

The Atlantic Triangle and Japan 1914-1921

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PRELUDE TO A NEW WORLD ORDER;
THE ATLANTIC TRIANGLE AND JAPAN
1914 - 1921

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PRELUDE A UN NOUVEL ORDRE MONDIAL:
LE TRIANGLE DE L'ATLANTIQUE ET LE JAPON
1914 - 1921

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Cette étude traite du rôle que joua le Canada en tant que médiateur entre la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis antérieurement à la Conférence de Washington sur la Limitation des Armements. Durant cette période de temps, la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis furent incapables d'affermir leurs relations diplomatiques et de coordonner leur politique étrangère en Extrême-Orient à cause de l'alliance qui existait entre l'Empire Britannique et le Japon Impérial.

Ayant comme point de départ, la recherche, par la Grande-Bretagne, d'un moyen de contrebalancer l'impérialisme de la Russie en Extrême-Orient, l'ouvrage trace le développement de l'alliance anglo-japonaise, de son inception à sa suspension.

L'intense rivalité navale entre les trois puissances du Pacifique est examinée comme étant l'obstacle principal au règlement de conflits. Cette incapacité pour la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis d'arriver à un accord au sujet de la question de la suprématie navale est soigneusement analysée et discutée en relation avec l'Alliance anglo-japonaise.

La Thèse affirme que le rôle du Canada dans ce conflit entre les deux autres membres du Triangle de l'Atlantique fût de les amener à une entente qui facilita le succès de la Conférence de Washington.

PRELUDE TO A NEW WORLD ORDER: THE ATLANTIC TRIANGLE AND JAPAN
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This study deals with Canada's role as a diplomatic mediator between Great Britain and the United States prior to the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments. During the period, Great Britain and the United States were unable to cement their diplomatic relations and co-ordinate their Far Eastern foreign policies because the British Empire was in alliance with Imperial Japan.

Beginning with Great Britain's search for a remedy to counterbalance Russian imperialism in the Far East, the work traces the development of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance from inception to suspension. The intense naval rivalry between the three Pacific Powers is examined as the logical backdrop to non-settlement. The inability of Britain and the United States to come to a settlement in regard to the naval paramountcy question, is closely discussed and analysed in relation to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Furthermore, the connection between the Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference is examined in detail.

The Thesis asserts that the Canadian role in the struggle between the other two members of the Atlantic Triangle, led to the success of the Washington Conference.

THERE IS NOTHING MORE DIFFICULT
TO CARRY OUT
NOR MORE DOUBTFUL OF SUCCESS
NOR MORE DANGEROUS TO HANDLE
THAN TO INITIATE A NEW ORDER
OF THINGS

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PREFACE

MORE than half a century has elapsed since the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was suspended and replaced by the Quadruple Treaty between the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan. During the era in which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance operated, the diplomatic relationship between the members of the Atlantic Triangle, went through perhaps its most trying period as it tested the viability of the bond between the nations who had common-stock in the Anglo-Saxon race.

The Great War, between 1914 and 1918, signaled the death-knell to the old system of international relations that was dominated by the British Empire. After the war the Great Powers tried to initiate a new order through the salvaging of the vestiges of the old. It did not work and a second attempt was made, resulting in the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments. This Conference has received a great deal of attention from many quarters because of the far-reaching implications of the issues that were resolved there as well as those which were not. Yet, there is one critical phase of events that have only partially been brought to light and little examined in connection with the enunciation of the proceedings that brought about the Conference. That phase concerned Canada. Without the illumination of the key role played by the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Arthur Meighen, the pre-history of the Washington Conference is incomplete.

The purpose of this research is to delineate a uniquely spectacular, rather than typical, relationship between Great

Britain, the United States and Canada that initiated and established the Foundation upon which the success of the Washington Conference rested. In the course of the work presented here, I have attempted to answer the question: What was Canada's role in the events that inaugurated the Washington Conference? So that as I have tried to set the findings connected with the events of 1921, against the background of international rivalry between the leading World Powers of the day, namely, Great Britain, the United States and Imperial Japan. At the heart of that conflict was a struggle for succession to the position of Great World Power. Therefore, in the title, the idea of rivalry is being used in the broadest sense of the word, as it was used in 1914 and 1921. However, since the important element that was connected to the armaments question revolved about the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, on account of its inception and influence you found to be indispensable to this work. In the examination of the correlation between the members of the Atlantic Triangle and Japan, I have tried to thoroughly evaluate the connection of the 1921 Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers with the Washington Conference. Specifically, yet with qualification, it is the contention of this thesis that certain resolutions arrived at during the preceding Imperial Conference meetings, induced President Harding to invite the World Powers to a conference on the Limitation of Armaments at Washington in November 1921.

Concomitantly, this novel information brings into perspective, a moot and hitherto incomplete episode in Canadian and Imperial diplomatic history.

I would like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor N. Bamba, of the History Department of McGill University, for his encouragement and judicious criticism in the preparation of this work.

I should also like to express my gratitude to Professor E. Laffey, of the History Department of McGill, for her encouragement and help during my first year of Graduate Studies.

My contribution and originality in this presentation comes from and through a primary investigation of the Loring C. Christie Papers; the Meighen Papers; the Borden Papers; the C. C. Ballantyne Collection; Memoranda from the Canadian Department of External Affairs; British Cabinet Records; the United States Congressional Records and the Parliamentary Records of Great Britain and Canada.

JTC

August 1974

PRELUDE

TOWARD the latter part of the nineteenth century, the economic motive that had been the deciding factor for a successful British Imperial foreign policy reached its apogee and was replaced by a priority for the Empire's security.¹ For Great Britain, this economic forfeiture in the time of international diplomacy, produced a fissure in one of the corner-blocks of her foreign policy. The return to a security priority and the departure from a tradition of isolation through a military agreement with Japan, paved the way for the United States to challenge Great Britain for the honour of becoming First World Power.

Isolation and neutrality had served as the watchwords of British foreign policy from mid-century until the period of Salisbury's last term in office in 1902. The merit of the tradition was locked into the freedom of movement by which her Empire policy makers were able to balance international events in a manner beneficial to the interests of the Empire. In the era, the region that necessitated Britain's protection was the Far East while India required special consideration because of the threatening encroachment from Russian imperialism. Since

¹ Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Report of the Proceedings of the Third Conference Ottawa: 1936, pp.11-14. See also: D.V. Fieldhouse, "Imperialism: An Historiographical Revision" The Economic History Review 2nd Series, vol.xiv, no.2, 1961, pp.137-209.

² S. Watson, Britain in Europe: 1732-1914 London: Cambridge Press, 1955, pp.9-10.

Russia and France had concluded an alliance in 1895, Great Britain could not look to the Republic for any help either as a counter-balance to Russia or as an arbitrator.¹ An added factor--China's defeat at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Navy--compounded Britain's problems in the Far East.² The British had been contemplating a military alliance with China but abandoned this approach when she was defeated by Japan. While British foreign policy directors responded analytically to the awesome victory of Japan in the first Sino-Japanese War, a sign that they had reached a tentative agreement on a remedy to their Far Eastern foreign policy impasse appeared in the spring of 1898. In keeping with the swing to a policy of protectionism and security, the Secretary of the Colonial Office, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, stated that England was once again contemplating an alliance with those Power's whose interests were at one with hers.³

It was not by accident that British-Japanese foreign relations first converged in 1894. In that year British diplomatic insight had sponsored a move toward a cordial rapprochement with Japan. The materialization of the diplomacy

¹C.F.Chang, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1931, pp.2-5.

²G.N.Curzon, Problems of the Far East London: Longmans Green and Company, 1896, pp.296-303.

³The Times (London), May 14, 1898, p.9.

sponsorship resulted in a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.¹ The strategy behind Britain's initiation of this Treaty was preconditioned by the position of Russia in European affairs and Czarist imperialism in the Far East.² However, an unforeseen series of events more instrumentally important than the Treaty of 1894 drew Japan into the camp of the British. Once again Russia was the catalyst.

By the time that the Treaty of Shimonoseki was being negotiated in 1895, Japanese troops had already become entrenched in the Liao-tung peninsula.³ To Russia, the presence of the Japanese forces in that area directly threatened her interests. Backed by France and Germany, the Russian's forced the Japanese to withdraw from the region and took over its control. To the sensitive national pride of the Japanese, this diplomatic coercion was only slightly less offensive than had been that mid-century infliction by the United States which had forced Japan out of isolationism. Since Great Britain was the only European Power who did not take part in the combined action of 1895, Japan was attentive to the British overtures for a military agreement when they were presented.

¹British House of Commons, Command Paper no.7566, 1894, p.1.

²British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, pp.297-301.

³W.G.Beasley, The Modern History of Japan London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970, p.163.

On February 12, 1902, Great Britain officially announced that she had concluded a military agreement with Japan.¹ The central features of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance asserted that, having a mutual recognition for the independence of China and Korea, and in defence of their mutual interests, if one partner went to war with a third and/or a fourth party, the other partner would come to her aid. If war ensued with only a second party, the partner would observe neutrality.² During the first decade in which the alliance remained operative, treaties, protocols and gentlemen's agreements with Russia, France and the United States strengthened Japan's bid for 'concessions-in-parity' with the other World Powers in the Far East. By no means a less important feature of the alliance for Japan was its symbol of respectability. As far as Great Britain was concerned, that agreement freed her from the entanglements in the Far East while it simultaneously fulfilled the demands of her security priorities. With the alliance behind her Britain was finally able to direct her attention to mounting problems on the European Continent that were threatening to erupt into war.

With the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as support, Japan began to pay closer attention to Manchuria. G. F. Hudson contended

¹The Times (London), February 12, 1902, p.5.

²I.H.Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894-1907 London: Athlone Press, 1966, pp.216-217.

that the rivalry between Japan and Russia in Manchuria precipitated the Russo-Japanese War although the real bone of contention was Korea.¹ In relation to the nascent, but growing enmity between the United States and Japan, the Russo-Japanese War served to heighten the tension in this regard. The war was characterised by some as a contest and struggle between the races. Akira Iriye noted that many believed the war was to determine the question of "...the glory or decline of Asia and Europe, the rise or destruction of the yellow and white races, and the victory or defeat of despotism and constitutionalism."² Japan's victory was the turning point in East-West relations and it set the stage for the emergence of American-Japanese antagonism. Fundamentally, the United States had not clearly formulated a set of specific policy objectives relating to China outside of a traditional approach promoting trade.³ However, at the end of the Russo-Japanese War the concept of the 'Yellow Peril' reappeared in the vocabulary of the American people and the fear of Japan dominating the entire Far East took root. Furthermore, the idea that the Japanese people believed themselves to be superior to all other nationalities

¹G.F.Hudson, The Far East in World Politics London: Oxford University Press, 1937, pp.131-132.

²A.Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asia Relations New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1967, p.91.

³Ibid., p.103.

was widely held by influential Americans.¹ On the West Coast of the United States, anti-Orientalism began to be expressed as an anti-Japanese movement.

The heightened sense of national rivalry between Japan and the United States engendered by the war combined with the Japanese ill will earned by Roosevelt at Portsmouth to produce reaction in California. 2

By the end of 1905, the San Francisco Board of Education had reacted to Japanese immigration in the city and implemented a plan for the segregation of Japanese public school children. A portion of the resolution proclaimed that, "...our children should not be placed in any position where (they)...may be affected by association with pupils of the Mongolian race."³ This example of racial antagonism toward the Japanese in the United States severely hampered the relationship between the two countries and intensified their mutual disrespect for one another in the pursuit of their policies in China.⁴ One observer declared that the majority of Western Americans believed that:

¹A.Iriye, Across The Pacific p.103. See also: R.L.Buell, "Again the Yellow Peril" Foreign Affairs vol.2, no. 1, 1923, pp.304-305.

²A.W.Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States New York: Harcourt, Brace Co., 1938, pp.346-347.

³Ibid., p.347.

⁴T.A.Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934, pp.48-55.

There is nothing to be said in favor of the immigration of Japanese...into the United States. If unrestricted, it would wipe out American standards of living, eventually reducing us to the economic level of the Oriental, and implant an alien...half-breed race on our soil which might make the negro problem look white. 1

The measures for the control of Japanese immigration into the United States took the form of a Gentlemen's Agreement whereby Japan voluntarily agreed to curb emigration.² American Federal legislation first appeared in the form of the Webb-Henry Act. This law made it virtually impossible for aliens to own land within the country.³ State legislation adopted a more restricting policy toward Japanese nationals. The California Land Tenure Act which embodied the restriction was interpreted by the Imperial Japanese Government as racist in form and spirit. Such an interpretation prompted a direct diplomatic protest to which the American Secretary of State replied:

The government of the United States regrets most sincerely that the Imperial government of Japan should regard this legislation as an indication of unfriendliness toward their people in the United States....We feel that Japan has been

¹R.L.Buell, "Again the Yellow Peril" p.306.

²T.A.Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968, pp.525-526.

³H.Kamikawa, Japan, American Diplomatic Relations in the Meiji and Taisho Period Tokyo: Pan-Pacific Press, 1958, p.299.

misled in its interpretation of the spirit and object of the legislationIt is not political. It is not part of any general national policy which would indicate unfriendliness or any purpose inconsistent with the best...understanding between the two nations. It is wholly economic.... The racial overtones...were...mere mark(s) of incident. 1

Regarding the implications and the conflict that was generated from the California legislation, O.J.Clinard observed that,"... so blunt was the Japanese protest that the United States feared war with Japan was imminent."² The elan that stemmed from this one issue did not cease either in the United States or Japan after the American government sent their apology to Japan. A Japanese Ambassadorial attaché declared that:

There remained a possible cause of war between Japan and the United States(that was) when Japan's honour... was at stake....When racial discrimination...takes a visible shape in connection with the treatment of (Japanese) in the State of California. 3

On the eve of the First World War, Japanese-American international relations were in a state of rapid deterioration. At

¹E.L.Robinson & V.J.West, The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson New York: Macmillan & Co., 1948, pp.184-187.

²O.J.Clinard, Japanese Influence on American Naval Policy Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947, pp.112-115.

³T.O.Kamoto, "American-Japanese Issues and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance" The Contemporary Review vol.cxix, 1921, p.359.

the heart of the problem lay a mutual enmity. In a more practical sense their individual national expectations in relation to the 'China market' prospects began to push the two Pacific nations toward irreconcilable catastrophe.

As the European storm approached, the United States continued her resolute policy of isolation and neutrality.¹ The accumulation of those war clouds added a continual weight to another component of that policy, which demanded more battle-ships and greater armament preparation.² The evolution of the naval race that had pit Germany against Britain in 1903 had, by 1914, begun to present a crisis situation to Great Britain and the British Empire.³ As long as the United States maintained an isolationist tradition, she would continue to enlarge her navy, which was second only to the British.⁴ As long, but only as long as Britain could match the naval building programme of the United States, the 'lion' would continue to dominate the seas. If war came to Europe, as it was threatening to do, and the Americans remained neutral while continuing to build, it would only be a matter of time

¹A.Moireau, "La Politique Nouvelle de l'Ariraute Anglaise" Revue des Deux Mondes vol.xxvii, 1905, pp.200-202.

²G.W.Melville, "The Important Elements of Naval Conflict" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science vol.xxvi, 1905, pp.123-130.

³Canadian House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates vol.cxlvi, 1921, p.2639.

⁴S.B.Luce, "Address Before the United States War College" Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute vol. xxix, no.3, 1903, pp.542-544.

until the British Navy was surpassed by that of the United States. The result would be that the world would have a new First Power.

Soon after the European mobilization began, the naval building programme of Great Britain came to a standstill.¹ The probability of the American Navy out-distancing Britain's multiplied with each passing month of the war. While British vessels were being lost in battle, the American's continued to produce capital ships. Isolation and neutrality were serving the United States well. The longer the respite, the sooner the United States would replace the British Empire as paramount power in world affairs.²

When Japan entered the war in 1914 as an Allied Power, she did so with a firm belief that any war-time intervention in the Far East would not be opposed by her first ally, Great Britain. Within a short period, Japanese forces had removed the Germans' from the Far East and presented the Chinese Government with a demand for the control of the German Leasehold in Shang-tung.³ Since the war precluded a maintenance of the status-quo, the Japanese were free to secure the operations in the Far Eastern

¹Note: (Eventhough the Canadian Government built ships and placed them at the disposal of Great Britain, the number and composition of these vessels was minimal.)

²H.&M.Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1932, pp.112-115.

³I.H.Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-1923 London: Athlone Press, 1972, p.153.

theatre without any violation of the treaties with her European Allies. However, Japan's ambitions were of a more wide-range character and covered not only Shang-tung, but the central Yangtse, South Manchuria and part of Fukien. There infamous 'Twenty-One Demands' that were presented to the Chinese Government, developed into a crisis and effected a major turning point in Japanese-American relations. Japan's actions were interpreted by the United States as unilateral expansionism, and they charged Japan with a violation of the 'Open Door' in each instance.¹ But the United States was powerless, short of war, to completely prevent Japan from maintaining her position. Consequently, the United States began to move in a direction that would guarantee the basic requisites for safeguarding the underlying principle to her Far Eastern foreign policy. That move simultaneously intensified the paramountcy duel between herself and Great Britain.

The United States Naval Act of 1916 proposed an authorization for the construction of 156 naval vessels. Such an unprecedented and massive construction programme was deemed to be necessary to assure the United States of a victory in open naval warfare not only against Japan but against her allies.²

¹T.O.Kamoto, "American-Japanese Issues and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance" p.359.

²United States Bureau of National Publications, Messages and Papers of the President vol.xviii, 1918, pp.8242-8245.

As the Naval Act was pending ratification in Congress, Republican Senator W.E.Borah asserted that "...America was... making certain that her honor had suffered enough to warrant such action."¹ Congressman Jouett Shouse openly acknowledged that the threat to America had come from Japan. He declared:

I believe this continent is not in serious danger of attack from Europe ...but I do not feel the same degree of complacency with reference to JapanSince 1905...she has been preparing herself carefully with the idea of ultimate world domination...She is a nation of believers in force, a nation that clings to the tenet that might makes right... -2

The affect that the Naval Act of 1916 had upon Great Britain was that it produced the climax to the British Empire's uncontested hold onto the supremacy of the seas. In effect this meant that Britain was no longer the undisputed premier world Power. However, through a clandestine agreement Britain was able to postpone the ultimate confrontation until after the war.

Early in 1917 Britain had her back against a wall. She was in a position to see quite clearly that if the United States could not be persuaded to halt construction, the British Empire would become eclipsed. As the fear of war with her ally Japan, had been the prime rationale for America's preparatory Act, Britain was in an even more precarious situation

¹ O.J.Clinard, Japanese Influence on American Naval Policy p.163.

² Ibid., p.149.

because of the existence of that alliance. Initially, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was intended to neutralize the Russian menace to the Far Eastern British Empire. By 1905 it had served its prime purpose. However, when the Russian threat had been wiped out by the Japanese, Britain saw fit to retain the agreement because without it she would soon find that Japan would simply replace Russia. By 1917, the possibility of Japan replacing Russia in the Far East was almost certain.¹ But for England to abrogate the treaty with Japan before an official American ultimatum was issued, was considered to be 'letting the tail wag the dog'.² There was still a further complexity with the problem. The construction of 156 vessels of war was a project that would take a great deal of time to complete. What were the possibilities of the United States and Japan becoming involved in war before this margin of certainty was completed? The risk factor to Great Britain was eliminated through diplomatic channels. The price America paid for her pre-margin of safety was an admission charge to World War.

While the United States entered the war as an Associate Power in the spring of 1917, she did so with a knowledge that befit her ascendancy claim.³ It took the form of an agreement

¹J.W.Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918 New York: Columbia University Press, 1957, pp.28-29.

²British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, pp.306-310.

³Messages and Papers of the President vol.xviii, 1918, p.8242.

between herself and Britain that expressly excluded Japan. That pact enabled Britain to retain the external appearance of the dominant power holder, for the United States agreed to 're-orient' her construction programme around the manufacture of destroyers and cruisers that were to see action in the Atlantic on anti-submarine and escort duty.¹ In return for 're-orientation', Britain and France pledged their military aid to America for a period of four years after the war in case of an attack from any other naval Power.² Through this exclusive tool, Britain postponed the date of her eclipse by the United States. She did so simultaneously at the expense and protection of her honour, for the exclusive agreement was directly leveled at her primary ally--Japan. Once Britain's national honour had been offered in exchange for the continued outward appearance of supremacy, her day of reconciliation was not far away. Before the Versailles Conference Treaties were finalized, Anglo-American naval rivalry came to the foreground of world affairs. A confrontation unfolded and became full-blown. For the first time, the nature and direction of the confrontation pointed to war between Great Britain and the United States.³

¹O.J.Clinard, The Japanese Influence pp.149-150.

²Ibid., pp.150-152.

³J.S.Galbraith, "The Imperial Conference of 1921 and the Washington Conference" The Canadian Historical Review vol.xxix, 1948, p.143.

ONE of the contributing factors to the failure of the Versailles Peace Conference was the impass between the United States and Britain over the issue of the freedom of the seas. In the altercation that came to be known as the 'Naval Battle of Paris', the American Admiralty warned their British counterpart that war between the two countries was imminent if the British continued to disregard the point.¹ Both naval delegations were cognizant that if no agreement was forthcoming, the naval race that had been temporarily halted would be resumed. That would invariably mean that a staggering output of funds would again be put into war preparation. Great Britain's war debt had already attained colossal proportions and an economic depression appeared to be unavoidable in either case.² Contiguous to both positions was the fact that the size and composition of their post-war fleets would affect the commercial potential of their peace-time resumption of trade.³ The United States reasoned that "...every great commercial rival of the British Empire eventually found herself at war with (her) and had been defeated..."⁴ Consequently, the American delegation

¹T.Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970, pp.21-22.

²British House of Commons, Command Paper no.912, 1920, "Report On The Commercial, Industrial And Financial Situation Of Japan, 1914-1919" pp.5-16.

³Ibid., pp.70-71.

⁴H.&M. Sprout, Toward a New Order of Sea Power p.62.

pressed their point, while on the other side of the conference table, the British Admiralty sat just as adamant. The tenor of the dispute was all the more ominous in light of the unwavering declaration that their government had made to the British public before the Conference began..

Nothing in the world, nothing that you may think of or dream of, or anyone may tell you; no arguments, however seductive, may lead you to abandon that naval supremacy on which the life of our... country depends. 1

More fundamentally important than the ostensible point of freedom of the seas, was an issue that had been central to British foreign policy in the Far East--the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.² The Paris impasse saw the American delegation trying to persuade the British to abrogate the Alliance as a gesture of 'good-faith' that could facilitate an arms' limitation conference. The British representatives were of the opinion that an arms' limitation conference would result from the natural course of deliberation once the Americans ratified the Paris Treaty.³ The Alliance itself was a binding treaty between Japan and Britain but since it was operative until 1921, there was no honourable method of its dispensation except through a clause

¹The Times (London), November 21, 1918, p.9. See also: A.G. Gardner, "Anglo-American Issues" The Contemporary Review vol.cxviii, 1919, pp.614-616.

²C.C.Ballantyne, Correspondence: 1904-1954 vol.1, "Diary of the Imperial Conference" entry no. 14.

³J.S.Galbraith, "The Imperial Conference" pp.143-145.

in the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was a part of the Paris Accord.¹

While the positions of their naval advisors were indicative of one area of dead-lock, top-level conference diplomacy began to turn on a similar note. In a memorandum prepared for the Canadian Department of External Affairs on American foreign policy, it was observed that:

Uneasiness mounted alarmingly as the months went on and it became evident that Paris, instead of initiating a new order in world relations...was in effect merely a colossal pulling and tugging of conflicting national interests each seeking only its own ends. ²

When France, Italy and Britain supported a guarantee claim by Japan for control of Shang-tung it became evident to the United States, that certain Japanese principles would prevail, thus forcing her to re-think the entire Paris proposition.³ The Mandated islands of the Marshall's, the Carolina's and the Mariana's (except Guam) were a further condition of the award.⁴ The Mandates, which virtually nullified the Pacific Ocean acquisitions of the of the United States, made it strategically

¹ L.C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, "The Stenographic Notes of the Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers of 1921" pp.6915-6916.

² Ibid., vol.3, File 6-7, "Memorandum" pp.2576-2577.

³ P.J.Treat, Japan and the United States 1853-1921, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1928, p.240.

⁴ Canadian Department of External Affairs vol.916, 1921, Memorandum marked Secret and Confidential "British Policy in the Pacific" pp.7-8.

impossible for her to maintain her sentinel chain across the Pacific without the possibility of encirclement from the Japanese.¹ As far as the Americans were concerned, the award placed her Far Eastern foreign policy and its Open Door Doctrine in jeopardy. However, the American President, Woodrow Wilson, was willing to allow the Japanese claim to stand, for he was convinced that the Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations would guarantee world peace.²

Wilson's super-idealism was not shared by the American Senate which opposed the adoption of the Paris agreement because of the restricting implications for American foreign policy.³ In his enthusiasm to get the Covenant of the League of Nations ratified by the Senate, Wilson committed a tactical error by allowing the upper house to revise and make amendments to the Treaty but refused to sanction their proposition concerning the Shang-tung award. The President concluded that if Shang-tung was not allowed to stay within the orbit of Japan she would bolt the Conference and all guarantees for a lasting peace would be gone. As far as the enlistment of the Senate's support was needed for the ratification of the Treaty and the Covenant, the Shang-tung question proved to be the Achilles tendon for Wilson's bid of world peace.

¹G.H.Blackeslee, "The Mandates of the Pacific" Foreign Relations vol.1, no.1, 1922, p.98.

²L.C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, "Memorandum on American Foreign Policy, 1922, p.2577.

³Ibid., p.2584.

The Senatorial leaders saw in the Japanese a Far Eastern version of German Prussianism sanctioned by the Allied Powers.

The situation is now much the same as that which existed between Great Britain and Germany before the outbreak of the European war. To break England's power was necessary for the ultimate fulfillment of Germany's ambition--to break the United States is necessary for the fulfillment of Japan's ambition. 1

The Japanese awards were vociferously chastised as a sell-out by the Allies. Senator Johnson of California said that "... all Senators seem to feel a sense of disapproval over the wrong done in the award...and if the United States condones this...it will be the first time we have been a party to... dismemberment..."² During the Senatorial debate on the Treaty, Senator Sterling of South Dakota reminded his associates that "... (as) far as the treaty is concerned the Shangtung provision...is in force. All the United States can do is to decline ...to become a party to it."³ The Republican members of the Senate shared the conviction of Wisconsin Senator Lafollette, who asserted that the "...awards to Japan rest on force. It involves robbery so barefaced that (the Allied) Powers won't go through with them if the United States refuses to become a party to it."⁴ Shortly thereafter, the Senate rejected the entire Versailles Peace Treaty by a vote of 55 to 35.

¹ C. Crow, Japan and America New York: McBride & Co., 1926, p.201.

² New York Times Current History vol.xi, no.1, 1920, "The Senate Debate on-the Peace Treaty" p.224.

³ Ibid., p.225.

⁴ Ibid., p.225.

Had Wilson allowed the Senate to dictate the terms of the Covenant any further, the direction of the Treaty would have been substantially altered and he would have been guilty of a breach of faith with his European Associates. In defence of the vote in the Senate, and assaulting Wilson's solidarity with the European Association, Senator H.C. Lodge said:

The unfortunate insistence of the President upon having his own way without any regard to the opinion of the majority of the Senate, which shares with him the treaty making power...created a situation in which the Senators were required to vote upon their conscience...under the Constitution (the authority) was theirs, and not his. 1

Wilson was aware of the implications of American non-participation in the League of Nations. The United States would have no choice but to resume the build-up of her military establishment. That was an affirmation that she would be re-embarking upon a course of militarism, to the detriment of the ideals upon which the nation had been founded. To a Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Wilson proclaimed:

If we must stand apart and be hostile rivals to the rest of the world...we must be physically ready for anything. We must see that every man in America is trained in arms. Such a policy would place American democracy in jeopardy of its life since democracy and militarism could not live co-jointly. 2

¹New York Times Current History "The Senate Debate on the Peace Treaty" p.262.

²United States Senate Document no. 106, 66th Congress, 1st Session, pp.498-499.

The Foreign Relations Committee was not swayed by Wilson's rhetoric. They adhered to the wishes of the Senate Republican clique led by Lodge, Borah and Hughes. Consequently, all reconsideration of American participation in the League of Nations under a Democratic administration was quashed.¹ Forthwith, the 1920 Presidential election campaign got underway.

'Against Wilson and The League' became the key-note upon which the policy platform of the Republican Party was built.² Their foreign policy appeared to be an exercise in equivocation under the auspices of the 'Old Guard' Senators. A portion of the text of the Republican platform ascribed that:

We favor a liberal and generous policy founded upon definite moral and political principles characterized by a clear understanding of and firm adherence to our rights...subject to a due regard for our international obligations; we should have our country free to develop its civilization along the lines most conducive to the happiness and welfare of its people, and to cast its influence on the side of justice and right...3

In this Republican declaration, there was nothing new regarding the principles upon which the Democrats had deemed fit to base their foreign policy upon up to 1920. Those principles were primarily an extension of the Monroe Doctrine on the Continent and the Open Door Doctrine in the Far East. As Chairman of the

¹Meighen Papers, 1921-1922, vol.29, 1921, pp.17537-17547.

²L.C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, "Memorandum on American Foreign Policy, 1922", p.2577.

³New York Times Current History, vol.xii, no.2, 1920, "The Republican Convention", p.561.

Republican Convention, Senator Lodge concluded in a further statement that; "...we declare that the Republican Party has the generous courage and constructive ability to...fulfill our world obligations without sacrificing our national independence."¹ At that time no formula was unveiled that could underwrite his high-minded claim. World obligations and national independence were postulates of Wilson's League of Nations venture which Lodge had repudiated and led the attack against. Surely the Republican's would not re-introduce a resolution for the adoption of the League's Covenant if they came to office! Or was Lodge alluding to a parallel society that would preserve peace? Nothing resolved at that convention could have led any reasonable person to believe that a definitive scheme was in the making that would reconcile national independence and an international obligation for peace. However, in a statement made at the beginning of the campaign by Charles E. Hughes, who emerged from the election as Secretary of State, a formula was intimated:

...the United States shall do her full part in association with the other civilized nations to prevent war, (and we) have earnestly considered how we may contribute most effectively to that end by our votes in the coming election... the question....is whether we shall join under an agreement containing the ...provisions...at Paris, or under an agreement which omits or modifies some of those provisions... 2

¹New York Times Current History, vol.xii, no.2, 1920, p.262.

²L.C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, "American Foreign Policy", p.2577. 7

While the Republican delegates prepared to vote for their Presidential candidates, the New York Times criticized Lodge and his followers for their reactionary attitude. The paper declared that the Senate had not considered what was best for the people but put themselves in the primary position by declaring their policy to be "...government of the Senate, by the Senate, for the Senate...".¹ The editorial went on to say that had the Senate put the interests of the people before their own, two things would have been realized. First, the economic benefits to the American people would have been substantially enhanced because the armament budget would have been dramatically reduced. Concurrently, the neurotic state of apprehension generated from the continued threat of war with Japan, Britain or both, would likewise have been substantially dissipated.²

On June 28, the Democratic Convention began on the West Coast. They were forced to fight the election on the issue of an unmodified treaty. Knowing too that they had to fight it in the face of all the elements of discontent and dissatisfaction within the country, they got as much mileage as they could out of an attack on the Republican platform.³ H.S. Cummings, the Democratic Convention's Chairman, reiterated that it was most

¹New York Times, June 9, 1920, p.4.

²Ibid., p.4.

³L.C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, "American Foreign Policy, 1922", p.2577.

obvious that "...the 'Old Guard' sold the honor of America for the privilege of nominating a reactionary for President".¹ Cummings stressed the pettiness of partisan politics by saying that:

The Republican platform reactionary and provincial is the very apotheosis of political expediency...(and) it will search in vain for a constructive suggestion for the reformation of the conditions which it criticises and deplores. It is the work of men concerned more with material things than with human rights.... There is no mental dishonesty more transparent than that which expresses fealty to a League of Nations while opposing the only League of Nations that exists. 2

It was on a note of despondency that the Chairman's uncanny accuracy came through when he declared:

Generations yet unborn will look back to this era and pay their tribute of honor to the man who (could lead) a people through troubled ways...nothing that we say can add or detract from that fame that will flow down the channels of history. 3

The issue of the League of Nations was the referendum upon which the Presidential Office was filled. On November 4, 1920,

¹New York Times Current History, vol.xii, no.2, 1920, "The Democratic National Convention" p.827.

²Ibid., pp.823-824.

³Ibid., p.825.

the United States electorate voted into office Warren G. Harding. The Republican Administration came into office with the largest majority in the history of the nation.¹ In foreign policy, the new government was bound by the problems which the Wilson government had failed to resolve and which the Republicans themselves had added to. It was acclaimed that:

The interpretation of this victory was left almost entirely to men irreconcilably opposed to the League of Nations....The vote was construed, not as an endorsement of the consistent policy of the Republican Senators in favoring the League with reservations, nor of the Republican platform in its advocacy of something closely approaching the League, nor of the viewpoint expressed by the 31 most eminent members of the Republican Party, but as a national condemnation, root and branch, of the existing League of Nations. 2

In such an environment, very little was certain and the Republican Administration appeared to be very largely opportunistic. Invariably, the most pressing problem concerned the naval arms conflict that was a threat to the uneasy peace. The first order of business was the enunciation of an appropriations bill that was to allocate more than 100 million dollars to the original Naval Bill of 1916.³ The introduction of the appropriations bill

¹New York Times, November 4, 1920, p.1.

²Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, "American Foreign Policy" p.2578.

³United States Congressional Record 67th Congress, 3rd Session, p.1218.

tended to exacerbate the already strained relations between the United States, Japan and Great Britain. From an American point of view, this renewed armament build-up was reported to be the result of "...a state of mind in which a nation expecting attack by some other country causes preparation to meet the attack".¹ And so by the spring of 1921, the new American government under President Harding was not willing to sacrifice its conservative policy of isolationism and alternately adhered to the logic of military preparation.

¹United States Senate Document no.126, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, p.865.

Chapter 2 THE INERTIA OF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE

THE failure of the Versailles Peace Treaty to obtain ratification in the American Senate, compelled Great Britain to re-evaluate her international position. Nowhere was re-evaluation more urgent than in her foreign relations with the United States. The immediate understanding that was produced by the rejection, did not directly concern the paramountcy question, although that issue was indirectly of transcendent importance.¹ Through a diplomatic gesture that was designed to off-set any renewed or direct confrontation arising out of that question, British statesmen evolved a conservative plan of compromise. It was first exposed to the British public on the eve of the American election when Lloyd George spoke before the British Parliament.

...we are aware of the forthcoming
American Presidential election and
...the renewal of the Anglo-Japan-
ese Agreement...is under consider-
ation by His Majesty's Government. 2

The existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had proven to be a ubiquitous barrier to an effective implementation of America's Far Eastern policy since the Russo-Japanese War.³

¹British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, p.309. See also: L.C.Christie Papers, vol.8, File 26, 1921, pp.1917-1919.

²British House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol.cxxx, 1920, p.2366.

³Loring C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.3, File 6-7, "Memorandum on American Foreign Policy, 1922" p.2584.

If the British had not had such an agreement with the Japanese, the United States believed that their interests in the 'China Market' would have been far more stable than was the present position. The foremost opponent of the Peact Treaty, Senator H.C.Lodge, concluded of the British-Japanese pact that, "... the continuance of the Alliance...could not fail to be regarded as seriously prejudicial to (American) interests."¹ Additionally, the failure of diplomacy between the United States and Japan would not have provided such a high degree of uncertainty which existed in lieu of any British aid to Japan in a war situation between the two Pacific nations.² Within the United States, it was believed that, should the two Pacific Powers eventually go to war, Britain would find that it would be impossible to remain secure in neutrality for, "...geography and economics would compromise Britain in the direction of pro-Japanese intervention...."³ The wide-spread acceptance of such a belief was perpetuated with the knowledge that a partial preventive measure had been written into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911. Under the extended feature of the Treaty, Britain had insisted upon the inclusion of Article IV:

¹ United States Senate Document no.125, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, pp.43-44.

² Loring C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, p.6915.

³ T.Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference p.28.

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of general Arbitration with a third Power, it is Agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force. 1

Although Great Britain and the United States had failed to agree on a Treaty of Arbitration, a Peace Commission Treaty was concluded between the two countries in September 1914.² Britain was of the opinion that this Peace Commission Treaty was synonymous with the spirit of Article IV in the 1914 Agreement and she readily substituted the Peace Commission Treaty for the Treaty of Arbitration.³ But much had changed since 1914 and as the United States had no similar arrangement with Japan, she could not absolutely rule out war between herself and Britain. It was an accepted fact that according to Admiral Sims, the United States had no faith in Article IV.⁴ From this it was certain that the Americans could not, under present circumstances, risk a naval confrontation in one ocean while the other was controlled by a potential enemy.⁵

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, p.6915.

²Ibid., p.6915.

³R.Young, "The Anglo-Japanese Alliance" The Contemporary Review vol.cxx, 1921, p.16.

⁴British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, p.310.

⁵Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, p.7511.

The impending American election brought Great Britain around once again into looking at the American position on the Alliance that they had put forth at Paris. There, the United States delegation had tried to persuade the British that the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would facilitate an armament limitation conference. But the British rejected the American proposition because they were convinced that both the Agreement and disarmament would be positively effected when the United States ratified the entire Paris Agreement. However, in the spring of 1920, the United States was not a member of the League of Nations and subsequently no limiting conference had materialized. A British governmental memorandum dated June 1, 1920 revealed the Far Eastern Department's stand on the Alliance:

The Japanese policy had become...
opposed to the best interests of not
only Great Britain and the United
States but China as well, having for
its ultimate aim a complete hegemony
over China politically, economically
and probably military. 1

If Britain could somehow re-assure the United States of where her real interests were in relation to America's Far Eastern foreign policy, there was a very good possibility that a disarmament conference could still come about.² In the light

¹T. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference p.28.

²Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, p.6941.

of a possible Republican Party win in the forthcoming American Presidential election, the British Cabinet's consideration of the question resulted in the following declaration being presented to the League of Nations.

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan have come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 13th July, 1911,...is not entirely consistent with the letter of the Covenant (of the League of Nations) which both Governments earnestly desire to respect. They have the honour therefore to notify the League that if this Agreement is to continue after July 1921, it must be in a form which is not inconsistent with that Covenant. 1

In effect, the presentation of that memorandum to the League of Nations activated the termination clause in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It was 'tantamount to a denunciation' and thereby set the date for its expiry for July 13, 1921.²

The British ploy of announcing her intention to terminate the Alliance was centered around an appeasement gesture to the Republican Party in the event of a victory by them. It was hoped that in that event the new administration would either re-commit the Treaty of Versailles to a Senate vote with the Lodge reservations, or outrightly call a conference on the limitation of armament.³ If the Democrats

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, p.7512.
See also: British House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol. cxxxi, 1920, p.2590.

²L. C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, op.cit., p.7511.

³Ibid., vol.3, File 6-7, p.2579.

were returned to office, the British Cabinet was certain to have the disarmament conference that they had worked for because Wilson was running his campaign on the League of Nations issue and America's entry into that body. Furthermore, the British Cabinet was cognizant of the formula that Charles E. Hughes had put forth before the campaign began, which had asserted a willingness and intent to stabilize peace. ¹

Soon after the Republican nomination of Warren G. Harding as their Presidential candidate, Harding made a campaign promise that heightened Britain's hopes and seemed to justify her actions. In his promise to mitigate world tension over the perpetual threat of war, Harding announced:

In the call of conscience...(there is)
an insistant voice for the reduction
of armament throughout the world...
and...we must give of American leadership
to that invaluable accomplishment. ²

The early signs of the Republican campaign regarding America's spirit of co-operation in foreign affairs was most encouraging to the British Government. Added to this encouragement Harding further stated:

There are two types of international
relationships. One is an offensive
and defensive alliance of Great Powers.
The other type is a society of free

¹ See above, p.17.

² The New York Times, July 23, 1920, p.4.

nations...(and) such an association
I favor with all my heart,....One
need not care what it is called....
Our concern is solely with the sub-
stance, not the form thereof. 1

To Great Britain, the 'substance' that Harding was referring to, most certainly concerned an armament limitation conference. The 'offensive and defensive alliance' had to be a reference to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had just been slated for the shelf. In his application of the principle for the preservation of peace, Harding resolved that:

(He) would take and combine all that is good and excise all that is bad from both organizations, (the World Court and the League)...so that we may still have a remnant of the world's aspirations...of helpful co-operation in the ultimate realization. 2

When Harding won the election on November 4, 1920, and when the official announcement came forth that Mr. Charles E. Hughes would become Harding's Secretary of State, British expectations reached their zenith.³

By early February 1921, it was reported to Lloyd George that the eminent Republican, Colonel E. House,

...believed that the United States must and will ultimately come into (the League). His view is that the

¹Meighen Papers, vol.29, 1921, p.17551.

²Ibid., p.17554.

³Ibid., pp.17550-17554.

President-elect...will (have to for)
his election pledges compel him to
do so.... 1

In the same month the British Prime Minister was asked if His Majesty's Government had decided upon its ship-building policy for the coming year.² The answer that Lloyd George gave was: "No policy has yet been decided upon and would not be until after the new Administration had taken office."³ However, the inauguration date on March 4, 1921 came and went without any proposal from Harding. The Republican administration "...swept the whole international slate entirely clean and began back at zero..."⁴ Consequently, Great Britain's diplomatic strategy relating to the termination notice came to naught.

By March 17 the British House of Commons was reacting with mixed emotions to the American naval escalation appropriations bill.⁵ In an atmosphere charged with apprehension and indignation, the Common's pressed the Prime Minister for positive counter-measures to off-set the American programme.

¹Meighen Papers, vol.29, 1921, p.17538.

²British House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol.cxxxviii, 1921, pp.754-755.

³Ibid., p.755.

⁴Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.3, File 6+7, p.2579..

⁵See above p.21.

Member of Parliament, F.G. Banbury pressed his point in a speech before the Commons.

America is suddenly building a large fleet. What for? Certainly there is Japan, but with the exception of Japan, there is only one other country at which this large fleet can be aimed and that is England. If that is so, let us not be caught napping...we must maintain the superiority of the English fleet at all hazards. 1

Another Member of Parliament, William Long, put the American Naval action in perspective by observing that:

We see the Naval Committee of the United States of America is laying down the principle that America shall maintain a navy at least equal to that of any power. That is a claim of equality...this country has never accepted (it) in the past and never will accept (it)...2

Lord Lee, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, summarized the intent behind the American move when he reported to the Cabinet that the United States had rationalized that:

...(History) has shown us (how) the British Empire grew to such a Power in the world, and we (Americans) intend to be the Great Power in the (near) future...3

At the first session of the new American Congress, deliberation had begun on a bill that would unconditionally

¹British House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol.cxxxix, 1921, p.1787-1788.

²Ibid., pp.1766-1767.

³British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, p.310.

guarantee the United States the coveted privilege and honour of becoming First World Power. An American Senator was to conclude:

...if we are going to compete with Great Britain and Japan in matters of foreign policy--then we must compete with them in armament...¹

The first estimate of the Construction Bill was to include:

2 aircraft carriers	at 57	million dollars
3 battleships	at 48.7	million dollars
1 destroyer	at 4.5	million dollars
2 submarines	at 3.8	million dollars.

²

Those initial estimates notwithstanding, the naval statistics that were presented to the British House of Commons on March 14, 1921, revealed that the United States had already surpassed Great Britain as the leading sea power.³

On March 17, the British Cabinet released their own appropriations figures for the coming year's naval construction programme, which was to begin forthwith. This venture allocated funding for four additional capital ships at a cost of £2.5 million.⁴ In the Cabinet report it was stated that:

The sum is a maximum...there will be no supplementary estimates under this head. The £2,500,000...today (will allow us to) launch a larger sum in the future years. ⁵

¹United States Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 1921, p.3180.

²Ibid., 1st Session, p.3205.

³British House of Commons Parliamentary Debates vol.cxxxix, 1921, p.1082.

⁴Ibid., p.1775.

⁵Ibid., p.1776.

Connected to the American Naval Appropriations Bill for more than 100 million dollars, there was a resolution that was a carry-over clause from the Naval Act of 1916 that was known as the Hensley resolution. This resolution of 1916 stated:

Upon completion of the war in Europe, or as soon thereafter as it might be done, the President of the United States is authorized to invite all the great governments of the world to send representatives to a conference...to consider the question of disarmament...¹

This safety clause could have been implemented by President Wilson had he chose to utilize it to effect a disarmament conference. He did not because the United States had a standing agreement with Britain and France which stated that if the United States were attacked by another sea power both 'guarantors' would come to her aid.² The guarantee allowed the United States to continue her armament production in relative security from attack. Subsequently, there was no need for the United States President to activate the Hensley authorization. However, Britain's pledge to the United States was due to expire in 1922 and "...if no settlement between the United States and Japan...is reached, there may be war in the Pacific as early as next year".³

¹United States Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, p.8813.

²See above: pp.8-9.

³Canadian Department of External Affairs, vol.916, 1921, Memorandum marked Secret and Confidential, "British Policy in the Pacific", p.3.

A similar resolution was introduced by Senator William E. Borah and it was appended to the Appropriations Bill then before Congress. Borah's ammendment came after he had received and examined reports presented by the Secretaries of both the Treasury and War.¹ Their briefs stated that within a period of thirty months, the United States would have to expend more than 17 billion dollars on refunding operations that had been connected to the armament building programme since 1916.² It was the Secretaries' belief that the presently contemplated and unprecedented allocation would be a direct cause for economic dislocation of industrial and financial institutions in the United States that would eventually lead the United States to economic ruin.³ It was with this knowledge that Borah formulated his resolution.

The President of the United States is authorized and requested to invite the Governments of Great Britain and Japan to send representatives to a conference which shall be charged with the duty of promptly entering into an understanding or agreement by which the naval expenditure and building programs of each of the said Governments...shall be substantially reduced annually during the next five years...⁴

¹United States Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 1st Session, p.1408.

²Ibid., p.1408.

³Ibid., p.1408.

⁴Ibid., p.3223.

However, the Forth resolution, like the Ten ley resolution, lacked the compulsory obligation, for it only authorized and requested the President to initiate proceedings that might facilitate disarmament, nothing more.

By the spring of 1921, it appeared that the United States was on the verge of displacing the British Empire as premier world power. To understand the circumstances that produced this phenomenon, it becomes imperative to investigate the Canadian connection to the Atlantic Triangle partnership.

WITHOUT exception, as the senior member of the overgrown British Empire, the Dominion of Canada stood to gain more than any other party from the new system of collective security embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. As a member of the North Atlantic community, the Canadian reaction to the new system was that for the settlement of international disputes, Canada was in line with public opinion in the withdrawal of the United States from the Versailles Conference. But once it became evident that Germany would not return to the League, and that the world would not become a member of the League, public opinion for return to security through internationalism, and the opinion of the Canadian public, had been cancelled. To recognize the inherent danger that was implied in the complete rejection of the Versailles Conference on the one hand, and the extending ramifications of the renewed naval rivalry between America and Britain on the other. Added to the crisis, the Canadian position vice-versa the Americans and the British became more than that of mere arbitership, because Canada had become a willing participant in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. To facilitate continuity and an understanding of the methods by which the Canadian Government actively pursued a policy to reconcile the opposition of the other two Atlantic Triangle parties, it becomes necessary to retrospectively trace the development and early course of Canadian-Japanese international affairs.

Before the outbreak of the First World War, Canadian autonomy in foreign affairs was subjected to the pragmatic calculations of the Imperial Government.¹ In the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation that was concluded between Great Britain and Japan in 1904, the framework of Canadian-Japanese foreign relations was tacitly structured because of the limited scope of her self-autonomy. In the preamble of 1904, article one made this clear.

The subjects of each High Contracting Party shall have full liberty to enter, travel and reside in any part of the dominions and possessions of the other High Contracting Party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property...and enjoy all the rights and privileges enjoyed by native subjects. 2.

Consequently, this extensive and far-reaching agreement automatically embodied long-term implications for the young North American nation, for the same under the definition of 'dominion' as specified in the Treaty. However, within a year of its negotiation reaction within both the Canadian House of Commons and within British Columbia was apparent. A block of

¹A.P.Keith, Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions 1918-1931 London: Oxford University Press, 1934, p.xv.

²British House of Commons, Command Paper no.7522, July 16, 1894 "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Imperial Japan" p.2.

representatives within the Canadian House of Commons were leading the attack. They resolved that the Dominion should firmly attempt to clarify its own position vis-a-vis the implications that stemmed from the open-endedness of the immigration flow that was implied in the agreement. The impetus behind their resolution evolved from an understanding that the conflicting racial differences between the residents of British Columbia and immigrant Japanese were threatening to erupt into race-riots. Their forewarning was not heeded and the problem in British Columbia continued to progress toward that end.¹ It was not until 1905 that Canada became a signatory to the Treaty and thereby gained some degree of control over her immigration quota's concerning the Japanese emigration to Canada.²

As indicated earlier, British Imperial foreign policy underwent a shift from a purely economic motive to a strategic and protectionist policy near the end of the nineteenth

¹Note: (The principle of including a clause exempting the Dominions from participation in Commercial Trade Agreements, unless they expressly gave notice of their intention of inclusion, was by-passed in the 1894 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan.) See also: A.G.Dewey, The American Political Science Review vol.xxv, no.2, May 1931, p.291. And: R.M.Dawson, The Government of Canada Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968, pp.48-49.

²A.R.M Lower, Canada and the Far East New York: Macmillan and Company, 1940, p.68.

century.¹ Contiguous to this policy re-alignment, every opportunity was exploited in the hope of courting a lasting friendship with the Japanese. It was to this end that Canadian autonomy in her immigration policies toward the Japanese, was allocated a backseat in the Imperial design. The tenor of the Canadian government's subordinate position to the higher aspirations of Imperial prerogative was exemplified when Wilfrid Laurier said that, "...whatever policy of restriction we may adopt against the...(Chinese) we cannot afford, for the sake of Imperial policy to treat the Japanese as we have the Chinese..."²

This example of subordinating the Dominions' rights to the will of Imperial directorship was not sustained in the province of British Columbia. In fact, protestation of such directives took the form of anti-Japanese laws within the provincial legislative assembly.³ The Imperial British Government's attitude to the provincial assertiveness was directly channelled through the Office of the Colonial Secretary. That agency repeatedly urged the federal government of Canada to rescind the province's legislation since

¹See above, pp.1-3.

²The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs (1901) Ottawa: pp.427-428.

³Canadian Royal Commission Report (1903) "Anti-Japanese Legislation in the Province of British Columbia" pp.5-17.

the anti-Japanese laws were in open contravention to the terms of the 1894 agreement. While the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 was just beginning to relieve the pressure on the British Cabinet, Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain cabled the Governor General of Canada that;

I have to request that you will impress upon your minister that restrictive legislation---the British Columbia Alien Labour Act ---appears to be...extremely repugnant to the sentiments of the people and government of Japan...¹

However, British Imperial directives failed to make commanding inroads in British Columbia where defiance was most overt.

The Vancouver Riot of 1907 was a prime example of the emotional pitch and indiscriminate violence that fell upon Chinese and Japanese immigrants alike. Touched off by economic issues connected with the fishing and forestry industry in the province, the Canadian, and in turn the British government, was placed in a most awkward and embarrassing situation.² The federal government attempted to make quick amends for the property losses to the immigrants and simultaneously appointed Deputy Minister of Labour, Mackenzie King, to head an inquiry into the Riot.³ That rapid action on the

¹Canadian Royal Commission Report (1903) p.155.

²Canadian Royal Commission Report (1907)"The Vancouver Riot" pp.5-15.

³Ibid., p.2.

part of the Federal Government, was brought about by an awareness that a flood gate would adversely affect British-Canadian relations; and in turn their own activities, the generous contributions made to the victims of the flood, and movement within the same Government for a clarification of technical legislation connected with the subject of Japanese immigration. The Conservative Party's leader, Mr. Robert B. Lorimer, reaffirmed his party's position on the same issue in a speech that was filled with overtones of warning:

To part of all our shores to be
overrun with millions and become
dominated by an alien race. Let
it be remembered that a million
men's country... (and) the sea
flood will flow in the veins of
those who built Canada as flooded
in the veins of those who built
Great Britain.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the latitude of Canadian foreign relations was limited and always bound to the Imperial policy that was designated by the British government. However, at the Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers in 1911, some progress was made toward Dominion self-responsibility. The slow-moving course of self-autonomy in international foreign relations, prompted Canadian Prime

¹Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs (1927) Ottawa:
p. 377.

Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, to establish a working formula whereby the country would be able to handle her own affairs. Although it was a meagre beginning, Laurier's impromptu established for the record a desire for a more progressive policy.¹

When the war broke out in 1914, Canada immediately committed a military force of 33,000 men to the European conflict.² As far as autonomy and foreign policy were concerned, it was declared that, "the war, itself the culmination of a clearly marked period of...foreign policy was bound to produce a new phase when we should be confronted with the task of redefining our position..."³ A new phase for Canadian autonomy began in December 1916 when British Prime Minister Asquith resigned as head of the government and was replaced by Lloyd George. Asquith had become disillusioned with domestic problems and was dissatisfied at the way in which the war effort was organized.⁴ Within a month of taking office, Lloyd George brought into existence the Imperial War Cabinet. Officially, the designated powers of the Cabinet were to direct the civil and military operations of the war under the combined leadership of the Empire's Prime Ministers. Functionally, its role was

¹M.Ollivier (ed.), The Colonial and Imperial Conferences From 1887-1937 vol.ii, Part 1, Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954, pp.58-78.

²Canadian House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates vol.cxviii, 1914, pp.8-9.

³L.C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.9, File 30, 1922, p.9272.

⁴I.H. Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations 1908-1923 London: Athlone Press, 1972, pp.196-202.

purely advisory. The intrinsic value of the Imperial War Cabinet lay in its capacity to maintain smooth and cordial relations between the Prime Ministers of the Dominions and the British Cabinet.¹ Extrinsically, the Imperial War Cabinet recognized and resolved to revamp the positions of the Dominion Governments in their quest for self-autonomy.²

The Imperial War Conferencees are of the opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to deal with during the war, and that it should be the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities. 3

While the hostilities continued to sap manpower, material and morale both in the field and on the homefront, a note of assurance and hope appeared in the future for Dominion status. It was widely acclaimed that:

The conditions of peace will...not only define our purpose and responsibility as an Empire towards other Powers; they will also...largely regulate the terms of our partnership as nations beneath one Crown. When ever in the future we discuss our joint defence, our common liabilities, our policy as an Empire amid...international affairs, these conditions

¹British House of Commons, Command Paper no.9005, 1918, "The Imperial War Cabinet Report, 1917" pp.1-6.

²M.Ollivier, (ed.), The Colonial and Imperial Conferences From 1887-1937 p.175.

³J.A.Stevenson, "Canada and Foreign Policy" Foreign Affairs vol.1, no.3, 1923, p.109.

of peace will be the hinge on which
all discussions will turn. 1

The common effort and sacrifice in the war led to the recognition of a status of equality between the governments of the Empire.² The conditions of peace did indeed formalize the partnership of equal nations under one Crown but at the same time their responsibilities evolved in similar proportion. By 1919, Canadian self-determination in foreign affairs took another leap forward when the country signed the Paris Peace Treaty on and under her own volition.³ At that first world conference after the war, Canada established her separate identity within the Empire as a member of the League of Nations. However prestigious that occasion of membership may have been, Canada was soon destined to play a much more formidable role in world affairs.

Basically, the Canadian role was a matter of geography. In a paper read at a meeting of the American Historical Association in 1934, Professor J. Brebner of Columbia University observed that, "...the most flattering commentary on

¹A.G.Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy: The Canadian Contribution vol.2, Toronto: Longmans Green and Company, 1929, pp.4-5.

²A.B.Keith, Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions 1918-1931, p.4.

³A.G.Dewey, "Parliamentary Control of External Relations in the British Dominions" The American Political Science Review, vol.xxv, no.2, May 1931, p.287.

Canada's rise to nationhood has been the...description of her as interpreter and intermediary between the United Kingdom and the United States".¹ Before this, the American Presidential advisor, Colonel House, declared that:

Canada has a most important part to play in maintaining the good relations between Great Britain and the United States because we (Canadians) understand the American people so much better than British people (do) and on the other hand, no doubt we understand the British people better than they did. 2

Here then was the essence of Canada's new role in international affairs, at least it was just after the First World War. The nation's diplomatic representatives rose to the challenge and through their efforts, assertions and discretion played the role of intermediary and interpreter in one of the most fascinating episodes in the diplomatic history of modern times.

Internally, the Canadian political scene was fragmented at the end of the war. It has been summed up by one biographer that the policies carried out by the coalition government during the war were about to rent that leading body.

¹J.B.Brebner, "Canada, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference", Political Science Quarterly, vol.50, no.1, 1934, p.45.

²Meighen Papers, vol.29, 1921, (Letter from N.R.Rowell to A. Meighen and L.George) pp.17538-17539.

The war had a cataclysmic effect on politics, disturbing traditional loyalties and dissolving the two-party system. Conscription had made the Conservative party anathema among French Canadians...railway nationalization...had estranged much of the English speaking business class...(and) the failure of the government to reduce the tariff was the undoing of the ministry... 1

In order to regain the majority vote lost through their policies of alienation during the war, the Progressive Party platform promised full reciprocity with the United States and free trade with the United Kingdom.² To assure the viability of those plans the government realized that the international relations between Great Britain and the United States had to become stabilized. Canadians then in a position to understand the problems, were keenly aware of the ramifications extending from American isolation on the one hand and the naval armament build-up and the threat to British supremacy on the other.³

Canadian public figures, not unlike their counterparts in the United States, had viewed the Japanese Siberian

¹R.Graham, Arthur Meighen vol.2, Toronto: Clark Irwin and Company, 1956, pp.5-6.

²Ibid., p.6. See also: W.K.Hancock, A Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of Economic Policy 1918-1939 vol.2, part 1, Toronto: Oxford Press, 1940, pp.145-149.

³Canadian House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol.iii, 1921, p.2657.

Expedition with much suspicion and apprehension and condoned the American containment action in that regard. A University of Toronto Professor claimed; "broadly speaking, Canadians appear to regard Japan with suspicion...and there is a tendency to characterize Japan as militarist and imperialist ...(which) plays a part in molding public opinion and influencing policy".¹ Such a pointed view in no small way added to the current belief that war between the United States and the members of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was probable. As a member of the British Empire, Canada had become a signatory to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance when it was renewed in 1911.² The newly acquired power of Canadian foreign policy makers was in the process of being tested, for those men were gravely aware that if war broke out, the sovereignty of the nation would not only be jeopardized but extinguished:

...in the event of war between Japan and the United States, China would intervene against Japan, which would oblige Great Britain (and Canada) to come into the war...against China ...and against the United States. 3

¹V.Anderson (ed.), World Current and Canada's Course Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1937, p.41.

²Canadian House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, vol.iii, 1921, p.2639. (This was the first great international instrument of high policy that Canada entered into).

³Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs (1921) pp.98-99. cited in: A.G.Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy : The Canadian Contribution p.72.

It was under these unfavourable circumstances that, "the government of Canada was compelled to take greater cognizance of developments in the western Pacific and...(the) relations between Great Britain and the United States".¹ One writer flatly stated that with such a surrealistic danger foremost in his thoughts, "Arthur Meighen instinctively, yet deliberately...moved to prevent that calamity".²

Throughout the American Presidential campaign and during the inauguration, the Canadian Parliament's views concerning the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were wholly negative. One Member of Parliament voiced that concensus before the House of Commons when he said:

The Government of this country cannot ignore the feeling that does exist in the United States in reference to this Agreement. I submit for the consideration of the Government...that in the interest of good relations...this treaty should be abrogated. ³

After the inauguration of President Harding and while the American Congress was in the process of deliberating the Naval Bill, there was a considerable amount of speculation that the

¹Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen vol.2, p.68.

²Ibid., p.68.

³Canadian House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol.iii, 1921, p.2639.

Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be renewed.¹ The question of re-negotiation was prompted expressly because the United States had not initiated a disarmament conference but obversely pressed the point of naval superiority through their building programme. Arthur Meighen, as head of the government, was opposed to renewal ostensibly because it was synonymous with giving Japan licence in the pursuit of policies of aggression. He was convinced that the Alliance was averse to the principles of collective security that were embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Finally, Meighen knew that if the Alliance was renewed, the wrath of the United States would fall upon Canada within the same hour as hostilities between the United States and Japan broke out.² Professor J.B. Brebner was the first to make the observation that Canada was the first to propose a Pacific Conference to deal with Pacific Questions.³ To wit, Meighen cabled London:

The question of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which I assume will be decided at the proposed meeting of Prime Ministers in June, has been considered carefully in Cabinet and ...we feel...we should terminate the Alliance and at once endeavour to bring about a conference of Pacific Powers...for the purpose of adjusting Far Eastern and Pacific questions. Such a straight forward course would

¹Canadian House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol.iii, 1921, pp.2639-2552.

²J.B.Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1949, p.282.

³J.B.Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference" pp.45-48.

enable us to end the alliance with good grace and would reconcile our position in respect of China and the United States. It will be a practical application of the principles of the League of Nations (and) should it eventually result in a working Pacific concert, the gain to British--American relations is obvious.¹

The British Cabinet's reaction to Meighen's proposal was a wait-and-see attitude. During the interim, the Canadian House of Commons began debate concerning Canada's course of action at the forthcoming Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers. As the Canadian representative to the London meeting, Meighen made it quite clear that the government of Canada would have final powers of ratification on any resolved action that the Imperial Ministers might see fit to implement.² The unanimity within Parliament concerning the Alliance is quite clearly shown. One opposition Member of Parliament said, "...an exchange of two or three dispatches...should make it perfectly plain to the Imperial Government what the mind of this government is...(that being) a negative one with regard to the renewal of the...Alliance".³ Before the Prime Minister and his aids, Colonel C.C. Ballantyne and Loring C. Christie, left for London, Meighen finalized official Canadian opinion by reiterating that the future of

¹British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record, no.23, vol.24, 1921, pp.101-102.

²Canadian House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, vol.iii, p.2640.

³Ibid., p.2660.

the Alliance, "...is a subject of great and definite moment ...and if there is one Dominion which, more than any other the question...is of importance, it is the Dominion of Canada".¹ As regarded the relationship between the members of the Atlantic Triangle, Meighen concluded, "I need not enlarge upon how serious...is the deliberation that must take place...the importance of it arises from the interest of the United States...and the interest of Great Britain... but the importance of it to us arises out of the very great interest of the United States in the renewal or non-renewal thereof".² Canada had come of age in the arena of world affairs. Her government well understood the issues involved in her place within the Atlantic Triangle. In that union, national security, internal relations and a separate identity all came together. Her key diplomat, Arthur Meighen, made it his task to guarantee that war would not come to the North American Continent. It was on that mission that he left for London in the first week of June, 1921.



¹Canadian House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, vol.iii, 1921, p.2639.

²Ibid., p.2639,

BETWEEN the end of May and the middle of June 1921, the British Cabinet met in conference to discuss the questions and plan of strategy that they would pursue at the forthcoming Cabinet of Dominion and Imperial Ministers. Since the problem of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the single-most important issue to be discussed at the Imperial meetings, the British Cabinet laboriously collected and collated the pertinent material that they had requested on the topic from their subordinates. Although they wished to see a modification of the Alliance, both the War Office and the Admiralty favoured a renewal.¹

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Earl Curzon, informed his colleagues that both Prime Minister Hughes of Australia and Prime Minister Massey of New Zealand desired renewal, but were willing to go along with a modification of the Alliance.² Asserting that the problem for Empire relations rested on the Canadian position, Curzon pointed out that Prime Minister Meighen was hostile to any form of renewal. Owing to Canada's proximity to the United States, their mutual living patterns and the dominant influence of the United States upon the aspiring economic trade relations of post-war Canadian business, it was natural that Canada should oppose renewal.³

¹British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, p.304.

²Ibid., pp.304-305.

³Ibid., p.304.

Curzon also made it known that certain Canadians were profoundly affected by the problems created by Japanese immigration in British Columbia and that they were the foremost group resolutely opposing renewal in the country.¹ It was the Secretary's belief that these considerations had led Mr. Meighen to propose a substitute for the existing Agreement and to initiate a Pacific Conference for a solution to the entire problems of that region of the world.² Furthermore, Curzon hoped that the Cabinet would not place the Empire's foreign policy in the hands of a Dominion government by following the lead presented by the Canadian Prime Minister.³ With reference to a cable that had been received from the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Auchland Geddes, Curzon reassuringly pointed out that: "...the renewal of the Alliance would have a sobering effect on the extremists (in the United States) who were...calling for additional armaments."⁴

The Secretary for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, while agreeing that Australia and New Zealand were both pressing for a renewal of the Alliance out of fear and alarm over the rapid growth of the Japanese Navy, said the Canadian Premier

¹British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, p.304.

²Ibid., p.304.

³Ibid., no.23, vol.24, 1921, pp.99-100.

⁴op.cit., p.305.

...had proposed a Conference of the Pacific Powers, and also that Sir Robert Borden should be sent to Washington to discuss the matter, and (he) had even gone so far as to suggest their making an independent agreement (with the United States) if His Majesty's Government decided to renew the Alliance. 1

It was understood that such an independent line of policy would be the initial action in the fracturing of Imperial solidarity and Empire relations. Churchill declared that the central resolution of the Canadian Prime Minister's was the same in Britain and the United States. He stated that what Canada wanted was to ensure the peace of the Pacific and the only difference was that the Prime Minister of Canada suggested a different means to attaining it. Churchill's personal hope was that the question of a Pacific Conference would not be dispensed with, as it would be greatly advantageous to bring the United States and Japan to the conference table, for "... His Majesty's Government had decided to maintain a one-Power standard."² To that end, he was in agreement with Lord Curzon for a renewal of the Alliance; however, the Colonial Secretary proposed that its terms be limited to a shorter period of time. Churchill's compromising proposal was to renew in modified terms, while favouring a Pacific Conference and

¹British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, p.306.

²Ibid., p.307.

simultaneously begin negotiations with the United States for such a Conference.¹

It was pointed out that the British government had informed the Japanese that if the Alliance was to be continued, it must be re-drafted in such a form as to be in accord with their mutual obligations toward the League of Nations.² With that in mind, A.J. Balfour, President of the Council, favoured renewal, for he argued that the Alliance had worked as a restraining measure to armed Japanese expansionism. Balfour declared that:

It must be remembered that the Japanese were not allowed to go to Australia, or in fact to any place where there was a white population. It was therefore somewhat unreasonable to say that she was not to expand in a country like China--where there was a yellow race. 3

Curzon rebuffed Balfour's statement, emphasising Japan's aggressive designs in the Far East:

Almost at the door of this great, helpless body there existed Japan, whose national temperament was fiercely imperialistic and where the German spirit of disciplined aggression had been imbued to a great extent. By her actions in Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, Manchuria

¹British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, pp.307-308.

²Ibid., pp.299-300.

³Ibid., p.309.

and Shangtung, Japan was already forming a ring around China. 1

The Secretary of Foreign Affairs concluded that, to bring out the point that the Alliance acted as a deterrent to Japan's armed aggression and expansion, was therefore not advisable.

Prime Minister Lloyd George, stressed the point that if the Alliance was not renewed, Japan would interpret that the British had dropped them out of fear of the United States. This would not only affect Britain's waning prestige in the Far East but throughout the world.² Considering how close this understanding was to the real issue of the paramountcy succession struggle, countenance had to be strictly observed. The Prime Minister was highly in favour of the Pacific Conference proposition that the Canadian had put forth, but after Britain had made it crystal clear to the other two parties that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would continue above all else.³

The results of the British Cabinet's deliberations upon the future of the Alliance resolved into an agreement that:

- (a) At the forthcoming meeting with the representatives of the Dominions and India, to support the proposal that the President of the United States of America should be asked to summon a Conference of the Pacific Powers, but only after it had been made quite clear to Japan and the other Powers concerned that we have no intention of dropping the Alliance

¹ British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.25, 1921, pp.300-301.

² Ibid., p.312.

³ Ibid., p.312.

- (b) That the period of the renewed Alliance should be shorter than the previous term of ten years and that its terms should be so drawn as not to be inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations. With the latter object in view, conversations preceding the renewal of the Alliance should be entered into with the United States of America and China. If the policy was accepted by the Dominions and India, Japan should be fully informed
- (c) In order to give time for the above procedure, the Alliance should be renewed previously for such further periods of three months as might prove necessary
- (d) To invite the Admiralty and the War Office to prepare Papers showing the assistance given by Japan in the late War in the Naval operations and in the supply of armaments to Russia respectively, and to ask the Committee of Imperial Defence, to prepare, before the meeting of the Imperial Cabinet, a Paper on the strategic situation in the Far East in the event of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement being determined. 1

The month of June marked the turning point in the arms race between the United States and Great Britain. In Washington, the debate over the Naval Appropriations Bill was coming to a vote in the American Congress. In London, the Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers was about to get under way. Within both bodies the prime concerns were the same but each gauged theirs from the opposite end of the spectrum. Although both countries wished to alleviate the

¹British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no. 23, vol. 25, 1921, p313.

threat of war that was perpetuated through their respective naval escalation policies, neither country would take the all important initiative of calling a conference to reverse the trend. In the United States it had been a foregone conclusion that unilateral disarmament was equated with dereliction of duty while the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remained in operation.¹ With one ally in the Pacific and the other in the Atlantic, the American executive was impervious to the initiation of conference talks until the United States Navy could be assured of coping with that situation in both Oceans.² The Naval Bill then before Congress, would facilitate such a guarantee to the naval forces of the United States. Once the appropriations guarantee came through, the United States would feel secure enough to either initiate or become a member to an armament settlement conference called by Britain. Up to June 16, the American government had not made any move to initiate a conference of that nature. On that date, the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was asked, "...whether any advances had been made by the Government of the United States of America, either officailly or or unofficially, for the reduction of naval expenditure...", the answer was, "His Majesty's Government has received no

¹C.N.Spinks, "The Termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance" Pacific Historical Review, vol.6, 1937, p.326.

²United States Congressional Record 64th Congress, 1st Session, p.8813.

communication on the subject from the United States Government".¹ Within a month, that trend was to be radically reversed.

The Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers that began in London on June 20, was lauded to be one of the most important conferences in the history of modern man. In the United States it was characterized as being, "...composed of the leading British and Colonial statesmen who gathered for the discussion of the problems of supreme importance to not only the British Empire, but the world".² During the inaugural address delivered by Prime Minister Lloyd George, the theme of the closed-session talks was released to the media.

We are ready to discuss with American statesmen any proposal for the limitation of armaments which they wish to set forth, and we can undertake that no such overtures will find lack of willingness on our part to meet them. 3

As the second session began, the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. W.M. Hughes, came to the foreground as an advocate for the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. He began by stating that the case for renewal was very strong, if not overwhelming, and that to Australia the Treaty with Japan had

¹ British House of Commons Parliamentary Debates vol. cxliv, 1921, p. 645.

² New York Times Current History vol. xiii, no. i, 1921, "The Imperial Conference", p. 849.

³ Ibid., p. 849.

a special significance.¹ Speaking of the difficulties with, and the attitude of the United States, Hughes did not fully comprehend what the Americans objected to in the Treaty.

This came across quite clearly for he stated:

Some of (America's objections)...relate to the emigration of Japanese to AmericaAs it is vital in the interest of civilization that a good understanding should exist between America and ourselves, we should endeavour to do everything in our power to ascertain exactly what it is to which America takes exception in this Treaty. We must make it perfectly clear that the Treaty is not aimed against her and that it could never be used against her. 2

Precluding the existing Agreement, Hughes said that in the future, "...any further Treaty with Japan, to be satisfactory to Australia, must specifically exclude the possibility of war with the United States".³ For Australia, renewal was demanded out of apprehension for a stepped-up programme of Japanese expansion in South East Asia. Alluding to this point, the Australian delegate's reasoning was similar to that of A.J.Balfour's, when the British Cabinet was discussing the

¹Loring C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, Stenographic Notes of the Meetings of the Representatives of the United Kingdom, The Dominions and India. June--July, 1921 vol.8, File24, 2nd Meeting June 21, p.3. (Hereafter referred to as Stenographic Notes).

²Ibid., p.4.

³Ibid., p.3.

line of action that they would press for at this meeting.

Hughes reasoned:

Should we not be in a better position to exercise greater influence over the Eastern policy as an Ally of a great Eastern Power, than as her potential enemy? Now if Japan is excluded from the family of great Western nations--and, mark, to turn our backs on the Treaty is certainly to exclude Japan--she will be isolated, her national pride wounded in its most tender spot. To renew this Treaty is to impose on her some of those restraints...(to) do well for the world's peace...we will do well for the Commonwealth of British nations to renew this Treaty. We want peace. 1

Hughes was especially committed to the idea of renewal, for without it Japan had special claim to a vendetta against Australia because of the lead that country took in opposing Japan's claim for a racial equality clause to be written into the Covenant of the League of Nations.² Australia was a 'white-man's country' and their leaders had professed that conviction in the face of the world.³ Hughes asserted that if war ensued because of the alienation of Japan,

¹L.C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, Stenographic Notes 2nd Meeting June 21, p.4.

²British House of Commons Sessional Paper vol.xiv, 1921, "The Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of the United Kingdom, The Dominions and India" pp.27-30.

³D.H.Macartney, "China and the Washington Conference" The Contemporary Review, vol.cxx, 1921, p.310.

and since that Commonwealth nation had no alliance with the United States, Japan could strike within a fortnight. Hughes then suggested:

Whether it would be wiser to invite a Conference with America and Japan, to ascertain what would be mutually acceptable, is a suggestion which I throw out. If one were quite sure what America desired, or was prepared to accept, that would form a reasonable basis for an Alliance with Japan, then I certainly would strongly press the suggestion. But in any case we ought to ascertain...what America's views are on this most important matter. 1

On the closely related question of Naval Defence and Disarmament, Hughes did not see the fine distinction of, or at least was not prepared to accept the view that the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was of prime importance for America's rationale for her armament campaign. Directing his statement to Prime Minister Lloyd George, Hughes concluded:

We ought not to underestimate the value of this Conference....The world tired of war, is yet neurotic, its nervous system so disturbed by war that while it cries...for peace, force is the first thing to which it turns to redress its grievances....If you fail to secure agreement for the limitation of armaments now, how can you expect to do so in the years to come?...Let us give the world...a lead..

¹L.C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, "Stenographic Notes" 2nd Meeting, June 21, p.4.

Invite the United States, Japan and France to meet us....In this matter the first step is everything. 1

It is imperative to point out that this suggestion by Hughes was for a second and different Conference than that which he had previously suggested.

In his opening speech, General Smuts of South Africa pointed out that since the war, the shift of the political course away from Europe to the Pacific and the Far East, was a problem that would sap the patience of international diplomacy for at least half a century.² Smuts called for an end to the old rival groups and exclusive alliances while he emphasised the need for conferences of this nature in the future.

(It is)...the parting of the ways at which we have arrived now....If we are wisely guided at this juncture this Conference may be one of the great landmarks in history. 3

Referring to the passage in the American Senate of the Borah Resolution,* Smuts concluded:

The American Senate has already made the first move in a unanimous resolution calling for a Conference of the United States, Britain and Japan.... It is now for this Conference of ours to give the lead and guide the Powers concerned into a...conference in regard to (disarmament). 4

¹ L.C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, "Stenographic Notes" 2nd Meeting, June 21, p.5.

² Ibid., p.9.

³ Ibid., p.9.

⁴ Ibid., p.9.

* See above: pp.37 - 39.

With regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Smuts at first withheld his views and adhered to a line of equivocation. In relation to Japan and the United States, the geographic position of South Africa was such that he could afford to be complacent. But, once Massey outlined his recommendation for renewal, to which the Indian representative approved, Smuts took a stand. He was not in favour of a renewal of the Treaty in its present form but wished to have it extended into a tripartite pact which would include the United States.¹

The South African placed the problem for the Empire's foreign policy in a crucible for his audit of the situation was not too dissimilar from that which the British Cabinet perceived from the recent American Senate's action.² Smuts reasoned that the Americans were groping about, trying to find a way to do their duty in world affairs as they had done in the war. This assumption prompted him to assert that the Empire was in a position to settle their differences with America.³ Lloyd George agreed. However, the British Prime Minister pointed out that it would be extremely difficult to enter into any association with the United States without it being dominated by them. Smuts declared that at the present

¹British House of Commons, Sessional Papers vol. xiv, 1921, pp. 22-30.

²British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no. 23, vol. 26, 1921, pp. 99-105.

³Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921, p. 6886.

time, the Americans were in the same position in relation to world power as was the Empire.¹ Hughes reminded his colleagues that an understanding with the United States was essential for world peace. Concomitantly, there was little chance for a viable understanding unless the Empire was prepared to relinquish the position of premier world power to America.²

At these early meetings of the Conference, the Canadian Prime Minister refrained from any solid denunciation of the Alliance. Ostensibly alluding to a basis of rules and principles in relation to the Dominions' powers to accept or reject the resolutions of His Majesty's Government in matters of high policy, Meighen proposed three postulates. Prefacing his working formula he said:

...incident to our very position on the map of the world, our distinctively Canadian relations with the United States,...are in their very nature so vital to us that the control of those relations has and must remain a matter incident to our autonomy. 3

In this statement, Meighen initiated the strategy for his plan to remain solidly opposed to the renewal of the Treaty.

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, p.6888.

²Ibid., p.6888.

³Ibid., p.6878.

He immediately followed this up by developing a working hypothesis about an independent course for the Dominion to adhere to in the event that he should fail to obtain his prime objective. Meighen's postulates concluded that:

There should be regular, and so far as possible, continuous conferences between the responsible representatives of Britain and the self-governing Dominions and India with a view among other things, of determining and clarifying the governing principles of our relations with foreign countries, and of seeking common counsel and advancing common interests thereupon.

That while in general final responsibility rests with the Ministry advising the King, such Ministry, should, in formulating those principles, have regard to the views of His Majesty's Privy Council in the Dominions and of the Representatives of India.

That as respects the determination of the Empire's foreign policy in spheres in which any Dominion is peculiarly concerned, the view of that Dominion must be given the weight commensurate with the importance of the decision of that Dominion. Speaking for Canada, I make this observation with particular reference to our relations with the United States.

To these specific conclusions, Meighen appended a final point that dealt with Constitutional matters. Since the British Empire had recently become a Commonwealth of free nations, Meighen argued that, "...any principles underlying the conduct of external relations (for) such a Commonwealth...must be

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921, p. 6879.

of such a simple and understandable character, that they will be generally acceptable to the...peoples that comprise the Empire".¹

It was not until June 28 that the Imperial Conference earnestly bore down upon the question of renewal.² In a letter to Robert Borden, the Canadian Legal Advisor to the Department of External Affairs, Mr. Christie indicated that the delay had been of a deliberate and calculated nature.³ The British Cabinet had arranged the agenda of the Conference in this way to allow time for the American Congress to vote on the Naval Appropriations Bill. It was the British Foreign Secretary who presented the Imperial Government's position on the Alliance in a forceful and masterly argument. He stalwartly began by asserting that:

The question of the renewal...of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is perhaps the most important, and certainly one of the most perplexing that will come before this meeting, for upon the solution of this question will depend the evolution of our own policy and, to a large extent, the peace of the world during the years to come. 4

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921, p. 6879.

²Ibid., p. 6915.

³Ibid., vol. 3, File 6-6, 1921, pp. 2210-2211.

⁴Ibid., vol. 8, File 24, 1921, p. 6915.

Lord Curzon brought the Conference up to date on the present situation. He began by saying that 'legally', the Agreement automatically expires on July 13, 1921, but the British Cabinet had decided to extend the expiry date until October 13th so that the entire Empire could decide its future. He then presented the arguments against renewal. They included the nullification of the original objects for the Alliance, namely the Russian threat in 1902 and the German threat in 1911. However, with a word of caution, the Foreign Secretary was not convinced that these conditions would not be revived in the near future. The second, and major objection arose from the feelings of the United States against any form of renewal.¹

The situation had received a novel twist and Curzon brought the attention of the delegates to bear upon three telegrams that had recently been received from the British Ambassador to Washington. In the first communique of June 5th, the American Secretary of State had confidentially asserted, "...the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be disastrous."² Curzon failed to point out that he had instructed Ambassador Geddes to ascertain if the United States was favourable to a substitution of the Alliance for a tripartite agreement between Britain, Japan and the United

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921, pp. 6916-6917.

²Ibid., p. 6917.

States.¹ Subsequently, the Dominion Representatives did not know that the American Secretary of State had not only made it clear that the United States was not interested in the proposition, but that any form of renewal would hand-cap any further discussion.² However, the two further telegrams that had arrived in London on June 27, emphatically asserted this last point. Geddes reported that Secretary Hughes had concluded with disquietude that any form of renewal, even if it excluded the American's from any operation of the Treaty, would be 'little less than unfortunate'.³

Taking advantage of the previous and favourable discourse by Hughes of Australia, Massey, and Srinavasa-Sastri of India, who outrightly demanded a renewal of the Alliance, and to a lesser degree General Smuts, Curzon proceeded with Britain's case, which strongly favoured renewal. Excepting specific instances that he defended as legitimate ambitions, the Foreign Secretary said that on the whole, the Alliance had had a steadying and stabilizing influence on the political conditions of the Far East.⁴ Japan's prowess in war was second to none and she had proven to be an honourable and scrupulous ally in the discharge of her obligations under the Alliance.

¹British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.26, 1921, p.102.

²Ibid., p.102.

³Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File24, 1921, p.6917.

⁴Ibid., p.6918.

Curzon then read an account that had been passed on to him by the British Ambassador, Sir Charles Eliot, at Tokyo. In the Ambassador's opinion:

If the present Alliance is replaced by an Anglo-American understanding, at the expense of Japan, the Japanese will no doubt cast about for new allies and will for some time find it hard to get any....but Germany...spares no pains to ingratiate herself with the Japanese... and spreads the idea that Japan and Germany...at the present juncture,... have many interests in common. 1

Therefore, Curzon reasoned, "Germany, with her usual subtlety and determination, is apparently already beginning to 'work'".² Referring to a second 'White Paper' that was initiated by the British Ambassador to Japan, Curzon stressed the desire of the Japanese for a renewal of the Alliance.

They are quite ready to accept the position that the views...of China must... be taken into account, and also...that we cannot possibly renew the Agreement except after consultation with America. On the other hand, supposing we were to drop them altogether....I think they would not only be humiliated, and mortified, but that that mortification would presently turn into anger...followed by an attitude of resentment and a policy of revenge. 3

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921,
p.6919.

²Ibid., p.6919.

³Ibid., pp.6021-6922.

In reference to the proposal submitted to the British Cabinet in February by the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Meighen, Curzon alluded to its possible adoption by the Conference. He said:

It might be well now, or at some not distant date, to have a Conference such as suggested by the Canadian Government with the American Government and the Japanese Government....This is a policy which is very well worthy considering and which might perfectly well be consistent with a renewal of the Agreement in some form.... 1

Adhering to British Cabinet policy, Curzon declared that the renewal should be accompanied by an expression of willingness by the British Empire to join the Americans in an examination, through Conference, of the entire problems of the Pacific. However, he stressed the point of the ordering of the proceedings. Renewal would precede a Pacific Conference, which would be held on the other side of the ocean.²

At this point in the Conference proceedings, Prime Minister Meighen wanted a strict clarification of the legalities concerning the joint notes that were presented to the League of Nations on July 8, 1920. He pointed out that he believed that they amounted to an intention to terminate and insisted the point be clarified for expediency. Until the problem of legality was studied by the Crown's attorney and a decision

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921, p. 6923.

²Ibid., p. 6923.

rendered, very little could be resolved.¹ In the interim, Meighen began his argument, not for a renewal of the Treaty in reduced terms as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs had argued, but for its complete termination.

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921,
p. 6924.

JUNE 29, 1921 marked the date on which the final arguments were presented in the American Congress on the Naval Appropriations Bill. By early evening the vote had been taken and the Bill passed into law, pending the President's signature, by a margin of 332 to 4.¹ Likewise, the appended Borah Resolution received similar approval. Concerning that amendment, and in anticipation of its implementation by Mr. Harding, Congressman Garrett of Tennessee announced; "There has never been any certainty as to the views of the President ...(and) it is somewhat gratifying that at this eleventh hour he has discovered a necessity for supporting...the bill... probably the greatest question of the hour."² However, regarding the authorization and request by both houses of government for the President to initiate a disarmament conference, at that point, the prerogative was entirely in his hands. But once the legislation received the Presidential seal of approval, Naval construction would begin immediately and the United States would be on its way to establishing the future course of international affairs.

On the same day in London, the Canadian Prime Minister began an attack that was highly instrumental in the altering of the British Empire's policy concerning the Anglo-Japanese

¹United States Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 1st Session, 1921, p.3227.

²Ibid., p.3225.

Alliance.¹ At the outset of his charge, Meighen asserted: "I feel compelled to oppose the renewal...(and) I would regret to see the Treaty continued in any form at all."² Stressing the immediate state of facts, the Canadian Prime Minister rebutted the Foreign Secretary's speculative point that if the Alliance were to be given up, a possible Russian-German-Japanese combination might result. Meighen challenged Curzon's declaration that the Alliance had stabilized the political conditions in the Far East. He believed that once,

...having made the Treaty for definite objects, Japan has far exceeded her rights, and progressively violated her covenant. It cannot well be imagined how in the short space of less than twenty years she could expect...to achieve more in the way of aggrandisement and...if we do enter into another Treaty...it makes us particeps criminis and thus affect our standing with all other nations. 3

This adjunct, tantamount to political iniquity, was not only a denunciation of the declaration for the principle of the Open Door, but a tacit and careless approval of the corrosive undermining of sovereign rights.

With a special reference to the Atlantic Triangle's relations, Meighen accentuated that relationship as the central

¹C.C.Ballantyne, "Diary of the Imperial Conference of 1921" (no page number) Meeting of June 29th.

²Loring C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, p.6930.

³Ibid., p.6931.

feature of the Empire's unified foreign policy.

We view this question...from the standpoint...that British-American friendship is the pivot of our world policy (and) it follows that in determining the wisdom from our point of view of any engagement, a major consideration must be its...effect on that friendship. 1

In any war between America and Britain, Meighen declared that Canada would become the Belgium of North America. He went on to say that the American Government was specifically hoping that this Conference would adopt a position that would enable them to bring about a much more favourable state of affairs. Due to the Senate's acceptance of the Borah resolution on the eve of the Imperial Conference, Meighen was convinced the United States was preparing to institute proceedings that would facilitate convening an assembly to discuss the reduction of armaments.²

What is there to be lost by letting this treaty matter stand until a Conference, as suggested, is held or until some sort of arrangement can be made resulting in an understanding? What is to be lost by such a procedure? 3

A disarmament conference was precisely the orifice that would, at the least, allow the British Empire to maintain an equality

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, p.6933.

²Ibid., p.6935.

³Ibid., p.6935.

of military superiority with the United States without the economic sacrifice. On the other hand, if the Alliance were definitely renewed, the British Empire would most certainly lose what the American Senate had gained and possibly hasten the cataclysm.

Once again alluding to the legality of the notes that were presented to the League of Nations involving their intentions to bring the Alliance into line with the Covenant, if that was indeed the intent at all, Meighen said there was not a moment to waste. He suggested that, before July 13th, it would be better to pursue conversations with the United States before anything else complicated the situation.¹ It seemed to him, "...that it is scarcely approaching the matter in the right way to renew the Treaty for a short time and to say to the United States, we are going right on unless you act."² Believing his recommendation and method of procedure to be correct, Mr. Meighen brought forth a memorandum from the American Ambassador in London to bolster his stated convictions. The note indicated that the renewal of the Agreement would stifle both a general disarmament meeting not to mention a preliminary Pacific Conference between

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, p.6936.

²Ibid., p.6937.

those member nations concerned with the problems of the Pacific.¹ He added that, "...the Ambassador replied without any hesitation that he could not imagine anything better than a (Pacific) Conference...between the interested Powers...and he felt confident that no objection would be raised by his Government should such a proposal be made."²

While the Imperial Ministers continued to debate the merits and alternatives to the Canadian's proposition, Prime Minister Lloyd George insisted that it was imperative, whatever the outcome, that the British Empire not offend Japan. The senior statesman declared that:

(Japan) stood by her compact to the very last letter. She has never been at a Peace Conference where she has not stood by us right through and through. In the war she stood by us and she stood by us in peace, and now to drop her is something...so far from winning the friendship of America, would win the contempt of (her) Statesmen. 3

Lloyd George realized that if the Foreign Secretary continued to insist upon a renewal of the Alliance it would not only deepen the determination of the Canadian Prime Minister, but excite the vehemence of the Australian Premier, Mr. Hughes.⁴

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, p.6937.

²Ibid., p.6938.

³Ibid., p.7509.

⁴J.B.Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference" p.54.

In a move to mollify the two Dominion Ministers, Lloyd George unexpectedly renounced the notice that had been delivered to the League of Nations by announcing that it was not tantamount to denunciation.

There has been no formal denunciation of the Treaty; it is purely inferential. Japan does not take the view that there has been a denunciation. In that case, until twelve months notice is given this thing lasts for twelve months from the date when you give the notice. There would then be no question of renewal; it would purely be a question of whether we should decide to denounce the Treaty. That would give time for the Conference (suggested) by Mr. Meighen and...get rid of the inevitable war. 1

Lloyd George called upon the Lord Chancellor, Viscount Birkenhead, to give his legal expertise on the issue which he had just put forth. Birkenhead concluded that the case was not exclusively a question of law but more a question of diplomatic expediency.² Concurrently, the Lord Chancellor upheld his Prime Minister's declaration that no denunciation had been intended. Lloyd George then added, "...that seems to me completely to change the whole situation."³ Meighen agreed and added, "...we are (now) discussing something quite different."⁴

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921, p. 7511.

²Ibid., p. 7511.

³Ibid., p. 7513.

⁴Ibid., p. 7513.

Consequently, Lloyd George proposed a postponement of the proceedings to reconsider the matter of denunciation and whether or not they should invite the parties concerned to attend a Pacific Conference.¹

When the Imperial Conference resumed, Prime Minister Meighen returned directly to the issue. He did not think it necessary, under the new conditions, to denounce the Treaty. Under the revised circumstances, it would be enough to have the Alliance brought into harmony with the letter of the Covenant of the League and thereby alleviate the threat of war to the entire Empire if hostilities occurred between the other two parties. However, if the problems of the Pacific were to be resolved, the further possibility of alleviating a war situation entirely could certainly be facilitated by a Pacific Meeting.¹ On these points the other Imperial Ministers were then in unanimous agreement with the Canadian Prime Minister. Immediately thereafter, Lloyd George instructed the Foreign Minister to draw up a tentative programme for a reconciliation procedure. His programme resolved to:

- (i) Inform the Japanese Government that the position is changed by the view that was expressed by the Lord Chancellor and the decision which was arrived at yesterday in consequence, and that no notification to denounce the Treaty has been given; therefore the Agreement goes on.

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, pp.7521-7523.

- (ii) Tell the League, in pursuance of the communications we have already had with them, that we propose to deal with the whole Eastern and Pacific question in a larger spirit; that any new arrangement will be in harmony with the Covenant, and that in the meanwhile we are prepared to state that wherever the Covenant is found to be in conflict with the Treaty, the Covenant is to prevail.
- (iii) Here in London, to approach the Japanese and American Ambassadors and the Chinese Minister with a view to finding out whether the Agreement as affected by what I have said concerning the Covenant of the League still remaining in existence, they will enter into a Conference upon the Pacific question in its largest aspect.
- (iv) After conversations with them, which could take place in the course of the next few days, to come back here and report to the Conference what is the result of these discussions.
- (v) That we do not notify our intention to denounce until a settlement has been arrived at by the new suggested Conference, or until a new Treaty has been drawn up by common agreement to replace the existing one. Should the Conference fail to arrive at any new agreement as adapted to meet the requirements of the Covenant of the League goes on. 1

These proceedings indicate that the only way the British Empire would give up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was if the United States coalesced in an agreement with the Treaty partners. These proceedings were, however, the first definitive and official move on the part of either of the three governments involved

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921,
pp. 7525-7526.

to bring the problems of the Pacific to the conference level.

By July 3, the British Foreign Minister had informed the American Ambassador of the Imperial Cabinet's decision that the Alliance would remain in existence and Britain wanted to hold a Pacific Conference.¹ Within caucus, the British Premier clearly indicated that the thrust and "...main object of the (Pacific) Meetings...would be to induce the United States...to make a concession and abandon her intention to build a great navy, (and) it would be expedient to insist on the conversations being held in London."² During the week, the American President received the British Government's invitation to the Pacific Meeting which had first been suggested by the Canadian Prime Minister. By July 8, the American Ambassador, Mr.G.Harvey, had informally reported to Lloyd George and Mr. Balfour, that he believed London would be quite acceptable as the meeting place.³ It appeared that the United States, although unfavourably disposed to the news that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had not been denounced, was frankly willing to come to the conference table and do her part to mitigate the uneasiness that stemmed from the entire Pacific question. President Harding went even further than Lloyd George immediately hoped. On Monday, July 11, the British

¹Loring C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, p.7531.

²British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.26, 1921, p.284.

³op.cit., p.7084.

Prime Minister, in a speech before the House of Commons, revealed the extent of America's 'new' spirit of international co-operation.

I am very glad to be able to inform the House today that the...President of the United States...Mr. Harding, has taken the momentous step of inviting the Powers to a Conference on the Limitation of Armament to be held in Washington in the near future, and he also suggested a preliminary meeting on Pacific and Far Eastern questions...which is assuming the first importance in international affairs. 1

He then partially explained to the British Parliament how the Imperial Conference of Prime Ministers had arrived at their decision that the Alliance with Japan would remain in operation for a minimum of twelve months. Conversely, the British Prime Minister did not indicate, or hint at in any way, how this decision to continue the Alliance had induced the American President to initiate the Limitation Conference or accept the British invitation--which was deliberately juxtaposed--to attend a Pacific Conference. However, at that day's session of the Imperial Ministers Conference, the British Prime Minister proclaimed with a certain degree of complacency, that it was without doubt that Harding's action was the result of the Imperial Ministers decision to adhere to a policy of Empire solidarity.

¹British House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates vol.cxlx, 1921, p.917.

There has been a very dramatic change in the whole situation, and although it has been nominally brought about by the President's invitation, it is really the result of our action here....That (action) has produced one of the most remarkable documents of modern times in the form of a direct invitation from the President... to a Conference on the question of disarmament to be preceded by a Conference on the question of the Pacific.

In effect, Harding's invitation to the disarmament conference, brought the paramountcy succession struggle to a definite respite and subsequently, the Imperial Conference had succeeded in its two major objectives.² However, Lloyd George's speech in the British House of Commons produced a problem which, if it had gone undetected, might have undone everything the Imperial Meeting worked for.

Basically, the problem can be resolved to an error in strategy. In his effort to divert the inducement property of the Alliance's continuation away from the Disarmament Conference, Lloyd George, in his Common's speech, implied that Harding had also initiated the preliminary Pacific Conference. To the Japanese, this was completely out of step with everything they had understood up to the time of George's speech in Parliament. It appeared to the Japanese that the British were not only not keeping them informed about the true nature and purpose of the Pacific Conference, but had the "idea that

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, p.7079.

²Ibid., vol.3, File 6-6, 1921, p.2217.

America and Great Britain had combined and manoeuvred with a view to placing Japan in a most disadvantageous position."¹

Japan had received the information that the Alliance would remain operative and Britain had intended to call the Pacific Conference. However, President Harding's invitation, coming as it did on the heels of Britain's request, without any prior indication, precluded a separate Conference relating to the Pacific problems that George had intended to be discussed in London before the Disarmament Conference in Washington. Furthermore, the Japanese had accepted the American President's invitation to Washington with the idea that not two, but one Conference was to take place, namely, an Arms Limitation Conference.² This oversight was not detected by Britain until July 26. On that day Lloyd George declared in frustration; "Our idea was that we should have two Conferences; one to discuss the Pacific problems³ and the other Conference to discuss disarmament. That is not Japan's idea at all. We have not any sort of understanding with Japan."³ From the time Curzon first informed the Japanese Ambassador that the Alliance would definitely continue, until the discovery of the anomaly, the

¹ Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921, p. 7154.

² Ibid., p. 7143.

³ Ibid., p. 7142.

Imperial Ministers had not received any confirmation or view on the subject from the Japanese Government. Lord Curzon informed the Imperial representatives:

We have never received a definite official reply from Tokyo, because they have been waiting to find out what was to happen with the real (Pacific) Conference, and whether the real Conference was to be in America, or whether the real Conference was to be the preliminary conversations here. 1

Consequently, the Japanese suspected that Britain and the United States were working together to their detriment. Lloyd George exclaimed; "...the situation has been given away so completely by the Japanese through lack of understanding... that I do not see how we can (now) fight for two Conferences."² There were two reasons for this. First, the time interval would be too great between the two meetings if, as of July 26, one was to take place in London and the other one in Washington. Secondly, if under these circumstances, Great Britain sought a postponement of the Disarmament Conference until the preliminary Pacific Conference was completed, the secrecy of the latter meeting was liable to jeopardise the former.³

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.8, File 24, 1921, p.7144.

²Ibid., p.7144.

³Ibid., p.7147.

With great reluctance, the British Prime Minister resolved that they would have to arrange for the preliminary Pacific Conference to take place in the United States. The draft memorandum to the American Government, stated in part:

Consultation is urgently needed with a view to creating the antecedent conditions...essential to the success of the Washington Conference. If the question of the limitation of naval armament is to be raised...it must be preceded, not merely by consultations, but by some provisional understanding, if not by definite agreement between the...Naval Powers of the Pacific. 1

In setting out these guidelines, which foreshadowed those that developed into the agreement replacing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the senior British statesman underscored the point that the consultations could not be arranged as part of the Washington Conference agenda itself. Any attempt to combine the two meetings would result in failure. Primarily, it would be imprudent to insist that the representatives of the lesser Powers wait until these preliminary discussions were completed, as very little else could be accomplished until the preliminaries were successfully completed. Furthermore, even if those representatives were willing to accept the delayed arrangement, the larger Conference would be so

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921, pp. 7149-7151.

prolonged that no first-rank representative could afford to be away from home for such an indefinite period.¹

With this final communication to the United States, the important work of the Imperial Conference of 1921 came to an end. In evaluating the conditions and the positive results of that very unique meeting of Imperial Ministers, certain outstanding features should be underscored. In the first place, it is imperative to keep in mind that in outlining Imperial Foreign Policy, the final decree lay not with the Dominions, but with the British Cabinet. But once having made that point in the clear light of the proceedings of the Imperial Conference, it becomes self-evident that a Dominion representative substantially altered the course of the foreign policy which had been designed by the more prestigious Cabinet members. If it is further kept in mind that this Cabinet represented and commanded the single-most powerful force in the world, then the work of that Dominion representative can be seen as little less than spectacular. From the vantage point of her geographic position within the Atlantic triangle, the Dominion of Canada, through the person of Arthur Meighen, was recognized by the other two members of that union as understanding those members better than they understood one another. Put another way, as a North American,

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol. 8, File 24, 1921,
p. 715f.

Meighen understood the United States; as a British North American, he understood Great Britain; as a Canadian, caught in the throat between the two, he recognized the impending danger of war and the insecurity that it bred. Methodically and deliberately, he moved to prevent the cataclysm that would involve the triangle in war.

Meighen's idea was to persuade the British Cabinet to unite with their American counterparts in a Pacific Conference to resolve the problems of the Pacific. It was his committed understanding that this remedy to impasse would also facilitate a disarmament conference and stabilize the peace of the world. To this end he stood against the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. However, since the power to annul the Agreement was not in his hands, Meighen could do nothing more than bolster his opposition to it with a sharp degree of practical logic. As the facts have demonstrated, the British Prime Minister quashed the issue of renewal through a simple manifestation of his own logic for the sake of Imperial solidarity. Again, as demonstrated above, the changed situation resulted in an invitation to the United States to join Great Britain and Japan in a Pacific Conference to settle the paramount questions that impeded world peace. Within a fortnight, that invitation was reciprocated by a call from President Harding for a Disarmament Conference. The diplomatic shuffling not-with-standing, the only thing

that remained to be worked out was the logistic imperative of the preliminary meetings to the Washington Disarmament Conference. Once they were concluded the Limitation Conference could begin. Since that episode was an integral, if somewhat anti-climactic epilogue to the resolve of the Imperial Conference of 1921, its nature and function were no less indispensable to the events that sparked the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament.

EPILOGUE

THROUGHOUT the remaining weeks of the summer and early fall of 1921, the British Cabinet and the Canadian Department of External Affairs prepared for the Washington Meetings.¹ As of September 12, there was still no firm agreement between the United States and Great Britain concerning the order of the proceedings at Washington. Similarly, the British Empire's choice of delegates to the Conference was not finalized until October 18.² It appears that these considerations were minor, for the two foreign-affairs bodies were more concerned with the policy to be followed for the Conference to succeed.³ Judging from the Canadian Department of External Affairs records, it becomes evident that the Canadian preparation for the Conference was highly extensive and well co-ordinated.

Initially, the Canadian contribution to the success of the Washington Conference hinged on the 'abortive' Pacific Conference meetings. Although not publicised as such, those meetings were held in Washington during the week preceding the first session of the Washington Conference. They were highly secret and were attended by delegates from the United

¹British Cabinet Records, Cabinet Record no.23, vol.27, 1921, p.13. See also: Canadian Department of External Affairs vol.916, 1921, "Memorandum on the Washington Conference 1921" pp.1-7.

²Borden Papers, 1921 vol.294, 1921, pp.172667-172673.

³Ibid., pp.172672-172673.

States, Japan, France and the British Empire.¹ Prior to these meetings, which in effect amounted to a Pacific Conference, the members of the British Commonwealth met in New York to finalize the policy that they would adhere to in regard to the Pacific Question meetings and the Washington Conference itself. At the onset of the New York session, the Commonwealth consolidation of policy resolved that:

Ostensibly, the Washington Conference will deal with the limitation of armament in the first place and with matters of policy in the second. In reality, the limitation of armaments will be subordinated to the question of policy. No limitation or reduction of armaments will be possible save on the basis of political agreement between the Powers chiefly concerned. 2

In their commitment and resolution to this touch-stone of diplomacy, lay the seeds that germinated into the Four-Power Pact--the substitute agreement for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

The members of this 'drafting' committee, led by A. J. Balfour and Sir Robert Borden, were cognizant that the pivot for the success of the Washington Conference lay with their ability to mediate between the United States and Japan. If they failed to meet their objective and could not mediate

¹Loring C. Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.3, File 6-4, 1921, pp.2088-2089.

²Canadian Department of External Affairs vol.916, 1921, "British Policy in the Pacific" p.2.

between the two sides, the disarmament talks would collapse and war could be expected in the Pacific within a year.¹ The Legal Advisor to the Canadian delegation in New York, Mr. Christie, held to the tenet that:

It is possible, but by no means certain, that the Washington Conference may lead to a settlement between the United States and Japan. ...But Japan and the United States may not be able to reach a settlement unaided. Efficient aid can only be given by the Representatives of the British Imperial Government. (British) policy seems likely, therefore, to dominate the Conference, however little its decisive influence may appear on the surface. 2

In the outline of their committed position to mediation, there was a 'discretionary willingness' to sacrifice the single-power standard for the success of the Conference.³ It was ascribed that the British Empire was, "...working for higher ends...and would leave the prestige of success to the American Government and be satisfied with the quiet substance of success...."⁴ However, there was a limit to this spirit of self-sacrifice. It was understood that their limit would only be manifest by a type of mutual guarantee and declaration from the Pacific

¹Canadian Department of External Affairs vol.916, 1921,

"British Policy in the Pacific" p.3.

²Ibid., p.4.

³Ibid., p.17.

⁴Ibid., p.17.

Powers. Furthermore, such a guarantee had to replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.¹ The working principles upon which a replacement agreement would be based were to be found in four international agreements already in existence. They were the Anglo-Japaneses Alliance; the Root-Takahira Agreement; the Lansing-Ishii Agreement and the Franco-Japanese Agreement of 1907.²

During the week that preceded the opening session of the Washington Conference, the British Delegation met with the representatives of the United States, Japan and France, and in accord with the principles contained in the above Agreements with Japan, worked out the format of the Quadruple Pact.³ On November 8, 1921, Borden informed Meighen that:

Conversations between the Delegations from the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan, have arranged a permanent basis for the adjustment of their relations in the Pacific...the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has been suspended by a draft agreement....Its essential and vital feature is that it provides a definite method whereby, if strained relations threaten to evolve into war, the issues involved may be resolved through a joint conference between all the parties to the agreement. 4

¹Borden Papers, 1921, vol.294, W.D.C. no.226, "Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments" p.2.

²Canadian Department of External Affairs vol.916, 1921, "Substitution of Inclusive Agreement or Understanding for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance" p.1.

³Loring C.Christie Papers, 1900-1941, vol.3, File 6-5, 1921, pp.2169-2172.

⁴Borden Papers, 1921, vol.294, pp.172739-172740.

In the draft outline that accompanied Borden's communique to the Canadian Prime Minister, the Agreement stipulated:

- (i) The High Contracting Parties agree as between themselves to respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean. If there should develop...a controversy arising out of any Pacific question...which is not settled by diplomacy...they shall invite the other High Contracting Parties to a joint conference to which the whole subject will be referred for consideration and adjustment.
- (ii) If the said rights are threatened by the aggressive action of any other Power, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding...to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.
- (iii) This Treaty shall remain in force for ten years from the time it shall take effect...(and) shall continue to be in force subject to the right of any of the High Contracting Parties to terminate it upon twelve months notice.
- (iv) This Treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible in accordance with the constitutional methods of the High Contracting Parties and shall take effect in the deposit of ratifications which shall take place at Washington. Thereupon the Agreement between Great Britain and Japan, which was concluded on July 13, 1911 shall terminate.... 1

On November 13, 1921, two days after the opening session of the Disarmament Conference, the announcement of this Treaty was proclaimed to the international community in Washington.

1

Borden Papers, 1921 vol.294, p.172741.

The long-awaited agreement between the Powers of the Pacific had finally come through. The achievement of this monumental document was so appreciated that Republican Senator H.C.Lodge declared he was personally certain that the Armament Limitation proceedings would result in nothing short of total success.

An in-depth commentary upon the complete success of the disarmament treaties and international resolutions that were concluded at Washington during the autumn and winter of 1921, is outside the scope of this work. However, some degree of delineation is called for in relation to the 'new order' that the Conference of 1921 initiated. In this synopsis, that term is defined in two ways. In the first place, new order was synonymous with the positioning of military superiority. At the early stages of the Conference, military superiority-positioning established that the United States and Great Britain were equal in strength. At the very least, new order in this context meant that the United States had challenged the British Empire's paramountcy in world power and had compelled that Empire to recognize a power equal to it.

On the other hand, 'new order' was understood to circumscribe and underwrite a system of international relationships.

¹
United States Senate Document no.126, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, pp.43-44.

Akira Iriye has adeptly pointed out that:

No nation has complete freedom of action. It has only a given number of alternatives, and this range of possible action is often determined by external factors such as (the) consideration of alliances and ententes, as well as...what (is) generally regarded as legitimate and plausible goals of foreign policy. 1

The era that was ushered in by the Washington Conference attempted to reverse the course of the national and international 'priority of security' trend and replace it with a viable economic principle in international relations. Subsequently, as is evident from the opening hypothesis of this work, the oscillation between a strategic and economic motivational principle for the success of individual national foreign policies, as well as an international spirit of co-operation, had come full-circle by 1921. In 1894, the trend was toward security. In 1921, it revolved around a pivot of co-operation through economic rehabilitation as the basis for stability and success. This was America's contribution to a new order. "Washington...tried to give concrete content to (that) definition of a new order."² The 'neo-imperialist' experimental trend in international diplomacy that began at the end of the

¹A. Iriye, After Imperialism: A Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921-1931 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, p.2.

²Ibid., p.3.

nineteenth century was shattered by the results of World War I. The balance of power, in the Far East and on the European continent was thoroughly decimated through additional factors in the form of the 'new-diplomacy' under the auspices of the Washington Conference. The structure of the new international system after 1921 was dominated, not by the leading influence of the British Empire, but by the United States of America. "It would define a new status quo, not based on a temporary balance of power among...imperialists, but on their pledge to refrain from military and political expansion..."¹ New order here meant that internationally, political imperialism was to be given up as a basis for national strength and replaced by co-operative economic policies.

The convening of the Washington Conference signaled an end to one era and the beginning of another. There are still questions to be asked and answers to be given in relation to the Washington venture. What went wrong in the decade between 1922 and 1932? Could the Manchurian crisis have been prevented if the Washington Conference had been more thorough in setting out the guide-lines of its new order? Such postulates still call for answers. Let it suffice to say that, however measured, the success at Washington could not have been obtained without the sacrifice and firm commitment to the ideals connected with world stability and international peace.

¹A.Iriye, After Imperialism p.11.

For Great Britain, sacrifice meant that the British Empire would accept military parity with the United States. It is axiomatic that the ideals embodied in the principles that underwrote the ten-year disarmament holiday were shared by the international community that assembled in Washington in 1921-1922. Yet, the vast majority of observers whose business it is to know and reassemble the facts in the continuity of events, have failed to detect the crucial position of the Dominion of Canada in the process and convention of the Washington Conference. Part of the answer to this apparent oversight, lies in the fact that Canada has never held 'Great Power' status in world affairs like Great Britain or the United States. In her physical weakness and overshadowing by the United States is also found the clue to Canada's greatest asset in the continual struggle of international power-politics. That asset is embodied in her ability to mediate between opposing factions. Even though Canada was and remains a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, she has not allowed that distinction to be overshadowed by the practicable and constant flow of shifting patterns of power politics. In conclusion, the interjection of the Canadian contribution to the success of the Washington Conference upholds this contention. The Washington Conference was the landmark of Canada's role as an international mediator. In this instance, Canada mediated

between the United States and Great Britain, resulting in the great conference. Over the years, the Canadian contribution to the world's currents of change has become less dramatic and the country continues to play her low-key role. Following the Washington experiment, refinement and modification have combined to alter Canada's posture from that of mediator and arbitrator, to that approaching a buffer or sounding-board between conflicting power entities prior to rapprochement. A recent example of Canada's role as a buffer between the Great Powers, is seen in her recent diplomatic recognition of the Peoples Republic of China. Very soon after the exchange of plenipotentiaries between Canada and the Republic, the United States began the process of rapprochement with China and she was admitted to the United Nations. Closer in time, although perhaps less influential in proportion, Canada's role as a member of the United Nations Peace Observer Corps in Vietnam, the Middle-East and Cyprus, demonstrates a willingness to act under the auspices of a commitment to a greater end, namely, peace. However, for those who recognize the 'kites' of contemporary history, it can be readily understood that the Canadian role between power-elites is meshed with the course and flow of international tides affecting the North American continent.

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