Responding to American Missionary Expansion:

An Examination of Ottoman Imperial Statecraft, 1880-1910

Emrah Sahin

Department of History
McGill University, Montréal

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Abstract

American missionaries made a lasting impact on education and religion in the late Ottoman Middle East. After the 1880s, provincial-level conflicts increased and affected diplomatic relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire. Much scholarship examines Washington-based papers and missionary collections, depicting—perhaps unconsciously—the Turks as uncompromising hosts and the missionaries as saviours or U.S. agents. This dissertation exposes these stereotypes by emphasizing the complexity and variation of the historical actors and their interactions. It places concerned parties within the context of Ottoman imperial statecraft and defines the central government as a sophisticated and powerful actor on missionary issues. Reading previously untapped Ottoman archival sources through analytical eclecticism, the dissertation analyzes central government responses to missionary expansion and, more specifically, how changing circumstances affected the ways in which the *fin-de-siècle* government approached increasing numbers of missionaries, their institutions, publications, and local-level legal cases. In addition to offering a nuanced and detailed account of Ottoman-missionary relations, the dissertation also provides: an alternative periodization for the topic; new historical narratives to the scholarship; and historical context for the contemporary debate over missionary activity in the Ottoman Empire.

Résumé

Les missionnaires américains ont eu un impact durable sur l'éducation et la religion dans le Moyen-Orient ottoman vers la fin du XIX^{e} siècle. Après les années 1880, les conflits ont augmenté dans diverses provinces ottomanes et ont affecté les relations diplomatiques entre les États-Unis et l'Empire ottoman. Bon nombre de travaux de recherche sont fondés sur une analyse de documents rédigés par des officiels américains et de recueils de textes rédigés par des missionnaires, et l'on y dépeint, peut-être inconsciemment, les Turcs comme des hôtes intransigeants, et les missionnaires, comme des sauveurs ou des agents américains. Dans la présente thèse, nous exposons ces stéréotypes en soulignant la complexité et la diversité des acteurs historiques et de leurs interactions. Nous plaçons les parties concernées dans le contexte de l'appareil gouvernemental impérial ottoman et définissons le gouvernement central comme un acteur complexe et puissant dans les questions liées aux activités des missionnaires. En examinant des documents jusqu'alors inexploités tirés des archives ottomanes, par éclectisme analytique, nous étudions les réponses du gouvernement central à l'expansion des activités des missionnaires et, plus précisément, l'incidence des circonstances changeantes sur l'approche adoptée par le gouvernement de fin de siècle vis-à-vis du nombre croissant de missionnaires, de leurs institutions et de leurs publications, et vis-à-vis des disputes juridiques qui survenaient à l'échelle locale. En plus de faire un exposé détaillé et nuancé des relations entre l'Empire ottoman et les missionnaires, la

présente thèse offre une périodisation alternative du sujet, apporte de nouveaux récits historiques qui s'ajouteront à l'historiographie des missionnaires et fournit un contexte historique pour les débats contemporains sur les activités des missionnaires dans l'Empire ottoman.

Acknowledgments

In April 2001, I went to Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, the History Chair at Middle East Technical University, Turkey. Two months prior to graduation, I asked his opinion about examining the role of religion in East-West relations. “Look in that mirror,” he said, pointing to the cheval glass next to the office door, “and tell me, do you see a man who can juggle that huge ball of research?” I looked and saw nothing; I did not even understand what it had to do with my anatomy. I now get the sarcasm behind the chair’s question, and know that my research project indeed needed extensive research, stronger perspective, specialization, inspiration, funding, guidance, and a supporting team. Aykut Kansu, Güçlü Tülüveli, and Seçil Karal Akgün taught me the basics of the historian’s craft; Halil İnalcık, Stanford Shaw, and Timothy Roberts framed my perspective on approaching history; Gil Troy, Jason Opal, John Zucchi, Leonard Moore, and Thomas Jundt helped me to crystallize and specialize; Kemal Karpat and Üner Turgay inspired my endeavours; the Turkish Cultural Foundation and McGill University offered partial funding for the project. The vital elements of success were guidance and teamwork: the perfect supervision of Laila Parsons, wonderful editing of Michael Wiseman, analytical-stylistic contributions of Hasher Majoka, and research-logistics assistance from Haluk Gelgeç, Raymond Esfandi, and my wife Sema Karagöz Şahin gifted me with a dream team. This dissertation is a product of this team. It is also a statement of how far my project has come since the last time I looked into “that mirror.”

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Note on Transliteration

Words in Ottoman Turkish, including the names of people and places in Turkey, have been transcribed with modern Turkish orthography. Accordingly, "c" reads like "j"; "ç" is "ch"; "ş" is "sh." The "ğ" is silent but lengthens the preceding vowel. "I" is pronounced like "io" as in *motion*; "ö" is the same as French "eu" as in *peu*; "ü" is the same as French "u" as in *lune*. All translations within this dissertation belong to the author; they respect the language of the text when possible and find an English expression when necessary to render the original tone.

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Ottoman Imperial Statecraft and American Missionaries, 1880-1910

In recent years missionary activity in Turkey has revived a century-old debate. On Wednesday, 18 April 2007, a group of five men, identified as "young" and "Muslim," attended a sermon at the Zirve Bible House, a mission and publishing firm in the south-eastern city of Malatya. The Turkish convert-pastor, Necati Aydın, was lecturing from the Bible when the carnage began. The group tied Aydın and his parishioners Uğur Yüksel and Tilman Geske to chairs, and murdered them brutally.[1]

Reactions to this bloody incident were uniform in their outrage. International Christian Concern, an influential human rights group based in Washington, called it "satanic." The Zirve Bible House director Hamza Özant, himself having been threatened, wished they would have received police

[1]"Turkish Believers Satanically Tortured for Hours Before Being Killed," 25 April 2007, online; Laura King, "3 men slain at Bible publishing firm in Turkey," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 April 2007, online. Birch recalls earlier incidents that contributed to the debate. "In 2005 Molotov cocktails thrown at the International Protestant church in Ankara caused £5,000 damage. And last year an American missionary in the south-eastern city of Gaziantep was bound and gagged by two assailants... Although they did not kill him, the attackers promised to come back and finish him off unless he and his family left Turkey immediately." Nick Birch, "Three Murdered at Turkish Bible Publishing House," *The Guardian*, 19 April 2007, online. For the continuing debate over missionary activity in Turkey, see Recep Kılıç, "Türkçe İnternet Ortamında Misyonerlik Araştırması [An analysis of web-based missionary activity]"; Ali Akyıldız, "Misyonerliğe Karşı Yasal Tedbirler/Misyonerlik Bir Kamu Sorunu Mudur? [Legal measures against missionary activity, is it a matter of public affairs?]"; in Asife Ünal eds., *Dinler Tarihçileri Gözüyle Misyonerlik* [Missionary activity from the perspective of historians of religion] (Ankara: Türkiye Dinler Tarihi Derneği Yayınları, 2005), pp. 103-110, 399-416.

protection. Even the supporters of Malatyaspor, a local soccer-team, protested "the massacre." In a game against Gençlerbirliği, they waved banners and shouted, "we damn terror!"[2]

At the official level, the Turkish government condemned this "savagery" (*vahşet*) and vowed to deliver to the court the butchers who had slayed their victims like animals. Its promise bore tangible progress, revealing also the motivation behind the act. Police captured the perpetrators and took them to the Malatya Heavy Penal Court Number 3 (*Malatya Üçüncü Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi*). The investigations revealed the incident was not the act of brutal, young, local, Muslim terrorists. It was a carefully-planned, masterfully-performed operation of the Ergenekon, an elite, clandestine, ultra-nationalist organization whose ultimate goal is the violent overthrow of Prime Minister Erdoğan's government. The trial thus moved to İstanbul on 17 March 2011 and merged with the larger, on-going Ergenekon trial.[3]

Despite the efforts of the Turkish Government, the media and missionaries alike pointed to the host government's ignorance as part of a broader trend that explains why such incidents have been happening in Turkey. Reporting from *Reuters*, *Der Spiegel* found the incident a perfect example of an "attack on Christians in Turkey," hyperbolically implying that all Christians in

[2] Nick Birch, "Three Murdered at Turkish Bible Publishing House," *The Guardian*, 19 April 2007; "'Emre Günaydın Azmettirici' İddiası [Claiming Emre Günaydın to be the solicitor]," *CNN Türk*, 23 Nisan 2007, online.
[3] "Christians Killed in Turkey," aired on *BBC World News*, 18 April 2007, online; "'Zirve' Ergenekon'a Bağlandı" [the Zirve trial has been connected to the Ergenekon], 17 March 2011, online; Damaris Kremide, "Martyrs Killed by Conspiracy, Investigation links Malatya murders to cabal of generals, politicians," *Christianity Today*, 15 June 2009, online.

Turkey are under attack.[4] Typical reactions from the American evangelical community also criticized "top government officials" for "fanning growing hostility against non-Muslims." Fundamentalist Christian news bulletin *The Witness* reporters add that "local prosecutors and police authorities are often reluctant to pursue reported incidents of vandalism or threats against church buildings or personnel."[5]

Further interpretation of the Malatya incident came from the missionaries. In the *World Evangelical Alliance* interview, the International Institute for Religious Freedom Director Thomas Schirrmacher revealed missionary concerns and perspective, building on the recent incident in Turkey. In his view,

> [That bloody incident] almost had to happen, given the way the tiny Protestant or Evangelical minority has been subjected to uninterrupted and unrestrained slander… coming from the highest levels in the government… In spite of tensions between the Islamicists and the Nationalists, the one thing on which they strongly agree is their dislike of Turkish Christians… Only in Turkey does this happen: a Muslim buys a Bible from a shop, and has to do this of his own free will, then someone complains about "overly aggressive missions…" no one will be able to say that the Turkish Nationalists and Islamicists really distinguish between the different varieties of Christians... The limited freedom of religion known by the old established churches in Turkey during the time of the Sultans is gone.

Schirrmacher saw this coming based on the assumption that Turks' hatred and reaction to missionary activity had survived, even strengthened over time.[6] However he was indeed emotional—having lost one of his students in the

[4] "Attack on Christians in Turkey, Three Killed at Bible Publishing Firm," *Spiegel*, 18 April 2011, online.
[5] "Group of Young Muslims Murders 3 Christians in Turkey," *Florida Baptist Witness*, 25 April, 2011, online.
[6] The World Evangelical Alliance, *An Interview with Thomas Shirrmacher, President of Martin Bucher Seminary and Director of the International Institute for Religious Freedom*, Bonn, Germany, 27 April 2007 [Bonn profiles press reports], online.

Malatya incident—and critical of Turkish authority and people from the past up to the present day.

This dissertation carries the continuing debate over missionaries in Turkey to the *fin-de-siècle* Ottoman Empire, studying the missionaries sent to the region by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), and Ottoman responses to their expansion.[7] From the 1880s onward, missionary expansion in the region became a major concern of the Ottoman central government, partly because the missionary message conflicted with Islam—the dominant religion across the Empire—and partly because missionary activity exacerbated local proto-nationalist unrest.[8] As indicated in intelligence-gathering surveys from the provinces, missionaries had become a formidable foreign group in the eyes of local Ottomans around this time. Their activities were reaching out to local community members through their hospitals, orphanages, schools and seminaries. Local authorities and

[7] The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was established in 1812, Boston Massachusetts, as a Protestant missionary agency to operate across the world. It divided the globe into mission spheres, marking the Ottoman lands as a separate and critical region. Eddy, a leading American Board missionary in the Ottoman Empire, suggested that "if the Gospel life can make a strong impression" in these lands, "the dynamic of it will be carried into every hamlet of" the East. David Brewer Eddy, *What Next in Turkey: Glimpses of the American Board's Work in the Near East* (Boston: The American Board, 1913), p. 86. For ABCFM history and missions to the Ottoman Empire, see Emrah Sahin, *Errand into the East: A Social History of American Missionaries in Istanbul, 1830-1900* (Köln: Lambert, 2009); Jeffrey C. Burke, *The Establishment of the American Presbyterian Mission in Egypt, 1854-1940: An Overview* (Ph.D. McGill University, 2000); William R. Hutchison, *Errand to the World: American Protestant Thought and Foreign Missions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East*: *Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971); Robert L. Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1960* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1970). This dissertation examines ABCFM missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman responses to them.

[8] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Donald Quataert, "Islahatlar Devri, 1812-1914 [the Age of Reforms]," in Halil İnacık and Donald Quataert eds., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi* [Economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire] (İstanbul: Eren, 2004), II: 885-1051; Fatma Müge Göçek, "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth Century Ottoman Society," *Poetics Today* vol. 14, no. 3 (Autumn, 1993): 507-538.

communities urged the central government to do something about this perceived threat to the social order. At the same time, missionaries also approached the government, requesting rights and their safety in the Ottoman domain. At times, they addressed challenging regional circumstances to U.S. diplomats and in American newspapers. Until the 1910s, the imperial bureaucrats remained occupied with the demands of missionaries and locals. They had to respond to local pressures against missionaries, regulate missionary institutions, monitor missionary publications, and arbitrate missionary-related disputes. The dissertation deals with these subjects, offering a detailed examination of, and raising questions about, the government's ideologies and practices, and its interactions with local authorities and people, U.S. diplomats, and missionaries.

The main focus of study is on the central government's reaction to missionary expansion in the Ottoman domain. This does not mean that a myriad of other actors, including Ottoman local authorities, U.S. diplomats, and the missionaries themselves are less important. Rather, the dissertation's analysis of imperial statecraft emphasizes the significance of these actors by showing how inter-connected they were with the development of imperial policy towards the missionaries from the 1880s to the 1910s.

For several reasons, this dissertation does not analyze other topics in detail. A more comprehensive history of missionary experience in the Empire would be based on a more detailed study of missionary collections as well as the imperial records. An additional chapter on local unrest during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries could enrich the dissertation's

presentation and yet risk the content's cohesiveness and integrity. Furthermore, a comparison of how imperial statecraft functioned with regard to missionary expansion and other areas such as labour unrest and national independence movements within the Empire would have been possible with more extensive research. The dissertation particularly addresses the following research questions:

1. How did the Ottoman imperial statecraft operate on specific issues related to missionary expansion at the provincial level? Why did the central government respond to missionary activity the way it did?
2. To what extent did the government in the capital cave in to local demands against missionaries? How did it translate local pressure into an imperial strategy?
3. What were the means the imperial bureaucrats used to regulate missionary institutions within the Ottoman domain? In what ways did changes in local context affect these means?
4. How did the central government respond to missionary publications? What imperial strategies did it form and apply to handle them? In what ways did these strategies affect missionaries' publishing and distribution activities?
5. Why did the central government aim to prevent U.S. interference in missionary issues? How did it cope with matters concerning the rights and safety of individual missionaries in the Empire? In what ways did imperial policy toward the legal cases of missionaries

influence the central government's relationship with local authorities?

Main Propositions

This dissertation examines the Ottoman central government's responses to American missionary expansion and the extent to which its fin-de-siècle statecraft affected these responses. It also traces the relationships between missionaries, local authorities and populations, and the government in the capital. In essence, the dissertation examines the processes by which the government approached missionary issues and how the mechanisms of imperial statecraft unfolded throughout the course of events. An examination of these processes provide insights absent from the existing literature, which often explains 'the missionary factor' while neglecting 'the Ottoman side' and is typically focused on the number of conversions and the transfer of modern ideas into a Middle East context.[9]

Scholars in the field have rarely addressed the question of imperial authority in their studies of the history of missionary activities in the Ottoman

[9] Michael Provence, "Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 43, no. 2 (May 2011); 205-225, especially pp. 206-208. The existing literature includes: Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century," *The Muslim World* vol. 92, nos. 3-4 (2002): 287–313; Nahid Dinçer, *Yabancı Özel Okullar: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kültür Yoluyla Parçalanması* [Foreign private colleges: the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by cultural means] (İstanbul: ER-TU Matbaası, 1970); Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century] (İstanbul: Arba, 1989); Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East; Missionary Influence on American policy, 1810-1927*; Fred F. Goodell, *Their Lived Their Faith: An Almanac of Faith, Hope and Love* (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1961).

Empire. Thus contributions of the central government to the missionary experience are left out of existing literature despite the importance and complexity of these contributions. The dissertation's principal contention is that official Ottoman policy on missionary expansion was not static but rather inextricably linked with changing local contexts, and the degree of impact of official Ottoman policy depended on the success of centralization efforts in the capital and the expediency of agents in provinces.

The sophistication of imperial authority surrounding missionary activity showed itself in various ways. Most importantly, imperial bureaucrats closely surveilled interactions between provincial governors, missionaries, and other local actors. They evaluated in detail the substance of relations between these competing interest groups before reaching decisions. Therefore, the dissertation argues, traditional interpretations of the central government as an autocratic, anti-missionary entity should be supplanted by a nuanced account of a centrifugal governing body that produced missionary policies based on a dynamic matrix composed of competitive self-interested stakeholders.

An assessment of two distinct stages of imperial responses to missionary expansion is possible. The first stage, covering the 1860s to the 1880s, is characterized by a belief in the capital that peaceful coexistence between the missionaries and local governments and communities was possible. At this stage, the imperial authorities did not distinguish American missionaries from other missionary groups including British, French, German, Italian, and Russian missionaries. Issues relating to these missionaries were addressed on a case-per-case basis under the expectation that local authorities could cope

within their jurisdictions. In practice, local governments and communities were hostile to missionary activity, leading the missionaries to seek help from the central government. During this stage the bureaucrats in the capital listened to both sides, patiently deliberating and hoping to make informed responses.

The second stage, between the late 1880s and the 1910s, is the dissertation's focus. Throughout this time, the Ottoman Empire was divided along socio-ethnic lines and depended on foreign credit.[10] Among ever-expanding missionary involvement in community affairs, local unrest, and U.S. diplomatic pressure, the imperial bureaucrats became more attentive to reports and petitions sent from the provinces. At this stage, the authorities categorized American missionaries as a special group and approached them with reference to their size, their involvement with specific incidents, and third-party interference in these incidents.

The 1883 census and regional surveys also supported local views that missionaries were a threat to social order. Thus from the early 1880s onward the central government began to develop standardized responses—marked by heightened vigilance and diminished tolerance—to missionary expansion. This broader evolution permeated imperial policies toward specific missionary activity at least until the 1910s. This dissertation further reveals that the central government justified its standardized responses to various missionary activities with standard terms such as "against norms and state interests" (*hâriç es-*

[10] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*; Donald Quataert, "Islahatlar Devri, 1812-1914 [the Age of Reforms]," pp. 885-1051; Şevket Pamuk, "The Ottoman Empire in 'the Great Depression' of 1873-1896," *The Journal of Economic History* vol. 44, no. 1 (March 1984): 107-118; Fatma Müge Göçek, "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth Century Ottoman Society," pp. 507-538.

salâhiyyet ve mugâyir-i menfa'ât-i Devlet) and "acts of sedition" (*fesad hareket*). In most cases, the government in the capital benefited from the vagueness of terminology, leaving the interpretation of such terms at their discretion.[11]

An assessment of imperial statecraft throughout the second stage also helps to revisit the monolithic depiction of Ottoman actors—the central government, local authorities and communities—as a single agency with an objective of "inveighing against the evils associated with competing educational institutions, those of the missionaries."[12] This dissertation challenges the validity of this historical judgment by demonstrating the ways in which Ottoman responses to missionary activity transformed during the late nineteenth century with a stronger exertion of imperial authority.

Other propositions include the government's treatment of specific issues of missionary expansion. To begin with, missionaries' conversion of residential houses into institutions such as schools and orphanages, their proliferation in provinces, and the lack of local authority to counter these developments were the main reasons why the government in the capital affected in the 1880s what the dissertation calls an "imperial strategy of containment." Missionary institutions became the subject of new regulations: all were obliged to register under the auspices of their sponsor, ABCFM, and to obtain licences from government agencies to continue operating. In addition, new building

[11] See the dissertation chapter, "Controlling Missionary Publications." In our future study, we hope to expand our textual analysis of Ottoman legal terms.
[12] See "Ottoman agency" and the quote in Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and the Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 1-40.

regulations allowed for renovation but not expansion of existing institutions and forbade the practice of using residences as mission-houses. In light of this imperial strategy and the mixed consequences of implementing subsequent regulations, it is safe to propose that the government's approach to missionary expansion was not stagnant.

Missionaries' publishing and distribution activities are another milieu in which the imperial bureaucrats held a significant impact. This dissertation challenges the notion that they took "an attitude of negligence" with regard to missionary publications.[13] Rather, the bureaucrats in the capital made a detailed analysis of each publication's content and its potential impact on the intended audience. It was largely due to this fact that they projected a pragmatic coherence in imperial policy mixed with reactive improvisation. *Fin-de-siècle* imperial policy toward missionary publications was a targeted policy. It made a qualitative distinction between religious and educational books and between their educated and uneducated potential audiences.

Final propositions are related to the government's approach to missionaries as the object of public security. Between the 1880s and the 1910s, the rights and safety of provincial missionaries overwhelmed the imperial bureaucrats. Around this time of local unrest, reactions from local communities and bandit groups put at risk the lives and property of missionaries. A major contention of the dissertation is that the lack of local authority and competence

[13] Çağrı Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," *Turkish Yearbook* vol. 30 (2000): 191-212; Nahid Dinçer, *Yabancı Özel Okullar: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kültür Yoluyla Parçalanması* [Foreign private colleges: the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by cultural means], pp. 79-81.

as well as increasing pressure from U.S. government and media forced the bureaucrats to formulate new ways of handling the issue. Most importantly, the legal cases of missionaries were incorporated into the matters of domestic affairs with the aim of eliminating third-party interference. Also, the imperial law-enforcement agency, or the public security and police, emerged as the key actor in handling these cases. This agency carried out many duties, including punishing criminals and conducting security operations, all in line with the imperial government's general objective to check criminal activities in the Ottoman realm.

Encountering Imperial Records

The research material used in this dissertation is substantively different from that used in other studies on the history of American missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire, which have used missionary collections and U.S. official papers as their main sources of analysis.[14] This study examines Ottoman imperial statecraft and the progression of the central government's responses to missionary expansion in local contexts: how the government collected and processed information; what specific problems local agents (authorities and communities) brought to the capital; what orders and regulations the

[14] Examples are included in John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*, pp. 402-410; Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*, pp. 351-374; Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century], pp. 5, 223-245; Çağrı Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," pp. 191-212, especially endnotes; Justin McCarthy, "Missionaries and the American Image of the Turks," in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan eds., *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 47-48.

government issued as to specific missionary issues; how imperial authorities handled the legal cases and claims of missionaries; and how the central government's approach affected interactions between the capital, local agents, and missionaries at the provincial level. Thus, narratives and analyses presented in the study intend to emphasize the nature of interactions, and the impact of the capital on these interactions. To pursue these objectives, the dissertation's core material is drawn from the imperial records being preserved in the Ottoman Archives Division of the Prime Minister's Office in İstanbul, Turkey.

The contents of many of the archival documents overlap, but the bulk can be divided into four general categories as: basic laws and regulations, administrative laws and regulations, records of sultans and statesmen, and judicial records. A new archiving administration has placed the documents into dossiers and placed these dossiers into collections as follows: Administrative Orders (*ahkâm defterleri*), Capitulations and Contracts (*imtiyâzât ve mukâvelât*), Economic Affairs (*İktisât*), Education and Cultural Affairs (*Ma'ârif*), Excise and Special Taxes (*Rusûmât*), Finance (*Mâliye*), Foreign Affairs (*Hâriciye*), Imperial Decrees (*Hatt-ı Hümâyûn ve İrâde*), Internal Affairs (*Dâhiliye*), Judicial Affairs (*Adliye*), Military Affairs (*Askeriye*), Municipal Affairs (*Belediye*), Organizational Ordinances and Regulations (*nizâmât*), Public Security (or Police, *Zabtiye*), Public Works (*Nâfia*), and Telegraph and Post Office (*telgraf ve posta*).[15]

[15] Midhat Sertoğlu, *Muhteva Bakimindan Basvekalet Arşivi* [the Prime Minister's archival collections] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1955); Stanford J. Shaw, "The Ottoman Archives as a Source for Egyptian History," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* vol. 83, no. 4 (September-December 1963): 447-452. Shaw notes that during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the Ottoman Archives improved remarkably. Since 1963, "a number of additional

Researching the dossiers in these collections involves various prospects and challenges.[16] The short summaries prepared for each dossier fail to adequately inform one of the contents. For example, the summary of one dossier dated 8 November 1895—available in the Internal Affairs collections as "the Vizierate, incoming, urgent-affairs documents" (*Sadâret, amedî, muhimme evrâkı*)—states "that investigations were made as the damages on American missionaries' houses and property during the incidents in Maraş and Harput had required; attached are the petition letters from persons complaining to have suffered from the incidents in Adana."[17] It gives a vague idea of what might be in the dossier but does not specify what the enclosed 59 documents really contain. Most summaries, then, may not help a researcher's initial project. However, a rich variety of documents enclosed in previously 'untapped' dossiers will provide plentiful research material for projects that are flexible in

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collections in that archive have been catalogued and made available, and my own subsequent research into the Ottoman reform movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have enabled me to examine these and other materials which I did not see or examine during my earlier research." Stanford J. Shaw, "Ottoman Archival Materials for the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries: The Archives," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 6, no. 1 (January 1975): 94-114, especially pp. 93-94. Also see *Guide on the General Directorate of State Archives* (Ankara: Prime Ministry Printing House, 2001); İsmet Binark, *A Short History of the Turkish Archives and the Activities of the General Directorate of the State Archives* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1994). An interesting work by the Turkish General Directorate of State Archives published selected papers presented at International Archives Symposium held in Montreal: *XII. Milletlerarası Arşiv Kongresi* [12th international archives congress], September 1992, Montreal (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1992). The archives have made further improvement since the 1970s. More documents were catalogued and several collections, such as the Imperial Decrees (*Hatt-ı Hümayûn ve İrâde*) were digitalized. Today, researchers can search the collections through computers at the archives' study room and online.

[16] The stages of our dissertation research have been discussed at a graduate conference in Kingston, "Writing Turks: Prospects and Challenges of Research in Ottoman Archives," *Where the Archive Ends: History and its Uses* (McGill-Queen's History Conference), March 2011. We hope to publish this presentation.

[17] Dossier's full title is B. E. O. (*Bâb-ı Âli Evrâk Odası*, papers of the records of the Sublime Porte], code name A. Mkt. Mhm. (*Amedî Mektubî Mühimme*, incoming correspondence urgent), dossier no. 647, file no. 39, 59 documents, 105 sheets, date 1313. C. 20. The dissertation prefers to cite the archival sources of this type in shorter forms. For instance, this dossier will be cited as A Mkt Mhm 647/39, 20 C 1313.

focus. In fact, the dissertation's second chapter on missionary institutions resulted from just such a focus and approach.

Archival sources used in this dissertation are from the collections of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Public Security, and Telegraph and Post Office. Initial source lists came out of a comparison of preliminary research topics and dossier summaries, and identified about 6,500 dossiers worthy of study. Further examination of select documents—by obtaining about 40 dossiers from each collection, analyzing their content, and transliterating a representative number from Ottoman script into Turkish-Latin script—helped to further narrow the focus to 2,200.

There were several reasons for reducing the number of dossiers for in-depth examination. To begin with, the dossiers placed in the collections of Excise and Special Taxes, Judicial Affairs, and Military Affairs, were not directly related to the research subject and were thus excluded. Records of sultans and statesmen—Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) and the imperial bureaucrats—were of secondary importance to the subject therefore they were eliminated. In addition, only some documents in the dossiers of several collections addressed the dissertation's subject. In such cases, selected documents underwent further analysis. For instance, only relevant documents in the collection of the Imperial Decrees—those on the Special Council of Ministers (*Meclîs-i Mahsûs-i Vükelâ*) and their motions on missionary-related issues—were obtained for further analysis. Lastly, as a result of researching a remarkable number of sources, various documents had to be acquired and

reserved for future study rather than used in this dissertation.[18] For instance, about 150 documents were obtained from the collections of Capitulations and Contracts, and Foreign Affairs. These documents indicate that many Ottoman subjects were inspired by American missionaries to become American citizens through the U.S. consulate in İstanbul. Despite being worthy of detailed analysis, they were excluded from the dissertation for subject integrity.[19]

This dissertation examined approximately 6,150 documents included in 2,200 dossiers from the collections of Educational and Cultural, Internal, and Foreign Affairs, and of Public Security and Telegraph and Post Office. Based on the documents under scrutiny, it presents imperial statecraft and the central government's impact on missionary expansion in the *fin-de-siècle* Empire. As the research stages reveal above, the sheer volume of imperial records may present a challenge to researchers, but they hold a wealth of information for prospective projects.

Approach

This dissertation prioritizes the use of original archival documents. They transcend previous studies by associating heretofore understudied particulars of Ottoman imperial statecraft with American missionary expansion in the *fin-de-siècle* Ottoman Empire. By and large, the dissertation's sources call for a nuanced approach to the subject-matter. Their content variety also makes

[18] Some footnotes throughout the dissertation refer to these documents that will be examined in the future.

[19] Happily, Kemal H. Karpat invited us to contribute an article—based on an analysis of the documents related to citizenship debates between Ottoman and U.S. governments—to the book titled, *Turkish Migration to the Americas: From Ottoman Times to the Present* (scheduled for publication in fall, 2012).

possible, and arguably necessitates, the utilization of "analytical eclecticism."[20] Analytical eclecticism posits that,

> Extolling... the virtues of a specific analytical perspective to the exclusion of others is intellectually less important than making sense of empirical anomalies and stripping notions of what is "natural" of their intuitive plausibility... [Analytical eclecticism] argues against the privileging of parsimony that has become the hallmark of paradigmatic debates. The complex links between power, interest, and norms defy analytical capture by any one paradigm. They are made more intelligible by drawing selectively on different paradigms-that is, by analytical eclecticism, not parsimony.[21]

Typically scholarship on relationships between Ottoman authorities and missionaries in the Empire has followed mono-paradigm approaches. Hence, it privileges parsimony and neglects complex and sometimes contradictory links between the central government, competing interest groups including local agents and missionaries, and various socio-communal norms prevailing across the late Ottoman domain. This being the case, existing literature has attributed predetermined roles to missionaries and the host government, generally studying the former as "an agency" of U.S. diplomacy in the region and the latter as "reactionary" and an "autocracy." In certain cases, it tends "to

[20] These documents are mostly collected under titles of the High Council of Ministries, the Imperial Telegram Centre, the Ottoman Embassy in Washington, the Sublime Porte, the Yıldız Palace, and the Ministries of Education, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and Public Security (and their sub-departments, such as the Committee of Examination and Inspection in the Foreign-Internal Press Services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Some documents including rules and regulations on specific topics are classified as miscellaneous. For the organizational development of the Ottoman central government and further steps toward regulation and systematization of the imperial statecraft, see Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: the Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); pp. 239-387.

[21] Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism," *International Security* vol. 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001-2002): 153-185, especially p. 154. The relevance of the analytical-eclecticism approach to a Turkish political context is demonstrated in Umut Uzer, *Identity and Foreign Policy: The Kemalist Influence in Cyprus and Caucasus* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris; New York: Distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). This dissertation finds this approach convenient and applicable to the *fin-de-siècle* Ottoman context.

emphasize American influence." In other cases, it depicts the missionary-authority relationship simply as a historical subject of an overarching confrontation between Christianity and Islam, with its actors as crusaders of these religions. Despite their scholarly value, products of these assumptions are essentially biased, and fail to present historical reality.

Applying a mono-paradigm approach to the *fin-de-siècle* Ottoman context would subordinate the Ottoman central government to no more than a primitive anti-missionary establishment.[22] Therefore this dissertation insulates the subject-matter from mono-paradigmatic assumptions, despite their dominance in the field, by extracting its *problemàtique* directly from archival sources and by selectively drawing on multiple paradigms. It gives particular preference to new research questions, exposes documents to multi-layered analysis, and provides an alternative account based on the substance of these

[22] Timothy Roberts and Emrah Şahin, "Construction of National Identities in Early Republics: A Comparison of the American and Turkish Cases," *The Journal of the Historical Society* vol. 10, no. 4 (December 2010): 507-531, especially pp. 507-508. Examples of scholarship include: Ussama S. Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations, 1820-2001* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010); Ussama S. Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," *The American Historical Review* vol. 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 768-796; Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 2007); Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan eds., *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future*; Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations] (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003); Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century"; Nahid Dinçer, *Yabancı Özel Okullar: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kültür Yoluyla Parçalanması* [Foreign private colleges: the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by cultural means], pp. 85-87; Musa Çakır, *Anadolumuz Asla Hristiyan Olmayacak: Misyonerler Memleketinize Geri Dönünüz* [our Anatolia will never convert to Christianity: missionaries, go back home] (İstanbul: M.S. Matbası, 1966); James E. Dittes, "The Christian Mission and Turkish Islam," *The Muslim World* vol. 45, no. 2 (April 1955): 134–144; Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman empire during the nineteenth century]; Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East; Missionary Influence on American policy, 1810-1927*; John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963); Engin Deniz Akarlı, "The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization, an Overview," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* vol. 26, no.3 (2006): 353-366.

documents. Furthermore, it does not make a conscious effort to relate to all existing paradigms in the field. Rather, it challenges these paradigms on specific issues of the subject-matter and where new findings deem necessary.

Broadly, this dissertation also prioritizes the use of archival documents based on their substance. At the dissertation's early research stage, only a few sources were found related to our preliminary research questions. This paved the way for further research, through available documents, to seek out a new *problemàtique*, to revise the research questions, and to develop historical themes that corresponded to the substance of examined sources.

Historiography and Contributions

Until the 1960s, histories of American missionary activities were written predominantly by missionaries themselves, their descendents, and some religious figures sympathetic to the missionary cause. Instead of analyzing the activities as a complex historical phenomenon, early works underscored the determination and endurance of missionaries in reaching out to people despite all the challenges faced by their missions.[23] They promoted missionaries'

[23] See some of early works in Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*, pp. 357-363; *Catalogue of Missionary Publications*. Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, n.d. [817.81 ABCFM box no. I; Andover Theological Library]; *Wise as Serpents and Harmless as Doves: An Illustration* (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1890); Frank T. Bayley, *Testimonies to Missions* (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1901); *America's Part in the Present World Revolution: An Address by Fred Field Goodsell* [Executive Vice-President of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, delivered 22 June 1942 at the 133rd annual meeting of the Board, in Durham, New Hampshire] (s.l.: s.n., 1942), unfortunately, Goodsell's address was not available during our research. In addition, it is instructive that Beaver's book on world missions proudly mentions his missionary background with the aim to promote the authority of the book on the subject: "one of the few outstanding authorities on Christian missions, he has had wide experience in the mission field as well as a through academic training." See R. Pierce Beaver, *Ecumenical*

intentions—delivering the Gospel and civilization to others in miserable and backward conditions—and their belief that missionary activity would invite "the mere pleasure of God," which, building on the Great Awakening sermon of the late eighteenth century theologian Jonathan Edwards, was the only thing that "keeps wicked men at any moment out of hell."[24] For these works, the Ottomans—Jews, Muslims, "nominal Christians" such as Armenians, and other misbelievers including pagans—deserved a detailed focus for two main reasons.[25] First, they constituted a large divided target audience with supposedly unlimited prospects of conversion. In addressing their fellows, missionary leaders suggested that,

> The two grand inquiries ever present in your mind will be, 'what good can be done? 'And by what means?' What can be done for the Jews?

Beginnings in Protestant World Mission: A History of Comity (Edinburgh, New York, Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), especially pp. 203-327. For early works on missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire, see footnotes 30-33.

[24] Earl E. Elder, *Vindicating a Vision: The Story of the American Mission in Egypt, 1854-1954* (Philadelphia: The Board of Foreign Missions of the United Presbyterian Church of North America, 1958); George Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards: A Life* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2003); John Piper, *God's Passion for His Glory: Living the Vision of Jonathan Edwards* (New York: Crossway Books, 1988); the significance of Jonathan Edward's preaching in ABCFM missionary activities, in Charles A. Maxfield, *The Formation and Early History of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (2001), online; Jonathan Edwards, "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," delivered 8 July 1741, Enfield, Connecticut, in Harry S. Stout ed., *Sermons and Discourses, 1739-1742* vol. 22, available from the Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University online. Thanks to Jason Opal for drawing our attention to the significance of Edwards' sermons.

[25] "Progress in Fifty Years; Stamboul as Mrs. Walker found it a century ago," in *Miscellaneous* [A.B.C. 14.2, Houghton Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts]; *American Board Charts: A Graphic Presentation of the Foreign Work of the Congregational Churches of America* (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 14 June 1916). Missionaries' letters, memoirs, opinion-editorials, pamphlets, and letters are in Houghton Library, Yale Divinity Library in New Haven, Connecticut, and Bilkent University Library in Ankara, Turkey. See *Guide to the Microfilm Collection: Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Woodbridge, Connecticut: Research Publications International, 1994); Mary A. Walker, "The Archives of the American Board for Foreign Missions," *Harvard Library Bulletin* vol. 6 (1952): 52-68. Parts of missionary collections related to missionaries in the Ottoman Empire are listed in the ABCFM Project in Bilkent University, online. Examples include "What the Missionaries are doing at Constantinople," *Boston Journal*, 2 October 1868, [reproduced in *Papers of the ABCFM*, A.B.C. 16, Reel 583 16.9.3: 541-542, Bilkent University]; *The American Board In the Near East: Centennial of Constantinople Station* (Constantinople: Selamet Press, 1931).

> What for the Pagans? What for the Mohammedans? What for the Christians?... If the "Gospel life" can make a strong impression [upon them] the dynamic of it will be carried into every hamlet of distant Kurdistan… [opening the door to the Orient].[26]

Second, the Ottoman lands had a sacred value: the missions to these lands—the cradle of Christianity and thus of civilization—provided a significant venue for contrasting Evangelical forms of Christianity, as carried by missionaries, with Islam and other forms of Christianity as practiced by the Ottomans.[27] Early missionary historiography was passionate, but biased, and infused with value judgments.[28]

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[26] "The Two Grand Inquiries," in *The Problem of Turkey as the American Board Views It* (Boston: ABCFM, 1923) [BV 3160 Z91; Andover Theological Library]; "if the 'gospel life,'" in David B. Eddy, *What Next in Turkey: Glimpses of the American Board's Work in the Near East* (Boston: ABCFM, 1913), p. 86.

[27] Cyrus Hamlin, *The Oriental Churches and Mohammedans*. Boston: ABCFM, 1853 [Missionary tracts nos.11, 815. L9; Widener Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts]; *Duty of American Christians to the Heathen* (Boston: The Board, 1866) [Pamphlet 817.83 ABCFM no: 3, Andover Theological Library]; James S. Dennis, *Islam and Christian Missions* (New York: Funk and Wangalis, 1889) [reproduced from *The Missionary Review of the World*, August 1889, ABCFM Pamphlet D, Andover Theological Library]; Henry O. Dwight, *Constantinople and Its Problems: Its Peoples, Customs, Religions and Progress* (New York: Young People's Missionary Movement, 1901); Zenope A. Bezjian, *Protestant Colleges in Turkey: An Address Delivered by Professor Bezjian Before the Cilician Union of the Evangelical Churches at its Thirty-seventh Annual Meeting Held in Aintab, June 29, 1903* [Pamphlet LG321.Z91, Andover Theological Library]; J. S. Hartzler and Shoemaker, *Among Missions in the Orient and Observations by the Way* (Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Mennonite Publishing House, 1912) [Andover Theological Library]; Fred F. Goodsell, *Ye Shall Be My Witnesses* (Boston: ABCFM, 1959); Reverend Fred F. Goodsell, *Shepard of Aintab* (Boston, Massachusetts: ABCFM, 1916); *150 Years in the Near East* (New York: United Church Board for World Ministries, 1969).

[28] Emrah Şahin, "Thinking Religion Globally, Acting Missionary Locally: Last Century's American Missionary Experience in the Middle East," *World History Bulletin* vol. 23, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 33-36. Early works on missionaries in the Ottoman Empire include: William Goodell, *The Old and the New: or, The Changes of Thirty Years in the East, With Some Allusions to Oriental Customs as Elucidating Scripture* (New York: M. W. Dodd, 1853); Rufus D. D. Anderson, *History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches* (Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 1872); Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks* (New York: R. Carter and Brothers, 1878), and *My Life and Times* (Boston: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society, 1893); *The Field, the Force, and the Work, 1881-1882* (Boston: ABCFM, 1882) [Pamphlet 817.83 ABCM No: 3, Andover Theological Library]; N. G. Clark, *Annual Survey of the Work of the American Board Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Board at Detroit, Michigan, 1882-1883* (Boston: ABCFM, 1883) [ABCFM Box no.2, Andover Theological Library], *General Survey of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Presented at the Annual Meeting at Hartford, October 1876*, and *October 1877* 2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1876, 1877)

A radical transformation occurred in the 1960s. Fairbank encouraged academics to study "the invisible men of American history," i.e. the missionaries, expecting they would claim the field of missionary history from the missionaries who had created and come to dominate it.[29] In fact it was the Cold War that pushed the field away from zealousness: throughout the 1960s scholars studied missionary activities largely through a bipolar prism and established inextricable links between the missionaries and the U.S. diplomacy.[30] In their works, the missionaries now became the embodiment of Christianity and also American interests in the Ottoman Empire.[31]

[Andover Theological Library]; Samuel C. Barlett, *Historical Sketch of the Missions of the American Board in Turkey* 3 vols. (Boston: ABCFM, 1896, 1872, 1889); *An Eastern Palimpsest: Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Transjordiana, Egypt* (London: World Dominion Press, n.d.) [ABCFM box II, Andover Theological Library]; Henry O. Dwight, *Constantinople and Its Problems: Its Peoples, Customs, Religions and Progress* (New York: Young People's Missionary Movement, 1901); James L. Barton, *Daybreak in Turkey* (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1908); Edward W. Capen, *American Board History Manuscript* (Boston: ABCFM, 1908) [Houghton Library]; David B. Eddy, *What Next in Turkey: Glimpses of the American Board's Work in the Near East* (Boston: ABCFM, 1913); *52 Weeks in the Turkey Mission of the American Board* (Stamboul: Souhoulet Press, 1925); *Centennial of Constantinople Station, 1831-1931; Near East Mission of the American Board* (Constantinople: The Board, 1931); *A Tour in Turkey: Land of Change and Challenge, A Visit to the American Board Mission* (New York: Congregational Christian Churches, 1958); *Papers of Cyrus Hamlin and George Washburn* [manuscripts presented by Mrs. Basil D. Hall, in Houghton Library]; George Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople and Recollections of Robert College* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909); Fred F. Goodsell, *Shepard of Aintab* (Boston, Massachusetts: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1916); *150 Years in the Near East* (New York: United Church Board for World Ministries, 1969).

[29] As the American Historical Association President, Fairbank delivered his keynote speech in the association's 1968 conference on the significance of studying the history of American missionaries. John K. Fairbank, "Assignment for the '70's," *American Historical Review* vol. 74, no. 3 (February 1969): 861-879. Despite his efforts, coming studies were not productive mainly because these studies did not work on new sources and relied essentially on missionary collections. DeNovo's consideration of Field's work as "admirable" and "sympathetic" to the missionary cause held true for many other works, even his own work to some extent. DeNovo's views in John A. DeNovo, "Review of America and the Mediterranean World," *The Journal of American History* vol. 56, no. 4 (March 1970): 932; James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean world, 1776-1882* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969); John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963).

[30] Georg G. Iggers, *Bilimsel Nesnellikten Postmodernizme Yirminci Yüzyılda Tarih Yazımı* [Turkish translation of *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000), p. 44; Peter Novick,

The Cold War context did not only create a tectonic shift that caused scholars in the United States to reconstruct American missionaries as agents of American ideals and interests in the Middle East. It also shaped the perspectives of "missionary" scholars in Turkey, the heir of the Ottoman Empire in the 1960s. In a world of either-or (you are either with us or against us), the works of these scholars took a position "against" the missionaries, calling on them to "go back home," and regarding their activities as the root cause of the fall of the Empire.[32]

During recent years after a period of some silence, missionary studies in the United States and Turkey have gained popularity, a new focus, and further specialization. Scholars, including more historians and fewer missionaries and political scientists, have been interested in various dimensions of American missionary expansion in the Middle East.[33] In some ways, however, early

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That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 338; Iva Dolezalova et al. eds., *The Academic Study of Religion During the Cold War: East and West* (New York: P. Lang, 2001).

[31] John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*; James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean world, 1776-1882*; A. L. Tibawi, *American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901: A Study of Educational, Literary and Religious Work* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*; Bayard Dodge, "American Educational and Missionary Efforts in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* vol. 401 (May 1972): 15-22.

[32] Akdes N. Kurat, *Türk-Amerikan Münasebetlerine Kısa Bir Bakış, 1800-1959* [Brief history of Turkish-American relations, 1800-1959] (Ankara: Doğuş Matbaası, 1959); E. Kırşehirlioğlu, *Türkiye'de Misyoner Faaliyetleri* [Missionary activities in Turkey] (İstanbul: Bedir Yayınları, 1963); Musa Çakır, *Anadolumuz Asla Hristiyan Olmayacak: Misyonerler Memleketinize Geri Dönünüz* [our Anatolia will never convert to Christianity: missionaries, go back home]; Nahid Dinçer, *Yabancı Özel Okullar: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kültür Yoluyla Parçalanması* [Foreign private colleges: the disintegration of the Ottoman empire by cultural means].

[33] Çağrı Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," *Turkish Yearbook* vol. 30 (2000): 191-212; Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century"; Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations]; Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan eds., *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future*; Şinasi Gündüz, "Misyonerlik [Missionary activity]," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Turkish religious

works and the tendency to depict history in colours continue to affect scholarship. For example, some scholars such as H. L. Murre-van den Berg, Michael B. Oren, and Ussama S. Makdisi have focused mainly on the contributions and achievements/failures of the missionary activities in the Middle East; others such as Çağrı Erhan, Nurdan Şafak, and Uygur Kocabaşoğlu have studied colonialist designs behind the missionary project and depicted the Ottoman central government, provincial authorities, and local communities, as anti-missionary.[34]

The works of Ussama S. Makdisi and Nurdan Şafak can be insightful in this respect. Makdisi and Şafak agree that the history of American involvement with the Middle East needs revising.[35] In *Artillery of Heaven*, Makdisi underscores the impact of American missionaries on Arab intellectuals and modernity. His research examines missionary collections and no Ottoman

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foundation encyclopaedia of Islam] (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2005), XXX: 193-199; H. L. Murre-van den Berg ed., *New Faith in Ancient Lands: Western Missions in the Middle East in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006); Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present*; Ussama S. Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations, 1820-2001*; Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*; Emrah Şahin, *Errand into the East: A Social History of American Missionaries in Istanbul, 1830-1900*; Ann Marie Wilson, "In the Name of God, Civilization, and Humanity: The United States and the Armenian Massacres of the 1890s," *Le mouvement social* vol. 227, no. 1 (2009): 27-44; Hans-Lukas Kieser, *Nearest East: American Millennialism and Mission to the Middle East* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010); also see the chapter's opening narrative.

[34] H. L. Murre-van den Berg, "The Middle East: Western Missions and the Eastern Churches, Islam and Judaism," in Sheridan Gilley and Brian Stanley eds., *World Christianities, 1815-1914* (Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 458-472; Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present*; Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*; Çağrı Erhan "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries;" Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations]; Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century].

[35] Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*; Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations].

sources, which seems to downplay the role of Ottoman government and regionalism in missionary expansion as well as intellectual and other currents in specific parts of the Empire. On the whole, Makdisi's *Artillery of Heaven* portrays American missionaries as idealistic reformers that inspired local intellectuals, especially the narrative's central figure Butrus al-Bustani. "Without the American mission," it argues, "there could have been no Bustani." This approach gives American missionaries credit and promotes the likes of Bustani as "an exemplary liberal product of the commingling of American and Arab histories that legitimated new identities."[36]

On the other hand, Nurdan Şafak presents the expansion of the missionaries as a cultural manifestation of American imperialism. In *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American Relations], Şafak hypothesizes that American missionaries came to the Ottoman Empire in response to Washington's intention to create an American sphere of influence in the Middle East. She then suggests that American missionaries and Ottoman Armenians together served for U.S. diplomatic interests and aimed to undermine Ottoman authority.[37]

In general, scholars in the field devote little attention to processes and the nature of interactions between subjects in their study.[38] This

[36] Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*, p. 216.
[37] Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations], pp. 59-79.
[38] Exceptions include Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*; Barbara Reeves-Ellington, "A Vision of Mount Holyoke in the Ottoman Balkans: American Cultural Transfer, Bulgarian Nation-Building and Women's Educational Reform, 1858-1870," *Gender and History* vol. 16, no. 1 (2004): 146-171; Barbara Reeves-Ellington, "Embracing Domesticity: Women, Mission, and Nation Building in Ottoman Europe, 1832-1872," in Barbara Reeves-Ellington et al. eds., *Competing Kingdoms: Women,*

historiographical lacuna appears to be twofold. First, the very meaning of American missionary activity in the Ottoman Empire holds political and religious connotations, providing incentives to focus scholarly attention on cause-effect correlations: how many "natives," or locals, were converted? To what degree was the missionary activity successful to bring civilization/modernity to the region? Such focus can often be a useful analytical tool because it encourages the assessment of missionary-host relationships in historical context. Yet it also possesses limitations. In particular, the focus on conversions and missionaries' legacy has discouraged scholars from looking, as much as they should, at nuances and varieties of responses to missionary expansion in broader and local contexts.[39] A second reason why the subject is largely being studied within a framework of East-West confrontation is that many of the field's practitioners work from a limited set of sources from missionary collections and Washington D.C. Strikingly, little effort has been made to broaden scholarship's focus by using Ottoman archival sources. Integrating these sources into existing literature will help to present other histories of missionary activity and to reveal more details of the subject from different angles.[40]

Mission, Nation, and the American Protestant Empire, 1812-1960 (Durham, North Caroline: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 269-292.

[39] Emrah Şahin, "Review Article: American Turkish Relations in Retrospective," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* vol. 12, nos. 1-2 (Fall 2006): 195-198.

[40] Stanford J. Shaw and Turgay criticized our research as overly relying on "the American side." For instance, Turgay suggested, "The Ottoman side of the story, however, would give his work a more balanced interpretation of ABCFM missions in the Ottoman Middle East by informing readers what the Ottomans had to say about them." A. Üner Turgay, "Review of Emrah Şahin's Errand into the East: A Social History of American Missionaries in İstanbul, 1830-1900" *International Journal of Turkish Studies* vol. 16, nos. 1-2 (Fall 2010): 126-127. In fact, their criticisms encouraged this dissertation to examine the Ottoman archival sources as the main source.

This dissertation, aware of the limits of its research and scope, does not aim to fill the lacuna existing in scholarship but hopes to make its contribution by using Ottoman sources and by presenting details of missionary expansion in the Empire based on them. In general, it contributes to two paradigms that inform studies of late Ottoman history and American foreign relations. The first paradigm concerns the ways in which Ottomanists date the Ottoman centralization attempts to the Age of Reforms, and more substantively to the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II.[41] The dissertation reveals specific dimensions of how the imperial policy of centralization manifested itself in the central government's responses to missionary expansion at the provincial level. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the government subordinated provincial authorities and dealt with missionaries as an exclusively internal affair, forbidding U.S. diplomats from intervening. Of course, this new policy of centralization was not without its problems and, in many cases, created counterproductive results. The second paradigm concerns U.S. involvement in the Middle East. Historians of American foreign relations place the emphasis on the commercial motivations of the U.S. government, suggesting that American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire were generally complicit with

[41] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994); Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism;" Rhodes Murphey, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century," *Poetics Today* vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 439-443.

U.S. diplomatic designs.[42] By viewing American missionaries from the imperial capital, the dissertation offers nuances to this notion and finds that the agendas of missionaries and the host government were very much their own, in spite of the impact from others, including the U.S. government and media, Ottoman provincial authorities, and local communities.

The dissertation's chapters on specific issues of American missionary expansion in the Ottoman Empire—increases in the number of missionaries, the legal status of missionary institutions, the significance of missionaries' printing and distribution activities, and their individual rights and safety at a period of local unrest—present detailed analysis of the Ottoman government's relationships to local actors, agents and communities as well as missionaries. An assessment of these issues should also contribute to on-going debates over authority, diplomacy, education, faith, identity, law, and order, which are the main arteries of late Ottoman studies today.[43]

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[42] Robert L. Daniel, *American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1960* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1970); Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East*: *Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*; J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of the United States Policy* (New York: Harper, 1953).

[43] Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*; Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*; Benjamin C. Fortna, *Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Stanford J. Shaw, *Studies in Ottoman and Turkish History: Life with the Ottomans*; Ferdan Ergut, "Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 38, no. 2 (2002): 149-164; A. Nuri Yurdusev, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional?* (Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Ariel Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State* (Boston: Brill, 2004); Elisabeth Ozdalga, *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy* (London; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*; Suraiya Faroqhi et al. eds., *Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community: Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008); Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Bernard Lewis, *Faith and Power: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Ilber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Mirası* [Ottoman legacy] (Istanbul: Timaş, 2010).

Historical Background

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries mark significant political, economic, and social changes in the history of the Ottoman Empire. This project's timeline covers the period between the 1880s and the 1910s. What made this period significant for the topic of this dissertation is the fact that Ottoman central government, in line with its centralization attempts, asserted its authority over the rising number of American missionaries in specific parts of the Empire. This section introduces an overview of Late Ottoman Empire and the imperial statecraft.

1. Late Ottoman Empire

Late Ottoman Empire refers to the eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, when the Empire struggled through and failed to eventually recover from political, economic, military, and social crises. Recent scholarship presents a number of arguments about the beginning of this fatal decline with varying focus. However, these studies agree that the most visible symptoms of the Empire's decline appeared with the humiliating defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, which was signed on 21 July 1774, ended the war, causing Ottoman affairs and minorities to be a matter of international concern for the first time. Successive reform efforts, which had started about a century prior and gained momentum during the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries, tried resolving crises on many fronts.[44] Nonetheless, for various reasons to be explained below, the decline carried on and led the empire to its fragmentation.

Ottoman politico-military failures and the Empire's subsequent territorial disintegration resulted from an interplay of external and internal developments. The Ottoman Empire fought costly and protracted wars against major European powers (Britain, France, and Russia) and suffered decisive defeats, culminating in its dissolution in the aftermath of World War I. During the Empire's long decline, European markets found alternative routes to the old Ottoman-controlled trade networks of the East, the Americas offered virtually unbeatable commercial opportunities, and the lucrative companies, backed by their governments, sapped resources from the Ottoman economy. Domestically, sultans proved unable to cope with a young, politicized generation of soldiers and scholars that challenged their authority and ethnic civil disorder plagued the internal dynamics of the Empire. Also of significance during this period, European powers established religious protectorates in Ottoman territory (over Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox). As the "Sick Man of Europe" became terminal, its ascending rival powers were in a strong position to dictate the terms of the Ottoman legacy. The establishment of the Republic of Turkey on

[44] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Sina Akşin, *Turkey From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation From 1789 to the Present* (New York: New York University Press, 2007).

October 29, 1923, marked the final phase of the establishment of nation states in the Middle East.[45]

Ottoman statesmen blamed their military defeats and weakening diplomatic clout vis-à-vis Europe on a failure to maintain international standards; the technology of warfare had changed so rapidly over the nineteenth century that the imperial army could not keep up, while Ottoman non-Muslims revolted in response to their lack of freedoms. In the view of the imperial bureaucrats, two fundamental adjustments had to be made: centralize and modernize the bureaucracy and the army, and grant liberty to non-Muslims.[46]

Fledgling Ottoman attempts at reorganization date to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Initially, Sultan Selim III (1789–1807) and his advisers promulgated a set of reforms to modernize the Ottoman army in both materiel and outlook; however, these early efforts met with strong resistance from an alliance of military officers and scholars. His successor, Mahmud II (1808–39), brought a careful, decisive, and bloody end to the Janissaries.

The Era of Reorganization (Tanzimat, 1839–76) embodied various ultimately vain attempts to prevent the Empire's decline. For instance, reforming the monetary system did not prevent the Ottoman economy from

[45] Donald Quataert, "Islahatlar Devri [the Age of Reforms], 1812-1914," in Halil İnacık and Donald Quataert eds., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi* [Economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire], II: 885-1051; İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Barışı* [Pax Ottomana] (İstanbul: Ufuk, 2004), pp. 45-47, 66-154.

[46] On various aspects of modernization, see Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanoğlu eds., *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu* [Age of reforms: the Ottoman Empire in a changing discourse]; W. R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers eds. *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968); Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History* (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2002), especially pp. 27-74; Fatma Müge Göçek, "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth Century Ottoman Society," pp. 507-538.

failing. Indeed, the Empire lost financial independence entirely when European powers took over its revenue streams through Public Debt Administration, which was established in 1881 to collect on outstanding payments owed to European companies and governments.

Throughout the Tanzimat era, European institutional models and military equipment flowed into the Ottoman Empire; draft regulations for the military, the banking system, modes of production, and the rights of non-Muslims underwent major revisions. Later, during the Constitutional Era, a newly-founded parliament (1876–78) gave these revisions an even more radical tone when freedom and equality before the law regardless of ethnic or religious orientation were officially sanctioned.[47]

From the 1800s onward, Ottoman sultans became more liberal in their relations with minority subjects; however, radical reforms and policies of accommodation did not purge the Empire of the detrimental effects of nationalism or Great Power interference. Nationalism penetrated the Ottoman political landscape through its European provinces, unfolding among the Balkan nations and signalling its future expansion to other regions within the Ottoman Empire. On February 14, 1804, Ottoman Serbs started a revolutionary movement directed against their Janissary rulers (*dayıs*). Despite being unsuccessful, it inspired other aspiring nations to revolt (Greece, Moldavia, Montenegro, and, later, Bulgaria) and eventuated in the Second Serbian Uprising (1815), which would earn Serbia its autonomy.

[47] Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanoğlu eds., *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu* [Age of reforms: the Ottoman Empire in a changing discourse], pp. 1-297.

Great Power meddling and national revolts fragmented the western provinces of the Empire over the course of the century. Other Ottoman nations, including Arabs, Armenians, and Kurds, soon took the revolutionary road as well. The Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*)—the political group that controlled the Second Ottoman Parliament following the Young Turk Revolution on 3 July 1908—fought the Italian War (1911–12), the Balkan Wars (1912–13), and, finally, World War I (1914–18) while attempting to grapple with civil disorder across the Empire.[48]

The subjects of the Empire bore the brunt of the suffering from protracted wars and civil strife; during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ottomans became victims of massacres and forced deportations from their native lands. Following the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I, the Ottoman Empire fell. In the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920, the victorious Entente Powers partitioned its remnants, stipulating that Britain, France, Greece, and Italy establish mandates, or zones of influence, and occupy certain regions, the Kingdom of Hejaz and the Democratic Republic of Armenia be recognized, the Ottoman army be kept to a maximum of 50,000 men, Ottoman finances be placed under Entente control, and an international commission administer the straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Seas.

The imperial government signed the Treaty of Sèvres, albeit reluctantly. However, the Turks, under their future political and military leader Mustafa

[48] M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey], II: 25-404.

Kemal Ataturk, rejected the treaty and began the Turkish War of Independence in 1919. The Republic of Turkey was recognized on 24 July 1923, with the Treaty of Lausanne, which revoked the terms and conditions articulated by the Treaty of Sèvres. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire's long decline and eventual fragmentation ended with the foundation of modern nation-states from the Balkans to the Middle East.[49]

2. Imperial Statecraft

In light of continuous socio-political instability until the end of the Ottoman Empire, it is somewhat surprising that the basic structure of the imperial statecraft remained intact. From the 1880s until the late 1900s, soldiers and intellectuals confronted Sultan Abdulhamid II over the issues of curbing his powers and granting freedoms. This confrontation, however, did not cause more than lively debates and several bloody incidents. In terms of organization, the *fin de siècle* imperial statecraft showed continuities. Macro-historical context did not affect the statecraft but local circumstances and specific incidents did give it a tone of "rational-legalism." Carter Findley argues that the growth of the imperial bureaucracy was "freed of outside control," and of political and diplomatic manipulation.[50]

[49] Sina Akşin, *Turkey From Empire to Revolutionary Republic: The Emergence of the Turkish Nation From 1789 to the Present* (New York: New York University Press, 2007); M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*.

[50] Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte*, pp. 163-167. On Late Ottoman imperial statecraft, see also Hüseyin Özdemir, *Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokrasi* [Bureaucracy in the Ottoman State] (İstanbul: Okumuş Adam, 2001); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey], II: 195-199; 217-235; 264-279; Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* vol. 13, no. 3

It would be instructive to compare Ottoman civil bureaucratic organization and its relation to the imperial palace of Sultan Abdulaziz I (1861-1876) in 1871, and its organization and relation to the Ottoman Parliament and the Committee of Union and Progress in 1914.[51] In the 1870s, the imperial bureaucrats working under the Sultan's authority belonged to the following branches: Grand Vezir (*Sadr-ı A'zam*), the Special Council of Ministers (*Meclîs-i Mahsûs-i Vükelâ*), the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (*Hâriciye*) and Internal Affairs (*Dâhiliye*), the Council of Judicial Ordinances (*Divân-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye*), and the Council of State (*Şûrây-ı Devlet*). Diplomatic establishments and provincial foreign affairs offices were Foreign Affairs agents; local administrations functioned under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In this structure, the civil bureaucracy, i.e. the agency not under the sultan's direct supervision, worked the following imperial branches: Finance (*Mâliye*), Education (*Ma'ârif*), Pious Foundations (*Evkâf*), Trade and Agriculture (*Ticâret ve Zirâ'at*), Receivership of Customs (*Rüsûmât Emâneti*), Public Works (*Nâfi'a*), Land Registry (*Defter Emâneti*).

From the 1870s to the 1910s, the authority of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) was challenged by significant political events including the 1908 Young Turk Revolution and the subsequent establishment of the Second Constitutional Monarchy. Several scholars note that, despite periodic changes among top-ranking bureaucrats and the addition to civil-bureaucratic ministries

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(December 1968): 451-470; Mehmet İpşirli, "Bâb-ı Âli [the Sublime Porte]," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Turkish religious foundation encyclopaedia of Islam] (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1992), IV: 378-389.

[51] Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte*, pp. 169, 301.

of two new offices—namely the Ministry of Justice (*Adliye*) and the Office of Posts, Telephone, and Telegraph (*Posta, Telefon ve Telgraf İdaresi*)—, no substantial changes occurred at lower levels based on political events so the inner workings of the imperial statecraft remained fairly stable.[52]

As of 1914, the Office of the Grand Vezir, the Council of Ministers, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, the Council of Judicial Ordinances, and the Council of State continued to collaborate and work under the Sultan's authority. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled diplomatic establishments and all foreign affairs offices; the Ministry of Internal Affairs orchestrated local administrations.[53]

Here the structure and workings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can provide a specific example. Following periodic changes in the post of minister, Kürd Said Paşa (1885-1895) and Ahmet Tevfik Paşa (1895-1909) served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs during most of the period from the mid-1880s to the late 1900s. The capacity of neither Kürd Said nor Ahmet Tevfik seemed to be hindered by politico-diplomatic uncertainty in the capital.[54]

The stability in leadership cadres also allowed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to improve its services. For instance, the Office of Consular Affairs, established in 1873 under the Foreign Correspondence Office of the Foreign Affairs, assumed the responsibility for "the correspondence of the ministry with

[52] Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte*, pp. 167-190; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey], II: 270-279; İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Barışı* [Pax Ottomana], pp. 148-154.
[53] Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte*, p. 256.
[54] Interestingly, Ahmet Tevfik served as the Grand Vezir in several terms from 1909 to 1922. Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte*, pp. 255-257.

consular corps, receipt of consular reports, production of semi-annual statistical reports... and a political information service." By the 1900s, this office had many rank and file officials at its disposal, "led by supervisory officials of long-familiar kinds."[55]

Political events and post changes in the capital might have some impact on the diplomatic framework in which missionaries were permitted to expand in the Empire. But in this dissertation, we emphasize the complexity of the imperial statecraft by focusing less on macro-level changes and more on the momentum that specific incidents gave to imperial bureaucratic machinery.

Chapter Overview

This dissertation presents several interwoven themes: the functioning of imperial statecraft, the Ottoman central government's relationship to local circumstances, and its position on American missionary expansion as evinced through licensing institutions, controlling publications, and addressing missionaries' rights and actions at the provincial level. To treat these themes separately would be to undersell the role of the central government—and the significance of its statecraft—in conflicts between missionaries and locals. Each chapter centres on specific dimensions of these themes.

Chapter 2, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," explores how the central government addressed missionary expansion within its borders. Between the 1880s and the 1910s, local agents

[55] For the quote and a detailed analysis of the Foreign Ministry, see Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte*, pp. 255-265.

and communities increasingly accused missionaries of undertaking socially and politically disruptive activities. Through reports and petition-letters, they requested that the government warn, punish, and deport missionaries from their respective regions. However their pressure largely failed to induce a staunch anti-missionary imperial policy. Instead, a dialectical process between locals and missionaries led to dynamic and pragmatically heterogeneous imperial responses. To begin, the Ministries of Education and Finance and customs and land registry offices traced missionary expansion through a census and surveys before analyzing the results relative to local unrest. The High Council of Ministers, a key agency throughout this process, then enacted orders and regulations reflecting the government's efforts to restore authority and ease local tensions: Missionary institutions and publications had to be approved by government agencies and Muslim students were barred from attending missionary schools. The capital understood local concerns but did not support local reactions; it preferred a more sophisticated and assertive approach that focused on long-term solutions to missionary expansion.

Chapter 3, "Regulating American Missionary Activity through the Granting and Denying of Licences," examines the imperial policy of licensing missionary institutions. Between the 1880s and the 1890s, missionaries purchased residential houses and converted them into schools, seminaries, and orphanages. To bureaucrats in the capital, this "illegal" practice stemmed partly from the ignorance and incompetence of local agents. They therefore applied a hands-on approach and ordered Empire-wide vigilance to cope with property issues. Specific decrees gave missionaries the right to own residential property,

but denied them the right to use houses for alternative purposes. Meanwhile, local authorities were given the duty of monitoring and reporting missionary institutions in their respective regions. Also during this period, imperial bureaucrats required missionaries to register their institutions as property of their agency ABCFM, or the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. This policy anticipated that one corporate body could be managed more efficiently. Thus while missionary institutions were being monitored by local officials, ABCFM would act as a responsible legal partner. However this new policy produced some unattended results. Chiefly, legally-independent missionary institutions became a formidable plaintiff after having merged under the American Board. Finally, the High Council of Ministers devised an imperial strategy of containment. Especially by the 1890s, this strategy allowed for the renovation of missionary institutions but prohibited additional structures from being built on their premises. Included in this thrust were regulations requiring the removal of missionary institutions from places of strategic or military importance. Taken together, new orders and regulations also emphasized the government's authority at the provincial level, providing legal hindrances to missionaries and reduced autonomy to local agents.

Chapter 4, "Controlling Missionary Publications," analyzes the confrontation between the central government and the missionaries over the question of printing within the Empire. From the 1880s onward, imperial bureaucrats became attentive to growing missionary literature published within or outside the Ottoman realm. They identified the objectives and the intended audience of missionary publications and considered the potential impact of

these publications on Ottoman subjects. Throughout the process, local authorities inspected missionary works and reported the results. The capital would then study them and take decisions accordingly. Similar to the reports examined in previous chapters, the reports were generally negative in tone. The central government did not forbid missionary publications *en masse*; it pursued pragmatic coherence and reactive improvisation in dealing with these publications. Further, a targeted position emerged from the centre: publications were restricted if destined to reach the rural populace—viewed from the capital as being easily influenced and susceptible to losing loyalty and faith. In addition, the government drew a qualitative line between educational and religious books: where educational books were allowed and even welcomed, religious books underwent intense monitoring and investigations. Lastly, this chapter discusses the functioning of imperial statecraft in controlling missionary publications. The Imperial Press Services, Telegram Centre, customs offices, Ottoman embassy in Washington, and provincial authorities streamed missionary publications to the newly created Committee of Inspection and Examination. The committee studied these publications and consulted with other government branches, including the Sublime Porte, on whether to release them in the provinces. Generally, the bureaucrats involved in this process agreed that missionary publications were being printed faster than provincial authorities could control. In addition, they discovered that local authorities had been failing to adopt the new regulations. The bureaucrats therefore affected a subtle policy of controlling printing devices and presses, considering that this would facilitate their efforts. The central government would not explicitly

forbid missionary publications, concentrating instead on hindering their advance through control of the machines that were required to produce them. A broader, top-down policy imposed from the capital curtailed publishing missions, becoming a source of frustration for missionaries who wished to use the power of the printed word.

Chapter 5, "Approaching Individual Missionaries as the Object of Public Security," studies specific incidents relating to the impact of the central government on the rights and safety of individual missionaries. In the *fin-de-siècle* Empire, some local communities and vigilante groups attacked missionaries and destroyed their property. U.S. diplomats sought to intervene on behalf of affected missionaries, hearing that provincial authorities had largely failed to prevent and stop these incidents from occurring. Ottoman bureaucrats however, considered such events as being under the purview of domestic affairs, and sought to reform local authority while eliminating foreign interference. The imperial definition of missionary issues within the body of domestic issues also precipitated the deeper involvement of provincial authorities, including administrative officials and police officers. These authorities investigated incidents, interrogated suspects, and undertook security operations. Administering these operations from the centre fell under the responsibility of the Imperial Ministry of Public Security. Also named gendarmerie or police, this ministry held extensive authority in local security issues; its works and decisions were trusted and generally approved of by other government branches. By and large, the central government undertook security operations to maintain local order and punish those who violated imperial law.

In certain cases, local authorities were found guilty of not protecting the missionaries in their regions. When this occurred, the government punished these authorities for their negligence. In so doing, the *fin-de-siècle* government forged a nuanced notion of what this dissertation calls imperial justice, which manifested itself in the treatment of individual missionaries as the object of public security.

2

Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure

In April 1892, *The New York Times* alleged "unscrupulous" behaviour in the treatment of American missionaries by the "double-faced" Turks, who were hampering the proselytizers' freedom of movement and generally interfering with their holy work in the Ottoman Empire. According to the article, the missionaries wanted six basic rights: the right to life, trade, travel, worship, the pursuit of happiness, and "when any of these rights have been unjustly infringed upon," they wanted the right to "claim redress."[1] *The New York Times* noted however, that the Ottoman government was reluctant to even consider such demands as the missionaries, "whatever they may claim to be their purpose," were "actually engaged in a work which, if successful, must inevitably end in the overthrow of the Moslem Government." The article went on to criticize the Ottoman government for arresting the missionaries and subjecting them to "the most tedious" and "nonsensical formalities."[2]

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[1] "The Unscrupulous Turk: His Double-Faced Treatment of Our Missionaries," *The New York Times,* 17 April 1892, p. 17.

[2] In general, contemporary newspapers in the U.S. media criticized the *fin-de-siècle* Ottoman government. Justin McCarthy, *The Turk in America: The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010). Like *the New York Times*, most newspapers defended the rights of missionaries and denounced the acts of the Ottoman government. Knapp stated that "the wicked and cruel Turks are standing idly by while the Armenians, especially women and children, fall beneath the wanton hand of the oppressor." George P. Knapp's statement quoted in "A Mischief-Making Society," *The Washington Post*, 24 March 1899, p.6. *The Meridian Republican* claimed that missionaries had been "under the patronage of the

The New York Times' analysis of a host government's reaction to American missionaries reveals a stark lack of understanding of Ottoman statecraft. First, the Ottoman administrative structure was far too complicated to be characterized as having a mere two faces.[3] Second, the Ottoman government—the villain of the piece according to *The New York Times* and several historians since—had neither a systematic policy of discrimination, nor anything resembling one.[4] In fact official Ottoman discourse on the missionaries was in a state of flux and at any given moment it varied considerably.[5]

Sultan... [who] has shown no disposition to encourage" them since the 1880s. "Scores on the Turk," *The Meridian Weekly Republican*, 26 April 1900, p. 4. Also see "Turks as Violators," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 June 1896, p. 9. It is important to note that numerous articles published in these and other newspapers seemed to gradually plant a 'notorious' Ottoman-Turkish image in American popular cultural memory. For example, an article reported that Ernest Roeber, a wrestling champion, "defeated the Terrible Turk" for the world's championship at the Greco-Roman style. "Terrible Turk Beaten," *Hartford Courant*, 8 March 1899, p. 1. Another article noted that the Turks, "once called terrible," lost that mere pseudonym" last night when Frank Gotch, a native American "giant killer," retained wrestling championship title by easily downing Yusuf Mahmud, the "Terrified Turk." "Champion Frank Gotch Downs 'Terrified Turk' in 2 Quick Falls," *Chicago Tribune*, 15 April 1909, p. 9. Late Ottoman image in the United States will be the subject of a future research.

[3] On Ottoman imperial statecraft see Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980); Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 2-3, 16-17, 27-73; Rhoads Murphey, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century," *Poetics Today* vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 439-443. On late Ottoman politics see M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). In a study of the central government relations with local authorities, Çetinsaya underscores the significance of interactions between foreign powers and local notables. Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908* (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).

[4] Emrah Sahin, "Thinking Religion Globally, Acting Missionary Locally: Last Century's American Missionary Experience in the Near East," *World History Bulletin* vol. 23, no 1 (Spring 2007): 33-36. Roderick argues that in the Ottoman Empire, "Christians were looked down upon as second-class citizens both by the Muslim public and the government. They suffered unequal treatment in various ways." Roderick H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," *The American Historical Review* vol. LIX, no. 4 (July 1954): 844-864, especially p. 845.

[5] Findley states that "in a multinational Empire with shrinking frontiers, within which the religious and ethnic mix shifted progressively, Ottoman reformers were always in a position of reacting to these changes and could never keep abreast of them." Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman*

That said, the idea that the Ottoman government was simply reactionary in dealing with local tensions is likewise erroneous, despite it being adopted by many historians. Some historians have portrayed the central government as the nemesis of "inalienable rights," both those of its own subjects as well as those of foreign missionaries.[6] This chapter seeks to challenge this long held notion on the basis of new primary research and hopes to invite a nuanced understanding of the complexities of the Ottoman decision-making process, particularly, as it pertained to American missionary activity. This will be demonstrated through a thorough examination of the interactions between a myriad of actors seeking to influence the central government, including provincial governors, Christian churches and miscellaneous local interests.

It is our contention that this dialectical process between competing interest groups was responsible for determining Ottoman state policy on this issue, and any variations in said policy can be attributed to the relative strengths

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Civil Officialdom: A Social History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 130.

[6] Emrah Sahin, "American Turkish Relations in Retrospective," International Journal of Turkish Studies vol. 12, nos. 1 and 2 (2006): 195-198; also see the dissertation chapter, "Ottoman Imperial Statecraft and American Missionaries, 1880-1910," especially the section on historiography and contributions. According to Erhan, it was "the local reactions" that formed "the attitude of the Sublime Porte." Çağrı Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," Turkish Yearbook vol. 30 (2000): 191-212, especially p. 202. Benjamin C. Fortna, Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and the Education in the Late Ottoman Empire (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 2; Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism," The American Historical Review vol. 107, no. 3 (June 2002): 768-796. Akarlı argues that "Abdulhamid earned his image as a 'reactionary ruler'," in Engin Deniz Akarlı, "The Tangled Ends of an Empire: Ottoman Encounters with the West and Problems of Westernization, an Overview," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East vol. 26, no.3 (2006): 353-366, especially p. 358. According to Finkel, "concentration of power in his own person was the ultimate expression of Abdulhamid's fear of the decentralization of authority." Caroline Finkel, Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923 (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p.500. Murphey divides the scholarship on the history of Ottoman institutions into two categories as Euro-centric and Turco-centric, in Rhoads Murphey, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century," pp. 419-443.

of the factions at a given time. Thus the traditional view of an autocratic missionary policy ought to be supplanted by that of a complex and dynamic matrix composed of different stakeholders that produced varying positions based on the internal dynamics of competing self-interests. To this end, this chapter presents an analysis of the intricate relations that linked the American missionaries to the Ottoman central government and provincial decision-makers (particularly within local contexts) between the 1880s and 1910s. First, it analyzes the ways in which the central government collected information concerning the expansion of the American Board missionaries in the provinces.[7] Second, it scrutinizes the factors behind the authorities' perception and treatment of the missionaries.

This chapter reveals that the imperial bureaucrats in the capital, already struggling with politico-economic instability and local unrest, changed their government approach to missionary expansion across the Ottoman domain during the 1880s.[8] In particular, it notes a two-tiered traditional mechanism: the primary tier demanded strict adhesion to a set of imperial policies, as the

[7] For the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), see the previous chapter, "Ottoman Imperial Statecraft and American Missionaries, 1880-1910," footnote 7.

[8] During the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman government was engaged in "continuous warfare" on many fronts and declared "financial bankruptcy." Meanwhile, Western powers began to interfere in Ottoman internal affairs and the ethno-communal unrest that continued to spread across the provinces presented more challenges to the government authority. Eventually, reform efforts from the 1840s onward did not provide much help for the imperial bureaucrats in the capital. See, for example, M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Donald Quataert, "Islahatlar Devri [the Age of Reforms], 1812-1914," in Halil İnacık and Donald Quataert eds., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi* [Economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire] (İstanbul: Eren, 2004), II: 885-1051; Christopher G. A. Clay, *Gold for the Sultan* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000); Şevket Pamuk, "The Ottoman Empire in 'the Great Depression' of 1873-1896," *The Journal of Economic History* vol. 44, no. 1 (March 1984): 107-118; Fatma Müge Göçek, "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth Century Ottoman Society," *Poetics Today* vol. 14, no. 3 (Autumn, 1993): 507-538.

government sent its provinces orders and regulations pertaining to general issues like dealing with rebels and collecting taxation. The secondary tier was reserved for local affairs such as endowments, education, and construction. In this governing system, local agents were the principal authority dealing with affairs at the provincial level.

Responding to the American missionaries, for instance in their interaction with the subjects of a given locale, began *ad hoc* in the latter tier and, over time, became a primary tier directive. From the late 1880s onward, missionary issues were not left to local agents; the imperial bureaucrats started to produce unilateral orders and regulations and transmitted them for provincial authorities to devotedly put into effect. This chapter will show the means by which the bureaucrats in the capital abandoned the secondary tier and assumed a more active leadership role with a centralized governing policy. The two-tiered mechanism, and its transformation through the decades, has been neglected by most of the scholarship in the field. Thus this chapter will also provide some insights that offer an alternative perspective on the capital's relationship to local agents.[9]

[9] Fortna claims that "together with such expected vehicles as the school, the teacher, and the textbook," the Ottoman agency charged "the Islamic men of learning-the Ulama" with inveighing against the evils associated with competing educational institutions, those of the missionaries. This chapter does not agree and suggests that missionary institutions were not seen as "evils" by all Ottoman authorities, imperial and provincial alike. Fortna's analysis of "Ottoman agency" and attitudes toward foreign schools is insightful. Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, pp. 1-40, especially p. 4.

Surveying Missionary Expansion

The last two decades of the nineteenth century began with the total number of American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire peaking, thus necessitating in the eyes of the imperial bureaucrats a coherent official policy to replace the *ad hoc* resolutions of old. Whereas the 1850s saw fewer than 200 missionaries operating in seven schools and churches in Ottoman lands, records for the 1880s indicate more than 400 missionaries operating in over 300 schools and 95 churches.[10] With the American missionaries claiming spiritual responsibility for some eighteen million "Ottoman souls awaiting salvation," their rapid expansion in the region led the central government—increasingly sensitive to the growing inter-religious conflict in the Empire—to develop a cohesive response to American missionary activities.[11] More than builders of schools, orphanages, and hospitals, the intentions of missionaries were not viewed in friendly terms by the established Ottoman authorities, who saw their activities igniting local residents to rebel against the state, provincial governors, and

[10] In further detail, there were 40 American missionaries in Antep, Adana, and Tarsus, 52 in the Balkans, 32 in Harput, Halep, and Bitlis, 75 in İstanbul and İzmir, 50 in Greater Syria and Persia, and 150 in the rest of the Empire. These numbers are calculated from *Guide to the Microfilm Collection: Papers of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Woodbridge, Connecticut: Research Publications International, 1994), pp. 228-266. For more figures see İlber Ortaylı, "Some Observations on American Schools in the Ottoman Empire," *Turkish Public Administration Annual* vol. 8 (1981), p. 95; quoted in Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, p. 77; Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy in the Near East*, p. 17; Seçil Karal Akgün, "The Turkish Image of American Missionaries in Turkey," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* vol. 13, (1991): 87-91.

[11] *American Board Charts: A Graphic Presentation of the Foreign Work of the Congregational Churches of America*. Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 14 June 1916 [Houghton Library]. For an overview of Christian missionary activity in the Middle East, see Şinasi Gündüz, "Misyonerlik [Missionary activity]," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Turkish religious foundation encyclopaedia of Islam] (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2005), XXX: 193-199.

religious leaders. The missionaries were to become *personae non gratae*.[12] The key agents behind the government's drift to a more ardent approach were the provincial governors and local communities that the central government had come to rely upon for its long-term policies by drawing lessons from local contexts and basing decisions on what Findley calls "the provincials' version of events."[13]

In part due to the great interest of the central government in documentation and collection of data concerning its domain, the remarkable growth of missionary work in the Empire yielded a substantial intelligence gathering effort from the 1880s onwards.[14] As an early sign of the emergence of a new official discourse, independent government branches pooled their information on the nature and magnitude of American missionary work. Bureaucrats from the imperial ministries—namely the ministries of Finance (*Mâliye*), Education (*Ma'ârif*), Receivership of Customs, and Land Registry—collaborated with those of "the Sublime Porte" (*Bâb-ı Âli*, i.e. the Office of the Grand Vizier), the Special Council of Ministers (*Meclîs-i Mahsûs-i Vükelâ*), the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (*Hâriciye*) and Internal Affairs (*Dâhiliye*).[15] They

[12] Hr Sys 45/15, 17 February 1875; Hr Sys 54/4, 13 August 1896; Hr Sys 67/38, 1 May 1908; Dh Eum Ayş 1/53, 17 C 1337 [Archival sources of this type are in the Ottoman Archives Division of the Prime Minister's Office, İstanbul, Turkey].
[13] Carter V. Findley, *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*, pp. 87-130.
[14] The bureaucrats in the capital used imperial records for better control of their subjects and others who might be concerned. As Peirce has noted, "indeed, documentation for the Ottomans was the handmaiden of control." Leslie Peirce, *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab*" (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003), p. 36.
[15] İpşirli states that "in the nineteenth century, especially during the reign of Abdulmajid and Abdulaziz, the Sublime Porte came to refer to the Ottoman government." Mehmet İpşirli, "Bâb-ı Âli [the Sublime Porte]," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Turkish religious foundation encyclopaedia of Islam] (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1992), IV: 378-389, especially pp. 378-379. Lewis notes that "as the real power of the Sultan decreased, it [the Sublime Porte] became the effective center both of authority and of government." Bernard

engaged in a collective endeavour to gather intelligence, conduct investigations at the local level, and analyze and compile the results at government headquarters in İstanbul. This information-processing and the decision-making that ensued allowed the Ottoman central government to develop a framework of policies for dealing with missionary activities that were put into effect over the next two decades.[16]

In contrast to previous government practice in investigating foreigners and their activities in the Ottoman domain, which had been acclaimed for its "simplicity, justice, and inexpensiveness," the investigations into the missionaries and the monitoring of their institutions were a complicated exercise, and fairly costly.[17] Initial overall reaction to the findings by the central government was marked by manifest frustration that Americans were moving about freely throughout the Ottoman realm and disrupting local public order.

Lewis, *The Middle East: 2000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day* (London: Phoenix, 2000), pp. 286-304, especially p. 303. Also see "Abdulhamid's bureaucrats" in Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey], (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 2000), II: 435-436. This chapter finds that the Sublime Porte does not refer to the central government in the *fin-de-siècle* context. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the central government involved imperial bureaucrats from many departments as well as the Sublime Porte. The Sublime Porte was a major government department but other offices, such as the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Public Security, should also be emphasized. This being the case, specific focus on the Sublime Porte might exclude the significance of the imperial bureaucrats from other offices in examining how the central government responded to missionary expansion in the Empire. In addition, the bureaucrats—including those of the Sublime Porte—dealt with the issues that cannot be defined as the Porte's business. This dissertation reveals that the imperial bureaucrats worked sometimes independently at their office and sometimes as a group in collaboration with colleagues from other offices; their work was more complicated and went beyond the Sublime Porte.

[16] Halil İnalcık, "Decision Making in the Ottoman State"; Cristoph K. Neumann, "Integrity and Integration: Assumptions and Expectations behind Nineteenth-Century Decision Making"; in Caesar E. Farah ed., *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire* (Kirksville, Missouri: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), pp. 9-18, 39-52; Hüseyin Özdemir, *Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokrasi* (Bureaucracy in the Ottoman State) (İstanbul: Okumuş Adam, 2001); Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 169.

[17] Warrington W. Smyth, *A Year with the Turks, or Sketches of Travel in the European and Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan* (New York: Redfield, 1854), p. 238.

The reaction of the government varied from warnings given to provincial authorities to executive orders for the missionaries to stop their activities.

Several cases record that a group of American missionaries had arrived and stayed in Ottoman cities without visas between the 1880s and the 1910s. The Ottoman central government worried about this and ordered local authorities to be vigilant. For instance, the news of the arrival of a large American missionary group on its way to Beirut and other parts of Greater Syria province reached the Ministry of Interior and, in response, the government issued an executive order to investigate their status. Ottoman officials were concerned not because the Americans had landed in Ottoman territory—many others had done so with ease—but rather because they had not notified the government.[18] In compliance with the central government's orders, local authorities detained the group. They were taken into custody, interrogated, and released on the condition that they report their activities to the authorities on a regular basis.[19]

The imperial bureaucrats largely believed that local agents had sufficient authority and wherewithal to deal with such transgressions by the missionaries. For example, a group of American tourists came to visit Hisarlık near the Dardanelles. As an illustration of nominal legal warnings, the bureaucrats in the capital reminded the local governor that all provincial

[18] Suraiya Faroqhi, *Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 110-143; Gerald M. MacLean, *The Rise of Oriental Travel: English Visitors to the Ottoman Empire, 1580-1720* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); for Ottoman-European diplomatic relations see, for example, *Turkey and Christendom: An Historical Sketch of the Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the States of Europe* (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1853), pp. 47-50.
[19] Dh Mkt 1728/79, 14 L 1307.

administrations were obliged to conform to the imperial decrees regarding foreign groups, itinerant or resident, and take care of such "local affairs properly." The matter appears to have ended there.[20]

As for the missionaries, the bureaucrats in the capital wanted to know where they were going, and ordered provincial authorities to report on their travel destinations and the purposes of their trips. The reports came from major cities and provided the capital with a wealth of information about where in particular the missionaries had been operating.[21]

Local circumstances significantly contributed to the ways in which the provincial governors perceived the missionaries and reported them to the central government. Alarmist reports from the provinces led the central government to find more reasons to worry and redouble its efforts to know more. A late example of these efforts dates to September 1917, three decades after intelligence on the missionaries had gained considerable momentum. On this date the Ministry of Interior ordered provincial authorities to prepare a detailed survey on the Ottoman non-Christian population and the American citizens "living in the land."[22]

While government agents were undertaking surveys of this sort throughout the nineteenth century, surveys specifically conducted on American

[20] İ Hus 128/1323 S-052, 15 S 1323.
[21] Reports from Ankara, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Erzincan, Erzurum, İzmir, Karahisar-ı Sahip, Kastamonu, Muğla, and Urfa, in Dh Eum 5Şb 76/10, 25 S 1337; Yemen, in Y Prk Myd 21/42, 29 Ra 1316; provincial-level intelligence on missionaries, in Ya Res 78/54, 6 L 1313; the status quo in the provinces, in Y Prk Myd 20/87, 9 N 1315; specific missionary institutions, in Dh Eum 5Şb 19/11, 14 M 1334; missionaries operating in Adana, Halep, İstanbul, İzmir (Aydın), and Sivas, in Dh Eum 5Şb, 2 Z 1336.
[22] For the 1883 Census, one of earlier Empire-wide surveys on this matter, see below; the mentioned imperial decree, in Dh Eum 3Şb 23/43, 8 Z 1335.

missionaries were something new.[23] Furthermore they helped the central government update its intelligence folders regarding the missionaries, and revealed that a considerable number of Ottoman citizens had obtained American citizenship in order to enjoy commercial privileges granted to foreigners within the Empire.[24] Surveys reflected a local administrative sensitivity toward American missionaries that sharply increased at the end of the nineteenth century and later affected the way the central government would reconsider its policies regarding the missionaries during the following two decades.

[23] Shaw indicates that in late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century censuses, "registration procedures were made far more detailed than previously... birth certificates and registers now indicated not only whether the child [person] was male or female, but also its name, place, date, and day of birth, names of the mother and father, the quarter, street and house number of residence, and all instances of travel away from the locality." Stanford J. Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 9, no. 3 (October 1978): 325-338, especially p. 335. Shaw's study does include surveys and censuses on foreigners and missionaries. However, this chapter finds that these too were similar in terms of their registration procedures, very detailed and informative.

[24] As Horowitz notes, "in a position of weakness... it became necessary to grant a growing range of special economic concessions to individual European powers. At the same time the problem of extraterritoriality was exacerbated by foreign protection of 'protégés-Ottoman' nationals who had received protection from foreign powers by purchase of family connection." Richard Horowitz, "International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of World History* vol. 15, no. 4 (December 2004): 445-486, especially p. 461. In Ottoman terminology, the capitulations (*imtiyâzât*) were the privileges granted by the central government to foreign countries and their citizens living in the Empire. James B. Angell, "The Turkish Capitulations" *The American Historical Review* vol. 6, no. 2 (January 1901): 254-259; Cengiz Kallek, "İmtiyāzāt [capitulations]," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* (Turkish religious foundation encyclopaedia of Islam) (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2000), XXII: 242-245; Emrah Sahin, "Capitulations," in Orlando Patterson and J. Geoffrey Golson eds., *Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa*, vol. I (California: SAGE, in press). In the Treaty of Lausanne, late Ottoman government wanted to abrogate the capitulations on grounds that Western governments had been exploiting the weaknesses of the Ottoman Empire, using the capitulations as a precursor to interfere with Ottoman internal affairs, including minority issues. For the government's position on this matter, the Treaty of Lausanne, and the debate over Ottoman debts to European states, see Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* (Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey), II: 435-436; "The Attempt of Turkey to Abrogate the Capitulations," *The American Journal of International Law* vol. 8 no. 4 (October 1914): 873-876;

On 18 December 1883, the central government ordered an Empire-wide census to determine the exact numbers of foreigners in Ottoman lands.[25] Unlike previous censuses, this census specifically addressed the presence of foreigners, and referred in particular to the newly Americanized non-Muslim Ottomans and American missionaries.[26] The consuls and embassies of the United States, Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, and Romania were specifically instructed to submit "comprehensive" census registries of their citizens residing in the Ottoman realm with details of their citizenship status and professions for the preceding four years. Reflecting the concerted efforts of various administrative branches, the order was approved in the Council of Ministers, issued by the Sultan, sent by the Ministry of Interior, and implemented by the Directorate of Public Administration. The notified parties were sent a "set of self-explanatory instructions," and urged to execute the order "rapidly and satisfactorily".[27] Significantly, the census was not limited to the Greater İstanbul area, where most non-Muslims and many foreigners lived or stayed. In encompassing the regions outside the capital, it took in those areas where the missionaries constituted a considerable part of the foreign population.

According to the government's report on the census, foreign embassies and consulates—including the U.S. and British embassies—"assured that they

[25] Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301.
[26] For a detailed study of the *fin-de-siècle* imperial surveys, see Kemal H. Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82-1893," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 9, no. 3 (October 1978), pp. 237-274.
[27] The census sample that the American consul received was the Syria Registry, which was submitted by Asım Effendi to the Sublime Porte in French. This sample is not available in the Ottoman Archives. But another document in the archives states that a copy of it might be available "in the City of Syria." This document also indicates that the census sample was written in foreign language (French) because the consulates "had not responded to the imperial decree" that they had received in Ottoman language. Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301, document no. 2. 'Effendi' was a title of position given generally to state officials and scholars during this time.

would provide a census registry book.[28] However their tardiness in this matter forced the central government into further action: it ordered the provincial administrations to undertake the census themselves. The application of this unilateral decision created certain problems at local levels, for instance, some persons (foreigners in the provinces, for instance those in Wallachia) "stated that they did not and would not reveal or register their identities to the Ottoman officials so long as their own governments did not ask for it."[29]

Deliberate challenges of this sort to local Ottoman authority frustrated the central government and had two major consequences. First, the government replied by turning the following practice into a binding law:

> As required by the Ottoman citizenship law, each and every person residing in the Ottoman State has to be recognized as Ottoman. When s/he states that s/he is foreign [not an Ottoman citizen], s/he has to prove it. Otherwise, his/her status as such is not confirmed.

The confirmation of a person's foreign status would come in the form of "an official certificate issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs."[30]

Second, those who refused to participate in the census were disfranchised: they could not claim property ownership, were denied official services, and were barred from making business transactions. In three districts of İstanbul (Galata, Eyüp, and Üsküdar), which were the main foreign-populated quarters of the city, what the document refers to as "the citizens of foreign counties" could not engage in real-estate transactions. Every type of

[28] Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301, document no. 3; a second notice that requested the embassies and consulates to send the required registries, in Y Prk Hr, 7/36, 18 S 1301, document no. 4.
[29] Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301, document no. 5.
[30] Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301, document no. 6.

business would now require the confirmation certificate of citizenship-status as stipulated by the new law.

When the foreign consulates and embassies asked about the objectives of this new census, the Ottoman central government gave a diplomatic answer. The census had been proposed in a brief submitted by Asım Bey, the Director-General of the Citizenship Branch. Upon his urging, the Council of Ministers had agreed that such a census would better facilitate their treatment of local disputes and knowledge of missionary activities. However foreign missions were given two surprisingly simple reasons for this comprehensive census: greater transparency and efficiency. In order for their consular business to be handled efficiently, foreign consulates and embassies needed "to prove the identity and qualifications" of their citizens domiciled in the Empire.[31]

The executive order specified that the census to be conducted in İstanbul would not "exclude the foreign population this time." Furthermore, those with foreigner status had to inform the central government when they wanted to "undertake any journeys" within, into or outside of Ottoman territory. They could set out on their journeys only "upon receiving an [Ottoman] travel certificate." The order divided foreigners into "foreigner-status accepted/rejected" categories. The status of all the foreigners in the Empire was to be determined by a "Special Commission," which was formed specifically to deal with foreigners in the Empire and after conducting a thorough examination of the documents to be sent by local governments and consulates.[32]

[31] The executive order dated 16 December 1883, in Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301, document no. 9.
[32] Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301, document no. 1.

As Shaw has shown, the census registry submissions were very important for future purposes.[33] The government explicitly warned that they would not confirm foreigners' legal or professional privileged status "unless they were registered in the records."[34] "As required by the Ottoman citizenship law," the executive order of 1883 stipulated, "each and every resident shall be recognized as Ottoman." Those who claimed foreign status were obliged to prove their "foreignness" and they were to be treated "as any other Ottoman subject if they failed to do so." Furthermore, the order supplanted the authority of provincial governors to deal directly with the missionaries. Thenceforward, the missionaries and their institutions were to fall directly within the orbit of the central government. According to the text of the document, the missionary movement in the Empire was "larger than incompetent local administrations could handle," and the central government "did not want to take any chances."[35]

Now that the numbers, students, and activities of the American missionary institutions formed the primary agenda,[36] the Ottoman government asked for detailed intelligence and investigative reports from the provinces, namely Bitlis, Harput, Erzurum, Halep, Trabzon, Urfa, and Beirut, where

[33] Stanford J. Shaw, "The Ottoman Census System and Population," pp. 325-338.
[34] Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301, document nos. 2-8.
[35] Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301.
[36] American missionary institutions, in Y Mrz D 11576 (edict no. 5782) and Y Mrz D 14527 (edict no. 2759); missionary schools, in Y Mrz D 11662 (edict no. 7210), Y Mrz D 11681 (edict no. 7479), Y Mrz D 11694 (edict no. 7605), Y Mrz D 12525 (edict no. 4660). The U.S. government often requested the Ottoman government to officially recognize missionary institutions. See, for example, the request made to the Special Council of Ministries, in Y Mrz D 14516 (edict no. 2544). For more see the dissertation chapter, "Approaching Individual Missionaries as the Object of Public Security," especially the section on Ottoman-U.S. relations regarding missionaries.

missionary activities were mostly concentrated.[37] After the turn of the century, an imperial edict noted that about 300 American missionary schools had been identified from existing statistics. Yet there were at least that many more in the Empire that had "escaped detection because they were hidden in odd corners... such violations," the edict notified the concerned department branches and local administrations, "are subject to vital attention and extreme caution."[38] In particular, the provincial governors had to send back results from the identification and inspection of the missionaries and their institutions, along with their personal views on the subject.[39]

This intelligence gathering had three main consequences. First, it created a sophisticated set of security data that would form the cornerstone of future policy. Second, the central government finally had a unified policy

[37] Beirut hosted American, British, French, and Russian missionaries. In part because missionaries were 'hyper-active' in the city and in part because Greater Syria became the subject of internal debates, the Ottoman central government wanted to obtain far more detailed reports on missionary activity in the region, from architectural plans of institutions to missionaries' financial standing and to school curricula. Missionary institutions in Beirut, in Y Prk Mf 2/22, 22 S 1309; the status, staff, and students of the American College in Beirut, in Hr Sys 67/34, 12 November 1907; American missionaries, their institutions and property in Beirut, in Dh İd 117/44, 12 N 1329; missionaries in Muslim-minority parts of the City of Beirut, in Hr Sys 67/38, 1 May 1908.

[38] Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 3.

[39] The Ministry of Internal Affairs ordered provincial authorities to submit progress reports concerning missionary expansion in their region. See, for example, the reports from Ankara, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Erzincan, Erzurum, İzmir, Kastamonu, Muğla, and Urfa, in Dh Eum 5Şb 76/10, 25 S 1337. Two specific reports on American missionary expansion in the provinces indicated that available information on missionary institutions—their location, status, and activity—was far from sufficient. Y Prk Esa 42/57, 29 Z 1320; Dh Eum 5Şb 19/11, 14 M 1334. Reports from Harput and Rumelihisarı (the Rumelian Castle), İstanbul, in İ Hus 79/1317 Ş 75; Ya Res 105/5, 6 N 1317; Ya Res 106/43, 2 Z 1317; reports from Bitlis, Erzurum, İzmir (Aydın), Halep, and Trabzon, in Y Prk Um 67/30, 13 Ş 1321; three detailed reports on American missionary expansion in Anatolia, in Y Prk Esa 17/19, 3 N 1310; Y Prk Esa 23/06, 7 Ca 1313; Ya Res 119/50, 20 Za 1320; an interesting report from Yemen relating to regional politics and missionary activity, in Y Prk Myd 21/42, 29 Ra 1316. The statistics on American missionaries submitted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in Y Mtv 183/10, 3 C 1316.

regarding the missionaries.[40] Third, the central government incorporated the provincial administrations' views on the missionaries in its policy. For instance, the governor of Erzurum submitted a comprehensive intelligence dossier that accused missionary institutions of causing local unrest. The central government departments analyzed such reports and began to take the presence of provincial missionaries a lot more seriously; provincial governors were promised that the central government would attend to their comments and "act accordingly."[41]

From the 1890s onward, the central government's policy regarding the missionary activity grew more assertive; the office of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under its chief Tevfik Pasha, became the main point of contact with U.S. officials working to support the missionaries. On one occasion, "the American consul [anonymous] in Erzurum came to my office," Tevfik Pasha writes, "I told him that the American missionaries over there [in the Eastern provinces, particularly Erzurum] were evidently involved in situations and actions that violate, and are against the established order… The U.S. government," the pasha confidently asserts, "would never support anyone or anything that would violate the law of the [Ottoman] Imperial State." Consequently, Tevfik Pasha explained that Sultan Abdulhamid II and his central government would "interdict such [missionary] activities in violation of [the Ottoman] law, and deport the missionaries… back to their country," the United States.[42]

[40] For the Sublime Porte discussion on American missionary expansion, see Ya Hus 477/43, 6 C 1322.
[41] Erzurum, in Ya Res 92/51, 28 Za 1315; local unrest, in Y Prk Hr 25/51, 12 Z 1315.
[42] Tevfik Pasha to the Sultan, 4 May 1898, Y Prk Hr 25/51, 12 Z 1315.

The American consul confirmed to Tevfik Pasha that the Ottoman central government had every right to punish and deport the missionaries on condition that "their offence against the central government was definite and based on strong evidence." According to the pasha's narrative, the consul thought however, that "some personal, criminal actions attributed to them [the missionaries] are the products of scheming of the Armenian Patriarchate and some others." The reason for such pressure on the missionaries was that "some Armenians that the missionaries had educated and preached to, had converted to Protestantism… Therefore, they were deprived of their material benefits." Consequently, the deportation of these missionaries from the Empire would be "arbitrary and unfair," and it "would only serve the interests of those who were against the missionaries… in pursuit of justice, the U.S. government will not consent to this." The consul would eventually yield, saying the U.S. government would consent to deportations and other legal measures only on condition that there was "solid evidence showing that the missionaries had violated the [imperial] law engaged in seditious activities." The consul wondered if this had been the case. Tevfik Pasha assured him that, yes, it was indeed.[43]

Responding to Expansion: Continuities and Inconsistencies

In order to answer disquieted foreign governments and enact a more coherent strategy toward the missionaries, the Ottoman central government turned to the intelligence data. Government officials undertook the daunting task of

[43] Tevfik Pasha to the Sultan, 4 May 1898.

classifying incoming intelligence files into thematic dossiers, while the Ottoman Minister of Education submitted to the central government an inventory of all the missionary institutions operating in the Empire.[44]

As of 1903, the government had at its disposal a comprehensive dossier regarding the American missionaries and their institutions in the Ottoman lands, which covered both licensed and unlicensed schools in major cities, their administration and services, the affiliations of their students, and whether there were any Muslim students enrolled in these schools. The dossier was left open to include any further reports, such as one from Halid Effendi, the Governor of Harput. Responding to the central government's order to report on American missionary institutions, Halid Effendi claimed that Muslim students in his province were not allowed to study in these institutions. "In the missionary schools, 897 students—463 males and 434 females, 201 boarded and the rest daily—were present… there were only twelve Assyrian students, the rest being Armenian." "That being said," Halid Effendi concluded in his report, "it was found that there is no child of Islam studying in these schools, just as there is no Muslim student in the licensed French school and unlicensed German school, about which the imperial edict also inquired."[45] The dossier, which included reports of this sort written between the 1880s and the 1910s, became the basis of decisions on the legal and financial status of missionary establishments

[44] American and British missionaries in Anatolia, in Ya Res 78/54, 6 L 1313; the faculty and students of Robert College and field trip to the Küçük Ayasofya Mosque, in Y Prk Zb 25/32, 20 Z 1317; ethno-communal situation in Anatolia, in Y Prk Myd 20/87, 9 N 1315; locations of missionary institutions in the provinces, in Y Prk Mf 4/36, 28 Za 1317; a list of missionary schools, in Y Prk Mf 4/66, 27 Z 1320; its submission to the Ministry of Education, in Y Prk Mf 4/80, 12 C 1321.

[45] From Halid the Governor of Mamüratilaziz (Harput), 21 February 1910, Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 7.

across the Empire.[46] For instance, the schools that had a proper license of operation and did not have Muslim students were allowed to continue their operations while the schools that had Muslim students and did not have a proper license of operation were often closed down and subjected to penalties such as fines.[47]

The comprehensive dossier revealed interesting facts; significantly, there were far more American missionary institutions in the eastern provinces, especially in Muslim-minority areas, than Ottoman bureaucrats had realized. In the western provinces, all American missionary institutions were operating within the rule of imperial law. Particularly, eight colleges, six elementary schools, one primary school and an orphanage in İstanbul, İzmir, and İzmit were registered in state records as "officially licensed." The reports from these provinces recommended to the central government that these institutions be allowed to keep working.

In the eastern provinces, however, almost all missionary institutions operated "with no legal status." In 1899, 35 schools had been documented as "unregistered in the state records," 13 of them in Aleppo alone.[48] Appalled by these numbers and seeking further information, in 1903 the central government ordered a complete survey of the locations in which the missionaries were "invisible" (*gizlendiği için göze çarpmayan*). This survey, a collection of field-reports prepared by provincial administrations, indicated that the farther from

[46] For licensing missionary institutions see the dissertation chapter, "Regulating American Missionary Activity through the Granting and Denying of Licences."
[47] Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325; Y Prk Mf 4/80, 12 C 1321.
[48] A future study will examine the details of reports on missionary expansion in the provinces with specific focus on Ottoman demographics.

"the centre" these missionary institutions were, the more nebulous their legal status.[49]

According to the survey, three colleges in İstanbul, nine schools in İzmir, one college and orphanage in İzmit, two schools in Bursa, seven schools and two orphanages in Sivas, three schools in Van, and one school each in Ankara, Bitola, and Trabzon, were all licensed. In Harput, one seminary and three schools were licensed while an orphanage was not. Further south in Adana, six out of eight institutions—including one orphanage—were "not licensed." In Jerusalem, three out of five neighbourhood schools did not have imperial licences. In Mount Lebanon, 26 out of 29 missionary institutions, including a seminary, were not registered with the central government. In Beirut, 21 out of 22 missionary institutions lacked official authorization. The only institution that had official licence to operate in the Province of Beirut was the Protestant College of Syria, known today as the American University of Beirut.[50]

Beirut was an unusually complex city in terms of missionary activities.[51] When Sultan Abdulhamid II ordered local governors to compile

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[49] Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 2. The term "centre" refers to "those groups or persons who tried to uphold the state's autonomy and supremacy in the polity." The centre is also identical with İstanbul, the imperial capital where those groups and persons were located. Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century," *International Political Science Review* vol. 1, no. 1 (1980): 81-105, especially p. 85.

[50] Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325; Y Prk Mf 4/80, 12 C 1321.

[51] In a study of the exceptionality of Beirut, Hanssen builds on a local version of "Ottomanism." He argues that "local interest groups not only depended on, but also sought, the presence of Ottoman imperial power in Beirut… [Beirut as a] public construction—literally as well as figuratively—cemented Ottomanism as a state ideology." Jen Hanssen, *Fin de Siècle Beirut: The Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 73, 266. Also see Charles Issawi, "British Trade and the Rise of Beirut, 1830-1860," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 8, no. 1 (January 1977): 91-101; David Kushner, "Muslim

reports on the American missionaries in their regions, Halil Effendi, the Governor of Beirut, promised to inform the government in İstanbul "no later than the meticulous examinations would generate answers to the issue concerned."[52] A week after the sultan's order came Halil Effendi's report with some unpleasant news. The central government already knew that a number of American missionaries had been operating in Beirut. However, Halil Effendi's report revealed that, as of 1907, "a total of 29 schools without a license [of operation] have been giving day-time and boarding education [in fields] of literature, business, and sciences… In these missionary schools," as his report recorded, "there are about 100 Muslim students and 650 Christian students from Egypt and the surrounding cities of the province" of Beirut.

There were no Muslim students in the American missionary schools, and the households used as schools, in the city of Trablusşam, or Tripoli, or the districts of Hamat, Lazkiye, Merc-i Uyun, Safita, and Sayda. It was only in the district of Safed that "41 foreigners, including 11 Christians and three Muslims, continued their education." "In conclusion," Halil Effendi added, "the total number of American [missionary] schools within the boundaries of the province, none of which [currently] hold an official license to operate, is 29."[53]

Education in the Vilayet of Beirut"; Martin Strohmeier, "The Commercial Network of Beirut in the Last Twenty Years of Ottoman Rule"; in Caesar E. Farah ed., *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 215-262.

[52] From Halil the Governor of Beirut, 6 March 1907, Y Prk Mf, 5/20, 2 R 1325, document nos. 5, 11.

[53] From Halil the Governor of Beirut, 13 March 1907, documents 11-12. Two days later, Halil Effendi sent another report. Based on a telegraph note sent from Tripoli, he noted that "the administration of the concerned city stated that there is a primary school that has enrolled male and female students including Muslim children since 1883. This being the case, the number of American missionary schools has increased from twenty-nine to thirty." Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 11-12.

Reports of this sort—prepared by provincial governors regarding the missionaries and their activities—focused on three main axes: the identification of missionaries, the objectives of their activities, and the interaction between the missionaries and local communities.[54] Taken together, these reports reflected the provincial administrations' claims that American missionaries spread agitation amongst local minority groups, forced them to convert to Protestantism, and propagated hatred of the Ottoman state. Most provincial governors duly recommended that the government in İstanbul take immediate action in the way of warning, punishing, or sometimes deporting missionaries from their regions.[55]

In at least one case, a provincial governor himself warned, punished, and deported the missionaries from his region, and only then told the central government about it. On 10 May 1907, Sabvar Bey, the Governor of Kayseri, reported to the government that Mahmud Ali Effendi, the Police Chief, and his assistant had closed down a female missionary house two days earlier. Despite the opposition encountered from the British Consulate, they took six Ottoman girls present in the house, placed them on a train with police escort, and sent them back to their families. "While it was unnecessary," the governor explained, "to confiscate the house which had been used as a missionary school, it would be expropriated in the event that the [missionary] work continued."[56] The central government would probably not have taken the

[54] The files of identification on American missionaries were submitted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs from Adana, İzmir (Aydın), Halep, İstanbul, and Sivas, in Dh Eum 5Şb, 2 Z 1336; missionary involvement in local incidents, in Dh Eum Ayş 1/53, 17 C 1337.
[55] See the report on "Christianization of the Muslim millet," in Hr Sys 45/15, 17 February 1875.
[56] Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 3.

drastic measures that Sabvar Bey resorted to, but neither did it reverse the decision or even comment on the issue. Its silence, it seems, was a sign of tacit approval.

The Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs accumulated reports from the governors of eight major cities—Antakya, Antep, Birecik, Bitola, İstanbul, Kayseri, Maraş, and Urfa—who complained that the American missionaries "intended" to convert local Christians of other sects to Protestantism.[57] While the central government was mainly concerned about the missionary appeal to Muslim subjects, it was also sensitive to missionary involvement in, and manipulation of, local non-Muslim communities. For instance, missionaries encouraged local non-Muslims in Bitola to turn against the Ottoman government because the latter constantly acted against their communal interests and because "the libertarian Rumelian reforms" it proposed would never "go into effect." The central government urged its local representatives to ward off such missionary propaganda.[58]

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[57] Hr Sys 54/4, 13 August 1896.

[58] "Bitola," in Y Prk Esa 24/58, 27 Z 1313. The research for this dissertation also has identified a substantial number of archival sources on Mormon missionary activity in Ottoman provinces. These documents have not been studied in depth; they can provide significant insights into various issues related to the missionary activity in the Ottoman Empire. See, for example, Mormons in Halep, in Y Mtv 242/43, 9 M 1321. Ottoman locals did not welcome the Mormons; similar to the activities of ABCFM missionaries, provincial authorities also regarded the Mormon missionary work as potentially dangerous to the communal order. For example, the governors of Antep, Birecik, and Maraş notified the central government that the Mormons came to sow the seeds of discord in their region. See Dh Mkt 1875/55, 3 Ra 1309; Dh Mkt 1855/29, 26 Z 1308; a report dated 22 September 1891 on a Mormon missionary who was communicating with locals in Antep, in Dh Mkt 1871/11, 18 S 1309. This Mormon missionary seems to have been the progenitor of later Mormon missionary activity in Antep as other Mormons came to Antep after him. Reaching a sizable number in the next two decades, the Mormon presence in the provinces caused the imperial bureaucrats in the capital to discuss the intentions of this "new missionary group," giving the U.S. Embassy the responsibility for the consequences of Mormon missionary activity in the Empire. Dh Mtk 455/15, 17 Z 1319. For an overview of the Mormon missionary activities in the provinces, see Seçil Karal Akgün, "Mormon Missionaries in the Ottoman Empire," *Turcica* vol. 28 (1996): 347-358.

Hafizî, the Governor of Bitola, gave additional reports on the missionary institutions in his region; there was an American missionary school, which had been "established with official license, and offered both primary and college level education," and whose students were Greeks, Bulgarians, and local gypsies, "affiliated with the [Orthodox] Patriarchate and various local synagogues… among them were found no Muslim students." However, another "Protestant school established by an Ottoman subject" had been closed without waiting for approval from central government "because the methods of education offered in that school were unlawful," and teaching was directed against the state. In addition, American missionaries had opened a primary-level boarding school in a private house despite a sworn declaration provided by the American Consulate in Bitola that they would not use residential houses as schools. "The consulate was informed of the situation and requested to enjoin the missionaries from acting against the law of the land," Hafizî recounted, "but the consul has as yet not acted on the matter."[59]

In March 1907, Seyfeddin Effendi, the Governor of the Province of Yanya, attested that there were no unlicensed American missionary schools in his province. In addition, "the primary schools operated by Italians enrolled only the children of those under Italian citizenship. Not a single child of Muslim parents was registered in those schools."[60] Matters grew more complicated three years later. Although there were no American missionary schools in Yanya, and Muslim students were free from missionary influence,

[59] Hafızi the Governor of Manastır, 15 March 1907, Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 9.
[60] Seyfeddin Effendi from the Province of Yanya, 22 March 1907, Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 38

the Greek-speaking natives of Yanya "were exposed to, and kept reading 'seditious' books and pamphlets written and published by the missionaries." Therefore the chief Ottoman official, Seyfeddin, argued that residents had "lost their loyalty to the central government and served, with [nationalist] Greeks, the interests of Greece." Many Ottoman households "who escaped to foreign countries originated from this province." What is more, in Yanya, "the native attitudes and actions drew the attention of local government." Seyfeddin also confirmed that he executed the imperial order that had been sent to him on the matter. "Households had been in possession of books and documents against the [Ottoman] imperial state," therefore the owners of "these households were sentenced to two to three years of imprisonment." At the same time, "the possibilities of interest in, and reading of those kinds of 'seditious' books and documents were removed." Those "who had given provocative [anti-state] speeches" in public spaces, "such as coffeehouses and other places where people got together," were "detected, caught… and placed under interrogation."[61]

There were certain exceptional cases where the central government revealed its mode of thinking and the ways in which it interpreted and responded to the missionary activities among the Ottoman subjects, particularly the Muslim subjects. The provincial authorities of Yanya indicated that "some people who apparently commit[ted] 'pious fraud,' and even a number of children still engaged in studies at [local schools] were involved in poisoning native perceptions [of the Ottoman State]." One telegram sent by the inspector

[61] Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 4.

of the Governorship of Rumelia even referred to a certain Muhammed Dari as a member of the local "gang of sedition." Oddly enough, Muhammed Dari was both "the imam [Muslim community leader] and the children's teacher in the mentioned location." Despite his position and reputation, Dari was "evidently found to be corrupt and [involved] in treason." Reflecting the pro-Muslim image of the Ottoman government that valued the leadership cadres of Muslim communities in the provinces, the telegram stated that "no further actions were taken against him… for the sake of his position." However, "other Muslim and Christian members [from lower social ranks] of the gang of sedition had to be punished so that their sedition would be prevented." In another note, the central government ordered the local administration to ensure that "the directors of [local] schools and educational institutions raise the ethical values of their students so that their loyalty to and faith in the [Ottoman] state would be maintained, the well-being of the state would be assured, and state authority would be restored."[62]

As discussed earlier, the *fin de siècle* Ottoman central government grew increasingly sceptical of American missionaries, in part thanks to local notifications and complaints against the missionaries. Indeed the volume of incoming reports created its own momentum. Increasingly wary, the central government underwent, during the 1890s and the 1900s, a change in its relations with the missionaries, especially in matters involving local residents, American consulates, and the licensing and taxation of new missionary

[62] Seyfeddin Effendi from the Province of Yanya, 11 March 1910-10 April 1907, Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document nos. 4-5.

institutions.[63] In one instance, the government ordered a secret investigation of Charles Edward and Alfred Thomas, two notable American missionaries who were coming to teach at Robert College in İstanbul. As Robert College was arguably the most trusted missionary institution in the eyes of the government and government agents were already very familiar with Edward and Thomas, this step symbolized a veritable sea-change.[64]

Provincial administrations worked to erode the central government's confidence in the missionaries.[65] According to the former, great numbers of American missionaries were working against state interests and the prevailing social order by promoting and exacerbating local tensions. American missionary activity had turned, many governors claimed, into "a movement of sedition" (*fesâd hareket*).[66]

As the central government had not always favoured the position of provincial administrations, the provinces were hoping to convert it into a weapon in their war over local issues with the missionaries. On 9 October 1890, when informed that students of American missionaries would stage a play at the American Theatre in the Selamsız quarter of İstanbul, the central government ruled that the play could be conducted as it "did not contain materials of sedition."[67] Likewise, two years later, it took no action against Kazaros and

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[63] For more on the legal status of missionary institutions, see the dissertation chapter, "Regulating American Missionary Activity through the Granting and Denying of Licences."
[64] Hr Sys 2742/80, 12 September 1905.
[65] For a detailed study of imperial orders sent from the capital to the provinces, see Halil İnalcık, "Transmission of Directives from Center to Periphery in the Ottoman State until the Seventeenth Century," in Caesar E. Farah ed., *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 19-28.
[66] Ya Res 122/88, 7 C 1321.
[67] Dh Mkt 1769/57, 25 S 1308.

Parsih, two Protestant preachers in Eleşkid, Ağrı despite the urging of provincial authorities. The government had decided that the intelligence files on them were devoid of "solid proof."[68]

In the 1890s, provincial reports continuously invited government officials to "do something" about foreigners, unwelcome visitors, and especially missionaries.[69] On 18 January 1891, the Ministry of Interior received a brief that some American missionaries had rented the residence of Gabriel Gregory (Şişmanyan) to preach to Ottoman children in Kumkapı, İstanbul. The central government regarded the case worthy of investigation, but the information provided was found inadequate and thus local officials were asked to furnish more precise details on the case, such as Gregory's street address.[70] Five days later, a report arrived from the field showing that Gregory, a legally confirmed American citizen, had turned his residence into a missionary school without the required licenses from the ministries of the Interior and Education.

Contrary to the expectations of local officials, the central government chose "not to shut down" the school and notified the American embassy to get it licensed instead.[71] On 8 April 1891, four months after the initial brief, state agents discovered that two American women had been "missioning" in the residence. After further inquiries however, the syllabi and books used by the missionary women were declared by the central government to be "not seditious." In light of the new findings, the government decided the school was

[68] Dh Mkt 1914/36, 20 C 1309.
[69] See, for example, the Protestant priest Messaros who gave a "provocative" speech to the Armenian Unity Committee, in Hr Sys 61/16, 31 March 1892; and another priest who argued the Turks had been attacking the Greeks, in Dh Eum Ayş 13/47, 24 N 1337.
[70] Dh Mkt 1800/141, 8 C 1308.
[71] Dh Mkt 1802/3, 13 C 1308.

good enough to be recognized as a "foreign institution" that worked for the good of the community.[72] Although the Ottoman government was growing increasingly cautious of missionaries and sceptical of their activities, its standard procedure of thoroughly investigating cases usually resulted, as in the Gregory affair, in an informed decision. The central government had not abandoned its conventional understanding of justice, and had not blindly turned against the missionaries.[73]

The earlier understanding of justice favoured by the central government did not always suit the provincial governors, who tended to side with established local interests in their frequent confrontations with the missionaries. One of earliest incidents involving the central government, the local communities, and American missionaries had taken place in 1849. When the residents of Ahur village in Tokat mistreated Wilson, an American missionary and his associates, the central government intervened. The central government chose not to punish the local communities but rather to mediate between them and the missionaries, and on 6 December of that year the government ordered the governor of Tokat to compensate the missionaries for the losses they had suffered and ordered the local communities not to abuse the American missionaries.[74]

For their part, Ottoman local communities did not always submit to the central government's directives to co-exist peacefully with the missionaries. On

[72] Dh Mkt 1827/17, 29 Ş 1308.
[73] In one case dated 1 February 1895, the central government reminded the local authorities in Adana that the American translator Bogos should be treated fairly in the court. İ Hus 34/1312 Ş-019, 6 Ş 1312.
[74] Hr Mkt 29/16, 21 M 1266.

21 October 1854, the central government specifically ordered the governor of Diyarbakır to stop local Muslims, evidently missionary-hostile, from harassing the American missionaries in the region.[75] When the governor complained that the disputes were caused by the American missionaries' provocations of Muslims, the central government ignored his complaint and commanded him to alleviate the tensions once and for all. In fact, the American missionaries were intent on converting the Nestorian Christians in Diyarbakır, thereby provoking the Nestorian Patriarchate to fight back.[76] Regardless, the central government reminded the governor and the patriarch of missionaries' rights in the Ottoman domain. The natives of Merzifon were likewise ordered to stop singling out and attacking missionaries.[77]

At this early stage the central government did not understand (or want to understand) whether the native reaction to foreigners (mainly missionaries) stemmed from valid resentment, xenophobia, or a communal hatred. In general, the government's approach and decisions were predicated on the idea of an imperial justice that was to be granted to everyone willing to live in the Empire peacefully under the rule of imperial law. Particularly until the 1880s, the government wanted to mediate rather than interfere with the disputes that erupted between locals and missionaries. Consequently the missionaries benefited from this benign treatment. After the 1880s however, this diplomatic approach towards the missionaries began to change, in part because the central government decided to support its provincial governors and subjects in the face

[75] Hr Mkt 91/15, 29 M 1271.
[76] Hr Mkt 59/36, 28 B 1269.
[77] Hr Mkt 61/21, 7 L 1269; Hr Mkt 47/78, 3 Za 1268.

of increasing missionary activities, and in part because the Ottomans (especially Muslim subjects and their children) became more and more susceptible to missionary influence.[78]

Central Government and Missionary Activities in Local Context

The American missionaries were deeply involved in minority issues, and their institutions influenced discourse on the subject; the missionary approach to reach out to all non-Muslim Ottoman students—Muslim students now being barred from missionary schools by government edict—drew minorities out of the Ottoman mainstream. Ottoman officials argued that the education missionaries gave to the children of the different *millets* (i.e. the existing social structure that defined the Ottoman subjects by confessional communities) inspired them to re-identify themselves as being distinct and assert their distinct identity.[79]

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[78] A dossier in the Ottoman archives contains 52 reports that reveal how many if any Muslim students were enrolled in American missionary institutions. These reports were submitted to the central government by the following authorities in the provinces: the Chief-official of Aleppo Bekir Sıdkı, the Governor of Edirne (Adrianople) Reşad Bey, the Governor of Hüdavendigar (Bursa) Tevfik Bey, the Governor of İzmir (Aydın) Faik Bey the Governor of Salonika Rauf Bey, , the Governor of Syria Şükrü Bey, and the Governor of Trabzon Zeyr Bey. The reports also mention the number and address and the legal status of the missionary establishments in their region, and present the personal opinions of provincial authorities on missionary expansion. See, for example, Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document nos. 10, 13-15, 17, 18-20, 24-29, 34-35, 39-42. In further analysis, the content of these reports hints at the Islamic-religious perspective of provincial authorities; thus supporting Karpat's analysis of the fin-de-siècle Ottoman state by focusing on Islamic elements. As he has noted, arguably the most important collective ideology to galvanize Ottoman officials in the 1880s and the 1890s were "Islamism." Kemal H. Karpat, *Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 20-67, 117-135, 155-182.

[79] İlber Ortaylı, "Millet [confessional communities]," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Turkish religious foundation encyclopaedia of Islam] (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2005), XXX: 64-70; Emrah Sahin, "Ottoman Millet System," in Orlando Patterson and J. Geoffrey Golson eds., *Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa*, vol. I (California: SAGE, in press). Several scholars take the perspective of provincial authorities at

Local complaints about the missionary activities had been present since the late 1830s, the earliest decade of American missionary establishment in the Empire. In February 1839, the municipal governor of Beyoğlu, İstanbul, complained that the missionaries had been "spreading sedition" among the Armenian students enrolled in their school. With the approval of the central government, he shut down the school and deported several Armenian students involved and "found guilty."[80] This incident suggested to the central government that such incidents might recur. The government therefore turned to the patriarchs of established millets, especially the Armenian millet.[81]

Collaboration between the Ottoman central government and the patriarchs was only to be expected, after all the Ottoman administrative structure had divided subjects by *millet*.[82] The patriarchs were *de facto* leaders of the millets and held a privileged position: they were allowed to set their own laws, run their churches independently, and collect taxes from their communities. The millets, mainly the Armenian, Greek, and Jewish, were autonomous in their communal affairs;[83] the central government did not

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face value and claim that the missionaries inspired the Armenians in Antep to abandon the Ottoman-Turkish language in their churches. In their view, the missionaries also encouraged Ottoman communities to speak native languages in daily life from the 1880s onward and call themselves Armenians instead of Ottomans. Necdet Sevinç, *Ajan Okulları* [Spy colleges] (İstanbul: Oymak Yayınları, n.d.), p. 51;also quoted in Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American Relations] (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003), p. 198.

[80] *Hatt-ı Hümâyûn* [Sultanic decree], 512/25086, 18 Z 1254.

[81] Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American Relations], p. 65.

[82] İlber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gayrimüslimler [Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire]," in *Osmanlı Barışı* [Pax Ottomana] (İstanbul: Ufuk, 2004), pp. 124-126.

[83] The 1897 Census gives the following figures for the Ottoman millets: approximately 74.07% Muslims, 13.49% Greeks, 5.47% Armenians, 1.13% Jews, and 0.24% Protestants. *İstatistik-i Umumi* [the demographics], pp. 15-16; quoted in Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey), p. 293.

interfere so long as they remained "loyal" to the government.[84] The government allowed the communities to elect their own patriarchs provided the patriarch-elect was a steadfast Ottoman agent and remained what İnalcık calls apolitical.[85] As a result, this administrative system made the patriarchs natural allies of the government and an integral part of the state structure.

Furthermore, the patriarchs of Ottoman churches were naturally hostile to the American missionaries who sought to convert their flocks. They agreed with provincial governors that their communities were being exposed to what they called "the seditious ideas of the missionaries," and claimed that the missionaries were poisoning their followers by converting them to Protestantism.[86] Consequently, they (along with provincial administrations) constituted the most hostile element toward the missionaries and sought the central government's intervention against them.

As discussed, it was not until later that the central government began to perceive the missionaries as dangerous to the state and social order. When the central government acted it almost always relied on governors and patriarchs to put the coming laws into effect. In one case, the Sublime Porte requested that

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[84] Stanford J. Shaw, "Ermeni Milleti [the Armenians]"; "Rum Milleti [the Greeks]"; "Yahudi Milleti [the Jews"; in Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey], pp. 163-166; Cevdet Küçük, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Millet Sistemi ve Tanzimat [Ottoman Millet system and Age of Reforms]," in Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanoğlu eds., *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu* [Age of Reforms: the Ottoman Empire in a changing discourse] (İstanbul: Phoenix, 2006), p. 401.

[85] Halil İnalcık, "The Status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under the Ottomans," *Turcica* vol. 11-13 (1991): 408-411; İlber Ortaylı, "The Ottoman Millet System and Its Social Dimensions," in Rikard Larrson ed., *Boundaries of Europe* (Stockholm: FRN, 1998), pp. 120-126.

[86] For the conflict between missionaries and local Armenians, see *Controversy between the Missionaries of the American Board and the Evangelical Armenian Churches in Turkey* [Extracts from the Minutes of the 14th Annual Meeting of the Bythinia Union, held at Constantinople during 12-25 May 1881]. New York: Armenian Young Men's Christian Association, 1882.

patriarchs prevent and "campaign against the circulation of seditious ideas" among the students in American missionary schools. As could be expected, the patriarchs worked loyally and diligently, and found willing and useful allies in provincial governors, who also had their qualms with missionaries.[87]

Several earlier cases supported the views of the patriarchs who thought and claimed the missionaries were poisoning their followers by converting them to Protestantism. The central government knew that conversions were not as many as the patriarchs claimed. But, the possibility was there; more and more people were using missionary services like health and education that exposed them to open contact with the missionaries.

When cases of conversion occurred, or when their former followers used missionary services, the government did not proclaim an imperial edict to address the issue of conversion in its entirety, rather it acted on a case-by-case basis. The resulting verdicts however, always favoured local agents, reflecting the fact that the central government drew the line at conversion. Maximos, the Catholic Patriarch, wrote a letter to the central government on 5 May 1849 and requested the government not endorse the appointment of Mihail Meşaka as the new Regent of the Damascus Consulate as the American missionaries had converted the latter to Protestantism. "The act of conversion," the patriarch contended, had alienated Meşaka from the Ottoman society, "uprooting" him

[87] Missionary school was closed, in *Hat* [edict] 512/25086, 18 Z 1254; imperial orders to the Armenian Patriarchate, in *Hat* 794/36842, 3 Z 1254. In a specific case, local pressure also targeted missionary schools. Like other reports such as one sent from Beyoğlu, İstanbul, a report dated 27 March 1896 indicated that the provincial governor and local subjects of Harput were angry with missionary schools in their region as the missionaries were "indoctrinating" their children in these schools. The central government ordered the governor to be vigilant and to continue informing the capital of the situation in the region. A Mkt Mhm 702/19, 23 N 1313.

from his social, communal as well as religious roots. The central government agreed and Meşaka did not get the job.[88]

Stephan Bedros Azarian, appointed Patriarch of Cilicia from 1881 to 1899, provides another perspective on the ways in which communal religious leaders tried to frustrate the missionaries. Whereas Maximos would not tolerate the converted in high office, Azarian was more concerned by the double standards missionaries used in distributing American and British donations to needy Armenians. "The American missionaries," he complained in 1896, "handed out the money collected in Britain and the United States only to the Protestant Armenians," who were their constituency.[89] Although the central government did not give a direct response to Azarian, the government later required all foreign aid to be distributed through state agencies because the missionaries were "biased in distributing aid."[90]

In the late nineteenth century, a series of conflicts erupted between American missionaries and local communities as many of the latter became hostile to missionary activities thought to be penetrating too deeply into their intimate social and religious spheres.[91] In December 1871, an American missionary who conspicuously attempted to convert natives in Bolvadin and Manisa faced lynching by a local mob,[92] and while the proceedings of the court

[88] Hr Mkt 25/49, 13 C 1265.
[89] Hr Sys 2741/50, 12 June 1896.
[90] For example, the central government did not allow missionaries to distribute to local subjects the donations collected in the United States by *the Christian Herald*. See, for example, the note on this matter of the U.S. Minister of Foreign Affairs, in A Mkt Mhm 688/6, 19 N 1313. Instead of missionaries, local Ottoman agents were authorized in distribution of foreign aid in the provinces. A Mkt Mhm 688/11, 11 L 1313.
[91] Hr Sys 2860/51, 3 October 1896.
[92] Hr Sys 81/59, 30 December 1871.

case that followed were not made public, the extent of open hostility is instructive.[93]

Later, the American missionary movement likewise antagonized the Orthodox Patriarch. In addition to several telegrams dispatched by local minorities, the Orthodox patriarch expressed to the central government his concerns about missionary activities.[94] On 5 July 1902, he complained that American missionaries were opening institutions like schools, churches, and publishing houses in Palestine and Syria. The missionaries were claiming that they respected local customs and religions, but the patriarch contended otherwise. He expected the government to resolve the matter and to forbid the missionaries from publishing against his church.[95]

Another issue, though perhaps less significant, was the American missionaries' violation of the communal land and property that had belonged to certain millets. In an incident in 1913, the Greek community turned against the

[93] In a *Congregationalist* article, the American missionary H. N. Barnum claimed that Ottoman Armenians had had no desire for a revolution against the imperial authority; In Barnum's view, a petite revolutionary caucus had been stirring up the Armenian community. Armenians in New York strongly reacted to Barnum's claims and argued that all the Armenians had long been frustrated "with the imperial rule." Aside from this debate, the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and the United States generally agreed that the norms and forms of their Christianity were better than those of Protestantism. See, for example, the report of Mavroyani Bey, in Hr Sys 2735/28, 22 December 1890.

[94] Zalimyan, Gaspar, and Kigork, three local Armenians, requested the central government to deport American missionaries from their province. In their view, missionaries were threatening the peace and order of their community. A Mkt Mhm 657/45, 12 C 1313. The government deported or relocated the missionaries based on investigation reports. In one case, an imperial order moved the American missionary Andros from Mardin to Diyarbakır, in A Mkt Mhm 637/42, 3 Z 1316.

[95] The Orthodox Patriarch, as well as the Armenian Patriarch, maintained an anti-missionary position. In July 1902, the patriarch noted that "Americans, British, French, Germans, and Russians [are] open[ing] schools and churches in Palestine and Syria... and use them for their cause," which was to steal members of his flock. Dh Mkt 534/65, 29 Ra 1320. Later, he also requested the imperial bureaucrats to prevent missionary publications from reaching his community. Hr Sys 67/31, 3 April 1906. For more on missionary publications distributed in the provinces, see the dissertation chapter, "Controlling Missionary Publications."

missionaries when the American College in Arnavutköy, İstanbul, took over a portion of the lands belonging to the Greek Church, their next door neighbour. Teodoraki Kalbakçıoğlu, a board member of the local Greek Church, decided to take the case to the Court of Order and Justice. In defence, the missionary James Barton advocated that the disputed land had already been registered to the American College for Girls in Arnavutköy. The case dragged on and the municipality of the region was asked to submit land surveys. It stands as an example of the central government removing itself from the fray and taking the position that it was a question of local jurisdiction.[96]

In 1896, a letter penned by American missionary Mikalem acknowledged and thanked the Ottoman central government for providing Muslims and Christians in Aleppo with the means to co-exist peacefully.[97] But letters like this were rare as the reality was that, in the *fin de siècle* Ottoman Empire, peaceful co-existence between Muslims and Christians (and among the Ottoman millets) was tentative. By the turn of the century, the central government had had enough of the missionaries, and tensions between the missionaries and millets wreaked serious havoc in major cities all across the Empire. Worse, the deteriorating relations seemed set to deteriorate further.[98]

In 1895, Kabadayan, a native Armenian professor teaching at İzmir American College, gave a provocative speech to his Armenian students that the Armenian patriarch feared would turn the audience against the government.[99]

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[96] Kalbakçıoğlu to the court, in Dh İd 154/7, 3 B 1331; Barton and local authorities involved in the case, in Dh İd 154/18, 10 S 1341.
[97] A Mkt Mhm 652/1, 8 S 1314.
[98] Çağrı Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," pp. 191-212.
[99] Hr Sys 64/17, 8 November 1895.

Later that same year, attacks by the local residents on the missionaries in their region increased. Ağnaniyan, a missionary of the American mission and a member of the Protestant Church in Arapgir, Malatya, was murdered by an angry mob and his church was burned down.[100] Missionary establishments in Harput were allegedly burned by native Muslim Kurds, and a number of missionaries barely escaped with their lives in fleeing from Bitlis to Van.[101] The central government assigned agents to investigate, however the government could not (or would not) become a party to these cases, which became a source of concern to American diplomats.[102]

In these tumultuous times, the central government arguably worked efficiently and well; on the balance of evidence, many government officials tried to solve complicated cases in a fair manner. After the local governor in Sivas accused Abkaryan, an American doctor of Armenian origin, of being a fanatical agitator, the government officials involved insisted that Abkaryan was "innocent until proven guilty." On 20 December 1890, the local governor was asked to provide solid proof to back up his suspicion and to keep an eye on Abkaryan and his association with the American consulate in Sivas.[103] The governor returned with the required evidence and another request to deport Abkaryan. The evidence persuaded the central government to approve the

[100] See, for example, the government's order for an investigation report, in A Mkt Mhm 657/53, 9 B 1313.
[101] An archival source notes, "so was written in American newspapers." A Mkt Mhm 657/34, 3 C 1313. According to the U.S. Department of Foreign Affairs, the same source mentions, local Ottoman police could intervene and stop this "unfortunate" incident. A Mkt Mhm 657/36, 3 C 1313.
[102] The U.S. ambassador in Beirut wanted to interview the Mersin residents in order to facilitate arresting the persons involved in the attack against a professor and students of the American College in Tarsus. A Mkt Mhm 616/5, 26 R 1313.
[103] Dh Mkt 1794/18, 9 Ca 1308.

deportation of Abkaryan,[104] who had by this time taken refuge with the American consulate, which did not want to hand him over to the Ottoman officials. The involvement of the American consulate in this case frustrated the central government even more, as they considered incidents of this sort to be in the realm of domestic affairs. Abkaryan was eventually deported, but a great number of others blacklisted by the provincial governors were not deported, simply "placed under state surveillance."[105] The involvement of the American consulate perhaps helped others to stay in the Empire.

As it transpired, the central government had requested too much from the provincial governors, some of whom lacked the resources to keep the missionaries under surveillance. Significantly, as social and political turmoil plagued the provinces and the American missionary movement in the Near East peaked, the central government increasingly came to side with provincial authorities. Local religious leaders spread anti-missionary feelings in the provinces, where the local tide had already been turning against the missionaries to varying degrees. As the only available information regarding the missionaries, their activities, and their institutions came from local sources, its presentation coloured the central government's interpretation. Missionary-related complaints from local communities even pushed the government to supplant some of its provincial governors.

[104] The American consulate protected Abkaryan, in Dh Mkt 1809/5, 5 B 1308. Ottoman imperial bureaucrats found Abkaryan to be a real agitator, in Dh Mkt 1789/19, 23 R 1308.
[105] The persons under surveillance included Gabriyan the Photographer and Batakçıyan the Scribe, the son of Tandıryan. Dh Mkt 1786/32, 16 R 1308.

Run by American and German donations, *Dar'ut-Terbiye*, the missionary school in the Palu District of Harput, was visited and supervised by American missionaries. The local residents of Harput complained that their governor, Haydar Effendi had demonstrated incompetence and a lack of vigilance in monitoring the school's operations. As a result, the central government replaced him, on 3 April 1899, with Mazhar Effendi, a former official working in the Court of Appeals.[106]

In June 1908, Yuvanaki Effendi, the Haçin Governor, shared Haydar's fate. To the outrage of local residents, Yuvanaki had conspired in the opening of an unlicensed American school, leading to his replacement by Abdulhalim Effendi.[107] It is also worth noting the case of a certain Mehmed, an Ottoman military officer serving in Iraq who was found to be pro-missionary. In fact, he had converted to Protestantism while he was a sergeant-major of the Reserve Corps in Baghdad. This apostasy incurred the central government's wrath, and in August 1900 Mehmed was not only dismissed but also deported far from his native Baghdad to Malatya.[108] The case of Mehmed also shows the extent to which the central government went to punish converters, especially when they were employed in state affairs or in higher ranks of its army.

[106] Dh Mkt 2185/83, 23 Za 1316.
[107] Dh Mkt 1259/41, 10 Ca 1326. The central government made such duty rotations rather frequently and sometimes for apparently odd reasons. For example, an imperial order discharged M. O. Hekman of American Hamburg Co. İstanbul on account of boarding—without permission, on his ship the person named Hüseyin Effendi, an Assistant Professor and teacher of Ottoman language at Robert College. Dh Mkt 1207/8, 16 N 1325.
[108] Dh Mkt 2395/6, 29 R 1318. Sometime after his moving to Malatya, Mehmed of Baghdad complained about "his miserable state of mind," thus asking the imperial bureaucrats whether he could return home. The bureaucrats did not readily accept his condition as a valid excuse and ordered the Malatya authorities to evaluate and report on his mental state. Based on the coming report, they forced Mehmed to stay in Malatya for one more year. Dh Mkt 2418/81, 28 C 1318; Dh Mkt 2462/135, 27 Za 1318.

The central government's strong reaction to conversion was not limited to state agents. The central government also found the possibility of Muslim children becoming Christians rather shocking.[109] Three reports from different provinces illustrate the local course of events alerting the government to this possibility. On 24 March 1891, American missionaries converted a Muslim student in Diyarbakır.[110] Two years later, Dr. Meteni, the Principal of the American Protestant Girls' School in Mersin, brainwashed some Nestorian female students studying in the school, and then "forced" a certain number of them to go to the United States. Later, on 2 April 1911, the Principal of the American Girls' College in Bursa snatched a Koran that her Muslim students were reading, and compelled the students to read the Bible instead.[111] The provincial governor reminded the central government that "restoring the law of the land and executing well-deserved penalties were crucial".[112] In reply, the government immediately ordered him to "save the Muslim students and deport" the missionaries. Incidents of this sort convinced the central government to devise concrete and more efficient policies on the missionary problem.[113]

The central government conveyed to the provincial authorities and the missionaries a new set of instructions to solve local disputes. These required

[109] Hr Sys 45/15, 17 February 1875; David Kushner, "Muslim Education in the Vilayet of Beirut," pp. 215-242.
[110] Hr Sys 71/32, 24 March 1891.
[111] Dh İd 117/27, 3 Ra 1329. The bureaucrats in the capital continued to receive incident reports from Bursa. In one case, for example, one report noted that American missionaries "forced" four Muslim girls to go from Bursa to İstanbul. According to the plan of the missionaries, these girls would meet someone named Rupen and leave the Ottoman domain under his guidance. When informed, the Ottoman security officers found the girls and arrested Rupen. Dh Eum 5Şb 37/59, 16 L 1337. For more see the dissertation chapter, "Approaching Individual Missionaries as the Object of Public Security," especially the section on 'imperial justice.'
[112] Dh İd 117/27, 3 Ra 1329.
[113] "Save Muslim children" and "deport Dr. Meteni," in A Mkt Mhm 700/5, 3 C 1311, document no. 3.

provincial governors to forbid local Muslim parents from sending their children to American missionary schools,[114] and the missionaries, the government ordered, would not be allowed to accept in their schools "the children of parents blacklisted by the central government" for agitating against the state and would "suffer the consequences," if they registered students whose family members had such criminal records.[115]

While the government tried to control matters, a series of tumultuous events in the provinces—not only in Muslim-majority towns—limited its success. In August 1909, in Tirana, Albania, locals who had heard that a missionary school would be established in their neighbourhood attacked C. Telford Erickson, the American missionary behind the project, and destroyed his holdings in the town.[116] Having been relocated to Drac by the government, Erickson wanted to move back to Tirana on account of an illness in his family. The government ordered the local administration in Drac and Tirana to prevent him from doing so as it would entail serious security risks.[117] Although the central government tended to remain neutral in arbitrating between the Tiranians and Erickson, it defended the natives' position against that of the

[114] The instructions to the Governor of Halep are in Dh Mkt 2351/130, 29 M 1318. In response to the instructions sent from the capital, provincial authorities deregistered Muslim children from missionary schools. For example, the İzmir (Aydın) Governor Faik Bey reported that there had been eight Muslim students attending a missionary school in İzmir. "Muslim parents and children attending the school... were ordered to terminate their relations with missionaries and their school." Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 41.
[115] A Mkt Mhm 701/02, 29 S 1312. In some cases, missionary institutions "sheltered" local youth found in the "wanted list" In the capital. For example, the Beirut American College student Dimitri was a "Russian spy," and the central government ordered missionaries not to 'protect' these persons. Hr Sys 2266/54, 13 September 1915.
[116] Hr Sys 132/31, 24 August 1909.
[117] Hr Sys 132/32, 30 August 1909; Hr Sys 132/33, 18 September 1909.

American diplomats involved in the case; Ottoman officials underscored that it was Erickson who had provoked the crisis.[118]

Illustrative of the gradual permeation of local perspectives into the central government's perception of the missionary issue, the case of Erickson suggests that the central government was siding with the locals more and more. Another example of the relocation or deportation of missionaries from Ottoman territory occurred in Mosul on 2 August 1896; American missionaries had opened a school in İmdadiye without due process, such as having it licensed by the Sublime Porte and recognized by the Ministry of Education. When the newly established school led the missionaries to activities deemed "seditious" by the local administration, the central government ordered the missionaries involved to be deported.[119]

From the 1880s, towns with endemic ethnic tensions, Muslim-majorities, and greater ethnic diversity began to experience more severe troubles related to the American missionaries.[120] On 21 March 1887, the Greek residents of İzmir stoned a missionary residence.[121] In January 1895, some American missionaries were murdered and their property destroyed in

[118] Hr Sys 132/36, 28 March 1911.
[119] A Mkt Mhm 694/13, 23 S 1314.
[120] It is important to note that not all local conflicts involved the missionaries. In one case dated June 1880, a conflict between Christians and Muslims erupted: in Haifa, local communities met for a wedding. During the wedding ceremony, they got in a fight and blood was shed. The imperial bureaucrats requested this incident to be investigated. The details of this incident will be examined in a future study. Y Prk Ask 2/74, 23 B 1297.
[121] Y Prk Tkm 10/23, 26 C 1304; *Le Temps*, a leading newspaper in Switzerland, speculated that the U.S. government was so frustrated that they would send a battleship to the region. Y Prk Tkm 10/32, 14 B 1304. For more see the dissertation chapter, "Approaching Individual Missionaries as the Object of Public Security," especially the section on Ottoman-U.S. relations regarding missionaries.

Harput.[122] A month later, bandits intercepted two American college students on their way to Adana and robbed them of their belongings.[123] In each case, the central government was called upon to resolve the matters; typically the government started with a thorough inspection, telling provincial governors not to deviate from the standards of imperial justice. In this way, the central government, as previously, attempted to formulate measured and well-informed responses.

In 1895, a series of social and religious disputes developed into severe confrontations between local communities, particularly in Eastern Anatolia. Scapegoated perhaps, several American missionaries together with many local Christians were killed and their houses and properties destroyed.[124] In the wake of the incident, the American consulate asked the central government for an explanation and urged it to compensate the missionaries for their material losses. In response, the government once again ordered a thorough investigation.[125] Addressing the American government's concern, it ordered the provincial governors to restrain locals from attacking the missionaries in their regions by any means necessary, particularly in Antep, Harput, and Merzifon, and to assign state guards to protect the missionaries.[126] Furthermore, some

[122] Hr Sys 73/18, 22 January 1895.
[123] İ Hus 34/1312 Ş-019, 6 Ş 1312.
[124] This chapter does not focus on the causes and effects of local ethno-religious conflicts. See, for example, Hr Sys 73/18, 22 January 1895; Hr Sys 73/18 23 January 1895; Hr Sys 73/20, 27 January 1895. In one case, missionary college was looted and the local church was burned during a local conflict. Hr Sys 73/20, 28 January 1895.
[125] The imperial order to inform the capital "of the burning of the missionary institutions," in Hr Sys 73/53, 16 January 1896.
[126] The executive order to protect missionaries, in Hr Sys 73/21, 28 January 1895; Ottoman officers assigned to guard missionaries, in Hr Sys 73/44, 5 December 1895; a letter from the U.S. Department of Foreign Affairs appreciates the Ottoman government's attention to the safety of American citizens (missionaries) in the Empire, in Hr Sys 73/54, 20 January 1896. For

missionaries, especially in Sason and Muş, were relocated from the outskirts to the town centres where the security situation was better.[127]

An increasingly cautious approach towards missionaries is also evident in the following cases of direct central government involvement. Back in 1873, the Dean of the American College in Beirut requested the central government sponsor a school exhibition to be held on college premises, and the government declined to do so. Correspondence on this issue symbolizes that, at least officially, the government retained its neutrality.[128] In 1887, Mormon missionaries, whose sect was a late arrival in Ottoman lands, asked the central government to officially recognize their denomination. This was the decade when the central government had turned sceptical of the American missionaries, and the response given to them was likewise circumspect: the central government "did not know them" and "had to thoroughly inspect their sacred book and publications", and unlike the early American Board missionaries, the Mormons did not receive a warm welcome.[129] This cold shoulder is indicative of the central government's change of perception regarding missionaries. Eventually, in 1916, the government departments agreed unanimously under the supreme command of the sultan to execute an

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the U.S. (and Canadian) diplomatic concerns with American missionaries in the Empire, also see Hr Sys 73/51, 9 January 1896; Hr Sys 2741/43, 25 April 1896.

[127] Missionaries relocated, in A Mkt Mhm 694/3, 11 Ca 1313.

[128] Hr Sys 68/10, 24 February 1873.

[129] A Mkt Mhm 495/32, 7 Ra 1305; Seçil Karal Akgün, "Mormon Missionaries in the Ottoman Empire," pp. 87-91.

imperial law that would restrict the further entry of American missionaries to Anatolia, effective 28 December of that year.[130]

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that amicable relations between the American missionaries and local governments and communities seemed plausible early on; however as missionary activities gained momentum and ethnic and national awareness increased in the *fin de siècle* Empire, relations became strained. Worried about the growing prevalence of missionary activities, the central government ordered a census in 1883, the results of which gave it even greater cause for concern. The census was a prime motivator of the "executive order" sent by the central government to the provinces that same year. As we have seen, this order forced missionaries to register with government agencies, restricted their movement, and forbade provincial administrations from dealing directly with them. In essence, this imperial response to American missionaries was a statement of intent for a stronger policy of centralization.

Changing local contexts and growing concerns over the scope and extent of the missionary movement in the Ottoman Empire profoundly shaped the central government's response to the missionaries and their institutions. A cumulative analysis of emblematic incidents shows that, far from being "double-faced", the government's perception and treatment of the American missionaries was complex and evolved from benign to sceptical and

[130] Restrictions on missionary expansion in the provinces, in Hr Sys 2429/59, 28 December 1916; missionaries complaining about the restrictions, in Hr Sys 2427/16, 17 October 1916.

antagonistic in certain cases. More than anything else, an intricate web of interactions between the central government and provincial governors, local religious leaders, and communities provided the prism through which the former came to understand the missionaries and pursue policies directed at their activities. It was not an "unscrupulous" central government that produced an official discourse against the missionaries in the *fin de siècle*, quite the contrary. It was the local discourse that led the central government to turn away from the missionaries in its Empire.

3

Regulating American Missionary Activity through the Granting and Denying of Licenses

The American missionary presence in the Ottoman Empire expanded rapidly and peaked in the 1880s. This was documented in the previous chapter with respect to the rising number of missionaries and the ever-increasing volume of imperial and provincial government documents dealing with incidences of law and order arising from their activities. This chapter will examine the spike in missionary activity through the lens of property license issuance, and shall document this strategy of containment by using the Ottoman archives to supplement the findings of the previous chapter. Whereas the missionaries had been allowed to purchase buildings—and to construct new ones on empty lands—without much hindrance in earlier decades, a complicated but cohesive centralized missionary establishment licensing policy evolved across the *fin-de-siècle* Empire as part of a broader response to the missionaries.[1]

This chapter examines a series of cases involving American missionaries and their institutions, and the imperial statecraft during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In so doing it shall help to understand

[1] For the Ottoman government during the nineteenth century, see Stanford J. Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reformers"; Albert Hourani, "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables"; Kemal H. Karpat, "The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire"; in W. R. Polk & Richard L. Chambers eds., *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 29-90.

the process of missionary institutionalization and to trace the evolution of the central government's responses. The main objective of this chapter is to contribute, through an archival study of missionary-related property transaction documentation, to a better understanding of the efforts of the government to centralize its administrative structure, establish its supreme authority over the provincial administrations, and contain missionary expansion in Ottoman lands.[2]

Historians generally agree on a discourse holding that the Ottoman government was trying to centralize its administrative structure and bring provincial administrations under tighter control. Indeed, several begin their discussions on Ottoman modernization with the central government's policy of centralization in the early nineteenth century.[3] However, particular details of this consensus have not been sufficiently studied.[4] This chapter also intends to place the aforementioned objective in the broader context of the Ottoman government's centralization policy by focusing on cases in which the central government employed its most effective power: licensing. By examining the

[2] Ottomanists are interested in the centralization attempts of Ottoman bureaucrats in the capital. Ibid. Also see Donald Quataert, "Islahatlar Devri [the Age of Reforms], 1812-1914," in Halil İnacık and Donald Quataert eds., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi* [Economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire] (İstanbul: Eren, 2004), II: 885-1051.
[3] Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanoğlu eds., *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu* [Age of reforms: the Ottoman Empire in a changing discourse] (İstanbul: Phoenix, 2006); Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History* (Leiden, Boston, Köln: Brill, 2002), pp. 27-74; Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 18-24, 30-37; Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: the Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 266-269.
[4] This dissertation does not focus on military aspects of the centralization of the Empire. See, for example, Avigdor Levy, "Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century," *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 18, no. 3 (July 1982), pp. 227-249.

interaction between the central government and the provincial governors, it also finds that the government assumed many of the powers previously exercised by the governors at the provincial level.[5]

In the 1880s, despite an imperial prohibition, it had become a common practice for American missionaries to purchase private houses and convert them into missionary institutions. The central government tended to place the blame for the failure to curb this illegal practice upon the provincial authorities, whose connivance was deemed essential to its continuance. The cases examined in this chapter suggest that this alleged administrative deficiency was the root cause of the central government taking a hands-on approach. Said approach required the missionaries to have imperial deeds for all their property transactions as well as the approval of the Special Council of Ministers (*Meclîs-i Mahsûs-i Vükelâ*). Thus, from the 1890s onward, the missionaries had to deal directly with the central government rather than its provincial administrations when it came to building new institutions and renovating or expanding existing establishments.

Responding to a perceived abuse of the welcome that missionaries had received in the Empire, the central government also decided to use licensing as

[5] Köksal argues that "centralization aimed at the formation of a regular bureaucracy, regulation of taxation, formation of a central police and military force, and secularization and standardization of justice and education. State centralization was accompanied with the idea of Ottoman citizenship through which direct ties between rulers and the ruled are formed." Yonca Köksal, "Rethinking Nationalism: State Projects and Community Networks in 19th-Century Ottoman Empire," *American Behavioral Scientist* vol. 51, no. 10 (June 2008): 1498-1515, especially p. 1502. Köksal also studied the details of Ottoman centralization in her dissertation, *Local Intermediaries and Ottoman State Centralization: A Comparison of the Tanzimat Reforms in the Provinces of Ankara and Edirne, 1839-1878* (Ph.D. Columbia University, 2002). This chapter suggests that, despite the great expectations of the imperial bureaucrats, local authorities and subjects did not support the capital's centralization project. The chapter hopes to provide another perspective on aspects of centralization in local context by looking at government regulations directed at missionary institutions.

a means of control.[6] These mechanisms, which did not allow intervention on behalf of the American consulate, limited the missionaries' property rights and served to contain their growth in the provinces, as well as in politically or militarily sensitive areas.

In terms of the imperial centralization policy vis-à-vis the American missionaries, it is important to recognize some of the unanticipated consequences of the new administrative strategy. Whereas two missionary schools, namely Robert College and the American College of Medicine in Beirut, enjoyed a favoured status with a relaxation of the strict licensing procedures and without any tax obligations,[7] the rest were ordered to re-register all their institutions with the government under a single agency, the American Board[8]—and although this order intended to keep the missionary institutions under control, the cases we examine reveal that this development sometimes ended up working to the advantage of the missionaries.

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[6] Much scholarship tends to neglect the government policy of taxation, and especially the licensing of non-governmental institutions such as missionary schools. Exceptions include Metin M Coşgel, "Efficiency and Continuity in Public Finance: The Ottoman System of Taxation," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 37, no. 4 (November 2005): pp. 567-586; Stanford J. Shaw, "The Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 6, no. 4, (October 1975): pp. 421-459; *Linda T. Darling, Revenue-raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660* (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1996). For an overview of Ottoman economy, see Mehmet Genç, "19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İktisadî Dünya Görüşünün Klâsik Prensiplerindeki Değişmeler [Discontinuities in traditional principles of Ottoman macro-economy during the the nineteenth century]," in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (State and economy in the Ottoman Empire) (İstanbul: Ötüken, 2003), pp. 87-96 [its English version is titled, "The Principle of Ottoman's Economical World View," *Sosyoloji Dergisi* [Journal of sociology] vol.3, no.1 (1988-1989): 175-185.

[7] Carl Marx Kortepeter, "American Liberalism Establishes Bases: Robert College and the American University of Beirut," *Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization* vol. 1 (1980): 22-37. The missionary colleges that received special treatment from the imperial bureaucrats will be examined later.

[8] For a social history of the American Board missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, see Emrah Sahin, *Errand into the East: A Social History of American Missionaries in Istanbul, 1830-1900* (Köln: Lambert, 2009).

It is also important to note that, in some cases, the central government and the missionaries differed as to their basic classifications of social work; the missionaries regarded education and charity as two inextricably linked fields of activity, whereas the government saw them as two separate sectors of community service. Differences of opinion would sometimes prevail on the symbolic value of the tools and equipments employed by the missionaries. For instance, the missionaries thought that the ringing of bells merely called students to classes and were of no other significance, while the central government regarded them as Christian religious symbols. Such conflicting views represent valuable insights into both parties' perception of each other, and help us better understand the dynamics of their mutual interaction.

While various domestic and international factors influenced the central government's perspective on given issues, this chapter argues that the policies of the central government regarding the legal status of missionary institutions in the Empire were not set in stone, but were subject to change depending on specific agents and incidents. The following analysis will outline the ways in which the central government interacted with the missionaries, provincial authorities, and local communities, on the basis of missionary establishments in local contexts.

Regulating the Faith through Licensing

The *fin-de-siècle* Ottoman government reformed its legislation and promulgated a set of new laws pertaining to the missionary institutions in the Empire. In the late nineteenth century, increasing missionary involvement in particular

regions, and local reactions to it, were compounded by widespread ethnic disturbances and financial crises.[9] It would thus be useful to examine the laws and regulations that went into effect during this period in an effort to contextualize the central government's approach to the missionary institutions in terms of licensing and regulation.

Early in the 1890s, several provincial governors drew the attention of the central government to a missionary practice that had been in effect for a decade. Their reports indicated that American missionaries in the provinces were in the habit of buying properties, particularly large and commodious buildings, and turning them into schools or churches without prior consent.[10] In response, the central government designated the Council of Ministers as the sole authority capable of ruling on the legality of such practices, tasking them with curbing illegal missionary activities, and bringing provincial governors under imperial authority on the issue.[11] An imperial decree sent by the Sublime

[9] Donald Quataert, "Islahatlar Devri (the Age of Reforms), 1812-1914," pp. 885-1051. For political and economic problems during the Hamidian Era (1876-1909), the Public Debt Administration, and relations between the central government and provincial authorities, see Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey] (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 2000), II: 217-329. Göçek notes that ethnic segmentation stemmed from "differential economic and social resource accumulation of social groups. In the Ottoman case, the religious differentiation between Muslims and non-Muslims created an ethnic segmentation… This segmentation was polarized in the nineteenth century." Fatma Müge Göçek, "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth Century Ottoman Society," *Poetics Today* vol. 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1993): 507-538. Also see the *fin-de-siècle* fiscal crisis, in Şevket Pamuk, "The Ottoman Empire in 'the Great Depression' of 1873-1896," *The Journal of Economic History* vol. 44, no. 1 (March 1984): 107-118; the debts the Ottoman government made during the Crimean War (1854), in Charles Morawitz, "The Public Debt of Turkey," *The North American Review* vol. 175, no. 549 (August 1902): 275-288.

[10] Y Prk Um 23/69, 27 Ca 1309 [Archival sources of this type are in the Ottoman Archives Division of the Prime Minister's Office, İstanbul, Turkey].

[11] Most of the cases in this chapter involve the Special Council of Ministers (*Meclîs-i Mahsûs-i Vükelâ*). The bureaucrats in the Sublime Porte and other departments discussed on the provincial reports relating to missionary expansion and the Council of Ministers turned the outcome of their discussion into proposals that would be laws after being approved by the

Porte (*Bâb-ı Âli*), with the approval of the council, commanded provincial governors to require all missionaries in their jurisdictions to sign a binding document promising not to convert their residential buildings into schools or churches without the consent of the imperial authorities.[12] The Porte was adamant about the application of this decree. The provincial governors were ordered to observe it on pain of "dismissal, imprisonment, and/or another appropriate punishment."[13]

A document available from the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs provides an insight into why the central government was so frustrated with the status quo; missionaries continued to buy properties and turn them into missionary institutions—usually with at least a tacit nod from their provincial governors, who were demonstrating a clear negligence of imperial law. In 1893, the central government denied a request by American missionaries to continue running their school in Harput. Behind the government's ire was that the provincial governor had already permitted the missionaries first to construct this school and then to continue running it without first checking with İstanbul.[14] The central government was determined to put an end to the practice of opening a school with mere provincial consent or a municipal permit from a local authority. The rationale was twofold: to assert the writ of the central

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Sultan. In general, many bureaucrats from various departments collaborated in order to formulate imperial policies concerning the licensing of missionary institutions. For other aspects of intra-departmental collaboration, see the dissertation chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure."

[12] For more on the Sublime Porte, see the chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," footnote 17.

[13] Dh Mkt 2004/29, 27 S 1310.

[14] Dh Mkt 2038/76, 14 C 1310. The Governor of Harput contacted the Sublime Porte on missionaries' petition for renewing the license of Boys' and Girls' College, which opened "thirty years ago." Apparently, he was unaware of new regulations that required contacting the Council, not the Porte. Dh Mkt 1844/82, 20 Za 1308.

government as part of the centralization policies, and to dampen local strife that left provincial governors susceptible to accusations of siding with the missionaries. Evidently during the last decade of the nineteenth century the government moved from being a distant bureaucratic agency collecting local reports, to being a strong-arm asserting its control over matters that were traditionally in the domain of provincial administrations.[15]

Given the rise in American missionary activity and the increasingly tense circumstances prevailing in Ottoman lands, the central government came up with an amendment to the 1892 Regulations. Dated 18 December 1893, the amendment required that the American missionaries seek approval for their institutions from the Council of Ministers as well as an imperial decree.[16] With this modification, the council sought to bring the provincial authorities firmly under its control.[17] In one typical instance, a municipal administration asked the council to shut down the Protestant College in Gedikpaşa, İstanbul because it had neither the decree nor the Council's approval.[18] The council ordered the municipal administrator "to wait" for a decision until the ministers had

[15] Donald Quataert, "Islahatlar Devri (the Age of Reforms), 1812-1914," pp. 885-1051.
[16] The imperial bureaucrats instructed the concerned parties that they had to be consulted when establishing "charity institutions" (*müessesât-ı hayriyye*). See, for example, general instructions sent to the U.S. Embassy, in Dh Mkt 183/48, 10 C 1311.
[17] Findley presents a more complicated structure for the nomenclature of the Ottoman administrative units. Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), especially pp. 41-68. This chapter finds it convenient to study the central government, provincial and municipal administrations as the main units of governance in the Ottoman Empire. The imperial authority belonged to the bureaucrats in İstanbul; local authorities administered laws and regulations in the provinces and municipalities, i.e. designated parts of the cities. Smaller administrative units, such as sanjaks or judgeships, were the subdivisions of provinces. The chapter does not examine but mentions them in specific context.
[18] Marden, a missionary who had worked at the Protestant College, wrote about her experience and students. See, for example, Etta Doane Marden, *Jubilation at Gedik Pasha* (Boston, 1914); *Gedik Pasha: Its Needs and Opportunities* (Boston: Woman's Board of Missions, n.d.); *The American School at Gedik Pasha, Constantinople* (Detached from Missionary Herald, 1933) [Andover Theological Library].

"discussed the matter." These ministers looked to find a permanent solution to the local problems surrounding the issue, and discussions on the status of the missionary school took about two weeks. Perhaps in part a reaction to provincial governors' generally alarmist approach to missionary activity, and in part having fully informed themselves of this particular Protestant College in Gedikpaşa, the central government did not shut it down but rather recommended its board members apply for a decree of permission and certificate of approval to continue operating.[19]

The new regulations and associate responsibilities brought feverish activity to the government headquarters in the capital as the Council of Ministers now had to assume control over issues that were previously dealt with at the provincial and even municipal level. From the 1890s to the 1910s, the council gave provincial authorities specific, strict orders to investigate and report—but never to intervene in—unlicensed missionary institutions in their regions. On 26 May 1901, the Governor of Halep was asked to investigate the American missionaries who had opened an unlicensed school for girls in his region.[20] A year later on 4 April 1902, another governor was asked to investigate the status of two unlicensed colleges in Tarsus, Mersin.[21] The council discussed the matter based on these local investigations and gave

[19] After the 1890s, the imperial bureaucrats became more occupied with the issues relating to the licensing of missionary institutions. The order for a local governor to patiently "wait and then apply" bureaucrats' decision in one case, in Dh Mkt 123/26, 20 Ra 1311. In another case, Krigor Effendi requsted permission to renovate a missionary school a month after the bureaucrats in the capital had begun discussing the legal status of this school. Krigor's rather hasty petition suggests that he was not concerned with renovation but wanted to have an idea of what bureaucrats might be thinking of the school. Dh Mkt 149/14, 2 R 1311.
[20] Dh Mkt 2489/123, 8 S 1319.
[21] These colleges are functioning as Tarsus American College today. "Tarsus American College," online.

general instructions to be followed across the land. Both colleges in Tarsus were temporarily closed (one later reopened), and the government asked for further investigations and a report. Since the new regulations counted all schools in the Empire as "Ottoman," rather than differentiating between American or foreign schools, the government specifically decreed, on 4 April 1902, that the governorship of Mersin did not have the authority to close the schools, but that it should keep the American consulate from interfering on behalf of American missionaries who had founded these colleges.[22]

On 2 December 1906, the American College at Tarsus came to the attention of central government officials once again. This time, the board of the college had begun the construction of additional buildings to their school complex without the approval of the appropriate authorities. The latter's concern was less the unlicensed construction, which had already been underway, than the fact that the construction site was too close to the imperial ammunition store located in the region. For this reason the government—bypassing its own ruling that new schools lay outside municipal jurisdiction—ordered the municipal governor to suspend the construction.[23] Concerned with security and sensitive to strategically important locations like this military base, the central government followed the same procedure on another occasion when, on 5 April 1908, it pushed the Governor of Haçin in Sivas to prevent the construction of a missionary school in his region simply because the

[22] Dh Mkt 469/69, 26 Z 1319.
[23] Dh Mkt 1131/82, 16 L 1324.

construction site was too close to the local military headquarters.[24] Furthermore, they were forbidden from building anywhere remotely near to the sacred spaces to which local communities were emotionally attached. Concerned with local sensitivities and the possibility of disruptions to law and order, the central government had taken this step sometime earlier in the decade.[25] In one case dated 23 August 1903, an American archaeologist by the name of Edgar was informed by government agency that he "could not make any excavations" in Divaniye, a province south of Baghdad, because "it was a sacred site."[26]

On 16 August 1915, the Council of Ministers wrote back to the municipal administrator in Bebek, İstanbul, who had asked for a pronouncement on the status of "unlicensed buildings added to the Robert College" complex. The council told him that no penalty was to be imposed even though the building license of the school was considered void according to "the New Construction Law (*Ebniye Kânunu*)." [27] Most missionary schools did not get special treatment from the central government except the few such as Robert College.

Demonstrated in the following two cases, provincial authorities had largely fallen in line with the new imperial policy. In 1905, George E. Post M.D., the director of the American Hospital in Beirut, applied to purchase a

[24] İ Hus 165/1326 Ra-13, 4 Ra 1326.
[25] Zeynep Çelik, *Empire, Architecture, and the City: French-Ottoman Encounters, 1830-1914* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), pp. 24-70; Aptullah Kuran, "A Spatial Study of Three Ottoman Capitals: Bursa, Edirne, and Istanbul," *Muqarnas* vol. 13 (1996): 114-131; Robert Ousterhout, "Ethnic Identity and Cultural Appropriation in Early Ottoman Architecture," *Muqarnas* vol. 12 (1995): 48-62.
[26] İ Hr 385/1321 Ca-27, 30 Ca 1321.
[27] The details of this case and the New Construction Law, in Dh Um Mvm 106/7, 6 L 1333.

property in the city; the Governor of Beirut notified the central government that Dr. Post had "promised and pledged" not to build a school or church on the open space attached to his house.[28] The government affirmed that it would recognize his property transaction as the procedures seemed "to be in order."[29] Six years later, William David, M.D., a missionary in Konya, was also allowed to buy a strip of land in that city on condition that it would only be used for personal needs.[30]

Consequently, the government dispatched to provincial administrations an executive order: "not to fall back on the old ways of letting missionaries open schools" without permission. This executive order, which had precedents in earlier cases, aimed to regulate the status of missionary establishments under the supreme authority of Sultan Abdulhamid II and his central government. In practice, no American missionary could open any new school in the Ottoman domain without an imperial decree.[31] The provincial governors had to understand and comply with the new regulation, and the governorship of Harput did just that.[32]

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[28] George E. Post founded the Department of Surgery at the American University of Beirut after he served some years as the "the head professor" at the Syrian Protestant College. He died in Beirut, September 1909. For Post's biography and obituary, see "Dr. George E. Post Dead.; Decorated for His Work in Missionary and Medical Fields," *New York Times*, 1 October 1909, p. 9.

[29] Dh Mkt 1033/11, 20 L 1323.

[30] Dh İd 43-2 27, 16 L 1329.

[31] This regulation aimed to control the expansion of missionary institutions in the provinces. In the long run, it affected all foreign schools. The order stipulated that "No foreigner... can set up schools without an Imperial Decree (*İrâde-i Seniyye*)," Dh İd 43-2 27, 16 L 1329.

[32] The Harput Governor admitted that the missionaries had opened a school in his region without following the procedures, including the approval of the central government and the issuance of a license-to-operate. He knew the answer but still asked whether to exempt the school from taxes. Dh Mkt 2061/70, 22 Ş 1310. The capital reminded the governor that any school would be "tax-free" only if approved, licensed, and recognized. The Ministry of Internal Affairs noted that "taxes... could be imposed on profit-generating institutions." Dh Mkt 249/5, 16 Z 1311.

New Vigilance and Missionary Institutions

Having developed a centralized policy regarding the missionaries, the central government issued new corresponding regulations. These regulations focused on the legal status of the missionary institutions, the nature of missionary work, and the "identity symbols" used in these institutions. From the 1890s onward, the American missionaries had reasons to feel constrained as the central government would not allow them to open new institutions or distribute charity to local residents without the consent of the Council of Ministers.[33] In addition, the government became very vigilant in preventing Muslim students from enrolling in missionary schools, and in regulating the symbols displayed in these schools.[34] For instance, the missionaries were forbidden from flying the American flag over their schools as this was considered seditious. In missionary schools, church bells, large crucifixes, and flags could not be prominently displayed, the government proclaimed.[35]

In principle, the *fin-de-siècle* imperial policy promoted a powerful central government backed by its provincial agencies to control the missionary institutions. However this policy did not always work as formulated in the face of complex situations on the ground. A significant reality was that the

[33] "No foreign school can be opened without a license," in Dh Mkt 2183/97, 17 Za 1316; Dh İd 43-2 27, 16 L 1329; "American missionaries cannot distribute donations," in A Mkt Mhm 536/14, 14 Ş 1313.
[34] "Prevent Ottoman students from registering and studying," in A Mkt Mhm 615/9, 30 S 1324; "No school can have American flags," in Dh Mkt 2183/97, 17 Za 1316. It is interesting to note that, at the same time, the Ottoman government provided fellowships for local students, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, to go and study in Europe, especially in Paris. Adnan Şişman, "Egyptian and Armenian Schools Where the Ottoman Students Studied in Paris," in Colin Imber and Keiko Kiyotaki eds., *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), II: pp.157-163.
[35] Dh Mkt 2183/97, 17 Za 1316; "prevent missionary expansion where Nestorians live,," in A Mkt Mhm 613/14, 29 Ca 1313.

missionary institutions were simply too numerous and too widely dispersed across the Empire. Cognizant of this, the central government wanted to make a fresh start in the next decade by promulgating another set of regulations aimed once again at regulating the missionary institutions.[36] These new laws required that all missionary institutions had to renew their licenses with the government. An incentive was also offered: "those institutions that did go through the process were to be allowed to maintain their tax-free status."[37]

As for the missionaries themselves, previously existing laws remained in effect. Their identification and professions, as well as their current legal status, had to be reported to the government on a regular basis. They could be dismissed from their professions if their identification or diplomas proved inauthentic, as in the case of a Dr. Rinos, whose diploma sent by the British embassy proved not to be original. At the same time, certain restrictions still applied in unison with the existing laws and practices. On 15 December 1904, a certain Elizabeth and her colleague, both U.S. licensed doctors on their way to work in Haçin, Sivas, were not granted work permits as the government had taken into consideration the existing law that women could not be medical practitioners.[38]

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[36] "American missionaries have to re-register their institutions if they want to enjoy tax exemptions," in Dh Mui 26-3/17, 28 L 1328.
[37] Dh Mui 26-3/17, 28 L 1328. The Ottoman government granted tax-exemption to the missionaries if they had no criminal record and their property had been registered. In one case, the Municipal Governor of Bitola taxed missionaries on their school property. He must have been confused with changes in regulations. For example, on 5 February 1910, the central government changed previous policy of taxation and announced that, as non-profit establishments, "all missionary institutions are now exempt from taxes except orphanages and during construction. Dh Mui 54/1, 25 M 1328.
[38] Dh Mkt 914/46, 8 L 1322.

As mentioned, one major problem the central government faced from the 1890s onwards was that the American missionaries began to use their residential buildings as schools or places of worship. Although the government had by then obtained comprehensive data on missionaries and their activities, the case load consequently swelled to near unmanageable levels as more and more incidents occurred and became increasingly difficult to resolve based on available laws and regulations.

On 21 June 1892, Parsen, an ordained bishop affiliated with the American Board, applied to the local government to approve and license the building he had recently established in Burdur. The government effectively ordered provincial authorities to observe the law and approve the request as it was understood that the building would be residential and would not be used for missionary activities.[39] On 6 July 1895, Ateşli, another missionary bishop, applied for and obtained official permission and approval to build a house on the land he had bought in Musul.[40]

Records suggest that the central government was open to granting permission for the housing needs of the missionaries. However it allied with local authorities and reacted strongly when such houses were employed for non-residential purposes. For this reason—whereas the residences of Parsen and Ateşli, as mentioned, received approval from the government—an apartment built by an American missionary and registered as "a residence" on state records in Beylan, Halep, drew the ire of the government. A report from

[39] Dh Mkt 1964/45, 26 Za 1309.
[40] Dh Mkt 394/19, 14 M 1313.

the Governorship of Halep revealed that several rooms of this house were being used for "schooling purposes."[41] Furthermore, the imperial agents did not protest when the Beylan Municipality eventually closed down the missionary residence, which they referred to simply as "a school." When the American embassy and local church officials later applied to reopen it, the central government maintained its stance on its "illegality," and observed that the missionaries were in total "violation of the law of the land."[42]

The 1892 regulations, which required the consent of the government for each missionary school and an official pledge by missionaries not to turn private houses into churches or schools, stayed in effect for a long time. On 30 October 1896, the central government chose not to license the American Protestant College of Harput due to the fact that this college was notorious for "brainwashing" students studying there. When its school complex burned down and the Board applied to rent a new building, the government in concert with the views of the provincial administration denied permission.[43] On 19 August 1898, the Governorship of Salonika reported to the central government that the Reverend E. B. Haskell, an American missionary, had applied to change the

[41] Dh Mkt 267/58, 29 M 1312.
[42] Dh Mkt 291/62, 6 R 1312.
[43] "License not granted to the American Protestant College of Harput," in A Mkt Mhm 659/9, 24 Ca 1314. This source also indicates the reasons why the imperial bureaucrats prevented local students from attending missionary colleges. While many bureaucrats considered missionary institutions as a motive behind local unrest, some also thought, especially during the 1890s, that missionaries were cloistering non-Muslim youth, turning them into leading actors in local rebellion against the authority and other communities. It is also interesting to note that the graduates of missionary colleges wrote to the capital for assistance on various occasions. For example, Seragi Cürüboğlu and Prodermas Teolisi, graduates of the American College in Beirut, contacted the Ministry of Internal Affairs after losing their their diplomas during local incidents, and requested the imperial bureaucrats to help on this matter. Dh İd 48-1/8, 22 N 1329.

status of a house he had recently purchased.[44] After the government requested local officials to work on the status change "in conformity with the law," the local administration took due consideration of the fact that Haskell intended to turn his house over to the Church Board. Therefore, it cancelled his application based on the requirement that "registration and approval" were "subject to the condition of not turning the house into a church" or school.[45]

The central government asked for the observance of the due process of law from provincial administrations as applications from American missionaries to open or reopen institutions kept streaming in. Thus the Ohio Missionary Society, a sister missionary organization to the American Board and newly arrived in the Ottoman Empire, asked the government on 2 February 1893 to let them reopen their church in Maraş.[46] Similarly, William S. Dodd, an American missionary doctor, applied on 7 November 1898 to open a general hospital in Talas, Kayseri, while later on 21 October 1905, Mary Garbis, an American Board missionary in Konya, made an official application to open a girls' college in that city.[47] In reply to these three and many other applications, the government made it clear both to the applicants and the provincial authorities that the procedures had to comply fully with the concerned laws.

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[44] Dh Mkt 2093/60, 2 R 1316.
[45] Dh Mkt 2112/79, 17 Ca 1316.
[46] The request from the Ohio Missionary Society to the the Maraş District Governor (*Mutasarrıf Paşa*), in Hr Sys 72/37, 2 February 1893.
[47] William S. "Dodd wants to open a hospital" in Dh Mkt 2130/43, 23 C 1316; "Letter from William S. Dodd to Friends," Talas (Kayseri), 10 April 1905, pp. 827-829 [16.9.7., *Eastern Turkey Mission* vol.18, *ABC 16: The Near East 1817-1919*, reel 703; Bilkent Library]. "Mary Garbis wants to open a girls' college in Konya," in A Mkt Mhm 549/36, 22 Ş 1323; for Garbis also see Charles N. Mahjoubian, *Garbis to America: Fifteen Years in Konya (Holy City of Turkish Islam) and One Year in Greece during the Years of the Armenian Genocide* (Southeastern, Pennysilvania: by the Author, 1995).

Permission was not granted in most cases, as they did not meet legal standards.[48]

Many reports, petitions, and letters changed hands between the central government, provincial authorities, and local residents. This correspondence manifests a remarkable policy change from the 1890s onward: while provincial authorities previously had the authority to deal with the missionaries, the central government proclaimed that all decisions concerning the missionaries, and their activities and institutions, would thenceforth be made by the government itself. Local administrations and residents would keep submitting reports and petitions, but the government had a nuanced interpretation of these, not always acting in favour of its local authorities and subjects. In the long run, the growth of missionary-related incidents, evidenced through reports and letters, caused the central government to assume sole authority. The enormous scope of legal and illegal missionary activities also made it imperative to reform its old practices and to grapple with the challenges these activities posed. Licensing missionary enterprises provided the government with a litmus test on the viability of its new schemes and strategy.[49]

Early in the 1880s, the central government nearly always allowed American missionaries to establish and register their institutions, even if the institutions in question had been opened without official permission. When the local administration reported on a missionary school that had been established

[48] "Imperial directives to be executed by provincial authorities," in Dh Mkt 2264/119, 27 C 1317.

[49] New regulations concerning the licensing of missionary institutions affected other fields of missionary activity as well. See, for example, the dissertation chapter, "Controlling Missionary Publications."

in Mezra, Harput on land bought by an American bishop, the government merely ordered the provincial Governor of Harput on 28 May 1884 to issue a proper license for the school as it primarily "appealed to the Protestant residents in the region."[50]

Although the imperial bureaucrats often took a benevolent attitude to charitable works regardless of who carried them out, they were vigilant nonetheless. By the 1880s, the central government—faced with a rising tide of local complaints—developed a new policy whereby missionary institutions were allowed to function but were prevented from expanding. On 22 January 1889, the teachers of the American College in Rumelia requested permission to build dwellings and clear some land to build a garden-yard for the physical-education of students.[51] "They can build," the government responded, but only "within the boundaries of the college."[52] The College Board, having complied with the rules set by the government by constructing the dwellings and the yard on "school property," duly received relevant licenses.[53] However, imperial records clearly noted that the renovations of missionary institutions had to be restricted to their original foundations. Thus the American College in Rumelia and other missionary institutions that applied for outer expansion were denied permission.

The increasing vigilance of the government agency did not translate into a hostile stance towards the missionaries themselves; their institutions were

[50] İ Mms 78/3413, 3 Ş 1301.
[51] Dh Mkt 1586/71, 20 Ca 1306.
[52] Dh Mkt 1627/117, 12 L 1306.
[53] "Residential houses for college faculty and staff," in Dh Mkt 1602/18, 4 B 1306; "the licensing of dwellings established on school property," in Dh Mkt 1679/48, 11 R 1307; "school yards," in Dh Mkt 1699/73, 25 C 1307.

allowed to open and function once the legal requirements had been met. In the late nineteenth century, provincial administrations asked the central government how to proceed on the status of missionary establishments in Beylan-Halep, Harput, Merzifon-Amasya, and Sungurlu-Çorum. Since their reports did not include solid enough evidence to reject the applications, the government acknowledged the legal status of all the missionary institutions therein. A school and church located in Beylan were issued licenses on 10 October 1894.[54] The missionary school in Harput had opened thanks to a temporary license issued "presumptuously" by the municipal governor, and eventually the government also accredited its legitimacy. On 19 June 1894, the government refrained from punishing the school by indefinitely removing its tax-free status, and instead forced it to obtain its license as soon as possible if it wished to remain tax-free.[55]

An imperial license was granted to the American College in Merzifon on 17 April 1895 and to the Protestant School established in place of a thirty-six year-old church in Sungurlu on 26 February 1899.[56] All the missionary schools and churches from Beylan to Sungurlu had opened on properties owned previously by either missionaries themselves or local religious and minority communities. Here, a question arises: did the central government allow and approve missionary establishments in newly purchased lands after the 1890s?

[54] A Mkt Mhm 704/04, 10 R 1312.
[55] Missionary institutions first had to have a license and then could be exempted from taxes. A Mkt Mhm 700/12, 28 Za 1311. They generally received tax-free status after meeting the license requirement. See, for example, the missionary schools in Harput, in Dh Mkt 249/5, 16 Z 1311.
[56] A Mkt Mhm 701/24, 22 L 1312; the government allowed an old church, which the missioanaries had established in Sungurlu in 1863, to "turn into a Protestant College, in Dh Mkt 2171/52, 16 L 1316.

The answer would be a qualified no. The government, the records show, pursued a policy of containment toward the missionaries, confining their zone of activity to where they were already operating. This amounted to deliberately curbing missionary growth in the land.[57]

It was the central government that missionary schools applied to renovate and expand their buildings. The American College in Harput, having sustained extensive damage from a fire, requested permission to renovate its buildings on 6 December 1899. Robert College in İstanbul also applied to expand its boundaries, to better serve a growing number of students, on 15 August 1900. The American College of Medicine in Beirut asked to open a new department on 1 October 1904, and others followed suit.[58] In keeping with its approach in issuing licenses, the government permitted these missionary institutions to survive, renovate, and conduct maintenance, but not to undertake further expansion.

Three months after its application, the American College in Harput received official permission for repairs and dormitory construction on the condition that "the new buildings will not function as classrooms."[59] The license issued for repairs specifically stated that the school was to undertake "no expansion beyond the original foundations."[60] Furthermore, the

[57] Also see below the granting and denying of licenses.
[58] "College in Harput," in Mv 98-2/80, 3 Ş 1317; "Robert College in Rumelihisarı," in Dh Mkt 2390/17, 19 R 1318; "American College of Medicine requests permission to open the Hospital of Obstetrics and Gynaecology," in Dh Mkt 895/18, 22 B 1322.
[59] Dh Mkt 2313/116, 3 Za 1317.
[60] Dh Mkt 2343/42, 10 M 1318.

construction stages of repairs had "to comply with the conditions stated in the imperial decree."[61]

While Robert College received immediate permission to expand its buildings within the existing boundaries of its campus on 15 August 1900, the College Board applied to double check its license for expansion, and asked whether they could use gunpowder to clear the land six years later on 3 August 1906.[62] While the central government had declined the expansion request of the college in Harput in part because the region was remote and on account of local ethnic tensions, it readily gave permission to Robert College to expand and even use explosives, which was an extraordinary concession.[63]

Robert College tended to receive a privileged treatment from the central government because it was "special."[64] Robert College's reputation and good image in the eyes of imperial authorities played a significant role in helping it obtain what it had requested.[65] A 1903 report from the Ministry of Education, which had surveyed all the foreign schools in the Ottoman Empire, begins with an analysis of Robert College. Established in Rumelihisarı in 1863, Robert College was given an imperial charter to provide primary, secondary, and

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[61] Dh Mtk 31/57, 28 Ca 1318.
[62] Dh Mui 26-1/1, 13 C 1324.
[63] Dh Mui 73-2/19, 10 C 1328.
[64] Carl Marx Kortepeter, "American Liberalism Establishes Bases: Robert College and the American University of Beirut," pp. 22-37; Keith M. Greenwood, *Robert College: the American Founders* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2000); John Freely, *A History of Robert College: the American College for Girls, and Boğaziçi University* (İstanbul: YKY, 2000); Emrah Sahin, *Errand into the East: A Social History of American Missionaries in İstanbul, 1830-1900*, pp. 66-68.
[65] Robert College "has acquired a worldwide reputation as a model American Christian College… The People of the East have manifested their confidence… [and] all the Christian churches of the East are in sympathy with it." "Letter from George to his wife Henrietta," New York, 28 January 1890, in *Papers of Cyrus Hamlin and George Washburn* [73 letters to Henrietta H. Washburn, 1863-1910, n.d., letters 69- 73; Houghton Library].

higher levels of education. In the year that the report was written there were 320 boys enrolled as boarders, the majority being American, British or Romanian citizens. Unusually sympathetic, the report acknowledges its thirty-two teachers, and declares Robert College to be an "outstanding" institution.[66]

The American College of Medicine in Beirut was another missionary institution that had earned itself a good reputation. This college was also looked kindly upon by the imperial authorities.[67] Like Robert College, it received immediate official permission to launch its project of establishing a hospital of obstetrics and gynaecology in Beirut in 1904.[68] As in the cases of Robert College and the American College of Medicine in Beirut, colleges for boys and girls in Adana, Antep, Kayseri, Mardin, and Van, as well as several other missionary colleges across the land were granted special permission to build physical extensions and undertake renovations.[69] Occasionally then, the reputation of a school and its administration, regional circumstances, and the function of the proposed maintenance or renovation project overrode the imperial policy of restricting the growth of missionary institutions in the provinces.

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[66] Y Prk Mhm 4/66, 27 Z 1320. George Washburn, the President of Robert College, published his memoirs. See George Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople and Recollections of Robert College* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909).

[67] This college maintained its reputation for years to come. Hamdan, graduate of nursing, "certainly hope[s] that we [the class of '48] will not only follow the footsteps of our predecessors, but also do our part in making the future of the nursing profession what it can and should be." Wadad Hamdan and Nuha Hitti, "Glimpses into Student Life at the American University of Beirut," *The American Journal of Nursing* vol. 49, no. 9 (September 1949): 605-606, especially p. 606.

[68] Dh Mkt 895/18, 22 B 1322.

[69] Another building "permitted to be built in the school yard in the Kasap Bekir Quarter, Adana," in Dh Mui 127/16, 29 Ş 1328; "Antep," in Dh Mkt 964/9, 27 Ra 1323; "Kayseri," in Dh Mui 9-2/6, 28 Ş 1327; "Mardin," in Dh İd 117/5, 24 N 1328; "Van," in Dh İd 117/2, 2 N 1328.

In spite of these permissions however, the government wanted to hold the missionary institutions in check. Reflecting its general policy of containing the missionaries, the central government confined their areas of expansion within the existing boundaries of their establishments. In addition, it encouraged local administrations to buy lands and provide funds to construct "Ottoman Muslim schools in their vicinity."[70] Rather than take an absolute stance against the missionaries, the central government's bureaucrats must have thought that they could better challenge and counterbalance the missionary effect by these moderate initiatives.[71]

The unlicensed institutions opened by American missionaries abounded across the Empire toward the 1910s, and the central government decided to reconsider the legal status of a few of them. Strikingly, these few institutions, which were given a second chance to legally survive, were located in densely populated areas where the missionary presence dated back many decades. For instance, the government allowed Robert College in İstanbul to renovate, American College in Harput to apply for a licence and get an imperial decree, and American Protestant College in Kayseri to be established. In these cases, the colleges' reputation, the strength of their applications, and diplomatic connections played significant roles in determining their fate.[72]

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[70] For an analysis of the Ottoman government's "immediate plan" to "combat" missionary institutions by reopening the Imperial School (*Mekteb-i Sultânî*) in Beirut, see Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and the Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 51-58.

[71] The imperial bureaucrats ordered the Kayseri Governor to to buy a strip of land from an American missionary named White and establish a state school on this land. They wanted the provincial treasury to pay for the costs. İ Hus 142/1324 R-01, 2 R 1324.

[72] American missionary Henry bought a house and turned it into a seminary. Dh Mkt 1924/59, 21 B 1309. After the local authorities in Harput closed an unlicensed missionary school, the

While the central government tolerated a few American missionary institutions, like Robert College and the American College in Beirut, many others were denied the benevolence of the government when they needed it most. On 28 November 1893, the government sent a strict note to the provincial administration that the establishment of a school or schools in downtown Konya by the Principle of American High School in Tarsus was "unacceptable" and "had to be deterred." The government further reminded local agents of its power by playing its *license* card. "No licence," it harked, could "be issued in absence of a decree (*irâde*)" issued from İstanbul.[73]

Governmental judiciousness in licensing the missionary institutions heightened in the 1900s. In line with its broader containment policies toward the missionaries, the government rejected the applications of the missionaries to construct and open new schools in the land. While the imperial authorities ordered the Governorship of Kayseri, on 14 April 1906, to "prevent the construction of a larger building" in the body of Talas American College, they ordered, on 3 April 1906, the provincial government to prevent Edward B. Haskell, an American missionary at Salonika, "from building a college of industry and agriculture" on the land he had bought and registered under his name. Government's negative response to the missionary agenda to open and

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bureaucrats in the capital reminded these authorities that the school "could be reopened only after the issuance of a licence-to-operate." Finally on 1 June 1894, the school obtained the license; the central government acknowledged its status and granted it a tax-exemption. A Mkt Mhm 700/12, 28 Za 1311. "The permission to re-erect the destroyed parts of the American College in Kayseri," in İ Hr 418/1327 B-17, 20 B 1327. For the protection of missionary property, also see the dissertation chapter, "Approaching Individual Missionaries as the Object of Public Security."

[73] İ Dh 1309/1311 Ca-40, 20 Ca 1311.

enlarge their schools suggests that its newly consolidated policy towards them would be exclusive and, more importantly, consistent.[74]

For the American Board, education and social welfare were two inseparable fields. For the central government, they meant two different, and therefore separate, fields of communal activities. Archival records reveal an increasingly cynical trend in the government's approach to the missionary movement. This was evident in official responses to the orphanages, soup houses, and hospitals that had been opened and run by the missionaries. The old charitable institutions of the missionaries would survive, but new ones would not be allowed.

In a note, similar to the one sent to the Governorship of Konya on 28 November 1893, dated 15 November 1897, the central government ordered the provincial governor in Diyarbakır to apply proper procedures in dealing with the unlicensed missionary orphanage in his region.[75] While the government allowed him to let the orphanage survive, it specifically ordered on 12 October 1910 that "Mr. Parker, the director of an orphanage in Haçin, who had several students there" would not be granted permission for a new orphanage in Everek. The government wanted its local branch to "warn him that he would not be allowed" and be subject to strict penalties under law.[76] In addition,

[74] The imperial "order to prevent the construction of missionaries... in Talas (Kayseri), in İ Hus 140/1324 S-076, 20 S 1324; "the land Haskell bought in the Kapıcılar Village in Kelmeriye District," Salonika, and the imperial order "rejecting his proposal" to open a college of industry and agriculture on this land, in Dh Mkt 1065/17, 9 S 1324

[75] A Mkt Mhm 702/24, 20 C 1315.

[76] Dh İd 117/8, 8 L 1328. A year later, the imperial bureaucrats decided that no license would be granted to German missionaries even after they had already established on recently-purchased land such institutions as soup house and school. Thus, the bureaucrats did not single

another orphanage owned by the American Board in Maraş underwent hostile treatment by the government. Based on the fact that the orphanage was registered to the American Board but run *de facto* by British missionaries, the imperial authorities ordered the provincial governor to shut it down.[77]

As well as serving its broader strategy of centralization, the government's effort to create a single organizational structure to contain the missionaries fulfilled a practical purpose.[78] The complexities were often overwhelming when local governors tried dealing with the American Board missionaries in their areas of jurisdiction. Intelligence files and complaints about missionary activities accumulated while the missionaries complained of biased local authorities. In order to establish its authority in the provinces and prevent local disruption, the central government set out, particularly during and after the 1900s, to register all missionary institutions as the property and under the responsibility of the American Board. This constituted a single umbrella that covered nearly all of the American missionary activity in the Empire.

The central government's clearance and re-registration strategy bore some success. By the 1910s, within about a decade, the legal ownership of nearly all missionary institutions, particularly colleges, had been transferred

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out American missionaries; their decisions affected other missionaries as well, regardless of their numbers and activity. Dh İd 123/5, 11 B 1329

[77] Dh Eum 5Şb 12/31, 26 C 1333.

[78] Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 3, no. 3 (July 1972): 243-281; Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire: With Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century," *International Political Science Review* vol. 1, no. 1 (1980): 81-105; Avigdor Levy, "Military Reform and the Problem of Centralization in the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century," *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 18, no. 3 (July 19892): 227-249.

from third parties to the American Board.[79] This landmark change in legislation created a stronger platform allowing the Board to better defend its interests vis-à-vis the government. This was, perhaps, an inadvertent consequence of centralization. Whatever the case, the central government chose a missionary corporate partner as its interlocutor over numerous independent, local, missionary agents.

Due to this policy of registering missionary institutions under the American Board, applications for new licenses, renovations, and extensions began to receive more positive responses from the central government. The Girls' College in the Kasapbekir Quarter in Adana, the International College in İzmir, and other colleges in Kayseri, Maraş, Mardin, and Van, secured the consent of the government to renovate their buildings and attach additional buildings to their school complex.[80] On 21 October 1914, the International College was even granted permission to buy a portion of land in Paradiso, İzmir, which was state property (*mîrî arâzi*), to erect additional buildings to accommodate its rapidly growing number of students.[81]

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[79] See, for example, "the registration to the American Board several colleges in Burdur (Konya)," in İ Hr 421/1328 S-15, 10 S 1328; "Haçin (Sivas)," in İ Hr 422/1328 R-19, 10 R 1328; "Ödemiş (İzmir)," and "the license for construction," in İ Hr 423/1328 B-05; "the church property in Beirut, previously owned by American missionaries William and James," in İ Hr 430/1331M-08, 9 M 1331; "Mount Lebanon," in İ Duit 36/37, 30 Z 1334; "Basra," in İ Mf 15/1328 S-2, 10 S 1328; "missionary colleges, orphanages, and residential houses in Urfa," in İ Hr419/1327 N-06, 7 N 1327; Dh Mui 6-1/12, 23 Ş 1328. In Sayda, Lebanon, the Girls' College and a high-school, previously registered to the Presbyterian Ford Society, were re-registered to the American Board. Dh Mui 76-2/11, 5 Ş 1328; Dh Mui 6-1/13, 23 Ş 1328. In addition, a school in Tripoli—established on the land belonging to the American missionary William Nelson, was registered to the American Board, in İ Hr 431/1331 B 23, 21 B 1331.

[80] "Adana," in İ Mf 16/1328 Sh-11, 15 Ş 1328; "İzmir," in Dh İd 154/15, 2 Z 1332; "Kayseri," in İ Hus 17/1329 R-4, 11 R 1329; "Maraş," and a night-school directed by Mr. Gazil, the principal of the American College, in Dh İd 163/4, 25 Za 1330; "Mardin," in İ Mf 16/1328 N-2, 16 N 1328; "Van," in Dh İd 117/2, 2 N 1328.

[81] Dh İd 154/15, 2 Z 1332.

American missionaries benefited from the Board's umbrella status in cases such as licensing and school extensions. So did the central government, at least in the long run. Up to the 1900s, the government would issue executive orders based on particular cases that were sent down to the provincial authorities for implementation. From the 1900s onward these executive orders, still based on particular cases but with solid precursors set in the 1880s and the 1890s, were also sent to the Board expecting it to ensure compliance from its constituent members. Thus, the government now had more than one agency to carry out its will, local authorities and the Board itself.[82]

Between the years 1911 and 1914, the central government still maintained a consistently cautious approach toward the missionary institutions. For instance, the college boards from Van and the Hamidiye quarter of Beirut asked the government to recognize the legal status of their schools and permit them to renovate their facilities. While a Dr. Atkinson applied to purchase additional lands for his hospital in Harput, and Chambers, a British missionary and principal of the American College in Bahçecik, İzmit, asked to add a building to the school complex.

The response given to the College Board in Van underscored the government's suspicion of activities pursued outside its sphere of knowledge. The government acknowledged the legal status of the school and allowed it to proceed with the renovation, however the school was warned to "comply with

[82] It is important to note that the imperial bureaucrats did not hesitate to use missionary institutions when necessary, especially during World War One. They usually checked with the provincial authorities about the convenience of using these institutions. In one case, a provincial report dated 1 February 1916 suggested renting the American College complex in Kayseri and using it as a hospital to care the veterans. Dh Eum 5Şb 21/13, 27 Ra 1334.

the concerned laws" while renovating its buildings. In addition, the school had to pay the government all its outstanding debt, if any.[83] If these prerequisites were fulfilled, then the central government would allow the missionary schools to continue their activities, effective from 14 June 1911, as in the case of the Protestant College in Beirut.[84]

Oddly, the government's concerns with the missionary movement focused primarily on "the corporate body" of the missionary institutions, rather than on the nature and the content of their activities. Even the 1910s, noted by historians generally as a period of anti-missionary sentiment in the government and of increasing ethnic and communal tension in the provinces, were not marked by any overt acts of hostility towards the missionaries on the part of the Ottoman government.[85] More accurately, the period was marked by a cautious

[83] During the 1900s, the bureaucrats in the capital made a significant change in the imperial policy of taxation. According to new regulations, missionaries had to "pay compulsory taxes" (*rüsûm ve tekâlif*), which provincial authorities would calculate. Dh İd 117/40, 17 C 1329.
[84] Dh İd 117/40, 17 C 1329, the imperial decree issued to "the Protestant College in Beirut," in Dh İd 117/45, 10 L 1329.
[85] In a study of missionary expansion in the Ottoman Arab World, Makdisi notes that it "very much represented the contradiction and struggle between two different and fundamentally antithetical readings of the world. One reflected a determination to refashion the world on evangelical terms… the other, a violent refusal to accept these terms." This being the case, he argues that "for the most part... Ottoman sovereignty ignored the fact that in rural Mount Lebanon, as in many other fringe areas of the empire, the Pact of 'Umar [protecting and tolerating Christians and Jews, i.e. the People of the Book, so long as they paid a poll tax and obeyed the Muslim authority] was honoured mostly in the breach." Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 5, 35. In another study, Şafak argues that American missionary institutions were the symbols of a "modern-day crusade.... the Ottoman Empire was cognizant of the destructive impact of American schools." Therefore, "the Ottoman Empire [authorities] aimed to prevent foreign schools from expanding." Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations] (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003), pp. 172, 188. Also see H. L. Murre Van Den Berg, "The Middle East: Western Missions and Eastern Churches, Islam and Judaism," Sheridan Gilley and Brian Stanley eds., *Cambridge History of World Christianities, c. 1815-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), VIII: 458-472; Fuad Sha'ban, *Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought: Roots of Orientalism in America* (Durham, North Carolina: Thomson Gale, 1991), pp. 83-114.

government showing increased concern regarding missionary activities possibly contributing to communal tensions in the provinces.

By means of addressing the American Board as a single entity, and transmitting to provincial authorities certain directives regulating missionary institutions across the Empire, the central government in fact sought to monitor and control the missionary activities in its domain. In line with this practice, Atkinson and Chambers were permitted to purchase lands on which to build. However like in the cases of schools in Van and Beirut, the government preconditioned its permission on the missionaries observing "the due process of law." For Atkinson, due process meant that the land he had initially bought from Nûmanzâde Konstantin Effendi could be used only as a garden-yard in the service of the patients in his hospital. For Chambers, it meant that he could erect one single building. Among other terms and conditions, he had to ensure that the building would not be used for classrooms. The state agents that would inspect and report on the observance of these laws by Atkinson and Chambers were provincial authorities.[86]

The legal status of missionary colleges in Adana, Kayseri, and Tripoli received government attention as well. Like several other colleges across the land, the college in Adana was opened without imperial permission by a certain Meteni, an American missionary of Ottoman origin. The college in Tripoli had established a four-storey school building although its license limited the establishment to no more than two. In response, the government ordered the

[86] "Atkinson," in Dh İd 117/41, 8 B 1329; "Chambers," in Dh İd 160-2/4, 13 Ca 1331.

Governorship of Tripoli to investigate and not let such illegal actions recur by strictly observing the regulations sent from İstanbul.[87]

The surveillance and closure of unlicensed missionary institutions became the norm from the 1890s onward. However a nuance needs underscoring: the central government, not the provincial administrations, was taking these decisions. For instance, the central government officials sent an angry note to further investigate the reasons for why the legally legitimate and licensed American College in Afyon had been closed by force without first consulting Istanbul. While the reasons were consistent with earlier cases, the provincial administration was explicitly warned not to act independently.[88]

As a matter of fact, arbitrary decisions were being made at local levels, a practice which the central government wanted to stop. In one incident in the early 1890s, the (district) Governor of Burdur suspended construction of a building being undertaken by Bartlett, an American missionary priest registered in state records as a resident of İzmir, which the state had approved.[89] The investigation soon revealed the motive of the Burdur governor. It was not the legitimacy of the construction, but its location. Bartlett had "begun constructing his building on state land (*mîrî arâzi*);" therefore, this governor "cancelled the

[87] A case in which missionaries in Tripoli violated storey-limits set by the central government, in Dh İd 123/18, 18 M 1332.
[88] Dh Mkt 1765/118, 15 S 1308.
[89] Bartlett had official permission to erect a building on the land that he had bought. The permission required that the building be used only for residential purposes. Dh Mkt 1916/93, 28 C 1309. The municipal authorities cancelling a progressing construction after warning from the capital, in Hr Sys 71/59, 8 November 1891.

construction." The concerned law stated that Bartlett had to not only have the license to build but had "to pay the state tax" as well.[90]

For a government alarmed by the growth of missionary activity and concerned with the legal status of the missionary institutions, the decision on the future of Bartlett's building is instructive. Perhaps because the cancellation was ordered not by the central government but by the local governor, the central government ordered that the governor of Burdur should, "for the sake of not making the public suffer, register the buildings built by Bartlett in some area in Burdur and receive the payment of taxes."[91] The government's order nullifying an earlier verdict of a local governor is a typical case in which the former reaffirmed its absolute power over these issues. In this case, Bartlett's buildings were registered to the American Board within two decades, and the imperial authorities approved the transaction.[92]

At least three other major cases of the same kind were reported to the government. Local governors in Beylan (Halep), Sivas, and Tarsus (Adana) shut down or cancelled the ongoing construction of buildings by the American Board missionaries. The church and U.S. embassy applied to reopen the school in Beylan, but the central government ignored their applications with the justification that no foreign agency could intervene in matters as regards to missionary activity and institutions.

The central government was seldom misinformed about the construction of missionary institutions, but it did happen occasionally. Furthermore, the

[90] Dh Mkt 1991/71, 30 M 1310.
[91] Dh Mkt 1996/63, 11 S 1310.
[92] Dh Mui 72/11, 25 S 1328.

government did not always overrule the arbitrary judgments of local governors. In Sivas and the other two cases mentioned above, the local governors seemed to have had an imperial consent to adopt an anti-missionary stance. Out of the three cases, the most critical was the unlicensed construction of a non-Muslim college in Tarsus, Adana. The construction did not have official approval from the authorities, and furthermore it was located too close to the imperial ammunition storage in the region. The Governor-General of Adana telegraphed Istanbul that they had halted the construction. The tacit approval of the government implied its support for the cancellation.[93]

Local Sensitivities

Although the nature of missionary activities was not the major policy concern, they did receive attention, particularly when these activities involved local Muslims or when the provincial authorities acted independently from the central government.[94] As required by the government, the provincial

[93] Missionaries built "a residential house" in Beylan and used some rooms of this house "to teach and preach." See the report from Aleppo to the capital, in Dh Mkt 267/58, 29 M 1312. The local church and the U.S. Embassy requesting the imperial bureaucrats to reopen a missionary residence shut down by local authorities, in Dh Mkt 291/62, 6 R 1312; the request of the bureaucrats in the capital to investigate a case in which local authorities did not monitor the construction in-progress of a missionary school in Adana, in Dh Mkt 339/49, 7 Ş 1312; the construction of a missionary college cancelled because it was not licensed and the construction site was "too close to the imperial ammunition storage," in Dh Mkt 1131/82, 16 L 1324; local reactions to the construction of missionary schools, in Dh Kms 28/26, 30 Za 1332.

[94] During and after the 1890s, the imperial bureaucrats criticized, and in some cases punished, the arbitrary acts of authorities at the provincial level. In general, they did not want to suffer the consequences of future arbitrary actions of these authorities, which happened in previous decades. Then, the bureaucrats targeted local authorities' *actio quod jussu*, i.e. the term that defines this undesired situation. Two cases in which the U.S. officials involved as a result of wrong decisions of local authorities, in A Mkt Mhm 701/24, 22 L 1312; Dh İd 163/8, 6 S 1331. In one case, local authorities closed the American College in Afyon by using "force, despite it having the imperial license-to-operate." See the case and the capital's order (dated 29 September 1890) to investigate the closure of this college in Dh Mkt 1765/118, 15 S 1308. In a similar case in April 1902, local authorities closed two "unlicensed" colleges in Tarsus. One

administrations became more careful over time, sometimes too careful, in consulting with the Council of Ministers in İstanbul. In an earlier example, on 3 December 1887, the local governorship of Adana asked how to deal with the unlicensed American missionary school opened by Dr. Meteni, which apparently had caused a degree of local unrest. Although according to the standard procedures the school had to be closed down if further functioning of the school was "against the local order," the governorship of Adana felt the need to double check with İstanbul.[95]

As examined in the previous chapter, the central government became alarmingly concerned when informed of Muslim students enrolled in missionary colleges.[96] The cases that moved government authorities to swift action resulted from the fact that the missionaries were not, they thought, staying away from Muslim children or respecting the regulations and law of the land. While these authorities left it up to the local administrations to investigate particular cases that involved the missionary movement in provinces, like in the case of Dr. Metini, they set strict rules to be followed when the missionary schools were not licensed and enrolled Muslim students.

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was reopened immediately as the imperial bureaucrats found it to be a state college. According to new regulations, they suggested that this college had to be "Ottoman... because Muslim students were studying there." In a specific note, the bureaucrats ordered local authorities "to not close such schools but not allow the U.S. consul intervene" either. Dh Mkt 469/69, 26 Z 1319. The details of this significant case will be examined in another study.

[95] Dh Mkt 1467/61, 18 Ra 1305. Another source also indicates that Dr. Meteni had opened the mentioned school without license. On 16 July 1897, Meteni, a resident of foreigners' quarter in Adana, passed away. The imperial bureaucrats previously determined that the corpses of Americans who had died within the Ottoman domain would be sent back to the United States. However, his son Ashin buried him in the yard of the American College in Mersin, without checking with the authorities. To his surprise, local authorities brought Ashin to the court as requested by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Dh Mkt 2083/69, 16 S 1315.

[96] Muslim children are "coming away 'denuded of Islamic customs," in Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and the Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, pp. 55-59, 85-86, especially p. 55.

On 29 July 1888, the Governorship of Adana permanently closed the unlicensed college opened by Meteni in the Karataş District. In addition, the local governor arrested a person by the name of David, a local missionary who allegedly "indoctrinated both Muslim and non-Muslim children to Christianity." While the central government had no problems with the missionaries teaching non-Muslim students, the entry of the Muslim children in the report must have touched a raw nerve within the government: it did not request any further evidence or justification for David's imprisonment. Rather, the imperial authorities left it up to the Governor of Adana to proceed, and to proceed "as is expected."[97]

On 3 January 1894, the Governor of Kayseri reported to the central government that an American missionary medical doctor by the name of William Dad had opened an unlicensed hospital in Talas "with fifteen beds," where he performed "unscientific" surgeries. Internal Affairs wanted further details of how improper surgeries were carried out in Dad's house-turned hospital.[98] The central government could not strip Dad of his right to practice his profession, especially "in absence of" details of his "unscientific way of performing surgeries." For this reason, the local, native-born doctors who complained about him were requested to send specific and officially verifiable details on the matter.[99] "The state doctor" in the province responded on behalf of the doctors in Talas, Ankara. Coupled with "the report that came from the

[97] Dh Mkt 1517/56, 20 L 1305; Dh Mkt 1467/61, 18 Ra 1305.
[98] Dh Mkt 161/17, 26 C 1311, document no. 1.
[99] Dh Mkt 161/17, 26 C 1311, document no. 2.

local police headquarters," the following letter gave details on the American missionary doctor's work in the field, with some shocking results.

> Mr. [William] Dad, the representative of the Protestant Community in Talas [Ankara] studied the Medical Sciences in America [the United States] and was obliged to work according to regulations of the Ottoman Association of the Science of Medicine. However, at this moment, he is incompetent and incapable of doing work, as a missionary and as a doctor. Even in the case of medical matters, he is pointlessly cutting and killing the parts of the body of various human beings, which is not a good practice of the science. He is doing so for the benefit of the [missionary] society he was a member of... [This being the case,] he opened a hospital with fifteen-bed capacity... therefore, his above-mentioned act should not be permitted but rather prevented... the absolute decision on the matter belongs to [the Sultan,] who has the Final Say.

The complaints did not end with this letter. [100] One public report revealed that the patients had long waiting times, had to cook their own food, and were charged astronomical sums for the services provided. The patients that were operated on complained that they "had been crippled" by William Dad. [101] Two other reports on him were in the same vein.[102]

The government authorities must not have needed that many details on William Dad and his malpractices. The shocking reports received a strong reaction from the authorities. On top of all the complaints from the local doctors, the governor, and the patients, Dad's hospital was not only unlicensed but also a building big enough to accommodate fifty patients at the same time.

[100] Dh Mkt 161/17, 26 C 1311, document no. 4.
[101] Dh Mkt 161/17, 26 C 1311, document no. 5.
[102] Dh Mkt 161/17, 26 C 1311, documents 6-7.

On 7 July 1902, an imperial directive ordered the local officials to seal Dad's hospital, which they did on 7 July 1902.[103]

The central government was concerned with not only the capacity of the missionary hospitals but about the legal status of their owners and the nature of their missionary work. Upon request, the government had informed its local administration in Van specifically of the law that foreigners—under the law foreigners meant anyone who was not an Ottoman citizen—could not open "privately owned hospitals," or dispensaries. In that regard, the proposal of American citizen Eşir M.D., who was affiliated with the American Board, had to be rejected.[104]

Unlike its earlier, inconsistent policies that randomly ordered closures or continued operations of unlicensed missionary hospitals, the central government took a solid, consistent stance between the 1900s and 1910s. The local administration was strictly ordered, on 30 July 1902, "to close the unlicensed hospital as soon as possible."[105] The missionary hospital in Konya shared the same fate on 16 April 1917, after natives had complained about it and the local authorities obtained solid evidence that American missionaries serving there "were discussing politics" and "propagating Protestantism." Furthermore, a certain Doctor Wilfred and Rachel Norest, two missionaries working in the hospital, had to be deported from Konya to İstanbul.[106] This

[103] Dh Mkt 550/52, 1 R 1320.
[104] Dh Mkt 536/39, 9 R 1320. It is interesting to note that local authorities report two weeks later revealed Mr. Eşir had already opened the hospital in Van.
[105] Dh Mkt 551/21, 24 R 1320.
[106] Dh Eum 5Şb 35/45, 24 C 1335.

strong reaction to missionary hospitals resulted from the fact that the hospitals served as a centre for religious teaching as well.

Bells, Clocks, and Flags as Symbols of Religion

The central government's attitude to the equipment used in missionary institutions was just as sceptical and restrictive as it was toward the construction and licensing of these institutions. As individual cases accumulated, similar issues led to broader decisions that affected the future of the missionary work in the Empire. Bells are an example of equipment that drew the attention of the government. The government regarded them as a symbol of Christianity, and formed its decisions according to where a particular missionary institution was located. Significantly, the more urban and religiously diverse the location, the less tolerant was the attitude of the government.[107]

In the *fin-de-siècle* Empire, American Board missionaries requested official permission to buy and use bells in a number of their institutions, namely in Amasya, Beirut, Burdur, Merzifon, and Tokat. In February 1893, the local administrations complained to the central government that the bells used in Jesuit churches and American missionary schools located across the land from Amasya to Merzifon "rang untimely at all hours." While the bells were

[107] This chapter has found no scholarly analysis of how the Ottoman government dealt with the equipments used in missionary schools, such as bells and flags. The following studies might inspire to research this subject: İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Barışı* [Pax Ottomana] (İstanbul: Ufuk, 2004); G. Georgiades Arnakis, "The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire," *The Journal of Modern History* vol. 24, no. 3 (September 1952): 235-250; Berdal Aral, "The Idea of Human Rights as Perceived in the Ottoman Empire," *Human Rights Quarterly* vol. 26, no. 2 (May 2004): 454-482.

permitted to be rung only at specified times, the government did not want any new bells, especially when the bells were foreign-made, and "superfluous."[108]

It was up to the imperial authorities to determine whether the bells were required. It seems that the size of a bell was a determining factor. For instance, when the Administration of the American College of Beirut requested permission to import a 660-pound bell ostensibly to be used to announce classes, the authorities decided that it was simply "unnecessary."[109] However, only three years later, the American missionary church in Burdur would get official permission to install a bell-tower with a smaller bell. The Public Administration Office distributed to the priests all the necessary documents and granted its approval.[110]

While the central government was more interested in the missionaries themselves, and licensing and taxing their building complexes, the bells and clock towers provide supporting evidence of the idea that the government wanted to be the main actor in making decisions on all matters related to missionary activities. The clock tower built in the American College of Beirut without a license was reported by the local governor, but when the college staff requested permission to use it, an imperial decree granted it nonetheless.[111] While allowing the college to use the tower, the government noted the incompetence of the local authorities in not preventing matters from reaching such an advanced stage. As in this case, the local authorities failed to report, on

[108] Dh Mkt 2051/3, 23 B 1310.
[109] Dh İd 117/52, 21 Za 1329.
[110] Dh İd 154/17, 20 L 1333.
[111] Dh İd 74/70, 3 M 1333.

time, the fact that a certain American missionary was building a four-storey school when he had permission for only two.[112] The central government warned its local agents each time such cases occurred. But the clock tower kept showing the time, and the four-storey school kept teaching local students.

Conclusion

As documented in the previous chapter, the American missionary institutions in the Empire rapidly expanded from the 1880s onward. In line with its broader attempts at centralization in the late and early twentieth centuries, the central government responded by assuming a more involved role in attempting to curtail the missionaries. The missionaries, for their part, contributed to this shift by violating the existing laws in the Empire. The incidents examined in this chapter suggest that the government's efforts at establishing its authority over its provincial administrations and containing the missionary expansion in its domain did not always bear fruit. In this respect, the Council of Ministers, the main authority in deciding on the matters related to the missionary institutions, particularly from the 1890s onward, used licensing as a mechanism of control. Nevertheless, in not a small number of cases social and cultural realities made peaceful co-existence tenuous between missionaries and local administrations and residents.

The central government's decision to treat the American Board like a corporate partner led to mixed consequences as well. The government sought some way to address missionary-related issues more effectively as there were

[112] Dh İd 123/18, 18 M 1332.

differences of opinion between the government and missionaries when it came to the nature of missionary activities and the equipment used in missionary institutions. This chapter argues that the policies directed at the legal status of the missionaries were a core component of the centralization attempts of the central government. However, throughout the period from the 1880s to the 1910s, they did not produce a workable long-term strategy regarding missionaries and their institutions: imperial regulations could not solve the main problem of property violations by the missionaries. In particular, licensing, a means of control the central government reformulated, merely frustrated all other parties involved in its execution.

4

Controlling Missionary Publications

One day "a ragged and besmudged specimen of the genus printer's boy" dropped by Henry Dwight's, the Bible House manager in *fin-de-siècle* İstanbul. Once washed and cleaned, the boy carried "not a trace of printing ink about his person." "This poor-day labourer" told Dwight that he had attained enlightenment "by attending the chapel in the Bible House." Now on the way to his "native village in the far East" of the Ottoman Empire, the poor boy wanted a Bible and prayers to follow him. "Amid the host of daily cares," said Dwight, the boy's expressed intention was quite a piece of news, "entertaining" indeed.[1]

Henry Dwight penned this anecdote to motivate fellow American missionaries as well as to capture the electrifying effects of their efforts on native Ottomans. [2] A seasoned and prolific missionary, Dwight predicted the wonders that would come about through determination and hard-work.[3] In reality, his printer's boy could not teach what he had learned in the Bible House

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[1] Henry Otis Dwight, *Constantinople and Its Problems* (Elbiron Classics Series, Adamant Media Corporation, 2005), pp. 45-46.

[2] For the first edition of Dwight's popular work see Henry Otis Dwight, *Constantinople and Its Problems: Its Peoples, Customs, Religions and Progress* (New York: Young People's Missionary Movement, and Chicago: Revell, 1901).

[3] Dwight was also a historian of the activities of the missionaries of ABCFM (the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions), *the New York Tribune* correspondent, and missionaries' business agent in the Ottoman Empire. Of the nine Dwights, Henry was the longest surviving member of the family who lived in İstanbul between 1867 and 1901. Henry Otis Dwight, *The Centennial History of the American Bible Society* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916); his opinion-editorials in *Missionary Herald* (Boston: ABCFM, 1821-1934) [in Houghton Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts]; for his genealogy see Emrah Şahin, *Errand into the East: A Social History of American Missionaries in Istanbul, 1830-1900* (Köln: Lambert, 2009), p. 112.

nor would prayers follow him to his village in Eastern Anatolia. But the printing ink that had been scrubbed off his person that day was destined to have a much stronger impact, and prayers were to multiply when printed. For the missionaries, the prospect of reaching out to the masses depended on a "host of daily cares" in the Bible House and other mission presses, printing and delivering to provincial destinations near and far.[4] Of all the reasons their printers kept running, communication with officials was most essential. All across the Empire, a complex communication and interaction network emerged between publishing missions and imperial authorities, becoming the locus of a protracted confrontation: a battle waged on printed paper. This chapter provides another context for the analysis presented in the rest of the dissertation by focusing on the confrontation between the Ottoman imperial authorities and the missionaries over the question of printing and publication.

Missionary historiography has ignored and presented only partial analyses of publishing activities of American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire, interpreting missionaries through a political lens as "crusaders," "diplomatic agents," "representatives of a superior civilization," or simply a "stumbling block between the U.S. and the Sultan," or the Ottoman government.[5] Major scholarship on the history of missionaries and their interaction with the Ottoman authorities and people has typically focused on themes such as religious contacts and expansion, conversions, sultans as

[4] Henry Dwight, *Constantinople and Its Problems*, p. 45.
[5] Emrah Sahin, "Thinking Religion Globally, Acting Missionary Locally: Last Century's American Missionary Experience in the Near East," *World History Bulletin* vol. 23, no. 1 (2007): 33-36; for missionary historiography see the dissertation's introductory chapter, "Ottoman Imperial Statecraft and American Missionaries, 1880-1910," footnote nos. 33-43.

"antagonist(s) of missionary America," the host government as a perpetrator of ethnic cleansing etc., and the motivations behind missions such as "altruism" or "imperialism."[6] Also, by translating missionary activities into a history of relations between human agencies, another large part of scholarship has concentrated on the ways in which Ottomans reacted to missionary activities,

[6] For recent scholarly perspectives and references to missionary publications, see Hans-Lukas Kieser, *Nearest East: American Millennialism and Mission to the Middle East* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), pp. 34-62; Ussama S. Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations, 1820-2001* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), pp. 103-146; Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 2007), pp. 123-148, 216, 290-296; H. L. Murre-van den Berg ed., *New Faith in Ancient Lands: Western Missions in the Middle East in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006), pp. 211-308; Justin McCarthy, "Missionaries and the American Image of the Turks," in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan eds., *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 26-48, especially p. 46; Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations] (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003), pp. 59-79, 172-173. See articles in Ann Marie Wilson, "In the Name of God, Civilization, and Humanity: The United States and the Armenian Massacres of the 1890s," *Le mouvement social* vol. 227, no. 1 (2009): 27-44; Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century," *The Muslim World* vol. 92, nos. 3-4 (2002): 287–313, especially pp. 288-293, 306-309. On early scholarship see İlknur Polat Haydaroğlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yabancı Okullar* [Foreign schools in the Ottoman Empire] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990), pp. 193-211; Nahid Dinçer, *Yabancı Özel Okullar: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kültür Yoluyla Parçalanması* [Foreign private colleges: the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by cultural means] (İstanbul: ER-TU Matbaası, 1970), pp. 85-87; Musa Çakır, *Anadolumuz Asla Hristiyan Olmayacak: Misyonerler Memleketinize Geri Dönünüz* [Our Anatolia will never convert to Christianity: missionaries, go back home] (İstanbul: M.S. Matbası, 1966); R. Pierce Beaver, *Ecumenical Beginnings in Protestant World Mission: A History of Comity* (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), pp. 203-227; James E. Dittes, "The Christian Mission and Turkish Islam," *The Muslim World* vol. 45, no. 2 (April 1955): 134–144. For classics in the field, see Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century] (İstanbul: Arba, 1989), especially pp. 15-23; Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East; Missionary Influence on American policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), especially pp. 286-309; James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean world, 1776-1882* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969); John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), especially pp. 8-9, 96, 98-99, 158; Fred F. Goodsell, *Their Lived Their Faith: An Almanac of Faith, Hope and Love* (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1961); William E. Strong, *The Story of the American Board: An Account of the First Hundred Years of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions* (Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1910); James L. Barton, "American Educational and Philanthropic Interests in the Near East," *The Muslim World* vol. 23, no. 2 (April 1933): 121–136.

producing less partial studies than earlier works, which DeNovo calls "admirable" or "sympathetic" to missionaries or the host societies. These studies focus on identities, education, gender, ethnicity, societies, and cultures and their relationship with missionary activities.[7] Despite the availability of new sources, much of the recent scholarship has tended to approach the object of study with a certain pre-determined approach in mind, leaving publishing and distribution at the periphery of missionary work.[8]

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[7] DeNovo regards Field's book, *American and the Mediterranean World*, as "admirable" and "sympathetic" toward missionaries. John A. DeNovo, "Review of America and the Mediterranean World," *The Journal of American History* vol. 56, no. 4 (March 1970): 932-933. Other works include Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Barbara Reeves-Ellington, "Embracing Domesticity: Women, Mission, and Nation Building in Ottoman Europe, 1832-1872," in Barbara Reeves-Ellington et al. eds., *Competing Kingdoms: Women, Mission, Nation, and the American Protestant Empire, 1812-1960* (Durham, North Caroline: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 269-292; H. L. Murre-van den Berg, "The Middle East: Western Missions and the Eastern Churches, Islam and Judaism," in Sheridan Gilley and Brian Stanley eds., *World Christianities, 1815-1914* (Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 458-472; Fuad Sha'ban, *Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought: Roots of Orientalism in America* (Durham, North Carolina: Acorn Press, 1991), especially pp. 83-114. Also see Şinasi Gündüz, "Misyonerlik [Missionary activity]," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Turkish religious foundation encyclopaedia of Islam] (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2005), XXX: 193-199; Barbara Reeves-Ellington, "A Vision of Mount Holyoke in the Ottoman Balkans: American Cultural Transfer, Bulgarian Nation-Building and Women's Educational Reform, 1858-1870," *Gender and History* vol. 16, no. 1 (2004): 146-171; Çağrı Erhan "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," *Turkish Yearbook* vol. 30 (2000): 191-212, especially p. 202; Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda XIX. Yüzyılda Amerikan Matbaaları ve Yayımcılığı [American presses and publications in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire]," in Aydın Aybay and Rona Aybay eds., *Murat Sarıca Armağanı* (İstanbul: Aybay Yayınları, 1988), pp. 267-285; Bayard Dodge, "American Educational and Missionary Efforts in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* vol. 401, no. 1 (May 1972): 15-22.

[8] On new archival sources see İlber Ortaylı, "Başbakanlık Arşivi'nin 1995 Yılı Yayınları Üzerine: Verimli Bir Yılın Değerlendirmesi [Publications of the (Turkish) Prime Ministry in 1995: analysis of a productive year]," *Türkiye Günlüğü* [Turkey daily] vol. 38 (January and February 1996): 198-200, reproduced in İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Barışı* [Pax Ottomana] (İstanbul: Ufuk, 2004), pp. 189-192; commonly-used sources on missionary activities in the Middle East in Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East; Missionary Influence on American policy, 1810-1927*, pp. 351-374. For works relying on these sources see, for example, Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*; Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century."

Only a few studies have done away with the existing framework and found the missions to be more than "[un]conscious agents of imperialism," and examined the publishing activities of American missionaries in the Empire.[9] Strikingly, these studies have largely assessed the publishing activities in quantitative terms, working on press and publication figures.[10] The minority of studies that focus on how Ottomans responded to these activities generally reach the same conclusion, agreeing that the authorities "took an attitude of negligence against" missionary demands in publishing while Ottoman confessional communities (*millets*), unlike authorities and Muslims, took an

[9] Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 301, 309. A brief history of the Ottoman printing press in the Ottoman Empire in Kemal Beydilli, "Matbaa [Printing press]"; Turgut Kut, "Matbaa Hurufatı [Printing types]"; in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Turkish religious foundation encyclopaedia of Islam] (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2003), XXVIII: 105-110, 111-113; Orhan Koloğlu, "The Penetration and Effects of the Printing Techniques on the Muslim Societies," in Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu ed., *Transfer of Modern Science and Technology to the Muslim World* (İstanbul: IRCICA, 1992), pp. 239-249; Server R. İskit, *Türkiyede Neşriyat Hareketlerine Bir Bakış* [Inquiry of publishing movements in Turkey] (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1939), especially pp. 31-129.

[10] On press and publication figures see, for example, an inventory of how many books missionaries published in the Ottoman Empire in Rufus Anderson, *History of Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches* (Boston: Congregational Publishing Society, 1872), pp. 503-518. Anderson's book was compiled by John A. Vinton of Winchester, Massachusetts and the recommended inventory included the publications of the American Board presses. For more see *American Board Charts: A Graphic Presentation of the Foreign Work of the Congregational Churches of America* (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 14 June 1916) [in Houghton Library]; Tahsin Fendoğlu, *Modernleşme Bağlamında Osmanlı-Amerika İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations in modern context] (Ankara: Beyan Yayınları, 2002), pp. 226-242; Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century], pp. 109, 157-160-162; Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda XIX. Yüzyılda Amerikan Matbaaları ve Yayımcılığı [American presses and publications in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire]," pp. 267-285; Çağrı Erhan "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," pp. 191-212; Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations], p. 179.

enthusiastic attitude and allied themselves with the missionaries on their publishing front.[11]

Scholars have paid publishing missions less attention than their significance and influence would warrant. This chapter examines in detail missionaries' publishing and distribution efforts in the Empire, hoping to provide another layer of nuance in presenting the variations of relations between missionaries and Ottoman authorities and people. Through a detailed analysis of the implications of the central government's policies in local contexts, this chapter reveals that the imperial authority was not unmindful, nor negligent of missionaries' publishing activities. Our main contention is that the Ottoman central government was attentive to the details and specific contexts of each case that it faced. This attention to detail and context allowed for the formulation of a sophisticated and targeted position on the issue of missionary publications. Rather than simply forbid such activities, the government sought to identify publications and their objectives, and then to determine the potential impact of these publications on Ottoman subjects if distributed. This being the case, responses toward missionary publications emanated from a pragmatic coherence in imperial policy mixed with reactive improvisation.

In dealing with publications, the Ottoman administrative process traditionally involved elaborate intra-departmental discussions on significant issues (such as authorship, place of publication, and content), which in many

[11] Çağrı Erhan "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," pp. 191-212; Nahid Dinçer, *Yabancı Özel Okullar: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kültür Yoluyla Parçalanması* [Foreign private colleges: the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by cultural means], pp. 79-81.

cases led to executive orders.[12] As a result there existed a web of complex processes that exposed missionary publishers to intense scrutiny and bureaucratic requirements in order for imperial officials to decide whether to allow, restrict or forbid their publications in the Empire.

The key instrument in controlling missionary publications was monitoring. The central government vested its local agents—provincial governors, police and others–with a responsibility to regularly verify the content of publications and to inspect publishing houses owned by American missionaries.[13] However it was up to the imperial bureaucrats to elaborate on the findings of these agents and, when necessary, take the initiative to restrict these publications and prevent missionaries from distributing their works. With the government's broader attempts at centralization and consolidation of provincial authority gathering pace, missionary publications were greeted with increasing amounts of caution and circumspection.[14] Ultimately Ottoman

[12] Caesar E. Farah ed., *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*(Kirksville, Missouri: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993), especially Halil İnacık, "Decision Making in the Ottoman State," pp. 9-18; Fatma and Ramazan Acun, "Demand for Justice and Response of the Sultan: Decision Making in the Ottoman Empire in the Early 16th Century," *Etudes balkaniques* vol. 43, no. 2 (2007): 125-148; Kemal H. Karpat, "Continuity of Form, Change in Substance: Dynasty, State, and Islamism," in *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 223-240. On Ottoman bureaucracy see Hüseyin Özdemir, *Osmanlı Devletinde Bürokrasi* [Bureaucracy in the Ottoman state] (İstanbul: Okumuş Adam, 2001).

[13] On Ottoman police see Glen W. Swenson, "The Ottoman Police," *Journal of Contemporary History* vol. 7, no. 1-2 (January and April 1972): 243-260; Ferdan Turgut, "Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 38, no. 2 (April 2002): 149-165, especially pp. 149-150; Ferdan Turgut, "The Police and the Dialectics of Social Control: The Ottoman Case," unpublished paper presented at *History Foundation: 5th International History Congress*, October 2005; for more see the dissertation's chapter, "Approaching Individual Missionaries as the Object of Public Security."

[14] In the absence of scholarship on the administrative context of the late Ottoman Empire, we find Murphey's study insightful. Rhoads Murphey, "Continuity and Discontinuity in Ottoman Administrative Theory and Practice during the Late Seventeenth Century," *Poetics Today* vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 439-443; also see the dissertation's chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure."

authorities responded to the missionaries' publishing agenda as they did in previous chapters dealing with surveillance, intelligence gathering, and licensing, with deference to the nature and substance of local cases.

Ottoman bureaucrats administering complex, vigilant monitoring processes fashioned permissions, restrictions, and sanctions with regard to publishing missions. Their general aim appears to have been keeping these missions far from small towns, villages and other rural areas, perceived by the central government as the home of uneducated malleable masses (*ahâlî* or *avâm*) prone to conversions.[15] For instance one relevant document notes that the "Muslim population" (*ahâliy-i İslâmiye*) in Yanya had surrendered themselves to the subversive influence of missionaries. As a result of their exposure to "seditious books and pamphlets" (*kitap ve risâil-i muzırra*) published by missionaries, the Yanya Muslims had been losing their loyalty to the central government and Islam. "This being the case, we try," noted the local governor, "to eliminate the possibility of reading these types of books and pamphlets" and "to catch and bring under law those [missionaries] who deliver speeches against the imperial policy in coffee-houses and other public

[15] Ottoman masses as social classes in Şerif Mardin, *Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2006), pp. 1-19; Ottoman authority and subjects in Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski eds., *Legitimizing the Order: the Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005); Ottoman "malleable" masses in Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Zihniyet, Siyaset ve Tarih* [Mentality, politics, and history from the empire to the republic] (İstanbul: Bağlam, 2006), especially pp. 21-22, 36-39, 98-101, 129-132; on different aspects of Ottoman social classes see Fatma Müge Göçek, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 3-43; Emrah Şahin, "Ottoman Society," in Orlando Patterson and J. Geoffrey Golson eds., *Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa* vol. I (California: SAGE Publications, scheduled for publication in January 2012).

spaces."[16] In another document, the Ottoman Minister of Interior Memduh Pasha detailed to Sultan Abdulhamid II and the Council of Ministers the results (and his evaluation) of missionary activities in Eastern Anatolia. Based on provincial reports, memos, and the findings of the Committee of Examination and Inspection under his ministry, the minister noted that "the conquering impact of ignorance" (*istilây-ı cehâlet*) upon the "Muslim population" (*ahâliy-i İslâmiye*) in provinces was "worthy of serious regret" (*cidden şâyân-ı te'essüf*). "Those who were people of Islam" were in such darkness that they did not know about their religion and thus "did not search to find the cure" (*derde dermân aramaması*) against the "seditious" (*müfsîd*) attacks of missionaries. In the views of the central government, such malleability and ignorance made missionary publications especially dangerous.[17]

By contrast the government did not explicitly oppose missionary letters from circulating in major cities and urban areas, perceived as the home of cosmopolitan and diverse cultures with a generally educated population less open to religious suggestion.[18] The government, as this chapter illustrates, also made a qualitative distinction between educational and religious publications. Whereas the former were tolerated and allowed in most cases, the latter were subject to a more serious monitoring and inspection process. A tangible outcome of the above-mentioned responses was that the central government

[16] Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 3 [Archival sources of this type are in the Ottoman Archives Division of the Prime Minister's Office, İstanbul, Turkey].
[17] Y Prk Dh 10/58 1315 Z 29, document no 2.
[18] Kemal H. Karpat, "Knowledge, Press, and the Popularization of Islamism," in *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, pp. 117-135; "Highly educated [and] urban... Ottoman elite... broader than the 'hard core' constituted by the ruling group," in Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), p. 13.

defined the boundaries of American missionaries' publishing and distribution activities, which continued to survive but did not thrive, save in the field of education.[19]

Vigilance on Publishing Missions

Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals agreed that missionaries were tarnishing the image of Ottomans in the United States. They also agreed that the publishing activities of these missionaries were posing a growing threat to public order within the Empire. When put together, the twin threat caused by missionaries' publishing activities (in the United States and the Ottoman

[19] By the year 1914, 12 mission presses (officially licensed) published 20,549.799 pages. *American Board Charts: A Graphic Presentation of the Foreign Work of the Congregational Churches of America*. Our research could not identify production levels of unlicensed presses and numbers of foreign publications. As noted by the central government, books and pamphlets imported by missionaries to the Empire were noticeably high. Thus effective from June 1893, the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued an order that any "missionary publication shipped to the Empire" (including even personal communication) would also be subject to "inspection" and to "approval" by Ottoman officials. Local authorities could allow distribution and duplication of missionary publications provided that they were inspected and "registered in the ministry's index of publication," the ministry being the Ministry of Education." Dh Mtk 61/33, 22 Za 1310. Earlier incidents precipitated this order. In 1892, Krigor Gasparyan, Bağdasaryan, and others had been caught while importing publications that contained ideas of "sedition" (*muzır*) and "rebellion" (*isyankârâne*). After the rise of such incidents, the central government chose to issue this Empire-wide order to "import and distribute" without imperial permission. Dh Mkt 1948/97, 15 L 1309. Tracy discussed with fellow missionaries reproducing "the Scriptures, in tongues familiar to the common people, the religious treatise or tract, the book of spiritual songs, the family newspaper," as the most promising mission to teach and spread their religion. Charles C. Tracy, "Salient Points in Mission History," *Services at the Seventy-Fifth Anniversary of the Establishment of the American Mission at Constantinople* (817.601, A512.1, A512se) [ABCFM collection in Houghton Library), p. 67; Rufus Anderson, *History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches*, pp. 503-518; *American Board Charts: A Graphic Presentation of the Foreign Work of the Congregational Churches of America*, sheet no. 2. For more publication figures see Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda XIX. Yüzyılda Amerikan Matbaaları ve Yayımcılığı [American presses and publications in the nineteenth century Ottoman empire]," pp. 267-285; missionary periodicals and libraries in Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century], pp. 48-49.

Empire) generated significant concern, especially for imperial bureaucrats.[20] To counter this perceived threat, these bureaucrats began to devise ways to grapple with the Empire's diminishing reputation and to regulate missionary activities within the Empire.[21] The government functions of these bureaucrats varied but their opinions on the matter showed striking similarities. These bureaucrats were affiliated with the Office of the Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âlî*), "the Ministries of Education, Foreign, and Internal Affairs" (*Ma'ârif, Hâriciye ve Dâhiliye Nezâreti*), the Committee of Examination and Inspection under the Foreign-Internal Press Services of the Foreign Ministry (*Matbu'ât-ı Ecnebîye Dâiresi, Mu'âyene ve Teftiş Encümeni*), the Foreign Communication Branch of the Imperial Telegram Centre, the Imperial Ottoman Embassy in Washington, and

[20] Hr Sys 73/56, 25 January 1896. Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals knew that American missionaries were writing books, memoirs, and newspaper articles in the Empire and publishing them in the United States. Examples of works written by missionaries in the Ottoman Empire include Crosby H. Wheeler, *Ten Years on the Euphrates; or, Primitive Missionary Policy Illustrated* (Boston: American Tract Society, 1868); Edward D. G. Prime, *Forty Years in the Turkish Empire; or, Memoirs of Rev. William Goodell* (New York: Robert Carter, 1876); Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks* (New York: R. Carter and Brothers, 1878); Cyrus Hamlin, *The Gospel in Asia Minor* (Boston: ABCFM, 1879); Charles C. Tracy, *Silkenbraid; or, A Story of Mission Life in Turkey* (Boston: ABCFM, 1893); Henri O. Dwight, *Constantinople and Its Problems: Its Peoples, Customs, Religions and Progress*. For more examples see the dissertation's bibliography. In addition, missionaries published opinion-editorials in popular American newspapers. We have found that the imperial bureaucrats thought these articles misrepresented Turks and the Ottoman Empire and manipulated the public opinion in the United States against them. For example, Heprowth's works and their translations were sent from the Ottoman Embassy in Washington to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then, the central government discussed how to handle them. Hr Sys 66/62, 14 November 1897; George H. Hepworth, "America's Big Interests in Turkey," *Boston Daily Globe*, 4 September 1904, p. 2A4). In fact, Hepworth was a noteworthy author: he published in *the Sun* and was widely quoted, especially on the issues of Armenian independence movement and Ottoman authorities, in *Chicago Tribune*, *Hartford Courant*, and *The Atlantic Monthly*. On political writings of missionary activity see Justin McCarthy, *The Turk in America: Creation of an Enduring Prejudice* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010); also the dissertation's chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," footnote no. 2.

[21] Our research in the future hopes to examine the ways in which imperial policies coped with the "Terrible Turk" image in the United States.

customs offices (particularly the office in Galata, İstanbul).[22] The customs, embassy, telegram bureaus, and provincial administrations streamed missionary publications to the Committee of Examination and Inspection for further evaluation. After a detailed analysis of these publications, the committee made suggestions to the Sublime Porte and ministries on how to handle them. Many bureaucrats were involved in the process, from customs to ministries, grasping at varying levels the character of missionary publications.

Over time these bureaucratic concerns led to a stricter form of vigilance targeting publishing houses of Protestant missions.[23] In many cases, this top-down vigilance led to Empire-wide, regular and surprise inspections of publishing houses, printing tools such as movable types, and printed material. Orchestrated by the central government, this vigilance came to affect (and principally dictate) the ways in which central and provincial authorities would deal with missionary printing houses and their products, especially when "the houses" lacked work permits and/or products containing materials of "sedition"

[22] We have recovered these offices from the sources that specifically refer to the views of each office on missionary publications. Examples include Dh Mkt 61/33, 22 Za 1310; Dh Mkt 412/50, 23 S 1313; Dh Mkt 785/3, 10 Ş 1321; Dh Mkt 999/75, 20 C 1323). Other sources indicate the Ministry of Public Security (Police) as a rather significant actor in dealing with these publications. Ottoman police in Glen W. Swanson, "The Ottoman Police," pp. 243-260; Ottoman imperial statecraft in Mehmet İpşirli, "Bâbıâli [the Sublime Porte]," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Turkish religious foundation encyclopaedia of Islam] (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1992), IV: 378-389; also see the Ministry of Public Security in the dissertation's chapter, "Approaching Individual Missionaries as the Object of Public Security."

[23] Missionary publications were printed in the United States as well as the Ottoman Empire. A significant categorical distinction is: textbooks and newspapers were printed in the U.S.; the Biblical translations and sermons in local languages were printed in the Empire. Hr Sys 66/82, 12 May 1900; Dh Mb Hps 154/27, 25 B 1333.

(*müfsîd* or *muzır*) and missionary propaganda "spoiling the imperial order" (*asâyişi bozucu*).[24]

This enhanced vigilance meant more, sometimes too much, work. On 15 August 1895, Neşet Effendi, a bureaucrat and the chair of "the Directorate of Foreign Press" (*Matbu'ât-ı Ecnebiye Müdürlüğü*), reported that things in his office were not going well.[25] Examining publications in foreign languages, mainly English, had became more and more burdensome.[26] One thing Neşet was sure of was that his directorate had to move "faster" and be "more competent in examining" American (missionaries') "publications and repudiating accusations" against Islam, the Ottoman Empire, and its "order of living."[27] What he did now know was how to do this.

For most bureaucrats like Neşet Effendi, need for vigilance and greater competence in their work posed daunting challenges when faced with mounting

[24] Dh Mkt 1540/31, 1 M 1306; Dh Mkt 16/28, 26 Z 1310; Hr Sys 65/34, 13 March 1896; Dh Mkt 2309/49, 21 L 1317. The imperial order embraced the prevailing norms of Ottoman traditions and customs and so, we take it as a broader term that represents what is called Ottoman *modus vivendi*. *Modus vivendi* in Hrvoje Cjivanović, "Modus Vivendi: Concept of Coexistence in Pluralist Global Society," *Politička Misao* vol. XLIII, no. 5 (2006): 29-44; the Ottoman *modus vivendi* in Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays* (Boston: Brill, 2002), p. 655; also see Roderick H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," *The American Historical Review* vol. LIX, no. 4 (July 1954): 844-864.

[25] Dh Mkt 412/50, 23 S 1313.

[26] The Directorate of Foreign Press was the principal government office examining works published in English, French, and other languages including Armenian, Greek, and Hebrew. The central government established the Translation Bureau (*Tercüme Odası*) in 1821, trained and recruited personnel in examining these works. Undermanned and unprepared, these personnel could not really catch up with the pace of missionary publications that continued to appear on their desk. Thus, Neşet Effendi and his staff were unable to translate and report on foreign publications to the level expected of them. The Translation Bureau in Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 81; foreign-language publications, especially in English, in Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1998), p. 136.

[27] Dh Mkt 412/50, 23 S 1313.

responsibilities.[28] Their grumbling about the enormity of their task also bore the risk of frustrating Sultan Abdulhamid II, a sultan ambitious to know everything the missionaries were putting on paper.[29] The sultan and his central government constantly exhorted his bureaucrats to work faster, harder and more vigilantly. However the government also recognized that increasing responsibilities could be overwhelming: in one specific case relating to the proposals sent by individual bureaucrats, it admitted the impossibility of undertaking the directives with the limited means available. In August 1893, they agreed to appoint "an expert," someone competent in reading English, to "the Committee of Examination and Inspection."[30] In principle, this expert was vested with imperial authority to facilitate the scrutiny of the "foreign publications." In reality, he would also supervise the inspection of American missionaries' publishing houses and examine the works published or distributed from within the Empire.[31]

The Ministry of Internal Affairs bluntly concluded in February 1902 that appointing just one expert to supervise publishing houses and examine publications was not going to be enough. A memo submitted to the ministry

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[28] On bureaucratic changes see Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* vol. 13, no. 3 (December 1968): 451-470, especially pp. 458-462.
[29] Francois Georgeon, *Abdulhamid II: Le Sultan Calife, 1876-1909* (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 2003); Selim Deringil, "Long Live the Sultan!: Symbolism and Power in the Hamidian Regime"; "They Confuse and Excite Minds: The Missionary Problem"; in *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, pp. 16-43, 112-134, especially pp. 125-134; Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 23, no. 3 (August, 1991): pp. 345-359; Nadir Özbek, "Philanthropic Activity, Ottoman Patriotism, and the Hamidian Regime, 1876-1909," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 37, no. 1 (February, 2005): pp. 59-81.
[30] Dh Mkt 412/50, 23 S 1313.
[31] Dh Mkt 412/50, 23 S 1313.

diagnosed another persistent problem: not only was the number of officials dealing with missionary printing activities in İstanbul and provinces insufficient, but they were under-qualified for what was required for the job.[32] According to several reports from provincial governors, some clerks—including some inspectors in Western Anatolia—were indeed vigilant and competent in "examining" missionary publications. They "meticulously" classified these publications as "permitted or prohibited," "destroying" the latter.[33] But most of the others failed to do so. The government gave the benefit of the doubt to all the officials, believing that they were checking missionary publications in their region on a regular basis. The government complained however, that their examination (and inspection) reports did not come in regularly or on time. When they did, they were usually "rather late."[34] To resolve this problem, the central government decided to train officials and hire new personnel to deal with missionary publications.[35] The emphasis was placed on recruiting new personnel because the job required knowledge of foreign languages, including French, Armenian and especially English, which existing staff usually did not have.[36]

Staff had to be hired and paid by local administrations, but they were expected to inform the central government of all hirings. This ensured central government control over local government expansion on the question of

[32] Dh Mkt 460/40, 17 Z 1319.
[33] Dh Mkt 509/39, 13 S 1320.
[34] Dh Mkt 509/39, 13 S 1320.
[35] Dh Mkt 460/40, 17 Z 1319.
[36] Dh Mkt 460/40, 17 Z 1319.

monitoring missionary publications.[37] In practice however, their expectations failed to reflect regional realities. The central government's correspondence with the governorship of Kayseri is instructive in this respect.[38] As a province, Kayseri was a critical location where missionaries received letters and "telegraphs," written mainly in English.[39] Without having sufficient knowledge of the works of the telegraph office in Kayseri (and, interestingly, lacking the will to acquire it), the central government sent to the Governorship of Kayseri its directive to hire new staff for the purpose of examining missionary publications and letters. The directive expected the governorship to "pay for hiring [wages]" as well. The content of the directive showed that imperial statesmen really had no clue as to the realities on the ground.[40]

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[37] On political and economic dimensions of centralization see K. Kıvanç Karaman and Şevket Pamuk, "Ottoman State Finances in European Perspective, 1500–1914," *The Journal of Economic History* vol. 70, no. 3 (2010): 593-629; Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), p. 500; Stephen R. Duguid, *Centralization and Localism: Aspects of Ottoman Policy in Eastern Anatolia, 1878-1908* (Simon Fraser University, unpublished M.A. thesis, 1970), pp. 205-323.

[38] For political, social, and economic history of Kayseri see Ronald C. Jennings, *Studies on Ottoman Social History in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Women, Zimmis and Sharia Courts in Kayseri, Cyprus and Trabzon* (İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1999); Suraiya Faroqhi, *Men of Modest Substance: House Owners and House Property in Seventeenth-century Ankara and Kayseri* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987). On Kayseri-central government relations see Süleyman Demirci, "Complaints About Avarız Assessment and Payment in the Avarız-tax System: An Aspect of the Relationship Between Centre and Periphery, A Case Study of Kayseri, 1618-1700," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* vol. 46, no. 4 (2003): 437-474.

[39] Besides American missionaries, Jesuit priests telegraphed letters and other papers (in French and Italian). Dh Mkt 779/71, 28 B 1321. The research for this chapter reveals that the use of telegraphy is an understudied yet significant topic of late Ottoman history. The telegraphy was not only the Sultan's favourite technological device. It also served well for the capital's centralization project, bringing the central and local governments in closer contact. The Ottoman telegraph services were established under the Ministry of Public Works. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), II: 120. Early in the 1870s the Ottoman telegraph network was the eighth longest in the world, extending over more than 17.000 miles. Yakup Bektaş, "The Sultan's Messenger: Cultural Constructions of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847-1880," *Technology and Culture* vol. 41, no. 4 (October, 2000): 669-696.

[40] Dh Mkt 779/71, 28 B 1321.

The governor of Kayseri replied in the negative, explaining logically, albeit in a grumbling tone.[41] The governor understood the significance of the issue and admitted that nobody in his administration, particularly in its Telegraphy Branch, knew foreign languages, but he regretted that he could not carry out the directive as he did not have sufficient funds. In addition, the governor pertinently asked whether hiring a competent, vigilant, and diligent official in Kayseri would really be wise and expedient. After all, Kayseri was "not a hub of international shipping;" Moreover, most printed materials, including those of the missionaries, were published or shipped not in Kayseri but in "İzmir and Galata [İstanbul], where they are treated" and examined.[42] The governor's intention seems to have been to show the impracticality of the new order rather than suggesting the deployment of the government's scant resources against publishing in the customs of İzmir and İstanbul. He was probably trying to shift the state's attention onto other cities, but his letter served its purpose.[43]

The difficulty with finding and funding more personnel to examine missionary publications did not change the central government's *sine qua non* order of vigilance, aiming to keep missionaries' publishing houses in check. Nearly all reports related to missionary publishing houses show a sense of

[41] Dh Mkt 779/71, 28 B 1321.
[42] Foreign language publications were challenging also for qualified staff. In a study of foreign publications during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Koloğlu states that it is "nearly impossible to decipher [publications], in spite of [officials'] knowledge of different occidental languages and the geography of those countries. Then, one can feel the difficulty with which a state employee of a century ago… could decode them." Orhan Koloğlu, "The Penetration and Effects of the Printing Techniques on the Muslim Societies," in Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu ed., *Transfer of Modern Science and Technology to the Muslim World* (İstanbul: IRCICA, 1992), pp. 239-249. Then, the quality of writing and materials were as important as knowing foreign languages.
[43] Dh Mkt 779/71, 28 B 1321.

desperation on behalf of local officials because the missionaries were printing all sorts of materials without passing them by local authorities regardless of whether these materials were "publishable" or not, including content which was deemed to be comprised of "sedition" and "gossip."[44]

Perhaps to justify poor execution of the new directive on their behalf, local officials merely increased their complaints. In the face of a rising number of requests to publish materials, the central government decided to rely less on local officials and more on the Ministry of Internal Affairs, particularly the Committee of Examination and Inspection. In 1898 however, the committee recognized the enormity of the task, absolving local officials for their reluctance and failure.[45] Whereas earlier applications had received individual treatment and usually permission to print, in August of that year the Special Council of Ministers (*Meclîs-i Mahsûs-i Vükelâ*) enacted a decree to reject all coming applications effective from that month. The reason behind the decree was three-fold. First, the council had been receiving an increasing number of applications to publish "unpublishable" materials. Second, instead of processing applications separately, the council members regarded missionary publications as "seditious" (*muzır*) and "propagandist" (*tahrîk edici*) wholesale. Third, as the central government admitted, there was a shortage of trained personnel to process these applications individually.[46]

It is important to note that the central government did not initially consider missionary publications to be essentially "seditious" in content, but

[44] Dh Mkt 2091/127, 28 Ra 1316; İ Hus 73/1316 L-46, 17 L 1316; Dh Mkt 742/8, 29 R 1321.
[45] Dh Mkt 2091/127, 28 Ra 1316.
[46] Dh Mkt 2091/127, 28 Ra 1316; İ Hus 73/1316 L-46, 17 L 1316.

rather developed this anti-publication stance over time.[47] Until the early 1880s, the government was relatively flexible in permitting missionaries to publish. As a result of this more hands-off approach, the missionaries (those affiliated with the Mormon Church as well as ABCFM) had published and distributed a good number of books, pamphlets, and miscellaneous papers across the Empire.[48] After the 1890s, the central government began to curb missionaries' printing activities in earnest.[49] To provincial authorities, anything to be published by missionaries could be considered as "sedition and propaganda" (*müfsîd ve muzır*), considering the imperial bureaucrats did not provide precise guidelines of what constituted the above. But imperial orders to certain provincial authorities hinted at what the government understood from these terms, building on a common–sense shared understanding. On 31 March 1899, the Bureau of Head Secretary (*Başkitâbet Dâiresi*, i.e., the Imperial Office of Communications) ordered provincial authorities in Alexandretta (İskenderun) to prevent American missionaries, including an American of Ottoman heritage, from propagating their religion with their publications. Their activities were categorized as "against norms" (*hâriç es-salâhiyyet*) and "against state interests" (*mugâyir-i menfa'ât-i Devlet*).[50]

[47] Justin McCarthy, "Missionaries and the American Image of the Turks," pp. 26-48.
[48] İ Mms 95/4054, 8 C 1305; Mv 26/33, 4 Ra 1305.
[49] İ Hus 73/1316 L-46, 17 L 1316.
[50] A number of incidents wedded to missionary propaganda involved citizenship issues, which in time became a source of conflict between the central government and the U.S. government. In one case, for example, a Maraş-born Ottoman subject named Hambar "escaped" and lived in the U.S. for five years. Upon his return, an American consul greeted him aboard the ship and sent him to Maraş. Regarding this unacceptable, the government also found that Hambar had violated the imperial laws by supporting American missionaries in his region. İ Hus 73/1316 L-46, 17 L 1316. Citizenship issues and their impact on Ottoman-U.S. relations will be the subject of a future study.

In its simple categorization of these activities as abnormal and anti-state, imperial agency's perception of missionary propaganda was ambiguous in substance and rationale. In agreement with the Head Secretary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs transmitted to the telegraphy branch of Foreign Communications in Harput a similar directive to prevent missionary papers and telegraphs from circulating: anything sent by and to missionaries might contain propaganda and sedition. Therefore, the Harput Telegraphy branch disallowed missionary prints to be released to "unauthorized persons" about whom information was not available.[51]

To clarify the substance of sedition and propaganda and to elaborate on the perceptual changes of Ottoman authorities in seeing missionary publications as undesirable propaganda, the chequered story of a weekly journal published by the American Press in Beirut is significant.[52] In June 1890, Henry Harris Jessup, the Vice President of the American Press in Beirut, received permission from the Ottoman Ministry of Internal Affairs to publish a weekly Arabic journal named, *an-Nashra al-'Usbuiyya*.[53] In September 1892, Jessup's *an-Nashra*, now two years old, caught the attention of provincial authorities in

[51] Dh Mkt 999/75, 20 C 1323.
[52] This account of Henry Harris Jessup's journal *an-Nashra al-'Usbuiyya* has been reconstructed from Ottoman archival records; our research identified no other source to support or revise it.
[53] Dh Mkt 1732/30, 27 L 1307. Henry Harris Jessup (1832-1910), a leading missionary in the Ottoman Empire, founded the Syrian Protestant College, or American University of Beirut today, and *an-Nashra al-'Usbuiyya*. He also wrote books, including *The Women of Syrian Arabs* (1873); *Syrian Home Life* (1874); *The Mohemmedan Missionary Problem* (1879); *The Greek Church and Protestant Missions* (1884); *The Setting of the Crescent and the Rising of the Cross* (1889); *Kamil, a Muslim Convert* (1899); *Fifty-Three Years in Syria* (1910). *The Women of Syrian Arabs*, online; *Fifty-Three Years in Syria*, online. Jessup's missionary career in the Ottoman Empire can be the topic of an interesting research. For a short study of Jessup, see Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East*, pp. 166-176.

Beirut, the city where it was printed.[54] The Beirut authorities checked on the journal and reported to the central government that *an-Nashra* conformed to the standards set by imperial regulations, simply publishing weekly "scientific" and "literary" articles.[55] The central government thus agreed to this journal's continued publication. In February 1900 however, the Committee of Internal Press annulled the eight-year old journal's license to operate, on grounds that it contained materials of sedition and propaganda.[56] At this point, Jessup did not know why his journal's legal status had changed.

"Vigilantly examining" *an-Nashra*'s previous issues had, it turns out, given the committee substantial evidence of sedition and propaganda, which led to the journal's license being revoked. While traditional interpretations still played a role in responding to publishing missions, the decree of closure dated July 1903 used the terms "sedition and propaganda" (*müfsîd ve muzır*) as articulated and applied by the government.

The decree mentioned one specific article published in *an-Nashra* that the committee considered a tool of sedition and missionary propaganda which "invite[d] all Christians to unite."[57] Inspired by the Bible and possibly from the Book of Ezekiel, the article urged Christians to get together and form "a preaching circle" in Jerusalem.[58] The absence of other articles of the same sort and further correspondence with the editor suggests that the government

[54] Dh Mkt 2001/10, 21 S 1310.
[55] Dh Mkt 2001/10, 21 S 1310.
[56] Dh Mkt 2001/10, 21 S 1310.
[57] Dh Mkt 742/8, 29 R 1321.
[58] Dh Mkt 742/8, 29 R 1321. Records do not specify what section of the Bible was cited for "the call." This chapter suggests that it was Ezekiel, which reads, "son of man, turn to Jerusalem, preach against the holy places," in the Book of Ezekiel, *Holman Christian Standard Bible* (France, 2007), pp. 1003-1070, especially 21:2, p. 1027.

officials may have been over-reacting and had given this article too literal a reading. Characterized also as an article full of "gossip" (*dedikodu*), the government issued orders to be executed: local officials were not to allow anything of this sort to be published.[59] Jessup successfully got round the order and was able to reopen his journal. In February 1904, the Committee of Internal Press cancelled the earlier verdict, not revealing what arguments Jessup had made.[60] After the journal underwent an extended review process and passed an inspection (this time by the officials working with the Committee of Internal Press), it was permitted to publish again.[61]

Jessup's efforts to persevere with *an-Nashra* eventually paid off, but he could consider himself lucky compared to other missionary publishers. The 1890s saw many imperially-instituted directives that channelled state authorities into uncompromising vigilance against these publications.[62] To the missionaries, it must have seemed as if the central government and its provincial agents had agreed to eliminate their publishing missions by any means necessary.[63] Further, the government had even authorized local officials to shut any missionary facility, be they "libraries" or "schools," in which "works of sedition (*muzırrıyât*)" were found, and local officials promised the

[59] Dh Mkt 742/8, 29 R 1321.
[60] Dh Mkt 821/6, 27 Za 1321. Four years after the initial verdict came a second order. Records suggest that Henry H. Jessup worked hard to get this order issued.
[61] Dh Mkt 821/6, 27 Za 1321.
[62] Dh Mtk 16/28, 26 Z 1310. Reports demonstrate that earlier cases precipitated the government's directives to its provincial agents to practice stricter vigilance on missionaries' printing facilities. One report dated February 1893 summarized the details of these directives, outlined the procedures of checking the facilities, and specifically required that the printing devices in the Merzifon Anatolia College be confiscated. Dh Mkt 2050/92, 21 B 1310.
[63] The Ottoman authorities claimed, however, that their actions were aiming nothing but to maintain the order. See, for example, Anonymous author, "Missionaries not Molested; Reassuring Advices Received from Our Ambassador to Turkey," *The New York Times Special*, 29 November 1914, p. 2; Tevfik Pasha to the Sultan, 4 May 1898, Y Prk Hr 25/51, 12 Z 1315.

central government that letters of "sedition" would not "appear," or be published.[64]

Shortages of personnel and of agents with knowledge of foreign languages resulted, to some extent, in the failure to successfully process the increasing volume of foreign publications. In the *fin-de-siècle* Empire these shortages also led to an innovative policy: the central government and its agents lacked the means to monitor publishing missions and to examine publications and their distribution, however they could monitor and restrict the means of publishing, such as movable types and printing machines. The government initiated an Empire-wide surge to vigilantly monitor the equipment available to missionary publishers and to immediately shut facilities that had no license to operate. By 1893, an imperial action-plan aiming to contain publishing equipment was well underway.[65]

[64] Dh Mtk 16/28, 26 Z 1310.

[65] Ibid.; Dh Mkt 2113/54, 19 Ca 1316. Unlike colleges, hospitals and orphanages, the government did not register American missionary presses according to their legal status. For more, see the dissertation chapter, "Regulating American Missionary Activity through the Granting and Denying of Licenses." Nevertheless, archival records cite the location and status of presses and mention what orders and regulations were addressed to them. An imperial order sent to unlicensed presses located in Galata and Beyoğlu is in Dh Mkt 2113/54, 19 Ca 1316. To the surprise of the bureaucrats in the capital, several offices under Ottoman ministries were working with "any presses," thus ignoring the order of the Imperial Council of Ministers to shut certain presses with criminal records, without a license of operation, and after printing seditious materials. For a case of one press owned by Manukyan, an American-turned Ottoman merchant, see Dh Mkt 2164/89, 21 N 1316. What's more, these offices had "official papers" copied "anywhere of convenience." The council therefore ordered all the government staff to immediately abandon this "ignorant" practice, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs urged municipal authorities to revoke Manukyan's license and to shut his press. Dh Mkt 2184/31, 19 Za 1316.

Imperial Policy on Printing Devices and Presses

Vigilance on American missionaries' publishing activities imposed further government regulations, focusing substantial attention on the printing devices missionaries used, particularly clichés, or movable types.[66] To imperial authorities, a policy of restricting the ownership and use of printing equipments could facilitate their broader policy of curbing missionaries' publishing and distribution activities. Between the years 1893 and 1906, the authorities made a serious effort to affect such a policy at local levels: vigilant state agents monitored and confiscated printing devices owned by missionaries, warning them not to mould clichés in Arabic (Ottoman) script.[67] The particulars of these regulations had a widespread effect on the printing industry in the *fin-de-siècle* Empire.

The new policy did not endorse summarily closing missionary presses and confiscating all their assets. Time and again, the central government (or local agents) explained to missionaries the legal grounds on which their presses were closed and the equipment confiscated therein. The explanation for closure and confiscation did not refer to new regulations but revealed the rationale behind the act, emphasizing a publisher's notoriety as well as their "insistence on publishing" letters against norms (meaning regulations in this context) and state interests.[68] Judging from the substance of local reports, the degree of one's

[66] Kemal Beydilli, "Matbaa [Printing press]," pp. 105-110; Turgut Kut, "Matbaa Hurufatı [Printing types],"pp. 111-113; difficulties in casting Arabic print types (Ottoman script) in Orhan Koloğlu, "The Penetration and Effects of the Printing Techniques on the Muslim Societies," pp. 241-243.
[67] Dh Mtk 86/42, 15 S 1311; Dh Mtk 2309/49, 1 L 1317; Dh Mtk 1020/19, 26 Ş 1323.
[68] İ Hus 73/1316 L-46, 17 L 1316.

notoriety determined whether a sanctioned closure or confiscation was definitive.[69]

Within said rationale, sanctions on missionary presses and equipments could be repealed in the absence of "notoriety" (*sâbıka kaydı*). In August 1893, local agents closed one printing press owned by Martin, an American missionary of British origin.[70] A respected publisher with a decent reputation, Martin complained. In the absence of a criminal record or of evidence showing that his machine printed letters containing sedition, the Ministry of Internal Affairs invalidated the local agents' act of confiscation. Surprisingly, the ministry did so despite the fact that Martin had indeed violated the law by operating the (confiscated) machine without license. The machine was eventually returned to him, on condition that he had to forfeit "a certain fee" to "the Fund of Internal Affairs" (*Dâhiliye Tahsîsâtı*). To expedite the process, Martin was encouraged to pay it as "soon" as possible.[71]

As well as missionaries, new regulations affected print setters. As the following cases of Halil Serkiz Efendi and Bedvi Efendi suggest, these regulations were amended and evolved over time, depending on new (but often similar) local incidents. Halil Serkiz was an Armenian publisher and the chief-editor of *Lisan al-Hal* and Bedvi was the editor of *al-Ahwal*. Beyond being in the same trade, Halil and Bedvi were both publishing and circulating papers in

[69] PThe notoriety of publishers usually resulted in the confiscation of their machines. Dh Mtk 86/42, 15 S 1311; Dh Mtk 2309/49, 1 L 1317.
[70] Dh Mtk 86/42, 15 S 1311.
[71] Dh Mtk 86/42, 15 S 1311. Generating revenue for the imperial treasury through taxation and fees will be the focus of a future study.

Beirut under license-to-operate. Later however, one notorious act was to blemish the legal status of the duo.[72]

Unlike Martin, Halil Serkiz and Bedvi were atypical men of letters who dared to "mould" Arabic types in their *ateliers*. Moreover, they used these types without license despite the fact that government agents repeatedly reminded them of the law against moulding and using types without applying for a license in advance. Complaints and local reports (all negative) gave the central government a "notorious image" of Halil and Bedvi. In February 1900, the Ministry of Interior ordered a "definitive" confiscation of their types.

Sources do not mention why the central government was overly concerned about this case. Perhaps because Halil Serkiz and Bedvi already had a bad reputation in the eyes of the Beirut officials or because the government wanted to make an example out of them, the ensuing imperial decree did not just warn these publishers but rather ordered that their "printing devices" be confiscated. Addressing also missionary "schools in Beirut," the city where the case was recorded, the decree explicitly reminded them of the ban and the obligation that came with new regulations: they were not to produce printing devices, and were to notify state officials of "every step of [their] work." The local officials were also instructed to "observe vigilance."[73]

As demonstrated in later incidents, local officials extensively applied what this decree articulated. In August 1905, local officials submitted to the central government a prompt report on a new printing machine soon after its

[72] Dh Mkt 2309/49, 21 L 1317.
[73] Dh Mkt 2309/49, 21 L 1317.

opening in the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut.[74] The imperial authorities in turn requested an extensive report on all printing presses in Beirut.[75] Significantly, the Ottoman government was sceptical about the missionaries in that region, suspecting they would pursue their publishing agenda under cover; the government chose to rely on its local officials rather than trusting the missionaries to reveal their (intentions and) activities.

While local authorities monitored and inspected publishing activities in provinces, the central government itself undertook the task in İstanbul. In the imperial capital all the main publishing houses were clustered in commercial plazas.[76] In part this explains why there are greater and more detailed sources on publishing houses in and around this city. For instance, numerous documents mention a certain American Plaza (*Amerikan Hanı*) located in Eminönü (in today's Fatih, İstanbul) as a centre of publishing.[77] An examination of the publication activity here and the central government's interaction with these

[74] Dh Mkt 997/3, 11 C 1323.
[75] Dh Mkt 997/3, 11 C 1323.
[76] At least 54 presses operated in İstanbul during the late nineteenth century. Kemal Beydilli, "Matbaa [Printing press]," pp. 105-110. The Bible House at Constantinople (İstanbul) was one of these presses owned by American missionaries. In 1872, the Bible House moved to its new building, no. 50 on the Uphill of Rıza Paşa. Soon after moving to a larger space, the Bible House obtained more devices and increased the number of its publications. For more on the Rıza Paşa see the next footnote. In the year 1880 alone, the Bible House—combined with presses smaller in size and production–published 3,536,000 pages in Armenian, 2,676,380 pages in Turkish (Armenian script), 1,226,000 pages in Turkish (Arabic script), 859,820 pages in Turkish (Greek script), and 21,000 pages in Greek. *Papers of the ABCFM*, 16.9.3, vol. 10, no. 103, quoted in Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century], p. 145.
[77] Archival sources on printing devices imported by the American Plaza merchants include Dh Mkt 870/93, 3 Ca 1322; Dh Mkt 1049/33, 19 Z 1323; Dh Mkt 1054/64, 7 M 1324; Dh Mkt 1081/31, 25 Ra 1324. Rıza Paşa was in today's Eminönü and Fatih, the business district of Eminönü, is a vivid commercial section of the city of İstanbul, visit the Fatih District online. Also see Dh Mkt 1043/73, 29 Za 1323; Dh Mkt 1049/33, 19 Z 1323; Dh Mkt 1081/31, 25 Ra 1324.

publishers reveals nuances of how the control over publishing activities was exercised.

One of these many printing houses in the American Plaza, the Matosyan Press, was run by a humble criminal-record-free (*sâbıkasız*) businessman, Agob Matosyan. Evidently government officials thought so in August 1899: on account of his modest character, they permitted Matosyan to import Turkish types from abroad on several occasions, possibly from Liverpool or Marseilles, the cities which usually produced and exported printing machines to the Empire.[78] Turning a little ambitious later on, Matosyan expanded his enterprise, purchasing more types and machines to print faster.[79] Enforcing the executive order of vigilance (perhaps more strictly than its original intent), officials confiscated all of his equipment. Moreover, the government had an idea of what to do with "the stuff" confiscated from Matosyan: "deliver it to the Imperial College of Industry (*Mekteb-i Sanâî*)," where it would prove useful.[80]

The central government stance against Agop Matosyan was far from set. His case-on-trial later demonstrated that although in principle imperial laws were impossible to challenge, the execution of these laws on a case-by-case basis was negotiable in practice. In January 1903, three months after Matosyan's types and machines had been confiscated, the government repealed the confiscation-decree. Based on an appeal or on revisiting Matosyan's reputation (absences of a criminal record and of any notorious notes in the

[78] "Permission," in Dh Mkt 2235/47, 10 R 1317; "Liverpool," in Dh Mkt 1049/33, 19 Z 1323; "France," in Dh Mkt 529/53 19 Ra 1320, document no. 3.
[79] Dh Mkt 595/24, 11 B 1320.
[80] The imperial order for stricter vigilance, in Dh Mtk 86/42, especially no. 2309/49, 1 L 1317; Dh Mkt, 595/24, 11 B 1320.

municipal registries in Eminönü), the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Internal Affairs reached the conclusion that the return of the confiscated equipment was the "proper" thing to do. [81]

Matosyan's case reveals that the imperial bureaucrats were not bull-headed; they were willing to revisit former rulings and compensate defendants as required. However, the process of revisiting cases and reversing previous decrees took a lot of time, perhaps getting those missionaries in the same trade as Matosyan to slow down their efforts and thus placing a check on their activities. The case also gave the bureaucrats the occasion to once again remind publishers of the *sine qua non* condition to keep operating: "describe and seek permission" for anything coming in and out. As cases from succeeding years indicate, many publishers responded to government's strategy of suasion.[82] Certainly Matosyan did. His printing types in Greek had already received the license-to-import-and-use well before they arrived on the first week of 1906.[83]

Publishers had the right to appeal in certain cases, and government agents processed their complaints when they did so.[84] Nevertheless, the imperial laws per se remained unchallenged: no publisher could defy them and the laws stayed intact unless amended through one imperial agency or more. Generally, various departments of the central government concurred when, in their view, changing contexts required changing codes. Certainly to the imperial bureaucrats, the constantly increasing number and quality of movable

[81] Dh Mkt 642/37, 28 L 1320.
[82] See, for example, Dh Mkt 1043/73, 29 Za 1323; Dh Mkt 1081/31, 25 Ra 1324; Dh Mkt 1054/64, 7 M 1324; Dh Mkt 1081/31, 25 Ra 1324
[83] Dh Mkt 1040/27, 14 Za 1323.
[84] Erhan does not accept the capital's attention to publishers' demands. Çağrı Erhan "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," pp. 191-212.

types, printing machines, and publications within the Empire indicated the need to occasionally revise concerned laws.[85]

Of the departments concerned with implementing and amending laws, sources particularly mention the directorates of Foreign and Internal presses affiliated with the ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs, and several customs offices assigned with authority at the ports of Galata, İzmir, İstanbul, and Trabzon.[86] More than any other, imperial policies on importing printing types and machines originated from these departments. Broadly, these policies embodied a triangulation of publishers and local state agents along with the aforementioned departments as formulated by high-ranking bureaucrats. Principles of this triangulation dictated that publishers notify the centre (the central government) of their work, and local agents to monitor it. By design, these directorates and customs offices—as a third party implicated in the system and accountable only to the centre—would facilitate resolving conflicts on printing devices and their function, ideally preventing them from arising.[87]

[85] Dh Mkt, 785/3, 10 Ş 1321.
[86] "İstanbul," in Dh Mkt 1049/33, 19 Z 1323; "Trabzon," in Dh Mkt 918/25, 22 L 1322. On Ottoman port cities see Biray Kolluoğlu and Meltem Toksöz, Cities of the Mediterranean: From the Ottomans to the Present Day (London and New York: I. B. Tauris and Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Edhem Eldem, et al. eds., The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), especially pp. 79-206; Mesud Küçükkalay, "Imports to Smyrna between 1794 and 1802: New Statistics from the Ottoman Sources," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient vol. 51, no. 3 (2008): 487-512; Gülden Erkut and Stephen Mitchell eds., The Black Sea: Past, Present and Future: Proceedings of the International, Interdisciplinary Conference, İstanbul 2004 (London: British Institute at Ankara, 2007); Henk Driessen, "Mediterranean Port Cities: Cosmopolitanism reconsidered," History and Anthropology vol. 16, no. 1 (2005): 129-141; Malte Fuhrmann and Vangelis Kechriotis, "The Late Ottoman Port-cities and their Inhabitants: Subjectivity, Urbanity, and Conflicting Orders," Mediterranean Historical Review vol. 24, no. 2 (December 2009): 71-78.
[87] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, documents 4, 8, 9.

Notwithstanding remarkable conformity with their third-party role to police printing-device importation, the directorates of presses and customs offices failed to prevent conflicts from arising as was demonstrated by a case from 1902.[88] In early summer, "two boxes of foreign-language types made of rubber" and another "box of types, cast-steel and coated with rubber" reached the customs office at the Port of Samsun, in the Province of Trabzon. Attached instructions required the former be delivered to American missionaries and the latter to a certain Kürekyan.[89] Hesitant, the port authorities asked for a directive from their head office in Trabzon, and the head office asked for a directive from the Ministry of Interior. From one office to another, a request for guidance reached all the way to the Sultan, symbolizing the bureaucratic chain of imperial authority and interdependency between offices.

Aware of existing laws, the Trabzon officials knew they had to confiscate both loads of types lacking official permission for delivery. They also knew very well that any confiscation would result in complaints and ultimately a legal matter—and more work. The Communications Department of the Ministry of Interior's reply was as expected: "execute the regulations of import" at all times.[90] Seeing the determination of the ministry on the case, the port authorities in Samsun inspected and confiscated the types for "lack of documentation."[91]

[88] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320.
[89] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 2.
[90] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, documents 2, 3.
[91] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 2.

The concerned American missionaries and Kürekyan, the addressees, searched for a broker to collect their boxes and turned to P. Bogognano, the well-known manager of *le magasin de tricot* in Beyoğlu. The missionaries, and especially Kürekyan, hoped their friend Bogognano would help resolve the issue.[92] Bogognano was apparently the right person to turn to, he had connections; he was a successful businessman, probably good friends with several bureaucrats, and a skilled writer of business-related petitions in line with proper Ottoman protocol.

Bogognano sent a long petition to the central government, while praising the reigning sultan Abdulhamid II. In short, he mentioned one fact backed by his personal experience and kindly requested the types be returned: "printing types of this sort are sold ubiquitously," said he, I myself use them "for pricing and packaging my merchandise." Hence, the types recently confiscated by the port authorities in Trabzon should "be given back," because "the imperial law requires" doing so. He did not mention the lack of documentation, the reason of confiscation.[93]

Bogognano was right. Printing types were indeed common and merchants were using them to price and package their products. The Director of the Ottoman Internal Press, Mustafa Effendi, found his petition worth forwarding to the Sultan (in summary) and proposed a discussion of high-ranking bureaucrats in the Council of Ministries. Mustafa Effendi's notes suggested that "these types must be treated the same way as others are treated,"

[92] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, documents 2-3, 7, 10.
[93] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 5.

with or without official documentation (permission). Certainly, "the final word and command in this regard [would] belong to the Sultan."[94] By late summer 1902, the chief-director of the customs office in Trabzon, while still awaiting the sultan's "final command" on the matter, told the Ministry of Interior he had handed over the types confiscated at the port to an imperial (ministry) official, so the central government could deal with them as the sultan wished.[95]

While the types passed into the hands of low-ranking officials, high-ranking bureaucrats effectuated Mustafa Effendi's proposal.[96] They informed the sultan of their discussion on the matter and left the final decision to him.[97] Here we should note that an incident of this sort would not have required such an elaborate discussion had it not involved a broader matter of concern. Bureaucrats not only pondered whether the missionaries and Kürekyan would receive three boxes of types but were grappling with all the possible eventualities that such a case threw up in order to formulate an imperial policy applicable to such incidents in the future.[98]

In June 1902, a report from the Galata Directorate of Customs and Foreign Goods had indicated that import of foreign types (and their unloading at Ottoman ports) was rather common. As in the case discussed here, most shipments had "no promissory note" granted by the government to senders and

[94] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 3.
[95] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 4.
[96] For Ottoman bureaucracy see the dissertation chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," footnotes 18, 19; Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* vol. 13, no. 3 (December 1968): 451-470, especially pp. 452, 455-462; Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society in Turkey," in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow eds., *The Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 42-63.
[97] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 3.
[98] In another case, Ottoman officials inspected printing types imported from the United States by the owner-publisher of *the Herald Levant*. Dh Mkt 894/9, 19 B 1322.

recipients.[99] Many senders and recipients had "no criminal records" either, just as the American missionaries and Kürekyan did not.[100] In simultaneous absence of promissory notes and criminal records then, the custom officials were hesitant to confiscate printing supplies.[101]

The Ottoman government was concerned with more than just individual incidents. In defiance of attempts to restrict printing activities within the Empire, more and more printing devices had been arriving without permission. As stated in an "imperial memorandum," "the ensuing order" brought with it a series of new regulations.[102] First, this order required that all types and printing machines—imported to the Empire through land or sea—be registered in official records prior to arrival. Second, the order required that registration specify the "reason for import" and the intended "function of the imported" devices. Furthermore, a promissory note and importer's oath—not to use imported devices for any other purpose than specified in the record—had to be appended to the registration.[103] The imperial bureaucrats hoped this order would streamline the functions of custom offices and avert future disputes related to importing printing devices.

In August 1902, the case Bogognano brought to imperial attention still awaited resolution. The Communication Department (of the Ministry of Internal Affairs) transmitted to low-ranking officials and the custom officials a note of guidelines in accordance with the new order. This department explained

[99] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 7.
[100] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 7.
[101] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320.
[102] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 6.
[103] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, documents 6, 9-10.

that the central government had discussed certain matters in depth and had come to a decision. In short order, the department's note then proceeded to suggest that the confiscated items be delivered to their intended recipients. The delivery would happen after the recipients, or Bogognano on their behalf, provided officials with oral and written oaths to use the types in these boxes for pricing and packaging only, and not for any other purpose. These oaths constituted the required promissory note (*sened ahzi*) to deliver the boxes. Significantly, the note of guidelines sent by the government relied on (in fact copied in form and content) the points the new order had specified. Although not registered in official records prior to arrival, a later registration specified the reason of importing these types (pricing and packaging), importer's oath, and a promissory note. Citing from Bogognano's petition, the note concluded that local authorities had to handle the case as ordered because it is "the way the imperial law requires." In doing so, the note itself makes clear a point of emphasizing the authority of the central government and conveys a strong message to the local officials about the fact that they need to recognize ultimate imperial authority over the matter.[104]

As embodied in the said order, the new imperial regulations helped local officials to be stricter with printing type and machine imports, but did not provide a legal basis to resolve complicated cases. This led to more detailed directives. On 1 November 1903, the Ministry of Interior learned from customs officials that an American citizen, most probably a missionary, had received a

[104] Dh Mkt 529/53, 19 Ra 1320, document no. 6. Archival sources do not reveal the outcome of this note.

commercial printing machine.[105] Despite the promissory note on this printing machine, the officials revealed, "its function" was ambiguous because its recipient had not been a merchant or publisher. The ministry gave concerned officials a general order to be vigilant about what would be done with this machine and a specific order to "not allow him to sell it to a third-party," or share it with others. He had to apply to the Directorate of Internal Press, the central government's department dealing with such cases, if he wanted to sell or share it.[106] With this requirement, the central government demonstrated its will to regulate domestic mobility of printing devices as well as controlling international printing-device trafficking.

Nevertheless movable types and printing devices continued to be imported and resold. Besides some merchants, many American missionaries imported them and subsequently transferred them to their institutions within the Empire, including colleges and even orphanages.[107] Provincial authorities and customs officials, somewhat ambivalent about the implications of imperial orders, chose to confiscate publishing materials arriving at their ports instead of delivering them. To begin with, these materials usually stayed in a customs shed until the officials checked with the government on whether to release them.[108] This confiscation method marked a clear sign of official regulation of the printing technology. It indeed seemed that custom officials' constantly

[105] Dh Mkt 785/3, 10 Ş 1321.
[106] Dh Mkt 785/3, 10 Ş 1321.
[107] "Armstrong," in Dh Mkt 1081/31, 25 Ra 1324; "printing tools imported by the Harput American College," in Dh Mkt 918/25, 22 L 1322; "reasons for importing these tools such as cast-steel types," in Dh Mkt 882/78 10 C 1322. For the Jerusalem orphanage see Dh Mkt 1020/19, 26 Ş 1323; for printing machines imported for the Kastamonu Industrial College by the Merzifon Anatolia College, see Dh Mkt 1119/53, 6 Ş 1324.
[108] Dh Mkt 1043/73, 29 Za 1323; Dh Mkt 1081/31, 25 Ra 1324.

asking for permissions had become a mere formality.[109] Existing laws dictated that all the types and printing devices, had to be delivered to recipients (*importers* in official registries)—no matter whether they were independent publishers or American missionaries and institutions—once the formalities had been fulfilled.[110] To some extent, the law helped customs officials secure binding documents from recipients that the government thought could be used for legal purposes later. These laws and regulations gained greater force when the government requested that provincial authorities apply them as well. Once delivered, recipients of printing types and machines had to be monitored, for which the government turned to its vigilant provincial agents.[111]

Permitting and Restricting Publications

In one *Boston Daily Globe* article, Reverend George F. Herrick, prolific author and veteran American Board missionary in İstanbul, presented the Ottoman government's supposed misconduct to the American public.[112] "There are three hundred American educational and philanthropic institutions in the Ottoman Empire whose property interests exceed seven million of dollars," said Herrick. Nevertheless, licensing "new college buildings" and "additions to old" are "held up for months." He thought that the central government had gone too far

[109] The Ministry of Internal Affairs received a promissory note from the Harput American College. The college authorities assured that they would use the imported printing tools to label the books, not to publish books. Based on the note, the central government released the tools and sent them to the college. Dh Mkt 918/25, 22 L 1322.
[110] See, for example, Dh Mkt 1081/31, 25 Ra 1324; Dh Mkt 918/25, 22 L 1322; Dh Mkt 1119/53, 6 Ş 1324.
[111] The central government required that an investigation report be prepared on the printing machines that had been delivered to the Merzifon Anatolia College. Dh Mkt 1119/53, 6 Ş 1324.
[112] George F. Herrick, "The Power of Islam," *Bibliotheca Sacra* vol. 32 (April 1875): pp. 362-375; George F. Herrick, "America's Big Interests in Turkey," p. 2A; Hr Sys 2829/45, 18 October 1893.

in monitoring and censoring missionary publications: its "custom officials" were inspecting and seizing "any book with the name 'America' in it." [113] While his comments on fellow missionaries' publishing activities in the Empire had an interested audience in the United States, they were the product of a coloured report and presented a distorted image of the Ottoman approach to missionary publications.

This chapter has so far examined imperial policies in licensing missionary buildings and in inspecting movable types and printing machines. The following section examines the ways in which the Ottoman government and its agents approached the distribution of missionary publications. Herrick was right in that state agents did inspect "any book with the name America in it." In fact, an imperial directive (of priority) required these agents to inspect every single work that American missionaries would publish (in the Empire or elsewhere) which was to be distributed among Ottoman subjects. Against Herrick's professed criticism, not all inspected works were seized based on a definitive judgment. Agents carried out painstaking inspections under the

[113] George F. Herrick, "America's Big Interests in Turkey," p. 2A4. The chapter finds it interesting that Herrick refers to the interest on American missionary property in the Empire in relation with the fact that the central government regarded some missionary institutions as charity foundations and thus giving them tax-exempt status. For more see the dissertation chapter, "Regulating American Missionary Activity through the Granting and Denying of Licenses," footnote 37. Missionaries' property lease did not also accrue interest partly because the government had not been interested in interest-generated income and partly because such an interest, when accrued, would not amount to a major asset. Archival sources on this matter contain no substantial discussion on property interests. In this respect, Herrick's reference to interest on missionary institutions seems to be given for the purpose of supporting his points. It must have appealed to American readership, especially to his Puritan readers in New England. In the early nineteenth century, New Englanders had already developed advanced calculus systems of property assets and interests by then. On the origins of "deep-seated changes in the economy and society" of New England, see Jason M. Opal, *Beyond the Farm: Ambition and Transformation of Rural New England, 1770s-1820s* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), especially pp. 44-68.

presence of continuous government instructions to "not interrupt [those] publishing and distribution" works which had been inspected-and-approved or already "registered in the index" of permitted publications.[114]

Monitoring and associated operations proved a far more astute means of government control over dissemination of missionary publications. In general, the government licensed publishing houses and permitted them to function unless they were deemed to be promoting "sedition" (*ifsâd*) among the Ottoman subjects.[115] This section reveals the criteria the central government applied in labelling a publication seditious. It will try to map out a coherent government discourse based upon specific cases involving permissions, restrictions and sanctions addressed to missionaries' publishing and distribution activities. It is our contention that certain criteria did exist, and that these criteria were applied to the cases based on the publisher's reputation and intent, as well as the publication's content. Imperial discourse should also demonstrate that "any missionary" was allowed to publish and distribute "any publications" with the proviso that missionaries and their publishing projects did not fall under the definition of "abnormal" and "anti-state" (*hâriç es-salâhiyyet* ve *mugâyir-i menfa'ât-i Devlet*). In the *fin-de-siècle* Empire, changes in local contexts precipitated further changes in the meaning and substance of these terms. The chief state agency in evaluating publishing projects was the central government.

[114] "Do not prevent," in Dh Mkt 1993/28, 4 S 1310; "registered in index," in Dh Mtk 61/33, 22 Za 1310.
[115] Dh Mkt 1709/7, 26 B 1307; Dh Mkt 1544/26, 11 M 1306; Dh Mkt 1765/117, 15 S 1308; Hr Sys 66/82, 12 May 1900; Dh Mb Hps 154/27, 25 B 1333.

It also adapted these terms—whether any project was abnormal or anti-state—and interpreted them to other state agents when it was deemed necessary.

The central government's principal concern when granting missionaries permission to publish and distribute materials was their reputation as applicants and the substance of their proposals.[116] The proposal's arrival in the government offices ushered a process of detailed inspection. The agents checked the applicant's criminal-record, handled procedures to obtain his verbal and written oath (legal declaration, in their presence, to willingly act inside imperial norms and not against state interests), and requested additional reports from local authorities when necessary. Once these procedures were followed, permissions were granted to benign proposals, authorizing the applicant to print, use, or distribute proposed books, pamphlets, etc.[117]

Complicated cases became subject to more scrutiny, extending the time of inspection.[118] A significant element in these cases had to do with permission papers the government gave to missionaries. These papers, far from perpetual government contracts, recognized the government's legitimate right to monitor

[116] From the 1890s onward, applying to obtain imperial authorization became a rather typical procedure for missionaries in the printing mission.

[117] See the missionaries' licensed publishing house in Beirut, in Dh Mkt 1709/7, 26 B 1307; also footnotes 52-62. In one case, Leon Manukyan submitted an expedient proposal and then received permission to resume the works f the printing house of his deceased father. Dh Mkt 2175/118, 26 L 1316. On the rejection of another proposal to publish and distribute the Bible in Kurdistan, see Dh Mkt 1765/117, 15 S 1308. The imperial authorities regarded controversial religious pamphlets to be against the imperial law and order as well as Islam. Therefore, they forbade them to be printed and distributed in South-eastern Anatolia. See, for example, Dh Eum Mtk 80/29, 14 C 1333.

[118] A series of requests from American missionaries to distribute books and pamphlets on city streets are found in Dh Mkt 911/14, 24 Ş 1322; Dh Mkt 948/42, 15 S 1323; Dh Mkt 1056/25, 15 M 1324. The chapter should also emphasize the fact that the imperial decision-making process attended to provincial postures on missionaries' publishing missions. See, for example, the proposal of a local community leader to stop missionaries' publishing activity, in Hr Sys 67/31, 3 April 1906; also the dissertation's chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," footnotes 113, 116, 117.

(and censor) the production and distribution of already-permitted works in the hands of missionaries, even after they had been printed and reached readers. This right, while affording local authorities time and opportunity to double-check the content of the publication, exposed missionaries to a constant threat of liability.[119]

Another significant element in complicated cases hinged on the wide powers afforded to provincial agents designated to implement laws and regulations. In earlier decades, the details of how the imperial law had been implemented in provincial levels did not matter much mainly because missionaries' publishing activities were of lesser significance in capacity and variety. After these activities multiplied in the early 1890s, provincial authorities began to apply the law in somewhat arbitrary ways.[120] A common problem was provincial bureaucrats overstepping their authority: some of them went beyond inspection and reporting (as assigned by the centre) and took on a self-ordained position (a conduct considered as unlawful by the centre) to restrict and forbid publishing and to confiscate the publications in their regions.[121] The central government had the will and means to tame these authorities and to amend their policies.

One incident demonstrating arbitrary action in a local context involved a number of provincial authorities. In May of 1892, the Ministry of Interior, the principal agency authorized to regulate printing-device trafficking and

[119] These cases are worthy of further analysis, especially in relation with Henry H. Jessup's case, footnotes 52-62.
[120] Dh Mkt 1709/7, 26 B 1307; Dh Mkt 1951/2, 21 L 1309; Dh Mkt 1993/28, 4 S 1310; Dh Mkt 1765/117, 15 S 1308; Dh Mkt 2006/61, 8 Ra 1310.
[121] Dh Mkt 1951/2, 21 L 1309; Dh Mkt 1993/28, 4 S 1310; Dh Mkt 61/33, 22 Za 1310.

coordinate operations on publishing and distributing activities in the Empire, declared that the government had given an affirmative answer to a request submitted by some American missionaries. A permission paper allowed these missionaries to carry out distributing "approved" books and pamphlets in Anatolia.[122] The missionaries then sent publications to their institutions across Anatolia.[123] To the ministry's surprise, several authorities in Anatolian provinces confiscated the incoming publications and inhibited already-licensed publishing houses from (printing and) distributing works. The ministry, appalled by such behaviour, ordered these authorities to report immediately.[124]

Provincial intelligence reports failed to justify these autonomous acts.[125] Following a long discussion among its high-ranking bureaucrats on this significant incident, the central government created new directives. Effective from August of 1892, these directives required the provincial authorities to fully comply with imperial laws (and regulations) instead of making decisions arbitrarily.[126] The directives also expounded the legal course on administering works published and distributed by missionaries. First, the Ministry of Education officials had the sole authority to examine books, pamphlets, etc. and determine the "liability" of their content. Then only "the Ministry of Education" could give "approval" to publish and distribute. Upon meeting these standards, examined works would be registered as "approved" in the imperial publication index and so "shall they be [allowed to] be published" and

[122] Dh Mkt 1951/2, 21 L 1309; Dh Mkt 1993/28, 4 S 1310.
[123] Dh Mkt 1951/2, 21 L 1309.
[124] Dh Mkt 1993/28, 4 S 1310; Dh Mkt 61/33, 22 Za 1310.
[125] Dh Mkt 1951/2, 21 L 1309; Dh Mkt 1993/28, 4 S 1310.
[126] Dh Mkt 1993/28, 4 S 1310.

distributed.[127] Later references demonstrate that cases of arbitrary decisions and practices at local levels declined. Apparently, the new directives had created their desired impact.[128]

American missionaries' requests for in-store and on-street bookselling also caused the central government to revisit and amend related laws and regulations. With the increase in the number of these requests and provincial officials checked by an arguably more reasonable (evidently less arbitrary) central authority, the missionaries aimed to reach out to non-Muslim subjects, moving beyond their former target audience of student groups registered in their institutions.[129]

The American Board missionaries' proposal to expand their distribution of literature came in the form of a petition. On 3 November 1904, the Ministry of Interior indicated it had qualms about this petition, fearing that imperial permission sanctioning missionaries to reach a larger public—less educated and more susceptible to the movement of ideas through written letters—would invite inadvertent consequences.[130] Thus in absolute terms the central government rejected the proposed project, considering it "against the norms" and "against state interests."[131] The project was not only deemed anti-state and outside imperial norms but also perilous on account of the shortage of personnel to examine publications and monitoring distribution, as well as the

[127] Dh Mkt 61/33, 22 Za 1310.
[128] See, for example, two cases dated 17 November 1903 and 11 March 1906, in Dh Mkt 795/5, 26 Ş 1321; Dh Mkt 1056/25, 15 M 1324.
[129] Dh Mkt 911/14, 24 Ş 1322.
[130] Dh Mkt 911/14, 24 Ş 1322; Dh Mkt 1056/25, 15 M 1324.
[131] Dh Mkt 911/14, 24 Ş 1322.

fear of official and community reactions to a massive missionary literature distribution effort.

Some unclear reasons led to a conditional approval to replace the absolute rejection of the petition within the year. Certainly the missionaries continued nudging imperial bureaucrats to sanction their petition to sell and distribute books in public, urging them to reconsider their petition. Furthermore, like customs and local officials, these bureaucrats did not want a protracted confrontation on this matter.[132] On 21 April 1905, the Ministry of Interior (in consultation with the Ministry of Education and Press) compromised by granting to the missionaries a conditional green-light.[133]

An imperial order permitted missionaries to sell and distribute only "the Bible" and other books that were not "controversial." The order reminded the missionaries that imperial officials reserved the right to examine all publications and monitor their distribution. In an effort to minimize harmful impacts on what the central government thought of as "malleable masses" (*avâm*), the order also stipulated that no pamphlets ever be published or distributed against state interests and Islam. If detected, such sedition would elicit dire consequences. Significantly, the government thought about the possibility of collaboration between missionaries and merchants in the print trade. Therefore, the new order applied to merchants in the print trade as well.

[132] Dh Mkt 948/42, 15 S 1323.
[133] Dh Mkt 948/42, 15 S 1323.

They too would suffer the consequences if they published without government approval.[134]

The reputation of publishers still played a profound role but the central government's new directives underscored that the future of their works depended largely on the meaning of their letters. Theoretically, missionaries and others were allowed to publish and sell/distribute pamphlets in peace (and with no official hindrance) in accordance with imperial law and public order.[135] In practice, customs and local officials contended that a remarkable number of these pamphlets violated imperial regulations, becoming subject to more intense monitoring and atypical restrictions.

Although George F. Herrick has contended that the Ottoman government was going too far in seizing "any book with the name 'America' in it," the central government did not seize or forbid all missionary publications in circulation; it examined them and monitored their distribution.[136] Seizures happened when any element in said process—publisher, content, publishing and distribution—violated existing regulations.[137] The imperial bureaucracy had outlined a vigilant course of action against seditious letters but in practice, it was provincial authorities that determined the course at local levels.

In almost all incidents the duty of monitoring fell upon provincial governors, themselves obliged to inform the central government of the

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[134] Dh Mkt 948/42, 15 S 1323.
[135] For the conditional permissions that the missionaries received to distribute the Bible and books in the provinces and thepermission granted to the Bible-vendor Nicholas the son of Ilyas in Kastamonu, see Dh Mkt 948/42, 15 S 1323. Ohannes, a licensed book-merchant and unlicensed street vendor, worked for the Bible House, in Dh Mkt 1056/25, 15 M 1324.
[136] George F. Herrick, "America's Big Interests in Turkey," p. 2A4.
[137] Dh Mkt 2427/82, 19 B 1318; Dh Mkt 502/53, 4 S 1320; Dh Mkt 948/42, 15 S 1323; Dh Eum Mkt 80/29, 14 C 1333; Dh Mbh Hps 154/27, 25 B 1333.

reputation of missionary publishers and the content of their literature. The government then checked reports and evaluated suggestions sent from the provinces.[138] In February 1887 for instance, provincial officials caught an American missionary with a number of books, the contents of which were found to be "seditious" and offensive to the law and order. Upon the central government's request, they sent the books to the Ministry of Education for further examination. The ministry's examination upheld the findings and communicated this view to the Council of Ministers. Most books, including for example Akalisis' pamphlet attacking the imperial authorities, aimed to agitate the masses and called on them to rebel against the state. Hesitant to confront the American Board, the council released the missionary, but his letters were "seized," and destroyed.[139]

An essential measure to judge the 'seditiousness' of a published material required checking the substance of its ideas and messages on Islam and Muslims. As documents reveal, this measure put "slanderous" views (*iftirâ*) on Islam and Muslims on par with "sedition" (*ifsâd*) against the state.[140] To illustrate, in those missionary publications that the central government

[138] Dh Mkt 1397/1, 8 Ca 1304; Dh Mkt 1509/67, 13 N 1305; Dh Mkt 1540/31, 1 M 1306.
[139] Dh Mkt HMKT 1397/1, 8 Ca 1304; 'missionary' books that the imperial authorities considered as propaganda tools in Dh Mkt 1540/31, 1 M 1306. Also see below the case of Karabet the son of Mesih.
[140] A recent debate over the works of a local missionary in Turkey seems relevant to the analysis above. On 5 February 2002, Ahmet Güvener, the pastor of a local Turkish-Protestant missionary church, was taken into custody and brought to the Diyarbakır Fourth Criminal Court of First Instance (*Diyarbakır 4. Asliye Ceza Mahkemesi*), because he had been "distributing the Bible" in Diyarbakır without "license-to-operate" and for "slandering against the principles of Islam." This case, file no. 2002/788, also called to the court a convert named Kemal Teymür because he had been helping Güvener to distribute the Bible in the region without permission. Eventually, Güvener and Teymür were acquitted. Interestingly, the court attendees included the American consul in Adana. "Tarihten Bugüne Türkiye'de Misyonerlik [Missionary work in Turkey from the past to the present]," online; "Kilise Davasinda Beraat [Acquittal in the Church Case]," online.

perceived as having challenged the imperial authority, Islam and Muslims were included in the following ideas: Ottoman Christians should be independent from the yoke of the Ottoman government, missionaries are in the Empire to help native Christians to reclaim their souls and sovereignty, "Christ as the Word of God" is the only way to salvation, Christianity is truer and purer in itself than Islam, , and atrocious Muslims kill Christians for political and religious reasons.[141] In addition, seditious views noted that "the entire Christian population will be destroyed" because the central government is "aggravating a situation already intolerable."[142] When printed, such ideas really alarmed the imperial authorities, leading them to urge that local officials bring missionaries to court and remove these ideas from mass circulation. And as mentioned in the imperial records dated 1888, books with these ideas were abundant at several libraries in missionary schools.[143]

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[141] A. Mkt. Mhm 615/9, 30 S 1324; Y Prk Dh 10/58, 29 Z 1315; A Mkt Mhm 763/28 9 R 1307; A Mkt Mhm 658/25, 7 L 1313; Hr Sys 2740/48, 21 November 1895; Hr Sys 2742/4, 14 May 1898; Dh Mkt 1540/31, 1 M 1306. Missionaries' earlier publications were more explicit in what the government described "slandering" against Islam and "attempting to convert" Muslims. In 1827, for example, a pamphlet by Joseph Wolf--a missionary in Alexandria for the Society of Promotion of Christianity among the Jews--had urged local Muslim leaders, even "the city governor," to "repent and return to Christianity." Local authorities deported Wolf from Alexandria (İskenderun) without asking to the capital. H. P. Palmer, *Joseph Wolf* (London: Heath Cranton Limited, 1935), p. 153; Wolf's case quoted also in Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century," p. 304. The imperial authorities approved local authorities' decision of deportation later and did not request further explanation on the case. See James Shepard Dennis, *Islam and Christian Missions* (New York: Funk and Wangalis, 1889) [reproduced from *The Missionary Review of the World*, August 1889, ABCFM pamphlet D; Andover Theological Library]; a report of the Foreign-Affairs Ministry on anti-Ottoman and anti-Islam articles published in American newspapers by American missionaries, in Hr Sys 73/56, 25 January 1896.

[142] The quote is in the newspaper article, "Fears for its Friends," *The Washington Post*, 21 December 1894, p. 7; this article, which was published with the support of American missionaries and the Armenian Revolutionary Committee, is translated into Ottoman-Turkish to be considered by the imperial bureaucrats, in Ya Hus 396/104, 19 M 1317, document nos. 2-5.

[143] Dh Mkt 1509/67, 13 N 1305; Dh Mkt 1540/31, 1 M 1306.

The following incident provides another example of what the central government perceived as being seditious publications. In May 1888, an apparently routine investigation took place in the library of the Antep Central Turkey College. An ensuing report informed the Ministry of Interior that this library "owned" many books slandering "Islam" and Muslims, and agitating "against the imperial law." Related documents do not detail exactly how pamphlets ridiculed Islamic teachings, but they specifically mention "ancient Armenian maps" that indicated the Armenian-majority lands of the Empire as "Independent Armenia." The investigating officials were hesitant to interrogate the library managers (missionaries) and seize and destroy these books, instead approaching the İstanbul government for advice.[144] The Ministry of Interior was adamant: immediately seize all the books and interrogate and warn the missionaries not to acquire the same books again.[145]

Whereas the central government underscored vigilance and transmitted to its local officials the details of imperial policies toward missionary publications, the implementation of imperial laws and regulations had marked variations thanks to officials' interpretations and the contextualization of these policies. Far from a standardized practice, the application of imperial policies toward missionary publications also depended on certain incidents that stemmed from local officials' often arbitrary decisions. Such decisions often

[144] Dh Mkt 1509/67, 13 N 1305.
[145] Dh Mkt 1540/31, 1 M 1306.

left the government in diplomatic tussles involving the U.S. consul and influential local businessman like P. Bogognano.[146]

For political and diplomatic reasons, the central government responded either positively or negatively to the arbitrary actions of its officials at local levels. On the one hand the government manifested a sense of frustration about the fact that actions taken by local officials caused diplomatic problems in the capital, as happened in 1892. In September of that year, local officials confiscated American Bible Society books on the way to Gebze, Kocaeli.[147] Confiscation resulted from arbitrary action in violation of the imperial policy. The local agents had confiscated the books without examining their content, not even knowing the central government had already permitted them to reach the city. The central government ordered them to apologize and release these books to the Society. Exasperated, an imperial order required the agents involved to provide a detailed report as to why the incident had happened in the first place.[148]

On the other hand, the Ottoman government sometimes demonstrated a tone of appreciation or silence (another symbol of affirmative feedback) when local agents acted somewhat arbitrarily in handling an impending crisis that otherwise could have presented greater difficulties. In September 1890 for instance, the government praised local authorities in Sungurlu, Çorum, for their timely response to illegitimate missionary activities in their region. These

[146] "Bogognano" in footnotes 88-95; see U.S. diplomatic reactions below.
[147] Henry Otis Dwight, *The Centennial History of the American Bible Society*; Dh Mkt 1056/25, 15 M 1324; Bible House, *Trustees' Minute Book, Records 1866-1923*, vol. I. (Constantinople, A.B.C. 26) [Houghton Library].
[148] Dh Mkt 2006/61, 8 Ra 1310.

authorities told the government that they had no choice but to "inhibit" the practice of missionaries printing and distributing the Bible to "malleable masses." Although they told the government only after the action had been taken, the central government appreciated the effort and the rationale behind it. Appreciating the act, the government encouraged them to "keep doing what they did."[149]

Along with a host of others, these two cases symbolize the central government's approach to the actions of its local agents, pursuing contradictory yet pragmatic purposes.[150] The government approved of, or at least tolerated, the arbitrary actions of local authorities when they fell in line with existing regulations and prevented an imminent danger that otherwise could not be handled. However it opposed, or at least requested detailed explanation from local authorities, when their arbitrary actions betrayed a manifest ignorance of existing laws and countered imperial clearance previously granted to missionaries.

Although the status of all publications was subject to approval (depending on inspection reports), some publications were considered "illegal" *ab initio*.[151] As the chief imperial executive and legislative agency, the central government classified certain publications into this category based on two

[149] Dh Mkt 1765/117, 15 S 1308.
[150] Some 'missionary' books, despite being authorized by the Ministry of Education, were confiscated in the provinces. See Dh Mkt 1951/2, 21 L 1309. Forbidden books and pamphlets in Hr Sys 71/61, 9 November 1891; Hr Sys 71/72, 8 April 1892; Hr Sys 71/75, 22 June 1892; Hr Sys 71/76, 29 August 1892; arbitrary actions of local authorities regarding the status of the printing press of missionary H. N. Barnum, in Dh Mkt 1381/74, 3 Ra 1304; Dh Mkt 1465/56, 6 Ra 1305; Dh Mkt 1449/78, 3 M 1305. Also see Dh Mkt 1732/30, 27 L 1307; Dh Mkt 1951/2, 21 L 1309; Dh Mkt 61/33, 22 Za 1310; Dh Mkt 2164/89, 21 N 1316; Dh Mkt 795/5, 26 Ş 1321; Dh Mkt 870/93, 3 Ca 1322; Dh Mkt 999/75, 20 C 1323.
[151] Dh Mkt 2079/46, 14 Ş 1314; Hr Sys 66/82, 12 May 1900; Dh Eum Mkt 80/29, 14 C 1333.

sources of information: existent knowledge on the reputation and career of the publisher and reports on the content of the publications. For instance, *Selected Reviews in Geographical Science* (*Hulâsâ al'Safiyya fi 'Ilm al'Coğrâfiyya*) and *Commensurate Answers* (*al'Ajwiba al'Wafiyya*), two "seditious" pamphlets of this type published by an editor of notorious reputation, were forbidden across the Empire.[152]

Before reaching Ottoman readers, *Selected Reviews* and *Commensurate Answers* were being published abroad. These pamphlets became the focus of government concern when reports indicated that Abraham Serkiz, an author blacklisted on account of his attacks on (the Ottoman) authority and calls for Armenian subjects to rebel, was the editor and principal author. When further investigation revealed that these pamphlets contained certain "elements of sedition," (*müfsîd ve muzır*) the central government declared them "illegal." In January 1897, the Ministry of Interior ordered—without mentioning the details of what evidence of sedition was found in these pamphlets—that government agents operating at customs offices and in provinces forbid their publication (duplication) and distribution; if found, agents had to "seize and destroy" them immediately.[153]

Another pamphlet, *The True Word in the Religion of Jesus* (*al'Kawlu al'Sahîh fî Dîn al'Mesh*), shared a similar fate. Published in Philadelphia by Cebrail Korkmaz, a Maronite Priest, *The True World* was regarded as a work directed against the teachings of Islam. The government considered that this

[152] Dh Mkt 2079/46, 14 Ş 1314.
[153] Dh Mkt 2079/46, 14 Ş 1314.

pamphlet would confuse the average Ottoman reader or mislead the malleable masses. Although Korkmaz had neither a "criminal record" nor a bad reputation in the eyes of government authorities, his pamphlet was believed capable of causing trouble. In May 1900, the Ministry of Exterior ordered government agents not to allow circulation of the pamphlet.[154] Significantly then, even in the absence of evidence of publisher malevolence or manifest intent to reach Ottoman readers, the government could and did pre-emptively forbid certain publications before they reached Ottoman lands. Promoted by the central government and executed by its agents, intelligence-in-advance played a profound role in these cases.[155]

In the 1910s, the imperial course of action did not change substantially. The government ordered local authorities to seize and destroy *Sermon on Miracles* (*Mûcizelere Dâir Hutbe*) and *Sermon on the Place of the Virgin Mary* (*Meryem Ana'nın Makâmına Dâir Hutbe*), two books on the miracles of Jesus and the superhuman character of the Virgin Mary, which were both against the orthodox teachings of Islam.[156] Indeed from the 1890s to the 1910s, the Ottoman government demonstrated a conservative and reasonably consistent strategy of monitoring and restricting missionary publications, well documented and far more sophisticated than George F. Herrick and other contemporaries were able to see from their vantage point as outsiders. In this period, the

[154] Hr Sys 66/82, 12 May 1900.
[155] Hr Sys 66/82, 12 May 1900
[156] "Prevent publishing," in Dh Mbh Ps 154/27, 15 B 1333; "prevent distribution in Trabzon and Erzurum," in Dh Eum Mkt 80/29, 14 C 1333.

government firmly opposed missionaries' activities when they risked interrupting the existing political and religious norms.

As we shall see, higher risks invited greater scrutiny and hence more far-reaching responses.[157] Significantly on 22 February 1892, the Ministry of Interior officially forbade American missionaries to "sell [or distribute] pamphlets in villages."[158] Reasons behind this landmark decision were twofold. First, the numbers of missionary publications had increased substantially and government agents, few in numbers, could not cope with the workload. Second, many of these publications—including ideas challenging the conventional social and religious views held by the broader mass of the population—could shake the socio-religious order of the countryside. In principle, the dissemination of knowledge was allowed to all parties, including those missionaries who had received official permission.[159] In practice, the dissemination of knowledge in the Empire mandated a thorough investigation and was not allowed (at least officially) when the content conflicted with Ottoman political, ethnic and religious views.[160] As in the following case,

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[157] A 1907 *New York Times* book-review noted that Will S. Monroe could "not cite native authority" in his new book titled, *Turkey and the Turks*, "for reasons which should be obvious to those knowing anything of the empire." "Boston Notes, Saturday Review of Books," *The New York Times*, 1 June 1907, p. br355. Anonymous reviewer's reference to Ottomans' "double-faced" character must have been obvious to the newspaper's readership. See the dissertation's chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," conclusion and footnotes 1-2.

[158] Dh Mkt 1925/27, 23 B 1309.

[159] The Bible Society complained when, in Trabzon, the Minister of Education forbade missionaries' circulation of books and pamphlets. The imperial authorities told the society that a detailed investigation was underway; they would discuss the investigation report and decide to do on this matter. Hr Sys 71/61, 9 November 1891.

[160] For example, the printing house of Barag, an Ottoman-born American citizen residing in Harput, was closed after publishing "seditious" books and encouraging the locals to rebel against law and order. Dh Mkt 1544/26, 11 M 1306. Similar to Barag, Grigor Gasparyan and Bağdasaryan were forbidden to work their presses and to import books in the provinces. Dh Mkt 1948/97, 15 L 1309. For American missionaries' books and pamphlets and the imperial

pamphlets usually conflicted with "Ottoman values" in clear ways, leading to multiple interpretations from government agents (legislative and executive staff), local residents, and missionaries.[161]

In January 1895, Ottoman police patrols saw their otherwise uneventful day interrupted by an expected passenger carrying a rather unexpected copybook (*defter*) in his briefcase.[162] Around noon, the patrols stopped the passenger and found him to be Karabet, the son of Mesih, the preacher of the American College in Çarşancak (today Akpazar in Tunceli). Preacher Karabet was on his way to his hometown during a holiday. Curious and vigilant, the patrols interrogated and detained Karabet, taking him and his book to the Governor's Office in Harput. Like other governors dealing with similar cases, the governor of Harput turned to the İstanbul government for advice on "how to treat" Karabet.[163]

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bureaucrats' view that they had the potential to spoil political and religious order in the provinces, see Hr Sys 61/18, 20 April 1892; Hr Sys 62/1, 9 January 1893; Hr Sys 65/63, 18 August 1896; A Mkt Mhm 655/16, 16 Ca 1313. On aspects of missionary education see Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2001), pp. 202-241; Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2002), pp. 712-729.

[161] A Mkt Mhm 655/16, 16 Ca 1313; A Mkt Mhm 658/14, 19 Ş 1313; A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313.

[162] "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' address to the Governor of Harput," in A Mkt Mhm 658/14, 19 Ş 1313, document nos. 2, 3; Ottoman police and relevant cases in Noémi Lévy and Alexendre Toumarkine eds., *Osmanlı'da Asayiş, Suç ve Ceza* [Ottoman public security, crime and punishment] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2007); Noémi Lévy, "La police ottomane au tournant des XIXe et XXe siècles: les mémoires d'un commissaire d'Izmir," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* vol. 54, no. 2 (2007): 140-160; Ferdan Turgut, "Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire," pp. 149-165, and "Polis Çalışmaları İçin Kavramsal Bir Çerçeve [a theoretical framework for police studies]," *Amme İdaresi Dergisi* [journal of civil administration], vol. 34, no. 1 (2001): 59-78.

[163] From the Governor of Harput to the Office of the Grand Vizier, in A Mkt Mhm 658/14, 19 Ş 1313, document no. 7. In one case, a close friend of the Antep American College principle was found with "seditious" (*muzır*) letters under his possession. See A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313.

The central government did not want the case to be closed. A thorough investigation by the ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs revealed and reported Karabet's notebook to contain "radical and seditious letters," which were contrary to the state, law, and order.[164] Written as sermons, two long letters sounded like Karabet's jeremiad. These letters provide a detailed example of material that the government considered sedition: they complained against the imperial order, claiming that persistent oppression inflicted upon the Armenians called for an imminent fall of the Ottoman, "Turkish-Muslim," Empire. These letters were addressed to the students in American College, whom Karabet sought to electrify and make militant:

> Rise up my sons... in this delivery I will give you something other than paper and pen. Run to the battlefield bearing your sword. May your mothers not worry about you... Unfurl your flag and I [have] prepared your guns... I prepared [them] against all these insults that they [have] long have eaten Armenians' bread and drank Armenians' water yet in return have cursed us in five languages... [These] vile Turks amused themselves and upset Armenians permanently. Their ears are deafest, their eyes blindest. Our land is not Rumelia or Persia. Our homeland is Armenia in Turkey and we [have] maintained our religion [customs] to this day.[165]

More explicitly, Karabet's second letter called all Armenians to bear arms and exact revenge on the Turks:

> Even the mountains we claim. Armenians come to Armenia. Form your ranks and run passionately against the Turks like you are going to a wedding. We should save our land with blood... Cry "Damn Turkey, long and long live Armenia!" Let us be saved and unite... Now is the perfect time, do your best.

[164] A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313, document nos. 2, 3.
[165] And so "this is the translation of one copybook (*defter*) seized from Karabet the son of Mesih," in A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313, document no. 4.

Immediately translated to the Ottoman Turkish, these letters reached the Council of Ministers, the Sublime Porte, the Ministries, and other departments concerned.[166] Also enclosed with these letters were the findings of Karabet's local interrogation and trial. Karabet defended himself at court, pleading not guilty. Admitting his letters were radical and seditious in content, he denied being the author. Karabet "claimed that he had borrowed [copied] these from newspapers under the possession of American missionaries."[167]

Government agents did not give undeserved credit to Karabet's denial.[168] Karabet was guilty until proven innocent; missionaries were innocent until proven guilty. Next, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to call him to the local court for a hearing. However, an expert analysis of the content of the copybook concluded that calling missionaries to the hearing was unnecessary.[169] Based on a phraseological analysis (*tarz-ı ifâde*) of the letters with reference to "general knowledge" of newspapers and missionary publications, experts identified that the letters were not copied from newspapers and had not been penned by missionaries. Karabet, they said, was lying.[170] To close official debates over the case, the Ministry of Internal Affairs informed other central government branches (particularly the Office of the Grand Vizier) that the copybook was taken as evidence from its owner, missionaries were left

[166] A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313, document no. 5 (front page).
[167] A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313, document no. 7. And the introduction of the dissertation chapter, "Stranger in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure."
[168] A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313, document nos. 2, 3, 7.
[169] A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313, document nos. 2, 3, 6.
[170] A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313, document no. 6.

outside the case, and Karabet would be tried in the local court "unless decided otherwise."[171]

As demonstrated in increasing numbers of cases during the 1890s, the Ottoman government worked to prevent American missionaries from distributing their publications in villages. In monitoring and interrogating suspects, vigilant governors and police played the primary role. A web of communication between the central government and these local agents determined the decisions that were to be taken on particular cases that involved seditious letters found to be against social norms and state interests. Evidently, the central government tried to maintain justice and fairness in responding to those caught with letters of sedition.[172]

A Case of Textbooks

Principal of Merzifon Anatolia College in Amasya and a widely-read author among church-goers in Boston, Charles Tracy referred to publishing activities as the greatest contributor to the American Board's Turkey mission."[173] With missionary fellows in İstanbul, Tracy agreed that "evangelism is [its] pioneer work. The work of translation and publication is one mission very eminent among others… How large," exclaimed Tracy, "is the fruitage of their influence!"[174] Ottoman authorities knew exactly what Tracy was talking

[171] A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313, document no. 3.
[172] Similar cases are in A Mkt Mhm 649/14, 21 Ş 1313; Dh Mkt 1947/47, 13 L 1309.
[173] Y Prk Mf 3/54, 29 Z 1313, document no. 2; Charles Tracy, *A Cry to Heaven from a Housetop* (Boston: American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1893); Charles Tracy, *Silkenbraid: Or, a Story of Mission Life in Turkey* (Boston: ABCFM, 1893).
[174] Charles C. Tracy, "Salient Points in Mission History," p. 67.

about.[175] In particular, they knew about missionaries' educational works, which Tracy said is "now our main business as missionaries."[176] Worries that missionaries' religious works would transgress law and order in lower layers of Ottoman society caused government agents to be cautious, vigilant, and ready to work overtime. On the other hand, optimism that missionaries' educational works would promote scientific knowledge and thus benefit the younger Ottomans caused these agents to be less cautious and vigilant. Of scholars and textbooks then, the government became more tolerant.[177]

The central government had wide-ranging information and had taken inventories of missionary teachers, textbooks, and schools at its disposal.[178] This section shall focus on a specific case to examine the imperial inventories, their content and implications. On 11 June 1896 one inventory of this type was completed on the Anatolia College in Merzifon. A product of local investigation (from the Sivas Province) and intensive studies, this inventory provided information about the faculty, staff, and textbooks read in the college. It had recorded teachers' names, their citizenship, where and when they had

[175] Examples are found in Dh Mkt 1540/31, 1 M 1306; Dh Mkt 1765/117, 15 S 1308; Dh Mkt 1925/27, 23 B 1309; Dh Mkt 412/50, 23 S 1313; Dh Mkt 2091/127, 28 Ra 1316; Dh Mkt 2309/49, 21 L 1317; Dh Mkt 460/40, 17 Z 1319.
[176] Charles C. Tracy, "Salient Points in Mission History," p. 67.
[177] "Prevent sedition" and "refund school expenses," in İ Hus 84/1318 Ca 48, 22 Ca 1318; "the imperial order for the Beirut Governor's help to Mr. William from Carnegie Institute during his research," in Dh Mui 57/27, 12 M 1328; Dh Mui 80/3-32, 30 C 1328; "protect missionaries and their institutions," in Dh Eum 5Şb 72/12, 11 M 1337. For another perspective on the subject, see Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Schoolbooks and the Hamidian Ideology," in *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908*, pp. 187, 271-277.
[178] "Investigation of foreigners," in Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301, document nos. 2-8; "schools in Beirut," in Yprk Mf 2/22, 22 S 1309; "missionary activities and schools in Mersin," in Y Prk Mf 3/11, 2 B 1311; "books, maps, and journals in American Library," in Y Prk Mf 4/44, 29 Z 1315; "American Girls College in Üsküdar," in Y Prk Tşf 4/13, 1 B 1312; a later source on "American College in Adana," in Hr Sys 2415/53, 16 December 1915.

received their diplomas, and names of textbooks, place and year of publication, and the language in which they were written.[179]

American missionaries expected "natives" to become "self-governing" and "self-supporting."[180] They succeeded in this objective as far as the Merzifon Anatolia College faculty and staff were concerned. Edward Dickens and other American missionaries led the college administration and continued to teach English, philosophy, and several courses on mathematics.[181] Other courses, including local languages, physics, and music, were offered by Arakil Sivaslıyan, Ohannes Manacıyan, and other native-Ottoman faculty staff. Significantly, the Ottoman language teachers were recruited from the college's own graduates and from the graduates of other missionary colleges.[182] Thus to

[179] Y Prk Mf 3/54, 29 Z 1313, documents nos. 2, 3.

[180] Here we shall note the following. Between the 1880s and the 1910s, the works of second-generation American missionaries suggest that they had adapted well to living and serving in the Ottoman Empire. Toward the early 1910s, these missionaries might not depend on local assistance from Christian converts and their students. However, the converts and the students chose either to work in missionary institutions or to emigrate to the United States in groups. As *American Board Charts* illustrate, the increase in missionaries and local workers in overseas missionary institutions were like the following. In 1820, 88 missionaries and 30 local workers; in 1860, 376 missionaries and 787 local workers; in 1885, 422 missionaries and 2183 local workers; in 1910, 593 missionaries and 4723 local workers; in 1915, 656 missionaries and 4777 local workers. The charts seem to count only the male missionaries by excluding family members. In a future study, we hope to examine the details of local assistance given to the missionaries. *American Board Charts: A Graphic Presentation of the Foreign Work of the Congregational Churches of America*, sheet no. 3.

[181] Names, degrees and positions of American missionaries in the Anatolia College are like the following: Edward Dickens (Princeton graduate of 1864), administrator and teacher of English and philosophy; George White (Iowa graduate of 1881), teacher of English; Frans Geech (?), (Carlton graduate of 1889), teacher of mathematics; Suzanne Dickens (Elmira graduate of 1890), teacher of mathematics. Y Prk Mf 3/54, 29 Z 1313, document no. 2.

[182] Names, degrees and positions of native staff in the Anatolia College are like the following: Arakil Sivaslıyan (Carlton graduate of 1891), teacher of mathematics; Ohannes Manacıyan (Antep graduate of 1882), teacher of Physics; Dimitri Teoharidi (Anatolia graduate of 1887), teacher of Greek Language; Ohannes Agopyan (Anatolia graduate of 1886), teacher of Ottoman Language and Literature; Avadis Gelinciyan (Anatolia graduate of 1886), teacher of Armenian Language; Akilef Yoalmidis (Anatolia graduate of 1892), lecturer of Greek Language; Yerapyon (Merzifon Girls College graduate of 1868), teacher of Armenian language; Lucy (Merzifon Girls College graduate of 1890), teacher of handwriting and diction; Aspasya (Bursa Girls College graduate of 1891), teacher of Greek Language; Seyak Tomayan (Anatolia College graduate of 1893), teacher of Music; Anna (İstanbul Girls College graduate of 1859), mentor;

American missionary college graduates—whose degrees met the Ottoman educational standards—personal connections offered teaching positions. Apparently, their employment (as native teachers) by the missionaries did not merit an imperial response.[183]

Textbooks read in the missionary college were checked and listed but not often censored by the imperial authorities. However, we shall note, textbooks were categorized not by the content (as was the case with religious publications) but by the subject matter. As examined below, students in missionary colleges studied certain subjects (including engineering and sciences) from textbooks imported from the United States and Europe, and certain subjects, such as Ottoman history, from textbooks published in the Empire.[184] Except two, all the textbooks were up to date, one-third of the total being published within five years of the 1896 inventory.[185]

New York and Boston were the major textbook exporters for missionary schools.[186] Lewis' *Engineering* (1889), Sonton's *English Grammar* (1893),

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Arusban (Merzifon Girls College graduate of 1893), teacher of Music. Y Prk Mf 3/54, 29 Z 1313, document no. 2.

[183] The government knew but did not react to the employment of Ottoman non-Muslim graduates in American missionary schools. Y Prk Mf 5/20, 2 R 1325, document no. 41. Muslims' enrolment and employment in these schools were a different matter, however. See the dissertation chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," the section on Ottomans in missionary institutions.

[184] Y Prk Mf 3/54, 29 Z 1313, documents nos. 2, 3.

[185] Apparently recommended but not required, the two textbooks were *The History of Ancient Greek Cities and Monuments* (1879, printed in Greek) and *Secrets of Being* (İzmir: Mısıryan, 1878, printed in Armenian).

[186] New York and Boston were the major cities of exporting textbooks to missionaries partly because missionaries had come from these cities and familiar with publications there. In addition, ABCFM missionary headquarters in Boston chose the books from New England markets. The Merzifon Anatolia College imported three textbooks from London and assigned them for courses on chemistry, logic, and world history, one textbook from Edinburgh for courses on biology, six textbooks from Paris for courses on French language and literature, four books from Athens for courses on Greek language and algebra, and two books from Venice, a book on ancient monuments and the Armenian translation of *Télémaque*.

Berry's *Economics and Politics* (1890) and 14 other textbooks were published in New York and read in Merzifon. Winters' *Applied Engineering* (1888) and *Analytical Engineering* (1892), Eastwool's *Science of Sanitation* (1890), and three other textbooks left Boston to be read in Merzifon. In the absence of domestic publications in the fields of sciences and engineering, the Ottoman government accepted and permitted the importation and use of these textbooks in missionary schools. In courses on Islam, history, law, language, and geography, the missionaries used textbooks published in İstanbul. Ali Nazima's *A Brief History of the Ottomans (Muhtasar Târih-i Osmânî*, 1892), *History of Islam* (*Târih-i İslâm*, 1893), and *Science of Speech* (*Fen-ni Belagât*, 1891), Hasan Fehmi's *State Law* (*Hukûk-u Devlet*, 1883), Muallim Naci's *Studies in Ottoman Reading* (*Ta'lîm-i Kırâ'at-i Osmânî*, 1886), and 33 other books were included in the reading lists of the Merzifon College. As 77 items classified in the inventory demonstrate, 38 books were written in Ottoman and published in the Empire, the rest being imported.[187] A typical student in the college was supposed to read and write in multiple languages (Ottoman as the official language, English as the school's main language of instruction, French as a second language, and Armenian or Greek as a native language). In addition, they must have been exposed to a variety of cultures thanks to the diverse origins of their teachers and textbooks.

[187] Y Prk Mf 3/54, 29 Z 1313, document nos. 2, 3. The cirruculum at state-run schools and missionary schools were similar in courses on Ottoman grammar, history, and law. However, these schools set different curriculum and assigned different textbooks for courses on foreign languages and sciences. For comparison of these textbooks with the textbooks assigned in Ottoman colleges, see Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Schoolbooks and the Hamidian Ideology," *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908*, pp. 187-202.

Dated 11 May 1893, the speech of missionary scholar Charles Tracy captured the objectives and achievements of his society's publishing and education activities: translation and publication reaped great benefits and education provided American missionaries their "main work."[188] To missionaries' credit, their students (graduates) acquired an education, arguably the best in the Empire, all thanks to a rich array of teachers and textbooks. Whereas other activities (primarily religious and public-oriented) met with a spontaneous and vigilant government response, educational activities (in the eyes of many bureaucrats a noble, benevolent enterprise oriented toward fresh intellectual minds) were monitored and documented, but tolerated. Varied official responses to missionary publications demonstrate that the central government did not outlaw missionary publications *en masse*. State agents had to forbid and destroy those publications with potential to have a combustible influence on minorities and rural subjects, while they approved and permitted educational publications that promised scientific learning. Eventually, the central government's interpretation of the objective and substance of published material helped missionaries to realign their target audience for their purposes, whether educational or religious.[189]

Conclusion

[188] Charles C. Tracy, "Salient Points in Mission History," p. 67.
[189] In another case, the Merzifon Anatolia College teacher Tomayan was detained in March 1893 by local police patrols, due to having "published seditious stuff." Immediately after his detainment, the central government requested a detailed investigation to ensure that his prosecution had relied on solid "proof." A Mkt Mhm 73/10, 27 Ş 1310, document nos. 2-7; A Mkt Mhm 733/35, 26 N 1310, document nos. 2-4.

Far-reaching responses to missionary publications in the Ottoman Empire owe their origins in part to broader concerns of the central government, but they also stem from a mixture of local cases examined above. In checking missionaries and licensing their institutions, the spread of imperial authority over local agents, missionaries, and communities precipitated socio-political control over the issue of publishing and distribution activities, manifesting itself in the form of vigilance, monitoring, and more regulation on publishers—native merchants as well as missionaries—and their product. Carried out by local agents and customs officers, inspections played an increasingly active role, inviting legal and sometimes police action. In particular, those cases considered as a challenge to the imperial order attracted serious attention and stronger responses at imperial and local levels. Other cases, which authorities considered atypical yet in line with its regulations, were tolerated by the central government, regardless of the local agent's opinion on the matter. Indeed, specific activities examined in this chapter were another manifestation of the central government's desire to maintain ultimate authority over local officials in controlling missionary publications.

Though resolved to controlling all printing activities in the Empire, the central government failed to make ends meet and suffered from a shortage of staff in both quantity and competence. Aware of certain limitations, imperial bureaucrats were often improvising policies, ordering new decrees and creating regulations. New policies sought to contain the means (printing devices like movable types and machines) and elaborated on the records of missionary publishers in an effort to make general and case-oriented decisions. As implied

in these policies, the central government conveyed a message: missionary or businessman, no publisher could import or print and distribute controversial and seditious materials in the Empire. Apparently, the fruits of "translation and publication," proudly presented by Charles Tracy, gave a bitter taste to imperial bureaucrats. They gave targeted and pragmatic responses to publishing missions nonetheless, keeping religious publications from rural regions on the one hand and allowing educational publications in cities and missionary colleges on the other. A sign of a qualitative line drawn between religious and educational publications, almost all religious publications underwent more careful scrutiny because it was assumed that religious publications were more likely to be challenging the Ottoman *modus vivendi.*[190]

Along these lines, the central government pursued a targeted policy, distinguishing educational materials from other materials and rural areas from urban areas where these materials would be published and distributed. In brief, the imperial bureaucrats generated pragmatic, coherent policies in dealing with missionary publications. Enforced with imperial supreme authority, these policies aimed to refine the rules of publishing in its domain, forcing not only missionaries but also other publishers to seek their approval and publish only "the publishable."

Despite being frustrated with the imperial bureaucracy, missionaries kept printing and distributing (sometimes off the imperial records) materials including the Bible (not interpretations and commentaries) and textbooks. To

[190] Charles C. Tracy, "Salient Points in Mission History," p. 67; Rufus Anderson, *History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches*, pp. 503-518. On *modus vivendi* see the chapter's footnote no. 24.

illustrate, by the year 1914 they had already published 20,549,799 pages in their licensed presses.[191] A missionary would definitely want to be allowed to do more. Commenting on Henry Otis Dwight's longing for "changes of policy or method which might somewhat forestall" Ottoman officials, one European Embassy secretary had consoled him with the Turkish proverb, "the dogs run out and bark, but still the caravan goes on!"[192] Packed with all types of books, the missionary caravan went on. But the dogs did not just bark. They bit too, somewhat hobbling the caravan.

[191] *American Board Charts: A Graphic Presentation of the Foreign Work of the Congregational Churches of America*. The research for this chapter has failed to determine the extent to which 'unlicensed' presses and 'imported' materials contributed to American missionaries' publishing mission in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the numbers of publications, imported and printed in 'unlicensed' missionary presses must have been remarkably high. Therefore, the Ministry of Internal Affairs proclaimed in June 1893 that "missionary publications… shipped to the Empire" would [from now on] receive full inspection and their delivery [would] come after [they are] approved "by the Ministry of Education." When/if an inspection report–on sender, publisher, receiver, content, and reason for shipment—was affirmative, a publication would be "registered in this ministry's index of publications." Only then would provincial agents allow it to be duplicated or distributed. Dh Mtk 61/33, 22 Za 1310. For a number of cases that led to this proclamation, see Dh Mkt 1948/97, 15 L 1309.

[192] Henry Otis Dwight, *Constantinople and Its Problems*, pp. 45-46.

5

Approaching Individual Missionaries as the Object of Public Security

Tuesday, 3 September 1901, was a horrible day for Ellen M. Stone. Born in Roxbury and educated at Chelsea Grammar and High School in Massachusetts, she had come to the Ottoman Empire as a missionary.[1] On the way to Gorna Dzhumaia, a small town in south-western Bulgaria, Stone and her local companion Katerina Stefanova-Tsilka were ambushed by an armed gang of twenty bandits. The gang captured them, hoping to intimidate the imperial authorities and demonstrate that in their corner of the Ottoman realm anarchy ruled.[2] Later known as "the Miss Stone Affair," the capture received anxious reaction from American officials, churches, and press. Theodore Roosevelt, inaugurated as President of the United States eleven days after Stone was captured, instructed the State Department to "spare no efforts" on the matter. Church circles and newspapers collaborated, turning the affair into a *cause célèbre* and raising $110,000 from church-going readers, the exact sum of

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[1] William Eleroy Curtis, *The Turk and His Lost Provinces* (Chicago, New York, Toronto, London, Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1903), pp. 217-242; Teresa Carpenter, *The Miss Stone Affair: America's First Modern Hostage Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2003); Ellen M. Stone photographs, online [promacedonia.org/bugarash/stone/gallery.html]. Ottoman records referring to Stone include: Hr Sys 56/2, 28 June 1903; Ya Hus 424/41, 14 L 1319; Yprk Mk 11/6, 25 C 1319; Y Prk Tşf 6/70, 7 Za 1319 [Archival sources of this type are in the Ottoman Archives Division of the Prime Minister's Office, İstanbul, Turkey].

[2] Y Mtv 231/147, 24 Ra 1320; Y Prk Tşf 6/70, 7 Za 1319; Dh Mkt 458/21, 17 Z 1319; Dh Mkt 460/56, 17 Z 1319; John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), pp. 33-34; William Eleroy Curtis, *The Turk and His Lost Provinces*, pp. 217-242.

ransom put on the head of Stone by the bandits.[3] Stone was detained for almost half a year until she was finally released on 23 February 1902.[4]

Amid American concerns for Stone, Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Tevfik Pasha declared his government was not liable for the Stone Affair. Regarding "this girl," the pasha informed the American Consul-General Charles Dickinson, "our side, viz. the central government" (*bizim taraf yânî Hükümet*) shall retain "non-responsibility" (*adem-i mes'ûliyyet*).[5] This diplomatic manoeuvre aside, the Miss Stone Affair received remarkable attention from imperial bureaucrats whose actions suggested they felt a sense of responsibility. The affair invited their attention not only because it could upset relations with the U.S.—a growing power in the region—but also because it revealed the extent to which social order had deteriorated and fallen into the hands of local gangs.[6] The bureaucrats worked hard to resolve the matter: they regularly met to discuss the affair with Grand Vizier Mehmed Said Pasha and drafted decrees to be issued by Sultan Abdulhamid II. Decrees promulgated

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[3] Ya Hus 424/41, 14 L 1319; Teresa Carpenter, *The Miss Stone Affair: America's First Modern Hostage Crisis*; "Large Donations for Miss Stone's Ransom: Kidnapped Missionary's Family Among the Contributors," *The New York Times* (special issue), 6 October 1901, p. 1; John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*, pp. 33-34.

[4] Ya Hus 424/41, 14 L 1319; Dh Mkt 441/21, 5 Z 1319; Y Mtv 231/147, 24 Ra 1320; Y Prk Mk 11/6, 25 C 1319; Y Prk Tşf 6/70, 7 Za 1319; William Eleroy Curtis, *The Turk and His Lost Provinces*, pp. 217-242; John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*, pp. 33-34.

[5] Ya Hus 424/41, 14 L 1319, document nos. 2-3.

[6] Ibid., Y Ee 94/43, 5 Ca 1320; Y Prk Eşa 2/57, 29 Z 1320; Y Prk Eşa 50/1, 5 M 1325; Ottoman-U.S. treaties in "Amerika-Devlet-i Aliyye [the United States-Imperial Government]," in *Muahedat Mecmuasi* [Collection of treaties] (İstanbul: Hakikat, 1294 [1877-78]), II: 2-24; Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türk-Amerikan Münasebetlerine Kısa bir Bakış* [Overview of Turkish-American relations] (Ankara: Doğuş, 1959); Çağrı Erhan, "Main Trends in Ottoman-American Relations," in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan eds., *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future* (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 3-35; Emrah Sahin, "Review Article: American Turkish Relations in Retrospective," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* vol. 12, nos. 1 and 2 (2006): 195-198.

new orders to be implemented by officials and security forces in Bulgaria, even going so far as establishing a special committee for the purpose of negotiating with the kidnappers. Furthermore, they ordered that local authorities "evacuate nearby villages" (*kimsenin mahal-i mezkûreye yaklaşmaması*) and that half the Third Cavalry Regiment "move immediately" (*seyr-i serî*) to corner bandits around Strymoniko in Greece, predicting this operation would rescue Stone.[7]

By characterizing the Miss Stone Affair as "one notorious outrage against the missionaries," presenting aspects of "Washington's" reaction to this outrage, and yet failing to mention Ottoman government attempts to save Miss Stone, John A. DeNovo embodies a broader trend in missionary historiography. Whereas the U.S. government's limited role in missionary affairs has received attention, the Ottoman government's considerable efforts to resolve missionary-related incidents have been either ignored or not examined at any length.[8] Scholarship that discusses the Ottoman role in these incidents has defined

[7] Ya Hus 424/41, 14 L 1319, document no. 2; Şakir's report to Sultan Abdulhamid II, in Yprk Mk 11/6, 1319 C 25, document no. 2.

[8] John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*, p. 33. See, for example, Ussama S. Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations, 1820-2001* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010); Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Michael B. Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present* (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Co., 2007); Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman empire during the nineteenth century] (İstanbul: Arba, 1989); Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century," *The Muslim World* vol. 92, nos. 3-4 (2002): 287–313; Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East; Missionary Influence on American policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971); James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean world, 1776-1882* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969); Çağrı Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," *Turkish Yearbook* vol. 30 (2000): 191-212.

imperial policy simply as "political," "reactionary" and "anti/pro-missionary."[9] Moreover, we seldom find in existing literature any analysis of how imperial statecraft manifested itself in dealings with American missionaries operating in the Empire. A closer examination of the Ottoman system of governance and its interactions with missionaries at the imperial and provincial levels will provide a more balanced account of Ottoman Empire-American missionary relations.

This chapter explores the top-down approach of the Ministry of Public Security (*Zabtiye Nezâreti*), examining how the government approached missionaries as individuals who threatened or were threatened by Ottoman subjects. It is our contention that a defining policy was the government's subtle endeavour to exclude missionary cases from diplomatic purview and treat it exclusively as a domestic matter. In so doing, Ottoman bureaucrats aimed to thwart U.S. interference. They involved every provincial agency in processing these cases, from collecting intelligence to orchestrating security operations and

[9] İlknur Polat Haydaroğlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Yabancı Okullar* [Foreign schools in the Ottoman empire] (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990), pp. 193-211; Nahid Dinçer, *Yabancı Özel Okullar: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Kültür Yoluyla Parçalanması* [Foreign private colleges: the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by cultural means] (İstanbul: ER-TU Matbaası, 1970), pp. 85-87; Musa Çakır, *Anadolumuz Asla Hristiyan Olmayacak: Misyonerler Memleketinize Geri Dönünüz* [Our Anatolia will never convert to Christianity: missionaries, go back home] (İstanbul: M.S. Matbası, 1966); James E. Dittes, "The Christian Mission and Turkish Islam," *The Muslim World* vol. 45, no. 2 (April 1955): 134–144; Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), especially pp. 87-129; Şinasi Gündüz, "Misyonerlik [Missionary activity]," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Turkish religious foundation encyclopaedia of Islam] (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2005), XXX: 193-199; Çağrı Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," pp. 191-212; Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American Relations] (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003), pp. 72-79; . For an analysis of the news in the American media and the views published by the missionaries on Ottomans' approach to missionaries and non-Muslims, see Justin McCarthy, *The Turk in America: The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010); "The Unscrupulous Turk: His Double-Faced Treatment of Our Missionaries," *The New York Times,* 17 April 1892, p. 17; untitled article by George P. Knapp in *The Washington Post*, 24 March 1899, p.6; "Turks as Violators," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 June 1896, p. 9.

determining responsibility. This chapter focuses on missionaries as individuals rather than on their institutions or activities. It complements previous chapters that have examined the licensing of institutions and controlling publications by investigating another area of contact between the central government and the missionaries, where the latter exist both as citizens to be protected and guarded against.

Imperial Justice

On 16 October 1904, Ottoman bureaucrats refuted allegations they were ineffective and biased in their treatment of American missionaries in the Empire. In a memorandum to the Sultan, they asserted: "Imperial decrees and the actions of the Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âlî*) have so far been completely effective." Any criticism of their policies, which was being articulated by missionaries, the U.S. government, and the missionaries' legal representatives, had been directed by "partial information" (*cüz'î tetkîk*), and was thus of no use in resolving matters relating to the rights and safety of foreigners in the Ottoman realm. The memorandum was an implicit expression of bureaucrats' confidence in the prevailing imperial statecraft. It was also an explicit statement of their belief that the central government could and should handle these matters "alone."[10]

[10] Ya Hus 477/43, 6 R 1322, document no. 5, two pages.

The 1904 Memorandum also revealed bureaucrats' assumption that only they had access to complete and impartial information on the missionaries. This assumption came from the work of provincial authorities. The central government had at its disposal many local agents collecting information, undertaking investigations, and implementing orders. As will be examined below, the Ministry of Public Security (*Zabtiye Nezâreti*), an important government branch, led these agents, tying them into a single imperial-security network.[11] Moreover, the government respected Public Security's judgment, partly because it was the only agency capable of producing in-depth analysis of security matters via an extensive network of sources, and partly because it "consisted of the most trusted men" in the capital.[12]

As the Empire's principal law-enforcement agency, the Ministry of Public Security collected evidence from its provincial agents, analysed it, and then submitted action-plans on specific incidents for the consent of other

[11] On 14 June 1869, the Law of Military Forces (*Asâkir-i Zabtiye Nizamnâmesi*) granted extended authority to the Ministry of Public Security, "Police" or "the Gendarmerie" in short. In 1879, the Reform Commission (*Islahat Komisyonu*) outlined administrative changes that affected this and other ministries. By the late nineteenth century, the Ministry of Public Security established a network of staff across the provinces. Derviş Okçabol, *Türk Zabita Tarihi ve Teşkilâtı Tarihçesi* [Institutional history of Turkish Police] (Ankara: Ankara Polis Entititüsü, 1940); Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey], (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 2000), II: 125-126; Glen W. Swanson, "The Ottoman Police," *Journal of Contemporary History* vol. 7, no. 1-2 (January and April 1972): 243-260, especially pp. 252-255. On the significance of the Public Security Forces in maintaining provincial order at a later period, see Ferdan Turgut, "Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 38, no. 2 (April 2002): 149-164, especially pp. 151-152.

[12] Shaw's study of the careers of the high-ranking bureaucrats in the Ministry of Public Security needs to be mentioned here. For example, Hafiz Mehmed Pasha (1880-1884), Kâmil Bey (1884-1890), Nazim Pasha (1890-1897), and Şefik Pasha (1897-1908) made distinguished careers and had the trust of the Sultan and many bureaucrats in the capital before they were assigned with leading the Ministry of Public Security. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey], II: 267.

government branches, including the Sublime Porte, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Dâhilîyye Nezâreti*), and the Ministry of Justice and [Religious] Sects (*'Adliye ve Mezâhîb Nezâreti*). A detailed examination of the archival sources—files of correspondence between government departments, debates over local safety and security at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, various local petitions and their processing in government offices, and incident reports from the Ministry of Public Security—demonstrates that the broader objective of the Ministry of Public Security was to maintain local law and order, while its specific objective was to find and punish persons, missionaries and Ottoman subjects alike, who violated imperial laws by encroaching on another's rights.[13] On these grounds, the ministry even accused some of its own agents of ignorance and abuse of their authority, resulting in government authorization to issue reprimands. Indeed, such incidents help to capture another aspect of 'imperial justice' that is presented in this chapter. Through an analysis of a series of public security incidents, this chapter reveals the way the *fin-de-siècle* central government sought to establish its own justice—separate from that of the provincial authorities—in either defending or punishing missionaries.[14]

[13] The archival sources include: Ya Hus 409/84, 22 R 1318; Y Prk Eşa 24/58, 27 Z 1313; Y Prk Eşa 52/2, 2 M 1326; Y Prk Um 67/30, 12 Ş 1321; Y Mtv 110/51, 6 C 1312; Dh Mkt 2355/32, 6 S 1318; Dh Eum 5Şb 2/59, 9 Z 1332; Dh Eum 5Şb 72/12, 11 M 1337; Dh Eum 5Şb 75/2 and 4, 1 S 1337; İ Hus 84/1318 Ca-48, 22 Ca 1318; Hr Sys 73/14, 15 January 1895; Dh Mui 11-2/16, 3 N 1327.

[14] See, for example, Hr Mkt 88/8, 10 M 1271; Dh Mui 7-3/36, 9 L 1327.

1. Intelligence and Evaluation

In the year 1906, the case of a certain Mois Aşçıyan occupied a top-priority space in the filing cabinet of Alexandretta Law-Enforcement Office (*İskenderun Zabtiye Dâiresi*). Away from Maraş, his native town, Aşçıyan had "been working in İskenderun for a period of several years." He was the preacher of the Protestant Church and a member of the administration of a local college in İskenderun, both of which were affiliated with American missionaries. For security officers, everything seemed typical until his activities were found to be more complicated than their records indicated. In the summer of 1906, an investigation turned up solid evidence to arrest Aşçıyan; he had "converted about 30 young Armenians to Protestantism, organized them into a new congregation under his leadership." Also included in the report were results of interrogations: Aşçıyan requested and "received from U.S. government... security expenses and taxes... due to the central government" (*Hükûmet-i Seniyyeye i'tâsına müte'ahhid bulundukları vergi ve bedelât-ı 'askeriyye*).[15] On 30 October 1906, the Ministry of Public Security transmitted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs the following verdict on Aşçıyan:

> Considering the case, his stay there [in Alexandretta] would be not good according to law and in fact (*merkûmun orada kalmasi câiz olmayacağına*) as reported from the Alexandretta Port Authority (*İskenderun İskele Komisyon Heyeti*). Based on further investigation... the committee of assessment states that he [Aşçıyan] should be made to reside in his native town Maraş...

[15] Zb 319/29, 17 Te 1322, document no. 2. Documents in this source do not mention the details of how Aşçıyan contacted the U.S. government and received its financial support. American missionaries must have helped Aşçıyan to meet the U.S. diplomats in Alexandretta.

> [the verdict is] to remove him to the mentioned town under the authority of the law-enforcement agency (*taht-ı zâbıtta*).[16]

The details of the Aşçıyan case help one understand the progression of data collection and analysis. It was local security officers who collected intelligence on cases of this sort, usually starting with third-person complaints. In collaboration with other state agents, these officers prepared and sent detailed case-reports to the Ministry of Public Security. Then, ministry officials in the capital elaborated on these reports and suggested their verdict to appropriate government branches, especially the Special Council of Ministers (*Meclîs-i Mahsûs-ı Vükelâ*) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the final stage, the verdict would be approved by the government and issued by the sultan. The process of handling missionary cases was all but identical with processes dealing with cases of any other nature. The inner machinations of the government suggest that the government agencies viewed missionary-related matters as part of domestic affairs and classified them within the body of domestic issues.

Besides local security officers, provincial agents frequently submitted reports on their respective regions, generally concentrating on ethnic disturbances. These reports also reveal ties to American missionaries.[17] In

[16] Zb 319/29, 17 Te 1322, document no. 2.
[17] Y Prk Myd 20/87, 9 N 1315; Y Mrz D 11662; Y Mrz D 11681; Y Mrz D 12425; Y Mrz D 14527; Y Prk Tşf 4/1, 10 S 1312; reports from the provinces of Aleppo, Beirut, Bitlis, Harput, Erzurum, İzmir, Trabzon, in Y Prk Um 67/30, 12 Ş 1321; missionaries converting their houses into institutions without government's approval, in Y Prk Um 23/69, 27 Ca 1309. For social unrest in the Ottoman Empire and other issues related to missionary property, see the dissertation's chapter, "Regulating American Missionary Activity through the Granting and Denying of Licenses." We should note that on numerous occasions, the offices of the

particular, many of these reports note legal cases regarding missionary propaganda and forced conversion of the native populace. Strikingly, they also contain details of specific cases in which missionaries had suffered from native prejudice and attacks. In both cases, imperial policy remained restoring order and safety.[18]

Bureaucrats in the capital were careful to spell out that the central government's "approach [to] non-Muslim" subjects and "missionaries" was fair and no different from their approach to Muslim subjects. Furthermore, they were explicit that the government would continue to "tolerate missionaries."[19] The reason for this careful presentation was twofold: they wanted to shield imperial regulations from criticism and display their magnanimous treatment of missionaries. To bureaucrats, the government was there for missionaries when they sought its help; in certain cases government agents guarded missionaries,

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Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs collaborated with American, European, and Ottoman foreign intelligence services. This chapter does not, however, examine the results of this collaboration as they are not specifically related to the Ottoman government's treatment of the missionaries. Importantly, however, the collaboration with foreign intelligence services provided significant information on anti-Ottoman activities. For example, the Bulgarian Revolutionary Organization purchased guns and ammunitions with money collected from U.S. donations, in Y Prk Eşa 52/2, 2 M 1326; Albanian committees of sedition (*fesâd komiteleri*) had been working to revolt against the imperial authority, in Y Prk Eşa 52/99, 20 Z 1326; Armenian mischief-makers (*fesedeleri*) came to Cyprus on their way to the Ottoman hinterland (the provinces in Central and Eastern Anatolia), in Zb 317/144, 14 A 1322; the U.S. Embassy requested that the central government help an American citizen to find money stolen from his home during his imprisonment, in Y Mtv 110/51, 6 C 1312; a note from the Ministry of Public Security informs the Ottoman Embassy in Washington that the name of the person mentioned to be communicating from the Ottoman Empire in anti-Ottoman newspapers in the United States does not exist, in Zb 339/51, 1 T 1324.

[18] See, for example, an orphanage belonging to American missionaries issuing propaganda, where attempts were made to convert children to Protestantism, in Ya Hus 409/84, 22 R 1318.

[19] Y Prk Bşk 35/78, 28 N 1311.

protected their property, and compensated them for their losses.[20] Those agents who knowingly allowed missionaries to suffer were subject to penalties and various forms of punishment.

Archival sources from Internal Affairs, including incoming reports on important incidents and communications with the American Embassy and provincial administrations, indicate that imperial policy did not, as a rule, run counter to missionaries. For instance, during the 1890s the government's efforts to defend missionaries were striking in their visibility. At this time, civil turmoil— or what imperial bureaucrats called "movements of sedition" (*fesâd hareketleri*) –became widespread, especially in the eastern provinces. Local incidents between fighting groups left missionaries and their property at the mercy of local mobs. Intelligence reports sent from, amongst others, Aleppo, Bitlis, Harput, Haçin, Merifon, Sivas, as-Suwayda and Urfa, drove imperial authorities to issue provincial authorities with a series of specific emergency orders that aimed to avert missionary suffering.[21]

[20] Examples include: an imperial order to assign police officers to guard the houses of American missionaries, in Y Prk Eşa 26/100, 23 L 1314; a thief who stole a missionary's purse was caught and detained in a local police station (*Zabtiye*), in Ya Hus 322/5, 19 N 1312; the murderer of an American missionary priest on route from Adana to Alexandretta was caught and taken to court, in A Mkt Um 521/47, 27 Ca 1278.

[21] Specific imperial orders include: "guard American missionaries in Bitlis," even though local unrest had ended, in Y Prk Ask 10/60, 30 Ca 1313; "protect their houses," in Y Prk Eşa 26/100, 23 L 1314; "do anything possible to guard" the U.S. citizens during local unrest, in A Mkt Mhm 609/5, 13 Ca 1315; "guard missionaries" in Haçin, in A Mkt Mhm 616/11, 24 Ca 1313; "protect women missionaries," in A Mkt Mhm 617/21, 3 Za 1314; "take all measures to guard missionaries" in as-Suwayda, in A Mkt Mhm 651/4, 1 Za 1313; "protect American missionaries" in Harput, in A Mkt Mhm 657/23, 24 Ca 1313; "protect missionaries" in Merzifon, in A Mkt Mhm 660/73, 16 C 1313 and in Sivas, in A Mkt Mhm 662/5, 21 L 1314; "police officers should escort" missionaries during their trip from Urfa to Van, in A Mkt Mhm 648/13, 20 B 1313.

Intelligence reports contained retrospective cases as well. These served not as a means to prevent incidents, but as a way to undo previous acts of injustice. To illustrate, an early report of this type records one Ottoman Nestorian Christian who gave a warm reception to a missionary group visiting his village. The provincial officials intervened, found him guilty without due legal process, and imprisoned him in a local police station. On 1 January 1853, the central government, having discussed the case, urged these "ignorant" agents to release him as soon as they received the attached order. The agents also had to learn and implement imperial law, and reveal the grounds on which they had put this "innocent" man into prison.[22]

Intelligence reports and imperial orders exchanged between imperial and provincial authorities show interconnected cycles of operation. Provincial agents continually sent data to the central government and imperial orders were, in turn, transmitted to provincial governors and security officers. These orders required governors and officers to undertake various actions. For instance, provincial governors were obliged to "assign sufficient number of police forces" (law-enforcement officers) in their regions to "properly watch and vigilantly guard" missionaries (*hüsn-ü muhâfaza*), protect their property, and "escort missionaries" during their travel. According to bureaucrats in the

[22] Hr Mkt 56/3, 20 R 1269.

capital, "the central government" was indeed working to "endow missionaries with safety by any means necessary."[23]

In the final years of the nineteenth century, missionary-related reports were numerous and became increasingly serious. This was mainly because missionaries became the most targeted group of fatal attacks amidst social disorder in provinces. Locals—mobs, rebels and even government agents—targeted a growing number of missionaries and their institutions in regions where public security had already become a critical issue. To illustrate, a local gang sabotaged the American College in Merzifon, several unnamed rebels charged and damaged missionary institutions in Tarsus, and in some instances American missionaries were verbally insulted, attacked and fatally assaulted by angry locals.[24]

Bureaucrats in the capital reacted by turning to intelligence reports. Their decisions came in three distinct phases. In the first phase they responded rather typically, ordering local authorities to further investigate each case and provide the central government with more information. In the second, they elaborated on evidence and transmitted a more detailed and targeted set of

[23] "Properly watch," in Y Prk Ask 10/60, 30 Ca 1313; "by any means," in A Mkt Mhm 609/5, 13 Ca 1315; "escort missionaries," in A Mkt Mhm 694/4, 1 C 1313; A Mkt Mhm 648/13, 20 B 1313.

[24] The suffering of missionaries at the hands of Ottoman locals deserves further analysis and will be the subject of a future study. "Merzifon," in Y Prk Ask 8/66, 30 Z 1310; "Tarsus," in Ya Hus 335/67, 11 Ra 1313. See, for example, Captain Hasan who insulted a missionary priest in Sivas, in A Mkt Mhm 701/5, 23 Za 1312; a local attack on two American missionaries in Halep, in Hr Sys 71/28, 21 February 1891; the murder of a missionary on the way from Adana to Aleppo, in A Mkt Um 554/74, 15 L 1278; the murderer of a missionary priest and his servant caught near Maraş, in A Mkt Um 521/47, 27 Ca 1278; "captured," in A Mkt Um 567/9, 21 Za 1278; A Mkt Um 568/54, 26 Za 1278; a Muslim thief who stole the possessions of a missionary woman caught, in Ya Hus 322/5, 19 N 1312.

orders. Finally they passed judgement: punishing the guilty, redressing the injustice, compensating the suffering party, and taking measures to prevent similar cases from occurring.

One specific case that represents the progression of these phases dates to 1892. A decade earlier, an American missionary, Bartlett, and his sister, wife and children had settled in Burdur, Central Anatolia.[25] From the day of their arrival the Bartletts "were not well-received by Greek and Armenian residents in the town." Obvious prejudice turned into open hostility in a short period of time. Residents made "frequent attempts to expel [the Bartletts] from their residence." After failed attempts, the Bartlett residence "suddenly collapsed [was demolished because of locals] throwing dirt and stones." [26]

The Bartletts had help in seeking compensation. On their behalf, the U.S. Embassy in İstanbul requested "1,200 liras against *damnum absque injuria* (loss without injury)" from the central government. The embassy also registered "a definite demand to correct and substitute local authorities responsible."[27] However Ottoman officials in the capital did not take these requests into consideration, rather they applied the aforementioned three-phased response mechanism.[28]

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[25] For the Bartlett residence in Burdur and its legal status, see the dissertation's chapter, "Regulating American Missionary Activity through the Granting and Denying of Licenses," footnotes 102-105.
[26] Ya Hus 264/183, 24 R 1310.
[27] This chapter finds *damnum absque injuria* as an appropriate transliteration of the Ottoman terminology, *dûçâr olduğu zarâr ve ziyân mukâbili*. Ya Hus 264/183, 24 R 1310.
[28] U.S. diplomats in İstanbul had been invited to the Sublime Porte for a meeting to discuss issues of importance with Sultan Abdulhamid II. In the meeting, they also mentioned the

Excluding U.S. diplomats from the process, imperial bureaucrats began by ordering the General-Governorship of Konya to investigate the Bartlett case and return with a report.[29] In a second round of orders, they wanted "the judicial authorities" (*cihet-i 'adliyye*) to continue "carrying out the obligatory investigation," including interrogation of suspects. At the same time, the local governor and the police in Burdur were authorized to search and "seize persons whose intervention had been found in the destruction of the [Bartlett] residence."[30]

Later reports to the central government suggest that the judicial investigation had gone smoothly. The guilty parties were identified, the local governor approved of the findings, and the police arrested several persons who led the attack. The government concluded that the guilty had to be punished, the Bartletts had to be defended and compensated, and future cases of this type had to be avoided:

> There is no need to worry even for a moment of time... 400 liras, the value of destroyed property as noted by the Province [of Konya], and 200 liras in return for other damages will be given to Mr. Bartlett... the total sum of 600 liras shall be requested and

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Bartlett case, and were told that their requests would be considered. While their requests were under consideration, the Sultan and Ottoman bureaucrats suggested that the U.S. diplomats "not attribute utmost importance to this specific incident" and "not think about sending battleships" to protect Bartlett. The Ottoman government did not consider the diplomats' requests at length, but certainly wanted to appear as if they did. This may well support this chapter's contention that the imperial bureaucrats wanted to not upset Ottoman-U.S. relations but, at the same time, deal with the Bartlett case as part of Ottoman domestic affairs. Ya Hus 264/183, 24 R 1310. For more, see the chapter's section on Ottoman-U.S. relations.

[29] On the correspondence between the capital and Konya, the Central Anatolian province that includes Burdur, the archival document mentions that "all intelligence [on the case of Bartlett] has been obtained through constant communication with the Province of Konya (*Konya Vilâyeti ile bi'l-defâat vukû bulan iş'ârat netîcesine göre*)," in Ya Hus 264/183, 24 R 1310.

[30] Ya Hus 264/183, 24 R 1310.

> taken from those who inflicted the damage [upon the Bartletts] and the imperial licence shall hereby be granted to Bartlett to rebuild the destroyed residence... in order to prevent future problems of the same sort, [we take the occasion of] this incident to give definite and obligatory warning to stop [bothering missionaries]... these are the imperial orders and the right thing to do.[31]

As this case demonstrates, local intelligence and investigative reports provided the major source of information for Ottoman bureaucrats dealing with missionaries' cases, led by judges, governors, and the police. In concluding this section, we argue the following: a three-part mechanism, which we outlined, gained in importance as the century drew to a close, becoming the central government's key strategy in its efforts to grapple with each missionary-related case. In addition, a thorough examination of the sources from the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Public Security suggests that the government resisted American interference and embraced a unilateral approach to missionary cases. Their principal objective being the maintenance of imperial justice and social order in provinces, the central government was directly involved in punishing local Ottoman agents and subjects for the sake of protecting missionaries.[32]

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[31] Ya Hus 264/183, 24 R 1310.

[32] This subject will be the focus of a future study. The cases that are examined but not presented in this chapter include: the murders of an American missionary and his servant, in A Mkt Um 521/47, 27 Ca 1278; an imperial order to "search" the suspects of a murder, in A Mkt Um 554/74, 15 L 1278; another order to take all possible measures to resolve the case, in A Mkt Um 542/55, 21 Ş 1278; suspects found and "the murderer captured," in A Mkt Um 568/54, 26 Za 1278; "natives in Maraş not allowed to [make seasonal trips to] summer pastures" for security reasons, in A Mkt Um 567/9, 21 Za 1278. Hasan Rakım Effendi, a senior official at the İstanbul Post Office, was found guilty of stealing checks while doing his job of checking letters sent to the missionaries from the United States. He was "arrested, punished, and exiled" to "a far away village," where he would work as "a low-key postman" away from missionaries and other foreigners. Zb 351/37, 9 Ş1323. A Muslim thief who had stolen the possessions of a missionary was found and arrested, in Ya Hus 322/5, 19 N 1312. Numerous petition letters from locals and missionaries told the central government about losses during local incidents and asked for

2. Public Security Regarding Missionaries and Locals

As we have seen in previous chapters, from the 1850s until the 1880s imperial policy toward American missionaries stemmed from a system of governance akin to the distribution of powers. This system vested executive power in the reigning sultan, entrusted legislative power to imperial bureaucrats in the capital, and placed judicial power with provincial governors, judges and security officers.[33] Up until the 1880s, the Sultan, the Sublime Porte, the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Investigations (*Meclîs-i Tahkîk*) were confident that the existing system was capable of dealing with incidents relating to missionaries, who represented a negligible percentage of the Empire's foreigner population.[34] The flow of intelligence and investigative reports from

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redress. These letters are available in A Mkt Mhm 647/39, 20 C 1313. Imperial procedures in "compensating the losses of [some American missionaries who had] suffered during [deadly and costly] incidents in Eastern provinces," in A Mkt Mhm 538/27, 3 B 1314. An imperial order to local governors and law-enforcement agents to "facilitate the return trip of missionaries who want to leave," in Dh Eum 5Şb 2/59, 9 Z 1332.

[33] For major works on the imperial bureaucracy and statecraft, see Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980); Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), especially pp. 2-73; Karen Barkey, "Islam and Toleration: Studying the Ottoman Imperial Model," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* vol. 19, no. 1/2 (December 2005): 5-19; Walter F. Weiker, "The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* vol. 13, no. 3 (December 1968): 451-470; Boğaç A. Ergene, "On Ottoman Justice: Interpretations in Conflict, 1600-1800," *Islamic Law and Society* vol. 8, no. 1 (2001): 52-87; Richard S. Horowitz, "International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of World History* vol. 15, no. 4 (December 2004): 445-486, especially pp. 445-455. These studies analyze imperial reforms, relations between the imperial and provincial authorities, and the impact of religion on the Ottoman system of governance. However, we should note that no scholarly analysis has presented a substantial framework to further study how the functioning of imperial statecraft affected imperial policy making. We therefore find especially helpful the findings of scholars in the field of statecraft in other contexts. See, for example, David P. Currie, "The Distribution of Powers after Bowsher," *The Supreme Court Review* vol. 1986 (1986), pp. 19-40.

[34] The Ottoman Council of Ministries founded the Assembly of Investigation (*Meclîs-i Tahkîk*) in March 1854 with the aim of effectively dealing with criminal cases and giving due process of law to involved parties, foreign and Ottoman alike. A Dvn 95/67, 1 Ca 1270.

the provincial level—by communities and missionaries as well as governors, judges, and officers—to the central government was considered sufficient to effectively practice executive and legislative power.[35]

Two major developments precipitated a reconfiguration of the capital's view on missionaries and state agents: rising socio-communal disorder in the provinces, and the evolution of American missionaries into a formidable foreign presence (with potential to affect "the movements of sedition" across *millets*), both of which posed overwhelming challenges to provincial authorities.[36] In response, the central government undertook extensive studies of specific incidents and surveillance of missionary activities in the provinces,[37] and provincial governors reported back on incidents and obstacles to restoring order in their regions.[38] In the *fin-de-siècle* Empire, these operations helped the central government to reform certain aspects of the imperial system of governance and to strengthen imperial policy concerning local officials, communities, and missionaries. Efforts at reform included new imperial orders,

[35] The archival documents on the efficiency of the existing system and provincial-level judicial practice are found in Y A Hus 160/4, 8 M 1296; A Mkt Um 574/50, 26 Z 1278; A Mkt Nzd 318/17, 27 Z 1276; A Mkt Mhm 1/14, 17 M 1260; Y A Hus 165/64, 27 Ş 1297; A Mkt Um 566/67, 20 Za 1278; A Mkt Mvl 147/29, 5 Z 1278. Also see the dissertation's chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure."

[36] Y Prk Mf 3/11, 2 B 1311; Y Ee 43/103, 6 R 1327. Socio-communal disorder will be examined elsewhere; see the dissertation's chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," especially footnote 9.

[37] See, for example, Ya Res 78/54, 6 L 1313; Ya Res 122/88, 7 C 1321; Y Prk Hr 7/36, 18 S 1301. The central government continued monitoring missionaries and other American citizens in the Empire. One archival source, dated 29 August 1917, indicates that an imperial survey was conducted because Ottoman-Greek relations were severed. Dh Eum 3Şb 23/43, 8 Z 1335. For imperial censuses and surveys see Kemal H. Karpat, "Ottoman Population Records and the Census of 1881/82-1893," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 9, no. 3 (October 1978), pp. 237-274.

[38] Y Prk Myd 21/42, 29 Ra 1316; İ Hus, 128/1323 S-052, 15 S 1323; Y Prk Myd 20/87, 9 N 1315; Ya Hus 409/84, 22 R 1318; Y Mtv 183/10, 3 C 1316; Dh Eum 5Şb, 2 Z 1336; Saffet Pasha's memorandum based on provincial reports in Y Ee 43/103, 6 R 1327.

specific regulations, staff changes, preventive measures, and an increasing dependence on the work of the Ministry of Public Security.

In the view of Ottoman bureaucrats, the major challenges in dealing with missionaries resulted from ignorance, incompetency, and corruption at the provincial level. As reflected in archival records from the years 1893, 1894 and 1897, the Council of Ministers worried especially about "officials' [ignorance in] preventing sedition promoted by missionaries" and "local administrations' incompetency in issues related to missionaries." In order to establish an effective policy, the council agreed upon "the need for [further] action."[39] This manifested itself in three spheres: protection of missionaries, punishment of local officials, and specific instructions to facilitate the work of local law-enforcement offices.[40]

While provincial authorities saw little point in giving special treatment to missionaries at a time when Ottoman residents in their regions were not given equal protection,[41] the central government considered the security of missionaries to be critical: while providing missionaries with safety, local

[39] Local agents' abuse of authority, which is mentioned in pieces of one significant "memorandum" (*lâyiha*) written by Şakir Pasha, deserve further analysis. Y Ee 132/40, 10 S 1315. Also, the council debate in Ya Hus 269/129, 24 B 1310; incompetency of local authorities in Y Prk Mf 3/11, 2 B 1311. In one case, the central government was informed that "flyers were posted" on the walls of a "missionary college in Kayseri." The flyers claimed that "Muslims [would] kill Armenians in the neighbourhood." Seeing local agents incapable of preventing this act of sedition, imperial bureaucrats concluded that "from now on, all schools owned by foreigners and Christians [referring to American missionaries] will be inspected directly by the agents of the Ministry of Education (*ma'ârif me'murlarınca*). A Mkt Mhm 724/4, 19 Ş 1311.

[40] Y A Hus 269/129, 24 B 1310.

[41] Y Prk Eşa 26/100, 23 L 1314. Missionaries were afflicted "during the movements of sedition" (*fesâd hareketler esnâsında*) in the eastern provinces in the 1890s. According to a related archival source, it is only "for this reason" that provincial authorities have to "give special attention to the safety and security of foreigners" in their regions. A Mkt Mhm 609/31, 5 C 1313.

officers were also expected to "monitor" and "prevent their [possible] engagement" in local affairs.[42] For these reasons, imperial orders required that missionaries receive "proper protection" (*hüsn-ü muhâfaza*) in cases of emergency and that provincial authorities "do as is due" (*gerekenin yapılması*) for their safety.[43] To illustrate, under specific orders the governors of Adana, Bitlis, Harput, Merzifon, Sivas and as-Suwayda recruited local men as guards during the 1890s and assigned them to "protect missionaries, escort them when travelling," and to "secure their residences."[44]

Based on incidents in which missionaries and their institutions had been attacked by local mobs or "rebels" (*âsî* and *müfsid*), imperial authorities continued to push provincial agents to undertake specific security operations and establish stricter control. In certain cases, they required that security

[42] Y Prk Eşa 26/100, 23 L 1314; A Mkt Mhm 612/4, 21 Ra 1314; A Mkt Mhm 609/5, 13 Ca 1315. The research for this chapter has not presented solid evidence assessing the position of U.S. diplomats on Ottoman security operations. Our contention is that an objective of the central government in operations of this type was to limit U.S. government involvement in missionary-related local incidents.

[43] "Proper protection," in Y Prk Ask 10/60, 30 Ca 1313; "do as is due," in A Mkt Mhm 609/5, 13 Ca 1315.

[44] Whereas earlier imperial orders requested that provincial-level governors personally deal with all security matters, the orders from the 1880s onward required that these governors, judges, and law-enforcement officers specifically protect missionaries. See, for example, an earlier order sent to Maraş on 1 July 1855, in A Dvn 104/64, 15 L 1271. "Protect American citizens in provinces during incidents," in A Mmkt Mhm 609/5, 13 Ca 1315; "protect missionaries in Merzifon," in A Mkt Mhm 660/73, 16 C 1313; "protect missionaries in Sivas," in A Mkt Mhm 662/5, 21 L 1314; "recruit guards to protect missionaries and their property," in Y Prk Eşa 26/100, 1314 L 23; "protect two missionaries on their way," in Y Prk Ask 10/60, 30 Ca 1313; "take necessary measures to protect missionaries in as-Suwayda," in A Mkt Mhm 651/4, 01 Za 1313; "provide security for missionaries in Harput," in A Mkt Mhm 24 Ca 1313. For orders transmitted to other regions, see A Mkt Mhm 609/31, 05 C 1313; A Mkt Mhm 616/11, 24 Ca 1313; A Mkt Mhm 617/21, 03 Za 1314; A Mkt Mhm 660/73, 16 C 1313; A Mkt Mhm 657/23, 24 Ca 1313; A Mkt Mhm 616/11, 24 Ca 1313; A Mkt Mhm 617/21, 3 Za 1314; a specific imperial order to protect missionaries "against all risks" (*her türlü ihtimâle karşı*), in A Mkt Mhm 612/4, 21 Ra 1314.

officers (*zabitân*) accompany missionaries on their travels.[45] A good example comes from Bitlis: on 15 December 1895, the central government contacted authorities there for further information concerning the security of missionaries in the region.[46] They reported back that local anarchy "put under risk the lives [and property] of missionaries." The government therefore ordered them—the governor, officials, and officers—to take "the necessary security measures" (*lâzım gelen emniyet tedbirlerinin alınması*). The government then demanded that, under police watch, missionaries be "relocated to Van," the safest city near Bitlis.[47] Another order specified that "their estates and belongings [would] be protected by any means necessary."[48]

Details of the correspondence between the capital and Bitlis revealed the severity of the situation. The Bitlis authorities reported that the moving operation could be fatally dangerous. In reply, the government admitted the risks involved but noted that missionaries' "estates and belongings [would] be protected by any means necessary [even] after the missionaries moved and [even] if no news came about their whereabouts" (*kendileri kaybolursa*).[49] The government was, in effect, forcing the provincial agency to be vigilant and proactive, and to assume responsibility for the missionaries' safety.[50]

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[45] Y Prk Ask 8/66; 30 Z 1310; A Mkt Mhm 648/13, 20 B 1313; A Mkt Mhm 662/5, 21 L 1314.
[46] A Mkt Mhm 694/4, 1 C 1313; A Mkt Mhm 619/17, 27 Ca 1313.
[47] A Mkt Mhm 619/17, 27 Ca 1313. Local soldiers played a policing role in this operation as well. Military officers acting as law-enforcement officers in the *fin-de-siècle* Empire will be the topic of future research.
[48] A Mkt Mhm 694/4, 1 C 1313.
[49] A Mkt Mhm 694/4, 1 C 1313.
[50] A Mkt Mhm 694/4, 1 C 1313; A Mkt Mhm 619/17, 27 Ca 1313; A Mkt Mhm 662/5, 21 L 1314. A series of imperial orders sent to eastern provinces, including Amasya, Antep, Merzifon, and Bitlis, suggested local officers continue to protect missionaries even after local incidents

The Bitlis authorities took full credit for the operation; the relocation of the missionaries and the protection of their property was a success. This specific operation is but one example. There were many other complex operations in which provincial authorities failed to implement imperial orders and new regulations concerning issues of regional safety. In one case, imperial bureaucrats showed signs of frustration upon hearing that a missionary residence in Talas, Kayseri was hit by gunshots from a local mob that had yet to be unidentified by the time news of the incident had reached the capital. İstanbul wanted to know the motive—whether it was meant to kill or just frighten the homeowner—and ordered the local authorities to prepare and submit a detailed intelligence report on "who shot and why?"[51]

By and large, Ottoman bureaucrats were swift in reacting to local agents that had proven themselves to be ignorant, incompetent, or simply incapable of dealing with missionary-related cases.[52] They removed such agents from active duty and reprimanded them. On other occasions, agents were exiled after

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had ended. A Mkt Mhm 612/4, 21 Ra 1314; Hr Sys 73/15, 17 January 1895. An archival source also mentions that other provinces were informed of these orders as well. For example, municipal authorities in İstanbul were ordered to guard missionary institutions, such as the Girls' College, despite the fact that İstanbul was unlikely to be as affected by local unrest as provincial regions were. A Mkt Mhm 742/20, 24 Za 1330.

[51] Dh Mui 11/2-16, 3 N 1327. This chapter could not locate the report requested from the Kayseri authorities. The report must include substantial evidence on the course of the investigation. It might also reveal details of the official perspective of the incident.

[52] Significantly, Ottoman subjects who contributed to security operations were rewarded and honoured. In one early case, Musaddık Pasha, then unemployed, was rewarded with employment in state offices based on his assistance to provincial authorities in finding the murderer of an American priest near Alexandretta (İskenderun). A Mkt Um 566/67, 20 Za 1278; the murderer brought to the court, in A Mkt Um 521/47, 27 Ca 1278. In a later case, dated 24 October 1909, the central government ordered the authorities in Kilis to honour persons who helped to arrest a local bandit named Abdino. Abdino had stabbed an American missionary doctor who resisted robbery. Dh Mui 7-3/36, 9 L 1327.

having abused their position and power.[53] In one case, the central government noted a high degree of incompetency in the work of Haydar Effendi, a district governor in Harput. Haydar Effendi perpetually failed to implement imperial orders by not investigating and reporting on missionaries in his region. The last nail in his coffin was a memorandum that the Imperial Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Dâhiliye Nezâreti*) submitted to the Council of Ministers on 4 April 1899. It revealed that American visitors and all manner of donations were coming to missionaries in Harput. Haydar Effendi did not report on this; worse, he did not even know about it. The government therefore removed him from his position. Upon the recommendation of the council, Mazhar Bey became the new district governor. As an old-school bureaucrat who rose through the ranks of the Imperial Court of Appeals (*Mahkeme-i Temyîz*), Mazhar Bey had the trust of his fellow bureaucrats in the capital.[54]

As noted, failure caused certain agents to be exiled. Such cases occurred when a provincial authority abused his powers or was involved in some type of

[53] Examples are in Dh Mkt 2185/83, 23 Za 1316; Hr Mkt 88/8, 10 M 1271; A Mkt Mhm 701/5, 23 Za 1312; Zb 351/37, 9 Ş 1323; Ya Hus 318/97, 9 Ş 1312; Zb 93/64, 29 Te 1323; Dh Eum Ayş 23/1, 1 M 1338.

[54] Dh Mkt 2185/83, 23 Za 1316. The chapter should note a nuance here: penalizing Ottoman local agents in missionary-related cases was not an established imperial practice prior to the 1880s, but it did happen in a few cases. On 3 October 1854, for example, the central government observed ignorance in the actions of several local authorities. As a Ministry of Foreign Affairs document indicates, Kurdish bandits had intercepted a missionary family en route from Diyarbekir to Antep and then robbed them of their possessions. Local authorities, especially the officers patrolling the route, had failed to prevent this robbery from happening. And they failed to catch the suspects after the fact. The government ruled that these officers and officials in the region had to be penalized. Hr Mkt 88/8, 10 M 1271. In a case dated 26 September 1919, Zekeriya Effendi, a police officer, was discharged from his duty because he had lowered the American flag in a local meeting house located in Bandırma (modern day Balıkesir). There were reasons for Zekeriya's apparently heavy punishment: the incident occurred on Easter and he was off-duty that day. Dh Eum Ayş 23/1, 1 M 1338.

criminal activity.[55] For instance, security officers arrested Hasan Rakım Effendi, an İstanbul Post Office worker who had been sorting foreign letters and packages. Hasan Rakım was working with letters sent from the United States in particular, and he was accused of "stealing checks, bank bills" (*poliçe*) and other valuables of that sort. Upon hearing the accusations on 22 February 1908, the bureaucrats in the capital ordered him exiled. Even before the court proceeding, Hasan Rakım found himself transferred away from İstanbul to "a countryside where no foreigner had been residing."[56]

We argue that *fin-de-siècle* Ottoman policy towards American missionaries was not an isolated struggle to limit missionary activities or for imperial dominance in a remote province. Rather, it was one part of a multi-faceted process in which many missionaries and provincial authorities were drawn together during periods of local upheaval. In response to "the need for action," the central government emerged as the leading actor in missionary

[55] Zb 351/37, 9 Şu 1323. Other cases, some of which are included below, also required local authorities and public workers being exiled. On 21 February 1897, a high-ranking military officer named Hüseyin was punished and deported from Havza, Sivas, for beating an American missionary priest. Ya Hus 318/97, 9 Ş 1312. On 11 November 1917, Israel, a prestigious Armenian doctor working in the city hall, was demoted and sent to Bitlis because he was identified to be communicating with, and supporting "Armenian committees of sedition in the United States" (*Amerika'daki Ermenî fesâd komitaları*). Zb 93/64, 29 Te 1323. Some officials were also exiled for having "married foreign women," which imperial bureaucrats believed would change a groom's views and customs. See, for example, the relocation of Muzaffer Paşazade Reşid Bey, the chief doctor of the Ottoman Embassy in Rome, after he married an American woman, in Y Prk Eşa 29/9, 18 L 1315; the news that one of Mahmud Paşha's sons would soon marry an American, in Y Prk Mk 9/108, 17 C 1318. The significance of exiles and relocations as an imperial policy will be examined elsewhere.

[56] Zb 351/37, 9 Ş 1323. This chapter reveals that the central government exiled local authorities before even hearing the court's decision. That is, the opening of a trial was sometimes sufficient to place a criminal card on the name of a local authority, and the card, an imperial opprobrium over one's official career, led to exile. Political opposition and radical changes in the 1900s, especially during the Young Turks Era, must have contributed to rushing exile decisions, as in the case of Hasan Rakım. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for a Revolution: the Young Turks, 1902-1908* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

administration despite the reluctance of the provinces by actively promulgating orders and correcting provincial authorities' irresponsible behaviour.[57] İstanbul's principal objective was providing missionaries with safety and protection, while in a broader context they also aimed to restore law and order in the provinces. As a result of the government's persistence, inadequate provincial level Ottoman officials became subject to penalties, demotion and exile, and being fired. However, none of these measures proved to be a panacea for the myriad problems that surrounded missionaries. As a result, the central government increasingly relied on the Ministry of Public Security. In the section that follows we shall see that the centre steadily granted greater authority to public security officers. It was these officers that would handle order and public safety issues, which in the long run turned the Ministry of Public Security into an Empire-wide embodiment of imperial power.

3. The Ministry of Public Security

On 5 May 1907, the Ministry of Public Security (*Zabtiye Nezâret-i Celîlesi*) received an investigative report from the Governor of Konya, Mehmed Pasha, on the extraordinary activity in the residence of American missionary Maria A. Gerber.[58] Gerber had "turned her house into a school without official

[57] Ya Hus 269/129, 24 B 1310.

[58] For institutional history of the Ministry of Public Security, see Derviş Okçabol, *Türk Zabita Tarihi ve Teşkilâtı Tarihçesi* [Institutional history of Turkish Police]; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman empire and modern Turkey], II: 125-126; Glen W. Swanson, "The Ottoman Police," especially pp. 252-255. The research for this chapter has found no scholarly reference to Maria A. Gerber. For popular stories of her life and times, see Thomas Cosmades, *Maria, God's Angel to Widows and Orphans in Anatolia*,

permission [by] adopting and teaching eleven Armenian girls." Intelligence from local security officers noted that Gerber "was about to leave Konya." Prior to her departure, she had left these girls in the hands of her friend, another missionary. "This move," said Mehmed Pasha, "double-confirmed her intentions [coloured with] illegitimacy and secrecy." Under the Sultan's orders, and acting on instructions from the Ministries of Public Security and Internal Affairs, security officers were sent to close Gerber's residence and "save the girls" she had adopted. The operation was successful. Among these girls, "five were natives of Konya and would be given back to their guardians." The other "six were from İstanbul." Mehmed Ali Effendi, the chief superintendent in the Konya Police Station, took the İstanbulian girls under his protection and custody before handing them over to "the police officer Setrag who, with an Armenian childminder (as three girls were younger than ten years old), would take them back home to İstanbul.[59] Security officers in İstanbul then investigated the girls' families, finding addresses where the girls might be sent.[60] They would be delivered variously to aunts, brothers, grandmothers, uncles, or distant relatives living in Beyoğlu, Dolapdere, Samatya, Yedikule and the Yenişehir downtown. Within two weeks security officers had contacted

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online [cosmades.org/articles/maria.htm; Thomas Cosmades, "At Zion Orphanage," in *Anatolia, Anatolia!*, online [armenianbiblechurch.org/food%20corner/anatolia/anatolia_index.htm].

[59] This narrative has been reconstructed from the Ministry of Public Security collections. Zb 46/13, 28 Te 1323, document nos. 2, 4, 6, 21. The mentioned report was the last of many that had previously been submitted. Investigations on Maria A. Gerber and her residence began a month earlier with the imperial order sent from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The ministry ordered the Konya authorities to check the Gerber residence, apparently after the ministry officials found "worthy of inquiry" the circular letter on the matter of Hasan Hazim Effendi, a local notable of Konya. Zb 46/13, 28 Te 1323, document no. 17.

[60] Zb 46/13, 28 Te 1323, document nos. 4-5.

family members and delivered the girls after an oral "confirmation" and "signature."[61]

The Gerber case is significant as it demonstrates the government's larger policy of undermining missionaries' illegal activities, such as adopting Ottoman children and using residential houses as schools. The development of the case is also important because it provides a microcosm for the extent to which the Ministry of Public Security and its local security force—security officers, law-enforcement officers or police—were involved in these matters. During this period Public Security and its agents assumed a key position in administering and resolving a wide array of local cases: they generated intelligence data, made investigations (and interrogations) and pursued operations, including specific missions and escorting suspects and victims when necessary.[62] As a growing player within the imperial statecraft, they submitted their work to the Sultan and government branches in the capital, who embodied the executive and legislative bodies of the imperial ruling structure respectively.[63]

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[61] Zb 46/13, 28 Te 1323, document nos. 7-15, 21.

[62] Reliance on the work of the Ministry of Public Security seemed necessary during a time when the central government was very concerned with local safety and security matters. The capital's worry that local unrest and intra-communal conflicts would escalate in frequency and severity, thus affecting missionaries in the provinces, are in Ya Hus 409/84, 22 R 1318; Y Mtv 242/43, 9 M 1321; Y Mtv 183/10, 03 C 1316; Y Prk Eşa 24/58, 27 Z 1313.

[63] Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye* [Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey], II: 125-126; Glen W. Swanson, "The Ottoman Police," pp. 252-255. Turgut indicates that "it was the public order that initiated the centralization of the police in the first place… the Ottoman Empire was a loyal follower of the French system in its administrative structure… In other words, crime fighting… is subsumed within a wide concern for administration and especially the good order of society." Ferdan Turgut, "Policing the Poor in the Late Ottoman Empire," pp. 151-152. This chapter's assessment of the Imperial Ministry

In practice, intelligence and investigative services were provided by local security officers affiliated with the Ministry of Public Security. Their work focused on 'criminal' and 'preventive' policing, that is, they were supposed to find and arrest criminals, as well as prevent prospective incidents from occurring.[64] On a regular, case-by-case basis, the ministry prepared an intelligence "memorandum" (*tezkire*) and an investigative "survey" (*tahrîr*) based on the work of local officers to forward to other government branches.[65] In the *fin-de-siècle* Empire, imperial policy relating to missionaries stemmed largely from these sources of information.

This chapter should also emphasize the high level of fluency in communicating orders and information between the central government and security officers in the provinces.[66] This fluency had been powered by the telegraph and sustained through government pressure on officers.[67] Particularly

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of Public Security supports this statement in some ways. Furthermore, the chapter's study of security officers in the provinces reveals that maintaining the public order lead to the centralization of police force in the late nineteenth century. In the *fin-de-siècle* Empire, crime fighting not only was 'subsumed within' administrative concerns and 'the good order of society' but targeted local concerns and the safety of the individual, missionary and Ottoman alike. Also see the previous section on the imperial distribution of power.

[64] Examples are in Y Mtv 56/51, 21 R 1309; Y Mtv 107/8, 22 R 1312; Y Mtv 110/51, 06 C 1312; Zb 309/29, 08 Ni 1322; Zb 321/78, 8 Ke 1323; Zb 311/44, 3 My 1324; Dh Kms 52-2/79, 30 N 1337.

[65] See, for example, Y Mtv 107/8, 22 R 1312; Y Mtv 56/51, 21 R 1309.

[66] The Gerber case, amongst others, also demonstrates that the Ministry of Public Security had a close relationship with provincial-level officials through local security officers. Zb 46/13, 28 Te 1323, document nos. 4-5; "the relations between law-enforcement officers and local administration officials (*Jandarmalarla mahallî idâre arasındaki münâsebetler*)," in Y Ee 132/40, 10 S 1315; the communication between security officers and Mustafa Şevket Efendi, the Director of the Post and Telegraphy Office in Hamidiye, in Zb 351/19, 19 T 1323; Zb 351/25, 1 E 1323; another example of such communication in Y Prk Um 74/122, 7 M 1323. Future research could focus on the specific dimensions of the relationship between officials and security officers.

[67] This analysis is based on archival documents including Ya Hus 424/41, 14 L 1319; Hr Sys 56/2, 28 June 1903; Ya Hus 424/41, 14 L 1319; Y Mtv 231/147, 24 Ra 1320; Yprk Tşf 6/70, 7

from the 1890s to the 1910s, an efficient communication network between the capital and the field allowed security operations to be conducted much faster than any other official business of the government.[68] To illustrate, initial correspondence on the Gerber case among different agencies (namely, the Sublime Porte, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Public Security, the Konya Governor and security officers) took less than two days. The governor sent the Ministry of Public Security a report on 9 May 1907; the next day, the bureaucrats in the Sublime Porte sent a note to Public Security after having discussed how to proceed. Following specific security operations (searching Gerber's house, removing the girls, identifying their families, returning them, etc.), the case was closed following a pronouncement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to all concerned parties.[69]

Although cases were closed in government quarters, work remained for local security officers. In the name of 'preventing and controlling' criminal activities amongst missionaries, as well as illegal actions against them, they

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Za 1319; Dh Mkt 458/21, 17 Z 1319; Dh Mkt 460/56, 17 Z 1319; Zb 351/19, 19 T 1323; Zb 46/13, 28 Te 1323. As a symbol of the capital's centralizing efforts and as the Sultan's favourite technological device, telegraphy brought Ottoman imperial and local authorities in constant contact and the Ministry of Public Works founded a telegraphy department. Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), II: 120. Early in the 1870s, the Ottoman telegraph network was already the eighth-longest in the world, extending over 17,000 miles. Yakup Bektaş, "The Sultan's Messenger: Cultural Constructions of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847-1880," *Technology and Culture* vol. 41, no. 4 (October 2000): 669-696.

[68] Memoranda, surveys, and imperial orders on matters related to security and safety of missionary were written in terse style. See, for example, Hr Sys 56/2, 28 June 1903; Ya Hus 424/41, 14 L 1319; Zb 46/13, 28 Te 1323, document nos. 2-21; Zb 309/102, 09 T 1322. This style, short and concise, served well to avoid confusion and to facilitate intra-governmental communication.

[69] "The Konya Governor to the Ministry of Public Security," 9 May 1907; "the Sublime Porte to the Ministry of Public Security," 10 May 1907; and other lines of correspondence in Zb 46/13, 28 Te 1323, document nos. 2-16.

escorted missionaries on their travels or when they moved, searched and arrested criminals and rebels that attacked missionaries, and engaged in several fights with missionaries' students who revolted against imperial authority.[70] They then sent memoranda and surveys to the central government following each operation.[71] If found to be ignorant or incompetent these officers shared the fate of other provincial authorities: penalties, exile, and arrest.[72]

In brief, the Ministry of Public Security and its officers changed the imperial reaction to incidents relating to the safety and security of missionaries in the provinces. Archival evidence confirms that the imprint of the Ministry of Public Security was considerable and enduring, a fact that is not sufficiently recognized in the existing literature. Led by the ministry and undertaken by local officers, their security operations profoundly affected imperial 'prevention' and 'control' of criminal activities across the Empire. Provincial officials and officers redefined the ways the central government dealt with 'crime' as it affected missionaries. In particular, intelligence memoranda and investigative surveys prepared by the Ministry of Public Security became amongst the most important sources of information for crime prevention. Thanks to speedy and efficient lines of communication between government branches at imperial and provincial levels, these memoranda and surveys not only led to instructions and orders being issued from the capital but helped

[70] Ya Hus 424/41, 14 L 1319, document no. 2; Yprk Mk 11/6, 1319 C 25, document no. 2; Dh Kms 61-2/3, 18 Z 1339; Zb 309/102, 9 T 1322; Dh Kms 61-2/3, 18 Z 1339; Dh Eum 5Şb 2/59 1332 Z 09.
[71] Examples are in Dh Mkt 33/42, 22 L 1310; Dh Mkt 33/42, 22 L 1310; Zb 309/102, 9 T 1322; Dh Kms 61-2/3, 18 Z 1339; Y Mtv 56/51, 21 R 1309.
[72] On the arrest of an Ottoman chief-superintendent see Dh Kms 61-2/3, 18 Z 1339.

resolve local incidents as well. In addition, this chapter's examination of security during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries suggests that although the security agency undertook a wide array of responsibilities and operations, the imperial bureaucrats regarded it as a part of their own governing structure. Thus, bureaucrats in the capital did not hesitate to hold security officers fully responsible if operations failed, taking administrative action against them when this occurred.

Toward the 1910s, the role of security officers in missionary cases had become so critical that the U.S. government took an interest in imperial security operations. On 12 February 1914, the U.S. Embassy in İstanbul requested that the Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs prepare an introductory book "on how the Ottoman Gendarmerie and Police institutions" were dealing with security issues.[73] However, the central government refused to reveal the inner workings of its security agency. As will be examined in the next section, a key objective of imperial policy was to solve missionary issues internally and not allow U.S. intervention in domestic issues. The central government was determined to maintain absolute control over security matters.

[73] Dh Eum Emn 52/19, 16 Ra 1332.

Ottoman-U.S. Diplomatic Relations Regarding Missionaries

Ottoman-U.S. diplomatic relations began in the early nineteenth century with the signing of commercial treaties.[74] The U.S. government then requested and acquired the legal right to all cases involving American citizens within the Ottoman Empire. Charles Rind and David Offley, functionaries vested with full authority by Washington, negotiated with Ottoman bureaucrats in İstanbul. Sultan Mahmut II approved the final draft of the first treaty the central government would sign with the United States.[75] Effective from 7 May 1830, the treaty stipulated,

> If litigations and disputes (*nizâ' ve da'va*) should arise between the subjects of the Sublime Porte and citizens of the United States, the parties shall not be heard, nor shall judgement be pronounced (*istimâ' ve fasl olunmayıp*) unless [an] American dragoman be present. Cases in which the sum may exceed 500 piasters (*kuruş*) shall be submitted to the Sublime Porte, and be decided according to equity and justice (*hakk ve 'adl*). Citizens of the United States... shall not be molested (*dahl ve ta'arruz olunmayıp*); and even when they may have committed some offence (*töhmetleri vukû'unda*) they shall not be arrested and put in prison by the local authorities, but they shall be tried by their Minister of Consul, and punished according to their offence, following in this respect, the usage

[74] For major works on Ottoman-U.S. relations see J.C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Dillemmas: The Background of the United States Policy* (New York: Harper, 1953); John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*; Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan eds., *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future*; M. Philip and Ethel Klutznik, *Pilgrims and Travellers to the Holy Land* (Omaha, Nebraska: Creighton University Press, 1996); Leland J. Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; London: H. Milford and Oxford University Press, 1966); James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882* (Princeton: University Press: 1969).

[75] On Ottoman-U.S. treaties see Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American Relations], pp. 36-59; Hasan Tahsin Fendoğlu, *Modernleşme Bağlamında Osmanlı-Amerika İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations in modern context], (İstanbul: Beyan, 2002), pp. 188-205; Orhan Köprülü, "Tarihte Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri [History of Turkish-American relations]," *Belleten* vol. LI, no. 200 (August 1987): 927-947; Lucius E. Thayer, "The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of their Abrogation as it Affects the United States," *American Journal of International Law* vol. 17 (1923): 207-233.

> observed toward other franks [i.e. Europeans] (*sâir müste'minân haklarında mu'âmele olunduğu vechle*).

Certain judicial standards prescribed in this treaty remained in force and effect until 24 July 1923.[76] The treaty allowed the United States to enjoy the same status as European powers (*sâir müste'minân*) and granted legal rights to Americans within the Ottoman realm. In particular, no Ottoman authority— the central government, local governors, judges (*kadı*), police— had a *de jure* right to intervene in the affairs of Americans, even when proven guilty (*töhmetleri vukû'unda*). In reality though, the treaty did not articulate what action should be taken in complex cases. When missionary activities gained momentum, especially towards the end of the century, the lack of specific details on the legal status of missionaries created substantial tension between the two governments.[77]

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[76] English version of the treaty in William M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, International acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and Other powers* [1776-1909, issued as Senate document no. 357, 61st Congress, 2d session], vol. I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1910-1938); Ottoman version of the treaty in *Muahedat Mecmuasi* [Collection of treaties], vol. II, section 1 (İstanbul: Hakikat, 1294 [1877-78]), and in DE, *Amerika Nişan Defteri* (i.e. the book kept by Ottoman Foreign Relations Office, in which regulations and decrees related to the United States were registered], 1/1, also quoted in Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American Relations], pp. 119-133. Ottoman-U.S. treaties were abrogated in the Treaty of Lausanne on 24 July 1923. Also see the dissertation chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," footnote 27.

[77] Y Ee 136/96, 25 Ca 1316. The entire treaty, including its "separate and secret article," focused mainly on diplomacy and commerce—American ships and guns to be purchased and imperial privileges (*capitulations*) to be granted by the Ottoman government to American diplomats. For an interesting source that indicates how American missionaries interpreted the existing Ottoman-U.S. treaty, see *The Treaty Rights of the American Missionaries in Turkey* (Boston: ABCFM, 8 April 1893) [the ABCFM pamphlet box in Andover Harvard Theological Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts]; for an analysis of the controversial articles of the treaty, see Sinan Kuneralp, "Ottoman Diplomacy and Controversy Over the Interpretation of the Article IV of the Turco-American Treaty of 1830," *The Turkish Yearbook* vol. 31, no. 2 (2000): 7-20.

Certain loopholes meant that the Treaty of 1830 was less effective than the concerned parties had expected it to be. To illustrate, terms like "equity and justice," so essential in major cases, were left undefined.[78] For this reason, Washington officials requested that their Ottoman counterparts specifically recognize American missionaries as part of the treaty. They also insisted that imperial laws concerning the legal status of missionaries and their institutions be revised. Washington essentially wanted *de jure* recognition of missionaries that would grant them the same rights as Ottoman non-Muslim subjects, including the right to special courts.[79] But the central government did not agree, and defined "citizens of the United States" as Americans working as diplomats or merchants in the Ottoman realm. Unlike diplomats and merchants, missionaries were regarded as permanent residents in the Empire. This approach helped the central government pursue a policy of plausible deniability when the U.S. government demanded redress and compensation for injustices and losses inflicted upon missionaries.[80]

At the end of the century, the increase in the numbers of missionaries and the increase in social unrest in the Ottoman provinces (especially Eastern Anatolia) led to heightened tension between the central government and the

[78] In fact, numerous cases could not be simply converted to a monetary value and many exceeded 500 piaster. See, for example, A Mkt Mhm 702/12, 8 Ra 1313; Y Prk Eşa 42/57, 29 Z 1320; Y A Res 96/44, 9 B 1316; Y Prk Eşa 49/70, 26 Ş 1324; Hr Sys 74/44, 28 November 1896; Mv 218/16, 23 R 1338.
[79] A statement of the U.S. Department of Foreign Affairs on the welfare and safety of missionaries in the Empire is in Hr Sys 69/34, 7 December 1896.
[80] Hr Sys 51/15, 19 July 1860; also the on-going debates over the articles of the treaty regarding 'Americans' in the Ottoman Empire and the report submitted to Washington officials on 6 December 1887, in Y Prk Tkm 11/44, 20 Ra 1305 (in French), especially pp. 1-25.

missionaries.[81] Missionaries were attacked by local mobs and their property (houses, hospitals, seminaries and schools) were damaged, burned and destroyed.[82] In order to garner support for their compensation claims against the central government, the afflicted missionaries publicized their cases in the American press to encourage the U.S. government to intervene on their behalf.[83]

Ottoman bureaucrats admitted that life in the provinces was becoming more challenging for missionaries. While they thought that resolving missionary cases would help to maintain— if not improve— relations with the United States, one remarkable element in their approach made it impossible to reach a diplomatic consensus.[84] Whereas missionaries considered the central government to be liable for their grievances, Ottoman bureaucrats considered

[81] See the incidents, for example, in Hr Sys 73/18, 22 January 1895, 23 January 1895; Hr Sys 73/20, 27 January 1895; Hr Sys 73/20, 28 January 1895; Hr Sys 73/53, 16 01 1896. On missionary activities see the dissertation chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure."

[82] Ya Hus 357/87, 11 Ra 1314; Y Prk Eşa 49/70, 26 Ş 1324; Hr Sys 74/46, 3 December 1896; Captain Hasan attacking a missionary priest in Sivas, in A Mkt Mhm 701/5, 23 Za 1312; Ya Hus 318/97, 9 Ş 1312; two missionaries attacked in Halep, in Hr Sys 71/28, 21 February 1891; missionary property damaged in Adana, Maraş and Harput, in A Mkt Mhm 647/39, 20 C 1313; a missionary residence burned in Y Prk Bşk 36/107, 30 Z 1311; the Anatolian College in Merzifon burned by "rebels" (*isyancılar*), in Y Prk Ask 8/66, 30 Z 1310; a missionary school destroyed by local gang, in Y Prk Ask 8/66, 30 Z 1310; the central government's discussion on the extent of local attacks on missionary schools, in Ya Hus 335/67, 11 Ra 1313.

[83] On the publicity of missionaries' claims and losses, see the dissertation's chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," footnotes 1-2, 13-14.

[84] Ya Hus 357/87, 11 Ra 1314; Ya Res 96/44, 9 B 1316; Y Ee 94/43, 5 Ca 1320; imperial consultants' memorandum (*lâyiha*) on missionary institutions in response to the U.S. ambassador's memorandum, in Ya Hus 278/29, 3 M 1311; the U.S. ambassador's memorandum in Y Prk Eşa 42/57, 29 Z 1320; the imperial note sent to the U.S. diplomats as regards to the cases in which missionaries were brought to imperial court, in Mv 218/16, 23 R 1338. An interesting proposal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends that Ottoman-U.S. relations should be stable and on friendly terms mainly because there are many American missionary institutions in the land, Hr Sys 69/27, 11 January 1896.

that their government bore no responsibility whatsoever.[85] They discussed this issue in detail on 11 October 1898, when Ali Tevfik Pasha criticized the missionaries for exploiting the treaty and turning to Washington on every matter. In his report, he stated,

> Our Sultan, supposedly (*güyâ*), has been refusing to pay compensation as per the requests of Americans [missionaries]… publications on the matter [the New York Tribune] are extremely deceitful (*gâyet yalancı*)… [their] statements are fake (*maskaralık*) and those who will believe them are men of ignorance (*basit adamlar*)… Nay they [missionaries] bore profound influence on the affairs of the central government (*Hükûmet-i Merkeziyye*)… [They influence the U.S. government and American press by claiming that] Turks continue rejecting our rights (*bizim hakkımızda Türkler red edip dururken*) and that the Ottoman government remains free to act the way it wishes (*Hükûmet-i Osmaniyye'nin mes'uliyyetine müsâ'ade ediliyor*).[86]

In this instructive report, the pasha provided a detailed depiction of the methods missionaries had been using to confront the central government. He could not understand how a minor issue like compensation could receive that much publicity and upset Ottoman-U.S. relations. He "regret[ted] hearing all the gossip and noise (*kîl u kâl ve gürültü edildiğine*) [as] the sum asked for in compensation is simply $500,000 [while] relations between the Ottoman State and U.S. is worth much more." He believed the central government capable of handling missionary cases on fair terms, and alone. In fact, he could "not make [himself] believe that a government [the central government] which had shown so much respect for them was protested against to such an extent that delicacy

[85] The Ottoman Embassy in Washington suggests not giving in to the demands of the U.S. government, in Ya Hus 317/89, 27 B 1312.
[86] Y Ee 136/96, 25 Ca 1316, document nos. 2-3.

and principles of diplomacy (*nezâket ve kavaîd-i siyâsiyye*) are trodden under foot (*pây-i mâl edercesine*)." The disputes, he found, were the missionaries' fault because it was they who "invest[ed] their efforts in political intrigues and contestation rather than dedicating themselves to the works of religion" (*hayât-ı diniyyelerce meşgûl olacakları yere*).[87]

As indicated in Ali Tevfik Pasha's report, missionaries' political designs posed serious risks to the central government. Not only did they present a negative image of the Ottoman Empire in the U.S., but they damaged Ottoman relations with the U.S. government as well. To the surprise of the Ottoman authorities, several U.S. battleships appeared on the horizon, sailing through the Mediterranean into major Ottoman ports such as Adana, İzmir and Beirut. Washington officials revealed that these excursions were not hostile but just to show support for American missionaries during their difficult times in the Empire.[88] However, Ottoman authorities could not help but conclude that American ships were anchored in imperial ports to help end current debates in favour of the missionaries. They were not alarmed by the ships, rather they were frustrated with the U.S. government's decision to undertake this pre-emptive manoeuvre.[89] The central government refused to alter its broader

[87] Y Ee 136/96, 25 Ca 1316, document no. 3.
[88] A Mkt Mhm 702/12, 8 Ra 1313; A Mkt Mhm 702/12, 8 Ra 1313; Ya Hus 457/77, 25 C 1321; Ya Hus 473/123, 22 Ra 1322. Incidents in Eastern Anatolia drew remarkable attention from American and European diplomats. While the U.S. Atlantic Navy would sail to the Ottoman Empire with the mission to settle compensation for afflicted missionaries, the Canadian Parliament discussed a collective action in the spirit of a crusade that would support missionaries in Anatolia. Hr Sys 73/51; Y Prk Tkm 10/32, 14 B 1304.
[89] Bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs blamed themselves for encouraging the U.S. Department of Foreign Affairs and American missionaries to make bold claims against the

policy in the face of U.S. aggression; missionaries in the Ottoman domain had the right to enjoy the same equity and justice as that given to any other Ottoman subject.

Missionaries would be defended and compensated, or punished and deported, only after the central government received and analysed intelligence reports from local Ottoman authorities.[90] In sum, *fin-de-siècle* imperial diplomacy principally focused on the following two objectives: first, minimize U.S. intervention; and second, deny allegations in the press while ensuring legal cases involving missionaries remained within the sphere of "domestic affairs."[91]

Conclusion

The safety of American missionaries was a defining issue of imperial policy. For missionaries too, who often debated the effects of imperial policy on their

Ottoman government. They noted that U.S. ships "sail through oceans and seas" to support missionaries against the Ottoman government partly because imperial bureaucrats are "not dedicated to their job" and "cannot make themselves clear to Washington" or missionaries. İ Hr 437/58, 22 Ra 1322.

[90] American missionaries who suffered in Maraş and Harput would be compensated, in A Mkt Mhm 538/27, 3 B 1314; the note of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Department of Foreign Affairs concerning the deportation of several American missionaries from the Empire—after being found guilty of spoiling local order in eastern townships by encouraging ethnic riots—in Hr Sys 74/44, 28 November 1896; the meeting of the Ottoman ambassador in Washington with the U.S. officials , in Hr Sys 74/47, 4 December 1896; Ottoman-U.S. governments' debates over Christians in the Ottoman Empire, in Ya Hus 357/87, 11 Ra 1314; the complaints of the Ottoman Christian subjects about missionary support to Armenian rebels, in Ya Hus 319/2, 10 Ş 1312.

[91] Hr Sys 51/16, 1 November 1860; İ Hus 21/1311 Ş-060, 18 Ş 1311; Y Mtv 144/135, 24 S 1314; Ya Hus 278/29, 3 M 1311; Hr Sys 2803/1, 26 June 1890; Ya Hus 319/2, 10 Ş 1312. An insightful discussion between the imperial bureaucrats and the U.S. diplomats in İstanbul on finding the most convenient court to try Americans accused of murders, in Y Prk Eşa 30/49, 10 S 1316. Also see Hr Sys 2803/1, 26 June 1890.

safety, it was obviously of great concern. Suspicious of the Ottoman government and its subjects, the missionaries turned to the U.S. government for help, which duly tried to support them. Historians have examined missionaries' rights and security in the Empire in the context of American interests in, and diplomatic relations with, the Ottoman government. But there are no detailed studies of the Ottoman development of a missionary policy that was based on the dual principle of protecting missionaries from Ottoman subjects and protecting Ottoman subjects from missionaries.

Drawing on hitherto understudied archival sources, this chapter argues that Ottoman bureaucrats, rather than taking a steadfast position for or against missionaries, perceived missionary incidents to be within the sphere of domestic affairs and worked to resolve them without third-party interference. Amidst rising local disorder, prejudice, and attacks, bureaucrats dedicated the government's authority—executive, legislative and judicial—to maintaining order and providing missionaries with security. Based on numerous incidents relating to provincial order and security, the chapter also indicates that the Ministry of Public Security was the key government agency responsible for accomplishing this task.[92]

[92] This chapter should note the following: Ottoman authorities maintained a somewhat neutral position on issues regarding safety and security of American missionaries in the Empire. Their position on missionaries' activities and institutions demonstrated signs of discontinuity with this position. For more, see the dissertation's chapters, "Regulating American Missionary Institutions through the Granting and Denying of Licenses"; "Controlling Missionary Publications."

The government's approach to individual missionaries as objects of public security is significant because it reveals specific dimensions of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century imperial statecraft. Intelligence and investigative data arriving from provincial authorities, especially local security officers, was critical ahead of formulating and issuing imperial orders. Although several government branches, especially the Sublime Porte and the Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs, were involved in the resolution of a given incident, local agents from the Ministry of Public Security led, from the 1880s onward, the entire process of intelligence collection and analysis, and the undertaking of security operations.

The Ottoman government's approach to missionaries was a source of concern for the U.S. government and the missionaries themselves. This anxiety stemmed from a distorted view of Ottoman intentions. For Ottoman bureaucrats, imperial missionary policy was the product of detailed, well-crafted, and thorough administrative procedures. At times, of course, it was exasperating as well. Yet they sought, whenever possible, to quickly resolve and avoid incidents similar to the capture of Ellen M. Stone, the topic of this chapter's opening narrative. Interestingly, in 1905, four years after her return to the United States, Stone asked imperial authorities for permission to return and open a missionary college. Tellingly, the Ottoman government refused her request.[93] One Stone turned, away…

[93] Hr Sys 70/19, 5 July 1905.

6

Conclusion: Historicizing the Imperial Bureaucrat

Imagine a bureaucrat working at the Imperial Ministry of Internal Affairs in İstanbul, the metropolitan capital of the late Ottoman Empire. Everyday he receives and evaluates reports and letters from provincial authorities, missionaries, and local petitioners. At a time of exceptional unrest, this bureaucrat proposes to act on missionary matters in collaboration with colleagues in neighbouring offices. His policies must be well informed and comply with imperial objectives and laws. He should also watch his mouth—not openly contradict or criticize his superiors, especially the Sultan—focus on his duties, and carry out the changes quickly and effectively. In the fin-de-siècle Empire, this imagined bureaucrat was more real than imaginary; many bureaucrats of his type could be found in the imperial capital. This dissertation invites their historicization. This dissertation is not a social history of imperial bureaucrats but it does nevertheless historicize these bureaucrats by showing the various ways in which they grappled with the missionary question.

Recently, missionary activity in the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey has been drawing more scholarly attention: American Historical Association President John Fairbank's "invisible men" of the 1960s, i.e. missionaries, have been fleshed out. More than "a narrative of pathos," in

Grabill's words, their embodiment has taken many forms.[1] Scholarship considers American missionaries as: "a power lobby," "an organized foreign power," the creators of "liberal thinkers... in the Ottoman and Arab context," "trouble," and the "warm and smiley figures that camouflage the cold face of American imperialism."[2] While robbing missionaries of integrity as independent historical subjects, much of the scholarship has not even considered the Ottoman central government worthy of closer attention. In the absence of archival sources, it tends to depict the host government as "double-sided," "autocratic," "reactionary," and simply an anti-missionary establishment.[3] Neglecting imperial statecraft and ignoring the role of imperial

[1] John K. Fairbank, "Assignment for the '70's," *American Historical Review* vol. 74, no. 3 (February 1969): 861-879, especially pp. 877-878; Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East*: *Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 286.

[2] Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East*: *Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*, p. 286; Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman empire during the nineteenth century] (İstanbul: Arba, 1989), p. 219; Ussama S. Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 276; Jeremy Salt, "Trouble Wherever They Went: American Missionaries in Anatolia and Ottoman Syria in the Nineteenth Century," *The Muslim World* vol. 92, nos. 3-4 (2002): 287–313; Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations] (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003), pp. 61-62; also see Michael Provence, "Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* vol. 43, no. 2 (May 2011): 205-225, especially p. 208.

[3] Emrah Sahin, "Review Article: Turkish American Relations in Retrospective," *International Journal of Turkish Studies* vol. 12, nos. 1 and 2 (Fall 2006): 195-198, and "Thinking Religion Globally, Acting Missionary Locally: Last Century's American Missionary Experience in the Middle East," *World History Bulletin* vol. 23, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 33-36; Turks had not "appreciated the Americans so much for their considerable benevolence and aid as depreciated them for their ethno-centricism and for what they did not do," in Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East*: *Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*, pp. 294-295; John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), especially pp. 8-9, 96, 98-99; on the Ottoman government attitudes towards missionaries as constantly changing, see see Çağrı Erhan, "Main Trends in Ottoman-American Relations," in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan eds., *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present, and Future* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 3-25; Çağrı Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes towards American Missionaries," *Turkish Yearbook* vol. 30 (2000): 191-212; Ann Marie Wilson, "In the Name of God, Civilization, and Humanity: The United States and the Armenian Massacres of the 1890s," *Le*

bureaucrats in 'missionary' debates have created somewhat distorted and ahistorical interpretations in the literature. Indeed, both the statecraft and the bureaucrats present valuable analytical tools that help to examine imperial authorities, local agents and communities, missionaries, and their inter-connected history. This study analyzes these issues and historicizes the imperial bureaucrat by reconstructing him as a sophisticated and powerful player in the *fin-de-siècle* context. In particular, it examines imperial statecraft and the central government's responses to missionary expansion between the 1880s and the 1910s.

"During the nineteenth century," states Donald Quataert, "the central Ottoman state structure became more powerful, more rational, more specialized and more capable of imposing its will." This dissertation notes the following nuance: reinforcing the power of *fin-de-siècle* imperial statecraft was the idea of the bureaucrats in the capital. The functioning of the statecraft involved the rationality and capacity of local agents. In handling missionary activity, bureaucratic centralization efforts also depended on the will of missionaries, communities, and provincial authorities. In addition, foreign intervention, long-lasting wars, a stagnant economy, civil disorder, and ethno-communal conflicts had caused "exceptional" unrest.[4] In this period, imperial bureaucrats saw local struggles between Ottoman subjects and missionaries escalate. Further, such

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mouvement social vol. 227, no. 1 (2009): 27-44; Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations], pp. 59-79, 172-173; also see the dissertation's chapter, "Strangers in the Land: Ottoman Central Government Reacts to Local Pressure," footnotes 1 and 2.

[4] Donald Quataert, "Islahatlar Devri, 1812-1914 [the Age of Reforms]," in Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert eds., *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarihi* [Economic and social history of the Ottoman Empire] (İstanbul: Eren, 2004), II: 887.

incidents were occurring on many different fronts and for varying reasons. They required informed and specific responses.

In tracing the central government's responses, it is worth pausing to examine the desires of opposing parties. The struggle between locals and missionaries may appear to concern little more than the nuances of the Ottoman socio-religious order and of missionary penetration into the intimacy of communal life, but the stakes were higher. In Ottoman provinces such as Kayseri and Mamuratülaziz, cultural norms, religion, and xenophobia—especially against missionaries attempting to civilize, convert, and get involved in local affairs—undergirded all structures of communal life. Therefore, an increasing proportion of the local populace turned to the central government as their traditional, powerful source of support. Ironically, many missionaries also sought the government's help to continue their activities, and for its protection from local pressures. As far as the opposing parties were concerned, all roads led to İstanbul.

This dissertation does not suggest that the Ottoman bureaucracy operated as a neutral arbiter between local society and missionaries. Rather, it argues that imperial bureaucrats were less reactionary than local Ottomans and more interested in long-term solutions. Therefore, they worked to control local missionary expansion especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by not allowing existing institutions to expand and by opening state institutions to counter these institutions. Often, however, the government in the capital attempted to resolve matters based on detailed evaluations of specific cases through investigations, reports, and petition letters. It was essentially this

process of evaluation that provided the central government with sophisticated positions on missionary issues and resulted in issuance of unilateral orders. As the dissertation demonstrates, contextual changes affected the details of specific cases and so influenced substance of the orders transmitted from the capital to provinces.

Based on pragmatism and the adaptability of imperial authorities to changes in local context, the dissertation suggests reconsidering the periodization of the history of missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. Existing literature tends to divide missionary history into periods relating to U.S. foreign relations, Ottoman political development, and in some cases, into three stages of "preparation," "settlement," and "harvest."[5] But from the capital's perspective it is better to divide missionary history into two stages. First, the two decades until the 1880s marked a period when peaceful coexistence was a prospect: missionary expansion was slow and local incidents were rare and usually minor. Hence, bureaucrats allowed provincial authorities to handle specific missionary issues within their jurisdictions. When incidents occurred, missionaries applied to the central government for redress and protection; the

[5] John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939*, pp. 8-13; Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East*: *Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*, xi-xii; Çağrı Erhan, "Main Trends in Ottoman-American Relations," pp. 3-25; Hasan Tahsin Fendoğlu, *Modernleşme Bağlamında Osmanlı-Amerika İlişkileri* [Ottoman-American relations in modern context] (İstanbul: Beyan, 2002), pp. 208-469; the mentioned stages in Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Kendi Belgeleriyle Anadolu'daki Amerika: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki American Misyoner Okulları* [America in Anatolia based on their own sources: American missionary schools in the Ottoman empire during the nineteenth century], pp. 29, 71, 119; missionary history divided into "The First Period: Getting Acquainted" (1820-1839), "The Second-Period: Advancement" (1839-1876), "The Third-Period: Dire Straits" (1876-1908), in Betül Başaran, *Reinterpreting American Missionary Presence in the Ottoman Empire: American Schools and Evolution of Ottoman Educational Policies, 1870-1908* (M.A. Bilkent University, 1997).

government was attentive to the allegations of both sides and deliberated patiently.

From the 1880s onward, the rise of local unrest and the growth of missionary activity caused significant changes. Imperial bureaucrats pursued new policies to provide standardized responses to missionary expansion, which in turn paved the way for diminished tolerance and heightened vigilance, as well as greater reliance on the reports and work of provincial-level agents. In line with their efforts of centralization, and in response to overwhelming local problems, the bureaucrats began assuming a more active leadership role. Up until the 1910s, their leadership reacted to local pressures and new circumstances by adopting five main tactics: promulgating orders to 'regulate' and 'contain' missionaries' institutions; extending the touch of imperial authority to every stage of missionary publishing and distribution; restructuring local agents through staff-changes and by assigning them new duties; redefining missionary issues as domestic affairs and eliminating third-party interference in these issues; and punishing persons—Ottomans and missionaries alike—who disrupted public security and violated imperial laws. A principal contention of the dissertation is that through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these tactics were extensively applied in a myriad of specific cases with varying levels of success.

Unlike existing literature, this dissertation does not essentially focus on the achievements of missionaries. Instead, it examines historical processes involving the ways in which bureaucrats were informed of missionary

activities, interacted with missionaries and locals, and responded to specific issues of missionary expansion in the Ottoman domain

The missionary journey across Ottoman time and space contains much more than was presented in this study. Other narratives, which await scholarly attention in the archives, might support or refute some of the dissertation's contentions. Nonetheless, they will serve the very purpose of this study: to provide a more nuanced analysis of missionary expansion, reveal similarities and discontinuities in specific issues relating to this expansion, and underscore the centrality of the imperial bureaucrats in the capital, all of which hold remarkable relevance to continuing debates over missionary activity in Turkey today.

Appendices

Ottoman provinces *c.* 1900 [source: Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, xvi].



Mission stations and colleges [source: Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy*, 17].



The Yıldız Palace in the 1880s [source: USZ62-81027, Library of Congress].



The Council of State *c. 1890* [source: USZ62-82357, Library of Congress].



Gate of the Topkapı Palace [source: USZ62-80999, Library of Congress].



The Topkapı Council Chamber [source: USZ62-81419, Library of Congress].

Robert College in the 1880s [source: USZ62-80996, Library of Congress].



Beyoğlu, İstanbul, *c.* 1890 [source: USZ62-81654, Library of Congress].

Missionary Publications [source: Kırşehirlioğlu, *Türkiye'de Misyoner Faaliyetleri*].

Printing types from the Bible House [source: Kırşehirlioğlu, *Türkiye'de Misyoner Faaliyetleri*].

TURKISH, NOGAI S. Russia

زيرا الله دنيايي شويله سوديكه كندو بر بجه اوغلين ويردي تا كه
هر كيم اكا اينانورسه هلاك اولميا اما ابدي ديرلكي اولا ◆ 1825

TURKISH, OSMANLI Turkey, &c.
Arabic char.

زيرا الله دنيايى بو قدر سودى كه كندى ابن وحيدينى و
يردى تا كه اكا هر ايمان ايدن هلاك اولميوب آنجق ابدى حياته
مالك اوله ◆ 1905

TURKISH, OSMANLI
Armenian char.

Զիրա Ալլահ տիւնեայը պու գատար սէվտի քի քէնտի Իպնի ի վահիտինի վէրտի. Թա քի անա հէր իման էտէն հէլաք օլմայըպ՝ անճագ էպէտի հայաթա մալիք օլա. 1904

TURKISH, OSMANLI
Greek char.

Ζίρα Ἀλλὰχ τὀυνγιαγιῆ πού κατὰρ σεβτὶ, κὶ κεντὶ Ἴπνι βαχιτινὶ βερτὶ, τά κι ἀνὰ χὲρ ἰμὰν ἐτὲν χελάκ ὀλμαγιηπ, ἄντζακ ἐπετὶ χαγιατὰ μαλὶκ ὀλά. 1909

TURKISH, OSMANLI
Roman char.

Zira Allah dünyayı öyle sevdi ki, biricik Oğlunu verdi; ta ki, ona iman eden her adam helâk olmasın, ancak ebedî hayatı olsun. 1943

Customs House, İstanbul, 1880-1893 [source: USZ62-80981, Library of Congress].



Ellen M. Stone [source: promacedonia.org/bugarash/stone/st1big.jpg].

Stone Captured [source: snimka.bg/album.php?album_id=193979&pid=4538019].



Police Station in the Vefa Square [source: USZ62-82589, Library of Congress].



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Houghton Library, Cambridge

Islamic Studies Library, McGill University, Montréal, Québec

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. [online]

National Library of Turkey, Ankara

Ottoman Archives Division of the Prime Minister's Office in İstanbul, Turkey

Widener Library, Cambridge

II. Ottoman Records

A Dvn: *Dîvân-ı Hümâyûn Kalemi*, the Sublime Porte secretary

Amerika Nişan Defteri 1/1, the Ottoman imperial registry relating to the United States of America

A Mkt Mhm: *Amedî Mektubî Mühimme*, incoming correspondence urgent

A Mkt Mvl: *Amedî Mektubî Meclis-i Vâlâ*, incoming correspondence the High Council

A Mkt Nzd: *Amedî Mektubî Nezâret Devâir*, incoming correspondence ministerial offices

A Mkt Um: *Amedî Mektubî Umum Vilâyât*, incoming correspondence provinces general

Dh Eum Ayş: *Dâhiliye Emniyet-i Umûmiye Asayiş*, internal affairs police public security

Dh Eum Emn: *Dâhiliye Emniyet-i Umûmiye Emniyet*, internal affairs police safety

Dh Eum Mkt: *Dâhiliye Emniyet-i Umûmiye Mektubî*, internal affairs police correspondence

Dh Eum: *Dâhiliye Emniyet-i Umûmiye*, internal affairs general security

Dh İd: *Dâhiliye İdâre*, internal affairs administrative

Dh Kms: *Dâhiliye Kalem-i Mahsûs*, internal affairs special secretary

Dh Mb Hps: *Dâhiliye Mebâni-i Emîriye ve Hapishaneler*, internal affairs state foundations and prisons

Dh Mkt: *Dâhiliye Mektubî*, internal affairs incoming

Dh Mui: *Dâhiliye Muhâberât-ı Umûmiye İdaresi*, internal affairs general communication bureau

Dh Um Mvm: *Dâhiliye Umûmiye Meclis-i Vukelâ Mazbataları*, internal affairs general the minutes of the assembly of ministers

Hr Mkt: *Hâriciye Mektubî*, foreign affairs correspondence

Hr Sys: *Hâriciye Siyâsî*, foreign affairs diplomatic

İ Dh: *İrâde Dâhiliye*, sultanic decrees internal affairs

İ Duit: *İrâde Dâhiliye İdâre-i Umûmiye Tasnifi*, sultanic decrees administration general collection

İ Hr: *İrâde Hâriciye*, sultanic decrees foreign affairs

İ Hus: *İrâde Husûsiye*, sultanic decrees special

İ Mf: *İrâde Mütefferik*, sultanic decrees miscellaneous

İ Mms: *İrâde Meclis-i Mahsûs*, sultanic decrees special assembly

Y Ee: *Yıldız Esas Evrâkı*, Yıldız Palace essential papers

Ya Hus: *Yıldız Husûsî*, Yıldız Palace special

Y Mrz D: *Yıldız Mâruzât Defteri*, Yıldız Palace registry of petitions

Y Mtv: *Yıldız Mütenevvi Mâruzât*, Yıldız Palace various petitions

Y Prk Ask: *Yıldız Perâkende Askerî*, Yıldız Palace communication military

Y Prk Bşk: *Yıldız Perâkende Başkitâbet*, Yıldız Palace communication the chief secretary

Y Prk Dh: *Yıldız Perâkende Dâhiliye*, Yıldız Palace communication internal affairs

Y Prk Eşa: *Yıldız Perâkende Elçilik, Şehbenderlik ve Ateşemiliterlik*, Yıldız Palace communication embassy, consul, military attaché

Y Prk Hr: *Yıldız Perâkende Hariciye*, Yıldız Palace communication foreign affairs

Y Prk Mf: *Yıldız Perâkende Müteferrik*, Yıldız Palace communication miscellaneous

Y Prk Mhm: *Yıldız Perâkende Mühimme*, Yıldız Palace communication urgent affairs

Y Prk Mk: *Yıldız Perâkende Müfettişlikler ve Komiserlikler Tahrirâtı*, Yıldız Palace communication papers of inspectors and police-superintendents

Y Prk Mm: *Yıldız Perâkende Mütenevvî Mâruzât*, Yıldız Palace communication various petitions

Y Prk Myd: *Yıldız Perâkende Yâverân ve Mâiyyet-i Seniyye Erkân-ı Harbiye Dâiresi*, Yıldız Palace communication office of aides-de-camp, holy attendants and general staff [military]

Y Prk Tkm: *Yıldız Perâkende Tahrirât-ı Ecnebiyye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği*, Yıldız Palace communication translation office of foreign papers and the palace

Y Prk Tşf: *Yıldız Perâkende Teşrifât-ı Umûmiye Dâiresi*, Yıldız Palace communication office of protocol general

Y Prk Um: *Yıldız Perâkende Umûmî*, Yıldız Palace communication general

Y Prk Zb: *Yıldız Perâkende Zabtiye*, Yıldız Palace communication public security [police]

Ya Hus: *Yıldız Husûsî Mâruzât*, Yıldız Palace special petitions

Ya Res: *Yıldız Resmî Mâruzât*, Yıldız Palace official petitions

Zb: *Zabtiye*, Public Security [police]

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