

RELATION BETWEEN THE
THEOLOGY OF CLEMENT
OF ALEXANDRIA AND
GREEK PHILOSOPHY

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"THE RELATION BETWEEN THE THEOLOGY OF
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY".

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School
of McGill University by Irving O. Vincent for
the degree of Master of Arts.

April 1st.1908.

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P R E F A C E

One cannot fail to notice a great difference in tone between the synoptic gospels and the writings of Clement of Alexandria; the one breathes the religious fervour inspired by the perfect life, the other is an attempt to interpret that life, which this writer also holds up as his ideal, by the philosophic concepts of a theology. The study of Clement of Alexandria shows that there are underlying his theology two distinct influences, Christianity with its roots in Judaism, and Greek Philosophy. These two streams of thought had long before met in Philo the Jew, and later in Justin the Christian martyr, and through these men the notion of the interaction of the two influences had reached Clement; but he also knew the Christian Scriptures and the writings of the Greek philosophers at first hand. But if he is not the first to bring the intellectualism of Greece into touch with the religious fervour of the East, he is at least one of the most interesting men connected with that interaction because he did so much in an original way to bring them really together. The purpose of this essay is to study what Clement thought of Greek Philosophy, how it predetermined his conception of Christianity, what elements it gave to his theology, and whether more of his theological beliefs than he was aware of did not come from Greek sources rather than from Christian.

An essay dealing with the theology of one of the Christian Fathers necessitates on the part of the writer some theory of the development of Christian doctrine, so that here I shall briefly state the view taken in the following pages, without, however, substantiating that view by any arguments; that the reader may know the presuppositions underlying the method I have employed, in the hope that such knowledge may help to explain the views put forward in the essay itself.

Christian doctrine really grew. It was not merely a logical development of what was implicit in its earliest forms; in many cases it took in new material by the help of which it developed what was implicit in itself. The doctrine of the Trinity is an example of this, as it was developed out of the Baptismal Formula by the help of the Greek ideas of the *λόγος* and *ὑπόστασις*, and the legal term of Roman law "persona"; but all of these words, with all that was implied in them, were borrowed bodily. Again Christianity made these borrowed ideas peculiarly its own, as it used them, so that they became part and parcel of Christian doctrine for all future generations. There was no "kernel"

around which a "husk" grew until the kernel was eventually covered up; it was Christianity still, even if it expressed itself in different ways from that in which it had been expressed by earlier thinkers. The Christianity of St. Augustine is no less Christianity than that of St. Peter or St. Paul. Let us rather express the development of Christian doctrine by likening it to the growth of an organic being, which takes in and assimilates to its own nature new material, and throws off what it cannot use; which severs its connection with the parent, and goes out into the world to fight for itself; which fights, and in the fight is forced to develop or borrow new methods of defence, which at length become characteristic of itself. But the struggle for existence is very severe, and victory is often won only by compromise with the opponent - by recognizing that he too has something valuable. Christianity is a principle of life and growth, of which the germ may conveniently be found in the Lord's Prayer; and, as it is alive, so it is constantly progressing by absorbing outside matter, with the help of which it reexpresses itself in new ways. The process of borrowing of Greek ideas by Christianity was not "ipso facto" an obscuration of its primitive force and simplicity, or yet a secularization. It was Christianity still and must be judged as the Christianity of its age, and not merely by comparison with what it was in times gone by, or is now, or what we think it ought to be. It has had a different mission to fulfil in each age, and (omitting the question of whether it has fulfilled that mission in the best way in each case), we must judge the Christianity of the Didache or of Tertullian primarily in its own surroundings before comparing them with the Christianity of Thomas à Quinas, for the purpose of depreciating one or the other. The Greek notions, which Clement so frankly confesses to have borrowed, denote no obscuration of Christianity by Greek ideas, but rather that, as I hope to prove, the movement with which he is represented, answered an urgent need of the time, and as such represents a necessary and beneficial advance.

The method of investigation must here, as in all cases, be determined by the particular nature of the evidence to be adduced. Here the material is very elusive, for Christian writers of that early period so seldom tell us their mental presuppositions, that it is difficult to reconstruct the process of their thought. It was a growth, and what we have is the result of that growth; we have the ideas of the great men of the Church, who put those ideas into writing in middle life, when their education was complete, and their prejudices were already formed. The results of that growth are before us, and also the particular characteristics of the surroundings in which they lived. Can we in the case of one man relate these two, and show how his ideas developed? What of the causes, known to be influential in Clement's day, and accessible to him, can account for the finished product of his thought as represent-

ed in his works ? The only method open to us is one of comparison, and not one of strict deduction; we cannot always say that this was the way, but we usually can answer that it might have been. Now seldom do men open the secrets of their hearts to us and allow us, as it were, to read their diaries; we know of only two Romans who did so, Cicero and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. When the process of thought is over, they wish to forget it, and give the world only the results. Or again, they may not be conscious enough of the steps taken to tell them to others in after years; they acted almost intuitively, and their past mental history was soon lost sight of, just because it had gone on so unconsciously, except as it gleams through in the stray phrases, which the historian now uses as his texts. But Clement is very frank; he is not afraid to praise Plato, or to use the philosophic language of his day without disguising it. He sees that Christianity has something to do with the Academy if it is to win Greece, and so he tells us much of his early education. Thus his life is important as shewing us what influences acted on him before he became a Christian.

There are two books which I regret to say that I was not able to read while preparing to write this thesis; they are Dr. Th. Zahn's *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Neutestamentlichen Kanons und der altchristlichen Litteratur*, Band 3: *Supplementum Clementinum*; and Dr. A. Harnak's *Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur bis Eusebius*. Of the former book Mr. de Faye speaks with the highest praise, and often tells one that his own work is in many respects but an attempt to follow out the discoveries of Zahn. Of the other book I have found a review in the *Amer. Journ. Theol.* Vol 2, No.3. by Caspar René Gregory, but not in time to make use of it in the thesis proper. Harnak, we are told, has taken great care to find out the sources and value of Eusebius' *Ecclesiastical History*. Of this work "the first chapter deals with the very important point that the real thread of all the chronological data in the Church History, so far as they flow from Eusebius himself, is the list of the Roman Emperors Harnak goes over the various dates and shows that not only those which give the names of the various Emperors, but also those which give a seemingly undecided, "at the time", or "in those times" really are to be attributed to the reigns of the Emperors. The few cases that seem to be doubtful are clear when after the survey of the whole field we find that the Emperors are the settled date-givers for Eusebius". By this important discovery Harnak has been able to show how both Zahn and Krüger have several times been at sea for want of just such a determination. "Harnak is not displeased with Eusebius because he does not try to give everything an exact date. On the contrary, it is of necess-

ity true that Eusebius could not date everything precisely, and if he had once gone upon the plan of hearing the grass of history grow and of saying exactly upon what day each thing had happened, we should have had a mass of dates which would have been largely imaginary and which would be harder to unravel than the inexact but precisely honest dates that he has given to us". Harnak also points out that Eusebius must have had a chronology at hand for the dates of Clement among a few others. Then he proves that the dependance of Jerome's *De Viribus Illustribus* on Eusebius much as Wescott had done in the *Dict. of Christ: Biog.* I did not have even this synopsis of what Harnak had written, when I wrote the chapter on the life and works of Clement, but I now find that I have no need to change any of my arguments, and I believe that on the whole the results of Harnak's work tend to support my naïve presuppositions as to the value of Eusebius as an historical writer of the first rank.

The translations of Clement in the thesis are either my own, or they have at least been compared with the Greek and approved of. The text itself of Clement, however, presents many difficulties, both because of careless editing, and because all the MSS of the large works can be traced back to two: one containing the *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus*, for which we are indebted to Arethas Bishop of Caesarea in Cappodocia; this is called the *Parisinus* (P), as it is now in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* at Paris; and another containing the *Stromateis*, which is now in the *Medicean Library* at Florence, and called the *Laurentianus*. But the facts just stated have only been known for about fifteen years, through the work of Dr. O. Stählin of the Berlin Academy. Thus it is difficult enough to get a good text under any conditions because there is the second MS of real value in either case, by which the other might be corrected; and earlier editors did not take the trouble to find out the respective value of the MSS, so that they in all cases followed the poorer ones. The only edition which will be of use in the future is the one which Dr. Stählin is now bringing out, since he first worked out the relation of the MSS and discovered what ones each previous editor has used, before he settled his own text. But this edition I have not been able to procure, but have used the edition of Potter, as reprinted by Migne in his *Patrologia*, and that of Klotz, to the chapters and sections of whose edition all my references have been made. For this reason I have carefully avoided any reference to passages where the text before me did not make sense, or where it seemed that there might possibly be any corruption.

The corrupt text, which I have been obliged to use, has also prevented me from working out the relation of the quotations of Plato in Clement to the present MSS of Plato; this would not be such a huge task as it might seem, since the edition of Klotz has an "Index rerum memorabilium", in which the name of Plato stands at the head of three columns, and since the edition of Migne has an elaborate system of cross-references. I cannot believe that Clement quoted his Plato from memory, as I have taken occasion to note a few passages, in which he exactly follows our text. It would be interesting to know, if it can be proven from the quotations, from which family of the Platonic MSS came the one which Clement used.

I have not used the Eighth Book of the Stromateis because the critical question underlying it has been by no means settled. Thus Photius says that it did not form part of the Stromateis in his day but that the Quis Dives Salvatur took its place. It is possible, as de Faye says, that we have here some of the unformed material for the great work which Clement had hoped to write on theology. Then there was no place for any such book among his works and so it was put in at different places in the early MSS. At any rate it seems a sort of handbook of Platonic philosophy, and has not been worked into the body of the Stromateis.

Chapter 1. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF CLEMENT

Concerning the external facts of the life of Clement we know very little; we know neither the place nor time either of his birth or death. He flits quickly across the page of history from darkness into darkness and is known to us, not by this or that specific thing which he did or did not accomplish, but by what he thought and the influence he exerted over men. We know him almost entirely through his writings, and in these we must find our Clement. Here we have something worth having and something the influence of which will never cease, while the story of some trivial incident in his life would be of little consequence in the history of the world in comparison with what we know of his thoughts and teachings. And buried up in these we have the biography of his mental development; here we have an autobiographical sketch as useful, if not so explicit, as the confessions of St. Augustine; and such a sketch can be reconstructed in its main outlines.

Titus Flavius Clemens is the full name of our Clement as given by Eusebius(1), by Photius(2), and is prefixed to the MSS of the Stromateis. The remarkable coincidence of his name with that of Flavius Clemens, the Consul of 95 A.D., and the nephew of Vespasian can hardly have been accidental, though no evidence is extant to prove what was his exact relation with that family. However this coincidence, taken along with the manifest learning he displays, suggests that he came from a wealthy family, which alone could have given him the excellent education which he must have received.

Epiphanius of Salamis (3) is the first to speak of Clement's birthplace and he says there were two opinions current in his day (i.e. a century and a half later) : "Clement, whom some say was from Alexandria, but others from Athens". Now there are obvious reasons for connecting him with Alexandria, the seat of his life's work, but there are no apparent reasons for connecting him with Athens. The statement that he was born at Athens must therefore rest on some credited tradition of the time of Epiphanius that he was born or educated there. This supposition gets support from the story he himself tells of his wanderings, in which he starts from Athens; and it at least coincides with the fact that he received a good education in philosophy, which he could certainly get at Athens. He was thus in all probability an Athenian by education if not by birth.

(1) H.E. VI. 13. (2) Cod. 111. (3) Haer. 32.6.

Clement was not born a Christian; he hints at this when he speaks of "disclaiming his former opinions" (4), and Eusebius definitely says he was born a pagan (5). He was thus placed in quite a different position from young Origen, who was a Christian from boyhood and received a Christian education. Clement certainly went to the ordinary pagan grammar school where he received his extensive knowledge of mythology from the study of the writings of the ancient poets - the sacred history of the Greeks. Thence he passed on into the schools of philosophy, before he became a Christian. We may be sure of one thing at least that he was a confirmed philosopher before he became a confirmed Christian. This would mean that he did not become a Christian until he was about the age of twenty-five. He has not told us what it was that definitely led him to Christianity but we can infer something of what it must have been. Now it is a fact which no one will deny that the future life of a Christian is much conditioned by the crisis, if such there be, or at least the decisive circumstance, which led to his becoming one. This is preeminently true in the case of St. Augustine and if we had both the confessions and the works meant for public reading, of other men, it would very probably be true in their cases too. What they emphasize in the Christianity of their future years, is what they had found wanting in their old religion; and their particular conception of it is explained by what they experienced at the moment of their conversion. St. Paul is a noteworthy example as he tells us about the decisive crisis which drove him into Christianity. Thus what Clement emphasizes is the new element he found at his conversion and that is the intellectual - a new conception of the deity and a new idea of what the religious life means. It was his intellect and not his conscience that found satisfaction in Christianity, and we must consider that he had been leading a worthy life before he became a Christian. There was no great gulf in his moral life - he did not feel that the acceptance of Christianity had meant for him a complete transplanting from a life of darkness and sin into one of bright happiness and holiness, as it meant for St. Augustine. He had become dissatisfied while a student with polytheism both from the moral and the intellectual sides, but he had found a scheme of ethics in the philosophic sects; what he was still longing for was the knowledge of things divine. He had sought this too among the philosophers, and the Pythagoreans had set him to learning geometry as an indispensable propaedeutic study, and the only consolation they could give his weary intellect was that "God geometrizes". What a loss of time for the man who was looking for a vision of God - for a vision of the unknown God! He was also dissatisfied with Stoicism, because its theology degraded God, when it said that He was in the meanest of matter. All that Stoicism could tell him, which he wished

(4) Paedag. I. 1.1.

(5) Ens. Demonstr. Evang. II.2.64.

to know, was God was One and that He was to be found in the workings of external nature; that the heavens declared his glory and the firmament shewed his handiwork. It widened his notion of Providence that was All in All, but it could not tell him of the nature of God. Then he turned to Plato, and now at last he hoped to get a vision of God. The incorporeal ideas filled him with enthusiasm; they seemed to give wings to his thoughts, whereby to soar up to the top of the vault of heaven and contemplate the moving principle of All, the really and truly Good. But for all his admiration of Plato, his long-desired vision of God seems never to have been fulfilled. He felt the need of some connecting link between himself and that far-off God, between the world of sense and the world of thought. But even if Platonism could not satisfy the inmost longings of his soul, it certainly left a lasting impression on his mind; and if it did nothing more, it at least enabled him to state his problem clearly and distinctly; he wanted knowledge of that great world-power whom he felt to be the very Idea of Good. His eclectic philosophy had failed to portray God. Now he met with Christianity, the complete wisdom and highest philosophy, with a true knowledge of things human and divine, and a perfect practise of the corresponding art. Its prophets gave him the conception of divinity he had been grasping after; its Christ came as the ideal man to reveal that God to men and to teach them to live like Himself; and then it had the stamp of representing things as they really were, in that it came, straight like drops of rain, from Heaven (6).

The only certain thing which we know of the early life of Clement is that he was an extensive traveller. He himself tells us that "he visited Magna Graecia, the East, Palestine and lastly Egypt" (7). What was the object of this long voyage? Like a true Greek, he was greedy for knowledge, but not now a knowledge of things divine, but rather a knowledge of the history and philosophy of his new religion; and we may be certain that no ordinary teacher satisfied him; he wanted some one who could explain Christian doctrines and express them in language which he could understand, so that we are not surprised to find that he studied under several teachers before he found rest. He tells us of his teachers: he begins by stating that his work was not written for display but as memoranda against old age

(6) This reconstruction of Clement's philosophic difficulties and the answer he found for them in Christianity was made by the help of a suggestion of M. de Faye that Clement's conversion was much the same as that of the writer of the Dialogue with Trypho.

(7) Strom. I.111.

of the vigorous and animated discourses he was privileged to hear "from blessed and truly remarkable men. Of these one was in Greece, an Ionian, the other in Magna Graecia; the first of these came from Cado-Syria, the latter from Egypt. There were others from the East, of which one was a native of Syria, the other a Hebrew from Palestine. When I came upon the last, who was the first in power, having traced him out in Egypt where he lay concealed, I remained with him. He, the true teacher, the Sicilian bee gathering the spoil of the flowers of the prophetic and apostolic meadow, engendered in the souls of his hearers a deathless element of knowledge" (7). Then he says that these teachers have faithfully guarded the apostolic tradition of doctrines, which had been handed down to them, and that they handed it on to him. This means that all these teachers were Christians, and that he was seeking to learn more from these men about the doctrines of his new religion. There is not the slightest evidence on the other hand for the supposition that Clement became a Christian while on his travels, made by M. de Faye, who then compares Clement to Plotinus, who set out on his travels "en quête de science divine et humaine; il était avide de savoir" (8). Clement had found this knowledge already, and he was then seeking merely to explain it more fully.

Who these teachers were, he has not himself told us, but scholars are in general agreement in accepting the statement of Eusebius (9) that the last teacher, whom he so warmly praises, was Pantaenus. Some have believed that Clement studied under Tatian and Theodotus (10), but this can hardly be so, for Clement gives as his reason for writing, his desire to perpetuate the teaching of his masters in Christian doctrine who had written nothing (11). These teachers are the unknown men, whom he so often speaks of as "the elders" (οἱ πρεσβύτεροι), by which name he does not mean so much that they were church officials as that they were old men who could remember the earliest generation of Christians, and as such were the depositories of Christian tradition. Now of these elders he often mentions Pantaenus, especially on questions of doctrines and traditions. Thus the teachings of the Stromateis, the longest work preserved, are those which he received on these journeyings; which, as he believed, he was merely reproducing (12).^{xsc. He} was quite unconscious of any fundamental difference between his doctrines and those of his predecessors. Though there may be illusion in this conviction, there must be much truth in it also, else it would have been detected by other writers of the next few centuries; as we shall have

(7) Strom. I.I.11.

(8) M. Eugene de Faye: Clement d'Alexandria. p.23.

(9) Eusebius H.E. VI. 11. (10) Hitchcock, p.55.

(11) Strom I.11, and Eclog. Proph. 27, in Bunsen's Ante-Nic. I.

(12) Ecl. Proph. 27. 50 & 56, & Str. II. 67, 68, being two interpretations he has heard of Psalms I.1.

occasion to point out, Clement reproduces much of the thought of Justin Martyr and the Fourth Gospel, while on the other hand orthodoxy, as we understand it today, did not exist even in the works of Irenaeus, as it was in a large measure the product of the school of Alexandria. Clement is thus as "orthodox", to use the anachronism, as any man of the time, and he does consciously try to reproduce the expositions he has heard. When we combine this conclusion with the other, that on his journeyings he was seeking to learn from the aged men of the Church more about its history, we have given special importance to the statements made by Clement in the works preserved to us, and those in works now lost, but fortunately quoted by Eusebius in a special chapter, on questions of early Church history. We see that Clement was a careful student, and one who was interested in past history; as Eusebius seems to have known, when he takes a whole chapter to reproduce the statements of Clement about the early history of the Church.

Now we are prepared to date Clement. We find him teaching in the Catechetical School in 190 A.D. as a colleague to Pantaenus, and later on, when Pantaenus may have been teaching in the East, but was more probably dead, as sole head of the school (13). We also know that when he wrote the Stromateis, some time after 192 A.D., he could still speak of himself as in his prime and as looking forward towards his old age. These facts enable us to place him between certain limits; we must be careful not to think of him as past middle life when he wrote the Stromateis, and we must also give him time for his education and travels. His education must have taken up his time until he was about twenty-five; and his travels and instruction under Pantaenus would take up several years more. Thus the year 160 A.D., or thereabouts, seems to fulfil all the conditions presented by known facts; so that he became a teacher in the school at the age of thirty, which does not seem unreasonable considering his precocious genius for acquiring facts and the excellent training he had had. This also suggests a motive for his flight from Alexandria in 202 A.D., when the persecution broke out; he was still in his prime, and felt that he would be worth more to the Church as a teacher than as a martyr.

After 202 A.D. Clement never came back to Alexandria. This is the only reasonable inference that can be

(13) From Eusebius H.E. VI.14 & 19 we see that Origen as well as Alexander was a pupil of Pantaenus so that he must have taken in Clement as a colleague. But on the other hand we know that some of Clement's works were written before 192 A.D. so that he must have been teaching there for some time. This is Zahn's argument as reproduced by M. de Waele. For Clement as the successor of Pantaenus see Eusebius H.E. VI.6.

made from the following passage of Eusebius, which we quote here in full for future reference: "While he (i.e. Origen) was engaged with his grammar school, as even he himself somewhere says, and since there was no one at Alexandria who had been given the task of giving catechetical instruction, but all had been driven away by the fear of persecution, there came to him certain of the people to hear the word of God. He was in his eighteenth year, when he was put at the head of the Catechetical school, in which he made progress during the persecutions of Aquila, the governor of Alexandria. And when he saw that he had already more than he could teach, since the Catechetical school had been entrusted to him alone by Demetrius, who was at the head of the Alexandrine Church, considering that the teaching of literature was inconsistent with the practise necessary for sacred teaching, without delay he abandoned the teaching in the grammar school as useless and inconsistent"(14). This passage shows that Demetrius gave the boy Origen the charge of the school during the time of persecution because there was no one else able to do the work. This explanation why Origen at so early an age (about eighteen) received this important position is perfectly adequate, and there is no reason to doubt the express statement of Eusebius. He also tells us that when Origen won a great reputation, Demetrius tried to get rid of him, but he kept on with his teaching and held the position when the Emperor Severus died (15). All this implies that Origen kept his position continuously and that Clement never came back. The next we hear of Clement is from a letter, which his pupil Alexander, then Bishop of Jerusalem, writes while in prison to the Church at Antioch, recommending Clement to that Church as a "man who had confirmed and increased the Church of God" (16). This letter implies that Clement was not teaching but helping his former pupil and friend in his episcopal duties, Clement must have died soon after, for Alexander speaks of him and Pantaenus as being dead when writing a letter to Origen (17), the words of which show that he was writing at the time when Origen first got into trouble with his Bishop, as he takes care to tell him that their friendship, which grew up between them as schoolboys in the school of Pantaenus and Clement, can never be broken. Clement's life was thus cut short when he was in his prime, and before he had completed the life-work he had planned out for himself.

(14) Eusebius H.E. VI. 3. N.B. Corrupt text in "without delay".

(15) Eusebius H.E. VI. 8.

(16) Eusebius H.E. VI. 11. This epistle can be dated from Eusebius VI.8, where he tells us that Alexander was in prison when the Emperor Severus died.

(17) Eusebius.

The origin of the Catechetical School at Alexandria, in which Clement won his reputation as a teacher, is as obscure as most questions concerning the Ecclesiastical history of the time; but Eusebius, the historian of the fourth century is very accurate, and he has quoted for us several contemporary documents which furnish us with circumstantial evidence that enables us, with our better historical method, to correct some of the traditions which he quotes as accredited in his own day. All that tradition had preserved to us of the early history of the school is that there was a school of sacred teaching (τῶν ἱερῶν λόγων) there from ancient times (18). The school emerges out of darkness under Pantaenus, and then it is an important institution. But even so we get no definite knowledge concerning it until the time of Origen and his pupils, and from their statements, studied in the light of Clement's works, we must try to find out what it was in his day. We know that from the earliest times the confirmation classes had been taught the elements of the Christian religion, and from this beginning undoubtedly grew the later Catechetical School. But some of the hearers, being men of education, asked for an explanation of these doctrines, and this precise teaching was soon offered. Thus Gregory Thaumaturgus, in his Panegyric of Origen (19), tells us that after an arduous preparatory training, Origen led his pupils up to a study of theology. The school was thus a seminary of Christian instruction, and its aim was to put their doctrines on a reasoned basis. But it was more than this; it was a propagandist institution which undertook to convert pagans and teach them the Christian way of living. Hermas tells us that in his day pagans often came to Christian services, and the reason why Origen opened the school during the persecutions was that certain pagans came to him asking to hear the word of God. Christianity was seeking to save the world, and it found it must associate with men of the world, if it was to convert them. There were now among the Christians men of education, who realized that if Christianity was to be understood at all and reach its coveted position of a world religion, it must express itself in the ordinary technical terminology of the day; that it was natural and lawful to fight their enemies with the enemies' weapons; and that they might summon philosophy and rhetoric to the defence of the persecuted cause. Thus were suddenly brought together in the cosmopolitan city of Alexandria two widely separated streams of ancient civilization, and we find in Clement's writings that the Christian

(18) Eusebius H.E. V. 10. Philip of Side, of the fifth century, tells us that Athenagoras founded the school, but he is an authority otherwise discredited and this is probably only a guess of his own.

(19) Gregory Thaum. Paneyr in Orig. ch.8.

way of life is not outwardly distinct from the better life to which pagan preachers exhorted men, and that Christianity is beginning to develop a systematic theology as an answer to the great problems of humanity. Probably the first man to do this systematically was the shadow personage of Pantaenus. M. Ernest Renan gives an admirable sketch of his work: "La vocation de Pantaenus était surtout l'enseignement oral; sa parole avait un charme extrême; il laissa chez ses disciples, plus célèbres que lui, un sentiment profond. Non moins favorable que Justin à la philosophie, il concevait le christianisme comme le culte de tout ce qui est beau. Heureux génie, brillant, lumineux, bien-veillant pour tout, il fut à son heure l'esprit le plus libéral et le plus ouvert que l'Eglise eût possédé jusque-là, et il marque l'aurore d'un remarquable mouvement intellectuel, supérieur peut-être à tous les essais de rationalisme qui se sont jamais produits au sein du christianisme" (20). In Clement's day the school was performing the three tasks above mentioned, of winning heathens, of instructing them in the Christian life, and lastly of explaining to the more advanced students a Christian theology. In this way the school gave a system of education that satisfied all Christians, whether educated or not, as it gave those who had the ability, a chance to find out what Christian doctrines stood for; and it also provided its own future teachers from those who were its most advanced pupils. Now these different aspects of the teaching of the school are apparent throughout Clement's writings.

After 202 A.D. the history of the school comes out into the clear light of history (21), and we can learn much from what it was under Origen as to what it must have been under Pantaenus and Clement. When Clement left Alexandria in 202 because of the persecution, the school was closed, but at length Origen reopened it at the request of certain pagans. Now Origen can hardly have made innovations so soon after the school was closed; he thought he was merely reviving a time-honoured institution. The only innovation can have been the early age at which he became head of the school, and that was necessary because of the exigencies caused by persecutions. At first Origen kept his grammar-school open also, but soon, when he found that he had more pupils in the Catechetical school than he could teach, he closed the other as being useless and inconsistent. By this he must have meant that it was useless to keep both open, as he taught literature in both, and that it was inconsistent, as in the one he was giving only a part of the truth, the whole of which might be had in the other (22). But we now find that Demetrius, the Bishop of Alexandria, invested Origen with the official mastership of the school because of

(20) E. Renan. Marc-Aurele vol. 7 de l'Histoire des Origines du Christianisme ch. 24. p. 432.

(21) Eusebius H.E. V & VI.

(22) See note (14).

his excellent work in propagating Christianity and instructing the faithful; but while bestowing a nominal honour on Origen, he brought the School under his own jurisdiction. This act was merely one part in the development of the Episcopate into an ecclesiastical monarchy, which was later to become a despotism, and claim that it alone held the keys of the Kingdom. This gives us almost perfect proof that the Church of Alexandria at first had no connection with the Catechetical School, which may have grown up spontaneously. A learned Christian, seeing the need, had begun to offer instruction there for the mere love of it, as pagan philosophers and preachers were doing elsewhere in the same city (23). The School may have been founded by some wandering evangelist, such as we hear of in Eusebius (24), who was allowed to go on with his work, with perhaps some slight opposition from the simple-minded, until the school, when under the leadership of a boy, was absorbed into the Church proper. This interpretation illustrates several things: it gives meaning to the words of Clement that he found Pantaenus concealed in Egypt (25); it gives us a hint that Clement never came back to the school because it was no longer the free school in which he had taught, but under the jurisdiction of a bigoted and selfish bishop (26); and it also explains the struggle between Origen and his Bishop as, partly a struggle between a man who stood for freedom of thought and a Bishop whose aim was the subjection of everyone to himself. Again, the complete silence of Clement, Alexander, and Origen about earlier heads of the school ought to be conclusive that there were none. An obscure but learned Christian founded the school in a humble way and on his own responsibility, as his pupil Origen afterwards restored it. It was Clement himself who brought the Catechetical School into the light of day and made it great.

Clement was an extensive writer but we do not possess all his works. Eusebius names the following (27) :-

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- (23) The fact that Origen would not take pay from the Catechetical School, while he would from the grammar school, points to the supposition that the teaching was gratuitous.
- (24) Eusebius H.E. III. 37, and Didache, ch. 11. "The apostles", as it calls them were travelling missionaries, as we see from the orders about entertaining them. Justin Martyr was such a one.
- (25) See note (7).
- (26) All that Eusebius tells us of Demetrius justifies this description.
- (27) Neither Jerome nor Photius can help us here. Jerome only knows the works that Eusebius knows, but he omits one and mixes up the name of another. Photius omits the same one, No. (9) in our list. See Wescott's article in Dict. Christ. Biog. Eus. H.E. VI. 13.

- (1). Στρωματεῖς, libb. VIII.
- (2). Ὑποτυώσεις, libb. VIII.
- (3). Πρὸς Ἑλλήνας λόγος προτρεπτικός.
- (4). Παιδαγωγός, libb. III.
- (5). Τίς ὁ σωζόμενος πλούσιος.
- (6). Περὶ τοῦ πένου.
- (7). Διαλέξεις περὶ νηστείας.
- (8). Περὶ καταλαλίας.
- (9). Προτρεπτικός εἰς ὑπομονήν.
- (10). Κανὼν ἐκκλησιαστικός.

We have today Nos. (1), (3), (4), (5), extensive fragments of No. (2), and fragments of other works, e.g. "On the Soul" to which Clement himself refers (28); but most of these fragments are in all probability passages from the lost works above noted.

Omitting the sermon on Riches, the works which we do possess form parts of a great "corpus theologicum", which he had projected, but was never able to complete. Let us study the plan he had formed before we take up the separate books.

He gives us this plan at the beginning of the Paedagogus: "Of the three parts of man, morals, actions, and passions, his morals have been taken by the Protrepticus, which is the guide of piety, and like the keel of a ship, is the foundation of the edifice of faith; rejoicing in which, and having abjured our ancient opinions, we renew our youth by coming into salvation. How good God is to Israel, to the upright in heart! All actions are the province of the Logos, which gives precepts (ὁποθετικός), while the Logos which exhorts (παρμυθητικός) cures the passions. It is however one and the same Logos, which on the one hand rescues man from the customs of this world in which he has been reared, and on the other hand leads him (παιδαγωγῶν) into the unique salvation which results from faith in God. Thus the heavenly guide, the Logos, was rightly called protrepticus or converter when he invites men to salvation. But now being at once healer and preceptor (θεραπευτικός καὶ ὁποθετικός), a part which he plays after the former

(28) Strom. III.3.13.

(ἑπόμενος αὐτῷ), he exhorts to obedience those whom he has converted (lit. "the head which has been converted", in Migne ed.) promising the cure of the passions within us. From which let the Logos be called by one name appropriate to his character, the Paedagogus. Now the Paedagogus is concerned with practice and not with theory. His aim being to improve the soul and not to teach it, and to be the Master, not of an intellectual life, but of a virtuous life. And yet the same Logos is a Teacher (διδασκαλός), but not now (i.e. in this work). For the Logos which in matter of doctrine explains and reveals, is the same as the Logos which teaches. But being our Paedagogus, it first exhorts to the attainment of right dispositions and character, and then persuades us to the energetic practice of our duties, enjoining on us pure commandments, and exhibiting to such as live afterwards, representations of those who have been led astray. Both are most necessary duties, that which assumes the form of counselling to obedience, and that which is presented in the form of example.Eagerly desiring, therefore, to perfect us in a gradual development in salvation and to bring us unto a perfect training (παιδείης), the Logos, being a lover of mankind in all respects, makes use of an excellent plan (οἰκονομία), and first exhorts (προτρεπῶν) ἡμᾶς, then leads (ἔπειτα παιδαγωγῶν) and finally teaches (ἐπὶ πάντων ἐνδιδασκῶν)!!

A truly wonderful plan for one's life work! And running through the whole of that plan we find the Logos, the keystone of his theology. The Logos is in the world inspiring every good and useful thought, and so he can speak of his own works as the teachings of the Logos. The great work which he proposes to write divides itself according to the duties of the Logos, into three parts of which one has been completed, the second is just being begun, while the third is in the future. The first, the Protrepticus or exhortation, is a propagandist work, and is addressed to pagans; it tries to convince them of the folly of idolatry and immorality, which Clement thought was a direct result of the former; and to win them to the service of the Logos. His first aim is to free his hearers from the pagan way of living and pagan customs (ἡθῆ), or what he has just called ἡ σύντροφος καὶ κοσμικὴ συννηθσία; and so he begins by asking his hearers to give up their mythology, which, however beautiful, was full of deceits and the cause of their corrupt manners. Instead of this he offers them a new song, the Logos as Teacher of the human race; he does not aim merely at freeing them from superstition but he wishes to communicate his religion to them. From the beginning the Logos was man's ally and gave him revelations by prophecy, but now he has appeared in human form as Christ and summons to piety. He compares the Logos to a physician who, to cure his patients, gives them treatment which they do not like, but it is merely to confer a benefit. Clement exhorts men to Christ by putting

emphasis on His love, which would even see them suffer temporary pain for greater and more lasting happiness; while he never employs the method of terrifying men by fear of future retribution. Clement is a most persuasive preacher; while he criticises paganism very severely, we ever feel that he had once been a pagan himself, and that he did not believe it was entirely bad and the work of devils; he has words of pity rather than of scorn for it, and the worst he can say of it is that it degraded God by likening Him to man. In the *Protrepticus* Clement is a preacher, speaking for the Logos, and trying to win converts; and his aim has been accomplished when they have been baptized (ἐπὶ τὸ λουτρὸν).

In the *Paedagogus* Clement takes up his great task of educating mankind, from the point at which he had left it in the *Protrepticus*, and goes on to explain to those who had left the darkness of paganism what the Christian life really means. What was absolutely necessary has been accomplished in his hearers, but Clement does not wish them to stop there. The neophyte by a definite act of will has put faith in Jesus as his Saviour, but he is still sick and diseased, from which state he must be set free. He has renounced paganism and accepted the new religion but his soul is full of passions (παθῶν) from which only a severe discipline (δουλοῖς) based on reason can liberate him; and now the Instructor (παιδαγωγός) cures these unnatural passions of the soul by means of exhortations. The human physician heals our bodies but the Great Physician, the Logos of the Father, heals both body and soul. And so he begins by explaining the office of the Logos as Instructor and how both men and women are alike under His charge. This last was necessary as an answer to paganism with its Gods for each sex. Then he goes on to give us some of the duties of the Christian life, which we find are merely those which pagan preachers were exhorting men to; in fact, he has in this part copied largely from Musonius Rufus, a Stoic teacher of the first century A.D. Thus the *Paedagogus* is a book of Christian morality and its aim is purely practical - the inculcation of the duties of the Christian life, without an explanation of all the philosophic difficulties underlying those duties; it is the *De Officiis* of the Logos to His children.

But Clement is not satisfied with this; he hopes to complete the work he has begun, and to make his hearers into perfect Christians who know what they have believed. They have been purified of all vices and affections incompatible with the Christian life; they have received its highest revelations but there is still for them the system of doctrine which underlies those revelations. The third book will consist of an exposition of Christian doctrines, and he proposes to call it ὁ δίδασκαλός. But we at once ask if it has been preserved to us, and, if not, if

any of the men of the next century knew of it. We can answer positively to both questions that such a work has never been heard of outside of his own references to it as something which he hoped to do in the future. And yet many scholars, knowing that no work of such a name existed, but remembering his promise, have argued that the Stromateis form that work; and that he found the subject very intractable, and could not reduce it to a perfect system, so that he called the work a Scrap-book. This seems to be the opinion of Hamak (e.g. Dogmengeschichte) (29) when he says that Clement in his day was not able to work out a system of theology but was obliged to leave the task to Origen. But such an interpretation of Clement's life work rests entirely on the identification of the promised Didascalus with our Stromateis, so that it is worth while to ask ourselves if Clement ever meant to identify them. Now at the end of the Paedagogues we find these words: "And now at last it is time for me to cease from the Paedagogues and for you to hear the Didascalus. And He, receiving you who have been trained in noble living, will teach you τὰ λογία" (30). Nothing could be clearer; he proposes to give us a system of doctrines. But is the Stromateis such? No, for in one place, when he is telling us what he has still to do, he speaks of the Didascalus as the very crown and completion of his present work (31). Having completed all that we have proposed (i.e. the Stromateis, as he has just told us, with a work on Prophecy and a commentary on the Scriptures) in these memoirs, if the spirit will, (reading τούτοις for οἷς) we shall minister to the urgent need and, address ourselves to the true gnostic science of nature (φυσικολογία).....which, according to the rule (κανὼν) of the true gnostic tradition, starts from the discussion of cosmogony and thence ascends to the department of theology" (i.e. φυσικολογία contains both κοσμολογία and θεολογία). Thus when writing Book Four of the Stromateis, Clement did not think he was writing on theology but only a preliminary discussion. Nor can Bunsen be correct when he identifies the Hypotyposes with the Didascalus, for all we know of the Hypotyposes goes to prove that it was merely the Commentary on the Scriptures, which he had hoped to work into the Stromateis, when writing Book Four. Thus Eusebius (33) tells us that Clement in the Hypotyposes gave some account of the writing of the books of the New Testament. As M.de Faye has so well argued, Clément never wrote the Didascalus: il "remet constamment la tractation doctrinale a une partie ulterieure de son ouvrage.....Nous supposons donc que Clement n'a pas réussi à mener à bonne fin l'ouvrage aux propositions grandioses qu'il avait conçu et que le temps ou les forces lui ont manque pour écrire ce qui eût été la premiere dogmatique

(29) Hamak Eng.t. II p.331. (30) III.12. 97, 98 of Paedagog.

(31) Strom.IV.1. whole chapter. (32) Bunsen - Hippolytus

(33) Eusebius H.E. VI. I. p.238.

chretienne. C'est à son élève Origène que cette tâche devait être réservée. Le De Principiis d'Origène est probablement l'ouvrage qui donne l'idée la plus exacte de celui que notre auteur espérait écrire un jour" (34). Since such a careful scholar as J.B. Mayor accepts this thesis, it does not seem necessary to repeat any more of de Faye's arguments against the identification of the Stromateis with his proposed theological work.

But what is the Stromateis? A sort of "hors-d'oeuvre", which the author had not at first thought of, but which he afterwards found it necessary to write because his earlier works had been misunderstood. Thus he tells us that certain ignorant people believed that everything besides simple faith was superfluous, and against these he defends his use of Greek Philosophy as a necessary equipment (35), and states his firm conviction that while one may be a believer without learning (ἄνθρωπος ἡρώδης), it is impossible for a man without learning to comprehend (συνεῖναι) the things which are declared (τὰ ἐν τῇ πίστει λεγόμενα) in the faith (36). Again, the simple-minded must have been shocked at the way in which Clement in the last books of the Paedagogus identified the Christian way of living with the pagan. But Clement had never meant that account of Christian duties to be taken as a complete description of the Christian life; and so he has to portray what the life of the gnostic Christian really is, not merely with relation to externals, but especially with reference to his own soul and will. Certain others objected to the very notion of expressing the Christian religion in terms of Greek thought; as we shall see later on, they were afraid that any theology at all meant the fantastic systems of Basilides and Valentinus. Now it was to answer such questions as these that Clement wrote his Stromateis, and this accounts for the polemical parts in it. He wished to justify his use of the Greek philosophers, and so he explained his notion of a Providence which is the cause of all that is good, whether strictly Christian or not; to answer the objection that the Christian life meant only a purged pagan life, with no positive addition, he gives us his notion of πίστις as a definite act of will by which man at his conversion gets positive help and inspiration from the Logos to lead a better life; and finally he treats of the progressive education of the Christian until he becomes an expert theologian; and at the same time he points out, to those who were willing to search for it, the way in which a Christian theology could be thought out without becoming like that of Valentinus. As he tells us in its name, it is a Scrap-Book, and not a system of theology. But he never expected when he began to write, that it would grow to

(34) de Faye's Clement p.93.

(35) Strom. I. 2.

(36) Strom I. 6. 35.

the limits it did (37). He only expected to write a short treatise which would come between the *Paedagogus* and the *Didascalus*; but the work grew in his hands and theological discussions kept forcing themselves in to such an extent that later writers could think he meant it for a work on systematic theology.

Eusebius dates these works of Clement when he says that in the *First Book of the Stromateis* Clement brings all his dates down to the death of Commodus 193 A.D. (38). This places the *Stromateis* after that date; and we may be quite certain that they were written out, at least in the form of lecture-notes, before he left Alexandria in 202. The *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus* must be earlier, and they were written in the order named, as the first chapter of the *Paedagogus* shows (39). The other large work, the *Hypotyposes*, is put before the *Stromateis* by M. de Faye, but in this he most certainly goes wrong: both Mayor and Th. Zahn argue against him. Clement in the first chapter of the *Paedagogus* tells us that he hopes to write a commentary on the Scriptures before he writes his theological treatise; and the *Hypotyposes* was such. It was another work preparatory to his "chef d'oeuvre".

Underlying all of Clement's writings is the one notion of the Christian life as an education superintended by the Logos, of which there are three stages represented by the *Protrepticus*, the *Paedagogus*, and the untouched *Didascalus*. Taken as such his writings represent the teaching he gave in the Catechetical School. Clement was not the sort of a man to write because he knew he could write well; he never thought of that, but his whole purpose is decidedly practical, to further the interests of Christianity. Burnet was certainly very rash when he said that Clement was a writer first, and a Christian writer after (40). His writings seem to be lecture-notes, which he revised for public perusal when he found that his teaching was proving acceptable to the students within the school. Such a supposition can alone explain the intrusion of learned quotations from Greek philosophers in the midst of bursts of eloquent exhortation; these quotations had a meaning to his students, but very little, even to the educated reader outside. Now we can bring all his writings together as work which he did for his students while master of the school. The *Protrepticus*-course was for those who were seeking the truth; the *Quis Dives Salvetur* and the *Paedagogus* for these who were trying

(37) *Strom.* IV. 1.3. where he says he will next present "whatever points we were not able to embrace in the previous *Stromata* in accordance with the beginning of the introduction, finishing them in one commentary". The introduction of *Strom* I. is lost.

(38) Eusebius H.E. VI. 6.

(39) See page.

(40) In Menzie's *Review of Theol. and Phil.* May 1906

A review of Stahlins edition of *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus*.

to perform the moral duties inculcated by Christian teachers; and the unwritten Didasculas would probably have represented the lectures given to those who went on to take the highest course, that of Divinity. Then the Hypotyposes was to serve as a foundation for the whole, like the last book of Origen's *De Principiis*, as it treated of the revelation in the Sacred Scriptures. Besides this we know that under Origen (41) the students took a course in literature (*γραμματική*) before studying theology, and the same must have been the case when Clement was master, because he so frequently quotes the great master-pieces of Greek literature, and his quotations would have been almost meaningless unless the students knew the more important of the works quoted, by their own reading. Under Clement the Catechetical School was a little Christian world all in itself; it was both a mission, a church, and a university; its aim was to win pagans for its faith, to instruct its own students both morally and intellectually, by sermons and by learned discourses; and it was a university which educated men to serve as bishops and teachers for the next generation. The institution was at first self-sufficient, and it was only when the school became incorporated into the Bishop's diocese that it gave up propagandist work and had to depend on others for its students. This was what the Catechetical School at Jerusalem was like under Cyril in the Fourth Century (42), and the change from that of Clement was due to the encroachments of the clergy. Like many modern universities it began activities quite outside the Church, but was later absorbed, and made to serve, however unwillingly, the dictates of a clergy.

(41) Gregory Thaumaturgus: Panegyric on Origen. Arg. 13.
 (42) Cyril of Jerusalem: Catechetical Lectures.

Chapter 11.

THE QUESTION OF THE RELATION
OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY;
CLEMENT'S VIEW.

Christianity in its earliest form was not philosophic just because its parent Judaism was not; it indeed dealt with the profoundest problems of human life, but solely from the standpoint of the man who wished to live better, and not from that of the man who was trying to relate each thing to something else, and to form a systematic scheme of thought. Thus a blind man sitting by the wayside offered to the disciples the interesting theological problem of the connection between sin and physical evil or deformity; but it was to Christ an opportunity for doing good, and instead of giving a learned discourse, we are told that He healed the man (1). This incident is typical; Christianity was at first a religious movement, and so when we find Christian teachers recognizing that it has anything to do with philosophy, that marks an important step in its history. We are now to consider how this question was forced to the front.

The words of Paul seem typical of the Christianity of the first century, that not many wise men were called. It was working among the lower classes, and we might say that it had not yet definitely shown itself on the surface of the Roman Empire. Paul was its one great thinker, but he stands almost alone, and after his death we hear of no man who like him was a missionary and a theologian. As Harnack somewhere asks, where was Paulinism known in the second century except in Marcion? (2). Christianity was preaching a religion which consisted essentially in a moral regeneration, and if it asked men to believe certain statements about the life of its founder, it took but little care to defend these beliefs, except by the upright life of its adherents. It was fighting the moral evils of the Roman world, and all its forces were spent in that direction; it made no special effort to win men of education, but rather sought to humiliate them, by asking them to become as babes in Christ. The Christianity of the average man

(1) Fourth Gospel IX. 1-7.

(2) The reference is to Paul's attitude to Judaism but it also shows the ~~character~~ of the next seventy-five years towards learning.

of this period seems admirably represented in the Didache, where it is expounded as a way of living, and we are told what the Christian must and must not do - its Christianity is an incarnation of the moral law in the person of Christ. The new movement is still satisfied with the Jewish garb in which it had been born.

But inasmuch as Christianity claimed to be a perfect and universal religion, it was forced, as it grew in numbers and power, to define its relation to other religions, and also to work out for itself a philosophy of its fundamental beliefs. This was an inherent necessity which began to be felt early in the second century; when Christianity almost unconsciously met the alternative, of answering the philosophic questions which confronted it, or of openly declaring that a subjective experience was sufficient to constitute them as Christians apart from any intellectual interpretation of that experience, and that reason was the enemy, and not the ally, of religious trust. It took the latter alternative, though not without some dissenting voices. Now since it was a despised religion, and often confounded with Judaism, it was forced to defend itself; but, whereas at first it had done this merely by pointing to the lives of its devotees, it now in the second century began to defend itself by intellectual methods, so that we get apologists. One of the first charges which they had to answer was that of atheism; their task was to show that they were not, and this necessitated some definite notion of what God was. Another important question which the violent opposition it met forced it to settle, was that of its relation to other religions; and this brought up the question of the place of Christianity in history. These questions were not settled until the second century of Christianity, but they show by their very existence an inherent necessity, which was to be met sooner or later. But this necessity was precipitated by external events.

Probably the most momentous event for Christianity in the second half of the first century A.D. was the fall of Jerusalem before the army of Titus. Up to that time Christianity had been working particularly among the Jews with almost no thought for Greek culture; but Judaism now turned back on itself, and we find no more of such liberal, though devout, Jews as Philo. He had no successor, and with him Hellenistic Judaism came to an end, because Judaism on the fall of Jerusalem entered a new stage under the leadership of Hillel. "This direction led farther and farther away from that which the New Testament had taken in following up and unfolding the spiritual elements of the Old. That development was incapable of transformation or renovation"(3).

(3) Edersheim - "Life of Christ" - vol.I. chapter 4. pg.57 of Amer. Ed.

It went on consistently to its completion in the Talmud Literature. This was a movement of contraction and concentration, so that Judaism now very carefully distinguished itself from all that was gentile; it became secluded and exclusive.

This action reacted on Christianity; whereas Paul sought to gain his converts in the Jewish quarters of the cities he visited, that field of operations was now definitely closed. We no longer get such letters as those of Paul to the Jewish converts in Rome or Galatia, and the Christianity represented by James the Bishop of Jerusalem, becomes less and less important. Christianity was forced to win its converts from paganism, rather than from Judaism, which now saw its greatest enemy in Christianity. Thus the great men of the next century in the Christian Church are converts from paganism.

The gospel offered its blessings freely to all and so was seeking educated men, who asked for a solution of their intellectual difficulties, as well as for ease of conscience. These men had often been trained in philosophy, and its terminology formed for them the very ground-work of their thinking or speculative problems, as Christianity had no such language of its own. Philosophy had many technical words which shortened the processes of thinking, and these the educated Christians began to use to explain, in a Christian way, the great problems of life. But these words brought with them certain suppositions, of which the most important was the power and importance of reason as a guide for action. Now when there was brought before the well-trained mind of the Greeks a religion, claiming as it then was beginning to do, to be a body of revealed truth, they at once tried to adjust the new material to the old, and to express this new revelation, considered both as an objective fact of past history, and a subjective fact of personal every-day experience, in the terms and notions they had inherited from their own philosophy. This stage was represented by Justin Martyr. He was dissatisfied with philosophy, else he would never have become a Christian; but he saw no opposition between the two. Thus he says that God gave philosophy to the Greeks for the same purpose that He gave the Law to the Hebrews, to serve as a slave (~~7618-~~ *2/10/08*) to lead them to the school of Christ; and he calls Socrates and Heraclitus Christians before their times, just as the Hebrew patriarchs had been. Now we find in Justin the philosophic term Logos used to explain the nature of the person of Christ, and this is the point where Greek speculation entered the Christian religion; it gave it a doctrine of God. Christians had all along been interested in the person of their founder, and now a philosopher tried to explain the nature of that person by a term borrow-

ed from the Jew Philo. Justin definitely "baptized" philosophic terms and methods into Christianity, but at the same time he insisted on his religion as a personal act of faith in a living and ideal personality, and not as a mere intellectual comprehension of certain notions. It was the perfect philosophy, but philosophy then meant not so much a scheme of knowledge as the knowledge requisite for an art of life.

But many of the first Christians drawn from the educated classes went so far with their philosophizing that the majority of Christians said that they had destroyed Christianity altogether. These are the people known as Gnostics, than whom there never were men more abused, and more unjustly abused, by their fellow-Christians. Now whatever else we may find in the fragments of their writings, that have been preserved to us, we must admit that they were the first systematic theologians. But they undoubtedly did philosophize away many great truths taught by Christ, and so they were driven out of the regular Churches to form ones of their own. Let us remember, however, that they were never thought of in their own day as anything but Christians, however bad. Thus it is grossly unfair of Canon Bigg to call Plutarch a gnostic, merely because he was troubled by the same questions as Valentinus, and gave much the same answers (4); he was not even a Christian, much less a sectarian (*ἀιρεσις* = Sect.). In such an unjustified comparison Canon Bigg is following the questionable authority of such men as Irenaeus and Epiphanius, who certainly did not understand their opponents well enough to give a just criticism of them, and so they fell back on the method of misrepresenting what they disliked. But Clement of Alexandria has preserved for us several fragments of the writings of Valentinus, from which we find that he was not such a foolish thinker after all, but that Christ occupies the central position of his theology (5): "Valentinus in his letter to Agathopous says that Jesus by subjecting all things to himself became powerful, and in this way worked out his divinity". Clement looks on Valentinus as a man who had trusted mere speculation too far, and had consequently departed from the traditional faith that came from the disciples; but he never takes delight in misconstruing and emphasizing wrongly the ideas of his opponents for the purpose of making them appear ridiculous. From Clement we thus see that Valentinus was really dealing in an imperfect sort of a way with the momentous philosophic problems which underlie Christianity. He was troubled by the question of evil. Christianity in that age insisted very strenuously on the evil that was in the world and the gnostics thus met this question among the first. Thus Canon Bigg himself says that it is unfair to approach these men from

(4) Bigg Christian Platonists.

(5) Strom. III. 7. 59.

the speculative side, since their metaphysical speculations were predetermined by their answer to the question of evil; we must begin to study them from the ethical standpoint, and we then see that they were troubled by the presence of evil in a world made by an Omnipotent and Benevolent God. Again Marcion was troubled by the relation of Christianity to Judaism, since he found certain qualities attributed to God in the Old Testament, which he saw were unworthy of Him, and since he was not prepared to accept the common doctrine of the time of allegorical interpretation, according to which the evident historic meaning was declared to be of no worth, except as a means of conveying other and greater truths covered up in it, which were to be extracted by this method of allegory. But as he had no notion of development, he insisted that the God of the Old Testament was different from Him whom Christ called Father; Christianity was either Judaism, or it was not; and it certainly was not. Thus he was lead into ditheism. But we ought to remember that such a notion did not appear as foblish to these men as it does to us, because they were nearer polytheism than we are. In trying to solve the problems which confronted them, undoubtedly the gnostics did reach some fantastic conclusions, yet we ought to remember that they were breaking new ground and handling very heavy tools, before we condemn their clumsy workmanship. Gnosticism is thus only a part of the great movement of Greek Christianity of that age to give a reasoned explanation of the enigmas of the religious life of the Christian and of the person of Christ, and in many respects is much like the theological systems of several of the early Fathers.

But because of their fanciful, and often absurd, results, the great majority of Christians felt bound to use force against the Gnostics, and drove them out of their Churches. To justify this step, and to prevent men from falling prey to the Gnostic theologies, the orthodox Church, if we may use the word for the conservative party, began to build a system of their own, the tradition of the Church, to which they appealed, as a supreme authority against the arguments of their opponents. This was particularly necessary, because many of the Gnostics were known to have tampered with the commonly accepted traditions of the day, to justify certain of their philosophic conclusions from the sacred writings. We must consider that the importance given in that age to an apostolical tradition was meant, partly at least, to counterbalance Gnostic speculations. In this way the Church got a rule of faith, which its adherents must subscribe to. But in so doing the Church itself performed one of the very purposes which Gnosticism had aimed at; the notion was fast becoming fixed, under the influence of the Jewish Scriptures, that Christianity was a body of revealed truths, and so "the rule of faith, explained and expanded, was transformed from a con-

fession of existing faith into a creed that conditions the existence of faith" (6); it was not a spontaneous outgrowth of the life within the fold, but the pass-word which one had to give to get in. Thus not only Gnosticism itself, but the opposition it aroused tended to emphasize the intellectual element of Christianity and when the church made Christianity into a body of revealed doctrines, it gave future theologians something definite to elaborate into a theology by the help of philosophy.

The early theologians had worked with a free hand, with nothing to hinder them from going wrong except their Logic; future theologians had to take account of a Church tradition, as well as reason, of which the tradition was taken as the criterion of the truth, and reason was only to explain it. But this ^{*sc.} ~~change~~ *development* was only gradual and it took place later in Alexandria than elsewhere. Thus Clement appeals to the sacred scriptures, the teaching of the Lord, and to the tradition which he had received from the ancient elders, but he places along side of the common tradition, which Harnak (7), with reference to Clement, says is Christian common sense, another and secret one, the gnostic. As against Irenaenus he insists that the common or catholic tradition is not the highest, and he does not find in it a fixed system of fundamental propositions. We might indeed find all the items of the Roman "regula fidei", the Apostles creed, scattered through Clement's works, but the important thing to note is that he does not bring them together into a creed. Such a fixed standard did not then exist in Alexandria, and the tradition which Clement appeals to is "the yet unsystematized tradition". This is important as showing that a Christian theology was beginning to unfold itself before the Church tradition was finally settled.

At first Greek speculation was distrusted in many quarters because men remembered that the Gnostics had been trained in Greek ways of thinking before they became Christians; and they associated the finished product entirely with the tools employed and not with the material which they had to work on. They believed that philosophy was entirely bad, partly because these early theologians had been led into extravagancies while using its methods, and partly because they found that many of the philosophers of the day (e.g. Celsus) openly opposed them. They conceived these attitudes to be the result of philosophic study, which only led to arrogance, and so they demanded the acceptance of the rule of faith without explanation;

(6) L.D. Osborn. Recovery of the Gospel.

(7) Dr. Th. Zahn in his "Supplementum Clementinum", I am told, admits that Clement did not have our formal ~~creed~~.

See Harnak Hist. of Dogma vol. 2 pg. 32-34 with notes.

they seemed afraid to trust their God-given reason. Tatian represents this type of mind; he absolutely scorns and despises all pagan culture and asks for some worthy product of the zeal of the philosophers. Again he takes great pleasure in mentioning the most foolish stories about the terrible deaths of philosophers, and he makes use of the fact they do not agree among themselves to prove that they were all imposters (8). This is the attitude of those who were frightened by Greek philosophy, and Tatian is particularly interesting because he does not see that he has himself been influenced by Greek philosophy when he uses the doctrine of the Logos (9). ~~The question of education also helped~~

The question of education also helped to force Christianity to define its position to Greek culture. At first Christianity had drawn most of its converts from Judaism, and the educational system of paganism had not been important, but now it became so when there were many Roman and Greek families with children to educate. Again the fact that infant baptism did not bother the Church during the first and second century also points to the fact that there were not many Christian children during those times; probably because adults were sought as converts and not children. In the time of Tertullian we know that the question of education was an important one.

Let us ask ourselves what a Christian boy would meet when he went to an ordinary pagan school. He would first of all be taught to read out of books literally saturated with the old mythology, which all Christians were taught to hate; the stories of this mythology formed the sacred history of the times, and as such they were explained and held up to the boy's reverence. Then a part of the fees which he paid to his master, was offered to the goddess Minerva, the patroness of learning; and he was also obliged to keep her festivals. The ordinary education was then a dangerous pursuit for a Christian boy, and at the end of the second century, educated men were feeling it to be such. They were asking what might be done that their children might be educated like others and yet not run the risk of losing their faith in Christianity. Tertullian has some very apt words on this subject: "Quaerendum autem est etiam de ludimagistris, sed et ceteris professoribus

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- (8) Tatian. Oratio ch.2,3. Tatian's hatred for Greek philosophy was probably influenced by his Syrian origin so that he is not typical of all the Church but only of the Jewish Christians; but this is important for us, because we know there were many of these in Alexandria.
- (9) Oratio ch.5.

litterarum. immo non dubitandum affines illos esse multimodae idololatriae. primum quibus necesse est deos nationum praedicare, nomina, genealogias, fabulas, ornamenta honorifica quaeque eorum enuntiare, tum sollemnia festaque eorundem observare, ut quibus uestigalia sua supputent. quis ludimagister sine tabula VII idolorum quinquatria tamen frequentabit? ipsam primam novi discipuli stipem Mineruae et honori et nomini consecrat, ut etsi non profanatus alicui idolo uerbotenius de idolothyto esse dicatur, pro idololatra uitetur. quid? minus est inquinamenti? eoque praestat quaestus et nominibus et honoribus idolo nuncupatus? quam Minerualia Mineruae, quam Saturnalia Saturni, quae etiam seruiculis sub tempore Saturnalium celebrari necesse est. etiam strenuae captandae et septimontium, et Brumae et carae cognationis honoraria exigenda omnia, Florae scholae coronandae;

flamminicae et aediles sacrificant creati; schola honoratur feriis. idem fit idoli natali; omnis diaboli pompa frequentatur. quis haec competere Christiano existimabit, nisi qui putabit conuenire etiam non magistro? scimus dici posse: si docere litteras dei seruis non licet, etiam nec discere licebit, et quomodo quis institueretur ad prudentiam interim humanum uel ad quemcumque sensum uel actum, cum instrumentum sit ad omnem uitam litteratura? quomodo repudiamus saecularia studia, sine quibus diuina non possunt? uidaemus igitur necessitatem litteratoriae eruditionis, respiciamus ex parte eam admitti non posse, ex parte uitari." (10) Tertullian sees the dangers; he sees that the education of the time was almost inextricably mixed up with, and in fact an apologetic for paganism; and yet he feels that in a sense the danger is unavoidable, as their children must receive an education in the same studies as other children do. He does recognize that secular and spiritual education are eventually inseparable; what he seems to want is a purged pagan education, for he does not wish to reject it altogether. This seems the one thing which the fiery Tertullian thought useful in all pagan culture, - and this very fact shows how important the question then was.

After the primary education came the grammar-school education with its study of Greek science among other things. Was the Christian boy to study music, dancing and especially astronomy? Tertullian gives a decided answer in the case of astronomy: "animadvertimus inter artes etiam professiones quasdam obnoxios idolatriae. de astrologis ne loquendum quidem est." (11). He disliked this study just because of its intimate connection with pagan rituals and beliefs.

(10) Tertullian - De Idolatria. 10. The text is that of Reifferscheid and Wissowa with some changes of my own in punctuation and the omission of a bracket.

(11) Tertullian. de Idolatria ch.9.

But he was an enthusiast who never did things by halves; and this impetuosity and enthusiasm of his nature explains many of his views. He thought Greek science was evil because of its connection with paganism, and so he wished to throw it entirely overboard, overlooking its usefulness when properly used. The Roman system of education was dangerous in all its parts and Christianity as yet had nothing to offer in its place.

The sweeping condemnation of Tertullian was felt by many to be too sweeping and we are not surprised to find that many of the Christian Fathers, and especially those who enjoyed such an education in their youth, saw the usefulness of this education and did not wish to banish it at all, but rather to make it serve the ends of Christianity (12). The life history of Gregory Thaumaturgus shows us what sort of an education an intelligent Christian boy received at Alexandria, when Origen was at the head of the Catechetical school; and the case of Gregory is especially interesting as he tells us that he came under Origen when quite young. Now he tells us (13) that he studied Logic, Physics, Geometry, Astronomy, and especially the science of Ethics as a preparatory course under Origen who then led him on to the study of Greek philosophy. He studied all and any writings available, whether pagan or Christian, philosophic or not, Greek or barbarian. But all this merely an introduction to the study of theology, in which of all subjects he says that Origen was most famous as a teacher. Origen himself in a letter to Gregory, after telling his former pupil that he might be a famous Roman lawyer or Greek philosopher, begs him to devote his good natural parts to Christianity; and so he asks him to make an extract from the philosophers of the Greeks, which may serve as a course of study or preparation for Christianity, and from geometry and astronomy what will serve to explain the sacred scriptures, in order that all that the sons of philosophers are wont to say about Geometry, Grammar, Rhetoric and Astronomy as fellow-helpers to philosophy may be used for the benefit of Christianity (14). These two passages show the attitude which the catechetical school under Origen took with reference to Greek philosophy and culture in general.

The attitude of Clement to Greek thought and civilization was much more exact just because he was one of the first to take a liberal view, such as we have just seen that Origen held; he felt it necessary to give an elaborate defence of his position, because of its novelty,

(12) This argument does not pretend to follow chronological order, as Tertullian is somewhat later than Clement and used his works: thus his remarks on the dyeing of hair in "De Cultu Feminarum" is from Clement's *Paedagogus*. But Tertullian is a convenient man to use, as we know him well.

(13) Gregory Thaum. *Panegyri*. in Orig.

(14) Origen's letter to Gregory Thaum. *ca. 1*.

in answer to the simple-minded and weaker brethren who were afraid of culture, both because of its relation with paganism, and because it was believed to have created Gnosticism. These weaker brethren were men whom Clement felt that he could not ignore, and so he took great care to conciliate them; he felt that he had something to teach them, but that what he had to teach them was merely a completion of what they already possessed. He wished to take these men with him and not to alienate them as the heretical Gnostics had done by their rigid differentiation of Christians into two classes. Thus we often find that for the sake of argument he accepted the positions of these men and then showed them that his own conclusions follow from their promises. The introduction to the *Stromateis* has for its special purpose the justification of the work he is undertaking, in the eyes of these men. In no place has he so clearly pointed out the fears which his teaching had excited, and the difficulties which were before him, if he was to win favour for his views. He begins by claiming for Christian teachers the right of putting their teaching into writing. He asks if it is reasonable not to allow Christians, who alone possess the whole truth, to write when the old mythology has so many apologists. Such an attitude among his readers must be the result of Gnosticism, (15) which was then first beginning to frighten men, though it was itself half a century old, just because there were men of education in the Church who saw how far these men had gone away from the commonly accepted views. The Church was meeting persecution from without and the danger of a crude rationalism from within, so that we are not surprised to find in many circles a conservative reaction by which it defines itself as one and indivisible, and as absolutely separated from everything of this world. This last step it did not take for several centuries just because there was a world to win. It was against the general body of Christians at the time that Clement was thus arguing, that there was something useful for Christians in Greek philosophy. Because of the importance of his opponents and because of his desire to win them to his way of thinking, he often makes concessions to them: he thus says that philosophy is not a *'sine qua non'*, "since nearly all without the encyclic education and philosophy of Greece, and some without a knowledge of literature, having been moved by the divine philosophy of the barbarians, have received with power the teaching concerning God, which comes through faith" (16). He definitely makes philosophy inferior and subordinate to the revelation which came through Christ (17). Each of the

(15) Tertullian in his *"De Praescriptione Haereticorum"*, ch. 1, definitely asserts that Greek philosophy was the father of Gnosticism. The attitude of Irenaeus is much the same.

(16) *Strom.* I. 20.29.

(17) *Strom.* I. 20.28 and I. 5.32.

sects possess only a part of the truth and it is his purpose to bring together an "eclectic philosophy", (18) and thus to reunite in a Christian theology what men had torn asunder. Thus he will pick and choose from among the teachings of the philosophers (19), and even then he will not get all the truth, for they did not know of the Logos of God, nor yet of God as a loving Father but only as a Creator (20). The barbarian and Hellenic philosophy has torn off a fragment of eternal truth, not from the mythology of Dionysus but from the theology of the ever-living Logos. This concession Clement most willingly makes to his opponents, but at the same time he definitely asserts his belief that these philosophers have been illuminated by the Light of the Logos.

Clement's attitude to Greek philosophy results from the way in which he thinks of its development; and he determines its origin by its worth. He believes that it contains a part of the truth, and he will not accept the view that it was given to men to deceive them. He traces all goodness back to God and therefore philosophy, as it contains a part of the truth. He is perfectly consistent in his belief that God's Providence was at work in the giving of philosophy to the Greeks. But in his explanation of this belief he is not so consistent. He has against him the view that philosophy was stolen by bad angels to mislead men, and he does not entirely reject this view as impossible that it was stolen by the devil; but he does reject the notion that being the result of a theft, it must therefore be bad (21). He strenuously asserts that it is good, and therefore cannot come from a bad origin; it may have been conveyed to their human wives by bad angels (22) but this does not diminish its value, for God, who knows all things and is all-powerful, if He did not prevent the theft, must have overruled it so that its results were good. The devil is thus transformed from an angel of darkness into one of light, who spoke some truths, in order that afterwards he might deceive men by his lies. But such a view is not Clement's own, as he definitely tells us that other men held it; and there is really no place for a devil in his theology, as we shall prove later on. What he is aiming at with this view is to convict his opponent out of his own mouth. This view therefore seems a sort of compromise with his opponents, and in it he has surrendered nothing which is of fundamental importance for his own position as he will not allow that philosophy is a work of the devil. But he more commonly holds the view that the Greeks plagiarized

(18) Strom. I. 7.37.

(19) Strom. I.12.57.

(20) Strom V.11.70; V.14.137; VI.7.55; VI.15.123; VI.17.154.

(21) Strom. I.1.18; I.9.44; VI.17.159.

(22) Strom. I.16.80; I.17.83; & V.1.10. Genesis VI.1.2.

from Moses and passed off as their own what was really Jewish (23). Thus he tries to prove that the Old Testament was older than Greek philosophy. Today we know that there is no relation between these two developments of thought, and that these Jewish writings, in the form in which we possess them, cannot possibly be earlier than the ninth century B.C., but are intimately connected with the work of the earliest prophets. Clement however was a firm believer in Jewish tradition, and besides he was deeply influenced by Philo, who had read much of Greek philosophy into the stories of the Pentateuch; so that we need not be surprised to find him arguing that Greek philosophy was plagiarized. That the Greeks were not above this, he proves by their plagiarisms from one another (24). But for all this he will not surrender it; and this shows that he saw that Greek philosophy had something which Christianity as yet did not have, and which he desired to win for it; he especially admires Plato, the chief thief. The first spark of philosophy came from the Old Testament but was fostered by the Greeks; he was too good a Greek scholar not to have seen a wonderful development in it between the time of Thales and Aristotle. This answer Clement found in Jewish thought, as well as the one which his opponents held. In either case he has shown the truth of philosophy, and so he has justified his use of it in his school. But he has another view of it, though not exclusive of the other, as Merk seems to think. It is that all knowledge and especially philosophy comes directly from God through the Logos; not only did God permit philosophy to come into being but he caused it (25). From the very existence of philosophy we might infer that God approves of it and that it comes eventually from Him. Philosophy and Christianity both go back to a single God and a single revelation as their source, but one is complete while the other is not. Philosophy is thus a forerunner of Christianity, as was the Jewish Law (26). He has conceived of the Logos as the great educator of mankind and philosophy is one of his works. This is a great conception and one which the Church soon forgot and even Clement did not see all that it meant, for he was not willing to think of idolatry in the same way as a preparation for a greater truth. Now such a view is not inconsistent with the view that much was borrowed from the Jewish Scriptures, as Providence worked in that borrowing, which he seems to think of as a worthy search for truth. The point which Clement has been trying to make all along is that whatever theory you accept as to the origin of Greek philosophy, there is still found working in it a divine Providence. He will not have Providence

(23) Strom. I.15.72; I.17.87; I.20.100 and many others.

(24) Strom VI.2.4 - 5.43.

(25) Strom. I.4.25, of the arts; Strom. I.5.28;
Strom. VI.5.42, of philosophy.

(26) Strom. VI.17.159.

torn asunder.

Next let us ask what it is in Greek philosophy that Clement thinks valuable. We have already noticed when speaking of his concessions to his weaker brethren that Clement rejects some parts of philosophy as worthless. Thus he has no use for sophistic rhetoric and eristic; they are mere arts of deception (27). In theology too some parts are quite worthless, as "tares have been sown by the proper husbandman of tares; so that sects have sprung up among us along with the true wheat, such as the atheism of Epicurus and his doctrine of pleasure". (28) Thus we see that Clement will not accept as parts of the true philosophy everything which he finds named philosophy (29). He gives us a definition of what he means by philosophy: "whatever has been well said by each of these sects and teaches righteousness along holy knowledge, all this eclecticism I call philosophy" (30). Clement is thus "nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri"; he is a true eclectic. His is an attempt to weave together into a system of theology all that was useful in Greek speculation and in ~~many~~ many cases his work shows his eclecticism, for he has not always succeeded in working these incongruous elements into a perfect system (31). In this respect Clement is only following the spirit of the times, as all thinkers were then eclectic, but most of them were the followers of one school more than the others; Clement however is truly eclectic, just because he is a Christian first and a philosopher afterwards. But there are certain philosophers whom Clement rejects absolutely and entirely, and these are the Epicureans, the Sceptics and the Sophists (32). He does not want philosophy as an end but as a means towards a Christian education and theology, and so he rejects all philosophy which merely plays with words. The two parts of philosophy which he wants especially are Ethics and Theology - the parts which teach "righteousness and holy knowledge". "Clement estime les philosophes d'après la valeur de leurs préceptes de conduite et de leur idées sur Dieu. En effet, pourquoi a-t-il une admiration si vive pour Pythagore et pour Platon ? C'est parce que personne n'a mieux parlé de Dieux. Pourquoi est-il si sévère pour le stoïcisme ? C'est parce que les stoïciens ont matérialisé Dieu. Et pourquoi, d'autre part, en fait-il le plus grand cas ? Il le dit expressément, c'est parce que leur morale était digne des plus grandes éloges. Pourquoi enfin est-il éclectique ? N'est-ce pas pour conserver sa liberté et pourvoir choisir, dans les

(27) Strom I.3.22; I.10.49 - 11.51; VI.18.162.

(28) Strom.VI.8.66. and Protrept. 5.66.

(29) Strom.I.19.92.

(30) Strom.I. 7.37.

(31) His psychology is a good example of this. see ch'5.

(32) Strom.I.2.21 - 3.22.

doctrines et dans chaque école, ce qui pouvait servir à la morale et à la religion ? Voilà donc le point de vue auquel Clément se place toujours pour juger la philosophie. C'est ce qu'il importe de ne pas oublier lorsqu'il s'agit de déterminer la mesure d'influence que la philosophie a eue sur la pensée." (33)

In the past philosophy led the Greeks to Christ as the Law did the Hebrews (34). This is a noble conception, and it explains all that he says about the value of Greek philosophy in past history. He bases this view on the principle which all his contemporaries were willing to admit, that all good things come eventually from God. He will not let Providence be torn asunder. Now he can speak of it as a "Testament" for the Greeks (35); the Gospel came near his own time, but before that at the proper time God gave the Law and the Prophets to the Jews and Philosophy to the Greeks (36). Now he can answer the question which troubled these early Christians very much, what would happen to the dead heathen; and the other question, why God waited so long before He sent Christ. His answer to the last is worthy of comparison with that of the "Epistle to Diognetus, where we are told: "But when the measure of our own unrighteousness was filled up, and it had been fully shown that punishment and death awaited it as its reward, and the time which God had fore-ordained to show forth His own goodness and power (Oh! the exceeding love of God for man!) He did not hate us etc.,"(37). How sarcastic seem the words in the bracket, and how infinitely more Christ-like is the answer of Clément! But he did not put the Old Testament and Philosophy on an equality; they both produce the same morality and that an imperfect but indispensable morality (38), but not the same religion, for philosophy did not abolish idolatry (39). This is an important and just distinction, that the Jews got farther along in their search for God than did the Greeks; but on the other hand he is not fair to paganism when he makes it consist solely in the worship of inanimate things - Plutarch would never have agreed to that; or again when he will not allow that idolatry was an imperfect grasping after God (40). Now Clément

(33) E. de Faye. p.170.

(34) Strom. I.5.28; VI.17,153 and 159.

(35) Strom. VI.6.42; 17.153.

(36) Strom. I.5.28

(37) Epistle to Diognetus. ch.9. in Bunsen's Hippolytus I.p.180.

(38) Strom. I.20.99; VI.6.45-47.

(39) Strom. VI.44-46.

(40) Protrepticus: almost anywhere.

can say that the Old and New Testament was of primary importance and philosophy of secondary (41). Thus we are led back again to the question of the origin of Greek philosophy, on which we say that Clement had no one precise answer. What he does wish to impress on his readers is that whatever means was employed in the production of philosophy, God was working through that means, so that philosophy is a part of the truth. Clement like Justin Martyr believes that reason has been spread abroad in the universe in such a degree that men are able to attain a part of the truth for themselves without the teaching of the incarnate Logos; he conceives of the divine Logos (*Λόγος διπνευματικός*) as penetrating the universe, as it were by seeds, and stirring up all that is noble and good. This is a notion which was borrowed from Stoicism, but an entirely new meaning was put on it. But Clement is not such an enthusiastic devotee of philosophy that he has determined to unite it, in all its parts and at any price, with the teaching of Christ. Not only has he criticised it very severely, and rejected whole parts of it, but he ever thinks of it as elementary and imperfect (*μεγίστη*) to the full revelation of God in Christ (42).

But Clement has yet to answer the question if the Christian may study philosophy. He has stated that Christianity contains the whole truth, so that it seems as if the objection of his opponents would hold that philosophy was superfluous. But he believes that it still has a mission to perform in the world and that it can give Christianity real help. In fact he sees that Christianity has not yet developed all its possibilities, but that it must take into itself all that is good in the world, as that is really a part of itself, being the result of the workings of the Logos. He seems to have had just that notion of the development of Christianity as a leaven in society, which would regenerate it and at last bring the Kingdom of Heaven to earth, that Christ portrayed in one of his parables; Christianity was to leaven the whole lump, and not merely part of it. So he does not wish the Church to reject culture; he sees that the great need of the Church of the day is education and culture, as every one else has it while the common Christian is afraid of it. He insists (41) Strom. I.5.28.

πάντων μὲν γὰρ δίδως ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν κατὰ
προηγούμενον, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ὡς τῆς τε διαθήκης τῆς
παλαιᾶς καὶ τῆς νέας, τῶν δὲ κατὰ ἑπικολούθημα
ὡς τῆς φιλοσοφίας.

(42) Strom. VI.8.68.

very strongly on the educational worth of Greek sciences and philosophy. But the Christian philosophy is not to be taught to everyone, but only to believers or those who are becoming Gnostics ($\alpha\kappa\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\iota\ \pi\alpha\rho\ \kappa\alpha\tau'\alpha\gamma\alpha\gamma\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota$); he is very much afraid of divulging the secret mysteries of the Christian life to the uninitiated (43). He wants the Encyclical science ($\tau\alpha\ \mu\epsilon\theta\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$) for a Christian system of education, such as we have found that Origen gave in later years in the same school. He saw that Greece was the home of the arts and sciences, and he wished to win these for Christianity (44). In this wish he was merely anticipating the action of future generations which made the Trivium and the Quadrivium the very basis of their whole system of education. History has justified this apology of Clement for Greek science. Thus in ch. 11 of Strom VI he takes up the different sciences, one at a time, and shows their educational value. Thus for Music he can quote the case of David, who was known in Hebrew tradition as the great psalmist. But what he desires most of all among these sciences is Dialectic - the art of reasoning. This is the pruning-knife which will cut away the entangled branches and differentiate the true from the false (45). He asks how one is to meet the reasoning of philosophers and the Gnostic sects without using their arguments (46). This of course is a sound argument and one which all philosophers of the time recognized, that to properly refute an opponent one must analyse his premises and prove them false (47). Clement has an answer also for those who were afraid that the encyclical sciences would lead Christians astray: "but if the faith which they possess for I would not call it $\gamma\iota\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ be such as to be dissolved by plausible speech, let it be dissolved and let them confess that they do not possess the truth. For truth ($\eta\ \alpha\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$) is immovable, but false opinion ($\eta\ \psi\omega\delta\omicron\delta\omicron\zeta\iota\varsigma$) dissolves itself" (46). Dialectic is useful that the truth may not be trampled under foot. But on the other hand these studies are not to be used as ends in themselves, as the Greeks so often used them, for they would then become Eristic and Epideictic Rhetoric; they are to be used for Christian purposes in "distinguishing what is common to a class from what is peculiar to one individual in it, since the cause of all error ($\pi\lambda\acute{\alpha}\nu\eta$) and false opinion is in the inability to distinguish in what respects things are common and in what respects they are different" (48). The chief use of the sciences is thus to refute his opponents with their own weapons. Underneath such a passage as this, of which we have quoted only ^{(see learned}

(43) Strom. I.1.17.

(44) Strom. VI. all of ch. 10.

(45) Strom. I.20.100.

(46) Strom. VI.10.81.

(47) Epictetus. Dissert. II.25, on the use of Logic.

(48) Strom. VI.10.82.

a few passages, there lie several important preconceptions, which explain his attitude to Greek learning; first, that truth is one and cannot contradict itself, since it is incarnated in the Logos so that truth cannot be in opposition to religious faith; secondly that the Christian can comprehend that truth, since the incarnate Logos has revealed it to men; and lastly that the Christian cannot be driven from his position by mere arguments, since in making a judgment the mind is not entirely passive, but adds something of its own, the assent of the will (*συγκατάθεσις*). Now, while these questions must be discussed later in the chapter on the life of the Christian in relation to the question of Clement's theory of knowledge, they seemed worth while mentioning here as helping to explain the point in question ^{and} ~~but~~ more especially as showing that he had worked out in his mind some consistent scheme of theology, which he was prevented from putting into writing by some contingency, of which we have no knowledge.

But the Sciences are only the helpers of philosophy, their mistress, which itself works towards the attainment of wisdom (*σοφία*)(49), it is placed above the Sciences in same way that Plato's Dialectic is placed above them. Philosophy is the very incarnation of the Greek love of knowledge and is therefore the crown and completion of the preparatory studies. Now Greek philosophy as it were purges beforehand and accustoms the soul beforehand for the reception of faith, on which the truth builds up knowledge (*ῥῶσις*)(50). This must mean that philosophy ~~to~~ purges the soul of moral disorders; and in this conception of philosophy he is simply repeating the common notion of his time, that philosophy can help a man to lead a better life. He sees that the travelling missionaries of paganism are working for the same end that he is, and so he welcomes them as helpers, and even incorporates much of the works of one of them, Musonius Rufus (51). Clement is about the only Christian of the time who could see anything good in these philosophic preachers, and so his attitude to them is especially interesting; like Epictetus (52) he believes that they could never have undertaken such a calling, and have carried it out with any success at all, without the help of God. He sees that they are not, first and foremost, opponents of Christianity, but that they are both looking

(49) Strom. I.5.30

(50) Strom. VII.3.20.

(51) Compare Musonius Rufus, ed. Hense (Teubner), and Wendland: *questiones musonianæ*. (Berlin).

(52) Epictetus III.22.2.

towards the same end, and therefore that they should work together, as long as their paths lie together. Clement seems to have understood better than any other man of his day what Christ meant when he said, "he that is not against us, is for us."

But philosophy is also useful from the intellectual standpoint; it imparts certain conceptions about God and the world, on which the Christian may build his theology. Now he says that "philosophy is an enquiry concerning truth and the nature of what really exists, and truth itself is that of which the Lord himself said "I am the truth"(53) Philosophy is a search for truth, which he then explains to be a search after God as revealed by His Logos. But he believes that all men have some revelation of this truth of God, and so the philosophers will assist him, as they had along his way by imparting certain notions about God and His relation to man. Thus philosophy prepares men for the truth by teaching them that God created the world and that now He cares for it and that His Providence is really a beneficent Providence (54). Philosophy is an exercise which serves to develop the true Gnostic, but it is not the only thing necessary: "philosophy helps towards the comprehension of the truth, being a search for truth, but it is not the cause of comprehension but a cause with others and a helper"(55). Clement thus never thinks of putting philosophy on a level with Christianity, though he does believe that it has much to teach the Christian who wishes to know what he has believed, and also the preacher who wishes to win the Greeks. He sees that the Greeks must have Christian doctrines expressed in their own language, if they are to understand them, and this is what he attempts to do.(55) Thus we see that Clement conceives of Greek philosophy, as helping to spread the influence of Christianity in the world, and also as deepening the content of the Christian life by giving it a theological vocabulary and a love for sure knowledge, with the help of which it might work out a theology of its own. Then too this very fact of knowing what he has believed will make the Christian a stronger man and therefore a more energetic missionary; and thus a theology of Christianity will enhance its power from within, as well as give it a larger field in which to work. This is a truism today that if any religion wishes to be a universal one, it must express its beliefs in the theological and philosophic terms of the day, that men may see what they are believing; and it is due in great measure to the work of such men as Clement, and his pupil Origen, that we today feel so strongly the

(53) Strom. I.5.32.

(54) Strom. I.16.80.

(55) Strom. I.20.97.

necessity for a theological explanation of our intuitive religious aspirations and beliefs, and an explanation which takes note of present as well as past philosophic conceptions.

Chapter III.

THE NATURE OF GOD

Christ had taught that God was a spirit, and that He was to be worshipped in spirit and in truth; but when Clement accepted Christianity he was forced by his Greek love for knowledge, to ask what Christ meant when He repeated these words; he felt the necessity of finding out for himself what this notion involved, and what spirit really was. To answer this question he was told by his brother-Christians to turn to the Hebrew Scriptures and also certain Christian writings, in which he would find a complete revelation of all truth. He did so but he interpreted these writings almost instinctively with the help of notions which he had brought with him from his philosophic education. He had a precedent for this procedure in the writings of the devout Jew Philo, and from him he borrows his method of allegorical interpretation. But before we discuss the influence of Greek thought, let us briefly sum up the elements of a theology which Clement could draw out of the Jewish Scriptures, as interpreted by Philo's system.

The latest Jewish writers, the sages, inherit of course the monotheism of the prophets, but they have abandoned anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity and tend to separate God from His Creation. A verse like this is typical: "God is in Heaven and thou on earth; therefore let thy words be few." Their reverence for God is as great as ever, but they are tending towards the notion of a cold and dispassionate God who is far removed from men. Thus the God of Ecclesiastes is without emotions, and the God of Proverbs rules by general laws, without favour and without caprice. Of course they do not separate God entirely from the economy of His Creation, but He is lifted as far away as possible from the trivial details of that economy. In their efforts to rid the idea of Jewish limitations and to spiritualize it, they have made their God supra-cosmic, if not transcendental.

In the realm of theology Plato has wielded an influence as far reaching as that of the Hebrew Prophets. He laid down two canons of theology, or rather mythology, which really every writer of theology since his day has taken into account: that God is the cause of good alone and not of evil, and that He is absolutely immutable (1). With these dogmas we can connect his notion of God's perfect goodness,

(1) Republic 378-380.

and also His omniscience, and the fact the He never contradicts Himself. But if God is so perfect and immutable, He must be lifted above the processes of decay and generation which go on in this world; and this is exactly what Plato does, when he says that God lives in the transcendental world of ideas, of the reality of which this world only more or less partakes (2). God is *ἄνθρωπος* and he contemplates the Ideas. Again Dr. James Adam, in his edition of the Republic, believes that Plato meant to identify God with the Idea of the Good, the former being the religious conception, and the latter the philosophic, of one and the same thing (3). But whether D. Adam was correct or not in making this identification does not matter, since, later Platonists, such as Plutarch certainly did identify them, and what we are now studying is not Plato's own thoughts so much as what was the standard interpretation of Plato in the second century A.D.. Now of the Idea of the Good, Plato says it is so purely transcendental that it is even beyond being (*ὑπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*), of which we can only say that it alone truly exists (4). But it is also important to note that his God is "no colourless ontological abstraction like being" but a personified moral principle, the Good. From these statements it seems a legitimate conclusion that the relation between such a God and the transient world can only be expressed by a metaphor, though God is still the cause of the world-process - He is the cause of being. This is the point where Plato's System, as he left it in his dialogues, seems to break down, and it was as an attempt to bridge this gap, that much of later philosophy came into existence. How Plato meant to relate the world of becoming to the world of Ideas, we cannot definitely answer, but it was certainly not by the doctrine that the ideas are immanent in things; as he often insists they are *χωρὶς τῶν αἰσθητῶν* (5), and things only partake (6), or are an image of them. We must be careful not to read the doctrine of the materialistic Store into Plato's ideas, as a short way to an answer. Thus Plato's God is the transcendental Reason of the Universe, of which we can only say that it ever truly is and is ever the same, being the cause of existence and knowledge. It is that which we cannot think away, or get beyond (*ὑπὲρ νοῦν*), and Plato is firmly convinced that that is the Good, or that God's purpose is good (6). But Plato tries to bridge this gulf between God and man by man's reason, which naturally aspires to know God and eventually can know him, after it is freed from the trammels of this world, which imprison it. But for man as such the nature of God is still inscrutable, and the notion of a philosopher who has seen God is only a pattern laid up in Heaven.

(2) *Timaeus* 29-32 & *Politicus*-(3) Adam's Ed. of *Rep.* II. p. 62.

(4) *Republic*. 509 B (myth. (5) *Republic*. 476 A.

(6) *Timaeus*. 29 E.

Platonism ends in a Dualism of God set over against the world.

Later Platonists, such as Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre, insist very strongly on the transcendence of God, in opposition to the Stoics, who identified God with the world-process; and at the same time more closely united man with God by the belief that man's soul is an incarnate daemon, or lesser deity. Educated men felt that their God of Platonism, when standing alone, was hardly better than the God of Epicurus; and so by a regular hierarchy of daemons they sought to relate the two. This shows how far transcendentalism had gone when it was felt necessary to go back to the belief in lesser deities.

Philo unites the supra-cosmic God of the Wisdom Literature with the purely transcendental God of Plato, with the result that God is now separated absolutely from the Universe. All that man knows of God is what He is not; He is simple and ineffable, without quality or form, but more than that we know not (7). He is the purest thing in the universe, superior to all perfection and knowledge, and better even than the Good (8). All these names applied to Jehovah are merely images of Him, who said "I am that I am", signifying that his nature was to be, not to be named (9). Again God is universal, not because He is contained in all, but because he contains all. (10). The fundamental thesis of Philo's theology is the impossibility of knowing God, and he is usually consistent with it, though he does speak of the perfect goodness of God (11). He insists that man cannot reach God either by reasoning or any other operation of the soul. Those who seek God in the world find only a shadow (12). And how can the rational soul know God, when it does not know even itself? (13). None of man's thoughts or aspirations reach God (14). Thus God seems absolutely inaccessible to man, and Philo only unites them by the superior faculty of pure intelligence, which is a direct gift from God (15). This alone elevates the soul towards the divine, but even then the soul does not understand God (16). Such is the nature of God to Philo that He seems entirely concealed within the darkness of his inaccessible being and ineffable name.

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| (7) Philo. Quod Deus Immut. ch.11. | (13) Legis Alleg.I.29. |
| (8) De Vita Contempl. ch. 1. | (14) De Cherub chs. 13 |
| De Opificio Mundi ch.2. | and 14. |
| (9) De Nom. Mutat ch.2. | (15) Legis Alleg.I.ch.13. |
| (10) De Confus. ling. ch.27. | (16) De Somn.I.ch.11. |
| (11) De Cherub. ch.25. | |
| (12) Legis Alleg III ch.32. | |

N.B. - These references are mostly from Vacherot, but in each case they have been verified.

To prevent this, Philo gives us his Logos, of which more in the next chapter. For all that man can do, he is absolutely separated from God and Philo is obliged to adopt the notion of a Mediator, or *tertium quid*, to prevent his philosophy from making the world as god-less as the Epicureans would have had him believe.

Clement's doctrine of God was the prevalent one of his day, in which God is set over against the world that he fashioned; and the great change which his notion of God underwent when he became a Christian, was that a conviction was given him that he had found a direct revelation of this God in Jesus Christ; by means of which conviction certain Philonic and Christian elements were superimposed on the Platonic conceptions already there. His future studies were an attempt to amalgamate these two streams of thought into a Christian theology.

According to Clement God is unknowable by the ordinary man; He is not known through the senses, as He is formless and shapeless, while the senses only perceive things that have these qualities (*τὰ αἰσθητά*) (17). The soul too is weak for the comprehension of reality (18). What he means is that the ordinary man cannot comprehend God at all, and that the Christian can, as we shall see later, only by putting himself into an attitude of mind which he calls faith, so that Christ can teach him. But then only the perfect Christian will know God's nature; the ordinary Christian must rest satisfied with a knowledge of the will of God (*τὸ βούλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*) as revealed by His Logos. Again he says it is easier to define what God is not, than what He is (19), and this impossibility to define what God's nature really is, seems to lead to agnosticism. But here we should be very careful; God is not entirely unknown and unknowable, since he has made a revelation of Himself through His Logos, through Whom He works; Clement has distinguished between God as He is, and God in his workings. Thus he believes in the teleological argument (20), and it is in fact by this that he gets his conception of God as the *Ἀρχὴ ὡς ὑποθετός*. But the attributes of God in Himself cannot be known; man by seeking could not find out God, and in his day had found Him out only because God had seen that the revelation in nature was insufficient and had given them a perfect one through the person of the Logos (21). So when commenting on the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, (22), in a fragment which has been preserved to us of the Hypotyposes, he says that the appellation of

(17) Strom. V.1.7. This quotation is important in the reference to the words of God to Moses, as he interprets them in the same way as Philo. See note (16) of this chapter.

(18) Strom V.12. 79.

(19) Strom V.11. 72.

(20) Strom V.1.6 - *παιδων τεχνικῶν καὶ σοφῶν ποιημάτων*.

(21) Strom VII.2.8. (22) Trans. of Clem: Amer. ed.p.

"light" as applied to God is only a metaphor, for we do not know God and therefore cannot define Him. He is thus ἀνοητος, if all the words which we apply to Him are merely similes. "To arrive at the Master of all is truly a difficult task as the object of our pursuit ever flees at our approach (23). And no wonder, for He is not circumscribed in space (24), nor is He in the form of any creature or of like passions; He is absolutely free from every quality which inheres to the things of this world (25). He is the ultimate cause of the universe, the farthest cause (26), and not only is He beyond the universe, but beyond the intelligible world (27). He is the point without position; He is ~~even beyond~~ Unity (ἑστὶν ἓν) (28). So far Clement is consistent, he has merely told us what God is not, and he has arrived at this by a process of abstraction, just as he tells us the true gnostic will reach a knowledge of God by freeing himself of everything that partakes of this world, until he arrives at the most general of ideas. Now while to us such an abstraction means absolutely nothing, for Clement it meant the supremest and highest reality, so that he could say that "the sacrifice which is most acceptable to God is unswerving abstraction from the body" (29). Again "we advance by analysis to the first notion (πρῶτην νοήσιν), beginning with the properties underlying it; and taking away from the body its physical qualities, such as depth and breadth, and lastly length, we will reach the point (μονάς) which has position, and if we take that away, we have the conception of the unit (ἑστὶν ἓν μονάς). If then abstracting all that belongs to bodies and things called corporeal, we cast ourselves into the greatness of Christ (τὸ μέγας), and then advance into immensity by holiness, we may reach the notion (τῇ νοήσει) of the All mighty, knowing not what He is but what He is not" (30). Now this notion of the absolute transcendence of God is Platonic, in the sense that this way of thinking can be traced back to Plato; it is a direct result of Plato's conception of God as immutable, while the world is ever changing. But Clement also uses several Platonic phrases which show that he knew Plato at first hand. Thus he says that God is ἑπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀπὸν μονάδα (31), which is a certain reminiscence of the Platonic one, ἑπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας ἀσώματος (32). He like Plato calls God the μονάς, but what is most convincing of all that Plato here influenced Clement, is in his use of the method of abstraction by which he gets his notion of God - it is by separating himself from the things of sense (τὰ διόφθητα) until he can contemplate the concepts of reason (τὰ νοήτα). Both the method and the words used to explain that method are a direct reminis-

- (23) Strom. II. 2. 5. (24) Strom. VII. 5. 28 & 6. 30.
 (25) Strom. II. 2. 6. (26) Strom. VII. 1. 2.
 (27) Strom. VI. 9. 78 & V. 6. 38. (28) Strom. V. 11. 72.
 (29) Strom. V. 11. 68. (30) Strom. V. 11. 72.
 (31) Paedagogus I. 8. 71. (32) Republic 509.

cence of Plato's own words about the contemplation of the Idea of the Good in book six of the Republic. As Clement remarks, what he offers his hearers is after all the unknown God of whom Paul spoke (33).

But in the other passages we find that Clement seemingly ignores the position just explained and speaks of certain attributes of God; he speaks of God as having reason, as loving and pitying. Here he is influenced, not by Plato or Philo, but by the New Testament, where he finds that God is a God of moral qualities. Philo somewhat inconsistently did the same, but what was inconsistent in Philo, is not in Clement, when we remember that the Logos, as we will explain later, is a revelation of God. The Logos came to reveal the will and workings of God, and so Clement believes he knows something about this far-off God. But when he attributes qualities to God, the Father, he believes that he knows them through the Logos. These two doctrines are not necessarily mutually exclusive, that God in Himself is incomprehensible, but that He is known in His workings. By this means Clement is able to retain faith in a God of moral qualities, and to prevent Him from becoming a mere metaphysical nonentity on his hands. But in the determination of the moral qualities of God, Clement is again seen to be a Platonist. God is without passions (*ἀπαθής*), without indignation or anger (*ἀθυμῶς*), and free from desires (*ἀνεπιθυμητικός*) (34). He is not in human form (35), but entirely free from human passions; He is absolutely without want (*ἀνευδής*) (36), for he is perfectly simple, while all things of sense are compound, and so each one needs something else by the help of which to subsist. But God, being simple and comprising everything, needs nothing else, but is perfectly self-sufficient (37). By this method of abstraction he has reached the notion of a God, who is in all respects different from man, except in reason (*λόγος οὐ νοῦς*), which both He and man possess. He never seems to forget that God is a personality as much as man is, in the sense that He thinks before He acts, and therefore can care for his Creation; which, if it means anything at all, means that God is rational. Thus even when he is defining God in the terms of a philosophy, and has called him the One or the Point, he immediately speaks of throwing oneself into the greatness (*τὸ μέγεθος*) of Christ (38). He never forgets that God is a rational being as the Logos reveals Him, but he then tries to free the personality of God from everything that might pertain to this world. As he so definitely tells

(33) Strom. V. 12. 83.

(34) Strom. IV. 23. 151. These are Platonic words.

(35) Strom VII. 7. 37.

(36) Strom II. 12. 81.

(37) Strom VII. 6. 30. & VII. 3. 15.

(38) Strom V. 11. 72. This word *προ-νοῦς* implies reason - νοῦς.

us, he reached this idea of God by trying to think of a mind that was free from time and space, and all the qualities which time and space bring with them (38). He is pure being (*ἄκρως οὐκ*)(39). God is a self-conscious and self-determined being, who is free from everything of this world of sense. Such a definition pleases Clement because it does not identify God with his creation (40), not yet does it make Him into a mere human being, as the popular mythology did (41); and such a definition he finds in the popularized Platonism of his day. He has now carefully separated God from everything that seems to connect Him with the world, and has connected Him with man only by the power of reasoning (42), which brings with it moral qualities; he has once for all separated God from matter. Now he is forced to allegorize away much of the Old Testament, saying that it spake in a way unworthy of God. But, like a Platonist, he is determined to hold to the notion of the goodness or love of God, and so he explains love as a relation of affection which does not show desire or want on the part of the one who loves, but is independent of time and space (43); God's nature, in so far as we know it, can thus be explained as that of benevolence and love. Now this is not so peculiarly a Christian conception as it first seems; Plato was the first to enunciate it. Plato says that it was because of His goodness that God created the world (44); for the same reason Plato separates God from everything that is evil, and only allows him to be the Creator of the good; for this reason he wishes to remanufacture mythology, because the old did not always picture Him as the cause of the good alone. Clement also repeats the words of Plato (45), *τὸς ἀντίος*, as meaning that God is not the cause of evil; so that even if Clement here reproduces a Christian thought, when he speaks of God's goodness, he is still greatly influenced by Plato, as the words which he uses to express that thought clearly show. "Again, following the example of Plato and in direct opposition to Jewish thought, Clement declares that God never takes vengeance (46). Thus he believes, since the world is perfect, that there is no evil but moral evil and its results in the world, and that misfortunes, if they do befall man, come as violent persuasions when gentler ones have failed. He will not believe that God can be angry or take vengeance; that would be doing himself harm. "God punishes with the purpose of benefitting both publicly and as individuals those who are being punished". Clement is so persistent in this belief that he says that God never willed that Christ must die but merely permitted it. "This was the only way to safe-

(38) Strom.V.11.72. ~~The word~~

(39) Protrept 4.56.

(41) Strom VI.17.149.

(43) Strom VI.9.73.

(44) Timaeus 29 E.

(46) Strom.VII.16.102.

~~implies reason~~

(40) Protrept 6.67.

(42) Strom.VI.9.72. -

(45) Republic 617 D. &
Strom.V.12.137.

guard the Providence and Goodness of God (47). This is the Platonic notion of punishment - God is good and he cannot be anything else than kind. Again many of his contemporaries thought of the ~~one transcendent~~ God of their philosophy as an object of worship. Cleanthes is his day had done so, when he spoke of repaying God in honour and chanting His deeds continuously, as is most fit for mortal men, who have no greater privilege than duly at all times to hymn the Universal Law. We find much the same in Epictetus when he speaks of following the will of God or the law of God, and of the impossibility of escaping from the God within; and when he says that the true attitude of men towards God is one of gratitude. ~~But~~ This notion of worshipping God by doing His will was only in its infancy among the Greeks, and can not have deeply influenced Clement. But he might have held all these doctrines about God's transcendence and goodness before he became a Christian.

But the God of Clement is not merely the God of the Platonists; there are attributes which he ascribes to God, besides that of goodness, common to both Christianity and Platonism, which are peculiarly Christian. Thus he can hardly have brought with him into Christianity the notion that God is not bound by natural law to be good, but that He is so because He has willed it (48). This seems to point to the definitely Christian idea of God as a personality, with perhaps a covert attack on the Stoic determinism. Plato, whom Clement so much admires, never hints at such a conception; his Idea of the Good, identified among later thinkers with God, merely lights up the universe and man by the light which He must emit (49). Clement, in the passage just quoted, seems to give us a criticism of Plato when he says that "God is not good without willing it, just as fire which warms, but the gift of his bounties is the result of an act of will". This notion that the goodness of God is an effort of His will is peculiarly Christian; in this respect the Platonic notion of God has been considerably changed towards the notion of a God with a personality. Another distinct change must have come over his notion of God by the addition of the Christian view that God wishes to save men and make them perfect as He is perfect - that the aim of God's providential care is seen not merely the ordering of the universe but especially in His plans to save the human race. With this notion is closely connected the idea of God as an education, who has given definite help to man. Plato never thinks of God as giving man any help; his God is a Sun which shines by natural refulgence, but it never comes near to man; if man wishes to contemplate the Idea of the Good, he must mount to the top of the vault of heaven. Clement is convinced that God

(47) Strom. IV. 12. 86. (48) Strom. VI. 12. 104., VII. 7. 42.

(49) Republic VI & VII. The allegory of the cave where the Idea of the Good is compared to the Sun.

wishes to save men: to find this feeling one has only to read the last chapter of the Protrepticus, in which Clement with great skill and power exhorts the pagans to abandon their old errors and listen to the teachings of Christ. Another great addition to Clement's theology at the time of his conversion was the notion that all work if done willingly and because of love, was worship. Now he understood the saying of Christ that God was a spirit and that he was to be worshipped in spirit and in truth. Clement's doctrine of God is an attempt to think out the content of the Christian view of God, under the influence of Platonism.

This Dualism, which separates God so entirely from the world, was the result of following Plato and Philo in an attempt to purify God of everything which pertains to space and time; but such a doctrine was a common one among educated men in Clement's time, and we might call it a natural development under the force of existing circumstances. Thus a consistent belief in monotheism in polytheistic surroundings would certainly tend towards the rejection of the anthropomorphism, in which polytheism had clothed itself. Again the problem of evil troubled the men of this age and especially the missionary preachers of both paganism and Christianity; and the Christian looked on "this world" (i.e. Roman Empire) as given over to the spirit of evil, from the evil of which both they and the pagan teachers urged men to flee. But if this world was so evil, God had to be separated from it, and so the words of Plato - *ὁ θεὸς ἀνόμιμος* - became a sort of a catch-word of the age as regards the problem of evil. Hence the educated men of the time readily accepted the Platonic doctrine of God as solving their difficulties. The only school which definitely opposed this transcendentalism was the Stoic, which substituted for it pantheism. It transported God into the midst of the world as its soul; then the world and its God were in intimate contact. That was a solution of one part of the problem but when taken for all the truth it destroyed the idea of God. Nature was not identified with the will of God, but God identified with the workings of Nature; Nature was not deified, but God naturalized. This only made the question of evil more difficult to explain, and so it was rejected by all who had not accepted Stoicism on other grounds. Plutarch tells us how this doctrine appealed to a man who was an ardent student of Plato (50), when he says that Chrysippus is forced to believe that God is the cause of all the bloodshed and cruelty of wars. This was the effect of identifying God with nature, and of course men fled to the opposite extreme and would have nothing to do with the Stoic theology. This is the view of Clement, that the Stoics disgrace God by identifying Him with the vilest of matter (51).

(50) Plutarch De Repugn. Stoic.

(51) Protrept. 5.66.

Now this belief that God in Himself has nothing to do with the world has conditioned the Christology, not only of Clement but of all the Christian Fathers; and the nature of Christ and his relation both to God and the world must be explained on these dualistic principles. Much of future theology is an attempt to justify from these promises the belief in the divinity of a Christ who is a Mediator between God and Godless man. Viewed from this standpoint, most of Christian dogma goes back to Plato's dualism on the intellectual side, being an attempt to think out on Platonic principles all that was involved for man and the world in the life of Christ.

Chapter 4.

THE LOGOS.

This necessity of uniting God with the world, and especially with the soul of man, must have been the important thing among the early religious difficulties of Clement, and it was just because that he felt that Christ had come to fill that gap that he so enthusiastically embraced Christianity. The doctrine of the Logos is the most important element in Clement's theology, but it was necessary to study his doctrine of God first, as that conditioned his Christology. Now his concern was not in the Christ as a man who bore all human trials and necessities and yet lived the perfect life; his interest was in Christ, the spirit who came to reveal to men the unseen God and to teach men to be like him. He is interested in Christ, the Logos.

For his doctrine of the Logos he depends directly on the Fourth Gospel, but as interpreted in the light of Philo's writings. Thus we need not discuss what the writer of the Fourth Gospel meant in his prologue, and whether he meant the same as Clement. All that we need to remember is that Clement believes he finds his own views there. What is important for us is to find out the influence of Philo on Clement, as Philo was certainly influenced by Greek ideas.

Philo had separated God's Being entirely from the world, but he had also felt that God's power was ever at work there. This power of God had been called "wisdom" (σοφία) by the Jews, and Philo takes up their views and expands them; he is a direct descendant of the writer of the book of Wisdom. Jehovah himself is outside the world, but his power is working in it, to effect creation and to keep the world-process running. Then this wisdom of God had been personified by the sages, and Philo tries to give a philosophic explanation of this notion. He is far on the way towards making this revelation of God into a person, for he calls it the countenance (πρόσωπον) of God, the shadow (σκιά) or the λόγος προφορικός — an outward manifestation of the hidden powers of the unseen God. But by the terms already employed, we see that Philo has caught up a Stoic phrase to explain a Jewish belief, and that the "wisdom" of the Old Testament is now identified with the Stoic Logos (a world-principle of law and order), which is immanent in the universe. Next, not to fall into pantheism, he combines the Platonic doctrine of the transcendent Ideas with the Logos, so that he can now speak of it as immanent in, and transcending sensible things. These three elements go to the making up of Philo's Logos, but the

Jewish one was in his mind first, and the others were called in to explain it. The Logos is also spoken of in the plural, when he is thinking of the different manifestations of God in nature, or of the different "ideas" in "the world of thought," which thus became not mere patterns, but forces working in the world. Again the ideas are spoken of as thoughts in the mind of God, and in this way they are brought together to make up the content of the personified Logos. But when the ideas are now thought of as one world-principle, Philo still calls it an idea; and since he has identified these ideas or thoughts in the mind of God with the angels of Jewish mythology, the Logos is an angel, the first-born of archangels. In this way Philo is working towards a personification of the Logos, as we would today call it, though Philo never used the word "persona", which is a technical one of Roman law. Now this Logos has two duties, that of creating the world, and of posing as an ideal for man. Philo has interpreted Genesis I. 26 as meaning that God first created a "spiritual man" (the generic concept of man) in his own image, and this spiritual man he elsewhere identifies with the Logos (1); while Genesis II. 7. he refers to the actual breathing man called Adam, who was earthy, but made in the form of the spiritual man. This interpretation of Genesis, by which he gets two men, is an important one, and one which later writers make much of. Now if the Logos is born, or an emanation, from Jehovah, of course it is subordinated to Him, or is a shadow of the divine light; the Logos is not a perfect and full representation of all the divine powers. This is important as Clement reproduces it later. Philo is not especially interested in the Logos as an intermediary to unite mankind to God; the lesser angels do that on occasions, and when necessary. The duty of the Logos is to create the world, to keep it going, and to serve as an intellectual ideal for man. Now Philo has in his theory bridged the gap which Plato left between the two worlds of reason and of sense; the only question one feels like asking is whether any real bridge could span such a chasm without breaking of its own weight. We have thus seen Philo take hold of the doctrine of "wisdom", and by means of philosophical concepts and a mythological belief, manipulate that doctrine until he gave it a personality. The Logos as a person is thus for Philo the result of a long process and hard toil, and we are not sure after all if he meant us to take it as an actual personage, as we think of a person, or not.

Under the influence of the Fourth Gospel, Clement starts out by positing the personality of the Logos; the spiritual Logos took on flesh and became the Christ, who walked the hills of Judea. By this use of the philosophic doctrine of the Logos Clement was able to explain to his own

(1) De Confus. Ling. ch. 14.

satisfaction the work of Christ, and how Christ was divine. The Logos, who had already existed with the Father-God, took on human flesh and came as an incarnate man to teach men, since they had not been able, from the imperfect revelations of Himself in the world, to find out his teachings and follow them. (2). Thus Clement has at once explained the fact that Christ called Himself the Son of God; has bridged the awful gulf, the abysmal depths of which he had himself felt so keenly, between man and his Creator; and also enabled himself to think of creation and the world-process as in some sense the work of God. But we also see that he has brought together ideas from two different sources; he has adopted Philo's view of the Logos, and has combined with it Christ's own statement that God was His Father. Now either of these, if taken literally, excludes the other, the Logos doctrine makes Christ only a partial manifestation of God; the other makes Him literally a Son of the same nature, who was conceived by the Holy Spirit. But Clement makes a great attempt to reconcile them, and his attempt is interesting because future theologians insist with the utmost literalness on the statement that Christ is the Son of God, and therefore a perfect manifestation of the Godhead (3).

(2) Strom. VII.2.8.

(3) Paul of Samosata is interesting because he sees the difficulty; he feels that Christ cannot have been the world-process, which became a person, and so he rejects the literalist's interpretation of both these phrases, and holds the pure humanity of Christ "who was not before Mary, but received from her the origin of His being". His pre-existence was simply in the divine fore-knowledge, and his incarnation of the wisdom or will of God was the same in kind as the incarnation of any idea in a great leader; the indwelling was not that of a person but of a quality. Now it is just possible that the writer of the Fourth Gospel meant no more than this, as he does not seem to have thought of Christ as a world-principle. This would necessitate translating $\delta\iota' \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ by "on account of Him", i.e. on account of this idea in God's mind to give a perfect and a divine man to the world. The writer would then have adopted this idea to explain the divine power, which all his disciples felt He had had; and as he had to express it in Greek he took the Greek word Logos for the Hebrew Memra, perhaps with a direct allusion by way of contrast to Philo, whose Logos as a world-power he cannot have understood. This is only a suggestion. See the Dict. of Chr. Biog. v.4. p.250, on Paul of Samosata.

The Logos both as a divine faculty (*δύναμις*), and also as a separate being (*ἐνδοξασ*), existed from the beginning. The Logos is on the one hand the image or revelation of the divine powers, and as such is thought of as the wisdom or will of God, working in the world as a principle of being, and aiming at its ultimate perfection; but on the other hand He has ever been a conscious personality, and as such when He found that the world was not being taught by the revelation of Himself in natural processes, took on human form, that He might teach men the true way of living, and give them an example of it in His own person. As such the Logos is both man and God - He was man in body, and God in soul. This is the most difficult part of Clement's theology to understand; how Christ can be both a world-principle, which is conceived of as the power of God, and at the same time a human personality, as it were catching up into Himself all the details of that infinite process. This difficulty is probably due to the fact that Greek philosophy had not yet thought out the question of self-consciousness and personality. It is true that Aristotle's God contemplates Himself, but that is only because Aristotle thinks it would be beneath God's dignity for Him to contemplate anything else. Epictetus is working towards the notion of self-consciousness, when he speaks of the faculty of the mind, which "accompanies ideas" (*παρὰκολουθεῖ τὰς φαντασίας*). But none of these philosophers had the exact notions of modern psychology concerning personality. What Clement does insist on with reference both to God and man, is the freedom of the will, and that is an important step towards a definite notion of personality. The Greek love for the personification of natural objects and processes tended to keep their notion of personality vague. Now this all seems to be reflected in Clement's conception of Christ as the Logos; he never seems to feel that his notion of Him as a world power is incompatible with that of human or even semi-human personality.

Now let us determine what Clement conceived to be the relation between the Logos and God. The Logos is the consciousness of God and also a distinct person. This means that Clement has distinguished "between the thought and the thinker; between mind and its unknown foundation" (4), or, to use a metaphor from human personality, between the mind and the brain. He has definitely taken the step of separating God from His Logos, and made the latter immanent in the world, so that he can say that God in Himself is not the object of demonstration, but the Logos is (5). This doctrine seems to be the result of combining the Fourth Gospel with Philo. There seems to be no influence of Aristotle,

(4) Bigg - Christian Platonists p.64.
 (5) Strom IV.25.156.

as Bigg thinks (6), in this separation of God from the power that rules the world; Clement criticises Aristotle too severely (7). He has merely thought out to their logical conclusions the premises with which he started. He now has two hypostases. But if the Logos is a definite personality, can Clement express the relation between Him and the Logos in such a way as to escape Ditheism? He believes he can, and he seems to have argued in this manner. He has explained the New Testament notion of Christ as the "Son of God" by Philo's notion of the Logos as the resultant of a definite forthgoing of the powers of God; the birth is really a self-evolution of God. But the act of birth is not, as in Origen, a perpetual process, but a definite act which took place before time began, as time has to do with the things of the world. Thus the Logos is both a created thing, and not; with reference to God He is a created thing, but with reference to the world He is everlasting, as having existed from before time and as being the instrument of God in creation. By this reconstruction of his thought we can account for Photius' statement that Clement made the Logos into a created thing, (8) and such phrases from Clement's own works as these: that Christ is the new creation which for a long time was not known (9), and that He was the first created Wisdom (*σοφία*) (10). But this question of the way in which the Logos came into being did not interest Clement much, and he must have turned over in his grave at the emphasis which future theologians placed on this question. Now, as Hatch remarks (11) in speaking of Philo, this metaphor of the generation of the Logos, whether as a single act or a continuous process, belongs to a dualistic conception of the universe, which, as we have already reminded ourselves, would explain much of Clement's theology. By this way of thinking Clement has subordinated the Logos to God; he calls Him the instrument of God in creation (12), the first begotten Son, and other names which imply subordination (13). The Logos gives us a true representation of, but he does not reveal all, the glory of the Father. Clement is very candid about this, and he never thinks it necessary to define His relation to God more explicitly. He worships the Logos as a revelation of something else. This is the result of the interpretation of Christ, the Son of God, by the philosophic notion of the Logos.

(6) Bigg - Christian Platonists, p.84. n.3.

(7) Protrept. 5.

(8) Photius - Quoted in Bigg: Chr. Plat. p.

(9) Quis Dives Salv. 12.

(10) Strom. V. 14. 90.

(11) Hatch Hibbert Lect- for 1888 p.249.

(12) Protr. 1.6. and Strom. VII.2.

(13) Rufinus saw the same when he said: "interdum invenimus aliqua in libris eius capitula in quibus filium Dei creaturam dicit". Quoted by Gieseler.

Next let us study the Logos as Creator of the world. Here the important question is whether Clement accepted the notion of two principles, matter and God, or whether he believed in Creation ex nihilo. We may at least be certain of this much, that this question gave him much trouble, and he even seems to suspend his judgment purposely in his earlier works, which we alone possess, for fear of giving offence. Thus he feels the difficulty of supposing two principles, when he criticises Aristotle (14), but here he seems to be objecting to matter as an intractable material substrate. From Clement's usual silence and from this criticism of Aristotle, Canon Bigg (15) with a seeming desire to read "orthodox" views into the difficult passages of Clement, confidently says he did not admit the "eternity" of matter; but Canon Bigg has forgotten two facts, that by his interpretation the manifest dualism of Clement falls to the ground, since if God made matter there would be no need of separating Him from it, as He, being Omnipotent would not have made anything from which He would need to be separated; and also the express statement made to the contrary by Photius (16), who had more of Clement's works than we, and who said that he found this doctrine in one of the latest works, the Hypotyposes, which statement we have no reason to doubt. Now if Clement's system was consistent at all, and that was certainly his aim, he must have believed in the eternity of a matter (*ἄχρονος ὄλη*) of some sort, though we may feel certain that he never looked on that matter as intractable in the hands of the Logos, or inherently evil, since the universe is perfect. He never traced moral evil back to an imperfect universe. The story of his earlier life, during which he gives us to understand that he studied Plato, enables us to conjecture that he brought with him into Christianity the Platonic notion of formless matter which only existed potentially (*τὸ μὴ ὂν*), but which was set over against God, as indestructible; and that he thought of the Logos as the demiurge who "arranged" (17) this invisible and "formless" (18) mass into an ordered and perfect universe. Thus he accepts the Platonic notion, as explained in the Timaeus (19), that time has a meaning only with reference to the universe, and so the *ὄλη* must be *ἄπορος* or *ἄχρονος* (20). Again Clement speaks of the creation of the world of Ideas, which served as model for the Logos in his creation of the material world (21) - another Platonic touch. Now with this view of two

(14) Strom V.14.90.

(15) Bigg. Christian Platonists p.76.

(16) Photius. See Bunsen's Analecta I.

(17) Strom VII.2.5. Clement seldom uses _____ of Creation.

(18) Genesis I.2, as Clement read it in the LXX.

(19) Timaeus 37 DE.

(20) Strom VI.16.142.

(21) Strom V.6-39.

principles in creation, one active and the other passive, it is possible to hold that there were other worlds before ours, which is what his pupil Origen afterwards taught. As Bigg says: "Creation, as the word is commonly considered, was in Origen's view not the beginning but an intermediate step in human history. Aeons rolled away before this world was made; aeons upon aeons, days, weeks, months and years, sabbatical years, jubilee years of aeons will run their course before the end is attained. The one fixed point in this gigantic drama is the end" (22). If we attribute such views to Origen's teacher, the statement of Photius becomes quite intelligible that Clement "thinks of matter as timeless and talks strangely of worlds before Adam" (23). Again, when speaking of Greek plagiarisms from the Old Testament, he says they got their idea of two principles from Genesis I.2, where it certainly is to be found in the LXX version (24). This interpretation is quite consistent with the rest of Clement's philosophy, and it explains why Clement is so careful to refute Stoicism, as it mixed up God with an alien principle; and polytheism which worshipped not God but the mere matter which he had fashioned - His *ἔργον*. Again it explains what he means when he says that God has no natural relation to us, since we have a body; otherwise there would be parts of God and He would sin in parts (25). It also explains why he is so careful to separate the immortal soul from the mortal, which only serves to unite it with the body, and is thus the seat of the passions (26). Creation as such is a mere illusion, and what the Logos did was to act as an architect. But this formless matter Clement never thought of, as did some of the Gnostics, as a principle of evil; to him the universe is perfect, and he does not trace moral evil to an imperfection in matter. As Pressensé admirably puts it; "To Clement evil is not a necessary consequence of creation; it is not an essential and primordial think like matter; it is only an accident, the result of the estrangement of the will" (27).

Another important trace of Greek influence in Clement is the purpose he ascribes to God in Creation. In the Old and New Testament we are never told of any purposes in Creation, but are at once introduced to the description of what actually took place; which is all the more startling as the Bible has no place for Chance. The writers do not try to fathom the purposes of God, though they often state or imply that all things were made for the sake of man. The purpose of salvation is mentioned

(22) Bigg, *Christian Platonists* p.193. Quoted also by Harnak.

(23) Photius in Bunsen's "*Analecta Ante-Nicaena*" vol.I. p.164,6.

(24) Strom. V.14.91.

(25) Protrept.5.66.

(26) See note (46) of this chapter.

(27) Pressensé, *Heresies and Christian Doctr.* p.266.

but not that of creation; concerning which we are merely told that when it was over it pleased God. Now Clement does say that God created the world because of his goodness (28), and this is a certain reminiscence of Plato (29). Now these few fragments which we possess of Clement's cosmological theory definitely point to the fact that he knew both Plato's Timaeus and Philo's De Opificio Mundi at first hand; but he differs from Philo in that he does not consider matter as intractable material substrate. Except for this one difference, Clement's cosmology is the most legitimate offspring possible of Greek Science. But by this we do not mean to assert that Clement was a Greek philosopher instead of a Christian theologian; in place of the Jewish mythology which so many of his contemporaries were bringing into Christianity, when they put the Old Testament on an equality with the teachings of Jesus, Clement adapted Greek Science to fill out what was lacking in the teaching of Christ.

But the Logos governs the world which He had created; He sustains the world process and keeps the world moving. After he had tuned the discord of the atoms into harmonious order, He set bounds to the ocean and prevented it from encroaching on the land (30). Here he identifies his Logos with the Stoic *σπερματικός λόγος* in fact, if not in words, and says that it stretches from the centre to the circumference, from the outermost parts to the centre and tunes the whole. The Logos is the world-process and also a person which works for good, and so is a moral governor of the universe. This^{*sc} is the most important function of the Logos in Clement, except that of teaching man; He does the will (*τὸ βούλημα*) of the Father by governing the course of things, and is the power by which Providence is administered. This question of a Moral Governor was a very important one at the time. Christianity had accepted the Jewish Scriptures as equal with their own writings and traditions, and this fact led Marcion into Ditheism, when he found that the God of the Old Testament had ordered cruel and immoral things; and in this way the very notion of a Providence had been impugned. Again certain Christians had thought of the Roman Empire as the very incarnation of evil powers and its Emperor as anti-Christ — it was indeed the kingdom of this world which aimed at the suppression of the Church of Christ. In this way they accounted for the moral degradation which they found so prevalent in the great cities; it could all be traced back to a personal power of evil, which had set up the Roman Empire as his Kingdom on Earth. To explain the prob-

(28) Strom V.11.76 where he quotes and approves of Plato.

(29) Timaeus 29E.

(30) Protrept. 1.5.

lem of moral evil these men had adopted the notion, which we find appearing in Jewish thought after the Exile and thence making its way into Christianity, of two contending powers; and then when Roman society opposed them, they identified it with the Kingdom of this Evil power. This was an explicit denial of the universality of Providence; God is the author of the Good only and Evil is due to other causes. "This view which found its first philosophic expression in the Timaeus of Plato, was transmitted, through some of the Platonic schools, to the later syncretist writers who incorporated Platonic elements. In this Platonic form it assumed the existence of inferior agents who ultimately owed their existence to God, but whose existence as authors of evil He permitted or overlooked" (31). This was the answer of Plutarch and many of the Christian Gnostics. Thus Marcion, the Judasizing and the Platonizing, Christians had all virtually denied the universality of Providence. Another answer was the Stoic, which in practice amounted to the epigram (32) that "the world is perfect and everything in it a necessary evil," which must therefore be endured; though they strenuously denied the existence of any other evil than moral. God's Providence relates to the Universe as a whole, so that inconveniences, or seeming evils in the parts, are really for the universal good. Thus Epictetus can believe that his lame leg is for the good of the universe, else it would not have been so (33). The Stoics were also in most cases determinists, who held the doctrine of Free Will only in the sense that a man may be happy in any condition if he wills it, and not in the sense that he could interfere with external circumstances and so make his conditions better. "The only real liberty and human dignity was to be found in renunciation" (34). This was pessimism and quietism, and could hardly have appealed to many except those in the greatest adversity. The Stoic insisted on Providence as regards the whole, but failed to give an answer that coincided with obvious experience or satisfied mankind, about the providential care of the parts; they neglected the notion of the worth of the individual man.

Now Clement has all these answers in his mind when he explains his views on the question of Providence. Personally he has the utmost faith that God (or the Logos, for he is not always exact in his use of the terms), cares both for the universe as a whole and for each of the parts, and his own conviction is so firm that he is disgusted with any one who feels doubts or questions it, and says they deserve to be punished (35). He says Providence is manifest from the sight of all its skilful and wise works, thus accepting the teleological argument, of which the Stoics had made such use before him (36); and insists that the Logos

(31) Hatch p.217.

(32) A.C. Bradley, quoted in Davidson's "Stoic Creed".

(33) Epictetus. Dissert I.12.23.

(34) Dills "Roman Society from Nero to M.Aurelius".p.310.

(35) Strom. V.1.6.

(36) See n.35. πάντων σοφῶν καὶ τεχνικῶν κομμάτων.

cares both for the individual and the community, "for being the power of the Father (i.e. allpowerful) He prevails over whomsoever He will, not leaving even the smallest part of his government (*διολκυστος*) uncared-for"(37). The Stoics had insisted on the care of God for man as a member of the community, but Clement has fully grasped the fundamental idea of Christianity, that God cares for the individual man as such and will save such as are weak and erring. But as a Platonist and a Christian, Clement qualifies this doctrine of a universal Providence by the opposite doctrine of man's Free Will, so that God's Providence never becomes Determinism with him. He states the antimony, without trying to reconcile it by philosophic arguments, and he certainly does not believe that "in moral things liberty is a direct imperfection, a state of weakness, and supposes weakness of reason and weakness of love", (38) since he attributes Free Will to God. He insists on both facts that God saves man, and that man saves himself (39); He is the Saviour of all who come to Him (40). Determinism in any sense, either of natural law, or of a power outside the individual which works for evil, seems to him to impugn the divine goodness and the divine right to punish the individual who has sinned (41). To save man's moral nature and the goodness of God, he is led to a strict Monism in Ethics, according to which man makes his own destiny by his own choice. There is no such theory as this in the New Testament, where it is tacitly assumed that man is moral, but no explanation of this fact is given; and Clement gets this notion ultimately from Plato's Republic (the myth of Book X), by transferring what Plato says of a pre-existent state to this present life. The close relation between the two is also shown by the fact that Clement uses in this very connection, of man making his own choice by an act of will, the words of Plato, *θεός τιμιος*. The race did

(37) Strom. VII.2.6 and 9.

(38) Bigg's Christian Platonists p.80, note. This note of Bigg, in which he quotes the above words of Jeremy Taylor, as if to prove that Clement's view was incorrect, was certainly due to a prejudice of his own, for he has not grasped the notion of Clement that Free-Will is a special privilege and boon to man, in virtue of which he alone of all creation is moral. He has done Clement a great wrong by not putting himself in Clement's position before he criticised him.

(39) See next chapter.

(40) Strom VII.2.7.

(41) Strom VI.12.98.

not once for all, in its representative Adam, make its eternal destiny, but each has to choose for himself whether he will do good or bad. There is no inherent, or inherited, inclination to evil, for moral responsibility presupposes an equal tendency to move towards either the good or the bad (42). Again, moral evil is the only evil in the world, and all seeming evils such as pain are here to test man and to help to come out strong by conquering them. Clement thus compares life in this world of sense to a gymnastic contest, at which God looks on (43), presenting an almost exact likeness to the interpretation which Epictetus had put on the Labours of Hercules (44). Thus all the evil and moral degradation in the world is traced back to individual acts of sin; but God overrules these acts of sin to good, so that only the sinners themselves are made worse by their sinning. The one important example is that of the theft of philosophy by bad angels; concerning which Clement says that even if it were a true account of the origin of philosophy, still God overruled it for good. He undoubtedly means to apply the same notion to all human actions, as this passage shows: he is answering the argument of the people who believe in a Devil, and he says that even so "all things are overruled from above to good, in order that the manifold wisdom (*ποικίλη*) of God might become known in accordance with the fore-knowledge (*προγνώσις*) of the ages, which he made through (Instrumental *ἐν*) Christ. And nothing is opposed to or in any way hinders God who is Lord and Ruler. But even the plans of those who have revolted, and their powers also, having reference only to a part, arise from a bad disposition just as the diseases of the body also arise, but are guided by the Universal Providence to a healthy end, even if the cause be bad. In truth it is the greatest <proof> of a divine Providence that it does not allow the evil which has arisen from a defection of the will to remain useless and unprofitable, much less to become harmful with respect to all the rest. For it is the work of the divine wisdom and virtue and power (for it is, if I may use the expression, the nature of God to do good, just as it is the nature of fire to warm and of light to illuminate) but this also is especially his work to bring to some good and useful end what has been planned with an evil intent with reference to certain things (*τινῶν* i.e. with reference to a part of the whole), and to make a good use of seeming evils and the testimony which results from temptation (45). Now such an elaborate theory of Providence

(42) Strom. VI.11.95 "Man is by nature adapted to virtue; not so as to be possessed of it by birth, but so as to be adapted for acquiring it."

(43) Strom. VII.3.20. (44) Epictetus Dissert. I.6.33.

(45) Strom. I.17.85.86. The wrong accent on such a common word as *the Indefinite Pronoun* - *τινῶν* - as printed by Klotz - shows his carelessness.

is not found in the New Testament, where it is merely stated that "Your Heavenly Father feedeth them". In all probability Clement had received this doctrine, before he became a Christian, from some Stoic teacher who said that it took all sorts of things to make up a universe, and that if a man did sin, he could do his fellows no wrong by bringing material disadvantage on them, as external circumstances could not affect his state of will, which alone mattered, but only gave him a situation in which to show his powers. Now when Clement joined this view^{* of wil} as affecting only the evil-doer, with his doctrine of the Universality of Providence, he would have the doctrine portrayed above; all of which he might have had before he became a Christian, and never felt called upon to renounce, but which he rather used to explain many questions which Christianity forced him to think about. He can now give a philosophic justification of the words of Paul that "all things work together for good to those who love God"; and he has interpreted the idea of Providence which he finds in the New Testament by the help of Greek philosophy.

Now Clement can insist against the Gnostics that the goodness of God is not incompatible with his justice, as man alone is responsible for the degradation he has brought on himself, in the position in which God put him to test him. But even then punishment is not vindictive but remedial. Clement has fled from that dreadful notion of God, which early Christianity under Jewish influences seems often to have inclined to, of regarding Him as an omnipotent Eastern Monarch, Who has issued definite commands, applicable to all men under all circumstances, and Who is therefore pleased when those commands are obeyed by his subjects, but becomes angry when they are disobeyed or slighted, and in His anger condemns the transgressors to a place of outer darkness, where there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth for ages upon ages. Such a God is a God of vengeance and not one who loves to forgive sins. Clement takes middle ground between such men and the Gnostics, who entirely rejected the notion of God's justice as being inconsistent with a perfect God. Clement does not oppose the two qualities of mercy and justice, but says that punishment is educative and not retributive. He quotes the flood as a typical example: "if in fact all sinful flesh perished in the flood, punishment being inflicted on them for the sake of education, we must believe first of all that the will of God, which is disciplinary and ever-active (παιδευτικόν καὶ ἐνεργητικόν), is to save all who turn to Him; and on the other hand that more subtle thing, the soul (ψυχὴ), could never receive any injury from the grosser element of water, being unconquerable by its subtle and simple nature, which is called incorporeal. But whatever part has been made gross as a

result of sin, this is cast away along with the carnal spirit (*παρ' ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα*) which lusts against the soul" (46). In another place he calls punishment a correction of the soul (47). It is thus a means employed in bad cases where men will not yield to gentler persuasion, and is a part of God's scheme of a gradual perfection of all men in his Kingdom. Thus the notion of justice is merged in that of disciplinary love. Now this idea of punishment is certainly not Jewish but Platonic, as Clement himself remarks (48), and especially the tracing of it all to the quality of goodness.

The last paragraph is interesting not merely because it points out a Platonic influence on Clement, for as a matter of fact most of the philosophers of the time must have had much the same notion of punishment as a "self-acting law" working for the good of the world, but it is especially interesting as an instance of a case in which, by borrowing Greek and not Jewish ideas, Clement has been able to win for his students a nobler conception of the deity, and has made a definite step forward in the development of a Christian theology.

Clement's doctrine of Providence in its relation to man takes the form of a doctrine of universal revelation. This is the legitimate outcome of his conception of the Logos as a personal influence which works through all the world to perfect it. By means of his philosophic doctrine, he has given the widest possible meaning to the work of Christ. Before his incarnation the Logos, disseminated like seed, was trying to teach all men, and therefore inspired the Hebrew prophets and the great teachers of other nations. As he himself says "it is impious to consider, since we have agreed that Providence exists, that all prophecy and also the economy concerning a Saviour, did not take in accordance with Providence" (49). And like Justin Martyr he believes that Socrates and Plato were Christians before their times; they were justified because they lived up to the light which they had. Hence he can speak of these teachers as being in a certain way inspired and quote their works, if they left any, as an authority almost equal to that of the Old Testament (50). All truth is one but men have torn it into parts as the Bacchantes did Pentheus (51); the way of truth is one, and into it flow streams from all

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- (46) Strom. VI.6.52.
 - (47) Strom. I.26.168
 - (48) Paedag. I.8.67.
 - (49) Strom. V.1.6.
 - (50) Strom. I.8.42.
 - (51) Strom. I.13.57.

sides. Or again, God is the cause of all things that are good, and what he has bestowed on each generation advantageously and at seasonable times is a preliminary training for Christianity - Thus he can say that Philosophy was the *παιδαγωγός* to lead the Greeks to Christ, as the Law the Jews. He seems to see that no one set of Sacred Scriptures has any right to claim for itself special reverence as a unique revelation, except as it comes nearer the truth than others, for all great and noble men have been in a greater or less degree inspired. But the very notion frightens him; it is too revolutionary to win general acceptance, and for once Clement does not follow out his promises to their logical conclusions. He takes refuge in the Jewish prejudice, which Christianity had in his day baptized, but found it difficult to spiritualize, that they alone had a direct revelation of the true God. He distinguishes between the revelation to the Jews and that to the philosophers, not only as regards quantity but also as regards the way of transmission: "God is the cause of all noble things, but of some *κατὰ προνοούμενον* as of the Old and New Testaments, but of others *κατ' ἐπικολούθημα*, as of philosophy (52)." The Old and New Testament come directly from God, while philosophy is farther removed from the source of all good, and comes by a more circuitous path. Or again, he says that Christ preached the gospel in Hades to those who had never heard it before, that he might bring to repentance those who had lived a just life as far as they could according to the Law and Philosophy, but not a perfectly just life (53).

The doctrine that the spiritual Logos took on a human form and became man, is the very keystone of the theology of Clement, as without this the rest would all fall to the ground. Now the body in which the Logos took up His abode was a real body (*σῶμα*), but not that of a common man. He was in deed *θεὸς ἐν ἡθρώπου σκήματι* (54), and He was willing to make use of *σώματος μορφῇ* (55), but this flesh was only a garment into which He had stepped and with which He had no natural connection. He was united immediately with the flesh (56), with the intervention of *sc. -out* any third element, --

(51) Strom. I.13.57.

(52) Strom. I.5.28.

(53) Strom. VI.6.

(54) Paedagog. I.2.2.

(55) Strom. VI.17.151.

(56) Strom. VI.9.70. Christ's body did not need food for its maintenance but was held together by a holy power, and he ate food merely that his disciples might not think He was different from themselves (*ὡς φρονεῖν*).

such as Origen found it necessary to use (57) when he supposed a human soul in the person of Christ. Thus he can speak of Christ as ^{ἄνθρωπος} and do away with the notion of any struggle within between the flesh and the soul (58). This is indeed the "pneumatic Christology" of Harnack, according to which "Jesus was regarded as a heavenly spiritual being (the highest after God), who took flesh and again returned to heaven after the completion of his work on earth" (59).

(57) Origen De Princip. II.63. "Hac ergo substantia animae inter Deum carnemque mediante (non enim possibile erat Dei naturam corpori sine mediatori misceri) nascitur Deus homo, illa substantia media existente cui utique contra naturam non erat corpus assumere". Quoted by Gieseler. Origen seems to have been influenced by Neo-Platonism in his answer to the psychophysical question of the relation of body and soul. Thus Plotinus, after arguing that the soul is a single immaterial "ousia" being one and the same subject of all perceptions, goes on to ask how such a soul can be related to the body. The answer he gives is that by the union of soul and body there is produced a compound nature which is divisible. Origen seems to have adopted this view for his own purposes, to explain how the divine Logos was united with a human body. See next note also. Clement himself feels a difficulty here as he says that the body and the Logos are held together by "a holy power".

(58) See N. 46, where it is said to "lust against the soul".

(59) Over against this pneumatic Christology Harnack puts the "adoption theory" according to which Jesus was regarded as a virtuous man (^{ἀγαθὸς}) chosen by God, with whom the Father or the Spirit of God was united, and who after being tested by a temptation in the wilderness was adopted by God as His Son, and invested with dominion. The Pastor of Hermas gives clear expression to this view, but it too goes back to Apostolic times and found its chief justification in Christ's baptism as told by Mark I.9-13, and afterwards copied by Matthew and Luke. Here also belongs the conception that traced back the genealogy of Jesus to Joseph. That this view was a common one in the time of Clement is seen by the importance given to the Pastor of Hermas and by the statement of Eusebius (H.E. V.28) that this was once the ruling Christology at Rome. Again, it lies at the base of the theory of Valentinus. Now these two Christologies are strictly speaking mutually exclusive - the man who has become a God and the Divine being who appeared in human form. But the existence of the Adoption theory was compromised by the doctrine of the miraculous birth of Christ by the Holy Spirit. Soon these two theories began to be compounded in an effort to save both the humanity and the divinity of Christ, and this is in part the meaning of Origen's notion that the pre-existent Logos was implanted in the man Jesus. Of course these two "Christologies" were not in the strict sense of the word "doctrines", but only general notions, more or less fluid but stable enough that we can even now catch glimpses of them as distinct from one another. Copied loosely from Harnack: Hist. of Dogma I. p.139.

This Christology can certainly be traced as far back as Paul's notion of Christ as a spiritual being; and it is the direct outcome of an attempt to interpret the nature of Christ in the terms of a dualistic philosophy, in which the Deity is absolutely separated from the world. Now this view is stated as definitely and as candidly by Clement as any one could state it; thus we find Clement insisting that Christ was perfect even before His baptism. He was never a man; so that we are not surprised to find that Photius found "heresy" in Clement, who ~~he~~ did not attribute a human nature to Christ but only the appearance of one (60). In Clement's theology Christ is not a human personality at all, but a "spiritual being" of quite a different nature from man; Who came to earth in the garment of human flesh that men might touch Him with their hands and hear from His own lips that He was the Son of God. He has elaborated a conception of the person of Christ by means of the doctrine of the Logos as he found it in the Fourth Gospel, which in turn he has explained by the doctrine of the same name which he found in Philo; and he has given us the Christ of theology instead of the Christ of history. But we must be careful in making such a distinction to say exactly what we mean. Clement has borrowed a philosophic notion ready made, by the help of which he has hoped to explain the nature of Christ's being and work, and this definition of Christ has really made Him into a theological concept. Of course Clement believes they are identical, but it is just here that we take occasion to differ from him most. Clement must have seen this himself as he does speak of the suffering of Christ on the Cross; but this is uncommon. Now this metaphysical character, which has no real human personality, is the result of following out to its logical conclusions the dualistic philosophy which he inherited from Plato (61).

Such a notion of the person of Christ is possible, just because Clement has no notion of His work as redemptive (a buying-back), but solely as educative. He never insists that the Logos bore the burden of sin on the cross; and the omission of such a reference, when commenting on Fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, should be conclusive (62). Again

(60) Photius Cod. 109. Quoted in Bunsen: *Analecta ante-Nicaena*.

(61) How early such a conception of Christ was formed is seen in the fact that St. Paul within thirty years of the death of Christ, holds a theory in many respects identical with Clement's. Thus we see that from the very earliest days, a philosophy of Dualism was at work helping Christianity to formulate its beliefs in a dualistic mould.

(62) *Paedagog.* I.8.67.

he denies that Christ suffered by the will of the Father, (63) since one of two things would then be true, that suffering would become a good thing because God willed it, or else those who decree and exact punishment would become guiltless. It remains to say that such things happen without the prevention of God, as this alone saves both Providence and the goodness of God. Thus his theory of the Atonement can eventually be traced back to his solution of the problem of evil. Since he does not believe in the doctrine of original sin, he does not need to insist on Christ's work as the legal act of paying with his own blood the debt owed by mankind to God for its sins, but which it could not of itself pay, having been bankrupted by Adam's sin.

Clement conceives of Christ's work as that of an educator. Men are weak for the comprehension of the things of reason (*τα νοητα*) because they can perceive only things of sense, and so the Logos came in the form of a man to teach a band of followers, and to deliver to them a definite revelation, by living in accordance with which they might become like God (64). In this conception of Christ's work Clement is merely following the belief then common that Christ came to teach men a body of truth - the *regula fidei*. Such a conception gave Clement an opportunity for insisting on the necessity of knowing what he believed, and also a support on which to begin building a system of theology. The insistence on the intellectual element in Christianity led Clement to adopt a Greek theory of knowledge as an explanation of the Christian Scheme of salvation.

(63) Strom. IV.12.88.

(64) This notion of Christ's teaching as a perfect Moral Law or system of casuistry, must have developed itself before Clement's time, as he presupposes that everyone will agree to it. It seems to me that this notion is a direct result of the Jewish relationship of Christianity, as the Jewish Christians wanted something to take the place of their Torah. Thus the Epistle of James is largely taken up with questions of morality, and in the Didache we get a definite set of rules for the Christian life; and both of these books are closely related to the Jewish party in the Christian Church. Harnack's notion of a secularization of Christian Morality under Greek influences (Hist. of Dogma, vol.2) has been, I believe, justly criticised by Mayor (Edition p. XXVIII). It seems that the Greek Christian merely picked up, and carried on, what was already a prevalent tendency in the Church. Christianity soon after the death of its first disciples met the dilemma of remaining a secluded sect of religious devotees, each of which would be a saint, or of

(64) Continued -

making certain compromises with the world to win it for Christ. Its love for making converts, and the care with which it remembered the last-reported injunction of its Master, sent Christianity out into the world. Now instead of a universal principle of right action, such as Christ taught (Matth.22.36-40), from which they were themselves to deduce whether a particular action was right or wrong, weak and erring men asked for some support or authority from without, which would at once keep them from anarchy, and save them the trouble of thinking. Thus they were ready to accept the sayings of Christ as a perfect system of casuistry and they did not foresee that if such a notion were to be united with that of a church which alone knew this truth and was therefore the only means of salvation, it might become, in the hands of a monarchical clergy, the cause of an intellectual stagnation for a thousand years.

Chapter 5.

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

Since the question of knowledge plays such an important part in the Soteriology of Clement, as we have just seen it must do, when he thinks of Christ primarily as a teacher, let us study his Psychology and his Epistemology before we study that theory of soteriology more in detail from the standpoint of the man who is saved.

Clement's Psychology is that of his day and in it we see several elements from different sources, which have not been perfectly reconciled. But this applies only to the details of his Psychology, for he is perfectly consistent in his Dualism of body and spirit (σὰρξ and νοῦς, or πνεῦμα) 'The constitution of man, then, since it exists among the things of sense, is made up of different but not opposite things, body and soul'. (1) But he makes distinctions within the soul itself (ψυχῇ); thus he speaks of the Platonic ἐπιθυμία, θυμός and λογισμός (2), and again he divides the soul into the "fleshly spirit" and "the spirit proper", or reason (νοῦς) (3). He also speaks of ten faculties of the soul, and three criteria of the mind (4). But all these subdivisions are only for the purposes of precise definitions, and they often come from different sources. What he does wish to insist on is that there are two parts of the soul, only one of which is immortal (5) and the other of which is related to the body, being a sort of a "tertium quid", so that it perishes with the body. Here he has done what Origen and Plotinus did after him; he has found it necessary to posit a third something to unite body and soul, and this he calls the animal, or fleshly spirit, or the flesh, and with it he connects the passions (πάθη) and desires (ἐπιθυμίας). Now he can account for the struggle

(1) Strom IV.26.166

(2) Strom II.10.33.

(3) Strom VI.16.134 and fragm. 81 of ~~Bohler~~. Klotz.

(4) Strom II.11.50 Ἐν ἡμῖν γὰρ ἄπο τοῦ τρία μέτρα, τρία κριτηρία μνηστέα, εἰσθεῖς μὲν εἰσθεσῶς λογισμῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ φημάτων ὁ λόγος, νοητῶν δὲ νοῦς. ὁ τοίνυν πρῶτος εἰστέταται μὲν τῶν κατὰ λόγον καὶ τῶν κατὰ δianoian καὶ τῶν κατὰ εἰσθεσιν καὶ ἐνθυσιάν ἀφαιρημάτων, κ.τ.λ.

(5) Strom V.6.52.

of purpose within the soul of man - a war between the flesh and the spirit. "The soul is confessed to be the better part of man and the body the worse, but the soul is not good by nature nor is the body bad by nature, nor yet is that which is not good straightway bad" (6). Here he takes care to say that the *σῶμα* is not bad by nature (i.e. it is not bad because its *ὄν* was evil), but he does mean that the body introduces weakness, as it prevents men from comprehending the things of reason (7). Reason on the other hand is a direct emanation from God (8). Here however Clement would not have used the word "part" (*μοῖρα*) as being too materialistic; he thinks of the relation of God to his spiritual Creatures as that between a burning torch and other unlighted ones - the burning one hands on the flame without losing any of its own (9). The soul is a spark of the divine. Thus he can say that like comprehends like, or that the reason (*νοῦς*) in man comprehends the Reason of the world, the Logos (10). Man is thus capable of wisdom but he can only attain it by grasping the Divine hand outstretched to lift him up (11), and so he has need of a special gift from God, the Holy Spirit. This is something additional which is given the Christian alone (12).

Christ led too busy a life to have any time to teach Psychology, and so when Christians wished to formulate a theology, they had to go outside of their own body for a theory of Psychology, and they put Christ's teaching about morals into the mould of a strange Philosophy. Paul had done this before Clement, but in Paul's case it is difficult to ascertain to what school of thought he is immediately indebted for his notions. In Clement's case however we do know by whom he was influenced; it was by Plato, Aristotle and later commentators on Aristotle. Thus he has used Plato's division of the soul into three parts, of which two are irrational, and Aristotle's notion of an active reason, which was then interpreted to mean an effluence from God. Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre both hold such views, and have combined them in the same way that Clement has done, from which we may

(6) See note 1.

(7) Strom V.1.7.

(8) Does not come from parent; Strom.VI.16.135, but comes from without. Strom V.13-39. The passage in which he speaks of a natural relation between man and God and says he cannot believe that man is a part of God (Strom II.16.74) seems to be mostly a hit at materialism as the next words of the Greek show. He is also in the "likeness" of God or of His Son. Strom.V.13-87 and VI. 9.72.

(9) Strom V.11.22.

(10) Strom V.3.16.

(11) Bigg: Christian Platonists p.32.

(12) Strom. V.13.88 and VI.16.134. See N.(3).

feel certain that such a doctrine was a common one at the time. Again under the influence of Stoicism he holds the unity of the soul; and like them he puts emphasis on the will, which comes under the head of *γούς*. But Clement is before all else a Christian, and so he has to speak of the Holy Spirit, which was to lead them into all truth. This serves to lead us to his **Epistemology**.

Clement begins by laying it down that there are two kinds of faith and two kinds of demonstration, one resting on knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη μονικῆν*) and the other on opinion (*δοξαστικῆν*). Now the demonstration which rests on opinion is human and is the result of rhetorical arguments or dialectic syllogisms (13). By this he means that the man who uses such a method of demonstration has not grasped the first principles of knowledge, which are grasped by faith alone, so that all he does is merely to play with words. Now this sort of knowledge is of no use at all for Clement, as it is not knowledge at all, but mere subjective opinion (*δοξά*). Man must grasp the first principles (*ἀρχαί*), and then go on to understand things. Here Clement has been influenced by Aristotle, who shows it to be the work of "reason" to take in first principles (14). Faith is a definite act of will (*ἔκονσις πρόληψις*) by which man believes in a God whom he cannot see. But man was weak and so Christ came as his teacher, and since His death the Holy Spirit has been teaching man. Just how he thought of the work of the Holy Spirit, we cannot say, as that work which he expected to write on Prophecy and the Soul has not come down to us (15); but we may be certain of this much at least that he meant it to stand between the Logos and man as an intermediary in the system of education, which the Incarnate Logos began. The Holy Spirit seems to be the instrument of the Logos in teaching mankind (16). It is not a natural endowment to mankind, since all men do not possess it, but it is an influence that comes into the soul after conversion from without, and gives it the assurance that it is contemplating the truth. It helps man to progress from a state in which he accepts things on faith to a higher state in which he proves what he has believed. It is more than an influence, it is also a faculty of the soul which he can put on an equality with the others (17). More than that, it is a being like the Logos, for when commenting on I John 3.1. "and if anyone has sinned, we have

(13) Strom II.1140.

(14) Arist. Nichom. Eth. VII.6; Strom II.4.14.

(15) Strom. II. 20. 113, & Strom. IV. 1. 2.

(16) Strom V.4.25

(17) See note 4.

Jesus Christ as our advocate (consolatorem) to the Father" he says: "Sicut enim apud patrem consolator est pro vobis Dominus, sic etiam consolator est quem post assumptionem suam dignatus est mittere. Hae namque primitivae virtutes ac primo creatae, immobiles et existentes secundum substantiam et cum subiectis angelis et archangelis, cum quibus vocantur aequivoce, diversas operationes efficiunt". (18) Thus the Holy Spirit, in some way which he has not definitely explained, directs man to the contemplation of God. And what is this *ἐμπνέειν τὸν θεόν* ? It is not by the ecstasy of the mystic, but by means of his own reason that man comprehends the Logos, Who is rational (19); he knows the will of God within himself. To express this he adopts the phraseology of the Stoic theory of knowledge, and in practise he never gets much beyond it; a certain degree of vividness and distinctness of intuition seems to constitute for him the action of the Holy Spirit, and so he is certain that he perceives things as they are in themselves (*καταληπτικῶς*) (20). Another trace of Stoic influence is the importance he puts on *οὐ κατὰ θεόν*; he does not feel that if a man knows the right he must do it, but rather that a soul may be in open rebellion against God; and on the other hand this importance which he puts on the will in the formation of a judgment enables him to say that men ought not to accept every plausible argument, but that the influence of the Spirit should also be felt to witness with our spirit that things are being represented as they are. Thus we see that knowledge is not a process of reasoning, though that is an integral part of knowledge, but it is an intuitive knowledge of the good; which man can obtain, however, only by help from outside; so that it resolves itself into the interaction of a finite mind and the Infinite, in which process the finite grasps the reality of the idea of God's goodness. Thus he can say "we have no sensible image made of sensible matter, but an image which is perceived by the mind alone, God who alone is truly God" (21). This is true knowledge, as revealed by the Logos, and just because the Logos reveals it, he believes it is perfect (22). But if this is alone true knowledge, then Clement must hold the doctrine of representative perception of external things, that what we know are only ideas which correspond to things, and since we perceive them by the organs of sense we can never be sure just to what degree they represent reality or the truth, which is the Logos that is in them. Clement has separated *ἡσυχία* and *νοῦς* (23) and knowledge pertains to the latter only; by sense-perception we perceive that such and such a bit of stuff (*ὅλη*) is there, but we know what it means as a formed thing by reference to its *ἡσυχία* (24), which is the Logos. It was just because ^{asc. only.}

(18) Klotz vol.2. tom.IV.p.61.

(19) Strom VI.9.72.

(20) Strom I.20.100.

(21) Protrepticus 4.51.

(22) Strom VI.8.70

(23) Strom II.11.50

(24) An Aristotelean doctrine which was then very commonly accepted.

men could not comprehend God perfectly by this round about way (περίφρων) (25) through natural processes that the Logos was incarnated, who after his assumption sent the Holy Spirit to help men to get knowledge. Before that Clement seems to believe that the Holy Spirit only occasionally spoke, as through the Hebrew prophets, and that the Greeks knew Him only by a round about way and so called Him the Unknown God (26). Again he says that "the Greeks who philosophized correctly knew God only by reflection and through a veil" i.e. as revealed in nature and not as the Hebrew prophets knew Him by a direct revelation through the Holy Spirit (27).

Now such perfect knowledge can never be separated from right action (28). In this he is following the philosophers of his day (e.g. Stoics) who said that Virtue consists of knowledge, but he is especially indebted to Plato, who like Clement insisted that in the perfect man Virtue is Knowledge but also allows for a lower sort of virtue in a lower stage, in which men are partially perfected. But in one respect Clement has taken a definite and momentous step beyond his pagan contemporaries; they told their pupils to get their knowledge for themselves and by their own efforts; they encouraged them to go on in the search for it but they insisted that they must get it for themselves. Christianity on the other hand could offer to the men of the time a Master who came to earth on purpose to reveal such truth as men needed and a Master whose "ipse dixit" was final for this very reason that He came to reveal God. It was no longer a case of "tendentemque manus ulterioris ripae amore" but God had come to the shore on which man stood. Now even if this influence from God was only subjective, still merely as a value-judgment it would have been of immense help, in as much as the will makes up a large part of each judgment. Christianity had an external help to offer, while Stoicism with its "God within" could never do more than inspire courage and hope; the "emanation from God" in their Psychology never became anything than the *Yōōs* in Clement's; while he could offer in addition the Holy Spirit, which thus takes up a prominent place in his theory of knowledge. But with this one, though prominent, exception, his theory of knowledge is borrowed from the Greek philosophers. Thus like Aristotle he believes that the first principles are undemonstrable and must be grasped by an act of reason, which he calls faith:

(25) Strom I.19.91. MSS read περίφρων . Eusebius corrects it - Migne ad locum.

(26) Strom I.19.91.

(27) Strom I.19.94. κατ' ἑμφρων καὶ διὰφρων..... διαφῶν τὸν θεόν.

This is almost certainly a reminiscence of Plutarch's De Iside ch.9. 354 B.C. where the same collocation is found; this can hardly be a mere coincidence, as διὰφρων is rare.

(28) Strom II.10.47

like Plato he insists that Knowledge is only knowledge of the Good, and that if the perfect man knows what is right he will do it, and with these he combines the Stoic notion of *κατὰ φύσιν*.

Next let us study the different stages through which the individual passes as he progresses towards this ideal of perfect knowledge and right action. We have seen that he conceives of the soul as coming into the world with no entry on either the debit or credit side of its account in the book of life; it must make its own destiny, whether for good or for bad. If the soul decides by an act of will to follow the teaching of the Logos, the first step is that of faith (*πίστις*). In this word there are two notions coming from two different sources. Clement defines faith by quoting Hebrews XI.1. that "faith is the substantiation of things hoped for, the certification of things not seen". Now the first clause of that definition comes from Hebrew thought, the second from Greek; and they were first united in the liberal Jewish School of Philo. The first means trust or confidence in a person, a movement, or a religion, and this is its meaning when used in the Old Testament (29). Thus Abraham is reckoned by Paul as the man who trusted Jehovah and who was therefore counted righteous (30); and Noah is called righteous by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, because he built the ark, when there was no sign of a flood, solely because God had ordered it (31). Faith in this sense is the trust which one person has in another to carry out a promise or covenant, and it implies a knowledge of the character of the other party. When applied to God it means the belief that God is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him (32). Faith in this sense was not found in the sacred literature of the Greeks, just because their gods did not invite confidence. But the other sense of faith does come from Greek thought - the intellectual notion of conviction (*συγκρισις*) in distinction to positive knowledge, and having all shades of meaning from mere conjecture (*εἰκασία*) to trustworthy assurance. This is its meaning when it is said that by faith we understand that the worlds were fashioned by the command of God (33). In this sense the Greeks used it as the comprehension of the invisible. This is the belief that God is (34). Paul uses the word in this sense when he says, "we walk by faith and not by sight" (35). Now these two meanings had first been brought together by Philo, so that the word means with him an intuitive knowledge of God's being, leading to a reliance

(29) Genesis XV.6.

(30) Romans IV.3 and Galatians III.6.

(31) Hebrews XI.7.

(32) Hebrews XI.6.

(33) Hebrews XI.3.

(34) Hebrews XI.6.

(35) II Cor. V.7.

on Him in all matters of practical life and a cheerful co-operation with His purpose. This is the meaning which Clement finds also in Paul and the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and on this foundation he lays, with the help of Greek philosophy, the lofty, noble, and useful superstructure of a Christian gnosis.

But first let us ask what faith means to Clement, now that he has expanded and defined the meaning of the word by the help of Greek philosophy. First of all, it is a definite act of will which accepts before-hand certain beliefs (ἐκρηστος ὑπόληψις καὶ πρόληψις ὑγνώμινος προκαταλήψεως) (36); it is that act of will which every one must make to become a Christian, and it is set over against gnosis which comprehends a system of Christian doctrine based on the knowledge of God. Thus faith is the least possible requirement for the Christian life. Now faith is not natural, as Valentinus held, but a complete change in the individual which the individual makes of its own accord (πιστεύς οὐκ ἔστι μετανοία κατὰ φύσιν) (36). Since faith is not a natural act, which one does by his very nature, but the result of free choice, it is the first step in that system of education in which man, partly by his own will and partly by the help of God, is lifted up to see God. The act of faith and the advent of the Holy spirit must thus be identical in point of time. Thus Clement says that "as the game of ball does not depend merely on one throwing the ball skilfully, but there is also need of another to catch it at the proper time, in order that the game may be completed according to the rules of playing ball, so also it is the case that the teaching can be trusted, whenever faith on the part of the hearers, being a sort of a natural art, contributes towards learning ()" (37). Here he seems to mean that there are two parties concerned in the process of knowing, man and God, and that the act of man is natural when compared with the act of God. Then he goes on to say that the Logos has preached to all and has given them no plea for ignorance, though he knew beforehand those who were not likely to obey (τοὺς μὴ πεισθεσόμενους). Now repentance is the perfect act of faith; for if he does not believe that was a sin to which he was addicted, he will not be taught: and if he does not believe that punishment has been prepared for the sinner, and salvation for the man who lives according to the commandments, he will not reform" (38). Then he quotes from Paul's injunction to Timothy about those who put aside faith and a good conscience and thereby made a ship-wreck of their faith: "So then we must no longer

(36) Strom II.6.27.

(37) Strom II.6.25.

(38) Strom II.6.27,

slander faith in an off-hand way as something both simple and common and belonging to anyone. For if it were a merely human practise, as the Greeks supposed, it would have been extinguished"(39) And again: "faith appears to us to be the first movement towards salvation; after which fear, hope and repentance, making progress with the help of courage and patience, lead us to love and gnosis". Then he quotes with approval the words of Barnabas who desired his readers to possess gnosis along with faith. Fear and patience are the helpers of faith, and long-suffering and courage are the allies. Then he mentions the virtues of σοφία, σύνσις, ἡμετερώς and γνῶσις as being the elements of knowledge, so that faith is more elemental still, but is as necessary to the gnostic as breathing is to man who lives in this world. But as it is not possible to live without the four elements, so without faith it is impossible to obtain gnosis. This is the foundation of truth (40). From this passage we see that for the man who possesses ψῆμα πιστεῖν, moral excellence consists in showing forth certain virtues and in keeping the law through fear (41). Now for the Christian who is at this stage the Paedagogus is intended to serve as a text-book of morals, and its morality is that of rules or laws. It does not appeal to man's reason but to his fear of punishment. Thus in the first book of the Paedagogus Clement finds it necessary to point out that God, by the Logos, both restrains men from sin by threatening and saves them by exhorting:(42); and to prove that God's justice is not inconsistent with His goodness (43). This all means that the principle of this scheme of morality is that of fear. Such is the state of the "psychic" Christian who believes that God is, and that he will punish sin; and so, taking the authority of the Church as his guide, he is leading the best moral life he can. But all this he is doing on the authority of another who does know, so that his guide in life is a set of rules. Again, though he has put faith in Christ, still he is morally diseased and from these diseases he can be set free only by severe discipline. Thus many of the rules in the book are negative and disciplinary. It is also interesting to note how little the Christian "way of life" here explained differs from the ideal of contemporary pagan preachers; outwardly they are almost identical, and Clement has here borrowed for his own purposes whole passages from Musonius Rufus (44). In fact, the very form of the book is a well known Greek literary one, and the ordinary Christian "way of living" is here expounded just as

(39) Strom II.6.30. (40) Strom.II.6.31
(41) Strom II.7.32.
(42) Paedagog.I. ch.10.
(43) Paedagog.I. ch.9.
(44) Wendland - Quaestiones Musonianae.

any philosophic teacher might expound his.

But over and above this life which rests on simple faith, Clement thinks of another which rests on reason - the life of the perfect or gnostic Christian. This notion of an elite body of Christians had been a common one among the heretical gnostics, who placed a great importance on knowledge. They had picked up Paul's words about "babes in Christ" and identified them with the simple Christians, as compared with themselves who had knowledge. They had divided the Christians into two camps, and this led to a secession of the plebs or common people, who would have nothing to do with the aristocrats. Now the Gnostics seem to have wished to reduce Christianity to a system of knowledge, whence their name; they were the first theologians, and Clement's theology must be studied partly as an answer to that of the heretical Gnostics. Thus Clement insists that faith and gnosis are closely related; faith is the foundation on which gnosis is built or the *sine qua non* in the development towards it. "Gnosis, which is the scientific explanation of the things which have been handed down according to the true philosophy, is related to faith" (45). This was what Clement especially wished of his gnosis; it was to explain the Christian doctrines by referring them to the Logos, the cause of all knowledge and that which was alone known. But this knowledge (*γνῶσις*) is accompanied by right action; like the Stoic wiseman, he does everything by reference to his reason, so that all he does is perfect. We here have a new principle of moral action - a direct knowledge of God's will. This gives a second system of morals in Clement of which love (*ἀγάπη*), based on knowledge, is the guiding principle and apathy (*ἀπάθεια*) the aim. Thus it is love that enables the Christian to go to martyrdom (46); it is love which sends the gnostic out into the world to win converts (47) and to help his fellow-men (48). Clement has indeed caught the spirit of Christ, when he says that the perfect Christian will act from love. And then he tells us that man's aim for himself is to gain complete control over the passions (*ἐπιθυμίας*), or even to eradicate them. He insists on this again and again and holds up the Apostles as examples. He has thus borrowed a term from Stoic philosophy. This shows that to Clement the life of contemplation was the perfect one, since in the life of action man must have emotions, even if it is only the care of his family; and these emotions distract him from his contemplation and prevent him entirely from separating himself from things of sense.

(45) Strom II.11.48. *ἡ γνῶσις ἡ ἀληθινή*.

(46) Strom IV.4.14.

(47) Strom IV.22.139.

(48) Strom VII.12.69.

The perfect knowledge which he has, inasmuch as it is made up so largely of acts of will, enables him to conquer absolutely all such affections as are not necessary for self-maintenance (49). Today this notion that the aim of ethics is to conquer the body would not be insisted on with the rigour with which Clement did insist on it. But the times are different; then some such quality was required of the Christian who stood continually in the fear of persecution; and so we find that Christian teachers extoll this as the aim of life. But in Clement this insistence on apathy as the end of life, is also connected with his theory of knowledge, according to which man knows God according as he frees himself from the body and the bodily part of the soul. Thus the doctrine of *ἀπαθεία* which Clement has borrowed from Stoicism, is not mere asceticism which believes in the suppression of the body and *its* wants as a praiseworthy act in itself, but it is closely related to his theory of immortality, in which he says that it is only *νοῦς* which came from God, that goes back to Him, so that the fleshly spirit must be cast off (50). Now in such a system the ultimate

(49)

(50) It is interesting to compare Clement's view of the relation of *πίστις* and *γνώσις* to the Platonic distinction between *δόξα* and *ἐπιστήμη*; and the Stoic's rigid differentiation between the *φρόνιμος* and the *σοφός*. The *ἐπιστήμη* of Plato is outwardly much like the *γνώσις* of Clement (i.e. not considering how they are got) but *πίστις* is far different from Plato's *δόξα*. In Plato "opinion" is concerned with things of this world, but the Clementine *πίστις* is concerned with God, or the Idea of the Good, just as *γνώσις* is, but in quite a different way. Clement never thinks of knowledge of objects, except as they are a manifestation of the truth of the Logos. And besides all this in Plato the philosopher only sees the Good, and that for a short time, after which he must return into the cave, but in Clement's theory of knowledge the chasm is spanned by God reaching out his hand to meet man half-way, so that man is thus in continual contact with God if he wills it. Clement's theology is the first philosophic attempt, on Platonic principles, which has succeeded in spanning this gap left by Plato. In comparison with the Stoic "fool", even when he is making moral progress, the Christian can take one step up from ignorance of God by having faith in Him, so that the change from a foolishness to wisdom is not instantaneous. Again Clement does recognize that externals have some value for such a Christian, for he counsels the Christian in such a stage how to use them; he sees that environment to such a Christian means a great deal. But the Stoic wise man is like the gnostic Christian in that this *γνώσις* when once gained is a continual privilege and that now all his acts are *κατὰ φύσιν* as done with perfect insight into the will of God, Before this his acts were *κατὰ νόμον* i.e. duties which custom or external authority had him do. It seems as if the distinction made by the heretical Gnostics would have exactly amounted to the Stoic distinction between the wise and the fool. Thus, however much Clement owed to Platonic and Stoic sources for his notion of knowledge, the notion is however quite separate

aim is not moral virtue, as that supposes a struggle, but rather likeness to and union with God, so that the virtues which he often speaks of and defines in the terms of Greek philosophy (51) are only a stage in the development of moral progress (προκοπή) as their aim is either knowledge or the suppression of the emotions (πάθος). The virtues are καθεστικαί; for even if he does not use the adjective, he does speak of καθάρσις, which stage comes after πλάνη (for καθάρσις is the result of studying philosophy) and of course it comes before γυναιξί, in which stage the rational part of the soul is strictly ἀνδρικός; so that the purging of the soul must come at the time when he is practising these virtues. This is especially interesting, as it shows a great likeness to many Neo-Platonic notions; and it is quite reasonable to suppose that Clement is here reproducing the Platonism of the age (52).

The Ethics of early Christianity and the Greek world have been brought into contact with the result above noted, that we get two moral theories - an aristocratic for the educated, and a democratic for the common people. Christianity based its morality on a divine command, which it took over from Judaism. The Moral Law was theocratic. Greek thought on the other hand based its Morality on Rationalism, or a theory of the world and society. We see this in Plato who cannot separate Ethics from either Politics or Metaphysics; and while the Stoics and Epicureans definitely separated Ethics from Politics, yet they both founded Ethics on a theory of the world and of Psychology - in fact they studied Metaphysics almost always as a foundation for their Morals. This is the meaning of their constant appeal to "nature"; their system was founded on the nature of man and the nature of the universe. It is true that the later

(50) Continued -

from either of them; he borrowed from these philosophers, not at hap-hazard, but as Plotinus afterwards borrowed, that he might use these notions as building material for a superstructure which would be quite his own and unique, even if older building material had been used.

(51) Paedagog. I.12.11; definition of "virtue".

(52) Whittaker in his work on Neo-Platonism (introduction and chapters 1 - 4) shows that this movement in philosophy was merely an attempt to think out a system by combining all that was best in previous Greek speculation. Thus we are not surprised that many of Clement's doctrines formed, by uniting several previous notions, can be paralleled from Plotinus, though there can have been no direct contact between the two systems of thought.

Stoics, such as Epictetus, speaks of the law of God, but by this they mean the laws or plan of nature. Thus Epictetus says: "for this is a law of nature and of God, that the stronger should ever overcome the weaker" (53). The Ethics of Epictetus are not founded on such a text as that, but rather on the constitution of man as a social being. Thus a Greek system of Ethics such as that of Plato, in which Altruism plays an important part, is always based on the nature of man as a social being. Thus the Greeks had elaborated systems of morality in which we first get the notion of virtues i.e. morality is divided up according to the different spheres of action, and each has a virtue. Greek morality was rationalistic and not religious; and so among the Greeks we do not find that *ἀμάρτυμα* means more to them than a failure or loss (54); they had no notion of sin as an act of rebellion against the will of God. Then too the Greeks put a great emphasis on the intellectual side of morals, that if a person knows a thing he will do it. The Greek philosophers, many of them men of iron will, insisted on knowledge as a basis for moral reformation. Could these two theories of morality, which had grown up on quite different soils, ever be united? This need was all the more urgent in Clement's day because a great moral reformation, quite independent of Christianity, was being led by the philosophic missionaries of paganism. In Clement's theory of pistis and gnosis we get these theories united: the Christian notion of fear of God's law is united with the Greek notion of a morality for the common classes which rests not on knowledge but on some lower faculty of the mind, and this gives us pistis; while above this we get a combination of the Greek conception of a perfect morality based on knowledge and of the Christian idea of keeping God's Law through love. In this way Clement believes he has united Greek Ethics with Christian. In many respects this is an admirable system, as it recognizes that not every one can think out a morality for himself from a general principle, such as Christ gave his disciples ~~for a perfect principle of conduct~~, and that the ordinary man must take it ready made in the form of law; but it certainly was influenced by Greek instead of Christian thought when it made Christianity consist in a system of knowledge from which morality was to be suspended. Then too this syncretism of moralities brought into Christianity the Greek notion of personal dignity, and the Roman one of personal rights, which in later times through the very recognition of a lower moral standard for the laity, quite drove out from popular morality the Christian doctrine of humility and service, while the clergy with

(53) Epictetus Dissert. I.29.19.

(54) Aeschylus alone of the Greeks seems to have the notion of the moral law being the will of Zeus.

their higher systems of morality had retreated from the wickedness of the world that they might live an untarnished life. This is the future developement which the notion of two moralities takes, and while it would be unjust to find the cause for this developement anywhere else than in the conditions of the time, yet we must recognize that this tendency came in through an attempt to unite two distinct moral theories.

Next let us speak of the Eschatological beliefs of Clement. Christ's views on this subject covered three main points; the belief in the certain triumph of His Kingdom, which He connected with His coming; the certainty of a victory of life over death, which He connected with His resurrection; and this principle of judgment, that every life must reap the reward of its own labours, whether good or bad, in the world to come if not in this. More than these three wonderful teachings cannot be got out of the New Testament, when we remember that He spoke to Jews and in Jewish forms. What the early Christian writers do give us that goes beyond these three, seems to be a borrowing from Jewish religious beliefs or the product of their own fertile imaginations. Now these three great doctrines, amplified no doubt by being transmitted to him through Jewish minds, Clement tried to explain by the help of Greek notions and ideas with which his mind was filled and without which he could not think consistently at all. We have already noted his belief that the physical universe is perfect and that man is being slowly educated by the Logos, and also his views on punishment. Here let us speak of the future life. He says that the Logos came to teach man to become like God (55) and that man who by nature has the $\epsilon\iota\kappa\omega\nu$ of God in his reason, is to get an $\delta\mu\acute{o}\iota\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ to God (56). He must mean by this that man by nature has the $\epsilon\iota\kappa\omega\nu$ of God in his reason, and that under the teaching of the Holy Spirit this is to get control over and conquer the $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$ of the irrational ~~body~~^{sc soul}, so that at death the reason of man may be reabsorbed into the divine $\pi\lambda\eta\gamma\omega\mu\alpha$. Thus he can say that the Gnostic will be and now is a God (57). Now this is not a Jewish notion at all but a Greek. The Jews, when they developed a notion of immortality, looked on it as a literal resurrection of the body with all the attributes it now has, which lives on in Heaven. Everything which exists on earth has existed previously in Heaven and will return there. "According to the Hellenic conception, which has become associated with Platonism, the idea of pre-existence is independent of the idea of God; it is based

(55) Protrept. 1.8.

(56) Protrept. 10.98 and Strom. II. 23. 131.

(57) Strom. IV. 23. 149.

on the conception of the contrast between spirit and matter, between the infinite and finite, found in the cosmos itself. In the case of all spiritual beings, life in the body or flesh is at bottom an inadequate and unsuitable condition, for the spirit is eternal, the flesh perishable. But the pre-temporal existence, which was only a doubtful assumption as regards ordinary spirits, was a matter of certainty in the case of the higher and purer ones. They lived in an upper world long before this earth was created, and they lived there as spirits without the "polluted garment of the flesh" (58). Now we see that the latter is the meaning of immortality in Clement, and here again the great debt which Clement owes to Plato is brought before us.

Let us close this sketch of the Christian life as Clement conceived of it by placing along side of it another sketch of the teachings of one of the noblest of pagan teachers. "In Maximus of Tyre, although he has no claim to the reputation of a strong and original thinker, we see this new religious spirit of the second century perhaps in its purest form. Man is an enigma, a contradiction, a being placed on the confines of two worlds. A beast in his fleshly nature, he is akin to God in his higher part, nay, the son of God. Even the noblest spirits here below live in a sort of twilight, or in a heady excitement, an intoxication of the senses. Yet, cramped as it is in the prison of the flesh, the soul may raise itself above the misty region of perpetual change towards the light of the Eternal. For in the slumber of this mortal life, the pure spirit is sometimes visited by visions coming through the gate of horn, visions of another world seen in some former time. And, following them, the moral hero, like Heracles, the model of strenuous virtue, through toil and tribulation may gain the crown. On this stormy sea of time, philosophy gives us the veil of Leucothea to charm the troubled waters. It is true that only when release comes at death, does the soul attain to the full vision of God. For the Highest is separated from us by a great gulf. Yet the analysis of the soul which Maximus partly borrows from Aristotle, discovers His seat in us, the highest reason, that power of intuitive, all-embracing, instantaneous vision, which is distinct from the slower and tentative operations of the understanding. It is by this higher faculty that God is seen, so far as He may be, in this mixed and imperfect state. For the vision of God can only in any degree be won by abstraction from sense and passion and everything earthly, in a struggle ever upwards, beyond the paths of the heavenly orbs, to the

(58) Harnack Hist. of Dogma I. Appendix 1.p.319.

region of eternal calm "where falls not rain or hail or any snow, but a white cloudless radiance spreads over all". And when may we see God ? "Thou shalt see Him fully", Maximus says, "only when He calls thee, in age or death, but meantime glimpses of the Beauty which eye hath not seen nor can tongue speak of, may be won, if the veils and wrappings which hide His splendour be torn away". (59)

(59) Dill's Roman Society from Nero to M.Aurelius p.421.

C O N C L U S I O N

THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF CLEMENT'S ATTEMPT TO GIVE A PHILOSOPHIC EXPLANATION OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES.

There are two elements which go to make up Clement's theology, the tradition of the Church which is best represented in the Regula Fidei or in the Didache, and Greek speculation, which was called in to explain these facts concerning the life of Christ. The aim of Clement was to give a rational account of the Christian religion, and to do this he made use of the philosophic terms common among the Greek thinkers. His was a "fidens quaerens intellectum"; he saw that it was quite impossible for any religious fervour to live and conquer the world, if it did not first turn back on itself and attempt to find out its own intellectual content. He saw also that philosophy cannot be the enemy, but must rather be the ally of religious faith; that the reflective part of man's mental life cannot be in opposition to the unreflective; and that reason itself might create something of its own which would be of infinite value to the Christian as a weapon with which to defend himself against his enemies, and as a means towards satisfying the craving of the soul for knowledge. But Clement never lets philosophical explanation take the place of religious faith, however much emphasis he puts on knowledge as the crown of the religious life. The important and necessary thing is the religious experience.

The notion of a Creed or body of beliefs is Greek, At the time when Clement lived, and for several centuries earlier, men of education had joined themselves to one or another of the philosophic schools, each of which accepted a regular set of dogmas, formulated by its founder and his most brilliant pupils. And as these schools came into violent opposition with one another, they became more exclusive; they protected themselves by requiring as a sort of entrance qualification a statement that the person would accept and defend certain beliefs. The "Manuale" of Epictetus and the *Kuriai Doxai* of Epicurus formed just such creeds, and in the case of the Epicurean school, it is almost certain that this little book became a sort of catechism,

which the pupils learned by heart. Thus it is in Greek philosophical schools that we find the nearest approach to anything like a creed. Now in the case of Christianity a creed was not developed by Greeks but against Greeks - it was developed by the orthodox body against the Hellenizing Gnostics, and this gave philosophical speculation a place to work in and something to manipulate. Thus by way of reaction against Greek thought, Christianity developed a Creed.

Greek philosophical explanation entered Christianity through the doctrine of the Logos, which was used to explain the belief in Christ's divinity. But philosophy was no docile pupil, which was willing to take a lower seat, but it demanded a hearing on its own account, and so we get a love for word-playing in future theology. The Greeks in becoming Christians lost none of their love for precise and exact definition. The love of theological speculation became more and more prominent in future years and it can undoubtedly be traced eventually to the Greek love for knowledge. Now Clement stands at the beginning of such a movement and he gives it great impetus by his epistemological theory of the work of Christ. Thus we believe it was to Greece that Christianity owed the notion both of a creed and a theology.

We have omitted all mention of a doctrine of the Trinity in Clement just because it means so little to him; but because of its importance in the future theological battles, it is worth the mentioning here. The doctrine of the Logos has forced Clement to subordinate Christ to God as He is only a revelation of God; then too the notion of the Holy Spirit as the instrument of the Logos, has further subordinated the Holy Spirit, so that now we have a series of three hypostases, which look very much like the Trinity of Plotinus. Is there any possible relation between them? We may answer at once that there can be no direct influence unless it is through Numenius. Now Clement and Numenius both make Reason the supreme God and not as did Plotinus, the second. Again the second hypostasis is in both a Creating God; but in Numenius the third hypostasis is really identical with the second, but by coming into contact with matter He is divided. This at once throws out the hypothesis that these two Trinities are the same. What did take place in Clement is that he developed the Church formula used in baptism, by means of certain Platonic notions such as that it is not God Himself but an Inferior Deity, who creates the world. Under Platonic influences he has subordinated the revelations and this process of subordination can be paralleled in the Neo-Platonic philosophy; otherwise Clement's doctrine is a legitimate unfolding of that formula when it was explained by the terms of a dualistic philosophy. It is not the result of Clement's theology which is

so important in the future history of Christianity but the attempt which he made, as that attempt laid down the principles along which theology was to develop. Thus his system was virtually rejected along with Origen's, but the impetus which he gave to the development of a systematic Christian theology cannot be over estimated.

We have tried to show how that Clement had formed a system of theology, which however he carefully distinguished from the Christian life so that religion and theology are not identical for him. But since the perfect Christian life is the result of a theology, Clement has gone far on the way to identifying them. The conception of Christianity as a new and perfect philosophy, which was then so prevalent among Christians of the educated classes who stood forth as apologists for Christianity, was certainly destined to lead to a theology as a necessity for the Christian believer. The very notion that Christianity was a revealed religion deposited with the apostles, would force it, when brought among Greek surroundings to explain it in a theology, and soon men began to mix up a fact that was to be explained with an explanation of it; we see how early this came in by reference to that doctrine of the Regula Fidei, which said that Christ descended into Hell; at first this was meant to explain something else, but it was soon adopted in the Creed as a thing to be believed of itself. The next and last step in the development of Christianity from a religion into a mere theology was the notion of two standards of morality, one for the theologian and another for the layman. This notion was in future years used to justify a church which had apostacized and was carrying on the work of Greek philosophy instead of the work of its Master Christ.

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Abbott's Silanus the Christian.

Morgan's Trinity of Plato.

Adam's Edition of Plato's Republic.

Hyde's Epicurus to Christ.

Bernard's Great Moral Teachers.

Whittaker The Neo-Platonists.

ERRATUM

The mistake has been very frequently made of misspelling Harnack's name; and as it comes so often, it has been impossible to correct it in each case.

