Contesting Citizenship and Faith: Muslim claims-making in Canada and the United States, 2001-2008

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July 2010

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of PhD in Sociology

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Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the cooperation of the research subjects of this project: various leaders and activists in the Muslim communities in Canada and the United States. I appreciate greatly the warmth that they received me with, the generosity of their time in spite of the busy schedules, and their patience with my questions and follow-ups.

I would like to thank the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for their generous funding of this research project through offering me a Canadian Graduate Studies Scholarship in the 2004-2007 period and an Internal SSHRC Grant in 2008. I would also like to thank the Canada-US Fulbright for helping me to complete my research in the United States between 2007 and 2008. Without the funding from Fulbright and SSHRC, the completion of this dissertation would have been more challenging and its scope more limited. I would also like to thank the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University and Professor John Esposito for offering me an International Visiting Research Fellowship in 2007 and putting me in touch with various members of the Muslim activist community.

I cannot thank enough Steven Rytina and Kathleen Fallon, my co-supervisors for the dissertation, for the support and guidance that they have given me throughout this process and my graduate studies in general. They have inspired me by their discussions, comments and feedback on how to think about the subject, the research, and the analyses and about my field of specialization in general. They have helped me find my way through the challenging and sometimes frustrating process of preparing, conducting and completing my research and this dissertation. I owe them all my gratitude for seeing me through this process.

I also have to thank Morton Weinfeld for his advice and insights regarding my research early on in this project. In addition, I have to thank some of my fellow graduate students at McGill, with who I have had the benefit of discussing,

debating and re-thinking my arguments and research and sociological literature in general, and without which this work would be much poorer. In particular, I would like to thank Anna-Liisa Aunio, Tanya Trussler, Kristin Nelson, Sean Clouston and Andrew Dawson: for their friendship and support, their intellectual insights and their willingness to indulge my questions, doubts and the challenges that I have faced in this process. I would also like to acknowledge the help of Erin Henson, Livia Nardini, Daniela Caucci, and Franca Cianni in helping me always manoeuvre my way through the administrative processes that graduate studies and a dissertation inevitably involves.

I would also like to acknowledge Maggie May Raymond, Sean Raymond, Mélanie Lambert, Emma and Théo for giving me a space in Montreal and Saint Zénon to complete my revisions and finish my dissertation in the summer of 2010. Without their generosity and hospitality, I am sure this last stage would have been much more challenging.

Finally, I have to say that I have come this far due to the unconditional love and support that my parents, my sister and my husband and his family have shown me during this process and before. All of my accomplishments have been possible because they have believed in me, been patient with me, and supported me in all my endeavours. Christian, thank you for all that you are and all that you let me be.

Abstract

This study analyzes the claims-making and counter-claims-making on citizenship and faith by American and Canadian Muslim political actors over the 2001-2008 period. It highlights the interactive processes by which competing discourses on citizenship and faith are negotiated to produce divergent constructions of Muslim citizenship: mainstream, liberal, secular, and progressive. Utilizing insights from theories of citizenship, collective identity and social movements, I show how divergent collective identities are produced within the same categorical group through complex interactions between: a) ideological baggage and biographies of claims-makers; b) demographic patterns of communities; c) historical tensions in the traditions and identities that are being negotiated; and d) the actual political constellations, both proximate and durable, in which such claims and counter-claims are being made. Moreover, such contests about collective identity, citizenship and faith are not only relevant for the group (American Muslim or Canadian Muslim), but also help highlight the inclusions, exclusions and blindspots in national narratives about belonging and hierarchies of obligations and how these are challenged.

Résumé

Cette recherche analyse les revendications et les contre-revendications liées à la citoyenneté et à la foi faites par les acteurs politiques musulmans américains et canadiens durant la période 2001-2008. Elle met en évidence les processus interactifs par lesquels des discours en concurrence sur la citoyenneté et sur la foi sont négociés et aboutissent à des constructions divergentes de la citoyenneté musulmane, ces constructions étant de type dominant, libéral, laïque ou progressiste. En utilisant des concepts des théories sur la citoyenneté, sur l'identité collective et sur les mouvements sociaux, la recherche explique comment des identités collectives divergentes sont produites au sein d'un même groupe à travers des interactions complexes entre : a) le bagage idéologique et les biographies des revendicateurs; b) les structures démographiques des communautés; c) les tensions historiques par rapport aux traditions et aux

identités qui sont négociées; et d) les constellations politiques actuelles et préalables aux revendications et contre-revendications. De plus, ces contestations concernant l'identité collective, de la citoyenneté et de la foi ne sont pas seulement pertinentes pour le groupe étudié (les musulmans canadiens ou américains), mais elles contribuent aussi à mettre en relief les éléments qui sont inclus, exclus et omis dans les discours nationaux sur l'appartenance des citoyens et sur les hiérarchies dans les obligations, ainsi que la façon dont ces discours sont remis en question.

Chapter 1: Contesting Citizenship and Faith: Research Questions, Hypotheses, Design and Theoretical Framework

If citizenship is a tie entailing mutual obligations between categorically-defined persons and a state, the identity "citizen" describes the experience and public representation of that tie. Such an identity does not spring whole from a deliberate invention or a general principle's ineluctable implications but from the historical accumulation of continual negotiation (1995: 227).

--Chares Tilly, "Citizenship, Identity and Social History", *International Review of Social History*, Volume 40, Supplement 3

The greatest psychological and political need for clarity about a common framework and national symbols comes from the minorities. For clarity about what makes us willingly bound into a single country relieves the pressure on minorities, especially new minorities whose presence within the country is not fully accepted, to have to conform in all areas of social life, or in arbitrarily chosen areas, in order to rebut the charge of disloyalty. (1994:64)

--Tariq Modood, "Establishment, Multiculturalism, and British Citizenship", *Political Quarterly*, Volume 65, Issue 1

From an Islamic point of view, we believe that when we accept American citizenship, a contract is established, by which we become loyal to our new country and protectors of its interests.

--Maher Hathout, Founder of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), Interview

As American Muslims we can probably have a greater impact on American society by intervening as a normative agent of change rather than a political actor. It sounds like day dreaming, but it is possible for a group of American Muslims to emerge which will work selflessly in pursuit of the most important public good--the normative integrity of our public and private institutions (2002: 73)

--M.A. Muqtedar Khan *American Muslims*: *Bridging Faith and Freedom*

"The key to achieving this essential and urgent change [constructive integration of Canadian Muslims] lies with increased education, public participation, and individual engagement. Only through proactive outreach can Muslims be motivated to claim their rightful place informing the living history of contemporary liberal, democratic and multicultural Canadian society."

-- Imam Zijad Delic, Communications Director of the Canadian Islamic Congress, November 9 2008, *The Friday Magazine*

One consequence of the attacks of September 11 2001 has been that governments and the publics of liberal democratic states have become caught up in re-examining the values and practices of liberalism, democracy, multiculturalism and secularism. At the heart of these public deliberations (or in many cases reactions rather than actual deliberation) is citizenship and a concern that it is changing. A second consequence of the attacks has been an explosive interest in Islam and Muslims: it has led both to thoughtful discussion and to rampant speculation about what Islam means for modernity, human rights, democracy, and its compatibility with the values of liberalism and (secular) humanism (Esposito and Mogahed 2009). For those who happen to be Muslim citizens in liberal democracies, the attacks turned a spotlight onto their faith and religious identity and issues these might pose for citizenship.

While the catalytic power of 9/11 is still playing out, its significance is undeniable for Muslim citizens: "The attacks were a break with our past as Muslims. Sept. 11, 2001 is not a defining moment in the history of North American Muslims but *the* defining moment (interviewee quoted by Arat-Koc (2006)." Or as Imam Zijad Delic of the Canadian Islamic Congress said during an interview with me: "After 9/11, we became an identity in crisis." Or as Edina Lukovic of the Muslim Public Affairs Council said "The attacks caused many Muslims to wake up--they had to listen finally to what we had been saying all along...about being American Muslims!" Within the Muslim communities the claims and counter-claims about what it means to be Canadian or American or French or British Muslim have been heated in public and even nastier in the backstage (Geaves 2004a,b; Karim 2008; Modood and Ahmad 2007; Salvatore 2007; Werbner 2007). They are being made by passionate individuals who all fundamentally believe in the need of their work to give voice to their community and to transform what it means to act and be not only Muslim, but more importantly a Muslim citizen.

In fact, in the 9-11 context, on center stage of discourses on religious groups and citizenship has been the minority Muslim populations in the Western

liberal democracies.[1] Some are concerned with the erosion of rights brought about by the security concerns and its consequences for the Muslim citizens and residents in liberal democracies (e.g., Cole 2003 and Feteke 2004). Others are concerned by the lack of Muslim integration, measured in terms of some of the various obligations of citizenship including voting, political participation and military service (e.g., Cohen 2007). Yet others point to the barriers that Islamophobia places on an inclusive understanding of citizenship (e.g., Biles and Ibrahim 2005b; Césari and McLoughlin 2005; Siddiqui 2008). Others point out the impact of transnationalism and dual citizenship of Muslims and the challenges it poses to traditional conceptions of the loyalty asked of citizens (e.g, Soysal, 1997).

However, there is a tendency in all of these studies to focus only on the relationship between state and Muslim communities (or Islamic doctrine) as the locus of citizenship processes. While this is an incredibly important and fruitful site of research, I believe it obscures the horizontal dimension of citizenship processes--the relationship between fellow citizens. More specifically, when Muslims become citizens of America or Canada, their relationship to other Muslims in their country of citizenship is no longer just religious but civic. This change transforms discussions of practices, boundaries, norms of faith into also conversations of citizenship. Thus Muslim actors making explicit claims toward the state regarding rights, practices and identity *or* towards each other are, I argue here, engaged in discussions of citizenship.[2]

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[1] This is neatly demonstrated in for example the Fall 2008 issue of the Canadian Diversity (Diversité Canadien) journal with its theme of Citizenship, where the majority of authors use Muslims as the key example around which to make their theoretical arguments. Or equally, in the third volume on *The Art of the State*, titled: *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada* (2007), the bulk of authors use Muslims as either exemplary or anecdotal evidence of the issues concerning citizenship in Canada. Similarly in the European context the specificity of the Muslim community in these discussions is even more phenomenal: one can barely keep up with the journal articles, edited volumes and research institutes on citizenship, secularism and Muslims that are mushrooming all over Europe.

[2] Engagement it has been pointed out to me could mean anything from civil conversations to violent interactions. Discussions of citizenship among Muslim actors in North America tend to be closer to civil conversations than violent interactions, although, as we will see in chapter 5, the bounds of "civility" are sometimes debatable. Nevertheless, given the norms of political contention and debate in liberal democracies, "engaged" has more affinity to actively

The urgency and visibility of these conversations in the aftermath of September 11 2001 provide us with an important opportunity to observe the struggles by which citizenship is negotiated and constructed not only in relation to the state, but also in relation to other sources of moral authorities, such as faith. Moreover, they provide us with the occasion to witness how practices of citizenship transform identities, including faith. The immense scope of cultural diversity among North American Muslim communities makes them a unique case in the world: either as majorities or minorities, there are no equivalently ethnically (Asian, Arab, African, Hispanic, European) and communally (Sunni, Shi'ite, Ismaili, Ahmadiyan, Druze) diverse Muslim communities living as fellow citizens as in the United States and Canada (Karim 2002; Leonard 2003b). This feature of North American Muslims makes them of particular interest in the study of the processes by which Muslim citizenship is negotiated. The diversities Muslim actors face create the task of answering questions of a) What constitutes Muslim identity and Muslim obligation? b) How do these link up to their obligations and identity as citizens in liberal, pluralistic, democratic and secular societies with Christian[3] memories?

Therefore, in this study, I examine the conversations and debates among a set of Muslim leaders and activists in North America in their efforts to answer these two questions. One key goal merits explicit statement. The analysis to be presented does not aim to show that the claims and counter-claims between Muslim actors are such that one set of claims has more affinity to liberal democratic citizenship and another less. Instead, because liberal democratic citizenship is marked by competing discourses of rights, identity and practices, both claims and counter-claims of North American Muslim actors diverge precisely on the understanding of citizenship they have affinity to. I argue that by

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participating (vs. passive) in representing, critiquing and responding ideas and identities without the use of violence than repertoires of violence that may dominate elsewhere or historically.

[3] The general trend is to say Judeo-Christian tradition or roots: the term reflects the explicit understanding in Christianity of its Judaic roots. However, I find it often obscures the fact that a Judeo-Christian memory is not necessarily equally open to Judaism (as easily evidenced by the history of anti-Semitism) as to Christianity. In fact, a Judeo-Christian memory refers to the Judaic roots of Christianity without an incorporation of the Jewish identity to the Christian one.

looking at these conversations and debates among North American Muslim actors in this manner, the contested and dynamic nature of citizenship is exposed, as is the fact that these conversations constitute another moment in the history of Western citizenship.

1.1 Goals and Research Questions

My first purpose in this study is to delineate the discourses in which these conversations are located and what are the sites of tensions in these discourses. I structure this task as follows: Theories of citizenship underscore that liberal democracies feature particular competing discourses regarding "new" citizens[4]. Scholars of immigration and identity politics have pointed out that new citizens are faced with the task of situating themselves in these competing discourses (Benhabib 2002; 2004;Bloemraad et al 2008; Brubaker 1992; Koopmans et al 2005; Modood 1994; Modood and Ahmad 2007). In this study, I am interested in the question of how do Muslim leaders and activists in North America negotiate and respond to these tensions.

Therefore, first, using the literature on citizenship I will sketch these competing discourses: 1) Liberalism posits the equality of individuals and the relationship between them. This puts it into tension with pluralism (whether as official policy of mutliculturalism as in Canada or norm as in the United States), which posits the equality of groups and the relationship between them. 2) Religious identity and communities of faith face particular challenges in the practice of citizenship due to a history and ideology of secularism and how it is linked to citizenship discourses. 3) Citizenship demands a commitment to the national public good even while processes of transnationalism and multiple citizenship problematizes it. Moreover, as we will see, the literature on social cohesion and national identities reflect that variations on conceptions of

[4] New citizens can be those who are new in the sense of recently arriving physically to the country of citizenship (generally recently arrived immigrants who have been naturalized) *or* those who have finally earned the right to citizenship even if they have physically lived in the nation for generations (women, African-American slaves, Chinese migrant workers). Although in this study the focus is on new citizens in the former sense, the competing discourses in citizenship apply to the latter group too.

citizenship implicate differing sites of loyalty (and therefore betrayal): values/civilization, institutions and practices, and commitment to pluralism.

Competing discourses, moreover, characterize not only liberal democratic citizenship, but also Islam and Muslim identity. Therefore, following the discussion on the tensions in citizenship, I then use the literature on the impact of the meeting of Islam and the West and globalization to outline certain tensions regarding change, secularism, difference and religious vs. political authority in the modernist movement in Islam, which structure the faith of Muslims and act as differentiated resources from which they can draw on in constructing an identity of Muslim citizenship.

Thus, having conceptualized both citizenship and Islam as institutions and processes which are constituted by tensions that have to be negotiated by those that identify to them and are embedded in them, I move on in the next chapters to read the claims and counter-claims of these Muslim actors regarding these tensions in liberal democratic secular citizenship and Islam as attempts to map citizenship and faith onto each other.

The focus in this study is to observe these debates in the wake of 9/11, when previously established Muslim actors observed the emergence of new Muslim actors in the North American public sphere. In this study, I call the former group "mainstream Muslim actors" because, across the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 time period, they have commanded larger constituencies and because they tend to be understood by both themselves and publics as representative of North American Muslims (Esposito and Mogahed 2009; Haddad 1997; Karim 2002; 2008; Khan 2003). The latter set of actors, characterized by multiple fault lines, I call oppositional, because they emerge, as I show in this study, as oppositional voices to the mainstream Muslim discourse. Therefore, in this study, I delineate the maps of faith to citizenship and citizenship to faith implicated by these mainstream actors vs. oppositional actors and their claims-making.

The second purpose of this study is to utilize social movement theory to explain two sets of observed variations. First, what explains the emergence of these divergent responses in the first place? That is, what explains the emergence of these public counter-claims to Muslim citizenship from the Muslim community? Second, what explains why the conversations among mainstream and oppositional Muslims in Canada are more conflictual than those in the United States, or why Canadian Muslim discourses are less nationalized than American Muslim discourses? In the first instance of variation, I draw specifically on research on identity politics to argue that identity politics structures claims-making so that difference becomes politicized. As a result, one can observe the emergence of claims of inclusion and exclusion around multiplicities of differences that diverge or conflict within a given categorical group. Moreover, the political practice of identity politics leads to intra-group conflict and divergences about representation in the act of mobilization. Regarding the second instance of variation, I argue that variations in the political opportunity structure between Canada and the United States regarding citizenship, multiculturalism, secularism, as well as the structure of political elites during the time of mobilization lead to divergences in the dynamic and content of Muslim identity discourses mobilized by Muslim actors in each country.

In short then, we can identify three research questions in this study:

1) How do North American Muslim actors negotiate various tensions in liberal democratic citizenship and Islam to construct Muslim citizenship, in the period over 2001-2008?

2) What explains variations in the dynamic between mainstream vs. oppositional Muslim actors in Canada vs. the United States, over this time period?

3) What explains the emergence of the multiple ways that citizenship and faith are negotiated in the Muslim community in North America, over this time period?

The hope is that by answering these questions through the documentation of the debates and discussions among a range of Muslim actors in North America and examining the variations and divergences, this study will be able to provide some insight into the processes by which citizenship is constructed and challenged and their consequences for religious identities.

1.2 Theoretical Framework: Collective identity and the role of political context, competing discourses, and biography in its construction

In this section I tease out some of the theoretical insights that motivate and guide this research. This study is informed by theories of citizenship, social movements and collective identity. At the heart of these three theoretical bodies is the insight that citizenship and collective identities are both produced by various modes of interaction between social movement activists, cultural and political institutions (Bloemraad et al 2008; Isin 1999; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Tilly 1995; 2003; 2005). To the extent that citizenship and collective identities become institutionalized by law, by political and cultural memories, by the meaning they continue to give peoples, and by the unintended consequences of policy and vision, they become sticky in their resistance to change (Bloemraad et al 2008; Brubaker 1992; Calhoun 2003; Tilly 1995). To the extent that they are subject to the vagaries of new ideas, new peoples, shifts and imbalances in power, and destabilizing events, they become vulnerable to contestation (Benhabib 2004; 2002; Isin 2002; Mann 2001; Ong 1996; Tilly 1995; 2003; 2005). This suggests that in examining the construction of Muslim citizenship in Canada and the United States, we should expect the process of building such a collective identity to be characterized by the interaction between these sources of resistance and contestation and how these actors negotiate these sources. In the chapters that follow, I attempt to analyze the multiple ways such sources of resistance and contestation are negotiated in the instance of creating Muslim citizenship by various Muslim actors in North America.

1.2.1 Collective Identity Processes

Collective identity refers to shared answers of a group to the question of "Who are we", (Tilly 2005). The answers to this question constitute the "boundaries, cross-boundary relations, within boundary relations and stories" which make up collective identity (Tilly 2005: 8). Collective identity is forged in the process of struggle as different political actors interact and react to each other: it is constructed in the claiming of identity and the counter-claims such claims-making engenders (Tilly 2003; 2005). In the social movement literature, one can identify several processes by which collective identity emerges out of political struggle and claims-making: 1) In claims-making, actors assert value differences and structures that delineate who they are in relation to other political actors, thus establishing boundaries, as well as commonalities and/or solidarities. 2) They also enact their shared identity and work to influence symbolic meanings as they engage other political actors—repeatedly negotiating the meaning of being "us". 3) In the process of such claims-making, they also create a larger sense of consciousness among those who are asserted to be as part of "us" that there are injustices (of exclusion, oppression, marginalization) to which "we" must react and respond and which "they" must correct (Gamson 1996; Melucci 1995; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Tilly 2003).

These processes do not occur in a vacuum and thus are not only subject to the agency of the actors making the claims. The claims and emergent collective identity of actors are shaped and constrained in several ways: They are, first, constrained by the biographies of the actors making the claims. Here by biography I am not interested in the much older accounts of activism being related to individualist characteristics or tendencies. Instead, I am interested in observing that certain collective identity claims and processes are shaped by leadership ideologies, which are shaped by patterns of biographies of the actors themselves. Actor ideology has been identified to be important in shaping collective identity and claims-making processes (Oliver and Johnson 2000). However, less attention has been paid to the fact that actor ideology is accumulated in the experiences of the actor in not only collective action but in a range of interactions of that actor

with other actors, including the state, religious authority, doctrine and practices, and cultural institutions. In chapters 2 and 3, I show how the biography of the Muslim actors making claims and counter-claims about Muslim citizenship are an important factor in understanding what influences how a given identity is understood and negotiated in relation to other identities and actors.

Secondly, claims are also constrained by the (potential and actual) audience of those claims: the target of the claims and those that the claims are being made for. In social movement literature this process has most commonly been examined by the framing paradigm (Snow and Benford 2000). The way claims are framed and articulated, scholars of framing have shown, are constructed by drawing on symbols and discourses, which are familiar with the targeted audience (Gamson 1988; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). In other words, the stock of "meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, narratives and the like (Benford and Snow 2000: 629)" makes up the "cultural resource base" from which new meanings are constituted (Benford and Snow 2000: 629). Moreover, the articulation and framing of claims about identity occurs through relational and interactive processes (Hunt et al 1994; Klandermans 1992, 1988), thus making both their content and meaning dynamic (Benford and Snow 2000). Thus, an examination of how citizenship, Muslimness, Islam, and other dimensions of the contested identity are being mobilized and negotiated has to pay attention to how they are already understood by the Muslim community actors are trying to represent and mobilize, as well as the non-Muslim public and the states toward which such claims are being made. Importantly, though, such understandings are rarely coherent: what it means to be Muslim in the community, what Islam implicates, or what citizenship constitutes are almost always characterized by tensions and competing understandings. How these tensions are negotiated to construct a coherent collective identity of American or Canadian Muslim citizen are exactly at the heart of this study.

In addition, recent studies of collective identity processes have brought into light the challenges of collective identity construction for whose members are characterized by competing and conflicting identities (Bernstein 2005).

Multicultural feminism and post-colonial feminism, along with studies of lesbian, gay and queer movements have highlighted that negotiating overlapping and intersecting identities can be complicated and conflict-ridden in efforts to construct and mobilize a particular collective identity since exclusions and fractures seem inevitable (Alexander 1999; Ryan 1997). This suggests that given the diversity in the North American Muslim community of ethnicity, race, and sect, the first step of studying Muslim claims of citizenship requires exploring the contests through which solidarities were built across these multiple identities to create a Muslim identity. Thus, in the next chapter I start out with an analysis of the demographic, discursive, and political processes by which a Muslim identity is constructed prior to 9/11. However, the exclusions that are inevitable in such constructions foreshadowed the emergence of oppositional voices in the wake of 9/11. Therefore, in chapter 3, I observe how new Muslim actors emerged that responded to such exclusions by building solidarity across diversities in different and complex ways.

Thirdly and relatedly, claims are also shaped by the political and discursive context in which such claims are being made and in which such interactions are taking place (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Steinberg 1999; Polletta 1999; 2004; Koopmans 2000; Tilly 2003). As a result of the intersectionality of identities that groups and individuals carry, collective identity claims makers are located in multiple and intersecting political and discursive contexts. Such contexts provide multiple sources of both constraints and resources for claims-makers. The challenge in collective identity research for avoiding essentialism requires that such complex interactions are not ignored (Calhoun 2001; Cerulo 1997; Nagel 1994). As a result, in this study, I attempt to show how competing discourses of liberal democratic citizenship, variations in nation-state specific manifestations of citizenship and processes of dealing with difference, differences and changes in contemporary political opportunity structures, historical and current relations between Islam and the West, and competing discourses of Muslimness interact in complex ways to shape and enable a range of Muslim identity claims-making about citizenship and faith. In this chapter, using extant

literature, I take on the task of delineating the competing discourses in liberal democratic citizenship and Islam that Muslim actors face. In subsequent chapters, I analyze the varying roles of nation-state specific political contexts and opportunity structures and biographies of activists in shaping how they negotiate the competing discourses on citizenship and faith.

Prior to moving to the description of competing discourses of liberal democratic citizenship and Islam, I want to discuss the concept and institution of citizenship in further detail to clarify its definition and highlight the importance of reading Muslim claims-making in North America as claims and counterclaims of citizenship and faith.

1.2.2 Citizenship as collective identity: political context and competing discourses

Citizenship has been conceived of as a particular kind of collective identity, one which refers to a relation between: "governmental agents acting unique as such and whole categories of persons identified uniquely by their connection with the government in question (Tilly 2005: 192)." Rooted in T.H. Marshall's work "Citizenship and Social Class" (1950), citizenship is generally understood to be characterized by four analytic dimensions, namely status, rights, practice (participation/action) and identity (Bloemraad 2000; Bloemraad et al 2008; Isin and Wood 1999; Weinstock 2002). Status delineates the formal and legal definitions of who belongs and who does not and the relationship between citizen and non-citizen. Rights refer to the benefits and privileges afforded by membership in the polity as citizens. Practice, also variously conceived as participation or obligations, describes the responsibilities of the citizen to the state and to fellow citizens. Finally, identity refers to the shared narratives, stories and ideals that are supposed to lead one "to identify to at least some degree with the political community to which one belongs, to be disposed to behave toward ones' fellow citizens in ways which promote the stability and unity of the community (Weinstock 2002: 243)."

Whether in efforts to expand the bounds of status, or the range of rights, or challenge the means and modes of participation or the content of national identity,

citizenship has been constantly subject to and forged by contestation and struggle in which actors, individuals, groups are implicated in "solidaristic, agonistic, and alienating orientations...constituting them as citizens, strangers, outsiders and aliens (Isin 2002: 276)." Like all other collective identities, the struggles of constructing citizenship are shaped by the political context in which such struggles are embedded, where political context is both the "durable organizational differences among governments" and the "change in organizational environments of particular political actors" (Tilly 1999: 57). As such, political process theory suggests that the specificities of how citizenship as an institution of belonging, rights and obligations manifests itself should impact, the outcomes and dynamics of contesting and claiming citizenship (Bloemraad 2006; Koopmans et al 2005; Tilly 1995;).

Moreover, struggles of constructing citizenship, like other collective identities, are not only shaped by political institutions and processes but also the discourses which surround and constitute citizenship (Hausendorf and Bora 2006). In particular, struggles of constructing citizenship require that those engaged in them have available to them a "range of resources" distributed by the "the discourses, practices and materialities of governance" through which specific instances of 'citizenship' can be assembled (Fairclough et al 2006: 100). Such resources include the "administrative and legal discourses, as well as popular culture (Fairclough et al 2006: 100)", and the various political and public discourses not only about rights and obligations but also about national identity and political participation through which one can talk and think about being a citizen (Brubaker 1990; Calhoun 1997; Giugni and Passy 2005; Hausendorf and Bora 2006).

These discursive resources, however, are not uniform and coherent. Writing on the historical development of citizenship in the modern nation-state and the political and social process that characterize its evolution, Tilly (1995) wrote, "If citizenship is a tie entailing mutual obligations between categorically-defined persons and a state, the identity "citizen" describes the experience and public representation of that tie. Such an identity does not spring whole from a

deliberate invention or a general principle's ineluctable implications but from the historical accumulation of continual negotiation (227)". One consequence of this is that most often as new persons and peoples become citizens they do not come to the negotiating table with a whole new set of constructs but instead draw on already existing competing understandings of citizenship and identity. In fact, even if they wanted to come in with a whole new set of constructs, the success of their claims will be deeply linked to whether they can frame their claims around existing narratives about what citizenship means (Snow and Benford 2000). However, precisely because the meaning, practice and identity of citizenship are the products of "historical accumulation of continual negotiation", it contains within it the fault lines of those contested deliberations. Claims made on the part of new citizens or excluded citizens work to expand and alter these fault lines, drawing on historical residues to call for the coalescing of another citizenship identity (Asad 2003; Isin 2002; Tilly 1995). Historical artefacts are shown to be paradoxical or contradictory or pertinent in this process and often, re-negotiation of old battles by new actors take place (Tilly 1995; 2005).

As a result of the contested process by which citizenship is created, integrated and maintained, new citizens are not faced with a coherent discourse on liberal democratic citizenship—instead there are multiple narratives in this discourse that exist concurrently through which citizenship can be performed. The co-existence of multiple and competing discourses on citizenship enables new citizens in that it gives them the possibility of choosing how they perform citizenship and negotiate their multiple identities. It also poses challenges in that it subjects them to potential exclusion based on collective memories of fear that are linked to old histories but which manifest towards new subjects (Isin 2002; Tilly 2005). This is in fact the significance of what Tariq Modood writes about citizenship and minorities:

> The greatest psychological and political need for clarity about a common framework and national symbols comes from the minorities. For clarity about what makes us willingly bound into a single country relieves the pressure on minorities, especially new minorities whose presence within the country is not fully accepted, to have to

> conform in all areas of social life, or in arbitrarily chosen areas, in order to rebut the charge of disloyalty (1994: 64).

One consequence of this lack of "clarity about a common framework and national symbols" is that new citizens of a particular categorical group, in an attempt to belong and be accepted, opt for competing or alternative narratives in the discourse of liberal democratic citizenship. This leads then to conflicts and debate within themselves, not only about the identity of the group (Muslim) but the identity of the non-group (non-Muslim) to which integration and acceptance is being attempted. Social movement theories of collective identity suggests that these conflicts and debates are shaped by not only processes of actor-ideology or –strategy but also by the interaction of actors with each other and those outside the group, and importantly, the political and discursive context in which such contests are occurring (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Tilly 2005; 2003): New citizens, in the process of making claims about their identity, get caught up in the production of the "historical accumulation of continual negotiation" of citizenship of the entire polity. Below I will present three particular sites in liberal democratic citizenship which are characterized by competing discourses that new citizens, like Muslims, find themselves facing and having to negotiate in their efforts to contest and construct the meaning of American or Canadian Muslim citizenship.

There are several advantages of reading North American Muslim claims making and debates within the community in this manner: For one, it avoids the tendency by many scholars of Muslims in North America to reduce Muslim oppositional voices as "sell-outs" or "political opportunists". There are two dangers in this reduction: firstly, it often takes for granted the claims of some mainstream Muslim actors, some of which are made for political, ideological and/or strategic reasons. As a result, it misses the opportunity to ask questions like: When is someone considered/labelled a sell-out or a political opportunist? Who/what is that person or group of people accused of betraying? What kind of identity is being excluded here in the categorical group? Secondly, it risks reducing claims-making by minority groups to one kind of political ideology: one of defending culture or ethnicity against non-members. Such a reading thus fails

to examine the "unexpected" and often "unaccepted" identity claims within minority groups in the same framework of contested citizenship. These kinds of claims-makers—for example, the ethnic minority activists against multiculturalism; the leftist minority activists who write editorials in conservative national papers; the religious activists who advocate for strict secularism; the conservative feminists—reveal both the flexibility with which citizenship can be negotiated, as well as the constraints certain actors face when they cross boundaries of identity and ideology.

As a result of reading the contests in the Muslim community about Muslim citizenship as different ways to negotiate competing discourses about American or Canadian citizenship, this study offers insight into the challenges faced by new citizens in becoming citizens, as well as the processes by how such challenges are faced. Inquiry into the claims and practices of the contests in the Muslim community among its various leaders and activists provides a more nuanced analysis of the range of claims about Muslim citizenship. The general tendency in the literature to classify claims by proximity to a static definition of citizenship reinforces an "us vs. them", "Western vs. non-Western" understanding of the claims of others and fails in grasping the specificity and historicity of these claims to Western liberal democratic polities (Asad 2003; Benhabi 2002; 2004). The analysis I am providing in this study allows us to see the conversations and debates within the North American Muslim community not as outside of the history of citizenship in these countries but as another moment in it. Finally, this framework also allows us to make sense of the divergence of the dynamics between mainstream and oppositional Muslim actors in the United States and Canada that I show has occurred in the wake of 9/11.

1.3 Competing discourses faced by Muslim actors regarding faith and citizenship

In this section, I draw out the competing discourses faced by Muslim actors in North America in various aspects of liberal democratic citizenship, as well as in Islamic discourses regarding change, difference, secularism and

diversity. Regarding competing discourses in liberal democratic citizenship, I draw on major works by political philosophers and other social scientists who have highlighted the various tensions observed in public discourses regarding citizenship in liberal democratic societies. Regarding competing discourses in Islam, I draw on works by scholars of Islamic traditions who observe the various clusters of approaches that Muslim communities have had in dealing with change and diversity. In the process of these two sets of discussions, I derive six hypotheses on how these competing discourses will lead to divergent positioning by Muslim actors regarding citizenship and its relationship to their faith identity.

1.3.1 Competing Discourses in Liberal Democratic Citizenship

I have thus far used the concept "liberal democratic citizenship" without offering any content for what this may indicate. In the literature on citizenship, there are various classification models of citizenship: communitarian vs. republican vs. liberal vs. ethnonational (Lainer-Vos 2006; Miller 1995; Turner 1990). Liberal democratic citizenship is understood to be characterized by a common core of beliefs: "the individual is the primary site of political agency; the state is the exclusive state for political identification; and individuals hold a constellation of rights against the state which are intended to guarantee both freedom and equality (Denham and Slawner 1998: 1)." The accumulation of these principles into the cluster of "liberal democratic citizenship" is a product of not only ideologies but also politics, where the fact that what liberal democratic citizenship actually means in practice and theory in the various countries of the West varies as a result of the "disparate histories of revolution, war, religion, and imperialism (Denham and Slawner 1998:1)."

The history of (liberal democratic) citizenship has been characterized by struggles and contestations of inclusions and exclusions (Isin 2002; Tilly 1995; 2003; 2005). As a result, it has constantly been subject to change as an institution. However, in the last three decades, the public sphere has witnessed a renaissance of debates about what citizenship means and entails. Scholars have attributed this revitalization of deliberating on citizenship in both research and the

public discourse to the transformation citizenship is understood to be undergoing in the face of greater pluralism in established and emerging democracies (Cairns et al 1999; Eck 1993; Miller 1995; Tilly 1995; Weinstock 2002), trends of decentralization (Kvitso and Faist 2007), re-emergence of the liberal-communitarian debate (Kymlicka and Norman 1994), processes of globalization (Bloemraad 2000; Cairns 1999; Turner 1990) and the dominance of a rights paradigm in both national and global spaces (Soysal 1997; Turner 1990). The concern with the transformation of citizenship has brought into light competing discourses surrounding the four dimensions of citizenship—status, rights, practice and identity—produced by historical battles and negotiations of both ideas and peoples.

In this section, I flush out key competing discourses regarding three of these dimensions rights, practice, and identity, which have come to characterize discussions about liberal democratic citizenship, which actors have come to face and can draw from in their mobilization of claims about citizenship and faith: a) the location of citizenship rights b) the place of religion and faith in the practice of citizenship and c) the site at which loyalty to the polity is displayed and shared identity is forged.

One may note that there are also competing discourses in the public and the literature about also the fourth dimension: status. Debates regarding status surround how it is acquired and whether the requirements for its acquisition are strong or weak (Kvitso and Faist 2007). The most common focus has been on whether citizenship granting regimes are based on birth (*jus soli*) or parental origins (*jus sanguinis*). Following concerns of whether non-resident citizens are utilizing citizenship in only an instrumental manner, more recent debates have emerged in countries that follow the *jus soli* regime whether requirements of either granting or keeping citizenship should be increased (Abu-Laban 2004). These debates are not focused on in this study because among North American Muslim actors variations regarding how citizenship is acquired formally are not emphasized across the identity spectrum; instead contests about the meaning of

citizenship in terms of rights, practice and identity are what one can observe across the range of Muslim actors examined in this study.

As I delineate below the competing discourses embodied in citizenship (in liberal democracies) regarding rights, practice and identity, it is important to keep in mind that these tensions are not located solely in the state and public sphere that Muslim actors have to respond to, but that they are the source of also what creates debates and conflicts among Muslim actors, which I show in my fourth chapter.

1.3.1.1 Rights: Individual vs. Collective Rights

Kvitso and Faist (2007) in their review of citizenship point out that public discourse parallels some scholarly concerns that rights afforded by citizenship are eroding. Some of the concern here has been centered on the changes brought about by a retreat of the welfare state, as well as the rise of a security regime in the wake of 9/11.

A more central site of anxiety about the erosion of rights, though, has been located in the concern that the individual is no longer the sole bearer of citizenship rights. The idea of group rights is thought to challenge the original privileges of the individual as citizen and weaken the protection liberal citizenship was thought to offer the citizen against the whims of communal authorities. In liberal democracies and among political philosophers an ongoing debate in the last four decades has been whether the trinity of rights of the citizen (civil, political and social) proposed by Marshal (1950) needs to be expanded to include group or cultural rights (Paluski 1997).

This concern about whether group or cultural rights are necessary has gained currency in the face of both increased cultural pluralism, i.e., the increase in distinct kinds of ethno-cultural diversities created by immigration, colonization, vagaries of state formation as well as cultures that are not distinguishable by an ethnie (such as gender, sexuality, lifestyle) (Weinstock 2002). From an identity politics perspective, Marshall's lack of concern with the group reflected an

assumption of a homogenous, male, white, Anglo-Saxon society (Smith 1999). However, in the face of cultural pluralistic societies, the justification of group rights lies in the tendency that the dominant group in a given society will appropriate the public sphere by framing their culture and interpretations as universal and objective, while the cultures and interpretations of minority groups will be relegated to the private sphere (Young 1990). This is understood to be problematic because it prevents minority individuals from the resources he/she needs to fully actualize their goals, thus putting them at disadvantage to citizens who come from the dominant group. The argument continues that if group rights are essential to the full realization of the individual, the principle of equality of individuals would then require that all minorities have access to the public sphere. In this conception, no particular group would be exempted from rights *a priori*. Nevertheless, the practical problem of who to assign rights to leads one first to the issue of identification of groups (Weinstock 2002).

In response to this challenge Wil Kymlicka has offered what he calls a liberal multicultural approach. While some have extended his approach to include cultural groups outside of ethno-cultural groups (such as women's groups and gay groups) (Young 1989), Kymlicka's focus is on ethno-cultural groups. Kymlicka (1995) suggests that historical (national) minorities, such as the Québécois and the First Nations in Canada, Native Americans in the United States, the Scots, Welsh and Irish in Britain, would be justified to bear group rights in the sense of self-government or special representation rights and that these should be more or less permanent. On the other hand, for immigrant/ethnic groups, Kymlicka (1995) suggests, minority rights should be granted in the form of policies that end racism, some form of affirmative action, education about pluralism and other cultures, exemption from certain rules that may violate religious practices, and public funding of cultural practices. African-Americans and refugees present Kymlicka with a challenge: African-Americans, he argues, are neither a voluntary immigrant group (given the history of slavery) nor a national minority (which may be more arguable) and moreover, they have generally desired full integration rather than separation; similarly, refugees are involuntary migrants, often not

having chosen the nation in which they find refuge and looking to return home (after resolution of conflict); therefore, they are more ambiguous in their perspective to integration. Kymlicka (1995) argues that treatment of these groups (as groups) must also be differentiated. The principle at work behind his approach is that real equality between citizens of pluralist societies can only be achieved through differentiated policies which pay attention to the actual lack of homogeneity and neutrality in the state. Therefore, he grounds his justification of minority rights in the liberal tradition: differentiated groups rights are justified because they help achieve more fully equality between individuals.

For Kymlicka the differentiation of rights between national minorities and ethnic/immigrant groups (and other groups) is justified by the historical processes by which they form: national minorities have become minorities by involuntary processes (conquest, expansion, colonization) and therefore may resist integration as a positive goal whereas immigrants have entered through voluntary processes and more often than not desire integration.[5] The historical justification has continued to raise questions, the main critique being that it privileges one group (or certain types of group) over others (Kymlicka 2007; Weinstock 2002). Moreover, historical justifications for differentiated group rights demand whether the liberal value of individual equality is compromised: that is, by justifying the differences of different groups in their right to govern themselves and the extent of their collective rights, does one risk giving more rights to the individual of that group compared to an individual outside that group (Benhabib 2002)?

Thus group rights raise another problem of equality: Exemptions and compensations are considered by some to violate the principle of fairness and the principle of color-blindness is argued to be more ethical and committed to the egalitarianism than that of differentiated treatment based on past/current

[5] Note here that integration is opposed to assimilation and generally involves a two-way interaction where immigrants and ethnic minorities as well as members of the receiving/majority community are expected to act to facilitate integration (Modood 2006). For a critique of this conception of integration and assimilation see Joppke and Morawska (2003).

disadvantages (Bell 1973; 1993; Abram 1986). Yet another critique of group rights regarding equality comes from Bissondath (1995): granting group rights at all ghettoizes minorities from the mainstream community and impedes the realization of equality for individuals and groups. It also devalues any real commitment to pluralism (Bissondath 1995).

In a liberal context, group rights must always be conditioned on membership being optional, or more pragmatically speaking, that every citizen should have the right of exit from the group (Weinstock 2002; Young 1990). Under liberalism, the individual cannot be forced into particular actions, including into remaining in (or entering) a group.[6] This condition, highly important for the liberal tradition, poses challenges for cultures outside the liberal tradition and its enforcement is one of the mechanisms by which groups entering liberal democracies find themselves transformed (partially) into the liberal tradition (Kymlicka 2007). However, the granting of even weak groups rights, some argue, reinforce the bonds by which one belongs to a group *at the expense* of the bonds one could form with non-members. This reinforcement then decreases the extent to which the right of exit can be practiced by an individual since our associations to our communities are often necessary resources by which we find work, shelter and emotional and social companionship. In liberal democratic (welfare) societies, public and legal institutions as well as the multiplicities of our associations are supposed to diminish the requirement of ties to any one community to sustain ourselves: however, ethno-cultural communities are, specially for immigrants, an integral resource (and often by far the most principal source) by which individuals sustain themselves in their new country (Tilly 1998). In fact, the role played by the community and the group in the facilitation of the individual to integrate into society is part of the reason for justification of group rights in the first place by identity politics philosophers such as Young (1990). Thus, we observe again the tensions that arise in the context of liberalism and pluralism regarding rights of the citizen as individual vs. part of a group.

[6] Of course, paying taxes and submitting to conscription are exceptions to this principle of liberalism in actual liberal polities.

We should note here that while Kymlicka's approach deals with the identification of which kinds of groups should have stronger group rights and which kinds of groups should have less, it cannot deal with the problem of how one identifies the religious practices that warrant exemption, the cultural practices that should be funded. This problem points to the plurality within any given cultural and religious group regarding practices. The consequence here being that in a context where group rights are granted, pluralities within groups may actually diminish and particular relations of power reinforced, compromising the rights of certain individuals in the group (Benhabib 2002; Biles et al 2005).

Therefore, the above discussion reveals a key tension in the liberal understanding of citizenship is between relations of inter-group equality and relations of equality within group. Furthermore, at the center of this tension is the question of who bears the rights and in relation to whom. These tensions are regularly at play in discussions of injustice and oppression, claimed by citizens against the state or by the state against citizens or by citizens against each other (Benhabib 2002).

Hypothesis 1: *Regarding rights of the citizen, the fault line between Muslim activists will tend to be structured around competing claims of group vs. individual rights: one side will tend to prioritize the inequality of the group (Muslims) in relation to other groups and its correction; another will tend to prioritize the inequality of individuals within that group (e.g., Muslim women, Ahmediyanns, Muslim gays) and its correction.*

At this particular point, it may be useful to highlight that in the framing literature on social movements, researchers have tended to examine the various way rights are framed by activists as means to justify particular practices or ban other practices (Snow and Benford 2000). This is an important insight into the study of movement dynamics, strategies, and meaning and the abundance of studies developing the framework is a testimony to its strength. However, what I find more relevant for the task at hand is that frames which take as subordinates *individual*, *citizen*, *collective* inevitably lead to tensions about boundaries between

these abstractions. Such tensions, the above hypothesis suggests, should show up in the form of divergent claims about Muslim citizens and rights.

1.3.1.2 Practice: The place of faith and religion in the practice of citizenship

A concern about the erosion of rights of the citizen has been accompanied also by a concern that the practice of citizenship on the part of citizens is weakening. This has been framed as a concern about the withdrawal of citizens. The practice of citizenship is said to be both declining on the part of citizens and what is being asked of them (Kvitso and Faist 2007). In this discourse, this decline is observed by falling rates of electoral participation, decreasing civic engagement and/or a lack of willingness to serve in the military, as well as a tendency that voting and paying taxes have become the only two real demands placed on citizens.

Political engagement through claims-making, electoral participation and consultation with the state regarding public policy are some of the hallmarks of how citizens practice their citizenship, how they participate in their governance. While some worry that it is the state's weakening of the obligations of the citizen that is causing the withdrawal of citizens from participating in their citizenship, other scholars and activists of citizenship, social movements, immigration and ethnicity have often been concerned with the barriers in the public sphere[7] that certain individuals may face in the practice of their citizenship. In fact, as we saw above, the rationale for identity politics provided by Young (1990) actually pointed to why granting group rights may actually therefore facilitate such engagement. However, one particular concern in the face of increasing religious diversity in the West has been whether the institution of secularism sets up barriers against the engagement of religious groups in the public sphere and hinders the ability of religious citizens to participate in their governance (Weithman 2002).

[7] Although the term public sphere is often ambiguously used in the social sciences, I use it here in the sense that Calhoun (1993) has pointed to, specifically the realm of discussions and activities that are oriented toward the state.

There are two particular critiques regarding secularism and its implications for the practice of citizenship for those of faith. One points to the historical bias of secularism due to its emergence in Christian societies (Bramadat 2005; Asad 2003; Yousif 2000): Thus, for example, Sejak et al (2008) point out that while no liberal democracy prevents the gaining of citizenship by fault of one's religion, the ahsitorical application of secularism to newcomers of faith in secular societies has consequences for the *practice* of citizenship: Their argument, regarding secularism in Canada, is that when the Christian roots of many secular practices and spaces (e.g., public holidays, vestiges of the cross in the National Assembly) are presented as non-religious, Christian citizens are privileged over non-Christian ones, specially newcomers of faith. Furthermore, "an ideological adherence to a strict separation of Church and State either in official policy or in Canada's public culture could discourage religiously defined groups from participating in public debates and projects. Most importantly, a closed secularism communicates to members of ethno-religious groups the understanding that Canadian identity and their religious identity are incompatible (7)." Similar arguments have been made regarding secularism and its consequences for the full participation as citizens of non-Christian groups in the context of United States (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2006), England (McLaughlin 2006), France (Césari 2002) and Germany (Jonker 2002). Furthermore, this argument has underscored the reconsideration of the reality of secularism in liberal democracies, historically and contemporaneously speaking, and the variations in what role religion plays in the public sphere and what institutional ties it has to the state. The religious genealogy of secularism as well as the variations on how secularism is practiced reveal deviations from a strict secularism for Catholic (e.g., Canada), Protestant (e.g., Germany) and mono-theistic e.g., (the United States) communities while not for other faith communities. Thus, in liberal democratic societies, the Christian roots of secularism poses the threat of exclusionary citizenship in a context of religious pluralism and consequently the withdrawal of (at least some) citizens[8].

[8] Although, as we will see in the chapter on the American-Muslim case, a history of religious pluralism in the context of secularism could actually create more dynamic processes of integration

While the above is an important point regarding the significance of historical processes in privileging the practice of citizenship for some religious individuals over others, there is a deeper concern associated with secularism and the practice of citizenship, one which pertains to the question of where do the meaning and authority of citizenship flow. While political philosophers such as John Rawls and Charles Larmore have been explicitly concerned with this question in their justifications of political liberalism, most researchers of citizenship in their study of the concept have tended to take the state as the referent point. On the one hand, this is understandable since it is only states which have the authority to grant citizenship, enforce it and take it away. On the other hand, the norms and principles which defend and guard a citizen and obligate him or her to the state and society are not necessarily the same for every citizen--often a citizen's commitment is derived from other sources of moral authority, in spite of the fact that the state may not wish it so. In fact, the tensions which arise in conflicting *practices* and *ideas* of citizenship derive their justification not only in varying interpretations of ethics and practice of citizenship demanded by the state but other sources of moral authority such as tradition, ideology, philosophy and faith[9].

A key argument that I hope to make by the end of this study is that the process by which individuals and groups become citizens is by the mapping of these other sources of moral authority to that provided by the state. What are the varying maps produced? That is a central question in this study. Social movement theory has tended to utilize framing as the key mechanism by which activists map differing identities onto each other (Snow and Benford 2000). However, claims-makers and leaders of communities are interested in more than just framing their ideas and identities in the language that is resonant to a larger audience (Oliver and Johnston 2000). They are particularly interested in making these varying

for faith communities (Fink 1992).

[9] Weithman (2002) expresses the same idea but utilizes the terminology of Rawls, specifically making the distinction between conception and concept: citizens can be united around the concept of citizenship even as their conceptions of citizenship remain plural.

sources of authorities conflict minimally for themselves[10]. Faced with new circumstances, communities, through their leaders and activists, tend to attempt to find ways of maintaining many of their practices and beliefs; however, to do so, they often have to justify these practices that are labelled foreign, exotic, alien, or even dangerous. These justifications are not only strategic but require an actual reorientation and rethinking of the way these practices fit into their new society: in fact, this process of reorientation and rethinking produces the maps that link the various moral authorities onto each other. The process of mapping becomes urgent when a particular identity and its associative authority is alleged to be incompatible with or challenging the authority of the state and the identity of citizenship. This may be even more deeply true of communities of faith because faith creates, parallel to the state, a community of believers bound to a higher authority, namely the authority of god.

Nevertheless, what is of more consequence than whether faith is more or less difficult than ideologies, traditions and philosophies to map on to the moral authority of citizenship and state (nation), is that the principle of secularism, present in all liberal democratic societies in the form of institutions and/or norms, some have argued, penalizes the faithful (rather than followers of other kinds of moral authorities) in their practice of citizenship by precluding certain kinds of identities and practices. In response though, others have argued that all identities and practices that cannot speak to the polity at large cannot be justified in the public sphere as a call to action. Sometimes this is called the norm of public justification, i.e., "each citizen ought to support only those coercive laws that she sincerely takes to be *justifiable* to each member of the public (Eberle, 2002: 294)."

[10] The framing processes of bridging, amplification, extension and transformation (Snow and Benford 2000) are one way of looking at this mapping process that movement actors of newcomers are engaged in. However, these processes remain strategic in their motivation and static in the conceptualization of the identities of movement audience/target and movement followers/leaders. While this is without doubt relevant in the study of certain aspects of movement dynamics, it is insufficient for observing the processes by which identities and ideologies (broadly conceived, i.e., including faith) change in movements. What I hope to show by the end of this study is that for the leaders and actors at the center of this study, answering how their faith can actually link up to their citizenship and vice versa is central to their motivations and actions.

According to this version of liberalism, often also called justificatory liberalism, public reason cannot be solely religious (or any other identity-specific) in its motivations. In this sense, the secular is supposed to differentiate public vs. religious motivations. In liberal democracies there is less debate about this restriction on politicians and the state (appealing to the principle of representation of the entire political community, religious and non-religious alike). However, the controversy starts when one takes on conversations of the general citizenry and their public claims--can religious reasons be utilized legitimately? Those who argue against the use of religious reason in public claims of citizens say that because citizens are in a sense co-sovereigns, "entitled to take part in bringing about" political outcomes", they should be bound to the requirement of public reason in making claims.

Weithman (2002) in *Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship* disagrees with this logic and argues for what he calls "responsible citizenship" (3). His challenge is two-pronged, both historical-empirical: First, he justifies the place of religious justifications by the role that religious organizations and institutions plays in developing the participatory dimension of citizenship for citizens: "...churches provide the means by which many people [religious people] gain access to realistically available opportunities to participate in politics and develop a sense of themselves as citizens (Weithman 2002: 4)." Secondly, churches have made (slaves, immigrants, and the poor) and can make important contributions to public debate relating to political outcomes that affect the full participation of other citizens based on interpretations of participation that derive from norms and reasons outside of the secular. To silence out one particular kind of reason endangers the process of deliberative democracy and risks political outcomes that are exclusive (Weithman 2002). Implicit in his argument is the bias in modern liberal democracies about the monolithic illiberalism of religions. By pointing out the significance of faith communities in cultivating citizens, in fostering participation, and in broadening the scope of public debate (conceived as a public good), Weithman underscores first the plurality in religious traditions and second

the negative consequences of privileging public reason over religious reason (and one could argue, other reasons in general).

The second critique of secularism in liberal democracies brings into light the centrality of civil society (as opposed to just the public sphere) as a space in which citizens are able to fulfill their obligations as citizens and practice their citizenship. It enlarges the space and the activities by which citizens participate. The role of the civil society in fostering citizenship and facilitating democracy goes back to De Tocqueville (1981 [1863]). The benefits (for the political community and for individuals) of civil society engagement by citizens are aptly summarized by Weinstock (2002):

> Thus, civil society can provide individuals with the goods of association, and can provide them with concrete options embodying different values, interest and ways of life. It can contribute to effective public-policy design and implementations by articulating needs and allowing for context-sensitive application. And it can channel potentially destructive passions so as to minimize the risk that they will manifest themselves in deleterious ways (255).

Therefore, debates and conversations among different civil society associations, including different kinds of religious groups (not only inter-faith conversations, but intra-faith ones) are instances of citizenship in practice. While the value of a thriving civil society has been questioned by various thinkers (Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Weinstock 2002; Young 2000), what the preceding discussion should have highlighted is that the institution of secularism in liberal democracies poses a particular challenge to the *practice* of citizenship of faith communities, and that the practice of citizenship is located both in civil society *and* the public sphere.

Hypothesis 2: *Regarding practice of citizenship, Muslim actors will tend disagree on the place of religious identities, practices and ideas in the public sphere: to the extent that they see Islam and faith as a source of public good, they will tend to emphasize the significance of religious reason in public discussions; to the extent that they see Islam and faith as a source of individual good, they will*

tend to argue for a strict secularism. Moreover, to the extent that Muslim actors will tend to see the place of religious identities, practices and ideas in the public sphere as actually harmful to the public good, they will also tend to argue for a strict secularism.

The point regarding the location of citizenship practices is significant because it brings up what role, for example, interfaith work, or inter-ethnic associations (located in civil society) can have for fostering in citizens the value of pluralism (understood as an emphasis on the commitment to collaboratively and positively engage with diversity and difference (Eck 1993)) or the value of finding common ground--either as consensus or compromise (located in the public sphere). Moreover, as Kymlicka (2007) notes, through the practices of engaging in civil society in liberal democracies, and of making claims on other citizens and the state in the public sphere, some illiberal norms and practices of groups are transformed. Social movement scholars have extensively studied the process by which movement actors and movements are transformed by their participation in the movement and their recognition by the state: they have tended to label this process as professionalization, mainstreaming, or institutionalization. I prefer Kymlicka's term transformatory because, I believe, it captures better the dynamic of change involved in the process. In addition, there has been a tendency to not only view professionalization/ institutionalization of movements (or movement actors) as problematic, but also to see it as a static or stagnant outcome once it has happened. Instead, in citizenship frameworks, transformative citizenship becomes significant in that this may be the process by which shared values are forged even if shared identity appears elusive in the context of plurality (Kymlicka 2007).

1.3.1.3 Identity: Sources of citizenship identity

The value of shared values and/or shared identity leads us to the last dimension of citizenship, namely identity, and the one that, scholars have argued, has posed the greatest challenge in discussions of citizenship and greater pluralism. In fact, underlying the discourse around identity and citizenship is the

particular problem value pluralism places on citizenship. Value pluralism refers to "...the fact that there are a number of incommensurable values and corresponding ways of life which are all legitimate objects of human aspiration, and that different citizens can make different, but equally legitimate choices within that set...and which are only compossible to a limited degree (Weinstock 2002: 242)." Value pluralism has led to questions regarding what binds citizens into a political community and how citizens negotiate the competing claims on their loyalty from other identities.

From a social theory point of view, there are three main approaches to the question of the ties that bind a polity together: The first is rooted in Durkheim's "collective conscience" which emphasizes common norms and values of the society in which the polity is located. There are two variations on this conception: 1) the identity of the citizen is rooted in a shared civilization, where civilization is understood to be historical (i.e., collective memories of blood and war) (Marshall 1950); 2) the identity of the citizen is rooted in a set of shared principles, embodied for example in the American Bill of Rights, the French Declaration on the Rights of Man and the Citizen, or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, which are supposed to be *a priori* to any other claims made by citizens. The justification of these *a priori* principles can be either historical or ideational in this conception, but either way, the understanding of citizenship here is national (Miller 1995; 2000). The axis of primary importance here for those claiming inclusion or exclusion from citizenship is values thought to be identified with nationality.

The second focuses on a common political identity by acknowledging that diversities make a common "civilization" difficult (however defined) but that identity can be achieved through widespread participation and engagement where consensus is required only on political institutions and political procedures of conflict resolution (Bauböck 2003; Berger 1998; Kymlicka 2007). Under this approach the understanding of citizenship is institutional and political and practice of citizenship is understood to be the primary process by which identity is forged.

In both these approaches and the national approach above, identity of citizenship is rather static: a set of preconceived histories, ideas or processes are defined to be the basis of what binds citizens together into a political community: to the extent that new citizens identify with these *a priori* identities, citizens share a common citizenship identity.

There are again two variations on this institutional/political approach, which emphasize a more dynamic approach to citizenship identity: In one variation of this institutional/political approach, the process of transformatory citizenship articulated by Kymlikca (2007) that we saw earlier reflects how citizens' actions, even when it is on the side of "illiberal" claims and even if those values do not change, *makes* valuable "liberal" democratic norms because of it what it permits these groups/citizens to attain. Therefore, he criticizes the critics of Canadian multiculturalism, for example, by arguing that what is most important to forge a common identity and a sense of a political community is making sure all groups can participate in the public sphere. Thus, irrespective of what they are making claims for, they will value the process (and therefore the ideals and institutions) that makes it possible: thus freedom of choice, democracy and multiculturalism become the basis of a common identity, for example, in the Canadian case. We saw elements of this particular discourse in both the discussion on rights and practices above: in this discourse, the content of citizenship is "thin" and the process of identification is dynamic and gradual.

Another variation on the institutional/political approach emphasizes to a greater degree the need for full and active engagement of all groups (identities) in society and the debate of a society's future (Jenson 1998). The emphasis on debate and pluralism in this approach also problematizes a static conception of citizenship identity: here various dimensions of citizenship identity are understood to be variable depending on the political and social constitution of the polity which is also understood to be dynamic. In a sense, neither values from the national approach nor the political institutions are seen as necessarily the

continuous thread which ties citizens together, but instead the possibility of being at the table to discuss it.

A third approach to what ties citizens to their polity takes the focus away from institutions and politics and emphasizes the practices in civil society which foster social trust among citizens to create a shared identity on the basis of that trust (Putnam 1995, 2000, 2004; Uslaner 2002). If we recall, in my discussion of the practice of citizenship, I noted that citizenship can be practiced in both civil society and the public sphere. Scholars of this civic approach to citizenship identity emphasize the participation and quality of participation in civil society rather than the political sphere per se. Moreover, there is an understanding that positive trust is built through participation in associations that bridge differences of class, ethnicity, religion and other identities. The general trend in this approach to citizenship identity has been to show whether bridging types of associative participation is occurring or not, why they are occurring and the consequences for those who are excluded (or those who choose to isolate themselves in primarily bonding types of associative participation) and the larger society and specially institutions of citizenship and national identity (Soroka et al 2007; Coté and Erickson forthcoming).

However, I am interested in the more implicit principle that is invoked in this civil society approach to citizenship: it places a premium on a commitment to pluralism, in the sense that was evoked by Eck (1993) earlier: pluralism is the "energetic engagement with diversity" which implicates an "active seeking of understanding across lines of difference" without resorting to relativism; it demands the recognition of pluralism as "an encounter of commitments" at the heart of which lies "dialogue" and a "commitment to being at the table (1993)." A conception of citizenship grounded in the idea that group interactions based on diversities of individuals (inter-faith, inter-ethnic, inter-class, inter-sexuality, inter-political parties/ideologies) are what produce citizens who recognize "others" as *fellow* citizens and therefore the larger polity that they constitute, seems to demand that we become pluralists of the Eckian kind.

Thus, while national citizenship emphasizes common values (and/or civilization) and institutional citizenship emphasizes common political institutions and practices, the civil society approach underscores a commitment to activities in all aspects of civic life that foster trust through processes of pluralism. In liberal democracies, these three sets of approaches to citizenship identity (or national belonging) co-exist, varying in the emphasis of what constitutes identity. Even as these institutions vary from country to country, within a country itself, as social historians have shown, which conception has more or less currency shifts relative to the struggles that constitute the *process* of citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Tilly 1995). Moreover, exactly because they are not perfect and static solutions, these combinations of ideas, of what belonging means in the context of citizenship, are continually renewed in moments of crisis. Citizens and states claim and enforce identity by mobilizing one or more of these notions of identity (national, political/institutional, civic) to prove their identification or allege the lack of identification in a society. These proofs of or allegations against identification are claims of "loyalty" and "betrayal" to the group which are key to identity discourses of any type and citizenship is not different.

For this study, I am interested in the varying conceptions of citizenship that are mobilized in the differing situations in which loyalty and betrayal are utilized by Muslim activists. Since the principal focus in national citizenship is common values and common-fate, I argue that national conceptions of citizenship are mobilized when claims of loyalty and betrayal center on liberal vs. illiberal values. An institutional/political citizenship is mobilized when identity discourses of loyalty and betrayal focus on practices centered around the state or away from the state. Isolation here could be seen as betrayal as could practices that remain subversive to norms of political process: by "underground" family courts for example, while loyalty could include for example high rates of electoral participation and commitment to peaceful and democratic means to claims-making. When a civic conception of citizenship is mobilized, identity discourses of loyalty and betrayal would be more localized; they could center around the level of bridging between different groups in local communities; the level of

willingness to participate in the local life of the community, *across* group lines (of gender, class, ethnicity, religion, and other identities). Here again, isolation could be claimed as betrayal, but participation in community service could be seen as loyalty. Moreover, general claims of trust and untrustworthiness reflect those who are seen to be loyal and those who could betray.

Hypothesis 3: *Regarding citizenship identity claims Muslim actors will diverge due to either a) differing conceptions of Canadian (or American) identity (i.e., national, political, or civic): i.e., Muslims activists will tend to divide on how they understand Canadian (or American) identity. Or b) because of a claim to fail to meet the ideals/standards to the shared conception of identity: i.e., even if Muslim activists agree on where a sense of belonging comes from (in the national, political or civic), they would disagree on how that belonging is displayed.*

1.3.1.4 Identity: The challenge of transnationality

In addition to competing narratives about what creates a sense of shared identity among citizens, competing discourses have also been generated as a result of what some has termed expansion in citizenship, i.e., the notion that the location of citizenship has been transforming in the face of multiple and nested citizenship (Kvitso and Faist 2007). The concern expressed here is that multiple and nested citizenship, both a consequence of different aspects of transnationalism and globalization, may destabilize political communities by either breaking down unity or weakening the means by which citizens identify to a particular community and thus weaken the institution of citizenship altogether.

Processes of transnationalism have been argued to have consequences for citizenship identity and the competing loyalties transnationalism generates in citizens who are members of transnational communities (Kvitso and Faist 2007). Immigrant groups in liberal democracies have been the focus of this argument in both popular and scholarly discourse (Faist 2000; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Legomsky 2003; Levitt and Schiller 2004; Ong 1996). Researchers have examined the consequences for national solidarity and citizenship identity given

the increasing ability of immigrants to maintain and sustain transnational linkages with authorities and communities outside the receiving country (Ong 1999; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Koopmans et al 2005; Soysal 1994). Faist (2000) underscores that transnationalism and citizenship are linked in two distinct realms: one occurs in the political space in the form of dual citizenship (or dual state membership) and the other occurs in the cultural space in the form of transnational communities linked by culture, religion or political ideology.

Regarding dual citizenship, most studies have focused on explaining the increasing prevalence of countries offering dual citizenships, its consequences for citizenship and sovereignty of states, the practices of dual citizens and the determinants of where dual citizenship is implemented and where it is rejected (Faist 2004; Gustafson 2002; Hammer 1985; Howard 2005; Sejersen 2008). Faist (2000) summarizes the critique of dual citizenship:

> Some critics have seen the institutionalization of transnational ties in dual state membership as a grave challenge. For them the political issue is this: The more transnational or multifocal ties immigrants entertain, the greater their ambivalence towards the receiving polity; the weaker the roots in the nation-state of settlement, the stronger the incentives to form a transnational community; the bolder the claim to a diaspora, the greater the tendency on the part of natives to question the allegiance of the newcomers, and, finally, the weaker the inclination of immigrants to adapt to the immigration country. In short, dual state membership hinders immigrant adaptation in the country of immigration, encourages populism on the part of the majority groups, and leads to divided loyalties among immigrants (202).

An associated claim in this position is that dual citizens tend to view their citizenship in the new country more instrumentally than meaningfully (Faist 2000).

The second way that transnationalism is supposed to challenge the hierarchy of loyalties demanded by citizenship is less tangible in that it refers to identities that are maintained by authorities other than a state (i.e., authorities that cannot grant citizenship but nevertheless create obligations on its members directed towards the group and authority): culture (e.g. Hispanic, pan-African,

pan-Arab, diasporas) and religion (e.g., Islam, Christianity and Judaism), as well as certain political ideologies[11] (e.g., communism, anarchism) are the most usual suspects in how authorities not bound by state borders problematize the hierarchy of priorities (and loyalties) implicated in citizenship. Transnationalism and globalization are seen to have intensified the processes by which these non-state authorities are able to maintain the ties that bind these communities together. The question here is does the increasing facility by which these ties can be sustained due to globalization actually lead to greater conflicts within citizens regarding the order in which their loyalties lie? The spectre of the Fifth Column arises in this discourse.

In the discussion on practice and secularism we saw that citizens of faith may pose a particular challenge to the practice of citizenship. Similarly, identity discourses of loyalty and betrayal among religious citizens may be particularly intensified since, the argument goes, faith communities are both institutionalized to a greater degree than other transnational identities and are postulated on ideas of transnationalism (Rudolph 1997). The axis of loyalty and betrayal in this discourse then, I argue, is centered on the question: Does this particular feature of faith communities pose a real challenge on the ability of religious citizens to act not only nationally but to prioritize the obligations to and identification with fellow citizens (the political community) over the obligations to and identification with fellow believers who are non-citizens (the spiritual community)?

Some scholars have argued that the focus on transnationalism (of particular kinds of groups, i.e., immigrants, religious citizens, etc) and its consequences for citizenship identity misses the point. In fact, what discourses on transnationalism and citizenship actually highlight are the differentiated demands of citizenship placed on identities perceived to be transnational (Arat-Koc 2006; Asad 1993). In this critique, scholars tend to highlight how for certain groups of

[11] One could replace political ideology by social movement. I choose the former because claims of loyalty and betrayal of *citizens* are fundamentally political and thus all ideologies of social movements that may be seen as potentially affecting citizenship identity will be politicized (even if the ideology may be rooted in non-political ideas).

citizens, the content of common values of citizenship is expanded to reduce the extent of choice possible, and greater sets of actions that constitute citizenship are demanded. In the absence of "civilisational" ties, the presence of greater diversity and a value of pluralism, majority groups argue for a thicker conception of citizenship, but only for those groups they deem as dangerous. It has been a repeated argument in the literature on identity politics and minority rights that this discourse is latent, made manifest at particular moments of crisis: World War II (and World War I) for the German (Tolzmann 1999), Italian (Luconi 2007; Carnevele 2003; Michaud 2002) and Japanese (Daniels 1999; 1971; Grodzins 1955) communities in North America (Fox 2001; Panayi 1993); Arabs in the United States during the oil crisis and the Iranian Revolution (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008); and Muslims in the wake of the 9-11 (Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008; Arat-Koc 2006).

Hypothesis 4: *Regarding citizenship identity and the transnational dimension of Muslim communities, Muslim activists will tend to divide on a) the extent to which they perceive their transnationalism to be particular compared to other groups b) the extent to which they are responsible to claims of loyalty made by Muslims outside of the borders of Canada (or the United States); and/or c) claims of betrayal made by fellow citizens against Muslim citizens as a consequence of Muslim communities outside.*

1.3.2 Competing discourses in Islam regarding difference, diversity, change and secularism

I have utilized the literature on citizenship to draw out three important sets of competing discourses that faith communities face as citizens of liberal democracies. This is one side of the map between faith and citizenship. The second side of the map looks at the tensions embedded in faith, in this case Islam. Once we have drawn these two sides, the rest of this study explores how Muslim actors in North America negotiate these competing discourses on citizenship and faith to construct Muslim citizenship and what explains the emergence of varying maps and the divisions and conflicts that characterize these variations.

Many studies, emphasizing the diversity in Islam and Muslim communities across the world, as well as the specificity of the national experience in which they are located tend to portray Muslim activists and movements as unrelated to each other; or they tend to emphasize the centrality of the way global Islam or the *ummah* structures these movements and local discourses (Roberson 2003; Wiktorowicz 2003). Both approaches miss the opportunity to understand how these sets of processes actually link up and when they link up (Wiktorowicz 2003). In an effort to respond to the call of missed opportunities, I attempt in this study to interlink both the transnational as well as the national dimensions of one particular aspect of Islamic movements in the modern era: i.e., the negotiation and construction of minority Muslim citizenship in liberal democracies. The following discussion lays out the general contours of the modernist movement in Islam, as it is understood in its transnational scope. The rest of the study pays attention to the particular manifestations of this movement in Canada and the United States, paying particular attention to how these local forms draw from and negotiate the transnational form, as well as how the local forms see their role in affecting the transnational form; the discussion of all this circumscribed by the focus of this study: the construction of Muslim citizenship by Muslim actors in North America.

I structure the discussion on competing discourses in Islam as follows: I first lay out the various forms of divisions that appeared regarding change, diversity and authority in Islam at the moment of encounter between Islam and the West in the 19th century. I outline in the following sections the divergent discourses in Islam, as a result, regarding a) what is the relationship between religion and the state; b) change and interpretation of doctrine and practices; and c) what is the source of religious authority.

1.3.2.1 Discourses in the Modernist Movement in Islam: Modernism, Fundamentalism and Traditionalism

In the literature on the history of Islam and Muslim societies, the 19th century represents a watershed moment for the Muslim world, identified as the

moment when European expansion in the Muslim world became dramatically transformatory. The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 is seen as the culmination of the changes in the 19th century and the beginning of the intensification of modernization processes in Muslim societies, initiated not only by European forces but also domestic ones. Of course Muslim societies prior to the 19th century had experienced political turmoil, extensive social change and imperialistic tendencies from both within and without. But historically these conflicts and tendencies had been led by other Muslim powers or non-Muslim powers that converted, or non-Muslim powers that enforced political and not cultural domination (Roberson 2003). What made the experiences of the 19th century unique in the history of Islam was that unlike their predecessors, Muslim actors were tasked with determining their position towards two cultural traditions: Muslim/Islamic and Western; moreover, the doctrine of secularism appeared to "explicitly put to discussion the status of the Koran as the ultimate source of moral knowledge and legitimacy for social life (Hoebink 1998: 38)".

These discussions produced what is called the modernist movement in Islam, which can be generally understood as a set of claims, ideas, and actions geared towards answering the question of Islamic adaptation to social change brought about by the increasing influence and penetration of European powers in the course of the 19th century in Muslim societies (Roberson 2003; Hoebink 1998). The movement is ongoing in the post-colonial era and is seen to be constitutive of the scope of national and local movements driven by identification to Islam and how it allows for responding to change. Hoebink (1998: 31-2)[12] identifies three ideal-type positions in the modernist movement, identified by their approach to interpretation (*ijtihad*) of revelation: modernism, fundamentalism and traditionalism.

[12] There is a tremendous volume of work on looking at Islamic scholarship and movements on responses within the religion to the problem of modernity and modernization (see Salvatore 1997; Eickleman and Piscatori 1996 for extensive reviews of this literature). I have found after a lot of perusal through this material that Michel Hoebink's article is particularly useful in framing the insights of these works into a coherent and analytic conceptual framework. Importantly, it draws upon a lot of the existing studies and scholarship to provide a framework that most researchers in the field would agree with, at least in its broad conceptualizations.

(1) Modernism[13], or renewalism, stands for a continuous reinterpretation of the ethical ideal. Modernists are often motivated by a desire to make the ethical idea relevant in the changing conditions of their societies. But no less often, modernism is inspired by the desire of political actors to mould the ethical ideal to justify their worldly ambitions. In their advocacy of interpretation, the modernists emphasize the "inner-wordliness" of the Koranic ethics as well as human moral autonomy and freedom.

(2) Fundamentalism resists or even completely rejects the interpretation of the ethical ideal. The fundamentalists' opposition to interpretation is often motivated by a desire to safeguard the ethical ideal of Islam against corruption by rulers and other politicians seeking to manipulate it to legitimize their political aims. In this connection, fundamentalists tend to emphasize the transcendence of God as well as the limitations and subjectivity of human judgement.

(3) Traditionalism permits interpretation of the ethical ideal, but on the condition that once this interpretation has taken place and is confirmed by the general agreement of the community, it can never be altered or rejected. Under this regime, the authoritative text of Islam continuously expands as each generation adds its own interpretations to those of earlier generations. Traditionalism can be viewed as a compromise between the extreme positions of fundamentalism and renewalism. By prohibiting re-interpretation and allowing interpretation only in novel cases, traditionalism tries to meet the demands for both stability and flexibility.

[13] To clarify, modernism is one kind of (ideal-type) discourse in the modernist movement, the other two being traditionalism and fundamentalism. The “modernist” in the modernist movement refers to the understanding that the modernist movement emerged out of the encounter between Islam and the West (i.e., West as modernity, not in the sense that modern is better or superior, but as a particular constellation of socio-political and economic arrangements, which was historically produced and carried by the West).

Existing positions in the modernist movement are located in this continuum constructed by ideal-types. I start below with the divergent positions each of these discourses have regarding the appropriate relationship between religion and the state. The reason for starting with this dimension of divisions is because it underscores the central role that historical and political interactions of religion and politics, particularly the state, have had in producing divergent Islamic discourses. Following this, I move on to the discussion about how change and interpretation of practices and doctrine are understood. Finally, this leads us to the discussion of where religious authority is located in Islam and the Muslim community in a context of globalization and pluralisation.

1.3.2.2 Relationship between Religion and the State

One particular source of tension in the modernist movement has been located in the concern with the relationship between religion and state: in the context of the meeting of Islam and the West and post-colonial politics, the tension has been framed in terms of a debate about what secularization means (Hoebink 1998). Regarding secularization understood as the separation of religious and political authority, modernists (renewalists) and fundamentalists have both advocated secularism in classical and modern Islam. Modernism supports secularism as a precaution against political authorities co-opting the religious and intellectual freedom embedded in its idea of reinterpretation. Fundamentalism supports secularism as a precaution of corruption of the religious ideal and truth. However, regarding secularization understood as a marginalization of revelation as a source of legitimate knowledge and justification for world affairs, the modernist movement suffered a break that produced a new fault line in Islamic discourses: between secularists vs. non-secularists.[14] Muslim

[14] I am using the term non-secularists instead of the term normally utilized by scholars, i.e., Islamists, understood as anti-secularists. My motivation for this is two-fold: 1) Given that both the fundamentalist and the modernist strands of the Islamist position accepts and advocates separation of political and religious authority, they are not anti-secularist per se. Instead, they differ with the secularists on the place of religious knowledge in the realm of human governance. They also differ in that non-secularists tend to advocate that the justification and mode of governance need to be differentiated from a Western understanding and tradition. These differences I believe are less about opposition to the principle of secularism. 2) The label Islamist

secularist thinkers, such as 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq, argued that government and political community should be governed by human reason and not religious belief or doctrine. For Muslim secularists, the strictest of separations between religion and state are necessary for democratic governance. Muslim secularists thus tend to agree with the liberal norm of public justification discussed above regarding the place of religious reason in the public sphere.

For Muslim non-secularists, secularization has been conflated to westernization. Whether in the modernist or the fundamentalist camps, Muslim non-secularists tend to conceptualize society as tied together "by moral solidarity, by loyalty to a generally agreed body of values and norms. The institutions of society--the law, the system of education and so on--are viewed as organically related to these cultural values (Hoebink 1998: 41)." Therefore the strength and cohesion of a community, political or otherwise, comes from the moral foundations of that society: in this sense the attempt at imposing new or alien institutions and simultaneously marginalizing the source of moral solidarity in Muslim societies (religion--Islam), the West, non-secularists claim, were attempting to weaken the foundations of society. Secularization therefore came to be seen as not only equivalent to westernization, but actually imperialism.

A final point of contention between modernists, secularists and fundamentalists regarding human relations and governance is political participation. First regarding the process by which decisions are made for the political community, secularists argue that any attempt at bringing in Islam into the state is necessarily authoritarian. Modernists and fundamentalists argue instead that since Islam does not recognize a religious authority outside of revelation, the prerogative on interpretation lies in the hands of the community of believers, not a few; therefore, the application of Islam cannot be by principle

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has become politically loaded. Even though for academics Islamism is supposed to refer to "the whole body of thought which seeks to invest society with Islam" which may be "integrist, but may also be traditionalist, reform-minded or even revolutionary), for many Muslim activists and scholars, the term has become one that conflates political Islam and Islam, or even worse, extremism in Islam and Islam. Given the extent to which this term tends to offend a larger number of respondents in this study, I will avoid using it.

authoritarian. However, the meaning of *sura* (mutual consultation between ruler and believers) divides modernists from the fundamentalists. For the latter, *sura* is not binding and it is to be received from a select group of advisers (experts). Instead, for the modernists *sura* is both obligatory and binding; moreover, it requires consultation with the whole community of believers (Rahaman 1981). Regarding political participation, as we may have noticed, the discussion of the various positions has limited itself to a community of believers. Secularists argue that even if non-secularists positions are able to institute some form of democratic governance, it would be exclusive of women and non-Muslims: for secularists, any attempt to use Islam to legitimize the governance of human relations will tend to create precarious situations for these groups because their inclusion requires interpretation and consensus (Hoebink 1998). The problem lies in particular passages in the Koran which tend to suggest exclusion of non-Muslims and women from the decision making process: modernists have to resort to the strong version of the historical approach to include these groups.

1.3.2.3 Change and Interpretation

Earlier on I mentioned that the secularist position came to be read by some modernists and fundamentalists as equivalent to a position calling for westernization: in the form of governance, relationship between state and religion, and in its treatment of minorities and women. The flip side to this conflation was that opposition to secularization produced a discourse on authenticity (*asala*) and a reform of the Muslim identity towards that authenticity: only by reasserting the true moral foundations of Muslim societies would they be able to adapt to the social changes brought about by European colonialism and maintain cultural and political sovereignty. At this point the modernists and the fundamentalists agree that traditionalism, the current general practice, is the wrong approach to revitalize the moral foundations of Muslim societies. For them, traditionalism with its emphasis on the obligation to adhere to the consensus of earlier generations of scholars is the source of the weakening of Muslim societies

because it has created distance between the original sources (Koran and Sunnah) as well as from the duty of "living interpretation" (Hourani 1962: 147).

The rejection of the historical accumulation of (medieval) jurisprudence binds the modernists and fundamentalists together but then exposes them to the classical problem of what constitutes the content and process of authenticity. Moreover a debate about authenticity inevitably implicates how change and interpretation of practices, ideas and doctrine are approached. Authenticity can be understood in an essentialist manner, i.e., it is achieved only in resistance to change or in reference to some pre-ordained past. It can also be understood in the sense of being relevant and true to the actual experiences of the communities and the individuals engaged in the practice of the faith. Claims of authenticity in Islam thus diverge on exactly how change and interpretation are understood.

The renewalist position asserts that human moral autonomy and the obligation of radical reinterpretation of Koran and Sunnah are necessary for defending the Islamic way of life and creating the moral/cultural foundations for a strong society.[15] In this modernist position, re-interpretation of revelation is impossible regarding the relationship between the individual and God in the afterlife.[16] On the other hand, re-interpretation of revelation is an obligation regarding the relationship between individuals within the ummah as well as outside the ummah in the world. Human reason and consensus are the means of re-interpretation and practice for the rules regarding human relationships. Moreover, reinterpretation has to be continuous and responsive to change. In this understanding, a call to authenticity is a call to the "practice of rational interpretation of the early legists (Hoebink 1998: 49)." The call to authenticity

[15] For those interested in exploring the particulars of these movements and discourses further, it is a good start to examine the works of some of the key actors associated with this modernist discourse in Islam: Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Gamal al-Din al-Afgani, Muhammad 'Abduh and Muhammad Iqbal (see *Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond*, edited by John Cooper, Ronald Nettler and Mohamed Mahmoud, 2000). These actors remain integral in the national and religious discourses of Muslim societies. Hanbalites like Ibn Taymiyya are also positioned on this side of the discourse as are the Mu'tazilites and the mystics from the classical period. Currently, the key intellectuals associated with this movement are Muhammad 'Amara and Rasid al-Gannusi.

[16] This is known as *'ibadat* in Islamic scholarship. The rules and processes involved in relationships between fellow human beings is known as mu'amalat.

lies in a particular historical practice; the outcome and content of that practice is supposed to be determined by the circumstances in which Muslims find themselves.

The degree of flexibility that some modernists have proposed has led opponents of modernists as well as researchers to argue that the only difference between the modernist position and the secularist position is semantic, with the latter preferring the term *'almani* (secularist) and human sovereignty and the former preferring *'madani* (civil) and *hilafa* (human vicegerency) (Hoebink 1998). I would argue that the semantic difference actually serves as a very good proxy for delineating the place of religion and religious reason in each discourse. *In the modernist position, religious reason should be present in the public sphere, whereas in the secularist position, religious reason should be private and public reason (or the norm of justifiability) should be the norm.*

In contrast to the modernist position, the fundamentalist call to authenticity is more rigid. The fundamentalist position is supposed to have emerged in reaction to the autocratic potential of the modernist position. Repeatedly in the classical period of Islam, political authorities tended to utilize the flexibility of interpretation in the realm of human affairs for their own interest, silencing dissenting religious voices and interpretations. Practices of abuse including the "Inquisition" by al-Ma'mun in the 9th century led to emergence of the fundamentalism, the rejection of any interpretation. In the colonial and post-colonial contexts and the abuse of power by secularists, as well as the tendency of secularists to often co-opt the modernist position for their own benefits, the fundamentalist position reappeared in opposition to modernists (Esposito 1980).[17]

Fundamentalism recognizes the sovereignty of God and the truth of revelation as unchangeable; moreover, it looks to revelation as the only legitimate source of order and human relations. Moreover, in modern fundamentalist

[17] Sayyid Qutb, often seen as the leading intellectual of the modern movement of political Islam (in both its violent and non-violent forms), is considered to be the most important spokesman for the fundamentalism of the 20th century.

movements, there has been an emphasis on the ability of the believer to distinguish between good and evil that is granted by God and revelation: therefore, the role of the fallibility of human judgement (important in the modernist discourse to argue for reinterpretation in the face of change) is removed under the condition of belief; nevertheless, debates within this position continues regarding the extent to which believers can determine who are unbelievers and how they should be treated (Hoebink 1998). Nonetheless, in the fundamentalist position, a key idea is the line between believer and unbeliever, where the criteria for believer is related to a literal interpretation of the Koran. The only site in which interpretation is possible in the fundamentalist position is exactly regarding what is not explicit in the Koran.

A key source of contention among modernists and (moderate) fundamentalists is regarding the historicity of the Koran, i.e., understanding the Koran to be conditioned by the historical circumstances in which it appeared. The most common position for moderate fundamentalists is that certain parts of the Koran can be understood as not applicable in the modern context because either a) they were to be applicable only under the condition of a perfect Islamic society which has yet to be achieved or b) the requirements for how and when they can be applied that they would rarely be applied in practice. It is via this position that many moderate fundamentalists reject the application of for example the Koranic *hudud* punishments. The modernists on the other hand "maintain that society has developed since the time of the Prophet and for that reason the *hudud*, as well as other social prescriptions in the Koran, have become obsolete in their literal wording (Hoebink 1998: 54)."

The most controversial modernist position commits itself clearly to a historical approach to the Koran. For modernists like Fazlur Rahman (1982), the problem in modern Islam has been its atomistic and ahistorical approach to the Koran: “once Muslims are able to rehistoricize the Koran, draw out the ethical principles behind the particular practices, and reapply these principles specifically to new conditions, the moral foundations of Muslim society will be re-

strengthened". Moreover, for modernists such as Muhammad Arkoun (2000), a historical approach to the Koran "allows for locating and developing the Islamic equivalents of "Western" concepts such as rationality, rights, humanism, freedom and democracy, thus releasing the Muslim consciousness from the polarization between Western secular reason and traditionalist Islam". In the modernist approach then, authenticity is maintained by the method of reinterpretation and the coherence of the Koran and the Sunnah: moreover, it allows for the possibility of possessing "a particular identity and at the same time participate in a universal modernity, to guard Islamic authenticity without locking oneself up in a static Islamic essence (Hoebink 1998: 57)." Secularists[18] reject this argument because they believe that these are binary positions that are irreconcilable: authenticity precludes universal modernity; Islam precludes secularization.

1.3.2.4 Source of religious authority

If the problem of modernity and Western colonization in the 19th and 20th century brought about the modernist movement in Islam with all its competing discourses, globalization has resulted in the pluralisation of religious authority in Islam. Islam has been understood by its practitioners and scholars as a religion that lacks a hierarchical established authority. The only source of religious authority that the community of believers can agree on is that the Koran is important. However, as we have seen above the interpretation of the Koran and its relationship to individuals, communities and political authorities are subject to competing discourses. In spite of this pervasive state of decentralized authority in the history of Muslim communities, Mandaville (2007) argues that pluralisation of religious authority in Islamt today is distinct from its historical condition. He identifies three ways that religious authority in the ummah has been further pluralized in the face of globalization: Functional pluralisation refers to the pluralisation of the reasons for which religious authority is looked to. A key feature of this process is that other forms of authorities are recognized to coexist alongside Islamic authority and this coexistence is not only comfortable but

[18] Key names in this discourse are: Aziz al-Azmeh and Sadiq Glala al-'Azm

potentially profitable for the Islamic life. Functional pluralisation implicates a personalization of faith, where the focus is personal piety and spiritual self-purification, yet it can be oriented towards a collective good (Fuller 2003), a critique of hegemonic Islam (Yacoob 2004) or salafism (Mandaville 2005). Spatial pluralisation refers to the distance and spaces in which one seeks authority or authorization. Islamic authority and authorization is now translocalized--muftis in Algeria may be delivering fatwas over the internet, which are followed by youth in Indonesia. Moreover, there is a general consciousness of the scope of the ummah, where local communities regularly observe and engage with religious authorities and discussions outside of their immediate community or country. In this sense, spatial pluralisation has the potential consequence of intensifying the ties that bind the ummah together.

Finally pluralistic mediatisation refers to the medias (texts, CDs, online forums, television broadcasts) and figures (orators, imams, professionals, *pirs*) through which Muslims seek authority. This includes the fact that religious authority has expanded to "new Islamist intellectuals" (Roy 1994) and lay Muslims (Leonard 2005) without formal religious education who act as authorized speakers of Islam. Moreover, "transnational advocacy networks, organized around themes, issues and shared predicaments rather than local authority figures, provide a mechanism for outsourcing concerns and inquiries beyond the confines of local knowledge and/or norms" and traditional forms of charismatic leadership (Mandaville 2007: 109)." However, and simultaneously, perhaps, the emergence of transnational figure-heads such as Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi reflects a process of creating a standardized and structured source of authority and religious knowledge in the face of the "alienating and heterogenizing effects of globalization (Mandaville 2007: 108)." Therefore pluralistic mediatisation emphasizes both the diversification of the form and kind of leadership as well as the possible consequences of globalization to institutionalize religious authority in Islam.

The significance of these processes of pluralisation of religious knowledge and authority is that Muslim activists and leaders acting in the confines of nation-state boundaries are a) able to claim authority to represent and articulate transformations and critiques of their faith without resorting to traditional forms of authority; b) able to draw on other non-religious discourses as required to complement the requirements of faith and other obligations, such as citizenship; and c) required to respond to a greater degree to the practices of a transnationally imagined ummah and compete with articulations of religious authority located geographically far away.

Based on the discussions in the previous three sections, two hypotheses can be derived regarding how such competing discourses in Islam regarding change, relationship between state and religion, and religious authority will result in divergences in Muslim identity discourses in North America:

> Hypothesis 5: *Muslim activists in North America engaged in the public sphere will tend to draw from the secularist and modernist discourses to varying extents regarding the construction of Muslim citizenship and the negotiation of the competing discourses in liberal democracies on citizenship*: (a) *To the extent that they draw from the modernist discourse, they will emphasize the significance of faith for participation and citizenship; (b) to the extent that they draw from the secularist discourse, they will emphasize the significance of a privatization of faith in the practice of citizenship.* (c) *To those who draw from a secularist discourse, the treatment of women and non-Muslims in Islam, will be a central issue.* (d) *To those who draw from a modernist discourse, the Islamic sources of "Western" values will be emphasized. (Finally, Muslim activists critiquing participation per se will tend to draw from a fundamentalist discourse.)*[19]

[19] I have put this last part in parentheses because it is not exactly tested by my research in this study. Instead, as we will see in the next chapter, the fundamentalist discourse was present explicitly prior to 2000 in the United States, in the form of what Khan (2001) calls the Isolationist movement. However, following a well document process, the fundamentalist discourse lost out

Hypothesis 6: *In such a context of pluralisation of religious authority, one could hypothesize that Muslim activists in North America will be subject to a constant questioning by non-Muslims and Muslims alike, regarding where they derive their authority and the legitimacy of their claims. Moreover, a recurrent site of tension will be what and who Muslim activists are responsible for responding to.*

In the last few pages, I have outlined a set of competing discourse in liberal democratic citizenship and in Islam that Muslim actors face as both constraints and resources in how they negotiate and construct the identity of (American or Canadian) Muslim citizen. Based on the discussion, I have drawn out six hypotheses regarding how these competing discourses will lead to divergences in the positioning of Muslim actors regarding their claims-making about citizenship and faith. These hypotheses underscore an attempt to overcome a significant tendency in the study of citizenship: In their review of the state of research on citizenship and the processes by which new groups negotiate it, Bloemraad et al (2008) point out that scholars focus on one of the four dimensions rather than examine the various ways these dimensions of citizenship interact to produce inclusions and exclusions, equalizations and marginalizations, divergences and convergences in the creation of communities of citizens. By structuring this thesis around hypotheses that take into account the various dimensions of citizenship, as well as dimensions of a political salient identity that actors are trying to mobilize, I hope to be able to show by the conclusion of this study how collective identities are produced through the interactions of these dimensions of citizenship and faith.

In the next section I outline the methodology and research design of this study. I conclude this chapter with an overview of the chapters to follow.

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among the Muslim American leadership. Nevertheless, what we will observe is that the fundamentalist discourse remains an important strawman by which Muslim activists make claims of loyalty and betrayal towards their fellow Muslim citizens.

1.4 Methodology and Research Design

The scope of this study is the set of claims-making in the United States and Canada over the 2001-2008 period by Muslim activist leaders regarding Muslim citizenship. I operationalized claims-making on Muslim citizenship (by Muslim activists) in three ways:

a) Claims-making oriented towards the state regarding rights of Muslims (either in relation to other non-Muslim citizens or Muslim citizens);

b) Presentations of Muslim identity in the media; and

c) Calls for practice of citizenship in Muslim gatherings.

These are claims in the sense that they are all made with an audience in mind, a desire for a response and an understanding that some response is obligated by those against who claims are being made. Moreover, they are claims-making about Muslim citizenship because they are oriented towards the rights, practices and identity dimensions of citizenship and they are repeatedly premised on an *a priori* concept of Muslim identity, although conceptions of Muslim identity are obviously contested. The focus is on the differing claims, presentations and calls being made by Muslim activists in each country.

The population of such claims-making and activists is obviously very wide. I constrain it further to the claims made by Muslim actors that explicitly *choose* to claim a national audience (rather than a local audience) and those actors who have an explicit aim to engage politically the polity of their citizenship. Therefore, while Friday *khutbas* (sermons) in mosques are not part of the population because mosques are centered around the proximate community, CDs widely sold of certain *khutbas* on the upcoming federal elections *are* part of the population because, first, they are not bounded by local community and are being offered by the Muslim actor on a national forum regarding topics; and second, because they are addressing a topic resident in the political sphere. Moreover, while local Muslim organizations are not part of the population, annual national

conventions attempting to attract Muslims from all parts of the country are part of the population. This constraint of national and political scope is motivated by the understanding that citizenship is formally bound to the nation-state and that citizenship refers to the political community. Even in federalist nations such as Canada and the United States, citizenship cannot be granted without consent from the federal state and that the federal state (in the form of Supreme Courts) has the final say in the validity of any variations in the rights of citizens that may exist between states or provinces. Furthermore, the identity dimension of citizenship suggests that localized practices and instances of identification between citizens are necessary but not sufficient for the creation of a citizenship identity for any one group. National narratives of citizenship, engagement with institutions of citizenship at the national level and levels of commitment to pluralism at the national level seem to be required for the production of identification of newcomers to citizenship. This is not to undervalue the significance of citizenship discourses at the local level, but instead to highlight the dynamics at the national level between Muslim activists regarding citizenship and faith. It would be a worthwhile project to examine how local and national level practices link up, but it is not the scope of this study.

1.4.1 Sample of Muslim actors in this study

The sample of Muslim actors (see *Appendix A*) in this study is chosen in two ways: from the ranks of leadership of the major national political advocacy Muslim organizations in Canada and the United States and from those Canadian (or American) Muslim figures that are repeatedly invited to participate in the activities organized by these national level Muslim actors. In particular this study examines the claims-making, presentation and call of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the American Islamic Forum on Democracy (AFID), the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN), the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) and the Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC). These are the leading national

Muslim political organizations in the continent, either in terms of numbers of members or in terms of visibility at the national level in the media.

In addition to the geographical scope of these organizations, the political orientation of this sample covers the political spectrum. Moreover, I also look at the set of speakers that draw the largest crowds in the Islamic Society of North America annual conventions. From both organizational interviews and research done on Muslims, ISNA is seen to be a social and not a political organization. However, the centrality of ISNA in the life of Muslims in both Canada and the United States, and the significant role it has in specially the mapping of faith onto citizenship for the Muslim community has meant that I have included in this study the annual conventions organized by ISNA. African-American Muslim actors are excluded from the study because a literature review suggests that the identity construction and movement dynamics of African-American Muslims have followed a distinct path from the immigrant Muslim population (as we will see in the following chapter) (Leonard 2003). However, if African-American Muslim leaderships are brought into interviews and organizational activities by non-African American Muslim actors, I analyze the impact and variation presented by African-American Muslim leadership on citizenship and faith. To that extent, the final analysis includes the speeches and presentations of several leading African-American Muslim leaders (Sherman Jackson, Imam Wahajj, Imam Zaid Shakir), obviously restricted to the national and political constraints discussed above.

1.4.3 Qualitative Methodological Strategy

The research goals and questions of this study are exploratory in nature, searching for the ways identities are constructed by individuals and organizations mobilizing claims about citizenship and faith. The emphasis is upon being able to scrutinize closely and intimately the meanings attributed to identities and actions and the negotiations by which such meanings are constructed and experienced by agents. In this project then, the primary focus is the "meanings, variations and perceptual experiences of the phenomena (Crabtree and Miller 1992: 6)." As a result, the research design of this project is qualitative and comparative.

The qualitative methodological strategy in this study is constituted by: 1) semi-structured interviews; 2) non-participant observation; and 3) analysis of primary literature and documentation produced by actors in this study.

1.4.3.1 Interviews

Between May 2007 and May 2009, a total of 31 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with various Muslim leaders at various locations in the United States and Canada, each interview averaging one hour (*see Appendix A*). The interviews were geared toward understanding from the actor's point of view the strategic dimensions of claims made by their organization and its goals, as well as to draw out the ideological and religious positions of the organizations, along with the socio-demographic and activist backgrounds of the leadership of these actors. The interview guides can be found in *Appendix B.* Access to actors were gained by either a) through e-mail requests for interviews, b) referrals by interviewees or other contacts in the community, c) meetings in events or forums in which subjects were present and where I directly requested for interviews. Interviews were conducted in-person or through the phone. Follow-ups of interviews were conducted when required, in-person, through phone or via e-mail. All interviews, except one (at the request of the interviewee), were digitally recorded and signed consent forms were acquired for all interviewees (see *Appendix C* for the consent forms that respondents had to sign).

1.4.3.2 Non-Participant Observation

In addition to interviews, a set of non-participant observation of various forms of meetings was undertaken. I have looked at the annual conventions organized by these actors, including ISNA over the 2001-2008 period. I have observed by either direct participant observation or recordings of the following conventions: ISNA-Canada 2007, ISNA 2007 and 2008; CIC 2007 and 2008 (in both Quebec and Ontario); MPAC 2005-2008; CAIR 2007. Moreover, for those that were not available for viewing, I have examined their programs, archived by these organizations, to record themes of conventions and subthemes of sessions.

The MCC and the AFID do not hold annual conventions. However, I have been able to examine in detail the forum in which they "gather" regularly, i.e., their online discussion group.

1.4.3.3 Primary Documentation

Finally, the research and analysis presented in this study also draws from primary documentation produced by the organizations and actors in this study. The materials documented in this study are three fold (*see Appendix D*). Regarding claims-making towards the state, I examined press-releases of the organizations that explicitly involved a claim directed to the state. Regarding presentations of Muslim identity in the media, I documented all op-ed articles written by Muslims leaders of these organizations in national newspapers (The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, The Globe and Mail, the National Post), and media appearances by these actors in national level programs. I also looked at a sample of major books and/or CDs by some of the activists in this study. Each document has been analyzed for 1) Who is the audience of the document? 2) What is the purpose of the document? 3) What are the primary modes of justification in the argument? 4) What is the argumentative position of the document? 5) Who is the author of the document? 6) Who is the document trying to represent? For the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th questions, the document is further analyzed for how and when Islamic discourses (traditionalist, modernist, secularist) are referenced, how and when citizenship discourses (regarding rights, practices, identity) are referenced and how and when the nation (America or Canada) are referenced. For greater detail on the coding and analysis of these materials, I refer you to *Appendix D*.

1.4.4 Comparative Framework

The comparative framework operates in two ways in this study: over time and over space. Both axes serve as proxies for examining changes, variations and continuities in political, discursive and organizational contexts in which collective identity claims-making are occurring. Temporally, the attacks of 9-11 placed Muslim citizenship and claims around it in the public sphere. Crisis moments are

ideal for bringing in latent tensions to the foreground and therefore, I utilize this time frame as an important opportunity to observe the way Muslim activists are negotiating the competing discourses on citizenship around their faith identity. I choose to start this study at the beginning of 2001 to observe the status of Muslim citizenship prior to the attacks and follow it dynamically through the following seven years to determine how conversations in the Muslim community changed (or remained the same) regarding Muslim citizenship.

Spatially, there are multiple advantages and motivations to studying claims-making about Muslim citizenship in the North American context. It focuses on the United States and Canada because as I stated at the beginning of this chapter: The immense scope of cultural diversity among North American Muslim communities make them a unique case in the Muslim world: either as majorities or minorities, there are no equivalently diverse Muslim communities living as fellow citizens. It is this feature of North American Muslims which make them of particular interest in the study of the processes by which Muslim citizenship is negotiated. While the proportions of Muslims living in Britain, France and Germany are greater than the proportions in the United States and Canada, Muslim populations in the European nations tend to be homogenous regarding their ethnic background (South Asian in Britain, North African in France, and Turkish in Germany); moreover, the socio-economic status in North American of Muslims is also more varied, particularly in the United States, than in Europe, where the great majority of Muslim citizens in the European countries tend to be from poorer socio-economic backgrounds. Homogeneities in ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds in the European case make it easy to cofound cultural and socio-economic factors with a Muslim identity. In the North American case, the heterogeneity magnifies the interactions, negotiations and challenges that characterize attempts to link citizenship and faith and construct Muslim citizenship. However, as comparative research have made clear, the actual constellations by which polities function matter significantly for social movement and citizenship outcomes (McAdam et al 1996). Thus, the choice of studying Muslim claims-making in two connected but distinct polities, the United

States and Canada, also allows me to analyze if, and if so, how such differences in practice result in variations and divergences, as well as what leads to commonalities.

1.5 Overview of following chapters

In this chapter, I have proposed that theories of collective identity, social movements and citizenship suggest that claims-making surrounding citizenship and faith can be expected to be shaped by political and discursive contexts, actor biographies, and interactions between claims-makers and with other political actors. I then outlined that Muslim leaders and activists, as new citizens of minority faiths in liberal democracies, face the three sets of competing discourses regarding citizenship, which I have drawn out in detail above. I then described that in addition to these competing discourses, Muslim actors also face the various tensions in Islam regarding change, secularism, and authority. The tensions identified in citizenship and Islam helped me to draw out six hypotheses about the fault lines along which Muslim identity discourses should be expected to diverge around. I concluded this chapter with the methodology utilized for the analysis in this study, describing the sample of individuals, organizations, material and documentation used here, explaining why the focus here will be on Canadian and American Muslim leadership, and stating the significance of having a longitudinal perspective, one that includes 9-11 as a transformative event.

Taking off from this, the next chapter describes the evolution of Muslim identity discourses on citizenship and faith prior to 9/11. It starts with a review of four sets of historical and contemporary contexts that have shaped the way that Muslim citizenship was constructed until September 11 2001: the demographic patterns of four waves of Muslim immigration to North America; the particular presence of African-American Muslims, other converts, and the coming of age of a second-generation; the significance of the *fiqh*[20] of minorities and its

[20] As by way of introduction, fiqh is the traditional sciences of legal methodology and jurisprudence in Islam.. As explained in the Glossary section of *Shaping the Current Islamic Reformation* (2003): "It is the academic commentary on and determination of the shari'a that evolved into a number of different understandings of the sacred sources. It is the study and

consequence for the struggle between isolationists and democrat Muslims; and the example of Muslim others, especially in Europe. In the third chapter, I then move on to describe the new Muslim actors that emerge in the wake of 9-11: progressives, secularists and liberals. I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the responses in the mainstream Muslim leadership to these new voices and the changing political climate. In chapter 4, I take on the six hypotheses to examine how they hold up as I delineate the various ways faith and citizenship link up in the face of this transformative event for the different Muslim identity discourses, both mainstream and oppositional.

The next two chapters borrow two insights from social movement theories to complete the second task of this study. Thus, in the fifth chapter, I utilize the framework of political opportunity structures to explain variation in the dynamics between Muslim actors in Canada vs. the United States. I analyze how variations in institutions of citizenship, multiculturalism, and secularism, along with differences in the immediate political context in Canada and the United States have resulted in a greater degree of polarization among mainstream vs. oppositional Muslim actors in Canada and a greater degree of nationalization of American Muslim identity discourses. In the sixth chapter, I examine the role of identity politics and the problematic place of transnationality in liberal democratic states to understand how differences in Muslim communities become mobilized as divergences regarding citizenship, nation and faith in the public sphere. I conclude this study with a summary of this study along with a discussion about some possible implications that these study on Muslim identity discourses on citizenship and faith have for liberal democratic theory on citizenship and identity politics.

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interpretation of the sacred sources which formed the purpose of the law schools or *madhhahibs*. It covers all aspects of public and private life as well as business. It is the result of human reason and is not divine law."

Chapter 2: Choosing to Become Citizens and Transforming Faith into Citizenship prior to 9/11

This, then, is the manifest destiny of American Muslims: to demonstrate to the rest of the world the relevance of Islamic values to a modern/post-modern existence. By interpreting Islam in such a way that it facilitates a virtuous existence, here and now, American Muslims can convince the West that Islam will only serve to enrich it further.

--Muqtedar Khan, "The Manifest Destiny of American Muslims", *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,* December 2000, p.g68

From self-preservation in the early years manifest in the formation of local community associations to identity revolving around the mosque, Muslims are finally seeking to establish themselves as a cohesive community. The community is only beginning to advance as an entity in the country's educational, social and political institutions. Just fifteen years ago, it was not easy for Muslims to find an elected representative to come to their functions. Today, thanks to the Honourable Dan McTeague, we are able to exchange information and ideas with so many of you in the hallowed halls of this great institution where you guide the destiny of the country our ancestors helped build and cherished, the country of our choice and the country we love.

--Daood Hamdani, "Canada's Muslims: An unnoticed part of our history", *Address on the occasion of Eid-al-Adha at the Parliament Building, Ottawa,* May 2, 1996

As we saw in the methodology section of the last chapter, compared to the Muslim population in other liberal democracies, the Muslim population in North America is smaller in proportion to the non-Muslim population *and* it is a more ethnically and religiously diverse, generally more educated and economically better-off population (Leonard 2003). Given the diversities that have constituted the Muslim population in North American, efforts to build and mobilize a discourse on *Muslim* citizenship and *Muslim* citizens have meant debates about which religious practices, political causes constitute Muslim identity and Muslim obligation. Well before 2001, Muslim actors in North America were involved in the process of building a Muslim identity that overcame the challenges posed by the diversities in the community. In this chapter, using extant literature on

Muslims in the United States and Canada, I will present the historical background of Muslims in the United States and Canada and the demographic, religious, and transnational context in which Muslim identity discourses on citizenship and faith emerged in North America before September 11 2001. Here, I analyze how four key historical contexts have shaped the progression of Muslims and Islam into the discourse of citizenship in North America, prior to the attacks of 2001: the waves of immigration by Muslims; the presence of African-American Muslims and converts; the significance of the *fiqh* of minorities and its consequences for the struggle between isolationist and democrat Muslims, and the example of Muslim others, especially in Europe and the Middle East.

While this chapter discusses variations between Canadian and American Muslim histories, when appropriate and significant, the focus in this chapter is on the *common* trends faced by Muslim leadership in the United States and Canada and where the Muslim leadership stood at the eve of 9-11. The shared context in the development of Muslim identity discourse, has been shaped by the facts that: 1) while initial attempts at organization by Muslims occurred in the United States, it was under an explicit and self-identified banner of a North American Muslim identity; 2) as a result, organizational leaders and religious figures of the Muslim community in each country are shared across the two nations; and 3) immigration patterns and policies, central in specially affecting the population numbers of the North American Muslim communities, of Canada and the United States, albeit with significant differences, have also paralleled each other.

2.1 A General Demographic Portrait of Muslims in North America

For Muslim leaders working to represent, mobilize, and redeem Muslim communities in North America, the most basic question is, what does this constituency look like, demographically speaking? This section presents the demographic structure of Muslims in Canada and the United States, primarily focusing on the picture before 2001, mainly due to constraints of data. The next two sections describe the major processes by which a Muslim population has established itself in North America, namely Muslim *immigration* to North

America, *conversion*, especially among the African-American population, and *transmission* of religious beliefs and practices to the next generation. While these discussions will point out the emergence of some central organizations and leaders among the Muslim population, it is in the sections on the *fiqh* of minorities and the example of Muslim others, that I will detail the organizational and leadership context regarding citizenship and faith prior to 9/11.

According to the most recent census conducted in 2001, there are 579,640 Muslims in Canada, thus making them at that time 1.95% of the Canadian population (Statistics Canada, see *Table 2.1*).[21] They are the fastest growing religious group in the country, and they are concentrated mainly in the provinces of Ontario and Québec (*Figure 2.1*), with the largest concentrations being in: Toronto (over 5%), Vancouver (3%) and Montreal (3%) (Statistics Canada, Census 2001); 67.7% of Muslims in Canada are Canadian citizens, 80% of Canadian Muslims are under the age of 45, 86% of Muslims in Canada are identified as visible minority with the largest group being South Asian Muslims (37% of the Muslim Canadian population); 28% of Canadian Muslims have a bachelor's degree or higher; and 91.42% of Canadian Muslims are 1st generation Canadians (*Figures 2.2a-e).*[22]

Relative to the general Canadian public, Canadian Muslims have lower rates of employment, even though their participation rates are similar: the unemployment rate among Muslims in Canada is twice as high as the unemployment rate in general public (Census 2001, Statistics Canada). Even though Statistics Canada has not released information of income by religious group, according to the nationally representative Ethnic Diversity Survey 2004,

[21] Canadian censuses have recorded the religious affiliation of Canadians since the first national census in 1871. Islam was an identified category in this first census and remained so until 1941, at which point it was dropped. It was brought back to the census in 1981 as a result of advocacy work on the part of Daood Hassan Hamdani, on behalf of the Council of Muslim Communities of Canada, who was also working in Statistics Canada at that point (Hamdani 1999).

[22] Zohra Husaini's analysis of the 1981 Canada Census revealed that "at the university level, the percentage of Muslims is twice as high as that of the other immigrants and close to three times as high as the total Canadian population (1990: 10)." In Figure 2. 2d, based on the 2001 Census, we see that rate of holding an undergraduate degree or higher is greater among Canadian Muslims (28%), compared to the Canadian public (15%).

Muslims, on average, tend to be less well-off compared to the general public (*Figure 2.2f*) (see also Hamdani 1999). However compared to Muslims in other liberal democracies (France, Britain, Germany and Spain), the difference between Muslims and national publics is significantly less in Canada than in Europe (Nesbitt-Larking 2007); as we will see though, the difference is higher than in the US (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006). Nevertheless, the inequalities of income and employment, despite the higher rates of educational and professional background of Muslim Canadians, have been, both prior to 2001 and since then, used by Canadian Muslim actors as evidence of discrimination against Muslims and thus cause for mobilization by Muslims to make claims on the state and the public.

Regarding religious information, there is less detail available: thus we have no national level information on what proportion of these Muslims are converts and non-converts and what proportion of Muslims are Sunni, Shi'i, Ismaili, Ahmadiyan and of other Muslim persuasions. Ahmad (1993) and Karim (2002) indicate that while the Sunni community is the largest, the most socially and politically organized community is the Ismaili Muslim community in Canada.[23] Based on the Ethnic Diversity Survey done in 2004 by Statistics Canada, 62.85% of Muslims in Canada rated their religion as "Very Important" to their identity on a scale of 5, and 5.78% rated their religion as "Not important at all". For those who regard religious identity to be "Very Important", there is no significant difference between first generation Canadian Muslims (63.15%) and second generation Canadian Muslims (62.34%). However, a greater proportion of second generation Canadian Muslims rated religious identity to be important (91.77%) compared to 85.47% of 1st generation Canadian Muslims. This matches

[23] The organizational level of the latter group is in part shaped by the hierarchical structure of religious authority in the Ismaili sect. The status of Ismaili Muslims is significantly different compared to other Muslims in both the Muslim community and the general public—Ismailis are considered to be much more integrated to the Canadian population. Relations between mainstream Muslim Canadian actors and Ismaili Canadian actors have often been tense or limited, although, as we will see in the next chapter, the post-9/11 oppositional Muslim voices have criticized this dynamic, suggesting that a significant part of the non-Ismaili Muslim population is exclusive of Ismailis (along with other non-Sunni/Shi'ite groups).

up with organizational leaders' perceptions in the post-9/11 context[24] and some scholarly research that there is a greater tendency, on average, by the second-generation to place importance in their Muslim identity compared to their parents (Karim 2009; Zine 2007). Although it is important to keep in mind that since these results are based on research conducted after the 2001 attacks and no such comparable data exists for the pre-9/11 period, it is difficult to determine whether this difference reflects a generational difference or reflects the consequences of the attacks of 9/11 and the politicization of Muslim identity in the Canadian (and global) public sphere. In fact, research conducted prior to 2001 suggests that Muslim community leaders were responding to a concern about the lack of religious identity in its youth (Yousif 1993; Husaini 1990; Rashad 1985; Haddad 1978).

In the American case, drawing the demographic picture is more difficult. The reason for this has been that determining the number of Muslims in North America at any point in time has been complicated by the fact that the American government does not keep track of information on religion of citizens and immigrants, neither in its census nor in its immigration and naturalization documentation. The estimates for Muslim Americans vary wildly, ranging from just over two million to seven million (see *Tables 2.2a-b*). Most studies suggest that the Muslim population in the United States is towards the lower end of the range, implying that Muslims constitute less than 1% of the American population: These estimations have come from several major nation-wide attempts at estimating the Muslim American population: The higher end of the approximation comes from the study conducted by the Hartford Institute for Religions Research. It led a survey in 2001 of all Muslim mosques which suggested that there were 2 million mosque-affiliated Muslims which implicated, according to the researchers, a total Muslim population of 6-7 million in the US. The study was in part supported by the Council on American-Islamic Relations and this is the preferred number by most Muslim organizations in the United States, which

[24] Elmasry, Mohamed. Interview. November 15 2006. Vancouver, Canada. Interview: August 29, 2007, Ottawa, Canada. Fatah, Tarek, Interview, Toronto: May 27th 2007

would suggest that the proportion of Muslim Americans is similar to the proportion of Muslim Canadians, approximately 2%. Many scholars of American Muslims prefer this number over the lower number, as we can see in the edited work of *Muslims in the Public Square* (2003). In contrast, Tom W. Smith, director of the GSS, suggested Muslims made up about 0.5% of the American population based on a review of all national polls and surveys between 1996 and 2001 on Muslims (2002). According to the Pew Muslim American study, Muslims are 0.6% of the US adult population, i.e., 1.4 million Muslims 18 years old and over living in the US (2007). Pew Hispanic Center demographer, Jeffrey Passel, in a separate study, using the Pew Muslim American study data as well as information from the US Census Bureau on nativity and nationality, estimated that there are 2.35 Muslims nationwide, including both adults and those under eighteen.

Based on the Pew Muslim American Study[25] (of those aged 18 years or more), 77% of Muslims in American have American citizenship, 87% of Muslims in America are under the age of 55, 62% of Muslims in America identified their race as non-white (16% as Black and 20% as Asian); 24% of Muslims in America hold a bachelor's degree or higher; and 15% of American Muslims are 2nd/3rd generation Americans (2007, see *Figures 2.2a-e*). In contrast, most studies tend to estimate a higher proportion of black Muslims than the Pew, some studies going towards 42% of American Muslims, others advocating towards over 35%. Although surveys tend to collapse Arab and South Asian Muslims into Asian Muslims, studies which have documented national origins suggest that Arab Muslims constitute the largest Muslim group among non-African-American Muslims (Leonard 2003; 2002). Moreover, the effect of some Arabs and South

[25] Based on the Gallup survey conducted by the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies in 2008 and the findings of which were released by the Muslim West Facts Project in 2009, these numbers differ, although overall the structure of the demographic picture remains the same. I have presented the specific numbers from the Pew Study regarding demographic information about Muslim Americans mainly because the focus of the study had been native and immigrant Muslim Americans. In contrast, the Gallup study focused on the entire US population to compare the various religious groups, including Muslim Americans. One weakness of the Pew study is that it only covered landlines, while Gallup covered both landlines and cell phones in its sampling process. Nevertheless, like I said, the structure of the demographic picture from both studies remains the same.

Asians identifying themselves as white in terms of race also makes the accounting of ethnic origin and race challenging (Kurian 2006; Leonard 2002)[26]. Given these variations in numbers, it is difficult to assert more than the fact that the majority of Muslims tend to be non-White and that a significant proportion of the non-White Muslims tend to identify themselves as black. However, what is perhaps more interesting from an organizational and collective action perspective is that leaders of respective communities tend to perceive the numbers of their constituencies towards the higher end of the range and this makes all the difference in the way these social actors choose to interact with outsiders and insiders.

Relative to the general American public, American Muslims have lower rates of full-time employment and higher rates of part-time employment; the percentage of Muslims who are not employed in the US is similar to the proportion in the general public (Pew Research Center 2007). On average, American Muslims have lower incomes compared to the general public, although the income disparity is smaller than that observed in Canada (*Figure 2.2f*). It is important to note that there are significant differences among the various ethnic groups in the Muslim American community: The Gallup survey conducted by the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies in 2008 found that employment and educational patterns among different racial groups in the Muslim American community reflect racial disparities in the general American population, with Asian American Muslims faring the best in terms of socio-economic variables and African-American Muslims faring the worst falling somewhere in between (Muslim West Facts Project 2009). In terms of religiosity, the same pattern that we saw in the Canadian case, of the younger and second-generation placing importance of religious identity (60%) than the first-generation and older groups (41%) shows up (Pew Research Center 2007). However, as in the Canadian case, the question of whether this was similar before 9/11 remains; research prior to 2001 suggests

[26] As I discuss in the section on African-American Muslims, the choice and possibility of some Muslims to identify themselves as white in the American context has created tensions between the African-American Muslim community and non-African-American Muslim communities.

that organizational mobilization in part was concerned with creating a religious identity in the youth (Leonard 2003), and that perhaps the significant difference between the second and first-generation in the centrality of religious identity speaks to the success of organizational efforts.

These descriptives of the Muslim population in the States and Canada are important for several reasons. Social scientists have often emphasised the importance of documenting demographic structure of communities as a first step to understanding social patterns and behaviours on the assumption that demographic variables are proxies for social structural processes (Teitelbaum 2005). They have also understood that demographic pictures are discursive resources for collective action actors and states, ways to legitimize claims, policies and actions and weave narratives about identity. The claiming and reporting of demographic quantities are, social scientists have pointed out, exercises in power since measuring demographic variables of groups are ways to identify what identities and variables are considered relevant (and legitimate) (Teitelbaum 2005). The quality of measures available also shapes the kind of debates that ensue between various social actors. For example, in the Canadian case, the availability of numbers around which there is consensus has meant that disputes have been centered on the interpretation of these facts and their implications.[27] In the American case, the lack of numbers around which there is consensus has meant that differentiated methods have been used to produce numbers that support various (and often opposing) positions and interests.

The significance of the politics of demographic facts about Muslim Canadians or Muslim Americans for identity discourses can be seen at many levels: For example, the high rate of growth of the Canadian Muslim population has been seen by Muslim Canadian actors as a legitimizing factor in their claims-making, underscoring the importance of this demographic group in the political

[27] Even in the Canadian case, the fact that census counting religious affiliation is taken only every 10 years, has meant that there have been debates in the in-between periods about how many Muslims. See the next note in one example of the implications of such debates for claims-makers.

and social landscape of Canada's future (Hamdani 1999).[28] It has also, in the post-9/11 context, been utilized against the Muslim community as a threat to Canadian identity, generating spectres of the Muslim masses taking over Canadian culture (e.g. see, Stein 2006). In the American case, the debate about just how many Muslims there are has led to some American Muslim activists pointing out that the tendency to underestimate the size of the Muslim population reflects prejudice against Muslims; their opponents in turn accuse the tendency of some to overestimate the size as a dishonest political strategy to exert unwarranted influence.

Thus, demographic patterns can be used to justify action against inequalities, correct racist discourses by providing evidence for inclusion or defying stereotypes, or support racist discourses by providing evidence for exclusion or reifying stereotypes. Muslim actors in North America are very aware of the politics of demographics: Hamdani, a prominent actor in the Muslim Canadian community, writes that apart from planning for the future and serving its own constituencies, compiling demographic information is needed "to dismantle the stereotypes that the North American society has built of Muslims (1999: 198)". It is further evident in the significant amount of resources that many Muslim actors in North America have spent in conducting surveys and taking polls, specially in the 1990s, which as we will see was when the

[28] It is actually interesting to note the claims-making history of this. In the 1990s, in their attempts to impress upon the Canadian public the importance of the Muslim Canadian community, Canadian Muslim actors took on an initiative to estimate the Canadian Muslim population. While the 1991 census had an available and reliable number, the effort was taken on without much knowledge of the census and also the perception that the rate of the growth in the Muslim community was making the 1991 number less relevant. Hamdani (1999), a prominent Canadian Muslim actor and one who has worked for Statistics Canada, describes in his article "Canadian Muslims on the eve of the 21st century" what happened as a result of their efforts. He points out that, some Muslim actors put the population of Canadian Muslims in 1996 at 1.3 million through the use of faulty methodology and inaccurate information. The estimate "failed scrutiny... [and] the news media and public officials resorted to citing the 1991 census count which was becoming more and more irrelevant with every year that passed because of the phenomenal growth in the community...The result was that instead of acquiring political muscle, which was the intended purpose of inflated figures, Muslims came to be regarded as a much smaller community than they actually were (1999: 199)." However, he continues, this was not the most significant loss. The worst consequence of this was that it "snatched away from the Muslims, at least for the time being, the most effective weapon against stereotyping—credibility—and deprived them of the opportunity to establish themselves as an informed and authentic voice (199)."

importance and legitimacy of political participation became the predominant discourse on citizenship and faith among Muslim leaders. [29] These efforts to capture the picture of what the Muslim community looks like socio-economically and culturally constitute a key action in the mobilization of a Muslim identity. Part of that picture has included narratives about origins—where do the Muslim communities come from in North America. In the next two sections, I discuss two important trends that have shaped Muslim identity discourses about their origins and their implications for citizenship identity.

2.2 Waves of Muslim Immigration and Variations in Citizenship and Religious Contexts

Presence of Islam and Muslims in North America has generally been examined in a two-fold way: that of African-American Muslims and converts and that of *non*-African-American Muslims[30]. I will discuss African-American Muslims and converts in the next section. The immigration of non-indigenous Muslims has occurred in four distinct waves (Karim 2002; Smith 1999; Hamdani 1997; Abu-Laban 1983). The first wave took place during 1875-1912 and the second wave took place in the wake of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, after

[29] For example: In 1959, the Federation of Islamic Associations in America conducted a survey to determine the number of households affiliated with the FIAA (Ba-Hunus and Kone 2004). The Muslim Research Foundation in Edmonton commissioned Zohra Husaini to publish a report in 1990 on the Muslim community in Canada. CAIR and CAIR-CAN have both since their respective founding dates, conducted and published annual surveys describing the demographic characteristics of the community and instances of civil rights violations. The CIC has published reports and analysis based on census data from its start. The AMC conducted a survey in 1992 to estimate the American Muslim population. CAIR had endorsed the Hartford Institute for Religions Research survey on American Muslims.

[30] A relatively new trend that is becoming part of common usage in both the Muslim and non-Muslim communities in the United States is to refer to African-American Muslims as indigenous Muslims and non--African-American Muslims as non-indigenous Muslims (Leonard 2003). While I will use all of these terms throughout this study because of their common usage, it is important to point out that there is debate about whether these terms are appropriate or not. For example, Samory Rashid (Political Science, Indiana University) published several articles between 1999 and 2000 critiquing the usage of the term "indigenous Muslims" for African-American Muslims because 1) in the Qur'an itself a distinction between immigrant and indigenous does not exist, 2) the Islamic vision of *al-ummah* (the Muslim community) is unitary and global, not national, racial or ethnic and 3) scholars using these terms have tended to minimize the influence of African American Muslims (Rashid 1999).

World War I. The population of Muslims immigrating during these two waves are not known clearly (Ba-Yunus and Kone 2004).[31] From various studies of descendants of these immigrants, it has been traced that they mainly worked as "peddlers or laborers in manufacturing plants, settling at first in New York, and then migrating to the Midwest (Nyang 2009: 19)." Moreover, it is known that they were primarily from the Middle East (often mainly from Syria and Lebanon), and some from Eastern Europe and only a small number of them established and attempted to maintain Islamic/Muslim institutions or practices (Smith 1999). Nevertheless, twenty mosques were established during these two waves and the central purpose of these mosques was concerned with preserving cultural values (Lawrence 1999): In the United States, the first continuing mosque was completed in 1934, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa (Smith 1999)[32]; in Canada, the first mosque was completed in 1938 in Edmonton (Yousif 1993). Another part of this wave included Muslim Punjabis imported as farm labourers in British Columbia during the mid-19th century, some of who then moved south to Stockton valley of California (Alam 1968)[33]. 'The Punjabi presence on the West Coast resulted in the creation of a new ethnic group in American society, which scholars who write about South Asian Muslims have come to identify s Punjabi Mexicans...these Muslims worked on the agricultural lands of the West Coast and many took Chicana wives among the Mexicans... [These Muslims] increasingly entered the American mainstream and many...would become medical doctors, engineers, and scientists (Nyang 2009: 19)." However, overall, these first two waves of Muslims

[31] According to the Canadian Census, 13 Muslims were recorded in 1871 and 645 in 1931 (see *Table 1*).[31] In the United States, the numbers suggest that about 10% of incoming immigrants at that time were coming from countries where the majority population were Muslim (Ba-Yunus and Kone 2004; Nyang 1999). However, what percentage of these immigrants were actually Muslim is not reliably known (Smith 1999).

[32] The mosque in Cedar Rapids is considered by many North American Muslims to be the "Mother mosque" (Smith 1999). This is true in the sense that it is the oldest mosque in North America that is still in use. Prior to 1934, Muslims in America had established other mosques, but none have continued to be used up to the present day. The earliest record of a mosque built by immigrant Muslims is in 1915 in Maine by Albanian Muslims.

[33] Hindu, Sikh and Muslim Punjabis entered BC as indentured labourers. What proportion of these Punjabis were Muslim is not well-known, but current concentrations of Muslims with this heritage suggest the proportion was significant. Note: The Punjab region, today, is located across (North Western) India and (Eastern) Pakistan. At that point in time, India was still under British rule and these labourers were part of the larger indentured labourer migrations that occurred between India and parts of the British Empire (West Indies, Eastern Africa and Canada).

were characterized by immigrants that were made up of mainly blue-collar or rural labourers, with little education and rural backgrounds. Some of these immigrants, over time, established small businesses—often in ethnic neighbourhoods (Ba-Ynus and Kone 2004).

In the post-World War II period, a third wave of Muslims immigrants arrived to North America, from Eastern Europe, Soviet republics and the Indian subcontinent. This wave, lasting up to the 1960s, saw the beginning of immigration of more educated and urbanized Muslims. Unlike the first two waves, where most Muslim immigrants to North America were economic migrants (and sometimes political refugees), in the third wave most Muslim immigrants were students. This wave also coincided with the rise of the civil rights movement and Islam entering the American public sphere in the form of the Nation of Islam movement and the leadership of Malcolm X, which I will discuss below. At the end of this wave, Muslim immigrants started establishing social organizations in addition to religious ones. The most important of these establishments were the Federation of Islamic Associations founded in 1953, by Lebanese immigrants in Canada, the Canadian Society of Muslims found in the 1960s in Toronto by Dr. M. Qadeer Baig, and the Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada, founded by Muslim students studying in the States in 1963 in Illinois, which spread across university campuses in the two countries over the next few decades. Founded by a conference of Muslim students from Canada and the United States, its vision at that moment was to cater to Muslim students in university campuses regarding space for prayer and finding a community to share in religious practices and foreign student life. The centrality of students in the third wave was a consequence of Cold War immigration policies in the US and Canada, which were competing with the Soviet Union regarding importation of students at the post-secondary level (Nyang 2009).

This trend of education-motivated immigration continued into the last wave, which started starting in the late 60s; however, in this fourth wave, economic migrants among Muslim immigration to the States and Canada also

took off--resulting in an influx of educated, urbanized professionals in the last wave. While educational background separates the first two waves from the last two waves, political contexts of origin countries separate the first three waves from the last wave: The first three waves were generally characterized by immigrants from religiously observant societies where political authorities reinforced religious institutions. The next and last wave saw, instead, the immigration of many religiously minded and social activist immigrants, who were leaving authoritarian societies enforcing secularism, often brutally (Smith 1999; Haddad 1987). The two important exceptions to this trend are Iranian Muslims (after the Iranian Revolution) and Pakistani Muslims (during and after General Huq) who were leaving states that were enforcing religion, again often brutally, and retracting secularism.

In addition, the last wave saw greater rates of familial immigration among Muslims, although due to differences in immigration policies the rate of familial immigration is lower in Canada than in the States (Karim 2002): the first three waves were often characterized by single Muslim men immigrating to North America or married men bringing in their families much later on; in contrast, the fourth wave has generally been characterized by families immigrating as a whole (Lawrence 1999). As immigrants of the third wave started to settle in and create families, and as the number of Muslim families increased due to the fourth wave, Muslim communities started to build not only more religious institutions such as mosques, but also social institutions, the most important being the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA, f. 1971) which was led by Pakistani immigrants and located in New York and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA, f.1982), located in Plainfield, Indiana, which was established by MSA leaders recognizing the need for an institution for Muslim families, outside of the student context (Leonard 2003).

This fourth wave, starting in the late 1960s and continuing up to the events of 9/11, is the largest (and the difference is even more pronounced in the Canadian context) and the rate of Muslim immigration has grown exponentially in

this fourth wave (*Figure 2.3*). The largest groups of immigrant Muslims in this period in both countries, during 1970s and 1980s particularly, came from three South Asian countries, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, overtaking the Arab Muslim immigration (Leonard 2002). It is worth noting that the percentage of Muslims immigrating to Canada in the 1991-2001 period is twice the percentage in the 1981-1990 period (*Figure 2.3)*: this implies that both for the Muslim community and the Canadian public, the increase in Muslim immigrants is both dramatic and relatively recent. In contrast, in the American case, while the rates have definitely increased over the years, the trend is less dramatic and spread out over a greater period of time. As a result, the Canadian Muslim community have a leadership and a constituency that are much more new to the Canadian context than the American Muslim community. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the fourth wave has been made up of mainly professionals in health and applied sciences, mainly from the South Asian, North African and Middle Eastern regions, who have taken up positions as doctors, engineers, computer scientists; in addition, a significant proportion of Muslim immigrants in this wave have also established small businesses (Ba-Yunus and Kone 2004).

However, this broad characterization obscures from view some important variations within Muslim immigrants in this last wave: a) In addition to the flux of professionalized and urbanized Muslim immigrants that characterizes this wave, there has been increasing rates of Muslims fleeing political turmoil and war in their countries of origin. This latter kind of immigration has originated mainly from Africa (Somalia and Sudan), Eastern Europe (the former Yugoslavia), South Asia (Afghanistan and Bangladesh), and the Middle East (Palestine and Israel, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran). Those leaving because of political conflict have often arrived by seeking asylum or through refugee status: although, as we saw in the introductory chapter, the relationship to citizenship of individuals and groups arriving as refugees is distinct from those arriving as voluntary immigrants, including those seeking political asylum. b) Even among those Muslims arriving as voluntary immigrants, over the last two decades, there have been an increasing number of Muslim immigrants coming from lower socio-economic background

than those who arrived as students or as professionals in the 1970s and 1980s. c) Also, among voluntary immigrants, there has been an increase in immigration lowering socio-economic status of individuals, the most common being of the shift from professional (in country of origin) to service worker (in country of destination)--this being more pronounced in Canada than the United States.

The attacks of 9-11 could be a threshold in which a fifth wave could be distinguished (Abu-Laban 2004). However, it is still too early, given the lack of data, to determine to what extent Muslim immigration may have been impacted since 9-11. According to the US Department of Homeland Security, immigration from Muslim countries to the US declined between 2001 and 2003 and started climbing back up since 2004. Whether these immigrants were Muslims or non-Muslims is not known since both the US and Canadian governments do not keep track of information regarding religion. There have been rhetoric and speculation suggesting that fewer Muslims would be interested in immigration to North America (particularly to the United States) or that fewer Muslims would be admitted to North America (again, particularly to the US). To what extent Muslim immigration has declined for either of these posited reasons will have to be evaluated in the future, when more data becomes available.

Nevertheless, the review above reveals the various dimensions of diversity which constitutes the Muslim community in North America: ethnic (South Asian, Arab, Slavic, Southeast Asian), racial (black, non-black, white), socio-economic status, and experience with the political sphere: authoritarian dictatorships (Iraq and Tunisia), theocracies (Iran), democracies (India and Lebanon), as well as those societies which have alternated between all forms (Pakistan). Moreover, while many came as economic migrants (especially in the last wave), others came as political and religious refugees—fleeing civil war (Somalia, Bosnia, Lebanon), political persecution (Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Pakistan). Moreover, the Muslim constituencies in North America are constituted by first-generation Muslims (i.e., converts), first-generation Americans (i.e., immigrant Muslims) and second and

third (and even) fourth generation American Muslims (i.e., children of immigrant Muslims).

In the context of this extensive diversity, one of the key challenges for Muslim leadership and Muslim citizenship has been the forging of a Muslim identity not circumscribed by ethnic and national identities of Muslim immigrants. Thus, the first level of evolution in Muslim citizenship in North America was the creation of ties between ethnic Muslim identities towards Muslim identities. As such, Muslim citizenship during this stage continued to be practiced in the realm of civil society. The key organizations attempting to congregate Muslims across ethnic lines were the likes of the Muslim Students' Association, the Islamic Circle of North America, and the Islamic Society of North America, which during the 1980s and most of the 1990s remained focused on the *social* aspects of citizenship and integration (Leonard 2003). Moreover, any practice of *political* citizenship by Muslim immigrants was often more the practice of citizenship by national or ethnic (Arab, Indian, Pakistani, Iranian, Turkish, Moroccan, Egyptian) immigrants, who happened to be Muslims: at this stage a political Muslim citizenship had yet to emerge in North America. This was not only a result of the extensive national and ethnic diversities of Muslim immigrants, but also that the immigrant Muslim community was nervous about practicing citizenship in a non-Islamic country-due to the prescripts of their faith (Khan 2002). The *fiqh* of minorities, as we will see below, was thus central in providing the rationale to both mobilize and be mobilized for many parts of the Muslim community as political actors and what would be the terms of that political identity.

Another powerful factor in why Muslim citizenship remained in the social realm for the bulk of the time of immigrant Muslim presence in North America are the variations in citizenship and pluralism contexts by which Muslim immigrants have found themselves in upon arrival and settlement. The first two waves of Muslim immigration coincided with larger trends of immigration in the United States and Canada, i.e., high rates during the latter part of the 19th century,

with declining rates (almost coming to a halt due to legislation severely restricting immigration from non-European countries) during the inter-war period and up to revisions of immigration acts in the 1950s. During the first wave, Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants, alike, were entering nations where integration, citizenship and pluralism were regulated by the principle of conformity (Bodner 1994; Berbrier 2004). Outward expressions of any ethnicity (read: non-British and non-Protestant) was deemed deviant and the demand to conform was immediate, upon arrival. The consequence of such an ideology of citizenship meant that those who could not become non-deviant (such as blacks or the Chinese) risked exclusion at all levels of citizenship; and that those who could become non-deviant, shed their "ethnic" baggage, often including their religious practices, and adopted a "white" identity, as was the case with many Arab Muslims at this time.

A competing vision at this time was the "melting pot" paradigm, which became the dominant narrative in the course of the first half of the 20th century, and variations of which still persist today: This paradigm, instead of condemning all ethnicities, holds that only ethnicities that continue to maintain themselves longer than it should (a criteria subject to conflict and negotiation) are deviant (Park and Miller 1920; Downey 1999; Berbrier 2004). Even though the language of this was different in Canada, the primary vision of integration of "others" into citizenship was at worst exclusionary and at best assimilationist, with reality often being located in a mix of conformity, isolation and/or marginalization (Day 2000). Under both perspectives, religious diversity outside of Christianity has been a source of problems, diversity outside of Protestanism (except in Quebec where diversity outside of Catholicism was the culprit) meant deep suspicion of Catholics and Jews. For those Muslim immigrants coming in the end of the 19th century and until the mid-20th century, there was no rights framework to address the inequalities of citizenship that resulted due to a lack of legal and social commitment to a principle of pluralism. Integration for Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants was understood as assimilation and assimilation and citizenship in its

fullness were limited by race and difference. At best, non-Protestant practices were tolerated in the *private* sphere.

The third and fourth waves of Muslim immigration occurred during dramatic changes in the socio-political and legal structures of North America: first, the process of becoming legal citizens of their new homes became less tortuous and more easily possible; in addition, and importantly, the socio-cultural discourse surrounding diversity and citizenship was transformed by the emergence of a rights framework, starting with the civil rights movement and followed by the feminist movement (Berbrier 2004; Day 2000); and finally, the establishment of identity politics since the 1980s has meant that Muslims settling in the United States and Canada were on a route that could end in the realization of full citizenship: civil, political and social rights. The contribution of Muslim activists to this sea change during the 1960s and 1970s was minimal with the huge exception of African-American Muslims (Nyang 1999), which I discuss below. However, beginning in the 1980s, the Arab and South Asian communities, including Muslim leadership in them, started participating in the larger identity politics of the time and have contributed to the expansion of citizenship discourses as well as a rise of a pluralist discourse of integration in both Canada and the United States--one that has significantly had to repeatedly negotiate the national narratives of European and Christian roots of these two nations.

In fact, increasingly in the 1980s and the 1990s, Muslim immigrants were situated in a context where discourses of pluralism and multiculturalism regarding integration of immigrant populations had shifted the terms by which newcomers viewed their role and obligation in their new country of residence and future citizenship. In contrast to the "melting pot" paradigm, under this new context of "multiculturalism", politics of recognition and identity politics, "the moral claims [were that] groups *should* retain their lifestyles and identities and preserve their ethnic, racial, or minority cultures...Thus, ethnicity is not considered deviant at all; rather, *ethnicity is normal* (Berbrier 2004: 36)." Of course, the old debate in

the melting pot paradigm of *which* ethnicity is deviant continued in this new paradigm that normalized ethnic "retention" (Gans 1997): which practices of which groups should be retained was still contested and determined by political contests over the power to determine the boundaries of "acceptable" diversity. Nevertheless, the terms of integration for immigrants, including Muslim immigrants, had changed dramatically from the 19th and early 20th centuries.

However, while identity politics and the rise of multiculturalism as a prevalent frame of discourses of pluralism and integration set the *larger stage* for the possibility of mobilizing a politics of Muslim identity in the 1980s and 1990s, an important process and force *within* the Muslim community had already been put into play starting in the 1970s that would become integral in reshaping the way faith and citizenship were to be linked in the Muslim community: the rise and consolidation of a native Muslim population in North America, i.e., African-American Muslims, other converts, and the children of immigrants as they reached adulthood. The native Muslim population, as we see in the next section, is the force that has driven the nationalization of the Islamic faith in North America.

2.3 African-American Muslims, Converts and Second-Generation Muslim Citizens: Nationalizing Faith

The largest native Muslim population in North America is the African-American Muslim population. Before I discuss the central role of this group in affecting the way Islam and citizenship link up, I am going to address the question of why I am discussing this in a chapter geared to address the *common trends* faced by Muslim leadership in *North America*. After all, there is no such equivalent population in Canada. The reason is two-fold: a) The Muslim leadership in the two countries are part of shared networks of activism, faith, and professions. Moreover, until the early 1990s, the major Muslim institutions in Canada, outside of mosques, have been chapters of Muslim American institutions.

While the legal and cultural contexts in which these chapters have been situated are distinct, often the events and discourses south of the border have shaped the discourses north of the border. b) Especially for the younger generation of Muslims in Canada, many African-American Muslim imams and activists are part of their reference for negotiating their faith and their citizenship (Karim 2009). Therefore, even though there is no local indigenous Muslim population in Canada, the ties of leadership, religious and political, among Muslim activists and their constituencies has meant that the presence and significance of African-American Muslim discourse and leadership have affected Muslim Canadian leadership and discourse on faith and citizenship (Haddad and Smith 1994).[34]

The tendency in the study of Muslims in North America, and particularly of African-American Muslims has been to observe either the differences in practices and theology between the African-American and non-African-American Muslim communities, or to observe the evolution of the movement of Islamic conversion in the African-American community towards orthodox or a more mainstream understanding of Sunni Islam. Moreover, given the centrality of race in the Islamic discourses of African-American Muslims, researchers have generally focused on racial dynamics both in the relations between African-American Muslims and non-Muslims, as well as within the Muslim community itself (Leonard 2003). Under this classic perspective, three important points can be drawn from the research on African-American Muslims, in analyzing the evolution of Muslim identity discourses on citizenship and faith in North America.

Firstly, the American public was initiated to Islam in their midst by the Nation of Islam (NOI) movement led by Elijah Muhammad in the 1950's and

[34] One particular example of this effect is seen in speeches of prominent imams and religious figures in Canadian Muslim gatherings: references to Malcolm X, slavery, racism (black not Muslim) are common references in Canadian Muslim discourses; also African-American Muslim figures such as Imam Wahhaj, Sherman Jackson, and Imam Zaid Shakir.

1960's (Nyang 1998). Even though the movement began in the end of the 1920s[35], it gained visibility at the national public sphere at the same time that the black civil rights movement took off. Moreover, even though Islam had been present in ante-bellum South among slaves and continued haphazardly throughout the 18th century, it had not existed in an institutional form, neither in the private nor in the public sphere (Kly 1989). Thus, it is keeping this in mind that the history of an indigenous Islam can be understood as a 20th century, urban, northern, largely working-class, underclass and Black phenomenon (Jackson 2004). Moreover, the Islam of the first half of the 20th century among African-Americans was an Islam that was un-orthodox (heterodox) vis-à-vis traditional (or Sunni) Islam: it was a grassroots faith with very little grounding in any historical Islam. The vision presented by Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam in the context of the civil rights movement was a political identity that claimed a militant separatist vision which underscored the racial oppression that Islam could challenge. Furthermore, Islam was adopted by African-Americans under an ideology that emphasized how Islam could allow "a Black...to become a truer, more authentic "Black man" (Jackson 2004: 205)." Therefore, the first public and political constellation of Islam and citizenship in North America was both national and separatist: it was national because it was oriented towards the entirety of the African-American community in the United States--the scope of the claims of Black Islam was bounded by nation and race, not faith; it was separatist because it envisioned a separate state for Blacks--Islam would provide the impetus and the identity to found this state, not integrate Blacks and Whites (Jackson 2004).

[35] The Moorish Science Temple founded by Noble Drew Ali was the forerunner of the Nation of Islam movement. It is also suggested that the founder of the Nation of Islam movement, Fard Muhammad, was a member of the Moorish Science Temple. Some of the ideas of the Moorish Science Temple continued into the Nation of Islam, however, more importantly, Noble Drew Ali's founding of the Moorish Science Temple and conversion of up to over 20,000 African-Americans to Islam, was integral in starting an institutional form of Black Islam that was uniquely American, as embodied in the Koran he created: "A slim pamphlet consisting of a curious mixture of the Mohammadan holy book of the same name, the Christian Bible, and the words of Marcus Garvey, and anecdotes of the life of Jesus--the whole bound together with the prophet's [Noble Drew Ali's] own pronouncements and interpretations (Bontemps and Conroy 1945: 175, quoted by Ansari 2004: 236)."

However, this vision shifted in the mid-1960s, which is the second point regarding African-American Muslims (Ansari 2004). Starting with Malcolm X, but decisively under the leadership of Warith Deen Muhammad, NOI followers gradually moved towards more orthodox versions of Islam, leaving NOI with Louis Farrakhan leading 100,000 Muslims and W.D. Muhammad leading 700,000-1.4 million Muslims under the American Society of Muslims (Nyang 1998). In this version of African-American Islam, Islam's role in freeing one from the racially oppressive society in which blacks found themselves remained critical (Karim 2008). However, it rejected, progressively, the separatist vision of Black Islam and embraced a universalist Islam. The consequence of this shift was the formation of a new constellation between citizenship and Islam in North America: Islam can be liberating without needing separation, its vision is integrationist *and* egalitarian.

Moreover, as a result of the combined processes of increasing immigrant Muslim presence and the mainstreaming of Black Islam, the last quarter of a century has represented an increase in the interaction between the two communities. While this has meant that African-American Muslims have embraced the particulars of the faith of their immigrant counterparts, it has represented also, albeit slowly, the adoption of some of the discourses and symbols by immigrant Muslim community of Black Islam. Thus, the narrative of oppression and liberation in Black Islam has entered the mainstream Muslim discourse in the United States. There is an important caveat here: while the Muslim community, around the world, generally perceives their religion to have this framework of equality and liberation [cf Jackson 2004], the sense of urgency of the African-American cause, and the difference between the ideal of non-racial Islam and the actual racial divides within the American Muslim *ummah* are not shared by the non-African-American Muslim community. In fact, as Jamillah Karim, African-American Muslim feminist activist and professor at Spellman College, puts it: "I...found that many of my [second-generation Muslim] peers

were not willing to see the African-American cause as a Muslim cause. For many of them, a "Muslim" cause was one that had to do with Muslims only."[36]

Therefore, and the final point regarding African-American Muslims is that while African-American Muslims' practices and rhetoric have come more into the fold of mainstream (Sunni) Islam, and while there have been more active efforts at linking the non-African American and African-American Muslim communities, absence of actual linkages and divergence in goals between the two communities continue to characterize the relationship (Leonard 2003): "While there is much talk about stemming this [growing divide between immigrant and indigenous Muslims], there is very little action being taken to bring the two communities together. Yes, there is cooperation on some important issues, but the cooperation is more of an alliance than unification (Khan 2002: 17)." Moreover, Jackson (2003) writes that the situation in the United States among immigrant Muslims and African-American Muslims has been problematic in the pre-9/11 context because immigrant Muslim actors and leaders failed to articulate an Islam that presented "effective antidote" to racism in the States: "Indeed, the major Muslim political organizations in America [including CAIR, MPAC and AMC][37], all run by immigrants, tend more often than not to support the Republican Party, despite the latter's anti-affirmative action, antisocial program stance. In fact, during the 2000 presidential campaign, these organizations went so far as to issue a public endorsement of Republican candidate George W. Bush without so much as attempting to secure a mandate from the Black American Muslim majority (205)!"

[36] Muslim Students Association Annual Convention 2008, August 30: Main Session.

[37] Jackson's critique here of the decision by the major Muslim political organizations regarding the 2000 elections is centered on the fact these organizations "acted in apparent defiance of the wishes of the Black American Muslim community (2003: 219)", i.e., ignoring the wishes and interests of one of the largest proportions of American Muslims. He does not claim that there is anything un-Islamic about choosing the Republican Party per se and moreover suggests that the "marriage between liberalism and the civil rights establishment has had a devastating effect on Black Americans, including Muslims, over the past quarter century (2003: 219)." Nevertheless, the apparent disregard of the immigrant Muslim actors of the wishes and interests of African-American Muslims reflect the challenge of forging "meaningful" and "dialogue-based" relationships between the two communities and leaderships in the pre-9/11 context.

Amina Wadud (2002) argues that the separation between the two Muslim communities and the persistent tensions lie in the fact that

> immigrant Muslims...come to this country aimed at mainstreaming themselves with regard to American privilege. [This] has sometimes meant, as with other immigrants, that they have assumed the mainstream ideology regarding rights and privileges. They have therefore imbibed some of the prejudices or the stereotypes with regard to oppressed peoples in this country. And instead of alleviating them, especially with Islam as the cause of their alleviation, they have perpetuated them. And so African-American Muslims collectively have been very sensitive to discrimination from different ethnic groups who are Muslim.

Karim (2006) attributes the continued separation of the two communities to racism and a consequent lack of trust between the two communities. She explains: "Both immigrants and African Americans contribute to divides in the American ummah. Both groups harbor racial and other forms of prejudice towards the other; however, immigrant Muslims have a level of power, authority, and privilege over African American Muslims. This privilege is what distinguishes racism from racial prejudice. Racism is "a system of advantage based on race" As people of color, South Asian and Arab immigrants do not share privilege and power with whites. To gain acceptance among whites, however, many [individuals] do "participate in antiblack racism" (2006: 226)."

At the organizational level this participation in "anti-black racism" takes on multiple forms. In the course of my interviews and research, I have found that most non-African-American Muslim organizations tend to take two approaches to African-American Muslims: In the context of public gatherings and campaigns targeted towards the wider American public, they often use African-American Muslims as legitimizing resources: in terms of numbers (20% of American Muslims are African-American), in terms of cultural icons who are imprinted in the American psyche (figures such as Malcolm X), in terms of narratives about racism and slavery to bolster to mobilize and motivate action, and in terms of current political representation (e.g., Muslim African-American Congressmen Keith Ellison and André Carson). However, in the context of smaller campaigns,

targeted to the Muslim community, these organizations tend to regard the black (non-immigrant)[38] Muslim community as a reality to, at best, stay silent about or at worst, criticize in terms of authenticity. Examples of criticisms of authenticity include African-American Muslims women finding themselves criticized for donning the African-American head covering instead of the Arab hijab or Imam W.D. Muhammad (the leader of the African-American Muslim community who passed away this year) for "put[ting] more America into Islam than Islam into America."[39]

This criticism and fear of "putting more America into Islam than Islam into America" has been a point of contention between not only African-American Muslims and immigrant Muslims, but also underscores a feeling in the convert- and second/third- generation Muslim Americans and Canadians in general: immigrant Muslims have tended to for the better part of their political careers emphasized only Muslim causes and mainly Muslim causes *outside* of American or Canadian borders (Leonard 2003; Karim 2002). African-American Muslims, along with other Muslim convert populations and second and third generation Muslim Americans, have argued that circumscribing political action and the practice of citizenship to Muslim causes and only foreign ones at that reduces the legitimacy of the Muslim community vis-à-vis their non-Muslim citizens.

However, the question of the scope of the political practice of citizenship among Muslims in North America is not only a strategic one. For the children of Muslim immigrants and their own families, as well as for other converts into

[38] There is a distinction in the American Muslim community between those who are African Muslim immigrants (and their children) and African-American Muslims, that is American blacks who are descendants of slaves in the United States. The former group participates in large part in immigrant mosques and with second-generation Muslim communities on a regular basis and are part of the larger organizations of this study. The latter group on the other hand continues to be on the large part separated from the immigrant community whether in terms of mosques or other Muslim events.

[39] Dr. Jamillah Karim concluded her speech with this reference, citing how trust needs to built between the two Muslim communities, and criticisms like these are not helpful in those efforts. She was recounting her observations prior to the attacks to 9/11. MSA Main Session, Aug 30 2008, MSA Annual Convention, Columbus, Ohio.

Islam, home is the nation they have grown up in, the nation they are citizens of. They have come to see their faith as one of choice (Lin and Jamal 2008; Leonard 2003); this is even more true of converts. Their faith has to speak to their experiences of American and Canadian citizenship and narratives and in an effort to do so they have been integral in shifting the religious leadership of their faith towards a more localized and national perspective; while the degree of actualization of this demand has varied from community to community, it has emerged at the national level in both countries, and an obligation that the current Muslim leadership fundamentally realizes it needs to fulfill if it is to pass on the beacon of Muslim leadership to the next generation in North America (Karim 2009; Leonard 2003). It is in this framework that one can understand the "rock star" status of Imams Siraj Wahah (African-American convert), Suhaib Webb (White-American convert) and Shaykh Hamza Yusuf (Euro-American convert) who speak not only without an accent, but utilize the myths and symbols of the US and Canada, the national histories and institutions with which the native Muslim population is familiar with to demand that their faith demands that Muslims be "good citizens" to "redeem" their nation and "realize its ideals"[40] (Leonard 2003). Thus just as one of the consequences of a movement of Black Islam has been to nationalize the scope of Islam and move it to the public square as a means of realizing and actualizing citizenship, so has the coming of age of the younger generations of immigrant Muslims and an emerging presence of converts in the leadership of the Muslim community.

Perhaps central to this process has been what Jackson (2004) identifies as the critical power of appropriation and conversion that is embedded in the North American native Muslim experience: born as citizens of the country, for native Muslims (converts and non-converts alike), faith is an act that occurs within the context of citizenship; faith is chosen, often as a conscious choice to resist exclusionary citizenship and reclaim citizenship. For Jackson (2004), regarding

[40] Shayk Hamza Yusuf, 45th Annual Convention of the Islamic Society of North America, September 1 2008, Columbus Convention Center, Ohio.

African-American Muslims, and Lin and Jamal (2008) and Karim (2009) regarding second generation Muslim Americans and Canadians, the demand from a constituency of a leadership that can make sense of Islam within the context of other identities, particularly national (citizenship) identities has been integral over the end of the 20th century in transforming the constellation of citizenship and Islam in North America: from citizenship in civil society to citizenship in the public sphere, from faith looking beyond the nation or separation to faith looking at nation and integration.[41]

Among the older generation of leadership in the Muslim community, this vision of faith and citizenship was first articulated best by Maher Hathout, the founder of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, in the 1980s: "Home is not where we buried our grandparents but where we raise our children." Unsurprisingly, of the leading political advocacy organizations in North America, MPAC has the youngest leadership. Nevertheless, generational differences and the particularity of the Black Islam movement is not the whole story of the transformation of the way Islam linked up to citizenship prior to 9-11. Even if the younger generation had given an impetus to nationalize faith, the majority of the immigrant community was still uncertain about what this would mean and what it could mean given Islamic traditions.

2.4 Fiqh of Minorities: Using Faith to Justify the Practice of Political Citizenship

It is important to note that for the Muslim immigrant community in both the United States and Canada, participation in the civic and political life of a non-

[41] I want to underscore here again that while the vision of discourses have been shifting since the 1980s, the reality of actual linkages that aims to integrate African-American Muslims and non-African-American Muslims, as well as the reality of the practice of acting (first) in the scope of national issues is still far from what is spoken of and hoped for. In fact, as we will see in some of the oppositional Muslim discourses, this discrepancy has become one of the major points of criticism towards Mainstream Muslims. Nevertheless, outlining the significance of the shifts in discourse of how citizenship and faith link up is the goal of this chapter and it is in this frame that I have argued how the rise of a native Muslim population contributed towards an integrationist and nationalist perspective on faith and citizenship.

Muslim country was not evident: "As recently as 1986, national Muslim leaders advocated residing only temporarily in *dar ul-kufr*, or the place of unbelievers (Leonard 2005: 10)." In fact, legitimization of active engagement as citizens came about only after hotly contested deliberation of *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). Fiqh scholar and President of the Fiqh Council of North America, Shaykh Dr. Taha Jabir al-Alwani coined the term *fiqh al-aqalliyyat* (or fiqh for Muslim minorities). He defines 'fiqh for Muslim minorities' as "a specific discipline which takes into account the relationship between the religious ruling and the conditions of the community and the location where it exists" (Al-alwani, 2004). 'Fiqh for minorities' is therefore the process of contextual application of the rules and principles of the primary sources of Islamic jurisprudence that is rooted in a recognition and appreciation of the particular conditions facing Muslims living as minorities (see *Table 2.3*). Some researchers have focused on the effect of fiqh of minorities on the Americanization of Islamic discourse: for example, Ghanea Bassiri (1997) examined the magazine *The Minaret* (of the Islamic Center in LA) to find that over time, 'traditions' of Islamic scholarship have been recast in the language of human rights and democracy. Leonard (2005) found professional Muslims who lead the political organizations in the United States have recast Islam in the language of a positivist science.

For the purposes of this study, there are two points regarding the fiqh for minorities. The first is that over the 1980s, the Muslim religious leadership in North America became more unsatisfied with imported or foreign Muslim scholars and legal opinions and also gained more confidence in itself and started to shift the locus of religious authority to North America, away from the countries of origin of the immigrant generation (Delorenzo 2000). This shift occurred slowly under the aegis of immigrant religious scholars such as a) Fazlur Rahman (d.1988), who was originally from Pakistan (or the Pakistani part of the Punjab region, since he was born in 1919 when Partition had not yet occurred)), educated at Oxford University, started his teaching career at McGill University, and immigrated as Professor of Islamic Thought to the University of Chicago in 1969,

where he stayed until his death; b) Ismail al-Faruqi (d.1986), originally from Palestine, and who taught also at McGill University as well as Temple University, and founder of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), located in Virginia, an institute whose goal was to create a center of Islamic scholarship within North America, and one that would produce scholarly dialogue between Islam and other faiths in the continent; and c) Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b.1933), originally from Iran, immigrated to the United States at the age of twelve, was educated at MIT and Harvard University in the 1950s, taught at Tehran University in Iran until the Iranian Revolution at which point he emigrated back to the United States and is currently Professor at George Washington University.

Moreover, as Leonard (2005) and Delorenzo (2000) point out, sources of religious authority has shifted not only geographically but also regarding discipline of knowledge: increasingly over the 1980s and continuing extensively into the 1990s, the value of expertise in American/Canadian culture, politics, law and history have become important in addition to religious knowledge. Furthermore, the source of religious knowledge has been increasingly held to higher standards by the Muslim community in North American, particularly the younger generation and converts: religious knowledge needs to be scholarly and academic and knowledge of Arabic is considered important. Thus even as expertise in the specificities of American or Canadian culture, language, politics and history is demanded, so is the significance of scholarly knowledge of the Qu'ran and Arabic. This transformation in the last two decades of what *ideal* religious authority is constituted by in North America has further contributed to the nationalization of faith and highlighted the *significance* of civic knowledge for the practice of faith and the importance of re-examined faith for the practice of citizenship: to what extent this idea is not fulfilled and to what extent the significance is not actualized or acknowledged has been further exposed in the face of the 9-11 attacks and by the rise, as we will see in the following chapters, of oppositional Muslim discourses and the changes in the Mainstream Muslim discourse.

Nevertheless, prior to the 2001, the second most important context of the fiqh for minorities relates to its understanding of citizenship of Muslims. Al-Alwani has rebuked other fiqh scholars on two important issues: First, regarding the unlawfulness of Muslims to hold citizenship in non-Muslim countries, he argues that the older law was particular to the North African context during anti-colonial struggles against the French. Moreover, he argues that wherever Muslims have the freedom to practice their religion freely should be considered *dar-ul-Islam* (the place or abode of Islam) (not *dar-ul-kufr* or *dar-ul-harb* (place of war)) and therefore, not only is it not unlawful for Muslims to hold citizenship in non-Muslim states, it is unlawful (in an Islamic sense) for Muslims to not engage as full citizens in such a society. The fiqh for minorities "is not meant to give minorities privileges or concessions not available to Muslim majorities; on the contrary, it aims to project minorities as representative models or examples of Muslim society in the countries in which they live (Al-Alwani 2004: 11)." As such, in 1994, under his leadership, the Fiqh Council of North America issued a *fatwa* (legal opinion) which allowed Muslims to vote during American elections: although this was a very important step in the religious justification and imperative towards practicing citizenship, the initial fatwa was limited in its scope of civic participation. However, once initiated, Muslim scholars, jurists and activists in North American have progressively expanded the range of practices that constitute legitimate (Islamic) civic participation (Fishman 2006). Thus, one consequence of this fiqh has been the reframing of Islamic duty as civic participation, broadly defined, i.e., from participation in local and national elections to community and social work outside of the Muslim community to development of professional careers in the public sphere (advocacy, journalism, government) (Khalidi 2004; Delorenzo 2000). The call to citizenship and its practice is repeatedly bolstered by the reference to *fiah al-aqalliyyat* among religious and political actors in the Muslim community; and as we will see in the following chapters, its necessity has been made more urgent in the aftermath of the September 11 2001 attacks (Al-Alwani 2004).

Another consequence of the fiqh for minorities has been related to its statement that relations between Muslims and non-Muslims as fellow citizens must be based on the moral and legal (Islamic) principles of "kindness and justice toward all nonbelligerent communities (Al-Alwani 2004: 26)." Moreover based on another Islamic principle that Muslims "should not keep any beneficial advantage to [themselves] but should share its benefit with other human societies (al-Khatib quoted in Al-Alwani 2004: 27)", Muslims in any country are obligated by their faith to give the message of their faith, not only in words but by example to all peoples, including their non-Muslim fellow citizens. The significance of these two principles in the fiqh for minorities was that it opened up a rationale for crossing boundaries of faith in civil society (inter-faith work) and for integrating (not assimilating) into the larger national society through participation in the public and private spheres with non-Muslim citizens.

While authority on such matters is by no means clear cut (Leonard 2005) the renewed and reinterpreted fiqh of minorities has increasingly taken on mainstream characteristics. This mainstreaming of the reinterpretation of what is legitimate action for Muslim citizens in non-Muslim countries has also been aided by an insistence that fiqh for minorities is a collective activity, and one that is built on deliberation and subject to re-evaluation and re-interpretation (ijtihad). This process of developing progressively, deliberatively and collectively a set of norms and practices surrounding Muslim citizenship in non-Muslim countries has helped to legitimate the breaking with classical Islamic understanding of Muslim minorities' roles and obligation in non-Muslim lands.[42] Moreover, this was, as Khan (2002) finds, integral to giving greater (Islamic) legitimacy to the *existence* and *raison-d'être* of all of the organizations and leadership under study here that work on the premise of participation and actualization of full citizenship.

[42] An important point to keep in mind regarding the fiqh for minorities is that Muslims in India have long practiced what Al-Alwani advocated: however, the justification for participation in the South Asian context has its own history (Khalidi 2004).

Nevertheless, religious justification to religious reinterpretation was not the only force that facilitated the emergence of a political identity of Muslim citizenship in North America. Certainly, religious processes and scholarship have been important in the process of legitimizing action and calls to action for those who believe (Khalidi 2004; Delorenzo 2000). However, religious rulings had not settled the question of what would be the content of political participation and practices of citizenship (Khan 2002; Abraham 2000). These questions were dealt among the political ranks of Muslim leadership in North America, in parallel to the debates surrounding the fiqh for minorities among religious scholars. In fact, within the Muslim community in North America, political Muslim leadership in the 1980s and early 1990s became embroiled in a battle between what Khan has called "Muslim Isolationists" (those focused on American foreign policy) and the "Muslim Democrats" (those focused on American Democracy).[43] In the process of this battle, between 1988 and 1994, four major national level political organizations were established: Muslim Public Affairs Council in 1988, American Muslim Alliance (AMA) in 1989, American Muslim Council (AMC) in 1990, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in 1994. Increasingly strengthened by the fiqh of minorities, the coming of age of the younger generation of Muslims, a rising consciousness among Muslim activists of the resources available to the Muslim community, and a context in which the first Gulf War was causing the Muslim population to see the prejudices they faced as Muslims, the "Muslim Democrats" won the battle against the isolationists, during the late 1990s, "culminating in the mobilization of the 2000 bloc vote, where the

[43] There are two other different kinds of groups among Muslim leadership that have continued to reject participation (Khalidi 2004). One is those who reject all participation on the basis that both Canada and the United States are land of the unbelievers (Kurfistans) and therefore the sole basis of legitimate action for Muslims can occur only among Muslims to call back those Muslim (men) who have "lapsed" from Islam. Groups such as the Tablighi Jamaat, Hizb al-Tahrir and the Khalifornians represent this position. A second form of opposition of participation comes from African-American Muslim leader Majil Abdullah Alami (formally known as H. Rap Brown) and immigrant Muslim leader Tariq Quereishi (who used to be the director of the North American Islamic Trust of ISNA, before ISNA shifted towards the reinterpretation of the fiqh of minorities). According to this second position, the risk of "corruption" or "assimilation" posed by interaction and participation outweighs any benefits that can be realized by participation. Therefore, Muslims in North American must live as separately as possible. Both of these sets of views on participation is still present in the North American context; *however*, by the "dawn of the twenty-first century, there is a consensus with the community about participation in public affairs (Khalidi 2004: 67)."

dominant discourse of "non-participation" for Muslim immigrants in the US was replaced by "active and united participation" (75-8)."

In the Canadian case, the strides were less dramatic, but the change was nevertheless notable. Daood Hamdani, a key Muslim Canadian intellectual and professional, noted in a 1996 address on the occasion of Eid-al-Adha at the Parliament building in Ottawa, about how much had changed in just the last 15 years for the Muslim Canadian community: "From self-preservation in the early years manifest in the formation of local community associations to identity revolving around the mosque, Muslims are finally seeking to establish themselves as a cohesive community. The community is only beginning to advance as an entity in the country's educational, social and political institutions."[44]

One mark of this emergent sense of an active and involved Canadian Muslim citizenship was the proposal put forward by the Canadian Muslim Society when it circulated a brief proposing the accommodation of Islamic family and personal law in the early 1990s (Karim 2002; Ali and Whitehouse 1992). The proposal represents the intersection of the discourses on citizenship and identity that had taken placed in the Muslim community in the preceding decade.

This is most evident in an article that is co-written by the author of the proposal, Syed Mumtaz Ali, entitled: "The Reconstruction of the Constitution and the Case for Muslim Personal Law in Canada". Empowered by the fiqh of minorities that called for interpretation of Islamic law and practices in new contexts and active political participation, and an associated nationalization of Muslim identity, Ali and Whitehouse (1992) frame the call for Muslim family

[44] Another key moment in the shift from isolationist tendencies to active and democratic tendencies in the Canadian case was when Mobeen Khaja, a prominent Muslim individual in Toronto, organized a "function bringing Muslims together with the members of parliament and senators of all political parties including senior cabinet ministers (Hamdani 1999: 199)" in the aftermath of the attacks on individuals of Arab/Muslim descent after the Oklahoma City bombing. Hamdani writes "Never before had a Muslim gathering in Canada been attended by so many and such powerful and influential people. Nor had Muslims shown such strength and unity of purpose on a previous occasion...It was the first time in Muslim's history in Canada that they had the opportunity to exchange views and information with the lawmakers at such a scale and in the parliament building itself (1999: 199)."

arbitration as part of the constitutional debates taking place in the country at that time. Starting with a discussion on the "constitutional crisis concerning the native peoples and the people of Quebec", which issues are "well-known to Canadians", the article shifts the discussion to "others in Canada whose needs and problems must be taken into consideration if a revamped Constitution is to serve all Canadians (1992: 164)." It is in addressing the needs of the various groups, including Muslim Canadians, that a "revamped Constitution" can go towards creating "loyal citizens of Canada (1992: 165)." Such loyalty, however, Ali and Whitehouse point out, derives not from some "monolithic process" of public education or one unified system of civic law, but through the different systems (Native, Québecois, Islamic) that teach individuals of different groups the shared "values such as freedom, rights, democracy, social responsibility, justice, and multiculturalism (1992: 165)." The imperative to be good citizens in Canada comes from Islam in this discourse, reflecting the primary direction by which citizenship and faith were being mapped on to each other by the 1990s.

The brief, however, failed to gain support in the Muslim community or even cause much stir in the public (Karim 2002). While reflective of the confidence that was emerging in the evolution of Canadian Muslim identity, spurred on by the fiqh of minorities, the fast-growing population of the Muslim Canadian community, and the efforts of Canadian Muslim actors to assert themselves in the political discourse of Canadian society, the failure of the brief to do much also made evident the work that still had to be done in mobilizing an active Canadian Muslim citizenship. One major development in the 1990s in Canada, as a result of the processes discussed, was the emergence of Canadian Muslim organizations at the national level that were independent from American organizations. In Canada, there were no national level political organizations until 1994, when the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) was founded, first as a chapter of the American CAIR because "it was the only organization that did not drop their jaw at a woman leading the

organization"[45] (since which it has become fully independent of the American CAIR). Interestingly, CAIR-CAN was founded by a second-generation Canadian Muslim, Sheema Khan. Her initial efforts at wanting to establish a national organization were in part shaped by her experience in the States with the Muslim American community during her graduate studies at Harvard, where she had found the ability of American Muslim organizations to assert themselves inspiring.[46] The Canadian Islamic Congress was founded in 1998 by a first-generation Canadian Muslim, Mohamed Elmasry, as an attempt to create a national level organization completely unaffiliated with any American organizations.[47]

Therefore, the 1990s marked the emergence of a new set of political actors in the American and Canadian public spheres—Muslim political organizations (*see Table 2.4)*. These organizations had emerged as the victors in a two-decade struggle *within* the Muslim community regarding the legitimacy and plausibility of Muslim public and political involvement in their respective national societies (Al-Arian 2004; Leonard 2003; Khan 1998). Before the decade was to end, these organizations would have made themselves visible in national and local electoral campaigns, civil rights issues, and foreign policy discourses.

The September attacks in 2001, however, Khan ([2002] 2005) argues, has brought the Muslim Isolationist discourse back in the game, within the Muslim Democrats camp due to "the systematic profiling of Muslims by the Department of Homeland Security, increased negative media attention, and Muslims feeling estranged and marginalized (145)." Mainstream Muslim leadership is facing anew the challenge of convincing the Muslim constituency in Canada and the United States that the contraction and violation of civil rights of Muslims is all the more reason to participate in the public sphere and utilize their political rights to claim a

[45] Sheema Khan, Interview, founder of the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations (which was first CAIR-Montreal, then CAIR-Ottawa, and then finally became CAIR-CAN), March 28 2008, Montreal.
[46] Sheema Khan, Interview, March 28 2003, Montréal, Canada.
[47] Mohammed Elmasry, interview, founder of the Canadian Islamic Congress, November 15th 2006, Vancouver.

stake in the discourse on citizenship and faith occurring in North America. Nevertheless, Khan (inspired and optimistic) concludes "As a new generation of Muslims joins the community, the influence of Muslim Democrats is being consolidated…Muslims are strongly in the corner of the Muslim Democrats and have come to manifest and articulate the third way that they were seeking—the one that would save Islam from extremism and American from the decline in its civil rights standards. That third way is not be Americans who are Muslims or Muslims who are born in America, but to be *American Muslims* ([2002] 2005: 147)."

However, Khan's characterization of the two camps, while apt for describing the political dynamics of the Muslim activist community in the 1980s and 1990s, fails to fully capture the political dynamics since 2001 in the Muslim community: The Muslim Democrats camp, consolidated against the Muslims Isolationists, faces new axes of conflict and difference, as well as new actors in the camp who challenge the basis of the previous consolidation. Thus the main site of contentious claims-making is along the lines of what being *American Muslims* or *Canadian Muslims* implies. Having embraced the idea of participation, the content of participation is what is being contested and oppositional Muslims are the new challengers to which Mainstream Muslim leadership has been made to respond to.

Before moving on to the final section in this chapter regarding historical contexts that have shaped the way citizenship and Islam link up in North America, a note needs to be made on the Canadian context. In general, as already noted a few times above, the processes discussed above have all been present in both the United States and Canada, but to differing degrees. For example, the significance of the minority fiqh in the Canadian Muslim community has been less pronounced than in the States. Even though the Fiqh Council services both Canadian and American Muslims, the mainstreaming of the participation discourse has been slower in the Canadian context than in the American one. The process of creating

a Canadian Muslim leadership has lagged behind that of the creation of an American Muslim leadership. Karim (2002) notes:

> Unlike the American Muslim leader Warith D. Mohammed, who has attempted to reconcile Islam with the American experience, there is no prominent leader or organization in Canada who has mounted a sustained effort to come to terms with the broader realities of the *ummah*'s existence. Whether it is architecture, intercommunity relations, or political participation, the predominant instincts are generally either to adhere to the past or to compartmentalize one's secular and religious lives. Despite the high level of education among Canadian Muslims, there has been a limited effort to engage intellectually with the philosophical bases of modernity from Islamic perspectives (274).

This in part due to the fact that a Muslim presence in Canada took place later than in the United States, and in smaller numbers; moreover, we saw that the drive for nationalization of a Muslim identity discourse has come from native Muslims i.e., those who were born in the States or Canada. In Canada, the population of native born Canadian Muslims is one-fourth that of native born American Muslims—thus the drives towards nationalization of an identity discourse has been weaker (*see Figure 2. 2e*). In addition, Canadian Muslim leadership has also been stalled by the availability of an American Muslim leadership that crossed borders. Furthermore, as we will see in the fifth chapter, the Canadian counterparts to Khan's Muslim Democrats are less consolidated in the 9-11 context, afflicted with organizational conflicts, and continue to be very much embedded in the process of legitimizing participation.

In general, in the Canadian case, many questions regarding the legitimacy and content of civic participation for Muslims has been made to occur in the aftermath of 9-11, thus under greater scrutiny than faced in the American case and under the pressure of both Isolationist and oppositional Muslim discourses. The fifth chapter will draw out the consequences of these differences. At the moment, given the focus on the pre-9-11 context for Muslim leadership in North America, it is important to underscore the significance of American Muslim discourse for the Canadian Muslim context, since for the bulk of Muslim presence in Canada,

the dominant Muslim trends regarding citizenship and faith have been influenced by Muslim American leadership.

2.5 The Example of Muslim Others: Localizing Faith or Expanding Citizenship?

Canadian Muslims, however, are not alone in being located in a transnational space where Muslim discourses, actions and practices located in different national spaces affect the contours of one's own leadership and vision. North American Muslims occupy a transnational space in both their actual relations through their families and diasporic networks as well as their faith-based relations through the idea of umma (a universal community of all believers) and importantly also, through faith practices such as pilgrimage. Moreover, they also occupy a transnational space in the sense that events happening outside of their immediate national context (in the Middle East, Indonesia or Britain and France) affect the national public perception of what 'being and acting' Muslims means (Leonard 2005). In the pre-9/11 context this has manifested in the following ways: The historical relationships between Arab and non-Arab Muslims, often in the context of conquest or migration has meant difficulty in developing consensus across ethnicities and Islamic sects (Delorenzo 2000): which religious practices, political causes constitute Muslim identity and Muslim obligation?

Irrespective of the debate between Isolationists and Democrats, what aspects of the Muslim *ummah* should Muslim Americans and Muslim Canadians take responsibility for: Palestine, the persecution of non-Sunni Muslims in Pakistan, the conflict in Nigeria between Muslims and Christians, the successes and abuses of the Iranian Revolution? What position should they take on these issues, based on what principles? Moreover, how should they take responsibility for any of these issues? Through their transnational networks in transnational spaces such as international conferences, conventions, publications, international media presentations? Or through (in combination with transnational networks or

in isolation) affecting the foreign policy interests of their nations of citizenship, the American or Canadian governments? Or should, Muslim leadership in North America insist on marginalizing the transnational dimension of the *ummah* and focus only on Muslim communities in the national context? Would that mean giving up the opportunity to be world leaders and examples of Muslim leadership and Islam in the *ummah*? For many Muslims, the freedom that the United States and Canada provides in the practice of Islam *obligates* them by their faith to affect the current trends in the Muslim world; that sense of responsibility is also further heightened by many Muslim citizens' understanding that the geo-political and cultural status of the US (as world power) and Canada (as a leader in human rights and the idea of a world society) implicate Muslim Americans and Muslim Canadians to shape not only they way their faith is practiced but what democratic, pluralistic citizenship can mean for Islam and Muslims; also, as citizens they have to consider should they affect, and if so how should they affect, the relations between Muslim nations and international Muslim actors and their governments.

North American Muslim organizers, activists, and leaders have been immersed in these questions and tensions since their arrival in the United States and Canada. In fact, one of the major axis of organizational divisions in the United States lay in the answer to these questions with the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) being the major proponent of focusing on national issues, depending only on national sources of funding, and taking a position towards American Muslim identity[48] vs. the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the American Muslim Council (AMC) being the major actors accepting funding from outside of the United States, and attempting to balance national vs. foreign policy issues related to Muslim Americans (Leonard 2003). In fact, while CAIR and AMC fell firmly on the Muslim Democrats camp (i.e., full participation in the political and civic life of American citizenship in contrast to the Isolationists that wanted to limit participation only to affairs related to

[48] Maher Hathout, Interview, Co-founder of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, April 15th 2008, Los Angeles.

foreign policy issues) along with MPAC, these differences between the leaders of these organizations meant that when the Isolationists were defeated, the divisions between these organizations came up more strongly, as we will see in the post-9/11 context. In Canada, before the attacks of 9/11, the division was more muted between CAIR-CAN and CIC; however, interviews with the two founders of the organizations reflect important differences: Sheema Khan tended to envision CAIR-CAN as a civil rights advocacy organization, one that would correct the domestic problems Muslim Canadians faced in their workplace and in the public sphere regarding its image; thus, CAIR-CAN in its founding had a predominantly national focus related to domestic issue and the realization of full citizenship for Muslim Canadians in the public sphere. Elmasry tended to envision the CIC as a spokesperson to the government on key issues of interest to Canadian Muslims, primary among which included the desire for the Muslim community to develop an effective voice regarding foreign policy issues including but not limited to the Palestine-Israel conflict. For Elmasry, it was highly important that Muslim Canadians started participating in electoral processes both as voters and as candidates so that a Muslim voice would be created in the political sphere to influence policy.

These tensions were neither resolved by the consolidation of the Muslim Democrats' perspective, nor by a growing presence of a native Muslim population, nor by an increasing trend towards identification with a national *Muslim* identity. These tensions, as we will see over the course of the rest of this study, become integral in the debates between mainstream and oppositional Muslims in the aftermath of 9-11. One of the greatest challenges faced by the entire range of Muslim leadership in North America has been how to manage the transnational dimension of Muslim identity when citizenship is national, and the fact that it had not been resolved prior to September 11 2001 would mean that the urgency of these questions would only be further heightened when the loyalty of Muslim citizens comes into question precisely because of the transnational dimensions of their faith and their religious and ethnic identities.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented some of the important trends before 9-11 in the way citizenship and faith have linked up for Muslims in North America. With the exception of Black Islam, prior to the 1980s, the dominant constellation of citizenship and faith in the 20th century for Muslims in the United States and Canada was limited to the level of civil society, the major shift being towards a national conception of Muslim identity that tried to overcome cleavages of ethnicity and sect. Even within the Black Islam movement, as we saw, the dominant trend was an attempt towards reclaiming citizenship by an ideology that often practiced separation and or isolation from non-Black communities. However, the transformation of Black Islam towards immigrant Islam and a more integrationist vision of citizenship, as well as the coming of age of the second-generation Muslim Americans and Muslim Canadians led to an increasing pressure to reconceptualise the relationship between citizenship and faith in the 1980s and 1990s towards a more nationalist understanding and identity. Along with shifts in both religious and political discourses among Muslim leaders and organizers regarding the legitimacy and obligation of full civic participation, this move towards nationalizing faith also led to a new understanding that faith required the practice of citizenship.

The end of the 1990s and specially the year 2000 marked the emergence of Muslim political actors on the national public spheres of the United States and Canada and a new sense of consensus and confidence in the possibility of Muslim citizenship. Thus, American Muslim scholar and activist Muqtedar Khan wrote in 2000:

> American Muslims have begun to believe in a manifest destiny of their own. The American Muslim community believes it has a divine mission to fulfill. Its

> enormous intellectual talent, its highly educated population, the free and even encouraging environment of the U.S., and the enthusiasm and dynamism of Islamic resurgence, all combine to give the American Muslim community an excellent opportunity not only to spread Islamic values in the West but also to influence and reshape the destiny of traditional Muslim societies (2000: 68).

Similarly, Canadian Muslim scholar Daood Hassan Hamdani proposed that "a new phase" had begun for Canadian Muslims as the 20th century drew to a close and they became the "principal non-Christian faith (1999: 197)". For Hamdani (1999), this presented the Canadian Muslim leadership with "promises [of] a higher profile and [of] a greater role in [Canadian] society (197)."

In the eve of the attacks of 9/11, emphasis was placed on the unity of Muslim leadership and the Muslim community and there were few voices of dissent in the *public sphere* with this image. However, there were still unresolved tensions regarding what unity meant, including in the area of how the challenges of transnational identities would be managed and negotiated. The attacks of September 11 are considered to have "changed the lives of North American Muslims forever (McCloud 2004: 82)". One particular aspect of the change was the spill-over of those unresolved tensions into the public sphere. Thus, while the established leadership attempted to orient themselves in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in a unified manner condemning the attacks, defending their faith and claiming loyalty to their country of citizenship, a new set of Muslim actors started to counter the picture of a unified Muslim community in both Canada and the United States. The next two chapters are geared towards delineating the shifts in the discourse of the established leadership regarding Muslim citizenship as well as the contours of a new discourse on Muslim citizenship put forward by a new set of Muslim actors who identified themselves as progressive Muslims, liberal Muslims and secular Muslims.

Table 2.1: Muslims in Canada, 1871-2001*(Source Karim 2002; Hamdani 1999)*

Census Year	1871	1931	1971	1981	1991	2001
Muslim Population	13	645	33,430	98,160	253,260	579,640
Pecentage of the Canadian Population	.000352%	0.0067%	.153%	.395%	.904%	1.95%

Figure 2.1: (Source: Census Canada 2001)



Figure 2.2a: (Source : Census Canada 2001 and Pew Muslim American Study 2007)



Figure 2.2b (Source: Census Canada 2001 and Pew Muslim American Study, 2007)





Figure 2.2c (Source: Census Canada 2001 and Pew Muslim American Study, 2007)





Figure 2.2d (Source: Census Canada 2001 and Pew Muslim American Study, 2007)





Figure 2.2e (Source: Census Canada 2001 and Pew Muslim American Study, 2007)



Figure 2.2f (Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey (PUMF) 2004 and Pew Muslims American Study 2007)





Table 2.2a: Recent Estimates of the U.S. Muslim Population (Source: Smith 2002)

Estimate Range	Number of Estimates
Less than 4 million	3
4–4.9 million	2
5–5.9 million	8
6–6.9 million	8
7 million .	2
Average of estimates	5.4 million

Table 2.2b: Recent Estimates of the U.S. Muslim Population (Source: Smith 2002)

Survey	Date	Mode	Target Population	% Muslim	N
General Social Survey (GSS)	1998	Per.	Adults	0.5	2,792
GSS	2000	Per.	Adults	0.6	2,813
Gallup	1999	Tel.	Adults	>1.0	4,788
Gallup	2000	Tel.	Adults	>1.0	3,000+
Gallup	1999-2001	Tel.	Adults	0.3	7,844
Barna	1999	Tel.	Adults	circa 0.5	2,755
American National Election Study	2000	Per. Tel.	Adults	0.2-0.4	1,807
GSS	1998	Per.	All Ages	0.6	2,792
GSS	2000	Per.	All Ages	0.5	2,813
American Freshman	2000	SAQ.	1st Year College Students	0.9	269,413

Figure 2.3 (Source: Census Canada 2001 and Pew Muslim American Study, 2007)



	Before 1961	1961-1970	1971-1980	1981-1990	1991-2001
Canada	0.24	1.68	8.76	13.46	47.59



	1979 and earlier	1980-1989	1990-1999	2000-2007
US	11	15	21	18

Table 2.3: Key Questions for the Fiqh for Minorities (Source: Al-Alwani 2004: 24-25)

Jurists concerned with a fiqh for minorities need to reflect very carefully on the key questions that arise from this subject, in order to prepare the ground fully and arrive at the true divine rulings, as far as humanly possible.	
How do members of minorities answer the questions Who are we?" and "What do we want?" in such a way that accurately reflects their particular situation and the common factors they share with others? "	Has the minority an extended existence outside the sacred land, or has it no external roots or extensions? What would be the effect of this on the majority?
What kind of majority is the minority living with? Is it authoritarian, consumed by feelings of dominance and possessiveness? Is it a majority willing to achieve a dynamic balance based on carefully considered rules that guarantee minority rights? How significant are these guarantees, and what mechanisms are in place to secure them?	What must the minority do in order to identify those parts of its culture that could become common? What parts of the majority culture can it adopt? What is the majority's role in this process?
What is the size, or weight, of the minorities we are dealing with in respect of their human, cultural, economic, and political abilities and resources?	Is the minority able to perform these activities normally, or does that require institutions and leadership to organize?
What is the extent of the interaction between members of the society? Is there interaction between the minority and majority in resources, industries, professions, and activities (rights and obligations), or is there discrimination based on laws confirming and promoting separation and segregation in all these fields?	What role do such institutions and leaders play in the lives of the minority? Do they focus more light on the minority's cultural identity?
What is the nature of the human geography of the society? Is there interaction? Are there any natural or artificial differences, disparities, or distinctions? Are there certain natural resources peculiar to the minority or the majority, or are these resources common?	Can such institutions turn into a network of interests that enhance the minority's distinctive qualities and persuade it that is cultural characteristics are the factors that identify it as a minority?

Would such institutions, unconsciously, lead members of the minority to question crucially the value or significance of these distinctive features, ask why they should not be passed on to others, or persuade the majority to adopt them?	How can the minority be educated to deal with the reactions of the majority and absorb the negative fallout without forfeiting the benefits?
If the minority is a blend of both historic and the ethnic, how can its identity be defined without risking is people being absorbed into the majority or becoming self-centered?	How can the common activities between the minority and the majority be developed and promoted? What areas have to be taken into account in this regard?
How can the special" and the "common" cultural identities be preserved and brought together at the same time? "	Has the minority any distinctive functions or activities it wishes to preserve, and what are they?
Has the minority any cultural dimension or identity that enables it, perhaps in the long run, to dominate culturally? What would be the effect of this on the majority?	

Table 2.4: New American and Canadian Muslim Political Actors in the 1980s and 1990s

Organization	Founding Date	Founder(s)	Initial Location	Motto
Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)	1988	Multiethnic, 1st generation American Muslims	Los Angeles, California	*Making Muslims Part of the Solution*
American Muslim Alliance (AMA)	1989	South Asian, 1st generation American Muslims	Fremont, California	*From Strategic Thinking to Concrete Results*
American Muslim Council (AMC)	1990	Arab leaders, 1st generation American Muslims	Washington D.C.	*Movement for Political and Civil Rights Justice for all Americans*
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)	1994	Arab leaders, 1st generation American Muslims	Washington D.C.	*In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful*
Council on American-Islamic Relations Canada (CAIR-CAN)	1994	South Asian, 2nd generation Canadian Muslims	Montreal, Quebec	*Your Voice. Your Future*
Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC)	1998	Arab leaders, 1st generation Canadian Muslims	London, Ontario	*In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful, The CIC is the independent voice of Canada's Muslims—Sunni and Shi'a, men and women, youth and seniors.*

Chapter 3: Dissent and New Diversities in Muslim Identity Discourses in the Wake of 9/11

I wept for a good hour. It was so much suffering. As a professor who teaches in this field, and as a Muslim who is committed to this religion, for it to all to come to this. It wasn't just that I was crying about the planes or the fear or the anxiety. ... I was crying over what has happened to Muslim civilization. Where are we now? I was crying over the fate of something that I love dearly, and that is Islam.

--Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl, Interview with Frontline, PBS, in response to "How did you experience 9/11?", Winter 2002

Most important, whatever we do must be united, compelling and convincing, not because we fear retaliation or harm by bigots or Islam-haters but because this is what Islamic morality teaches us. And because this is our country, and we must be at the forefront of the war against those who wish to terrorize it into abandoning its traditions of tolerance and sanctuary.

-- Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl, "US Muslims Unify and Stand up!" Opinion, *Los Angeles Times*, July 14 2002

This accusation of silence in the face of the September 11 attacks is now coupled with increasingly aggressive rhetoric about Islam being an "evil" religion and Muslims a "fifth column." Efforts to even teach about Islam in public schools and universities are now routinely attacked if they do not focus on the most extreme interpretations. When Muslims try to correct uninformed statements about Islam, we are labeled apologists. Open and honest discussion about Islam in the public is increasingly silenced by the bigoted attacks of individuals...who recently called for Muslims to apologize for the 9/11 attacks.

--Riad Z. Abdelkarim, "How American Muslims Really Responded to September 11", August 20 2002

Let us make no mistake about it: Today, Muslims have no enemy greater than fanatics in their midst...Let us know that fanaticism is ignorance; it is nothing but sickness and bigotry; let us know that fanaticism is opposed to both scripture and reason...We Muslims therefore condemn these barbaric attacks against innocent people. W*e condemn them unconditionally; we condemn them because it is opposed to reason and revelation. It is contrary to the fundamental principles of Islam which teach the sanctity of life. Make no mistake about it, We Muslims cannot be Muslims unless we affirm the sanctity of life in all forms. Let every Muslim know that there is no room in*

Islam for fanaticism, for hatred, for racism, for terrorizing innocent people, for indiscriminate killing, even in a state of war. Let us Muslims shoulder our responsibility in this crisis facing our society by distancing ourselves from all those who have perpetrated such a heinous and dastardly crime. I appeal to every Muslim to cooperate with the authorities in bringing the culprits to justice. Let no Muslim harbor such criminals in their midst; doing so is violating the laws and values that we cherish dearly in our religion.

-- Shaykh Ahmad Kutty, Friday Khutbah to Jami Mosque, Toronto, Oct 11 2001

The above set of quotes taken together capture a large part of the range of responses from the North American Muslim leadership in the wake of the attacks of 9/11: horror at what had happened, urgency to speak up for Islam and nation, for Muslims and publics, the need to show loyalty to nation and public by cooperating with authorities and distancing the faith and the community from "the culprits", as well as the need to defend the faith and the community from unjustified reactions and accusations. However, 9/11 also had the effect of giving rise to new voices and diversities among Muslim actors in North America: voices and diversities that reflected some of the tensions that the mainstream Muslim leadership of the 1990s had failed to overcome, as well as dimensions of identity, citizenship and faith that had been untapped in the mainstream Muslim discourse. This chapter describes the new voices that appeared in opposition to the mainstream Muslim leadership and identity discourse in the aftermath of September 11 2001, as well as the shifts that took place in mainstream Muslim discourse and leadership in its wake.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks in 2001, all of the major Muslim organizations across North America released press statements, both collectively and individually, generally of the following form:

> ISNA joins Muslim organizations throughout North America in condemning these terrorist attacks and calls upon Muslim Americans to come forward with their skills and resources to help alleviate the sufferings of the affected people and their families. ISNA condemns these senseless acts of terrorism against innocent

> civilians, which will only be counterproductive to any agenda the perpetrators may have had in mind. No political cause could ever be assisted by such immoral acts."[49]

These statements were usually followed by a call on restraint from public officials and media for associating a faith community with the attacks, as well as accounts of harassment faced by American and Canadian Muslims since the attacks. For example, the CAIR and CAIR-CAN press releases read:

> We call on public officials and media professionals to exercise restraint in using inflammatory language that pins the blame of the terrorist attacks on any faith or ethnic group. Using visual or oral symbols of a faith community in conjunction with the crimes of terrorists will only create more hysteria, incriminate the innocent, and possibly lead to more innocent loss of life.[50]

Nevertheless, few of these statements had the full effect intended by their release. The call to not associate the attacks with "visual or oral symbols of a faith community" was heeded to some degree by media officials, in part because of similar admonitions given by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. However, the statements made by Osama bin Laden about the attacks being in the name of Islam and for the Muslim world had a much stronger effect in associating the attacks to the faith and the faith community. One result was explosion in discussions on Islam and Muslims, which in North America transmuted itself (intended or not) into calling on Muslims in America or Canada to answer for or at least explain what had happened. While the responsibility of having to explain what had happened was falling on Muslim individuals from their neighbours, co-workers, and non-Muslim friends and acquaintances (Abdo

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[49] ISNA Press Statement, September 11 2001. Retrieved at: http://web.archive.org/web/20011214123731/www.isna.net/news.asp?view=detail&id=21 The statement was signed by American Muslim Alliance, American Muslim Council, Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers, Association of Muslim Social Scientists, Council on American-Islamic Relations (including CAIR-Can), Islamic Medical Association of North America, Islamic Circle of North America, Islamic Society of North America, Ministry of Imam W. Deen Mohammed, Muslim American Society, Muslim Public Affairs Council

[50] CAIR and CAIR-CAN Press Release, September 14 2001: Retrieved at http://www.caircan.ca/itn_more.php?id=A59_0_2_0_M

2006), there was an equivalent process occurring in the public sphere from the media. What surprised the pre-9/11 network of mainstream Muslim actors was that it was not their statements or their spokespersons who were being asked to respond to the questions being asked by the media. After all, as we saw in the last chapter, not only had they been attempting to establish their presence at the national level for a decade or so, they also considered themselves the voice of moderation in the North American Muslim community. Instead, the search by the media for "moderate Muslims" produced an eclectic array of voices speaking for Islam and Muslims (Leonard 2003; Hermansen 2004): some religious leaders like Shayk Hamza Yusuf of the Zaytuna Insitute, some social scientists like Muqtedar Khan, some Islamic scholars like Khaled Abou El Fadl, and some journalists like Irshad Manji and Mona Eltahawy.

Most of these early commentators were identified as "moderates" and were claimed to be speaking for a "moderate majority" or the "silent majority" of Muslim populations in North America. However, they were also often critical of both the Muslim community in North America as well as "the Muslim leadership" in North America. Thus, Khan wrote an article entitled "A Memo to American Muslims" on October 5th 2001, which got circulated around major newspapers around the United States[51]:

> It is time that we acknowledge that the freedoms we enjoy in the US are more desirable to us than superficial solidarity with the Muslim World. If you disagree than [sic] prove it by packing your bags and going to whichever Muslim country you identify with. If you do not leave and do not acknowledge that you would rather live here than anywhere else, know that you are being hypocritical. It is time that we faced these hypocritical practices and struggled to transcend them. It is time that American Muslim leaders fought to purify their own lot.[52]

[51] For example, in the Washington Post (November 19 2001), in USA Today (January 1st 2002). The memo itself is said to have gotten 230,000 hits on Khan's own website ijtihad.org which is a self-syndicated column.

[52] Muqtedar Khan, *A Memo to American* Muslims, October 5th 2001, http://www.ijtihad.org/memo.htm, retrieved on September 15 2006.

Khaled El Fadl, on July 14th 2002 wrote in an op-ed in the *LA Times*:

> the leadership of these [Muslim American] organizations has failed to establish its credibility and to convince the American public of the outrage felt by most Muslims over the tragedy of Sept. 11. Various individuals and particular organizations have issued isolated condemnations, but to date there has not been something unified and overwhelming. Muslim leadership has failed, and it has blamed everyone but itself for this failure.[53]

These articles caused controversy in the ranks of Muslim leadership in North America.[54] It was seen by many as not only an incorrect portrayal of Muslim sentiments in North America, but also a betrayal to the community at a point that it felt vulnerable. After all, it was Khan who had celebrated the Muslim leadership and community in the States for their maturation and progress over the 1990s and had exulted in 2000 about the "manifest destiny" of American Muslims. For Khan, though, the memo was a call to action on the Muslim leadership in North America to "to lead the American Muslim community in soul searching, reflection and reassessment." Khan found that in the context of the attacks, the new manifest destiny of American Muslims was to "police our world. It is our responsibility to prevent people from abusing Islam. It is our job to ensure that Islam is not misrepresented. We should have made sure that what happened on September 11th should never have happened." That failure was for Khan a consequence of the "practice of hypocrisy on a grand scale" by the American Muslim community regarding their active criticism of American

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[53] El Fadl, Khaled Abou. "US Muslims, Unify and Stand Up!" *The Los Angeles Times:* Commentary, July 14 2002.

[54] For example, CAIR-LA responded to El Fadl's criticisms by point out that perhaps he had missed out on the all the work being done by CAIR about condemning the terrorist attacks of 9/11. CAIR-LA Press Statement, July 18th 2002. El Fadl in turn responded to CAIR on July 20th 2002 saying that while he knew of all of the responses CAIR pointed to, "What [he] found missing [after September 11th 2001] is what might be called a *proportional* public relations campaign." He continued, "Certainly, a Muslim American campaign existed, but, in my view, it was not proportional to gravity of events and accusations leveled against us. When someone threatens you with a tank, you cannot respond with a handgun. We needed to respond with a concerted, systematic, unified, and unrelenting effort, considering the stakes and dangers to our religion.

foreign policy without an equivalent criticism of the wrongs carried out by Muslim states and Muslim communities in the world. According to Khan, 9/11 was a wake-up call to shift the content of participation by American Muslims: " It is time the leaders of the American Muslim Community woke up and realized that there is more to life than competing with American Jewish lobby for power over US foreign policy." This imperative came from the fact that "The worst exhibition of Islam happened on our turf. We must take first responsibility to undo the evil it has manifest. This is our mandate, our burden and also our opportunity." El Fadl wrote in a similar spirit, "Most important, whatever we do must be united, compelling and convincing, not because we fear retaliation or harm by bigots or Islam-haters but because this is what Islamic morality teaches us. And because this is our country, and we must be at the forefront of the war against those who wish to terrorize it into abandoning its traditions of tolerance and sanctuary."[55]

These commentaries reflected the rise of oppositional voices to the mainstream Muslim leadership in North America after the attacks of 2001. In the eve of 9/11, the discourse on Muslim citizenship and faith in North America had been dominated by the existing leadership of organizations like ISNA, MPAC, CAIR, CIC and CAIR-CAN. Of course, as we saw in the last chapter there were divisions in the community and among the leadership itself as to what citizenship implicated and what were the obligations imposed by faith on the enactment and meaning of citizenship. However, these divisions and debates had been taken place internally and it reflected the position among Muslim activists that these organizations and the Muslim communities it attracted was the site of where consensus had to be built. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the scramble for finding moderate Muslims by media and some political figures, a new set of actors emerged who imagined a different way of being Muslim and American or Muslim and Canadian from what had been articulated by the mainstream actors before 9/11. Moreover, they were not necessarily interested in articulating their different

[55] El Fadl, Khaled Abou. "US Muslims, Unify and Stand Up!" *The Los Angeles Times:* Commentary, July 14 2002.

visions in private, i.e., outside of public scrutiny, in the conference rooms of organizations and meetings between and with board of advisors.

In addition, they were also claiming to speak for a different kind of Muslim citizen in North America—one that challenged the vision of who an American/Canadian Muslim was. That vision, strangely enough, was held in common by both the mainstream Muslim activist community and the politically correct public. [56] It was the vision of a Muslim citizen as one who was visibly religious (hijab or beard, visible minority—often Arab or Middle Eastern, mosque attending). Both also imagined that for American or Canadian Muslims, citizenship mattered in the three following ways: making claims against exclusion based on religious practice, making claims to build communities of faith through religious and community institutions, consequently supporting various multiculturalist polices or initiatives by public institutions, and the foreign policy positions of their government (American or Canadian) on mainly the Palestine-Israel issue. Evidently, valuation of these images by Muslim actors and non-Muslim actors often diverged. Addressing this divergence in valuation was in part the target of the various "educational campaigns" led by mainstream Muslim actors in the pre-9/11 context. However, the new Muslim voices were not interested in removing the stigma associated with this image of the North American Muslim; instead, they were challenging the image itself and mobilizing different images of how citizenship and faith linked up for Muslim citizens in North America.

[56] When I say this image is shared by the non-Muslim public, I am referring to the more politically correct mainstream image of Muslims before 9/11. There is of course a second image of the Muslim that is present in the public space, what Mona Eltahawy likes to refer to as "the Angry Muslim": violent, dangerous, foreign. While that image has been utilized more with foreign than domestic Muslims prior to 9/11, the rapidity with which the two have been conflated both in the time of the first Gulf War as well as in the aftermath of 9/11, speaks to the how the image resonates in the North American context. Nevertheless, my point here is that in the public space, what the "good Muslim" looked like was not all that far off from what the mainstream Muslim leadership imagine it looked like. They differed mainly in that the "good Muslim" for the non-Muslim public was probably "too Muslim for North America" or "not American enough" (Mamdani 2004).

This chapter is focused on examining these oppositional voices and the identities they represent. In particular I explore the emergence of *progressive*, *liberal*, and *secular* Muslims as oppositional voices to the mainstream Muslim leadership in North America. To my knowledge, this is the first systematic account of the different kinds of oppositional voices in North America.[57] Research examining the range of responses by Muslim actors since 9/11 in North America has focused on the various dynamics and challenges faced by the mainstream leadership and the community at large (Haddad 2002; Bukhari et al 2004; Geaves et al 2004; Abdo 2006; Ewing 2008). The new voices have generally been either ignored or discounted for their marginality in the community or to the mainstream leadership. When they have been discussed, the focus has been on the favourable opportunity structure presented to them by 9/11 where voices critical of Muslim activism and advocacy have gained support in the media and the public. The latter is important in explaining *the public space they have been granted* in presenting their claims and their representations of Muslim citizenship. Importantly, though, it does *not* explain those claims and representations themselves.

Moreover, it also fails to understand the dynamic between oppositional and mainstream Muslim actors as competing claims of what it means to be a Muslim citizen (in a non-Muslim context); as well, it misses the impact of these new representations from within the community on the mainstream Muslim leadership's image of Muslim citizenship. The analysis of the various dimensions of a new discourse on citizenship and faith by a wider scope of Muslim voices will be the focus of the next chapter. Specifically, I will compare in the next chapter the variations in North American Muslim activist discourse in how dimensions of citizenship (rights, practice and identity) and Islamic faith

[57] Modood and Ahmad (2007) have identified another classification of Muslim perspectives on British multiculturalism in Great Britain among the contentious term of "moderate Muslims": traditionalist, modernist, philosophical, and existentialist. These labels were derived in relation to the perspective of Islam that the subjects of their study manifested in their positions and stances. Unlike the classification in this study for the oppositional actors, the labels in Modood and Ahmad (2007) were not self-identifications, but are nevertheless analytically interesting.

(authority, modernism) link up since 9/11. However, before I can do so, I need to present the emergence of these oppositional voices and identities and the key actors involved in articulating them in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, which is what the rest of the chapter is focused on.

3.1 New Diversities of "Moderate Muslims" to Contend With: Progressive, Liberal and Secular

I mentioned earlier that in the wake of the attacks in 2001, there was a search for "moderate Muslims". All of the existing organizations presented themselves as "moderate Muslims": Salaam Al-Marayaati, the Executive Director of MPAC wrote an article in 2002 on "The Rising Voice of Moderate Muslims", in part to articulate what they meant. However, the label moderate was muddled from the beginning in its use in the media and the political spheres. In part, this was because it was being claimed by and applied to anyone who condemned the attacks, argued for an Islam that was not fundamentalist or extremist, labels that were also without much consistency in their application[58]. Established and emerging Muslim leaders in North America both became increasingly frustrated as the label of "moderate" became a political tool of distinguishing "good Muslim" from "bad Muslim" (Mamdani 2004). John L. Esposito, Director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, expressed the arbitrary nature of this process when he

[58] In the Doha Debates held on February 28th 2006, when asked to define extremism, Hamza Yusuf and Dr. John Esposito tried to make distinctions between fundamentalism and extremism, between literalist interpretations and interpretations that justified violence. This differentiation was repeated by most established Muslim leaders in North America during a workshop I attended on Islamophobia organized by the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding in Georgetown University, on September 20th 2007, which was attended by presidents of CAIR, MPAC, AMPAC, ambassadors from the Organization of Islamic Conference, leading imams such as Shaykh Abdal Hakim Jackson (Sherman Jackson): a point of consensus among these leaders was that extremism lies with those ideologies that support violence against innocent citizens of any faith or country, while fundamentalism is part of a range of views that regard the way the Qur'an is approached as a text and Islam as a faith. Because of the connotation of fundamentalism in Western culture, many Muslim leaders have chosen to avoid the use of the term but they still want to underscore the difference between extremism and Islamic schools that opt for a literalist reading of the text or look back to an idealized point in Islamic history. I will discuss some of their points further below in this chapter when I describe the shifts in the discourses of mainstream Muslim leadership after 9/11.

described how media and government officials were repeatedly calling up the center asking for a list of moderate Muslims or a verification of whether panellists, commentators, invited guests were moderate Muslims or not.[59] Although the label of "moderate" continues to be applied, it is claimed by only a few North American Muslim actors as an activist identity. Instead, North American Muslim actors have attempted to differentiate the scope of "moderate" Muslim viewpoints through other labels, more of their own making: reformist, liberal, secular, progressive, traditional (-ist), orthodox, classical.[60]

As a result of the politicization of "moderate Muslim" since 2002, most organizations and actors who were part of the Muslim leadership prior to the attacks of 9/11 have generally avoided the use of these labels altogether after 2002: While some of these religious leaders, Muslim academics, and activists will utilize "traditional", "orthodox" or "classical" to explain their particular affinities in Islam in a language that may be more legible for non-Muslim publics, they have generally favoured the use of more common Muslim distinctions: Sunni, Shi'ite, and the major Islamic schools of thought. The strategy among most of the mainstream Muslim leadership has been to first identify oneself as an

[59] John L. Esposito: " To give you the most bizarre example post 9/11, from my point of view, is the situation in the United States at times when you will get a phone call and somebody will say, 'We want to meet with a group of moderate Muslims, can you give me a list?' as if it's a shortlist. 'Or we have a group here that wants to go up to Congress and they're Muslim leaders. Can you look it over and let us know whether or not they're moderate Muslims?'", *The Doha Debates*, February 28 2006, Transcript at http://www.thedohadebates.com/debates/debate.asp?d=33&s=2&mode=transcript. Dr. Esposito referred me to this discussion when I was a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University during 2007-2008 under the US-Canada Fulbright Fellowship.

[60] An example of the rejection of the "moderate" label came from a discussion arranged by the Muslim Public Affairs Council between young American Muslim activists and the Department of Homeland Security in Washington D.C during the first two-day National Muslim American Youth Summit (July 13-14 2007) . During the discussion, all of the young American Muslim activists present called for a change in the use of "moderate". Their reason was two-fold: a) Moderate seemed to call for Muslims to be only "moderately" Muslims—thus signalling against public expressions of piousness and strength of faith; b) the attachment of the adjective moderate to Muslims gave the impression that the Muslim community was divided between moderate vs. radical/extremist Muslims in some sort of equal proportions. Instead, they advised DHS officials that a better term would be mainstream or traditional Muslims for those who are more religious.

American/Canadian Muslim, and then if necessary explain the various Islamic sects and schools of thought that exist, followed by explaining, again if necessary, the various ethnic origins of Muslims in North America. This ordering of the Muslim identity was, as we saw in the last chapter, the result of the various processes by which the Muslim identity was nationalized in the 1980s and 1990s in North America. The goal and product had been an American or Canadian Muslim identity, rooted in Islamic schools of thought, not "tribal baggage". There was a second reason also for the reluctance to use "moderate": associating moderate to a Muslim or Islamic identity positions a religious identity in a political spectrum, and could reinforce a public image of Islam as a political religion, something that mainstream Muslim leadership were trying to discount in the post-9/11 context.[61] While the prevalence among North American Muslim communities of this way of claiming Muslim identity in North America was by no means perfect in the pre-9/11 context, for those already involved in the existing network of North American Muslim leadership, this *was* the standard.

However, the attacks of 2001 resulted in the emergence of a new set of very public Muslim diversities—diversities that reflected more the political discourses of North America and modernist Islam rather than histories of ethnic identities or even sectarian divisions. The most common labels claimed for these diversities have been: progressive, liberal, secular or liberal-secular. "Reformist" floats around some Muslim intellectual-activist circles, but the general trend has been to identify reform as the process by which a particular Islam (liberal, secular, progressive) can be achieved.[62] In fact, as we will see later on in this chapter, despite the differences among progressive, liberal and secular Muslim activists, what they share in common is a call to reform *Islam* as opposed to the mainstream

[61] Tahra Goraya, Deputy Director and Chief Operating Officer of CAIR (2007-2008), Interview, Oct 24th 2007, Washington D.C.

[62] Irshad Manji calls herself "radical traditionalist", although it is not a label that has been taken up by anybody else. Tarek Fatah, founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, labels himself "liberal-secular" as do most members of the MCC. Others like Omid Safi, founder of the Progressive Muslims Union of North America, call themselves "progressive". Zahid Jasser, founder of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, calls himself secular.

leadership's approach that calls for reform in the *practices* of Muslims. Moreover, these discussions about reform in both mainstream and oppositional discourses, as I show in the fourth and sixth chapters, are not only about Islam or religious identity—they are central to the various way that (American/Canadian) citizenship and the nation are conceived by the range of Muslim actors. Nevertheless, the variations in the oppositional discourses have impacted the mainstream Muslim discourse in complex ways, and thus it is important to understand the content and actors that populate each of these different identifiers that have been mobilized since 9/11.

3.1.1 Progressive Muslims

The newest term in the North American context has been "progressive" and, compared to the other major oppositional voices, it has also achieved the most organizational form in the post-9/11 period. This is manifest in the establishment of organizations that identify with the label directly in their names such as the Progressive Muslims Union of North America (PMUNA, f. 2004), Progressive Muslims Union (PMU, f. 2005), Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV, f. 2007), Progressive Muslims Network-DC (PMN-DC, f. 2007), Progressive Muslims Network (f. 2007). In addition, the series of discussion forums identifying with the progressive Muslim identity are also reflective of the new movement: These discussion forums include monthly meet-ups of groups such as "Free Muslims Against Terrorism" (Washington DC), "Muslims Against Terrorism" (Toronto), "Progressive Muslim Meetup Groups" (41 such groups across North America)[63], as well as online discussion forums such as ProgrsesiveIslam.com, muslimwakeup.com, ProgressiveMuslims.org.

[63] The website http://progmuslim.meetup.com/ lists the locations of 41 different meet-up groups, located mainly throughout the East Coast in North America and metropolitan areas such as Toronto and San Francisco. The two most active groups according to interviews with Tarek Fatah, Farzana Hassan, Munir Pervez, and Laurie Sylver, as well as New York Times articles, Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star are the Toronto Progressive Muslims Meetup group and the New York Progressive Muslims Meetup group. Obviously, like the problem with membership numbers of mainstream groups such as CAIR, CAIR-CAN, MPAC, and CIC, these listings of membership and

Before 1983, the label "Progressive Islam", was used sporadically by scholars as synonymous with modernist Islam. It was first differentiated from the anti-colonialist modernist Islamic discourse by Suroosh Irfani in his study on Iran in 1983, entitled *Iran's Islamic revolution : popular liberation, or religious dictatorship*? Other than in Iran, as a movement distinct from modernist movements (such as in Malaysia or Indonesia), it has been documented only in South Africa (Edeiris 1991; Esack 1988) and in Pakistan (Alatas 1954; Irfani 1985). In 1998, starting in Toronto and expanding outwards, a small network of activists and scholars, located both in the Western and non-Western worlds, calling themselves the Progressive Muslim Network (PMN)[64], started an e-discussion group with the aim of defining "Progressive Islam".[65] It produced a declaration on the precepts of Progressive Islam in 1999 (Esack 2003). The declaration reflected a process of consensus building between a diverse set of Muslim activists and scholars that shared in common a vision and understanding of Islam as a social justice movement, opposed to "sexism, racism and environmental degradation (Esack 2003: 93)" and strongly affiliated to the anti-imperialist ideologies of post-colonial movements. As such, the declaration defines Progressive Islam as: "that understanding of Islam and its sources which comes from and is shaped within a commitment to transform society from an unjust one where people are mere objects of exploitation by governments, socio-

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chapters, specially of informal gatherings without official status are unreliable. Nevertheless, the efforts by some actors to claim organizational efforts and constituencies and civil society status are reflective of an *emergent* identity. Moreover, according to active members of some of these groups and certain new studies such as Hermansen (2004), the establishment of these discussion groups is not false and the numbers tend to be accurate at the level of average attendance.

[64] This 1998 version of the PMN has no actual affiliation or continuity with the 2007 PMN.

[65] This was accounted during interviews with Tarek Fatah and Attiq Azard, both involved in the PMN discussions. Farid Esack, South African scholar and activist famous for his development of a liberation theology in Islam, and also part of the PMN also describes this in his essay in the 2003 *Progressive Muslims* text. Moreover, the home page of the PMN can be viewed through the internet archive source Wayback Machine at: http://web.archive.org/web/20020403150253/www.progressivemuslims.com/index2.html

economic institutions and unequal relationships."[66] Nevertheless, after the writing of the declaration, the PMN produced little else until the attacks of 9/11.

At that point, some members of the PMN located in Canada and the United States started a second round of discussions with other Islamic scholars around the two countries. The product of that discussion over "600 e-mails and hours of phone conversations" during the course of 2002 produced in 2003 a text of 15 essays edited by Omid Safi, an American Muslim Professor of religious studies at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, titled *Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism*. During the course of my interviews with activists that identify themselves as progressive Muslims, as well as the process of documenting the materials and publications produced by these activists, I have found that the book became a guide for the progressive Muslim movement since its publication. As such, it provides an important insight into the progressive Muslim identity.

In the introduction to the book, Safi discusses the choice of "progressive Muslim" over "liberal", "reformist/reform" and "critical" Muslim as identifiers. The consideration of "reformist" or "reform" is based on the fact that "the progressive Muslim project represents an ongoing attempt at an Islamic *ijtihad*, or committed critical thinking based on disciplined but independent reasoning to come up with solutions to new problems (Safi 2003: 8)." An important part of this project "is to account for and challenge the great impoverishment of thought and spirit brought forth by Muslim literalist-excluvists (Safi 2003: 8)." Several authors in the text (for example, El Fadl and Moosa), in this spirit, attempt to develop ways of reading and interpreting the Qur'an and engaging the Islamic tradition in a manner that attempts to overcome what they see as the tendency to

[66] The Declaration originally was located at http://www.progressivemuslims.com/index2.html However, the site has expired and the declaration is no longer available through the site. The actual declaration can still be found through the internet web archive project Wayback Machine at : http://web.archive.org/web/20020810131337/http://www.progressivemuslims.com/progislam.html

engage in "text fundamentalism". Text fundamentalism, according to them, manifests in two ways. One form is what all "moderate" Muslim leadership in North America rejects: the understanding that "we" must live literally with the values and practices of a past idealized community. The other form is what progressive Muslims label as the politics of Islamic apologetics. Mainstream Muslim leadership tends to engage in the practice of "justifying the past by today's standards." The point of contention is with the practice of reading into historical Muslim communities the principles of the values "we" value today: "In order to persuade people in public discourse today, the most effective psychological trick to play on unsuspecting Muslim audiences is to say that some past authority...held such an enlightening position on matter X, so why do you lesser mortals not adopt it (Moosa 2003: 122)?" Rejecting this need for apologetics, the progressive Muslim movement calls for "greater confidence" among Muslims in "our present sense of justice and equality (Moosa 2003: 121)". This form of engagement recalls the modernist (or renewalist) call for a continuous reinterpretation of the ethical ideal in the Islamic tradition that I discussed in my first chapter. By pointing out that our contemporary ethical ideal may differ from those Muslim communities who came before us, including the community of the Prophet, and that there is a contemporary task to re-read the Islamic tradition in light of a new ethical ideal, the progressive Muslim movement is engaged in a project of reform.

Safi explains that despite the importance of reform to the movement, progressive Muslims rejected the label "reformist" for strategic reasons. They did not want the movement to be conflated to the perceived dynamics, consequences and connotations of the Protestant Reformation: "Ours is not a project of developing a "Protestant" Islam distinct from a "Catholic" Islam (Safi 2003: 14)". Moreover, he specifies that unlike the activists of the Protestant Reformation, progressive Muslims are not interested in "creating a further split within the Muslim community (2003: 14)" but instead "to heal it and urge it along (2003: 15)". Safi's justification and differentiation suffers from defining the goals of the

16th century Reformation by the consequences of the movement itself. However, it also reflects a desire to distance the progressive Muslim identity and agenda from the politics of historical analogy. As he explains, the burden of the history of the Protestant Reformation is that it split the Christian community through a process that was tumultuous, violent and painful. This is the vision which is conjured up by some Muslim leaders (in North American and elsewhere) when other Muslims call for an Islamic Reformation. The main thrust in these statements is an accusation against reformists of wanting to divide the *ummah* and to tear it from its past.[67] Wanting to defend against these types of accusations and concerns, progressive Muslims, are reluctant to call their agenda one of an Islamic Reformation. Moreover, there was also a concern on the part of progressive Muslims, that in the wake of 9/11, the *loudest* calls in North America for an Islamic Reformation have come from not only individuals who were non-Muslims but perceived by North American Muslims as highly prejudicial against Islam and Muslims, namely characters such as Daniel Pipes, Bernard Lewis, Steve Emerson. As such, for a movement that was trying explicitly to not create "rupture" and to speak for Muslims, an explicit identification with reformist carried "baggage" that they were "uneasy" with (Safi 2003: 15).

Further on Safi writes:

[67] I have observed these kinds of statements in speeches presented by Hamza Yusuf, Jamal Badawi, and Suhaib Webb in the annual ISNA conventions of 2007 and 2008. In the case that it is unclear or assumed otherwise, these figures were not using a language of threats and accusations. Instead, they were concerned about what could be the consequences for the Muslim community if change and renewal were pursued without being cognizant of what the historical Reformation had been. While I will discuss this further on in the section on renewal and reform, I wanted to emphasize here that these were *not* statements which in any way or form threatened or labelled individuals and movements. However, as movement activists, oppositional voices including progressive Muslims tend to be aware of the strategic pitfalls implicated by such statements. My emphasis here, that these statements are not threats or calls to label others as apostates is motivated by the willingness of many oppositional Muslim activists (and non-Muslim actors) to impute these meanings into the statements as a result of what some individual Muslims may think or say in other spaces (physical or virtual spaces). From my own observations, mainstream Muslim leaders such as Yusuf, Badawi and others, tend to immediately accompany their statements regarding oppositional Muslim voices and ideas with warnings to their audiences to not act in ways that lack 'adab (compassion): i.e., to refrain from calling other Muslims *kufir (*un-believer) or accuse Muslims of *ridda* or *irtidad* (apostasy).

> Some [in our group] suggested the label "liberal Muslim". It is certainly true that on many social issues most of us find ourselves on the "left", so to speak. But many progressive Muslims also do not agree with the connotation of liberal as "loose, not strict," as if progressive are only *loosely* Muslim, and they can be progressive only because they are not *strictly* following Islamic teachings (2003: 17)."

Thus, while liberal identifies in many ways the politics of the progressive Muslim movement regarding its valuation of human rights, social equality and pluralism, the rejection of liberal, like the rejection of reformist, is strategic. It is strategic because "liberal" presents itself, especially in recent North American public discourse, as an easy target for marginalization in faith communities. As various research of religion and faith in North America have pointed out, there is a tendency in popular discourse to identify only those who attend church (or the equivalent of church in other religious traditions) and participate in more "traditional" or "conservative" rituals of their religion as "true believers" (Bibby 2002; Hoover 1998). One consequence of this is that when religion and faith enter political discussions, those being asked to speak for religion are asked to be iconic of such true believers. This bias, though, towards understanding religiosity by markers of "traditional" rituals and affiliation with religious organizations are not only held by secular publics or secular media institutions at large, but also by faith communities themselves. Safi and other progressive Muslims feared that "liberal" would have only further reinforced this bias. Progressive Muslims recognize that their daily practice of Islam diverges from how the regular mosque goers and more traditionally oriented Muslims practice Islam. One of the founding directors of the Progressive Muslims Union in North America (PMUNA), Ahmed Nassef said in 2004, that he hoped that the progressive Muslim movement would become the voice of the non-mosque affiliated North American Muslims.[68] In fact, some progressive Muslim activists tend to argue that they speak for the actual (silent) majority of North American Muslims, often

[68] Zoll, Rachel. "Progressive American Muslims Push for Reinterpretation of Islam" in USA Today, October 7th 2004. The article quoted from press statement released by Ahmed Nassef as part of preparations of the launch of the PMUNA in November 2004.

citing as evidence the fact that the majority of Muslims living in North America are not affiliated with a mosque. For progressive Muslims, affiliation with a mosque is neither a necessary nor a sufficient marker of strength of belief and identity in Islam. After all, Islam only mandates prayer in congregation for the *jummah* (Friday) prayer; otherwise, the five daily prayers are obligatory but not in congregation, and moreover, congregation in Islam does not require a mosque. Similarly, progressive Muslims often differ in their adherence to other popular markers of religiosity, such as the wearing of the *hijab* or *jilab* by women (although, a small proportion of progressive Muslim women wear the *hijab*, such as scholar-activist Amina Wadud). In their view, their adherence to the five pillars of Islam and the *shahadah* (the articulation of faith) as well as to the meaning they attach to faith for their identities are the markers of the "strictness" and "strength" of their faith. However, since "liberal Muslim" may implicate otherwise and thus reduce their legitimacy in the discourse on Muslim identity in the public sphere and in their own communities, they decided to not adopt it.

In addition to the strategic rejection of "liberal" as an identity marker for the movement, there was also an ideational reason. Safi writes, "[I]n our view many self-declared "liberal Muslims" have been too enamored with modernity, too eager to identify themselves wholeheartedly with European and American structures of power. In the end, they have proven unable and unwilling to adopt a critical stance against the injustices of *both* Muslim societies *and* Western hegemony (2003: 17)." The essays in the text by Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl and Farid Esack further develop this critique of a liberal Islam that embraces modernity uncritically. As such, they tend to reject ideas such as the need for an equivalent of the 17th century European Enlightenment for the Muslim world (Moosa 2003), a call that is often articulated by liberal Muslim activists. Moreover, they also tend to reject the liberal Muslim "premise that fundamentalism was perhaps the most important issue facing the world, and the events of September 11 the single-most important event that required a radical shift in Muslim responses to modernity and being in the world (Esack 2003: 82)."

For progressive Muslims, instead, "the most important issue facing the world" is injustice as articulated in the 1998 declaration by the PMN. This is why the 2003 text identifies justice as the first issue that the progressive Muslim movement is geared towards both attaining it and as first principle from which their understanding of Islam takes off.

Apart from adjectives reformist and liberal, "critical" had also been considered as an identifier to the movement. The reason was because "critique" is considered to be a central dimension of the movement's goal and practice. Critique is understood as resistance to creating ahistorical accounts of Islam and Muslims. Defensive and reactionary statements by mainstream Muslim leadership and non-Muslim actors claiming "Islam is a religion of peace" is, for progressive Muslims, *equivalent* to the Orientalist renderings of Islam and Muslims because they both rely on essentialization and reductionism. Thus, critique requires the act of

> chronicl[ing] the spectrum of Muslim practices and interpretations for both ourselves and society at large. We cannot and should not single out only sublime examples that are likely to be palatable to a non-Muslim public, just as we would not want the xenophobes to focus exclusively on the fanatical fringe of Muslim societies (Safi, 2003: 21).

Moreover, in the same vein the liberal Muslim act of denying the "fanatic" as a Muslim by statements such as "Osama bin Laden is not a Muslim" is also seen as an instance of the same essentializaiton and reductionism. Progressive Muslim identity calls for a critical engagement with the historical traditions in Islam in its entirety. As we saw earlier, Progressive Muslims detract any tendency to bypass Islamic scholarship and to engage in the practice of "text fundamentalism" by looking at the Qur'an as the only text by which Islamic principles justifying particular values (liberal or otherwise) and practices can be determined. There is call in the progressive Muslim movement to reinterpret the ethical ideal of the faith in light of "our world" and "our place", which may very well produce laws and practices that are markedly different from the traditions of

Muslim communities of the past. For example, regarding gender justice, an issue of primary importance to the progressive Muslim movement, Kecia Ali, feminist-scholar-American Muslim activist, finds problematic the North American Muslim practice of selectively choosing the verses that reflect equality between men and women to defend Islam. She says, "Those verses...are a great starting point...but let's be honest about the whole spectrum of what the Qur'an says, both the conservative part as well as the progressive part."[69] She writes, "A serious analysis of traditional jurisprudential logic leads me to the conclusion that a new jurisprudence is required. It cannot be achieved piecemeal, or through strategies of patching together acceptable rules from different schools. Nor can it be sidestepped by exclusive focus on scripture. There is no getting around law; we must understand it, then work to replace it (2003: 166)."

Critique as chronicling is, thus, supposed to lead to reform in direction of values held to be important to progressive Muslims, social justice, gender justice and pluralism. It is obvious from this that for the founders of the movement, critique is integral as method and practice. However, since the understanding of critique in this manner is different from its popular connotation where it is "taken to refer to those who criticize" progressive Muslims rejected the label of "critical" as a primary identifier of their movement. The concern was that "Critical Muslims" can sound like a bunch of whiners who sit around and complain...without the attempt to change realities...at the ground level (Safi 2003 18)." This concern though reflects a larger problem in the progressive Muslim movement: a tension between its intellectual *vs* its non-intellectual activists. In fact, the tension actually extends to a tension between the progressive Muslim *scholars* vs. progressive Muslim activists who are not scholars. In the latter group the "clear" lines of boundary drawn by the scholars between liberal and progressive become more blurred. This became most evident in the events that occurred in the founding of the Progressive Muslims Union of North America in

[69] Kecia Ali, Interview with Speaking of Faith® from American Public Media, July 28th 2005, retrieved at http://speakingoffaith.publicradio.org/programs/progressiveislam/index.shtml on September 1st 2007.

2004. However, before I discuss this, let me discuss briefly what the liberal and secular Muslims identifiers have meant for Muslim activists in North America.

3.1.2 Liberal Muslims

Unlike the newness of the progressive identifier in movements focused on reform in Islam, "liberal" Islam and "liberal" Muslim have a longer history. Liberal Islam is rooted in anti-colonial movements in the 19th century and a discourse of European liberalism adopted by Muslim intellectuals of that movement. Liberal Muslims tended to emphasize reforming Islam in directions that were the anti-authoritarian and anti-totalitarian (Kurzman 1998). In the Muslim world today, there are still movements that identify themselves as liberal in this sense. One repeated critique that liberal movements have faced is that they are not critical (enough) of colonialism in its historical or current form. For more fundamentalist movements, this critique, as we saw in our discussion in the first chapter, is based on asserting a singular (and unchangeable) difference between Western vs. Islamic concepts and therefore practices and institutions (Hoebink 1998). Liberal Muslims, along with progressive Muslims, deny the existence of such singular divisions. However, progressive Muslims tend to argue that liberal Muslims tend to conflate universal concepts to Western *forms* and thus fail to envision other forms of practices and institutions that embody the same concepts: freedom, justice, pluralism (Esack 2003; Moosa 2003).

While North American liberal Muslims advocate the anti-authoritarian pro-democracy stance taken by liberal Muslim movements in Muslim-majority nations, their focus has shifted regarding North American Muslim communities. Although, often highly critical of each other, self-identified liberal actors such as American Muslim scholar-activist Muqtedar Khan, American-based journalist Mona Eltahawy, Canadian Muslim author-activist Irshad Manji and the American Islamic Congress emphasize a reform in Islam centered on the notion of

individual rights.[70] The focus is both on "freedom" and "independent thinking" as important dimensions of how reform can be practiced to realize ideals of equality and tolerance. Perhaps a symbolic, but nevertheless significant, example of what some see as the dividing line between progressive and liberal Muslim is what language is used to discuss the issue of gender: Liberal Muslims, unequivocally, articulate the importance of achieving gender equality in the language of *women's rights*. In contrast, progressive Muslims frame the issue through the language of *gender justice*. While this difference between justice vs. rights is important for progressive Muslims, it is less important for liberal Muslims. Many liberal Muslims see themselves to have an affinity with much of what is expressed in the progressive Muslim discourse outlined above, regarding issues of social justice, gender justice, and a commitment to pluralism. As such most of the liberal oppositional voices in the wake of 9/11 have publicly endorsed the organizational efforts of the progressive Muslim movement in North America. In fact, both Muqtedar Khan and Mona Eltahawy were on the advisory boards of the PMUNA when it formed in 2004. Moreover, liberal Muslims tend to often use the labels modernist and progressive interchangeably with liberal, as has been the general trend in renewalist movements during colonial and contemporary times among Muslim communities.

In fact, it is progressive Muslims who tend to draw clearer ideological lines against liberal Muslims, based on criteria of who is too liberal (Irshad Manji) and who is sufficiently progressive (Mona Eltahawy). The point of tension seems to be a lack of two things among liberal Muslims: a post-modernist project and a systematic engagement with the body of Islamic knowledge and traditions (Esack

[70] For instances of such self-identifications: Khan ("Who are Moderate Muslims", ijtihad.org, Dec 04 2002) retrieved at http://web.archive.org/web/20021204221341/www.ijtihad.org/moderatemuslims.htm; Eltahawy (biography on personal website and blog), retrieved at http://www.monaeltahawy.com/ as well as in her column on the Muslim WakeUp! Online magazine, see for example http://www.muslimwakeup.com/main/archives/2006/11/003076print.php; Manji ("Under the Cover of Islam", New York Times, Op-ed, Nov 18 2004); AIC, Interview with founding member and president Zainab Al-Suwaij, Dec 05 2007, Washington D.C.)

2003; Safi 2003; El Fadl 2003). Liberal Muslims on the other hand have not drawn such boundary lines against progressive Muslims. Nevertheless, or perhaps precisely because of this, there has been no identifiable liberal Muslim movement in North America. Unlike the progressive Muslim movement, oppositional Muslim voices using the "liberal" label have been individual activists either associated with a range of progressive or secular Muslim organizations in North America or founders of their own forum of activism, often as public intellectuals or journalists. Examples of the latter include Manji's *Project Ijtihad*[71] or Khan's own site on ijtihad[72].

An important point is that this kind of drawing of ideological boundaries is more evident among the scholar-activists in the progressive Muslim movement than among the ranks of the organizers and non-scholarly activists, liberal or progressive. Perhaps one reason for this is that while the progressive Muslim movement in North America was originally founded by American Muslim scholars of Islam, the liberal Muslim discourse in North America has come from primarily American Muslim journalists and public intellectuals from a social science background. As a result, the analysis of what constitutes modernist and post-modernist, uncritical and critical discourse among Muslims and in Islam has been left to the purview of progressive Muslim intellectuals, while "policy talk" has come more from liberal Muslim activists. Thus, Progressive Muslim scholars tend to locate *ijtihad* as a theological endeavour requiring Islamic knowledge, such as what was proposed by progressive Muslim scholar Kecia Ali, above, regarding Islamic jurisprudence on marriage; and most self-identified liberal

[71] On her website http://www.irshadmanji.com/Project-Ijtihad. The project tends to work more as a blog and a weak network of organizations and individuals that Irshad Manji documents and publicizes through her own work as author and journalist.

[72] Khan's website is located at http://www.ijtihad.org/ The site itself was originally set up in September 1999 by Khan as a self-syndicated column and E-zine on Islam and global affairs. All articles on the site are written by Khan himself or consist of references to Khan or reviews of Khan's books. Various articles by Khan have been published by newspapers in the United States, among them *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *USA Today*. The site took on a much more expanded form in October 2005 to manage what Khan saw as greater demand for his articles.

Muslims participating in the public sphere tend to emphasize an *ijtihad* process located in public discourse among Muslim citizens and what kinds of actual policies should be supported by North American Muslims. As such, when liberal Muslim activists *have* criticized the progressive Muslim movement, it has been directed towards what they see as an elitist and ideological discourse of Islamic knowledge.[73] But we are jumping the gun by delving into the debates regarding renewal and change that become characteristic of the North American Muslim discourse on citizenship and faith after 9/11. As we will observe in the section on renewal and change in this chapter, progressive Muslims will deny this charge from liberal Muslims while also alleging why a lack of engagement with the body of Islamic knowledge has led to a politicization of Muslim identity in North America by the mainstream leadership.

A persisting point of division between liberal Muslim and progressive Muslim activists in North America has concerned the content of American (and Canadian when relevant) foreign policy in the Muslim world.[74] While critical of the "war on terror" rhetoric and the "securitization of civil rights legislation", liberal Muslims support American or Canadian foreign policy that purport to

[73]An exemplary discussion reflecting this divide in the progressive vs. liberal Muslim voices is a conversation that took place between American progressive Muslim scholar-activist Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl and liberal American Muslim Muqtader Khan in April 2003. El Fadl discussed in the April 2003 issue of the *Boston Review* the place of democracy in Islam and Muslim communities through the lens of Islamic jurisprudence. Khan responded to the article on his own column with an article entitled "The Priority of Politics" whose subtitle was "The tyranny of legalism". While El Fadl's argument was based on the progressive Muslim imperative of critical engagement of Islamic knowledge and traditions, Khan's argument suggests that reform needs to bypass the constraints imposed by the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence and the power this gives to Muslim jurists, progressive or otherwise. In its stead, Khan argues: "There will be no Islamic democracy unless jurists permit the *democratization of interpretation*. Let every citizen be a jurist and let her interpret Islam and Shari'ah when she votes."

[74] Whether Muslim activists are Canadian or American, both for oppositional and mainstream voices, regarding foreign policy, concerns about the actions of the American government dominate in activist circles. Canadian policies and actions are brought into the discourse often in relation to American action and policy—is the Canadian government following suit or diverging and how that should be evaluated; or should the Canadian government follow suit or take another path. As we saw in the last chapter—the prevalence of American action in the Middle East has been often a central site of action and discussion among Muslim activists in *both* Canada and the United States due to the superpower status of the US at the global level.

democratize the Muslim world. In fact, their criticism of existing efforts is not directed towards the goal of such policies but the failures of such policy attempts and some of the means by which it has been attempted. Liberal Muslim activists agree with the rhetoric of "winning the hearts and minds" of Muslims in American foreign policy on the Muslim. Going back to the centrality of "extremist Muslim movements" in the Muslim world, liberal Muslims do view the current global politics in terms of "the struggle for the soul of Islam".[75] We saw earlier that Progressive Muslim actors find this kind of advocacy as examples of the liberal Muslims' "uncritical support of Western imperialism" and a willingness on the part of liberal Muslims to lose sight of the socio-economic and political causes of extremism and violence in the Muslim world (Esack 2003; Safi 2003). As we will see below, this particular tension on American (and Western) foreign policy in the Muslim world has manifested in multiple forms not only between progressive and liberal Muslim activists in North America, but *across* North American Muslim discourse on citizenship and faith.

3.1.3 Secular Muslims.

In addition to the progressive and liberal Muslim voices which have emerged in opposition to mainstream Muslim leadership, a third kind of oppositional Muslim voice in North America has been those who identify themselves as "secular Muslims". On the ground, there are two kinds of secular Muslim identities: One is what is sometimes also referred to as cultural Muslim identity. Secular-cultural Muslims are generally individuals who have left most or all ritualistic practices associated with Islam, as well often the Islamic faith, but who continue to identify with their "Muslim roots" by birth or otherwise.[76] Of

[75] Liberal Muslim actors such as Muqtedar Khan, Mona Eltahawy, Irshad Manji, the AIC, Ahmed Nassef of MWU!, Tarek Fatah of MCC, and Farzanna Hassan of MCC have all repeatedly used these phrases to describe how they see the current global climate and challenge for Muslim activists in North America.

[76] Note, that there is another kind of voice floating around in North America and the West that also includes Muslims who have explicitly left their Islamic faith, who call themselves ex-Muslims: one infamous spokesperson identifying as an ex-Muslim as been former Dutch parliamentary

course, Muslims who fall into this kind of category is not a new phenomenon. Moreover, there are many "cultural" Muslims in North America, who since 9/11 have joined in various existing Muslim organizations to advocate against anti-Muslim discrimination, participate in educational campaigns to non-Muslim publics regarding Islam and Muslims, or (re-)engage with their community of faith.[77] However, what is new in the post-9/11 context is the *activist formulation* of this identity in the public sphere. The presentation of this identity generally tends to be motivated by one or two reasons: a) there is a need to articulate that one can choose to identify with Muslim on the basis of culture and/or personal experience and not only on the basis of faith; b) anti-Muslim rhetoric and

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member Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who identifies herself as Dutch-Somali author and feminist; another is the founder and president of the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain (f. 2007) Maryam Namazie; another example of an organization is Apostates of Islam. However, unlike the secular-cultural Muslims who insist on an identification with Muslim (and Muslim communities) due to cultural heritage and a sense of loyalty, ex-Muslims reject the Muslim identity dogmatically. The basis of an activist identity on ex-Muslim has been primarily directed against two ideas: one that a Muslim cannot leave Islam and two that the punishment for leaving Islam is death in many Muslim-majority countries. Because this study is focused on the discourses of citizenship and faith being articulated by North American actors that explicitly identify themselves as Muslims, ex-Muslims does not fit the population of this study and therefore I do not discuss them. However, the appearance of an ex-Muslim discourse is an interesting development in the face of 9/11 and could be worthy of study under another framework. Already there are important divisions forming in online discussions regarding what "ex-Muslim" means or should mean: for example the conflict between ex-Muslims members of Faith Freedom International (FFI) and the Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain (CEMB) is, for lack of a better word, fascinating.

[77] Based on several panel sessions organized by MSA-National (the national chapter of the Muslim Students' Association of North America) in which various MSA leaders and members held discussions about the challenges facing MSAs, MSAs across North American universities are increasingly important sites in which this is occurring among the younger Muslim generations (MSA-ISNA Annual Convention, Columbus Ohio, Aug 29-Sept 1st 2008). This has also been documented by American journalist Geneive Abdo in her book *Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America after 9/11* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). However, as a couple of individual interviews revealed: there is a real struggle happening at MSAs across campuses in North America between the conservatives who want to maintain strict boundaries of membership based on a particular kind of religiosity ("hijabis and beardis" as Idrees Ally of University of Toronto-MSA mentioned) and those MSA leaders who want to create a more inclusive space for Muslims, irrespective of their religiosity. Abdo (2006) suggests from her own research into MSAs that when conservatives lose ground in MSAs, they tend to leave the MSAs and establish their own mosques outside of campus. In the discussions that were taking place in the MSA Convention in 2007, MSA leaders were attempting discover how to bridge the divide between conservative and non-conservative Muslims without losing one group over the other.

practices in the North American public sphere require "conscientious" action 'to speak up in defence of Islam and Muslims when they are wronged."[78]

Public advocacy on the *basis* of this kind of Muslim identity is new in the North American context. However, it appears that the politicization of Muslim identity in the North American public sphere has led to some efforts to mobilize on the basis of a secular (cultural) Muslim identity. Although this remains a really new discourse in the public sphere, one spokesperson for this kind of cultural Muslim identity has been Canadian Muslim activist and co-host on Faith FM of Islam: Faith and Cultures since 2006, Hesham M. Sabry. Sabry also launched in June 2008, HaSM, an online forum for Humanist and Secular Muslims[79]. HaSM, although based in Kitchener, Ontario, hopes to be transnational in membership and activism. It sees itself as a forum in which critical analyses are done of issues relating to hate towards Muslims, both within and outside of the Muslim communities across the world. Apart from actually developing "objective, scholarly, intellectual, respectful, balanced arguments and reasoned critical analyses", HaSM sends, when needed,

> copies of such analyses...to relevant entities, officials, personalities, bodies, organizations, governments and/or parliamentary committees all over the world as a means of informing them, or improving or correcting their understanding and knowledge of Islam, as well as debunking the misunderstandings, misperceptions, and myths about it and its followers that may be widely held in the west, and inadvertently propagated by misinformed people, or deliberately disseminated by haters of Islam and Muslims." [80]

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[78] http://www.secularmuslims.com/about.php#created For example in describing What is HaSM? Sabry explains: HaSM is, relatively speaking, quite unlike any other organization, Muslim or otherwise, both in its goals and its world view. HaSM tries to speak for the tens of millions of secular, non religious, humanist and atheist Muslims who share something in common: their concern for Muslim peoples and their welfare, advancement and success in the world, and a loyalty to the people and culture from which they, their parents, or ancestors originated. (emphasis in original)

[79] http://www.secularmuslims.com

[80] http://www.secularmuslims.com/about.php#created

The second form of secular Muslim identity is rooted in the secularist Islamic discourses of the 20th century, which I discussed in my introductory chapter. I am going to refer to this second kind of secular Muslims as secularists of the political kind, so as not to confuse them with the cultural Muslim secularists we saw above.[81] Secular Muslims of the political kind often agree with various aspects of both liberal and progressive Muslim ideas and goals, and some liberal and progressive actors agree with a secularist cause, although the extent and content of secularism is contested. However, secular Muslims differ from other oppositional Muslim voices in that the separation between religion and state is *central* to their activist cause and identity. Unlike secular Muslims of the cultural kind, these secular Muslims tend to emphasize their religious connection to the Islamic faith. Notwithstanding the strength of their faith, what this second kind of secular Muslims finds is the necessity of a renewal in Islam of the secularist interpretation of political authority. Their main reference in the Islamic tradition to this strand of thought is 12th century Islamic scholar Ibn Rushd who is better known in western history as Averroes. Although he and other modern secularist scholars are referenced by North American secular Muslims for a theological justification of secularism, the main thrust of arguing for a secularization of Islam is what they see as "disastrous consequences" of the politicization of Islamic identity. Secular Muslim activists here tend to make the argument that the lack of political justice and freedom in much of the Muslim world is related to this politicization of Islam and the rejection of secularism as a normative principle of governance.

[81] Like most labels and identifiers in the North American Muslim discourse, the use of secular is not clear-cut. However, based on interviews with North American Muslim activists, most tend to agree that secular Muslims of the cultural kind are distinct from secular Muslims of the political kind. Note, that a few interviewees either disagreed with the notion of secular or cultural Muslims as a valid identifier or claimed these identifiers were new to them. For example, Nihad Awad of CAIR, during an interview suggested "I don't think secular Muslims means much...there are Muslims who support secularism for different reasons (October 31st 2007, Washington D.C.)." Another interviewee from the American Islamic Congress who asked to not be named said regarding the label cultural Muslims: "I am not sure what that Muslim means...I don't know what they mean (Interview, December 5th 2007, Washington D.C.)."

Unlike liberal Muslim voices in North America, secular Muslims have taken some organizational shape in the form of the Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC), American Islamic Forum on Democracy (AIFD)[82], Canadian Muslims Union (CMU)[83]. These organizations were all founded after 2001 and all three organizations prioritize in their mission statements the principle of secularism. In an interview, Tarek Fatah, who co-founded MCC (2002), articulated that the founding of these organizations was motivated by a "horror that there was not a single Muslim organization anywhere in the world that addressed these issues and stated quite explicitly that they believed in the separation of religion and state."[84] While this is a gross exaggeration given the history of secularist discourse and movements in the contemporary Muslim world (Asad 2003; Césari 2005; Hoebink 1998), it reflects how these North American secular Muslim activists see their role and purpose. Apart from a belief that secularism needs to be enshrined into Muslim political institutions in the Muslim world, North American secular Muslims tend to generally point to ways policies and institutions of multiculturalism threatens the norm of secularism in Canada and the United Sates, by blurring the line between religion and state. They point to the presence of various Islamic institutions as examples of how those lines are being blurred: for North American secular Muslims, the presence of faith-based schools, including and specially Islamic ones, faith-based financing, including and specially Islamic

[82] AIFD appears to be mainly a one-man show, although Dr. Jasser cites the number of subscribers to the newsletter as an indication of support for his cause. Thus, its organizational "thickness", specially regarding a Muslim constituency is hard to determine. During the phone interview with Dr. Jasser, he was repeatedly evasive about how many active members he thought the organization had (November 10th 2007). Nevertheless, Jasser, as we will see in the chapter on the States, has managed to present himself in the American public sphere as an oppositional voice.

[83]The CMU was founded in 2006 as a result of a split in the Muslim Canadian Congress. Those members who left or were forced to resign, including MCC co-founders Attiq Azad and Arif Raza, formed the CMU. I will discuss the reasons for the split in the next chapter as it brings out important an important example of differing claims of nationalistic vs. institutional citizenship among Canadian Muslims. However, it is important to note that the CMU has been since its founding only sporadically active.

[84] Tarek Fatah, Founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, Interview, Toronto: May 27th 2007

financing, and attempts at allowing religious (again, specially Islamic) arbitration regarding some matters are all instances of "fuzzy secularism".[85]

In interviews, it became evident that the issue was not just a matter of preventing public funding or support of such faith-based institutions of finance, education and arbitration,. Instead, there was a concern that the presence of these kinds of institutions, even through private funding and private support, leads to "a *de facto* parallel system of law" because it allows one to prioritize Islamic practices and legal tradition over secular law and norms.[86] It is this particular form of the secular Muslim position that has often driven a huge wedge between secular Muslims on one hand and progressive and liberal Muslims on the other.[87] Moreover, the stance by some of these activists that the wearing of the veil in public spaces is a violation of secularism, reflects that the secularism being advocated for has more in common with the practice of French *laïcité* than North American secularism: at center of it all is a question of the extent to which the practice of faith has to be privatized (Bowen 2007). Actually, as one heated discussion between two secular Muslim activists, both on the board of the PMUNA, made clear, among North American secular Muslim activists, there is a serious division between what secularism means or should mean in relation to the Muslim community in North America.[88] Those divisions reflect very much the kind of tensions I presented earlier as discussed by Weithman (2002). However these debates among secular Muslim activists are also part of debates within the wider North American Muslim leadership regarding how secularism should be practiced and understood by minority Muslim communities in North America. Moreover, given the variations in the place of religion and secularism in the United States, Canada and Québec (Seljak 2008; Berger 2002), these discussions about secularism and Muslim citizenship and identity have taken distinct paths in

[85] Tarek Fatah, Founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress, Interview, Toronto: May 27th 2007
[86] Farzana Hassan, Interview, May 28th 2007, Toronto.
[87] For example, Muqtader Khan "The myth of secularism", ijtihad.org, January 01 2004.
[88] The discussion took place on progressiveIslam.org in a series of exchange between Silvers and Fatah on November 11 2006.

the three contexts. As such, I will describe and analyze the debate of secularism among secular vs. other Muslim activists in North American in the following two chapters.

Nevertheless, what the post 9/11 emergence of a secular Muslim activist makes evident is the rise of a new kind of diversity in North American Muslim discourse. A diversity, which includes, we have seen, progressive Muslims and liberal Muslims. I have already pointed to some of the dividing lines between these new voices. However, despite these divisions, there was an attempt in 2004 to establish an organization that would try to unify these divergent oppositional voices. The focus on creating a platform that would allow the articulation of the diversities of Muslim communities and discourses was clear in the opening statement by the founders of the new organization, which stated:

> PMUNA has been formed in recognition of the urgent need for greater and more coordinated articulation of the pluralistic and compassionate sentiments of vast sections of the community. PMU seeks to expand the range of spiritual, social, intellectual, and political choices for North America Muslims, and to challenge the narrow set of "normative" Muslim ideas and behavior expected of all of us both within and beyond the North American Muslim community.[89]

The collaboration between progressive, liberal and secular Muslims across North America led to the November 2004 launching of the Progressive Muslims Union of North America (PMUNA) in New York. By 2006, the new organization had fallen apart due to internal divisions.

3.1.4 Progressive Muslims Union of North America: An untenably large tent

The desire to create such an overarching organization was based on conversations between many of these activists in the period of 2002-2004, often in

[89] Sarah Eltantawi, Hussein Ibish, Ahmed Nassef, and Omid Safi. Retrieved at: http://web.archive.org/web/20041212223826/www.pmuna.org/archives/2004/11/progressive_mus_1.php#more

the forum of *Muslim WakeUp!*, an online magazine and discussion forum set up by Ahmed Nassed and Jawad Ali in 2003.[90] Among those leading these conversations to set up an organization were: Omid Safi (the editor of the *Progressive Muslims* text); Sarah Eltantawi, who was at the time of these discussions, the Communications Director of MPAC, Ahmed Nassef, and Hussein Ibish, who was at the time the Communications Director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination League. The collaboration was based on a consensus that what they (progressive, liberal and secular Muslims) share is a dissatisfaction with the leadership of many mainstream Muslim organizations, which does not articulate their particular concerns regarding faith and citizenship.

In particular, they tended to believe there is a need of reform in Islam—a reform geared towards greater openness of what it means to be Muslim in the *ummah* and an embracing of what they perceive as universal values of human rights. As such, for example, the PMUNA statement of principle starts off with "We affirm that a Muslim is anyone who identifies herself or himself as "Muslim," including those whose identification is based on social commitments and cultural heritage." The latter clause was important for the secular Muslims of the culturalist kind. It also states, "We affirm the validity of Islamic ritual and practice as an expression of love for God, while acknowledging that specific forms of ritual and practice are individual choices and should never be imposed through coercive means." By placing ritual and practice at the individual level, this created the possibility of urging reform at a broad level.

[90] The mission statement of MWU in 2003 stated: "MuslimWakeUp! seeks to mirror the diversity, dynamism, and creative spirit of Islam. We will celebrate all that is alive with meaning in our lives—spirituality, music, art, literature, politics, laughter, love, compassion—everything that is close to the heart. We will speak our mind for what we feel is right, especially when it conflicts with what we are accustomed to—all the time seeking God's guidance and forgiveness. Through our online and offline publications, we seek to bring together a global community that shares this mission." MWU had actually originally taken off in 1980s in Southern California as a collective that encouraged public participation of Muslims in America regarding various issues of concern to the individuals involved in the organization. However, the MWU, as a website, as it is now, took off under Nassef and Ali in 2003, who are both located in New York.

The statement continues to identify equality "of status and worth of all human beings" as a primary precept of its activist framework. It identifies 'adl (justice) and 'ihsan (compassion) as the guiding principles of all its work. The specification of justice and compassion in this way drew on the progressive identity. Finally, the secularist (of the political kind) identity was incorporated as the mission statement concludes with a statement of support of the "political separation of religious institutions and state functions, and the strict neutrality of the state on matters of religion." Moreover, the mission statement articulated what we saw earlier in the opening statement of the launch of the organization, i.e., the need to present a different Muslim voice about what it meant to be Muslim in North America: "PMUNA was formed in recognition of the widespread misunderstanding of Islam and the diverse Muslim community, and the urgent need for greater and more coordinated articulation of the pluralistic and compassionate sentiments of vast sections of the community."[91]

Even before the Eid-el-fitr November 15 2004 launch of the organization, the effort at creating an organization that tried to reflect the diversity of the Muslim community in North America and its own commitment to pluralism was plagued with incredible divisions. The most public articulation of these divisions was in the refusal by a large number of invited activists to serve on the board of the PMUNA. On September 24 2004, those invited to serve on the board were a wider range of Muslim activists (see *Table 3.1*). Of the 20 invited actors, only six accepted the offer. The final list of advisory board for the PMUNA, included another scholar, not on the original list: Scott Siraj Al-Haqq Kugle, a professor of religion at Swarthmore College. Some of those who rejected the invitation wrote a letter which they posted on the PMUNA site explaining why they were

[91] The PMUNA site no longer exists. After the problems the organization faced internally, in 2006, the site was removed. However, thanks to the web archive s, the documents of the organization can be retrieved at: http://web.archive.org/web/20041205000057/www.pmuna.org/archives/mission/index.php

concerned about participating with the PMUNA.[92] The letter cited that the inclusion of particularly six individuals had caused them to decide that the PMUNA could not be part of a "true progressive movement". The individuals of concern were: Malik and Seeme Hasan, Muqtedar Khan, Farid Zakaria, Nawaal al-Sadawi, and Ziyad Asali.

The Hasans had founded in 2004 a group called Muslims for Bush. Malik Hasan was a retired HMO executive and founder of HealthNet and his wife Seeme had been a Republican Party activist for a long time as well as a patron of the arts in Colorado. Having supported Bush, like the mainstream Muslim leadership, in the 2000 elections, the group found that Bush's responses to the American Muslim community in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 had reflected a respect for the faith and the community.

Table 3.1: Activists and Scholars Invited to Serve on the PMUNA Advisory Board in September 2004

Name	**Decision by launch of PMUNA on Nov 15 2004**	**Name**	**Decision by launch of PMUNA on Nov 15 2004**
Abdol Karim Soroush	Declined	Khaled Aboul Fadl	Declined
Akbar Ahmed	*Accepted*	Malik and Seeme Hassan	Declined
Tarik Ramadan	*Accepted*	Mohja Kahf	Declined
Ali Abu Nima	*Accepted*	Naeem Jeenah	Declined
Amina Wadud	*Accepted*	Nawal el-Sadawi	Declined

[92] The letter was written by among others, Farid Esack, the progressive Muslim scholar and activist I discussed earlier. The letter can be retrieved at: http://commentpmuna.blogspot.com/2004/11/text-of-comment-on-formation-of-pmuna.html.

Ebrahim Moosa	Declined	Rashid Khalidi	Declined
Faisal Abdul Rauf	Declined	Salaam al-Maryati	Declined
Fareed Zakariya	Declined	Sheikha Fariha	Declined
Farid Esack	Declined	Tariq Ali	Declined
Hamid Dabashi	Declined	Ziyad Asali	*Accepted*
Muqtedar Khan	*Accepted*		

However, they found that the distancing by the mainstream Muslim leadership of the Bush administration due to the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan was an unfair response from the community. Instead, they saw the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as "bringing liberation not war" to the peoples of those countries. When ISNA allowed the group to have a booth at its 2004 Annual Convention, there was a negative reaction among many attendees, including among those who had voted for Bush in 2000. In fact, as we will see in the fifth chapter, the 2004 elections brought out important debates about how should American Muslims vote and gave rise to a discussion on the politics of voting among mainstream Muslim actors. The open letter to the PMUNA presented the Hasan's wealth, their support for Bush and the wars as ample reason for why "true progressive Muslims" should be worried about where the organization may be headed.

In a similar manner of critique through "self-evident" facts, the letter finds fault with the invitation to Muqtedar Khan to be part of the Advisory Board. Referring to the memo Khan wrote in 2001 to American Muslims, the letter to the PMUNA highlights his statement of "as soon as it became clear that Muslims were behind 9/11, I told my wife "there goes my chance to be this country's first Muslim Henry Kissinger.". It also highlights his statement in "A Memo to Osama Bin Laden: Go to Hell" where Khan wrote "We will fight with America and we will fight for America; we have a covenant with this nation; we see it as a divine commitment." The letter juxtaposes the two statements apparently wanting to portray Khan as a supporter of the war on Iraq. In the memo, written before the

declaration of war had been made, Khan makes clear he is against the war. In fact, in the memo written in response to the Feb 13 2003 bin Laden tape, Khan writes:

> Yes, we American Muslims will continue to challenge the Bush administrations' proposal to wage war against Iraq. We think a regime change in Washington is as necessary as a regime change in Baghdad, but that is an intramural affair. Once the war is declared, make no mistake Mr. Saddam Hussein and Mr. Bin Laden, We are with America. We will fight with America and we will fight for America. We have a covenant with this nation, we see it as a divine commitment and we will not disobey the Quran (9:4) – we will fulfill our obligations as citizens to the land that opened its doors to us and promised us equality and dignity even though we have a different faith. I am sure Mr. Bin Laden, you can neither understand nor appreciate this willingness to accept and welcome the other.[93]

The open letter to PMUNA describes Zakaria as a *Newsweek* journalist "whose public imperialist credentials are impeccable and whose only problem with the empire is that it is doing an inefficient job." These comments were based on Zakaria having written an article on August 5th 2002 titled "Invade Iraq, but bring friends" where he argued that if the Iraq mission was done properly, it could be the "single best path to reform the Arab world." An Egyptian feminist and founder of several organizations in Egypt, Nawaal al-Sadawi was criticized in the letter for having "campaigned for the enforcement of the ban on hijab", which "is as reactionary as forcing women to wear it." Asali has been involved as an activist for Arab and Palestinian issues through the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee since the 1980s. He also founded the American Task Force for Palestine (ATFP) in 2003. His apparent lack of "progressiveness" was displayed the letter suggested because he had made a statement in 2002 saying that perhaps Palestinians should consider giving up the right of return. The fact that his reason for the statement—that it was only hindering the development of a two-state solution for the conflict—was not mentioned in the letter.

[93] Retrieved at: http://www.ijtihad.org/BinladenII.htm

The authors of the letter identified themselves as "activists and/or scholars who have been part of the shaping and articulation of a global progressive Islamic discourse for a number of years." Writing that "regardless of how inclusive the outreach of progressive Muslims ought to be, we assume that anyone serving on the leadership or Advisory Board of such an organization will be a)Muslim and b)progressive (however broad one's understanding of these terms)." Their criticism of the PMUNA, and specially the five individuals above is articulated in terms of the ideological stance taken by some of them to the far-right and also the belief that "academics, writers or millionaires who have chosen to sit outside [the Muslim community in North America] cannot legitimately claim a role in the transformation process of a community." The letter concludes that the "inclusion of individuals who have been unashamed in their embrace of an imperialist agenda reflects an unprincipled utilitarianism" or "a bewildering ideological confusion." The authors position themselves as sympathetic to the need of an organization like the PMUNA because "mainstream Muslim organizations in North America...has [*sic*] often been—regrettably—rather unkind to those seeking space to dissent". However, they explain that by wanting to choose some liberal and secular activists as advisors who "will serve the strategic objectives of the Empire", the PMUNA was "setting itself up for failure". Thus, the letter highlighted the need of dissent from Muslims in North America, but also draws an ideological boundary around what that dissent should be about: Pluralism as long as the voices of pluralism advocate an anti-imperialist social justice discourse of the left: which meant a rejection of the politics of not only social conservatives but also economic conservatives and nationalism.

If these progressive Muslims found the PMUNA to be dangerously close to selling out to Empire, mainstream North American Muslims, even those who shared an interest in more liberal interpretations of Islam such as Louay Safi and Sayyid Syeed of the Islamic Society of North America, found the PMUNA was attempting to be "too radical" and therefore "alienating" the mainstream Muslim community in North America. Moreover, the likes of Daniel Pipes and Steve

Emerson and Mark Steyn, found the PMUNA to be "too soft" in their demand of reform and the content of reform. Despite all of the criticism, from all sides, the launching of the organization got positive national level attention through *The New York Times* and *USA Today*.

However, in less than a year, the organization fell apart. One major source of contention became regarding the means and ends of reform and the limits of how public displays of dissent could be conducted. The crux of the matter came down to the decision by some to want to hold a female-led prayer of a mixed congregation in March 2005. [94]

In July 2005, Muqtedar Khan resigned from the Advisory Board of the PMUNA, with another public letter decrying the faults of the organization. He cited the lack of *'adb* (civility) as a primary reason for resignation. Referring to the decision to go ahead with the woman-led prayer, he also pointed out that the organization's reform goals were directed incorrectly towards Islamic rituals instead of social practices of Muslims.[95] In his letter of resignation, Khan makes clear, that while he believes a majority of North American Muslims support the cause of a progressive Muslim movement, the PMUNA was no longer voicing the values of the movement. In the letter, other than the issue of *'adb*, two sites of conflict are located. Khan writes, "PMUNA is operating with a set of moral principles randomly acquired from Marxism and/or postmodern cultural trends and is treating them as absolutely moral truths, and are now looking for arguments with some Islamic content to justify them."

Thus while the open letter written by Esack et al to PMUNA in 2004 pointed out that the organization was not oriented *enough* to the left, Khan was

[94] Retrieved at http://pmunadebate.blogspot.com/2005/07/muqtedar-khans-resignation-letter.html The letter is also available at website of *The American Muslim* E-zine.

[95] I will discuss the significance of the debate that this event initiated further below because it brought into the public sphere the spectrum of responses from the North American Muslims leadership.

resigning because the organization was being dominated by those who were *too far* to the left or *too* post-modernist. However, he shares with the authors of the 2004 letter, that there was too much emphasis on a secular Muslim identity, of the culturalist kind. He wrote, "This is the only Muslim group where people who believe in the teachings of the Quran are ridiculed and those who express ambivalence about it even about the existence of God are celebrated."

Sharing the latter sentiment, as well as a concern about a perceived lack of *'adb* among active PMUNA members, in August of the same year, Safi, Eltantawi, and Ibish, three of the original founding members resigned from the executive board of PMUNA.[96] Although the organization continued to exist in name until December 2006, there was little public activity by the PMUNA after August 2005. In December 2006, co-chairs Pamela Taylor and Zuriani "Ani" Zonneveld resigned to found Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV).[97]

Thus, the attempt to establish an umbrella-organization that embraced in principle the various new Muslim voices of the post 9/11 context was a failure. However, almost all the major actors in the organization continued, upon leaving it, their own efforts at articulating and representing their own visions of "new" Muslim identities, centered around reform of Islam, as well as "new" constellations of Muslim and American or Muslim and Canadian. The discussion (or debate and conflict) was hardly over. But, whether at the PMUNA or outside,

[96] The original letter of resignation from the three leaders explains their resignation saying that the PMUNA was headed in a direction that was divergent from what Safi, Eltantawi and Ibish had envisioned in its founding. Safi wrote an article later on that expressed more clearly the problems he and the others faced in the organizations, emphasizing Khan's point that one cannot speak for Muslims or call for reform by alienating the Muslim majority in North America. The original letter can be retrieved at http://pmunadebate.blogspot.com/2005/08/omid-safi-hussein-ibish-sarah.html. The article by Safi was published by the *Muslim Public Affairs Journal* in January 2006 under the title, "Challenges and Opportunities for the Progressive Muslim movement in North America."

[97] According to Fatah, during my interview with him, he said "There was no ... clarity of mission." (Toronto, May 27 2007). However, since I was not able to interview either Taylor or Zonneveld, I cannot state in any confident manner what happened and if other reasons may have led to the outcome.

these new voices have shared one common challenge: a criticism of their marginality in the Muslim community in North America. Thus, I conclude this section on the new diversities of Muslims that emerged after the attacks of 9/11 with a discussion of this criticism.

3.2 The problem of authority and legitimacy of the "new" Muslim activists

Whether, progressive, liberal or secular, many of the voices articulating these identities in the public sphere were *new* activists in two senses: First, they were new activists in the sense that until the attacks of 9/11, most of them were not involved in the public sphere as *Muslim* activists, i.e., activists working for causes identified as Muslim. As my interviews revealed, most of the voices that have entered the public sphere as oppositional voices to mainstream North American Muslim leadership were involved in mainly secular (i.e., not faith-based) movements prior to 9/11: feminist, socialist, anti-imperialist, civil rights, anti-racist; others were not involved in any form of activism prior to the attacks.[98] This characteristic of these new voices is I believe particularly important because it identifies an important difference between them and mainstream Muslim leadership: In contrast to the mainstream Muslim leadership, who were constituted by experiences of activism related to Muslim constituencies and Islam (or who entered activism through MSA in Canada and the United States), for many of these new actors, while faith had been an important part of their *personal*/*private* identities, and had thus played a role in their activist work prior to 9/11 as such, it had not been the center of their activist causes, nor a public identity for them. They had mainly been involved in various causes through

[98] From the sample of 35 oppositional respondents in this study, based on interviews and fieldwork, 15 individuals had been actively involved in working with organizations/groups that worked for what they identified as feminist causes, 12 in socialist causes, 15 in anti-imperialist causes, 20 in civil rights causes, and 6 in anti-racist causes. (Note that, obviously as displayed by the numbers, many individuals had been involved in multiple kinds of causes: interviewees were asked to list the kind of causes they had worked for or activist work they had engaged in prior to 9/11.)

organizations that were not identified as Muslim or even faith-based. Farzana Hassan, president of the Muslim Canadian Congress between 2006 and 2008, for example, had been working with various women's groups dealing with women's rights. Munir Pervez, Communications Director at the Muslim Canadian Congress (2006-2008), for example, had been working with PEN Canada, an organization that is centered on defending the right of freedom of expression for writers around the world. Zainab Al-Suwaj, founder and president of the American Islamic Congress, was involved in a "non-Islamic movement for democracy"[99] against Saddam Hussain in 1991, before she fled Iraq and took American citizenship.

One major exception to this trend have been the leaders of the progressive Muslims movement who are composed of mainly North American Muslim academics located in various Islamic or Religious Studies departments and institutes (see *Table 3.2)*. Prior to 9/11, the individuals who would come to constitute the bulk of the progressive Muslim leadership in North America had been involved in various efforts to understand, analyze and develop new modes of interpretation in Islam and Islamic history. Nevertheless, of these group of individuals, those who *had* been involved also in non-intellectual activist work prior to the attacks had been heavily engaged in non-Muslim causes such as feminist causes (Kecia Ali, Gwendyln Zoharah Simmons, Amina Wadud) and anti-racist causes (Simmons, Wadud, and Esack). Thus, like some of the other new voices, they also came into the politics of Muslim identity in North America in the aftermath of 9/11 with their own particular non-Muslim activist ideologies—ideologies that were important dimensions of their political identities. Thus instead of the "tribal baggage" with which the original mainstream Muslim leaders had to contend in the 1980s, these new Muslim voices had "political/ideological baggage" with which they had to contend in their efforts to create a collective oppositional voice, the consequences of which we saw in the breakdown of PMUNA.

[99] Zainab Al-Suwaj, Interview, December 05 2007, Washington D.C.

Second, precisely because most of these individuals had not been involved in *Muslim* activism in North America, they were new to those individuals and actors who had been working for creating and promoting *Muslim* identities and interests in North America. As such they had often not been involved in the decades of conversations and debates in which Muslim leaders had engaged in to hammer out consensuses and manage the forging of a collective identity cross-cut with diversities that ranged socio-economic, ethnic and political factors. Several exceptions to this had been for example Muqtedar Khan, Khaled Abou El Fadl, and some other progressive Muslim scholar-activists; but, most of the new voices that emerged as opposition to the mainstream leadership had neither witnessed nor participated in the debates and conflicts within the mainstream leadership. Instead, they often came in with an experience of the Muslim community located, at best, in the local mosques and community centers of their own neighbourhoods, or, at worst, outside of Muslim communities altogether. In a sense, many of these activists' experiences with the Muslim community were more parochial—disconnected from the transformations that had been occurring among the national level leaderships of the North American Muslim communities. This is not to discount the relevance of their particular experiences or the validity of their own encounters with the community. However, because of memories of alienating experiences within their own Muslim communities, I would argue, many of these new voices sought out to create their own forums through which they could articulate their visions of Muslim citizenship when the events of 9/11 put it under scrutiny.

Thus the newness of these activists meant that they *were* marginal to the both the existing network of Muslim leadership and the communities that were their constituencies. However, the marginality of these voices was also a result of how these new voices were treated by the existing leadership in the wake of 9/11. Some of those who attempted to take the discussion directly to the existing

leadership "were pushed to the edges"[100]: "In fact, there have been a considerable number of incidents in which critical and original voices that emerged from within the Muslim community in the United States and Canada have been marginalized by means that are less than admirable.[101] The consequence of their marginality and their marginalization however has been the establishment of organizations and forums that are often "thin" in terms of membership numbers as well as in terms of their ties to Muslim communities—whether those are mosque attending communities or not.

[100] Esack et al in 2004 open letter to PMUNA: "The PMUNA is an understandable response to the way many young and critical Muslims are being pushed to the edges by mainstream Muslim organizations far more interested in patriarchal control over Muslims than in a creative and living expansion of our faith along a progressive faith."
http://commentpmuna.blogspot.com/2004/11/text-of-comment-on-formation-of-pmuna.html.

[101] El Fadl, Khaled Abou. "Past year has been difficult for American Muslims", Dallas *Morning News*, Commentary, September 8th 2002. The acknowledgement of these kinds of reactions from within the mainstream Muslim community was articulated by both oppositional voices such as Tarek Fatah and Munir Pervez, *as well as* by mainstream leaders such as Tahra Goraya (Deputy Director of CAIR) and Ingrid Mattson (the current president of ISNA).

Table 3.2 Professional, Ethnic and Activist background of some key Progressive Muslim Voices

Person	Area of Specialization	Department	University	Post-Secondary Studies	Ethnic Background	Citizenship	(Self-identified) oppositional label	Convert	Pre-9/11 Non-Scholarly Activist Experience
Kecia Ali	Marraige and Divorce in Islamic Jurisprudence	Religion	Boston University	US	American	American	Progressive	Yes	Feminist
Khaled Abou El Fadl	Law: Islamic, immigration and national security	School of Law	UCLA	US	Arab	American	Progressive	No	None
Farid Esack	Liberation theology in Islam	Interreligious Studies	Xavier University	Pakistan, UK, Germany	South African	South African	Progressive	No	Anti-apartheid; feminist
Marcia Hermansen	Islamic Studies and World Religions	Theology	Loyola University, Chicago	US	White	American	Progressive	Yes	None
Amir Hussain	Muslim communities in North America, religion and literature and film	Religious Studies	California State University, Northridge	Canada	Pakistani	Canadian	Progressive	No	Inter-faith Dialogue with World Conference on Religion and Peace
Ahmet T. Karamaustafa	Pre-Modern Islamic Intellecutal and Social History	History and Religious Studies	Washington University, St. Louis	Canada	Turkish	Canadian	Progressive	No	None
Omid Safi	Islamic mystical tradition, pre-modern history of the Eastern Islamic wolrd and post-modern Muslim thought	Philosophy and Religion	Colgate University	US	Iranian	American	Progressive	No	None
Gwendolyn Zoharah Simmons	Islamic progressive reform; impact of Islamic law on Muslim women; women, religion and society	Religion	University of Florida	US	African-American	American	Progressive/Sufi	Yes	Civil Rights Movement/Human Rights
Amina Wadud	Islamic Studies	Philosophy and Religious Studies	Virigina Commonwealth Univeristy	US	African-American	American	Progressive	Yes	Feminist
Ebrahim Moosa	Islamic law and ethics	Religion	Duke University	India/South Africa/UK	South African/Indian	American	Progressive	No	Human Rights

*Affiliations refer to 2003 positions, at the moment when the *Progressive Muslims* text was published

Conscious of their lack of legitimacy in terms of these criteria, these new voices have justified the legitimacy of their claims in one or two ways. One is by a claim of the importance and relevance of their ideas to the Muslim community.[102] "We felt an organization was needed which wouldn't have to compete on the basis of it size but simply on the basis of the ideas that it floated." The other is by challenging the rationale implicit in a criticism which bases legitimacy of voice on numbers and embeddedness. Disparate characters such as liberal Irshad Manji and progressive Farid Esack as well as the current liberal-secular president of the MCC have argued that this practice of that "we cannot comment if we do not represent" gives up any basis of advocating for social change and thus it cannot be a fair criticism of their claims. While all agree that for real social change to come around, grass-root movements need to be built directed at their own communities, the current absence of such movements or the weakness of these movements cannot be a justification for "silencing".

In the fifth and sixth chapter, I will explore some of the larger political and discursive processes by which these dynamics between mainstream and oppositional actors have been shaped and their consequences for liberal democratic theory. However, it is important to note that the above discussion highlights that the oppositional Muslim identity discourses, which emerged in light of the attacks of 9/11 reflect the significance of actor biography—activist experience, relationship to and experiences with religious institutions inside and outside, experiences with the state and immigration—in shaping the content and location of oppositional Muslim identity discourse in North America. The demands, dissent, and diversities that these new actors and identity discourses brought to the forefront played a major role in the shifts that took place in the mainstream Muslim discourses as they attempted to respond to the challenges within and outside the Muslim community in the aftermath of September 11 2001. This is what I turn to in the final section of this chapter.

[102] Tarek Fatah, Interview, May 27th 2007, Toronto.

3.3 Response from the Mainstream Muslim Leadership since 9/11

In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, the response from the mainstream Muslim leadership has been four-fold: First, there has been an increased public recognition of divisions and conflicts within the community. Second, the basis of unification of the community has been broadened. Third, calls for reform of practices within the Muslim community have intensified. Finally, the scope of political and social engagement has been widened.

Prior to the attacks of 9/11, among the existing community of Muslim activists in North America it was the norm to engage in debates and conflicts in the community behind closed doors. The reason for this practice of presenting a unified voice was two-fold: it was "strategically necessary"[103] and/or there is "a requirement against causing *fitna*"[104]. The rationale of strategic necessity is straightforward: Public unity will lead to a more coherent and powerful position in claims-making than a divided position on issues of concern. Cognizant of diversities of sect, ethnicities and political ambitions, these activists nevertheless agree that "public bashing"[105] of each other based on these differences is counter-productive. Moreover, it allows those who are against the interests of North American Muslim communities to take advantage of these divisions as justifications to ignore or discount claims made by Muslims in North America. The second rationale, i.e., of preventing *fitna*, is faith-based: fitna refers to an Islamic precept of tribulation or where the faith of the community is tested. Generally, acts that cause fitna have been seen to be contrary to the good of the *ummah*.[106] In this sense, the public expression of divisions, have been understood by many Islamic scholars and practioners, both in the Muslim world and in the

[103] Maher Hathout, co-founder of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, Phone Interview, April 15th 2008.

[104] Imam Zaid Shakir, co-founder of the Zaytuna Institute, Interview, Montreal, Feb 21st 2009.

[105] Sheema Khan, founder of the Canadian Council on American Islamic Relations, Montreal, Sept 16th 2008. She referred to the decision early on (prior to 9/11) by CIC and CAIR-CAN to avoid voicing their differences in the public because it would weaken their position vis-à-vis non-Muslim opposition, Muslim constituencies and institutions.

[106] Historically,it has been used to describe periods of civil wars in the *ummah*.

West, as a potential cause for fitna that should be avoided. Neither rationale, in mainstream Muslim discourse, discount disagreements of perspectives *per se* nor ignores that there are important problems in the community, which need to be changed. However, instead of dealing with these issues in the public space, mainstream North American Muslim activists have generally focused on the processes of reaching consensus, managing debates, and creating reform from within by accepted means of reform, while defending the community and the faith to outsiders. Nevertheless, principles of strategic necessity and avoiding fitna have meant that in the context of organizational and personal power dynamics, demands for change have suffered from "frustrating inertia."[107]

In the wake of the attacks of 9/11, some of the new voices, which we saw earlier, came into the public sphere that had apparently decided the urgency of the situation trumped any fear of causing *fitna*. Thus in an op-ed in the *LA Times* addressed to CAIR, Khaled Abou El Fadl, one of the main thinkers of the progressive Muslim movement wrote less than a year after the attacks: "I have despaired, long ago, of private criticisms; my experience teaches me that things develop in a far more healthy way if they are cast out into the light, and I have found that the mainstream public respects any voice that they find to be honest and straightforward."[108] Along with El Fadl, other voices like Omid Safi, Muqtedar Khan, Irshad Manji and Tarek Fatah, started publicly criticizing the existing leadership's response by pointing out silences about certain practices within the community. Safi wrote in 2002: "Far too long, we have sat silently—I have sat silently—when someone gets up in our Islamic centers, our mosques, and vents poison. How many foaming-at-the-mouth, hate-filled speeches about "the

[107] Imam Zaid Shakir co-founder of the Zaytuna Institute, Interview, Montreal, Feb 21st 2009.
[108] Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The LA Times*, July 20 2002. On July 14 2002, El Fadl had written an op-ed on July 14th 2002 that criticized the American Muslim leadership's response to the attacks of 9/11. Two days later, the LA Times had published a letter from CAIR-LA responding to El Fadl by demonstrating that he had been wrong in his critique. In response, El Fadl sent a letter to CAIR-LA as well as to the LA Times, elaborating further what he had meant. He did point out that while he had not intended to implicate CAIR as part of his criticisms, he found that their focus on civil rights precluded from really speaking for the Muslim community and reforming the Muslim community.

Jews" and the "corruption of women" and the immorality of "the West" have I heard in our sacred places? Enough is enough." White Muslim convert and progressive Muslim scholar, Marcia Hermansen in 2004 and Canadian progressive Muslim scholar Amir Hussain in 2003 wrote about the "ugly secret" of how some "immigrant Muslims" expressed "a sense of happiness and smug vindication about the attacks." They explained that the initial choice to not speak to "the media or outsiders" was based on a "fear that it could cause further backlash against the vast majority of Muslim in North America who were innocent of such thoughts and appalled by the violence."

Those norms of silence and "private criticism" have shifted over the course of the eight years after the attacks, not only among the oppositional voices but also among the mainstream Muslim leadership. In fact, one consequence of the emergence of the oppositional actors has been that criticism of the faith community from both inside and outside the community could not only be reduced to "anti-Islam" rhetoric. In way of defending themselves against the new voices, they have had to admit *publicly* that "there are many problems within the community", but that "this is not representative of the mainstream Muslim community". What is important in this shift is that mainstream Muslim leadership has slowly become less defensive about "ugly secrets". Recognizing that some of the alleged "ugly secrets" may be true, mainstream Muslim activists have taken it head on by starting new campaigns that attempt to correct some of those tendencies. Almost all of the major Muslim organizations across Canada and the United States have started "counter-terrorist" and "anti-terrorist" projects often specifically geared towards preventing the radicalization of Muslim youth and religious leaders of the community have insisted on cooperation with the authorities from the Muslim community. Some Muslim activists, prior to the 9/11 attacks, had already been calling for these kinds of efforts among mainstream Muslim circles: Hathout (of MPAC), Mattson (of ISNA), Zaid Shakir (Zaytuna Institute) were such voices in the leadership. However, it was only *after* the attacks, and the ensuing criticisms from the new oppositional voices and the non-Muslim public, that these ideas gained concrete ground in the mainstream activist

circle. Mainstream North American Muslim activists observe these new campaigns as an admission that there had been a "gross oversight" on the part of pre-9/11 Muslim leadership in North America. These new efforts are for many in the activist circle "a recognition" of the responsibility North American Muslims have "to stop the oppression of Muslim committed by other Muslims in the name of Islam" as well as "the greatest duty to stop violence by Muslims against innocent non-Muslims in the name of Islam."[109] Moreover, inter-faith projects have gained a more important place in the work of these organizations and actors, specially as a way of fighting anti-Semitism[110] in the community as well as developing better relations with Christian communities.[111]

Another aspect of the oppositional voices also struck a chord with some of the mainstream Muslim leadership. If we recall, earlier, I described how many of these new oppositional voices had articulated a sentiment of alienation from the community and the leadership's vision of being Muslim in North America. Some in ISNA, including Louay Safi and Ingrid Mattson, along with leaders from MPAC and CAIR-CAN have expressed publicly that North American Muslim organizations need to reflect a wider spectrum of Muslims, to truly be able to represent Muslims. In the face of both oppositional voices as well as an admission by the mainstream activists themselves, the pre-9/11 discourse on a

[109] Ingrid Mattson, Interview on Common Ground, Research Channel, Penn State Broadcasting, December 6th 2006. The interview was conducted after she was elected president of ISNA. She had articulated exactly the same sentiments earlier as vice president of ISNA in the 2002 text edited by American Muslim journalist Michael Wolfe, *Taking Back Islam*.

[110] A project at the North American level is the Dialogue Project founded by ISNA and the Union for Reform Judaism in 2007. One part of the project is Children of Abraham: Muslims and Jews in Conversation which provides a guide to mosques and synagogues about how to open conversations between the two faith communities in North America.

[111] An example of this kind of an effort is A Common Word Between Us and You, which an international effort at creating better dialogue between Catholics and Muslims, of which ISNA has been an important player: particualry important have been Mattson (as a former Catholic and current President of ISNA, as well as a highly respected academic of Muslim-Christian relations and understanding), Louay Safi (Executive Director of the ISNA Leadership Development Center), and Muzzamil Siddiqui (former president of ISNA: 1997-2001 and current member of the Fiqh Council of North America). Another example is the "Uniting to Protect" campaign launched in November 2007, which involves a partnership between the Fiqh Council of North America, ISNA, and other North American Christian and Jewish leaders to unite "against criminal terrorists".

national Muslim voice has had to shift to a discourse that acknowledges the lack of a coherent voice and the unfinished project of building an American or Canadian Islam. The shift is embodied in the oft repeated claim since 9/11 by North American mainstream Muslim leaders: "Muslims are not a monolithic whole". Before, this was the challenge that had been needed to be overcome in private. Now it was the public defence against criticism from both non-Muslim publics and oppositional Muslim voices of various practices and beliefs in the community.

However, the consequence of acknowledging the continued sources of diversity, division, debate and alienation has included serious new efforts at creating common ground. In part this has been pushed forward by the greater interest of the non-mosque affiliated Muslims in these organizations after 9/11. An example of the greater interest was in 2003: the attendance in the annual convention of ISNA increased five-fold between 2001 (before the attacks) and 2003. Suddenly it was not only the religiously conservative attending the convention. This turn of events helped swing in favour for those mainstream Muslim activists who had been criticizing that there was a gap between the Muslim community in North America and its leadership. It catalyzed efforts at building a wider basis of unification of the Muslim communities in North America. The emphasis has been "How do we construct unity without uniformity?" The building of common ground has been emphasized in each ISNA convention since 2001. For example, in the 2008 Convention, Imam Suhaib Webb, a white American convert who has become an iconic figure for the younger generations of the Muslim community in North America, repeatedly emphasized, "We have to develop the maturity to live with each other...coming together in our diversities does not have to mean I have to accept the authenticity of your creed...but I have to respect it....those issues on which we differ should not be silenced by the hand."[112] While the work prior to the attacks of 2001 had been

[112] Imam Suhaib Webb, 45th ISNA Annual Convention, August 30th 2008 , Columbus, Ohio. Webb was one of the main speakers in over six sessions, including the opening and closing sessions attended by the majority of participants.

focused more on the shedding of ethnic identities over a (Sunni) Muslim one, the work since the attacks has *also* focused on trying to overcome the sectarian divides to create an Islamic identity. One important example of such an effort is that in the 44th Annual Convention of the Islamic Society of North America, the Muslim Code of Honor between Sunni and Shi'ite was signed on September 2007, that in part stated "We agree that steps should be taken to protect the general Muslim population in North America from the distribution of divisive, inflammatory or irrelevant literature, primarily from overseas, in order to maintain the integrity and protect the future of Islam in North America and curb the spread of harmful and misleading propaganda."[113]

The election of Canadian Muslim Ingrid Mattson as the Vice-President of ISNA in 2002 and then President in 2006 is seen by many as another reflection of that shift: Her election was a "watershed" in two important ways. First, she was the first female leader of a national level Muslim organization in North America. The choice of a female leader was a significant victory for the less conservative voices[114] in the mainstream leadership since for many conservative Muslims, the Qur'an is understood to stipulate against female leadership. While some among the oppositional voices have viewed her election as a symbolic but "insufficient" step[115], among the mainstream Muslim circle, this has signified much more.[116]

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[113] The full document can be retrieved at: http://www.isna.net/events/Special-Projects/Muslim-Code-of-Honor.aspx The document was the product of a meeting of leaders from major North American Muslim organizations in July of 2007. The declaration was catalyzed by earlier declarations from the Council of Islamic Organization of Michigan (May 2007) and a similar declaration of Intra-faith Code of Honor produced by Muslim leaders in California, including MPAC (March 2007). The Preamble to all of these three declarations reference the sectarian conflict in Iraq at the time. For example, the larger Muslim Code of Honor starts: "Reports of sectarian tension overseas, particularly in the aftermath of the American invasion of Iraq, have prompted the Muslim American leadership to speak out against communal divisions and all sectarian violence. Such expressions of sectarianism, if unchecked, may add fuel to the fire, engulfing the Community in historical grievances that magnify theological differences and minimize the common `Pillars of Faith' on which all Muslims agree, irrespective of their school of thought (*madhhab*)."

[114] Louay Safi, Executive Director of the ISNA Leadership Development Center, Interview, Columbus Ohio, August 31st 2008.

[115] Oppositional Muslim voices find that she is insufficiently progressive regarding reform of women's place in Islamic practices. Mainstream Muslim leadership finds that Mattson's ability to

Second, she was the first non-immigrant and the first covert leader of a national level Muslim organization in North America. [117] The choice of a non-immigrant leader was equally significant because it was a win for those in the leadership who had been advocating against "Muslims from there know better than Muslims from here viewpoint."[118] In fact the attempt to give greater voice at the level of both political and religious leadership to the convert Muslim population in North America, as well as the African-American Muslim community, has been one of the marked shifts which has occurred in the wake of 9/11[119]: Examples of changes that reflect a shift away from the immigrant leadership to a non-immigrant leadership include the joint conventions since 2003 between the African-American Muslim American Society (MAS) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA); the founding of the National Council for Imams and Islamic Centers in Washington D.C. in June 2004 by ISNA, the Muslim Alliance of North America, ICNA, and MAS.

The third shift, i.e., reform of practices within the North American Muslim community, is actually a continuation of the trend that existed prior to 9/11: a process of moving towards a more "authentic Islam" and away from the cultural

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"balance" piety with her professional (academic) and activist success makes her the symbol of what equality and dignity for women means in Islam.

[116] Asma Mirza, President of the National Chapter of the Muslim Students Association of North America, Interview, August 30th 2008, Columbus, Ohio.

[117] On both counts, this is not true if we account for the leadership of Sheema Khan of CAIR-Can. Sheema Khan, female and born and raised in Canada, was actually the first female non-immigrant leader of a national-level organization. However, the clout of ISNA is not comparable to that of CAIR-Can and thus the significance of Mattson's election was of tremendous importance for the mainstream Muslim leadership.

[118] Imam Zaid Shakir, co-founder of the Zaytuna Institute, Interview, Montreal, Feb 21st 2009. Similar sentiments were articulated by for example Imam Suhaib Webb, speech at closing session at the 45th ISNA Annual Convention, Columbus, Ohio, September 1st 2008. Other examples of this was also present in the same session by Shaykh Hamza Yusuf and Sherman Jackson.

[119] This however, has been a much stronger trend in the United States, than in Canada. In fact, the only attempt at having a convert leadership in Canada of a major Muslim organization occurred with CAIR-CAN in 2005. However, the president resigned within a few months. In both active participation and leadership positions, immigrants dominate the discourse of citizenship and faith for Canadian Muslims. I will discuss in the next couple of chapters what impact this divergence may have had on the trajectories of how mainstream and oppositional Muslim voices have related to each other in the States vs. Canada.

practices of Islam. Ingrid Mattson, as part of the Dialogue Project, in her address to the Union for Reform Judaism Biennial in 2007, articulated the significance of the diversity of the North American Muslim community in facilitating this process:

> As Muslims from different parts of the world came together in America to worship and fulfill the tenets of their faith, they did not always find themselves in agreement about the true Islamic position on many issues. Indeed, sometimes, the conversations became rather heated – and those disagreements have not yet ended in many places. Still, engaging in that conversation yielded ... positive results. ... Muslims were forced to confront the reality that many cultural practices and beliefs contrary to our faith have been integrated into many traditional understandings of Islam. By confronting the differences, we became aware that sometimes the Islam that was being taught in Muslim societies was not in harmony with the ethical teachings of the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad, but were, in fact, misogynistic, authoritarian or extremist views antithetical to true Islam....[T]he very act of discussing these differences, in a free society with no state-enforced religion, encouraged more respect for diversity within Islam, less support for authoritarian tendencies and a greater feeling of responsibility on the part of the ordinary Muslim to learn more about his or her religion.

The "vilification" of Islam and the community from the non-Muslim public in the wake of 9/11 and the "PMUNA experiment"[120] provided a new context to intensify the process of reform away from practices and views "antithetical to true Islam".

In fact, one of the major areas of reform since the attacks has focused on the treatment of women in the Muslim community, specially in the mosque. In 2005, two separate events led by voices outside of the mainstream community resulted in a publicized and public discussion in the Muslim community of activists regarding gendered practices in mosques. Asra Nomani, an American Muslim journalist focused on exposing the marginalized spaces for women in mosques by

[120] Louay Safi, Executive Director of the ISNA Leadership Development Center, Interview, Columbus Ohio, August 31st 2008. In the Muslim online e-zine, *The American Muslim* as well as his own website, Safi has written commentaries on the lessons learned from the establishment and dissolution of the PMUNA.

taking a camera crew to several mosques. For mainstream Muslim actors, even those sympathetic with her cause, were critical of her method: in part because it alienated the community from which reform had to come for it to be real. The response from one such sympathetic mainstream actor was that Nomani's approach of targeting mosques as sites of

> "direct action", which is usually reserved for military bases, polluting factories, and sinister embassies as opposed to houses of worship - in the final analysis might well be reinforcing sensationalistic popular images of mosques as dens of extremism and oppression rather than opening up mosques to women. In a post-9/11 world, showing up with a camera crew at a mosque you've never set foot in before and bullying your way in to stage triumphant photo-ops seems unlikely to do much for interfaith relations or consciousness-raising.[121]

However, the more important and divisive event was the decision by the PMUNA to lead a woman-led *jummah* prayer of a mixed congregation. El Fadl provided the scholarly interpretation in support of Amina Wadud, a board member of the PMUNA, to lead the prayer. Although the organization first attempted to find a mosque that would agree to Wadud leading the prayer, all the approached mosques and Islamic Centers declined. As a result, the prayer was led in a community center in New York. The decision was divisive within the organization, but it was more strongly opposed by mainstream Muslim actors. Ingrid Mattson, Imam Zaid Shakir and Louay Safi all publically criticized the effort. Mattson agreed that the treatment of women in mosques was unfair and needed reform. However, the problem was not that women could not lead prayers of mixed congregation: "authentic Islam" for Mattson consisted of the sanctity of how prayers are to be conducted, which according to all the major schools of Islamic jurisprudence is against the leading of prayer by women of a mixed congregation. The continuity of this tradition, and the prohibition against *bida* (innovation) regarding rituals of worship, are central to the strength of the Muslim *ummah*—these are the ties that bind Muslims across the varied cultures in which

[121] Svend White, "Lessons learned from the PMU experiment", *The American Muslim*, September 26th 2005. White is an American Muslim activist, located at the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy.

Islam has taken root.[122] Imam Shakir, also released a public critique of why the Wadud initiative was problematic. His concern however was that it caused *fitna* in the community.[123] Safi's response was that the initiative reflected the oppositional voices' "uncritical" embracement of "western feminism" and was "an incorrect way of aligning Islamic values to North American mores.[124]

For Mattson, Shakir and Safi, along with many of the mainstream Muslim voices, there *were* real issues of concern regarding the treatment of women in mosques: The problem was that women were often secluded in the mosque away from the imam in cramped spaces without proper sound systems that allowed for the women to be able to hear the *khutbahs*. This was not because of true Islamic principles, but the "misogynistic" views of imams and cultural distortions of practices. The problem was also that women's role in Islamic centers was severely constrained or their contributions to the faith community ignored. This had been voiced before 9/11 by some mainstream actors, however, it was only in the aftermath of these public initiatives, Safi, as head of ISNA's Islamic Leadership Development Center, published in 2006 a guide addressed to mosques about they can make houses of worship more friendly to women.[125] The guide was then endorsed and distributed by some of the major national Muslim organizations, including CAIR and CAIR-CAN. Some oppositional voices saw this as a victory of their making[126]; others saw it only a step in the right direction, but insufficient[127].

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[122] Ingrid Mattson, "Can a Woman be an Imam? Debating Form and Function in Muslim Women's Leadership". Retrieved at http://macdonald.hartsem.edu/muslimwomensleadership.pdf, 2005 (3(4):8-21). Shortened version of the article was distributed through the ISNA newsletter.

[123] Imam Zaid Shakir, "An Examination of the Issue of Female Prayer Leadership", March 23 2005. Retrieved at http://alghazzali.org/resources/femaleprayer.pdf The article written by Shakir was circulated in the newsletters of the major organizations, as well as on Muslim magazines: altmuslim.com and The American Muslim.

[124] Louay Safi, Executive Director of the ISNA Leadership Development Center, Interview, Columbus Ohio, August 31st 2008.

[125] "Women Friendly Mosques and Community Centers: Working Together to Reclaim Our Heritage." Retrieved at: *www.ildc.net/womens-involvement/WomenAndMosquesBooklet.pdf*

[126] Laury Silvers. In her defence of the PMUNA initiative she frames the prayer as an act of civil disobedience to push the Muslim community in the right direction against practices of gender

The fourth development in the response of mainstream Muslim actors since 9/11 has been a widening of the scope of political and social engagement that faith and citizenship require. Like the imperative of reform, this is an intensification of a process begun before the attacks. If we recall, in the last chapter, one of the most significant sites of reform with which the mainstream leadership had been engaged was reconciling the issue of becoming active Muslim citizens in non-Muslim nations. In the pre-9/11 context the definition of active engagement had focused on electoral participation. In the after-math, active engagement has come to mean political participation as well as social participation outside of just the Muslim community. From scholar-activists like Ingrid Mattson, Sherman Jackson and Louay Safi to religious leaders like Hamza Yusuf, Zaid Shakir and Suhaib Webb, to political activists like MPAC Salaam al-Marayaati and CAIR-CAN Sameer Zuberi, the direction from mainstream Muslim leadership to the North American Muslim community has been: silence and passivity are no longer options.

What is required is action by Muslim citizens to reach out to their non-Muslim neighbours and communities to "put a face to Islam", to "educate the non-Muslim public about Islam", to "redeem our nation" and to "take back Islam". As part of this process political engagement is necessary and it needs to go beyond voting: during the political activist panels in ISNA conventions in both Canada and the United States, there is a repeated emphasis on why American and Canadian Muslims need to place themselves as candidates at the local, state/provincial and national levels. Yet political engagement, as Nihad Awad, of CAIR, emphasized during an interview, is also about calling into radio stations, writing letters to the local and national level newspapers. "Correcting misrepresentations" is a duty: it is in this spirit that mainstream Muslim

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injustice. "Islamic Jurisprudence, 'Civil' Disobedience and Woman-Led Prayer." April 18 2005. Muqtedar Khan, who was opposed to the PMUNA initiative, nevertheless acknowledged that it had provoked the mainstream Muslim community into action. In an article on his site ijtihad.org, he commends the publication of the guide: "Bravo! Better Late than Never!"

[127] Tarek Fatah. Founder of the Muslim Canadian Congress. Interview, May 27th 2007, Toronto. Since the Wadud intitiative, several such prayers led by women and their giving of sermons have occurred in Toronto, led by Laury Silvers, Raheel Raza and Pamela Taylor.

organizations have collaborated with mosques across North America to hold open houses in their communities.

Moreover, mainstream religious leaders like African-American Zaid Shakir, Bosnian-Canadian Imam Zijad Delic and Canadian Shaykh Ahmad Kutty have insisted that "insularity" in the Muslim community is "unacceptable" because it "violates our Islamic duty". This however needs to not only be self-serving—it needs to go beyond the Muslim community: mainstream Muslim actors view this to be the greatest challenge facing them and the community. Since 2001, mainstream Muslim voices have attempted to step up their efforts to get the community to engage outside of itself with the social issues of the community. To initiate and catalyze, major advocacy organizations have attempted to start campaigns that move beyond advocacy of political participation, interfaith dialogue, and singularly Muslim issues: environmental activism and community-service for the homeless and the poor have been two important kinds of activities encouraged by mainstream Muslim actors for North American Muslims to take part in. The premise has been: we have to show our contribution to the good of the nation. From the pre-9/11 immigrant dominated discourse among mainstream actors, the "integration" of Muslim immigrants economically was supposed to be sufficient to justify their claim on the public for a place in the national story. In the post-9/11 context that claim is tempered in mainstream Muslim discourse: "We have a responsibility", Hamza Yusuf said to a crowd of hundreds at the ISNA convention in 2008, to "bear the light of justice...*before* we ask for justice for ourselves."

In this call for action, engagement and discussion, the new mainstream Muslim leadership shares with the oppositional Muslim actors the understanding that reform and renewal in Islam and Muslim practices are imperative. Although there are conflicts regarding the meaning, method and content of reform, there is a common understanding that North American Muslims have a "special responsibility" for initiating reform and renewal of the *ummah* and for the *ummah*. This notion of special responsibility and the associated debates on its meaning, we

will see in the next and sixth chapter, have important implications for what citizenship, nation and faith mean and how they are related.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have seen that 9/11 led to the emergence and mobilization of Muslim voices that had been absent, latent or silent in the public sphere in North America prior to the attacks of 2001. In particular we observed that three particular identity discourses emerged: progressive, liberal and secular. These emergent discourses have widened the discussion on citizenship and faith in the Muslim community. Among mainstream Muslim actors, important shifts occurred in discussions about Muslim identity and citizenship, as they attempted to respond to and meet the challenges posed by oppositional Muslim actors and the public discourse: an increased public recognition of divisions and conflicts within the community; a broadening of the of unification of the community; intensification of calls for reform of practices within the Muslim community; and the widening of the scope of political and social engagement that is required of Muslim citizens. While mainstream Muslim actors are right when they claim that much of what they have been saying since 9/11 was already part of the discussions taking place in the community of activists prior to the attacks, the above analysis of changes in leadership and claims reflect that what has shifted are: focus, location of those discussions, the range of actors claiming voice and their understanding of what citizenship *and* faith mean in relation to each other. This chapter has described the first three aspects of this shift. The next chapter will analyze the latter, for both mainstream and oppositional Muslim actors: what do citizenship and faith mean in relation to each other for Muslim citizens in North America after 9/11?

Chapter 4: Citizenship and Faith Clusters After 9-11 in North American Muslim Discourses

In the last chapter we saw that in the wake of 9/11 new kinds of Muslim identities were articulated as critique to existing Muslim discourse in North America. Moreover we saw that the pre-9/11 leadership also shifted its focus in response to the new context. Importantly, one emergent consequence was a greater practice of the public claiming of national identities and citizenship as well as a greater emphasis on the special responsibility for Muslims in North America to call for and effect reform, renewal and change in the faith community. Of course, the content of what national identity or citizenship may entail or what reform should be enacted remained and has remained important sources of debate between oppositional and mainstream Muslim voices, as well as within the two sides. In the conclusion to the last chapter, I pointed out that these debates were not necessarily created by the attacks of September 2001. Instead, 9/11 served as an important moment in making *visible* divisions and diversities that had been latent, silenced, or temporarily incorporated in the pre-9/11 movement towards forging a national Muslim identity in both North American nations. Thus, while 2001 did not create these identities *per se*, it led to the collective and public claiming of these other Muslim identities. Thus, the North American public sphere in the 9/11 context, we gathered from the previous chapter, was populated by a wider range of public Muslim identities: liberal, secular, progressive and mainstream (see *Table 4.1)*.

In this chapter I examine these various public Muslim identities further. Specifically, I ask what these identities reveal about how citizenship and faith are negotiated in multiple forms in the post-9/11 context. Utilizing the analytical framework on citizenship discussed in chapter 1, I examine the differing identities regarding their position on the various dimensions of citizenship, i.e., rights, practice, and identity on the one side and dimensions of faith on the other side, i.e., religious authority and the role of faith in civic identity and action. The emphasis in this chapter is on how Muslim actors themselves, due to ideology

and/or strategy, map citizenship and faith onto each other. The hope is to make explicit what was implicit in the last chapter, i.e., the ways these Muslim identities link citizenship and faith. In the next two chapters, I shift the focus away from the actors themselves to first show that certain differences in the institutions of diversity and secularism between Canada and the United States, as well as organizational histories of the Muslim communities have further affected the dynamics of these negotiations between oppositional and mainstream actors; and secondly, to explore how identity politics and the relationship between transnationality and citizenship in liberal democratic societies have shaped these negotiations. Thus, from the cumulative discussions in chapters three, four, five and six, I will be showing that not only actor ideology, identity and strategy, but also the discursive, institutional, and organizational contexts in which these actors are situated shape how citizenship and faith identities are mapped onto each other.

In this chapter, I first articulate where North American Muslim actors locate themselves with respect to the various dimensions of citizenship and faith traditions. Drawing from this discussion, I highlight the frameworks by which these differing actors arbitrate issues of citizenship and faith when faced with perceived or alleged conflicts. I have framed this latter discussion under the banner of "conflicting moral authorities" This goes back to my discussion in the first chapter, where I pointed out that (new) citizens of a polity are sometimes faced with task of managing and/or resolving competing moral authorities in relation to the moral authority presented by the state. While political philosophers have dwelt on the consequences of this for different political systems of thought, the sociological task is to examine the ways these tensions or differences are negotiated. For the purposes of this study, one important question was how the obligation to the nation is negotiated in light of obligations to the faith community or the faith, if and when there may be conflicts between the two. I have already shown, in the second chapter, the series of steps by which mainstream Muslim actors before 2001 had attempted to accomplish this. After first discussing the four clusters of citizenship and faith among North American Muslims, I present

the ideological means[128] by which Muslim actors, since 2001, attempt to accomplish this.

Table 4.1 summarizes the discussion to follow in the form of an analytic classification of the four clusters of citizenship and faith among North American Muslims. Throughout the discussion in this section I will develop the main points presented in this table. The classification here is analytic in purpose and content.

I also integrate the hypotheses of this research in the discussion that follows. This chapter relies primarily on the data already presented in the previous chapter; however, when appropriate, new interview and organizational material is presented. As in the last chapter, the data for analysis here is based on a reading of the various documents produced by the various organizations and actors who are the subject of this study; position papers and books produced by these actors were particularly important in this part of the analysis. Please refer to the methodology section again for a list of these documents. In addition, these analytic classifications are also further complemented by what individual leaders in these organizations expressed a greater affinity to or priority for during the course of interviews.

[128] As I have already noted, the focus in this chapter is on actors themselves: the ideological and/or strategic means by which citizenship is negotiated. In the next two chapters, I extend the analysis to the institutional, political, discursive and organizational aspects by which actors' attempts to negotiate citizenship (and faith) are affected. The choice to separate out these processes into separate sections is for purposes of analytic clarity.

Table 4.1 Citizenship and Faith Clusters After 9-11 in North American Muslim Discourses

	Dimensions of Citizenship			Dimensions of Faith	
Type of Muslim Actor	**Rights**	**Practice and the Place of Religion**	**Identity**	**Location of Religious Authority**	**Root of Reform in Islamic Movement**
Progressive	Collective-Individual[(a)]	Public	Civic	Islamic Scholars(-hip)	Traditionalist-Modernist
Liberal	Individual	Private-Public	Political-National	Consensus (sura)	Modernist
Secular	Individual	Private	National	Individual	Secularist
Mainstream (pre-9/11)[(b)]	Collective	Public	Political	Islamic Community and Islamic Scholars	Traditionalist-Modernist
Mainstream (post-9/11)[(c)]	Collective-*Individual*	Public-*Private*	Political-*Civic-National*	*National* Islamic Community and Islamic Scholars	*Modernist-Traditionalist*

(a). Hyphenated classifications reflect that both aspects of the given position are held to be important; priority or ordering is reflected by which position is placed first in the composite positions.

(b). Pre-9/11 refers to the discourse at the end of the 1990s. For a discussion of the Muslim discourses prior to this time period, please refer to Chapter 2.

(c). Words which are italicized indicate what has shifted since 9/11 in the mainstream Muslim discourse

4.1 North American Muslim Mappings of Citizenship and Faith

4.1.1 Individual vs. Collective Rights

If we recall, in chapter one, I discussed that one of the central tensions that has been identified in theorizing on citizenship has been that between individual vs. group or collective rights. Based on the theory and study of citizenship, I hypothesized that: *Regarding rights of the citizen, the fault line between Muslim activists will tend to be structured around competing claims of group vs. individual rights: one side will tend to prioritize the inequality of the group (Muslims) in relation to other groups and its correction; another will tend to prioritize the inequality of individuals within that group (e.g., Muslim women, Ahmadiyan, Muslim gays) and its correction (Hypothesis 1).* In what follows, I present the positions held within the North American Muslim discourses and conclude that while there *is* a fault line between Muslim discourses around competing claims of group vs. individual rights, the fault line is manifold rather than singular.

Both liberal Muslims and secular Muslim voices tend to locate themselves squarely on the side that only the individual is the sole bearer of rights of citizenship. While liberal Muslims will often acknowledge that specially in the 9/11 context, Muslim Americans or Muslim Canadians have been targeted as members of a group, their position is that this needs to be addressed not by claims of groups rights but instead by the redressing of any violation of individual rights guaranteed by one's citizenship. For liberal Muslims, it is unimportant by who the violation is enacted (i.e., the faith community, the state, or the public) because the recourse lies in recompense and/or justice based on the principle of rights of the individual to choose (freely) and act upon that choice. Liberal Muslims tend to be sympathetic thus towards Muslim organizations and leadership which are focused on addressing civil and political rights such as CAIR and MPAC. For the same reasons, liberal Muslims are also supportive of Muslim voices decrying abuses within the community which attempt to enforce behaviour that is not freely chosen. It is in this light that liberal Muslims like Muqtader Khan have been

strong supporters of mainstream organizations like CAIR and MPAC, either by attending as guest speakers (CAIR) or by serving as Editor-in-Chief of the *Muslim Public Affairs Journal* (2006-2007). It is for the same reason that he initially joined as advisory board member of the Progressive Muslims Union of North America.

While secular Muslim voices are all for the redressing of discrimination based on any identity, including religion, they are highly wary of claims of group rights by faith groups. In particular, they tend to see religious communities as more likely than other communities to infringe on individual rights.[129] As such, they prefer to prioritize a secular view of the rights granted by citizenship—one that is not only focused on the individual as the bearer of rights but also actively polices what are the legitimate spaces in which discrimination can be claimed. Secular Muslim voices of the political kind are more often than not against the *public* presence of religion.

Of course the line of where an act of religion is public and when it is not is a fine one and one motivated by a particular understanding of religion itself. For example, secular Muslims are not against the presence of mosques, churches and temples *per se*, as long as they are not built on public property or funded publically; women can wear the *hijab*, *niqab* or other covering motivated by faith, but not in public spaces—including public schools, courts, government offices, and for some, even in the streets. Two particular ideas motivate this apparently arbitrary distinction—prayer and congregational prayer are mandated by all interpretation of the religion and as such, the right of individuals to the freedom of

[129] For example, of the 3334 distinct post subjects (9632 responses in total) between May 2007 and December 2008 in the Muslim Canadian Congress discussion forum, 53.8% were discussions regarding religion as an instigator for gender, political, state violence or a force in inhibiting free expression (specially speech). Of these, 1/3 of the responses included at least one reference of the particularly harmful aspect of religion (as organized religion) on individual rights—women's rights, children's rights, civil and political rights. While more than 80% of these references were focused on Islam and the Muslim communities (35.6% referred to Canadian Muslim communities; 33.3% referred to Muslim communities in where they are minorities (mainly in the West), and the remainder referred to Muslim communities in the Muslim world), the remainder of these references did highlight the "sins" of the other religions: particularly common "targets" were Hinduism, Sikhism and Evangelical Christianity.

expression of religious practice obligates society to accept privately owned but publically visible places of worship. In contrast, because the *hijab* and other codes of dress are not mandated by the religion, they are not guaranteed by the right to freedom of religion of individuals; as such, if such a practice is banned for reasons of "public good", secular Muslims voices do not see this as a limitation "above and beyond" the regular sets of limitations placed on non-Muslim individuals in liberal societies for the sake of common goods.[130] The public good, in this case, is often framed in terms of either security and/or the equality of individuals: secular Muslims will point out that non-Muslims are not allowed to walk around in the public space with their faces completely covered for the purposes of security and thus the use of religious excuse to wear the *optional* niqab therefore creates inequality in society, as well as increasing security risks.[131]

Mainstream Muslim discourse, while cognizant of diversity, are invested in the forging of an Islamic identity transcendent of individual understandings. This is in contrast to liberal and secular Muslim discourses which while placing a premium on the principles of choice, equality and/or secularity as essential to the common good, they resist the defining of "Muslim interests" and attempts at claiming a collective vision of say "Islamic history" or "Muslim culture" or even a "Muslim good" distinct from those larger common goods. For mainstream

[130] Tarek Fatah, co-founder, Muslim Canadian Congress, Interview, May 28 2007, Toronto. Munir Pervez, Communications Director, Muslim Canadian Congress, Interview, May 30 2007, Toronto.

[131] Both anti-racism activists and theorists have argued that this argument rationalizes the prejudice and racism against Muslims in the contemporary context. The arguments that allowing the niqab creates inequality or engenders a security threat or prevent effective communication between individuals (teachers and students for example), according to them, are ways to legitimize prejudices against Muslims (Razack 2007). This is further backed up by demonstrating that in places where the practice of wearing the niqab has been banned, such as the Netherlands, targets the behaviour of a few women; the disproportionality of the reaction against the niqab given how many women practice it, has been argued as evidence of the racism that Muslims (Muslim women) are being subjected to (Razack 2007; see also Lysiane Gagnon's article "The Chief Electoral Officer is Right About the Niqaab" (Globe and Mail, September 17 2007). I think these points are invaluable insights into the way racism and prejudice can manifest itself. They do not, however, delegitimize the claims of secularist Muslims as what they consider to be valid positions/interest around which they are mobilizing (i.e., in the sense of worldview and interest; the morality of their claims or their "truth-status" is not being examined in this study).

Muslims on the other hand, as we saw in the second chapter, in the pre-9/11 context, the primary focus, in fact, was to hammer out such a collective vision. This is not to say that the individual was unimportant in mainstream Muslim discourse pre-9/11, only that in relation to a non-Muslim public sphere, mainstream Muslim discourse in North America prioritized the collective faith community and its interests**.**

One question that arises at this point is: what else would an activist discourse attempting to integrate and assert Muslim American/Canadian identity do? The oppositional discourse is a counterpoint to what forms activist discourses of collective identity claims-making can take. I will discuss the theoretical implications of this further on in the sixth chapter. However, the basic point is this: in much of literature on identity politics there is an assumption that if members of a categorical group take to collective action to demand the proper way to address the public identity of that categorical group, the claims will prioritize the "collective" dimensions and interests of that identity. Recently though, several scholars, including Modood (2007), Benhabib (2002), Asad (2003), have shown that this assumption overlooks an important social phenomena: the resistances within the categorical group to action based on the identity or any assertion of group interests based on that identity.[132] Their argument underscores an important insight: claims of citizenship, identity and faith do not have to prioritize or even assert a sense of collectivity or collective rights. In the case of North American Muslim actors, while mainstream actors do, liberals and secularists do not and in fact oppose it.

[132] While there has been an intellectual movement in the social sciences that has articulated this critique of identity politics and how it is both expressed and practiced, few studies have explored this resistance empirically (Modood 1999). This negligence actually parallels the earlier tendency in social movement studies of ignoring movements which put at center identities that were assumed to be more hegemonic: masculinity, whiteness, heterosexuality (Berbrier 2003). In this case, it is minority voices articulating claims that sounds like assimilationist claims or nationalist claims that have been ignored: while I will show that there are important differences between the oppositional voices and conservative assimilationists/nationalists, the more important point now is more simple.

As such, common claims of collective rights[133]—claims of recognition, right to maintain culture and the means to do so, the legitimacy of influencing policy and legislation from a particular collective point of view—were the primary forms of claims being made. Citizenship was understood to be only partially meaningful if limited to the rights of the individual. Instead, what rights citizenship could grant to the collective dignity of the faith community and the faith was equally important to make citizenship complete. Since the attacks of 9/11, mainstream Muslim actors have adopted a complementary individual rights perspective to this collective rights discourse. Ironically, this shift has partially been driven by processes of profiling and public discourses that have placed collective guilt on the Muslim identity and the faith. As we saw in the previous chapter, the flip side of rejecting these processes and criticizing these practices has meant that mainstream Muslim discourse has had to shift to equally emphasize the diversity and the individual in the public sphere. Some claims, in the post-9/11 context, have been reframed in terms of choice instead of "culture", "collective" or "group".

Nevertheless, strategic adaptations to changing context, as well changes in leadership are not the only drivers in this shift in mainstream discourse. This shift has been more dominant in the American context. The presence of an institutional structure in the Canadian context which not only supports but facilitates claims of culture and collectives, has provided less incentive for such a shift. In the next chapter, I examine in greater detail the impact of differences in institutional structures in differentially shaping American vs. Canadian Muslim identity discourses. However, at this point in the analysis, the significance is that there has been, in the wake of 9/11, a shift from a focus on collective rights to one that integrates explicitly rationales based on individual rights.

[133] To reiterate a point from the beginning of this study, claims of collective rights are different from claims of redress (against stigma or injustice), albeit, the latter can be part of the former. As I have discussed in the first chapter and as I discuss in the sixth chapter, the former are a product of a shift in the content of claims-making, a shift that is often marked by the shorthand of "politics of recognition" or identity politics (Benhabib 2002; Fraser 2000).

Progressive Muslim discourse deviates from mainstream, liberal and secular understandings of rights. Liberal and secular Muslim discourses, we have seen, tend to discount claims of collective rights on the basis of Muslim identity, and mainstream Muslim groups are prone to see it as an important means by which full citizenship can be attained and remain meaningful. In progressive Muslim discourse, citizenship is understood to be meaningful only in a *human* rights frame, where inequalities and injustices of any community and individual are seen to violate the rights of all. In progressive Muslim discourse, claims of recognition for a particular group or the individual are seen as limited views of human society and what it means to be citizen.[134] While the progressive view cannot discount the individual as the bearer of rights, it prioritizes claims of social justice and thus places a premium on the collective, understood in the broadest sense. As we have already seen, progressive Muslims thus are reluctant to get on the bandwagon with mainstream Muslims actors because they find their focus on the Muslim group as insufficient; in a parallel vein, they find the liberal Muslim understanding of individual rights to be centered around freedom of choice as also limiting; finally, they clash with the secularists because secular Muslims are seen to prioritize one kind of belief (secular) as "better" than another (religious) in determining the common good.

What the progressive Muslim discourse on rights makes clear is the complexity of how citizenship and rights are negotiated by citizens. In fact, a preference or emphasis on one kind of rights versus another is shaped by strategy and other political principles, including freedom of choice (liberals), secularism (secularists), and justice (progressives). Mainstream Muslim discourse is more clearly located in the "traditional" or more commonly understood idea of why activists make collective claims of culture. However, even this has had to accommodate claims framed in terms of individual rights. Therefore, as I stated in the beginning of this section: the hypothesis that Muslim activists will be

[134] The many instances in which Safi, Esack and El Fadl in *Progressive Muslims* (2003) highlight the broader dimension of rights than understood in the Marshallian sense only emphasizes their perspective.

divided along the lines of individual vs. group rights fails to capture the complexity of how rights are negotiated in Muslim discourses on citizenship and faith. Actor ideology, in this case liberalism, secularism, progressivism mediates in what way actors understand and claim rights of citizenship.

4.1.2 Practice and the Place of Religion in the Public Sphere

The second dimension of citizenship is practice, or the set of obligations by which an individual fulfills his/her role to the polity in which he/she is a citizen. Practice, if we recall, refers to not only the obligations that citizenship places on the citizen, but also the various means by which those obligations can be enacted. Furthermore, as we have seen, discussions about practice for citizens of faith have pivoted on the *place of religion* in the public sphere and thus the institution or the norm of secularism. In the literature, we saw there were two questions: (1) whether citizens of faith can fully realize their obligations to the polity because of their obligations to the faith community and (2) whether the norm of secularism prevents citizens of faith from fully fulfilling their obligations to the polity.[135] I discuss these two questions in the conclusion of this study in light of the analyses and findings of this study. In this section, I focus more narrowly on what position the various North American Muslim actors hold regarding the place of religion in the public sphere. Drawing from the literature, I had hypothesized that the answer to this question of the place of religion among Muslim activists will differ by whether one sees faith identity (Muslim identity and Islam) as a source of public good or not:

> *Regarding practice of citizenship, Muslim actors will tend to disagree on the place of religion in the public sphere: to the extent that they see Islam and faith as a source of public good, they will tend to emphasize the significance of religious or faith-based identity in public*

[135] A subsidiary to the second question was whether the histories of how secularism has been forged in a polity privileges certain faith groups over others, rather than disadvantaging all citizens of faith. This particular question is addressed in more detail in the next two chapters.

> *discussions; to the extent that they see Islam and faith as a source of individual good, they will tend to argue for secularism. Moreover, to the extent that Muslim actors will tend to see a public Islam (and public religion) as actually harmful to the public good, they will tend to argue for a strict secularism (Hypothesis 2).*

In this section, I show that this is to a large extent demonstrated in North American Muslim discourse, and is specially evident for the liberal and secular positions. However, progressive and mainstream Muslim positions are more complex and are sites of tensions. As we will see next, particularly the mainstream Muslim leadership is caught up in a strategic and ideological dilemma regarding the place of religion and their role in mobilizing civic and political action based on a faith identity.

Mainstream Muslim discourse, as we saw in chapter two, evolved over the 1980s and 1990s into an emphasis on bringing faith identity from the private sphere, as demanded by the Muslim isolationist perspective, to the public sphere, as put forward by the Muslim democratic perspective. One particular focus in the pre-9/11 context had been providing a rationale for how an Islamic perspective could contribute to the attainment of the nation's ideals and the good of the society. As such, faith and Islam were imagined as sources of public goods. In the wake of the attacks of 2001 and the consequent intensification of the public gaze on their faith, ideology and practices, mainstream Muslim discourse is again in turmoil. On the one hand, the attempt to present the contribution of the Muslim community and the potential of the Islamic faith as a force toward the common good has intensified. As I showed in the previous chapter, by expanding the *meaning* and *space* of where citizenship is practiced (and should be practiced) into the social and the civic, mainstream Muslim discourse has acquired a less parochial tone. On the other hand, the role of the Muslim identity or Islamic values in the *political* space of the practice of citizenship is in tension within mainstream Muslim discourse.

In fact Mainstream Muslim actors feel as if they are in a dilemma. Judging from what they see as the influence exerted by the Jewish lobby[136] and the Christian right[137] in influencing public policy, particularly foreign policy, they find that creating a parallel political Muslim voice is of crucial importance. This was, if we recall, an important motivator in the pre-9/11 context for mobilization. In light of the increased incidents of violation of civil rights of Muslim citizens and heightened stigmatization of Muslims and Islam in the public sphere, Mainstream Muslim activists find that it is even more urgent that a political Muslim voice is represented and articulated in the public sphere.[138] However, they have also learned that, specially in the post-9/11 context of a backlash against Muslims and Islam, a collective Muslim voice in the public sphere seems to create "sometimes more problems than it solves."[139] This was strongly perceived in the American Muslim community due to the successive shifts away by the Bush administration from the Muslim community in the aftermath of the 2001 attacks; nevertheless, it was also felt by the Canadian Muslim community, specially with the election of the Conservative government into power in 2006.[140] While isolationism is not making a come-back, there is an increasing trend among activists to place Islamic rationales in the background rather than the foreground during the making of claims. Within mainstream discourse, the use of religious rationales for support of or critique against a policy has also retreated since September 11 2001. Mainstream Muslim actors are very aware, specially in the American context, the difficulty non-Muslim political actors face when advocating for Muslim interests or associating with mainstream Muslim activists. They point out that building ties in the background is important in this context for doing actual advocacy work; however, it discredits their legitimacy to their own

[136] Mohamed Elmasry, Founder of CIC, Interview, November 15th 2006, Vancouver
[137] Nihad Awad, Co-founder of CAIR, Interview, October 31st 2007, Washington D.C.
[138] Edina Lukovic, Communications Director, MPAC, March 29th 2008, Phone Interview (Los Angeles)
[139] Parvez Ahmed, Former President of CAIR, Interview, November 6th 2007, Phone interview (Jacksonville, Florida).
[140] Faisal Kutty, Interview, April 23rd 2008, Toronto.

constituency.[141] These actors acknowledge the dilemma in which they are placed as a result of this: The strategic and ideological drive to mobilize Muslim identity in the public sphere has to be weighed against the strategic consideration that the action itself tends to catalyze the intensity of their opponents' criticisms, weaken their support among the political elite, and simultaneously diminish the legitimacy of their leadership to their own constituencies.

This particular dilemma showed up dramatically during the 2008 presidential campaign, when mainstream Muslim actors decided to not forward an explicit support of Barak Obama in the public sphere. Unlike the 2000 elections, where the American Muslim Alliance and the American Muslim Taskforce mobilized not only for the registration of Muslim voters, but also encouraged a bloc vote for the Republican candidate George W. Bush, in the 2008 elections, endorsement of Obama was consciously muted in the public. Not wanting to "ruin" his candidacy and campaign, many mainstream Muslim actors chose to keep their support in the background.[142] This led many in the American Muslim community, who were attracted to Obama's candidacy, to question their support for him.[143] Moreover, though, it underscored the significance of leaving a faith identity outside of the *political* sphere and the collective gaze.

Unlike the conflicted position of mainstream Muslim actors, the secularist Muslim position is quite uncompromising in its opposition to the place of religion

[141] Edina Lukovic, Communications Director, MPAC, March 29th 2008, Phone Interview (Los Angeles)

[142] Other than a couple of instances where Obama recognized this problematic position American Muslims were being placed in, the Democratic Party campaign's relationship to their Muslim constituency was run in a parallel manner.

[143] One example of this occurred during the 2008 Annual ISNA Convention. During a session in which African-American Muslim Congressmen Keith Ellison and André Carson were presenting on the significance of voting in the 2008 elections, one young Muslim American student from an American University posed the question of why he should support Obama, given the distance that had been created between the candidate and the community in the public space. In another session during the same convention, one of the panellists, the head of CAIR-FL, expressed a similar dissatisfaction with what he felt was "euphoria" in certain parts of the community and the country about Obama's candidacy. He felt that he was "without candidate, without choice". He explained himself by pointing out the acceptance by Obama of the resignation of a Muslim American from his staff who cited the difficulty his being Muslim was causing the campaign.

in the political space. The secularist position on rights already underscored this position. However, the secularist Muslim position in North America is stronger than that: there is no place for religious practices in the public sphere for secularist Muslims[144]. This is motivated by two-levels of understanding of faith and its relationship to the practice of citizenship. First, faith in secularist Muslim discourse is *only* legitimate as a private individual's right to belief. Second, any expression of public Islam or other public faiths are understood in the secularist discourse as *potential* sources of public harm.[145] Let me use the example commonly used by secular Muslims, i.e., the hijab, as a major symbol of the relationship between acts of faith and acts of citizenship: their argument goes, because the hijab is embedded in historical processes of unequal power between cultures (Arab and non-Arab), within families (parent/brother and daughter/wife), and between genders, it is a practice that contradicts the primacy of individual rights and freedom embodied by liberal citizenship. As such, the wearing of the *hijab* in public spaces is a violation of the contract of citizenship**.**[146] In a similar vein, religious reason, with its histories of "oppression and injustice", as well as exclusion, has "earned" the place of being delegated to the private sphere only. This position of secularism of the strictest kind is held by its Muslim proponents as a matter of principle. Many North American Muslim actors (as well as many non-Muslim actors in North America) find this position too radical and argue that it betrays secular Muslims to be both anti-Islam and anti-liberal citizenship.

As such, the liberal Muslim discourse is opposed to the secularist Muslim discourse because it is understood as contrary to choice. Nevertheless, the liberal Muslim discourse is conflicted as to the appropriate place for religion in the

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[144] In the description of the Muslim Canadian Congress online discussion forum, the site concludes about itself:
"We believe in the separation of religion and state in all matters of public policy. We feel such a separation is a necessary pre-requisite to building democratic societies, where religious, ethnic, and racial minorities are accepted as equal citizens enjoying full dignity and human rights enunciated in the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.Muslim Canadian Congress." http://groups.yahoo.com/group/MuslimCanadianCongress/, retrieved May 31 2007.

[145] See note 2.

[146] Farzana Hassan, President of the Muslim Canadian Congress (2006-2008), Interview, May 30th 2007, Toronto

public sphere. In various debates in the public sphere regarding the hijab, Islamic finance and sometimes even religious courts for family arbitration, liberal Muslims have tended to emphasize the importance of giving each individual the choice to opt-in and opt-out of any of these practices. Among liberal Muslims, support of secularism as institution and/or norm is also premised on the priority of individual choice and equality as determinants of legitimate practice. Thus, many liberal Muslims support secularism *because* it means that both religiosity *and* non-religiosity will be allowed to be practiced in a wide-ranging manner[147]. At the same time, however, precisely because choice is of central importance to the liberal Muslim discourse, it opposes secular Muslim actors' call for a strict privatization of faith and its practices. In fact, liberal Muslims are often quite strong advocates of making explicit the normative aspects of one's politics clear—secularism in this sense is problematic for the liberal Muslim position because it excludes the religiously derived/faith-based normative dimensions of one's political interests and stance.[148]

Progressive Muslim actors have a less conflicted position than liberal and mainstream Muslims, while being opposed to the secularist position as well. For progressive Muslims, if we recall, social justice was seen to be a determining principle. This implicates that all moral forces, including faith, are valuable and important in producing active citizens. The place of religion is legitimate in the public sphere to the extent that it furthers the cause of social justice; to the extent that it works against it, religion must be reformed (Esack 2003). Nevertheless, in an important way, progressive and mainstream Muslim understandings of how

[147] This is the position that Muqtedar Khan for example takes in "The Myth of Secularism" (ijtihad.org/secularism, January 1st 2004, retrieved, September 20th 2007).

[148] This position is equally true of liberal Muslims of the likes of Manji as well as of the type of Khan. As I pointed out in the last chapter, liberal Muslim identity is probably the least coherent in terms of how faith is practiced. Nevertheless, those who claim themselves as liberal Muslims emphasize 1) choice and 2) equality of individuals. (I will bring this up again in a later section in this chapter.) Thus even though Khan and Manji disagree on major aspects of each others' practice of faith and sometimes their respective alliances, they are consistent in that they use the same principles to arbitrate an issue, including the place of religion in the public sphere. Importantly, they are also both strong advocates of bringing in the normative explicitly into politics—but as individual expressions rather than collective laws.

citizenship and faith link up are convergent: faith should expand the practice of citizenship beyond the political sphere, citizenship should expand the practice of faith beyond the faith community. This is specially true in the light of the shift that mainstream Muslim discourse has experienced in the expansion of the meaning of obligations as citizens, from the political to the social and civic.

In contrast, precisely because secularist Muslim actors tend to envision faith as a source of individual good, at best, and a source of public harm, at worst, they hold a position that is exclusive of religious discourse in the public sphere, specially the political one. However, liberal Muslim discourse link up the practice of citizenship and faith through the principle of choice and equality: in their understanding, as long as the practice of citizenship is not hindered by faith, or the shared institutions of the polity are not harmed by participation of religious reason in public deliberation of policies and law, and as long as all faith communities are allowed an equal space in that deliberation, secularism as an institution or norm should not be tied to the practice of citizenship.

4.1.3 Identity: civic, political and national citizenship identities

The debates within the Muslim community about whether faith is a source of public good or not and, consequently, the conflicts about determining the place of religion in the public sphere leads to an important insight: Muslim actors are invested in imagining themselves as valuable members of the community that grants them the rights of citizenship. Both activists and scholars tend to make the mistake of reifying these conversations about secularism into static camps that individuals, groups or actors enter to take residence in. Instead, as Benhabib (2002) points out, the ongoing debates, conflicts, and conversations within and across the various Muslim voices may be seen as reflective of their participation in deliberative democracy and their attempts at entering the conversation on what is the common identity they share with other citizens of that polity. Thus, in this framework, the issue of identity, the third dimension of citizenship, and the ties that bind are seen as the willingness of Muslim actors to attempt to map citizenship and faith onto each other, to critique and debate presentations and

representations of Muslim identity by not only non-Muslims but fellow Muslims themselves. Identification with the polity, from this political philosophical perspective, is participation in the deliberation (by means that are considered legitimate).

However, what *are* the ways North American Muslims themselves envision identification with the polity in which they are citizens? As I discussed in my first chapter, claims of identification and the resulting mapping between citizenship identity and faith identity will vary by whether Muslim actors view identity demands of their North American nation as civic, political, and/or national (Hypothesis 3). To reiterate from the first chapter, citizenship identity refers to nature of what ties together different individuals and groups as fellow citizens of a given polity: is it in the interactions that transcend identities of gender, race, religion and ethnicity? Is it in the institutions and the processes that characterize the way citizens relate to the state? Is it in the narratives of history and civilization that imply common memories and ancestors? This is a heavily contested site in North American Muslim discourse: the actors engaged in this discourse are emotionally invested in their claims of how Muslim citizens are bound to the American or the Canadian nation. In many ways, this is the definitive aspect of what they are trying to negotiate, how they are linking two identities which are of primary importance for their public selves (as well as private ones). In this section, I describe which understanding of citizenship identity the various Muslim actors' claims most closely resemble: civic, political or national.

As I delineate the positions which Muslim actors hold regarding citizenship identity, two important themes emerge: First, how one imagines the nation[149] implicates what one's obligation and one's fellow citizens' obligation to

[149] Please recall, that when I refer to the nation, in this discussion, as throughout the study, the reference is to the United States for American Muslims and Canada for Canadian Muslims. While these groups are also located in other nations (Muslim in terms of the *ummah*, or the various nations of their origins/background), as we have seen from the beginning, the goal of this study (and these actors) is to bridge their other identities (specifically the Muslim one) to that of the nation that has received them (in the case of immigrants) or the nation which is theirs by birth (African-Americans, 2nd/3rd generations).

the nation is. Second, how one imagines the nation implicates what are the limitations the nation places on one's obligation and one's fellow citizens' obligation to non-citizens is. This latter theme brings out the complex challenges that territorially defined citizenship places on citizens who locate themselves transnationally. Both of these themes are taken up in the sixth chapter.

Secularist Muslim opposition to other Muslim voices, particularly mainstream ones, make manifest their understanding of citizenship obligating a national identity. Both political institutions and civic norms of the United States or Canada are seen as determining of the American or the Canadian nation: to be a citizen in this understanding implicates the sharing of common values with the community of citizens that these institutions and norms implicate. In a very strong sense, secularist Muslims find public claims in which cultural difference is utilized to claim exception or special privilege as acts of defiance against the national identity implicated by citizenship in the American or the Canadian polity. This reflects an understanding of Canadian identity and/or American identity which is based on values and civilization. In secularist Muslim discourse, citizenship and identification requires the adoption of these values and a deep understanding of the civilisational discourse of western modernity. Thus, neither multicultural liberals nor assimilationist conservatives they are probably most aptly described as rigorous assimilationists[150], which probably helps to partially make sense of the strange situation that even as their own political backgrounds have been oriented towards left of the center, they have had to adapt to the fact that their bedfellows at the moment in the political and media realms are the conservatives.

[150] The labelling of this group is an interesting challenge. The use of "rigrous assimilationist" was suggested by Steven Rytina. I have chosen to utilize this label because it describes clearly the position that secularists have taken in relation to how Muslims and new citizens should related to and integrate to the receiving nation-state. Other options could be cosmopolitan nationalists or assimilationist cosmopolitans. They are nationalist in the sense of prioritizing the Canadian (or the American) nation as the primary source of ethnic identity in relation to political positions and relations to the state. They are cosmopolitans in the sense that they resist heterogenizing particulars.

Still, many of their actions in the post-9/11 context has reflected an understanding of citizenship that is of the nationalist strand. For example**,** in a Canada Day celebration, the secular Muslim group, the Muslim Canadian Congress, was heavily critical of an activist in the Canadian Arab Federation writing out "Fuck Canada!" on his personal status in his Facebook profile.[151] Another example of this includes the repeated use of the "go back home" logic by secularist Muslims when mainstream Muslim actors or fundamentalist Muslim actors criticize their own Western governments in favour of non-Western governments. This has been used in six different op-ed pieces by the MCC over the 2007-2008 period, out of a total of 10 op-eds that were published. Yet another example is the sentiment expressed in several of my interviews with secular Muslims that one should identity oneself as not "Muslim Canadian" (or "Pakistani Canadian), but simply "Canadian".[152] In the secularist Muslim view, the responsibility for "new" citizens is to transform non-Canadian (or non-American) identities one is part of into one that is compatible with the Canadian (or American) understanding of itself. The idea is to choose elements of one's other identity (food, may be some dress, literature, some rituals, music) that do not conflict with or challenge the values of their citizenship identity.

In a secular Muslim understanding, the granting of a complete set of social, political and civic rights to all citizens, including Muslims, is an act of inclusion by the polity; citizenship itself is understood as an invitation to the national narrative and identity; as a result, the obligation of the "new" citizen is to display loyalty to the granting polity by adopting fully the national identity embodied in the constitutions and national imagination of that polity. Sometimes this understanding has implications that throw even secular Muslims in turmoil: One particular issue that drove a wedge within even the secularist Muslim camp in 2006 was the Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon: Hezbollah is listed by the

[151] Muslim Canadian Congress Discussion Forum, July 1st 2008.

[152] Tarek Fatah, Co-founder, Muslim Canadian Congress, Interview, May 28 2007, Toronto; Munir Pervez, Communications Director, Muslim Canadian Congress, Interview, May 30 2007, Toronto; Farzana Hassan, President, Muslim Canadian Congress, Interview, May 30 2007; Attiq Raza, Co-founder, the Canadian Muslims Union, Interview, June 30 2007.

Canadian government as a terrorist organization. Does showing support for the victims of Israeli attack in a protest march which displays the Hezbollah flag constitute an act of betrayal or disloyalty against the nation? The issue at hand was not support of the Lebanese victims. Members of the MCC were uniformly against the Israeli attacks. The issue was how opposition to the attacks and support for the victims were shown: walking in a protest that showed support for Hezbollah—an organization that has been listed by the Canadian government as a terrorist organization, as well as an organization that is against the secular principles of the organization. In 2006, the Muslim Canadian Congress lost a third of its board of directors, including the co-founder of the organization, as a result of this issue. Because these individuals had either directly participated in such a march or supported those who had, the organization experienced a heated debate, in which the majority of the organizations members and leaders asked for a public apology. Such an apology was seen as problematic by those who had participated in the march because they did not see this as a violation of neither the principles of the organization nor Canadian citizenship. The outcome was the resignation of these members and the establishment of a parallel secular Muslim organization, the Canadian Muslim Union (CMU).[153]

Liberal Muslim actors share with the secular Muslim voices the conception that collective identity implicated by citizenship emphasizes certain common values. In the true liberalist sense, these are equality, individual autonomy and choice. If national identity was limited in this minimalist way, liberal Muslim actors would be advocates of a national conception of identity. However, liberal Muslims point out that national identity is more often entangled with historical narratives of blood and civilization. Since both blood and civilization are exclusive of the narratives that "new" citizens are part of, in liberal Muslim discourse, political institutions which emphasize processes of participation and practice of citizenship become the primary basis of shared identity among citizens. The uniqueness of the political institutions and processes

[153] Munir Pervez, Communications Director, Muslim Canadian Congress, Interview, May 30 2007, Toronto.

are understood in liberal Muslim discourse as determining of the national identity, rather than stories of common civilization or particular values. Thus, liberal Muslims understand national identity at the political level. As we saw in the previous chapter, liberal Muslims, like Muqtedar Khan, argue that inclusion into these institutions and active engagement by Muslim citizens in these institutions are the means by which "new" citizens develop an affinity to the shared identity with non-Muslim citizens. Liberal Muslims, as we have seen, thus will emphasize identification with the major political institutions and processes of the nation. The political sphere is the locus of displaying and forging shared identity with the polity granting citizenship.

Mainstream Muslim actors, in the pre-9/11 context, we observed, held a similar position about the site at which national identity is located. The 1990s was, if we recall, an effort at mobilizing a collective Muslim identity that linked explicitly the political institutions of the polity to the faith identity in an effort to rationalize participation in a non-Muslim context. Identification with the non-Muslim society and nation was attainable, these actors argued, by the shared understanding of the political institutions of representation, democracy, and pluralism. By arguing that these institutions are not only compatible with Islamic principles but are also potentially Islamic, mainstream Muslim actors in the pre-9/11 context made a case against the Isolationist discourse and a case for identification with the nation through political participation.

In the wake of the attacks however, this mapping has been framed by critics, including oppositional Muslim voices, as being an utilitarian approach to shared identity, one that is not invested in the national imaginary beyond the particular interests of the faith community.[154] We have already seen in the last chapter and in our discussion on both practice and rights that mainstream Muslim actors have challenged this criticism by attempting to expand the loci and content of participation by the American and Canadian Muslims. This has included first a

[154] We saw this repeatedly in the last chapter in the critiques from the oppositional voices. Particularly important examples were the criticism written by El Khaled and Khan in the aftermath of the attacks that I discussed in the previous chapter.

greater push towards dealing with fundamentalist and extremist interpretations and practices within the Muslim communities in North America, including projects dealing with counter-terrorism and youth radicalization.[155] In addition, there has been a greater thrust towards an understanding of pluralism beyond the political sphere into the public sphere. Mainstream Muslim actors such as Louay Safi and Muzamil Siddiqui, as well as Shaykh Hamza Yusuf and Imam Zaid Shakir have been integral in pushing an understanding of American identity as rooted in pluralism. As such, we saw in the last chapter that interfaith and interethnic dialogues have accelerated in the post-9/11 context. Moreover, the accusations of disloyalty or discourses of collective guilt have meant that in the 9/11 context, mainstream Muslim actors have also devoted a significant time making claims that reference also a national identity based on values and common civilization. The approach here is distinct from the secular Muslim conception: while secular Muslims see a distinction between western liberal modernity to which new citizens can integrate into, mainstream Muslims draw out how Islamic ideals and western liberal modernity share common roots historically and contemporarily.

Furthermore, there are greater efforts on the part of Mainstream Muslim actors in the States and in Canada to integrate into the national narrative Muslim stories, such as discovering the four hundred years of Muslim American history,

[155] This was importantly demonstrated during my interview with Nihad Awad, the co-founder of CAIR. In conclusion to his response to the question of what he considered one of the most dramatic changes his organization has gone through since the 9/11 attacks, he said: "Our development of programs and workshops that deal with youth radicalization." He expressed candidly that this was something that he had never envisioned as part of the agenda of CAIR. Its development came about because of "our community was more ready for it" in the face of the attacks (October 31st 2007, Washington D.C.). During my interview with then CAIR President Parvez Ahmed, the same sentiment was expressed, however, Ahmed felt CAIR leadership was not doing enough (November 6th 2007, Washington D.C.). The MPAC report on the challenges that American Muslim youth faced in the aftermath of 9/11 also paid attention this issue of radicalization. Edina Lukovic (March 23 2008, L.A.) and Safiya Ghori (April 10 2008, Washington D.C.) of MPAC expressed that a report like this would have been much harder to write in relation to the Muslim community prior to September 2001. Thus they also confirm Awad's feeling that the mainstream Muslim community had shifted its attention.

or establishing Islamic History Month in Canada.[156] Although secular Muslims critique these efforts as selective story-telling that marginalizes other Muslim stories, from the framework of Benhabib (2002), the injection of the group narrative into the national narrative could be interpreted as a putting away of claims of difference for claims of forging common civilisational and value-based narratives, thus pushing for emergent national level understanding of citizenship identity. It is in this sense that the mainstream Muslim discourse draws upon not only political and civic understandings of the citizenship identity, but also on a national understanding of a community of citizens.

Progressive Muslim voices, we saw in the previous chapter, are reluctant to identify with a particular national identity. Their basis for this is that they see the common community as the *human* community. This is not surprising given that we already saw that progressive Muslim actors also see the citizen in terms of *human* rights and his or obligations as a result of those rights to world society. Consequently, progressive Muslim voices are impatient with conversations about national loyalty or identification with a particular polity. Despite their reluctance, they interpret their citizenship identity through mapping their principles of justice and pluralism onto the ideals of their polities in which they are citizens. This is clearly demonstrated in the following statement made by progressive Muslim actor Omid Safi:

> I see a difference between nationalism and patriotism. If nationalism implies that I somehow identify more with the citizens inside a national border than with those outside of it, I will not abide by this "ism". My identification is with all of God's children, the American and the Russian, the South African and the Indian, the Israeli and the Iranian, the Palestinian and the Chinese. As complicated as identities are, I aim to identify with the "children of Adam" (Bani Adam), as the Qur'an calls the universal community of humanity. Patriotism, on the other hand, is different. To me, patriotism is about upholding the

[156] I spend considerable time on these campaigns and their significance for the questions of this study in the next chapter, including the theoretical framework in which this can be interpreted.

> ideals upon which this great nation was founded...I write this as an American Muslim, committed to pursuing social justice and peace for all of God's creatures.[157]

Precisely because progressive Muslims are resistant to reducing citizenship to a particular state or polity, they are unwilling to identify with narratives which attach particular values to particular national communities; moreover, they find little difference between the political understanding of the nation that the liberals identify and the national understanding of the nation that the secularists identify. They however, as Safi's statement drives home, perceive communities through the lens of a commitment to pluralism (and justice): as such, they identify with the American nation or the Canadian nation as communities committed to the value and realization of pluralist societies. The emphasis on interethnic and interfaith work in progressive Muslim work in American and Canadian communities reflects this understanding of national identity as being rooted in a commitment to pluralism. It is in this sense that progressive Muslim discourse finds affinity with a civic understanding of the nation.

At this point of the analysis we have a picture of the differentiated understandings of how mainstream and oppositional Muslim voices in North America interpret the identity demands of the polity. The third column in Table 4.1 summarizes this analytic classification. Below, I am going to explore the consequences of this in relation to moral authority and obligation to the nation. In the sixth chapter, I will explore why these differing conceptions come into play for not only Muslim actors at this moment, but potentially for all new groups of citizens in liberal democratic pluralist polities.

Prior to that, though, I argue that we would expect to see that claims of loyalty and betrayal to the nation within North American Muslim discourse would occur along differentiated conceptions of the nation (see *Hypothesis 3, Chapter 1)*. The basis of that argument is that the dimensions of practice and identity are

[157] Safi, Omid. 2002. "Being Muslim, Being American After 9/11." In *Taking Back Islam: American Muslims Reclaim their Faith*, edited by Michael Wolfe, pp. 68-9.

intricately linked: if one conception of identity implies a certain set of practices, while another conception of identity implies a differing set of practices, claims and counter-claims of loyalty and betrayal are made that reflect more these differing conceptions than whether an act is an act of disloyalty of not. Among the continuum of North American Muslim identities, there are many allegations from one side to the other about loyalty and betrayal to the nation, but they are more often based on different understanding of what being loyal to the nation implies. They are, as we can derive from the discussion in this chapter so far, accusations related to what civic duty implies, what national identity means, and what rights one has/should have. In short, they are the kind of conversations that is supposed to take place among citizens if our understanding of citizenship as a dynamic and negotiated institution is correct.

This is not to deny that the ways some of these allegations have been thrown around are less than polite forms of public conversations among citizens. However, a quick overview of the way politics is conducted by political actors and civic engagement by social actors makes evident that politeness (or even a commitment to non-exaggeration) is not the primary accepted form of conducting politics and civic action. In the language of social movement literature, allegations which frame opposing actors as less than upstanding citizens are part of the repertoire of contemporary collective action (McCafferey and Key 2000; Vanderford 1989). North American Muslim accusations of each other (at least among the actors I am studying) are arguably at similar level of mud-slinging as witnessed during the 2008 American elections among the presidential candidates. However, there are important variations in the level and degree of "mud-slinging" between mainstream and oppositional Muslim actors in Canada and the United Sates, an analysis of which that I take up in the next chapter.

4.1.4 Location of Religious Authority and Roots to Reform

Thus far, I have presented a picture of how the various Muslim identities envision citizenship. At particular points I have pointed out that these articulations of citizenship were drawn from a combination of strategic and

ideological factors. To avoid making it appear that these ideological factors are merely individual political positions, I want to bring back into the discussion the point that these identities and their associated ideologies are also located in larger modernist traditions in Islam. I have already described this in the last chapter in passing, but let me just re-present it here briefly, while also articulating where each identity discourse locates religious authority. The purpose of bringing these back into the discussion is that these positions and historical associations have limiting and enabling consequences for how citizenship and faith can be linked together by the various actors. In the discussion that follows, we can recall from the first chapter in the section Islamic discourses the following definitions: Modernism, or renewalism, in Islam stands for a continuous reinterpretation of the ethical ideal. Traditionalism in Islam permits interpretation of the ethical ideal, but on the condition that once this interpretation has taken place and is confirmed by the general agreement of the community, it can never be altered or rejected. Fundamentalism in Islam resists or even completely rejects the interpretation of the ethical ideal.

Secular Muslims draw on the secularist tradition in modernist Islam. Following the secularist tradition, they locate religious authority in the individual believer and emphasize the importance of social change in how belief should be practiced. Reform is a continuously necessary process in the secularist Muslim view. Drawing from examples in Muslim societies after Muhammad's death, they argue that in the histories of Muslim communities, structured affiliation between Islam and the state have always led to conflict, violence, and a distortion of the faith (Fatah 2007). Moreover, they also draw on the history of Christianity and the West as another instance which bears witness to the importance of separating the sphere of belief from the sphere of politics.

Unlike secular Muslims, liberal Muslims locate religious authority in the process of consensus achieved by the *ummah*. However, like the secularists, they also emphasize the importance of adaptation of belief and its practice to social context. The liberal Muslim worldview in North America is rooted in the

modernist tradition of Islamic discourse on reform: while emphasizing a continual reinterpretation of the ethical ideal, it understands the process of reinterpretation to be one forged by *sura* or by consultation between experts, rulers and believers of the *entire ummah*. The emphasis in this tradition for governance is the *civil* nature of how social and the ethical life are governed. The individual is important in this process as part of the community and the building of consensus.

In contrast to both the secularists and the liberals who reject the accumulated body of knowledge and tradition as the basis by which the ethical ideal is reinterpreted, progressive Muslim discourse draws on the traditionalist strand of reform. As we have seen in the last chapter, progressive Muslims are severely critical of "shallow" understandings of the knowledge and jurisprudence of Islam. Islamic scholarship is a highly valued act in the progressive Muslim worldview. In fact, the ideal in progressive Muslim discourse is that each believer has deep knowledge of Islamic scholarship to reinterpret for himself or herself the ethical ideal of Islam. Thus religious authority is located neither in the collective nor in the individual but in the scholarship of Islam. It is in this sense that progressive Muslims are situated in the traditionalist discourse of reform. However, there is a simultaneous obligation of the believer and the community of believers to reinterpret the ethical ideal in each generation according to progressive Muslims. As such, they are also situated in the modernist discourse of reform. Progressive Muslims straddle the dualism of traditionalism-modernism in Islamic discourse with an appeal to the universal ideal of justice. However, it also places them in a unique position of defending both the importance of collective knowledge of the faith as well as radical changes in its practice. Interestingly though, if we recall the debate between Khan and El Fadl, as well as the mainstream Muslim unhappiness with the progressive Muslim mobilization, it appears that instead of allowing progressive Muslims to act as a bridge between the various interpretive communities, the duality of progressive Muslim discourse marginalizes them.

Mainstream Muslim actors have been accused of being moderate fundamentalists. However, this is an incorrect portrayal of their worldview regarding religious authority and also where they locate themselves in the Islamic tradition. As we saw in the second chapter, during the 1990s, mainstream Muslim discourse was divided among the isolationists and the democrats. The former group rejected political and civic participation in a non-Muslim society on either fundamentalist or traditionalist grounds. The democrats during this time, as I showed in chapter two, straddled the traditionalist-modernist traditions. In an important way, mainstream Muslim actors are still rooted in the same two traditions—however, the modernist tradition has become more dominant in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Reinterpretation and reform, we saw in the last chapter, has gained more ground among religious scholars affiliated with mainstream Muslim actors and it has gained more legitimacy among North American Muslim constituencies.

This particular shift has been in part possible because reinterpretation in the modernist sense has been paced by grounding certain practices of the faith in the traditionalist discourse. Thus, as we saw in the last chapter, for example, prayer practices are set as off limits in which tradition has priority over reinterpretation. Finding historical precedents among Islamic scholars and in the practice of Muslim communities are important criteria in whether a reinterpretation is valid or not among mainstream Muslim actors. They differ from progressive Muslim actors on this only in where religious authority is located and consensus is derived: i.e., who determines the "correct" reinterpretation and the "correct" tradition and how is it determined. Progressive Muslims, we saw, place that burden on all Muslims, and autonomy of deep interpretation is prioritized over consensus of interpretation. Mainstream Muslims, in contrast, place the burden on Islamic scholars and other religious leaders, and consensus of interpretation among the community of the faithful is prioritized over autonomy of deep interpretation.

So how is this important for the questions in this study? Firstly, if we recall, the fifth research hypothesis of this study posited how tensions within the modernist movement in Islam would affect the debates in the Muslim community in North America:

> *Muslim activists in North America engaged in the public sphere will tend to draw from the secularist and modernist discourses to varying extents regarding the construction of Muslim citizenship and the negotiation of the competing discourses in liberal democracies on citizenship*: (a) *To the extent that they draw from the modernist discourse, they will emphasize the significance of faith for participation and citizenship; (b) to the extent that they draw from the secularist discourse, they will emphasize the significance of a privatization of faith in the practice of citizenship.* (c) *To those who draw from a secularist discourse, the treatment of women and non-Muslims in Islam, will be a central issue.* (d) *To those who draw from a modernist discourse, the Islamic sources of "Western" values will be emphasized. (Finally, Muslim activists critiquing participation per se will tend to draw from a fundamentalist discourse.)*

If we look at Table 4.1, we see that all of those who draw on the modernist discourse also tend to emphasize to some extent the importance of faith in the practice of citizenship (H5a). In a parallel manner part b of the hypothesis is also confirmed.[158] Also, from the discussion on rights and practice, and the previous chapter, we have seen that gender and minorities (Muslims and non-Muslim) are sites on which claims are made by secularist Muslims regarding citizenship and faith (H5c). Finally, modernist roots of mainstream actors appear to correlate with their efforts to find the Islamic sources of Western values (H5d): this is

[158] The secularist position appears tautological. It is but it is importantly derived from not my own definitions, but from self-identifications of the actors themselves. This underscores the importance of the principle as a central identity element of this group of Muslim actors.

particularly true in the pre-9/11 case, as we saw in the evolution and establishment of mainstream Muslim identity before 2001. Since then, these efforts, we have seen, have accelerated even further, which has been driven in part by the shift in leadership who are more inclined to the modernist tradition. My hypothesis had ignored the traditionalist thread in Islamic reform; this had been based on the observation by scholars of Muslim societies which argued that in light of the colonial encounter between the West and the Muslim world, the traditionalist discourse had hit a dead-end (Hobenick 1999; Eickelman and Salvatore 2004). However, the progressive Muslim activism (in North America) appears to have brought it back, and as we have seen thus far, they pose an interesting cluster of how faith and citizenship can be linked up.

Secondly, in an important way, where the various identities locate religious authority and in which tradition of reform they identify with impact: a) the legitimacy with which they can make their claims to the larger Muslim and non-Muslim publics; and b) what mappings are possible between citizenship and faith at an ideological level for the actors. For each of the identities, we can delineate these two impacts. Because religious authority and responsibility of interpretation are located in the individual, secularist Muslims have the most freedom in terms of what mapping they can make from faith to citizenship, although their secularist position limits the mapping in the opposite direction. However, precisely because the individual is the authority, legitimacy as measured in social movement literature by criteria of expertise and/or embeddedness are lacking for the secular Muslim actor, whether measured by the non-Muslim public or the Muslim one. On top of that, the history of the secularist movement in Muslim societies has left a stigma on the secularist Muslim across many Muslim communities, thus further diminishing his/her legitimacy within the Muslim community.

Like for the secularist Muslim, the rejection by the liberal Muslim of the body of accumulated knowledge and practice, and the emphasis on continual re-interpretation places them in a position to map faith on to citizenship, relatively

freely. Although, the importance placed in the process of *sura* in the modernist tradition implies the liberal Muslim has to work with the faith community to build a consensus around that map. The noted shift that has been observed of liberal Muslim activist Irshad Manji from when she jumped into the foray to now is a case in point.[159] Liberal Muslims thus, like, progressive and mainstream Muslim actors, all have an advantage when it comes to legitimacy in relation to the secularist Muslim actor because they take into account the faith community in a more integral way. Mainstream Muslim actors have done the most leg-work in developing the relationship between the community and Islamic scholars that bridges reform and tradition; this has however meant that their mapping from faith to citizenship has had to be more negotiated and paced than what secularist or liberal Muslims have been able to claim. Finally, as I demonstrated, the progressive Muslim actor is surprisingly caught in a bind as she/he struggles to straddle the traditionalist and the modernist movements: this is actually more attributable to the primacy he/she places on Islamic scholarship. The progressive Muslim actor has, as we saw in the previous chapter, the tendency to be too intellectual (for the common citizen) and too ideological (thus preventing alliances that for example liberal Muslims are willing to make). The academic aspect of the progressive Muslim project often leaves the progressive Muslim actor in the margins of these conversations.

4.2 Means of Negotiating Citizenship and Faith and Obligation to Nation

From the sum of the discussion, thus far, on the various North American Muslim identities, which have been mobilized in the public sphere, it should be clear that each identity has a key principle by which it arbitrates conflicts that arise regarding their identities as Muslims and as citizens of a particular liberal

[159] In March 2007, MPAC Director Salam al-Marayati pointed this out to Irshad Manjii during the course of the broadcast by Los Angeles Public Library ALOUD Lecture Series and KCET program for their series "American at Crossroads", in which they were both guest speakers along with Muslims for Progressive Values co-founder Ani Zonneveld. Manjii admitted to this point during the meeting and has acknowledged it further in several other presentations she has made, including during her debate with Reza Aslan in May 2008, which was hosted by the Economist and the Culture Project.

democratic polity. Table 4.2 presents these key principles of each activist identity.[160] These key principles can in some ways be thought of as functions which evaluate the faith or citizenship equivalent for action; they can also be thought of as the common frames by which they can talk to both their faith community and their fellow citizens. These principles are important markers of the identities being mobilized in the North American context. They are also robust principles, which help Muslims negotiate the tensions posed by the "newness" of the Muslim identity in the history of Western citizenship. As we have seen above, they are central to how various Muslim actors manage the complexity of dual or hyphenated identities such as Muslim American or Muslim Canadian.

Table 4.2: Means of Negotiating Citizenship and Faith

Type of Muslim Actor	**Source of Obligation to the Nation**	**Key Principles**
Progressive	Faith	Social justice Pluralism
Liberal	Nation	Freedom of choice Equality of individuals
Secular	Nation	Secularism Equality of Individuals
Mainstream (pre-9/11)[(b)]	Faith	Social justice (faith community)
Mainstream (post-9/11)[(c)]	*Nation*	Social justice (faith and national community)

[160] This is from Table 4.1, but is presented here for clarity in.

In addition to these principles, there is one another tool by which North American Muslim actors negotiate faith and citizenship: from which kind of authority they draw the obligation to the polity. In the pre-9/11 context, the primary source of obligation to the nation, we saw was faith. The fiqh of minorities had implicated the American Muslim or the Canadian Muslim to fully realize himself/herself as a citizen, through active participation and identification. The nation in this formulation had no independent demand on the Muslim; it was only by the requirements of faith that the Muslim was obligated to respect the nation's contract of citizenship. In the post-9/11 context, we have seen that this vision has been critiqued by oppositional voices and has also shifted even within the mainstream activist community.

In the mainstream Muslim community, actors who have emphasized the nation as the primary source of one's obligation to the polity have gained strength: Suhaib Webb, Zaid Shakir, Hamza Yusuf, Ingrid Mattson. This is in fact a second major shift in the mainstream Muslim process of nationalizing faith: if the prior focus was to integrate diversities of ethnicities into a national Muslim identity, in this stage, the focus has been to distinguish the American Muslim or the Canadian Muslim from other Muslim communities. The oft-repeated phrase by mainstream Muslim actors, since 9/11, of the "special responsibility" of American or Canadian Muslims is an instance of this shift. Ingrid Mattson has been the leader in defining this position since 2001: As vice-president of ISNA in 2002 she wrote, "It is therefore a religious obligation for Muslims in America to promote what is in the best interest of the American people, in terms of their security and basic needs. Muslim Americans cannot be a special interest group concerned only with the rights of Muslims in America and abroad." This has been catalyzed, as Ingrid Mattson herself has pointed out, by the "horror of 9/11" and understanding that the privileges of freedom, which Muslims in North America enjoy as citizens, implicate a special responsibility to be "ambassadors". As ambassadors though, while acknowledging the ability to bridge, they are also drawing distinctions of being Canadian or American Muslims, not just Muslims.

The frame of special responsibility has created an interesting position for the American/Canadian Muslim communities' relationship to the faith community at large: On the one hand, the frame, by distinguishing these national Muslim communities from the *ummah* in general prioritizes the national community and reduces the "transnationality" of the group. On the other hand, the frame *expands* the transnationality of the group by suggesting that American Muslim citizens are responsible, by matter of privilege and duty of their faith, to change the course of radicalization in the Muslim world and facilitate the relationship between the state of their citizenship and the states of their faith communities. This dual process has important implications for the impact of transnational communities on the theory of liberal citizenship, and I take this up in the conclusion of the next chapter. It is there that I will deal with my fourth research hypothesis regarding the impact of the transnational dimension of the Muslim identity on the mapping of citizenship and faith.

The secular and liberal Muslim identities have emphasized that citizenship is only partially realized if the source of obligation to the nation comes from any source other than the nation. One significant aspect of their position is that regarding the obligations of Muslim citizens to non-citizen Muslims is secondary in the light of demands made by the polity. Liberal and secular Muslims are not opposed to the participation of Muslim citizens in the criticism, debate and protest in the formulation of policies that they find would affect negatively the faith community outside of the polity. However, their position is that: once such policies are made, those policies and laws should not be defied in the interests of the faith community over the binding obligation of the polity. This kind of a position reinforces the territorial definition of citizenship—which prioritizes the authority of the territorially bounded polity over the authority of any other community.

The progressive Muslim identity challenges the legitimacy of a territorially defined liberal democratic citizenship most clearly, since as we have seen it conceptualizes its scope as beyond any particular polity. However, as we have

also seen, it also challenges the scope of the faith community. In some ways the progressive Muslim identity questions the very mapping of faith and citizenship. It brings into light, I argue in the sixth chapter, the implications of "transnational movements" on how citizenship is institutionalized and practiced in liberal democracies.

4.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have provided an analysis of the discourse of mainstream and oppositional Muslim actors to present four different clusters of how citizenship and faith are mapped in the post-9/11 context. By locating the civic and faith dimensions of the claims and counter-claims of the range of Muslim actors, this chapter has attempt to present us with a clearer picture of what are the representations of Muslim citizenship these actors are attempting to mobilize and the various ways they have negotiated some of the tensions of liberal democratic citizenship. This, if we recall, was the first goal of this study. The second goal of this study was to explain a) the emergence of the divergent representations within the Muslim community and b) the divergence in dynamics between Muslim actors in Canada compared to in the United States. The following two chapters take on these goals. The next chapter takes on the comparison in Canada and the United States of the dynamic and content of Muslim identity discourses. The following chapter addresses the issue of divergent representations within the Muslim community and its implications for theories and practice of liberal democratic citizenship.

Chapter 5: Comparing American and Canadian Muslim Identity Discourses and Actor Dynamics

In the previous chapters, I have discussed the mainstream and oppositional Muslim actors and their identity discourses as a North American entity. I have primarily focused on the emergent identity discourses that are common across the Canadian and American contexts. The main reason for this approach, as indicated in chapters 2 and 3, has been that there are indeed a lot of commonalities in the post-9/11 patterns of how citizenship is negotiated by Muslim actors in these two countries, as well as other liberal democracies in which Muslim communities are located (Modood 2008). Moreover, as we have seen, many of the primary Muslim actors in the American context are also key actors in the Canadian context; this is true of both the mainstream and oppositional actor communities.

Nevertheless, there are two motivations to also analyze the range of Muslim claims-making and identity discourses by the different political contexts in which they are located: American and Canadian. The first motivation is theoretical: While the content of faith and actor background may transcend national boundaries, the content of citizenship is territorially bound and there are important variations in the meaning, practice and institutions of citizenship that actors face. An underexplored question in the literature on citizenship and minority integration is how such variations may impact the way groups negotiate citizenship (Bloemraad et al 2008). The second motivation is empirical: My observation and reading of these actors and their claims-making have made it evident that in Canada, the conversation between the mainstream and oppositional actors has become more polarized than the one observable in the United States. In addition, the conversation in the United States is more nationalized than the one in Canada. Therefore, the goal in this chapter is to discuss why these divergences have occurred and the influence of the differing political contexts in shaping the divergent claims.

5.1 Comparing Polarization and Nationalization in the Conversations between North American Muslim Identity Discourses

5.1.1 Polarization

I have shown that we can identify four major kinds of identity clusters, which Muslim actors are mobilizing in the conversation on citizenship and faith. I have also made passing commentary on how these identities and their representative actors are perceived by each other. This section provides a more structured analysis on the conversational dynamic between North American Muslim actors, i.e., how do these different actors perceive and interact with each other? While this question is very broad, my interest in this question is very narrow: I want to know what kind of boundaries these emergent identities assert. The location of these boundaries has important implications for the possibility of forging a common representation of Muslim citizenship. This is important a) from the perspective of certain mainstream Muslim actors and policy makers who want to mobilize and identify a group for the purposes of recognition and redistribution of resources; and b) for the theoretical literature on citizenship, liberal democracy and diversity, which I will discuss further in the conclusion of this study.

Researchers of social movements have identified *polarization-vilification* as rhetorical strategies by which a given set of movement actors respond to ideological challenges by opponents (Zald and Useem 1987). Polarization refers to the establishment of "a definitional dichotomy of "us versus them" or alternatively, an exaggerated, black-and- white vision of events that justifies investment of resources (McCaffrey and Keys 2000: 44).[161] Vilification "is a

[161] One common way of doing this is by identifying oneself in explicit opposition to opponents: so rather than just claiming "We secular Muslims believe in the separation of the church and state", one claims "Unlike other Muslims, we secular Muslims believe in the separation of the church and state." In the first case, a boundary is drawn that is self-referential; in the second case, a boundary is drawn that identifies two groups in opposition to each other. The latter case reflects a more rigid boundary than the former. Almost all collective identity claims-making is constituted by the drawing of "us vs. them" boundaries; however, the degree to which this is done varies. And it is exactly the variation between Canadian vs. American Muslim actors that I am interested in. For other references on polarization as a counter-framing process in the social movement literature, see: Donati 1988; Gamson 1992; Ryan 1991; Steuter 1992; and Mansbridge 1986.

rhetorical strategy that discredits adversaries by characterizing them as ungenuine, malevolent advocates (Vanderford 1989, p. 166)". Polarization and vilification are related if we conceive of vilification as more than mere strategy. Vilification of the opponent creates and reinforces the boundaries of us vs. them by adding a moral dimension to those boundaries. By "portraying an adversary as a corrupt other", an actor is able to see him/herself as "a moral agent fighting against evil", thus charging and further hardening the boundaries between the actor and the opponent (McCafferey and Key 2000: 50). While social movement literature has focused on the rhetorical aspects of this process, it is important to also note the actions which reinforce the rhetoric. Thus, not only the rhetoric of "us vs. them", but also the practice of refusing to participate in conversations with the opposing actor should also be taken as an indicator of the polarization of a conflict. Moreover, another strategy of creating "us vs. them" rhetoric, I would argue, is when any actor, institution or individual, who engages with the opponent group without overt hostility is taken to be against "us". Vilification of such third party actors is then another way we can observe the hardening of boundaries. Finally, discourses acknowledging an organizational field with multiple actors tend to indicate weaker identity boundaries than a field characterized by two primary (and opposing) actors. Also, when organization occurs along an identity vs. when an identity remains unorganized (or disorganized), one can argue that the organized identities indicate hardening of boundaries (Tilly 1999). In this analysis, I thus conceive polarization of a conversational dynamic to be constituted by the following indicators:

1. Use of "us vs. them" rhetoric through the practice of self-identification through relational opposition;
2. Practice of "us vs. them" idea or mindset through the absence of partaking in conversations with opponents;
3. Vilification of opponents;
4. Vilification of third party actors;
5. Number of primary actors in the public discourse, i.e., whether the organizational field is multiple or bipolar;

6. Degree of organization.

In an important way, these six indicators reflect the idea that polarization of a conversation manifests an unwillingness and/or inability of the various actors to find points on which they feel they can negotiate.

Table 5.1 provides a comparison of polarization of conversations between Canadian Muslim actors vs. American Muslim actors along these six indicators. The patterns presented in this table are based on editorials, press statements, and interviews of the actors in this study. It is important to note that this data and evaluation is relative and comparative: it does not mean that polarization-vilification only occurs in the Canadian context and is completely absent in the American context. This evaluation is also based on what has been observed at the national level among the actors of this study; at local levels,

Table 5.1: Comparing Polarization of Conversations among North American Muslim Actors

Indicator of Polarization	Canadian Muslim Actors	American Muslim Actors
Use of "Us vs. Them" rhetoric: Self-identification through relational opposition	In a plurality of press statements and public claims made by the Muslim Canadian Congress and the Canadian Islamic Congress, actors from both organizations refer to the other actor explicitly as an opponent to their own position. Self-identification takes the form of both "We are secular Muslims" *and* "We are not fundamentalists like those..." This pattern has increased since 2003, when the debate on Sha'ria courts took place in Ontario. During the course of interviews, oppositional and mainstream actors were quick to identify their own identity positions in opposition to other groups and actors. Moreover, this kind of explicit distancing occurs even within the mainstream actors in Canada. For	With the exception of the AFID, since 2005, oppositional actors have articulated their position without reference to mainstream actors. This is true of mainstream actors' statements generally, even prior to 2005. 2005 marked a important shift in the oppositional discourse in American regarding this, which marked the collapse of the PUMNA. During the course of interviews, oppositional actors were just as reluctant as mainstream actors in identifying Muslim opponents; both groups take the position that there is a continuum of positions, all relatively equally valid and important. Among mainstream actors, self-identification occurs without articulating

	example, although CAIR-CAN avoided this in the first years of its establishment, it has progressively participated in the process of distancing itself not only from the MCC but also the CIC in its statements.	oppositional identities. Majority of press statements and public claims made by MPAC, CAIR, ISNA frame positions in reference to their own position and assumed constituencies, not in reference to an oppositional identity.
Practice of "Us vs. Them" mindset: Absence of conversational engagement: • **conversations between actors are not initiated by actors themselves;** • **refusal to participate in conversations with opponents, even when organized by third party actors**	Between the period of 2001-2008, no direct conversations were initiated by the MCC to engage CIC and CAIR-CAN. While CIC and CAIR-CAN have had many direct conversations in this period with each other, the majority of these were initiated prior to 2003. In a range of invitations in which CIC president and MCC actors were asked to participate in panels, one or the other or both refused to participate. One major exception to this was in a panel organized by the University of Toronto in 2003 in which both Mohammed Elmasry and Tarek Fatah participated. This was the last instance in which this happened. In a few instances MCC actors have participated in	Organizations have shared common board members across the oppositional and mainstream spectrum: e.g., PMUNA and MPAC and CAIR. Conferences and conventions organized by some key mainstream actors have invited oppositional actors to speak or participate: MPAC has been a major bridge between oppositional and mainstream actors. In public forums and certain media outlets, invitations to have dialogues between mainstream and oppositional actors have been accepted on both sides. MPAC and Irshad Manji have been key representatives of each side

	debates or dialogues between CAIR-CAN members or religious leaders that support the mainstream discourse. Such engagements tend to be used as platforms to promote their own claims and vilify the opposing actors in the forum.	in these forums. However, CAIR chapter representatives have also participated in these kinds of conversations. Observation of such interactions reveal some concerted effort to find common ground. Again, this has accelerated since 2005.
Vilification of opponent actors	CIC and MCC actors have denied publicly the legitimacy of each other repeatedly since 2003. Primary leaders of these organizations have been vilified and caricatured by the opposing organization as "not Muslim", "opportunist", "radical", "dangerous", "deceptive", "liar", "sinister", "Muslim basher", "authoritarian", "narcissist". CAIR-CAN has generally stayed out of the "mud-slinging", but its own leaders have been attacked in terms of credibility and legitimacy by the MCC. During interviews, both oppositional and mainstream Muslim actors did engage in personal vilification of opponent groups.	Since 2001, other than the AFID, the claims and counter-claims in the United States by Muslim actors have mainly focused on the content of claims rather than the personalities involved. A major exception in this trend was in 2005 when the PMUNA was being established, during which personal vilification occurred on both sides (see Chapter 3). This trend ceased with the break-up of the PMUNA. During interviews, both oppositional and mainstream Muslim actors did not engage in personal vilification of opponent groups.
Vilification of third-party	Allies, collaborators or	Both oppositional and

actors	facilitators of mainstream actors have been labelled as "Islamist" or "fundamentalist" by the MCC in Canada. Those targeted for such labels have included *The Globe and Mail*, the New Democratic Party, various research centers in Canada that support a multicultural research agency; the Human Rights Commission; federal and provincial MPs who have supported claims or causes campaigned for by CAIR-CAN or CIC. Similarly, allies, collaborators and facilitators of oppositional actors have been labelled "Islamophobic" or "racist" by the CIC and/or CAIR-CAN. Those targeted for such labels have included *The National Post*, *Maclean's*, the Liberal Party, the Conservatives, various think-tank institutes in Canada, and federal and provincial MPs who have supported claims or causes campaigned for by MCC or CMU.	mainstream actors have generally been open to engage in conversations initiated by third party actors. While neutrality is not assumed, necessity and potential for change has been the approach taken by the range of actors in relation to third party actors. However, there are some common targets of labelling of third party actors as biased and Islamophobes: these are certain think-tank institutions in the States, Bernard Lewis, Steve Emerson and Daniel Pipes, and FOX Channel. Dialogue even with these third party actors have been initiated and/or participated in by not only oppositional actors but also mainstream actors. For the latter, there has been significant distancing by oppositional actors from these third party actors in the last few years in terms of identification of shared positions.
Number of primary actors and Degree of organizational structure	Mainstream (Canadian Islamic Congress & CAIR-CAN) vs. Secular (Muslim Canadian Congress) actors	Mainstream (ISNA, MPAC, CAIR) actors vs. individual oppositional actors (liberals, secularists, progressives)

polarization- vilification patterns may be quite different from those observed at the national level. Finally this evaluation is also based on rhetoric and acts that are made in the *public sphere* and in interviews with me; what occurs in the private boardrooms of these organizations has not been the subject of this study and therefore I cannot make any claims about it. However, based on the public dimensions of the conversation between Muslim actors, the table summarizes key patterns in which polarization is observed to a greater degree in the Canadian context than in the American context.

Looking at the table, we see that in the Canadian case, polarization is exemplified across all the indicators. Whether in the form of: vilification of third party actors such as the national-level newspapers that print editorials by opponent leaders as either "Islamist" or "Islamophobe"; or, refusal to engage in debate in common forums; or, self-identification through not only claims of "We are..." but also "We are not like..."; or, the fact that the organizational field is dominated by one oppositional actor and two mainstream actors—the dynamic of relations between these actors reflect a hardening of boundaries that we do not find in the American case.

Furthermore, we can also see in the table, across the six indicators of polarization, certain central events mark the hardening of patterns of interactions with oppositional identities in each national context: In the Canadian case, the pattern of greater polarization was accelerated by the 2003 sha'ria court debate in Ontario: it marked the end of efforts on both the mainstream and secularist sides to partake in conversations in shared forums; it also marked the point at which CAIR-CAN started to distance itself more from certain key mainstream actors, including the CIC. The debate about (Muslim) family arbitration courts made manifest that mainstream vs. oppositional Muslim actors had different institutional resources that they could rely on; in addition, the political actors, material, and discursive resources that they would be able to draw on was shaped by both historical and proximate aspects of the political opportunity structure in Canada regarding how diversity is understood and managed. In the analysis that follows in the chapter, I flush out the specifics of these political processes to

demonstrate how mainstream vs. oppositional Muslim relations in Canada have become polarized to the degree observed. In the United States, a different event marked strengthening of the pattern of lesser polarization: the collapse of PUMNA in 2005: the failure of organizing a coherent oppositional identity in the States, and the relative success of creating broad-based constituencies by mainstream actors, I argue below, reflects a very different political opportunity structure in the States.

The question to ask of course is why we observe this difference in polarization between these two countries among its Muslim actors. In the next section, I suggest that there are two key structural reasons for how this has occurred: a) institutional variations between the two countries regarding diversity and citizenship; b) organizational structures and histories, which have also been shaped by the first factor. Before moving on to this task, I note that there is a second feature that marks a divergence in the identity discourses of American vs. Canadian Muslim actors: the degree of nationalization of a discourse.

5.1.2 Nationalization

In the last chapter, I showed that of the four clusters of North American Muslim identity discourses, three of them identify with a national understanding of citizenship identity, although this is only fully embraced by the secularists, conditionally embraced by the liberals and partially by mainstream actors (see *Table 4.1*). Nevertheless, this mapping, whether absolute or partial, has resulted in a general nationalization of the conversations that take place between the various Muslim actors in both countries. By nationalization of a conversation I mean that the key referents in the conversation are the nation.[162] This implies that in the conversation between mainstream and opposition actors in a given country, the major issues, actors, and actions discussed remain focused on those located or

[162] This is the same understanding of nationalization that I utilized in Chapter 2 in discussing the pre-9/11 discourse among North American Muslims.

framed through the nation. Moreover, the primary forum of action and claims-making for the actors is also the (territorially-bound) nation.

We saw earlier that both ideological reasons prior to 9/11 and strategic reasons after 9/11 have progressively pushed mainstream actors to reframe and articulate Muslim claims-making through a discourse that integrates into and creates narratives of the nation based on what is specific and particular to that country. One key example of this in the American context has been ISNA's effort to create a timeline that claims Muslim history in America to be at least 400 years old. The timeline is part of a larger initiative tellingly called "Change the Story". The "Change the Story" initiative took-off in 2008 from a report produced by the US-Muslim Engagement Project, entitled "Changing Course: A new direction for US relations with the Muslim world". Although the goal of the initiative is to start dialogue between Muslims and non-Muslims across the world, and has an emphasis on aspects of inter-faith dialogue, the bulk of its projects are centered on Americans (Muslim and non-Muslim). ISNA has been identified by the project and the founders of the project (Search for Common Ground and Consensus Building Institute in 2006) as an important partner in the process of shifting directions among Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Moreover, one of the inter-faith advisory board members of Change the Story is the General Secretary of ISNA, Dr. Muneer Fareed. The "Change the Story" website states in response to a self-posed question on "What stories do we want to change?": "As we make caricatures of one another, communities fracture, individuals become isolated and we all miss experiencing the rich mosaic of relationships so unique to the American landscape."

Mainstream Canadian Muslim actors point to the successful establishment of October as the Islamic History Month in Canada as a parallel to the efforts of ISNA in the States, regarding the timeline.[163] However, there is an important difference between the two projects: in the Canadian case, the project focuses primarily on Islamic referents that are to be demonstrated and illustrated as

[163] The campaign was pushed forward by the Canadian Islamic Congress and it was explicitly modeled after the Black History Month in Canada.

symbols of the richness and complexity of Islamic culture. In the American case, the project focuses primarily on Muslim referents that are American. The latter focuses on figures, symbols and events which have occurred in the bounds of an identifiable American history. The identity work that is done in this project aims to (re-) discover Muslim stories in the formation of the American nation. The former focuses on figures, symbols and events which have occurred outside of an identifiable Canadian history. The identity work that is done in this project is to educate a non-Muslim public about Islamic culture. While both projects are attempts to integrate the Muslim narrative into the national imaginary, the "Changing the Story" project is much more national than the "Islamic History" project. This reflects an important divergence in Muslim identity discourses between the American and Canadian contexts.

A greater nationalization of identity discourse is also observed among American oppositional actors than their Canadian counterparts. American oppositional actors tend to focus on the challenges and problems posed by the mainstream American Muslim identity and actors. In regard to fundamentalist practices, militant action, and violence, American oppositional actors search for examples in the American Muslim communities. While Canadian oppositional actors jump at any such Canadian Muslim example to fortify their position[164], the bulk of their claims refer to practices outside of the Canadian Muslim context. There is a much greater tendency among Canadian oppositional actors to look outside of the borders of Canada for what is problematic about a mainstream

[164] The Sha'ria debate in Ontario along with the death of Afsana Parvez and the "separate schools" proposition in Ontario provided ample opportunity for Canadian oppositional actors to focus on figures, events and symbols in Canada. Nevertheless this kind of Canadian focus is more exceptional than common. Moreover, in examining what was said and written on about these issues, Canadian oppositional actors tended to often justify their arguments more on the basis of evidence and examples from outside of Canada than through examples in Canada. In fact, in these situations, mainstream Muslim actors were more apt and willing to draw parallels to Canadian precedents and divert the conversation away from non-Canadian examples. This, as we will see below, reflects the particularity of what Canadian history and its ways of incorporating diversity and equality offers to claims-making actors.

Canadian Muslim citizenship or why Canadian attempts to accommodate Muslim practices is problematic for Canada.[165]

So why is there a greater tendency towards nationalization of discourses among American Muslim actors, irrespective of whether they are oppositional or mainstream, than Canadian Muslim actors? As in the case of divergent polarization, I suggest that there are two key structural reasons for how this has occurred: a) institutional variations between the two countries regarding diversity and citizenship; b) organizational structures and histories, which have also been significantly shaped by the first factor. Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter, using theoretical and empirical research on American and Canadian institutions of diversity and citizenship, I explain how these two divergences have occurred.

5.2 Institutions of Diversity: Citizenship, Multiculturalism, Secularism

Canada and the United States have been built on a history of immigration. Nation-building in these two countries has been intricately tied to the question of diversity and difference that immigration implies (Berbrier 2004; Kymlicka 2000; Glazer 1999; Joppke 1999; Brubacker 1989). Both countries have constructed a range of institutions that attempt to manage the diversity and difference that immigration, settler diversity, religious pluralism, and indigenous populations imply: marginalization, assimilation, secularism, and (liberal) multiculturalism (Alba and Nee 1997; Kymlicka 1995; Laczko 1994). Because these two countries have shared some challenges associated with diversity, geographic proximity, and cultural and political ties, there are commonalities between the two nations in their institutions of diversity and how immigrant incorporation is implemented

[165] 64.10% of the 3334 distinct post-subjects in the MCC discussion forum posted between May 2007 and December 2008 referred to events, figures, and symbols *outside* of the Canadian context. In contrast, American Muslim liberal, progressive and secularist claims centered around figures, events and symbols inside the American context: for example, 67.1% of the events and figures referred to in AFID newsletters, since its founding in 2006, were located in American Muslim communities.

(Modood 2006; Kymlicka 2000). Nevertheless, there are significant differences, which have created distinct models of how new citizens and new diversities are incorporated into the polities of these nations (Bloemraad 2006; Modood 2006; Kymlikca 2000; Joppke and Lukes 1999; Lipset 1986). Such differences, researchers have shown, have important impacts in how new citizens organize themselves and what material, political and discursive resources and options they have in negotiating their citizenship to other collective identities (Bloemraad et al 2008; Kurien 2006).

In this section, using the extant literature on Canadian and American models of diversity, ethnic relations, citizenship and immigrant incorporation, I outline some of the key differences faced by American vs. Canadian Muslims regarding three major institutions of diversity: citizenship, multiculturalism and secularism. In the final section of this chapter I propose that these institutional variations impact the content and the relations between competing/opposing actors, as well as how such actors organize themselves. The combined effect, I conclude helps us to understand why we observe a greater degree of polarization in the Canadian context and the greater degree of nationalization in the American context.

The argument presented here follows the political opportunity structure framework in the social movement literature. A political opportunity structure framework suggests that "social structural tensions, problems and grievances (Koopman 2004: 451)" impact the mode and content of collective action through the "available opportunities and constraints set by the political environments in which mobilising groups...operate (Koopmans 2004: 451)". Political environment in this literature has been broadly defined, to the extent that it has led scholars to debate what it actually means (Goodwin and Jasper 1999): (1) "durable organizational differences among governments" or "change in organizational environments of particular political actors" (Tilly 1999: 57); (2) whether culture is a separate or constitutive element of political opportunities and political structures/processes (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Polletta 1999). The debate has brought into light that political opportunity structure is constituted by

both the durable and the dynamic, both the historical and the proximate; both the cultural and the non-cultural: the interactions of these various dimensions of political opportunity structure help shape collective action dynamics and outcomes (Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Poletta 1999; Tilly 1999).

In this analysis, I emphasize the parts of political opportunity structure that are relevant to the mobilization and collective identity claims-making of new citizens. In particular I focus on three institutions by which nation-states organize diversity and with which claims-making groups have to interact with: citizenship, multiculturalism and secularism. The institution of citizenship tends to generally focus on the process of immigrants becoming citizens and one's relationship to other polities and non-citizens; multiculturalism, as an institution, tend to focus on relations, treatment and status of citizens of minority groups; and secularist policies and norms tend to focus on the relations between religious institutions and the state. The durable, historical and non-cultural dimensions of these structures in each nation interact with the more dynamic, proximate and cultural aspects, including ruling and changing governments, available political alliances, norms about difference, religiosity and identity, which impact the content of identity claims, the quality of boundaries asserted, the strategies that are utilized to mobilize and make claims, and the relational dynamics between mobilizing groups. The differences between these institutions in Canada vs. the United States, I argue, help to explain the differences in patterns of polarization and nationalization in Muslim identity relations and discourses in North America.

Several researchers have pointed out that though these institutional differences between Canada and the States are persistent and real, their actual impact on the retention/shedding of ethnic identity by new citizens and their experience in the socio-economic and political incorporation (integration) are less easy to differentiate (Laczko 1994; Reitz and Bretton 1994). Despite the inconclusiveness of this kind of empirical research, social movement theory and research suggests that the differences are important in two ways:

As discursive resources and frames: many actors in the public sphere (journalists, academics, politicians, government officials, and activists) tend to present what is right or wrong about their multiculturalism, secularism, or citizenship frameworks through these different/divergent frames (Seljak et al 2008; Bloemraad 2006; Koopmans 2004; Kymlicka 2003; Berbrier 2004).

As material and political resources: Since these institutions of multiculturalism, citizenship and secularism are differentially located and implemented in the Sates vs. Canada, who and what are seen as material and political resources by claims-makers of collective identity is shaped by the differences in policies and practices (Abu-Laban 2007; Bleomraad 2006; Jenson and Philips 1996).

Therefore, in the discussion that follows, I compare actual policies, legal structures, and norms regarding diversity in America and Canada, by tracing the opportunity structure that institutions of citizenship, multiculturalism and secularism create for new citizen actors generally. Following this comparative section, I then locate the implications of these differences in shaping the differential outcomes of identity claims and relations among the various American vs Canadian Muslims actors: specifically greater polarization of Muslim identity discourses between Canadian Muslims and greater nationalization of Muslim identity discourses among American Muslims.

A point of definitional clarity is needed here before further discussion. In the framework that I have used thus far in this study, I have used a political theoretical understanding of citizenship, multiculturalism and secularism as articulated by liberal democratic theory. Citizenship, understood to be constituted by status, rights, practices and identity, also embodies certain key tensions characteristic of liberalism and pluralism, in which multiculturalism and secularism are seen to be two (conceptual/ideological) approaches by which citizenship rights, obligations, and identity are organized for citizens of faith. However, citizenship, multiculturalism and secularism are not only political

theories. They also exist as distinct, interlinked and actual institutions by which a nation-state organizes diversity and which (new) citizens interact with. To demonstrate that institutional differences related to how diversity is managed shape the content and relations between Muslim actors in each national context, the political opportunity structure framework is an appropriate tool to shift the frame from the political theoretical understanding of citizenship, multiculturalism, and secularism to the ways these understandings are interpreted and implemented in different national societies. [166] Thus in the next three sections, I compare the way these three institutions in Canada and the United States are understood and practiced.

5.2.1 Citizenship

Several studies have explored how American and Canadian citizenships engage with diversity regarding immigrants and their becoming citizens. The majority of such studies have focused on the naturalization process for immigrants that do not fit the "white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon male" template—i.e., diversities that challenge the historical norms of race, religion, culture and gender (Bloemraad 2008; 2006; 2002). Even though both Canadian and American

[166] Let me explain this a little bit further: The ways that political theories about citizenship, multiculturalism and secularism have influenced public ideologies and actual policies, and vice versa, have been taken up by both scholars in the field of sociology of knowledge (Wong 2008; Modood 2003; Joppke and Lukes 1999) as well as political scientists examining how political philosophies are transformed into public ideologies (Schumaker 2008; Kymlicka 1999). The increasing "dialogue" between political theories of citizenship and diversity and the sociology of citizenship and diversity promises to be fruitful in nuancing and perhaps settling old debates about these ideas, and creating new possibilities in how democracy, liberalism and pluralism are envisioned, managed, and implemented (e.g., Bloemraad et al 2008; Benhabib 2002; Parekh 2001; see also the journal co-founded by Tariq Modood, *Ethnicities*, which reflects an attempt to bring together the philosophical, political and sociological discussions on ethnicity, including citizenship, multiculturalism and secularism; in many ways, the work of British sociologist Tariq Modood actually exemplifies this kind of work; see also the journal *Canadian Diversity*). In this study, I have taken the insights of this kind of research to first identify what kinds of tensions structure how collective identity actors negotiate and forge citizenship identities. The goal in chapter 1 was to identify these tensions, and in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I showed what kinds of identity clusters had been negotiated or produced by Muslim claims-makers. These tensions are common to liberal democratic societies with pluralist polities: the political theoretical debates have been applied in all of these societies and they all manifest public discourses which contain them, albeit in varied combinations and strengths. Leaving the analysis at this point would however ignore the specificities of these tensions and applications; an analysis of the impact of these specificities requires, however, shifting the focus from the political theoretical debates to the actual institutional practices.

histories reflect a pattern of widening inclusion of such diversities regarding citizenship[167], as well as naturalization laws that are more similar than different (Bloemraad 2006), scholars have pointed out that there are two major differences in how immigrants become citizens in these two countries.[168]

Firstly, the evolution of citizenship in the Canadian context has been directly linked to a discourse on ethnic and cultural diversity: nation-building in the Canadian context has been constituted by an understanding of the coming together of multiple groups and cultures (Temelini 2007; Kymlicka 2007). Day (2000) critiques this standardized view of Canadian nation-building. He focuses on how nation-building in Canada has been constituted by racial construction of the "Other": Aboriginals, French, non-British/French whites, non-Europeans. While his analysis is interesting for observing the racial dynamics of Canadian nation-building, it does not contradict the more common academic (and political) narrative of Canadian nation-building: The particular socio-political, economic and cultural realities in which the encounter between the Aboriginal peoples and the European colonialists (French and the British) occurred, as well as the context in which the encounter between the French and the British occurred created a distinct challenge for creating a nation (Kymlicka 2003). The way that the

[167] Abu-Laban (2004) points out that the impact of policy changes in border crossings and civil rights due the attacks of 9/11 challenges this characterization of "citizenship moving along an egalitarian ethos (17)". She argues that the result of these policy shifts has been the creation of a hierarchical citizenship based on (perceived/actual) place of origin and/or birth, religious affiliation, holding of dual citizenship and ethnicity. This experience of citizenship is shared disproportionately by Muslims across the border (Heymann 2006; Abu-Laban 2004). I have already discussed in my third chapter the impact of this kind of shift on the identity discourses of the mainstream actors in both America and Canada: collective action against discriminatory policies, increased mobilization from previously passive or inactive Muslim members of the national community, and greater engagement of mainstream actors regarding the civic and political dimensions of citizenship identity. I also noted that mainstream actors on the Canadian side of the border acknowledge the catalytic effect that 9/11 and the shift in citizenship policies had for its own position and membership; on the American side of the border, mainstream actors have also experienced a similar increase in interest and involvement, but it was slower in taking off than in Canada. This could be explained in the following ways: a) a perception of a greater dramatic break/shift in policies in the Canadian case may have created a greater sense of urgency among Canadian citizens; and/or b) the fact that the attacks happened on American soil could have resulted in anxiety or desire to refrain from (immediate) action. This could be analyzed further in future research.

[168] In *Warmth of the Welcome: The Social Causes of the Economic Success of Immigrants in Different Nations and Cities* (1998), Jeffrey Reitz referred to this as the "warmth of welcome" that immigrants counter and its implication in the socio-economic and political incorporation of them as citizens.

political actors of those moments managed and overcame this challenge involved recognition of distinct groups based on culture and the sharing (albeit unequally) of power and governance. This process in turn has shaped the understanding of the Canadian nation of itself as a nation of diverse groups, which is what is "imparted" to newcomers and new citizens.

In contrast, the evolution of citizenship for *immigrants*[169] in the American context has been directly linked to a discourse on security and law enforcement (Bloemraad 2006; Magaña 2003; Andreas 2000; Alvarez 1987). Following the analysis of Reitz (1998), Bloemraad (2006) focuses on the variations in the "warmth of the welcome" as emblematic of this difference between the two countries. In the United States, she writes, citizenship policies were managed until March 1 2003 by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) which was housed in the Department of Justice; in 2003 its primary responsibilities were moved to the Bureau of US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which is housed in the Department of Homeland Security. [170] She concludes: "In the United States, immigration policy largely starts and ends at the border. Government attention and resources revolve around border control; subsequent processes of integration are considered outside the purview of the state

[169] It is important to keep in mind regarding Bloemraad's analysis, that immigrants looking to become citizens experience the idea of citizenship differentially from those who are already citizens by virtue of birth and/or heritage. Immigrants experience the process of becoming citizens in the United States mainly through the policies, bureaucrats, and practices of the INS (Andreas 2000; North 1987). The fact that this central agency in this process has been understood by policy-makers, immigrants and the agents themselves as a law-enforcement agency has helped to create the perception for new citizens that their becoming citizens and citizenship has a lot to do with security and their ability to show that they are not suspect. In contrast, those who are citizens by birth or heritage, experience the process of integrating their citizenship identity often through narratives in the classroom and other educational and public forums.

[170] Bloemraad writes: "Following the outbreak of war in Europe, then-president Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1940 Reorganization Plan (Number V) transferred the now named Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice. The move reflected the changing perception of immigration and citizenship as a national security issue rather than an economic one. War responsibilities included recording and fingerprinting every alien in the United States through the Alien Registration Program, organizing and operating internment camps and detention facilities for enemy aliens, and guarding national borders with the Border Patrol (Smith 1998). The location of the INS in the Department of Justice shaped the actions and priorities of the agency and played into the INS's image as an enforcement agency. Sixty years later former INS commissioner Doris Meissner still finds that "the dominant culture of the agency...is rooted in a view of immigration as a source of security and law enforcement vulnerability more than of continuing nation-building" (2006: 109)."

(Bloemraad 2008)." [171] The welcome is "long, grey" (North 1985: 311). In Canada, she points out, citizenship policies extend beyond naturalization; Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) understands its role to promote and encourage immigrants to become citizens and participate in the polity by voting.[172] This kind of a differential experience, she points out, creates differences in the level of attachment new citizens feel in America vs. in Canada and are manifest in the significantly higher rates of naturalization in Canada, since the 1970s. While this may not be relevant for second-generation citizens, it has important implications for how citizenship is understood for first-generation citizens and what kind of mobilization seems possible and necessary.

Secondly, and consequently, citizenship is understood to be more demanding in terms of loyalty in the American context:

> We expect a greater degree of loyalty and commitment, which is expressed in our oath of naturalization (in which one gives up all previous loyalties to 'foreign potentates or powers'), as well as the literature distributed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to prospective immigrants to prepare them for the required tests on American history and the American Constitution... we do insist on a change of political identity in our naturalization laws—there is nothing multicultural about them yet (Glazer 1999: 195-6).[173]

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[171] There are many reasons for why this is maintained and there have been attempts by different political actors to shift the direction of the INS and other citizenship policies for immigrants towards a different direction. For example, between 1995 and 1996, a program was created by the INS called Citizenship USA. It was an attempt to provide services to immigrants to help them become active citizens. Due to opposition from the Republican Party, which saw the program as a ploy to help the Democratic Party garner support, and concerns that "criminals" were being given citizenship, the program was cancelled by the INS (Bloemraad 2006). Both critiques reveal the suspicion that new citizens face at the institutional level as they become citizens. While this discourse exists in Canada also from various directions, at the institutional level, as the policies point out, the experience is different for new citizens.

[172] She attributes this divergence, in part to the pervasive anxiety about illegal immigrants in the States due to the Mexico-US border and the absence of such a border issue for Canada (Bloemraad 2006; Lipset 1986).

[173] Bloemraad (2006) discounts the importance of this in her discussion of how citizenship structures differ between the States and Canada. She points out that although American allegiance oath demands the giving up of loyalties to all other foreign powers, American citizens are allowed to hold citizenship in other countries, just like Canada. Bloemraad chooses with this particular issue to focus on only the legal structure of the policy, while ignoring the normative dimension of it. This is strange considering that her approach to comparisons of citizenship is an institutional one, where the norms are just as important as the rules in understanding outcomes. At any rate, Glazer's point is that the history of the oath continues to dominate the contemporary

Hyphenated identities in the American context are understood to be secondary to the primary American identity, which is understood to be "ideological commitment" (Lipset 1986). This greater obligation to display loyalty to the nation has in part been explained by the fact that the nation-building process in the United States has included the project of war and empire, thus requiring more explicit displays of loyalty against a common enemy and to the state and nation (Lipset 1990).[174] This is also rooted in the fact that the American nation was founded through a war of independence, one that required clear indications of affiliations and allegiances (Lipset 1990). Moreover, it is perhaps relevant that historically suspect citizens (Mexicans, Germans and Italians, Japanese) have redeemed themselves to the nation by what is arguably deemed the greatest act of loyalty—fighting for the nation against their ethnic brethren in other countries (Gonzales and Massmann 2006; Smith 1997; Takaki 1993).

In contrast, in the Canadian context, the nation started as a dominion of the British empire, and one that was already populated by (at least two) recognized national groups—the French and the English. The legacy of this history has been that hyphenated identities are taken to be the primary identifiers by which citizens participate in the Canadian polity (Kymlicka 2007). Without a long history of war and a sense of secure borders, as well as a discourse of self-understanding of a nation of multiple peoples, multiple allegiances have not been considered to be equally problematic in the Canadian context as the American context (Collacott 2008; Foner 2008)[175].

At first glance these two differences in citizenship approaches appear contradictory: after all, if Canadian citizenship is explicitly embedded in a nation-building framework, in opposition to the legal/security framework of American

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understanding of citizenship in the States that considers dual citizenship as suspicious. It is the discursive power of the oath that he insists on, and I believe it is in line with Bloemraad's approach of studying how institutions shape immigrants' incorporation into citizenship.

[174] Thanks to Steven Rytina for helping me to see the deep historical roots of this norm of citizenship.

[175] This has recently been brought into question in the Canadian context and become part of a public debate on whether dual citizenship makes sense or what obligations Canadian citizenship should require of those who hold dual citizenship (Jedwab 2008). The 2006 evacuation of Lebanese Canadians from Lebanon instigated this debate in the public forum and the parliament.

citizenship, should it not be Canada which demands a greater display of loyalty than the States? This apparent contradiction becomes more legible in light of the fact that nation-building in the two contexts have meant two very different things: in the Canadian context, as already mentioned, nation building has assumed the co-existence and maintenance of cultural groups (Kymlicka 2007); in the American context, nation building has assumed the disappearance of cultural groups into the "melting pot" of American identity (Huntington 2004; Glazer 1999; Lipset 1986). The consequence of these two different narratives of national identity has also meant that in the American context, suspicion of otherness has been more prevalent; thus requiring both greater displays of loyalty from newcomers as well as the enforcement of this through institutions of law and security.[176]

These two differences in how citizenship is experienced by newcomers is further enhanced by the variations in how new citizens (first and second-generations) experience their difference and diversity: i.e., through the differentiated institutions of multiculturalism in the two countries. In the next section, I compare some key dimensions along which American and Canadian multiculturalism differs.

5.2.2 Multiculturalism

In describing the emergence and movement of multiculturalism in liberal democracies, Joppke and Lukes (1999) write:

> As a word or a thing, 'multiculturalism' first appeared in Canada and Australia in the early 1970s. After belatedly abandoning their 'whites only' immigration policies, these young immigrant societies called an official multiculturalism to the rescue in order to juggle the incompatible claims of defeated homeland minorities (both Aboriginal and settler), newly entering Asian and other non-European immigrant groups, and their old European immigrant cores. Interestingly, official multiculturalism was instituted in post-colonial societies that lacked independent

[176] Again, the history of war and empire in American nation-building helps to explain this persistent and pervasive suspicion of otherness.

> nation-founding myths and clear breaks with their colonial past, *à l'Americaine*, thus conceiving of themselves as multiple cultures coexisting under the roof of a neutral state. This could not be so in the United States, the next stage of multiculturalism's *tour de monde*, where a strong sense of political nationhood and centripetal melting-pot ideology could only clash with multiculturalism's ethnicizing and centrifugal thrust. Accordingly, only in the United States did multiculturalism adopt the oppositional, anti-institutional stance that it would retain in its further march towards Western Europe (3).

This description captures the way multiculturalism has generally been thought of in a comparative light: as official policy in Canada and in the US, an oppositional trend which takes place without a formal centralized structure.[177] It also underscores that the assimilationist pressure is weaker in the Canadian context than in the American context due to the understanding that national identity in America is more defined (Lipset 1986), while in Canada its boundaries are more blurred and the narrative is constituted by diversity (Kymlicka 2003). While this highlights the broad differences in the two nations regarding the place of multiculturalism, for the purposes of this study, a deeper comparison is needed. In particular, we can identify four particular normative/policy differences, which structure American vs. Canadian multiculturalism: a) who is targeted by multiculturalism b) where policies of multiculturalism are located; c) what is the relationship of multicultural policies to the (federal) state and d) location of opposition to multiculturalism.

In Canada, multiculturalism, as an official policy, targets ethnic/immigrant groups that are not Aboriginal, British or French. In fact, multiculturalism forms one of three distinct "silos" of citizenship in Canada that differentiates groups by

[177] There has been an enormous amount of literature on defining/classifying multiculturalism(s) and in the process the creation of contrasting/complementary notions of other multiculturalisms: thick vs. thin multiculturalism; cultural pluralism vs. cosmopolitanism; culturalism vs. multiculturalism; civic integration vs. multiculturalism. These contrasting/conflicting definitions populate academic, political and popular discourse in North America (as well as Western Europe, Israel, Australia) (Rubin and Verheul 2009; Joppke and Lukes 1999). However, in the Canadian context, the definition is easier because it has had such a formalized history since it has been enacted as an official policy and written into the Charter and Constitution. In the American scenario it is more difficult to pin down a specific meaning or set of policies and here I rely on a set of key texts to help me compare the two forms of multiculturalism.

ethnicities, ethnic histories and relations (see *Table 5.2*) (Kymlicka 2007).[178] As *Table 5.2* makes clear, multiculturalism in Canada is firmly rooted in the federal government: It is grounded in debates of the 26th and the 27th Parliaments of Canada, the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the consequent statement and adoption of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" by Prime Minister Trudeau in

Table 5.2 Three Different "Silos" of Diverse Citizenship in Canadian Multiculturalism

Institutional Dimensions	**Aboriginal Peoples**	**French/Québécois**	**Immigrant/Ethnic**
Historic Roots	Royal Proclamation of 1763	Quebec Act 1884 and the BNA Act 1867	1971 Parliamentary Statement of Multiculturalism
Framework Legislation	Indian Act 1985	Official Langages Act, 1969	Canadian Multiculturalsim Act 1988
Constitutional Provisions	Sections 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982	Sections 16 to 23 of the Charter	Section 27 of the Charter
Responsible Federal Government Department	Indian and Northern Affairs	Intergovernmental Affairs and the Commissioner for Official Languages	Heritage Canada and Citizenship and Immigration of Canada
Guiding	treaty rights,	239bilingualism,	multiculturalism,

[178] This is true if we accept that conceptually speaking the Aboriginal people, the French/Québécois, and the British are ethnic groups. The fact that in Canadian discourse, ethnicity is often reserved for those groups who fall outside of these three groups (Kymlicka 2007) is reflective of the very different positions this groups have occupied in the Canadian imagination compared to the "immigrant" groups.

Concepts in Articulating Claims	aboriginal rights, common law title, sui generis property rights, fiduciary trust, indigeneity, self-government, self-determination	duality, (asymmetric) federalism, distinct society, nationhood	citizenship, integration, tolerance, ethnicity, diversity, inclusion

a. This table is adapted from the classification provided by Kymlicka (2007) in his discussion on diverse citizenships in Canada.

October 8 1971. Embedded in the Charter of Rights and Freedom, it was then established as governing legislation in the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act, 1988,* where all parts of Canadian society were expected to follow its principles in its actions. Thus, Canadian multiculturalism is instituted in the legal framework of the country. Moreover, it is enforced by two ministries that do the "citizenship work" of the nation: Heritage Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada.

In the United States, multiculturalism is not state-sponsored to the extent that it is in Canada. As a result, it is not practiced as a set of legally binding commitments; instead it is an eclectic set of efforts by non-state actors to give it substance in varied contexts according to their own varied understandings of what multiculturalism entails. As most scholars of American multiculturalism have pointed out, it was a movement, initiated by scholars in the social sciences and humanities and activists, in opposition to the dominant assimilationist, "melting pot" ideology (Ruben and Verheul 2009; Jonker 2009; Joppke and Lukes 1999). Multicultural practices and projects have been most dominant in educational institutions in the United States, rooted in college admissions and university curricula policies in the 1970s and 1980s, they have expanded into high school and primary school curricula (Ruben and Verheul 2009; Owen 2005). In addition to various celebratory programs such as Hispanic/Asian/Pacific heritage weeks

and the adoption by the US Postal Service of cultural stamps, multiculturalism has also been divisive in American society: It has populated popular discourse in the "culture wars" that the American public sphere has witnessed since the 1980s and the affirmative action debates in the 1990s (Ruben and Verheul 2009): national unity and the causes for failed (African-Americans) and successful integration (Asian-Americans) have been at the heart of the rhetoric of such debates.

An interesting point to note is that while in Canada there are three different institutions responsible for three different histories of difference (Kymlicka 2007), in the American case no such institutional distinction is made between African-American and immigrant groups. For example, affirmative action, one major public policy related to discrimination and integration of diversity was originally targeted towards African-Americans and women. However, since then, there have been efforts to expand it to include other groups. While the degree of expansion has been rather limited regarding actual affirmative action policies, in the field of multicultural practices in universities, schools, and the workplace, expansion to other groups has been extensive (Glazer 1999). One overall idea of accommodation, diversity and integration guides programs addressing inequalities based on differences and discrimination: they do not make distinctions between African-Americans, immigrants and other ethnic groups, and even women. The consequence of this is that racialization of identity is sometimes attractive, in terms of qualifying for affirmative action and making claims of discrimination that resonate with the public (Jackson 2007), but it is also stigmatizing, and thus many groups spend a lot of effort attempting to escape the racialization of their identity by claiming whiteness or pointing away from blackness (Jackson 2007; Ramirez 1995). Thus, as an oppositional force, multiculturalism in America has been seen as potentially challenging the dominance of race in how difference is perceived (Ramirez 1995). However, it has also been argued that non-white groups will not be allowed to be fully engaged members of the nation if they do not accept the racialization of their identity; a cultural frame, it has been argued, makes invisible the injustices faced by difference in American society (Jackson 2007).

Despite the differences in how multiculturalism is implemented in the States vs. Canada, opposition to multiculturalism has come from similar fronts in both countries (Ruben and Verheun 2009; Kymlicka 2007; Joppke and Lukes 1999): a) it is not achieving its goals of equality and the ability of groups to maintain their culture; b) it is eroding national identity and c) it reifies cultural practices and places a disproportionate burden on some members of a cultural group. The first criticism has come mainly from scholars and activists. The second has come mainly from conservatives and nationalists. The last critique has come from some minority activists themselves, as well as feminist scholars. Thus, in both countries, new citizens who are mobilizing identity claims, which are perceived to draw from multiculturalism as a legitimatizing discourse, are potentially subject to this range of critique from those actors who oppose, challenge or criticize such identity claims.

However, while across the border the range of discursive resources available to those who oppose claims that draw on multiculturalism are shared, new citizens continue to face different opportunity structures when it comes to how difference is understood and managed: a) multiculturalism in Canada is an official policy, supported legally, institutionally and normatively while it is an intellectual and activist movement in the States; b) in the States, race remains in tension with multiculturalism; in Canada, a discourse on culture and ethnicity dominates the discussion; c) there are multiple (three) systems by which diversity is managed in Canada and only one in the States. These distinctions implicate that in Canada certain actors can claim the state as an institutional and political resource, that ethnicity and culture have greater currency in how identity is marked, and that tensions created by the co-existence of multiple institutions of diversity may lead different and opposing actors to find different state actors as resources for support and legitimacy. In contrast, in the American case, actors mobilizing identity claims tend to have to do a lot more collective action work to find support in the state and the public. These differences, we will see below, has consequences for how Muslim actors make identity claims and who and what they perceive as (discursive, material, and political) resources in their mobilization.

5.2.3 Secularism

Liberal democratic societies have dealt with the challenge of religious pluralism through some combination of multiculturalism and secularism. In some ways, secularism problematizes the goals of multiculturalism because while multiculturalism is oriented towards making many aspects of culture public (in terms of display, support, organization, participation, and representation), secularism is oriented towards making one particular aspect/kind of culture private, namely religion.[179] This places new citizens mobilizing on the basis of their religious culture in a distinct spot than those mobilizing on the basis of other kinds of cultures (ethnic/racial/sexual) (César 2007; Bramadat and Seljak 2005). Thus, the framing and content of claims made by new citizens varies according to not only the kind of multiculturalism in place but also the kind of secularism in place (Bowen 2007; César 2007; Koopmans et al 2005; Ewing 2002; Kastoryano 2002). Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter it is important to compare the Canadian vs. American secularisms.

To recall, in Chapter 1, I discussed how secularism can be thought of as an institution as well as an ideology. As an institution it refers to the rules and norms that create and enforce the neutrality of the state's relations to religious institutions. How neutrality is implemented and practiced vary from context to context (Gorski and Altinordu 2008; César 2007; Asad 2003). As an ideology, it challenges the validity of religious norms, ideas and practices, i.e., of religious authority, in the public sphere (Gorski and Altinordu 2008; César 2007). Here, I compare secularism in Canada and the United States along both ideological and institutional dimensions.

[179]The most commonly articulated reason for this has been that secularism accommodates religious diversity by keeping God out of politics: God in liberal democracies occupies a space unique to Himself, because while "problematic" cultural practices can be simply deemed illiberal, religious practices appear to require a separate framework. The genealogy of this is indeed fascinating (see Taylor 2008; Asad 2003). However, here the existence of this competing and/or complementary framework which new citizens of faith face is what is important.

In the American case, secularism is much more institutionalized in the identity and practice of the nation than in the Canadian case (Seljak 2007). While the word "secularism" is not written into official documents in America, the First Amendment has been interpreted to require a practice of secularism; the dominant metaphor in this framework has been Thomas Jefferson's interpretation of the First Amendment, "a wall of separation between Church and State (Jacoby 2004). The effect has been an institutionalization of secularism into the legal, legislative, and judicial aspects of governance.[180] As a result of this interpretation, the American government (at the federal, state and local levels) does not give any financial support to religious institutions: it considers its responsibility to guarantee the religious freedom and equal treatment for all religious groups. This has meant that religious groups looking to influence public opinion or public policy have to do so in the same manner as all other interest or lobby groups in the States—through creation of organizations, mobilization of constituencies, distribution of publications, and other modes of collective action (César 2007).

Canadian secularism differs from the American case in several ways. Firstly, the history of secular institutions in Canada is relatively new; although trends of secularization were visible in the 1920s, it was only in the post-World War II era that Canada saw "the emergence of what we might recognize as a secular state (Seljak et al 2008: 10)", i.e., the neutrality of the State in its relations to religious institutions. While the shift was more dramatic in Quebec, after 1960,

[180] Research in history, religious studies, sociology and political science have shown that there has been a movement since the 1980s in the United States to reinterpret American history and identity in Christian terms. See Newman 2007, Jacoby 2004, Rozell and Wilcox 1996, Bruce 1990, Midgley 1990, Johnston 1982. These studies have pointed out that the New Christian Right have used the following strategies to achieve their goal: framing the debates and deliberations of the founding Fathers in religious terms, demonstrating the religiosity and Christianity of these actors, the importance of religious belief and institutions in key historical events, and attempting to change science and social science curricula in schools by Christian activists in Educational Boards; reframing key political and social issues through a Protestant morality; mobilizing "a moral majority". This movement has challenged both multiculturalism and secularism as valid approaches to deal with cultural, racial and religious diversity. In Canada, the emergence of the Alliance Party and the discourse of the Conservative party/government parallel some of the claims and directions of the Moral Majority and Christian Right movements in the States (Seljak 2005). The fact that in Canada, this movement toward reframing the nation as Christian took the form of a political party and in the States it has remained a social movement which interacts with the Republican (and Democratic) Party reflects the variation in the (durable and proximate) political opportunity structures of the two countries.

"politicians and senior civil servants implemented public policy and institutional changes that brought about the de-Christianization of Canadian society and public institutions by limiting the influence that the Church had previously exercised over the public affairs of the state (Seljak et al 2008: 10)." Thus secularism was not part of the founding myth/narrative of Canadian identity. However, as a result of recent history and the influence of the American imagination on the Canadian one, secularism has become part of the national myth/narrative of Canadian identity in the contemporary era.

Secondly, the historical relations between the State and the Church, along with the place of Roman Catholic identity and institutions in Québécois identity has meant that secularism is not instituted into the legal, legislative and judicial aspects of governance in Canada:

> To say that Canada is a secular state is not an accurate assessment of Canadian constitutional law and jurisprudence. Unlike the United States there is no strict separation between Church and State in the *Canadian Constitution Act*, 1982. The situation in Canada is more complex. For example, the *Constitution Act* actually *requires* some provincial governments to fund Roman catholic separate schools, an arrangement that is simply impossible in the US...The myth of separation of Church and State may blind us to realities of Canadian history and society and has the potential to promote a false understandings of how Canadians deal with ethno-religious diversity (Seljak et al 2008: 7).

Thus, provincial governments are not necessarily neutral in their relationship to religious institutions. In fact, the Supreme Court of Canada reasserted the constitutional validity of state support of Roman Catholic schools (Seljak 2005). This exceptionalism has been justified in Canadian discourse on the basis of the understanding that historical realities justify procedural inequalities due to their importance and relevance in creating substantive relations of equality, i.e., between the French and the British. This rationale parallels what we saw earlier regarding Canadian multiculturalism, i.e, the institution of three different systems of citizenship.

Ideologically, secularism is more similar than different in the two countries. In fact, most researchers have focused on European vs. American ideologies of

secularism: The main thrust of this comparison has been that unlike in Europe (and specially France), religion is not considered to be necessarily harmful or deviant in the social life of American citizens; although in certain intellectual milieus, there is a certain discourse that is anti-religion, generally, religion and religiosity, are both considered as normal and productive dimensions of identity.[181] Canadian secularism shares more with American secularist ideology than its European counterpart. Nevertheless, secularist ideology in Canada is distinct from an American ideology, in one major way: there are two forms of secularist ideology in Canada: a Québécois version, and a "rest of Canada" version. The Québécois version borrows much from the French laïcité version: religiosity is suspicious in the public life. The "rest of Canada" version is similar to American secularist ideology, but has until recently been generally absent as a discourse, unlike in the States, where its presence has been more pervasive across time.[182]

Thus, in Canada, the co-existence of these two forms of secularism creates unique challenges and possibilities for collective identity organizations and actors acting on a national level: diametrically opposed actors can find legitimacy of

[181] Scholars of immigrant and minority religions in American society have pointed out that generally religion has served productive purposes towards integrating newcomers and mitigating inequalities produced by class, race and ethnicities (Wuthnow 1988). However, it has also been pointed out that this is truer when the immigrant religion is Christian rather than non-Christian. Non-Christian or minority religions tend to have a much more difficult time mobilizing their faith as a productive source of identity—facing suspicions of betrayal and extremism (e.g., see Kurian 2006). Nevertheless, in a comparative light with Europe, it remains true that religious identity is seen to be normative rather than deviant in the American context.

[182] During the course of the Reasonable Accommodation debates that took place in 2007 Quebec, Canadian commentators, both from Québec and outside Québec, found it to be emblematic of the different understandings of secularism (and immigrant integration) that existed in Québec vs. in the "rest of Canada". It would be interesting to test through further research whether opposition to religious diversity occurs in different ways in Québec vs. outside of Québec. I have not focused on the reasonable accommodation debates in this study because while Muslims and Islam were often the elephant in the room for why they were initiated whose needs seemed unreasonable to accommodate, Muslim actors generally stayed away from the debates. While CAIR-CAN representative Zubair Hussain made a formal statement, and both mainstream and oppositional actors commented on the final report released by Charles Taylor and Reymond Bouchard, for these actors, there was nothing "special" about the commission and its proceedings: for the mainstream Muslim actors, it provided evidence of both the prejudice that Muslims faced in Canada and Québec and hope that the formal structures of the land were not ready to cave to the prejudices of populist politicians. For oppositional actors, it reinforced the idea that Muslims need to reform their practices in a manner that was more Canadian (or Québecois) than they had done so far.

their own positions about the place of religion in the public sphere at the level of the state. Both positions/identities are not negated and contemporary precedents of each are available as evidence for actors to refer to and make claim to as justification for their stances. Such a situation creates the possibility of sustained debate with substantial resources to back each side and create a tendency towards hardening of positions and requiring the choosing of sides.

In the last three sections I have compared American and Canadian institutions of diversity: citizenship, multiculturalism, and secularism. *Table 5.3* summarizes this discussion.

Table 5.3: Comparing Canadian vs. American Institutions of Diversity

Institution	Canada	United States
Citizenship	Nation-building and integration framework (Bloemraad 2006; Temelini 2007) Participation is emphasized (Bloemraad 2006)	Security and law enforcement framework (Bloemraad 2006) Display of loyalty is important (Glazer 1999; Bloemraad 2006)
Multiculturalism		
Target of Multiculturalism	Ethnicity-based (Kymlicka 2000; Bloemraad 2006): Immigrants vs. Settler communities vs. Indigenous Peoples (Kymlicka 2000; 2007)	Race-based (Shklar 1991; Takaki 1993; Glazer 1999) Immigrants vs. African-Americans (Shklar 1991; Takaki 1993; Glazer 1999; Bloemraad 2006)
Policy Location:	Constitution, Charter, Federal Ministries of Heritage and Citizenship and	Policies of Affirmative Action (Joppke and Lukes 1999; Glazer 1999;

	Immigration (Kymlicka 2000; 2007; Temelilni 2007) Policy is expected to be followed across all institutions/organizations/businesses in the country	Kurien 2006); Laissez-faire approach by the state (Modood 2006); Educational Institutions
Relation to the State	State-oriented (Modood 2006) and State-Initiated (Joppke and Lukes 1999; Temelini 2007)	Multiculturalism as an Oppositional Movement (Joppke and Lukes 1999)
Location of Opposition:	Scholars and Minority Activists (It needs to work better or it ignores distribution issues of inequality); Conservatives and Nationalists (It is destroying the country); Oppositional Minority Activists and Feminists (It is hurting some members more than others)	Judiciary (Justice as equality); Conservatives and Nationalists (It is destroying the country); Oppositional Minority Activistsand Feminists (It is hurting some members more than others)
Secularism	History is recent: since the 1960s. Has become part of Canadian self-identity;Not officially instituted: state-support of church exists (Berger 2002; Seljak et al 2008)	History is rooted in the founding of the nation. Is part of American self-identity (although it is being challenged currently). Officially instituted: no state-support of church exists

	Two secular ideologies: (Seljak et al 2008): Quebec (European/French pattern: religiosity/religion is harmful) and Rest of Canada (American pattern: religion/religiosity is an important/productive part of identity)	(Gorski 2008; Seljak et al 2008)

5.2.4 Proximate and Dynamic Dimensions of Political Context

While the institutions I have described can be characterized as the durable opportunity structures available to claims-makers, the accessibility and relevance of the resources these structures provide are mediated by more proximate political context, specially ruling (and oppositional) political actors (Koopmans 1999; Tarrow 1994). In this light there is one final difference in political context to consider between Canada and the United States. In the period of 2000-2008, the time period of this study, in the States, the governing administration remained the same at the federal level. The major shift in the George W. Bush administration occurred in the wake of 9/11, i.e., at the early part of the period in focus. The governing discourse was suspicious of both immigration and multiculturalism and overtly supportive of Christian frames regarding morality.[183] Security concerns and the primacy of loyalty to American identity dominated the discourse on citizenship and diversity.

In contrast, Canadian claims-makers experienced a major shift in the political context in which they operated when the Conservative Party won in 2006, after 12 years of Liberal Party rule. The governing discourse since 2006 has become more suspicious of multiculturalism and diversity (Dib and Donaldson 2008); it has also expressed support of Christian frames regarding morality, in

[183] See note 180.

direct opposition to liberal frames of morality prior to 2006 (Biles and Ibrahim 2008); modes of citizenship have been questioned in the wake of 9/11 generally, but the Conservative Party has emphasized the need for enforcing a Canadian identity that transcends other identities and citizenships—dual citizenship has been questioned in this context (Jedwab 2008); finally, while a security frame entered public policy and citizenship discourse prior to the Conservative Party's win, their victory reinforced the securitization of citizenship and identity (Abu-Laban 2004).

I have thus far compared the political environments faced by collective-identity claims-makers generally in Canada vs. the United States. In the following section, I examine how the various differences in how institutions of citizenship, multiculturalism, secularism interact with proximate political context factors such as ruling political actors and shifts in immediate political climates to differentially impact the relations between Muslim actors, as well as the content of Muslim identity discourses in Canada and the United States. The structure of the argument to follow is based on the insight of social movement theory that both the perception and actuality of institutions impact who and what claim-makers see as possible discursive, material and political resources in the mobilization of their interests, identities and ideas (Abu-Laban 2007; Bloemraad 2006; Koopmans et al 2005; Berbrier 2004; Steinberg 1999; 1998; Jenson and Philips 1996).

5.3 Impact of Differentiated Institutions on Relations between Muslim Actors and the Content of Muslim Identity Discourses in Canada vs. the United States

Based on the discussion above and interview data that asked Muslim actors to identify who and what they saw as their primary resources for collective action in terms of key actors, allies and ideas, I have identified what are the major institutional, discursive, material and political resources available to mainstream vs. oppositional Muslim actors in Canada and the United States regarding diversity and citizenship claims. These are compared in *Table 5.4.*

For mainstream Canadian Muslims, the 1988 Multiculturalism Act and Heritage Canada constitute as key institutional resources through which they find

both material funding and support for not only identity claims-making and mobilization, but also events. Moreover, multiculturalism, as a key element of Canadian national narrative constitutes as a primary discursive resource through which they legitimize their claims of difference and their claims against discrimination. Although regarding certain moral issues, mainstream Canadian Muslims positions would find greater affinity to Conservative Party positions, the historical and current context has ruled out any possibility of their seeing the Conservative Party as a possible ally. As with most "new citizen" and minority groups, the Liberal Party has been seen as the major political ally for mainstream Muslims in Canada: as a result mainstream Muslims groups such as the CIC has put in a lot of effort to create effective representation of Muslims in Liberal Party forms, such as during the 2006 election of Liberal Party leader. Interestingly, as a result of the shifting positions of the Liberal Party vis-à-vis the securitization of citizenship since 9/11, and the consistent opposition of the NDP to this process, as well the willingness of the NDP to accept a greater proportion of visible minority candidates, mainstream Muslims have started seeing the NDP as a political resource, even though regarding certain issues such as homosexuality and abortion, their moral positions are diametrically opposed. Finally, apart from these external resources, mainstream Canadian Muslims have available to them a 15 year organizing experience, in which they have been able to create some basis of raising funds from their own members a moderate-sized constituency.

In contrast, mainstream American Muslims have a much longer memory and experience of organizing and claims-making. In addition, their constituency base is large compared to their Canadian counterparts. As discussed earlier, part of this has been shaped by the fact that the institutional resources available to mainstream Muslim actors in the States are interest-group/lobby politics and courts. These are seen by mainstream Muslim American actors as institutional sites in which they can assert their claims—however, both sites, unlike in Canada, require the ability to mobilize constituencies and also

Table 5.4 Comparison of Resources Available to Mainstream vs. Oppositional Actors in Canada and the United States

	Mainstream Actors		Oppositional Actors	
	Canada	**United States**	**Canada**	**United States**
Institutional Resources	Heritage Canada Multiculturalism Act 1988	Interest-group politics Courts	Media: specially *The National Post* and *The Toronto Star*	Interest-group politics Conservative Think Tanks
Discursive Resources	Multiculturalism	Religious Freedom Secularism	Canadian Identity Secularism	Patriotism and Nationalism: American Identity Secularism
Material Resources	Funding from Heritage Canada Funding through membership, private donations, and activities	Funding through membership and domestic and international donation	Funding through active individuals	Funding through active individuals
Political Resources	New Democratic Party/Liberal Party	Republican party (2000-2001) Since 9/11, until 2008, they have	Conservative Party	None

		been an organization in search of a Party: 2 African-American Muslim Congressmen		
Organizational Resources	Moderate-size constituency base 15 year organizing experience and memory	Large constituency base 50 year organizing experience and memory	No apparent constituency base other than members of organization Primary public reference of oppositional voice is located in one organization	No apparent constituency base other than members of organization No primary public reference of oppositional voice

raise funds from such constituencies. The absence of institutions that provide funds for claims-making or events in the American context has also meant that the primary source of material sources for Muslim American actors has been donors and their own members. The idea of religious freedom has been seen by mainstream Muslim actors as a discursive resource legitimizing the making of claims about religious identity and asserting the right to practice their religion. While secularism was seen prior to 2001 as perhaps a problematic or constraining

resource, as we saw in the third chapter, it has been since then been increasingly seen as a way to legitimize claims against the interference or imposition of interpretation from political institutions, including courts and governments.

For Muslim American oppositional groups, secularism has also been seen as a discursive tool. However, as we saw in the last chapter, it has an anti-religious tone which, given the normative place of religion and religiosity in America, has found itself in tension with the very discourse it seeks to legitimize itself. A much more productive discursive resource for Muslim American oppositional groups have been the patriotism and nationalism that dominates American discourse about displaying loyalty for all citizens, specially for new citizens. The use of this discourse has allowed them to find institutional support from conservative think-tanks, which in turn has meant that they have seen interest-group politics as a means by which they can assert their claims. As we will see below though, their inability to create significant constituency base has meant that they have failed to identify any immediate political actors as resources to their claims.

In contrast, oppositional Muslim actors in Canada have found themselves identifying the ruling Conservative Party as a political ally. This in part has occurred, despite the left politics of secular Muslims, because the Conservative Party has responded to the critique against multiculturalism from these Muslims actors. The assertion of and the demand by Muslim opposition groups for mainstream Muslims to explicitly identify with a Canadian identity has created the strange alliance of non-Muslim social conservatives and liberal Muslim secularists. As a result of both ideology and such paradoxical alliances, the primary material resource that Muslim Canadian oppositional groups identify is funding through active members.

Having identified what are the primary institutional, discursive, material, political and organizational resources identified by mainstream vs. oppositional Muslim groups given the political opportunity structure they face, I now discuss below how the "choice" of these resources structure the relations between

mainstream and oppositional Muslim groups such that in the Canadian case, the relations are more polarized. I then discuss, how they also result in the greater degree of nationalization in American Muslim identity discourses than in Canadian Muslim identity discourses.

5.3.1 Polarization

Looking at *Table 5.4*, one key feature stands out across the comparisons in the Canadian context: the resources available to Muslim actors in Canada stand in a competitive and oppositional relationship to each other: state vs. critical media, NDP/Liberal Party vs. Conservative Party, multiculturalism vs. secularism, multicultural Canadian identity vs. national Canadian identity. The fact that both sets of Muslim actors (mainstream and oppositional) have been able to use and ally with competing powerful resources and actors has meant that not only have these opposing Muslim actors been able to sustain their efforts and positions, but they have also had to define themselves more clearly in the public space. Paradoxically, the availability of powerful resources and actors on each side has meant that Muslim actors are less constrained by a constituency base of their own making: the availability of resources has meant that more ideological identity claims can be made without having to pay the cost of losing a wide constituency base. Moreover, in the Canadian context, there is one major oppositional Muslim voice, the Muslim Canadian Congress. The combined effect of this is that Muslim identity discourses end up being embedded in larger competing discourses and relations. Thus, for example, the identity claims of the MCC identity claims made in the conservative *National Post* is not only the claims of secular Muslims against mainstream Muslim claims, but also becomes a point of contention against the liberalism of the Liberals and the NDP or the lack of nationalism of these groups. At the same time, to continue to have the support of the *National Post* as a forum in which they can make claims, they have to maintain a consistently ideological stance against these positions: their identity-claims ends up taking on the nationalist anti-multiculturalist stance of their

supporters and allies. As a result identity boundaries have hardened in the Canadian context among Muslim actors.

In contrast, in the American context, the laissez-faire approach to citizenship and multiculturalism has required both mainstream and oppositional Muslim actors to lobby public officials through the creation of interest/lobby groups. This has generally also required the mobilization of large constituencies, even prior to 9/11. As a result, each major mainstream actor in the States (ISNA, MAS, CAIR, MPAC) have histories of mobilization and claims-making that is at least 20 years old. The lack of institutional resources (of the kind found in Canada) has actually required these actors to develop organizations with considerable power and skills. One such skill has been that in the process of creating constituencies they have learned how to broaden their discourse: a larger constituency has required them to progressively expand the contours of their identity discourse. This has given them the ability to co-opt many oppositional critiques into their own discourse when such oppositional discourses arose post-9/11. Also, as a result of the structure of interest-based politics, mainstream actors have had to create some linkages with political leaders in both parties (with the Republican Party prior to 9/11, and with the Democratic Party since then). The absence of partisan politics within the Muslim American actor community has been aided by the fact that the Republican Party abandoned the mainstream Muslim actors in the wake of 9/11.

The oppositional actors have not been able to create such interest groups nor mobilize a large constituency in favour of their position. They have followed similar patterns to those carried out by the MCC in Canada, but their efforts have been less successful primarily because a) they have been unable to create a coherent organization around their identity and claims, b) no major media outlet has given them the primary voice for Muslim issues, c) their opponents, the mainstream actors, have had a much longer history of organization and claims-making than they have had. These three factors have been exacerbated by the absence of political leaders taking on their cause in any coherent way. Political actors in the States have mainly stayed away from oppositional actors, primarily

because they lack constituencies. As a result, their only institutional support has come from those opposed to Muslim claims-making completely, conservative think tanks led by the likes of Pipes, Emerson, and Lewis. The combined effect of this dynamic has been a weakening of oppositional identity discourses in the public sphere.

This discussion has attempted to show that as a result of what kind of resources are available and have been successfully utilized by the various Muslim actors in Canada vs in the United States, the relations and conversation between the various actors in Canada has become more polarized than in the States. It is important to keep in mind though that the role of individual actors in these organizations and their ideological positions have also been important in shaping this polarization: For example, in addition to the political opportunity structure, in the Canadian case, the dynamic of interaction between Canadian Muslim leaders has been shaped by two individuals and their affiliated identities: Mohamed Elmasry (mainstream Muslim identity) vs. Tarek Fatah (radical secularist Muslim identity). The presence of both two key and opposing identities, each with a very public figure head has meant that claims about and against public identities have become more personalized: as a result, loyalty to the leader has meant stricter claims of identity and hardening of boundaries. In the American case, as a result of a longer history in which organizational founders have given away to a succession of chosen leaders, claims of identity are based less on personalized following. Furthermore, while MPAC in the American case has served as an important bridge between mainstream and oppositional Muslim identities; CAIR-CAN has been frustrated in comparable efforts at reducing the degree of polarization between mainstream and oppositional Muslim identities in Canada.

Moreover, as I noted in Chapter 3, the biographies of those who have led oppositional discourse are filled with stories of persecution by religious institutions, governments and communities; in contrast the biographies of those leading the mainstream Muslim organizations are filled with stories of persecution by secularist institutions and governments. These biographical histories are important in shaping how these actors perceive each others' claims and positions.

In both contexts, therefore, there have been and continue to be polarization of the conversation. Nevertheless, the institutional context and resulting resource structure these actors see as available help to reinforce the ideological identity positions that they carry (as in Canada) or weaken/silence one kind of position and broaden another (as in the States).

5.3.2 Nationalization

While explaining the variation in polarization across the two countries required paying attention to the interaction of multiple institutions, resources and their interactions, the variation in nationalization that I observed at the beginning of this chapter requires a less complex explanation. Contrasting approaches to citizenship and multiculturalism have resulted in greater nationalization of Muslim identity discourses in the States than in Canada. American Muslim actors, mainstream or otherwise, are required (like most other ethnic/immigrant groups of the past and present) to display loyalty to the nation to a much greater degree than their Canadian counterparts. This has meant that both prior to 9/11 and even more after it, American Muslim actors have had to develop a discourse which utilizes national referents in their identity claims.

In the Canadian context, this kind of obligation has not been "normative" since the adoption of multiculturalism as a policy for immigrant groups: while the security context of 9/11 and the victory of the Conservative Party has created greater pressure towards displaying loyalty and Canadian-ness, there has been a lot of opposition to this kind of pressure from political actors within the state, as well as civil society actors who are not Muslim. Thus a large public discourse that has challenged the notion of a "Canadian Identity" weakens the pull to shift to a nationalized discourse. Moreover, the fact that Canadian national identity has been built on an idea that it is constituted by multiple identities and cultures that should be supported has meant that non-Canadian referents are normative in claims-making. The mode of integration in Canada does not require the use of Canadian referents; it only requires accepting the process by which integration is negotiated. As a result, there is no major institutional push towards a

nationalization of discourse. Instead, as Kymlicka (2007) pointed out, engagement and participation should eventually lead to such a nationalization, but that is not the goal of the process nor an indicator of its success. The real pressure towards nationalization has actually fallen on Canadian mainstream actors due to oppositional Muslim actors, which is the same in the American case. As a result of the difference in the direction and magnitude of pressure, the degree of nationalization is weaker in the Canadian case.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown a) identity boundaries are more hardened in Canada than America among mainstream vs. oppositional Muslim actors b) Muslim identity discourses are more nationalized in the American context than in the Canadian one. I have then utilized social movement theory's insights regarding political opportunity structures to explain how differentiated institutions of citizenship, multiculturalism, and secularism shape what resources Muslim claims-makers perceive they have available to them. I have argued that the resulting choice of their alliances and utilizations have resulted in the greater polarization of relations between Canadian Muslim actors and the greater nationalization of Muslim identity discourses in the United States.

This chapter has focused on explaining certain divergences in outcomes in the relations between claims-makers and content of identity claims in two different national contexts. In the next chapter, I take on the question of why divergent Muslim identity discourses emerged in the public sphere, to begin with. That is, apart from the role of the event of the 9/11 attacks in catalyzing the emergence of new actors, what explains the multiplicity of claims-making around Muslim identity in North America? I suggest in the next chapter that the reality of identity politics and transnational communities produce pressures towards the emergence of divergent identity discourses in the public sphere and that these have important implications for identity claims of new citizens and national narratives more broadly.

Chapter 6: The Impact of Identity Politics and Transnationalism in Shaping Identity Discourses

I started this study with three questions. I first asked: How do Muslim actors negotiate three tensions in liberal democratic citizenship? I answered this question in chapters 2, 3 and 4 by examining the structure and content of these negotiations in Canada and the United States before and after 9/11, as well as the ideological, experiential and strategic motivations of the actors leading these negotiations. In the wake of the attacks of September 2001, I identified four major clusters by which tensions regarding rights, practice, nation and faith are negotiated: liberal, progressive, secularist, and mainstream. Second, I asked what explains the greater degree of conflict among mainstream vs. oppositional Muslim actors in Canada than in the United States. In chapter 5, I utilized the framework of political opportunity structure to show that Canadian Muslim actors face a different resource structure for mobilization and claims-making than American Muslims actors due to the way each country has implemented and institutionalized citizenship, multiculturalism and secularism, as well as due to the more proximate political context of who is governing during the period in which these Muslim actors are acting.

Finally, the remaining question is: what explains the emergence of the multiple ways that citizenship and faith are negotiated in the Muslim community in North America? From the discussions in the previous three chapters, I have already shown how a combination of actor biography, the catalyst of the 9/11 attacks, and strategy have produced these different clusters. However, this is only a partial answer to the question of divergent representations. In this chapter I argue that the divergence of these representations is also rooted in two key realities of liberal democratic societies: identity politics and transnational communities. Drawing on research in identity politics, I argue that identity politics structures claims-making so that difference becomes politicized. As a result, one can observe the emergence of claims of inclusion and exclusion around multiplicities of differences that diverge or conflict within a given categorical

group. Moreover, the political practice of identity politics leads to intra-group conflict and divergences about representation in the act of mobilization.

All of this is further impacted upon by the reality that large proportions of citizens of liberal democratic societies are located in transnational communities. Although there is a long history of how nation-states have always held such communities suspect, the technological, socio-economic and political aspects of contemporary globalization appear to have heightened the demands and responsibilities placed on such transnational communities by the nation-state. Ironically, these kinds of specific efforts to enforce the primacy of one's obligations to the nation, has the consequence of a) strengthening the transnational dimension of that identity and b) placing such communities "at risk" of being accused of disloyalty or foreignness on the basis of the "transnationality" of their identity.

The goal of the analysis in this chapter is to demonstrate that the emergence, structure and dynamic of Muslim identity discourses are powerfully shaped by a larger context of identity politics and "transnationality", regardless of actor ideology and strategy. This final analysis completes the goals of this study.

6.1 Identity Politics

Both social movement scholars and political theorists have identified many collective struggles since the 1970s to be characterized by a "politics of recognition" (Melucci 1996; Taylor 1992; Offe 1985). Nancy Fraser articulated this when she wrote, "The 'struggle for recognition' is fast becoming the paradigmatic form of political conflict in the late twentieth century.... Cultural domination supplants exploitation as the fundamental injustice. And cultural recognition displaces socioeconomic redistribution as the remedy for injustice and the goal of political struggle (1995:68)." She argues that "the grammar of political claims-making" about social justice has shifted from one of redistribution to recognition (Fraser 2000: 108)". At the heart of a politics of recognition is the idea that misrecognition of an identity by others is harmful in the development of the individual. When one encounters repeatedly the "stigmatizing gaze of a

culturally dominant other, the members of disesteemed groups internalize negative self-images and are prevented from developing a healthy cultural identity of their own (Fraser 2000: 110)". In addition, misrecognition can prevent integration, perpetuate structures of inequality, and prevent collective action for social change. To correct this, claims-makers of such misrecognized groups "reject such images in favour of new self-representations of their own making, jettisoning internalized, negative identities and joining collectively to produce a self-affirming culture of their own—which, publicly asserted, will gain the respect and esteem of society at large (Fraser 2000: 110)".

The concern with misrecognition, its consequences, and the forms of political practice, including collective action that it requires has come to be described in popular, political and social scientific discourses as identity politics (Bernstein 2002). Political theorists and social movement scholars have presented various arguments for what are the implications of identity politics for claims-making and democracy, as well as how we can read this "new" kind of claims-making. Various social movement and ethnicity scholars have pointed out that it is historically inaccurate to characterize these kinds of claims-making about misrecognition as new. Tilly (1995), for example, argued that the history of claims-making has been always accompanied by the need for the recognition that "we" matter and the assertion of "our identity". Many anti-colonial struggles could easily be read as collective struggles of identity rather than socio-economic justice. Critiques of the new social movement (NSM) perspective have argued that NSM scholars were mistaken in what had changed: the academic perspective had shifted or widened—academic lenses prior to the 1970s were coloured primarily by Marxism, where class was observed to be the dominant variable in the social movement literature; in contrast with the "shift to culture" or "return to culture" that the social sciences witnessed after the 1970s, scholars started to observe what they had missed before (Poletta and Jasper 2001). In this spirit, many critiques of NSM revisited historical social movements to demonstrate the identity elements of their claims (Bernstein 2002; Poletta and Jasper 2001). While I do not disagree with this critique and body of evidence, it is important to

note that "identity politics" has not only been an academic concept—it is currently part of popular, public and political discourse, especially in liberal democracies. It may have become so because of academic shifts and "public philosophers", but now it exists as a cultural and discursive context in which claims-makers operate (Benhabib 2002). It is in this sense that I am interested in the "force" of identity politics leading to divergences of claims-making among Muslim actors.

For the purposes of this study, I am interested in the consequences of identity politics for the goals of claims-makers, the content of claims-making and the dynamic between different claims-makers. Although much of the debate on the consequences of identity politics has been more normative rather than empirically grounded propositions (Bernstein 2002), there are two key insights that these approaches have yielded: Firstly, identity politics has resulted in the politicization of difference. Secondly, identity politics has the tendency to essentialize the discourse on representation. I elaborate on each of these two insights, in turn, below. I then use the case of Muslim claims-making on citizenship and faith to explore the impact of 1) the politicization of difference for claims about inclusion into the nation; 2) the challenge of representation that claims-makers face in mobilizing variations of a given status group identity.

Claims of inclusion and exclusion in identity politics center around difference: Claims-makers either a) demonstrate exclusion based on difference and call for the rectification of that exclusion; or b) demonstrate exclusion based on difference and call for the inclusion of that difference. In the first instance, a right to difference is claimed not to assert a difference, but to claim *a priori* inclusion: this is the liberal idea that difference (Muslim in relation to the non-Muslim nation or secular Muslim in relation to the mainstream Muslim) should not matter. Yet, in making claims that difference should not matter, actors often have to make visible first how difference matters (profiling or silencing) and which difference matters (being orthodox Muslim or not accepting the hijab). In

fact, it is only by recognizing and displaying *the* difference that matters can actors then argue that it should not matter. This paradox results in the politicization of difference.

In the second instance, a right to difference is claimed to assert a difference and claim the incorporation of that difference into the wider discourse: this is the multicultural idea that difference should matter in a positive way. This results in the value and relevance of mobilizing based on identifying what is different, usually assumed to be a "defined" culture, one that is not the dominant/historical norm of the nation (e.g., Muslim in a non-Muslim society). However, those whose experiences do not fit the excluded defined culture are left with two options: the default option is of assimilating into the dominant/historical norm of the nation. This is a problematic choice for many who observe that one's exclusion from the minority culture (e.g., Muslim) does not easily translate into inclusion in the majority culture (non-Muslim). The other option is to mobilize the difference (e.g., liberal, progressive, secular Muslim) that prevents the easy translation or affiliation. In short, because identities are constituted by multiple dimensions of experiences, an identity politics that places value on difference comes to be constituted by multiple iterations of what difference is mobilized, even within a particular categorical group. Again, the result is a politicization of difference.

Scholars of identity politics have taken different approaches to evaluating this politicization of difference that identity politics creates. In the Marxist perspective, politicization of difference is evaluated to be negative because it prevents building of solidarity and coalitions across differences (Kauffman 1990; Gitlin 1994; Harvey 1996; Hobsbawm 1996; Piore 1995). In the NSM perspective, the currency that difference has gained as a justification for mobilization and claims of recognition is new in the history of collective action (Melucci 1989; Cerulo 1997; Poletta and Japser 2001). In the social constructionist/post-modernist approach, the politicization of difference provides an opportunity to build movements that take into account the intersectionality and constructed nature of identity; however, the successful exploitation of such an

opportunity requires a radical politics that eradicates difference as deviant (Butler 1990; Seidman 1993; Vaid 1995).[184]

In all three perspectives, however, politicization of difference is seen to also essentialize the discourse on representation, i.e., there is a tendency to claim by claims-makers that only those who experience the difference may speak of it (Fraser 2000). This is seen as problematic because it has the potential to be exclusive, as well as to reify that which collective actors want to change (Fraser 2000; Bernstein 2002). For example NSM researchers have highlighted the strategic challenges that a mobilization on difference poses to activists: one key goal of claims against misrecognition is to transform essentialized conceptions of an externally imposed categorical identity into one that is *authentic*, i.e., grounded in the living culture of that identity. However, in the process of trying to represent what is authentic, as opposed to distorted, there is a constant risk of essentializing the identity to only what is represented, and excluding those who do not fit that representation. This is further elaborated on by the social constructionist/post-modernist approach, in which there is a concern that mobilizing on the basis of existing "status categories" places actors in the position of remaining subordinate to the hierarchical status quo since status categories are one form of regulation. As a result, they argue, identity politics "hardens rather than redefines differences in status identities that are the basis for inequality (Bernstein 2002: 56)." Claims-making in identity politics is seen "to be narrow, political, state-centered activism that fails to adequately address the cultural bases of power (Bernstein 2002: 56)."[185] The difference of the identity remains the norm, which brings us back to the neo-Marxist concern that identity politics fails to achieve a recognition that is integrative of the members of the demeaned group.

I will now turn to how these two aspects of identity politics play out in the case of Muslim claims-making on citizenship and faith.

[184] For a broader review on these three approaches to identity politics see Bernstein (2002). The classification of these three approaches is based on her article.
[185] For greater detail on the social constructionist/post-modernist approach to identity politics see Butler (1990), Seidman (1993), Vaid (1995)

6.1.1 Multiplicities of Exclusions to Include into the National Imaginary

In negotiating citizenship and faith, North American Mainstream and oppositional Muslims make claims of inclusion and exclusion that use both liberal and multicultural ideas about difference and its place in the national imaginary. An example of a liberal claim of difference that implicates a widening of the national imaginary can be observed in an editorial, written by the founder of CAIR-CAN and the then chair of the organization, Sheema Khan. In the editorial she tells a story of how she is waiting for her two kids to be seen by a doctor, when in the radio "O Canada!" comes on to commemorate Memorial Day in Canada.[186] The song, she writes, gets her to deliberate on the national story:

> My beautiful country, I thought. A beacon of light in a world filled with so much darkness. One of the few places where a worried mother can get prompt medical attention for her sick children, despite our current health-care concerns.
>
> As we observed two minutes of silence, my six-year-old son asked what was happening. I tried to explain the significance of remembering the efforts of those who had died in conflict.
>
> But it's also important to remember that while Canadian soldiers were fighting tyranny overseas, many were battling the tyranny of discrimination here in Canada. During both world wars, various ethnic groups faced suspicion, even internment, under the pretext of national security. Their treatment was often enshrined in law, later repealed by the efforts of those who found the miscarriage of justice unconscionable. Albertan suffragette Nellie McClung fought on behalf of Japanese Canadians and Jewish refugees during the Second World War. Such struggles have helped the cause of justice right here.

Having expressed a shared understanding of Canadian history, one that reminds her readers of those historical struggles for inclusion, she then narrates a story that is not yet part of that shared narrative. She continues,

[186] Khan, Sheema. "Deliver Us from Suspicion". *Globe and Mail*, November 11 2003.

> In the post-9/11 era, Canadian Muslims and Arabs find themselves a minority under suspicion, based on the pretext of national security. The harrowing tale of Maher Arar has evoked collective outrage -- more so, given the signs of complicity on the part of Canadian security services.

She describes in detail more instances of how Canadian Muslims are undergoing the same unjustifiable suspicion as Canadian Japanese and Canadian Jews did in the past. These instances of exclusion require rectification. Thus, she concludes the editorial with

> In the past, Canadians have resolved to right the wrongs inflicted on members of our mosaic. Let's take this challenge, O Canada, to stand on guard for thee.

By the end of the editorial, thus, Khan has called on all Canadians to stand up against the exclusion of Canadian Muslims from freedom against discrimination and suspicion.

Notice here that Khan's editorial points out an exclusion based on difference and calls for its rectification by referencing historical moments in which such rectifications have come about for other groups. Khan's focus is on underscoring that difference (i.e., being Muslim) is being used to unfairly exclude and that this must be corrected. The premise here is that Canadian Muslims have rights *prior* to the identification of their being Muslim *as Canadian citizens*; as such, those rights cannot be denied on the basis of their difference in being Muslims. Evidently, though, implicit in this editorial is also a story that hopes for a widening of the Canadian story: Khan's narration implies that perhaps in the future other new citizens will reference not only the Canadian-Japanese and Canadian-Jewish struggles of incorporation, but also Canadian-Muslim struggles. Thus, the citizenship story told to a future generation will include a new iteration of struggles, one that accounts for the difference of Muslim.

An example of a multicultural claim of difference comes from another mainstream actor, the CIC. One of the most common claims made by mainstream Muslim actors before and after 9/11 is that North American society is often unwilling to grant the same rights or privileges it accords other groups. In the Canadian context, one issue around which such claims have been made has been around the so-called "Sharia Debate" between 2003 and 2006 in Ontario. The affair started when Syed Mumtaz Ali of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) announced that they would be offering faith-based arbitration in family disputes according to Islamic legal principles and the 1991 Ontario Arbitration Act, which recognized a variety of legally binding procedures outside of the formal legal system.[187] Under this Act, some Jewish, Christian, and Ismaili Muslims had, since 1991, set up arbitration boards to resolve and arbitrate on family disputes based on their respective religious principles.[188] As several studies have pointed out, there was little public scrutiny or controversy regarding the Act and/or these arbitration boards prior to 2003 (Boyd 2004). However, with the 2003 announcement by the IICJ, public debate ensued regarding first whether Islamic jurisprudence were appropriate to the conditions of the Act and second, whether the Act itself was legitimate.

[187] Ali, known in the Canadian Muslim community to be the first Muslim lawyer in Canada and the first man to be sworn in as a lawyer by the Quran, had been involved in efforts to set up Muslim arbitration courts for a period of twenty years. In 2003, his efforts culminated in the form of the IICJ. Whether intentionally or not, the framing of what the IICJ and Muslim arbitration would mean in his statement in October 2003 was problematic on two levels: Ali stated that once decisions would be made in the arbitration courts, they would be final and without recourse to Canadian court oversight. Ali also stated that all "good Muslims" would be required to go through these courts. As Boyd (2004) and Khan (2007) have pointed out, the first statement was legally incorrect and the second statement was problematic. Nevertheless, both Muslim and non-Muslim actors in the Canadian public took the IICJ statements for granted, leading to a polarization between proponents and opponents of the 1991 law as well as the Muslim arbitration courts. In her final report in 2004, Boyd attempted to dispel the misperceptions of the public, advocates, and opposition, as well as the IICJ regarding how the 1991 Act had been implemented and practiced as well as how Muslim arbitration courts would be practiced. Nevertheless, in the end, perception, initiated by the IICJ, won over "actual" facts. (Syed Mumtaz Ali passed away in July 2009.)

[188] The first proposal in Canada for Muslim arbitration courts relating to family matters was in 1994 in Quebec (Norris 1994). Sheema Khan (2007) and Berger (1995) have noted that the level of controversy generated following this proposal in Quebec reflected the deeply conflicted relationship in Quebec regarding "the place of religion within a secular system (Khan 2007: 475)." Unlike the Ontario case in 2003, in the end, nothing much came out of the proposal or the public demand to review the proposal in Quebec. This perhaps reflects the impact of 9/11 in amplifying the way the public (Muslim and non-Muslims) relates to issues of faith and specially Muslim practices.

CAIR-CAN, CIC and ISNA-Canada supported the IICJ move[189]: Faisal Kutty of CAIR-CAN and Wahida Valiante of CIC were vocal about the benefits of bringing an already existing *informally* run system into the legal fold where practices would be more regulated, thus protecting religious Muslims from arbitrary rulings as well as legally recognizing practices that were already in place. Their support for the IICJ claim came from an understanding that the claim was calling for the inclusion of certain Muslim practices that had a non-Muslim basis (the 1991 law) to be included: the 1991 law, along with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, warranted that if Muslims should want to have family arbitration courts, they should not be excluded from this privilege, since other groups (Ismailis, Jews) had the same right. This understanding carries both a liberal and a multicultural understanding of difference. The claim of exclusion from the an existing law assumes the liberal understanding of difference: Canadian Muslims as Canadians should be able to practice their rights like any other (religious) group. The claim to regulate family relations through their own religious interpretations, however, assets a multicultural understanding of difference: Muslim (Jewish, Ismaili) differences of how family relations are ordered are being claimed to be included into the Canadian understanding of family relations and their regulation, which are inscribed into civic law.

The IICJ claim faced opposition in the Muslim community from oppositional actors such as like the Canadian Council for Muslim Women (CCMW) and the MCC, as well as other non-Muslim Canadian actors. After much heated debate and a recommendation by a government appointed

[189] CAIR-CAN was the most wary of their support of the IIJC move. CAIR-CAN's Sheema Khan pointed out in her interview with me that that the move was made by the IIJC without consultation with the larger Muslim community and leaders. Moreover, in an article written in the edited volume *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*, she argues that IIJC failed in its efforts to institute Muslim family arbitration courts because they failed to provide "an in-depth analysis of contextual issues...and answer many of the criticisms aimed at their initiative (Khan 2007: 480)." Contextual matters that she argues the IIJC needed to consider were " the gains made by the women's movement, the secular framework of society, widespread ignorance and fear of Sharia and the lack of community consensus on the need for such an institution (Khan 2007: 480)."

commission that Muslim arbitration *should be* allowed, the final decision came in 2006 where the Ontario premier rejected all forms of religious arbitration and called for the repeal of the 1991 Act.

The mainstream vs. oppositional responses in the Canadian Muslim community to this debate and decision is important in underscoring the multiple ways new citizens make claims of exclusion and inclusion into the national imaginary. I discuss first the mainstream Muslim position. I then analyze the oppositional Muslim position to highlight how claims of inclusion themselves can be exclusive in a manner that generates new claims of inclusion that have identity implications not only for a given categorical group, but also the national imaginary.

Most mainstream Muslim actors saw the outcome of the Sharia debate as an instance of the profound tendencies of exclusion against Muslims in Canadian society. The Canadian Islamic Congress has written multiple op-eds in the CIC's *Friday Magazine* which point out the double standards against which Muslim citizens and their practices are measured.[190] These statements highlight that Muslim actors were "merely asking" to follow existing Jewish family arbitration courts. They were particularly "bewildered and shocked" that "instead of grant (*sic*) Muslims the courts, they took it away from the Jews!"[191] The exclusion being claimed is that the national narrative remains Christian: the norms of multiculturalism in Canada or religious pluralism in the United States are applied only to the Jewish and Christian faiths in any meaningful way and in a thin way to other non-Abrahamic faiths such as Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism.[192] Mainstream Muslim actors attribute this to a climate of prejudice,

[190] Such editorials were published on for example, *Friday Magazine* (7:57) May 28th, 2004(Rabi-al-thani 9, 1425);*Friday Magazine* (8:77) Sep 16, 2005 (Shaaban 12, 1426).
[191] Mohamed Elmasry, Interview,Vancouver 2006.
[192] Mohamed Elmasry, Interview, Vancouver 2006.

"Islamophobia", and ignorance about the process and meaning of Islamic practices including Sharia.[193]

In order to counter these exclusions, mainstream Muslim actors have run educational campaigns of various forms which attempt to demystify the Muslim in the American or Canadian public and present Islam in a light that reflects its compatibility to national ideals: justice in the American case and peace in the Canadian one.[194] These campaigns and presentations are, in effect, attempts by the mainstream Muslim actors to weave into the national narratives a Muslim story: to widen the national narrative to also include the difference of Muslim-ness. It is in this light the CIC considers one of its major successes the declaration by the Canadian government of October as Islamic History Month, paralleling Black History Month in February.[195]

Importantly, these campaigns implicate an understanding of national identity which underscores the normality and value of difference: the national narrative is supposed to be constituted by multiple narratives that are allowed to *co-exist*. Even Khan, whose editorial illustrates a different way of claiming exclusion than the campaigns by CIC or ISNA, draws on this discourse of the *normality* of difference. Not only does she highlight the mosaic dimension of the

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[193] *Friday Magazine* (8:73) September 7th, 2005 (Shaaban 3, 1426)

[194] It is unclear to me if there is much significance to this divergence for the goals of this study. Suffice it here to say that Muslim discourse in the United States has focused on mapping ideals of Islamic justice to ideals of American justice, while in Canada, the emphasis has been on the shared value of peace between Islamic ideals and Canadian ones. Of course, as we saw in the third chapter, both justice and peace have been important tropes through which Islamic and national ideals are linked. However, there is a predominance of justice in the American context and peace in the Canadian one among Muslims in each nation. Based on interviews, I would say that this has resulted due to a combination of personalities and certain interpretations of American vs. Canadian history and national representations of these personalities. In particular, in the American case, the influence of MPAC founder Maher Hathout has been integral in the predominance of justice as a common theme across the faith and the nation. In the Canadian case, perhaps because of a lack of equivalent intellectual discussion/deliberation on the issue, the more "diluted" principle of peace has been more predominant. This is further supported by the increasing prevalence of "justice" in Canadian Muslim discourse as Islamic scholars enter the conversations more publicly in Canada and in the Muslim community itself.

[195] Wahida Valiante, current president of the CIC, Interview: January 20 2008 (at the time of the interview, she was the vice-president of CIC), Toronto. Imam Z Delic, Interview: August 29, 2007, Ottawa.

Canadian identity, but more importantly, she points to the past collective struggles of other groups as constituting the national narrative. She draws on these historical struggles to remind her non-Muslim and Muslim Canadian audiences that the national narrative is constituted by excluded differences that have become included. In both forms of claims, difference of the Muslim identity takes on center stage, whether it is in how it is treated by non-Muslims or represented by Muslims. The call in both instances of mainstream discourse is to identify and maintain the difference of *Muslim* in the national narrative as an instance of the nation, not outside of it.

In contrast to the mainstream response to the conclusion of the Sha'ria debate in Ontario, oppositional Muslim actors saw the repeal of the 1991 Arbitration Act as a victory against the dangers of creating exclusions by including particular differences, Oppositional Muslim actors had opposed not only the inclusion of Islamic family arbitration into the religious family arbitration courts, but they criticized generally the idea of different, identity-based family arbitration courts, irrespective of the religion. They argued no religious family laws, including Islamic jurisprudence, had as its principle the equality of women. They pointed out that an inclusion of difference (Islamic or other religious interpretations of regulation of family relations) into the legal sphere would be problematic because it would 1) be exclusive by giving legal legitimacy to a particular interpretation of what family arbitration laws are in Islam or any other given religion and 2) be exclusive of all those members of the religious group who would choose not to participate in these courts for the resolution of family disputes. As such they argued that both the proposal for a Muslim arbitration board and the Arbitration Act were contrary to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom.

Importantly, both the reasons for their opposition and their goals make manifest that in this instance oppositional Muslim Canadians are not only challenging the representation that is mobilized by mainstream Muslims, but also

what the state has presented as legitimate difference. I show below that we can actually understand oppositional claims-making as challenges to the kind of Muslim representation that is being asked to be included into the national imaginary. However, since what kinds of representations are taken as acceptable exclusions to include reflect not only prejudices against a particular group but what are the markers in a society for culture and identity broadly (Berbrier 2002), oppositional Muslim claims are claims also against the state; they are an attempt to deconstruct the representation of religious/cultural identity in the public space. In short, oppositional Muslim claims-making make evident that the premium that identity politics identity politics places on difference makes any attempt to include Muslim identity open to further claims of exclusion and inclusion that the *represented* Muslim identity does not contain. These latter claims, I argue, can be understood to be claims of exclusion by not only mainstream Muslims but also the nation in how religiosity and/or religious identity is understood and represented.

Recall from chapter 3, how central the oppositional Muslim claim to "right to speak", the "depth of their belief in Islam", and the importance of practicing the "real Islam" is to liberal, secular and progressive Muslims. At the same time, at the heart of their justification for mobilizing is to make visible other ways of being Muslim. The difference they perceived to be both missing and excluded in the public sphere was an Islam that was not typified by "normal" symbols of Muslim-ness and religiosity: adherence to orthodox rituals and practices. They blame, we saw earlier, both the mainstream Muslim actors, but *also* the media, political actors and a public that misrecognized what believers may look like and what they may say. Oppositional Muslim actors are attempting to claim that there is an exclusion of their voices and identities on the basis that when both mainstream Muslim actors and American and Canadian publics and actors speak or think Muslim, they do not see the *liberal* Muslim, the *secular* Muslim, and the *progressive* Muslim. This is distinct from the mainstream Muslim claim about the diversity of Muslims: mainstream Muslim actors claim diversities of ethnicities, practices, and sects; they challenge the stigmatization of Muslim religious

identities in the American and Canadian public sphere. In contrast, when oppositional Muslim actors make claims about the diversity of Muslims, they challenge the American/Canadian public imagination of what a religious identity looks like. The oppositional challenge is that differences of religiosity, and not religion, need to be rethought in national narratives.

This challenge links up with the social constructionist/post-modernist critique of identity politics, which has argued that liberal democratic citizenship incorporates difference in a problematic manner. Difference, this critique argues, is often understood in terms that are essentialist or essentializing—this is specially true in reference to pre-existing identity categories. As a result, difference in identity politics reinforces groups and group rights. For example, Richard Day (1999) in his critique of multiculturalism in Canada, has argued about the group premise in the (Canadian) national metaphor of mosaic: he has pointed out that the referencing of the mosaic in the Canadian narrative has always prioritized the idea of the nation as constituted by different groups (or peoples) rather than individuals. According to him, this leads to an identity discourse centered on group boundaries and rights and thus generates policies which repeatedly reinforce groups. Thus, when new citizens enter the public sphere, they are often circumscribed by discourses of group rights. One important consequence of this is that within the new citizen group, differences are muted, suppressed, and/or marginalized (Day 1999; Vertovec 1995; Hall 1992).

Political theorist Seyla Benhabib (2002) has made a similar argument in her critique of both Taylor's communitarian and Kymlicka's liberal theories of multicultural citizenship. She has pointed out that this referencing and assumption of the group is not only particular to polities with official policies of multiculturalism like Canada, but also to other countries in which multiculturalism is, albeit contested, part of the norm of political, legislative and/or judicial practice, such as in the United States. Citing examples of successful criminal defences where culture and group rights are used to explain

acts of violence, she demonstrates the ways in which courts legitimizes a particular interpretation of an identity and its practice and accords citizenship status to it, while a competing identity and its practice is "othered" and citizenship status is held back from it. According to this critique, certain differences are incorporated into the national narrative as part of multiculturalism or normal difference, while other (interpretative) differences are excluded from the way the nation imagines the group, in this instance the Muslim (Canadian/American).

In this frame then, while mainstream Muslim claims are viewed by proponents of the politics of recognition, multiculturalism, and liberals as "normal" efforts to take away stigmas of being Muslim, these claims in a context of how identity politics is practiced reinforce the idea that one is Muslim by certain kinds of acts that signify religiosity. As researchers of non-Western Muslim communities have shown, this is not common to being Muslim in non-Muslim societies, i.e., the specificity of claiming Muslim-ness and of claiming it through certain markers is contextual and situational; there is nothing *a priori* about the (public) relevance of Muslim identity. This can be read in the following way: The position of being a (stigmatized) minority in liberal democracies has the consequence of "politicizing" or "publicizing" that identity and thus demanding its representation. In turn, representation resonates often only in a certain manner—it has to demonstrate appropriate markers of this "other" or minority identity, i.e., it has to demonstrate difference (Kurian 2006; Benhabib 2002; Modood 1998). Thus, in attempting to remove certain connotations in difference, minority identities in societies espousing liberal democratic citizenship with some norm of multiculturalism, has to make manifest differences, which should be celebrated (food, clothing, festivals, histories) as part of the national culture (Benhabib 2002; Day 1999; Vertovec 1995; Hall 1992). Any counter-claim to whether the celebrated difference is appropriate or exclusive is also a claim to what is national culture: claims about a given identity demanding inclusion generate counter-claims and new claims about the national narrative.

Therefore, the emergence of the oppositional Muslim voices in the post-9/11 context can be understood as a way of contesting a national narrative, not only an in-group representation. Oppositional Muslim claims-making in North American is more than just an effort to change the way some Muslims see other Muslims; in fact, it is a significant effort to change the way the nation imagines not only the Muslim but also the religious. Oppositional Muslim claims are efforts to re-imagine the religious in the national imaginary as well as the Muslim in the Muslim (Canadian/American) imaginary. The temptation in analyzing these claims of oppositional Muslim voices is to cluster them with "assimilationist" claims (or demands) made by non-Muslim actors on Muslims. It would be wrong to conflate the two. The latter claim is exclusive of all differences that are imagined to be foreign to national self-image (Christian, or white, or Western). However, the claim being made on the part of oppositional Muslim actors is that multicultural narratives only accommodate one way of being religious (or cultural)—one that reifies religiosity and culture into a visible difference (beards, hijabs, regularity of prayer, attendance of religious events). Those who are not visibly religious are expected to be part of the non-religious public—multiculturalism does not makes space for religious and cultural differences that do not conform or display visible (and recognized) markers of religion and culture.

In such a context, these non-traditional actors have three options a) blend into the background and make no claim to the mobilizing group (*silence*) b) find others who share the same basis of exclusion across various categorical identities and mobilize on the basis of individual rights framework (*civic mobilization*) c) find others who share the same basis of exclusion in the categorical group and create and display their own culture so that it too is recognized and not demeaned (*oppositional mobilization*). The latter two modes of action will result in varying degrees of conflict with the mobilizing "traditional" group, as well as other actors in the public sphere; they will also require developing markers for identification of what it means to be this excluded group—liberal, secular, progressive. Thus

the original action of challenging stigmatization of a given identity and its exclusion from the national imaginary (Muslim) leads to the fostering of multiple new identities (Muslim, liberal Muslim, secular Muslim, progressive Muslim) and claims on transforming the national imaginary further.

Future research should explore what kinds of factors and mechanisms influence whether the outcome of mobilizing against stigmatization of a particular identity results in silence, civic mobilization or oppositional mobilization within that identity group. Researchers and theorists of identity politics have centered heavily on how status groups mobilize and some of the conflicts it creates for individuals within the group. However, they have rarely looked at how individuals within the group facing such conflicts or tensions organize to mobilize, the identity discourses they establish, and the outcomes of such mobilizations for the identity group, as well as the polity in which they mobilize. This kind of research would also allow us to gain insight into how does the public negotiate the mobilization of differences of a given categorical group that is perceived as different itself? While this study cannot answer this question, it has raised it. If we are to deeply understand the implications for mobilization and collective identity claims-making on citizenship and public discourse about national identity, we need to include an understanding of how the reality of multiplicities and intersectionalities of identities impact our deliberation of imagining our national selves in pluralist societies. This requires that we understand when and how these multiplicities and intersectionalities are acted upon and mobilized, as in the case of civic or oppositional mobilization and when they remain silent.

6.2 Transnationalism

Transnationality is one particular kind of multiplicity and intersectionality of identity. It is produced by the act of international migration *and* the actual practices by which individuals maintain ties to communities in both their place of

origin(s) and their destination(s) (Basch, et al., 1994; Vertovec, 1999). Liberal democratic states like Canada and the United States have a paradoxical position vis-à-vis transnationality: On one side of the paradox, transnationality is sanctioned in the form of recognizing that one's citizens can mobilize to make claims about the foreign policy of their government and the relations of their government to other communities that are of value to them. That is, citizens of a country have the right to attempt to influence the actions of their government regarding what is held to be important to them. The caveat to this right is that the actions being demanded are not harmful to the polity or the security of the nation-state.

The caveat leads to the other side of the paradox, i.e., transnationality is held suspect. The spectre of the "fifth column" can be mobilized quickly against certain kinds of transnationalities at certain times. Maintaining ties across borders is held suspect under certain conditions—specifically when the ties are with groups/identities that the host-nation is at war or conflict with. Historically the nation-state has asked the breaking of such ties at such times. But in the context of globalization and identity politics, nation-states have also increasingly seen such citizens as possible resources to win wars, to gain advantages by, or even to help shift the dynamic of the relationship. As a result, such suspect citizens are placed under an additional obligation: *participate in transnational practices but on nationalist terms.* Such an obligation works paradoxically with the attempts of new citizens to construct a national definition of their "other" identities, such as Muslim. The American or Canadian Muslim is suddenly asked as a requirement of his/her citizenship to broaden the purview of being Muslim to beyond the national border. However, how it is broadened and why it is broadened are to be dictated by the nation-state. Otherwise, the act is held suspect.

This is the challenge that nation-states pose to the transnationally located citizen. It creates a complex context in which such citizens have to act—they are asked to display loyalty by acting as an agent of the nation-state—to actively reform and inform the "other" identity he/she posseses, while simultaneously hold back from asking the nation-state to reform and be informed by the other

identities which constitutes the citizens of that state. For the citizen then who occupies such a transnational space, like the Muslim American or Canadian, and has to negotiate this paradoxical position, the options are:

1) reject the identity that is considered problematically transnational;

2) reconcile the tensions between the national and the transnational identities; or,

3) challenge the idea that the transnational identity create tensions with the national identity.

The legitimacy of these options at any given point in time and for a given group depends not only on the identity in question but the context in which it is being questioned. Interestingly, the option that we do not observe among the actors in this study is the use of the first option: rejection of Muslim identity. This is perhaps best explained by the emergence of identity politics and multiculturalism as a dominant trope in liberal democratic states. A value of the right to difference and the possibility to mobilize to challenge allegations of suspicion makes the second two options much more likely in the contemporary context. We have already seen in this study that mainstream Muslim actors, both before and after 9/11, have attempted to both reconcile the tensions that are posited about their obligations to the *ummah* (Muslim nation) and their national polities (American or Canadian), as well as challenge the idea that transnational identity is problematic per se to the national identity. Among the oppositional Muslim actors, this is also evident.

The conflict between and among mainstream and oppositional actors, we have seen throughout this study, has centered on how to reconcile the tensions and how to question the idea that a transnational identity is problematic for the nation. However, what is common across the various actors is a sense that occupying a transnational space in a liberal-democracy creates an obligation to act transnationally, not only on behalf of the faith, but also on behalf of the nation. It is this latter sense that the Muslim American citizen or the Muslim Canadian citizen has to, *as an obligation to his/her nation* (American/Canadian), respond to

acts outside of the nation and act to change ideas outside of the nation, that I want to discuss in this final section of this study. I show that nation-states manipulate the transnationality of identity by nationalizing the obligations of a transnational identity. As a result, citizen groups located in transnational spaces are paradoxically further transnationalized—placing them at greater risk of being held suspect by the nation.

In the literature on transnationality and citizenship, the primary concern has been whether transnational practices of citizen groups are withering away at the meaning of national citizenship and the power of the nation-state (Kivitso and Faist 2007; Soysal 1994). Scholars of citizenship and international migration have suggested that contemporary globalization has facilitated the ability of individuals and communities to maintain and sustain such ties to an extent that it has problematized the exclusive relationship between citizen and state (Brubaker 1989; Faist 2000; Kivitso and Faist 2007). Moreover, the institution of international human rights by Western democracies, others argue, has led to a shift of the regulation and practice of citizenship from the nation-state to the local and/or supranational organizations (Held, 1993; Soysal 1994; Holston & Appadurai, 1999). Others have pointed out that nation-states themselves have acted to expand the possibility of maintaining transnational ties through offering their citizens the option of dual citizenship and extending many rights to non-citizens (Kvitso and Faist 2007). These processes have resulted in an anxiety about the institution of citizenship, specially in its territorially-bound sense.

Some analysts have challenged this concern by pointing out that while citizens may be able to cross borders more easily and more frequently via travel, communication and sending of remittances, with regard to political action, citizens are still primarily restricted to act in the nation of which they are citizens. As a result, the nation-state is still at the center of claims-making by citizens. Moreover, transnationally located citizens are not acting to hurt national interests, but to re-define what national interest are. Democratic nation-states, may, as a result of more diverse populations, have to expand the definition of its national interests: in this scenario, it is not that the power of the nation-state is in crisis,

but how it imagines itself is in crisis. Thus, for example, in the case of Muslim claims-making in North America, efforts to shift the stance of the American or Canadian governments regarding the Israel –Palestine issue, can be read as an attempt to change the Judeo-Christian imaginary of these two nations; and the failure of these efforts to materialize in actual change in policy could be read as a reflection that Muslim and other Arab citizens are not considered to have an equal right to the nation as their Jewish and Christian counterparts. In fact, during the course of my interviews with both mainstream and oppositional Muslim actors, such sentiments were articulated across the different ideological lines. This kind of analysis could provide further insight into how national imaginaries are constructed by claims-making of transnationally located citizens.

However, I am more interested in another less considered aspect of how transnationality and citizenship are linked: how nations themselves deepen the transnational dimensions of transnationally located citizens. I believe that most analysts have ignored the multiple ways that nation-states themselves create transnationality in some of their citizens: the absence of this kind of analysis has resulted in a blind-spot in the literature on transnationality and citizenship—the construction and practice of citizenship for such citizen-groups are distinct as a result of the obligations placed on them by the nation of which they are citizens: The obligations of citizenship are differentially allocated to certain transnationally located citizens.

If we recall, in my third chapter, we saw that oppositional Muslim voices arose in the wake of 9/11, claiming that certain practices in the Muslim community needed to be reformed and rethought. They were acting to put pressure on existing Muslim leadership in North America to not only change their practices but to ask them to create change in Muslim communities. Interestingly, their critique of mainstream North American Muslim leadership and demand for change extended beyond Muslim communities in the United States and Canada. Instead, there was an explicit demand from the oppositional Muslim groups that mainstream Muslim leadership to attend to the problems in Muslim practices *outside* of American and Canadian Muslim communities. Mainstream Muslim

leaders found themselves that at the very moment that they were trying to distant themselves from the "bad" Muslims by claiming that their acts were alien to Islam and the Muslim citizens of the US or Canada, they were being pressured from many sides to take responsibility for these "bad" Muslims and reform communities oceans away. In fact, some of that pressure was even coming from within their own ranks in the mainstream Muslim community. As we saw, in 2006, the president of ISNA, Ingrid Mattson, argued that North American Muslims had a "special responsibility" to Muslim outside. Mattson's claim was justified on the basis of what she thought her faith and the privilege of being a citizen of a liberal-democratic nation entailed. Oppositional Muslim actors agreed (but did not see mainstream Muslim leaders' efforts as sufficient or appropriate to the task).

This sense of special responsibility of Muslim citizens, however, was also articulated by non-Muslim actors in the media, government and the public sphere. As we saw in chapter 3, they asked that Muslim citizens condemn the acts (9/11, London attacks) committed by non-citizen Muslims in places far away; they asked that Muslim citizens explain why such acts were being committed by Muslims; they questioned the loyalty of those that tried to explain these acts had other causes than their faith (poverty, inequality, authoritarianism); they demanded that Muslim citizens come forward and explain their faith; they asked that Muslim citizens denounced certain practices that were observed in other nations (e.g. beheading or stoning), even if there was no precedence of such acts in the communities (Canadian Muslims or American Muslims) that were being asked to give them up. We also saw earlier that institutions of the nation-state, like the police, intelligence-gathering organizations, the military, legislators, called on Muslim citizens to come forward and help them reform the Muslim community, aid them in identifying the "bad" Muslims, interpret cultural practices of other Muslim nations. Failure to do so was, at least in part, understood to be a sign of bad faith on the part of their Muslim citizens—it was understood that these citizens were not fulfilling their obligations to their nation.

Moreover, such demands from the public sphere legitimized resonant claims being made by the oppositional groups. Attention was thus heightened to public voice by oppositional Muslim groups when they critiqued the mainstream Muslim voices of the States and Canada on the basis of acts and ideologies articulated elsewhere, outside of national boundaries. Fellow citizens were being held responsible for fellow non-citizens and a refusal to accept responsibility was seen as a failure to uphold the obligations of national citizenship. In contrast, those (Muslim) citizens, who were concerned about the acts and violence of fellow non-citizens across borders (Muslims outside of the national borders) and were demanding that Muslim Canadians/Americans have to accept responsibility, were seen as fulfilling the obligations of national citizenship. By affirming the claims of oppositional Muslims and placing pressure on mainstream Muslim citizens in North America to act to reform and inform Muslims outside of national borders, the nation-state was attempting to shape the way transnationality is practiced by its Muslim citizens. In the process, it helped to foster the lines of conflict and divergent identity discourses in the Muslim community in North America.

The shift to "special responsibility" that has been articulated by North American Muslim actors in both mainstream and oppositional camps is thus not only a product of the organizational and ideological dynamics of these actors; it has tended to resonate and persist across ideological lines precisely because it is supported by the nation-state in which these citizen groups are acting. Although mainstream Muslim actors are suspicious of attempts by the state to attract Arab and Muslim citizens to investigations and work in government units, their "special responsibility" rhetoric has partially legitimized these calls. Moreover, all mainstream Muslim organizations across North America have engaged actively to inform intelligence gathering projects, an idea that before 9/11 would have been seen by the community as a betrayal, and by activists as problematic; instead, it is now framed as a way of being active citizens. Thus, as a result of 9/11, the nation-state has become a major actor in shaping the identity discourses of Muslims actors in North America. While in the 1980s and 1990s, Muslim actors were

attempting to forge new ways of constructing a *national* identity of being Muslim so that Muslim citizens could have a voice in the political and social decisions of their society, in the post-9/11 context, Muslim actors were being asked by the state to re-construct their identity in a manner that recognizes them as citizens only if they participated in efforts to deconstruct Muslim identities elsewhere. In such a context, those Muslim citizens who were motivated by the ideological understanding that Muslim citizenship in a liberal democratic nation-state required transnational thought and practice in the form of reforming Muslim practices and interpretations of belief generally, found fertile ground to speak. As a result, the North American public spheres witnessed the emergence of differentiated citizenship identity discourses from the "Muslim" categorical group that we have seen in this study.

In this chapter, I have argued that the politicization of difference produced by identity politics leads to the emergence of multiple claims of exclusion and inclusion into the nation within the categorical group. Moreover, a further context for divergence of identity discourses in the Muslim identity is produced by the paradoxical position that liberal democratic nations place its citizens who are located in transnational communities. Thus, while ideological commitments of Muslim actors themselves, and strategic decisions, have led to the emergence of multiple Muslim identity discourses on citizenship and faith within the Muslim community, a context of identity politics and transnationality have led these "internal" debates and dialogues into the public sphere and implicated these conversations in larger questions about the national imaginary and public debates about national identity and citizenship.

In the conclusion of this study, that follows, I summarize the findings and analyses of this study. I conclude with the implications of this study for the literature on liberal democratic citizenship, diversity and pluralism, and the challenges of mobilizing a faith-based identity.

Conclusion

In this conclusion of the study, I summarize the argument that I have presented in the preceding chapters. I, also, discuss in the course of the summary what is the significance of the analyses presented for the body of literature on citizenship, collective identity and social movements. I conclude with a discussion of what direction future research may take given the arguments and findings in this study.

The Argument and its Significance

In this study, I have utilized the various and often divergent efforts at constructing Muslim citizenship by North American Muslim actors as a way to highlight the interactive processes by which collective identities are constructed and competing discourses on citizenship and faith are negotiated. At the core of the analyses presented here is the argument that new citizens are not faced with coherent narratives about rights, practices and identity about the nation to which they are becoming citizens. Instead, as a result of the historical accumulation of negotiations, new citizens are faced with the rather precarious task of constructing an understanding of their new identity that they must not only mobilize for their daily life, but one that they must be able to mobilize to the public and the polity to which they have become part of formally, specially when they face inequalities, discriminations and/or some other forms of exclusion.

Their mobilized and negotiated representations, however, are subject to not only critique from the public but also members of their "own" group, who they now relate not only as, say Muslims, but also as fellow citizens. In the process of representations and critique, counter-claims and representations, negotiations and re-negotiations, one is able to observe that collective identities are produced through complex interactions between: a) ideological baggage and biographies of claims-makers; b) historical tensions in the traditions and identities that are being negotiated; and c) the actual political constellations in which such claims and counter-claims are being made, both the proximate and the durable. Moreover, such contests about collective identity, citizenship and faith are not

only relevant for the group (American Muslim or Canadian Muslim) but also help highlight the inclusions, exclusions and blindspots in national narratives about belonging and hierarchies of obligations and how these are challenged.

Most frequently studies of citizenship tend to focus on either a) how the state shapes the identity of the citizen and individual actors or b) how citizens and individual actors negotiate and enact their obligations to the polity and the state in their everyday life. In contrast, studies of social movements tend to focus on how activists and claims-makers attempt to shape, challenge and change the obligations posited by the state, how they are constrained by it in their efforts, how individuals come together to mobilize, and how they respond to potential and actual constituencies, bystanders and opponents. In this study, I have tried to marry these two bodies of literature—although the emphasis remains on the social movement frameworks. But unlike many social movement literature, where researchers tend to focus on one kind of variable—frames, political opportunity structure, resource structure, ideology, or emotions—I have attempted to emphasize how various kinds of structural processes and institutions—discursive, political, demographic, ideological—interact in differentiated ways to forge divergences and convergences in how one imagines one's group/collective identity: one's obligations to fellow believers (faith or otherwise), fellow citizens, fellow members of communities that do not match up cleanly with territorial and political boundaries.

I discuss each of the four key conceptual variables and their role in leading to divergent constructions of Muslim citizenship next. Three demographic features have mattered for Muslim actors in constructing Muslim citizenship: a) ethnic, racial and sectarian diversity of the Muslim community, b) the presence and size of a native (non-immigrant) Muslim population, and c) the perception of the community within and without as a socio-economically successful community.

In the pre-9/11 context, diversities of race, ethnicity and sect, which characterized the Muslim population in the United States and Canada due to

historical patterns of immigration, created challenges for actors interested in mobilizing a Muslim identity in national public spheres. Debates within the community about which cultural interpretations of practices constituted as Muslim and legitimacy of participating fully in the citizenship of non-Muslim nations characterized the Muslim activist community for some time: the primary contest was centered on whether full (political) participation as citizens in a non-Muslim polity was opposed to the obligations one had to one's faith and the *ummah*. Eventually those arguing for full participation won out, in part due to arguments that pointed out the problematic nature that the socio-economic success of Muslim communities in North America was not matched by an equivalent degree of political success and influence. Desire to influence the politics and perception of the nation regarding themselves and Muslims elsewhere, they drew on the *fiqh* of minorities to legitimize their claims to those in the community who were unsure about how citizenship and their faith linked up. Often, though, their claims and the identity they were hammering out in the processes implied that the motivation to mobilize lay elsewhere—in their faith and the *ummah* outside. However, immigrant children who came of age in their host nation, native-born children in the Muslim community, and the African-American Muslim community challenged the idea that Islam was an immigrant religion and Muslim an immigrant identity, or that the primary reason for its practice lay in faith or the faith community. Instead, this growing population of individuals who were Muslim and American or Muslim and Canadian by birth pressed demands on their own community to think of American Muslim (or Canadian Muslim) as an identity that drew from both what was American (or Canadian) and what was Muslim. In fact, their claims pushed North American Muslim actors to start imagining what American Islam or Canadian Islam meant and could mean. This is the process I described in the second chapter.

In the post-9/11 context, I showed in the third chapter, the demographic diversities that mainstream Muslim actors had attempted to overcome, became a way of challenging a public discourse that implicated all Muslims in acts of violence, terrorism, and suspicion. However, their work in the past decades had

constructed a particular Muslim identity—one that had attempted to include and smooth over certain kinds of differences (ethnic and racial), but one that had inevitably excluded others (ideological and sectarian). While a pre-9/11 Muslim identity discourse emphasized a certain idea of what religiosity and faith looked like, in the post-9/11 context, new Muslim actors emerged that challenged both the apparent orthodoxy of mainstream Muslim discourse, as well as the understanding of the American (or Canadian) nation and citizenship that it narrated. Liberal, secular and progressive Muslims in North America drew on different discourses in different combinations regarding citizenship and Islam than their mainstream counterparts had.

At the heart of the discussion in this study of divergent constructions of Muslim citizenship is the idea that Muslim actors have available to them different discourses from which they can hammer out their answers to "Who are we". Thus, regarding "being a citizen", the various Muslim actors of this study are able to draw on competing ideas about: a) the location of citizenship rights; b) the site at which loyalty to the polity is displayed and shared identity is forged; and c) the place of religion and faith in the practice of citizenship. Regarding "being Muslim", these actors were able to draw on competing ideas about change, secularism, and authority. In the first chapter, I drew out the historical and philosophical sources of these discursive tensions in liberal democratic citizenship and in Islam. In the fourth chapter, I was then able to show the various ways these tensions were negotiated to produce four different clusters of Muslim identity discourses on citizenship and faith: mainstream, liberal, secular and progressive. Each of these collective identities made certain claims about where rights were located for the citizen, how loyalty is displayed, what constitutes the nation they are acting in, what is the place of faith in the public sphere, where religious authority is located, and how change and difference are to be approached and interpreted: in short how to be and act as a "Muslim citizen".

These constructions and mobilizations, however, were not (are not) being carried out in political vacuums by ahistorical actors. The oppositional actors

carried with them activist backgrounds that were not in explicitly Muslim causes: they had been initiated into mobilization in causes related to class, race, ethnicity, feminism. Their experiences had made salient not only their religious, cultural or their citizenship identities but also their ideological identities: liberals, social justice activists, pluralists, leftists, feminists. The importance of the ideological "baggage" of oppositional actors shows up in their failure to construct a single coherent oppositional narrative to the mainstream one: instead, their ideological commitments created further divisions and the construction of multiple forms of Muslim identity discourses on citizenship and faith. Nevertheless, in spite of their differences and its consequences, they shared in common a certain alienating experiences with the Muslim community writ large and especially religious authority, often in part due to exclusions based on differing understandings of what being Muslim meant. This prevented most oppositional actors from finding ways to negotiate their critiques within the confines of the community: instead, their claims, in the presence of a political climate that allowed for them to speak, found their way into the public sphere. In contrast, mainstream Muslim actors had found community through the Muslim community, where experiences of discrimination, inequalities or injustice had been mitigated by the religious community; where doctrines of domination and marginalization had been challenged by a belief in the doctrines of their faith. Their activist experiences were either new, driven by a sense of urgency regarding the attack against their identity, or rooted in other causes that mobilized on a Muslim identity. The divergent actor biographies have led to divergent understandings of what it is to be a Muslim citizen, why one should act, and how one reads the opponents' claims.

However, as I showed in the fifth chapter, how they relate to each other, has been also shaped importantly by the political context in which they are located. American Muslim actors (mainstream and oppositional) find themselves situated in a context which has facilitated the co-opting of the oppositional identity claims by mainstream actors. The lack of institutional allies in the American context as a result of shifts in political opportunities brought about by

9/11 and of histories that have placed multiculturalism outside the formal structure, a citizenship identity that emphasizes national narratives of belonging, and a formal secularism in which religions and religious institutions serve as important mechanisms by which excluded others become American citizens, the dynamic between the various American Muslim actors have been much less polarized. In contrast, both oppositional and mainstream Canadian Muslim actors have found institutional allies, again as a result of political opportunities brought about by 9/11 but also as a result of the differentiated history of citizenship, multiculturalism and secularism in Canada.

Moreover, these divergent contexts have also affected the degree to which Muslim identity discourses have become nationalized in their content. As I show in the fifth chapter also, a larger native Muslim population, a stronger emphasis on national narratives of what constitutes belonging, and an ambivalence about what multiculturalism means in terms of difference, have led to stronger pressures in the American Muslim actor community, whether mainstream or oppositional, to Americanize their constructions of being Muslim to a greater degree than their Canadian counterparts. For the latter, a formalization and normalization of multiculturalism, along with a greater ambivalence about what constitutes the Canadian nation (civic, political or national), and a smaller native Muslim population have led to identity discourses that are not explicitly national or whose claims and referents are not primarily Canadian.

In both situations though, while the content may diverge in the degree of national referents utilized, the goal is to broaden the narrative of the nation: to once again, in the historical accumulation by which citizenship is negotiated, expand the boundaries of who is included not only formally, but whose cultures and histories are recognized as part of the national imaginary. This goal, I argue in the sixth chapter, underscores the consequences of the emergence of identity politics. A context of identity politics has legitimized the quest by mainstream American or Canadian Muslim actors to integrate Muslim or Islamic history,

respectively, into that of the American or Canadian imagination. But, it has also legitimized the counter-claims by oppositional Muslims that these national imaginaries are exclusive about religiosities that do not conform to a certain form of visible orthodoxy—that if a Muslim and Islamic history is to be included into the national imaginary, it needs to be multiple—one that includes the liberal Muslim, the secular Muslim, the progressive Muslim, not only as a secular or progressive or liberal Canadian or American, but explicitly as a liberal Canadian Muslim or a secular American Muslim, and so on.

Finally, if both mainstream and oppositional Muslim actors in North American are working to broaden the boundaries of the national narrative and negotiate the tensions in their faith and in their citizenship, the difficulties they have faced along the way and specially in light of 9/11 reflects also the particular challenge that their transnationality, and others who occupy certain kinds of transnational spaces, places them in. It creates a complex context in which such citizens have to actively reform and inform the "other" identity he/she possesses (Muslim), while simultaneously hold back from asking the nation-state (the US or Canada) to reform and be informed by the other identities which constitutes the citizens of that state. What I argued, then, in the sixth chapter is that nation-states manipulate the transnationality of identity by nationalizing the obligations of a transnational identity. As a result, citizen groups located in transnational spaces are paradoxically further transnationalized—placing them at greater risk of being held suspect by the nation and making more urgent the claims-making work being done by Muslim actors in North America regarding citizenship and faith.

While mainstream and oppositional Muslim actors may find the counter-claims of each other tiring, unhelpful, or even damaging, what the sixth chapter and this study in general I hope highlight is that the contests in the public spheres of Canada and the United States of the Muslim community are part of the struggles that have always characterized the challenging of exclusions instituted in citizenship at any given point in time. To locate them as such allows, I believe, to gain further insight into how collective identities are forged, how

processes of building citizenship and national imaginaries are dynamic and complex. I want to underscore here that while the argument presented in this study is not parsimonious, it overcomes the tendency in much of the literature to focus on strategy or agency over other dimensions of collective identity processes processes that lead to particular representations of American/Canadian Muslims (Karim 2008; Leonard 2003; 2005). As the literature on collective identity processes make evident, collective identities are forged through the *interactions* of complex processes (Tilly 2005); this is what I hope I have shown in this study.

Figure C.1 summarizes the structure of the argument presented in this study. It outlines that divergent constructions of Muslim citizenship, in North America, have been produced by four key structures and processes: actor biography, demographic background, discursive tensions, and political context. These, in turn, are further constituted by particular forces that claims-makers are faced with negotiating.

Figure C.1: Structure of Argument



Finally, I have also attempted to show that it is both naive and dangerous to pay attention to only certain kind of actors and claims-making over others: there are some, including some of my own research subjects, who will be reluctant to take seriously the claims of the oppositional Muslim voices that I showed emerged in the wake of 9/11 as representations and mobilizations of Muslim citizenship. However, these oppositional identity discourses should not be reduced to the label of rhetoric of political opportunists or sell-outs, by reason of *scholarly* interests: These labels are normative valuations of certain activists and ideas, which presuppose what an "activist" is, for what he or she can mobilize, and places a judgement on what is relevant and authentic about identities. These can all be valid judgements for individuals, politicians, activists and communities to make; they cannot, however, be determinant of our work as scholars, if only because in looking at them and analyzing their claims we are able to observe further the kinds of exclusions narratives about citizenship and faith imply, as for example, what I argued in chapter six, that is, these claims challenge the norms liberal democratic nations have about religiosity and what culture looks like when polities value multiculturalism.

Future Directions of Research

There are two directions that this study suggests for future research, which are motivated in part by the limitations of this study. Due to constraints of time and resources, this study constrained itself to look at Muslim actors in North America working at the national stage. There are good reasons for why I limited the questions of this study to national level actors: Because citizenship has, in the modern liberal democratic state, come to be integrally linked to the nation-state, and because conversations about citizenship and Muslims since 9/11 have taken place to a large extent in the national public sphere, I was interested in exactly larger-level efforts to construct national representations by Muslim actors of answers to the question of "Who are we" and what it means to be and act as a Muslim citizen. I also limited this study to comparing the Muslim collective identity discourses in North America. However, it would be beneficial for future

research to compare a) how national level representations and mobilizations about Muslim citizenship links up to local level representations and mobilizations and b) how North American Muslim representations and mobilizations compare to those in other contexts in which one finds Muslim communities and actors.

One reason to compare national vs. local level Muslim identity discourses on citizenship and faith is that we may actually be able to gain insight into how the understanding, practice and negotiation of citizenship differs in national public spheres vs. local public spheres, or how they converge. This could give insight into the body of literature that suggests that we need to study citizenship not at the level of the nation-state but at the level of the city (Bloemraad et al 2008).

Another reason for why comparing local vs. national level conversations and contests about Muslim citizenship would be important would be that, in doing so, one could test the salience of the identity discourses of mainstream, liberal, secular and progressive Muslims that I have identified here. Are these particular to national level discussions and if so why? If not, are there patterns to the power balances and dynamics between the various actors? Does the content of these identity discourses vary by location of the conversation and claims or do they transcend variations in local political and discursive structures? What could explain this? Moreover, these same questions would actually apply in any other comparative context, outside of North America. The arguments here about how political and discursive contexts shape the construction of Muslim citizenship would be able to be deepened and nuanced in the light of a comparative framework that extends beyond the North American case.

Importantly, the comparative framework should be extended to other constructions of collective identity in which citizenship and faith are mapped in liberal democratic states. The arguments presented in this study would gain explanatory power if one were to observe similar patterns of contests in how Jewish citizenship, Catholic citizenship, or Hindu citizenship were or are being constructed and negotiated. Do similar fault lines appear as a result of the common tensions faced by these groups regarding liberal democratic citizenship

or do these vary because of differing tensions in their faith identities to which they negotiate their citizenship or do these vary because of differences in the discursive and political tensions due to differences in when these claims are being made or how they are perceived? Moreover, is there something particular to a faith having a minority status as opposed to a majority status in how it is mapped to citizenship? A comparison of the processes and analyses presented in this study to other attempts at negotiating citizenship and faith would help us abstract out further in how actor biographies, demographic contexts, discursive tensions and political contexts interact to produce divergent understandings and enactments of faithful citizens and their implications for the processes by which national imaginaries are constructed. This is in short, what I have attempted to do by comparing Muslim actors in Canada vs. the United States over a period that included the dramatic catalyst of 9/11.

While this study would gain much by extending the comparison to different faith actors, in other time periods, at varied locations, it has shed light on how competing discourses about citizenship and faith are meaningful and powerful in the production of collective identities. History is powerful not only in the relations that are set up in the process of struggles and contests, but also the ideas that get put in place. They enable the emergence of new identities, which in turn lead to new contests and challenges. This study has opened up further our understanding of collective identity as a product of complex interactions between ideology, biography, demography, and political context and negotiations by actors of competing discourses. Finally, this study has shown us that such contests about collective identity, citizenship and faith are not only relevant for the given group attempting to find their place in a given polity, but also underscore that such 'minority' efforts are crucial to our understanding of what is the actual and potential content and meaning implicated by two powerful shapers of identity and community—citizenship and faith.

Appendix A

Sample of Organizational Actors in This Study

*Positions of respondents refer to what positions they have held in the organization up to or before December 2008.

American Muslim Organizational Actors	Interviewed/Observed Leaders
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA)	Ingrid Mattson (Vice-President, President)
Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)	Maher Hathouth (Co-founder and Senior Advisor) Edina Lekovic (Communication Director and Director of Policy and Programming) Salam Al-Maryat (Executive Director) Safiya Ghori (Government Relations Director) Haris Tarin (Washington D.C. Office Director; Community Development Director) Shazia Kamal (Hate Crime Prevention Coordinator)
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)	Nihad Awad (Co-founder and Excecutive Director) Parvez Ahmed (National Board Chairman) Tahrah Gorya (National Director) Mohammed Nimer (Research Director)
American Islamic Council (AIC)	Zainab Al-Suwajj (Founder and Executive Director)
American Islamic Forum on Democracy (AIFD)	Zuhdi Jasser (Founder)
Progressive Muslims Union of North America (PMUNA)	Omid Safi (co-founder) Farid Esack Khaled Abou-El Fadil
Canadian Muslim Organizational Actors	**Interviewed/Observed Leaders**
Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC)	Mohamed Elmasry (Founder and President) Wahida Valinte (Vice-President and President) Mohamed Sawan (Montreal Regional Director) Imam Zijad Delic (National Executive Director) Hussein Mouftah (Chair of CIC's Regional Directors Commitee)
Council on American-Islamic Relations-Canada (CAIR-CAN)	Sheema Khan (Founder and President()) Faisal Kutty (Legal Counsel and Vice-Chair of CAIR-CAN Board of Directors) Sameer Zuberi (Communications Director)
Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC)	Farzana Hassan (President) Tarek Fatah (Co-founder) Munir Pervez (Communications Director) Kanwar Mafooz (Calgary Regional Representative)

Other Interviewed/Observed Leaders

Shaykh Suhiab Webb (Imam, activist, speaker)
Shaykh Hamza Yusuf (Islamic scholar, teacher, and founder of Zaytuna College (California))
Imam Zaid Shakir (Imam, teacher, faculty at Zaytuna College (California))
Siraj Wahhaj (Imam of Masjid Al-Taqwa in Brooklyn, New York, and AMC Board Member)
Azma Mirza (President of the National Muslim Students' Association)
Idrees Ally (President of MSA, University of Toronto)
Seana Pasic (MSA, University of Toronto

Appendix B

Last Name:_______

First Name _____

Affiliated with:

Contact Information:

A. **Background information on the respondent's relationship to and experiences with the organization.**

1. First, I would like to ask you some questions about your relationship to the name of organization:
    a. What is your present position in this organization?
    b. What is your main responsibility in the name of organization?
    c. How long have you been with the organization?
    d. How did you come to become a member with the organization?
    e. How did you come to occupy your current position in the organization?

2. How would you describe your experience with the name of organization?
    a. Probe on disagreements/debates/conflicts the respondent has engaged in
    b. Probe on positive experiences the respondent has experienced

3. How would you describe your role in the decision-making process in the name of organization?
    a. Probe here on how the respondent thinks decisions are made in the organization
    b. Probe here on how the respondent feels about how decisions are made in the organization

4. How would you describe the relevance of being Muslim in your work with the name of organization?
    a. Probe here on discussions or experiences the respondent may have had during his work with the organization that have underscored issues of 'being' Muslim.
        i. Probe on the frequency and significance of discussions on religious issues among members and leaders?

ii. Probe on the frequency and significance of discussions on diversity in Islam among members and leaders?

B. Questions regarding the organization's goals, procedures and members

1. What have been some of the most important actions taken by your organization in the last 10 years?
    a. Could you please describe to me briefly the goals of Action A?
    b. Could you please describe to me how the organization tried to achieve these goals?
    c. How would you evaluate the outcomes of Action A?

2. What would you say are some of the most important goals of the name of organization at this moment?
    a. Probe here about domestic vs. foreign policy issues
    b. How much agreement do you find there is among members and leaders on these goals?
    c. Probe on long-term and short-term goals
    d. Probe on priority of goals

3. Have the goals of the name of organization changed during your membership and leadership of the organization?
    a. Probe on what has changed
    b. Probe on what the respondent believes has caused these changes

4. How successful do you think the name of organization has been in achieving its goals?

5. What do you believe has contributed to the successes of the name of organization?

6. What are some of the biggest challenges currently faced by the name of organization? And in the Canadian Muslim community?

a. Do these challenges differ from previous years?
b. What are some of the ways the organization can face these challenges?
c. How much agreement do you find there is among members and leaders on how to face these challenges?

WHAT makes CAIR-CAN unique among Muslim civil society actors?

→ Quebec vs. rest of Canada?

→ How would you describe the political and social environment that Canadian Muslims face? (Changes?)

7. How representative of the Muslim communities in America/Canada do you find the name of organization is?
    a. Probe here on who can become members
    b. Probe here on who becomes members
    c. Probe here on how often community Muslim groups work with the organization.

8. How does the name of organization try to ensure representation?
    a. Probe here on what participatory processes the organization has
    b. Probe here on the role of newsletters and other publications published for members
        i. Probe here on the way decisions are made about the content of such material.
    c. Probe here on how annual gatherings and organizational events are organized and advertised to members

9. How important do you think the name of organization is for its members?
    a. Probe here on the ways members participate in the organization

10. How would you describe the leadership of the name of organization?
    a. Probe here on the formal and informal procedures by which leaders and positions are determined in the organization
    b. Probe here on the role of ethnicity, religiosity, political experience, educational experience, professional experience, expertise in other fields that may play into who tends to lead in what positions
    c. Probe here on what kind of social skills are valued in leaders and by leaders in the organization

11. Who would you identify as important figures for the Muslim community in America/Canada?
    a. In the organization?
    b. Outside of the organization?
    c. Outside of America/Canada?

C. Questions regarding Islam and Muslims in relation to the organization.

1. In what ways is Islam important for the name of organization?
    a. Probe here on the position of the organization towards the ideas of "secular Muslims", "cultural Muslims"

2. What role, if any, do religious figures play in the organization?
    a. Probe here on if religious figures are invited to public events organized by the organization
        i. Why or why not?
    b. Probe on the role of mosques for organizational events and practices

3. Would you say the name of organization is a Muslim or an Islamic organization?
    a. Probe here on why the group has chosen Islamic or Muslim as its name
    b. Probe here on what kind of an organization the respondent sees his/her organization as.

4. What do you believe has been the impact of 9/11 for your organization?

5. How do you believe the organization has tried to deal with the consequences of 9/11?

6. What other political events do you believe have had important impacts for your organization?

    a. How have they affected the organization?

b. How has the organization dealt with these events?

D. Information on the relationship of the organization to other institutions and organizations

1. How would you describe the relationship of the name of organization to the American/Canadian government?
    a. How often do you work with the government?
    b. How do you work with the government?
        i. Probe here on who and what kinds of governmental bodies/people—stable relations or more transitory purposive relations.
        ii. Probe here on what kind of projects, issues.

2. How would you describe the relationship of the name of organization to other American/Canadian Muslim organizations?
    a. Which Muslim organizations has the name of organization worked with?
        i. Probe here on what kind of projects, issues.
        ii. Probe here on whether the organization works with mosques.
    b. How is it decided who to work with?
    c. Are there Muslim organizations that name of organization would find more difficult to work with?
    d. Are there Muslim organizations that name of organization finds easier to work with?

3. How would you describe the relationship of the name of organization to other American/Canadian ethnic organizations?
    a. Which ethnic/cultural organizations has the name of organization worked with?
        i. Probe here on what kind of projects, issues.
    b. How is it decided who to work with?

c. Are there ethnic/cultural organizations that name of organization would find more difficult to work with?
d. Are there ethnic/cultural organizations that name of organization finds easier to work with?

4. How would you describe the relationship of the name of organization to other American/Canadian religious organizations?
    a. Which religious organizations has the name of organization worked with?
        i. Probe here on what kind of projects, issues.
    b. How is it decided who to work with?
    c. Are there religious organizations that name of organization would find more difficult to work with?
    d. Are there religious organizations that name of organization finds easier to work with?

5. How would you describe the relationship of the name of organization international organizations?
    a. Which international organizations has the name of organization worked with?
        i. Probe here on what kind of projects, issues.
    b. How is it decided who to work with?
    c. Are there international organizations that name of organization would find more difficult to work with?
    d. Are there international organizations that name of organization finds easier to work with?

SPECIFICALLY WITH CAIR US?

E. Questions on the participation of respondent with other Muslim organizations

This part of the interview will be conducted only if the respondent feels comfortable with sharing the information. I will remind the respondent at this point again, that if he/she feels uncomfortable about answering the following questions, they can refuse to answer the questions as was stated in the consent form. I will let the respondent know at this point in the interview that I am asking these questions just to understand the background and trajectories of how these national advocacy groups have come to be: all information from this part of the interview will be coded to quantitative data for statistical analysis—no individual's specific information will be published. After coding, identifying information for these questions will be removed as soon as possible. I believe it can contribute to a much better understanding of the processes of identity politics.

1. Are you currently a member of any other Muslim organizations in the United States or Canada?

   [**IF YES]**

   a. Could you please tell me which ones?
   b. What is your position in the organization A?
   c. How long have you been with organization A?
   d. How did you come to become a member with the organization?

   [**IF NO]**

   e. Would you consider joining any other Muslim organizations in the near future while you are still part of the name of organization?
   f. What kind of organizations would you consider?

2. Have you ever been a member of any other Muslim organizations in the United States or Canada?

   a. Could you please tell me which ones?
   b. What was your position in the organization A?

c. How long were you with organization A?
d. How did you come to become a member with the organization?
e. How did you come to leave the organization?

3. Are you currently a member of any other Muslim organizations outside of the United States and Canada?

   [**IF YES]**

   a. Could you please tell me which ones?
   b. What is your position in the organization A?
   c. How long have you been with organization A?
   d. How did you come to become a member with the organization?

   [**IF NO]**

   e. Would you consider joining any other Muslim organizations in the near future while you are still part of the name of organization?
   f. What kind of organizations would you consider?

4. Have you ever been a member of any other Muslim organizations outside of the United States or Canada?
   a. Could you please tell me which ones?
   b. What was your position in the organization A?
   c. How long were you with organization A?
   d. How did you come to become a member with the organization?
   e. How did you come to leave the organization?

5. Are you currently a member of any other Muslim organization outside of the United States or Canada?
   a. Could you please tell me which ones?
   b. What is your position in the organization A?
   c. How long you been with organization A?
   d. How did you come to become a member with the organization?

E. Background information on the respondent

1. When were you born?

2. Where were you born?

    a. Probe here on whether respondent was an immigrant to Americ/Canada and if so what was his/her experience.

3. What is your citizenship?

4. What is your educational background?

5. What is your current occupation?

    a. Probe here with what is his/her professional background.

6. What is your ethnic background?

7. How would you describe your religious background?

8. What is your marital status?

9. Are you currently a member of any other kinds of organizations in the United States or Canada?
    a. Could you please tell me which ones?
    b. What is your position in the organization A?
    c. How long have you been with organization A?
    d. How did you come to become a member with the organization?

10. Have you ever been a member of any other organization in the United States or Canada?
    a. Could you please tell me which ones?
    b. What was your position in the organization A?
    c. How long were you with organization A?
    d. How did you come to become a member with the organization?
    e. How did you come to leave the organization?

Is there something I have not covered that you would like to bring up regarding claims-making by Muslims in Canada (and the United States)?

Appendix C

RESEARCH CONSENT FORM
MCGILL UNIVERSITY

Title of Research: ***Collective Identity Claims-Making by Muslim Organizations in the United States and Canada***

Researcher: Sara Nuzhat Amin, doctoral candidate
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Purpose of research: This study explores how national Muslim organizations in Canada and the United States are mobilizing Muslim identities in the public sphere and what is the content of these identities. I look at six national political advocacy Muslim organizations to forge Muslim collectivities and claim representation of a Muslim polity. I ask how and why do the collective answers by these organizations to the question of "Who are we Muslims?" emerge, diverge, converge, and change? I use interviews of organizational leaders, invited keynote speakers and leading affiliates, along with observations of organizational conferences and strategic meetings, to understand what explains the variation within and between these organizations in the collective identity they voice over time. The two Canadian organizations are the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) and the Muslim Canadian Congress (MCC). The three American organizations are the American Muslim Alliance (AMA), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and the American Islamic Congress (AIC). In addition, I look at both national chapters of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). Finally, I also interview leaders of Muslim Students' Association at different locations with large Muslim populations. The research will be used in publications and a dissertation by Sara Nuzhat Amin.

What is involved in participating: A recorded interview consisting of questions about your experiences as a member of name of organization and its activities and goals. The interview will last approximately 1.5-2 hours. Your participation is completely voluntary and you may decline to answer any questions or terminate the interview at any time. This study is a sociological account of the public statements of North American Muslim organizations as well as the various processes by which such identity statements are determined. Therefore, I would like to use the names of the participants in the study. However, I do not need to use the names of all interviewees. You may choose to conduct your interview such that the information in the interview will not be directly associated with your name. Please be aware that I will not use your name in any publication if you so choose; however, since the community of Muslim leaders is a relatively small community, please be aware of limits of confidentiality. For all interviews, no one will have access to any interview materials except me and my dissertation committee.

Consent: I have read the above information and I agree to participate in this study.

____ I wish to remain unidentified in all publications.
____ You have my permission to use my name as having contributed but do not associate me with particular statements.
____ You have my permission to use my name and identify it with particular statements, under the condition that I will be able to see which comments are used prior to publication.
____ You have my permission to use my name and identify it with particular statements.
____ I agree to have this interview recorded.

Participant's Signature: _____ Date: _____

Researcher's Signature: _____ Date: _____

Appendix D

Press Communiqués:

For each organization: Press releases 2000-2008 as archived by the organization. Any joint press releases by organizations will only be counted once. I will collect per year, for each organization, a sample of 15 per year. Prior to sampling, total counts will check for variations in frequency of press releases by month and year (e.g., September and October 2001 may have high counts of press releases by all organizations compared to July 2001 or July 2005). In each year, for each organization, press releases will be sampled proportionally to these counts. Final results will weigh in the variations in the counts.

Op-ed pieces by organizational leaders, identifying themselves as representing their specific organization: 2000-2008 in any one of the following national newspapers: *New York Times, Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, The Globe and Mail, The National Post and La Presse*.

Organizational Events:

For each organization:

- Annual Convention Final Programs 2000-2008 (archived for each organization)
    - The MCC and the AIC have had no annual convention
    - The CIC, CAIR have one per year.
    - The AMA will have its 3rd annual convention in 2007
    - ISNA and ISNA-Canada Annual Conventions

- Annual conventions news reports in a national newspaper (*New York Times, Los Angeles Times, The Washington Post, The Globe and Mail, The National Post, La Presse*): maximum of 1/newspaper/event before event and 1/newspaper/event after event, for a total of 2/newspaper/event for each organization in the period of 2000-2008.

- Action Alerts, Ad Campaigns, Research Projects, Strategic Meetings, in the 2000-2008 period. These vary by organizations as to whether they choose to initiate these kinds of events or not. As dialogic analysis

suggest, the choice of repertoire of presenting can be important, as is obviously the content of the discourse.

- For example, CAIR's "Muslims in America" Ad Campaign, where they took out a whole page in a range of national newspapers, is certainly relevant in examining the content of what Muslim identity is being mobilized.
- Or, for example, Action Alert Campaigns, utilized by the MPAC, CAIR and CIC, but not AMA, AIC and the MCC, are also relevant, since Action Alerts narrate what constitutes as a reason for 'we' to act.
- Research projects initiated by organizations: e.g. giving grade reports to candidates (CIC), the financial network analysis of oppositional organizational leaders to foreign countries (MCC), surveys organized by CAIR or the AMA, or interfaith conferences set up by the MPAC, the MCC or the Iraq Reconstruction Initiative by AIC.

Magazines, Newsletters and Other Publications:

Each magazine sent to subscribers over the period of 2000-2008 for:

- CIC: *The Friday Magazine* (weekly)

The AMA, MPAC, CAIR, CAIR-CAN, PUMNA and the MCC do not have weekly magazines:

- The AMA has E-letters, which are, on average, produced bi-weekly.
- MPAC has a book series and also issues booklets. In the MPAC website, they describe these publications as a "cornerstone of MPAC's work" which "address controversial religious issues, challenges to identity formation and the role of Muslims within American Society." MPAC also produces a newsletter which is not produced with any regular frequency.
- CAIR and CAIR-CAN have weekly newsletters, which has a similar form to the CIC *Friday Magazine*.
- The MCC has an online discussion forum, to which all members have access. In it any member: may initiate

discussion on any topic relevant to the mission statement of the organization, may respond to any opinion or idea or question raised by a fellow member or to an external event (relevant to the mission statement of the organization, whose interpretation is often broadly applied, which is itself important in this study), and finally, may suggest modes of action for the organization (including the direction an op-ed piece should take e.g.), which is then voted on to decide which action will actually be taken.

- The PUMNA had an online forum that was archived as well as did public discussions on NPR (National Public Radio) and published the book *Progressive Muslims* (2003).
- The AIC produces series of publications it distributes to Muslims as well as the public at large. This is similar to the MPAC book series, but generally the publications tend to be structured as guides and short action-guide documents rather than as (research) books produced by MPAC. The AIC also has a monthly newsletter.

Glossary of Foreign Terms

*Adapted from the *Glossary of Foreign Terms* in *Muslims' Place in the American Public Square: Hope, Fears, and Aspirations* (Bukhari et al 2004: vii-x).

adl. Justice

al-din. Quaranic faith in God

alim (pl. Alims or ulema). Islamic scholar. Commonly used for someone who has a thorough knowledge of Islam and its sources—the Quran and the Sunnah.

al-munafiqun. Quaranic term for hypocrites.

dar al-dawah. The land where Islam is propagated.

dar al-harb. The land of war.

dar al-ijabah. The land of compliance.

dar-al-Islam. The land of Islam.

dar al-muahadah. The land of trade.

dawah. Muslim propagation of their religion.

dhan (azzan). Call to prayer.

faqih. A specialist in Islamic jurisprudence **(fiqh).**

fatwa. A juristic opinion given by an alim, mufti, mujathid, or faqih on any matter pertinent to Islamic law.

fiqh. Literally, understanding; knowledge of Islam through its laws; science of the law of Islam. The term fiqh is to a large extent the product of human endeavour; the Shariah is closely related to divine Revelation and knowledge that is only obtained from the Quran and the Sunnah.

hadith. This is the oral form of the Prophetic tradition that combined with his actions in life to form the Sunnah. When the term is capitalized, it applies to the sciences dealing with the Prophet's tradition in all its aspects

hajj. A pilgrimage to Mecca.

halal. That which is lawful (legal and allowed), as distinguished from ***haram***, that which is unlawful.

hudud. Islamic penal code regarding criminal matters.

hukm. The rationale behind the legal reasoning for fatwa issued by a faqih.

ijma. The Islamic jurisprudential term relating to consensus of the Muslim community on matters relating to the teachings and practice of their faith.

ijtihad. Considering that the accepted juridical sources of Islam are valid for all time and space, ijtihad may be described as a creative but disciplined intellectual effort to derive legal rulings from those sources while taking into consideration the variables imposed by the fluctuating circumstances of Muslim society.

jihad. A Quaranic term that means struggle for spiritual development , on the one hand, and resistance to injustice through armed struggle, on the other.

Juma (jummah). Friday community prayer that Muslims offer weekly.

khutbah. A sermon delivered by an imam or khatib during Friday prayers

kufir (kafir). An Islamic term for "unbeliever"

madhabs. The schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

madrasa. Muslim schools where young people are trained in Islamic sciences.

masjid. Mosque

maslaha. A term in Islamic jurisprudence that deals with the principles of social harmony.

mizan. Balance.

mujtahid. The Muslim scholar who is sufficiently knowledgeable in Islamic law to issue a fatwa (ruling) after going through the process of ijtihad.

salat. Muslim prayer that is performed five times daily.

shahadah. An affirmation of belief in God and in the mission of Prophet Muhammad. Anyone who makes such a declaration in the presence of Muslim witnesses is a Muslim.

shar'iah. The collective name for all the laws of Islam. It includes all the religious, liturgical, ethical, and jurisprudential systems.

shura (sura). A Quaranic term that denotes the application of the principles of consultation in decision making among Muslims.

Sunnah. Literally, "a clear path or beaten path." Referred to whatever the Prophet said, did, agreed to, or condemned. The Sunnah is the second source of the Shariah after the Qu'ran.

taqlid. Uncritical adoption or imitation and following of a particular scholar or school of thought.

tawhid. The act of affirming that Allah is the One and only God, the absolute, transcendent, Creator, the Lord, and Master of the worlds.

ummah. A Quranic term that describes the community of Muslims.

usul al-fiqh. The science of Islamic jurisprudence, philosophy of law; the methodology of deriving laws from the sources of Islam and of establishing their juristic and constitutional validity.

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