted his authority.

The key to Ben Bella's rise to power in the summer of 1962 was

his alliance with the ALN under Col. Boumediene. Yet he also sought to

gather supporters from other circles. Essentially, Ben Bella, who lacked

an independent power base, tried to get all groups to support him and

then to play one off against the other. However, as was seen in the case

of Morocco, this type of politics is inimical to long-range policy formu-

lation. To overcome the weakness of his position Ben Bella tried to alter

the composition of the political elite by excluding some old members and

by promoting new ones.[10] To do this Ben Bella came to rely increasingly

on the army, while at the same time he was trying to undermine Boumediene

and his clique in the General Staff. Finally in June 1965 Boumediene led

a bloodless coup d'état and removed Ben Bella from power.

Although Ben Bella was immensely popular and had an almost

charismatic appeal to the masses, there were almost no demonstrations in

his favor following his fall. His downfall was not protested because he

had failed to organize his supporters. He had tried and failed to re-

organize the FLN into a vanguard party that would provide him with a solid

power base.[11] In addition, he shifted his civil administrators around so

frequently that there was no effective administration in the countryside.[12]

Thus Ben Bella's position as head of state gave him no special legitimacy

or organizational base.

[9]Ibid., p. 19, also see Quandt, Political Leadership, p. 172.

[10]Ibid., p. 234.

[11]Moore, North Africa, p. 119.

[12]Ibid., p. 137.

In some respects Boumediene's regime is quite different from the
one that preceded it. In particular, Boumediene did not share Ben Bella's
total commitment to socialism. Nonetheless, both relied in the last analysis
on the army. The army in Algeria is essentially Boumediene's creation, and
has been involved in politics since before independence. Violence seems
endemic in Algerian politics and the army has been used frequently to put
down opposition. The ALN had its name changed to the ANP (Armée Nationale
Populaire) and is made up of the old standing army that did little of the
fighting during the war. Since independence Boumediene has recruited a
number of French-trained officers into the army who give it a professional
outlook. Until the coup d'état the army was not involved in politics in
any regularized manner. After the coup d'état many army leaders were brought
into the government and thus the army became more fully integrated into the
political life of the country. The Revolutionary Council, which served
as a policy-making body after the fall of Ben Bella in June 1965, was
almost entirely made up of military men. The military were also prominent
among the ministers Boumediene appointed to run the government. In addition
to army officers Boumediene's ministers included a number of well-educated,
technically competent young men. In spite of efforts by Boumediene to gain
a wider base for his rule, he still depends primarily on the army.[13]

After the 1965 coup d'état Boumediene emphasized the "collegial"
leadership of the country. He personally avoided the public eye and most
policy decisions were evolved in lengthy meetings of the Revolutionary
Council.[14] Since that time three major factions seem to have arisen, which

[13]Ibid., p. 238.

[14]Quandt, Political Leadership, p. 248.

up to now have worked relatively well together and have remained loyal to
Boumediene.[15]   The first faction consists of Boumediene and former members
of the General Staff from the war of liberation.   The Foreign Minister,
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, is prominent in this group.   The second faction is
made up of French trained professional officers.   This group has gradually
been excluded from politics as the Revolutionary Council and the principle
of "collegial"leadership have lost importance over the years.   Finally, the
third group consists of a number of educated, technically competent, younger
men.   Belaid Abdesselam, the Minister of Industry and Energy, is prominent
in this group which favors technocratic solutions.

Although Boumediene has been successful in strengthening the
administration, he has not been able to institutionalize an organized
political process.   Therefore he has opted for a solution that involves
the expansion of the area of administration and the shrinkage of the area
of politics.   This solution resembles Bourguiba's policies but, unlike
Bourguiba, Boumediene has no functioning political party to organize the
people and to provide the regime with valuable feedback.

The number of persons who have had some significant voice in the
politics of the country under either Ben Bella or Boumediene has been small.
As the Ottaways note:

> Since Algeria attained its independence, its political history
> has been written almost entirely by those who led the war of
> liberation...If the clans in power have changed, the elitist
> character of Algerian politics has not.   Only a small civil-
> military oligarchy has been involved in the political process,
> while there has been remarkably little participation on the part
> of the people.   Even the mass organizations' power to influence
> events has depended more on the personal influence of the par-
> ticular leaders than on the number of members in the organization.[16]

[15]Ottawa, Algeria, pp. 282-283.

[16]Ibid., p. 288.

The extreme elitist character of Algeria's politics coupled with a mixed record of economic and social achievements has prevented the regime from acquiring legitimacy. Power in Algeria has been personalized since independence and there has been no institutionalization of roles and structures in government.

II. Regime Strategies of Development

The change in government in Algeria brought with it a change in the strategy for development. Although Boumediene frequently stated that he would be faithful to the principles of the revolution, there have been distinct changes in policy. However, both Boumediene and Ben Bella had to face the fact that the Algerian government has had a very low regulative capability. Thus whatever their ideological inclinations might have been they had only a limited ability to implement them. Underlying the development strategies of both men was a commitment to a vague ill-defined conception of socialism. The government was perceived by both as an instrument for molding society. But in the absence of a well articulated philosophy of development and a functioning administration, the two regimes have been unable to make the same progress as the Tunisian regime.

Fundamental to the understanding of Algeria's problems in translating its ideological commitments into practice is the fact that it has had a low capability for planning and administration. This is paradoxical since Algeria has the most elaborate administrative infrastructure in the Maghreb.[17] However, the Algerian administration is not geared to the needs of development and its cadres are poorly trained. Boumediene has attached great

---

[17]Moore, North Africa, p. 133.

importance to the improvement of the administration and appears to be making

some progress.[18]

The departure of the European population in 1962 meant the

departure of 90 per cent of the government's administrative cadres.[19] This

meant for a long time that many posts were either vacant or occupied by

foreigners. For example, in 1964 the Ministry of Agriculture was allocated

funds for 524 "category A" civil servants, yet of this number 374 were never

found and 101 were foreigners.[20] As the state expands and becomes more

involved in economic affairs the need for trained personnel has obviously

increased. But it was estimated in 1967 that it would take 12 years for

Algeria to train the cadres necessary to regain the pre-independence level

of staffing.[21] The lack of personnel has resulted in poor administration

and, in the early years, no administration at all. As late as 1965 the

Algerian government was able to spend only two-thirds of the investment

credits which had been allocated in the budget, primarily because it lacked

the cadres.[22] Furthermore, the structures and methods of the administration

are maladapted to present needs.[23] Based on a French model, the Algerian

administration uses long, complex procedures and is bogged down in paperwork.

Both Ben Bella and Boumediene have found the administration to be a stumbling

block in their respective plans for development.

Ben Bella made much of his socialist leanings, but had a poor

grasp of socialist doctrines; at one time he stated that he was a Marxist

[18]Ibid., p. 240.

[19]René Gallissot, L'Economie de l'Afrique du Nord (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969), p. 80.

[20]André Tiano, Le Maghreb Entre les Mythes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), p. 34.

[21]Ibid., p. 36.

[22]Ibid., p. 537.

[23]Moore, North Africa, p. 142.

but rejected dialectical materialism. Workers' self-management, which became the distinctive feature of his brand of socialism, was largely thrust upon him by events beyond his control. As large numbers of French commercial farmers and industrialists left Algeria in 1962, the Algerian workers often had to take over the management of the abandoned enterprises to ensure production. In March 1963 Ben Bella announced a series of decrees that were to make workers' self-management law. The inspiration for the March Decrees came not so much from Ben Bella as from a handful of foreign Trotskyite advisors who were anxious to have a chance to try out their ideas.[24] Ben Bella accepted the idea because his regime still lacked a distinctive socialist feature and also because he was anxious to use it as a weapon in a political dispute he was having with certain members of the FLN Political Bureau.[25]

Self-management has proved to be a viable economic principle in Yugoslavia, but in Algeria because of poor planning and perpetual government interference it failed. Algeria was most committed to the idea in the agricultural sector where the Yugoslav experience has shown that it is least likely to succeed.[26] As a result the farms went into debt and wine and cereal production dropped. In the industrial and commercial sectors self-management was never employed except in a small number of relatively unimportant firms. These firms were never given adequate credit facilities and in the face of strong competition from the private sector most of them failed. The program of self-management received much publicity but was

[24]Humbaraci, Algeria, p. 115.

[25]Hervé Bourges, L'Algerie à l'Epreuve du Pouvoir (1962-1967) (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset, 1967), p. 71.

[26]Humbaraci, Algeria, p. 118.

constantly disrupted by ill-informed government interference and was never given enough qualified personnel.[27]

Lacking a unified party like the Neo-Destour in Tunisian, Ben Bella was largely unable to effect any meaningful social reforms. He desired to make changes in the status of women in society and in fact was very popular with the Algerian women. Although he never dared to attack any Islamic institutions, as Bourguiba had done, he clearly emphasized socialist themes over Islamic ones. Yet because of the weakness of the state and party, social modernization and reform remained largely a matter of slogans and official propaganda.

Boumediene's orientation in the realms of economic and social policy was somewhat different from Ben Bella's. In matters of economic policy he has slowly abandoned the program of workers' self-management and opted for a form of state capitalism. Since 1965 Algeria's economic policies have been based on an ever enlarging state-controlled sector.[28] The regime has been most concerned with economic stability and production and for the most part has ignored problems of inequalities of income and property.[29] Much like Hassan in Morocco, Boumediene has sought to control the rural sector through the use of agricultural credits. However, for the long-run the regime appears to be planning the establishment of co-operatives somewhat like those tried in Tunisia.[30]

---

[27]André Tiano, "L'Experience du secteur public de production au maghreb depuis l'indépendance," Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques et Politiques V (June 1968), pp. 335 & 342.

[28]Gallissot, L'Economie, p. 88.

[29]Ibid., p. 88.

[30]Moore, North Africa, p. 260.

The move towards state capitalism has been the work of the younger technocrats led by Belaid Abdesselam. These men were brought into government after Boumediene's coup d'état and are the force behind Algeria's decision to engage in overall economic planning. Planning was started in Algeria in 1966, and in 1967 a Three-Year Plan was announced. Although it brings some order to Algeria's investments, the Plan reveals a lack of real coordination and, more serious still, a lack of fundamental agreement on economic policy.[31] The major problem with Algerian efforts at economic planning seems to be that the country's administrative apparatus is still maladapted to the tasks at hand.[32] Yet despite the numerous problems to be overcome, principally the problems of the administration, deeply rooted political obstacles to planning, as found in Morocco, do not exist in Algeria. Therefore it seems likely that, as long as the technocrats remain in favor, rational planning will continue to grow in importance.

In matters relating to social reform and modernization, Boumediene has been more conservative than Ben Bella. Boumediene himself had an Islamic education and even studied briefly at the Al Azhar in Cairo. He is known to have strong attachments to Islam and emphasizes the fact that Algeria is an Islamic country. Whereas Ben Bella emphasized socialist themes, Boumediene has underscored traditionalist ideas. On the question of women's rights Boumediene halted the campaign for women's emancipation and the few women who occupied public posts were dismissed.[33] Questions of

[31]Gallissot, L'Economie, p. 89.

[32]Moore, North Africa, p. 142.

[33]Humbaraci, Algeria, p. 251.

social justice in the distribution of goods and services have been ignored

and the stress has been shifted to production. There has been no attempt

to reform the traditional system of Islamic jurisprudence.[34] In general,

Boumediene has stressed the necessity of returning to the sources of Islam,

which has attracted to him the conservative religious elements of the

country while alienating the young and the Left. However, it would be

a mistake to regard Boumediene as completely opposed to social modernization,

but he does place much less emphasis on it than did Ben Bella. Boumediene's

brand of socialism is more oriented towards central planning and technolo-

gical progress, as evidenced by his support of Abdesselam and the technocrats.

One progressive element in Boumediene's policy for development

was the establishment and election of the communal assemblies in 1967.

These assemblies, set up in all the communes of the country, were to be

primarily administrative bodies which were to help take some of the demands

off the central administration. They were to have, in addition, some

independent authority in dealing with local matters, especially as regards

the initiation of small-scale development projects. However, in the first

years of their operation the communal assemblies were not properly funded

and the promised powers were not granted to them.[35] Despite their very

limited scope at present, the assemblies have the potential for forming

the base of a more developed political system in the future.

Over the entire period since independence Algeria has had to

cope with more economic and social problems than either of its neighbors.

This fact derives primarily from its peculiar colonial history and difficult

[34] Moore, North Africa, p. 142.

[35] Ottaway, Algeria, p. 226.

transition to independence. The Algerians have largely concentrated their

resources on industrial development; the new Plan announced in January 1970

accorded 45 per cent of public investment to industry as compared to 15

per cent for agriculture. This means that little is being done to help

the majority of the population which lives in the countryside. The cost

of living has been rising steadily, as has the rate of unemployment.[36] The

bulk of investment has been channeled into mineral extraction and heavy

industry, which may provide the basis for future development, but which

for the time being has not benefitted the bulk of the population. Many of

Algeria's problems are the direct or indirect result of the abrupt departure

of the European population in 1962 which caused economic dislocations on a

scale that dwarfed the events in Tunisia and Morocco. Utilisation of

capacity in the industrial sector in 1969 had yet to come up to the pre-

independence level.[37] In other sectors as well the post-independence

development efforts have merely served to redress the damage done in the

summer of 1962.

III. The Educational Problems of Algeria

Algeria's handling of its educational problems has been hampered

by the poor planning capability of its administration. As a result of this

and its dependence on France for teachers and professors Algeria's educational

policies, up until 1969, have been quite conservative. The revolutionary

rhetoric of both Ben Bella and Boumediene has not affected the schools very

---

[36]Ibid., p. 288.

[37]Gallissot, L'Economie, p. 82.

much. There has been no long-range, all-encompassing plan announced that
can compare to Tunisia's Ten-Year Perspectives for Education. Nonetheless,
Algeria's leaders have been increasingly concerned with adapting the school
system to the development needs of the country. This has been evidenced
in the new directions educational policies have been taking since 1969.
Although the Algerians have registered substantial progress in this area,
when this progress is measured against either the country's needs or the
equivalent progress registered by the Tunisians it is found to be wanting.

Faced with the massive departure of skilled manpower to France
after independence, Algeria's leaders all agreed on the necessity of
expanding the school system to produce the replacements necessary. Also
the socialist ideology of the revolution demanded that the schools be made
more democratic. However, in many respects the expansion program did
little to alter the elitist nature of the system, and thus could not
properly be called democratization. The regime also realized very early
on that education had to be practical if the schools were to produce
students capable of taking the places of the departed French technicians
and administrative personnel. In fact Algeria has done quite well in
orienting its students to technical and vocational studies, although
problems in this respect do still exist. On the question of Arabization
the Algerians started off by making some of the mistakes that the Moroccans
had made several years before. These mistakes were soon rectified and
the country now has what amounts to a bilingual policy equivalent to that
in Tunisia. Algeria's problems with nationalization of the school system
have been monumental due to the lack of any Franco-Arab schools during the
colonial era. Despite its progress Algeria still lags behind both Tunisia
and Morocco in this respect.

Algerian policy makers have, up to now, had few options open to them. The country's dependence on French aid for education has meant the retention of a basically French educational establishment. One of the extraordinary things in an examination of Algeria's educational policy is the contradiction between the rhetoric of independence and socialism, on the one hand, and the high degree of French penetration in cultural and educational affairs, on the other. With its revolutionary ideology it would be expected that Algeria would have adopted the most radical educational reforms. External constraints, such as the dependence on the French, have been operating in such a way as to prevent this from happening. Internal constraints, such as the poor planning and administrative capability of the government, have been operating in favor of the maintenance of the status quo. But, despite these constraints, the Algerians have evolved a fairly realistic policy. The isolation of the political system from the people, which is dangerous for political stability, has been a positive factor in the elaboration of a realistic policy for education.[38] For, unlike its Moroccan counterpart, the Algerian Ministry of National Education has not had to be too concerned with adverse public reaction to its decisions.

A. Democratization

As was the case in Morocco and Tunisia, the French helped to stimulate a generalized demand for education which they did not satisfy. Free access to the schools had been one of the principal demands of the

[38]Moore, North Africa, p. 271.

Algerian nationalists since World War I.[39] These demands were made a matter of absolute necessity after the abrupt departure of well over two-thirds of the colon population by the end of the summer of 1962. The modern sector of the economy and the government had been run by the colons and it was vitally important to train replacements for them in the briefest time possible. Finally, and perhaps most important, the revolutionary ideology of Ben Bella and his associates demanded that the schools be made democratic.

School attendance by Algerian Moslems in 1954 had only reached 15 per cent of the school-age population, the lowest rate of the three Maghrebi countries.[40] Some progress was realized by the French during the war of liberation but the Algerians still had to start independence with an especially low rate of school attendance. Figures on the rate of primary school attendance at the time of independence vary considerably since they often include the colon population. Tiano estimates that in 1960 the rate was approximately 30 per cent, without revealing whether or not the colon population is included.[41] Since 1962 the Algerians have made rapid progress. By 1965 primary school attendance had reached 43 per cent of the primary school-age population (see Table I). In the two subsequent years total primary school enrollment increased from 787,602 to 1,485,390 (see Table II), but as a proportion of the total primary school-age population this represented no increase.[42] Secondary school enrollment

[39]Charles-Robert Ageron, Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1969)

[40]Ibid., p. 85.

[41]Tiano, Le Maghreb, p. 39.

[42]UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1969 (Paris: UNESCO, 1970), pp. 70-77.

has also been growing dramatically. Enrollment in general secondary

education, for example, has increased at an annual average of approximately

14 per cent from 1964 to 1967.[43] The number of Algerians pursuing higher

studies has increased from 589 in 1954 to 8,503 in 1966. In 1969 it was

estimated that over 60 per cent of the total school age population was in

school.[44]

Despite the undeniable progress accomplished, the expansion of

the school system has not overcome the deep social inequalities of the

colonial system. Moreover, some aspects of Algeria's educational policies

have been openly elitist in their operation. Up to 1968 the expansion

program did little to break down the regional disparities left by the

French. To make up for this disequilibrium the government announced in

October 1968 that it was going to concentrate its school construction efforts

in the backward regions of the country.[45]

The elitist characteristics of the Algerian school system are to

be found at the secondary and university levels. The ratio of secondary

and university students to primary school pupils is the lowest in North

Africa: in 1966-1967 the ratio was 1:8 in Algeria, while it was 1:5 in

Morocco and 1:7 in Tunisia.[46] This means that in Algeria post-primary

education is reserved for a carefully selected elite. Passage from one

level to another in the school system is determined by examination, but

the standards in the past have been set artificially high. The standards

[43]Figure computed from information supplied in: International Bureau of
Education & UNESCO, International Yearbooks of Education 1964-1967 (Geneva:
UNESCO, 1965-1968).

[44]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," Maghreb No. 37 (January-February
1970), p. 42.

[45]Jeune Afrique (Tunis), No. 407, October 27, 1968, p. 52.

[46]Moore, North Africa, p.270.

of the French system have been maintained to preserve the equivalence

between French and Algerian diplomas, but it has also preserved the elitist

character of the schools. As a result, those students who come from

middle-class backgrounds and who have thus had certain cultural advantages

tend to succeed most often. In fact a disproportionate number of the

university students do come from middle-class families.[47] In other words

the maintenance of artificially high standards has preserved the quality

of the degrees at the expense of the policy of democratization. Essentially,

the Algerians have up to now,revolutionary rhetoric aside, expanded their

school system but have failed to make it appreciable more democratic.

Nonetheless, the expansion program is in itself a considerable achievement

and Algeria now ranks second in rate of school attendance in the Maghreb.

On the matter of female enrollment the Algerians have done little

to improve the situation they were left with in 1962. Up to 1967 the

percentage of female primary school pupils remained more or less steady

at 38 per cent (see Table II). Although this figure is the highest in

North Africa, it represents the work of the French and not the result of

any Algerian policy. In secondary and university education there has been

a small but consistent drop in the proportion of female enrollment (see

Tables III-V). Although the Algerians are more democratic in this matter

than the Moroccans, they have not tried to improve the situation as have

the Tunisians. This state of affairs can undoubtedly be ascribed to

Boumediene's general Islamic orientation and antipathy for women's rights.

[47]Le Monde (Paris), December 24, 1968, p. 13.

Algerian planners have been aware of the built-in elitist
tendencies of the school system and rumors of an impending reform were
reported in 1969. In January 1970 a new Four-Year Plan was announced which
contained proposals aimed at overcoming some of the faults outlined above.
The secondary school system has been given the largest share of investment.[48]
This will permit a rapid expansion to overcome the low ratio of secondary
students to primary pupils. Moreover, a new four-year secondary school
cycle (the old one, based on the lycée system, lasted seven years) is to
be generalized. The planners hope this will allow a decentralization of
the system and bring the schools closer to the communities they serve.[49]
The Plan also foresees universal primary education by 1978 and the
elimination of all regional biases in the entire educational system.[50]
Finally, by lowering the standards on the baccalauréat examinations and in
some cases dropping the exam as an entrance requirement to university, the
government hopes to make the university more democratic.[51] If all these
reforms are implemented they will go a long way towards making the
educational policy conform with regime ideology. As of now it is still
too early to evaluate the implementation of the reforms. Nonetheless, it
should be noted that the education section of the Plan is poor in detailed
statistics and some of its proposals seem overly ambitious (e.g. the rate
of secondary school expansion is set at 22 per cent per annum).

---

[48]"Le Plan Quadriennal Algérien, 1970-1973," Revue Algérienne des Sciences
Juridiques, Economiques, et Politiques VII (September 1970), p. 771.

[49]Ibid., p. 826.

[50]Ibid., pp. 825-826.

[51]Ibid., p. 826.

B. Rationalization

Algeria has been quite successful in channelling its students into scientific and technical studies. However, with its low capability for manpower planning it has not been able to engage in the same sort of comprehensive planning found in Tunisia.[52] Despite this poor capability for planning, Algeria had, at the time of independence in 1962, two very important advantages over Morocco and Tunisia. Firstly, as was pointed out above, the Algerian government operated in relative isolation from popular demands. This has meant that the Ministry of National Education has been able to stream students off into the sciences and engineering with relative ease, despite the greater popularity of the humanities and law. Secondly, Algeria did not have the thorny problem of the Koranic schools to cope with. The French had always frowned on traditional education in Algeria and as a result there were very few Koranic schools and no university-mosque. Thus the Algerians were not confronted with the problem of having to integrate several school systems into a single unified system.

On the eve of independence Algeria already had a very substantial proportion of its secondary students in vocational education. In 1960, for example, slightly over one quarter of the country's secondary school students were enrolled in vocational courses (see Table VI). One of the few areas in which the Ben Bella regime was successful was education and in particular technical education.[53] The emphasis on vocational and scientific education was in large part dictated by the desperate shortage

[52]Moore, North Africa, p. 272.

[53]Humbaraci, Algeria, pp. 93-94.

of technical cadres occasioned by the French exodus after independence.

Since 1962 the Algerians have devoted roughly as much of their budget as

the Tunisians to vocational education and teacher training.[54] In 1967

Algeria had 28 per cent of its secondary level students in either vocational

or teacher training courses; for Tunisia the figure is 39 per cent, Morocco

22 per cent (see Table VII). It should be borne in mind, however, that

Algeria, proportional to its population, had half the number of students

of Tunisia.

At the same time the Algerians have attempted to rationalize

and streamline the structure of technical and vocational education. In

1965 the technical schools were unified into one system and the overly

specialized courses were eliminated.[55] The same year the Algerians began

to make a serious effort to engage in comprehensive manpower planning. In

large part Algeria's successes in rationalizing their schools are due to

the fact that public demands for specific types of education are weak and

can be ignored.

Yet despite the very solid progress the Algerians have made they

are still a long way from solving their manpower problems. It was estimated

in 1968 that by 1973 Algeria would need 21,000 university or other post-

secondary trained cadres and that of this number only 6,500 would be fur-

nished from its own educational system.[56] The inability to produce a

sufficient number of trained personnel accounts for the country's dependence

on French assistance: in 1967 one half of the French technical cooperants

---

[54]UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1969, pp. 424-426.

[55]International Bureau of Education and UNESCO, International Yearbook of
Education 1966 (Geneva: UNESCO,1967), p. 11.

[56]Le Monde (Paris), December 24, 1968, p. 13.

served in Algeria.[57] Given the dimensions of the manpower needs in Algeria

it is doubtful whether any regime could have completely mastered the

situation. However, the extremely high standards of the examinations

result in a high failure rate. This leads to a tremendous wastage of

partially trained men. For example, in 1966 only 26 per cent of the can-

didates for the baccalauréat actually passed the exam.[58]

The Algerian planners are conscious of these shortcomings and

the new Four-Year Plan contains some new proposals which aim at overcoming

them. As was noted in the section on democratization, the standards for

the baccalauréat are to be lowered. Once this is done it will help to

eliminate the wastage presently taking place in the school system. The

Plan also foresees the establishment of thirty new technical institutes.

These institutes aim at providing practical training to a large number of

individuals in a short period of time.[59] Of the some 28,000 cadres to be

trained in the Plan period in these institutes 36,000 are destined to work

as teachers. The idea of the technical institutes seems new and shows the

concern of the planners over the manpower problem. However, on the basis

of the information presented in the Plan document the institutes appear

hastily conceived. There are no detailed figures presented concerning

where the teachers are to come from nor on the distribution of the students

by field of study. A table giving a partial breakdown of the manpower needs

of the country is presented at the end of the section on education, but is

not integrated with the rest of the proposals.

---

[57]Le Monde (Paris), July 6, 1967, p. 9.

[58]Jeune Afrique (Tunis), No. 334, June 4, 1967, p. 49.

[59]"Le Plan Quadriennal Algérien, 1970-1973," p. 828.

C. Nationalization

On the issue of nationalization of the schools the Algerians
were faced by much greater problems at the time of independence than either
of their neighbors. The magnitude of Algeria's problems in this respect is
due to its colonial history. Principally, the low rate of school attendance
among Algerian Moslems during the colonial period meant that at the time of
independence there were relatively few Algerians qualified to teach. In
addition, the lack of a Franco-Arab school system meant that a rudimentary
national curriculum had not been developed as it had been in both Morocco
and Tunisia. Yet statements concerning the necessity of nationalizing
the schools formed an integral part of FLN demands during the war of
national liberation. After 132 years of cultural alienation it was only
natural that the nationalists sought to reestablish national identity in
the schools.

In the first years following independence it appeared that the
Algerians were going to follow the Moroccans in attempting nationalization
at any price. Numbers of Egyptian teachers were brought into the school
system and unqualified Algerians were given teaching positions. With
little preparation, history and geography courses were made to emphasize
Algeria and the Maghreb. However, the great importance that was attached
to the maintenance of high standards and the equivalence between French and
Algerian degrees soon put an end to the hasty nationalization of the schools.

The nationalization of the teaching corps has proved to be
especially difficult for Algeria because of its monumental shortage of
qualified indigenous teachers. The use of Egyptian teachers was primarily
dictated by the program of Arabization and will therefore be treated in the

following section. It should be noted here, however, that the Egyptians

proved to be no more Algerian than the French and not as well qualified

professionally. The introduction of Algerians into the teaching corps was

extremely rapid in the first years of independence. For example, before

1962 only 15 per cent of the primary school teachers and 2 per cent of the

secondary school professors were Algerian Moslems while for the academic

year 1963-1964 the figures were 58 per cent and 46 per cent respectively.[60]

Since 1963 the nationalization of the teaching corps has been considerably

less rapid. In 1969 it was estimated that 87 per cent of the primary school

teachers and only 45 per cent of the secondary school professors were

Algerians.[61] To train new teachers Algeria had, in 1967, some 3 per cent

of its secondary students in teacher training courses. Relative to other

North African countries this is a fairly respectable percentage; for Tunisia

the corresponding figure was 5 per cent while Morocco trailed far behind

with 0.6 per cent (see Table VI).

The nationalization of the teaching corps is far from complete and

the progress that has been made has caused some problems. The main effect

of the rapid promotion of Algerians in the teaching corps has been a marked

deterioration of pedagogical standards. In 1965 nearly 13,000 of the some

22,000 Algerians teaching in the primary schools had only a primary school

education themselves.[62] While the recruitment of these unqualified teachers

continues, the Ministry of National Education is trying to give them additional

training with summer courses. As the figures presented above show, less has

[60]Humbaraci, Algeria, p. 283.

[61]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," p. 43.

[62]Tiano, Le Maghreb, p. 78.

been done to achieve the nationalization of the secondary schools than has

been done at the primary level. However, it seems that even the limited

use of Algerian professors, coupled with the retention of French examination

standards, has entailed a high rate of failure on the baccalauréat.

Although Algeria's efforts at training new teachers are very

respectable when compared to those of its two neighbors, they are quite

inadequate when compared to the actual needs of the country. A 1970 estimate

placed the country's needs for new teachers at 36,000 by 1973, while only

2,500 students a year were passing the baccalauréat examination.[63] The

new technological institutes projected in the Four-Year Plan will have as

one of their principal objectives the training of some 26,000 new teachers.

But, it remains to be seen if the provisions of the Plan can be implemented

and whether or not the graduates of these institutes will be of sufficiently

high quality.

The Algerian effort at nationalizing the curriculum of the

schools has been slight compared to the emphasis placed on this problem in

the rhetoric of the elite. Very soon after independence courses in history

and geography were reoriented to the study of Algeria rather than France.[64]

Arabic philosophy courses were introduced in the lycées. Questions on the

baccalauréat emphasized social revolution by asking the students to write

on such topics as the moral value of voluntary work.[65] Of course, a large

component of the program to nationalize the curriculum was the policy of

Arabization, which is discussed separately in the following section. However,

[63]Selections Hebdomadaire du Journal "Le Monde" (Paris), No. 1153, December 2, 1970, p. 2.

[64]International Bureau of Education & UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education 1963 (Geneva: UNESCO, 1964), p. 14.

[65]Gordon, French Algeria, p. 198.

at the secondary level the Algerians have been slow to give up the French

curriculum. For example it was not until 1967 that Latin was dropped as a

required course in the first years of secondary school.[66]

The students were one of Ben Bella's primary support groups,

primarily because his radical, if incoherent, ideology appealed to them.

The Union Nationale des Etudiants Algériens (UNEA) consistently supported

Ben Bella and even exhorted the regime to accelerate the pace of the revo-

lution.[67] However, the UNEA militants showed little taste for practical

social and political work, preferring to discuss politics in Algiers' cafés.[68]

The UNEA and the FLN youth wing were the only national organizations to

oppose the Boumediene coup d'état. Since 1965 the students and youth in

general have not been completely won over by the new regime. In particular,

the students are alienated by the regime's attachment to Islam and its

rejection of all foreign ideology, especially Marxism.[69] Generalizations

concerning the political socialization of Algeria's youth in the nation's

schools are hard to make, since few if any surveys or studies on this problem

have been allowed.

D. Arabization

All official declarations of the FLN set Arabization of education

as an ultimate goal, although the exact mode of its achievement was never

---

[66]International Bureau of Education & UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education 1967 (Geneva: UNESCO, 1968), p. 7.

[67]Ottaway, Algeria, p. 129.

[68]Ibid., p. 130.

[69]Ibid., p. 287.

set.[70] The first Minister of National Education realized that Arabization

could only be gradually achieved. Yet in the first years after independence

it looked as if Algeria was going to make the same mistakes as Morocco did

with its hasty and ill-conceived program of Arabization. Since then Algeria

has opted for a policy of Arabization that resembles Tunisia's policy of

careful Arabization one year at a time. This policy was in large part

dictated by the fact that there were very few trained Arabists in Algeria.

The implementation of this restrained program of Arabization was facilitated

by the fact that the Ministry of Education did not have to face organized

groups trying to force the pace of the program.

In the school year 1962-1963 seven classroom hours per week were

given in Arabic and the remaining 23 hours per week were in French. At

the secondary level new classes were added in the 5th and 6th forms which

were to lead eventually to an Arabic language baccalauréat. To help out

with the program Algeria accepted a number of Egyptian teachers and pro-

fessors. In the school year 1963-1964 there were over 2,000 foreign Arab

nationals teaching in Algeria at all three levels of the school system.[71]

However, the Egyptians often had no training as teachers and in any case

were never popular.[72] Once the Egyptian teachers were dropped from the

teaching corps the pace of Arabization slowed down considerably. In 1964

the first year of primary school was completely Arabized and it was not until

1967 that the second year was also Arabized.[73] At the same time a few

[70]Gordon, French Algeria, p. 200.

[71]Humbaraci, Algeria, p. 283.

[72]Ibid., p. 156.

[73]International Bureau of Education & UNESCO, International Yearbook of
Education 1968 (Geneva: UNESCO, 1969), p. 10.

courses, primarily history and philosophy, have been Arabized at the secondary

and university levels. In addition a completely Arabized curriculum for

Islamic institutes has been devised. Despite his attachment to Islam and

his own Arabic education, Boumediene has made no significant attempt to

speed up the process. This fact is probably an indication of Boumediene's

confidence in the younger technocrats who favor a slow, careful Arabization

of the schools.

Although Arabization of the schools is the official policy, there

are substantial indications that it is not popular in Algeria. Ideologically

it is quite popular and the left-wing critics of the regime accuse it of not

being progressive enough. These critics see Arabization as a means of

partially reestablishing Algeria's identity.[74] However, ordinary Algerians

seem to have some reservations and the middle class, with its French outlook,

has a strong prejudice against the use of Arabic.[75] Now that the first two

years of the primary school cycle are completely Arabized many parents hold

their children out of school until the third year (it is not known whether

or not these children are sent to private school in the meantime). Thus

in the school year 1967-1968, 26 per cent of the third year pupils were in

school for the first time.[76] The completely Arabized schools appear to

attract only those students who could not make it into the regular French-

style schools.[77] Few Algerians train to be Arabic language teachers and

those that do so have a strong theological outlook. Moreover, the question

---

[74]An example of this sort of criticism can be found in: Abdallah Mazouni, Culture et Enseignement en Algérie et au Maghreb (Paris: François Maspero, 1969).

[75]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," p. 37.

[76]Ibid., p. 39.

[77]Moore, North Africa, p. 273.

of dialectal versus classical Arabic has never been settled. As a result it is generally accepted that the program of Arabization has pulled down the level of teaching.[78]

The insistence on relatively high quality education in Algeria has taken precedence over Arabization. So long as the country remains dependent on French assistance and continues to train most of its own teachers in French, so long will Arabization remain an unattainable goal. Algeria's policy in this field is essentially a bilingual one like Tunisia's. However, according to its official statements Algeria still remains committed to complete Arabization. The end of the "special relationship" between France and Algeria, brought on by the nationalization of the oil industry in Algeria, may force Algeria to step up the pace of Arabization since it can no longer count on easy access to French aid.

IV. Conclusions

Algeria's achievements in the field of education have been substantial and are a source of pride for the regime. However, as has been indicated, much remains to be done and the policies pursued up to 1969 sometimes ran counter to other regime goals. The high priority accorded the schools is indicated by the fact that the government regularly allocates between 20 and 25 per cent of its annual budget to education. However, in some areas there is a fundamental divergence between the stated goals for education and the actual achievements. This is symptomatic of the regime's generalized inability to live up to its revolutionary ideology and stems from the basic systemic weakness of the regime.

[78]"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb," p. 38.

Up to 1969, Algeria had a relatively conservative educational policy that resulted in solid progress, but which was not in line with the official ideology. Two major internal constraints have been responsible, in large part, for this situation. Firstly, the government has been incapable of real innovation and long-range planning. Secondly, Algeria has always been faced with a critical shortage of teachers. This leads to a third, and external, constraint which is Algeria's dependence on France for teachers. This last point has been especially restrictive as concerns nationalization and Arabization.

Despite the regime's verbal attachment to democratization of the schools, Algeria has not made the best use of its schools in overcoming the problems of social stratification left by the French. The FLN always claimed to speak in the name of the people and claimed that its revolution was for all the people. Yet since 1962, although the schools have been open to an ever-growing number of Algerians, they have not been made significantly more democratic. The poorer rural regions are still disadvantaged and the secondary schools retain a distinct middle-class bias. The new initiatives announced in the Four-Year Plan aim at helping to overcome these distortions. But, up until 1969, the schools were perpetuating the status quo.

The problem of national integration has not been helped by the schools either. The continued neglect of the backward regions and the middle-class bias of the secondary schools indicate that there has been no major effort to reduce social cleavages in Algerian society. Here again the new Plan offers the hope that new programs are being implemented to cope with this problem.

Although their attempts at rationalization have not been guided by any overall plan, the Algerians have done quite well in adapting the schools to the needs of the economy. However, the magnitude of the country's manpower needs has meant that much more has still to be done. Algeria's relative successes in this regard are due not only to its development-oriented ideology, but also to the relative isolation of its political system.

With no surveys available on socialization patterns in the nation's schools, it is somewhat hazardous to make any conclusive statements on the role of the schools in political socialization. However, it does seem clear that Algeria's youth does not accept the Islamic elements in Boumediene's ideology. Moreover, the UNEA takes a consistently more radical political line than that of the regime. From these indications, it is safe to infer that the regime has not been entirely successful in inculcating the country's youth with its point of view.

Chapter VI

Summary and Conclusions

I. Summary

In the three preceding chapters the educational policies of the
three North African countries have been examined. In each case the political
system and strategy of development have also been briefly analysed. The
discussion of the educational policies centered on four major policy
questions which have arisen in all three countries: (1) democratization,
(2) nationalization, (3) Arabization, and (4) rationalization. Democrati-
zation points to the expansion of the school system and its use to overcome
rigidities in social stratification. Nationalization of the schools refers
to orienting the school curriculum to the given nation and the employing
of national personnel in the teaching corps. Logically, Arabization (the
use of Arabic, the national language) of the schools should be considered
along with the other attempts to nationalize the school curriculum. However,
Arabization is such a major problem in North Africa that it has been
considered separately. Rationalization refers to the effort to adapt the
schools to the needs of economic development.

It is possible to make a rough ordering of each country's performance
on each of these policy questions. Figure VI-I below ranks the countries
relative to each other, but does not make an absolute evaluation of perform-
ance. Tunisia's superior capabilities in planning and implementation seem
to place it first on all questions. Although Algeria has done relatively
better than Morocco on democratization and rationalization, it has lagged
behind on the other points, largely because of its different colonial

Figure VI-I

Rank Order	Democratization	Nationalization	Arabization	Rationalization	
1					Tunisia
2					Algeria
3					Morocco

experience. As time passes and it overcomes its colonial heritage it

seems certain that Algeria will lead Morocco in all categories and perhaps

overtake Tunisia.

As was seen in Chapter II, Section V, these four policy questions

are related to the four areas of major theoretical interest discussed in

the Introduction (1) Social Stratification, (2) Political Socialization,

(3) National Integration, and (4) Economic Growth. Democratization of the

schools, for example, affects social stratification and socialization patterns,

and can also have side effects on national integration. Nationalization

affects socialization and can indirectly impinge on economic growth. Arab-

ization has the same effects as nationalization and in addition can affect

national integration. And finally, rationalization, apart from its obvious

links with economic growth, can affect all of the other three areas.

Given their theoretical and substantial importance, these four

broad areas serve, in the following four subsections, as the framework

for briefly evaluating and analyzing, in a comparative context, the perform-

ance of the three regimes in North Africa. In a concluding section, the

implications of the variations in performance among the three regimes are

considered for the hypothesis presented in the Introduction. It will be

recalled that the hypothesis stated that the more development-oriented a

regime is, the more likely it is to use education as a tool to further its

particular view of national development; but that the success of its

efforts in this direction will be a function of its capabilities, internal

and external. An external constraint would be, for example, heavy depen-

dence on foreign assistance in the field of education. Examples of

internal constraints would be a lack of authority on the part of the regime

or an inconsistent regime ideology.

A. Social Stratification

Both Algeria and Tunisia have a fundamental commitment to creating

a more democratic or egalitarian society. Tunisia's commitment in this

regard stems from Bourguiba's attachment to the French radical tradition.

Algeria's commitment springs from the anti-colonialist, socialist ideology

of its leaders. Morocco's stance is somewhat ambiguous on this problem.

On the one hand, Hassan claims to be leading the country towards a consti-

tutional monarchy and a more egalitarian society. Yet on the other hand,

he has concentrated his efforts on maintaining the present system of elite

politics and traditional authority.

Tunisia has, without a doubt, made the best use of its schools in

its efforts to overcome the rigidities of social stratification. In this

area, Tunisia has skillfully used its educational policies to help achieve

a long-range policy goal. The country has pushed ahead with an ambitious

program of school expansion and retains the highest rate of school attendance

in North Africa. Moreover, because of the way the expansion was carried out

many of the distortions of the old colonial school system are progressively

being overcome. Backward rural areas have been favored in school construction

and efforts have been made to increase female attendance. These factors,

coupled with recruitment patterns increasingly oriented to achievement criteria, have prevented the educated elite from becoming a closed group. In summary, Tunisia has rationally adapted its schools to achieve what for it is an ideologically desirable goal.

Algeria has not been able to do as much as Tunisia despite its officially more egalitarian ideology. Nonetheless, the Algerians have made considerable progress and their latest announcements promise more progress still. Algeria now ranks second in North Africa in the rate of school attendance, whereas it once ranked last. However, it has not been concerned, until recently, with overcoming the urban bias of the system. Nor has it done much to encourage female attendance in the schools. Furthermore, the maintenance of very high academic standards in the secondary schools gives them a strong middle-class bias. The low ratio of secondary and university students to primary school pupils also adds to the overall elitist character of the school system. The major constraint that has hampered the Algerian government has been the poor overall planning capability of its administration. Up to the present, the administration has been ill-equipped to fulfill its role as initiator of development projects. Boumediene has been trying to reform Algeria's administration, seemingly with some success. The government is now aware of the shortcomings of its educational policies and in its new Four-Year Plan has announced a number of initiatives which aim at redressing the situation.

As might be expected, Morocco, with its ambiguous commitment to overcoming the rigidities in its social stratification system, has done the least to attack these rigidities through the school system. It must be recognized, however, that because of the post-independence school expansion

the Moroccan schools are more democratic now than they were under the French.
Yet the operation of a number of elite schools, both within and without the
regular school system, has meant that no progress comparable to that in
Tunisia, or even Algeria, has been made towards the promotion of a more
egalitarian society. Like Algeria, Morocco has done little or nothing to
correct the urban and male bias in the schools. The lack of policies,
coupled with the continued reliance on ascriptive criteria in political
and economic recruitment, have meant the perpetuation of the old stratifi-
cation system. The expansion of the school system has served primarily
to create a large pool of disappointed elite aspirants. The reason for
Morocco's poor performance in this area is a low regime commitment to ega-
litariau ideals. In addition, the Moroccan administration, like its Algerian
counterpart, lacks the skills of the Tunisians in planning.

All three countries of the Maghreb remain a long way from their
stated goal of egalitarian society. However, Tunisia has made a concerted
effort to use the school system to reduce social inequalities. Algeria
long ignored the elitist cast of its schools, thereby perpetuating the
colonial system. But in recent years the Algerian government has been
making notable efforts to bring its policy in line with its ideology. Until
Algeria's administration is adapted to its needs the country will continue
to lag behind Tunisia. Finally, Morocco has not made very good use of its
schools to reduce social inequalities, nor for that matter have the schools
been used to help to effectively maintain old inequalities. Its school
expansion program, compromised as it is by the existence of elite schools,
has only served to create a growing pool of disappointed elite aspirants.

B. Political Socialization.

All three North African countries, irrespective of their ideolo-
gical orientation, have tried to use the schools to cope with the problem
of socialization. As in most new nations, the governments of the Maghreb
have sought to inculcate the youth with a sense of national identity and
ideological commitment. The school system is the ideal instrument for such
a purpose, since in all three countries it now reaches a sizable proportion
of the youth population. In their programs of nationalization and Arabi-
zation, the North African countries have tried to adapt the school curricula
to this purpose.

Tunisia has probably made the most conscious effort to use the
schools to socialize its youth along new lines. The curriculum of the
Tunisian schools is oriented to practical affairs and the courses in
philosophy and civics emphasize the rational. Islamic studies are still
taught but the themes stressed are modern and reformist. The reliance on
the schools as an instrument of socialization stems from Bourguiba's belief
that school graduates would be converts to his program of modernization.
Tunisian students do in fact support modernization. However, because their
training has taught them to be rational and critical, they have often been
sharply critical of the regime when they felt it was not living up to its
ideals. In particular, Bourguiba's patrimonial style of authority is
resented. But basically the country's youth seem to share the same goals and
aspirations as its leaders despite disagreements on tactics and the tempo
of reform.

Since Boumediene took power, the Algerian school curriculum has
lost some of the socialist hue it had under Ben Bella and has sought to

reemphasize the Islamic element in Algeria's national identity. The students

do not seem to accept the Islamic orientation of the regime's ideology.

However, because of lavish government expenditures on education and the

students, and because Boumediene has not totally abandoned socialism, the

students do give grudging support to the regime. It is impossible to go

beyond these few conjectural remarks concerning socialization patterns in

Algeria, because of the lack of field studies on this problem.

The Moroccan regime has made a considerable effort to inculcate

the country's youth with its ideology, but without much success. Moroccan

courses on morality and civics reflect the conservative outlook of Hassan's

regime. Yet most of the students oppose the regime, either openly or covertly.

The regime's problem seems to stem from the fact that, although the school

curriculum supports its point of view, the students take their political

inspiration from French left-wing authors and journalists. Thus there is

a fundamental incongruence between the regime's ideology and the progressive

orientation of the majority of the students. Therefore, the frequent student-

police confrontations of recent years will probably continue.

In summary, Tunisia appears to have had the greatest relative

success in inculcating its students with the official ideology. This limited

success derives in large part from the congruence of the regime ideology with

youth aspirations. Conversely, Algeria's and Morocco's relative lack of

success in this regard derives from the incongruence between regime ideology

and youth aspirations. In the case of Algeria the incongruence is not as

total as it is in Morocco, and as a result the students do not actively

oppose the regime as often and as intensely as they do in Morocco.

C. National Integration

Fostering national integration, the creation of a nation-state,
is a complex task and obviously goes far beyond the mere use of the schools
to achieve limited objectives. Nonetheless, education, with its powerful
influence on socialization patterns and social stratification, can have
a profound effect on national integration. The three North African regimes
are all concerned with fostering national cohesion, but their respective
views on the desirable type of cohesion vary considerably. Both Tunisia
and Algeria envision a mobilized, democratic society in which cohesion is
fostered by belief in rational formulae and institutions. The Moroccan
regime has sought to encourage a more traditional type of national cohesion
based on Islam and traditional allegiances.

Motivated by a desire to create a more rational society, the
Tunisian regime has made intelligent use of its schools in promoting
national integration. Its conscious efforts to bring education to all
regions and social classes have helped to promote national cohesion. Its
educational policies have militated against the emergence of a rigid governing
class, thus minimizing the problems of the elite-mass gap. The elimination
of the old traditional school system has ensured that all Tunisian school
children are given the same modern education. Taken together, Tunisian
policies amount to a conscious attempt to use the schools to promote national
unity.

Algeria, like Tunisia, has an ideology that calls for new forms of
national unity. In Algeria the need to promote new forms of national cohesion
is more pressing because of the utter lack of any traditional basis for
cohesion. Yet Algeria has been unable to make as good use of its schools

as Tunisia has. The early school expansion did little to overcome the
urban-rural cleavage and the secondary schools have been openly elitist in
their operation. The Algerian administration has begun, since 1968, to
take positive measures on these problems. But in the first seven years of
independence the Algerian administration showed little imagination in dealing
with these and other problems.

To a large degree the regime in Morocco has been able to rely on
traditional forms of cohesion, principally allegiance to the king. There-
fore its need to create a new type of national unity, overcoming old vertical
and horizontal cleavages, is much less urgent. Moroccan educational policies
however, have served neither to preserve the status quo nor create a stable
new situation. The urban bias of the school system has not been corrected,
nor have the schools been used to overcome the problems of the elite-mass
gap. Moreover, the traditional Islamic schools were never merged into a
unified national school system. But,by giving a relatively advanced education
to an ever-growing number of Moroccan youth without making provision for
co-opting them into the elite, the regime has created what will undoubtedly
prove to be a serious problem for national integration.

Both Tunisia and Algeria seek in the long-run a national unity
based on a mobilized population. Yet only Tunisia has been able to make
real progress towards this goal Its success in adapting the schools for
this purpose has been due to a broad consensus among its leaders and admini-
strators on both ends and means. In Algeria such a consensus is just now
beginning to emerge among the leaders and as a result educational policies
are being designed to reflect the regime ideology. On this point the Moroccan
regime has very different aspirations from its two neighbors and has not been

so concerned with using its educational investment to promote national
integration. However, by not thinking out the consequences of its policies
it has seriously endangered traditional cohesion, without at the same time
providing for a new basis for national unity.

D. Economic Growth

Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are all vitally concerned with
promoting economic growth. The rate of population increase alone makes
economic growth a necessity. The two more radical regimes, Algeria and
Tunisia, have opted for "socialist" paths to development. For them socialism
connotes a planned, government-directed type of economic development rather
than an equitable distribution of goods and services. Morocco, on the other
hand, has had to rely heavily on private capital since its regime wishes to
avoid the abolition of private property as much as possible. More basically,
the Moroccan regime, unwilling as it has been to introduce profound modifi-
cations into the existing order of society, has been reluctant to undertake
long-range economic planning seriously, since this might destroy its present
bases of support.

With a far superior planning apparatus than those of its neighbors,
Tunisia has been able to successfully integrate its educational policies
into an overall plan for economic development. Although manpower planning
techniques are rudimentary and far from perfect, Tunisia has made the best
use of the present state of the art. It has been successful in directing
its students to economically useful fields of study; thus it has come the
closest to satisfying its manpower needs on its own. Tunisia's relative
success derives from an ideology that emphasizes concrete achievements, a

superior administrative structure inherited intact from the French, and a

concerted effort to improve the administrative capabilities of the system.

Algeria has also been moderately successful in adapting its schools

to the needs of the economy. Although it has not directed its efforts with

detailed manpower plans, Algeria has consciously directed its students

towards the sciences and vocational training. However, because of the

country's overwhelming needs in trained manpower, coupled with the great

wastage in the schools caused by high failure rates, Algeria is far from

satisfying its needs. To solve these problems the new Plan contains signi-

ficant new initiatives designed to adapt even more carefully the school

system to the necessities of economic growth.

From the economic point of view, the money Morocco has invested

in education has been wasted for the most part. Although the government is

sensitive to the fact that only certain types of education are useful in pro-

moting economic growth it has been almost totally unable to channel its

students and financial resources to these types of education. All the statist-

ical indicators show Morocco lagging far behind Algeria and Tunisia in this

respect. The heavy charge of education on the Moroccan budget has only created

problems rather than solving them. The direct causes of the extremely poor

performance are not hard to find. They derive from the regime's unwillingness

and inability to sponsor fundamental change.

Because Tunisia's other reforms were rationally ordered and because

the regime is deeply committed to economic change the country's schools have

been adapted to the needs of the economy. Algeria shares much the same

commitment to economic development, but has lagged behind because its efforts

are not guided by an overall plan for economic development. As the Algerian

administration orients itself to the tasks of development one can expect that

its handling of this and other related problems will improve. With a regime

interested in preserving the status quo for as long as possible, Morocco has

been and will continue to be unable to match the performance of its two

neighbors.

II. Conclusions

Ideally, ideology should define ultimate purpose and promote social

consensus in some systematic way.[1] In the underdeveloped countries both of

these functions are especially important. The first function deserves special

note, since these countries are undergoing profound changes and need to orient

themselves to these changes. In these countries ideology defines goals and

outlines the proper path to their achievement. The second function of ideo-

logy is also very important since the leaders need to persuade the masses

that their goals represent the "general will" and should be supported as a

matter of moral duty.[2]

Since ideology defines goals and purposes it can often serve as a

causal explanation of state policy. However, from the discussion in the

preceding section, it should be clear that ideology is not the only, or the

best, explanation of educational policy. Of equal relevance in explaining

policy choices and implementation is an understanding of the regime's planning

and administrative capabilities. For although its ideology gives a regime

an orientation to certain policies, it is the regime's capabilities that

determine the final choice and mode of implementation. Without planning

and administrative capabilities the most ideologically motivated regime

would be unable to translate its commitments into actual practice.

[1]Léon Dion, "An Hypothesis Concerning the Structure and Function of Ideology" in Ideology, Politics, and Political Theory, ed. by Richard H. Cox (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1969), p. 234.

[2]A.H. Hanson, The Process of Planning (London:: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 18.

On the basis of ideology one can separate Morocco, with its
fundamentally conservative outlook, from Algeria and Tunisia, both of which
are oriented to change. Here, ideology does serve to explain the fundamental
cleavage between the educational policies of Morocco, on the one hand, and
those of Algeria and Tunisia, on the other. The former has made little use
of its schools to aid in an overall plan of development, because it lacks
a consistent action-oriented ideology to guide in goal-determination. The
latter two have consciously used their investment in education as part of
a larger plan of social, economic, and policial development.

Apart from its efforts to affect the socialization of youth,
Morocco's educational policies have been aimless in terms of any long-range
objectives and have only been used to provide ad-hoc solutions to short-term
problems. In this respect the educational policies of Morocco are part and
parcel of a regime that is entirely caught up in the problems of the present
and cannot plan for the future. In marked contrast, Tunisia's and Algeria's
educational policies have been designed with certain goals in mind and to a
greater or lesser degree are integrated with other change-oriented policies.
These policies reflect the commitment of the two regimes to rationally ordered
change and development. Ideology here seems to be of fundamental importance
insofar as it provides for a coherent means of goal-determination.

On the other hand, differences between Tunisia and Algeria cannot
be explained on the basis of ideology alone. On the basis of ideology one
would be inclined to expect Algeria to have made the most direct and radical
use of the school system in coping with the problems of development. But such
has not been the case and Tunisia with a less radical, more pragmatic outlook,
has done more to use education as a tool for development. The explanation
appears to lie in the differences in the planning and administrative capabilities

of the two regimes. This points up the type of problems that can arise if
one classifies regimes on the basis of ideology and type of authority patterns
alone, as Apter has done. In addition, it is vital to have some notion of
the amount of authority a regime possesses and its ability to make some
coherent use of this authority.

Tunisia's superior planning and administrative capabilities have
allowed it to integrate the goals and priorities of one phase of reform with
those of another and to implement the entire policy in a relatively satisfactory
manner. Moreover, although Tunisia's ideology is less radical, it is, none-
theless, a workable body of ideas heavily oriented to practical thought, its
hallmarks being rationalism and pragmatism. Algeria's ideology is more
abstract and very little adapted to the actual tasks of development. Most
importantly, however, the Algerian regime has lacked an administration with
the same capabilities for planning and implementation as its Tunisian counter-
part. As it slowly develops these capabilities its performance might well
come to match that of Tunisia.

The countries of the Maghreb have all been devoting between 20 and
25 per cent of their annual budgets to education. Yet only Tunisia and Algeria
seem to be intent on using this investment to achieve certain politically
desirable goals. Particularly in Tunisia, education policies have been
linked to other programs in an effort to seek solutions to some of the prob-
lems of development. In Morocco long-range goals have not been well thought
out, and, as a result, the tremendous effort in education has been more instru-
mental in the creation of problems than in their solution. It seems that only
the change-oriented regimes are willing to use education as a tool to achieve
long-range goals; regimes oriented to the status quo lack this capability.
Thus, in line with the hypothesis, educational policies do seem to be a
function of the ideology and the capabilities of the political system.

Appendix - Tables

The figures presented in Tables I - IX are drawn from the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1969. The first exception is in Table I where the figures are drawn from the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1968. Secondly, the figures in Table VI were calculated by the author using the data found in Tables III - V. Finally, Table IX is taken directly from Le Maghreb Entre Les Mythes by Tiano.

In using Tables I - VI the reader should handle the 1955 figures for Tunisia and Morocco and the 1960 figures for Algeria with caution since in all cases they probably include the colon population. Nonetheless, these figures are useful insofar as they give a rough idea of the size and internal organization of the school systems at the time of independence in each country.

Table I

Percentage enrolled of corresponding population of school-age.

Year	Algeria		Morocco		Tunisia	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
1955	---	---	17%	4%	26%	11%
1960	28%	8%	27%	7%	44%	15%
1965	43%	11%	32%	15%	61%	25%

Table II

Progression of Primary School Enrollment

Year	Algeria Enrollment	% female	Morocco Enrollment	% female	Tunisia Enrollment	% female
1955	---	---	(1956) 438,918	34	241,426	30
1960	787,602	40	795,893	28	449,230	33
1965	1,357,608	38	1,115,745	30	734,316	35
1967	1,485,390	38	1,105,237	32	826,069	37

Table III

Progression of Enrollment in General Secondary Education

Year	Algeria Enrollment	% female	Morocco Enrollment	% female	Tunisia Enrollment	% female
1955	---	---	23,940	38	26,750	n.a.
1960	83,272	44	58,978	27	44,686	n.a.
1965	94,745	31	195,169	24	65,024	n.a.
1967	116,077	30	270,832	26	81,717	n.a.

Table IV

Progression of Enrollment in Vocational Secondary Education

Year	Algeria Enrollment	% female	Morocco Enrollment	% female	Tunisia Enrollment	% female
1955	---	---	7,318	38	14,932	n.a.
1960	24,422	34	25,973	24	14,126	n.a.
1965	34,685	28	14,705	23	31,237	n.a.
1967	38,877	26	14,436	22	45,595	n.a.

Table V

Progression of Enrollment in Teacher Training at the Secondary Level

Year	Algeria Enrollment	% female	Morocco Enrollment	% female	Tunisia Enrollment	% female
1955	---	---	109	n.a.	442	n.a.
1960	1,675	55	1,100	n.a.	1,193	n.a.
1965	2,518	33	1,057	19	4,745	n.a.
1967	5,439	31	1,771	26	7,297	n.a.

Table VI

Distribution of Secondary School Students by Field of Study (in per cents)

Year	Algeria General	Vocational	Teacher	Morocco General	Vocational	Teacher	Tunisia General	Vocational	Teacher
1955	---	---	---	76.3	23.3	.3	63.5	35.4	1.0
1960	76.1	22.3	1.5	68.5	30.2	1.3	74.5	23.5	2.0
1965	71.8	26.3	1.9	92.5	7.0	.5	64.4	30.9	4.7
1967	72.4	24.2	3.4	94.4	5.0	.6	60.7	33.9	5.4

Table VII

Distribution of University Students by Field of Study (in per cents) and
Total Number of University Students per 100,000 of population (for academic
year 1966-1967)

Country	Humanities & Education	Law and Social Sciences	Natural Science	Engineering, Medicine & Agriculture	No. Students per 100,000 population
Algeria	30%	26%	18%	26%	76
Morocco	42%	36%	9%	13%	56
Tunisia	38%	30%	22%	10%	160

Table VIII

Expenditure on Education by Level (in per cents) 1967

| Country | Administration | Primary | Secondary | | | Higher |
			General	Vocational	Teacher Training	
Algeria	7.8%	58.5%	----------25.2%--------------			8.4%
Morocco	2.1%	54.7%	28.9%	4.6%	0.9%	n.a.
Tunisia (1966)	1.7%	50.2%	25.3%	10.3%	1.7%	6.8%

Table IX

The Order of Magnitude of Demographic Variables Significant for Economic Policy (in thousands)

| | Algeria | | | Morocco | | | Tunisia | | |
	1966	1970	1980	1966	1970	1980	1966	1970	1980
Population	11,600	12,975	17,795	13,400	15,104	20,735	4,600	5,140	6,833
Annual Growth of population	350	400	573	400	470	699	130	145	202
School-age population (6-14)	2,730	3,055	4,190	3,150	3,550	4,875	1,078	1,205	1,600
Annual growth of school-age population	82	93	135	94	110	164	34	34	47
Working age population (15-65)	5,850	6,545	8,975	6,830	7,698	10,566	2,422	2,706	3,598
Annual Growth of working population	175	200	290	205	239	356	60	77	106

Source: André Tiano, Le Maghreb Entre les Mythes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), p. 25.

Selected Bibliography

I. Books

Adams, Don, and Bjork, Robert M. Education in Developing Areas. New York:
          David McKay Company, Inc., 1969.

Adams, Don, ed. Educational Planning. Syracuse: Center for Development
          Education, All-University School of Education, Syracuse University,
          1964.

Ageron, Charles-Robert. Histoire de l'Algérie Contemporaine. Paris:
          Presses Universitaires de France, 1969.

Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. Comparative Politics: A
          Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

Ashford, Douglas E. "Attitudinal Change and Modernization." Modernization
          by Design. Edited by Chandler Morse et al. Ithaca: Cornell
          University Press, 1969.

----------. Morocco-Tunisia, Politics and Planning. Syracuse: Syracuse
          University Press, 1965.

----------. Political Change in Morocco. Princeton: Princeton University
          Press, 1961.

----------. Second and Third Generation Elites in the Maghreb. Washington,
          D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964.

Barbour, Nevill. A Survey of North West Africa (The Maghrib). London:
          Oxford University Press, 1962.

Bourdieu, Pierre. Sociologie de l'Algérie. Paris: Presses Universitaires
          de France, 1963.

Bourges, Hervé. L'Algérie à l'Epreuve du Pouvoir (1962-1967). Paris:
          Editions Bernard Grasset, 1967.

Coleman, James S., ed. Education and Political Development. Princeton:
          Princeton University Press, 1968.

Dion, Léon, "An Hypothesis Concerning the Structure and Function of Ideology."
          Ideology, Politics, and Political Theory. Edited by Richard H. Cox,
          Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1969.

Fanon, Franz. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968.

Fishman, J.A.; Ferguson, C.A.; and Gupta, J.D., eds. Language Problems of
   Developing Nations. New York: John Wily, 1968.

Foreign Areas Studies Division. Area Handbook for Morocco. Washington, D.C.:
   Government Printing Office, 1965.

Gallissot, René. L'Economie de l'Afrique du Nord. Paris: Presses Univer-
   sitaires de France, 1969.

Ganiage, Jean. L'Expansion Coloniale de la France, Sous la Troisième
   Republique. Paris: Payot, 1968.

Gordon, David C. North Africa's French Legacy: 1954-1962. Cambridge:
   Harvard University Press, 1962.

----------. The Passing of French Algeria. London: Oxford University
   Press, 1966.

Halstead, John P. Rebirth of a Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan
   Nationalism, 1912-1944. Cambridge: Center for Middle-Eastern
   Studies, Harvard University, 1967.

Hanson, A.H. The Process of Planning. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Hanson, John Wagner and Brembeck, Cole S., ed. Education and the Development
   of Nations. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.

Humbaraci, Arslan. Algeria: A Revolution that Failed. New York: Frederick
   A. Praeger, 1966.

International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development
   of Morocco. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.

International Bureau of Education and UNESCO, International Yearbook of
   Education 1963. Geneva: UNESCO, 1964.

----------. International Yearbook of Education 1964. Geneva: UNESCO, 1965.

----------. International Yearbook of Education 1965. Geneva: UNESCO, 1966.

----------. International Yearbook of Education 1966. Geneva: UNESCO, 1967.

----------. International Yearbook of Education 1967. Geneva: UNESCO, 1968.

----------. International Yearbook of Education 1968. Geneva: UNESCO, 1969.

----------. International Yearbook of Education 1969. Geneva: UNESCO, 1970.

Julien, Charles-André. Histoire de l'Afrique Blanche. Paris: Presses
   Universitaires de France, 1966.

----------. Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord, tome II. Paris: Payot, 1969.

Kitchen, Helen. The Educated African, a Country-by-Country Study of Educational Development in Africa. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

Laroui, Abdallah. L'Histoire du Maghreb, Un Essai de Synthese. Paris: François Maspero, 1970.

Le Tourneau, Roger. Evolution Politique de L'Afrique du Nord. Musulmane, 1920-1961. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1962.

Mazouni, Abdallah. Culture et Ensengnement en Algérie et au Maghreb. Paris: François Maspero, 1969.

Micaud, Charles A. Tunisia, The Politics of Modernization. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.

Miege, Jean-Louis. Le Maroc. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966.

Moore, Clement Henry. Politics of North Africa. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970.

----------. Tunisia Since Independence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.

Ottaway, David and Marina. Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.

Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

Quandt, William B. Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1969.

Rudebeck, Lars. Party and People, A Study of Political Change in Tunisia. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967.

Sasnett, Martena, and Sepmeyer, Inez. Educational Systems of Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

Sigmund, Paul E. The Ideologies of the Developing Nations. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

Tiano, André. Le Maghreb Entre Les Mythes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.

UNESCO. Statistical Yearbook 1968. Paris: UNESCO, 1969.

----------. Statistical Yearbook 1969. Paris: UNESCO, 1970.

Waterbury, John. The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political
          Elite: A Study in Segmented Politics. New York: Columbia
          University Press, 1970.

Whorf, Benjamin Lee. Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge: The
          M.I.T. Press, 1964.

Zartman, William I. Destiny of a Dynasty. Columbia: University of South
          Carolina Press, 1964.

----------. Problems of New Power: Morocco. New York: Atherton Press, 1964.

Zolberg, Aristide. Creating Political Order: The Party States of West
          Africa. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966.

II. Journal Articles

Ashford, Douglas E. "End of an Era for Tunisia." Africa Report XV
          (January 1970), pp. 28-31.

----------. "Neo-Destour Leadership and the 'Confiscated Revolution.'"
          World Politics XVII (January 1965). pp. 213-231.

Bourguiba, Habib. "The Tunisian Way." Foreign Affairs XLIV (April 1966),
          pp. 15-16.

"Le colloque sur l'enseignement-Algérie." Maghreb XVI (July-August 1966),
          pp. 15-16.

Duvignaud, Jean. "Classe et conscience de classe dans un pays du maghreb:
          la tunisie." Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie XXXVIII (1965),
          pp. 185-200.

Hyden, Goran. "Can Co-ops Make it in Africa?" Africa Report XV (December
          1970), pp. 12-15.

Lelong, Michael. "La formation civique, morale, et religieuse dans
          l'enseignement tunisien." Institute de Belles Lettres Arabes IC
          (3rd trimester 1962), pp. 257-270.

----------. "L'enseignement tunisien en 1967." Institute de Belles Lettres
          Arabes CXVII (1st trimester 1967), pp. 83-90.

Marais, Octave. "La classe dirigeante au maroc." Revue Française de
          Science Politique XIV (August 1964), pp. 709-737.

"L'operation écoles coranique au maroc." Maghreb XXXVI (November-December
          1970), pp. 34-36.

"L'orientation de pensé du maroc actuel à travers les manuels scolaires en langue arabe." Maghreb XXXVI (November-December 1969), pp. 36-41.

"Le Plan Quadriennal Algérien, 1970-1973." Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques, et Politiques VII (September 1970), pp. 733-867.

Peyrol, Manuéle. "L'expérience des cooperatives en tunisie." Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines LXI (January 1971), pp. 33-48.

Pigasse, Jean-Paul. "Ombres et lumieres sur la tunisie." Politique Etrangère XXXIV, pp. 615-630.

"Problèmes de l'enseignement au maghreb." Maghreb XXXVII (January-February 1970), pp. 36-47.

"La rentrée scolaire au maghreb." Maghreb XII (November-December 1965), pp. 18-24.

Robert, Jacques. "Opposition and Control in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria." Government and Opposition I (May 1966), pp. 389-404.

Rudebeck, Lars. "Developmental Pressures and Political Limits: A Tunisian Example." The Journal of Modern African Studies VIII (July 1970), pp. 173-198.

Spencer, William. "Morocco's Monarchical Balancing Act." Africa Report XV (December 1970), pp. 19-21.

Tiano, André. "L'expérience du secteur public de production au maghreb depuis l'indépendance." Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridiques, Economiques, et Politiques V (June 1968), pp. 327-371.

Zamiti, Khalil. "Les freins idéologiques au développement." Cahiers Internationnaux de Sociologie XLI, pp. 105-115.

III. Unpublished Materials

Eick, Ronald Edward. "Development of Schools in Two Arab States of North Africa, with Particular Attention to the Nature and Effect of French Influence." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1965.

IV. Newspapers and Magazines

Jeune Afrique (Tunis), No. 312, January 1, 1967 - No. 492, June 9, 1970.

Le Monde (Paris), January 1, 1966 - August 30, 1970.

Les Selections Hebdomadaire du Journal "Le Monde". (Paris), No. 1148, October 22, 1970 - No. 1172, April 14, 1971.