Becoming a Gendered Citizen:

Filipina Marriage Migrants' Political Incorporation in South Korea

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ABSTRACT

How does gender affect female marriage migrants' participatory citizenship? It is a pressing question especially for countries in Asia experiencing increasing number of female marriage migration, yet has been understudied. This study seeks to answer the question by analyzing the process of political incorporation of Filipina marriage migrants in South Korea. Combining insights from gendered citizenship and immigrant political incorporation scholarship, I argue that opportunities and resources that immigrants face for political participation in the host country are inherently gendered. In particular, I find that female marriage migrants engage in bargaining with various levels of patriarchal host country institutions to gain access to political rights and to participate in politics both formally and informally. Women's negotiation for political incorporation further shapes the contours of participatory capacity of female marriage migrants as a group, demonstrating the circumscribed nature of sociopolitical opportunities available to them.

I draw on in-depth interviews with 89 Filipinas, nine Korean spouses, and 39 individuals involved in immigrant-related organizations to explore the process of women's political incorporation in South Korea—a country with a sizable and growing marriage migrant population. I supplement interviews with participant observations of Filipina marriage migrant's interactions with their family members, co-ethnic group members, and community/government organizations. Additional documentary materials from government statistical data, policy documents, and reports produced by NGOs are used to support primary data contextually.

My empirical chapters examine patterns and processes of women's citizenship acquisition, voting participation, voluntary associational activities, and national level representation. In the first empirical chapter, I examine how women acquire citizenship and vote. I find that both urban and rural women experience naturalization as a reward or incentive for accommodating and acquiescing to a set of gendered rules and scripts in the Korean family rather than as a basic right they are entitled to through civic learning and commitment. Yet, women's voting decisions show two trajectories of continued conforming and independent decision-making, showing that women engage in contestation and renegotiation as the terms of bargaining change.

In the second empirical chapter, I examine women's voluntary associational life in urban and rural areas. I find that differential local jobs women take, levels of community gender surveillance, and institutions accessible to women in each area lead to different patterns of participation. Urban women, with higher autonomy and less gender policing, often have greater participatory capacity compared to their rural counterparts. Woman's different bargaining power vis-à-vis their family and community members influences membership characteristics, organizational ties, and types of activities at the organizational level. In sum, voluntary associations in urban areas display more counterpublic characteristics, whereas those in rural areas show a rather cooperative orientation to the dominant public discourse toward female marriage migrants.

In the final empirical chapter, I examine the process and effects of national level political representation of Filipina marriage migrants. Specifically, I focus on how the presence of a Filipina marriage migrant legislator influences feelings of political inclusion among women in urban and rural areas. I find that while women in both areas acknowledge symbolic benefits of the descriptive representation, their sense of 'political responsiveness' differs.

Urban women are critical of the representational role of the congresswoman, whereas their rural counterpart express positive assessment. I show the divergence stems from differential community collective norms about female marriage migrants' political representation.

The contributions of this dissertation are threefold. First, it offers at the empirical level a comparative analysis of female marriage migrants' political incorporation under different local gendered context of reception in a new immigrant-destination, which has been rarely examined. Second, this dissertation contributes to the growing body of literature on female marriage migrants in Asia, extending current gendered citizenship approach to include dynamic participatory dimension. Third, this dissertation contributes to the immigrant political incorporation scholarship, which has given insufficient attention to gender. I show that the opportunities and resources for women's political learning, participation, and representation are affected by gendered norms and expectations women confront in various levels of host country institutions, thus demonstrating that we should not treat immigrant political incorporation as a gender-neutral process.

RESUMÉ

Comment le genre affecte-t-il la participation à la citoyenneté des migrantes de mariage ? C'est une question urgente surtout pour les pays asiatiques qui reçoivent un nombre croissant de migrations de mariages féminins, et pour lesquels cette question n'a pas encore été étudiée. Cette étude cherche à apporter une réponse à cette question à travers l'analyse du processus d'incorporation politique des migrantes de mariage philippines en Corée du Sud. Combinant les idées issues de la littérature sur la citoyenneté selon le genre et sur l'incorporation politique des immigrants, je soutiens que les opportunités et les ressources que les immigrants rencontrent dans le pays hôte en regard de leur participation politique sont intrinsèquement genrées. En particulier, je constate que les migrants de mariage de sexe féminin doivent négocier avec les différents niveaux des institutions patriarcales du pays d'accueil pour obtenir des droits politiques et participer à la vie politique du pays à la fois formellement et informellement. La manière dont les femmes négocient leur incorporation politique influence la capacité des migrantes mariage en tant que groupe à participer, ce qui illustre la nature circonscrite des possibilités sociopolitiques qui leur sont offertes.

Ma recherche s'appuie sur des entretiens approfondis menés auprès de 89 femmes philippines, neuf époux coréens et 39 personnes impliquées dans des organisations liées à l'immigration. Ces entretiens me permettent d'explorer le processus d'incorporation politique des femmes en Corée du Sud - un pays comptant une population importante et croissante de migrants de mariage. Ces entretiens sont complétés par une observation participante des interactions que les migrantes de mariage connaissent avec les membres de leurs familles, les membres de groupes co-ethniques et des organismes communautaires et gouvernementaux. De la documentation additionnelle tirée de données statistiques gouvernementales, de documents politiques et de rapports fournis par des ONG est utilisée pour situer le contexte de cette étude.

Mes chapitres empiriques examinent les modèles et les processus d'acquisition de la citoyenneté, de participation aux élections, d'activités au sein de groupes associatifs et de représentation des femmes au niveau national. Dans le premier chapitre empirique, j'examine comment les femmes obtiennent la citoyenneté et le droit de vote. Je constate que les femmes qui vivent en régions urbaines et rurales entrevoient la naturalisation comme une récompense ou un incitatif à accepter et à se conformer aux règles genrées de la famille coréenne plutôt qu'à un droit fondamental qui s'acquiert à travers l'apprentissage et l'engagement civiques. Cependant, les décisions de vote des femmes montrent deux trajectoires, l'une de conformité, l'autre de prise de décision indépendante. Ceci montre que les femmes se livrent à la contestation et à la renégociation jusqu'à que les termes de la négociation changent.

Dans le deuxième chapitre empirique, j'examine la vie associative des femmes dans les zones urbaines et rurales. Je constate que les différents emplois locaux que les femmes occupent, les niveaux de surveillance des genres dans les communautés et les institutions accessibles aux femmes dans chaque région conduisent à des modes de participation différents. Les femmes urbaines, dotées d'une plus grande autonomie et faisant l'objet de moins de surveillance, ont souvent une plus grande capacité de participation que leurs homologues des zones rurales. Le différent pouvoir de négociation des femmes vis-à-vis leur famille et les membres de la communauté influence les caractéristiques des membres, les liens organisationnels et les types d'activités dans les organisations. En fait, les associations communautaires dans les zones urbaines présentent plus de caractéristiques contre-publiques, tandis que celles des

zones rurales montrent plutôt une orientation coopérative envers le discours public dominant à l'égard des migrantes de mariage.

Dans le dernier chapitre empirique, j'examine le processus et les effets de la représentation politique des migrantes de mariage des Philippines au niveau national. Plus précisément, j'examine la manière dont la présence d'une législatrice immigrante de mariage issue des Philippines influence les sentiments d'inclusion politique parmi les femmes dans les régions urbaines et rurales. Je constate que, bien que les femmes dans les deux régions reconnaissent les avantages symboliques de la représentation descriptive, leur impression face à « l'ouverture politique » diffère. Les femmes urbaines sont critiques du rôle de représentation de la femme siégeant au Congrès, tandis que leurs homologues rurales en font une évaluation positive. Je montre que la divergence découle de normes communautaires collectives différentes concernant la représentation politique des migrantes de mariage.

Les contributions de cette thèse sont triples. Premièrement, elle propose au niveau empirique une analyse comparative de l'incorporation politique des migrantes de mariage dans différents contextes d'accueil locaux genrés à l'intérieur d'une nouvelle destination d'immigration qui a rarement été examinée. Deuxièmement, cette thèse contribue à enrichir la littérature sur les migrantes de mariage en Asie, en élargissant l'approche actuelle de la citoyenneté genrée pour y inclure la dimension participative dynamique. Troisièmement, cette thèse contribue aux études sur l'incorporation politique des immigrants, lesquelles ont accordé une attention insuffisante au genre. Je montre que les possibilités et les ressources pour l'apprentissage, la participation et la représentation politiques des femmes sont influencées par les normes de genre et les attentes que les femmes rencontrent aux différents niveaux des institutions du pays hôte. Cela montre que l'incorporation politique des immigrants ne peut être analysée comme un processus neutre de genre.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation concerns immigrants' gendered political incorporation. Migration scholarship has gradually moved toward incorporating gender into analyses of the processes of migration and integration (Donato, Gabaccia, Holdaway, Manalansan, and Pessar 2006; Herrera 2013; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2000; Nawyn 2010). Specifically, in terms of immigrant integration, studies have shown that gender shapes the integration trajectories of migrant households (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992; Espiritu 1999; Menjivar 1999), labor market integration and social networks that facilitate or hinder long-term incorporation (Hagan 1998), immigrant community political mobilization (Hardy-Fanta 1993; Jones-Correa 1998), and the host country's integration policies (Chung and Kim 2012; Lee 2012).

However, as Donato and colleagues (2006:12) point out, the major theories of immigrant incorporation, which were developed mainly in North America as well as in Europe, do not devote much attention to gender; immigrant political incorporation scholarship has been no exception. As Okamoto and Ebert (2010:531) indicate, past studies of immigrants' naturalization and voting behavior have largely supported the straight-line assimilation model and have approached political incorporation as determined by immigration-related factors such as increased years of stay, generational status, and host country language ability (Liang 1994; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Yang 1994). While more recent studies and the European literature on a broader range of political activities pay more attention to local and national contextual factors, which include local institutions and organizations, host country integration policies and political systems, and configurations of citizenship (Bloemraad 2006; De Graauw 2008; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Okamoto and Ebert 2010), gender has rarely been considered as a constitutive element. However, a handful of previous studies clearly show that immigrants face differing opportunities and resources for political

incorporation along gender lines (see Hardy-Fanta 1993; Jones-Correa 1998). For example, Jones-Correa (1998) shows a gendered political socialization process where male Latin immigrants, in an attempt to compensate for the relative loss of public status, participate actively in hometown associations, while their female counterparts have more incentives to be involved in the host country's local politics. In general, past studies provide insights into the important determinants of political incorporation, but they do not systematically examine how gender permeates those determinants.

This lack of attention to gender is surprising, given that the insights from the gendered citizenship literature clearly inform how women and other minorities are differentially incorporated into the political community from privileged men (Ong 1996; Pateman 1988; Phillips 1993; Young 1987; Yuval-Davis 1993; 1997). Feminist accounts of citizenship consequently suggest that the local, national, and supranational contexts for political mobilization are constructed in gendered ways (Pessar 2001).

In this study, I apply the gendered citizenship perspective to examine immigrants' political incorporation and representation. That is, I approach the political incorporation of immigrants, which refers to "the process of becoming a part of mainstream political debates, practices and decision-making" (Bloemraad 2006:6-7) and is often measured by naturalization, electoral political participation, and voluntary associational activities/social movements, as a gendered process. As individuals located within 'the citizenship/non-citizenship spectrum' pushing for full citizenship at the margin (Choo 2011; Stasiulis and Bakan 1997), female immigrants based on marriage gain political membership in the host country through marriage and the family system. For female marriage migrants in South Korea (henceforth Korea), this means that women need to negotiate their membership and participation within the Confucian patriarchal family system, which is reinforced by the Korean state's gendered citizenship project for these women (Minjeong Kim 2008). However, it is not only the family and the state

with which women negotiate their participation, but also the local community associational life and political culture, which influence women's capacities to form participatory associations (Somers 1993).

Informed by previous studies that examine the gendered and ethnicized citizenship of Filipina marriage migrants in Korea (Choo 2011; Minjeong Kim 2008), I examine the political participation and representation process of Filipina marriage migrants. In particular, I look at how they negotiate their citizenship acquisition, voting, voluntary associational activities, and representation vis-à-vis various institutions in Korean society, including the family, local and national level organizations. As studies show differential conditions that women face in urban and rural areas (Hiroo and Lee 2009; Minjeong Kim 2008), I compare the patterns of participation in urban and rural areas to account for the influence of differential community associational life and political culture on women's participation.

This study explores three primary research questions:

1. In what ways does gender affect female marriage migrants' political incorporation?
2. What are the different forms of political participation for female marriage migrants (formal vs. informal; individual vs. group-based)? How does gender mediate the type of political participation that women engage in?
3. How do female marriage migrants manage opportunities and resources in the host country in order to enhance their political participatory capacity? In what ways does gender shape or constrain this process?

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Gendered political opportunity structure and resources

Past research on immigrant political incorporation and participation has consistently shown the importance of the context of reception, as it offers both symbolic and material resources for both formal and informal political activities. Several studies support this line of argument, as they build on the conceptual framework of political opportunity structure (McAdam 1996; Meyer 2004) and resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977) developed

in the social movement literature. The key recognition of the political opportunity perspective is that collective mobilization is context-dependent (Meyer 2004). In addition, the resource mobilization perspective devotes particular attention to organizations that mobilize people into collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977), although the definition of resources has also been conceptualized as participants' time, money, and skills (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) or immigration status (Okamoto and Ebert 2010). Building on these conceptual frameworks, Bloemraad (2006) suggests the 'structured mobilization' model, where the host country's political institutions, administrative bureaucracies and integration policies facilitate or hinder the development of ethnic community organizations, which ultimately function as 'political muscle' that mobilizes immigrants into naturalization and voting. Similarly, Koopmas and Statham (1999) show that immigrants' collective mobilization for political demands are shaped by the modes of citizenship of the host country, which facilitate certain forms of claims-making.

Meanwhile, recent developments in the literature on female marriage migrants in East and Southeast Asian countries, in the context of increasing female marriage migration within the region, attend more to gender dynamics in discussing immigrant women's incorporation (Choo 2013; Ito 2005; Minjeong Kim 2008; Wang and Bélanger 2008). This is in part due to the clear pattern of gendered migration in the new immigrant destinations (Jones and Shen 2008; Kim and Oh 2011). Studies have documented host countries' attempts to construct differential citizenship for female marriage migrants based on normative gender norms and nationalist ideals (Minjeong Kim 2008; Wang and Bélanger 2008). This stream of research clearly suggests that in the particular case of female marriage migrants, the state's political strategy for integrating women cannot be understood without the role of gender.

In fact, as feminist citizenship scholars have argued, the process and contents of political membership in various levels of host country institutions and communities are

profoundly related to immigrants' positions in various social categories, especially gender, ethnicity, and class (Yuval-Davis 1999). Specifically, while immigrants are offered nominal individual rights to participate freely in the political community, whether as a citizen or non-citizen, female migrants' membership and participation are realized in the host country's institutions and communities, which are fraught with gendered norms and expectations, thereby leading to differential access to resources and opportunities for political incorporation.

In particular, female marriage migrants' membership in the host state's political community is mediated by their membership within the familial domain, which has traditionally been considered as 'private,' and thus, politically irrelevant. Feminist scholars have pointed out that such a dichotomous distinction and relegation of women to the private domain as dependents of male family members have been the bases for exclusionary discourse on citizenship centered on males (Pateman 1988; Vogel 1991). As scholars have documented, however, this private and public dichotomy is rather artificial, and the two realms are intricately linked (Prokhovnik 1998). The family and heterosexual marriage have been and remain legally and socially connected with the foundations of national citizenship as the mechanism for social reproduction, and thus have been the foci of state intervention, often in the form of social provisions (Orloff 1993; Turner 2008). The sexual division of labor within families - women's disproportionate share of domestic work – limits women's engagement in the labor market and/or civil society, which is, again, influenced by the state's welfare provisions (Orloff 1993).

In addition, previous studies on immigrant political incorporation point to the variation in political opportunity structures and resources in a sub-national context (Martinez 2008; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). Similarly, scholars have acknowledged the importance of the local context over national and/or supra-national arrangements for migrants to access and exercise their citizenship rights in practice (Basok 2004; Jones-Correa 2005; Marrow 2005), some to the extent so as to suggest that urban citizenship may become a home-base for cosmopolitan

democracy (Baubock 2003). Relatedly, Somers (1993) points out the importance of community capacities for the participatory association of citizens in fulfilling citizenship rights. Although previous studies have suggested that important variations can be found within the participatory capacity of Filipina marriage migrants in urban vs. rural contexts due to the strong lingering presence of Confucian patriarchy in the rural parts of Korea (Hiroo and Lee 2009; Minjeong Kim 2008), few studies have comparatively examined this variation. I argue that examining how women's political incorporation is articulated differently under differential gendered context of reception will provide clear insights into the roles that gender plays, and how it facilitates or hinders women's political participation.

Political participation as negotiating citizenship

Feminist approaches to participatory political citizenship views political participation as a right and an opportunity to collectively deliver and articulate the interests of women and minority groups, thereby enabling them to gain greater control of their own lives (Lister 1995; 1997; Phillips 1991; Young 1989). In her attempt to critically synthesize the liberal and civic republican traditions of the meaning of citizenship, Lister argues that citizenship should be conceptualized as a dynamic process between citizenship as a status, with a wide range of rights, and as a practice, involving political participation. Here, political participation is an essential part of citizenship, not only as a means but also an end, in and of itself, in "fulfilling the full potential" of one's citizenship status (Lister 1997:42). Pushing the dynamic participatory aspect of citizenship further, Stasiulis and Bakan (1997) maintain that citizenship is negotiated through a dynamic process of struggle rather than simply being granted to 'deserving' individuals by the state.

At the same time, feminist scholars acknowledge the burden and costs of political participation, especially for women and minority groups, who often lack the symbolic and

material resources to participate. Even after including informal ways of participation in community groups and social movements, in which women are believed to be more active than the formal political system, time and other resources necessary for being involved in politics are still unequally distributed. For example, scholars have pointed out that a disproportionate responsibility for unpaid care work in the family limits women's participation in community associational activities (Herd and Meyer 2002; Lister 1997). After all, as Lister rightly points out, "we cannot understand the gendered patterns of the exercise of political citizenship in the public sphere without understanding the sexual division of labour within the private" (Lister 1995:11). Especially for those who are closer to the non-citizenship side within the citizenship/non-citizenship spectrum (Stasiulis and Bakan 1997), the costs of political participation may be too high, as in the case of temporary migrant workers (Basok 2004) and sometimes may involve moral degradation when the available bases for claiming one's rights are framed as such (Choo 2013).

In this sense, political participatory citizenship for women and minority groups inevitably involves, in practice, the process of negotiation with certain costs and benefits in everyday life. Female marriage migrants tend to be incorporated primarily into the 'private' realm as members of the family (Minjeong Kim 2010); however, political participation is often theorized as being realized within the 'public' realm. Although the interdependent relationship between the private and public has been acknowledged (Lister 1997; Phillips 1991), balancing the two is an inherently challenging and demanding task. Yet, as Ong convincingly shows, immigrants' citizenship is not about passively conforming to the normative criteria of belonging, as defined by the host state. Rather, it is the process of immigrants' negotiating in everyday life with "the often ambivalent and contested relations with the state and its hegemonic forms…a dual process of self-making and being-made within webs of power linked to the nation-state and civil society" (Ong 1996:738).

Political membership through bargaining

As seen previously, according to the gendered citizenship literature, one's political membership is mediated by membership in various collectives that intersect with one's social positioning in terms of class, gender, and sexuality, among other factors (Yuval-Davis 1999; 2006). Therefore, rather than experiencing a direct relationship vis-à-vis the host state, immigrants' political membership and political participation are mediated by their gendered membership in various institutions within the host society. However, the gendered citizenship literature is not enough to explain how women, as active agents of social change and as a marginalized group who are facing patriarchal arrangements as constraints, respond to their environment.

Drawing on the concept of the patriarchal bargain (Kandiyoti 1988; 2005), I argue that the political incorporation of female marriage migrants should be understood within the context of them engaging in bargaining with gendered political opportunities and resources "to pave their way into the public-political domain" (Herzog and Yahia-Younis 2007:579). Kandiyoti introduced the term 'patriarchal bargain' to explain how women who are within the patriarchal system, which basically works against them, strategize in order to maximize their security and optimize their life options. I found the concept helpful because it views women not only as rational actors who strategize within a set of concrete constraints to make the best of their circumstances, but also as gendered subjects enculturated to think within culturally conceivable options. For example, Read and Bartkowski (2000)'s study on how Muslim women living in the US deal with the controversy over the practice of veiling showed that for both women who choose to veil or not, veiling is understood as enabling women's public-sphere pursuits as equal participants alongside men within the patriarchal social arrangement. As the authors argue, women's negotiation or "patriarchal bargain" reproduce and reformulate the existing Muslim gender discourses.

The foregoing discussion of political participatory citizenship as a bargaining process happening within multiple layers of gendered community and institutional settings reveals that it can only be examined through an empirical study of the process of negotiation happening at the ground level to recognize 'what people actually do' (Prokhovnik 1998:95). Further, in order to understand how women negotiate, it is important to understand the context and content of negotiation. In the following section, I position female marriage migrants within the context of gendered citizenship in Korea.

GENDERED CITIZENSHIP FORMATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN KOREA

When migrants enter a host society, they face various existing institutions of inequality, which produces a unique pattern of incorporation as they intersect with their position in social categories such as race, gender, class, ethnicity, etc. (Choo 2011; Minjeong Kim 2013; Ong 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993). For example, Choo (2011; 2013) shows the differential paths of acquiring substantive citizenship rights among Filipina migrants in Korea, according to their gendered incorporation into existing institutions. Focusing on women's pursuit of achieving 'moral inclusion', she argues that the rights of Filipina migrants are differentially claimed and acquired, depending on whether they are incorporated into masculinized manufacturing sectors, the feminized sexual industry, or the patriarchal family and marriage system. In the case of migrant wives, Choo argues that women choose motherhood in order to claim their membership, as it provides effective grounds to be included as moral equals. This narrow window of claiming one's moral inclusion clearly suggests limited opportunities and resources available for women for their political participation, as well. Therefore, in order to examine the existing institutions of inequality into which Filipina marriage migrants are incorporated, I first try to show the gendered meaning of 'Being Korean'

in contemporary Korean society. I then discuss how gendered citizenship has influenced Korean women's political participation.

State nationalism and patriarchy

While the postcolonial South Korean government granted liberal civil rights to all of its people by nominally including an abstract rights provision in its constitution in 1948, the historical construction of the contemporary meaning of 'Being Korean' shows that its actual implementation is far from ideal universal citizenship. In a way, citizenship was historically based on selective inclusion and exclusion as a result of one's loyalty to the anti-communist state as the country experienced national division and the Korean War (D.-C. Kim 2006). At the same time, it involved gendered mobilization and incorporation during the modernization project (E.-S. Kim 1999; Moon 1994). In this section, I focus on the latter point in order to show the foundations of the gendered incorporation of Filipina marriage migrants.

The contemporary gendered meaning of 'Being Korean' has its origins in the state's modernization project since the 1960s, as it had reorganized the country's history and traditions in order to construct a homogenized, yet gendered identity of its people (E.-S. Kim 1999). The modernization project, which was led by the military authoritarian state (1961 – 1987), accompanied the process of industrialization, with an emphasis on progress and overcoming underdeveloped conditions, as well as the construction of a Korean national identity shared by a larger number of Koreans than ever before through universal education and the development of mass media (Moon 1994: 151-2). Moon (1994) argues that a gendered construction of state nationalism was at the core of Korean women's subsequent and continued subordination by the militarized and masculinized state and patriarchal family. The official nationalist narrative under Park Chung-Hee's regime, which gained power by military coup in 1961, represented the Korean nation as created and defended by male ruling elites. At the same time, selective

elements of Confucianism and Buddhism, such as loyalty to the state (*chung*), filial piety to parents (*hyo*) and selflessness, were emphasized as Korean traditions in order to inculcate obedience and loyalty in its people. What is noticeable in this emphasis is that women became rarely visible in the public space, while 'authentic' Korean women are represented as sacrificing themselves for the sake of family, chastity and filial piety for parents-in-law (Moon 1994: ch. 5). Meanwhile, the discourse conveys male Koreans in general and male ruling elites in particular as the primary agents of the country's industrialization and national defense, while Korean women are represented as passive instruments or auxiliaries to men (E.-S. Kim 1999).

Throughout the modernization project, the relationship between women and the state reflected and reproduced this gendered discourse of Korean-ness. State nationalism mobilized and incorporated women into the modernization project in a way such that it reorganized and reinforced women's subordination (Moon 1994: ch. 7-9). Women's identity as biological reproducers and reproducers of daily life were publicly emphasized and tightly managed through population control and rational household management policies, which were perceived to be crucial to economic growth. At the same time, female factory workers' contributions to export-oriented economic development and their identity as workers were marginalized and repressed, as they were excluded from state-led skills training opportunities. Women's growing labor market participation, albeit a weaker fallback position in the labor market as unskilled and docile labor, was contrasted with the rising wage levels of male workers in heavy industry (Seguino 1997; 2000). Similarly, women's intense farm labor in the process of rural development was unacknowledged, while women's sexuality was exploited for foreign exchange in the international sex tourism industry.

At the core of gender relations in Korean society during the state's modernization project has been the patriarchal family, which is legally bounded by family law[1] in the Civil Code. Patriarchy, composed of patrilineage (i.e., continuing the family pedigree by sons), patrilocal marriage (i.e., women incorporated into the husband's family), and male patriarchs (i.e., a family represented by males) had been institutionalized into family law during Japanese colonization as a result of two factors: the colonizer's efforts to transplant its patriarchal family system so as to incorporate the colonized, and the patriarchal characteristics of the Chosun Dynasty's ruling class (H.-A. Yang 2010). The Chosun Dynasty (1392-1910) adopted Confucianism as its state ideology, which served as the major source of gender definition. *Namnyo-yubyol* (sex-difference) and *namjon-yobi* (honored men, abased women) were the major principles of governing gender relations (Cho 1998: 192). The former assigns men to the outer, public space while women are relegated to the inner, domestic space, thus serving as a basis for social arrangement, while the latter puts the two domains in an explicitly hierarchical order.

The patriarchal elements in family law were maintained when the Korean state first created family law in 1958 under the first republic (1948~1960) (Ahn 2014:80). Since then, the state elite has maintained the patrilineal and patriarchal family as the basic unit of Korean society, although it has been challenged by the women's movement and has subsequently gone through several revisions. Women's subordinate relations in the patriarchal family vis-à-vis male members are not limited to the family. In fact, as Eun-Sil Kim (1999) argues, Korean women experience expanded patriarchal family relations in their workplaces and in their relationships with the state. Moon (1994:225) similarly argues the following:

> Korean mothers/wives in the patrilineal nuclear family represented in the family law are not independent citizens as the Constitution of the Republic of Korea glibly proclaims. Their existence for others presumes that their labor is not only available but

[1] This refers to Part 4 with respect to relatives and Part 5 with respect to inheritance of the Civil Code.

also free and voluntary—i.e., out of "love" or "self-sacrifice." In line with this presumption based on the principle of masculine dominance, the masculinized Korean state exploits women as asexual mothers/wives and as sexual workers for efficient economic development.

Korean women's gendered citizenship and political participation

Korean women's gendered citizenship formation during the period of authoritarian rule (1947-1987) has had a negative impact on women's political participation, although political and socioeconomic changes in Korean society for the past three decades and the women's movement have constantly challenged and brought about certain changes. According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2014, which measures gender-based gaps in economic participation, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment[2], Korea is still ranked at 117 among 142 countries (Hausmann, Tyson, Bekhouche, and Zahidi 2014).

Focusing specifically on women's electoral political participation, as institutionalized politics have been considered as primarily a male domain, women constituents have experienced low political efficacy, and female candidates lack both material and symbolic support (W.-H. Kim, Kim, and Kim 2001). Although the number of female constituents has been greater than that of male counterparts for all elections – presidential, parliamentary, and local – female constituents' voting rates had been lower until the 1990s. Female constituents have also shown more dependence on male family members' opinions in deciding who to vote for, including their husbands and fathers, compared to their male counterparts. However, the gender gap in voting rates have constantly decreased, and women in their late 20s and 30s, who are actively engaged in the labor market, showed higher voting rates compared to their male counterparts in more recent elections in the 2000s. Women's dependency on male family

[2] Political empowerment is measured by the ratio of female parliamentary members, the ministerial level officials, and the number of years of a female head of state for the last 50 years over male value (Hausmann et al. 2014:4).

members has also attenuated (W.-H. Kim et al. 2001; Koo, Yoon, and Choi 2015; S. Y. Lee 2013). In addition, the ratio of women parliamentary members has constantly been increasing, from 2.7 to 3% in the 1990s, to 15.3 to 17% in the 2010s, although this number still ranks the country at 109 among 193 countries, according to data by the Inter-Parliamentary Union as of 2016[3].

Women's participation in civil society has gone through similar patterns. Women's participation had been rather limited during the period of authoritarian rule due to gender norms that constrained women to the domestic sphere; these norms were also institutionalized into family law and state policies, as I previously described. Political activities were considered as masculine. Studying diverse groups of Korean women who were engaged in social movements in the 1980s, Moon (2002) argues that the Confucian legacy, which expects women to take on domestic responsibilities, circumscribed women's participation in expanding civil society. Female peasants and factory workers who were active in these social movements tended to discontinue their participation after marriage. Cho (1998: 200) similarly argues that the heavy emphasis on the identity of women as mothers based on Confucian patriarchy stifled women's rights movement, as "it is not motherly to feel oppressed…even less so to complain about one's own hardships and to protest for one's own rights". Violent confrontation between civil society and the military state further discouraged women's participation, as the gender norms in Korean society associated physical violence with masculinity. Female activists considered themselves to be violating the desired characteristics of women (Moon 2002:470-482).

However, the Korean women's movement has actively taken advantage of the political opportunity structures of democratization and has successfully secured advances in civic, socioeconomic, political, and human rights (Jones 2006; Suh 2011). The women's movement

[3] http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm

in the post-democratization era has challenged patriarchal oppression and women's marginalization while engaging in institutional politics to expand women's space in the public. For example, the women's labor movement in the 1990s initially focused on recognizing women's identity as workers, independent of their husbands and/or their roles within the family. It then further developed into a movement to expand citizenship for women by arguing for mother's rights and socializing domestic work (Jang 2001). Women's organizations raised public awareness and had laws enacted against domestic and sexual violence within the family, which had been ignored by conventional civil society as 'private' matters (Suh 2011). They also formed several coalitions for the revision of family law (Ahn 2014) and the institutionalization of mandatory gender quotas in candidate selection by revising the Party Law (E.-G. Kim 2004). While some scholars point to the limitations of such movements, given that they lack grassroots members and are led by a small number of activists and volunteers (Moon 2002), it is also argued that such movements and institutionalized accomplishments were the main sources of changes in gender relations and narrowing the gender gap in women's electoral political participation (W.-H. Kim et al. 2001).

In sum, the gendered citizenship formation of Korean women by the state and the patriarchal family had circumscribed women's political participation. However, through their own participation, women have also challenged the gendered nature of their citizenship and patriarchal family, and have been able to bring about significant policy, institutional, and representational changes.

MARRIAGE MIGRATION AND THE RECONSOLIDATION OF PATRIARCHY

While gender role expectations for women in the family, both as biological reproducers and reproducers of daily life through domestic labor, are increasingly contested among native Korean women, they are particularly enforced among female marriage migrants (Minjeong

Kim 2013; Lee 2012). In this section, I show how women are incorporated into what I call the 'reconsolidation of patriarchy' in the Korean family. The incorporation of female marriage migrants into Korean society is a process of concerted activities of the state, family, and civil society. Individual marriage migrants and voluntary associations are also active agents in the process. Focusing on the state and family, which have the most direct influence on women's incorporation, I first briefly explain the background of female marriage migration, while attending to the active role of the state. I then elaborate on how the reconsolidation of patriarchy occurs in Korean families with marriage migrants.

The state's intervention in female marriage migrants

While the Korean government has permitted only temporary stays for migrant labor, most of whom are male, it has promoted female marriage migration since the early 1990s, initially in an attempt to resolve a significant sex imbalance and 'bride famine' in the rural parts of Korea. Local governments and agricultural associations attempted to seek a solution to the problem of a sharp downturn in the reproduction and caregiving functions of rural families in arranging marriages between bachelor farmers and ethnic Koreans from China[4] (henceforth Korean-Chinese). In 1999[5], commercialized international marriage agencies flourished as mediated marriage businesses were liberalized, the consequence of which was an increase in international marriages, as well as diversification of the brides' nationalities. As a result, international marriages have expanded beyond rural areas since the early 2000s. The

[4] They are descendants of Koreans who migrated to China during the period of Japanese colonial rule over Korea in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. With a population of approximately two million, the Korean-Chinese are concentrated in the northeastern provinces of China – Jilin, Liaoning, and Heilongjiang. Korean-Chinese brides were welcomed because they were thought to contribute to the ethnic continuity of Koreans (Freeman 2005). As the Korean and Chinese governments reestablished official relations in 1992, a number of these arranged marriages began to increase rapidly.

[5] The Simplified Family Rite Standards law, which regulated four ceremonial occasions related to coming of age, weddings, funerals, and ancestral rites, was abolished in 1999, thereby liberalizing marriage businesses.

number of international marriages peaked in 2005, constituting 13.6% of all marriages, and has remained at a level of one in ten new marriages – one in three in rural areas – since then. The majority of these marriages are between Korean men and foreign brides[6]. More than half (58.6%) of families with international marriage migrants are living in the greater Seoul area, which is a metropolitan area consisting of Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi province. Marriage migrants from China, including Korean-Chinses, constitute more than half (53.3%) of all marriage migrants. The second largest group is Vietnamese women (18.3%), followed by Japanese (5.8%) and Filipinas (5.3%) (MOGEF 2013).

As the discourse of the national population crisis became prevalent in the early 2000s[7], the central government started to frame female marriage migration as a solution to low fertility and the aging population. At the same time, families with female marriage migrants and their children emerged as a center of social concern, who could likely bring about integration problems. Thus, the state recognized *damunhwa-gajok* or multicultural families, as they were officially named, as the site of active intervention (H. M. Kim 2007:107; Paik 2010: ch.2). Consequently, the first comprehensive policy plan, "Support Plan for the Social Integration of Female Marriage Migrant Families", was announced by the Presidential Committee on the Aging Society and Population Policy in 2006. As seen in the title, planned policy and subsequent policy on female marriage migrants are largely designed to assist women as members of the family. The leading governmental institution of marriage migration matters was also shifted from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) (H.-K. Lee 2008). The nationwide networks of Multicultural Family Support

[6] There are 266,547 families with international marriage immigrants and naturalized citizens in Korea and about 80% of them are the families with female migrants (MOGEF 2013).

[7] The total fertility rate of Korean women marked the world's lowest record of 1.08 in 2005. Although it has recovered to 1.30 as of 2012, it is still lower than the minimum 2.1 needed to maintain the current population level. Korea became an 'aging society' in 2000, where more than 7.2 percent of the population was older than 65 (Statistics Korea 2010; 2013).

Centers (MFSCs) – formerly named as the Marriage Migrant Woman Family Support Center – were established, starting in 2006, according to the Support Plan under the Healthy Family Support Center, which is again under MOGEF.

The state's active intervention on female marriage migrants has often focused on facilitating and reinforcing women's roles as wives and mothers in the family. For example, MFSCs provide programs and services that are focused primarily on helping marriage migrants perform their domestic work as members of the family, especially as mothers (Minjeong Kim 2013). In fact, Lee (2012) argues that the state discursively constructed the role of marriage migrants as unpaid domestic labor in the family in order to ensure the social reproduction of families with low incomes, which otherwise would have been impossible in a heavily family-dependent welfare regime. To cope with the potential problem of female marriage migrants' various (and possibly contradictory) cultural backgrounds and their independence after naturalization, Korean traditional family values are used in an attempt to discipline marriage migrants, both in the family and government-run institutions, including MFSCs.

Reconsolidation of patriarchy

For many Korean men, international marriages are chosen to fulfill what they perceive to be impossible with Korean women. Korean men expect their foreign wives to be obedient to them and their parents-in-law, to have a strong maternal instinct, and to uphold traditional family values. These expectations are often constructed in relation to the imagined cultural characteristics of migrant women's home societies (Minjeong Kim 2013; Seol, Lee, and Cho 2006). These expectations are closely related to men's attempt to re-establish their masculine identity through heterosexual marriage, which they believe has become increasingly difficult to fulfill with Korean women (Minjeong Kim 2008). During the process of marriage and afterward, men's masculine position as head of the household is reinforced by the perceived

lower status of women's country of origin, compared to Korea, in the global economy. That is, the superior position of the husbands and in-laws vis-à-vis female marriage migrants are assumed not only by male supremacy and patrilocal arrangements based on Confucius patriarchy, but also on perceived economic gaps between countries. As N. Y. Kim (2006; 2008) argues, Koreans tend to attribute a country's national status to the strength or weakness of its people's blood due to their strong ethnic nationalism, which equates a country with an ethnic group who supposedly share a single blood ancestry. Thus, the perceived lower national status of the Philippines compared to Korea serves as a ground for othering and stigmatization.

Under this condition, female marriage migrants face stronger expectations to conform to the norms of patriarchal Korean families, compared to native Korean women. For example, marriage migrants tend to live with their in-laws. Approximately 25.8% of marriage migrants reported living with their in-laws in 2009 (KIHSA 2010). Although the number dropped to 12.7% in 2015, as some women eventually set up their own households separate from that of their in-laws (MOGEF 2015b), it is still more than twofold (5.7%) of that of Korean families as a whole in the same year (MOGEF 2015a). While extended living arrangements may also occur out of economic necessity, this greater tendency to live with in-laws attest to women's weaker position to resist domestic responsibilities. As the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relationship is the core mechanism of incorporating women with different family names into patrilineal families in Korea (Min-jung Kim 2007:231), in many cases, mothers-in-law are "the main agents in transforming foreign women into Korean women" (H. M. Kim 2007:114). They tend to monitor and control the behaviors of their daughters-in-law in order to discipline them to become dedicated wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law, which they justify as "Korean customs".

The support programs for marriage migrants provided by state institutions such as MFSCs are often in collusion with husbands and in-laws, as they are mainly focused on

assisting marriage migrants' roles as wives, mothers, and daughters-in-law in Korean families. As Minjeong Kim (2013) shows, these public assistance programs can be valuable resources for Korean husbands and/or in-laws in disciplining marriage migrants and in compelling them not to defy the expected patriarchal norms.

Women's responses to this reconsolidation of patriarchy by the Korean state and the family are by no means homogeneous. However, while the responses could vary by the socioeconomic status of the Korean family and women's individual cultural resources (Minjeong Kim 2008), it is important to note that the heterosexual marriage and family are solid institutions that offer women not only material and legal, but also moral inclusion in Korean society (Choo 2013). For this reason, women must strategize within a set of concrete constraints.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

In the remainder of this dissertation, I examine how Filipina marriage migrants in urban and rural areas negotiate their political incorporation vis-à-vis various host country patriarchal institutions. In the following chapter, I lay out the research design and methodology for this study. I begin by providing a detailed explanation about the fieldwork sites – urban and rural areas – and then I discuss the collection of data. This is followed by a discussion of the data analysis.

In Chapter 3, "Naturalization and voting as family affairs", I examine the process of citizenship acquisition and the voting decisions of Filipina marriage migrants. Within studies of immigrant political incorporation, naturalization and voting have been identified as key indicators of adaptation to the host country's political system. These studies usually assume that going through the process of naturalization and turning out at the polls are gender-neutral processes, indicating an understanding and internalization of the host country's political process and norms. In this chapter, I challenge this assumption and highlight the need to examine the gendered context. Specifically, I argue that the political incorporation of female

marriage migrants should be understood within the context of their engaging in bargaining with patriarchal host country institutions, that is, gendered political opportunities and resources. This chapter shows that naturalization and voting decisions are the result of women's constant negotiation with the gendered norms and expectations they face within the family and community.

In Chapter 4, "Challenging or conforming? Voluntary associational activities", I comparatively examine how gendered local labor market integration and local community membership influence the participatory capacity of individual Filipinas. I also examine the characteristics of voluntary associations in urban and rural areas. This chapter shows that the differential levels of community surveillance over Filipina marriage migrants, according to gender norms, together with the differential gendered local job markets and institutions accessible to women in each area, lead to different patterns of participation. Divergent membership characteristics, organizational ties, and types of activities at the organizational level are also discussed. In sum, voluntary associations in urban areas display more counterpublic characteristics, whereas those in rural areas show a rather cooperative orientation to the dominant public discourse toward female marriage migrants.

In Chapter 5, "National-level political representation and its effects", I examine the effects of the presence of a Filipina marriage migrant legislator on Filipina respondents' feelings of inclusion in mainstream political debates in urban and rural areas. While both Filipinas in rural and urban areas acknowledge the symbolic benefits of having a Filipina politician, their descriptive representation does not seem to increase their level of political efficacy in either area. Among urban women, critical evaluations and perceptions of 'likely non-responsiveness' were expressed. Approval of the representational role of the congresswoman among rural women was not based on an understanding about political activities of the congresswoman. I explain this difference by comparing the collective norms of local communities and how they influence women's response.

In the Conclusion, I revisit the research questions introduced in this first chapter. I then discuss the theoretical contributions and situate the analysis within the larger literature on

immigrant political incorporation and gendered citizenship. I also discuss the limitations and practical policy implications.

CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

I conducted multi-site ethnographic field research on patterns of political incorporation among Filipina marriage migrants in Korea. I compared the cases of Filipina marriage migrants residing in urban and rural areas. I collected and analyzed data following an approach similar to the grounded theory procedures advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1998). My field research occurred over seven months, from May to December 2014, and took place in major metropolitan areas and rural counties in the southern part of Korea. These locations were chosen to compare different gendered membership in urban and rural areas. Studies have shown that female marriage migrants in rural communities face traditional gender role expectations (Hiroo and Kim 2009; Minjeong Kim 2008). They are immersed in strong social ties among the rapidly aging population and experience generally lower status compared to men. This reality is vastly different from that of urban environments.

THE RESEARCH SITES

In my initial proposal, I planned to recruit respondents only in one city (Big City), and one county (Southern County) to account for the different patterns of integration in rural and urban settings due to social, geographic and institutional environments (Somers 1993). This research design was based on the assumption that Filipina marriage migrants residing in one administrative district are geographically bound to utilize government institutions and NGOs within that boundary and have limited interaction with neighboring districts. Some early observations of these two field sites challenged my assumptions. I soon found that many marriage migrants residing in districts *neighboring* Big City would visit government institutions/NGOs in Big City and participate in co-ethnic gatherings there. Residents in neighboring districts often have easier access to organizations in Big City through public transportation than to those in their own districts. Some residents in counties neighboring

Southern County experience a similar situation as they live closer to the government institutions/NGOs in Southern County than those in their own districts. As residential patterns are usually sparse in rural counties, my respondents tended to interact more with women in Southern County than with women in their own districts. These initial observations led to some changes in my field research plan. Instead of focusing solely within two administrative districts, I also recruited women from neighboring districts.

During the first few weeks, I went back and forth between Big City and Southern County to make initial contacts with potential respondents and arrange lodging. Then I spent two and a half months in each area. After five months, I also extended my focus to other cities and counties. The urban sample of Filipina marriage migrants were mostly recruited from Big City as well as six other cities surrounding it. Participants from additional two cities in the southern part of Korea were also included as I learned about their active political participation during my fieldwork. This theoretical sampling helped me further elaborate the relationship between the urban context of reception and women's political participation (Glaser and Strauss 2009). The rural sample of Filipina marriage migrants were recruited from Southern County as well as two other neighboring counties.

Southern County

Southern County is located in the southernmost province on the Korean peninsula. It is a rural county with a population of 77,332. About 30% of its population engages in agriculture.[8] About 2.4% of its residents are foreign, naturalized, or native-born children with immigrant backgrounds.[9] There are 13 villages (*myeon*) and one town (*eup*) in Southern County. The

8 From County Hall Office Annual Statistics, June, 2014.

9 Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2013.

town is located in the geographical center and houses the local county hall, bus terminal, and the Multicultural Family Support Center (MFSC). Buses constitute the main mode of public transportation in the county. A local bus route reaches all 13 villages that surround the central town, but its schedule is infrequent, usually at one or two hour intervals, except to more highly populated nearby towns or popular tourist attractions. Every bus stops running after 7:00 pm. Thus, it was very difficult to travel between towns by bus.

I began my fieldwork in Southern County in May. I chose the field site because JeonNam province, which consists of five cities and 17 counties and where Southern County is located, has the third highest Filipina marriage migrant population excluding the urban environments of Seoul and Gyeonggi province. Southern County has one of the largest populations of Filipina marriage migrants in JeonNam province (N=83[10]). I first gained access to the research site through the leader of a Filipina voluntary association in Southern County, who knew a Filipina living in a nearby city who became my first contact. I also contacted the MFSC and the County Hall Office to receive general information on female marriage migrants in the County and gain access to the programs they offered.

Big City

I chose the Big City as another field site because it best represents the urban environments I was seeking to examine. As a capital city in Korea, Big City houses central government offices such as the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), which handles the majority of support policies for female marriage migrants, and affiliated organizations that control the MFSCs nationwide. Foreign or naturalized residents and children

10 Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2013.

with migrant parents consist of 3.9% of its population of 10,195,318.[11] Almost all 25 boroughs have an MFSC chapter except for the borough with the smallest marriage migrant population. There are several voluntary associations of multi-ethnic marriage migrants that have more than 1,000 members, as well as national offices of NGOs catering to marriage migrants. With a dense network of buses and subways, one can easily access such centers and organizations, even from neighboring satellite cities within a two-hour radius.

DATA COLLECTION

The primary data consists of three key components, as outlined below.

In-depth Interviews. The focus of this study was to explore patterns of political incorporation among Filipina marriage migrants and how institutions such as the family and immigration policy influence those patterns on the ground. Thus, the bulk of my data came from in-depth interviews with Filipina marriage migrants and some of their husbands, as well as staff involved in immigrant-related government institutions and NGOs.

The process of recruiting potential Filipina respondents in Southern County was facilitated through several routes for the purposes of reaching respondents with various backgrounds. I sought diversity in terms of length of stay, how they met their spouses, age, number of children, family living arrangements, occupation, religious affiliation, and degree of participation in co-ethnic gatherings. I primarily used the snowball method for sampling, but also chose respondents purposefully to incorporate as much variation as possible. Through my initial contact with the leader of a voluntary association in Southern County I was able to reach roughly 50% of the Filipina marriage migrants in Southern County. Yet I soon learned that there are two other voluntary associations of Filipina marriage migrants. The members of each

[11] Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2013.

association are in close contact with each other based on their geographical proximity and religious affiliation. Therefore, I occasionally attended the Unification Church, where about 20% of Filipinas attend. The other group is geographically based on the far south village of Southern County, which is far from the MFSC. I used referrals to reach members of the group, which included about 20% of Filipinas as members.

The population of Filipina marriage migrants (N=1,487[12]) in Big City was much larger and more geographically dispersed than in Southern County. Thus, I first relied on referrals from my initial contacts, consuls at the Embassy of the Philippines, as well as leaders and officers of registered Filipina organizations. I also contacted multi-ethnic marriage migrant organizations to seek Filipina respondents. I soon learned that there are far more activities offered in Big City by various organizations for Filipinas, including the Embassy, Filipino international student organizations, community organizations, and Filipina voluntary associations than in Southern County.

By the time I moved to Big City, I had more knowledge of migrant wives' process of marriage and difficulties in adapting to Korean culture. My fieldwork in Southern County suggested that women who experienced divorce or separation might go through a different process of political incorporation from those who remain in their marriages although they share other sociodemographic characteristics (i.e., age, length of stay, number of children, etc.). Therefore, I purposefully recruited some divorced and/or separated marriage migrants (whom I was not able to find in Southern County) in addition to those who remain in their marriages.

First, face-to-face semi-structured interviews were conducted with 89 Filipina marriage migrants. Table 1 presents sociodemographic characteristics of Filipina respondents. The

12 Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2013.

average age of the urban and rural respondents was 38.7 (range: 23-56) and 38 (range: 24-56), respectively. The time since arrival was about 11 years for both groups. The percentage of respondents with Korean citizenship was higher among rural respondents (82%) than their urban counterparts (68%). About a third (27%) of urban respondents experienced divorce and/or separation. The average number of children was slightly higher in rural areas (1.93) then in urban areas (1.69). Among those remain in their marriages, the percentage of respondents living with their parents-in-law was higher among rural respondents (33%) than their urban counterparts (15%).

I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with Filipina marriage migrants (N=33; see Table 1) in Southern County. Many of my interviews with marriage migrants (20 out of 33) took place at Filipinas' homes. Thus, I was able to meet their children, husbands, and mothers-in-law, as well as sometimes their mothers or other family members from the Philippines. Except for one case where the whole interview was conducted with both the Filipina marriage migrant and her husband, I was able to ensure one-on-one interview time with the Filipina respondents (i.e., in separate rooms) so that the content of the interview was not influenced by the presence of other family members. My interviews with Filipina marriage migrants lasted one to five hours, and for some respondents several follow-up interviews were needed. All interviews and conversations with the women were conducted in a mixture of Korean and English. Filipinas in Southern County seemed more comfortable using Korean than English, except for those who taught English or who had arrived in Korea recently. As they were fluent in either language and I am fluent in both, we were able to communicate. On occasions in which Filipinas spoke Tagalog with each other, I received translation help from other Filipinas who are fluent in Korean or English during the interview or informal gatherings on the spot.

Interviews (N=56; see Table 1) were mainly conducted in coffee shops following respondents' preference in Big City. Only 20% of the interviews were conducted at home (11 out of 56) yet I was able to observe some of the respondents' interactions with their husbands, children, in-laws, or other family members from the Philippines during the interviews and at informal gatherings. Some interviews were also conducted at the offices where respondents worked or in their stores. As Filipinas in Big City predominantly work as English teachers, most interviews were conducted mainly in English with a few exceptions for those who had migrated a long time ago.

Table 1. Sociodemographic characteristics of Filipina marriage migrant respondents

Residence	No. of respondents	Average age (range)	Average time since arrival in years (range)	% Citizens	Average No. of children (average age)	% Living with in-laws	% Divorced
Urban Area	56	38.7 (23-56)	11.31 (0.8-23)	68%	1.69 (9.81)	15% (6/41)	27%
Rural Area	33	38 (24-56)	11 (0.3-18)	82%	1.93 (9.84)	33%	-

During the interviews, I tried to examine how Korean institutions such as patriarchal family structures, community organizations, and local governments influence women's socio-political integration. I first broadly touched on their life experiences in the Philippines and the process of moving to Korea to understand the context for their life in a new country. Respondents then naturally drew comparisons between their lives in both countries as they talked about how differences in family culture, community activities, national policy, and religious context had influenced their day-to-day lives in Korea. I also asked what their primary

concerns were, how they went about solving problems, and whether their local institutions were helpful in the process. I asked more focused questions about the process of acquiring (or not acquiring) a membership to their surrounding institutions (i.e., citizenship) and how they participated in the decision-making process of each institution. For example, I asked what their positions were in their families and communities, how they voted, how they participated (or did not participate) in voluntary associations, and how they thought about their representation at the national level.

Second, additional semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine husbands (see Table 2 below) in order to better understand how they influenced my respondents' socio-political participation. Interviewing them helped me to understand how husbands might situate, act upon, and influence the process of women's political incorporation. I recruited interviewees based on information that I received during my interviews with the Filipina marriage migrants. I tried to select the interviewees with as much variation as possible in terms of how they met their wives, where they lived, and what their occupations were. The husbands in Southern County predominantly engaged in farming and had flexible work hours compared to office or factory workers. I was able to meet the husbands at home on a rainy day or a lunch break. On some occasions, including the education program at the MFSC and informal gatherings, I was able to mingle with the husbands and some of them included me in their conversations. In Big City interviews were mostly conducted outside the home, and I had to ask Filipina respondents to introduce their husbands for interviews. In interviewing and observing husbands, I started by asking about the process of their marriages to contextualize how decisions were made in their families. Then I asked what they thought about the government's policy for marriage migrants and their family. I particularly focused on their thoughts about their wives'

participation in activities outside the home. Interviews lasted roughly 30 minutes to one hour each.

Table 2. Husbands

ID	Age	Years married	Occupation	Residence
SC_1	32	6	Accountant	City
SR_1	50	13	Bus driver	Southern County
SC_2	51	7	Laundryman	Big City
SR_2	43	12	Farmer	Southern County
SR_3	50	15	Farmer	Southern County
SR_4	39	2	Self-employed	Southern County
SC_3	57	17	Family business	Big City
SC_4	51	7	Self-employed	Big City
SC_5	46	23	Private English Academy	County

Third, open-ended interviews with local and central government officials, as well as staff of community organizations, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations involved in immigration matters were included in data collection (N=39; see Table 3 below). I spoke with the staff members working in different levels of central and local government and other individuals associated with immigrant matters such as staff members of the MFSCs, community welfare centers, both Korean and multi-ethnic NGOs, the Embassy of the Philippines, a marriage migrant politician and assistant, and pastors. These individuals were targeted because they were either in regular contact with marriage migrants or in a position to

make and implement settlement or integration programs. Previous studies have shown that interactions between female marriage migrants and individuals involved in such institutions shape women's access to citizenship rights and benefits as well as family interactions (Choo 2011; Minjeong Kim 2008). I focused not only on how they ran the programs and activities for marriage migrants but also on their general thoughts about women's integration and the nature of their interactions with marriage migrants. Interviews with Korean officials/staff or respondents from other ethnic backgrounds (i.e., marriage migrants from China) were conducted in Korean while interviews with Filipino staff were conducted in English. Interviews lasted roughly 30 minutes to two hours.

All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed either in English or Korean verbatim.

Table 3. Government officials and individuals associated with immigrant matters

Government employees	Multicultural Family Support Center employees	Community organizations (government-funded)	Non-governmental organizations	Embassy of the Philippines	Marriage migrant politician and assistant	Total
11	9	3	12	2	2	39

Participant Observations. I supplemented interviews with participant observations of Filipina marriage migrant's interactions with their family members, co-ethnic group members, and community/government organizations. Participant observations provided a rich experiential context for interactions in my respondents' daily lives that are essential to understanding the process of political incorporation yet difficult to fully capture in interviews. Through observations, I was able to examine subtleties that helped me ask new questions and better probe respondents during my interviews. Access to my participant observation sites was gained mostly through interviews with Filipina marriage migrants and immigrant-related

government and NGO staff during which I gained knowledge about various formal and informal gatherings. When choosing the sites, I focused on observing how the Filipinas participated and interacted in the programs offered by various governmental and non-governmental organizations and possible influences on political incorporation. It was also important to observe how marriage migrants organized and utilized co-ethnic events or informal gatherings in homes or coffee shops. Finally, when the interviews with marriage migrants were conducted at home or whenever there were informal gatherings including husbands and/or in-laws (12 out of 33 respondents in rural areas; 11 out of 56 respondents in urban areas), I focused on observing interactions between the respondents and their family members.

My fieldwork in Southern County and other counties included day-to-day interactions with Filipina marriage migrants and the people surrounding them, including family members, staff of immigrant-related organizations, and marriage migrant women from other countries. I attended and volunteered as a teaching assistant at the Korean language classes offered by the MFSC three times a week and attended another Korean language class offered by one of the township governments that was located far from the Center once a week. After class at the MFSC in the morning, I would spend time with Filipina marriage migrants and usually have lunch with them in a nursery room, which is on the same floor as the class room. I participated in the Center's various educational and cultural programs: regular gatherings of playgroup, sex education for wives, leadership workshops for husbands, and the annual sports festival. I was also invited to various events organized by Filipina voluntary associations and countless informal gatherings such as birthday parties, fieldtrips, and occasional leisure time at homes and coffee shops. This participation gave me the opportunity to interact with staff at the MFSC and the local governments and community welfare center. If permitted, I accompanied

interviewees to their work places (i.e., family farms, green houses, barber shops, etc.). I also occasionally attended the Southern County branch of the Unification Church or Catholic Church.

In Big City and other cities, sites for participant observations were more diverse than those in rural areas as the Filipina respondents interviewed were involved in a greater number of programs and events offered by various institutions and organizations. Consequently, I attended events offered by the Embassy, international student organizations for Filipinos attending Korean universities, local government, MFSCs, community welfare centers, NGOs, and Filipina associations. For example, I attended the 'Multicultural Family Forum' organized by the Embassy; a Filipino language class for the children of Filipina marriage migrants offered by the Embassy, a Filipino students' organization, a Filipina voluntary association, and local government officials; a multicultural festival organized by the MFSC; weekly mentor-mentee programs for marriage migrants offered by the community welfare center; and weekly education programs organized by local NGOs. I occasionally attended Protestant or Catholic churches and informal gatherings. I also assisted as an interpreter at the Family Court for one of my Filipina respondent's divorce hearings.

I attended national events such as forums held at the National Assembly on the direction of marriage migrant support policy and education policy for the children of marriage migrants, as well as events hosted by several multi-ethnic marriage migrant organizations.

Additional Organizational/Government Documents and Statistical Data. Finally, I collected and reviewed various relevant documents. I analyzed policy documents, educational booklets, and research reports produced by related NGOs, as well as newspapers and statistical

data including the 2012 National Survey on Multicultural Families[13] in order to situate the socio-political integration of Filipina marriage migrants in a broader context. Some of the documents were obtained during interviews with government officials or NGO staff and others were publicly available on government or organization websites.

DATA ANALYSIS

My interpretation and analysis of primary data followed a grounded theory approach to better understand unexplored gender dynamics in female marriage migrants' political incorporation. Analysis in this study is based on transcripts of interviews and fieldnotes from participant observation. It is supported contextually with additional documents and data.

I coded all interview scripts using the qualitative software program NVivo. NVivo allowed me to manage and organize data efficiently. Using the coding process suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998) as a guide, I started with open coding in which I coded every paragraph of the interview transcripts. I then labelled and categorized recurrent phenomena, focusing on women's naturalization, voting, voluntary associational activities, and responses to national representation. This process was followed by axial coding in which I linked categories and subcategories to ultimately create a story line about how women experience the process of political incorporation. Yet my method was also iterative as I constantly switched between different levels of coding and data collection. Through the process, I learned that gender dynamics in the family were shaping Filipina marriage migrants' political incorporation. This finding encouraged me to focus on the interactions between family gender dynamics, and local or national level institutions that sometimes reinforced or challenged gendered family norms. My initial coding also influenced my later sampling of respondents as divorce and

13 Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 2013. "2012 National Survey on Multicultural Families".

separation cases became more prevalent in my urban interviews and I added related coding categories.

Notes from participant observations were similarly coded. I focused on contextualizing and complementing women's accounts of political incorporation in their daily interactions with family, government institutions, community organizations, and co-ethnic voluntary associations. For example, through observation data I was able to capture how patriarchal gendered norms and expectations are transmitted to women on the ground in certain institutional settings while they are challenged on other occasions.

CHAPTER 3. NATURALIZATION AND VOTING AS FAMILY AFFAIRS

Previous studies have shown the particular importance of bridging ties in immigrant political incorporation that link immigrants to non-coethnic members (Hagan 1998), especially to those who possess politically relevant resources (Gidengil and Stolle 2009; Jones-Correa 1998) to facilitate learning about and becoming active in the adoptive country's politics. While such studies have looked at the social contexts of neighborhoods, workplaces, and voluntary associations and the kinds of ties that immigrants form, much less attention has been paid to the political consequences of ties within families. Only a few studies have explicitly focused on the influence of family dynamics and bridging ties within families[14] in the political socialization of immigrants, which are largely limited to the parent-child relationship (see Bloemraad and Trost 2008; Wong and Tseng 2008), leaving no discussion about other familial relations, such as marital relations. Further, most studies treat bridging ties as neutral channels that simply provide relevant resources to facilitate immigrants' political incorporation. However, as social capital scholars have long acknowledged, social relations do not merely function as information channels. Rather, they come with obligations and expectations, along with norms and sanctions (Coleman 1988:S104).

International marriage creates strong bridging ties within a family (Gidengil and Stolle 2009:732), which may have profound consequences for marriage migrants' political incorporation. Marriage and family relations are fraught with norms and obligations that are often combined with legal regulations. In addition, it has been argued that women's political engagement is heavily influenced by male family members, especially by their husbands (Beck

[14] Putnam (2000) distinguishes bridging and bonding ties. Bridging ties refer to social networks that link people from different social backgrounds, while bonding ties bring together people of a similar background. While family ties are more likely to be bonding ties, in the case of international marriage or family migration, where children are born as native or are exposed to the host society during their formative years, family ties between couples or parents-children become bridging ties.

and Jennings 1975; Weiner 1978), although more recent studies see spousal influence as a two-way process (Stoker and Jennings 1995). Therefore, we can expect that family relations would have a strong influence, particularly on how female marriage migrants obtain political membership and participate in the host society's political process.

In the case of Filipina marriage migrants in Korea, the norms and obligations of the family are based on Confucian patriarchy. As mentioned in Chapter 1, feminist scholars have argued that the lingering effect of Confucian tradition and the masculinization of civil society under military authoritarian rule (1961-1987) have historically circumscribed Korean women's active participation in civil society (Moon 2002). Since the influence of Korean Confucian patriarchy on the general adaptation of Filipina marriage migrants has been well documented by other scholars (Abelmann and Kim 2005; Freeman 2005; Minjeong Kim 2008), here I focus specifically on how family norms and obligations influence the process of women's political incorporation—defined as naturalization and voting. I also pay attention to how gendered norms are reinforced or challenged by institutions and organizations outside the family as women negotiate their political space. Given that Confucian influence has relatively attenuated in urban areas, while still maintaining a strong presence in rural life (Hiroo and Kim 2009; Minjeong Kim 2008), I also attend to the different social contexts of the city and rural environments.

PROCESS OF NATURALIZATION

Citizenship acquisition is not only a critical prerequisite for the political inclusion of the immigrants, as it grants the right to vote and to hold an elected office, but it is also a central political act for immigrants, as it may entail a change in political allegiance, along with other rights and privileges (Jones-Correa 2001). Moreover, scholars see the process of becoming a citizen itself as involving a high level of integration through considerable efforts and

commitment (Bloemraad 2006; Bueker 2005; Liang 1994; Wong and Pantoja 2009). Although the naturalization process varies, depending on each country's citizenship system, it is the fundamental premise of the civic basis of citizenship that immigrants are expected to achieve some level of integration through the process (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008). Most immigrants have to navigate the host country's institutions and draw on necessary resources around them to acquire citizenship. In receiving countries that do not allow for dual citizenship, immigrants must also renounce their sending country citizenship.

Beyond this basic premise and requirements, by definition marital naturalization involves native-born spouses. In fact, a close examination of the process of naturalization among Filipina marriage migrant respondents shows how they negotiate and bargain with this "required dependency" on their Korean spouses. The current Korean Nationality Law stipulates that marriage migrants can apply for citizenship after two years of residency or one year of residency within more than three years of marriage[15]. Before the 1997 amendment, female

15

Nationality Law changes affecting marriage migrants

1998-2002	- From only paternal lineage to both paternal and maternal lineage are accepted for children to acquire citizenship by birth. - Two years of residency or one year of residency within at least three years of marriage and a naturalization written test are required.
2003-2008	Naturalization written test replaced by interview test.
2004~	In the case of marriage dissolution before marriage immigrants acquire citizenship, eligibility for applying is as follows: - If the marriage is dissolved due to a spouse's death or absence or other reason attributable to the spouse. - If the marriage migrants are/will be rearing minor children from the marriage.
2009~	Marriage migrants should satisfy either of the below conditions: - Pass the interview test. - Complete the Korean Immigration Integration Program (KIIP).
2011~	Dual citizenship allowed

marriage migrants were automatically given Korean citizenship[16]. However, the residency requirement was set in place to prevent "fake marriages."[17] Given that the citizenship process takes about two or more years, women usually hold a spousal visa for up to four to five years while going through multiple visa renewals. Though it is not stipulated in the law, immigration officials usually require the presence of the spouse for the renewal[18] (J.-S. Kim 2011:225). This requirement makes women's residency status heavily dependent on their husbands.

Claire, who lives in Big City is a good example of Filipinas' dependency on their husbands. Claire had stayed in Korea with a spousal visa for six years prior to acquiring citizenship in 2012. During those six years, her husband always needed to accompany her to the Immigration Office for the renewals. Without the physical presence of her husband, she thought, her visa renewal application would have been denied. This situation is markedly different from the relatively more independent relationship she enjoyed with her Korean husband in the Philippines for ten years before they migrated to Korea together for their children's education. Claire noted that in her current relationship with her husband, she "became so dependent on him" that it had a heavy influence on her daily life. "There were

16 Three of the Filipina marriage migrants in the rural province and nine of those in the city area received their Korean citizenship upon their marriage with Korean husbands.

17 The Ministry of Government Legislation explains the background of the 1997 Nationality Law amendment as follows:

> …before, when a foreign woman marries a Korean man, Korean citizenship was automatically given without the naturalization process. Recently, the increasing number of those who live in less developed countries hope to enter our country and work, but our immigration law strictly forbids this. Therefore, there were a considerable number of women who married bachelor farmers, registering their marriage, and once they acquired citizenship, then they unilaterally ran away from home, taking advantage of the process. The amendment requires foreign brides to go through the naturalization process like foreign grooms… We expect that fake marriages will disappear because foreign brides should live with their Korean husbands for at least two years, and the husbands should help them become naturalized. [translated from Korean]
> (http://www.moleg.go.kr/knowledge/monthlyPublication?mpbLegPstSeq=129591)

18 Foreign brides are required to have their husbands as a guarantor in order to be issued a visa (F-6) for marriage immigration, and this reference needs to remain effective whenever they renew their visa. If the husband retracts his reference at his will, the wife's status becomes illegal.

disadvantages to it. … I was always with him. Even traveling on vacation, holidays, I never experienced traveling without him," she said. It was only after she received citizenship that she started travelling only with her children to join her friends, who often travelled on vacation without their husbands.

Beyond the "required dependency" of the visa renewal process, the naturalization process also has its own built-in mechanisms to make women dependent on their spouses, which in turn creates an imbalanced power dynamic. Because the application process can only begin with the cooperation of the husband, the husband or his family members have substantive authority over the migrant women's naturalization process as gatekeepers. Vangie, who is the leader of one of the newly formed Filipina voluntary associations in Big City and a mother of two sons, felt as though she had been constantly tested for her citizenship at home for seven years until she finally acquired it:

> Vangie: [It was] difficult because of the family…very high expectations. It's like you should be good in everything about Korean culture before you acquire Korean citizenship.
>
> Interviewer: So your family members kind of gave you pressure?
>
> Vangie: Yeah, a lot. "You can't be a Korean citizen because you don't know anything about Korean culture." Even though myself, I know already. I don't understand why. That's why it took so long before I got my citizenship.
>
> Interviewer: Your family members don't have the authority over whether you gain citizenship or not, but you're worried about how they think?
>
> Vangie: Yes, you have to be perfect with, you have to be good all the time like that. The expectations are really high. You have to just like what she [sister-in-law] said before, before I become a Korean citizen, I should know everything, Korean language, Korean culture, and [how to] *take care of the kids in society*. They want me to become like Korean. … They don't allow me to get the citizenship [until I meet the expectations]. It's like an examination for them. It's like taking a mid-term exam before I need to get the final result. It's like I need to do my very best, my efforts, everything, in the house. [emphasis added]

Proving her eligibility to the standards of her husband and sister-in-law[19] became a crucial part of her naturalization process. Here, the eligibility criteria involved being "good in everything" related to Korea, with the ultimate goal being that she should know "[how to] take care of the kids in society." What it means to "become like Korean" for her sister-in-law reveals clear messages of Vangie's gender role as a mother. Vangie has been planning to go to the university for a bachelor's degree and possibly proceed to a graduate degree, but she has never "opened up to" her husband or sister-in-law about her plan: "Because I know in Korea, it's like if you're married, you just focus on your children like that." In fact, she quit her teaching assistant job at an international school, as her sister-in-law asked her not to work so that she could take care of her kids full time.

Learning Korean culture from husbands and in-laws, among others, often means learning how to "do gender" properly within the family. Most women pointed to a perceived gap in the gender role expectations in the family of Korea from that of the Philippines. Joyce has been married for seven years in Big City and works part time as an English teacher. Her account illustrates the differences that Filipinas perceive in their daily conduct:

> It's hard, first time, it was hard because we have a different culture. Korean men, they're so different. (…) Because Korean men, they don't know what is the household chores, and help a girl or woman to do, but in the Philippines, for example, if I came home late in my case, because I have two brothers, we lived together, and if they come earlier than me, they would prepare some food to eat for dinner. So even if I came home [late], they have already prepared for our dinner. So, the girl, the woman is more comfortable because they [men] helped prepare some dinner, right? *But here in Korea, you have to serve the men. You have to serve them like a king.* I'm not sure, if all the men in Korea are like that, but mostly, because I heard [of similar] problems from my friends. [emphasis added]

Many other Filipinas were aware of the cultural differences between Filipino and Korean families in terms of gender roles. In fact, studies on Korean married women's role in families,

[19] Vangie' parents-in-law had passed away when she got married, and she said that her "sister-in-law is like her mother-in-law."

even after women's considerable participation in the labor market, still document the lingering effect of the Confucian traditional family system, which subordinates the wife under the husband and parents-in-law (Peng 2009; Sung 2003). According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2014, which measures gender-based gaps in access to resources and opportunities, Korea is ranked at 117 among 142 countries, while the Philippines is ranked at seven (Hausmann et al. 2014). While negotiation between partners with two different cultural backgrounds may result in various outcomes, women's required dependency for their stable residency and naturalization often makes women the sole negotiator while husbands and in-laws largely concede little.

Negotiating one's legitimate position with expected gender roles often becomes more intense for women in rural areas. Many of them must work on the family farm while also taking full responsibility for the childrearing and housework, which also has been the case for native Korean women (Gills 1999). Moreover, a higher rate of inter-generational cohabitation and relatives living nearby, combined with a small community environment makes marriage migrants more subject to gender-role policing. Marian had to take her 17-month-old girl and three-month-old boy to a scorching fig greenhouse, as she was required to work in the green-house by her husband, with no one to take care of the babies. For the past two years since she's been married, her brother-in-law's wife, who lives in the same town, has constantly monitored her conduct inside and outside of the house. She pushed Marian to work on the farm, helping the husband, while also keeping the house clean, arguing, "[I know that] you work outside, but you also need to be good at housework because you're a woman." Knowing that she is held accountable primarily for the housework from influential in-laws, she asked her husband and in-laws to allow her to concentrate on the housework, but her requests are often denied:

> How can I do my housework? I always work outside with my babies, imagine that. … If they [in-laws] want me to do good work inside [the house], then they [should] talk

> to my husband so that my husband knows that I need to be good at housework than working outside. I always tell that to my husband that I really need time to clean the house, but my husband says, "It's all right, it's all right." I don't know what to do. … I really want to do my housework because that's the first assignment of being a wife, but how can I do my housework if my husband's priority is to work outside. … I don't know what they [in-laws] want me to do. I do everything since I was here. I never let myself pretend or act like a princess because even I was nine months pregnant when I was in the field, fig greenhouse, and the cattle shed helping their brother without thinking that I'm pregnant with my eldest baby.

Marian asked me about the law and policy regarding divorce and custody, as she contemplated the idea of leaving her husband one day after a quarrel with her husband. However, a few weeks later, she decided to endure the situation and control her feelings thinking, "Maybe the best thing to do is to wait until my status will change into a Korean citizen." Knowing that breaking the marital relationship may lead to unstable residence status and custody loss, Marian realized that she was not on an equal footing with her husband in negotiating her expected roles, at least until she becomes a Korean citizen.

As can be seen in Marian's case, acquiring citizenship status is oftentimes a complex and constant bargaining process of proving one's eligibility through performing expected gender roles, especially for women who face marriage problems. Before the law was amended in 2004[20], there was no legal protection for the residence rights of marriage migrants who became divorced before they acquired citizenship. Women have been susceptible to domestic violence, as they could not secure their stay in Korea outside of their marriage. July, who ran away from her alcoholic and violent ex-husband, had to return to her husband in the province when she was advised by her colleagues at the factory in the city where she worked that she "must go back and live [with her husband] to convert to a citizen." Even after she acquired citizenship in 2003 and has been separated from her husband since, she did not officially get divorced until eight years later while occasionally performing her duties as a wife and a

20 As a result of the Nationality Law amendment in 2004 (Article 6.2), marriage migrants whose marriages are dissolved due to reasons attributable to their Korean spouses are guaranteed legal residency status.

daughter-in-law. For example, she would visit her husband and in-laws whenever her mother-in-law missed her grandson, and she would also visit them during national holidays. She explains that it was her way of showing gratitude to the Korean family for her citizenship status:

> Even though I'm divorced now, I contact my husband. "Did you have your meal? Are you in good health? Don't drink too much." Just in my heart, I feel that, I have a big thankfulness to my Korean family because I'm a citizen here. It's hard to come to Korea, it's hard to be a good citizen here. Even if I'm not successful in getting married to a Korean, in dealing with my Korean family, but my heart, I'm so thankful so much for having a Korean family, even if I'm not successful, I'm not struggled because of my citizen card. I kept contact. Maybe next month, I'm going to my mother-in-law.

In the case of July, fulfilling the expected roles of wife and daughter-in-law was more substantial in maintaining and securing her position in the Korean family than maintaining the couple's actual marriage condition (i.e., separation). She persuaded the Korean family to begin her citizenship process through her continued performance of expected gender roles.

Among the expected inventories of "rules and scripts regulating gender relations" (Kandiyoti 1988:286), becoming a mother may be the most central to family and community members' expectations, as well as it is institutionally recognized by the Nationality Law. Marital naturalization is based on the fact that couples establish a family, which is a foundational institution that distributes citizenship entitlements. This unique status of the family is legitimated by the state, given that families function as the social mechanisms for the reproduction of society through the birth, maintenance and socialization of offspring (Turner 2008). As it is combined with the context of marriage migration, women's citizenship acquisition becomes conditional on women giving birth to a child. The Nationality Law allows an exception on the residency and marital status requirement when the applicants have or will have children with Korean nationality[21]. As Minjeong Kim (2008) argues, marriage migrants are under an "ethnicized maternal citizenship" project propelled by the Korean state. Female

[21] Article 6.2.4 of Nationality Law

marriage migrants have access to certain social rights only when they are not divorced or raising children who are Korean citizens if they are not naturalized citizens (J.-S. Kim 2011).

Every Filipina respondent knew that having a child with Korean nationality significantly eases the naturalization or visa renewal process, even in the case of divorce. Kate made logical sense of this reason within the context of the "runaway bride" discourse: "[I applied for citizenship] after I gave birth to my baby. Because in Korea, you can apply for Korean citizenship, it's better if you have a baby. Because they'll ask, more points if you have a baby because you have more reasons to stay here in Korea. Some of the Filipina married women here stay away from their husband. If you have a baby, you make a family here in Korea, so they [immigration officers] are going to consider that." Olga, who has been married to her husband in the city for seven years without a child, had failed the interview test several times. Olga's husband, who accompanied her during the interview tests also attributed her tough naturalization process to being childless:

> If you have a baby, then [the application notice is] issued in two years and six months. If you don't have a baby, you can apply only after five years. … Even then, they [the Immigration Office] make it very tricky, they'll fail you several times. Nothing was wrong [during Olga's interview test] then you go home and wait for the result only to find out that you failed. … [Olga] failed twice. If you have a baby, then it is unconditional.

While the expected role as child bearer is experienced more or less as an institutional barrier to obtaining citizenship for women in the city, it greatly influences women's everyday life in the rural provinces through family and neighborhood surveillance. Lorraine, who lives in the southernmost village of about 20 households in a rural province, had been trying to have a baby for nine years, without success. She found her relationship with her in-laws difficult, as she has been blamed for being childless: "My aunt [on her husband's side] told me one day that I'm not a woman. 'If you were a female, why would you not have a baby?' she told me." Elderly people in her town would also routinely ask her whether she has kids and when she

answers no, they always ask "Why not?"

In addition, Filipina marriage migrants' gendered position intersects with their position as a foreigner. Abby, who is living in the same town as Lorraine, had a painful first year of marriage, full of conflict with her husband and in-laws, until she became pregnant with her first son:

> I was so offended because the old and middle-aged women gossiped about why I didn't get pregnant. They would tell me good things in front but [bad things] behind my back. My husband would hear it and also become offended. He also relayed what he heard to me; then I kept mental distance from those women. [I heard that] one old woman said "*Just send her back [to the Philippines] because she couldn't bear a child."* Does that make sense at all? (laughs) There are also Korean women who can't bear a child. (…) Before they talk bad things about me, things like I'm having pills to stay sterile or other bad things, they should think. I was so stressed. [emphasis added]

The fact that she did not get pregnant as soon as she got married not only caused her to be blamed for not fulfilling her gender role, but also created doubts about her legitimacy to stay in Korea. Abby further pointed out the double standard that applied to marriage migrant women: "Usually, when you get married, if you think about normal families, babies do not come right away. Rather, young couples consider having a stable job or housing first before a child nowadays (…) Why only us? This problem occurs because I'm a foreigner." Her being pregnant after one year was considered an anomaly, as most marriage migrants in the province become pregnant within a few weeks after their marriage. Her husband applied for her citizenship after she gave birth to her first son. Abby recalled her husband telling her with respect to his applying for her citizenship: "I can do this much for you because you gave birth to a child." While she was left wondering about the relationship between her having a child and acquiring citizenship, she was "rewarded" by her husband with citizenship for fulfilling her expected gender role.

Similarly, citizenship was actively sought out by a few participants vis-à-vis their

husbands on the grounds that they are entitled to gain "official mother" status. As marriage migrants' names will only appear in the Family Relation Certificate of their offspring once they acquire citizenship, some women found it problematic for their children not to have a mother on the official documents. It was only then that they actively demanded their husbands to start the naturalization process. Such was the case for Miriam in the city, who came to know about the absence of her name on her first son's family register[22] when she brought her son to a daycare center:

> Interviewer: Why did you apply for Korean citizenship?
>
> Miriam: Because of my children. Only my name was not on the family census [family register]. I fought with my husband. "Hey, my name is not there, where is it?" I got angry. There's only a baby's name. Only my name was not there.
>
> Interviewer: On what occasion did you get to see the family census?
>
> Miriam: You need the certified copy of the family census when the baby goes to the hospital or enters the daycare center. I got to see it [when I brought my first son to the daycare center] and there was not my name. "Let's get a divorce." (laughs) That's how I got citizenship.

According to Miriam, her husband did not want her to acquire citizenship, as he suspected she would run away. Her experience echoes those of others, who found becoming an "official mother" and completing the blank on their children's official identification document as a legitimate ground to claim the need for their citizenship acquisition to their husbands.

The widespread images and stories of "runaway brides" (Freeman 2005), either experienced firsthand by husbands[23] or depicted in the mass media, exacerbate the imbalanced power relationship by holding women morally accountable for potential marriage failures. "Runaway brides" can be interpreted as the extreme case of breaching gender role expectations.

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22 There was the Family Register until 2007, where citizens were registered based on the family unit centered on the male head of the family. It has been replaced by the Family Relation Certificate since 2008, where a citizen is individually registered with his or her parents and offspring.

23 As in the case of Ciara.

Thus, extending the bargaining with patriarchy analysis, the lingering discourse of "runaway brides" can significantly deteriorate conditions of bargaining for women. Many Filipinas were hesitant to ask for the citizenship process to begin or were denied their rights by their husbands or other family members.

Rain, a newlywed who has been married for ten months in Big City, thought that it is her husband's call whether she will apply for citizenship or not. When asked if she is going to apply, she answered: "Maybe, if my husband wants me to. If not, I'm good. I'll go back to the Philippines then (laughs). I can work in the Philippines." Like Rain, women either became inactive about getting citizenship on their own account or relied on an outside authority to instigate the process to equalize the power imbalance. Leigh, who is a regular participant of one of the programs for marriage migrants run by a local community NGO in Big City, told her husband that he would be in trouble if he kept delaying the application, "He [husband] wouldn't budge if you do not push. "We'd better do it slowly." Why would we? If you would not apply, the teachers at the Green Village [name of the NGO] will call you; they said they'll report it. Hurry hurry (laughs)."

Likewise, Cheskka, who came to Southern County in 2001, was able to start the process with the help of nuns and priests from the Catholic Church that she regularly attends:

> The Church called, "Maria[24], you should apply [for citizenship] soon. You need to get hurry because you already have two babies". "No, my husband, my mother-in-law and father-in-law wouldn't let me". … The nun phoned every day. The priest also phoned. "Take her, take her [to the Immigration Office]". So finally we went. I went with my husband.

In this context, husbands' initiatives, even if for their own convenience, were appreciated amidst all other negative conditions. When Gene, a single mother, recalled the process of

[24] Baptismal name.

getting citizenship, she described her ex-husband's initiative as being "generous": "He was generous also because maybe he was very tired to go every year to Immigration for extension [of the spousal visa]. And when he hears that I can apply for citizenship because we had a son, he helped me also." Gene's ex-husband never provided financial support for the family. It was his second marriage, and he got married without letting her know about his considerable amount of debt, which eventually led to their separation, then divorce. However, Gene still remembered her husband as being "generous" in that he applied for her citizenship, against all odds.

In addition to women's Korean family and neighbors, institutions outside of the family, with which women have contact during the process of naturalization, also play a role in sending women messages about gender norms and expectations. For example, teachers from Korean language class offered by the MFSC or other migrant-related organizations for the language requirement for citizenship often become important agents of socialization. During my participant observation at the MFSC in the province, there were occasions where some of the students' in-laws would ask teachers to convey certain messages to their daughters-in-law during the language lessons. For several times, the teacher would include vocabulary and examples related to the in-laws' requests. The teacher would ask students one day about "who is pregnant now" or "who wants to become a mother." The other day, the teacher congratulated one student who became newly pregnant and added, "You're supposed to put a lot of effort to become pregnant and become a mother. Do you know what contraceptive is?" Subsequent questions targeted one of the students from Vietnam, whose in-laws asked the teacher to relay the message about the importance of becoming a mother: "Do you have other plans? Plan to not become a mother? You're just not becoming pregnant?" During my participant observation in the Korean language classes or other educational programs for marriage migrants, teachers

would often comment on what the desirable conduct would be as a wife and a daughter-in-law in everyday situations.

So far, we have seen how the naturalization process is practiced and understood with respect to Filipina marriage migrants and their families. In sum, citizenship acquisition is experienced as a reward or incentive conferred by the husbands and in-laws to marriage migrants who fulfill the expected gender roles within the family, rather than as basic rights to which women are entitled. Therefore, while naturalization is itself considered as the primary component of the political incorporation of immigrants among immigration scholars (Bloemraad 2006; Jones-Correa 2001), my finding shows quite a different picture. While the law stipulates that applicants will be tested on their "basic qualities as nationals of the Republic of South Korea, including Korean language ability along with their belief in the basic orders of liberal democracy," in reality, naturalization is understood and/or practiced as the result of women's negotiation efforts to find their place in the family and community in terms of dealing with the constant assessment of how they "do gender" from husbands, in-laws, and other Koreans, rather than as a way to achieve civic learning as a member of the larger society.

VOTING DECISIONS

According to the 2012 National Survey of Multicultural Families, 77.4% of Filipinas among those who have acquired citizenship responded that they have voting experience in Korea (MOGEF 2013). Approximately 80% of Filipina participants who are naturalized in my study also responded that they have voting experience. As marriage migrants experience naturalization and voting sequentially, their "required dependency" on their spouses during the naturalization process may further influence women's voting practices. However, while naturalization involves bureaucratic procedures, which require the joint activities of marriage migrant women and their spouses, voting decisions and practices technically do not require

consensus or cooperation. In addition, voting behaviors involve various factors that could vary among women. Studies have documented that certain immigrant-related factors have an impact on immigrant voting turnout. Predictors such as duration of stay, political socialization in the home country, linguistic barriers, as well as political contextual factors (i.e., anti-immigration legislation) were found to be important, along with other traditional predictors for non-immigrants, such as demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, the existence of social networks, etc. (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; White et al. 2008).

Previous studies have also documented the particular importance of social networks in immigrant political incorporation, as they often face a lack of information and resources, along with language barriers (Bloemraad 2006; Gidengil and Stolle 2009; Hagan 1998; Jones-Correa 1998). Consequently, for marriage migrants who came directly to stay with native families, the family can be the closest resource and networks for their political mobilization. I found that the influence of the native family on Filipinas' political socialization comes with norms and expectations of conformity. Thus, the "doing gender" framework is also useful in explaining the voting practices of Filipina marriage migrants. Roughly put, for some Filipinas, voting practices are done in line with their consistent dependency on their spouses or in-laws, even after citizenship acquisition. For others, initial periods of dependency did not last in terms of choosing their preferred candidates. Below, I present how Filipinas make their voting decisions, and what meanings they give to the practice.

Consistent dependency

As marriage migrants face the daunting tasks of learning about a new political structure, history, and actors in a short period of time, one might expect that they would be likely to employ some cognitive shortcuts in choosing their preferred candidates. In fact, studies on voting behavior show that employing cognitive shortcuts, such as following the endorsements

of trusted others to make up for political ignorance, is a common practice among voters in general (Lau and Redlawsk 2001:953–54). Many Filipina respondents seem to depend on endorsements because their point of reference in making decisions was often their husbands or parents-in-law. In the words of a Filipina who has been in the leadership role of a co-ethnic organization, "Most of us really vote. We practice the privilege of voting, and mostly, who do we vote for? Usually we depend on the husband. Like 'Honey, who do you like?' Like that. Whatever our husbands tell us, we vote for them."

Certainly, a lack of information and language barriers may hinder new citizens from choosing their own candidates. Many Filipinas shared a sense of trust toward their husbands or in-laws in choosing the right candidates. In the words of one Filipina, "I knew the importance of casting a vote, but unfortunately, I didn't have any idea about the people I'm supposed to vote [for]. I just trusted my husband." Here, trust is based on women's perceptions that they are less informed about Korean politics, compared to their husbands or parents-in-law. Nina has been living with her parents-in-law in Southern County, and she has experienced two elections since she became a Korean citizen in 2011. When asked how she decided who to vote for, she replied:

> I don't know who to vote for very well. I asked my father-in-law and mother-in-law. "Oh, you vote just for this one" they said. "You only have to vote for that person." (laughs) "[Candidate] Number two." I don't know very well and the political style is quite different in the Philippines. There are a president, vice president, senator, congressman in the Philippines like in the US. But here, it's all congressman. Only congressman. That makes me confused cause it's different.

Such was also the case for Kate, who lives in the city with her daughter and husband. Kate became a citizen in the same year as Nina. She was aware of the two major parties in the congress and was not hesitant about voicing her concerns about the current presidency, "I think the president is good but her advising staff, I don't like them." Her major source of political information is from her husband, who "watches news every day in the morning." During the

past two elections, she followed her husband because she thought she could not understand all of the information about the candidates:

> I don't know actually. There's the Saenuri Party, and the Democratic Party, so if whatever my husband says, okay I will. I don't care about, because sometimes they speak very hard Korean. My husband explains it to me: "That's a very good politician"; "Okay I have to vote for this one, what's the name? I'm going to memorize [him]." I go there [to the poll] early 6 o'clock in the morning. Many people were in the line. I voted for the Democratic Party.

For Nina and Kate, their source of information about the candidates is limited to their husbands and in-laws due to their language barrier and lack of other social networks where they might obtain additional information and opinions.

However, it is not guaranteed that these new citizens will overcome their language barrier and establish more politically relevant social networks outside of the family the longer they reside in Korea. In fact, some women who have resided in Korea for more than ten years show no interest in Korean politics and have minimal knowledge about it. The reason Mariel, who has been living in the city for 15 years, asked her husband whom to vote for was in order to finish the voting process quickly. She said, "I ask him which one is good, okay this one, okay, I'll vote [for] the same one so it will not be difficult for me when I go to the poll, just [find the] number and stamp and finish, quickly go out." When asked if she is not that interested in Korean politics, she replied, "Because I don't know them. I don't know their education, their experiences. I don't want to study who's who and what's what." Like Mariel, some other women's political apathy toward Korean politics was observable, which could possibly lead to their dependency on their husbands or in-laws in making voting decisions.

However, a closer examination of women's endorsement behavior reveals that there is more than political ignorance or apathy at play. The process of voting sometimes serves as an opportunity for husbands and parents-in-laws to assert/reinforce their power over Filipina

marriage migrants by influencing their decision-making. Women, in turn, conform or pretend to conform because they are told that it is what they are "supposed to" do. A Filipina who has been the president of one of the largest Filipino organizations for 13 years explains the reason as to why so many Filipinas follow the voting decisions of their husbands and in-laws: "It is said that there's a Korean culture and tradition that women must follow their husband, and especially if the wives are living with their mothers-in-law or parents-in-law, so they should follow whatever they say to avoid quarrel. So [they] just follow [their voting decision]."

Such was the case for Annie, a mother of three in her early 40s. Annie became a citizen in the mid-2000s and has voted ever since. Her choice has always coincided with that of her husband:

> Interviewer: Have you ever voted?
>
> Annie: Yes, many times. I'm a regular voter.
>
> Interviewer: How do you decide who to vote for?
>
> Annie: From my husband. I ask him, "Who's your favorite candidate? Who's doing well?"
>
> Interviewer: Then you just follow him?
>
> Annie: Yes. (laughs) Sometimes I would tell him "Sojin's daddy[25], I heard this one did something [bad]," then he goes, "Oh, you shouldn't be bothered. You're supposed to give credit to what I say." (laughs) It's like that. It's funny.

While Annie watches TV and reads the newspaper for her own information about the candidates and politics in general, she does not argue with her husband when different opinions arise, but rather follows his decision. If we put voting practice in the context of the larger family life, one can see it as an extension of what Annie has done with many other decisions. She followed her husband's decision to move in with the mother-in-law to a province from a nearby city one year after she arrived in Korea. Although she found it "suffocating" to live with her

25 It is a casual custom to call a husband by one's offspring's name in Korea.

mother-in-law with whom she could barely communicate and wanted to work outside, she did not go against her husband's will and stayed home during her pregnancies. When asked about her future plans for the family, she said, "Sojin's daddy has taught me that we do not think about going up really high, becoming rich. We just think about making ends meet. He said that both the rich and the poor are the same; they all eat kimchi[26]." While she has been a good negotiator and persuasive in getting her husband involved in household chores, it was with a reminder from her husband: "You'd better not tell other people [that I'm doing the housework]. There's no Korean men [who do the housework]. Men are heaven, yes, heaven."

The idiom "Men are heaven in Korea" frequently came up during the interviews with the Filipina respondents, which indicates the message they receive about the spousal relationship. This male authority extends to in-laws, which is also combined with seniority as a basic principle in organizing hierarchical relationships within the family[27]. In this context, some Filipina respondents who are living with their in-laws follow their voting decisions. Martina, who married and migrated to the province at the age of twenty in early 2000, voted for the first time in her life in Korea. In a small town with only about 80 families, Martina's parents-in-law were crucial for her transition to a new life. During the elections, she would always ask her mother-in-law, whom she calls "mom," and her husband who to vote for: "If my mom [mother-in-law] says, 'This one is good,' then I vote for the one. My husband would say, 'Suit yourself' [when asked], so I say, 'Okay, then I'll do it myself.' My mother-in-law would say, 'Just help this person [candidate] and the rest is up to you' (laughs)." Since Martina's husband has no interest in politics, her point of reference has been her mother-in-law.

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26 Traditional fermented Korean side dish made of cabbage.

27 One of the educational programs for marriage migrants hosted by the local Multicultural Family Support Center on couple's relationships I attended emphasized such a hierarchical relationship within the family as stemming from traditional Korean family values.

Sometimes pretending to conform would suffice as voting decisions are not shared publicly. Such was the case with Ella, who has been living with her mother-in-law in the city since she married and who migrated in the late 1990s. Her mother-in-law happens to be vocal on voting decisions. When her mother-in-law said, "Let's vote for this one," she would always say, "Okay, let's go for that one." But her real decision was made based on what was on the news and pamphlets delivered during the election period:

> When you get into the polling place, [your actual voting decision] cannot be seen. I'm supposed to choose what I want. [But in front of my mother-in-law,] I just say 'Yeah, let's vote for the one,' even though I do not like [the candidate].

Thus, pretending to conform protects her from the possible unwanted consequence of negative assessment about her "doing the daughter-in-law."

As we have seen, whether it is conforming or non-conforming, voting practice is experienced as a family affair, where women showcase their political compliance with the key members of the family, thus "doing gender" in the Korean family. Consequently, in the case of non-conforming, some women face more than minor adverse consequences. Ciara's first voting experience illustrates an extreme response that women may experience in the case of non-conforming. Again, we need to put the voting practice within the larger context of family life. Ciara's marriage life has been difficult. She knew that it was the second marriage for her husband, but she did not know that his ex-wife, also a marriage migrant from China, had run away due to domestic violence. It was only after she heard from her neighbor saying, "Why you married a man like that?" that she made sense of his verbal abuse whenever she tried to go against his will. During the first five years of her marriage, she could not have a social life outside of the home because her husband thought she would run away. It took her nine years to become a citizen because her husband did not want the process to begin. She said, "When his first wife got Korean citizenship already they always fought. He said, 'I know that you only

need Korean citizenship, that's why you married a Korean.'" A year before her first time to vote in 2014, she had to stay at her friend's house with her son for two weeks because her husband refused to let them in, blaming her for being late to prepare for dinner. When asked how she decided who to vote for, Ciara replied, "The person that I want is what my husband doesn't want. (laughs) If I would not vote for the person who he likes, last time he got drunk and went outside of our house and started yelling. Kind of like that."

While the case of Ciara may sound extreme, the expectation to conform to the political decisions of husbands or parents-in-law clearly exists. Analyn, who is the president of the co-ethnic organization in the province, had a quarrel with her husband during the general election campaign period in 2014 because he wanted to "dictate" her decision. When asked why she felt she was being "dictated" to, Analyn replied, "He shouted, 'Vote [for] the person I told you, he's the best blah blah blah… That man [you chose] is corrupt; never vote for him, understand?' He will repeat what he said almost every day before the election." Analyn did not follow her husband's choice and decided on the candidate based on her own research. However, after 13 years of marriage, she is still under such conforming pressure.

Marriage migrants' perceptions of political ignorance can be heavily influenced by their submissive position within the family, as they will always feel "less authentic," regardless of how well informed or adapted they are. Such was the case for Nicole, who is the leader of a small self-help group of about 15 Filipinas in her neighborhood in the city. Nicole has never questioned her husband's choice since she became a regular voter in the early 2000s. When asked why she follows her husband's decisions, she replied:

> Nicole: My answer is very simple. I believe that my husband knows well in choosing an effective candidate.
>
> Interviewer: Why do you believe so?

> Nicole: It's my option and decision to follow what's my husband's principles in selecting a candidate. Yes I am a Korean citizen now but I was not born as a Korean but my husband will *always be an authentic citizen of Korea*. He knows more than me his fellow Koreans. [emphasis added]

Nicole has been living with her parents-in-law since her marriage. She was working as an industrial trainee at the time of her marriage, but quit to take care of her father-in-law, who suffered paralysis after a stroke for two years until he passed away. She stopped sending money to her family in the Philippines after getting married because she thought it is what most Korean women did. The reason she has only one child was also to follow the contemporary Korean family practice of having just one or two children, while her siblings in the Philippines have six or eight children. Her first advice to those younger marriage migrants in her group is to "follow your mother-in-law and then your family, you serve your husband." However, for Nicole, she is still not an "authentic" Korean citizen who can make political decisions on her own, even though she has followed "all [of] the Korean traditions" for almost 20 years of her life in Korea.

Independent decision-making: Contesting and Renegotiation

As the term 'bargain' implies, patriarchal bargain bears the possibility of being "contested, redefined, and renegotiated" (Kandiyoti 1988:286) when the terms of bargaining change. Studies show that changing social contexts surrounding patriarchal arrangements (Hutson 2001) and struggles for the marginalized groups to advance their status in existing hierarchy (Herzog and Yahia-Younis 2007) can bring about renegotiation of the terms of bargaining. This also applies to Filipina marriage migrants who acquired citizenship status, thus experienced significant transition from non-citizen to citizen.

White and colleagues (2008) argue that immigrant voting is largely a function of exposure to the host country's political system. When this exposure is combined with the

changing terms of bargaining, Filipina marriage migrants engage in contestation and renegotiation regarding their voting decisions. Some women experienced the transition by being exposed either directly to the candidates who run for election, or indirectly through broader political practices. Women's contestation and renegotiation were observable in both urban and rural areas.

Women who had direct encounters with the candidates said that they voted for the person, even if the choice did not match with their husbands. Grace, who lives in Southern County, chose the presidential candidate she had met and with whom she had shook hands. It was when she visited the National Assembly members' office building for her percussion performance using a traditional Korean instrument. The percussion group was run by the MFSC in the province where she had actively participated back then. When talking about her voting choice, which was against the dominant political orientation of the province and her husband, she lowered her voice as her husband was at home during the interview:

> Interviewer: How do you decide who to vote for?
>
> Grace: I asked the baby's dad. I do not know the candidates very well, what kind of person they are. But I met Park Geun-Hye[28], the [current] president, in person. It was while ago.
>
> Interviewer: How did you meet her?
>
> Grace: Through the Center [MFSC]. We went to the National Assembly with our percussion team. Yes, I've been there. Back then we were even sent to the National Assembly [by the Center]. It was quite interesting. I met Park Geun-Hye, the president, and we had a handshake. (…) Back then she was a congresswoman. (…) We also met Ahn Cheol-Soo[29], he was there too. So I asked [my husband] "Dasol's daddy, who will you choose as the president?" (suddenly lowering her voice) President Park Geun-Hye is not favored in the province. [The husband said] he will not choose Park Geun-Hye. "Okay, I'll just do it myself." I voted for the President Park. (laughs) She's good looking and I met her in person, so I should. Others, well, I haven't met them.

Grace's direct encounter with a politician happened during her first visit to the National

28 The 18th president who started her term in 2013.

29 A politician who resigned his candidacy in the 18th presidential election in 2012.

Assembly building, which is at least four hours away from her province by bus. Although the performance itself did not involve political activity, it was part of a show put together by one of the national assembly members to celebrate multiculturalism. The experience had a positive impact on her political awareness, as it took place in the heart of congressional politics, and also with famous politicians participating.

Grace's story echoes Lovely's, who chose a politician whom she met directly. Lovely is an active participant in a co-ethnic self-help group in her neighborhood, which is affiliated with the government community office located in Big City. She attended several events for marriage migrants organized by the District Office through her self-help group and took notice of the politician's presence. Lovely, who divorced her Korean husband and recently remarried with a foreign national, seems to have clear criteria when it comes to choosing candidates:

> Lovely: I'm voting for whom I like. I like the, before he's a mayor [the head of a ward office] here in Gang-dong neighborhood, I really liked to vote for him because he is thinking about *damunhwa* (Korean translation of multicultural).
>
> Interviewer: How did you know that he thinks about *damunhwa*?
>
> Loverly: Because after he's in his position, the District Office, I think they're giving lots of [benefits], you can learn everything for free. ... He's really nice. You know, every time if there's a problem with *damunhwa*, he's there. We met him personally in one table because of the typhoon Yolanda. He gave us, who's affected by the typhoon, he gave us money.

Lovely could not remember which party the candidate was affiliated with. However, she remembered clearly that the candidate was present at various programs and events for the marriage migrants, which she figured out while attending all of those, as she was recruited by her self-help group.

A few Filipinas experienced a transition from relying on their husbands or parents-in-law to using a reference outside of the family. Once they start to think that they "know better," they begin not to defer to the decisions of the husbands or parents-in-law. Marjorie, who is the

president of the co-ethnic organization in her city, has become very active in her community since she started a small gathering of Filipinos at the Catholic Church in the late 2000s. The group evolved into an organization of more than 220 Filipino members, and through volunteering in the organization, she quickly became connected to some other Korean NGOs in her community. However, it was only until she was diagnosed with depression in the early 2000s that she decided to go out and become involved in community activities. With a disabled husband who only had sporadic unstable jobs and three children, she concentrated on earning money to stay out of the cold during winter, and not to borrow money for her babies' milk. Marjorie became a citizen in the early 2000s and has casted a vote for every election since:

> Marjorie: My husband told me who to vote [for]. (laughs) He felt good that I became a Korean citizen. [He said,] "Now, you have to vote, let's vote." So I have voted without exception.
>
> Interviewer: Your husband told you who's good.
>
> Marjorie: Yes, he would tell me. But now I *know better*.
>
> Interviewer: How do you decide now then?
>
> Marjorie: You know, the Saenuri Party is strong in this Daegu-Gyeongbuk region. I know that, so I go for the Saenuri Party. Now I'm also looking into the Democratic Party, as well. [emphasis added]

Getting involved in community activities provided Marjorie with "firsthand" experience, which enhanced her perception of "knowing better," thus enabling her to make her own decisions.

In addition, some women became interested in politics along the way. Such was also the case for Erin, who showed the most active form of formal political participation – running for office – among respondents. Erin migrated and married in 1991 before international marriages kicked into high gear in the late 1990s. In her 24th year since arrival, she ran for a city council seat during the 2014 General Election. However, her independent voting decisions and political activism did not develop right away. She said, "For the earlier time I used to just

vote [for] the person my husband would think the best … But now I listen to the discussion and try to figure out who's the deserving candidate, I mean the reliable and able one to pursue what is best for the people and the country." In fact, her early marriage was a struggle with poverty and domestic violence. She recalled an accident where her husband became bed-ridden for several months as a turning point that ended the struggle. Her husband finally let her work outside the home. She took a teaching job at a private English academy, raising her salary year by year until she started her own academy in 2001. It was when she became "financially and socially stable" that she turned her eyes to other marriage migrants and migrant workers. She became involved in helping migrant workers with labor disputes and translating for marriage migrants. When I asked her what motivated her to be active in volunteer activism, she responded:

> Erin: I got angry as I got to know more. If I'd rather stay ignorant, I would think, "Well, this is the way it is." When I knew nothing about Korea, my husband or other people around me would say, "You should do this and that in Korea." I was like, "Oh yes, I should follow." However, as we learn things more, we get to think about things like human rights and what we can do about it. We deserve so much more than this. I felt like we are just being controlled.
>
> Interviewer: Being controlled?
>
> Erin: Yes. All things should be transparent but they [Koreans] let certain things open and hide others. You get to realize it as time goes by. Then it pisses me off.

Erin's feeling of exclusion in accessing "how things work" has been extended to "people in positions from governor, mayor, representatives, councils" and "the [incumbent] Party" as she navigates and interacts with various local institutions while engaging in volunteer activism. Her desire to be involved in making decisions that matter to them led her to choose her own candidates, and ultimately to run for a position herself.

Exposure to the host country's political system is not the only path to independent voting behavior. In some cases, prior political socialization and a high educational level initiated political activism, leading to more exposure to the new political system (Jones-Correa

1998). For Freya and her husband, political socialization happened in a two-way process, which is different from the usual dynamics between Korean husbands and Filipinas with citizenship observed among the other marriage migrant couples in this study. As a president of one of the largest and oldest Filipino organizations, Freya had been recruited for a presidential election campaign as a representative of the Filipino community by a congresswoman, who is a naturalized Korean with a Filipino background. Freya has a relatively lower level of Korean fluency, compared to others who have arrived at the same time. Her husband can speak English, and she mostly uses English at work. However, the language barrier did not hinder her from "educating" her husband, who used to vote for the "famous one":

> As far as my observation is concerned, the wives follow the decision of the husband, the husband said, "you should follow because of blah blah blah," but for me, no. Relax, we should study first, what are their [politicians'] platform in the government? First my husband did not understand what platform is. "Okay, it's a program, he or she should follow this program because he or she promises that this program will be rendered to the people."

She would ask her husband about the candidates' platform and they would decide whom to vote for together. She emphasized her education in law, which included the subject of political law to legitimize her emphasis on a candidate's platform over the popularity vote. Her experience in working as a district secretary for a congresswoman back in the Philippines also offset her language barrier.

CONCLUSION

Contrary to the assumption of extant studies on immigrant political incorporation, whether one acquires citizenship and votes cannot itself indicate immigrants' understanding and internalization of the host country's political system, especially in the marriage migration context. As we have seen in this chapter, marriage migrants' naturalization and voting decisions are realized in the context of them engaging in bargaining with patriarchy in an attempt to

negotiate their legitimate space in Korean society through membership in the Korean family.

While the process of marital naturalization requires dependency on husbands by definition, this required dependency creates a power imbalance within the family, where women are subject to constant assessment of their daily behavior, according to the gender norms and expectations of the Korean Confucius patriarchy. Women are under pressure to conform to such norms and expectations, even to make the process begin. Women's eligibility for citizenship is often decided by their husbands or in-laws, based on whether they conform or not. As a result, women experience citizenship as a reward or incentive for accommodating and acquiescing to set of gendered rules and scripts in the Korean family rather than as a basic right they are entitled to through civic learning and commitment.

After the required dependency that ends with citizenship acquisition, women's voting decisions show two trajectories of continued dependency and independent decision-making. I found the patriarchal bargain framework to be valid in explaining both trajectories. Women's conforming (or fake conforming) voting behavior was in line with their other daily conduct and decisions in the family, which was to follow the male and in-laws' authority; thus, voting decisions are made as a part of being a deferential wife or daughter-in-law. This can be understood both as women strategizing to make the best of given circumstances, which I refer to as gendered political opportunity structure and resources, as women realize limited positions of power available to them. On the other hand, some other women make independent voting decisions as they acquire citizenship when they have direct or indirect exposure to Korean politics or strong prior political socialization experiences in the Philippines. This demonstrates that women engage in contestation and renegotiation as the terms of bargaining with patriarchy change.

CHAPTER 4. CHALLENGING OR CONFORMING? VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Feminist scholars have tried to broaden the conventional definitions of political participation in Western democracies, which are centered around formal interactions between citizens and the state. They contend that the narrow scope of politics is based on privileged male citizens' experiences. They argue for reconstructing the concept of public space – because the personal is political – and acknowledging informal forms of participation (Fraser 1990; Jones 1990; Lister 1997). In fact, as Stall and Stoecker (1998:732) point out, grass-roots community organizing takes place in the neighborhood, which is "not as isolated as the family, and its networks include secondary as well as primary relationships." Thus, the community can also be a public sphere place. In a similar vein, recent studies on immigrant political participation have documented the growing importance of community-based grass-roots participation among immigrants who do not necessarily engage in formal politics (Ginieniewicz 2010; Landolt and Goldring 2009; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). These studies differ from previous studies that found the value of ethnic community organizations in their function as a vehicle for immigrants to enter a host country's formal politics (Bloemraad 2006; Fennema and Tillie 2001). Instead, they view immigrant community organizing and grass-roots movements as political participation outcomes.

In line with these studies, I approach ethnic voluntary associational activities of Filipina marriage migrants as informal forms of political participation. Invoking the concept of a "subaltern counterpublic" where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses and practices (Fraser 1990), I comparatively examine ethnic voluntary associational activities of Filipina marriage migrants in urban and rural areas in this chapter. Through my comparison, I try to demonstrate conditions that promote or hinder the development of Filipinas' voluntary associational activities, using characteristics of

counterpublic.

Scholars acknowledge both cooperative and confrontational relationships between civil society and government (Foley and Edwards 1996; Paxton 2002). Focusing on the latter aspect of associational life, Fraser proposes the term "subaltern counterpublic" to refer to associations that function as an alternative public sphere. In subaltern counterpublics, marginalized social groups undertake communicative processes with their own voices and languages "to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs" (Fraser 1990:67). Fraser argues that the presence of these competing counterpublics is important to remedy in part the participatory disparities caused by social inequalities along gender, class, race, and ethnic lines in dominant public spheres, such as parliamentary politics.

Studies on the political functions of immigrant associations support their compensatory role as members of ethnic minorities are expected to become better prepared to participate in the host country politics through associations (Bloemraad 2006; De Graauw 2008; Fennema and Tillie 2001; Jacobs and Tillie 2004). In addition, studies on immigrants' participation in social movements suggest that ethnic associations also function as a counterpublic to the dominant public, which can lead to confrontational political participation from their members (Klandermans, Toorn, and Stekelenburg 2008; Martinez 2008; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). Recent studies show that local contexts with heightened group boundaries between immigrants and natives (Okamoto and Ebert 2010) or large immigrant populations and ethnic organizations (Martinez 2008) have a positive influence on immigrants' protest participation. These studies suggest that such local contexts would promote counterpublic characteristics of ethnic associations. Yet these studies lack an explanation of how immigrants' gendered membership in the host society's local communities can influence counterpublic functions of ethnic associations. In the case of Filipina marriage migrants who are incorporated

into reconsolidated patriarchy by the state and Korean families, associations function as "spaces of withdrawal and regroupment" (Fraser 1990:68) from the dominant public. These spaces can enable them to create and disseminate critical discourse and practices within their local communities, depending on the characteristics of their gendered local community membership.

I concentrate on the influence of local context on Filipina marriage migrants' voluntary associational life, focusing on the role gender plays in the development of counterpublic associational activities. I argue that higher community surveillance over Filipina marriage migrants align with gender norms in rural areas, whereas cities provide local jobs and institutions accessible to women that can challenge gender norms. These regional differences lead to different patterns of participation on the individual level and divergent membership characteristics, organizational ties, and types of activities. Filipinas in urban and rural areas share similar experiences over the course of naturalization and voting, both requiring limited and sporadic commitment that could be confined by family influence (Chapter 3). Yet participating in voluntary associations requires a regular investment of one's time, money, and energy outside of the family. In this chapter, I first demonstrate the diverging paths of Filipinas' associational life in urban and rural areas. The participatory capacity of individual Filipinas was higher in urban areas. Furthermore, ethnic voluntary associational activities that resembled a subaltern counterpublic were only observable in urban areas. I then detail how different gendered local contexts lead to these divergent paths. I focus on the gendered local labor market's integration of women and the characteristics of community membership.

DIVERGING PATHS

Filipina marriage migrants' participation in voluntary associational activities in urban and rural areas demonstrate different patterns on both individual and organizational levels. At

the individual level, women who are members of associations in urban areas tend to have more available time and financial independence to participate in associational activities than those in rural areas. At the organizational level, associations in urban areas orient their activities toward individual rights, challenging the dominant social categorization of marriage migrant women as members of 'multicultural family.' In contrast, associations in rural areas employ a family-based approach which reinforce marriage migrants' gender roles as wife, daughter-in-law, and mother.

Participatory capacity of Filipinas

According to the National Survey of Multicultural Families (MOGEF 2013), Filipina marriage migrants show the highest rate of participation in co-ethnic gatherings compared to other marriage migrant groups. While the national average for all female marriage migrants was 52.7%, 76.3% of Filipina marriage migrants said they have participated in co-ethnic gatherings. The rate was higher in the rural areas (78.48%) compared to urban areas (75.54%), according to the survey. My data also shows that more women in rural areas have membership in co-ethnic voluntary associations than those in urban areas[30]. Based on these figures, one might think that women in rural areas are more actively participating in such associations. Yet closer examination of women's participation reveals a different picture.

While more than 80% of my respondents in rural areas have membership in co-ethnic voluntary associations, those not in leadership positions identified themselves as "inactive" members. For most rural women in my study, organizational participation was limited to attending a yearly event. Attending regular monthly meetings for informal self-help is difficult for rural women mainly due to their farming schedules. In fact, during my fieldwork it was

[30] 81.8% of rural women (27/33) have membership in co-ethnic voluntary associations whereas 62.5% (35/56) of urban women were members of such associations.

difficult to make interview appointments with these women during the peak farming season, and these appointments were often rescheduled. In contrast, while a smaller proportion of urban Filipinas (62.5%) held membership in voluntary associations, members attended organizational activities more frequently. For example, women reported regular attendance at meetings even when they did not hold leadership positions. As urban associations had more members who could attend meetings and events, they were more proactive in organizing regular programs and applying for stable funding opportunities.

The act of registering associations with the government for funding is illustrative of the differences in members' availability. One of the rural associations in this study gave up on registering as a non-governmental organization at the County Office. Although the County Office offered associations the opportunity to be registered and receive subsidies for activities, this group could not take advantage of the opportunity due to lack of active members to handle the administrative work. Analyn, the president of the association—formed in 2011 with about 50 members—explained the association's reasons for not pursuing the County Office's funding opportunity:

> Analyn: We once considered registering [at the County Office] but I said I'm not going to do it [to other members] because it's stressful. … At least one person needs to be willing to handle related matters, I need to assign someone these tasks, but I can't. If there's only one person who takes responsibility, that person needs to be responsible until the end. If I apply to register as a president when there's no one else, I really need to keep this going [on my own] until the end. So I said I won't do it. There was no one else who was willing to do the job so I didn't [apply]. … I don't want to be bothered because I'm responsible for my family, and we're in a tough situation. I need to take care of my mother [in the Philippines]. … Her health is not good so I always need to send money and buy her medicines. It would be uncomfortable to handle [the association] if we were registered. … My husband also told me to focus on our family and not to care too much about others.
>
> Interviewer: Would your association have been funded if you applied and registered?
>
> Analyn: Yes, they [the County Office] would have granted us some funding. Not sure about the exact amount but the County Office gives associations like ours about several

million won.

Interviewer: That could be a lot to handle.

Analyn: It could be a nuisance, how to spend the budget and so on. And people would have many things to say, so I didn't want to take the responsibility.

Members of the association agreed that receiving government money involves lots of work that the group may not have been able to effectively handle. Gabriel, a former president of the association, was also skeptical about the capacity to handle additional funds:

> If you have to enter these kinds of programs and activities, especially [ones that involve] the government, if you have to get the budget from the government, it's not really easy because you have to create your own activities. Aside from that, using public money is not as easy as you would think. So you have to prepare a lot. … I didn't jump to the conclusion [to register].

Having served as an officer of the youth organization in her village in the Philippines, where she organized events for village festivals in collaboration with the local government, Gabriel had a sense of what it took to create the association's regular programs and handle subsidies from the government. She also didn't want to take sole responsibility for the consequences of registration. Another member of the association who closely observed the process explained why the association ended up not applying to register, saying that "the leadership is so weak because there are no other people to support."

Meanwhile, urban associations have actively tried to register for local government funding, although they have often failed. For example, one of the urban associations was rejected by the city hall because they did not serve marriage migrant women of multiple nationalities. Since its inception in 2006, this association has organized several regular programs including seasonal sports tournaments and an Independence Day festival. The association also has a group of active members who have taken turns serving as officers and sharing administrative responsibilities with the president. Another urban association eventually succeeded in registering at the local Tax Office as a legal entity. This association also has a

group of active members who can not only attend regular meetings and programs, but also take on more responsibility as officers.

Diverging organizational characteristics

The majority of voluntary associations (14 out of 15) that I examined in both rural and urban areas, even religious organizations and informal self-help groups, identified their primary purposes as providing mutual support, promoting societal integration, and celebrating Filipino culture. Yet despite this similarity, urban and rural associations exhibit distinct approaches to activities, membership compositions, networks, and affiliations (Figure 1). I focus specifically on these differences to better understand how the local context shapes women's participatory citizenship.



Figure 1. Different characteristics of voluntary associations in rural and urban areas

The differences between urban and rural voluntary associations can be summarized by the divide between individual rights-based approaches in urban areas and family harmony-

based approaches in rural areas. Membership in associations that take the individual rights-based approach is open to Filipina migrants of all statuses, including undocumented women, and sometimes male Filipino migrants as well. Their networks include activists engaged in multiple levels of organizing, ranging from local and national Korean women's and migrant movement organizations to transnational migrant movement organizations. On the other hand, rural associations restrict membership only to Filipinas with marriage migrant status and their Korean family members. They are connected primarily with government-run institutions, such as the MFSC or religious institutions, particularly the Unification Church.

In the rural area where I conducted research there were only a few known cases of 'runaway' wives. In comparison, stories of divorce or failed marriages were not uncommon for my urban respondents. Consequently, associations in the urban area frequently deal with such cases. Marilyn, a vice president of a newly formed urban association, is a divorcee herself. She explained that members of the association are mostly young marriage migrants who are "battered wives:"

> Most of this group asks about, for example, divorce, like battered wives. And how they could live here in Korea, what they would have to do, their lifestyle here, and how, for example, some of the women have problems with husbands. So we give advice. … And we advise to unite the family. We say 'don't do this' 'we should be like this, like that' but if the woman is really, you know, the husband could really not be handled, me, I have my own experience. So, I truly like, you know, we have the choice to be happy. You don't need to be like 'oh well, things will be alright.' Life is too short.

The association provides members with assistance regarding the process of divorce and introduces job opportunities for those who became undocumented after separating from their husbands. Since the government-funded marriage migrant institutions such as the MFSCs rarely assist with divorce procedures or serve undocumented migrant women, the association provides an alternative space that creates discourse and practices for migrant women as individuals rather than as members of Korean families.

In a society where married women's sacrifices and endurance have been traditionally valued and imposed on marriage migrants as norms and expectations (Chapter 1), the "choice to be happy" and idea that "life is too short" clearly counter the dominant public discourse toward female marriage migrants. Marilyn, who divorced her Korean husband and remarried a retired American army soldier, could not find her space in the official category of 'multicultural family,' which refers to a family composed of Korean spouses and (mostly female) marriage migrants. So instead of joining another organization formed around the multicultural family, she created a new one:

> I'm different, my husband is American. I have no Korean husband. So when you say *damunhwa* (multicultural) it is for [those who] married Koreans. How could I continue that? Multicultural, you're married to a Korean, I'm not. With Korean citizenship, I could have done it [joined other organizations], but spouse, no. I was [in multicultural family], but not at the present. If I wanted to [join other organizations], why not, but it complicates so much. … I could be maybe a battered wife. That's the thing I want. No more else. When you were hit by your husband, abused, that's the thing I want to handle.

For Marilyn, the association is an alternative space for her identity, apart from what was available to her in Korean society.

Securing the residency rights of marriage migrant women as individuals was also the reason why Freya mobilized Filipina marriage migrants back in 2001. Several Filipina marriage migrants were afraid of addressing domestic violence problems as their residency status was at stake. They contacted Freya, who was then the leader of a group consisting mostly of Filipino migrant workers. Freya decided to organize a group of Filipinas to advocate for the residency rights of marriage migrants who had become victims of domestic violence. They fought for the right to address domestic violence without the fear of losing their right to stay in Korea after their marriages are dissolved. Women gathered and formed one of the oldest and largest urban voluntary associations. The association submitted a petition signed by 116 members to the Embassy of the Philippines, challenging the Korean Nationality Law which unconditionally

denied the residency rights of marriage migrants whose marriages were dissolved. The petition was sent to the Department of Justice by the Philippine ambassador to Korea. Freya, who has been the president of the association since then, believed the petition was at least partially responsible for the law's reform in 2004.

Transnational ties, which were also a distinctly urban feature, provided members of associations with the opportunity to think of themselves beyond the national context. Jennifer, the president of an association that is affiliated with a transnational activist network called Action Network for Marriage Migrants' Rights and Empowerment(AMORRE)[31], visited Japan through an exchange visit program organized by AMMORE. Jennifer explained the purpose of the visit:

> The purpose of our exchange program was to get to know the life of Filipino marriage migrants in Japan. We compared how we live to what their problems are, their struggles, their benefits in Japan. … Filipino leaders [of AMORRE] passed a resolution. If there is one immigration law in Korea that's good, they can pass a resolution in Japan. What good immigration law we found in Japan, we can also pass a resolution [in Korea].

At the forum that took place during the exchange visit, Jennifer learned that marriage migrants in Korea have less difficulty acquiring citizenship than those in Japan. "In Japan, even though marriage migrants acquire permanent visas, when their spouse passes away their visa will be cut off if they don't have any children. So they try to find another man to give them a visa." Jennifer and other members heard stories of fellow Filipina marriage migrants in Japan who fought against the Japanese government for their rights and their children's rights to be fully accepted as Japanese citizens even after dissolved marriages. Thus, they witnessed that the neighboring country's laws and policies could support contentious claims to secure migrant rights in the host country. When asked what the association gained through the exchange visit,

31 AMMORE is a network of organizations and individuals advocating for the rights of marriage migrants. It has 23 member organizations including grassroots marriage migrant organizations in Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Australia.

Jennifer answered that she and her colleagues learned "to fight for our marriage migrants' rights and to learn from each other's lives in other countries." While the members of this association had no direct experience confronting the Korean government, transnational ties gave them the indirect experience of fighting for marriage migrants' rights and potential repertoires of contention.

Unlike in urban associations, the activities of rural associations are focused on securing a women's place and protection within the family, thereby incorporating her into the larger community. The rural case of the Korean-Filipino Family Association illustrates this point well. The association was formed independently, and its members include women from several neighboring rural provinces. Yet it is affiliated with the MFSC in the province where the majority of its members reside. Although the association is also affiliated with the Embassy of the Philippines, the MFSC has overwhelming influence on its operations. The MFSCs are government-run organizations that have a clear focus on incorporating marriage migrant women into Korean families rather than serving them as individuals (Chapter 1). Thus, strong connection with the MFSC results in family-focused activities. While relying on financial and technical support from the MFSC, the association is compelled to act within certain boundaries. For example, the 2014 Filipino Day event, which is an annual event hosted by the association to celebrate the Independence Day of the Philippines, became one of the family education programs of the Healthy Family Support Center (HFSC).[32] The same foundation directs and operates the HFSC and the MFSC. The MFSC provided an art instructor who introduced the

[32] The Multicultural Family Support Center in the province is jointly run with the Healthy Family Support Center (HFSC) by the same private foundation. Thus, the HFSC is also a government organization which was established by the Framework Act on Healthy Families implemented in 2005. There are 152 centers nationwide that focus on family education, counselling, childcare support programs, etc. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, which supervises both the Multicultural Family Support Center and the Healthy Family Support Center, plan to integrate the two centers starting in 2017. The province where my fieldwork took place was one of the trial cases for early integration.

program. Then Filipinas and their Korean family members talked about their dreams and goals for the future. At the end of the event, all participants had to take photos with a placard reading "Family Recreation Program hosted by the Healthy Family Support Center" and fill out a survey evaluating the program by the Center. The association wanted to subdue the festive nature of the event following the Sewol ferry tragedy[33]. Yet the change was governed by the resources accessible through the MFSC.

The Unification Church (UC) also influences the familial orientation of the rural association's activities. The UC has been the major channel for international marriage arrangements between Filipinas and rural Korean men since the late 1990s (Lee 2008). Filipinas who continued to attend the Church after migrating to Korea through the UC formed a nationwide voluntary association called the Philippine Women's Association in Korea in 2001. The name of the association was changed to the Philippine Blessed Missionaries in Korea (PBMK) in 2011 and registered under the UC. As the founder of the association, Louise explains that their purpose is to educate those who have received "holy blessing" – referring to marriage in the Church – without a "deep understanding" of the purpose of their marriage:

> So our goal was to continuously educate them so that they can maintain the life of faith and they can maintain their family life. We also fear that they may separate [from their husbands] because of difficulty in language and culture. So we try to keep them tight, educate them. During those years, we go on lecture tours almost every year giving them the Divine Principle chapter one through sixteen because some of them just read three or four important parts. They miss a lot of the chapters. … Many of us who were part of the blessing ceremonies until 2005 really had difficulty dealing with the families. Some of them separate, divorce, or run away.

The core tenet of the Divine Principle—the main theological textbook of the UC—is the creation and preservation of an ideal family (Minjeong Kim 2008:141). Based on this belief, a group of active Filipina UC members including Louise mobilized Filipinas who were scattered

33 The ferry named 'Sewol' sank on April 16 in 2014, killing 304 people. Those killed were mostly high school students on a field trip to Jeju Island. In the weeks and months following the tragedy, public concerts and festivals were scaled down or cancelled.

in the local churches to help each other adapt to a new country and promote "an ideal family." They elected regional coordinators and national officers. The PBMK currently provides counselling and education services regarding family issues to 2,000 members nationwide.

The influence of the UC and the PBMK among rural Filipinas has been more significant than that of other relatively recently formed associations due to its substantial history in the area. As Minjeong Kim (2008:155) demonstrates, the UC "had been the only place where Filipinas could meet fellow Filipinas" in the rural province for a long time, and thus "provided a place for them to create a social community based on the common ground." Not all Filipino-Korean couples maintain contact with the UC after marriage, and some respondents who got married through the Church were actively against it due to differing religious beliefs and worldviews. Yet the UC has maintained its influence among Filipinas mainly through various voluntary associational activities with the PBMK. Gabriel, a regional coordinator of the PBMK in a rural province, has attended various PBMK programs with colleagues, often in a neighboring city. The programs range from cultural activities such as singing and dancing competitions or English speech contests for children, to more religious ones including seminars and education programs. The latter are, as Louise explained, focused on promoting a healthy family. Gabriel explains how membership in the UC and the PBMK have helped her overcome hardships in her marriage life:

> I cannot live in Korea without the principles of church because it's not easy to live in Korea, [There's a] Different language, different culture, different everything. Our church teaches us to develop relationships with our husbands. We need to develop our families. Family is what's most important. We formed a family in Korea with true love. … I heard that Koreans prefer marrying those who believe in the Unification Church because the Church does not allow divorce based on principle. … We had difficulty when we came here first, but we always served our mothers-in-law and fathers-in-law. Filial piety, you have to obey parents. So Koreans have very strong filial piety, and I respect that. We also learned that from the Unification Church. So our husbands have this filial piety culture and we have to obey.

While not every rural member of the UC and the PBMK are dedicated believers like Gabriel, their participation is oriented towards maintaining good family relationships and conforming to the norms of Korean patriarchy.

GENDERED CONTEXT OF RECEPTION: COMMUNITY LEVEL ANALYSIS

In approaching citizenship as a practice rather than a set of legal entitlements, studies on migrants' citizenship have pointed out the importance of membership in local communities of citizens to access and exercise rights (Basok 2004; Baubock 2003; Uitermark, Rossi, and Van Houtum 2005). Extending the community-level analysis to the puzzle of Filipina marriage migrants' divergent voluntary associational life in the urban and rural areas, I incorporate the insight of gendered citizenship scholarship. As Yuval-Davis (1999; 2006) argues, citizenship practice is mediated by one's membership in various collectivities located at multiple levels–local, national, supra-national–which intersect with one's social position in terms of class, gender, sexuality, etc. Thus, I focus on how gendered community membership in urban and rural areas accounts for women's voluntary associational activities. The diverging patterns of voluntary associational life I find in this study cannot be explained by individual human capital or national context alone. Women's average age and the length of their stay in an urban or rural area does not differ significantly in this study.[34] Past studies have marked those two variables among others as important indicators of immigrants' political participation (White et al. 2008). These demographic similarities between rural and urban marriage migrants also indicate that women's lives are mostly parallel in terms of childrearing responsibilities.[35] A child's infancy usually hinders a woman's activities outside of her family. The supposed effect of education

[34] Average time since arrival is 11.31 and 11 years and average age is 38.7 and 38 in the city and the province, respectively.

[35] Filipina marriage migrants in this study tend to have their first baby within less than two years.

on association participation was mainly overridden by the differential access to job opportunities available in communities.

In order to account for gendered community membership and its influence on women's associational life, I adopt Somers (1993)'s institutional and relational analysis of variations in community's capacity for associational life. In her study of emerging modern citizenship rights in eighteenth century England, Somers argued that an association's capacity and citizen participation were greater in pastoral industrial communities than in arable communities. According to Somers, this trend emerged due to higher degrees of political autonomy and community solidarity in the former, resulting from unique residential arrangements and family practices. I found that the capacity for associational life is higher among urban women compared to rural women, due to higher autonomy and less gender policing. Although women in both urban and rural areas live under similar norms of Korean patriarchy in their families, their negotiations with gendered norms were articulated differently. Urban women respondents were integrated into the gendered local labor market of English language instruction. This employment niche provided them better ground for negotiation due to financial independence and improved status within their families. Rural women respondents were integrated into the gendered local labor market of farming and low-skilled service work, which did not improve their status and often confined them within the boundaries of the family. Living in a small and tightly-knit rural community also means that women are more prone to community members' gender policing of their behavior, thus hampering free and autonomous associational life outside the socially recognized category of the 'multicultural family.'

Gendered local job markets and participatory capacity

Extant studies have documented an overall positive relationship between women's participation in the workforce and political engagement. Paid work provides women with

political resources including civic skills, independent earnings, and social contacts for potential recruitment that result in better integration of women in the political system (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2008; Orloff 1993; Togeby 1994). Yet a closer examination reveals that the relationship is not uniformly positive as effects differ based on the type of work and experiences gained (Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1999). Immigrant women who start with no pre-existing resources in the host country are particularly affected by job disparities (Hagan 1998). For example, Hagan examines how gendered labor market integration of Maya female migrants into private-household domestic work confines their physical presence within the workplace. Hagan finds that domestic work thus hinders their participation in co-ethnic voluntary associations. On the other hand, Maya men, who were mostly employed in retail businesses, participated actively in voluntary associations. Mayan men's participation eventually facilitated their political incorporation to the host country.

The link between the type of work and the level of involvement in voluntary associations was clearly observed through a comparison between urban and rural areas. Financial independence and improvement of the status of Filipinas in the family through their work was only observable in women in English teaching positions or other office jobs, which were concentrated in urban areas (see Table 4 below). Filipina marriage migrants who take on English teaching jobs are often integrated into the English teaching labor market as "secondary" labor to native English speakers within a dual labor market framework (Park 2011). Their jobs are secondary because they are characterized by underemployment and instability. This characterization stems from prevalent nonstandard employment relations such as part-time, temporary, and independent contract work (Kalleberg and Sorenson 1979; Kalleberg 2003). Women's gender and ethnicity/nationality are at play in such labor market positioning. English teaching jobs accessible for Filipinas in urban areas can be largely categorized as care work,

involving teaching and/or nursing children in the daycare or kindergarten using the English language and sometimes helping teachers who are native English speakers. In the case of English instruction jobs involving schoolchildren, it often means working in an afterschool class or assistant teaching position at the international school. Responsibilities include bus monitoring and helping the main teacher who is a native English speaker, as well as disciplining children. Women cope with underemployment and instability by taking two or three jobs. Despite the concentration of these English teaching jobs in a more precarious secondary market, these employment opportunities nonetheless give freedom and resources to women. Their autonomy and financial resources allow urban Filipina migrants to be more involved in co-ethnic associational activities at a deeper level (e.g., organizing activities and making a regular commitment).

Meanwhile, women in the rural area are integrated mainly into farming or low-skilled service jobs such as motel cleaning or assistant nursing (see Table 4). The rural areas of South Korea have experienced drastic feminization and aging populations since the 1970s and 1980s. As export-oriented industrialization took place during this period, primary industries including agriculture and fisheries began to suffer severe labor shortages due to rural-to-urban exodus. Thus, rural women have become a major source of farm labor (Moon 1994). Integrated into the gendered labor market of farming and low-skilled service jobs, Filipinas in rural areas are often not able to gain financial independence or improve their status in the family. Studies have found that the agricultural labor of native Korean women is unacknowledged due to their primary identity as reproductive and domestic beings (Moon 1994). Similarly, Filipinas' farm labor did not improve their status within their families. Thus, it was difficult for Filipinas to have discretion over their work schedule. Farm labor also confines women's physical presence on the farm, making it difficult for them to join associational activities.

Table 4. Women's work

Occupation	Urban		Rural	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
English teaching	28	50	6	18.18
Farming	-	-	12	36.37
Interpreter/Counselor	4	7.14	2	6.06
Small/Network Business	7	12.5	-	-
Caregiver/Nurse Assistance	-	-	5	15.15
Cleaning	1	1.79	3	9.09
Factory	4	7.14	2	6.06
Researcher	1	1.79	-	-
Unemployed	11	19.64	3	9.09
Total	56	100	33	100

One might argue that urban women's higher level of education (see Table 5 below) led to more involvement in voluntary associations. This conclusion corresponds to what the political science literature tells us (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). However, I find that the types of jobs women obtain are often governed by a combination of the opportunities available in their local communities and their level of education, rather than determined by the latter alone. For instance, women who finished high school or junior college were teaching English in the city while those who had bachelor's degrees were working on the farms in the provinces. Contrary to the political participation model's primary focus on human capital (Verba et al. 1995), I find that Filipina marriage migrant's capacity to participate in voluntary associations depends on their status and degree of autonomy within the family—an institution into which they are integrated from the start. The family, in turn, influences women's integration into the differential gendered local labor markets available in rural and urban areas.

I illustrate this point through the story of two women, one in the city and one in a rural province, below.

Table 5. Level of education

Highest level of education	City		Province	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
High school	6	10.71	6	20.69
College drop out	5	8.93	7	24.14
Junior College	10	17.86	6	20.69
Bachelor	33	58.93	10	34.48
Master or above	2	3.57	-	-
Total	56	100	29	100

Anna

Anna has been living with her parents-in-law in the city since her marriage in the late 1990s. She received an allowance from her husband until she started working in the mid-2000s. Most of the respondents in this study said they were not trusted to handle the money to run the household, at least in the initial years. They received allowances from their husbands and some of them had no cell phone until they got their first job. Anna works as an English teacher, like half of Filipinas living in the urban area in this study (see Table 4). Filipinas possess distinct cultural capital within the context of 'English Fever' in Korean society, as English is one of the official languages of the Philippines along with Tagalog. In South Korea, there has been an intense emphasis on oral language proficiency in English since the 1990s (Park 2009; Lee et al. 2010). This 'English Fever' has led to a dramatic upswing in English education by native speakers both in the public and private sectors.

In fact, Anna got her first job on the street from a random Korean mom who

approached her, assuming that she would speak English: “There was one mother who approached me on the street. ‘Oh, are you a foreigner? You look like a foreigner. Would you teach English to my kids?’ Anna majored in a three-year midwifery program for her bachelor’s degree back in the Philippines, and subsequently worked at a hospital in Dubai for three and a half years using both Arabic and English. After a year of gaining experience as a private tutor, she moved to a private English academy where she has been working for eight years. Like other Filipinas in the city, Anna had relatively immediate access to job opportunities as an office worker without fluency in Korean.

Like most women who are working, especially those who teach English, Anna talks about how having gainful employment in an office job outside the family gave her greater independence and improved her familial status. This process in turn allowed her to commit regularly[36] to the Filipino Korean Spouses Association (FKSA). FKSA is one of the oldest Filipina voluntary associations, with more than 500 members mostly based in city. Anna’s mother-in-law was very controlling, and she did not support Anna gathering socially with other Filipinas before her job started. In fact, a staff director working at one of the MFSCs in the city said that Korean family members are usually not supportive of marriage migrant women’s voluntary associational activities because “husbands and other family members have negative perceptions about women’s gatherings. They think women join co-ethnic gatherings and learn bad things, receiving bad influence.” This perceived ‘bad influence’ is shared by Korean families in rural areas as well, as one of the civil servants in the rural area reported “Parents-in-law would not let the women go outside the home as much as possible even to study Korean. [They feared that] women would mingle and run away. There were many such cases among

[36] She was among one of a few members that the president of FKSA recommended as active members.

Vietnamese brides."

Anna and her mother-in-law often got into quarrels: "I had a lot of stress. Fighting, and then my mother-in-law was like, 'If you go outside and meet your friends, you should come home by five o'clock.' And when I invite my friends to my house, they [my parents-in-law] would ask 'Why are you inviting a lot of your friends, especially Filipinas? I don't understand you because you are speaking Filipino.' She disliked [me bringing Filipina friends] saying it's noisy."

However, Anna recalled that her mother-in-law started to change after she started working. Then she was not only contributing significantly to the household but also giving her allowance: "The thing I hated the most was, she would call several times [when wasn't home] and ask 'What time is it? Where are you?' … We often got into quarrels because of that. … Now it's much better. It's okay now. If we got into quarrels, she'll always give in." While she thinks she's not as active in the activities of FKSA as she would like to be because of duties involved in living with parents-in-law, she has at least managed her own schedule while she has worked as an English teacher.

Jessica

After the first three years of adjusting and raising children in a small village by the sea, Jessica has engaged in laver farming for more than six years. She graduated from a four-year college with a major in hotel restaurant management and worked as a hotel manager in Manila prior to getting married. As remote as it may seem from her former life in the Philippines, her new life near the sea, struggling with laver bed in severe cold, was seen a natural choice for Jessica because her Korean in-laws made their living off of the sea. During high summer when no hands are needed with the business, she works on the farm or repairs other families' laver

beds. In fact, farming is the most accessible work opportunity in her rural province. About 30%[37] of all households in the province engage in farming while the rate ranges from 0.1% to 3.5%[38] in the city. More than one third of the rural Filipinas in my study were engaged in farming (see Table 4). Some women also teach English, but opportunities are fairly limited as compared to the city. Therefore, among the six rural women who teach English, only two earn their main income through working as an English teacher. For the others, teaching English is only one of the many part-time jobs they do in addition to farming, motel cleaning, and serving at restaurants.

Farming is often characterized by physical isolation, intense manual labor, little or no independent monetary compensation (especially in the case of family farming), and no flexibility in work schedule. While Jessica is eager to meet fellow Filipinas, she is not a member of any associations in the province. "I don't have time to meet friends. So I don't get to meet Filipinas very often." She has tried to form regular informal gatherings with a couple of other Filipinas who live nearby, but has failed as most of them, who are also engaged in farming, find it difficult to make the time. Jessica's participation on the family farm has not particularly changed her status in the family as she was dependent on an allowance from her aunt-in-law who lives next door until she finally rebelled. It was Jessica, her husband, and her uncle-in-law who went to the sea for laver farming but the money earned from the farming all went to the aunt-in-law:

> In the Philippines, when you get married, it is the woman who has control [over the household income]. I wasn't able to do that here for years. … I fought with the baby's daddy every day because of money. Because we worked together. Am I an idiot? Of course we should take control over the money. I told him that I'll leave. … Whenever I brought up the issue, he said just wait a little longer. I waited one more year but he

37 Annual Statistics Report published by Administration and Support Division of the Provincial government in 2014.

38 Statistics Korea 2011.

> kept telling me to wait. I was like 'Okay, I'll stop asking. If I leave, then you'll be in trouble. We should split the money that we earned [from the aunt-in-law] or I'll leave.' Then my aunt-in-law came to our house and handed a bank book over to me.

It was only threatening to run away that moved her husband to let her handle the household income and budgeting after five years of their marriage.

As can be gleaned from this comparison, women's participatory capacity in voluntary associations is often determined by the type of jobs they have, which influences women's status in their families. The type of a woman's job was, in turn, governed by her communities' gendered labor market. While a woman's individual participatory capacity is governed by her job type and mediated by her familial status, characteristics of a woman's associational activities are closely related to the gendered social membership and degree of gender policing in her community.

Gendered local community membership

Local community life operates quite differentially in urban and rural settings. It is an important part of Filipina life in small rural village communities consisting of about 20 to 100 households, where everyone knows who comes and goes. High visibility of marriage migrants in such small villages makes it common for the local government officials or heads of a village to know not only which families have marriage migrants, but also how the couples are doing. For instance, it was from a deputy director of a township office that I learned, before interviewing my respondent, that she was the third wife after two runaway foreign brides. At one of the weddings between a Filipina and a Korean man I observed in the rural province, the officiant's message illustrated the high visibility of marriage migrants in rural communities: "I have officiated 30 international marriages so far but I rarely officiate weddings recently. I made an exception and accepted a request from the bridegroom after learning that this is his first marriage and that he will be living in my neighborhood".

Meanwhile, community life in the city is often characterized by anonymity, or as one of my respondents said, a "mind your own business" style of living. For instance, one of my respondents in the city who got divorced from her Korean husband and remarried to a Filipino migrant worker had no interactions with local community residents or institutions despite having lived in the same borough for more than 20 years. The only time she engaged with the local Korean community was when she needed paper work at a local community center. Officially, she also had no job because she makes a living in Korea by buying and selling Filipino products to undocumented Filipino migrant workers in her neighborhood. This community environment guarantees anonymity for its members and also renders more freedom and independence to associational life.

High visibility and a close-knit community environment, coupled with higher levels of intergenerational cohabitation and in-laws living in the vicinity[39] often resulted in constant surveillance and assessment of rural Filipinas' conduct. This surveillance was often observed in daily situations where Filipinas were in contact with native Korean women. One such occasion was observed when Filipinas who take a Korean class at the MFSC were having lunch with a Korean language teacher in the nursery room after class. The following conversation that took place during lunch demonstrates how surveillance and assessment can be communicated to Filipinas. The Korean teacher started and led a conversation about a marriage migrant having a boyfriend and running away from her husband after giving suspicious look to a Filipina woman who was talking on the phone in Tagalog:

> Korean teacher: Chloe [the woman who was on the phone] has such a charming personality.
>
> Vietnamese translator: It is a girlfriend [to whom she talks on the phone].

39 Among those still married, 33% of rural respondents were living with their parents-in-law compared to 15% of urban respondents. In most cases, parents-in-law and relatives were living in the same village or nearby.

Korean teacher: I guess Filipinas don't have boyfriends.

Filipina translator: Then how about women from Cambodia or somewhere else?

Vietnamese translator: Many Vietnamese have boyfriends. People saw a Vietnamese couple kissing at the bus terminal and spread the word.

Another Filipina: Yes, some of our husbands are bus drivers so if they see something at the bus terminal, everyone will know.

Korean teacher: Didn't the Filipina woman who used to work at the town hall run away recently?

Filipina translator: She came to me one day and cried, telling me that her husband was having an affair.

Korean teacher: Is that true? Her husband is a simple farmer and is not clever enough to have another woman.

Filipina translator: [An affair] with a barmaid.

Korean teacher: Oh, that's not an affair. That's a whoring. It's different from having an affair.

Interviewer: What's the difference between them? If my husband does that, I'll divorce him.

Korean teacher: A woman would never leave home before she meets a man who seduces her. [If she leaves home without such man] she would just be somewhere where she has to make ends meet by washing dishes. That's why a woman rarely divorces her husband. Even a woman says she cannot leave because of kids, that's a mere excuse. The reality is that there's nowhere to go. Well, rumor has it that the Filipina had an affair and that's why she ran away. Korean women, when their husbands have an affair, take it as an insurance. They use it as a leverage for the rest of their life, 'oh you made a mistake back then', then you can turn the tide of the war. If you just run away, you'd never be able to do that.

The conversation started with her suspicion and assessment about whether or not the Filipina on the phone was talking to a boyfriend. It ended with her conclusion that no matter what the circumstances are, even when one's husband has an affair, it is a gain for the wife to endure rather than divorce or run away. In addition, she also confirmed the rumor in the community that the Filipina who recently ran away had a boyfriend. The Filipina translator tried to defend her by saying that she suffered from her husband's extra-marital affair, but the teacher talked about the 'Korean wife's way' of defining a marital problem and using it to maintain a relationship. Other Filipinas who were at the lunch did not challenge her. One of the Filipinas

in the conversation just added that if some extra-marital affairs happen in the province, everyone will eventually get to know because there are people who can notice them in public.

This community surveillance led to self-policing of Filipinas, which influenced the membership composition, network ties, and characteristics of associational activities. The membership of the rural associations is restricted to marriage migrants, excluding Filipino migrant workers or undocumented migrants. Even considering that the number of Filipino migrant workers is rather small in rural areas compared to the city with large industrial complexes,[40] my observations demonstrate that this restrictive membership is a result of surveillance and self-policing.

A conversation between Analyn, who is the president of the rural Korean-Filipino Association, and Belle, who is a member of the Association, illustrates the active effort to keep Filipinas separate from both male and female migrant workers. Talking about the year when Filipino migrant workers started to come to the province for work and eloped with four Filipina marriage migrants, they argued that there should be no interaction between Filipina marriage migrants and migrant workers:

> Analyn: Some of the Filipinas had an affair, when was it, about seven years ago. Male [Filipino] migrant workers came here and four of the women ran away at the same time because of them. They lost their hearts to those men. So we feel a bit nervous when migrant workers come, we're worried if the mind of the newcomers went seesaw by any chance.
>
> Belle: Those young sisters. So I always tell them 'Girls, stay away from men. Do not get close to them.'
>
> Interviewer: Why?
>
> Belle: It's dangerous. We need to protect our families. I get that some may be not satisfied with their husbands, but let's just think about our children.
>
> Analyn: Those men speak the same language so women's minds can be swayed. But they are only words. They just live the same in reality. Those women who ran away

40 While the ratio of Filipina marriage migrants to migrant workers is between 1:1.7 and 1:10.7 in the urban area under study, it is 0.47 in the rural area (Statistics Korea 2013).

with the men are living a hard life now.

The leaders of the Association not only restrict their membership to Filipina marriage migrants, but also try to limit Filipinas' encounters with migrant workers. Given the local history, Anayln—who is also a board member of the Multicultural Family Support Center in the province—opposed the Center chair's proposal to allow undocumented Filipino migrant workers to take the Center's Korean language class alongside Filipina marriage migrants. Belle also strongly argues that marriage migrants and migrant workers should not study in one class:

> Analyn: I'm sorry for those fellow Filipinos [migrant workers] but I disagreed.
>
> Belle: No, it shouldn't be.
>
> Interviewer: Why?
>
> Belle: The reason why is, look, even now, you know we have frequent gatherings, right? There's a lot of rumors now. There are two girls, those newcomers with babies are said to be having an affair. … That's why it's dangerous. If we accept them [migrant workers], we would have to tell them 'Girls, don't hang out with the guys'. And the husbands would also say 'Return home by this time, don't spend the time outside home' cause they know they [Filipinas and male migrant workers] encounter every day in class. The presence of male migrant workers would make them anxious. … Even hanging out with female migrant workers would eventually become gatherings with male migrant workers because they'll join the gatherings.

Belle feared that the presence of migrant workers would lead to husbands' increased surveillance over women's activities outside the home and increase negative rumors about Filipina gatherings. The leaders of the Association wanted to prevent the negative influence of Korean families' surveillance and rumors by actively engaging in self-policing which left little room for the possibility of pan-Filipino membership with migrant workers in their voluntary associations.

If surveillance and self-policing limits rural women's associational membership makeup, political geography of communities limits voluntary associations' access to various other institutions and organizations. Despite the current advancement of communication and transportation technology, physical distance often hinders voluntary associations in the

provinces from forging relationships with institutions and organizations based in the city. Among such institutions, the Embassy of the Philippines is of paramount importance. The administration of the sending country has been identified as a main institutional actor in immigrant politics. Immigrant politics can be defined as migrants' political activities seeking the betterment of their situation in the host country (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003:762). The Embassy of the Philippines, among others, has often played an active role in improving the status of Filipino migrant workers overseas (Anderson 2001).

The Embassy of the Philippines in South Korea provides assistance to nationals, focusing traditionally on labor migrants as the dominant group. However, starting in the mid-2000s, the embassy has gradually attached importance to marriage migrants and their children as their numbers increase. A consul at the Embassy whose tasks are specialized in marriage migrant issues explains that this weight translation has occurred with evolving situations, "In the early years I think the embassy was more worker-oriented because of the EPS[41] and the ITS[42] and now there are more women's groups but it's only starting to change in terms of number. Because I think one third or one fourth of marriage migrants are still Filipinos but then I don't know the number of Koreans who were formerly Filipinos, so there could already be half or even more".

The possibility of re-acquiring Filipino citizenship[43] or holding dual citizenship[44] for marriage migrants also encouraged the Embassy's involvement in marriage migrant issues. When asked why the Embassy cares about marriage migrants who became Korean citizens

41 Employment Permit System.

42 Industrial Trainee System.

43 According to the Republic Act No. 9225 on Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition enacted in 2003, natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Filipino citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country can retain or re-acquire their Filipino citizenship.

44 A revision to Article 10 of the Korean Nationality Law enacted in 2011 enabled dual citizenship for marriage migrants.

through naturalization, the consul answered, “When they become Korean nationals technically they’re no longer Filipinos. But under our law, they can reacquire Filipino citizenship and become Filipinos again.” While the Embassy is aware of individual cases of women who face conflicts with in-laws or suffer extreme domestic violence, limited resources and influence has hindered the Embassy from direct involvement in securing women’s rights. Instead, the Embassy has become active in organizing and registering marriage migrants’ groups to keep track of the matter, “I think one of our roles is to empower them, have them get organized in their areas because unlike the workers, the women are more fixed in their residence. (…) they stay there and eventually they become citizens. And they have more rights and they have more capacity to help in the future once they establish themselves.” Accordingly, the Embassy also provides forums and education programs focused on empowering marriage migrants.

For example, the Embassy co-hosted a four-week Filipino language education program for the children of Filipina-Korean couples with one of the Filipina marriage migrant associations in the city. The program is also a collaboration with the Seoul Global Center, which is a support center for foreigners living in Seoul run by the Seoul City Hall and another voluntary association of Filipino international students studying in Korea. A consul who specialized in education and public relations announced the launch of the program at the Embassy’s Multicultural Forum with invited leaders of Filipina voluntary associations nationwide:

> What we’re going to do is, we’re going to show the Korean government that it’s possible that multiculturalism is not simply a one-way street. It’s not only that we make Filipina women and their children those who were produced from such unions assimilate in this society, but rather, Korea itself can be a truly multicultural society by accepting and even adopting different cultures and different languages from the women who come here to marry. […] Through official Philippines language teaching, both husband and wife have equal [standing], and Filipina wives will have a greater voice inside the household. Right now, maybe zero identity or very little identity. What is the Philippines? What is Filipino? We can actually empower women officially with the use of Seoul Global Center or any municipality and the Philippines embassy so that

> you will have a voice inside your own household. That means, now officially you can teach your child Tagalog, because unlike other Koreans, you have a second language. We'll try to empower you with the use of official, partnering with different local governments.

The consul emphasized that the Embassy's intervention and its collaboration with the Korean local government would give 'official' status to the activities of Filipinas, thereby empowering women vis-à-vis their Korean families. Moreover, the consul believed that such programs could challenge the Korean government's definition of multiculturalism, which is largely seen as "a one-way street" to assimilate Filipinas and their children into Korean society without acknowledging their different cultural roots. While not providing direct financial support—as shown in the case of the Filipino language education program—the Embassy provides material resources such as necessary venues and network ties, as well as symbolic resources to voluntary associations.

In fact, with powerful institutional barriers to official recognition from the Korean government, the connection with the Embassy is an alternative way to gain official power and authority for voluntary associations, which could legitimize their existence and activities. While voluntary associations can register themselves at the central or local Korean government office, requirements for registration have been difficult to fulfill.[45] Many Filipino community organizations fail to satisfy the requirements due to lack of personnel and language proficiency. Local governments set up an ordinance for the '*Damunhwa* (multicultural) family' in the late 2000s, which includes financial and administrative support for the legal person or groups who support the '*Damunhwa* family.' Yet Filipino organizations were often not able to benefit from the ordinance as they were not categorized as 'multicultural' organizations, which were supposedly composed of female marriage migrant women of multiple nationalities.

[45] According to the Civil Code section 4, the list of more than 100 members and the valid address and phone number of the organization office is required.

Yet for voluntary associations to benefit from Embassy support, they need to build close relationships with the Embassy. As the consul pointed out, the Embassy needs to "know who we're dealing with:"

> [Once the group is registered] then we can advise them on what to do. We can advise, and they can tell us what their problems are. I mean, technically, they don't have to register, but once we already know about you, why would you not register. So we tell them to register. We'll know the officers, we'll know the contacts, it's more transparent for us. We know who we're dealing with. Especially if they're going to be there for the long term. […] You also have to know who might be the next leaders, if the community is helpful to each other or not helpful to each other, that's the kind of thing we require. Then once we already know them, then we can represent their interests.

The annual consular mission trip is the main venue where Filipino community groups may introduce themselves to the Embassy and build relationships. Yet the opportunity is not even. Due to limited resources, the Embassy prefers conducting trips to regions where there is a guaranteed list of more than 40 people who would receive consular services.[46] Thus, it is less likely that the trips will reach those who live in rural provinces or smaller cities with small or dispersed migrant populations. This differential access to the Embassy, which is apparent in comparing urban and rural areas, positively influences the counterpublic orientation of urban based associational activities.

Meanwhile, rural associations rely on the MFSC or the UC for material and symbolic support as those institutions are easily accessible and well-acknowledged in rural communities. A staff member at the rural MFSC—who used to work at the community welfare center which also deals with migrant-related matters in city—clearly felt the higher visibility of the rural MFSC. "When I was in Seoul, I really didn't know about the MFSC in our borough. But after coming here, I saw that local government and public institutions have a lot of interest in the MFSC." This staff member explained the background for the heightened attention, "When you

46 Interview with a consul.

look at schools, the number of children are decreasing both in Seoul and here. But in rural cases, there are a lot of children from multicultural families who are younger than elementary school aged, especially in the case of Vietnamese and Filipina [marriage migrants]. The number of children from multicultural families are more concentrated here than in the city and the number is increasing." A staff leader at the MFSC also added that "People say that schools in townships would have been closed if it were not for multicultural families." As the MFSC staff explain, "returning the sound of crying babies to farming families" (Freeman 2005:84) is considered an important contribution of multicultural families in rural communities. Thus, the rural government that is suffering from continued population decreases is more attentive to the MFSC compared to the urban government. In addition, husbands and other Korean families were also better aware of the presence of the MFSC. They often asked whether I was a staff member from the MFSC whenever I conducted interviews with Filipinas. Similarly, for Korean families who initiated their marriages via the UC, the Church remains a credible institution when it comes to the protection of marriage and family. As previously described, network ties with these institutions influence associational activities' focus on the 'multicultural family.'

CONCLUSION

Contrary to existing studies on the positive relationship between smaller communities and residents' civic involvement (Oliver 2000) or political efficacy (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011), the urban/rural divergence in Filipinas' voluntary associational life pointed to the opposite trend. Filipinas in the city were better able to become active members of voluntary associations while those in the rural province found it difficult to stay involved. Some of the voluntary associations in the city were engaged in individual rights-based activities, which challenged the dominant social positioning of marriage migrant women as members of 'multicultural families.' In rural areas, voluntary associations stuck to the social category of the

‘multicultural family,’ demonstrating a cooperative orientation that conforms to Korean patriarchy.

I find that community level characteristics are most responsible for this divergence in the level of involvement, membership makeup, network ties, and activities of Filipinas’ associational life. First, differential gendered occupational concentration gives more freedom for women in the city to be involved in voluntary associations while limiting them in the provinces. Small and close-knit rural community life puts women under constant surveillance and self-policing. Strong ties to government-run and religious institutions that emphasize the importance of family further confined rural associations within the context of family and local community. Meanwhile, the near absence of urban community gender policing, as well as greater access to the Embassy and other institutions emphasizing individual rights provided women in the city with resources and opportunities to function as a counterpublic to the dominant public.

CHAPTER 5. NATIONAL-LEVEL POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND ITS EFFECTS

Previous studies on immigrant and minority political representation have largely agreed on the positive attitudinal and behavioral effects of having minority politicians who share the descriptive characteristics of the constituents they represent. They argue that those represented feel enhanced political interest and efficacy, less political alienation, and engage more in political participation (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Fridkin and Kenney 2014; High-Pippert and Comer 1998; Mansbridge 1999; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Rocha, Tolbert, Bowen, and Clark 2010). According to these studies, the primary mechanism linking the presence of minority politicians and more political engagement of the represented is "a contextual cue of likely policy responsiveness", which encourages minorities to feel that their engagement has intrinsic value (Bobo and Gilliam 1990:387). Relatedly, scholars have found that minority representation increases knowledge about and contact with the representative, leading to the belief among minorities that they have a say in the government (Banducci et al. 2004).

These positive psychological and attitudinal effects of descriptive representation merit our attention because apart from the findings that Filipinas' political activities, such as voting and voluntary associational activities are heavily influenced by the Korean families and communities (Chapters 3 and 4), we might still expect that the presence of a Filipina legislator in the parliament would serve as a macro-level cue providing Filipinas with feelings of inclusion in mainstream political debates. Moreover, these positive psychological and attitudinal effects might eventually lead to more autonomous political participation in the future.

In this chapter, I examine how the differential context of reception in urban and rural areas influences the supposed effect of minority representation. I focus on how the presence of

a co-ethnic politician (a congresswoman) is interpreted differently, focusing on women's feelings of inclusion. While both Filipinas in rural and urban areas acknowledge the symbolic benefits of having a Filipina politician, the descriptive representation does not seem to yield feelings of inclusion in the national-level political process in both areas. Among urban women, critical evaluations and perceptions of 'likely non-responsiveness' were expressed. Approval of the representational role of the congresswoman among rural women was based on little knowledge and interest about the political activities of the representative; as a result, it did not enhance women's competence in their understanding about mainstream politics. I first provide the background regarding the emergence of a congresswoman who is a naturalized Filipina marriage migrant. I then analyze Filipina marriage migrants' responses, focusing on the implications for Filipinas' national-level representation.

A PHILIPPINE-BORN CONGRESSWOMAN REPRESENTING THE MULTICULTURAL FAMILY

Jasmine Lee, who is a naturalized Korean and Filipina marriage migrant, became a congresswoman in the 2012 General Election. She was given a prime number on the party list for the proportional representatives[47] of the Saenuri Party, which was then the ruling conservative party. The Party made it clear that she was nominated as the representative of the 'multicultural family'[48], which the Party considered as one of the minority groups requiring special representation in the form of proportional representation[49]. In fact, there were several

47 The electoral system in South Korea has single-member electorates, where only one legislator is elected in the district. It is combined with a proportional system, where the overall votes for a party are translated into a corresponding proportion of seats. Among 300 seats in the congress, 47 are determined by the proportional system. The former is least favorable to minority candidate recruitment, such as women, and the latter is the most favorable due to the support of the party and low campaign costs (Rule 1971).

48 According to the Multicultural Family Support Act, a multicultural family refers to a family composed of a marriage migrant and a Korean national or a family consisting of a person who acquired Korean citizenship, according to the Nationality Law, and a Korean national.

49 According to the press release of the Saenuri Party, published on March 26, 2012, the spokesperson of the Central Election Campaign Committee announced, "We promised to protect minorities and the weak including children, women, multicultural families, people with disabilities, and North Korean defectors. As you can see, we nominated proportional representative candidates to fulfill the promise."

attempts by political parties to align with the multicultural discourse and related policies, which have become in vogue in Korean society since the mid-2000s, by giving candidacy to marriage migrants.

Since the early 2000s, various grassroots organizations and NGOs have advocated for the rights of migrants, including marriage migrants and the children born out of international marriages. They have challenged racial discrimination and the norms of ethnic and cultural homogeneity (H.M. Kim 2008). Amidst the increased requests from civil society to have more systematic migrant integration policy, by 2005, marriage migrants and their children emerged as a center of state concern, sparked mainly by two major social affairs that drew national public attention (Paik 2010:65-66; Lee 2008). One was the October 2005 riots in the suburbs of Paris by second-generation immigrants, which were portrayed by the Korean media as the possible future of Korean society if it failed to integrate marriage migrants and their children. The other one was the visit of the American football star Hines Ward and his Korean mother in January 2006. As someone born in Korea to a Korean mother and an African-American soldier father, his success story in the US called attention to more than half a century of discrimination and prejudice against biracial "mixed-blood" (*honhyeol*) children since the U.S. military's presence in Korea. While the call for a 'multicultural' society was not necessarily limited to only marriage migrants and their children, the Korean government announced plans for a comprehensive policy specifically targeting the social integration of marriage migrants and their families in 2006, which was followed by a series of related policy implementations.

As political scientists point out, contextual factors – the multicultural discourse and related policies in this case – can affect both potential candidates and the party at every step of the candidate nomination process, namely, eligibility, selection, and election (Matland 2005; Rule 1981). For example, previous studies on women's representation show that certain

contextual factors, such as the welfare orientation of a country or a state, are positively associated with women's recruitment. For example, when welfare issues become prominent, it can expand the eligibility criteria for political parties to include female candidates, who are often closely related with welfare issues as voters become more receptive to such candidates (Rule 1981:65). In support of these findings, political parties in Korea started to expand their candidate pool to include female marriage migrants. The first attempt was made by the Creative Korea Party (CKP), then a newly established small political party. At a press conference in the National Assembly, Moon Gook-Hyeon, then the leader of the CKP, announced the recruitment of a Filipina marriage migrant who was a naturalized Korean citizen as a proportional representative nominee for the 2008 General Election "to address the issue of rapidly increasing multicultural families"[50]. Although she was not elected, as she was given lower priority on the party list, this attempt captured the broad attention of the media, given that she was the first political candidate of foreign ancestry in Korean history.

Political parties did not act on their own or in a vacuum. NGOs advocating the rights of migrants were behind the scene, connecting the political parties and migrants both by creating social consensus about the need for representation and by directly introducing potential candidates to the parties. In fact, in the case of the Filipina congresswoman Jasmine Lee, one of the Korean women's organizations not only significantly contributed to establishing the political representation of marriage migrant women as a prominent social agenda, but also introduced her as a potential candidate to political parties. The Center for Korean Women and Politics (CKWP), a women's movement organization whose activities have focused on implementing a gender quota system and political education of women since

50 Yonhap News, March 10, 2008. "*The Creative Korea Party giving candidacy to female migrant from the Philippines as proportional representative*".

1990 (E.-G. Kim 2004), launched an education and training project for marriage migrant women in 2008. While the CKWP has had an annual training program to foster women legislative staff since 1999, the organization expanded its boundary to include female marriage migrants to launch "Making the Number One International Marriage Migrant Woman Member of the Legislative Body in the 2010 General Election Project", funded by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. The Project, in which Jasmine Lee participated actively, received wide positive attention from the press media within a wider context of multicultural buzz and the international political climate at the time. Several major daily newspapers introduced the project, interlacing it with the multicultural background of the then president-elect of the US: "This project began this year to promote mothers who lead multicultural families to enter the politics in Korea, just like the President-Elect Barak Obama, who is from a multicultural family in the US"[51].

The CKWP actively sent a list of its Project participants to political parties, who they think could be desirable candidates. While not directly choosing from the list, the Saenuri Party, one of the major parties, adopted the idea of having marriage migrant candidates on the party list for proportional representatives in the 2010 Local Election. The later elected female marriage migrant candidate from Mongolia was given the number one position on the party list for the proportional representatives of the Gyeonggi provincial legislature, which has the largest foreigner population among the provinces. The 2010 General Election was also the first election since the nomination quota for women had become mandatory, according to the revised Election Law[52]. According to this law, each local constituent should nominate at least

51 JoongAng Daily Newspaper, November 8, 2008. "*Overcoming the prejudice…dreaming of a Korean Obama*".

52 According to the revisions made to the Public Official Election Act (Article 6. Section 47.5) in 2010, which is prior to the 2010 General Election in June, political parties should nominate at least one woman candidate in each electoral district.

more than one woman as candidates for the provincial legislature. Therefore, the female marriage migrant candidate could satisfy the quota while also representing the marginalized group, which was the nomination rule that the Saenuri Party announced. Finally, in the following parliamentary election in 2012, Jasmine Lee was given the prime number on the Saenuri Party list.

WOMEN'S RESPONSES TO DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

Both Filipinas in urban and rural areas agree on the symbolic benefits of having someone who shares descriptive characteristics with them in the National Assembly. Every Filipina respondent knew Jasmine Lee's name. When asked about her, most Filipinas said that they not only felt "proud" as a group, but also thought that her presence enhanced the social standing of Filipinos in Korean society. However, while most women in the rural areas did not have further knowledge about Jasmine Lee's political activities, women in the urban areas tended to be more knowledgeable. Further, while women in the rural areas did not express any critical evaluation, women in the urban areas tended to be more critical about Jasmine Lee's political activities to the extent that they disapproved of her representational role.

Symbolic inclusion as a common theme

According to Mansbridge (1999:649), the descriptive representation of a particular social group who has been excluded from participating in politics can change the social meaning of "not able to (fit to) rule" ascribed to the group, in a way that affects all members of the group. In support of Mansbridge's argument, Filipinas who have experienced discrimination based on their ethnicity and gender in Korean society were keen to observe the perceived changes brought about by Jasmine Lee's presence in the ruling assembly. Mio, who is working as a part-time English teacher at a private academy in the city, replied when asked

about the congresswoman, “I’m very proud of her; she’s representing the whole Filipinos in Korea. So as a member of the congress, people will know she’s a Filipina. So great. So [people will know] Filipinos are also great. She is a symbol of how great Filipinas are, how strong we are, and how powerful [we are].”

The feeling of social enhancement that Mio expressed exists against the backdrop of the perceived lower position of the Philippines and Filipinos in the global economy that is pervasive among Koreans. As previously mentioned (Chapter 1), the perceived lower national status of the Philippines compared to Korea serves as a ground for othering and stigmatization. This is well reflected in some of the spouses’ accounts. The majority of husband respondents (eight out of nine) either observed or experienced firsthand how the perceived lower status of the Philippines influences other Koreans’ attitudes toward marriage migrants and their spouses. The husband of Germain, who is a farmer in the rural province, described the attitudes of his townspeople toward his wife and other marriage migrants, “Because they [wives] are *damunhwa* [multicultural] families, they don’t get along well with Korean townspeople. … When we [the husbands] are around, townspeople would say only good things like, ‘Oh she’s working hard’… ‘They [the multicultural families] live well’. But when there’s town events where all are gathered, they say things [to wives] like, ‘You eat well cause you’re coming from the poor country blah blah blah’. My wife had a really hard time.”

Germain’s husband lives in a small rural town where “Korean men get along with each other like brothers”; thus, he has rarely experienced discrimination himself. In contrast, Korean husbands in the city talked about prejudice toward the spouses of marriage migrants. The perceived lower status of women’s country of origin is often connected with the class implications of their Korean husbands. Jenny’s husband, who runs a fruit stand at a traditional market in the city, explained Koreans’ dichotomous notion of poor and rich countries, and how

it relates to the prejudice attached to international marriages:

> People in our country have a much distorted perception. For example, let's say you're living with a foreigner. People would see it totally different depending on whether you live with an American or a Filipino [woman]. In their mind, it's totally different. If a man lives with an English or French woman, then they are looked above. You're looked down upon if you live with Filipinos or Vietnamese. Although we're all multicultural families, English and French are perceived differently from Filipinos, Vietnamese, and Chinese.

This resonates with the everyday experiences of Manila's husband, a young professional working at a foreign-affiliated firm in the city: "Whenever I introduce myself to a stranger, if I tell them I'm married with a Filipina, then I can see that they look at me with pitiful eyes. … I'm suddenly being treated as a marginalized class."

The presence of Jasmine Lee in the National Assembly, Filipinas believed, has changed the social meaning of "not able to rule" attached to Filipinos in Korean society. Fay, who has lived in a rural province for 18 years since her marriage, explained how Jasmine Lee's election contributed significantly to changing people's perceptions about Filipina marriage migrants, who had been a marginalized social group in Korean society:

> The Philippines is very poor compared to Korea. So they [Koreans] look at us as nothing compared to those marriage migrants from Italy, America; they look at them as very high. … No matter how smart we are, we're viewed as dumb because our country doesn't have money. But American people are richer than Koreans. Everyone thinks, 'Look at her, she has a very high standard'. It's like that. … I'm very thankful to Jasmine Lee because she raised how we're viewed in the society. …We're very lucky because people all got to know about the Philippines because of a Filipina who became a congresswoman. Americans are also on the television but none of them are lawmakers. That's why we're very proud. So people will think that 'Filipinos are poor but they are smart'.

For Fay, the presence of a co-ethnic politician is a signal for a change in Korean society, as it has started to recognize that the economic standing of one's country of origin cannot be equated with the human capital of people living in the country. Similarly, Marie, who is the former

president of a multinational female marriage migrants' voluntary association in the city, thought that it would not only promote Koreans to "accept us as we are", but would also become an inspiration to other marriage migrants:

> We're proud; I'm very proud of them [Jasmine Lee and Lee Ra[53]] because even though they belong to the multicultural families, but still they have the chance to be elected by the people…I think it's a starting point where we can really introduce the multicultural families, to open up the eyes of the Korean people, to *accept us as we are*. … I think they're working good. So I think because of them, multicultural women are having this confidence, 'Oh they can do it, we can do it', like that. So passing the confidence to other people. [emphasis added]

According to Marie, Jasmine Lee's descriptive representation signals a general responsiveness of the Korean society toward marriage migrants and their families, indicating a departure from the norms of ethnic and cultural homogeneity. As the president of the CKWP argues, then, the presence of a marriage migrant politician may "show that migrant women are not merely the welfare beneficiaries or good daughter-in-law or wife, but they are also citizens who own political rights". The extent to which such perceived symbolic benefits of having a Filipina marriage migrant politician has actually translated into greater acceptance of and equality for Filipinos in Korean society remains unclear.

While women in both urban and rural areas agreed on the symbolic benefits of having descriptive representation, their level of understanding about the political activities of Jasmine Lee and their thoughts about 'likely political responsiveness' differed, as shown below.

Diverging opinions and feelings of political efficacy

Studies on minority politics have shown that minority political representation

53 Lee Ra, a naturalized marriage migrant from Mongol, was a member of a provincial assembly in Gyeonggi province at the time of the interview. She was also elected as a proportional representative of the Saenuri Party and served from 2010 to 2014.

positively influences the political participation of those represented by increasing their levels of political efficacy, which generally refers to feelings of political responsiveness (Banducci et al. 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; High-Pippert and Comer 1998). Political efficacy is conceptualized as having two separate components. One is *internal efficacy*, which refers to the belief about one's own ability to understand and participate in politics, and the other is *external efficacy*, which refers to beliefs about the responsiveness of the political system (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990:290). The question regarding the effect of a Filipina marriage migrant congresswoman on Filipina marriage migrants' feelings of inclusion in the mainstream political debate, then, boils down to whether such representation has increased their levels of internal and external political efficacy.

Meanwhile, more recent studies on the effect of minority descriptive representation on constituents' political attitudes and behaviors have started to acknowledge that the effect cannot be captured in a universal way, given that minority groups are diverse, in and of themselves. As some studies have found little evidence of the independent positive effect of descriptive representation on constituents' feelings of political efficacy (see Lawless 2004), recent studies have paid increasing attention to specific conditions, such as the ideological orientation of constituents (Griffin and Keane 2006) and party congruence between the representative and her constituents (Reingold and Harrell 2010). However, since most of these studies rely on survey data, they have been unable to capture more nuanced understandings of how minority constituents' diverse positions in society mediate the supposed positive attitudinal and behavioral effects.

As I show below, Filipina marriage migrants' response to Jasmin Lee's descriptive representation was shaped by the differential gendered context of reception in local communities. In terms of approving the representational role of Jasmine Lee and having the

perception of 'likely political responsiveness', women in urban areas expressed rather critical opinions, compared to their rural counterparts. This lower external efficacy was combined with higher internal efficacy, as they were also more informed about Jasmine Lee's political activities. The combination of high internal efficacy and low external efficacy amounts to 'active disapproval' of the representational role of the congresswoman. On the other hand, rural women expressed positive opinions about the responsiveness of the congresswoman, while they had little knowledge about her actual political activities. This high external efficacy and low internal efficacy resulted in 'passive approval' of Jasmine Lee's role.

Among urban women, the sense of 'policy unresponsiveness' was constantly expressed, which they thought is based on party control and limited outreach and grassroots experience, as well as the perceived absence of shared experience. One of the issues that emerged frequently during the interviews was Jasmine Lee's attempt to propose a bill that guarantees access to basic rights, such as education and healthcare to undocumented migrant children.[54] A month prior to the fieldwork, she led public hearings at the National Assembly for enactment of the bill, which drew wide media and public attention[55], followed by a controversy over whether the law would eventually be appropriated to legalize undocumented migrants. For some Filipinas, the bill was seen as prioritizing undocumented children over the children of international marriages, and was thereby considered as problematic.

Judy, who is a mother of two daughters and a former president and member of several Filipino voluntary associations in her city, expressed her concerns when asked about Jasmine

54 The Basic Bill for Guaranteeing the Rights of Children of Migrants was co-sponsored by Jasmine Lee and brought before the National Assembly on December 18, 2014, after a series of public hearings since April in the same year. The Bill was automatically scrapped, as it was not passed in the session.

55 Yonhap News, 3 April, 2014. "*Guaranteeing the rights of children of migrants by law…public hearing at the National Assembly*".

Lee:

> She wants [undocumented] migrant children to be legalized in school here in Korea. But for me, I like children and I want them to have more education here, I also care very much about them because they're undocumented children. But for me, it's not proper because those children's parents know that their children will be undocumented. If they really think about their children's education, they're going to send them to the Philippines. I think if the law is accepted by the government, I think there will be more undocumented parents making families here in Korea. … I think it's very unfair. There are lots of children here in Korea to concentrate. How about, *why don't they just concentrate on immigrant children?* You know immigrant children, I think for me, as I can see and as I can hear, here in Ansan [name of the city], I think the focus should be on those children's education because it's very lacking. … For example, Soyoung [name of a friend's daughter who is in the same voluntary association] is very good at school but my friend cannot teach her children because she cannot speak Korean very well. And the education, mathematics, we don't understand. Very difficult to teach our children. Before when we [Judy and her friend] were in a different [Filipino] organization, you know the head said, 'What are the problems we can help you about?' I told him that education is one of the most important for our children. [emphasis added]

Judy divorced her Korean husband ten years ago after eight years of marriage. Since then, she had to send her children, then seven and eight years old, to the Philippines to her sister to provide care and education for her to concentrate on earning money in Korea. In fact, among the activists working for marriage migrants, an 'infant diaspora' phenomenon, where children of international marriages were sent to the mother's country of origin due to a lack of material and family support in Korea, is well noted (Heooh 2009). For Judy, the priority should be on assisting the education of those "immigrant children" rather than on undocumented children. Her belief is not only based on her personal experience of raising 'infant diaspora', but also from her accumulated observations of others while engaging actively in Filipino voluntary associations in her city. Her experience of discussing collectively within the associations about how to address the problems of their members (i.e., children's education) contributed to her belief, as well.

In addition, her apprehension that the proposed bill may be abused by undocumented migrants reflects a moral disjuncture between some Filipina respondents and the

congresswoman. For Judy, who said, “They [undocumented parents] are going to teach those children that it is not proper to be undocumented…that illegal is illegal”, the perceived moral disjuncture in the most publicized legislative activity of the congresswoman keeps her from approving the congresswoman’s representational role. Similarly, JeeAnn, who is a mother of three children and a member of a voluntary association living in the city, expressed her disappointment: “Jasmine Lee was in the election so those who acquire Korean citizenship voted [for her]. … We now think we shouldn’t have voted [for her]. She’s not helping us. She is also a *damunhwa* (multicultural), but she posted on the Internet that she’s helping illegals. There are so many people who are having difficulty among us, *damunhwa*, but why she’s not helping?” For JeeAnn and her friends, their political participation in the form of voting in support of Jasmine Lee was never answered due to differential policy priorities and a moral disjuncture that prioritize undocumented migrants’ needs over their own, thereby leading to perceived ‘policy unresponsiveness’. This sense of low external efficacy was created and confirmed while urban women exchanged their ideas about their collective interests and evaluated whether the activities of the congresswoman addressed them or not.

In fact, recent studies on women’s political representation question the assumption of the representational link between individual minority politicians and minority group perspectives. They argue that descriptive representation, which is not connected to or lacks the process of dynamic collective claims-making of marginalized groups, cannot guarantee substantive representation (Celis, Childs, Kantola, and Krook 2008; Weldon 2002). A critical evaluation of Jasmine Lee among Filipinas in urban areas is in line with this argument, as they talked about her disconnection with the wider Filipina population, limited experience in grassroots activities, and alleged ‘party control’. Gwen, who is the vice president of the oldest Filipina voluntary association and an advisor and board member of several other Filipino

associations in the city, criticized Jasmine Lee's limited outreach:

> She said she has a lot of programs and to check her blog. … Some spouses have no time to check her blogs. … She's famous of course, but [in terms of] interventions and outreach, she just reaches out to people around her. She didn't reach out to people who really need her. … FKSA [name of the association] is a very old organization, and she's supposed to keep in touch with us or with the president or support when there's programs but we never get support from her yet.

Jasmine Lee's perceived disconnection with the wider Filipina public and their experiences and needs also relates to the suspicion over the process and motive of her becoming the representative of multicultural families in the Saenuri Party. Filipinas questioned whether Jasmine Lee would be able to represent marriage migrants rather than the Party's interests. Erin, who ran for candidacy for the city legislature in the 2014 Local Election and the former president of a Filipino voluntary association in her city, contrasted her grassroots advocacy activities and an attempt to "start from the very basic" with the process of Jasmine Lee's election:

> The Saenuri Party is very clever. The Democratic Party [opposition party] has never thought about it. I can give credit for it because the [Saenuri] Party came up with the idea [of having the multicultural family on the party list]. … Jasmine became a member of the congress, but it was not through winning the direct votes. [It was] *just out of luck*. … I think Jasmine is sitting on the position that is too high. You can only become a robot in there. You cannot voice what you want, you cannot implement what you have in mind. … I think it is not her fault, I think she is just used by her party. I don't know if they really educate her. 'Hey we need you to be here, why don't you join us?' Because she wanted to be in the position so she just said yes. [emphasis added]

For Erin, Jasmine Lee represents no more than the Party's 'symbolic gesture' to include multicultural families without the grassroots mobilization of female marriage migrants or multicultural families as a whole. Being elected as a proportional representative by being given a prime number on the party list means being elected "by luck" in her mind, which is different from winning direct votes from constituents. She thought Jasmine Lee's weak presence in the Party stems from a lack of grassroots support, which in turn makes her skeptical as to the extent

that Jasmine Lee could be autonomous and capable in her representational role without being wielded by her party's influence.

The suspicion of 'party control' is, as Erin also pointed out, based on the fact that there was no process of achieving consensus over her becoming the representative vis-à-vis female marriage migrants and/or multicultural families. As shown previously, Jasmine Lee was recommended as a potential candidate to the political parties by one of the Korean women's movement organizations in which she was engaged. The absence of the procedure of gathering the collective voice of Filipinas and holding the representative accountable made some Filipinas question whether Jasmine Lee could actually represent the group as a whole.

Mariah, who is a single mother of three children and the recipient of national basic livelihood guarantees (i.e., welfare), doubted that Jasmine Lee would be able to represent those who are in worse economic situations. As a member of the Unification Church and a leader of various Filipina voluntary associations, both within and outside of religious communities, she differentiates the social position of the wider Filipina public and that of the congresswoman:

> Jasmine also had difficulty like us, but what was different about her was that her parents-in-law were rich and her husband treated her very nicely. What was even better was that her husband didn't marry her through the [commercial marriage] broker but they were a love marriage. That's why she succeeded. I'm sorry for the loss of her husband but. … In her case, she experienced only good things. She didn't experience something really harsh. The person who received only good things is different from the one who experienced difficulties.

The shared experience between the representative and the represented, scholars argue, has been the core of why minority descriptive representation is inevitably linked to substantive representation (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1998). Because of the shared experience, which is perceived to be different from the majority, minority politicians are thought to be best equipped to represent the voice of the minority. However, for Mariah, Jasmine Lee does not share the experience with the majority of marriage migrants. Along with the supposed better

socioeconomic status of the husband's family, the way Jasmine Lee got married, which she referred to as a "love marriage" instead of marriage through commercial agencies or the Unification Church, led Mariah to doubt that Jasmine Lee would represent the substantive interests of wider Filipina groups, including hers. In fact, Mariah had a chance to confirm her assessment when she had an opportunity to ask the congresswoman a question about governmental support programs for childcare during a Q&A session at one of the Forums hosted by the Embassy of the Philippines[56]. During the interview after the Forum, where leaders of voluntary associations were invited, she complained that the congresswoman's answer was too broad and did not address the reality of a single mother who is busy working. She concluded that Jasmine Lee does not know or share the harsh reality of the majority of marriage migrants.

In critically evaluating Jasmine Lee's legislative activities, urban women were looking for the possibility of sociopolitical mobility through substantial representation of the congresswoman, beyond symbolic recognition. Women's critical accounts were often corroborated by their observations gained from interactions with friends in the neighborhood or members of voluntary associations. In this sense, their interactions with other Filipinas contribute to a critical awareness of their social and political position and to their evaluations of the congresswoman. Gwen, who is in the leadership position of several voluntary associations, is also a single mother of one son and is working four jobs that are contractual or part-time. Criticizing the current direction of the Korean government's support policy for marriage migrants and their families, she said, "If we really voice out [what we want], we want something beneficial and not something only temporary":

I expected much from her [Jasmine Lee], since she is the voice of multicultural, not

56 I attended the Forum on June 10, 2014.

> only for Filipinos. …There's a lot of Filipino women in Korea who are giving so much things to the society … it was not recognized by anybody but until now, we're working as a contractual… So until now, we're still treated as foreigners even though we are carrying Korean IDs. There's something to be done. But I think Jasmine Lee hardly noticed that. … Our children could have a good future, but if we continue working as a contractual, the same, they will follow. If they [Korean government] will have this project for multicultural families, 'We will give this discount to multicultural family', how can we be accepted in the society if we are just treated all the time as foreigners? So, there is the reason why Korean people hate us continuously, because they say, 'There are so many benefits for multicultural family'. Why? Why multiculturals have benefits? Because we cannot be levelled with Korean people's employment system. … We need something that is lifetime. We need some assurance or a security for a lifetime.

For Gwen, the descriptive representation of Jasmine Lee in the congress does not signal 'political responsiveness', as there have been no substantial changes in terms of efforts to enhance the socioeconomic status of marriage migrants and their families that she encountered through voluntary associational activities and work. What she thinks as problematic regarding the Korean government's support policy for the 'multicultural family' is that there are only temporary benefits, which are only causing a backlash from native Koreans. Gwen thinks that socioeconomic integration takes up half the process of becoming a full member of society: "You accepted us as a part of your family; accept us 100%, not 50%".

In contrast, most women in the rural areas approved of the representational role of the congresswoman and did not express negative evaluations. However, they did not mention in much detail about how the congresswoman represents marriage migrants. Most of them were not knowledgeable about the political activities of the congresswoman. This combination of feeling high external efficacy and low internal efficacy can be partly explained by physical distance. Although the congresswoman is supposed to represent multicultural families nationwide, as she is a proportional representative of the Saenuri Party, some rural women seem to think that her representation is limited to urban areas. As a proportional representative who is not bound by any specific constituency, her various political activities cover both

national and international events. Yet her *outreach program*s (i.e., educational programs and open forums) are focused in Seoul and metropolitan areas, where the National Assembly Members' Office Building is located[57]. Thus, Filipina marriage migrants living in rural areas do not derive direct benefits vis-à-vis Jasmine Lee's outreach efforts.

This physical distance may have contributed to rural women's lack of interest and knowledge about the congresswoman's activities. For example, Ruth, who is a mother of three children and a part-time cook at one of the penitentiaries in the rural province, says, "Jasmine Lee is our role model as a foreigner living in Korea. When we need a friend, maybe Jasmine Lee is our answer whom we can depend on". She also said, "Her job is to *support multicultural families in the city* [emphasis added]". However, as it is also true that her legislative activities are centered on the central government's policy which takes effect nationwide, distance alone cannot adequately account for rural women's passive approval of the congresswoman. Ruth remembered that the congresswoman used to be a panelist on one of the television programs about marriage migrants before being elected. Yet, she did not know what the congresswoman is doing specifically as a lawmaker other than "supporting multicultural families, helping with translation, as well as lecturing".

Along with physical distance, I argue that the divergence between urban and rural women's responses is in part due to community norms about political participation, which encourage or discourage female marriage migrants' participation. Whereas women in urban areas perceive and expect the presence of a congresswoman as something that could have substantial influence beyond symbolic benefits in their lives, their rural counterparts seem to discount or be unaware of such a possibility. Scholars have argued that the community

[57] According to a series of reports on the congresswoman's various activities published by her office during the first two years of her term (2012-2014), she had not visited any events taking place in the fieldwork sites in rural areas.

environment can encourage, as well as discourage political engagement through the informal transmission of group-based norms (Huckfeldt 1979; Kenny 1992; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997). According to a survey conducted by the Center for Korean Women and Politics (CKWP) on 963 residents in Seoul and Gyeonggi province in 2013, where most of my urban respondents reside, responses to "How do you think about the political participation of migrants (with citizenship) including female marriage migrants?" indicate the public's positive orientation about women's political participation. Sixty percent of the respondents answered, "It is necessary", while 14.3% answered, "It is not necessary". A few weeks prior to the 2014 Local Election, female marriage migrants who participated in the CKWP's political educational program formed 'The League of Migrant Women Voters', a multi-national voluntary association that encourages women's political participation. Its members waged several street campaigns to get out the vote in Seoul.

In contrast, the context of reception in rural areas does not seem to encourage female marriage migrants' inclusion in the process of political decision-making. The case of female marriage migrant politicians was deemed as 'urban affairs', which may not be relevant in rural areas. Comments from those who are involved in immigrant-related government institutions illustrate this point. They point to the perceived difference in the characteristics of female marriage migrants and/or Korean spouses, and the sociopolitical context of reception between urban and rural areas. A president of the MFSC in the rural province commented about the social and political participation of female marriage migrants, "I think there's a large difference in the way of thinking. [Urban and rural] female marriage migrants' way of thinking could be similar, but there's an enormous difference between that of their spouses, and so does the environment".

A local government employee in the County Hall's welfare division, whose tasks

involve supporting female marriage migrants in the rural province, said that there have been no substantial changes on how community members think about the political engagement of female marriage migrants after the election of Jasmine Lee:

> Politics here [in the rural province] is about making allies by representing people's interests, who are mostly old people. … Probably, for female marriage migrants here, political engagement may feel like a story of another world. While women came to this country for various reasons, mostly, they came to earn money and to contribute to their family [back in their country of origin]. For marriage migrants in Seoul, I guess the channel for their migration is different, and they could feel closer to the politics. Seoul also has bigger election districts and a greater number of politicians. Here, there's one county governor, a member of parliament, and ten county legislators[58]. Would Koreans give up on that [for marriage migrants]? For this county, the time is not yet ripe for a multicultural society. … I'm afraid people still look at them as being different from us. Why marry foreigners when one can marry Koreans? They [marriage migrants] are not even white and blond. So we still distinguish them and look at them as people whom we should support, whom we should confer benefits. There is no such thing as high or low job but people here mainly live on farming so it's difficult for them to make the time to learn Korean as in Seoul.

Her comments point to the general public's perception in the rural provinces about female marriage migrants as being a disadvantaged class who, unlike their urban counterparts, are incapable of pursuing something other than economic benefits. She also indicates perceived higher competition for elected offices and aging constituents compared to the urban areas, which she thinks adds an additional barrier to the political representation of female marriage migrants.

Another County Hall employee also expressed reservations about the social and political participation of female marriage migrants based on his observation:

> There are cases where husbands do not want to expose migrant women outside. That tendency is decreasing nowadays but before, the men tried to hide [the wives] *because it's a rural village*. There's a perception that they bring foreign women because they lack the ability or lack other things. So there were cases where they [husbands] keep [the wives] from going out. Now that the number [of female marriage migrants] has increased, I think the perception is gradually changing. … Women started to come out,

[58] This is because apportionment of the number of elected offices is primarily based on the size of the population, although the election law allows adjustment with consideration of regional representativeness and severe deviation in the population size between urban and rural areas.

but that's as far as the change goes. [emphasis added]

As seen in the above comments, perceived differences between urban and rural areas shape the community collective norms about whether female marriage migrants are ready to represent their interests in formal politics, unlike their urban counterparts.

Rural communities' collective norms about female marriage migrants being 'not ready to represent' send contextual cues to women through their daily interactions. Rural women receive such cues, both within and outside of the family. When asked about the possibility of her becoming the head of a women's association in her village, Ruth, who is a naturalized citizen and a mother of three children, expressed her doubt: "If you're to become the president of a women's association or head of the village, you get to handle the village budget… I would get to handle the money as a foreigner. I have this doubt that 'can Korean people trust me?' Look at my family, even my mother-in-law doesn't trust me, then how could other villagers trust me?" Similarly, Abby's answer to her thoughts about the congresswoman naturally leads her to negative interactions with community members:

> Abby: Jasmine Lee *unni* (elder sister) knows our mind the most; I think she is our voice. The voice of us migrant women in Korea. I think she's so great. … We were happy in the Philippines but the [socioeconomic] environment was difficult … Here, the material needs are met, but the peace of mind is lost…although I'm a foreigner, although I'm not Korean, I have this wish [for Koreans] not to ignore us.
>
> Interviewer: Are you not a Korean citizen?
>
> Abby: Yes, I am [a naturalized Korean citizen]. So, I think of myself as Korean. But I look foreign at a first glance. People around me always treat me as a foreigner and ignore me. At first, I got ignored a lot. I was also ripped off whenever I buy something. … *Unni* [Jasmine Lee] climbed up to the position in a very difficult way. I don't think I would be able to do it to the extent. I just want to help fellow migrant women, especially those who are newcomers. I want to help them with their peace of mind.

Abby, who works mostly on the family farm, calls Jasmine Lee '*unni* (elder sister)' as Korean women would call their elder sister or someone who is close to and older than them. Abby's positive assessment about the congresswoman is not based on the information about her

activities. Rather, it was based on the emotional connection she felt toward her as a co-ethnic member living in a hostile foreign country and the vague expectation of her 'knowing our mind'. Similarly, most of the other rural women approved of the congresswoman's representational role by simply saying that "she's good to us as an ambassador of the immigrants" or believing that "she will help us".

CONCLUSION

The advancement of a marriage migrant woman, a Filipina marriage migrant more specifically, in Korean parliamentary politics was the result of a combination of multicultural buzz, the legacy of Korean women's organizations' political empowerment movement, and the political parties' response, rather than of grassroots organizing of female marriage migrants. This contextually driven descriptive representation did not lead to increased understanding or competence for political participation among rural women, while at the same time, it did not provide the perception of 'political responsiveness' among urban women. While women in both areas acknowledge the symbolic benefits of descriptive representation, urban women's critical assessment about the congresswoman's political activities stem from unaddressed expectations for sociopolitical mobility through her legislative activities. Urban women had suspicions and reservations about the representational role of the congresswoman, as there was no process of grassroots mobilization or outreach in her election. However, such expectations as well as disappointment were absent among rural women. Rural women were less knowledgeable about the political activities of the congresswoman, and their positive assessment was based on the vague assumption of her "helping us".

I showed that this urban-rural divergence is not only the result of physical distance, but also of the differential community collective norms regarding female marriage migrants' political representation. Physical distance makes it difficult for rural women to actively take

advantage of the congresswoman's various outreach programs. In addition, it was the rural community's perception about women's inability to represent themselves that hinders women from interpreting descriptive representation as an opportunity to include their voices in mainstream political debate.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

This study is an analysis of the gendered process of immigrant political incorporation in South Korea. It focuses on how Filipina marriage migrants negotiate their citizenship acquisition, voting decisions, voluntary associational activities, and representation vis-à-vis patriarchal host country institutions in urban and rural areas. The findings point to a complex process of political membership gaining and participation through women's bargaining with patriarchy, which constantly changes as the terms of bargaining change. As women experience naturalization, job market integration, and national-level representation, they engage in contestation and renegotiation. However, it is also clear that the overall process is circumscribed by limits, by "certain positions of power available to them" (Kandiyoti 2005:146), as seen in diverging patterns of political participation among women. I will conclude this study with an overall summary of the gendered political incorporation process of Filipina marriage migrants and a discussion of the contributions and limitations.

Within the literatures of immigrant political incorporation, the question of the role that gender plays in the process has largely been overlooked. Although migration scholars have strived to incorporate gender into analyses of the process of migration and integration, the major theories of immigrant incorporation have remained inattentive to gender. Building on the theoretical framework of previous immigrant incorporation studies, research on immigrant political incorporation has also turned a blind eye to the role of gender in the process. For example, an institutional approach, which emphasizes the role of institutions in providing symbolic and material resources for immigrant political incorporation, assumes that the organization of the institutional framework is gender-neutral (Bloemraad 2006; Wong 2006). Relatedly, central theoretical frameworks frequently used and proven useful in analyzing the political mobilization of immigrants, such as political opportunity structures and resource

mobilization, do not address how gender plays a role in accessing and reading cues for opportunities and resources (Bloemraad 2006; Koopmas and Statham 1999; Okamoto and Ebert 2010).

However, the gendered citizenship literature clearly tells us that women's relationship with polity is not the same as men's. Examining the classic contract theories, which lay the foundation of Western democracies, Carole Pateman (1988) argues that women are incorporated into civil society as dependents of men, who have sexual rights over women. Women's dependence on men is based on the sexual differences of men and women constructed by patriarchalism. Women, who lack the capacity to participate in civil society, are located within the private sphere, namely the family, which is considered as politically irrelevant. She shows how sexual difference is constructed as political difference in liberal contract theorists' thinking, as it pairs men with freedom and political rights, and women with subjection. While Pateman focuses primarily on the exclusion of women as a homogeneous category, other feminist critiques of citizenship attend to heterogeneity among women themselves and other minority groups (Ong 1996; Phillips 1993; Young 1987; Yuval-Davis 1993; 1997).

Although the feminist critique of universal citizenship indicates how women and other minorities in different social positions are differentially incorporated into the political community, little is known about the gendered process of immigrant political incorporation. In bringing this to light, this study fills this gap by examining the case of Filipina marriage migrants in Korea by asking three research questions presented in the Introduction:

1. In what ways does gender affect female marriage migrants' political incorporation?
2. What are the different forms of political participation for female marriage migrants (formal vs. informal; individual vs. group-based)? How does gender mediate the type of political participation that women engage in?
3. How do female marriage migrants manage opportunities and resources in the host

country in order to enhance their political participatory capacity? In what ways does gender shape or constrain this process?

My analyses revealed that gender relations fundamentally shape the process of political incorporation of Filipina marriage migrants. Specifically, as women's political membership and participation in the host country is mediated not only by their gendered membership in the Korean family, but also by various local and national institutions that are fraught with gendered norms and expectations, they engage in bargaining with patriarchal arrangements to secure their incorporation and participation. Women also engage in contestation and renegotiation as their conditions of bargaining change, albeit within the available options in the local and national context.

REVISITING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Political incorporation is basically a learning process for immigrants who are new to the norms and routines of the host country politics (Rogers 2006). Immigrant political incorporation scholarship has consistently focused on the role of institutions, such as government integration policy and civic institutions, for integrating immigrants into democratic society (Bloemraad 2006; Wong 2006). The institutional model, while providing valuable insights into the process of the political learning of immigrants, is not enough to fully explain female marriage migrants' political incorporation in the emerging immigrant-destination of Korea. First, the approach does not recognize that the institutions are often fraught with gendered norms and expectations. Second, the strong emphasis on the role of ethnic civic institutions and favorable government policies toward such institutions in previous studies (see Bloemraad 2006) makes it difficult to apply the institutional model to the context, which lacks such institutions. Community organizations and leaders with immigration backgrounds, who have social and cultural connections to immigrants and are familiar with

immigration policy and law, are found to be central in mobilizing immigrants into the host country political system in countries with a long history of immigration (Bloemraad 2006; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Wong 2006). Yet in a new immigrant-receiving country, such institutions are less mature, and the civil society is relatively ethnically homogeneous.

My research shows that it is initially, and mainly through the Korean patriarchal family that female marriage migrants learn about and are connected to the political system. In this sense, the family institution substitutes for ethnic civic institutions in the traditional immigration countries, which often take responsibility for the immigrants' naturalization, voter registration, and getting out the vote campaign for contemporary waves of immigrants. In the words of the social movement literature, the political opportunity structure and resources for female marriage migrants are, thus, inherently connected with women's position in the family, which are fraught with gendered norms and expectations.

My multi-site ethnographic field research, which includes in-depth interviews and participant observation in both urban and rural areas, showed that Filipina marriage migrants engaged in bargaining for their political incorporation as they face gendered norms and expectations in various institutions, including the family. The gendered norms and expectations women confront in the patriarchal family were often reinforced by the state's citizenship and integration policy designed for female marriage migrants, together with a perceived lower economic status of women's country of origin in the global economy. The processes of citizenship acquisition and voting clearly reflected this 'reconsolidation of patriarchy'. However, as women were gradually integrated into institutions outside of the family, they actively engaged in renegotiations with Korean family members. I showed that some women chose their candidates independently as the terms of bargaining changed (i.e., equal footing as a citizen in the family). Similarly, urban women's local labor market participation and ties with the Embassy of the Philippines, among others, enabled them to renegotiate their terms of

voluntary associational participation within families and communities. In addition, some urban women engaged in voluntary associational activities that advocate and facilitate Filipina migrants' inclusion (i.e., undocumented divorcees without children and undocumented workers) in Korean society on the basis of individual human rights, challenging the immigration policy of the Korean state. This implies that while opportunities and resources for political incorporation are circumscribed by the gendered context of reception, women constantly negotiate and challenge the terms of their political participation, thereby contesting the gendered institutional framework for their inclusion.

This study also shows that gender influences various forms of political participation differently. The influence of the differential gendered context of reception in urban and rural areas was less apparent in formal participation as individual citizens (i.e., voting) than in informal group-based participation (i.e., membership in voluntary associations). While this seems to make logical sense, given that group-based voluntary associational activities would necessarily involve community-level resources (i.e., venues), it also indicates the lack of collective mobilization regarding women's voting participation. Although voting itself is done individually at a discrete point in time, apart from one's daily lives, it is often a social process that involves mobilization through networks, especially for immigrants who are in the gradual process of learning about the host country politics (Bloemraad 2006; Ramirez 2005; Wong 2005). While the pressure to conform from the Korean spouse and in-laws prevails, there were few attempts to mobilize Filipinas, either from themselves or from outside, to counterbalance familial influences. However, women actively mobilized themselves and were mobilized from outside (i.e., the Embassy of the Philippines) when it comes to voluntary associational activities. If gauged solely by electoral participation, voting rates may suggest a high level of political learning among the marriage migrants. While the family does mobilize women into the Korean political system, it is within the context of women fulfilling their gendered roles as

submissive wives and daughters-in-law. As such, voting may not be a good measure of Filipina marriage migrants' political incorporation and by extension, political learning. Instead, this study reveals that a complex process of civic skills training, grassroots mobilization, and advocacy work happen while women engage in *informal* political activities. Such informal group-based participation, however, is still constrained by the family, community, and the state, as seen in the diverging paths of urban and rural women.

Finally, women's individual negotiation has clearly shaped the participatory capacity of women as a group. Women's votes were rarely imagined collectively as the 'voice of Filipina marriage migrants', given that most women in this study tended to conform to the decisions of their spouses or in-laws. The different characteristics of urban and rural voluntary associations more clearly showed that women's individual bargaining power with patriarchal arrangements influenced the capacity of Filipina marriage migrants as a group. Urban women's desire for substantial benefits through the representation of a Philippine-born congresswoman suggests the higher potential for collective mobilization and action, compared to their rural counterparts.

In sum, as the findings show, the process of female marriage migrants' political incorporation was shaped by opportunities and resources from various local and national institutions including the family, labor market, community organizations, the state's integration policy, and intergovernmental institutions, which offer women membership contingent upon their gendered performance. Women actively navigated and engaged in bargaining with such institutions for their political incorporation. Such efforts have been more apparent in informal and group-based voluntary associational activities compared to voting. As discussed previously, this tendency seems to show more than logistical differences between the two forms of participation, as women seem rather disengaged from electoral politics, compared to community-based organizing. Thus, the gendered context of reception also influenced which forms of collective political mobilizing were more viable to female marriage migrants. Further,

the gendered context of reception had a clear impact on how female marriage migrants are politically incorporated as a group. It shaped not only the capacity of group-based activities, but also influenced political attitudes as a group.

THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Several scholars have pointed out that immigrant political incorporation is a relatively understudied area within immigration scholarship (Bloemraad 2006; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). The examination of Filipina marriage migrants' political incorporation in the emerging migrant destination of Korea contributes to filling this gap, and it demonstrates how studies on immigrant political incorporation can benefit from incorporating gender into the analyses.

In the immigrant political incorporation literature, scholars have consistently shown that political incorporation is a context-contingent social process. The institutional approach, which focuses on institutions that provide dominant cues regarding the context of reception for immigrants, has been well developed in recent studies (Bloemraad 2006; Wong 2006). In addition, building on the conceptual framework of political opportunity structures and resource mobilization developed in the social movement literatures, studies have argued that local community organizations, the host country integration policies, and citizenship configurations shape immigrants' formal and informal forms of political participation (Bloemraad 2006; De Graauw 2008; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). Feminist accounts of citizenship have long argued, however, that how a person is incorporated into the political community differs by one's social location along gender, class, ethnicity and race (Ong 1996; Pateman 1988; Phillips 1993; Young 1987; Yuval-Davis 1993; 1997). Building on these insights, recent studies on female marriage migrants in East and Southeast Asian countries have shown that the context of reception for women's general incorporation into the host country is constructed according to gendered norms (Choo 2011; Ito 2005; Minjeong Kim 2008; Wang

and Bélanger 2008). Yet, there is little research that has explicitly emphasized the impact of gendered citizenship on immigrants' political incorporation.

As seen in Chapters 3 and 4, Filipina marriage migrants in Korea faced gendered political opportunities and resources in the process of citizenship acquisition, voting, and voluntary associational activities. Women managed such opportunities and resources by bargaining with gendered norms and expectations in an attempt to secure their political membership. The varied patterns of political incorporation between women in urban and rural areas, as well as the changing patterns of participation that women experience through their socioeconomic integration process, showed both the context-dependent nature of incorporation and women's strategic efforts to pave their way into the public political spheres in the host country.

This study clearly contributes to immigrant political incorporation scholarship, which has not given adequate attention to gender. While migration scholarship has strived to incorporate gender into their analyses of the process of migration and integration, repeated calls from scholars to bring gender to the fore of migration studies (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2000; Mahler and Pessar 2006; Nawyn 2010) testify to the fact that the efforts have been rather limited. While the case of female marriage migrants has some limitations in its generalizability because of their specific embedded arrangements within the native family, this study still sheds light on how gender influences the process of female migrants' political incorporation. Admittedly, we might expect to find that gender mediates the political incorporation process in different magnitudes for other types of female migrants (i.e., domestic workers, family class, and economic migrants); yet, the opportunities and resources for women's political learning will be affected by the gendered norms and expectations they confront in various host country institutions. For example, several empirical studies suggest that gendered labor market integration and changing family gender norms influence female migrants' political

socialization (Hagan 1998; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992; Jones-Correa 1998). By combining the insights of feminist citizenship scholars, who have challenged the universal citizenship model, into the analyses of Filipina marriage migrants' political incorporation, this study expands our understanding of what role gender plays in the process of immigrant political incorporation.

In addition, by applying the concept of 'patriarchal bargaining' (Kandiyoti 1988; 2005) to account for women's responses to patriarchal arrangements, this study reveals the fluid process of political incorporation as bargaining, which unfolds as female marriage migrants experience socioeconomic integration into the host society. In this way, this study departs from previous research on female marriage migrants' incorporation, which presents a one-way picture of women being passively incorporated by the host state's political strategies (Lee 2012; Wang and Belanger 2008). As the findings show, women engage in contestation and renegotiation in furtherance of better life options, while seeking to secure their position in the host society, both at the individual and associational level. Therefore, while all female marriage migrants face the Korean state's gendered integration policy, the process of political incorporation varies, depending on the local context and the individual woman's socioeconomic integration.

Finally, according to the literature on minority representation, there have been studies involving the positive influence of descriptive representation on the political attitudes and behaviors of those who share the descriptive characteristics (Banducci et al. 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Fridkin and Kenney 2014; High-Pippert and Comer 1998; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Mansbridge 1999; Rocha et al. 2010). While these studies indicate that the presence of minority politicians provides cues for 'likely policy responsiveness' to the represented and encourages more political engagement, these studies were not able to explain often contradictory results (see Lawless 2004). As seen in Chapter 5, the presence of a naturalized Filipina marriage migrant in the ruling assembly, whose political advancement was not

connected with the grassroots civic engagement of Filipinas, did not lead to more engagement among women in either the urban or rural areas. This suggests that the process of minority politicians' electoral success could matter in addition to ideological or party congruence between the representative and the represented (Griffin and Keane 2006; Reingold and Harrell 2010). Further, the community collective norms about political participation mediated the effect of descriptive representation. Finally, previous studies have been limited to traditional immigration countries, where the size, spatial concentration, and the length of settlement allowed immigrants and minority groups to establish a political voting bloc (Banducci et al. 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990). The examination of descriptive representation in the context of an emerging immigrant-destination, thus, adds to the stream of research.

Expanding on the last point, this study contributes to better understanding the process of political incorporation in a new immigrant-receiving country with a relatively ethnically homogenous population. While previous studies focusing on traditional immigrant-destinations emphasize the role of ethnic institutions and are relatively favorable government immigration policies, often based on social consensus (Bloemraad 2006; Wong 2006), a new destination generally lacks such resources for new immigrants. For example, in her extensive study of immigrant incorporation in a new destination in rural America, Helen Marrow (2009) shows that recent Latino immigrants undergo bureaucratic incorporation that precedes political incorporation through electoral politics, which has been considered as the traditional incorporation model. The study documents that newcomers face various barriers in entering electoral politics, either due to their undocumented status or a lack of resources such as immigrant-serving and ethnic community organizations. Thus, Marrow suggests that new-comers' interests are more incorporated through local bureaucrats who are in frequent contact with them, rather than by co-ethnic political officials or leaders. Similarly, this study shows that Filipina marriage migrants, lacking established ethnic organizations, do not experience

political incorporation mainly through electoral politics. Rather, this study highlights the process of Filipina marriage migrants becoming politically engaged, albeit not necessarily through formal politics, through the direct and indirect role played by their job market integration, local community social membership, voluntary associational activities, and relationship with the sending country Embassy, among others.

Contributions to studies on female marriage migration in Asia

In recent years, a growing body of literature has focused on the incorporation of female marriage migrants in Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea. In investigating women's access to citizenship rights and benefits, previous studies have focused on the complex relationship between women's position in the family, advocacy efforts of the civil society, and the host state's incorporation strategies (Choo 2011; Ito 2005; Minjeong Kim 2008; Lee 2012; Wang and Bélanger 2008; Yeoh, Leng, and Dung 2013). While these studies indicate that women are incorporated into the host country institutions, which are fraught with gendered norms, they have yet to explore how such gendered incorporation influences women's political incorporation.

Some studies have shown the collaborative efforts of the host country's civil society and female marriage migrants to empower and redefine women's inclusion against the monocultural and exclusionary citizenship model of the host country (Chung and Kim 2012; Hsia 2009; Ito 2005). While such studies focus on women and civil society's efforts to claim female marriage migrants' inclusion primarily based on motherhood, my study reveals a broader spectrum of political participation and claim-making. As seen in Chapter 4, depending on the local gendered context of reception, women's associational activities ranged from advocating for members' inclusion based on individual human rights, to conforming to the dominant discursive position available to them, such as the 'multicultural family'. Through the

comparison, the study also demonstrates that such a differential orientation is firmly grounded on women's bargaining power with patriarchal arrangements, both at the individual and group level.

In addition, this study explored female marriage migrants' electoral participation and representation, which previous studies have rarely examined. The increasing number of female marriage migrants would acquire legal citizenship status in some of the receiving countries in Asia. How would the host country's formal political scene respond to such changes in the demographic makeup of constituents? An answer to this question would provide an interesting testing ground for minority political inclusion in new immigrant destinations. As seen in Chapters 3 and 5, this study gives a glimpse of the emerging presence of female marriage migrants in the host country electoral politics and how gender influences their participation and representation.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES

Some limitations of this study deserve elaboration and point to future research possibilities. Conducting a case study necessarily involves some limitations in relation to the number of respondents, local communities, and voluntary associations, as well as the number of countries covered in the study. The findings might have differed to some extent had female marriage migrants with different ethnic backgrounds in Korea been studied. For example, according to the National Survey on Multicultural Families (MOGEF 2013), Filipina marriage migrants are the most active in participating in co-ethnic gatherings, compared to other female marriage migrants from China, Vietnam, and Japan. In fact, Filipina marriage migrants in this study often drew on their experience of participating in religious gatherings and/or voluntary organizations under the local governments (i.e., youth council or *Sangguniang Kabataan*) back in the Philippines in organizing and participating in voluntary associations. Thus, the

experience of past political participation in one's country of origin may inform female marriage migrants differently about how they respond to gendered opportunities and resources for political participation. Plus, the patterns of socioeconomic integration of each group may differ. For example, almost immediate access to the job market of English language instruction among Filipinas in urban areas cannot be replicable to women from other countries. This would suggest that other ethnic groups may not be able to "bargain" with their Korean spouses and in-laws for more autonomy and equal standing in the family. Consequently, gendered membership in the family may make it difficult for women from other ethnic groups to engage in voluntary associations. Lastly, the active role of the Embassy of the Philippines in assisting and organizing voluntary associational activities of Filipina marriage migrants may be difficult to observe among those of other ethnic groups. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Embassy of the Philippines is unique in its active role of improving the status of temporary migrant workers overseas (Anderson 2001). I learned from the interviews with consuls at the Embassy that their efforts to assist marriage migrants' voluntary associations are closely connected with assisting temporary migrant workers, as the two groups often share membership, especially in urban areas.

In addition, female marriage migrants from Japan and China, who are ethnically and culturally more similar to Koreans, may experience a different negotiation process for their incorporation, which would also influence their political participation. For example, from interviews with the leaders of multinational voluntary associations of female marriage migrants who migrated from Japan and China, I learned that they generally had a better command of the Korean language, despite a similar period of stay compared to Filipinas. When talking about Jasmine Lee, a Philippine-born congresswoman, one of the leaders from China commented that she would not be able to take advantage of the visibility that Jasmine Lee enjoyed as a symbol of a 'multicultural family' due to her different "face". When juxtaposing her comment with

Filipinas' comments about perceived discrimination based on their different phenotype and ethnicity, it appears that female marriage migrants from different countries may not have the same perspective on how their appearance and ethnicity position themselves in Korean society. Therefore, the question of how ethnicity would influence the political incorporation of different groups of female marriage migrants cannot be predetermined and thus call for further empirical study.

Similarly, the case study of Korea may not represent the gendered political incorporation patterns of other countries. As previously stated, the Korean government has permitted only a temporary stay for migrant labor, while it promoted female marriage migration since the early 1990s. While its short history of immigration and gendered immigration policy, as well as its history of Confucian patriarchy instituted in the family and the governmental system make Korea suitable for a study of gendered immigrant political incorporation, the results are better understood in relation to those contexts. More studies need to be completed in other parts of the world in order to determine how female immigrants with various migration experiences navigate the host country institutions. For example, as Yeoh et al. (2013:147) point out, political incorporation of female marriage migrants in Korea may be different from that of Singapore, which has a political culture of 'non-resistance' or 'illiberal democracy', and the civil society and government sector are framed as such. Urban women's strong ties with the Embassy of the Philippines, which at times works in collaboration with the local governments, or their networks with other civil society organizations may be difficult to observe in such a circumscribed political culture. As the authors point out, the already diverse ethnic and racial composition of Singaporean society and the state's official multiracialism may create a different political incorporation path for female marriage migrants. Further, as Chung (2010) shows, the Korean government's centralized immigrant incorporation policies, which specifically target and encourage female marriage migrants to be incorporated as naturalized

citizens, are different from those of the Japanese approach, where the local governments provide general support for a wide range of immigrants as local residents, without attempting to include them as naturalized citizens. Thus, we can predict that the political incorporation of female marriage migrants in both countries will show different trajectories.

This study could also benefit from a future longitudinal examination of how female marriage migrants' voting, voluntary associational activities, and representation evolve as women are further integrated into Korean society. As this study shows, women's bargaining with patriarchal arrangements for their space in the public political sphere is not a static process, but changes according to the social context and women's position in the society. For example, I learned from interviews that a growing number of Filipina marriage migrants have received or are pursuing associate and bachelor's degrees (or above) at Korean universities. Similar to the effect of women's labor market integration shown in Chapter 3, this additional educational attainment (which is particularly valued in Korean society) may provide women with more bargaining power, not only within, but also outside of the family. Meanwhile, there has been a growing discourse of reverse discrimination and 'anti-multiculturalism' sentiment toward migrants, including female marriage migrants.[59] This changing social context may also affect women's group consciousness in the future, possibly in a positive way by making the group boundary between native Koreans and marriage migrants "bright" (Okamoto and Ebert 2010). Examining how such changes and the long-term interaction of the two, such as how women's political participation influences patriarchal institutions, and how this may influence women's further political position in the host society, could be explored in follow-up studies.

59 The 2nd Multicultural Family Policy Basic Plan (2013-2017) was published by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in December 2012.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Framed as a solution to low fertility and the aging population, government integration policies for female marriage migrants have focused on women's initial adaptation to the Korean family as mothers, wives, and daughters-in-law. While the recent reformulation of support policies has directed more attention to assisting women's labor market participation and raising social awareness and understanding of multiculturalism[60], attempts to include women's voice into the process of policy-making, which has a direct impact on their lives, have been rather limited. Instead, the focus of policy attention has quickly moved to the children of international marriages, who are gradually reaching adulthood. During the 12th meeting of the 'Multicultural Family Policy Council'[61] under the Prime Minister's Office in 2016, the government set a support plan for the children of multicultural families, according to their growth cycle, as the major policy agenda for the coming decade[62]. While the support plan seems necessary, as one of my study participants pointed out (Chapter 5), it is women's social and political status that matters the most when it comes to the long-term future of those children. Approximately 80 percent of the families formed through international marriages earn less than the monthly average household income of the country[63]. This means that marriage migrants' socioeconomic integration is important in improving the status of the whole family. In addition, how mothers deal with and fight against discrimination based on a different appearance and culture in a society with an ethnically homogeneous population will influence the terms of their children's inclusion.

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60 Ibid.

61 The 'Multicultural Family Policy Council' was officially launched under the Prime Minister's Office in 2009 with more than ten branches of governmental administration. The Council has since undertaken a division of labor between those branches and has set the direction of policies related to female marriage migrants and their families.

62 Press release from the Prime Minister's Office published on March 9, 2016.

63 According to Statistics Korea, the average household income in the year 2012 was 4,077,000 won (about 3,485 USD).

My research suggests that governmental support for female marriage migrants' voluntary associational activities could enhance the possibility of more autonomous political participation of women, thus enhancing the chance to include their voices in the policy- making process. While government-run institutions such as the Multicultural Family Support Centers across the country provide rather limited support (i.e., a meeting place and snacks) for the self-help groups of female marriage migrants that are registered under the Centers, this kind of approach does not seem to garner long-term benefits for women. As I have previously shown, Filipinas' voluntary associations sometimes embrace Filipinos of all migration statuses and various agendas, which cannot be subsumed under the 'multicultural family' category. They often suffer from a lack of material support for regular education programs for their members, while facing high institutional hurdles to be registered directly under the government for financial support. The support from the government would provide not only material benefits, but also legitimacy that is much needed in such associations, as women need to negotiate their participation vis-à-vis their husbands, in-laws, and sometimes their neighbors in the case of small rural villages.

Overall, my research suggests that more equal gender relations within and outside of the family would better serve the political incorporation of female marriage migrants. While counselling and educational programs for international marriage couples could help, long-term and substantial support for women's socioeconomic integration outside of the family should be vital for women's better terms of bargaining for political participation.

APPENDIX

REFLECTIONS

Before entering the field, I was worried that my outsider identity – being a native Korean with middle class and urban background – would impede my access to and understanding of my respondents' lives. Yet once they learned that I had experienced living in a foreign country, many of my respondents seemed to open their minds and relate their experiences of with mine. Many have relatives living in Canada, which helped breaking the ice during initial encounters. In fact, the majority of my respondents were surrounded by people who were very different from them in terms of education, age, and culture – especially in Southern County – and they seemed to easily relate to me. At the same time, I observed that many respondents felt more comfortable sharing their stories with an outsider. Many confided that they kept distance from other Filipinas either because they wanted to stay away from gossip or because they do not want to burden friends or neighbors. They also do not want to share the difficulties of living in Korea with family members in the Philippines so as not to make them worry. At the end of one interview, a woman thanked me for letting her share what had happened in her life without hesitation. Some others were willing to share their stories because they wanted their voices heard. Yet I was consistently aware that my positionality and personality would both impede and facilitate different forms of understanding (McCorkel and Myers 2003; Shaffir 1991). Therefore, I tried to complement this limitation by using multiple methods of data collection in the field (Roth and Mehta 2002).

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