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'THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REVOLUTION':
AN INQUIRY INTO ŞEVKET SÜREYYA AYDEMİR'S INTERPRETATION OF THE TURKISH REVOLUTION

by

Ahmet Kuyaş

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ABSTRACT

Influenced by national Communists with whom he came in contact in Bolshevik Russia, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir developed in early republican Turkey a theory which he called theory of national emancipation movements. According to this theory, the emancipation of a colonial nation did not consist only of obtaining political sovereignty. A vanguard of revolutionary elite had to monopolize power, and lead the nation to the creation of a classless society. It was understood that the coming of this new society was the prerequisite for the success of socialist revolution in industrialized countries. Yet, although many in the Kemalist regime felt sympathetic to this theory, the regime did ultimately not endorse it. This is a significant turning point in modern Turkish history, for this response, among other indicators, shows that the new Turkish regime was willing to be a part of the European system despite the latter's record as colonizer and imperialist.

RÉSUMÉ

Sous l'influence des communistes nationaux qu'il a connus en Russie bolchevique, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir a élaboré une théorie des luttes d'indépendance nationale dans la Turquie des années 30. Selon cette théorie, l'acquisition de la souveraineté politique n'était pas suffisante pour l'indépendance totale et le développement des pays colonisés. Il fallait qu'une avant-garde d'élites révolutionnaires saisit le pouvoir, et dirigeât la jeune nation vers l'édification d'une société sans classes. Ce processus était considéré aussi comme une condition nécéssaire pour l'avènement de la révolution socialiste dans les pays industrialisés. Quoiqu'un certain nombre de kémalistes eut été attirés par cette théorie qui fut tolérée pour un certain temps, le régime kémaliste ne l'a finalement pas adoptée. Cette décision du régime marque un tournant décisif dans l'histoire de la Turquie contemporaine, car elle montre que les dirigeants du pays étaient décidés à se joindre à l'Europe malgré le charactère impérialiste de celle-ci.

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INTRODUCTION

The present thesis was conceived originally as a first step in the writing of the history of the Kemalist Revolution and early republican Turkey. When its author started his training in history, not only was the history of that period still not written, but also those in and outside the profession who had taken up the challenge in the form of monographs were facing serious difficulties in rationalizing their subject-matter. The period was a particularly difficult and painful one in the still continuing process of liberalizing the country. While Turkish Marxists, some of whom perceived themselves as the heirs to Kemalist principles, were being subjected to a ruthless repression legitimized by the same principles, the liberals and secular conservatists were trying to reconcile the ongoing economic and political liberalization with authoritarian and etatist Kemalism. Under these circumstances, the historical profession underwent a serious crisis similar to that which François Furet defined in his book on the historiography of the French Revolution in 1978:

> [I]t is particularly difficult for societies that claim a revolutionary 'founding', especially if it is relatively recent, to write their contemporary history.[1]

In Turkey, during the first half of the 1980s, liberal and secular conservatist discourse jettisoned the idea of a Kemalist revolution. The political make-up of the nation had changed. Due to a certain ideological liberalization going back to the Seventies, religious circles did not feel compelled to cooperate with the liberals and right-wing secularists anymore, and founded their own political parties. The response to this development by liberals and right-wing secularists still obsessed with the 1950s, when huge Democratic Party majorities in the Parliament had ruled the country, was to make concessions from Kemalist secularism.[2] Strikingly, a group of prominent Marxists who had assumed the role of intellectual leadership in the Turkish left during the 1970s joined in this trend of retreat from the Revolution. Unable to make the distinction between the Kemalist Revolution itself and the mili-

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1. François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, translated by Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 83.

2. It would be interesting to note here, as a historiographic example, that a chronology of the Kemalist period published in 1973 by the Institute for the History of the Turkish Revolution under the title of "Chronology of Atatürk and the Turkish Revolution, 1918-1938" was reprinted by the Turkish Historical Society in 1988 as "Chronology of Atatürk and the History of the Republic of Turkey, 1918-1938;" see Utkan Kocatürk, Atatürk ve Türk Devrimi Kronolojisi, 1918-1938 (Ankara: Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1973), and idem, Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Kronolojisi, 1918-1938 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988).

tary repression of the early Seventies and Eighties, which used the Kemalist jargon as a legitimizing rhetoric, the latter started to trace the history of their predicament back to Kemalist times. A combination of revolutionary romanticism, political expediency and persecution complex exaggerated this critique to the point of denying any revolutionary virtue to the Kemalist regime. This was all the more ironical since the Marxist left in Turkey, at least a majority of its most articulate and resourceful representatives, had wholeheartedly supported the Kemalists in the 1920s and 30s.

The idea of a study on a Marxist view of the Kemalist regime that had developed contemporaneously with Kemalism, thus emerged. In addition to its possible contribution to the understanding of the current ideological problems of the Republic, such an idea also had the virtue of focusing on the only substantial body of writing on Kemalism by non-Kemalists of the period. The reading of the publications of the Communist Party of Turkey during the 1920s soon revealed, however, that this literature would be of greater help to the student of the communist doctrine of the Twenties than to a historian interested in better understanding the Kemalist regime. A group of defectors from the Communist Party who joined the Kemalists in the late 1920s proved to be a more interesting subject for a thesis. Its obvious focus would be the <u>Kadro</u> movement, which is more often cited than properly understood, and which took its name from the journal published by the above-mentioned

group of "renegades" between 1932 and 1935.

Closer scrutiny revealed the Kadro movement to be more than just a sympathetic Marxist interpretation of the Kemalist regime. The journal had an original doctrine or, as it was called at that time, an ideology of its own, which rationalized the Kemalist Revolution as a first step on the way to achieve yet a greater, worldwide revolution. Although the entire group subscribed to it, it was obvious that this ideology was the brainchild of a single individual who, in his turn, was the product of Turkish nationalism and the Bolshevik Revolution. The dissertation had found its title.

The present thesis is thus the story of an ideology developed in Turkey during the first half of the 1930s. As such, it is also the story of the individual, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who propounded this ideology. Yet, it is not intended as a biography. First of all, the thesis ends with the formulation of the ideology and does not deal with the subsequent life of its author. Second, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's life until the formulation of his ideology is not traced in all its aspects either. Although it is hoped that a real human figure will nevertheless emerge from the following pages, the intention was naturally not to narrate a life story in full.

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1897 - March 25, 1976) started his political career as a fervent nationalist. His adolescent years coincided with the period when Turkish nationalism invaded the Ottoman-Turkish political and intellectual circles.

Yet, the extraordinary circumstances of the immediate post-World War I years led him to join the Communists. He lived between 1919 and 1923 in different parts of what ultimately became the Soviet Union. After a very active career in the Communist Party of Turkey in the mid-1920s, he joined the Kemalists in 1928 and published, together with several other intellectuals of his generation, the monthly journal Kadro in Ankara from January 1932 to January 1935. Although his ideas were not welcomed by the regime and his journal was ultimately closed down, he remained in the civil service and rose in the hierarchy. After the first free elections won by the Democratic Party in 1950, he retired as a man of the ancien régime and remained in oblivion for about a decade. His star rose again when he became a well-known figure in Turkish intellectual circles in the 1960s and 70s. His fame was due to his numerous articles published in the weekly Yön and the daily newspapers Vatan and Cumhuriyet, as well as to his monumental biographies of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1963-1965), İsmet İnönü (1966-1968) and Enver Pasha (1970-1972). This was a deserved fame, for his biography of the founder of modern Turkey is, in this author's opinion, still the best among a multitude of works on Atatürk, and the last two, although far from equalling the former in both historiographic and literary quality, have the merit of being still the only biographies of İnönü and Enver Pasha. These biographical works, which cover no less than seven decades of late Ottoman and modern Turkish history, are

also significant for the perspective developed in the pages below, for they constitute a sort of addendum to Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's autobiography, published in 1959. As a matter of fact, their author's fate had been closely related to the fortunes and achievements of these three leaders for almost forty years.

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir also had a significant influence on Turkish left-wing intellectuals of various allegiances during the 1960s and early 70s. In the very seminal intellectual milieu created by the Constitution of 1961 he had come to the fore with a series of articles in the journal Yön (1961-1963 and 1964-1967). These articles, written mostly in defense of Kemalist etatism with a peculiar socialist jargon, had an immediate and favorable echo in both the Turkish left and the old-guard Kemalist circles. The period was in fact extremely propitious for such a reception. A new enthusiasm, even an optimism had been generated by the belief that the country had resumed the Kemalist path of revolutionary change. This meant for the Kemalists a return to the basic principles of the Republic which, they believed, had been ill-treated during the preceding decade under the rule of the Democratic Party. As for the Turkish left, since they had thus far considered Kemalist state capitalism as an easier path to collective ownership of the means of production, this restoration was also a positive step.

The international situation too constituted an impetus for

such a revival. It was in fact the peak period of the decolonization process. What was going to be named the "Third World" was being emancipated. Moreover, a new idea developed by the colonial peoples, namely the idea of non-alignment, had a strong appeal in the paranoid atmosphere generated by the Cold War. These concepts of national independence and non-alignment were considered to be genuinely Kemalist principles by the generations educated in Republican schools. The Turkish National Struggle was seen as the first of its kind and an example for the colonial and semi-colonial peoples. The idea of non-alignment, on the other hand, was welcomed as the application of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's famous dictum, Yurtta sulh cihanda sulh, "Peace at home, peace on earth," to the then prevailing political and psychological atmosphere throughout the globe, which feared a third and even bloodier world war.

Finally, and on a more exclusively academic level, the support that the Soviet Union accorded to the colonial peoples after Stalin's death in their struggle for independence and development had created in the late 1950s a rich body of literature on the precedents of this support. The heroic age of the Communist International, the way it had rationalized the National and Colonial Question, and the revolutionary appeals it had issued to the attention of colonial nations were studied in numerous books and articles of which Şevket Süreyya Aydemir was certainly aware. As a product of this heroic age of the Communist International and encouraged by the above-mentioned

conditions, Aydemir referred in the pages of Yön to his attempt in the journal Kadro at developing an original ideology for the Turkish Revolution during the early 1930s. He was in fact extremely moved to witness the awakening of the colonial world, an event which the Comintern had expected in the early 1920s. Moreover, as it was predicted by many Communists during that period, the international situation in the early 1960s looked as if the decisive settling of accounts between capitalism and socialism would take place in this newly emerging "Third World." He thought that his arguments of more than thirty years ago were finally being put into practice. In 1968, he even published the second edition of his book İnkılâp ve Kadro, "The Revolution and the Cadre," which was originally published in 1932 and consisted of a revised version of both his articles in Kadro, centered around the theme of national liberation movements, and two memoranda he had composed in 1931.

The present thesis studies both Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's unusual intellectual adventure until he joined the Kemalists, and the making of the ideology he developed for the Kemalist regime under the latter's suspicious gaze. Chapter 1 covers his career as a nationalist until Enver Pasha's definitive failure to recapture the political leadership in Turkey. Chapter 2 follows Aydemir as a member of the Communist Party of Turkey until the party's official demise in early 1928. The third chapter is a survey of the Kemalist regime from the beginning of the Turkish National Struggle to the early

Thirties, and requires some explanation with respect to its terminology.

In addition to both his intellectual and psychological predisposition and the changes which occurred in the communist doctrine prior to his decision to join the Kemalists, the nature of the Kemalist regime as well was an important factor in Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's ultimate choice. In the following account of that regime, which is usually and correctly referred to as Jacobin, the terms "dictatorship" and "dictatorial rule" are also used. They are not, however, intended as derogatory appellations. They simply indicate a political fact, a feature which cannot be dissociated from revolutionary politics. They are not invested with the ahistorical meaning that today's political scientists employ for regimes which do not fulfill the requirements of modern democracy.

Today's Turkey is a relatively democratic country. Bearing in mind that her democratic record stands better than many Latin American and some European countries, this is not a minor achievement for a nation whose cultural past did not have any contribution whatsoever to the development of modern democracy. The author personally believes that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's ultimate vision of his country's future was a fully developed democracy. The question, however, is still a matter of debate, and even a matter of polemics, in Turkey. It is a fact that he did not rule as a democratic leader. Yet, he was a dictator who imposed democracy upon his people. This tragic role he

played in Turkish history was best described by himself, and at a rather early stage of his revolutionary career, in a conversation with the journalists of Istanbul:

> An individual would think in a particular manner in Ankara, in a different manner in Izmir or Istanbul, and in yet another different manner in Paris.[3]

It should be added here that the dictum "Sovereignty belongs to the nation" appears in Turkish political thought with him, and that he took special pains to do everything via the legislature. As to his successor, the only additional but no minor credit the historian can give to İsmet İnönü is that, once compelled to establish parliamentarian democracy by mainly external factors, he played an honest game according to the rules, to the point of alienating individuals of his entourage who were not ready to relinquish the sweet advantages of political power. Yet, as it has been noted above, one does not have to be a democrat to have contributed to the building of democracy. It has to be admitted that democracy has social, legal, economic and ideological prerequisites, and, even if the Kemalists are ultimately proven to be individuals who did not have great sympathy for democracy, the fact that their revolutionary dictatorship prepared the ground for democracy precisely in these fields will still remain to be recognized. Consequently, the account of the Kemalist regime in Chapter 3

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[3]. See Arı İnan ed., Gazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün 1923 Eskişehir - İzmit Konuşmaları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1982), p. 51.

should not be read as an indictment of this regime.

The fourth and final chapter will sum up and discuss Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's ideas developed in his articles in Kadro and in his book, İnkılâp ve Kadro. The significance of Aydemir's ideology in modern Turkish history and its ultimate fate will be discussed in the concluding pages.

All the translations in the thesis are mine, unless otherwise indicated. For all names and publication titles in Ottoman Turkish, the modern Turkish spelling is given throughout the thesis.

Chapter 1

The Nationalist Militant

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir was born in 1897 in a district in the northeastern outskirts of Edirne called Sofu İlyas. He was the third son of a relatively poor refugee family. Like the rest of the inhabitants of the neighborhood, both his father Mehmet Efendi, the gardener of a local notable, and his mother Şaziye Hanım were Balkan refugees from Deliorman (Northern Bulgaria) and Eastern Rumelia respectively.[1] Whereas Mehmet Efendi's profession and his quasi-religious devotion to it may have been influential on Aydemir's lifestyle in his later years of retirement, Şaziye Hanım's personality and skills had an

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[1]. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, 4th edn. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1971), pp. 21-22; see also idem, Kırmızı Mektuplar ve Son Yazıları (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1979), pp. 68-69. With reference to the mountainous environment he describes, Aydemir is most probably wrong when he calls the region where his mother's family came from as Western Thrace. In fact, it is also probable that his mother's family moved to Edirne not in 1878 as he claims, but following the annexation of Eastern Rumelia by Bulgaria, that is to say, sometime after 1885.

Owing to the frequency of our references to Suyu Arayan Adam which is Aydemir's autobiography, paginations in square brackets will be given throughout the Chapters 1, 2 and 4.

immediately decisive and lasting impact on the young Şevket. In her capacity as the only literate person in the neighborhood, Şaziye Hanım taught her son to read and write at an early age, raising him thus to the rank of second-in-charge for the public reading sessions which took place in their house [pp. 25 and 28]. This particularity of Aydemir's sharpened further when he attended the district school (mahalle mektebi) next to Muradiye Mosque, for he became the only school-child of the neighborhood after his elder brothers, who had by then enrolled in military boarding schools [pp. 32-33].

As the name Sofu İlyas, "İlyas the Devout," indicates, Aydemir's surroundings were deeply religious. The religious life he describes in his autobiography is dominated by a folk Islam permeated by all sorts of superstition on the one hand, and a somewhat sophisticated mysticism with Şaziye Hanım at its center, on the other. As a matter of fact, Aydemir's mother was a mevlevi who held frequent zikir ceremonies in her house, including the yearly commemoration of Şebb-i arus, the death anniversary of Mevlana Celalettin-i Rumi.[2] Living in this religious atmosphere and being initiated into Islamic mysticism at an early age contributed to Aydemir's growth into a pious school-boy. We know that during his school years he made his way into the mevlevi convent adjacent to his school, thanks to the complicity of its gardener, and attended sema ceremonies

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2. Idem, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 25 and 30; see also Halil İbrahim Göktürk, Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (Ankara: Arı Matbaası, 1977), p. 15.

[pp. 35-39]. Commenting on the omnipresence of religion in Edirne and the numerous old mosques dominating the city's silhouette from every angle, Aydemir also recalls that these mosques "later became [his] constant visiting sites" [p. 31].

The city of Edirne in general, and its Sofu İlyas district in particular, had characteristics other than their religiosity to work on a young mind at the start of the 20th century. Capital city of the Ottoman empire before Istanbul, and the starting point of the conquest campaigns in Europe, Edirne nad become towards the end of the 19th century a frontier outpost, only a few miles away from the Bulgarian border. Following the territorial losses after the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, it had replaced Şumnu (Shumen, Kolarovo) as headquarters of the Second Army and acquired the features of a huge fortress [pp. 20 and 43]. With its awareness of hosting an army retreating from the shores of the Danube, its fresh memory of Russian occupation in 1878, and its thousands of refugees from all over what used to be Ottoman Europe, the city of Edirne knew too well that the Empire was shrinking. Naturally, this consciousness was more poignant in Aydemir's social milieu since all the inhabitants of his neighborhood considered themselves descendants of the conquerors [p. 20]. Yet, we find in the mood which Aydemir himself describes more than a mixture of nostalgia and sorrow kept alive by countless stories relating the lands abandoned and the tragic circumstances in which they were left behind. In fact, the atmosphere these refugees breathed was

one of doom: they believed that their retreat had not yet come to an end [pp. 19-23].

The profound pessimism of these refugees concerning their fate may have had its roots in an empirical wisdom that they had drawn from a long experience which lasted for more than a century. But daily life in the Balkans at the turn of the century had nothing optimistic to offer either. Nationalistic contentions in the region had finally come into the open in the form of guerrilla warfare. Armed groups known by the name or the pseudonym of their leaders terrorized every village and small town in order to achieve ethnic-national homogeneity within the largest possible territory.[3] Stories of their exploits and crimes were told in Edirne's Sofu İlyas district so frequently that children used to adopt the names and strategies of these leaders in their most preferred outdoor game, called çetecilik or komitecilik.[4] Aydemir tells his readers that this game degenerated more than once into pitched battles between the children of Muslim and Christian districts

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[3]. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 10 and 48. Aydemir also remembers the mobilization of the army units stationed in Edirne on the occasion of "a Bulgarian uprising" for which he gives the date of 1905 (ibid., p. 48). This is undoubtedly the Ilinden-Preobrazhensko rising of August 1903; see Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History (Boulder and New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 283-285.

[4]. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 14-18. These two words mean literally "band membership" and "committee membership." They are derived respectively from çete, the Turkish version of chete, "band" in Bulgarian, and komite or komita which became the generic name for the guerrilla groups in the Balkans after the name of the Supreme Macedonian Committee.

of the city, and makes the following comment on the occasion of one such skirmish in which adults were involved with knives and revolvers:

> It was as if both sides had anticipated, after an unexpected spark, the last and decisive settling of accounts in which they knew they would sooner or later engage.[5]

When the Young Turk Revolution stopped these ethnic conflicts temporarily, Aydemir was a military rüşdiye (middle school) student. There is certainly more than one reason which finally made his parents choose for him [p. 33] the same profession as his elder brothers, who were by then commissioned officers in remote parts of the Empire. The most obvious one derives from the fact that state service was naturally the only possible way to social promotion for a young man of Aydemir's condition. Yet, this consideration does not explain the preference of a military career to a position in the civil service. The reasons for this choice, that Aydemir fully acknowledges for himself in his autobiography, were his fascination, like anybody else in his neighborhood, with the military attire of his brothers when they came home for short leaves, and the military spirit that everyday life in the city of Edirne had inculcated into his mind [p. 43]. Another possible motivation

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[5]. Ibid., pp. 18-19. These inter-ethnic war games seem to be quite widespread in the Balkans at that period. In his memoirs, Zekeriya Sertel relates the same phenomenon in Usturumca (Strumica), where he was born in 1890; see his Hatırladıklarım, 2nd edn. (Istanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977), pp. 17-18.

may have been the longing for the lands of the forefathers or the eagerness to defend the ones for which an undeclared war had been waged uninterruptedly since the 1880s. As a matter of fact, this latter was also the main motivation of the Young Turk revolutionaries in proclaiming the restoration of the 1876 Constitution in Manastır (Bitola, Bitolj) on 23 July, 1908.

Aydemir was among those who welcomed the new regime enthusiastically. He preached to his neighborhood on the auspicious changes that the new regime would bring about, and missed none of the demonstrations in favor of the Revolution [pp. 50-51]. He, in fact, already belonged to the group of politicized students in the military school [p. 47], probably because of his early acquaintance through his brothers with the "evils" of the Ottoman administration under Abdülhamit II. These young men, like the great majority of the officers of their generation, were staunch constitutionalists, and the older one used to refer to the sultan with the rhyming and rather strong word <u>şeytan</u>, "Satan." They had also volunteered for <u>Hareket Ordusu</u>, "The Action Army," composed of units loyal to the Revolution and aiming to crush the counter-revolutionary uprising which occurred in the capital city on April 13, 1909 [p. 53].

Apart from comments on the prevailing spirit in his military school, which consisted mainly of a preparation for future conquests [pp. 44-46], and more or less retrospective remarks on the general conditions of the Empire, Aydemir's

autobiography is almost completely silent on the four years between the anti-constitutionalist uprising and the aftermath of the Balkan War. This is all the more striking since the period is particularly eventful both for Aydemir and his relatives on the one hand, and the city of Edirne on the other. Only short notes here and there indicate that his eldest brother had died shortly before the siege of Edirne by the Bulgarian and Serbian armies, that his other brother was among the defenders of the city, and that he himself "was sent to Istanbul with the children."[6] When he turns up again in Edirne after the war, Aydemir tells his readers that in the meantime his mother had passed away and his father, incapacitated by blindness, had lost his job with no pension whatsoever [p. 65]. He does not mention the particularly harsh winter conditions and the state of starvation in which Edirne had endured the siege, which lasted for about five months. Although he devotes two chapters of his biography of Enver Pasha to the Balkan War and narrates in detail some of the major battles, Aydemir barely mentions the siege of Edirne in the same work.[7] Strikingly, his stay in Istanbul is not developed either, although it must have been a very difficult experience, for the

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[6]. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 59. Aydemir's eldest brother must have died because of poor health; mention is made of him as a sickly person (ibid., p. 53), and Aydemir does not use the term şehit, "martyr," when referring to his death.

[7]. Idem, Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya: Enver Paşa, 3 vols. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970-1972); for the Balkan War, see ibid., Vol. II, pp. 305-373.

capital city was crowded with thousands of refugees, and its hotels, private houses and even major mosques were transformed into hospitals to care for the wounded or cholera-stricken soldiers.[8]

The most interesting feature of this period in Aydemir's life, however, is the fact that after the Balkan War he emerges as a student in a teachers' training college [p. 65]. Given his age and the duration of studies in a rüşdiye, Aydemir must have attended the military idadi (high school) before the outbreak of the Balkan War. Evidence suggests that he in fact did so. According to Selim Sun, a retired general and Aydemir's classmate, Aydemir had attended Kuleli High School, the prestigious military idadi of Istanbul, but was obliged to go back to Edirne after the Balkan War as the only person to take care of his disabled father,[9] his only living brother having been transferred to duty in Samsun, on the Black Sea.[10] Yet, there was neither a reason nor the possibility for him to attend this school, for Edirne had a military idadi of its own.[11] On the other hand, if we assume that Aydemir had

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8. See the memoirs of Cemil Topuzlu who was the mayor of Istanbul at that time: 80 Yıllık Hatıralarım (Istanbul: Güven Basım ve Yayınevi, 1951), pp. 151-160; cf. Sara Ertuğrul Korle ed., Geçmiş Zaman Olur ki... Prenses Mevhibe Celalettin'in Anıları (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1987), pp. 197-199.

9. Göktürk, p. 25, footnote.

10. Aydemir, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, p. 101.

11. See Edirne vilayeti hakkında bazı malumat-ı tarihiyye ve nafıa ve mevadd-ı sairedir ([Edirne?]: n.p., ca.1892), pp. 152-154; cf. 1309 sene-i hicriyyesine mahsus salname-i vilayet-i Edirne ([Edirne]: Vilayet Matbaası, ca.1892), pp. 100-101. As the seat of the Second Army, Edirne had even its own War

already reached the senior class in high school in 1912 and that he had to go to Istanbul to complete it in conformity with the new organization of the military schools,[12] he could not have returned to Edirne before graduation since the city was not recovered by the Ottoman troops until July 1913. Hence, we believe that Aydemir attended the military high school in Edirne and that he was forced to leave, most probably upon the insistence of his parents, who feared the possible death of their youngest son who would have certainly entered the trenches as a cadet.[13] Naturally, this required his resignation, and he had to choose another career.[14]

One obvious reason for which the Balkan War years are effaced from Aydemir's memory consists of the misfortunes of his family. But the trauma his resignation has caused seems to be the ultimate reason behind this silence. Aydemir had been

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Academy (Mekteb-i Harbiye) for a short period from 1905 to 1908-1909; see Faik Reşit Unat, Türkiye Eğitim Sisteminin Gelişmesine Tarihi Bir Bakış (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1964), pp. 67-68.

12. The military school system was reorganized during the Balkan War. According to the new system, the senior class of the idadis was transformed into a preparatory class for the War Academy, and students from all over the Empire had to attend it in Kuleli; see Unat, p. 68.

13. Aydemir recalls that his father had a similar but much more passive reaction when he wanted to volunteer for the front in 1915; see his Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 73; cf. Göktürk, p. 25.

14. We must add, however, that Göktürk's version would still be credible, assuming that Aydemir's departure for Istanbul had not ruined his military career and that he returned there to attend the senior class in Kuleli for the academic year 1913-1914 which he could not complete for the same reason.

literally in love with his intended military career. He believed that "a soldier was a great and heroic character. He was a different kind of being and nobody could be superior to him" [p. 454]. He also says that while he was enrolled in the military rüşdiye, he "used to disdain anyone who was not a soldier or a student in a military school" [p. 45]. In fact, the entire story of his life bears witness to his attachment to the military life and demeanor. Military marches, drills and fighting techniques were going to constitute a significant part of his pedagogy throughout his career of both nationalist activism and teaching. Moreover, he would volunteer whenever he saw an opportunity.

Aydemir's second choice, which seems to be his own, is perfectly well embedded in the ideological atmosphere which prevailed following the disasters of the Balkan War. After two decades of gestation at the end of the 19th century, and almost a decade of official repression corresponding to the last years of Abdülhamit II's reign and the beginnings of the Young Turk regime, Turkish nationalism had literally erupted subsequent to the Balkan War. Together with a tremendous proliferation of nationalist literature, the entire educational system was reorganized along nationalistic lines, and as Aydemir puts it, the teachers' training colleges were the "home" (ocak) of this new ideological movement [p. 65].

It seems that Aydemir was attracted by this new ideology before the Balkan debacle, as he refers to a short story which

appeared in the first issue of Türk yurdu, "Turkish Homeland," the well-known nationalist periodical published by the Turkish Hearths Society (Türk Ocakları).[15] But he still referred to himself as "Ottoman" [p. 62], and fully embraced his new Turkish identity only after the physical collapse of the multi-national Empire in Europe and the far-flung psychological ruin it caused. As it had for many young men of his generation, Turkish nationalism represented to Aydemir a healing for his wounded pride and a new utopia enabling him to maintain the dreams of conquest and glory, as pan-Turk irredentism replaced pan-Ottoman nostalgia. Yet, what made Aydemir "intoxicated with the new ideology" [p. 68] was not a mere readiness to get immersed in the Zeitgeist. Nationalism appealed to him because it also meant militant action: it required teaching and preaching. As a matter of fact, the young reader of folk tales and the preacher of the constitutionalist revolution in the nightly gatherings of Sofu İlyas district appears to have discovered his vocation in the teachers' training college under the reign of nationalism. He was the best student in the school and was always assigned to give a speech when the occasion arose [pp. 66-67]. As for his summer holidays, he writes that he spent them in the villages of the region to earn a living as

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15. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 61-63. The story in question is Üzümcü, "The Grape Peddler," by Ahmet Hikmet; see Türk yurdu, I, 1(1327/1911): 3-7. It is very revealing that the main character of the story, who was described by the author as the incarnation of all the moral and physical qualities of the Anatolian peasant, made Aydemir think of the old Ottoman conquerors.

assistant to the threshing machine operators, tithe recorder or village clerk, and describes his spare-time activities as follows:

> Then, if I had time before the schools opened, I would travel from village to village. The fields, the roads and the agitating crowds of people were captivating me more and more. I would enter into discussions with turbaned hojas in village coffee-houses or in mescit (small mosque) gardens; or I would gather around me children of the villages, teach them marches and drill them in the harvest fields. I used to say:
>
> -- Our path is determined now.
>
> This path was, according to the widespread expression of the time, the path "towards the People."[16]

It was during the harvest season in Çerkezköy that Aydemir heard about, and actually saw, the mobilization order for the Ottoman army, on August 8, 1914. But, as he was not yet of age, he had to return to school despite his desire to volunteer, and he saw his class empty little by little as the Ottoman empire entered the Great War [pp. 71-73]. He seems to have repeated his demands to the recruitment office throughout the school-year 1914-1915, especially after he received the news of his brother's death on the Eastern front, during the battles of Sarıkamış (December 1914 - January 1915) where the losses on the Ottoman side were particularly high. His

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[16]. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 67. The motto that Aydemir cites, "towards the people," was the title of yet another nationalist weekly, Halka doğru, which was published under the leadership of the poet Celal Sahir (Erozan) in Istanbul in 1913-1914; for more details on the movement, see Zafer Toprak, "Osmanlı Narodnikleri: 'Halka Doğru' Gidenler," Toplum ve Bilim, 24(1984): 69-79.

insistent demands were finally met at the end of the summer of 1915, which he had spent in İbriktepe, a village not far from Edirne. Subsequently, Aydemir had to leave the teachers' training college before completing his studies, and went to Istanbul to join the "Rabe training camp" for reserve officers in Erenköy, at the age of eighteen.[17]

The young recruit appears to have been absolutely impatient to take the place vacated on the Eastern front by his brother [pp. 73 and 77]. But there was another and perhaps more important reason behind this eagerness to be commissioned to this particular front: it was "a front en route to the Turkish lands which remained outside of Turkey" [p. 73]. As a matter of fact, the World War was welcomed by Turkish nationalists as an opportunity not only to get rid of foreign supremacy in the Ottoman empire, but also to realize the pan-Turk ideal of uniting all the Turkic speaking peoples, the great majority of whom lived under Russian rule.[18] They had kept silent during the three months of Ottoman neutrality, but allowed a German to publish under their auspices and in favor of the Central

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17. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 73-74 and 77. The training camp was called "Rabe camp" after the name of its commander, Maj. Rabe (see Göktürk, p. 28), who was in charge of the 15th Infantry Regiment at the outbreak of the war as part of the German Military Mission; see James Madison McGarity, Foreign Influence on the Ottoman Turkish Army, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Washington D.C.: The American University, 1968), p. 149.

18. See, for example, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, "Cihan harbine iştirakımız ve istikbalimiz," in his Siyaset ve iktisat hakkında birkaç hitabe ve makale (Istanbul: Kütüphane-i Hilmi, 1340/1924), pp. 8-9.

Powers, a series of propaganda pamphlets. In one of these, the author contended that if "Turkey" succeeded to attain enough power to legitimate her rule over her possessions, "the stretching of her boundaries up to the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus Mountains would be essential for German interests."[19] After the Ottoman empire joined the war, the irredentist feelings of the nationalists surfaced immediately. An early example was Türkler bu muharebede ne kazanabilirler?, "What May the Turks Gain in the Present War?", a book published probably in December 1914, in which Moiz Kohen used the word irredenta for the first time, translated it into Turkish as tahlis, "rescuing," and pointed to the Turkic peoples of Russia and especially of Azerbaijan as its objective.[20] Youths like Aydemir who, even before the war, dreamed of an extended Turkish homeland in front of the maps hanging on the walls of

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19. Parvus, Umumi harbin neticelerinden: Almanya galip gelirse (Istanbul: Türk Yurdu Kitaphanesi, 1330/1914), p. 22. This pamphlet was followed by another entitled Umumi harbin neticelerinden: İngiltere galip gelirse (Istanbul: Türk Yurdu Kitaphanesi, 1330/1914).

20. Moiz Kohen, Türkler bu muharebede ne kazanabilirler? (Istanbul: Türk Yurdu Kitaphanesi, 1330/1914), pp. 20-46. Shortly before this book, the same author had published, under the pseudonym of "Tekin," another book entitled Turan (Akkurum [=Istanbul]: Türk Yurdu Kitaphanesi, 1330/1914), in which he had advocated an eastward expansion towards Turan, the greater Turkish homeland, but had refrained from using the term irredenta; see especially the last chapter entitled Yeni Cengizlik, "The New Gengis Khans," pp. 136-143. For more details on pan-Turk ideology in this period, see Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism in Turkey (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981), pp. 28-71; for more details on Moiz Kohen who used the pseudonyms "Tekin" and "Tekin Alp," see idem, Tekinalp, Turkish Patriot 1883-1961 (Leiden & Istanbul: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nahije Oosten, 1984).

their classrooms [p. 66] and thought that the opportunity to effectuate it was in sight, were certainly not disappointed with the military marches they learned in the training camp, for these were all products of this pan-Turk version of expansionist ideology.[21]

Having completed his training in approximately six months, Aydemir managed to have himself commissioned to the Eastern front and set forth early in the summer of 1916 to Suşehri, headquarters of the Third Army. His journey from Istanbul to the front, which took forty days, was his first contact with Anatolia, which had an idealized image among Turkish nationalists as the Turkish heartland of the Ottoman empire, and his first acquaintance with the conditions under which the Ottomans had entered into the World War. He describes in his autobiography with many a touching detail the poverty-stricken land and people he saw during his trip to Suşehri, and comments retrospectively on the far from adequate means of communication and transportation through which the country was supposed to dispatch men and supplies to the fronts.[22] His disillusionment grew even greater when he finally reached the unit to which he was assigned and learned that his 28th Regiment of the 9th

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21. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 79; for Aydemir's familiarity with the xenophobic nationalist literature of the period, see below, pp. 58-59.

22. Ibid., pp. 81-97. For the war-time conditions of the Ottoman empire, the following study is still unsurpassed: Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).

Division was in fact the remnants of respectively the 28th Division and the 9th Army Corps, and that his company was only 38 men strong [p. 105].

The young reserve officer experienced heavy fighting during his very first night on the front and felt very proud of being among the defenders of the fatherland [pp. 107-108]. In the following days, however, apart from minor attacks and counter-attacks which had become a routine, reconnaissance missions seem to have been the only consequential duty he had to perform. In any case, he was transferred towards the end of the summer to a machine gun unit held in reserve and, away from actual fighting, found much time to read, practice his own profession of teaching, and contemplate the unexpected challenges that his new students brought forth.

Aydemir's first encounter with the Anatolian peasant to whom he wanted to teach some rudiments of civic instruction while under arms, produced in him a mental shock and turned out to be a discovery, almost a revelation. He was puzzled by the degree of ignorance of his soldiers who were all, except for one, illiterate and knew neither the name of the Ottoman state nor the names of its ruler and capital city. They did not have any notion of fatherland and showed a total absence of national consciousness. The poor teacher's belief that the Anatolian peasant was a deeply religious being and a devout Muslim was also overthrown when his soldiers betrayed the same ignorance in religious matters as well, or displayed strongly heterodoxi-

cal, even quasi-heretical faiths. None of them recognized the call to prayer (ezan), and only a few knew how to perform the prayers (namaz) [pp. 112-115]. Aydemir tells that he was able to cope with this pitiful situation thanks to a book by Mehmet Şemsettin (Günaltay), published right at that time, and describes how this ordeal aroused in him a sense of guilt as part of the elite responsible for the benightedness of the masses.[23]

The astonishment of Aydemir in close contact with the Anatolian peasant is a fact that deserves attention in more than one respect. As a matter of fact, Aydemir was not a city boy who had never been in a rural setting and thus completely ignorant of peasant life and culture. Nor was he surrounded by illiterate people for the first time in his life. The least which can be said here is that there was certainly a great difference between the Anatolian and Balkan peasants with respect to their material conditions, learning and socio-political consciousness. In final analysis, it is obvious that he benefited to a great extent from this tormenting experience, and there can hardly be any reason to doubt the overall validity of his ultimate judgment on it, despite the exaggeration in his claim:

This direct and difficult encounter with the Anatolian

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23. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 115-117. The book in question is Hurafattan hakikata ([Istanbul]: Tevsi-i Tıbaat Matbaası, 1332/1916), and consists of both an invective against all deviations from sunnism and a call for modernization in the form of a general and conspiratorial history of Islam in which every "heresy" is seen as a plot on the part of the freshly converted individuals and peoples with the exception of Turks who have been the champions of the caliphate.

> peasant... and his innermost feelings has been a blessed event for the educated young men... during the war. This fraternization which gained strength with the comradeship in arms and the blood ties that the National Struggle created, has been the beginning of today's national unity. Until then, there was nothing in common between the people and those educated ones who had risen from among their ranks [p. 110].

Life on the front seems to have continued with the usual routine until a communiqué from General Headquarters announced in February 1917 that a revolution had broken out in Russia. This event proved to be of great significance for Aydemir and his companions, for they found themselves shortly afterwards in a state of drôle de guerre, both sides being firmly established in their positions without delivering a single shot. News of an approaching armistice stayed in the air for a while but turned out to be false. Then, on a summer day, it befell to Aydemir to conclude a de facto armistice while he was commanding a machine gun squad in a strategic point. Impatient Russian soldiers, tired of waiting for the news of the armistice, put down their arms and started walking towards the Ottoman lines in a disorderly and cheerful way. This took place opposite Aydemir's own position and, faced with a complete lack of initiative on the part of his superiors, he decided to act on his own in order to prevent the Russian soldiers from walking over the mine field which separated the two armies. When he finally reached the Russian soldiers, he was offered a huge and circular loaf of bread with a handful of salt in its center. He immediately understood that he was given peace and friend-

ship according to a Slavonic custom known in the Balkans as well. He took a piece of bread, dipped it in the salt, ate it and asked his sergeant to do the same. This ritual ended amid the joyful cries and hurrahs of the Russians, and some lengthy speeches were delivered. Later on, a regimental order assigned Aydemir to represent the Ottoman side in all such occasions of parley and fraternization [pp. 122-124]. Aydemir relates also that friendly gatherings of officers on both sides of the front took place for a while after this happy incident, and that he had a friend of his age among the Russian officers, who, like himself, had to abandon his studies because of the war.[24] These contacts came to an end when the revolutionary soldier committees took control of the front on the Russian side. After the disintegration of the Russian army and the departure of the Russian elements proper, things changed totally, and hostilities were resumed with a somewhat different enemy.

Two days after the armistice talks had opened in Brest-Litovsk, the Transcaucasian Comissariat, which did not recognize the Bolshevik government and had replaced the Russian administration in the regions of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, held a meeting to consider the armistice that Mehmet Vehip Pasha (Kaçı), the commander of the Third Ottoman Army,

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[24]. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 186. There was, however, a moment of exception in this fraternization period, when the Ottoman army made a nocturnal attack to please the Vice-Commander in Chief Enver Pasha who was on visit to the front on November 22, 1917; see idem, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, pp. 369-371.

had proposed. The ensuing negotiations ended with an armistice on 18 December 1917, three days after the one signed in Brest-Litovsk.[25] While negotiations for a peace treaty were under way in the same city, the Ottoman government decided to cross the demarcation line and recover the territories lost to the Russians since the beginning of the war. The Third Army was reorganized into two army corps. In the North, the Second Army Corps Caucasus headed by Col. Galatalı Şevket Bey was to advance along the coast line towards Georgia, and in the South, the First Army Corps Caucasus under the command of Col. Kazım Karabekir Bey was given the task of recovering Erzincan and Erzurum on its way towards Armenia.[26] Karabekir's army corps comprised three divisions: the 10th, the 36th, and the 9th to which belonged Aydemir's 28th Infantry Regiment.[27]

Using the reports of banditry and massacre on the part of the Armenian irregulars as a pretext, the Ottoman army broke the armistice conditions and started to move forward on 12 Feb-

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25. Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (New York: Philosophical Library Inc., and London: George Ronald, 1951), pp. 81-82, and Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 167-172. Our further account of the developments on the Transcaucasian front will be based on these two studies.

26. Kazım Karabekir, Erzincan ve Erzurum'un Kurtuluşu (Istanbul: Koşkun Basımevi, 1939), pp. 11 and 81-82. For the details of the military operations on this front in 1918, see W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, Caucasian Battlefields. A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp. 457-478.

27. Karabekir, pp. 75 and 85, and Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 128.

ruary 1918. The following day Erzincan was captured, but Aydemir was not able to take part in the operations: he had narrowly escaped death during the first hours of the offensive and was recovering. On his way back from a mission behind the lines trying to reach his unit, which had in the meantime moved forward, Aydemir was on the point of freezing to death when his soldiers found him half asleep. He describes in his autobiography in great detail both the hallucinations he had while he was freezing, and the interior scene of his childhood in Edirne when he realized that he was freezing to death [pp. 128-131].

At the beginning of March, while the Ottoman army was advancing towards Erzurum, the Transcaucasian Comissariat was invited to Trabzon where peace negotiations would take place. The Seim, or the Transcaucasian Parliament which had opened on February 23, was envisaging peace on the basis of reestablishing the pre-war frontiers when news was heard from Brest-Litovsk, where the Bolshevik government had agreed to the restoration of the 1877 frontier with the Ottoman empire. After more than a month of hesitation the Seim decided to declare war on the Ottomans on 14 April. In the meantime, the Ottoman army had continued to push forward, completely undisturbed by these diplomatic moves. The city of Erzurum was taken from the Armenians on March 12, and the units of Karabekir reached the pre-war frontier on the 21st.

It was Aydemir's 9th Division which had captured Erzurum.

Afterwards it proceeded towards the 1914 frontier where Aydemir's own batallion attacked and took the village of Kötek. After the fighting was over, Aydemir and his best friend since the day he left the training camp in Istanbul, Hüseyin Avni (Ulaş), read the order which had arrived from the General Headquarters and had just been distributed to all the units. In it, Enver Pasha was telling them that "in order to put an end to the prevailing anarchy in the Caucasus and spread the civilization even further," the Ottoman army was going to keep advancing [pp. 133-134]. The next day they crossed the frontier early in the morning and advanced on Sarıkamış. Yet, Aydemir was not able to complete the first move in this second phase of the operations, either. After two days of marching, when the town of Sarıkamış was in sight, his unit encountered a fierce defense on the part of the Armenians. Aydemir's horse, hit by a shellburst, fell down and rolled on his leg. As his unit had withdrawn, Aydemir remained for a while with a broken leg in the no-man's-land under heavy fire, and he had only two bullets in his revolver. He had decided to commit suicide in the case of an enemy counter-attack, for "in this war [they] fought, there were no such rules as taking prisoners. The fate of the prisoner on both sides was a terrible death." But his unit advanced again, and he was taken to a field hospital in particularly harsh winter conditions [pp. 135-137].

Aydemir must have stayed for approximately two months in the field hospital at Karaurgan. He writes that when he was

finally released, the citadel of Kars had already been occupied by the Ottoman army, which was now on the other side of the 1877 frontier.[28] During this time, the Seim had declared the independence of Transcaucasia, made known that it accepted the provisions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and called for an armistice. The Ottoman empire officially recognized the Democratic Federative Republic of Transcaucasia on 28 April 1918, and the city of Batum, under Ottoman occupation since April 15, was chosen to host the new peace conference. Yet, when the conference opened on May 11, Halil Bey (Menteşe), Minister of Justice and the chairman of the Ottoman delegation, informed the Transcaucasian delegates that, as compensation for the damages created by the recent declaration of war, the Ottoman government was asking for more than the territories restored by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This was enough to create a deadlock in the negotiations. In order to strengthen their bargaining position, the Ottomans violated the armistice once again, and Karabekir's Second Army Corps Caucasus crossed the frontier on May 15, 1918. Shortly afterwards, Alexandropol (Leninakan, Gümrü) was occupied.[29]

Aydemir rejoined his unit in Alexandropol. He was extremely moved when he crossed the Aras river, "the gate of

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28. Aydemir, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, p. 440.

29. Kazemzadeh, pp. 104-112, and Trumpener, pp. 176-177. Halil Bey appears to be somehow less interested than Enver Pasha in these new territorial acquisitions; see İsmail Arar ed., Halil Menteşe'nin Anıları (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1986), pp. 228-230.

Turan" [p. 139], the greater Turkish homeland:

> When I crossed a bridge and set foot on Caucasian soil for the first time, I felt the excitement that I had expected and embellished in my imagination for years [p. 141].

He believed that the real mission of his generation was beginning to be accomplished there, on the banks of the Aras river. Further ahead, "Caucasia" with all its mountain ranges and valleys up to the Caspian Sea was waiting for him and for many others like him who, strong with the ideal of pan-Turkism, were going to lay the foundations of a new national life [p. 142]. In those days he was particularly exposed to this kind of excitement and enthusiasm not only because the Transcaucasus, and especially Azerbaijan, had a pivotal status in the irredentist literature, but also because he was extremely impressed by a novel by Müfide Ferit (Tek), published recently in Istanbul. This was the story of a young intellectual who, preferring his pan-Turk ideal to his love for a beautiful and well-educated woman, leaves Istanbul to work as an apostle of nationalist awakening in Turkestan under czarist rule, and meets a tragic death the very day his beloved finally comes to his side.[30] Aydemir was so much infatuated with this book that he carried it everywhere under all circumstances:

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[30]. Müfide Ferit, Ay Demir (Istanbul: Halk Kitaphanesi Neşriyatı, 1334/1918). One of the few women among the members of the Turkish Hearths Society, Müfide Ferit was married to Ahmet Ferit (Tek), Minister of Finances during the Turkish National Struggle, and Minister of the Interior in the early republican period.

> This book was written at such a time, and I had read it in such a place and under such circumstances that it immediately appeared to me as a divine inspiration.
> ...
> Sometimes, while reading this book, I would close my eyes and imagine myself giving hope and comfort to people who flocked around me in the deserts, roads, villages and towns of Turan.[31]

He empathized with Müfide Ferit's hero so deeply that he took his name as a pseudonym the following year, and as patronym in 1935.

At about the same time, before moving southwards along the Aras valley with his unit, Aydemir had also a bitter experience acknowledged by almost all those who served as officers in the Ottoman army during the First World War: disappointment with the German ally. For some of them, this was related to German designs on the Ottoman empire. For some others, it was a matter of pride, for they had expected to be treated as peers by the Germans, but witnessed condescension and arrogance.[32] For those on the Transcaucasian front like Aydemir, the German attitude was an outright betrayal. As a matter of fact, the

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31. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 138-141. It appears that Aydemir had a small, ambulant library on the front throughout the war (ibid., p. 140 and idem, Kırmızı Mektuplar, pp. 69-70). We must note also that he was able to keep in touch with the literary life in Istanbul and to receive books rather quickly for wartime conditions. He also confesses that his love for books has made a thief of him on one occasion, when he robbed the library of the Alexandropol School of Commerce of its several books; see his Kırmızı Mektuplar, p. 72.

32. For a few examples, see Karabekir, pp. 23-32, Falih Rıfkı, Zeytindağı (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1932), pp. 97-99, and İsmet İnönü, Hatıralar, 2 vols. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985-1987), Vol. I, pp. 153-159.

respective greeds of the allies, though different in nature, had been in serious conflict since the conference in Batum. The Germans wanted to keep the Ottomans out of Transcaucasia for they coveted the mineral riches of the region. But their desire to keep Russia out of the ongoing war by respecting carefully the stipulations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was also an important factor in this policy. Hence, when Georgians asked for German help to contain the Ottomans, German assistance was gladly accorded, but only after Moscow's approval of Georgian independence. After Georgian independence was declared on 26 May as the only possible way to salvation for this country, a series of agreements were signed with the Germans. The latter obtained, among others, the right to use the Georgian railways that the Ottomans wanted for themselves. It appears that together with various economic agreements concluded with Georgia, Germany had some trade ventures in Armenia as well. Halil Pasha (Kut) writes in his memoirs that the Germans "had offered money and airplanes" to the Armenians.[33] This transaction, or part of it, actually took place, since Aydemir saw in the Alexandropol train station a German plane being transported to Erevan in the company of five German soldiers.[34]

Aydemir seems to have enjoyed life in the Aras valley. He

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[33]. M. Taylan Sorgun ed., Bitmeyen Savaş. Kutülamare Kahramanı Halil Paşa'nın Anıları (Istanbul: 7 Gün Yayınları, 1972), p. 238.

[34]. Aydemir, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, pp. 440-441.

did not join the bulk of Karabekir's army corps, which had moved further south to Iran and taken Tabriz, but stayed with the rearguard covering the region between Erevan and Nakhjuvan. Since a series of peace treaties were signed with the now independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on June 4, 1918, thenceforth he was an officer in an occupation army. He was stationed in the small town of Norashin in the Aras valley, halfway between Erevan and Nakhjuvan, and close to the railway line leading to Julfa [p. 143]. He writes that his days in the Aras valley "were a sort of knighthood days" in his life [p. 142]. With his white horse and Caucasian garments he had acquired immediately after arriving in Norashin, he toured the neighboring villages to parade for the local ladies as well as to deliver impassioned sermons on the virtues of pan-Turk nationalism [pp. 143-146]. He was once again surrounded by listeners who admired him all the more, he says, for this young officer represented also a victorious army which had delivered them. He also tells that one day, an unexpected incident affected him very much and sharpened his zeal. While on a reconnaissance mission in the mountainous regions of Armenia, he heard in a Turkish village a drummer singing a wedding song of which the lyrics were none other than the most famous verses of the nationalist poet Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul). He was extremely moved to see that nationalist literature had preceded him in a remote mountain village in Transcaucasia.[35]

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[35]. Idem, Suyu Aravan Adam, p. 148. The poem is entitled Cenge Giderken, "On the Way to the Combat," and was written in 1897, during the war with Greece. Its author, Mehmet Emin Yur-

Aydemir's idyllic life as a nationalist missionary in the orchards of the Aras valley was cut short by the end of the war. The Ottoman empire was defeated and had asked for an armistice, which was signed on 30 October 1918, in Mondros (Mudros). A few days later, the Ottoman army in Transcaucasia received the order to withdraw. Aydemir's unit was summoned to transfer all authority to Armenian units and to withdraw at night, without warning the local Turkish population [pp. 146-147]. He seems to have hesitated to comply and envisaged remaining in Transcaucasia like many others, but the orders were categorical:

> Every soldier remaining in the Caucasus will have done harm to the fatherland. The enemy will judge this as a breach to the armistice conditions and will not fulfill his own obligations, either.[36]

A reluctant and sad withdrawal had thus begun amidst the supplications of the local Turks. While crossing the Markara bridge on the Aras, everybody in Aydemir's company was in tears. He writes that it was at that very moment that he had decided to return to Transcaucasia after his discharge from official duty [p. 149]. He was demobilized in Erzurum and took the boat to Istanbul the following week in Trabzon [p. 153].

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dakul (1869-1944), a poet of mediocre talent but of great inspiration, was known for some time as Türk şairi, "the poet of the Turk," as the poem in question opened with the words "I am a Turk." Due to his pathbreaking role as a nationalist, he was later surnamed milli şair, "the national(ist) poet."

[36]. Ibid., pp. 148-149; cf. Jacques Kayaloff, "From the Transcaucasian Past: Two Documents about Turkish Resistance in 1918," Journal of Asian History, 6(1972): 123-132.

After a short and unpleasant stay in Istanbul, where he witnessed the hardships of enemy occupation, Aydemir headed for Edirne. He must have arrived there sometime in December. By that time the railway station and some other strategic points around the city had been occupied by the Entente forces.[37] His main activity in his hometown was the resumption of his studies in the teachers' training college, which he completed "in a few months" [p. 154]. During these months he also took part in the activities opposing the annexation of Eastern Thrace to Greece. He was among the founders of İhtiyat Zabitleri Cemiyeti, "Reserve Officers' Association," which seems to have worked in coordination with Trakya - Paşaeli Müdafaa Heyet-i Osmaniyesi, "The Ottoman Defense Committee of Thrace - Paşaeli," and the First Army Corps stationed in Edirne under the command of Col. Cafer Tayyar (Eğilmez) Bey [p. 154]. In fact, Aydemir's involvement with the afore-mentioned committee was practically unavoidable since the director of the teachers' training college, Rıdvan Nafiz Bey, and a very active reserve officer, Şefik (Bicioğlu) Bey, took part in its foundation.[38] But, when

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37. Aydemir tells that the bastions around the city were occupied by Italian soldiers who very seldom appeared in the city (Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 154). Yet, no mention of Italian forces is made by Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu in his Trakya'da Milli Mücadele, 2 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1955-1956). According to the latter, the train station in Uzunköprü was occupied by a French regiment on 4 November 1918, and an infantry battalion together with a cavalry regiment of the Greek army took charge of it on January 14, 1919, in addition to the entire railway line upto Hadımköy (Vol. I, pp. 145-151).

38. See Bıyıklıoğlu, Vol. I, pp. 123-137.

he heard the news that the government of Azerbaijan was looking for Turkish teachers, he left Edirne, most probably during the summer of 1919, and was greeted by his friends as "an envoy to Turan."[39]

When Aydemir took an Italian steamer in Istanbul for Batum, his hometown was under occupation and facing the serious threat of being annexed by Greece. Other and larger parts of Anatolian soil under British, French, Greek and Italian occupation had a similar fate as far as the designs of the Entente Powers were concerned. Last but not least, the East Anatolian provinces, for the liberation of which he too had fought, were slated to become parts of the newly established Armenian Republic. On the Turkish side, popular demonstrations and sporadic cases of armed resistance against the occupation forces were not rare. Still in an embryonic form, a nationalist movement for the defense of what was considered to be the Turkish homeland was nevertheless under way and establishing its organization. Aydemir seems to have had some scruples concerning his departure for Transcaucasia under these circumstances:

> I wondered whether my departure was a desertion from the struggle which had begun in our own lands. But there was a

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[39]. Aydemir, Suyu Aravan Adam, p. 154, and Göktürk, p. 57. In fact, Azerbaijan had asked for military instructors and teachers as early as November 1917, immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution, when relations between Moscow and Transcaucasia were cut. For the early contacts in matters of military intelligence, see Aydemir, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, p. 381, and Naki Keykurun, Azerbaycan İstiklal Mücadelesinin Hatıraları (Istanbul: İstanbul Ekspres Matbaası, 1964), pp. 43-44; for volunteer officers sent to Azerbaijan early in 1918, see Karabekir, pp. 138-142.

> voice that came from the depths of my heart and convinced me about the justness of my choice. After all, the war that was fought was the same in both places... And there is no doubt that it was easier in Anatolia, for there still existed an army no matter how enfeebled it was. There were experienced officers and a warrior nation that one could count on. Many thousands of youths like me would fight in this army. But in the Caucasus and further away, there were neither officers nor a nation acquainted with warfare. And these were precisely the lands over which the clouds of war were now gathering [pp. 154-155].

It must be noted here how much this justification of his decision to go to Transcaucasia sounds like the answer that the hero of Müfide Ferit's novel Ay Demir gives to his beloved on one occasion. As a matter of fact, in a dialogue between the two protagonists in the opening pages of the novel, Hazin Hanım takes issue with Demir Bey's (later Ay Demir) decision to go to live in Turkestan and contends that the backward and miserable "Turkey" is in desperate need of the profitable efforts of idealist men like him. In his reply, after enumerating first the ills of "Turkish" society and then the ways to fight against them, Demir Bey finally depicts a modern, wealthy and happy country and continues:

> All these will one day be accomplished in Turkey. It is only natural to be so, and so will it be sooner or later. After all, we live in our own country as her masters, thanks to God. We and only we are responsible for our backwardness and misery. Whereas the Eastern and Northern Turks are deprived of the services of a caring administration. Instead, they are oppressed by an enemy who annihilates them systematically.[40]

Unlike many other Turkish teachers who idled in Baku,

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[40]. Müfide Ferit, pp. 4-6.

Aydemir went to the Ministry of Education to ask for a position in a rural area shortly after his arrival in the cosmopolitan capital city of Azerbaijan. With all the enthusiasm of being back in Turan, he introduced himself as Aydemir for the first time in his life and was assigned to the small town of Nukha in the North-West [pp. 156-157]. He took up his function of nationalist missionary almost immediately upon his arrival in Nukha with a speech he delivered on the occasion of his predecessor's funeral. He seems to have impressed his audience with both his military outfit, which lacked any epaulet whatsoever indicating a rank, and his words, which consisted of an extended definition of şehadet, "martyrdom." He told his listeners that martyrdom was not only death for one's religious faith but also for one's fatherland, and that fighting against ignorance in one's country was also sacred because it contributed to the defense of that country. Therefore, the dead teacher was a martyr, and his grave should be considered as a shrine to be venerated by all Turks attached to the idea of national awakening [pp. 158-159].

Aydemir's first move in the direction of achieving this national awakening was to Turkify education in his school. After he settled in a small apartment in the school building, he made the Russian teachers run away, we are not told how, and saw his class hours increase significantly [pp. 160-161]. He also organized a troop of boy scouts which looked more like a militia, since its members were all young teachers like him-

self. He in fact drilled these young men like soldiers and initiated them into military tactics and strategy. This troop then started to tour the neighboring villages in order to spread their nationalist credo. Aydemir was always at their head to evaluate their conduct and achievements during these expeditions. He was a teacher for the rest of the population as well. Not only did he counsel almost everyone on various occasions, but he also visited a different mosque every Friday to deliver a speech on educational and military matters before the usual sermon by the imam [pp. 161-162].

Aydemir seems to have been satisfied for a while with the modest results of his militant action in Nukha. In any case, he was very happy once again to be the kind of hero he wanted to be. Moreover, the natural beauty of Nukha and its surroundings and the platonic love affair he had with one Sitare [pp. 183-185] added to his existence the taste of his childhood's fairy tales [pp. 188 and 230]. But he started to lose his faith as time passed [pp. 164-171]. In close contact with the realities, he had to struggle with all sorts of practical difficulties and had many a moment of desperation. When he turned to the ideological literature which had thus far influenced his action, he was able to find neither an articulate theory nor a survey of positive knowledge which would have explained to him where he stood. The retrospective character of his autobiography notwithstanding, he tells his readers that apart from Moiz Kohen's book Turan, which consisted of "a handful of

chimere and an armful of ignorance," all he could use amounted to "bits and pieces of prose and poetry, disconnected utterances and roundabout formulae" [p. 165].

While Aydemir was stricken with despair over his lack of knowledge and guidance, warfare and new opportunities for activism once again changed the course of his life. He confesses that at that time he "needed to be tossed and tumbled by the winds of war" [p. 171]. This describes quite eloquently the crisis he must have gone through. Moreover, his predicament was not only a matter of insufficient knowledge or of discouragement. It was as if the vision of utopia which mobilized his generation had evaporated. The young man who had a very strong sense of mission had simply been deprived of this mission, his raison d'être. The indifference and even the resistance shown by the Azeri elite to the idea of a united Turan must have been an important reason for his inner crisis. But, given the very special time and space which constituted the setting of this loss of faith, we can also assume that he in his turn may have been subject to propaganda in favor of the Russian Revolution and its principles, or may simply have made an intellectual choice in that direction. The Bolshevik press, which was very active in Azerbaijan starting from the latter part of 1919, may also be responsible for this loss of faith.[41]

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[41]. See Tadeusz Swietochowski, "The Himmāt Party. Socialism and the National Question in Russian Azerbaïjan 1904-1920," Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, XIX, 1-2(1978): 119-142.

Although he does not refer to Communism before he relates the Bolshevization of Azerbaijan, he seems to have thought that "revolutions and liquidations were perhaps necessary" [p. 167]. The winds of war he needed were about to bring both.

In January 1920, war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As the outcome of tensions which had already led the two nations to several skirmishes since 1917, it was not an unexpected event. On March 27, the Armenians of the district of Karabagh revolted, occupied the Askeran pass on the Kura valley and encircled the nearby town of Shusha. This created an outrage amongst the populace in Nukha as well as everywhere else in Azerbaijan, since the pass was a spot of vital strategic importance on the way leading to the district of Karabagh, for the possession of which the war was actually fought. A volunteer force of 400 soldiers was quickly organized in Nukha, and Aydemir was entrusted with its command [pp. 172-173]. When Aydemir's small unit reached its objective, the Askeran pass had already been taken by Azeri regulars. The eager volunteers were nevertheless given a chance to deliver Shusha. They entered the town after three days of fierce fighting and with losses of fifteen dead [pp. 173-174].

The importance of this short expedition for Aydemir was the fact that he had encountered on his way to Shusha, Halil Pasha and Küçük Talat Bey (Muşkara) in the town of Akdam.[42] These

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[42]. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 209 and 215. Halil Pasha (Kut) (1881-1957) who was one of the leading figures of the Committee of Union and Progress and the uncle of Enver Pasha, was arrested and jailed in Istanbul after the Armistice as a war criminal. He escaped in August 1919 and joined

dignitaries of the supposedly defunct Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) were at that time members of a newly established Communist Party of Turkey (CPT) and busying themselves to facilitate the Bolshevization of Azerbaijan.[43] As a matter of

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Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) in Eastern Anatolia at a time when the latter was organizing the nationalist resistance movement (see Sorgun, pp. 260-302). He was almost immediately dispatched by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Azerbaijan for establishing contacts with the Bolsheviks. Another reason for this hurried move was Mustafa Kemal Pasha's fear of having his movement been judged as a Unionist endeavor by the Entente Powers (see ibid., pp. 302-306).

A member of the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress, Mehmet Talat Bey (Muşkara) was called Küçük, "The Young(er)," to be distinguished from Mehmet Talat Pasha, one of the top Unionist leaders and premier during the war. He too had been arrested by the occupation authorities in Istanbul and had escaped together with Halil Pasha, whom he accompanied to Azerbaijan.

43. The CUP, which had instigated the constitutionalist revolution in 1908 and ruled the Ottoman empire uninterruptedly from 1913 to the end of the war (see below, Chapter 3, pp. 140-144 and 155-159), was dissolved in its last congress on 5 November 1918. Yet, its leaders never gave up politics and tried to regain control over Turkey during the Turkish National Struggle and in its aftermath. For parts of their activities during the Turkish National Struggle, see below, pp. 64-68; for a more detailed coverage of these activities, see Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Moskova Hatıraları (Istanbul: Vatan Neşriyatı, 1955), Kazım Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz (Istanbul: Türkiye Yayınları, 1960), idem, İstiklal Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat ve Terakki Erkanı (Istanbul: Menteş Kitabevi, 1967), Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, "Mustafa Suphi ve Milli Mücadeleye El Koymaya Çalışan Başı Dışarda Akımlar", Belleten, XXXV, 140(1971): 587-654, Mete Tunçay ed., Mesai - 1920. Halk Şuralar Fırkası'nın Programı (Ankara: A. Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1972), idem, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar (1908-1925), 3rd edn. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1978), Paul Dumont, "La fascination du bolchevisme: Enver pacha et le Parti des soviets populaires, 1919-1922", Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, XVI, 2(1975): 141-166, and Erik Jan Zürcher, The Unionist Factor. The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984); for the activities during the republican period and the final liquidation of the surviving members of the CUP, see Zürcher, p. 132ff and below, Chapter 3, pp. 149-152.

fact, both Bolsheviks and Turkish nationalists had seen each other as potential allies against the Entente Powers and multiplied their contacts during 1919 for future cooperation. The Bolsheviks were the only possible source of support on which the Turkish nationalists could rely in the forthcoming struggle to liberate their country. The Turkish resistance movement in its turn, and despite its "bourgeois" character, was seen by the Bolsheviks as a natural ally in their own war against capitalist imperialism, since Turkey was part of the colonial world and was trying to shake off her imperialist yoke.[44] It is upon these considerations of strategy and theory that Enver Pasha and Karl Radek had had their contacts in Berlin at the end of the summer of 1919 and projected "a Soviet - Muslim alliance against British imperialism."[45] Contacts with a much more realistic aim of a Turco-Soviet cooperation in the Trans-

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[44]. The best scholarly work on Bolshevik attitudes vis-à-vis the nationalist independence movements during this period is Demetrio Boersner's The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question, 1917-1928 (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, and Paris: Librairie Minard, 1957); two studies are also valuable from a documentary perspective: Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), and Hélène Carrère d'Encausse and Stuart Schram, Le marxisme et l'Asie 1853-1964 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1965). For a short survey of the developments in Bolshevik policy relevant to our purpose, see below, pp. 59-62.

[45]. Edward Hallett Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 3 vols. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), Vol. III, pp. 248-249. After the Armistice, Enver Pasha had escaped to Germany together with many other leaders of the CUP. For his activities in Germany prior to his departure for Soviet Russia, see Azade-Ayşe Rorlich, "Fellow Travellers: Enver Pasha and the Bolshevik Government 1918-1920," Asian Affairs, XIII, 3(1982): 288-296.

caucasus took place in Istanbul, and especially in Eastern Anatolia and in Azerbaijan around the same time, and Turkish envoys were finally sent to Baku in the beginning of August at the latest.[46] Yet, these envoys proved ineffective in anti-Bolshevik and rather pro-British Azerbaijan. Less than two months after them, Halil Pasha arrived in Baku with special instructions from Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk).

When Halil Pasha arrived in Azerbaijan, Transcaucasia constituted a barrier between the regions of Anatolia controlled by Turkish nationalists and the regions of the former Russian empire under Bolshevik rule. Nationalist Dashnaks and Musavatists were governing Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively, and Mensheviks were in power in Georgia. Not only were all these young Transcaucasian republics more or less on good terms with the Entente Powers, but also the Entente fleet had absolute control of the Black Sea. This meant, as far as the Turkish nationalists were concerned, not only lack of Bolshevik support but also threat of encirclement by their enemies. Direct land contact with the Bolsheviks, meaning a Bolshevik occupation of Transcaucasia, was vital for them. Halil Pasha made a successful contribution in the ultimate achievement of this aim. He seems to have established himself first in Baku, in the headquarters of Türkiye Halk Murahhaslığı, "The People's Legation of Turkey," founded by Nuri Pasha (Killigil) earlier

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[46]. Paul Dumont, "L'Axe Moscou - Ankara. Les relations turco-soviétiques de 1919 à 1922," Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, XVIII, 3(1977): 165-193.

in the same year.[47] This legation was made into the CPT with Halil Pasha at its head at the beginning of April at the latest, between the Karabagh crisis and the arrival of Bolshevik troops in Azerbaijan.[48] Parallel to his military activities in the Azeri army against the Armenians, Halil Pasha multiplied his efforts in favor of the Bolsheviks. He acted as a Bolshevik emissary at least twice, the first time asking the Musavat government for oil deliveries to the Bolsheviks, and the second time restraining his nephew Nuri Pasha from fighting the Red Army in Daghestan.[49] It is also reported that he was in Kuba, near the frontier with Daghestan, shortly before the 11th Red Army crossed the border, to keep the railway tracks safe for the use of the Bolsheviks.[50]

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47. Bilal Şimşir, İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk, 4 vols. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1973-), Vol. II, pp. 324-325. Nuri Pasha, who is Enver Pasha's half-brother, had been imprisoned in Batum by the British after the Armistice, but had escaped to Baku in the summer of 1919. See also Paul Dumont, "Bakou, carrefour révolutionnaire 1919-1920," in Ch. Lemercier-Quelquejay, G. Veinstein and S. E. Wimbush eds., Passé turco-tatar, présent soviétique. Etudes offertes à Alexandre Bennigsen (Louvain: Editions Peeters, and Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1986), pp. 413-433.

48. See Şimşir, pp. 324-325, and Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, pp. 609-612. According to the latter source, two different groups merged to form the CPT after the reception of a message sent by Karabekir (ibid., pp. 538-539), the day after the occupation of Istanbul by the British. One of the military leaders of the Turkish National Struggle, Brigadier Kazım Karabekir (1882-1948) was in command of the 15th Army Corps stationed in Erzurum at that time. For the content of his above-mentioned message, see below, pp. 51-52.

49. Sorgun, pp. 318-321.

50. Keykurun, pp. 101-102.

The Bolsheviks finally took control of Azerbaijan on 27 April 1920, four days after the opening of Büyük Millet Meclisi, "The Grand National Assembly" (GNA), in Ankara. Approximately three months after these episodes, frontier contact was established in Nakhjuvan between Turkish nationalists and Bolsheviks, and a few days later the first shipments of Russian gold arrived in Anatolia.[51] The important role that Halil Pasha had played in these developments was acknowledged in a report sent to Moscow by two of the highest Bolshevik officials in the Transcaucasus, G. K. Ordzhonikidze and S. M. Kirov.[52]

Although his autobiography does not say a single word on his role during this episode, it is clear that Aydemir took an active part in the Bolshevization process in Azerbaijan. He only recognizes that listening to Halil Pasha and Talat Bey in the town of Akdam "had been something new" for him [p. 209]. In fact, he had listened to them reading a message from Kazım Karabekir Pasha, the commander of the 15th Army Corps in Erzurum [p. 215]. In his message, Karabekir was asking Halil

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51. See Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, p. 882, and Dumont, "L'Axe Moscou - Ankara", p. 173.

52. See Richard G. Hovannisian, "Armenia and the Caucasus in the Genesis of the Soviet-Turkish Entente," International Journal of Middle East Studies, IV, 2(1973): 129-147; see also Serge Afanasyan, L'Arménie, l'Azerbaïdjan et la Géorgie de l'indépendance à l'instauration du pouvoir soviétique (1917-1923) (Paris: Editions l'Harmattan, 1981), p. 107, and Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union. Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 221-227.

and Nuri Pashas "to work for having Azerbaijan and Daghestan dominated by Bolshevik ideology and, eventually, for helping the Bolsheviks of Batum and bringing Georgia under Bolshevik rule."[53] Aydemir also tells that, after his return to Nukha, Talat Bey had visited him there and that the two of them "had had the opportunity to talk and discuss at length" [p. 209]. It seems that these two meetings were sufficient to draw Aydemir to work for the Bolshevik cause in the Transcaucasus, for we find him in Darband, a frontier city in Southern Daghestan, between the meetings which took place early in April and the penetration of the Red Army into Azerbaijan [pp. 179-181].

We do not know what Aydemir's mission in Darband was. But, given the circumstances and the facts reported by witnesses, it can be safely assumed that he belonged to Halil Pasha's entourage, who circulated the false news that the Red Army was coming to Azerbaijan with the further task of proceeding towards Anatolia under the command of Halil Pasha to help the Kemalists.[54] Obviously, Aydemir's role in this period was not limited to the groundwork of neutralizing a potential Azeri willingness to resist the Bolsheviks. Ahmet Cevat Emre tells among his reminiscences of Soviet Russia that Aydemir "had

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53. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, p. 539.

54. Keykurun, pp. 101-102, and Pipes, p. 226. It appears that Halil Pasha actually believed this story to be true, after his contacts with the Communists in Baku; see ibid., pp. 226-227.

rendered services to the sovietization revolution (sovyetleştirme inkılabı) in the district where he lived."[55] As a matter of fact, Aydemir's own account of the episode is full of indirect information supporting this view, although his retrospective description of the Bolshevik presence in Nukha is far from being sympathetic.[56]

Although he had worked for the Bolshevik cause, Aydemir had

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55. Ahmet Cevat Emre, "920 [sic] Moskovasında [sic] Türk Komünistler", Tarih Dünyası, I, 1-3(1964-1965): 88-93, 146-151 and 278-285.

56. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 182-194. Aydemir had his autobiography published in 1959. This was by no means a time to write about one's life as a Communist, even in the past tense. This is why he conceals certain facts, and reports others in a much too circumlocutory fashion. Yet, he reveals himself to be a decent historian at the very end of his unsympathetic description, when he says: "I am not sure whether I could have expressed all these thoughts so clearly in those days." On the other hand, he describes some of the picturesque aspects of revolutionary zeal with a very discrete humor, and his narrative is not totally devoid of passages where a sparkling enthusiasm betrays the nostalgia for his "heroic age." This peculiarity dominates entirely his account of the years spent in Moscow as a student, in the first part of his Kırmızı Mektuplar. Written in the mid-1970's, shortly before Aydemir's death, and at a time when it was not unusual to write on Communism from an insider's standpoint, Kırmızı Mektuplar is a beautiful and uninhibited piece of affectionate nostalgia. Another very probable reason for his complicated style in Suyu Arayan Adam consists of the scruples he must have had in writing for Turkish readers about his role in sabotaging the independence of a Turkic people in favor of "the hereditary enemy of the Turk," i.e. the Russian, no matter how vital this had been for the Kemalists who had no other option for survival. At this point, it would be relevant to note that, whereas Halil Pasha's memoirs deny vehemently such a responsibility in the Bolshevization of Azerbaijan (see Sorgun, pp. 323-324), Naki Keykurun, the Musavatist Chief of Police who emigrated to Kemalist Turkey after the Bolshevik takeover, is at pains to demonstrate that Halil Pasha had not acted on behalf of Ankara (op. cit., pp. 100-101); cf. Resulzâde Mehmet Emin, Asrımızın Siyavuş'u (Istanbul: Millî Azerbaycan Neşriyatı, 1339/1923), pp. 58-68.

difficulties in accommodating himself with the new regime at the beginning. This was partly due to his problems antedating the Bolshevik takeover. He thought of himself as "a useless and disillusioned former warrior" [p. 194]. He was not totally wrong, in the sense that the mission which had brought him to lands far away from his hometown did not exist any longer. In addition to his own contribution to its demise, which must have certainly weighed on his conscience, he "thought that [he] had nothing to do [in Azerbaijan] anymore" [p. 188]. Moreover, his relationship with Sitare was not the same as before, perhaps because of the role he had played in the abrupt social change which affected Nukha. Relating this episode of estrangement, Aydemir refers to the prevailing atmosphere in Nukha, then utters this comment which, to a certain extent, sounds autobiographical:

> No one knew what was going to happen. No one was self-confident; nor was there someone certain of his present or future. A few people's sycophancy for the newcomers and attempts at carrying on thus a tranquil life by siding with them, were all in vain. As a result of these attempts, they were rejected by both the people and the newcomers and did not know which way to go, impotent and lonesome as they were [pp. 188-189].

On the other hand, he felt insecure because of his previous activities as a nationalist militant and thought that the Armenian minority of Nukha could inform the Bolshevik authorities [p. 216]. One day, a friend of his' brought him the news of his imminent arrest. He tried to escape with a fellow teacher but failed in his attempt without, however, being

noticed. This proved to be a fortunate failure, since the arrest never materialized [pp. 219-220 and 227].

Aydemir's anxieties seem to have been short-lived. Only five months after the incursion of the Red Army into Azerbaijan, he was declining a job offer in Anatolia made by Memduh Şevket Bey (Esendal), the Ambassador of the Ankara Government in Baku, on the request of Aydemir's old friend, Hüseyin Avni Bey, then the Vice-President of the GNA. In fact, he enjoyed life in this anarchical atmosphere, which satisfied only too well his revolutionary romanticism. When the ambassador reminded him of the dangers he might have to face, he replied:

> Suppose, Sir, you were in Paris during the French Revolution. Would you have left that city because it was dangerous?[57]

The Bolshevik authorities, on the other hand, had confidence in Aydemir. After the arrival of a Red Army division in Nukha, the division's Cheka commissar, a young and uncouth fisherman from Astrakhan, had shared his apartment for a while [pp. 185-187 and 194]. In addition to an unspecified function he performed in the educational bureaucracy, he also continued to exercise his profession, but with a new curriculum and somewhat strange students in the classroom. He had become professor in a sort of "continuing education" program for mountain

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[57]. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 216-217. We must add however that Aydemir's throwing in his lot with Enver Pasha may have been another, and perhaps the unique, reason behind this refusal; see below, pp. 68-72.

villagers who, seated with their strange attire in the benches designed for elementary school children, amused Aydemir very much. His new students respected him and proved to be avid for learning, to the point of disturbing him late in the evenings with all sorts of questions [pp. 216-218]. He seems to have devoted his spare time to "meetings" on the content of which he says very little, but tells that they "interested" him [pp. 194-195]. He also gives a detailed account of a trial which was certainly not the only one he attended [pp. 191-193].

It is through these meetings and trials that Aydemir familiarized himself with the Bolshevik discourse. What he seems to have retained of it, however, amounts to its anti-imperialist component. He still did not feel attracted by the concepts of class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat but endorsed the way international politics was rationalized by the Communists.[58] He combined his reluctance for an analysis based on the existence of social classes with his acceptance of the phenomenon of imperialism as defined by the Bolsheviks, to develop a universalist theory of his own which, in its turn, condemned his former pan-Turkism as a particularistic theory bound to perpetuate the existing bloodshed among the nations. His new theory appealed to him so much that he authored his

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58. Ibid., pp. 195-196 and 203. Vedat Nedim Tör, a future colleague of Aydemir's in both the Communist Party of Turkey and the journal Kadro, seems also to have come to Communism via anti-imperialist emotionalism and after having read Lenin's Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism; see his memoirs, Yıllar Böyle Geçti (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976), p. 8.

first article, in which he wrote that he was one of "the children of a realm where all the religions were equal, and all the peoples brethren" [pp. 196-197].

Aydemir says he did not know who these "children" were. It is clear however that he was already one of these "national Communists" as Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay put it,[59] that is to say, one of the many Turkic speaking intellectuals who have embraced Communism to revolutionize their society. However, these national Communists rejected both the internationalist principle of the Communists because of the emotionalism due to their status of individuals belonging to the colonial world, and the concept of class struggle because in their judgment this was inapplicable to their society due to feeble, even nonexistent, class differentiation.[60] As a matter of fact, Aydemir says that he ultimately found reason to excuse the abuses of the Bolshevik takeover in the concept of social revolution, something that his former faith could not achieve, to his great despair:

> ...[I]s there a revolution which gives birth bloodlessly to the civilization and order it promises? These events are the labor pains announcing the birth of a new universe, and this bloodshed is perhaps the price of former offenses... And what difference can the characteristics of the actors

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[59]. See Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay, Les mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie. Le "sultangalievisme" au Tatarstan (Paris and The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1960), especially pp. 96-98 and, for the nationalist-reformist background of these "national Communists," pp. 52-53 and 69-92.

[60]. Ibid., pp. 101-105.

> make? Who could have destroyed the throne of the czars, had these coarse fishermen from Astrakhan not existed? And how else can this moribund Asia rise from her Seven Sleepers' slumber? How else can we heal the gangrened wounds of torpor of this Asia, this decayed Bokhara, this opium-addicted Persia, this China and India? [pp. 198-199]

In this passage of his autobiography relative to the awakening of the East, Aydemir cites a poem entitled Şarkın Ufukları, "The Horizons of the Orient," written by Ali Canip (Yöntem) before the First World War. The poem, of which Aydemir gives the first four and the last two verses, was like Aydemir's own reasonig both an appeal and a justification for revolutionary violence. Here are its closing lines:

> ...
> Let your prayers not kneel down before deaf heavens;
> Let your curses put afire the horizons;
> To overwhelm oppression and subjugation a little blood will suffice,
> O Orient! Wake up, that is enough; o Orient, arise![61]

The sequel to this awakening was the liberation of these "oppressed peoples of the East from oppression, exploitation and massacres" [p. 195]. But in terms of Aydemir's understanding, there was no such sequence: awakening and liberation were synonymous. The social-Darwinist philosophy of his generation and its corollary, which consisted of an acute xenophobia vis-à-vis Europe, were so solidly implanted in his mind that, after he writes his above-mentioned justification for revolutionary violence, he immediately goes on to say:

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[61]. See Ali Canip, Geçtiğim yol ([Istanbul]: "Türk Kadını" ve "Talebe Defteri" Müessesesi, 1918), pp. 5-6.

> Especially this latter justification captivated me, for our generation was hostile to the West and disappointed with the East. We would think that the West had always cheated on us, had always considered us as wrong. We used to say that the West was the enemy of our very being, land and creed,

and quotes the most explicit verses of yet another poem which, according to Aydemir, his entire generation knew by heart:

> I have not forgiven you, the West, my cowardly oppressor,
> Turks will remain your enemy until dies their last survivor![62]

Since the Bolshevik Revolution had shaken the East from its inertia, "[f]oreigners would now leave Asia. Asia would belong to Asians henceforth" [p. 199]. This was what Aydemir expected from the near future when he went to Baku in September 1920 as a delegate to the First Congress of the Peoples of the East, organized by the Third (Communist) International.

From early 1918 onwards, Joseph Stalin and his Muslim "national Communist" collaborators in the People's Comissariat to the Affairs of Nationalities (Narkomnats), such as Mir Said Sultan Galiev, considered the main theoretician of national

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[62]. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 198. Composed immediately after the Balkan War, the poem in question was entitled Kin, "Hatred," and had won to its author, Emin Bülent (Serdaroğlu) (1886-1942) great fame and a golden watch offered on behalf of the nationalist literary society Genç Kalemler, "The Young Pens," by a deputation including Ali Canip Yöntem and Talat Muşkara; see Yusuf Ziya Ortaç, Portreler, 2nd edn. (Istanbul: Akbaba Yayınevi, 1963), pp. 101-102. For the significance of the poem within Turkish Hearths Society circles, see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 5 vols. (Istanbul & Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1945-1972), Vol. II, p. 144.

Communism, had through their publications attracted attention to the revolutionary potential of the colonial nations. It was assumed that "the European ruling groups [had] produced, through the very essence of their economic and social system, two groups of have-nots --the colonial peoples and the industrial workers."[63] Hence, any attempt to emancipate the colonial nations would have, it was thought, a weakening effect on this system and precipitate the expected socialist revolution in the industrialized countries of Europe. Sultan Galiev, for example, wrote:

> All Muslim colonized peoples are proletarian peoples and as almost all classes in Muslim society have been oppressed by the colonialists, all classes have the right to be called "proletarians"... Therefore, it is legitimate to say that the national liberation movement in Muslim countries has the character of a Socialist revolution.[64]

He went even further and, considering that the European working classes were not as revolutionary as the Russian Communists thought them to be, he contended that "without the participation of the East, it [was] impossible... to achieve the international socialist revolution."[65]

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63. Boersner, p. xi.

64. Words of Sultan Galiev in a speech during the Regional Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) held in Kazan in March 1918, quoted in Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union. A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World (Chicago: The University Chicago Press, 1979), p. 42.

65. Mir Said Sultan Galiev, "Sotsialnaia revoliutsiia i Vostok", Zhizn' Natsional'nostei, 38[46](1919), quoted in full in Bennigsen and Wimbush, pp. 131-133.

Consequently, the Communist International (Comintern) concentrated on this issue extensively during its second congress in July 1920, and reconsidered its policy vis-à-vis the national liberation movements. In addition to V. I. Lenin, delegates from colonial countries, such as Manabendra Nath Roy from India and Hendricus Sneevliet (using the pseudonym "Maring") from the Netherlands Indies, were particularly influential on the final decisions of the congress, which consisted broadly of intensifying propaganda work among the colonial peoples and supporting the liberation movements of these peoples even under the leadership of non-proletarian parties, provided that the leaders in question were committed to serious social change in their countries. Ultimately, the term "bourgeois democratic," which was used in reference to these movements, was also abandoned upon the insistence of Lenin and replaced by the construct "national revolutionary."[66] This was an important step in the making of modern communist thought, since the underdeveloped peoples were for the first time recognized as having a significant role in the socialist revolution which, thus far, had been the birthright of the industrialized nations. The emancipation of the colonial world was even defended as a prerequisite for the socialist revolution in Europe by the Indian delegate Roy, who was later condemned by Lenin. Yet, in a letter pertaining to the agenda of its third congress, the Executive Committee of the Communist

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66. See Eudin and North, pp. 68-70.

International (ECCI) would nevertheless recognize that "without a revolution in Asia, the proletarian world revolution [could not] be victorious."[67]

The immediate result of this change in the Bolshevik outlook came in the form of measures destined to strengthen the ties between the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [RCP(b)] and the peoples of the East, be they in the Russian orbit or not. While regional congresses were organized to discuss the problems specific to peoples living on the formerly imperial Russian lands, an appeal was issued for "the enslaved masses of Persia, Armenia and Turkey," urging them to participate in a congress in Baku together with other Asian and Transcaucasian peoples. In fact, the ECCI had not waited for the end of the Second Congress of the Comintern to publicize its new policy. The appeal in question was issued on the opening day of the congress, and the first session in Baku was scheduled for August 15.[68]

With a delay of two weeks, the First Congress of the

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67. See Boersner, p. 106; for the Second Congress of the Comintern, see Carr, Vol. III, pp. 253-261, Boersner, pp. 78-93, Eudin and North, pp. 39-44, and Carrère d'Encausse and Schram, pp. 40-48; for a good summary of the change in the communist outlook to the colonial world, see Stephen White, "Communism and the East: The Baku Congress, 1920," Slavic Review, XXXIII, 3(1974): 492-514.

68. Carr, Vol. III, p. 261; for the complete text of the appeal "To the Enslaved Popular Masses of Persia, Armenia and Turkey," issued on 20 July 1920, and the proceedings of the congress at Baku, see Congress of the Peoples of the East, translated and annotated by Brian Pearce (London: New Park Publications, 1977).

Peoples of the East opened on September 1, 1920, under the patronage of the Comintern, which was represented by such prominent figures as Grigorii E. Zinoviev, Karl Radek and Béla Kun. A total of 1891 delegates attended, of whom more than two thirds seem to have professed to be Communists, but a later comment by Zinoviev stated that less than half of them were party members.[69] Aydemir writes that he was probably the youngest delegate in the congress. Unlike many others, he was not armed but was dressed in his usual military uniform [pp. 203-204]. He describes with humorous detail the participants in the congress, their eagerness to fight a holy war against the imperialist West, and the rather theatrical way in which sessions were carried through and unanimous decisions taken [pp. 204-207].

The Congress of the Peoples of the East was not of great significance for Aydemir, since he had already embraced fully what was repeatedly proclaimed in its seven lengthy sessions. The trip to Baku nevertheless opened new horizons to him. On the closing day of the congress, Küçük Talat Bey introduced Aydemir to Enver Pasha [pp. 208-213]. Although he writes that the latter had lost much of his charisma during his appearance in the congress [p. 207], Aydemir seems to have been impressed by his former party leader[70] and Vice-Commander in Chief.

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69. Carr, Vol. III, p. 262; for the ethnic-national origins of the delegates, see Congress of the Peoples of the East, pp. 187-188.

70. There exists only one reasonably reliable source which refers to Aydemir as a CUP member; see Göktürk, p. 81.

As we have previously seen, Enver Pasha had established contacts with the Bolsheviks during his stay in Germany. His aim was to fight British imperialism on a scale as wide as the entire Islamic world. He was also planning to found İslam İhtilal Cemiyetleri İttihadı, "The Union of Islamic Revolutionary Committees" (UIRC), as a successor to the organization of the same name conceived during the war to conduct fifth column activities within the predominantly Islamic lands of the British Empire. He was certainly not a Communist and, as other conservative Muslims did, saw the Bolsheviks only as fellow collaborators against a common enemy.[71] But he was not altogether resistant to the idea of adopting socialist principles either, provided that these latter be refurbished according to the teachings of Islam.[72] When he finally reached Moscow in August 1920, he found, to his great satisfaction, the Bolshevik leadership equally disposed to a joint venture against the British. In fact, he was a valuable weapon in the hands of the Comintern as both a potentially more amenable substitute for Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the eventuality of the latter's defeat in Anatolia, and as a charismatic figure capable of winning over the loyalty of Central Asian Muslims. This second concern had ultimately been the reason for the Comintern

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71. See, for example, Muhammad Rashid Rida, "Socialism, Bolshevism and Religion," in Anouar Abdel-Malek ed., Contemporary Arab Political Thought, tanslated from the French by Michael Pallis (London: Zed Books, 1983), pp. 156-159.

72. See his letter to Cemal Pasha in Aydemir, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, pp. 519-520.

to urge him to go to Baku for the Congress of the Peoples of the East despite his well-known religiousness and malapropos record as the mastermind of pan-Turkish expansionism. As to his appearance in the congress, Aydemir relates that Turkish Communists protested strongly against it and claimed that he should have appeared instead before a revolutionary court [pp. 207-208]. A compromise was finally reached upon the insistence of Zinoviev, and Enver Pasha's speech was read by two other delegates, in Russian and in Turkish.[73]

During the days immediately after the Baku congress Enver Pasha developed, together with many other Unionists, the text known as Mesai, "The Work."[74] Despite its leftist tone, influenced by Bolshevik rhetoric, Mesai was very little more than a naive program to retain traditional values and institutions under new names. The similarities between this text and the political program of a group of avowedly former Unionists in the GNA under the name of Halk Zümresi, "The People's Faction," may indicate that CUP members inside and outside Turkey were in touch, and that Mesai was intended to secure Bolshevik support for an eventual Unionist takeover of Turkish affairs. In any event, it is obvious that Enver Pasha's foremost aim was to seize power in Turkey, by military means if necessary. Yet,

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73. For the complete text of Enver Pasha's speech, see Congress of the Peoples of the East, pp. 76-79.

74. See Dumont, "La fascination du bolchévisme," pp. 150-151; for the complete text of the program, see Tunçay, Mesai, pp. 41-82.

the Bolshevik support for such a scheme was all the more problematic to obtain, since Enver Pasha and the CUP were severely indicted in a resolution taken in the fourth session of the Baku congress for their policies during the war and summoned to prove their new profession of faith by tangible deeds; and there also existed a reorganized CPT which enjoyed the full support of Moscow.[75] This situation led Enver Pasha to shift further to the left and to organize Halk Şuralar Fırkası, "The People's Soviets Party" (PSP), projected most probably as the Turkish section of the UIRC.

The PSP, which had a program more radical than Mesai and thus marked the extreme limits of Enver Pasha's flirtation with Communism,[76] proved nevertheless ineffective as a tool for recapturing the leadership in Turkish politics. Alarmed by Unionist activities and distrustful of Bolshevik policies, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had started to take a series of both preemptive and repressive measures against the strengthening of the left in Anatolia as early as September 1920. These included the dispatching of a delegation to the Baku congress, the changes in the laws pertaining to high treason and to the formation of all kinds of associations including political parties, the formulation of a Halkçılık Programı, "Program of

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75. For the complete text of the resolution, see Congress of the Peoples of the East, pp. 82-83; for a short history of the CPT, see below, Chapter 2, pp. 76-78, 100-109 and 117-123.

76. For the complete text of the party program, see Tunçay, Mesai, pp. 85-104.

Populism," the foundation of an "official" Communist Party of Turkey, the prosecution of all the leftist parties or associations active in Anatolia, and the ban on the Unionist leaders' return to Turkey. These measures were ultimately successful both in checking an eventual Bolshevik infiltration in Anatolia and in preventing a Unionist renaissance in Turkish politics.

Though isolated in his exile and deprived of the help he had expected from the Bolsheviks, Enver Pasha had hardly given up hope. He made a last attempt to seize power in Anatolia during the Greek offensive in the summer of 1921. While the Turkish army was in retreat, he menacingly informed Mustafa Kemal Pasha of his inevitable return to Anatolia and secretly joined a small group of followers in Batum at the beginning of September.[77] There, during the battles on the river Sakarya where the future of the Turkish liberation movement was at stake, Enver Pasha presided over the Congress of the PSP which was renamed İttihat ve Terakki, "Union and Progress." A series of resolutions, which amounted to nothing less than a detailed political program, vindicated legitimacy for the CUP to come to the open again and argued mildly that the Anatolian resistance movement was none other than a Unionist undertaking, and thus it was the Committee's natural right to assume its leadership.[78] However, the victory of the Turkish forces on the

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77. For his letter dated July 16, 1921, to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, see Cebesoy, pp. 231-235; for the details of his secret arrival at Batum, see Aydemir, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, pp. 604-605.

78. For Enver Pasha's earlier decision to change the name of the party, see his letter dated July 26, 1921, to Halil

Sakarya put an abrupt end to these last battle cries of Enver Pasha. Completely abandoned by Moscow, he would leave the Transcaucasus at the beginning of October at the latest, his destination being Russian Turkestan, where he died on 4 August 1922, while fighting the Bolsheviks in the name of "Greater Turan."

It is certain that Aydemir worked for Enver Pasha during the summer of 1921, if not during the entire year between the Baku congress and the Kemalist victory on the river Sakarya. We know that he had secretly crossed the Turco-Soviet border during the battles of Sakarya on a reconnaissance mission, most probably in preparation for Enver Pasha's passage to Anatolia.[79] In addition to this fact, which he never mentioned

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Pasha in Karabekir, Enver Paşa, pp. 311-312; for the resolutions of the congress, see ibid., pp. 152-156, and Cebesoy, pp. 237-238.

79. See Mete Tunçay, "Şevket Süreyya Aydemir," Milliyet Sanat Dergisi, 178(1976): 3-5; cf. Göktürk, who contends that this secret mission led Aydemir as far as the town of Malatya (op. cit., p. 86). Certainly, Aydemir conceals this episode of his life in order not to be seen by his readers as one of those sentenced to damnatio perpetuae by Turkish official historiography. It would have been, in fact, very difficult to relate one's activities, the success of which depended on the failure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Similarly, in an article published in Kadro, Aydemir gives a series of wrong dates in order to conceal his presence in Batum in the summer and fall of 1921: see Şevket Süreyya, "Benerji Kendini Niçin Öldürdü?" Kadro, 4(1932): 31-39. Aydemir ultimately corrected these dates in an interview he gave to Yön, where he declared that he had met Nazım Hikmet at Batum, late in September, 1921; see "Şevket Süreyya Aydemir'le Bir Konuşma: Nazım Hikmet Ankara'da (I)," Yön, 199(1967): 7.

In Suyu Arayan Adam, Aydemir's description of Enver Pasha is distant, cold and even condescending here and there. Yet, in a passage where he relates a conference, given most probably by the Red Army general Kakurin [see Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, 2 vols. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), Vol. I, p. 389] on the circumstances of Enver Pasha's death, his

in his works, there is also the possibility that the mystericus person who had accompanied Enver Pasha and Dr. Nazım Bey on their secret journey from Moscow to Batum at the beginning of September 1921 was Aydemir himself. A passage in Aydemir's Enver Paşa thus relates the Unionist leaders' arrival at Batum:

> There was someone who accompanied them. Yet, after having sheltered them in a house in Batum for only one day, he had placed them in the car 1030 parked out of the way in the Batum train station and had disappeared. More precisely, he had proceeded to his secret mission of surveillance.[80]

As a matter of fact, the nature and the timing of Aydemir's mission in Anatolia conform well with the content of this rather enigmatic paragraph.

Another indication of Aydemir's activities as a courier or secret agent on the service of Enver Pasha's PSP is his frequent "trips." He, in fact, acknowledges that during this

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judgement on his former leader's record is ambiguous in the extreme (pp. 281-288). Throughout his Enver Paşa, the last and the weakest of his biographical works, which he wrote at the age of 73, this ambiguity persists along with traces of nostalgia and hero worship. There are also passages where Aydemir seems to be willing to revise his autobiography, like the quotation below on Enver Pasha's arrival at Batum, but contents himself with enigmatic sentences as if they were intended to be decoded. The most unforgivable characteristic of this work, however, is the fact that Aydemir repeats the false legend of Enver Pasha's death, the famous cavalry charge against the Red Army machine guns (Vol. III, pp. 684-685), although he was one of the few who had listened to General Kakurin's account of the facts.

80. Aydemir, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, p. 604. Dr. Nazım (ca.1870-1926) had been one of the most active members of the CUP both before and after the Revolution of 1908. Member of the central committee of the party, he was among those who left Istanbul for Germany shortly after the Armistice. Implicated in the conspiracy against Mustafa Kemal Pasha, he was hanged in 1926 (see below, Chapter 3, pp. 149-152).

period he used to travel extensively, and not only inside Azerbaijan:

> I was like a medieval knight between the Caspian and the Black Sea. I would go whereve. a disturbance, a fight occurred.
> ...
> Three times I returned to Nukha from different places. All of these journeys had been long and difficult. Each time I would see Sitare once and for a very short time, and leave the town [p. 233].

These journeys must have taken place after the end of April 1921, since Aydemir's being a part of the delegation sent by Nukha for the first anniversary celebrations of the new regime in Baku would indicate that he was still active in his small town at that time.[81] The ultimate proof of the fact that these journeys were made on Enver Pasha's service is that, not only would his desertion after April 1921 have created pecuniary problems, but also travelling outside Azerbaijan would have meant trouble for a non-Communist like him, unless he had some status at least accepted by the Bolsheviks, if not respected. It has to be assumed as a matter of fact that both problems were solved by Enver Pasha's PSP.

Another fact which indicates that Aydemir had worked for Enver Pasha's plans to succeed is his acute desperation after the failure and departure of his leader. He felt once again

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[81]. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 222-226. In an interview he gave later in his life, Aydemir told that he had "joined the Soviet of Azerbaijan." We do not know whether he was referring to the same delegation or not; see "Atatürk Kadro'yu Niçin Destekledi?" Yön, 27(1962): 10-12.

abandoned and lacking a mission:

> I was travelling around without any aim or purpose whatsoever... I escaped to the farthest places possible... [P]erhaps I was looking for my death [p. 233].

This desperation seems to have affected his physical condition as well, for Vâlâ Nureddin Vâ-Nû who met him most probably at the beginning of October, describes him thus on the day they were first introduced at Batum:

> He is fervent in his walk and impassioned in his talk. He has the light of intelligence in his blue eyes, but his eyelashes are red. For this reason he uses tinted lenses.[82]

But, as the whole episode in Enver Pasha's service is concealed in Aydemir's autobiography, this desperation is presented as the result of his rather tragic love affair with Sitare, and his return to active political life is described as an auspicious outcome of his marriage, despite the fact that he had joined the CPT before his marriage:

> Finally one day, I married the first Turkish woman I met in Batum... My marriage has dragged me back into the fight for the causes of the time [p. 234].

In fact, Aydemir was a revolutionary in quest of a revolution and felt lost after the disappearance of the one that Enver Pasha had promised. Yet, he soon found another mentor in the person of Ahmet Cevat (Emre), who was a fellow educator of

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[82]. Vâlâ Nureddin Vâ-Nû, Bu Dünyadan Nazım Geçti (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1965), p. 256.

fame thanks to his nationalist publications before the war. In addition to his influential role of go-between in Aydemir's marriage, Ahmet Cevat was going to have him embark on a still greater project of revolution, namely the world socialist revolution, as he was a member of the Baku-based CPT after the reorganization of this party at the beginning of the summer of 1920.

Chapter 2

The Revolutionary Activist

Aydemir's involvement with the Unionist endeavors for reasons of both loyalty and doctrine had not prevented him from collaborating more or less closely with other groups in the Transcaucasus. One of the major reasons which account for the possibility of such cross-organizational activities is the unsettled political atmosphere that prevailed in the region until the end of 1921. A good example in this respect is the apparent ease with which the Bolsheviks seem to have contemplated the mutually antagonistic and supernumerary existences of a CPT and a PSP for tactical reasons of their own, while their relations with a third party, the Kemalists, were rather amicable. Another very significant reason, partly related to the preceding one, was the complex combination of the survival of pre-revolutionary political allegiances and/or group identities with a peculiarity of the revolutionary periods --a series of sudden and often opportunistic changes in loyalties, some of which turn out to be ephemeral for various

reasons. This aspect of revolutionary politics was further amplified in the case of the Muslims of the former Russian empire due to the relative tolerance that the Bolsheviks displayed toward the "heretics," such as the Azeri Musavatists for example, lest they should alienate them and eventually force them to armed resistance. As a consequence of these factors, individuals of various allegiances were able to socialize on various occasions and on the basis of extremely variegated common denominators, join forces for specific deeds which had different meanings for each and every partner, and inevitably, gather intelligence to serve the interests of their own group.[1]

Aydemir's life in Azerbaijan seems to have conformed to this pattern until at least the spring of 1921. While he was an Azeri civil servant in his capacity as teacher and highly esteemed in his district as indicated by his election to represent Nukha both in the Congress of the Peoples of the East and the first anniversary celebrations of the new regime, he had contacts with other groups. After the congress, he was introduced to Enver Pasha, an event which opened a very significant chapter in his life. He may also have been approached by the Kemalist ambassador in Baku, Memduh Şevket (Esendal) with an unacknowledged proposal, in addition to the above-mentioned suggestions of his old friend Hüseyin Avni (Ulaş),

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[1]. Among the memoirs illustrating these episodes of toing and froing, the one by Abdullah Battal-Taymas, Ben Bir Işık Arıyordum (Istanbul: Tan Gazetesi ve Matbaası, 1962) for the Don - Volga basin, and the other by Vâ-Nû, op. cit. for the Transcaucasus, are particularly rich in examples.

since he says in his often cryptic style:

> Some other matters came also under discussion during the talk with our ambassador in Baku [p. 217].

Yet, the most important contact that Aydemir established during his stay in Baku was, by far, the one with Ahmet Cevat (Emre), who introduced him to the communist leader Mustafa Suphi.[2]

An opponent of the Unionist regime prior to the First World War, Mustafa Suphi had been among those sent into exile in the small Black Sea port of Sinop. Having escaped to Russia shortly before the war, he had lived in prisoner camps until the October Revolution and, as a consequence of intense propaganda, had become a Communist. After his release he joined the Narkomnats and, as a member of the Central Muslim Commissariat, he became the senior responsible for agitation and propaganda among Turkish-speaking Muslims. He was the chief editor of Yeni Dünya, "The New World," which he published in Moscow, Aqmasjid (Simferopol), Odessa, Tashkent, and ultimately in Baku, according to the needs and changing fortunes of the Bolshevik cause during the civil war. He arrived in Baku exactly one month after the Bolshevik takeover and devoted himself to the restructuring of the Unionist-led CPT. Some of the notorious Unionists such as Halil Pasha were promptly purged, and the party was renamed Baku Türk Komünist Teşkilatı, "The Turkish Communist Organization of Baku" (TCO),

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[2]. Aydemir, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, p. 581.

for it did not yet have party status as defined by the Comintern.[3] To begin with, a founding congress with a minimum number of delegates was necessary for full membership in the Comintern.

On 10 September 1920, that is, three days after the closing of the Congress of the Peoples of the East, the First Congress of the CPT opened in Baku. Only 32 out of a total of 74 participants were full members entitled to vote.[4] Aydemir belonged to the non-voting majority. He briefly describes the congress with his usual humor and does not give much detail [pp. 213-214]. Yet, this First Congress of the CPT paid special attention to the emancipation struggle of the colonial peoples, a subject dear to Aydemir, with a long speech by Hilmioğlu Hakkı on the "colonial question."[5] Moreover, it can be clearly seen in the summary of the program discussions that one issue, on which the ultimate Bolshevik attitude alienated many a "national Communist" as early as 1921, caused some objections

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3. Mustafa Suphi, "Türkiye Komünist Teşkilatı Merkezi Heyeti'nin Faaliyeti," in Türkiye Komünist Fırkası'nın Birinci Kongresi (Baku: Türkiye Komünist Fırkası Neşriyatı, 1920), pp. 26-27 as reprinted in Mete Tunçay ed., Eski Sol Üzerine Yeni Bilgiler (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1982), pp. 72-73; see also Paul Dumont, "Bolchévisme et Orient. Le Parti communiste turc de Mustafa Suphi, 1918-1921," Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, XVIII, 4(1977): 377-409; for a detailed biography of Mustafa Suphi, see ibid. and Ali Yazıcı, "Mustafa Suphi Yoldaş'ın Tercüme-i Hali ve Siyasi Şahsiyeti Hakkında Muhtasar Malumat," in Mustafa Suphi ve Yoldaşları, 3rd edn. (Istanbul: Güncel Yayınlar, 1977), pp. 15-21.

4. Türkiye Komünist Fırkası'nın Birinci Kongresi, p. 3.

5. Ibid., pp. 38-46.

from the audience and lengthy debates ensued.[6] This was the issue of federalism that was referred to in Article 7/b of the third section of the program entitled "Religion and Nationality," which reads:

> The CPT accepts as government, the formation of a sovietic republic of workers and peasants who belong to various nations, and prefers the form of a federation to be based on the principle of the "voluntary union of free nations."[7]

Mustafa Suphi's foremost aim was to go over to Anatolia and organize the CPT on Turkish soil. It seems that he had been in touch with Mustafa Kemal Pasha as early as September 1919, while he was in Odessa.[8] After his arrival at Baku and while the Red Army was marching across Armenia towards the Turkish frontier, he sent a letter to Mustafa Kemal Pasha to ask for permission and assistance for the TCO to work against the imperialist designs in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's polite and very formal reply insisted, among other points, on the necessity of safeguarding the unity of the nation in a difficult period, implying thus a reluctance to allow additional political parties in Anatolia.[9] Permission to send a communist

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6. Ibid., pp. 82-83.

7. Türkiye Komünist Fırkası Programı (Baku: Türkiye Komünist Fırkası, 1920), p. 12, as reprinted in Tunçay, Eski Sol, pp. 142-153.

8. Mustafa Suphi, "Tarihi Vazife," in Mustafa Suphi ve Yoldaşları, pp. 71-72; for the approximate dating of the article, see Tunçay, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, p. 230.

9. For the complete text of both letters, see Fethi Tevetoğlu, Türkiye'de Sosyalist ve Komünist Faaliyetler (1910-1960) (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1967), pp. 221-225.

plenipotentiary to the GNA was nevertheless granted. Yet, having made up his mind long before Mustafa Kemal Pasha's reply reached him, Mustafa Suphi ultimately secured permission to come to Anatolia in December 1920, and arrived at Kars with a group of party members on the 28th of the same month. The group was treated very badly throughout its short stay in Eastern Anatolia, and two of its members, both retired officers, were arrested in Kars. Mustafa Suphi and the remaining fourteen members of the CPT were forced to go to Batum by sea, on their way back to Baku. They were all massacred and thrown overboard shortly after their motorboat left Trabzon, on January 28, 1921, upon orders most probably emanating from Ankara.[10]

This criminal event, in which the CPT lost four of the seven members of its central committee, was first reported in detail to Mikhail L. Veltman (alias Pavlovich) in a letter by Ahmet Cevat (Emre) on April 2, 1921.[11] A linguist, educator and columnist, Ahmet Cevat (1876-1961) had published a series of textbooks before and during the First World War and was a fervent nationalist. He had arrived at Baku during the Armistice with the intention of selling his school manuals to the Musavatist Ministry of Education. He also joined the

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10. The details of the episode and an excellent survey of the rich literature on it are to be found in Tunçay, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, pp. 229-242.

11. Mikhail L. Veltman, Revoliutsionnaia Turtsiia (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1921), pp. 119-121, quoted in full in Tevetoğlu, pp. 241-242.

"Language Commission" of the same ministry and became its chairman. It appears that he was approached by the Unionists of Baku who wanted to publish a newspaper after the Bolshevik takeover. But the latter were not sure whether they wanted Ahmet Cevat or not, for he had been among the harshest critics of the Unionist regime in a series of articles he had published after the Armistice. The uneasy rapprochement was cut short with Ahmet Cevat's joining Mustafa Suphi, whom he knew from the Teachers' Training College of Istanbul, where they had both taught.[12]

According to his memoirs, Ahmet Cevat joined forces with Mustafa Suphi almost as soon as the latter arrived at Baku, and lived in the office of the TCO. His work consisted of the administration of Yeni Dünya, to which he also contributed articles focusing most probably on imperialism, since he writes in his memoirs that the issues he was responsible for had an "entirely nationalistic spirit."[13] He was a delegate to the Congress of the Peoples of the East, and was among those who opposed the presidency's decision to host Enver Pasha. We do not know when he became a member of the CPT. But this must have taken place before September 1920, for he was one of the relatively active delegates during the party congress. He was elected a member of the external bureau of the central committee. He writes in his memoirs that he was opposed to the

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12. Emre, pp. 88-91, and Vâ-Nû, pp. 227-234.

13. Emre, pp. 146-150.

idea of going over to Anatolia. It seems also that Mustafa Suphi had preferred that he stay at the head of their paper in Baku. Aydemir relates that Ahmet Cevat thought this return to Anatolia untimely and dangerous, and tried to dissuade Mustafa Suphi.[14]

Ahmet Cevat's minor status in the CPT did not change when the remaining Turkish Communists in Baku founded a new organization. Yet, he was almost completely inactive as far as politics is concerned and devoted his time to the marketing of his textbooks, this time to the Communists. He also indulged in the carpet trade.[15] It is during this period that Aydemir joined him at Batum. There is also evidence that Ahmet Cevat was aware of Aydemir's plan to go secretly to Anatolia, and that he advised him not to undertake it.[16] Soon they would form a "social family" together with two young men, Nazım Hikmet (Ran) and Vâlâ Nureddin (Vâ-Nû), who arrived from Anatolia at the beginning of September 1921.

Aydemir does not say when he joined the Communist Party. All we know is that this happened in Batum during a session of both admissions and purges [pp. 236-237]. But, if we admit the sequence of events as related by Vâlâ Nureddin, Aydemir must have become a CPT member sometime in late September, for he was

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14. Ibid., p. 93, and Aydemir, Enver Paşa, Vol. III, pp. 581-582.

15. Vâ-Nû, pp. 234-235 and 255-283.

16. Göktürk, p. 86.

a Communist when they met. We also know that soon afterwards he delivered his first speech as a Communist on the occasion of the "Emancipation Day of the Women of the East," the celebration of which he describes with great humor [pp. 238-240].

Aydemir was a revolutionary in quest of a suitable revolution for his country. In addition to the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, Communism attracted him through its anti-imperialist discourse, which had a great influence on Aydemir's generation in Turkey. But, despite the fact that his familiarity with both the communist ideology and the Bolshevik practice of it must have increased significantly before he officially joined the CPT, he was certainly not a Marxist when he did so. He may be best described as a social-Darwinist and a Jacobin, and his coming to Communism was to a great extent the result of an extreme positivism in sociological approach common to many Turkish intellectuals during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Hence, this conversion was certainly not due to the so-called affinity between Islam and Communism dear to some contemporary eccentrics like the <u>imam</u> in Ahmet Cevat's entourage who contended that he had "reached a synthesis of [Islam] with the Bolshevik doctrine."[17] Communism represented to Aydemir a way to transcend his generation's dilemma posed by the West which, in Dankwart A. Rustow's words, "provided both the ideals of modernization, of industrialization, and of nationalism and the reality of imperial

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17. Vâ-Nû, pp. 227-228.

hegemony and colonial or semi-colonial rule."[18] Communism meant thus not only revolution and modernization for his country, but also revolution and redemption for the imperialist West.

Aydemir's autobiography is totally silent about his life in Batum until the summer of 1922. The only source we have on this period is the very rich memoirs of Vâlâ Nureddin Vâ-Nû, Bu Dünyadan Nazım Geçti, "There Was Nazım in This World," which he wrote as a token to the memory of his best friend, Nazım Hikmet Ran, the most famous Turkish poet of the twentieth century.[19] The two friends had come to Batum on September 2, 1921, and encountered Ahmet Cevat in Tbilisi a few weeks later. They immediately sympathized and decided to form what Ahmet Cevat called a "social family" on their return to Batum. They established themselves first in Hôtel de France, but the two young men later moved to a mansion deserted by a Scandinavian banker and occupied then by Ali Rıza, the former typesetter of Yeni

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18. Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Appeal of Communism to Islamic Peoples," in J. Harris Proctor ed., Islam and International Relations (London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1965), pp. 40-60.

19. Nazım Hikmet (Ran) (1902-1963), one of the most innovative names in modern Turkish poetry, has also been the most influential poet on the younger generations. He was arrested in 1938 for communist activity and remained in prison. He spent his life in exile after his release in 1950 and died in Moscow. His books were banned for a long time and even his best pieces can still not be found in school manuals.
A poet of much lesser talent, Vâlâ Nureddin Vâ-Nû (1901-1967) was better known as a journalist and translator. His most well-known publication was Bu Dünyadan Nazım Geçti which is a youthful account of almost a lifetime.

Dünya. Thanks to the acquaintances of Ahmet Cevat, Vâlâ Nureddin was able to make a living by giving Turkish lessons, a service which he paid back by cutting out the overtly nationalistic passages from Ahmet Cevat's textbooks destined to be sold in Bolshevik Azerbaijan. Very shortly after this communal life started, Aydemir joined the group and occupied a room in Ali Rıza's mansion.[20]

Aydemir owes his marriage to his "social family," more precisely, to the artistic skill of Nazım Hikmet who was also a painter above the average, and to Ahmet Cevat's skills of persuasion. According to Vâlâ Nureddin, one day when the "social family" was in full session, Aydemir saw a sketch in Nazım Hikmet's notebook. This was a cartoon of the young Leman Hanım, the sister of Hikmet Bey, who was the director of the Turkish school in Batum. When he was told that the young woman lived in Batum, Aydemir immediately expressed a serious desire of marrying her. Ahmet Cevat, in his turn, took the matter seriously as well, and asked for Leman Hanım's hand in marriage on Aydemir's behalf. Vâlâ Nureddin says that he and Nazım Hikmet thought until the last moment that Aydemir was joking. Consequently, it is virtually impossible to determine whether Aydemir had recognized in Nazım Hikmet's sketch a person he had already seen and liked without informing his friends, or, in a moment of extreme romantic fervor, he "fell in love" after a fashion that the popular Turkish romances abound in examples.

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20. Vâ-Nû, pp. 226-258.

The marriage was soon celebrated, and a new member was added to Ahmet Cevat's "social family."[21]

Only a few months, if not weeks, after Aydemir's marriage, the group left Georgia for good. Ahmet Cevat seems to have complained about his life in Batum in a letter to Veltman at the beginning of 1922. Veltman, who was also a colleague of Ahmet Cevat's in his capacity as Orientalist, was at that time the Chairman of the Scientific Association for Eastern Studies, a member of the Narkomnats collegium and the editor of the journal Novyi Vostok, "The New East." It was probably on Veltman's initiative that in the spring of the same year Ahmet Cevat received a letter from Georgii I. Safarov, who was in charge of the Comintern's newly established Eastern Section. Safarov was inviting him to teach in the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (CUTE) in Moscow. Ahmet Cevat was willing to go to Moscow, but wanted to take his "social family" with him. He got in touch with Ordzhonikidze who, informed of the project by Moscow, gave permission to the four young people to accompany Ahmet Cevat to Moscow, where they would study. The group then moved to Baku to take the train to Moscow at the beginning of the summer of 1922.[22]

It appears from the memoirs of Ahmet Cevat that Aydemir and

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21. Ibid. p. 259. Ahmet Cevat writes in his memoirs (p. 148) that Aydemir would have committed suicide if he could not marry Leman Hanım.

22. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 273 and 279, Emre, p. 151, and Vâ-Nû, pp. 279-287.

his wife were not part of the initial project. and that it was Aydemir who expressed the desire of joining the group.[23] Despite the fact that Aydemir's greatest interest had thus far been in militant action and that intellectual subtlety was not his forte, his lack of broad knowledge and higher education bothered him constantly. His craving for learning increased after he met Nazım Hikmet and Vâlâ Nureddin, who had come to the Transcaucasus with the intention of studying in revolutionary Russia, preferably in Moscow. Moreover, these cultivated young men, who belonged to old and distinguished families of Istanbul, who had graduated from the Naval School and the Galatasaray Lycée respectively, seem to have gently snubbed their good friend who, in addition to all his lack of refinement, spoke no other language than his native Turkish. Aydemir relates an episode when Nazım Hikmet labeled him as "peasant" with the condescension of both the bourgeois and the Marxist [p. 259], and Vâlâ Nureddin mocks in his memoirs the low intellectual quality of Aydemir's readings.[24]

Another factor which must have been decisive in Aydemir's ultimate choice is the political situation in the Transcaucasus at the beginning of 1922. Although the Bolshevik system was still in its phase of construction, the times of dramatic upheaval had ended. Moscow, on the other hand, was a much more attractive place for Aydemir's taste as the capital city of the

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23. Emre, p. 151.

24. Vâ-Nû, p. 257.

world socialist revolution. As for the relations with Kemalist Turkey, they were no different than any other relationship between neighboring and rather friendly countries since the Treaty of Kars signed between the GNA and the Transcaucasian SSR's on 13 October 1921 as a sequel to the Turco-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921. Last but certainly not the least, the CPT, which had lost its cutting edge together with the loss of its most active members, was disbanded sometime in the summer of 1922.[25]

Ahmet Cevat's "social family" must have arrived in Moscow in June or, at the latest, at the beginning of July, since they saw Cemal Pasha there.[26] Both Aydemir and Vâlâ Nureddin relate that they had long talks with Dr. Nazım Bey, yet another Unionist leader who was in Moscow at that period.[27] The group was first lodged in Hotel Lux (later Tsentralnaïa Hotel), the guest house of the Comintern, located on Tverskaïa Street (later Gorki Street) in central Moscow [p. 250], until the students went to the summer camp of their university [p. 253]. It

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25. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, p. 1157, and the memoirs of Süleyman Nuri, a member of the Central Committee of the CPT, in Tunçay, Eski Sol, p. 21; see also below, p. 100.

26. Vâ-Nû, p. 337. One of the top Unionist leaders and Minister of the Marine during the war, Ahmet Cemal Pasha (1872-1922) had followed Enver Pasha in Russia. He was sent to Afghanistan as a Bolshevik emissary and seems to have contributed to the Soviet-Afghan rapprochement. He was assassinated, most probably by the Bolsheviks, in Tbilisi, on July 21, 1922.

27. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 293-302, and Vâ-Nû, pp. 225-226 and 337.

was in this camp that the three young men formed the "6th of August cell" [p. 258], which took at a later date the very serious decision of executing Leman Hanım, for marriage was an obstacle to efficiency in revolutionary activism. The project, which was developed to the point of choosing the executioner in the person of Nazım Hikmet, was finally and happily abandoned.[28] Back in Moscow, apart from some time they dedicated to translations to earn money and to demonstrations against the Kemalist regime in front of its embassy, where Aydemir remembers to have delivered one of his impassioned speeches,[29] their life centered around the Communist University of the Toilers of the East.

Hendricus Sneevliet (alias Maring) had proposed during the Second Congress of the Comintern that "[the Comintern should] give the Eastern Communists the opportunity to obtain a theoretical education in communism... in Russia, so as to help make the Far East an active member of the Communist International."[30] The idea was accepted by the Comintern, and Zinoviev informed the Congress of the Peoples of the East at its seventh session of the future organization of "a university of the social sciences for activists in the East."[31] Subsequently, the Communist University of the Toilers of the East

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28. Göktürk, pp. 88-89.

29. Aydemir, Kırmızı Mektuplar, p. 65.

30. Eudin and North, p. 41.

31. Congress of the Peoples of the East, p. 146.

(CUTE) was officially established on April 21, 1921, by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Soviets. It was dependent on the Narkomnats, and the Deputy People's Commissar to the Affairs of Nationalities, Grigorii I. Broido, was placed at its head. According to Bennigsen and Quelquejay, the CUTE was operative during the academic year 1921-1922, and had a total of 713 students in December 1921.[32] This number seems to have reached 895 by January 1923, as indicated by Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, who also give the following information on the curriculum:

> The chief sections of the [CUTE] in 1925-26 were: Leninism and the History of the Russian Communist Party; History; Historical Materialism; Mathematics; Natural Sciences; Philology. The subsections included Physics and Chemistry. Study groups were founded for Leninism and party structure, economic sciences, natural sciences, Eastern studies and colonial politics, history, philology, and education.[33]

Aydemir reported the following figures, most probably those of 1923, in August 1924:

> [There are] 1000 students. Out of this total, 360 are women from the East. The students of the school are all young people who belong to 63 nations living in the various plains and plateaus of Asia. These are, in decreasing numbers, Tatars, Chinese, Azeris, Caucasians, Turks, Chuvashes, Iranians, Mogols, Indians, etc. The school's library is run by 26 clerks and its holdings amount to 250.000 volumes which increase by twenty per cent. every year.[34]

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32. Bennigsen and Quelquejay, pp. 148-149.

33. Eudin and North, p. 86.

34. Sabiha Şaziye [alias Şevket Süreyya Aydemir], "Bolşevikler diyarında ali tahsil," Aydınlık, 24(1924): 633-635.

In addition to the permanent teaching staff, which included people such as Roy, Sneevliet and Sultan Galiev, Bolshevik leaders like Radek, Stalin, Zinoviev, N. Bukharin, L. B. Kamenev and L. Trotsky often lectured at the CUTE. Instruction was given in major European and Asian languages. The latter comprised Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, Persian and Turkish.[35]

According to Aydemir, the school premises, located on Tverskaïa Street, opposite Pushkin Square, were in a very bad shape in the summer of 1922, and various services, to begin with the food, were rather poor. But in the fall of the same year, on their return from a summer camp not far from Moscow, the students discovered that things had improved significantly [pp. 253 and 273]. Various student committees were responsible for the running of the school, and Aydemir became the chairman of the military committee. He notes on this occasion that the basement of their building looked like an arsenal [p. 273]. Education, on the other hand, seems to have been serious at the CUTE despite the low standards of the recruits:

> In reality [the CUTE] did not look like a university but an institution that manufactured students for universities... The secondary education of the students enrolled here was definitely uneven. Many had spent their high school years on the fronts, in civil wars. In fact, admission was certainly not difficult for those who met some requirements. But a whole series of preparatory courses, tests and classes worked so efficiently and so smoothly that the recruits were constantly eliminated, almost without noticing it. Those whose names appeared on the lists posted

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35. Emre, p. 148, Vâ-Nû, p. 325, and Bennigsen and Wimbush, p. 110.

> regularly on the walls of the main hall left the school without complaint and went to work... I felt rather educated, rather well-trained in this crowd despite all my shortcomings [p. 274].

Aydemir seems to have been one of the best students of the CUTE, at least for some time. He learned Russian quicker and better than his two friends and inspired a well-deserved respect that his classmates paid by electing him as the student representative in the summer of 1923.[36] Very scarce invitations sent to the CUTE were handed over to Aydemir by the administration, certainly because of his outstanding record. This is how he was able to listen to General Kakurin, who gave a detailed account of the last days of Enver Pasha in Bokhara, at a conference organized in the Moscow Military Academy [pp. 281-288]. Similarly, he attended an enlarged plenum of the ECCI, most probably the third, which issued the famous "Directive of Policy to the Third Congress of the Chinese Communist Party" in May 1923, since Aydemir relates a plenum session entirely dedicated to the analysis and discussion of the revolutionary potential in China [pp. 348-351]. But Aydemir's performance was not limited to his successful training as a Communist. Vâlâ Nureddin reports on several occasions that Aydemir had also developed a revolutionary ethics in which devotion to social revolution imposed a rigorous self-discipline close to asceticism on the individual, who had to refrain even from youthful volatility. It appears that he

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[36]. Vâ-Nû, pp. 316 and 356.

admonished his friends on moral grounds more than once and with perfect eloquence which made him the undisputed leader of the Turkish contingent at the CUTE.[37]

We do not know exactly what Aydemir studied, which classes he attended in the CUTE. We are not even sure whether he was a full-time student or simply attended some sort of professional formation course in pedagogy. The only fact we are certain of is that his stay in Moscow lasted for less than two academic years, that is, at least one year shorter than the normal duration of studies at the CUTE. He may also have been one of those students who had to leave the CUTE, depending on the way one reads the obvious errors in dates given in his autobiography. For example, under a picture which shows him as a student in Moscow, the dates given are "1921-1924" [p. 275], despite the fact that he had come to Moscow in the summer of 1922 as it has been previously indicated, and that his return to Istanbul took place "at the end of 1923" as reported later by Aydemir himself [p. 387]. But the strongest possibility is that he was first enrolled in a short program and then briefly served as lecturer in the CUTE, since Vâlâ Nureddin reports that Aydemir "distinguished himself, and was appreciated, as an excellent educator."[38]

No matter how Aydemir ultimately fared in the CUTE as either a student or an instructor, it is certain that he was

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37. Ibid., pp. 304, 306-307 and 316-317.

38. Ibid., p. 325.

well acquainted with Leninist theory, not only because this latter subject was compulsory in the curriculum but also he was personally interested in studying it. The first published text we know from him is a translation from Lenin entitled "The October Revolution in Russia" which appeared in the first issue of Kızıl Şark, "The Red Orient," in November 1922. It was signed "Ay Demir Şevket."[39] His first article to be published in Turkey after his return to Istanbul was again on Lenin. It is in fact revealing that the issue of Aydınlık, "Light" (best rendered by, and actually translated from, the French clarté), the journal of Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası, "The Turkish Socialist Party of Workers and Peasants" (TSPWP), consecrated to Lenin after the latter's death, contained two articles on Lenin of which Aydemir signed one as "Şevket Süreyya," although he was young and only a very recent member of the editorial staff.[40]

In all events, doctrinal teaching in the CUTE followed the lines drawn by Lenin in 1920 with respect to the colonial world and the national liberation wars. Ahmet Cevat's recollections on this matter are very explicit:

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39. Tunçay, Eski Sol, p. 330.

40. Şevket Süreyya, "Lenin ve leninizm," Aydınlık, 20(1924): 519-523; the article was in fact a shorter version of a study on Lenin and Leninism which formed, together with a long biography of Lenin by Sadrettin Celal (Antel) and additional articles translated from the Russian, a book published later in the same year: Sadrettin Celal and Şevket Süreyya, Lenin ve leninizm (Istanbul: Aydınlık Külliyatı, 1924).

> The words of the leaders --Zinoviev, Bukharin... Trotsky... Radek and others-- who came to give conferences in the [CUTE] when I was in Moscow, still sound in my ears:
>
> -- Comrades; you will work together with the nationalists in Turkey; like them and together with them you will fight against the imperialist powers who are the enemies of Turkey! Your task is to understand and support the nationalist movement![41]

Similarly, it is reported that in 1923 the Chinese Communists were strongly encouraged to work with the Kuomintang, Sun Yat-sen's radical democratic party, by the envoy of the Comintern, Maring, who was the godfather of the CUTE and one of its instructors:

> [Maring] persistently maintained the idea that the Kuomintang was not a bourgeois party, but was a party uniting various classes, and that the proletarian party must join the Kuomintang in order to draw the latter to the side of the revolution.[42]

The coincidence of Stalin's first steps to power, parallel to the shift toward the idea that the Russian Revolution constitutes a universal example, with the first purge which struck the CUTE in 1924, has to be seen as a further, ex post facto evidence of this "rightist deviation." It is also understood that teaching in the CUTE went beyond Lenin's 1920 theses in some points, and that the ideas of Sultan Galiev and Roy, which tied the success of the proletarian revolution in the industri-

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41. Emre, p. 148.

42. Ch'en Tu-hsiu's letter of December 10, 1929, to the members of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted in Eudin and North, p. 346.

alized countries to the liberation of the colonies, placed their stamp on the institution. Moreover,

> the ideological purity of the instruction at [the CUTE] certainly was suspect early on, if not for the mixed politics of the faculty and students then for the materials recommended for student reading. Among doctrinal works recommended to students, for example, were the writings of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, hardly the stuff that Bolsheviks are made of.[43]

Although Aydemir had already left Moscow for Istanbul when Stalin's multi-faceted power struggle began, he appears to have understood the basic difference between the future master of the USSR and the old guard in the Comintern who dreamed, if not of a world revolution, at least of a revolution in Europe. As a matter of fact, it can be clearly seen in his autobiography that Aydemir was dreaming of extending the revolution to Europe. This aspect of his thoughts is expressed very vividly in a passage where he relates an exaggeratedly optimistic speech by Kamenev delivered in the movie theater Le Chat Noir, the conference hall of the CUTE, with respect to the expected revolution in Germany [pp. 363-368]. This belief in the coming revolution and the enthusiasm it inspired are thus described in Aydemir's last and posthumous book:

> [L]et me come back to that atmosphere of our university years which was certainly worth living in, despite all its illusions, setbacks and defeats. This was perhaps an atmosphere which existed only in our minds. But it was also a universe that we, our workers and our beliefs had created for ourselves. To put it shortly, it was ours.

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[43]. Bennigsen and Wimbush, p. 110.

> Our existence acquired a meaning inside it. Even though it was based upon ready-made ideas, we stood together inside it for a better future we believed in. We were all destined to become either the heroes or the unknown soldiers of this future. But one way or the other, we were all destined to be the conquerors of the future. When Nazım Hikmet shouted,
>
> There is a raid,
> a raid to the sun!
> We will conquer it;
> soon will this be done!
>
> we felt the warmth of the sun in our palms as if we had already conquered it...[44]

Aydemir's dreams are even more explicit a few pages below in the same book:

> At that period we all admired the Western-oriented intellectual leaders of the Party such as Trotsky, Zinoviev and Radek. While listening to them, we used to imagine ourselves as revolutionary conquerors resting in Poland, in Germany, on the shores of the Rhine... in the very near future. These conquests were, in our minds, imminent and inevitable.[45]

But some time later, Aydemir had another experience which seems to have impressed him much. He went to listen to Stalin, this time in the more modest premises of a factory canteen, and found a totally different rhetoric. The theory of "socialism in one country," although not enunciated plainly, constituted in an embryonic form the main theme of Stalin's speech. Stalin's foremost concern was Russia's underdevelopment and the ways to cope with it, a subject bound to strike a chord in Aydemir's heart [pp. 369-372].

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44. Aydemir, Kırmızı Mektuplar, pp. 41-42.

45. Ibid., p. 73.

In the above-mentioned passage of Suyu Arayan Adam where Aydemir describes the enlarged plenum of the ECCI which issued the "Directive of Policy to the Third Congress of the Chinese Communist Party," there are cynical remarks on the absence of a Chinese delegate, be it to confirm or to invalidate what was said on China and Chinese politics [pp. 349-351]. The retrospective character of his autobiography notwithstanding, it can also and legitimately be asked whether Aydemir had already developed some sort of reserve vis-à-vis the pretensions of the Comintern to lay down the law even for colonial societies on which knowledge was certainly superficial and, to a certain extent, prejudiced. It is also possible that this attitude of the Comintern seemed quite arrogant for someone like Aydemir, extremely emotional over the question of imperialism. We do not know to what extent he was familiar with the Galievist theory which argued that imperialist powers would remain imperialist even under proletarian regimes and that the real class struggle was between the colonizers and the colonized.[46] It can be guessed, however, that he was rather well acquainted with it, assuming that Sultan Galiev must have used his lectures in the CUTE to propagate his ideas, which would soon be equated with counter-revolution by Stalin. It is in fact reported that a great majority of the young Tatar Communists who attended the CUTE considered him as their leader.[47]

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46. Bennigsen and Quelquejay, pp. 176-182.

47. Ibid., pp. 148-149.

But, even if this last point is eventually proven wrong, Aydemir would still be well aware of the Galievist "heresy," like anyone else attentive to the developments of the period, for the simple fact that Sultan Galiev's disgrace and arrest in the spring of 1923 were no minor events.

Sultan Galiev belonged to the "rightist" faction of the RCP(b) which supported the idea that Communists should not refrain from collaborating with the bourgeois elements in colonial countries. But he went further to argue that the concept of class struggle should not be constantly put forward, and that a united national front should be constituted on a long term basis in these countries. Although the Comintern opposed the idea of the durability of these national fronts and did not take into account the claims of some Russian Muslims in the Congress of the Peoples of the East, who argued that communist policies in Muslim lands should be revised according to the specifities of their peoples,[48] it can be said that the difference between Sultan Galiev and the Comintern pertained only to tactics and that they concurred in the essentials. But in internal Soviet politics things were utterly different, and Sultan Galiev resented very much the "leftist" stand of Stalin and the RCP(b) vis-à-vis the bourgeois elements of the national minorities. As a matter of fact, the autonomy of the national

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48. See especially the speeches of Narbutabekov, representing the Turkestan, and Ryskulov, a delegate from Kazakhstan, in Congress of the Peoples of the East, pp. 59-64 and 114-118.

republics was very limited due to a lack of local communist cadre in sufficient numbers and a distrust vis-à-vis the national bourgeoisies. The local Russians were not only in high and important positions, but also aimed to centralize the whole administrative system still further. As a result of these facts, the pre-revolutionary Great Russian chauvinism vis-à-vis the indigenous elements remained unaltered under the guise of orthodoxy in Marxist doctrine. Moreover, the entire party system was controlled by Moscow in such a centralized manner that even the Bolshevik principle of soviet representation was violated.[49]

These problems of doctrine that can be classified under the heading of "the quarrel between the rightists and the leftists" were still under open discussion in Russia when Aydemir studied in Moscow. They must have been particularly embarrassing for a Turkish Communist like Aydemir at that period, for the Kemalist attitudes after the victory in Anatolia seemed to take the opposite direction to Lenin's theses on the national revolutions. As a matter of fact, Kemalists had not done much for Soviet participation in the peace talks at Lausanne. In internal politics, the Turkish left was once again severely repressed on the eve of the Lausanne Conference, and the discussions over the new constitution which started at the end of 1923 revealed a serious shift to the right from the revolution-

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[49]. For details from Tatarstan, see Bennigsen and Quelquejay, pp. 127-134; for a very rich summary of the phenomenon, see Carr, Vol. I, pp. 368-383.

ary position where the Kemalists had thus far stood. In short, the Comintern's left wing, almost entirely composed of West-European delegates, seemed to be right in its claim that independence under nationalist leaderships would lead to the creation of new bourgeois regimes. Yet, the Comintern's reaction to the Kemalists had been mild and the Leninist policy of supporting the nationalists in their struggle for independence continued. As it was planned for China, Communists had to work with the nationalists in Turkey, too, without forgetting their ultimate aim of seizing the leadership of the nation at a later stage and turning the movement for independence into a social revolution. In the very first text he authored after his return to Turkey, Aydemir formulated this Leninist stand in the following words:

> ...[S]imilar to the proletarian movements in the West, the nationalist movements in the East are legitimate, historical and progressive movements. They deserve the assistance of the international proletarian class in all their aspects.[50]

Aydemir returned to Istanbul "towards the end of 1923" on board the Soviet steamer Krasnodar which he took at Odessa [p. 387], and settled with his wife in an old house in Büyükdere, on the European shore of the Bosporus [p. 397]. He found a position as teacher in the Barbaros Hayrettin Elementary School

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[50]. Şevket Süreyya, "Lenin ve leninizm," in Sadrettin Celal and Şevket Süreyya, op. cit., p. 40. This passage is omitted in the shorter version of the article published in Aydınlık.

in Beşiktaş, and worked in the journal Aydınlık, the organ of the clandestine CPT, after school hours [p. 392]. It seems that he had yet another duty which he performed in the evenings:

> Dressed as a peasant immigrant from Rumelia, the accent of which he imitated perfectly, he used to do propaganda work in coffee-houses.[51]

The circle that Aydemir joined on his return from the Soviet Union was first established in Berlin in 1919 by Turks of various professions who were sent to Germany during the First World War. At that time it was called Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Fırkası, "The Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey." On September 22, 1919, Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası, "The Turkish Socialist Party of Workers and Peasants" (TSPWP), was officially founded in Istanbul by the same group with additional members. But the new party remained almost totally inactive, partly because of the difficulties created by the occupation authorities in Istanbul, and partly because of the fact that a good mary of its members had left the city to join the ongoing resistance in Anatolia. Yet,

> while the Third Congress of the Comintern was being held in Moscow (22 June - 12 July 1921) [those who had remained in Istanbul] managed to publish the journal Aydınlık. The underground CPT which was based in this city must have been founded in this period. Thenceforth, the TSPWP, which would be active only intermittently, was going to act as the legal extension of this underground organization, and

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51. Tunçay, "Şevket Süreyya Aydemir," p. 4.

Aydınlık would be its legal organ.[52]

Following the directives of the Comintern, Aydınlık supported the Kemalist regime against its all too numerous opponents in Istanbul. Articles written for the most part by Dr. Şefik Hüsnü (Değmer) (1887-1959), the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPT, sided with the Ankara government in almost every issue of Aydınlık until the autumn of 1923. After the victory of the nationalists in Anatolia and the abolition of the sultanate, Şefik Hüsnü welcomed the Kemalist principle of the sovereignty of the people and vehemently attacked Lütfi Fikri Bey, the President of the Istanbul Bar Association, who had criticized the concentration of legislative, executive and juridical powers in the GNA.[53] Having asserted that the program of the regime was "fundamentally revolutionary," he declared that "the defense [of Ankara] against its detractors [was] a duty of the conscience" for the socialists.[54] In perfect Jacobin fashion, Aydemir furthered this idea in the pages of Aydınlık in February 1924:

> Every move aiming at maintaining and defending the republic is a just, progressive and forward-looking move, no matter how violent it is.[55]

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52. Idem, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, pp. 293-308.

53. Ş[efik]. H[üsnü]., "Anadolu'dan gelen fikirler etrafındaki münakaşalar," Aydınlık, 10(1922): 265-267.

54. Ibid., p. 266.

55. Şevket Süreyya, "Lenin ve leninizm," Aydınlık, 20(1924): 522.

Obviously, the CPT was ready to support even a Kemalist dictatorship, provided that it persecutes only those who were considered to stand on its right.

The CPT seems also to have planned, or at least hoped, to form a united revolutionary front with the Kemalists in this period. The following remarks of Şefik Hüsnü in an article he published during the general election in the spring of 1923, support this view which was perfectly in accord with the policy of the Comintern:

> One can imagine only three currents in this country from now on: 1) The current represented by those who effectuated, and who are determined to make durable, the present revolution, 2) The reactionary current which gathers those who are attached to feudal traditions and to the Ottoman dynasty, and 3) The socialist current which aims at deepening and expanding our revolution to the advantage of the poor worker and peasant masses and of the middle classes, and at directing it towards a social revolution based on the principle of collective ownership. The first and the third currents will be able to work hand in hand for a long time in order to enforce in fact and in practice the acquired law and, together with the great majority of the nation, they will form one single body to oppose the dark forces on every occasion when the reactionary elements will constitute a menace.[56]

Although he had used the term "bourgeois revolution" with respect to the achievements of the Kemalist regime,[57] Şefik Hüsnü did not judge the Kemalist government as entirely bourgeois, but kept seeing in it a popular government which might lead to the sovereignty of the lower classes.[58] This

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[56]. Şefik Hüsnü, "İntihabat ve yoksul ve orta halli sınıflar," Aydınlık, 15(1923): 383-385; emphases added.

[57]. Idem, "Anadolu'dan gelen..." p. 265.

[58]. Idem, "Sosyalizm cereyanları ve Türkiye," Aydınlık,

attitude changed in the fall of 1923, after the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. As a matter of fact, in an article written in October 1923, he opposed the right of the president of the republic to dismiss the elected Grand National Assembly, proposed the title of "People's Republic of Turkey" (Türkiye Halk Cumhuriyeti) for the new state, and most significant of all, deplored the projected constitutional amendments such as the separation of the legislative and executive powers.[59]

With regard to the economic policy of the new regime, Aydınlık was equally enthusiastic in its support, with some reservations, however, with respect to the projected monopolies. Its economics specialist, Dr. Vedat Nedim (Tör), argued in a series of articles entitled "Economic Independence" that protectionism was certainly necessary for Turkey, but not to be seized as an occasion to create a local entrepreneurial class. According to Vedat Nedim, not only would this mean worse products for higher prices as far as the Turkish consumers were concerned, but it would also lead the country to dependence on foreign capital sooner or later.[60] His preference for state monopolies as part of the best protectionist policy to be implemented was shared by Şefik Hüsnü who, having expressed the same reserves and hopes, seemed nevertheless more satisfied than his colleague with the policies of the Kemalist Halk

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16(1923): 410-415.

59. Idem, "İnkılap esasatının tadili," Aydınlık, 18(1923): 458-460.

60. Vedat Nedim, "İktisadi istiklal," Aydınlık, 18(1923): 466-469 and 20(1924): 523-528.

Fırkası, "The People's Party," and asked his readers to support it.[61] Aydemir's ideas on the matter were more explicit and, seen from the Comintern's stand, constituted a crime of lèse majesté:

> ...[I]n order to undergo a revolution of proletarian dictatorship, capitalism should be fully flourishing, the proletarian class should be developed in size, in organization and in consciousness, and the class antagonisms should have reached a stage calling for the revolution.
> ...
> [O]ur country is presently not going through a period of "accumulation of capital." The country is now in a state of continuous impoverishment and destitution. It is not the proletariat, but the unemployed, the unskilled, in other words "the lumpen proletariat" who are in the increase... Subsequently, neither for the social democratic nor for any other type of mass movement is the social ground in our country ripe enough.
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> There is now in the agenda the historical task of building a country which is wealthy, rich in capital and developed, and this task befalls to a disciplined and organized (mütəşekkil) republican party.[62]

This rhetoric's intended audience was naturally in Ankara, and not in Moscow. As Communists who had great sympathy for both Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution, Aydemir and his comrades could not be equated with some European Marxists for whom a proletarian revolution in Russia was an oddity for it had to occur first in the most advanced country of the capitalist world. Yet, the attitude of the CPT vis-à-vis the Kemalists was criticized by the Comintern as legal Marxist, that is to

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61. Şefik Hüsnü, "Amele sınıfı cumhuriyet hakkında ne düşünüyor?" Aydınlık, 21(1924): 537-540.

62. Şevket Süreyya, "Lenin ve leninizm," Aydınlık, 20(1924): 520 and 522.

say, in class alliance with the bourgeoisie until the latter's maturity, during the Fifth Congress of the Comintern which took place in Moscow in June-July 1924. At the 25th session of the congress on June 30, Dmitrii Z. Manuilsky, a member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) who was elected on this occasion to the Presidium of the ECCI, contended that

> ... Aydınlık, the organ of the Turkish Communist Party, published a number of articles urging the Communist Party to support the development of national capitalism against foreign capitalism.[63]

The next day, on the 27th session, Şefik Hüsnü spoke under the pseudonym of "Faruk," and told the audience that Manuilsky's analysis was not correct. Yet, not developing his speech in this direction, Şefik Hüsnü did not even mention Aydınlık's critical stand with respect to the development of a national bourgeoisie and its preference for state monopolies, and dwelled on its political support for the Kemalist regime. The speech ultimately turned into a mea culpa, and ended with a short analysis of the immediate growth of a rather powerful reaction to the Ankara regime as the reason for the almost unconditional support that the CPT gave to the latter.[64]

The Comintern was actually well aware of the nature and the strength of the opposition in Turkey. Its official organ had

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63. Eudin and North, p. 327.

64. The Turkish translation of Şefik Hüsnü's speech by İoanna Kuçuradi is in Tunçay, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, pp. 350-354.

even published articles on this issue.[65] In fact, this was a two-fold problem of both political analysis and doctrine. The Comintern saw the Kemalists not exactly as national-revolutionary in Leninist terms, but as any other European bourgeois class. Consequently, alliance with them constituted a united front "from above," a heresy which it had already denounced in Germany, whereas for the CPT, Mustafa Kemal Pasha's People's Party was something like a Turkish Kuomintang, and alliance with it, a united front "from below." But in addition to this dialogue of the deaf in matters of political analysis, which the CPT avoided by accepting the criticisms as appropriate, the Turkish Communists faced another and more significant problem on doctrinal grounds, for

> if they failed to support protectionism, they were guilty of failing to fight for the national independence of an underdeveloped nation; if they supported protectionism, they were guilty of aiding and abetting capitalist construction.[66]

This dilemma would be soon overcome by the Comintern through the influence of the RCP(b) under Stalin's leadership, for during the Fifth Congress of the Comintern the

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[65]. See, for example, P. Kitaigorodsky, "La contre-révolution turque relevait la tête," La Correspondance Internationale, 17(1924): 185-186, G. Astakhov, "L'imperialisme étranger et la contre-révolution turque," ibid., 17(1924): 186, and M[anabendra]. N[ath]. Roy, "L'abolition du Khalifat," ibid., 18(1924): 192. A short notice before the first article indicates that the authors of the first two articles were residing in Turkey.

[66]. Boersner, p. 173.

> doctrine of the universal applicability of the Russian example was... publicly enunciated. Henceforth, revolutionary effectiveness would be judged by the degree of loyalty to the Russian model.[67]

Starting from the summer of 1924, Aydınlık dedicated more space to theoretical articles, admonished as it was on doctrinal grounds. Already in August, Şefik Hüsnü published an article focusing on the "destructive" and "constructive" efforts of the Kemalist regime, and asked the socialists to support the People's Party in all its efforts aiming to destroy the remnants of the ancien régime, and oppose it in its attempts to build capitalism in the country.[68] In another article in the following issue of Aydınlık, he once again raised the issue of economic development and reiterated the affirmative position of the CPT with respect to state monopolies, arguing that settling the accounts "with a bourgeoisie composed of elements holding the reins of the state economy" would be an easier task.[69]

The CPT and its official organ felt compelled to give stronger support to the regime when, towards the end of 1924, the opposition finally formed a political party which had a rather warm welcome from both conservative and moderately reformist circles in Istanbul. The first issue of Aydınlık

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67. Ibid, p. 162.

68. Şefik Hüsnü, "Menfi halkçılıktan müspet halkçılığa," Aydınlık, 24(1924): 618-619.

69. Idem, "Devlet inhisarına niçin taraftarız?" Aydınlık, 25(1924): 642-644.

after the foundation of Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, "The Progressive Republican Party," was almost entirely dedicated to a harsh criticism of the new party. In addition to the article of Şefik Hüsnü, which laid stress on the hypocrisy of the new party's program, an article by a worker, Lemi Hicran, argued that the working classes had nothing worthwhile to expect from the new formation, and another by Burhan Asaf (Belge) ridiculed the party program which had a hesitating provision concerning the share to be given to the workers from entrepreneurial profits.[70]

Similarly, the CPT sided without reserve with the regime when the Sheikh Sait Rebellion broke out in February 1925. For the Comintern, this was a purely feudal and Islamic reaction against the secular republic, and it was fomented by the British to create additional problems for the Turks, with whom they had a frontier dispute in Kurdistan.[71] Aydınlık did not have the time to comment on the issue after the rebellion started. But another journal of the CPT, the weekly Orak çekiç, "The Hammer and Sickle," which was designed for a working class readership, published articles perfectly in accord with the Comintern's views and gave its full support to the

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[70]. See idem, "Memleketimizde siyasi fırkalarla sınıflar arasındaki münasebet," Aydınlık, 28(1924): 721-723, Lemi Hicran, "Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası ve amele," ibid., pp. 735-736, and Burhan Asaf, "Son orta oyunundan iki sahne," ibid., p. 739.

[71]. See, for example, I., "Que se passe-t-il au Kurdistan?" La Correspondance Internationale, 16(1925): 135.

Kemalists."[72] Yet, this support was insufficient to save the organs of the CPT from the wrath of the government. As a matter of fact, following the extraordinary Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu, "The Law on the Maintenance of Public Order," issued on March 4, 1925, both Aydınlık and Orak çekiç were suppressed by a government decree on March 12, together with many other opposition newspapers.[73]

As another extraordinary measure during the above-mentioned rebellion, the Kemalist government had formed the expeditious revolutionary tribunal İstiklal Mahkemesi, "The Independence Court," originally instituted in 1920 as the judiciary extension of the GNA. When this tribunal started to arrest journalists sympathetic to the opposition, some of the CPT members, like Şefik Hüsnü, left the country. After almost a month of paralysis, those who remained in Istanbul issued a manifesto on the occasion of May Day celebrations. The government's response came in the form of a mass arrest. Within a week, 38 members of the CPT were arrested and sent to the Independence Court in Ankara. Aydemir was part of this group.

Aydemir's main activity until his arrest had been in the domain of publishing. During the year and a half which separated his return to Istanbul and his arrest, he had published two pamphlets, many articles in Aydınlık and certainly several

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72. Tunçay, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, p. 368.

73. For more details on the Progressive Republican Party, the Sheikh Sait Rebellion, and the Law on the Maintenance of Order, see below, Chapter 3, pp. 145-150.

anonymous articles in Orak çekiç. In addition to the above-mentioned study on Lenin which he co-authored with Sadrettin Celal, he had published a short work entitled Grev nedir? "What is a Strike?" under the pseudonym of "Kadri Osman."[74] As for his articles in Aydınlık, they were predominantly on theoretical subjects and aimed at popularizing the Marxist credo. Although they are all successful examples in this direction, the accessibility of their vocabulary for a working class readership is highly debatable. They had, in chronological order, the following titles: "Lenin and Leninism,"[75] "The Philosophy of Karl Marx in His Own Words,"[76] "The Question of Imperialism,"[77] "Marxism and Darwinism,"[78] and "What is Dialectics?"[79] His other articles in Aydınlık consisted of two essays analyzing the international political situation, "On the Tenth Anniversary of the Great War: Are We Facing a War or a Revolution?"[80] and "The Strength of the International Proletarian Army,"[81] in addition to an obituary of Ziya Gökalp

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74. Kadri Osman [alias Şevket Süreyya Aydemir], Grev nedir? (Istanbul: Aydınlık Külliyatı, 1924).

75. "Lenin ve leninizm," Aydınlık, 20(1924): 519-523.

76. "Karl Marks'ın ağzından kendi felsefesi," Aydınlık, 23(1924): 596-598.

77. "İmperyalizm bahsi," Aydınlık, 26(1924): 676-677.

78. "Marksizm ve darvinizm," Aydınlık, 28(1924): 726-727.

79. "Diyalektik nedir?" Aydınlık, 28(1924): 743-744 and 29(1925): 783-785.

80. "Harb-ı umuminin onuncu sene-i devriyesinde: harbe mi, ihtilale mi gidiyoruz?" Aydınlık, 25(1924): 652-653.

81. "Beyn'el-milel amele ordusunun gücü," Aydınlık,

which is unusually critical for this genre: "Mr. Ziya Gök Alp from a Marxist Perspective."[82]

Aydemir also rose rapidly, and seems to have been very active, in the CPT apparatus. In the Third Congress of the CPT held in Istanbul on January 1st, 1925, not only was he part of the central committee of 21 members, but also he was among the seven members elected to the executive committee. Together with Sadrettin Celal, he was responsible for the party publications.[83] This position of Aydemir's in the party structure makes credible the argument of Fethi Tevetoğlu who contends, without any sustaining proof though, that Orak çekiç was actually published by Aydemir.[84] As the articles of Orak çekiç were either anonymous or published under pseudonyms, it is impossible to determine to what extent Aydemir contributed to it as a writer. However, we are certain that at least one article, an interview with a group of workers from Edirne, belongs to Aydemir, who had signed it as "Süreyya."[85]

Regarding his arrest, Aydemir says in his autobiography that he had become familiar with the policemen who came to arrest him, for they had been watching his house for a long time before they took him away [p. 397]. It appears that

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26(1924): 683-684.

82. "Marksizm objektifi önünde: Ziya Gök Alp Bey," Aydınlık, 27(1924): 690-692.

83. Tunçay, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, p. 362.

84. See Tevetoğlu, p. 381.

85. Tunçay, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, pp. 361-362.

Aydemir had a chance to avoid this arrest and to escape to the Soviet Union. One night, he took a small boat on the Bosporus and rowed in the direction of the Soviet freighter which had received special instructions to slow down, but he changed his mind at the last moment. He had decided to stay in his homeland despite all the dangers he may have to face.[86] He was immediately taken to Ankara with his companions. But almost three months would lapse between their first day in the capital city where the Independence Court registered their names [pp. 398-400], and the day of verdict, August 12, 1925. Aydemir was among those for whom the prosecutor had asked for the capital punishment; yet, he was sentenced to ten years and was sent to prison in Afyon [pp. 407 and 423].

During the year and a half he spent in custody in Ankara and in prison in Afyon, Aydemir seems to have contemplated extensively the nature of the Kemalist Revolution and the general conditions in Turkey. In Ankara, he had the chance of meeting both the average Kemalist revolutionary in the person of the President of the Independence Court, Kel Ali (Çetinkaya), "Ali the Bald," and a fair sampling of the "enemies of the regime," his inmates in custody waiting for their turn to appear before the court for various reasons. None of these individuals appeared to him as having fully understood what had happened, and was still going on, in Turkey. For Ali Çetinkaya, revolution meant only a change in

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86. Göktürk, p. 118.

the political regime and it had already come to an end [pp. 405-407]. With this narrow outlook, he was clearly lagging behind the Revolution, and was certainly not representative of the regime. As if he was willing to confirm this judgement of Aydemir's, he reprimanded Aydemir once for the latter's use of the European calendar [p. 405] which would be adopted by the new regime in a few months, on December 26, 1925. Aydemir recalls an even more telling case of incongruity between the regime and its pitiful man of confidence. According to Aydemir, the trial Ali Çetinkaya was in charge of just before the verdict on the Communists, was a case of public demonstration against the newly adopted western-style headgear [p. 404]. What made the case ironic for Aydemir was the fact that he had seen the "revolutionary" judge on the very day he was brought to Ankara, insulting and even beating a young journalist because the young man wore a panama hat [pp. 399-400]. Between the two incidents, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had made his famous trip to the town of Kastamonu where he introduced the Western hat to the population. This episode seems to have worked on Aydemir's mind so intensely that the headgear reform is treated as the most audacious act of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the best of his biographical works, dedicated to the founder of modern Turkey.[87]

The inmates in the custody house, on the other hand, were

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[87]. See Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Tek Adam, 2nd edn., 3 vols. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966), Vol. III, pp. 238-253.

all individuals completely overtaken by recent history. They belonged either to the pre-revolutionary world and tried to stick, naively for some and rather maliciously for some others, to their old way of life, or to the military phase of the revolution. The latter group had an extremely difficult time accommodating themselves to ordinary times of law and order [pp. 400-404 and 412-414]. They could not understand the new order that was being built slowly. Everyday life in their company, however, constituted an invaluable laboratory for Aydemir in his understanding of the revolution and all sorts of social problems it had to struggle with:

> The occupants of the rooms and the cells were constantly changing. All the problems of both the country and its various social layers were running like a flood through the corridors. Watching all these fallen grandees of the past, ex-ministers, former heroes turned traitors, reactionaries who wanted to restore the sultanate, sheikhs, notables, beys and brigands pass through these corridors and exhibit all their weaknesses, aroused strange thoughts in my mind [pp. 413-414].

Out of eleven Communists sentenced to different terms, only Aydemir and another, a foreman in the army workshops, were sent to the Afyon penitentiary [p. 426]. Although the two men experienced special treatment on the part of the administration as the only political prisoners, and they looked radically different from their fellow inmates in every aspect, they were quick to inspire respect and sympathy in their overcrowded cell block. This was to a great extent due to Aydemir's extraordinary performance as a teacher. As a matter of fact,

when the young shepherd whom Aydemir taught to read and write was able to send a decent letter to his village at the end of only the second month of instruction, Aydemir's students increased significantly [pp. 431-432].

Aydemir tells in his autobiography that an incident that occurred in one of his classes, which looked more like informal gatherings, impressed him to the point of changing the course of his life. He noticed during a lecture that one of his pupils, a former sergeant and a murderer, had tears in his eyes. He was extremely perplexed, for the subject-matter of the day, the atmospheric phenomena, had nothing special to make people cry. After the class, this person came to Aydemir's side and told him:

> Why do people not talk to us like you did, Mister? Why do they not explain things like you did? All the problems of this people amount to ignorance, Mister. Keep this in mind! And the fault is with the government, not with us. It is the imam, and we are the congregation. How can you expect the congregation to know when the imam does not teach? [pp. 433-434]

Aydemir's comments on these words are very suggestive:

> I cannot forget these words. I even think that these words were unconsciously engraved in my memory and perhaps gave a direction to my life [p. 434]

As the transformation of the prison into a classroom was a radical solution to its usual monotony and the boredom of the inmates, the prison administration rewarded Aydemir and his friend with a special room of their own which was not even

locked during the night [pp. 436 and 440]. In this room Aydemir conceived and wrote the greatest part of his study, "Ways of Economic Development for Modern Turkey." The book, which defended a "national economy based on the principle of etatism," was completed in 1926 and sent to the Ministry of Education the following year. It was never published, for the commission of the University of Istanbul which examined it gave an unfavorable report because of its historical materialist inspiration [pp. 436 and 467].

Commenting briefly on the content of this book, Aydemir says that it was during its conception that he felt alienated from Communism for the first time:

> Under the light of conditions and realities which I was able to evaluate better inside the prison walls, my research and thoughts had taken me from the communist order and methods, which could certainly not be achieved through our means, to an Etatist (Aydemir's emphasis) economic thought, and had detached me from a revolutionary commitment. This had not been that easy. I went through innumerable hesitations and inner crises. Yes; a different sort of state was needed in Turkey. Perhaps still despite the people, but certainly for the people. Perhaps a démocratie dirigée (in French in the text). Henceforth, the state had to be the imam, and the nation, the congregation. And this imam had for sure something to give to the congregation [p. 436].

In fact, Aydemir was "detached from a revolutionary commitment" only to commit himself to another revolution. Yet, it would be erroneous to think that he had abandoned Communism while he was in prison in Afyon. Events in 1927 would prove that his problem was with the Comintern and the Communist Party of Turkey rather than with Communism. He was going to reconsider his

thoughts of the prison days more than a year after his release, on the occasion of his second arrest as a Communist Party member, late in 1927.

Aydemir was released from prison on the third anniversary of the Republic, on October 29, 1926 [pp. 442-443]. This was due to the new Penal Code which, passed on July 1st, made provision for "political crimes" with lighter sentences. He returned almost immediately to Istanbul, and after some hard time of unemployment, he found a position as accountant in the Istanbul agency of the Rumanian oil company, Neft Syndikat.[88] According to the information given by Aydemir himself on January 7, 1967, he started to work in the Central Committee of the CPT together with Vedat Nedim (Tör) who had become the secretary general of the party after the arrests of 1925.[89] If we are to believe a clumsy diagram given by Tevetoğlu, which shows the central committee of the party as composed of nine members instead of seven, he was once again responsible for party publications.[90]

It appears that throughout this period Şefik Hüsnü, who had stayed in the Soviet Union, pressured the Central Committee of the CPT with letters from Moscow to pursue a more active

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88. Letter to Vâlâ Nureddin, August 8, 1927. I gratefully thank Ms. Müzehher Vâ-Nû who gave me the permission to read all the letters sent to her late husband by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir.

89. Mete Tunçay, "Sunuş," introduction to Jülide Ergüder ed., 1927 Komünist Tevkifatı (Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1978), pp. 13-15; see also Ergüder, pp. 130-133.

90. Tevetoğlu, p. 395.

policy, by publishing manifestos against the regime and organizing strikes, and that the Secretary General Vedat Nedim interpreted these measures as against the interests of the party and as aiming solely at increasing Şefik Hüsnü's prestige with the Comintern.[91] It is also reported that the Central Committee of the CPT was divided and that Aydemir sided with Vedat Nedim. According to Aydemir's own words, it was he who

> had rebuked Kitaigorodsky, the envoy of the Comintern who had come with the intention of investigating on the spot the discords within the party, and had forced him to leave on the same day.[92]

Şefik Hüsnü finally returned incognito from exile some time during the summer of 1927 to enforce the directives of the Comintern. Upon his initiative, the railway workers of Adana went on strike in August, and three manifestos were circulated and posted in different places both in Adana and in Istanbul.[93] According to İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, the activist wing of the party was ready to post manifestos even on the walls of the Dolmabahçe Palace upon the request of the Comintern during Mustafa Kemal Pasha's stay there.[94] It is an established fact that when the police started the investigation of these mat-

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91. Tunçay, "Sunuş", p. 13.

92. Ibid., p. 15.

93. Tevetoğlu, p. 398.

94. Interview with İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, August 15, 1989; this interview was made possible through the good offices of Ms. Müzehher Vâ-Nû.

ters, Vedat Nedim denounced the entire party apparatus to the authorities together with the branches of Adana, Ankara, Eskişehir and Izmir.[95] In October, a total of 55 suspects including Aydemir, Şefik Hüsnü and Vedat Nedim, were arrested and their files were sent to the Istanbul Court of Assizes. Yet, since the instruction of the case took almost three months, the trial could begin only on January 16, 1928. It was nevertheless terminated within six days. Like many others, Aydemir was acquitted, but he was never to return to the CPT.

As it has been stated above, Aydemir had in fact not turned his back on Communism. During the trial he had even declared that he was a Marxist.[96] Together with many other companions such as Burhan Asaf (Belge), İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin) and Vedat Nedim (Tör) who were all going to be his collaborators in Ankara a few years later, he had come to crucial conclusions on the interrelated problems of defining, first, the nature of the Kemalist regime, and second, his position vis-à-vis the Comintern. These conclusions, drawn from the developments of the years 1926-1928, ushered in yet another turning point in Aydemir's life. But this time, the change of direction was definitive, and it was going to make of Aydemir the significant historical agent he always wanted to be.

The sudden appearance of an opposition, the support it

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95. Tevetoğlu, p. 399, and Ergüder, pp. 136, 138 and 140-141.

96. See Ergüder, p. 70.

received from a majority of people in Istanbul and the ultimate repression it was subjected to, had been decisive for Communists like Aydemir in developing the judgment that the Kemalist regime was not a bourgeois regime and had to be supported by people dedicated to the ideal of social revolution. Then, in 1926, following the discovery of a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a series of measures had dismantled the Committee of Union and Progress, a formation which had constituted a serious threat to the Kemalists since 1920. Finally, in the summer of 1927, Mustafa Kemal Pasha called for a general election and felt secure enough to set foot in Istanbul for the first time since he had left that city in May 1919. On his return to Ankara, he would read his famous Nutuk, "The Speech," a highly subjective account of recent Turkish history, during the Second Congress of the RPP. The same congress would endow the party with a new constitution destined to be of great significance in the development of Turkish politics.[97]

The heavy-handedness of the Kemalists, and their firmness in keeping the "bourgeois-democratic" elements at bay, were all features of a revolutionary regime that appealed to Aydemir. The Kemalists were extremely jealous of their power, and constituted thus the only possible leadership for a mass mobilization that a visionary militant like Aydemir needed. Moreover, Aydemir had a first-hand knowledge of the regime's shortage of cadre who had understood what the Revolution was

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97. For details, see below, Chapter 3, pp. 149-153.

about and who were ready to work for it. Compared to the power and the program of the Kemalist regime, what the CPT could offer at that time was far from satisfying him.

During the years 1926-1928, the CPT went through the most difficult period of its existence. The temptation to give stronger support to the Kemalists had increased after the episodes of the Progressive Republican Party, the Sheikh Said rebellion, and the final liquidation of the CUP, which had revealed the Jacobin nature of the regime. Yet, the increasing pressures of the Comintern urged the CPT to adopt a strictly proletarian line in a country which had only a few tens of thousands of industrial workers. Bowing to this demand would have made the party condemn itself to be an insignificant political club, and would guarantee that the newly established and rather weak nuclei of workers' organizations be placed in jeopardy in a period when the regime was not at all inclined to tolerate political opposition.

Under these circumstances, the CPT witnessed a split in its midst all the more profound since the Comintern was inclining to adopt a firmly leftist approach to the national revolutionary movements. As a matter of fact, the Stalinist tendency, which consisted of relying exclusively on proletarian movements by avoiding the formation of national fronts even with the lower middle classes, seemed to be confirmed as the only realistic tactic after the "betrayal" of the Kuomintang in 1927. This tendency would finally be adopted as the official

policy in the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in 1928, which ushered in "a phase of ultra-leftism in the Eastern and colonial countries."[98] For these countries, Communism would be a marginal movement henceforth, unless it was freed from identification with proletarianism.

It seems that Aydemir's thought evolved precisely in that direction. Although we do not have any proof of this evolution for the years immediately before he joined the Kemalist regime, one of his articles in Kadro shows that by the spring of 1932, he had reached the idea that proletarianism was a narrow-mindedness that does great harm to the communist movement in the underdeveloped, agrarian nations. The article was a review of Nazım Hikmet's latest long poem, Benerci Kendini Niçin Öldürdü? "Why Did Banarjee Kill Himself?" written to criticize Aydemir's presumed defection. This was the story of an Indian Communist who, realizing that he had betrayed the communist cause, commits suicide. In fact, Banarjee was none other than Aydemir, who was considered by Nazım Hikmet as having committed a moral suicide.[99] In his review article, Aydemir turned upside down Nazım Hikmet's argument, and contended that Banarjee was actually Nazım Hikmet himself, for both the author and the character, by their fanatical loyalty to the ideals of the proletariat that amounted to only 0.5% of the population of

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98. Boersner, p. 272.

99. Nazım Hikmet, Benerci Kendini Niçin Öldürdü? (Istanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1988), pp. 9-90.

India (probably the same percentage applied to Turkey too), were out of touch with the societies in which they lived. They could be best described as Blanquists condemned to marginality in the context of colonial realities.[100] In 1962, Aydemir expressed his conception of communist activism in an underdeveloped setting in the following terms:

> Class struggle is not a sound cause for the patriotic and nationalist socialism of the underdeveloped countries. These countries are still at an early stage of capitalist development, or even at an altogether pre-capitalist stage. Under these circumstances, the aim cannot be class struggle or class dictatorship. The aim should rather be the unity, around an enlightened ideological movement, of all the social strata of the nation who endorse the principles of social justice and social activism. If, on the contrary, one insists in asserting that in these countries, and for that matter in Turkey, the working class should be the leader and the vanguard of social development, that social development should evolve within a proletarian framework, and that the proletariat should form the active cadre of that development, one would run the risk of dividing the socialist movement, which is none other than a struggle for national liberation.[101]

Since the Comintern insisted on this proletarian parochialism, and because the idea of organized Communism outside the aegis of the Comintern seems to have never occurred to Aydemir, the only possibility for him was to join the Kemalist Revolution.

Aydemir took the train for Ankara only a few months after his acquittal, probably at the beginning of the summer of 1928. He was full of enthusiasm on the way to Ankara and dreamed of a modest position as school teacher in a mountain village [pp.

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100. Şevket Süreyya, "Benerji," pp. 35 and 39.

101. Idem, "Sosyalizm ve Kapitalizm," Yön, 37(1962): 20.

447-449]. It seems that he was helped by Ahmet Cevat (Emre) in Ankara, not only materially as he admits in his autobiography [p. 447], but also in being introduced to the Ministry of Education. To his great surprise and satisfaction, he was appointed Deputy Director General of Higher and Technical Education [p. 453]. He also submitted a report on the "Periodic Fluctuations of the Turkish Currency" to Ali İktisat Meclisi, "The Supreme Economic Council," a semi-official and consultative body constituted in 1927 with representatives from the government, the armed forces, the universities, the chambers of commerce and industry, and other professional organizations. He was engaged by the council as deputy secretary general [p. 453], possibly upon the initiative of his friend Vedat Nedim, who knew the secretary general of the council, Nurullah Esat (Sümer), as a fellow student in Berlin and a founding member of the Workers' and Peasants Party of Turkey. Soon afterwards, his report, which defended the creation of a bank of issue in Turkey, was published in the form of an article in four parts and under a slightly modified title, "On Stabilizing the Turkish Currency."[102]

Aydemir was also appointed Director of the newly founded Ankara High School of Commerce, a position he held until 1937, when he joined the Ministry of Economy.[103] Yet, this part of

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102. Şevket Süreyya, "Türk parasının tesbit-i kıymeti hakkında," Hayat, IV, 85-88(1928): 137-139, 156-157, 177-178 and 197-198.

103. See Göktürk, pp. 144, 191 and 229; cf. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Kahramanlar Doğmalıydı, (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1974), p. 165.

his life as a civil servant is altogether omitted from his autobiography. In fact, the only and indirect reference to this position in his works is the facsimile of a flattering autograph by Mustafa Kemal Pasha written on the occasion of the visit that the latter had paid to the school in 1933.[104] His revolutionary zealotry, however, seems to have had its stamp on the education in the school for we find the following anecdote in the memoirs of Hilmi Uran for the academic year 1928-1929:

> It was sometime during the late Rahmi Köken's Ministry of Commerce. One day he had taken me to an examination in the Ankara High School of Commerce. The examination on that day was on civic instruction. The children were coming in the examination room and going out one after the other. The late Rahmi Bey probably wanted to examine one of the students on the classical categorization of the governmental systems as absolutism, constitutional monarchy and republic, and to lead him thus to say that our republican system was the most advanced. "Tell me my son," he said, "what sort of a system is our governmental system?" The answer that the child unhesitantly gave made us all laugh first and then change the subject. Given with a strangely affected voice and with full conviction, the answer was: "Absolute republic, sir!"[105]

The spirit and the personnel that Aydemir found in the Ministry of Education were exactly what he was looking for. There reigned an atmosphere of mobilization, and the staff were all idealist people dedicated to their job [pp. 456-460]. The ministry building was very old and in a pitiful condition. But lamps remained lit until late at night in all the offices with

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[104]. See Aydemir, Tek Adam, Vol. III, p. 460.

[105]. Hilmi Uran, Hatıralarım (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959), p. 210.

the same spirit as during the National Struggle, when the same building had served as dormitory for GNA members.[106] In fact, Aydemir was lucky to work under one of the legendary figures of the Kemalist Revolution, the hard-working Minister of Education Mustafa Necati Bey,[107] and during a most dramatic period in the history of the ministry, for in August 1928, that is, only a few months after Aydemir began to his work there, Mustafa Kemal Pasha ordered the alphabet change to be accomplished before the end of the year. Under these extremely demanding circumstances and superiors, Aydemir's efforts were badly needed, without any reference to his political background. This tolerance is illustrated by the following dialogue he had one day with Necati Bey:

> When I was first introduced to him, he put his hand on my shoulder and said:
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> -- You can do anything you want, my friend; but do not turn our school children into Communists!
>
> I replied:
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> -- I have nothing to do with school children, Mister Minister. But watch out for yourself!

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106. See Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 457, and idem, "Köyde Mezarı Olmayan Aydın Yalnız Öğretmenlerdir," in his Kahramanlar Doğmalıydı, pp. 112-118; the article was originally published in Cumhuriyet, on August 2, 1971.

107. A lawyer by training, Mustafa Necati Bey (1894-1929) had been very active at the beginning of the Turkish National Struggle as both a resistance fighter and a publisher in the Aegean region. He had been a deputy for Saruhan in the first GNA. He was a deputy for Izmir when he entered the cabinet as Minister of Education, a post he held until his death. For his biography by a teacher active during his ministry, see M. Rauf İnan, Mustafa Necati (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1980).

He laughed and made all of us laugh [pp. 458-459].

In a few months' time, Aydemir was "at the service of the Revolution" as he entitled the 25th chapter of his autobiography [p. 451]. Although he would soon criticize it for reasons of his own, he seems to have been captivated on the spot by the openness of the Revolution for all those who wanted to work for it:

> The price for the Turkish Revolution had not been paid with countless tears and torrents of blood as it had been the case for the Russian or Chinese Revolutions. Those who wanted to serve the Revolution in its most advanced positions were able to find a place for themselves in the trenches there.[108]

Moreover, the constructive enthusiasm which dominated the cadre in the Ministry of Education encouraged him and helped him to feel once again useful to the community [p. 455]. He felt once again part of a general mobilization. This is how he describes the revolutionary mobilization of that period in his autobiography, written after years of experience as a civil servant:

> The bureaucrat had not yet superseded the man of action and deed... The bureaucrat was still in the background, and the floor still belonged to the revolutionary.[109]

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108. Aydemir, Kırmızı Mektuplar, pp. 77-78. Aydemir was actually not alone in this situation; since 1927, Burhan Asaf (Belge) and İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin) were employed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and State Railways Company respectively, and Vedat Nedim (Tör) started to work in the Society for National Economy and Savings in 1929. For Aydemir's somewhat different feelings on the degree of tolerance of the Kemalist regime in the early Thirties, see below, Chapter 4, pp. 233-235.

109. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, pp. 459-460; cf. Tör, p.

Aydemir's fascination with the openness of the Kemalist Revolution and its temperance with respect to those who did not share its political philosophy may be explained by his belief in the principle of a united front which gathers all the revolutionary elements in a given society, a policy that Russian and Chinese revolutionaries were not able or not willing to put in practice. It is possible to trace this back to Lenin as well as to Sultan Galiev. As a matter of fact, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir has so far been considered correctly as a direct heir to Sultan Galiev with reference to the ideas he developed after he joined the Kemalist civil service.[110] It is also clear that he has unquestionably demarcated himself from some aspects of Leninist theory after the publication of Kadro in the 1930s.[111] Yet, if Aydemir's ultimate decision to collaborate with the Kemalist regime is taken into consideration without reference to his subsequent activity, it would be appropriate to conclude that he adopted a line of conduct perfectly in accord with both traditions. In fact, even his adherence to the People's Party in 1930 [p. 503] is justifiable in Leninist definitions of communist tactics. At this juncture, it has to be remembered that whereas Lenin posited the serious commitment of non-proletarian parties to social revolution as a prerequisite for communist collaboration with them,

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110. See Bennigsen and Wimbush, p. 110, and Merdan Yanardağ, Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Kadro Hareketi (Istanbul: Yalçın Yayınları, 1988), pp. 168-185.

111. See below, Chapter 4, pp. 203-206.

Sultan Galiev was ready to enter in alliance even with the bourgeoisie. It is precisely on this issue that the Communist Party of Turkey had endured a whole series of difficulties in its inner struggle first to define accurately the Kemalist regime and second to conform to the Leninist principle of alliance, to the point of straining and even severing its relations with an increasingly Stalinist Comintern. As a matter of fact, neither the CPT nor the Kemalist regime had undergone a change from 1923 to 1928. The only transformation that this period witnessed had occurred in the Comintern's approach to the tricky subject of national emancipation. The split which occurred in the CPT can thus be explained by the simultaneous growth within it of two groups, one with a tendency to accept passively anything decreed by the Comintern, and the other which stuck to the original Leninist stand as it gradually reached a different understanding of the Kemalist policies in 1923-1924 which the party had seen at the time as retreat from revolution.[112] The best illustration of this second attitude can be found in a study by Aydemir written towards the end of 1930 and published early in 1931. Here Aydemir first argued that the economic policy of the new regime was defined by the economic congress held in Izmir in early 1923. Then, after having summarized in five articles the principles laid down by the congress, he went on to say:

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112. See Şefik Hüsnü, "İnkılap esasatının tadili", p. 460.

> One is obliged to take into account the unsettled political atmosphere of the period in order to understand the reasons for the ambiguity that is visible here and there throughout the above-mentioned formulae.[113]

The fact that Communists like Aydemir, İsmail Hüsrev and Vedat Nedim were all individuals who had attented the CUTE is also partially responsible for the split in the CPT.[114] As students of this school, where Leninism was the dominant ideology despite some deviations, this group's loyalty to the principle of supporting the national revolution certainly played an important part in the demise of their party. As a matter of fact, in a report he wrote to the attention of the Comintern's Secretariat for the East and the Balkans on September 10, 1927, Şefik Hüsnü had complained about the irresponsible attitudes of "many among the former students of the [CUTE]."[115] What amounted to irresponsibility for Şefik Hüsnü was actually not only an obvious reluctance to criticize the Kemalists, but also the urge actively to support the Kemalist Revolution. Since they were prevented from giving this support from within the Communist Party, they had finally opted for joining the Kemalist civil service as individuals. In short, Aydemir had joined the Kemalists out of loyalty to what he was taught at the CUTE during Lenin's lifetime, and only after having reached

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113. Şevket Süreyya, Cihan İktisadiyatında Türkiye (Ankara: Milli İktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti, 1931), pp. 58-59.

114. See Vâ-Nû, pp. 325-326 for İsmail Hüsrev, and Göktürk, p. 93 for Vedat Nedim.

115. Tevetoğlu, p. 403.

the conclusion that the facts which made communist observers rationalize the Kemalist regime as a bourgeois republic amounted to tactical moves in a politically delicate situation where temporary concessions were necessary.

Chapter 3

The Kemalist Revolution

The major characteristic of Turkish political life from the beginning of the National Struggle to the early 1930s is the dictatorial leadership of a group organized under the politically neutral title of Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti, "Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia" (ADRAR), which was gradually and very subtly transformed into a political party that adopted the name Halk Fırkası, "People's Party." This sine qua non feature of revolutionary politics became visible for the first time in the Constitution of the ADRAR that was printed in September 1919. With this document, the association not only raised itself above the existing parties, perfectly legal according to Ottoman laws still in force, by stating that it was "free of party politics" (Art. 7/i), but also came to consider its own decisions as being "in accord with the national conscience," and any misinterpretation or misrepresentation of them as "treason to the nation and the fatherland" (Art. 6).[1] More-

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[1]. See "Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti Nizam-

over, those who had not yet joined the movement represented by the association because of foreign military occupation were warned that they would be "considered with tolerance until the imposed circumstances would have come to an end" (Art. 3). Finally, the document stated that the elected Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) of the ADRAR "represents the fatherland in its entirety" (addendum to Art. 7).

Clearly, the Constitution of the ADRAR was equating the association with the Turkish nation. Its monopolization of the "national conscience" gave the association a legitimacy which transcended all other legally constituted political bodies. Moreover, although it did not claim the ADRAR to be the repository of the "national will," it mentioned this inflammatory concept twice (Arts. 7/ii and 11). Hence, the ADRAR was ready for a revolutionary move of which all the legitimacy was carefully displayed in a text which seemed to have no other ambition than opposing the dismemberment of Anatolia and Rumelia. In fact, even when the Constitution of the ADRAR was being drafted, Brigadier Ali Fuat Pasha (Cebesoy), commander of the 20th Army Corps in Ankara, was appointing officers with extraordinary powers "in the name of the nation."[2] Two months later, when preparations were under way for the opening of the new Ottoman Parliament, lengthy dis-

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namesi," in Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler, 1859-1952 (Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Yayınları A.Ş. Basımevi, 1952), pp. 514-519.

2. See Uluğ İğdemir ed., Sivas Kongresi Tutanakları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1969), p. 77.

cussions took place within the Representative Committee concerning the location of the future parliament. Some of the members, not wishing to send the deputies to Istanbul because of Entente threats weighing over the city, advocated that the parliament meet somewhere in Anatolia, perfectly aware that this would be a revolutionary move and that they would have to call this institution a "constituent assembly."[3] The occasion for such a move arose on March 16, 1920, when the Entente forces occupied Istanbul. Subsequently, the committee realized the "constitutional revolution" when its president Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) called for an extraordinary parliament to meet in Ankara, "using thus the constitutional prerogatives of the sultan."[4]

But the ADRAR's monopolization of the national conscience was far from corresponding to the political realities despite the efforts of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his close collaborators. This became apparent with the opening of Büyük Millet Meclisi, "The Grand National Assembly" (GNA), in Ankara on 23 April

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[3]. See idem ed., Heyet-i Temsiliye Tutanakları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1975), pp. 3-17.

[4]. Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923-1931) (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981), p. 41. As a matter of fact, "du point de vue du droit constitutionnel, la révolution turque commença avec les élections illégales de 1920;" Norbert de Bischoff, La Turquie dans le monde, translated from the German by M. Bénouville (Paris: Payot, 1936), p. 165; see also Yunus Nadi Ankara'nın İlk Günleri (Istanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955), p. 112. For the complete text of "Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti namına intihab hakkında tebliğ" issued on 19 March 1920, see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Istanbul: Türk Devrim Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1981), Vol. I, pp. 374-376.

1920. First of all, not all the deputies were ADRAR candidates. It has to be noted, as a matter of fact, that Mustafa Kemal Pasha's afore-mentioned call for a general election included important concessions away from the initial resolutions of the ADRAR. Its sixth instruction stated that "candidates from all parties, circles and associations [would be] eligible to the parliament."[5] Moreover, deputies from the dissolved Ottoman Parliament were welcomed as an element of continuity which certainly constituted an additional source of legitimacy for the GNA. Second, despite the unanimous adherence to the main goal of the ADRAR, the liberation of what was considered to be the Turkish homeland from foreign occupation, and the relative acceptance of the principle of being free from party politics, different groups emerged on the basis of political agendas with respect to economic, social and cultural matters. This situation finally led Mustafa Kemal Pasha to create in May 1921 Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu, "The Defense of Rights Group" (DRG), within the GNA, which he had considered only two months earlier as the general assembly of the ADRAR.[6]

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[5]. Atatürk, Nutuk, Vol. I, p. 375.

[6]. Ibid., pp. 425-426. In a telegram sent to the Erzurum branch of the ADRAR on June 29, 1920, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had announced that "the GNA [had] also the attributes of the Congress of the ADRAR;" see Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. IV: Tamim, Telgraf ve Beyannameleri (1964), p. 341. This was confirmed by a cipher dated 22 March 1921 (ibid., pp. 373-374). Two months later however, these attributes were conferred on the DRG in the GNA: "The Board [of the Group] is also, until the meeting of the Congress, the central authority of the organization of ADRAR;" see Article 4 of "Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Grubu Nizamnamesi," in Faik Reşit Unat, "TBMM'nin I. Devresinde ARMH Grubunun Kuruluşuna ve Çalışmalarına Ait Bazı Vesikalar," Tarih Vesikaları, III, 13(1944): 1-15.

Although we may accept the DRG as a decisive step on the way to the formation of the People's Party (PP), there is evidence that the group left much to be desired as far as its unity and homogeneity were concerned with regard to the political program and action of its leadership. Indeed, many proposals of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his close friends in political, social and cultural matters failed to obtain a majority vote in the GNA or, as in the case of the Law on the prohibition of the alcoholic beverages (Menn-i Müskirat Kanunu), opinions against theirs carried the day. In short, parliamentary groups proved to be more contingent than strongly unified around a rigid program cemented with some kind of party discipline.[7] This party discipline was precisely what Mustafa Kemal Pasha needed after the final victory of the nationalist forces in the fall of 1922 and the subsequent abolition of the sultanate, in order to have complete freedom of action to shape the future of Turkey. To this effect a new purge certainly seemed necessary, but by no means sufficient, for a great majority of the opposition in the GNA was also, and legitimately, calling itself the Second Defense of Rights Group.[8]

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[7]. See Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Siyasi Hatıralar, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Vatan Gazetecilik ve Matbaacılık T.A.Ş., 1957), Vol. I, p. 27, and Yakup Kadri, "Büyük Millet Meclisi," İkdam, August 26, 1921.

[8]. Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, pp. 45-46. The Second Group seems to have come to existence between May and July 1922; see Tunaya, p. 537. Tunçay cites in full an article published in the daily Tan, the organ of the Second Group, where it was said that the Group was opposed, above anything else, to "all personal rules," an utterance which certainly aimed at Mustafa Kemal Pasha; see Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, pp. 62-63. For Mustafa Kemal Pasha's opinion on the situation in the

Mustafa Kemal Pasha's decision to create a political party was first made public in December 1922. By its very name the PP was intended to comprehend the entire nation, and it expected popular support comparable to that of the days of struggle for liberation.[9] The idea of a single comprehensive party implicit in this first move was made clearer the following month in two conversations with the citizens of Eskişehir and Izmit,[10] and was further developed in yet another conversation, this time in Balıkesir. Basing his arguments partly on a solidaristic analysis of society taken as a whole under the appellation of nation, and partly on the alleged absence in Turkey of social classes "as they can be seen in other countries," Mustafa Kemal Pasha subtly repudiated a multipartite system reflecting socio-economic differences.[11] On April 15, 1923, the day before the GNA dissolved itself after having voted for new elections to be held, a change in the High Treason Law barred the way to the formation of political

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Assembly, see İnan, pp. 58-60 and 81-82. See also Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), especially pp. 306-323 and 376-377 for the socio-professional background of the Second Group deputies, which did not differ much from that of the deputies of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's DRG. According to this study, the Second Group gathered some 118 deputies against 197 who belonged to the "First" (p. 307).

9. Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II. pp. 46-48.

10. Arı İnan, pp. 36 and 118-122.

11. Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II, pp. 96-97. For Mustafa Kemal Pasha's explicitness on this issue, see Arı İnan, p. 83.

parties advocating the return to the sultanate.[12]

Along with these moves towards the establishment of a one-party system, the protagonists of the PP also had to secure the aura of the ADRAR for their new formation. The document known as Dokuz Umde, "The Nine Principles," stated cautiously on April 8, 1923, that "the existing DRG in the Assembly [would] be made into the People's Party."[13] This announcement, which established a link between the ADRAR and the PP, met with strong protests, as could have been expected, of the Second Group. One local branch of the ADRAR close to the latter, that of Trabzon, was particularly vocal.[14] Yet, these were only the last battle cries of the Second Group, for Ali Şükrü Bey, one of the leading members of the group, had been assassinated on the 2nd of the same month by the commander of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's personal guards, Topal Osman, thus placing the opposition under a terrorist threat.[15] Together with this single act of violence which must have demobilized the Second Group to a

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12. Cebesoy, Siyasi Hatıralar, Vol. I, pp. 309-310; for the amendment, see Düstur, 3rd series, Vol. IV (Istanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1929), p. 81. The same law was going to be altered once more on February 25, 1925, during the Progressive Republican Party episode, in order to prohibit religious considerations in party programs; see ibid., 3rd series, Vol. VI (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası, 1934), p. 107.

13. For the complete text of Dokuz Umde, see Tunaya, pp. 580-582.

14. Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, p. 53.

15. Aydemir, Tek Adam, Vol. III, pp. 81-83. Topal Osman, Osman the Lame, had resisted the authorities who wanted to arrest him and was shot dead together with many of his men by the regular army units.

great extent, the overall lack of organization of the opposition and the unrivaled popularity of Mustafa Kemal Pasha ensured that the PP won the quasi-totality of the parliamentary seats in the ensuing elections. Well aware of this popularity as the most valuable weapon against the Second Group, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had secured a change in the electoral law that introduced universal male suffrage on April 3, 1923.[16] The DRG was finally incorporated into the People's Party on November 20, 1923.[17]

In his above-mentioned declaration in Balıkesir, notwithstanding its implications for the future of Turkish political life, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was correct in telling his listeners that "the nation [had] suffered much from party politics."[18] He was actually referring to the past fifteen years of constitutional parliamentarianism which was fresh in people's minds as a particularly violent period of confrontation

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16. Düstur, 3rd Series, Vol. IV, pp. 16-17.

17. Kocatürk, 1st edn., p. 261. In a conversation with party members in Trabzon on 16 September 1924, Mustafa Kemal Pasha treated his party as the ADRAR (Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II, p. 191), and in his opening speech to the PP Congress on October 15, 1927, he referred to the Congress of Sivas as the First Congress of the PP (ibid., Vol. I, pp. 351-352). This was repeated in the following congress which was named before its opening as the "Third Congress" (ibid., Vol. I, p. 367). To the best of our knowledge, this ADRAR - PP continuity was challenged only once, in an utterly unconvincing article by Bahadır Dülger in Son Saat, October 22, 1947: "C.H.P. ve Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti." For a concise yet accurate judgement on the matter, see Aydemir, Tek Adam, Vol. III, p. 310.

18. Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II, p. 96.

politics with a series of coups and counter-coups, recurrent terrorism and an unbridled hatred in the rivalries. This period, known in Turkish historiography as İkinci Meşrutiyet, "The Second Constitutional Period," deserves our attention, for it stands in many respects as a rehearsal of the political history of the early Turkish Republic, and as a training ground for its leaders.

Beginning with the Revolution of July 23, 1908, the Second Constitutional Period is characterized primarily by the rule of İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, "The Committee of Union and Progress" (CUP), which had assumed the most important role within the constitutionalist opposition to Hamidian absolutism.[19] In addition to this undisputed leadership in oppositional activities against the Ottoman regime prior to 1908, the CUP had also been the instigator of the mutinies of July 1908 in the Third Imperial Army stationed in Macedonia, which finally took the form of a military pronunciamento, by far the most important coup de main that made Abdülhamit II give way. Con-

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[19]. For the CUP, see Tunaya, pp. 108-142, Sina Akşin, Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1987), and Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks. The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). For a general analysis of the Young Turk opposition, see Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, The Young Turks. Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), Şerif Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 2nd edn. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983), and the detailed monograph of M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, Bir Siyasal Düşünür Olarak Dr. Abdullah Cevdet ve Dönemi (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, n.d.). The detailed history of the Second Constitutional Period is to be found in Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk Devrim Tarihi, 3 vols., 2nd edn. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1963-1983).

sequently, the CUP made its debut in the constitutional regime as the most popular political formation, and its candidates won the first general election which took place in November - December 1908.

Yet, the CUP was far from being a homogeneous political party. Its aim was to save the Empire from disintegrating into nation-states, and/or from being partitioned among the European powers.[20] To this effect its policy consisted of a return to the constitutional regime of 1876, and of modernizing measures in fields such as administration, education and economy, among others. As a result of this vague program, the Unionist majority very soon split into many factions, and the committee met with strong opposition within the very parliament which it had chosen as its main weapon in supervising state affairs.[21] Outside the Parliament the situation of the committee was not one of ascendancy either, as it had been only a few months earlier. It had since attracted much hostility on account of its interference in the state apparatus by removing many civil servants from their offices, which were then conferred upon Unionists, and had caused great anger within higher official circles by

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20. It is accepted that the Revolution of 1908 was precipitated after the British and Russian moves with regard to the Macedonian affair; see Akşin, pp. 69-74, and Ahmad, pp. 2-3.

21. Tunaya, p. 181, and idem, Hürriyetin İlanı (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1959), pp. 32-33. Ahmad mentions (op. cit., p. 54) that the British Ambassador, Sir Gerard Lowther, had foreseen this opposition as early as the elections. For the CUP's preference to dominate the Parliament while keeping away from high offices, see ibid., pp. 17-28.

acting as representatives of the Ottoman state on several occasions.[22] Finally, some socio-professional subgroups of the traditional Ottoman establishment, such as the medrese students and army officers without a modern education, were thoroughly unhappy with the new regime, which had suppressed either their privileges or simply their positions. With the help of ultra-conservative elements who, in their turn, were shocked by some public statements of the CUP leaders with respect to future modernization of the country, these groups ultimately staged the first blow against the new regime: several First Army units stationed in Istanbul mutinied and asked for a return to the rule of şeriat on April 13, 1909.

This event marked a turning point in the history of the Second Constitutional Period. Indeed, the CUP, in light of its recent experiences, aimed on the one hand to build up a one-party system, and on the other, to shape by legal as well as illegal means a constitutional system within which the executive power would have the upper hand vis-à-vis the legislative. This move became effective towards the end of 1911 when the slowly but steadily growing opposition, which had gathered some seventy deputies in the Parliament, formed Hürriyet ve İtilaf, "The Liberal Union." More heterogeneous a party than the CUP itself, the Liberal Union owed its existence to the hostility its members felt towards the Unionists. When the new party won

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22. Feroz Ahmad, "Great Britain's Relations with the Young Turks 1908-1914," Middle Eastern Studies, II, 4(1966): p. 310.

a by-election in Istanbul in only its third week of existence, the CUP reacted by proposing a constitutional change which meant a return to the cabinet system of the Constitution of 1876 from the parliamentary system established by the amendments of 1909.[23] The unfolding of this new venture, which was to constitute a valuable weapon for the last sultan on two occasions, in 1918 and 1920 when Mehmet VI (Vahdettin) dissolved the Parliament, went as follows: the proposal was obstructed by the Liberals; in January 1912 Sultan Mehmet V (Reşat) dissolved the Parliament, and in February were held the notorious sopalı seçim, "elections with sticks," which gave an overwhelming majority to the Unionists in the Parliament which, in its turn, voted in favor of the constitutional change.

Illegally but firmly established in power, the CUP had to face in July 1912 almost the same situation it itself had created four years earlier. Indignant at the Italian attack on Tripolitania and discontented by the dictatorial rule of the Unionists, a group of Halaskar Zabitan, "Savior Officers," caused the fall of the committee by a pronunciamento provoking a crisis which was all the more delicate since it could have degenerated into a full-scale revolution, had there been an effort to cooperate with the uprising which took place in Albania.[24] The CUP managed to get out of this state of dis-

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23. Recai Galip Okandan, Amme Hukukumuzun Anahatları, 3rd edn. (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977), pp. 340-363 and 434-441, and Tunaya, Hürriyetin İlanı, pp. 38-39.

24. Arar, pp. 146-147 and 150.

grace, which seemed fatal to many contemporary observers, thanks to the chaos that the Balkan War created, as well as to the hesitations of the Ottoman government in the face of the peace conditions dictated by the European Powers. The coup d'état known as Bab-ı Ali Baskını, "Raid on the Sublime Porte," gave the government back to the Unionists, and the subsequent murder of Prime Minister Mahmut Şevket Pasha provided them with the pretext to suppress all opposition with unprecedented brutality. The Unionist dictatorship, which was to last until the Ottoman defeat in World War I, had begun, and the Liberal Union went underground only to reappear after the Armistice in order to persecute its Unionist enemies with at least equal if not greater harshness.

Having asserted that "the experiments of the Second Constitutional Period in the field of political thought [were] completely successful," a Turkish scholar prominent through his authoritative works on the period remarks nevertheless that "the idea of a political party could by no means appear" in the same period.[25] As a matter of fact, it was still very difficult to call the CUP a political party even as late as the First World War years, but some kind of party unity was nevertheless achieved by those who remained loyal to the lofty ideals of 1908 after those who had defected joined the opposition. Moreover, the CUP leaders were aware of the existence of some power-hungry opportunists in their ranks and erected a

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[25]. Tunaya, Hürriyetin İlanı, pp. 78-82.

system that barred the way to high office.

The short history of the transformation of the ADRAR into the PP proves that the concept of a political party was still in an embryonic state in 1923, but also indicates that the practical lessons of the recent past were well learned, at least by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who told the Soviet Ambassador that "enemies [were] infiltrating [their] party but only to be detected and unmasked."[26] As a matter of fact, when the newly elected GNA held a special meeting on September 9, 1923, in order to discuss and adopt the Constitution of the PP, some of its members were already known as opposed to the formation of such a party, and even more to Mustafa Kemal Pasha's leadership, because of his leanings towards dictatorial rule and radical change.[27] This minority passed into open opposition after the proclamation of the Republic, and Hüseyin Rauf Bey (Orbay), one of those who were still loyal to the sultanate-caliphate, became its most prominent figure thanks to his criticism of the way the Republic was proclaimed.[28] The fol-

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26. Simeon Ivanovich Aralov, Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları, translated from the Russian by Hasan Ali Ediz (Istanbul: Burçak Yayınevi, 1967), p. 127; see also Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II, p. 132.

27. Cebesoy, Siyasi Hatıralar, Vol. I, pp. 311-312, and Vol. II, p. 9.

28. A retired naval officer and a hero of the Balkan War during which he had the command of the cruiser Hamidiye. Rauf Bey had also been the head of the Ottoman delegation to the Armistice of Mondros (Mudros) on 30 October 1918, while he was Minister of the Marine. He had joined Mustafa Kemal Pasha very early and been elected to the last Ottoman Parliament. After the occupation of Istanbul, he was deported to Malta by the British and was able to return to Ankara only in 1922, after his release. On his early profession of faith as a "loyalist,"

following year, events such as the debates over the new Constitution, the abolition of the caliphate, and the discovery of widespread corruption among the leading figures of the PP, contributed to the intensification of the opposition. Şefik Hüsnü wrote in June 1924:

> It is understood that we are on the eve of a ruthless family dispute between two rival factions of the Turkish bourgeoisie.[29]

In October 1924, a vote of confidence requested on the basis of the alleged incompetence and abuses of the Minister of Immigration and Settlement Affairs finally precipitated the regrouping of the opposition into a political formation, namely Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, "The Progressive Republican Party" (PrRP).[30]

Under the leadership of many important figures of the liberation movement such as Kazım Karabekir Pasha, Ali Fuat Pasha, Refet Pasha (Bele) and Abdülhak Adnan Bey (Adıvar) along with Rauf Bey, the PrRP reached a total of 29 deputies in the Assembly, and was backed by the moderately reformist circles in

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"loyalist," see Atatürk, Nutuk, Vol. II, pp. 609-610; on his criticism of the hasty way the Republic was proclaimed, see his statement to Vatan, November 1st, 1923.

29. Şefik Hüsnü, "Türk burjuvazisinin aile kavgaları," Aydınlık, 22(1924): 562-565.

30. Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, pp. 100-103. On 10 November 1924, one week before the foundation of the PrRP, the PP changed its name into Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, "The Republican People's Party;" see Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, p. 560. It appears that the adjective "republican" was first used as early as March 1924 within the circles which finally formed the PrRP; see Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, p. 100 note 78.

Istanbul discontented by the radical moves of the regime, especially with respect to the abolition of the caliphate. In addition to this political motivation, the new party advocated a more liberal economic policy, as opposed to the interventionist policy of the PP, in its program which was made public the day the party was founded.[31] As a matter of fact, the party was also supported by the trade bourgeoisie of the large cities, who needed more foreign capital. It was also stated in this program that "the Constitution [would] not be amended without the consent of the nation" (Art. 5), and that "the Party [was] respectful toward religious belief and opinions" (Art. 6).[32] By no means a radical nor protectionist formation, the PrRP appeared, moreover, in a period when the leading figures of the new regime were hardly inclined to tolerate a multi-party system. Premier İsmet Pasha (İnönü) had already equated the previous Turkish experiments in this system with "anarchy."[33] Now, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who had recently declared that it was out of question for him to accept the role of a non-partisan President of the Republic, was openly chal-

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31. For the complete text of the PrRP Program, see Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, pp. 616-620.

32. This sixth article which caused the final demise of the PrRP was criticized because of its extreme vagueness even by a journalist who supported the party; see the article of Ahmet Şükrü in Vatan, November 24, 1924: "İki fırka arasındaki başlıca farklar."

33. See his speech during the party group meeting on 22 November 1923 in İsmet İnönü, İnönü'nün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1946), pp. 69-85.

lenged by Article 12 of the PrRP Program which read:

> The person who is elected President of the Republic loses his status of deputy after his election.[34]

In February 1925 a rebellion broke out and gave the regime the opportunity to get rid of the undesired opposition, as well as to strengthen its position by extraordinary measures. This violent outburst in Eastern Anatolia, called the Sheikh Sait Rebellion after its leader, a Kurdish sheikh, was basically a reactionary rising against the secular Republic aiming to restore the caliphate, despite the fact that a minority among the rebels can be more appropriately described as Kurdish nationalists.[35] In March, the Assembly passed the Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu, "The Law on the Maintenance of Public Order," which was to lapse only in 1929, and the creation of two İstiklal Mahkemesi, the notoriously expeditious "Independence

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[34]. Tunaya, Siyasi Partiler, p. 620. For Mustafa Kemal Pasha's profession of faith as a partisan president, see his above-mentioned conversation with the party members in Trabzon on 16 September 1924 in Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II, pp. 191-192.

[35]. See Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, pp. 127-146, and Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925 (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1989). Both authors see the rebellion as a nationalist movement. Yet, the parliamentary discussions on the prospective abolition of the aşar tax (tithe), which was collected through tax-farmers whose quasi-totality were local notables, may have been the real cause of the rebellion. A study of the tithe records would certainly be of great help to come to a conclusion on this delicate question. To the best of our knowledge, the only study which raised this issue has been Paul Gentizon's Mustapha Kemal ou l'Orient en marche (Paris: Editions Bossards, 1929), in pp. 60-85. The aşar tax was ultimately abolished on the fifth day of the rebellion.

Courts" initially instituted during the National Struggle.[36] By these moves the government obviously aimed to present a local rebellion as a full-scale counter-revolutionary movement.[37] Subsequently, all opposition newspapers were banned, and along with the trials of several journalists, an anti-PrRP campaign started without, however, any substantial proof of the implication of the opposition party in the rebellion. Ultimately, the PrRP was suppressed by a government decision in June on account of charges of religious propaganda for political ends,[38] but its members remained unmolested in the GNA as independent deputies.

After the military victory in Anatolia, the name of the Committee of Union and Progress had been heard on various occasions such as the Peace Conference of Lausanne, the general election of 1923 and the formation of the PrRP. On the other

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36. For the complete text of the Law on the Maintenance of Public Order, see Düstur, 3rd series, Vol. VI, p. 144; the Independence Courts took charge of such cases as spying, collaboration with the enemy, seditious activities and desertion. They were known for issuing very harsh sentences, which could not be appealed, in very short times; for details, see Ergün Aybars, İstiklal Mahkemeleri (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1975); for the activities of the Independence Courts during the republican period, see idem, İstiklal Mahkemeleri, 1923-1927 (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1982).

37. We must however say that Mustafa Kemal Pasha sincerely feared a "Turkish Vendée" when the insurrection broke out; see Hasan Rıza Soyak, Atatürk'ten Hatıralar, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. Yayınları, 1973), Vol. I, pp. 317-318. It appears that when the news of the rebellion reached Ankara, a genuine atmosphere of panic prevailed in the capital city; see Chris Kutschera, Le mouvement national kurde (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), p. 83 note 9.

38. See above, p. 138, note 12.

hand, the CUP, which had supposedly dissolved itself by a resolution of its last congress in 1918, had in fact tried to regain control of Turkish politics during the National Struggle and seems to have had such ambitions after the Kemalist victory as well.[39] Although a great majority of former left-wing Unionists had already become irreversibly staunch Kemalists, there still existed many reasons to consider the CUP a serious potential rival: its past glory as a fighter for freedom, its contribution to the national struggle for liberation, its cadre of strong personalities who had assumed important roles in the recent past, and the simple fact that these remaining right wing leaders, such as the former ministers Cavit Bey and Kara Kemal Bey and the journalist Hüseyin Cahit Bey (Yalçın), constituted a respectable liberal alternative to Kemalist Jacobinism for the bourgeoisie of Istanbul, who were disappointed with Kemalist economic policies. An attempt at assassinating Mustafa Kemal Pasha, discovered in the fall of 1925 and tracked by the police until the summer of 1926, finally brought to an end the activities of the CUP and gave the coup de grâce to the PrRP.[40]

The Independence Court of Ankara took charge of the case with two trials in Izmir, the final location of the conspiracy,

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[39]. See above, Chapter 1, pp. 64-68, for the period of the National Struggle, and Zürcher, p. 132ff, for the aftermath of Lausanne.

[40]. For the details of the abortive assassination, see Zürcher, pp. 144-145.

and in Ankara, and made a purely political issue out of it.[41] Direct implication of some former Unionist and Progressive members in the conspiracy rendered the task easier for the judges, and all the Progressive deputies, except for one, were summoned by the tribunal. This measure was certainly taken with the sole aim of intimidating some of the prominent leaders of the PrRP despite their undoubted innocence, for they had been acting as a party group in the Assembly since the dissolution of their party. As a matter of fact, Ali Fuat Cebesoy recounts in his memoirs the following dialogue with Halet Bey (Sağıroğlu), deputy for Erzurum, after the Izmir trial:

> -- What will the line of conduct of <u>our party group</u> in the Assembly be now?
>
> -- Should not the group be considered as dissolved after such a catastrophe, Halet Bey?[42]

When the Ankara phase of the trials ended on August 26, 1926, there was a total of nineteen death sentences, many condemnations to imprisonment, and no sign of effective or potential opposition to the regime remained. The following year, Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), then a deputy for Mardin in the GNA, published his novel <u>Hükūm Gecesi</u>, "The Night of Verdict," a very critical account of the Second Constitutional Period

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41. Ibid., p. 156. For the details of the trials, see Feridun Kandemir, <u>İzmir Suikastının İçyüzü</u>, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955).

42. Cebesoy, <u>Siyasi Hatıralar</u>, Vol. II, p. 218; emphasis added.

which was presented as under permanent Unionist terror[43] The National Credit Bank (İtibar-ı Milli Bankası), a purely Unionist undertaking, was absorbed by Türkiye İş Bankası, "The Business Bank of Turkey," founded by Kemalists with an important personal contribution by Mustafa Kemal Pasha. In October of the same year, Mustafa Kemal Pasha delivered his famous Nutuk, "The Speech," at the opening of the Republican People's Party (RPP) Congress, and criticized bitterly both his former companions in arms, who had ultimately joined the opposition in the PrRP, and the CUP, which he held to be responsible for the loss of the Empire.

Although not questioning the idea that the ultimate goal of the Kemalist regime was liberalization and multi-party democracy, a German political scientist says that "a leaning towards a comprehensive-dictatorial party line was discernible in the Kemalist movement even during the early 1920's."[44] In fact,

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43. The novel was serialized in Milliyet, one of the two Kemalist dailies of Istanbul, before being released in the form of a book (Istanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1927). Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1889-1974), one of the best novelists of modern Turkey, had been a moderately anti-Unionist journalist during the Second Constitutional Period and one of the few pro-Kemalists among his colleagues of Istanbul during the Turkish National Struggle. He was also known for his short stories. He achieved great fame with his first novel Kiralık konak, "Mansion for Rent," (serialized in İkdam in 1920 and published in the book form in 1922) and was elected deputy for Mardin in 1923. He was a deputy for Manisa, where his family originated, when he joined Şevket Süreyya Aydemir to publish Kadro.

44. Klaus von Beyme, "Batı ve Marxist Gelişme Teorilerine Göre Kemalizm," in Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar. Türkiye İş Bankası Uluslararası Atatürk Sempozyumu (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1983), pp. 263-287.

along with its firm decision not to tolerate any opposition on the political scene, the RPP had also chosen to keep under its monopoly all kinds of social organizations, whether of an economic, cultural, philanthropic, or even strictly professional character. This attitude, which was mildly formulated for the first time in the two Constitutions of the DRG in 1921 and 1922, appeared clearly in the new Constitution of the RPP adopted in its Congress of 1927:

> Article 40. - The candidacy of those who are to enter the board of directors of all kinds of organizations, political, social, economic, cultural, and the like, is posted after having been approved by the Party Inspectorates.[45]

Thus, the Turkish Hearths Society came under the control of the RPP despite the efforts of their well-known leader, Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) who had served more than once in Kemalist cabinets, as did many other groups, such as the Turkish Teachers' Association and the National Turkish Student Union, the former in 1928 and the latter between 1928 and 1930.[46]

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[45]. See "Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Nizamnamesi," Ayın tarihi, XIV, 43(1927): 2557-2570. The "Principal Article" (Madde-i esasiye) of both Constitutions of the DRG read:

"The Group... will make use of all the moral and material forces of the nation and direct them toward the necessary targets in order to achieve its sacred aim, and will try to have all the official and private organizations and institutions of the country serve this essential motivation."

For both texts, see Unat, loc. cit.

[46]. For the Teachers' Association, see Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, p. 240; for the Students' Union, see Abidin Nesimi, Yılların İçinden (Istanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977), pp. 74-76. For other examples, see below, pp. 184-185, and Ahmet Hamdi Başar, Atatürk'le Üç Ay, 2nd edn. (Ankara: İ.T.İ.A. Gazetecilik ve Halkla İlişkiler Yüksek Okulu, 1981), p. 92.

This dictatorial attitude of the RPP, which tended to equate itself with the Turkish people as the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks had done with their "nation" and "proletariat" respectively, had results contrary to the party's expectations in the process of contact with the people on local levels. There was a widespread indifference toward politics that found its expression in all the elections of the period, which saw very low participation rates. This can be explained to a certain extent by the revolutionary moves such as the abolition of religious schools and orders, the adoption of Western clothing, the presence of women in all kinds of social gatherings, the abolition of state religion and the replacement of the Arabic script by the Latin alphabet, which had alienated from the regime the more conservative sections of the society. Yet, contrary to the wishes of the RPP leadership, not all those who felt sympathetic to these achievements were able to join the ranks of the party either, for the whole network of influence peddling party inspectors and trustees contributed to keeping the party basis very narrow and impermeable to new members.[47] The GNA reflected well in its turn this process of revolutionary change without extensive participation: the governmental rule of the revolutionary minority ensured that the parliamentary sessions before and after the elections of 1927 very

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47. For the abuses committed by party trustees, see Uran, pp. 229-232, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Serbest Fırka Hatıraları, 2nd edn. (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969), pp. 37-38, and Cemal Kutay ed., Üç Devirde Bir Adam, Fethi Okyar (Istanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1980), p. 534.

often gathered less than half of the deputies. Along with the disillusionment caused by economic profiteering and political nepotism, this seemingly stagnant atmosphere was bitterly criticized in 1928 by the novelist Yakup Kadri:

> I feel so forlorn and lost in this new atmosphere that I regret I did not die amidst the joyful cries of the past victory days.[48]

This apparent stagnation was only the calm before the storm. The notorious international depression year of 1929 brought some economic measures which, revealing completely the Jacobin nature of the regime in economic matters as well, greatly upset the newly emerging capitalists of Turkey, already seriously disillusioned with the Kemalist economic policies pursued since 1923 and suffering from the consequences of the international economic crisis. The disillusionment with the regime of the nascent Turkish bourgeoisie was equalled only by its ambitions, which were exacerbated by the nationalist economic policy that the Unionists had adopted after the Balkan War and the very favorable post-victory conditions for prospering in peace.

The Unionists had in fact been the creators of these newly emerging Turkish capitalists and had spoiled them. The new

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48. See the postface to his Ergenekon, 3rd edn. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973), p. 227. In a report presented to Mustafa Kemal Pasha in 1926, Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey had exposed this situation of the RPP without inhibition; its facsimile and modern Turkish transliteration are given by Soyak, Vol. I, pp. 493-508.

generation of politicians who came to power with the advent of the Second Constitutional Period were well aware that their "new regime needed solid bases."[49] The times when the Ottoman bureaucracy was trying to assert its independence vis-à-vis the sultan and to establish the state apparatus as a continuum free from sudden changes of humor, had long passed. Those who had the destiny of the Empire in their hands during the Second Constitutional Period were now trying to make this state into a socially organic entity. Together with this socio-political aim, this new generation had a strong desire to manufacture the battleships and the locomotives for which the Ottomans had to pay Western powers, and a relatively sound understanding of the socio-economic structure that lay behind these ironclad symbols of might. Consequently, the Young Turks did not hesitate to embrace bourgeois capitalism after their seizure of power.

In 1913, Ziya Gökalp, the famous theoretician of the CUP, had written that "the fact that a strong government could not be established in [the] country [was] due to the lack of economic classes among Turks."[50] What he had in mind was the

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[49]. Moustapha Soubhy Bey, Rapport sur l'organisation du Crédit Agricole en Turquie au Congrès National de la Mutualité et de la Coopération Agricoles (Rouen: n.p., 1910), p. 3.

[50]. Ziya Gök Alp, "Üç cereyan," Türk yurdu, III, 11(1328/1913): 331-337. A professor of sociology in the University of Istanbul and a member of the Central Committee of the CUP, Mehmet Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924) had been the most influential mind in Turkish thought in the 20th century. Although his two simultaneous quests for scientific knowledge and political expediency did great harm to one another, and despite the fact that his somewhat tentative ideas changed very often, it can be said that his views set the broad framework for the socio-economic policies of both the Unionists and the Kemalists.

missing bourgeoisie which the Unionist regime wanted to create after 1913 as an integral part of its "National(ist) Economy" (Milli İktisat).[51] Hence, the CUP governments took a series of measures aiming to help the Muslim Turks to accumulate capital, which would constitute the basis for local economic development on the one hand, and the means to compete with foreign investments on the other. One such measure was the creation of banks in Istanbul, such as İtibar-ı Milli Bankası, "The National Credit Bank," of which many Unionist leaders were shareholders, and in the major trade centers of Anatolia, with entirely Turkish capital.[52] Another measure of this kind was the enactment of Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu, "The Law for the Encouragement

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51. Muhittin, yet another pro-Unionist intellectual, was even more explicit with respect to this missing bourgeoisie; see his article "En büyük eksiğimiz," Halka doğru, 6(1329/1913): 46-48. Falih Rıfkı Atay says that "during the Second Constitutional Period the opening of a shoemaker's shop in Direklerarası was seen by [his] generation as the announcement of entrepreneurship among Turks;" Çankaya, 2nd edn. (Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Matbaacılık Sanayii A.Ş. Basımevi, 1969), p. 453. For the "National(ist) Economy," see the well documented study of Zafer Toprak, Türkiye'de "Milli İktisat" 1908-1918 (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982).

52. See A. Gündüz Ökçün, "1909-1930 Yılları Arasında Anonim Şirket Olarak Kurulan Bankalar," in Osman Okyar ed., Türkiye İktisat Tarihi Semineri (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975), pp. 409-475.

The following figures are compiled from the data provided by Ökçün:

Bank founders	in 1909-1912	in 1913-1918
Foreigners	3	3
Minorities	1	0
Turks	2	15

Of the 15 banks founded by Turks between 1913 and 1918, at least eight had CUP members in their board of directors.

of Industry," which was drafted back in 1909. The latter stipulated measures such as tax reductions, customs exemptions, free allocation of construction terrains, etc.

But more important than these technicalities of economic life, there appeared a new economic ethos which the previous generations of Ottoman administrators and politicians had not been able to endorse. As a matter of fact, 19th century Ottoman administrators "did not have the courage to sacrifice the artisans and small workshop production for the sake of industrialization."[53] The populist scruples of the Unionists were weaker. By the time they made their way to power they had understood that the Western ascendancy they so much envied rested on a particular kind of social system, and they wanted to set the same mechanism to work in the Ottoman empire. There followed an ideological mobilization which consisted of an appeal to the money-making instincts of the Muslim Turks. Many private enterprises were launched, thanks either to public funds or to the increased profit margins in the trade of some vital goods whose prices went up artificially under government patronage.[54] Some further measures, such as obliging foreign firms to employ Muslim Turks in greater numbers, raising the

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53. İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1983), p. 152.

54. See Topuzlu, pp. 175-178. For the use the Unionists made of these profits, see Toprak, Millî İktisat, pp. 151-152. Toprak tells us (ibid., pp. 30-32) also that creating a bourgeoisie had precedence over justice in the redistribution of wealth according to Ziya Gökalp.

customs duties, encouraging the creation of companies aiming to dislodge foreigners or non-Muslim minorities from their dominant position, especially in the wholesale trade of agricultural products, and ultimately, abolishing the Capitulations, made the Unionists the undisputed leaders of a nationalist economic mobilization. In an article written in 1920, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf Bey (Akçura), who was among the promoters of the idea of "National(ist) Economy," appropriately described the CUP as "the party of the Turkish bourgeoisie."[55]

At the end of the National Struggle, the young Turkish bourgeoisie expected the Kemalists to replace the defunct CUP in playing midwife to liberal capitalism. The situation was exceptionally propitious: the peace that the country needed for so long was finally in sight, and the ethnic minorities, who so far had had practically all the key positions in economic activities, were to a great extent evicted by one means or another. All this newly emerging class needed then was the full support of the national state.

Yet, the founders of the national state had an economic perspective somewhat different from that of their predecessors.

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[55]. See his "İttifaka dair," in Akçuraoğlu Yusuf, pp. 21-32. Yusuf Akçura's most significant contribution to the promotion of the "National(ist) Economy" was his articles in Türk yurdu, which rationalized the comparatively stronger Tatar nationalism in Russia as a manifestation of the Tatar bourgeoisie. See also Feroz Ahmad, "Vanguard of a Nascent Bourgeoisie: The Social and Economic Policies of the Young Turks, 1908-1918," in Osman Okyar & Halil İnalcık eds., Social and Economic History of Turkey (1071-1920) (Ankara: Hacettepe University, 1980), pp. 329-350.

The Unionist endeavors under the heading of "National(ist) Economy" meant either fraudulent transactions or fortunes amassed through the good offices of the public treasury. Consequently, the emergence of war-time nouveaux riches contributed to worsen further the image of the bourgeoisie, which had appeared until then as the unsympathetic agent of European interests within the Empire, in the eyes of the bureaucratic elite and of many intellectuals.[56] Moreover, although still representing the material power of the West, the bourgeoisie of Europe was now seen by the leading Turkish intellectuals as the expansionist class at the source of imperialism and as an association of greedy individualists undermining the internal peace of the nations, thus causing widespread social upheavals and revolutions in Europe.[57] Consequently, the Kemalists opted for a strong populism which was not limited only to the populist jargon ushered in by the Unionists as a counter-weight for their economic practices.[58]

Even the name "People's Party" met with strong reactions on the part of the young bourgeoisie of Istanbul.[59] The close

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[56]. For the frauds of the Period, see Ahmed Emin, pp. 119-140, and Toprak, Millî İktisat, pp. 343-345.

[57]. See Ziya Gök Alp, "Avrupa'da içtimai buhranın sebebi," Küçük mecmua, 31(1339/1923): 13-14.

[58]. For the populist ideology during the Second Constitutional Period, see Toprak, "Osmanlı Narodnikleri," and idem, "II. Meşrutiyet'te Solidarist Düşünce: Halkçılık," Toplum ve Bilim, 1(1977): 92-123; for the new content of populism under the Kemalists, see Bülent Tanör, "Lozan'a Giden Yıllarda Türk Anayasa Tezinin Doğuşu," in Lozan'ın 50. Yılına Armağan (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1978), pp. 199-229.

[59]. See, for example, an editorial by Ahmet Emin: "Halk

relations that the Ankara Government had with the Bolsheviks during the National Struggle had already led the Kemalists to be identified with the Bolsheviks in the eyes of many foreign observers and of the wealthier classes in Istanbul. There had been also the sentiment of a common cause vividly expressed by İbrahim Tali (Öngören), the representative of the GNA to the Congress of the Peoples of the East,[60] and a purely indigenous communist activity existed in Anatolia during the same period. Moreover, the GNA, which held also the executive power, had named its ministers "icrâ vekili" (executive agent), an expression which sounded, and actually translated into European languages at that time, as "comissar." Last but not least, aiming to preempt both the Bolshevik and Unionist activities in Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his close collaborators had made the GNA adopt a Halkçılık Programı, "Program of Populism," which had a strongly leftist substance.[61] Although the Ankara Government had prosecuted the Communists on every occasion when some sort of negotiation seemed possible with the Entente Powers,[62] the anxieties concerning the future politico-economic structure of Turkey, the fear that she might imitate the Rus-

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Fırkası," Vakit, December 21, 1922.

60. For the complete text of İbrahim Tali Bey's speech in the fourth session of the Baku Congress, see Congress of the Peoples of the East, pp. 79-82.

61. See İsmail Arar, Atatürk'ün Halkçılık Programı, (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1963); for the circumstances under which the Program of Populism was brought into the agenda of the GNA, see above, Chapter 1, pp. 64-67.

62. For these cyclical prosecutions, see Tunçay, Türkiye'de Sol Akımlar, pp. 243-244 and 258-259.

sians with respect to her foreign debts and the uncertainty over the fate of European possessions and investments on Turkish soil, led the Entente to obstruct the peace talks in Lausanne.[63] This development placed the nationalists in an extremely delicate situation at the beginning of 1923 by adding an important political grievance to the socio-economic platform of opposition of the bourgeoisie. Hence, the nationalists had to compromise. The above-mentioned conversations of Mustafa Kemal Pasha with the citizens of Eskişehir, Izmit and Balıkesir were truly clever moves aiming, among other things, to appease the anxieties of the local bourgeoisie:

> I am asking you, gentlemen; how many people who have a large capital, how many people who possess a great wealth are there in our country? How many millionaires can you show me in Turkey? And how much money does our richest man have? Can fifty thousand or one hundred thousand pounds be considered as an important capital? Are these the people whom we will consider as capitalists and attack? No, gentlemen. This country and its people need to be much richer. This is their right. Consequently, we will not be covetous of their wealth and, raising perhaps the middle size merchants to their level too, we all will prosper even more. Gentlemen; we would like our country to have more and more millionaires and billionaires, and to let these rich people cover the country from one end to the other with banks, railways, factories, companies and other industrial institutions. We would like them to set us free from the need for foreign capital.
> Consequently, the real interests of this country compel us not to oppose these people but to enrich them even more. Hence, they too are part of our people, they too belong to this category.[64]

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[63]. See Beşir Hamitoğulları, "İktisadi Sistemimizin Oluşmasında Lozan Andlaşmasının Etkileri," in Lozan'ın 50. Yılına Armağan, op. cit., pp. 164-188.

[64]. Arı İnan, pp. 120-121. The excerpt is from the conversation in Izmit, on 19 January 1923.

Projected both as a means to calm the fears of the possessing classes and as an attempt to define the economic policy of the new regime, the Economic Congress which took place in Izmir in February 1923 served also as an indirect message to the Entente Powers during the interruption of the peace negotiations in Lausanne.[65] As a matter of fact, both the Minister of Economy, Mahmut Esat Bey (Bozkurt), and Mustafa Kemal Pasha took this opportunity to announce on many occasions and in several different places that the new regime was not opposed to foreign capital and that there would be new investment possibilities provided that the investors remain respectful of the sovereignty rights of Turkey.[66] Although it did not give Turkey as complete an economic freedom as the Kemalists would have liked to have, the peace treaty was finally signed in Lausanne on July 23, 1923, at the end of the second session, which started in April, roughly a month after the closing of the Economic Congress in Izmir.

The Kemalist state was rather successful in creating and strengthening a national economy, the aims and limits of which had been designated respectively in Izmir and Lausanne.[67] The

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65. For the congress, see A. Gündüz Ökçün, Türkiye İktisat Kongresi, İzmir 1923 (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1968).

66. Ibid., pp. 9-11, 16-17, 252-253 and 263; see also Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. I, p. 285.

67. It can be said that the republican economic policies have closely observed most of the principles adopted in Izmir; see the opening speech of Mahmut Esat Bey in Ökçün, İktisat Kongresi, pp. 262-266. See also Korkut Boratav, Türkiye'de Devletçilik (Ankara: Savaş Yayınları, 1982), pp. 12-14, and Yahya S. Tezel, Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi (1923-

customs tariffs established by the Unionists in 1916 were kept unchanged as a provision of the Lausanne Treaty until 1929, only to be raised in October of the same year.[68] Many measures were taken to increase agricultural income by state subsidies and state entrepreneurship aiming to improve the productivity of the sector and the commercialization of its output. Specific facilities were also accorded to private initiative in the industrial sector which culminated in the new Law for the Encouragement of Industry enacted in May 1927. The promotion of national banking kept pace as well, as Mustafa Kemal Pasha set the example by founding Türkiye İş Bankası, "The Business Bank of Turkey."

On the other hand, along with the subsidies and facilities accorded to the agricultural and industrial sectors, the state too embarked on entrepreneurship, for "in addition to the general weakness of the economy, the backwardness in fields such as transportation, energy, and heavy industry that require large investments and important technological input, neces-

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1950) (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982), pp. 138-139. For the Lausanne Treaty's importance in shaping the economic policy of the Republic, see Hamitoğulları, loc. cit., despite the fact that it is hard to share the author's implicit idea of Kemalist compliance.

68. Tezel, pp. 144-148, and Orhan Kurmuş, "1916 ve 1929 Gümrük Tarifeleri Üzerine Bazı Gözlemler," The Middle East Technical University Studies in Development, 1978 Special Issue, pp. 182-209. Both authors are rather sceptical over the issue whether these tariffs helped Turkish industrialization or not, a question that needs detailed research to be answered properly. On the other hand, both authors agree upon judging these measures as a source of additional revenue for the state.

sitated it."[69] This, of course, was not a novelty in Turkey, since the first examples of state manufactures go back to the first half of the 19th century when a few factories were launched, mainly to meet the needs of the army. When the republican government embarked on its project to "cover the country with an iron net," it had also before it the famous example of the Hejaz Railway, the most important achievement of Sultan Abdülhamit II's "pan-Islamist" policy. Finally, in many different economic fields such as the various services in the ports, mining or the production and import of sugar, alcohols, explosives and petroleum among others, state monopolies were formed and conceded to privileged private companies.

All these measures contributed to an exceptional growth in the Turkish economy until the Great Depression, the average growth rate of the gross national product being 10 per cent. per annum,[70] but gave the same economy an exceptional structure as well. Indeed, during the 1920s the Turkish economy presented the curious and unique image of a mixture of liberalism and etatism, creating rather an ambivalent and complex relationship between the state and the bourgeoisie. The

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69. Emre Kongar, "Devletçilik ve Günümüzdeki Sonuçları," in Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarihiyle İlgili Sorunları (Istanbul: İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi Mezunları Derneği, 1977), pp. 141-175.

70. İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, 1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politika Arayışları (Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1977), p. 35. It must be noted however that much of this growth represents the recovery from war-time damage.

ambivalence in this relationship was characterized by the Constitution of 1924, which had been drawn upon liberal lines, and the economic profession of faith of Mahmut Esat Bey in his opening speech of the Economic Congress in Izmir, which had announced that private initiative and devletleştirme, "nationalization," were going to constitute the two pillars of the new regime's economic policy.[71] Yet, the Kemalist state did not define clearcut limits that such a coexistence theory required for the economic activities of both the public and private sectors. On the contrary, the private sector's liberties were curtailed to a great extent by the economic legislation of the period.[72] As early as the end of the first year of the Republic, a professor of economics had defined the regime's economic policy as "extremely interventionist,"[73] bearing in mind primarily the proliferation of state monopolies. The taxation policy of the regime was not advantageous for private initiative, either. The Transaction Tax (Muamele Vergisi) especially would be bitterly criticized during the 1931 Congress of the RPP by the deputies of Istanbul, the only

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71. See Ökçün, İktisat Kongresi, pp. 262-263. For an early allusion of Mustafa Kemal Pasha to nationalizations, see his opening speech of the third session year of the GNA in Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. I, p. 220; for a yet earlier allusion to nationalizations by the Minister of Economy, see Mahmut Esat, "Yeni Türkiye'nin manası," Hakimiyet-i milliye, November 9-16, 1921.

72. See Boratav, pp. 75-92.

73. İbrahim Fazıl, "İki fırkanın iktisadi ve mali programı," Vatan, November 23, 1924.

location of significant industrial activity in the country."[74] The income and real estate taxes were also very high and were going to constitute one of the major grievances of the Free Republican Party in 1930.

The omnipresence of the Kemalist state in all aspects of economic life can be understood better only if analyzed "in the broader context of ideology in general," as suggested by Zvi Y. Hershlag,[75] and in light of the internal tensions of the 1920s. As a matter of fact, the populist nationalism which dominated the era, thanks in large measure to the writings of Ziya Gökalp, was based upon the assumption that the individual is by nature selfish and his actions are against the public interest.[76] This belief can be found also in Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler, "Civic Notions for the Citizens," the famous high school manual of civic instruction published in 1930 by Afet

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74. See C. H. F. Üçüncü Büyük Kongre Zabıtları (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), pp. 121-122. The law on this tax was passed one week before the new Law on the Encouragement of Industry, on May 21, 1927; for a brief yet trenchant comment on the law, see Şevkct Süreyya Aydemir, İkinci Adam: İsmet İnönü, 3 vols. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966-1968), Vol. I, pp. 433-434. Despite widespread discontent, the government seems to have considered increasing the Transaction Tax from 6 % to 10 % later in 1931 or in 1932; see Col. H. Woods, Economic Conditions in Turkey (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1932), p. 17.

75. Zvi Y. Hershlag, "Atatürk's Etatism," in Jacob M. Landau ed., Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey (Boulder: Westview Press, and Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), pp. 171-180.

76. See Ziya Gök Alp, "Avrupa'da içtimai buhran," and his Türkcülüğün esasları (Ankara: Matbuat ve İstihbarat Matbaası, 1339/1923), pp. 167-169. This radical change in Gökalp's attitude toward the bourgeoisie can best be explained by the advent of the Bolshevik Revolution which preoccupied him as early as 1917, as can be seen in his articles in Yeni mecmua.

Hanım (İnan), but well known to have been dictated by Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself.[77] On the other hand, as we have already stated, the turmoils and the revolutions of post-war Europe had very much shaken spirits in Turkey. Subsequently, it was argued that for the orderly development that the country needed, the state should establish a line of conduct in all kinds of social activities and prevent any development independent of its will. Late in 1930, the Minister of Economy, Mustafa Şeref Bey (Özkan), defended the economic policy of the regime in the following terms:

> The economic interests within the country will not pursue activities in an anarchical manner. They will be directed and driven to a single goal in order to achieve a high harmony and equilibrium. But in doing so, the state will not replace the individuals, but will put an end to those characteristics of the individual endeavors which constitute an obstacle to this harmony; it will prevent the individual activities from proceeding in a mutually antagonistic and harmful manner, and will direct them in a way favorable to the common and general interests of the community... If ever the state does not intervene, it would have closed its eyes to the economic activities of both the local individual interests and of the foreign individuals to threaten the unity and even the existence of the country.

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77. See Afet, Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler (Istanbul: Milliyet Matbaası, 1930), p. 76ff; for Mustafa Kemal Pasha's autorship of the book, see Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1969), p. 7. A foreign witness interpreted this mentality as follows: "La richesse et le capital sont, d'après l'ultra-popularisme, des éléments sociaux pathologiques... C'est l'exagération anormale des intérets personnels;" see Gérard Tongas, Atatürk et le vrai visage de la Turquie moderne (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1937), pp. 26-28. The same year, a Turkish commentator preferred the coinage "manieur d'argent" to the word "capitalist;" see Rachid Erer, La société anonyme devant la crise économique (Istanbul: Imprimerie Cumhuriyet, 1937), p. 138.

> in economy, there are certain dominant positions. Those who reach these positions from an economic background may most possibly abuse the individuals for their own interests. This is what one calls l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme... The state must always and completely occupy these dominant positions and must be able, by this means, to protect the private initiatives on the part of these individuals. If we happen to leave these dominant positions to the anarchical rule of liberalism, gentlemen, all that has been done during the last ten years can be destroyed within a single year.[78]

One should not, however, take this credo as yet another extreme example of the state of mind which the historian Benedetto Croce was nostalgically deploring around the same date.[79] This was the voice of Kemalist Jacobinism which, along with its aspirations to a virtuous state judging the realm of economy as a secondary ground of considerations subject to politics,[80] was also trying to control every imaginable social and economic activity that could constitute the basis for an eventual political opposition endangering the socio-cultural

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78. Quoted after parliamentary minutes by Tekeli and İlkin, pp. 178-179. Mustafa Şeref Bey is certainly one of the best examples to represent the change of attitude of the Turkish intellectuals toward economic matters which occured between 1913 and 1923, since he had served as Minister of Economy in the Unionist cabinets which implemented the "National(ist) Economy" measures.

79. Benedetto Croce, Storia d'Europa nel secolo decimonono (Bari: Giuseppe Laterza e Figli, 1932), p. 317: "...[E]ssendo rimasto il concetto di liberismo pigramente associato con quello di liberalismo, la sfiducia nella formula liberistica induceva sfiducia nella verità stessa della libertà politica, che è concetto di altro ordine e superiore."

80. For Kemalist attitudes toward economics, see Ergun Özbudun, "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime," in Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun eds., Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1981), pp. 79-102.

revolution. In fact, the Kemalists, too, had created many nouveaux riches. The Business Bank which finally took over the National Credit Bank, the last vestige of the Unionist power in the country, Türkiye Milli İthalat ve İhracat Anonim Şirketi, "The National Import - Export Company of Turkey," or İstanbul Liman Şirketi, "The Istanbul Harbor Company," were but a few of the results of this policy.[81] A close examination of the names involved in these new undertakings shows that they were all early Kemalists who had demonstrated their commitment to the nationalist cause. Economically speaking, however, they constituted a client bourgeoisie raised by state subsidies to the detriment of "neutral," hence politically untrustworthy, individuals who were certainly better placed candidates for the same ventures if judged purely on economic grounds. Yet, this client bourgeoisie did not have the unconditional blessing of the regime either; their ambitions, too, were checked by the government on at least two important occasions when the Business Bank wanted to form the core of the projected Central Bank and to obtain the paper mills concession.[82]

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[81]. See, on the Import-Export Company, Selim İlkin, "Türkiye İthalat ve İhracat Anonim Şirketi," Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Gelişme Dergisi, 2(1971): 199-231, and Uran, pp. 201-205; on the Istanbul Harbor Company, see Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkiye'nin Düzeni, 2 vols., 6th edn. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1973), Vol. I, pp. 266-271.

[82]. On the Central Bank, see Selim İlkin, "Türkiye'de Merkez Bankası Fikrinin Gelişimi," in Osman Okyar ed., op. cit., pp. 537-586; on the contention over the paper industries, see Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Politikada 45 Yıl, 2nd edn. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), pp. 130-137.

The new regime thus conformed conscientiously to the ideas of an "economic state" and of an "economic school of new Turkey" put forward respectively by Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Mahmut Esat Bey in their opening speeches to the Economic Congress of Izmir. The reasons behind both the liberal inspiration of the Constitution of 1924 and the absence during the Twenties of a more radical move toward straightforward etatism of the Thirties are to be found in the fear of a potential political opposition on the one hand, and the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Lausanne on the other hand. The former was little by little stamped out during the 1920s thanks both to the dictatorial rule of the regime and to the creation of a new client bourgeoisie that supplanted the old one. A good indicator of this process can be found in the attitudes the business circles displayed vis-à-vis the concept of a central bank. The traders who dominated the Economic Congress of Izmir had turned a deaf ear to the idea in 1923. In 1925, they were still reluctant to accept the creation of such a bank. But from 1928 onwards they seem to have supported the will of the government in this direction.[83] As to the limitations relative to Turkey's customs policy imposed by the Treaty of Lausanne, they appear to have been a matter of concern for the government as early as 1925.[84] Finally, a large number of the foreign firms operating

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83. See İlkin, "Merkez Bankası," pp. 545-546 and 556, and Gülten Kazgan, "Türk Ekonomisinde 1927-1935 Depresyonu, Kapital Birikimi ve Örgütleşmeler," in Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Sorunları, op. cit., pp. 231-274.

84. Tekeli and İlkin, p. 59.

in Turkey left the country during the same period, harassed by the unfavorable policies of the government.[85]

The year 1929 started with an important increase in the imports as many firms wanted to lay in as much stock as they could before the new customs tariffs became effective. This had a negative effect on the value of the Turkish pound, and the government took the first of a series of measures which were going to alienate the trade sector from the regime. A new law passed on May 16, 1929, introduced the quota system in the allocation of foreign currencies.[86] Two weeks later, the law on the new customs tariffs was voted in the GNA. The new tariff regulations aiming to protect the local goods and products introduced much higher taxation than had been the case and gave a further blow to the import trade.[87] In the meantime, the depreciation of the Turkish pound continued. This constituted an issue of primary importance for the government, for Turkey was about to start paying her part of the Ottoman Public Debt as was agreed upon during the peace conference at Lausanne, and she had serious problems with her balance of payments. The pro-government Istanbul daily Cumhuriyet started to publish alarmist articles which introduced

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85. Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War, pp. 291-295, and Oya Silier, "1920'lerde Türkiye'de Milli Bankacılığın Genel Görünümü," in Osman Okyar ed., op. cit., pp. 485-533.

86. İlkin, "Merkez Bankası," p. 565.

87. Tekeli and İlkin, p. 71. See also above, p. 164, note 68.

to a large extent the Law for the Protection of Turkish Currency (Türk Parasını Koruma Kanunu), enacted in February 1930. With this new law convertibility was abandoned and the divorce between the trade sector in imports and the regime was definitive.[88]

Another measure, probably the most far-reaching, was the "economic program" of Şakir Bey (Kesebir), the Minister of Economy, at the request of Ali İktisat Meclisi, "The Supreme Economic Council," in June 1929.[89] Although we do not have any substantial data on the issue, the widespread coverage that the prospective "program" received from the press seems to have provoked anxieties within business circles. This can only be understood indirectly from the defensive attitudes taken by the pro-government newspapers and especially from Cumhuriyet, which took special care to emphasize that Şakir Bey's study was neither a white paper nor an economic program, but a simple "report" on the economic conditions of the country. In fact, when it was finally completed and submitted to the Premier in March 1930, it was given the title of "Report Concerning Our

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88. See Zvi Y. Hershlag, Turkey. The Challenge of Growth (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 85. In 1929, the government's attempts at establishing a limited control on the export trade as well were strongly opposed and the scheme was temporarily abandoned (Tekeli and İlkin, pp. 82-83); the following year, however, the government became directly involved in the export trade with the establishment of the Tobacco Monopoly (ibid., pp. 187 and 201). By 1933 "practically... all foreign trade was under government control" (Hershlag, The Challenge of Growth, p. 67).

89. Tekeli and İlkin, pp. 98-99.

Economic Situation" (İktisadi Vaziyetimize Dair Rapor).[90] Yet, it was followed by an economic program in April, and commentaries sympathetic to etatism started to appear in the pro-government newspapers.[91] However, the government preferred to remain silent over its growing willingness to increase the role of the state in the economic life of the nation until the creation of a new political party, which was supposed to defend the interests of the private sector.

Emanating from a revolutionary regime, the decision to create an opposition seems very strange. Moreover, Mustafa Kemal Pasha's decision in that direction came at a moment when Turkey counted a great number of people discontented for reasons other than counter-revolutionary feelings, for Turkey was not spared the Great Depression's devastating effects in 1929. The world economic crisis that reached its peak in that year had initially not been felt in Turkey as deeply as it had been in many peripheral countries, thanks to the variety of Turkish exports. The agricultural sector linked to the world market had suffered the most important losses. Turkish exports had diminished 10.5 % in value despite an increase of 6.9 % in tonnage from 1928 to 1929.[92] Ironically, Turkish agriculture

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90. Ibid., pp. 100-101; for the complete text of the report, see ibid., pp. 227-559.

91. For the text of the program, see ibid., pp. 561-572. To our knowledge, the first article to appear on etatism was an editorial in the official Hakimiyeti Milliye of March 29, 1930, entitled in plain Turkish "Devletçilik" (Etatism). The author was Zeki Mesud (Alsan), then a deputy for Edirne.

92. See tables in Tekeli and İlkin, p. 88.

was going to feel the crisis very strongly the year after, and to encounter the worst of difficulties in 1931, the best harvest year of the post-war period. The Commercial Secretary to the British Embassy noted that "1931 will be remembered as one of the leanest commercial years of the Turkish Republic."[93] But the decline of the purchasing power of this most important consumer group in the country had had tragic results for internal trade as early as 1929. Many traders who already had serious difficulties in liquidating their huge stocks and were incapable of obtaining credit, had gone bankrupt or closed out in 1929.[94]

Under these circumstances, we can say that Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, "The Free Republican Party," was launched in August 1930 perhaps to appease the discontent created by the tragic results of the world economic crisis, and certainly to meet smoothly the fear of socialism ushered in by the ideas of planned economy and etatism.[95] It was thus to constitute a counter-weight for the regime's decision to expand the range of its interventionist economic policy in force since 1923. The person chosen by Mustafa Kemal Pasha to lead the party, Ali

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93. Woods, p. 41.

94. Silier, p. 504.

95. On the Free Party, see Ağaoğlu, passim, Kutay, p. 377ff, Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, pp. 245-275, Süreyya İlmen, Zavallı Serbest Fırka (Istanbul: Muhiddin Fuat Gücüyener Yayınları, 1951), Walter F. Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey. The Free Party and its Aftermath (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), and Çetin Yetkin, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı (Istanbul· Karacan Yayınları, 1982).

Fethi Bey (Okyar), a politician and diplomat well-known for his liberal views, had been criticizing the regime's economic policy for some time, and he was in serious conflict with Premier İsmet Pasha over the mode of payment of the Ottoman Public Debt at the time the new formation was made public.[96]

It is difficult to take this political venture for a genuine and honest attempt at establishing multi-party democracy in Turkey. In spite of some evidence suggesting that the coming of an opposition party was already known before its official announcement,[97] not even a single statement may be seen on the part of official circles alluding to the need for an opposition prior to its sudden appearance. This is all the more striking since the regime had almost the entire press of the country on its side, and had already used it quite intelligently to introduce the new aspects of its economic policy. On the other hand, the chief author of the Free Party, Mustafa Kemal Pasha,

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96. Ali Fethi Okyar (1880-1943) was a close friend of Mustafa Kemal Pasha since their debuts in the CUP as young officers. He had resigned from the army and become a diplomat. He was the Ottoman Ambassador to Bulgaria when Mustafa Kemal Pasha served there as a military attaché. Deputy in various Ottoman parliaments and in the GNA, he was also Minister of the Interior in 1923 and Premier in 1924-1925, during the PrRP episode, and was replaced in office by İsmet Pasha when the Sheikh Sait rebellion broke out. He was Ambassador to France when Mustafa Kemal Pasha summoned him to assume the leadership of the Free Party. His conflict with İsmet Pasha was due to his statement to the French press, in which he had declared that Turkey would pay her share of the Ottoman Public Debt in gold, whereas the government was envisaging payment in banknotes; see Asım Us, Gördüklerim, Duyduklarım, Duygularım (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1964), p. 135.

97. Ağaoğlu, p. 3, Kutay, p. 384, and Asım Us, Hatıra Notları, 1930-1950 (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1966), pp. 13-14.

took his measures against an unknown future by stating explicitly and right at the beginning that he was the Chairman of the RPP in his open letter to Fethi Bey in the papers of 12 August 1930. Moreover, he made it clear in a personal letter that "the activities of the government [were] absolutely right in all essential respects," and was extremely nervous when talking to those deputies criticizing his own party's conduct in the GNA, or simply wishing to join the new party by their own decision.[98]

Yet the outcome of the events showed that the ersatz party achieved an unexpectedly wide popularity, reaching the proportions of a serious threat to the ruling party. In fact, the new party's official foundation had been followed by a shower of letters and telegrams to Fethi Bey from all over the country, sent to congratulate the new formation as well as to request admission or to invite the party leaders to found a branch in various cities and towns.[99] This popular support reached its peak during the Aegean tour that Fethi Bey and his companions undertook in September in order to establish the local branches of the Free Party. Beginning with Izmir, where the party leaders were acclaimed by thousands of sympathizers, the journey was a triumph. But along with the enthusiasm shown to liberals in a region badly stricken by economic crisis, the

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98. See the letter to Kazım Pasha (Özalp) in Weiker, p. 92. For Mustafa Kemal Pasha's difficulty with the criticisms, see Ağaoğlu, pp. 10-11, Kutay, pp. 449-451, and İlmen, p. 72.

99. Kutay, pp. 491-492.

popular fervor of Izmir in particular had the characteristics of an angry mob attacking violently the representatives of the regime, i.e. the local branch of the RPP and the newspapers which supported it. Although substantial proof of provocative measures taken by the officials existed and officially acknowledged, this sacrilege marked the beginning of the end for the Free Party.[100]

The Aegean tour of the Free Party leaders had brought to the fore one important fact: the popularity of the RPP had decreased significantly. Kazım Pasha (Özalp), the Chairman of the Assembly, whom Mustafa Kemal Pasha had sent to Izmir to investigate the incidents on the spot, wrote later that

> the truth was that the People's Party had melted after Fethi Bey's arrival in Izmir. And Fethi Bey pursued his trip from Izmir to Balıkesir, extinguishing the People's Party everywhere he passed.[101]

At a delicate moment when its supporters' discontent with the regime had a strong tendency towards vindictive schemes by use of violence, the Free Party took the badly flawed resolution to participate in the municipal elections, tempted as it was by unexpected popularity. Hence, the regime reacted vigorously. In a move of self-defense, Mustafa Kemal Pasha laid stress once more on his status of Chairman of the RPP,[102] and, motivated by

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100. For the details of the incidents, see Ağaoğlu, pp. 34-41, Weiker, pp. 89-90, and Yetkin, pp. 170-173.

101. Kazım Özalp, "Atatürk ve Cumhuriyet," Milliyet, 29 October - 3 November 1963.

102. See his answer to Yunus Nadi Bey's open letter asking him to assume the leadership of his party, in Cumhuriyet, Sep-

the revealing suggestions of the Ministry of the Interior, the administrative authorities rigged the elections, which took place in October.[103] As for the Free Party, it achieved some success in several localities, but the discussions it opened in the Assembly with respect to electoral frauds and the subsequent tensions these discussions provoked hastened its demise.

This short presence of the Free Party in Turkish politics brought to light, and opened discussions over, the great majority of the aforementioned problems of the Turkish economy. One of these was state favoritism and related frauds committed mainly by the "affairiste" circles around the Business Bank and close to the Minister of Economy, Şakir Bey.[104] Severely harassed by Free Party criticisms over the concession of sugar refineries, Şakir Bey was finally replaced in office by Mustafa Şeref Bey, who was the only Minister of Economy during the

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tember 10, 1930.

103. The circular sent to the provinces by the Ministry of the Interior is in Yetkin, pp. 269-270. Commenting on the results of the municipal elections, Mustafa Kemal Pasha is reported to have said that the winning party was idare fırkası, "the administration party;" see Soyak, Vol. II, p. 436. In his opening speech of the parliamentary session year, Mustafa Kemal Pasha brought this fact to the attention of the GNAT as well; see Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. I, p. 352. For an apologetic approach to the abuses, see the Premier's speech in the RPP Congress, C. H. F. Üçüncü Büyük Kongre, pp. 4-5.

104. "Affairiste" was the derogatory nickname given by the intellectuals and bureaucrats to both individuals related to the Business Bank and to agents lobbying in the capital city for different business circles. It is derived from the title of the Bank in French, Banque d'affaires. According to Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, the nickname was İsmet Pasha's coinage; see his Politikada 45 Yıl, pp. 109 and 113.

period 1923-1939 to be from outside the Business Bank circles. This incident also betrayed a split within the RPP with respect to private initiative under government patronage, uncovering a group of thoroughgoing bureaucrats siding with Premier İsmet Pasha and a group of influence peddlers concentrating around the Business Bank. As a matter of fact, İsmet Pasha had already criticized this state favoritism in 1928 and declared in the Assembly that "serious businessmen [were] being swept away."[105] He is also reported to have said:

> An achievement on the part of the state where individuals do not dare to enter, that, I understand; an achievement through private initiative, that, I understand as well; but an achievement by individuals and banks through state influence, that, I cannot understand.[106]

Yet, an artificial solidarity was somehow created to counter the sharp diatribes of the new party's deputies in the Assembly.

The ruling party was challenged not only in the GNA and in political rallies similar to the incidents of Izmir. The small business circles of large cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Adana and Samsun also tried to shake off government supervision of their trades. A good example of this trend is an incident in September 1930, on the occasion of board elections to the Shoemakers' Guild of Istanbul:

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105. İsmet Paşa, İsmet Paşa'nın Siyasi ve İçtimai Nutukları (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası, 1933), p. 225.

106. Atay, Çankaya, p. 457.

> The Guild was told by two RPP members that no election could take place until the list of the candidates had been examined and approved by the RPP. The Guild agreed to postpone the election, but when it was held voted down the RPP-approved slate.[107]

The most important and revealing debate that the Free Party criticisms opened, however, was over the government's taxation and construction policy. The spokesmen of the new party, and particularly Fethi Bey, contended rightly that the country was overtaxed and pointed to expensive public works as the source of the evil. Their main targets were the ongoing railway constructions. Subsequently, İsmet Pasha answered his opponents and, on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the Ankara - Sivas line on 30 August 1930, made it clear that these constructions were in fact part of their national defense policy.[108] A subtle link was thus established between nationalism and the government's choices in its economic policy. As a matter of fact, İsmet Pasha continued his speech with a lengthy defense of various taxes and monopolies as parts of the same policy that the state was compelled to pursue, and finally defined this economic attitude as <u>mutedil devletçilik</u>, "moderate etatism."[109] It was for the first time, and in the third week of existence of the Free Party, that the regime was

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107. Weiker, p. 209.

108. See İsmet Paşa, pp. 292-327; see also Falih Rıfkı, <u>Moskova - Roma</u> ([Ankara]: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1932), p. 10.

109. İsmet Paşa, pp. 314-315.

referring to its economic policy as etatism. Later, Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey (Ağaoğlu), who was one of the top leaders of the Free Party, commented rightly on the matter in the following terms:

> Those who had named the new party "Free" before its constitution, had also decided to add the adjective "Etatist" to the old one.[110]

Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey was right, since the identification of etatism with nationalism occurred prior to the creation of the Free Party. The idea can be found in Afet Hanım's aforementioned manual of civic instruction, which must have been written sometime in mid-1929.[111] Consequently, further discussions between the two parties mostly concentrated around the idea of nationalism, and the Free Party was attacked vehemently by the official or semi-official spokesmen as an anti-nationalist formation. As Walter Weiker puts it, "the RPP reacted by treating criticism of its economic record as criticism of the Revolution itself."[112]

The existence of an economic program for the government on the one hand and the regime's acknowledgment of its etatist policy on the other gave birth to new anxieties, and the pro-

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110. Ağaoğlu, p. 17.

111. For the identification of etatism with nationalism, see Afet, Vatandaş İçin, p. 78ff; for the dating of the composition of this book, see Mustafa Baydar, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver ve Anıları (İstanbul: Menteş Kitabevi, 1968), pp. 311-313, and İsmet Pasha's autographs in Afet İnan, Medeni Bilgiler, p. 547.

112. Weiker, p. 144.

Free Party press displayed a genuine fear of eventual nationalizations.[113] The Kemalists felt obliged to declare in public statements that their etatism was only "moderate," and it was to be applied only in sectors where private initiative did not have the necessary funds or simply did not dare to enter. Moreover, the Minister of Economy promised in May 1931, during the RPP Congress, that all the state-owned enterprises would be transferred to the private sector in the future.[114] Nevertheless, on the occasion of this congress and only six months after the Free Party episode, the RPP declared etatism as official economic policy in its program without the need to soften the term with the adjective "moderate."[115] In fact, a more radical move towards etatism was to come later in the Thirties with both industrial planning, inspired mainly by the Soviet Union, and nationalizations.

On 17 November 1930, the day the Free Party was dissolved by a decision of its leadership, Mustafa Kemal Pasha went on a tour of the country which was to last for more than three months. Accompanied by a huge number of specialists from all the ministries and some prominent figures of the RPP, he set to work with the aim of examining in detail the conditions under which the population had shown great sympathy for the Free

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113. See Tekeli and İlkin, pp. 126-127.

114. See C. H. F. Üçüncü Büyük Kongre, pp. 73-75.

115. Ibid., pp. 28-30, and Cümhuriyetçi Halkçı Fırkası Nizamnamesi ve Programı (Ankara: T. B. M. M. Matbaası, 1931), p. 31.

Party.[116] The trip was known to the press as having been projected since October, and those who expected it to bring radical changes in Turkish politics were not disappointed when the President called for new elections immediately upon his return to the capital city at the beginning of March. A few days later a major change occurred, and Recep Bey (Peker) who was going to be a most influential figure of the RPP until 1936, became the secretary general of the party.

After the elections and the formation of the new cabinet once more by İsmet Pasha, the Third Congress of the RPP was opened on May 10, 1931. A turning point in the history of the ruling party, the congress adopted for the first time a program for the RPP formulating the famous Altı Ok, "The Six Arrows," the fundamental principles of the party which ultimately made their way into the Constitution in 1937: republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, laicism and revolutionarism.[117] The congress also took the decision to dissolve the Turkish Hearths and to incorporate them into the RPP's projected Halkevleri,

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116. The best account of this inspection visit is given by Başar (op. cit.) who was among Mustafa Kemal Pasha's retinue.

117. See C. H. F. Programı, pp. 30-31. We translate laiklik not as secularism, for Turkish secularism did not consist of a simple separation of state and religion, but copied its French model where religion was subject to the secular state, thanks to the creation of a Directorate of Religious Affairs responsible to the Premier.

The sixth "arrow," inkılapçılık, has so far been translated into English as "revolutionism" and "reformism;" we retain here the translation offered by Abdülhak Adnan (Adıvar) in his "Ten Years of Republic in Turkey," The Political Quarterly, VI, 2(1935): 240-252.

"People's Houses," this being a first step towards the dissolution of all kinds of associations which were judged potential rivals to the RPP after the example of the Turkish Hearths, many members of which seem to have supported the Free Party.[118] Two months later, while the newspapers supporting the regime were full of articles praising the iron-fisted system of Italy or the propaganda methods of the Soviet Union, another measure strengthening the RPP dictatorship was taken by the GNA, which voted the Press Law (Matbuat Kanunu), described by an opposing journalist as follows:

> Had the aim been to criticize this law thoroughly, one could not have hesitated to tell that it is made of articles written to satisfy not a republican regime, but rather a system two steps behind it. As a matter of fact, it can be seriously argued that nowhere on earth is such a law applied.[119]

With these measures, Kemalist Jacobinism was finally in full control of the country in the year 1931. It is under these circumstances of revolutionary politics, that is, under the dictatorial rule of a voluntarist elite group who, once in the position of representing the general will, starts defining

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118. For the implication of the Turkish Hearths with the Free Party, see Baydar, pp. 71-78, and Samet Ağaoğlu, Babamın Arkadaşları, 2nd edn. (Istanbul: Nebioğlu Yayınevi, n.d.), p. 146; for their activities during the republican period, see François Georgeon, "Les Foyers Turcs à l'époque kémaliste," Turcica, XIV (1982): 168-215.

119. Arif Oruç, Vatandaşın Birinci Hürriyeti (Istanbul: Tecelli Matbaası, 1932), p. 23 (the emphasis is in the original text). For the complete text of the Press Law, see Matbuat Kanunu (Istanbul: Kütüphanei Umumi, 1931).

this general will and purges one after the other all elements trying to draw the principles of their political action from the reality which is generally referred to as civil society, that Şevket Süreyya Aydemir started to develop his rationalization of the Turkish Revolution. Moreover, the Kemalist regime for which the popularity of the Free Party had been a warning, embarked in 1931 on a farreaching ideological mobilization. A greater emphasis on nationalism was to constitute the keystone in building up a constituency conforming to the principles proclaimed by the RPP program. This was another appealing feature for Aydemir, since he had finally found the ground for synthesis of nationalism and social revolution, two ideals he had so far worked for. He thought that this synthesis was finally possible, for the Kemalist regime was obviously not bourgeois-democratic, as Marxist orthodoxy according to Comintern would define, but national-revolutionary as Lenin had suggested in 1920.

Chapter 4

The Ideology of the Revolution

Aydemir seems to have grown disenchanted with the way things looked after the euphoria created by the alphabet change came to an end. The problem was the same as the one he had witnessed during his first and short stay in Ankara. The atmosphere in the capital city was stagnant; there was no sign of revolutionary enthusiasm. Some people in the official circles "had accepted the revolution as a fact but had not comprehended it" [p. 460]. Some others simply considered the revolution as a mere change in the political system which was successfully completed. For example, Falih Rıfkı Atay, who was the senior editor of the official Hakimiyeti Milliye at that time, was to write many years later that the Turkish Revolution had lasted for "five years and one month," and ended on November 3, 1928, when the Law on the new alphabet came into effect.[1] But for Aydemir, not only was the Revolution far from coming to an end, but also the misconception of its true mean-

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1. Atay, Çankaya, p. 392.

ing by those who considered themselves as its servants and guardians in their confrontation with the "reactionary" forces, endangered it. What the Revolution represented had to be, first, properly understood in the light of recent Turkish history, and then explained to the people. Furthermore, Aydemir was convinced that the Turkish Revolution had a far reaching world-historical significance which was still to be grasped and appreciated fully. He believed, as a matter of fact, that the Turkish Revolution constituted a path breaking example for the colonial world and that considering it as a purely national phenomenon was a deplorable parochialism [pp. 461-462].

The Free Party episode had provided Aydemir with the impetus to take action on behalf of the Revolution. His apprehensions about economic hardships as a potential enemy of the accomplishments of the Revolution [pp. 462-463] were clearly confirmed by this untimely venture. The leadership who had not understood what the Revolution was about, had taken the disastrous decision of creating an opposition party, and the masses of people who were imbued of neither a revolutionary enthusiasm nor a sense of self-sacrifice, had supported it in a moment of acute economic crisis. Moreover, this wave of protest had unleashed some counter-revolutionary passions. Five weeks after the dissolution of the Free Party, there occurred an incident in the Aegean town of Menemen where a group of Naksibendi dervishes rose up against the secular regime in the name of Islam. The rioting during which a reserve officer,

Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay, and two watchmen (bekçi) were slaughtered, was crushed by army units within a few hours, and its leader, Derviş Mehmet, was shot. But this was yet another indicator of the precarious situation of the regime as Aydemir saw it. In short, the Revolution was in danger and a call to arms was necessary.

Aydemir issued his appeal in the form of a public lecture he delivered in the Turkish Hearth of Ankara on January 15, 1931. The lecture, entitled İnkılâbın İdeolojisi, "The Ideology of the Revolution," was given upon a request on the part of the Turkish Hearth direction who were to a certain extent familiar with Aydemir's ideas thanks to his intervention during the previous public lecture given in the premises of the society.[2] Aydemir's argument was that the Turkish Revolution was an original revolution of world-historical meaning, for it had set an example for the colonial world. Moreover, it had not yet ended, and it still needed an ideology. This ideology was an absolute necessity for both keeping the revolutionary fervor alive and directing the revolutionary energy in a rational manner towards well-defined aims, the sum total of which was none other than national development. Aydemir also maintained that the needed ideology was already there, waiting

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2. Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 14 and 15, 1931, and Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro. (İnkılâbın İdeolojisi) (Ankara: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1932), p. i. Due to typesetting errors, the date of the talk appears in a footnote as January 29, 1929, in Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 467, and as January 5, 1931, in Tek Adam, Vol. III, p. 462.

to be extracted simply from the revolutionary experience that Turkey had been undergoing for a decade. Once formulated clearly, this ideology was to constitute the guiding principle for an elite of revolutionary vanguard who would impose their will by sheer force on all the dissident or unenthusiastic minds. These assertions were in fact an implicit critique of the RPP as a political formation which did not have a program or even a set of well-defined principles.

According to Aydemir, his ideas were criticized on the spot by the leaders of the Turkish Hearths Society such as Hamdullah Suphi Bey, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf Bey and Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey, who nevertheless felt that it would be worthwhile to print Aydemir's lecture and distribute it to the Turkish Hearth branches all over the country.[3] Aydemir declined the offer for various reasons. As a typical revolutionary whose primary aim was the seizure of the state apparatus, he was not interested in publicizing his ideas outside a restrained circle of political leaders in highest positions. He was also irritated by other factors. Serious criticisms had begun to appear in the newspapers, including the official Hakimiyeti Milliye, almost immediately after his lecture. In addition to this, he was certainly afraid of being identified as a Turkish Hearth sympathizer in a period when the regime was distrustful of the society and was planning to dissolve it. Thus, Aydemir

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3. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, p. i, and Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 469.

preferred first to rebuke his critics while he prepared a pamphlet, based on his initial lecture, to the attention of the leaders of the regime.

The first and the most vocal among the earliest of Aydemir's critics had been Neşet Halil (Atay) Bey in Hakimiyeti Milliye. The latter published an article entitled Demokrasi Rejimi, "The Democratic Regime," three days after the lecture, and criticized Aydemir's ideas as undemocratic. After a long and intelligent discourse on the history and the virtues of democracy, Neşet Halil Bey maintained that the Turkish regime was democratic, and concluded his article on a note of reproach, saying that "talking about the ideology of [the Turkish] revolution with no faith in democracy [was] somewhat sad."[4] Aydemir answered Neşet Halil Bey on January 23 with a long article bearing the same title as his lecture.[5] The article, which looks like a summary of the initial lecture, is thus the only document to be a first hand information on the content of Aydemir's talk. Before concluding with a short rebuttal of Neşet Halil Bey's definition of democracy, Aydemir summed up his ideas in several points. According to Aydemir, Turkey was experiencing a genuine revolution of universal value, for this revolution was the result of the antagonism between the colonialist and the colonized nations. As the first of its

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[4]. Neşet Halil, "Demokrasi Rejimi," Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 18, 1931.

[5]. Şevket Süreyya, "İnkılâbın İdeolojisi," Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 23, 1931.

kind, this revolution was sui generis. Yet, as all other revolutions, the Turkish Revolution too represented a set of ideas which, in this particular case, was common to all the national liberation movements yet to come. But this set of ideas was still not formulated in clear cut principles, and this constituted a major weakness which remained to be remedied by the revolutionaries for two reasons: the ideology that the Revolution needed would not only explain this revolution, rendering thus its defense easier, but it would also help to distinguish its aims. In Aydemir's words, the most important of these aims was the "accumulation of national capital" which had to be carried out as the logical application to the economy of the principle of "realistic nationalism."[6] Aydemir's most poignant diagnosis in forcing his detractor to silence, however, came at the very end of his rationalization of the Turkish Revolution. This was also the ultimate justification of his recent decision to join the Kemalist regime:

> The regulatory aspect of our national liberation movement is the revolutionary order. The revolutionary order is the order in which the Turkish society passed, through concomitant leaps, from colonial dependency to independence, and from one state to another...
>
> There are people who call this order a "democracy." This is wrong. It might be said that the Turkish revolution is a revolution that aims at establishing a democratic regime. But the "political order" it now lives through is not in itself a democracy.[7]

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6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. Emphases are Aydemir's. Neşet Halil Bey wrote two more articles in response to Aydemir's article and insisted in maintaining that the regime in Turkey was democratic: "Demokrasi Rejimi ve İdeoloji Bahsi," Hakimiyeti Milliye, January

Instead of continuing the polemic with Neşet Halil Bey, Aydemir expounded the ideas of his initial lecture into a pamphlet destined to the leadership of this "political order." This was duplicated in a limited number and presented to "personalities in a position of guide in matters of thought and revolution."[8] According to Aydemir, Mustafa Kemal Pasha welcomed it as a "valuable work" and worth printing in great numbers [p. 481]. So was the reaction of Recep (Peker) Bey, the new Secretary General of the RPP, who is reported to have said that the pamphlet ought to be printed in 100.000 copies to be distributed to the entire party organization.[9] However, these wishes were never to materialize, for the author was not interested in reaching huge numbers of readers. His suggestions were addressed to, and were meant to be implemented by, a small group of revolutionary cadre [p. 481].

The little evidence we have on the matter shows nevertheless that Aydemir had the kind of response he was expecting, especially from the party apparatus. As a matter of fact, he was invited by unspecified authorities to submit a memorandum on organizational problems to the Central Committee of the

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28, 1931, and "Demokrasi Rejimi," ibid., January 31, 1931.

8. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, p. i. The number of copies thus distributed is given as 21 in Suyu Arayan Adam (p. 481), and as 20 in the second and third editions of İnkılâp ve Kadro; see ibid., 2nd edn. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968), p. 30, and ibid., 3rd edn. (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1986), p. 27.

9. Göktürk, p. 148.

RPP.[10] The memorandum which seems to have generated some discussions in party meetings was probably very detailed, for we know that it included chapters, or at least sections, entitled "Echelons of the Party's Central Organization" and "The Party and the School Committees."[11] Yet, this has apparently been a source of trouble for Aydemir. According to his autobiography, the pamphlet on the meaning of the Revolution and the memorandum were interpreted by some as a new movement within the party, and even fractions for and against it emerged with lengthy lists of partisans. There are in fact fairly acceptable reasons to believe that Aydemir had truly this ambition at that period, and that his star was rising. First of all, the Third Congress of the RPP was widely expected to bring about radical changes in the party. Second, Aydemir has been very active in the organization of the People's House of Ankara, the first of a series the foundation of which was decided during the Third Congress of the RPP. Moreover, he and some colleagues had the intention of founding a "Museum of the Revolution" which would form the nucleus for a future "Institute of the Revolution." Aydemir writes that he felt compelled to send a letter to Recep Bey in order to reassure him that he did not have the intention of creating a new current within the party [pp. 469-471]. Unfortunately, he does not indicate whether this letter was sent before or after the

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10. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. ii.

11. Ibid., 2nd edn., p. 32, and ibid., 3rd edn., p. 29.

Third Congress of the RPP.

Considering that all these developments took place in the spring and the summer of 1931, in other words, around the Third Congress of the RPP, it can be safely assumed that Aydemir's ideas with respect to party organization had a considerable influence on the outcome of the congress. As it was noted in the preceding chapter, the congress drafted the first program ever in the history of the RPP. Of course, the Free Party experience had already made some structural problems of the RPP come to the fore several months earlier. But the idea of a homogeneous and rigidly organized revolutionary vanguard defining the nature and the aims of the Turkish Revolution was altogether new. When, at the beginning of March 1931, Mustafa Kemal Pasha had called for anticipated elections, he had also asked Recep Bey to take over the office of Secretary General of the RPP with the special task of preparing the party congress. Therefore, it is more than probable that the memorandum submitted by Aydemir, and discussed in party meetings, was requested by Recep Bey himself. It is also certain that Aydemir's memorandum had a substantial contribution to the party program. Indeed, the final version of the preamble of the party program that was adopted on the fourth day of the congress, May 13, 1931, begins with a sentence taken almost word by word from Aydemir's initial talk:

> The main ideas which constitute the basis for the Program of the Republican People's Party are evident in the actions

> taken, and applications in practice, ever since the beginning of our revolution.[12]

As for "revolutionarism," the last of the "Six Arrows" of the RPP, and the one which does not refer to any clearly identifiable doctrine as the other five, its raison d'être and wording in the party program are in total conformity with the apprehensions expressed by Aydemir:

> Loyalty to the continuously maturing principles which emanate from the revolutionary changes accomplished by our nation through numerous sacrifices, and commitment to their defense, are accepted by the Party as fundamental.[13]

Moreover, Alaeddin Bey, a deputy for Kütahya, called the program the "credo of the revolution" during the fifth session of the congress, and said of its overall character that it expressed "the ideology of the Turkish [R]evolution which, until [then], did not exist in the written form," uttering thus Aydemir's original motivation in almost identical words.[14] There is evidence that Aydemir was aware of this fact, which probably encouraged him to pass into action, for he wrote three and a half years later, on the eve of the Fourth Congress of the RPP, that

> when ... the idea of a social nationalism concurred with the material and practical course of the Turkish Revolution, the revolution found its sense. Those who wish to

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12. C. H. F. Programı, p. 29.

13. Ibid., p. 31.

14. C. H. F. Üçüncü Büyük Kongre, p. 229.

trace this transformation may consult the minutes of the party congresses.[15]

It is around the same time, that is, sometime in mid-1931 at the latest that Aydemir and a handful of friends must have decided to publish the monthly Kadro, "The Cadre," the journal destined to propagate Aydemir's interpretation of the Turkish Revolution. It is beyond any doubt that the extraordinary circumstances of the RPP Congress gave birth to the idea of publishing a journal with this name. As a matter of fact, Falih Rıfkı Atay had published at the beginning of March 1931, when Recep Bey had become the new Secretary General of the RPP and the forthcoming party congress had been announced, two editorials entitled respectively Kadro and Gene Kadro, "Cadre Again," in Hakimiyeti Milliye.[16] Given the expectations of the period with respect to the structure and organization of the RPP, and considering that this suggestive word was chosen as the name of the new publication, Aydemir and his friends certainly aimed at exerting some influence on the party, if not at drawing it altogether to embrace their own rationalization of the Turkish Revolution. In fact, according to Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Kadro was designed to "assume the function of a vanguard for the RPP."[17] For Vedat Nedim Tör, the "director"

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15. [Şevket Süreyya], "Kadro," Kadro, 35-36(1935): 6; the sentence which we emphasize appears as a footnote in the original text.

16. See Falih Rıfkı, "Kadro," Hakimiyeti Milliye, March 4, 1931, and "Gene Kadro," ibid., March 5, 1931.

17. Karaosmanoğlu, Politikada 45 Yıl, p. 108; see also his Zoraki Diplomat, 2nd edn. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1967), p. 8.

of the journal, the publication of Kadro consisted of

> an attempt to make Kemalism into an ideological system for the People's Party which was in a chaotic condition, in a sort of limbo, due to the existence within it of all sorts of incongruous currents.[18]

There is evidence that both the coming of the journal and its above-mentioned motivation were common knowledge to the political circles in Ankara as early as July 1931. A letter sent by the future novelist Abdülhak Şinasi (Hisar) to Cevdet Kudret mentions condescendingly the forthcoming publication even with its correct name:

> Yakup Kadri, and his friends I should say, for there is also his brother-in-law Burhan Asaf and a few other writers, and perhaps Necip Fazıl, too, --they want to publish a journal named Kadro. But this will probably be published for reasons somewhat other than literary. The publishers want to be rather pedantic by assuming a role of guidance. They want to discuss the ideas which govern and direct us as if they were to say: "Look how we are going to tell you what you actually want to achieve!"[19]

However, the first issue of Kadro had to wait until January 1932 to be published. This was probably due to financial reasons, for the editors had to contract a loan to start their publication.[20] Yet, Aydemir writes in his autobiography that

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18. Interview with Vedat Nedim Tör, July 18, 1981.

19. Letter dated July 25, 1931, from Abdülhak Şinasi to Cevdet Kudret, in Türk Dili, 274(1974): 248-249. Abdülhak Şinasi Hisar (1883-1960) was employed at that time by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an adviser.

20. Korkmaz Alemdar, "Basında Kadro Dergisi ve Kadro Hareketi ile İlgili Bazı Görüşler," in Cem Alpar ed. Kadro (Facsimile Reprint), 3 vols. (Ankara: Ankara İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi Yayınları, 1978-1980), Vol. I, pp. 21-40.

the initial capital of the journal consisted of the subscription fees of its editorial board members, Aydemir, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Vedat Nedim Tör (1897-1985), Burhan Asaf Belge (1899-1967), İsmail Hüsrev Tökin (1902-1994) and M. Şevki Yazman (1896-1974) [pp. 481-482]. As an insider to the regime in his capacity as a deputy for Manisa, and an individual close to both the president of the republic and the prime minister, Yakup Kadri secured the permission of the latter,[21] and became the franchise holder for the publication according to the applicable legislation in force. In addition to this linkage which provided Kadro with some sort of tacit blessing of the regime, both Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pashas have supported the project to the point of subscribing to the journal [p. 482]. Finally, Vedat Nedim was entrusted with the "directorate" of the journal, an office which combined the functions of chief executive officer and senior editor.

It is in the pages of Kadro that Aydemir developed his "ideology," more precisely, his doctrine for the young Turkish state. He published, between January 1932 and January 1935, the date of the last issue of Kadro, close to 100 articles of which only 61 were signed. In addition to these articles, Aydemir published a book in August 1932, İnkılâp ve Kadro (İnkılâbın İdeolojisi), "The Revolution and the Cadre (The Ideology of the Revolution)."[22] The book reformulated all the

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21. Karaosmanoğlu, Politikada 45 Yıl, p. 108.

22. See above, p. 189, note 2. During his "Kadro period," Aydemir published two more books, the relevance of which shall be discussed in the following pages; see Şevket Süreyya, İkti-

ideas he had expressed in various places, including the first six issues of Kadro, since his talk at the Ankara Turkish Hearth. Despite its ambitious title, however, it was far from constituting Aydemir's last word on the historical significance of the Turkish Revolution. As a matter of fact, a close examination of Aydemir's subsequent articles in Kadro shows that he later added some meaningful details to his initial rationalization, to the point of developing a revised version of historical materialism to the usage of colonial peoples.

Despite the avowedly nationalistic character of his motivation, Aydemir's ideology was universal. He explained the Turkish Revolution in a world-historical context, without treating it as a uniquely Turkish phenomenon. His method was historical materialism, and his utopian conclusion on the future of the human society was very similar to the communist society according to scientific socialism. The reason why he never referred to a supra-national human society has to be seen as a sign of his time, as a self-imposed, necessary censorship in a period of high tide of romantic nationalism. His thought was built around the phenomena of colonialism and imperialism, and consisted of a sympathetic critique of scientific socialism which he considered as a product of 19th century Europe with all its inherently Eurocentrical weaknesses and neglects. Yet, unlike his thoughts a dozen of years or so earlier, this criti-

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sat Mücadelesinde Köy Muallimi, Vol. I: Ziraat Mahsullerini Kıymetlendirme Meselesi, and Vol. II: Köy Kooperatifçiliği (Ankara: Maarif Vekâleti, 1933).

que was totally devoid of xenophobic nationalism.

Aydemir adhered fully to historical materialism by adopting the notion of forces of production as the premise for rationalizing society and history.[23] He saw the story of human experience as the story of class conflicts based on the ownership of the means of production at all stages of technological development and everywhere on the globe.[24] He acknowledged this more openly when, in a polemic with the philosopher Mustafa Şekip (Tunç) Bey, he declared Kadro's purpose as conceptualizing the Turkish Revolution according to the historical materialist method.[25] His problem with this philosophic tradition and the originality of his thought emerged when he dwelled on the emergence of the capitalist society and the ongoing antagonisms generated by this society.

For Aydemir, the initial accumulation of capital, that had given birth to modern society as epitomized by West European nations and their offshoots throughout the globe, was not a phenomenon confined to those countries which ultimately became capitalist. In other words, this accumulation of capital was not the result of only a seizure of the surplus value generated

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23. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. iv and 26-29.

24. Ibid., p. 34.

25. Idem, "Bergsonizm Yahut Bir Korkunun Felsefî İfadesi..." Kadro, 11(1932): 43-50, and "Bergson Bahsi ve Hürriyet Telâkkimiz," ibid., 13(1933): 42-46; see also his answers to the criticisms of Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey and Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) Bey in "Bir Görüş Tarzı Nasıl İptizale Uğrar?" Cumhuriyet, January 23, 1933, and "Biz Avrupa'nın Hayranı Değil, Mirasçısıyız!" Kadro, 29(1934): 43-46, respectively.

in those countries. As important as this seizure, there was also an external source for this accumulation, and this was none other than the plunder and colonization of the lands outside Europe.[26] Hence, colonialist expansionism according to Aydemir was not an endeavor on the part of nations which had already reached the capitalist stage, but an undertaking which played an important role in the very formation of that particular stage, and which, later, gave pace to its full development in the form of imperialism. Thus, alongside the antagonism between the capitalists and the workers in capitalist countries, a second antagonism between colonialist and colonial nations was created.

In Aydemir's thought, the very nature of capitalism was an obstacle to the globalization of capitalist relations of production.[27] Hence, the inequality in the global distribution of wealth, technology, culture and sciences would not be transcended until the defeat of capitalism. Consequently, the above-mentioned antagonisms were supposed to be solved by revolutionary means. At this juncture, Aydemir demarcated himself from scientific socialism by going back to the thesis that

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26. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 117, "Emperyalizm Şahlanıyor Mu?" Kadro, 16(1933): 5-10, "Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi, II: Marksizm," ibid. 19(1933): 6-16, and "İş Kanunu Yeni Cemiyetin Temel Kanunlarından Biridir," ibid., 30(1934): 9; see also idem, "Die soziale Bedeutung der türkischen Revolution," Europäische Revue, 12, Jahrgang, Heft 6b (1936): 500-501.

27. Idem, "Millî Kurtuluş Hareketleri Hakkında Bizim Tezimiz," Kadro, 12(1932): 40, and "Yeni Devletin İktisadi Fonksiyonları," ibid., 29(1934): 7.

formed the backbone of the Galievist theory of colonial antagonism, and that Roy had formulated during the Second Congress of the Comintern. He advocated that socialist revolutions would not occur in capitalist countries because of the colonial antagonism that helped to create a class alliance between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The workers' combativity for socialism was nullified thanks to the share they were given from the surplus value obtained from the unequal exchange with the colonies.[28] In addition to this, Aydemir was convinced that, if they occur at all, proletarian revolutions in capitalist countries would not solve the antagonism between the colonizers and the colonized.[29] In other words, like capitalism, the proletarian revolutions could not be thoroughly international either, since the contradiction which gives rise to them was not shared internationally. The only revolutions that could put an end to the contradiction between capitalist and colonial societies were thus the national emancipation movements (milli kurtuluş hareketleri) which, according to Aydemir, "did not share a common destiny with the class struggle in Europe."[30]

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28. Idem, "Yeni Devletin İktisadi Fonksiyonları," pp. 10-11.

29. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 50-54, "İnkılâp Bitti Mi?" Kadro, 3(1932), p. 8, and "Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey'e Cevap, 4: Taklit Nedir, Mukallit Kimdir?" Cumhuriyet, December 17, 1932.

30. Idem, "Milli Kurtuluş Hareketleri Hakkında Bizim Tezimiz," p. 42; see also idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 35-38, "İnkılâp Bitti Mi?" p. 8, "Yeni Devletin İktisadi Fonksiyonları," p. 7, and "Beynelmilel Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi, III: Türk Nasyonalizmi (II)," Kadro,

It is obvious that Aydemir's frustration with respect to the expected socialist revolution in western Europe after World War I, is at the origin of his profoundly pessimistic attitude vis-à-vis the revolutionary potential of the workers of the industrialized countries. As for his pessimism relative to the outcome of the socialist revolutions, it is equally obvious that it was derived from the developments leading to the formation of the Soviet Union. Aydemir was in fact disappointed with communist practices on two grounds. First, as a former party member, he had witnessed the withdrawal of communist support for the national emancipation movements when Stalin decreed that the only movements worthy of Soviet Union's support were the proletarian revolutions. Clearly, colonial nations deprived of industry and proletariat would not be able to count on the proletariat of the industrial nations. Second, there was the fact that the formation of the Soviet Union had been a very painful process for the nations of the former Russian empire. Not only was national independence denied to them under the pretext of "voluntary union of free nations," but even their Communists were not permitted to organize themselves on a national level after the Austro-Marxist model. Be it in the sovietic republics of the Union or in the "autonomous" regions inside Russia, political power was monopolized by ethnic Russians who happened to form the great majority inside the All-Union Communist Party (the future Communist Party of the Soviet Union). As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, Sultan Galiev

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21(1933): 5-14.

had been the first major Communist leader among the Muslims of the Soviet Union to denounce and condemn this process, and to be purged as a consequence. He had expressed his disillusion with the Bolshevik Revolution by stating that colonialist nations would remain colonialist even under proletarian regimes, that the real class struggle was between the colonialist and the colonial nations, and that the success of the proletarian revolutions depended on the emancipation of the colonies.[31]

Because of the self-imposed censorship mentioned earlier, Aydemir could not express Sultan Galiev's third point as bluntly as the latter did. He nevertheless showed that he fully subscribed to this idea, too, by contending that "the antagonism between economically advanced and backward countries comes before all other antagonisms. It is in fact the mother of all antagonisms."[32] Yet, this means that he in fact did believe in a destiny common both to the national emancipation movements and to the class struggle in Europe. This apparent inconsistency should not be read only as a maladroit and unconvincing attempt at demarcating himself from Communism that he and his colleagues were being constantly incriminated with.[33] It was also due to his probably difficult but defini-

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31. See above, Chapter 1, pp. 60-61, and Chapter 2, pp. 96-97.

32. Şevket Süreyya, "İktisadi Devletçilik," Kadro, 17(1934): 41; see also idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 35, "Kadro ve İzvestiya," Kadro, 6(1932): 46-47, and "Millî Kurtuluş Hareketleri," p. 41.

33. See below, pp. 241-243.

tive break with the Leninist approach to the colonial question enunciated in the Second Congress of the Comintern. As a matter of fact, when Aydemir denied this commonality of fates between the proletarian and colonial revolutions, he was denying the subordinate role that the Comintern had asssigned to the colonial revolutions vis-à-vis the proletariat's own struggle.[34]

Since he did not deny the concept of class struggle, and because the theory of colonial antagonism that he borrowed from people such as Roy, Sneevliet and Sultan Galiev was based on the appropriation of a surplus value, Aydemir was still in the historical materialist tradition of interpreting history. He had thus two important points of revision. On the one hand, Marxism, or scientific socialism was reduced to a doctrine derived only from the developments in the European society after the industrial revolution, and valid only within the boundaries of that society, and on the other hand, the antagonism between colonizer and colonized was assigned a more important role than the class struggle in Europe, which now depended on the success of the former. Yet, Aydemir did not stop there. Towards the end of the "Kadro period," he argued in a public

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34. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 56-63; see also [Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu)?], "Siirt Mebusu Mahmut Beyefendiye Açık Mektup," Kadro, 23(1933): 43. The style of this article, published anonymously with the signature of "Kadro," is definitely not Aydemir's. I attribute it to Yakup Kadri, for he seems to have taken the denunciatory criticisms of Mahmut (Soydan) Bey in Milliyet as very personal; see below, pp. 242-243, and his Zoraki Diplomat, p. 27.

lecture that he later published in Kadro, that modern society under the domination of capitalism rested on three, rather than two, contradictions: a class antagonism between the capitalists and the workers, a nationalistic antagonism between the capitalist and the colonial nations, and a second nationalistic antagonism among the capitalist countries themselves.[35]

Aydemir's third antagonism, the one among the capitalist countries themselves, poses a problem for it seems to have no validity whatsoever from a historical materialist perspective, and constitutes thus the seemingly weakest, yet original, aspect of his doctrine. It can be easily argued that many people who belonged to the historical materialist school during the 1920s and 30s had certainly seen this rivalry as a very important problem to reckon with, for it had only too recently caused a general conflagration, and was still portent of similar butcheries. Yet, it was definitely not seen as an antagonism which carried the seeds of a social revolution.

The reason why Aydemir raises this rivalry between capitalist countries to the status of a dialectical antagonism can be found in the development of his thought throughout the publication of Kadro. As a matter of fact, by August of 1932, when his book İnkılâp ve Kadro was published, Aydemir had mentioned only two antagonisms as characteristics of the modern society: the class antagonism in the capitalist countries and the antagonism between capitalist and colonial nations.[36]

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35. Idem, "Yeni Devletin İktisadî Fonksiyonları," p. 7.

36. Idem, "İnkılâp Bitti Mi?" pp. 7-8.

Interestingly, despite a short passage in İnkılâp ve Kadro which alluded to a much earlier birth of capitalism and colonialism,[37] neither his book nor his articles throughout the rest of 1932 did refer to the rise of capitalism and the antagonism between the colonialist and colonial nations as phenomena antedating the industrial revolution. In İnkılâp ve Kadro, for example, Aydemir contended that the colonial antagonism started with the industrial revolution that created the distinction between industrial and agricultural nations,[38] and alluded to "the savage exploitation of the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies, that [had been going] on uninterruptedly for the last one hundred and fifty years."[39] It would be possible, therefore, to say that between the beginning of 1933 and May 10, 1934, when he spoke of three antagonisms for the first time ever,[40] he reflected on the recent history of Europe at some length, devoted some time to the study of early capitalism, and most significantly, considered in greater depth the concept of class alliance in capitalist countries that was formulated during the Second Congress of the Comintern. Although it is not developed in an articulate manner in his writings, the conclusion he seems to have reached stands as a precursor to the Marxian theory of the relative autonomy of the state that was

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37. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 117.

38. Ibid., pp. 31-32.

39. Ibid., p. 36; emphasis added.

40. Idem, "Yeni Devletin İktisadî Fonksiyonları," p. 7.

going to be fully developed later in the century.

Aydemir wrote in 1963 that

> the state's function of executive agent of a class has weakened [in our time] ... The state has started to intervene in the economic life in the best interest of the society.[41]

Despite the fact that such a clear formulation of this idea is absent in his writings during the 1930s, Aydemir had all the sociological data and theoretical paraphernalia that would lead him in that direction. For example, although he did practically not dwell on the issue at all, it appears that Aydemir was aware of the fact that raison d'état, alongside private initiative, had been a significant factor in the mercantilist period of accumulation of capital, for he alluded in an article published in April 1933, to "popes and princes" among the initiators of "imperialism."[42] But the bulk of his sociological argument is drawn from the observation of the economic, social and political developments in Europe after the First World War and throughout the Great Depression years. First, there was the case of Germany. The expected socialist revolution in the immediate post-war years had not occurred, but German society was still in a turmoil. This was due, according

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[41]. Idem, "Marksizm, Memleketçi Sosyalizm ve İhtilal," Yön, 59(1963): 16.

[42]. See his "Emperyalizm Şahlanıyor Mu?" p. 5, and "Die soziale Bedeutung," pp. 500-501; cf. idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 117, and İsmail Hüsrev, "Garpte Sermaye Terakümünde Müstemlekelerin Rolü," Kadro, 32(1934): 17-21.

to Aydemir, to the loss of the colonies after a war of capitalistic rivalry.[43] Then, there was the Russian Revolution, the very existence of which posed a problem to Aydemir's idea of the impossibility of a proletarian revolution without an anti-colonialist revolution. There is no indication as to whether Aydemir was aware of the fact that the Bolshevik Revolution, although under the leadership of a proletarian party, was carried out mainly by peasant-soldiers. But the objective conditions which had made that revolution possible were again due to the rivalry between capitalist countries that had led the world into a general conflict, and this, Aydemir knew well. Finally, a series of measures such as the raising of the customs tariffs or bilateral clearing agreements, was the proof of the fact that capitalist countries were trying to cope with a global crisis of capitalism with nationalistic solutions.[44]

On the theoretical level, it is obvious that the acceptance of the Kemalist regime as national revolutionary, that is, a voluntarist regime which did not represent class interests, already constituted an approach leading to the idea of the relative autonomy of the state. But the concept of a revolu-

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43. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 36, "Benerji," pp. 36-37, and "Yeni Devletin İktisadî Fonksiyonları," p. 11; see also İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 20, where Aydemir sees the loss by the capitalist world market of 170 million of Russian consumers as one of the causes of the Great Depression.

44. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 16.

tionary state devoid of organic ties with a particular class was in fact none other than a corollary to the theory of class alliance in capitalist societies. In Aydemir's thought, recent developments in Europe had been amply supporting the validity of the class alliance theory, for the capitalist nations, in their quest for a solution to the Great Depression, had adopted not a primarily capitalistic but a nationalistic policy. This, in its turn, constituted the undisputable proof of the fact that, no matter what might be said of the nation itself, the nation-states were a living reality alongside classes, and their past and present antagonisms were significant to the evolution of human history.

At a first glance, Aydemir's socio-historical analysis may seem to be an anomalous amalgamation of historical materialism with nationalism. It is all too obvious that the concept of nation occupies a very important place in his doctrine. Even some references to the official Turkish Historical Thesis, which assigned some essential characteristics to the Turkish nation, can be seen in his writings around the time of the First Turkish Historical Congress (July 2-11, 1932).[45] Moreover, it was argued by one of Kadro's editorial board members

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[45]. For the Turkish Historical Thesis, see Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları. Medhal (Istanbul: Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti, 1931), the proceedings of the First Turkish Historical Congress, Türk Tarih Kongresi (Istanbul: Matbaacılık ve Neşriyat T.A.Ş., 1932); for traces of Turkish Historical Thesis in Aydemir's writings, see his "Plan Mefhumu Hakkında," Kadro, 5(1932): 5-12, "'Europacentrisme'in Tasfiyesi," ibid., 7(1932): 5-10, and İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 137-138.

that the journal had "substituted nation to class" in its approach to history.[46] A closer look into his writings with special care to place them in their proper historical context, however, shows that his definition of the nation is definitely a Marxist definition, that his historical materialist method has always had primacy over his nationalism, and that the concept of nation has been a secondary support to the concept of class in his writings both during and after his Kadro period in his revision of historical materialism. As a matter of fact, in his last and unfinished work that was published posthumously, Aydemir reiterated his belief in the validity of the concept of class struggle for the study of history, but added that nationalism had been a primary factor in the downfall of empires, the most significant event of contemporary history.[47]

In a chapter of İnkılâp ve Kadro, Aydemir defined the nation as the result of a historical process, and as such, a new manifestation in human history related to the industrial revolution.[48] He then went on to declare that this did not apply to Turkey, since Turkey had not thus far experienced the same material development as Europe, and defined the Turkish

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46. Interview with İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, August 15, 1989.

47. Aydemir, Kırmızı Mektuplar, pp. 86-88.

48. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 94-97; see also his Kırmızı Mektuplar, p. 87, where he claims that the concept of nation and the movement of nationalism are only 150 years old.

Revolution, and by extension all the liberation struggles in the colonial world, as the first step on the way to become a nation.[49] Hence, when Aydemir praised Ziya Gökalp as an important figure in Turkish intellectual history in an article published in Kadro, he did not have in mind Gökalp's risorgimento nationalism, but the latter's ideas on the organizational activities, especially in the realm of economy, that made a society a nation, that is to say, modern.[50] Moreover, Aydemir's future Turkish nation was not a nation in search of a place among that myriad of distinct cultures and polities who, in the idyllic world that Gökalp had borrowed from Johann Gottfried Herder, respected one another as equals, but remained apart as competitors. It was a nation devoid of antagonisms, in other words, a classless society, which would not contribute to the perpetuation of Aydemir's three antagonisms.[51] If one needs to look for European precursors of Aydemir's nationalism, Moses Hess, who is considered as one of the founding fathers of both Communism and Zionism, and especially Ber Borochov, the theoretician of Socialist Zionism, would be more appropriate figures.[52]

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49. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 99-109.

50. Idem, "Ziya Gökalp," Kadro, 2(1932): 29-40; see also İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 109.

51. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 36 and 39-40, "Plan Mefhumu Hakkında," p. 12, "Geri Teknik ve Sayin Sefaleti," Kadro, 6(1933): 9-12, and "Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey'e Cevap, 5: Demokrasi Bahsi ve Bir Küçük Hesaplaşma," Cumhuriyet, December 18, 1932; see also below, pp. 215-216 and 223-225.

52. For Moses Hess, see Sir Isaiah Berlin, "The Life and Opinions of Moses Hess," in Against the Current: Essays in the

Finally, the violence involved in the process of becoming a nation was not considered by Aydemir as an angry revolt or a war of nationalist aggression, but as part of a universal revolution which had to be accepted as legitimate as the struggles of the Tiers Etat in the past, and of the proletariat more recently, to vindicate their usurped sweat.[53] At this juncture, mention should be made, as a more rightful forerunner, of Mehmet İzzet who, like Gökalp, was a professor of sociology at the University of Istanbul during the first half of the 1920s. In a book he published shortly after the Kemalist victory, the latter had studied all the well-known territorial, ethnic, linguistic, etc. arguments of the nationalists, refuted them one after the other, and concluded that:

> the cause of the Turkish nation acquired an immense scope and significance ... ever since it concurred with the cause of the enslaved Islamic societies ... If we want to be proud of our national ideal and culture, we have to assign to it [sic] a universal (beşeri) merit.[54]

The universal revolution that was supposed to liberate these "enslaved" societies was the essence of Aydemir's theory of "national emancipation movements." The national emancipa-

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History of Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 213-251, and Shlomo Avineri, Moses Hess: Prophet of Communism and Zionism (New York: New York University Press, 1985); for Ber Borochov, see his selected essays edited by Moshe Cohen, Nationalism and the Class Struggle: A Marxian Approach to the Jewish Problem (New York: Young Poale Zion Alliance of America, 1937).

53. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 36.

54. Mehmet İzzet, Milliyet nazariyeleri ve milli hayat (Istanbul: Kanaat Kitaphane ve Matbaası, 1339/1923), p. 149.

tion movements were, first, a process through which colonies and semi-colonies achieved their full political and economic independence. This category did not include the national emancipation of a Czechoslovakia or Poland, for example. According to Aydemir, these countries had not been subjected to an exploitation of their economic resources. On the contrary, they had witnessed the growth of capitalist relations of production on their soil to the same level of sophistication with the powers that once ruled them.[55] By contrast, colonies like India and semi-colonies such as the Ottoman empire were characterized by foreign exploitation, by the disruption of their economic life and social structure due to this imperialist penetration, and by their subsequent technological and cultural backwardness.[56] Second, in order to be categorized among national emancipation movements, a movement of independence had to adopt a new developmental policy and not to reproduce the social system based on the exploitation of classes by classes and of nations by nations. In short, the national emancipation movements were revolutionary movements that aimed at transcending the capitalist society on a global level.

Aydemir referred to this new society, to the new world order he had in mind, in his writings very frequently. He nevertheless did not embark on defining it in detail for two

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[55]. Şevket Süreyya, "Sosyal Milliyetçiliğin Zaferi," Kadro, 35-36(1935): 9-10.

[56]. Idem, "Emperyalizm Şahlanıyor Mu?," p. 6, "Geri Teknik," pp. 9-12, and "İş Kanunu," pp. 10-12.

reasons. His first reason, that has already been mentioned above, was the nationalist atmosphere in which he developed his theory, and with which he had to conform somehow. His second, and perhaps more important reason is the fact that his theory was not based on some determinism that made the future into an inescapable fate for colonial societies. Ideological motivation in the form of anti-capitalism and voluntarist activism had a very important share in this utopian vision of the human society. Although he hoped that the Chinese, and especially the Indian movement for independence would, in the future, adopt a path similar to the Turkish Revolution, he made it clear that other paths were equally possible for those nations.[57] In other words, the national emancipation movements remained an option to be chosen on a national level. This is also the probable reason why İsmail Hüsrev Tökin thought that Kadro had replaced classes with nations in its interpretation of history. A third possible reason, related to the preceding one, might be that, since the Turkish Revolution was thus far the only material manifestation of the national emancipation movements, and his theory of national emancipations was a simple induction originating from the isolated national experience that the Turkish Revolution amounted to, Aydemir did not want to indulge extensively in futuristic speculation.

The Turkish Revolution was the starting point of Aydemir's

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[57]. Idem, "Sosyal Milliyetçiliğin Zaferi," p. 10; see also his "Değişen Hindistan," Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 27 & 30 and February 14, 1932.

theory as the first national emancipation movement, the path breaker for the rest of the colonial world.[58] As it has already been indicated, all the aspects of this transformational process, from the foundation of the republic to the reform of the alphabet, fascinated him. Two particular characteristics of the revolutionary regime, however, attracted his attention more than others, and it can be said that his thought is entirely based on them. These are the principles of revolutionarism and etatism that figured among the Six Arrows of the RPP.

As a revolutionary activist committed to radical social change, and already familiar with a major revolution, Aydemir was convinced long before the formulation of the Six Arrows that Turkey was experiencing a revolution. As a matter of fact, it can be clearly seen in Aydemir's writings that it is his observation of the political life of the country as opposed to achievements such as the proclamation of the republic, the abolition of the caliphate, the adoption of a Civil Code or western headgears among others, that convinced him of the revolutionary nature of the regime in Turkey. He knew perfectly well that the latter were none other than reforms that could have been carried out by any "bourgeois democratic" regime, and that the Unionists had actually taken significant initiatives in those directions as early as the World War years. He was able to see beyond those reforms, thanks to a

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58. Idem, "Plan Mefhumu Hakkında," p. 12.

great extent to his fresh experience of the Russian Revolution, that what was at work in Turkey was, in the first place, a revolution as a mode of politics.

In an article comparing Fascism, Communism and the national emancipation movements, Aydemir made explicit this observation on the nature of the revolution by asserting that "state structures look as quasi-identical in countries that undergo a revolution."[59] This revolutionary state was characterized by the absolute power of a minority who, guided by the enthusiasm in their belief in a principled and progressive movement, imposed their will on the rest of the society by use of sheer force.[60] Aydemir also recognized that periods of revolution were "periods of extremes," and maintained that there could not be much room for tolerance in a revolutionary regime.[61] For the revolutionary regime, individual subjects did count for nothing in comparison with its objectives.[62] The violence that the revolutionary regimes used against opponents was justified by Aydemir as a sign of their sensitivity with respect to the objectives of the revolution.[63] Aydemir also confessed that

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59. Idem, "Türk Nasyonalizmi (II)," p. 10; see also his remarks in ibid., pp. 12-13.

60. Idem, "İnkılâp Heyecanı (Antuziasm)," Kadro, 2(1932): 6, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 156, and "Bergsonizm," p. 46.

61. Idem, "Bir Ruh Fantazisi yahut Yerli Peygamber," Kadro, 1(1932): 31, and "Proğramlı Devletçilik," ibid., 34(1934): 6.

62. Idem, "Bir Ruh Fantazisi," pp. 36-37, and "Halk Evleri," Kadro, 3(1932): 35.

63. Idem, "Darülfünun, İnkılâp Hassasiyeti ve Cavit Bey İktisatçılığı," Kadro, 14(1933): 10.

this violence was not only a manifestation of self-defense, but a necessary source of nourishment for revolutions:

> The greatest danger for a revolution arises when its enemies disappear. It can even be maintained that, in order to survive and reach their objectives, revolutions are compelled to invent enemies when there is none.[64]

These cynical assertions of Aydemir indicate, above all, that he had ceased to be the romantic revolutionary he used to be some years ago. He still remained a visionary due to the utopian dimension of his thought, but he did not call a political process a revolution in function of its objectives. A political process was, or was not, a revolution, depending first and foremost on its progression. Of course, the objectives of a revolution ultimately made it into a legitimate and desirable development or not; but these objectives were not part of the definition of the revolution according to Aydemir. This is the reason why he kept referring to the national emancipation movements (i.e. the Turkish Revolution), together with the Bolshevik Revolution and the Fascist takeover in Italy, under the appellation of "post-war revolutions."[65]

Finally, Aydemir saw the developments of the mid-1920s and the subsequent promulgation of the Law on the Maintenance of Public Order as only the beginning of the revolutionary process

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64. [Idem], "Kadro," Kadro, 14(1933): 4.

65. [Idem], "Kadro," Kadro, 6(1932): 3, "Falih Rıfkı ve Son Eseri," ibid., 9(1932): 46, and İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 152.

that was still continuing in Turkey. When he argued that

> all the social layers whose interests were threatened in the face of the progression of the Revolution, from the extreme right of the reaction, composed of sheikhs, notables, opportunistic collaborationists with foreign capital, to its most enlightened elements, got mobilized in a variety of ways. A wild wind of counter-revolution, that used all available means from armed rebellions to coups d'état and conspiracies, started to blow,[66]

he was referring to a period when the revolution as national emancipation movement had only very superficially begun. By the time the above-mentioned law was passed, the nature of the young Turkish state was still determined by the wishes of the Economic Congress of Izmir, the stipulations of the Lausanne Treaty, and the legal framework provided by the Constitution of 1924. Since then, however, there had been many significant changes in the country's political and economic makeup. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's dinner table had practically become the most important policy-making office of the regime, the RPP candidates to the GNA were now hand-picked by a triumvirate composed of the president of the republic, the prime minister, and the secretary general of the party, the Republic was made into a de facto single-party regime, societies and associations of all sorts were either suppressed or taken over by the party, the party itself had adopted policy principles such as etatism that contradicted the liberal spirit of the Constitution, and

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66. Idem, "Don Kişot'un Yeldeğirmenleriyle Muharebesine, Kürsü Politikacılığına ve Cavit Bey İktisatçılığına Dair," Kadro, 17(1933): 15.

an important part of the industrial and trade bourgeoisie was alienated to the regime.

Aydemir was naturally not able to bluntly mention these developments as tangible proof of the fact that the model revolutionary regime which he defined in his articles was a living reality in Turkey. Nor did he ever use the term dictatorship to name generically the various aspects of revolutionary politics in practice, despite the fact that he did not have any inhibition to use the same term when referring to the class dictatorship of the proletariat. All he could do was to allude to a "revolutionary order" that prevailed in the country, and to mention succintly that that "order" was not a democracy.[67] He also dwelled in two articles, both published in the last issue of Kadro, on the significance of the ideological literature that had developed in Turkey since 1924, reminding thus his readership that they should not waste their time in trying to define the Turkish regime through a literal reading of the Constitution.[68] In addition to these, a much more oblique allusion to the Turkish electoral system, the composition of the Assembly, and the rather peculiar application of the principle of popular sovereignty, can be found in one of his articles commenting on Fascism, Communism and Turkish national emancipation movement, in the form of a comparison

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[67]. See above, p. 192, and his İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 81-88.

[68]. Idem, "Kadro (1935)," p. 6, and "Sosyal Milliyetçiliğin Zaferi," p. 11.

between the GNA and the French Assemblée Nationale.[69]

This dictatorial rule was legitimized by Aydemir through a relatively elaborate description of the society that the revolutionary regime was supposed to aim at achieving. The complete picture thus obtained was also the substance that made the Turkish Revolution into the first and epoch-making example of the national emancipation movements. This distant end result consisted of a politically independent, economically self-sufficient, technologically advanced, and classless society that was free of all antagonisms.[70] Thus, a national liberation movement was first a successful revolt against the political dependency of agricultural nations on the industrialized nations, something that Turkey had already accomplished. But, although a necessary first step in the national emancipation movements, this revolt did not determine the latter. As it has been stated earlier, the crucial role in the unfolding of the national emancipation movements belonged to the particular nature of the subsequent process of economic development that the new nation-state embarked on.

For Aydemir, the first prerequisite for economic development in a national emancipation movement was autarky.[71] Due to

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[69]. Idem, "Beynelmilel Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi, III: Türk Nasyonalizmi (I)," Kadro, 20(1933): 7-8.

[70]. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 44-45 and 78, "Ziya Gökalp," p. 36, and "Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey'e Cevap, 5."

[71]. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 17.

her semi-colonial past, Turkey did not have a developed and rationally integrated national economy. In Aydemir's mind, this integrated national economy could be built "only on the basis, and around the framework, of a national industry."[72] Yet, industrialization for an underdeveloped country such as Turkey depended in its turn on a series of protective measures against the competitive products of the industrialized nations. Consequently, a strong barrier of customs tariffs was to be the first step on the way to build a national economy.[73]

However, this autarky that Aydemir saw as an absolute necessity for economic development, was not a complete seclusion. In other words, the national industry that was yet to be constructed, was not meant to produce a substitute for every single item that the nation in question had been thus far importing.[74] The customs bariers were simply meant to sustain national self-sufficiency in vital goods, and to rationalize the production of commodities of which the raw materials were among the natural resources of the country. Thanks to this economic policy of the national emancipation movements, not only would industry be more evenly spread on the globe, but also various industrial activities would be more rationally distributed among nations, who would henceforth stop producing at random all sorts of consumer goods, and concentrate on their

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72. Ibid., p. 120.

73. Ibid., pp. 124-128.

74. Ibid., pp. 127-128.

own specific products.[75] A natural consequence of this redistribution of industrial activity on the globe would be a certain industrial regression in Europe, of which the ongoing world economic crisis was an early indicator. This was of course a good sign for Aydemir, not only because it led to a more just world order, but also because it created further opportunities for the underdeveloped nations.[76] He alluded in one of his articles at the policy of exporting technology, recently adopted by some European nations, as the "emigration of the machines," and urged the Turkish government to adopt flexible measures of exception in their foreign trade policy that would enable the country to import the much needed technology for remarkably low prices.[77]

Thus, Aydemir's new world order did not consist of a set of capitalist nation-states who would have learnt to live together in harmony and on more modest means. Following the above-mentioned redistribution of economic activities in the world, the structure of those nations would also change. Although he vaguely referred to some possible large-scale social movements in the future of industrialized European nations,[78] for reasons

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75. Ibid., pp. 17, 24 and 82.

76. Ibid., pp. 14-15 and 17-18; see also idem, "Tabiata Tehakküm," Kadro, 3(1932): 19-24, and "1789 İhtilâlinin Mezarı Başında, II: Mahreç Yok!... II n'y a pas de débouché!" ibid., 33(1934): 10.

77. Idem, "Tabiata Tehakküm," pp. 23-24 , and "Makinaların Muhacereti," Kadro, 23(1933): 6-11.

78. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 17-18 and 39.

of self-imposed censorship mentioned earlier, he did not comment on the proletarian revolutions he expected in those countries. But he did give a fairly clear picture of the future society in the lands of national emancipation movements. According to Aydemir, the newly emancipated nations such as Turkey could and should not evolve in the direction of reproducing the antagonisms of the capitalist society that they had fought against. Accordingly, the national capital that would be accumulated as a result of the measures of autarky, had to be seized and used in a way not to create class and colonial antagonisms. The only way to achieve this was the adoption of a rigorous policy of etatism, yet another aspect of the Turkish Revolution, and one that constituted the second pillar of Aydemir's thought.[79]

For Aydemir, the disruption of national economies under colonialist pressures had an almost auspicious consesequence in countries like Turkey: capitalist relations of production and a strong capitalist class had not appeared.[80] The revolutionary state was now supposed to fill this vacuum, and lead the nation on the path toward a socially harmonious economic development. However, Aydemir took special care to emphasize that this new social harmony did not consist of a containment of class antagonisms on behalf of some individual interests.[81] For this

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79. Ibid., pp. 54-55 and 108-109.

80. Ibid., p. 52; see also idem, "Otokritik," Hakimiyeti Milliye, January 24, 1932.

81. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 112.

reason, he did not agree with the official definition of etatism as it appeared in the RPP Program which read:

> Accepting the individual labor and activities as fundamental, we nevertheless adhere to the principle of involving the state in matters relative to the general and best interest of the nation, particularly in the economic sphere, in order to lead the nation to welfare and the country to prosperity in the shortest possible time.[82]

For him, etatism consisted of a much wider, regulatory role of the state in the building and functioning of the national economy. Since the preamble of the RPP Program stated that its principles "were valid not for only a few years, but for the future as well,"[83] it was certainly not a transitory policy, as many saw it even after the RPP Congress of May 1931. It did not aim simply to hasten the process of economic development. On the contrary, etatism was a determinant characteristic of the Turkish Revolution, and it actually guaranteed the latter's success.[84] Although he seemed to acknowledge in a passage of <u>İnkılâp ve Kadro</u> that profitable businesses in agriculture, trade and industry would continue to function as before,[85] what he had in mind was much more than a mere reversal of the public and private sectors' roles as they appeared in the RPP Program.

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82. <u>C. H. F. Programı</u>, p. 31.

83. Ibid., p. 29.

84. [Şevket Süreyya], "Kadro," <u>Kadro</u>, 21(1933): 3-4, "Yeni Devletin İktisadi Fonksiyonları," p. 11, and "Proğramlı Devletçilik," pp. 8 and 10-11.

85. <u>Idem</u>, <u>İnkılâp ve Kadro</u>, 1st edn., p. 112.

In fact, Aydemir's etatism tended to be a quasi-total negation of private initiative. Basing his argument on the actual and rather large-scale presence of the Turkish state in practically all the branches of the country's economy, and the reason why this was an absolute necessity, he surmised that that presence might expand ad infinitum in the future:

> At this stage, it would be inappropriate to formulate a definitive opinion on the boundaries of the economic activities of the state. But we are convinced that these boundaries will constantly expand, and that the state, as the instrument of a national economic mobilization that keeps perfecting itself, has the utmost capacity to sustain such an expansion.[86]

Yet, Aydemir could dwell on this thorny issue only in a few articles throughout the publication of Kadro, as the journal had been labeled by many as crypto-communist.[87] One of his targets was the sugar refineries, that were reorganized under the umbrella of a private company launched in 1925 with the aim of attaining national self-sufficiency in this vital good. In three articles, he indicted the privileged company with low productivity due to mismanagement and extreme profit-seeking, to finally ask for the nationalization of the industry.[88] Another of his targets was the tobacco trade that had suffered

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86. Ibid, p. 119; the emphasis is Aydemir's.

87. See below, pp. 241-243.

88. Idem, "Şeker İstiklali ve 160.000 Ton Türk Şekeri," Kadro, 11(1932): 5-16, "Milli İktisat Planı ve Şeker İstiklali," ibid., 24(1933): 5-16, and "Şeker Mütehassısının Raporu Ne İçin Eksiktir?" ibid., 30(1933): 41-48. See also the propaganda caption in Kadro, 21(1933): 50.

relative losses in recent years. In a short article packed with statistics, Aydemir contended that these losses were not the result of the world economic crisis, but the outcome of irrational exploitation, and again asked for radical state intervention in the field.[89]

Given the pivotal importance of economy in Aydemır's thought, the conspicuous absence in his writings of a significant commentary on the concept of planned economy and the first five-year plan elaborated in 1933, may seem strange. As a matter of fact, there is no reference at all to planned economy in his İnkılâp ve Kadro, and only one of his articles published in Kadro mentions the concept with some substance.[90] In addition to the fact that purely economic matters were the responsibility of Vedat Nedim Tör, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin and M. Şevki Yazman among Kadro writers, Aydemir had two more reasons for this silence. First of all, the policy of planned economy was already adopted by the regime even before Aydemir and his friends started to publish their journal. Thanks to colleagues close to the top leadership of the regime, he knew that the policy which had started in the spring of 1930 with an "economic program," would end with the securing of the Soviet aid for the first five-year plan for industrial development during İsmet Pasha's visit to the Soviet Union in the spring of

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89. Idem, "Türk Tütüncülüğü ve İktisadi Devletçilik," Kadro, 2(1932): 41-45; see also idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 14.

90. "Plan Mefhumu Hakkında," loc. cit.

1932 (April 25 - May 10). Moreover, in fashion with the regime's habitual manner of introducing its new policies to the public, Falih Rıfkı (Atay), the senior editor of the official Hakimiyeti Milliye, praised economic planning for industrial development and its implementation in the Soviet Union in a series of articles that were shortly afterwards made into two pamphlets.[91]

Aydemir's second reason for his relative silence over economic planning was the idea that, once etatism was adopted as a determinant characteristic of the regime, planning the economy would be reduced to a mere policy in determining the priorities. In other words, when the economy was under state control, the economic plan was nothing more than an item of governmental program. The only article in which Aydemir wrote at length on the "concept of plan" was thus devoted to the explanation and defense of the new and different nature of planning in Turkey. He brought to the attention of his readers the fact that planned economy in Europe was either a means of coping with a crisis due to a particular class antagonism as in the West, or an attempt at transcending that class antagonism as in the Soviet Union. But for such national emancipation movements as the Turkish Revolution, planned economy was a policy for the creation of a new type of society devoid of that

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91. See Falih Rıfkı, Yeni Rusya (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1931), and Moskova - Roma, op. cit. For Aydemir's very favorable comments on İsmet Pasha's visit to the Soviet Union and on Falih Rıfkı's second book, see his "Kadro [6(1932)]" and "Falih Rıfkı ve Son Eseri," respectively.

class antagonism.[92]

At a first glance, this approach to class analysis might lead the observer to think that in Aydemir's thought, absence of classes proper to the capitalist mode of production meant absence of classes altogether. As it has been mentioned earlier, however, Aydemir applied historical materialism and class analysis to all societies and for all times. His problem was again an issue of self-imposed censorship, for he had to conform with the dogma posited by the regime in the RPP Program which read:

> It is one of our fundamental principles to consider the people of the Republic of Turkey not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professional groups according to the division of labor for purposes of individual and social livelihood.
>
> A) Farmers, B) Craftsmen and shopkeepers, C) Unskilled and skilled workers, Ç) People of the liberal professions, D) Industrialists, large land owners and big businessmen, are the major components of the Turkish community. The labor of each of these are essential to the livelihood and happiness of the others and of the wider community. The targets that our Party is aiming at with this principle are the achievement of social orderliness and solidarity instead of class struggle, and the establishment of a harmony between interests so that they will not contradict each other. Individual interest depends on one's talent and working ability [alone].[93]

In fact, Aydemir thought that Turkish society still had a pre-capitalist class structure, characterized by quasi-feudal relations of production, but could not say it. This is the

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92. Şevket Süreyya, "Plan Mefhumu Hakkında," p. 12.

93. C. H. F. Programı, p. 32.

reason why he alluded at the absence of classes "in the meaning that applies to industrialized countries," in colonized nations.[94] This belief and the difficulty to express it are suggestively revealed in a passage of İnkılâp ve Kadro that attracted the attention to the absolute necessity of "revolutionizing the village," that is to say, the rural society.[95] However, as the specific problems of Turkish rural economy were accepted as the specialty of İsmail Hüsrev Tökin and Vedat Nedim Tör in Kadro, Aydemir did not dwell much on the subject.[96] But, he worked in the Ministry of Education for that end, and in a more active manner. He had taken part in 1932 in the formation of a "Commission of Village Affairs" in that ministry. Although it was soon discontinued, probably sometime during 1934, the commission managed to organize a course in 1933 for elementary school teachers working in rural areas. Aydemir joined the teaching staff with two series of lectures on the technical and organizational problems of rural

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94. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 52; see also his "Otokritik," loc. cit.

95. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 9-10.

96. İsmail Hüsrev Tökin and Vedat Nedim Tör published a total of more than twenty articles betweeen themselves in Kadro on the problems of Turkish agricultural sector alone. Most of Tökin's articles were later made into a book that appeared among Kadro publications: Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı (Istanbul: Matbaacılık ve Neşriyat T.A.Ş., 1934). It must be emphasized here that Tökin did not refrain from naming the social structure in the rural sector as feudal in his writings; for a sampling of his writings, see İsmail Hüsrev, "Köy İktisadiyatında Teknik İnkılap," Kadro, 2(1932): 15-21, and "Türkiye'de Toprak Ağalığı," ibid., 9(1932): 23-29.

economy.[97] Later in the same year, his lecture notes were published by the Ministry of Education in the form of two pamphlets that had the title "The [Role of the] Village Teacher in the Economic Struggle."[98]

Aydemir's etatism was not limited to economic matters alone. In fact, by a series of suggestions in his numerous articles, he tried to promote a kind of all-embracing etatism, a revolutionary dictatorship, under the generic title of "permanent revolution," whereby he was actually combining the RPP principles of revolutionarism and etatism.[99] This all-powerful state needed, for example, a single, "revolutionary press" that Aydemir described in the following terms:

> In a country which undertook a revolution and tied its fate to the progression of that revolution, the press is an integral part of the general staff of the revolution, and constitutes a centralized organ in the struggle for public education. The abuse of this organ by some wandering souls has a negative effect on the order and success of the revolution. The revolution can be victorious only when all the forces and instruments that contribute to its victory are directed toward determined targets under a certain order.[100]

Similarly, Aydemir welcomed the "university reform" that struck

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97. See Şevket Süreyya, İktisat Mücadelesinde Köy Muallimi, Vol. I, p. 6; the discontinuation of the commission is reported in idem, "Bir İlk Eser: Türkiye Köy İktisadiyatı," Kadro, 34(1934): 37.

98. See above, p. 199, note 22.

99. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st ed., p. 81.

100. Ibid., p. 10; see also [idem], "Kadro," Kadro, 9(1932): 5, and "Proğramlı Devletçilik," pp. 8-11.

the University of Istanbul in 1933, by correctly interpreting it as a purge in an institution that did not conform with the principles of the Turkish Revolution.[101] In the same vein, he argued for state control of all the mass media, including the radio stations and the movie industry,[102] to finally suggest that this trend of Turkish etatism should lead the way to some new legislative activity. When, in an article he wrote on the occasion of a series of conferences given at the Ankara Law School, he formulated a desire for a "revolutionary law" to be developed by the new school, Aydemir was certainly expecting some constitutional amendments that would incorporate the significant developments of the last few years into the constitutional text.[103] He later expressed this idea somewhat more explicitly in another article, in which he wished the principles of Turkish etatism to be "compiled [in the form of a book] and [made] free from attacks (müdevven ve gayri kabili taarruz)" by the next party congress.[104]

Following the example of the University of Istanbul, Aydemir demanded, albeit in a circumlocuted style, for new purges, as he progressively adopted a role of spokesman of the Revolu-

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101. Idem, "İnkilâp Kürsülerinde, Inkilâp İlmileşmelidir," Kadro, 28(1934): 5, and "Darülfünun," pp. 6-11.

102. Idem, "İçtimaî Zihniyet," Kadro, 31(1934): 42.

103. Idem, "İnkılâp Hukuku," Kadro, 26(1934): 5-10.

104. Idem, "Proğramlı Devletçilik," p. 6; for the circumstances that led Aydemir to ask for constitutional amendments, see below, pp. 245-249.

tion. Parallel to this sycophantic tendency which, ironically, aimed at narrowing the political tolerance of the regime that Aydemir was to praise decades later, he also shifted towards flattering the leaders of the regime, especially Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in an opportunistic manner. While describing those whom he considered as non-revolutionary elements inside the regime, Aydemir paraphrased parts of a speech that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had given in Samsun in 1924, in which the latter had condemned the attempts at forming a new political party:

> The basic principle of [the RPP] is to strive to achieve true salvation and prosperity for the country and the nation. In my opinion, this is the road that leads to the objective, and it is definite. It consists of strengthening and consolidating the Republic, and of ensuring that the nation advances with determination and success on the road to civilization and modernization through mental and social revolution. Those who are engaged in this definite but doubtlessly long and demanding road might not advance from the beginning to the end at the same time, with the same pace and the same degree of fatigue. Thus, they might consider different ideas and measures. But, it is necessary that they do not deviate from the road, turn their eyes away from the accepted target, and betray the principal objective.[105]

Aydemir used this passage in İnkılâp ve Kadro in the following terms:

> These people are those who joined the caravan [later]... [T]hey soon got tired on the road... The road they had taken revealed to be too much of a challenge for their narrow visions.[106]

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105. Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II, p. 193.

106. Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 41. Some thirty years later, Aydemir gave a slightly different version of his paraphrase as Mustafa Kemal's words taken from Nutuk; see his Tek Adam, Vol. III, p. 312.

Later in 1934, he also concluded an article that suggested the purge of the opponents of the principle of etatism as a permanent policy, with a reference to a passage at the beginning of Nutuk, where Mustafa Kemal Pasha bitterly criticized his former companions in arms, but this time in the form of an exact quotation with a proper footnote:

> Some of the people, with whom we had engaged together in the path of national struggle, started to resist me and went over to the opposition throughout the evolution of the nation's political life until the proclamation of the Republic and the enforcement of republican laws, as they reached the limits of their intellectual and mental capacities.[107]

Aydemir believed that, apart from a small minority of individuals among the leaders of the regime, everybody and everything carried the potential threat of pulling the Turkish Revolution off target.[108] In theory, there was nothing wrong in this state of things, since revolutions were, by Aydemir's definition, the business of small minorities. But the revolutionary minority in Turkey disregarded this essential characteristic of revolutions by keeping the non-revolutionary elements in important positions inside the regime. The openness of the regime to the point of tolerating in its bosom discussions and differences of interpretation on its basic principles was a pathological peculiarity of the Turkish Revolution.[109]

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107. Idem, "Proğramlı Devletçilik," pp. 12-13; the quotation is from Atatürk, Nutuk, Vol. I, p. 14.

108. Idem, "İnkılâp Kürsülerinde," p. 13.

109. Idem, "Proğramlı Devletçilik," p. 6.

According to Aydemir,

> the will and the interests of the revolution [had to be] represented by the will of a small but conscious vanguard, a small but advanced and disciplined group of cadre (kadro), who understand the revolution and carry it forward.[110]

This small group of cadre, who had understood what the Turkish Revolution was about, were of course none other than the members of the Kadro editorial board and the top leadership of the regime sympathetic to the journal. But Kadro writers did not belong to the cadre only because they contributed to Kadro. They were first of all functionaries serving the revolutionary state, that is to say, civil servants who concurred with the ideas disseminated by Kadro. In other words, they were those "cadre of young and revolutionary intellectuals, who had assumed a role of guide in national matters," and whose rise was proudly announced by Aydemir.[111] Since these cadre were part of the etatist state, they had nothing in common with their European counterparts, who were in fact the intellectual and technocratic executives of a social class:

> [T]he intellectuals of the new Turkish society are not clerks who, under the orders of a class who possesses the technological forces, work for the interests of that class. To the contrary, they constitute the cadre of technocrats and administrators who work for the best interests of the

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110. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., pp. 7 and 150.

111. Ibid., p. 64.

society that monopolizes all high technology.[112]

Aydemir's society which monopolized the ownership of the means of production was a politically passive society. Its individual elements did not possess democratic rights, for, according to Aydemir,

> [the aim] was not to give the individual a "freedom" that almost isolated him from the society, ... but "a job and a duty" within a "free nation."[113]

This idea of the Jacobin Aydemir was derived to a great extent from both his past experience as a nationalist militant and his acquaintance with the communist conception of the party as the vanguard of a class that did not have a full class consciousness. But in theoretical terms, it was based on the premise that democracy was the result of class alliance at work in the industrialized nations. Aydemir believed that political democracy in those societies was a product of capitalism, that it was possible only in so far as it rested on the exploitation of the colonies, where people were denied the democratic rights, and argued that

> Referring to the "rights of the individual" in a colonialist country that lives off of the surplus extracted from the colonies would be an insolent mockery of the reality.[114]

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112. Ibid., pp. 64-66.

113. Ibid., p. 87.

114. Ibid., p. 88.

Thus, although political democracy constituted a "reasonable social system" at the stage of social development where industrialized nations stood, the realities of the peoples at the stage of national emancipation could not be rationalized within the dichotomy of democracy versus anti-democracy. Similarly, the dictatorship of the cadre who shoulder the national emancipation movements had nothing in common with the anti-democratic regimes that had proliferated in Europe after the First World War, under circumstances that made class alliance impossible.[115]

Aydemir called this system of collective ownership of the means of production, that was expanded to practically all social insitutions, and was supervised by a voluntarist elite who knew what was best for the people, social nationalism (cemiyetçi or sosyal milliyetçilik and sosyal nasyonalizm).[116] His choice of this particular construct as the name of his doctrine is certainly the result of an attempt to reconcile his twin commitments of the preceding two decades: nationalism and social revolution. The reason why his ideology was not named "national socialism" can be easily guessed. First of all, Aydemir had to conceal his socialism, or he rather had to have his socialism look like something else. Moreover, despite his

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115. Ibid., pp. 81-91, and idem, "İçtimai Zihniyet," p. 42.

116. Idem, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 94, "Kadro (1935)," p. 5, "Sosyal Milliyetçiliğin Zaferi," pp. 8-9, and "Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey'e Cevap, 7: Millet Nedir ve Sosyal Nasyonalizm," Cumhuriyet, December 22, 1932.

all too radical conviction that the Nazis had nothing to do with Socialism, he nevertheless wanted to demarcate himself from National Socialism in name too, because he lived in an atmosphere where nationalism did not tolerate even allusions to some similarity between the Turkish regime and others [p. 401]. Thus, "nationalism" had to be the name of the ideology, and "socialist," diluted to "social," its modifier. Years later, he would have the same recourse to terminological subtilty, this time for the sake of socialist universalism, and refer to his ideology he tended to see applied in Third World countries, and notably in Nasser's Egypt, as memleketçi sosyalizm, "patriotic socialism."[117]

Kadro announced in its October 1934 issue that its publication would be "temporarily suspended" after its forthcoming issue, because its franchise holder, Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), was appointed an ambassador and had left the country.[118] In fact, although an additional issue appeared in January 1935, the suspension was definitive. There was no official ban on the journal, but its demise could not be appealed. The decision had originated from the presidential mansion, and implemented in the classical manner in which individuals held in high esteem by Mustafa Kemal Pasha were

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117. For a few examples, see idem, "Komünizm İle Mücadele," Yön, 38(1962): 8, "Memleketçi Sosyalizmin İlkeleri," ibid., 58(1963): 16, "Sosyalizm ve Kapitalizm," p. 20, and "Marksizm, Memleketçi Sosyalizm ve İhtilal," p. 16.

118. Kadro, 34(1934): 2.

"punished." Yakup Kadri was appointed ambassador to Tirana, following the example of Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver), the former president of the Turkish Hearths, appointed ambassador to Bucharest after the dissolution of his society.[119]

It has been already stated that both Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pashas had welcomed the publication of Kadro, and taken a subscription.[120] This tacit support of the strong men of the regime lasted almost until the end, culminating in the October 1933 issue of the journal which celebrated the 10th anniversary of the Republic. Mustafa Kemal Pasha had sent a message to the journal, wishing it success in its acknowledged task of "serving the establishment and development of the ideology proper to the Turkish nation," and İsmet Pasha had given, upon a request by Yakup Kadri, a short article on the etatist character of the RPP.[121] There is no reason to believe that İsmet Pasha's support has ever come to an end. Not only did the journal constitute an excellent proxy in his protracted war against the liberal wing of the party, but also Yakup Kadri's memoirs indicate that he had not had a voice in the ultimate decision to suppress it.[122] Yet, for a variety of reasons,

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119. Karaosmanoğlu, Zoraki Diplomat, pp. 5-17; for Hamdullah Suphi's case, see Baydar, p. 156.

120. See above, p. 199.

121. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's short message is in Kadro, 22(1933): 3; for the premier's article, see Başvekil İsmet, "Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfı," ibid., pp. 4-6; for Yakup Kadri's request, see Karaosmanoğlu, Politikada 45 Yıl, p. 110.

122. Karaosmanoğlu, Zoraki Diplomat, pp. 6 and 11-13.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha had gradually grown displeased with the publication, and he had the final verdict on the issue.

First of all, Kadro had been a thorn on the side of the RPP and the secretary general of the party, Recep (Peker), from its inception. Not only was it an open challenge to the party's will to control everything in Turkish society, but it also constituted a breach in the unity of the party itself. Adding insult to injury, the very name of the publication suggested that only its sympathizers were the true cadre of the regime, a role that Recep Bey had assigned to himself, and was very jealous of. For these reasons, he opposed the publication of the journal from the very beginning, and after being overruled by Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pashas, did his best to discredit it in the eyes of the president of the republic.[123] After February 1933, he had an additional reason to believe that Kadro was unnecessary, for he started to publish a new journal, Ülkü, "The Ideal," as the organ of the People's Houses, with practically the same motivation as Kadro.[124]

Second, it appears that the regime had always remained suspicious of Kadro writers because of their record as former members or sympathizers of the Communist Party of Turkey, with the exception of Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and M. Şevki Yazman. The secret police seems to have kept them under surveillance.

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123. Ibid., pp. 5-7 and 26-27, and idem, Politikada 45 Yıl, pp. 108-109.

124. For the profession of purpose of the new journal, see Recep, "Ülkü Niçin Çıkıyor," Ülkü, I, 1(1933): 1-2.

According to Yakup Kadri, his good friend Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of the Interior, once told him that he was aware of the latest of Kadro's fortnightly editorial board meetings, when they saw each other at the presidential mansion later on the same day.[125] However, on an occasion when Kadro found itself under serious charges of Communism, Mustafa Kemal Pasha intervened in favor of the journal, to the point of breaking the political career of the then RPP deputy for Siirt, Mahmut (Soydan).

Although it is not clear whether he wanted to capitalize on the suspicions of the regime or not, Mahmut Bey had been the only critique of Kadro to bring against it unmitigated charges of Communism. He did this in the Istanbul daily Milliyet, which was funded by a group who had been one of the direct targets of Kadro, namely, the Business Bank circles. Following İsmet Pasha's article that appeared in the October 1933 issue of Kadro, Mahmut Bey published an editorial in Milliyet and praised the premier for having silenced the "irresponsible elements" who presented RPP's etatism as identical with communist principles. These elements, whom Mahmut Bey never mentioned by their names, had in mind an "absolute etatism" that left no breathing space to private initiative, and their ideas were taken from the congress proceedings and decisions, and the political practices, of the Communist Party.[126] Kadro answered

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125. Interview with Murat Belge, August 1, 1981.

126. Siirt Mebusu Mahmut, "Başvekilin Makalesi: Fırkamızın Devletçilik Vasfı," Milliyet, November 5, 1933.

back this insidious charge with an anonymous article, penned in all likelihood by Yakup Kadri, and asked Mahmut Bey to produce the communist documents that constituted their alleged source.[127] Mahmut Bey announced in a second article that he accepted the challenge, and that he would soon divulge those documents.[128] Upon Mustafa Kemal Pasha's intervention, however, this never happened, and Mahmut Bey took a long leave in the form of a travel in western Europe for "medical treatment."[129]

Finally, and more important than the preceding reasons, there is the fact that Kadro's ultra-Jacobinism had gradually become an excuse for those who opposed various policies of the regime to broach their grievances. Two prominent liberals, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, the former RPP and Free Party deputy, and Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), the former pro-Unionist journalist and share-holder of the National Credit Bank, took the lead in this direction.

Although he first exhibited some perplexion vis-à-vis the ideas of Aydemir, Ahmet Ağaoğlu has ultimately been the commentator who came closest to understanding him. Ağaoğlu published two series of articles in Cumhuriyet in November-

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127. See [Yakup Kadri Karosmanoğlu], "Siirt Mebusu," p. 44; see also above, p. 206, note 34.

128. Siirt Mebusu Mahmut, "Vicdani Bir Vazife," Milliyet, December 30, 1933.

129. Karaosmanoğlu, Zoraki Diplomat, pp. 27-28, and Alemdar, p. 32.

December 1932 and January 1933. Both series, which consisted of a defense of liberal capitalism against the Kemalist regime, and contained misreadings as well as pertinent critiques of Aydemir's ideas, were made into a book later in 1933 with the same title as the first series, Devlet ve Fert, "The State and the Individual."[130] In these articles, Ağaoğlu first exposed Aydemir's leaning toward totalitarianism, and expressed his consternation with the latter's monopolization of speech in the name of the Turkish Revolution.[131] He also contended that Aydemir and his journal were the representatives in Turkey of the anti-liberal currents that had developed in Europe after the war and had curtailed individual rights wherever they seized power, and did not fail to define the category Kadro belonged to as a nationalist version of historical materialism.[132] However, he made a grave mistake by reading in reverse the causal relation that Aydemir saw between the political developments of the post-war era and the world economic crisis.[133]

But Ağaoğlu was poignant in his defense of individualistic

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130. Ağaoğlu Ahmet, Devlet ve Fert (Istanbul: Sanayiinefise Matbaası, 1933). Ağaoğlu's 25 articles were published in Cumhuriyet between November 13 and December 1, 1932, as Devlet ve Fert, between January 1 and 10, 1933, as Cevaba Cevap, "Reply to the Reply," and on February 5, 1933, as Son Söz, "A Final Word."

131. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Devlet ve Fert, pp. 10-11, 73, and 116.

132. Ibid., pp. 6, 10-11, and 91.

133. Ibid., p. 13.

liberalism. He convincingly argued that human society progressed thanks to the creative genius of the individual, and saw in the growing importance of the state a rather recent historical development necessitated by the complexity of interest conflicts in modern nations.[134] He then moved on to asserting that without those individual freedoms, it would be impossible to expect economic growth, and claimed in the perfect social-Darwinist fashion that Aydemir's colonized nations had been conquered by the liberal nations of Europe because they had failed to achieve economic development due to their despotic political systems.[135] According to Ağaoğlu, the Kadro group wanted to engage in the same historical dead end because

> they want[ed] to wipe out the individual and the nation, and to give all the means of production and the accumulation of capital to that mystical institution, which they call "the state," and which they place outside and above the nation.[136]

For Ağaoğlu, Aydemir and Kadro had not understood the true meaning of the Turkish Revolution. The Revolution was carried out against a tyrannical rule that had enslaved the Turkish society, inhibited its creativity, and, as a consequence, turned it into an easy prey for imperialist powers. The aim of the radical social reforms that had followed the political revolution was the building of a free society. But, the Kadro

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134. Ibid., pp. 22-46.

135. Ibid., pp. 26-29, and 110-112.

136. Ibid., p. 91.

group did not believe in the concept of freedom, and for this reason they never mentioned these reforms, nor did they ever refer to the Constitution which was thoroughly liberal.[137]

Ağaoğlu's reference to the Constitution was actually an indirect message to the regime, asking it to honour the stipulations of that fundamental text. Aydemir was quick to see this aspect of Ağaoğlu's arguments, and charged him of criticizing the Kemalist regime under the appearance of a critique of his own ideas.[138] Aydemir's charges revealed justified a few months later, when Ağaoğlu started publishing a daily newspaper, Akın, "The Raid," in Istanbul. There, he openly criticized the regime's economic policy as well as its lack of respect for civil rights. This new venture was short lived however, for Mustafa Kemal Pasha openly ordered Ağaoğlu to close down his newspaper.[139]

Among numerous articles that Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) published in his journal, Fikir Hareketleri, "Intellectual Currents," which was entirely devoted to the defense of liberal democracy, especially the series entitled Matbuat Hayatı criticized Kadro. Hüseyin Cahit asserted that Kadro's interpretation of the Turkish Revolution was wrong. For him, the aim of the Revolution was the establishment of a liberal, demo-

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137. Ibid., pp. 12-14, 74-75, and 86-90.

138. Şevket Süreyya, "Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey'e Cevap, 2: Bir Üslup Hücumu Arkasında Bir Fikir Hücumu," Cumhuriyet, December 12, 1932.

139. Samet Ağaoğlu, pp. 175-177.

cratic regime, and in this scheme there was no room for Kadro's concept of permanent revolution.[140] However, he later exhibited an understandable lack of comprehension by writing that this concept concealed an attempt at "diverting the Revolution in the direction of Fascism or state socialism," perplexed and mislead as he was by a combination of several factors.[141]

Aydemir's use of the construct "social nationalism," his intended ambiguity with respect to private initiative, and the support that Kadro enjoyed in high governmental circles despite its acknowledged historical materialist credo, were among these factors. In addition to these, Aydemir's sympathy for propagandistic and educational aspects of Fascism,[142] his rather laudatory presentation of the Carta del lavoro as a good example of national solidarity and mobilization,[143] and the fact that Yakup Kadri published in Kadro a series of articles in which he praised Soviet Russia and Fascist Italy,[144] also led critics such as Hüseyin Cahit to perplexion. Last but not least, these critics were to a great extent helped in their task by officially sanctioned circles who openly acknowledged

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140. Hüseyin Cahit, "Matbuat Hayatı," Fikir Hareketleri, 1(1933): 18-19.

141. Ibid., 37(1934): 171-172.

142. See Şevket Süreyya, İnkılâp ve Kadro, 1st edn., p. 153, and idem, "Genç Nesil Meselesi," Kadro, 4(1932): 5.

143. Idem, "Fikir Hareketleri Arasında Türk Nasyonalizmi, I: Faşizm," Kadro, 18(1933): 9-10.

144. Yakup Kadri, "Ankara - Moskova - Roma," Kadro, 6-7 & 9-12(1932) and 13-16(1933).

similarities between the Kemalist regime and both the Soviet Union and Fascist Italy,[145] as well as by the famous Italian Turcologist, Ettore Rossi who, basing his argument on the above-mentioned passage in the RPP Program relative to the absence of social classes in Turkish society and on the creation of the People's Houses, contended that the new regime in Turkey was Fascist.[146] It is for the same reasons that Peyami Safa, who criticized Aydemir's ideology in Cumhuriyet, first wrote that Kadro was professing a Marxist economy under the guise of nationalism, but ultimately defeated this initial and warranted reading by arguing that the journal was none other than the tribune of Turkish Fascism.[147]

Aydemir did not fail to notice the critique of the Kemalist regime in these arguments either, and insinuated in an article that Hüseyin Cahit was actually using him as a scapegoat to vent his opposition to Kemalist practices.[148] The trouble was that the regime too was aware of this fact, and did not want to ban Hüseyin Cahit's journal after Ahmet Ağaoğlu's newspaper,

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145. A good example can be found in Falih Rıfkı's Moskova - Roma, p. 17.

146. See Ettore Rossi, "Recenti aspetti della Rivoluzione Turca," Il Giornale di Politica e di Letteratura, VIII, 5(1932): 9-10. The article was probably made known to the Turkish readership thanks to a rebuttal by Burhan Asaf: "Faşizm ve Türk Millî Kurtuluş Hareketi," Kadro, 8(1932): 36-39.

147. Peyami Safa, "İnkılâbımızın İdeolojisi," Cumhuriyet, July 29, 1933.

148. Şevket Süreyya, "Hüseyin Cahit Bey'in Hazin Tarafı," Kadro, 31(1934): 40-41; see also idem, "Proğramlı Devletçilik," p. 8.

lest it would justify the charges of anti-democratic rule. The only solution was, thus, to silence Kadro which, in addition to its radicalism that attracted criticism from outside, caused great concern inside the ruling party as well.

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION

The ideas that Kadro defended have so far been read as a "development ideology" and an "early dependency theory."[1] These readings are certainly correct, but incomplete. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's brainchild was actually more than a development theory for dependent nations. It was also, and primarily, a corrective addendum to Marxism.

As it has been shown in the preceding pages, Aydemir's method in developing his theory of national emancipation struggles was historical materialism. It has also been argued that the reason why he did not apply the concept of class antagonism rigidly to modern Turkey and why he rather used the Kemalist regime's claim that Turkish society was not divided into classes, was self-imposed censorship. The originality of his version of socialism resides in his attempt at assigning a sig-

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[1]. See Ömür Sezgin, "Kadro Hareketi," in Alpar ed., op. cit., Vol. I, p. 18, and Haldun Gülalp, "Nationalism, Statism and the Turkish Revolution: An Early 'Dependency' Theory," Review of Middle East Studies, 4(1988): 69; see also idem, Gelişme Strateiileri ve Gelişme İdeoloiileri (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1983), pp. 87-118.

nificant role to non-capitalist societies on the road to the formation of the international socialist society. His thought was based on two premises: the communist neglect of the national question and the Leninist-Galievist rationalization of colonial revolutions.

Aydemir's adventurous past as a nationalist militant, who had been extremely sensitive over the issue of imperialism, predisposed him to see the implicit Marxist concept of leadership of the proletarians of advanced capitalist countries in the world socialist revolution as too Eurocentrical. As a matter of fact, according to this theory, all the colonial nations had to do was to sit and wait either for the creation of an industrial proletariat in their lands, or for the coming of the socialist revolution at the imperialist centers. The frustration of the national aspirations during the formation of the Soviet Union led Aydemir to discard this concept altogether. For him, as for Sultan Galiev and the Jewish Bund before him, the colonial nations did not have much good to expect from the proletariat of the imperialist countries.[2]

After the completion of the Turkish National Struggle, Turkish Communists found themselves in an odd situation. They were now supposed to support the isolation of their country from world capitalism. This meant that they had to contribute to the foundation of a national state which was not bourgeois democratic, and which did not promote national capitalism.

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[2]. Bennigsen and Wimbush, p. 46.

Under these circumstances, a parallel oppositional activity as Communists did not make much sense to many of them, all the less so since Turkey did not have a large industrial proletariat. When, after the foundation of the Republic, splits appeared in the nationalist camp and the Jacobin nature of the Kemalist regime became more apparent, Aydemir and some other Turkish Communists believed that Lenin's analysis was confirmed by the Turkish case, and decided to contribute to the building of a non-bourgeois society in their country.

Joining the Kemalist regime as an individual Communist meant more than national liberation for Aydemir. In fact, the proliferation in the colonial world of regimes such as the Kemalist regime was the only way for a truly international socialist revolution, for as long as the inequality between the imperialist and colonial nations persisted, there was no chance of achieving that revolution. Thus, there were two antagonisms which had to be overcome on the way to world socialist revolution, a class antagonism and a colonial antagonism, and the latter had precedence over the former in Aydemir's thought. But this precedence existed only at the international level, and was not a qualitative one. In other words, colonial revolutions were a prerequisite for socialist revolutions in imperialist countries. Otherwise, there was a different class antagonism in every individual country, and these had to be solved by different people.

As far as capitalist countries were concerned, the vanguard

of the revolution was the party of the working class rendered more combative due to the loss of surplus value that was extracted from the colonies. Which class and which party were supposed to carry out the colonial revolution? And, which other classes were its antagonists on the way to the building of the socialist society? Aydemir's kadro, or the cadre of revolutionary elite, looked like a group of voluntarist intellectuals, whose ideology was based on historical materialism, and who did not have organic ties with a particular class. With this idea, Aydemir seemingly pushed a step further the concept of a Communist Party that was formed by a majority of bourgeois intellectuals who knew where humanity was coming from, and going to, and thus knew better than the workers where the latter's interests had to be looked for. This revolutionary kadro's dictatorship was claimed to be the dictatorship of the nation, an entity that could hardly be accepted as social reality by historical materialism. Even a minority of Marxists, who did take into account nations as significant historical agents, had thus far seen them as polities, that is, frameworks for politics, but not as social bases for politics. The idea of colonial antagonism, which made the colonial nations into "proletarian nations," solved this problem.

But Aydemir did not think that the bourgeois-radical leadership who had carried out the National Struggle would also realize on its own the national emancipatory revolution. If he

and his colleagues later insisted on the problems of rural Turkey, it was because they knew that that leadership was capable of collaborating with the land owning class who had been rather influential during the National Struggle. Thus, following Sneevliet's recommendations to the Chinese Communists,[3] Aydemir and his communist colleagues had to infiltrate the bourgeois radical RPP in order to prevent its deviation toward bourgeois democracy, and eventually, to lead it in the direction of socialism. Turkish society would thus become socialist without passing through the capitalist stage. The dictatorial rule of the RPP, its radical social reforms, and the etatist economic policy it finally adopted were all signs indicating a predisposition of that party to be influenced by socialism.

Was this a misreading of the Turkish Revolution? Can it be said that the abandonment of the proletarian cause for the sake of influencing bourgeois radicalism was an illusion? This author believes that although Aydemir's venture was an illusion, it was not based on a misreading of the Turkish Revolution. Aydemir was perfectly aware of the essentially bourgeois character of the regime, and this is the reason why he tried hard to convince the Kemalists to amend their constitution.[4]

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[3]. See above, Chapter 2, p. 93.

[4]. The Constitution of 1924 was Aydemir's true pet hate. Many years after the suspension of Kadro, he still referred to it as one of the big mistakes of the period; see his Tek Adam, Vol. III, pp. 182-185, and İkinci Adam, Vol. I, pp. 285 and 321-329.

He thus took his chance in perfect knowledge of the situation, and failed. The dimension of illusion in Aydemir's attempt, on the other hand, was not his own fault, but rather the outcome of a romantic vision of history that most Communists shared, many of them until well into the 1970s. Bourgeois radicalism, or Jacobinism, was seen by the Bolsheviks and their followers throughout the world as proto-socialism, and Aydemir was no exception to this.[5]

Although it is the subject of another thesis, it would be relevant here to give a tentative answer to the question why the Kemalists tolerated Aydemir's ideas for three years despite his openly acknowledged historical materialism. The said tolerance seems to this author to be a meaningful hint pertaining, if not to the nature of the Kemalist regime, at least to the mentalité of many of its significant participants. As it has been argued above, Aydemir and some of his colleagues had come to Communism through anti-imperialist sensitivity. This sensitivity was rigorously widespread in Turkey during, and for some time after, the National Struggle. Among his numerous remarks relative to the future emancipation of the colonies, these words of Mustafa Kemal Pasha addressed to King Amanullah of Afghanistan in 1928 are a good indicator of this mood:

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[5]. See Tamara Kondratieva, Bolcheviks et Jacobins: Itinéraire des analogies (Paris: Editions Payot, 1988), and for a convincing final verdict on the issue, Ferenc Fehér, The Frozen Revolution: An Essay on Jacobinism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Ch. 7: "Was Jacobinism proto-socialism?" pp. 128-148.

> The sun that rises in the lofty horizons of the future is the fortune of the nations who had been suffering for centuries. That this fortune should never again be covered with dark clouds depends on the diligence and devotion of those nations and their leaders.[6]

The following year, a liberal none other than Ahmet Ağaoğlu published a book entitled İngiltere ve Hindistan, "Britain and India," and exposed the incommensurate political conditions in which Britons and Indians lived under the one but not the same British sovereignty.[7]

The corollary to this anti-imperialist consciousness, that is, the identity of a "proletarian nation" seems also to be widely accepted by Turkish intellectuals in the 1920s. For instance, Falih Rıfkı (Atay) had referred in 1922 to the Turkish nation as a nation of toilers with all its socio-professional components in an article he wrote to criticize the celebration of May Day as the workers' day.[8] Similarly, when Aydemir arrived at the Ministry of Education in 1928, Kemal Zaim Sunel, who was his highest superior as permanent undersecretary for education, told him that he should forget about the cause of the proletariat, for Turks "as an entire nation [were] proletarians."[9] Thus, Aydemir's idea of colonial

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6. Atatürk, Söylev ve Demeçleri, Vol. II, p. 252; cf. the quotation from Mehmet İzzet, above, Chapter 4, p. 214.

7. Ağaoğlu Ahmet, İngiltere ve Hindistan (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1929).

8. Falih Rıfkı, "1 Mayıs," in his Eski Saat, 1917-1933 (Istanbul: Akşam Matbaası, 1933), pp. 95-96.

9. Aydemir, Suyu Arayan Adam, p. 453.

emancipation as the motor force of current history fell on rather sympathetic ears.

In this ideological atmosphere, Aydemir's interpretation of Turkish etatism, too, received a favorable echo. The scandals associated with the "National(ist) Economy" of the CUP, and the experience with the imperialist nature of capitalism had created a moral dilemma among Turkish intellectuals after the First World War. How could Turkey join the capitalist world after the ordeal she had gone through in the fight against that same world? The social problems faced by capitalist Europe during the Great Depression years, and negative commentaries by Kadro writers as well as by others, also played an important role in further tarnishing the image of capitalist society. Turkish etatism as interpreted by Aydemir, on the other hand, offered an accommodating middle road between capitalism and Communism on the way to a just and prosperous society. The following opinion, reported to have been expressed by the Director of the Kayseri Cotton Factory, a state enterprise launched with Soviet Russian technical assistance, was quite representative of a group of young civil servants who might be considered as avid readers of Kadro:

> [T]he aim was to turn [the workers of the factory] neither into robots nor into class-conscious proletariat, but into self-respecting citizens who would be aware of the fact that the factory was owned by the State, and therefore was their property, and that the better they worked, the better they would live themselves.[10]

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[10]. Lilo Linke, "Social Changes in Turkey," International Affairs, XVI(1937): 545.

This approach to etatism, which is still, though to a lesser extent, valid in today's Turkey, was by no means accepted by all in the Kemalist regime. Moreover, even those who supported it and made it a part of, first the RPP Program, and later the Constitution, did not see it as a doctrine like Aydemir did. The Kemalist cadre, like their predecessors the Young Turks, were liberals in their hearts, eager to reproduce the might of capitalist Europe in their own country. They did not aim at creating yet another alternative to capitalist society. Having suffered at the hands of the latter did not lead them to perpetuate the long struggles of the past under new names. What enabled them to do so was the critical stance they adopted vis-à-vis their own society and history. Already during the First World War, İbrahim Hilmi (Çığıraçan) had claimed that Turks, instead of blaming Europe, had to look for the fault in their own house.[11] The achievement of full sovereignty was enough for Ziya Gökalp to reiterate in 1923 his idea that Turkey had to "westernize."[12] A staunch Kemalist, Mehmet Saffet (Engin), expressed this attitude in a radical manner in 1928:

> We have given up the pretension of constructing a hybrid civilization. Thus, we have distanced ourselves from the illusion of forming a new culture by reconciling the Islamic culture of the eastern civilization with the industrial culture of the western civilization. We henceforth

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11. Tüccarzade İbrahim Hilmi, Avrupalılaşmak (Dersaadet: Kütüphane-i İslam ve Askeri, 1332/1916), p. 4.

12. Gökalp, Türkçülüğün esasları, pp. 46-59.

> determined our path from the perspectives of both its aim and its direction: we are Turkish and European.[13]

There was no room for Aydemir's "Third Worldism" in this program. For this reason, he died as an embittered man, although he had been influential in changing the perception of the Turkish National Struggle (Milli Mücadele) into that of a War of Independence (İstiklal Harbi, and later, Kurtuluş Savaşı), and had an almost immediate gratification in seeing some of his ideas like the foundation of an Institute of History of the Turkish Revolution and the inclusion of a course on the History of the Revolution in secondary and higher education curricula, pass into reality. We do not know what his reaction would have been to the crisis and collapse of Communism, and to the appropriation of some of his fundamental ideas by Islamic puritanism. But it is certain that he would have been delighted to see the graffiti Le Tiers-Monde est le Tiers Etat! that appeared on the walls of Paris during the bicentennial celebrations of the French Revolution.

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[13]. Mehmet Saffet, Türkiye'de demokrasi inkılabı (Istanbul: Kütüphane-i Sudi, 1928), pp. 83-84.

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