WHERE DID EVERYONE GO?
SOCIAL MOVEMENT DEMOBILIZATION
IN UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

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ABSTRACT

Mass mobilizations are uplifting and powerful events. However, we still know little about how, why, and when such mobilizations unravel or what if any lasting consequences they have for civil society once they end. In this dissertation, I investigate the complex aftermath of mass movements by looking at their demobilization periods and their effects on civil society. This demobilization process involves a decline in both protest activities organized by social movement organizations (SMOs) and number of activists over time, combined with a reduction in the movement's societal resonance.

Throughout this thesis, I make two related arguments. I first contend that social movements demobilize when ordinary people lose interest in them, reflected in an acceleration of the disengagement of rank-and-file protesters and contraction in a movement's societal resonance. SMOs and their leaders do not initiate the demobilization process; instead, they must decide how to respond to it once it begins to occur. Second, I argue that while SMO leaders cannot prevent demobilization from occurring, their choices determine which form(s) demobilization will take – radicalization, institutionalization, abeyance, and/or disappearance. These forms, in turn, have different implications for post-mobilization civil society. While disappearance and radicalization tend to yield negative outcomes, especially in terms of the movement's societal acceptance, institutionalization and abeyance may enable ongoing cooperation among former protestors and leave more resources for future mobilizations. However, as social movement demobilization is an evolving process, the timing and interaction of these choices may also result in disunity, polarization, and marginalization. These arguments go against the conventional wisdom that social movements are intrinsically productive, with each episode a learning process that helps to further consolidate civil society.

I make these arguments through a comparison of the demobilization processes of two post-Soviet social movements: The Ukrainian Orange Revolution (2004), in which mass mobilization succeeded in reaching its short-term political objectives, and the Russian movement "For Fair Elections" (2011-12), in which mobilization occurred but failed to meet its goals. Both in Ukraine and Russia, demobilization had unintended and problematic consequences for civil society. While Ukrainian civil society had taken important steps toward consolidation *before* the Orange Revolution, the fact that key leaders and groups were coopted *during* the movement affected their capacity to institutionalize afterward, leaving Orange SMOs largely marginalized. In Russia, part of the movement *For Fair Elections* first demobilized through limited radicalization while another part demobilized through a premature departure into formal politics, distracted by the regime's feigned openness to such participation. These two different choices hindered the movement's later attempt to institutionalize, placing the movement in abeyance by default and leaving ambiguous results for civil society. My method combines a process-tracing approach with protest event analysis, for which I constructed an original database of over 3500 protest events based on Russian and Ukrainian newspapers and wire reports.

RÉSUMÉ

Les mobilisations de masses sont des évènements inspirants et exaltants. Pourtant, les modalités de la démobilisation et ses conséquences potentielles pour les sociétés civiles sont encore très peu connues. Dans cette thèse, j'étudie les lendemains complexes des mouvements de protestation en analysant leur période de démobilisation et leurs effets sur les sociétés civiles. La démobilisation renvoie non seulement à une réduction des activités de protestation organisées par les organisations des mouvements sociaux (OMS) (niveau méso) et du nombre d'activistes dans le temps (niveau micro), mais également à un affaiblissement de la résonance sociétale du mouvement (niveau macro).

Deux arguments principaux sont développés dans cette thèse. Je soutiens d'abord que les mouvements sociaux se démobilisent lorsqu'ils perdent de leurs intérêts pour les citoyens ordinaires, ce qui se reflète dans le désengagement croissant des manifestants ainsi que dans l'affaiblissement de la résonance sociétale du mouvement. Ainsi, bien que les OMS et leurs leaders ne soient pas les acteurs qui amorcent le processus de démobilisation, ils doivent toutefois décider de la façon d'y répondre lorsque celui-ci commence. Deuxièmement, je soutiens que malgré leur incapacité à empêcher la démobilisation, les leaders des OMS déterminent par leurs choix la ou les forme(s) que la démobilisation prendra – radicalisation, institutionnalisation, rémanence (*abeyance*) ou disparition. Ces formes ont quant à elles des implications différentes pour les sociétés civiles post-mobilisations. Alors que la radicalisation et la disparition engendrent la plupart du temps des conséquences négatives, notamment à l'égard de l'acceptation sociétale du mouvement, l'institutionnalisation et la rémanence peuvent mener à une coopération durable entre les anciens protagonistes du mouvement et apporter de nouvelles ressources pour les mobilisations futures. Or, comme la démobilisation est un processus évolutif, la synchronisation et l'interaction de ces formes peuvent aussi entraîner une plus grande désunion, voire une polarisation ou une marginalisation de la société civile. Ces arguments remettent donc en question l'idée communément admise selon laquelle les mobilisations sont invariablement bénéfiques, chacune d'elles constituant une expérience d'apprentissage qui consolide la société civile.

Pour étayer ces arguments, je m'appuie sur une étude comparative des processus de démobilisation de deux mouvements sociaux postsoviétiques : la Révolution orange ukrainienne (2004), au cours de laquelle des mobilisations de masses ont réussi à atteindre leurs objectifs immédiats, et le mouvement russe « Pour des élections honnêtes » (2011-12), qui n'a pas réussi à atteindre ses buts à court terme. Tant en Ukraine qu'en Russie, la démobilisation a ainsi eu des conséquences inattendues. Si la société civile ukrainienne affichait un certain degré de consolidation avant la Révolution orange, la cooptation précoce d'OMS par l'opposition politique a affecté leur capacité de s'institutionnaliser, laissant les OMS du camp orange en grande partie marginalisées. En Russie, alors qu'une partie du mouvement prenait la voie d'une radicalisation limitée, une autre a plutôt investi l'arène politique formelle, se laissant distraire par l'ouverture superficielle du régime à cet égard. Ces deux choix différents ont compromis la tentative subséquente d'institutionnalisation du mouvement, le plaçant ainsi dans un état de rémanence par défaut et laissant des résultats ambigus pour la société civile. Ma méthode combine une approche de reconstitution des processus (*process tracing*) à une analyse des évènements de protestations (*protest event analysis*) pour laquelle j'ai construit une base de données originale qui compte actuellement près de 3 500 évènements de protestations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LISTS OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

Figures

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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

I have transliterated Russian and Ukrainian words using the Library of Congress system (ALA-LC) without using diacritics throughout the dissertation, except for commonly accepted English words and names, such as Yanukovich instead of Ianukovich or Yushchenko instead of Iushchenko. Unless otherwise specified, all translations from Russian and Ukrainian are my own.

Mass mobilizations are uplifting and powerful events. They can transform passive and atomized individuals into active protesters who temporarily put aside differences for the sake of a greater cause. However, we know little about how, why, and when such mobilizations unravel or what if any lasting consequences they have for civil society once they end (Koopmans 2004, Fillieule 2015). As Tilly and Tarrow (2015) recently noted, "From decades of research on social movements, we know a great deal about the conditions and dynamics of mobilization, but we know far less about how contentious actors demobilize" (p. 127).

Often celebrated *ex ante* as the 'triumph of civil society', social movements leave behind a variety of political and societal consequences (Bosi *et al*. 2016). Yet there is a common assumption that mobilization is intrinsically productive, with each episode a learning process that helps to further consolidate civil society. For example, in the enthusiasm brought by the initial success of the 2004 Ukrainian Orange Revolution, Diuk (2006) argued that, "This type of protest creates a qualitatively new kind of civil society, one that transcends the need for a connection with the state or government because it has its own form of self-organization" (p. 81). In the aftermath of the Russian 2011-12 movement *Za chestnye vybory* (For Fair Elections, hereafter FFE), Lanskoy and Suthers (2013) stressed that despite the increased repression faced by opposition groups, "the experience of uniting and coordinating during the protest movement brought significant benefits. By working with a broad range of civic activists and other political parties, they learned to be more responsive to the movement as a whole" (p. 83). It is not always clear, however, whether and how these optimistic assumptions are borne out empirically. As Howard (2011) argues, citing post-communist Europe as prime example, revolutionary periods can also lead to people deserting the streets and disengaging from civic organizations, "leaving their societies largely passive and depoliticized" (p. 134). To address this uncertainty, I investigate the demobilization of mass protest movements in the complex aftermath of the Orange Revolution and the Russian movement FFE.

Part of the wave of color revolutions that spread across the region in the mid-2000s[1], the Orange Revolution was a series of mass protests that occurred in Ukraine in the fall of 2004, during the presidential election campaign pitting Viktor Yanukovich (the chosen successor of the incumbent, Russia-aligned candidate) against Viktor Yushchenko (the pro-Western candidate of the unified opposition). In the disputed second round held on November 21, 2004, in which exit polls predicted a clear victory for Yushchenko, the Central Election Commission of Ukraine instead announced Yanukovich's victory. The political opposition, supported by many civil society actors, immediately organized a popular movement (adopting the color Orange as its main symbol) to contest the election results, attracting broad domestic and international resonance. Following previous patterns that proved to be successful in other post-communist countries, such as in Serbia (2000) and in Georgia (2003), Ukrainian youth groups were particularly active in the movement. During the peak of the Orange Revolution, large-scale and festive demonstrations were held every day in the capital of Kyiv, on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), as well as in many regional cities. Other protest actions were also common, including tent cities, pickets, occupations, and student and factory strikes. In the heyday of the Revolution, close to one million Ukrainians took part. On December 3, the Ukrainian Supreme Court anulled the results of the second round and scheduled a third round for December 26. Yushchenko won the new runoff election with about 52 percent of the vote and was inaugurated January 23, 2005, officially becoming the third president of Ukraine. This marked the end of the Orange Revolution, widely proclaimed to represent a successful case of civil society mobilization[2].

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[1] The 'color revolutions' expression refers to the popular upheavals that occurred in Serbia (the Bulldozer revolution – 2000), Georgia (the Rose revolution – 2003), Ukraine (the Orange Revolution – 2004) and Kyrgyzstan (the Tulip revolution – 2005), which by following a similar logic, brought changes to the ruling political elite of these countries. As Tucker (2007) stresses, although the 'color revolutions' has become a popular expression among specialists and journalists, "[t]he use of the word 'revolution' is not meant to imply any long-term consequences of these events, but rather only to identify that the anti-regime forces were in fact successful in overthrowing the current regime" (p. 536).

[2] Among the major works on the topic, see for example Kuzio 2005a 2005b, McFaul 2005, Åslund & McFaul 2006, Hale 2006, Wilson 2006, Beissinger 2007, Tucker 2007, Way 2008, Zherebkin 2009, Ó Beacháin & Polese 2010, D'Anieri 2006, Bunce & Wolchik 2011 or Onuch 2014.

Following the parliamentary elections in December 2011, in which United Russia (the political party established by Vladimir Putin's regime) won the majority of seats in the Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), protest events took place denouncing electoral fraud. Initially only comprising a few thousand protestors in Moscow, the FFE movement rapidly increased in scale and scope. Eventually, more than a hundred thousand people would gather in the streets of Moscow for mass demonstrations, while tens of thousands would protest in various regional cities. Over the course of about three months, many smaller protest events were also organized, including flashmobs, sit-ins, pickets, and hunger strikes. As with the Orange Revolution, the Russian movement adopted a color as its main symbol (the white ribbon). Aside from its massive size and broad resonance, one of the biggest novelties of the FFE movement was that many ideologically diverse social and political groups came together to form coalitions and participate in the movement against the regime. After March 4, 2012, when Vladimir Putin won back the presidency, the FFE movement began to run out of steam. Nonetheless, mobilization continued for several months before being met with growing repression. The eve of Vladimir Putin's inauguration, May 6, marked a turning point in that regard, with violent confrontations occurring between the police and the protesters. Several arrests and convictions followed in what is now known as the 'Bolotnoe' case. The movement organized other mass events, in particular on June 12 and September 15, 2012, but its heyday was clearly over. Despite limited electoral reforms announced by the Kremlin during the peak of the movement, the FFE movement failed to achieve its most important objective: the annulment of the 2011 parliamentary elections and the organization of new elections[3].

Both mobilizations surprised many observers, as they challenged the common assumption that post-Soviet civil societies were rather weak. Several authors had previously noted the weakness of civil society in the post-Soviet region as a whole, especially compared with other regions in the world (see for example, Crowley 1997, Kubicek 2002, Howard 2003, Valkov 2009). In particular, Howard (2003) emphasized the legacy of the Soviet period as negatively affecting the level of engagement and trust toward public activities in post-communist countries. In both

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[3] Among the major works on the topic, see for example Bikbov 2012, Clément 2012, Merlin & Brenez 2012, de Tinguy 2012, Aron 2013, Greene 2013, Robertson 2013, Smyth *et al*. 2013, Volkov 2013, Chaisty & Whitefield 2013, Dmitriev 2015, Gel'man 2015a, Sakwa 2015, Lankina 2015 or Sobolev 2015.

Ukraine and Russia, however, mass mobilizations unexpectedly occurred, which seemed to represent at first glance an important rupture with the weak civil society thesis.

The Research Question

In this dissertation, I look at the societal consequences of social movements in non-democratic regimes. My main aim is not to explain *why* demobilization occurs given that every social movement must inevitably demobilize; rather, it is to understand *how* large-scale mobilizations devolve into relative societal quiescence. Instead of being treated as an outcome, demobilization is thus considered here as a *process* that embodies various forms at different points in time. In addition, whereas the literature often considers a strong civil society as a prerequisite for social movements, it often neglects to examine how social movements themselves affect the subsequent state of civil society. My approach echoes della Porta and Diani's (2011) call for more interaction between social movement and civil society studies. It also builds on Grey and Sawer's (2008) advice on "not only examining movements when they are most visible, public and widespread, but also looking at continuing activity and lasting legacies (p. 2)".

For analytical purposes, I break down the overarching research question into two components and address them sequentially. First, I ask *what is demobilization and how do we know when it occurs?* As will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter, I define demobilization as a process that involves a decline in both protest activities and number of activists over time, combined with a reduction in the movement's societal resonance. I apply this definition to the two social movements under study to measure demobilization processes using protest event analysis (PEA). Relying on newspapers or other primary sources to select protest events, PEA is a type of content analysis that enables many aspects of protest activity to be quantified, such as timing, location, demands, size, event types, etc. (Koopmans & Rucht 2002, p. 231). This process involves the building of large datasets on social movements, which can cover different time periods and geographic zones. Statistical analyses are then performed in order to visualize the evolution of protest movements along various dimensions.

Second, I ask *what different forms can demobilization take and what effects do they have on post-movement civil society*? While different forms of demobilization are often referenced in the literature, such as institutionalization, radicalization, abeyance, and disappearance, there is a need for conceptual clarity on how these forms translate into practice. Authors tend to associate successful cases of mobilization with the institutionalization of social movements, which occurs when movement ideas, causes or actors become more embedded in the formal decision-making process and/or in society in general. Often viewed as the counterpart of institutionalization, radicalization refers to the fragmentation of broad movements into smaller but very committed factions, ready to use more direct and violent actions as opposed to just demonstrative actions. In the literature, regime repression and movement failure are often identified as conditions that lead to radicalization. In turn, abeyance relates to movements that consciously retreat from street activism in order to concentrate on basic survival, especially under unfavorable political conditions. Finally, the literature on social movements often implies the end or death of social movements, suggesting that movements can simply disappear without leaving any significant offspring. I discuss each of these forms further in the next chapter, where I also present specific indicators for studying them through process tracing analysis.

The Argument

Throughout this thesis, I make two related arguments. I first contend that social movements demobilize when ordinary people lose interest in them, reflected in an acceleration of the disengagement of rank-and-file protesters and contraction in a movement's societal resonance. Social movement organizations (SMOs) and their leaders do not initiate the demobilization process; instead, they must decide how to respond to it once it begins to occur.

Second, I argue that while SMO leaders cannot prevent demobilization from occurring, their choices determine which form(s) demobilization will take – radicalization, institutionalization, abeyance, and/or disappearance. These forms, in turn, have different implications for post-mobilization civil society. While disappearance and radicalization tend to yield negative outcomes, especially in terms of the movement's societal acceptance, institutionalization and abeyance may enable ongoing cooperation among former protestors and leave more resources for

future mobilizations. However, as social movement demobilization is an evolving process, the timing and interaction of these choices, in particular between radicalization and institutionalization, may also result in disunity, polarization, and marginalization.

I make these arguments through a comparison of the demobilization processes of two post-Soviet social movements: The Orange Revolution, in which mass mobilization succeeded in reaching its short-term objectives, and the Russian movement *For Fair Elections* (FFE), in which mobilization occurred but failed to meet its goals. Comparing these two cases enables me to test the alternative explanation that the short-term outcome of mobilization (success/failure) rather than SMO leaders' choices explains the forms that demobilization takes after a period of contention. As mentioned above, institutionalization is usually associated with movement success while radicalization is thought to be indicative of failure. Nonetheless, as no one has yet proposed a clear causal mechanism regarding how success and failure affect demobilization across cases, I do not assume that this relationship holds. Cross-case comparisons provide an opportunity to examine whether the demobilization processes at work after successful mobilizations are also at work in the case of failure.

Both in Ukraine and Russia, demobilization had unintended and problematic consequences for civil society. While Ukrainian civil society had taken important steps toward consolidation *before* the Orange Revolution, the fact that key leaders and groups were coopted *during* the movement affected their capacity to institutionalize afterward, leaving Orange SMOs largely marginalized. As a result of limited radicalization and internal struggles, civil society did not strengthen after the Orange Revolution despite all the expectations brought by the event. In Russia, part of the FFE movement first demobilized through limited radicalization while another part demobilized through a premature departure into formal politics, distracted by the regime's feigned openness to such participation. These two different choices hindered the movement's later attempt to institutionalize, placing the movement in abeyance by default and leaving ambiguous results for civil society. Contrary to the argument that social movements have the power to "change everything" (Van Gelder 2011), the results of this research instead show that mass mobilizations do not necessarily translate into invigorated civil societies, and this holds whether or not the social movement succeeds in achieving its immediate, short-term goals.

My arguments respect the agency of SMO leaders despite the often restricted political environments in non-democratic regimes, or what has been called political opportunity structures in the social movement literature (Kriesi *et al*. 1995, Tarrow 1998, Meyer 2004, Osa & Schock 2007). Elite divisions, the presence of formal allies, growing political repression, and economic upheaval can all affect the course of a movement. In particular, regime repression in the aftermath of the FFE movement in Russia surely affected civil society actors' room for maneuver. But while restricted political opportunities limit the choices and possibilities available to social movements, they do not determine them entirely. As Piven and Cloward (1977) noted, "within the boundaries created by these limitations some latitude for purposive effort remains. Organizers and leaders choose to do one thing, or they choose to do another, and what they choose to do affects to some degree the course of the protest movement" (p. 37). Thus, movement leaders engage with and react to changes in political opportunities; they are active agents who choose different strategies and frames for their movements, producing an iterative process of interactions between the state and its challengers (McAdam *et al*. 1996, McAdam *et al*. 2001, Nepstad & Bob 2006). Social movement scholars tend to explore this iterative process only in the initial, mobilization phase of a cycle of contention (see Sawyer & Meyer 1999 and Nepstad 2004 for exceptions). In this dissertation, I apply this relational approach to social movements' demobilization periods. Because the political opportunity structures were significantly different after the Orange Revolution and the FFE movement (more open in Ukraine than in Russia), we would expect divergence in the forms and outcomes of demobilization as well.

These two cases also lend themselves to within-case analysis. For example, Ukraine experienced another significant mass mobilization after the Orange Revolution, known as the Euromaidan. Russia, however, has remained characterized by low political activism until very recently. These within-case variations allow me to examine whether or not the nature of earlier demobilization processes can help to explain these different outcomes in the long run.

Civil Society and Social Movements

Definitions and Assumptions

Before reviewing the literature on demobilization, I must clarify other key concepts used in this dissertation, especially those of civil society and social movements. In the democratization literature, a flourishing civil society is often considered as one of the main requirements for consolidating democracy (Cohen & Arato 1994, Diamond 1994). Linz and Stepan (1996) define civil society as "that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests" (p. 7). Despite this rather broad definition, one part of the democratization literature in the 1990s tended to put a narrow emphasis on formal NGOs, whose main functions were associated with democracy promotion (see for example USAID or Freedom House interpretations). Meanwhile, Putnam and his neo-Tocquevillian followers (Putnam *et al*. 1994, Putnam 1995) popularized the concept of social capital, which encompasses more informal elements, such as norms, trusts, and social networks, that are thought to develop through participation in civic associations. Yet, these informal elements are still closely linked to a specific set of values, conceived as being necessary for the good functioning of democracy (i.e., reciprocity, solidarity, and other positive social norms). As Edwards (2014) argued, these two different streams in the civil society literature tend to conflate civil society as associational life with civil society as representing a "good", more democratic, and more open society. However, especially in the post-Soviet environment, social capital does not always reflect the level of political activism and democratization, given that the Soviet legacy strongly impacts the relationship (Ledeneva 1998, Aberg 2000, Howard 2003, Radnitz *et al*. 2009, Gatskova & Gatskov 2012). Moreover, many post-Soviet NGOs have been criticized for being more concerned about securing international funding than about developing societal constituencies (Henderson 2002, Mendelson & Glenn 2002, Sundstrom 2006, Evans *et al*. 2006, Jakobson & Sanovich 2010, Lutsevych 2013).

Between these two poles, there are other visions of civil society that do not necessarily restrict the concept to formal, functionalist, or normative elements. As Greene (2014) argues, "Civil society is infinitely broader, larger, and more substantial; it is closer to the *societas civitas* than

to the banal sum of NGOs" and the kind of organizations included in civil society should vary according to context (p. 54). Instead of dismissing the concept of civil society (Cheskin & March 2015) or proposing yet another definition for it, I use Edwards's (2014) broad definition, which understands civil society as the part of society that,

> contains all associations and networks between the family and the state in which membership and activities are 'voluntary,' including NGOs of different kinds, labor unions, political parties, churches and other religious groups, professional and business associations, community and self-help groups, social movements and the independent media (p. 24).

This broad definition should make it clear that I do not draw a delimiting line between *civil* and *political* societies although I acknowledge that this remains disputed in the literature (Cohen & Arato 1994). It seems particularly hazardous to determine where the social becomes political and vice versa (Foley & Edwards 1996). For example, after having noted the limits of externally funded NGOs in promoting local activism and support for post-Soviet civil societies, scholars started to pay more attention to informal groups and grassroots movements that were developing during the 2000s. Youth groups, in particular, attracted a lot of attention, as they were often associated with the color revolutions, such as PORA in the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. Youth groups were indeed frequently the first actors to mobilize in the streets, attracting the participation of 'ordinary citizens', which greatly contributed to the successes of mobilizations. But by directly or indirectly supporting certain political candidates, these youth groups also blurred the line between civil and political societies, as will be seen in the next chapters.

In Russia, the opposition is generally divided into two broad categories: the systemic opposition versus the non-systemic opposition[4]. The non-systemic opposition includes a variety of actors and ideologies united by their opposition to Russian President Vladimir Putin's regime, going from political parties like PARNAS, formal NGOs like Memorial or Golos, to more informal movements, such as the group Strategiia 31, the Levyi Front, and nationalist groups. Moreover, cultural and popular media figures are also usually included in the non-systemic opposition.

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[4] The systemic opposition (sistemnaia oppozitsiia) comprises the non-ruling political parties that are officially represented in the Duma, namely the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and A Just Russia (SR).

Although some non-systemic political parties can now be officially registered, they have no real chance to be included in the formal decision-making process that would come with a certain degree of institutionalization, given that institutionalization would require stable and predictable interactions with the state (Greene 2014). This makes it even more necessary for them to resort to non-conventional forms of participation, such as street protests that rely on mobilization from a variety of actors.

As a result, my approach to civil society corresponds to what Edwards (2014) views as the "only acceptable compromise" to solve this debate, namely "that political parties are *in* civil society when they are out of office and out of civil society when they are in" (p. 28). In a nutshell, for Russia, all non-systemic opposition actors are considered civil society actors, although civil society is not limited to the non-systemic opposition[5]. The same could be said for Ukraine. I consider all the actors of the Orange movement as part of civil society until Yushchenko's election as president. Yushchenko's election redefined which actors could be thought as being part of the opposition to the regime, as well as part of civil society.

This brings me to the concept of social movements and their link with civil society. In order to make sense of the many different definitions of social movements found in the literature, Snow *et al*. (2004) stress the fact that all definitions are usually based on three or more of the following five points: "[1] collective or joint action; [2] change-oriented goals or claims; [3] some extra- or non-institutional collective action; [4] some degree of organization; and [5] some degree of temporal continuity" (p. 6). Since it nicely encompasses these criteria, I use David Meyer's (2003) definition of social movements, understood as "organized challenges to authorities that use a broad range of tactics, both inside and outside of conventional politics, in an effort to promote social and political change (p. 30)". While mobilizations may at first glance appear spontaneous and fluid, Meyer's definition as well as Snow *et al*.'s (2004) criteria highlight that a degree of organization is required. This organizational capacity is provided by social movement

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[5] In effect, civil society in Russia also includes actors who are not necessarily against the regime and who use instead other form of actions situated within the lines drawn by the regime, in a sort of "consentful form of contention" (Cheskin & March 2015). As Mason (2016) notes, "many participants in the protests of 2011 and 2012 considered themselves 'citizen-activists' (grazhdanskiye aktivisty) concerned about the electoral process, not engaged in a political struggle" (p. 14). As a result, the 2011-12 movement repercussions were thought to be potentially beneficial to civil society in general, and not only to the non-systemic opposition.

organizations (SMOs) that act as brokers of mobilizations. McArthy and Zald (1977) define SMO as a "complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement these goals" (p. 1218). Thus, SMOs refer to social groups within a broader movement, which can include everything from diffused and informal groups to more traditional and formal organizations, such as NGOs or thinks tanks[6]. Contrary to Howard (2003) who argues that "civil society requires a degree of routinization and institutionalization that is usually absent in such forms of mobilization" (p. 39), using Edward's broader definition of civil society leads us naturally to include social movements, SMOs, and other informal groups into our understanding of civil society (see also Uhlin 2006, p. 22).

Both the Orange Revolution and the FFE movement correspond to Meyer's definition of social movements. Indeed, what partly explains the broad attention given to these events is that they were no longer the sorts of isolated protests one observed during the post-Soviet transition (Lyall 2006, Robertson 2011). Instead, they both represented instances of mass mobilizations that brought together different SMOs under the same banner (think, for example, of the choice of a color) for the sake of producing political change. The common cause in each movement was of course linked to political leaders, with for example advocating for Viktor Yushchenko's victory in Ukraine and vividly rejecting Vladimir Putin's regime in Russia. However, the cause behind the two movements cannot be simply restricted to narrow support or rejection of political candidates, as many SMOs and activists were primarily motivated by principled ideas, such as democratic ideals and fairness in elections. These broader ideals also fed the expectations that post-Soviet civil societies were finally awakening, as will be discussed in the empirical chapters on each movement. While the Orange Revolution spawned a prolific literature, it has often been analyzed as a part of the color revolutions literature. This literature aimed at finding common causes for their occurrence, leaving their societal consequences less explored (for exceptions, see Tudoroiu 2007, Laverty 2008, and Cheterian 2013). Likewise, the Russian FFE movement generated a great deal of scholarly attention but few authors have investigated its aftermath

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[6] As noted by della Porta and Diani (2011), the choice in using concepts, such as SMOs, civil society organizations (CSOs), or NGOs, often relate to the literature with which we engage. Throughout this dissertation, SMOs is used as an umbrella for very different kinds of civil society and social movement organizations, except for political parties, which are considered more formal actors (even though they can be part of civil society when they are not in office).

beyond a focus on the growing repression.

More contentious is the decision on whether or not to include in our analysis the mass countermovements that emerged in reaction to the Orange and FFE movements in order *to resist* political changes. These types of mobilizations have received scant attention in the literature (especially compared with social movements or revolutions) (Slater & Smith 2016, Beissinger 2017). As countermovements are not "organized challenges to authorities" but are often organized by the authorities themselves (or loyal third parties), they do not fit into Meyer's definition of social movements. However, although analytically distinct, countermovements should still be considered instances of mobilization.

Consequently, I use Slater and Smith's (2016) definition of counterrevolutions, which are conceived as "collective and reactive efforts to defend the status quo and its varied range of dominant elites against a credible threat to overturn them from below" (p. 1475). Although, scholars tend to assume that countermobilizations are completely organized top-down and that their participants are mainly motivated by material concerns, I agree with Slater and Smith (2016) that they "are by definition elitist but not necessarily elite-led and perhaps never elite-only affairs" (p. 1476). Some citizens can truly be attached to the status quo and want to defend it, not necessarily because they are getting financial incentives. As Beissinger (2017) rightly argues, in countermovements, "there is often an additional element that is not merely a product of material incentives but is rooted in significant societal divisions or tensions within society" (p. 4). These different motivational sources, according to Beissinger, make countermobilizations *composite* in character (i.e., they include different parts of the population that are drawn together by the regime or loyal third parties), rather than *coalitional* as for social movements (i.e., they include autonomous and pro-active actors deciding to form coalitions among themselves). The composite nature of countermovements, both in terms of actors involved as well as their motivations, deserve more attention. Although frequently organized from the top in a reactive fashion, countermovements, just like social movements, need and build upon mobilization resources, political opportunities, and framing strategies. If not used effectively, countermovemnets can also fail, having backfiring effects that might stimulate further bottom-up mobilizations (Slater & Smith 2016). As a result, although the main focus of this dissertation is

on two social movements – the Ukrainian Orange movement and the Russian movement FFE – I will also look at the countermovements that these events generated, providing fresh data on their occurrence, location, and participation rate.

Toward a Synthesis?

As this brief overview of the literature highlighted, although both the studies on social movements and on civil society are interested in collective actors and public actions, they have mostly evolved in parallel (della Porta & Diani 2011). Indeed, social movements are usually conceived as more dynamic than civil society. Moreover, della Porta and Diani (2011) note the greater emphasis that social movement scholars put on conflict and contentious politics as compared to the civil society researchers. In turn, social movements are generally thought as being more temporary, especially in their visible forms. This is illustrated by the qualifications we tend to use to refer to social movements, as being successful or not, while we use more static terms to describe civil society, being for example weak or strong.

Thus for both theoretical and practical reasons it appears important to investigate what happens to social movements once they end and what consequences they leave behind for civil society. Referring to the social capital literature, one can ask whether social movements foster a better balance in civil society between "bonding ties" (within-group relations), "bridging ties" (connections across groups), and "linking ties" (external relations between SMOs and the broader society) (Edwards 2014, p. 29). Or building more directly on the literature of social movement outcomes (Giugni 1998, Bosi *et al*. 2016), social movements' aftermaths can be investigated as to whether they culturally change civil and political activities, and whether they leave new organizational resources from which new civil society associations can emerge or from which future mobilizations can be built (see Staggenborg 1995 for example). It is my contention that in order to do so, one has to first investigate closely the demobilization processes of social movements.

Demobilization

As noted at the outset, demobilization has long been neglected in the literature on social movements. Authors have either tended to ignore the decline of movements in order to concentrate on their causes, or considered demobilization as a natural and unproblematic stage of broader protest cycles. In particular, three main problems in the literature justify the need to study demobilization in more detail. First, the absence of a clear theoretical framework and definition for demobilization and its different forms make it difficult to study as well as to accumulate knowledge on the topic. Put simply, the issue starts with knowing when demobilization occurs, which implies finding an operationalizable definition. The second problem relates to how demobilization has been studied, in particular the scant attention that demobilization has received at the meso- and macro- levels of analysis beyond the study of repression effects. Third, although testifying of the topic's growing relevance, the recent interest found in the literature concentrates almost exclusively on the causes of demobilization. Meanwhile, the consequences of demobilization for the future state of civil society are still too often ignored.

Issue 1: What Do We Mean?

The first issue when studying demobilization is defining what we mean. Although noting that demobilization had been understudied, Tilly and Tarrow (2015) still illustrate how often the concept is defined simply as the reverse process of mobilization. For example, while they define mobilization "as an increase of the resources available to a political actor for collective making of claims", they simply add that "demobilization is a reduction of this aggregation of resources" (p. 120). Moreover, authors tend to use different terms as synonyms for demobilization, such as disengagement (Klandermans 2003, Fillieule 2005), decline (McAdams 1983, Hipsher 1996, Kamenitsa 1998), or contentious contraction (Koopmans 2004) to name just a few examples (see also Davenport 2014, p. 21 for a similar argument). While this plethora of concepts can be useful for grasping different aspects of demobilization, it also increases the complexity of finding an operationalizable definition, especially since these terms do not all refer to the same level of analysis. For instance, disengagement refers to individuals leaving their organization (micro-

level) whereas decline can both refer to an organizational decline (meso-level) and the decline of an entire social movement, itself composed of many SMOs (macro-level).

Related to this definition problem, demobilization has often been defined through the forms it can embody, thus conflating different forms of the phenomenon with the phenomenon *per se*. For example, the literature on democratization has tended to equate demobilization with institutionalization processes that usually follow a period of transition (Epstein 2003, Hipsher 1996, Oxhorn 1994), what Davenport (2014) calls *positive* demobilization. Along these lines, Gamson (1975) argues that a period of contention is over when a movement becomes institutionalized, that is to say, when it no longer constitutes a challenge to its main adversaries and becomes instead a legitimate actor (gaining acceptance, while also accepting the formal rules of the game). In this conception, movement success often leads to institutionalization, which, in turn, leads to demobilization (Meyer 1993a). Or, in the words of Goodwin and Jasper (2003), "[s]ocial movements, in short, may become victims of their own success" (p. 315). While many view this form of demobilization positively (Mushaben 1984, Browning *et al*. 1984, Suh 2011, Kim *et al*. 2013, Bosi 2016), Piven and Cloward (1977) stressed the risks associated with the institutionalization and bureaucratization of SMOs.

To what extent demobilization through institutionalization is desirable depends of course on its context and timing, which will be a question explored in more detail throughout this dissertation. However, for now the problem with this approach is that institutionalization is only one of the various forms a demobilizing movement can take. For instance, a movement can radicalize, go into abeyance, or simply disappear. In fact, radicalization is usually seen as the opposite of institutionalization (Klandermans 1997, Koopmans 2004, Kriesi *et al*. 1995; della Porta & Tarrow 1986, Tarrow 1998, Jung 2010). Tarrow (1989) noted, for example, that protest cycles, as they progress, inevitably increase competition among social movement organizations (SMOs) over tactical innovations, in particular over the choice between more conventional and radicalized forms of action. Tarrow (1998) later refined his views by emphasizing important variations in protest cycle shapes and endings, but still argued that internal splits over choosing institutionalization or radicalization usually lead a protest cycle to its end (Tarrow 1998, p. 175). Koopmans (2004) also emphasizes that "Both processes, institutionalization and radicalization,

in tandem contribute to the decline of the cycle, as people are either satisfied by reforms, or scared from the streets by violence" (p. 29). In turn, Kriesi *et al*. (1995) contend that in all protest waves, mass mobilization "ended in twin processes of institutionalization and radicalization (124)", adding that "if institutionalization and radicalization continue, protests will ultimately decline" (p. 138). Employing event-history analysis based on Kriesi *et al*.'s data, Jung (2010) recently confirmed that "demobilization was largely driven by the interaction between the institutionalization of moderate factions and the radicalization of marginalized factions" (p. 41).

But although the literature rightly links the processes of institutionalization and radicalization to the demobilization phase, it is not always clear how these concepts are related. For example, should we understand radicalization and institutionalization as *causing* demobilization *per se*, or should we see them instead as part of the *causal mechanism* of demobilization, understood as a process linking a phase of intense mobilization to a period of relative quiescence? This is of course a theoretical issue that mostly depends on the research question. Yet because institutionalization and radicalization are not "self-induced processes" but rather "a response to something" (Klandermans 2003, p. 125), I argue that they should be thought of as symptoms rather than causes of demobilization. Especially when the goal of the research is to explore social movement outcomes on civil society, it seems more logical to view institutionalization and radicalization processes as different forms of demobilization, and explore how their interaction over time affects the subsequent state of civil society.

Furthermore, other forms of demobilization can be found in the literature (Fillieule 2015). For example, Taylor (1989) popularized the concept of abeyance to describe a kind of strategic retreat adopted by SMO leaders in order to survive in nonreceptive political environments. Perhaps more intuitively, Gamson (1975) argues that a movement can simply cease to exist by stopping its activity or by being significantly altered (i.e. disappear), what Davenport (2014) calls *negative* demobilization. Tilly and Tarrow (2015) stressed that in most of the cases they studied, "demobilization combined escalation, institutionalization, defection, disillusion, and repression" (p. 140). As a result, there is a need for some theoretical clarity between the phenomenon of demobilization on the one hand, and its different forms and mechanisms on the

other. In the next chapter, I offer an operationalizable definition of demobilization from which precise indicators are identified according to different levels of analysis.

Issue 2: A Narrow Focus on Individuals

The second problem in the literature concerns the level of analysis through which demobilization has often been studied. Whereas the main assumption is that demobilization is the inevitable outcome of all social movements (Freeman 1983, O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, Meyer 1993a, Goldstone & McAdam 2001), the phenomenon has primarily been studied at an individual (micro) level of analysis. Important exceptions include empirical studies on feminist movements (Cayo Sexton 2003, Epstein 2003, Marx Ferree 1994) and the US civil rights and peace movements of the 1960s (Freeman 1983, Edwards & Marullo 1995). However these studies tend not to engage with each other's theoretical arguments, focusing instead on explaining a specific empirical case.

Indeed, in an effort to rebalance the literature, some authors have started to analyze the disengagement processes, i.e. how and why individuals defect from their organization or stop protesting (see, for example, Ebaugh 1988, Whalen & Flacks 1989, Fillieule 2005, 2010, Klandermans 1997, 2003, White 2010, Viterna 2013, Meirowitz & Tucker 2013). But although studies on individual disengagement bring interesting insights, especially in terms of biographical consequences of activism (McAdam 1988, Giugni 2004, Kim *et al*. 2013, Beckwith 2016, Blee 2016, Giuni & Grasso 2016, Masclet 2016, Whittier 2016), they suffer from two shortcomings. First, these works often focus on the fate of a few individuals from specific social movements, which makes it hard to provide any kind of generalization. Second, micro-level studies of disengagement can simply not explain the decline of mass movements at broader levels. As Demirel-Pegg (forthcoming) argues, "We still have very little understanding of how personal level circumstances translate into a collective disengagement from protests" and whether there is any threshold for disengagement (Granovetter 1978). As Koopmans (2004) argues, "[t]o date, the explanation of protest decline is perhaps the weakest chain in social movement theory and research" (p. 37); in a recent chapter, Fillieule (2015) also laments the scarce literature on the phenomenon at the meso- and macro- levels notwithstanding the important progress that has been made at the individual level. Consequently, this thesis

concentrates more on the meso- and macro- levels of analysis; that is, on the main SMOs that compose a movement, on their interactions, and on their leaders' reactions to shifts in political opportunity structures.

Issue 3: A Growing Interest on Demobilization: Bringing the Consequences Back In

Having said that, one might argue that demobilization is perhaps understudied simply because it does not warrant research, especially compared to the mobilization period. Indeed, sometimes gaps in the literature exist for good reasons. However, not only have scholars of social movements been urging more research in this area, but there has also been a growing and recent interest in studying demobilization (Kowalchuk 2005, Heaney & Rojas 2011, Lapegna 2013, Davenport 2014, Demirel-Pegg & Pegg 2015, Girod *et al*. 2016, Villalón & Ibarra 2016). The Arab Spring, in particular, which resulted for many in dashed hopes regarding Middle Eastern democratization, drew more attention to the aftermath of mobilizations (Weyland 2012, Bellin 2012, Lynch 2013, Meirowitz & Tucker 2013, Howard & Walters 2015). But although important, these works tend to focus on *the causes* of demobilization, considering demobilization as the outcome to be explained. Meanwhile, *the processes* and *consequences* of demobilization remain to be addressed (see Koppelman 2017 for a recent exception).

For example, demobilization has frequently been studied indirectly through the analysis of how states respond to mobilizations. On the wide spectrum of possible reactions, states usually choose between making real and honest concessions, using harsh repression, or some variants and combinations of these options. Almost forty years ago, Karstedt-Henke (1980, pp. 217-220) stressed how the authorities use strategies of 'divide and rule' to counter mass protests, trying to coopt the moderate part of a movement while alienating the radical wings. Demirel-Pegg and Pegg (2015) recently added an important nuance to this argument by showing that under certain conditions the state may instead attempt to coopt radicals and repress moderates. Authorities can also simply ignore protests, thus not even acknowledging any legitimacy to street actors (Bishara 2015), or use what Yuen and Cheng (2017) call attrition of mass protests while pretending to tolerate them. Meyer (1993a) underlined how regime type can influence states' reactions, arguing that "Repressive governments are able, for some period of time, to suppress incipient protest, while extremely tolerant ones bring challengers into the polity, thus preempting extrainstitutional

protest" (p. 161). In particular, the effect of repression on mobilizations has been extensively studied in the literature, although no consensus has yet emerged regarding how effective repression is in quelling protests, an ongoing debate often referred to as the "repression-mobilization nexus" (Lichbach 1987, Opp & Roehl 1990, Rasler 1996, Moore 1998, Earl 2003, Schock 2005, Davenport & Müeller 2005, Davenport 2014, Girod *et al*. 2016, Demirel-Pegg forthcoming).

Other scholars have focused more on the organizational (meso) level of protest, trying to examine which organizational features best guarantee protest or organizational resilience, indirectly preventing demobilization. Here again, significant debates remain. While Piven and Cloward (1977) argued a long time ago that "organization prevented organizing" (p. 316), many authors later refined the type of organizational features that seem better to sustain mobilizations (McCarthy & Zald 1977, Minkoff 1993, Edwards & Marullo 1995, Davenport 2014, Franklin 2015). For example, in an argument that harks back to Taylor's concept of abeyance, Franklin (2015) shows that the SMOs which develop effective organizational structure are in better position to maintain the commitment of activists and will prove more resilient against repression over time. Davenport (2014) draws attention to how SMO leaders need to sustain organizational trust and prepare their members to upcoming repression. These findings add weight to my arguments that the meso-level of mobilization, that is to say SMOs fate and leaders' choices, are key dimensions of demobilization. But although studying the causes of demobilization and organizational decline is surely an important avenue for research, I argue that there is also a need to understand demobilization processes and their consequences for civil society.

Plan of the Dissertation

In the next chapter, I delve more directly into theory and methods, proposing a conceptual framework for the study of demobilization. In doing so, I also review the literature on the different forms usually associated with demobilization, such as institutionalization, radicalization, abeyance, and disappearance. Moreover, the chapter suggests making two analytical distinctions, explaining the differences between the internal and external dimensions of institutionalization on the one hand, and between strategic abeyance and abeyance by default

on the other. The next four chapters (chapters 3 to 6) represent the empirical core of the dissertation. In chapters 3 and 4, I concentrate on the Ukrainian Orange Revolution and its aftermath. I first present the results of the protest event analysis on the Orange Revolution (chapter 3) and then examine the different forms that demobilization took after this initially successful case using process tracing (chapter 4). In chapters 5 and 6 I replicate the same analytical process for the unsuccessful Russian FFE movement. Finally, in the conclusion, I address the long-term outcomes of the demobilization processes in both cases through within-case analysis. More specifically, I discuss the 2013-14 Euromaidan movement in Ukraine as well as the lack of significant political activism in Russia. The conclusion is thus an invitation to further reflect on demobilization, acknowledging how social movement outcomes, while affected by the demobilization processes, are also impacted by time.

CHAPTER 2 - TOWARD A THEORY OF DEMOBILIZATION

Studying a topic that has been neglected in the literature offers both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, once the relevance of the topic is clearly demonstrated, the research can aim at making significant, substantive contributions, in part because of the novelty of the findings. On the other hand, this novelty often comes with serious theoretical and methodological challenges. This chapter seeks to offer a systematic theoretical framework and methodology with which to study demobilization. I will start by providing an operationalizable definition of demobilization and identifying three levels of analysis at which to examine key moments in demobilization through quantitative protest event analysis. I will then define and discuss more extensively the four different forms of demobilization - institutionalization, radicalization, abeyance and disappearance - which will constitute the main processes to be traced in the qualitative chapters. The final section discusses in greater detail the methodology that I use throughout the dissertation, which is a combination of process tracing with protest event analysis.

Definition (The What Question)

As summarized in Table 2.1, demobilization is defined here as an evolving *process* that includes a decline in the activities organized by SMOs (meso-level), a disengagement of activists (micro-level), and a contraction in the intensity of societal contention (macro-level). The decline in SMO activities can be operationalized by the structure of protest activities (numbers, action repertoire, geographical scope), and the disengagement of activists by their scale (number of participants). The contraction in the intensity of societal contention refers to the societal resonance a movement attracts. As Meyer (1993a) argues, having a high public profile helps movements "to demonstrate their strength, to build organizations, and to reach a broader constituency" (p. 170). The movement's visibility (media attention), social-media trending, and popular attitudes are relevant indicators for determining its societal resonance.

Table 2.1. Definition of Demobilization

THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS	INDICATORS	METHODS/DATA
Macro-level Contraction in the intensity of societal contention	**Societal resonance of protest:** Visibility (media attention) Trending Public opinion	Protest event analysis Google Trends Polling data
Meso-level Decline in the activities organized by SMOs	**Structure of protest:** Number and frequency, action repertoire, geographical scope	Protest event analysis
Micro-level Disengagement of activists	**Scale of protest:** Number of participants	Protest event analysis

Illustrating the growing interest in demobilization among social scientists, Davenport (2014) and Demirel-Pegg (2017) have recently proposed definitions of demobilization. Davenport (2014) uses demobilization to refer to "official termination and/or significant alteration of the formal institution engaged in challenging authorities; (2) departure of individuals (members) from relevant organizations – especially the founding and/or core members that participate most frequently; (3) termination of or significant reduction in dissident interventions (behaviors); and (4) a fundamental shift in the ideas of the challenger (particularities of the claim) away from what was earlier established" (p. 21). Davenport's definition represents more a list of indicators than a theoretical definition, however, perhaps because Davenport is primarily interested in explaining the decline of one particular SMO (the Republic of North Africa active in Detroit between 1968 and 1973) rather than the demobilization of broader social movements. Demirel-Pegg (2017)'s definition of demobilization as "the process by which protesting decreases in scale and scope and eventually ends" (p. 178) is perhaps the closest to mine, but does not differentiate among the levels of analysis entailed by the phenomenon, nor does it specify its indicators.

As a result, I contend that my definition offers two main advantages. First, by integrating three levels of analysis, it reconciles the main concepts used by social movement scholars when addressing demobilization – such as contentious contraction, decline, and disengagement – into a single definition. By the same token, it offers flexibility for empirical analyses to concentrate on one level of analysis (or more), while keeping a broader theoretical consistency. Second, by defining demobilization as an ongoing process rather than an outcome, we allow variations in the forms taken by this process over time, while avoiding the pitfall of conflating demobilization with the different forms the phenomenon embodies.

Timing (The When Question)

The three levels of analysis are of course intertwined in practice and do not need to occur all at the same time. The important point here is that they all represent different aspects of the demobilization process. As the findings in the Ukrainian and Russian cases reveal, demobilization of social movements often starts primarily at the macro- and micro- levels, that is when average citizens lose interest in participating in the movement, which affects both the broader societal resonance and the scale of the protest events that can still be organized at the meso-level. As we will see, this micro-level disengagement occurred first in both movements, independently of whether the movement was successful as in Ukraine or not as in Russia. Similarly, the meso-level remained mobilized for a correspondingly longer time in both instances, accentuating its importance during the demobilization period. Furthermore, the structure of protest activities evolves during the demobilization period, with the action repertoire often passing from demonstrative (e.g., rallies) to more direct actions (e.g., hunger strikes, occupations) and where a certain recentralization of activities around the biggest cities typically takes place. The composition and the initiators of the protest activities may also change, with individual SMOs deserting the movement at different moments.

Forms (The How Question)

As previously noted, several authors link the dual processes of institutionalization and radicalization to demobilization. But how, when, and to what extent these processes take place in the aftermath of mobilizations are questions that remain to be addressed, as their arrangements/interactions can leave different legacies for the movement. For example, if part of the movement tries to institutionalize early but eventually fails while in the meantime other SMOs radicalize, the effects on civil society would be different compared with an instance where institutionalization succeeds early, leaving no real influence to the radicalizing fringe. Similarly, in some cases abeyance may be a strategic choice that SMO leaders make and in others, it may occur later "by default" because other options fail. The type and timing of abeyance, as for institutionalization and radicalization, might have different implications for civil society.

In order to examine further these different forms of demobilization, we need to know how to recognize them in the first place. Table 2.2 offers a summary of the indicators for each form (and sub-form) of demobilization. These forms represent theoretical ideal types. Attempt to pursue a specific form does not guarantee success. Moreover, in practice, forms of demobilization interact and may even overlap at times. The evolution in the movement's action repertoire, the fate of the main SMOs, and the nature of the ties among these groups indicate which form of demobilization dominates at a given moment. As Meyer (1993a) notes, SMOs "often survive at the expense of the movements that nourish and create them" (p. 172).

Table 2.2. Forms of Demobilization (Ideal Types)

Forms	Institutionalization		Radicalization		Abeyance		Disappearance
	External	**Internal**	**Limited**	**Strong**	**Strategic**	**By default**	
Indicators							
Ties among groups	SMO acceptance	SMO cooperation	SMO competition		SMO core	SMO dispersion	SMO dispersion
Actors	Formalization/ Embeddedness	Survival/ professionalization	Polarization/ Factionalization		Survival	Survival/ Death	Death/ Significant alteration
Actions	Conventional	Demonstrative/ conventional	Direct (no violence)	Direct (light or heavy violence)	Self-interested	Self-interested	None

Institutionalization: External and Internal Dimensions

Meyer and Tarrow define institutionalization as "the creation of a repeatable process that is essentially self-sustaining; it is one in which all the relevant actors can resort to well-established and familiar routines. For political movements, institutionalization denotes the end of the sense of unlimited possibility" (Meyer & Tarrow 1998, p. 21). This latter expression relates to the actions available to SMOs, indicating a repertoire that becomes more routinized and formalized during institutionalization (Meyer 1993a). Hipsher delves further into this idea, arguing that '[i]nstitutionalization involves greater reliance on negotiations, the electoral process, and working through government institutions and agencies' (Hipsher 1998, p. 157). For example, Meyer (1993a) highlights the changes in tactics of the anti-nuclear American movement that followed their institutionalization, arguing that, "Mass public support was less important than congressional endorsement; public demonstrations and media attention became less significant than financial support" (p. 168).

Other scholars stressed in turn the process through which social movements, by developing an increasingly close and cooperative relationship with the state, may transform themselves into interest groups, unions or political parties (Kim & Kim 2011). Kriesi *et al*. (1995) argue that institutionalization processes occur when SMOs become increasingly efficient and professionalized, and work with external formal allies, such as political parties (see also Heberle 1949, Heaney & Rojas 2007). Greene (2014), in turn, equated the institutionalization of social movements with the consolidation of civil society, arguing that the relationship between SMOs and the state is a key element for analyzing institutionalization processes. Also viewing social movement institutionalization as the result of strategic interplays between states and movement actors, Bosi (2016) defines the process as the inclusion into formal politics of a movement's ideas, personnel, and/or SMOs (see also Suh 2011).

These definitions ultimately reveal the need to distinguish between *external* and *internal* processes of institutionalization. The external dimension is centered on SMO-state relations after a period of contention, hence focusing on a context in which social movements may or may not successfully increase the formalized influence exerted by civil society on social and political life.

The crystallization of this context is linked to the creation of stable and effective mechanisms of dialogue and interaction between the state and civil society representatives. Moreover, once SMOs have accepted the rules of the game imposed by the state, their repertoire of actions becomes more conventional, leading to negotiating with formal actors or participating in elections. For external institutionalization to happen during demobilization, SMOs must be first recognized as legitimate actors by the authorities and, more widely, society (Gamson 1975).

However, as stressed by Meyer (1993b), there are disagreements among scholars about whether a movement's institutionalization means that it has been accepted or coopted, or whether or not institutionalization is desirable even beyond cooptation. While for some, institutionalization means that previous challengers gain greater influence on the decision-making process (Mushaben 1984, Browning *et al*. 1984, Suh 2011, Kim *et al*. 2013, Bosi 2016), others alert us to the fact that it can also mean that societal groups will now dedicate more resources and time to organization-building while neglecting the promotion of substantive change and cooperative ties with other SMOs (Piven & Cloward 1977, Meyer 1993a). According to these authors, institutionalization often comes at the cost of ending street activism, which is thought to be a more powerful weapon for lower classes to achieve influence.

To be sure, the tension between gaining formal acceptance and representation versus becoming coopted and self-interested for SMOs is real and there is no universal measure to determine exactly which is taking place. It is probably more effective to view them as two poles on a continuum. Analysts should pay attention to the context and examine whether groups or only a few leaders participate in institutionalization, whether the rules of the game are transformed in ways that enable power-sharing, and how other civil society members react (see Bosi 2016 and Koppelman 2017 for insightful recent examples). Strong indications of cooptation rather than formal acceptance would be if only a small number of SMO leaders are involved, the rules of the game stay the same, and other civil society actors react negatively to the process. While formal acceptance can bode well for post-movement civil society development, cooptation arguably has the opposite effect by societally delegitimizing the coopted activists, "beheading" their SMOs, and splitting the social movement.

Having said that, gaining real influence and acceptance after social movements is surely more difficult in non-democratic regimes (Suh 2011). Effective formal external institutionalization of social movements is far more likely in democratic countries, as seen with, for example, the civil rights movement of the 1960s, the feminist movement of the 1980s, or the environmentalist movement of the 1990s. In non-democratic landscapes the blatant cooptation of SMO leaders is a more frequent outcome. As will be discussed in chapter 4, even after a successful case such as the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, later attempts to achieve formal group influence and representation in politics largely failed, mainly because of prior cooptation processes.

In addition to the external aspect, institutionalization also features an *internal* dimension, in which SMOs as individual organizations survive and become more professionalized and efficient, and in which their mutual relationships become more cooperative and regularized. Internal institutionalization means that SMOs maintain a certain level of cooperation in the aftermath of social movements. This institutionalization typically builds upon cooperation that began during the social movement itself: SMOs may decide to formalize an organizing structure that was created during the movement or to maintain an informal platform of discussion or collaboration. The repertoire of actions might become more conventional or remain composed of demonstrative actions; demonstrative actions tend to be less frequent albeit more efficiently organized.

Independently of whether a movement initially succeeds or fails, internal institutionalization might serve as the basis upon which more effective civil society and powerful movements can develop. Internal institutionalization is even more important in non-democratic regimes, where civil society is usually weaker, given the structural lack of resources for SMOs and their dependence on a few charismatic leaders. In such contexts, even if the movement does not achieve external institutionalization during demobilization, it can still strive to reach a certain level of internal institutionalization, which may increase in turn the movement's future legitimacy *vis-à-vis* the population as well as show the effectiveness and capacity of civil society (Suh 2011, p. 450). How Heaney and Rojas (2011) describe the demobilization of the American antiwar movement after 2005 is a good example of institutionalization at the internal level. The authors note that despite fewer and smaller demonstrations, "the organizations in the movement

continued to build their organizational structures and seek new avenues of influence through lobbying, voter education campaigns, get-out-the-vote drives, television advertising, and peace billboards" (p. 52). While external institutionalization depends primarily on the state's response to the social movement (and thus the regime type), the extent of internal institutionalization depends primarily on the responses that SMOs and their leaders have to the changing political environment.

Radicalization

Although social movement scholars have often referred to radicalization, few have proposed a clear theoretical definition. For example, Chenoweth and Shock (2015) recently noted that, "While the social movement literature tends to see radical flanks in a variety of ways relating to means and ends, the civil resistance literature tends to characterize them only according to whether they use violence" (p. 430). Scholars of terrorism have also lamented the conceptual confusion around the term, arguing that radicalization should be understood in relative rather than absolute terms (Mandel 2009, Sedgwick 2010, Neumann & Kleinmann 2013). Notwithstanding the lack of an established definition, a set of specific elements—including direct and confrontational action (Kriesi *et al*. 1995, Boudreau 1996, Melucci 1996), uncompromising attitudes, and violence (Schock 2005, Chenoweth & Stephan 2011, Moskalenko & McCauley 2009)—is commonly associated with the concept and can thus serve as indicators of radicalization within social movements.

Regarding the repertoire of actions, Boudreau draws a distinction between demonstrative acts, such as mass protests that are highly symbolic, and direct action such as seizures, blockades, land occupations, or sit-ins, where "[p]articipants seize resources to satisfy their demands or take unilateral action to resolve a grievance" (Boudreau 1996, p. 181). Along the same lines, Melucci argues that direct action "is not expressive but instrumental action, although it may attain symbolic and expressive dimensions" (Melucci 1996, p. 379). Even if this type of action is sometimes a response to mass demands, it can evolve in increasingly radicalized—but not necessarily violent—directions, eventually reducing societal support for the movement (Boudreau 1996, p. 183). As individual SMOs become more and more radicalized, the broader

movement becomes more polarized (that is to say, internally divided), and moderate activists increasingly turn away from the movement, further accelerating the demobilization process (Jung 2010, p. 41)[7]. As Lohmann (1994) shows, moderate - and not radical – activists are the ones who add weight in the reasoning of ordinary people when they decide whether or not to join protests. Describing demobilization of the Italian protest cycle of the 1960-70s, Tilly and Tarrow (2015) remark that radicalization "scared off timid souls and motivated them to move into institutional politics or the relative safety of private life. The result was polarization—increasing ideological distance between the wings of a once unified movement sector, divisions between its leaders, and, in some cases, terrorism" (p. 130).

Just like for institutionalization, there are debates in the literature over whether radicalization has the potential to bring positive effects for a social movement by making the moderates appear more acceptable (Haines 1984, Jenkins & Eckert 1986) or whether it always brings more negative outcomes (Sharp 1973, Shock 2005, Chenoweth & Stephan 2011, Pearlman 2016). According to Chenoweth and Schock (2015), who examined more than 100 protest campaigns, radical flanks, especially violent ones, are associated with much lower rates of participation with no positive effect on the likelihood of success. Scholars have also suggested insightful and convincing mechanisms that would lead to such negative effects within movements. For example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show how radical violent actions significantly reduce mass participation given that they increased "the moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers to participation" (p. 10) while Schock (2005) emphasized the loss of support from third parties that might be essential to the movement. However, the methodology employed in this research stream often relies on broad and static categories, comparing violent versus nonviolent campaigns as a whole, rather than viewing radicalization as a process that might occur during generally nonviolent movements that are demobilizing, and which may or may not turn violent.

Kriesi *et al*. (1995) distinguish different levels of violence that can take place during a movement, in particular between actions involving light violence, such as limited property

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[7] While I speak of radicalisation as a possible form of demobilisation for an entire social and mass movement, I am fully aware that radicalisation implies greater mobilisation of smaller factions.

damage or an occasional violent demonstrations, and those employing heavy and systemic violence, such as terrorism. The level of violence can be used to distinguish between limited versus strong radicalizations. Despite eschewing heavy violence, SMOs might still turn to more direct actions with their leaders displaying increasingly uncompromising stances, which would represent a limited form of radicalization compared to the earlier large-scale and festive movement that employed demonstrative actions.

Abeyance

Taylor (1989) popularized the concept of abeyance following her research on the historical continuity of the women's movement in the interwar United States (Rupp & Taylor 1987), and later applied it to analyze the fate of the movement after the 1980s (Taylor & Whittier 1997). Taylor defines abeyance as "a holding process by which movements sustain themselves in nonreceptive political environments and provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another" (Taylor 1989, p. 761). According to her, abeyance structures contribute to movement's continuity by offering (1) preexisting networks of activists, (2) an established repertoire of goals and tactics and (3) a collective identity on which further mobilization can build (Taylor 1989, p. 770). Notably, abeyance normally channels the activism of the remaining participants into a narrow niche of self-interested acts and they refrain from direct actions, even though political opportunities are closing. Abeyance as a consequence should not be subsumed into radicalization. In abeyance, the movement privileges reflective and self-consolidating narratives (Polletta 1998) above actions aimed at fostering further collective mobilization, what Marullo *et al.* (1996) called adopting "retention framing" over "action framing". Building on this scholarship, other authors have used the concept of abeyance to explain the transformation of mass movements into more quiescent forms (Mooney & Hunt 1996, Sawyers & Meyer 1999, Bagguley 2002, Holland & Cable 2002, Grey & Sawer 2008, Faupel 2011, Heaney & Rojas 2011).

Taylor (1989) identifies temporality, exclusiveness, centralization, culture and purposive commitment as the five indicators of a movement in abeyance (p. 765-770). Exclusiveness relates to the fact that the movement is neither trying to attract new members, nor attempting to

gather social support. Rather, in periods of abeyance, movements even attempt to expel superfluous membership to ensure "a relatively homogeneous cadre of activists suited to the limited activism undertaken" (Taylor 1989, p. 768). An attractive strong organizational culture is essential "to provide security and meaning for those who reject the established order and remain in the group", to whom purposive commitments are expected (Taylor 1989, p. 769, see also Poletta 1998). Centralization provides the movement "stability, coordination, and technical expertise necessary for movement survival" (Taylor 1989, p. 768) even if, as posited by Piven and Cloward (1977), it can also reduce its ability to lead protest actions.

In Taylor's account, abeyance is a voluntary strategic retreat that enables a social movement to survive, generally yielding positive results for civil society. This also corresponds to how Rupp and Taylor later reflect on the concept when they argue that it was "an optimistic way of framing a scaled-down period of women's movement activity because the theory assumed that, under the right conditions, feminism could re-emerge out of the doldrums as a movement of full passion, excitement, new ideas, and novel tactics […]" (quoted in Grey & Sawer 2008, p. xiii). Sawyers and Meyer (1999) have however remarked that abeyance can ultimately exert a detrimental influence, by preventing SMO leaders from seizing new opportunities for activism and by fragmenting the broader movement. Although Bagguley (2002) also agrees that abeyance can bring negative consequences in terms of mobilization, he draws our attention to other positive effects of abeyance on civil society in general. For example, he argues that the "Second-wave feminism in Britain has left a substantial residue in the form of a 'women's civil society'" with the creation of many informal and formal organizations imbricated in such a fashion that "they generate an integrity and robustness greater than the sum of their parts" (p. 182). Different conditions can here again lead to different effects.

But perhaps more importantly, abeyance is not necessarily a choice, and may instead become the default option after other forms of demobilization have been attempted and failed. The route to abeyance as well as its timing in the demobilization process is thus as important to analyze as abeyance *per se*. In particular, there is a need to distinguish between a social movement in a general state of abeyance from a situation in which a few SMOs are themselves in abeyance but where no core of the previous movement remains. The latter situation represents a dispersed type

of abeyance (or an abeyance by default). While some SMOs might very well survive in abeyance by default (see Holland & Cable 2002 for example), others disappear, which can jeopardize the movement's prospects for future mobilization, especially if the remaining SMOs act in isolation from (or in competition with) one another.

Disappearance

The last form of demobilization is disappearance. In this case, most of the key SMOs have disappeared or have been so significantly altered that it becomes difficult to draw a link between the new and old organizations. Obviously enough, actions related to the movement are no longer organized. This form is useful primarily as a theoretical construction in order to differentiate this stage from others. In reality, it is difficult to think of a movement that simply disappears and leaves no trace, especially when confronted with the three previous forms of demobilization described above. However, since many authors still refer to the death of social movements (Edwards & Marullo 1995, Davenport 2014), it is important to include it as a possibility when theorizing demobilization.

A Methodology for Studying Demobilization

Whereas protest event analysis (PEA) is useful for studying *whether* and *when* demobilization takes place at different levels of analysis, process tracing is more suited to understanding *how* demobilization evolves at different points in time. In this section, I discuss both methods and how I will combine them to provide analytical leverage on the study of demobilization.

Protest Event Analysis

As Table 2.1 above indicates, PEA is used to measure demobilization indicators at all three levels of analysis. PEA is a method that has been explicitly developed by social movement scholars in order to enable large, cross-national comparisons of movements[8]. First, researchers need to select news reports on protest events, which are then coded along different variables, such as timing, number of participants, claims, etc. Having constituted datasets on social movements, statistical analysis are in turn conducted that allow the mapping of general trends in protest cycles or investigating if different properties of protest co-vary together.

As Hutter (2014) argues, "Researchers rely on PEA, as a type of *content analysis*, to systematically assess the amount and features of protests across various geographical areas (from the local level up to the supranational level) and over time (from short periods of time up to several decades)" (p. 336). This method is thus well suited for studying different aspects of demobilization. It can quantify and map the micro- and meso-levels of demobilization, showing the evolution in the frequency, location, size, and action repertoire of protests. Moreover, as will be discussed further below, it can inform us on the macro-level of demobilization, since societal resonance implies event visibility and media attention that PEA can reveal. Beyond offering rich empirical descriptions and enabling more complex statistical analyses, scholars recognize that this method is also particularly good for theory development and answering new questions (Oliver *et al*. 2003, Fillieule & Jiménez 2003).

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[8] For a recent and well-balanced summary of the debates around the development and evolution of PEA in social movement studies, see Hutter (2014).

As discussed in Hutter (2014), many debates around the type and selectivity of sources or around data selection strategies associated with PEA have helped the method to become more rigorous over successive generations of scholars. While Koopmans and Rucht (2002) contend that "PEA provides a solid ground in an area that is still often marked more by more or less informed speculation" (p. 252), Beissinger (2002) stresses flexibility as the method's main assets. For example, he writes that, "Events can be segmented by their particular characteristics. They can be aggregated at almost any meaningful level of space or time. It is a misnomer to speak of a single methodology of event analysis [....]" (p. 460). Perhaps because of this great flexibility, it is all the more important for social movement researchers who wish to perform PEA to reflect on the type of data they use and discuss their inherent biases in an explicit fashion.

For this dissertation, the reflection led me quickly to the choice of gathering my own datasets for both the Ukrainian and Russian movements, since no systematized datasets were available for conducting the type of analysis required. For example, as will be further detailed in the next chapter, despite having been extensively studied, the literature on the Orange Revolution does not offer any rigorous mapping of the protests such as the one I needed for this dissertation. Scholars have instead used other methods and sources, such as polling data, surveys, and participant observation, which gave rise to many insightful analyses on the Orange Revolution. However, especially when compared with more recent events, such as the Euromaidan, the lack of systematized protest data on the Orange Revolution, coupled with distance in time, resulted in some conventional wisdom that is not necessarily borne out empirically. For example, it is common to affirm that the Orange Revolution was essentially a phenomenon of western and central Ukraine, and that very few or no protest events took place in other parts of the country. When confronted with the findings of chapter 3, such affirmations appear curious and need to be nuanced. For the Russian 2011-12 FFE movement, some datasets already exist but, as I explain in chapter 5, they would not have enabled me to analyze the demobilization period extensively, nor to compare with the Ukrainian case. Similarly, it is also interesting to realize that with the March 2017 wave of Russian protests denouncing corruption, a conventional wisdom quickly arose that is challenged by the FFE PEA data. For example, many observers argued that these new protests, *unlike the 2011-12 movement*, were not only concentrated in Moscow and in St. Petersburg but instead took place in many regional cities. However, chapter 5's findings show

how geographically widespread the FFE protest events were, especially at the beginning of the FFE movement. These examples reveal the importance of PEA for keeping a good empirical record of past movements for future comparisons.

The sources used for both movements as well as the coding procedures are detailed in the codebook found in Appendix A. In both the Ukrainian and Russian cases, I gathered massive amounts of data on the two movements from five different sources, such as local newspapers and news wire reports. As Greene (2014) notes, "media coverage has the analytical advantage of being contemporaneous with the events at hand and thus not blurred by the passage of time and subjectivity of memory" (p. 123). The two datasets count in total 3,504 protest events (1,114 events for Russia and 2,390 events for Ukraine), which are individually coded along roughly 30 substantive variables. The database for Russia spans nine months, from December 2011 to August 2012 inclusively. The database for Ukraine includes eight months, from November 2004 to June 2005 inclusively. The aim was to include the months where mobilizations were at their peak followed by six months of demobilization in both cases. For Ukraine, the peak months of mobilization were considered November and December 2004 whereas for Russia, the peak months were between December 2011 and February 2012 inclusively.

I used a partially automated selection strategy with a comprehensive list of keywords related to both movements to select news articles from Factiva, from which I then coded the variables defined in the codebook. Compared to previous PEA studies that selected data manually (Tilly *et al*. 1975, Kriesi *et al*. 1995), using electronic archives speeds up the selection process. However, it is still a very time-consuming approach given that it generates many false positive hits (Hutter 2014). More importantly, using keywords does not solve all selection and representation biases (Maney & Oliver 2001, Strawn 2010).

Representation biases are well-known in any media analyses and I do not claim that my datasets are devoid of such biases. However, following Mueller's (1997) categorization, I adopt both representational and media selection approaches. The representational approach means that I acknowledge the biases inherent in my sources but I try to keep them constant as much as possible throughout the selection and coding processes. Second, by having five different media

sources for each movement, I vary the type of biases associated with each source, which corresponds to the media selection approach[9].

For Russia, I included *Novaia gazeta*, which is the most critical newspaper toward the regime, thus providing more protest events often depicted in a positive light. On the other hand, *Izvestiia*, which is a pro-regime media outlet, provided far fewer events related to the FFE movement, and when it very rarely did, the tone was often more negative. The three other sources used are widely consulted national newspapers, namely *Moskovskii komsomolets*, *Kommersant*, and *Nezavisimaia gazeta*. In the case of *Kommersant*, it was possible to include all associated publications in the search, such as *Kommersant Regions*, which was very useful for finding local events.

For Ukraine, the fact that the Orange Revolution occurred over 10 years ago meant that it was more difficult to find electronically accessible national newspapers for the entire period of the movement. I thus used the five following sources: *Unian*, *Ukraïns'ki Novini*, *Interfax*, *RIA Novosti*, and *ITAR TASS*. The choice of using regional news wire reports for Ukraine while using national newspapers for Russia implies some limits in the comparative claims that I can make between these two cases. However, the fact that I used 'Kommersant – all sources' for Russia provided many reports that were drawn from news agencies, such as *RIA Novosti* or *ITAR TASS*. Moreover, *Unian* and *Ukraïns'ki Novini* are both national news agencies, which are based in Kyiv and report largely on domestic affairs. They also publish most of their wire reports simultaneously in both Russian and Ukrainian, which neutralizes the language issue. Overall, these two Ukrainian sources alone provided about 55 percent of the events in the database on the Orange Revolution.

Using media analysis in non-democratic countries opens the door to criticism. However, as Greene (2014) argues, print media in Russia remain "generally uncensored and subject to much less government pressure than television" (p. 123). In Ukraine, during the time of the Orange Revolution, mass media remained overall in the hand of oligarchic groups, many of which had

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[9] See Attachment 4 in the codebook for details about the weight of each source's coverage.

close connections with the Kuchma regime (Prytula 2006, Ryabinska 2014). Nevertheless, as for Russia, using print media, especially news wires such as *Unian* and *Ukrains'ki Novini* with solid international reputations, is less problematic than using TV channels. Consequently, I do not claim that the way protest events were reported is free of biases and transparent, especially regarding the difference between protest movements and pro-regime movements (or countermovements). Yet, whereas one would expect that these issues would sharpen the biases usually found in media analyses toward reporting more large-scale and sensationalistic events compared to small and local events (see for example Rootes 2003 for a good review), the fact that I still found many small-scale events reported after the peak of both movements indicates that the datasets can be considered representative of the general trends in the protest cycle. As Koopmans and Rucht (2002) and Robertson (2013) argued, "one should keep in mind that for many analytic purposes, it is not so much the actual level of protest but its composition and trends over time that are of interest" (Koopmans and Rucht 2002, p. 247), such as the "qualitative differences between the periods in terms of repertoire, demands, and location" (Robertson 2003, p. 15).

Bearing these caveats in mind, especially for analyzing the meso-level (the structure and organization of protest events) and the micro-level (the number of participants in events) of demobilization, the fact that PEA reflects more the media visibility of protest than a catalogue of every single event becomes an asset in measuring the macro-level, namely the broader societal resonance of the movement. As Beissinger (2002) argues, "Although event data do not in themselves measure beliefs, they can provide (particularly when juxtaposed with other information) insight into the issues that resonate within populations at specific moments in time and into the changing or consistent character of issues over which populations mobilize" (pp. 43-44). In addition to the PEA, I also use proxy measures such as polling data and web-search data for measuring societal resonance. While the former usually captures individual opinions or preferences, the latter reveals aggregated political behaviors (Pelc 2013). As Pelc (2013) argues, "Seeking information is a crucial political activity, yet it has been widely overlooked because until recently scholars had little means of observing it" (p. 631). By using Google Trends, we can get a sense for this information-seeking activity.

Although Google Trends is a relatively new tool, it has been increasingly used for measuring public attention and issue salience (see Mellon 2014 for a good review). While debates continue as to the validity and representativeness of Google Trends data, it remains a powerful tool as long as we acknowledge its limits. For example, as discussed in Mellon (2014), "The Google data are not given in absolute volumes but are indexed to the highest observed search volume, which is set to 100. Consequently, it is not possible to ascertain the frequency of searches that took place at any given time, but only how the searches have changed over time" (p. 50). Moreover, as Google Trends works with representative samples of searches (and not with their totality), these samples are recalculated every time a new search is made. It is thus important, as Pelc (2013) suggests, to repeat the searches at different points in time to ensure that the results are consistent over different searches. Having said that, just like for the PEA on both movements, using Google Trends, in addition to polling data revealing popular attitudes toward the movement, provides a way to get at general trends regarding the evolution of the societal resonance of movements.

Process Tracing

Process-tracing analysis is the ideal method for investigating the choice and evolution of the dominant forms of demobilization and how they interact with each other to produce civil society outcomes (Mahoney 2010). Bennett and Checkel (2015) define process tracing "as the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case" (p. 7). As a result, whereas the first part of the thesis is based on data-set observations (DSOs) for measuring demobilization (the protest event analysis), this part investigates causal process observations (CPOs), defined by Brady *et al.* (2010) as "observations about context, process, or mechanism [that] provide an alternative source of insight into the relationships among the explanatory variables" (p. 24). Thus, the focus here is not on finding correlations *across* cases, but on providing careful descriptions and examining sequential processes that different forms of demobilization take *within* the two cases – that are then compared – in a building block approach to theorization (see also Collier 2011).

The causal mechanism is demobilization processes, namely the different forms taken by demobilization when a social movement starts to unravel. While causal mechanisms are in essence unobservable, Table 2.2 above summarizes the observable implications/traces that are associated with each form of demobilization, concentrating on both actors and actions. Although the core forms come directly from theory (thus implying a strong deductive moment, Maillet & Mayaux 2015), the specification of each sub-form was made possible only after looking empirically at each case (thus relying on induction as well).

The process tracing analysis relied on diverse types of primary and secondary sources. First, primary sources were consulted during the PEA on both movements (chapter 3 and chapter 5), which provided a way to further delimit my cases, identifying the main actors involved and the critical junctures in the demobilization processes. In effect, as pointed out by Beissinger (2002), while reading the detailed accounts on protest events is necessary to construct datasets, "event data also provide the basis for an embedded qualitative research strategy of process tracing, allowing us to probe specific critical events more deeply" (p. 45). Second, I also consulted many other primary sources (other newspapers, blogs, websites, social media data) that could help to trace further the CPOs that I found during the PEA. In particular, to determine the fate of the main SMOs, as well as their relationships with one another, I needed to closely look at each organization's trajectory analyzing the choices made by the leaders, the type of actions conducted, the frames used, as well as the protest demands that SMO put forward in the aftermath of the movement. Third, I confronted what I observed with domestic and external academic analyses of both countries as well as other types of evidence coming from the literature already existing on both movements. When it was relevant for theorization, I also compared the cases with one another, having found in both a failed attempt to institutionalize and limited radicalization, despite the differences in the initial outcomes of the movement. The way these processes interacted over time, however, varies, which also left different lasting legacies when one looks in the longer run (see the conclusion for more detail).

As George and Bennett (2005) stress, one of the main strengths of process-tracing is that it allows the researcher to address the problem of equifinality "by documenting alternative causal paths to the same outcomes and alternative outcomes for the same causal factor" (p. 224). Consequently, even if I concentrate on the forms of demobilization by looking primarily at the

fate of actors, their interactions, and the evolution of actions, I am not arguing that political opportunities or other external explanations are not important in these evolutions. As Evangelista (2015) argues about the end of the Cold War, an event is in fact "made up of many events, and therefore many possible data points" (p. 184). Similarly, the end of a social movement also consists of many data points that need different types of explanations depending on the time frame and the level of analysis adopted. Process tracing thus provides a good way to explore alternative explanations – such as the initial success or failure of the movement, the repressive environment, or the elite divisions – and how they may also have influenced the forms of demobilization.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I laid out a theoretical framework and a methodology for the study of demobilization. As mentioned earlier, given that demobilization has been undertheorized thus far in the literature, the project aims at contributing to the literature of social movements in general by aggregating and expanding upon previous studies to build a more unified framework for analysis (George & Bennet 2005).

In order to do so, the first issue was to define what demobilization means, as well as when and how it occurs. I suggest defining demobilization as an evolving *process* that includes a decline in the activities organized by SMOs (meso-level), a disengagement of activists (micro-level), and a contraction in the intensity of societal contention (macro-level). I also specify the indicators to measure each level of analysis entailed by this theoretical definition (see Table 2.1). Then, I turned to the forms commonly associated with demobilization in the literature, namely institutionalization, radicalization, abeyance, and disappearance of all or part of the movement, and provide observable indicators to determine whether one form (or sub-form) is occurring at a specific point in time (see Table 2.2). In the last section, I discuss and justify the methodology that I use throughout this thesis, which is a mixture of protest event analysis with process-tracing. This discussion should be read along with the codebook in Appendix A, which further details how the datasets were compiled and events coded. The remaining chapters represent the empirical core of the dissertation, with the next two concentrating on Ukraine (chapters 3 & 4), followed by two on Russia (chapters 5 & 6).

CHAPTER 3 – THE UKRAINIAN ORANGE REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH: A PROTEST EVENT ANALYSIS

The Orange Revolution[10] occurred in Ukraine during the 2004 presidential elections, which were contested by two main figures: Viktor Yanukovich (the chosen successor of the incumbent Leonid Kuchma) and Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the opposition. Although protests had occurred beforehand, the Orange Revolution began in earnest on November 22, when the Central Election Commission declared that Yanukovich had won the second round with 49.5 percent of the vote (against 46.6 for Yushchenko), clearly contradicting the results of the exit polls conducted by civil society actors.

Opposition groups organized daily large-scale demonstrations and other events (including tent-cities, pickets, and blockades) across the country. In Kyiv, organizers initially expected between 60,000 and 80,000 protesters on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square); in the end, more than three hundred thousand people gathered at the peak of the mobilization, and according to later estimates, figures exceed one million (Nikolayenko 2009, p. 48, Beissinger 2013, p. 5). Outside of Kyiv, about 2 million Ukrainians protested in many regional cities, with 80 percent of the protesters from the more pro-Yushchenko western and central regions. On December 3, the Ukrainian Supreme Court invalidated the results of the second round and scheduled a re-vote on December 26, in which Yushchenko won the presidency with about 52 percent of the vote (against 44 percent for Yanukovich). The Orange movement can thus be considered a successful social movement, given that it succeeded in meeting its primary goals (i.e., the annulment of the election results and the victory of Viktor Yushchenko).

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[10] The Orange Revolution expression is used throughout the chapter to delimitate the period of mass protests that occurred between November 2004 and January 2005, which can include both the events supporting Yushchenko and the events supporting Yanukovich. The Orange movement is used more specifically to refer to the social movement that supported Yushchenko. I use Blue events when I discuss the countermovement that supported Yanukovich.

Although the political opposition was the driving force behind the Orange events, civil society played a key role, just as it had in all the other color revolutions (Cheterian 2013)[11]. Yushchenko's political party Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina), which allied with Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT) in the coalition 'Force of the People' (Sila Narodu), developed significant links with many social movement organizations (SMOs) that turned out to be instrumental in these events. Of particular importance were several youth groups, such as Black and Yellow PORA, Clean Ukraine (Chista Ukraïna), I know! (Znaiu!), as well as Students' Wave (Students'ka Khvylia). Other well-established civil society actors, including the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (Komitet vybortsiv Ukraïny), the Democratic Initiatives Foundation (Fund demokratychni initsiatyvy), and the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies named after Olexander Razumkov (hereafter, the Razumkov Centre) supported the Orange campaign by conducting exit polls and spreading alternative information. Many of these old and new SMOs[12] participated in broader coalitions formed precisely for preventing electoral fraud during the presidential elections, namely the 'New Choice – 2004' (Novyi vybir – 2004) and the 'Freedom of Choice' (Svoboda Viboru) (Kas'kiv *et al*. 2007, p. 12-13).

In addition to this highly cooperative network, the societal resonance of the Orange Revolution was unprecedented in Ukraine. For example, the Orange movement went far beyond street protests: schools, universities, and factories in many cities halted their activities in order to denounce the electoral fraud[13]. One can even note the movement's popularity in fashion trends at that time[14]. Public opinion polls found that between 18 and 22 percent of the Ukrainian population participated in these events, and in some regions, participation exceeded 50 percent

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[11] Although debates exist about the exact role that civil society played in the protests, whether it was more a mobilizing, a triggering, or a channeling role (Stepanenko 2006, Way 2014), few would dispute the fact that civil society was a key actor.

[12] As explained in chapter 1, SMO is used throughout this dissertation as an umbrella for various informal and formal groups that compose and idenfity with a social movement, be they think tanks, NGOs, or more informal groups (see McArthy & Zald 1977).

[13] V zapadnykh oblastiakh Ukrainy v politicheskie razborki vtianuli detei: Ob"iavlena zabastovka shkol vo L'vovskoi i Ivano-Frankovskoi oblastiakh. (2004, November 25). *ITAR TASS* ; Yurskii, A. (2004, November 26). Vinnitskii politekhnicheskii universitet ob"iavil kanikuly do 25 dekabria v podderzhku politicheskoi zabastovki storonnikov Yushchenko. *Ukraïns'ki Novini* ; Okolo 27 tysiach predpriiatii prisoedinilis' k obshchenatsional'noi zabastovke - Kinakh (2004, November 30). *Unian*.

[14] See for example, V Kieve nazvany laureaty fotokonkursa "Miss revoliutsii". (2004, December 11). *ITAR TASS* ; "Oranzhevaia revoliutsiia" na Ukraine prinesla novogodniuiu modu na oranzhevye elki. (2004, December 16). *ITAR-TASS* ; Korolenko, P. (2005, January 14). Proekt "B": Modno i stil'no. *Vedomosti* ; Vystavka 'Orznzhevoe mgovenie zhizni' otrkylas' v Ukrainskom Dome (2005, January 22). *Unian*.

(Beissinger 2011, p. 28-29). Without a doubt, the Revolution was easily the most resonant event of 2004 in Ukraine and arguably the most resonant event since the Soviet breakup[15].

Despite being closely associated with the political opposition, many observers saw in the Orange Revolution a social movement that illustrated the awakening of Ukrainian civil society, finally ready to fight for democratic change and standing up for principled ideas (Silitsky 2005, Kuzio 2005a, Diuk 2006, Demes & Forbrig 2006, Kas'kiv *et al*. 2007). According to Mykola Haber, Chairman of the Patriotic Party of Ukraine, the Orange Revolution started the day "when people decided to go out into the streets in order to show that Ukraine is the most democratic country"[16]. While remaining cautious about the prospect for long-term changes, Stepanenko (2005) argued that "the Orange Revolution at least determined a new way of public political activity, formed new social experience, and integrated itself as a successful political mobilization of wide sections of the population in a post-Soviet country" (p. 596). Contrary to these more optimistic interpretations, I argue that despite its success, the Orange Revolution did not substantially invigorate Ukrainian civil society in a lasting manner. This argument will be developed at length in the next chapter, where I examine the Orange Revolution demobilization processes and their results in greater detail through process-tracing. But in order to do so, we must first pinpoint how, when, and where demobilization of this extraordinary social movement occurred.

In this chapter, my aim is thus to describe the mobilization and demobilization dynamics of the Orange Revolution, identifying its turning points at different levels of analysis. This chapter presents the results of a protest event analysis that I conducted on the Orange Revolution. Based on an original dataset of about 2,400 events, it lays out the structure of the mobilizations and reveals the critical moments in the demobilization period, in the process highlighting regional differences (between Kyiv and the regions, as well as between eastern and western regions). In particular, the data call into question two interrelated and widespread assumptions: that Orange protests only occurred in the western and central regions of Ukraine; and that Ukrainians from the eastern and southern regions were more apathetic toward civil society activities.

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[15] Ommunikatsionnaia gruppa PRT prezentovala reiting samykh rezonansnykh sobytii v Ukraine 2004 goda. (2005, January 27). *Unian*.

[16] My translation : "[…]kogda liudi reshili vyiti na ulitsy, chtoby dokazat', chto Ukraina - samaia demokraticheskaia strana". V Kieve prezentovana suvenirnaia moneta 'Pomorancheva Revoliutsiia 'TAK' (2004, December 28). *Unian*.

As the database compiles all events that happened during the Orange Revolution, it also enables a closer comparison of the Orange movement with the counter-mobilization organized by the Yanukovich supporters (hereafter, the Blue countermovement) – a topic that has thus far been neglected in the literature. As mentioned in chapter 1, countermovements are defined as "collective and reactive efforts to defend the status quo and its varied range of dominant elites against a credible threat to overturn them from below" (Slater & Smith 2016, p. 1475). Although I do not consider countermovements as social movements per se, as they are not organized to challenge the authorities but are rather organized by these authorities (or third loyal parties), they are still instances of mobilizations and should not be simply dismissed because of their attachment to the regime. While many protesters may participate in those pro-regime events because of material incentives, I would not assume that other reasons could not be part of their motivations. As Beissinger (2017) argues, referring to the Orange Revolution as his main example,

> Incumbent regimes often enjoy a social base that transcends patronage relationships due to cultural or ideological divisions within society. Moreover, autonomous counterrevolutionary participation can be motivated less by enthusiasm for the incumbent regime than by dislike of the social forces represented within revolutionary movements (p. 5).

As a result, without equating the Blue countermovement with the Orange movement, this chapter presents data on the Blue events and participation that might introduce more complexity about the Orange Revolution than it is usually the case. In turn, non-aligned events relate to all other protest events that were occurring at the same time as the Orange and Blue events but could be neither classified as pertaining in one of the two camps.

On a more theoretical note, the chapter shows that even after successes, social movement demobilization is a complex process that requires further scrutiny. While in the literature movement victories have often been associated with greater institutionalization of civil society (as will be discussed in Chapter 4), the results of the subsequent protest event analysis highlight that definitions of success vary from one group of actors to another. In turn, this often leads to rising tensions, as the timing of demobilization for different SMOs may not all coincide. When such large-scale mobilizations occur – and especially when they succeed in meeting their goals –

we tend to take it for granted that the main SMOs will become more embedded into society, attracting more activists and resources, having matured through the mobilization period. I find instead that SMOs might also become marginalized, further polarizing civil society instead of consolidating it.

The Data

Despite the scholarly interest that the Orange Revolution generated, as of yet no structured dataset has systematically mapped the full evolution of the movement. Authors have conducted many interviews, surveys, or focus groups ex-post (Stepanenko 2005, Lane 2008, Shyyan 2008, Bozzoli & Brück 2010, Beissinger 2011, 2013, Onuch 2011, 2014), but no protest event analysis on the Orange Revolution has been performed. As a result, the number of events organized and the number of participants in the Orange Revolution are often reported as vague estimates that vary according to authors. For example, whereas Beissinger (2013) argues that "somewhere between 4.9 and 6.7 million people participated in the revolution on the Orange side across various parts of Ukraine, while between 700 thousand and 1.4 million participated in protests on the Blue side (in support of the incumbent regime)" (p. 7), Freedom House (2005) claims that "Up to 3 million people participated in different meetings, actions, and marches across the whole of Ukraine" during the Orange Revolution. In turn, Onuch (2015) provides more conservative estimates, noting that "approximately 800,000 people took part in the protests in Kyiv and close to 1,5 million across all Ukraine" (p. 40-41).

In order to conduct a protest event analysis on the Orange Revolution, I therefore compiled an original dataset. I did so using five different sources, with the most useful being two Ukrainian news agencies, *Ukraïns'ki Novini* and *Unian*, which both reported about 55 percent of the 2,390 events in the database[17]. The database includes all protest events reported by the sources that took place from November 2004 to June 2005, thereby including the two months where mass mobilizations were at their peak as well as the six subsequent months of demobilization. These data of course constitute only a sample of all the protest events that took place in Ukraine during

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[17] See codebook (Appendix A) for more details on the coding processes.

this period, so it is possible that events not included in the dataset vary in systematic ways. As the collecting and coding processes were the same for every included entry, however, I have minimized biases across events that are in the dataset. The data thus provide insights into general trends occurring during and after the Orange Revolution across the almost 2,400 events that received coverage at the major news agencies.

Orange Events and SMOs - A Meso-level Analysis

Figure 3.1 presents the structure of the Orange movement in terms of events organized on a monthly basis[18]. Unsurprisingly, November and December 2004 represent the two months where the movement was at its peak, with respectively 339 and 415 events that count for 57 percent of all Orange activities reported in the dataset (n=1330). But what Figure 3.1 also shows is that despite clear demobilization trends that became noticeable from January 2005 (with a decrease of 73 percent in terms of events organized compared to December 2004), a stable degree of mobilization remained at the meso-level, which began to slightly diminish only in June 2005. As a result, while many authors have usually identified the end of the Orange Revolution in late December, just after the re-run of the second round on December 26 (Onuch 2015, p. 35), or extended it a little more into January (Beissinger 2013, p. 5), the data show that not everyone within the Orange camp were ready to go home after Yushchenko's electoral victory.

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[18] As explained in the codebook, to decide whether to include an event into the Orange movement, the following criteria were used: 1) the event was organized by one (or more) of the main actors (SMOs or leaders) of the Orange movement, and 2) the event was not a Blue event. See Appendix A for more details.

Figure 3.1. Number of Orange events per month, November 2004-June 2005

If we look at the same data disaggregated on a daily basis, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, some nuances appear although the general trends remain valid. For example, not only is the importance of the November and December months still visible, but we can also see that the Orange events were spread out geographically only during a very short period. More precisely, November 23 represents the peak day during which 51 Orange events were organized all across Ukraine. Already in early December, however, the number of Orange events organized per day had more than halved, falling to between 10 and 20 events per day in December.

Figure 3.2. Number of Orange events per day, November 2004-June 2005[19]

Indeed, if we take the longest periodization for the Orange Revolution (from November 22 to January 23, i.e. the day of Yushchenko's presidential inauguration), the average number of Orange events organized per day is about 13 events. However, if we only take the outburst of mobilization comprised of the 12 days between November 22 and December 3, when the Ukrainian Supreme Court decided to re-run the second round, the average reaches 28 events organized per day (see Table 3.1). These 12 days also represent clearly the peak of the movement in terms of the number of participants as shown in Table 3.1, and as it will be further discussed below. But already after December 3, and even more after December 8 where a political pact was agreed among the new and old elites, we note a decrease of three times in the average number of events organized per day, which then falls again by three times after the Orange Revolution.

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[19] For all figures presented that compile the data on a daily basis, the mention of the month represents the 15th day of each month.

49

Table 3.1. Summary of the level of participation (per protest day) and number of events in average (per day) in the Orange movement at different moments

Periodization	Protest day	Participation (average/protest day)	Number of events (average/protest day)
During the Orange Revolution	63	53,354	13
- Nov 22 - Dec 3	12	238,209	28
- Dec 4 - Jan 23	51	9,859	9
After the Orange Revolution	147	935	3.2

Kyiv vs. the Oblasts: Regional variations of the Orange movement

While the focus surrounding the Orange Revolution has often been put on the central square in Kyiv (the Maidan), Figure 3.3 depicts the variation in the importance of Kyiv compared to other regional locations. During the heyday of the Orange movement in late November, the protests were more diffused all across Ukraine. Starting from early December to the end of January, a clear recentralization of protest activities around Kyiv took place. Later in the demobilization period, however, we see that the weight of Kyiv compared to the regions diminished. Overall, this figure testifies to the fact that beyond Kyiv, Ukrainian regions participated quite actively in the Orange movement. Although we would need to have more data in order to make proper comparisons between the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan, the findings presented here at least require us to nuance recent affirmations that "unlike the Orange Revolution, Euromaidan was not confined to the capital but spread to become a nation-wide phenomenon" (Pishchikova & Ogryzko 2014, p. 3). In fact, despite clear demobilization trends, regions remained mobilized to a certain extent even after the Orange Revolution at the meso-level.

Figure 3.3. Comparison of numbers of Orange events per month in Kyiv and the regions, November 2004-June 2005

Figure 3.4 breaks down the comparison in terms of percentage of regions, both in keeping Kyiv in the central district (left quadrant) and in excluding it (right quadrant). If Kyiv is kept in the picture, the central region is clearly dominant with 53 percent of all Orange events. In addition, the western region counts for 21 percent, which makes the two western and central regions organizing close to three quarters of all Orange events. However, when we exclude Kyiv from the picture, we see a much more balanced division between the central (32 percent), the western (30 percent), and the southern regions (31 percent). To have a better sense of what happened in the Ukrainian regions, excluding Kyiv appears justified, given that the evolution of mobilization follows a very different logic in the capital, if only because many protesters left their home regions to organize and participate in the Kyiv events[20]. Although Orange events organized in the eastern region might appear very small in proportion to the three other regions, with 5 to 7 percent of events organized, some mobilization for the Orange camp had nonetheless occurred in the East contrary to what has often been suggested.

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[20] Sokolovskaia, I. (2004, December 9). 300 tys. zhitelei regionov priniali uchastie v aktsiiakh protiv fal'sifikatsii vyborov Prezidenta v Kieve po podschetam Kievsoveta. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

Figure 3.4. Regional distribution of Orange events, November 2004-June 2005

Indeed, one of the most persistent beliefs related to the Orange Revolution is that the mobilizations were concentrated in the western and central regions. For example, Onuch (2015) argues that "unlike the Orange Revolution, which was certainly a phenomenon of western and central Ukraine, the Euromaidan was a national phenomenon, even though the largest protests took place in similar locations to 2004" (p. 39). Likewise, Reznik (2016) contends that, "in contrast to the events of the Orange Revolution, in late 2013 to early 2014, Euromaidan protests, though not numerous, also appeared in cities in the east and south, where Russian-speaking representatives among the medium strata also showed their civil positions" (p. 5). Yet as Figure 3.4 shows, if we look at the Orange mobilizations outside Kyiv[21], the southern and eastern regions account for about 38 percent of all Orange events in the dataset.

Figure 3.5 presents the evolution of the regional distribution for the Orange mobilization over time (excluding Kyiv from the central region). We can quickly notice that while during the Orange Revolution, the central, western, and southern regions were all very active in organizing Orange events, the southern region suddenly became more important in the initial aftermath (from January to April 2005) at the expense of both the western and central regions. As will be discussed below, this is mostly due to a sit-in organized in Simferopol during that period, in

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[21] Kyiv organized 57 percent out of the 712 Orange events that took place in the central district.

which former Orange SMOs associated themselves to new groups, such as the Tatar community. Later, however, the central and western regions returned to prominence.

Figure 3.5. Evolution of the regional distribution of Orange events, November 2004-June 2005

Figures 3.6 and 3.7 disaggregate the data at the city level in each region. In the central region, Poltava (25 percent), Vinnytsia (20 percent), and Cherkasy (20 percent) were the three poles of protest activity once Kyiv is excluded. In the western region, Lviv organized almost a third of the Orange activities (29 percent), and Ternopil a little less than a quarter (22 percent). However, what these figures do not show very clearly is how several other cities participated in the Orange movement, organizing at least one event during or after the Orange Revolution (see Table 3A in Appendix B for the number of events in each Ukrainian city).

Figure 3.6. Distribution of Orange events by city in the central region without Kyiv (left) and in the western region (right), November 2004-June 2005.

Central region (without Kyiv)   Western region

Turning to the eastern parts, Figure 3.7 shows how distributed protest events were in the southern region (left quadrant) while also emphasizing how the Orange mobilization in the eastern region was mainly concentrated in Kharkiv (73 percent), and to a far lesser extent, in Luhansk (17 percent) and Donetsk (10 percent).

Figure 3.7. Distribution of Orange Events by City in the southern (left) and eastern regions (right), November 2004-June 2005

Southern Region   Eastern Region

These findings shed new light on eastern and southern activism during the Orange Revolution. As Figure 3.7 illustrates, just like during the Euromaidan, smaller protests supporting the Orange movement did occur during the Revolution in cities such as Simferopol, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Dnipropetrovs'k.

In fact, as we saw with Figure 3.5, the weight of the southern region in terms of Orange protest activities significantly increased from January to April 2005, eclipsing the activism in all other regions. To understand this net increase, we need to look at the Crimean capital, Simferopol, in which 40 percent of all Orange events in the southern region took place. If we focus only on the aftermath of the Orange Revolution (after January 23), Simferopol's weight at the meso-level increases by 10 percent, accounting for almost half of all Orange events organized in the southern region. This suggests that while Orange SMOs initially returned home quickly in Simferopol after Yushchenko's victory in late December[22], it did not take long before they returned to the streets to denounce local officials[23]. They also rapidly broadened their coalition, associating themselves, for example, with the Tatar community and its demands for land redistribution. As a result, former Orange activists in Crimea, such as Viktor Nevirko, were now openly challenging the new Yushchenko regime[24].

Orange SMOs: Dissociating from Yushchenko

This last point brings me to the question of the SMOs and leaders that were behind the Orange events. In the sources used to construct the database, the organizers were not often precisely identified. Most often a source would report for example that "Yushchenko (or Yanukovich) supporters" organized event X (or stop their protest activity) in Location Y. Consequently, I cannot make strong claims about the exact weight of each SMO during the Orange Revolution. However, it should be noted that what the data reveal in terms of the main

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[22] Nikolaenko, M. (2004, December 29). Storonniki Yushchenko svernuli palatochnyi gorodok v Simferopole. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.
[23] Riabchikov, L. (2005, February 10). Predstaviteli "revoliutsionnogo" Narodnogo fronta Kryma trebuiut otstavki glavy pravitel'stva avtonomii. *ITAR-TASS*.
[24] Nikolaenko, M. (2005, April 26). Krymskie tatary svernuli palatochnyi gorodok v Simferopole. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

actors of the protests parallels the findings of the secondary literature.

For example, for many events, I coded Yushchenko headquarters ('Shtab Yushchenko') as the main organizers when the sources suggested that the Orange political elite were the orchestrators of the events. This code was used for about 25 percent of the Orange events (n=1330). However, after the Orange Revolution, this code quickly lost its relevance as Yushchenko and his team began forming the new regime. I thus coded each political party separately and then recoded them into 'Other formal actors' (which organized 15 percent of Orange events), in order to enable the comparison with the former Yushchenko headquarters team (that also comprised some of these political parties). While 'PORA' organized 18 percent of events, other Orange youth groups initiated about 8 percent of protest activities, which brings the youth involvement to a quarter in terms of organizing events. I used the code 'Activists' when it was unclear whether an event was ordered and organized by the Yushchenko headquarters or any other SMOs. Broadly-defined activists organized about 20 percent of all Orange events. The remaining 14 percent of events were organized by other Orange SMOs ('Others'), including the Forum for the Rescue of Kyiv (Forum spaseniia Kieva) or the Popular Front of Crimea Against Corruption (Narodnyi front Kryma protiv korruptsii). All these actors and their relative weights in the Orange movement correspond to what other authors have identified as the main players of the Orange Revolution (Bunce & Wolchik 2011, Beissinger 2013, Onuch 2014).

Table 3.2[25] shows the geographical distribution of Orange actors' involvement. Interestingly, the majority (except for 'Other formal actors' and 'Other SMOs') distributed their energies similarly,

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[25] For Table 3.2, I recoded the variable for the first Organizer (ORG1) for Orange events for which I had 79 different actors/SMOs into six categories: Yushchenko headquarters, other formal actors, PORA, other youth groups, activists, and others SMOs. While Yushchenko headquarters, PORA, and activists were the original codes, I recoded the three others. The 'Other formal actors' is here composed of events organized by the 'Nasha Ukraina', 'Sila Narodu', 'Edinaia Ukraina', 'Narodnyi rukh Ukrainy', 'Narodnyi soiuz Ukraintsy', 'Natsional'nyi al'ians', 'PPPU', 'Partiia promyshlennikov i predprinimate', 'Partiia zashchitnikov otechestva', 'political parties', Partiia zakhisnikiv Vitchizni', 'Sobor', 'SPU', ' Ukrainskaia narodnaia partiia', and 'Yabluko'. The category 'other youth groups' includes 'Bat'kivshchina moloda', 'Chista Ukraïna', 'Mezhdunarodnyi molodezhnyi tsentr', Molodezh' nadezhda Ukrainy', 'Molodezhnaia partiia ukrainy', 'Studencheskii zabastovochnyi komitet Chernivtsi', 'Studencheskoe brastvo', 'Studencheskoe bratstva Kryma', 'Students', ' Soiuz molodykh sotsialistov', and 'Ukrainskii studencheskii soiuz', 'Youth wing of Sobor'. Other SMOs ('Others') is composed of the 49 remaining actors, including SMOs such as ' Forum spaseniia Kieva', 'Narodnyi front Kryma protiv korruptsii', 'Za Pravda svobodu poltaskvoi obshchiny', 'Channel 5', 'Dnipropetrovshchina za chestnye vybory', 'KIU', 'Komitet natsionalnyi spasenia', or 'Komitet predprinimatelei (Lviv)', and many social groups, such as 'Teachers', 'Profsiuz', or 'workers'.

with between 32 to 38 percent of their Orange events organized in Kyiv, and between 62 to 68 percent of events organized outside the capital. The difference with the 'Other formal actors' and 'Other SMOs' is probably due to the fact that these categories include a greater diversity of local groups with each organizing fewer events than those in the four other categories.

Table 3.2. Geographical distribution of Orange events according to actors

	Yushchenko headquarters	Other formal actors	PORA	Other youth groups	Activists	Other SMOs	Total
Locality							
Kyiv	106	55	91	37	84	39	**412**
	(32%)	(27.5%)	(38%)	(34%)	(32%)	(21%)	**(31%)**
Region	223	145	146	73	181	150	**918**
	(68%)	(72.5%)	(62%)	(66%)	(68%)	(79%)	**(69%)**
Total	329	200	237	110	265	189	**1330**

If we look at the regional variations of Orange actors' involvement by excluding Kyiv from the central region, as presented in Figure 3.8, we see some noteworthy differences: 'Other SMOs' organized more events in the southern region (especially compared to the western region); 'Activists' were more important in the western region; and the 'Other formal actors' were not as active in the western region as they were in other regions. Nonetheless, these differences may lie more with how the sources reported the organizers than with a meaningful divergence. For example, the Yushchenko headquarters organized Orange events in every region in a roughly similar fashion, as did the youth groups (although for the southern region, there was less diversity among youth groups, as PORA seemed to have monopolized protest activities).

Figure 3.8. Regional distribution of Orange events according to actors

Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 depict the evolution of the importance of these event organizers during the movement. In Figure 3.9, we see that after an important involvement of the Yushchenko headquarters (in dark blue) during the heyday of the Orange Revolution (Nov. 22-Dec. 3), the political opposition demobilized rather quickly already after December 3, thus even before I stop to use the 'Yushchenko headquarters' code because of the end of the elections (after Dec. 26). Note also that only five days later, on December 8, a political compromise was reached between the Yushchenko team and the outgoing officials, foreseeing a Constitutional change that would give more power to the Parliament to the detriment of the President. Despite the disengagement of formal actors, however, PORA (in green) and other activists (in light blue) played a greater role in the later days of the Revolution. In turn, PORA was still organizing protest events until April 2005, whereas the activism of other youth groups seemed to become more important from April to June 2005. Other SMOs became more significant as soon as the Orange Revolution finished. But here again, some variations might come from how the data were reported in the aftermath of the Revolution.

Figure 3.9. Orange actors' importance as event organizers during the Orange movement

Consequently, I recoded the actors' categories in order to reduce these eventual differences in reporting protest events after the Revolution. In Figure 3.10, I use only three categories: Formal actors (which includes both Yushchenko headquarters and other political parties), youth groups, and other SMOs (which includes activists). First, while the relative participation of formal actors diminished after the Orange Revolution (diminution of 10 percent) the youth and other SMOs involvement increased by 5 percent each after the Orange Revolution. As a result, the rapid demobilization of many formal actors after the Revolution was initially replaced by a greater diversity of actors, such as youth groups and other SMOs in general, although, as Figure 3.9 reminds us, the overall number of Orange events organized after the Revolution diminished.

Figure 3.10. Comparison of the proportion of Orange events organized by different actors, before and after the Orange Revolution

During the OR

Others
36%

Formal
actors
42%

Youth
groups
22%

After the OR

Others
41%

Formal
actors
32%

Youth
groups
27%

Repertoire of Actions

As discussed in the previous chapter, the evolution of the repertoire of actions is a good indicator of how a social movement develops over time. In particular, the distinction between event-type categories, for example between demonstrative and direct actions, can tell us whether the movement aims to attract new protesters or is instead beginning to radicalize, which is associated with demobilization.

The Orange movement, despite having often been described in festive, large-scale, and peaceful terms[26], did not rely exclusively on demonstrative actions such as massive rallies and pickets. Looking at the repertoire of actions of the entire Orange movement as shown in Figure 3.11, we see that Orange protesters actually used more direct than demonstrative actions, for example establishing many sit-ins/tent-cities ('lager') throughout Ukraine. Sit-ins represent the most common Orange event type (with 51 percent), followed by rallies/demonstrations (21 percent)

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[26] Indeed, violent clashes between the protesters and the regime never happened despite many rumors about an eventual violent response by the state. See Shtaby kandidatov v prezidenty ukrainy pugaiut drug druga vmeshatel'stvo silovykh structur v razreshenie kondflikta (2004, December 24). *WPS: Oborona i bezopasnost'*.

and pickets (17 percent)[27]. Although many of these sit-ins, such as the famous one on Khreshchatyk Avenue in Kyiv, were mainly non-violent and disciplined, protesters were nonetheless occupying the space on a more permanent basis than with demonstrations and rallies. If we add to sit-ins other direct actions, such as blockades (3 percent), hunger strikes (3 percent), and other direct forms (2 percent), direct actions represent 59 percent of the overall repertoire of the Orange movement from November 2004 to June 2005. In fact, about only 40 percent of the Orange events organized during this period were truly demonstrative actions.

Figure 3.11. Repertoire of actions for the Orange movement, November 2004-June 2005

When the Orange Revolution is broken down into different time periods, the importance of direct action appears more clearly as the repertoire of actions evolved rapidly (see figure 3.12). In effect, when using the shortest periodization (between November 22 and December 3), we see that at the very beginning of the mobilizations, demonstrative actions were clearly dominant, with rallies (54 percent), pickets (5 percent), and other demonstrative forms (3 percent) representing 62 percent of all events. However, a limited radicalization took place during the rest of the Orange Revolution (between December 4 and January 23) when direct actions, and mainly

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[27] Event types were coded by the term used in the source to describe the nature of the event. As a rule of thumb, rallies ('mitings') are used to refer to large-scale demonstrations, which generally include a stage and people addressing the crowd whereas pickets are usually more modest events and do not necessary involve speakers. More importantly, however, is that both event types are demonstrative actions.

sit-ins (74 percent), represented more than three quarter of all events being organized by the Orange movement (see Figure 3.12, right quadrant). This also corresponded to a sharp decrease in participation numbers as will be discussed later (see Figure 3.25).

Figure 3.12. Orange movement event types during two stages of the Orange Revolution

Nov. 22 – Dec. 3 2004

Dec. 4 2004 – Jan 23 2005

To have a broader picture, we should also look at the evolution of the demonstrative versus direct actions on a daily basis for the entire period covered by the database. Figure 3.13 shows how quickly demonstrative actions went from being predominant in late November and early December to being almost completely eclipsed by direct actions until late January 2005.

Figure 3.13. Evolution of the repertoire of actions for the Orange movement, November 2004-June 2005 (by day)

In the immediate aftermath period (February and March 2005) the repertoire of actions of the Orange movement became more balanced, with about 60 percent demonstrative actions. But it did not take long before the return to direct action predominance, accounting for 70 percent of the repertoire from April to June 2005.

The Evolution of Protest Demands

By its very nature, the Orange Revolution was first and foremost a political event: Two candidates and their groups of supporters confronted each other over electoral results. In the database, I used five categories to group protest demands: Political, socioeconomic, sociocultural, ecological, and ethnic[28]. It should thus come as no surprise that the Orange movement mostly advanced political claims, which constitute roughly 96 percent of the demands of the movement (the remaining 4 percent is composed of ethnic, socioeconomic, and sociocultural claims).

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[28] See codebook, pp. 258-259 (Appendix A) for more details.

To see how the movement demands evolved after the Orange Revolution (see Figure 3.14), I recoded the political category into three different sub-categories: 1) the initial demand to support Yushchenko and other claims related to the elections, 2) demands related to the appointment of officials or requesting their removal, and 3) other political requests. While the first two are more straightforward, the third sub-category includes broader and more diverse political issues. Given their rather minimal occurrence, I also aggregated socioeconomic, ethnic, sociocultural, or ecological claims into a single category 'Others'.

Figure 3.14 illustrates how important political demands remained within the Orange movement after the Orange Revolution despite the end of the electoral contest. Figure 3.15 shows the breakdown of these demands according to actors. In Figure 3.14, we see that protest demands moved away from being overwhelmingly centered on supporting Yushchenko to being concerned with the policies of his new regime. In particular, as will be discussed in the next chapter, Yushchenko's appointments of officials during spring 2005 proved to be a contentious task around which many Orange actors continued to mobilize (see light-Orange area).

Figure 3.14. Evolution of Orange movement protest demands, November 2004-June 2005

While other political requests (shaded in brown) include more diverse political claims made by Orange SMOs, it is worth noting that these claims were often quite radical, with demands

requiring 'lustration' of officials' or asking to officially recognize the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).

Moving beyond political requests, other demands (shaded in red) were also put forward, but they never occupied a central role. In April 2005, there were more protest activities classified under ethnic events than in the previous months, with, for example, a Tatar-led sit-in in Simferopol that lasted 25 days and pressed for land redistribution.

Figure 3.15. Orange movement protest demands by main actors, November 2004-June 2005

While many Orange SMOs were still organizing protest events and remained mobilized at the meso-level, finding new political reasons to go out into the streets, often against their own former heroes, these demands never transformed into socioeconomic or sociocultural issues, which could have potentially attracted more popular sympathy. Partly as a result, and especially given the stark contrast with protest demands put forward around the same time by SMOs unrelated to the Orange movement (see Figure 3.24 below), former Orange SMOs seemed to have missed an opportunity to become more embedded into Ukrainian society and into political life. Although we cannot be completely sure that such opportunity existed in the first place, the fact that not only observers wanted to see in the Orange Revolution the awakening of civil society, but also that Orange SMOs and leaders clearly stated that they wanted to play a greater

role in the Ukrainian public life after the Orange Revolution (as will be discussed in the next chapter) gives us a way to contrast such high expectations with the actual far modest outcomes.

Blue Events and Non-Aligned Protest Events

While the Orange movement attracted a great deal of scholarly attention, the countermovement organized by the Yanukovich camp was typically ignored or dismissed as a fake movement composed of insincere participants paid for their participation. Kuzio (2007), for example, called the Blue countermovement "political tourism", claiming that its participants lacked the energy "of the orange voters whose convictions made them stay for 17 days in cold weather on Kyiv's streets". Even when Blue protesters were not dismissed offhand (Stepanenko 2005, Beissinger 2013), authors rarely went further than simply mentioning that they existed (see Bozzoli & Brück 2010 for a rare exception).

Yet if we are interested in the level of activism in Ukraine during this period, it makes little sense to completely exclude Blue events from our analysis. While it is true that Blue events were often organized by Yanukovich allies who used administrative resources, we cannot necessarily assume that all Blue protesters were contrived or paid for their participation. It seems highly improbable that the regime could guarantee such material incentives to all participants, whom according to Beissinger (2013) have amounted to between 700 thousands to 1.4 millions of people. Some participants may have genuinely preferred the status quo to the more pro-West orientations often associated with Yushchenko's political program. Studying more closely the difference in motivations between the Blue and Orange protesters, Bozzoli and Brück (2010) find that while Blue participants were more likely to be public employees (which supports the thesis that people felt contrived to participate in fear of losing their jobs), current unemployment status almost doubled the chance of participating in the countermovement (which might also be associated to accumulated grievances against growing globalization linked with the West). Especially in Ukraine, where deep societal and regional divisions exist, the Blue countermovement surely built upon these preexisting tensions.

Figure 3.16 presents all events that occurred during and after the Orange Revolution, dividing them between the Orange movement (the orange column), the Blue countermovement (the blue column), or neither of the two camps (the grey column)[29]. Rather than forming part of a broader protest campaign, these non-aligned protest activities were typically organized by SMOs unrelated to each other, often pressing for single-issue socioeconomic claims. If we look at the period from November 2004 to January 2005, 36 percent of all events were organized by Yanukovich supporters (Blue events), and in January, this percentage reached 57 percent. We can also note that the Blue countermovement appears to have been, just like the Orange movement, quite resilient over time – further supporting the argument that it is worthy of inclusion in academic research. In fact, in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, the two groups organized roughly the same number of street protests. To be sure, both movements became more heterogeneous after the Orange Revolution, with their claims also evolving. However, since the aim is to trace key moments and processes in demobilization, it appears important to include events that were still being organized by actors who were previously part of the movement or countermovement. Otherwise, we would be tempted to conclude that the movement simply disappeared instead of demobilizing through different paths.

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[29] See codebook, p. 261 (Appendix A) for the criteria used to decide whether to include an event into the Orange movement, the Blue countermovement or in non-aligned events.

Figure 3.16. Events per month organized by the Orange movement, the Blue countermovement, and others, November 2004-June 2005

Looking at Figure 3.17, which disaggregates the data on a daily basis, a slightly different picture emerges. The left-top quadrant presents the evolution of all daily events that occurred in Ukraine between November 2004 and June 2005, which are in turn divided into different types of events: the Orange events (right-top quadrant), the Blue events (left-bottom) and non-aligned events (right-bottom). We see for example that the countermovement never enjoyed the same extraordinary upsurge that was experienced by the Orange movement. Nonetheless, the Blue countermovement remained quite constant in its level of mobilization, with periodic increases in intensity. The relative success of the countermovement in maintaining a certain level of activism in Ukraine is also interesting when we compare it with the pro-regime events in Russia, which were far more concentrated in time and never translated into longer-lasting activism (see chapter 5).

Regarding the non-aligned events (right-bottom quadrant), they only intensified a little in May 2005. Of course, the month of May is always a busy time of the year in which different groups organize various protest activities on May 1 and May 9 (Victory Day), which accounted for about 25 percent of the non-aligned events for May 2005. But several other events were

organized in May denouncing, for example, the seizure of a company in Dnipropetrovs'k[30], working conditions in Ivano-Frankivsk[31], or food price increases in Zhytomyr[32].

Figure 3.17. Events per day in Ukraine, November 2004-June 2005

The Blue Countermovement

Looking at the regional distribution of the Blue events (Figure 3.18), we note without surprise that these events were mostly held in the southern and eastern regions (68 percent of the events), and that even when keeping Kyiv into the picture, the central region barely attracted a quarter of the Blue activism. More precisely, only 17 percent of all Blue events were held in Kyiv[33]. As a

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[30] Tretii den' prodolzhaetsia bessrochnyi miting rabotnikov dnepropetrovskogo tsentral'nogo rynka "Ozerka". (2005, May 22). *Unian*.

[31] Deputaty Dolinskogo raisoveta trebuiut otmenit' prikaz, kotoryi vlechet za soboi sokrashchenie rabotnikov 'Dolinaneftegaza' (2005, May 22). *Unian*.

[32] V Zhitomire pered zdaniem oblgosadministratsii prokhodit miting kommunistov protiv povysheniia tsen (2005, May 25). *Unian*.

[33] However, 146 out of 219 events (67 percent) occurring in the central region were held in Kyiv and 45 events (21 percent) took place in Cherkasy, the remaining 12 percent was divided into 10 other cities. See Table 3B in Appendix B for the number of Blue events in each Ukrainian city.

result, excluding Kyiv from the analysis is less relevant than for the Orange movement to see regional variations.

Figure 3.18. Regional distribution of Blue events, November 2004-June 2005

Figure 3.19 presents the evolution over time of Blue activism by region. The results are a particularly interesting comparison with Figure 3.5 (the same graph for the Orange movement). At the beginning of the mobilization of both movements, three regions shared a roughly balanced number of events, while a fourth region was largely dormant (i.e., the western region in the Blue case, and the eastern region in the Orange movement). By the peak of Blue activism, in January 2005, the southern and eastern regions dominated the rest of Ukraine. Yet in the wake of that peak, we observe a gradual rebalancing across the regions.

Figure 3.19. Evolution of the regional distribution of Blue events, November 2004-June 2005

These changes over time point us toward a number of particularly important moments in the Blue countermovement. We see, for example, that the central region became more important for Blue activism from April to June 2005. This was largely due to the campaign organized by the youth branch of Yanukovich's Party of Regions to protest against the arrest and jailing of the head of the Donetsk Regional Council, Boris Kolesnikov[34]. This campaign accounted for 74 percent of all events organized in the central region during these three months. The increase of Blue activism in the western region in May and June, in turn, was driven by a sit-in in Uzhhorod (the capital of the Trans-Carpathian oblast) which accounted for about 93 percent of the events organized in the western region[35]. This protest was organized by the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) and its youth branch to denounce political repression and the arrest of the Trans-Carpathian governor Ivan Rizak. If we look at the southern region, the cities of Odessa (36 percent) and Simferopol (30 percent) accounted for two-thirds of the events organized; while in the eastern region, Donetsk (59 percent) and to a lesser extent Kharkiv (22 percent) were the key centers of Blue activism during and after the Orange Revolution.

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[34] Esli vlast' ne poidet na dialog, oppozitsiia pribegnet k radikal'nym shagam, v chastnosti, blokirovaniiu transporta i organizatsii vseukrainskoi zabastovki - Yanukovich (2005, April 25). *Unian*.
[35] Gorshkov, D. (2005, June 18). Aktivisty SDPU(o) snova ustanovili palatki v Uzhgorode. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

For the organization of the Blue events, contrary to the Orange movement, the main actor was not the Yanukovich political headquarters ('Shtab Yanukovich'), which organized only about 12 percent of the events, nor the Party of Regions ('Partiia regionov') with 13 percent, but broadly-defined activists with about 17 percent of events. Of course, this is perhaps only due to how the sources reported events, as media in Ukraine were only partially free and could have applied self-censorship. However, as the coding process was the same than for the Orange movement, in which the Yushchenko headquarters alone organized 25 percent of events, the comparison might also confirm the impression that the Blue organizers were less united and efficient than the Orange movement. It might also confirm the composite character of countermovements as noted by Beissinger (2017), meaning that different parts of society are pulled together by the regime or loyal third parties without having a strong coalitional basis. For example, other political parties close to the Yanukovich camp were also important event organizers: the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPU[o]) and the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU) led by Nataliia Vitrenko organized respectively 9 and 8 percent of events. The Odessa SMO 'United Fatherland' (Edinoe Otechestvo) organized about 12 percent of events reported in the database, all in Odessa in the southern region. Several other SMOs, such as the Strike Committee (zabastovochnyi komitet), the Committee for Winning Together with Yanukovich (Komitet za pobedu vmeste s Yanukovichem), the Slavic Great Power (Slavianskaia Derzhava), the Russian Community of Crimea (Russkaia obshchina Kryma), and many others organized the remaining events.

In order to simplify the analysis, I recoded the main actors into five categories: Yanukovich headquarters, other formal actors, youth groups, activists, and other SMOs[36]. Figure 3.20 shows the evolution of each of these actor categories in organizing Blue events. Just as for the Orange movement, we see that the Yanukovich headquarters (the dark Blue area) lost its importance after the Orange Revolution but other formal actors (the red area) such as Yanukovich's Party of

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[36] For the first Organizer (ORG1) of the Blue events, I initially had 52 different actors/SMOs. While Yanukovich headquarters and activists were the original codes, I recoded the three others. The 'Other formal actors' includes 'Partiia regionov', 'PSPU', 'RPU', 'Russkii blok', 'SDPU(o)', 'Trudovaia Ukraina', and the 'NDP'. The category 'youth groups' is comprised of the 'Soiuz molodezhi regionov', 'Komitet molodezhnykh organizatsii Odessa', 'Molodezh' Sevastopolia za Yanukovicha', 'Students', and 'Ukrainskaia sotsial-demokraticheskaia molodezh''. The 'Other SMOs' encompasses the 39 remaining actors, including SMOs such as 'zabastovochnyi komitet, 'Komitet za pobedu vmeste s Yanukovichem', 'Slavianskaia Derzhava', 'Russkaia obshchina Kryma', 'Veterany', 'Soiuz rozhdennykh revoliutsiei', ' Slavianskaia Gvardiia', Soiuz' or 'Journalists'.

Regions, the PSPU, and the SDPU(o), as well as many other Blue SMOs (the light blue area) took over the task of organizing protest events. Interestingly, Blue youth groups (the green area) were not as important during the Orange Revolution as they were for the Orange movement, but their importance grew in the aftermath, from March to June 2005. Perhaps more importantly, 93 percent of the youth involvement was concentrated in Kyiv.

Figure 3.20. Blue actors as event organizers

If we examine the repertoire of actions used by the countermovement, we note the same dominance of direct actions as for the Orange movement (see Figure 3.11), with mainly sit-ins that account for 60 percent of the Blue repertoire. Moreover, the limited radicalization that the Orange SMOs displayed during the late Orange Revolution period (see Figures 3.12 and 3.13 above) was mirrored in the other camp, as shown by Figure 3.21. During the peak of the mobilization, just like the Orange camp, Blue activists was using more demonstrative actions, with rallies (62 percent), pickets (3 percent), and other demonstrative actions (3 percent), accounting for 68 percent of their events. However, immediately after December 3, direct actions increased sharply; in particular, the relative importance of sit-ins almost doubled (from 31 to 57 percent). If we add to sit-ins the use of blockades (3 percent), direct actions in the late Orange Revolution period represented 60 percent of all Blue events. But contrary to the Orange movement, which saw a return to demonstrative actions in the early demobilization period, the

Blue SMOs' radicalization trends remained, with a constant reliance on sit-ins and other direct actions (71 percent of the Blue repertoire after the Orange Revolution).

Figure 3.21. Blue countermovement event types in the early and late Orange Revolution

Nov 22 – Dec 3   Dec 4 – Jan 23

In terms of protest demands, political claims accounted for about 93 percent of the Blue demands. In fact, 53 percent of all Blue demands were directly related to supporting Yanukovich, sometimes adding other local requests. But as shown by the above figures, the Blue countermovement did not collapse after the Orange Revolution; rather Blue actors continued to organize many protest events that were now often aimed at rejecting the new Yushchenko regime and its policies. In order to show the evolution of the political requests put forward by the Blue actors after the Orange Revolution (see Figure 3.22), I repeated the same process that I did for the Orange movement by recoding political demands into three sub-categories: 1) Demands that aimed at supporting Yanukovich plus other requests related to the elections, 2) Demands related to supporting officials considered by the Blue camp as being now persecuted or harassed by the new regime, and 3) other political requests. Then, I regrouped all socioeconomic, sociocultural, ethnic, or ecological demands into 'Others'.

Figure 3.22. Blue countermovement protest demands, November 2004-June 2005

Comparing Figures 3.22 and 3.14 highlights the contentiousness of the first few months of Yushchenko's term. As previously stated, the nomination process was controversial within the Orange camp, as many actors worried that Yushchenko was compromising too much with officials of the former regime. For the Blue countermovement, however, these new appointments and removals of officials were likened to a witch-hunt. As we saw above in Figure 3.19, an increase in Blue activism was clearly visible in the central and western regions from April to June 2005, and Figure 3.22 shows that the types of demand put forward relate to supporting or defending officials.

Outside of the central and western regions, an important sit-in for supporting officials occurred in Odessa (southern region) from December 2004 to April 2005. Initially, the protests were organized to support Yanukovich but grievances increased with the ousting of the mayor Ruslan Bodelan (a close ally of Yanukovich) and his replacement by Yushchenko ally Eduard Hurvits[37]. The new regime justified this decision on legal grounds: The Primorsky District Court just canceled the 2002 verdict that had recognized Bodelan the mayor at that time. Despite this justification, many Blue activists in Odessa saw this decision as an attempt to manipulate the

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[37] Eks-genprokuror Ukrainy Vasil'ev okharakterizoval razgrom palatochnogo gorodka v Odesse kak primer politicheskikh repressii. (2005, April 15). *Interfax*.

courts for political reasons, especially after that the Primorskyi District Court also ruled that their sit-in had to be disbanded on April 9, 2005[38].

Non-Aligned Events

While both the Orange movement and the Blue countermovement represented about 92 percent of all protest events during the period under study, Figures 3.16 and 3.17 reminded us that other events unrelated to these two camps also occurred. Figure 3.23 brings further precision on the regional distribution of these non-aligned events and highlights the dominance of the central region if Kyiv is kept into the analysis (40 percent). In fact, 28 percent of all non-aligned events reported in the database occurred in Kyiv (and the capital accounts for 70 percent of protest activities in the central region). Other key centers of protest were Lviv (50 percent of events in the western region) and Kharkiv (54 percent in the eastern region).

Figure 3.23. Regional distribution of non-aligned events, November 2004-June 2005

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
[38] Levko, A. (2005, April 9). Militsiia demontirovala palatochnyi gorodok storonnikov eks- mera Bodelana v Odesse. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

Contrary to both the Orange and the Blue camps, SMOs that organized unrelated events mostly used demonstrative actions; 74 percent of the repertoire is composed of rallies (34 percent), pickets (30 percent), or other demonstrative actions (10 percent). In particular, sit-ins accounted for a mere 9 percent of these events, thus confirming that Ukrainians are fully capable of protesting without using tents.

Most strikingly, Figure 3.24 shows that, despite their relative infrequency, these events raised more diversified protest demands – most notably with socioeconomic protest demands 50 percent of the time, while political claims accounted for a mere 28 percent. The contrast here is clear. On the one hand, one finds two highly politicized instances of mobilizations (namely the Orange movement and its countermovement) confronting each other in the streets during the Orange Revolution, with their claims remaining narrowly political in the aftermath, concentrated on supporting or rejecting the new political elite. On the other hand, other issues were of concern to the public, but they remained largely ignored by the main SMOs of the Orange and Blue camps.

Figure 3.24. Non-aligned protest demands, November 2004-June 2005

To sum up, although the Orange Revolution has often been described through the prism of the three-week large-scale, peaceful protests in Kyiv organized by a unified political opposition and

an awakening civil society, this section introduced more complexity to this narrative. There were in fact two large political mobilizations during this period: the Orange movement, mainly organized by the political opposition and affiliated SMOs, and the Blue countermovement, organized by the incumbent regime and loyal third parties. Ordinary citizens who participated in both types of events had presumably different motivations, as material incentives or concerns were probably more important for countermovement participants whereas principled ideas were conceivably more significant for Orange protesters. Yet, it would also seem quite simplistic to assume that these differences account for all participants. In a somewhat ironic twist, both camps continued to organize protest events after the Revolution, converging unintentionally on criticizing the new Yushchenko regime (albeit for different reasons).

At the meso-level, the two groups remained mobilized during the six months that followed the Orange Revolution. But – especially for the Orange movement – the early disengagement of formal actors in December was associated with a limited radicalization in the repertoire of actions later on. Blue actors, in turn, seemed to imitate the Orange repertoire and increasingly use more direct actions, in particular sit-ins, which were the dominant action-type in both camps after the Orange Revolution. If on the one hand, the data confirm that the Orange movement was more involved in the western and central regions, while the Blue countermovement was more active in the southern and eastern regions, they nonetheless indicate that protest events occurred across Ukraine for both camps. These findings provide nuance to the distinction often made between the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan vis-à-vis geographical diffusion.

Activists of the Orange Revolution - A Micro-level Analysis

So far the data have illustrated the evolution of mobilizations at the meso-level, analyzing the number, type, location, and organizers of events that occurred during and after the Orange Revolution. As we saw in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the Orange movement was already partly demobilizing in December, a trend that was futher confirmed in January. Yet we also noticed that many Orange SMOs were still regularly taking to the streets in the aftermath of the Revolution. But to what extent did these events interest ordinary Ukrainian citizens who actively took part in the Orange Revolution? Did they still participate in these ongoing protest activities?

Figure 3.25, which compiles the total participation in the Orange events on a monthly basis, shows the dramatic public disengagement that occurred. After close to 3 million Ukrainians participated in the early days of the Orange Revolution, already by December we notice a sharp decline (of about 75 percent) compared to November 2004. Then, in January the decline reaches 99 percent compared to the November participation. This abrupt decline in participation should also be understood in conjunction with the net increase in the use of direct action by the Orange movement after December 3. There was a slight revival in May but this is mostly due to the Yushchenko's Nasha Ukraina party organizing an official Victory Day commemoration event on May 9, in which more than 85 thousand Ukrainians took part.

Figure 3.25. Number of participants in the Orange events per month, November 2004-June 2005

However, the picture also hides variations in participation given the extreme numbers in November that drive the rest of the results. Thus, in Figure 3.26 I excluded the Orange Revolution period as well as the official May 9, 2005 event in order to have a better idea of the variation in participation during the demobilization period. Figure 3.26 shows the results disaggregated on a daily basis. While fluctuations in the participation rate did occur from late January to the end of June, Orange events attracted very little participation overall. The most

important date of protest in terms of the number of participants was May 5, 2005, where six Orange events took place gathering more than seven thousand people in the streets. However, only one of them attracted more than one hundred activists. This event was organized by formal actors of the new regime in order to commemorate the UPA in Rivne[39].

Figure 3.26. Orange event participants per day, Feb 2005-June 2005

Another way to analyze the drastic demobilization that occurred at the micro-level is to look at the average daily participation as shown above in Table 3.1. While during the 12 most intense days of protests between November 22 and December 3 an impressive average of 238,209 people went out in the streets daily, during the rest of the Orange Revolution (from December 4 to January 23), the average drops by 96 percent with about 10,000 people. In the aftermath of the Revolution, the average number for each day of protests falls again by 91 percent, with now less than a thousand people in the streets participating daily in Orange events all across the country.

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[39] V Rovenskoi oblasti bliz bratskoi mogily ukrainskoi povstancheskoi armii poiavitsia muzhskoi monastyr'. (2005, May 6). *Interfax*.

Kyiv vs. the Oblasts

Figure 3.27 depicts the demobilization patterns in Kyiv and in the rest of Ukraine. In order to better analyze the demobilization period, I used two different y-axis scales, which both refer to participation numbers in thousands. From the right picture, we see that demobilization happened much quicker in the rest of Ukraine as compared to Kyiv. In fact, already in December after the Supreme Court decision, we notice a decline of 95 percent in participation outside Kyiv, whereas participation declined only by 40 percent in the capital. Of course, we should keep in mind that many people from the regions went directly to the Maidan in Kyiv in order to show their support for Yushchenko until the rerun of the second round. Thus, while the capital was able to centralize and sustain the participation level for a while, it also depressed regional activism at the same time. Looking at the right-hand picture, we see in turn a very similar trend in the evolution of the participation in both Kyiv and the regions after the Orange Revolution. Even after excluding the official event organized by the Yushchenko's regime on May 9, the month of May remained dominant in terms of participation. This revival might be better explained by the fact that people are traditionally more used to go out to the streets during this period of the year, rather than representing a real resurgence in the participation of both movements.

Figure 3.27. Comparison of Orange event participation between Kyiv and the rest of Ukraine, November 2004-June 2005

While Kyiv attracted the majority of Orange protesters, with 47 percent of Orange participation, regional variations occurred outside Kyiv. Figure 3.28 shows a comparison between regions including Kyiv (left graph), and between regions excluding Kyiv (right graph). If Kyiv is kept in the picture, the eastern and southern participation counts for only slightly over 10 percent of the entire Orange participation; however, if Kyiv is excluded, the percentage of these two regions' participation doubles, reaching together one fifth (21 percent) of the Orange participation. Thus, even during the time of the Orange Revolution, participation in the Orange movement in the eastern and southern regions still existed. Between November 22, 2004, and January 23, 2005, more than 350,000 people went in the streets in these regions to protest for the Orange movement, with the peak on November 26 when close to 70,000 people participated in the Orange protests. Tens of thousands of people protested in Kharkiv, while thousands protested in Luhansk, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odessa, and Zaporizhzhia.

Figure 3.28. Regional distribution of Orange event participants, November 2004-June 2005

We should nonetheless acknowledge the dominance of the western and central regions in terms of participation even when Kyiv is excluded (accounting for about 79 percent of the Orange participation), especially in the aftermath of the Revolution. But again, these proportions are driven by the heyday of the Orange Revolution. In order to examine potential variations, I also looked only at the aftermath of the Orange Revolution outside Kyiv (since Kyiv accounts for 96

percent of the Orange participation in the central district after the Revolution)[40]. Figure 3.29 shows that, just as for the meso-level (Figure 3.5), the southern region becomes more important after the Revolution. We can also notice the importance of the western region, especially in May 2005, whereas in Figure 3.5, the importance of this region in terms of organizing events appeared limited in the aftermath. Thus, despite fewer events, western Ukrainians were still interested in participating in them. It once again shows the importance of looking at different levels of analysis to understand what happens after major episodes of contention.

Figure 3.29. Orange participation regional distribution after the Orange Revolution

Blue Events and Non-Aligned Participation

In Figures 3.16 and 3.17, we saw how the number of events organized by the Orange movement was similar to the Blue countermovement after the Orange Revolution. Figure 3.30 compares the number of protesters in the streets on a monthly basis between the two groups and with other non-aligned events (the grey line). What the left picture shows is that the Orange movement was clearly more successful in terms of attracting people to the streets during the Orange Revolution.

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[40] This is partly due to the May 9th event organized by the new regime. If we exclude this official event, Kyiv is still accounting for about 77 percent of the central region participation after the Orange Revolution.

However, already in January 2005, more protesters kept participating in the Blue events. In April 2005 (see right graph), we actually see more people protesting for the Blue countermovement. In May 2005 the Orange movement appears to be more popular, but this is largely driven by the May 9 event organized by Nasha Ukraina in Kyiv. If we take out this official event, then the Blue countermovement again scored better (as did the non-aligned events).

Figure 3.30. Protesters per month in Ukraine, November 2004-June 2005[41]

Figure 3.31 presents the same data disaggregated by day, excluding the official May 9 event. Comparing these results with Figure 3.17 shows that despite the fact that the Blue and Orange movements both remained somewhat mobilized at the meso-level, demobilization trends at the micro-level were significant, especially for the Orange movement. To be sure, we cannot completely rule out that some former Orange participants became involved in non-aligned events, as the data do not allow us to trace the individual path of every participant. However, as noted previously, not only were the non-aligned events unrelated to the Orange and Blue sides, but they were also unrelated to each other. Thus even if former Orange participants protested in the most successful non-aligned event in February (taking place in Kyiv to protest against the

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[41] Missing data were coded '0'. About 24 percent of the whole database had missing data for the number of participants, but this percentage was very similar for the three types of events (25 percent of the Orange events, 23 percent of the Blue events, and 28 percent of the non-aligned events), which increases the validity of the comparison. See codebook (Appendix A).

illegal seizure of an energy company)[42], we cannot infer that they continued protesting in the subsequent ones.

Figure 3.31. Protesters per day in Ukraine, February-June 2005

Not surprisingly, the majority of Blue participation was concentrated in the southern and eastern regions. Figure 3.32 shows that 85 percent of the Blue participants protested in these two regions, even when Kyiv is kept in the picture. Compared to the Orange movement where about one protester in two was in Kyiv, for the countermovement, only one out of ten protesters went out in Kyiv's streets. According to Kuzio (2016), this was largely due to demographic factors:

> Yushchenko voters were younger and more highly educated and
> therefore those who are more mobile and active in civil society and able
> to withstand the winter cold in Kyiv. Yanukovych voters meanwhile,
> were on average over 55 and with lower levels of education, groups who
> are far less active in civil society (p. 105).

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[42] Predstaviteli shesti oblenergo prosiat Yushchenko ne dopustit' silovykh zakhvatov energokompanii (2005, February 21). *Unian*.

While demography likely played a role in the mobility of actors, we should nonetheless refrain from taking for granted that Yushchenko voters were necessarily from the most active segment of civil society. Based on survey data, Beissinger (2013) argues that "counter-revolutionaries [Blue supporters] were actually more heavily involved in civil society associations (34%) than revolutionaries [Orange supporters]" (pp. 8-9). The evolution of regional distribution in Blue participation following the Orange Revolution forces us to note that countermovement activists were not as immobile as previously assumed (see Figure 3.33).

Figure 3.32. Regional distribution of Blue participation, November 2004-June 2005

For example, as we saw in Figure 3.19, Blue activism increased in the central region after the Orange Revolution, primarily due to the growing importance of Kyiv (especially from April to June 2005). Reflecting this increase in the number of events organized, Blue participation in the central region also grew significantly during the demobilization period, as illustrated in Figure 3.33. The contrast over time is stark. Between November 2004 and March 2005, only 11 percent of Blue participation occurred in the central region. Yet from April to June 2005, Blue participation in the central region represented 43 percent of the Blue countermovement – 95 percent of which occurred in Kyiv (compared to 79 percent from November 2004 to March 2005). The recentralization of Blue protest participation in Kyiv during the demobilization

period shows that these activists were perhaps more mobile than initially thought, especially once the streets of Kyiv were less occupied by the Orange movement.

Figure 3.33. Regional distribution of Blue participation after the Orange Revolution

Relatively few protesters took part in the non-aligned events, especially during the Orange Revolution. Yet, as Figure 3.31 above shows, this participation still occurred from time to time. Just like the regional distribution of these events was quite balanced (see Figure 3.23), the participation was also relatively divided. More protesters went out in the streets of Kyiv (39 percent in total), which helps explain the dominance of the central region in Figure 3.34. But the figure also shows a more balanced regional participation in the non-aligned events, compared to both the Orange movement (Figure 3.28) and especially the Blue countermovement (Figure 3.32).

Figure 3.34. Regional distribution of non-aligned participants, November 2004-June 2005

How Quickly Did the Orange Color Fade? – A Macro-Level Analysis

While my database offers the opportunity to dig into the meso- and micro-levels of the Orange Revolution and its aftermath in great detail, it is only useful for analyzing the societal resonance of mobilizations in an indirect way (i.e. the extent to which events were reported already gave us a sense of their visibility). When a massive and extraordinary movement occurs, such as the Orange Revolution, it necessarily creates a societal buzz around which discussions, assessments, and critiques of the movement emerge. This is what I refer to as the macro-level of mobilization, or the societal resonance that a social movement attracts (see chapter 2 for more details). Identifying when this resonance decreases also provides us with insights into the timing of demobilization. In order to measure societal resonance, I thus also use proxy measures such as polling data and web-search data.

As many authors and survey results have established, the resonance of the Orange Revolution in and beyond the Ukrainian society can hardly be denied (see Beissinger 2013 for example). But despite this notoriety, societal support for Orange protest activities was more controversial and fluctuated over time. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, the Razumkov Centre polls already

revealed significant polarization trends in support for the Orange movement: While 45 percent of Ukrainians supported it, 40 percent opposed it. The data also showed important regional variations in the support for the Orange events, as 86 percent of the population in western Ukraine viewed the events positively while 67 percent in eastern Ukraine had negative attitudes toward them[43]. Figure 3.35 presents further data compiled by the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, which shows a decline in support for the Orange movement in March 2005, when societal support fell to 40.7 percent and continued to decline in the following years (the orange line). Parallel to that, the opposition to the Orange movement (the blue line) grew, magnified by former Orange supporters now swelling the ranks of the opposition, as Table 3C makes explicit (see Appendix B).

Figure 3.35. Orange movement: societal support/opposition

Source: Golovakha and Panina (2008) for data from 2005 to 2008. See footnote 43 for 2004 data.

Another way to examine societal resonance is to investigate the intensity with which people sought information about the Orange movement in Ukraine at the time of the Revolution using Google Trends data. These data provide insights into the behavior of the most active segments of society, including youth – a key player in the Orange Revolution. Moreover, some authors have

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[43] Aktsii protesta oppozitsii podderzhivaiut 45% Ukraintsev. Opros Tsentra Razumkova (2004, December 3). *Unian*.

designated the Orange Revolution as the first 'Internet Revolution' (McFaul 2005, p. 12, Kuzio 2006, p. 375), testifying to the important role that the Internet played, notwithstanding low access rates at the time (Goldstein 2007). As a result, while these data cannot reveal broad societal attention to the Orange movement, they provide a meaningful complement to polling data. Taken together, these data enhance our understanding of how and when the movement's resonance began to fall.

Figure 3.36 shows the online relative resonance of five keywords[44] related to the Orange movement: Maidan (in red); PORA (in yellow); miting/rally (in Green); Pomarancheva, the Ukrainian term for Orange (in Brown); as well as its Russian version, Oranzhevaia (in Orange)[45]. Using the two latter search terms was a way to analyze whether regional polarization can be observed online. What is first interesting to note are the similar trends between the on-line resonance (macro-level), especially of the search term 'Maidan', and activity at the meso-level (see Figure 3.2). The week of November 21-27, 2004, is the moment where the first three search terms experienced the highest popularity, which increases our confidence regarding both the internal validity among the terms selected and the external validity, comparing with other levels of demobilization. The word 'pomarancheva' peaked the week of the re-run of the elections on December 26, while the term 'oranzhevaia' was at its greatest popularity only a year later in November 2005, when the one-year anniversary of the Revolution made it salient again.

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[44] It should be noted that Google trend data depict relative and not the absolute popularity of search terms. See chapter 2 for a more comprehensive discussion on Google Trends.

[45] One of the important limitations of Google Trends is that it needs a sufficient amount of data in order to show some results. Thus, while many SMOs participated in the movement, I cannot investigate their online resonance if there were not enough hits. The five keywords selected therefore are the ones that were the most useful in terms of results. I also tested the different declinations of these keywords and got either no results (because not enough data) or the results are not significantly different.

Figure 3.36. On-line resonance of the Orange movement measured by five key words, October 2004-December 2005[46]

Source: Google Trends data. The search is restricted to Ukraine only.

Regarding regional variations, the word 'Maidan' was the most popular everywhere (Figure 3.37). What is also striking is that the traditional division between the western/central and eastern/southern regions clearly stood out. All keywords but 'miting' were more searched in the western and central regions of Ukraine. In both languages, the searches for Orange were 100 percent associated with the word 'Revolution' and we see the polarization of searches between the western/eastern regions, especially with the Ukrainian version.

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[46] As Google Trends use samples for normalizing their results, data can change from time to time but usually the main trends remain the same. Figures 3.36 and 3.37 represent results from a search generated on January 31, 2017, which was later replicated on February 7 and 16 2017.

Figure 3.37. Regional resonance of Orange movement key words, October 2004-December 2005

Source: Google Trends data. The search is restricted to Ukraine only.

As the Orange Revolution was a fight primarily between two electoral candidates, I also added the two leaders' names in order to see whether the previous results would still hold. In Figure 3.38, the Orange line shows the evolution in the popularity of 'Yushchenko' compared to 'Yanukovich' in Blue, and of 'Maidan' (in red), 'PORA' (in yellow'), and 'miting' (in green). The results indicate the same peak (November 21-27, 2004) for all search terms, even though the resonances of Yushchenko and Yanukovich were far greater than the three other words.

Figure 3.38. On-line resonance of the Orange Revolution measured by five key words, including leaders' name, October 2004-December 2005[47]

Source: Google Trends data. The search is restricted to Ukraine only.

Google trends data show that Ukrainians were less interested in information about the protests and the Maidan after the November peak. Their interest in Yushchenko decreased at the same time, stabilized until the second round of voting, then contracted before one final increase around his inauguration in January. These data thus reflect my earlier findings vis-à-vis other levels of analysis: that is to say, that demobilization occurred quite sharply after the Supreme Court decision to rerun the second round of elections. This seems to indicate that societal resonance shifted in early December, with public attention turning from protest activities toward the new elections. After the vote, a certain level of mobilization remained at the meso-level, but these protest activities had lost their popular basis and societal resonance. Coupling these findings with the polling data shown above, it seems that Ukrainians quickly lost faith in the Orange Revolution. This loss of faith or disappointment feeling seemed almost inevitable when confronted with the great enthusiasm generated by the movement and the high expectations placed in the new regime (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 2005, Palyvoda *et al*. 2016). At the same time, Ukrainians did not find attractive the protest activities that were still

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[47] Figure 3.38 and 3.39 represents results from a search generated on February 1st, 2017, which was later replicated on February 7 and 16 2017.

organized at that time. Thus, former Orange SMOs protested alongside former Blue supporters –
yet all of these protests remained relatively marginal in the eyes of the broader public, who was
rather disengaged from public activity.

Conclusion

By exploring the dynamics of the Orange Revolution and its aftermath, this chapter's main
findings can be categorized along two main dimensions. First, the original data compiled here
represent an initial attempt to systematically describe regional and temporal variation in Orange
Revolution mobilizations. At the same time, they also provide important insights into the
evolution of the repertoire of protest actions, demands, and actor involvement. The above figures
highlight that while identifying the moment when the Orange Revolution began may be
relatively easy, given the sudden burst of mobilization on November 22, determining its end date
is far more complex. Although there are different turning points in the demobilization process,
the main critical juncture was the Supreme Court decision on December 3 to annul the second
round of elections and rescheduled a third round. This decision was interpreted as a success by
the Yushchenko team, now turning its attention back to formal politics in order to win the third
round. Five days later, the political deal reached in the Rada between the Orange and the
outgoing elites confirmed the end of the upswing in mobilization. After that moment,
mobilization at all three levels declined abruptly, although the meso-level stabilized soon after.

The chapter also makes clear that the Orange movement was not the only major organizer of
street protests at the time of the Orange Revolution. It is true that the Orange movement was
extraordinarily successful in terms of the number of events, participants, and societal resonance
it attracted, yet the Blue countermovement organized by the Yanukovich supporters should not
be discounted as it also represented an instance of mobilizations (see Figures 3.16 and 3.17). In
particular, this chapter has made the case that focusing exclusively on the Orange movement
would lead us to draw faulty conclusions about regional divisions in Ukrainian protest culture.
While the Orange movement was undeniably more popular in the central and western regions,
protest activities also occurred in the southern and eastern regions at the time of the Revolution –
and not only for the Blue countermovement. Figure 3.39 compares all events taking place in

Ukraine (left quadrant) as well as the number of participants (right quadrant) during and after the Orange Revolution, divided by region while isolating Kyiv.

Figure 3.39. Protest activism in Ukraine, November 2004-June 2005

Number of events

Number of participants (in thousands)

These results call into question the enduring claim of a weaker protest culture in the southern and eastern regions and, more specifically, the argument that the Orange Revolution was essentially a western and central event. Ukrainians from the southern and eastern regions also protested during that period – though of course more often than not they came out to support the countermovement rather than the Orange movement. And although the database must be expanded to the Euromaidan before we can properly compare regional activism across the two events, the present findings nevertheless nuance prior claims that geographic diffusion was one of the most interesting novelties of the Euromaidan (Pishchikova & Ogryzko 2014, Onuch 2015, Puglisi 2015, Reznik 2016). All of the figures presented confirm that the Orange Revolution was indeed a spectacular instance of mass mobilization. Yet, it was also a mass mobilization that was both more limited – in terms of the intensity of mass protests, which already started to decline in early December – and more diffused – in terms of its geographic diffusion and legacies – than is usually acknowledged.

Second, in terms of the actors involved in the Orange movement, the chapter partly confirms David Lane's (2008) argument that, despite high public participation in the Orange events, mass involvement was more of an 'audience' type. The main actors behind the protests were formal ones. The most notable such actor was the Yushchenko campaign headquarters, which disengaged quite early from the mobilizations, in the process provoking a massive disengagement of protesters at the micro-level and contributing to radicalization trends at the meso-level. As Heaney and Rojas (2011) have shown, the departure of formal actors can be significantly detrimental for social movements, since it depletes them from essential resources and motivations for moderates to keep up the struggles, while empowering the radicals. As soon as the Supreme Court decided to rerun the last round of elections, on December 3, the Yushchenko team no longer had any use for street protests: in their eyes, the Orange Revolution was already a success[48]. It thus seems fair to say, as both D'Anieri (2006) and Lane (2008) have contended, that Yuschchenko actually "sought to avoid a revolution" (p. 545) that would bring about real regime change or bring more civil-society actors into the decision-making process.

Yet when we turn our attention beyond the Yushchenko campaign headquarters, examining the demobilization process of the Orange Revolution at different levels of analysis highlights that interpretation of success and failure varied considerably among actors. SMOs participating in a movement do not all react uniformly to different political opportunities during the demobilization period, and this often increases tensions among groups (Tarrow 1989). The findings presented in this chapter thus lead us to revise Lane's contention that protesters did not constitute an autonomous protest movement separate from the political opposition. The Orange camp was not homogenous, and parts of the protest movement demonstrated a great deal of autonomy in their decision to keep protesting long after Yushchenko campaign headquarters found it politically expedient to do so. In particular, youth groups remained mobilized and organized many protest activities right up until Yushchenko's inauguration (meso-level). This involvement continued in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, when youth groups were joined by numerous others; yet both the repertoire of actions and protest demands became increasingly radicalized without attracting any substantial societal resonance (macro-level) or

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[48] Oppozitsiia Ukrainy prazdnuet pobedu. (2004, December 8). *Reuters*.

high participation rates (micro-level). The radicalization of the repertoire of actions can also be observed within the Blue countermovement, which also continued to protest, often via sit-ins that sought to support officials dismissed by the new regime.

In the meantime, the broader public quickly became disenchanted with the outcomes of the Orange Revolution and began to worry about the broader socioeconomic situation (IFES 2005, p. 10), although these concerns did not translate into a greater readiness to join civic or political associations[49]. It seems, however, that neither former Orange nor Blue actors were interested in incorporating these issues into their protest demands, instead opting to remain within their narrow, polarizing political frames. As a result, despite continuing protests, these SMOs were unable to attract greater societal acceptance. The next chapter will thus turn to address the Orange Revolution's aftermath in more detail, highlighting how the choices made by Orange movement leaders contributed to the marginalization and polarization of civil society.

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[49] People declaring being a member of a civil society organization remain very low from 2004 to 2008. There was a slight increase in membership in political parties from 2004 to 2005 but this trend decreased afterward (Golovakha & Panina 2008, p. 10).

CHAPTER 4 - DEMOBILIZATION AFTER SUCCESS:

UKRAINE'S POST-ORANGE MALAISE

The Maidan did its job,
the Maidan can leave[50]

In its immediate aftermath, the Orange Revolution was typically perceived as a total success for the movement (Kuzio 2005b, Åslund & McFaul 2006). As Kuzio (2005b) put it, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution unearthed a vibrant civil society that few scholars and analysts believed had existed" (p. 117). Many assumed that after such a great success, civil society would become more involved and integrated into Ukrainian public life (Diuk 2006, Demes & Forbrig 2007). But in order to have lasting positive effects on civil society, mass movements need to result in the increased institutionalization of civil society, whether via transformed and expanded relationships with the state (external institutionalization) or its own members (internal institutionalization)[51]. Yet as Stepanenko (2006) argued, despite many episodes of contention, after the Orange Revolution Ukraine still lacked "institutionalized mechanisms that enable systemic (not [only] spontaneous) citizens' political and social engagement" (p. 572). As a consequence, a consensus began to emerge that civil society had been marginalized and people's hopes regarding the new regime quickly dashed after the Orange Revolution (Golovakha & Panina 2007, Laverty 2008, White & McAllister 2009, Gatskova & Gatskov 2012, Solonenko 2014).

In this chapter, I will examine the factors that impeded civil society institutionalization in Ukraine in the wake of the Orange Revolution. The literature has often pointed to the political

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[50] My translation: "Maidan sdelal svoe delo, Maidan mozhet ukhodit'". Politologi vyskazyvaiutsia po povodu togo, kto kontroliruet Maidan (2005, January 18). *Unian*.

[51] As explained in chapter 2, external institutionalization of social movements refers to the main SMOs acquiring a greater role in public life, presupposing that they become recognized and accepted by the state as legitimate actors. This process can take different forms, such as the creation of formal mechanisms for consultation or dialogue. The key point is that the relations between SMOs and the state become more stable and predictable. Internal institutionalization refers to securing or developing further platforms of cooperation among SMOs.

instability and conflicts that raged among the Orange elites almost immediately after the Revolution, as these battles monopolized the political scene and greatly contributed to growing popular disillusionment. Importantly, this indicates that while division among elites might facilitate the emergence of social movements (McAdam 1996, Tarrow 1998, Osa & Shock 2007), it appears that during demobilization, elite divisions may impede social movement institutionalization. Yet, as this thesis shows, the demobilization process and its outcomes are affected not only by political opportunities such as elite division, but also by the choices made by movement leaders during and after mobilizations. It is thus important to closely examine internal movement dynamics to see how leaders react to such changing political opportunities.

In the social movement literature, movement successes have often been associated with their institutionalization, where external institutionalization is emphasized and understood as a form of demobilization that results from the strategic choices of actors (Suh 2011, Peterson 2016, Bosi 2016). For example, Tarrow (1998) argues that,

> The pattern of institutionalization is almost everywhere the same: as the excitement of the disruptive phase of a movement dies and the police become more skilled at controlling it, movements institutionalize their tactics and attempt to gain concrete benefits for their supporters through negotiation and compromise – a route that often succeeds at the cost of transforming the movement into a party or interest group (p. 101).

In the process of external institutionalization, movements necessarily set aside some of their previous tactics, such as street protests, in order to gain new advantages from the state (Suh 2011). As discussed in chapter 2, many authors view this process as representing an important trade-off for movements: on the one hand, by relinquishing previous street tactics, social movements lose the momentum and media attention that they need to go stronger and impose themselves (Meyer 1993a); on the other, this decision might be a strategic and rational response to changing political opportunities, thereby offering an alternative path by which to pursue their original struggle (Hipsher 1998). Many SMOs will thus try to formalize themselves and/or increase contact with formal actors. For example, Kriesi *et al*. (1995) note in their description of the 1960s civil rights movement that,

Everywhere, the 1960s wave gave rise to the emergence of new professional SMOs, lobby organizations, or – especially in Europe – new left political parties… Of course, the degree to which the activists of the 1960s succeeded in bringing about such changes differed considerably from one country to another, but on the whole the link between protest and subsequent institutionalization and reform is unmistakable (p. 112).

As a result, when a successful movement is in the process of dying out, institutionalization often seems to be the form of demobilization that would best secure the positive consequences of its previous struggle in the long-term. When the struggle is democratization in and of itself, as in many Latin American countries in the 1980s, it was frequently viewed as preferable for SMOs to retreat for a while so that political parties could lead the reforms (Oxhorn 1994, Hipsher 1998). Often presented as a trade-off between representative and participatory forms of democracy, the outcome was nonetheless viewed as advancing the common cause of democratization (see Koppelman 2017 for a recent and more critical perspective). However, timing issues and internal conflicts seem to be rather absent from this account – as if social movements were only composed of actors with generally converging interests.

But what happens when a broad social movement that had framed its main goals in terms of democratic elections succeeds quickly, but then allows itself to be hijacked by political parties that are not real democratizers? In that case, I argue that institutionalization will not occur, and that civil society actors will instead risk marginalization. Based on an extensive analysis of primary and secondary sources, I will show that both the timing and the choices made by leaders of the Orange movement did not contribute to make Ukrainian civil society significantly stronger, not only vis-à-vis the state and society in general (i.e., a lack of external institutionalization) but also within itself (i.e., a lack of internal institutionalization). The demobilization period was thus marked by both a failure to institutionalize and growing, albeit limited, radicalization.

PORA (It's Time) to Call It A Revolution!

These processes have their roots in the last days of the Orange Revolution. As seen in the previous chapter, demobilization began very early during the Orange Revolution, when the leaders of the political opposition (formal actors) decided that they had already accomplished their goals when the Supreme Court ruled to re-run the elections. The movement's participation rate (micro-level) plummeted and the number of protest activities decreased significantly (meso-level). Societal attention shifted from the streets to the new electoral round (macro-level). Many tent-cities were disbanded in early December, in particular in Vinnytsa and Kharkiv[52], and some blockades of administrative buildings were lifted in Kyiv[53]. However, some groups within the movement were suspicious of this hasty demobilization. Although the formal political opposition asked protestors to leave the streets in order to concentrate on the upcoming elections[54], many activists wanted to remain on the Maidan at least until Yushchenko's victory on December 26[55], and possibly until Yushchenko's inauguration on January 23[56].

For the political opposition, this stubbornness was embarrassing since many within the Orange elite had thought that the crowd was under their control. For example, Taras Stets'kiv, a key leader in the Yushchenko campaign headquarters, replied in early December to the question of whether his team could have intervened on the streets if something went wrong, said that "In fact, people were trusting and listening to us to such an extent that this, in principle, could not have happened" in the first place[57]. However, in mid-December, some Orange activists felt

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[52] Storonniki Yushchenko svorachivaiut palatochnye gorodki v nekotorykh ukrainskikh gorodakh. (2004, December 9). *Interfax*.

[53] Blokada zdaniia pravitel'stva Ukrainy oppozitsiei sniata, "oranzhevye revoliutsionery" raz"ezzhaiutsia po domam. (2004, December 9). *ITAR TASS*.

[54] Sokolovskaia, I. (2004, December 8). Oppozitsiia namerena prizvat' svoikh storonnikov na Maidane Nezalezhnosti raz"ezzhat'sia po domam i gotovit'sia k vyboram. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*; Yushchenko prizval svoikh storonnikov aktivno uchastvovat' v podgotovke golosovaniia 26 dekabria. (2004, December 8). *Interfax*.

[55] Palatochnyi gorodok i ukrainskii dom budut funktsionirovat' do ob"iavleniia pobedy Yushchenko. Komenda ukrainskogo doma (2004, December 8). *Unian*.

[56] Savchuk, N. (2005, January 15). Zhiteli palatochnogo lageria na Khreshchatyke v Kieve namereny ostavat'sia v nem do vozmozhnoi inauguratsii Yushchenko. *Ukraïns'kii Novini*.

[57] My translation: "Na samom dele liudi nastol'ko nam verili i nastol'ko nas slushali, chto etogo v printsipe ne moglo sluchit'sia". Dmitricheva, O., Rakhmanin, S., & Silina, T. (2004, December 10). Anatomiia dushi maidana. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.

abandoned and started to protest against their own side[58]. They complained about being treated brusquely ('bestseremonno'), not being offered any food or medical aid, and receiving contradictory orders from the main political office. A protester noted that: "It turned out that it is easier to organize protest actions than to stop them"[59]. In turn, the political opposition showed that they considered the mass protests merely a tool for achieving their own opportunistic ends. As Mykola Tomenko, a close ally of Yushchenko, said just before the re-run of the election: "We will resume the Maidan as an instrument of our support", presuming that they had the power to stop and then restart mass protest on the Maidan precisely on December 22[60].

While some groups were not ready to leave the streets, other SMOs like the youth group PORA showed a quick readiness to retreat. For example, after initially having vigorously denounced any possible negotiation between the opposition and the former Kuchma team as a move that could discredit the new government and demoralize popular resistance[61], PORA representatives declared victory and asked their supporters to go home on December 8, right after Kuchma, Yanukovich and Yushchenko had reached a compromise agreement on political reforms[62]. Although PORA continued to organize protest events, the group announced that it would now change its tactics, concentrating more on information diffusion regarding the new elections[63]. The timing of PORA's reorientation illustrates how close some PORA leaders were to the political opposition, which will be discussed later.

Meanwhile, other SMOs simply ignored the call to go home and pursued their protest activity, showing that not everyone within the Orange movement wanted to simply adhere to the

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[58] Broshennye na proizvol sud'by ustavshie i golodnye aktivisty "oranzhevoi revoliutsii" piketiruiut svoi shtab v Kieve. (2004, December 16). *ITAR-TASS*.

[59] My translation: "Okazalos', chto aktsii protesta legche organizovat', chem prekratit'". Broshennye na proizvol sud'by ustavshie i golodnye aktivisty "oranzhevoi revoliutsii" piketiruiut svoi shtab v Kieve. (2004, December 16). *ITAR-TASS*.

[60] My translation: "My budem vozobnovliat' Maidan kak instrument nashei podderzhki". Vodianoi, A. (2004, December 17). "Sila naroda" namerena 22 dekabria prizvat' storonnikov Yushchenko vyiti na Maidan Nezalezhnosti v Kieve. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

[61] "Pora" schitaet nepriemlemymi peregovory oppozitsii s predstaviteliami vlasti, potomu chto eto mozhet diskreditirovat' komandu Yushchenko (2004, November 30). *Unian;* V "Pore" schitaiut chto zatiagivanie peregovorov s vlast'iu mozhet privesti k porazheniiu oranzhevoi revoliutsii. (2004, December 3). *Unian*.

[62] Savchuk, N. (2004, December 8). Kampaniia "Pora" prizyvaet bastuiushchikh studentov vernut'sia k uchebe. *Ukraïns'kii Novini*; "Pora" pozdravliat studentov s pobedoi i prizyvaet vernut'sia k zaniatiiam (2004, December 8). *Unian*.

[63] "Pora" meniat taktiku deistvii nakanune peregolosovaniia vtorogo tura vyborov (2004, December 8). *Unian*.

opposition success story. In particular, two instances deserve more attention. First, PORA as well as other activists had initiated a blockade and established a tent-city around the presidential administration building in the midst of the mobilization. On December 20, a few days before the third electoral round, the Shevchenko District Court of Kyiv ruled that PORA had to dismantle the blockade. Despite the PORA leadership's readiness to comply with the Court's order, they were unable to convince a group of about a hundred activists to end the blockade[64]. The remaining protesters argued that the Court's decision did not apply as no PORA members were among them. They insisted that they instead "represented the Ukrainian people and that they were blocking the adminstration building on their own initiative", which they would cease only to let in the "lawfully and fairly elected president of Ukraine"[65]. Although not large, the tent-city around the presdiential administration indeed stood until Yushchenko's inauguration[66].

The persistent tent-city on Khreshchatyk Avenue – very close to the Maidan – also was a thorn in the side of the formal political opposition once they had decided that the Orange movement should demobilize. Along with the massive rallies that took place every day on the Maidan, this sit-in was established on November 21 and rapidly became one of the main symbols of the Orange Revolution. In its heyday, about ten thousand people lived there in more than five hundred tents[67]. Just as for other protest actions, the Khreshchatyk tent-city became increasingly superfluous for the political opposition after Yushchenko's victory, yet activists were in no hurry to leave, many of them wanted to stay until a complete victory of the Maidan. According to Viktor Nebozhenko, director of a sociological institute, activists felt that the role of the Maidan has significantly dropped lately and some of them felt deep resentment for the fact that the winners did not seem to care about them anymore[68]. After several requests from Yushchenko's allies, including Kyiv mayor Oleksandr Omel'chenko, to remove the tents, Yushchenko signed

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[64] Savitskaia, A. (2004, December 22). Storonniki Yushchenko otvergli pros'bu "Pory" razblokirovat' zdanie Administratsii po ulitse Bankovoi. *Ukraïns'kii Novini*.

[65] My translation: "My - predstaviteli naroda Ukrainy i po sobstvennoi initsiative blokiruem zdanie administratsii", - otvetili oni, podcherknuv, chto snimut ego tol'ko v tom sluchae, chtoby propustit' tuda "zakonno i chestno izbrannogo prezidenta Ukrainy". Storonniki Yushchenko blokiruiut administratsiiu prezidenta, chtoby posle 26 dekabria propustit' tuda "zakonno izbrannogo glavu gosudarstva". (2004, December 22). *ITAR TASS*.

[66] Sokolovskaia, I. (2005, January 24). Storonniki Yushchenko svernuli palatochnye gorodki vozle Administratsii i Kabmina. *Ukaïns'kii Novini*.

[67] Neobkhodimost' v palatochnom gorodke na Khreshchatyke otpadet pered golosovaniem 26 dekabria, schitaiut koordinatory aktsii. (2004, December 4). *Interfax*.

[68] Politologi vyskazyvaiutsia po povodu togo, kto kontroliruet Maidan (2005, January 18). *Unian*.

an order to disperse the Khreshchatyk sit-in on January 14 and offered the remaining protestors one-way tickets to go back to where they came from[69].

This order was criticized by many activists, including his close ally Yulia Tymoshenko. Some protesters refused to believe the order was real; others were bitterly disappointed, such as Serhiy Zhailo who said to a reporter "I was expecting Yushchenko's gratitude, not a stab in the back"[70]. A few days later, the Khreshchatyk camp coordinator addressed the media with a document stating that, "we are not extras in a film (massovka), we are not state employees that they can disperse with some orders… And we want to warn them: we forgive the offense, but we will never accept the humiliation of the Ukrainian people!"[71]. To be sure, these stubborn protesters represented a small minority of the former Orange participants; yet, as the above quote makes it clear, they also formed the most committed portion of activists, which could quickly radicalize. Part of these remaining protesters formed a new SMO, the Coalition of the Participants of the Orange Revolution (Koalitsiia uchastnikov Oranzhevoi revoliutsii, hereafter the KUOR), to which about 500 activists signed on[72].

Volodymyr Malynkovych, director of a Ukrainian think tank, argues that these internal tensions arose because there were two separate logics and motives within the Orange movement: While many people came to the Maidan to make a revolution, in fact no revolution occurred beyond a change in the political elites: "Yushchenko will pursue a policy of compromises and agreements, while the Maidan came for a revolution. They [Maidan protesters] in principle want to continue to participate in the process of a political revolution; yet for Yushchenko and his entourage, it is no longer necessary"[73]. Here again, PORA showed how connected its members were to the

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[69] Zhmin'ko, Z. (2005, January 14). Yushchenko poruchil svoim storonnikam svernut' palatochnye gorodki na Khreshchatyke i okolo Kabmina do 18 ianvaria. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

[70] Quoted in Karmanau, Y. (January 15). Protesters Continue their Vigil in Opposition Tent Camps Despite Yushchenko's Order to Leave. *The Associated Press*.

[71] My translation: "My ne massovka, my ne shtatnye rabotniki, kotorye mogut pozvolit' sebe raspustit' nas kakim-to rasporiazheniem...No my khotim predosterech': my proshchaem obidy, no nikogda ne smozhem smirit'sia s unizheniem ukrainskogo naroda". Esli ne budut vypolneny obeshchaniia novoi vlasti, to liudi snova pridut na Maidan - Koordinator palatochnogo gorodka. (2005, January 19). *Unian*.

[72] Aktivisty "oranzhevoi revoliutsii" otkazyvaiutsia podchinit'sia rasporiazheniiu Yushchenko svernut' palatochnyi gorodok na Kreshchatike. (2005, January 17). *ITAR TASS*.

[73] My translation: "Yushchenko budet vesti politiku kompromissov i soglashenii, a Maidan prishel na revoliutsiiu. Oni v printsipe khoteli by prodolzhat' uchastvovat' v protsesse politicheskoi revoliutsii, a Yushchenko i ego

political opposition. Rather than showing empathy toward its fellow protesters, PORA instead offered its help to the authorities in dispersing the remaining tents. According to PORA, the sit-in that stood right beside the Maidan was no longer fulfilling its function; instead, it was now limiting the Orange movement[74].

In demonstrating such loyalty toward the political opposition that was about to form the new regime, PORA members engaged in the type of strategic demobilization through institutionalization described in the literature: Retreating from the streets to let formal actors take over in the post-mobilization period, and expecting support for their group in return. For example, in early 2005, Yellow PORA's leader, Vladislav Kas'kiv claimed that "[…] the moral authority the movement earned in its fight for freedom and democracy puts PORA in a position to play a unique public role in Ukrainian society" (Kas'kiv *et al*. 2005, p. 17). However, neither PORA nor other Orange SMOs actually succeeded in playing a significant role in Ukrainian society after the Orange Revolution.

Cooptation without Institutionalization

The unity of the Orange movement has often been presented as an important reason for its success. For example, comparing with the Euromaidan, Onuch (2015) argues that,

> During the Orange Revolution, the Maidan was also divided between different groups, into what some would call zones. However, from the beginning of the protests activists and party coordinators were united. In 2004, as explained by the coordinators themselves, the different networks of activists and political opposition forces cooperated, coordinated, and even signed a formal deal in 2004 (p. 38).

Although Onuch is right to underline the importance of cooperation among actors, this interpretation overlooks the struggles within and between SMOs during the Orange Revolution.

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blizhaishemu okruzheniiu eto uzhe ne nado". Politologi vyskazyvaiutsia po povodu togo, kto kontroliruet Maidan (2005, January 18). *Unian*.
[74] Sokolovskaia, I. (2005, January 20). Kampaniia "Pora" predlagaet meru Kieva Omel'chenko pomoch' ubedit' zhitelei palatochnogo lageria pokinut' Khreshchatyk. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

In any social movement, heterogeneity of actors and interests can be observed. Thus there is nothing exceptional in the fact that the Orange movement also had internal conflicts. What is interesting, however, is that important differences impeded the SMOs' ability to institutionalize further in the wake of the movement, especially when the timing of these choices is brought into the picture. The desired levels of formalization for SMOs and loyalty toward the political opposition was controversial during and after the Orange Revolution. While closer contacts with formal actors, such as participating in youth wings of political parties, helped Ukrainian civil society to professionalize before the Orange events (Onuch 2014, p. 120), the formalization of these contacts during the movement crystallized the relationships in a sort of preemptive cooptation. On November 15, amid the second round of the elections, Yellow PORA concluded a formal agreement with the Yushchenko team to closely coordinate protest actions (Kas'kiv *et al*. 2005). From that point onward, the distinction between the civic and political campaigns blurred, with the interactions between them intensifying, both professionally and personally. As we saw above, at the same time as the political opposition decided to change its protest strategies to focus on the new electoral round, PORA leadership invited its members to do the same, announcing that "as a civic movement, [PORA] will lose its relevance"[75].

But close relationships between SMOs and the political opposition were not welcomed by everyone within the movement. For example, Black PORA members consistently refused to sign the agreement in order to avoid compromising their autonomy. As Tatiana Boiko (a Black PORA member) explains: "We agreed to monitor the holding of clean elections, and fight against fraud organized by Viktor Yanukovich's team, but we refused to support 'Nasha Ukraina' and to campaign for Viktor Yushchenko"[76]. She adds that after the deal had been concluded, Yellow and Black PORA not only stopped cooperating, but also started to act in conflict with each other. According to Boiko, Black PORA members were warned by Roman Bessmertnykh (one of the top Yushschenko campaign managers) that they would be left aside and miss the "train of the

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[75] My translation : "Takoi "Pory", kak byla - tochno ne budet, potomu chto kak grazhdanskoe dvizhenie ona utratit aktual'nost'". 19 dekabria "Pora" provedet s"ezd, na kotorom budet obsuhdena strategiia dal'neishei deiatel'nosti (2004, December 8). *Unian*.

[76] My translation: "My soglasilis' sledit' za chistotoi vyborov, borot'sia protiv fal'sifikatsii, organizovannykh shtabom Viktora Ianukovicha, no otkazalis' podderzhat' "Nashu Ukrainu" i agitirovat' za Viktora Yushchenko." Molodezh' prishlas' v "Poru". (2005, June 30). *Novaia gazeta*.

revolution", because of their refusal to officially join Yushchenko's campaign[77]. In the end, however, both PORA groups missed the revolutionary train, as this early cooptation worked against civil society institutionalization after the movement. While on the one hand, the discord it caused reduced the chances for future cooperation among civil society members (internal institutionalization), early cooptation deprived the new regime of incentives to support civil society after the Orange Revolution, once the regime no longer needed them (external institutionalization).

Moreover, early cooptation did not help Orange SMOs to gain greater societal acceptance during demobilization (another indicator of external institutionalization). As Onuch (2014) explains, given that "SMO leaders became more formally connected to political parties and as they attempted to convince their rank-and-file members to join the political party movement, they lost legitimacy, which led to the fragmentation of the largest SMOs" (p. 181). Not only did Yellow PORA lose internal legitimacy within the Orange movement, but the group members also appeared less trustworthy in the eyes of the population in general, who viewed them as agents working for political parties. Another example is Chista Ukraïna, whose key members were coopted into political parties such as Nasha Ukraina[78] and BYuT[79] in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution. Even though not all Orange SMOs accepted this early cooptation, their external legitimacy became closely linked to that of the Orange political elite who, as we know now, quickly disappointed many Ukrainians.

Looking at PORA's fate reveals how little societal legitimacy the two groups won despite their work in the Orange movement. PORA members organized an official closing ceremony right after Yushchenko's inauguration to announce the group's transformation. Testifying to PORA's close contacts with the political opposition, Orange officials attended the ceremony, during which Oleksandr Zinchenko read a letter of congratulations and thanks from the new President[80]. While Black PORA decided to continue street activism, Yellow PORA's main new project was

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[77] Molodezh' prishlas' v "Poru". (2005, June 30). *Novaia gazeta*.
[78] V Donestkoi oblasti formiruetsia rabochaia gruppa po sozdaniiu parti "Nasha Ukraina" (2005, January 28). *Unian*.
[79] One leader of Chista Ukraïna, Oleksandr Solontai, became later BYuT regional deputy (2006-2010). Aleksandr Solontai, persona non-grata uzhe v neskol'kikh strankh. (2012, June 10). *Uzhhorod Info*.
[80] "PORA" prekratila svoiu deiatel'nost' (2005, January 30). *Unian*.

the creation of a political party to participate in the 2006 parliamentary elections[81]. Yellow PORA leader Vladyslav Kas'kiv showed great enthusiasm about the new PORA party because, as he argued, "there is no one political force in Ukraine that could propose needed solutions, a new way to bring Ukraine out of the crisis" (Kas'kiv quoted in Cheterian 2013, p. 190). While some observers were initially optimistic about PORA's chances of success as a political party, arguing that PORA would be seen as one of the few political forces with the moral authority to criticize the new regime[82], others disagreed. As with the choice to join the political opposition during the Orange Revolution, the decision to form a political party was vividly criticized by Black PORA, whose leaders claimed that their 'brand' had been captured by opportunists against the organization's ideals[83]. Black PORA attitudes reflects what Bosi (2016) describes about the tension entailed in the institutionalization processes, as some groups would "see in institutionalization the danger of selling out their key concerns, [given that] it runs against their assumption that it is through unconventional forms of actions that social change will be brought about" (p. 344). As a result, Black PORA decided to re-brand itself later in 2005, changing its name to OPORA. Becoming more like a traditional western-style NGO, OPORA described itself as a civic network that concentrates on elections, education, and housing[84]. While the group has succeeded in remaining free of partisan elements, it took a long time before securing its new role within Ukrainian civil society[85].

Many other controversies followed the creation of the political party 'PORA'. For example, the Ministry of Justice twice refused to register the party, arguing that several signatures were falsified and many addresses were nonexistent. Other Orange SMOs encountered similar problems trying to register as political parties after the Orange Revolution. The Popular front 'Ukraïntsi!', for instance, also had its registration refused by the Ministry of Justice[86]. In turn,

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[81] Vodianoi, A. (2005, February 28). Aktivisty kampanii "Pora" initsiiruiut sozdanie odnoimennoi politicheskoi partii. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.
[82] Kuz'mov, T. (2005, January 28). Shans pokoleniia. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.
[83] Regional'nye koordinatory GK "Pora" protive ispol'zovaniia ee brenda pri sozdanii odnoimennoi partii. (2005, February 28). *Unian*.
[84] See V Ukraine sozdana grazhdanskaia set' "Opora" dlia kontrolia nad deiatel'nost'iu vlasti (2005, December 20). *Unian*.
[85] See conclusion for a more detailed discussion on OPORA's fate.
[86] Zhmin'ko, Z. (2005, April 6). Narodnyi soiuz "Ukraïntsi!" obviniaet Miniust v otkaze registrirovat' ego kak partiiu po politicheskim motivam. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

PORA leaders demanded the removal of the Minister of Justice, Roman Zvarych, based on his allegedly unprofessional behavior and questionable educational background[87]. To defend himself, Zvarych stated that, "The Ministry of Justice does not show more tolerance for participating in revolutions. This is a state body, which is exclusively governed by Law. Application of the Law does not include benefits for veterans of the Orange Revolution"[88].

In the end of June, the Pecherskyi District Court ruled out in favor of PORA and obliged the Ministry of Justice to register the party[89]. In an interview given in early August 2005, Kas'kiv argued that the new political elite had tried to put up barriers to registration because "Just like the whip, we received the stick from a small but influential group of "fathers" of the "NU" [Nasha Ukraina], who today are high-ranking officials, but who have not learned to separate power from business"[90]. While it is hard to know if the Ministry's actions were politically motivated, it seems obvious that these scandals did not help the new party to successfully achieve external institutionalization, which probably also affected its societal support.

In addition to the controversies surrounding PORA's party registration, other factors played a role in the group's eventual marginalization. As a former activist explained at that time, "empty statements and threats to everyone and everything, [and] a sharp increase in PORA members' age – up to 40-50 years" quickly affected the external legitimacy of the group (quoted in Syyan 2008, p. 85). The party PORA later decided to form an electoral bloc with the Reform and Order Party (PRP), despite having initially said that the group was not considering any formal association with another political party given its unique platform[91]. In the end, PORA as a

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[87] Nezaregistrirovannaia partiia "PORA" trebuet, chtoby Zvarich podal v otstavku - Zaiavlenie (2005, April 15). *Unian*.

[88] My translation: "Ministerstvo iustitsii ne razdaet indul'gentsii za uchastie v revoliutsiiakh. Eto - gosudarstvennyi organ, kotoryi rukovodstvuetsia v svoei deiatel'nosti iskliuchitel'no Zakonom. Primenenie trebovanii Zakona ne predusmatrivaet l'got veteranam pomaranchevoi revoliutsii". Zvarich ubezhden, chto kampaniia, razvernutaia protiv nego, iavliaetsia popytkoi pokazat' novoi komande: Tak budet s kazhdym nepokornym. (2005, May 10). *Unian*.

[89] Ukrainskaia partiia "Pora" primet uchastie v parlamentskikh vyborakh. (2005, June 29). *Interfax*.

[90] My translation: "Kak knut, tak i predlozheniia prianika my poluchali ot nebol'shoi, no vliiatel'noi gruppy "ottsov' "NU', kotorye na segodniashnii den' iavliaiutsia vysokimi dolzhnostnymi chinovnikami, no ne nauchilis' otdeliat' vlast' ot biznesa". Kuz'mov, T. (2005, August 5). Lider "Pory' Vladislav Kas'kiv: "V sisteme novoi vlasti segodnia nuzhna revoliutsiia'. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.

[91] See for example Kas'kiv interview with Dzerkalo Tyzhnia when he stated that PORA members "have developed a completely clear unequivocal position - to participate in the election campaign on our own". Kuz'mov, T. (2005, August 5). Lider "Pory' Vladislav Kas'kiv: "V sisteme novoi vlasti segodnia nuzhna revoliutsiia'. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.

political party only won 1.47 percent of the vote in the 2006 elections, despite its association with the PRP[92] (Central Election Commission of Ukraine). The chief editor of the intellectual journal Krytyka, Andriy Mokrousov, noted after PORA's defeat that, "it is a good thing that Yellow Pora! did not win more votes, because it is a virtual party and a parody of liberal politics" (Mokrousov, quoted in Cheterian, p. 190). In the aftermath, the party PORA experienced considerable internal struggles and was later coopted by Yushchenko's electoral bloc for the next elections in 2007. Kas'kiv finally obtained a seat in these elections, the only seat that PORA ever won[93].

PORA's failed attempt to become a legitimate actor in Ukrainian political life after the Revolution is not isolated. For example, although it had announced plans to take part in the 2006 parliamentary election campaign, Chista Ukraïna's activism had already faded to nearly nothing by late 2005[94]. Comparing youth activism after the Revolution on Granite in the early 1990s and after the Orange Revolution, Diuk (2013) argues that "In both instances, the youth who led the protests were either excluded from the post-protest political arrangements (1990), or else their ideals and aspirations were ignored and they were not invited to take up any important government positions (2004)" (p. 181). As Wolowski (2008) argued,

> New groups, which had emerged on the Maidan in autumn/winter 2004,
> entered Ukrainian politics. However, their small membership figures,
> low level of activity and internal disputes prevented them from fulfilling
> the task which they had been expected to carry out, namely to bring
> about a qualitative change on the party political scene (p. 40).

Moreover, just as the early cooptation processes were detrimental to civil society institutionalization, later cooptations that occurred when key leaders of the Orange movement deserted civil society to form the new government were also damaging. For example, the Director of the Razumkov Centre, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, became Defence Minister while two leaders of important SMOs, the Centre for Political and Legal Reforms (CPLR) and the Civil

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[92] Gasanova, I. (2006). Partiinaia zhizn' - Liberaly i tribunaly v odnoi probirke. *Ekspert-Ukraina, 3*(54), 34-38.
[93] Skoropadskii, A. (2010, February 15). Desiatki tysiach liudei na ploshchadi trebuiut chestnykh vyborov - Eta kartina 5-letnei davnosti uzhe nevozmozhna na Ukraine. *Novoe Vremia*.
[94] Sozdana obshchestvennaia organizatsiia 'Chistaia Ukraïna' (2005, January 19). *Unian*.

Society Institute, became Yushchenko's advisers. Yellow PORA's leader Kas'kiv also served as Yushchenko's adviser for some time. The Director of the International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS) was appointed the Chair of the National Academy of State Administration (Razumkov Centre 2007, p. 13). One may argue that after the success of the Orange Revolution, joining the ranks of the new authorities was a rational choice to make for SMO leaders as they could try to get more influence for civil society from within. This argument harks back to the debates in the literature regarding the desirability of social movement institutionalization and how to distinguish between cooptation and institutionalization. As explained in chapter 2, whether only few leaders get invited to participate in the formal political arena, the extent to which the rules of the game remain untouched, as well as the way other civil society actors react to these processes can indicate that cooptation is taking place instead of institutionalization. Applying these indicators to the Ukrainian case, it seems undoubtedly that cooptation process dominates the Orange Revolution's aftermath.

As highlighted by the Ramzukov Centre (2007) "After the Orange Revolution, there were hopes that the authorities would fundamentally change their attitude to civil society, passing from enmity and neglect to real partnership" (p. 9); however, no such change occurred. Yushchenko made some initial efforts to improve civil society participation in the policy-making process[95], but these efforts tended to be either insufficient or badly implemented. Already in September 2005, representatives of established SMOs noted that their relationships with the new authorities were still ambiguous at best and depended on the goodwill of a few individuals. For example, Il'ko Kucheriv from the Democratic Initiatives Foundation expressed his disappointment that "the new government has not implemented any of his project, and that the government does not see in the third sector an intellectual partner"[96] (see also Golovaha and Panina 2008 as well as Sushko 2009). At about the same time, the SMO 'Alliance Maidan' published a memorandum arguing that power relations remained essentially the same despite the change in leaders. The group leaders argued that, "Instead of dialogue with society, the regime, by force of old habit,

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[95] For example, presidential decrees were passed introducing new mechanisms of cooperation between the state and civil society, including the creation of consultative and advisory bodies at the national and regional levels (Ghosh 2010).
[96] My translation: "novaia vlast' ne realizovala ni odnogo ego proekta i "chto vlast' ne vidit v tret'em sektore intellektual'nogo partnera'". Borisova, I. (2005, September 30). Novaia vlast' i "tretii sektor': v boi analitikov po-prezhnemu ne berut. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.

makes promises, uses PR and manipulates public opinion. Society responds to this with disappointment and apathy"[97].

Allina-Pisano (2010) also notes the extent to which civil society in the post-Orange environment had to deal with the same – if not worse in eastern Ukraine – unstable interactions with state actors due to "an increased politicization of relationships between civic organizations and the state" under Yushchenko (pp. 240-244). Yushchenko's public statements were often clear about the loyalty expected from society toward his regime. For example, in April 2005, he stated that, "We want journalists to be our partners today, and to be on our side of the barricade with the power, because we will honestly fulfill those obligations and the words that the Ukrainian nation gave to us on the Maidans"[98]. However, as Yulia Tychenko from the Ukrainian Centre for Independent Political Research underlined, the risk was that the "new authorities confuse NGOs' support for the values of the Orange Revolution with loyalty towards holders of political power", also acknowledging the new regime's tendency to "try to make use of the NGOs in order to legitimate this or that position" (quoted in Cheterian 2013, p. 196).

Not only did the cooptation of leaders not prove as beneficial as expected for civil society, but it also deprived the streets of useful resources. Taras Stets'kiv, an important Orange leader, admitted with regret that while becoming the President of the National Television Company of Ukraine, he did not create a broad social movement to support the ideas of the Revolution[99]. Discussing the lack of enduring successes of the Orange Revolution, Volodymyr Filenko, another key figure of the Orange movement, acknowledged the civic retreat that followed the movement. In a sort of mea culpa, he notes that,

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[97] My translation: " Zamist' dialogu z suspil'stvom vlada, za staroiu zvychkoiu, praktykує obitsianky, piar ta manipuliatsii suspil'noiu svidomistiu. Suspil'stvo na tse vidpovidає zneviroiu ta apatієiu". Memorandum Maidanu. Cherhovi zadachi Pomaranchevoi Revoliutsii. (2005). Retrieved from http://maidan.org.ua/arch/memo/1127062390.html

[98] My translation: "my khotim, chtoby segodnia nashimi partnerami byli zhurnalisty, chtoby oni byli po odnu storonu barrikad s vlast'iu, potomu chto my chestno vypolniaem te obiazatel'stva i slova, kotorye daliukrainskoi natsii na maidanakh.". Yushchenko prizval zhurnalistov, biznesmenov i prostykh grazhdan perdderzhat' vlast' '. (2005, April 27). *Unian*.

[99] Oranzhevaia revoliutsiia: pobeda, kotoruiu ne uderzhali. (2012, November 12). *Newsru.ua*. Retrieved from http://palm.rus.newsru.ua/ukraine/22nov2012/maidano.html#1

Citizens who went on the Maidan then, returned to their home, sat down on sofas to watch television. But power must be controlled, we should have created public organizations, some committees in the defense of democracy. Any power, even very good, has a tendency to become bad if it becomes uncontrolled[100].

In sum, early cooptation processes prevented key SMOs from remaining relevant in the eyes of the population when they tried to institutionalize themselves after the Orange events, while later cooptation of actors engulfed civil society leaders in formal politics and left fewer leaders in the streets. This echoes a recent report on the state of civil society from the CCC Creative Center, which stated that after the Orange Revolution: "Civil society found itself in a state of crisis due to the lack of engagement of citizens in state affairs, their lost trust in politicians, and the loss of the most proactive representatives of CSOs to government positions" (Palyvoda *et al*. 2016, p. 20).

Radicalization Trends

Despite accounts that stress how quickly people disengaged from public life after the Orange Revolution, it will be a mistake to think that nothing happened in the Ukrainian streets. As shown in the previous chapter, activists of both the Orange and Blue movements often chose to voice their discomfort with the new regime by organizing protest events in the subsequent months. However, these events attracted few participants and had little societal resonance. Meanwhile, the repertoire of actions and protest demands of both sides showed some signs of radicalization, even in the late Orange Revolution period.

In particular, the first months of Yushchenko's regime and the appointment of new officials quickly irritated some of its previous allies. In effect, despite Yushchenko's initial discourse

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[100] My translation : "Hromadyani, iaki todi viishli na Maidan, roziishlysia po domivkakh, posidaly na dyvanakh bilia televizoriv. A vladu treba bulo kontroliuvaty, treba bulo utvoriuvaty hromads'ki organizatsii, komitety zakhystu demokratii. Bud'iaka vlada, navit' duzhe dobra, maie skhyl'níst' stavaty poganoiu, iakshcho vona staie bezkontrol'noiu". Oranzhevaia revoliutsiia: pobeda, kotoruiu ne uderzhali. (2012, November 12). *Newsru.ua*. Retrieved from http://palm.rus.newsru.ua/ukraine/22nov2012/maidano.html#1

about the necessity to exclude all former regime officials from power[101], he sometimes had to compromise, which was not always welcomed by Orange SMOs. In addition to throwing eggs at officials[102] or booing them in public[103], protest events against appointed officials were organized in many cities, with the most important being in Kyiv, Odessa, Dnipropetrovs'k, Kharkiv, Poltava, Vinnytsa, and Zaporizhzhia. For example, the nomination for governors of Sergei Kas'ianov in Dnipropetrovs'k, Arsen Avakov in Kharkiv, and Vasilii Tsushko in Odessa were met with street resistance[104]. Members from the civic campaign PORA (often coming from the Black PORA wing before the group changed its name) and other activists also asked for the resignation of university rectors in Chernivtsy and Cherkasy because of their support for Yanukovich during the elections[105]. Some city mayors and procurators became targets of Orange SMOs, in particular in Odessa, Poltava, and Uzhhorod. Pressured by the street, Yushchenko had to yield on some occasions, such as in Khmelnytsky[106] and Dnipropetrovs'k[107], where he dismissed his own chosen governors after protests.

The limited radicalization that occurred within the Orange movement resulted partly from the cooptation-induced lack of institutionalization. SMOs wanted to express that they felt left out of the nomination process. In Kharkiv, for example, activists complained that the process of official appointments was too opaque and that all their propositions for candidates were ignored[108]. The Committee of Voters of Ukraine (KIU) also noted that the nomination process under Yushchenko was actually worse than under Kuchma, because of the absence of clear criteria or a

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[101] Yushchenko zaveriaet, chto na rukovodiashchikh dolzhnostiakh ne budet liudei, kotorye vystupali protiv smeny vlasti. (2005, February 15). *Unian*.

[102] Gois, P. (2005, January 28). Aktivisty kampanii "PORA" zabrosali mera Uzhhoroda Pogorelova iaitsami. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

[103] V Krymu proshel ob"edinitel'nyi forum sil, podderzhivaiushchikh prezidenta Yushchenko. (2005, January 29). *Interfax*.

[104] Korobka, A. (2005, February 18). 100 zhitelei Dnepropetrovskoi oblasti trebuiut u oblgosadministratsii otstavki gubernatora Kas'ianova. *Ukraïns'ki Novini* ; Predstaviteli obshchestvennosti chuguevskogo raiona piketirovali khar'kovskuiu OGA, trebuia osvobodit raion ot korruptsionerov (2005, February 22). *Unian*

[105] Aktivisty "Pory" i "Studencheskoi volny" trebuiut ostavki rektorata cherkasskogo natsional'nogo universiteta (2005, February 25). *Unian* ; Zavtra studenty neskol'kikh chernovitskikh vuzov provedut miting s trebovaniem ostavki rektora bukovinskoi finakademii. (2005, May 11). *Unian*.

[106] Yushchenko zaveriaet, chto na rukovodiashchikh dolzhnostiakh ne budet liudei, kotorye vystupali protiv smeny vlasti. (2005, February 15). *Unian*.

[107] Glushchenko, D. i. (2005, April 14). Yushchenko nazyvaet naznachenie dnepropetrovskim gubernatoram Ekhanurova kompromissnym dlia oblasti. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

[108] Khar'kovskie organizatsii NRU, KUN I "Zelenye" trebuiut prozrachnogo protsessa formirovaniia novoi vlasti (2005, March 1). *Unian*

transparent mechanism through which nominations were made[109]. Lacking formal channels of dialogue or consultation, some groups radicalized their positions and actions. Students going on hunger strikes to call for the removal of University rectors also illustrated radicalizing positions and a certain feeling of despair. For example, after more than a week of hunger strike, parents of protesters expressed their disappointment with the new elites, saying in a letter that,

> We, parents, were standing in public squares of Kyiv and other cities
> during the Orange Revolution, fought for democracy, the rule of law,
> and justice; yet now our children are forced to go on hunger strike, even
> during the days of Easter, and fight for human rights for people, who
> want to live and learn in a democratic society[110].

Moreover, internal struggles that existed during the mobilization period became exacerbated during demobilization, which did not ease the radicalization trends. As described above, public clashes between Black and Yellow PORA on the future of the organization as well as between the PORAs and other Orange activists are examples of such internal conflicts. Mutual accusations of organizing politically motivated or 'by order' (zakaznoi) events were also divisive for the Orange movement[111]. To be sure, the split among the Orange elites that occurred very rapidly after the Orange Revolution also engendered a pernicious social climate for SMOs.

Beyond accelerating the marginalization of Orange SMOs, the radicalization trends within the movement further polarized civil society between Yushchenko and Yanukovich supporters. Let us not forget that during the peak of the Orange protests, less than half of the population supported the events organized by the Orange movement[112]. As was described in chapter 3, protest events occurred all over Ukraine, but in many places, especially in Donetsk, Luhansk,

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[109] KIU nachal monitoring politicheskikh partii i ispolnitel'noi vlasti Ukrainy. (2005, April 13). *Unian*.
[110] My translation: "My, roditeli, stoia na ploshchadiakh Kieva i drugikh gorodov vo vremia Pomaranchevoi revoliutsii, borolis' za demokratiiu, zakonnost' i spravedlivost', a teper' nashi deti vynuzhdeny golodat' dazhe v Paskhal'nye dni i borot'sia za prava cheloveka, kotoryi khochet zhit', uchit'sia v demokraticheskom obshchestve". Roditeli golodaiushchikh studentov bukovinskoi finakademi zaiavliaut, chto gotovy pribegnut' k samozhzheniiu (2005, May 5). *Unian*.
[111] In addition to the scandal around PORA and the Ministry of Justice, see for example the following events, in which such accusations were openly made: Aktivisty "Pory" piketirovali dnepropetrovskuiu oblgosadministratsiiu protiv naznacheniia gubernatorom Kas'ianova (2005, February 11). *Unian;* Rzhevskii, V. (2005, June 2). Shtab "Pory" v Kieve otkreshchivaetsia ot intsidenta v Kerchi. *ITAR TASS* ; Chleny regional'nykh organizatsii "Bat'kivshchini" prosiat Tymoshenko obratit' vnimanie na negativnye protsessy v partii (2005, June 22). *Unian*.
[112] Aktsii protesta oppozitsii podderzhivaiut 45% Ukraintsev. Opros Tsentra Razumkova (2004, December 3). *Unian*

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and Odessa, people were protesting in the Blue movement, thus *in reaction to* the Orange movement, threatening to hold a referendum on the federalization of Ukraine if Yushchenko was elected president[113]. As a Blue protester said, "We are not against those who are in Kyiv. We are for unity. But we are against such people, like Yushchenko, who want to divide us"[114]. It thus comes as no surprise that the limited radicalization of the Orange movement provoked the radicalization of the other camp as well.

In addition to radicalization of the repertoire of actions, many of the demands put forward by Orange actors in the wake of the Orange Revolution showed no sensitivity to the losers. For example, some PORA and Chista Ukraïna members were advocating for rapid lustration policies toward representatives of the former regime. PORA activists gathered a 'black list' (chernyi spisok) of about 150 officials to be dismissed because of their alleged abuse of power under the former regime[115]. Another youth group, Student Brotherhood (Studencheskoe bratstvo), announced the creation of a lustration committee, the first of which was established in Crimea, while picketing the Ministry of Education to demand the dismissal of all professors involved in the electoral fraud[116]. A new SMO, the National alliance (Natsional'nyi al'ians), created in the wake of the Revolution[117], protested at a theater in Chernivtsi against a well-known Ukrainian singer who had just released her new album in Russian. According to an activist of the group, the youth were becoming real Ukrainian patriots and were fed up by the total 'russification' of social life in Ukraine[118]. Even more radical were the demands to recognize the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the militant branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) led by Stepan Bandera, himself a highly controversial figure in the Ukrainian society, variously

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[113] Belovaia, O. (2004, November 28). Obastanovka na Ukraine WPS Russian Media Monitoring Agency.

[114] My translation: "My ne protiv tekh, kto v Kieve. My za edinstvo. No my protiv takikh, kak Yushchenko, kto khochet razdelit' nas". Storonniki Yanukovicha provodiat s"ezd na vostoke (2004, November 28). *Reuters*.

[115] Na budushchei nedele "Pora" peredast v sekretariat prezidenta "chernyi spisok" gossluzhashchikh. (2005, February 16). *Unian*.

[116] Studencheskoe Bratstvo ob"iavliaet o sozdanii vseukrainskogo liustratsionnogo komiteta (2005, February 25). *Unian*.

[117] See the historical backgroup of the group on their webpage: http://nation.org.ua/pro/istorychna-dovidka/

[118] My translation: "On dobavil, chto molodezh' v gorodakh nachinaet stanovit'sia nastoiashchimi patriotami Ukrainy, kotorym nadoela total'naia rusifikatsiia obshchestvennoi zhizni". V Chernovtsakh pod stenami dramteatra, gde vystupala Irina Bily, molodezh' protestovala protiv ee russkoi iazhchnogo al'boma. (2005, March 21). *Unian*.

considered a national hero or a Nazi collaborator[119]. While I do not dispute the sincerity of the activists, the timing of such protest demands sent the wrong message to the former Blue activists and Yanukovich supporters. Put differently, the fact that these actions were conducted immediately after the Orange Revolution did not foster civil society consolidation; instead, it created more tensions and reinforced Ukraine's societal divisions[120].

In turn, the new regime's polarizing policies often made the situation worse[121]. Consequently, instead of going home, Blue activists frequently organized protest actions, including pickets, rallies, and sit-ins during the spring of 2005[122]. The sit-in in Uzhhorod to support the governor Ivan Rizak, charged with involvement in the suicide of a university rector, lasted 37 days (despite relocations after the Uzhhorod City-Court banned activists from protesting in front of the Regional State Administration)[123]. The arrest for extortion charges in April 2005 of the head of the Donetsk Regional Council, Boris Kolesnikov, generated even more protests. Yanukovich and his supporters decried the arrest, claiming that the case was a clear example of growing political repression. Blue SMOs organized over two months of sit-ins and rallies in Kyiv and Donetsk to support Kolesnikov[124]. Even though they did not attract the same societal resonance as the protests during the Orange Revolution, these events succeeded in bringing thousands of people to the streets, ironically further uniting the opposition against Yushchenko[125]. According to the leader of the Union of the Youth Regions of Ukraine,

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[119] Trukhan, V. (2005, March 24). 150 storonnikov UNP trebuiut ot L'vovskogo gorsoveta obratit'sia k Yushchenko s pros'boi initsiirovat' priznanie UPA voiuiushchei storonoi. *Ukraïns'ki Novini* ; Gorshkov, D. (2005, April 21). 100 storonnikov NRU, UNP i KUN trebuiut u Rady priznat' voinov OUN-UPA voiuiushchei storonoi vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine. *Ukraïns'ki Novini* ; Miting, posviashchennyi uchastnikam OUN-UPA, proshel vo L'vove. (2005, May 22). *Interfax*.
[120] See for example, Stepanov, S. (2005, June 22). 2 tys. chelovek protestuiut v Sevastopole protiv priznaniia OUN-UPA voiuiushchei storonoi vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.
[121] Glavnoi ugrozoi ot predstoiashchei izbiratel'noi kampanii iavliaetsia uglublenie raskola obshchestva. Ekspert tsentra Razumkova. (2005, April 20). *Unian*.
[122] See for example : V Donetskoi i Luganskoi oblastiakh Ukrainyproshli aktsii protesta protiv diskriminatsii russkogo iazyka. (2005, May 31). *RIA Novosti*. ; Stepanov, S. (2005, June 22).
[123] V Uzhgorode po resheniiu suda demontirovany palatki SDPU(O), ustanovlennye v znak protesta protiv aresta Rizaka. (2005, June 21). *Unian*.
[124] Smoliaruk, A. (2005, June 30). Protestuiushchie protiv aresta Kolesnikova storonniki "Soiuza molodezhi regionov Ukrainy" svernuli palatochnyi gorodok u Kabmina. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.
[125] Vas'kovskaia, I. (2005, April 11). Zachistka "Kriminal'noi oppozitsii". *Novaia gazeta*.

[…] the protest actions opened the eyes of many citizens of our country on the real state of affairs in the government. They showed that in the country, democratic norms are not working, that there is a gross violation of the Constitution norm and the laws of Ukraine, that telephone law is used, restricting freedom of expression[126].

As this quote illustrates, Blue actors were learning not only to replicate the repertoire of actions used by the Orange movement but also to borrow its discourse on democratic rights to frame their grievances.

Working Together After Success

So far the chapter has mainly focused on what went wrong for civil society after the Orange Revolution. One might argue that despite all these obstacles, Ukrainian civil society learned from the Orange protests and institutionalized cooperative practices, what I call internal institutionalization. However, internal institutionalization after mass mobilizations does not occur in a vacuum, and needs to be compared with the pre-mobilization state of civil society.

To explain the success of the Orange Revolution, scholars and activists often emphasized the extent to which civil society had become progressively consolidated through previous episodes of contention, which enabled it to play a central role in the Orange Revolution (Diuk 2006, Karatnycky 2005, Kuzio 2005b, Bunce & Wolchik 2011, Onuch 2014, Nikolayenko 2015)[127]. For example, Yellow PORA leader, Vladyslav Kas'kiv noted that,

> Ukrainian civil society underwent an active transformation. In their struggle for democracy during previous election campaigns, NGOs had acquired considerable experience in providing information, educating citizens and monitoring the electoral process. Influential NGO coalitions and large-scale cooperation programs had emerged (Kas'kiv *et al*. 2005, p. 4).

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[126] My translation: "[…]aktsii protesta otkryli glaza mnogim grazhdanam nashei strany na real'noe sostoianie del v gosudarstve. Oni pokazali, chto v strane ne rabotaiut normy demokratii, proiskhodit gruboe narushenie norm Konstitutsii i zakonov Ukrainy, ispol'zuetsia telefonnoe pravo, ogranichivaetsia svoboda slova". V tsentral'nom parke kul'tury stolitsy demontirovan palatochnyi gorodok (2005, June 30). *Unian*.

[127] In particular, the failed 2001 protest campaign against Kuchma, during which SMOs denounced the gruesome murder of the journalist Georgiy Gongadze, has been presented as a critical event for civil society. According to this interpretation, it was during and after this event that many SMOs learnt and decided to work together.

Kuzio (2005b) also underlined the importance of previous protest campaigns, arguing that the Orange Revolution was "the result of extensive grassroots campaigning and coalition building among the political opposition and civil society groups [adding that] the Orange Revolution had been several years in the making" (p. 129). But while Ukrainian civil society showed important signs of internal institutionalization before the Orange Revolution, these institutionalizing trends slowed down afterward because of the dual processes of cooptation and limited radicalization described above.

That is not to say that there was no cooperation among Orange SMOs in the wake of the Revolution. For example, in the Lviv region, about thirty SMOs created a union under the name of the political coalition Sila Narodu (it was reported that PORA was the only organization that refused to participate)[128]. Harking back to the absence of external institutionalization, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation launched in the summer of 2005 a coalition initiative to lobby for legislative changes regarding the third sector, urging the Yushchenko administration to provide "Orange wings for NGOs" (Freedom House 2006). Other long-standing SMOs, such as the KIU along with 'Alliance Maidan' and the newly transformed OPORA, created the coalitions 'Clean Elections' (Chysti vybory-2006)[129] and 'Conscious Choice' (Usvidomlenyi vybir-2006)[130] in order to monitor the 2006 parliamentary elections. Former Orange activists might also have dedicated their energy to more local causes, such as in the Kyiv Rescue Forum (Forum spaseniia Kieva), which protested against Kyiv's policies in terms of land redistribution, illegal construction, and stray animals[131], although this type of activism shifting from national to local campaigns needs to be better investigated in future research.

However, the key question remains whether or not civil society has benefited on balance from the Orange experience, in terms of the ties that SMOs have cultivated among each other. Many authors argued that the Orange Revolution had led to weakened SMO networks (Onuch 2014, p.

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[128] Vo L'vovskoi oblasti sozdano ob"edinenie obshchestvennykh organizatsii 'Sila Naroda', v kotoroe voshlo 30 organizatsii (2005, April 4). *Unian*.
[129] Chisyi Vybori (2006, February 10). Retrieved July 20, 2015, from http://protection.org.ua/ua/activity/635?
[130] U Kiievi prezentovano kampaniiu "Usvidomlenyi vybir-2006". (2006, February 10). *Unian*.
[131] http://www.forumspaskiev.org.ua/index_old.php

230, Freedom House 2007) and a subsequent loss of popular support for street activism (Golovakha & Panina 2007, White & McAllister 2009, Beissinger 2011). As Beissinger (2013) recently argued,

> Despite the shared sense of community that united Orange revolutionaries, once its anti-incumbency goal was achieved, the Orange coalition quickly unraveled at both elite and mass levels. Its leaders became engulfed in factional squabbles; its participants demonstrated weak commitment to the revolution's democratic master narrative, failed to mobilize in defense of the revolution's articulated ideals, and soon broke down into the electoral factions out of which the revolution was originally composed (p. 17).

This quote emphasizes that after the Orange Revolution success, cooperative ties among SMOs were jeopardized by both the lack of uniting goals and by cooptation processes, further complicated by the divisive political climate. Moreover, it has to be noted that a significant part of the cooperative networks that were still developing existed in the western and central regions, without cross-regional bridging with eastern and southern Ukraine. The civic network OPORA, for example, remains active only in the western and central regions, with regional offices in Lviv, Rivne, Vinnytsia, Chernivtsi, Cherkasy, and Uzhhorod. The fact that long-standing SMOs continued to work together on occasion after the Orange Revolution thus seems more related to the previous state of civil society than to the Orange Revolution in and of itself.

Once again, the PORA example is instructive. As Bunce and Wolchik (2011) note, "Although widely thought of as an organization, or as two groups, in fact Pora billed itself as a 'united initiative of hundreds of NGOs' that involved numerous volunteers and groups and implemented a wide variety of projects" (p. 132). Created for the Orange Revolution, PORA was thus a platform for youth activism cooperation and networking that could have been maintained in the aftermath of the event. However, the two poles of leadership that developed within the Black and Yellow wings quickly proved irreconcilable. As we will see again in the Russian case, such a duplication of functions and leadership centers turns out to be detrimental to the movement's internal legitimacy. The internal struggles and mutual accusations of 'discrediting the Maidan' did not foster a greater cooperative climate for SMOs in its aftermath.

Conclusion: Marginalization and Polarization of Civil Society

Despite Ukrainian civil society's key role in the Orange Revolution, I have shown in this chapter that it did not on balance benefit from this extraordinary episode of mobilization. I have argued that two interlinked processes in the demobilization period must be taken into account in order to understand this outcome. First, despite their attempts, Orange SMO leaders failed to increase their organizations' external institutionalization, in part because of cooptation processes and internal struggles. The result was greater marginalization of civil society, with Orange SMOs, including youth groups, generally sidelined from the post-Orange political process (Diuk 2013). Second, limited radicalization of both the Orange and Blue movements led to further polarization within society and across regions. As Lane (2008) argues, "the events of the Orange Revolution did not initiate, and the consequences did not effect, integrating mechanisms creating solidarity—the formation of a 'civic Ukraine'—but led to greater division between East and West Ukraine" (p. 545). As a result of these two intertwined processes (i.e. failed institutionalization and limited radicalization), internal institutionalization in Ukrainian civil society slowed in the wake of the Orange events.

More generally, the initial enthusiasm of the Orange Revolution rapidly turned to societal disenchantment and pessimism toward political activism (Golovakha & Panina 2007). White and McAllister (2009) note, for example, that "there was general agreement, across the east and south as well as the west, that the outcome of the revolutionary events had been disappointing, or even negative" (p. 241). Conducting focus groups after the Revolution, Onuch (2014) finds that many respondents felt deceived by Orange activists who, they believe, no longer pursued their watchdog work in the aftermath (p. 208). Likewise, Stewart stresses that whereas in the immediate wake of the revolution, public perception of the SMOs' influence on politics initially increased, it significantly declined from 2005 onwards (Stewart 2009, p. 187). Beissinger (2011, p. 31) also notes that notwithstanding the sincerity of youth protests during the Orange Revolution, by 2006, the level of youth activism in Ukraine had significantly dropped. Consequently, the Orange experience did not transform how Ukrainians related to civil society and political activism.

While the corrosive political climate of the post-Orange period surely did not help SMOs to embed themselves into the country's sociopolitical life or to maintain cooperative networks with each other (i.e., the two dimensions of institutionalization), their close contacts with formal actors were also damaging. In particular, the quick division that occurred within the Orange elites monopolized the new regime's attention while also increasing tensions among civil society actors, who felt pressured to take sides.

On a more theoretical note, the chapter calls into question two assumptions often found in the literature on social movements. First, although divisions within the elite are often presented as political opportunities for mobilization, persistent divisions might actually represent obstacles to a smooth demobilization process, especially after a movement achieves success in accomplishing key goals. Second, the literature frequently associates social movement institutionalization with closer contacts with formal actors, such as political parties (Heberle 1949, Kriesi *et al*. 1995, Heaney & Rojas 2007, Peterson 2016). As the chapter shows, however, formal actors may also adopt a 'winner takes all' attitude in the aftermath of successful mobilizations, seeing no incentives to further empower the social groups that helped achieve that success. Achieving external institutionalization is thus not a foregone conclusion after successful social movement, but is rather, as noted by Suh (2011), "an outcome of joint strategic choices by both the movement and the state—a sociohistorical construct that is only possible under specific conditions in which propitious international environments, favorable political structures, and opportune activities of movement leaders and members coalesce" (p. 443). Deciding when and how to ally with formal actors seems thus to be an important strategic decision for leaders of mass movements, both during mobilization and demobilization.

CHAPTER 5 – THE MOVEMENT 'FOR FAIR ELECTIONS' IN RUSSIA: WHEN, WHERE, AND HOW DID IT END?

Immediately after the parliamentary elections of December 4, 2011, in which the Russian ruling party, United Russia (UR), allegedly received 49.3 percent of the votes and 238 out of the 450 seats in the Duma, protests denouncing electoral fraud began. While protests had been taking place in Russia quite regularly[132], the mass character that the new protests soon developed was spectacular, especially when contrasted with the seeming weakness of Russian civil society (Howard 2003, McFaul & Treyger 2004). Within the first days of protests in Moscow, instead of the few hundred people initially expected by the organizers, from 5,000 to 10,000 showed up[133]. Mass demonstrations were then held in dozens of cities across Russia on December 10 and 24, in which hundreds of thousands of people participated. Mass protests were repeated in February 2012, but declined soon after the presidential elections in March 2012. Between each of these massive demonstrations, smaller but very creative forms of actions were organized, such as car rallies, human chains, or toy protests. The movement's main symbols during the protests were the white ribbon and the slogan 'For Fair Elections (FFE)' ('Za chestnye vybory')[134].

A whole range of established social movement organizations (SMOs) participated in these protest activities, ranging from the Left Front (Levyi Front) of Sergei Udal'tsov and the liberal coalition Solidarnost' of the late Boris Nemtsov to nationalist and right-wing movements. In addition, new SMOs were created during the movement, including different organising committees (Orgkomitet), a Civic Movement (Grazhdanskoe Dvizhenie) and the League of Voters (Liga Izbiratelei), which were all influential in the leadership of the movement. These

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[132] The group Strategiya-31 organised protests on the 31st of each month to denounce the continuous violation of the Constitution's Article 31, which regulates freedom of assembly. The number of participants in these protests, however, is never more than a few hundreds of people. See Konstitutsiya Rossiskoi Federatsii, availabe at: http://www.constitution.ru/10003000/10003000-4.htm, accessed 27 April 2015.

[133] For a good summary of how FFE leaders had initially very low expectations, see Al'bats, E., Svetova, Z., Skovoroda, E., & Chernuk, I. (2012, December 3). Dekabr' 2011-go. *Novoe vremia*.

[134] The movement's initial demands included: The annulation of the parliamentary elections; the holding of new and fair elections, the removal of the Central Election Commission chairman, Vladimir Churov; the adoption of more democratic legislation regarding elections and the registration of political parties; and the immediate release of all political prisoners. See Churov ob"edinil oppozitsiiu. (2011, December 9). *Moskovskie novosti*.

SMOs not only included long-term activists, but also new leaders, such as the anti-corruption blogger Aleksei Naval'ny, and the environmentalist leader Evgeniia Chirikova. Moreover, respected journalists as well as popular cultural figures such as Leonid Parfenov, Boris Akunin, Dmitri Bykov, and Kseniia Sobchak joined the movement. As Greene (2013) argues, the creation of new ties between old and new SMOs facilitated by social media was one of the most important factors enabling the mobilization.

The systemic political opposition - that is, the non-ruling parties officially represented in parliament [the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and A Just Russia (SR)] - also participated in the movement, but played a more ambiguous role than opposition parties had during the Ukrainian Orange Revolution. The relationships between the non-systemic opposition (nesistemnaia oppozitsiia), which includes SMOs, unregistered political parties and many other civil society actors, and the systemic or formal opposition (sistemnaia oppozitsiia) are often strained and competitive. Nonetheless, at the peak of the movement, the allegedly fixed borders between the systemic and non-systemic opposition became more fluid. For example, individuals such as Il'ia Ponomarev, or Gennadi and Dmitri Gudkov from Spravedlivaia Rossiia (SR) acted as key leaders of the protests, while some non-systemic actors had supported systemic leaders in the presidential elections, such as Udal'tsov supporting the KPRF leader, Gennadi Ziuganov.

The Russian movement also enjoyed important societal resonance for a sustained period. For example, traditional mass media started reporting on the protests in mid-December, while also giving voice to the non-systemic opposition (Fond razvitiia grazhdanskogo obshchestva 2012, p. 27). Newspapers not considered particularly critical of the regime, such as *Izvestsiia*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets* or *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, and even more surprisingly, pro-regime TV channels, such as Channel One or NTV, were discussing the FFE movement and interviewing its leaders. Beyond the protest events, many other initiatives related to the movement were reported on, including not only cultural initiatives, such as artistic exhibitions on the protests[135], but also more

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[135] D'iakova, E. (2011, December 23). Fotoboloto. *Novaia gazeta*.

popular enterprises, such as dating initiatives[136] and a fashion line offering good taste clothing to protesters during demonstrations[137]. Consequently, although the number of protesters that took part in the repeated mass demonstrations during the winter of 2011-2012 was unprecedented in Putin's Russia, the creation of crosscutting coalitions between old and new SMOs, as well as the societal resonance that the social movement reached, were perhaps even more significant.

While the next chapter will explore in detail the choices the main leaders of the movement made during the demobilization period and their ramifications, this chapter examines the broader dynamics of the demobilization process. It will thus set the stage for the qualitative analysis by identifying the key trends that characterize the FFE movement from its mobilization peak to its more quiescent period. It presents the results of a protest event analysis that is based on an original database of 1,114 events spanning from December 2011 to August 2012 inclusively (see codebook in Appendix A). The aim is not only to identify critical moments in the demobilization process, but also to empirically inform the reader about different dimensions of the FFE movement, including the variation in protest dynamics between the centre and the regions, the evolution of its action repertoire, and the transformation of the main claims associated with the movement. Moreover, as the dataset also includes all protest events that occurred during the period studied, they allow me to compare the FFE events with other protests actions taking place at the same time, including pro-regime and unrelated events.

My protest event analysis calls into question the common assumption that the movement demobilized primarily due to regime repression. The increase in repression occurred only after the violent clashes between the regime and the protesters following the May 7, 2012, presidential inauguration of Vladimir Putin. Demobilization had begun much earlier, however. Rank-and-file activists, along with more moderate leaders, started to massively disengage from the movement immediately after the March 2012 presidential elections (micro-level). This period also corresponded with a progressive reduction in the societal resonance of the movement (macro-level). Compared to the December 2011 Duma elections, which many Russians considered

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[136] Vasil'eva, E. (2011, December 23). Miting 24 dekabria internet nazval "Iarmarkoi Zhenikhov". *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

[137] Dubinina, A. (2012, February 17). Moda dobralas' do barrikad. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

unfair, the presidential elections did not suffer from the same legitimacy deficit. Levada Center found for example that 45% of the population did not doubt the fairness of the presidential elections, and another 15% thought they were absolutely fair[138]. Thus, the movement rapidly suffered from problem depletion and had to adjust its protest demands (Davenport 2014). In addition, the regime had begun to participate more actively in the competition for the streets, organising many pro-Putin demonstrations that attracted media attention and deprived the movement of its uniqueness.

SMOs were still mobilized and continued to organize protest events (meso-level) after the presidential elections, despite the loss of many protesters and the decline in societal resonance. But the structure of these protests changed. The FFE movement entered a period of limited radicalization, where protest events took a more direct form, such as hunger strikes or sit-ins, in contrast to the previous demonstrative actions embodied by large and festive rallies. This radicalization was limited given that violence occurred very rarely during the whole movement. Nonetheless, the limited radicalization phase made it difficult for the movement to gain new activists, retain moderate participants, or secure societal sympathy, further accelerating the demobilization process. Interestingly enough, the regime's use of repression toward the protesters that started in May 2012 actually temporarily revitalized the FFE movement, unexpectedly deflecting the earlier radicalization trends and briefly re-mobilizing the micro (protest participants) and macro (societal resonance) levels. Of course, repression had this effect only because activists choose to respond to it in a moderate fashion, which highlights the need to bring movement leaders back in the analytical picture even in a repressive context. Other attempts to invigorate the movement were undertaken later in 2012. In particular, the movement organised another March of Millions on September 15, which attracted tens of thousands of protesters. Nonetheless, the momentum of the movement was undeniably subsiding by that point, as many more moderate leaders had already disengaged from the movement. In turn, both the number of activities aimed at attracting mass support and the number of protesters continued to decline in 2013 (Ross 2015, Treisman 2013).

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[138] Khamraev, V. (2012, March 24). Grazhdane rossii ne zhaluiutsia na davlenie. *Kommersant*.

The Data

Contrary to the Ukrainian Orange Revolution, where few structured datasets were compiled on the protests, different projects have already gathered (or are in the process of gathering) data on the FFE movement. One can easily find non-systematic data about the movement. For example, many authors wrote about the 2011-12 protests, focusing on the mass events in Moscow. But beyond the fact that they tended to neglect smaller and regional events, more problematic for the purpose of this thesis is that they reported inconsistent and sometimes wildly different participation figures, while not elaborating on the sources used (compare, for example, Kryshtanovskaia *et al*. 2013, Fond razvitiia grazhdanskogo obshchestva 2012, Smyth *et al*. 2013).

More structured datasets on recent Russian activism do exist (Robertson 2007, 2011, 2013; Lankina, 2015, Lankina & Voznaya 2015, Sobolev 2015). In particular, Reuter and Roberston (2015) as well as Lankina and Voznaya (2015) have compiled datasets on protest events that include the movement FFE. However, like all databases, they have their limits. For example, these databases are based on activist-generated data and are therefore more likely to over-represent events that correspond to the activists' worldviews[139]. As a result, they may be less reliable in indicating the societal resonance of events beyond opposition circles. I designed my database to minimize this potential bias by building on five local newspapers with different views of the regime. As a result, while Lankina and Voznaya's (2015) database includes 551 protest events for all of 2012, I find 780 events for the first eight months of 2012, even after excluding pro-regime events. Sobolev (2015) also constructs a database by using Integrum.ru, a Russian media monitoring website, but does not identify the specific media sources used[140]. As the main goal of this dissertation is to compare FFE with other mass mobilizations, and primarily with the Orange Revolution, as well to focus on the demobilization process, it seemed more

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[139] For example, while Reuter and Roberston (2015) use data from the Institute of Collective Actions (IKD— "Institut Kollektivnoe Deistvie"), a leftish-oppositionist group, and from the KPRF, Lankina and Voznaya (2015) use data compiled by the namarsh.ru, which is a liberal website created by the oppositionist Garry Kasparov.

[140] The number of events in my database is similar to Sobolev (2015) for the same period, which increases the confidence of my results. Between December 4, 2011, and May 30, 2012, Sobolev's database includes 440 mass events. Although Sobolev does not clearly define mass events, I have 499 events that could be classified as such for the same period (this excludes the pro-regime events as well as events that have less than 100 participants reported, but keeping the ones with missing data on the number of participants).

appropriate to build a new comparative database using the same types of sources and the same coding process. The data presented here complement and in certain key ways expand upon existing datasets on Russian activism, with a specific focus on the FFE movement.

FFE Events and SMOs - A Meso-Level Analysis

The structure of the Russian FFE mobilization differed from the typical color revolution pattern in which massive and daily protests lasted for a short period before declining dramatically (see chapters on Ukraine). In Russia, scholars generally describe the FFE movement as punctuated by a few mass events organized over a period of three months without numerous activities between them (Sobolev 2015, p. 99). The three events that occurred in Moscow – on Bolotnaia Square (December 10), Sakharov Avenue (December 24), and again on Bolotnaia Square (February 4) – are usually presented as the key events of the movement. The May 6 event on Bolotnaia Square in Moscow on the eve of Putin's inauguration, where violent skirmishes happened between the police and the protesters, is seen as the major turning point after which repression increased. While we cannot deny the importance of these four Moscow events, many other protest events occurred in between the main events, both in Moscow and in the rest of Russia.

Figure 5.1 presents all events organized by the FFE Movement throughout Russia between December 2011 and August 2012. Although these events cannot all be considered massive, we see that the total number of events per month is considerable, with about 100 or more events organized by the movement until May 2012, except for the New Year holiday period in January[141]. First, these results contradict Mark Kramer's (2013) argument regarding the prolonged January break that Kramer viewed as one of the biggest mistakes made by the movement leaders. According to him, "Experience from the mid-1980s on has shown that the best way to mobilize people to take part in large peaceful protests is to keep doing it, week after week, to sustain momentum (p. 4)". Figure 5.1 shows instead that the January break did not hinder the movement's capacity to mobilize as mass protests resumed in February. The results

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[141] In Russia, the New Year holidays span over at least two weeks, during which all public and state activities are almost completely freeze. Thus, the low activism during this period does not represent a surprising finding and does not mean that the FFE movement was in decline.

seem to confirm rather the effect of repression as a major cause of demobilization, given that a sharp decline can be identified after the month of May.

Figure 5.1. Number of FFE events per month, December 2011-August 2012

However, when further disaggregated, the data reveal important nuances (see Figure 5.2). First, compiling events by month leads us to believe that both the months of December 2011 (with 147 events) and May 2012 (with 145 events) were the peak of the movement in terms of activities organized. When looking at the events per day, however, we see a very different picture. Figure 5.2 shows that during the first three months, the protests were diffused geographically, with specific days during which several events were held at the same time in different cities; from March 2012, this trend shifted with fewer events organized on the same day across the country but with events occurring on a more regular basis.

Figure 5.2. Number of events per day of the FFE Movement, December 2011-August 2012

Thus between December 2011 and February 2012, there were 41 days on which protests were organized in Russia, with an average of 6.5 events per day. Between March and May 2012 there were 87 days of protests with an average of 3.8 events per day, whereas between June and August 2012, protest events were organized on 45 days, with an average of 1.7 events/day (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Summary of the level of participation (per protest day) and number of events in average (per day) in the FFE Movement, according to different moments

Periodization	Protest day	Participation (average/protest day)	Number of events (average /protest day)
Dec 2011 to Feb 2012	41	10,943	6.5
March to May 2012	87	1,694	3.8
June 2012	12	5,484	1.6
July to August 2012	33	107	1.7

Moscow vs. the Regions

As shown in Figure 5.3, the period after the March 2012 presidential election corresponds to a greater proportion of events organized in Moscow when compared to the first months of mobilization. In fact, the mobilizations in Moscow do not evolve in the same way as in the rest of Russia. The total number of events outside Moscow, again excluding the January holiday break, presents a quite expected protest cycle shape, where after almost six months of high intensity, the organization of protest events sharply declined after May 2012. But in Moscow, we see that the intensity in the number of events organized peaked in April and May 2012, after which it also significantly dropped.

Figure 5.3. Comparison of numbers of FFE events per month between Moscow and the regions, December 2011-August 2012

Thus, contrary to what has often been assumed, the predominance of Moscow in terms of protest activities is not so obvious, especially at the beginning of the movement. While the capital surely held the largest events, we cannot deny the role that the rest of Russia played in organizing protests (see Table 5A in Appendix C for the exact number of events by cities).

Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of FFE events by the eight federal districts. Even when keeping Moscow in the analysis (see the left picture), the distribution of protest events organized in the Central federal district is only slightly above one third (34 percent), with the Volga (22 percent) and Southern districts (14 percent) also significant in terms of activism. This appears more clearly when we take Moscow out of the analysis, given that the capital represents about 67 percent of the 231 events organized by the movement in the Central district[142]. As the right picture shows, about twice as many events were organized in the Volga district (28 percent) as in the Central one (15 percent). The percentage organized in the Southern district (18 percent) also exceeds the Central district. Another notable finding is the unimpressive position that the Northwestern federal district occupied, even when St. Petersburg is kept in the picture.

Figure 5.4. Distribution of FFE events by federal districts, December 2011-August 2012

To add more weight on the above argument regarding the importance of the regions in the FFE movement, Figure 5.5 depicts the evolution of the regional distribution for the FFE events over time. We can see more clearly the recentralization of events taking place around the Central federal district, and thus Moscow, after the March elections. We also see how roughly balanced are the FFE events in the different regions at the beginning of the movement. Only during

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[142] Moscow organized 155 out of the 231 FFE events organized in the Central district, followed by Zhukov with 44 FFE events, and Voronezh with 8 FFE events. The remaining 24 events were almost evenly divided in the other cities.

demobilization the Volga and the Southern districts take more importance compared to other districts.

Figure 5.5. Evolution of the regional distribution of FFE events, December 2011-August 2012

If we zoom in the Volga and Southern districts, we see the cities that were the most important in explaining the results above. For example, in the Volga district where 146 FFE events were organized, we can see from Figure 5.6 that Kazan and Nizhnii-Novgorod were the important centers of the movement.

Figure 5.6. Distribution of FFE events by cities in the Volga federal district, December 2011-August 2012

For the Southern district, Astrakhan won the biggest proportion, with half of events organized (of a total of 96 events) (see Figure 5.7). This dominance is due to the longest hunger strike of the movement, conducted by Oleg Shein from SR, to contest the mayoral election results held in Asktrakhan on the same day as the presidential elections. Volgograd (with 15.5 percent) and Rostov-on-Don (with 10 percent of events) were also quite active, while other events were spread across different cities of the district.

Figure 5.7. Distribution of FFE events by cities in the Southern federal district, December 2011-August 2012

This brief excursion into the regional distribution of the FFE events enables us to nuance some of the claims made by Robertson (2013) and Lankina (2015) about protest in the regions versus Moscow before and during the 2011-12 FFE movement. For example, Robertson (2013) argues that, "protest has been on the move spatially. Once largely confined to Russia's vast provinces, the capital (as in most democracies) has become the dominant location for protests to be organized" (p. 12). Lankina (2015) also finds a greater concentration of protests in Moscow, especially in 2011-2012, although less acute than in Robertson (2013). My data suggest that the burst of Moscow-centered events in 2012 was concentrated in one or two months during the demobilization period (April and May 2012) rather than representing a trend for the FFE movement or protest activities in Russia more generally.

Systemic vs. Non-Systemic Opposition

One of the biggest novelties of the FFE movement was the large spectrum of actors involved in the organization of protest activities. The way the events were reported in the press does not allow me to make strong claims about the precise weight of SMOs as protest organizers. Nonetheless, the data offer ways to distinguish general trends. For example, the relationship between the systemic and non-systemic oppositions has been ambiguous from the start, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. While many systemic opposition leaders did not want to be associated too closely with the non-systemic opposition at the national level, other members of the formal opposition saw the protest movement as an opportunity to gain more support, especially at the regional level. David White (2015b) notes a similar trend even prior to the FFE movement, arguing that, "in the region local party branches [of the KPRF] were ready to help to mobilize social protest and cooperate with ideological enemies, particularly with the liberal Solidarity movement" (p. 318). As Table 5.2 shows[143], 86 percent of all FFE events

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[143] As the codebook (Appendix A) explains, I coded up to three organizers for each event. When the information was missing, I used 'regime', 'opposition', or other expressions depending on the demands made in the events. For Table 5.2, I recoded the variable for the first Organizer (ORG1) for which I had 174 different actors/SMOs into four categories: systemic, non-systemic, all-opposition, and others. The systemic opposition is here composed of events organized by the 'KPRF', 'LDPR', 'Spravedlivaia Rossiia', 'Yabloko', and 'Oleg Shein' (from Spravedlivaia Rossiia). The nonsystemic opposition is composed of 'Activists', the 'Assembleia', 'Boris Akunin', 'Dal'nevostochnaia Alternativa', 'Demokraticheskyi Vybor', 'Drugaia Rossiia', 'Ekaterina Samutsevich', 'Golos', 'Golos Ufy', 'Initsiativnaia Gruppa', 'Kazanskaia Liga Izbiratelei', 'Komitet 6 maia', 'Komitet Protestnykh Deistvii', 'Krasnoiarsk protiv zhulikov i vorov', 'Levyi Front', 'Liga Izbiratelei', 'Natsional-Patriot', 'Natsionalists',

organized by the systemic opposition were held outside Moscow, whereas the non-systemic opposition organized 40 percent of FFE events in the capital.

Table 5.2. Geographical distribution of FFE events according to actors

	Systemic	Non-systemic	All opposition	Others	Total
Locality					
Moscow	17	115	9	14	**155**
	(14%)	**(40%)**	(5%)	(16%)	**(23%)**
Regions	108	175	168	69	**520**
	(86%)	(60%)	(95%)	(84%)	**(77%)**
Total	125	290	177	83	**675**

In order words, while the systemic opposition was clearly an important actor at the regional level, the non-systemic opposition concentrated more of its efforts in the capital. The key point is that it would be a mistake to think that the systemic opposition was not involved in the movement. Figure 5.8 compares the number of FFE events organized by day between the systemic opposition and the non-systemic opposition. What becomes clear is that once the momentum of the FFE movement passed, the systemic opposition distanced itself from it. It did not stop protesting (see Figure 5.27 for instance), but it became increasingly difficult to associate these events with the FFE movement.

'Nesistemnaia Oppozitsiia', 'OGF', 'Olga Romanova', 'Omskoi civil coalition', 'OrgKomitet', 'OrgKomitet Protestnykh Deistvii', 'OrgKomitet protestnykh aktsii', 'Orgkomitet Za Chestnye Vybory', 'PARNAS', 'PRP-PARNAS', 'Pussy Riot', 'Samara protiv ER', 'Saratovskoe Obiedinenie Izbiratelei', 'Sergei Udaltsov', 'Solidarnost', 'Strategiia', 'Tigr', 'Volia', and 'Zelenaia lenta'. The all-opposition category refers to both systemic and non-systemic opposition, as I could not distinguish precisely which actors were included and so coded 'Opposition' for the main organizer. The category 'Others' refers to all other SMOs or actors that were not directly associated to the opposition, such as 'workers', 'local people', 'mothers', or 'trade unions'.

Figure 5.8. Comparison of number of FFE events organized per day between the systemic and non-systemic opposition in Russia, December 2011-August 2012

The next figure compares temporally the weight of these different types of opposition. Once again, we need to keep in mind that these findings indicate how events were reported in the sources. Nonetheless, we see that the non-systemic opposition becomes more significant in proportion after the peak of the movement (from 20 percent between December 2011 and February 2012 to 58 percent afterward) as the importance of the systemic and non-specified (all-opposition) opposition decreases (from 65 percent between December 2011 and February 2012 to 31 percent afterward).

Figure 5.9. Comparison of the proportion of FFE events organized by different actors, before and after March 2012

Dec 2011 to Feb 2012   Mar to Aug 2012

Repertoire of Actions

Just like for the Orange movement, the FFE movement was first and foremost a non-violent protest movement. Figure 5.10 shows the overall proportion of each type of action used by SMOs during the FFE movement. If we take all demonstrative actions together (i.e., rallies, which translate into 'mitings' in Russian, acts, pickets, other demonstrative actions), we see that more than two-thirds of the events were demonstrative (69 percent), while only 27 percent can be classified as direct actions (i.e., hunger strikes and sit-ins). Compared with Figure 3.11 in chapter 3 that also depicts the repertoire of actions for the Orange movement, we see that Russian protest repertoire used in general far less sit-ins (13 percent for FFE against 51 percent for the Orange movement).

Figure 5.10. Repertoire of actions for the FFE movement, December 2011 to August 2012

Beyond the static distribution of event-types used by social movements, what is of course more indicative of their evolution is how the repertoire of actions changed over time. If we divide the data temporally before and after the March elections, we see an important increase in direct actions compared to demonstrative events (see Figure 5.11). During the first three months of the mobilization, demonstrative actions represented the overwhelming majority of the FFE events organized - 92 percent of all events. During the demobilization period (from March to August 2012), the proportion of demonstrative actions falls to 53 percent and direct actions, mainly composed of tent-cities and hunger strikes, increase from 7 to 43 percent. This corresponds to the period of limited radicalization.

Figure 5.11. Evolution of the repertoire of actions for the FFE movement, before and after March 2012

Dec 2011 to Feb 2012

Mar to Aug 2012

Demonstrative ■ Direct ■ Violent ■ Traditional

This radicalization was limited both in form and time, as will be discussed in the next chapter. While more radical discourses and direct actions were used, the movement refrained from violence, which would have corresponded to a more extensive form of radicalization. In terms of length, the radicalization also stopped rather early in the demobilization period. When regime repression became more serious after May 2012, the movement did not respond with more radicalization, as Kriesi *et al.* (1995) would have predicted. Instead, SMO leaders tried to stop earlier radicalization trends. For example, we see the return of more demonstrative events organized by the movement from June to August (as Figure 5.12 illustrates), which also corresponded with a slight renewal of its popularity, as will be discussed below.

Figure 5.12. Evolution of the repertoire of actions for the FFE movement, December 2011 to August 2012 (by month)

The Evolution of Protest Demands

We shall now have a look at how protest demands evolved within the movement. Just like for the Ukrainian case, protest demands were initially classified into 5 categories: political, socioeconomic, sociocultural, ecological, and ethnic. The idea is not only to analyze the evolution of the FFE demands but also to see what other type of demands were put forward at about the same time by SMOs unrelated to the movement[144].

Before looking at other demands, we need to look at the FFE movement itself. Although this movement was by definition political, in the sense that most demands were related to the contestation of elections and were critical of the authorities (92 percent of FFE events were coded 'political' and 7 percent were classified 'ecological'), we see a certain diversification of its political demands during the demobilization period. For Figure 5.13, I divided the category 'political' into three different sub-categories: 1) the initial demand 'For Fair Elections' (FFE), 2) the FFE demand plus other issues, which usually added regional concerns or reacted more directly to the regime's authoritarian measures (FFE+), and 3) other political issues (Others). The

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[144] See codebook, pp. 259-260 (Appendix A) for more details.

other political issues could include claims related to elections but regarding specific actors or subnational elections, without being related to the initial and more abstract demand of fair elections at the federal level.

Figure 5.13. Evolution of the protest demands in the FFE movement, December 2011-August 2012

What Figure 5.13 shows is that the movement started to diversify its political demands after the March elections. However, if we proceed to a more qualitative analysis of the sources, we see that this evolution was more reactive than proactive. For example, in April, many events were organized to denounce unfair elections in Astrakhan while also directly supporting Oleg Shein in his hunger strike. Between May and July, the diversification of demands was mostly a reaction to the Bolotnaia Square case[145] and to the adoption of stricter regulations toward protest events. The little rise of ecological demands that we can see in April and May mainly relates to the inclusion of the sit-in for the Tsagovskii Forest that took place in Zhukov during that period[146]. Only in August, the movement added more proactive demands. For example, activists initiated a tour of

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[145] The Bolotnaia Square case refers to a criminal case opened by the Investigative Committee in the wake of the event of May 6 2012, which resulted in about 30 official accusations and some imprisonments of activists. For more details, see http://bolotnoedelo.info/en/
[146] Tumanov, G. (2012, May 15). Lager' ukhodit v gorod. *Kommersant*.

the regions in order to expand their support base. Consequently, they started to talk less about elections and more about their own program and future plans of actions.

Especially compared with Figure 5.19 below that presents the evolution of the protest demands external to the FFE movement, where we can observe a great diversification of demands taking place in the spring 2012 (see also Sakhnin 2014, pp. 70-71), it is difficult not to conclude that the FFE movement missed an opportunity to consolidate at the regional level if it were to open the door to more socioeconomic or ecological demands. For example, a long-time activist herself, Carine Clément stressed how important was the opportunity for the FFE activists to build upon the Astrakhan struggle to become a more inclusive social movement. She argued that "If the Astrakhan events could only lead in reducing the separation of the capital's opposition or liberal tusovka from the exhausted 'bottoms' that are keep fighting from time to time, it would be a giant step forward the democratization of society"[147]. However, just like for the Zhukov events, this struggle remained mostly local, as the FFE movement did not capitalize on it to enlarge its demands to social and ecological issues.

Pro-Regime and Non-Aligned Protest Events

The events organized by the FFE movement were not the only protest activities in Russia during winter 2011-2012. Figure 5.14 presents all events taking place during this period according to whether we can classify them in the FFE movement, in the pro-regime events, or in other unrelated or non-aligned events. While the blue column shows the FFE events, the red column shows the events organized by the regime. We see that the regime was rather slow to react to the movement in December and January, as if caught by surprise. Then, the countermovement expanded in February and March 2012, just before the presidential elections, and declined afterward (the July upsurge corresponds to the annual Seliger forum events held by youth groups such as Nashi). The purple line corresponds to protest events that were not organized by the main SMOs of the FFE movement or related to its claims, while still not fitting the category of pro-

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[147] My translation: " Esli by astrakhanskie sobytiia smogli by tol'ko privesti k sokrashcheniiu otryva stolichnoi oppozitsionnoi ili liberal'noi tusovki ot zagnannykh no vremia ot vremeni boriushchikhsia "nizov' - eto bylo by uzhe gigantskii shag vpered v storonu demokratizatsii obshchestva". See Clément, C. (2012, April 19). Pochemu Astrakhan' kruche Bolotnoi. *Institut "Kollektivnoe deistvie"*. Retrieved from http://www.ikd.ru/node/18194

regime events[148]. Often, these were single-issue events pressing socioeconomic or ecological claims.

Figure 5.14. Comparison of numbers of events per month organized between the FFE movement, the pro-regime events and non-aligned events, December 2011-August 2012

If we look at the comparison by day, we see once again a different picture. Figure 5.15 depicts the evolution of all events organized in Russia (left-top quadrant) between December 2011 and August 2012, and then divided into the FFE events (right-top quadrant), the pro-regime events (left-bottom image) and other events (right-bottom quadrant). Whereas Figure 5.14 gives us the impression that the other events significantly increased in May and June 2012, Figure 5.15 puts this rise in daily perspective, which appears far less notable. We also see how concentrated the pro-regime events were, which were organized close to the presidential elections without any traceable continuity afterward. The pro-regime events organized during this period (February and March 2012) were all demonstrative, with 93 percent of them consisting of mass rallies, and almost all put forward political protest claims supporting the regime, such as 'Za Putina' (for Putin).

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[148] See the codebook, pp. 260-261 (Appendix A) for the criteria used to decide whether to include an event into the FFE movement.

Figure 5.15. Comparison of numbers of events per day in Russia, December 2011-August 2012

Figure 5.16 shows the distribution of all pro-regime events according to federal districts (compared with Figure 5.4 for the FFE movement, left quadrant). We can note that the pro-regime events were more concentrated in the central district that were the movement events although the proportion of events organized in Moscow compared to the regions is overall a bit lower for the countermovement (21 percent for the pro-regime events compared to 23 percent for FFE events). Also, within the Central district, Moscow counted for only 39 percent of all pro-regime events organized. For the FFE movement, Moscow represented about 67 percent of events organized in the Central district. Without wanting to reify the so-called Moscow versus the regions dichotomy employed by the Kremlin during the 2011-12 movement, the data shows that the regime did try to organize many of its support events outside of the capital.

Figure 5.16. Distribution of Pro-regime events by federal districts, December 2011-August 2012

Perhaps, more importantly, while the Russian countermovement was probably composite in nature and also based on existing societal tensions (here, Moscow vs. the regions) (Beissinger 2017), these findings add evidence to the limited capacity of the regime to develop organizational capacity for its support in the longer run, despite its many previous attempts (think of the Nashi's youth group or the more recent Anti-Maidan Movement). These pro-regime events clearly did not result in any kind of sustainable movement or actions in their aftermath. As usual, once the regime considered the threat over, countermovements are simply cast aside.

If we now look at the distribution of non-aligned events by federal districts, we see a similar distribution to the FFE movement (see Figure 5.4, left picture), although Moscow is even more preponderant in terms of activities organized within the Central district, accounting for 78 percent of the district. The proportion of the Central district does not significantly differ after the March elections, remaining close to 30 percent.

Figure 5.17. Distribution of non-aligned events by federal districts, December 2011-August 2012

The repertoire of actions used by these SMOs was very diverse, as illustrated in Figure 5.18. Demonstrative actions are less dominant, representing about 51 percent of all actions used (when adding rallies, pickets, acts, and other demonstrative actions). Direct actions (with sit-ins, hunger strikes and other direct actions) count for about 44 percent of the repertoire used by SMOs outside of the FFE movement. There was also a certain radicalization in the action repertoire, where direct actions increase of about 20 percent after the presidential elections. However, as these protests were organized by SMOs unrelated to each other, we cannot rely on this indicator to the same extent as that for the FFE movement.

Figure 5.18. Repertoire of actions used by non-aligned SMOs, December 2011 to August 2012

Examining the protest demands of these unrelated events (Figure 5.19), we see that they differ quite significantly from those promoted by the FFE movement during the same period. For example, while the movement put forward mainly political demands, ecological protests were organized by other SMOs in May and June, including a daily sit-in in Sochi contesting bridge destruction for the 2014 Olympics or the anti-Nickel movement, which began to take shape during this period. Socioeconomic protests, related to labor and housing in particular, were also frequently held during the life of the FFE movement without being integrated into its core demands.

Figure 5.19. Non-Aligned Protest Demands, December 2011-August 2012

Thus, although many authors wanted to see the FFE movement as a continuation of prior local protests that transformed into a national movement, or of socioeconomic demands that became more political (Lankina 2015, Robertson 2013), these data introduce more complexity. Even during the broad and popular FFE movement, unrelated events focusing on different claims were organized and coexisted with it. Perhaps other actors were inspired and decided to go out into the street in order to protest for their specific causes during the FFE movement, but how these smaller and more specific events actually influenced the FFE movement's evolution appears less straightforward. Given that the FFE movement sidelined socioeconomic demands even during demobilization (as shown in the next chapter), it seems that their influence would have been minimal at best. In turn, on a theoretical level, even if such local events may on occasion turn into national political movements, we do not know how the national movement transforms or influences local events in its aftermath.

As a result, it seems prudent to not assume a link between national regime-change movements and local protests that advocate for socio-economic issues. Although the latter type of protest can also be viewed as political, the activists themselves often reject this label. For example, during the autumn of 2012, Mason (2016) conducted ethnographic research into protest movements in Russia and encountered activists rallying for Russia's educational system. As she started to talk

with them, she noticed how eager they were to discuss their fight with her, while noting that "when asked how long they'd been involved in politics, one of the women objected, 'This isn't politics. We're just expressing a social demand'" (p. 13).

As this section showed, significant changes within the FFE movement occurred during the course of the demobilization period that affected where, how, and by whom events were organized. While during the first three months of mobilizations, protest events were geographically diffuse, mainly composed of demonstrative actions, and organized by a wide variety of opposition actors, the following period saw a recentralization of protest events in Moscow, the greater importance of non-systemic actors (given the disengagement of the systemic opposition from the movement), and a sharp increase in the use of direct actions, testifying to radicalization trends within the movement. In other words, although the movement was still organizing many events until the regime crackdown in May 2012, the structure of this mobilization had already started to sharply change after the March 2012 presidential elections.

Activists – A Micro-level Analysis

Let's now turn more specifically to participation in the movement. Figure 5.20 shows the total number of participants in the FFE events throughout Russia on a monthly basis. The results show a decline in the participation rate after the March 4 elections, and a moderate revival during the months of May and June, when the regime became more repressive towards the movement.

Figure 5.20. Number of participants in the FFE events per month, December 2011-August 2012

If we further break down the data on a daily basis, we notice the decline in participation more clearly after the March elections (see Figure 5.21). This also seems to confirm what Smyth *et al*. (2013) found in their analysis. To the core protesters added a "larger group of protest participants who were less sure about the efficacy of protest or the nature of the regime and, therefore, were less committed to the reform movement. These individuals swelled the ranks of the large street actions but disappeared from our sample by the end of the protest cycle" (p. 21). Only a few events in Moscow in May and one event in June were able to attract tens of thousands of people. Again, the massive attendance at the June 12 event, called the March of Millions, is interesting given that it took place in the midst of the regime crackdown campaign on the movement.

Figure 5.21. FFE event participants per day, December 2011-August 2012

Another indicator is the average daily participation, although it needs to be kept in mind that a few large events are influencing those averages. While the average number of participants in the FFE events by day of protest (i.e., dates where protest events were organized) between December 2011 and February 2012 throughout Russia was about 11,000 people, the average falls to about 1,700 people between March and May 2012 (see Table 5.1 above). In June, while the daily average of 5,500 people during days of protests may give us the impression of a steep renewal of participation, we should interpret this result with more caution given that it is largely driven by the June 12 event. The months of July and August then confirmed the earlier demobilization trends with about a hundred people for each day of protests.

Moscow vs. the Regions

While Figure 5.20 shows a certain revival of participation during the months of May and June, the importance of Moscow in this resurgence is significant as shown by Figure 5.22, especially when contrasted with the rest of Russia, where the participation declines more sharply after

March 2012 (although in April the participation in Moscow was exceptionally lower than in the rest of Russia). Figure 5.22 shows how from May 2012, Moscow was the main location in terms of retaining protesters. Contrasting these results with Figure 5.3 above also brings important nuances to the moment of demobilization in the regions. While in terms of events organized (meso-level), demobilization started in the rest of Russia after May 2012, we see that in terms of participation (micro-level), demobilization has started two months earlier, which confirms that the March 4 elections were a critical juncture for the FFE movement.

Figure 5.22. Comparison of participation in the FFE events between Moscow and the rest of Russia, December 2011-August 2012

Figure 5.23 enables us to see which regions succeeded best in attracting and retaining protesters for the FFE movement. The Central district is overrepresented in the right-hand picture (71 percent) because of Moscow, which counts for about 96 percent of the FFE participation in the Central district during all the movement. If we take Moscow out of the analysis as in the left-hand picture, the Northwestern district becomes dominant (37 percent), with the Volga district in second place (19 percent), and the Siberian region in the third position (13 percent). Comparing with Figure 5.4 above, we see that the Northwestern district did not organize many events but

that the ones that were held were massive, which is of course related to St. Petersburg that counts for 89 percent of all participants in the district. We also see that the Volga region is in the second position both for events organized and number of participants, while the Siberian region becomes more important in terms of the number of people. However, whereas Figure 5.5 shows that in the Volga region, Kazan and Nizhnii-Novgorod were dominant in terms of activities, participation is far more diffuse: Samara and Nizhnii-Novgorod each had about 15 percent of the participants from the region, followed by Perm, Ulianovsk, Cheboksary, and Kazan with about 10 percent each. In the Siberian region, Novosibirsk managed to get the most people into the streets with about 29 percent of the participation from the region, followed by Omsk (about 21 percent) and Krasnoiarsk (about 17 percent).

Figure 5.23. Distribution of FFE participants by federal districts, December 2011-August 2012

Although Moscow's preponderance in the protests becomes far more visible in terms of participation numbers than in terms of events organized, we still see an evolution between the initial phase of the protests and the demobilization phase. Figure 5.24 shows a difference of about 20 percent in the importance of the Central district (where Moscow is dominant) before and after March 2012. As a result, it confirms the earlier findings about the importance of the regions in the peak of the movement, and the fact that the recentralization of the movement in Moscow happened during the demobilization period.

Figure 5.24. Distribution of participants in the FFE events by federal districts, before and after March 2012

Dec 2011 to Feb 2012   Mar to Aug 2012

Pro-Regime and Non-Aligned Participation

While Figure 5.14 depicts the number of events organized by the FFE movement compared to pro-regime and other events, Figure 5.25 illustrates the participation rate in each category of events on a monthly basis. If we saw above a concentration of pro-regime events in February and March followed by a significant decrease, especially when compare to the FFE events, we see in Figure 5.25 that first, the regime was far more successful in terms of putting people into the streets than was the FFE movement, and second, that pro-regime participation did not drop as much as did the number of pro-regime events. In other words, if we juxtapose these two pictures, we realize that while the FFE movement continued to organize many events until May 2012, many were direct actions that did not attract many protesters; the regime, on its side, did not organize many events but people still went to them in great numbers when they were held (for example, Den' pobedy on May 9th or the Seliger camp in July). To be sure, the regime was able to use so-called administrative resources to its advantage, which surely explains much of its success in terms of participation. Nonetheless, as Smyth *et al*. (2013) noted, through these events, many "like-minded participants who supported the regime but who would unlikely to have participated in street actions without incentives" realized that they were far from being the minority (p. 4). As a result, the regime seems to be doing a better job in terms of mobilizing its support on an ad-hoc basis than it is doing to develop long-term support capacity.

This display of pro-regime support may have been more powerful than the repressive turn in demobilizing the bottom-up FFE movement. As Lev Gudkov from the Levada Center noted in April 2012: "The people who first came to protest against electoral fraud, saw themselves as the majority and believed that behind them was a significant part of society. When it turned out that for various reasons just as many people were opposed to them, supporting the power and being mobilized by it, the mood began to slightly change"[149]. This echoes Beissinger (2017)'s argument regarding motivational sources for countermovement participants being rooted in societal tensions. Note, however, that according to Gudkov - and as we will explore in the next chapter - the main reason for demobilization was the lack of organization within the FFE movement and the leaders' inability to develop a concrete program of actions.

Figure 5.25. Protesters per month in Russia, December 2011-August 2012

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
[149] My translation: "Liudi, kotorye vpervye vyshli s protestom protiv fal'sifikatsii, vosprinimali sebia kak bol'shinstvo i polagali, chto za nimi - znachitel'naia chast' obshchestva. Kogda zhe okazalos', chto im po raznym prichinam protivostoit ne men'shee kolichestvo liudei, podderzhivaiushchikh vlast', otmobilizovannykh eiu, to nastroenie nachalo neskol'ko meniat'sia". Baryshnikov, V. (2012, May 3). Sotsiolog Lev Gudkov - ob ugasanii protestnogo dvizheniia v Rossii i perspektivakh ego rosta. *Radio Svoboda*.

In terms of geographical diffusion, we can also notice recentralization trends in the pro-regime participation around Moscow after the March elections. Nevertheless, participation was more diffuse than in the FFE movement during the first three months, with 46 percent of pro-regime protesters going out into the streets outside of the Central district, in which Moscow represented about 82 percent of all participation (see Figure 5.26, left-hand picture). Then, after the March elections, the importance of the Central district increases to 76 percent, in which Moscow accounted for 76 percent (see Figure 5.26, right-hand picture), which means that only 24 percent of people protested outside of the Central district.

Figure 5.26. Distribution of participants in the pro-regime events by federal districts, before and after March 2012

Dec 2011 to Feb 2012   Mar to Aug 2012

From Figure 5.25, just like from Figure 5.15 above, we may have the impression that participation and events unrelated to either the FFE movement or the regime (i.e., non-aligned events) were insignificant. But we need to keep in mind that these results are shown in comparison to an extraordinary instance of mobilization, and it does not mean that these other events did not matter. Figure 5.27 shows, for example, the evolution of both the number of non-aligned events organized and the participation rate on a daily basis. The visible upsurge of these events after the March elections should be partly understood by a disengagement of systemic opposition actors from the movement, redirecting their energy to protest events they considered

to be more politically neutral. Nevertheless, many of these events were also organized by local people, trade unions or other activist groups simply unrelated to the FFE movement.

Figure 5.27. The evolution of non-aligned events organized throughout Russia and their daily participation

While we saw earlier (Figure 5.17) that the regional distribution of non-aligned events was similar to the FFE movement, the distribution of participants differs sharply. Comparing Figure 5.28 with Figure 5.24, we notice far more dispersed participation in non-aligned events, even though we also see a certain recentralization occurring after the March elections. Interestingly enough, protesters unrelated to the movement that went out into the streets in the Central district were not as concentrated in Moscow as it is usually the case. Between December 2011 and August 2012, Moscow represents only 28 percent of all the participation that occurred in the Central district.

Figure 5.28. Distribution of participants in non-aligned events by federal districts, before and after March 2012

Dec 2011 to Feb 2012

Mar to Aug 2012

Societal Resonance – The Macro-level

Now let's turn to the evolution of the movement's societal resonance by examining polling data and Internet search tools. What we first see looking at survey data is that the movement did not go unnoticed. In January 2012, a poll from the All Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM), which is considered to be closer to the regime than the Levada Center, concluded that 84 percent of the Russian population had heard the movement's speeches on electoral fraud, and 54 percent were aware of the actions organized by the movement[150]. Russian Opinion and Market Research (ROMIR) conducted a survey at about the same time that reveals an even higher proportion of people aware of the movement's activities, with 77 percent of respondents[151]. After the presidential elections, VTsIOM found that a third of the Russian population (33%) had heard about actions organized to denounce the election results (a decrease of 19 percent compared to January), while 60 percent had heard about the pro-regime demonstrations. More importantly, about two-fifths of those who had heard about the activities

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[150] Rossiiane khorosho informirovany o mitingakh, posviashchennykh rezul'tatam proshedshikh vyborov. (2012, January 24). *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

[151] ROMIR. (2012). Ia by poshel s nim na miting [Press release]. Retrieved from http://romir.ru/studies/309_1329854400/

of the movement were either disturbed (19 percent) or felt anxious (18 percent) about them. Another 10 percent were "disappointed" by these protests, and only 10% felt hope about them[152].

Levada Center data enable us to trace in more detail the evolution of popular support toward the movement, as illustrated by Figure 5.29. The blue line shows the support for the FFE movement while the red line depicts its disapproval rate. Here again, the month of March appears as a key moment, where popular support for the movement decreased by 11 percent compared to the month of December (from 44 percent in December to 33 percent in March). We then see a reboot of the movement's support, but it seems rather unstable, changing rapidly between July 2012 and May 2013. The Levada Center does not have, unfortunately, the same longitudinal data for the countermovement, as they only have data for February and March 2012. But as we saw in Figure 5.15, the great majority of the pro-regime events took place in February and March (65 percent), thus magnifying the importance of these two months for which we have data. The green line displays societal support for the pro-regime events and the purple line shows disapproval. Although we do not have enough data to generalize, we can see a similar trend regarding the support for the two types of mobilizations. At the very least, it shows that support for pro-regime events was far from being unconditional and that it even decreased from 42 percent in February to 38 percent in March 2012.

[152] Pavlov, S., & Ivanov, M. (2012, March 22). VTsIOM spisyvaet mitingi. *Kommersant*.

Figure 5.29. Societal support to FFE movement compared with pro-regime events, December 2011-May 2013[153]

Source: Levada Center. (2012). Protestnaia aktivnost' Rossiian [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/2012/12/13/protestnaya-aktivnost-rossiyan-3/[154]

In addition to polling data, I also use Google Trends to track Internet searches related to the FFE Movement in Russia to get at another dimension of the movement's societal resonance. Although not everyone in Russia has Internet access, the use of the Internet has rapidly surged in the past years. In 2012, more than 50 percent of the adult population used the Internet. For people under 34 years old, Internet was the primary media used in 2012, ahead of television where the regime control is far more important[155]. As a result, just like for the Ukrainian case, even if the use of Internet does not capture the whole population, we may be confident that it includes the most active part of society. Figure 5.30 shows the relative popularity of four Russian keywords most likely to be associated with FFE events: miting (in blue), marsh millionov (in red), bolotnaia (in

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[153] The survey question was: "Do you support the mass protests that started from December last year ("For Fair Elections", "March of Millions" and etc.)?" My translation: "Podderzhivaete li vy prokhodiashchie nachinaia s Dekabria proshlogo goda massovye aktsii protesta ("Za chestnye vybory", "Marsch millionov" i t.p.)?
[154] The data for December 2012, January 2013, and May 2013 are reported to be from Levada on Vladimir Ryzhkov's sie http://ryzkov.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33550:2013-06-16-13-40-38&catid=2:2011-12-26-10-24-39&Itemid=26
[155] Chaykovskaya, E. (2012). Russia's Internet use surges. *Moscow News*. Retrieved from http://russialist.org/archives/russia-internet-use-surges-824.php

yellow), and Naval'ny (in green), restricting the analysis to Russia only[156]. The results indicate the same peak (December 4-10) for all search terms except for 'marsh millionov' (march of millions). If we look at the word 'miting' (rally) in blue, we can see very clearly the rises corresponding to the mass events (Dec. 10, Dec. 24, Feb 4, and March 5), although the word's popularity decreases right after the March elections. However, the word 'miting' is then replaced by 'March of Millions' for the later events although the decline in popularity is nonetheless visible. The term 'bolotnaia' in yellow, which relates to the name of the square where mass rallies were held, has minimal upsurges when events are taking place on this square. While the popularity of the term 'Navl'nyi' in green was initially connected to the movement, we notice a different evolution from January on, even if the popularity of the term is also falling over 2012. Comparing Figure 5.30 and Figure 5.2 (i.e., daily number of events organized), we note a similar demobilization trend at the macro and meso levels.

Figure 5.30. On-line resonance of the FFE movement measured by four key words, November 2011-December 2012[157]

Source: Google Trends data. The search is restricted to Russia only.

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[156] I tested other keywords, such as 'za chestnye vybory', 'protest', 'belaia lenta', or 'Udal'tsov' but all of these terms were not significant, especially compared to 'miting'. It needs to be kept in mind, as explained in chapter 2, that Google Trends measures the *relative* popularity of specific word searches on Google, and not their *absolute* popularity.

[157] Figures 5.30 and 5.31 represent results from a search generated on November 3, 2016, which was later replicated on April 10 and May 23 2017.

In order to also test whether the results were mainly driven by the fact that the keywords in Figure 5.30 were related to the movement and to see if the previous results would change, I added the control term 'Putin' in Figure 5.31. The purple line shows the evolution in the popularity of the 'Putin' word compared to the four initial words and confirms that the resonance of the movement was real, especially in December, where the word 'miting' outdistanced the 'Putin' term.

Figure 5.31. On-line resonance of the movement measured by five key words from Google Trend data

Source: Google Trends data. The search is restricted to Russia only.

While the Levada Center data show a more ambiguous evolution in terms of societal support to the movement, the other polling data and the on-line resonance of the movement corroborate the trends found in other levels of analysis, namely that the March presidential elections strongly affected the structure of the mobilizations in all three levels of analysis. Studying the Russian Twittersphere in detail, Spaiser *et al*. (2016) also argued that right after the presidential elections, the general public represented on Twitter began to increasingly lose interest in the FFE movement. From that period on, began a long demobilization process that took different forms at different times, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Conclusion

While many observers were very enthusiastic at the initial upsurge of the FFE movement, it has usually been taken for granted that the movement ran out of steam because of an increase in regime repression in May 2012. Political repression is often the main explanation forwarded in attempts to explain the timing of demobilization and the weak state of the non-systemic opposition in Russia after the FFE movement (Lanskoy & Suthers 2013, Aron 2013, White 2015a, Gel'man 2015b). While repression toward the opposition surely increased after the 2011-12 protests, it has nonetheless been a constant impediment for Russia's political activism, and for civil society more broadly, in particular since Putin's second mandate (Chebankova 2013, Greene 2014). Most authors note how Putin's regime employs different forms of repression, and that these repressive tactics have both inhibiting and channeling effects on civil society (Roberston 2011). However, as we have seen, the timing of repression and demobilization often do not align neatly.

On the one hand, the FFE's loss of momentum after the March 2012 presidential elections represented a critical juncture at all the three levels of analysis. Individuals started to desert the protests (micro-level), a trend that was particularly visible on the March 5 and March 10 protests compared to previous rallies. Many SMO leaders responded with more direct actions, such as hunger strikes and sit-ins, which were no longer dedicated to attracting new activists (see figure 5.32 for a side-by-side comparison of the FFE events and participation during demobilization).

Figure 5.32. The evolution of FFE events and their daily participation during demobilization

Consequently, even though the movement was still organizing events (meso-level), the structure of the mobilization, in terms of its repertoire of actions, main actors, and location had changed after the March presidential elections. Moving from demonstrative to direct actions, from a variety of actors (that included both the systemic and non-systemic opposition as well as radical and moderate figures) to non-systemic actors and more radical groups, and from geographical diffusion to centralization in Moscow, the FFE movement demobilized initially through limited radicalization. As the previous section illustrated, this radicalization negatively affected the societal resonance of the movement.

On the other hand, the increase in repression of the FFE movement occurred quite late in the contention cycle, starting with the famous Bolotnoe case that followed the May 6 mass event, where violent clashes took place between the regime and the protesters. However, contrary to the regime's expectations, the harsh reaction toward the protesters seemed to have actually reboot the FFE movement for a while, with cultural leaders re-engaging with the movement. For instance,

some popular figures organized the March of Writers and Poets on May 13, which attracted about ten thousand people to the streets again. In the midst of the repression, where many new laws aimed at restricting public protests and civil society were promoted by the regime, and even precipitously rushed through parliament before the June 12 event, the June rally still attracted close to 60,000 people in Moscow. As a result, the repression initially seemed to boost the movement by giving people other reasons to protest even though the elections were over. This finding adds to the important literature that debates the complex relationship between repression and mobilization (see chapter 1 for an overview).

When the regime's repression later became more targeted, with for example the repetitive harassment of the Levyi Front and its leader Sergei Udal'tsov, this appeared to fuel the movement as well[158]. For example, during the September 15 event in which the Levada Center fielded a survey, the second most popular declared motivation for protestor participation was "Indignation toward the actions of the authorities and the repression against leaders and protesters" (34 percent) [159]. But while political repression seemed to reinvigorate many activists, the movement had difficulty framing the issue in a convincing fashion. The main demand that the movement put forward during the repressive period was for the release of political prisoners, in particular the Bolotnoe convicts. However, this slogan had very weak resonance within the broader population; the Levada Center showed that only about 7 percent of respondents approved this demand in May 2013 and 2 percent in early 2015[160]. Other protest demands that FFE SMOs used in 2013, such as "Russia without Putin" and "Putin has to go", were also not well supported by the population, with only a fifth in favor (and 60 percent opposed)[161].

It is therefore clear that repression alone, although surely important, is not sufficient to explain demobilization and ambiguous legacy of the FFE movement. As Davenport (2014) notes in his recent book on demobilization, the effect of repression on social movements "is conditioned by

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[158] Kozlova, A. (2012, October 19). Oppozitsiiu ob"edinilo "delo Udal'tsova". *Izvestiia Peterburga*.

[159] Levada Center. (2012). Opros na "marshe millionov" v Moskve v 15 sentiabria [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/2012/09/17/opros-na-marshe-millionov-v-moskve-15-sentyabrya/

[160] "Levada-tsentr" sostavil reiting samykh populiarnykh oppozitsionnykh lozungov. (2013, June 11). *RBC* ; Levada Center. (2015). Neokhodimost' politicheskoi oppozitsii i podderzhka "oppozitsionnykh" trebovanii Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/2015/02/27/neobhodimost-politicheskoj-oppozitsii-i-podderzhka-oppozitsionnyh-trebovanij/

[161] "Levada-tsentr" sostavil reiting samykh populiarnykh oppozitsionnykh lozungov. (2013, June 11). *RBC*.

the challengers' attempt to prepare its members for repressive behavior […] and to sustain organizational trust while governments are trying to undermine both of these efforts […]" (p. 10). The FFE movement leaders did not prepare members for repression, and appeared to be surprised by the violence that occurred during the May 6 event. In the aftermath of the clash, the movement leaders were blamed on many occasions for not showing more compassion toward the convicts[162]. With all the internal struggles that the movement experienced during demobilization, which will be discussed further in the next chanpter, the leaders were clearly unable to sustain trust within the movement

While as noted by Kramer (2013) creating and sustaining momentum in mobilizations is essential for social movements, demobilization will inevitably occur. As a result, for movement leaders, seizing the momentum in the demobilization process, knowing when and how to retreat, and knowing how to avoid radicalization and marginalization is as no less important, given that how demobilization occurs will impact the legacy of the movement on civil society. Now that we know when, where, and how demobilization happened within the movement, the next chapter will discuss in more detail how movement leaders made choices during the demobilization process, leaving in the end very ambiguous results in terms of civil society consolidation.

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[162] Sinitskii, A. (2012, July 24). Oppozitsiia stolknulas' s protestom. *Kommersant*; Polukhina, I. (2012, July 23). Bolotnoe Delo: Trebuiutsia ochevidtsy *Novaia gazeta*.

CHAPTER 6 – DEMOBILIZATION AFTER DEFEAT:

LEARNING FROM FAILURE?

We wanted better,
but it turned out like always[163]

Up to the mid-2000s, Russians were often presented as politically apathetic and with a low engagement in public life (Kubicek 2002, Javeline 2003, Howard 2003, McFaul & Treyger 2004)[164]. During the 1990s, civil society developed primarily along vertical lines linking donors and SMOs, which hindered the development of horizontal linkages (Henderson 2002, Jakobson & Sanovich 2010). Despite this weak civil society thesis, attentive observers testified to the growing activism of emerging social groups and movements, particularly since Putin's second mandate (Evans *et al*. 2006, Clément *et al*. 2010, Chebankova 2013, Robertson 2013, Greene 2014, Argenbright 2016). Many emphasized that SMOs accumulated experiences, made new connections, and developed new toolkits through mobilization episodes such as the movement against the monetization of benefits in 2005, the Kaliningrad movement in 2010, and the Khimki movement of 2010-11 (White 2015b, Lankina 2015). Yet this new activism often had difficulty extending beyond single-issue claims and/or spreading beyond specific locations, and was frequently portrayed as apolitical (Aron 2012). Likewise, two problems of Russian civil society were still often mentioned: the failure of activists' efforts to resonate publicly beyond a small group of supporters, and the inability of opposition groups to cooperate with one another (Lyall 2006, Mendelson & Gerber 2007, Henderson 2011, Chebankova 2013).

Consequently, when the FFE movement arose, some wanted to see in it the politicization of Russian activism and the maturation of civil society (Gudkov 2012, Aron 2013). But despite the initial enthusiasm engendered by the FFE movement, its aftermath did not bring convincing improvements in terms of these two long-term weaknesses. Instead, after an intense mobilization

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[163] Viktor Chernomyrdin. 1993.
[164] For notable exceptions, see Lyall (2006) and Robertson (2011).

lasting several months, the movement has had difficulty in capitalizing on these crosscutting ties as well as in transforming its societal resonance into greater social acceptance.

In the literature on social movements, social movement failures have often been associated to repression and with the closing of political opportunities (Davenport 2014), which would lead movements to either radicalize, go into (strategic) abeyance, or simply disappear. For example, while Kriesi *et al*. discovered "important mechanisms of variation among protest waves" in the ending of four West European democracies, the authors further posited that, in non-democratic contexts, radicalization is likely to occur because of strong, albeit not necessarily effective, repression (Kriesi *et al*. 1995, p. 142). On the other hand, Taylor (1989)'s research would lead us to think that in a context of closing opportunities, movement leaders would opt for abeyance in order for key SMOs to survive and the broader cause to remain alive. However, as this dissertation shows, demobilization processes are also complex phenomena in non-democratic settings. While they are affected externally by state responses (and consequently, by regime type), they also evolve internally over time, affected as they are by the choices made by their leaders.

In this chapter, I argue that, despite the growing repression that surely played a role, understanding how the movement's demobilization unfolded and how its leaders reacted to the loss of momentum is also important in explaining the ambiguous outcomes left by the 2011-12 mobilizations. As the previous chapter just showed, even before the intensification of repression, part of the FFE movement first demobilized through limited radicalization. Meanwhile, another part of the movement demobilized through a premature departure into formal politics (i.e. external institutionalization), attracted by the Medvedev regime's partial openness to such participation. In this chapter, I will show how these two different choices hindered the movement's later attempt to internally institutionalize, placing the movement in a state of abeyance by default.

Limited Radicalization

Early in the demobilization phase, the movement FFE showed some signs of radicalization. This trend became prominent during the Pushkinskaya Square post-election event, on March 5, which featured a relatively small number of participants, especially compared to previous events. Low attendance surprised SMO leaders, who had initially planned to walk on Tversakaya Street (one of the central thoroughfares in Moscow) and establish a tent city around the Kremlin[165]. However, to peacefully achieve this objective, the movement needed a critical mass of people, perhaps twice as big as 15,000 people who ended up attending the event[166]. While the majority of people quickly dispersed after Naval'ny's speech, smaller and more radicalized groups remained in the square. Some right-wing groups then decided to organize an unauthorized march, which was however marred by light violence[167]. Meanwhile, three of the movement's main leaders (Sergei Udal'tsov, Aleksei Naval'ny, and MP Il'ia Ponomarev), called for an unlimited protest action, refusing to leave the Square. Symbolically grabbing the Square fountain, Udal'tsov stated, "I will stay here until Putin is gone. And let's stay all here until Putin is gone"[168]. What had started as a demonstration then ended in confrontation, as more than 200 people were arrested[169].

After this event and the following one held on March 10 on Novyi Arbat (in which 15,000 to 20,000 people participated, less than half of the 50,000 expected)[170], the organizing committee decided to enter a phase of strategic abeyance until May 6, to ultimately regain its strength. A vocal part of the movement criticized the organizing committee for that decision, arguing that the regime's choice to ignore the movement's main demands necessitated civil disobedience[171]. It was not uncommon to hear more radical figures accuse the liberals of having ruined (*slili*) the

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[165] Rodionova, A. (2012, March 1). Udal'tsov ugrozhaet osadoi Kremlia. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

[166] Rossiiskaia oppozitsiia 5 marta provedet aktsii protesta. (2012, March 4). *Delo*; Khachatrian, D. (2012, March 5). Moskva razdelitsia na "za" i "protiv" *Novaia gazeta*.

[167] Tropkina, O. g., & Ershov, E. (2012, March 6). Moskva otmitingovala i razoshlas'. *Izvestiia*; Bozhedomskii, A. (2012, March 7). Ne vse umeiut proigryvat'. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

[168] My translation: " Budu stoiat', poka ne uĭdet Putin. I davaĭte ne uĭdem, poka ne uĭdet Putin", see Sakhnin 2014, p. 66.

[169] Sinitsyn, A. (2012, March 7). Komu Maidan, komu - fontan. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

[170] Petukhova, E. (2012, March 7). Aleksandr Gorbenko: Arbat ne budet soglasovan. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*. Rodionova, A. (2012, March 11). Test na protest. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

[171] Gorbachev, A. (2012, March 19). Siurpriz pobediteliu ot nesoglasnykh *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

revolution[172]. While Spaiser *et al*. (2016)'s recent study illustrates the sharp decline in the popularity of protest-related keywords right after the presidential elections, the authors also point that "At the same time the anger of those who had supported the movement turned against the oppositional leaders who were blamed to have failed" (pp. 11-12). Interestingly, radicalization trend did not emerge from the harsh repression eventually performed by the regime, as it ultimately originated in both the regime's initial choice to ignore the movement and, significantly, the movement's post-electoral lack of activist focus.

Nonetheless, intensive radicalization, and the resultant increase in violence, did not ultimately take place. One of the critical moments in that regard occurred on May 6, the first edition of the "March of Millions", at the eve of Putin's inauguration, when violent clashes erupted between the protesters and the police. On March 5, the low attendance had surprised the leaders; on May 6, when the organizing committee had made an official request to the authorities for a 5,000-person event, about 30,000 protesters gathered on Yakimanka Street[173]. Massive arrests followed, and about 30 activists were later convicted on charges of organizing and participating in a mass riot, now known as the Bolotnoe Affair (Bolotnoe delo). The May 6 event was a turning point in the authority's reactions to the protesters, and many observers expected the movement to further radicalize (Kryshtanovskaya *et al*. 2013)[174]. However, despite the repressive measures implemented after the inauguration towards civil society (see Sakwa 2015 for a good review), the FFE movement did not respond with more violence, contrary to Kriesi *et al*.'s expectations. The FFE movement's refrain from using strong radicalization lends weight to literature suggesting an ambiguous relationship between repression and protest (Lichbach 1987, della Porta 1995, Davenport 2014).

Nevertheless, when considering the evolution of the action repertoire in the Russian case, a limited form of radicalization came to the surface early on during the demobilization process.

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[172] Rodionova, A. (2012, March 11). Zavedomo proigryshnaia oppozitsiia. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*; Naganov, V. (2012, April 6). Boloto vmesto revoliutsii. *Novaia gazeta*.

[173] 6 maia. Marsh Millionov zavershilsia massovymi zaderzhaniiami i ulichnoi voinoi s politsiei (Khronika, sobytii, video, foto) (2012, May 6). *Novaia gazeta*; Marsh naotmash'. (2012, May 10). *Kommersant*.; Maevka i OMON. (2012, May 14). *Kommersant''-Vlast'*.

[174] See also Bode, V. (2012, May 17). Sotsiolog Aleksandr Bikbov: Protestnoe dvizhenie radikaliziruetsia. *Radio Svoboda*. Retrieved from http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/24584580.html

The movement's repertoire evolved from mainly demonstrative acts (mass protests) to more direct actions (hunger strikes, sit-ins). From late February to April 2012, at least four significant hunger strikes related to electoral issues took places in different regions (Lermontov, Astrakhan, Chelyabinsk, Moscow), while, in Astrakhan, Oleg Shein (with about 20 other people) fasted for 40 days attracting significant media attention[175]. An important part of the movement also began to employ more sit-ins. As Bikbov argues, before the May 6 event, the movement mostly used urban space as a gathering place; however, after the violent clashes, protests included more direct struggles for this urban space[176]. As discussed in chapter 2, direct action entails more instrumentality than expressivity, tends to attract fewer rank-and-file protesters, and often contributes to the marginalization of the whole movement.

The Okkupai movement that emerged around that period (May to June 2012) is a good example of these processes. Following the presidential inauguration, small groups of protesters decided to change their tactics by calling for the continuous rotation of activists, or more accurately, for the replacement of 'walkers' (gulyaiushchie). By continuously moving, they believed they would avoid political repression since, in contrast to public demonstrations, they did not need official permission to simply walk around (guliat')[177]. Shortly after, some groups decided to establish a camp at Chistye Prudy around the monument of Abai Kunanbaev (Okkupai Abai), with a continuous rotation of 500 to 3,000 protesters[178]. Initially this sit-in had societal resonance[179]. The camp was visited by cultural and intellectual figures, part of the so-called 'creative class' associated with the broader movement (Fond razvitiia grazhdanskogo obshchestva 2012). After being dispersed twice, the movement's later versions, Okkupai Barrikady and Okkupai Arbat, did not enjoy the same resonance and came to suffer from growing internal divisions due to the increased presence of nationalist organizations, which clashed with the leftist groups that initially dominated the camp. As a consequence, the movement Okkupai became rapidly marginalized; its

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[175] Fel'dman, E., & Zotova, N. (2012, April 25). 40 dnei zakonchilis' pochti pobedoi. *Novaia gazeta*.
[176] Cited in Bode. V (2012, May 17).
[177] Kostiuchenko, E. (2012, May 11). Bul'varvary *Novaia gazeta*.
[178] Gorbachev, A., & Samarina, A. (2012, May 14). Kontrol'naia progulka ot pushkina do griboedova *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.
[179] Barb'e, N., Babkina, L., Zarubin, M., Chupilko, A., Kirill Permiakov, K., & Nilov, I. i. (2012, May 15). "Okkupai Abai". *Snob*.

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[175] Fel'dman, E., & Zotova, N. (2012, April 25). 40 dnei zakonchilis' pochti pobedoi. *Novaia gazeta*.
[176] Cited in Bode. V (2012, May 17).
[177] Kostiuchenko, E. (2012, May 11). Bul'varvary *Novaia gazeta*.
[178] Gorbachev, A., & Samarina, A. (2012, May 14). Kontrol'naia progulka ot pushkina do griboedova *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.
[179] Barb'e, N., Babkina, L., Zarubin, M., Chupilko, A., Kirill Permiakov, K., & Nilov, I. i. (2012, May 15). "Okkupai Abai". *Snob*.

organizing structure, the Assemblies, created further divisions in the broader movement before decreasing in size in June 2012 (Grigoryeva 2012).

To be properly understood, radicalization trends ought to be contrasted with a series of competing actions that civic-oriented figures active within the movement organized at the same time. In parallel to the *Okkupai* camps, cultural leaders Boris Akunin and Dmitry Bykov organized, on May 13, the walk of the writers[180]. Likewise, on 19 May, painters and other artists organized the walk of the painters[181]. More demonstrative and symbolic than instrumental in nature, these 'control walks' (kontrol'naia progulka), which attracted at least 10,000 people, mainly aimed at stopping the radicalization trend occurring within the movement itself (Volkov 2013, p. 17). Although the movement's radicalization was fairly limited in both time and form, its emergence during the early stages of demobilization affected the movement's later attempt to institutionalize at the internal level.

Failed Institutionalization

Institutionalization, as described in chapter 2, entails both internal and external processes. In non-democratic regimes where external institutionalization is often more difficult after a period of contention, social movements can still prioritize internal institutionalization. To this end, movements become more efficient, and maintain and expand cooperative ties between SMOs. Ultimately, the FFE movement missed the opportunity to enhance its efficiency in this way. The movement's aftermath, so far, has left no convincing evidence that this episode of mobilisation reduced the long-term weaknesses of Russian civil society, either by way of increasing its societal support or improving its ability to forge viable and durable alliances.

External Institutionalization: Premature Exit Toward Formal Politics

The external institutionalization of social movements (that is, regime recognition of the movement's legitimacy through greater roles in social and political life after a period of

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[180] D'iakova, E. (2012, May 16). Patrul'nyi stoit, Aleksandr Sergeevich progulivaetsia... *Novaia gazeta*.
[181] Shepelin, I. i., Khamraeva, V., & Litoi, A. (2012, May 21). Iskusstvo na svezhem vozdukhe. *RBC Daily*.

contention) is a rare feature in non-democratic regimes. As Gill pointed out, the Russian case is not different in this regard: "Formally the government refused to open negotiations with the protesters, and to thereby give them any sense of official imprimatur. Both Putin and Medvedev generally dismissed them as genuine actors on the Russian scene, and refused to give way on their principal demand for new elections" (Gill 2014, p. 6). Although Putin said, in his December 2011 televised conference, that he viewed the movement positively, he simultaneously discredited it crudely, declaring that he initially thought that the movement's main symbol—the white ribbon—was actually a hanging condom. He also called the protesters 'Banderlogi', a reference to monkeys in Kipling's *The Jungle Book*[182].

In addition to this contemptuous attitude, the state started to more efficiently mobilize its own supporters in early 2012. By holding mass demonstrations that were often larger than the ones organized by the opposition, the regime directly competed with the movement in the streets for societal acceptance and legitimacy. As Beissinger (2017) highlights, "the more divided society appears to be over the issue of regime-change, and the more those members of society who favor the status quo are willing to mobilize in defense of the regime, the more hollow opposition claims to represent the preferences of 'the people' would appear to be" (p. 13). For example, while the FFE movement held 98 events all across Russia in February 2012 (the month preceding the presidential elections) gathering more than 180,000 participants, the regime held 83 pro-Putin events that gathered more than 600,000 people during the same time period[183]. Spaiser *et al.* (2016) describe how the Kremlin was also more effective than the opposition on social media, employing various strategies of communication. These strategies aimed not only at discrediting the opposition but also at mobilizing the regime supporters around its electoral program that centered on stability and modernization, de facto highlighting the movement's lack of program of its own. As a result, the regime succeeded in changing the momentum in its favor at that period. As the authors argue "This may thus have significantly weakened the oppositional voice on Twitter at a time the movement was already struggling to regain momentum, further mobilise and overcome internal divisions" (Spaiser *et al.* 2016, p. 19).

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[182] Kolesnikov, A. (2011, December 16). "Idite ko mne, banderlogi". *Kommersant*.
[183] See Figures 5.14 and 5.25 in chapter 5.

While not formally recognizing the movement and its demands, the state nonetheless passed a number of 'soft' reforms, such as installing web cameras in voting stations, easing registration for political parties, and reintroducing direct elections of regional governors. Before leaving the presidency, Medvedev did meet with some SMO leaders from the non-systemic groups but, given the president's imminent departure from office, this meeting was largely symbolic[184]. Especially when confronted with the repressive measures adopted once Putin returned to the presidency, these reforms formed part of a strategy of containment rather than representing a true recognition of the movement's legitimacy. Immediately after the presidential elections, the regime continued to discredit the movement by broadcasting twice on time national television "Anatomiia Protesta" (Anatomy of a Protest), a controversial documentary on the movement, in which SMO leaders were depicted as CIA agents[185].

However, the regime's apparent openness to some institutional compromise changed the political opportunities available to the movement, insofar as it affected its already weak internal unity and societal support. With the announcement of reforms facilitating the registration of political parties[186], many SMOs began to seek registration to participate in the October 2012 regional elections, in a process that partly distracted them from protesting in the streets. By late March 2012, about 85 parties had applied for registration to the Ministry of Justice, and, by May, this number had reached 160[187]. As the formation of electoral blocs was still not allowed, these new registered parties could not seriously challenge the United Russia party. According to Golosov (2014), the multiplication of small opposition parties, with some deliberately acting as spoilers, hurt the systemic opposition parties, thus benefiting UR. As the electoral results made clear in October, the reform actually helped UR to regain its strength at the regional level, as Putin's party maintained its majority in almost every regional parliament (Golosov 2014).

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[184] Tirmaste, M.-L., Samokhina, S. i., Pisarenko, O., Granik, I., & Nagornykh, I. (2012, February, 17). Nezaregistrirovannye otmetiatsia u prezidenta. *Kommersant*.

[185] Tumanov, G. (2012, March 17). NTV sobral auditoriiu na piket. *Kommersant*.

[186] In particular, the number of compulsory members for registrating a political party was reduced from 40,000 to 500, and the number of signatures required to for registered parties for participate in the state *Duma* elections was abolished, or reduced for non-registered parties. See Federal'nyi Zakon, No. 28-FZ C.F.R, available at: http://graph.document.kremlin.ru/page.aspx?1606566; Federal'nyi Zakon, No. 41-F3, available at: http://graph.document.kremlin.ru/page.aspx?1609982, both accessed 25 April 2015.

[187] Samokhina, S. i. (2012, March 30). Novye partii so starymi litsami. *Kommersant*; "U naseleniia est' zapros na nastoiashchuiu partiiu". (2012, May 5). *Kommersant*"-*VLAST*'.

Throughout the demobilization phase, these reforms represented a faux openness of political opportunities, as they led SMO leaders to pursue external institutionalization, diverting their time and energy from the broader movement. For example, after the Republican Party of Russia (Respublikanskaia partiia Rossii, RPR) had managed to renew its registration, its leader, Vladimir Ryzhkov (considered a moderate figure within the movement), skipped the 6 May event arguing that he was too exhausted to participate[188]. To be sure, institutionalizing by participating in the electoral process could potentially bring positive outcomes at the societal level, if only by providing more pluralism and greater representativeness in the party system. When party system institutionalization is quite weak per se, as is the case in Russia, there is the risk that the movement opted to dilute its strength for very thin benefits.

For example, Aleksei Naval'ny, one of the most prominent leaders of the movement, ran in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election and managed to attract a significant part of the vote (27.2%) against the incumbent, after thousands of his supporters waged a very efficient campaign. Nalval'ny's campaign, however, relied almost entirely on his personal charisma and popularity, pointing out to the movement's lack of institutionalization. Many of Naval'ny's supporters also exhibited zealous intolerance when confronted with criticisms from other SMO leaders. For instance, when Evgeniia Chirikova declared that she would not vote for Naval'ny as the latter's manifesto overlooked ecological issues, his supporters accused her of being a traitor, a KGB agent, or a drunkard. In response, Chirikova noted that, "for the candidate in power and his supporters, it is important to be able to respond with dignity to criticisms. If we conflate discussion of ideas with discussion of personalities, how are we then different from Nashiststov [pro-Kremlin youth group members]?"[189]. Chirikova's remarks highlight that, despite the participation of individual SMOs and leaders in the electoral process in 2013, the FFE movement was not institutionalized at the external level. When a few leaders succeeded in grabbing more popular attention, they became instead easier targets for regime repression, as Naval'ny's

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[188] Partii stalo vosem'. (2012, May 11). *Moskovskii Komsomolets*; Filina, O. g. (2012, May 14). "Teper' pridetsia vybirat'". *Ogonek*.

[189] My translation : 'Dlya kandidata vo vlast' i ego storonnikov vazhno umet' dostoino reagirovat' na kritiku. Esli svalivat'sya s obsuzhdeniya idei na obsuzhdenie lichnostei, to chem togda my otlichaemsya ot nashiststov?'. See Chirikova, E. (2013). Oshibka Kandidata. *Ekho Moskvy*, Retrieved from http://echo.msk.ru/blog/chirikova/1119586-echo/

subsequent arrests illustrated. Commenting on the September 2014 electoral round, Gel'man remarked that "almost no serious opposition candidates were allowed to run anywhere in the country" (Gel'man 2015b, p. 4), testifying to the ultimately faux political opening brought about by the 2012 reforms.

It is therefore not surprising, given the non-democratic nature of Russian politics, that as the FFE movement demobilized, no effective mechanism of dialogue between the movement and the state was created to give civil society more influence over the decision-making process[190]. Rather, the regime did its best to deprive the movement of societal acceptance and legitimacy. Diverting from a pattern emerged within other successful mobilizations across the former Soviet Union, such as illustrated by the Ukrainian case in the previous chapters, the Kremlin did not bother to coopt SMO leaders, as given their internally competitive relationships it proved to be more efficient to simply repress and discredit them. The next section delves into the ambiguous internal institutionalization of the movement.

Internal Institutionalization: Too Little, Too Late?

During Mobilization

From its inception, the FFE movement had to deal with important internal divisions that, while indicating the movement's broad representativeness, posed significant hurdles to its institutionalization. Instead of trying to offer a unifying platform with a consistent political and socioeconomic agenda, the movement opted to emphasize its own diversity, and came to include SMO leaders from all ends of the political spectrum. While such broad movements are not necessary doomed from the start (Kolstø 2016), it follows that they often have to cope with internal division, which can, in the longer run, affect their popular support. For the FFE movement, intense disputes already erupted in the lead up to the second large demonstration on

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[190] A good example is the "Otkrytoe pravitel'tsvo" (Open Government) project that was formed in May 2012 under the Medvedev government, and presented as a new mechanism of state-civil society dialogue. The project, however, was not taken seriously by civil society figures, and in only one year lost all of its relevance. See Naumov, I. (2013, May 16). Otkrytoe pravitel'stvo pytaetsia naiti sebe primenenie *Nezavismaia gazeta*.

24 December 2011. In particular, the selection of speakers to address the crowd on Sakharov Avenue was a contested issue between the movement's cultural leaders (Boris Akunin, Leonid Parfenov) and the old guard of liberal oppositionists led by Boris Nemtsov. As the meetings of the FFE Orgkomitet were broadcast online, these very public rivalries began to affect the mood of the protesters who openly booed many of the speakers on Sakharov Avenue, including Nemtsov and Sobchak[191]. An important debate also surrounded the opportunity to give voice to nationalist and right-wing figures, such as Vladimir Tor[192]. On the Sakharov stage, Tor claimed that the FFE movement would not have been possible without the Nationalist rally that took place in December 2010 on Manezh Square, one that end in a violent riot[193]. Intra-movement rivalries erupted beyond Moscow, for example in Kazan[194], Saratov[195], and in St Petersburg, where the movement simply split and organized different parallel events on the very same day[196], further precipitating demobilization at the regional level.

Although the coexistence of a plurality of SMOs within a broader social movement is a good indicator of its resonance and vitality, duplication of the same functions amongst SMOs increases in turn the climate of competition and confusion that inevitably arise within a social movement (Tarrow 1989). As Minkoff (1997) argues, the more a movement becomes popular, the more SMOs emerge, producing interorganizational competition for resources and new members (also see Meyer 1993a). This seems to be particularly true with regard to the movements' organizational structures and leadership.

In the Russian case, such tensions resulted in the proliferation of organizing committees that often overlapped with each other. While the FFE Orgkomitet was initially in charge of coordinating the protest actions of the movement, a contest for legitimacy was soon launched by other initiatives. For example, the League of Voters (*Liga Izbiratelei*) formed in January 2012 by cultural and civic leaders, including Akunin and Parfenov who quit the Orgkomitet because of

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[191] Vezhin, S. (2011, December 26). Professional'nykh nesoglasnykh osvistali. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

[192] For a good analysis of the Liberal and Nationalist coalition during the 2011-12 movement, see Kolstø (2016).

[193] Allenova, O. (2012, January 23). Marsh nesoglasnykh drug s drugom. *Ogonek*.

[194] Antonov, K. (2011, December 21). Nesoglasnye proiavili nesoglasovannost'. *Kommersant*.

[195] Petrova, M. (2012, January 24). SOI ne sobralos' pod odnim znamenem. *Kommersant*.

[196] Andrianov, K. (2011, December 26). Protest na vybor. *Kommersant*.

diverging view[197]. The League of Voters stressed that its focus was mainly on the fairness of the electoral process and on the coordination of volunteers but, in practice, its relationships with the Orgkomitet, which had by then become the Civic Movement (*Grazhdanskoe Dvizhenie*)[198], were more complex and affected the unity of the movement. To add to the confusion, a wide range of activists (liberals, leftists, nationalists, and representatives of civic SMOs) proceeded to form a Council within the Civic Movement[199]. The Liberal leaders were thus often clashing with the Nationalists, as the former did not want to be associated with the latter. The 4 February *shestvie* (rally) was organized 'by columns' as activists from these four political orientations, instead of putting aside differences during the event, symbolically walked in parallel[200]. As a result, local observers began to note the taste of reheated leftovers brought by the event: "The protest is treading water, the opposition cannot do anything except claiming for 'Putin to resign', but how to suggest what to do further, where to go further – it's completely unclear"[201].

During Demobilization

Dissension intensified during the demobilization process. In the lead up to the first March of Millions, which was planned on May 6th, the organizing committee (now called 'Orgkomitet Protestnykh Deistvii')[202] was so internally divided that the entire event was nearly called into question[203]. The period of limited radicalization, as mentioned earlier, had generated more factions. According to one of the Levyi Front leaders, Aleksei Sakhnin, more radical protesters

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[197] Khachatrian, D. (2012, January 18). Grazhdane uchrediteli. *Novaia gazeta;* Rodionova, A. (2012, January 19). Noev kovcheg liubitelei. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

[198] Rodionova, A. (2012, January 19). Rody novoi koalitsii. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

[199] The Round Table 12 December (*Kruglyi stol 12 dekabrya*) represented another organizing platform aiming to develop protest strategies. Its influence over the movement was at best marginal. Formed in the aftermath of the first mass protest on Bolotnaya Square on 10 December, the Round Table disappeared from the radar until 6 February, when it held its first working session, which was plagued by conflicts between different generations of activists. See Lipskii, A. (2012, February 8). K vesne prosnulis'. *Novaia gazeta*.

[200] Rubin, M. (2012, January 25). Shestvie razdelit' uchastnikov na ideologicheskie kolony. *Izvestiia*.

[201] My translation: "Protest topchetsia na meste, oppozitsiia ne mozhet nichego, krome "Putina v otstavku", predlozhit', chto dal'she, kuda dal'she - polnyi tuman". See Al'bats, E., Svetova, Z., Skovoroda, E., & Chernuk, I. (2012, December 3). Dekabr' 2011-go. *Novoe vremia*.

[202] The Orgkomitet of Protest Actions was mostly formed on the basis of the Civic Movement and its Council mentioned above, which stopped its activities in April 2012, but was more politicized than its predecessor and included fewer cultural and civic figures. See Gorbachev, A. (2015, April 6). Nesoglasnye s inauguratsiei. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

[203] Tumanov, G. (2012, May 3). V "Marshe millionov" ne khvataet nulei. *Kommersant*.

started to consolidate around Udal'tsov during that period while more moderate and cultural leaders were either gone or had significantly reduced their activism (Sakhnin 2014, pp. 67-69). As a result, the balance of power had shifted from moderate to more radical figures in the spring 2012. Following the May 6th event, Vladimir Milov, considered a liberal and moderate leader, wrote that this event showed how "the winter conglomerate of different forces, which had entered the Orgkomitet, has predictably ended with the replacement of brilliant, but less organized forces, with more organized ones, and the net winner appears to be clearly Sergei Udal'tsov and people from Levyi Front"[204]. Later in the demobilization period, however, Levyi Front activists were disappointed with the refusal of the FFE movement to include socioeconomic demands. They were even more disappointed with their own leaders' ambivalence between strongly advocating for the socioeconomic agenda and securing cooperation with the whole movement (Sakhnin 2014, p. 92).

Meanwhile, observers also witnessed the formation of many new SMOs. For example, the Workshop of Protest Actions (Masterskaia Protestnykh Deistvii) is a SMO that was created during the movement, out of which smaller SMOs and projects emerged, such as Resistance and the movement Okkupai (Volkov 2013). In the midst of the FFE mass movement, the Workshop gathered in Moscow clubs, thanks to Facebook. Activists went on stage to share ideas for new protest activities, with the proposals then assessed by the group as a whole[205]. In the early demobilization period, however, the workshop simply ceased to meet, just as the movement 'Okkupai' rapidly waned in the summer of 2012. In effect, the Okkupai movement had its own internal factions (Grigoryeva 2012). Most importantly, however, the Assemblies publicly clashed with the Orgkomitet during the preparation for the second March of Millions, on 12 June and the writing of a new manifest for the movement. As their influence had grown during the spring, left-wing activists wanted now to have more influence on the decision-making, and in particular, advocated for the inclusion of more socioeconomic demands to the movement's main targets. However, this issue proved to be very controversial (Sakhnin 2014, pp. 91-92). Other leaders,

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[204] M translation: "Sobytiia 6 maia pokazali, chto zimnii konglomerat raznykh sil, soshedshikhsia v "orgkomitete protestnykh deistvii', predskazuemo zakanchivaetsia vydavlivaniem iarkikh, no menee organizovannykh sil bolee organizovannymi, i netto-pobeditelem situatsii ochevidno vygliadiat Sergei Udal'tsov i liudi iz "Levogo fronta'." See Milov, V. (2012, May 14). Fleshmob otchaianiia. *Gazeta.ru*. Retrieved from https://www.gazeta.ru/column/milov/4582633.shtml
[205] Beshlei, O. g. (2012, January 30). 4 Fevralia: 22 goda spustia. *Novoe vremia*

often coming from the liberal stream, were against including socioeconomic demands because of the divisive character this process would have necessarily entailed in their opinion[206]. Just before the 12 June event, the Okkupai Assemblies published a letter addressed to the Orgkomitet, requiring that the Okkupai leaders be permitted to address the crowd during the March[207]. After their request was rejected[208], the Okkupai leaders attacked the Orgkomitet in the media once again, calling its legitimacy into question. For example, they wrote

> The members of the Orgkomitet have not been elected, they are only invited there… For more than six months the Orgkomitet has limited the demands of the protesters by framing them in terms of new elections and the resignation of Putin, although an important part of the protesters have long considered it essential to include social demands. The Orgkomitet attempts to present the opinions of 20 people as if they were representative of the whole protest movement. We are against this[209].

At the regional level, Okkupai groups also emerged, such as in St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Nizhny-Novgorod, Kaliningrad, Barnaul, and Vladivostok, but many of which quickly felt disconnected with the Moscow Okkupai movement, as their regional grievances were often ignored by the capital activists. According to Gel'man, these Okkupai groups were doomed to fail given that they were unable to attract larger societal support than the usual narrow group of oppositionists[210]. The short-term fate of many of these new SMOs seem to support Minkoff (1997)'s thesis that sequencing effect occurs between early risers and later entrant SMOs to social movements. As she argues, "There may be a competitive replacement effect in which later entrants to the social movement arena displace early risers with respect to protest activity but not their organization-building" (Minkoff 1997, p. 794).

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[206] See for example, Nekrasov, D., Voronkov, K., & Gudkov, D. (2012, June 26). Dmitrii Gudkov: Chego khotiat revoliutsionery. *Vedomosti*.

[207] "Okkupaitsy" trebuiut slova na mitinge 12 iiunia. (2012, June 10). *RBC*.

[208] One of the Assemblies' leader, Izabel' Magkoeva, reported that the Orgkomitet leaders replied to her request by saying "And who are you? We have more important people among us" (My translation: "Da kto vy takie? U nas povazhnee liudi est"). See Reiter, S. (2012, December 24). Abai i nyne tam. *Novoe vremia*.

[209] My translation: "Chleny orgkomiteta ne vybiralis', oni byli prosto tuda priglasheny...Orgkomitet uzhe polgoda ogranichivaet trebovaniya protestuyushchikh, kotorye transliruyutsya v obshchestvennom mnenii kak trebovaniya perevyborov i otstavki Putina, khotya ogromnaya chast' protestuyushchikh uzhe davno schitaet neobkhodimym vklyuchit' sotsial'nye trebovaniya. Orgkomitet pytaetsya naviazat' mnenie 20 chelovek vsemu protestnomu dvizheniyu. My vystupaem protiv etogo". See Vatutin, S. (2012). "Okkupai" protiv "Marsha millionov". *Wek.ru*, (June 20). Retrieved from Wek.ru website: http://wek.ru/okkupaj-protiv-marsha-millionov

[210] Garmazhapova, A., Farberova, K., Gunin, I., Dmitriev, A., Trunov, D., Tepliakov, S., . . . Petrov, I. (2012, May 22). Okkupai RF. *Gazeta.ru*.

Partly influenced by these criticisms, the movement tried to institutionalize during the autumn of 2012. As Sakhnin (2014) points out, after all these Okkupai sit-ins died out, there was no longer any other coordinating structure to compete with the Orgkomitet. At the same time, the organ faced a legitimacy crisis (p. 98). In an attempt to reenergize what was left of the movement as well as to maintain a more efficient and legitimate structure for cooperation between SMOs, in October 2012 the Orgkomitet of Protest Actions transformed itself once again into the Coordinating Council of the Opposition (Koordinatsionnyi Sovet Oppozitsii, hereafter the 'KSO'). A major difference between this Council and the previous Orgkomitets was that KSO members would be elected. In effect, an online election took place from 20–22 October 2012, to select 45 members from different political orientations. According to Savel'eva (2013), 81,300 took part in the vote, in a turnout that, while smaller than the 100,000 expected, represented a good result for an online and unofficial election (p. 60). Aleksei Naval'ny won the first place, followed by Dmitrii Bykov, Garri Kasparov, and Kseniia Sobchak. Udal'tsov was also elected but at the 20th rank[211].

The results of these elections raised many eyebrows among FFE activists, especially given the low position got by left-wing leaders such as Udal'tsov[212]. These poor results could be partly explained by the fact that, although the KSO was established to lessen the legitimacy problems of the FFE leaders, the legitimacy of the organization itself was called into question within the movement from the very beginning[213]. For example, Levyi Front activists had been divided on the question of whether to participate in the KSO, which many considered to be an instrument for consolidating Naval'ny's influence within the movement (Sakhnin 2014, p. 100). A campaign for boycotting the elections was launched on Internet before the vote and Il'ia Ponomarev even removed his candidature to protest against the voting procedure[214]. Although Volkov (2013) was

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[211] Tsentral'nyi vybornyi komitet. (2012). Rezul'taty golosovaniia. Retrieved from http://cvk2012.org/news/rezultaty_golosovaniya/

[212] See for example, Kashin, O. (2012, October 23). Komanda ch'ei-to mechty. *Openspace*. Retrieved from http://www.openspace.ru/article/523; Levaia oppozitsiia somnevaetsia v vernosti podscheta golosov na vyborakh v KSO. (2012, October 23). *Rosbalt*.

[213] Shul'ga, O. (2012, August 3). Na pravom flange soglasiia net, a est' konkurentsiia. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*; Dve pozitsii oppozitsii (2012, August 6). *Novaia gazeta*.

[214] Deputat Il'ia Ponomarev snial svoiu kandidaturu s vyborov v KS. (2012, October 19). *Lenta.ru*. Retrieved from https://lenta.ru/news/2012/10/18/ponomarev

initially optimistic about the KSO, he nonetheless stressed the importance for the Coordinating Council of offering effective leadership, which he saw as more important than elections *vis-à-vis* the movement's legitimacy. However, the KSO proved to be anything but efficient. For example, a few months into the KSO's existence, an alternative organ was created from within the KSO ranks, called the Expert Council of the Opposition (Ekspertnyi sovet oppozitsii, the ESO)[215]. The ESO even organized activities that competed directly with KSO-organized activities in the spring of 2013[216]. Yet just as with the KSO, the ESO's activism quickly faded[217]. The KSO dissolved in October 2013 after many of its elected members had refused to take part in its working sessions. As Kryshtanovskaya *et al*. (2013) argued, the conflicts within the KSO[218], in addition to the many scandals surrounding the leaders of the movement, increased the disorientation of the remaining activists.

The internal struggles and the multiplication of organizing structures greatly impeded the institutionalization of the movement, as ultimately illustrated by the KSO failure. Other factors, including the increased repression and divisive strategies used by the state, certainly contributed to this failure, yet, the attempt to internally institutionalize also came rather late in the demobilization process. Indeed, the movement tried to institutionalize only after many rank-and-file protesters had distanced themselves from the movement because of its early radicalization tendencies, and after the attention of many of its leaders had shifted from protests to regional elections.

It could be argued that, although the movement had failed to institutionalize collectively, some SMOs may have internally institutionalized on an individual basis while individuals may have redirected their energy to less visible forms of activism at the local level, building on the experience acquired during the FFE moment. Interesting findings on this matter have been recently presented in a collective volume edited by Russian sociologists (Erpyleva & Magun

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[215] Zaiavlenie gruppy byvshikh kandidatov o situatsii v Koordinatsionnom sovete oppozitsii (KS) i uchrezhdenii Ekspertnogo Soveta. (2013). Retrieved from http://esovet.org/organization/

[216] Organizatory aktsii 6 maia obvinili v provokatsii orgkomitet aktsii 5 maia. (2013, April 29). *Zaks.ru*.

[217] On Facebook, the group has 184 members, whom only 10 percent joined from the last 2 years. Facebook. Ekspertnyi sovet oppozitsii. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/groups/368392236585994/members/

[218] See for example Shevtsova, L. (2012, November 19). Konflikt revoliutsionerov i adaptantov. *Ekho Moskvy*. Retrieved from http://echo.msk.ru/blog/shevtsova/953065-echo/

2015). After their examination of some of the local groups that came out of the movement, Zhuravlev *et al*. argued that these groups have been in a constant state of demobilization, torn between individualisation and collectivism. As they describe, "in the spring of 2012, after the presidential elections, at the very beginning of new civic initiatives, activists were full of optimism and inspiration. Six months later, these feelings turned into disappointment, and in the winter of 2013, we could actually talk of the crisis of local movements"[219] (Zhuravlev *et al*. 2015, p. 460–61). In turn, while Turovets (2015) documents the effectiveness of the Anti-Nickel movement in the Voronezh region in 2012–2013, she indicates that it evolved in parallel with rather than as a result of the FFE movement. According to Sakhnin (2014), toward the end of 2012, "an outflow of activists, who have joined the movement at its peak, began. Even some veterans became less involved in protest campaigns. Cases of splits and internal conflicts within activist groups became more frequent" (p. 122).

To be sure, it seems likely that some SMOs and activists continued their public involvement in the aftermath of the movement. Based on the available evidence, however, there seems to have been very limited civil society institutionalization coming directly from the FFE mobilization experience.

A Conflicting Systemic-Nonsystemic Logic

Beyond the dichotomy between regime responses and the protesters' choices, the systemic opposition is also essential to understanding key developments during the demobilization period. While the state's negative attitude towards the movement was to be expected, the shifting attitudes of the systemic opposition towards the non-systemic opposition also contributed to the overall failure of the institutionalization processes.

From the very establishment of the FFE movement, the systemic opposition was ambivalent towards this initiative. Although KPRF leader Gennadi Ziuganov initially distanced his party

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[219] My translation : 'Vesnoi 2012 goda, posle prezidentskikh vyborov, v samom nachale formirovaniya novykh grazhdanskikh initsiyativ, aktivivisty byli polny optimizma i voodushevlenniya. Uzhe cherez polgoda eti chustva smenilis' razocharovaniem, a k zime 2013-go mozhno bylo govorit' o krizise lokal'nykh dvizhenii' (Zhuravlev *et al*. 2015, pp. 460-461).

from what he considered to be an 'orange threat' (in reference to Ukraine's Orange Revolution)[220], he soon came to be active part in the movement and almost criticized its leadership for pausing protest events in January 2012[221]. The agreement that, on 17 January 2017, was concluded between Ziuganov and Udal'tsov was controversially interpreted within the movement, as this deal stipulated that Udal'tsov's *Levyi Front* would support Ziuganov in the presidential race. In case of election, Ziuganov would fulfill the movement's main demands, one of which was the removal of the Chairman of the Central Election Commission, Vladimir Churov[222]. Less than two weeks after the deal was concluded, however, the KPRF abandoned the pursuit of Churov's removal and, jointly with the LDPR, accepted the conditions of the UR majority[223]. While the systemic opposition had rhetorically denounced electoral fraud, no MP elected on 4 December renounced their *Duma* seat, hence reducing their legitimacy within the movement, which had been calling for the annulment of the election.

As seen in the previous chapter, the systemic opposition did however try to capitalize on the protest wave, especially after the movement had begun to mobilize larger groups of protesters. Beyond their participation in events organized by the movement, systemic opposition activists often held parallel events, diluting the effectiveness of the movement's efforts. For example, between the two massive movement demonstrations on Bolotnaia Square (10 December) and Sakharov Avenue (24 December), Yabloko[224] held, on 17 December, a protest event featuring the same themes as the FFE movement. As it only attracted 1,500 people, the Yabloko event did not yield positive results for the party or the movement, and it ultimately undermined the Bolotnaia events by sending confusing signals[225].

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[220] Tsvetkova, R. (2011, December 20). Prazdnik neponimaniia. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

[221] Khamraev, V., & Samokhina, S. (2012, January 12). Gennadii ziuganov gotov zapolnit' pauzu v mitingakh. *Kommersant*.

[222] Poegli, V. (2012, January 19). Naden'te trusy, gospoda kandidaty. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.

[223] Despite having demanded Churov's removal, the KPRF and LDPR quickly dropped this claim in exchange for the creation of a working group on electoral reforms. See Rodin, I. (2012, January 30). Oppozitsiia priznala itogi vyborov v gosdumu. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

[224] Although Yabloko status is difficult to place, the party acted more as a systemic opposition party during and after the movement.

[225] Lomakin, B. (2011, December 19). Krivaia protesta stremitsia k nuliu. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

The systemic parties did not support enthusiastically the reforms proposed by the regime either, in particular those connected with relaxation of the requirements to register political parties. As argued above, these reforms served more as a containment strategy aimed at weakening the movement rather than a real attempt to open up political opportunities. Nevertheless, many systemic opposition members felt that their own interests were threatened by the reforms. As noted in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*,

> No matter how many votes have been stolen from the systemic parties in the elections, their risks [to lose their comfortable positions and status] in a fair competition are much higher... In fact, opposition parties owe their longevity precisely to the Kremlin tutelage system. In free and fair elections, the current parliamentary opposition parties would have to start to strongly compete with non-systemic parties closely related ideologically, and they are not ready for this battle[226].

By opportunistically playing both sides, the systemic opposition limited the movement's efficacy, especially in Moscow. This pattern consolidated in both the mobilization and the demobilization phases, during which the systemic opposition began to distance itself from the movement as was shown in chapter 5. After the March elections, the systemic parties and their main leaders stop participating in the movement's activities and, throughout 2012, they began to criticize with increasing vehemence the movement's tactics (Stanovaya 2013, Sakwa 2015). In his June 2012 report, Ziuganov declared that, thanks to the KPRF party, the FFE movement had not been monopolized by the 'Orangivists', using once again to the Kremlin's favorite expression to discredit the non-systemic opposition[227].

Although many prominent movement leaders came from the systemic party A Just Russia (SR), throughout the demobilization phase (and while the movement attempted to internally institutionalize more in particular) the party leadership adopted an increasingly negative stance

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[226] My translation: "Skol'ko by golosov ni ukrali u sistemnykh partii na vyborakh, ikh riski v usloviyakh chestnoi konkurentsii gorazdo vyshe…Po suti, imenno kremlevskoi opeke sistemnye oppozitsionnye partii obyazany svoim dolgozhitel'stvom. Na svobodnykh i chestnykh vyborakh nyneshnim parlamentskim oppozitsioneram prishlos' by vstupit' v zhestochaishuyu bor'bu s ideologicheski blizkimi vnesistemnymi partiyami, a oni k takoi bor'be ne gotovy", See Bresh' v partiinoi sisteme. (2012, February 2). *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

[227] Ziuganov: kommunisty ne pozvolili pazguliat'sia "orangistam". (2012, June 19). *Fontanka.ru*. Retrieved from http://www.fontanka.ru/2012/06/19/133/

towards the movement. In September 2012, the SR opposition went as far as to unseat MP Gennadi Gudkov, while threatening the expulsion of party members associated with the FFE movement. During the KSO elections, SR leader Sergei Mironov made the threat clear enough: "In such circumstances, playing revolution and provoking the authorities to further tighten the screws is either infantilism, or even worse, a dangerous and wilful provocation aimed at attaining one's own egoistic goals at all costs"[228]. About a year later, Yabloko leader Sergei Mitrokhin further increased tensions within what remained of the movement, suggesting that Aleksei Naval'ny was part of an 'oligarch project' that Yabloko had to fight against[229].

In short, just like for the successful Orange movement, the difficult relationship between formal actors (systemic) and the movement (or the non-systemic opposition) greatly impeded its institutionalization. The difference between the two cases primarily lays in the distinction between the external and internal institutionalization. While formal actors in Ukraine impeded the successful Orange movement to reach external institutionalization, those very same formal actors proved to be a hurdle to internal institutionalization that could have followed after the unsuccessful Russian movement. As its initial involvement in the movement's activities was mostly opportunistic, the systemic opposition had no interest in helping the movement to internally institutionalize after the initial momentum waned. The systemic opposition had in this sense exacerbated, rather than alleviated, the tensions internal to the non-systemic opposition. The systemic opposition of course contains a wide array of parties and individuals, and therefore should not be treated as a homogeneous bloc. Yet many of its members have proven to be more concerned with losing their privileged status than with helping ideologically similar SMOs to develop or maintain cooperative ties. Nor did the systemic opposition help SMOs to achieve greater public acceptance.

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[228] Shchipkov, F. (2012, October 27). Mironov prizval eserov otmezhevat'sia ot protestnogo dvizheniia. *RIA Novosti*.
[229] Gorbachev, A. (2013, December 16). "Yabloko" okonchatel'no razrugalos' s naval'nym. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

A Movement in Abeyance by Default?

The Russian experience reveals the need to comparatively explore demobilization processes, especially during a period of closing political opportunities, expanding on the conclusions reached by Kriesi *et al*. (1995). After attempting but failing to institutionalize at a later stage of demobilization, the movement entered a state of abeyance, from which it has sporadically and briefly emerged to organize public events. What Kryshtanovskaya *et al*. perceived as post-6 May radicalization, is actually closer to the abeyance indicators of purposive commitments, culture and, exclusiveness:

> In place of aggressiveness came persistence and stubbornness: protesters are not themselves inclined to provoke a violent clash, but in the case of such situation, they are more likely to behave as a cohesive team, by resisting attempts to harm "their own" (svoim). Among the remaining protesters, there are very strong moral and ethical imperatives; this is why defense of their comrades appears to be for them a unique virtue (Kryshtanovskaya *et al*. 2013)[230].

According to the Civil Society Development Foundation (Fond razvitiia grazhdanskogo obshchestva 2012) the movement shifted in its use of social media: it ceased to employ Vkontakte to recruit and mobilise new activists, and, in a further sign of exclusiveness, began to employ VK to nourish its core membership. Many of the preeminent SMOs created during the movement, such as Liga izbiratelei, the Okkupai movement, or the cultural platform Masterskaya protestnykh deistvii, are now active almost exclusively on social media, which act as abeyance structures for the remaining activists (Greene & Roberstson 2016)[231].

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[230] My translation: "Na mesto agressivnosti prishli stoikost' i uporstvo: demonstranty ne sklonny sami provotsirovat' stolknoveniya, no v sluchae ikh vozniknoveniya situatsii s bol'shoi dolei veroyatnosti povedut sebya kak splochennyi kollektiv, protivostoyashchii popytkam prichinit' vred 'svoim'. Sredi "stoikikh protestuyushchikh" ochen' sil'ny moral'no-nravstvennye imperativy, poetomu zashchita tovarishchei yavlyaetsya dlya nikh odnoznachnoi dobrodetel'yu'" (Kryshtanovskaya *et al*., 2013).

[231] Although the Facebook page of these SMOs remained accessible, there was a clear stagnation of their membership: the Workshop has attracted only 23 new members over the last four years; and the Okkupai movement's last post is dated late 2012[231]. See Facebook. Masterskaia protestnykh deistvii. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/groups/protest.workshop/members/; Facebook. Okkupai Rossiia. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/OccupayRus/?fref=ts

However, the abeyance in which the FFE movement sustains itself lacks the important criteria of centralization, as posited by Taylor (1989). In effect, the centralization in the movement leadership has never been completed, in part due to the failure to internally institutionalize, which would have provided the movement with enhanced legitimacy as well as macro-level coordination and stability. Because of earlier interactions between radicalization and institutionalization, the FFE movement has thus fallen into abeyance by default, characterized by a dispersed network of SMOs that are themselves in abeyance without having left behind a long-lasting core. As Sakhnin (2014) from the Levyi Front rightly underlined, "The competition between party-type projects which specific ideologies and a general democratic movement format, which unites people of different views, reveals one important contradiction that has not been solved within the movement 2011-2012" (p. 120)[232]. While future collaboration between SMOs is not to be categorically excluded; the movement's legacy is not however expected to facilitate this cooperation. Consequently, in cases of restricting political opportunities (i.e., increased repression) and after failure, abeyance, and not necessarily radicalization as posited by Kriesi *et al*. (1995), can become the default option to demobilizing movement. Yet, the effects of abeyance by default over the subsequent state of civil society and its implications for the next episode of contention deserve more attention, which will be further explored in the conclusion of the dissertation.

Conclusion

The FFE movement has been widely regarded as the most important episode of social contention in post-Soviet Russia. Its key demands were not achieved but perhaps unsurprisingly, most observers formulated an optimistic assessment of the movement's societal consequences. Indeed, despite its short-term failure, many still want to see from this mobilization episode a learning experience in the longer run for the non-systemic opposition and for civil society more broadly. For example, although being quite critical to the movement evolution, Sakhnin, a left-wing leader during the movement, concluded his book on FFE by saying that:

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[232] My translation: "Konkurentsiia mezhdu proektami partiĭnogo tipa s opredelenno ideologiei i obshchedemokraticheskim formatom dvizheniia, kotoroe ob"ediniaet liudei raznykh vzgliadov, vskryvaet odno vazhnoe protivorechie, kotoroe tak i ne bylo resheno v ramkakh dvizheniia 2011–2012 gg.".

Finally, part of the society began to realize that it is not enough to go out few times in the streets to achieve changes in the country, that without self-organization, active participation and responsibility, democracy will remain an unattainable dream. Undoubtedly, this experience will affect the evolution of civil society in the future (p. 124)[233].

Yet, as this dissertation shows, the aftermath of mass mobilizations are not necessarily all and always positive. In the Russian case, the learning processes and long-lasting effects of coordinating at a broader level appear to be more limited than expected, although we ought not to discard the possibility that some SMOs had benefited individually from the mobilization experience.

Viewing demobilization as an evolving process helps us to understand this outcome. Just like in Ukraine, this chapter showed that the FFE movement demobilized through several intersecting processes of limited radicalization, external and internal institutionalization. But the timing and interactions of these processes were different. While in Ukraine, part of the Orange movement sealed an early deal with formal actors, thus opening the door to cooptation and preventing SMOs to reach external institutionalization in the aftermath of the mobilizations, leaving in turn many groups turning to limited radicalization; in Russia, an important part of the FFE movement turned first to radicalization while other key SMO leaders attempted to jump into formal politics and deserted the movement despite the very limited chances of success. Nonetheless, it is worth stressing again that, despite the repressive measures introduced later under the renewed Putin regime, the FFE movement resisted intensive radicalization.

It remains that the FFE institutionalization has ultimately failed. On the one hand, the failure to institutionalize externally can primarily be explained by the regime's repression and diversion strategies, which negatively affected political opportunities. Nevertheless, the initial choices made by SMO leaders also hampered internal institutionalization. As Sawyers and Meyer

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[233] My translation: "Nakonets, chast' obshchestva stala ponimat', chto nedostatochno neskol'ko raz vyǐti na ulitsu, chtoby dobit'sia peremen v strane, chto bez samoorganizatsii, aktivnogo uchastiia i otvetstvennosti demokratiia tak i ostanetsia nedostizhimoǐ mechtoǐ. Nesomnenno, chto etot opyt skazhetsia na evoliutsii grazhdanskogo obshchestva v budushchem".

argued, "choices that activists make about claims and tactics, albeit not in circumstances they themselves choose, affect the trajectory of a movement, its unity, and its prospects for subsequent success" (Sawyers & Meyer 1999, p. 202). Interestingly, the systemic opposition parties played a similar role to the winning formal actors in Ukraine, turning out to be more foes or spoilers rather than allies when it comes to movement institutionalization. From the late 2012, the FFE movement seemed to be thus in a state of abeyance by default.

Today, it seems fair to say that the FFE movement has faded from the public's eye. In June 2012, 37 percent of the population responded that they fully supported or somewhat supported the movement; five years later, only 26 percent do. Whereas in April 2012, 52 percent agreed to say that mass protest was a very effective or mostly effective way to influence politics, only 20 percent did so in January 2017[234]. On May 6, a rally to commemorate the movement attracted no more than thousand demonstrators, despite being sanctioned by the authorities[235]. In short, examining the demobilization phase of the FFE movement indicates that it did not significantly help civil society overcoming its two long-term weaknesses, as it did not change the way Russian SMOs interact with each other, nor did it attract more popular sympathy to its cause.

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[234] Levada Center. (2017). Protestnye aktsii [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/2017/02/21/protestnye-aktsii/
[235] Sulim, S. (2017, May 6). Khvatit nas mochit' v sortire. Kak v Moskve proshel miting pamiati "Bolotnoi". Reportazh "Meduzy". *Meduza*; Tadtaev, G., & Pruntseva, D. y. (2017, May 6). V Moskve proshla aktsiia oppozitsii na prospekte Sakharova. *RBC*.

CHAPTER 7 - THE AFTERMATH OF THE AFTERMATH

This dissertation has focused on the immediate aftermath of social movements, identifying the main processes through which mass mobilizations unravel and their consequences for civil society. Despite different short-term outcomes in Ukraine and Russia (success vs. failure in reaching the movements' key goals), I found that in both cases the ways in which demobilization occurred left ambiguous results for civil society. The research shows that extraordinary social movements do not always yield the stimulating impact on civil society that many observers tend to assume. In this concluding chapter, I turn to address larger questions about the possible longer-term impacts of mass movements on civil society. While the demobilization processes identified in this dissertation should be understood primarily as the mechanisms through which civil society passes from an intense period of mobilization to a more quiescent period of activism, they may also help to shed light on the longer-lasting legacies that movements leave behind.

Evaluating the longer-term consequences of social movements is challenging, especially since some of the most important may be indirect and diffuse. Giuni (1998), for example, argues that "while social movements are rational efforts to bring about change, many of their consequences are unintended and often unrelated to their claims" (p. 383). Gamson (1975) was one of the first to propose evaluative measures for social movement outcomes, asking if the movement resulted in SMOs gaining greater acceptance by the state and within society, and if their broader constituencies gained new advantages or benefits from the street struggle. Several authors then further refined these measures (see Müeller 1987, Marx Ferree 1994, Staggenborg 1995, Earl 2000, Whittier 2004). Building on Müeller (1987) and others, Staggenborg (1995) suggested evaluating social movement outcomes based on they extent to which they produce: 1) cultural changes and 2) new organizational resources for future mobilizations (see also Marx Ferree 1994). According to Staggenborg (1995), cultural changes may include "changes in social norms, behaviors, and ways of thinking among a public that extends beyond movement constituents or beneficiaries, as well as the creation of a collective consciousness among groups" (p. 341). In order to lessen the methodological problems associated with such a broad definition, I suggest that such "changes in social norms, behaviors, and ways of thinking" should be equated with

societal support for protest activities and political activism. The second category is more easily operationalized as it relates to SMO organizational resources, density, and capabilities.

Applying them to my two cases, I will examine: 1) whether ordinary citizens have become more supportive of and interested in political protest activities in their aftermath (cultural change); 2) whether SMOs that participated in the movements are still active and have become more embedded in society (new organizational resources); and 3) whether collaboration among different civil society groups has become more noticeable and institutionalized (both new organizational resources and cultural changes). Then I will discuss these outcomes in light of the Euromaidan mass mobilization in Ukraine and the relative lack of mass political protest in Russia since the FFE movement. In doing so, I argue that studying demobilization helps us "to offer an explanation for *how* and in *what circumstances* movement activities cause outcomes" (Earl 2000, p. 9), which is often the weakest part of research on social movement outcomes (McAdam and Snow 1997).

Ukraine: Civil Society in the Inter-Maidan Period

Any discussion on Ukrainian social movements must address the Euromaidan movement that took place nine years after the Orange Revolution. On November 21, 2013, a small group of protesters gathered on the Maidan to denounce the refusal of President Viktor Yanukovich to sign the EU Association Agreement. Escalating quickly, the subsequent events led not only to the dismissal of Yanukovich (now expelled twice from power in a decade by mass protests), but also to a protracted and violent crisis which is still ongoing. External actors became directly involved, culminating in the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014 and the self-declaration of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DPR and LPR respectively). The scale of violence and the dramatic consequences make the Euromaidan significantly different from the Orange Revolution. Yet, just as in the immediate aftermath of the latter, the Euromaidan gave rise to many claims about a supposedly 'awakening civil society' (Kobets & Ruda 2014, Pishchikova & Ogryzko 2014, Puglisi 2015, Solonenko 2015). As this dissertation indicates, however, we should not assume that these optimistic assumptions will necessary be bourne out (see also Gatskova & Gatskov 2016).

While many authors have compared the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan, highlighting insightful similarities and differences between what are often presented as two distinct episodes (Khmelko & Pereguda 2014, Popova 2014, Onuch 2015, Kuzio 2016), fewer analyses have linked both events in terms of what the former might have contributed to the latter. The common line of argument stresses that the Orange Revolution did not result in significant changes in civic engagement but that the Euromaidan might very likely do so. For example, while Puglisi (2015) argued that, "Though occasionally hailed as a 'triumph of civil society,' the Orange Revolution has, in fact, produced only partial and short-termed transformations in its fabric and modus operandi" (pp.5-6), she added that "Euromaidan has introduced a qualitative change in social participation. It has widened and redefined the concept of civil society and has established a causal link between the latter and social mobilization" (p. 6). Instead of investigating whether these claims hold or not, I will examine the extent to which the Orange Revolution's aftermath influenced the unfolding of the Euromaidan. My main argument is that the civil-society legacies of the Orange Revolution demobilization period, although not sufficient explanations, are necessary in order to understand the speed at which the Euromaidan radicalized and the extent of the protestors' distrust of the political opposition and SMOs.

Support for Political Activism and Protest Activities

As chapters 3 and 4 have shown, the Orange Revolution did not bring sustained public interest or participation in protest activities in its aftermath. In March 2005, about a third of respondents considered themselves to be "winners" of the Orange Revolution, while only 12 percent thought of themselves as being on the losing side. Only a year later, however, the proportion of self-perceived winners halved to just 16.4 of respondents, while "losers" grew from 11.7 percent to 34.7 percent (Golovakha and Panina 2008, p. 77).

Although this growing disenchantment meant that Ukrainians had accumulated more grievances, it did not lead citizens to participate more in political or civic activism, as sociological surveys have repeatedly shown (Gatskova and Gatskov 2012, p. 2). While Ukrainians claimed to be more ready to participate in rallies and peaceful protests to defend their rights just after the Orange

194

Revolution in March 2005 (35.2 percent compared to 28 percent in February 2004), this readiness declined to 30.7 percent in April 2006 and lost another percentage point in the following year (Golovakha & Panina 2008, p. 17). In 2008, a survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre revealed that about 57 percent of Ukrainians would not participate in protests against the authorities while only about 24 percent were ready to go out in the streets[236]. This also echoes White and McAllister's (2009) findings about political activism; as one interviewee in Poltava said, "absolutely nothing had changed, except that people were no longer prepared to take this kind of action as they could see it led nowhere"[237] (p. 241). A recent study comes to a similar conclusion even about volunteering, which is usually seen as a more apolitical form of activism, arguing that "in Ukraine – a country that experienced the Orange Revolution and a rise in levels of civil liberty – the voluntary work rate also declined, suggesting the failure of nonprofit organizations to capitalize on this public mobilization" (Kamerāde *et al*. 2016, p. 17).

Although small protest activities were still taking place immediately after the Orange Revolution, they were unable to attract significant attendance and societal attention. Interestingly, the Blue movement was initially somewhat more successful in that regard. However, despite the efforts of Blue leaders (composed almost exclusively of political officials), the Blue movement did not have much resonance in the inter-Maidan period. This could be observed during the 2007 "Blue Maidan," in which Yanukovich's allies tried to organize mass protests mimicking the Orange Revolution in order to denounce Yushchenko's dissolution of Parliament. The imitation quickly turned into a parody when Yanukovich addressed an overwhelmingly Russian-speaking crowd in Ukrainian, while another Blue leader used the famous Orange slogan "Razom nas bahato" (Together we are many)[238]. Despite bringing about 10,000 people into the streets for about two months, the Blue protests did not attract much media coverage. Different sources instead noted the top-down nature of the mobilizations (Kuzio 2007)[239]. Moreover, while many Kyiv citizens had supported the Orange movement, the Blue

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[236] Razumkov Centre. (2008). Iake iz tsikh dvokh sudzhen' naibil'shoiu miroiu vidbivaє Vashu pozitsiiu? (aktsiї protestu) [Press release]. Retrieved from http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=339

[237] This quote is also interesting compared to the findings of the protest event analysis, which revealed that Poltava was an important city in terms of protest activities in the Central region (see Chapter 3).

[238] Taras Berezovets: U Yushchenko bol'she shansov na pobedu, chem u Ianukovicha. (2007, April 5). *Novyi Region*.

[239] Sergeeva, A. (2007, April 3). Na "belo-sinem' Maidane poiavilis' storonniki Yushchenko. *Novyi den*.

Maidan seemed to be mostly populated by people from the regions[240]. In a strange irony, although the Orange leaders tried to counter-mobilize their supporters (with for example Taras Stets'kiv claiming that they could still bring 500,000 people into the streets), they did not do much better[241]. As Berezovets noted during the 2007 Blue Maidan, "Mass actions [like the Orange Revolution] are [now] impossible in Kyiv. Kyiv residents are apathetic and they will support neither one, nor the other"[242].

To be sure, there were other instances of organized street protests in the inter-Maidan period. In particular, socioeconomic protests had been growing since late 2010 with Yanukovich's return to power (Dutchak 2015)[243]. However, as shown by the Centre for Society Research's data (2014), the majority of these protests attracted little participation and remained mostly free of political elements. The Tax Maidan (Podatkovii Maidan) that occurred in late 2010 is a notable exception. Organized by entrepreneurs to denounce the new tax code, the movement attracted more than 10,000 people to the Maidan for about two weeks[244]. Although Yanukovich partially vetoed the Tax Code in response, the protests were repressed on December 3 and many activists were later charged[245]. The regime's harsh reaction seemed to fuel this emerging activism[246]. It also has to be stressed that although political leaders tried to join these protest campaigns later, they were initially organized from the bottom up[247].

Civil society was thus still active after the Orange Revolution. However, can we link these protests and initiatives with the mobilization experience of the Orange Revolution itself? I argue

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[240] Eksperty: Yanukovich potratil na vesennii Maidan do 74 mln. dollarov. (2007, May 30). Novyi region.

[241] See for example Revunets, T. (2007, April 12). Maidan 2.1 Still on Standby, Counter-Maidan Still Sucks. [Blog post]. Retrieved from http://tap-the-talent.blogspot.ca/2007/04/maidan-2.html; Revunets, T. (2007, April 15). Just Another Mismaidan. [Blog post]. Retrieved from http://tap-the-talent.blogspot.ca/2007/04/just-another-mismaidan-what-happened.html

[242] My translation: "Massovye aktsii takogo poriadka nevozmozhny v Kieve. Kievliane - apatichny, i ne budut podderzhivat' ni odnikh, ni vtorykh". Taras Berezovets: u Yushchenko bol'she shansov na pobedu, chem u Ianukovicha. (2007, April 5). *Novyi Region*.

[243] V Ukraine rastet protestnaia aktivnost' - pravozashchitniki. (2010, December 10). *Unian*.

[244] Na Maidane sobralis' uzhe bolee 10 tysiach chelovek. Fotoreportazh. (2011, November 29). *Tsensor.net*. Retrieved from http://censor.net.ua/photo_news/143622/goryachie_serdtsa_rastopili_led_protivorechiyi_mayidana_i_dvinulis_k_ve rhovnoyi_rade_fotoreportaj

[245] Zinoviev, R. (2011, March 11). Rasprava nad uchastnikami nalogovogo maidana. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.

[246] Realizatsiia reform v ZhKKh bez obshchestvennoi podderzhki mozhet privesti k kommunal'nomu "maidanu' - ekspert. (2011, February 3).

[247] 60% protestov na Ukraine prokhodiat bez uchastiia oppozitsii (2011, Marsh 31). *Intv.ua*.

that the Orange Revolution was in fact more an impediment than a facilitator of such post-Orange political activism. For example, a study conducted in 2010 with civil society leaders revealed that half of them believed that youth were politically passive, mainly because of the "frustration, loss of interest in politics and disappointment in politics [that occurred] after the Orange Revolution failed to meet social expectations"[248]. Former Soviet dissident Vasilii Ovsienko shared this viewpoint, noting in 2011 that the absence of mass protests did not mean that Ukrainians were supporting the regime. Rather, he argued that society had not yet recovered from the failure of the Orange Revolution, adding that "too many disappointments and a too low level of trust in opposition leaders" were hurting citizen activism[249]. At the very least, the Revolution did not provoke significant cultural change regarding political activism and street protests.

The Fate of the SMOs

Regarding the fate of the major SMOs that participated in the Orange movement, we need to distinguish between those that predated the protests and the ones that were created for or just after the movement. Did preexisting SMOs benefit from the mobilization experience, attracting more activists and becoming more consolidated? Are the new ones still alive and active? Most of the long-standing and formal SMOs, such as the KIU, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, or the Razumkov Centre continued their operation in the wake of the Revolution. But despite being quite well-known in the international and local NGO communities, they did not play a greater role in Ukrainian public life post-Orange Revolution, either in terms of being treated more as partners by the regime or by enhancing their societal constituencies.

As was shown in Chapter 4, after the Orange Revolution relations between SMOs and the state remained mostly unstable and based on individual personalities. Cooptation processes also deprived many of the preexisting SMOs of their main leaders, with for example the Razumkov

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[248] My translation: "razocharovanie, poteriu interesa k politike i razocharovanie v politikakh, posle togo, kak "pomaranchevaia' revoliutsiia ne opravdala obshchestvennykh nadezhd". Bol'shinstvo predstavitelei obshchestvennykh organizatsii schitaet, chto molodezh' v Ukraine sposobna k proiavleniiu protesta - opros. (2010, October 4). *Unian,*
[249] My translation: "Slishkom veliko razocharovanie, slishkom nizkii uroven' doveriia k lideram oppozitsii'"ю Derkach, A. (2011, May 23). Ukrainskoe boloto. *Ekonomicheskie Izvestiia*.

Centre's Director, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, becoming Defense Minister under Yushchenko. Likewise, popular support for civil society did not significantly improve and Orange SMOs did not gain increased trust from the Ukrainian population. Of the 32 percent of Ukrainians somewhat or fully trusting them in 2003, this percentage decreased yearly after the Orange Revolution and reached a low of 21.5 percent in 2008[250].

Other SMOs such as PORA, Znayu!, and Chista Ukraïna had been created especially for monitoring the 2004 presidential elections (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, pp. 130-131). While Chapter 4 discussed in length the unsuccessful attempt of Yellow PORA to transform into a formal political party after the Orange Revolution, the fates of Znayu! and Chista Ukraïna are also telling. Created in September 2004[251], Chista Ukraïna announced in January 2005 its intention to transform into a political movement but its activism and societal attention faded quickly. Similarly, although Znayu! developed networks of activists in different regions for the Orange Revolution (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, p. 131), after working with PORA and other SMOs to monitor the 2006 parliamentary elections Znayu! appeared to vanish from the Ukrainian public scene[252]. Another SMO formed during the Orange Revolution, Alliance Maidan, lasted a little longer but never became an established SMO with important resonance. After having organized a few protest actions in 2005[253], the group seems now to have disappeared from societal activism[254].

Created by the protesters who refused to leave the Maidan after Yushchenko's victory, the Coalition of the Participants of the Orange Revolution (KUOR) has concentrated its actions mainly around the anniversaries of the Orange Revolution. The group seemed to renew its

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[250] Razumkov Centre. (2013). Chi doviriaєte Vi gromads'kim organizatsiiam? (dinamika, 2001-2013) [Press release]. Retrieved from http://old.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=81 This also corresponds with Stewart (2009).

[251] Chistaia Ukraina zaiavliaet o bezosnovatel'nykh arestakh ego aktivistov organami pravoporiadka (2004, September 7). *Unian*.

[252] Obshchestvennye organizatsii ob"iavili o nachale kampanii po vyiavleniuu politicheskikh prostitutok v spiskakh na vybory-2006 (2004, September 12). *Unian;* Kerpel', A. (2006, February 17). 5 obnarodovat' izbiratel'nye spiski kandidatov v deputaty raznykh urovnei, informatsiiu o nikh i ikh partiiakh i blokakh obeshchaet grazhdanskaia initsiativa "Znaiu!" *Ukrainskoe natsional'noe informatsionnoe agentstvo*.

[253] Al'ians "Maidan" podal isk o nepravomesnoti deistvii Yushchenko, podpisavshego zakon o neprikosnovennosti deputatov mestnykh sovetov (2005, November 29). *Unian*.

[254] Ivanenchuk, N. i. (2005, November 20). 7 partii i organizatsii podali zaiavki v Kievgoradministratsiiu na aktsii v tsentre Kieva 22 noiabria. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

activism with Yanukovich's return to power in 2010, with its protest actions increasing from late 2010 and early 2011 onward to denounce the regime. Consequently, this SMO became the target of repression, although this repression did not deter its leaders from organizing. KUOR's impact on Ukrainian civil society remains controversial, however, as the group has often associated itself with nationalist or right-wing organizations[255]. While the SMO claimed at its creation in 2005 that more than 500 activists had signed up, its social media presence indicates that its basis for support has not greatly expanded beyond a small group of protesters[256].

OPORA, the civic network founded by members of the Black PORA wing, stands out compared to the above-mentioned SMOs. Instead of declining, OPORA's civic activism slowly but steadily grew over time and the group is now well established in Ukrainian society, enjoying fairly stable societal support[257]. One of its main leaders, Ol'ga Aivazovskaia, was recently named as one of the most successful women in Ukraine in the societal sphere[258]. OPORA, which focuses on elections, higher education, and communal housing, has remained fairly nonpartisan, although it does have Western links and funding. But despite its success, OPORA has limited societal recognition, even after almost 12 years of activity[259]. Working closely with the KIU, to the point of sometimes duplicating its functions[260], OPORA's work did bear fruit in terms of new organizational resources, especially in the Western and Central regions of Ukraine. However, OPORA's fate is more the exception rather than the rule.

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[255] See for example, Bedenok, M. (2011, November 7). Aktivisty "Svobody" i "Koalitsii uchastnikov oranzhevoi revoliutsii" sozhgli flag KPU na Maidane Nezalezhnosti v Kieve. *Ukraïns'ki Novini;* Riabov, M. (2012, June 12). Ukrainskie natsionalisty proveli aktsiiu protiv Lukashenko u posol'stva Belorussii v Kieve. *Novyi Region*; Bespiatov, T. (2012, June 28). "Koalitsiia uchastnikov oranzhevoi revoliutsii" zaiavliaet o zaderzhanii militsiei svoikh lidera i aktivistki vo vremia aktsii u Administratsii. *Ukraïns'ki Novini*.

[256] While the KUOR is quite active on social media, it has now about 900 likes on FB and its FB group includes a little more than 300 members (out of which only 5 members joined in 2017). See Facebook. VGO "Koalitsiia Uchasnikiv Pomaranchevoï Revoliutsiï". Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/vgo.kupr/?pnref=lhc; Facebook. Koalitsiia Uchasnikiv Pomaranchevoï Revoliutsiï (KUPR). Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/groups/kupr.org/. The group has no Twitter account but its leader, Sergiy Mel'nichenko, has about 70 followers on Twitter and a little more than 2000 followers on FB. See Facebook. Sergii Mel'nichenko. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/kupr.melnychenko; Twitter. Sergii Mel'nichenko. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/MelnychenkoKUPR

[257] OPORA has now about 13,000 likes on FB and 10,500 followers on Twitter. See Twitter. Civil Network OPORA. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/opora; Facebook. Hromadians'ka merezha OPORA. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/pg/cn.opora/about/?ref=page_internal

[258] Ob"iavleny 100 samykh uspeshnykh ukrainok - Telekanal novostei 24. (2017, March 2). *TV News Channel 24*.

[259] Tregubov, V. (2012, May 11). Nervnaia sistema obshchestva. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.

[260] Tregubov, V. (2012, May 11). Nervnaia sistema obshchestva. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.

Having said that, the Orange Revolution surely represented a critical event in the lives of some activists, meaning that the Revolution probably had spillover effects in terms of leadership capacity (Meyer & Whittier 1994). Many former Orange leaders formed new SMOs, especially after Yanukovich's 2010 return to power. For example, Olexandr Solontai, from Chista Ukraïna, is a leader of the "Youth Guard" (Molodizhna varta, NKGK)[261]. Former Black PORA leader Mikhail Svistovich was a leader of the Tax Maidan and belongs to Vidsich, another SMO formed in 2010. Another important leader of the Tax Maidan, Oleksandr Danyliuk, traced his activism back to the Orange Revolution, in which he was a lawyer for Znayu![262]. Danyliuk then became the leader of Common Cause (Spilna Sprava), a group that quickly radicalized during the Euromaidan.

On balance, the fate of many Orange SMOs is rather negative. Preexisting groups did not generally become more embedded in Ukrainian civil society after the Revolution, and most of the groups formed during and immediately after the Revolution did not last long. Moreover, with the OPORA exception, much of the remaining Orange activism evolved toward radicalization. Remarking on the growing activism after 2010, Kirichenko from Dzerkalo Tyzhnia ironically summarized the situation:

> It turns out that we do have societal organizations. The fact that they could not *not* exist, we had always suspected, as well as suspected that during the "inter-Maidan" period they were not very interested in the population or in journalists. There is little money, the powers-that-be do not pay attention to them and test their patience with run-around replies, the population is passive and does not want to unite - these are the main difficulties faced by representatives of non-state organizations and movements[263].

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[261] See http://mvarta.org.ua/ and Facebook. Molodizhna varta Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/mvarta/
[262] A New Generation Emerges on National Stage. (2010, November 25). *Kyiv Post*.
[263] My translation: "Okazyvaetsia, obshchestvennye organizatsii u nas est'. To, chto ikh ne mozhet ne byt', my podozrevali vsegda, kak i to, chto v 'mezhdumaidannoe' vremia imi ne ochen'-to interesuetsia naselenie vkupe s zhurnalistami. Denezhnykh sredstv malo, vlast' ne obrashchaet vnimaniia, treniruia terpenie obshchestvennikov otpiskami, naselenie passivno i ne zhelaet ob"ediniat'sia — vot osnovnye trudnosti, s kotorymi stalkivaiutsia predstaviteli negosudarstvennykh organizatsii i dvizhenii. Kirichenko, I. (2011, September 2). Gorizontal'nye sviazi punktirom: obshchestvennye organizatsii v Ukraine. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.

In addition to summarizing the main challenges faced by SMOs after the Orange Revolution, Kirichenko's quote highlights the fact that these groups did not become major actors more embedded in Ukrainian society after the Revolution.

SMOs – Cooperation or Competition?

In this inter-Maidan period, SMOs have occasionally cooperated. But again, the point is to assess whether or not the particular ties forged during the Orange Revolution were sustained in the aftermath. On this specific question, chapter 4 indicated that there was a considerable slowdown in the development of cooperation between SMOs, both because of the degenerating political climate and because of the dual demobilization processes of failed institutionalization and limited radicalization. As Puglisi (2015) argues, "Past the revolutionary phase and following the inception of the Yushchenko presidency ... society retreated from the political arena; spontaneous networks gradually dissolved and structured non-governmental organisations returned to their splendid isolation" (p. 6).

In 2011, the Democratic Initiatives Foundations conducted a study probing leaders of 34 SMOs about the weakness of the third sector. After noting the indifference of the state, media, and public toward SMOs, one-fifth of those leaders noted that it would be desirable to develop efficient cooperation between SMOs in order to solve common problems, to which Kirichenko added that "it would be important and *new* for our societal practices"[264]. Along the same lines, the Director of the Democratic Initiatives Foundations, Irina Bekeshkina, argued that "Civil society is based on a quality like solidarity. In this sense, horizontal connections are developed here in Ukraine at such a micro-local level, as with family, friends, and at best, colleagues at work. But societal interests, unfortunately, do not connect people very much"[265].

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[264] My translation: "…eto vazhno i bylo by novo dlia nashikh sovremennykh obshchestvennykh praktik". Emphasis added. Kirichenko, I. (2011, September 2).

[265] My translation: "Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo baziruetsia na takom kachestve, kak solidarnost'. V etom smysle gorizontal'nye sviazi razvity u nas na takom uzkolokal'nom urovne, kak sem'ia, druz'ia, v luchshem sluchae kollegi po rabote. Bolee obshchie interesy, k sozhaleniiu, liudei sviazyvaiut malo". Kirichenko, I. (2011, September 2).

Cooperation among SMOs did begin to increase again around the 2010 presidential elections that saw Yanukovich's return to power. For example, on the eve of the elections, about 50 SMOs created the Civic Campaign (Novii Hromadianin) that aimed to strengthen the coordination of public initiatives and foster the influence of citizens in the social and political processes of Ukraine[266]. In turn, a group of activists from the Civic Campaign, along with journalists, political scientists, and other civil society leaders, created the movement Chesno ('Fairly') in the fall of 2011. Chesno launched the campaign "Filter the Duma" (Filtryi Dumu), which concentrated on monitoring the 2012 parliamentary elections[267]. About 150 Ukrainian SMOs participated in this campaign, which was also acclaimed by international observers[268]. Since then, the movement Chesno has organized several other campaigns focusing on elections and seemed to be now well established in Ukrainian society[269].

In addition to these more formal SMO associations, other bottom-up movements were taking root. As Lutsevych (2013) stresses, "In 2010 and 2011 Ukraine witnessed an awakening of civil movements that had seemed dormant since the Orange Revolution" (p. 13). After the Tax Maidan protests, the Assembly of Small and Medium Level Business Civic Organizations organized the campaign Auto Maidan, in which societal groups such as pensioners, teachers, and doctors denounced what they called economic repression and anti-popular reforms[270]. Not satisfied with the regime's lack of reaction, activists launched a social campaign called "Forward!" (Vpered!) in which more than 100 SMOs from all Ukrainian regions participated [271], and which later turned into a civic movement. Noting that they evolved from the Tax Maidan in only a year, one of the co-chairs of the organization stressed that, "We have learned to not only formulate but also defend a unified position on key and vitally important issues for each of us.

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[266] Facebook. New Citizen Public Campaign | Hromads'ka kampaniia Novii Hromadianin. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/pg/newcitizen/about/?ref=page_internal
[267] Tregubov, V. (2012, May 11). Nervnaia sistema obshchestva. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*. See http://www.chesno.org/
[268] Sych, V. (2012, November 29). Mezhdunarodnye eksperty konstatirovali uspekh obshchestvennoi kampanii "Fil'trui Radu!". *Ukrainskoe natsional'noe informatsionnoe agentstvo*.
[269] Chesno has now more than 50,000 likes and followers on Facebook and Twitter. See Facebook. Hromads'kii rukh "Chesno" | Civic movement "Chesno". Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/pg/chesno.movement/likes/?ref=page_internal and Twitter. Chesno. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/chesno_movement
[270] Uchastniki AvtoMaidana trebuiut ot vlasti priniat' "Narodnuiu reformu', razrabotannuiu predprinimateliami. (2011, March 25). *Unian*.
[271] Nalogovyi maidan i Avtomaidan gotoviat sovmestnuiu aktsiiu protesta. (2011, April 6). *Ukrainskii biznes portal*; Bukin, S. (2011, April 8). "Vpered' - protiv bespredela. *Pravda Ukraina*

We created an effective organizational structure. Today the authorities ignore our demands. Therefore, we must force the authorities to listen to us ... or replace them"[272]. By this time, the movement was already associated closely with formal actors, in particular with the Rada deputy Natalia Korolevska from the Tymoshenko's political Bloc "Biut-Bat'kishchina", who later transformed the movement into a political party. Unfortunately, the poor results that the party got in the 2012 parliamentary elections proved once again that the decision to closely associate SMOs with formal actors or to transform social groups into political parties might be risky for civil society in non-democratic regimes as it might result in their marginalization[273].

In sum, as was true for the support for political protests and for the fate of SMOs, the turning point in SMO cooperation was not the experience of the Orange Revolution, but Yanukovich's return in 2010 and his reintroduction of repressive policies. Ironically, it is this repression that seemed to motivate people to finally overcome their disappointments regarding the Orange Revolution and remobilize in the streets.

And now the Euromaidan…

The protest events now referred as the "Euromaidan" had their own trigger and underlying causes. Their evolution was also very different from previous mass events in Ukraine inasmuch as they quickly turned violent. Without claiming that the Orange Revolution's limited impact on civil society explains why the Euromaidan turned violent, I argue that these consequences do help explain the unexpected speed with which radicalization occurred.

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[272] My translation: "My nauchilis' ne tol'ko formulirovat', no i otstaivat' edinuiu pozitsiiu po kliuchevym, zhiznenno vazhnym dlia kazhdogo iz nas voprosami. Sozdali deistvennuiu organizatsionnuiu strukturu. Segodnia vlast' ignoriruet nashi trebovaniia. Sledovatel'no, my dolzhny vynudit' vlast' prislushivat'sia k nam..., ili izmenit' vlast". V Ukraine sozdano VOO "Grazhdanskoe dvizhenie "Vpered!'. (2011, November 22). *Unian*.

[273] After a split in 2012 between Tymoshenko's Bloc and Korolevska's Ukrainian Social Democratic Party, Korolevska got excluded from the latter and renamed her party, the Party of Natalia Korolevskaia "Ukraine – Forward!" (Partiia Natalii Korolevs'koi 'Ukraïna – Vpered!'). The Party Ukraine – Forward! participated in the 2012 parliamentary elections, claiming to represent the interests of small and medium businesses. However, the party received only 1.58 percent of the vote. See Grytsenko, O. (2012, August 2). Korolevska recruits acting, sports stars for campaign. *Kyiv Post*; Central Election Commission of Ukraine. Retrieved from http://www.cvk.gov.ua/info/zbvo_2012.pdf

The protests were initially organized by a small group of students (about 1500 participants) under pro-European slogans[274]. As Onuch and Sasse (2016) explain, coordination problems emerged rapidly at the beginning of Euromaidan. SMOs and experienced activists seemed to be caught by surprise, as they were now focusing on monitoring elections and preparing for the next electoral cycle. The authors do contend that past mobilization experiences and preexisting networks made a difference in the earliest days of protests, as well-known activists were some of the first to show up. It must be stressed, however, that many of these early protesters were in fact students, too young to have participated in the Orange Revolution (Lyubashenko 2014, p. 66). Moreover, according to the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, the overwhelming majority of protesters in the initial phase of the Euromaidan (about 92 percent) were not members of any political or civic association and the vast majority said they joined the protests of their own volition[275].

Political leaders rapidly tried to take advantage of the protests, especially the troika of Vitaliy Klitschko, Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Oleh Tiahnybok[276], but they quickly realized that they could not control the crowd (Lyubashenko 2014). In fact, their involvement seemed to create even more division and uncertainty within the movement, as many actors (political parties and SMOs) were diffusing individual calls for protests on their own social media channel, sending thus confusing signals (Onuch & Sasse 2016, p. 566). SMOs also rejected political parties' attempts to monopolize the mobilizations or to create a broader alliance (Khmelko and Pereguda 2014, p. 232). Onuch and Sasse (2016) argue that "parties wanted to compete for the role of the next 'hero' of the revolution, or the next 'saviour', thereby demonstrating that they had 'not learned from Yushchenko's mistakes'" (p. 566). In this competitive atmosphere, many observers stressed

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[274] Na Maidan priishlo bliz'ko 1500 oburenikh zupinkoiu evrointegratsiï. (2013, November 22). *Ukraïns'ka pravda*.
[275] Il'ko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation. (2014). Maidan-December and Maidan-February: What Has Changed [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.old.dif.org.ua/en/publications/press-relizy/vid-mchi-sho-zminilos.htm
[276] These three figures were the key opposition leaders during the Euromaidan. Vitaliy Klitshko is a former champion boxer who got involved in politics in the mid-2000s and got elected in the Rada in 2012. Announcing that he would run in the 2015 presidential elections (planned before the Euromaidan), he then withdrew his candidacy to support Petro Poroshenko during the presidential elections in May 2014. Since 2014, he serves as the mayor of Kiv. Arseniy Yatsenyuk is an economist and lawyer who served important positions under Yushchenko. During the Euromaidan, he was one of the central leaders of Tymoshenko's political party, Batkivshchyna. He served as the Ukrainian Prime Minister from the Yanukovich's downfall in February 2014 to April 2016. Having served as a Rada deputy multiple times in the 2000s, Oleh Tiahnybok is the leader of the fair-right nationalist party, Svoboda.

that both the political opposition and the SMO leaders often appeared "out of touch" with the crowd. They were unable to successfully frame underlying grievances or to capitalize of the broader societal discontent with the regime. Instead they kept a narrow focus on the EU Association Agreement, which limited public participation (Onuch and Sasse 2016, p. 567). By late November the protests appeared to be dying out, with only a few hundred people remaining on the Maidan. Activists even announced on November 29 that their final action would be held on December 1[277]. Of course, this is not what happened.

What fueled the mobilization first and foremost were the mistakes made by the Yanukovich regime, which violently repressed protesters on the night of 29 to 30 November. This sudden repression turned the protests into ones about injustice and civil rights rather than just the EU Association Agreement. From that point on, the number of participants on the Maidan began to significantly increase. Survey data from December 10 showed that about 70 percent of the protesters said they joined because of the violence used against the protesters and only 5 percent because they responded to the call to come out made by the political opposition[278]. However, this new opportunity for enhancing the societal basis of the protests was once again missed by both the SMOs and the political opposition because of their inability to coordinate effectively and because of their internal struggles. According to Onuch and Sasse (2016), this failure "made it possible for radical voices to gain in strength and created the space for further regime repression" (p. 574). As the section above shows, radicalization trends in many SMOs in the inter-Maidan period contributed to these uncompromising attitudes. The SMO Spilna Sprava, created during the Tax Maidan, is a prime example of such radicalization; it became quickly associated with right-wing groups such as Right Sector (Pravyi Sector) during the Euromaidan. Although new and more moderate SMOs, such as EuromaidanSOS and Civic Sector, were also created, overall it led to more competition than moderation within the movement. Irina Bekeshkina, for example, stressed that there were already "too many leaders, each of whom wants to be number one"[279].

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[277] Evromaidan: Aktivisty planiruiut final'nuiu aktsiiu na 1 dekabria. (2013, November 29). *RBC-Ukraïna*; V Kieve prezentovana suvenirnaia moneta 'Pomorancheva Revoliutsiia 'TAK' (2004, December 28). *Unian*.
[278] 70% uchastnikov aktsii protesta vyshli na Maidan iz-za zhestokogo izbieniia uchastnikov Evromaidana – opros. (2013, December 10). *Unian*.
[279] My translation: "…tam slishkom mnogo liderov, kazhdyi iz kotorykh zakhochet byt' pervym". Kirichenko, I. (2014, January 31). Evromaidan: "nesshivaemyi" raskol mezhdu vlast'iu i obshchestvom. *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*.

Although many authors underlined the broader geographical diffusion of the Euromaidan protests than those of the Orange Revolution, the polarization in popular support for both Maidans was quite similar. As chapter 3 showed, about 45 percent of Ukrainians supported the Orange Revolution against about 40 percent who did not. A survey conducted in December 2013 showed that, while 49 percent of Ukrainians supported the Euromaidan, about 45 percent were against it. Even more regional divisions could be observed in 2013-14 as compared to 2004-05, with 84 percent of the population in western Ukraine favorably viewing the Euromaidan protests against 81 percent of the Eastern population who did not (compared to 86 percent vs. 61 percent in 2004-05)[280]. As a result, the polarization during and after the Orange Revolution did not seem to lessen in the interval of the two Maidans.

The legacy of the Orange Revolution, and in particular the disappointing post-Revolution political developments after the euphoria of initial victory, thus left different kinds of consequences for different groups of actors. The political opposition appeared to have learned little and tried to replicate the Orange experience with top-down protests and polarized debate. For their part, SMOs were no longer interested in partnership with the political opposition but were also unable to control the crowd due to their own internal problems and often-competitive attitudes. This disconnect between SMO leaders and Euromaidan protesters is another indicator of how little embeddeness and acceptance SMOs gained after the Orange Revolution. In turn, ordinary citizens proved suspicious of both groups of actors and, as the regime increasingly repressed protesters, began to self-organize and used more direct actions, such as blocking roads, occupying official institutions, and building barricades, all of which quickly led to more violent acts. The majority of Ukrainians did not support these radical actions, favoring compromise even during the repression and violence[281]. Consequently, the Euromaidan's evolution confirms that the Orange Revolution did not produce significant cultural changes regarding how Ukrainians

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[280] Bol'shinstvo podderzhivaet Maidan, no ne verit v sposobnost' oppozitsii upravliat' stranoi — sotsopro. (2013, December 10). *Delo*; Pochti odinakovoe kolichestvo ukraintsev podderzhivaet i ne podderzhivaet protesty - issledovanie "Nastroeniia Ukrainy". (2014, February 7). *Ukrainskoe natsional'noe informatsionnoe agentstvo*.
[281] In January 2014, about 70 percent of respondents (and this figure was about the same in all regions) supported negotiations between the protesters and the authorities. In February 2014, according to another survey, about 63 percent of the respondents favored negotiations and dialogues between the regime and the protesters. Kirichenko, I. (2014, January 31); Pochti odinakovoe kolichestvo ukraintsev podderzhivaet i ne podderzhivaet protesty - issledovanie "Nastroeniia Ukrainy" (2014, February 7).

relate to protest activities, nor did it leave important organizational resources that could work to lessen the political polarization of the country.

Russia: Five Years After Bolotnaia

Support for Political Activism and Protest Activities

As discussed in the previous chapter, initial expectations about the FFE movement's legacies were high as this mobilization episode was often viewed as representing a political and national culmination of previous local and socioeconomic struggles (Gudkov 2012, Aron 2013, Lankina 2015). As Tomila Lankina (2015) writes,

> The over-time trend of the politicization of Russia's electorate should therefore be explored both with reference to the acquisition of a skill set and tool kit for effective protest activism acquired through regular engagement in localized, *a-political* contentious acts; and the openings at regional and national levels that facilitated the transmutation of citizen activism into protests concerned with wider, systemic *political* issues and those that target national and not just local authorities. It is the combination of these factors that contributed to the dramatic anti-regime protests in December 2011 and March 2012 (p. 40).

This passage illustrates the teleological vision that is often associated with protest activities. Although this vision probably depicts important developments that *may* occur in a mobilization period, we cannot necessarily assume that they will continue during and after a movement's demobilization. A look at current Russian activism seems to indicate that, just like in Ukraine, the links between political and socioeconomic protests are tenuous at best and that the FFE movement did not contribute towards bridging them.

Indeed, five years after FFE, the potential for politically oriented street activism remained quite limited in Russia. Just before the 2016 parliamentary elections, the Levada Center found that only 15 percent of the Russian population thought that election-related political protests might take place (compared with 33 percent in March 2012) and only 10 percent of respondents said

they would join such protests if they occurred (compared with 14 percent in February 2012)[282]. To be sure, having 10 percent of respondents ready to protest could be viewed as a fairly significant reserve, as it would mean about 14 million people in the streets (see also TsEPR 2016a). Yet the majority of this reserve did not seem ready to accept the leadership of the non-systematic opposition. Despite being relatively well known to the public, most non-systemic opposition figures attracted confidence from only about 1 percent of respondents, with Aleksei Naval'ny and Grigori Yavlinsky the least unpopular at 4 percent and 3 percent of respondents respectively[283]. According to Aleksei Grazhdankin from the Levada Center, "people will be ready to go to protest activities, but either with the Communists or other forces, not with the non-systemic opposition"[284].

The March and June 2017 anti-corruption protest waves seem to represent a change, although it is still early to say how these protests will evolve further. This is especially true if we examine other protest activities that took place over the past five years. The Center for Social and Labor Rights indicated that the number of labor-related protests have doubled since 2008 (Bisiukov 2016; see also TsEPR 2016b). Well-organized protest campaigns have included the Anti-Nickel movement (2012), the doctor strikes (2014), the long-distance truck driver protests (2015-17), the anti-paid parking protests (2015-17), and more recently the anti-demolition protests (2017). This indicates that Russian society is far from apathetic.

However, what is striking about most post-FFE protest campaigns is how quickly their organizers distanced themselves from FFE-affiliated organizations and political goals. For example, Andrei Konoval, one of the trade union leaders who organized the doctor protests, underlined that although political parties such as the KPRF, PARNAS, and Yabloko were visible during their first event, "In the second action, parties were not involved, not even for technical details. The only organizations that were behind the actions were *Together for decent healthcare*

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[282] Levada Center. (2016). Protestnyi potentsial [Press release]. Retrieved from
http://www.levada.ru/2016/09/16/protestnyj-potentsial-4/
[283] Levada Center. (2016). Oppozitsiia: neobkhodimost', uznavaemost' i doverie [Press release]. Retrieved from
http://www.levada.ru/2016/03/14/oppozitsiya-neobhodimost-uznavaemost-i-doverie/print/
[284] My translation: "Liudi gotovy budut vyiti na protestnye aktsii, no libo s kommunistami, libo s inymi silami, no ne s vnesistemnoi oppozitsiei". Mukhametshina, E. (2016, March 13). Mikhail Khodorkovskii stal samym izvestnym vnesistemnym oppozitsionerom. *Vedomosti*.

(Vmeste za dostoinuiu meditsinu), *KTR*, and *Action* (Deistvie). And I think we managed to remove any politicization"[285]. As *Novaia gazeta*'s editor noted about the long-haul truck driver protests, "democratic parties, such as PARNAS and Yabloko, tried to enter in dialogue with the truckers, but the truckers' attitudes towards them is cautious - there is no mutual trust, it is another electorate"[286].

In contrast to the FFE movement, these protest campaigns did not reject the regime or make primarily political demands; instead, they denounced specific socioeconomic policies and appealed to the authorities (and often to Putin directly) to solve their problems[287]. As Crowley and Olimpieva observed about the trucker protests,

> Rather than denouncing Putin, most truckers appealed to him. 'President, help us!' was one of the most prominent slogans. Some of the opposition groups that had been behind the 2011/2012 protests — both on the left and the right — tried to unite with the truckers, in order to combine economic with political demands to bring about substantial change in Russia. But the truckers would have none of it[288].

Even when some socioeconomic protestors became frustrated with the regime's indifference, they still presented themselves as distinct from the FFE movement and its supporters. As a North Caucasian trucker stated, "We are not like those white-ribboned dreamers in 2011. We have crowbars, and we won't hesitate to use them when we are pushed to the wall"[289].

Moreover, according to Denis Volkov of the Levada Center, all these recent movements "do not add up to an overall protest movement. Most of the protesters deliberately emphasize the non-political nature of their performances. Often, the protesters themselves are not ready to look for

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[285] My translation: "Ko vtoroi aktsii partii uzhe ne privlekalis', dazhe k tekhnicheskim detaliam. Organizatsiei zanimalis' tol'ko 'Vmeste za dostoinuiu meditsinu', KTR i 'Deistvie'. I ia schitaiu, chto nam udalos' ubrat' politizirovannost'. Nedovol'nye mediki Moskvy: sotsial'nye aktivisty ili oppozitsionery. (2015, March 23). *IA Regnum*.

[286] My translation: "V peregovory s dal'noboishchikamipytalis' vstupit' demokraticheskie partii, v tom chisle PARNAS i "Iabloko", no k nim otnoshenie u liudei za rulem nastorozhennoe - net vzaimnogo doveriia, chuzhoi elektorat". Martynov, K. (2015, December 2). Dal'noboishchiki i poputchiki, ili spoilery protesta. *Novaia gazeta*.

[287] Kolesnikov, A. (2016, January 22). Russia's Waiting Room. *Carnegie Moscow Center*; Eismont, M. (2014, November 10). Pochemu vrachi vyshli na polshchad. *Novoe vremiia*.

[288] Crowley, S., & Olimpieva, I. (2016, February 10). Is Putin About to Face a 'Colored Revolution'? *Monkey Cage*.

[289] Kolotilov, V. (2015, December 3). Truck Protests Signal New Kind of Social Activism. *The Moscow Times*.

allies, claiming the exclusivity of their situation"[290]. On March 27, 2017, a day after thousands of people responded to Navalny's call to take to the street and denounce corruption, the long-haul truckers began a general strike throughout Russia that lasted more than three months. Yet, despite being very close in time, these two protest waves evolved in parallel, with minimal contact between each other. Truckers again emphasized their willingness to engage in dialogue with the regime[291].

In mid-May, a massive Moscow rally denounced the regime's plan to demolish housing buildings known as Khrushchevki. More than twenty thousand people joined the rally, making it one of the most important protest events held in Moscow in 2017. While this rally too had a self-declared apolitical nature, it is even more striking that a controversy quickly arose between the organizers of the event and non-systemic opposition figures. When Navalny approached the rally stage despite not being officially invited, he was immediately intercepted by the police. Rather than denouncing the police's actions, the rally organizers complained about Navalny, arguing that his presence had ruined the event[292].

Consequently, while the current activism deserves our attention, the FFE movement did not cause it; in fact, it has little if any direct link to the FFE movement at all. The recent anti-corruption protests initiated by Naval'ny (which in March brought about 60,000 people to the streets throughout Russia) represented a partial exception, although even in this case the crowd was mainly composed of first-time protesters[293]. The writer Elizaveta Aleksandrova-Zorina explained that former FFE participants were largely absent from these new protests, saying that many of them, "have left Russia in the past five years or have ceased to be interested in politics. It happened to all my friends who were with me on Bolotnaia and Sakharov. They are still

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[290] My translation: "No vse eti mitingi ne skladyvaiutsia v obshchee protestnoe dvizhenie. Bol'shinstvo protestuiushchikh namerenno podcherkivaet nepoliticheskii kharakter svoikh vystuplenii. Zachastuiu mitinguiushchie sami ne gotovy iskat' soiuznikov, zaiavliaia ob iskliuchitel'nosti svoei situatsii". Volkov, D. (2016, February 18). Krizis v umakh: stoit li zhdat' massovykh protestov. *Forbes*.
[291] Polukhin, A., & Kobylkina, D. (2017, April 8). Protest na prikole. *Novaia gazeta*.
[292] Ponomareva, A. (2017, May 15). Poka ne poiavilsia Navalny. *Radio Svoboda*.
[293] Sulim, S. (2017, March 27). "Mne by sovest' ne pozvolila ostat'sia doma'. Rossiiskie shkol'niki rasskazali "Meduze', pochemu oni poshli na ulichnye aktsii. *Meduzza*. Retrieved from https://meduza.io/feature/2017/03/27/mne-by-sovest-ne-pozvolila-ostatsya-doma; Kosacheva, T. (2017, March 28). Molodezhnyi sotsprotest. *Kommersant*.

depressed by what is happening in the country, but they no longer believe they can change anything"[294].

Thus, while localized and apolitical protests might turn into broader political movements, the demobilization of these broader political movements will not necessarily translate into more localized protests and enduring activism. In a nutshell, just like for the Ukrainian case, the FFE movement did not seem to provoke a cultural change in the way Russians relate to political activism.

The Fate of the SMOs

Many of the preexisting groups that participated in the FFE movement were already well known in non-systemic opposition circles and boasted small groups of supporters. For example, the leftist groups "Levyi front", "ROT-Front", and the liberal organization "Solidarnost'" all actively participated in the movement and continued to exist in its aftermath, along with the Republican Party RPR-PARNAS. However, the mass protest episode did not have the invigorating impact that one might have expected. For example, Solidarnost' was largely sidelined after the movement because its leaders Boris Nemtsov, Il'ia Yashin, and Sergei Davidis were busy forming new groups and political parties[295]. Solidarnost' activists also explained a split between the St. Petersburg branch and the federal centre along these lines: "We should understand that 'Solidarnost' went through a protracted crisis, during which many active and reasonable people found themselves in the use of other organizations" [296].

The Levyi Front, in turn, had to cope with greater repression from the regime; Udal'tsov, was repeatedly harassed and eventually sentenced to 4.5 years of prison for mass disorder related to

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[294] My translation: "uekhali iz Rossii ili perestali interesovat'sia politikoi. Tak sluchilos' so vsemi moimi druz'iami, byvshimi so mnoi na Bolotnoi i Sakharova. Oni po-prezhnemu udrucheny proiskhodiashchim v strane, no oni uzhe ne veriat, chto v ikh silakh chto-to izmenit'."Aleksandrova-Zorina, E. (2017, March 28). Bez mitinga vinovatye. *Moskovskii Komsomolets*.
[295] Litoi, A. (2013, January 18). Oppozitsiia pytaetsia sokhranit' brend "Solidarnost". *RBC Daily*.
[296] My translation: "Nuzhno ponimat', chto "Solidarnost'" proshla cherez zatiazhnoi krizis, v khode kotorogo mnogie adekvatnye i aktivnye liudi nashli sebe primenenie v drugikh organizatsiiakh". Ignatenko, A. (2016, April 27). V Peterburge dve "Solidarnosti" – kakaia nastoiashchaia? *Zaks.ru*.

the Bolotnoe case[297]. But as explained in chapter 6, this repression initially seemed to further the commitment of activists rather than discourage it. However, internal conflicts were frequent, in particular on the questions of expanding FFE demands to socioeconomic issues. In late 2012, Boris Kagarlitsky, a respected activist in leftist circles, argued that because its members were deeply dissatisfied by their participation in the FFE movement, the Levyi Front might even dissolve, especially if the state's repression of the SMO *declined*: "If the pressure subsides, heated discussions in the 'front' will resume"[298]. While this diminished pressure never came to pass, Levyi Front was still torn by discord and was later deserted by many of its activists[299].

And what of the new SMOs? Some of the most famous, such as the Coordinating Council of the Opposition (KSO), quickly vanished or, as with the League of Voters (Liga izbiratelei), only remained active on social media. The League of Voters, abandoned by many of its prominent cultural leaders after the movement, had to cope with resource scarcity and minimize its activities[300], although a few regional branches did remain active, such as in Rostov. Moreover, a scandal arose in the fall of 2012 when Nikolai Beliaev, the coordinator of the League of Voters and founder of the group Resistance (Soprotivlenie, a SMO created in the midst of the movement) [301], absconded with the League's money, raised through public donations[302]. Although this scandal cannot be attributed to the FFE movement itself, it tainted the reputation of its SMOs and demoralized activists. Reflecting on the FFE movement's fate two years later, Boris Akunin, one of the founders of the League of Voters, did not hide his dashed hopes regarding the League, already a distant memory for him[303]. Although social media seem to act as abeyance tools for

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[297] Udal'tsov i Razvozzhaev prigovoreny k 4,5 godam lisheniia svobody kazhdyi za organizatsiiu massovykh besporiadkov - sud. (2014, July 24). *ITAR-TASS*.

[298] Litoi, A. (2012, November 28). Oboshlos' bez ekstremizma. *RBC Daily*.

[299] See for example Facebook. Vladislav Ryazantsev (2016, June 11). Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=963740760413370&set=a.232366363550817.49786.100003323665567&type=3&theater; Live Journal. Andrey-lf (2016, September 26). Retrieved from http://andrey-lf.livejournal.com/57657.html

[300] Ol'shanskii, K. (2012, October 3). "Golos" i "Liga izbiratelei" ne budut sledit' za vyborami v Stavropol'skom krae. *Kavkaskii uzel*.

[301] Filimonov, K. (2012, March 30). Kogo razbudila Bolotnaia. Gruppa "Soprotivlenie". *Radio Svoboda*. Retrieved from http://www.svoboda.org/a/24531604.html

[302] Rodionova, A. (2012, October 11). Pokusivshegosia na den'gi oppozitsii sniali s vyborov. *Moskovskii Komsomolets* ; "Liga izbiratelei" lishila polnomochii svoego koordinatora Nikolaia Beliaeva. (2012, October 22). *ITAR-TASS*.

[303] Skvortsova, E. (2014, September 10). Boris Akunin: Bol'shinstvo rossiian segodnia odurmaneny. *Sobesednik*.

many pre-existing and new SMOs, in these and other cases it is hard to see a clear link between virtual activism and real-life activism (Greene & Robertson 2016)[304].

Moreover, the trend toward downplaying street activism to pursue external institutionalization in the wake of the movement only increased in the following years. As discussed in chapter 6, several FFE leaders and SMOs concentrated on more conventional forms of participation like seeking official registration to participate in elections[305]. The leftist ROT-Front and the liberal RPR-PARNAS both obtained their official registration in 2012[306]. After being officially registered, RPR-PARNAS continued street activism, but the discussion around the party's future strategies and branding monopolized leaders' attention[307]. About a year later, the party split when regional supporters of the more moderate leader, Vladimir Ryzhkov, decided to create their own party. Ryzhkov argued that the Party needed "to move on to regular work, to participate in elections in the majority of regions, and to go with a positive agenda, moving away from a purely confrontational stance"[308]. One of the major points of contention was the desirable degree of collaboration between RPR-PARNAS and Aleksei Naval'ny, whose nationalist inclinations made many liberal figures feel uncomfortable[309]. After the split, RPR-PARNAS became PARNAS, led by Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Kasyanov, and Il'ia Yashin.

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[304] For example, Solidarnost' has about 10K followers on Twitter (Twitter: Solidarnost'. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/solidarnost_rus/followers), and a little less than 2,500 members on Facebook (Facebook. Dvizhenie "Solidarnost'". Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/groups/rusolidarnost/members/). The levyi front has about 2,800 members on Facebook as of December 2016 (Facebook. Dvizhenie "Levyi Front". Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/groups/LeftFront.ru/members/) and a little more than 3,200 followers on Twitter (Twitter. Levyi Front (Rossiia). Retrieved from https://twitter.com/leftfront_ru). The proportion of new members is also quite visible since 2012, although we should interpret these data with caution, as we cannot say how many left. However, when looking at events that these SMOs organized on Facebook, it appears obvious that they do not attract large crowds, calling thus into question the extent to which virtual activism can translate into street activism. For example, less thatn 70 people on average participated in the last 10 activities of the Levyi front and less than 30 people on average stated having participated in the last 10 events organized by Solidarnost' (Facebook. Dvizhenie "Levyi Front". Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/groups/LeftFront.ru/events/; Facebook. Dvizhenie "Solidarnost'". Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/events/266747247042846/).

[305] Korobeinikova, E. G. (2012, July 11). Chislo partii, uchastvuiushchikh v regional'nykh vyborakh, uvelichilos' do 19 - zamglavy TsIK. *RIA Novosti*.

[306] Partiia "ROT Front" poluchila ofitsial'nuiu registratsiiu (2012, December 14). *Ekonomicheskaia i filosofskaia gazeta* ; Gorbachev, A. (2012, June 18). Frukty-ovoshchi na partiinom pole *Nezavisimaia gazeta*.

[307] Vybory v 2013 g. i osvobozhdenie politzakliuchennykh - osnovnye trebovaniia RPR-PARNAS. (2012, June 16). *Zaks.ru*

[308] My translation: "nuzhno perekhodit' k sistematicheskoi rabote, uchastvovat' v vyborakh v podavliaiushchem chisle regionov i idti s pozitivnoi povestkoi, ukhodia ot chisto konfrontatsionnoi", Ivanov, M., & Goriashko, S. (2014, January 22). Vladimiru Ryzhkovu sozdadut novuiu partiiu. *Kommersant*. Author's translation.

[309] Smirnova, M. (2014, January 24). "RPR-PARNAS": budushchee za Naval'nym? *Zaks.ru*.

For his part, Naval'ny, one of the most prominent leaders of the FFE movement, also decided to form his own party, which he named the People's Alliance (Narodnyi al'ians); it later became the Party of Progress (Partiia progressa)[310]. Another party that was formed at about the same time, the Party of December 5 (Partiia 5 Dekabria), also came directly from the FFE movement and advocated similar ideas to those of the People's Alliance, RPR-PARNAS, and Yabloko[311]. Evgeniia Chirikova, an environmental activist and another important leader of the FFE movement, competed in the Khimki mayoral election in October 2012, where she came in second with about 18 percent of the vote. In the wake of these elections, she initially stated her desire to form a political party[312] but in the end decided to immigrate to Estonia instead.

In retrospect, this move to engage strongly in formal politics was premature as argued in chapter 6. It diverted energy away from unconventional forms of participation, trading new organizational resources that have developed via the movement for uncertain electoral gains. Perhaps most importantly, it also frequently undermined the already fragile cooperation between the SMOs and actors that initially enabled the FFE movement.

SMOs – Cooperation or Competition?

This last point brings me to the question of whether we can observe increased cooperation between SMOs after the FFE movement. The lack of cooperative ties is one of the most important problems of the non-systemic opposition, and even more broadly, of civil society in Russia. The FFE movement was often thought to have the potential to overcome such weaknesses. For example, David White (2015b) argues that "a steep 'learning curve' allowed the post-2011-2012 election period to emerge as one in which 'dissentful contention' reached unprecedented visibility, and a previously un-organised civil society began to achieve greater co-ordination both with political society and among its various diverse components" (p. 322).

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[310] Soratniki Naval'nogo sozdaiut partiiu. (2012, August 2). *Moskovskii Komsomolets* ; Litoi, A. (2012, December 12). "Khomiaki' zakhoteli partiiu. *RBC Daily*.
[311] Zheleznova, M. (2012, November 29). Novye tsentristy. *Vedomosti*
[312] Zheleznova, M. (2012, October 16). Chirikova sozdaet svoiu partiiu. *Vedomosti*.

Looking at the aftermath of the movement, however, there is much more evidence of competition among the non-systemic opposition than there is of cooperation. During the September 15, 2012, event that was organized to re-mobilize the movement, the Levada Center conducted a survey among participants. In answering the question of what were the main weaknesses of the protest movement, 49 percent of respondents chose "its lack of a clear program of action" while a quarter selected "division and conflicts among leaders" [313]. Perhaps the best example of internal competition comes from the disappointing fate of the KSO, which led to more public clashes and internal rifts. This attempt to institutionalize the cooperative ties that remained within the movement, which for some would have offered a clear and more legitimate leadership, proved to be largely unsuccessful. To the question of whether the movement had been in vain, Boris Akunin replied that "in the organizational sense, definitely, that is what happened: the opposition remained divided" [314], although he also noted that public discontent toward the regime remained [315]. Thus, as we saw in chapter 6, the FFE movement was closer to a state of abeyance by default in late 2012, as no leading core of the movement remained and SMOs return to their previous isolation state.

Nevertheless, one might argue that achieving durable cooperation among so many diverse groups and ideologies was doomed from the start, and that it might be expecting too much from the opposition. It may indeed be more productive to look for evidence of lasting cooperation among SMOs with similar ideologies. On the one hand, many liberal SMOs, such as RPR-PARNAS, Party of December 5, and the People's Alliance, cooperated on multiple occasions with Solidarnost' and other smaller SMOs in organizing protest actions after the FFE movement. This ad hoc cooperation may indicate that the liberal portion of the movement was in strategic abeyance in order to cope with political repression, and that it emerges from time to time to revitalize its troops (see for example Lankina 2014 p. 2). In addition, the more formalized SMOs decided to form a coalition around the 2013 mayoral elections in Moscow, during which RPR-

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[313] Levada Center. (2012). Opros na "marshe millionov" v Moskve v 15 sentiabria [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/2012/09/17/opros-na-marshe-millionov-v-moskve-15-sentyabrya/
[314] My translation: "V organizatsionnom smysle, bezuslovno, tak i proizoshlo: oppozitsiia ostalas' raskolotoi". Skvortsova, E. (2013, November 27). Boris Akunin: Vsegda mechtal stat' Karamzinym. *Sobesednik*.
[315] See also Baryshnikov, V. (2012, May 3). Sotsiolog Lev Gudkov - ob ugasanii protestnogo dvizheniia v Rossii i perspektivakh ego rosta. *Radio Svoboda*.

PARNAS enabled Naval'ny to run and win an impressive 27 percent of the vote[316]. But these positive efforts were overshadowed by struggles among and within SMOs, which occurred between protest actions/campaigns and sometimes even during them. In early 2014, Maksim Katz, a Yabloko leader, came to this rather harsh conclusion: "The opposition in Moscow has been killed and completely crushed - from last year's union nothing remained, there is no one to coordinate with, and all have maintained minimal activities" [317].

The Crimean annexation in March 2014 further divided the FFE movement, both internally and from the rest of the population. While many liberal leaders denounced the annexation and organized protest events[318], others, including some of the preeminent FFE leaders (Udal'tsov, Naval'ny, and Khodorkovsky), declared publicly that they would not return the peninsula to Ukraine if they were in power[319]. To quote Naval'ny, "Is Crimea some sort of sausage sandwich to be passed back and forth, or what?", just after asserting that Crimea "will remain part of Russia and will never again in the foreseeable future become part of Ukraine" [320]. These statements inflamed debate among activists and monopolized discussions for some time[321]. Important splits also occurred in the leftist groups and in the right-wing nationalist movement (Laruelle 2014). While busily arguing within its own ranks on the hypothetical question of whether Crimea should be 'given back' to Ukraine, the opposition had little time for other substantive issues.

Then later, the non-systemic opposition seemed unable to seize the opportunity that arose when the Putin regime's Crimea-inspired popular boost started to fade. By 2015, with international sanctions hitting Russia's economy hard, it was clear that many Russians had became more

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[316] RPR-PARNAS vydvinet Naval'nogo v mery Moskvy. (2013, June 9). *RBC Daily*.

[317] My translation: "Oppozitsiia v Moskve polnost'iu zashiblena i zadavlena – ot proshlogodnego letnego ob"edineniia ne ostalos' i sleda, nikto ni s kem ne koordiniruetsia i vse imeiut kakie-to karlikovye masshtaby deiatel'nosti". Katz, M. (2014, April 20). Mosgorduma. *Ekho moskvy*. Retrieved from http://echo.msk.ru/blog/maxkatz/more/1309354.html. Author's translation.

[318] Rustamova, F. (2014, September 5). Demokraticheskaia oppozitsiia ob"edinilas' vokrug aktsii za mir na Ukraine. *RBC Daily*.

[319] Udal'tsov, S. (2014, March 24). Ukrainskie uroki. *Ekho moskvy*. Retrieved from http://echo.msk.ru/blog/udaltsov/1285254-echo/; Venediktov, A. (2014, October 15). Interview - Aleksei Naval'ny. *Ekho moskvy*. Retrieved from http://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/1417522-echo/

[320] Dolgov, A. (2014, October 16). Naval'ny Wouldn't Return Crimea, Considers Immigration Bigger Issue Than Ukraine. *The Moscow Times*.

[321] See for example, Blogozrenie: Naval'ny, Khodorkovskii i #Krymnash. (2014, October 19). *Deutsche Welle*.

worried about the future[322]. Many began to encourage the non-systemic opposition to consolidate around the economic crisis by efficiently framing and adopting the population's grievances. Unfortunately, that would have required some serious work from the opposition, which was already weakened and fragmented. According to Denis Volkov of the Levada Center, the non-systemic opposition "refuses to understand why the majority supports the power, what mechanisms works in favor of the authorities. They say that they are all 'brainwashed patriots', 'let them eat grass', etc.", adding that, "If the opposition cannot overcome its contempt toward the majority, it will remain marginal"[323].

The depressing fate of the Democratic Coalition (Demokraticheskaia koalitsiia, or Demkoalitsiia) formed in 2015 between the main liberal SMOs in the run up to the 2016 elections revealed the weak ties that united liberal SMOs. First, the coalition was far from representative of all liberal SMOs that evolved from the FFE movement. While competitive relationships with Yabloko were to be expected from the beginning (given the FFE experience), the fact that key FFE actors, such as Ryzhkov and the two Gudkovs, were now competing under the Yabloko banner against Demkoalitsiia candidates was more problematic for the movement's legacy. But perhaps the most worrisome of all was the low public interest in the Demkoalitsiia primaries organized in the spring of 2016. These primaries were intended not only to select the coalition's candidates for the elections, but also to attract societal attention and broaden the societal basis of the coalition. Despite Demkoalitsiia leaders' confident predictions that at least 100,000 to 200,000 people would take part, only fraction of this number had registered by early April (some sources speak of about 2,500 registered electors). This influenced the coalition's decision to postpone its primaries to the following month[324]. When the Kremlin then publicly exposed a scandal involving one of the Demkoalitsiia leaders, Mikhail Kasyanov, the coalition

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[322] Mukhametshina, E. (2015, May 20). Vse bol'she liudei vidiat negativnye posledstviia prisoedineniia Kryma. *Vedomosti*.
[323] My translation: "Ona otkazyvaetsia ponimat', pochemu bol'shinstvo podderzhivaet vlast', kakie mekhanizmy rabotaiut v pol'zu vlasti. Oni govoriat, chto eto vse "vatniki", "pust' oni travu zhrut" i t.d. Esli oppozitsiia ne preodoleet etogo prezreniia k bol'shinstvu, to ostanetsia marginal'noi". Volkov, D. (2015, January 16). Protesty ne slivaiutsia. *Boss*. Author's translation.
[324] Vinokurova, E. (2016, April 11). Novye litsa i starye ssory. *Novoe vremia*

quickly collapsed, with leaders blaming one another for the discord[325]. In the end, fewer than 25,000 people took part in the primaries, which occurred amidst yet more public scandals[326].

Consequently, the non-systemic opposition approached the 2016 elections in a very fragile state, competing more often with one another than with the regime. Just a few days before the vote, Mariia Baronova, a former FFE activist and now an independent candidate aided by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, critically responded to Naval'ny's last attempt to determine the strategy for the whole non-systemic opposition. Complaining about what she referred to as the sectarian tendencies that many leaders displayed after the FFE movement, she argued that "The loss of official and long-term impacts of the opposition on the Bolotnaia mass protests, the loss of opportunity to guide and consolidate the energy of the protest, are in many ways a consequence of such sectarianism" [327]. And while we cannot generalize from the perception of Baronova, this section has made it clear that the FFE's legacies are at best ambiguous when it comes to achieving greater coordination among the opposition groups. Showing some minimal capacity to cooperate and coordinate would have helped these SMOs to further attract societal sympathy and support.

Looking at the 2017 anti-corruption protests, one can also note that apart from Naval'ny, other FFE leaders or SMOs were largely absent. Consequently, while Navalny's successes indicate that a political opposition movement may re-emerge, it appears very different from the FFE movement. At the moment there are no protest-related SMOs that transcend Navalny nor any coalitions forming between SMO groups or leaders. Whereas the 2011-12 coalition often had to compromise among its different ideological strands regarding the strategy to adopt with the authorities, Navalny now displays more uncompromising attitudes, such as his last-minute decision to change the location of the June 12 event from the sanctioned Sakharov avenue to the

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[325] Antonova, E. (2016, April 27). Soratniki Naval'nogo zaiavili o razvale koalitsii s Kas'ianovym. *RBC*

[326] Dergachev, V., & Braterskii, A. (2016, May 29). Saratovskii Zhirinovskii' osedlal oppozitsiiu. *Gazeta.ru*.

[327] My translation: "Utrata ofitsial'nymi mnogoletnimi oppozitsionerami vliianiia na protestnye massy Bolotnoi ploshchadi, utrata vozmozhnosti napravliat' i konsolidirovat' energiiu protesta — sledstvie, vo mnogom, podobnogo sektantstva". Blog "Novoi gazety'. (2016, September 13). Naval'ny vs Baronova. *Novaia gazeta*. Author's translation.

unsanctioned Tverskaia street. Reacting to this event, Novaia gazeta's Martynov argued that "there is no protest movement any more, there is Aleksei Navalny's struggle for power"[328].

Plus ça change…

The uneven playing field remained a constant in Russia's elections after 2012 - the most obvious failure of a movement whose main goal was "For Fair Elections". Yet, in its aftermath, many of the movement's former leaders devoted more time to participating in those elections than to street activism or civil society organizations[329]. As we have seen, the FFE movement initially demobilized through a complex interaction of radicalization and, most importantly, a relentless drive toward formal politics against all odds of success. Indeed, the constant focus that non-systemic opposition actors have placed on participating in elections at all levels (mayor, regional, and federal) seems to have overshadowed many other goals. In the process, basic tasks – such as organizing appealing protest events, developing a broader base of supporters, or maintaining cooperation among opposition forces – have been cast aside. In the wake of the FFE movement, all the major leaders were drawn away into party creation or formalization, thereby neglecting civil society and SMO development (or SMO survival in some cases). Participating in elections does presume that parties will attempt to broaden their constituencies, but it also implies first and foremost that parties compete with one another for each vote. There were multiple attempts to create coalitions among liberal parties after the movement, but such cooperation is hard to cultivate in electoral contexts, especially in a weakly institutionalized party system.

Looking at the movement's aftermath five years later, what seems particularly puzzling is that so many leaders and SMOs prioritized this exit to formal politics (attempt to externally institutionalize) over consolidating civil society, especially in a context of narrowing political opportunities. When political represion increased after the movement, one would have expected that SMOs would either further radicalize or choose instead to be in abeyance in order to minimally survive and potentially reinforce their ties with each other. Instead, they choose to

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[328] My translation: "Protestnogo dvizheniia bol'she net, est' bor'ba Alekseia Naval'nogo za vlast'". Martynov, K. (2017, June 14). Protest konchilsia. Nachalas' bor'ba za vlast'. Ot redaktsii *Novaia gazeta*.
[329] Mukhametshina, E. (2016, September 16). Rossiiane po-prezhnemu ne gotovy protestovat'. *Vedomosti*.

focus on elections, which not only often divided them further, but also unintentionally legitimized the regime they sought to denounce. Unfortunately, as the 2016 parliamentary elections illustrated, their efforts appear to have helped the regime while also hurting themselves. The low turnout of 47 percent is worth noting in this context, a diminution of about 13 percent compared to the 2011 elections, even though at least two non-systemic parties (PARNAS and Yabloko) were allowed to participate in them[330].

Naval'ny's role in sparking the March and June 2017 protests demonstrated that opposition leaders do have options, even in Russia - they can adapt their strategies and successfully frame existing grievances. Russians will go out in the streets in this repressive environment, even in unsanctioned protest events, if the organizers find the right way to persuade them; the title of Naval'ny's documentary film about Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's corruption, "On vam ne Dimon" (Don't Call Him 'Dimon'"), seemed particularly powerful in attracting young protesters. As Oreshkin explains, "Navalny found a language to address them with. It's not the old denunciations of 'Putin's bloody regime,' but just the calm demand for genuine investigation of corruption at the top"[331]. Alone among the former FFE leaders, Naval'ny appears to have belatedly learned this lesson and become the undisputed leader of the streets in the absence of the main FFE SMOs or a grand coalition among opposition groups. While this might turn out to be a clever personal electoral strategy for Navalny if political opportunities improve, it has far less promise for sparking more broad-based, long-term political and social activism across Russia.

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[330] Yabloko lost its financial state funding as it received less than 3 percent of the vote (1.99 percent). PARNAS received less than 1 percent of the vote (0.73). See Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation: http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100067795854&vrn=100100067795849&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=0&vibid=100100067795854&type=242

[331] Quoted in Weir, F. (2017, March 27). Why Russian Protests Are Making the Kremlin Rethink 2018 Presidential Elections. *Christian Science Monitor*.

Conclusion: Implications and Research Agenda on Demobilization

As argued throughout this dissertation, the literatures on social movements and contentious politics tend to focus on the emergent phases of mobilizations; we too often lose interest in social movements once they begin to abate, and are thus left with little empirical analysis with which to work. As a result, scholars and policy makers end up assuming quite a lot about the decline of movements and the consequences of protests on civil society. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution was quickly proclaimed to be over after Yushchenko's victory and was celebrated as the "triumph of civil society". Yet a more careful consideration of the aftermath period draws one's attention to the growing marginalization of Orange SMOs, as well as the polarization of Ukrainian society that was clearly visible in the streets. In Russia, it is often assumed that the FFE movement demobilized primarily due to the regime's increased repression. In fact, demobilization had already started two months earlier, with movement leaders then engaging in limited radicalization and attempts to externally institutionalize. Placing the movement in abeyance by default, this also left the movement ill prepared to cope with the subsequent repression. As these cases make clear, before we can determine the causes or the consequences of demobilization, we need to first identify its timing and nature.

To be sure, demobilization seems to mean many different things in the literature, which often conflates different levels of analysis and different forms of the phenomenon. It is for that reason that this dissertation started by suggesting a conceptual framework (chapter 2). In particular, it defined demobilization as a process that involves a decline in protest activities and the number of activists, combined with a reduction in the movement's societal resonance. Doing so enabled us to disentangle indicators for measuring the timing of demobilization from indicators that inform us on the possible forms (or paths) of demobilization (namely, institutionalization, radicalization, abeyance, and disappearance). As chapters 3 and 5 demonstrated, the timing of different levels of analysis does not always align in social movement demobilization. After either success or failure, ordinary citizen involvement (the micro-level) and the movement's broader societal attention (macro-level) were the first dimensions to decline. By contrast, SMOs (meso-level) were not always ready to leave the streets, nor to acknowledge that the momentum was turning

against them. The choices that SMO leaders made regarding how to keep the battle going influenced, in turn, which forms the demobilization process took in both Ukraine and Russia.

Thus, in chapters 4 and 6, we saw that demobilization is an evolving process, with different forms of the phenomenon dominating at different points in time: there is not one single form of demobilization associated with success or failure. In line with the past and current findings of the literature, institutionalization and radicalization processes do seem to always be present during demobilization; yet, the timing, the nature, and the extent to which these forms are implemented in practice vary, producing different outcomes. What is more, studying the Russian and Ukrainian cases highlights that sub-forms must be introduced, especially between external and internal institutionalization, and between strategic abeyance and abeyance by default. For example, indicators of abeyance could indeed be observed under the growing repression with which Russian civil society had to cope after the FFE movement. But here again, it matters whether abeyance was a choice (strategic abeyance) or a result of failed attemps (abeyance by default).

At the theoretical level, the findings of this dissertation have implications regarding our understanding of social movements. In particular, they serve to highlight the importance of better understanding the interactions between political opportunity structures and actors' choices during demobilization periods. First, the findings confirm the complexity of the repression-mobilization relationship. Moreover, they invite scholars to not only examine the effects of repression on mobilization and subsequent radicalization, but also investigate the effect of a movement's prior radicalization on the way SMO leaders manage repression. Whereas the presence of allies in the formal arena is often seen in the literature as a political opportunity enabling mobilization, allies might become foes during demobilization and impede a movement's impact in the medium- and long-term. As we have seen in both cases, institutionalization processes may well be brought to a halt if a movement associates too closely with formal actors, such as political parties. Deciding when, how, and how long to cooperate/associate with formal actors is thus important for SMO leaders. Likewise, the facilitating effect of elite divisions during movements' emergence periods might become an impediment for civil society during demobilization, as these divisions create more tensions among SMOs.

Methodologically speaking, the dissertation also serves as an illustration of the advantages of building rigorous datasets on protest events, not only during but also after social movements. These data enable us to use different levels of aggregation and use protest event analysis to ask various questions about a movement's evolution. For example, what might first appear to be a stable and successful mobilization if one looks only at the number of events organized could, in fact, turn out to be rapid demobilization if one considers participation rates. Similarly, looking at different levels of data aggregations (e.g. on a daily rather than a monthly basis) can highlight different patterns about the structure of protest. Usually associated with quantitative analyses, protest event analyses also lead us naturally to carry out additional qualitative analyses (e.g. process tracing), as turning points and critical events quickly emerge from the reading of sources.

While this dissertation had mainly examined Ukraine and Russia, the possibility to extend both the theoretical and methodological insights to other cases is substantial. First, it would be important to compare these cases with others from the post-Soviet region. For example, studying the aftermath of other color revolutions in countries such as Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, as well as examining failed attempts, such as in Belarus and Armenia, would provide us with indications of the generalizability of the empirical insights. Turning our attention toward cases in other regions also offers considerable promise: on the one hand, we should examine whether these findings can travel to other non-democratic regions, such as the Middle East after the Arab Spring; on the other, we should also consider cases in established democracies, such as with the 2016-7 mass mobilizations in the U.S. after the election of President Donald Trump or the 2012 Maple Spring in Quebec. Doing so would help to determine the limits of the framework while at the same time working to improve it.

Finally, the general findings of this dissertation serve as an invitation for us to pause before applauding mass mobilizations as simple instances of civil society awakening. Instead of shifting our attention away when movements began to decline, we must realize that the important work might be just about to start for civil society actors. We not only need to understand how people can be a powerful weapon against authoritarian leaders when they unite, but also to examine when and how the risks they take and the time they invest in those mobilizations can leave enduring, positive changes in their societies.

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Appendix A: Codebook for the Protest Event Analysis

In this database, the unit of analysis is 'protest event' defined as "politically motivated unconventional actions" (Kriesi *et al.* 1995, p. 263). Building on Beissinger (2002), I used the following two criteria to operationalize events, namely "a voluntary gathering of person(s) with the purpose of engaging in a [public] display of sentiment for or against public policies" that is "bounded by space and time" (Beissinger 2002, p. 4 codebook). However, unlike Beissinger, I did not impose a minimum number of persons for coding events, since I wanted to gather all protest events reported. Moreover, if we acknowledge the authoritarian trends of the countries selected, we also have to be aware of the increased costs for participating in protest, which makes events often less well-attended but no less public.

I employed a half-automated selection strategy to collect data, using Russian key words that are related to protest events. I included many words used in Beissinger (2002) both for peaceful and violent events, such as *demonstratsiia* (demonstration), *miting* (rally), *protest* (protest), *besporiadki* (disorders), *drak* (fight), *volneniia* (disturbances), *stychki* (clashes), *boi* (battles), and *miatezh* (insurrection). In addition, I also used *marsh*, *shestvie* (procession), and *piket* (picketing) as well as specific key words that were directly associated with the social movement under study. In the case of Russia, I added the expression *Za chestnye vybory* (For fair elections), *Bolotnaia* (in reference to both the public square and the movement in general) and *Okkupai* (in reference to the occupy movement that came out of the broader movement). In Ukraine, I added *pomaranchevevaia, oranzhevaia revoliutsiia*, *PORA*, and *Maidan*. By doing so, I made sure that my search was not restricted to demonstrative or direct protest actions, and that any types of action, including more traditional actions were included[332], especially if they were associated to the Orange of FFE movements. All reported events were coded even if they were not related to the movement.

Events were delimited by day, locality, and organizers. Thus, if only one of these variables differed, events were coded separately. For example, even if events were organized the same day and organized by the same SMO, they were considered separate events if they took place in a different locality. Likewise, if a hunger strike or tent-city was reported to last 12 days, a separate event was created (with a different number of event (NUM)) for each of these 12 days. However, an event could evolve through the day by changing forms (i.e., activists organize a public march which transformed later into a rally) and places within the same locality (see variable 'LOC' below). An event was still counted as one if it was organized by the same SMOs with the same

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[332] That being said, as some traditional actions, such as press conferences would take place very frequently, I only coded them if they were organized by the leading SMOs of the movement.

demands and within the same location[333]. This tended to happen more frequently with news agencies reporting on massive events. In case of doubt, the coding strategy was more conservative aiming at preventing the duplication of the same event, being repeatedly reported by the same sources in order to update information. That being said, according to the context, some events had clearly to be considered separate events, such as tent cities or blockade of governmental buildings, which had their own logic (in terms of duration and type of actions). I excluded all reports of planned events, and only coded events that actually occurred. To code an event, I minimally needed to have a date, a location, organizers or indication of demands.

For continuing events, I also coded them conservatively. For example, if a source only mentioned a start date for an event that was supposed to last five days, but no mention of this event is found later in the sources, I only coded it on the start date for which I have a source. Reversely, if a source reported that an event, such as a tent-city, terminated on a specific day, but without mentioning when it started, I only coded it on its end date. However, if a source reported on Friday that the tent-city that was established on Tuesday in Kharkiv and was still going on, I created four events for Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. If I found a mention of the same tent-city two weeks later saying that it was still ongoing, I coded all days that connect the last mention to the new mention; otherwise, I stopped coding the event and did not assume it may have lasted longer.

Below is the list of the substantive variables that were coded for all events. For both countries, working variables were created only for recoding purposes and are not detailed here[334].

Event Number (NUM). A unique number was given to every event coded. The first number corresponds to the country code, the four other digits to the year, the following two to the month, and the last four numbers to the event number within a month. As an example, the demonstration that took place on Sakharov Avenue in December 24 2011 is assigned the Event Number 12011120153, since this event was the 153^e event (0153) of December (12) in 2011 (2011) in Russia (1). At the moment, the database for Russia counts 1,114 events. The same logic was used for Ukraine with (2) as the country code. The database for Ukraine includes 2,390 events.

Event Month (MONTH). The month an event occurred.

Event Date (DATE). The reported date of event. In cases when the precise date was missing but it was clear that the event happened very recently, I coded the event as occurring the date prior to publication. In some occasions, especially with news agency reports, I coded the event occurring

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[333] For example, during the peak of the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko supporters were often changing places from the Maidan to the Cabinet of Ministers or to the Ukrainian Parliament, the Rada. Some sources thus reported during the same day that 3,000 people held a rally at the Rada, while later that day they reported a total of 10,000 people having protested during the day for Yushchenko on the Maidan in Kiev.

[334] For example, temporal variables were created to delimitate the Orange Revolution according to different periodization in the endings (OR_12-3 =441, OR_12-8 = 557, OR_12-26 = 860, and OR_01-23 = 1166). The code '0' corresponds to before the OR, '1' to the OR, and '2' to its aftermath.

the same day as the publication, but only if it made sense with the context. When there was no indication at all of the date an event took place, but only a mention of the month of its occurrence (or when no month was mentioned at all), I excluded the event.

Event Location (LOC). The city in which the event took place. In the very rare occasions when the city was missing but I had precise information about the federal subject as well as other information about the number of participants, I coded the event by oblast', republic, or krai. As an example, in the database on Russia, in February 2012 (NUM: 12012020089 to 12012020099) it was reported that 11 events took place the same day in the Altai Republic, gathering in total 5,500 of people so I coded 11 events in Altai with each having 500 participants. As a rule of thumb, however, when there was no specific city mentioned, I excluded the events.

Numeric Location Code (LOC_NUM). These numbers correspond to the country code (one digit), the administrative region/federal district code (two digits), and the city code (two digits). As most of the events took place in cities that are capital/administrative centers, I aggregated the events by their administrative divisions in Ukraine and by their federal districts (okrugs) in Russia. In Russia, when an event took place outside an administrative center, I coded the event under 'others' within its corresponding federal district. For example, an event taking place in Sochi was coded '10207', where '1' correspond to Russia, '02' to the Southern Federal District, and '07' to 'others', as Sochi is not the capital/administrative center of any federal subject within the Southern federal district. For comparison, an event taking place in the city of Moscow was coded '10110' where '1' is Russia, '01' refers to the Central Federal District, and '10' to the city of Moscow, which is both an administrative center and a federal subject. By contrast, events located in the Moscow oblast were coded under '10119' where the last two digits '19' correspond to 'Others' within the Central federal district[335]. I applied the same logic for Ukraine (country code '2'), but with administrative regions (oblasts) since Ukraine does not have federal districts. Therefore, there are more codes for administrative regions in Ukraine but less codes for capital/administrative centers since they are already disaggregated within each region. The detailed codes can be found in Attachment 1.

Regional Divisions (REG_DIV). For Ukraine only. Given the enduring regional divisions of Ukraine (western vs. eastern regions), I created a variable in order to aggregate regional trends in the (de)mobilization moments. Following the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) macro regions schema, the **Western region** includes the oblasts of Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytsky, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, Volyn, and Zakarpatska (LOC_NUM: 20301, 20302, 20601, 20602, 20901, 20902, 21401, 21402, 21801, 21802, 22001, 22002, 22201, 22202, 22301, 22302). The **Central region** corresponds to the Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr oblasts (LOC_NUM: 20101, 20102, 20201, 20202, 21001, 21002, 21101, 21102, 21701, 21702, 21901, 21902, 22101, 22102, 22501, 22502). The **Eastern region** refers to the oblasts of Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Luhansk (LOC_NUM: 20501, 20502, 20701, 20702, 21301, 21302), and the **Southern region** includes the oblasts of Dnipropetrovs'k

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[335] As most of the events took place before the New Moscow reform that enhanced the territory of the city, which now includes many territories that were previously part of the Moscow oblast (such as Troitsk or Rublevka), I did not take into account these administrative changes that took effect in July 1ˢᵗ, 2012.

(4), Kherson, Crimea, Mykolaiv, Odessa, and Zaporizhzhia (LOC_NUM: 20401, 20402, 20801, 20802, 21201, 21202, 21203, 21501, 21502, 21601, 21602, 22401, 22402).

Event Type (TYPE). The main word (or expression) used for reporting the event. When an event was reported differently by two sources, I tried to take the word that corresponded more accurately to the event type from the context. For example, although a tent-city established at the Rada could also be reported as 'picketing', the fact that the protesters lived there and occupied more durably the urban space make it closer to a direct action; thus I would used 'lager' for tent-city (code 26). In few occasions, I put two words for the same event, when two different forms were clearly reported for the same event to show its evolution. For example I used 'shestvie + miting' (code 3) or 'golodovka + lager' (code 28) in some cases, especially when the two event types corresponded to the same event type category (see TYPE_CATEG). That tended to happen only in the case of massive events. As a rule of thumb (97.5 per cent of events in Russia, and 98 per cent of events in Ukraine), there was only one word coded per event.

A special note for Ukraine, however, has to be made when massive events on the Maidan took often the form of rallies even though tents were established at the same time. I included a working variable 'TENTS' for taking note of the numbers of tents during these massive rallies. But I separately coded events that were actual tent cities, such as the one established by PORA on Kreshchatyk Street in Kyiv, because such camps had their own logic and evolution during and after the Orange Revolution. When there was no clear word associated with an event, I used 'aktsiia' to mean act of protest.

Numeric Codes for Event Type (TYPE_NUM). Every type of event corresponds to a numeric code. The detailed codes can be found in Attachment 2.

Event Type Category (TYPE_CATEG). In order to analyze the evolution of the repertoire of actions, event types were aggregated under four categories of protest events (Kriesi *et al.*, 1995): demonstrative actions **Demonstrative** (codes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 34 35), direct actions with no violence **Direct** (codes: 26, 27, 28, 29, 36, 37, 38), violent actions **Violent** (codes: 30, 31, 32, 33), and traditional actions **Traditional** (codes: 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 39). The code numbers correspond to the event type codes, detailed in attachment 2.

Event Organizers (ORG1, ORG2, ORG3). A maximum of three SMOs or actors were recorded, where they were reported as being the organizers or the main participants of the events. The sources used did not always allow me to detail the SMOs, given that it was often only reported, for example, that an event supporting the movement took place in a specific day. In these occasions, for Russia, I coded 'Opposition' as the organizers. For the same reason, I used 'Regime' for pro-regime events, even if the event organization was conducted by some potentially intermediary organizations. 'Nesistemnaia oppozitsiia' was used when it was clear that the organizers were not part of the formal or systemic opposition. I used 'Activists' for events against the regime that were not necessarily organized by the political opposition and when no specific SMO was mentioned. However, when there was a clear social group behind a protest event, such as workers, farmers, or journalists, I used this specific term even if these

protesters could also be thought as activists. The aim was to remain the closest possible of the sources.

For Ukraine, the dichotomy between the opposition and the regime was not as fixed as in Russia, given that the Yushchenko opposition became the new regime in the aftermath. As a rule of thumb and unless reported differently in the source, I used 'Shtab Yushchenko' or 'Shtab Yanukovich' when the events were organized by the candidate's campaign headquarter. After the Orange Revolution, I used instead the political party that organized the events, which could be 'Nasha Ukraina' for Yushchenko, 'Partiia regionov' or 'SDPU' for former Yanukovich supporters, etc. Just like for Russia, when there was no clear political party or SMO reported, I used 'Activists' or other social group that best described the protesters. The most important variable was ORG1, whereas ORG2 and ORG3 were extra information that was not always reported. The three variables 'ORG' remain uncoded numerically.

Demands (DEMAND). A categorical variable capturing the main reason an event took place. Once again in coding this variable, I tried to remain as close as possible to the sources. Since the focus of my work is in specific social movements (and their demobilization phase), however, I also regrouped when possible similar demand types that were not directly related to the movement under study. For example, I used the broad categories of 'Ecological issues' or 'Ethnic issues' when the issue was related to these types of demands. Whenever it was possible with the source, I nonetheless tried to specify such demands, such as claims for 'river protection' or 'forest protection', in the knowledge that I will subsequently aggregate them into broader category demands (see DEMAND_CATEG below).

The main code for the movement in Russia is 'Unfair elections' (code 115) but I also took note of related demands when it was central to the event, for example with 'Unfair elections + new legislation of mass events' (code 127) (see codes 115 to 137 for all other declinations). These 23 codes were used for 45.6 percent of all demand codes for Russia.
In Ukraine, the main code for the Orange movement during the Orange Revolution was 'Support Yushchenko' (code 297), with declinations (codes 297 to 309), and 'Support Yanukovich' (codes 287) with declinations (codes 287 to 296). There 22 codes represent 49.7 percent of all demand codes used for Ukraine.

Numeric Demand Codes (DEMAND_NUM). Every demand corresponds to a numeric code. For Russia, 139 demand codes were recorded that could also be used for Ukraine if relevant (for example, code 72). Moreover, 184 demand codes were also identified only for the Ukrainian case, which in total correspond to 323 demand codes (see details in Attachment 3).

Demand Categories (DEMAND_CATEG). A categorical variable to regroup demand types. I used five categories to aggregate demand types in order to determine the evolution of the main demands of a specific social movement, and to see which other claims and demand categories coexisted at the same time. Demands can sometimes seem to pertain to more than one demand category, such as socioeconomic and political claims, but I attempted to grasp the dominant justification of each event in order to classify them into a single category. Although most of protest demands can be considered political to a certain extent, the demands had to clearly make claims against or for the current regime or officials in order to be classified as 'political'. For

example, if an event was held to protest against tax reforms or work conditions, it was considered 'socioeconomic'. Also included in political events are all issues related to justice and the rule of law. All commemorative events as well as sportive, religious, or LGBT events were considered 'sociocultural'. Ecological claims had to relate to the protection of the environment in some ways, and ethnic claims had to relate to kinship, origin, and linguistic issues. The clear predominance of the political category is explained by the fact that the protest event analysis has been done in the timing of two important political movements that were clearly protesting against and for the regime.

The following list provides the details of which codes were used for each category:
Socioeconomic claims (demand codes: 1, 5, 7, 19, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 34, 36, 40, 41, 42, 43, 52, 54, 57, 62, 67, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 85, 87, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 108, 138, 139, 154, 156, 157, 158, 162, 165, 176, 181, 182, 187, 189, 196, 201, 206, 219, 228, 229, 237, 240, 242, 243, 246, 262, 267, 271, 278, 310, 311, 318, 323), **Sociocultural claims** (demand codes: 3, 8, 11, 37, 38, 39, 50, 63, 75, 80, 89, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146,147, 152, 159, 163, 203, 204, 205, 207, 209, 210, 211, 213, 215, 216, 217, 223, 231, 232, 233, 236, 244, 316)**,**
Political claims (demand codes: 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 35, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 55, 58, 60, 61, 64, 66, 71, 72, 78, 84, 86, 88, 90, 91, 94, 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 155, 160, 161, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 212, 218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 230, 234, 238, 239, 241, 245, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264, 265, 266, 268, 270, 272, 274, 275, 276, 277, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, 319, 320, 321), **Ecological claims** (demand codes: 2, 16, 56, 65, 95, 173, 190, 208, 273) and, **Ethnic claims** (demand codes: 4, 13, 59, 77, 81, 177, 214, 235, 269, 322).

Event Movement (MOVEMENT). For Russia only. A binary variable capturing whether or not an event can be considered part of the movement 'For Fair Elections' (coded 1 for yes or 0 for no). To decide whether to include an event into the broader movement, the following criteria were used: 1) the event was organized by one (or more) of the main actors (SMOs or leader) of the movement; and/or 2) the event's main demands denounce the elections or used similar claims, and 3) the event was not a pro-regime event. Notwithstanding these criteria, some events straddled two options. For example, many ecological events that demanded forest protection were neither centered on the election theme nor were they reported as having been organized by main actors of the movement. But as Evgeniia Chirikova, one of main leader of the FFE movement, initially came from a forest protection movement, they were many links that could be drawn with the new forest protection events. I thus decided to include the sit-in in Zhukov in the defense of the Tsagovskii forest (see NAME 'Tsagovskii les'). However, I left out the sit-in in Sochi (see NAME 'Okkupai most') because it was much harder to see a direct link with the FFE movement. For the same reasons, many events with socioeconomic or sociocultural demands were not included.

Regarding the main actors of the movement, here is a non-exhaustive list of relevant SMOs that were always included in the movement: different versions of Orgkomitets, Liga izbiratelei, Levyi front, Solidarnost', PRP-PARNAS, the Assembleia, Nezistemnaia oppozitsiia, and many others. A difficulty arises with the systemic opposition parties, such as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), Just Russia (Spravedlivaia Rossiia, SR), and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) given their ambiguous relationship with the FFE movement. For some of the events organized by these parties, especially in regions during the peak of the movement, it made a great sense to include them in the movement. However in other cases, these parties were acting rather as spoilers (which was especially the case with the LDPR) or they were pursuing their own agenda, such as for the KPRF. I thus had to code them depending on the context of the events. As a rule of thumb, SR events were more often included in the general movement than the ones organized by the LDPR. For the KPRF, while their events during the peak of the movement were coded most often than not as part of FFE, after the presidential elections, their events became more mixed.

Overall, 675 out of the 1114 events (61 percent) coded in the database for Russia were considered to be part of the FFE movement.

Pro-regime Events (PROREG). For Russia only. A binary variable to isolate the events that were organized by the regime (coded 1 for yes or 0 for no). The criteria used to determine a pro-regime event were: 1) the event was organized by actors considered to be created or completely coopted by the regime (i.e., Edinaia Rossiia, ONF, or Nashi are examples in the case of Russia), and/or 2) the main demands revolve around preserving the current regime, supporting Putin, defending the election results, or other very similar themes (main demand codes 51, 107, 108, 110). In the vast majority of cases, the pro-regime stance of an event was very obvious and left no room for doubt. 186 out of 1114 events (about 17 percent) were definitely pro-regime events, and 45 percent of these events took place in February 2012.

As for the **OTHER/NON-ALIGNED** Events, these correspond to protest events that could neither be associated directly to the movement or pro-regime events (coded 0 for both MOVEMENT and PROREG). In Russia, there were 253 events: 42 percent of them put forward socioeconomic claims – from which demands were mainly related to housing (30 percent), labor (28 percent), healthcare systems, education and more commercial issues – 23 percent were related to ecological demands, 21 percent to political issues, 7.5 to sociocultural issues, and 6.7 to ethnic questions. These events were organized by a variety of actors, sometimes by the systemic opposition parties as explained above (9 percent), sometimes by other social groups, such as local people (21 percent), broadly defined activists (23 percent), workers (7 percent), LGBT activists (3 percent), and many other SMOs.

Pro-Yushchenko events (YUSHCH). For Ukraine only. A binary variable that refers to the pro-Yushchenko events during the Orange Revolution (coded 1 for yes or 0 for no). To be considered pro-Yushchenko, an event had either 1) to be organized by Yushchenko's political team and allies during the Orange Revolution, or 2) clearly voiced its pro-Yushchenko stance as the main demand. However, in order to not excessively essentialize and dichotomize the two camps, I did not continue to code this variable after the Orange Revolution. 831 events out of the whole database of 2390 events, about 35 percent, were included in the pro-Yushchenko events. During

the Orange Revolution (from Nov22 to Jan23 = 1166 events), this percentage is closer to 66 percent, with 773 events occurring in this exact period.

Pro-Yanukovich events (YANU). For Ukraine only. A binary variable that isolates the pro-Yanukovich events during the Orange Revolution (coded 1 for yes or 0 for no). To be considered pro-Yanukovich, an event had either 1) to be organized by Yanukovich's political team and allies during the Orange Revolution, or 2) clearly voiced its pro-Yanukovich stance as the main demand. As the final round of the elections were contested by Yanukovich supporters for a while, this variable extends a little bit further than the variable YUSHCH but follows the same obsolescence in the coding the farer we get from the Orange Revolution. 623 events out of 2390 event (26 percent) had a very clear pro-Yanukovich stance. During the Orange Revolution (from Nov22 to Jan23 = 1166 events), this percentage is closer to 30 percent with 346 pro-Yanukovich events occurring during this timeframe.

Orange events (ORANGE). For Ukraine only. A binary variable that is used to delimitate the events related to the Orange movement (coded 1 for yes or 0 for no). To decide whether to include an event into the Orange movement, the following criteria were used: 1) the event was organized by one (or more) of the main actors (SMOs or leaders) of the Orange movement, and 2) the event was not a Blue event. Including all Pro-Yushchenko events, this variable also extends beyond the Orange Revolution, and includes all events organized by actors that were previously in the Orange camp that continued to organize protest events later *although not necessarily in support of Yushchenko*. A non-exhaustive list of the main SMOs concerned here are Nasha Ukraina, Sila Naroda, PORA, Chista Ukraïna, Znaiu, KIU, Sobor, Maidan, Za Chestnuiu vlast', Kongress Ukrainskikh nationalistov, Narodnyi rukh Ukrainy, Narodnyi front Kryma protiv korruptsii, Komitet uchastnikov oranzhevoi revoliutsii, Forum spaseniia Kieva, Natsional'nyi al'ians, Svoboda, Molodezh' nadezhda Ukrainy, Sprotiv, Za spravedlivost'. As a result, 1330 out of the 2390 events (56 percent) coded in the database for Ukraine were considered to be part of the Orange movement.

Blue events (BLUE). For Ukraine only. A binary variable that is used to delimitate the events related to the Blue movement. The criteria used to determine a Blue event were: 1) the event was organized by actors considered to be close to the incumbent/former regime, and 2) the event was not an Orange event. Thus, including all pro-Yanukovich events, this variable also extends beyond the Orange Revolution, and includes events organized by actors that were previously in the Yanukovich camp and that continued to organize protest events later although not necessarily in support of Yanukovich. A non-exhaustive list of the main SMOs concerned here are 'Shtab Yanukovich', Partiia regionov, Progressivnaia sotsialisticheskaia partiia Ukrainy (PSPU), Sotsial-demokraticheskaia partiia Ukrainy (ob'edinennaia) (SDPU-o), Narodnaia demokraticheskaia partiia Ukrainy (NDP), Edinoe otechestvo, Zabastovochnyi komitet, Soiuz Molodezhi regionov, Soiuz veteranov afganskoi voiny, Rossiiskaia obshchina Kryma. As a result, 858 out of the 2390 events (36 percent) coded in the database for Ukraine were considered to be part of the Blue movement.

In Ukraine, the **OTHER/NON-ALIGNED** Events correspond to protest events that could neither be associated directly to the Orange nor to the Blue events (coded 0 for both ORANGE and BLUE). There were 202 events in Ukraine: 50 percent of them put forward socioeconomic

claims – from which demands varied from being against 'seizure of a company' (15 percent), to pension and in-kinds benefits (17 percent), labor (9 percent), education (9 percent) or commercial issues (6 percent)– 28 percent were related to political demands, 16 percent to sociocultural issues, and 6 percent to ethnic and ecological questions. These events were organized by diverse groups: sometimes by specific parties or SMOs, such as the Green Party of Ukraine ('Partiia zelenykh Ukrainy') or the Chernobyl Union of Ukraine ('Soiuz Chernobyl' Ukrainy'), but often by broader social groups such as 'local officials', 'local people', 'workers' or 'entrepreneurs. Having said that, the most important actor in organizing other events in the database was the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) that organized about 18 percent of such events. Although the KPU can often be associated to the pro-Russian elites of Ukraine, during the Orange Revolution, the party did not formally sit with a side in particular (Kuzio 2005a, p. 33). Moreover, the demands they put forward in their protest events could neither be clearly associated to the Blue movement.

Estimates of Number of Participants (ESTPART_1, ESTPART_2, ESTPART_3). The estimates of the number of participants. Especially for massive events, such as on the Maidan in Ukraine during the peak of the Orange Revolution, or on December 24th and February 4th in Russia, reports gave many details and provided different figures of participation throughout the day. I thus coded the peak estimates given by each source to grasp the event at its largest size. ESTPART_1 refers to the number reported by the source(s) (or their average when there was more than one) where there was no mention as to whether this estimate was given by the organizers or the authorities. ESTPART_2 is the estimate given by the organizers of the event when specified, or the highest estimates (i.e., the two generally corresponded), while ESTPART_3 is the estimate given by the authorities or the lowest number (i.e., the two also usually corresponded)[336]. I did not record multiple estimates that did not diverge within the same variable (i.e., EASTPART 1, 2 or 3).

For some of the biggest events, although there were many diverging estimates, I still coded up to three estimates. For example, for the Sakharov event on December 24, while the number given by the authorities was 29,000 (ESTPART_3), the organizers provided the figure of 120,000 (ESTPART_2) participants. Other sources provided different estimates, such as 102,486 for Novaia gazeta, 73,500 for Moskovskii komsomolets, and 72,400 given by the Grazhdanin Nabliudatel' project, as reported by Kommersant. Consequently, I took the average of these three figures for my third estimate (ESTPART_1 = 82,795). The following expressions were coded as follow: 'few people' (neskol'ko chelovek) = 10, 'few tens' (neskol'ko desiatkov) = 50, 'few hundreds (neskol'ki soten) = 500, etc. The Russian word for 'about' (okolo) did not affect the coding; I took the number as reported. However, when the expressions 'more than' (bol'she) or 'less than' (men'she) were used, I attempted to account for this by adding or subtracting 5 for tens, 10 for hundreds, and 100 for thousands.

In cases where an event took place during several days, as it was the case with tent-cities in Ukraine, the number of participants was not always mentioned for each day. However, because

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[336] It has to be kept in mind that for the countermovements, ESTPART_2 and ESTPART_3 were generally the same or were very similar figures, thus the participation rate for pro-regime events was necessarily inflated compared to the opposition.

the event was reported as ongoing in different sources at different point of time, I took the number of participants that was reported on the nearest day that follows the one for which I had no figure. For example, if in December 10, a source reported that about 5,000 people were still living in tents on Kreshchatyk avenue, and in December 14, the number reported was 3,500 people but no number was reported for December 11-12-13, I took the figure '3,500' for participants for these three days.

A special note for car rallies, where the number of cars was reported instead of the number of participants. Unless specified otherwise, I considered that 2 people were in each car; thus, I multiplied the number of cars reported per two for the number of participants. I applied the same logic when I only had the number of tents reported for tent-cities.
Missing values were coded 0.

Participation in the Event (PARTIC). The final number used for determining the number of participants. I averaged ESTPART_1, ESTPART_2 and ESTPART_3. When the number of participants was below 50, I took the exact number given, but for numbers greater than 50, I round up to the next 50 (i.e., 70 becomes 100; 130 becomes 150 or 7278 becomes 7300). Missing values were coded 0. Overall, at least one estimate was available in 79 percent of the events in Russia and 76 percent of the events in Ukraine.

For Russia, missing data were more important for the events that were neither coded as part of the movement, nor as pro-regime events, with 39 percent of these non-aligned events had missing values for the number of participants (compared with 17 percent of the movement events and 10 percent of the pro-regime events). However, there is an outlier for the movement events in July, where 72 percent of the events reported had missing values for participants. In August, this percentage decreased to 18 percent, which makes it hard to tell whether the month of July was merely an outlier or whether it represented more an emerging trend in the media attention to the movement. For Ukraine, missing data were more balanced between the different categories of events: Missing data accounted for about 25 percent of the Orange events, 23 percent of the Blue events, and about 28 percent for the unrelated events.

Category Size (CATGPARTIC). The variable used to aggregate the participation figures into broader categories. The following categories were used: (1) 1 participant; (2) 2 to 50 participants; (3) 51 to 250 participants; (4) 251 to 500 participants; (5) 501 to 1,000 participants; (6) 1,001 to 2,500 participants; (7) 2,501 to 5,000 participants; (8) 5,001 to 10,000 participants; (9) 10,001 to 25,000 participants; (10) 25,001 to 50,000 participants; (11) 50,001 to 100,000 participants; (12) 100,000 to 250,000 participants; (13) 250,001 to 500,000 participants; (14) 500,001 or more participants. Missing data were coded as 0.

Event Name (NAME). The name of an event. The main function of this variable is to take account of the duration of an event, such as tent-cities or hunger strike, and to facilitate the search of specific events.

Number of Arrests (ARRESTS). The number of arrests by the police either during or after the event. As only 11 percent of the events in Russia included physical arrests, and less than 1 percent in Ukraine, it seems that reports on arrests were not systematic in the sources. But this

also speaks to the trend in the authorities' reaction toward the two movement, being initially more tolerant than usual.

Violence (VIOLENCE). Whether or not violence occurred during the event (coded 1 for yes or 0 for no). To code the occurrence of violence, it had to be clear from the sources that some fight, injuries, or casualties occurred.

Sources (SOURCES). The source(s) that reported the event. For Russia, five local newspapers were used representing different positions toward the Kremlin and civil society. Whereas *Izvestiia* is definitely the most pro-regime newspaper of the selection, *Novaia gazeta* is clearly associated with the opposition movement and always displays critical views toward the regime. As was expected, *Ivestiia* reported far less protest events, reporting only 8 percent of events in the overall database compared to *Novaia gazeta*, which reported 25 percent of events in the overall database. As the aim was to ascertain the movement's societal resonance and the visibility of its activities (rather than to get the whole spectrum of all events that could have occurred in Russia during this period), I added three widely consulted newspapers that have national coverage, which are *Moskovskii komsomolets*, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, and *Kommersant*. Note that in the case of *Kommersant*, it was possible to include all associated publications in the search, such as *Kommersant Regions*, which helps to explain the dominance of this source (43 percent of the reported events was reported by Kommersant alone). See the weight of each source's coverage in Attachment 4.

For Ukraine, I used the five following sources: *Unian*, *Ukraïns'ki Novini*, *Interfax*, *RIA Novosti*, *ITAR TASS*. As mentioned in chapter 2, the choice of using only news wire reports for Ukraine while using mostly local newspapers in Russia implies limits in the comparative claims that I can make between these two cases. However, while *Unian* and *Ukraïns'ki Novini* are definitely news agencies, there are also based in Kyiv and report largely on domestic affairs, which make them closer to local newspapers than it might seem as first glance. They also publish most of their wire reports simultaneously in both Russian and Ukrainian, which neutralizes the language issue. Overall, these two Ukrainian sources alone reported more about 55 percent of the events found in the databases. See the weight of each source's coverage in Attachment 4.

Numeric Source Codes (SOURCES_NUM). A numeric code was given to each of the newspaper in Russia, as follows: *Izestiia* (code 1), *Kommersant* (code 2), *Moskovskii Komsomolets* (code 3), *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (4), and *Novaia gazeta* (code 5). When more than one newspaper was used, I simply added all the numeric codes associated to the sources. The same logic was repeated for Ukrainian sources with *Interfax* (code 1), *ITAR TASS* (code 2), *Ukraïns'ki Novini* (code 3), *Unian* (code 4), and *RIA Novosti* (code 5).

Report Date (STORY_DATE). The date of the report about an event. When there is more than one newspaper reporting on the same event, this variable represents the report date closest to the event. However, when there is only one newspaper, the variable is the exact date of publication.

Authorization by the Authorities (LEGAL). For Russia only. Whether or not the event was permitted by the authorities (coded 1 for yes or 0 for no). I only coded this variable if there was a

specific reference to the official authorization in the report. As a result, this variable should be used with caution.

Attachment 1. Territorial Codes

[ ] = Country
( ) = Administrative regions/Federal districts
xx = Capital/Administrative centers (cities)

Russia [1]

<u>Central Federal District (01)</u>

01. Belgorod
02. Briansk
03. Vladimir
04. Voronezh
05. Ivanovo
06. Kaluga
07. Kostroma
08. Kursk
09. Lipetsk
10. Moscow
12. Orel
13. Riazan
14. Smolensk
15. Tambov
16. Tver
17. Tula
18. Iaroslav
19. Others

<u>Southern Federal District (02)</u>

01. Maikop
02. Astrakhan
03. Volgograd
04. Elista
05. Krasnodar
06. Rostov-on-Don
07. Others

<u>Northwestern Federal District (03)</u>

01. Arkhangelsk
02. Vologda
03. Kaliningrad
04. Petrozavodsk
05. Syktyvkar
07. Murmansk

08. Narian-Mar
09. Velikii Novgorod
10. Pskov
11. St-Petersburg
12. Others

Far Eastern Federal District (04)

01. Blagoveshchensk
02. Birobidzhan
03. Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii
04. Magadan
05. Vladivostok
06. Iakutsk
07. Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk
08. Khabarovsk
09. Anadyr
10. Others

Siberian Federal District (05)

01. Gorno-Altaisk
02. Barnaul
03. Ulan-Ude
04. Chita
05. Irkutsk
06. Kemerovo
07. Krasnoiarsk
08. Novosibirsk
09. Omsk
10. Tomsk
11. Kyzyl
12. Abakan
13. Others

Ural Federal District (06)

01. Kurgan
02. Ekaterinburg
03. Tiumen
04. Khanty-Mansiisk
05. Cheliabinsk
06. Salekhard
07. Others

<u>Volga Federal District (07)</u>

01. Ufa
02. Kirov
03. Ioshkar-Ola
04. Saransk
05. Nizhnii-Novgorod
06. Orenburg
07. Penza
08. Perm'
09. Samara
10. Saratov
11. Kazan
12. Izhevsk
13. Ulianovsk
14. Cheboksary
15. Others

<u>North Caucasian Federal District (08)</u>

01. Makhachkala
02. Magas
03. Nalchik
04. Cherkessk
05. Vladikavkaz
06. Stavropol
07. Groznyi
08. Others

Ukraine [2]

<u>Cherkasy Region (01)</u>

01. Cherkasy
02. Others

<u>Chernihiv Region (02)</u>

01. Chernihiv
02. Others

<u>Chernivtsi Region (03)</u>

01. Chernivtsi

02. Others

Dnipropetrovs'k Region (04)

01. Dnipropetrovs'k
02. Others

Donetsk Region (05)

01. Donetsk
02. Others

Ivano-Frankivsk Region (06)

01. Ivano-Frankivsk
02. Others

Kharkiv Region (07)

01. Kharkiv
02. Others

Kherson Region (08)

01. Kherson
02. Others

Khmelnytsky Region (09)

01. Khmelnytsky
02. Others

Kyiv Region (10)

01. Kyiv
02. Others

Kirovohrad Region (11)

01. Kirovohrad
02. Others

Krym Region (12)

01. Simferopol
02. Sevastopol

03. Others

Luhansk Region (13)

01. Luhansk
02. Others

Lviv Region (14)

01. Lviv
02. Others

Mykolaiv Region (15)

01. Mykolaiv
02. Others

Odessa Region (16)

01. Odessa
02. Others

Poltava Region (17)

01. Poltava
02. Others

Rivne Region (18)

01. Rivne
02. Others

Sumy Region (19)

01. Sumy
02. Others

Ternopil Region (20)

01. Ternopil
02. Others

Vinnytsia Region (21)

01. Vinnytsia
02. Others

Volyn Region (22)

01. Lutsk
02. Others

Zakarpatska Region (23)

01. Uzhhorod
02. Others

Zaporizhzhia Region (24)

01. Zaporizhzhia
02. Others

Zhytomyr Region (25)

01. Zhytomyr
02. Others

Attachment 2. Event Types Codes

1.   Miting
2.   Shestvie
3.   Shestvie + Miting
4.   Piket
5.   Odinochnye pikety
6.   Manifestatsiia/Demonstratiia
7.   Narodnaia guliana
8.   Miting + Lager
9.   Progulka
10. Vstrecha s deputatom
11. Aktsiia
12. Avtoprobeg
13. Flashmob
14. Flashmob + Miting
15. Kruglyi stol
16. Sobranie
17. Zacedania
18. Press conference
19. Public platform
20. Seminar
21. Prayer
22. Film projection
23. Skhod
24. Subbotnik
25. Zabastovka
26. Lager
27. Golodovka
28. Lager + Golodovka
29. Blockade
30. Draka
31. Stychka
32. Boi
33. Attack
34. Avtoprobeg + Miting
35. Kontsert
36. Blockade + Lager
37. Zakhvat
38. Zakhvat + Golodovka
39. Forum

Attachment 3. Demands Codes

Russia

1.   Against abolition of bonuses
2.   Against acculturation of park area
3.   Against antireligious forces
4.   Against arrests of Muslims
5.   Against bad roads
6.   Against counter-terrorist operations
7.   Against gas price increase
8.   Against homosexuals
9.   Against increased repression in prison
10.   Against law on defamation
11.   Against Marat Gel'man exposition
12.   Against mayor
13.   Against migrants
14.   Against Moscow fusion
15.   Against MP opposition
16.   Against Nickel industry
17.   Against NTV (Anatomia protest)
18.   Against police behavior
19.   Against privatization
20.   Against protest actions
21.   Against raise of transport fee
22.   Against removing officials
23.   Against revolution
24.   Against school fusion
25.   Against seizure of company
26.   Against Shein
27.   Against SZHR
28.   Against taxi reforms
29.   Against the closing of industry
30.   Against the daycare new menu
31.   Against the Governor
32.   Against the opposition
33.   Against USA policies
34.   Against WTO
35.   Anti-regime
36.   Build a bridge
37.   Change of metro name station
38.   Commemorate August 19th
39.   Commemorate Mordovia unification with Russia
40.   Commercial issues

41. Commercialization of education
42. Compensation for no daycare
43. Construction issues
44. Creation of a new SMO: Fund sodeistvia obshchestvennomu kontroliu
45. Creation of a new SMO: Grazhdanskoe dvizhenie
46. Creation of a new SMO: Liga Izbiratelei
47. Creation of a new SMO: Saratovskoe obiedinnenie izbiratelei (SOI)
48. Criminal affair
49. Draft on children of war (bill)
50. Divers
51. Defend the elections
52. Denounce medical mistakes
53. Denounce corruption
54. Deprived of underwear (prison)
55. Detention of activists
56. Ecological issues
57. Education issues
58. Electoral issues
59. Ethnic issues
60. EU-Russia Summit
61. First anniversary of ONF
62. For a new program of restructuration of credits
63. For federal legislation against homosexual propaganda
64. For severe penalty for Rasul Mirzaev
65. Forest protection
66. Going regional
67. Healthcare system
68. Housing
69. Indignation regarding Sberbank publicity
70. In-kind benefits
71. Journalist arrest
72. Justice issue
73. Kidnapping
74. Labor
75. LGBT issue
76. Limitation of water
77. Linguistic issue
78. Magnitsky affair
79. May 1st
80. Monument for car accident victim
81. More territorial autonomy for Balkars
82. Mortgage loans
83. Mother allocations
84. Municipal issues / guardianship
85. Public garage
86. NATO base

87. No parking place
88. Organization and institutionalization
89. Protect traditional family and values
90. Publicizing protest actions
91. Reaction to previous event
92. Request help for housing
93. Require the involvement of the Ombudsman and better detentions
94. Removal of officials
95. River protection
96. Russian nationalism + unfair elections
97. Seliger 1 – Innovation
98. Seliger 2 – Economy
99. Seliger 3 – Construction
100. Seliger 4 – Civil Society
101. SSSR 2.0.
102. Support mayor
103. Support Novaia gazeta journalists
104. Support Pussy Riot
105. Support Pussy Riot + court decision
106. Support Pussy Riot + strategiia 31
107. Support Putin
108. Support Putin but ask for more humane conditions at work
109. Support the arrest of Igor Bestuzhii
110. Support UR and Putin
111. Support 6 may prisoners
112. Support Krym
113. Support Naval'ny
114. Support 31st article of the Constitution
115. Unfair elections
116. Unfair elections + against the governor
117. Unfair elections + Church too close to the state
118. Unfair elections + Defend a teacher
119. Unfair elections + ecological issues
120. Unfair elections + Egor Sviridov murder
121. Unfair elections + harsh conditions
122. Unfair elections + May 1 event
123. Unfair elections + May 6 event
124. Unfair elections + May 9 event
125. Unfair elections + minority issues
126. Unfair elections + NATO base
127. Unfair elections + new legislation of mass events
128. Unfair elections + political prisoners
129. Unfair elections + regional elections
130. Unfair elections + removal of the head of the Regional Election Commission
131. Unfair elections + sacking of school director
132. Unfair elections + stop dictatur!

133. Unfair elections + strategiia 31
134. Unfair elections + support Jirinovsky
135. Unfair elections + support Moscow
136. Unfair elections + support Shein
137. Unfair elections + support Ziuganov
138. Wage arrears
139. Wage cuts

Ukraine only.

140. 9th Anniversary of the Constitution
141. 14th Anniversary of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
142. 16th Anniversary of the retreat from Afghanistan
143. 19th Anniversary of Chernobyl events
144. 86th Anniversary of the reunification
145. 87th Anniversary of the Revolution
146. 222nd Anniversary of Crimea annexation to Russia
147. Against a monument for Yalta commemoration
148. Against appointment of officials
149. Against appointment of officials + land request
150. Against appointment of officials + require more transparency in power formation
151. Against attempt of Orange Revolution in Crimea
152. Against autocephalous
153. Against censorship
154. Against closure of a market
155. Against closure of TV channels
156. Against direction of a naval military channel
157. Against enterprise reorganization
158. Against food price increase
159. Against identification numbers in passports
160. Against internal appointment in Nasha Ukraina
161. Against Kyiv officials
162. Against law on compulsory car insurance
163. Against legalization of marijuana
164. Against local power's actions
165. Against liquidation of communal pharmacies
166. Against the new regime policies
167. Against media pressure
168. Against national Internet register
169. Against NATO adhesion
170. Against NATO adhesion + against seizure of energy company
171. Against NATO adhesion + union with Russia
172. Against NATO and EU integration
173. Against non-ecologial actions of officials
174. Against non-respect of constitutional rights

175. Against occupation
176. Against opening procedures for bankruptcy of Avtomotozapchast'
177. Against Orange band performance
178. Against Poezd druzhby
179. Against political reforms
180. Against political repression
181. Against Russian gas oligarchs
182. Against selling narkotiki in drugstores
183. Against separatism
184. Against the arbitrariness of power
185. Against the blockade of Kabmin
186. Against the broadcasting of anti-orange documentary
187. Against the decrease in custom tariffs
188. Against the formation of Nasha Ukraina faction
189. Against the interdiction of holding a rally of shareholders
190. Against the selling of lands
191. Against Tymoshenko for PM
192. Against UPA recognition
193. Against Yushchenko inauguration
194. Against Yushchenko
195. Against Yanukovich
196. Against travel price increase
197. Ask for the arrest of separatist leaders
198. Avoid nomination of officials
199. Broadcasting issue
200. Call for peace
201. Cancel the increase in custom duties
202. Cancel the election results
203. Celebrate day of the Fatherland Defense
204. Celebrate Soviet Army Day + Russian language
205. Celebrate Yushchenko's victory
206. Change hospital location
207. Church conflict
208. Cleaning and demilitarization
209. Commemorate Jewish genocide
210. Commemorate political repression victims
211. Commemorate War Heroes
212. Consolidate the youth
213. Construction of a new Church
214. Crimean Tatars status and rights
215. Den' Evropy
216. Den' pobedy
217. Den' Rossiia
218. Denounce party practices
219. Denounce the shortage of natural gaz
220. Denounce Uzkbek authorities at UN

221.	For EU adhesion
222.	For fair elections in Moldova
223.	For the Dynamo club
224.	For the stability of the Dnipropetrovs'k oblast
225.	Free Ivan Rizak + against political repression
226.	Free Boris Kolesnikov
227.	Free Yushchenko lawyer, Petr Grigorenko
228.	Implementation of social program in Chernobyl
229.	Increase in salaries
230.	Investigate privatization
231.	In memory of Pope John-Paul II
232.	In memory of Taras Shevchenko
233.	In memory of Vyacheslav Chornovil
234.	Kushnarev delo
235.	Land issues
236.	Legalization of marijuana
237.	Living conditions in dormitory
238.	Lustration
239.	May 1st + against UPA recognition
240.	May 1st + stop repression and increase of prices
241.	May 1st + Union with Russia and Belarus
242.	National student strike
243.	Nationalization of energy company
244.	Naval celebrations
245.	No trust in local leaders
246.	Pensions
247.	Pressure on prosecutor
248.	Prosecution of officials
249.	Removal of Arsen Avakov
250.	Removal of Genprokurator
251.	Removal of Justice officials
252.	Removal of Ruslan Bodelan
253.	Removal of Student union's representative
254.	Removal of Sergeii Kas'ianov
255.	Removal of Sergei Kunitsyn
256.	Removal of Sergei Ryzhuk
257.	Removal of the government
258.	Removal of the police head
259.	Removal of UMVD officials
260.	Removal of university rector
261.	Require faster investigation of Gongadze's case
262.	Require investigation of company Nibulon
263.	Require investigation of university rector's actions during the elections
264.	Require the abolition of the ban for entry in Belarus
265.	Require Yushchenko's intervention to solve the crisis in the city
266.	Resignation of Kabmin

267. Review budget provision for entrepreneurs
268. Reunification to Russia – 51th Anniversary of the annexation to Ukraine
269. Russian language recognition
270. Status of Sevastopol
271. Status of veterans
272. Stop classification of legal acts
273. Stop Yushchenko campaign pollution
274. Support Arsen Avakov
275. Support Boris Kolesnikov
276. Support Cherkasy student protest
277. Support Kyiv officials
278. Support medical clinic independence
279. Support Ruslan Bodelan
280. Support Sergei Kas'ianov
281. Support Sergei Kunitsyn
282. Support Soviet Ministrov Kryma
283. Support TV channel
284. Support Tymoshenko for PM
285. Support university rector
286. Support Union of Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus
287. Support Yanukovich
288. Support Yanukovich + 14th anniversary of the restoration of the Crimea autonomy
289. Support Yanukovich + against separatism
290. Support Yanukovich + federalism of Ukraine
291. Support Yanukovich + referendum
292. Support Yanukovich + reject election results
293. Support Yanukovich + removal of Evgeniia Burlachenko
294. Support Yanukovich + resignation of executive committee
295. Support Yanukovich + respect of constitutional rights
296. Support Yanukovich + Support Evgeniia Kushnarev
297. Support Yushchenko
298. Support Yushchenko + against separatism
299. Support Yushchenko + den' sobornosti
300. Support Yushchenko + mayor
301. Support Yushchenko + media biais
302. Support Yushchenko + removal of Anatoliia Kukoby
303. Support Yushchenko + removal of Evegenii Kushnarev
304. Support Yushchenko + removal of Kaletnik
305. Support Yushchenko + removal of Khomiaka
306. Support Yushchenko + removal of Kozak
307. Support Yushchenko + removal of Sergei Kivalov
308. Support Yushchenko + removal of Smotr and Romaniv
309. Support Yushchenko + request extraordinary session of the City Council
310. Tax issues
311. Unhappy with protest conditions
312. Unfair elections + against Russia meddling into domestic affairs

313.	Unfair elections + dismissal of government bodies
314.	Unfair elections + removal of all officials related to the fraud
315.	Unite democratic forces in Crimea and remind Yushchenko of Crimea claims
316.	Unite protestant forces
317.	UPA recognition
318.	Want investment program back
319.	Yushchenko vs. Yanukovich
320.	Recognize Yuri Luzhkov as person non-grata
321.	Support Petr Holovatenko
322.	Against Russification
323.	Against insurance increase

Attachment 4. Weight of Source Coverage

Media Coverage of Protest Events in Russia, December 2011-August 2012

Sources	Reported events (along with other source(s)) (n=1114)	Exclusively reported events (n=1114)	Exclusively reported FFE events (n=675)	Exclusively reported pro-regime events (n=186)
Izvestiia	8 %	1 %	< 1 %	< 1 %
Kommersant	60%	43 %	43%	51 %
MK	21 %	9,6 %	9,3 %	6,5 %
Nezavisimaia gazeta	24 %	13 %	14,2 %	11,3 %
Novaia gazeta	25 %	13 %	10 %	1 %

Media Coverage of Protest Events in Ukraine, November 2004-June 2005

Sources	Reported events (along with other source(s)) (n=2390)	Exclusively reported events (n=2390)	Exclusively Reported Orange events (n=1330)	Exclusively Reported Blue events (n=858)
Interfax	20 %	4,8 %	5 %	4,2 %
ITAR-TASS	16,8%	5,5 %	2,1%	11,2 %
Ukraïns'ki Novini	64 %	35,5 %	34,2 %	37 %
Unian	49 %	19 %	21,3 %	11,5 %
RIA	2 %	< 1 %	< 1 %	< 1 %

Appendix B

Table 3A. Number of protest events organized by cities by the Orange movement, November 2004-June 2005

City	Frequency	Percentage
Kyiv	413	31%
Simferopol	111	8%
Lviv	81	6%
Poltova	73	5%
Ternopil	62	5%
Vinnytsia	60	5%
Cherkasy	58	4%
Kherson	47	4%
Sumy	45	3%
Kharkiv	44	3%
Dnipropetrovs'k	44	3%
Chernivsti	37	3%
Odessa	30	2%
Uzhhorod	29	2%
Ivano-Franskivsk	21	2%
Kirovohrad	20	2%
Zaporizhzhia	17	1%
Pryluky	13	1%
Mykolaiv	12	1%
Rivne	11	1%
Luhansk	10	1%
Zhytomyr	7	1%
Evpatroriia	7	1%
Chernihiv	7	1%
Donetsk	6	<1%
Sevastopol	6	<1%

Lutsk	6	<1 %
Akhtyrka	4	<1 %
Nedrigayliv	3	<1 %
Khmelnytsky	3	<1 %
Drohobych	2	<1 %
Mukachevo	2	<1 %
Yalta	2	<1 %
Others	37	3%
Total	1330	100%

Table 3B. Number of protest events organized by cities by the Blue countermovement, November 2004-June 2005

Cities	Frequency	Percentage
Kyiv	146	17%
Donetsk	141	16%
Odessa	125	15%
Simferopol	104	12%
Kharkiv	53	6%
Cherkasy	45	5%
Uzhhorod	41	5%
Sevastopol	37	4%
Luhansk	30	3%
Kherson	25	3%
Dnipropetrovs'k	23	3%
Zaporizhzhia	17	2%
Mykolaiv	13	2%
Mariupol	9	1%
Chernihiv	7	1%
Poltava	5	1%
Ternopil	4	<1%
Kirovohrad	4	<1%
Zhytomyr	3	<1%
Vinnytsia	2	<1%
Rivne	2	<1%
Ivano-Franskivsk	2	<1%
Sumy	2	<1%
Others	18	<1%
Total	858	100%

Table 3C. Societal support for the Orange movement[337]

Did you support the leaders of the Orange Revolution and do you support them now?	2005	2006	2008
Supported and continue to support	40,7	29	22,4
Supported but do not support now	3,8	15,1	16,7
Did not support and support now	7,7	5,8	4,9
Did not support and do not support now	26,8	38,7	41,5
Difficult to say	20,7	11,3	14,2

Source: Golovakha and Panina (2008, p. 77).

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[337] My translation: "Chy pidtrymuvali Vy politichnykh lideriv 'pomaranchevoi revoliutsii, i chy pidtrymuete vy ikh zaraz".

Appendix C

Table 5A. Number of Protests Organized by Cities by the FFE movement, December 2011-August 2012

Cities	Frequency	Percentage
Moscow	155	23%
Astrakhan	48	7%
St. Petersburg	46	7%
Zhukov	44	7%
Kazan	37	5%
Nizhny-Novgorod	26	4%
Cheliabinsk	18	3%
Volgograd	15	2%
Cheboksary	13	2%
Khabarovsk	13	2%
Ufa	11	2%
Ekaterinburg	10	1%
Krasnoiarsk	10	1%
Lermontov	10	1%
Novosibirsk	10	1%
Rostov-on-Don	10	1%
Saratov	9	1%
Orenburg	8	1%
Samara	8	1%
Voronezh	8	1%
Vladivostok	7	1%
Ioshkar-Ola	6	1%
Omsk	6	1%
Tomsk	6	1%
Ulianovsk	6	1%
Kaliningrad	5	1%
Kyzyl	5	1%

Perm	5	1%
Srednaia Ákhtuba	5	1%
Barnaul	4	1%
Blagoveshchensk	4	1%
Irkutsk	4	1%
Kurgan	4	1%
Penza	4	1%
Riazan	4	1%
Tiumen	4	1%
Iaroslav	3	<1 %
Kemerovo	3	<1 %
Kirov	3	<1 %
Krasnodar	3	<1 %
Ulan-Ude	3	<1 %
Arkhangelsk	2	<1 %
Balakovo	2	<1 %
Belgorod	2	<1 %
Bogorodsk	2	<1 %
Chita	2	<1 %
Izhevsk	2	<1 %
Kursk	2	<1 %
Lipetsk	2	<1 %
Magnitogorsk	2	<1 %
Shakhty	2	<1 %
Sochi	2	<1 %
Syktyvkar	2	<1 %
Tambov	2	<1 %
Velikii Novgorod	2	<1 %
Vologda	2	<1 %
Others	42	6%
	675	